Towards a new concept of multi-level

governance? Remarks by Dr. Thomas

Conzelmann, University of Maastricht MLG Atelier,

10 September 2008

(Revised version: 25 September 2008)

1. Contexts of the debate

The debate on multi-level governance (MLG) relates to a number of

developments within the European Union (and other international
organisations). Concerning the EU, the concept had first been
discussed in relation to two developments: first, the increasing
activity of subnational actors in Brussels (as demonstrated by the
opening of subnational ‘embassies’ in Brussels and the erection of
the Committee of the Regions in 1992/1994), and second, their
greater role in EU policy-making and implementation, as shown most
clearly by the 1988 reform of the structural funds. In addition, an
increasing number of direct contacts between the subnational
authorities and the Commission were observed. All of these
developments seemed to indicate that subnational government
was becoming more prominent in the decision-making and
implementation processes of EU politics. Against this background,
Gary Marks initially characterized MLG as the result of a “centrifugal
process in which decision-making is spun away from member states
in two directions”, namely to the subnational as well as the
supranational levels (Marks 1993: 401-402). In the wake of this, the
much older debates on regional mobilisation and constitutional
transformation of the nation state (Keating 2008 gives an overview)
were also increasingly discussed in the MLG context. Multi-level
governance thus was interpreted as an outcome of the
simultaneous processes of European integration and regionalisation,
both of which led to a diffusion of powers away from the nation state
(Hooghe 1996).

In its more recent versions, the MLG discourse has begun to address
more generally the diffusion of political authority into a less
hierarchical and more network-like
structure of EU policy-making; often portrayed as ‘new modes of
governance’ (NMG).

1
The use of ‘soft’ (i.e. non-binding) forms of regulation, and the
emergence of public- private governance arrangements are
highlighted in this discussion. Empirical reference points are –
among others – the Open Method of Coordination, voluntary accords
and the ‘new approach directives’, as well as delegation to
regulatory networks and agencies (see Héritier 2002; Sabel/Zeitlin
2007; Koutalakis 2008). These instruments are characterised by
subsidiarity (i.e. delegation to lower levels or to private actors) and
the inclusion of actors not on the basis of formal competence, but on
the basis of the resources these actors can bring into play. The
emergence of these different forms of “multi-level and polycentric
governance” (Schmitter 2003: 72) is discussed as a product of
gradual and incremental institutional formation at EU level and as an
attempt to inject a dose of flexibility into an otherwise cumbersome
policy process.

2. ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ multi-

level governance

Reflecting on these different contexts within which the MLG concept is

discussed, Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe (2003; 2004) have
proposed to distinguish different ‘types’ of multi-level governance.
The more traditional ‘Type 1’1 form of MLG builds upon
‘general-purpose’ jurisdictions (governments) at different
levels, and is mostly interested in the interaction between these
levels and the sharing of competences between them. Type 1 MLG
thus is attached to a state-centric concept of politics. Consequently,
federalism is described as the “intellectual foundation” for Type 1
MLG by Marks and Hooghe (2003: 236). One institutional blueprint
that takes up this notion of MLG is the ‘Europe of the Regions’
concept that was debated broadly in the 1990s (Conzelmann 1996)
– even though, one may add, the ideas proposed by many
supporters of the Europe of the Regions concept tended to be more
radical than the kind of “Russian doll set of nested jurisdictions” that
Marks and Hooghe have in mind
(2003: 236). A less sweeping version of Type 1 MLG in the EU
context would foresee

1 Marks and Hooghe term them Type I and Type II. For ease of reading, this
note sticks to Arabic numbers.

2
regional and local public actors cooperating with the higher levels in a
variety of policy areas and public services broadly conceived.
Regional and local government would act as a third territorial layer
in EU policy-making. Where this level is lacking, efforts should be
made to erect the necessary bodies in order to safeguard the
effective application of EU laws and to organize input from civil
society. The principle of subsidiarity as expressed in the EU
treaties forms the normative backbone of this approach.

Type 2 multi-level governance as identified by Hooghe and Marks is

characterised by task-specific (instead of general purpose)
jurisdictions, intersecting memberships and a flexible design that is
responsive to temporary need (2003: 237-239). As explained by the
authors (2004: 29), “Type II multi-level governance (…) consists of
special-purpose jurisdictions that tailor membership, rules of
operation, and functions to a particular policy problem”. The basic
idea is that “all significant costs and benefits are internalized
within the jurisdiction” (2003: 240), which in turn leads to the idea
that such jurisdictions may very well span several (territorially or
otherwise defined) levels. Applied to the EU, the
concept would foresee that decision-making
and implementation networks take over tasks which are only
rather loosely defined in EU secondary legislation. The partnership
arrangements in the implementation of the structural funds could
be seen as one prime example, as well as the often highly
complex networks emerging around the different variants of the
Open Method of Coordination. Regarding the normative principles
which underpin this “Type 2” notion of multi-level governance, one
could point to policy effectiveness and the minimization of negative
externalities (even though the jury is still out here), but also to a
‘post- parliamentarian’ conception of democratic legitimacy: While
the use of soft law decreases the demands on democratic
legitimacy, benchmarking, transparency and direct civil society input
could keep MLG arrangements accountable and in line with the
preferences of citizens. In addition, the more ‘hands on’ approach
of many new instruments in EU governance can also increase the
participatory quality of EU policy- making (cf. Gbikpi/Grote 2002;
Borrás/Conzelmann 2007; for a sceptical view see
Papadopoulos
2008).

3
3. Type 2 MLG as a
favoured concept

It is unclear whether “Type 1” or “Type 2” should be the

starting point for the Committee of the Region’s discussion on
multi-level governance. From an analytic point of view, a key
question is what kind of questions the different approaches would
lead us to ask, and what sort of comparisons they allow. Here, the
Type 1 concept implies that the EU can and should be compared to
other federal systems. Regions would be seen as another
constitutional or quasi-constitutional layer in multi-level governance,
and the question would arise how competences are best
distributed across the different territorial layers. In contrast, the Type
2 approach would see multi- level governance in the EU as related
to the wider problems of governance at the domestic and the
global levels (cf. Jørgensen/Rosamond 2001). It would allow to
compare decision-making and implementation networks across
different policy fields (e.g. in regional, environment, culture,
tourism, and urban policy) or to compare governance in the EU
with task specific governance arrangements at the global or
subnational levels. The transfer of experiences and the
comparative analysis of governance in different institutional settings
would be facilitated by such an approach.

Both approaches are not without their problems. When applied to

the EU, it seems that the Type 1 approach has difficulty in grasping
many elements of EU governance. For example, regional and local
structures vary widely across Europe, and there is no agreement
concerning the role that the regional or local levels can and should
play in the various member states. Another problem relates to
the difficulties of neatly delineating tasks across layers – witness
the long and winding road to agreement over this issue in the
Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties.

Should we therefore focus on the Type 2 approach when

thinking about “a new concept of multi-level governance” in the
EU context? Concerning the descriptive2 accuracy of the Type 2
variant in the EU context, the answer would be yes, especially if
we move beyond the confines of structural policy and look at other
policy fields such

2 As noted correctly by a number of writers present at this first MLG

atelier, the multi-level governance concept is stronger as a descriptive tool,
but up to now lacks explanatory punch.

4
as the environment with a less clear-cut role for regions
and municipalities (Conzelmann 2008; Knill/Tosun 2008). But even
the paradigmatic approach of the EU’s structural policy – as noted
above, the area where MLG as a concept was first developed
and tested – is much more compatible with Type 2 multi-level
governance.

Let me briefly explain this last point: In retrospect, it seems

that the original excitement both of academics and of regional
policy elites about the empowerment of subnational actors and the
possible emergence of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ was to a large
degree due to the state-centric analytical lenses that observers
used when looking at the role of the subnational level in the EU.
These ‘Type 1’ lenses precluded an interpretation of the new
implementation structures of the structural funds as part of a larger
phenomenon of governance in the Union. In fact, federalism was
never something the Commission had in mind when pushing for the
inclusion of regional actors in the implementation of the structural
funds. Rather, regional, local (and other sub-national) actors were
seen by the Commission as crucial partners in producing more
meaningful regional development plans than those drawn up by
remote member state bureaucracies and in diffusing new ideas
about regional development that contrasted from the more
traditional focus on infrastructure and investments (cf. Keating
2008: 72). But regional actors remain constrained to that task-
specific and basically temporary function and in principle act on
a par with the other “social partners” that were mentioned in the
implementation regulations for the structural funds from 1993
onwards. In addition, the geographical and functional delimitations of
networks set up for structural funds purposes clearly vary over time
and often do not coincide with the administrative borders of regions
and municipalities as defined in the (quasi-) constitutional
arrangements of member states. Even though regional
governments or decentralised executives often do play an
important role in the implementation networks of the structural
funds, these networks do not pretend to represent a certain
‘region’ (rather, they represent an intervention area of the
structural funds), and are also not intended to contribute to the
emergence of more

5
 3
formalised regional structures. In summary, therefore, the Type 2
conception of MLG seems to be better aligned to current EU
policy-making – which is an important argument to favour this
conception over the more traditional Type 1 outlook on MLG.

4. The territorial
aspect

An open question in Type 2 MLG is the significance of the territorial

aspect, and by implication the role that regions and localities are to
play in a governance structure thus conceived. Marks and Hooghe
inform us that “the constituencies of Type II jurisdictions are
individuals who share some geographical or functional space and who
have a common need for decision-making” (2004: 240). This implies
that geographical interdependence (in the sense of belonging to
the same municipality, region or otherwise defined territory)
possesses the same status as functional interdependence, and that
the ‘multi-level’ concept can relate to any situation of distinct actors
with joint problems. Yet, the problem with this idea is that
governance by definition is concerned with solving shared problems.
It is understood, for example, as “all those interactive arrangements
in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving
societal problems or creating social opportunities” (Kooiman 2002:
73). In that sense, governance is by definition concerned with
“functional spaces” within which common problems exist. If this is
true, however, it becomes unclear what additional analytical
distinction is introduced by the ‘multi-level’ concept. One answer
could be that ‘levels’ do not relate to territory, but to some other
sort of actor qualities apart from a shared geographical location, e.g.
being a ‘business’ or ‘civil society’ actor.4 Yet, such different actor
qualities are already included in the mainstream definition of
governance (as opposed to government). Furthermore, if
individuals can make up

3 Even in the UK, where the implementation of the reformed structural funds
coincided with (and sometimes seems to have triggered) the emergence of a
certain degree of regional identification, and – after the advent of the Blair
 Government – the creation of regional development agencies, both the
importance of the EU’s structural funds and the long term institutional
implications of that development should not be overstated (Conzelmann 2006;
Bache/Conzelmann 2008).
4 Cf. the discussion on whether or not it makes sense to keep ‘multi-level’ and
‘multi-actor’ concepts apart, which is touched upon in the note “Questions and
quotes on the (new) concept of MLG" prepared for the present atelier, p. 2.

6
‘levels’, there is a clear tendency that “any complex organisation
can be described as an example of MLG” (Keating 2008: 76). In
summary, then, the concept of “multi-level” governance is in clear
danger of either becoming tautological (“functional spaces”, “multi-
actor networks”) or of replacing more suitable terms (such as
“organization”) if the concept of levels remains underspecified. In my
view, therefore, if MLG is meant to denote something different than
the more general term “governance”, then one has to insist on the
significance of territory for the multi-level concept.5

Yet, this does not imply a return to Type 1 multi-level governance.

While Type 1 MLG refers to nested administrative entities, in Type 2
MLG the notion of “levels” may refer to a variety of territorially
defined arrangements of cooperation, and not just those territorial
layers that are foreseen in the (quasi-) constitutional and
administrative structures of member states. Multi-level governance
could then be defined as

“an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a

multiplicity of politically independent but otherwise interdependent
actors – private and public – at different levels of territorial
aggregation in more or less continuous negotiation/deliberation/
implementation, but does not assign exclusive policy competence to
any of these levels or assert a stable hierarchy of political authority”
(Schmitter 2003: 72, my emphasis).
The concept of region (or more generally of “territorial level of
aggregation”) would then refer to any territorial arena within which
interaction among a variety of actors can take place, and in
which the experience of territorial interdependence and
geographical proximity provide important motivating factors for
working together and for engaging with the outside world (such as
networks that have formed at other territorial levels). One could
push this point even further in accordance with the discussion
on Type 2 MLG as developed above: The concept of “region”
(and by implication, of “locality”) is not necessarily tied to any
sort of constitutional or administrative structure, but is rather a
socially constructed concept: A region emerges where actors are
coming together on the basis of geographic proximity and a shared
problem or opportunity (such as accessing structural funds).
Geographic proximity is
important because it conjures up feelings of interdependence,
belonging, trust, and

5 Also compare the manifold examples that Marks and Hooghe give of real world
Type 2 MLG. In the majority of cases, these are related to organizations with
some territorial basis.

7
solidarity and thus can facilitate the interaction within networks. In
more abstract terms, a concept of MLG thus conceived would be
interested in the relation between geographical space and the
institutionalization of decision-making and implementation capacity;
with the former (geographical space) acting as a catalyst for the
latter (the process of institutionalization; cf. Fürst 1993).

A crucial question in this conception is what kind of benefits

territorial proximity has for the organization of interaction within a
regional arena. The ‘new regionalism’ debate (Amin/Thrift 1994;
Cooke/Morgan 1998; Crouch et al. 2001) offers a number of
interesting answers here. Moreover, one would want to know under
what conditions functional networks bound to territory can influence
decision-making in multi-level systems or can take over specific
tasks of relevance to the higher levels (such as implementation).
One important hypothesis is that administrative or constitutional
regions are at a certain advantage in organizing such
processes of territorial cooperation, but that they have no monopoly
on doing so. Empirical cases to research such issues in the EU
context6 could be the intervention areas of the EU structural funds,
or implementation networks in EU environmental policy.

5. The discussion on multi-level governance in the

2001 White Paper

The concept proposed above also seems plausible in the light of the
approach taken in the White Paper on European Governance
(European Commission 2001), which is still one of the prime
reference points in the discussion of governance in the EU. As is the
case in the structural funds model, the White Paper sees public
regional and local actors in principle on a par with other social
partners. It is argued, for example, that “a stronger interaction with
regional and local governments and civil society” is needed, and
that the Commission intends to “establish a more systematic
dialogue with representatives of regional and local governments
through national and European
6 This concept would also still enable comparisons to be drawn between multi-
level governance in the EU and global governance. For example, it can be
observed in the area of climate protection policies that regions and cities are
acting as implementing actors of local ‘Agenda 21’ concepts, thus resembling
some of the processes that we see in EU environmental policy.

8
associations” (ibid.: p. 4, my emphasis). Concerning the
dissemination of information about EU policies (discussed under the
headword ‘openness’), the White Paper states that the Commission
and other EU bodies will “promote efforts to deliver information at
national and local level, where possible making use of
networks, grassroots organisations and national, regional and local
authorities” (p. 11).

While all this in principle relegates regional and local authorities to

the role of ‘yet another’ societal group with the capacity to
influence EU policy-making, there are some indications in the White
Paper on how regions and localities are still special actors. For
example, the Commission explicitly tags regions and cities as “an
elected and representative channel interacting with the public on EU
policy“ (p. 12). The White Paper also acknowledges the role
that subnational government plays in the implementation of a
number of key policies, calls for “a systematic dialogue with
European and national associations of regional and local
government“ and proposes “target-based, tripartite contracts (…)
between Member States, regions and localities designated by them
for that purpose, and the Commission”, where “the designated sub-
national authority in the Member States undertakes to
implement identified actions in order to realise particular objectives
defined in ‘primary’ legislation” (p. 13).

Judging from these proposals in the White Paper, the Commission

wants to mainly use regional and local actors as intermediary
institutions on a par with other actors who bolster up
implementation and who organise and bundle civil society
input. Constitutional status, administrative capacity and the
presence of representative institutions (like parliaments) are an
asset in that they foster the capacity of regions and localities to
organize societal input and to implement policies – and to do both in a
democratically legitimate and transparent manner. Still, this capacity
is not seen by the Commission as being restricted to the regional or
local level. It is rather a capacity that is currently more developed
there, but which in the medium run could very well be
paralleled on other levels of societal
organization.7

7 Cf. the portions of the White Paper dealing with the role of civil society and of
“networks”. As with regions and localities, civil society need to observe
standards of “accountability and openness” (p.
15), and is considered an important partner in implementation. Again, the
White Paper envisages

9
6. Summary and
recommendations

Given that the task of the Ateliers on Multi-level Governance is to

develop concrete proposals for action on the basis of the MLG
concept, it seems appropriate to first arrive at a clear understanding
of what MLG is and implies. This note has opted for the adoption of a
Type 2 conception of MLG as proposed by Marks and Hooghe, but
modified their ideas by insisting on the crucial role of territory
for a viable MLG concept. It was argued that while there is
definitely room for geographically defined spaces in the debate on
EU governance, the White Paper and the structural funds model
imply that constitutional status or the democratic quality of regional
and local government will not work as door-openers in all (or even the
majority of) cases, and on top of that are nothing that is peculiar to
regions and cities. In practice, however, regional and local
government can and should exploit their – at least for the time being
– still unrivalled status. Administrative capacity, unmatched
democratic legitimacy
(where there is a directly elected parliament) and their capacity to
credibly represent a given region or locality entitle them to become
natural focal points of any sort of political activity at the subnational
or transnational level. It will at least be difficult to argue for the
exclusion of these actors from decision-making and
implementation networks at the subnational level.

In practical terms, this would mean that the CoR and more generally
regions and cities within the EU should not just insist on special
status because of constitutional guarantees, but should rather
exploit the opportunities to become crystallization points for
subnational networks that the Union badly needs in devising
and implementing policies. This agenda would focus on the
exchange of experiences
between stronger and weaker players within the Committee of
Regions and would

“partnership arrangements” with civil society, where the Commission commits

to “additional consultations” in exchange for a pledge by civil society
organizations “to tighten up their internal structures, furnish guarantees of
openness and representativity, and prove their capacity to relay information or
lead debates in the Member States” (p. 17). Concerning networks, which
“link businesses, communities, research centres, and regional and local
authorities”, it is once more argued that they could act as “multipliers
spreading awareness of the EU and showing policies in action”, and that “by
making them more open and structuring better their relation with the
Institutions, networks could make a more effective contribution to EU policies”
(p. 18).

10
emphasise the Committee’s role as a learning platform which has
been emerging in recent years.8 Such a shift of emphasis would of
course not rule out the continuation of the opinion-giving function of
the CoR, and should also be acceptable to stronger regions who
anyway tend to defend their specific interests outside of the CoR,
e.g. through subnational ‘embassies’ and a number of interest
associations such as the Conference of European Regions with
Legislative Power (REGLEG).

In addition, the CoR should continue to address the externalities of

multi-level policy- making that are not taken sufficient note of in the
current EU governance structure. The consideration of such
externalities is in fact one of the prime normative principles that can
be derived from a MLG perspective (cf. Marks / Hooghe 2004: 239-
241). One starting point in this respect is the protocol “on the
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”
attached to the Lisbon Treaty. It specifies that regional and local
actors (among others) are to be consulted before legislative acts are
proposed by the Commission (Art. 2 of the Protocol). In
addition, there is acknowledgement that “draft legislative acts
shall take account of the need for any burden, whether financial
or administrative, falling upon the Union, national
governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and
citizens, to be minimised and commensurate with the objective
to be achieved” (Art. 5). The consistent application of these
stipulations could well form a building block for enhanced and
truly ‘multi-level’ governance at the EU level and might alleviate
many of the burdens that regional and local entities (however
defined) currently experience in EU policy-making.

Address for
correspondence
Dr. Thomas Conzelmann, Universiteit
Maastricht Postbus 616, 6200 MD
Maastricht, The Netherlands Tel. +31
(0)43 38-82066; Fax -84917
E-Mail :
t.conzelmann@politics.unimaas.nl
WWW:
http://www.fdcw.unimaas.nl/staff/conzelman
n

8 For example through the CoR Subsidiarity Monitoring Network, the

Open Days and the
Interinstitutional Forums.

11
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