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..... " IS A HOLDING OF THE ,
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FORTe AVENWORTH, KANSAS
*DOCUMENT
S" NO.N-2146.56 COPY NO. 1
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A RESEARCH REPORT
Prepared at
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox Kentucky
13 51950 1949r
~A19
4 ~e rc/
ARMOR VS MUD AND MNES
BY
1949 - 1950
Commanding General,
Fourth Armored Division
P RE FA CE
participating personnel.
The reader will find that the 4th Armored Division met
Chapter Page
9 November 1944.. .. .. ., 9
. .o Co
o. . . .*o
. * .. *. r . .
11 November 1944.
*' 9999 9
12 November 1944. 9 . . 9e . . .9
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13 November 1944.
.. . .9 9 . . * 9 9999
9999 9 9 * 9 9
9
14 November 1944. . *
15 November 1944.
18 November 1944. ., . . .. 9 9 o 9. 9 . . . 9 . .. 39
iii
Chapter Page
21 November. 194 4. .. 42
28 November .. , . , ., , . 9, 9 9 60
December 1944. .. , . . . .
1944. .............. 0a .. .* .. .. .. 9.9. 9 66
1944. . .. . , 9.. . .....
December 68
1944 .... , ,......* . . i.
iv
Chapter Page
Conclusions,,. .. ., , .. . **. 85
*. .f. 9"*7
ANNEX
..
.n~ INTELLIENCE .......... - t ... .. ,,,
r.it)t~ ..
,.!L~_l,71iJl
.... ,... .. 4..
INTRODUCTION
Army of the United States. Indeed, this division was the only
chances for failure are excellent. The action of the 4th Armored
Fort Knox, homw of the Armored Force and 1st Armored Division,
was the source of the cadre for the 4th Armored Division, The
had been received and the division began its initial training
Regiments, each with medium and light tanks; the 51st Armored
battalions.
and announced that the 4th Armored had been alerted for overseas
members. The time spent in Texas and the United Kingdom can
of all other types of weather may easily fall prey to this type.
and therefore thought the trench foot malady would not be present.
accordingly.
3
general area from which the assault was launched. As the
described as follows:
crossings over the RHINE in the MiAINZ area. This assault was
I'OSELLE area in 1944. Cold winter rain had fallen for three
had hoped for, and the weather people say we won't get it
November. This assault, without air support, was the first blow
along the entire front. The enemy forces opposing the Third
U. S.
S. Ary, while initially surprised by the opening of the
S
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winter offensive, found themselves capable of putting up a
the enemy reserve and was not in immediate contact until after
against IETZ with the strategic objective being the SARRE district;
of the terrain to the point where mass attacks by our tanks would
keep our air corps off their backs. One condition, however,
the situation that confronted the XII Corps and the part played
2Ibid p 8.
3 (Washington, Army
Combat Divisions of World War II.
Times, 1946) P 78.
4 Captain Kenneth Koyen.
0p cit
5
Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs
of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary
Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 kay 1945, a report prepared by General
of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, (Washington: Goverment Print-
ing Office, 1946) p 73.
6
After Action Report, Third U. S. Army, 1 August 1944
to 9 May 1945, Volume I, p 126.
7Ibid
No. 10, 12th Army Group, dated 21 October 1944, directed the
personnel replacements.
the bombing of the dam containing the lake, ETiNG DE LINDRE, near
the Germans. 2
The two armored divisions of the corps were pulled
out of the line for rehabilitation, refitting, maintenance, and
refitting, and training was the order of the day. Units were
to NOMENY-LETRICOUiT-CHENICOUHT-FOSSIEUX-CH;Ai BREY-JUViECOCURT
4th Armored Division was assembled in the rear of the 26th Infantry
Division, and the 6th Armored Division in rear of the 35th Infantry
Division.
laneous units, opposed the XII Corps when it launched its attack
paring for this offensive on the part of our forces, the enemy
moved the aforementioned armored division out of army reserve
the entire 361st Volks Grenadier Division; with the entire 11th
DELME RIDGE in the zone of the 80th Infantry Division,. and the
secure the DEL3E RIDGE and prodeed to seize the high ground in
CR85)
11 PZ
MORHANIGE
i
9
5',
NANC1
-,-et &
26th Division, was to secure the right (south) flank of the
head over the RHINE RIVE= between OPPENHEI. and JMANNHEk., and
over the SEILLE IVE-R and the two armored divisions to attack
which included every field piece with the corps, and captured
south of DEL
VE IDGE on an axis M'NHOUE-MALAUCOU iT-VIVIERS to
MrErZ
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FRANCE
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VIVIERS-HANNOC OURT-VILLE LS-DESTRY-LANDROFF-VILLE. " Task Force
over the RHINE iRIVER in the 1kANNHEIM area. The artillery with
and mass the fires of all the artillery with the division. All
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1944 set the stage for the drive by the 4th Armored Division
toward the SARRE on the following day. The next chapter will
3Ibid
4
After Action Report, XII Corps, November 1944, G-2
Summary, Period 1 November - 1 December 1944, Section III,
Annexes 1 and 2.
10
Personal Interview, Lt Col Robert M,. Parker, Jr.,
Command and Staff Department, The Armored School, Fort Knox,
Kentucky,
ORHANGE and secured positions from which the armor was able to
Figure 4)
8 November 1944
along its entire front. By dark the 26th Infantry Division had
plan, XII Corps issued orders directing the movement and attack
ORS
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move at 0530 hours on 9 November, using the routes prescribed in
Field Order Number 10, and gave the division priority on the roads
line infantry divisions, the enemy made plans to commit one task
direction of DEL .J. The other task force, built around the
9 November 1944
MAZERULLES, and BEY, to NANHOUE where the column split. The north
road blocks, and antitank fire. Excellent air support, which was
1. ,
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cleared VIVIERS and assembled in the vicinity of HINNOCOURT.
and one half-track to enemy fire. After clearing the woods and
on the left flank and together with the other guns, succeeded in
knocked out three tanks and the remainder of the company became
the column had established a line on the high ground, 700 yards
4
southwest of FO'TENY.
Combat Command B indicated that the 4th Armored Division was not
and drive quickly to the SARRE RIVER, That evening the division
made plans to commit Combat Command A to the south in the
had made good progress during the day advancing into the out-
MORVILLE-LES-VIC.
10 November 1944
broken into two columns for the attack. The leading column
at dark, Resistance during the day was light, but the bad
wet ground impeded any movement off the roads. During the
cleared CHATEAU SALINS and the woods south of HAMPONT, and had
antitank, tank, and artillery fire coming from the high ground
6
Grenadier Regiment recaptured VIVIERS. The infantry of the
35th Division had not followed closely the armored attack through
night, cutting the supply route for the Churchill column. The
the west of VIVIERS, They discovered that the enemy had cut
them off from the rest of the column when an ambulance return-
11 November 1944'
A's sector, Major Hunter's column moved from its assembly area
25
to the west across the railroad and turned north toward
this engagement, the column lost one medium tank, three light
they had cleared the southwest section of the town. During the
The artillery fire, together with the direct fire from the tanks,
SAL INS.
Oden split his column into two forces. The leading force
t
of LIDREZING. Although the attack by Colonel West s force had
that day,
3T H TAN1K BATTALJIC~ ( cR'FD
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9 November 1944
o] a
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51ST A1RMORED INFANTRY BATT~AIC (REINFORCED)
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On the morning. of 12 November,. Niajor Hunter reCddied
cut the escape route of the Germans from MORHANGE to the east.
when the tanks took the town, were attacked by the 111th Panzer
12
Grenadier Regiment supported by tanks. Company B, 37th Tank
500 yards south of the town and was unable to advance. The
37th Tank Battalion lost three medium tanks and one 105-mm
assault gun to enemy fire and had to destroy t,;o other tanks
town the column was delayed while the engineers from Company C,
of the town, whild they had been unable to move for lack of
in ORON.
the 11th Panzer Division sent a task force from the 110th Panzer
sh~
Ir~l.~
;:
XII Corps issued Operational Directive Number 24, which
gave the 4th Armored Division and the 26th Infantry Division
18
SARRE and EICHEL RIVERS.
13 November 1944
and antitank fire. The forward observer tank from the 94th
the column, was hit three times in rapid succession, The column
in RODALBE the preceding day, spent the day in reor aidpgng, in" the
Division attacks.
out of its assembly area near CHATEAU BREHAIN with its objective
with the slow progress due to the muddy condition of the road,
of VILLERS-SUR NIED. First contact was made with the enemy east
successful, taking the enemy by surprise from the flank and rear.
32
then proceeded through MARTILLE toward DESTRY. As in the past,
the advance was slowed by mines and road blocks. The engineers
the Germans were laying in this area. At about dark the column
20
halted northeast of MARTHILLE short of DESTRY.
14 November 1944
these tanks, but only after it had lost its lead tank. At the
infantry who were accompanying the tanks. The column had dif-
33
ficulty in continuing its advance because the leading tank, which
had been knocked out, was blocking the road, requiring vehicles
about 1000 yards west of GUEBLING, it was met by heavy tank and
centration while our tanks closed in. All the enemy tanks were
The second and third tanks in the column irrmediately fanned out
to the right and left of the lead tank, but they were also disabled
path through the mines. The infantry discovered that the bridge
across the creek 100 yards farther to the east had been blown,
and the stream there was unfordable for vehicles. The engineer
bridge. It was dark before the bridge had been completed, but
After dark the remainder of the column moved into the town and
took-up positions reinforcing the infantry. During the night
the Germans poured intense artillery and mortar fire into the
21
town from the commanding ground which they still held, ' 22
made contact ith both Combat Command A and i th the 35th Division
in DALHAIN.
23
were routed by the tank destroyers in the column, which were able
to maneuver off the road in the mud. The tank destroyers knocked
out one enemy tank and one self-propelled gun in this engagement.
the afternoon.
in the north half of the corps zone w&th the 80th Division,
The mission and objectives of the 4th Armored Division were not
changed. 25
15 November 1944
In GUEBLING, t
Colonel West s task force continued to be
apparent that the ,est task force would be unable to hold the
the town, the engineers destroying the bridge which they had built
36
the night before. The German artillery and tank fire continued
6
to hammer the column during its withdrawal.2 27 Colonel West
described the enemy artillery and tank fire during this operation
to CONTHIL to LIDREZING.
35th Division, The town was cleared by late afternoon and the
15th contemplated that the 8th would follow the 51st Armored
the Churchill column was delayed by the tail of the 51st column,
16 November 19,
with the enemy along the highway north of RiCORANGE and on the
ing the 35th ard 26th Divisions, with one -combat command in each
31
of the 26th Division.
18 November 1944
commanding officer.
39
Comb~b t riiai A is 6&gnied into three Torces tor
its attack h suhppot dP tie h Division. The north column
19 November 1944
north of RODALBE, the column was further delayed until the engineers
the column left the burning town and bivouacked west of VIRMNG
for the night, Late in the day Company B, 37th Tank Battalion,
40
T~oemler1944
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Infantry, 35th Division, occupied VIRKING throughout the night..
the day, The 26th Division had not succeeded in clearing DIEUZE,
its 3 3
assigned route of advance,
the SARRE RIVER, the details of which are covered in the following
chapter.
20 November 19
the column was halted by several blown bridges near LENING. The
Germans kept fire on the bridge sites which prevented the engineers
41
The south column of Combat Command A moved out, using
the same route the north column had taken the previous day.
area between CONTHIL and RODALBE. Its mission was to screen the
RIVER.
21 November 1944
Division attacked to the east in the zones of the 26th and 35th
1
After Action Report, XIT Corps, November 1944, Annex 1
and 2, p 7.
3
After Action Report, XII Corps, November 1944, G-2
Periodic Report ,87, 9 Novenber 1944,
5
Ibid, Item 10, November 1944.
Op cit, Weitersheim, p 4.
7
Interview, Major Risden L. Fountain, formerly Executive
Officer, 22d Armored Field Artillery Battalion,
8O cit, Weitersheim, p 6,
9
After Action Report, 4th Armored Division, November 1944,
G-2 Periodic Report #91, Item 150.
43
120p cit, ieitersheim, p 7.
1
3Combat History, 4th Armored biviision, November 1944,
.item 12, Noveaber 1944.
16 0p cit, Weitersheim, p 7.
18
After Action Report, XII Corps, November 1944, Annex 1
and 2, p 64.
1 9
Combat History, 4th Armored Division, November 1944,
Item 13, November 1944. Although there is no mention in the
report of the engagement in the vicinity of the CONTH-L WOODS,
Lt Col Parker recalls the action because of the loss of his
forward observer s tank.
20
Combat History, 4th Armored Division, November 1944,
Item 13.
21
Major Hugh F. Young, "Reinforced Armored Infantry Team
in the Attack of a Town," a student monograph (Fort Knox,
The Armored School), pp 1-7.
22
9p cit, Lt Col Parker,in November 1944.
23
After Action Report, 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
November 1944, pp 2, 3.
24
Combat History, 4th Armored Division, November 1944,
Item 14.
2 5
After Action Report, XII Corps, November 1944, Annex 1
and 2, p 6'5.
27
0p cit, Lt Col Parker,
2
8Comments by Lt Col Arthur L, West, in discussing attack
on GUEBLING with Captain Thomas Diamanteb.
2 9 4th Armored Division, November 1944,
Combat History,
Item 15.
30 XII Corps, Noveimber 1944, Annex 1
After Action Report,
and 2, p 66.
31
Ibid, p 69.
3
9ombat History, 4th Armored Division, November 1944,
Item 19.
33
Ibid, Item 19.
seize crossings over the SARRE RIVER. To the soutL the attack
German forces in the south of the XII Corps zone were with-
withstood the one yy' s attempt to drive them back across the
river,
19 November 1944
German defenses along the SARRE RIVER from the south. That
1115 the division ordered the combat command to move to the east
the 19th was repulsed when it was within a hundred yards of the
city. Although the combat command was unable to move because
day,
20 November 1944
(See Figure 12)
the 328th Infantry on its left. The attack of these two battalions
had withdrawn during the night. 3 By 1400 the infantry had cleared
DIEUZE and combat Command B began its advance to the east, The
and halted one kilometer west of DOMNO -LES-DIEUZE for the night.
As the column was strung out along the road individual units
21 November 1944
CHATEAU .VW1E
/U ISSf
LFSKIRCHEjN
EYWIJ
IIULC EY
19 di ..-
"' 23
the bridge and get the advance under way before dark, the column
48'
22 November 1944
was halted by debris from the railway overpass which had been
destroyed and was blocking the road.. After the rubble had been
the 953d Volks Grenadier Regimen, supported by the 81th Fort ess
Machine Gun Battalion and 816th Super Heavy i,.achine Gun Battalion
6
equipped with 20:mm antiaircraft guns, The tanks rapidly drove
the dam, so there was no danger of the dam being blown, thus
washing out the treadway bridge and isolating the force to the
from the woods to the north of the road, The battalion deployed
to clear the woods, but it met heavy fire from hidden enemy
49
fi
Y}F
vv
y v
:::}41ti2fi" tip.
S..
T3
S d6PHTOGRAP
drew to the vicinity of MITTERSHEIM and bivouacked there for the
night.
23 November 1944
both bridges and thus became the first Third Army troops across
the SARRE RIVER. At about 2000 they made contact with elements
the 90-foot bridge over the SARRE. The Churchill column outposted
50
Colonel Jacques column was ordered to join the remainder
all the troops in the 4th Armored Division enjoyed a turkey dinner.
24 November 1944
on the morning of the 24th and crossed the SARRE RIVER at ROMELFING*
By 0950 the battalion had reached POSTROFF and. secured the high
ground west of the town where they organized for defense. During
the day they received sporadic artillery fire from the northeast,
0930 the head of the column had cleared HELLE.ING without meeting
through the town heavily mined. One mile north of KIRRBERG the
column met artillery, antitank and machine gun fire from the
vicinity of BAERENDORF. Elements of the 902d Panzer Grenadier
held the town. As the tanks were delayed by mine fields and a
blown bridge west of the town, the infantry led the attack to
The battalion then outposted the town for the night.9 In the
The 130 Panzer Lehr Division had been given the mission of
driving south to strike the Seventh Army attack in the flank and
fire., Task Force ,cKone had struck the south shoulder of the
German defenses holding the west bank of the SARRE RIVER, The
25 November 1944
when two of their tanks had been knocked out and a considerable
German attack hbd been thrown back and the 53d reestablished their
1
lines north an east of the town,
the edge of the town, but intense enemy fire forced them to.
withdraw to the positions from which they had launched the attack,
During. the day all the artillery with the 4th Armored
3
After Action Report, 4th Armored Division, November
1944, G-2 Periodic Report #89.
4 Combat History, 4th Armored Division, November 1944,
Item 21.
7
Combat History, 4th Armored Division, November 1944,
Item 22.
9Ibid, It em 24.
10
Letter, Hq Air P/W Interrogation Detachment, US,
APWIUC, Ninth AF Adv 63/1945, 372,2, APO 696, US Army, "A Crack
German Panger Division and Vhat Allied Air Poeer did to it
Between D-Day and V-Day." (130th Panzer Lehr Div, coimmanded
by Gen Lt Fritz Bayerlein), p 13.
lIbid, p 13.
flanking the German defenses east of the SARRL. For the first
time since the November offensive had begun the 4th Armored
26 November 1944
(See Figure 14)
DIVISION
26 NOV s3O NOV I qP
26 Nov
-...... 27 NovUNO
. )c-x Nov 28 SR-NO
® ...... 29 Novr
® .. 30 Nov
IR VIbR
REV
GEN ADAMS W/LLE R
2~ . , ASSWSIL.LER.
BONNBAEO RNGDOR
FRTHTLMIN
LOHR.
Regiment, 25th Panzer Division were defending the town and the
the bridre. Both battalions halted south of the bridge for the
night, Later that niht the enemy ag:ain tried to destroy the
3
bridge, but was stopped by small arms fire.
and a combat corrmand reserve (see Figure 15). At 1300 the Oden
Ai 25 Af-,3Z4 j]7aI
(Less I Plat)
66th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in Direct Support
CCA RESERVE
26 November .1944
35 89I wcEr3zae
the area south of DRULINGEN and ASSWILLER had been cleared by
27 November. 1944
booby-traps, and enemy fire had halted the attack in the town.
for the night. The enemy shelled the town very heavily through-
to seize GUNGWITLL: and HILL 354 to the north. The attack was
preceded by a sharp artillery preparation on known and suspected
had cleared the town, making good use of grenades, flame throwers,
cleared the town but the intense enemy artillery fire forced
day.
BONNEFONTAINE. 10
28 November 1944
the town was not occupied by the enemy, the roads were heavily
mined and all the bridges had been blown, The column halted in
. .' .'
column moved along the east edge o.f the BOIS DE lOLSTHOF to
the morning.
71st Combat Team had cleared the BOIS D'EYVVILLER, and then
By 1615 that afternoon the 8th Tank Battalion and the 51st
to the north.l2
HFRSKIRCH EN.
29 November 1944
the road north of REXINGEN had been blown by the Germans when they
the road of mines, but were unable to replace the fourth bridge
if;s
is l
1 3V.
,
U. S. ARMy PHOTOGRAPH
until after dark because of the heavy artillery fire falling in
the force by-passed the town and occupied HILL 357, one kilometer
Jacques column remained in BERG all day, carin for their vehicles
and equipment-.
0830 to clear the woods and secure HILL 330 overlooking SARRE ThERDEN.
infantry and tank fire from elements of the 902d Panzer Grenadier
of the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion and the 8th Tank Battalion
*% -- ~
r
tic
withdrew to the vicinity of BURBACH, where it bivouacked for the
hight.
The 71st Combat Team from' the 44th Division was released
zone, taking over the area south of the 4th Armored Division
between the 4th Armored Division and the 26th Division, giving
Some of these troops later reoccupied the town to oppose the 26th
Division's attack,
30 November 1944
north and seized the high ground one mile southeast of .ACKViILLER.
of the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion moved from BERG to HILL 357,
which the tank units with the battalion had seized the previous day,
Panzer Lehr Division for movement into the ARDENES sector. The
division made plans to pull out of the area, but the movement was
delayed until the 11th Panzer Division could extend to the south-
east to-cover the line which the Panzer Lehr.units were holding.
The relief was further delayed by the fact that the division was
DIVISION
I DEC -- DC L
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1 December 1944
(See Figure6
of the battalion,
the 901st Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the 25th Panzer Grenadier
Combat Comimand., Just short of the crest of HILL 318 the tanks
had captured the hill, forcing the enemy to withdraw to the north,
for positions from which his unit could support the attack on
2 December 1944
with machine gun fire. When the infantry had beaten off the
to HILL 309. They met very little resistance and occupied the
lMortar and small arms fire was sufficient to drive it off. At 0900
the infantry, together with the 8th Tank Battalion, attacked north
through the woods. By 1215 the leading units had crossed the
clearing the wood west of MILL 332. By 1500 the column had driven
the enemy from HILL 332 and had consolidated positions there.
the battalion attacking HILL 332 made no contact with the enemy
armor.
Infantry Battalion.
All the front line units used the day to improve their
positions and prepare for the next day's attack. The 26th Division,
Command A units in the area spent most of the day clearing the
small arms and mortar fire from the woods to the west. The 8th
Battalion knocked out four enemy tanks as they emerged from the
were part of the' enemy armor reported by the Air Force the previous
day,
AEJ4
93
I C953 Af5S
__________I
A fjn c 24 B o
ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF COMBAT COMMAND A
4 DECEMBER 1944
Ep
~J66 LJ%9
EJ 94S5 (155-lwW)
Brigadier General Herbert L. Earnest also joined the division
4 December 1944
the column were unable to move into the town because of the
posting the high .round to the northeast 'across the EICHEL RIVER.
balance of the day and most of the night filling the craters,
The 35th Tank Battalion lost three tanks to enemy artillery fire
German antiaircraft and small arms fire from the woods to the
north and east halted the attack. The infantry cleared the woods
by 1130
Qandtho attack continued, .As the tanks started down the
by ten tanks from the 15th Panzer Regiment, 11th Panzer Division.24, 25
After a short fight in which two enemy tanks were knocked out,
company of tanks had pushed through the town, and captured the
the bridge and outposted the north bank. At 2030 they repulsed
t
SARRE-UNION in support of the 101st Regiment s attack, engaged
three enemy tanks and destroyed one, By late afternoon the 26th
5 December 1944
off the road. In the Cormbat Command A sector, the 35th Tank
direction along the high ground. The soft condition of the terrain
forced the tanks to remain on the roads most of the time, As they
SINGLING from the south, As the Company C tanks left HILL 348
in their advance toward SINGLING .they began to sink into the mud,
When the tanks, slowed to a speed of three to four miles per hour
tanks of the 15th Panzer Regiment and the 61st Antitank Battalion
from the direction of HILL 384 fell in the area. 1ith one company
Colonel Abrams withdrew to the vicinity of HILL 349 for the night.2 6
27
to support the attack by fire in SINGLING and to the north.
jumped off before the .infantry was able to join them. At 1700
(four miles north of BINING). The attack jum ed off with the
72
the NICHELSBUSCH woods harrassed the column. The advance was
delayed until the infantry cleared the woods. The muddy ground
halt with the head of the column just north of the OERUVNGEN -
28
DEHLINGEN road.
6 December 1944
along HILL 346, the artillery smoked the south edge of SINGLING.
In spite of the artillery fire, tanks from the 15th Panzer Regiment
(both of the 11th Panzer Division) engaged the 37th Tank Battalion
toward BIING.
to enter the town its leading tank was knocked out by an enemy
tank (or self-propelled gun) located in the west end of the town.
The tank company, when it encountered more tank fire to the east
of the town, withdrew to the reverse slope of the hill 400 yards
the two columns received direct fire support from the 35th Tank
Battalion and the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion, which had moved
through RAHLING and occupied positions on HILL 343. The 37th and
74.
Combat Command B moved forward at 0830 to attack SINGLING
from the west, but was halted by artillery fire and direct tank
349.
the 12th Armored Division was going to relieve the 4th Armored
32
Division, beginning at 0700 the next morning.
7 - 8 December 1944
during the 7th, but relief of front line, units did not begin
rmored Division, except the artillery and the 704th Tank Destroyer
of the two Co.mbat Co.r°ands were eff .ctive and well coordinated.
In their push north the resistance of the German forces remained
3
Co!mbat History, 4th Armored Division, November 1944,
Item 26.
4
After 'Iction Report, CCA, 4th armored Division, November
1944, p 4.
5
After Action Report, 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
November 1944, p 8,
6
Gen Lt en,' von Tietersheim, rEmployrent of the 11th Panzer
Division in Lo er Lorraine, Rhineland Part II, p 13.
7
fter Action Report, XII Corps, November 1944, G-2 Periodic
Report 4106.
16Ibid, pp 13-14.
21
Combat History, 4th Armored Division, December 1944,
Item 2.
22
Ibi, Item 3.
23
Ibid, Item 4.
24
0p cit, "eitersheim, pp 14-16.
25
After Action Report, XII Corps, December 1944, G-2
Periodic Report :113.
27
Interview, Lt Col Robert l. Parker, Jr., formerly
Commanding Officer, 94th Armored Field Artillery Battalion,
30
After Action Report, XII Corps, December 1944, G-2 Periodic
Reports -115 and 116.
31
Small Unit Actions, Historical Division, War Department,
pp 176-212.
32
Combat History, 4th Armored Division, December 1944,
Item 6.
33
1bid, Items 7 and 8,
CHAPTER 6
SUMMR Y
For these gains the 4th Armored Division lost 46 tanks and 33
suffered much more than did the 4th Armored Division (see Annex
,
made this campaign probably the most severe of the war for the
4th Armored Division (see Annex III'. The record of 720 men
armored units into small ambush. forces and ' sisted over a wide
1
front. Knowing the weather had canalized our forces to the
roads, he was not only able to inflict losses and slow the
could withdraw over known routes. The enemy lwas further able
were made narrow by the mud, Together, the terrain, the weather,
and the ingenious enemy wvere able to contain the attack of the
mplo
rment of the lth Armored Division
the 35th Division did not gain the success expected, the 4th
attack of Combat Command A went well and might have achieved the
German lines between the 11th Panzer Division on the north and
lost some. of its attacking force in the mud around RODA'lE that
across the SAS E and met the 130th Panzer Lehr Division that had
east of the SARRE was tankable and the attack gained impetus',
regained and the Germans were in for some violent shock action
record of the 4th Armored Division before and after the action
will surely agree that every type of maneuver and every trick
of the, armored trade was tried by the 4th Armored in this operation,
but most still used the rolled blanket. Shoe pacs and artic
limited sizes and numbers. Trench foot had finally been brought
were the same that started at MALAUCOURT however, they were much
and blood-..
Major General John S. Wood was lost to the division
Few leaders have been able to project their will Lnd personality
Army, and of XII Corps, As such, the operation. had its appointed
zone was weakest in enemy strength, but the terrain was low and
from and lies within the realm of. combat intelligence, namely,
weather',
in the defense of the sector opposing the XII Corps was very
being able to select the areas in which it fought, the enemy armor
in weather and over terryin unfavorable for t>e use of tanks. That
the present ecrui pment of the armored division does not allow for
exploitihg the road net is the only course open to the attacker
only when the need for the early seizure of the objective is
against. ene.my, aud and terrain may destroy its inherent aggressive-
NOTES FOR CF
APTER
.
1
The E loyment of the llth Panzer Division in Lorraine,
Part II, r ort by en Lt Tend von 'ietersheim,
bhineland
10 January 1947
2
G-2 hcport 7-104, 4th krmored Division, 26-27 November
1944, Item. 167, FS 600-86, Reel 8,
30p cit, iiet rsheim,
4 11.
O cit,,Ticitersheim, pp 7,
5
Small Unit Actions, Singling, 4th Armored Pivision,
6 December 1944, ( ashington, D. C., Historical Division,
Var Department, 4 April 1946), p 177.
PERSONNEL
9 November 1 22 2 54 0 0
10 November 3 28 5 64 2 6
11 November 10 36 10 29 0 0
12 November 1 "5 1 45 2 2
13 November 0 6 4 34 0 5
14 November 1 13 3 63 0 0
15 November 0 11 3 104 0 3
16 November 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 November 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 November 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 November 1 5 1 13 0 0
20 November 0 5 4 22 0 0
21 November 3 3 0 6 0 0
22 November 0 1 0 2 0 0
23 November 0 3 0 4 0 0
24 November 1 11 2 33 0 2
25 November 0 15 3 49 0 9
26 November 0 5 0 19 0 0
27 November 1 8 5 59 0 1
28 November 0 11 0 15 0 0
29 November 0 3 0 25 0 3
30 November ? ? . .
REA RKS . .
89.
Returned to duty:
A-. A W RDS .
3. T
BRONE ST -. 290, with 11 Oak Leaf Clusters.
officers and men, General Patton also made some sound recommendations
+.h..:....riw Ir ++.-"'°Y
rI-o + + w++.w.Yw: w + ++ *!1.w t-w~r .. +r-.r ,.ws w+. .. w.Mrwr
n..- ... _ r}:...
Prisoners
Date Killed Wounded Taken - zP_ RK3
;--'-;--~-7-T-?--~~-- rYP~ ~
IIU3-F - -
1 December 3 14 9 57 0 0
2 December 0 13 4 44 0 0
3 December 0 6 2 32 0 4
4 December 1 13 4 35 0 0
5 December 1 13 2 17 O 00'
6 December 0 13 1 25 0 1
7 December 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 December 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 December 0 '0 0 0 0 0
10 December 0 0 0 0 0 0
~lp"-~s~-
-r~-an-._ -n
Enemy Casualties
Prisoners
De te illed Wounded Taken Remark s
1 December 75 100 23
2 December 55 100 21
3 December 50 125 13
4 December 50 83 131
5 December 1 0 69
6 December 60 10 156
7 December 0 0 0
8 December 0 0 0
9 December 0 0 0
10 December 0 0 0
-r
~ar~-rrrr~r*l-----rcr rm-* -
NOTE: All figures taken from G-3 Journal, 4th Armored Division,
9 November 1944 to 7 December 1944,
92
ANNEX II
INTELLIGENCE
Divisions facing the XII Corps during the period 8 November 1944 -
Nondivi.siona l unit s,
including those in
reserve 5,800 5,400 3500 2,000.
8-9 November
9-10 November
96
3 6 1st Grena dier Division
952 Gren Regt,.. ,,. .. ... ,....Division zone
361 Engr Bn........ . .. .. .... ..Division zone
513d Infantry Division
1119 Inf Regt . , ,... . ,..... Division zone ..
11th Panzer Division
110 Psz Gren Regt .. .. ..... . . ,.. FONTNY
111 Pz Gren Regt .. . * ., ,,,. ,iTXE
11 Pz Ron Bn... .... . ... . .. Divi sion zone
277 Flak n n.,..... ., .. . .. . .,UTTIGNY
43d Fortress -G Battalion, ....... . .. Divi sion zone
51st Fortress kG Battalion Division zone ......
48th Infantry Division
401 rty Brig .. ...... .. .GCr: *ZCUkT
813 Fortress En.. . .. * Near AULNOI? SUR-SELLE
1559th Artillery Regiment,
12-13 November
13-14 November
15-16 November
16-17 November
17-18
. L.....
November
,... mbpmgetemp
11th Panzer Division
110 Gren segt.. . ... BOURGOLTROFF
..... ,,GUEBLI NG,
111 Gren Regt...,,........ .. Division zone
15 Pz Re t. ... ....... ,, ..... . .. Divi sion zone
llth Pz cn Bn................. .. Division zone
209 Pz Enr Bn.........,...... ..Division zone
559th Grenar'ier Division
1126 Gren Regt.............. S..Division zone
559 Engr n..,. ...... . Division ,,... . .. zone
805th Super Heavy ]hG Battalion..... S.Division zone
C T Rutel, .... .. . . ...... .,GUiELLING
361st Grenadier Division
952 Gren: Regt. ....... ,.. ...... .. KEPRIICH LES DIEUZE
48th Infantry Division
401 •Arty :Bri'g ... . . t,...9 .. Division zone
.. L .:. 9.. . .
98 ,. ,
18-19 November
19-20 November
20-21 November
21-22 November
23-24 November
24-25 November
25-26 November
*-o
26-27 November
27-28 November
28-29 November
29-30 November
101
30 -November - 1 December
1-2. December
2-3 December
3-4 December
102
4-5 December
5-6 December
6-7 December
7-8 December
2,03
Weathe r Summary
until 7 December 1944, the period the 4th Armored Division was in
Partly
Fair Cloudy Cloudy Rain Snow
8 November........ X
9 November ..... X X
10 November, ,...,.. X
30
2 November....,.,..
DNovember... .... .. Fg x
1 December,. p. ,. X
4 December,..,. . X
2 December ... .. ,,,. X
3 December.., ,... . x
4 December .. ,.....,
656 Decenber
December,..;;..,..°
;. .. ,... . X
A .' Xi
X
Total Days: 30 8 4 12 14 2
,1Q4
Comments
the 11th Panzer Division and the 130th Panzer Lehr Division
came into the lines, the 8th of November and the 24th of November,
reserve area where they had been refitting. The 11th Panzer
upon the entry of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division into the battle,
it was orderd to. attack and seize -LS-CE, thus indicating its
strength.
time was provided for their forces to delay and select terrain
1Q5
with armored infantry, formed the teams. They would strike,
fall back, move up, and strike again- The condition of the
carriers and the tank destroyers, first retired and then returned
were mastered .'1 its small and even smallest 'elements, contributed
10i6
commanders is not known, but this break in the G..rman lines
107
,NNEX III
LOGISTICS
7 December 191.44
36 RMedium tanks
10 Liaht tanks
2 105- rmm Howitzer .7 motor carriages
3 75-ma Howitzer M8 motor carriages
2 76-mm Gun M18
33 Personnel carriers, ,half-track
61 1/4L.-on trucks
3 3/4-ton trucks
6 Ambulance s
1 1-1/2--ton truck
1 2-1/2-ton trucks
i.1..s'UNITI ON LX.P
jIP IUREs: