Case: 1:20-cr-00042-SJD Doc #: 37 Filed: 10/16/20 Page: 1 of 12 PAGEID #: 167

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-42
Plaintiff,
JUDGE DLOTT
vs.
GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING
TAMAYA DENNARD, MEMORANDUM

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 10, 2020, Defendant Tamaya Dennard will stand before the Court for

sentencing having defrauded the public by participating in a bribery scheme. Her conduct

was brazen. Dennard contacted someone she knew had imminent business before the City.

She then solicited money in exchange for her vote on City Council relating to that business.

Although she claimed she was in financial distress, Dennard spent the proceeds on a lavish

vacation shortly after receiving the bribe payments.

Courts have repeatedly recognized bribery as a serious crime—one that demoralizes

the public and undermines confidence in the integrity of our democracy. Here, Dennard’s

flagrant conduct not only defrauded the public of its right to honest services, but undermine d

faith in government and reaffirmed existing doubt about whether elected officials act in the

public’s best interest. Because of the societal damage caused by public corruption, the goal

of promoting general deterrence weighs heavily at sentencing.

A criminal complaint issued against Dennard on February 24, 2020. After a federal grand

jury indicted her for crimes related to the bribery scheme, she pled guilty to Honest Services Wire

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Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346. Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A), the parties have

agreed to certain guideline provisions, which result in a final offense level of 17. As set forth

below, the United States submits that a sentence within the guideline range is appropriate.

II. THE COURT’S TASK AT SENTENCING

After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the

Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, and judges must impose sentences in accordance with 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), which describes the factors to be considered. A district court must use the

Guidelines to calculate a defendant’s sentencing range and consider the range when devising a

sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007).

After calculating the advisory Guidelines range, the Court must consider that range along

with all the factors listed in § 3553(a) before arriving at the sentence. These factors include:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed--
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) . . . the sentencing range established . . . [by the Guidelines];
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing Commission . . .
that . . . is in effect on the day of sentencing[;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In August 2019, Dennard solicited payments from an individual (the “CHS”) knowing the

individual was involved in a development project on the downtown Cincinnati riverbank, the

“Banks,” which required official action by City Council prior to development. (DE 24 at 6 (Plea

Agreement); PSR ¶ 24.) Specifically, the Banks project involved a land swap deal involving the

City that required approval by City Council. (PSR ¶¶ 24–25.)

The CHS was actively soliciting meetings with City Council members, including Dennard,

to discuss specifics and the status of the project. (Id. ¶ 26.) Dennard called the CHS after she

canceled a scheduled meeting with the CHS relating to the project. During the call, Dennard

solicited a $10,000 loan from the CHS to pay for personal expenses; and then, later in the call,

Dennard increased her ask to $15,000 before noting, she “did not know how this works.” (Id.

¶ 27.) After the CHS denied her request for payment through a subsequent text message,

Dennard responded with a text to the CHS, which stated that she was in a “rough spot” and noted

she “has nothing.” (Id.) She later texted the CHS a photograph indicating that she was evicted

from an apartment, and then stated: “If you are willing to meet with me, I’m sure that I will be

able to help you.” (Id. at 28; DE 24 at 6). The CHS then contacted law enforcement and began

recording communications from Dennard at the FBI’s direction.

On September 5, 2019, the CHS met with Dennard. Early in the meeting, Dennard told

the CHS about Dennard’s personal financial troubles, after which Dennard requested $10,000 and

suggested she would repay the money. (PSR ¶ 31.) During the conversation, Dennard stated

that she would support the land swap deal. (Id.) Later that day, Dennard sent a text message to

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the CHS asking “if 15k is doable,” and again suggested that she had created a promissory note

laying out the repayment schedule. (Id. ¶ 32.)

The next day, during a recorded telephone call, Dennard agreed to accept $15,000 in

exchange for her votes on City Council, broken down into two payments—$10,000 for her first

vote for the land swap deal, then another $5,000 after a possible second vote. (Id. ¶ 33.)

Shortly after Dennard received the $10,000 payment, she began reaching out to the CHS

about the second payment. On September 18, 2019, Dennard left a voicemail and sent a text

message stating that she needed the $5,000 immediately because of an emergency. (Id. ¶ 36.) In

a follow-up call, Dennard again agreed that she would vote for the land swap deal in exchange for

the $5,000. (Id. ¶ 37.) After receiving $5,000 cash from the CHS, Dennard immediately booked

two seats on a flight to Florida and deposited $4,600 cash in her bank account. (Id. ¶ 38.) During

her three-day trip to Florida, Dennard spent over $4,000 on accommodations and other trip

expenses. (Id.) Her bank records indicate that she could not have paid for the Florida trip

without the $5,000 in bribe money.

Despite receiving the bribe payments in September 2019, Dennard never again raised the

issue of the promissory note or attempted to repay any money from the CHS as of her arrest on

February 24, 2020.

Rather, Dennard continued to reach out to the CHS for more money in exchange for official

action. See Exhibit A (text exchanges between Dennard and CHS). During a call in November

2018, the CHS told Dennard that a zoning change relating to the Banks project was likely to come

before City Council. (PSR ¶ 39.) Shortly after the call, with that information, Dennard solicited

more money. For example, on November 4, 2019, Dennard texted CHS and said, “Good

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Morning! Are you around today? I could really use your help. It’s kind of urgent to get it today.”

She continued: “Happy to help you. But need yours too.” (Id.) On November 13, 2019,

Dennard contacted CHS and asked for more money, then stated, “As I said, I’m sure there will be

ways to help you as well and I will.” (Id.)

Dennard received a $60,645.75 yearly salary as a Council member. (Id. ¶ 88.)

These facts, set forth in the PSR, are uncontested.

Based on this conduct, the grand jury charged Dennard with three counts of honest services

wire fraud, two counts of bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, and two counts of

attempted extortion under color of official right. (DE 14.) Dennard has pleaded guilty to Count

1 of the Indictment, honest services wire fraud. Pursuant to the agreement, Dennard has agreed

to pay a $15,000 money judgment to the government.

IV. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINE RANGE

The parties agree with the Probation Office’s guideline calculation. In the plea

agreement, the parties calculated the guidelines for Count 1 as follows:

 Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(a)(1), the base offense level is 14 because the Defendant was

a public official at the time of the offense.

 Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2), 2 levels are added.

 Pursuant to Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3), 4 levels are added because the Defendant

was an elected official at the time of the offense.

 The USAO does not oppose a 2 level reduction in offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1 based upon the Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, provided that the

Defendant’s conduct continues to demonstrate compliance with the terms of § 3E1.1. The

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Defendant may be entitled to an additional 1 level decrease pursuant to § 3E1.1(b) in

recognition of the Defendant’s timely notification of her intention to plead guilty.

(DE 24 ¶ 8.) The parties agree that the final offense level is 17. (Id.) This calculation is

consistent with probation’s guideline calculation as set forth in the PSR. (PSR ¶¶ 47–57.)

Dennard is Criminal History Category I, leaving a guideline range of 24 to 30 months

imprisonment. (Id. ¶ 100.) There are no outstanding objections to the PSR.

V. APPLICATION OF THE 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) FACTORS

Application of the § 3553(a) factors support a guideline sentence of imprisonment.

A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense ; History and Characteristics of the

Defendant

Elected officials owe a duty to provide honest services to constituents, and officials violate

that duty by soliciting and accepting bribe payments. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368

(2010). “This country[’s] . . . proper functioning requires elected officials to serve the common

good, not illicit personal gain. Our citizens place faith in the honesty and integrity of elected

officials.” United States v. Morgan, 635 F. App’x 423, 450 (10th Cir. 2015). As one court

explained, corruption by a public official:

demean[s] the integrity and work ethic of the many public servants
in his community who strive each day to improve life and
governance . . . . And [the corrupt official] has damaged the political
morale of his constituency . . . and of all Americans. The deviant
acts of the corrupt public official are of course horrific, “but a
hundred times worse is the demoralization of our people which
results.”

United States v. Sorenson, 233 F. Supp. 3d 690, 700 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 705 F. App’x 481 (8th Cir.

2017) (quoting Justice Louis Brandeis, Speech to the Good Government Association (1903))

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(emphasis added). More pointedly, President Theodore Roosevelt explained to Congress in 1903

the effect of corruption on society: “There can be no crime more serious than bribery. Other

offenses violate one law while corruption strikes at the foundation of all law.” Theodore

Roosevelt, Third Annual Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (Dec. 7, 1903)

(emphasis added).

Roosevelt’s words remain all too relevant today. See, e.g., Sorenson, 233 F. Supp. 3d at

703 (“There’s so much money sloshing around government right now that it’s very difficult to

have confidence that any decision is being made on the merits. That doubt about whether our

public servants are operating in our interests or whether their vote is available for purchase to the

highest bidder is magnified every time we see another politician exposed as corrupt.”) (quoting

United States v. Silver, No. 1:15–cr–00093, Dkt. No. 300 at 58 (S.D.N.Y.)). Sentencing courts

properly consider these effects on democratic governance in determining an appropriate sentence

in corruption cases. See United States v. Fattah, 813 F. App’x 808, 813–14 (3d Cir. 2020)

(district court properly supported sentence in finding defendant’s “flagrant conduct undermines

the confidence of the citizenry in the integrity of all public institutions and public officials. This

cynicism saps the strength of [ ] our democracy.”); Sorenson, 705 F. App’x at 483 (affirming

district court consideration of “los[t] confidence in the integrity of its system of government” when

an official “abuses his position by using it to facilitate the offense”); Morgan, 635 F. App’x at

448–52 (noting the proper consideration at sentencing for bribery offenses of the “harm to the

reputation of honest public servants and the public faith in legitimate state government”); United

States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s application of

§ 3553(a) factors where district court explained, “when someone’s elected to a position of trust as

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an elected official, . . . they just don't have a right to have a bag that they can carry around stuff

they get from people that are involved with them in this process.”); United States v. Anderson, 517

F.3d 953, 966–67 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming sentence where the district court “stressed the

corrosive effect that corruption has on the public trust and expressed his belief that the scandals

will not end unless they are treated ‘appropriately hard.’”); United States v. Ganim, 256 F. App’x

399, 402–03 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding sentence reasonable because the “elected municipal official .

. . criminally and shamelessly flouts his lawful authority and the public trust”).

Here, Dennard sold her votes relating to a large-scale development project for $15,000.

She intentionally targeted the CHS for bribes, knowing the CHS had significant issues pending

before the City and needed council members’ votes to further the project. After receiving the

$15,000 in bribe payments, she never again referenced a “promissory note” or loan in the five

months from her receipt of the bribes until her arrest—rather, after returning from her Florida

vacation, she solicited more money from the CHS in exchange for help before Council. Indeed,

she contacted the CHS not once or twice, but repeatedly over the course of several months

demonstrating that her conduct was not the result of a mistake or single transgression, but rather a

calculated plan. See Exhibit A.

Ultimately, Dennard chose to enrich herself at the public’s expense. In doing so, Dennard

violated the public’s trust in her but also undermined democratic values and institutions by

furthering the all-too-familiar impression that elected officeholders use their positions to benefit

themselves rather than further the public’s interests. Fattah, 813 F. App’x at 813–14. Worse,

Dennard solicited the bribe money claiming she needed $15,000 for a personal emergency; she

appealed to the CHS’s sympathies and presented her personal and financial situation as dire. But

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after receiving $5,000 cash, Dennard booked a trip to Florida and blew most of the bribe proceeds

on a lavish vacation. The nature and circumstances of the offense support a guideline sentence.

As for the history and characteristics of the Defendant, the Court faces a challenging task.

On one hand, the PSR sets forth a number of challenges Dennard faced throughout her life, which

the Court should consider in determining an appropriate sentence. (PSR ¶¶ 66–77.) To her

credit, Dennard overcame obstacles prior to her election to Cincinnati City Council, and, according

to the overwhelmingly positive letters submitted on her behalf, rose to become a leader in the

community, using her talents to attempt positive change. On the other hand, this does little to

mitigate Dennard’s criminal violation of the public’s trust after overcoming those obstacles.

Moreover, Dennard defrauded the same community she was elected to serve. Indeed, that is the

saddest, and most “demoralizing,” part of this case—although Dennard positioned herself to serve

her community with integrity, she chose illicit payments over honest service. These simply are

not the actions of a leader. This factor also supports a guideline sentence. See Ganim, 256 F.

App’x at 402–03 (affirming sentence where district court explained, “[t]he Court recognizes its

duty under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) to consider the defendant’s history and characteristics, including

his accomplishments as mayor, and already has considered this information, but remains persuaded

that it should be given a lesser weight in the context of a top elected municipal official who

criminally and shamelessly flouts his lawful authority and the public trust.”).

B. Need for a Sentence to Reflect the Seriousness of the Offense , to Deter Criminal
Conduct, and to Provide Consistent Punishment

As the above makes clear, corruption crimes are serious offenses that threaten democratic

governance. For this reason, courts have found general deterrence to be a particularly important

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factor in sentencing corruption cases. See United States v. Watkins, 691 F.3d 841, 853 (6th Cir.

2012); Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 966–67; Sorenson, 705 F. App’x at 483. “[T]he need for a

general deterrence is a priority, and a significant sentence would likely deter those in high places

. . . from abusing the public trust.” Fattah, 813 F. App’x at 813–14 (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted); Morgan, 635 F. App’x at 450 (“Deterrence is a crucial factor in sentencing

decisions for economic and public corruption crimes”) (citing Senate Report); see also United

States v. Peppel, 707 F.3d 627, 637 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Because economic and fraud-based crimes

are more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these crimes

are prime candidates for general deterrence.”) (quoting United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227,

1240 (11th Cir. 2006)). “‘[O]ne of the primary objectives’ of sentencing elected officials

convicted of bribery is ‘to send a message to other public officials that bribery is a serious crime

that carries with it a correspondingly serious punishment.’” Morgan, 635 F. App’x at 450–51

(quoting United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013)); Sorenson, 233 F. Supp.

3d at 699 (“It must be made plain to the public at large that behavior such as that exhibited by

Defendant is categorically unacceptable and will not be tolerated by a self-respecting and

functional democratic government.”).

For these reasons, courts generally impose a sentence of imprisonment for public official

bribery cases, even where the dollar amount of the bribe is small. Morgan, 635 F. App’x at 463

(J. Holmes, concurring) (citing cases). This is true in cases similar to Dennard’s. See, e.g.,

United States v. Richard, 775 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming thirty-three month sentence

for soliciting and accepting $10,000 in bribes); United States v. Owens, 697 F.3d 657, 658 (7th

Cir. 2012) (one-year-and-one-day prison sentence for accepting $1,200 in bribes); United States

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v. Beldini, 443 F. App’x. 709, 712–13 (3d Cir. 2011) (thirty-six months’ imprisonment for

receiving two $10,000 bribes); see also Morgan, 635 F. App’x at 450–52 (remanding for

resentencing where state Senator received $12,000 in bribe payments and received probationary

sentence by district court). These factors—the seriousness of the offense, deterrence, and

consistent punishment—therefore also support a guideline sentence.

VI. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a guideline sentence of imprisonment is appropriate.1

DAVID M. DEVILLERS
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

s/ Emily N. Glatfelter
EMILY N. GLATFELTER (0075576)
MATTHEW C. SINGER (IL 6297632)
Assistant United States Attorneys
221 East Fourth Street, Suite 400
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Office: (513) 684-3711
Fax: (513) 684-6385
E-mail: Emily.Glatfelter@usdoj.gov
E-mail: Matthew.Singer@usdoj.gov

1 The manner in which she serves the sentence, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, is within the Court’s
discretion.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing was filed with the Court’s CM/ECF System this

16th day of November, 2020, which provides electronic notice to all parties.

s/Emily N. Glatfelter
EMILY N. GLATFELTER (0075576)
MATTHEW C. SINGER (IL 6297632)
Assistant United States Attorney

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