Foreword

The transportation of troops and supplies to build up and maintain the

force of more than five million soldiers deployed overseas by the United States
Army in World War II involved operations of unprecedented magnitude and
complexity, both across the oceans and within the military theaters of the war.
The movement of supplies for allied forces greatly increased the Army's trans-
portation task. The two preceding volumes of this group have told the story of
Army transportation in the continental United States. This volume deals with
land and water movements in theaters of operations around the world. It
surveys port, railway, highway, and water operations that constituted a major,
and in some instances a controlling, factor in the prosecution of the war. Time
and again the Army's experience during the war underlined the need for
clearly recognizing the importance of transportation in planning and executing
tactical as well as logistical operations.
After the creation of the Transportation Corps in July 1942, transportation
activities overseas became increasingly its concern and were carried out in
ever-widening measure by staff officers and units provided by the Corps to
oversea theaters. The focus of this volume is nevertheless on Army transporta-
tion problems and activities as a whole, since other services also had a very
large hand in moving troops and supplies within the theaters. The authors
have told their story from the records and the points of view both of the oversea
commands and of the Transportation Corps in Washington. If it is at times a
story of inadequate performance, primarily because of shortages of trained men
and suitable equipment, it is also a story of over-all success in delivering the
men and the goods when and where they were needed to defeat the enemy.

ALBERT C. SMITH
Washington, D.C. Maj. Gen., U.S.A.
15 December 1954 Chief of Military History

vii
 Introductory Note
As is indicated in the Preface, the preparation of this volume was carried out
under the general supervision of my predecessor, Mr. Chester Wardlow. Its
appearance marks the completion of a comprehensive account, in three
volumes, of the history of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps during World
War IL
Dr. Harold Larson served as Senior Historian of the Army Transportation
Corps during World War IL He was Chief Historian of the XXIV Corps in
Korea, 1946-47, and thereafter, to March 1952, Historian, Transportation
Section, Office of the Chief of Military History. He has a Ph.D. in History from
Columbia University, and is now on the staff of the Air University Historical
Liaison Office in Washington, D.C.
Mr. Joseph Bykofsky received his Master of Arts degree from Columbia
University, and is currently a candidate for a Ph.D. degree in History at Amer-
ican University. During World War II he served as an officer in India and
Burma, where he was engaged in transportation activities. He has been asso-
ciated with the Transportation Corps historical program since July 1949. Before
that time he had participated for three years in the writing of the World War II
history of the American National Red Cross.

HARRY B. YOSHPE
Washington, D.C. Historical Research Officer
15 December 1954 Office of the Chief of Transportation

viii
 Preface
This volume, which deals with the U.S. Army transportation activities in
the oversea commands, is the last of the trilogy devoted to the history of the
Transportation Corps in World War II. In the first volume attention was given
to the nature of the transportation task, the functions and organization of the
Transportation Corps, and the operating problems and relationships of the
Corps. The second volume covered troop and supply movements within and
from the zone of interior and Transportation Corps problems of procurement
and training.
In this, the third volume, the oversea commands are discussed separately.
This method of treatment was suggested by the nature of the material, by the
fact that officers who directed Army transportation operations were responsible
to the respective oversea commanders, and by the wide differences in transpor-
tation activities and problems in the several areas.
The Chief of Transportation in the zone of interior had no direct authority
over transportation within the oversea commands. Transportation was but one
phase of logistical operations utilized by theater commanders in the attainment
of their tactical objectives. While the discussion in this volume will attempt to
make clear the role of the Chief of Transportation in planning for and support-
ing oversea operations, such matters are presented more fully in the other
volumes of Transportation Corps history. The present work deals primarily
with the Army transportation organizations in the several oversea commands,
the operations for which they were responsible, their relation to transportation
matters that were not directly their responsibility, and their position in the
theater structure.
In the main, the volume presents a topical treatment of the organization
and major types of transportation within each oversea command, although
efforts have been made in the introduction and elsewhere to orient the reader
to underlying strategic and logistic developments and problems. This compart-
mentalization appeared to be the method best adapted to an orderly presenta-
tion of the various transportation operations. An exception is the chapter on the
South and Central Pacific, where the absence of significant rail, inland water-
ways, and long-haul truck operations made possible a roughly chronological
approach.
The volume does not deal exclusively with Transportation Corps activities.
Created in July 1942 with a relatively limited scope, the Corps assumed
responsibility for operations performed until then by other technical services.

ix
In the interest of completeness early water, port, rail, and inland waterways
transportation operations conducted by the Quartermaster Corps and the Corps
of Engineers are considered within the scope of this discussion. Oversea motor
transport operations, performed by Quartermaster trucking units but usually
directed by Army transportation organizations, are also treated. Animal and
other means of transport are included where they were performed under the
direction of Army transportation organizations. Allied, joint Army-Navy,
Navy, and civilian transportation are discussed insofar as they affected Army
transportation.
The foregoing should not suggest that this volume is a complete account of
military or even of Army transportation overseas. The support of the Army
commands depended heavily on shipping provided or controlled by the War
Shipping Administration and the Navy. Within the Army, air transportation
was basically a responsibility of the Air Forces, while pipelines were the
responsibility of the Corps of Engineers, and consequently these means of
transportation received only incidental treatment here. Tactical transportation,
that is, transportation in the combat area as distinguished from the communi-
cations zone, was not a Transportation Corps responsibility and lies within the
realm of the combat historian. Amphibious assaults and other combat opera-
tions are dealt with only to the extent that Transportation Corps troops and
equipment participated.
While the preparation of this work has involved extensive consultation
between the two authors, there has been a basic division of responsibility. Dr.
Harold Larson prepared the chapters on the transatlantic theaters and bases
and the Southwest Pacific (Chapters I, III-VIII inclusive, and X). The remain-
ing portions of the book are the work of Mr. Joseph Bykofsky, who also handled
the final revision of the volume as a whole. The index of the completed work
was compiled by Dr. Rose C. Engelman.
Although the authors have relied in large measure on War Department and
oversea records collections in Washington and Kansas City, there has been
some departure from this procedure. In the case of the Persian Corridor, where
the command was concerned predominantly with transportation, the chapter
draws heavily on Dr. T. H. Vail Motter's published volume, The Persian Corridor
and Aid to Russia, and on records collected by him. Monographs on Army trans-
portation in certain oversea commands prepared by Dr. Harold H. Dunham
and Dr. James R. Masterson were invaluable. Other published and manuscript
histories produced in the Office of the Chief of Military History and in the
theaters also have proved of great assistance. Interviews with Army officers and
others who participated in wartime operations have been employed to supple-
ment, verify, and interpret the record. For details on the scope of research, the
reader is invited to examine the Bibliographical Note which is appended.
The authors are grateful to the many people, both military and civilians,
whose co-operation and assistance made possible the production of this volume.
Only a few can be mentioned here by name. The writers have profited from the
direction and supervision of Mr. Chester Wardlow, former Historical Research
Officer, Office of the Chief of Transportation. His critical judgment and sage

x
counsel have added much to this book. Special thanks are due Lt. Col. Leo J.
Meyer, who, in his capacity as Deputy Chief Historian, Office of the Chief of
Military History (OCMH), guided the work to the editorial stage. Miss Mary
Ann Bacon, OCMH, edited the volume and Mr. Arthur C. Henne copy-edited
it. The photographs were selected by Maj. Arthur T. Lawry, Chief of the
Photographic Branch, OCMH, and the maps were prepared by the staff of the
Cartographic Branch under the direction of Maj. James F. Holly. At all stages
of their work, the authors received invaluable assistance from their own office
staff, notably from Miss Marie Premauer, Mrs. Janet S. Conner, and Miss Mary
Morrissey. The writers, however, assume full responsibility for the judgments
expressed and for any errors of omission or commission.
Statistical data on traffic within each oversea command were compiled
during or shortly after the war, often by several agencies at various echelons of
command. The authors have found frequent conflicts between sets of statistics.
In such cases, where efforts to reconcile the differences have failed, the figures
emanating from what seemed to be the most authoritative source have been
used.
The use of many technical terms in both the text and the footnotes has been
unavoidable. Abbreviations have also been used extensively to eliminate
frequent repetition of long titles of agencies and officials and to identify
documents cited and the files and records in which they are located. For the
convenience of the reader, a Bibliographical Note, a Guide to Footnotes, a List
of Abbreviations, a Glossary of Code Names, and a Glossary of Technical Terms
have been appended.

Washington, D. C. JOSEPH BYKOFSKY

15 December 1954 HAROLD LARSON

xi
 Contents
Chapter Page
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

I . T H E ATLANTIC A N D CARIBBEAN BASES . . . . . . . . . 8

T h e North Atlantic Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
T h e Caribbean Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

I I . ALASKA A N D WESTERN CANADA . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Strategy and the Development of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . 31
Evolution of the Transportation Organization in Alaska . . . . . . . 35
Shipping—The Key to the Supply of Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Development o f Subports f o r Seattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
T h e Alaskan Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Rail Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Motor Transport Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
River Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Alaskan Transportation—Post-V-J D a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

III. BUILD-UP I N BRITAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Bolero Against a Shifting Strategic Background . . . . . . . . . . 70
Initial Flow of Troops and Cargo to the United Kingdom . . . . . . 73
Development o f t h e Transportation Organization . . . . . . . . . . 74
Co-ordination of U.S. and British Transportation . . . . . . . . . 84
Cargo Reception, Identification, a n d Distribution . . . . . . . . . . 91
Ships, Troops, and Cargo for the Build-up . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Port Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Railway Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Motor Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Equipment a n d Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
T h e Situation o n D D a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

I V . NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

T h e Strategic Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Plans a n d Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Organisation of Transportation in North Africa . . . . . . . . . . 148
Port a n d Shipping Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Highway Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Railway Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Evacuation of Patients and Enemy Prisoners of War . . . . . . . . 177
T h e Final Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

xiii
Chapter Page
V . SICILY A N D ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
The Organization of Transportation in the Mediterranean . . . . . . 184
U.S. Army Transportation i n Sicily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Transportation i n t h e Italian Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Rail Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Truck a n d Highway Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Other Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
T h e Final Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

V I . T H E INVASION O F NORMANDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

The Establishment of Planning Machinery for Continental Operations . . 234
Planning a s o f D D a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Mounting t h e Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Out loading From the United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Beach a n d Early Port Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Initial Motor Transport Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Early Rail Operations i n Normandy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
The Transfer of Transportation Headquarters to the Continent . . . . . 287

VII. T H E ASSAULT O N SOUTHERN FRANCE . . . . . . . . . 290

Plans a n d Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
Mounting Dragoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Beach Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Opening t h e Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Initial Motor Transport Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Early Military Railway Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
The Transition to a Communications Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . 298

VIII. FRANCE, BELGIUM, A N D GERMANY . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Transportation in Relation to Tactical Developments . . . . . . . . 301
The Evolution of the Transportation Organization . . . . . . . . . 303
T h e Expansion o f Port Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
T h e Problem o f Shipping Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
U.S. Army Port Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
Movement Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
Motor Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
Railway Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
Inland Waterways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
Transportation Corps Supply on the Continent . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Outbound Passenger a n d Cargo Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

I X . T H E PERSIAN CORRIDOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375

The Significance of the Persian Corridor in Allied Strategy . . . . . . . 375
T h e Period o f British Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379

xiv
Chapter Page
IX. THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR—Continued
The U.S. Army Assumes a Transportation Mission . . . . . . . . . 382
T h e Months o f Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
The Development of American Transportation Operations . . . . . . . 392
Port Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
T h e Military Railway Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
T h e Motor Transport Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
The Close of U.S. Army Transportation Operations . . . . . . . . . 423

X . T H E SOUTHWEST PACIFIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425

T h e Organizational a n d Logistical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
T h e Transportation Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
T h e Regulating System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
The U.S. Army Fleet in SWPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
Port Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
Rail Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
Motor Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
T h e Transportation Load i n SWPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Demobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487

X L T H E SOUTH A N D CENTRAL PACIFIC . . . . . . . . . . . 489

The Hawaiian Area—Pearl Harbor to Midway . . . . . . . . . . 491
Safeguarding the Lines of Communication in the South Pacific . . . . . . 494
Transportation in Support of the South Pacific Offensives . . . . . . . 497
From Static Defense to Offensive Operations in the Central Pacific . . . . 509
Redeployment, Rehabilitation, and Roll-up in the South Pacific . . . . . 523
Transportation in the Final Phase of the War . . . . . . . . . . . 527
Postwar Transportation Operations in the Middle Pacific . . . . . . . 545

XII. CHINA, BURMA, A N D INDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547

T h e Strategical a n d Logistical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
T h e Indian Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
T h e Assam Line o f Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567
The Military Railway Service in India-Burma . . . . . . . . . . . 572
American Barge Lines i n India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579
Motor Transport on the Stilwell (Ledo-Burma) Road . . . . . . . . 580
U.S. Army Transportation i n China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591

XIII. OBSERVATIONS A N D CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 605

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620

GUIDE T O FOOTNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 626

LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 628

xv
Chapter Page
GLOSSARY O F CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637

GLOSSARY O F TECHNICAL TERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647

Tables
No.
1. U. S. Army Troops Debarked in the United Kingdom, by Port Area,
January 1942-June 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2. U. S. Army Cargo Landed in the United Kingdom, by Port Area,
January 1942-June 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3. Vehicle and Cargo Deliveries to China and Burma by Months: 1945 . . 586

Charts
1. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, SOS, ETOUSA:
9 January 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, AFHQ,
NATOUSA—COMZONE, NATOUSA: October 1944 . . . . . . 188
3. Loading of U. S. Assault Forces for Normandy Invasion: June 1944 . . 253
4. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, COMZONE,
ETOUSA: 1 April 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
5. Tonnage Moved East of the Seine and North of the Rhone: 1944-45 . . 349
6. Organization of Headquarters, Transportation Corps, USASOS,
SWPA: December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
7. Schematic Diagram of China Transportation Routes: August 1945 . . . 600

Maps
1. Alaska Highway and Connecting Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2. Transportation Regions in the United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3. Lines of Communication in French North Africa . . . . . . . . . . 138
4. Routes of the Red Ball Express . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
5. XYZ Motor Transport Hauls: 14 April 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
6. Phase Operations, 2d MRS: 1 October 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
7 . T h e Persian Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
8 . Calcutta-Kunming Line o f Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . 548
9. Assam Line of Communications: December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 569
1 0 . Kunming-East LOC: February 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592

xvi
 Illustrations
(Following page 374)

Movement of Troops
The Versatile DUKW
DUKW's in Use
Ingenious Use of Terrain Features
Widespread Destruction of Facilities
Sunken Ships
Port Congestion
The Port of Antwerp
MRS Operations in India
Rail Equipment
Climatic Extremes
Convoys for China
Overland Movements East of Kunming
Truck Refueling Station
Road Conditions in Burma and Iran
Delivering the Goods
Support of the Final Offensive Against Germany

Illustrations are from the Department of Defense files.

xvii
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS:
OPERATIONS OVERSEAS
 Introduction
The entrance of the United States into
World War II created transportation
problems of unprecedented scope and
complexity. Requirements for the deploy-
ment of military forces and materiel to
oversea commands and their intratheater
movement dwarfed those of World War I,
in which men and supplies were moved
over a relatively short sea line of com-
munications to well-established, protected
ports for action on a single major front. In
World War II much larger forces were
employed overseas on far-flung active and
inactive fronts. Their deployment and
support, as well as the provision of con-
siderable assistance to our Allies, made it
necessary to spread shipping over sea
lanes encircling the globe. The reception
and distribution of cargoes and personnel
in the theaters were rendered more diffi-
cult by the lack of port, storage, and other
base facilities in many areas of the Pacific,
the North Atlantic, and Alaska; by exten-
sive destruction of ports and railroads in
France and Italy; and by unsatisfactory
lines of communication in such backward
areas as North Africa, Iran, and India.
Furthermore, amphibious operations on a
scale hitherto undreamed of had to be
undertaken in both the transatlantic and
the transpacific theaters in order to come
to grips with the Axis powers and to ad-
vance on their homelands. The move-
ment of assault forces and their equip-
ment to and across beaches alone con-
stituted transportation tasks of great
magnitude.
From the outset transportation, particu-
larly ocean shipping, proved vital in the
conduct of the war. Initially, no other
logistical factor exercised a more direct
limiting effect on strategic planning. Even
before Pearl Harbor, the problem of se-
curing shipping to service oversea areas
and the necessity of developing oversea
ports had arisen in connection with the
strengthening of defenses of Panama,
Puerto Rico, and Alaska, and the estab-
lishment of Army garrisons in the North
Atlantic and the Caribbean, foreshadow-
ing the greater problems to be encountered
after the nation became involved in a
global war.1
Before Pearl Harbor U.S. and British
planners had decided to place the major
emphasis on the defeat of Germany in the
event that the United States and Japan
should enter the war. The decision was
reaffirmed at the ARCADIA Conference of
December 1941-January 1942. Initial ac-
tion in the Pacific was to be limited to
strategic defense. Among the basic under-
lying assumptions were such logistical
factors as the shorter Atlantic route and
the availability of developed ports in
Europe.
1
For a discussion of the vital role played by trans-
portation in the conduct of the war, see Chester
Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities,
Organization, and Operations, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951),
Ch. I. On the limiting effects of the shipping shortage
on strategic planning, see Maurice Matloff and
Edward M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition
Warfare: 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), passim.
4 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
The execution of this strategic design
was deferred when other and more urgent
tasks developed. Aside from defending the
east and west coasts of the United States,
it was necessary immediately to reinforce
Hawaii, the Panama Canal, Alaska, and
other outposts. Although the strategic
plans called for checking the Japanese ad-
vance into the South and Southwest
Pacific and safeguarding the air and sea
lanes of communication with those areas,
the execution required far more men and
matériel than was originally thought ade-
quate. At the same time lend-lease aid to
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and
China was essential if those nations were
to continue their resistance to the enemy
powers. With shipping in critically short
supply and losses through submarine ac-
tion exceeding new production, imple-
mentation of the long-range strategic plan
suffered while planners sought to meet the
more immediate requirements to the
extent that transportation would permit.
Far more troops were deployed to the
Pacific in the first six months of 1942 than
to Britain under the plan to build up a
striking force there (BOLERO). Although
effective reinforcement of the Philippines
proved impossible, American forces were
landed in Australia and on South Pacific
islands lying athwart the air and sea lanes
to the Southwest Pacific. Considerable at-
tention was given to the strengthening of
Hawaiian defenses until the Battle of Mid-
way eliminated the threat to that area.
The longer sea voyages, the lack of port
and storage facilities west of Hawaii and
north of Australia, and the consequent
delay in the turnaround of vessels resulted
in the delivery of fewer troops and less
matériel to the Pacific than could have
been moved to Europe with the same
amount of shipping.
Other important areas required and re-
ceived support during this period. Troops,
supplies, and construction materials were
shipped to garrison and expand Alaskan
stations and to undertake new projects in
western Canada, including the Canol and
Alcan undertakings for the development
of local oil resources and the construction
of the Alaska Highway. In the Atlantic,
reinforcements were rushed to Caribbean
and South American bases and to Iceland.
Small forces were also sent to India, half-
way around the world, to conduct air
activities and to expedite the delivery of
lend-lease materials to China.
Developments during the summer of
1942 continued to exercise an adverse
effect on BOLERO. Desiring, for psycho-
logical as well as military reasons, to get
American forces into action against Ger-
many, the British and American chiefs of
state decided on an invasion of North
Africa. The requirements for this opera-
tion made it necessary to restrict greatly
the flow of men and materials to the
United Kingdom in the fall and winter of
1942-43, and in fact placed a drain on
those already provided under the build-
up program. During the course of the
North African campaign the longer sea
voyages, the shortage of escort vessels, and
inadequate port capacities added to the
great burden already placed on shipping.
Meanwhile, the hazards to convoys on
the Murmansk route and the possibility of
Japanese interference on the Pacific route
had caused Allied leaders to decide to de-
velop a supply line to the USSR through
the Persian Gulf as an alternative. This
necessitated the provision of American
troops and equipment to take over and ex-
pand the operation of Iranian port and
railway facilities and to establish a truck-
ing service. In large measure, the men and
INTRODUCTION
materials, as well as shipping, were made
available by diversions from BOLERO.
Furthermore, although the Pacific was
assigned the mission of strategic defense,
the limited offensive beginning with the
Guadalcanal assault in August 1942 re-
quired substantial shipping. Port facilities
at Noumea and other South Pacific island
bases proved incapable of handling the
shipping directed to the area. By late fall
a large number of vessels had become im-
mobilized awaiting discharge, a develop-
ment that not only endangered the success
of the Guadalcanal Campaign but also
contributed to the general shortage of
shipping, then being strained to the
utmost by the North African invasion.
It was not until the late spring of 1943
that increased vessel production and re-
duced submarine losses tended to make
ocean shipping a less restrictive factor in
strategic planning. At the TRIDENT and
QUADRANT Conferences, the Allied plan-
ners decided not only to go ahead with the
build-up of U.S. forces in the United
Kingdom for the invasion of the European
continent but also to implement a pro-
gram of "unremitting pressure" against
Japan. By August the movement of men
and materials to Great Britain had at-
tained major proportions, even as Sicily
was being overrun and preparations were
being made for landings in Italy. Mean-
while, South and Southwest Pacific forces
had begun a steady advance up the
Solomons-New Guinea ladder. In the
Central Pacific, the Hawaiian area was
converted into a huge base for mounting
and supporting assaults on the Gilberts
and Marshalls—preliminary campaigns
to a general westward advance. Following
decisions to undertake a north Burma
campaign and to accelerate air deliveries
over the Hump, the China-Burma-India
5
theater was provided the service troops
and the equipment necessary to break the
bottlenecks on the line of communications
supporting those operations. Shipping and
assault forces were provided also for the
expulsion of the Japanese from the Aleu-
tians.
No longer the predominant considera-
tion in strategic planning after mid-1943,
shipping remained a conditioning factor
throughout the war. The necessity of
maintaining secondary and inactive areas
such as China-Burma-India, Alaska, the
Persian Corridor, and the North Atlantic
and Caribbean bases, and of meeting lend-
lease and other commitments to Allies had
a bearing on the timing and scope of
operations on active fronts. The effort to
meet lend-lease commitments to the Soviet
Union, for example, provided constant
competition for vessels also needed to
maintain American military operations.
In addition, during the latter part of 1943
increased U.S. commitments to the
United Kingdom import program placed
a serious drain on available shipping.2
Moreover, requirements for vessels for
intratheater movements consistently ex-
ceeded the amount of shipping the plan-
ners in Washington provided for the pur-
pose, causing theater commanders to
retain a considerable number of trans-
oceanic vessels for use in their own areas.
Theater commanders encouraged the
practice because of the lack of suitable
port and storage facilities, a deficiency
that led to the use of vessels as floating
warehouses. Naturally more concerned
with the success of operations in their own
2
For details on the effect of the Soviet Protocols
and the United Kingdom import program on ship-
ping, see Richard M. Leighton and Robert W.
Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1955), Chs. XX-XXI, XV.
6 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
areas than with the world-wide shipping
situation, oversea commands tended to di-
rect more vessels to advance bases than
could be unloaded and to discharge only
the cargoes immediately needed, keeping
the remainder aboard the vessels in port.
In late 1944 vessel retentions, particularly
in the European Theater of Operations
and the Southwest Pacific Area, reached
such proportions that they interfered with
the movement of essential materials from
U.S. ports. As a result, presidential inter-
vention through the Joint Chiefs of Staff 3
was required. Theater commanders were
made directly responsible for the economi-
cal utilization of shipping in their respec-
tive areas. They were directed to match
shipping with the discharge capacity at
destination ports, ban the use of vessels for
storage purposes, and severely restrict the
practice of selective discharge.4
While ocean shipping gradually de-
clined in relative importance as a factor
shaping strategy, the availability of land-
ing craft persisted as a major considera-
tion. The decision to assault Sicily and
Italy adversely affected plans for am-
phibious operations in Burma. Later, the
shortage of suitable craft caused the post-
ponement of landings in southern France
that were originally scheduled to be
undertaken simultaneously with the Nor-
mandy invasion.5 In the Pacific, where
amphibious warfare prevailed, plans for
campaigns hinged on whether or not there
would be sufficient assault vessels.
Deployment overseas, involving the
movement by the Army of 7,293,354 pas-
sengers and 126,787,875 measurement
tons in the period from December 1941
through August 1945, was a gigantic
transportation task, but by no means the
only one.6 Intratheater movement was
essential and often involved large-scale
Army transportation operations. In all
oversea commands, existing port, rail,
motor, and inland water transport facili-
ties were insufficient to handle wartime
traffic, and in some areas they were non-
existent. Consequently, it proved neces-
sary to provide American troops and
equipment to supplement, augment, or
take over transportation facilities and
greatly expand their operations.
During the course of the war American
soldiers were called upon to perform trans-
portation jobs under every conceivable
operating condition and on every conti-
nent but Antarctica. They worked vessels
at ports and off the beaches in the wind-
swept and barren Aleutians, in the de-
bilitating heat of Iran, India, and North
Africa, in subarctic Greenland and Ice-
land, on isolated and sometimes un-
healthy Pacific islands, in the United
Kingdom, and in war devastated areas of
Sicily, Italy, France, and Belgium. They
ran trains over reconstructed lines on the
European continent, across deserts and
mountains in Iran and North Africa,
through the monsoon rains in Assam in
India, and over ice-coated track and in
sub-zero temperatures in Alaska and west-
ern Canada. They drove trucks on the
Ledo Road over the hill and jungle
country of Burma, negotiated dusty desert
and high mountain passes in Iran, hauled
an entire Army corps across the length of
Tunisia, and provided flexible support for
American forces advancing from the
3
Throughout the war, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
consisted of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Army
Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, Army Air
Forces, and a personal representative of the President.
4
Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 282-96.
5
Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., Ch. XXV; Gordon
A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951),
pp. 166-73.
6
Wardlow, op. cit., p. 99.
INTRODUCTION
Normandy beachhead. They operated
amphibian vehicles in landings in Sicily,
Italy, and France, and in every Pacific as-
sault from the Marshalls campaign on-
ward. They also operated river craft on
the Brahmaputra River in India and the
Leopold Canal, the Rhine, and the
Danube in Europe. Often the jobs were
done under great pressure, sometimes
under fire, and usually with an initial
shortage of men, supplies, and equipment.
Transportation operations within the
oversea commands naturally varied
greatly in nature and extent, depending
on the mission of the theater, the size of
the forces employed, the lines of communi-
cations that could be utilized, the avail-
ability of local facilities and manpower,
the American transportation equipment
and personnel provided, the climate, the
terrain, and other factors. The organiza-
tions established in the theaters to direct
transportation operations were equally
diverse. The Army Transportation Corps,
a new technical service created in July
1942, made rapid headway in establish-
ing itself as an effective central agency in
the zone of interior. In the theaters, how-
ever, it was initially almost unknown, and
7
regulations defining its place in the theater
structure were lacking. As a result, Army
transportation organizations overseas
tended to vary in authority and functions
with local conditions and the desires of
theater commanders. A selling job was
necessary before the importance of cen-
tralizing and co-ordinating transportation
was understood and carried into practice.
The Transportation Corps started out as a
small service struggling to gain control
over transportation functions exercised by
established agencies, notably G-4, the
Quartermaster Corps, and the Corps of
Engineers, so that it could fulfill its mis-
sion. Many problems were raised in de-
termining the role of the Transportation
Corps in commands where authority was
decentralized to territorial base sections
and in areas under Allied or unified com-
mand. By an evolutionary process the
Transportation Corps gradually grew in
stature as the war progressed. In some
theaters it eventually approximated the
organization that had been developed in
the zone of interior, and, while differing in
the manner of organization, it ultimately
assumed a position of considerable im-
portance in most commands.
 CHAPTER I

The Atlantic
and Caribbean Bases
The expansion of the U.S. oversea Caribbean bases added materially to the
military establishment, which during the work of the Quartermaster Corps and the
war virtually encircled the globe, began Supply Division, G-4, which were then
rather modestly in 1939 with the reinforce- responsible for Army transportation. Since
ment of Army garrisons in Panama and the sites to be leased from the British were
Puerto Rico. With the end of the "phony not developed, considerable new construc-
war" in Europe in the spring of 1940, the tion would be necessary, involving sizable
United States was compelled to concen- shipments of men and materials. The
trate upon securing its own frontiers as Army Transport Service, the branch of the
well as protecting the Panama Canal. The Quartermaster Corps then operating a
somber prospect in May of a complete small fleet of troop and cargo vessels, em-
collapse of both France and Great Britain braced barely enough ships to meet the
spurred the hasty adoption in the follow- requirements of the prewar offshore bases.
ing month of a new Joint Army-Navy After a study of shipping needs, under-
Plan (RAINBOW 4), aimed at preventing taken immediately after news of the
the Germans from acquiring a foothold in destroyers-for-bases transaction broke, The
the Western Hemisphere. During May the Quartermaster General took steps, in col-
British Prime Minister made his first re- laboration with the U.S. Maritime Com-
quest for a loan of old American destroyers mission, to increase the transport fleet.2
to bolster the British Navy. Negotiations Although original plans for these newly
bore fruit in the destroyers-for-bases agree- acquired bases were later scaled down,
ment of 2 September 1940, whereby Great their development, as well as the build-up
Britain received fifty overage destroyers,
1
and the United States acquired the right Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans
and Preparations, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
to lease naval and air bases in Newfound- WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), pp. 106-07,
land, Antigua, the Bahamas, Bermuda, 462-63, 477-85; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild,
Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British The Western Hemisphere, Vol. II, Ch. II, a volume
in preparation for the series UNITED STATES
Guiana. These newly leased bases in effect ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; Winston S. Churchill,
formed a new American defensive fron- Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Com-
tier, extending from Canada to South pany, 1949), pp. 24-25, 398-416.
2
OCT HB Monograph 5, pp. 42-48. For the titles
America.1 of OCT HB numbered monographs, see Bibliographi-
The acquisition of the Atlantic and cal Note, pp. 620-21.
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES
of Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal,
remained an important defense project
throughout 1941. During that year, more-
over, the defensive screen was pushed
farther eastward to embrace Greenland
and Iceland, and arrangements were made
for the establishment of a number of air
and meteorological stations in northeastern
Canada.
A brief survey of the transportation
problems involved in establishing and
maintaining these bases is a proper prel-
ude to the discussion of the more formida-
ble problems encountered after the United
States entered the war. Numerous other
bases scattered across the Atlantic, among
them Bermuda, the Azores, and Ascension
Island, each had its place in the conduct of
the war, but did not involve sufficiently
distinct transportation problems to war-
rant further mention here.
The North Atlantic Bases
The island of Newfoundland lies on the
great circle route between New York and
the British Isles, shielding the mouth of
the St. Lawrence and jutting into the
North Atlantic. Because of its strategic
location, this island outpost was accorded a
high priority for development as an Amer-
ican air and naval base.3 Following a sur-
vey of the island's potentialities in Septem-
ber 1940, a board of experts appointed by
the President recommended three sites for
development. Army installations later
established at these locations were Har-
mon Field, at Stephenville, Fort Pepper-
rell, near St. John's, and Fort McAndrew,
in the vicinity of Argentia.
Shipment of the first U.S. Army contin-
gent to Newfoundland, originally sched-
uled for mid-November 1940, was delayed,
principally because of the necessity of
9
finding and preparing a ship suitable to
transport the troops and quarter them un-
til housing could be provided ashore. After
undergoing repair and modification, the
Edmund B. Alexander finally sailed from the
Brooklyn Army Base on 15 January 1941
with 59 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 921
4
enlisted men. After four days at anchor
outside St. John's harbor waiting for a
heavy snowstorm and a strong gale to sub-
side, the vessel finally docked on the 29th
at a small leased wharf. Upon arrival, Col.
Maurice D. Welty, commander of the
troops, also took over as Superintendent,
Army Transport Service. The troops were
housed on board until May 1941 and then
moved ashore. Additional shipments arriv-
ing after that date brought U.S. Army
strength to almost 2,400 by the close of the
year.
These troop movements, coupled with
the steady flow of supplies and equipment
for the garrison and for base construction,
placed a heavy burden on the island's
transportation means. The leased dock
and other port facilities at St. John's were
inadequate. Argentia, the other available
port, was developed as a naval base, and
therefore its use by the Army was re-
stricted. The principal means of clearance
from the ports to Army stations and to the
main airport at Gander was the govern-
ment-owned Newfoundland Railway.
This narrow-gauge railroad was of small
3
Except as otherwise noted, the account of activities
in Newfoundland is drawn from the following: Hist
Monograph, U.S. Army Bases, Newfoundland, ASF
CE, Jan 46, OCMH Files; Summary of Hist Events
and Statistics, NYPE, 1941, OCT HB NYPE; Rpt,
Jesse Floyd, Industrial Traffic Engr, Commercial
Traffic Br OQMG, Newfoundland Railway and
Transportation To, and Within, Newfoundland (2
vols.), 19 Nov 41, OCT HB Newfoundland; Hist
Rcds, NBC, May 42-Apr 45, OCT HB NBC Rpts.
4
Special Rpt, NYPE Immediate Base Garrison for
St. John's, Newfoundland, transmitted with Ltr, 4 Jun
43, OCT HB Newfoundland.
10 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

capacity, its rolling stock was old and in ized the purchase of two 500-horsepower
poor condition, and heavy snowstorms tugs for use at St. John's.6
from January to April often hampered the More persistent were the difficulties
operation of trains. The few roads that with local longshoremen, who did their
existed were unimproved and could only work in a leisurely fashion and in one in-
be used for local movements. stance, upon discovering they were han-
Under the circumstances the Army had dling explosives, went on strike for higher
to take measures to improve transporta- wages in the midst of discharging a vessel.
tion facilities. The base construction pro- By late October 1941, refusal of the long-
gram called for replacing the leased wharf shoremen's union to permit port opera-
at St. John's with a permanent concrete tions for more than ten hours a day had so
dock equipped with two heavy-lift cranes. delayed cargo discharge as to hinder the
Work on this project was begun in August local construction program, leading the
1941. To supply Harmon Field with gaso- Secretary of War to request American
line and oil a pipeline was extended into representation to the British Embassy and
Bay St. George for direct discharge from the Newfoundland Government regarding
tankers anchored offshore. Considerable the urgent need of full-time operation at
American financial assistance and a mod- the Newfoundland ports.7
est amount of equipment were furnished The difficulty in unloading and clearing
for the rehabilitation of the railway, some cargo at St. John's caused The Quarter-
new road construction was undertaken, master General in January 1942 to ques-
and a temporary pier was erected at tion the wisdom of completing the new
Argentia. American dock at the eastern end of the
Pending completion of these projects, harbor away from the railway yards, and
the volume of inbound traffic inevitably led him to urge the Corps of Engineers to
exceeded the capacity of the local trans- develop a secondary port at Argentia.8 But
portation system. Port congestion, already the crisis was already passing. Although
evident at St. John's in September 1941, U.S. Army ground and air strength con-
remained a problem throughout the ensu- tinued to grow, reaching a peak of about
ing fall and winter months. Limited port 10,500 troops in June 1943, curtailment of
and rail facilities, together with snow, the construction program beginning early
gales, and fogs, delayed cargo discharge in 1942 brought a general reduction in
and clearance and compelled many vessels shipping requirements.
to wait for a berth. Unsatisfactory condi- The problem of port capacity was defi-
tions for cargo discharge contributed to
the congestion at the port.5 Vessels with The story of the unloading of the Leonard Wood in
5

May 1941 illustrates the difficulties encountered at St.

cargo requiring heavy lift equipment ini- John's. For details, see Extracted Rpt, CO Troops
tially had to be lightened and moved USAT Leonard Wood to ACofS G-4 Trans Sec WD, 17
across the harbor to the large crane at the May 41, OCT HB NBC Misc.
6
Memo, Actg ACofS G-4 to TQMG, 6 Jun 41, sub:
Newfoundland Railway docks. Action to Remarks and Recommendations . . . USAT Leonard
solve this problem was taken in June 1941, Wood, G-4/32033-2.
7
when G-4 requested that wherever possi- Ltr, SW to Secy State, 25 Oct 41, WPD 4351-9.
Cf. Memo For Rcd Only, 29 Oct 41, G-4/32033-2.
ble ships employed on the Newfoundland 8
See Corres, 9 Jan-26 Mar 42, OQMG 557 New-
run be not over 25-foot draft and author- foundland.
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES 11

nitely eased in February 1943, when oper- could be completed in that year, it was
ations began at the new U.S. Army dock suggested that they be manned and
at St. John's. Finally completed on 15 equipped as weather stations. On the basis
March, the 605-foot dock and wooden of this recommendation, arctic weather
transit shed proved adequate for the re- stations were established at Fort Chimo,
duced traffic, and two new electrically (CRYSTAL I), Labrador, at the upper end
operated gantry cranes, each with a capac- of Frobisher Bay (CRYSTAL II), and on
ity of thirty tons, added to the efficiency ofPadloping Island (CRYSTAL III), off the
operations. By this time construction was northeast coast of Baffin Island. The
drawing to a close, and existing port and CRYSTAL movement, involving shipment
rail facilities were fully capable of han- from Boston of a small detachment for
dling the maintenance of a fairly static each station, arctic housing, technical
garrison and the delivery of aviation gaso- equipment for communications and
line and other operating requirements to weather service, aviation gasoline, and
the airfields. Newfoundland remained an food and fuel reserves, was effected in the
important U.S. air and naval base, with fall of 1941 by the USAT Sicilien, five
St. John's as the principal Army port. trawlers, and three small Norwegian ves-
sels added to the fleet during a stop at
The Crimson and Crystal Bases
Halifax.
U.S. Army transportation activity in The movement, begun on 21 Septem-
northeastern Canada was a direct out- ber 1941, was made over a long and haz-
growth of the development of the air ferry ardous route and presented a number of
route to the United Kingdom. The British unusual problems. Since the CRYSTAL
and Canadians in late 1940 had begun to stations were accessible only to compara-
ferry bombers directly across the Atlantic tively small vessels, it was necessary to
from Gander, Newfoundland, to Prest- transfer the Sicilien's cargo to the other
wick, Scotland, a nonstop flight of about ships for final delivery. This was partially
2,100 miles. Despite impressive results, the accomplished at Halifax and was com-
route had serious shortcomings. The pleted at Port Burwell Harbor, the ren-
weather was often hazardous, and the dis- dezvous near CRYSTAL I from which the
tance from Newfoundland to Scotland was final runs were made. Because of ice and
too great for short-range aircraft. The snow, tides up to forty-two feet, and un-
inauguration of the lend-lease program in satisfactory charts and soundings, the
March 1941 pointed up the need for a utmost caution had to be exercised. At
more northerly air ferry route that would each base the same procedure was fol-
take advantage of the steppingstones to lowed. Spurred on by extra pay, the sea-
Britain afforded by Newfoundland, Green- men turned to and assisted in cargo dis-
land, and Iceland.9 9
For a convenient summary, see Samuel Milner,
At the War Department's direction, sur- "Establishing the Bolero Ferry Route," Military Affairs,
veys of possible landing fields in Labrador XI, 4 (Winter 1947), 213-22. On the Air Corps Ferry-
ing Command (later renamed the Air Transport Com-
and on Baffin Island were made during mand), see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate
June and July 1941. Four sites were (eds.), The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, Plans and
selected, but since ice and snow would seal Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1948) (hereafter
off the area before any major construction cited as AAF, I), 314-18, 346-47, 362-63.
12 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

charge. Eskimos helped as pilots and a large storage shed, both served by rail;
laborers. After cargo was lightered ashore, equipment for loading and unloading
a small engineer detachment erected pre- ships and rail cars with grain and general
fabricated housing, installed communica- cargo; and a marine repair yard. Ships of
tions equipment and weather-recording 28-foot draft could be berthed at all stages
apparatus, and laid in supplies and fuel of the tide. The port was accessible to
for the radio and weather men assigned to ocean-going vessels from the latter part of
maintain a lonely vigil through the long July to mid-October; thereafter, high
winter months. By late November the ex- winds, heavy snow, ice, and sub-zero tem-
pedition had left the area, having success- peratures halted port operations.12
fully carried out a difficult assignment U.S. Army marine activity at Churchill
under discouraging conditions.10 got under way after a hasty survey in mid-
U.S. Army operations in northeastern June 1942 by Paul C. Grening, a former
Canada received fresh impetus when the sea captain then serving as a civilian con-
air ferry program underwent rapid expan- sultant in the Office of the Chief of Trans-
sion following the entry of the United portation. Early in July port personnel
States into the war. The main route under were selected, and by arrangement with
development, extending from Presque Canadian transportation officials all rail-
Isle, Maine, via Labrador, Greenland, way facilities and dock equipment at
Iceland, to Prestwick, Scotland, involved Churchill were placed at the U.S. Army's
a long hop from Goose Bay, Labrador, to disposal, as were all Canadian craft in the
13
Narsarssuak, Greenland. To facilitate the Hudson Bay area. Preceded by the
rapid delivery of long-range and short- 10
On the CRYSTAL stations, see the following: Rpt,
range aircraft to the British Isles, the Capt Paul C. Grening to TQMG, 9 Dec 41; Personal
United States and Canada in the summer Journal of Comdr Alexander Forbes, Sep-Oct 41; In-
of 1942 joined in a co-operative venture, formal Rpt, Forbes to Col Howard Craig [Nov 41]. All
the CRIMSON Project, designed to set up in in OCT HB North America CRYSTAL. See also Hist
Monograph, U.S. Army Base, Frobisher Bay, NAD
central and northeastern Canada a series CE, Mar 46, Supplements 1 and 2, OCMH Files.
11
of airfields, 400 to 500 miles apart, situated Milner, loc. cit.; Memo, CG AAF for CofE, 1 Jun
42, sub: Addtl Rqmts, NE Ferry Route, in Supple-
along alternate routes to permit a choice ment 4, Hist Monograph, U.S. Army Base, Fort
of landing fields in the event of bad Chimo, NAD CE, Mar 46, OCMH Files; AG Ltr
weather.11 320.2 (7-23-42) MS-E-M, 27 Jul 42, sub: Comd, Sup,
and Adm, CRIMSON Project; Stetson Conn and Byron
To provide for the movement of the men Fairchild, The Western Hemisphere, Vol. I, The
and materials necessary for construction Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. XIII, pp.
of the CRIMSON bases in the Hudson Bay 47-54, a volume in preparation for the series
area, the War Department established a UNITED 12
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
Memo, Chief Rail Div for Brig Gen Theodore H.
port operation on the bay at Churchill in Dillon, 13 Jun 42, sub: Rail Facilities at Churchill
Manitoba. Originally developed for the . . . , OCT HB North America CRIMSON Project;
Hist Monograph, U.S. Army Bases, Churchill, NAD
export of Canadian wheat, Churchill was CE, Jan 46, pp. IM, IV-9-10, VI-4, OCMH Files.
linked with The Pas, the nearest inland 13
Memo, Grening for George W. Auxier, 9 Dec 42,
settlement of any size, by a standard- sub: Hist Statement re Churchill PE; Memo, Exec
gauge single-track rail line, approximately OCT for CG SOS, 1 Jul 42, sub: Port Bn and Port Hq
for Churchill; Memo, Col Norman H. Vissering for
510 miles long. The port's water-front CofT, 4 Jul 42, sub: Rpt on Conf with Canadian Offi-
facilities included an 1,800-foot wharf and cials. All in OCT HB Ocean Trans Ports Churchill.
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES
389th Port Battalion and a small group of
civilians experienced in cargo handling,
the recently activated 12th Port, com-
manded by Lt. Col. (later Col.) Curtis A.
Noble, arrived by rail at Churchill on 19
July. With the assistance of the civilian
component, the port troops operated at
Churchill during the brief open season,
receiving shipments by rail from the south
and outloading them on vessels for delivery
to air bases then under construction in the
Hudson Bay area.14
By the end of the shipping season, a
total of 626 passengers and 25,310 weight
tons had been shipped. The bulk of the
cargo was moved to Southampton Island,
Fort Chimo, and upper Frobisher Bay,
with small tonnages going to various
weather stations. Deliveries to these bases
were hampered by the hazardous waters
and adverse weather of the Hudson Bay
area and the necessity of lightering all
cargo from ship to shore at destination.
Altogether, it was a small and costly oper-
ation involving twenty vessels. Colonel
Noble and his men returned to the United
States in November 1942, leaving behind
at Churchill 115 carloads of Engineer and
Signal Corps supplies that had arrived too
late for shipment.
Despite planning in the Office of the
Chief of Transportation at Washington,
U.S. Army port operations were never re-
sumed at Churchill. Instead, the installa-
tions in the Hudson Bay area were sup-
plied directly by water from Boston.15 The
utility of Churchill was severely limited
because of the port's brief open season and
the long rail haul from its source of sup-
ply. More important, the Hudson Bay
routes that it served proved of limited
wartime value. This resulted from the fact
that increasingly large numbers of assem-
bled aircraft were being delivered to the
13
United Kingdom as deckloads on tankers
and Liberty ships, while improved facil-
ities at air bases, advances in aircraft range
and dependability, and better weather
data made possible increasingly heavy
movement of airplanes over the main ferry
routes through Labrador and Newfound-
land without recourse to additional step-
pingstones in northeastern Canada.16
Greenland
A huge island lying northeast of Labra-
dor, Greenland formed a vital part of the
protective screen shielding the east coast
of North America and became an im-
portant way station on the North Atlantic
air route. A country of ice, snow, and cold,
the rugged coast with its deeply indented
fjords offered magnificent scenery but al-
most no port facilities. For much of the
year ice blocked the approaches from the
sea, and ice floes were a serious hazard for
all shipping. The mining town of Ivigtut,
the most developed settlement, had the
only road in Greenland, stretching about
two miles back from a small artificial har-
bor with a single pier for loading cryolite,
a mineral used in the production of
aluminum.
While preliminary inspections by the
U.S. Army and Navy of several possible
14
On port operations at Churchill, see Port Log,
12th PE, Churchill, 12 Jul-15 Oct 42, and Hist, 12th
Port, 5 Jul-13 Nov 42, OCT HB Oversea Ports;
Memo, Vissering, Trans Member, for Chmn North
Atlantic Ferry Route, 8 Nov 42, sub: Resume of
Trans Activities in Connection with the CRIMSON
Project, OCT HB Ocean Trans Ports Churchill.
15
For details, see Col. Norman H. Vissering's let-
ters and memoranda, 5 January-25 June 1943 (OCT
HB Ocean Trans Ports Churchill). Vissering was the
key figure in OCT planning for the CRIMSON Project.
16
OCT HB Monograph 19, pp. 156-63; Hist Mon-
ograph, History of United States Army Forces, Central
Canada, pp. 1-3, 14-20, and Exhibit A, OCMH
Files.
14
sites for airfields and other military instal-
lations were underway, U.S. and Green-
land authorities on 9 April 1941 entered
into a joint agreement granting the United
States the right to locate and construct
landing fields and other installations for
the defense of Greenland and the North
American continent. Because of the short
working season, the lack of construction
materials, and the dearth of facilities for
the discharge of ships, the project was
bound to be difficult. All food, supplies,
and equipment for American use would
have to be imported. 17
By late April 1941 Narsarssuak, in the
southernmost part of Greenland on the
Tunugdliarfik Fjord, had been chosen as
the site for first air base. Conveniently lo-
cated about midway between Goose Bay,
Labrador, and Reykjavik, Iceland, Nar-
sarssuak could be reached from either
point by a hop of about 775 miles. It natu-
rally became the destination of the first
military force shipped to Greenland from
the United States. 18 Selected to perform
initial construction and defense, this force
was built around a battalion of aviation
engineers and an antiaircraft battery. The
Corps of Engineers, which was responsible
for the construction program, made the
heaviest demands on shipping.
After considerable delay in readying
one of the two Army transports assigned
to lift the expedition and its equipment, a
force of 23 officers and 446 enlisted men,
accompanied by 2,565 long tons of cargo,
sailed under naval escort from New York
on 19 June 1941. The convoy proceeded
to Ivigtut, where it picked up several
pilots, and on 6 July dropped anchor at
Narsarssuak near the site of the projected
air base. Cargo discharge, begun on the
following day, was a slow and difficult
task. Everything had to be lifted by ship's
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
gear into lighters, of which there were too
few; the tidal range o f t e n to twelve feet
hampered the unloading of lighters; float-
ing ice was a frequent hazard; and
anchorage was a problem because of poor
holding ground and limited space for
maneuvering. All troops had to assist in
cargo discharge, with a resultant adverse
effect on the construction program. It was
August before the two vessels completed
discharge. Meanwhile, work on the air
base had begun. 19
At Narsarssuak initial construction by
military personnel ended in late Septem-
ber 1941, when the contractor's force ar-
rived. About the same time another group
of civilian construction workers began
work on a second air base at Sondre
Stromfjord. There also unloading cargo
by lighter proved a long and difficult
process. As soon as possible a temporary
dock was built where lighters could be
moored for discharge. Movement ashore
was hampered because only five trucks
had arrived in the first convoy. A third air
installation was established at Ikateq, near
Angmagssalik on the east coast.20
Except for a few Navy facilities, mili-
tary installations on Greenland were de-
signed for the furtherance of the North
Atlantic air ferry route. Because of the
emphasis on air, an Air Corps officer, Col.
Benjamin F. Giles, was designated as the
first commanding officer of the Greenland
17
OCT HB Monograph 11, pp. 2-1 1; Craven and
Cate (eds.), AAF, I, 122; Watson, op. cit., pp. 485-86;
U.S. Department of State, Peace and War; United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1942), pp. 99-100.
18
Craven and Cate (eds.), AAF, I, 343.
19
OCT HB Monograph 11, pp. 11-26.
20
Hist Monograph, U.S. Army Bases, Greenland,
ASF CE. Mar 46 (hereafter cited as Greenland), Vol.
I, pp. IV-4-5, V-12-13, OCMH Files; OCT HB
Monograph 11, pp. 32-35; AG 580 Mvmt to Green-
land, Sec. 4; G-4/32869, Sec. 1.
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES
Base Command, which was established in
21
the fall of 1941.
Cargo shipments to Greenland were
modest in 1941, but with America's entry
into the war there was a fairly heavy
movement of materials from the United
States, totaling 194,700 measurement tons
during 1942. The main categories were
construction materials, equipment, and
supplies for the Corps of Engineers and its
contractors, gasoline and lubricants for the
Air Forces, and subsistence and other
maintenance supplies for the garrisons.22
Considerable difficulty was experienced
during 1941 and 1942 in maintaining a
balanced flow of supplies to Greenland.
Since no regular American steamship
service to Greenland existed in the sum-
mer of 1941, the Corps of Engineers char-
tered several small freighters to meet its
shipping needs. The North Atlantic Divi-
sion of the Corps of Engineers, which was
directly responsible for construction in
Greenland, established its own base at
Claremont Terminal, Jersey City, New
Jersey, where supplies and equipment
were assembled, stored, and segregated
according to priority of shipment. 23 The
arrangement proved unsatisfactory, for
the port commander at Boston found that
ships for Greenland arrived from New
York so heavily loaded with Engineer
items that little or no space remained to
lift other cargo accumulated at his
installation.
The Greenland Base Command re-
ported that its supply situation was un-
satisfactory because insufficient shipping
space had been allotted to supplies needed
for maintenance and operation, as distin-
guished from construction. After confer-
ences in June and July 1942, involving
representatives of the Greenland Base
Command, the Chief of Engineers, and
15
the Chief of Transportation, it was decided
to assign all shipping available for the sup-
ply of the Greenland bases to the Boston
Port of Embarkation and to make that
port responsible for allocating shipping
space in accordance with priorities set by
the Greenland Base Command. Also the
Corps of Engineers agreed to transfer its
activity from the Claremont Terminal to
Boston. By mid-December 1942 the sup-
ply difficulties had been overcome.24
While a solution was being worked out
for the shipping and supply situation, the
Greenland Base Command was grappling
with the local transportation problem.
During the first year service personnel and
means for cargo handling were extremely
limited; enforced reliance upon lighterage
and the handicaps imposed by the high
tides slowed cargo operations; and, be-
cause of the limited navigation season,
freighters tended to bunch in Greenland
waters awaiting discharge and convoy
arrangements.
Efforts by the Army to deal with this
situation were devoted first to the im-
provement of port facilities. At Narsar-
ssuak, which became the chief U.S. Army
port of the command, the need of a dock
was first met by building a temporary
structure about 150 feet long. Later, a
small sheltered cove was selected as the
site of a more permanent dock. Construc-
tion, begun in February 1942, featured
wooden cribs filled with rocks to form a
448-foot marginal wharf. When this dock
was finished as many as three small ships
could be discharged simultaneously.
Warehouses, oil and water pipelines, har-
21
Memo, Actg ACofS for CofS USA, 3 Jun 41, sub:
CO Greenland Base Comd, WPD 4173-86.
22
23
ASF MPR, Sec. 3, 31 Jan 43, p. 86.
Greenland, Vol. I, pp. IV-5-6, IV-25-26.
24
For the basic correspondence, June-December
1942, see OCT 000-400 Greenland.
16
bor craft, and crash boats also were
provided.
Improvements at other ports were more
modest. At Ivigtut, aside from the local
facilities for loading cryolite, the U.S.
Navy had a rock-filled crib dock used
principally by Coast Guard vessels and
tankers, and the Army had two small crib
docks suitable only for barges. At Sondre
Stromfjord the Army had a 106-foot oil
dock, as well as a 140-foot cargo dock.
Both were temporary structures built to
accommodate barges, as was also the small
crib dock at Ikateq. 25
As port construction moved forward,
steps were taken to relieve the shortage of
port personnel, which had necessitated the
employment of inexperienced troop labor
and civilian construction workers. In an
unusual but costly effort to cope with this
situation, the Chief of Transportation re-
cruited thirty-two experienced longshore-
men in Baltimore and Philadelphia. This
group worked in Greenland from mid-
October to late December 1942, and in
that short period reduced appreciably the
amount of undischarged cargo. 26 More
permanent relief followed the arrival in
1943 of the 194th Port Company, organ-
ized and trained especially for work at the
Greenland bases. The men of the 194th
were distributed in detachments among
the various bases. At Narsarssuak, where
the load was greatest, they had to be sup-
plemented with other troops.
By the fall of 1943 transportation diffi-
culties in Greenland were no longer acute.
With the completion of major construc-
tion, the volume of inbound cargo
declined sharply. The new main dock at
Narsarssuak, equipped with crawler
cranes of 20-ton capacity, proved satisfac-
tory,' and transportation personnel sta-
tioned there were reported to be capable
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
and efficient. Although Greenland re-
mained important as a link in the air
route to the United Kingdom, by the
summer of 1944 the transportation tasks
27
had become largely routine.
In June 1945, the port organizations at
Sondre Stromfjord, Ivigtut, and Angmag-
ssalik were closing out, and all transporta-
tion activity was being concentrated at
Narsarssuak. Personnel were redeployed,
except for those left at each base to crate
and load the material to be shipped to
Narsarssuak. There, excess equipment was
either sold to the Danish Government or
returned to the United States.28
Iceland
Iceland, like Greenland, attracted the
attention of the United States many
months before Pearl Harbor. The British
occupation of the island in May 1940 had
been rather reluctantly accepted by the
Icelandic Government. Believing that Ice-
land could be protected without this physi-
cal occupation, the latter made explora-
tory proposals to the United States con-
cerning Iceland's inclusion within the
orbit of the Monroe Doctrine. The United
States at first took no official action on the
overtures, but eventually changed its atti-
25
On transportation difficulties and port construc-
tion in Greenland, see Greenland, Vol. I, pp. V-12-15,
V-44-45. V-62, V-69-70, V-76, VI-7; and Memo,
Capt O. P. Gokay, CE, for Hq SOS, 4 Jun 42, sub:
Unloading Time for Vessels BW-1, OCT 370.5
Greenland, Mvmt BLUIE WEST.
26
OCT HB Monographs 11, pp. 49-52, and 19,
p. 18. Significantly, despite excellent pay none of the
men cared to remain in Greenland. Interv, H. H.
Dunham with Capt William J. Long, 31 May 44,
OCT HB Greenland.
27
OCT HB Monograph 11, pp. 60-67; Rpt, Col
Vissering, Inspection Trip, Aug-Sep 43, pp. 7-12,
OCT HB North America, CRIMSON Project; TCPI
Bull, 22 Aug 44, Item 10.
28
Rpt 832, Dir Intel Div BPE, 26 Jun 45, sub: Ob-
servations at Greenland, OCT HB North America
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES
tude. By the spring of 1941 the worsening
war situation made the British Govern-
ment anxious to release its occupation
troops for use elsewhere. This could be
done if the United States immediately
took over responsibility for the defense of
the island, a commitment the United
States had recently agreed to in the event
it entered the war. In June, with British
encouragement, the Icelandic Govern-
ment issued an eleventh-hour invitation to
the United States. The first American gar-
rison, a provisional Marine brigade,
reached Reykjavik early in July 1941.29
The defense of the Americas was
strengthened and the antisubmarine cam-
paign aided by developing Iceland as an
important base along the North Atlantic
air and sea lanes to the United Kingdom.
As in the case of Greenland, Iceland was
unable to provide construction materials
or to support the occupation forces. Sup-
plies and equipment therefore had to be
imported, a task involving the assignment
of scarce shipping to another extremely
hazardous route.
Reykjavik, the capital and principal
port of Iceland, lay on the southwest coast.
Protected by two breakwaters, its small
inner harbor—roughly sixteen feet at low
tide—could accommodate only vessels of
moderate draft. Of the several quays, the
best was a 525-foot marginal wharf known
as the Main Quay. The second largest
port, Akureyri, on the northern coast, had
only a few small docks. On the east coast
were the tiny fishing ports of Budhareyri
and Seydisfjordur. The absence of any
road traversing the island was a serious
handicap to transportation, making coast-
wise traffic mandatory. Fortunately, the
British had chartered a number of
"drifters," which were Icelandic fishing
vessels ranging from 75 to 150 feet long.30
17
Even before the first U.S. contingent ar-
rived in Iceland, it became evident that
inadequate port facilities and meager
housing would make it necessary to effect
American occupation by stages. In order
to determine discharge possibilities as well
as to prepare the way for an Army garri-
son, the War Department, late in June
1941, ordered Maj. (later Col.) Richard S.
Whitcomb and Lt. Col. Clarence N. Iry to
Iceland, the former to look into the trans-
portation aspects and the latter the engi-
neering problems.31 Traveling by air,
Whitcomb and Iry arrived at Reykjavik
on 4 July. After consultation with British
and Icelandic officials, Whitcomb con-
cluded that the basic transportation re-
quirements of the forces to be sent to
Iceland would be one port battalion and
one truck battalion, a small passenger and
freight vessel, three tugs, an oil barge, a
water boat, a cabin cruiser, and a floating
derrick of 75-ton capacity.32 These re-
quirements were met only in part and
very slowly.
Approximately 4,100 strong, the ma-
rines, commanded by Brig. Gen. John
Marston, reached Iceland on 7 July 1941
aboard four troop transports, accom-
panied by two cargo ships, a tanker, a tug,
and naval escort vessels. Having arrived
in advance of the Marine contingent,
Whitcomb was able to make helpful pre-
liminary arrangements with the British
and the Icelanders. The two freighters
were unloaded at the quays, with their
own gear. Discharge of the transports,
29
See the account of the Iceland occupation in
Conn and Fairchild, The Western Hemisphere,
Vol. II.
30
31
OCT HB Monograph 14, pp. 2, 11-15.
Ibid., pp. 14-21; WPD 4493 and 4493-3; MS,
Col R. S. Whitcomb, One War, pp. 1-2 OCT HB.
32
Hist Rcd, TC IBC, Jul 41-Oct 43, pp. 6-8, OCT
HB Iceland.
18
which drew too much water for the inner
harbor, was begun from anchorage in the
outer roadstead on 8 July and completed
three days later. Aided by long hours of
daylight and surprisingly good weather,
the marines worked continuously, unload-
ing supplies and equipment into tank
lighters, landing boats, and nondescript
local craft for delivery to the docks or to a
nearby beach, where British trucks waited
for the last move to camps and dumps.
Although the harbor was crowded and the
port facilities poor, the energetic marines
were soon ashore and settled in their new
island quarters.33
The Americans added to the growing
wartime burden on Reykjavik. Iceland
depended heavily upon imports, and its
needs, together with those of the British
and American forces, had to be met
almost entirely by ocean traffic through
that port. The convoy system frequently
crowded several ships into the harbor at
one time, and prompt cargo discharge was
essential to prevent undue delay in vessel
turnaround. Under these circumstances
co-ordination of harbor activities and a
program for expanding the port's facilities
proved necessary.
Preliminary negotiations, undertaken
early in July between Whitcomb and the
local harbormaster, culminated in a
formal agreement on 19 August 1941 be-
tween U.S. representatives at Reykjavik
and the port authority there. In return for
a first priority on the use of the Main
Quay and contingent priorities covering
two other quays, the Americans agreed to
effect various repairs and improvements
in the inner harbor, including the con-
struction of a new East Quay to join the
Main Quay and the Coal Quay so as to
add approximately 1,000 feet of marginal
wharf for American ships. The agreement
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
also provided for building a new transit
shed. The United States was to defray all
costs, but the port authority was to carry
34
out the work.
While the projected harbor improve-
ments were still under discussion, the first
U.S. Army contingent reached Iceland.
Consisting of 1,226 officers and enlisted
men—mainly Air Forces personnel—it ar-
rived on 6 August 1941 aboard three
ships. Of these, the Army transport
American Legion encountered the greatest
difficulty. Because her draft would not
permit berthing in the inner harbor, the
vessel had to be discharged at anchor into
tank lighters and motor launches. More-
over, Company B of the 392d Port Bat-
talion, which arrived on the vessel, was
untrained and inexperienced. This unit
and other Army troops assigned to the dis-
charge operation functioned so inexpertly
that they had to be replaced by marines.35
The second ship, the Mizar, was unloaded
without incident, but the third, the
Almaack, lacked proper cargo gear and
was loaded in such a way as to make dis-
charge difficult. Because of these handi-
caps, the fast turnaround U.S. Navy de-
sired for this convoy was not attained.36
Amid atrocious weather, a second U.S.
Army contingent, 5,058 personnel, reached
Iceland on 16 September 1941 in a
heavily escorted convoy of ten vessels.
Among the passengers were nine civilians
experienced in marine operations and a
small amount of port equipment, but no
33
See the account by the historian of the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps, John L. Zimmerman, The First Marine
Brigade (Provisional), Iceland, 1941-1942 (Washington:
Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1946).
34
Hist Rcd, TC IBC, Jul 41-Oct 43, pp. 9-11, 74,
and App. VII, OCT HB Iceland.
35
Ibid., pp. 16-18.
36
Rpt, Capt C. E. Battle, USN, Disembarkation of
Troops and Cargo, Reykjavik, Iceland, 6-12 Aug 41,
OCT HB Iceland—Misc.
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES
port troops. Although Whitcomb had ar-
ranged for a small freighter and a number
of drifters to effect the discharge, the naval
officer in command, desiring a quick turn-
around, decided instead to use open tank
lighters and landing boats to remove the
packaged cargo. Exposed to rain and
spray during ship-to-shore delivery, the
cardboard containers soon fell apart,
leaving the contents a ready prey to pil-
ferers. Aside from indicating need for
better understanding between the Army
and Navy, this incident pointed to a seri-
ous deficiency in Army packaging meth-
ods—a deficiency that was not corrected
until long after Pearl Harbor.
With the second Army contingent came
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, who as-
sumed command of all American forces
on the island, including the marines.
Under General Bonesteel, Major Whit-
comb became Assistant Superintendent,
Army Transport Service (ATS). To carry
out his task Whitcomb had only one port
company, a handful of experienced civil-
ians, and a few pieces of floating equip-
ment. At the same time, port activity in
general was placed under the quarter-
master of the newly created Iceland Base
Command. Because of the shortage of
port troops, Bonesteel assigned the task of
unloading vessels to the 10th Infantry
Regiment, the port company to provide
technical and supervisory assistance and
to operate all cranes, tractors, and tow-
motors.37
Although no better solution was at
hand, neither the Assistant Superintend-
ent, ATS, nor the 10th Infantry Regiment
were happy about this arrangement. The
infantrymen had no desire to be long-
shoremen, and Whitcomb would have
preferred additional service troops. At first
there were only four cranes (two of 6-ton
19
and two of 4-ton capacity) and eight
tractors for dock work. Motor transport
was usually in short supply, and the
narrow streets of Reykjavik and poor
roads leading to depots and camps added
to the operational difficulties. As 1941
drew to an end, daylight hours were lim-
ited and winter storms often halted cargo
operations. Under these conditions, more
and more ships awaiting discharge ac-
cumulated at Reykjavik.38
The unsatisfactory port and shipping
situation persisted well into 1942. The
Army, which in January took over from
the Navy complete responsibility for the
supply of U.S. forces in Iceland, was irked
by the growing backlog of its supplies
awaiting shipment at New York. Since the
Army Transport Service lacked vessels for
assignment to this run and was unable to
obtain additional ships from the Maritime
Commission, the Navy was requested to
provide shipping to lift the backlog. The
Navy, however, maintained that the as-
signment of more vessels to the Iceland
service could not be justified unless ships'
turnaround time was improved.39
Neither service was pleased with ar-
rangements for cargo discharge at Reykja-
vik. The combination of winter weather,
insufficient port personnel, and inade-
quate shore facilities were obvious causes
of the difficulty. Early in March 1942 the
War Department directed the Iceland
Base Command to take corrective action
regarding the delay of ships at Reykjavik,
and in the following month it dispatched
37
Hist Rcd, TC IBC, Jul 41-Oct 43, pp. 21-26, and
Exhibit S, OCT HB Iceland.
38
Whitcomb, One War, pp. IV-5-6, OCT HB.
39
Memo, Col Clarence H. Kells for ACofS G-4, 12
Feb 42, sub: Mvmt of Cargo to INDIGO; Memo, Rear
Adm Sherwoode A. Taffinder to Lt Gen Brehon B.
Somervell, 10 Mar 42. Both in OCT HB Iceland—
Misc. Cf. OCT HB Monograph 14, pp. 60-70.
20
two civilian specialists, Paul C. Grening
and Clifford S. White, to Iceland.
By this time improvement was under
way, for the arrival in late January of ad-
ditional port personnel and the adoption
in February of the practice of discharging
ships on a twenty-four hour basis were
already reducing turnaround time. The
visit of the two specialists proved bene-
ficial, however, in pointing up the need for
additional troops, trucks, floating equip-
ment, and berthing space, and through
their efforts the port later received several
small harbor boats and a number of heavy
cranes.40
The port difficulties at Reykjavik were
part of the growing pains of the Iceland
Base Command. Troop and cargo traffic
was heavy in 1942, for as Army forces ar-
rived, the Marines and the British gar-
rison moved out. The same ships that de-
livered American replacements picked up
the British and their equipment and car-
ried them to the United Kingdom. The
expanding U.S. garrison called for sizable
shipments of Army cargo, which in April
1942 amounted to 55,991 measurement
tons.41
While these changes were taking place,
the port organization was growing. Early
in March 1942 it was augmented by
twenty-nine enlisted men, from a Quar-
termaster shoe repair company, who with
training eventually formed a nucleus for a
port headquarters. In August two more
port companies arrived. One was assigned
to Reykjavik and the other distributed
among the outports at Akureyri, Seydis-
fjördur, and Búdhareyri. Of these out-
ports, taken over from the British in Au-
gust and September 1942, the most im-
portant was Akureyri. All three unloaded
transatlantic cargo vessels and trans-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
shipped freight and personnel by coast-
wise steamship and drifter to the numer-
ous Army outposts around the island.
Completion of the new transit shed at
Reykjavik in late 1942 gave the port ade-
quate quarters to store and sort cargo and
to house and repair port equipment. Im-
proved harbor facilities and the acquisi-
tion of additional port equipment, includ-
ing two much-needed 45-ton cranes and a
small fleet of harbor craft, at last put the
port organization in position to meet all
anticipated demands.42
Meanwhile, in line with the precedent
already set in the zone of interior by the
creation of a separate Transportation
Corps, Army transportation activities
were removed from the base quarter-
master's jurisdiction on 1 September 1942.
This eliminated from the transportation
picture the base quartermaster, who had
not always seen eye to eye with the Army
Transport Service superintendent on the
management of the port. There was still
no port headquarters, although a table of
organization had been proposed. The pro-
posal had to pass through the Iceland Base
Command, European theater headquar-
ters, and the War Department, and at one
point it appeared to have been lost in the
shuffle. The required approval was finally
given, and in May 1943 the 18th Port was
activated in Iceland, with an authorized
strength of 38 officers, 2 warrant officers,
and 455 enlisted men drawn from port
personnel already there. Whitcomb, who
was soon to be made a full colonel, was
40
Memo, Grening and White for CofT, 26 Apr 42,
sub: Port Facilities, INDIGO, OCT HB Iceland—Misc.
Cf. Whitcomb, One War, pp. IV-10-11, OCT HB.
41
Zimmerman, op. cit., p. 16; OCT HB Monograph
14, p. 104.
42
Hist Rcd, TC IBC, Jul 41-Oct 43, pp. 39-52,
66-68, 79, 84-87, 103-04, OCT HB Iceland.
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES
named Port Commander as well as Super-
intendent, Army Transport Service.43
Ironically, when the port organization
finally took shape, the Iceland Base Com-
mand was already in the process of reduc-
tion. After June 1943 monthly shipments
of U.S. Army cargo from the United
States to Iceland were modest since the
base had reached its maximum develop-
ment. At the same time, outloadings of
men and surplus matériel to the United
Kingdom assumed sizable proportions,
and by the close of the year more U.S.
Army cargo was being removed from Ice-
land than was being received.
By the late fall of 1943 the reduction of
the command had progressed to a point
where the port organization could be
drastically scaled down. On 30 October
Whitcomb ended his tour of duty in Ice-
land. The four transports that carried
Colonel Whitcomb and most of the officers
of the 18th Port to the United Kingdom
took a total of 515 officers and 8,869 en-
listed men from the Iceland Base Com-
mand. On 29 December 1943 the 18th
Port was disbanded, and the personnel
that stayed on formed the Port Section of
the Iceland Base Command. Diminishing
activity and continuing reductions in
transportation personnel in Iceland char-
acterized the remainder of the wartime
period there. 44
The Caribbean Bases
While developments were taking place
in northeastern Canada and the North
Atlantic, the strengthening of old bases
and the construction of new ones in the
Caribbean area were being pressed. Within
the Caribbean Defense Command, estab-
lished during 1941, were located not only
21
the Panama Canal, Puerto Rico, and the
West Indian bases acquired in the bases-
for-destroyers deal of September 1940, but
also such valuable resources as the bauxite
mines in Surinam and the oil refineries of
Curasao and Aruba. 45 Some of the Carib-
bean bases also provided landing fields for
the air ferry route between the United
States and West Africa.46
Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico, the oldest American Carib-
bean outpost, was strengthened beginning
in 1939. Transportation problems were few
during the first year. By mid-1940 all water
transportation activities in the Puerto
Rican Department were under the juris-
diction of the department quartermaster.47
At San Juan, the capital and for many
years a regular port of call of the Army
Transport Service, port operations were
supervised by two officers and two enlisted
men. All cargo was loaded and discharged
on a contract basis at a small, leased pier.
43
GO 28, Hq IBC, 1 Sep 42; Whitcomb, One War,
IV-3-6, OCT HB; AG Ltr 320.2 (4-13-43), OB-I-
SPOM-U-M, 1 7 Apr 43, sub: Constitution and Acti-
vation of 18th Port Hq; GO 15, Hq IBC, 8 May 43.
44
OCT HB Monograph 14, p. 104; Hist Rcd, TC
IBC, Nov 43, p. 1 and Exhibit C, Dec 43 and Jan 44-
Mar 45, OCT HB Iceland; Whitcomb, One War, pp.
IV-5, V-6, V-8-9, V-12, OCT HB; GO 106, Hq IBC,
29 Dec 43. Almost all the personnel of the 18th Port
eventually found new assignments in the United
Kingdom with the 11th Port, under Whitcomb's
leadership.
45
The Caribbean Defense Command was divided
into a Puerto Rican Sector, a Panama Sector, and a
Trinidad Sector.
46
Craven and Cate (eds.), AAF, I, 123-24, 281-82,
299-303.
47
The Puerto Rican Department, as constituted on
1 July 1939, included Puerto Rico, adjacent islands
and bays, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Except where
otherwise stated, for the period through 1942 this dis-
cussion is based upon Hist Rcd, TC P.R. Dept, 1 Jul
40-31 Dec 42, OCT HB P.R. Dept.
22
Rail service was provided by a coastal line
from San Juan, operated by the American
Railroad Company, and a number of
others run by local sugar companies. De-
spite mountainous terrain, the island pos-
sessed a good highway network, extending
in checkerboard fashion from east to west
and north to south.
The situation began to change in the
latter half of 1940, when additional troops
were sent to Puerto Rico and the new
American garrisons in St. Thomas, St.
Croix, and Antigua placed under the
Puerto Rican Department for administra-
tion and supply. The increased traffic soon
overburdened the port's personnel and
facilities. By the end of 1941 it had been
necessary to add fifty-eight civilians, in-
cluding a marine superintendent, to the
small military staff. Work on a modern
terminal for Army use was begun in
August 1941 on a site adjacent to the
Puerto Rican General Depot at Fort Bu-
chanan, and was completed in September
1942. It included a 600-foot concrete pier,
a 500-foot transit shed, fuel and water
lines, and rail connections with the Puerto
Rican General Depot.
The volume of military cargo delivered
at San Juan grew from 88,087 measure-
ment tons in 1941 to 141,135 measurement
tons in 1942. Shipments from San Juan to
U.S. contingents on neighboring islands,
extending as far eastward as Antigua and
ultimately including both Jamaica and
Cuba, also increased.48 Beginning with one
harbor boat, the Puerto Rican Depart-
ment gradually assembled a sizable local
fleet of interisland transports and harbor
craft. 49
The completion in 1942 of major con-
struction at Borinquen Field and the open-
ing of the new Army terminal eased the
transportation task. The burden was fur-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ther lightened when arrangements were
made to co-ordinate Army, Navy, and Air
Forces movements to and from the area.
Briefly, the U.S. Navy employed its refrig-
erated vessels to deliver perishables for all
U.S. forces. The Army moved all other
supplies to San Juan and was responsible
for interisland distribution from that port.
Both services used their ships to return
military personnel and cargo to the zone
of interior. Wherever possible, the Army
Air Forces (AAF) and the Navy carried
passengers on northbound planes to
Miami, Florida.50 The hazard of water
communications with Puerto Rico was
lessened when the heavy concentration of
U-boats in the Atlantic caused a reduction
of their activity in the Caribbean in the
latter part of the year.51
In March 1943 Transportation Corps
observers found operations proceeding
smoothly. Transportation activities were
being directed by a small staff under Col.
William H. Sadler, who had been ap-
pointed department transportation officer
in late August 1942. Colonel Sadler's
duties included general supervision of all
water and rail transport, liaison with the
Navy and AAF regarding transportation
matters, and technical supervision of all
transportation officers in the Puerto Rican
Sector. Sadler also headed the port of San
48
On the minor Transportation Corps operations
in Cuba, Jamaica, and Antigua, see Hist Rcd, TC
Antilles Dept, 1941-45, Pts. III, IV, and VI; Hist
Rcd, TC Jamaica Base Comd, 20 Nov 42; and Hist
Rcd, TC Antigua Base Comd, Oct 41-Dec 42. All in
OCT HB.
49
Rpt, Lt Col Benjamin C. Allin and Capt Robert
G. Stone, Puerto Rico, 18-19 Mar 43, p. 3, Annex
13A, 13D, and 13G, OCT HB P.R. Dept.
50
Rpt, Allin and Stone, Puerto Rico, and Ltr to Col
Clinton F. Robinson, 19 Mar 43, Dir Contl Div SOS,
OCT HB P.R. Dept.
51
See Craven and Cate (eds.), AAF, I, 514-18,
521-23, 530, 535-36; and U.S. Fleet Anti-Submarine
Bull, Jun 43, p. 5.
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES 23

Juan, which had an authorized strength of to the United States was initiated in the
five officers, two warrant officers, and nine Antilles Department in mid-September
enlisted men.52 1943. The progressive reduction of the
Port activity remained significant command's strength during the last half of
throughout 1943, and in that year Army the year was reflected in increased passen-
cargo landed at San Juan totaled 140,339 ger traffic at San Juan. Temporarily, these
measurement tons.53 Following the acqui- movements proved burdensome, but in
sition of additional cargo-handling equip- the long run the reduced strength of the
ment and harbor craft at the new Army command resulted in a lessening transpor-
terminal, all ordinary demands could be tation activity.
met. Cargo discharge was accomplished The frequent irregularity and almost
by contract stevedores and extensive use prohibitive cost of water transport to the
was made of competent civilians at the more remote points in the Antilles Depart-
various transportation offices and the port ment led to considerable dependence on
of San Juan. The interisland transports air traffic. Puerto Rico, Trinidad, British
and harbor craft were manned by civilian Guiana, and Cuba had the advantage of
crews. There were occasional labor short- being located on routes served by the Air
ages and work stoppages, but none de- Transport Command. Regularly sched-
layed the working of Army vessels. uled flights were also made by the 330th
On 1 June 1943 the Puerto Rican Transport Squadron to practically every
Department was redesignated the Antilles base in the area, and special flights were
Department and the latter's jurisdiction arranged when emergencies arose. In mid-
was extended to cover the areas formerly February 1944 the transportation officer
encompassed by the Puerto Rican and of the Antilles Department gained control
Trinidad Sectors. Under this arrangement, of all air space assigned to the command,
the transportation officer at San Juan be- and received authority to arrange for any
came the Antilles Department transporta- air space that could be secured from other
tion officer, and his authority was extended sources such as the Air Transport Com-
to include supervision of U.S. Army trans- mand and the Naval Air Transport
portation activities in the expanded area Service.56
under the jurisdiction of the new depart-
ment.54 However, the previously inde- 52
pendent transportation organization of Rpt, Allin and Stone, Puerto Rico, pp. 2, 4, and
Annexes 1 and 4, OCT HB P.R. Dept. Interservice
the Trinidad Sector and Base Command relationships at San Juan were described as excellent.
53
was allowed considerable freedom in its Total compiled from quarterly figures in Histori-
operation because of its distance from de- cal Record, Transportation Corps, Antilles Depart-
ment, for 1943 (2 binders) (OCT HB). This illustrated
partmental headquarters. Aside from and well-documented report is the source here used
Cuba and Jamaica, which were supplied for transportation activity in 1943.
54
directly from the zone of the interior after Hist Rcd, TC Antilles Dept, 1941-45, p. 2, OCT
HB Antilles Dept.
transshipment via San Juan proved time 55
Hist Rcd, TC Antilles Dept, 1 Jan-30 Jun 43, pp.
consuming and wasteful, the outposts in 12-13, and 1941-45, p. 2.
56
the Antilles Department continued to be Hist Rcd, TC Antilles Dept, 1 Jul-31 Dec 43, pp.
55 4, 6, and Incl 9a and 12; Rad, ASF Trans to CG An-
supplied from Puerto Rico and Trinidad. tilles, 9 Dec 43, CM-OUT 3640; Hist Rcd, TC An-
Rotation or return of military personnel tilles Dept, 1941-45, Pts. I and II.
24 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Puerto Rico remained an important From the outset the Americans in Trini-
base throughout the war. It presented dad had to furnish considerable local as
none of the unusual transportation prob- well as interisland transport. Hundreds of
lems that characterized the operations at laborers had to be moved daily by boat,
the North Atlantic bases. truck, and train to and from construction
projects. As the supply and transshipment
Trinidad
point for all American installations within
Situated 574 nautical miles southeast of a radius of approximately 500 nautical
San Juan, Trinidad had valuable oil and miles, Trinidad depended almost exclu-
asphalt resources and was an important sively upon water transport to deliver per-
transshipment point for bauxite. Because sonnel, supplies, and equipment to outly-
of its strategic location, the island was also ing islands, including St. Lucia, the Dutch
a focal point on the established air and islands of Curaçao and Aruba, and British
shipping routes between the United States, and Dutch Guiana.59 In order to accom-
South America, and West Africa. With the plish this mission, the Army gradually
arrival at Port-of-Spain on 5 May 1941 of acquired, operated, and maintained a
a U.S. Army force of 60 officers, 995 en- local fleet of interisland transports, tugs,
listed men, and 10 civilians, Trinidad be- barges, and other craft. 60
came the site of garrison and airfield Port congestion began to develop as
construction and the supply base for Amer- early as June 1941, and by October of the
ican contingents on outlying islands.57 following year it had become so acute that
Although the excellent harbor at Port- it aroused deep concern in Washington.
of-Spain had to be dredged periodically, it Vessels in large numbers crowded into the
afforded well sheltered, safe anchorage at harbor at Port-of-Spain since it was an
all seasons. Vessels drawing up to thirty important convoy control point for the
feet could be berthed at King's Wharf, a U.S. Navy as well as the headquarters of
facility equipped with lighterage and pos- an expanding U.S. Army base and supply
sessing direct rail connections. Adjacent to depot, the transshipment center for baux-
King's Wharf was Docksite, a largely un- 57

developed, muddy area of about twenty- OCTHist Rcd, TC Trinidad Base Comd, 7 Sep 42,
HB Trinidad.
eight acres extending along the Gulf of 58
WD Rpt, A Survey of Trinidad, 29 Jan 41, OCT
Paria for approximately 3,000 feet. Set HB Trinidad Base Comd; Caribbean Defense Comd,
Construction And Real Estate Activities in the Carib-
aside for American use, Docksite was later bean Defense Command, II (1 Nov 46), 175-82, 195-
enlarged to encompass 183 acres, and in 201; MS, Hist Sec Trinidad Base Sector, History of
time a new Army wharf, a large general Trinidad Sector and Base Command, I, 72-73,
depot, warehouses, repair shops, and other 277-79, 59
OCMH Files.
On U.S. Army transportation activities in St.
facilities were constructed there. In addi- Lucia, Curaçao, Aruba, and the Guianas—all small
tion to Docksite, the principal installations scale—see the following: Construction and Real Estate
erected on Trinidad were the Army base Activities in the Caribbean Defense Command, II,
279-84, OCMH Files; Hist Rcd, TC Antilles Dept,
at Fort Read and the adjoining Waller 1941-45, Pt. X, XI, OCT HB Antilles Dept; Sum-
Field. A run-down railway connected Fort mary of Hist Events and Statistics, NYPE, 1941, p. 16,
Read and Port-of-Spain, and ultimately OCTHist HB NYPE.
60
Rcd, TC Trinidad Sector and Base Com-
both these points were joined by the mand, 7 Sep and 20 Oct 42, OCT HB Trinidad Base
Churchill-Roosevelt Highway.58 Comd.
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES
ite from the Guianas, and the only port of
entry for the busy island of Trinidad. In-
sufficient storage space, inadequate port
facilities, inefficient dock labor, and lim-
ited rail and highway transport contrib-
uted to an unhealthy situation: ships were
immobilized awaiting discharge and port
clearance lagged. Drastic action was
obviously in order.
On 1 November 1942 a Transportation
Corps officer, Col. Werner W. Moore, was
appointed port controller and clothed with
sweeping powers to relieve port conges-
tion. He immediately requisitioned addi-
tional equipment from the zone of interior,
requesting in particular the expedited de-
livery of two 60-ton diesel locomotives, a
tanker, six 500-ton cargo barges, and
5,000 cargo pallets. Native dock workers
were engaged in maximum numbers for
cargo discharge and without regard to the
expense of overtime pay. With the co-
operation of all concerned, including an
advisory port committee, and the tempo-
rary assignment of several experienced
wharf supervisors imported from New
York and Montreal, the congestion was
gradually reduced. By the end of 1942
Army cargo ships were being berthed at
Port-of-Spain without delay and the turn-
around time had shown decided improve-
ment.61
Despite this improvement in the Army
operation, the general situation at Port-of-
Spain remained unsatisfactory. Having
seen at least fifty ships in the harbor while
flying over it, General Somervell directed
that a qualified officer be detailed at once
to investigate. Lt. Col. Benjamin C. Allin
was selected by the Chief of Transporta-
tion and he, with Capt. Paul C. Grening,
visited Trinidad from 26 to 30 January
1943.62
Allin and Grening found that of a total
25
of 72 vessels in the harbor on 19 January
1943, more than a third were transients
using the port only to obtain coal, water,
and stores. This situation stemmed from
the fact that the shallow waterways in the
Guianas made it necessary for the large
ocean-going vessels that carried bauxite to
the United States to take on only partial
loads at the mines. The vessels then pro-
ceeded to the Chaguaramas terminals near
Port-of-Spain, where cargo space was
topped off from a stockpile of bauxite
assembled there by about thirty smaller
shuttle craft, mostly coal burners. At this
time, the latter spent an average of 11.6
days in the harbor, a delay caused chiefly
by the lack of coal-bunkering facilities.
But relief was already in sight since the
bauxite quota from the Guianas was to be
cut by about 50 percent by obtaining ore
from other areas, an additional coal barge
equipped with a crane was to be procured
for bunkering, and wherever possible the
War Shipping Administration was to sub-
stitute oil-burning vessels for the coal-
burning shuttle craft.
Although the problem of harbor con-
gestion was nearing a solution, the prob-
lem of overburdened port and rail facilities
remained. The Corps of Engineers had
begun building a new Army wharf with
berthing space for two ships, but by late
January 1943, only the first berth and one
transit shed were completed. At Allin's
suggestion, temporary rail connections
were installed and immediate use was
61
Memo, Col Moore to CofT SOS WD, 3 Nov 42,
sub: Shipping Congestion in Trinidad; Memo, Chief
Port and Field Agencies Div for Col Robert H. Wylie,
8 Nov 42, sub: Congestion at Port-of-Spain. Both in
OCT 567.2 (Trinidad). See also Rpt, Lt Col Ralph H.
Sartor, TC, Shipping Situation, Port-of-Spain, OCT
HB Trinidad Base Comd.
62
See report by Allin and Grening, Trinidad, 1
February 1943 (OCT HB Trinidad Base Comd), upon
which the following paragraphs are based.
26
made of this berth and shed. Despite the
need of additional port personnel, neither
Allin nor Grening favored the assignment
of a port battalion. The colonial governor,
they explained, wanted no Negro troop
labor for fear of inciting local unrest, and
the commander of the U.S. Army base did
not favor using a white battalion along-
side the native dock workers. In addition
the investigators aided in expediting the
delivery of the additional port and rail
transportation equipment that had been
requested.
In the spring of 1943, with the arrival of
new cargo-handling gear, Trinidad had
enough port equipment. Rail equipment,
including three locomotives and 124 rail-
way cars, arrived and was used on the
local government-owned railway. The lat-
ter acquisitions improved rail service,
although the railroad's operation con-
tinued to be hampered by antiquated
equipment and the loss of many of its best
workers to better paying military projects.
The command also was assigned the
USAT Monterey, a 404-foot troop and cargo
transport, to be used in the supply of bases
in Brazil and on Ascension Island. Com-
pletion of the new 1,202-foot Army wharf
made possible the complete release of
King's wharf in the summer of 1943.63
A number of transportation problems
remained to be solved at Trinidad, as was
evident to the two Transportation Corps
officers who had taken over Colonel
Moore's duties as port controller and chief
of the Base Transportation Division upon
his transfer to Washington in January
1943. The Base Transportation Division
was subordinate to the General Depot—a
holdover from the days when The Quar-
termaster General was responsible for both
depot and transportation activities—and
requests for transportation were delayed
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
in passing along the chain of command.
The district engineer, who was independ-
ent of the Trinidad Sector and Base Com-
mand, operated harbor craft, engaged
ocean transport, and actually employed
more equipment and personnel on the
local railway than did the Transportation
Corps.64
The Base Transportation Division was
divorced from the General Depot on 1
July 1943, and later in the month Colonel
Allin took over as chief of transportation
for the Trinidad Sector and Base Com-
mand of the Antilles Department. Allin
recovered the transportation functions
that had been performed by the district
engineer, but by the close of the year the
entire command was already in the proc-
ess of reduction. 65 Beginning in 1944 the
U.S. Army tended to concentrate its sup-
ply and transportation activities at the
permanent Puerto Rican base in San
Juan. Incident to this shift the transporta-
tion organization and function in Trinidad
fell off appreciably in size and scope.66
Redeployment brought a final flurry of
activity. Waller Field was selected to serv-
ice and maintain a fleet of about 260 C-47
airplanes engaged in Green Project, an
operation involving the airlift of troops
from the European and Mediterranean
theaters to the zone of interior. The first
63
Rpt, Col Sartor, Shipping Situation, Port-of-
Spain, 29 Apr 43, with atchd Ltr to Brig Gen Robert
H. Wylie, 3 May 43; Hist Rcd, TC Trinidad, 5 Apr
43. Both in OCT HB Trinidad Base Comd. See also
Hist Rcd, TC Antilles Dept, 1941-45, Pt. IX, OCT
HB Antilles Dept.
64
Sartor rpt and ltr cited n. 63.
65
For the basic letters, September 1943-January
1944, see OCT HB Overseas Opns Gp, Corres—
Trinidad.
66
History of Trinidad Sector and Base Command,
II, 13, 18, OCMH Files; Rpt, Maj Mark C. Collarino
to Dir of Opns OCT, 13 Jul 44, Sec. II, OCT HB An-
tilles Dept; Hist Rcd, TC, Antilles Dept, 1941-45, Pt.
IX.
THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES 27

service personnel for this activity reached rectly to the Secretary of War. As an
Trinidad on 29 May 1945. By July, Green emergency measure, on 5 September
Project planes were carrying 30,000 men 1939, the Canal Zone was placed under
per month on the last leg of the homeward the jurisdiction of the Commanding Gen-
trek, making 31 trips daily from Natal to eral, Panama Canal Department. 6 9 The
Miami, using Waller Field as a service latter's authority over operation of the
and maintenance depot. After the sur- canal and governmental functions, how-
render of Japan this program was cur- ever, continued to be exercised through
tailed almost as suddenly as it had begun, the governor.
ending officially on 10 September 1945.67 The port facilities were excellent at
both Cristobal and Balboa, but beginning
Panama Canal in 1940 a flood of defense projects greatly
The Canal Zone was a permanent part increased the pressure upon these ports
of the prewar American defense system. and the local railway. The Third Lock
Among the first U.S. outposts to be rein- Project was undertaken to provide an ad-
forced after Hitler advanced on Poland, ditional set of locks and new approach
the Canal Zone was the headquarters of channels for the Panama Canal, and there
the Panama Canal Department and later was extensive construction for the air,
became the headquarters of the Carib- ground, and naval forces.70 The Trans-
bean Defense Command. Within this area Isthmian (Boyd-Roosevelt) Highway and
the primary function of the Army was to the Rio Hato link of the Inter-American
protect the Panama Canal so that it could (Pan-American) Highway further in-
be used at all times by the U.S. Navy. Air creased the traffic to and within the area.
defense was contemplated from airfields Although the Public Roads Administra-
in the Canal Zone, in Puerto Rico, and in tion was responsible for these two projects,
the Caribbean bases acquired from the the Army was affected because of the
British. For the United States, in war as in drain upon manpower and matériel, and
peace, the Panama Canal formed a vital the added transportation load.71
link between the Atlantic and the 67
History of Trinidad Sector and Base Command,
Pacific.68 Vol. II, Ch. IX, OCMH Files.
68
Watson, op. cit., pp. 458-63; Craven and Cate
In peacetime, the governor of the Pan- (eds.), AAF, I, 160-65; Conn and Fairchild, The
ama Canal was responsible for the oper- Western Hemisphere, Vol. II, Chs. X, XI. See also
ation and maintenance of the canal itself, Norman J. Padelford, The Panama Canal in Peace and
as well as the administration, sanitation, War Padelford,
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942).
69
op. cit., pp. 170, 188-89.
and government of the Canal Zone. The 70
Excavation for the Third Lock began in July
governor was also the president of the 1940, and the project continued until curtailed in
May 1942. See Annual Rpt of Governor of Panama
Panama Railroad, which ran along the Canal, FY 44, p. 47.
eastern side of the waterway to connect 71
The Trans-Isthmian Highway became available
the terminal ports of Cristobal and Bal- for limited military traffic in late April 1942. Con-
boa. The Panama Railroad Company struction of the sixty-one-mile link of the Inter-Ameri-
can Highway from La Chorrera to the air base at Rio
also operated the Panama Line, whose Hato was completed in July 1942. See Study, Hist Br
three ships had been specifically designed U.S. Army Caribbean, The Boyd-Roosevelt Highway
for its needs. The governor, by custom and Inter-American Highway, Jan 48, OCMH Files.
Cf. Hist Rcd, TC Panama Canal Dept, Jul 40-Sep 42,
a retired Engineer officer, reported di- pp. 5-8, 12-15, OCT HB Panama.
28
As a result of these abnormal condi-
tions, congestion at Cristobal was frequent
throughout 1941, but it affected the com-
mercial lines rather than the Army Trans-
port Service. Army cargo had priority dis-
charge, and no undue delay was reported
despite the scarcity and inefficiency of
dock workers. A recommendation that
port troops be brought in and utilized was
disapproved by the Caribbean Defense
Command on the ground that the docks
were not under exclusive military jurisdic-
tion. Apart from a housing problem, it
was considered undesirable to use U.S.
soldiers alongside native dock labor. At
the close of 1941, although the situation
was not serious, Col. (later Brig. Gen.)
Harlan L. Mumma, department quarter-
master, still complained of the very ineffi-
cient labor and the obsolete equipment of
the Panama Railroad Company, which
controlled all port facilities and did all
stevedoring for the Army in the Canal
Zone.72
Movements within the Canal Zone,
along the line of the canal, were performed
chiefly by the Panama Railroad. 73 Air
transport was limited to emergency ship-
ments. Motor transport, although re-
stricted by the poor roads and rough ter-
rain, had a significant role. In addition to
organic vehicles, the Panama Canal De-
partment depended upon a motorized
Quartermaster regiment, which by March
1942 operated an Atlantic and a Pacific
motor pool, together with a dispatch pool
of staff cars. The tractor-trailer combina-
tions used by this regiment proved valu-
able at the piers and for large shipments
to the Quartermaster subdepot at Rio
Hato. The Trans-Isthmian Highway, sup-
plementing the railroad and the canal,
permitted rapid movement of troops and
supplies by motor transport between
Cristobal and Balboa.74
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
When the United States entered World
War II, Army transportation in the Canal
Zone, as elsewhere overseas, was a respon-
sibility of the Quartermaster Corps. The
creation of the new and separate Trans-
portation Corps on 31 July 1942 brought
no immediate change. 75 To discharge his
transportation responsibilities, on 5 Feb-
ruary 1942 the department quartermaster
set up an Army Transport Division, which
dealt with ocean-going shipping and rail
transportation, and an Area Transporta-
tion Division, which operated and main-
tained the smaller ships and harbor craft
employed locally to forward troops and
supplies to outlying stations. The Army
Transport Division relied extensively upon
the facilities and personnel of the Panama
Canal establishment, with its modern
piers and warehouses at Cristobal and
Balboa and the Panama Railroad. The
Area Transportation Division had no such
good fortune, for it had to procure, man,
operate, and maintain its own local fleet.76
The primary mission of the Area Trans-
portation Division was to serve U.S. mili-
72
For the basic correspondence, January-December
1941, on the cargo congestion in the Canal Zone, see
OCT HB Panama Misc Papers.
73
The Panama Railroad was a single-track line
running 47.62 miles from Colon on the Atlantic side
via Gatun, Gamboa, and Pedro Miguel to Balboa and
Panama on the Pacific side. See Hist Rcd, TC Pan-
ama Canal Dept, Jul 40-Sep 42, The Panama Rail-
road, pp. 1-12, OCT HB Panama.
74
Hist Rcd, TC Panama Canal Dept, Jul 40-Sep
42, Motor Trans, pp. 1-11, OCT HB Panama.
75
On 7 December 1941 the department quarter-
master was Col. John T. Harris, who was also Super-
intendent, Army Transport Service. He was succeeded
by Colonel Mumma, who remained in this niche
throughout the war and was given the additional title
of Chief of Transportation, Panama Canal Depart-
ment, on 22 September 1944. See GO 102, Panama
Canal Dept, OCT HB Gross Panama Canal. Cf. Hist
Rcd, TC Panama Canal, Jul 40-Sep 42, Army Trans-
port Service, p. 1, OCT HB Panama.
76
See Hist Rcd, TC Panama Canal Dept, Jul 40-
Sep 42, Area Trans, pp. 1-57, OCT HB Panama,
from which this and subsequent paragraphs are
drawn.
 THE ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN BASES
tary installations that could be reached
most conveniently by water. Although this
organization functioned at both ends of
the isthmus, serving numerous isolated
airfields, air warning stations, and other
installations, its activity centered on the
Pacific side where American bases ex-
tended from Guatemala as far south as the
Galapagos Islands and Peru. The division
therefore set up its headquarters at Bal-
boa, where it secured pier, marine repair,
and storage facilities.
From a small nucleus of boats already
in the Canal Zone, the Area Transporta-
tion Division ultimately developed an
adequate fleet of shallow-draft freighters,
tugs, barges, and other small craft. A
number of larger vessels, including tank-
ers, were also acquired to supply the more
distant outlying bases. Aside from fifty
purse seiners, procured by the Chief of
Transportation on the U.S. west coast for
the Aircraft Warning Service and deliv-
ered to Panama in the spring of 1942,
most of the newly acquired vessels were
forwarded to the Canal Zone from the
New Orleans Port of Embarkation. By 1
June 1942 the Panama Canal Department
had 197 harbor boats in operation. 77
A greater problem—never completely
solved—was the procurement of compe-
tent crews. Many of the civilians who de-
livered the craft from the United States
were unwilling to remain, since their
families could not be brought to Panama
and the pay scale was not attractive.
Others stayed a while but left as soon as
possible. The local activation in July 1942
of the 160th Quartermaster Boat Com-
pany, stationed at Corozal on the Pacific
side, afforded some relief. Despite a gen-
eral lack of seafaring experience, these
men developed into competent marine
officers after a period of training under
licensed personnel.
29
There were other difficulties. Where
separate living quarters could be arranged
aboard the vessel, a native crew could be
employed under white licensed personnel,
but if not, racial friction was a possibility.
It was usually desirable that the vessel
complement be either entirely military or
entirely civilian, since the great disparity
in pay made the average soldier dis-
gruntled if he worked alongside civilians.
The manning problem was eased in 1943,
however, as the construction program be-
gan to taper off and new men became
available who were willing to remain in
Panama rather than return to the United
States and risk possible induction. 78
Transportation was heaviest at the
Canal Zone in 1942 when the construction
work was greatest. A total of 738,839
measurement tons of Army cargo was re-
ceived at Cristobal and Balboa during the
year, the bulk of it arriving on transports,
with minor tonnages carried by commer-
cial vessels.79 Intensive submarine opera-
tions in the Gulf of Mexico during the
spring and early summer caused the can-
cellation of numerous sailings from New
Orleans, and a congestion of cargo devel-
oped at that port. As a result, beginning
late in June, all shipments for Panama
except perishables were moved through
the port of Wilmington, California. While
this arrangement, which was in effect until
the end of the year, avoided the subma-
rine danger, it was expensive in terms of
77
Memo, Maj Gen Charles P. Gross for Somervell,
6 Apr 42, sub: Purse seiners, and 1st Ind, WD SOS to
QM Panama Canal Dept, 25 Apr 42, OCT 565.3-900
Panama; Rpt, Water Div OCT, Harbor Boats, 1
Jun 42, OCT HB Water Div.
78
Hist Rcd, TC Panama Canal Dept, Jul 40-Sep
42 and Oct 42-Jun 43, Area Trans, OCT HB Pan-
ama.
79
For port statistics, see Hist Rcd, TC Panama
Canal Dept, Jul 40-Sep 42, ATS, p. 48, and 1 Oct 42-
30 Jun 43, ATS Section, OCT HB Panama.
30
transportation because of the longer rail
and water hauls involved.80
Monthly deliveries of Army cargo to
Cristobal and Balboa reached a peak of
85,286 measurement tons in September
1942. The downward trend of shipments
that followed was halted temporarily in
the first quarter of 1943, when some addi-
tional construction work was undertaken.
To meet the unexpectedly heavy demands
for transshipment of cargo to the outlying
bases, the Area Transportation Division
had to charter and borrow additional ves-
sels. But this was only a flurry, for con-
struction was nearing an end, and the
command was soon in the process of
reduction.81
Like Trinidad, the Canal Zone experi-
enced a brief resurgence of activity occa-
sioned by the redeployment program.
During the summer months of 1945 large
shipments of troops and cargo en route
from Europe to the Pacific passed through
in an impressive movement known locally
as Operation Transit. The project was
placed under the direction of the Deputy
Commander, Panama Canal Department,
and the department chief of transporta-
tion was assigned responsibility for the
technical phase, which included servicing,
repair, and transit of the ships.
The first redeployed troopship to pass
through the Panama Canal was the USS
Uruguay, which docked at Cristobal on 20
June 1945 with 4,400 men aboard, direct
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
from Leghorn, Italy. The next day the
ship was on her way to the Pacific. The
ensuing weeks saw a steady succession of
ships in transit. Every possible facility, in-
cluding religious, USO, Red Cross, and
post exchange services, was made avail-
able to make the short stay in the Canal
Zone pleasant and profitable. The last re-
deployment vessel, the USS Hawaiian
Shipper, arrived on 14 August 1945, just in
time for its passengers to get news of the
Japanese surrender and to find their desti-
nation changed to New York. Altogether,
36 ships passed through the Canal Zone
carrying approximately 125,000 troops
being redeployed from the European and
Mediterranean theaters.82
At the war's end, the maintenance of
the small force assigned to guard the Pan-
ama Canal constituted only a minor trans-
portation task. Together with the other
Caribbean bases and those in the North
Atlantic, Panama had long since become
part of a secondary front overshadowed
by the European and Pacific theaters.
80
Memo, Dep Chief Mvmts OCT to CGs NOPE
and SFPE, 28 Jun 42, sub: Estab of Los Angeles as
Temp Sub-Port; Ltr, CofT SOS to Dep Administrator
WSA, 3 Dec 42. Both in OCT 565.3-900 Panama.
81
Hist Rcd, TC Panama Canal Dept, Oct 42-Jun
43, passim, OCT HB Panama.
82
See Operation Transit in the Panama Canal De-
partment (1945), copy in OCT HB Panama. Cf.
Study, Plng Div OCT, Panama Canal Estimate of
Traffic and Capacity (c. Jun 45), OCT HB Exec
Panama Canal.
 CHAPTER II
Alaska and Western Canada
The outbreak of war in Europe caused
the United States to look to its Atlantic
defenses but created little apprehension
regarding the security of Alaska. General
Staff planners believed that the undevel-
oped state of the Territory, poor means of
communications, rugged terrain, and ad-
verse climate made unlikely the operation
of major land forces in Alaska and that air
or land invasion of the United States via
Alaska was not to be expected. Although
the possibility of surprise aggression ex-
isted, they anticipated that any such
enemy action would be minor and in all
probability confined to the Aleutian
Islands and the shores of the Gulf of
Alaska. The key to the defense of Alaska,
therefore, appeared to be the control of
Kodiak, Sitka, and the Unalaska-Dutch
Harbor area, where the development of
naval bases was contemplated, and of
Anchorage and Fairbanks, which could be
developed as air bases and maintain a
small, mobile air-ground team. Protected
by a superior Pacific fleet, the bases could
be defended by small Army garrisons and
by aircraft capable of carrying effective
action as far south as Ketchikan and as far
west as Kiska.1
Strategy and the Development
of Transportation
In line with this concept there was,
beginning in mid-1940, a limited strength-
ening of Alaska's defenses. A gradual
build-up of Army forces at Anchorage and
Fairbanks was undertaken, and small
garrisons were established at Kodiak,
Sitka, and Dutch Harbor, at covering air-
fields at Annette Island and Yakutat, and
at Nome on the west coast of Alaska. Col.
(later Lt. Gen.) Simon B. Buckner, Jr.,
was appointed commander of U.S. Army
troops on 9 July 1940, and later headed
the Alaska Defense Command (ADC), ac-
tivated on 1 March 1941, with head-
quarters at Fort Richardson, Anchorage.
The ADC came under the Western De-
fense Command, which like its prede-
cessor, the Ninth Corps Area, embraced
the U.S. west coast and Alaska. Expan-
sion was accelerated somewhat as a result
of the German invasion of the Soviet
Union in June 1941 and renewed Japa-
nese aggression in Southeast Asia, and by
the end of the year Army strength in
Alaska had reached 23,798.2
Meanwhile, construction was begun on
an air line of communications between the
United States and Alaska. Upon the rec-
ommendation of the Permanent Joint
Board on Defense, established by the
1
1st Ind, WPD to CG Fourth Army, 10 Oct 39,
WPD 3512-39 through 3512-49 Alaska Devel and
Settlement; Rpt, 15 Aug 40, sub: Defense of Naval
Bases at Sitka and Kodiak, JB 313, Ser 650, ADC 611
Rds II, KCRC AGO.
2
MS, WDC, History of the Western Defense Com-
mand, 17 Mar 41-30 Sep 45, Vol. I, Ch. I, pp. 2-6,
OCMH Files.
32
United States and Canada in August
1940, work was begun on a chain of air-
fields extending across western Canada to
Fairbanks. This construction program
was nearing completion at the end of
3
1941.
The defensive concept, predicated on
U.S. naval supremacy, was rudely shaken
by the Pearl Harbor attack. It was then
feared that Japanese submarine action
might endanger the sea lanes to Alaska
and that enemy possession of bases in the
Aleutians or on the shores of the Gulf of
Alaska might cut the sea lines of supply
from the U.S. west coast. At the same
time, completion and expansion of the
chain of airfields in western Canada and
Alaska became an urgent necessity. To
facilitate the operation and supply of
these airfields, and to provide an emer-
gency land route to Alaska in the event of
enemy interference on the sea lanes, the
War Department undertook the construc-
tion of the Alaska Highway. Also, surveys
were made to determine the feasibility of
building a railroad via the Rocky Moun-
tain Trench from Prince George, British
Columbia, to Fairbanks; the Canol
Project, designed to tap western Canadian
oil resources to supply aviation and motor
fuel to western Canada and Alaska, was
initiated; and studies were made regard-
ing the development of river and winter
road routes to supply stations that would
be cut off in the event the Bering Sea or
the Gulf of Alaska or both were denied to
U.S. shipping.4
While the use of alternate routes and
resources was under consideration, steps
were being taken to maintain and expand
the supply of Alaska by water. As a safety
measure, vessels were routed via the
Inside Passage, formed by the islands of
southeast Alaska, to Cape Spencer, where
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
convoys were formed for onward move-
ment across the open sea to stations in cen-
tral and southwest Alaska and beyond. To
ease the pressure on Seattle, the port of
embarkation for Alaska, a subport was
opened at Prince Rupert, British Co-
lumbia, and in an effort to relieve the
shortage of ocean-going vessels the Alaska
Barge Line was established to carry
cargoes from Seattle and Prince Rupert
via the Inside Passage to Juneau, and
later to Excursion Inlet, for transshipment
westward on ocean-going vessels.
As construction forces began work on
the Alaska Highway and other western
Canadian projects, the barge line also car-
ried supplies to Skagway, Alaska, the
ocean terminal connected by the White
Pass and Yukon Railroad with the high-
way at Whitehorse in the Yukon. In the
fall of 1942 Skagway was activated as a
subport of Seattle, and to expedite de-
liveries to Whitehorse the Army leased
the antiquated rail line. To command all
U.S. Army activities in western Canada
and the extension of those activities into
Alaska, including the White Pass and
Yukon Railroad and the Alaska Highway,
the Northwest Service Command (NWSC)
was established in September 1942. Col.
(later Brig. Gen.) James A. O'Connor as-
sumed command and set up his headquar-
ters at Whitehorse.
3
On air transport and other AAF operations in
Alaska and western Canada, see Graven and Cate,
AAF, I, 124-26, 147-48, 166-70, 193, 303-09, 357-
56, 361, 462-70, IV, 359-401.
4
ASF Contl Div Rpt 175, The Alaska Highway, 1
Jun 45, pp. 4-14, OCMH Files; Memo, Somervell
for CofE, 25 Mar 42, Hq NWSC and Off of Div Engr
NW Div, AG Sec 617 U.S.-Canada-Alaska RR, Rail
and Port Survey, KCRC AGO; Rpt, prepared by
com representing ASF Contl Div, OCofE, OQMG,
and CG NWSC, The Canol Project, OCMH Files;
Memo, Col Dabney O. Elliott, Dir Strategic Logistics
Div SOS, for ACofS for Opns SOS, 2 Oct 42, OCT
463.7-523.06 Alaska 41-42.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
In Alaska, meanwhile, expansion of
defensive garrisons proceeded as far as the
limited shipping permitted. Existing bases
were strengthened, new ones established,
and new airfields constructed. In early
1942, to cover Dutch Harbor, sites for air-
fields were garrisoned at Umnak Island in
the Aleutians and at Cold Bay in the
Alaska Peninsula. Other stations acti-
vated before June included Cordova, Val-
dez, and Juneau in southeast Alaska, and
Naknek off Kvichak Bay.5
Even as efforts to gird Alaska's defenses
moved forward, the Japanese launched a
two-pronged attack against Midway and
Dutch Harbor. The repulse of the enemy
at Midway (3-6 June) removed the threat
to the U.S. west coast and the Hawaiian
area and helped restore the balance of
naval power in the Pacific. The Dutch
Harbor attack (3-4 June) proved diver-
sionary and ended with the withdrawal of
Japanese forces and their occupation of
Kiska and Attu Islands in the western
Aleutians. These enemy bases lacked the
strength to threaten seriously Alaska's
security or to disrupt the sea lanes in the
Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska.
After the Dutch Harbor attack, the
Nome garrison was strengthened and
Army forces were stationed in the Bristol
Bay and Kuskokwim Bay areas, in the
Pribilof Islands, and at various points in
the interior of Alaska. An advance along
the Aleutian chain was begun in August
1942 with the occupation of Adak Island,
which was followed in January 1943 by
unopposed landings on Amchitka Island.
Both Adak and Amchitka were developed
as important forward bases, from which
the Japanese-held islands were subjected
to increasingly heavy air attack.
As a result of these military develop-
ments, there came into existence a large
33
number of scattered garrisons dependent
on water transport and, with the excep-
tion of installations served by the Alaska
Railroad and the Richardson Highway,
lacking connections with each other. By
the fall of 1943 there were in Alaska
twenty-eight ports, forty main posts or
garrisons, and over seventy locations where
6
troops were stationed.
The expansion of defensive installations
was accompanied by several notable im-
provements in the field of transportation.
Additional port facilities were constructed
at Seward and Dutch Harbor. Adak, a
barren island when occupied, was devel-
oped into a port handling over 100,000
measurement tons per month. The Alaska
Railroad's civilian force was augmented
by a railway operating battalion in the
spring of 1943, and a rail extension was
completed from Portage Bay to the newly
developed port of Whittier, giving the rail-
road a new and more convenient port of
entry.
Meanwhile, the possibility of utilizing
Alaska as an overland supply route to
Siberia and/or as a base for large-scale
offensive operations had been explored. In
the latter part of 1942 the idea of a rail-
road from Canada to Alaska was revived,
together with a rail extension and pipeline
from Fairbanks to a port on the Seward
Peninsula. Also, plans were made for the
development of river and winter road
routes from Whitehorse to Fairbanks and
thence along the Yukon River to Alaska's
west coast, and for a similar project along
the Kuskokwim River. Planning for the
Alaska Highway called for the delivery of
5
G-4 Per Rpt, Hq ADC, Initial Rpt, 10 Dec 42,
pp. 3-4, AG Opns Rpts Sp 3 19.1 10 Dec 42 (2).
6
Lecture by Brig Gen Frank L. Whittaker, Dep
Comdr ADC, at A-N Staff College, Washington,
D.C., OCT HB Alaska Misc Info.
34 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

as much as 200,000 tons monthly to Fair- only in emergencies. The Alaska Highway,
banks from the Dawson Creek and White- opened as a pioneer road in November
horse railheads. The Canol Project, origi- 1942 and substantially completed as an
nally intended to produce crude oil at all-weather highway in October 1943, was
Norman Wells in the Northwest Territories used to deliver only a token amount of
and carry it to Whitehorse by pipeline for matériel in Alaska beyond Fairbanks, al-
refining, was expanded to include a distri- though it proved valuable in supplying
bution pipeline system extending from airfields and Army and civilian construc-
Skagway to Whitehorse and from White- tion forces along the route.8
horse south to Watson Lake and north to The end of the Aleutian Campaign
Fairbanks and Tanana. The chain of air- brought a marked reduction in Alaska's
fields was expanded, intermediate airfields transportation requirements. Construction
were placed under construction, and in was curtailed, many garrisons and air-
September 1942 an air ferry system for the fields were inactivated or placed in a care-
delivery of lend-lease aircraft to Siberia taker status, excess supplies were evacu-
was established along the airway.7 ated or redistributed to remaining centers
Most of the plans for large-scale trans- of activity, and surplus troops were re-
portation operations were soon abandoned turned to the United States for deploy-
or considerably deflated. By early 1943 it ment to more active theaters. On the
was apparent that neither the plan for an administrative side, the ADC on 1 Novem-
overland supply route to Siberia nor that ber 1943 was divorced from the WDC and
for major offensive action based on Alaska established as the Alaskan Department,
would soon materialize. At the same time, an independent command reporting direct
the continued availability of the sea lanes to Washington.
and the improving shipping situation not With the exception of Canol, which was
only made it possible to meet the needs of pressed to completion as a measure to re-
the forces in Alaska and western Canada lieve the world-wide oil and tanker short-
more adequately, but also to provide for age, western Canadian projects moved
the expulsion of the Japanese from the
7
Aleutians. The capture of Attu in May Rpt on Survey, Trans-Canadian Alaska Railway
Location, 12 Oct 42, OCT 612-617 Alaska 41-42;
and the unopposed landings on Kiska in Memo, Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes, ACofS for Opns SOS,
August completed this phase. Thereafter, 7 Oct 42, sub: River Trans Yukon River, OCT 618-
steps were taken to reduce Alaska to a 900 Alaska 41-42; Memo, Maj Gen Wilhelm D.
Styer, CofS ASF, for CofT, 22 Mar 43, sub: NWSC
static, defensive garrison. Barge Lines on Lower Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers
These events made unnecessary the in Alaska, OCT 560.1-563.4 Alaska 43; Rpt, Gen
development of alternate overland routes. O'Connor to CG SOS, 12 Oct 42, sub: Review Rpt,
Trans-Canadian Alaska Ry, OCT 612-617 Alaska
Although an Engineer survey had upheld 41-42; Ltr, Somervell to CofE, 16 Nov 42, sub: Canol
the feasibility of constructing a trans- Project, NWT, Canada and Alaska, OCT 678
Canadian Alaska railway, the project had Alaska 44; MS, Hist Sec Alaskan Dept, Official His-
been unfavorably considered by the War tory of the Alaskan Department (hereafter cited as
Alaskan Dept Hist), Ch. XVI, p. 360, OCMH Files.
Department in November 1942 because of 8
Memo, Maj Gen Thomas M. Robins, Actg CofE,
the time and expense involved. Inland for CG SOS, 7 Dec 42, sub: Trans-Canadian Alaska
Ry, Prince George, B. C., to Kobe, Alaska, ASF 39-2
waterways were developed only to a lim- Alaska 382; ASF Contl Div Rpt 175 cited n. 4, pp.
ited extent and winter roads were used 35-38.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
from a construction to a maintenance
phase in early 1944.9 As a part of a general
reorganization calculated to facilitate the
transition, a command-wide Transporta-
tion Section was established headed by Lt.
Col. Harley D. Harpold. Whereas opera-
tions in NWSC had previously been char-
acterized by a lack of centralized control
and co-ordination of the available means
of transportation, under the new set-up
the Transportation Section exercised cen-
tralized movement control and other traf-
fic management functions. At the same
time, operations were decentralized to five
transportation districts, which operated
under policies and procedures formulated
by the Transportation Section. The re-
sultant improved planning and co-ordina-
tion of movements and more efficient use
of transportation contributed to the orderly
reduction of the command.10
When Canol's production and refining
facilities were abandoned in March 1945,
the last major activity in western Canada
came to a close. Activities that were con-
tinued—maintenance of the Alaska High-
way, signal communications, and distribu-
tion pipelines; supply of the airfields; and
operation of the port of Skagway and the
White Pass and Yukon Railway—were
rapidly reduced to minor proportions. In
June 1945, when NWSC was discontinued
and its duties were turned over to the
Sixth Service Command, there were less
than 1,600 military personnel in western
Canada.11
On V-J Day, Alaska was a static defen-
sive area with a military strength of ap-
proximately 36,000. The supply of Alaska
still depended on water transportation,
supplemented by a small amount of cargo
and a considerable number of passengers
carried by air. The availability of the sea
lanes and shipping made it uneconomical
35
to supply Alaska in any other fashion, but
the Alaska Highway and associated proj-
ects added considerably to the area's
potential for defense in the uncertain years
ahead.
Evolution of the Transportation
Organisation in Alaska
The creation of a large number of
isolated garrisons in Alaska resulted in the
development of a decentralized command
structure. Since extremely limited com-
munications between stations made im-
possible an orthodox supply system where-
by depots were organized in depth with
rail and road nets leading to the forward
areas, post commanders were made re-
sponsible for the supply as well as the
defense of their installations. Exercising
command and supply functions normally
performed by higher headquarters, they
requisitioned most categories of supply
directly on the Seattle Port of Embarka-
tion, maintained reserves of stocks, and
9
In February 1944 NWSC headquarters and the
office of the Northwest Engineer Division were con-
solidated, and General O'Connor was replaced by
Brig. Gen. Ludson D. Worsham. Worsham, in turn,
was succeeded in May 1944 by Col. (later Brig. Gen.)
Frederick S. Strong, Jr., who continued in command
until NWSC's inactivation. On the early months of
the shift to the maintenance phase, see Rpt, CG
NWSC to CG ASF, 12 Mar 44, sub: Interim Rpt on
Curtailment of Opns . . . in NWSC, ASF 65-6 Vol.
I Policy File NWSC.
10
For details on the reorganization of transporta-
tion activities in NWSC, see Memo, Col Harpold for
Chief Hist Br OCT, sub: Responsibilities of Trans Sec
and Appointment of CofT, OCT HB NWSC.
11
Memo, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, Dir Plans and
Opns ASF, for ACofS OPD, 23 May 45, sub: Discon-
tinuance of NWSC, ASF Plng Div A46-839 Vol. X
Gen NWSC; STM-30, Strength of the Army, 1 Dec
45, p. 63. Residual transportation functions were as-
signed by the Sixth Service Command to the Ed-
monton Transportation District (formerly Edmonton
Rail Regulating Station) in July 1945. See Harpold
memo cited n. 10.
36
assumed administrative and operational
control over all service and ground troops.
Each post tended to become a self-con-
tained installation subject to a minor
degree of co-ordination from ADC head-
quarters.12
Before the Pearl Harbor attack, Army
transportation operations were confined
largely to the ports. In August 1941 there
was a total of six Quartermaster officers
serving as Assistant Superintendents,
Army Transport Service, one each located
at Seward, Sitka, Dutch Harbor, Chilkoot
Barracks, Annette Island, and Yakutat.
These officers handled ATS functions in
addition to their other duties. Labor was
provided by civilians, where available, or
by troops detailed by the post com-
manders.13
The first command-wide ATS organiza-
tion emerged shortly after Pearl Harbor.
With the expansion of defensive garrisons,
the Army Engineers chartered floating
equipment from canning firms and other
commercial interests in order to move
construction personnel and materials to
new stations and to handle lighterage and
other harbor activities. The Officer in
Charge of Alaska Construction was made
responsible for the operation of this equip-
ment and accordingly was designated
Superintendent, Army Transport Service.
Effective 1 July 1942, the ATS was
divorced from the Engineers and placed
under the administrative jurisdiction of
the ADC Quartermaster Section. An ATS
superintendent was assigned, assuming
responsibility for all floating equipment
formerly under the Engineers, and ar-
rangements were made to bring all harbor
boats in ADC under his control. Toward
the end of the year a Transportation Sec-
tion was established on the special staff of
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ADC headquarters at Fort Richardson,
and the ATS superintendent was made
part of this section.14
The ATS superintendent was primarily
a staff officer responsible for co-ordinating
vessel movements within the command,
the control of ports remaining a function
of post commanders. Consequently, there
evolved during 1942 a large number of
widely distributed, unconnected or loosely
connected ATS units, known in ADC as
"outports." Lacking authorized Tables of
Organization, the typical ATS outport was
staffed by a few military and civilian per-
sonnel furnished from local sources. Port
labor was sometimes provided by organ-
ized port companies, but more often work
was performed by details from tactical
troops. ATS units, port companies, and
other personnel were under the control of
the post commanders.
Improvisation and the use of garrison
troops provided relatively efficient opera-
tion of Alaskan ports, but by late 1942 the
growing volume of shipping made it nec-
essary to increase outport staffs, bring in
qualified transportation personnel, and
provide for a larger degree of co-ordina-
tion in shipping and port activities. In
December 1942 the War Department ap-
proved an ADC request for an allotment
of forty-four officers, including an ATS
superintendent qualified in shipping and
harbor operations, and assistant superin-
tendents and other officers to supervise
12
G-4 Per Rpt, Hq ADC, Initial Rpt, 10 Dec 42,
pp. 1-2.
13
Rpt, Maj R. W. Smith to TQMG, 28 Aug 41,
sub: List of Commissioned Officers—Water Trans,
OCT 121.3-230.7 Alaska 41-42.
14
Trans Sv Hist Rcd, Jul 42, Supt ATS, Ft. Rich-
ardson, Alaska, 8 Aug 42, OCT HB Alaska Corres;
Alaskan Dept Hist, Ch. VIII; G-4 Per Rpt, Hq ADC,
Initial Rpt, 10 Dec 42, p. 7.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA 37
16
cargo handling and harbor craft operation highly important operating unit of ADC.
and maintenance at the outports.15 Despite his success in effecting consider-
About this time General Buckner placed able improvement in the ATS organiza-
a request with the War Department for a tion, Colonel Noble was dissatisfied with
chief of transportation for ADC. In Janu- his status in the command. He found that
ary 1943 Colonel Noble, who had com- his authority was not only restricted by
manded the 12th Port at Churchill, Mani- General Whittaker's supervision, but also
toba, was selected by the Chief of Trans- by the supervision exercised by post com-
portation in Washington. Upon arrival at manders, several General Staff officers, the
ADC headquarters, Noble was disap- ADC Transportation officer, officials of
pointed to find that he was not to assume the WDC, and the Seattle Port of Embar-
over-all direction of transportation opera- kation. His basic difficulty was that of
tions. Brig. Gen. Frank L. Whittaker, developing an integrated ATS organiza-
newly appointed Deputy Commander, tion when control of ports was decentral-
ADC, responsible inter alia for logistical ized to officers appointed by and responsi-
operations, believed that water transpor- ble to post commanders. Noble could give
tation was so important that it would technical guidance to Assistant Superin-
require Noble's full attention. Conse- tendents, ATS, but could exert influence
quently, Noble served solely as ATS super- over port commanders only through Gen-
intendent. Maj. (later Col.) Reuben W. eral Whittaker. Although Whittaker was
Smith, heading the ADC Transportation willing to correct situations where port
Section, was retained to deal primarily commanders did not permit assistant
with rail operations. In practice, both men superintendents to function properly, he
acted as staff officers to General Whittaker, insisted that the ATS superintendent
who exercised general supervision over should not infringe on the control of ports
17
transportation operations. by post commanders.
As Superintendent, ATS, Noble gave Noble advocated the establishment of a
the outports a larger degree of guidance centralized transportation organization
and instituted measures to control the flow
of traffic. ATS outport units at twenty- 15
Ltr, Col E. P. Post, CofS ADC, to CG WDC and
three ports were expanded and revitalized; Fourth Army, 1 Oct 42, sub: Pers for ATS, Alaska,
War Department approval of manning OCT 240-330.4 Alaska 41-42; 2d Ind, WD AGO to
CG WDC, 2 Dec 42, OPD 320.2 ADC Sec IV Cases
tables was obtained for ATS outport head- 142 to 206; Ltr, Lt Col Curtis A. Noble, Supt ATS
quarters, harbor craft detachments, ma- ADC, to Gen Wylie, ACofT, 25 Feb 43, OCT HB
rine way units, and maintenance platoons; Alaskan Dept Orgn of ATS.
16
Ltrs, Noble to Wylie, 25 Feb 43, 6 Aug 43, and
marine repair facilities were placed under 2d Ind, AGO to CG WDC, 7 Jun 43, OCT HB
construction at Adak, Seward, and Fort Alaskan Dept Orgn of ATS; Memo, Wylie for Gross,
Glenn and a floating repair shop was 10 Aug 43, sub: Trans in Alaska, OCT HB Wylie
Alaska.
secured from Seattle; maintenance pla- 17
Noble ltrs cited n. 16; Ltrs, Noble to Wylie, 29
toons were assigned to the principal ports; Mar, 7 Apr, and 4 May 43, OCT 333.1 Alaska;
and training schools for harbor boat per- Check Slip, Hq ADC, Note IV, Whittaker to Supt
ATS, 5 Aug 43, sub: Inspection of Ports at Camp
sonnel were activated. By August 1943 the Earle and Shemya by Supt ATS ADC, OCT HB
ATS was beginning to take its place as a Alaskan Dept Orgn of ATS.
38
exercising direct control over shipping,
port, rail, and other transportation activi-
ties. Instead, ADC in August 1943 issued
directives that made some progress in cen-
tralizing ATS activities, but that in other
respects proved disappointing to him. ATS
was made a separate command and was
designated the responsible agency for the
management, operation, and maintenance
of all vessels in Alaskan waters and for
their routing and berthing. The assistant
superintendents and the units under their
control, including outport headquarters,
harbor craft detachments, and marine
way and maintenance units, were placed
under the ATS superintendent for techni-
cal direction, but remained under the
administrative and operational control of
post commanders. At the same time, the
ATS superintendent was removed from
the ADC special staff, and the ADC Trans-
portation Section was announced as the
special staff agency dealing with transpor-
tation matters. Control of troop and cargo
movements was given to G-3 and G-4
respectively, and post commanders were
authorized to use, without reference to
ADC headquarters, any transport facility
serving their posts.18
The creation of an independent ATS
was a step forward, but Noble maintained
that he had been denied essential func-
tions, which were retained by various
members of the General Staff and the
ADC transportation officer. Disappointed
because he had never been permitted to
function as ADC chief of transportation
and believing that the ATS had grown
into an efficient organization only in the
face of "continual interference" and "op-
position to policies which would allow the
Superintendent, ATS to establish and exer-
cise normal prerogatives," Noble was
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
convinced that his usefulness in Alaska
had ended.19
Colonel Noble was transferred from
Alaska and was succeeded in September
1943 by Col. Joe Nickell, a Field Artillery
officer who had been port commander at
Adak, Attu, and Shemya Islands. At that
time Transportation Corps strength in
Alaska attained a wartime peak. On
1 October there were 1,917 troops and
several hundred civilians serving with ATS
and outport headquarters, harbor craft
detachments, marine way units, and main-
tenance platoons. In addition, four port
battalion headquarters and seventeen port
companies, aggregating 4,000 men, were
stationed at the major year-round ports,
and 1,168 railway troops were working on
the Alaska Railroad. Regardless of defi-
ciencies, much progress had been made in
expanding transportation operations in
the command.20
Under Colonel Nickell the conflict
between centralized and decentralized
control of port operations was resolved.
The functions of port commander and
Assistant Superintendent, ATS, were com-
bined and assigned to experienced Trans-
portation Corps officers wherever possible.
This was eventually accomplished at all
the major western Aleutian ports except
Amchitka, where an Infantry officer de-
tailed to the Transportation Corps had
done an excellent job and was retained. At
ports with an almost purely transportation
18
GO 129 and Staff Memo 220, Hq ADC, 1 Aug
43, OCT HB Alaskan Dept Orgn of SOS.
19
Ltr, Noble to Wylie, 6 Aug 43, OCT HB Alaskan
Dept Orgn of ATS.
20
Paraphrase of Rad, 19 Sep 43, CM-IN 14175,
OCT HB Alaskan Dept Orgn of ATS; History of
Transportation Developments Within the Alaska De-
fense Command (hereafter cited as ADC Trans Hist),
Rpt II, Transportation Corps Personnel and Units,
OCT HB Alaska.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
mission, such as Whittier, Seward, and
Nenana, Transportation officers were as-
signed either as post commanders or ex-
ecutive officers to the commanders. In
this manner, the Superintendent, ATS,
was able to give centralized direction to a
decentralized operation.21
Integration of transportation functions
was also accomplished at ADC headquar-
ters. Retaining his position as ATS super-
intendent, Nickell was appointed Chief of
Transportation and Traffic Manager, Alas-
kan Department, in March 1944, assum-
ing responsibility for the control and co-
ordination of all transportation facilities
and military traffic under the jurisdiction
of the Commanding General, Alaskan De-
partment, and for arrangements for air
movement of personnel and cargo. Colonel
Smith, previously transportation officer on
the Alaskan Department's special staff,
became assistant chief of transportation.
When motor transport on the Alaskan
portion of the Alaska Highway was trans-
ferred to the Alaskan Department in June
1944, Nickell took control of this activity,
and arranged for commercial truckers to
handle the minor traffic flowing from Fair-
banks to the Alaskan-Canadian border.
Water transportation remained Colonel
Nickell's chief responsibility, including
port operation, intratheater shipping, and
the operation, maintenance, and repair of
floating equipment. Motor transportation
activities were negligible, and after much
delay most railway troops were evacuated
in the spring of 1945. At the war's end,
Transportation Corps strength in the Alas-
kan Department, including the Transpor-
tation Section and ATS headquarters,
fifteen outport headquarters, harbor craft
personnel, ship repair and maintenance
units, supply personnel, and port troops,
39
was approximately 3,000 officers and en-
listed men and 500 civilians—a sizable
number when compared with the small
total military establishment in Alaska.22
Shipping—The Key to the Supply
of Alaska
From a transportation point of view,
Alaska was not a peninsula but an island
linked with the continent by sea and air.
Since the Territory produced little locally
for its own support, the military as well as
the civilian population depended heavily
on shipping from the U.S. west coast. The
supply of the Army in Alaska was initially
maintained by a small fleet of government-
owned and government-chartered vessels
operated by the ATS at the San Francisco
Port of Embarkation. In the first year of
the build-up, ending 30 June 1941, that
port shipped approximately 210,000 meas-
urement tons to Alaska. Most of this
cargo was delivered to Seward for local
use and for rail distribution to bases under
development in the Anchorage-Fairbanks
area, with small tonnages going to Kodiak,
Sitka, and other southeast Alaskan ports.
The nine vessels in service in July 1941
were of small capacity, had seen long serv-
ice, and in most instances had a top speed
of below ten knots.
Seattle was established as a subport of
San Francisco in August 1941, and as-
sumed responsibility for shipments to
Alaska. In the last six months of the year
the ATS fleet was increased, and approxi-
mately 330,000 measurement tons, des-
21
Ltr, Nickell to Maj Mark C. Collarino, Overseas
Opns Gp OCT, 24 Aug 44, OCT HB Alaska.
22
GO 52, Hq Alaskan Dept, 18 Mar 44, KCRC
AGO; G-4 Per Rpts, Hq Alaskan Dept, qtrs ending
31 Dec 43, 31 Mar 44, 30 Jun 44, 31 Mar 45, 30 Sep
45, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
40
tined largely for Alaska, were shipped from
Seattle. Building materials for the Corps
of Engineers made up 60 percent of this
23
tonnage.
The attack on Pearl Harbor greatly
complicated shipping problems. The ne-
cessity for routing vessels through the
Inside Passage and convoying them for-
ward from Cape Spencer lengthened sea
voyages and slowed deliveries. The num-
ber of Alaskan stations served by Seattle
increased from 12 in December 1941 to 38
in October 1942. Most destination ports
had extremely limited facilities, so that
cargo discharge was slow and ships' turn-
around time unduly long.
In the first months after Pearl Harbor
the Army, engaged in strengthening its
defenses in other vital areas and in secur-
ing the lines of communications to the
Philippines and Australia, could make few
additional vessels available for the Alaska
run. In January 1942 the ATS at Seattle,
which had been made a primary port of
embarkation independent of San Francis-
co, was operating six government-owned
and ten bareboat-chartered vessels capa-
ble of delivering 55,000 measurement tons
a month. Since 106,000 measurement tons
a month plus space for personnel were
needed, supplies began to pile up at
Seattle.24
When the local War Shipping Adminis-
tration (WSA) representative attempted
to effect the return to their owners of ships
on bareboat charter to the ATS, Seattle,
the Army objected and a lively contro-
versy ensued. The Western Defense Com-
mand proposed that all vessels engaged in
the supply of Alaska be placed under mili-
tary control, but the War Department
considered this impracticable. Instead,
Transportation Corps and WSA officials
in Washington arranged a compromise
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
whereby vessels already under bareboat
charter to ATS would remain in that
status; other commercial vessels in the
Alaskan service would continue to be
manned and operated by their owners,
and WSA would allocate them to the
Army, the Navy, or civilian agencies as re-
quired. Those ships allocated to the Army
were loaded and directed to their destina-
tions by the ATS.25
The transports owned and chartered by
the Army plus those allocated to it by
WSA were insufficient to carry the bur-
den. The situation grew serious after April
1942, as demands arising from construc-
tion work on the Alaska Highway and
other western Canadian projects were
added to Alaskan requirements. To allevi-
ate the shortage, six vessels were diverted
from other services to the Alaskan run. In
addition, the ATS at Seattle arranged for
fishing vessels to carry Army cargo to
southeastern Alaskan ports upon their de-
parture for fishing banks in the area;
chartered a few Canadian vessels and
available space on commercial vessels;
utilized tugs, barges, and vessels unsuit-
able for ocean duty to deliver cargo to In-
side Passage ports; and arranged for naval
vessels to carry some Army cargo. In July
23
Memo of Rcd, Jackson, 11 Aug 41, sub: USAT
Alaskan Sv, OCT HB Ocean Trans Alaska; Ltr, Col
Thomas J. Weed, Supt ATS SPE, to TQMG, 17 Feb
42, OCT HB Ocean Trans Alaska; SPE Hist Rpt IV,
p. 1, OCT HB SPE.
24
Rpt, Brig Gen Eley P. Denson, CG SPE, to Contl
Div OCT, 8 Nov 42, sub: Rpt on Adm Devels, OCT
HB SPE Corres; SPE Hist Rpt VIII, pp. 1-2, OCT
HB SPE; Memo, Gross for CG SOS, 15 Mar 42, sub:
Trans of Material to SW Alaska, ASF 39-2 Alaska
384.
25
Ltr, Lt Gen John L. De Witt, CG WBC and
Fourth Army, to CG SOS, 10 Mar 42, sub: Ships for
the Sup of Alaska, OCT 555-561.1 Alaska 41-42; Ltr,
Somervell to CG WBC, 11 Mar 42, same sub, OCT
544.3-563.8 Seattle 41-42; Memo, OCT for OPB, 5
May 42, sub: Purchase of Vessels by ATS, OCT
523.07-554.4 Alaska 41-42.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
1942 Alaska Barge Line operations were
instituted to deliver materials from Seattle
and Prince Rupert to Juneau for trans-
shipment westward on ocean-going vessels.
In this fashion, water shipments to Alaska
and western Canada were increased from
50,347 measurement tons in December
1941 to 234,287 measurement tons in
October 1942. In the same period over
64,000 troops were transported by water
to Alaskan and western Canadian
stations.26
By November 1942, twenty-nine U.S.-
owned and U.S.-chartered vessels in the
Alaskan service, supplemented by barges,
fishing vessels and WSA-allocated ships,
were meeting minimum requirements, but
they did not deliver sufficient tonnage to
overcome the general shortage of housing,
construction materials, and other supplies.
With shipping barely adequate for de-
fensive purposes, tactical operations were
possible only after careful logistical plan-
ning. When Adak was occupied in August
1942, shipping was phased so that vessels
did not arrive faster than they could be
discharged. Later in the year, the War
Department's diversion of several vessels
from the Alaskan run to meet lend-lease
commitments to the Soviet Union caused
the cancellation of plans to occupy Tanaga
Island in the Aleutians. Most of this ship-
ping was soon replaced, but the incident
indicated the narrow margin on which the
Army operated in Alaska. 27
During the first half of 1943, the ship-
ping situation steadily improved. Port
facilities at Seattle and Prince Rupert and
in Alaska were expanded, and the world-
wide shipping shortage eased somewhat.
In May approximately a hundred Army
transports and commercial vessels were on
the Alaska run, as well as tugs, barges,
and other floating equipment. 28 Water de-
41
liveries attained an all-time high in July,
when Seattle and Prince Rupert shipped
364,106 measurement tons to Alaska and
western Canada. In this period shipping
was also made available for new tactical
operations, which culminated in the Kiska
landings in August 1943.
With the ensuing curtailment of activ-
ities and the consequent reduction of mili-
tary strength in Alaska and western
Canada, water shipments fell off steadily,
averaging about 54,000 measurement tons
monthly in late 1944. By the end of the
year, Army troops in Alaska had been re-
duced from a peak of 150,000 in August
1943 to 52,000, while military personnel
in NWSC had decreased from 24,000 to
2,400. At the war's close, water deliveries
were on the order of 30,000 measurement
tons a month. Vessels from the zone of in-
terior were then calling at six major Alas-
kan ports, from which passengers and
cargo were transshipped to other stations
by vessels under theater control. 29
Development of Subports for Seattle
The build-up of Alaskan defenses fol-
lowing the Pearl Harbor attack was re-
tarded by congestion at the Seattle Port of
26
Memo, Maj Norman H. Vissering, Chief Traffic
Sec OCT, for Col McGinley, 9 May 42, OCT HB
Ocean Trans Alaska; Ltr, Weed to CofT, 26 May 42,
sub: Vessels Operating out of SPE, OCT 544.3-563.4
Seattle 41-42. For statistics on water deliveries to
Alaska and western Canada see Alaskan Dept Hist,
App. I, Water Transportation, Pt. I, Tab. 6.
27
SPE Hist Rpt VII, p. 6, OCT HB SPE; G-4 Per
Rpt, Hq ADC, Initial Rpt, 10 Dec 42, pp. 13-14; Ltr,
DeWitt to CofS, 1 Dec 42, sub: Shipping Rqmts for
Alaska, OCT 565.4 Alaska 41-42; Memo, Maj Gen
Thomas T. Handy, ACofS, for TAG, 12 Dec 42, same
sub, OPD 565.4 Sec I, Cases 1-36.
28
ADC Trans Hist, Rpt I, General, OCT HB.
29
G-4 Per Rpts, Hq Alaskan Dept, qtr ending 31
Dec 43, pp. 1-2, qtr ending 30 Jun 44, p. 2, qtr end-
ing 30 Sep 45, p. 6, AG Opns Rpts 319.1; STM-30,
Strength of the Army, 1 Dec 45, pp. 62-63.
42
Embarkation as well as the shipping
shortage. The rail net leading into Seattle,
the terminal facilities, and the port per-
sonnel were inadequate immediately to
handle the accelerated movement of
troops, supplies, and equipment. In an
effort to relieve the burden on Seattle and
to increase the lift to Alaska, a number of
subports were established in western
Canada and southeastern Alaska.
The first and most important of the sub-
ports was Prince Rupert, British Colum-
bia, situated almost 600 miles north of
Seattle at the western terminus of the
Canadian National Railway. With Can-
ada's consent, the subport was officially
activated on 6 April 1942, for the purpose
of shipping to southeast Alaskan stations
cargo that could be routed to it by rail
from eastern and central United States as
well as a smaller amount delivered by ves-
sel, barge, and rail from Seattle. Imme-
diately available at Prince Rupert were
leased docks capable of berthing three ves-
sels, a transit shed, limited open and closed
storage space, and a small group of two
officers and twenty-six civilians who had
handled the salvage and reshipment of the
cargo of a transport grounded nearby.
Steps were taken to augment port person-
nel and construct additional port facilities,
and tugs, barges, and small Canadian ves-
sels were chartered or obtained from Seat-
tle to supplement the ocean-going vessels
operating out of the port. Installations to
handle ammunition were leased at Wat-
son Island, twelve miles from Prince
Rupert, and a staging area was placed
under construction three miles beyond at
Port Edward.30
Prince Rupert's development was
slower than expected, the port shipping
forward less than 50,000 measurement
tons and fewer than 3,000 troops in its first
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ten months of operation. The scarcity of
local labor and materials retarded con-
struction, and a shortage of floating equip-
ment limited traffic. Operations were
further handicapped in the winter of
1942-43 by congestion on the Canadian
railways, which were overtaxed with sup-
plies for the Alaska Highway and Canol
as well as for Prince Rupert. In the ab-
sence of centralized traffic control, freight
car movements were un-co-ordinated,
and agencies concerned, both contractor
and military, diverted and unloaded cars
without regard to consignee or owner-
ship of the freight. As a result, individual
cars meandered along the line all the
way from Waterways to Edmonton, Daw-
son Creek, and Prince Rupert, before
they were either unloaded or trans-
shipped. Some semblance of order ap-
peared with the establishment in Novem-
ber 1942 of a Rail Regulating Station at
Edmonton, but the tie-up could not be
materially eased until March 1943, when
a temporary embargo was placed on rail
shipments into Canada.31
Operations began to improve in the late
spring and summer of 1943 as rail conges-
tion was reduced and construction pro-
gressed. Three new berths for vessels and
three barge berths were completed, a dock
apron, a transit shed, and storage space
were added, and by midyear housing for
3,000 men was provided at the Port Ed-
ward staging area. With increased facil-
ities available, Prince Rupert in March
30
Unless otherwise cited, the section on Prince
Rupert is based upon: Rpt, 1st Lt Theodore G. Wear,
Jr., History of the Subport of Embarkation at Prince
Rupert to 30 September 1942, and subsequent hist
rpts, OCT HB SPE Prince Rupert Subport; SPE Hist
Rpts V and XXX, OCT HB SPE.
31
NWSC First Semi-Annual Rpt, Jan 44, p. 8, AG
Opns Rpts 91 SCI-0.3 (1596) M, 25 Sep 42-1 Jan 44;
Harpold memo cited n. 10.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA 43

1943 was assigned direct responsibility for struction materials needed for the devel-
the supply of Alaskan stations southward opment of new bases in southwestern
from Yakutat, including the Excursion Alaska, the district engineer at Seattle
Inlet barge terminal, and for water deliv- proposed making large-scale barge deliv-
eries to forces in western Canada through eries via the Inside Passage to a terminal
Skagway. Port traffic increased steadily, in the vicinity of Cape Spencer, where
hitting a peak in July 1943, when Prince cargo would be transferred to ocean-going
Rupert shipped forward approximately vessels for westward delivery. By cutting
95,000 measurement tons, received about in half the voyages of transports, the barge
47,000 measurement tons by rail and operation would greatly increase the
water, and handled over 12,600 military amount of cargo they could deliver to
and civilian personnel arrivals and de- Alaska.
partures. Staffed by some 3,900 troops and The plan was adopted by Western De-
civilians, the subport then had operating fense Command and received War De-
responsibility for 17 cargo vessels of 60,000 partment approval in May 1942. The
measurement tons capacity, 17 tugs, and Army Engineers thereupon undertook a
scows with a capacity of 22,000 measure- survey to determine the best site for a ter-
ment tons. minal and the construction required. The
Water shipments dropped to 38,518 Seattle port commander, who was as-
measurement tons in August and contin- signed responsibility for the project's de-
ued to decrease despite the fact that Prince velopment, formulated plans for a barge
Rupert was given the added responsibility line designed ultimately to deliver 150,000
in December of supplying the stations measurement tons a month and set up an
served by the Alaska Railroad. While the interim operation to Juneau with craft
curtailment of activities in Alaska and locally available.33
western Canada materially reduced the The transshipment operation at Juneau
port's value, the fact that Seattle was being contributed little to the supply of Alaska,
groomed to play a major part in support principally because of limited port facil-
of Pacific operations made advisable ities and the slow development of the
Prince Rupert's retention as a reserve port barge line. The production of necessary
ready to take over the entire supply of new floating equipment took time, and in
Alaska should Seattle become overbur- the meantime only a limited number of
dened. In the summer of 1944 the port craft could be secured through charter,
was reduced in strength and nonessential 32
Memo, Wylie for CG ASF, 8 Jan 44, sub: Instal-
installations were placed on a stand-by lations of Prince Rupert, Juneau, Excursion Inlet, and
basis. Prince Rupert continued in oper- Edmonton, OCT 323.3 Alaska 44-45; Memo, ACofS
G-4 for CG ASF, 13 May 44, sub: Devel and Use of
ation as an outport of Seattle throughout Prince Rupert, ASF Plng Div A 47-192 Vol. 25 Prince
the war, shipping to Alaska and the Pa- Rupert.
33
cific Ocean Areas such supplies as could Ltr, Col Beverly C. Dunn, District Engr, to CG
WDC, 28 Mar 42, sub: Trans of Materials to SW
economically be laid down at the port. 32 Alaska; Ltr, Somervell to CG WDC and Fourth
Like Prince Rupert, the Juneau and Army, 17 May 42, same sub; 1st Ind, Office Supt
Excursion Inlet subports had their genesis ATS SPE to CofT, 18 Jun 42. All in OCT 567 Alaska
in the shipping crisis of early 1942. 41-42. Also see Ltr, Denson to CofT, 17 Jul 42, sub:
Devel of Sub-PE-Icy Straits/Juneau, OCT 323.3
Alarmed by the growing backlog of con- Alaska 44-45.
44
lease, and purchase. In October 1942 the
barge line was hauling about 18,000 tons
monthly from Seattle and Prince Rupert,
for delivery to Skagway and other Inside
Passage ports as well as Juneau. More-
over, increased water deliveries direct to
Alaskan destinations in the latter part of
1942 eased the pressure for augmentation
of the barge line, and the lion's share of
newly acquired floating equipment was
allotted to ADC for lighterage and other
operations in Alaska. These developments,
together with diversions of craft to tactical
operations in the Aleutians, accidents,
and equipment breakdowns, caused de-
liveries to Juneau to remain far below
those originally planned. 34 From its acti-
vation in July 1942, when the first ship-
ments of cargo arrived by barge, the
Juneau subport received only 50,548
measurement tons by barge, Army trans-
port, and commercial vessel from Seattle
and Prince Rupert, and shipped forward
only 32,716 measurement tons to destina-
tions from Yakutat westward.35
Meanwhile, Excursion Inlet, a barren
site located at the head of the Inside Pas-
sage had been selected for the planned
barge terminal. Construction, begun in
September 1942, was sufficiently ad-
vanced by the following spring to warrant
the transfer of most transshipment opera-
tions from Juneau. Activated on 22 March
1943, Excursion Inlet received approxi-
mately 275,000 measurement tons during
the year, much of it by barge, small Ca-
nadian vessels, and other ships unsuitable
for long ocean voyages, and shipped for-
ward about 156,000 measurement tons to
Alaskan destinations as far west as Attu.
At the end of 1943 some 7,000 troops and
180 civilians were on duty at the subport,
and construction completed included two
1,000-foot wharves, two 4,000-foot barge
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
extensions, two oil docks, cold storage and
marine repair facilities, housing, thirty
miles of road, and a station hospital.36
The transshipment operation was not
expanded beyond this point. The shift of
military strength in Alaska to the Aleu-
tians reduced the savings in ships' turn-
around time that could be effected by
using Excursion Inlet. Moreover, it was
more important to furnish employment
for the civilian labor pools at U.S. west
coast ports such as Seattle, which was not
then being used to capacity, than to con-
tinue operation of a port of limited value
with troop labor. By April 1944, when the
War Department ordered the subport's
discontinuance, cargo arrivals had vir-
tually ceased, accumulated cargo was
being cleared, and military strength was
in the process of reduction. 37 Salvageable
materials were then shipped back to the
United States, and a small caretaker de-
tachment was left behind at the installa-
tion, which was formally inactivated in
January 1945.
Although over-all barge deliveries can-
not be segregated in the available port
statistics, it was estimated that 240,000
measurement tons were shipped by barge
from Prince Rupert and Seattle between
October 1942 and August 1943. In the fall
34
SPE Hist Rpt VIII, OCT HB SPE; Ltr and Incl,
DeWitt to CofS, 1 Oct 42, sub: Construction of Fltg
Equip for the NW, and Memo, Handy to TAG, 1 Dec
42, sub: Shipping Rqmts for Alaska, OPD 565.4 Sec
I Cases 1-36.
35
On Juneau, see Hist Rpts, Juneau Subport of
Embarkation, Activation Through December 1943,
OCT HB SPE Juneau Sub-PE; SPE Hist Rpt V, pp.
17-23, OCT HB SPE.
36
On Excursion Inlet see Hist Rpts, Mar-Dec 43,
OCT HB SPE Excursion Inlet Subport, and SPE Hist
Rpt V, pp. 23-25 and App. B-D, OCT HB SPE.
37
Ltr, Col Clifford Starr, Chief Adm Div OCT, to
CG SPE, 31 Dec 43, sub: Reduction in Troop
Strength-Excursion Inlet, and Ltr, TAG to CofT, 4
Apr 44, sub: Disposition of Excursion Inlet Sub-PE,
OCT 323.3 Alaska 44-45.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
of 1943 barge operations were accounting
for a substantial proportion of deliveries to
Excursion Inlet and for approximately
22,000 measurement tons a month carried
to Skagway and other southeastern Alas-
38
kan ports. But their importance was al-
ready declining. After the close of trans-
shipment activities at Excursion Inlet,
barge operations were limited chiefly to
small-scale deliveries from Prince Rupert
to Skagway and other southeastern Alas-
kan destinations.
Unlike Juneau and Excursion Inlet,
which were transshipment ports for the
supply of Alaskan stations, Skagway was
developed as an ocean terminal for U.S.
military and civilian forces in western
Canada.39 Located at the head of the
Lynn Canal and connected by rail with
the Alaska Highway, Skagway began re-
ceiving cargoes in the spring of 1942 for
the supply of construction and other forces
served out of Whitehorse. By the fall of the
year Skagway was becoming badly con-
gested. Available military and civilian
labor was insufficient, and the narrow-
gauge railroad and its wooden two-berth
dock were antiquated, poorly equipped,
and extremely limited in capacity.
To cope with the situation, Skagway
was established as an Army subport of
Seattle in September 1942. Work was be-
gun on dock improvement, cargo-han-
dling equipment arrived, and port troops
were assigned to handle dock operations,
warehousing, and carloading. At the same
time, the Army leased and took over oper-
ation of the rail line. Improvement was
immediate, but the onset of severe winter
weather in December again curtailed port
operations, and the small volume of ton-
nage discharged from ships and barges
piled up on docks and in storage areas
because of interruptions in rail service.
45
With the moderating of the weather the
upswing in port traffic was resumed, and
in May 1943 Skagway discharged ap-
proximately 30,000 weight tons, over four
times its September 1942 performance. By
this time two additional vessel berths, new
barge grids, and more storage space were
available, port personnel had been in-
creased, and improved rail operations had
cut down backlogs at the port. Traffic at
Skagway reached a peak in August 1943,
with the discharge of approximately 58,-
000 weight tons (estimated at 90,000-
100,000 measurement tons).
Skagway was transferred from Seattle's
control on 1 September 1943, becoming a
port of debarkation under the Northwest
Service Command. During the remainder
of the year port activity declined sharply
as construction projects in western Can-
ada neared completion. The subsequent
evacuation of civilian contractor em-
ployees and equipment took up some of
the slack, but this failed to halt the gen-
eral downward trend of port traffic. With
the general curtailment of NWSC activ-
ities in 1944, the port was reduced in
strength. Later in the year, in order to
make maximum use of the personnel
available and to provide unified direction
to the interrelated port and railroad activ-
ities, both operations were consolidated
and placed under an Army officer desig-
38
Address at Boston Conf by Brig Gen Eley P. Den-
son, 30 Aug-1 Sep 43, Special Problems in Supply of
Alaska, OCT HB Alaska Misc Info; Ltr, Lt Col J. A.
Barthrop, Supt ATS SPE, to CofT, 26 Aug 43, sub:
Tug and Barge Construction, OCT HB Alaskan Dept
Fltg Equip.
39
On Skagway, see the following: Hist Rpts, Skag-
way Subport of Embarkation, OCT HB SPE Skag-
way POD; Hist Rpt, 375th Port Battalion, Transpor-
tation Corps, AG Opns Rpts TCBN-375-0.1 (29703)
M, 1 Sep 42-31 Dec 44. For statistics see Hq NWSC
and Off of Div Engr NW Div, Trans Br 563.59 Ton-
nage and Estimates, KCRC AGO.
46
nated general superintendent. The small
continuing traffic was handled by a com-
bination of military and civilian person-
nel, and provision was made for the
eventual replacement of all Army troops
by civilians.40
The Alaskan Ports
During the three years of the Alaskan
build-up ending with the occupation of
Kiska in August 1943, there evolved a
large number of scattered and isolated
ports possessing limited facilities and often
41
subject to adverse climatic conditions.
In southeastern and central Alaska, the
ports were generally ice-free, but handi-
capped by excessive fog and rain. North
and northwest of Kodiak, the ports were
icebound seven to eight months in the
year and had to be supplied entirely dur-
ing the summer season. With the excep-
tion of Bethel, which could handle ships
drawing up to eighteen feet of water, these
ports were rendered unsuitable for dock
operation by rough seas, high winds, and
shallow and rocky approaches. Ships had
to be discharged by lighterage since they
had to anchor twelve miles offshore at
Naknek, six miles at Port Heiden, and two
miles at Nome. The Aleutian chain,
stretching 1,200 miles westward from the
Alaska Peninsula, was ice-free, but with
the exception of Dutch Harbor the ports
were barren, wind-swept, and sparsely in-
habited. Umnak, garrisoned in early
1942, lacked harbors and had to be sup-
plied by barge from Chernofski Harbor,
twelve miles to the southwest. As other
Aleutian bases were occupied, it was nec-
essary to start from scratch, lightering in
troops, equipment, and supplies, con-
structing docks, sorting sheds, warehouses,
and other base facilities, and eventually
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
converting from lighterage to dock
operations.
At most Alaskan ports, the scarcity of
civilian labor made necessary the exten-
sive use of military personnel for handling
cargo. In the absence of trained port units,
Engineer and tactical troops were em-
ployed. Army port companies were even-
tually brought in and one or two were as-
signed to each of the larger ice-free ports,
but these units were often heavily supple-
mented by tactical troops, particularly at
the Aleutian ports. At the icebound and
the smaller ice-free stations, port labor
continued to be performed largely by gar-
rison troops. Some assistance was provided
through continuance of a peacetime prac-
tice of ships engaged in the Alaskan trade,
since crew members on both commercial
vessels and Army transports acted as
winchmen and longshoremen and per-
formed other duties incident to cargo dis-
charge and loading.42
The principal prewar port was Seward.
Located at the southern terminus of the
Alaska Railroad, it was the port of entry
for Army and civilian goods for Anchor-
age, Fairbanks, and other points served by
the rail line. Cargo was discharged by
civilian longshoremen over an old rail-
road-owned dock capable of berthing two
ocean-going vessels. Seward was able to
handle cargoes for the initial build-up of
the Anchorage-Fairbanks area, but with
the increased traffic following Pearl Har-
bor the Army had to construct a new two-
berth dock and bring in port troops. In
40
NWSC MPRs, Sep 44, pp. 3-4, Dec 44, pp. 3, 7,
DRB AGO.
41
Unless otherwise cited, narrative and statistical
data pertaining to the Alaskan ports are drawn from
ADC Trans Hist, Rpt I and supplementary per rpts.
42
Ltr, Col John M. Franklin, Chief Water Div
OCT, to WSA, 25 Aug 42, sub: Crew Members
Working as Stevedores, OCT HB Ocean Trans
Alaska.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA 47

April 1943 the three port companies on four months in the year, activities at Val-
duty at Seward, together with civilian dez were seasonal, the port receiving little
longshoremen, discharged approximately tonnage during the winter months but dis-
38,000 measurement tons of Army cargo. charging as much as 27,000 measurement
Despite the improvements, Seward was tons monthly during the brief summer, for
not retained as the main port of entry for shipment by truck to stations as far north
stations on the rail belt, because the as Fairbanks. The prewar commercial
mountainous southern section of the rail port facilities were adequate and labor
43
line impeded traffic moving northward. was provided by garrison troops. In the
In May 1943 a rail cutoff was completed latter part of 1943, with the discontinu-
extending from Portage junction, sixty- ance of the motor transport operation,
four miles north of Seward, eastward to Valdez was placed on a caretaker status.
Whittier on Prince William Sound. Virtu- Other ports in central and southeastern
ally all Army cargo was then routed Alaska, including Cordova, Yakutat, An-
through Whittier, which commenced op- nette Island, and Sitka, were isolated and
erations on 1 June 1943 with a newly con- were used only for the supply of local gar-
structed Army dock capable of berthing risons and airfields. Extensive improve-
two ocean-going vessels and adequate rail- ment of existing dock and lighterage facil-
way yard and terminal facilities. Whittier ities was not required; labor was provided
handled its peak traffic in July 1944, when by civilian longshoremen, where available,
two port companies discharged or loaded and by garrison troops. Like Valdez and
53,500 measurement tons. When the war the icebound stations, these ports handled
ended the port was still active, but rarely insignificant traffic after 1943.
handled more than 10,000 measurement Kodiak was already being developed as
tons a month. a naval base when the first Army troops
Anchorage, the third port on the Alaska arrived in April 1941. Initially, two Navy
Railroad, was the site of the largest mili- docks, capable of berthing three vessels
tary station on the Alaskan mainland. each, and a privately owned wharf were
Unfortunately, it was icebound six to available. In March 1942 the Army pur-
seven months of the year, and during the chased a cannery dock, and improved it to
open season operations were handicapped a point where it could handle a large
by tides of unusual height and bore. The ocean-going vessel. Dock labor was pro-
Army rehabilitated the single-berth dock vided by civilian longshoremen until a
in the spring of 1941, but made few other port company arrived in November 1942.
improvements. In the open season incom- Relations among the Army, Navy, and
ing tonnage was handled by troops de- civilian dock owners were excellent, each
tailed from the post. During the rest of the making its facilities and labor available to
year installations in the Anchorage area the others.
were supplied through Seward and later To the westward, Dutch Harbor stood
Whittier. as the prewar naval bastion overlooking
The only other port linked with the in- the Aleutian chain. When the first Army
terior of central Alaska was Valdez, the garrison troops arrived in May 1941, they
southern roadhead of the Richardson used the Navy dock and the commercially
Highway. Since the road was open only 43
See below, pp. 53-54.
48
owned Unalaska Dock. The Army took
over the latter installation in September
1942 and later completed construction of
a new dock and a number of berths for
small boats at Captains Bay. Army cargo-
handling activities were conducted by tac-
tical troops until December 1942, when a
port company arrived. Dutch Harbor
loaded or discharged up to 34,300 meas-
urement tons of Army cargo monthly dur-
ing 1943, and although traffic declined
markedly thereafter it remained one of the
major Army ports in Alaska.
The largest Alaskan port operation had
its origin in the selection of Adak for de-
velopment as an advance base from which
to bring the Japanese-held islands of Attu
and Kiska under air attack. 44 On 30 Au-
gust 1942 six troop and cargo vessels, car-
rying an occupation force of 4,602 officers
and men and 43,500 measurement tons of
supplies and equipment, arrived at Adak.
The landing was unopposed but proved
difficult, the uninhabited island lacking
facilities of any kind. Troops were light-
ered ashore by 32 LCP's (landing craft,
personnel) and 4 LCM's (landing craft,
mechanized) of the Navy transport
J. Franklin Bell. A fifty-knot wind and
heavy surf caused many of the landing
craft to be broached, and their continued
operation was made possible only after
ATS tugs arrived and towed them back
into the water. All troops were pressed
into service to manhandle the cargo from
landing craft to the high-water mark on
the beach. As cranes and tractors were
landed through the surf, it was possible to
move cargo from the beach to dispersal
areas. Cargo was unloaded from lighter to
beach until the third day, when a barge
dock was improvised by beaching one
barge and fastening two others to it as an
extension. Unloading was completed on 6
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
September, and thereafter additional
Army and Navy personnel were brought
in as rapidly as available shipping and
port capacity would permit.
Under the leadership of the post com-
mander, Brig. Gen. Eugene M. Landrum,
Adak was developed into a powerful for-
ward air base, a staging area for subse-
quent expeditions, and the most impor-
tant port in Alaska. Docks, sorting sheds,
and warehouses were constructed, port
operations were systematized, and port
troops, cargo-handling equipment, and
trucks were brought in. From his tactical
staff, General Landrum detailed a port
commander and subordinate officers, in-
cluding an ATS assistant superintendent
and a harbor boat master. The port com-
mander directly controlled all service and
tactical forces engaged in port operations,
including ATS officers, port companies,
and harbor craft, truck, sorting-shed, and
warehouse troops. This improvised port
organization proved highly effective and
was made a model for other ports by Gen-
eral Whittaker. In April 1943 Adak dis-
charged approximately 130,000 weight
tons. The Army had completed a pile-
driven lighterage dock and two piers ca-
pable of berthing three ocean-going ves-
sels, while the Navy had built a separate
dock at Sweeper Cove. Army cargo and a
portion of the Navy cargo were handled
by two assigned port companies and two
others being staged pending assignment to
more advanced ports, supplemented by
large details of tactical troops.
During the period in which Adak out-
fitted task forces for additional landings in
the Aleutians, the port commander, Colo-
nel Nickell, trained several officer teams
44
G-3 Rpt, G-3 Sec WDC, Offensive Phases of the
Aleutians Campaign, AG Opns Rpts 91-DC4-30
(5792) 14 Sep 43.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
to assist future port commanders in organ-
izing their operations. Using available
port and tactical troops, the team set up
and trained outport headquarters; organ-
ized the harbor by the placement of buoys
and set up a system for dispatching land-
ing craft, tugs, and barges; developed
ship-to-shore discharge, first with landing
craft, then with barges, and finally from
docks; and organized the handling of dis-
charged cargo, at first with tractors on the
beach and later with trucks at docks, sort-
ing yards, and dispersal areas. After estab-
lishing a port operation, the team might
stay on or be used in a new landing. Nick-
ell himself moved to Attu as port com-
mander early in its development and later
took command of the Shemya port, where
he served until his appointment as Super-
45
ntendent, ATS.
After the Aleutian Campaign, Adak
continued as the most active Alaskan port.
It became a transshipment port, receiving
supplies from Seattle and distributing
them by small vessels and barges to minor
ports in the area. Adak handled over
100,000 measurement tons in some months
of early 1944, but the general reduction in
military strength soon brought a marked
decline in traffic.
The advance down the Aleutians
brought into operation a number of im-
portant ports to the west of Adak. At Am-
chitka, occupied in January 1943, the port
repeated the cycle of lighterage, construc-
tion, expansion, and conversion from
barge to dock operations that had charac-
terized Adak's development. Berthing
facilities for two ships were completed in
June 1943. After discharging a peak of
63,000 measurement tons in September
Amchitka handled less traffic, and by late
1944 was receiving only small tonnages,
largely by transshipment from Adak.
49
After Amchitka's occupation, it was
decided to bypass Kiska and take Attu, at
the western end of the Aleutian chain. In
the spring of 1943 an assault force of
11,000 was assembled on the U.S. west
coast and sailed from San Francisco on 24
April in five transports with a strong naval
46
escort. The U.S. forces started landing in
heavy fog on the beaches of Massacre and
Holtz Bays on 11 May 1943. Troops and
equipment were carried ashore by Navy
LCT's (landing craft, tank), LCVP's
(landing craft, vehicle and personnel), and
LCM's. The handling of cargo on the
beaches was the responsibility of the 50th
Engineer Regiment, under Maj. Samuel
R. Peterson, the shore party commander.
First landing operations were confused.
The assault force had been given no prac-
tice in amphibious landings in fog or in
darkness and was unfamiliar with Alas-
kan climate and terrain. Many craft lost
their way in the fog, broke down, or were
delayed in landing their cargoes and re-
turning to their ships. The unloading of
supplies from ships to landing craft was
not co-ordinated, and the system of mark-
ers indicating where supplies for each
service were to land broke down. Despite
the efforts of the Engineers, supplies piled
up on the beach and became jumbled,
making difficult their segregation and
routing to the dumps. Movement from
beach to dumps was delayed as tractors
45
See Nickell ltr, cited n. 21.
46
Unless otherwise noted, the account of the Attu
campaign is based upon: Draft MS, Capt Nelson L.
Drummond, Jr., The Attu Operation, 24 May 45, Pt.
II, Sec. III; Alaskan Dept Hist, Ch. IV; ONI Weekly,
19 May 43, Vol. III, No. 20, p. 1391. All in OCMH
Files. Rpt, Gen Landrum, CG Landing Forces, to
TAG, 25 Jun 43, sub: Rpt on Opns at Attu, AG Opns
Rpts 91-TF4-0.3 (23374) M 22 Jun 43; WD, The Cap-
ture of Attu, As Told by the Men Who Fought There
("Fighting Forces Series" [paper-bound ed.; Washing-
ton: The Infantry Journal, 1944]), pp. 1-27.
50
and trailers, operated by inexperienced
drivers, broke through the tundra and
mired down in the mud beneath. The
mountainous terrain and the absence of
roads limited vehicle movements from
dumps to the interior, compelling the
Army to rely on large troop details hand-
carrying supplies in support of combat
elements.
Despite the difficulties, the initial land-
ing force and a portion of the supplies and
equipment were landed by noon of the
second day, but much of the cargo had to
wait until the weather improved before it
was unloaded. Fog not only limited cargo
discharge, but also caused a temporary
stalemate in the fighting. After several
days a slight break in the weather permit-
ted Army and Navy aircraft to go into ac-
tion, and ground forces began a slow but
steady advance in the face of stiff resist-
ance.
As U.S. forces proceeded inland, dis-
charge operations, concentrated largely at
Massacre Bay, improved. Larger Navy
landing craft, LCT's and LST's (landing
ships, tanks) arrived, carrying cargo from
ship to shore until the third week of opera-
tions, when ATS tugs and barges moved
in to take over lighterage activities. Mean-
while, congestion on the beach was re-
lieved by locating dumps on the banks of
a creek and using the gravelly bed as a
supply road for vehicle deliveries from the
beach. The shore party commander,
Major Peterson, temporarily became port
commander, two port companies arrived
from Adak, and port facilities were placed
under construction. When on 31 May
American forces captured Chichagof Har-
bor, the last enemy stronghold on Attu,
supplies were flowing across the beach to
the interior without serious interruption.
During the course of the Attu cam-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
paign, several pieces of equipment proved
valuable in the movement of supplies. In
particular D6 wide-tread tractors and
Athey full-tracked trailers proved indis-
pensable in negotiating the tundra-cov-
ered beaches. An innovation was the use
of sled pallets to which supplies were
strapped. Used as dunnage aboard ship,
they could be towed by tractors when put
ashore. With some modifications, the pal-
let was used in the Kiska landings and re-
ceived extensive use in amphibious opera-
tions in the Pacific.
Toward the end of combat operations,
Attu moved into the base development
phase. Colonel Nickell, who had landed
with the initial force as a member of a
party to make a reconnaissance for port
facilities, arrived from Adak with an offi-
cer team to take over port operations;
Major Peterson became executive officer.
A port organization patterned after that
of Adak was developed and the conversion
from barge to dock operation was effected.
By 10 July 1943 a two-berth dock and a
sorting area were completed and the 100,-
000 measurement tons put ashore since
the establishment of the port had been
cleared. Tug and barge operations were
continued in order to supply outposts
around the island's perimeter, and to
transship cargo over sixty miles of water
to Shemya after that island was occupied.
Attu handled its peak traffic in the winter
of 1943-44, discharging up to 42,923
measurement tons and loading up to 22,-
302 measurement tons monthly. Despite
a decline in operations thereafter, Attu
remained an active reception and trans-
shipment port.
Shemya, the largest of the Semichi
Islands, was the next objective following
the Attu landings. In the first months after
its occupation in June 1943, two port com-
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
panies arrived; docks, airfields, and roads
were placed under construction; and all
ground force vehicles were pooled to pro-
vide transport for port and other base op-
erations. Port development was retarded
by the lack of dock construction materials
and the limited floating equipment avail-
able for shuttling cargo from ocean-going
vessels at Massacre Bay, but a breakwater
and piers were finally completed, and in
the summer of 1944 Shemya was a busy
port handling up to 76,000 measurement
tons a month. Operations were complete-
ly disrupted in November 1944 when a
storm washed out sections of the break-
water and carried away the piers. 47 Con-
tinued bad weather caused the Alaskan
Department to place Shemya on a closed
winter status until April 1945, when the
first vessel of the season was discharged
from the port's roadstead. New pier con-
struction enabled the port to handle Lib-
erty vessels by the end of June, and in the
closing months of the war Shemya was
again one of the major Alaskan ports.48
The capture of Attu and the occupation
of Shemya set the stage for the seizure of
Kiska, the final assault operation in the
Aleutians. In the spring and early summer
of 1943, a combined American-Canadian
task force was assembled on the west coast
of the United States and Canada. After
acclimatization and further training at
Adak and Amchitka, the force arrived off
Kiska on the night of 14-15 August. The
first troops to land found that the enemy
had withdrawn unobserved.49
The Kiska operation, the largest under-
taken in Alaska, employed 20 troop and
cargo vessels, 14 LST's, 9 LCI's (landing
craft, infantry), 19 LCM's, and other craft.
Accompanying the force of approximately
34,500 troops were 102,174 measurement
tons of supplies and equipment. In the ab-
51
sence of port facilities, cargo and person-
nel were unloaded directly onto the beach
from LST's or delivered from ship to
shore by LCVP's, LCM's, and LCT's.
Some days later, ATS barges were towed
in by tugs from other Aleutian stations
and assisted in lighterage operations. Six
cranes were brought in early in the opera-
tion to lift and stack palletized cargo and
other heavy loads in the sorting yards. A
port battalion, less two companies, arrived
on a freighter simultaneously with the
landing force and was used for discharge
activities aboard ship. Unloading on the
beach and work in the sorting yards were
handled by details from various troop
units.
Following the landing, Kiska experi-
enced a brief period of base development.
By October 1943 an Army dock capable
of berthing two ocean-going vessels, and
a causeway leading to it, had been com-
pleted. Port operations, previously de-
pendent entirely on lighterage, were now
based on ship-to-truck discharge and were
considerably speeded up. The reduction
of military strength, however, soon
brought a decline in activities, and by
mid-1944 Kiska was a small outpost rare-
ly receiving more than 1,000 measure-
ment tons a month.
47
This disruption placed a sudden and severe work-
load on the port of Attu, which was then charged with
unloading not only its own cargo but also that for
Shemya. The latter cargo was transshipped to Shemya
by harbor craft. By a radio net established between
the two ports, it was possible to meet the emergency
expeditiously without loss of life or harbor craft. Notes,
Lt Col William H. Wilson, former port commander
Attu, OCT HB Alaska Attu Misc.
48
G-4 Per Rpts, Hq Alaskan Dept, qtr ending 31
Mar 45, p. 9, qtr ending 30 Jun 45, p. 7, qtr ending 30
Sep 45, p. 6, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
49
Alaskan Dept Hist, Ch. V; Combat Narrative,
ONI, The Aleutians Campaign, Jun 42-Aug 43, pp.
100-105, OCMH Files.
52
At the end of the Aleutian Campaign,
there were in Alaska twenty-eight ports
scattered from Annette Island to Nome
and Attu. As part of the general reduc-
tion of the Alaskan garrison that ensued,
the minor ports in southeastern and cen-
tral Alaska were inactivated or greatly re-
duced in strength in the winter of 1943-
44, and with the exception of Nome the
icebound ports were closed out and evacu-
ated in the open season of 1944. These
developments, coupled with the general
decline in traffic, resulted in the concen-
tration of debarkation activities at a lim-
ited number of ports and the development
of intratheater transport.
Perhaps the most persistent problem
encountered at the Alaskan ports was the
lack of floating equipment. From the be-
ginning, there had been a shortage of tugs,
barges, and other craft for lighterage, out-
post supply, and intratheater transport.
Floating equipment, assigned to the vari-
ous ports and operated by harbor craft
detachments, suffered a high mortality
rate because of rugged operating condi-
tions and the virtual absence of marine
repair and maintenance facilities.50
The harbor craft fleet was built up
slowly. The equipment taken over from
the Engineers by ATS in August 1942 was
augmented, and by early 1943 there were
about 190 pieces of floating equipment on
charter to the Army in Alaska. At that
time, the fleet was cut back sharply by a
War Department order to return chartered
boats to their owners in time for the com-
ing fishing season so that food essential to
the war effort could be provided. Mean-
while, other floating equipment had ar-
rived from Seattle, which had been sup-
plying Alaska with tugs, barges, and other
small craft since the spring of 1942. By the
end of August 1943, Seattle had shipped
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
forward to Alaska over 450 pieces of float-
ing equipment, an amount sufficient to re-
lieve, but not overcome, the shortage.
Other improvements were provided
through the construction of marine repair
and maintenance facilities. During 1943
barge ways were constructed at Chernof-
ski, Kodiak, Annette, Adak, Attu, and
Amchitka, and by early 1944 marine ways
capable of performing major repairs on
small vessels were in operation at Seward,
Adak, and Amchitka. These facilities, to-
gether with the assignment of additional
craft and small freighters, produced a
steady improvement in the floating equip-
ment situation during 1944. As ports
were reduced in number and traffic de-
clined, the Army's floating plant proved
adequate for lighterage, outpost supply,
and the development of intratheater
transport. 51
In the final wartime months, vessels ar-
riving in the theater discharged almost
exclusively at Whittier, Dutch Harbor,
Adak, Attu, Shemya, and Nome. Trans-
shipment of cargo and personnel to and
from minor ports was accomplished by a
fleet of 176 powered units constituting a
service known as Harbor Craft, Alaskan
Department. The main burden of this
traffic was borne by thirteen small vessels
operating on regular intratheater shuttle
runs. Ocean-going tugs towing scows op-
erated over the same routes for the move-
50
G-4 Per Rpt, Hq ADC, Initial Rpt, 10 Dec 42, p.
7; Ltr, Col Barthrop, Supt ATS SPE, to CofT, 26 Apr
43, sub: Tug and Barge Cons, OCT HB Alaskan Dept
Fltg Equip.
51
Alaskan Dept Hist, Ch. X; Ltr, Henry L. Stim-
son, SW, to Harold L. Ickes, Secy Interior, 25 Jan 43,
OCT 545.4-561.1 Alaska 41; Denson address cited n.
38; Responsibility for Maint and Repair ATS Harbor
Craft and Mob Pier Equip, 27 Nov 43, a sheet atchd
to Corres in OCT HB Alaskan Dept Orgn of ATS; G-4
Per Rpt, Hq Alaskan Dept, qtr ending 31 Mar 45, p.
23, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
ment of the heavier types of cargo, and
also on several shorter and less important
runs.52
Rail Operations
Although Alaska is one fifth the size of
the continental United States, only two
railroads were in regular operation in the
Territory in 1940. One, the Alaska Rail-
road, was the sole year-round transport
facility in central Alaska. The other, the
White Pass and Yukon Railroad, had only
twenty-two miles of line actually in Alas-
ka. Other rail lines were in existence, but
had ceased operations. A small section of
one of these, the Copper River and North-
western Railroad, was taken over by the
Army in the spring of 1942 and used to
haul freight thirteen miles from the port
of Cordova to the post and airfields.53
The Alaska Railroad
The Alaska Railroad was a standard-
gauge line with approximately 470 miles
of main-line track extending from Seward
through Anchorage to Fairbanks, and
about thirty miles of branch lines to the
Matanuska valley and the Eska and Sun-
trana coal regions. The railroad also op-
erated docks at Seward and Anchorage,
coal mines in the Eska region, and a river
steamship line on the Tanana and Yukon
rivers. Owned by the U.S. Government
and operated by the Department of the
Interior, the Alaska Railroad was headed
by a general manager and manned by a
force of approximately 900 civilian
employees.
Operated since 1923, the railroad's Sep 45, p. 6, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
53
equipment was worn and its docks were in
a state of disrepair. Track, laid with light OCT 463.7-523.06 Alaska 41-42; ADC Trans Hist,
seventy-pound rail, required constant Rpt I, Rail; Alaskan Dept Hist, Ch. IX.
53
maintenance. Operation of the southern
end of the line, running through moun-
tainous country, was made difficult by
steep grades and heavy snows. Train
speeds rarely exceeded fifteen miles an
hour, and at mile fifty a tunnel and a
rickety wooden-loop trestle made travel
at any but minimum speed dangerous. To
bypass the difficult southern section, work
was begun in 1941 on a twelve-mile cut-
off from Portage junction to Whittier, but
construction, which involved the boring of
54
two tunnels, progressed slowly.
Despite its limitations, the Alaska Rail-
road, with only minor structural improve-
ments and small increases in equipment,
was at first able to handle the increased
traffic incident to the build-up of the
Anchorage-Fairbanks area. But heavy
losses of workers, who were leaving to take
other jobs, to return to the United States,
or to enter military service, caused the
railroad's track and equipment mainte-
nance to fall seriously in arrears. Result-
ing equipment failures and car shortages,
coupled with increased water-borne traf-
fic into Seward, created a bottleneck for
northbound traffic in the winter of
1942-43.
To deal with this situation ADC, with
the approval of the railroad's general
manager, requested railway troops to
augment the civilian force on the line.
After a Military Railway Service (MRS)
survey had confirmed the need, the Chief
of Transportation in Washington arranged
for the shipment of the 714th Railway
Operating Battalion, augmented by five
extra track maintenance platoons and
52
G-4 Per Rpt, Hq Alaskan Dept, qtr ending 30
ADC Trans Hist, Rpt I, Gordova.
54
Rpt, Jesse E. Floyd, Alaska-Yukon, 23 Jul 42,
54
stripped of certain technical personnel
such as train dispatchers, telegraph oper-
ators, and signal maintenance and lines-
men.55 The entire force of 25 officers and
1,105 enlisted men arrived at Seward
from Seattle on 3 April 1943. Headquar-
ters was set up at Anchorage and disper-
sion along the line begun.56
While responsible administratively to
ADC headquarters, the battalion was
under the operational control of the gen-
eral manager of the Alaska Railroad. The
railway troops assisted civilian workers on
the four divisions of the main line, making
possible considerable improvement in the
line's maintenance and operation. The re-
inforced maintenance of way company,
aggregating 9 officers and 739 enlisted
men, provided section help along the line,
the troops receiving work instructions
from civilian foremen through noncom-
missioned officers. The railroad was as-
sisted also by the transportation company,
which provided twenty-five train crews,
and the maintenance of equipment com-
pany, which supplemented civilian work-
ers at the main shop at Anchorage and at
other shops along the line and later as-
sumed operation of the new Army shops.
The Army also augmented the railroad's
equipment in modest fashion, bringing in
seven locomotives, sixty-five freight cars,
and a locomotive crane from the United
57
States.
The Portage-Whittier cutoff was pushed
to completion by the Army engineers and
civilian contractors, and on 1 June 1943
the twelve-mile line was placed in opera-
tion, along with new shop, rail yard, and
dock facilities at Whittier. Aside from by-
passing the difficult southern section of the
main line, the cutoff shortened the rail
distance to northern stations by fifty-two
miles. Army freight was then routed
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
through Whittier, leaving Seward to
handle civilian freight.
The provision of rail troops, the routing
of Army tonnage through Whittier, and
the small increases in equipment markedly
improved the railroad's performance. In
November 1943 the line hauled 66,000
tons of revenue freight, as compared with
36,302 tons in the previous January. Dur-
ing the year the total revenue and non-
revenue freight carried by the railroad
amounted to 698,978 tons, almost 178,000
tons more than the 1942 figure. 58 Deteri-
oration of the line had been halted, and
the Alaska Railroad had become a reli-
able transport facility capable of meeting
Army demands.
In March 1944 the improved strategic
situation in Alaska, together with de-
mands for railway troops from active the-
aters, led the Chief of Transportation in
Washington to recommend the curtail-
ment of Army assistance, but the railroad's
inability to secure sufficient civilian per-
sonnel made it necessary to retain the
troops temporarily. The Alaska Railroad,
with a combined civilian and military force
of about 2,000, experienced its peak year
of traffic during 1944, hauling 642,861
tons of revenue freight. By April 1945 in-
creases in the civilian force and declining
traffic enabled the Alaskan Department to
55
Ltr, Ohlson to Abe Fortas, Under Secy Interior,
28 Feb 43, OCT 617 Alaska 42; Rpt, Col Charles F.
Dougherty, Actg Gen Mgr MRS, to CofT, 14 Mar
43, sub: Alaska RR, OCT 617 Alaska 43; Memo,
Gross to CG SOS. 14 Mar 43, sub: Pers to Maintain
Equip and Right of Way on Alaska RR, OCT 319.2-
320.2 Alaska 43.
56
See ADC Trans Hist, Rpt IV, Tab, 714th ROB,
upon which the discussion of the battalion's activities
is based.
57
Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 12 Aug 43, sub: G-4
Per Rpt, ADC, for qtr ending 30 Jun 43, AG Opns
Rpts 319.1, 12 Aug 43 (2).
58
For statistics subsequent to 1942, see ADC Trans
Hist Rpt I, and supplementary per rpts.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
make the rail troops available for return to
the United States. Except for one track
maintenance platoon that stayed on until
27 August, the battalion was relieved,
59
departing Fort Richardson on 10 May.
The White Pass and Yukon Railroad
The White Pass and Yukon Railroad
was a narrow-gauge (thirty-six inch) rail-
road extending 110.7 miles from Skagway
to Whitehorse. The line was managed by
a resident official representing three oper-
ating companies, whose capital stock was
owned by a British firm. Placed in service
in 1901, the railroad had undergone little
development. Equipment operating on the
line in mid-1942 consisted of 9 locomotives,
186 revenue freight cars, and 14 passenger
cars, the majority of which were over 40
years old. Track was laid with light 45 and
46-pound rail, for the most part rolled be-
fore 1900. Like the Alaska Railroad, the
WP&Y owned and operated allied facili-
ties, including the ocean dock at Skagway
and a river steamship line out of White-
horse.60
Operating with limited and antiquated
equipment over a rugged route, the rail-
road was unable to clear cargo laid down
at Skagway, and by the fall of 1942 it was
fast becoming a bottleneck in the flow of
supplies into western Canada. At the
direction of General Somervell, who had
inspected the line in August, the railroad
was leased by the Army, effective 1 Octo-
ber 1942. By this time a railway detach-
ment of 9 officers and 351 enlisted men
had been activated and shipped from
Seattle, and arrangements were being
made to purchase and ship American rail
equipment.61
Engineer Railway Detachment 9646A
arrived at Skagway in mid-September
55
1942, set up its headquarters, and after a
brief period of instruction took over the
operation and maintenance of the rail-
road. With the continued assistance of the
civilian employees, the troops acted as
mechanics, engineers, dispatchers, fire-
men, conductors, telegraphers, section
hands, brakemen, and track walkers.
Upon the transfer of MRS from the Engi-
neers to the Transportation Corps in No-
vember 1942, the unit was redesignated
the 770th Railway Operating Detach-
ment, Transportation Corps.62
Under military operation, the railroad
carried 14,231 tons in October, about
3,000 tons more than the previous month.
It was expected that equipment scheduled
for early arrival would further accelerate
traffic, but severe winter weather struck
59
Memo, Gross for ACofS G-4, 3 Mar 44, sub: Opn
by U.S. Army of Seward-Fairbanks RR, OCT 320.2
Alaska Jan-Aug 44; Memo, Gen Lutes, Dir Plans and
Opns ASF, for CofT, 23 Mar 44, same sub, and
Memo, Brig Gen Stanley L. Scott, Dir Plng Div, for
Actg Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 19 Apr 45, sub: Re-
cruitment of Pers for Alaska RR, ASF Plng Div A47-
192 Vol. 19 Alaska RR Alaska; Rpt, Year 1945, 714th
Railway Operating Battalion, AG Opns Rpts TCBN-
714-0.1 (30030) M Yr 1945.
60
Except as otherwise cited, the account of opera-
tions on the WP&Y route is based on the following:
Rpt, Jesse E. Floyd, WP&Y Route, 16 Jun 42, OCT
617 Alaska; Binder, Gottschalk Rpt, Hq NWSC and
Off of Div Engr NW Div, Contl Br KCRC AGO;
Richard L. Neuberger, Highballing at Sixty Below,
ASF 65-2 Vol. 19 WP&Y RR NWSC; Memo, Col
A. F. McIntyre, Rail Div OCT, 23 Dec 43, sub: Rail
Tonnage on WP&Y RR, OCT 471-595.01 Alaska 43;
First Semi-Annual Progress Rpt, Jan 44, pp. 17-18,
AG Opns Rpts 91-SC1-0.3 (1596) M, 2 Sep 42-
1 Jan 44.
61
Memo, Gen Styer, CofS ASF, for CofEngrs, 22
Aug 42, sub: Directive ... of CG SOS as a Result
of His Inspection in Alaska, ASF 65-2 Vol. 19
WP&Y RR NWSC; Rpt, Brig Gen Carl R. Gray, Jr.,
Gen Mgr MRS, to CofEngrs, 7 Sep 42, sub: Lease of
WP&Y RR, OCT 420-463.6 Alaska 41-42.
62
Rpts, Maj John E. Ausland, CO Engr Ry De-
tachment 9646A, to Gray, 20 Sep, 13 Oct 42, OCT
319.1 WP&Y Weekly Rpt; 1st Ind, OCT to Gen Mgr
MRS, 30 Dec 42, OCT 322.03 WP&Y Route.
56
the area in December, and for a three-
month period high snow drifts, ice, snow-
slides, and sub-zero temperatures made the
line's operation and maintenance a night-
mare. Rotary snowplows preceded all
trains, but occasionally drifts were too
high to cut through and trains were iso-
lated. Ice on the rails resulted in frequent
derailment of locomotives and cars, and
when trains stopped they froze to the
tracks. Traffic slowed to a trickle, and in
December and again in February the line
was completely immobilized for ten-day
periods.
While the troops were battling to keep
the line in operation, plans were being
made to increase the railroad's personnel
and equipment. In view of increased
Northwest Service Command estimates of
supply requirements, a MRS survey was
made in early 1943, following which the
Transportation Corps undertook to pro-
vide the additional troops, rolling stock,
and motive power needed to handle 1,200
tons daily by May. On 1 April the detach-
ment was redesignated the 770th Railway
Operating Battalion, with an authorized
strength of 19 officers, 2 warrant officers,
and 708 enlisted men. Technical supervi-
sion of the railroad, previously exercised
by MRS headquarters, was transferred to
the Commanding General, NWSC.63
As the weather moderated and addi-
tional personnel and equipment were
placed in service, rail operations improved.
Traffic, virtually all northbound from
Skagway to Whitehorse, climbed from
5,568 tons in February to a peak of over
40,000 tons in August. By the fall of 1943
the backlog of freight at Skagway had
been cleared and the railroad was hauling
all tonnage offered.
During the year 1943 the WP&Y car-
ried 284,532 tons, more than ten times the
traffic handled in 1939, and transported
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
some 22,000 troops and civilian construc-
tion workers to Whitehorse. The right of
way had been improved, 25 locomotives
and 284 freight cars had been added to the
equipment, and night operations had been
initiated. The entire responsibility for
maintenance and operation rested with
the 770th Railway Operating Battalion,
assisted by about 150 civilians.
The second arctic winter experienced
by the rail troops again curtailed train
operation, but demands for tonnage were
now diminishing. Although a significant
southbound movement from Whitehorse
to Skagway developed in the summer and
fall of 1944 as construction forces evacu-
ated their men and equipment, it was in-
sufficient to offset the decline in north-
bound traffic. The battalion was reduced
in strength during the summer, and in
November the bulk of the troops returned
to the United States. Remaining rail activ-
ities were consolidated with port opera-
tions at Skagway, and the 330 military
and 120 civilian personnel involved were
placed under an Army general superin-
tendent. The railroad was returned to
civilian management in December 1944,
and arrangements were made for the
evacuation of equipment and the recruit-
ing of civilian workers to replace the
troops.64
63
Ltr, Gross to ACofS for Opns SOS, 26 Feb 43,
sub: Ry Opn Over WP&Y Route and Northern
Alberta Rys to Supply NWSC, OCT 617 Alaska; Ltr,
TAG to CG NWSC et al., 27 May 43, sub: Redesig-
nation and Reorgn of 770th Ry Operating Detach-
ment TC, Hq NWSC and Office of Div Engr NW
Div, AG Sec 320.2 770th Ry Bn, KCRC AGO; Ltr,
Dougherty to CG NWSC, 19 Mar 43, sub: Tech
Supervision of WP&Y Route . . ., OCT 617 Alaska.
64
Memo, Brig Gen Walter A. Wood, Jr., Dep Dir
Plans and Opns ASF, for ACofS OPD, 22 Apr 44, sub:
Reduction of Pers 770th Ry Operating Bn, ASF 65-2
Vol. 19 WP&Y RR NWSC; Plan of Opn for Return
of WP&Y to Civ Opn, 16 Sep 44, Hq NWSC and
Office of Div Engr NW Div, Contl Br WP&Y Ry,
KCRC AGO; NWSC MPR, Dec 44, p. 7, DRB AGO.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
Motor Transport Operations
Alaska possessed few highways and
lacked land communications with the rest
of the continent at the outbreak of war.
The road system within the Territory had
undergone little development, much of the
population in the interior being served by
river during the brief summer season. In
1940 there were only 2,212 miles of road
suitable for automobile traffic. These high-
ways, concentrated largely in central
Alaska, were unpaved, limited in capacity,
and subject to seasonal interruptions. Con-
sequently, Army motor transport activities
within the Territory, other than those in-
volved in local post supply, were minor.
The Richardson Highway
The principal prewar Alaskan road was
the Richardson Highway, leading 371
miles northward from Valdez to Fairbanks
over a route generally paralleling the
Alaska Railroad. At Fairbanks the road
joined the Steese Highway, which ex-
tended 162 miles to Circle. The Richard-
son Highway net was extended by the
Army during 1942 through the comple-
tion of two branch roads. One, the 147.5-
mile Glenn Highway connecting Palmer
with the Richardson Highway below Gul-
kana, made possible diversion of some
freight from the Alaska Railroad. The
other, the 138-mile Tok Junction-Slana
cutoff extending from four miles above
Gulkana to Tok Junction on the Alaska
Highway, reduced the trip from Valdez to
Tanacross and Northway airfields by about
a hundred miles.
Since snow and ice blocked the moun-
tainous southern section of the Richardson
Highway from mid-October to June, the
road was open only 120 days in the year.
During the 1942 open season, Army motor
57
transport operations on the highway and
its branches were performed by two Quar-
termaster truck companies and by com-
mercial contract haulers. Operating prin-
cipally out of Valdez, eighty 2½-ton Army
trucks and sixty 5-ton commercial trucks
delivered about 26,000 tons to Gulkana,
Fairbanks, and the airfields at Big Delta,
Tanacross, and Northway. During the
winter, movement halted with the excep-
tion of a trickle of supplies delivered from
the Fairbanks railhead.
The two Quartermaster truck units,
again assisted by civilian carriers, resumed
active operations in May 1943. This time,
in addition to the supply of its own stations,
ADC was asked to receive and deliver
through Valdez supplies for NWSC forces
on the Alaska Highway. Tonnage figures
for the 1943 season are incomplete, but
available data indicate that the deliveries
did not greatly exceed those of 1942.
Thereafter, the Richardson Highway lost
its military importance. Valdez was placed
on a caretaker basis in the winter of
1943-44, and the continued supply of the
northern airfields on the Alaska Highway
was accomplished by commercial truckers
hauling from the Fairbanks railhead.65
The Alaska Highway
The Alaska Highway extends north-
westward from the Dawson Creek railhead
in British Columbia through the Yukon to
Big Delta, Alaska, where it joins the Rich-
ardson Highway, which provides the final
ninety-five mile link to Fairbanks. (Map 1)
The route crosses plains, mountains, and
forests, traversing large areas covered with
muskeg, a mosslike vegetation forming a
65
Alaskan Dept Hist, Ch. VIII, pp. 254-63; ADC
Trans Hist, Rpt I, Highways, and Rpt II, Highways;
Nickell Ltr cited n. 19; G-4 Per Rpt, Hq Alaskan
Dept, qtr ending 30 Sep 45, p. 7, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
hard surface in winter, but causing the
ground to become soggy and swampy
during the spring thaw. As finally com-
pleted, the Alaska Highway was an all-
weather, gravel-surfaced road 1,428 miles
long and averaging twenty-six feet in
width.66
Although the Alaska Highway was a
product of the war emergency, the idea of
a land link between the United States and
Alaska was by no means new. Proposals
for the construction of a highway were
made in the prewar years, but these had
consistently received a negative response
from the War Department, which believed
that such a project would have little mili-
tary value. As the international situation
worsened in the fall of 1941, the General
Staff modified its policy slightly, recogniz-
ing the desirability of a highway as a long-
range defense measure, provided it did not
interfere with more pressing military
requirements.
Shortly after Pearl Harbor the War De-
partment's attitude shifted to one of active
support. This change was based on two
main considerations. First, a highway to
Alaska, if located along the airway placed
under development in the winter of
1940-41, would facilitate the latter's sup-
ply and expansion; second, the highway
would provide an alternate land route in
the event of enemy interference with the
sea lanes to Alaska.67 Upon the recom-
mendation of a Cabinet committee and
Army representatives, the highway project
was approved on 11 February 1942 by the
President, who authorized construction to
begin at once.
Construction, begun in the early spring,
progressed rapidly. By 25 October 1942
Army Engineer troops, with substantial
assistance from the Public Roads Admin-
istration (PRA), had completed a pioneer
59
road passable from Dawson Creek to Fair-
banks. After maintaining the highway
through the greater part of the ensuing
winter, Engineer troops were withdrawn,
leaving PRA civilian contractors to im-
prove the road to an all-weather highway
and complete it to approved standards.
As the pioneer road neared completion
in the fall of 1942, Services of Supply
headquarters in Washington exhibited
considerable interest in establishing truck-
ing operations that would make possible
large-scale deliveries to Alaska as well as
the supply of airfields and construction
and service forces along the route. Al-
though original plans for the Alaska High-
way did not contemplate its use as a supply
line to Alaska unless the sea lanes were
cut, the shipping shortage, increasing ADC
supply requirements, and the possibility
that Alaska might be developed as an
overland route to Siberia lent new empha-
sis to such a project. Plans proposed in
August and September called for ten
Quartermaster truck regiments and 1,400
10-ton trucks to begin operations about
1 December 1942, carrying 1,000 tons a
day out of Dawson Creek and delivering
66
Except as otherwise noted, the discussion of the
Alaska Highway is based on the following: ASF Contl
Div Rpt 175 cited n. 4; Rpt, Capt Theodore P.
Petropoulos, Adj Hq Alaska Hwy, Historical Data,
Alaska Military Highway, 15 Feb 44, Hq NWSC and
Off of Div Engr NW Div 314.7 Alaska Hwy, KCRC
AGO; Pamphlet, Public Relations Br NWSC. The
Alaska Highway, OCMH Files; NWSC First Semi-
Annual Rpt, Jan 44, AG Opns Rpts 91-SC1-0.3
(1596) M, 2 Sep 42-Jan 44; Binder, Gottschalk Rpt,
Hq NWSC and Office of Div Engr NW Div, Contl Br,
KCRC AGO. For statistics on freight movements over
the Alaska Highway, January 1943-May 1945, see
ASF Contl Div Rpt 175 cited n. 4, Exhibit S, and
NWSC MPRs in DRB AGO.
67
Memos, Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow, ACofS, for
CofS, 19 Jan 42, sub: Status of Alaska Hwy in WD,
and 23 Jan 42, sub: Construction of Hwy Between US
and Alaska, WPD 4327-21 through 4327-31. For a
more detailed discussion, see Conn and Fairchild, The
Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. XIV.
60
600 tons daily to Fairbanks. With the
spring thaw, supply movements other than
those required by construction forces
would be halted until the summer of 1943,
when operations would be resumed and
expanded. The Commanding General,
NWSC, in October 1942 estimated that
the highway would be able to carry
200,000 tons a month by December 1943,
providing suitable equipment and person-
nel were made available. He also recom-
mended construction of a feeder road of
200,000 tons monthly capacity linking
Haines, on the Inside Passage, with the
Alaska Highway. This project was ap-
proved by the War Department, and work
was put in hand early in 1943.68
Prospects for large-scale motor transport
operations, however, were soon dimmed.
The 10-ton trucks could not be provided
in quantity; instead, Services of Supply
(SOS) in September 1942 authorized the
shipment of 1,400 2½-ton to 5-ton trucks
and such heavier vehicles as were avail-
able under established priorities. At about
the same time, the Army's Operations
Division (OPD) decided that the situation
in Alaska was not sufficiently urgent to
justify exceeding the current troop basis
by activating the ten truck regiments re-
quested by SOS. By November, OPD cut
the number of truck regiments to be as-
signed to four, and in January 1943 the
force was reduced finally to one over-
strength regiment.69
These developments were influenced by
a changing strategic and logistic situation.
By early 1943 the shipping shortage had
eased and plans for the use of Alaska as an
overland supply route to Siberia or for
offensive operations west of the Aleutians
were fast fading. Moreover, the westward
shift of strength in Alaska caused the high-
way to lose much of its potential impor-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
tance, for even if the Alaska Highway
could deliver all or most of the supplies
needed by the forces in Alaska, it would
still be necessary to move them by rail
from Fairbanks to Seward or Whittier for
onward shipment to stations in the Aleu-
tians, on the Alaska Peninsula, or on the
west coast of Alaska. In the end, the idea
of supplying Alaska by highway was aban-
doned. According to the Deputy Com-
mander, ADC, only fifty-four tons had
been delivered to his command by motor
transport by the fall of 1943.70 Although
the substantial completion of the road as
an all-weather highway in October of that
year made possible significant deliveries to
the Alaskan Command, the curtailment of
troop strength in Alaska and the continued
availability of the more economical water
route made such operations unnecessary.
Throughout the war, the Alaska Highway
was used primarily for the supply of the
military and civilian construction forces
and the airfields and other installations
along the route, both in Alaska and in
western Canada.
The first motor transport operations on
68
Memo, Gen Lutes, ACofS for Opns SOS, for
ACofS G-3, 26 Aug 42, and Memo, Brig Gen Ray-
mond G. Moses, ACofS G-4, for ACofS G-3, 3 Sep 42,
sub: Activation of QM Truck Regts for Alcan Hwy,
OPD 320.2 ADC Sec IV Cases 143-206; Memo,
O'Connor for ACofS for Material, 23 Sep 42, OCT
569.2-616.4 Alaska 43; Memo, Styer for ACofS OPD,
6 Jun 44, sub: Haines Mil Rd, OPD 611 Alaska Sec II
Cases 42-59; O'Connor rpt cited n. 7.
69
Memo, Activation of QM Truck Regts for Alcan
Hwy, Gen Handy, ACofS, 5 Sep 42, OPD 320.2 ADC
Sec IV Cases 143-206; Memos, Styer for ACofS for
Material SOS, 23 Sep 42, and Gross for Somervell, 1
Nov 42, sub: Sup via Alaska Hwy, OCT 569.7-616.4
Alaska 43; Transcript of Phone Conversation, Incl to
Memo, Col Henry J. Woodbury, CE, for O'Connor, 6
Jan 43, and Office of Div Engr NW Div, AG Sec
322 QM Truck Regt and Sup Troop Requests for
Alaska Hwy, KCRC AGO.
70
See Whittaker lecture cited n. 6.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
the Alaska Highway involved the hauling
of supplies and equipment for construction
forces by organizational vehicles supple-
mented by four Quartermaster truck com-
panies and civilian ton-mile contractors.
As Army trucks began arriving in quantity
at the Dawson Creek railhead in the fall of
1942, motor transport was placed on an
organized basis. Beginning on 1 October
three trucks a day, loaded with construc-
tion materials, started on pilot runs from
Dawson Creek to Whitehorse over the un-
completed highway. During the month an
Engineer officer was appointed Officer-in-
Charge, Fairbanks Freight and Alcan
Highway Operations, and was responsible
for highway construction as well as motor
transport.
To expedite cargo deliveries and prevent
freezing, the trucks were kept moving day
and night. Relay stations where new
drivers could take over and vehicles could
be serviced were set up from 27 to 60 miles
apart, depending on road conditions. Sta-
tions were manned and trucks operated by
troops provided by Engineer regiments
along the road. Repair shops were placed
under construction and a system of con-
trolled dispatching was instituted. In No-
vember approximately 1,000 trucks were
dispatched from Dawson Creek, 350 of
them moving to Whitehorse. On 19 No-
vember, the day before the official opening
of the highway, the first convoy dispatched
from Dawson Creek for Fairbanks left
Whitehorse. It arrived at its destination
two days later with supplies for Ladd
Field. With the onset of bitter winter
weather in December, however, only emer-
gency vehicles carrying essential freight
were moved. Inadequate housing and
maintenance facilities and rough roads
caused personnel severe hardships and
deadlined a large number of vehicles.
61
In January 1943 Northwest Service
Command established a separate Alaska
Highway headquarters at Whitehorse to
take over the operation and maintenance
of vehicles on the highway, other than
organizational equipment and that used
by the chief of the Engineer Division and
his contractors. Other assigned functions
included the policing and patrolling of the
highway and the distribution of petroleum
products other than aviation gasoline. Col.
Joseph P. Glandon, QMC, assumed com-
mand in February, moving his headquar-
ters to Dawson Creek, where the largest
volume of supplies had accumulated.
Under Alaska Highway headquarters
there shortly developed three divisions,
one each based on the Dawson Creek,
Whitehorse, and Fairbanks railheads.
Each division headquarters was responsi-
ble for activities over about one third of
the highway, with Colonel Glandon exer-
cising over-all command and co-ordinat-
ing movements between divisions.
To carry out its mission, Alaska High-
way headquarters was assigned one over-
strength Quartermaster truck regiment,
the 477th, with approximately 4,000 offi-
cers and enlisted men. Arriving at Dawson
Creek in January 1943, the regiment
moved out along the route by truck to re-
lay and way stations, which by the end of
March were spread one hundred miles
apart. During this period several medium
and heavy automotive maintenance units
were placed at terminal points at Dawson
Creek, Whitehorse, and Fairbanks, and
other personnel were assigned to police
and patrol the highway and to store, issue,
and distribute petroleum products.
Alaska Highway headquarters retained
the relay system, whereby trucks moved
continuously from dispatch point to desti-
nation. Each relay station was normally
62
manned by a company or detachment of
the 477th Truck Regiment. Drivers oper-
ated vehicles from one station to another,
where new drivers were assigned and the
original drivers, after rest, took returning
vehicles to their home stations. Relay sta-
tions were provided with facilities for
housing, messing, medical care, and vehi-
cle servicing and maintenance. Trucks
requiring major repairs were evacuated to
the nearest shops or handled by Ordnance
contact parties. Vehicle control was
effected through daily flow reports from
relay and way stations to their respective
division headquarters, which consolidated
them and reported daily to Alaska High-
way headquarters. Division headquarters
received requests for cargo from all organ-
izations served by the road, set up priori-
ties, and allotted tonnages.
The establishment of Alaska Highway
headquarters and the assignment of the
truck regiment did not bring an immedi-
ate improvement in operations. Severe
winter weather, persisting into March
1943, and delays in erecting housing and
maintenance facilities because of the shift-
ing of station sites inflicted severe hard-
ships on both men and equipment. The
WP&Y Railroad serving Whitehorse, was
literally frozen in, and the rail line serving
Dawson Creek was heavily congested. As
a result, vehicles under the control of
Alaska Highway headquarters in the first
three months of 1943 carried only 7,500
tons of military supplies and a smaller
tonnage destined for civilian construction
contractors. By April the rail situation had
cleared, but heavy rains and thaws made
through traffic impossible. In that month
the last convoy to be dispatched from
Dawson Creek to Fairbanks until the fall
of the year departed, and traffic was lim-
ited to deliveries to construction and serv-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ice forces and airfields along the open
portions of the road.
In June road conditions were sufficiently
improved to permit more extensive opera-
tions. Army vehicles supplemented by
trucks leased by Alaska Highway head-
quarters from civilian firms increased their
deliveries to Army and Air Forces installa-
tions and to civilian contractors working
on Army projects from about 3,900 tons in
May 1943 to a peak of over 26,000 tons in
September. In addition, passenger, ex-
press, and mail services were instituted,
which by the latter part of the year were
in operation over the entire route between
Dawson Creek and Fairbanks. The better
driving conditions, which resulted as the
all-weather road neared completion in
October 1943, made it possible to double
driving distances. Relay stations were
spread 200 miles apart, with way stations
between them. At that time over 1,500
cargo trucks, of from 2½-ton to 10-ton
capacity, and 250 service and passenger
vehicles were operating under the direct
control of Alaska Highway headquarters,
hauling over the entire length of the high-
way, and over feeder roads reaching into
Haines, Norman Wells, and Valdez.
During 1943 Army vehicles operated by
Quartermaster troops under Alaska High-
way headquarters hauled approximately
134,000 tons about 40,000,000 ton-miles
for the Army, the Air Forces, and civilian
construction forces along the highway.
Other accomplishments included the
transport of 41,876 passengers, the express
delivery of some 3,000 tons of high priority
and pilferable supplies, and the hauling of
1,483,870 pounds of mail. These statistics
do not reflect the total traffic on the road,
for there were approximately 17,000 gov-
ernment and civilian contractor trucks
and several hundred commercial vehicles
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
on the highway at the height of operations.
Classification, registration, and traffic con-
trol of these vehicles constituted a major
function of Alaska Highway headquarters.
Contractor and commercial trucks hauled
much of the construction materials on the
road, carrying an estimated 200,000 tons
in the six months ending 30 November
1943.
As construction projects were completed
and moved into the maintenance phase in
the winter of 1943-44, traffic on the
Alaska Highway fell off sharply and the
motor transport organization underwent
progressive reduction. In December 1943
the 477th Quartermaster Truck Regiment
was disbanded, its overhead and excess
operating personnel were reassigned, and
the remaining troops were assigned directly
to the Commanding Officer, Alaska High-
way. As part of the general curtailment of
NWSC operations that followed, Alaska
Highway headquarters was itself inacti-
vated on 1 March 1944, and its personnel,
equipment, and property were transferred
to district headquarters at Dawson Creek,
Whitehorse, and Fairbanks, which had
recently been established in order to com-
bine activities, curtail operations, and re-
duce personnel within their territories.
Steps were also taken to arrange for the
continued supply of airfields and main-
tenance forces through the maximum pos-
sible use of commercial carriers.71
From this point on, motor transport op-
erations were conducted on a decentral-
ized basis under the central freight cargo
control of NWSC headquarters. In June
1944 the Fairbanks District was inacti-
vated, and operations on that portion of
the highway in Alaska were transferred to
the Alaskan Department. Traffic between
Fairbanks and the Canadian border was
then handled by commercial traffic serv-
63
ice arranged for by the Alaskan Depart-
ment, while NWSC had similar service
between Dawson Creek and the Alaska-
Canadian border. The services over-
lapped, permitting movements, without
transferring cargo, from Fairbanks to
Whitehorse, or from Whitehorse to Fair-
banks.72 By this time evacuation of con-
struction forces was well under way, and
most road movements involved short hauls
within the districts. Construction opera-
tions in western Canada had virtually
ceased by the end of 1944, and no tonnage
was hauled for this purpose thereafter.
At the war's end, little traffic was mov-
ing over the road and arrangements were
made for the transfer of the Canadian por-
tion of the highway to Canada, effective
1 April 1946. Although the Alaska High-
way had contributed little to the supply of
Alaska, it had made possible the construc-
tion and supply of staging airfields, com-
munications facilities, and distribution
pipelines along the route and provided a
margin of safety in the event the sea lanes
should be cut. At best, hauling by road to
Alaska would have been uneconomical
when compared with sea transport. In
1945 it was estimated that the highway, if
operated at peak capacity, could deliver
700,000 to 720,000 tons a year to Fair-
banks for the support of approximately
100,000 troops in Alaska. To handle this
traffic a truck-operating and highway
71
Ltr, Maj B. B. Miller, AG NWSC, to CO 477th
QM Truck Regt, 28 Dec 43, sub: Disbandment of
477th QM Truck Regt Hq NWSC and Office of Div
Engr NW Div, AG Sec 322, 477th QM Truck Regt;
Ltr, Somervell to CG NWSC, 10 Feb 44, sub: Curtail-
ment of Opns and Reduction of Pers and Equip in
NWSC, ASF 65-6 Vol. I Policy File NWSC; GO 11,
Hq NWSC, 20 Feb 44, Hq NWSC and Office of Div
Engr NW Div, AG Sec 323.3 Alaska Hwy, KCRC
AGO.
72
Binder, Trans Plan (Tentative), NWSC, to
become effective 1 Oct 44, p. 4, OCT HB NWSC.
64 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

maintenance force of 135,000 men and needed supplies could not be delivered by
73
13,000 to 14,000 trucks of 8-ton capacity river craft during the summer season.
would be required. It was clear that, bar- The only tractor-train operation of con-
ring an unforeseen emergency, Alaska sequence undertaken in western Canada
would continue to rely on water transport involved the movement to Norman Wells
for its supply. of Canol supplies and equipment left un-
delivered at the close of the 1942 naviga-
Tractor- Train Operation tion season on the Mackenzie River sys-
tem. Since rough and treacherous ice
The absence of roads except in central made the use of tractor trains on the frozen
Alaska caused most locations in the in- rivers and lakes inadvisable, civilian con-
terior to rely on the inland waterways and tractors and Army Engineer troops in the
air transport for their supply. During the winter of 1942-43 pushed through a
winter months, October to May, when the 1,000-mile winter road (Grimshaw Road)
rivers were frozen, there was limited haul- from Norman Wells to the Peace River
ing into the interior by dog team, pack railhead in Alberta, and built feeder roads
train, and tractor train. The Army became into Fort Smith and Fort Simpson, along
interested in the possibilities of extended the river route, and Fort Nelson on the
tractor-train hauling first while studying Alaska Highway.
alternate routes to the interior and west Tractor-drawn sled trains were placed
coast stations for use in the event the in use, but experience soon proved them
Bering Sea or the Gulf of Alaska was lost, unsatisfactory. The trains could not ne-
and later in considering plans for develop- gotiate grades of 5 percent or more and
ing an overland route across Alaska to had to be broken up at these points, while
supply the Soviet Union via Siberia. in other places the lack of snow impeded
The idea of utilizing tractor trains was the use of sleds. Motor trucks were then
an attractive one. They were a flexible substituted, ultimately handling 60 per-
means of transport, less vulnerable than cent of the total tonnage carried over the
those operating over fixed routes, and re- road. The winter road operation failed to
quired a minimum of construction. Sleds accomplish its full mission. Of the 18,222
drawn by caterpillar tractors could travel tons shipped north from Peace River in
over frozen rivers and lakes or overland the winter of 1942-43, only 5,293 tons
on winter roads built by brushing out were delivered to Norman Wells. A total
trails and reducing steep grades. During of 3,567 tons was consumed in operation
1942 plans were drawn up for the estab- and the balance had to be left along the
lishment of inland water and winter road route to be picked up by boat when navi-
routes extending from Whitehorse to Fair- gation was resumed. After the spring
banks and from Fairbanks to the west 73
Rpt, Lt Col J. H. Leavell, Hauling Freight by
coast of Alaska, but their development Tractors and Sleds in Alaska . . .,15 Jul 42; Memo
proved unnecessary. Although the pos- sub: for Rcd, Lt Col J. R. Worthington, TC, 14 Jan 43,
Sup Routes in Alaska; Rpt, 1st Lt A. L. Pranser,
sibilities of tractor trains continued to be CE, Tractor Train Operations in Arctic and Sub-
explored by the Army, their operation in Arctic Regions, 1 Apr 44. All in OCT HB Alaska.
Alaska was limited to relatively short See also Memo, Gross for Somervell, 10 Sep 42, sub:
NW Route via Alaska-Siberia, OCT 370.5 Russia,
emergency hauls and to situations where Route via Alaska and Siberia.
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA 65

break-up of 1943, the winter roads were The Kuskokwim River provided access
74
abandoned. from the port of Bethel to the McGrath
garrison and airfield, 250 miles upstream.
River Transportation During the summer of 1942 the Morrison-
Knudsen Company, a civilian contractor
Like tractor-train hauling, river trans- firm then constructing airfields at Bethel
portation was the subject of much plan- and McGrath, chartered the equipment
ning but only limited development. The of the Alaska Navigation Company, which
only inland waterways used to any extent carried 11,500 tons of Army and commer-
by the Army were the Yukon-Tanana river cial freight from Bethel to McGrath by
route, the Kuskokwim River, and the the season's end. To clear a backlog of
Mackenzie River system in western Can- Army cargo remaining at Bethel, the ATS
ada. The Yukon-Tanana route became requisitioned sufficient floating equipment
important in Army operations with the to increase the line's capacity to 20,000
establishment of an air base at Galena, tons. But the craft so provided proved un-
approximately 225 miles downstream suitable for operation in the shallow, swift
from the Nenana railhead. During the waters of the Kuskokwim. The two river
1942 and 1943 open seasons, deliveries to boats and six barges operated by ATS
Galena were made by the Alaska Rail- hauled only 2,000 tons of Army supplies
road's River steamship line, which since during the 1943 season, while Morrison-
1923 had been operating from Nenana on Knudsen's two old stern wheelers—tow-
the Tanana River to Ruby and Marshall ing barges—carried 10,500 tons. During
on the Yukon. the 1944 season McGrath was evacuated
Operations were considerably expanded and approximately 3,300 tons of excess
after the 1944 spring floods in the lower supplies and equipment were carried
Yukon washed out the Galena air base. downstream to Bethel by the Alaska
To meet the emergency, the Superintend- Navigation Company, under contract
ent, ATS, contracted for the services of all with the Army, for transshipment to other
available private craft in the area and points in Alaska.75
diverted floating equipment from south- The Mackenzie River system was one
eastern Alaska to augment the three an- of the basic supply routes for Canol. All
tiquated stern-wheel steamers and seven equipment and material for the Norman
barges owned by the Alaska Railroad. Wells oil field development and for the
River ports were established at Nenana construction of the eastern half of the
and Galena and details were assigned to crude oil pipeline from Norman Wells to
build rafts to carry packaged fuels down-
stream. During the 1944 season 31,500 74
Canol Project rpt cited n. 4, pp. 85-90; ASF
tons, almost triple the 1943 traffic, were Contl Div Rpt 175 cited n. 4, Exhibit I.
75
The discussion of the Tanana-Yukon and
moved by river steamers, tugs, small boats, Kuskokwim river operations is based on the follow-
barges, and rafts. The air base was again ing: ADC Trans Hist, Rpt I, River Transportation,
inundated in 1945, and once more a river Rpt II, River Transportation, Rpt VI, Data Pertain-
fleet was assembled, this time to move ap- ing to River Operations; Alaskan Dept Hist, Ch. XII;
Nickell Ltr cited n. 21; G-4 Per Rpt, Hq Alaskan
proximately 50,000 tons of supplies and Dept, qtr ending 30 Jun 45, p. 6, qtr ending 30 Sep
equipment between Nenana and Galena. 45, p. 7, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
66
Whitehorse had to be transported to job
sites via this inland waterway. The river
route, open about 135 days a year between
May and October, extended northward
1,200 miles from the railhead at Water-
ways, Alberta, to Norman Wells, North-
west Territories, via Great Slave Lake and
the Mackenzie River.
In the spring of 1942 the Army and its
contractors set up 55,000 tons for delivery
to Norman Wells during the coming river
navigation season. In preparation for this
movement, the War Department created
a task force of approximately 2,500 service
troops who, together with civilian person-
nel of the construction contractor, were
assigned to handle the transportation of
construction equipment and materials
from Waterways to Norman Wells. Ar-
rangements were made for the charter of
commercial facilities along the route,
which would be supplemented by Army
equipment. As Canol freight began mov-
ing into the Waterways railhead in volume
late in May, river transportation opera-
tions were begun.
The planned tonnage was not delivered
to Norman Wells by the end of the 1942
season. The commercial facilities were in-
sufficient and the brief open season limited
craft to three round trips. Operations were
also hampered by the 16-mile portage be-
tween Forts Fitzgerald and Smith on the
Slave River and the storms on Great Slave
Lake that made impossible the use of
Engineers' ponton equipment and re-
stricted traffic to heavy barges. By the end
of June only 5,450 of the 55,000 tons re-
quired at Norman Wells had been dis-
patched northward from Waterways. To
deal with this situation, the Army in-
structed the civilian contractor to build
or assemble additional heavy barges, but
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the open season ended before construction
was completed, leaving much of the re-
quired materials undelivered. This delay,
plus the failure of ensuing winter road op-
erations, set the entire project back a year.
In an effort to improve operations dur-
ing the coming season, the Army in Feb-
ruary 1943 contracted for the services of
Marine Operators, an experienced civilian
river transport firm, to operate govern-
ment-owned floating equipment and to
subcontract the services of all other pri-
vate operators on the river system. Marine
Operators moved personnel in to take over
direction of the project and gradually to
replace the troops engaged in the work.
The evacuation of the Army task force
was begun in the summer of 1943 and
completed in September. The equipment
was greatly augmented during this period,
and by the end of the 1943 season 157
barges with a total capacity of about 20,-
000 tons had been assembled or built and
65 river boats had been purchased.
Under Marine Operators, 32,230 tons
were transported out of Waterways and
19,060 tons were carried from various
river points to Canol and Norman Wells
or intermediate points below Fort Smith.
At the close of the 1943 season, practically
all materials awaiting shipment had
been cleared. The small amount of critical
materials remaining at Waterways and
Fort Smith was flown to its destination.
Floating equipment was removed from the
water and placed on skidways above the
level of high water and ice at Waterways,
Fort Fitzgerald, Fort Smith, and Canol.
Since only a limited volume of supplies
was scheduled to move into Norman Wells
in 1944, preparations were made to sal-
vage or otherwise dispose of equipment
and to arrange with commercial operators
ALASKA AND WESTERN CANADA
on the river system to handle the necessary
76
traffic.
According to the Transportation Offi-
cer, NWSC, the 1944 operations on the
Mackenzie River system, like those of the
two previous years, suffered from "a lack
of comprehensive transportation plan-
ning." Plans, developed in late 1943, did
not provide for the exploitation of the
Canol Road, which was completed in De-
cember of that year and could have been
used during the winter to relieve the bur-
den on river transport during the open
season. Also, insufficient cargo was on
hand in the spring of 1944 to permit full
use of barges as they became available.
On the positive side, tote boxes of 5-ton to
10-ton capacity were constructed at
Waterways and were handled by cranes,
thereby expediting loading and unloading
operations. The use of these boxes also ex-
pedited the movement across the portage
at Fort Smith. During the operation, too,
tug boats were cut into sections and
hauled by rail to Waterways, where they
were welded together and used on the
Mackenzie River system. At the close of
the project, the tugs were again cut apart
and evacuated.
Realizing the importance of long-range
planning for the supply of isolated arctic
installations, Brig. Gen. Frederick S.
Strong, Jr., in the late summer of 1944 as-
signed his transportation officer respon-
sibility for planning for the logistical sup-
port of Norman Wells during the 1945
open season. Plans were developed that
called for the shipment of supplies over
the Canol Road during the winter months,
for the advance delivery to Waterways
of material to be moved over the Macken-
zie system, and for shipwrights to be flown
into barge and tug boat sites along the
67
route during the winter to prepare the
craft for the 1945 operation. Implementa-
tion of the plan was made unnecessary by
the decision to abandon the Canol project.
However, from the standpoint of any
future subarctic operations, the experience
demonstrated the need for adequate ad-
vance planning that would take cog-
nizance of the vagaries of the climate and
provide for maximum exploitation of
available means of transportation as the
opportunity arose.77
Alaskan Transportation—Post- V-J Day
The war's end found Army transporta-
tion to and within Alaska geared to serve
small air and ground forces concentrated
in two main defensive areas—central
Alaska and the Aleutians. Although the
Alaska Highway and the Canol distribu-
tion pipelines had made possible overland
supply, the military population still relied
on the far more economical water route
and to a smaller extent on air transport.
Except for internal shipments, the support
of War Department activities in Alaska
remained a responsibility of the Seattle
Port of Embarkation. The bulk of the sup-
plies moved from the United States by
ship to Seward or Whittier or the major
Aleutian ports, with minor tonnage going
to the small peacetime garrison at Nome.
Transport within Alaska was the respon-
sibility of the Alaskan Department. Dis-
tribution of supplies to minor ports was
made by an Army-owned small-boat fleet
based principally on Adak. The small vol-
ume of Army cargo for the interior was
76
Canol Project rpt cited n. 4, pp. 59, 65-66, 70-
75, 87, 90-91, 139; Rad, Worsham to CG ASF, 4 Dec
43, Hq NWSC and Off of Div Engr NW Div, AG Sec
678 Pipe Line, KCRC AGO.
77
Harpold memo cited n. 10, pp. 14-16.
68
delivered during the summer months by
commercial river carriers. The Alaska
Railroad continued as the primary carrier
in central Alaska and in December 1945 it
assumed control of the port of Whittier.
In April 1946 port operations at Whittier
were discontinued and all traffic was
again handled through Seward.
In general, transportation facilities were
adequate for the support of the 30,000
Army, Air Forces, and Navy personnel
stationed in Alaska in mid-1946. The only
carrier giving any concern to the Army
was the Alaska Railroad, which had been
subjected to heavy use during the war
years and was in need of extensive reha-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
bilitation. The Army was again exhibiting
interest in the improvement of the rail
line, as well as in the completion of a road
from Seward to Anchorage to provide an
alternate route in the event railway serv-
ice should be interrupted. But on the
whole, the Alaskan Department could re-
port in routine fashion that there were no
transportation difficulties that could not
be corrected or handled by local action.78
78
Rpt, Col John R. Noyes, TC, Lt Comdr Ross B.
Nelson, USNR, and Maj H. J. Heinichen, QMC, to
CofT, 13 Jul 46, sub: Rpt on Sup of Alaska, OCT HB
Wylie Alaska; G-4 Per Rpt, Hq Alaskan Dept, 31 Mar
46, p. 2, G-4 Rpts Alaskan Dept 31 Mar 46 (G-533),
DRB AGO.
 CHAPTER III
Build-up in Britain
Shortly after its entrance into the war,
the United States, in line with the long-
range Allied objective of defeating Ger-
many first, commenced the build-up in
Britain of forces and equipment intended
for eventual employment in a major am-
phibious assault against the Nazi-held
coast of northwestern Europe. Great Brit-
ain was in many respects admirably suited
to serve as a base for the accumulation of
American strength and the organization of
British and American armies into a co-
ordinated striking force. Although 3,000
miles from U.S. North Atlantic ports, she
was but a few miles from the European
Continent. Aside from the resources of
military manpower and matériel that she
herself could contribute, Britain possessed
excellent ports, a strong industrial system,
well-organized railways, and a skilled
though depleted labor force.
The American build-up, involving the
movement by water of almost 1,700,000
U.S. Army troops and over 14,000,000
measurement tons of cargo into the United
Kingdom by 6 June 1944, posed formida-
ble transportation problems for both the
United States and Britain. 1 Deployment
from the zone of interior was narrowly
circumscribed by the shortage of shipping,
heavy losses of vessels and freight to enemy
submarine action, and diversions to meet
immediate needs in other oversea areas.
In the United Kingdom, the influx of
American men and materials placed an
additional load on transport facilities al-
ready heavily taxed by wartime require-
ments. The ports, many of them damaged
by enemy aerial bombardment, were
handling a large import program in addi-
tion to heavy military shipments; the rail-
ways were crowded with abnormal traffic;
transport equipment and personnel were
limited; and highly centralized civil and
military control of traffic was necessary to
keep the situation fluid.
The Americans in Britain at first had to
rely entirely on the British for the recep-
tion and distribution of men and equip-
ment, and indeed were largely dependent
on British transport facilities, installations,
and local civilian labor throughout the
war. The U.S. Army had to orient and
adapt itself to British operations and pro-
cedures and to work closely with British
military and civil shipping, port, rail,
motor transport, and movement control
authorities, and with labor unions, steve-
dores, and other agencies affecting their
activities. As the American establishment
grew, the U.S. Army gradually assumed
control of the handling of U.S. ships in
British ports and of the movement of
American troops and cargo. U.S. port
troops were brought in to augment the in-
1
Although a cumulative total of 1,671,010 troops
had arrived in the United Kingdom as of 3 1 May
1944, actual troop strength was 1,526,965, largely be-
cause of troop shipments from the United Kingdom
to North Africa.
70
adequate civilian labor force; locomotives
and rolling stock were imported to bolster
the overburdened railroads; and a sepa-
rate American movements control system
was set up to parallel that of the British.
The growth of American authority in no
way mitigated the necessity for close co-
ordination of U.S. and British transporta-
tion activities. The tight transportation
situation required integrated control of
the flow of men and supply to and within
the United Kingdom, if a breakdown was
to be avoided. Despite some inevitable
friction and occasional conflicts of interest,
this was achieved to a remarkable degree.
The task of directing American trans-
portation activities in the United Kingdom
was assumed by a young, inexperienced
Transportation Corps. Still in the process
of organization in the United States in the
spring of 1942, the Corps' functions and
authority were in the formative stage.
There was no large pool of officers experi-
enced in transportation matters and no
doctrine covering the Corps' responsibili-
ties overseas. A pioneer among oversea
theater organizations, the Transportation
Corps in Britain had to gain recognition
within the theater and assume authority
over transportation activities formerly
handled by the Quartermaster Corps and
the Corps of Engineers. Within the theater
Services of Supply, the Transportation
Corps' authority had to be defined vis-a-
vis territorial base section commands.
Moreover, as already indicated, relations
had to be worked out with British trans-
portation agencies. By an evolutionary
process the Transportation Corps grew
from a small handful of officers and en-
listed men into an effective organization
that played a vital role in the build-up in
Britain, the mounting of the invasion, and
the continental operations that followed.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Bolero Against a Shifting
Strategic Background
American interest in Great Britain
antedated the actual entry of the United
States into the war.2 U.S. military ob-
servers had been sent to Britain in 1940,
and in March of the following year Con-
gress enacted legislation extending lend-
lease aid to the British. Joint staff discus-
sions between the American and British
military authorities were initiated early in
1941. At these meetings the decision was
made that should the United States be-
come involved in the war with both Ger-
many and Japan, the major emphasis
would first be placed on the defeat of
Germany. Also, plans were worked out to
deploy U.S. forces to Iceland and the
United Kingdom in the event of war, and
arrangements were made for an immedi-
ate exchange of military missions.
Shortly after Pearl Harbor the Allied
planners at the ARCADIA Conference reaf-
firmed the objective of defeating Germany
first, but the method of implementing this
strategic aim still had to be agreed upon.
British plans for invading the Continent
from the United Kingdom (ROUNDUP)
were vague and limited in scope, and
more serious attention was devoted to a
proposed invasion of North Africa (GYM-
NAST). Both plans soon became dormant,
however, in view of the critical situation in
the Pacific and the shipping shortage. At
ARCADIA, steps were taken to expand the
2
Unless otherwise indicated, the section on the
strategic background of BOLERO is based upon the fol-
lowing: Ronald G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of
the Armies, Vol. I, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), Chs. I-IV;
Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Chs. I-III; Matloff
and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-
1942, pp. 12-62, 97-114, 174-97, 234-45, 278-97,
307-27.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
U.S. force planned for deployment to
North Ireland from 30,000 to 105,000, in
order to relieve British divisions for serv-
ice elsewhere. The first contingent of the
expanded force, designated MAGNET,
sailed from New York to Belfast in mid-
January 1942, but the same factors that
deterred the accomplishment of other
long-range strategic objectives resulted in
a cutback of the MAGNET Force, and only
part of the projected number was eventu-
ally shipped.
By March 1942 War Department plan-
ners were able to look beyond readjust-
ments in the immediate situation and out-
line a plan for a cross-Channel invasion of
northern France in the spring of 1943.
Proposed measures to be taken during the
period of preparation for this operation
included amphibious raids along the
enemy-held European coast, an air offen-
sive, and the accumulation of U.S. forces
and matériel in Britain. Provision was also
to be made for a more limited assault in
the autumn of 1942, should this prove de-
sirable to avert a collapse of Soviet forces
or to capitalize on any serious weakening
of the German stand in the west. The pro-
posals, accepted by the British in April
1942, were referred to as the BOLERO Plan.
However, by summer the term BOLERO
was applied only to the build-up phase of
the plan, while ROUNDUP and SLEDGE-
HAMMER were code names used for the
operational phases.
The planning machinery for BOLERO
was set in motion with the establishment
of special committees in Washington and
London. The Washington BOLERO Com-
bined Committee, which held its first
meeting on 29 April 1942, was described
as "a shipping agency . . . charged with
recommendations adequate for placing in
England the necessary personnel and
71
equipment to carry out the BOLERO Plan."
Lt. Col. Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., chief of the
Planning Division, Transportation Service,
SOS, began attending on 9 May 1942, as
the representative of Brig. Gen. (later Maj.
Gen.) Charles P. Gross.3 By this time a
similar committee had been established in
London, and both committees were at
work on the details of the over-all plan for
the movement of U.S. forces into the Brit-
ish Isles and for their reception, accommo-
dation, and supply.
From the spring of 1942 onward BOLERO
planning was continuous, but was soon
hedged about by diversions, delays, and
uncertainties arising from a shifting strate-
gic situation. This can best be illustrated
by a discussion of the four BOLERO Key
Plans, which were drawn up by the British
on the basis of the decisions of the BOLERO
planners and included complete details
regarding the over-all arrangements for
accommodating American personnel,
equipment, and supplies in the British
Isles. All were simply revisions or new edi-
tions of a single basic plan. Issued by the
British War Office, primarily to inform
the pertinent British agencies of U.S.
Army requirements in the United King-
dom, these plans were useful to all con-
cerned.4
The first BOLERO Key Plan, dated 31
May 1942, was based on an ultimate total
strength of 1,049,000 American troops and
an invasion date of spring 1943. The esti-
mated rate of arrival of U.S. forces in the
United Kingdom was to reach a peak of
3
Min, 1st Mtg, BOLERO Combined Com (Washing-
ton), 29 Apr 42, and 4th Mtg, 9 May 42, OPD ABC
381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 1. General Gross served as
Chief of Transportation in Washington throughout
World War IL
4
For comparable basic planning directives of the
U.S. Army, see Plan for SOS ETO, Vol. V, Transpor-
tation, 1 Nov 43, AG 381 (5440) USFET.
72
100,000 to 120,000 men per month by
September 1942. For planning purposes it
was assumed that 80 ships carrying a total
of 320,000 dead-weight tons would be dis-
charged each month. Maximum use was
to be made of all suitable British ports.
The plan also included the evacuation of
almost all British troops from the south-
western part of England to give space to
incoming American personnel. The Sec-
ond Key Plan, dated 25 July 1942, raised
the target figures somewhat, but develop-
ments were already under way that were
to result in a drastic cutback of the
build-up program.5
In July 1942 the American and British
chiefs of state decided to undertake a
North African invasion (TORCH) in the fall
of the year. This operation would not only
require a great diversion of shipping, per-
sonnel, and equipment from BOLERO but
also would necessitate shifting to North
Africa men and materials already in the
United Kingdom. It was generally con-
ceded by American planners that launch-
ing and supporting TORCH would in all
probability rule out a cross-Channel oper-
ation in 1943. A Third Key Plan, taking
these circumstances into consideration and
issued on 11 November 1942, had as its
first objective a contingent of only 427,000
U.S. troops in the United Kingdom by the
late spring of 1943 and a goal of 1,049,000
by the end of that year. In view of the
higher priority given the Mediterranean,
the severe shipping losses, and the uncer-
tainty regarding the date and scope of the
cross-Channel assault, these figures could
hardly be considered firm.
The strategic basis for the resumption of
a large-scale BOLERO movement was
firmed up slowly during 1943. Although
at the Casablanca Conference, held early
in the year, no fixed commitment was
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
made with reference to a cross-Channel
operation, it was decided that a combined
staff under a Chief of Staff to the Supreme
Allied Commander (COSSAC) would be
set up in Britain to plan for coastal raids
and for a possible invasion of the Conti-
nent in 1943-44, and that BOLERO would
be resumed.6 The COSSAC staff was
established in April 1943, but the immedi-
ate execution of the conference's decision
regarding BOLERO was rendered impossi-
ble by Mediterranean operations planned
for the summer, continued heavy losses of
vessels, lend-lease assistance to the Soviet
Union, and British civilian import require-
ments.
Prospects for BOLERO brightened per-
ceptibly during the spring of 1943 as ship-
ping losses decreased and the Allied stra-
tegic situation cleared. At the TRIDENT
Conference in Washington in May it was
decided to intensify offensive air opera-
tions based on the British Isles and to
build up troops, supplies, and equipment
in Britain for a cross-Channel assault to
take place about 1 May 1944. To attain
these objectives, Mediterranean operations
subsequent to the scheduled invasion of
Sicily were made subject to approval by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the
commander in that area was limited to
the use of forces already allotted to him.
Based on schedules proposed at TRI-
DENT, the fourth and last BOLERO Key
Plan appeared on 12 July 1943. It set the
time of the projected assault as the spring
of 1944 and called for a total U.S. troop
strength in the United Kingdom of 1,340,-
000. It contemplated a maximum of 160
cargo ships to arrive during April 1944,
5
For copies of the BOLERO Key Plan, see AG
BOLERO-OQMG (L) Papers, except for the third plan,
which is found in AG 381 (5440) USFET.
6
The title COSSAC was used to indicate both the
headquarters and its head.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN 73

carrying an average load of 4,000 dead- It was against this strategic background
weight tons. that the transportation tasks involved in
Plans were further crystallized in August the U.S. Army's build-up were performed
1943 at the QUADRANT Conference at and that the organization and procedures
Quebec, where the TRIDENT decisions were necessary to that accomplishment were
endorsed and the COSSAC plan for a gradually developed.
cross-Channel invasion (OVERLORD) in
Initial Flow of Troops and Cargo
May 1944 was affirmed. Also, in view of
to the United Kingdom
reduced shipping losses, the BOLERO com-
mitment was increased, 1,446,000 troops The post-Pearl Harbor movement of
to be available in the British Isles by the U.S. troops into the United Kingdom got
projected invasion date of 1 May 1944.7 under way on 15 January 1942 when the
The target date was subsequently post- veteran Army transport, Chateau Thierry,
poned a month in order to make available and the British troopship, Strathaird, left
an additional month's production. New York with 4,058 troops. The com-
QUADRANT did not wholly eliminate manding officer, Maj. Gen. Russell P.
uncertainty in strategic planning. Later in Hartle, was critical of conditions on the
the year the British made proposals for Strathaird, which carried most of the per-
the postponement of OVERLORD in favor of sonnel. Reflecting the scarcity of shipping,
Mediterranean operations, but these were the troop quarters were crowded, and
definitely set aside at the Tehran and enemy action could have resulted in more-
Cairo Conferences of late 1943. There, than-normal casualties. Both transports
commitments were made for the cross- arrived safely at Belfast in Northern Ire-
Channel invasion and also for simultane- land, where the troops, composed chiefly
ous landings in southern France (ANVIL). of elements of the 34th Infantry Division,
Primarily because of the landing craft disembarked in the morning hours of
shortage, ANVIL was later delayed until 26 January 1942.8
August 1944. Because of the critical situation in the
The progressive firming up of strategic Pacific, comparatively few additional U.S.
planning was reflected in the implementa- troops reached the British Isles during the
tion of BOLERO. The flow of troops and first quarter of 1942. A second convoy,
materials into the United Kingdom, a nine vessels carrying 8,555 troops, sailed
trickle during the North African opera- from New York for Belfast on 19 February.
tion, began to increase steadily during the The next major movement did not develop
summer of 1943, reached the flood stage until 30 April, when a total of 13,924 U.S.
in the final six months before the cross- Army personnel embarked on eight ships.
Channel assault, and continued for several After temporary service as troop carriers
months thereafter. Meanwhile, strategic in the Pacific, the mammoth British pas-
and logistic planning for OVERLORD had senger ships Queen Mary and Queen
gone forward in the United Kingdom. As 7
CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to Presi-
the invasion date neared, attention was dent and Prime Minister, Official QUADRANT Conf
turned increasingly to the task of bringing Book. 8
Summary of Hist Events and Statistics, NYPE,
the American resources built up in Britain 1942, OCT HB NYPE; Voyage Rpt, Gen Hartle, 24
to bear on the enemy across the Channel. Jan 42, OCT 370.5 Strathaird.
74
beth were placed in the New York-United
Kingdom shuttle service in May and June,
9
respectively. At the close of June 1942,
56,090 U.S. Army troops had landed in
the United Kingdom. Of this total, 41,205
or 73.4 percent were then stationed in
Northern Ireland, but with MAGNET in
discard and BOLERO under way, the bulk
of the troops arriving thereafter were to
debark in England and Scotland.10
During the warmer months of the year
the build-up of American personnel in
Britain was augmented appreciably by
"double bunking." To attain the maxi-
mum passenger lift many of the troops
slept in shifts, occupying bunks in rotation;
they were given two meals daily, which
involved almost continuous mess opera-
tions. The first such shipment left New
York on 31 May, when 8,018 passengers
were crowded aboard the Thomas H. Barry,
Siboney, and Munargo. Subsequently, it be-
came a common practice to load transports
beyond normal troop carrying capacity
after due provision had been made for life-
saving equipment and other essentials.11
The troop build-up was accompanied
by a progressive accumulation of matériel
in the United Kingdom. U.S. Army cargo
discharged at British ports increased from
441 measurement tons in January 1942 to
279,092 measurement tons in June. As in
the case of the troops, all cargo at first
flowed to the Belfast area, but beginning
in May 1942 the ports on the west coast of
England, as well as in the Clyde area of
Scotland, commenced to receive American
cargo and soon outstripped North Ireland
in importance.12
Development of the Transportation
Organization
Success in the BOLERO program was
dependent upon the development of an
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
efficient supply and transportation organ-
ization for the U.S. Army in the British
Isles. When the first American troops
landed, there was neither a Services of
Supply nor a chief of transportation, and
several months elapsed before this situ-
ation changed.
The first American contingent placed
no great burden on British transport, but
larger troop movements were bound to
create problems. Sensing the need of closer
liaison on transportation matters, the in-
terested British agencies in April 1942
asked that U.S. Army personnel be as-
signed to assist. In response, the War De-
partment advised Maj. Gen. James E. Cha-
ney, then in command of the U.S. Army
Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), that
Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Frank S. Ross and
four assistants would be sent to London, at
the same time recommending that Ross
serve as Chaney's chief of transportation.
General Chaney concurred concerning
Ross and requested an additional twelve
officers as the nucleus of a transportation
staff of fifty or sixty officers that would be
needed before the arrival of a large body
of U.S. troops.13
9
The Queen Mary carried 9,863 on her first trip as a
carrier of U.S. troops, and the Queen Elizabeth, 10,383.
The lift of each was later increased to approximately
15,000 troops. See Rad, Somervell to CG ETOUSA,
30 Aug 42, CM-OUT 9329, OCT 370.5 England,
and OCT Monograph 12, pp. 20-23.
10
For statistics see below, p. 103, Table 1.
11
Summary of Hist Events and Statistics, NYPE,
1942, p. 6, OCT HB NYPE; OCT HB Monograph 30
p. 179; Rpt, CO Troops Hq 6528, Overloading of
USAT 39, the Thomas H. Barry, 11 Jun 42, OCT HB
Ocean Trans Overseas Troop Mvmts; Memo, IG for
CofS,
12
9 Sep 42, sub: Overseas Mvmts, WDCSA 370.5.
For statistics see below, p. 104, Table 2.
13
Rads, AGWAR (Marshall) to USFOR London,
22 Apr 42, CM-OUT 4315, and London (Chaney)
to AGWAR, 24 Apr 42, CM-IN 6536, OCT 210.3
England 42; Ltr, Ross to Harold Larson, 9 Mar 49,
OCT HB Inquiries.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN 75

Meanwhile, an Army Services of Supply Isles as a staff officer since he preferred a

had been created in Washington as part of combat assignment, but he saw the poten-
the War Department reorganization in tial importance of the task. Lean, ener-
March 1942. Within SOS, an organization getic, high-strung, Ross was to serve
was set up to take over transportation throughout the war as the U.S. Army
functions formerly performed by G-4 and chief of transportation for the European
the Quartermaster Corps. It was expected theater.15
that parallel SOS organizations would be Ross had begun planning an organiza-
activated in the oversea commands, and tion before he received his appointment to
the War Department took the initiative in Lee's staff. At this time the SOS in Wash-
organizing an SOS for the United King- ington was contemplating considerable
dom. At a staff conference in Washington expansion of the functions of its Transpor-
on 7 May 1942, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Som- tation Service. Patterning his organization
ervell, Commanding General, SOS, an- on this concept, Ross assembled officers to
nounced that Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) staff the rail, water, and motor divisions,
John C. H. Lee had been chosen to head and to plan for the organization of units to
the Services of Supply in the British Isles. be employed in operating and maintain-
General Lee was to prepare preliminary ing small landing craft during the Channel
plans, decide on a tentative organization, crossing. He came into Lee's organization
and then leave for London. The head of fully convinced of the necessity for inte-
each supply service at Washington was grating all theater Army transportation
asked to submit the names of his two best activities, other than air, and expected
men, of whom one was to be selected for that this doctrine would be accepted.16
Lee's staff. General Gross, then chief of the
SOS Transportation Service (later Trans- The Transportation Office
portation Corps), strongly recommended
Colonel Ross, already earmarked for duty Headquarters, Services of Supply,
with General Chaney. Ross then became USAFBI, was activated under General
chief of Transportation Service under Lee on 24 May 1942, the day he and a
General Lee.14 14
Hist Monograph, Hist Div USFET, Administra-
Born in Colorado on 9 March 1893, tive and Logistical History of the European Theater
Ross had spent his early years in Texas, of Operations, Pt. II. Organization and Command in
where during summer vacations he had the European Theater of Operations, Vol. I, Mar 46
worked on a railroad. He began his mili- (hereafter cited as Adm and Logistical Hist of ETO,
Pt. II, Vol. I), pp. 8-9, 20-21, OCMH Files; Wkly
tary career in 1916 as a private in the Confs, SOS, 7 May 42, p. 2, sub: Orgn SOS, AG 381
Texas National Guard. After serving in (5440) BOLERO USFET; Memo, Gross for Lee, 7 May
World War I he remained as an officer in 42, sub: SOS BOLERO-Trans Sv, OCT HB Gross Day
File.
the U.S. Army. On 7 December 1941, he 15
For biographical details, see T/5 Irwin Ross,
was already stationed in Washington, "Ross of ETO," Army Transportation Journal, I, 3
D.C., as chief of the Port and Water Sec- (April 1945), 32-36; and TC Monthly News Ltr,
ETO, Vol. 3, No. 2, 28 Feb 46, pp. 1-2, OCT HB
tion, Transportation Branch, G-4. In late ETO Trans News Letter.
16
April 1942 Ross was ready to join the 10th See Gross memo cited n. 14 and Ross ltr cited n.
13. The Transportation Corps was soon relieved of
Armored Division. He was, in fact, none functions pertaining to landing craft, and organiza-
too enthusiastic about going to the British tional provisions for this activity were abandoned.
76
17
group of his staff officers arrived. A
member of this party, Colonel Ross imme-
diately began to assemble and organize his
headquarters staff. His knowledge of Army
transportation in World War I had con-
vinced him of the advisability of having
not only transportation experts drawn
from civilian life but also "a leavening of
Army officers." The professional soldiers
could supply the supervision that he
believed had been woefully lacking in
the American Expeditionary Forces in
1917-18. In furtherance of this policy,
wherever possible Ross placed a Regular
Army officer in a key position but selected
an officer with the appropriate civilian
technical background to serve as assistant.
The resultant pooling of experience was
intended to insure smooth operation from
both the military and the technical points
of view. For deputy chief of transportation,
Ross chose Col. Norman A. Ryan, who
combined a substantial military back-
ground with more than thirty years of
railway experience.18
On 11 June 1942 an initial allotment of
135 officers reported for duty in the Office
of the Chief of Transportation, then tem-
porarily located at No. 1 Great Cumber-
land Place in London. Most of the men
had little or no experience in the transpor-
tation field and of course knew nothing of
19
local conditions.
Up to this time there was no formal
theater directive defining the authority
and functions of the SOS and its subordi-
nate services in the theater, since there
were differences between General Lee,
who with the War Department desired an
organization with broad administrative
and supply responsibilities, and General
Chancy, who believed that the SOS
should have more limited powers. Formal
definition of the scope and extent of the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
SOS, including its transportation organi-
zation, had to await a change in theater
20
organization and command.
On 8 June 1942 the European Theater
of Operations (ETOUSA) was established
as successor to the U.S. Army Forces in
the British Isles. General Chaney was re-
placed as theater commander by Maj.
Gen. (later General of the Army) Dwight
D. Eisenhower on 24 June. 21 The question
of the organization of transportation in the
theater was raised immediately. Writing to
General Eisenhower on 22 June, Somer-
vell requested his opinion regarding the
desirability of creating in oversea theaters
a "separate transport corps entirely di-
vorced from the Quartermaster Corps,"
and whether that service should also oper-
ate railroads. Eisenhower replied that it
was essential "that all forms of transporta-
tion—motor, rail, water—be closely co-
ordinated." He was in complete agreement
with his SOS commander, General Lee,
who had already set up a transportation
service and assigned it responsibility for
the operation of all means of surface trans-
portation in the communications zone, in-
cluding ports, motor transport, and mili-
tary railways. He concluded that a
transportation service should be organ-
ized separate from the Quartermaster
Corps, and that the operation of railroads,
then charged to the Chief of Engineers,
should come under the Chief of Transpor-
17
Adm and Logistical Hist of ETO, Pt. II, Vol. I,
pp. 30-31.
18
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I, 1-4 and App. 2, OCT HB
ETO.
19
Hist Rcd, TC SOS ETO, Aug 42, OCT HB ETO
Hq.
20
Adm and Logistical Hist of ETO, Pt. II, Vol. I,
pp.27-44, 57-64.
21
Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Op-
erations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), p. 374.
 BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
tation Service. On 19 July Somervell
informed Eisenhower that the Secretary of
War had approved the creation of a
Transportation Corps that would be re-
sponsible for all rail and water activities.
With regard to motor transport, on the
other hand, Somervell had taken steps to
centralize the procurement and mainte-
nance of vehicles in the Ordnance Depart-
ment, and had left the truck companies in
the Quartermaster Corps. The truck units
in the theater, he stated, could be attached
as circumstances warranted to the Trans-
portation Service, a division, a corps, or
the quartermaster or other staff officers.22
In the meantime, work on a general
order defining the role of the SOS in the
European Theater of Operations (ETO)
had gone forward, and on 20 July 1942 a
theater directive was issued outlining the
structure and functions of General Lee's
organization. Included was provision for a
Chief of Transportation Service on the
special staff of the Commanding General,
SOS. This provided formal recognition for
a Transportation Service exercising trans-
portation functions previously divided
between the Quartermaster and the
Engineers.23
In the following month the Transporta-
tion Service in ETO was redesignated the
Transportation Corps, following the pat-
tern already set by the parent organization
in Washington. Since the Corps was new
and not thoroughly understood either in
the zone of interior or overseas, Ross's
organization was subject to frequent ad-
justments. Pursuant to a War Department
directive of August 1942 that assigned
vehicle maintenance to the Ordnance De-
partment and left truck operations with
the Quartermaster Corps, Ross was de-
prived unexpectedly of all motor transport
functions other than movement control on
77
the highways. However, in July 1943 he
was again assigned responsibility for motor
transport operations. Meanwhile, Ross's
functions pertaining to rail transportation
had been given War Department sanction
in mid-November 1942, when it broad-
ened the scope of the Transportation Corps
to include all military railway activities
except construction.24
Other adjustments had to be made in
relation to the SOS base command struc-
ture that evolved in the United Kingdom.
Deciding to decentralize his operations,
General Lee in the summer of 1942 set up
skeleton territorial base sections, which in
the ensuing months grew into full-fledged
organizations. Ultimately five base sec-
tions were established. (Map 2) Base sec-
tion commanders were made responsible
for administration and supply, and for all
SOS operations in their areas not
exempted by the commanding general. A
number of activities, among them Trans-
portation Service including port oper-
ations, initially were exempted from base
section control, but this arrangement soon
came up for reconsideration. Base section
commanders were dissatisfied with the
degree of control exercised by the chiefs of
technical services over exempted activities.
A firm believer in base sections, Lee
steadily increased their authority, and in
August 1943 completely abolished ex-
empted activities, making base section
22
Memo, Eisenhower for CG SOS WD, 27 Jun 42,
sub: Contl and Opn of Trans, AG Adm 341A ETO;
Memo, Somervell to Eisenhower, 19 Jul 42, OCT HB
ETO Misc Info.
23
Adm and Logistical Hist of ETO, Pt. II, Vol. I,
p. 69.
24
Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 25 Aug and 10 Sep 42, OCT
HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Ltr, Ross to Harold Lar-
son, 9 Mar 49, OCT HB Inquiries. On Transporta-
tion Corps motor transport functions, see below, pp.
126-29.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
commanders responsible for all SOS oper-
25
ations in their respective areas.
This decentralization of the control of
transportation operations to the base sec-
tions limited the chief of transportation to
technical direction. The change was par-
ticularly important in the realm of port
operations—the largest U.S. transporta-
tion activity in the United Kingdom.
Some base section commanders gave the
term technical direction a liberal inter-
pretation, permitting the chief of trans-
portation considerable leeway in dealing
with the ports. Others, understandably
jealous of their prerogatives, closely con-
trolled the activities of their port com-
manders. Ross never concurred in the
arrangement that placed the ports under
the base sections, believing that its success
was too dependent on the personalities
and caliber of the several base section
commanders, and that the interjection of
a headquarters between the chief of trans-
portation and the ports handicapped ef-
fective supervision and co-ordination. As
will be seen, the vague line of demarkation
between base section control and tech-
nical direction in some instances created
difficulties in the conduct of port oper-
ations. The larger problem of decentral-
ized versus centralized control of transpor-
tation activities was to come up again on
the European continent, as well as in
other oversea commands. 26
In July 1942, in order to obtain more
space and a better location, General Lee
moved SOS headquarters from London to
Cheltenham, a former resort city in Glou-
cestershire. However necessary, this trans-
fer posed a problem for the chief of trans-
portation. He could function only by
co-operating with the U.S. supply services
at Cheltenham, but at the same time he
could not operate without maintaining
79
liaison with the British transportation
agencies in London. Ross therefore had to
divide his staff. The principal administra-
tive duties and the operating functions
that involved the supply services were cen-
tered at Cheltenham, but many of the
personnel, especially those in planning
and liaison activities, stayed in London in
order to keep in direct contact with the
British. A special courier service had to be
devised to facilitate interoffice communi-
cation, since Cheltenham was about ninety
miles from London. Maintenance of a
split staff proved undesirable, and in mid-
August Ross began the gradual return of
his Cheltenham organization to London.
There, suitable space was found in Self-
ridge's Annex, which housed the Trans-
portation Corps headquarters until its
move to France.27
Aside from two small branches for con-
trol and statistical purposes, the staff of
the theater chief of transportation, as it
was organized on 1 November 1942, was
concerned with three types of activity: op-
erations, administration, and planning
and liaison. Operations, which included
control of American rail and highway
movements and supervision of work done
at the ports, was headed by Col. Donald
S. McConnaughy. Administration, then
under Lt. Col. James R. Worthington, in-
volved the usual housekeeping functions,
together with cable communications.
Planning dealt primarily with the trans-
portation aspects of pending operational
25
Adm and Logistical Hist of ETO, Pt. II, Vol. I,
pp. 108-22, 239-50.
26
Ltrs, Ross to Larson, 9 Mar and 5 Dec 49; Intervs,
Larson with Col David W. Traub, 21 Mar 50, and
with Maj W. H. Henderson, 14 Jan 49, OCT HB
ETO UK Ports.
27
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 159-60; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, I, 4-5, 12, OCT HB ETO; Ltrs, Ross to Gross,
8 Jul, 25 Aug 42, and 10 Sep 42, OCT HB Gross Day
File, and Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
80
projects, and liaison was almost entirely
with the British. Planning and liaison were
assigned to Col. (later Brig. Gen.) George
C. Stewart, until he left for North Africa
and was replaced by Lt. Col. (later Col.)
28
David W. Traub on 13 November 1942.
Meanwhile, the contemplated invasion
of North Africa had begun to have a dis-
turbing effect upon the Transportation
Corps in the British Isles. The first blow
fell on the planning staff. In late August
1942, except for the executive who re-
mained to insure the continuity of plans
for operations in the United Kingdom, all
the planning personnel had to work on
the transportation aspects of the projected
assault.29 In the same month a small liai-
son group, headed by Colonel McCon-
naughy, was assigned to assist the British
in effecting outbound movements in sup-
port of TORCH. Since the infant Transpor-
tation Corps was not yet prepared to per-
form the task, the British assumed respon-
sibility for the movement of all American
as well as British personnel and material
leaving the United Kingdom for North
Africa. The liaison group represented the
U.S. Army interest at the British War
Office, assisting in the screening of re-
quests for moves and determining their
priority. Later known as the Export
Movement Division, this organization dis-
banded in the spring of 1943 when the
volume of outbound traffic for the North
African theater had fallen off.30
The North African invasion not only
created a diversion in planning activities,
but also cut deeply into the strength of the
Transportation Corps in the United King-
dom. In mid-October 1942, Ross reported
that transfers to the TORCH operation had
seriously depleted his staff, although he
believed it would be possible to rebuild
rapidly on the framework remaining in
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the United Kingdom, if the BOLERO
program should be revived. Shortly there-
after Ross was assigned to temporary duty
in North Africa, and in his absence Colo-
nel Ryan assumed charge of the transpor-
tation office. During this period many
transportation officers left the British Isles
to serve in North Africa. Some, such as
Colonel Stewart, remained with the forces
in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, but
others, including Ross, had only tempo-
rary assignments. Several transportation
units, among them the 3d Port and three
port battalions, also were sent from the
United Kingdom to take part in the North
African campaign.31
Although greatly reduced, the Trans-
portation staff that remained in Britain
experienced no difficulties because the
load was slackening. In the six months
from November 1942 to May 1943, the
bulk of the available U.S. Army personnel
and cargo flowed into North Africa rather
than the United Kingdom. American per-
sonnel debarking at British ports fell to a
low of 1,277 in March 1943, and in that
month the total discharge of U.S. Army
cargo was only 65,767 measurement tons. 32
Despite certain adverse factors, the
North African operation benefited the
28
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I, 3-5, 12-16, and App. 3,
OCT HB ETO.
29
OCT HB Monograph 29, pp. 41-48; Hist Rpt,
TC ETO, I, 15-16; Hist Rcd, TC ETO, dictated Aug
42 by Maj W. H. Beers, pp. 7-8, OCT HB ETO, Hq.
30
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 26 Oct 42, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross; Hist Rpt, Story of Transportation in
the United Kingdom (hereafter cited as Story of
Trans in UK), pp. 147-48, OCT HB ETO; Hist Rpt,
TC ETO, I, 9, OCT HB ETO; IRS, Exec Officer Ex-
port Mvmt Div to Exec Officer OCT, 10 Apr 43, AG
320 Functions of TC Hq USFET, Serial 11, EUCOM.
31
Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 14 and 26 Oct 42, OCT HB
Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. I,
App. 8, OCT HB ETO; Ltr, Ryan to Gross, 7 Nov 42,
OCT HB Gross ETO—Rail.
32
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 26 Oct 42, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross. See also, Tables 1 and 2.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN 81

U.S. Army transportation organization in tion were placed under a new Motor
the British Isles. Personnel losses, some Transport Division. Later, the Traffic Con-
only temporary, were offset by experience trol Division was redesignated the Move-
gained. Valuable "know-how" had been ments Division, and a new Supply Divi-
acquired in helping to outload the task sion was established. As shown in Chart 1,
force units that sailed from the United on 9 January 1944 the transportation
Kingdom. Both Ross and his associates in office had seven divisions, each headed by
North Africa profited by the first-hand ex- an assistant chief of transportation. With
perience obtained in unloading troops and this organization Ross was ready to meet
cargo and operating ports and railways in the responsibilities of D Day.
an active theater. On the whole, it was At the close of January 1944 the prin-
fortunate that this foretaste of wartime cipal functions of the European theater
conditions came before the Transportation chief of transportation were to give tech-
Corps had to support the invasion of Nor- nical supervision to the operation of all
mandy.33 port facilities under U.S. Army control; to
Ross reached North Africa on 11 No- effect and control the transportation of
vember 1942, departed on 26 January U.S. personnel and cargo from ships to
1943 for a brief stay in the United States, destinations in the theater, and subse-
and then returned to London. 34 Soon quent movement by rail, highway, or
thereafter, he reorganized his headquar- water; to operate and maintain military
ters in order to simplify administrative railways under U.S. Army jurisdiction; to
procedures, to differentiate between oper- control U.S. Army movements by motor
ating and traffic control agencies, and to vehicles and to operate motor transport
effect decentralization. In addition to a not assigned to other services or com-
Control Section under his direct supervi- mands; to advise the commanding general
sion, the new organizational pattern pro- of the theater Services of Supply as to
vided assistant chiefs of transportation for limitations imposed by transportation fa-
administration, for planning (including cilities on tactical operations; and to
intelligence, statistical, and historical func- recommend policy on all Transportation
tions), for traffic control (meaning simply Corps matters in the European theater. 37
movement control), and for operations During the fall of 1943 Ross had also
(comprising such operating agencies as begun to adapt his organization to pro-
the ports and the military railways to- 33
OCT HB Monograph 29, pp. 47-48; Ltr, Ross to
gether with the functions relating to pack- Gross, 31 Dec 42, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
ing and marking, training, tracing lost 34
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
shipments, and moving perishables). 35 to 31 Oct 43, Sec. IV, p. 1, OCT HB North Africa.
35
Ltr, SOSTCa-320, 10 Apr 43, and IRS, CofT
In July 1943 General Ross made further SOS to AG SOS ETO, 21 Apr 43, AG 320 Respon-
36
changes. The Military Railways Branch, sibilities of TC 1943-45 EUCOM.
36
formerly under Operations, was given Promoted to brigadier general on 25 June 1943,
Ross attained the rank of major general on 3 June
separate status as the Military Railways 1944.
Division. Operations was redesignated the 37
Memo, CofT SOS ETO, 11 Jul 43, sub: Orgn of
Marine Operations Division, and the OCT; Office Memo 28, OCT SOS ETO, 10 Sep 43;
Material submitted by Gen Ross for SOS Orgn Adm
motor transport functions recently recov- and Opns Manual, 30 Jan 44. All in AG 320 Respon-
ered by the theater chief of transporta- sibilities of TC 1943-45 EUCOM.
CHART 1—ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION, SOS, ETOUSA: 9 JANUARY 1944

Source: Rpt, Consolidated Historical Report on Transportation Corps Activities in the European Theater of Operations,May1942 Through V-E Day, Chart IV, OCT HB ETO.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
jected operations on the Continent by
creating the Advance Echelon, which be-
gan detailed planning for OVERLORD and
later became part of the Forward Echelon,
Communications Zone.38
The Problem of Personnel
The Transportation Corps in the
United Kingdom, like other technical
services, had to contend throughout the
war with two basic handicaps. One was
the Army policy of limiting service troops
to a minimum, so as to provide the maxi-
mum shipping space for combat units.
The other was a growing shortage of man-
power, which forced acceptance of men
with little or no transportation ex-
perience.39
Early in June 1942 the troop basis set
up for U.S. Army transportation activity
in the United Kingdom contemplated a
headquarters staff, two traffic control
units, and four port organizations. The
traffic control units, then known as group
regulating stations, each had 75 officers
and 300 enlisted men. Specifically devised
by Ross to provide overhead personnel,
they could be used "anywhere for any-
thing." 40 Each port headquarters was to
have attached to it four port battalions,
two service battalions, and certain other
necessary service units.
The first American port personnel had
reached Belfast in May. Other transpor-
tation units began arriving in the United
Kingdom in June and July. The initial
port headquarters, the 3d, debarked on 23
June. To gain experience, it was assigned
to the Bristol Channel area for on-the-job
training with the British. On 13 July the
4th Port landed and was stationed in the
Mersey area. In the same month the 1st
Group Regulating Station reached the
83
theater. Subsequently, the requirements
of the North African invasion led to a
temporary suspension of the movement of
transportation troops into Britain and to
withdrawals among those units that had
41
arrived.
Largely because of the diversion of per-
sonnel to North Africa, the theater chief
of transportation's headquarters organiza-
tion in February 1943 numbered only 55
officers, 5 warrant officers, and 120 en-
listed men. Under its supervision were the
1st Group Regulating Station and the 4th
and 5th Ports.42 Meanwhile Ross, during
his brief visit to Washington, had sought
among other things to establish new per-
sonnel requirements for the Transporta-
tion Corps in the European theater. On 5
March 1943 he received an allotment of
thirty-seven officers to perform adminis-
trative, personnel, planning, procure-
ment, highway, marine, and railway func-
tions, but he pressed for more. He was es-
pecially anxious to obtain more regulating
groups, claiming that he could not func-
tion without them. He could not, he
added, continue to cry on the shoulders of
the British for help. If necessary, he was
38
For this and subsequent developments pertaining
to Transportation Corps activities in connection with
the cross-Channel invasion, see Ch. VI, below.
39
Memo, Wylie for Gross, 16 May 42, OCT HB
Wylie Stay-backs; Ltr, Ross to Larson, 5 Dec 49, OCT
HB Inquiries.
40
Ltr, Ross to Larson, 5 Dec 49, Note 25, OCT HB
Inquiries.
41
Memo, Lt Col V. H. Williams, Jr., for CofT, 3
Jun 42, sub: Troop Basis . . . BOLERO, OCT 370.5
England (Mvmt Bolero) 41-42; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 8
Jul 42, OCT HB Gross Day File; Memo, Williams for
Gen Dillon, 21 Sep 42, sub: Units and Equip Status,
OCT 370.5 Mvmt Bolero (Ry Equip and Ry Pers
Rqmts).
42
Ltr, Col Worthington, OCT, to Col Ryan,
DCofT SOS ETO, 3 Feb 43, OCT 210.3 England 43;
Rad, USSOS London to WAR, 25 Feb 43, CM-IN
13305, OCT 320.2 England 43; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 30
Mar 43, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
84
willing to take youngsters fresh from offi-
cer candidate schools in the United States
and to train them after arrival overseas.43
The theater chief of transportation was
disappointed with the personnel sent to
him in the first half of 1943. The enlisted
men, in particular, lacked both experience
and education. He found it hard to under-
stand why he was given shoe repair men,
laundrymen, sewing machine operators,
and tailors. Specifically, he wanted white
enlisted men who could read and write,
an essential requirement if they were to
keep track of freight and perform the other
necessary documentation. For traffic reg-
ulating groups, he also needed men who
could deal with both military and civilian
personnel and could work in close har-
mony with their British counterparts. The
officers he received often failed to measure
up to the desired standards. Some were
deficient in discipline, courtesy, and tech-
nical qualifications. Many were older men
who did not hold up well under the long
and arduous hours of work that were
required.44
Because of the difference between Amer-
ican and European customs and methods,
a special school was established for the
orientation of newly arrived Transporta-
tion Corps officers and enlisted men. The
first session, held at Seamills Camp near
Avonmouth, was opened on 1 August 1943.
The instruction stressed matters peculiar
to the United Kingdom and the Continent
and explained in detail the wartime opera-
tions of the Transportation Corps. Ross
considered the results excellent.45
Prodded by vigorous protests from
ETOUSA, General Gross and his staff
tried hard to eliminate poor timber from
Transportation Corps units destined for
the United Kingdom. Improvement re-
sulted, and as the year drew to a close
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
there was less criticism of incoming per-
sonnel. Early in September 1943 Ross
commented favorably on the 4th Regulat-
ing Group, from which misfits and other
unqualified personnel had been screened
46
before the unit left the United States.
Nonetheless, the situation during the
ensuing months was difficult. As late as 6
June 1944 the theater chief of transporta-
tion was worried by delays in the arrival
of personnel and the need of employing
green men. He believed that the Trans-
portation Corps should have had the serv-
ices of many qualified men who had been
assigned to less important positions else-
where. He reported, however, that with
few exceptions the performance of recently
received units had been good. The main
problem was that these troops could not
acquire sufficient experience in the thea-
ter before the invasion began.47
Co-ordination of U.S. and
British Transportation
One of the first jobs facing the Trans-
portation Corps in the United Kingdom
was to effect a satisfactory working rela-
tionship with the pertinent British mili-
tary and civilian agencies. With British
43
Memo, Col Fremont B. Hodson for Col Herbert
B. Wilcox, OCT, 5 Mar 43, sub: Commissioned Pers
for UK, and Ltr, Wilcox to Ross, 26 Mar 43, OCT
210.3 England 43; Ltr, Ross to Hodson, 3 Apr 43,
OCT 320.2 England 43.
44
Ltrs, Ross to Wilcox, 19 Jun 43, and Wilcox to
Ross, 28 Jun 43, OCT 210.3 England 43; Ltr, Ross for
CofT, 29 Jun 43, sub: TC Shipts EGB 390 and EGB
436, OCT 370.5 England 43; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 30
Jun 43, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
45
On the Seamills School, see Hist Rpt, TC ETO,
I, 10-11 and App. 14, OCT HB ETO. Cf. Ltr, Ross
to Larson, 5 Dec 49, Note 31, OCT HB Inquiries.
46
Ltrs, Gross to Ross, 21 Aug 43, and Ross to Gross,
7 Sep 43, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Ltr, Ross
to Larson, 5 Dec 49, Note 30, OCT HB Inquiries.
47
Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 6 and 30 Jun 44, and Gross
to Ross, 19 Jun 44, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
transport facilities already hard hit by the
war, effective and co-ordinated control of
American and British traffic was neces-
sary to avoid port congestion and to pre-
vent a breakdown of the railways. Even
before the Americans arrived, British
trains were carrying far larger passenger
loads, although usually for shorter dis-
tances, than most U.S. trains. To the for-
midable British traffic was added, in 1942,
the burden of American personnel, equip-
ment, and supplies for the build-up. 48
The British early in World War II had
instituted a strict control of all transpor-
tation, military and civilian. On the civil-
ian side, to attain more effective co-ordi-
nation of port management and inland
transport, the new and powerful British
Ministry of War Transport (BMWT) had
been formed in May 1941 by a fusion of
the former Ministries of Shipping and
Transport. Under Lord Leathers, the
BMWT exercised pervasive control over
shipping, port operations, and inland
transport. To the Americans, the more im-
portant BMWT agencies were the Diver-
sion Committee, which directed ships still
at sea to their destination ports; the Sea
Transport Service, which among other
things had charge of the berthing and un-
loading of all U.S. vessels for a time; and
the regional port directors, who controlled
port operations. The British railways were
operated by civilians at the direction of
the Railway Executive Committee. Other
BMWT divisions controlled the allocation
of civilian motor transport, coasters, and
inland waterway facilities within the
United Kingdom.49
On the military side, the Quarter-
Master-General of the British Army had
a Movements Control Directorate, usually
known as "Q" Movements. It was headed
by a director of movements, who had two
85
deputies, one for stores (that is, freight)
and the other for personnel. Q Movements
was represented at every level of com-
mand. Assigned to each of the British mili-
tary commands were movement control
officers, who in turn operated through
subordinates, generally intermediate dis-
trict officers, and, in the lowest echelon, the
railway traffic officers (RTO's) stationed at
all principal points. A central headquar-
ters in London co-ordinated all British
movements involving one or more com-
mands. At the ports, the British movement
control organization was represented by
embarkation commandants and teams of
embarkation staff officers and RTO's. The
Quarter-Master-General also had a direc-
tor of transportation, who was responsible
for the construction of port and rail facil-
ities and for their technical operation
when not performed by a civilian agency.
The Royal Air Force had its own move-
ment control organization, set up parallel
to and working in close conjunction with
the British Army Movements Control
Directorate.50
The theater chief of transportation
stressed the necessity of maintaining close
liaison with the British on all transporta-
tion activity. Aside from establishing
numerous contacts with the British Min-
istry of War Transport regarding ship
48
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 2, 13.
49
Ibid., pp. 14-15; Rpt, Consolidated Historical
Report on Transportation Corps Activities in the
European Theater of Operations, May 1942 Through
V-E Day (hereafter cited as Consolidated Rpt on TC
Activities in ETO), Annex 5, p. 1, OCT HB ETO.
See also William K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing,
British War Economy (London: His Majesty's Station-
ery Office, 1949), pp. 219, 268, 2 7 1 .
50
Handbook of Administrative Instructions for the
Cooperation of the British Army and the Ground
Forces of the United States Army in the British Isles,
1943, prepared by the British War Office in conjunc-
tion with Hq ETOUSA, 29 Apr 43, Secs. XXVI-
XXVII, OCT 320.21-352.0 England 43.
86 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

diversions, rail operations, and other mat- transportation established a movement

ters, he worked closely with the British control organization patterned after that
director of transportation (Maj. Gen. of the British. In the top echelon were
Donald J. McMullen), particularly with U.S. regional transportation officers,
respect to the procurement of railway whose areas corresponded to those of the
equipment. Of necessity, too, Ross had to British military commands and whose
set up effective liaison with the British di- major staff function was to maintain liai-
rector of movements (Maj. Gen. Noel G. son with the British on transportation
Holmes). Controlling all British military matters. Under the regional transporta-
movements in the United Kingdom, the tion officers were operating agencies
Movements Directorate served as mentor headed by district transportation officers.
and model in the development of a paral- In the lowest echelon were the local rail-
51
lel American organization. way traffic officers. Although staffed by
U.S. Army personnel, the new organiza-
U.S. Liaison and Organization tion followed the prevailing British pat-
for Movement Control tern, and its personnel frequently shared
quarters and facilities with their British
From the first, the staff of the U.S. counterparts. The arrangement worked
transportation organization followed Brit- well, and Ross's only complaint was that
ish procedures and learned by working the British were too polite and did not put
53
alongside British movement control per- his men to work quickly enough.
sonnel. Soon after reaching London, Ross At first the British wanted to absorb the
established informal liaison with the Brit- American personnel into their own move-
ish Director of Movements through Maj. ment control system, but Ross disagreed,
Louis Zinnecker, who had been handling believing that the establishment of a U.S.
transportation matters for General Army organization able to act for itself
Chaney. During the transitional period, was an essential prerequisite to its ultimate
while the newly arrived personnel became transfer to the Continent, where it would
familiar with British methods, Major operate its own line of communications.
Zinnecker remained temporarily as liaison Equally undesirable was the development
officer until replaced on 8 June 1942 by of a completely separate U.S. movement
Colonel Stewart. At that time, two officers control organization, for the British and
were placed under Stewart, one detailed Americans then would both be doing the
to the British deputy director of move- same type of work and competing for
ments for personnel (Brigadier C. S. available transport facilities. The solution
Napier), and the other assigned to the adopted was to set up a system of joint
deputy director of movements for stores
51
(Brigadier W. D. A. Williams). This Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I, 6-7, OCT HB ETO; Ltr
marked the inauguration of an increas- Ross to Larson, 5 Dec 49, Note 9, OCT HB Inquiries;
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, Annex
52
ingly important liaison activity. 5, pp. 2-3.
52
As American traffic expanded, the liai- Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I, 7, 14, and App. 1, OCT
son begun at London had to be extended HB ETO; Interv, Col Thomas Fuller, 15 Jun 48,
OCT HB ETO Misc.
throughout the United Kingdom. During 53
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 15, 74-76, 79; Ltr,
July and August 1942 the theater chief of Ross to Wylie, 28 Jul 42, AG Adm 314A ETO.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
traffic control, whereby each individual
engaged in this activity—whether British
or American—was held responsible for his
respective movements. In practice, U.S.
and British movement control personnel
co-operated freely, the former relieving
the latter as rapidly as possible in the areas
where American troops had become the
principal users of transportation.54
The first U.S. Army Regional Trans-
portation Office in the United Kingdom
was established in Northern Ireland on 14
July 1942. By mid-August five others had
been set up in the British Isles.55 Since
they paralleled the British military com-
mands, the six transportation regions did
not coincide with the four base sections
(Northern Ireland, Western, Eastern, and
Southern), set up by the Services of Sup-
ply in July 1942. This necessitated a de-
parture from the British system, under
which movement control personnel were
directly responsible to the director of
movements in London. To provide the
necessary co-ordination, the regional
transportation officers were placed on the
special staffs of the base section command-
ers, with the theater chief of transporta-
tion exercising technical supervision over
their operations. In practice, the regional
transportation officer nearest a base sec-
tion headquarters became the base section
transportation officer for that base section,
and Ross later recommended that the
term "regional transportation officer" be
dropped, since it was peculiar to the
United Kingdom.56 Including the Central
Base Section (London) and two additional
regions, by 1943 there were eight trans-
portation regions and five base sections.
(See Map 2.)
As the representative of the theater
chief of transportation the regional trans-
portation officer supervised all U.S. Army
87
traffic under his jurisdiction, maintaining
constant liaison on transportation matters
with the British authorities and with the
American units within his region. Any
unit that desired to move had first to con-
sult the district transportation officer to
make the necessary arrangements. 57 All
movements of American personnel and
freight were under his direct supervision,
as were also the railway traffic officers as-
signed to his district.
Operating at the ports, depots, and
principal railway stations utilized by U.S.
troops, the railway traffic officer repre-
sented the theater chief of transportation
at the lowest echelon in movement con-
58
trol. As the local trouble shooter, he
sought to expedite the movement of U.S.
troops, supplies, and equipment. He
helped provide prompt and dependable
transportation by maintaining close liai-
son with British movement control officers
and civilian railway personnel. At big
depots he dealt almost exclusively with
freight, arranging for rail cars, supervising
their loading and dispatch, completing
the necessary documentation, and keep-
ing the depot commander informed on all
transportation matters. At large railway
54
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 15-16; Ltr, Ross to
Larson, 9 Mar 49, OCT HB Inquiries; Trans Sv In-
structions and Info, 17 Jul 42, OCT HB Gross ETO—
Rail.
55
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I, 46, OCT HB ETO; Story
of Trans in UK, p. 76.
56
GO 10, SOS ETO, 20 Jul 42; Consolidated Rpt
of TC Activities in ETO, Annex 5, p. 1; Ltr, Lt Col
Page H. Slaughter to Larson, 4 Apr 50, OCT HB In-
quiries; Memo, CofT COMZ ETO for CofT WD, 10
May 45, sub: Current and Future Orgnl Rqmts, CofT
ETO, AG 320 Responsibilities and Functions of TC
EUCOM.
57
The district transportation officer was renamed
district regulating officer in 1944. Hist Rpt, TC ETO,
II, 31, OCT HB ETO.
58
The Railway Traffic Officer was also called Rail
Transportation Officer. As a rule the RTO was an en-
listed man specially trained for this work.
88
stations, on the other hand, the RTO was
concerned chiefly with personnel. He
supervised the loading and unloading of
U.S. troops and accompanying equip-
ment, and performed a wide variety of
personal services. At one time or another
practically every American soldier had
reason to be grateful for service received
from the officer with the brassard reading
"R.T.O. U.S.A." The average RTO had
to arrange travel accommodations for
about two hundred persons daily. If more
than twenty persons were involved, clear-
ance had to be obtained from the District
Transportation Officer. American mili-
tary personnel traveling on orders were
required only to submit a copy of their
orders to the RTO at the station, who
then issued a travel warrant for use as a
ticket.
The RTO had many duties and prob-
lems. He had to keep records of both per-
sonnel and freight movements. Lost or
misplaced baggage, particularly barracks
bags, was a daily headache. Since the
British railways ordinarily lacked dining
car service, the RTO had to assist when
U.S. troop trains made a so-called "re-
freshment halt." A frequent problem was
the American soldier on furlough who
lacked funds to return to his camp. In
September 1942 the Transportation Corps
devised a system of repayment warrants,
whereby the RTO could arrange for rail
travel and the cost was deducted from the
soldier's next pay. As the local field agent
of the theater chief of transportation, the
RTO constituted a basic element in move-
ment control for the U.S. Army, first with-
in the British Isles and later on the
Continent.59
American railway traffic officers were
drawn initially from the 1st Group Regu-
lating Station, a traffic control unit that
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
arrived in Liverpool on 12 July 1942 and
was dispersed in small detachments
throughout Great Britain. These men
were trained beside their British counter-
parts and instructed to keep their eyes and
ears open and mouths shut. In the mean-
time, they were urged to learn the British
control system and to attempt no innova-
tions. By September 1942 they were re-
placing the British RTO's and taking
60
hold in good fashion.
As was to be expected, the American
RTO's experienced some difficulty in ad-
justing themselves to British methods of
traffic control. They often tended to speed
up operations and press for additional
railway equipment to the annoyance of
their British colleagues. Eventually, how-
ever, the American and British RTO's
came to understand each other better, as
a result of their close association and their
61
work on similar problems.
Under the system outlined above, the
theater chief of transportation, working in
close co-operation with British transporta-
tion and movement control agencies in
London, the nerve center of British trans-
portation, exercised control over all Amer-
ican personnel and cargo movements to
and from the ports and between the
regions and base sections. Regional trans-
portation officers, operating under his
technical supervision, were responsible for
implementing directives of the theater
chief of transportation governing inter-
regional moves and for directly arranging
for local moves in conjunction with their
59
On RTO's, see the following: Story of Trans in
UK, pp. 79-87; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. I, App. 10
and App. 14, pp. 20-24, OCT HB ETO.
60
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 10 Sep 42, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross.
61
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 80-81, 87; Hist, 1st
Gp Regulating Station, 8 Jun-Dec 42, AG Opns Rpts
TCRE-10.1.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
local British opposite numbers. Under the
supervision of the Army regional trans-
portation officers, the district transporta-
tion officers and the RTO's performed the
actual operational aspects of traffic
62
control.
Procedures Governing the Movement
of Traffic
In the course of building its movement
control organization, the Transportation
Corps evolved procedures governing the
flow of American men and materials into
British ports and their distribution to the
interior. These procedures were designed
to regulate the flow into the main stream
of British traffic under tight schedules and
over heavily burdened transportation
facilities. They encompassed movements
from the point of departure in the zone of
interior to their ultimate destinations in
the United Kingdom.63
In the case of inbound cargo, aside from
forecast and sailing cables received from
the United States, Transportation Corps
headquarters in London got its first ink-
ling of what to expect from the cargo-
loading cable dispatched for each out-
bound vessel by the U.S. port of embarka-
tion. The port of embarkation also
forwarded two copies of each ship's mani-
fest by air. The cargo-loading cable, con-
taining a general description of the cargo
in the ship, by hatch and deck level, was
intended primarily to facilitate the selec-
tion of a port of discharge in the United
Kingdom. The manifest, listing in detail
what the ship carried, among other things
enabled the supply services to nominate
depots for the reception of the cargo.
Approximately one week before the
estimated time of arrival of the convoy
with which the ship had sailed, the
BMWT Diversion Committee met to de-
89
termine the port best suited to receive the
vessel. At this meeting were represented
all agencies interested in importing, ware-
housing, shipping, receiving, and moving
cargo into the United Kingdom, includ-
ing the British Q Movements and the U.S.
Transportation Corps. The decision of the
Diversion Committee was sometimes a
compromise, since the most conveniently
located port with respect to the destina-
tion of the bulk of the cargo might already
be too congested to accommodate addi-
tional shipping. Such factors as avail-
ability of berths and labor, the ship's
draft, special types of cargo-handling
equipment that might be required, and
the availability of transport to the interior
were all taken into consideration. The
Diversion Committee, of course, consid-
ered ships other than those with U.S.
Army cargo, selecting ports for as many as
500 ships a month.
Before the Diversion Committee met,
Transportation Corps headquarters in
London, on the basis of the cargo-loading
cable, had selected a tentative port and
determined from the theater U.S. chiefs
of services the depots and warehouses to
which they desired the cargo transported.
If the manifest arrived early enough be-
fore the Diversion Committee meeting, it
was "broken down," a process that in-
volved extraction of the items pertaining
to the respective supply services, which,
62
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 74-78; Ltr, Slaughter
to Larson, 4 Apr 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
63
On procedures governing the movement of cargo
and personnel, see the following: Memo, OCT
ETOUSA, to CofT WD, sub: S u m m a r y of Vessel
Opns in the UK, 27 Apr 43, OCT 000-900 ETO
1943; Story of Trans in UK, pp. 69-70, 81, 131-32;
Oral info, Col Traub, former DCofT SOS ETO, 13
Feb 50, OCT HB ETO UK Misc; Consolidated Rpt
on TC Activities in ETO, Annex 5, Pt. I, pp. 4-6, Pt.
H, pp. 1-2; Interv, Bykofsky with Col Cleland C.
Sibley, 28 Jan 53, OCT HB ETO.
90
on the basis of the likely port, indicated
the desired inland depot destinations.
Armed with such information, the Trans-
portation Corps representative gave the
Diversion Committee the facts upon which
a definite port allocation of the vessel was
made.
Upon the assignment of a definite port,
the theater chief of transportation notified
the interested port commander and chiefs
of services. After the latter had made a
final revision of desired destinations, the
Freight Branch in Transportation Corps
headquarters prepared cargo disposal in-
structions, showing the number of the ves-
sel, port of discharge, date of berthing,
marking of the cargo, number of packages,
type of cargo, destination to which the
cargo was to be moved, and the suggested
means of transport and the British agency
or services involved. In the case of ship-
ments by rail, the chief means of transport,
the railroads to be used and the destina-
tion depot, or the station nearest to the
destination, were shown. These instruc-
tions were distributed to port command-
ers, all chiefs of services, regional trans-
portation officers, and interested British
agencies.
Cargo disposal instructions ordinarily
were in the hands of the port commanders
and the transportation agencies concerned
forty-eight hours before the vessel was to
be berthed, in order to give them time to
plan for discharge and port clearance. As
each carload, truckload, or bargeload was
dispatched from a port to a depot, the
RTO at the port notified the depot com-
mander through his RTO by teletyped
Traffic Dispatch Advice, giving the num-
ber of the rail car or other carrier, a brief
description of its contents, and the time of
dispatch from the port.
So far as inbound personnel were con-
cerned, Washington normally notified the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
theater chief of transportation by cable of
contemplated shipments of units, and later
informed him of the convoys with which
the units were scheduled to sail. On the
basis of this information, Corps headquar-
ters obtained from the theater G-3 the
destinations desired and published a fore-
cast of arrivals for the use of all agencies
involved. When the convoys sailed, the
U.S. ports of embarkation cabled confir-
mation directly to the theater chief of
transportation, who then set in motion the
arrangements for reception of the units
and their movement inland. In the case of
the Queens, which crossed so quickly and
carried such large numbers that the usual
sailing cable did not allow enough time to
prepare for debarkation, an earlier cable
notice was sent that might be only 80 per-
cent correct as to numbers and units and
yet would enable planning to begin in the
theater before the final cable arrived.
Upon receipt of the sailing cable from
the U.S. port, the Transportation Corps
Passenger Branch in London met with
representatives of Q Movements and the
British railways to work out the details of
securing rail equipment, scheduling trains,
and planning stops for meals. Movement
instructions were prepared and jointly
signed by the theater chief of transporta-
tion and the British director of movements.
Indicating the port and date of arrival
and the strength of units, the instructions
were issued to the port commanders and
RTO's concerned.
For large shipments, the main difficulty
was to obtain enough railway equipment
without disrupting British traffic. Because
of the possibility of enemy air action and
the pressure for a quick turnaround of
transports, it was necessary to effect
prompt debarkation and clearance of in-
coming passengers. Since trains ran on ex-
tremely close schedules, their spotting,
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
loading, and departure had to be timed to
the minute—a complex and delicate task.
Indeed, the scheduling of trains dictated
the entire debarkation procedure.
The debarkation of troops, like the dis-
charge and clearance of cargo, was the re-
sponsibility of the port commander. Before
the vessel docked, his boarding party in-
formed the troops on security regulations
and gave the transport commander and
unit commanders the plan of debarkation.
Upon debarkation, the troops, under the
guidance of an RTO, marched directly
from the pier to trains waiting nearby.
After supervising their entrainment and
completing arrangements for indicated re-
freshment stops, the RTO notified the
transportation officer at point of destina-
tion. At the end of the rail journey the
men were met by the RTO in charge of
their onward movement to the assigned
camp or billet, which might be reached on
foot or by truck.
The regulation of the flow of American
traffic in the United Kingdom was obvi-
ously a complicated undertaking, involv-
ing the co-ordination of shipping, port
facilities, inland transportation, the desires
of the various U.S. supply services, and
the diverse if not conflicting interests of
British and American agencies. At the
same time as he was creating his own or-
ganization and co-ordinating his trans-
portation activities with those of the Brit-
ish, the theater chief of transportation had
the continuing task of receiving, identify-
ing, and distributing the cargo essential to
the build-up. This proved to be no simple
task.64
Cargo Reception, Identification,
and Distribution
From the outset General Ross had dif-
ficulty getting adequate and timely data
on vessels bringing U.S. military cargo to
91
the United Kingdom. Advance informa-
tion regarding the type and amounts of
cargo was urgently needed to facilitate
discharge and distribution, as well as to
expedite return of the ships to the zone of
interior. Late receipt of such data ad-
versely affected control of inbound U.S.
Army cargo, particularly when data ar-
rived so late that the depot destinations
could not be secured in time for the Diver-
sion Committee meeting. Throughout the
summer of 1942 Ross repeatedly requested
that he be kept fully and promptly
advised of all inbound shipments for the
U.S. Army. On occasion he discovered
that British agencies received cargo data
four to five days earlier than he did. He
complained, in particular, that the sailing
cables and cargo manifests from New
York reached him spasmodically.65
At the New York Port of Embarkation,
which had the primary supply responsibil-
ity for the European theater, the port
commander stated that the cables were
dispatched through the Signal Corps not
later than twenty-four hours after sailing,
and that the manifests were being for-
warded by air in the distinctive envelopes
the theater had requested. Yet even if the
cables were sent out promptly, they were
often slow in reaching the theater, since
they were routed through Washington.
After arrival in the United Kingdom, ad-
ditional time was lost in decoding, para-
phrasing, and delivering the message. As
a matter of fact, the Signal Corps was so
burdened with wartime traffic that Ross
64
Rpt, Maj Thomas J. Mooney, NYPE, Visit to
ETOUSA, 4 Aug 43, OCT 319.1.
65
Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 10 and 2 1 Sep 42, OCT HB
Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I, 22-25,
OCT HB ETO; Memo, Exec Officer OCT for CG
NYPE, 25 Mar 42, sub: Info Required by London;
Rad, London to AGWAR, 31 Jul 42, CM-IN 10895.
Both in OCT 567 England 42. Rad, London to
AGWAR, 27 Jun 42, CM-IN 9338, OCT 319.1 Eng-
land 42.
92
had to set up his own cable section. As to
the cargo manifests, even when they were
forwarded by air, delivery might be de-
layed by adverse weather conditions.
Moved by the plight of the theater, the
Chief of Transportation in Washington
initiated corrective action. Late in August
1942, with the co-operation of the State
Department, General Gross inaugurated
an officer courier system to transmit ship-
ping papers by air to the United King-
dom.66 In the following month, at the
request of the European theater, the
Transportation Corps adopted a stand-
ardized cargo-loading cable for the United
Kingdom. It gave the name, code number,
destination, status, and physical charac-
teristics, together with a brief description
of the cargo carried. The newly devised
cargo-loading cable was a great improve-
ment; it could be used in place of a miss-
ing manifest in order to effect the proper
disposition of cargo.67
Vessels from the United States nor-
mally proceeded under escort to a rendez-
vous near the British Isles, where the
convoy was broken up. The respective
ships were then assigned by the BMWT
Diversion Committee to the British ports
best able at the time to receive the passen-
gers and cargo. Because of severe enemy
air attacks in the southern and eastern
coastal areas, most American cargo en-
tered through ports in North Ireland and
the British west coast ports along the
Clyde, the Mersey, and the Bristol Chan-
nel. The crowded condition of the ports,
scarcity of inland depot space, frequent
night raids by German bombers, and ever-
present shipping shortages all pointed up
the desirability of expediting port clear-
ance and vessel turnaround through ad-
vance planning for cargo distribution.68
Despite determined efforts to effect im-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
provement, the European theater con-
tinued to be plagued until well into 1943 by
delayed, inadequate, or missing data on in-
bound cargo. The cargo-loading cable on
the SS Abraham Baldwin, for example, did
not come through until 29 January 1943,
the very day the vessel was to be consid-
ered by the Diversion Committee. Since
the meeting was to be held at 10:30 A.M.,
there was obviously no time left to deter-
mine the inland destinations, and the
American representatives had to attend
the meeting without knowing where the
U.S. Army cargo was to be delivered. In
March, the theater chief of transportation
reported that five cargo ships had arrived
without the slightest advance information
from the United States. He therefore
urged that "dynamite" be placed under
the persons responsible at the ports of
Boston and New York.69
In response to repeated complaints from
the theater, General Gross on 17 April
1943 issued instructions to the port com-
mander at New York that henceforth the
theater chief of transportation was to be
directly advised of all cargo shipments to
66
Memo, CG NYPE for CofT WD, 4 Aug 43, sub:
Info for CG USFOR, OCT 567 England 42; Memo,
CofT for CG SOS WD, 21 Aug 42, sub: Asgmt of Of-
ficers . . . as Couriers, OCT 311.4-319 England 41-
42; Ltr, CofT to Secy State, 20 Aug 42, OCT 311.4
England 42; Ltr, Ross to Larson, 5 Dec 49, OCT HB
Inquiries.
67
Memos, Opns Officer OCT for CGs NYPE, BPE,
and HRPE, 5 and 30 Sep 42, sub: Cargo Loading
Cables, OCT 563.5 England 42; Hist Rpt, TC ETO,
I, 23, OCT HB ETO.
68
Memo, Vissering for ACofS for Opns SOS, 4 Nov
42, AG 400 (Equip & Sup to Accompany Overseas
Troop Mvmts); Rad, London to AGWAR, 17 Nov
42, CM-IN 7398, OCT 567 England 42. See also
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 146-47.
69
Ltr, Ryan to Gross, 24 Mar 43, OCT 569.4 Eng-
land 43; Memo, ACofT ASF for Maj Gen Homer M.
Groninger, 10 May 43, sub: Cargo Cables to UK,
OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
the United Kingdom, irrespective of the
nature or of the type of ship, with the
single exception of equipment carried by
troops. Shortly afterward, arrangements
were made to send cargo cables directly
from New York to London, rather than via
Washington, thereby saving time. Gross
also stationed an officer at the New York
port for a thirty-day period to check the
transmission of cargo information. Ross
soon reported a great improvement in the
receipt of cargo manifests, but noted that
the cargo-loading cables were still causing
difficulty.70
The problem of delay in the receipt of
cargo-loading cables was then attacked by
the installation of additional circuits, and
marked improvement followed. By July
1943 the difficulty had been largely elimi-
nated, and during September timely ad-
vices were received for 94 percent of the
ships bringing U.S. Army cargo to the
United Kingdom. In August all necessary
papers were received at least five days be-
fore the arrival of the ships in the British
Isles.71
Early in 1944 the Chief of Transporta-
tion in Washington undertook an experi-
mental program to develop a standard
manifest to satisfy both the oversea com-
manders and the ports of embarkation.
Two types resulted: one for information
required by transportation agencies, and
the other for data needed by supply agen-
cies. The transportation manifest, sup-
ported by the standardized shipping docu-
ments introduced by the U.S. Army in
1943, made up the supply manifest. Trans-
mitted by air to the theater, the supply
manifest provided advance data on incom-
ing shipments. Coupled with other meas-
ures to facilitate cargo identification, the
shipping procedures in effect by D Day
1944 were adequate to keep the European
93
theater fully and promptly informed on all
inbound cargo.72
Packing, Marking, and Zoning
The European theater chief of trans-
portation also had to contend with poor
packing and marking, which slowed both
port clearance and ultimate distribution
to the depots. Army procedures in these
matters had not been adapted to wartime
requirements, and other oversea com-
mands encountered much the same prob-
lem.73 As early as March 1942, deficiencies
were noted in the marking and packing of
equipment sent to Northern Ireland. Dur-
ing the ensuing summer Ross's complaints
were loud and long. He reported that at
Liverpool he had watched the discharge
of a vessel in which 30 percent of the cargo
had no markings at all and much of the
remainder was so poorly marked that the
supply services had to open and examine
70
Memo, ACofT for CG NYPE, 17 Apr 43, sub:
Delays and Omissions in Forwarding Cargo Info
Overseas, and Ltr, Gross to Ross, 20 Apr 43, OCT
569.4 England 43; Ltrs, Gross to Ross, 10 May 43, and
Ross to Gross, 18 May 43, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen
Ross.
71
Ltrs, Gross to Ross, 27 May 43, and Ross to
Gross, 30 Jun 43, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross;
Ltrs, Ross to Wylie, 3 Jul 43, and Ross to Gross, 31
Jul 43, OCT 319.1 England; Memo, CG SOS ETO
for CG ASF, 18 Sep 43, sub: Ships' Manifests and
B/L, OCT 569.4 England 43; Exhibit D, prepared by
Mvmts Br Chief Opns TC SOS ETO, 9 Oct 43, in
Plan of SOS ETO, Vol. I, Trans, 1 Nov 43, AG 381.
72
Memo, Chief Contl Div OCT for Exec OCT, 5
Nov 45, sub: Rpt on Accomplishments and Handi-
caps, par. 4, OCT HB Contl Div Rpts; ASF Annual
Rpt, FY 44, pp. 27-29; OCT HB Monograph 19, pp.
273-75.
73
On packing and marking, see Chester Wardlow,
The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Sup-
ply (Washington, 1955), pp. 133 ff., and Erna L. Risch,
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Serv-
ices, Vol. I (Washington, 1953), UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, pp. 355-59.
94
practically half of what they received be-
fore proper distribution could be made. In
an explosive account Ross told of opening
an unmarked crated cardboard box which
contained a complete shelter tent packed
in excelsior, of finding two new engines
completely ruined because of poor pack-
ing, and of seeing a carefully crated empty
wooden reel with no clue as to the shipper.
He noted dozens of boxes with addresses in
lead pencil on one side, or other illegible
or unsuitable markings. Moreover, the
packing followed commercial peacetime
procedures and was wholly inadequate for
wartime conditions. Fully half the cargo
was in uncrated pasteboard cartons that
would not stand rough handling and ex-
posure to rain. 74
Better methods of packing and marking
obviously were needed, and this was pri-
marily a responsibility of the supply serv-
ices in the zone of interior, working under
the supervision of Army Service Forces
(ASF) headquarters. The Transportation
Corps assisted, by setting up an inspection
system at ports on both sides of the Atlan-
tic so that unsatisfactory marking and
packing would be reported. Early in Au-
gust 1942, Ross informed Gross that he
was establishing an inspection service at
U.K. ports. Gross replied that he had
taken similar measures and was having
the problem thoroughly studied, but he
pointed out that information on which to
base remedial action would have to come
chiefly from the theater. 75
Despite some improvement, by the fall
of 1942 the shortcomings of the Army
marking system had created serious prob-
lems in the European theater. There, the
routing and distribution of supplies to the
proper destination was hindered by the
lack of a simple clear-cut system of code
marking that would facilitate identifica-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
tion of the container or group of con-
tainers. The prevailing marking practice
ignored the necessity of reconsigning a
large percentage of shipments received in
the theater, and it did not provide in suf-
ficient detail for the prominent display of
the code marking itself in a uniform loca-
tion on the container. The theater there-
fore recommended a revision providing for
more detailed, clearer, and more uniform
marking procedures, but, chiefly because
of preoccupation with the North African
invasion, nothing came of this proposal.
The TORCH operation revealed various
deficiencies in packing and marking which
were duly noted in the European theater.
The principal development that followed
in the British Isles was the activation in
December 1942 of a ten-man mobile
packing unit, which served as a training
group, demonstrating proper packing and
marking techniques to selected personnel
of service and tactical units.76
The European theater again urged re-
vision of the marking procedure, and in
74
Memo, Col Vissering for Lt Col Clarence P.
Townsley, SOS, 26 Apr 42, sub: Deficiencies in
Freight Shipt for 2d Contingent Magnet, OCT 544.2-
565.1 England 42; Ltr, Ross to Wylie, 28 Jul 42, AG
ETO Adm 341A; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, III, 13-14,
OCT HB ETO; Ltr, Ross to Larson, 5 Dec 49, No. 37,
OCT HB Inquiries.
75
Rad, Ross to Gross, 4 Aug 42, CM-IN 1269, and
Cbl, Somervell for CofT to USFOR, 17 Aug 42, CM-
OUT 5318, OCT 370.6-400.301 England 41-42;
Capt. F. W. Koepnick, "Wrap It Up," Army Trans-
portation Journal, I, 8 (September 1945), 4.
76
AG Ltr, 26 Jul 42, sub: Requisitioning and
Marking Sup for Overseas Shipt, OCT HB Water Div
Code Marking; Memo, Capt H. L. Phyfe for CofT
SOS ETOUSA, 7 Oct 42, sub: Marking of Sup, OCT
HB Ocean Trans Cargo Marking; Hist Rcd, OCT
AFHQ NATOUSA, activation to 31 Oct 43, Tab
AK, Annex E, OCT HB North Africa; Memo, Actg
CofT SOS ETO for CofT WD, 14 Mar 43, sub: Pack-
ing and Marking, OCT 400.1-400.215 England 43;
Ltr, Ross to Wylie, 1 Jun 43, OCT 3 19.1 England
Jan-Sep 43.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN 95

December 1942 sent two officers to the second part normally consisted of the ab-
zone of interior to propose the so-called breviation for the shipping service and the
UGLY system.77 This new scheme called class of supply indicated by a Roman
for numbering requisitions so that the numeral. The third part, designed mainly
oversea command could readily identify for the oversea commander, comprised a
all items en route in a convoy through the combination of letters and numbers to
receipt of a cargo cable listing the identi- designate the specific shipment or ultimate
fying numbers and the cargo tonnage un- consignee. A typical oversea address
der each number. The Chief of Trans- might read "BOBO-QM II-A322." Pro-
portation in Washington did not accept vision was also made for other markings,
the plan as presented, but by 23 March including a description of the container's
1943 a satisfactory compromise was contents, its weight, cubage, and package
reached. Applied at first only to the number, its priority, and its service color.79
United Kingdom, the new marking sys- Elaborate additional marking to indi-
tem identified shipments by the requisi- cate the depot of origin or a partial ship-
tion number, which also appeared on the ment did not develop until October 1943,
cargo manifest and in the cargo cable. By when the complete identification system
September 1943 complaints from the the- known as ISS (Identification of Separate
ater had decreased about 90 percent.78 Shipments) was put into effect for all the-
The new marking system was followed aters. By June 1944 further refinements
on 1 June 1943 by a new War Department had been added, such as a symbol showing
directive, of general application, which the time priority of the shipment and the
aimed at providing secrecy while insuring assignment of numbers to line items on the
an uninterrupted flow of matériel to over- requisition.80 Given proper marking, over-
sea consignees. Three general methods of sea port personnel could readily identify
marking oversea shipments were pre- incoming cargo and effect the desired dis-
scribed: (1) by shipment numbers (groups tribution within the theater.
of three or more digits) for troop move- Closely related to the marking problem
ments or special supply movements; (2) was the concurrent need of a workable
by shipping designators (words or pro- zoning system, whereby shipments could
nounceable combinations of four letters) 77
UGLY was the shipping designator for Great Brit-
for routine shipments of supplies; (3) by ain. See WD Pamphlet 38-4, Shipping Designators,
marking "in the clear" when specifically 10 Jul 45, p. 18.
78
Ltr, CofT SOS to DCofT SOS ETOUSA, 16 Dec
authorized. The Chief of Transportation 42, OCT HB Gross ETO Rail; AG Ltr 400.161 (3-19-
at Washington was charged with the su- 43) OB-S-SPORT-M, 23 Mar 43, sub: Asgmt of Code
pervision of the marking system as it ap- Combinations for Shipts to ETO; Memo, Col N. M.
Coe, OCT, for ACofT for Opns TC, 9 Apr 43, sub:
plied to all classes of supplies consigned to Info to ETO, OCT 400.1-400.215 England 43; Re-
oversea destinations through U.S. Army marks, Col Coe, Proceedings of Zone Trans Officers'
ports of embarkation. Conf, 24, 25, 26 Sep 43, OCT ASF, p. 97.
79
Directive WD, Requisitioning and Marking Sup-
As described in the directive, the over- plies for Overseas Shipment (Marking Directive), 1
sea address usually was in three parts. The Jun 43, OCT HB Ocean Trans Cargo Marking.
80
first, intended primarily for transporta- The requisition line item consisted of not more
tion agencies, always included the ship- than three digits, starting with No. 1 for the first item.
In effect this limited a single requisition to 999 items.
ping designator on the shipment. The See ASF Annual Rpt, FY 44, p. 29.
96
be consigned to definite areas within the
United Kingdom. Throughout 1942 cargo
vessels were loaded simply for NABOB
(Northern Ireland) and/or WILDFLOWER
(Great Britain). Early in 1943, at the sug-
gestion of the British Ministry of War
Transport, Colonel Ryan proposed a plan
whereby Great Britain was to be divided
into areas to which specific U.S. Army
shipments would be sent. The suggestion
was favorably received in Washington,
and it was put into effect as soon as theater
approval of a plan had been obtained. 81
The new zoning plan was designed to
simplify the diversion of incoming cargo
vessels and to help relieve the strain on
British railways by eliminating wasteful
crosshauls. As set up in April 1943, Zone I
comprised the United Kingdom north of
a line of county boundaries drawn through
London and Banbury; Zone II consisted
of the area south of this line, including the
port of London. Provision was also made
for a possible Zone III in Northern Ire-
land. Zones were to be served by ports
within their area, although most cargo
entering the Clyde in Zone I had to be for-
warded by coaster to ports in Zone II. As
many ships as practicable were to be load-
ed in the United States with cargo re-
quired in a single zone. The change began
with the July 1943 requisitions.82
The shipping designator UGLY (Great
Britain) was to be employed when the
zone of destination was unknown or im-
material. The shipping designator for
Zone I was Soxo, for Zone II, GLUE. In
October 1943, when Zone III was estab-
lished in Northern Ireland, it became
known as BANG. Normal allocations of
cargo were: 41 percent to Zone I, 53 per-
cent to Zone II, and 6 percent to Zone
III.83
Both in the United States and in the
United Kingdom, the packing and mark-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ing of U.S. cargo had to be supervised and
policed continually so as to detect lapses
from prescribed procedures and insure im-
provement. Within the theater the Trans-
portation Corps regularly prepared in-
spection reports noting deficiencies and
making recommendations. Ross's staff
sometimes suggested changes, such as an
improved packing for .30-caliber rifles
that was calculated to save approximately
50 percent in shipping space. They made
special studies of the packing and marking
of spare parts for Quartermaster Corps
items and those of other supply services.
Despite continual improvement, inspec-
tions of inbound U.S. Army cargo con-
tinued to reveal occasional shortcomings.
In April 1944 Ross complained of the loss
of eggs in the shell because of poor crating
and storing, and of field ranges packed in
inadequate containers with wasted space.
Nonetheless, considerable progress was
made in packing and marking, and the
major faults had been overcome.84
Organizational Equipment and Supplies
In addition to the difficulties experi-
enced because of faulty packing and
marking, the theater was confronted with
81
Ltr, Ryan to Gross, 23 Feb 43, with atchd buck
slip notations by Coe and Gross, OCT 563.5 England
(Zoning) 1943.
82
Rad, USFOR London to WAR, 4 Apr 43, CM-
IN 2746; Memo, ACofS for Opns ASF for CofT ASF,
27 Apr 43, sub: Zoning of UK, OCT 563.5 England
(Zoning) 43.
83
See Chart of Cargo Arrivals by Zones, 30 Jun 44,
OCT 319.1 ETO, G-4 Per Rpt, Sep 44.
84
Interv, Capt Sidney H. Collins, Water Trans Sv
Div OCT, 22 Oct 48, OCT HB ETO Marking and
Packing; Item 2, 3d Semi-Monthly Rpt, Ross to Gross,
30 Apr 43, and Item 1, 22d Semi-Monthly Rpt, Ross
to Gross, 16 Feb 44, OCT 319.1 England; Memo,
DCofT SOS ETO for CofT ASF, 3 Apr 44, sub: Semi-
Monthly Rpt on Activities of Marine Opns Div, 16-
3 1 Mar 44, and Memo, CofT SOS ETO for CofT
ASF, 3 Apr 44, sub: Rpt of Inspections of Incoming
U.S. Army Cargoes, AG 319.1 Rpt to CofT Wash-
ington.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
the problem of getting organizational
equipment and supplies delivered prompt-
ly, so that the troops could have them soon
after arrival. Since troops moving to Brit-
ain generally sailed on ships that traveled
faster than the freighters carrying their
impedimenta, a time lag was inevitable.
Until production could be stepped up, the
organizational equipment sent overseas
frequently was that which the unit had
used in training, and it could not be re-
leased until unit training had been com-
pleted. Even when all the organizational
equipment for a given unit was loaded in
the same convoy it might be spread over
several cargo ships and discharged at dif-
ferent British ports, necessitating further
sorting and assembly in the theater. The
uncertain troop basis for the United King-
dom also made planning difficult. 85
In the first half of 1942 equipment short-
ages in units leaving the United States
were frequent, and they usually were filled
by stripping other units in the zone of in-
terior, leaving the latter with the task of
replacement. During this period the units
destined for the British Isles normally
crated their own equipment and "force
marked" it before departing. Generally,
such units did not receive their equipment
until they had been overseas for at least 30
days, but often not for 80 to 120 days. Be-
hind this unsatisfactory situation lay the
difficulty in locating and delivering the
equipment after discharge at United
Kingdom ports and the frequency of in-
secure packing and poor marking, which
delayed distribution within the theater.
Apart from improved packing and mark-
ing, the obvious remedy was the shipment
of organizational equipment in advance of
the troops, or, as it was commonly called,
86
preshipment.
Accordingly, with a view to utilizing
available cargo space and taking advan-
97
tage of the long summer days for discharg-
ing, General Gross pushed the advance
shipment of equipment and supplies to
the United Kingdom. Unfortunately,
many items preshipped during the sum-
mer of 1942 became "buried" in British
depots and could not be found when
87
wanted for the North African invasion.
The blame for this state of affairs, which
by September was so serious as to imperil
the projected TORCH operation, could be
placed upon both the zone of interior and
theater. Poor packing and marking in the
United States and lack of depot and other
service personnel and hasty port clearance
and storage in the United Kingdom were
the chief contributing factors. Ultimately,
after much scurrying about on both sides
of the Atlantic, Eisenhower's requirements
were met, but on a reduced scale. The
last-minute duplication of items, which
presumably had been shipped in advance
to the British Isles, left the War Depart-
ment with an unfavorable impression of
the preshipment program, despite the
basic soundness of this approach to the
problem of getting troop units and their
impedimenta together soon after the ar-
88
rival of the troops overseas.
85
For a detailed account, see Study, Richard M.
Leighton, Hist Sec Contl Div ASF, The Problem of
Troop and Cargo Flow in Preparing the European
Invasion, 1943-44, Dec 45, passim, OCMH Files. See
also, Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 128, pp. 21-23, and
Memo, Col Vissering, OCT, for ACofS for Opns SOS
WD, 4 Nov 42, OCT HB Ocean Trans Packing and
Packaging.
86
Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 1 7 Jan 42, sub:
Equip of Troops; Ltr, CofS USA to CG WDC, 13 Mar
42. Both in G-4/33889. See also Gen Bd Rpt, Study
128, cited n. 85, pp. 21-22.
87
For additional details see below, pp. 142-43.
88
Memo, CofT SOS for CG NYPE, 8 Jul 42, sub:
Shipt of Advance Cargo, OCT 563.5 NY; Memo, Lt
Col Carter B. Magruder for Gen Lutes, 10 Jan 42,
sub: Cargo for Bolero, OCT 544.2-565.1 England 41-
42; Ltr, Lutes to Lee, 12 Sep 42, ASF UK Plans Files;
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 21 Sep 42; Memo, ACofS for Opns
SOS WD for CofT SOS, 29 Sep 42, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross.
98
The ensuing North African campaign
stimulated interest in the handling of both
personal and organizational equipment.
As a result of his brief tour of duty in
North Africa, and mindful of the implica-
tions for the Transportation Corps, Ross
spoke out against requiring soldiers to
carry more equipment than they had need
89
for. Meanwhile, General Lee had sug-
gested reducing the size and weight of the
"A" and "B" barracks bags, noting that
the "B" type might contain anything from
carbines to libraries.90 In this connection
Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, then com-
manding the 29th Infantry Division, pre-
pared a staff study showing that substan-
tial reduction could be made in the ton-
nage of TAT (to accompany troops) equip-
ment and supplies. On the other hand,
such personal baggage and organizational
equipment as might be loaded aboard the
troopships took that much of a load off the
freighters—an important consideration in
view of the severe shortage of cargo ship-
ping.
Gerow stressed the fact that clothing
and equipment shipped in bulk from de-
pots was compactly packed, better crated,
and required less space than that carried
by individuals in barracks bags. He fur-
ther suggested that, if stocks permitted, the
heavy weapons and combat vehicles that
could not accompany the troops be turned
in by alerted divisions for reissue to new
divisions being formed, and that the nec-
essary replacements be shipped direct
from the manufacturer to the United
Kingdom, properly marked for the unit
concerned. When the matter reached the
theater commander late in December
1942, he declared that it was highly im-
portant to stock enough matériel in all
categories to equip incoming units imme-
diately upon arrival so as to reduce the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
loss of time in training, and directed that
General Gerow's suggestions be thoroughly
91
explored.
Early in 1943 the Chief of Transporta-
tion in Washington received a proposal
from an Air Corps officer that organiza-
tional equipment be shipped direct from
depots or factories and issued to units
upon arrival overseas. At about the same
time, General Somervell, returning from a
tour of the theaters, stressed the impor-
tance of getting equipment to the theaters
ahead of or at the same time as troops.92
Beginning in late February 1943 the Chief
of Transportation actively agitated in the
War Department for the adoption of a
preshipment program. Such a program
was of course subject to the availability of
shipping, and would impose additional re-
sponsibilities on the U.S. ports of embar-
kation and the theater. Other difficulties
could easily arise because of changes in
priorities or destinations of units, prac-
tices that were currently all too frequent.
89
Memo, Ross for Somervell, 15 Jan 43, sub: Notes
on Obsns in North Africa, OCT HB Wylie Urgent
Matters 1943; Memo, ACofT SOS for ACofS OPD, 3
Feb 43, sub: Impedimenta for Overseas Troops, OCT
HB Meyer Staybacks.
90
Troops going overseas carried their personal
equipment and gear in two barracks bags. The "A"
bag, containing items required by troops during the
voyage, was carried aboard by the soldier to his bunk.
Other items were packed in the "B" bag, which was
placed in the hold of the ship.
91
For pertinent correspondence, 18 November-27
December 1942, see AG 523.07 Hq SOS ETO 42 and
43 Shipping Priorities, especially Ltr, Gerow to Lee,
28 Nov 42, and 1st Ind, CG 29th Inf Div to CG
ETOUSA, 12 Dec 42, and 2d Ind, Hq ETOUSA to
CG SOS ETOUSA, 27 Dec 42.
92
Memo, Maj Paul A. Cunyus, AC, for CG ASC,
2 Jan 43, sub: Mvmt of Air Sv Gp Overseas, OCT HB
Ocean Trans Overseas Troop Mvmts; Memos, Somer-
vell for Gross, 19 Feb 43, no sub, and Gross for Somer-
vell, 23 Feb 43, sub: Reply to Your Obsns During In-
spection Trip, OCT HB Exec Gen Somervell's
Inspection Trip to Africa.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
But preshipment provided the only prac-
93
tical means of achieving the desired end.
Meanwhile, the European theater had
recommended that each soldier embark-
ing thereto carry a single barracks bag,
and that the normal contents of the "B"
bag, such as overshoes, extra blankets, and
impregnated clothing, be shipped in bulk
for issue to troops upon arrival. Except for
general-purpose vehicles, all shipments of
organizational equipment under the
Tables of Basic Allowances were to be
made in bulk. Additional service troops
were requested to handle receipts and
issues under the new plan, which was cal-
culated to lessen damage to equipment in
transit and to conserve shipping space.
The prevailing system was termed unsatis-
factory. From the training standpoint
alone the theater was dissatisfied, and it
cited many examples of delays and short-
ages. Having received no reply to two
cables dispatched in February 1943, the
theater commander inquired again in
March as to the status of his request,
which he termed "a matter of grave
importance." 94
In response to this prodding, Somervell
informed the European theater on 8
March 1943 that its situation was known
and appreciated but that corrective action
depended primarily on shipping cargo in
advance of troops. Such preshipment was
deemed currently undesirable because of
(a) changing troop requirements usually
caused by last-minute requests from the
theater; (b) the shipping shortage and
specifically the lack of cargo space on the
large, fast troop carriers to the British
Isles; and (c) the necessity of allowing the
troops to retain their equipment for train-
ing purposes as long as possible before
movement overseas. Since simultaneous
arrival of troops and cargo could not be
99
effected, it was believed more practicable
to have the troops arrive in the theater in
advance of the equipment so as to assist
in its unloading, assembly, distribution,
and servicing.95
However, the situation was already in
process of change. As the result of deci-
sions at Casablanca to undertake new
Mediterranean operations, troop sailings
to the United Kingdom scheduled for the
second quarter of 1943 were cut back
sharply. This made available approxi-
mately 350,000 measurement tons of sur-
plus cargo space, which had been allocated
to carry equipment accompanying troops.
Maximum utilization of this cargo space
appeared essential, if the necessary sup-
plies and equipment were to be provided
for the very heavy troop movements that
were contemplated during the latter part
of the year. Moreover, advance shipment
would take advantage of the summer
months, when the long hours of daylight
would minimize enemy air activity and
permit maximum operations at the British
ports. Although the planners in the War
Department's Operations Division were
mindful of the previous unfortunate ex-
perience in connection with the North
African invasion, they acceded to the de-
sires of the theater and the Army Service
Forces, and on 16 March endorsed pre-
shipment in principle. By mid-April, ASF
93
Memo, Lt Col Richard D. Meyer, Exec for Opns
OCT, for Wylie, 9 Apr 43, OCT HB Wylie Cargo;
4th Ind, Wylie, ACofT, to ACofS for Opns ASF, 4
Apr 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.
94
Memo, CG SOS ETO for CG SOS WD, 16 Jan
43, sub: Individual Equip on Overseas Moves; Para-
phrases of Cbls, ETO to AGWAR, 9 Feb 43, No. W-
1509, and 12 Mar 43, No. 2303. All in AG 523.07 Hq
SOS ETO 42 & 43 Shipping Priorities. Quote is from
Cbl, 12 Mar 43.
95
Memo, CG SOS for CG ETO, 8 Mar 43, sub:
T/BA for Units, OCT 400.33-413.77 England 43.
100
had worked out the details of a limited
preshipment program.96
Under the ASF plan, preshipment was
authorized for (1) organizational equip-
ment, less general-purpose vehicles of
units ordered to the United Kingdom,
such equipment to be called to the port
one month before the scheduled sailing
date; (2) Glass IV supplies and equipment
to be requisitioned by the theater on the
basis of the total troop strength; 97
(3) boxed general-purpose vehicles and
major items of equipment for which pro-
duction exceeded current requirements
for all units in the troop basis; and (4) a
reserve of forty-five days of combat main-
tenance for the entire troop basis. The
movement of such cargo was to be effected
as early as practicable, but in priority be-
low that for meeting the needs of the North
African theater, two Pacific operations,
and the training requirements for troop
units then in the United States or to be
activated in 1943. Every effort, said Maj.
Gen. LeRoy Lutes, must be made to re-
lease cargo to the ports, even if unbalanced
shipments should result. Boxed vehicles,
tanks, prefabricated buildings, and other
bulky items were especially desired. The
prime requisite was immediate avail-
ability.98
In May ASF secured Operations Divi-
sion approval to further broaden the pre-
shipment program. Since the troop basis
set up for the theater was highly tentative,
permission was granted to ship equip-
ment for "type" rather than specific units.
Thus equipment could be shipped in bulk
for storage and ultimate issue to types of
units that would eventually arrive in the
United Kingdom.99 By this time, the Bat-
tle of the Atlantic had reached the turning
point, and reduced shipping losses and
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
greater vessel production pointed to an in-
creasing cargo lift.
The preshipment program soon ran
into difficulty, largely because of continued
uncertainty regarding the size of the
troop build-up in Britain, the grave short-
age of equipment and other available
cargo, and the low priority accorded
100
BOLERO shipments through 1943.
Already subject to higher priority de-
mands from active theaters and to re-
quirements for training in the United
States, the slender stockpile of organiza-
tional equipment available in the zone of
interior also had to be drawn upon for the
rearmament of certain French divisions
in North Africa. Although the domestic
production of equipment increased, short-
ages persisted in many items. 101 In these
circumstances, only a limited amount of
96
Leighton study cited n. 85, pp. 6-12; Ruppen-
thal, op. cit., pp. 133-34; History of Planning Division,
Army Service Forces, Vol. III, App. 5-D, Memo,
Lutes for ACofS OPD, 16 Apr 43, sub: Cargo for UK,
OCT HB.
97
That is, supplies and equipment for which allow-
ances are not prescribed, or which require special
measures of control. Normally, Class IV includes con-
struction materials and aircraft. See WD TM 20-205,
Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 18 Jan 44,
p. 62.
98
Memo, ACofS for Opns ASF for Dir Stock Contl
Div ASF, 17 Apr 43, sub: Cargo Shipts to UK, OCT
HB Wylie Cargo; Rad, Hq ASF (Somervell) for CG
ETO, 20 Apr 43, CM-OUT 8165, OCT HB Wylie
Shipping and Cargo for UK (1943-44).
99
Ruppenthal, op. cit., p. 134.
100
Memo, CG ETO for TAG, 1 May 43, sub:
Troop Basis and SOS Priorities, AG 400.22 (16 May
43) (1), SOP for Shipts of Equip and Sup to UK;
Memo, Gross for Somervell, 2 May 43, sub: UK
Troop and Impedimenta Mvmts; and Memo, Gross
for Styer, 6 May 43. Last two in OCT HB Wylie
Staybacks.
101
On training allowances, see Leighton study
cited n. 85, Ch. III; and on French rearmament, see
ibid. pp. 93-101. See also, Memo, CG SOS ETO for
TAG [19 Sep 43], sub: BOLERO Supply Program,
OCT HB ETO Plng and Preparation; and OCT HB
Monograph 29, pp. 69-73.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
equipment could be made available for
preshipment.
From the beginning preshipment
lagged, and during the summer of 1943 it
failed to attain the original objective—the
maximum utilization of the available
cargo space. In the period May through
December 1943 advance shipments made
from Boston and New York totaled 2,427,-
646 measurement tons, or about 40 per-
cent of all cargo shipped to the United
Kingdom. By far the largest amount for-
warded by a single technical service—the
Ordnance Department—consisted of ve-
hicles and ammunition. In no instance
did any technical service ship all its cargo
scheduled for movement. As will be seen,
it was not until after late 1943, when a new
high priority was accorded all equipment
and supplies for the European theater,
that sufficient cargo materialized to fill
available cargo space. In the first five
months of 1944, advance shipments to the
United Kingdom reached a- total of
1,863,629 measurement tons. As before,
Ordnance items predominated. 102
Although only a partial success, the
preshipment program benefited the Army
in the long run, since cargo shipped in
advance meant that much less to be for-
warded in the future. Apart from a very
real value in easing the burden of shipping
and cargo distribution in the theater dur-
ing the crucial months preceding D Day,
advance shipment offered three important
advantages. First, more units could be as-
sured of receiving reasonably complete
equipment immediately upon arrival in
the United Kingdom. Next, units about to
be sent overseas could release their old
equipment in the zone of interior, thus
lessening oversea maintenance and re-
placement in the theater. Lastly, equip-
101
ment was sent factory-packed and factory-
marked, thereby conserving shipping
space and reducing substantially loss or
damage en route. In reviewing the sub-
ject in 1945, a general board, established
in the European theater, concluded that
advance shipment "solved to a most satis-
factory extent the problem of promptly
and properly equipping units arriving in
the British Isles." 103
Ships, Troops, and Cargo
for the Build-up
Under the BOLERO program, the flow of
troops and cargo fluctuated considerably
with changes in the shipping situation,
shifts in strategic planning, and higher
priority demands arising in other oversea
areas. These factors not only affected the
volume of shipments that could be directed
to the United Kingdom in any given pe-
riod but also made it difficult to achieve a
balance of vessels, troops, and cargo that
would avoid either wasting precious ship
space or holding men and matériel in idle-
ness in the zone of interior. The delivery to
Britain of the quantities of personnel,
supplies, and equipment required for the
invasion of the Continent proved a com-
plex and often frustrating task.
The job of transporting BOLERO troops
and cargo to the United Kingdom would
have been even more difficult had not
British assistance been available in the
form of troop and cargo space. This was
especially true of troop space because of
the large and fast passenger liners the
British Ministry of War Transport assigned
102
NYPE, Progress and Activities, Jan 44, p. 76,
and Jun 44, p. 10; 1st Ind, CG NYPE to CofT, 25 Jun
45, and Incl 1. All in OCT HB NYPE.
103
NYPE, Progress and Activities, Jan 44, p. 76;
Gen Bd Rpt, Study 128, cited n. 85, p. 22.
102
to the shuttle run between New York and
the United Kingdom. During the period
from 1 January 1942 through 31 May
1944, ships under British control trans-
ported a total of 1,006,104 passengers from
104
the United States to Britain.
The British were also able to furnish the
Americans with a portion of their material
requirements, thereby lightening the bur-
den on shipping. Begun as a supply expe-
dient during the extreme shipping crisis of
1942, local procurement in the United
Kingdom later developed into a regular
practice with the U.S. Army. Theater rec-
ords indicate that of a total of 23,237,407
measurement tons of materials assembled
in the United Kingdom from June 1942
through May 1944, 9,191,117 measure-
ment tons were supplied by the British.105
Nevertheless, the bulk of the supplies
and equipment needed in the European
theater and practically all U.S. troops
came directly from the United States and
were delivered almost exclusively by
water. The First BOLERO Key Plan, 31
May 1942, contemplated an ultimate U.S.
troop strength in the British Isles of
1,049,000 men, to be achieved as rapidly
as shipping would allow. To secure the
necessary troop lift, ships had to be drawn
from all possible sources—the War Ship-
ping Administration, the U.S. Navy, and
the British Ministry of War Transport.
With the help of the British Queens, the
Wakefield and the West Point of the U.S.
Navy, and a number of other Army, Navy,
WSA, and BMWT vessels, U.S. troop
movements to the United Kingdom grad-
ually increased. During the period June-
August 1942, debarkation of U. S. Army
personnel in the United Kingdom totaled
119,474.106
Although the movement of troops to the
United Kingdom had proceeded accord-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ing to schedule, the concurrent shipments
of cargo soon began to lag, but through no
fault of the theater. Indeed, in June 1942
Ross had advised Gross that the antici-
pated heavy movements of cargo during
the summer months would cause no port
congestion in the theater as long as the
arrivals were properly spaced. A lack of
cargo in the States and a shortage of bot-
toms accounted for the lag in the arrival of
cargo in the United Kingdom. The latter
was so pronounced that in August General
Somervell complained to the War Ship-
ping Administration of its failure to make
cargo ships available as promised.107
The recurring shortage of ships and
cargo, together with losses at sea and de-
mands of other theaters, caused the U.S.
Army to fall considerably short of the ini-
tial BOLERO goal of 320,000 long tons to
be discharged each month in the British
Isles. During June, July, and August of
1942 cargo landed monthly in the United
Kingdom did not exceed 441,256 measure-
ment tons (186,281 long tons).108
104
See study, Col Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., Chief Plng
Div OCT, 22 Mar 46, pp. 7, 12-13, OCT HB Topic
Logistics; Ltr, British Jt Staff Mission (Maj F. D. Har-
ris) to Col D. E. Farr, 12 Jan 45, with Incls, OCT HB
Topic British Shipping.
105
Memo, DCofS USA (Maj Gen Joseph T. Mc-
Narney) for CG USAFBI, 16 May 42, sub: Estab of a
Gen Purchasing Bd, OCT 319.2-370.45 England;
U.S. President, Seventeenth Report to Congress on Lend-
Lease Operations, Reverse Lend-Lease Aid from the British
Commonwealth of Nations, 24 Nov 44, pp. 9-10.
106
Unless otherwise indicated, all statistics on per-
sonnel debarkations in the United Kingdom are
drawn from Table 1, p. 103.
107
Memo, Dep Chief Mvmts Division for Water
Div OCT, 11 Jun 42, sub: Cargo for BOLERO, Jun-
Aug, and Memo, Chief Contl Br OCT for CG NYPE,
21 Jun 42, sub: Cargo Ship Sailings to UK, OCT
544.2-565.1 England 42; Ltr, Somervell to Rear Adm
Emory Scott Land, 5 Aug 42, Hq ASF Shipping 42-
43.
108
For statistics on cargo discharged in the United
Kingdom, see Table 2, p. 104.
 BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN 103

TABLE 1—U. S. ARMY TROOPS DEBARKED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, BY PORT AREA,
JANUARY 1942-JUNE 1944 a

a
Troops debarked include personnel redeployed from Iceland and Mediterranean as well as shipments from the United States.
b
Other ports include those in the Humber, Thames, and Scottish East areas.
c
The figure for debarkations in Clyde area during April 1944, listed as 105,987 in the TC Historical Report, Volume III, has been cor-
rected to conform to later consolidated and cumulative data.
Source Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. VI, Table, UK Troop Arrivals by Port Areas, January 1942-June 1944, OCT HB ETO; TC
SOS ETO MPR, 30 Jun 44, Table 1, U. S. Troops Debarked Monthly in the United Kingdom, AG Adm 451 ETO.
104 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 2—U. S. ARMY CARGO LANDED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, BY PORT AREA, JANUARY
1942-JUNE 1944
(MEASUREMENT TONS)

Source: TC SOS ETO MPR, 30 Jun 44, Table 6B—U. S. Army Cargo by Port Areas—Measurement Tons, AG Adm 451 ETO.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
Despite severe handicaps, at the close of
August 1942 some progress had been made
in expediting the delivery of troops and
cargo for the BOLERO program. After that
month and in fact until well into 1943,
because of the requirements of the North
African campaign, the flow of both men
and matériel to the British Isles was
sharply reduced, although it was never
entirely halted. In September 1942 the
number of incoming U.S. military person-
nel fell to 28,809, as compared with 73,869
in the preceding month. During the period
from October 1942 through April 1943
troop debarkations totaled only 75,024.
The discharge of U.S. Army cargo at Brit-
ish ports was similarly affected, declining
from 362,363 measurement tons in Octo-
ber 1942 to only 65,767 measurement tons
in March 1943.
The North African invasion not only
reduced BOLERO traffic to a trickle but also
drew heavily on the men and materials
already assembled in the United King-
dom. In the period from October 1942
through February 1943, a total of 150,693
troops and 348,905 long tons of cargo was
shipped from the United Kingdom. As a
result of these outloadings, actual troop
strength in the United Kingdom declined
from 223,794 to 104,510, and a serious
supply shortage developed. Thereafter, the
United States met most of the North Afri-
can requirements, and few troops and only
modest amounts of cargo were forwarded
from the United Kingdom, but a drain
had been placed on BOLERO from which
the European theater did not soon re-
cover.109
Revival of the hard-hit BOLERO program
hinged primarily upon getting enough
ships to lift the troops and cargo required
to undertake an invasion of the Continent.
Referring to the world-wide shipping situ-
105
ation General Somervell observed, "Our
plans to carry out a determined and effec-
tive offensive during 1943 and to strike
further decisive blows in 1944 are meas-
ured almost entirely by the shipping which
can be made available for military opera-
110
tions."
In the spring of 1943 the available ship-
ping for the United Kingdom was not in
balance. Cargo space was in excess because
it had been allocated on the basis of a
troop build-up that had so dwindled that
fewer than 5,000 men actually debarked
during the three months from 1 February
through 30 April. This was one of the con-
siderations that led to the preshipment
plan whereby the available cargo vessels
were to be utilized for the advance ship-
ment of organizational equipment and
supplies to Britain so that incoming Amer-
ican troops would find their impedimenta
on hand upon arrival.111 In this connection
Brig. Gen. Robert H. Wylie, Assistant
Chief of Transportation, in Washington,
recommended that supplies for BOLERO be
forwarded as early as possible, irrespective
of the monthly troop movement schedule.
Wylie had noted the difficulties that arose
in the British Isles because of the small
number of widely dispersed depots, the
inadequate transportation facilities, the
shortage of manpower for distribution and
warehousing, and the resultant time lag in
the assembly, or "marrying up," of troop
109
Hist Rpt, TG ETO, Vol. I, App. 8, OCT HB
ETO; Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 87-113.
110
Memo, CG SOS for CofS USA, 25 Mar 43, sub:
Proposed Allocation of U.S. Shipping, Hq ASF Ship-
ping 42-43.
111
Memo, Lt Col D. E. Farr, Mvmts Div OCT, for
Chief Theater Gp OPD, 19 Feb 43, sub: Projected At-
lantic Shipping; Rad, USFOR London to AGWAR,
18 Mar 43, CM-IN 9667; Ltr, Gross to Lee, 3 Apr 43,
OCT 370.5. See also Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp.
132-34.
106 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

units and their equipment. The problem measurement tons in December. Never-
was further aggravated by the fact that theless, the tonnage shipped fell far short
approximately ten cargo ships were re- of the total scheduled for movement.
quired to bring the organizational equip- Largely because of the low priority given
ment and supplies for the men aboard only the European theater and the still lower
one of the Queens.112 priority given cargo for preshipment, a
Despite hopeful planning it was not easy large part of the material requested by the
to achieve a balance between the available theater simply could not be sent, despite
cargo and cargo space for the United the constant effort by ASF headquarters,
Kingdom. Efforts to fill the ships often the Office of the Chief of Transportation,
were hampered by the failure of organiza- and the New York Port of Embarkation to
tional impedimenta to arrive at the port as fill available shipping space. Periodic cal-
expected. Because of the unsatisfactory culations of the Water Division included
training status of the units involved, their ominous figures under the heading, "Ad-
equipment could not be released in time ditional Cargo Required to Fill Shipping
for shipment. On 15 April 1943 the Water Space Available." 114 The cargo estimate
Division in Washington, which had gen- for November 1943, in particular, noted a
eral supervision of the movement of cargo shortage of 467,000 measurement tons,
for the build-up, reported that, instead of despite the pressure the Water Division
the estimated 79,000 measurement tons, continuously exerted to get cargo to the
the total organizational equipment avail- ports.115
able for April shipment would do well to 112
Memo, Wylie for Chief Plng Div OCT, 8 Apr
total 18,000 measurement tons. Various 43, sub: Data for Gen Somervell, OCT HB Wylie
items scheduled to move either failed to Staybacks; Memo, ACofT for CG SOS, 9 Apr 43, sub:
materialize or took less space than origi- Data on Shipping Situation, Hq ASF Shipping 42-43.
113
Memo, Col Vissering for Gen Wylie, OCT, 9
nally estimated. Cargo listed as immedi- Apr 43, sub: Cargo for UK; Memo, Vissering for
ately available often did not reach the port Chief Water Div OCT, 15 Apr 43, same sub; Memo,
until much later. To avoid unused ship Vissering for Gross, 3 May 43, sub: Daily Rpt of UK
Cargo; Rad, USFOR London to WAR, 30 Apr 43,
space, the Transportation Corps shipped CM-IN 18171. All in OCT HB Wylie Shipping and
what cargo could be obtained. Ross nat- Cargo for UK (1943-44).
114
urally complained. With limited Army Memo, Vissering for CofT, 18 May 43, sub:
Cargo for Shipt to UK; Memo, Vissering for CofT, 1
port personnel and the prevailing shortage Jun 43, sub: Cargo Situation; Memo, Maj M. E.
of British labor, he looked for trouble from Sprague for Gen Gross, 20 Aug 43, sub: Revised Car-
inbound cargoes that included a wide go Sailings to UK. All in OCT HB Wylie Shipping
and Cargo for UK (1943-44). Ltr, Wylie to Ross, 19
variety of supplies and involved an unusual Jul 43, OCT 370.5; Memo, Col Stokes, OCT, for Som-
113
amount of sorting. ervell, 19 Aug 43, sub: Revised UK Cargo Shipping
Despite a marked increase in shipments Program, Hq ASF Trans 43; Memo, Col Meyer,
OCT, for Chief Water Div, 1 Nov 43, OCT HB
of BOLERO cargo during the last half of Meyer Staybacks. On the European theater's low pri-
1943, more cargo space was offered than ority see Leighton study cited n. 85.
115
could be filled. Cargo discharged in the See various documents in OCT HB Gross Ship-
ping Capabilities and Rqmts. Also note Gross buck
United Kingdom increased from 348,900 slip attached to Cargo Estimate, UK, Water Div,
measurement tons in June to 670,024 OCT, 1 Dec 43, OCT HB Wylie Shipping and Cargo
measurement tons in July, and with the for UK (1943-44); and Memo, Col Meyer, OCT, for
Dir Sup ASF, 4 Dec 43, sub: UK Cargo, OCT 563.5
exception of a dip in November continued England Sep-Dec 43. Cf. Wardlow, Movements, Train-
to increase, reaching a peak of 1,008,150 ing, and Supply, pp. 155-57.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
The scarcity of BOLERO cargo was well
known to both Somervell and Gross. In-
deed, further serious shortages were antici-
pated because of the requirements of forces
in other theaters, changes in the strategic
situation, and production uncertainties in
116
the zone of interior. The situation was
viewed with grave misgivings. As one ob-
server noted, if the theater's requirements
were as large as projected, then the con-
tinuous failure to ship the desired amounts
could lead to "an impossible backlog" of
cargo to be moved during the spring of
1944, conceivably necessitating revision of
the strategic plan. 117
During this period the build-up of
troops, like that of cargo, did not proceed
according to plan. After reaching a low
point in March 1943, troop arrivals gradu-
ally increased. Throughout the summer
and fall the trend was upward, except in
August when heavy movements for the
September invasion of the Italian main-
land led to a sharp drop in personnel sent
to the United Kingdom. By October, how-
ever, it had become evident that the
BOLERO troop movement was falling be-
hind the estimate projected at QUADRANT.
The Transportation Corps was not meet-
ing its commitments because of a shortage
in troop space, aggravated by delays in
deliveries of converted ships. The prevail-
ing trend, if continued, could bring a defi-
cit of approximately 75,000 men, or
roughly five divisions, by the invasion
date.118
The failure to move the planned troops
and cargo meant that the resulting defi-
ciencies would have to be made up in the
remaining months before the invasion.
This had to be accomplished, regardless of
the pressure this last-minute effort was
bound to exert upon the overburdened
ports and railways of Britain. So far as
troops were concerned, the requirements
107
were met, but only by heavy debarkations,
which reached a peak of 216,699 men in
April 1944. Indeed, more troops arrived
in the six months ending 31 May 1944,
than in the entire period from January
1942 through November 1943.
Meanwhile, the War Department had
taken steps to eliminate a major obstacle
in the flow of cargo. On 21 December
1943, it removed the low priority assigned
to materials moving into the European
theater, and replaced it with a new high
priority for all equipment and supplies, in-
cluding the special requirements of opera-
tional projects.119 This measure, coupled
with increased domestic production, soon
brought a flood of cargo to the Atlantic
seaboard. The main limiting factor then
became the capacity of the ports, railways,
and depots of the United Kingdom. By
March 1944, the increase in the amount of
cargo available was reflected in the dis-
charge of record tonnages in the United
Kingdom. From December 1943 through
May 1944 a total of 7,115,356 measure-
ment tons was discharged, as contrasted
with the 6,935,640 measurement tons pre-
viously landed in the United Kingdom.
In the three months ending 31 May 1944
alone 4,404,193 measurement tons were
unloaded.
Although postponement of the invasion
to the first week in Tune provided an addi-
116
See Cargo Estimates; Memo, Chief Water Div
OCT for Actg CofT, 26 Oct 43, sub: Cargo Estimates
for UK; Memo, Actg Dir Stock Contl Div ASF for Dir
of Sup ASF, 30 Oct 43, sub: Analysis of Projected
Tonnage for UK. All in OCT HB Wylie Shipping
and Cargo for UK (1943-44).
117
Memo, Vissering for ACofT for Opns, 11 Nov
43, sub: Availability of Cargo for UK, OCT HB Wy-
lie Shipping and Cargo for UK (1943-44).
118
Memo, Col Farr, Mvmts Div OCT, for Wylie, 4
Oct 43, sub: Conversions, OCT HB Mvmts Div Farr
Staybacks.
119
Immediate Action Ltr, 21 Dec 43, sub: Priorities
for ETO (UK), AG 400.22 (5-16-43) (1) Sec 1A. For
details see Leighton study cited n. 85, Ch. VII.
108
tional month for discharge operations, it
was still a tight squeeze to satisfy the cargo
requirements of the U.S. Army within the
prescribed time limit. Various expedients
had to be employed in order to minimize
possible port, rail, and depot congestion in
the British Isles. After conferring with the
theater, General Gross set up a special
pool of fifty-four "prestowed" vessels,
which were to be used primarily as float-
ing warehouses. Carrying general cargo
and ammunition in balanced lots, these
ships were to move to the United King-
dom, where they would remain until
called forward by the theater commander
for discharge directly on the Continent.
This plan avoided the necessity of dis-
charging, storing, and reloading the cargo
in the United Kingdom. 120
The last-minute expedients also in-
cluded the so-called "commodity loaders."
These were vessels loaded with a specific
type of cargo, such as rations, vehicles, or
ammunition, to fill an immediate on-the-
spot requirement. Designed for easy dis-
charge and quick dispatch of the cargo to
dumps in the assault area, the ships were
not restricted in number as were the pre-
stowed vessels, and they did not require as
elaborate advance planning. 121
Both the prestowed and the commodity-
loaded vessels generally entailed a loss of
cargo space, since they usually could not
be loaded "full and down." They played
an important role in the invasion of the
Continent, but their use as floating depots
drew sharp criticism because it immobi-
lized ships urgently needed as carriers in
both the Atlantic and the Pacific.
The use of prestowed and commodity-
loaded vessels provided only partial relief
for the hard-pressed transportation facili-
ties in the United Kingdom. Ships in-
tended for discharge on the Continent were
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
not dispatched to Britain before May
1944. Meanwhile, the U.K. ports and in-
land carriers had begun to show signs of
congestion. Cargo piled up at the ports,
particularly in the Bristol Channel area,
and the British had to place embargoes on
civilian rail traffic in order to keep the lines
clear for military freight and to prevent
bottlenecks at important junctions. In
these circumstances, although there al-
ready was a backlog of cargo at the New
York Port of Embarkation, the theater de-
cided to reduce the monthly discharge
ceiling for U.K. ports for May and June
from 140 to 120 ships. Actual vessel ar-
rivals during May, however, exceeded the
ceiling. Moreover, the mounting of the
cross-Channel invasion, begun in the same
month, further limited the capacity of the
ports and the means of interior transport.
As a result, berths could not be found for
thirty-eight vessels, which had to lie idle at
anchor. To deal with this situation, the the-
ater made preparations to place much of
the cargo from these ships in temporary
dumps behind the port areas, but this
proved unnecessary. Through careful
Transportation Corps planning all cargo
was discharged and forwarded to destina-
tion. Nevertheless, the problem of finding
sufficient port capacity was not completely
solved until shortly before D Day, when
120
Memo, Dir Plng Div ASF for CofT, 14 Apr 44,
sub: Ships for UK in May and June, and Memo, Dep
Dir for Plans and Opns ASF for CG ASF, 18 Apr 44,
sub: Status of Shipping to UK, OCT HB Wylie Ship-
ping and Cargo for UK (1943-44).
121
On the prestowed and commodity-loaded ships,
see Leighton study cited n. 85, pp. 133-37; OCT HB
Monograph 29, pp. 76-77; and ASF MPR Sec. 3, Dec
44, p. 56. On the cargo of prestowed ships, which in-
cluded rations, lumber, steel landing mats, and am-
munition, see loading plans of 22 February, 8 and 17
March 1944, prepared by Overseas Supply Division.
New York Port of Embarkation (OCT HB ETO
Shipping).
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
the British agreed to a reduction in their
import program.122 Despite diversions, de-
lays, and uncertainty, the BOLERO pro-
gram was successful in bringing to the
United Kingdom the men and materials
needed for the assault on the Continent.
Port Operations
The first requisite for the smooth flow of
troops and supplies into the United King-
dom was efficient port operations. When
Colonel Ross reached the British Isles, the
U.S. Army already had a small port organ-
ization in Northern Ireland. Soon there-
after he extended American port activity
to the Glasgow, Liverpool, and Bristol
Channel areas, all of which had the great
advantage of being relatively safe from
enemy action by air and by sea. Subse-
quently, as the need arose, he placed
organizations at other ports, notably at
London and Southampton.
With respect to the ports, the theater
chief of transportation had two major sets
of problems. The first was primarily organ-
izational and fell almost wholly within the
purview of the U.S. Army as it functioned
within the theater. The second was mainly
operational and had broader and more
intricate aspects, involving as it did the
use of British port facilities and British
labor to meet varying American needs. It
must also be remembered that, regardless
of their importance, the requirements of
the U.S. Army never constituted more
than a fraction of the enormous tonnages
that had to be delivered through U.K.
ports to support the civilian population
and the wartime economy of Great Brit-
ain. During the course of the war, the Brit-
ish imported approximately 25,000,000
long tons per year, roughly ten times the
total U.S. cargo discharged in the United
123
Kingdom during 1943.
109
From the organizational standpoint, the
theater chief of transportation was ham-
pered by not having a free hand in the
management of U.S. Army port activity.
As already indicated, the assignment of
control of the ports to the base sections
limited him to technical supervision, al-
though of necessity he dealt directly with
the port commanders on a day-to-day
operating basis. General Ross never ap-
proved of the arrangement. From his point
of view, subordinating the ports to the
base sections simply meant interposing an-
other headquarters between his office and
the port commander. Interference by a
base section commander, no matter how
well-intentioned, could and on occasion
did seriously upset port operations. Al-
though much depended upon the person-
alities involved, the arrangement was con-
ducive to misunderstandings and bicker-
ing. In particular, as D Day approached
and time grew short and tempers shorter,
the relations between the staffs of the the-
ater chief of transportation and the South-
ern Base Section became strained, since
they did not see eye to eye on the outload-
ing of troops and cargo for the Normandy
invasion. The port personnel also objected
to the interference of the Southern Base
Section in technical matters.124
Another major organizational problem
involved the development of American
port organizations suited to operations in
the United Kingdom. The initial head-
quarters organization provided by the War
Department was the so-called mobile port,
122
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 236-39; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, Vol. II, pp. 11-13a, Vol. III, Ch. III, pp. 7-8,
OCT HB ETO.
123
124
See Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 147-48.
Ltrs, Ross to Larson, 9 Mar and 5 Dec 49; In-
tervs, Larson with Col D. W. Traub, 21 Mar 50, and
with Lt Col Ivan L. Brenneman, 22 Mar 50. All in
OCT HB ETO UK Ports.
110
with a staff that supervised port operations
and performed the necessary administra-
tive and supply functions. 125 Ross soon
found this unit inadequate for his needs.
Also, since no two ports had to deal with
exactly the same shipping problems, he
proposed a flexible organization, with the
126
strength dependent on the workload.
While flexibility was obviously necessary
as a means of meeting local requirements,
the new Table of Organization and Equip-
ment for a major port headquarters (over-
sea), approved in November 1943, called
for a reduction in the normal strength from
579 to 519 officers and men. The resultant
reorganization was effected at the several
ports in the United Kingdom early in
1944. Headed by a port commander, who
might have the rank of brigadier general,
the new port headquarters was designed
to function with two port directors: one for
services (including administration and the
several supply services); and the other for
operations (including a transportation di-
vision and a water division). Port battal-
ions, Quartermaster truck companies,
harbor craft units, ship maintenance and
repair companies, and other service and
operating units were to be attached as re-
quired by local conditions and the amount
of traffic to be handled.127
The personnel provided to man the U.S.
port organizations were often a source of
disappointment to the theater chief of organization could be shifted from one port to another
transportation. Although he realized that as the need arose, was later dropped.
the Transportation Corps faced a growing
Equip and T/O, OCT 563.5 England (T/BA Equip)
scarcity of qualified technicians, he ob- 1943; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 29 Jun 43, OCT 319.1 Eng-
jected to being given officers who were land.
unable or unwilling to adapt themselves to
operating conditions. Admitting that on
occasion he had been overly critical of
some personnel sent to him from the zone
of interior, Ross reminded Gross in June
1944 that it had been necessary to relieve
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
more than half the port commanders origi-
128
nally assigned to the United Kingdom.
The port organizational problems, how-
ever, were minor in comparison with those
in the operational category. Although the
British ports were among the best in the
world, they lacked modern equipment
when judged by American standards, had
suffered from enemy air raids, and were
very poorly manned. The longshore labor
force was seriously depleted, military serv-
ice having drawn off many of the younger
and more efficient men. In the beginning
the British Sea Transport Service of neces-
sity took charge of berthing and unloading
all American vessels, and British move-
ment control officers regulated the inland
traffic to and from the ports. As rapidly as
possible, the theater chief of transportation
arranged to assume these functions for the
U.S. Army, in line with his determination
to develop a transportation organization
that could operate independently. It was
impracticable to assign separate ports en-
tirely to the Americans but the U.S. Army
was gradually given control of American
ships in British ports. This transfer had
been largely completed by 1943.129
From the outset, Ross counted on the
maximum utilization of British port equip-
ment and British labor, but he realized
that the local resources would have to be
125
The term "mobile," used to indicate that the
126
Memo, Ross for Gross, 27 Feb 43, sub: Port
127 WD T/O&E 55-110-1, 20 Nov 43; Hist Rpt,
TC ETO, II, 43, OCT HB ETO.
128
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 26 Oct 43, OCT 320.2 Eng-
land 43; Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 30 Jun, 15 Jul 43, 6 and
30 Jun 44, and Gross to Ross , Jan-28 Jul, 21 Aug,
2 Nov 43, 19 Jun 44, OCT HB. Gross ETO—Gen
Ross.
129
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 15, 23-24, 26-27.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
supplemented from the United States. In
mid-May 1942 he requisitioned sufficient
American equipment to operate twenty-
four berths simultaneously, and in June he
foresaw an ultimate need of sixteen port
battalions and eight service battalions.
Shortly thereafter, British port facilities
capable of handling 120 ships a month
were allocated to the U.S. Army.130
As additional cargo-handling equip-
ment arrived from the United States, in-
cluding that brought by various port units,
the shortcomings of the British installations
were partially offset. A port survey by a
qualified American civilian in December
1942 pointed out the advantages to be
gained by further modernization, but
neither Ross nor Gross was certain that
the British would use equipment such as
fork-lift trucks. In March 1943 Gross re-
marked that the reluctance of union labor
in the United Kingdom to employ labor-
saving devices presented a problem diffi-
cult of solution. Yet he hoped, somewhat
too optimistically as events were to prove,
that the use of modern equipment by
American port battalions would eventu-
ally lead the British port authorities to
appreciate its desirability and to request
its adoption.131
Apart from inadequate facilities and
equipment, the principal limiting factor at
the ports was the grave shortage of labor,
which persisted throughout 1942 and well
into the next year. The pinch began to be
felt most severely in the summer of 1943,
when incoming tonnage was on the in-
crease after the comparative lull during
the North African campaign. It was a
common practice to assign only enough
men to work one or two hatches. Even
when enough British labor was available,
the Army might get only six hours for eight
hours of pay. Americans found it hard to
111
appreciate the British custom of taking
"tea breaks" in the morning and after-
noon. When the dockers took the break
first and were followed a little later by the
crane operators, operations might be
halted from forty minutes to an hour, since
the dockers could not function without
cranes.132
During that summer strikes and dis-
putes over wages and hours, combined
with a scarcity of longshore labor and un-
satisfactory performance by men on the
job, slowed the discharge of U.S. Army
cargo and delayed the turnaround of
American ships in United Kingdom ports.
British authorities had hitherto been re-
luctant to concede the necessity of employ-
ing U.S. military personnel for handling
cargo, but by mid-July 1943 a lack of
civilian longshoremen had developed in
practically every area, the shortage aver-
aging 850 men per day in all ports. In
view of this development, the British
finally conceded that U.S. troops would
have to be used. During August the gen-
eral labor shortage became more acute,
and practically all vessels were delayed in
discharging because of insufficient labor.
Ross therefore requested the shipment of
nine more port battalions as rapidly as
possible, which would complete the fifteen
130
Memo, CofT SOS ETO for CG SOS ETO, 6
Jul 42, sub: Trans Plan and Rqmts for BOLERO, OCT
HB Gross ETO — Gen Ross; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 19
Jun 42, OCT HB Gross Day File; Memo of Conv,
Ross with Mr. Donald, Asst to Dir Ports, and Mr.
Ford, Div Supt South Wales Dist, Gen Supt Great
Western RR, 2 Jun 42, OCT HB ETO Bristol Chan-
nel Ports.
131
Ltr, Ezra W. Clark to Somervell, 17 Feb 43;
Memo, Ross for Gross, 27 Feb 43, sub: Port Equip and
T/O, and 1st Ind, CofT SOS to CG SOS, 13 Mar 43.
All in OCT 563.5 England (T/BA Equip) 43.
132
Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 17 Aug 43, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross; Personal Obsn, Lt Col Leo J.
Meyer, 1 Mar 49, former port commander at Sou-
thampton, OCT HB ETO Ports.
112
units allotted to the BOLERO program. 133
The arrival of additional American
port battalions in the fall of 1943 helped
relieve but did not solve the labor prob-
lem. At the outset the performance of the
new port battalions was unimpressive. A
report prepared on 21 October by Ross's
headquarters revealed that at a number
of ports British civilians, working the same
types of ships and cargo, were discharg-
ing more tons per gang per hour than
the American battalions.134 With experi-
ence and training the troops soon did
much better. But even so, in February
1944 General Gross noted that the num-
ber of measurement tons unloaded in the
United Kingdom per working day per
ship was low as compared with the aver-
age rate for oversea ports—942 measure-
ment tons as against 1,128 measurement
tons.135 This poor showing was attributed
in part to the unwillingness of British
labor to use modern dock equipment, but
General Ross felt that it could be traced
mainly to the sheer inability of the older
British workers to operate at a faster pace.
Inadequate and inefficient civilian labor
and a lack of modern equipment contin-
ued to plague U.S. Army operations at
most British ports throughout the
build-up.136
In general, the development of Amer-
ican port activities followed a basic pat-
tern. Initially completely dependent on
the British, U.S. Army personnel quickly
established close relations with British
port and transportation authorities and
oriented themselves to British methods of
operation; then, as the necessary person-
nel and experience were obtained, they
gradually were given considerable free-
dom of action in handling U.S. Army per-
sonnel and cargo. Using British port facil-
ities and relying heavily on British labor
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
and equipment, the American port com-
manders of necessity continued to work
closely with the British military and the
civilian agencies that dealt with port man-
agement, port operation and clearance,
movement control, the provision of labor,
and other port activities.
While conforming to this general pat-
tern of development, American activities
at the individual ports naturally varied
because of their differing missions and
facilities and their peculiar organizational
and operating problems. A brief review
will serve to indicate the principal char-
acteristics and major accomplishments of
the several British ports used by the U.S.
Army during the BOLERO period.
Northern Ireland Ports
As has been already noted, the first
United Kingdom port used by the Amer-
icans in World War II was Belfast, in
Northern Ireland. The port facilities were
adequate despite some damage from en-
emy bombing, but modern mechanical
equipment was lacking. Two privately
owned floating cranes were available for
heavy lifts, but additional cargo-handling
133
for the basic correspondence, July-October
1943, see OCT HB ETO UK Ports—General. See
also Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 30 Jun and 15 Jul 43, and
Gross to Ross, 28 Jul and 21 Aug 43, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross.
134
Memo, Col Thomas Monroe, ACofT Marine
Opns SOS ETOUSA, to Port Commanders, sub: Ef-
ficiency of Port Labour, Military and Civilian, OCT
HB ETO UK Ports—Gen.
135
Subsequently, the discharge rate at the-British
ports almost doubled, reaching an average of 1,729
measurement tons per day during the period 16-31
May 1944. See Rpt, Utilization of Vessels Employed
by U.S. Army, 16-31 May 1944, OCT HB Water Div
Vessel Utilization Rpt.
136
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 26 Oct 43, OCT 320.2 Eng-
land 43; Memo, Gross to Somervell, 23 Feb 44, sub:
Discharge Rate for ETO, OCT HB Gross Day File.
See also ASF MPR, Sec. 6, Analysis, 31 Jan 44, p. 81.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN 113

equipment had to be supplied by the U.S. men, gear, and insurance for a fee equal-
Army. Troops disembarked either directly ling 20 percent of the gross payroll. Judged
from transports or from tenders loaded at by American standards the labor was in-
anchorage in the Belfast Lough. The efficient, and the contract put a premium
Sydenham berth was very convenient for on slow discharge. Indeed, the American
receiving assembled aircraft, being near corporation charged with servicing the
an airport to which the aircraft could be aircraft landed in Northern Ireland pre-
towed on barges. The ability to operate ferred to have its own personnel receive
under lights and around the clock, if re- the planes from the ship's gear, rather
quired, was a prime asset.137 than risk damage by local workmen.
The first American port organization to Nevertheless, local longshoremen were as-
reach the United Kingdom landed in signed to the job and drew wages while
Northern Ireland in mid-May 1942. Com- doing nothing. The stevedoring firm also
manded by Col. Richard Stockton, VI, it sought to have all American vessels han-
began activity at Belfast and then extend- dled at Belfast, although discharge could
ed its jurisdiction to include Londonderry, be accomplished more rapidly and
Lisahally, Larne, Coleraine, and a few cheaply at other ports in the area. Despite
other minor installations. Later the head- protests by the port commander, this un-
quarters was redesignated Northern Ire- satisfactory situation obtained until the
land Ports. British authorities technically summer of 1943, when a new stevedoring
were in charge until 21 September 1942, contract, embodying better financial
when the American port commander was terms and encouraging prompt discharge,
given complete responsibility for U.S. was secured.139
Army port operations. Belfast and its subports were found con-
Stockton had no easy assignment. His venient places to discharge deck cargo,
staff was small, and he was heavily de- notably aircraft, leaving the remainder of
pendent upon the British. Moreover, he the ship's load to be discharged in Britain.
found the local U.S. Army quartermaster Port personnel in Northern Ireland out-
reluctant to surrender the control that he
137
had exercised over U.S. Army transpor- Historical Data to May 1943, Facilities for
Berthing Vessels, 25 Jun 42, OCT HB ETO Northern
tation up to that time. To make matters Ireland Ports; Condensed Rpt, Activities of Northern
more difficult, the port commander had Ireland Ports January 1942-December 1943, AG
been placed under the Northern Ireland Adm 254 ETO; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 1 Sep 43, OCT
HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
Base Command, when it was established 138
Condensed Rpt, Activities of Northern Ireland
on 1 June 1942, and on occasion Stockton Ports, January 1942-December 1943; Memo, Stock-
found himself caught between conflicting ton for CofS USANIF, 19 Jun 42, sub: Comments on
Port of Belfast. Both in AG Adm 254 (ETO). Histori-
orders. For example, the theater chief of cal Data to May 1943, Northern Ireland Ports; Memo,
transportation had directed that civilian Ross for all ports, 3 Aug 42, sub: Employment of Ci-
labor be employed in so far as possible, vilians; Announcement, Base Commander, Officers'
Mtg, 3 Sep 42; Interv, Larson with Stockton, 2 Aug
but the base commander gave contrary 49. All in OCT HB ETO Northern Ireland Ports.
138
instructions. Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 19 Jun and 8 Jul 42, OCT HB
Cargo discharge presented a major Gross Day File.
139
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 31-33; Historical
difficulty. A local stevedoring firm had a Data to May 1943, Northern Ireland Ports, OCT HB
virtual monopoly, furnishing longshore- ETO Northern Ireland Ports.
114 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

loaded part of the force sent to North succeeded in the following month by Lt.
Africa, and in the fall of 1942 the bulk ofCol. (later Col.) James A. Crothers. As at
the U.S. combat troops, equipment, and Belfast, the Americans in the Clyde area
supplies assembled in Ulster was with- at first depended heavily upon the British.
drawn for that operation. Inbound traffic Troop debarkations were handled by the
declined thereafter, and virtually ceased British embarkation commandant, with
in the first half of 1943. During this period
U.S. port personnel providing liaison; the
port operations were managed by a small British movement control organization
cadre, which in June 1943 comprised only arranged for the transportation of person-
seven officers and twenty-six enlisted men.nel and cargo to and from the port; and
In the ensuing months cargo and troop the Sea Transport Service was responsible
arrivals picked up and the port organiza- for berthing and discharging American
tion was temporarily enlarged, but by D vessels.
Day American activity at the Northern The assumption of greater responsibil-
Ireland ports had again dwindled to ity by the U.S. Army followed the arrival
negligible proportions.140 of the 5th Port on 11 September 1942.143
Early in November 1942, by agreement
Clyde Area Ports between the theater chief of transporta-
tion and the British director of move-
Although considerable cargo was re- ments, the U.S.port commander for the
ceived, the primary mission of the Clyde Clyde area assumed responsibility for the
area ports was the reception of troops. movement of U.S. Army personnel and
More than half of the U.S. debarkations cargo in and out of the area. This action
to 30 May 1944—873,160 of the 1,671,- was followed, on 27 April 1943, by a for-
010—came through these installations.141 mal agreement between the British em-
The Clyde area included the ports of barkation commandant and the U.S.
Greenock and Gourock; the deep broad commanding officer of the Clyde area
anchorage known as the Tail of the Bank, ports, whereby the latter became respon-
which was situated near the mouth of the sible for unloading troop transports carry-
Clyde River; and the port of Glasgow, ing a preponderance of U.S. Army
some fifteen miles up the river. Glasgow personnel. Some control of cargo opera-
possessed outstanding facilities, the King
140
George V docks being regarded as among Story of Trans in UK, pp. 35, 37-39; Semi-
Monthly Rpt, Hq Northern Ireland Ports to CofT
the best in the United Kingdom. All piers SOS ETO, 15 Jun 43, par. 2, 6, and Ltr, Col Eugene
had an adequate number of movable elec- A. Eversberg, OCT, to Ross, 9 Oct 43, OCT 319.1
tric cranes. Because of the narrow and Misc Rpts 43-44; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. I,
pp. 5-6, Ch. VI, pp. 16-17, Ch. VII, pp. 1-3, OCT
comparatively shallow channel leading to HB ETO.
Glasgow, the larger troop transports 141
See Table 1, p. 103.
142
anchored at the Tail of the Bank, from Story of Trans in UK, pp. 40-41; Hist Rcd,
which the incoming personnel were moved Clyde Area Ports and 5th PE, 1 May-31 Dec 42,
OCT HB Oversea Ports 5th Port.
142
by tender to Gourock and Greenock. 143
Assigned to duty with the Clyde area ports, the
The first Clyde area port commander, 5th Port was headed in turn by Col. Kenneth K. Bul-
Capt, (later Col.) Kenneth D. McKenzie, lock and Col. Eugene A. Eversberg before being
placed under the command of Colonel Crothers on 21
was appointed on 8 June 1942; he was December 1942.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
tions was exercised by the British Sea
Transport Service until June 1943. There-
after the Americans were in full charge of
their own port operations.
Although granted a large measure of
independence, the Americans continued
to work in close collaboration with the
British. Aside from contacts with the Brit-
ish embarkation commandant, the British
Movement Control, and the British Sea
Transport Service, the U.S. port personnel
maintained close liaison with the Clyde
Navigation Trust, the port regional di-
rector, the Ministry of War Transport, the
Ministry of Labour, the Admiralty Berth-
ing Office, the Clyde Anchorages, and
various stevedoring firms. Despite some
misunderstandings, excellent co-operation
was maintained, and the British military
and civilian authorities provided valuable
assistance.144
Operating from Nissen huts erected on
the piers, the men of the 5th Port were
active at each of the principal docks in the
Clyde area ports. During the winter of
1942-43, rain, fog, high winds, and heavy
seas, combined with the wartime black-
out, greatly hampered cargo discharge.
Nevertheless, large numbers of assembled
aircraft were unloaded, together with
many vehicles, harbor craft, locomotives,
and other heavy items, which this port
area was well equipped to handle. In the
summer of 1943 an acute shortage of civil-
ian labor necessitated the use of troops,
first to remove baggage and organiza-
tional equipment, and later to discharge
other cargo. Beginning in October of that
year, U.S. Army personnel received tech-
nical instruction at the nearby Renfrew
Airdrome in the unloading of aircraft, a
task subsequently assigned to a special
group of the 502d Port Battalion. During
the following May the 5th Port passed the
115
million mark in measurement tons dis-
charged under its supervision. Both May
and June 1944 were record months for
cargo operations. 145
Meanwhile, more troops had landed in
the Clyde area than anywhere else in the
United Kingdom. With the exception of
the six months following October 1942,
when BOLERO was subordinated to Medi-
terranean operations, personnel debarka-
tions were heavy, reaching a peak of ap-
proximately 100,000 in April 1944.146 The
Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, and other
large troopships brought many American
units to the Tail of the Bank. Debarkation
from anchorage at this point entailed
careful co-ordination with the British in
order to obtain the tenders for the passage
from ship to shore, as well as the rail
equipment to deliver the incoming per-
sonnel to their destinations.
After the U.S. port commander as-
sumed full responsibility for unloading
troopships in April 1943, a standard de-
barkation procedure was developed. As
explained in the discussion of the move-
ment control system, rail equipment was
secured, and detailed train schedules were
144
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 41-44; Hist Rcd,
Clyde Area Ports, 1 May-31 Dec 42, 1 Jan-27 May
43, and 28 May-4 Jun 43, OCT HB Oversea Ports
5th Port.
145
Hist Rcds, Clyde Area Ports, 30Jul-31 Dec 43,
and Hist Rpts, Port TC-251, 1 Jan-31 Jan, and 1
May-30 Jun 44, OCT HB Oversea Ports 5th Port;
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. VIII, pp. 2-4, OCT
HB ETO.
146
The Clyde area ports reports and Transporta-
tion Corps historical reports covering activities during
April 1944 give 105,987 as the number of troops de-
barked, but an analysis of a later Transportation
Corps consolidated report would indicate that the cor-
rect figure should be 97,373. See Hist Rpt, TC-251,
Apr 44, OCT HB Oversea Ports 5th Port; Hist Rpt,
TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. VI, Table, Troop Arrivals by
Port Areas, Jan 42-Jun 44, OCT HB ETO; and TC
SOS ETO MPR, 30 Jun 44, Chart 1—Monthly Troop
Debarkations, AG Adm 451 ETO.
116
147
worked out in advance in London.
Since troop trains from the Mersey area as
well as those from the Clyde area passed
through junction points such as Crewe,
careful planning of train movements was
essential in order to avoid tie-ups. In the
case of American troop debarkations,
London provided the port commander
with movement instructions, including the
time of arrival, the strength of the units,
and the train schedules. Under the port
commander, a commissioned boarding of-
ficer supervised the debarkation of the
troops from transport to tender to train,
according to the predetermined schedule.
At Gourock and Greenock local military
bands with their skirling bagpipes and
brilliant tartans welcomed the new arriv-
als, while the American Red Cross pro-
vided refreshments.148
The ports in the Clyde area gave vital
support to the North African invasion, the
majority of the men in the first three U.K.
convoys for North Africa embarking in
this area. Although no troops were out-
loaded for the Normandy assault, person-
nel attached to the 5th Port helped equip
and service more than one hundred of the
MTV's (motor transport vessels) that were
employed in the cross-Channel operation.
Many experienced officers and men of the
5th Port, including three port battalions,
and most of the harbor craft, were with-
drawn for service on the Continent. 149
The Mersey Ports
The Mersey River area, lying midway
on the British west coast, was the point of
entry for heavy shipments of both troops
and freight. Centering in Liverpool, it in-
cluded the docks at Birkenhead and Gar-
ston and the nearby port of Manchester.
In addition to excellent railway connec-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
tions, the area was served by inland water-
ways, notably the Manchester Ship Canal,
and sufficient lighters and tugs were avail-
able to aid in the discharge of vessels and
to clear cargo from the port. Despite the
damage inflicted by the Luftwaffe, the
port facilities were largely operative. As at
other English ports, the docks were old
and the cargo-handling equipment was
inadequate, especially for heavy lifts; the
cobblestone surfaces also were a drawback
150
to efficient operation.
A U.S. Army port command was estab-
lished in the Mersey area on 18 June 1942.
Headed briefly by Maj. John M. Gaffhey,
the port operation was placed under the
command of Lt. Col. (later Col.) Cleland
C. Sibley on 9 July. 151 Shortly thereafter
the 4th Port arrived in the United King-
dom, and was assigned to the Mersey
area. As was the case at other ports, a
period of orientation and dependence on
the British preceded the assumption of
control of operations by the Americans.
Colonel Sibley was fortunate in obtaining
the services of a British civilian who was
experienced in cargo operations and had
entry to shipping and other agencies in
147
See above, pp. 89-91.
148
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 41-46; Hist Rcd,
Clyde Area Ports, 1 Jan-27 May 43, OCT HB Over-
sea Ports 5th Port; Hist Rcd, Clyde Area Ports, 15
Oct-12 Nov 43, AG Adm 341A ETO; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, Vol. III, Ch. VI, pp. 16-17, Ch. VIII, pp. 1, 2,
and 4, OCT HB ETO.
149
Story of Trans in UK, p. 46; Hist Rpt, TC ETO,
Vol. III, Ch. VIII, pp. 5-7, OCT HB ETO. In Au-
gust 1944 the entire 5th Port moved to France and
was replaced at Glasgow by the 7th Port. See Hist
Rcd, 5th Port, 1-31 Aug 41, OCT HB Oversea Ports
5th Port.
150
Memo, Lt Col Alan E. MacNicol, Supt ATS, 11
May 43, sub: Hist Info Concerning Operating Condi-
tions at Mersey Area Ports, OCT HB ETO Mersey
Ports; Story of Trans in UK, pp. 47-49.
151
Colonel Sibley continued as port commander
until early January 1944, when he left to plan for the
projected operation of the port of Cherbourg.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
Liverpool affecting U.S. port activities. In
a short time, co-operative working rela-
tionships were established with officials of
the Mersey Dock and Harbor Board,
which controlled and operated the Liver-
pool Port Area, with the regional port di-
rector, and with local representatives of
the Ministry of War Transport, the Min-
istry of Labour, and the British Movement
Control. In late August 1942, as soon as
the necessary personnel were trained, the
U.S. port commander assumed control of
embarkation, debarkation, entraining,
and detraining where American troops
were concerned; and on 1 September he
began to take over movement functions
previously exercised by the British with
respect to cargo. In practice, Colonel Sib-
ley worked closely with the British embar-
kation commandant on personnel move-
ments, and the staffs of the two men oper-
ated together under the direction of one or
the other, depending on whether the
troops involved were American or British.
Sibley stated later that this teamwork be-
tween the U.S. Army and the British civil-
ian and military authorities was indis-
pensable in accomplishing the mission of
his port command.152
The Mersey ports ranked second to the
Clyde area ports in total personnel re-
ceived and were surpassed only by the
Bristol Channel ports with regard to cargo
unloaded before D Day. The wide dis-
persion of the Mersey port area facilitated
the berthing and discharge of incoming
vessels but increased the burden of admin-
istration and operation. A telephone net-
work linked seven miles of sprawling
docks. The landing stages, or floating
docks, at Liverpool usually were employed
for debarking troops, although some pas-
sengers were discharged to tenders in mid-
stream.153
117
At first all cargo discharge was per-
formed by British civilians. Later, both
British and U.S. military personnel had to
be used. According to Colonel Sibley,
there were never enough men to fill every
job or to work around the clock. As a rule,
the Liverpool laborer worked only at the
dock of his choice, and he shunned all
overtime. Indeed, a general strike devel-
oped in mid-August 1943 in protest
against overtime. The port commander
thereupon completed discharge by using
all military labor that could be rounded
up, and the strike was settled with the
longshoremen accepting such overtime as
was required. The arrival of several Amer-
ican port battalions in the fall of 1943 and
the use of British service troops eased the
burden. Nevertheless, the heavy inbound
traffic in the first half of 1944 placed a
severe strain on the available labor
supply.154
The subport of Manchester was con-
nected with the Mersey River by a canal
so shallow that cargo ships had to be
lightened for the passage. Port labor was
scarce in this highly industrialized area,
necessitating the employment of a port
battalion. Manchester was especially use-
ful for unloading heavy cargo, such as
steel, and the ability to bring such ma-
152
Memo, Capt Alan G. Baker, Hq Mersey Area
Ports, 7 Sep 42, sub: Chronological Hist of Mersey
Area Ports; Memo, CG SOS ETO for CO Mersey
Area Ports, 11 Sep 42, sub: Transfer of Opns of Brit-
ish Mvmt Contl to Trans Sv USA; Comments by Col
Sibley, 9 Sep 49. All in OCT HB ETO Mersey Ports.
153
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 52-56; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, Vol. I, App. 13, Vol. II, p. 45, Vol. III, Ch. VI,
p. 16, and Ch. VII, pp. 1-3, OCT HB ETO.
154
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 49-50; Ltrs, Ross to
Gross, 17 Aug 43, and Gross to Ross, 21 Aug 43, OCT
HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Hist, 4th Port, activation
to 14 Sep 44, OCT HB Oversea Ports; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, II, 5, OCT HB ETO; Comments by Col Sib-
ley, 9 Sep 49, OCT HB ETO Mersey Ports.
118 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

terial inland by water netted substantial formerly the port commander at Glasgow,
savings in railway freight charges.155 assumed command of the 17th Port and
The Mersey River ports loaded many was designated commander of the ports in
ships for the North African invasion. In the Bristol Channel area. By 16 April 1944
the summer of 1943 they debarked many the 17th Port, assisted by the 16th Port,
German and Italian prisoners of war. had taken over port operations. The two
Early in January 1944 the 4th Port, then organizations worked together until the
slated for service in France, was relieved latter's departure for duty on the Con-
by the 15th Port, which thereafter super- tinent in June.158
vised the U.S. Army port operations in The docks in the Bristol area were ade-
the Mersey area.156 quate, but there were a number of hand-
icaps. The exceptional high tide created
Bristol Channel Ports problems. The facilities had been designed
chiefly for bulk shipments and were not
In the Bristol Channel area the U.S. readily adaptable to the prompt forward-
Army mainly used the ports of Swansea, ing of mixed American cargoes. The lack
Barry, Cardiff, Newport, and Avonmouth. of sorting space at Newport, Cardiff, and
The largest amount of U.S. Army cargo Barry was a serious problem. Sheds were
assembled in the United Kingdom was re- acquired at St. Mellons to receive, iden-
ceived through these five ports. They had tify, and dispatch a large part, of the cargo
the important advantage of being located discharged at those ports.
near the largest number of the U.S. Army At the outset, the British supervised
depots in Great Britain, thus minimizing port operations, while 3d Port personnel
the amount of inland transportation worked individual ships and acquired val-
required. uable experience for their North African
On 22 June 1942, Lt. Col. (later Brig. mission. In mid-August 1942, somewhat
Gen.) Edward H. Lastayo was designated earlier than at other British ports, the
to command the Bristol Channel ports. Americans took over responsibility for
The port headquarters, originally located handling their own cargo ships and as-
near Avonmouth, was transferred in Au- sumed movement control for U.S. freight.
gust to a more convenient location in
155
Newport. The 3d Port functioned in this Story of Trans in UK, pp. 56-57; Memo, Col
area until it left for North Africa in the Area Ports, 11
MacNicol, May 43, sub: Hist I n f … Mersey
OCT HB ETO Mersey Ports. See also
fall of 1942. Thereafter, a detachment of Rpt, Subport TC-282, 1 Jan-31 Dec 44, OCT HB
the 5th Port supervised the U.S. Army Oversea 156
Ports.
Hist, 4th Port, activation to 14 Sep 44, pp. 2-3,
port operations until July 1943, when it OCT HB Oversea Ports; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, II, 41-
was absorbed by the 11th Port.157 To assist 42, OCT HB ETO.
in handling the heavy increase in traffic, 157
During its stay in the Bristol Channel area, the
the 17th and part of the 16th Port were 11th Port was commanded in turn by Col. Russell G.
Simpson, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Harry B. Vaughan,
attached to the 11th Port early in 1944. Jr., Lt. Col. Grover G. Heldenfels, Brig. Gen. Joseph
Earmarked to take part in beach oper- L. Phillips, and Colonel Whitcomb.
158
ations in Normandy, the 11th Port began Story of Trans in UK, pp. 58-59; SO 11, OCT
SOS ETO, 22 Jun 42, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen
a gradual withdrawal from the port area Ross; Hist, 17th Port, Ch. V, pp. 2-8, OCT HB
in March. At that time, Colonel Crothers, Oversea Ports.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN 119

As at other ports, it proved highly advan- were more directly exposed to enemy
tageous to establish close working rela- action. Indeed, as early as mid-August
tionships with the local British military 1942 the theater chief of transportation
and civilian agencies.159 had assigned 1st Lt. Thomas S. Lowry to
As a rule, cargo was discharged by civil- serve in Hull as acting port commander of
ian labor, which at times was unsatisfac- the Humber River Ports. On 6 September
tory both in quality and in quantity. By a subport was set up at Immingham, on
arrangement with the labor unions, U.S. the south bank of the Humber. Lowry's
Army port personnel were placed in the staff was small, the activity was light, and
hatch gangs solely for purposes of observa- on 30 November 1942 the Humber River
tion and training. At first the unions ports were closed. In the following spring
stoutly resisted any attempt to employ they were reopened, chiefly for cargo re-
U.S. troops as longshoremen, even though ception. After its arrival in late July 1943
the civilian labor force clearly could not the 12th Port, headed by Col. Bert C.
continue to carry the entire load. Several Ross, functioned at Hull and Imming-
brief strikes occurred. In June 1943 at ham. U.S. Army operations at Hull suf-
Avonmouth, for example, the local unions, fered from the prevailing shortage of civil-
supported by the British Ministry of La- ian dockworkers, and most of the unload-
bour at London, prevented the port com- ing there had to be done by troops of the
162
mander from using a port battalion to 498th Port Battalion.
speed up the discharge of a ship. Later, Because of the continuing danger from
however, the British furnished additional enemy air attacks, no substantial use was
workers, and permitted the use of Amer- made of the excellent discharge facilities
ican port troops where the need arose.160 at London until 1943. In April eight ves-
At the height of their activity, from July sels, carrying lend-lease cargo originally
1943 to June 1944, the Bristol Channel destined for the Soviet Union, were
ports consistently unloaded well over diverted to London. Since these ships car-
300,000 measurement tons of cargo per ried ammunition, they were dispersed
month. In the peak month, April 1944, in- 159
bound material came to 692,958 measure- Memos, Col Simpson for CofT SOS ETO, 27
May and 2 Jun 43, sub: Info for Hist Br; Dir, CG SOS
ment tons, and inbound troops totaled ETO, 15 Aug 42, sub: Re Transfer of Opns, British
28,388. The troop and cargo figures for Mvmt Contl; Memo of mtg held at Avonmouth on
that month highlight the impressive con- Sunday, 9 Aug 42. All in OCT HB ETO Bristol
Channel Ports. See also Hist, 4th Port, 20 Jun 44, pp.
tribution toward victory made by U.S. 4-5, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
Army port personnel in the Bristol Chan- 160
Hist, 3d Port, 20 Jun 44, p. 5, OCT HB Over-
nel area.161 sea Ports; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 15 Jul 43, with Incl, Ex-
tract from Rpt of Discharge of SS Marymar, OCT HB
Gross ETO —Gen Ross; Hist, 17th Port, Ch. V, pp.
Eastern and Southern Ports 5, 10, 12, 18-19, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
161
See Tables 1 and 2, pp. 103, 104.
162
GO 72, SOS ETO, 23 Nov 42; Memos, 2d Lt
The Northern Ireland, Clyde, and Bris- David V. Scoggin, TC, for Hist Br OCT SOS ETO,
tol Channel port areas bore the brunt of 21 Nov 42, sub: Hist Info, and 8 Apr 43, sub: Info for
the BOLERO program until the summer of Hist Br. All in OCT HB ETO Humber Ports. Memo,
CG 12th Maj Port for OCT SOS ETO, 25 Jun 45,
1943, when increasingly heavy inbound sub: Hist Rpt; and Hist, 12th Port, 4 Aug-31 Dec 43.
shipments compelled the use of ports that Both in OCT HB Oversea Ports 12th Port.
120 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

along the Thames River to minimize the a thriving passenger port and a familiar
risk. Having no port personnel, the re- gateway for visitors to the British Isles, it
gional transportation officer at London had suffered severely from enemy bomb-
drafted local railway traffic officers to as-
ing. As a result, the port had remained
sist in supervising the discharge opera- idle for some time, and much of its cargo-
tions. Working an average of eighty-two handling equipment had been removed to
hours a week, these RTO's supervised other ports. Yet despite the considerable
cargo discharge until mid-July 1943, when damage, Southampton remained one of
the 14th Port, under the command of the best ports in England. Deep water and
Brig. Gen. Joseph L. Phillips, arrived and relatively little tide made it a port of few
took over this activity.163 In the following
locks, and there were numerous modern
December the 12th Port began relieving piers as well as seven graving docks for
the 14th Port, which was slated to expand ship repair. Although many British offi-
its operations at Southampton and Plym- cials feared that the port was too vulner-
outh and prepare for the cross-Channel able, the Americans reopened it in the
attack. By the end of January 1944 the summer of 1943, and the fears were soon
12th Port was operating in London, Hull, found to be without foundation.
and Immingham, and it continued to do Early U.S. operations were hand-
so until transferred to Normandy shortly icapped by the shortage of cargo-handling
after D Day.164 equipment and by labor troubles. Labor
During the last half of 1943 the 14th at Southampton, as elsewhere in Britain,
Port supervised the discharge of approxi- was in short supply and none too efficient.
mately 350,000 measurement tons of During the summer and fall of 1943 the
cargo at London, Southampton, and Plym- activity of the 14th Port at Southampton
outh. Of that amount, 162,224 measure- was interrupted by a number of strikes,
ment tons were received at Southampton. several of which represented protests
After being relieved at London, the 14th 163
Port confined its work to Plymouth and General Phillips was transferred to command
the 11th Port on 27 October 1943. His successor, Col.
Southampton, of which the latter was to Walter D. McCord, stayed on until February 1944,
become the main installation. when he left to become Regional Transportation Of-
Plymouth, a victim of the German blitz, ficer, Southern Base Section. Col. Frederick W. Hyde
then served as port commander until 12 April 1944,
had only a limited cargo capacity. Early when Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer assumed command. See
in 1944 it came under the jurisdiction of Hist, 14th Port, Oct 43, Feb 44, Apr 44, OCT HB
the newly arrived 13th Port, which pushed Oversea Ports.
164
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I, 41, 48, OCT HB ETO;
through the faltering barge-construction Memo, Chief Opns TC SOS ETO, 14 Apr 43, sub:
program at Truro, Totnes, and Hayle, Discharge in UK of Vessels … for North Russia,
outloaded large amounts of ammunition OCT 319.1 England Jan-Sep 43; Memo, Hist Office
RTO CBS for OCT SOS ETO, 24 Aug 43, sub: Hist
at the old Cornish port of Fowey for the Rpt, AG Adm 341A ETO; Memo, Hist Office RTO
invasion of Normandy, and dispatched CBS for CofT SOS ETO, 28 May 43, sub: Info for
thousands of troops and vehicles from Hist Br, OCT HB ETO, Centl Base; Hist, 12th Port,
4 Aug-31 Dec 43, 1 Jan-21 Feb, 3-9 Apr, and 21 Jul
Plymouth and Falmouth for the cross- 44, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
Channel attack.165 165
Hist Rcd, 14th Port, Dec 43; Hist Rpt, 13th
Southampton became the principal Port, May 44; Gen Release No. 2357, Hq UK Base.
All in OCT HB Oversea Ports. U.S. Army ETO, The
U.S. port on the south coast. In peacetime 13th Port, 1943-1946, pp. 1,6-10.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
against the presence of American military
police who were stationed in the hatches
to prevent pilferage. Nevertheless, by Oc-
tober cargo operations had increased
substantially.166
Early in 1944 the headquarters of the
14th Port was moved from London to
Southampton. Fairly compact office space
and a sufficient number of billets were ob-
tained in and near the city by using vari-
ous structures, including the Blighmont
Barracks, a wing of the Civic Center, a
school, and two hotels. In the ensuing
months cargo-handling facilities were
greatly improved and, except for minor
squabbles, labor disputes practically
ceased.
Southampton together with the other
ports along the southern and eastern
shores of Great Britain, including the
Thames and Humber River areas, con-
tributed substantially to the build-up in
the British Isles by receiving cargo di-
verted from the heavily burdened Bristol
Channel and Mersey River ports, particu-
larly after July 1943. But Southampton's
principal wartime contribution was to be
made as a port of embarkation rather
than as a port of discharge. In the months
preceding the cross-Channel assault the
emphasis in Transportation Corps oper-
ations increasingly shifted from receiving
personnel and cargo to planning and pre-
paring for the outbound movement to the
Continent. Since southern England was
close to Normandy and the scene of the
greatest concentration of American troops,
the ports in that area were the logical in-
stallations from which to mount and sup-
port the invading forces.
During May 1944, with Lt. Col. Leo J.
Meyer in command, all cargo-discharge
operations ceased at Southampton, and
the port personnel concentrated their
121
efforts on preparations for the Normandy
167
invasion. From D Day onward the
Southampton Port of Embarkation had a
key role in the outbound movement of
U.S. troops, equipment, and supplies to
the Continent. A major port activity at
this time was the loading of vehicles and
drivers aboard specially converted Liberty
ships for delivery across the Channel.
Because of its proximity to the Continent,
its excellent facilities, and the experienced
Army port organization, Southampton
remained active to the end of the war. The
port was also destined to play a prominent
part in the redeployment and repatriation
of American troops and in the movement
of British war brides to the United
States.168
The British ports obviously had a large
responsibility in the build-up of American
strength in the United Kingdom. By the
end of June 1944 the U.S. Army port or-
ganizations, with British co-operation and
assistance, had landed in the United
Kingdom a total of 1,792,512 U.S. Army
troops and 15,573,699 measurement tons
of cargo. Beginning on D Day, almost all
the U.S. military resources slowly built up
since January 1942 had to be shipped out
during a relatively short period in a sort
of BOLERO in reverse. Although this activ-
166
Hist Rcd, 14th Port, Aug-Nov 43, OCT HB
Oversea Ports 14th Port; Memo, Ross for Gross, 30
Nov 43, sub: Wkly Rpt Port Opns, OCT 319.1 Eng-
land OCT-Dec 43; Rpt, Col McCord and Col Meyer
to CofT WD, 18 Oct 43, OCT 320.21-352.9 England
43.
167
Command of the 14th Port was assumed by Col.
Sherman L. Kiser on 25 July 1944, Colonel Meyer
becoming his deputy.
168
Hist Rcd, 14th Port, Dec 43, Jan, Feb, May-Jul
44. and Opn OVERLORD, 14th Port, 6 Jun-6 Sep 44,
OCT HB Oversea Ports 14th Port; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, Vol. II, pp. 42-43, Vol. III, Ch. IX, OCT HB
ETO; Memo, Col Meyer for Larson, 1 Mar 49, sub:
Ch on Port Opns in British Isles, OCT HB ETO UK
Ports.
 122 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ity ultimately was bound to reduce the ican standards, the number of units of
importance of the U.K. ports, all were equipment was large in relation to the
under great and continuous pressure dur- mileage, but the capacity per unit was
ing the critical spring and summer of 1944. small. The British freight car, or "goods
wagon," for example, might move an
Railway Transportation average of only five to six tons as com-
pared with an average of forty tons carried
170
The movement of U.S. Army personnel in the American boxcar. Also much
and cargo between the various ports and smaller than its American counterpart,
destinations in the interior was largely the the British passenger car was designed to
task of the British railways, though motor effect ready discharge of passengers from
and inland water transportation were also many compartments and at numerous
used. The railroads had early felt the im- stops. Upon his arrival in England, Colo-
pact of war. From 1 September 1939 on nel Ross was much impressed with the
they were under wartime controls. Be- heavy movement of passenger trains,
cause of the emergency all freight cars which he described as frequent and as
were pooled, traffic was regulated on a crowded as those of the New York City
171
priority basis, and passenger movements subway.
were curtailed. When American troops Since short hauls were the rule, the U.S.
first began to debark, the British railways Army made no effort to set up the cus-
were already suffering from at least three tomary staging system for troops de-
serious handicaps: (1) a critical shortage barking in the British Isles. Thanks to the
of manpower, arising from the diversion meticulous scheduling of trains, newly ar-
of railway employees to wartime assign- rived troops were able to march directly
ments; (2) a sharp reduction in railway from shipside to railway cars for the
equipment because of oversea require- journey inland. The shortage of rolling
ments, the losses of the British Expedition- stock and the competing demands of the
ary Forces in France after Dunkerque, civilian economy made close co-ordination
abnormal wear and tear resulting from necessary in order to effect the prompt
unusually heavy domestic traffic, and re- movement of either troops or freight. All
stricted new production, especially of lo- military traffic was subject to the jurisdic-
comotives; and (3) a limited capacity to 169
move tanks, other armored vehicles, and Memo, David Wills, Info Div British Sup Coun-
cil in North America, sub: British Transport Con-
bulky Engineer and Air Forces items, at- trols, c. 1942, OCT 500 England 42; Hist Rpt, TC
tributable in part to small cars and in part ETO, Vol. I, App. 15, pp. 12-14, OCT HB ETO;
to clearance restrictions such as those im- OCT HB Monograph 29, pp. 23-24; Ltr, Ross to Lar-
169 son, 5 Dec 49, OCT HB Inquiries. See also Hancock
posed by tunnels. and Cowing, op. cit., pp. 480-83.
When Britain entered the war, her rail- 170
For monthly averages of loaded British wagons,
ways Had 19,463 locomotives, 1,241,711 see ASF MPR, Sec. 3, 30 Nov 43, p. 71.
171
Rpt, Otto Jabelmann to W. Averell Harriman,
freight cars, and 45,838 passenger cars 5 Jan 43, sub: British Locomotive Situation, OCT
with a total seating capacity of 2,655,000. 453.01-453.3 England 43; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. I,
The total route mileage was 19,273 miles, App. 14, p. 13, OCT HB ETO; Ltr, Ross to Wylie, 28
practically all of which was laid with Jul 42, AG Adm 453 England 42. See also Facts About
British Railways in Wartime (London: British Railways
standard-gauge track. Judged by Amer- Press Office, 1943).
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
tion of the joint American and British
movement control organization, in which
the Transportation Corps was most com-
monly represented by the ubiquitous
RTO.
Because of the dependence of the Army
172
upon rail transport, the serious shortage
of steam locomotives that developed in
Great Britain during 1942 had disturbing
implications for the BOLERO program. To
meet the grave need of additional motive
power, plans were made for the procure-
ment in the United States of 400 locomo-
tives of the 2-8-0 type, comparable to the
British "Austerity" class engines.173 Simply
designed so as to permit rapid production,
these locomotives were to be used first on
the British railways and later by the U.S.
Army on the Continent. Fifteen switching
locomotives also were required for moving
freight cars at the U.S. Army depots in the
United Kingdom. The theater requisition
for these 415 locomotives, together with
the usual spare parts, accessories, and
tools, was forwarded in mid-August
1942.174
During the summer and fall of 1942
there were growing indications of impend-
ing difficulty. The outloading of troops
and cargo for the North African invasion
added appreciably to the burden of the
railways. In appraising the situation Ross
found the British railway men generally
co-operative, but handicapped by the
equipment shortage. At the same time, he
complained that the U.S. Army supply
services on occasion were unable to indi-
cate the proper depot destination for cargo
and were quite lax in unloading wagons
promptly. Also, from time to time the sup-
ply services demanded embargoes on cer-
tain depots, which if granted would have
resulted in congestion at the ports, where
the docks had to be kept clear both to
123
make space for incoming cargo and to
guard against loss through enemy air at-
tack. By October 1942 it was obvious that
unless additional locomotives were pro-
cured, rail transportation might bog down
badly. Fortunately, tangible American aid
arrived soon. In November the first of the
2-8-0 locomotives was landed at Cardiff,
Wales, where it was received with appro-
priate fanfare. 175
In an effort to stave off the impending
crisis in railway transportation, W. Averell
Harriman, the U.S. lend-lease representa-
tive in London, himself an executive of a
large American rail line, arranged to have
Otto jabelmann, mechanical engineer of
the Union Pacific Railroad, sent to Lon-
don in late 1942 to look into the British
locomotive situation. Jabelmann died
before his study was completed, but his
findings, which became available in Janu-
ary 1943, indicated: (1) a serious defi-
ciency of motive power, arising from
greatly increased traffic; (2) a decrease in
the production of new locomotives; and
(3) insufficient maintenance, resulting in
too high a percentage of locomotives being
laid up for repairs. Blackout restrictions
also contributed to abnormal operating
difficulties. According to Jabelmann, the
400 American locomotives ordered for
BOLERO traffic—of which only 26 had
172
During the period from 1 August 1942 to 31 Au-
gust 1943, 65 percent of the total cargo dispatched
from the ports was forwarded by rail. See ASF MPR
Sec. 3, 30 Nov 43, p. 71.
173
The figure 2-8-0 refers to the wheel arrange-
ment of the locomotive.
174
Memo, CofT SOS for CG SOS ETO, 6 Jul 42,
sub: Trans Plan, OCT HB Gross ETO —Gen Ross;
Memo, Chief Rail Div OCT for Gen Dillon, 30 Jun
42, sub: Diesel Locomotives, OCT 453 England 42.
175
Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 25 Aug, 10 Sep 42, OCT HB
Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Ltr, Ryan to Ross, 21 Oct 42,
OCT 453 England 42; Ltr, Ryan to Gross, 25 Nov 42,
OCT HB Gross ETO—Rail.
124
been delivered up to 28 December 1942—
were urgently needed as a stopgap meas-
ure until British locomotive construction
176
picked up.
Early in 1943 General Lee put pressure
on Washington to speed up the delivery of
American-built locomotives to the United
Kingdom. The need was urgent. So far ex-
cellent weather had forestalled serious dif-
ficulty on the British railways, but be-
tween 1,000 and 1,500 trains had been
canceled per week, chiefly because of lack
of power. By 28 May 1943 a total of 184
U.S. Army 2-8-0 locomotives had been
received, of which about 100 already were
being operated on the British main lines.177
A definite understanding with the
British concerning the employment of the
BOLERO locomotives was not obtained
until mid-May 1943. Though regarded as
U.S. Army property, this equipment was
to be placed in a joint stockpile under
American and British control. As the lo-
comotives arrived they were sent to a
civilian railway shop for final assembly
and adjustment before assignment to the
British railways. The British Railway Ex-
ecutive Committee had general super-
vision of the BOLERO locomotives, but the
theater chief of transportation kept de-
tailed records of their utilization, operat-
ing condition, and location, so as to be
able to recall them on short notice if they
178
should be needed for military purposes.
Of these locomotives, only 396 figured in
the final accounting. Under the original
agreement, the British railways were to
maintain the locomotives in good running
order and to return them when requested
in the same condition as when received,
subject to normal wear and tear.179
The principal problem with respect to
the BOLERO locomotives was to assure ade-
quate maintenance, since the British were
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
short of labor and were therefore inclined
to pay little attention to such compara-
tively new equipment. The Americans, on
the other hand, realized that unless suffi-
cient maintenance were provided, the
locomotives might not be serviceable when
needed for U.S. Army operations on the
Continent. Accordingly, at the direction
of the theater chief of transportation, U.S.
Army inspectors kept careful watch on
both the maintenance and use of this
equipment.180
As D Day aproached General Ross in-
creased his pressure on the British for
proper maintenance of the BOLERO loco-
motives, but because of the critical labor
shortage his efforts were not very produc-
tive. Beginning early in 1944 the Ameri-
can 2-8-0 locomotives were progressively
recalled by the U.S. Army to be prepared
176
Ltrs, Gross to Lee, 26 Nov 42, and Ryan to
Gross, 6 and 10 Dec 42, OCT HB Gross ETO —Gen
Ross; Memo, Jabelmann for Harriman, 5 Jan 43, sub:
British Locomotive Situation, OCT 453.01-453.3 Eng-
land 43; Ltrs, Gross to Ryan, 23 Dec 42 and 20 Jan
43, OCT HB Gross ETO. See also Hancock and
Gowing, op. cit., pp. 481-82.
177
Memo, ACofS for Opns SOS for ACofS for Ma-
terial SOS WD, 16 Jan 43; Paraphrase of Cbl to Gen
Macready, British Army Staff, 20 Jan 43. Both in
OCT 453.01-453.3 England 43. See also Hancock
and Gowing, op. cit., p. 482; and Memo, Ross for
Gross, 28 May 43, sub: Rpt, Mil Ry Activities, OCT
453 England Jan-Jun 43.
178
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 18 May 43, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross; Memo, Gross to Ross, 16 May 43,
sub: Rpt Mil Ry Activities ETO, OCT 569.5-900
England 1943.
179
Of the original 400, two locomotives were de-
stroyed by explosion and two were withdrawn for
training purposes. See Memo, Chief Sup Div TC
ETO for Recorder Gen Purchasing Bd, 13 Mar 45,
OCT 453.31 England 44.
180
Memo, Maj Frank E. Cheshire, Overseas Liaison
Br OCT, for Lt Col Herbert, OCT WD, 29 Jan 43,
sub: Asgmt of Additional 2-8-0 Type Locomotives to
UK, OCT 453.01-453.3 England 43; IRS, ACofT to
CofT APO 887, 8 Oct 43, sub: British Locomotive
Production, OCT 319.1 England, Oct-Dec 43; Hist
Rpt, TC ETO, II, 81, OCT HB ETO.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
for service on the Continent, and at the
end of March 355 of them had been as-
sembled at Ebbw Junction. The return
was on such short notice that the British
had no time for overhauling and recondi-
tioning, which had to be accomplished by
the Americans.181 The 2-8-0's were a great
aid to the British railways in handling
wartime traffic and represented the major
American contribution to the relief of the
overburdened transportation facilities of
the United Kingdom.
Other equipment was also loaned to the
British railways, including 50 0-6-0 type
steam locomotives for use in the coal mines
and at British ports, 700 flatcars for mov-
ing oversize loads, 500 tank cars for carry-
ing petroleum products, and 42 refrigera-
tor cars for transporting U.S. Army perish-
able supplies. All this equipment was sub-
ject to return on fourteen days' notice. In
mid-February 1944, on recommendation
of General Ross, General Lee directed
that no U.S. Army rolling stock ear-
marked for operation on the Continent
should be released to the British railways
without specific authorization by the
theater chief of transportation. 182
The Transportation Corps did not un-
dertake any railway operations in the
United Kingdom except at the U.S. Army
depots. In October 1942, at the urgent re-
quest of the British who were then hard
pressed by the demands of the TORCH
undertaking, U.S. railway troops began
taking over responsibility for switching
and maintaining the tracks at these in-
stallations. Although temporarily handi-
capped by the transfer of rail personnel to
North Africa, by April 1943 Transporta-
tion Corps troops were doing the switch-
ing at eight U.S. Army depots, using
eighteen locomotives for the purpose. As
additional railway operating troops
125
became available, this activity was ex-
panded.183
The British Isles formed a useful train-
ing center for American railway troops,
most of whom were without firsthand
knowledge of the European railway sys-
tems. The theater chief of transportation
therefore assigned various military rail-
way units to U.S. Army depots and to
British railway installations so that the
men could obtain the technical training
and practical experience required for
military railway operations on the Conti-
nent.184
The United Kingdom also served as a
convenient base at which to assemble and
store railway rolling stock for ultimate use
in France. Some of this equipment came
from British sources, but most of it arrived
from the United States in knocked-down
form. The assembly and storage of railway
cars developed into a major enterprise,
concerning which further details will be
181
Memos, Ross for Gross, 14 and 31 Mar 44, sub:
Rpt Mil Ry Activities, AG 319.1 Rpt to CofT Wash-
ington; Memo, Chief Sup Div TC ETO for Recorder
Gen Purchasing Bd, 13 Mar 45, OCT 453.31 Eng-
land 44.
182
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, II, 67-68, OCT HB ETO;
Memo. Ross for Gross, 14 Mar 44, sub: Rpt Mil Ry
Activities ETO, AG 319.1 Rpt to CofT Washington;
IRS, ACofT Sup Div OCT to Lt Harris, Hist Sec, 6
Oct 44, AG Adm 341A ETO. See also IRS, G-4 to
CofT SOS ETO, 29 Jan 44, sub: Wagons for Conti-
nental Opns, and Memo, CG SOS ETO for Base Sec
Comdrs, 13 Feb 44, same sub, AG 453 Vol. I 1944 Ry
Equip.
183
Ltr, Ryan to Gross, 7 Nov 42, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Rail; Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in
ETO, Annex 8, History of the Military Railway Serv-
ice, Apps. 10 and I; Memo, Lt Col S. H. Bingham,
TC, for CofT SOS ETO, 9 Apr 43, sub: Responsibili-
ties of TC 1943-45, AG 320 Responsibilities of TC
1943-45 EUCOM; Memo, Ross to Gross, 16 May 43,
sub: Mil Ry Activities. OCT 545.9-900 England 43.
184
Memo, Ross for Gross, 28 May 43, sub: Rpt, Mil
Ry Activities ETO, OCT 453 England Jan-Jun 43;
Memo, Ross for Gross, 15 Jun 43, same sub, AG 319.1
Misc Rpts ETO 43.
126
given in the account of Transportation
Corps supply activities.185
While fulfilling its responsibilities for
rail transportation in the United King-
dom, the Transportation Corps developed
plans for rail operations on the Continent.
The Transportation Corps Military Rail-
way Division had been working on rail
equipment requirements since 1942, and
the Transportation Corps Advance Eche-
lon, set up in mid-September 1943, gave
increasing attention to plans for rail as
well as other transportation activities fol-
lowing the cross-Channel assault. On 20
March 1944 the 2d Military Railway
Service headquarters, under Brig. Gen.
Clarence L. Burpee, arrived in England
and began to prepare to take control of
U.S. military railway operations in north-
ern France. By D Day detailed plans had
been worked out for the transfer of U.S.
rail personnel and equipment to the Con-
tinent and for the operations to be under-
186
taken thereafter.
Motor Transport
The U.S. Army at first made only lim-
ited use of the motor vehicles in the
United Kingdom, in part because of seri-
ous shortages of gasoline, oil, and tires,
and in part because of the narrow and
winding roads, which were usually
flanked by hedges that tended to obscure
the driver's vision. Americans also had
some anxious moments learning to drive
on the left side and under blackout re-
strictions. But when it became obvious
that the British railways could not bear
the entire burden, increasing use had to
be made of motor transport.187
The theater chief of transportation had
a dual interest in motor transport: as a
means of moving troops and freight, and
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
as an activity involving traffic control. At
the outset he was assigned responsibility
for the operation, maintenance, and
movement control of motor vehicles. In
midsummer of 1942 the War Department
transferred functions pertaining to the de-
velopment, procurement, and issue, as well
as heavier classes of maintenance, from the
Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance De-
partment. The operations of truck troop
units remained a responsibility of the
Quartermaster Corps. The European the-
ater followed suit on 1 September, thereby
limiting the Transportation Corps to
movement control for U.S. Army traffic
on the highways. This change came as an
unexpected blow to General Ross. Al-
though he professed no desire to retain re-
sponsibility for the maintenance, as-
sembly, or distribution of motor vehicles,
he thought it a mistake to remove the
operation of trucking units from his juris-
diction. Despite the disadvantage of di-
vided responsibility for motor transport,
this situation prevailed for almost a
year.188
The Transportation Corps was responsi-
ble for arranging all U.S. movements by
highway to and from the ports, and for
the control of all motor traffic involving
convoys of fifty or more vehicles (twenty
or more vehicles when moving through
London, Edinburgh, or Glasgow). The
185
Hist Rpt, TG ETO, I, 64-67, OCT HB ETO;
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, Annex 8,
MRS Hist, App. 10. See below, pp. 129ff.
186
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, An-
nex 8, MRS Hist, pp. 13-15.
187
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 108-09.
188
WD Cir 245, 25 Jul 42; Hist Rcd, Ord Sv Hq
SOS, 22 Jul-20 Sep 42, AG Adm 564 ETO; A Brief
Outline History of the Motor Transport Service, OCT
HB ETO MTS; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 10 Sep 42, OCT
HB Gross ETO —Gen Ross; Ltr, Ryan to Gross, 7
Nov 42, OCT HB Gross ETO —Rail; Ltrs, Ross to
Larson, 9 Mar and 5 Dec 49, OCT HB Inquiries.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
theater chief of transportation exercised
control of American road movements
through the same regional organization
already set up to control U.S. rail moves.
Upon request of a depot or troop unit, the
regional transportation officer, working in
close co-ordination with representatives of
the British Movement Control and the
U.S. Army provost marshal, issued move-
ment instructions covering dates, sched-
ules, routes, staging, and traffic control.
Implementation of these instructions was
the responsibility of the district trans-
portation officers and the railway trans-
portation officers under them. Traffic con-
trol was performed by the base section
provost marshal, the British Movement
Control, or the civil police. Later, convoys
of less than fifty vehicles moving within a
district or between districts in the same
region were handled directly by the dis-
trict transportation officer concerned.189
The U.S. movement control organiza-
tion assisted in reducing the waste of mile-
age, gasoline, rubber, and manpower
caused when motor convoys returned
empty. Late in 1942 the British War
Office suggested a return-loads plan,
designed to promote the maximum utili-
zation of drivers and vehicles. General
Lee accepted this plan and charged the
theater chief of transportation with the re-
sponsibility for securing return loads for
U.S. Army trucks. The plan was limited
to vehicles dispatched on journeys in ex-
cess of twenty-five miles. The U.S. Army
dispatching officer would notify the re-
gional transportation officer or the nearest
RTO of the number of vehicles available
for loading, their types and capacities, and
the time of arrival at destination. If the
RTO was unable to secure a return load
he telephoned the regional transportation
officer, who arranged for a load through
127
the British Military Transport liaison
officer. No return was to involve civilian
traffic, deviate from a direct route by
more than ten miles except in an emer-
gency, or interfere with military opera-
tional moves.
Other measures were adopted to insure
that U.S. Army vehicles had pay loads on
every trip. Whenever possible casual ship-
ments were pooled and transported in
British commercial vehicles. Newly ar-
rived organizational vehicles were used to
forward freight to inland points while
en route to their respective units. Periodic
surveys were made of the utilization of
motor transport, particularly for the
heavy traffic between the ports and the
depots. From its inception through 4
March 1944 the conservation effort, in-
cluding the return-loads plan, resulted in
an estimated saving of $686,002.20.190
Control of the operation of motor trans-
port vehicles was returned to the Trans-
portation Corps in the summer of 1943.
Studies conducted while this activity was
under the Quartermaster Corps had indi-
cated that the separation of movement
control and operational functions did not
lend itself to the efficient use of equip-
ment. As a corrective measure the vehicles
of certain motor transport units were
pooled, to be used where and when
needed; and, with the concurrence of the
189
Story of Trans in UK, pp. 109-10; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, Vol. I, App. 14, pp. 33-34, 70-72, and Vol. II,
pp. 24-25, OCT HB ETO.
190
Ltr, Ryan to Gross, 25 Nov 42, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross; 1st Ind, Hq SOS OCT ETO, to
CofT WD, OCT 400.33-413.77 England 43; Hist Rpt,
TC ETO, Vol. I, App. 14, p. 28, OCT HB ETO;
Memo, Lt Col H. J. Dooley, TC, for CofT SOS ETO,
7 Mar 44, sub: Rpt Hwy Br OCT, AG 320 Responsi-
bilities of TC 1943-45 EUCOM. The savings were
calculated on the basis of the British estimate of
twenty cents a mile reloaded. See Hist Rpt, TC ETO,
II, 28, OCT HB ETO.
128
chief quartermaster of the theater, the
operation of all motor transport not spe-
cifically assigned to other agencies was re-
assigned to the Transportation Corps in
July. Anticipating this change, General
Ross had already established the Motor
Transport Division in his headquarters
under Lt. Col (later Col.) Loren A. Ayers,
who had been active in U.S. Army motor
transportation since 1941.191
As organized on 26 January 1944, the
Motor Transport Division had three
branches, concerned respectively with re-
quirements, allocations to the base sec-
tions, and unit training. The troop units
under its control at this time consisted of
Quartermaster truck companies, Quarter-
master car companies for carrying person-
nel, amphibian truck companies, and
headquarters and headquarters detach-
ments of Quartermaster battalions (mo-
bile). Each of these units, with its equip-
ment, was assigned to a specific base sec-
tion for rations, quarters, administration,
and day-to-day operational control. The
mission of the Motor Transport Division
was to provide general-purpose motor
transport for the use of all elements of the
Services of Supply and to relieve the hard-
pressed rail and inland waterway facili-
ties. The division determined the over-all
requirements, allocated vehicles and troop
units to the base sections, and supervised
the utilization of the vehicles and the
training and utilization of the personnel.192
In the field, the port commanders
supervised and directed the operation of
the vehicles and troop units allotted to
them by the base sections. Other motor
transport units in the base sections were
controlled by the regional transportation
officers through their district transporta-
tion officers and RTO's. The regional
transportation officers operated motor
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
transport pools, organized provisional
trucking units, and allocated vehicles to
meet peak loads in the region and to assist
other base sections. Under the regional
transportation officers, the district trans-
portation officers directed the operation of
Transportation Corps motor transport
units, issued orders for the movement of
troops and freight, and co-ordinated
movements to other districts or regions
through the regional office. The RTO's,
functioning under the district transporta-
tion officers, controlled the operation of
Transportation Corps trucking units to
and from their installations.193
When the Motor Transport Division
was established, motor transport was still
a relatively minor activity, but the strain
on railroad facilities caused by the heavy
inbound traffic necessitated increased
reliance on truck transportation begin-
ning in the latter half of 1943. By March
1944, approximately one third of all U.S.
Army cargo cleared from United King-
dom ports was being shipped by highway.
This traffic was handled in part by Trans-
portation Corps motor transport units and
in part by civilian carriers secured through
the British Ministry of War Transport.
Road movements within and between
191
Memo, Ross for all concerned, 11 Jul 43, sub:
Orgn of OCT, and Memo, Brig Gen Robert McG.
Littlejohn, Chief QM, to Col Royal B. Lord, Chief Svs
SOS ETO, 4 Jul 43, sub: Re-allocation of MT Duties,
AG 320 Responsibilities of TC 1943-45 EUCOM;
Story of Trans in UK, p. 112; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I,
62 and App. 1, OCT HB ETO, Cir 45, Hq SOS
ETOUSA, 22 Jul 43, AG Adm 71 C (ETO); IRS,
Asst ACofT MT Div to CofT, 7 Sep 43, sub: Resume
of First Month's Work, AG 319.1 Misc Rpts 44
EUCOM TC.
192
Ltr, H. Lehneis to Larson, 28 Mar 50, OCT HB
Inquiries. See IRS, CofMT Div to CofT SOS ETO,
25 Jan 44, and IRS, Capt Valentine, OCT, to Lt Col
Case, Adv Ech TC, 14 Feb 44, AG 320 Responsibili-
ties of TC 1943-45 EUCOM.
193
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. I, App. 14, p. 27, OCT
HB ETO.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
regions also increased. Convoys of fifty or
more vehicles, controlled by motor convoy
officers, numbered 4,080 in March 1944,
almost ten times the number handled in
the previous November. As D Day drew
near, the principal problem confronting
the motor transport units under the juris-
diction of the theater chief of transporta-
tion was a shortage of 150 officers, which
had an adverse effect upon training, ad-
ministration, and operation.194
Shortly after its creation, the Motor
Transport Division began to prepare for
the invasion of Normandy. Plans were
worked out in the summer of 1943 regard-
ing the number of troop units and the
number and types of equipment to be
used, and the assignment of extra drivers
to permit round-the-clock operations. The
theater Transportation Corps was unable
to secure approval for the number of
truck companies it considered necessary.
To add to its troubles the procurement of
heavy-duty equipment that it requisi-
tioned was delayed, forcing the ac-
ceptance of less desirable types. The pro-
vision of personnel to serve as extra drivers
was not authorized until the spring of
1944, a delay adversely affecting their
quality and training. These developments
were to have serious consequences during
the rapid advance of the U.S. Army on
the Continent after the St. Lô break-
through.195
In the last months before the cross-
Channel assault, the Motor Transport Di-
vision worked closely with the Transporta-
tion Corps Advance Echelon in develop-
ing detailed plans for motor transport ac-
tivities on the Continent. The bulk of the
staff of the Motor Transport Division was
eventually taken over by the Advance
Echelon, which moved to France after D
Day. The rear echelon in London became
129
the Motor Transport Division of the
United Kingdom Base Section. Mean-
while, a month before the invasion, a
Motor Transport Brigade was established
as part of the Advance Section, Com-
munications Zone, arid prepared to as-
sume control of initial zone of communi-
cations motor transport activities on the
196
Continent.
Equipment and Supplies
The first equipment requisitioned by
the Transportation Corps in the United
Kingdom was intended for U.S. Army
port operations. The theater chief of
transportation did not become directly
responsible for the procurement of mili-
tary railway equipment until late 1942,
when that function was transferred from
the theater chief of engineers. Neverthe-
less, in July of that year Ross had begun
to explore the possibility of fabricating all
required railway rolling stock in the
British Isles, using imported American
steel. The project was never carried out, in
large measure because of the shortage of
qualified British labor.197
Freight Carsfor the Continent
Meanwhile, Maj. Frank E. Cheshire,
an officer experienced in the field of rail-
194
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, II, 24, OCT HB ETO;
Memo, DCofT SOS ETO for CofT ASF, 29 Mar 44,
sub: Rpt MT Activities ETO, AG 319.1 Rpt to CofT
Washington, EUCOM.
195
On Transportation Corps planning for motor
transport on the Continent, see below, pp. 234-35,
239-42.
196
IRS, CofS Br MTS OCT to Chief MTS OCT,
29 Dec 44, sub: Reorgn MTS OCT, AG 320 Respon-
sibilities of TC 1943-45 EUCOM; A Brief Outline
History of the Motor Transport Service, pp. 6-7, 10,
OCT HB ETO MTS.
197
Ltrs, Ross for Gross, 19 Jun and 8 Jul 42, OCT
HB Gross Day File. Cf. Hancock and Go wing, op cit.,
pp. 480-83.
130
way equipment, had been assigned to
assess the freight car requirements for the
European theater. Personal observation in
the United Kingdom had impressed him
with the utility of the small British 4-wheel
goods wagon, or freight car. Accordingly,
in the summer of 1942 he designed a simi-
lar knocked-down 4-wheel, 20-ton freight
car that required a minimum of material
and shipping space, was easy to assemble,
and had an expected service life of four to
five years. Although other types would be
needed, this car was considered basic.
Initially, some 22,400 cars of this type
(open and box) were projected. Each car
was to be so fitted as to be readily inter-
changeable with British equipment. Fur-
ther savings in metal arid in weight were
to be achieved by using plywood for the
roof, sides, and ends. Cheshire's original
design was rejected as impractical by the
U.S. Army Engineer Board, but a modi-
fied 4-wheel 20-ton car was adapted for
Army use. It was built with heavier steel
sections than Cheshire had deemed nec-
essary, and the fabrication was by riveting
rather than by welding as he had advo-
cated.198
After consultation with the theater, the
War Department drew up a program for
the shipment of 29,000 railway cars to the
United Kingdom. As visualized on 1 Sep-
tember 1942, the requirements included
16,000 20-ton boxcars, 9,600 gondolas of
20-ton and 40-ton capacity, 3,200 56-ton
flatcars, and smaller numbers of tank,
brake van, and refrigerator cars. All rail-
way cars were to be fabricated in the zone
of interior and shipped knocked-down for
assembly overseas. Shipment was to be at
the rate of 2,500 cars month beginning
in October 1942.199
During the winter of 1942-43 the Trans-
portation Corps in the United Kingdom
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
negotiated with the British to obtain the
Hainault railway sheds and siding near
London as a plant for the erection of the
knocked-down, American-built freight
cars. Originally planned to serve the Lon-
don subway but never completed, the site
was deemed the most desirable for this
project despite some danger of air attack.
Initially, two railway tracks were to be
constructed, one for assembly and erec-
tion, and the other for storage. Although
the Transportation Corps had completed
plans to use the facilities at Hainault in
March 1943, the installation was not for-
mally activated as a Transportation Corps
depot until mid-July. Up to that time only
356 knocked-down cars had been re-
ceived.200
The activity at Hainault afforded valu-
able training. Assembling a 20-ton boxcar,
for instance, took place in eleven stages,
ending with the touch-up paint and the
stencil that identified the car as a unit of
the U.S. Army Transportation Corps.
From July to September 1943 a detach-
198
Story of Trans in UK, p. 119; Memo, Maj J. M.
Poorman, OCT, for AG, 13 Jun 42, sub: Orders, OCT
210.3 England 42; Memo, Col Ryan for Col Lewis T..
Ross, OCofE WD, 24 Jul 42, sub: Plans for New RR
Car, Memo, Ryan for Traub, 5 Aug 42, sub: Re…
Rolling Stock, and Ltr, Cheshire to Ryan, 15 Aug 42,
OCT HB ETO Rys (Hist Data to May 43); Ltr, Ross
to Gross, 10 Sep 42, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross;
Ltr, Cheshire to Larson, 6 Sep 49, OCT HB Inquiries.
199
Paraphrase of Cbl, WD to CG USFOR, 8 Aug
42; Memo, Chief Ry Br Troops Div OCofE for Chief
Sup Div, 1 Sep 42, sub: Cars for Stock Pile. Both in
OCT 370.5 Mvmt BOLERO (Ry Equip and Ry Pers
Rqmts.)
200
Memo, CG SOS ETO for CG ASF WD, 25 Mar
43, sub: Standard Gauge Ry Cars; Notes of Mtg at
War Office, 25 Mar 43, sub: Hainault Ry Depot. Both
in OCT HB ETO Rys (Hist Data to May 43). See also
Memo, Ross for Gross, 28 May 43, sub: Rpt Mil Ry
Activities ETO, OCT 453 England Jan-Jun 43;
Memos, Ross for Gross, 14 and 30 Jul 43, same sub,
OCT 319.1 England Jan-Sep 43; Ltr, Ross to Gross,
26 Nov 43, OCT 453 England Jul-Dec 43.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN 131

ment of the 729th Railway Operating Bat- By 30 May 1944 a total of 20,351
talion, consisting of mechanics recruited wagons or cars of all types had reached the
from U.S. railroads, pioneered in the theater, including 9,270 20-ton boxcars,
assembly work at Hainault. Thereafter, 5,050 20-ton gondolas, 2,891 40-ton gon-
the 756th Railway Shop Battalion under dolas, 1,530 56-ton flatcars, and smaller
Lt. Col. Howard U. Bates rolled up an numbers of 20-ton caboose, 40-ton tank,
impressive record. The heaviest produc- and refrigerator cars. Most of the 7,106
tion was attained in June 1944 when 1,147 erected units had been assembled at
201
cars were erected. Hainault, but appreciable numbers were
In addition to the Hainault facilities, set up at Sudbury-Egginton and Moreton-
other installations were set up to handle on-Lugg.204
Transportation Corps equipment, spare
parts, and supplies for use in the United Hospital Trains and Unit Cars
Kingdom and on the Continent. By mid-
August 1943, depots had been established The arrangement for the assembly of
at Ebbw Junction to store spare parts for American rolling stock in the United
locomotive repairs and at Highbridge to Kingdom included only freight cars.
store spare parts for 0-6-0 locomotives and Other arrangements had to be made,
organizational equipment for port and therefore, to provide the specialized rail-
railway units. Transportation sections also way equipment required to move sick and
functioned at four general depots in the wounded U.S. Army personnel within the
United Kingdom: Sudbury-Egginton, theater.
Moreton-on-Lugg, Wem, and Burton-on- Despite wartime shortages of matériel
Trent. The first three were concerned with and labor, some progress was made during
the assembly and storage of knocked- 1943-44 in obtaining hospital trains. This
down railway cars, and the fourth housed was accomplished through the co-opera-
spare parts for 2-8-0 locomotives and the tion of the theater chief of transportation
overflow of organizational equipment. 2 0 2
Although the assembly of 20-ton freight 201
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I, 68-70, OCT HB ETO;
cars accounted for the bulk of the car- Ltr, Ross to Gross, 26 Nov 43, OCT 453 England Jul-
erection project, special attention had to Dec 43; Hist Rcd, 729th Ry Operating Bn, 15 Jan 44,
be given to refrigerator cars. During the and Rpt, Technical Operations Depot TC-201 and
TC-203, 756th Railway Operating Battalion, 14 Dec
summer of 1943, because of unusually 44, OCT HB ETO France Rys Unit Rpts.
warm weather, the scarcity of suitable rail 202
Memo, Ross for Gross, Sep 43, sub: Rpt Mil Ry
equipment, and the problem of getting ice, Activities ETO, OCT 453 England Jul-Dec 43;
the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps ex- Memo, Ross for Gross, 30 Jul 43, same sub, OCT
319.1 England.
perienced difficulty in moving perishables 203
Extract, Phone Conv, Ross and Wylie, 7 Aug 43,
over the British railways. In an effort to OCT 319.1 England (Tel Conv) 43; Memo, Ross for
safeguard the food destined for American Gross, Sep 43, sub: Rpt Mil Ry Activities ETO, and
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 26 Nov 43, OCT 453 England
military personnel, the theater requested Jul-Dec 43; Memo, ACofT for Sup for CG ASF, 8 Sep
that unassembled refrigerator cars be given 43, sub: Ry Cars, Refrigerator, OCT 531.4, 1942;
Summary Rolling Stock Position, OCT SOS ETO, 30
priority shipment from the United States. Sep 43, OCT 319.1 England Jan-Sep 43.
By 30 September 1943,100 had arrived 204
Summary Rolling Stock Position, OCT SOS
in the United Kingdom.203 ETO, 30 May 44, AG 319.1 Rpt to CofT Washington.
132
and the chief surgeon with the assistance
of the British. By late June 1943 a decision
had been reached in Washington that, in
order to save shipping space, hospital
trains would be procured in the United
Kingdom. Some old British cars held over
from World War I were pressed into serv-
ice, and additional hospital trains were
made up from available wooden cars. The
conversion work was accomplished under
U.S. Army supervision at the Swindon
205
railway shops. By 1 September 1943 fif-
teen hospital trains had been made avail-
able in the United Kingdom, and three
self-contained ambulance-unit cars, de-
signed to transport small groups of casual-
ties, were in process of conversion from
British railway equipment. 206
A hospital train consisted of fourteen
cars: seven or eight ward cars equipped
with triple-deck hospital beds or litter
racks, a pharmacy-office-surgery car con-
taining an operating room with the mini-
mum equipment, kitchen cars, sleeping
cars for the train personnel, and a utility
car to provide heat. Made up of old and
hastily converted equipment, the hospital
trains fell far short of American specifica-
tions. The wooden cars were hazardous in
case of fire or accident, and the heating
and ventilation were found inadequate.
The hospital trains were employed in
the United Kingdom to move patients
from one hospital to another or to the
ports for evacuation to the United States.
The chief surgeon of the theater provided
the medical staff, equipment, and supplies,
and controlled the utilization of the trains.
Their operation as railway equipment was
supervised by the theater chief of trans-
portation, who also furnished a small
maintenance crew. By D Day twenty-
seven hospital trains intended for use on
the Continent had been converted or were
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
nearing completion. At the end of 1944
twenty-five such trains had been ferried
across the Channel and placed in opera-
tion in France. A number were continued
in use in the United Kingdom after the
invasion to move casualties from a num-
ber of transit hospitals on the south coast
of England to general hospitals in the inte-
rior. Later, all patients were debarked at
Southampton, whence hospital trains car-
ried them directly to the general hospi-
tals.207
Marine Equipment
The port operating equipment received
in the United Kingdom in 1942 was chiefly
that that accompanied the port battalions.
Much of this equipment was diverted to
North Africa, compelling the theater chief
of transportation to start anew to obtain
the equipment required for port opera-
tions in the United Kingdom and on the
Continent. For the first phase of the inva-
sion (D Day to D plus 90) the U.S. Army
205
Memo, Conf, Gen Dillon's Office, OCT WD, 10
Jun 42, OCT 370.5 Mvmt BOLERO (Ry Equip and Ry
Pers Rqmts); IRS, DCofT to CofT APO 887, 26 Apr
43, sub: Rpt for CofT Washington, OCT 319.1 Eng-
land; Memo, Chief Rail Div OCT, for ACofT for Sup
OCT, 26 Jun 43, sub: Trans Shortages, OCT 531.4
Hosp Trains.
206
On ambulance-unit cars, the first of which was
delivered on 17 September 1943, see the following:
Memo, Ross for Gross, 30 Sep 43, sub: Rpt Mil Ry
Activities ETO, OCT 319.1 England; Hist Rpt TC
ETO, Vol. I, App. 11, Diagram, Ambulance Unit,
OCT HB ETO; Comments, Capt James W. Rowe,
SGO, 11 Oct 44, OCT HB ETO Evacuation.
207
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. I, pp. 27-28, Vol. III,
Ch. III, pp. 3-4, OCT HB ETO; Memo, ACofT for
Sup OCT for SGO, 8 Jul 43, sub: Hosp Trains, OCT
531.4 Hosp Trains; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 6 Jun 44, OCT
HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Gen Bd Rpt, Study No.
124, pp. 54-55, OCT HB ETO. See also Comments,
Capt Rowe, SGO Medical Plans and Opns, and
Memo, Col Fred H. Mowrey, MC, for 20 Sep 47, sub:
Hosp Trains, OCT HB ETO Evacuation.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
requirements for the Continent were de-
termined jointly with the British with a
view to setting up a joint stockpile. For the
second phase (after D plus 90), the Ameri-
can requirements for the Continent were
calculated by the chief of transportation's
Planning Division and submitted to the
War Department as special Transporta-
tion Corps projects.208 Among the marine
items included in approved Transporta-
tion Corps projects were 473 104-foot
knocked-down steel barges and 400 60-
foot knocked-down wooden barges, to-
gether with oil tankers, launches, marine
tractors, tugs, and towboats.209
Aside from receiving and maintaining
all U.S. Army port and marine equip-
ment, the Transportation Corps supervised
the assembly of the items which were
shipped in knocked-down condition. The
erection of barges was begun early in 1944
by private British contractors working
under the supervision of the theater chief
of transportation. The wooden barges
were set up at Totnes and the steel barges
at Hayle and Truro. The program called
for 120 steel barges and 220 wooden
barges to be ready for use by 31 May
1944. To meet this goal, General Ross re-
quested that the 386th Port Battalion, a
Negro unit, be used along with British
civilians at Totnes. The labor unions ob-
jected, but eventually agreed to an ar-
rangement whereby U.S. Army personnel
were allowed to assist in the work as a
means of obtaining practical training
essential to future military operations.
Despite considerable difficulty in attain-
ing the scheduled production, by the end
of May 1944 a total of 176 steel barges had
been assembled at Hayle and Truro, and
at Totnes all 400 wooden barges were com-
pleted two weeks ahead of the target date.
Other assembly activities included the
133
erection of 30-ton and 60-ton floating
cranes at various ports.210
As the invasion date drew near, marine
equipment poured into the British Isles.
More than 100 tugs, up to 86 feet in
length, were shipped as deck cargo. The
larger seagoing tugs generally proceeded
to the theater under their own power,
while other floating equipment, notably
the oil barges and car floats to be used for
cross-Channel ferrying of petroleum prod-
ucts and railway rolling stock, had to be
towed on the hazardous passage across the
Atlantic. These craft were to play a vital
role in the invasion of France. At South-
ampton, for example, three tugs of the
329th Harbor Craft Company towed units
for the artificial harbor to the far shore,
and a fourth was active in the initial Nor-
mandy landings. The failure of twenty-
three large ocean-going tugs to arrive by
D Day was a serious blow. Production
difficulties were blamed for this deficiency,
which was made up as far as possible by
substituting other craft from the United
States.211
208
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I, 17-18, OCT HB ETO;
Interv, Col Traub, 5 Apr 50, OCT HB ETO Plng &
Preparations.
209
AG Ltr, 20 Oct 43, sub: Special Projects (Trans)
ETO, OCT 400 England (Special Projects-Trans) 43;
Memo, Actg Dir Sup TC for Exec Office ACofT for
Opns ASF WD, 3 Nov 43, sub: Fltg Equip, OCT
541.2-563.4 England 43; Ltr, Gen Ross to Col Worth-
ington, OCT, 12 Nov 43, OCT 319.1 England Oct-
Dec 43.
210
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, II, 61-62, 64, OCT HB
ETO; Hist Rpt, 13th Port, May 44, p, 13, OCT HB
Oversea Ports; Ltr, Ross to Larson, 5 Dec 49, OCT
HB Inquiries; Consolidated Rpt on TG Activities in
ETO, Annex 4, p. 3.
211
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 6 Jun 44, and Memo, Chief
Water Div OCT for CofT ASF, 9 Jun 44, sub: Tugs
for ETO, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross. Hist Rcd,
14th Port, Jun 44 (329th Harbor Graft Co), OCT HB
Oversea Ports 14th Port; OCT HB Monograph 19, pp.
201-02. On the towing, which was performed by the
U.S. Navy, see AG 560 Barges 12/44-12/45
EUCOM.
134
Spare Parts and Supplies
Because of the relatively slow increase
in Transportation Corps personnel in the
United Kingdom, supply was not a press-
ing problem until 1943. During 1942 a
substantial amount of equipment and
supplies was obtained from the British,
including 70,000 life belts; 3 harbor craft;
10 mobile cranes; 3 diesel locomotives;
100 motor coaches converted for use as
ambulances; and 30 tons of locomotive
spare parts for both heavy and running
repairs. Thereafter requirements mounted.
In addition to current requirements, the
theater chief of transportation had to con-
tribute to the joint American-British stock-
pile being built up for use on the Conti-
nent from D Day to D plus 90.212
From the beginning General Ross was
faced with the problem of securing suffi-
cient spare parts, and in the fall of 1943
he was especially concerned over spare
parts for the 400 BOLERO 2-8-0 locomo-
tives. Late in the year Maj. John W.
Marsh, assigned by Ross to investigate the
spare parts situation in the United King-
dom, found that, apart from a lack of in-
formation as to what was needed and what
was available, confusion existed as to iden-
tification and nomenclature. Marsh also
found that the spare parts depot at Burton-
on-Trent was an old wooden building with
no lighting and with other deficiencies, and
that the officer-in-charge there was handi-
capped by a lack of mechanical equipment
and by unfamiliarity with the names and
functions of many of the parts carried in
stock. In his report, Marsh recommended
that railway spare parts be shipped from
the United States automatically, that is,
periodically without waiting for requisi-
tions; that a standard nomenclature be
adopted; that a spare parts catalog be pre-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
pared; and that a qualified storekeeper be
assigned to the European theater to super-
vise the storage and issue of railway equip-
213
ment and parts.
The spare parts problem was accentu-
ated by the comparatively wide range of
transportation items that ultimately had
to be procured. Unfortunately, much of
this equipment was not standardized.
Moreover, being a newly established tech-
nical service, the Transportation Corps
had only begun to establish the needed
equipment catalogs, standard nomencla-
ture lists, and technical manuals, and
lacked the accumulated experience with
respect to replacement and mortality fac-
tors that the other technical services had
developed through the years. Eventually,
as such aids were developed and the requi-
site experience was gained, the spare parts
situation became much less acute.214
In recognition of the growing signifi-
cance of his supply activity, General Ross
established a new Supply Division under
Col. Leonard F. Felio in October 1943.
The division was made responsible for the
procurement, storage, and issue of all
transportation equipment authorized for
Transportation Corps units, as well as the
Transportation Corps supplies and equip-
ment required for operational projects on
the Continent. As previously noted, dur-
ing 1943 the Transportation Corps ob-
tained considerable additional depot space
for the storage and issue of its matériel,
212
Memo, Chief Procurement Div OCT SOS
ETOUSA for Gen Purchasing Agent London Ech
SOS APO 887, 20 Jan 43, sub: Rpt of Direct Procure-
ment on Reciprocal Aid by TC, OCT HB ETO Sup.
213
Memo, Ross for Gross, Sep 43, sub: Mil Ry Ac-
tivities ETO, OCT 453 England Jul-Dec 43; Memo,
Actg ACofT for Sup for Chief Field Svs Gp OCT, 25
Oct 43, sub: Spare Parts, OCT 453.31 England 43.
214
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. XIII, pp. 1-3,
OCT HB ETO.
BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN
much of which was intended for use on the
Continent, and at the close of June 1944
the Corps occupied 143,000 square feet of
covered space, 4,157,000 square feet of
open space, and 136,000 square feet of shop
space, distributed among ten depots. By
that time the Supply Division had re-
viewed and approved more than 2,400
requisitions and had issued approximately
4,000 shipping releases, indicating to the
ports of discharge, RTO's, and receiving
units concerned the disposition of supplies
215
scheduled to arrive.
During the critical period April-June
1944, besides receiving supplies from the
United States and issuing organizational
equipment to units, the Supply Division
had to arrange for the movement of trans-
portation equipment to the Continent.
Since not enough port equipment had
arrived to permit issuance of the entire
amount authorized for each unit, the Sup-
ply Division and the Marine Operations
Division had to apportion the available
items among the ports in the United King-
dom and on the Continent. Air shipment
was requested for many spare parts for
marine engines, tugs, and tankers.
The Supply Division was responsible for
keeping stock records of all items on hand
and en route, for issuing equipment to
newly arrived units, for establishing re-
quirements for all equipment and supplies
not automatically provided, and for main-
taining liaison with appropriate British
agencies with a view to local procurement
wherever possible. It had mastered these
details fairly well by the time activities
were transferred to the Continent. 216
135
The Situation on D Day
During the build-up period the Trans-
portation Corps, with the aid of the Brit-
ish, successfully handled the transportation
activities involved in the accumulation of
American men and materials in the United
Kingdom. As strategic planning firmed
up and inbound traffic reached large-scale
proportions in the latter half of 1943, the
Transportation Corps gave increasing
attention to preparations for the invasion
of the Continent.217 On 6 June 1944 Gen-
eral Ross expressed his belief that prepara-
tions for the most part had been success-
ful. This was true despite the delay in the
arrival of certain large tugs, the late arrival
of personnel, and the failure to obtain de-
sired heavy-duty motor vehicles.218 Ahead
lay the task of transferring a large part of
the men and supplies accumulated in
Britain to the Continent, and undertaking
there the transportation operations re-
quired for the support of U.S. forces in
combat. Before going into that, however,
it is necessary to discuss transportation
problems in North Africa and the Medi-
terranean.
215
Ibid., pp. 3-4; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 18 May 43,
OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Memo, Ross for
Gross, 10 Jun 43, sub: Depot Cos TC, OCT 319.1
England Jan-Sep 43; Memo, Gross for Ross, Sep 43,
sub: Rpt Mil Ry Activities ETO, OCT 453 England
Jul-Dec 43.
216
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. XIII, pp. 1-5,
OCT HB ETO; Rpt, History and Activities, OCT
Supply Division, 29 Aug 45, OCT HB ETO Sup Div.
217
For details on Transportation Corps participa-
tion in the planning and execution of OVERLORD, see
below, Ch. VI.
218
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 6 Jun 44, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross.
 CHAPTER IV
North Africa
Transportation for the invasion of North
Africa, the first major Allied offensive of
the war, was a combined enterprise draw-
ing on both American and British ship-
ping. After the initial phase, during which
U.S. troops and cargo were forwarded
from both the United Kingdom and the
United States, the American forces re-
ceived their principal support directly
from the United States. The bulk of the
men and matériel had to be moved ap-
proximately 3,400 miles 1 across the At-
lantic during a time of intensive Axis
submarine warfare and when naval escorts
and ocean shipping space were at a pre-
mium. In order to land personnel and
cargo and transport them to the fighting
front, the Americans had to engage in
port, railway, and motor transport opera-
tions. (Map 3) These activities not only
required close co-ordination with the
British but also involved the French, who
owned the basic transportation facilities,
and the local Arab population.
In many respects the campaign was a
pioneering venture in wartime transporta-
tion operations. Without extensive experi-
ence in planning, mounting, and support-
ing a large assault force, the U.S. Army
had much to learn and encountered nu-
merous difficulties. Yet, despite limited
facilities, adverse weather, language bar-
riers, and grave shortages of men and
equipment, the necessary transportation
2 Hydrographic Office, 1943), pp. 280, 293.
job was done.
The Strategic Background
When, in July 1942, the U.S. and Brit-
ish leaders decided to undertake the inva-
sion of French North Africa, the Allied
military outlook was bleak. In Europe the
Germans had driven the Soviet Army
back toward the Caucasus, in Africa the
British had lost Tobruk, and in the Far
East the Japanese had advanced almost as
far south as Australia. Although Ameri-
can strategic planners believed that a
North African invasion might well rule
out a cross-Channel operation during
1943, there were numerous advantages to
be gained from such an operation. It
would bring American forces into action
against the enemy at an early date and
would provide additional bases from
which to attack Axis-held Europe. From a
shipping point of view, the operation
would open the Mediterranean route to
the Middle East and India, thereby mak-
ing unnecessary the long voyage around
the Cape of Good Hope. While the pro-
jected invasion obviously did not meet
Stalin's demand for a second front on the
1
The distance from New York, the main supply
port for the North African theater, by the shortest
navigable route to Oran via Gibraltar. See Table of
Distances Between Ports via the Shortest Navigable Routes,
as Determined by the Hydrographic Office, United States
Navy Department (Washington: U.S. Navy Department
2
OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 1-3.
NORTH AFRICA
European continent, it at least won his
3
acquiescence.
The abrupt shift from preparations for
an invasion of the European continent to
an entirely different operation necessitated
radical readjustments in planning and
preparations. Limitations of time, the de-
lay in reaching a final determination of
the objectives, strength, and timing of the
invasion, and other factors created serious
logistical difficulties, and, as one student
of military logistics has noted, "turned the
whole process of preparation into a feat of
4
improvisation."
In late October 1942, approximately
three months after the decision to under-
take the invasion, three task forces, total-
ing some 107,000 American and British
troops, set sail under naval escort for
North Africa. Two forces (the Center and
Eastern) were mounted from the United
Kingdom to capture, respectively, Oran
and Algiers. A third force (the Western)
was dispatched from the United States to
seize Casablanca. The landings took place
as scheduled on 8 November, and within
forty-eight hours the major ports and air-
fields in French Morocco and Algeria had
been secured. Then followed the race to
occupy Tunisia ahead of the Axis. This
race the Allies lost, since the Germans
reacted swiftly. They seized the ports of
Tunis and Bizerte and rushed in sufficient
reinforcements to halt the Allies just short
of the Tunisian plain. The onset of winter
rains brought a temporary stalemate,
marked by bitter but indecisive fighting.
In the ensuing contest in 1943 the initial
advantages of transportation and supply
fell to the Axis powers. They had rela-
tively short air and sea lines of communi-
cation between Italy and Tunisia, while
the Allies had to transport most of their
men and supplies over the broad and dan-
137
gerous Atlantic to Casablanca, whence
supplies had to be hauled 1,400 miles
overland to Tunisia or through the Strait
of Gibraltar to Mediterranean ports closer
to the fighting front, notably Oran and
Algiers. Nevertheless, by exploiting and
expanding available port facilities and
improving rail and highway transporta-
tion operations, the Allies were able to
bring in and sustain a far larger force than
the enemy. After repulsing the German
thrust through Kasserine Pass in central
Tunisia in February, the Allies regained
the initiative and in April launched an
offensive aimed at Tunis and Bizerte. Of
considerable assistance in the support of
the advancing American forces were the
arrival in North Africa of motor transport
and rail equipment, shipped by special
convoy from the United States, and the
utilization of small forward ports to the
east of Algiers. At the same time the Allies
were increasingly successful in cutting off
Axis support by sea and air, thereby has-
tening the surrender of the enemy in May
1943.5
Plans and Preparations
The period of active planning for the
North African invasion began in late July
1942 when the Combined Chiefs of Staff
(CCS) 6 directed that the planning for
3
George F. Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa:
1942-1943, a volume in preparation for the series
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II,
Ch. I, passim; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for
Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942, pp. 266-84, 328-29.
4
Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy:
1940-1943, p. 453. See also, pp. 139-44, below.
5
Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United
States Army, July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943, to the Secre-
tary of War, pp. 29-33, 35-42; OCT HB Monograph
9, pp. 4-6.
6
The Combined Chiefs of Staff consisted of the
British Chiefs of Staff for Army, Navy, and Air or
their representatives and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
138
MAP 3
Oran and Algiers should take place in
London and that for Casablanca in Wash-
ington. The code name TORCH was as-
signed to the operation, and early in
August 1942 General Eisenhower was
appointed Commander in Chief, Allied
Expeditionary Force. In the same month
at Norfolk House in London, under Gen-
eral Eisenhower's deputy, Maj. Gen. (later
Lt. Gen.) Mark W. Clark, a combined staff
of American and British officers began
working on the plans for the invasion. The
theater chief of transportation, Colonel
Ross, was represented at Norfolk House
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
by his principal planner, Colonel Stewart.
Among other transportation officers who
assisted in the planning was the chief of
the Transportation Corps Planning Divi-
sion in Washington, Colonel Stokes, who
helped co-ordinate the planning in the
United Kingdom with that in the United
States.7
7
History of Allied Force Headquarters and Head-
quarters NATOUSA (hereafter cited as Hist of
AFHQ), Pt. I, August 1942 to December 1942, pp.
1-4, 15-16, DRB AGO; OCT HB Monograph 9, pp.
9-12; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 10 Sep 42, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross.
NORTH AFRICA
The planners worked under several
serious handicaps. Divergent American
and British interests had to be reconciled
and decisions reached as to what each
nation would contribute to the common
effort. The many details that had to be
ironed out between the two widely sepa-
rated planning centers in London and
Washington resulted in voluminous com-
munications, which on occasion developed
into a veritable "transatlantic essay con-
test." 8 American supplies and equipment
shipped to the United Kingdom, which
could be made available for the invasion,
139
sometimes were lost en route or were mis-
placed in the theater, necessitating dupli-
cate and even triplicate shipments from
all-too-often inadequate stocks.
The entire operation was hemmed in
by various contingencies. The French
might resist the Allied invaders, or the
Spanish might prove hostile. Even the
weather was a worry, since it could hinder
the landings. Moreover, the July decision
had left undetermined the time, size, and
8
Capt. Harry C. Butcher, USNR, My Three Years
With Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1946), p. 85.
140
place of the initial assaults. There was
considerable disagreement as to whether
or not there should be simultaneous land-
ings outside and inside the Mediterranean.
At one point in August, when it appeared
that the naval strength available would
not support three major landings simul-
taneously, General Eisenhower recom-
mended abandoning the assault on Casa-
blanca and concentrating the attack in-
side the Mediterranean with a view to a
swift advance into Tunisia. This course of
action was considered too hazardous in
Washington, and Casablanca was retained
as an objective. Finally, in September,
agreement was reached on simultaneous
inside and outside landings, the troop
strength for the assault was made predom-
inantly American, and D Day was set ten-
tatively for early November. The delay in
arriving at these decisions inevitably com-
plicated the task of determining over-all
military requirements and made difficult
the job of providing the necessary supplies,
equipment, and transportation to effect
and support the invasion.9
In the aggregate, the TORCH planners
were confronted by two distinct sets of
limiting factors. The first pertained pri-
marily to the assault phase, when plans
hinged upon securing the required naval
escorts and combat loaders for the invad-
ing forces.10 The second related to the sup-
port phase, when the principal limitations
were the size and frequency of ocean con-
voys and the capacity of ports in the the-
ater to accommodate them. The tight
shipping situation was relieved insofar as
TORCH was concerned by the high priority
accorded that operation. Troop and cargo
vessels were withdrawn from other impor-
tant programs, including BOLERO and the
convoys to the northern Soviet ports. De-
spite minor crises that developed from
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
11
time to time, sufficient vessels were pro-
vided. The basic problem was not ship-
ping, but rather the number of vessels the
navies could safely escort. Slow cargo con-
voys originating in American waters were
limited to forty-five vessels by the U.S.
Navy, and similar convoys from the
United Kingdom were restricted by the
Royal Navy to fifty-five ships. Fast troop
convoys from the United States and the
United Kingdom were limited, respec-
tively, to twenty and twenty-five vessels.
These convoy limitations were to exercise
a highly restrictive influence on the flow
of supplies into the theater and caused the
Army repeatedly to request their relaxa-
tion. The situation was eased beginning
early in 1943 by adding special convoys to
the regular schedule and by permitting
fast tankers to sail unescorted from the
Caribbean. It was further eased in April
when the Navy's February authorization
of 60-vessel convoys was put into effect.
The convoy restrictions, even when liber-
alized, proved a greater limitation on the
support of the North African campaign
9
Ibid., pp. 82-87; OCT HB Monograph 9, pp.
14-22, 28-29; Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa,
Ch. II, passim; Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., pp.
417-24.
10
Combat loaders were specially equipped vessels
that carried both the assault troops and their essential
weapons, vehicles, and supplies, so stowed as to facili-
tate immediate use on a hostile shore. See Samuel Eliot
Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in
World War II, Vol. II, Operations in North African
Waters, October 1942-June 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1947), p. 27. Combat loading was
always wasteful of shipping space.
11
In this category were the shipment of coal to the
United Kingdom and the British request for addi-
tional shipping to meet its TORCH commitments, for
which acceptable arrangements were finally reached.
The procurement of vessels for a proposed Northern
Task Force was considered but did not become neces-
sary because no enemy action developed in the neigh-
boring Spanish territory. See OCT HB Monograph 9,
pp. 22-28; Notes on Plng TORCH, OCT HB North .
Africa; and Misc ping data in TC folders TORCH, 15
Jul 42-6 Mar 43, OCT HB Overseas Opn Gp.
NORTH AFRICA
than the theater's port accommodation
and discharge capacity. With few excep-
tions, the ports were to be capable of un-
loading greater tonnages than the convoys
could bring in.12
In preparation for the invasion the
Transportation Corps planners in London
made a careful study of the port, rail, and
highway facilities in French North Africa.
Detailed reports, including maps, were
prepared for all the important ports on
the basis of the latest available intelli-
gence. The key figure in the planning for
the projected port activity was an experi-
enced steamship man, Maj. (later Lt.
Col.) Chester F. Sharp. After a survey of
the berthing capacity of each port in
peacetime and after due allowance for
possible enemy demolition or interference,
Sharp computed the number of hatches
that presumably could be worked at given
periods in each port. Then he tried to de-
termine how many tons of cargo per hour
could be discharged by inexperienced
troop labor under combat conditions. Be-
lieving that the British estimate of four
dead-weight tons per hour per hatch was
too conservative, he used the figure often
dead-weight tons, which later proved to
be close to the average. In order to attain
the maximum discharge, the Americans
contemplated the extensive use of mechan-
ical cargo-handling equipment such as
fork-lift trucks and crawler cranes. The
Transportation Corps procured as much of
this equipment as possible from the United
Kingdom and then got the remainder
directly from the United States.13
As developed by late September 1942,
TORCH plans were based on the assump-
tion that 73 berths would be available
immediately at the captured Allied ports,
and that additional ports with anchorage
for 20 vessels would be taken within two
141
weeks. Of these 93 berths, 56 were located
at the western and central ports, princi-
pally Casablanca and Oran, which would
be seized and operated by the Americans.
A U.S. port headquarters was to be as-
signed to each of the two major port areas,
to arrive shortly after the initial landings.
The eastern ports, including Algiers, Phil-
ippeville, and Bone, were to be operated
by the British.14
Maj. (later Col.) Sidney H. Bingham
was chiefly responsible for planning the
U.S. Army railway operations in North
Africa. Considerable enemy destruction
was anticipated, but luckily did not mate-
rialize. Only one railway line ran from
Casablanca via Oran to Tunisia. Early in
October 1942, General Eisenhower esti-
mated that he would require at the outset
approximately 50 locomotives, 600 cov-
ered cars, 400 open railway cars, and 50
war flats, and that ultimately 250 locomo-
tives and 2,700 covered and 1,800 open
cars would be needed. Further communi-
cation resulted in an agreement that the
Western and Center Task Forces would
call for the required railway equipment
after a preliminary survey in the field. 15
Since the enemy might have rendered
the railways inoperative, the Transporta-
tion Corps planners had to be prepared to
rely on port clearance by truck, if neces-
sary. Aerial photographs and peacetime
maps were examined to determine the
12
Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., pp. 468-70, 477-
78. See Chapters XVI and XVII for a detailed treat-
ment of the role of logistics, including transportation,
in the planning, mounting, and support of the North
African campaign.
13
See Lecture (n.d.) at Atlantic Coast TC Officers
Tng School, Ft. Slocum, by Lt Col C. F. Sharp, Pre-
paring for an Operation of a Port of Debarkation in a
Combat Zone, pp. 1-3, OCT HB Ft. Slocum Lectures.
14
Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., p. 468; OCT HB
Monograph 9, pp. 44, 142.
15
OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 44-46.
142 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

road network and the railway system lead- The reasons for this situation could be
ing from each port area, as well as the found on both sides of the Atlantic. In the
space within the dock area for maneuver- summer of 1942 the Americans were still
ing trucks. Detailed highway transporta- converting newly acquired warehouses in
tion reports were worked out by two high- the British Isles into U.S. Army depots.
way traffic experts, Capt, (later Lt. Col.)The depots generally had insufficient and
Franklin M. Kreml and Capt. George W. inexperienced personnel. Storage had
Barton. All pertinent logistical factors been hasty, primarily with a view to re-
were considered, even to the time required moving cargo as quickly as possible from
for one man to load a standard 2½-ton the port areas in order to prevent conges-
truck with rations. Road and dump signs tion. Adequate inventories were not yet
were prepared and procedures were devel- complete. Frequently, poor packing,
oped for over-the-road control of highway marking, and documentation of shipments
movements. According to Kreml, it was from the zone of interior had plagued the
estimated that from D Day to D plus 30 a theater. Much equipment had arrived
total of 5,100 tons per day could be moved broken or damaged, and many items were
by truck out of Oran, a target figure only not properly identified on the shipping
about 100 tons per day below the actual containers or in the cargo manifests. All
achievement for this period.16 these shortcomings had been reported to
Washington and vigorously denounced by
The Case of the Missing Supplies
the theater chief of transportation. With
The supply requirements of the U.S. respect to the current crisis, he stated that
forces in North Africa were of deep con- the depot situation in the United King-
cern to the Transportation Corps planners, dom was bad, and that the stocks were
both in London and in Washington, since unbalanced. Of one thing he was certain—
the planners had to know approximately the Transportation Corps had delivered
what would have to be moved to a given the goods to the supply services, even
port by a given date and what ships were though the latter did not know what was
available. As the invasion drew near, the in their depots.18
supply picture was characterized by un- A transatlantic exchange of cables ulti-
certainty and confusion that on occasion mately revealed that some of the missing
bordered on chaos. On 21 August 1942 items had been located, others were on the
General Somervell's chief of staff called way from the United States, and still
attention to the disturbing lack of firm others were not absolutely essential. Nev-
data on supply and shipping requirements. 16

Early in September the situation became TransSeeSchool,

Sharp lecture cited n. 13, p. 4. Cf. Lecture at
Ft. Eustis, by Lt Col Franklin M.
even more alarming when General Eisen- Kreml, 29 Oct 42, pp. 3-5, OCT HB NATOUSA Hy
hower disclosed that a large part of the Rpts. 17
supplies and equipment presumed to be Memo, CofS SOS WD for CofS USA, 21 Aug 42,
sub: Need for Early Definition of Forces … , Hq
in the United Kingdom and available for CofS WDGS (2) 1942 (Somervell File). Cf. OCT HB
TORCH could not be located in time to Monograph 9, pp. 30-31.
18
meet the deadline and therefore would See Study, Maj William C. Frierson, Prepara-
tions for TORCH, pp. 27-28, OCMH Files; Ltrs, Ross
have to be replaced from the United to Gross, 10 and 21 Sep, 14 Oct 42, OCT HB Gross
States.17 ETO—Gen Ross. Cf. Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 87-99.
NORTH AFRICA
ertheless, a total of approximately 260,000
measurement tons of U.S. supplies and
equipment needed in the United King-
dom to meet early (D plus 5) TORCH re-
quirements was lacking and had to be
procured from American and British
sources. For example, even though ample
ammunition should have been sent to the
theater, 11,000,000 rounds of ammunition
had to be borrowed from the British. The
immediate need was met, but only by
frantic effort and at a heavy cost in addi-
tional shipping. Initially, sixteen cargo
vessels were requested to move the 176,000
measurement tons of special high-priority
items that had to be in the United King-
dom by 20 October 1942. The remaining
84,000 measurement tons were to be for-
warded in subsequent shipments. Changes
made by theater headquarters in London
and the failure of certain items to arrive in
time for loading resulted in modification
of the original shipping plan, but the fact
remained that much valuable cargo space
had been expended, both for the matériel
poured into Britain that could not be lo-
cated and for the necessary replacements
of that matériel.19
Last-minute requests from the theater
became so frequent and vexing as to cause
Washington to notify the theater that no
further changes would be made in the
first supporting convoy from the United
States unless dictated by "urgent strategic
reasons." Efforts were also made to get the
theater to provide early advance informa-
tion on its requirements for subsequent
convoys and to set a time limit for un-
avoidable changes. Because of the appar-
ent absence of adequate data about in-
coming cargo and the sheer inability of
supply service personnel to identify items
listed on the cargo manifests, the theater
frequently and on occasion knowingly du-
143
plicated its requests. This practice, waste-
ful both of supplies and shipping, came to
a head in mid-October 1942, when a de-
mand for additional ordnance material led
to a tart observation by General Somervell
that all items had been shipped at least
twice and most items three times. In
Washington this period of confusion and
duplication left an impression not readily
forgotten.20
Meanwhile, the theater had been work-
ing on a complete plan for the support of
TORCH. The plan, forwarded to the War
Department late in October 1942, pro-
vided that initially each task force was to
be supplied by the base from which it was
launched. The Western Task Force (WTF)
was to have direct supply from the United
States from the beginning. The Center
Task Force (CTF) and the predominantly
British Eastern Task Force (ETF) were to
be supplied from the United Kingdom,
with the latter drawing its supplies
through British channels. Both the WTF
and the CTF were to submit their requisi-
tions to the theater SOS in London for
screening and subsequent forwarding to
Washington. Also, substantial reserves of
supplies and ammunition were to be built
up rapidly in North Africa and in the
United Kingdom.
The plan was opposed by the SOS in
Washington, principally on the grounds
that the establishment of a separate
TORCH reserve in the United Kingdom
would unduly complicate supply proce-
dures and necessitate double handling,
and that more direct and expeditious sup-
19
Memo, Gross for Somervell, 2 Oct 42, sub: Cargo
Ships for Special Opn, and Memo, ACofS for Opns
SOS for CofT SOS WD, Nov 42, sub: Necessity for
Info of Flow of Sup, OCT HB Meyer Stay backs.
20
OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 33-34. For addi-
tional details on the efforts to meet the supply crisis
see Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., pp. 429-35.
144 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

port would be forthcoming if both the tation at the British War Office, where
CTF and the WTF requisitioned directly priorities were set and movement orders
on the New York Port of Embarkation. were prepared. General Ross tried to have
After some controversy a compromise was the movement orders issued in ample time
reached in early December 1942, to be to assure complete preparation of the
observed pending the transfer to the units, and on the whole he was able to
United States of the entire responsibility accomplish this aim. A few Ground Forces
for the direct supply of the U.S. forces in and Air Forces unit commanders balked
North Africa. The arrangement provided at moving until compliance was directed
for a far smaller supply reserve in the by General Eisenhower, but otherwise
United Kingdom than contemplated the outbound troop traffic proceeded
earlier. As before, the WTF would be smoothly.
supplied from the New York port, but Within the United Kingdom, all load-
would now requisition directly on it. The ing plans for outbound cargo were made
CTF would be supplied as far as practica- in London and each depot was given de-
ble by convoys from the United States, tailed shipping instructions on the items
supplemented by shipments from the that it was to furnish. In the initial con-
small U.K. supply reserve. This force voys from the United Kingdom all the
would requisition on London, where Euro- cargo ships were loaded with assorted sup-
pean theater headquarters would deter- plies so as to minimize the loss in the event
mine what it could provide, and then of sinkings. Last-minute changes affecting
requisition the remainder from the New both troops and cargo were frequent and
York port. The U.S. elements of the ETF bothersome. The principal difficulty for
were to be supplied from American or, if the Transportation Corps arose from poor
required, British stocks in the United co-ordination between the ports and de-
Kingdom. This dual supply line remained pots on supply shipments. The outloading
in effect until February 1943, when out- was accomplished under pressure and a
loadings from the United Kingdom for heavy cloak of secrecy. According to Ross,
the support of American forces in North with so much "hush-hush" prevailing
21
Africa were substantially completed. confusion at times was to be expected.24
21
OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 36-40; Leighton
Mounting the Task Forces in Britain and Coakley, op. cit., pp. 466-68, 479.
22
Convoys were designated by symbols, among
The convoys for the North African in- which "F" meant fast, "S" slow. The "UG" convoys
sailed from the United States and the "KM" convoys
vasion had to bring troops and cargo from from the United Kingdom. All convoys were num-
widely separated areas, necessitating care- bered in sequence: UGF-2, KMS-1, KMF-3, etc. For
ful scheduling to insure arrival at the de- return voyages the letters were reversed to read
GUF-1, MKS-1, etc. See Memo, ACofS for Opns
sired time and place. 22 As previously SOS for TQMG et al, 29 Oct 42, sub: Maint of U.S.
indicated, within the United Kingdom Army Forces in Special Opn, OCT HB Overseas
the brunt of the work involved in the con- Opns Gp TORCH 28 Sep-14 Nov 42.
23
See above, p. 80.
trol of movements of troops and matériel 24
Hist Rpt, Story of Transportation in the United
for TORCH was performed by the British.23 Kingdom, pp. 147-55, OCT HB ETO; Ltrs, Ross to
A small American liaison group, later Gross, 10 and 19 Sep, 18 Oct 42, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross; Ltr, Brig Gen (Ret.) Charles O.
known as the Export Movement Division, Thrasher to Larson, 21 Apr 50, OCT HB ETO In-
represented the theater chief of transpor- quiries. See also below, p. 160.
 NORTH AFRICA
After brief amphibious training, in
mid-October 1942 the two assault forces
embarked from the Glasgow and Liver-
pool port areas on combat-loaded vessels,
which were then assembled in the Firth of
Clyde to take part in a final rehearsal for
the invasion. The principal U.S. Army
components in the expedition were ele-
ments of the 1st and 34th Infantry Divi-
sions and the 1st Armored Division,
together with several groups from the
Eighth Air Force. The first convoys from
the United Kingdom were loaded and
dispatched entirely under British super-
vision, but with some assistance by Trans-
portation Corps personnel. On 26 October
1942 both task forces set sail for North
Africa, and they arrived at Oran and
Algiers on 8 November. Aboard the con-
voys KMF-1 and KMS-1 were 46,920
American troops and 26,690 British
troops, together with a total of 54,827
long tons of U.S. and British cargo.25
The United States Prepares
for the Invasion
While the Americans and British in the
United Kingdom made ready for their
role in TORCH, the operation had become
a prime concern of the War and Navy De-
partments and the Joint and Combined
Chiefs of Staff in Washington. 26 Since the
United States was not only to mount and
support roughly one third of the attacking
force, but was also to be increasingly
relied upon to furnish the supplies, equip-
ment, and ships for the forces to be dis-
patched from the British Isles, Washing-
ton became almost as important a center
for plans and operations as Eisenhower's
headquarters in London. In the United
States the Transportation Corps helped to
get the vessels needed for the invasion. The
Transportation Corps Planning Division
145
prepared numerous studies, varying in
detail with the changing tactical objec-
tives, on North African port, rail, and
highway capacities. The Chief of Trans-
portation assigned representatives to the
Western Task Force G-4 and to the TORCH
committee, as well as transportation
officers and units for transportation oper-
ations in North Africa. The ports of em-
barkation at New York and Hampton
Roads assisted in mounting the assault
convoy of the Western Task Force and
gave subsequent support to the U.S. Army
in North Africa.
One of the first tasks was to secure
enough American combat loaders to
move the assault forces, since the British
had the lift for only four regimental com-
bat teams. To fill this need twelve small
vessels were hastily converted (six by the
Army and six by the Navy) into modified
combat loaders. The conversion entailed
installing landing-boat davits, increasing
the capacity of the booms, providing more
troop space, adding armament, and ar-
ranging quarters for the Navy crew that
was to operate the vessel. The twelve ships
were obtained principally at the expense
of the BOLERO program. So limited was
the time that several were still in the yards
when the loading began at Hampton
Roads.27
25
Hist rpt cited n. 24, pp. 150-54; ASF MPR Sec.
3, 31 May 43, pp. 85-86. Cf. Brig. Gen. William
Francis Heavey, Down Ramp! The Story of the Army Am-
phibian Engineers, pp. 20-21, 30; and Howe, Opera-
tions in Northwest Africa, Ch. III.
26
Except as otherwise indicated, this section is
based upon Hist Rpt, HRPE, I, 12-15, OCT HB; and
OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 53-78. For the support-
ing Transportation Corps documents, see TORCH, 15
Jul 42-6 Mar 43 (3 folders), OCT HB Overseas Opns
Gp; and North Africa (1 folder), OCT HB Wylie.
27
Memo, Dir Opns OCT for Chief Water Div, 4
Aug 42, sub: Conversion of Vessels to Modified Com-
bat Loaders, and Tabs 6 and 96, OCT HB Meyer
Staybacks.
146 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Apart from working on the broader The original plan called for more organic
problems of determining the over-all ship- equipment, tanks, ammunition, and sup-
ping and supply requirements for TORCH plies than the available ships would hold.
and the number of service troops needed This problem was attacked by reducing
to support an estimated total invasion the amount of armor to be included and
force of approximately 240,000 men, the by obtaining the seatrain New Jersey (later
planners in the United States were con- redesignated the USS Lakehurst} to move
fronted with the immediate and pressing the tanks that could not be loaded in the
task of arranging for the mounting of the other vessels. In addition, a cut of 50 per-
assault convoy of the Western Task Force. cent was made in the initial organiza-
Entirely American, the initial contingent tional equipment, and the level of supply
of 33,737 men was scheduled to sail under was reduced to 10 units of fire and to 45
U.S. naval escort from Hampton Roads days for rations. The Transportation
to French Morocco in October 1942. Corps Planning Division assisted Patton's
Under the command of Maj. Gen. (later staff throughout this period, and one
Lt. Gen.) George S. Patton, Jr., the transportation officer, Maj. (later Lt. Col.)
Western Task Force was drawn chiefly Charles F. Tank, was detailed for full-time
from the 3d and 9th Infantry Divisions duty with the Western Task Force, which
and the 2d Armored Division. For the op- he eventually accompanied to North
eration General Patton's men were organ- Africa.28
ized into three subtask forces. The "Z" Most of the loading of the assault con-
subtask force, commanded by Brig. Gen. voy took place at the newly activated
(later Maj. Gen.) Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation,
was assigned to the capture of Mehdia, under the command of Brig. Gen. John R.
near Port-Lyautey, and the adjacent air- Kilpatrick. The 28 combat-loaded vessels
field. Under the command of Maj. Gen. were to be readied in two groups or flights,
Jonathan W. Anderson, the "Y" subtask the one of 13 vessels for the smaller "X"
force, the largest of the three, was to seize and "Z" subtask forces and the other of
29
Fedala preliminary to the taking of Casa- 15 ships for the larger "Y" subtask force.
blanca. The "X" subtask force, under Each subtask force commander was made
Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, was to oc- responsible for embarking his own con-
cupy the small coastal port of Safi, south- tingent. However, the loading plan for
west of Casablanca. each ship was prepared by a transport
Early in August General Patton's staff
28
began to assemble in Washington to deter- Interv, H. H. Dunham with Col Tank, 14 Nov
44; Memo, Lt Col Richard L.Jewett, 20 Jul 43, sub:
mine the requirements in ships, troops, Role of Plng Div TC in WTF Plng. Both in OCT HB
and matériel for the Western Task Force. North Africa TORCH Plng.
29
Although the projected size of the force The loading, although under Army and Navy di-
rection, was performed almost entirely by civilian
remained fairly stable, the troop list fluc- stevedores working at four different sets of piers in the
tuated considerably, as combat units Newport News and Norfolk areas. See Ltr, Gen
replaced service units and air force troops Kilpatrick to Rear Adm Trevor W. Leutze, 30 Sep
were substituted for ground force troops 42, sub: Detailed Arrangements for Handling and
Loading of Ships for Task Force A, and Memo, Maj
in the assault convoy. Corresponding Tank for Gen Gross, 4 Oct 42, OCT HB Wylie North
changes had to be made in the cargo. Africa.
NORTH AFRICA
quartermaster, whose principal purpose
was to make available for immediate dis-
charge the combat vehicles, ammunition,
and supplies required by the units aboard
that particular vessel. Ammunition and
rations in prescribed amounts were placed
in each vehicle, additional amounts were
carried by each soldier, and the remainder
was stowed in easily accessible spaces on
the transport. The seatrain New Jersey was
loaded at New York to ease the strain on
the Hampton Roads Port of Embarka-
tion, and six vessels were partially loaded
by the Navy at New York and sent to
Hampton Roads.
An elaborate system had been devised
by the War Department for marking and
forwarding the cargo for each ship, but
changes in the assignment of troops,
weapons, and vehicles from one vessel to
another soon brought confusion. Both
ammunition and rations should have been
sent to the port in bulk, rather than in in-
dividual shipments, and then distributed
to the task force as required. Engineer,
signal, medical, chemical warfare, and
ordnance supplies (other than ammuni-
tion) were assembled in a single ware-
house at Newport News, where cube and
weight were readily calculated for use in
planning stowage and where delivery
could be made to each ship as the need
arose.30
The loading operations at Hampton
Roads were beset with difficulties. Freight
poured into the port, often without ade-
quate identification. Separated by the
bay, the piers at Newport News and Nor-
folk were served by different railways, and
shipments consigned to "Hampton
Roads" sometimes went to the wrong ter-
minal, necessitating troublesome tracing
and transshipment. Despite excellent co-
operation, both the Army and the Navy
147
were hampered by inexperienced person-
nel and drastic time limitations. General
Patton's staff was never assembled in one
spot until the very last moment, a factor
hindering effective planning.
Moreover, the Transportation Corps
installations that could have helped were
all new and undeveloped. The Richmond
Holding and Reconsignment Point was
not yet prepared to give satisfactory serv-
ice. The port of embarkation at Hampton
Roads had been established only recently,
and since its staging area was not com-
pleted General Patton's three divisions
had to be staged at nearby camps in Vir-
ginia and North Carolina. Because the
landings in North Africa might have to be
made through surf and over the beaches,
all combat vehicles had to be water-
proofed and processed to prevent rust and
corrosion, and facilities for this purpose
had to be improvised.
At the insistence of the Army and the
Navy and to provide firsthand knowledge
of loading and unloading, early in Octo-
ber a practice run of the "Y" contingent
was arranged, which included a landing
exercise at Solomons Island in the Chesa-
peake Bay and the discharge of troops and
vehicles at the port of Baltimore.31 By
mid-October the bulk of the cargo had
been stowed on the ships of the "X" and
"Z" subtask forces. A considerable
amount of ammunition that arrived at the
last moment had to be lashed to the decks.
Beginning on 22 October the "Y" force
loaded the last of its cargo.
30
Maj. William Reginald Wheeler (ed.), The Road
to Victory, A History of Hampton Roads Port of Embarka-
tion in World War II (Newport News, Va. [New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press], 1946), I, 66-68.
31
Troops of the "Z" force under General Truscott
later took part in a similar brief rehearsal at Solomons
Island.
148
There were some disconcerting elev-
enth-hour developments. The six trans-
ports that had been partially loaded at
New York had to be unloaded and then
reloaded to fit final loading plans of the
transport quartermasters. The transport
Lee developed engine trouble, and her
troops and cargo had to be shifted to the
Calvert, a hurried task accomplished in
only thirty-five hours. The Contessa, a
small light-draft boat that had at one time
been a banana boat of Honduran registry,
was chartered at the last minute to carry
aviation gasoline and bombs up the wind-
ing, shallow Sebou River to a strategic
airfield at Port-Lyautey. The Contessa
reached Norfolk too late to sail with the
assault convoy since emergency repairs
had to be made, and several vacancies in
her crew had to be filled by volunteers
from seamen jailed at Norfolk for minor
offenses.32
While the Contessa was being readied,
the final topping off of cargo took place for
the main convoy. On 23 October the last
of the troops embarked. By dawn of the
following day the ships (Convoy UGF-1)
bearing the Western Task Force took to
the open sea, escorted by U.S. naval craft,
all under the command of Rear Adm.
Henry Kent Hewitt. Aboard were 33,843
U.S. troops and 93,102 measurement tons
of U.S. Army cargo.33
Organization of Transportation
in North Africa
The commanders of the three task
forces that converged upon French North
Africa on 8 November 1942 were respon-
sible for the control of military transpor-
tation within their respective areas during
the first phase. The Western and Center
Task Forces were assigned SOS staffs, in-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
cluding transportation personnel, which
arrived in the assault and early support
convoys and served as the advance
echelons of base sections that were to as-
sume direction of supply and transporta-
tion activities. Shortly after the landings,
the Mediterranean Base Section was offi-
cially activated at Oran under Brig. Gen.
(later Maj. Gen.) Thomas B. Larkin, and
a similar headquarters, the Atlantic Base
Section, was set up at Casablanca under
Brig. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson. The trans-
portation organizations of the two base
sections were headed, respectively, by
Colonel Stewart and Col. Thomas H.
Stanley. No provision was made for an
American logistical organization in the
Eastern Task Force's area, where supply
and transportation activities were con-
trolled by the British. At the end of 1942
the two base sections were released from
the control of the task forces and placed
under the Allied Force Headquarters
(AFHQ), which had been transferred
from Gibraltar and the United Kingdom
to Algiers.34
Meanwhile, a combined transportation
organization had begun operating in
AFHQ. Planning for such an organiza-
tion had begun in London in August
1942, when a G-4 section (Supply and
Evacuation) was established under Col.
32
In the early morning hours of 27 October 1942,
the Contessa, unescorted, set forth on a hazardous dash
across the Atlantic. Speedy (16 knots), she managed to
overtake the task force and to accomplish her mission.
See Wheeler, op. cit., Vol. I, Ch. VIII.
33
See Rev. Draft, Maj William C. Frierson, Load-
ing and Debarking Task Force A, North African Ex-
pedition, November 1942, with comments by Gen
Kilpatrick, 12 May 44, OCT HB North Africa TORCH
Plng; ASF MPR, Sec. 3, 31 May 43, pp. 85-86. Cf.
Leighton and Coakley, op, cit., pp. 439-45.
34
OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 142-46, 177; Hist of
AFHQ, Pt. I, pp. 98-99, Pt. II, December 1942-
December 1943, pp. 167-69.
NORTH AFRICA
(later Brig. Gen.) Archelaus L. Hamblen
(American). This office differed from the
normal U.S. Army G-4 section in that it
did not include transportation functions,
which were placed in a separate Move-
ments and Transportation Section, headed
by Col. (later Brigadier) A. T. de Rhe
Philipe (British), the senior Allied trans-
portation officer on the staff.35 This organ-
ization was to provide the framework for
co-operating American and British trans-
portation staffs. As outlined in AFHQ
movement and transportation instruc-
tions, issued by General Eisenhower on 20
October 1942 as a guide to the task forces,
the U.S. Army Transportation Corps staff
and the British Q (Movements) staff were
in principle to form a combined Move-
ments and Transportation organization.36
Both staffs were to be individually respon-
sible through their own normal channels
of command to the Chief Administrative
Officer, AFHQ, for the efficient employ-
ment of their respective services. Together,
they were to be responsible for policy and
for allocation of facilities to the various
operating areas in accordance with the re-
quirements of the theater commander. At
the outset certain common measures were
enjoined, such as standard documentation
for rail shipments and the pooling of
available transportation facilities as soon
as contact was established between the
task forces. The instructions also provided
for the establishment of a North African
Shipping Board (NASBO). Headed by a
civilian BMWT official, and representing
both American and British interests,
NASBO was to serve as a co-ordinating
agency for all shipping matters arising in
the TORCH area.37
No U.S. Army officer was selected to
head the American side of the AFHQ
transportation organization before the in-
149
vasion, in large part because of uncer-
tainty regarding the status of Colonel
Ross. At various times during the prein-
vasion period it appeared that he would
be assigned to either Larkin or Wilson, or
that he would go with Hamblen and serve
in the transportation section at AFHQ.
General Lee desired to retain Ross in the
European theater, and Ross himself con-
sidered the possible assignments in North
Africa as demotions. Finally, in mid-
October Ross was notified that he would
go with General Larkin, who wanted him
to set up the port operation at Oran.
Although his orders placed him on tem-
porary duty with the Center Task Force
and called for his return to the United
Kingdom by the end of the year, he feared
he might well be retained and assigned to
some subordinate transportation job at
AFHQ.38
Arriving at Oran with the D-plus-3
convoy, Ross remained at that port until
about 20 November 1942 when, as top-
ranking Transportation Corps officer, he
moved to Algiers to set up the American
35
Hist of AFHQ, Pt. I, pp. 51, 54-56.
36
See Adm Memo 13 and Annex 2, AFHQ, 20 Oct
42, Mvmts and Trans Instructions, in Hist Rcd, OCT
AFHQ NATOUSA, activation to 31 Oct 43, Tab A,
OCT HB North Africa. Cf. Draft of Memo, Maj Gen
H. M. Gale, CAO AFHQ to CG WTF, 15 Oct 42,
OCT HB Overseas Opns Gp, TORCH, 28 Sep-14 Nov
42.
37
NASBO, later (16 November 1943) designated
Mediterranean Shipping Board, functioned as a joint
advisory committee until August 1945. Col. Creswell
G. Blakeney (ed.), Logistical History of NATOUSA-
MTOUSA: 11 August 1942 to 30 November 1945 (Naples:
Via Ponti Rossi, 1946), pp. 144-46; Hist of AFHQ, Pt.
I, pp. 87-89. Neither Gross nor Ross favored the crea-
tion of NASBO, the former objecting to its civilian
control and wide powers and the latter deeming it un-
essential and of dubious merit. See Rad, London to
AGWAR, 8 Oct 42, CM-IN 3097, and Draft of TC
Reply, Marshall to Eisenhower, 9 Oct 42, OCT HB
Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
38
Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 10, 17 Sep, and 8, 14, and 26
Oct 42, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
150 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

side of the transportation organization at was the consequence of the shortage of

AFHQ. Ross dutifully accepted this last personnel and office space which made it
assignment, but with grave misgivings. necessary to use U.S. staff officers at Al-
With a meager staff, he had to battle to giers in a dual capacity, sometimes repre-
operate independently of the British and senting the U.S. Army theater and
to maintain the separate identity of the sometimes the international AFHQ.
American transportation organization Stewart, like the others, had to be mindful
under a compromise AFHQ arrange- of the theater G-4's admonition to be
ment. On 1 January 1943, when the Of- aware in each action of what hat he was
fice of the Chief of Transportation, AFHQ, wearing.
had begun to shape up, Ross had only five As U.S. chief of transportation in the
officers. They consisted of a deputy chief theater, Stewart served as adviser to the
of transportation (Lt. Col. Thomasnewly appointed Commanding General,
Fuller), an executive officer (Maj. Francis Communications Zone (U.S.), and the
J. Murdoch, Jr.), a Water Section (Colonel AFHQ G-4, and represented U.S. inter-
Sharp and Maj. John T. Danaher), and a ests in discussions and decisions affecting
Rail Section (Major Zinnecker), together transportation. 40 He was responsible to
with an Administrative and Statistical the Communications Zone commander
Section staffed by four enlisted men. for the efficient operation of the Transpor-
Three other sections (Operational Plan- tation Corps, for co-ordination with Brit-
ning, Air, and Highway) were contem- ish Q Movements in the planning and
plated but not yet staffed.39 execution of movements, and for the prep-
Colonel Ross wrestled with these prob- aration of transportation policies and
lems until late January 1943, when he left directives for issuance to the base sections.
for Washington before returning to his Operating under the policy that all pos-
post as chief of transportation for the sible command, administrative, and op-
European theater. He was succeeded tem- erational functions were decentralized to
porarily by his deputy, and on 13 Febru- the base section commanders, Stewart
ary 1943 Colonel Stewart became chief of co-ordinated matters involving more than
transportation in North Africa. Stewart 39

was to hold this post for more than two to 31Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
Oct 43, Secs. I-II, and Tab H, OCT HB North
years, ultimately attaining the rank of Africa; Ltrs, .Ross to Gross, 8, 14 Oct, 31 Dec 42, 29
brigadier general. His office was located Jan 43, OCT HB Gross—ETO.
Fuller was later promoted to a colonel, and Mur-
in the St. George Hotel in Algiers in the doch later became a lieutenant colonel.
same room with his British counterpart, 40
On 9 February 1943, Brig. Gen. Everett S.
Brigadier de Rhe Philipe. Hughes, Deputy Commander, NATOUSA, was addi-
Following activation on 4 February tionally appointed Commanding General, Communi-
cations Zone (U.S.). The zone included the area west
1943 of the North African Theater of Op- of a north-south line drawn about midway between
erations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA), Colo- Oran and Algiers. Hughes was to assume all possible
U.S. administrative and supply duties then being per-
nel Stewart, as the senior Transportation formed by AFHQ, develop supply plans for U.S.
Corps staff officer, AFHQ., was designated forces in future operations, and in co-operation with
the chief of a corresponding transporta- the AFHQ chief administrative officer insure co-
ordination of U.S. and British operations. Hist of
tion section of the headquarters staff, AFHQ Pt. II, pp. 194-96; Logistical History of
NATOUSA. This unusual arrangement NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 22-23.
NORTH AFRICA
one base section and/or British, and/or
French transportation. He allocated
transportation troops and equipment to
the base sections, and he exercised such
over-all control as was required to insure
efficient operation of the Transportation
Corps throughout the theater.41
Although the preinvasion planning had
called for the eventual establishment of
an SOS headquarters to co-ordinate the
efforts of the base sections, such an organ-
ization did not come into being until after
the activation of NATOUSA. Headquar-
ters, SOS, NATOUSA, was set up at
Oran in mid-February 1943, under Gen-
eral Larkin, to direct U.S. supply activ-
ities in the theater. The SOS was given
control of functions relating to supply and
administration in the base sections, but
command of the sections was retained by
theater headquarters. Within the SOS a
Transportation Section was created,
headed by Major McKenzie, who func-
tioned primarily in an advisory, planning,
and liaison capacity on transportation
matters.42 In time, the Transportation
Section's functions were expanded, and
ultimately it was assigned responsibility
for the staff supervision of all transporta-
tion facilities in the U.S. communications
zone, but these changes were not made
until after the close of the North African
43
campaign. In the meantime, Colonel
Stewart continued to perform his co-
ordinating and supervisory functions on
the Allied and theater headquarters levels
and retained authority to deal directly
with both SOS and base section transpor-
tation officers on operational matters.44
Shortly after the establishment of the
SOS, the base section structure was
rounded out by the activation of a new
Eastern Base Section (EBS), under the
command of Col. (later Brig. Gen.)
151
Arthur W. Pence, with Lt. Col. Edward
T. Barrett as the transportation officer.
The EBS headquarters was at first located
at Constantine. The primary purpose of
this base section was to strengthen the
long supply line to the U.S. II Corps,
which was soon to join in the final Allied
45
offensive in North Africa.
As Chief of Transportation, NATO-
USA, serving in a dual capacity at
AFHQ Colonel Stewart had his hands
full in the critical spring days of 1943
when the Axis power was being broken in
North Africa. With limited personnel he
had to supervise rapidly expanding trans-
portation activity in the wake of the ad-
vancing Allied forces. To the highly im-
portant Water Section, which was re-
sponsible for the supervision of shipping
and port operations, were added Rail,
Air, Operational Planning, and Highway
Sections.46 In addition, Stewart had to
contrive satisfactory working arrange-
41
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Sec. II and Tab F, OCT HB North
Africa.
42
Major McKenzie was succeeded in May 1943
by Col. John R. Noyes.
43
For a treatment of organizational developments
after the end of hostilities in North Africa, see below,
pp. 184-88.
44
Condensed Rcd, Trans Sec SOS NATOUSA, ac-
tivation through Sep 44, OCT HB North Africa SOS
Hq; Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Tabs F and K, OCT HB North Africa;
Hist of AFHQ Pt. II, pp. 196-202.
45
For the II Corps alone, more than 100,000 men
and their equipment had to be moved across difficult
country to take part in the closing drive. See Historical
Division, U.S. War Department, To Bizerte With the
II Corps: 23 April 1943-13 May 1943, AMERICAN
FORCES IN ACTION SERIES (Washington, 1943);
and Hist Rcd, Trans Sec EBS, 22 Feb-30 Apr 43, pp.
5-6, 28-29, OCT HB North Africa.
46
See below for further details on the work of the
Water, Rail, and Highway Sections. The Air Section
functioned primarily as a liaison group to arrange air
transport within the theater. The Operational Plan-
ning Section was set up chiefly to plan for the attack
on Sicily. See OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 131-40.
152
ments with his British and French col-
leagues, whose methods and procedures
frequently differed from those of the
Americans.
The multiplicity of transportation or-
ganizations within the theater, although
confusing, did not prove a serious defect
because the necessary co-ordination was
achieved by having a single individual
(Colonel Stewart) serve both as senior
American transportation officer on the
AFHQ staff and the U.S. theater chief of
transportation. In view of the dual rela-
tionship between AFHQand NATOUSA,
the division of U.S. communications zone
functions between NATOUSA and SOS
NATOUSA, and the relative autonomy of
the Military Railway Service, Stewart
faced a situation that was not in accord
with the book. Nevertheless, being a
resourceful person who got along well
with others, he obtained results with the
means at hand, winning the respect and
support of both Allied and American
associates.47
Port and Shipping Activities
The task of developing an effective
transportation system of necessity began
at the ports, which were the initial objec-
tives of the Allied assault forces and the
funnels through which were poured the
men and matériel required for the cam-
paign. On 8 November 1942 the three
task forces made simultaneous landings in
North Africa. The Center Task Force
landed near Oran, but was hindered in its
advance on that port city by stiff French
resistance. Assistance in breaking the
deadlock was provided by a transporta-
tion officer, Colonel Barrett, who per-
suaded a French railway crew to deliver a
trainload of ammunition to the embattled
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
48
18th Infantry Regiment. Meanwhile,
the British-American Eastern Task Force
had debarked and moved against Algiers,
and the Western Task Force had landed in
French Morocco to capture Safi, Fedala,
and Mehdia, and then to seize Casa-
blanca. Five U.S. transports were sunk
during the assault phase, four by enemy
submarines in Moroccan waters and one
by bombing and torpedoing off Algiers.
The early landings in French Morocco
were marked by delay and confusion.
Fortunately, the weather was excellent
and the opposition of the French short-
lived, and General Patton's ships were
soon discharging directly onto the piers of
Safi and Fedala. The high ground swells
of the Moroccan coastal waters caused
considerable damage to the landing craft
that brought the first troops and supplies
ashore. Here as at Algiers, and to a lesser
extent at Oran, many craft were lost or
disabled, and others failed to reach the
right beach because of faulty navigation
by inexperienced crews, defective equip-
ment, and poor construction. By 11 No-
vember 1942 all hostilities had ceased,
and thereafter cargo operations generally
could proceed at all occupied ports with-
out interruption. Direct discharge at the
docks in Casablanca did not begin until
13 November, pending the arrival of the
D-plus-5 follow-up convoy.49
47
Interv, Col Fuller, former deputy to Stewart, 15
Jun 50, OCT HB North Africa Misc Info. See Hist
Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation to 31 Oct
43, Secs. II. III, and Tabs H, K, L, O, OCT HB
North Africa.
48
Barrett was one of a party of ten Transportation
Corps officers, headed by Colonel Stewart, who ar-
rived at Arzew with the Center Task Force on D Day.
49
OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 79-87, 101-02;
Final Rpt, WTF, Operation TORCH, AG Opns
Analysis File 95-32.7 (7844); Morison, History of Naval
Operations, II, 167-73, 200-203, 212-13.
NORTH AFRICA
Following the assault landings, Casa-
blanca and Oran were used as the two
main ports of entry for the U.S. Army.
Possessing extensive port facilities and rep-
resenting insurance against enemy closure
of the Strait of Gibraltar, Casablanca re-
mained important throughout the North
African campaign. However, beginning
early in 1943 an increasing proportion of
the incoming tonnage was shipped into
the Mediterranean for discharge at Oran
and smaller ports in its vicinity, and after
March Casablanca was no longer used to
capacity.50 Algiers remained in British
hands.
Although the practice of having sepa-
rate U.S. or British operation of ports
generally was observed, in preparation for
the final offensive a number of small
British-controlled ports to the east of
Algiers were made available for use by
the Americans. Two of these ports,
Philippeville and Bone, which were lo-
cated close to the U.S. advance depots at
Constantine and Tébessa, materially eased
the pressure on the long overland supply
lines emanating from the major ports in
the west. Bizerte, the last major port de-
veloped by the U.S. Army in North
Africa, was taken at the conclusion of the
campaign. Together with Oran, it played
an important part in the support of later
operations in the Mediterranean.
Although each port under U.S. control
had its own special difficulties, certain
problems were common to all. Some port
rehabilitation was inevitable, ranging
from comparatively little at Casablanca
and Oran to extensive reconstruction at
Bizerte. The available port facilities gen-
erally had to be supplemented from U.S.
or British resources. "Language was a
formidable barrier, since few Americans
knew French and fewer still Arabic. Labor
153
had to be recruited locally and strict
supervision was necessary to insure any
degree of efficiency. Pilferage was com-
mon and troublesome. Successful accom-
plishment of discharge operations re-
quired careful co-ordination with the con-
necting rail and motor transport facilities,
which at first were extremely limited. 51
Casablanca
Casablanca had an excellent artificial
harbor built around an old fishing port
and protected by a long breakwater. The
two main docks, the Commercial and the
Phosphate, were well equipped with
modern cargo-handling equipment, pos-
sessed ample storage space, and had direct
rail connections. Sunken and damaged
French vessels, including the huge battle-
ship Jean Bart, blocked a few berths but
caused no serious difficulty. Early reports
of extensive damage by American air and
naval action at Casablanca were ex-
aggerated, and the excellent facilities
available at this modern port permitted
the ready discharge of large amounts of
cargo. Limited use was made of the two
berths at Safi, the single berth at Fedala,
and also a few outlying ports, but Casa-
blanca became the principal port in
French Morocco for both inbound and
outbound U.S. Army shipments. 52
Despite the favorable port conditions,
cargo operations at Casablanca got off to
a bad start amid haste, confusion, and
friction that soon culminated in an acute
attack of port congestion. The ships of the
assault convoy had been hurriedly un-
50
OCT HB Monograph, pp. 142-43, 297-301;
Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., pp. 477-78.
51
See Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp.
99-104, 106-07, 141.
52
OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 142-43, 157-60.
154
loaded in order to speed their return to
the United States and to make way for the
D-plus-5 convoy. In the absence of port
troops, the Army's poorly organized work
details were unequal to the task of cargo
handling and had to be assisted by Navy
personnel. The docks were piled high
with miscellaneous supplies and equip-
ment, literally dumped from the landing
craft and lighters in helter-skelter fashion.
Together with ammunition, packaged
gasoline, and field rations, for which the
invaders had immediate use, the assault
ships brought much excess and unauthor-
ized equipment smuggled aboard at
Hampton Roads by eager beavers anxious
not to be caught short overseas. Because of
the disorder on the docks at Casablanca,
the Army had to "forage" for wanted
items, and since there were insufficient
guards the natives pilfered almost at will.
This messy situation still prevailed when
the first Transportation Corps port or-
ganization arrived.53
The 6th Port, under the command of
Col. Howard Parrish, landed at Casa-
blanca on 19 November 1942 with the D-
plus-5 convoy, which brought the first
large contingent of service troops. Colonel
Parrish had only two port battalions, the
382d and the 384th, neither of which had
ever worked on a water front. 54 Except for
a few seasoned longshoremen, railway
workers, and truck drivers, these men
lacked experience and training. Within a
short time after arrival, both units had
pitched pup tents in a large empty lot and
had begun work.
The difficulties of the 382d were typical.
It found the Phosphate Pier cluttered with
dunnage, boxes, crates, and drums from
the D-Day convoy, which had to be
cleared before their own ships could be
unloaded. Little cargo gear was available,
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
and rope slings were used extensively,
even for heavy lifts. There was a shortage
of motor and rail transport to clear the
docks. Rain fell on the first day and fre-
quently thereafter. At the end of a twelve-
hour shift of hard work the men returned
to cold, damp beds. Cold chow, at first K
and then C rations, was the rule until the
unit could set up its mess equipment. Be-
cause of the confusion and congestion on
the piers, unsatisfactory working condi-
tions, and fatigue and lowered vitality
among the men, the tonnage output of the
382d at first was not impressive. By 29
November 1942, through the joint effort of
the 382d and 384th Port Battalions and a
few attached units, almost all the cargo in
the D-plus-5 ships had been discharged.
The officers and men concerned were
subsequently commended by General
Patton for doing what at first was thought
humanly impossible.
En route to Casablanca the 6th Port
had been ordered to operate directly
under the G-4, Col. Walter J. Muller, of
the Western Task Force. During the un-
loading of the D-plus-5 convoy the G-4
and his staff kept a close check on port
operations, applying constant pressure to
clear the piers and to expedite cargo dis-
charge. On occasion the G-4 and other
superior officers on General Patton's staff
issued direct orders to subordinate officers
of the 6th Port without consulting its com-
mander. Colonel Parrish objected to this
"interference," 55 which naturally caused
53
Morison, History of Naval Operations, II, 175-76;
Hist Rpt, HRPE, II, 3-5, OCT HB; Hist Rcd, OCT
AFHQ NATOUSA, activation to 31 Oct 43, Tab
AK, Annex F, OCT HB North Africa.
54
See Hist, 382d Port Bn, 16 Jun 42-May 44, AG
Opns Rpts TCBN-382-0.1 (29991), from which this
paragraph is drawn.
55
Ltr, CO 6th Port to CofT WD, 12 Dec 42, OCT
HB North Africa Ports.
NORTH AFRICA
some friction. Relations between Muller
and Parrish became strained, the former
questioning the latter's competence and
threatening his relief. On 2 December
1942, the day after the arrival of the D-
plus-20 convoy, while Colonel Parrish was
ill, Colonel Muller by verbal order placed
his executive officer, Colonel Tank, in di-
rect charge of port operations, leaving
Colonel Parrish responsible solely for ad-
ministration and port commander in
name only. Parrish protested this action
as irregular and appealed to the Chief of
Transportation in Washington for clarifi-
cation of the status of his command, which
he mistakingly assumed was an exempted
station. His protest was without avail
since General Patton, who supported his
G-4, obviously had the authority and in-
tended to run the port operation at Casa-
blanca.56 Parrish remained in nominal
command of the 6th Port until mid-
January 1943.
Apart from the friction between G-4
and the port commander, which was not
conducive to high morale, the basic diffi-
culty at Casablanca at the outset was one
of insufficient means. In retrospect, both
Tank and Parrish agreed that there was a
shortage of motor and rail transport and
of supporting service units. 57 Except for
the two port battalions, military man-
power was limited and native labor at
best was inefficient. Although the 6th Port
had been promised 200 2½-ton cargo
trucks with 1-ton cargo trailers per day
and enough relief drivers to permit
around-the-clock operation, the maxi-
mum number of trucks furnished for port
clearance in a single shift during Novem-
ber 1942 was only 72 because of diversions
to other missions.
After Colonel Tank took over in De-
cember, additional troop and native labor
155
and more cargo-handling equipment be-
came available, which greatly facilitated
cargo discharge and dock clearance.
Although Tank was recognized as a con-
scientious and capable officer, some of the
more experienced members of the 6th
Port did not always see eye to eye with
him on port operations. They seriously
doubted the wisdom of spreading the
gangs over an entire convoy rather than
concentrating upon the complete dis-
charge of individual vessels one at a time.
Tank, however, was under pressure to
work the maximum number of ships.
Both Tank and the 6th Port quickly ran
into the periodic Transportation Corps
oversea nightmare, that of cargo being
discharged faster than it could be cleared
from the port area by the available port,
motor, and rail facilities.58
Despite the acute shortage of rail and
motor transport, the second supporting
cargo convoy, which consisted of twenty-
five ships (132,362 long tons) and arrived
on 1 December, was completely dis-
charged by 20 December 1942. Outload-
ing, which later was to become a major
activity at Casablanca, began with this
convoy. Outbound shipments fell into two
main categories—cork, phosphate, and
scrap iron shipped to the zone of interior,
and troops and cargo sent to the forward
areas. The next convoy, UGF-3, arrived
on Christmas Eve carrying mostly per-
sonnel and little cargo. Under a full
African moon and with sirens sounding to
warn of the first enemy air raid since the
56
Ibid., and Response by Gen Wylie, 12 Jan 43,
with appended date from rpt of investigation by Lt
Col P. Parker, IGD, OCT HB North Africa Ports.
57
Ltrs, Col Parrish, 1 Jul 50, and Col Tank, 11 Jul
50, to Harold Larson, OCT HB Inquiries.
58
See Col Parker rpt cited n. 56, pp. 1-2, 11-16,
30-36, 40-43, and Exhibit Q3.
156
landings, 23,043 passengers were safely
debarked from eleven ships.59
Toward the close of 1942 port conges-
tion ceased, and the lot of the harassed 6th
Port began to improve. In mid-December
the two port battalions moved from their
miserable bivouac areas into more desir-
able quarters, the 382d to a warehouse
and the 384th to a balloon hangar. Dur-
ing the following month morale was fur-
ther lifted when the mail with their new
APO address finally caught up with the
men. The arrival of two other port bat-
talions, the 379th and 480th, provided
much needed military personnel. Arabs
were employed in sizable shifts, averaging
about 1,000 per day, and proved fairly
satisfactory as dock labor when closely
supervised. When the Western Task Force
somewhat reluctantly relinquished con-
trol at Casablanca to the Atlantic Base
Section on 7 January 1943, the 6th Port
had become an efficient-working organi-
zation.60
During the ensuing months at Casa-
blanca U.S. troops and cargo were regu-
larly discharged and forwarded to the
combat area. The maximum port activity
was attained in March 1943, when 156,-
769 measurement tons were discharged.
Although the outloading of salvaged and
captured materials, the evacuation of the
American sick and wounded, and the re-
moval of enemy prisoners of war assumed
increasing importance during the spring
and summer, the over-all port traffic de-
clined. Because of the increased emphasis
on the use of the Mediterranean ports,
which had shorter lines of communica-
tions to the Tunisian front, Casablanca
was no longer used to capacity. Following
the end of Axis resistance in North Africa
in May 1943, the port lapsed into a sec-
ondary role. After handling approxi-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
mately 1.5 million measurement tons, two
thirds of it incoming cargo, during the
first nine months of its operation, Casa-
blanca was the scene of minor U.S. trans-
61
portation activity until the fall of 1945.
Oran
When measured in troops debarked
and cargo discharged, Oran and its sub-
ports far surpassed Casablanca and its
satellites during the North African cam-
62
paign. The 3d Port began activity at
Oran on 12 November 1942, under the
command of Colonel Lastayo. The unit
had gained some experience at the Bristol
Channel ports in the United Kingdom
and was far better prepared than the 6th
Port for assignment in North Africa. From
the beginning, Lastayo maintained close
liaison with the Commanding General,
Center Task Force, and he worked in close
collaboration with the Mediterranean
Base Section (MBS) commander (Larkin)
and the MBS transportation officer
(Stewart). Subsequently, Oran became
the principal port of the Mediterranean
Base Section. Mers el Kébir, Nemours,
Mostaganem, and Arzew, all nearby,
were employed to handle the overflow
from Oran.
Although only a roadstead shielded by
a breakwater, Mers el Kébir received con-
siderable cargo during the first phase of
59
Hist, 6th Port, I, 36, 40-45, 66-68, OCT HB
Oversea Ports.
60
Ibid., I, 38-40, 43, 48-50, 54-55, 62; Hist, Trans
Sec ABS, pp. 5-6, 15-16, 20-24, OCT HB North
Africa. Tank was succeeded as port commander on
14 January 1943 by Col. Eggleston W. Peach.
61
Hist, 6th Port, II, 6, 9, 11-12, 17-18, 20, OCT
HB Oversea Ports; ASF MPR, Sec. 3, 30 Sep 43, pp.
54-59.
62
Except where otherwise indicated, this section is
based upon Hist, 3d Port, 20 Jun 44, OCT HB Over-
sea Ports.
NORTH AFRICA
the invasion. The small artificial harbor of
Nemours, to the west of Oran, was not
used extensively until the summer of 1943.
Mostaganem and Arzew, both linked with
Oran by rail, had fairly adequate cargo-
handling equipment, and during Febru-
ary 1943, their peak month of activity,
they discharged 28,138 and 32,781 long
tons, respectively.
At Oran the port area consisted of a
narrow strip of land at the base of a steep
cliff, above which lay the city. The U.S.
Army operated at three piers, normally
using fourteen berths to discharge cargo.
The port was well supplied with heavy
lift equipment, including four floating
cranes ranging in capacity from 100 to
150 tons, but the equipment was not im-
mediately available. The first unloading,
therefore, was done with ship's gear, sup-
plemented by the organizational equip-
ment of the 397th and 399th Port Bat-
talions. At the outset, to facilitate mainte-
nance, cargo gear was pooled at Mers
el Kébir and Oran. It included among
other things, 10 fork-lift trucks, 6 mobile
1½-ton cranes, 10 warehouse tractors, 15
warehouse trailers, rope and wire nets,
shackles, bridles, trays, and pallets for
about 15 vessels.
After landing at Mers el Kébir the men
of the 3d Port marched the six miles to
Oran. There they found a disorganized
port, the quays littered with barrels of
wine and other merchandise, the ware-
houses in disorder, and the harbor strewn
with sunken craft. Since storage space was
very much limited, prompt clearance of
cargo was needed to prevent congestion.
Fortunately, the port facilities were intact
and the berths accessible. The principal
operating problem was to find sufficient
manpower to work around the clock.
Wherever possible, native labor was ob-
157
tained in order to release American sol-
diers for other duties and to benefit the
local economy. Some civilians were em-
ployed directly, others were engaged
through a labor syndicate, which dis-
charged vessels under contract on a ton-
nage basis. As many as 3,000 civilians
were employed at the port, the menial
tasks falling to the natives. Under-
nourished, ill clad, poor workers, and fre-
quently pilferers, they had to be watched
at all times. In addition to the natives, at
the peak of operations the 3d Port used six
63
or seven port battalions.
Apart from the labor situation, the
major problem was to keep the cargo
moving. Port clearance was dependent
largely on motor transport, since the rail
network allowed direct access to the ships
at only a few points. Instead of having
each supply service move its own items
from port to depot, a provisional freight
dispatch company, the 6697th, was set up
in port headquarters to control and direct
each movement and operate a motor pool.
The 3d Port had two hundred 2½-ton
trucks constantly at its service. These were
supplemented daily by 125 to 150 pri-
vately owned French trucks, all flat beds
from 12 to 23 feet long. The French vehi-
cles burned wood or charcoal, were old,
and were in poor mechanical condition.
The acquistion of large U.S. Army semi-
trailers, which could carry heavy and
oversize items such as piling and rails, per-
mitted the release of many inferior French
trucks. Port clearance was expedited by
the gradual increase in the number of
U.S. Army trucks of various types, greater
63
After Italy's capitulation, selected Italian pris-
oners of war were organized into port and service
battalions, which proved satisfactory and lessened the
need of native labor.
158
speed in loading and unloading vehicles,
and improved control of motor transport.
Truck strength at the port reached the
peak on 25 May 1943, when 479 trucks
were used during the day and 474 during
the night to haul 7,546 tons of freight.
It was soon found that the Table of Or-
ganization for the port was inadequate.
Continuous operation at Oran and its sub-
ports required more officers and enlisted
men than were available. No provision
had been made for a Port Provost Marshal
Section, although it was urgently needed
to direct the effort against pilferage and
possible sabotage. At the outset the num-
ber of guards was grossly inadequate, con-
sisting of two engineer companies trans-
formed overnight into military police. By
far the most acute problem was to sup-
press the pilfering fostered by the fantastic
prices of the local black market. A sum-
mary court procedure was employed to
mete out prompt punishment, and fifty-
one cases were brought to trial in a single
day. In addition to the natives, merchant
seamen were frequent offenders, and U.S.
military personnel were also involved. As
a precaution against pilfering, all inbound
and outbound cargo was funneled through
a single gate at the port. Any items likely
to be stolen, such as subsistence, post ex-
change supplies, and whiskey, had to be
accompanied by guards.
Cargo discharge at Oran reached a new
high in February 1943, when a total of
206,195 long tons was unloaded from 38
Liberty ships. Thereafter, as the fighting
extended eastward, other ports were de-
veloped nearer to the front. Nonetheless,
Oran remained important both for the
supply of American troops in North Africa
and for the outloading of U.S. Army cargo
for the later campaigns in Sicily, Italy,
and southern France. 64
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Philippeville, Bône, and Bizerte
As previously noted, the Eastern Base
Section was created early in 1943, pri-
marily to strengthen the long supply line
to Tunisia. Despite all efforts exerted to
utilize both rail and highway routes into
eastern Algeria from Casablanca, Oran,
and Algiers, the available facilities simply
did not suffice to move the volume of ma-
tériel needed by the Allied troops. The
small British-controlled port of Philippe-
ville, located about 400 miles east of Oran,
afforded a partial solution, although it had
been severely bombed, could not receive
vessels of deep draft, and had a maximum
daily capacity of only 1,500 long tons. As
soon as possible the harbor was dredged to
accommodate ships drawing up to twenty-
two feet, and American port personnel
and mechanized equipment were brought
in to assist the British. By March 1943
ever-increasing amounts of cargo were be-
ing discharged at Philippeville, to be for-
warded by rail and motor transport south
to the newly established general depot at
Ouled Rahmoun and thence east to the
advance dump at Tébessa.65
In preparation for the final drive in the
Tunisian campaign, use had to be made of
ports east of Philippeville. Late in March
1943 the British-held port of Bone was
pressed into service for the Americans. Its
harbor had thirty feet of water and could
therefore take fully loaded Liberty vessels,
but the almost constant air raids ham-
pered cargo discharge. Subsequently, port
64
See Supplements 4 and 5, Hist, 3d Port, Aug-Sep
44, OCT HB Oversea Ports. By September 1944 the
outloading of cargo predominated at Oran, and late
in February 1945 the port was released to French
military control. Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA,
Jan-Mar 45, OCT HB North Africa.
65
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec EBS, 22 Feb-30 Apr 43, pp.
6-8, 10, OCT HB North Africa.
NORTH AFRICA 159

operations were pushed still farther east- petroleum products frequently increased
ward to La Calle and Tabarka, two minor the total daily discharge to well over
coastal ports where U.S. Army cargo was 10,000 long tons. During the following
discharged from vessels of shallow draft, summer Bizerte became a major port of
including British and American landing embarkation for the assault and follow-up
craft and a fleet of fourteen small Cornish forces for the Sicilian and Italian cam-
fishing boats that were dispatched daily paigns.67
from Bone. This water route was supple-
mented by an overland route that used a Port and Shipping Problems
meter-gauge railway as far as La Calle
and motor transport the remainder of the In the course of the North African cam-
distance to Tabarka. Philippeville and paign numerous problems were encoun-
Bone, though useful, were soon sup- tered in the conduct of shipping and port
planted by the strategically located port of activities. Most of them were also to be
Bizerte, which came under the 8th Port in found in other theaters, but since the spot-
late May 1943.66 light was thrown first on North Africa the
Bizerte had suffered severely from Allied lessons learned there were given early and
68
bombing and Axis destruction, the sur- wide circulation. The experience of the
rounding waters were dotted with the Transportation Corps indicated that the
hulks of sunken enemy vessels, and the city planning and preparations for oversea
was in ruins. The main port of Bizerte lay port operations should be made in detail,
at the head of a narrow channel leading including provision for berthing space for
from the Mediterranean into the deep at least the first two cargo convoys; ade-
land-locked Lake of Bizerte, at the end of quate port equipment such as fork-lift and
which were the docks at Ferryville. The hand trucks, crawler cranes, dollies, pal-
proximity of this port area to Sicily, cou- lets, cables, ropes, tools, and acetylene
pled with the good rail and highway facili- torches; and sufficient trained port per-
ties of northern Tunisia, made Bizerte a sonnel to work around the clock. The
valuable base. The first U.S. cargo had to choice of an officer for the "man-size job"
be unloaded from coasters to lighters. of port commander should be made most
Meanwhile, the harbor and the entrance carefully. The grave deficiencies in pack-
to the lake were cleared of obstructions ing and marking called for corrective
and berthing space was readied. Two Lib- action in the zone of interior. In particu-
erty ships began discharging at pier side lar, cardboard and corrugated paper car-
on 12 June. tons were strongly condemned as unsatis-
Supporting port facilities in need of factory for amphibious landings. Excessive
repair, such as damaged roads and broken sizes and weights of such items as landing
water mains, were reconditioned as quickly 66
Ibid., 22 Feb-30 Apr 43, pp. 23-25, and 1 May-
as possible. Because of frequent enemy air 30 Jun 43, p. 44; Hist, 8th Port, 1942-44, pp. 5-7,
raids all discharged cargo had to be re- OCT HB Oversea Ports.
67
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec EBS, 1 May-30 Jun 43, pp.
moved immediately from the port area. 44-49, 53-55, and 1 Jul-20 Sep 43, pp. 41-50, OCT
In the latter part of June 1943 general HB North Africa.
68
cargo was being unloaded at the rate of For the TG report and related comments, see Hist
Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation to 31 Oct
3,000 or more long tons per day, and bulk 43, Tab AK, OCT HB North Africa.
160
mats in 5,000-pound bundles called for
heavy lift equipment. Organizational im-
pedimenta often were poorly packed and
marked, emphasizing the need of early
and better preparation for oversea move-
ments on the part of units, home stations,
and service commands. The urgent need
for amphibian vehicles in port and beach
operations was clearly established, and the
serious shortcomings in the characteristics
and functioning of the available landing
craft were pointed up by their mortality
rate in the assault, despite the fact that
there was little or no shore opposition.
Port activity naturally centered about
the ships that brought men and matériel
to the theater. The movements of these
vessels were strictly circumscribed by the
convoy system, which might mean, as
happened at Casablanca, that a given
Liberty ship would have to depart, even
though not fully discharged, lest she miss
the returning convoy. According to the
theater chief of transportation, his princi-
pal difficulty arose from failure to receive
complete, accurate, and direct informa-
tion on inbound convoys and cargo suffi-
ciently in advance of the actual arrival of
the ships.69 Although the ports in the
United States endeavored to speed the
dispatch of such vital data, annoying de-
lays Occurred, especially in the initial
phase when communications for North
Africa had to be sent via London. The
port commander at Oran at first tried to
rely on air-mailed manifests, but two con-
voys arrived ahead of the shipping papers
and the result was confusion. To prevent
recurrence, special Transportation Corps
couriers were employed until the regular
U.S. Army courier system proved more
70
dependable.
Similarly, the distribution of shipping
data from the theater chief of transporta-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
tion to the North African ports and base
sections in the beginning was haphazard
and unreliable. Procurement of an elec-
tric mimeograph machine permitted rapid
71
reproduction of shipping papers, but a
special Transportation Corps courier sys-
tem had to be instituted to insure safe and
prompt delivery of information within the
theater. Akin to the basic difficulty of get-
ting adequate data on incoming convoys
and cargo was the daily problem of keep-
ing abreast of the new and ever-changing
code names, shipment numbers, and ship-
ping designators, since cargo consistently
arrived in the theater with markings that
were unfamiliar to the port personnel, who
in this instance became the victims of too
much security.
As in the United Kingdom, "diversion
meetings" were held before the arrival of
each convoy in order to determine the
number of ships to be received and dis-
charged at each port. Attended by repre-
sentatives of the U.S. theater chief of trans-
portation and all agencies having an in-
terest in the cargo, the Diversion Commit-
tee assigned ships to individual ports,
taking into consideration the desires of the
69
On the problems of disseminating shipping in-
formation to and within the theater, see the following:
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation to 31
Oct 43, Sec. III and Tab Q; Hist, Trans Sec ABS, pp.
21-22, 25-26. Both in OCT HB North Africa. Sharp
lecture cited n. 13, p. 10. For similar problems en-
countered in the United Kingdom, see above, Chapter
III.
70
The first Transportation Corps courier from the
New York port arrived by air at Casablanca on 19
February 1943.
71
The principal shipping papers were the cargo-
loading cable, the first source of information on in-
bound cargo; the hatch breakdown of the manifest,
which was forwarded to the theater by air courier,
together with a set of clean stencils to reproduce this
document as a guide for the desired cargo distribu-
tion to supply depots and dumps within the theater;
and the ship's manifest, of which two advance copies
were sent by air to the theater chief of transportation.
NORTH AFRICA
supply services involved and the ability of
the ports to receive and discharge the ves-
sels. The theater chief of transportation
staff also attended the weekly Priority of
Movements (POM) meetings, at which
SOS, Air Forces, U.S. Navy, and Allied
forces tonnage requirements were bid and
allotments of shipping space made.
Co-ordination of all shipping questions
arising in the theater was handled through
the North African (later, Mediterranean)
Shipping Board, on which the U.S. the-
ater chief of transportation was repre-
sented. Composed of representatives of the
British Ministry of War Transport, the
American War Shipping Administration,
and all U.S. and British military agen-
cies concerned with merchant shipping,
NASBO provided advice regarding the
allocation of shipping in the area; nomi-
nated to the naval commander-in-chief
vessels for inclusion in convoys originating
in the theater; expedited the turnaround
of vessels; allocated ships for imports and
exports of civilian cargo; co-ordinated the
movement of tankers and colliers; and
cared for the welfare of merchant seamen.
A major task within each American-
controlled port was the co-ordination of
the activities of the three U.S. operating
agencies most vitally concerned with ship-
ping—the Navy, the Army, and the War
Shipping Administration. A local port
committee representing the interested
parties, American and Allied, met daily
and ironed out the operating details
common to all.72
Despite inexperienced personnel, lim-
ited facilities, and the constant haste and
pressure of war, the U.S.-operated ports
in North Africa rolled up an impressive
record. Oran and its subports carried the
largest load, but the ports in the other two
base sections also were active. The follow-
161
ing tabulation shows the long tons of gen-
eral cargo, bulk POL (petrol, oils, and
lubricants), and coal, and the number of
vehicles discharged in each base section
up to 30 June 1943: 73
Highway Transport
Efficiency of port operation depended
mainly upon the rate of port clearance,
which was effected primarily by highway
transport. 74 Since the rail facilities might
be destroyed, the initial Transportation
Corps planning in London aimed at port
clearance solely by truck. At first only
short hauls (port to dump) were contem-
plated, although long hauls (50 to 250
miles) later were found necessary because
of the inadequacy of rail transport. The
planning included the development of
traffic systems, forms, and SOP's (standing
operating procedures). Traffic regulating
personnel made available by the 531st
Engineer Boat Regiment were trained for
72
See Sharp lecture cited n. 13, pp. 8-12; and Hist
Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation to 31 Oct
43, Sec. III and Tab A, OCT HB North Africa.
73
ABS and MBS statistics cover the period 8 No-
vember 1942-30 June 1943. The EBS data begin with
the activation of that base section in February 1943.
See Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation to
31 Oct 43, Sec. VII and Tab AN, OCT HB North
Africa.
74
Except as otherwise indicated, this section is based
on the following: Rpt, Maj Arthur G. Siegle, High-
way Operations in North Africa, Apr 43, Pts. 1-4;
Trans School, Ft. Eustis, Va., Highway Unit Train-
ing Pamphlet No. 9; Talk by Lt Col Franklin M.
Kreml at Trans School, Ft. Eustis, 29 Oct 48. All in
OCT HB. Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, ac-
tivation to 31 Oct 43, Sec. III (5) and Tab AJ, OCT
HB North Africa; Ltr, Kreml, 18 Sep 50, HIS 330.14
(4 Aug 50), OCMH.
162
six days at Liverpool, immediately before
sailing for North Africa.
Early Operations
No highway division was established by
the theater chief of transportation until
July 1943 since there was very little inter-
sectional operation of highway transport
apart from organic movements and deliv-
eries to the east of new vehicles. While the
hostilities continued, except for a few large
movements, the control of highway traffic
was left mainly to the base section trans-
portation officers. The nature of the con-
trol over highway transport varied among
the base sections. In the Atlantic and
Eastern Base Sections this control tended
to be centralized, but in the Mediterra-
nean Base Section it was decentralized
between port and highway movements.
The Americans at first lacked both trained
personnel and an established procedure
for effective over-the-road control, but for-
tunately they received splendid assistance
from the British, who had both the men
and the system needed.75
The Transportation Corps planners for
highway transport, Captains Kreml and
Barton, landed at Arzew on 8 November
1942 with Colonel Stewart's advance
party. The first task was to organize suffi-
cient motor transport to support the com-
bat troops once they had exhausted the
three days' supply carried ashore on their
backs. The capture of Oran made avail-
able approximately 380 charcoal-burning
trucks belonging to a wine syndicate,
which were promptly requisitioned. Both
at Casablanca and at Oran a shortage of
U.S. Army trucks hindered port opera-
tion. Locally owned vehicles were pressed
into service, but considerable difficulty
was experienced because of inability to
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
exercise adequate control over the civilian
drivers.
Back piling, that is, temporary storage,
of cargo in the port areas was necessary,
not only because of an insufficient number
of trucks for port clearance but also be-
cause the vehicles themselves were not
suitable for carrying certain items such as
cased vehicles. Although highly desirable,
back piling by class was not practiced in
the early and most critical stage of cargo
clearance, in part because port troops were
not aware of the importance of properly
sorting back-piled cargo, and in part be-
cause of having to rely largely on native
labor. As a result, the transportation sys-
tem was less efficient than it might have
been had supplies been stacked by class so
as to facilitate transfer to dumps and
depots when more trucks became avail-
able.
Contributing to initial confusion at the
ports was the lack of an effective control
system by which trucks, storage space, and
labor could have been fitted like links in
the tight chain of military transportation.
The local communication system at best
was grossly inadequate for the control of
motor transport. In such a large port as
Oran, telephones were either lacking or
useless, and communication was main-
tained by runners. An attempt to employ
walkie-talkies was stopped by the signal
officer on the ground of security violation.
Without adequate control, trucks got lost,
drivers went off on their own, and tie-ups
developed at dumps, thereby depriving
the ports of badly needed motor transport.
To his regret, Captain Kreml had failed
to bring a goodly supply of road signs. In
the absence of such signs, and especially
after dark, bewildered American drivers
75
Interv, Maj Harry D. Kamy, 20-21 Sep 44, OCT
HB North Africa Misc Info.
NORTH AFRICA
wasted many hours trying to find the
dumps. Luckily, French drivers knew
where to go if shown the location on a
map, and after a week or ten days of ori-
entation Americans also could be trusted
not to get lost. Ultimately, an effective
control system was established whereby
trucks were dispatched daily as required
and were kept under close supervision
from port to dump by a central highway
office. To avoid impending tie-ups fewer
trucks might be dispatched to a congested
dump or additional labor obtained for
unloading at destination. The object was
to keep the trucks moving, preferably
around the clock if enough drivers could
be obtained.76
The Transportation Corps was embar-
rassed repeatedly by not being consulted
in the initial selection of dumps and
depots. The ideal location was high, dry,
and firm terrain able to support truck
traffic, situated near the port, and adja-
cent to connecting rail and highway facili-
ties. Actually, when the rains came, some
dumps became seas of mud, and at Oran
as many as sixty trucks were mired in one
night. The cargo capacity at the destina-
tion frequently failed to match the incom-
ing volume. For instance, the Class I dump
in Oran was a warehouse with an inside
loading platform that accommodated only
two trucks, thereby forcing other vehicles
to wait. At another site the mud was so
thick that the dump had to be closed and
the supplies moved elsewhere.
Although the roads deteriorated under
wartime traffic, they were kept reasonably
usable by the Corps of Engineers. In the
latter stages of the campaign, however,
two important bottlenecks developed in
the Eastern Base Section. One was in the
mountainous La Calle-Tabarka area,
where truck operation was handicapped
163
by poorly surfaced roads, steep grades,
and sharp turns; and the other, in the
vicinity of the important supply base of
Constantine, where rain made the high-
ways dangerously slippery.
During the early, critical stage of port
clearance, the trucks carried all they pos-
sibly could, subject only to being able to
get in and out of the muddy dumps. The
standard U.S. Army 2½-ton 6x6 truck
could safely carry 4 to 5 tons, but it was
virtually useless for moving bulky cargo
such as cased vehicles, airplane parts, rails,
and telephone poles. Larger trucks would
have been useful, and tractors with semi-
trailers would have proved very helpful,
since the trailers could be dropped off for
loading and picked up later. One-ton
trailers were considered uneconomical for
short hauls, but later proved useful for
runs from Philippeville to Tébessa and
Ouled Rahmoun. Ships were discharged
at Philippeville only during daylight
hours, and the cargo was stacked. At night
inbound trucks left empty one-ton trailers
to be filled, then received their own ship-
ments, and finally returned to attach the
loaded one-ton trailers for the outbound
trip.
Except for cargo clearance from port to
dump, the bulk of the motor traffic moved
eastward, principally by convoy. Convoys
of organic vehicles carrying men and sup-
plies generally were loaded and dispatched
from Casablanca and Oran, proceeding
eastward under Transportation Corps
traffic control to Orléansville, at which
point they became subject to British move-
ment control. Replacement vehicles usu-
ally were taken forward in convoy by
officer and enlisted replacements who
76
For details of the control system, which varied
somewhat among the base sections, see Highway Unit
Training Pamphlet No. 9 cited n. 74.
164
were frequently inexperienced drivers
simply drafted for the job. 77 U.S. Army
freight moved by convoy in accordance
with priority lists. In addition to American
motor transport, both organic and casual,
the North African highways had to carry
British and French traffic. Under these
circumstances effective control over motor
traffic, including convoys, was essential to
prevent highway congestion.
Detailed AFHQ instructions for the
conduct of motor convoys began appear-
ing early in February 1943, when this type
of traffic had become significant in the
theater. As a rule, the officers in charge
were cautioned to adhere strictly to the
prevailing speed limits (usually 25 miles
per hour or less in built-up areas) and the
prescribed traffic density (15 vehicles to
the mile), in order to avoid casualties to
the native population arising from careless
driving. Small advance parties were to be
sent ahead to make arrangements at the
next intermediate point. Each convoy was
to begin with enough rations for seven
days and gasoline for 500 miles. The nor-
mal halts were to be observed, and the
progress of the movement was to be
checked at the traffic control posts en
route. A blue flag was to be carried by the
leading vehicle and a green flag by the
rear vehicle. Guards had to be placed on
the cargo trucks for protection against
marauding natives and hungry soldiers.
In order to regulate convoy movements
a chain of traffic control stations was set
up early in 1943, beginning at Casa-
blanca. According to Kreml, this traffic
regulation at first did not work well. As
the American convoys pushed eastward
beyond Orléansville, their movements
conflicted with those of the British, who
therefore insisted upon regulating all U.S.
Army highway movements from the west.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Imbued with the traditional American
spirit of independence, both service and
combat elements objected vigorously to
having their movements regulated. As a
result, the British complained to AFHQ
that they were deluged by approximately
2,900 vehicles passing through Orléans-
ville in a single day, instead of the 1,800
vehicles that had been agreed upon as the
normal daily load at that point. This par-
ticular difficulty was resolved by an
AFHQ directive subjecting all such move-
ments to regulation.
A second difficulty was one of commu-
nications. A movement might be cleared
from, say, Oran, but the traffic control of-
ficers on the road frequently could not be
informed of the plan because of broken
telephone connections. A call generally
had to pass through several switchboards
and, as Kreml said, it was a miracle to get
through and an even greater one to be
heard. Highway traffic regulations, to be
effective, depended upon an adequate,
centralized communication system hard
to achieve under combat conditions.
Long hauls of the convoy type hardly
became significant until Generalfeld-
marschall Erwin Rommel broke through
the American defenses at Kasserine in
February 1943. Because of the loss of the
limited rail net in this area, it became
necessary overnight to activate several
new truck battalions for service in the
Eastern Base Section, primarily to deliver
ammunition, petroleum products, rations,
and other supplies for the support of the
U.S. II Corps near Tébessa. These truck-
ing units were hastily organized with
untrained personnel drawn from various
combat units. The 2640th Quartermaster
Battalion (Truck), for instance, had many
77
Interv, Maj Kamy, 20-21 Sep 44, OCT HB
North Africa Misc Info.
NORTH AFRICA
men who had not even driven automo-
biles in civilian life. Within a week the
battalion had loaded high-priority freight
and was on the road heading east from
Casablanca. Despite mountainous terrain,
the long trip to Ouled Rahmoun was
completed successfully on 23 March 1943,
less than a month after the battalion had
been hurriedly activated at Casablanca.
The unit at once began operating on a
78
twenty-four-hour hauling schedule.
Convoy UGS-5½
The transformation of the campaign
from a stalemated operation mired down
in mud into a war of movement greatly
increased the demands on the limited
overland transport facilities in the theater.
Fortunately, the need had been antic-
ipated early in 1943. After participating
in the Casablanca Conference, General
Somervell had taken a direct hand in im-
proving the rail and highway facilities in
the theater, which even then fell far short
of satisfying the current demands. In late
January, after conferring at Algiers with
General Eisenhower and his staff, Somer-
vell concluded that motor and rail trans-
port represented the greatest need in
North Africa. Accordingly, in a long radio
message he startled the War Department
by demanding that a special convoy be
sent on 15 February with a huge quantity
of highway and rail equipment, together
with certain other urgent items. No ob-
stacle, declared Somervell, was to be per-
mitted to interfere with this shipment as
directed.79 At the same time approxi-
mately 4,000 new service troops were re-
quested in addition to an MRS detach-
ment of about 25 officers and enlisted
men, under Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr.,
165
upon whom Somervell counted for correc-
tive action to increase the capacity of the
80
North African railways.
The special convoy assembled at
Somervell's behest was an excellent ex-
ample of effective wartime co-operation.81
Time was short, shipping tight, and maté-
riel scarce. The Navy agreed to furnish
the necessary escorts. The War Shipping
Administration somehow managed to spot
twenty available cargo ships, but their
locations were such that loadings had to
be done at New York, Baltimore, and
Hampton Roads. In Washington, the As-
sistant Chief of Transportation, General
Wylie, personally supervised the assem-
bling of the cargo and its movement to the
ports.
The most pressing transportation re-
quirement was motor transport, which
had been in short supply from the begin-
ning of the North African operation be-
cause the number of vehicles accompany-
ing the initial task forces had been dras-
tically cut for lack of shipping space. In
fact, at his first conference with the thea-
ter commander, General Somervell had
suggested scheduling a special convoy
primarily to deliver as many trucks as
possible. The original plan called for 5,000
2½-ton cargo trucks, 400 5-ton dump
trucks, and 2,000 1-ton, 2-wheel cargo
78
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec EBS, 22 Feb-30 Apr 43, pp.
10-14.
79
Rad, Algiers to AGWAR, No. 7428, 26 Jan 43,
CM-IN 12248, OCT HB North Africa Convoy 5½.
This message provoked Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer's
often-quoted reply pleading for more time if the
Pentagon Building had to be shipped. History of Plan-
ning Division, Army Service Forces, Vol. III, App.
4-A, DRB AGO.
80
Compilation by TC Plng Div, 26 Jan 43, and
Memo, Teletype Conv, Somervell, Gross, and Styer,
26 Jan 43, OCT HB North Africa Convoy 5½.
81
The convoy was known variously as Convoy 5½,
UGS-5½, UGS-5.5, and UGS-5A.
166
trailers. Smaller 1½-ton equipment had
to be substituted for 5-ton dump trucks,
which were unavailable. Since the 5,000
2½-ton trucks were the largest single item
requested, General Wylie decided that
this portion of the shipment would have
to be cut about 10 percent in order to in-
sure space for other must cargo. The trucks
were shipped in part on wheels but mostly
boxed.82
The principal railway items requested
by Somervell for inclusion in the convoy
were 5 80-ton locomotives, 5 56-ton war
flats, and 25 15-ton and 25 30-ton meter-
gauge wagons. The meter-gauge items
were to be restricted to specific ships in
order to permit diversion to ports in the
forward area where such equipment was
most needed. The additional locomotives
and rolling stock were calculated to inject
new life into the ailing North African rail
line.
Despite a tight squeeze in assembling
the cargo and the snow and rain that
slowed the loading, the special convoy
sailed from Hampton Roads on 17 Febru-
ary 1943. The result in large measure of
unremitting effort by the Transportation
Corps, this shipment gave valuable sup-
port to the theater. Some items had to be
left behind, but the bulk of the transpor-
tation equipment was shipped, including
4,536 2½-ton cargo trucks and 1,872 1-ton
trailers.83 The convoy, which reached the
theater early in March, was hailed as a
godsend by General Eisenhower. The
trucks greatly increased the mobility of
the Allied forces, and the locomotives and
other rolling stock helped prevent a
breakdown of the North African railways.
The theater commander later attributed
the success of the Tunisian campaign
largely to the support from the special
convoy.84
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Supporting the Final Offensive
In the theater, meanwhile, highway
activities in the Eastern Base Section were
being stepped up. In preparation for the
impending Allied counteroffensive, sup-
plies were brought in through the port of
Philippeville and the railhead at Ouled
Rahmoun for forwarding by truck or rail
to Tébessa. At the outset, the principal
difficulty came from accepting tonnage
commitments in excess of the actual
capacity to deliver. A potentially danger-
ous gap between promise and perform-
ance was closed by means of a weekly
highway transport program, predicated
on the available lift on the one hand and
the service demands on the other, subject
to arbitration and approval by the G-4 of
the Eastern Base Section. During the last
half of March 1943, 16,722 tons were
moved east from Ouled Rahmoun, of
which 9,544 tons went by truck and the
remaining 7,178 tons by rail.85
Aside from the obvious disadvantage of
functioning with hastily organized and
largely untrained personnel, the trucking
units in this area at first had two major
handicaps that impaired their operating
efficiency. One was the failure to load the
2½-ton trucks to the maximum capacity.
82
Memo, Wylie to Styer, 14 Feb 43, OCT HB
North Africa Convoy 5½.
83
Other cargo included automotive spare parts,
construction equipment, PX supplies, and high-
priority Signal, Medical, and Air Forces items. See
OCT HB North Africa Convoy 5½.
84
Ltrs, Eisenhower to Somervell, 28 May 43, and
Styer to Somervell, 13 Jun 43, Hq ASF CofS 1942-
43. The prompt delivery of the trucks made a deep
impression on Eisenhower. Ltr, Franklin to Gross, 5
Nov 44, OCT HB Gross ETO; Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 148-49.
85
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec EBS, 22 Feb-30 Apr 43, p.
15, OCT HB North Africa; Ltr and Comments,
Kreml, 18 Sep 50, HIS 330.14 (4 Aug 50), OCMH.
NORTH AFRICA
The other was the lack of a firm trucking
schedule that would achieve a steady flow
of freight with the best possible turn-
around time. Motor transport also suf-
fered from an acute shortage of tools,
maintenance equipment, spare parts, and
tire-patching material, for which there
was only gradual relief.
By mid-March 1943 the volume of
highway traffic in the Eastern Base Sec-
tion had grown so great that Major Kreml
was assigned to make a special study of
the traffic pattern with a view to possible
improvement. He recommended that the
highway system, hitherto under British
movement control, be organized into
"blocks," much like those used by rail-
ways. Roadside traffic control stations
were set up at intervals of about thirty
miles, all connected by telephone with an
area dispatcher, who could then tell at
any time the exact whereabouts of any
convoy on the road. As a result, much of
the slack time inherent in the previous ar-
rangement was eliminated. The British
favored the change and indeed helped set
up the required telephone system.86
An outstanding achievement of the
final phase of the Tunisian campaign was
the movement in April 1943 of the entire
U.S. II Corps of more than 100,000 men
and their equipment from the extreme
southern flank in Tunisia to the northern
flank, in preparation for a decisive thrust
against Bizerte and Tunis. Although the
movement began with some confusion, it
was completed in orderly fashion. The
bulk of the II Corps personnel moved in
its organic vehicles, but additional trucks
had to be furnished by the Eastern Base
Section. In connection with the move-
ment, the 2638th and 2640th Quarter-
master Truck Battalions, operating ap-
proximately 230 2½-ton trucks and trail-
167
ers, transported 1,100 tons of ammunition
from dumps three miles south of Tébessa
to a new site about twenty-five miles east
of Tabarka. This mission was accom-
plished within forty-eight hours, despite
driving rain and mountain roads with
steep grades and sharp curves. Accidents
took the lives of two men, and German
aircraft strafed some vehicles, causing
minor damage.87
As the fighting intensified in northern
Tunisia, the volume of traffic grew too
heavy for the narrow, mountainous, scenic
highway between La Calle and Tabarka.
Since wounded troops were being evac-
uated over the same road in the opposite
direction, the trucks often had to pull over
to the side and stop to permit ambulances
to pass. In the absence of a rail link be-
tween La Calle and Tabarka, efforts were
made to ease the strain on the road by
using water transportation to bypass it.
Landing craft were sent from Bone to
Tabarka, where their cargo was forwarded
either by rail or truck. This arrangement
kept the highway available for essential
traffic. In fact, even after hostilities ended
in May 1943 and until the port of Bizerte
could be operated at sufficient capacity to
support the American troops in Tunisia
by direct water shipments, the accepted
pattern was to combine existing water,
rail, and highway facilities to form a single
transportation system within the theater.
Beginning with limited resources in
equipment and personnel, supplemented
by locally owned trucks with native driv-
ers, the Transportation Corps in North
Africa managed to meet the ever-chang-
ing demands of the U.S. Army for high-
86
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec EBS, 22 Feb-30 Apr 43, p.
21, OCT HB North Africa.
87
Ibid., pp. 28-29; To Bizerte With the II Corps,
p. 4; Kreml ltr and comments cited n. 85.
 168 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

way transport. The trucks were kept mov- far short of American standards. Mainte-
ing despite enemy aircraft, hazardous nance had been neglected, trains were
mountain roads, heavy rain, thick mud, slow, and there was a grave shortage of
and the frequent necessity of hauling at motive power.90
night under blackout conditions. As Gen- Railroading in North Africa was car-
eral Ross wrote, "When you tell a driver ried on by a wartime melange of Amer-
'Get these rations to such-and-such a ican, British, and French military person-
place—they've got only enough for break- nel, superimposed upon the normal
fast,' you know he'll get it there, come hell, peacetime organization of French and
high water, or Nazis." 88 Arab civilians. In the course of the cam-
paign U.S. and British railway troops and
Railway Operations equipment were brought in, and Allied
railway activities were placed under an
Although the U.S. Army could not American director of military railways.
have functioned in North Africa without Most of the participating U.S. troops had
motor vehicles, the number was insuffi- been railroaders in private life, and the
cient to satisfy all demands for overland previous affiliations of the officers and en-
transport. In this theater as elsewhere all listed men read like a roll call of Amer-
available railway facilities had to be uti- ican railways. In the forward areas the lo-
lized as promptly and fully as possible. The comotives were operated by military rail-
main railway, a single-track line during way personnel, assisted by French civilian
most of the war, ran roughly parallel to the engineers acting as pilots. Elsewhere, na-
northern coast of Africa from Casablanca tive civilians ran the trains. Like other
via Fès, Oujda, Oran, Algiers, and Con- Americans in the theater, the U.S. rail
stantine to Tunis, a total of 1,410 miles. (See personnel had to contend with language
Map 3.) The main line was standard difficulties, equipment shortages, and the
gauge, but most of the branch lines, in- hazards of enemy aircraft and mines.
cluding those in Tunisia, were narrow
(meter) gauge. From Casablanca to Fes Initial Activities
the main line was electrified, eastward of
Fes it depended upon steam. Freight ca- Preliminary Transportation Corps esti-
pacity was estimated at 240 tons of mili- mates of late July 1942 called for one rail-
tary supplies per day per train, yielding a way grand division91 and four railway op-
total of 5,760 tons for 12 trains per day
each way. The International Teamster, XL, 5 (April 1943),
88

The North African railways operated 13-14. 89

Each system was known by the letters CF
in three distinct nets, conforming in gen- (Chemin de Fer) to which were added either M, A,
eral to the boundaries of French Morocco, or T, indicating the Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian
Algeria, and Tunisia.89 The Americans lines. 90
Data compiled by Maj R. E. Shineman, Rail Div
found these railways undamaged in most OCT WD, 2 Mar 43; Ltr, Gray to Gross, 28 Feb 43.
respects and in normal operating condi- Both in OCT HB North Africa MRS Misc. Cf. Hist,
tion, but unequal to the wartime traffic. Trans 91
Sec ABS, p. 13, OCT HB North Africa.
A railway grand division was a military service
The rolling stock, especially the "dinky" organization corresponding to the office of the general
engines and small hand-braked cars, fell superintendent on an American railroad.
NORTH AFRICA 169

erating battalions in the initial North tices that the Americans found time con-
95
African contingent, and a reserve of two suming, the principal obstacle was a
railway operating battalions and one rail- severe shortage of manpower and rolling
way shop battalion.92 The first military stock that had to be overcome by the em-
railway unit to reach the theater was the ployment of U.S. and British railway
761st Railway Transportation Company troops and equipment. 96 At first, British
(less one detachment), which after a short railway operating troops functioned east-
training period in England, was sent to ward from Orléansville, leaving railway
North Africa, debarking at Mers el Kébir activity west of that city under American
on 11 November 1942. Among its first control.
tasks were the operation of the railway At AFHQ during the early months of
yards at Oran; the setting up of RTO's the campaign, U.S. Army rail activities
from Oujda to Algiers; and the assign- were under the supervision of an experi-
ment of railway men as guards, who could enced American railroader, the theater
also serve as crews if need be, to U.S. deputy chief of transportation, Colonel
Army supply trains moving east from Fuller. During the early part of the cam-
Oran.93 paign, at nine each night he and his Brit-
An advance echelon of twelve officers ish counterpart held a Priority of Move-
97
and enlisted men of the 703d Railway ments meeting, at which the current de-
Grand Division, under the command of mands for military transportation were
Colonel Burpee, landed at Casablanca on 92
Memo, Lt Col D. E. Brisbine, Rail Div OCT, to
18 November. Members of this group at Col Coe, 28 Jul 42, sub: Troops Needed to Operate
once began work with the French railway Rys . . ., OCT HB North Africa MRS Misc. Later,
officials to move American troops and additional railway units had to be sent to help the
their organic equipment from the D-plus- French. See Rads, NATOUSA and WD, 25 Jan 43,
CM-IN 11277, and 18 Jan 43, CM-OUT 6558,
5 convoy. In the effort to furnish all OCT 319.2-321.03 Africa 1943.
93
needed transportation, Burpee's staff had Hist Rcd, 761st Ry Trans Co, 28 Jul 42-Apr 43,
OCT HB North Africa Ry Units.
the good fortune to find an American vet- 94
Hist, Trans Sec ABS, pp. 13-14, OCT HB North
eran of World War I who was familiar Africa.
95
with the local rail situation and could Many hours were lost because the French sched-
94 ules, called "paths," were based upon the meeting and
serve as an interpreter. passing of trains at certain points, a somewhat inflexi-
Throughout the North African cam- ble system usually attended by delay that on occasion
paign the Americans were to exercise exceeded the actual running time between stations;
and because the French were very slow in effecting
purely supervisory control over French shop repairs, particularly with regard to locomotives.
railway operations, and their success was Ltr, Gray to Gross, 28 Feb 43, OCT HB North Africa
dependent upon winning the support and MRS Misc. 96
For an over-all survey from the American point
co-operation of the local railway officials of view, see Rpt, DG MRS AFHQ, 30 Nov 43, sub:
so as to expedite the movement of U.S. Chronological Statement of North African Ry Opn,
Army personnel and freight. The French OCT HB North Africa MRS Misc. On the British
effort, see Notes on the African Campaign, Nov 42-
generally co-operated well until the war May 43, compiled by Trans (British) Sec AFHQ
ended, after which the restoration of nor- Jun 43, in 2 pts., (1) Railway Operating and Work-
mal railway service became their para- shops and (2) Railway Construction and Repair, OCT
HB North Africa MRS Gen Rpt.
mount interest. Apart from the language 97
Subsequently (1943) POM changed from a daily
problem and certain French railway prac- to a weekly meeting.
170
weighed and the priorities established for
all types of movement within the theater,
including shipments by rail for the U.S.
Army. On the following day Fuller or one
of his staff officers conferred with repre-
sentatives of the British Army and the
French Army, 98 and with key officials of
the French railways, in order to regulate
and co-ordinate this traffic and apportion
rolling stock to meet the most essential
needs of the Americans, the British, and
the French. Thrice weekly an Allied Rail-
way Commission, of which Fuller also was
a member, met to thrash out the larger
problems not solved at these daily
meetings.
A rail section was formally organized at
the Office of the U.S. Chief of Transporta-
tion, AFHQ in January 1943. Among
other things, the section prepared the rail
movements schedules for U.S. Army per-
sonnel and freight, maintained liaison
with the British and French regarding
such movements, and furnished informa-
tion to the American base sections on
movement priorities. It worked closely
with the Military Railway Service after
that organization began functioning in
North Africa."
Although Fuller and his associates had
proved valiant pioneers, by the beginning
of 1943 it had become evident that greater
co-ordination and closer supervision of
American operations on the French rail-
ways in North Africa could be achieved
only by setting up a special military rail-
way organization to function on a theater-
wide basis. The eastward advance of the
Allied forces had greatly lengthened the
supply line, increasing the burden laid on
the railways. As yet comparatively few
U.S. military railway personnel had
reached North Africa, and because of the
extensive area to be supervised, their
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
efforts were spread thin. Apart from the
Advance Echelon, 703d Railway Grand
Division, and the 761st Railway Trans-
portation Company, only two other
Transportation Corps railway units
reached the theater before the end of
1942. They were the 753d Railway Shop
Battalion, which worked primarily in the
French railway shops at Sidi Mabrouk;
and the 727th Railway Operating Battal-
ion, which was soon to begin operating
the meter-gauge line from Ouled Rah-
moun to Tébessa, virtually within the
combat zone. No other U.S. railway units
became available until late February
1943. when the remainder of the 703d
Railway Grand Division, the 713th Rail-
way Operating Battalion, and Company
C of the 753d Railway Shop Battalion
arrived.100
The Establishment of a Military
Railway Service
Since as a civilian his forte had been
railway traffic rather than operations,
Colonel Fuller felt the need of an experi-
enced operating man who could supervise
all U.S. Army rail transportation in North
Africa and assure the maximum utiliza-
tion of the French railways. The day after
98
Wartime control of the railways was vested in the
French Army under Col. E. Quenard, Director of
Military Transports in North Africa.
99
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Sec. II, par. 1-6, and Hist Rcd, Adv
Ech Hq MRS North Africa, 27 Jan-30 Apr 43, pp.
3-4, OCT HB North Africa; Interv with Col Fuller,
28 Jul 50, OCT HB MRS Misc.
100
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Tab V, OCT HB North Africa; DG
MRS AFHQ rpt cited n. 96, pp. 1-3, Exhibits A, C,
D, H, I. See also Hist, 713th Ry Operating Bn, 25
Apr 42-15 May 43, and Hist Rcd, 703d Ry Grand
Div, 26 Jul 43, OCT HB North Africa Ry Units.
NORTH AFRICA 171

the Casablanca Conference closed, the appointed as his deputy, a combined staff
matter was taken up by General Somer- was set up, and the operation of various
vell with the theater G-4, General Ham- routes was assigned to U.S. or British
blen, the theater chief of transportation, units. The British considered the decision
Colonel Ross, and the latter's deputy, to place Allied railway operations under
Colonel Fuller. Somervell recommended American command inconvenient, since
General Gray, and a request for him was they believed that it entailed a loss of
immediately dispatched to Washington. British responsibility for railway policy on
An experienced and aggressive railway their lines of communication, but they ac-
executive, Gray was then stationed at St. cepted it loyally. Although differences in
Paul, Minnesota, serving as general man- methods and organization inevitably
ager of the Military Railway Service, caused some difficulties, on the whole the
which had been transferred from the arrangement worked well. Liaison was
Corps of Engineers to the Transportation close, many firm friendships developed
Corps in mid-November 1942. between U.S. and British officers, and
General Gray and a small advance Gray found Brigadier Gage most co-oper-
party left the United States by air, land- ative.
ing at Algiers on 9 February 1943. Five Although Gray had no direct command
days later the AFHQ commander for- authority over the French Military Rail-
mally assigned Gray as director general of way Service, a small organization with
Military Railways in North Africa, and only six companies of construction troops,
placed all U.S. and British military rail- by AFHQ directive his recommendations
way personnel at his disposal. Serving in were to be the basis for negotiations con-
an Allied capacity, he reported directly to ducted by the Allied chief administrative
the Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ officer with the French authorities regard-
and for certain functions he was also re- ing the extent to which railway develop-
sponsible to the deputy theater com- ment and operation would be effected
mander, 101 but he was virtually independ- through the medium of the French Mili-
ent of the U.S. theater chief of tary Railway Service, or by U.S. or Brit-
transportation. This arrangement was not ish military railway personnel. In prac-
in accord with the more orthodox view of tice, the French recognized Gray's
General Gross that the theater chief of responsibility for the direction of all mili-
transportation should control and super- tary railway activities, and their military
vise rail as well as port and highway op- units were placed at his disposal in much
erations. However unorthodox Gray's
101
position might appear, the results were Specifically, Gray was responsible to the deputy
theater commander for the development and opera-
good—in large measure because Colonel tion of railway facilities within the U.S. communica-
Stewart recognized the energy and ability tions zone, and for the well being and morale of U.S.
of General Gray and was glad to let him military railway troops.
102
Interv with Col Fuller, 15 Jun and 28 Jul 50,
run the railways.102 OCT HB MRS Misc. On Gray's assignment, see Rad,
General Gray established his Military Eisenhower to AGWAR, 26 Jan 43, CM-IN 12178,
Railway Service headquarters at Algiers. OCT HB North Africa MRS Misc; GO 19, AFHQ
14 Feb 43; and Hist Rcd, Adv Ech Hq MRS North
There, the British director of transporta- Africa, 27 Jan-30 Apr 43, pp. 1-3, OCT HB North
tion, Brigadier R. F. O'Dowd Gage, was Africa.
172
the same manner as the American and
British troops.103
Basically, General Gray depended upon
French civilians to run the railways, since
sufficient Allied trained military person-
nel were lacking for complete MRS oper-
ation. In accordance with AFHQ policy,
he sought to assist the French to move the
maximum Allied tonnage by supplement-
ing their limited resources in manpower
and equipment. Indeed, before Gray
reached North Africa, the theater chief of
transportation had advised that American
personnel and rolling stock must be pro-
cured to prevent a breakdown of rail-
ways.104 Although the French co-operated
fully, civilian operation was not deemed
desirable in the combat zone, and in other
areas in the interest of efficiency the
Americans had to supplement the French
train and repair crews. Rolling stock,
already in poor condition, was to suffer
increasingly from enemy action as the
campaign turned eastward.
At the time of Gray's arrival, American
rail units in the theater or en route con-
sisted of the advance echelon of the MRS
headquarters, the railway grand division,
two railway operating battalions, a rail-
way shop battalion, and a separate trans-
portation company. After conferring with
the deputy theater commander and the
AFHQ Movements and Transportation
Section staff, he requested additional U.S.
railway units to meet his anticipated re-
quirements. These units, consisting of the
rear echelon of MRS headquarters, two
railway grand divisions (the 701st and
704th), and three railway operating bat-
talions (715th, 719th, and 759th) landed
in North Africa on 11 May 1943.105
Additional railway equipment had
been requisitioned by the Americans and
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the British before Gray's arrival. Because
damage was less than expected, the origi-
nal requirement of 250 standard-gauge
2-8-0 locomotives, 175 meter-gauge 2-8-2
Mikado locomotives, and approximately
5,000 cars was later reduced by the Di-
rector General, MRS, to 105 2-8-0 and 60
2-8-2 locomotives and to 1,500 cars.
American-built rolling stock began arriv-
ing early in 1943. Railway cars were
erected and 2-8-0 standard-gauge loco-
motives were unloaded and serviced at
Oran by personnel from the 753d Rail-
way Shop Battalion. Part of the 753d had
already been assigned to the modern
French railway shops in Sidi Mabrouk,
where the chief task was to erect meter-
gauge locomotives urgently needed on the
Ouled Rahmoun-Tébessa line. The first
two meter-gauge locomotives were un-
loaded at Oran in mid-March 1943. They
were unassembled and each consisted of
fourteen packages, which were shipped to
Sidi Mabrouk for assembly. Within ten
days both locomotives were ready for
service.106
Although existing U.S. Army regula-
tions assigned responsibility for extraor-
103
DG MRS AFHQ rpt cited n. 96, pp. 2-3 and
Exhibit E; Ltr and Comments, Gray to Maj Gen
Orlando Ward, Chief Mil Hist, 18 Jul 52, OCMH
Files. For the British point of view, see Brigadier R.
Miklem (ed.), Transportation ("History of the Second
World War, 1939-1945, Army") (London: His
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), p. 103.
104
Memo, Actg Chief Rail Div to CofT WD, 26
Jan 43, sub: Action . . ., with Incl, Msgs 6834 and
1233, OCT 319.1-321.03 Africa 1943.
105
All of the additional units disembarked at Oran.
See DG MRS AFHQ rpt cited n. 96, pp. 2-4; Hist
Rcd, Adv Ech Hq MRS North Africa, 27 Jan-30 Apr
43, pp. 2-3, OCT HB North Africa.
106
Hist Rcd, Adv Ech Hq MRS North Africa 27
Jan-30 Apr 43, pp. 5, 6, and Supplement 1, OCT HB
North Africa. For technical details, see Hist, 753d Ry
Shop Bn, activation to 30 Apr 43, pp. 13-17, 22-24,
OCT HB North Africa Ry Units.
NORTH AFRICA
dinary repairs and reconstruction of mili-
tary railways to the Corps of Engineers,
the MRS in North Africa engaged in
these activities from the outset.107 This
came about in part because of the interna-
tional and theater-wide nature of the
MRS command, and in part because of
the availability of MRS personnel for con-
struction purposes. The British Transpor-
tation Service troops placed at Gray's dis-
posal included personnel for railway con-
struction, a function assigned to that
service in the British Army. Also, the fairly
satisfactory maintenance conditions on
the North African railroads made it possi-
ble to use the A (maintenance of way)
companies of the American railway oper-
ating battalions for construction and
rehabilitation work.
Military construction troops undertook
three main types of railroad work in North
Africa—depot track work, involving such
projects as the construction of depot lay-
outs and the extension of sidings; rehabili-
tation of captured lines in the combat
zone; and, at the end of hostilities, con-
struction of a more permanent nature.
Depot track work in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean Base Sections was per-
formed by U.S. Engineer troops, while
similar construction from Algiers eastward
to the combat zone was performed by
American and British troops of the MRS.
The delineation of responsibility for re-
pair and rehabilitation of rail lines in the
combat zone was at first less clear. After
establishing his headquarters at Algiers,
Gray set up an advance headquarters at
Constantine under Col. E. L. Parkes
(British) to handle construction planning,
and to maintain liaison with the French
Military Railway Service, French civilian
railway officials, the group commander in
173
the combat zone, and U.S. base section
and British line of communications com-
manders. Shortly after the enemy break-
through at Kasserine had been repulsed,
confusion arose among the MRS, the U.S.
II Corps engineers, and the French Mili-
tary Railway Service as to which agency
should be responsible for the work in the
area evacuated by the enemy. The situa-
tion was clarified, first by verbal order and
then, on 10 April 1943, by AFHQdirec-
tive. The Director General, MRS, was
specifically assigned responsibility for
planning and effecting the construction,
maintenance, and repair of military rail-
ways in both the communications and
combat zones. Provision was made for the
director general to call on the tactical
commander in the combat zone, and on
AFHQ and the SOS commander in the
communications zone, for additional as-
sistance when insufficient resources were at
his disposal. The same directive gave Gray
the responsibility for planning, requisi-
tioning, stocking, and issuing all railway
equipment and materials. These responsi-
bilities were to remain part of the MRS
mission during subsequent operations in
Sicily, Italy, and southern France.108
Rail Operations Under the MRS
When General Gray's MRS became ac-
tive, the North African campaign was
nearing its crucial stage. In order to ex-
pedite the movement of supplies in sup-
port of the combat forces, he assigned the
107
See AR 55-650, 27 Feb 43, par. 4; Cf. Wardlow,
Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, pp. 62-65.
108
Rpt, MRS, Railway Construction and Repair,
North African Campaign, 1 Aug 43, pp. 1-4, and Ex-
hibit 2, OCT HB North Africa Ry Construction and
Repair.
174
bulk of the available U.S. railway units to
109
operations in the forward area. Early in
March 1943 the 703d Railway Grand
Division, the main body of which had
recently disembarked at Mers el Kébir,
moved to Constantine and assumed juris-
diction of the CFA (Chemins de Fer
Algeriens) lines extending from Beni
Mansour to Souk Ahras, from Philippe-
ville to Le Kroub, from Ouled Rahmoun
to Tébessa, and from Oued Kebrit to
Tébessa. Assigned to the 703d were the
727th Railway Operating Battalion,
which had already begun operations on
the overtaxed Ouled Rahmoun-Tébessa
line during the previous month, and the
newly arrived 713th Railway Operating
Battalion, which was given jurisdiction of
the lines from Beni Mansour through
Constantine to Philippeville. As already
stated the 753d Railway Shop Battalion
(less Company C) was placed on duty at
the CFA shops at Sidi Mabrouk.110
Stationed farthest forward, the 727th
Railway Operating Battalion, com-
manded by Lt. Col. Fred W. Okie, had
begun its operations under serious handi-
caps. The locomotives on the meter-gauge
line from Ouled Rahmoun to Tébessa
were often junk heaps, and many had no
brakes. Tools and materials for repair
were in short supply, and the unit at first
lacked even a red lantern.
From the outset the 727th operated un-
comfortably close to the enemy. On 14
February, when the loss of Gafsa appeared
imminent, Colonel Okie, aided by a small
detachment of the 727th and three trucks,
attempted to evacuate highly essential
railway rolling stock and war material.
Despite strafing, four of the imperiled
locomotives were removed, but the re-
maining engines and sixteen cars of am-
munition were caught behind a blown-out
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
bridge at Sidi Bou Baker on the rail line to
Thélepte. The detachment had just suc-
ceeded in concealing eight locomotives in
a mine tunnel near Moularès and im-
mobilizing them by removing vital parts,
when the approach of an enemy tank
caused Okie hastily to load his men and
engine parts on trucks and leave for
Redeyef. En route, the party was fired
upon by native troops but avoided further
attack by waving a French flag. After
picking up twenty-six French civilians
and their baggage at Redeyef, the Ameri-
cans set out across the desert via Tamerza
to Bir el Ater, walking and pushing the
trucks for several miles through deep
sand. The detachment finally reached the
road running north into Tébessa, arriving
there on 16 February with gas tanks prac-
tically empty.111
On 17 February when the Thélepte air-
field was abandoned, another detachment
of the 727th, under 1st Lt. Victor E.
Williams, removed all rail equipment in
this vicinity. This movement came under
enemy fire, and several cars of equipment
were destroyed. Shortly thereafter, when
Rommel's forces broke through the Kas-
serine pass, the battalion made ready for
the possible evacuation of Tébessa itself.
However, by the morning of 25 February
1943 the enemy had retreated, leaving
109
Exceptions were the 761st Railway Transporta-
tion Company and part of the 753d Railway Shop
Battalion, both of which remained in the Oran area,
and a provisional railway grand division head-
quarters, which was organized at Casablanca to
handle liaison and expedite military movements over
the lines of the Chemin de Fer Maroc west of Oujda,
French Morocco.
110
Hist Rcd, Adv Echelon MRS, 27 Jan 43-30 Apr
43, pp. 4-6, OCT HB North Africa.
111
Hist Rcd, 727th Ry Operating Bn, 15 Feb 42-
Apr 43, p. 21 and Exhibits 2-4, OCT HB North
Africa Ry Units; Ltr, Gray to Gross, 28 Feb 43, OCT
HB North Africa MRS Misc; Ltr, Okie to Larson, 22
Aug 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
NORTH AFRICA
behind numerous deadly mines and sev-
eral badly damaged bridges. Railway re-
pair and reconstruction progressed rapidly
in the recaptured area, and within fifteen
days after the German withdrawal the
line was open to Kasserine.112
Altogether, these were difficult days for
the newly arrived MRS, especially in the
war-torn area around Tébessa. There
train operations were frequently inter-
rupted, considerable damage was done to
railway equipment and facilities, many
bridges were demolished, and approxi-
mately 16 locomotives were lost to the
enemy. On 27 February 1943, when the
crisis had passed, 50 of the 70 engines the
MRS had at Tébessa were definitely in
bad order and only 10 of the remaining 20
were operational. More rolling stock was
needed immediately. During March 2-8-2
meter-gauge locomotives began coming
off the assembly line at Sidi Mabrouk,
thereby helping to relieve the serious
shortage of motive power on the Ouled
Rahmoun-Tébessa line. The main facili-
ties for servicing incoming 2-8-0 standard-
gauge locomotives were located at Oran.
The port was also the center for assem-
bling various types of railway cars,
shipped knocked-down so as to conserve
shipping space.113 By April 1943 MRS
personnel at Oran had placed in service
38 standard-gauge locomotives and had
assembled 233 railway cars. With this
added equipment, Gray was confident of
the success of his mission.114
Eastbound rail traffic continued heavy
as the North African campaign drew to a
close. Constantine, Ouled Rahmoun, and
Tébessa were especially busy points. Dur-
ing the seven days ending 21 April 1943,
the MRS ran thirty trains between Ouled
Rahmoun and Tébessa, and in the follow-
ing week as many as forty-eight trains
175
were operated daily through Constan-
tine.115
In contrast to the comparatively minor
destruction inflicted elsewhere in the thea-
ter, the rail lines to the south and east of
Tébessa in the Kasserine-Sousse area were
heavily damaged by enemy demolition
and Allied air bombing. After the Ger-
mans had been forced out of the Kasserine
area in late February 1943, the 18 Army
Group commander ordered the rehabilita-
tion of the Haïdra-Kasserine-Sbeïtla-
Thélepte line. Because of the differences
in directives issued by the individual
armies concerned, 18 Army Group issued
its directive jointly with those of the U.S.
II Corps and the MRS advance head-
quarters. As a consequence, both the II
Corps engineers and the MRS began
planning for the necessary rehabilitation.
At the same time the French Military
Railway Service, which believed it had
the sole responsibility, also undertook to
plan the work. As previously noted, all
three services engaged in the project, with
resultant confusion and some delay.
To avoid a repetition of this experience,
the 18 Army Group staff made verbal ar-
112
Hist Rcd, 727th Ry Operating Bn, 15 Feb 42-
Apr 43, Exhibit 3, OCT HB North Africa Ry Units;
Okie ltr cited n. 111.
113
The assembly work at Oran was done by Com-
pany C, 753d Railway Shop Battalion. This unit also
converted 20-ton and 40-ton boxcars into refrigerator
cars, which brought fresh meat and vegetables, a
welcome relief from C rations, to the Army chow lines.
See Hist, Co C 753d Ry Shop Bn, 21 Nov 42-30 Apr
43, May 43, OCT HB North Africa Ry Units; and un-
signed article, "Army Railroaders Build Reefers in
North Africa," Railway Age, CXV, 13 (September 25,
1943), 481-82.
114
Ltrs, Gray to Gross, 28 Feb, 5 Mar, 7 Apr 43,
OCT HB North Africa MRS Misc.
115
Memo, DG MRS AFHQ, to Dep Theater Comdr
NATOUSA, 25 Apr 43, sub: Performance Week End-
ing 21 Apr 43, OCT 453.3 Africa; Memo, same to
same, sub: MRS Performance 22-28 Apr 43, OCT
HB North Africa.
176 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

rangements for the MRS to assume re- areas were hindered by mines placed
sponsibility for the planning, co-ordina- along the right of way by the retreating
tion, and performance of railroad repairs Axis forces. Neither the British nor the
in the combat zone. The next job, the re- American railway troops were at first ade-
pair of the line running eastward from quately trained to deal with such hazards.
Sbeïtla to Sousse, was completed expedi- Track mines usually were detected by em-
tiously under MRS guidance by U.S. and ploying a locomotive to push several cars
British MRS units, U.S. Engineer troops, loaded with rock to take the brunt of any
French MRS units, and civilians. exploding mines.117
Following the formal assignment of the As the Allies advanced deeper into
railway construction and rehabilitation Tunisia and the supply line lengthened,
functions to the director general on 10 prompt turnaround of rolling stock be-
April 1943, no further administrative dif- came increasingly necessary. Constant
ficulties were encountered. In the final pressure had to be exerted to speed up the
phase of the campaign, the rapid Allied discharge of cars and expedite the return
advance across northern Tunisia offered of empties from the east. During April
little opportunity for either friendly or 1943 an average of more than 150 car-
enemy destruction, and it was possible to loads of supplies had to be delivered each
place rail lines in that area in operation day to the forward railheads.118 At the
with only light repairs. Basing his plans on peak of activity on the Algerian and
priorities established by the 18 Army Tunisian railways in the period 13 April-
Group, Gray assigned responsibility for 12 May 1943, Allied freight traffic, based
individual lines to advanced U.S. and on a total mileage of 1,905 for all sections,
119
British MRS units, and to the French totaled 31,554,660 ton-miles.
MRS. An important exception to this ar- The relations of MRS with the three
rangement came when a newly captured major railway systems varied consider-
segment of the line running from the port ably. Over the Moroccan railways (CFM)
of Tabarka to Mateur was used to carry the MRS control was almost entirely
supplies forward to the U.S. II Corps. In supervisory. Excellent co-operation was
order to place the line in service as rapidly received from the French railway person-
as possible, the Eastern Base Section nel, but the trains were slow and delays
rushed in Engineer troops who repaired frequent. The only substantial aid given
the line from Tabarka to Nefza. Me- 116
chanics of the 753d Railway Shop Bat- MRS rpt cited n. 108, pp. 1-5; Ltr, Gray to
Gross, 6 May 43, OCT HB North Africa MRS Misc.
talion moved in and repaired the one Axis forces surrendered before the entire Tabarka-
available but decrepit locomotive at Mateur line could be opened, and it therefore had
Tabarka, and on 4 May, one day after the only limited value for the campaign. See Hist, 753d
Ry Shop Bn, May 1943, OCT HB North Africa Ry
Americans entered Mateur, the first train Units.
117
was dispatched from Tabarka with 13 Hist Rcd, Adv Ech Hq MRS North Africa, 27
loads, 145 net tons, aboard. The remain- Jan-30 Apr 43, Supplement 2, OCT HB North
Africa.
der of the line from Nefza to Mateur was 118
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ, activation to 31 Oct 43,
later repaired by Allied MRS troops.116 Sec. III, pars. 14-23, OCT HB North Africa.
119
Figures are in long tons per mile. See Hist Rcd,
Although damage to rail facilities was Adv Ech Hq MRS North Africa, 27 Jan-30 Apr 43,
generally light, operations in the forward Exhibit 60, OCT HB North Africa.
NORTH AFRICA 177

the CFM by the Transportation Corps was remarked, it was the irony of fate that the
fifteen 2-8-0 standard-gauge steam loco- battered Tunisian rail lines were to be-
motives, which were needed because of in- come all-important for subsequent cam-
sufficient electric power. The CFM natu- paigns in Sicily and Italy. 120
rally became less significant as the Allies Following the surrender of the Axis
advanced eastward. It served as insurance, forces in North Africa in May 1943, all re-
however, for had the Strait of Gibraltar maining lines in Tunisia not previously
been closed by enemy action it would placed in service by the Allies were swiftly
have become a vital line of communica- readied for temporary operation. The first
tions from Casablanca to the Mediter- train entered Tunis on 13 May. Plans were
ranean. made jointly by the MRS, the French
The Algerian railways (the CFA) car- Military Railway Service, and civilian
ried the largest amount of Allied military railway officials for more permanent re-
tonnage and were given the most assist- pair work on the Tunisian lines. Recon-
ance by the MRS. Co-operation on the struction areas were assigned to Ameri-
CFA was good until the end of the fight- cans, the British, and the French, and
ing, when the French railway personnel work was begun with a scheduled comple-
evidenced a stronger desire to run the tion date of September 1943.121
lines in their own way. Here as elsewhere The end of hostilities in North Africa
on the North African railways, the Di- altered the transportation pattern of heavy
rector General, MRS, was not satisfied movements of men and materials from
with the French methods of operating west to east. Thereafter a two-way flow of
trains and of maintaining and repairing traffic developed, as men and matériel
equipment. He believed that the MRS, if were moved both into and out of Tunisia.
given full control, could have done a The inbound traffic was largely in prep-
much better job, but he had no authority aration for the projected invasion of Sicily
over the civilian railway personnel. Re- and Italy. Already in progress but much
gardless of the urgency, he had to request, accelerated by the Axis surrender, the
he could not order. Yet he had to bring in outbound movement involved mostly
MRS troops and equipment that in the personnel.122
aggregate accounted for an estimated 70
Evacuation of Patients and Enemy
percent of the transportation capacity of
the CFA. Prisoners of War
The Tunisian system (the CFT) re- Aside from the U.S. Army combat and
ceived the least supervision from the MRS service units moved out of North Africa
because it was the longest in enemy hands. for the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, 123
Because of wartime destruction, the Tu- 120
See DG MRS AFHQ rpt cited n. 96, especially
nisian lines required the most reconstruc- pp. 5-10.
121
tion. Motive power and rolling stock were MRS rpt cited n. 108, pp. 6-7.
122
Some cargo was shipped to the zone of interior.
found in deplorable condition. The CFT Never voluminous, it consisted chiefly of captured
management was resourceful, but the sys- enemy equipment and scrap, the latter being useful as
tem suffered from the same procrastina- ballast for returning vessels.
123
After its liberation, North Africa became a huge
tion and delay previously encountered in assembly area for subsequent assaults in the Medi-
Morocco and Algeria. As General Gray terranean. See below, Ch. V.
178 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

there were two main groups of outbound means of evacuating sick and wounded
personnel. The first group, which had during the first eight months of the cam-
been accruing since the invasion began, paign. The number so evacuated was lim-
was the sick and wounded. The second ited. Until liberalized in late February
group comprised the Axis prisoners of war, 1943, theater policy restricted this method
who ultimately became so numerous and to patients mentally and physically capa-
burdensome that mass removal from the ble of caring for themselves in the event of
theater provided the only solution. Both disaster at sea. Even after patients of all
groups posed special problems for the types were permitted to be removed on
Transportation Corps. transports, the ship's facilities had to be
adequate but generally were far from the
The Sick and Wounded best. Most troop carriers were routed to
Casablanca, and at that port transporta-
Because the landings were relatively tion difficulties and movement restrictions
unopposed, the initial American casual- minimized the number of patients that
ties were light, and several months elapsed could be evacuated from the Mediter-
before the removal of patients became a ranean and Eastern Base Sections. Until
major undertaking. Within the combat early 1944 the theater consistently suffered
area, cross-country ambulances provided from a lack of advance information on the
the chief means of transportation for cas- number of patients of each class who
ualties, and jeeps were convenient on could be evacuated aboard incoming
narrow mountain roads, though not com- vessels. Meanwhile, beginning in May
fortable. Weapons carriers and 2½-ton 1943, an easing of the theater movement
trucks also were used for ambulatory policy combined with improved rail facili-
patients but only in an emergency for ties and an additional medical hospital
litter cases. In a few instances the slow but ship platoon, greatly increased the num-
sturdy mule was used for movements over ber of patients that could be evacuated to
the rugged terrain of Tunisia. Air evacua- the zone of interior. As a result, a total of
tion, which was faster and more comfort- 11,434 patients was evacuated by troop-
able, proved increasingly valuable and in ship in the last half of 1943, as compared
fact became indispensable during the final with the 4,850 evacuated during the first
offensive in Tunisia, but the bulk of the re- half of that year.126
movals to hospitals and ports was made on 124
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp.
hospital trains. Their movements were 304-08, 321-23; Memo, DG MRS to CofT WD, 28
controlled by the G-4, AFHQ, which set May 43, sub: Hosp Trains, AG 531 Africa (May 28,
priorities to meet the needs of the Ameri- 1943) Hosp Trains; Ltr, Gray to Wylie, 11 Oct 43,
OCT 353-370.05 Africa 1943.
can, British, and French forces.124 125
Before being registered as a hospital ship, and
No U.S. Army hospital ship was avail- therefore protected by the Geneva Convention, the
able in North Africa until June 1943, Acadia had completed several voyages (December
1942-April 1943) as an ambulance transport, carry-
when the Acadia lifted the first load of 778 ing troops to the theater and evacuating patients. On
U.S. Army and Navy patients from Oran the Acadia, see OCT HB Monograph 7, pp. 22-29.
126
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp.
to the United States.125 Although British 312, 316-17, 321-23; Hq MTO, Annual Rpt, 1943,
hospital ships were of some assistance, re- Med Sec NATOUSA, SGO HD 319.1-3 (Mediterra-
turning troopships provided the principal nean).
NORTH AFRICA
The evacuation by train and ship of
American sick and wounded overseas was
handled jointly by the Medical Depart-
ment and the Transportation Corps, the
former furnishing the required medical
personnel, supplies, and facilities, and the
latter providing the necessary transporta-
tion by land and water. To facilitate the
work of these agencies, on 16 September
1942 U. S. Army commanders of oversea
theaters and bases were directed to sub-
mit, through their respective U.S. supply
ports, certain essential information: (1) a
monthly report indicating the number of
patients actually awaiting evacuation
from overseas, and the number of addi-
tional patients expected within the next
thirty days, and (2) a special report on the
sailing of any vessel with patients being
evacuated to the continental United
States.127 In North Africa there was some
lag in setting up this system.
At first, casualties from the Center and
Eastern Task Forces were to be evacuated
to the United Kingdom aboard British
carriers, but in the absence of regular U.S.
Army hospital ships the patients from the
Western Task Force were to be sent to the
States on returning troop transports. By
late November 1942, a total of 115 casual-
ties from the latter group had been re-
ceived at Hampton Roads, the very port
from which they had only recently em-
barked.128
Manifestly, from the Transportation
Corps point of view, the most difficult
problem in the evacuation process was to
develop adequate land and water trans-
port. The eleven hospital trains employed
within the North African theater were im-
provised from French railway coaches and
boxcars, which had been made as comfort-
able as possible. The movement of casual-
ties by rail was especially heavy in April
179
1943 and reached a peak in May, when
the fighting ceased.129 As patients await-
ing evacuation from the theater began to
accumulate, the demand increased for
additional hospital ship space. The need
had been foreseen by General Eisenhower
before the invasion of North Africa, but
the world-wide shortage of ships was so
acute that only the makeshift accom-
modations aboard the troop transports
were available. 130 Only three U.S. Army
hospital ships, the Acadia, the Seminole, and
the Shamrock, arrived in the theater during
1943. Altogether in that year, a total of
3,593 patients departed for the United
States via hospital ship as compared with
a total of 16,284 patients evacuated by
troop transports.131
The evacuation of patients continued
long after the fighting had ended in North
Africa, the process in general being com-
plicated by limited rail and water trans-
portation. Except for the registered hos-
pital ships the accommodations at sea
were far from perfect, although every
effort was exerted to furnish the maximum
in comfort and care.
127
AG Ltr, 16 Sep 42, sub: Essential Info Concern-
ing Evac of Sick and Wounded from Overseas, later
modified by AG Ltr, 13 Jan 43, same sub, OCT HB
PE Gen Evac of Patients.
128
Paraphrase of Rad, WD to CG SOS ETO, 12
Dec 42, CM-OUT 4001, and Ltr, CG HRPE to
CofT SOS WD, 28 Nov 42, OCT HB Ocean Trans
Hosp Ships.
129
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Sec. III, pars. 18 and 30, OCT HB
North Africa.
130
Transports generally lacked secure quarters for
severe mental cases and Transportation Corps and
Medical Corps personnel frequently failed to agree
on the types and numbers of patients that could
properly be evacuated on a given vessel. See Rpt, Col
Thomas G. Tousey, MC, to CG NYPE, 20 Aug 43,
OCT HB North Africa Misc Rpts.
131
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p.
312.
180 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Prisoners of War lowing the Axis surrender in North Africa

placed a severe strain on the North Afri-
The patients to be evacuated were can railways, already swamped by the
never as numerous as the German and movement of casualties and the redistribu-
Italian prisoners of war who had to be tion of troops and matériel incident to
taken out of the theater. As the campaign renewed assaults in the Mediterranean.
developed, the POW's, as the prisoners of Herded on foot or in trucks to the rail-
war were called, became an increasing heads, the POW's then proceeded west-
burden for the theater to guard and feed. ward in boxcars.134 In May alone, a total
Many prisoners, especially the Italians, of 81,804 POW's was evacuated by rail
were retained in North Africa as workers from the Eastern Base Section. Many
for the U.S. Army, but many more had to thousands more were carried by truck in
be shipped to the zone of interior, where convoys traveling to the west. In accord
they could be used to ease the labor short- with the policy of evacuating POW's as
age. Able-bodied prisoners of war, to be fast as possible and by any available
sure, could not expect the same amenities means, processing within the theater was
accorded American patients, but by ac- kept to a minimum. Within each base sec-
cepted international practice they were tion the transportation officer and the
entitled to certain basic privileges such as provost marshal shared the responsibility
adequate food, clothing, and medical care. for the evacuation of POW's, who were as
The Transportation Corps was responsible a rule either loaded directly aboard ship
for effecting POW movements by land or held temporarily in the port stockade.135
and sea; the Office of the Provost Marshal Evacuation by sea of the rapidly grow-
General had over-all supervision, deter- ing enemy prisoner population was ham-
mined policy and procedure, and fur- pered in the beginning by the U.S. Navy
nished the military police to guard the limit of 500 POW's for each unescorted
prisoners en route to and aboard ship. 132 vessel. This policy remained in effect until
The number of prisoners in American mid-May 1943, when General Eisenhower
custody in North Africa did not bulk large requested and received its temporary
until enemy resistance began to collapse abrogation.136 Because the regular troop
in the spring of 1943. In mid-May the the-
ater commander reported that from
132
225,000 to 250,000 prisoners of war had OCT HB Monograph 30, pp. 104-05, 111-12.
133
Rad, Algiers to Oran and WAR, 18 May 43,
been captured, most of whom would re- CM-IN 11583, OCT 383.6-388.4 Africa; Statistical
quire feeding by the U.S. Army. Reflect- Br Contl Div Hq ASF WD, Statistical Review, World
ing subsequent large-scale POW evacu- War II, p. 158, OCT HB.
134
After removing POW's, many trucks returned
ation from the theater, the total prisoner loaded with depot reserves.
strength (German and Italian) in the 135
See Hist Rcd, Trans Sec EBS, 1 May-30 Jun 43,
United States increased progressively un- pp. 18-19, 40-41, and Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ
NATOUSA, activation to 31 Oct 43, Sec. III, pars.
til it reached a peak of 172,763 in Decem- 26, 29, 31, OCT HB North Africa; SOP, Hq MBS,
ber 1943. Of this total by far the greater Evacuation of Prisoners of War, 11 May 43, OCT HB
number, 123,440, were Germans, many Ocean Trans POW.
136
Memo, CofT WD for Adm R. S. Edwards, 13
from Rommel's Afrika Korps.133 May 43, sub: Revision of POW Limitations, and Re-
The wholesale removal of POW's fol- ply, 14 May, OCT HB Ocean Trans POW.
NORTH AFRICA
transports could not carry the huge load,
emergency passenger space had to be con-
trived. At the theater's suggestion and
with War Department approval, cargo
vessels of the EC-2 Liberty type, which
because of their primary mission became
known as POW ships, were hastily con-
verted. Using freighters from convoys
UGS-8 through UGS-21, the theater
evacuated 75,366 prisoners of war to the
United States.137
As was to be expected, the POW vessels
were poorly equipped to move personnel.
The improvised sanitary facilities, which
included overside latrines, were unsatis-
factory. The water supply usually was
insufficient. The prisoners subsisted on C
rations, and at first they slept on blankets
spread over the deck. All POW Liberty
ships were operated by the War Shipping
Administration, which also arranged for
their conversion. The WSA furnished port-
able passenger accommodations (standee
berths), and provided the supplies for each
ship. Initially, about 300 prisoners were
carried on each vessel, but this figure later
was raised to 500 or more. Lifesaving
equipment was provided, including im-
provised life rafts made from dunnage
and empty oil drums and life preservers
filled with native cork. Medical personnel,
supplies, and equipment were placed
aboard each vessel. Ordinarily, one medi-
cal officer and three medical enlisted men
were assigned to 300 prisoners. Aboard
ship the POW's were kept behind wire
barricades and iron doors. Evacuation en-
tailed a serious drain on the theater man-
power, since armed guards had to travel
on each ship, varying in number in pro-
portion to the group being evacuated.
Normally, the No. 2 'tween-deck space
was equipped to hold 300 to 500 prisoners
of war, and the No. 3 'tween-deck space
181
was made to accommodate 40 or more
escort guards.138
The POW Liberties were obvious make-
shifts, and the frequent overloading re-
sulted in cramped, uncomfortable quar-
ters and excessive strain on the ships' facil-
ities. Being in no position to complain, the
prisoners simply endured the passage.
Later, when American soldiers had to be
transported on the same POW ships,
efforts were made to improve such features
as messing arrangements, sanitary facili-
139
ties, and ventilation.
The Final Phase
The closing months of the campaign
had been characterized by a growing em-
phasis on transportation and supply.
Within the theater the basic Transporta-
tion Corps problem remained that of co-
ordinating and supplementing all avail-
able means of transportation over the long
and tenuous supply line in order to support
the Allied push eastward into Tunisia. By
combined lifts involving water, rail, and
highway facilities, sufficient men and
matériel were moved forward to support
the American effort. The U.S. troops, said
General Stewart, "never lacked supplies
as the result of failure on the part of trans-
portation." For this accomplishment he
gave due credit to the support of the Chief
of Transportation in Washington and the
U.S. ports of embarkation. 140
137
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Sec. III, pars. 10-11, OCT HB North
Africa.
138
OCT HB Monograph 30, pp. 115-17; Logistical
History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 113; Memo, CofT
for Actg CofS ASF, 28 Jan 43, sub: Life-saving Equip,
OCT HB Ocean Trans POW.
139
Ultimately, by Transportation Corps and WSA
action, these vessels were much improved. OCT HB
Monograph 12, pp. 17-19, 30, and 115-17.
140
Ltr. CofT (U.S.) AFHQ to CofT ASF WD, 6
Jun 43, Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activa-
tion to 31 Oct 43, Tab AM, OCT HB North Africa.
182
The North African campaign gave a
helpful preview of the principal supply
and transportation problems likely to be
encountered in other theaters. Consider-
able loss resulted from pilferage, despite
guards and protective packaging. 141 In
North Africa, cartons were not wanted
because they soon disintegrated when ex-
posed to the elements in the open fields
around Casablanca that were used for
storage. As late as April, the deputy the-
ater commander requested that balanced
stocks be sent and that shipments be prop-
erly packed and marked. This demand
from the theater led to the pronouncement
by General Gross that goods delivered
unfit for use or that failed to arrive be-
cause of improper packaging or marking
constituted a "scandalous waste." 142
Still another problem by no means
peculiar to the North Africa theater was
the frequent shipment of units without
their equipment. This difficulty arose
early, since the task force units had been
compelled to leave behind 50 percent or
more of their organic equipment, pre-
dominantly vehicles. Pending the delivery
of this equipment to and within the thea-
ter, the effectiveness of the units involved
was obviously impaired. The problem
persisted, affecting the Transportation
Corps as well as other units. General
Gray, for instance, complained that three
railway operating battalions were allowed
to sail from the United States without
their equipment, thereby materially limit-
ing their usefulness in the theater.143
Largely because of shortages in matériel
and shipping, the War Department and
the theater were unable to eliminate the
time lag between the arrival of troop units
overseas and the delivery of their equip-
ment. Nevertheless, the reports of ob-
servers made it clear that here, indeed,
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
was a condition calling for corrective
action.144
As to the supply picture, by early 1943
the understandable desire of all concerned
to avoid any conceivable shortages had
culminated in an actual excess of certain
items in the theater. This oversupply per-
tained chiefly to items shipped on an
automatic basis, such as subsistence, am-
munition, and petroleum products. In an
attempt to load all ships to the maximum,
the ports in the zone of interior utilized as
much filler cargo as possible, and espe-
cially rations. Such shipments tended to
accumulate and to deteriorate in North
Africa, overtaxing the theater storage
facilities. The obvious remedy, soon ap-
plied, was to place further shipments to
the theater on a requisition basis.145
Following the end of hostilities, North
Africa was important principally as a sup-
ply base and a staging area for U.S. Army
operations in Sicily and Italy. Reflecting
the emphasis on this new mission was the
141
The natives generally were blamed for most
thievery in North Africa, but cargo pilferage en route
became so serious that by March 1943 General Gross
decided to place special Transportation Corps cargo
security officers aboard freighters to safeguard U.S.
Army shipments. See Memo, Gross to Styer, 26 Mar
43, sub: Rpt ... by ASW, OCT 322-352.9 Africa
1943. Cf. OCT HB Monograph 18, pp. 147-151.
142
Memo, CofT to Port Comdrs, N.Y., Boston,
Hampton Rds., Baltimore, 26 Apr 43, sub: Ltr from
Maj Gen Hughes. OCT 400 Africa.
143
Memo, DG MRS to Dep Theater Comdr NAT-
OUSA, 16 May 43, sub: Performance, MRS, OCT
471-486.96 Africa.
144
For typical complaints, see Memo, Brig Gen
Gordon P. Saville, Dir Air Defense, to ACofS G-4,
OCT HB North Africa Misc Info; Memo, McCloy
to Styer, 22 Mar 43, sub: Rpt, OCT 322-352.9 Africa
1943. John J. McCloy recommended that equipment
be sent in advance of the troops, as was done in the
ETO preshipment program.
145
Memo, Somervell for Gross, 19 Feb 43, Hq ASF
Trans 1943. Note reply by Gross, 23 Feb 43, OCT
HB North Africa Misc Info. On the broader aspects,
see OCT HB Monograph 27, pp. 33-34, 155-59.
NORTH AFRICA
organization of a new Supply Branch in
the SOS Transportation Section on 1 June
1943. Headed by Maj. Harry D. Kamy,
the Supply Branch was concerned with
the procurement, storage, and issue of
items peculiar to the Transportation
Corps, mainly railway, port, and marine
equipment and supplies. Subsequently, a
Transportation Corps theater depot for
marine and port equipment was estab-
lished at Oran, in addition to the several
Transportation Corps subdepots already
in operation. During July 1943 the Corps
was made responsible for procuring, stor-
ing, and issuing life preservers, a necessary
item for troops embarking for Sicily and
Italy and for enemy prisoners of war being
evacuated to the United States.146 In Sep-
tember, two provisional base depots were
established to handle railway equipment
arriving at Oran and Algiers.147
By the fall of 1943 the major Allied
effort in the Mediterranean had shifted
from North Africa to Italy. On 24 Octo-
ber the U.S. Army chief of transportation
183
in the theater, General Stewart, estab-
lished a forward headquarters in Naples.
The Director General, Military Railway
Service, AFHQ, General Gray, had al-
ready moved to that city. 148 Both Stewart
and Gray had learned much in North
Africa. Fortified with knowledge born of
wartime experiences, they and their men
faced the hard task of providing water,
rail, and highway transport for the Italian
campaign.
146
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec SOS NATOUSA, 1-30 Jun
43, pp. 3-5; 1-31 Jul 43, p. 4; and 1-31 Aug 43, pp.
4-6, OCT HB North Africa. Also, see Interv, Maj
Kamy, 20-21 Sep 44, OCT HB North Africa Misc
Info.
147
The depots were at first manned by two provi-
sional units organized in the theater; these became the
2682d Base Depot Company in November 1943. Hist
Rcd, 2682d Base Depot Co (TC Prov), Nov 43, OCT
HB North Africa Ry Units; Memo, Chief Rail Div
OCT for ACofT for Opns, 26 May 43, sub: Base
Depot Cos, TC, OCT 322-352.9 Africa.
148
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Sec. II, par. 13, and Tab P, OCT HB
North Africa; Ltr, DG MRS AFHQ to Chief Mil Ry
Br Rail Div OCT WD, 23 Oct 43, OCT HB North
Africa MRS Misc.
 CHAPTER V

Sicily and Italy

Following the liberation of North During this period transportation in the
Africa, the Allied forces launched their Mediterranean area was supervised or ad-
next major assault against the island of ministered through many agencies and
Sicily, the nearest and most practicable echelons. At AFHQ, co-ordination and
objective for furthering the war in the general policy direction of Allied trans-
Mediterranean. From Sicily it was only a portation activities were provided by the
step to attack the hard core of enemy re- G-4 Movements and Transportation Sec-
sistance on the Italian mainland. Within tion, in which General Stewart headed the
2
this theater the primary purpose of Allied American side. Stewart was also chief of
operations was to force the withdrawal of transportation for the North African the-
Fascist Italy from the European Axis and ater, and in that capacity he was responsi-
in doing so to hasten the collapse of Nazi ble to the communications zone com-
Germany. mander for U.S. transportation activities.
SOS, NATOUSA, had its own transporta-
The Organization of Transportation tion officer (Col. John R. Noyes), as did
in the Mediterranean also each of the base sections. As the op-
erations progressed, there were added to
Allied activity in Sicily and Italy was the three base sections in North Africa
undertaken within the same framework of (Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Eastern)
command, supply, and transportation de- the Island Base Section (Headquarters,
veloped during the North African cam- Palermo, Sicily), the Peninsular Base Sec-
paign. General Eisenhower continued as tion (Headquarters, Naples, Italy), and
supreme commander, AFHQ until 8 the Northern Base Section (Headquarters,
January 1944, by which time his forces Ajaccio, Corsica).3
had completed the conquest of Sicily and The movement of men and matériel
penetrated the Italian peninsula. Eisen- into the theater was effected chiefly by
hower also headed the U.S. theater water, and the staff supervision of this ac-
1
(NATOUSA), arid his deputy com-
1
manded the Communications Zone, Redesignated Mediterranean Theater of Opera-
tions, U.S. Army (MTOUSA) on 1 November 1944.
NATOUSA, including the base sections. GO 11, NATOUSA, 24 Oct 44.
Charged with directing U.S. Army supply 2
During the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, as
activities, but without command author- earlier. Stewart's British counterpart was Brigadier de
ity, the Services of Supply, NATOUSA, RheFor Philipe.
3
further details, see OCT HB Monograph 17,
functioned under General Larkin. pp. 106-13.
SICILY AND ITALY
tivity, including the utilization of U.S.
Army ships and ports, was a major func-
tion of the theater chief of transportation.
Railways and highways provided vital
means of transport, but neither played as
prominent a part in Stewart's organiza-
tion as water transportation. The Military
Railway Service, AFHQ, except for the
necessary liaison and co-ordination with
the office of the chief of transportation,
enjoyed virtual autonomy, and highway
activities were primarily the concern of
the base sections. The principal function
of Stewart's office in air traffic was to
screen all demands for transportation by
air of personnel and freight of American
ground forces, arranging for movement on
a priority basis. The theater chief of trans-
portation also had a branch for opera-
tional planning, which assisted in mount-
ing task forces within the theater.
When the Sicilian invasion began,
Stewart's AFHQ-NATOUSA Transporta-
tion Section staff was small. As of 1 July
1943, he had twenty-two officers, one
warrant officer and twenty enlisted men.
His deputy chief was Colonel Fuller, and
his executive officer, Colonel Sharp. Most
of the personnel served in the Water, Op-
erational Planning, and Administrative
and Statistical Branches. The other
branches—Rail, Air, and Highway—
were small. Headquarters was then in
Algiers.
In the months that followed, Stewart's
organization participated in the planning
for each projected assault and co-ordi-
nated U.S. transportation activities in
support of the Allied advance into Sicily
and Italy. At the same time the trans-
portation office kept in as close contact as
possible with all forward elements in the
theater. When the AFHQ Advance Ad-
185
ministrative Echelon (FLAMBO) was estab-
lished at Naples in October 1943, it
contained a U.S. Transportation Section
under Colonel Fuller, who also continued
to serve as Deputy Chief of Transporta-
tion, AFHQ. Initially composed of five of-
ficers and twelve enlisted men, Fuller's
staff functioned as an advanced echelon of
the Transportation Section, AFHQ-
NATOUSA, to co-ordinate American
4
transportation matters in Italy.
Meanwhile, the SOS Transportation
Section, located at Oran, had grown in
size and activity. To the Water, Rail,
Highway, and Air Sections, all established
before the end of hostilities, were added a
Planning and Prestowage Section (May
1943) and Supply and Troop Branches
(June 1943). Principal activities super-
vised by the SOS transportation officer
during the latter half of 1943 were the
movements of SOS passengers and cargo,
Transportation Corps supply, prestowage
and operational movements, and the allo-
cation and training of transportation
troops.5
The prevailing pattern of transportation
organization was modified as the result of
the reorganization of NATOUSA in Feb-
ruary 1944. At that time the duties and re-
sponsibilities of the Commanding General,
Communications Zone, including the
command of the base sections and activi-
ties therein, were turned over to the SOS
4
On the Transportation Section Advance Admin-
istrative Echelon (later Allied Armies in Italy), which
remained active throughout 1944, see the following:
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec AFHQ AAI, 26 Nov 43-31 Dec
44, OCT HB North Africa; OCT HB Monograph 17,
pp. 114-15, 166-73; History of Allied Force Head-
quarters and Headquarters NATOUSA (hereafter
cited as Hist of AFHQ), Pt. III, December 1943-July
1944, pp. 929-31, DRB AGO.
5
On the SOS Transportation Section before Febru-
ary 1944 see OCT HB Monograph 17, pp. 121-27.
186
commander, General Larkin. 6 The con-
solidation of command and operational
functions pertaining to the communica-
tions zone made necessary a restatement
of the respective responsibilities of the U.S.
theater chief of transportation and the
SOS transportation officer, and by agree-
ment between Larkin and Stewart such a
division of functions was worked out. Be-
cause of the Allied nature of operations
and the need for daily contacts with the
Navy, the War Shipping Administration,
and other agencies, the over-all co-ordi-
nation of transportation activities contin-
ued to be the responsibility of Stewart, as
Chief of Transportation (U.S.), AFHQ.
Serving as adviser to the Allied and
American theater commanders on U.S.
transportation matters, he would partici-
pate in AFHQ planning; allocate ship-
ping, air, and rail lift to various bidders
under priorities determined by AFHQ
secure vessel allocations and arrange for
the water movement of U.S. personnel
and cargo within the theater; and super-
vise the movement of units and vehicles
into, within, and out of the theater. He
was also to receive and disseminate ship-
ping information, determine the ability of
ports to receive incoming vessels, and con-
duct diversion meetings for incoming
UGS convoys.
The SOS transportation officer, on the
other hand, was to serve as adviser to the
SOS commander. Colonel Noyes was to
exercise staff supervision over all trans-
portation facilities in the communications
zone, and would retain his responsibilities
relating to SOS troop and supply move-
ments, Transportation Corps supply, pre-
stowage, operational movements, and
troop training and assignments. He would
secure the means for effecting supply
movements from the theater chief of
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
transportation, and would request the lat-
ter to arrange for troop movements under
priorities established by AFHQ.7
Although provision was made for con-
stant liaison between the SOS transporta-
tion officer and the theater chief of trans-
portation, the arrangement did not work
well. Early in June 1944 Stewart informed
Larkin that experience had revealed a
number of serious defects. Responsibility
and authority were divided, confusion
and differences of opinion had arisen, and
he believed that the arrangement might
well break down under the strain of
8
mounting a large amphibious operation.
To remedy the situation, the theater issued
a directive on 23 June designating Stewart
as SOS transportation officer, in addition
to his other duties. Colonel Noyes became
Stewart's deputy. The control and super-
vision of transportation activity on the
AFHQ NATOUSA, and SOS levels were
now unified in the person of General
Stewart, who was responsible to the SOS
commander for transportation matters
pertaining solely to U.S. movements and
the communications zone, and to the Al-
lied and U.S. theater commanders for
matters handled on the AFHQ level.
Actual consolidation of the AFHQ-
NATOUSA and SOS Transportation Sec-
tions began in July, when AFHQ and
6
For details on the reorganization, which was de-
signed to conserve manpower, see Hist of AFHQ, Pt.
III, p. 746. Larkin's consolidated headquarters re-
tained the designation SOS NATOUSA until 1 Octo-
ber 1944, when it was officially renamed COMZONE
NATOUSA (later COMZONE MTOUSA). See
Blakeney (ed.), Logistical History of NATOUSA-
MTOUSA: 11 August 1942 to 30 November 1945, pp.
30-31.
7
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec SOS NATOUSA, Feb 44,
pp. 1-2, Exhibits A, B, and F, OCT HB North Africa;
Hist of AFHQ, Pt. III, pp. 776-77.
8
Stewart was here thinking of the projected inva-
sion of southern France, which was undertaken in
mid-August 1944.
SICILY AND ITALY
SOS moved their respective headquarters
from Algiers and Oran to Caserta, Italy.9
The process of merging the transportation
staffs and functions continued for several
months, but by mid-August Stewart's or-
ganization had been streamlined into two
branches, one administrative and the
other operational, each composed of
groups with specific assignments. In the
following month a new group was added,
which operated a clearing agency for lost
and unclaimed personal baggage—a
perennial problem overseas.10
By October 1944, when the Office of
the Chief of Transportation attained its
maximum expansion, the Administrative
Branch was divided into six groups con-
cerned, respectively, with office adminis-
tration, personnel, supply, planning, con-
trol, and personal baggage. The Opera-
tions Branch also contained six groups, of
which four were responsible for arranging
shipments by water, air, rail, and high-
way, including the necessary liaison. Of
the two remaining groups, the one had
technical supervision of the use of floating
equipment, with the required planning
and liaison—an important function. The
other, having by far the largest staff in the
Operations Branch as well as in the entire
office, arranged, supervised, co-ordinated,
and recorded the movement of U.S. Army
cargo and personnel into, within, and
from the theater.11 (Chart 2)
In November 1944 General Stewart
moved forward to serve as transportation
officer for the newly created Southern
Line of Communications (SOLOC) in
southern France. He was succeeded by
Colonel Lastayo, formerly Transportation
Officer, Peninsular Base Section. Stewart
took with him to France a sizable portion
of his staff. The resultant loss of experi-
enced transportation personnel might
187
have proved serious for the Mediterranean
theater had not the transportation activity
already begun to decline. Colonel Lastayo
still had the tremendous task of removing
American personnel, supplies, and equip-
ment from North Africa to Italy and to
southern France.12 However, as the fight-
ing progressed to the area north of Rome,
the lines of communication were short-
ened and the demands made on the
Transportation Corps lessened appre-
ciably.
The organizational pattern remained
substantially unchanged through V-E
Day. Lastayo was followed as theater chief
of transportation on 18 June 1945 by his
former executive officer, Colonel McKen-
zie. Subsequently, during August and
September 1945 the transportation office
was absorbed by the Peninsular Base
Section.13
In his primary role of supporting the
American forces in the Mediterranean,
the U.S. theater chief of transportation
faced several formidable tasks. He had to
get things done through many echelons
and commands and with many nationali-
ties. Even within the U.S. Army he had to
deal with three major echelons of com-
mand, a confusing situation that ultimate-
ly was resolved by having the chief of
9
Supplementary Hist Rcd, Trans Sec SOS
NATOUSA, Jun-Jul 44, p. 1, Incls 1-3, OCT HB
North Africa; Hist of AFHQ, Pt. III, pp. 776-77.
10
Previously, this had been a Quartermaster func-
tion. Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, Jul-Sep
44, p. 24, and Exhibits E-3 and M-2, OCT HB North
Africa.
11
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Oct-Dec 44,
Exhibit C-1, OCT HB North Africa.
12
At the close of 1944, approximately 100,000 tons
of material remained to be outloaded from Oran. Hist
Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Oct-Dec 44, p. 14,
OCT HB North Africa.
13
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Jan-Mar 45,
pp. 1 and 5, Apr-Jun 45, p. 10 and Exhibit B-3, Jul-
Sep 45, Exhibits E-2 and E-3, OCT HB North Africa.
 CHART 2—ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION
AFHQ, NATOUSA—COMZONE, NATOUSA: OCTOBER 1944

Source: Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Oct-Dec 44, Exhibit A-1 OCT HB North Africa.
SICILY AND ITALY 189

transportation wear three hats—one each peninsula. The capture of this strategi-
for AFHQ, NATOUSA, and the SOS, cally situated island was highly essential
NATOUSA. He had to prepare for each in order to clear the Mediterranean sea
new landing operation, often before the route. Moreover, as a military objective
current mission had been completed. In it did not require an excessive expendi-
addition, he had to clear the rear lines of ture of men and matériel. At the Casa-
personnel, supplies, and equipment as blanca Conference, in January 1943, the
quickly as possible in order to meet urgent decision was reached to invade Sicily dur-
needs in the forward areas. ing the favorable period of the moon in
To furnish the proper co-ordination and the following July, but only after comple-
supervision, the U.S. theater chief oftion of the conquest of Tunisia. The un-
transportation, as earlier during the North dertaking posed two major problems. First,
African campaign, was represented at preparations for the assault had to be
AFHQ meetings where incoming vessels made in North Africa, far from the major
were assigned to ports best situated to re- supply bases in the United Kingdom
ceive them, and when the limited water, and the United States. Second, the task
rail, and airlifts were allocated on a prior- force units, together with their equip-
ity basis. Of special significance in Italy ment and supplies, had to be assembled
were the Shipping Diversion and Port from several widely scattered areas, and
Acceptance meetings, at which decisions one infantry division, the 45th, had to be
were reached as to where all incoming brought from the United States. Since
vessels should be discharged; and the Rail ocean shipping fell far short of the amount
Priority of Movements meetings, at which required and since the rail and highway
tonnage for rail movements was allotted facilities within the theater were grossly
among the respective bidders.14 inadequate, HUSKY, as the Sicilian opera-
Since the Allied personnel and equip- tion was called, placed great strain upon
ment were not sufficient for the job, trans- the available transport.
portation operations were heavily de- Besides co-ordinating the activities of
pendent upon local resources. Wherever the American and British ground, sea,
possible, civilian labor and prisoners of and air forces assigned to the assault, Gen-
war were utilized. As the Allied forces eral Eisenhower's planners had to consider
moved forward, they frequently faced the various contingent factors such as the
necessity of rehabilitating war-torn trans- number of ships and landing craft likely
portation facilities for military use. to be available, the probable capacity of
the ports to be employed for mounting the
U.S. Army Transportation in Sicily task forces, and the most suitable time and
place to launch the actual invasion.15
Within the Mediterranean theater com- 14
OCT HB Monograph 17, pp. 151-56.
15
bat was characterized by a series of am- For a brief helpful summary of the Sicilian oper-
ation, read General Eisenhower's report, AFHQ,
phibious landings in Axis-held areas, of Commander in Chief's Dispatch, Sicilian Campaign
which the first was launched in Sicily in 1943 (hereafter cited as CinC's Dispatch, Sicilian
the summer of 1943. Sicily provided a Campaign), OPD 319.1 ETO (4 Aug 44). See also
Howard M. Smyth, Sicily: The Surrender of Italy, a
convenient steppingstone for the Allied volume in preparation for the series UNITED
advance from North Africa to the Italian STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
190 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The specific areas for the assault were for the airborne troops that were to be
selected so as to insure protection for the dropped in advance of the assault. The
invaders by Allied aircraft based on invasion was to be accomplished by Task
Malta and in Tunisia. The beaches on the Force 141 (later called the 15th Army
southern coast of Sicily were relatively Group). It consisted of two separate task
narrow and led directly into rough, moun- forces, which on landing were to consti-
tainous terrain that favored the defenders tute the U.S. Seventh Army under Lt.
and confined the motor transport of the Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., and the Brit-
attackers to the comparatively few pass- ish Eighth Army, under General Sir Ber-
able roads. Under these circumstances nard L. Montgomery. During the plan-
the primary objective of the Allied com- ning period, the two armies were known
mander was to land the maximum in men respectively as Force 343 (the Western
and matériel as rapidly as possible at the Task Force) and Force 545 (the Eastern
coastal points where air cover could be Task Force), the former American and the
furnished, and thereafter to provide addi- latter British.
tional support through captured ports, In NATOUSA the responsibility for the
specifically Palermo in the west and Syra- transportation aspects of the HUSKY op-
cuse and Catania in the east. eration centered in the office of the chief
After considerable discussion, General of transportation. At the outset General
Eisenhower later decided to postpone the Stewart assigned two officers to assist in
projected seizure of Palermo and to con- the planning and to maintain liaison with
centrate the attack in the crucial south- the special staff group of the I Armored
eastern area, with a view to the early cap- Corps (Reinforced), which was to lay the
ture of several important airfields deemed groundwork for the American task force.
essential to forestall prohibitive shipping To clarify the duties and responsibilities of
losses by enemy action. The final revised the various American agencies involved, a
plan of 18 May 1943, advocated by the air meeting was held at Rabat, French Mo-
commander and the naval commander, rocco, on 11 March 1943, at which an
indicated that, for lack of a major port, agreement was reached on the mounting
the invaders for a time would have to rely of the operation.17 Briefly, it made the task
heavily on supply and maintenance over force commander responsible for furnish-
the beaches. Fortunately, the landings ing detailed data to the theater chief of
were facilitated by the use for the first transportation and to SOS, NATOUSA,
time by Americans in the Atlantic area of on the men and matériel to be moved;
certain new types of equipment. Among designating the desired time, place, and
these were the various ocean-going land- order of discharge; providing a transport
ing craft that could deliver men and ma- quartermaster with suitable assistants on
tériel directly to the beach areas, and each combat-loaded vessel; and supplying
the 2½-ton amphibian truck, or DUKW,
16
which proved extremely useful for ship-to- See Action Rpt, Western Naval Task Force, The
Sicilian Campaign. Operation "HUSKY," July-August
shore movements of personnel and 1943 (hereafter cited as WNTF Action Rpt, Sicilian
cargo.16 Campaign), OCMH Files.
17
The revised plan did not alter the tar- The agencies represented were Task Force 141,
the Chief of Transportation, AFHQ, the SOS,
get date of 10 July, which among other NATOUSA, the Northwest African Air Service Com-
reasons had been set to insure moonlight mand, and the U.S. Navy.
SICILY AND ITALY
adequate personnel for discharge opera-
tions on the far shore. The actual loading
was to be done by the base sections under
the supervision of SOS, NATOUSA, and
in accordance with stowage plans ap-
proved by the task force commander. The
Navy was to provide, man, and operate
the combat-loaded vessels, landing ships,
and other craft employed in the assault
and was to furnish all ocean transport for
the attacking force.
Although these arrangements obviously
could not cover all contingencies, they
helped eliminate much of the confusion
previously encountered in North Africa.
Within Stewart's office, the Operational
Planning Branch took the lead in the
preparations for HUSKY. In anticipation of
greatly increased activity by this branch,
then headed by Colonel Murdoch, its
staff was augmented by nine Transporta-
tion Corps officers from the United States,
who arrived shortly before the invasion
18
began.
Stewart's organization worked closely
with the Transportation Division of the
G-4 Section of the U.S. Seventh Army,
which was guided by Colonel Tank, who
had previously served as port commander
at Casablanca. The Transportation Divi-
sion had a slow growth. Colonel Tank was
hard put to find qualified personnel and
was further hampered by having to divide
his small staff between the forward and
the rear echelons of the Headquarters,
Force 343, at Mostaganem and Oran. As
a special staff group devoted exclusively to
transportation matters, Tank's organiza-
tion functioned mainly to establish trans-
portation policy and to control and super-
vise water, rail, and highway transport for
the U.S. Army in the Sicilian operation.19
The initial disposition of the Seventh
Army contemplated three independent
subtask forces landing simultaneously,
191
with a fourth force held in reserve. The
assault troops consisted of three reinforced
infantry divisions: the 3d, or Joss Force,
under Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott; the
1st, or DIME Force, under Maj. Gen. Terry
Allen; and the 45th, or CENT Force, under
Maj. Gen. Troy C. Middleton. The 1st
and 45th Divisions together formed the
II Corps, or SHARK Force, commanded by
20
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley. Since the
assault area lacked a single sizable port,
provision had to be made for over-the-
beach supply, for thirty days if necessary.
The basic plan was to give each soldier
only the essentials for combat. Each sub-
task force was charged with its own main-
tenance until such time as consolidation
could be effected and Force 343 could
assume the responsibility for supply. The
1st Engineer Special Brigade was the
agency chosen to consolidate and control
all supply activities for the task force as
they were relinquished by the divisions.
In essence the brigade was to function as
the SOS for the Seventh Army. 21
Preinvasion Preparations
The assembling of the subtask forces
began before the completion of the Tunis-
ian campaign. When the dates for release
of the assigned units had been settled, the
G-3, AFHQ, authorized the G-3, Force
18
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Sec. III, par. 3, and Tab AL, OCT HB
North Africa.
19
See Report of Operations of U.S. Seventh Army
in Sicilian Campaign (hereafter cited as Seventh
Army Rpt of Opns), Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, pp. E-12 and
E-13, AG Opns Rpts RG 207.03.
20
See Report of Operations of II Corps in the
Sicilian Campaign, 1 Sep 43 (hereafter cited as II
Corps Rpt of Opns), OCMH Files. Cf. Omar N.
Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1951), Chs. VIII-X.
21
Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, p.
E-12. After the close of the campaign the brigade was
replaced by the 6625th Base Area Group, a provision-
al organization that was succeeded by the Island Base
Section in September 1943.
192
343, to issue the movement orders. Any
necessary additional transportation was
allocated by G-4, Movements and Trans-
portation, AFHQ, and furnished by SOS,
NATOUSA, through the base sections.
The close co-ordination required to imple-
ment the movement and mounting sched-
ule for all headquarters concerned was
supplied largely through the G-4, Move-
ments and Transportation Section, AFHQ.
Transshipment within the theater was a
major problem since the troops, supplies,
training centers, staging areas, and final
ports of embarkation were often hundreds
of miles apart. All available types of trans-
portation in the theater were employed—
22
water, rail, highway, air.
The units taking part in the invasion
received special amphibious training,
mainly at the Fifth Army Invasion Train-
ing Center on the Gulf of Arzew. The 1st
Engineer Special Brigade helped train all
beach personnel, placing particular em-
phasis on the utilization of the new land-
ing craft. It also trained all DUKW
drivers. Selected units conducted practice
exercises under simulated combat condi-
tions, but for lack of time these rehearsals
were hurriedly planned and at best were
"dry runs" on a reduced scale.23
The assembly, mounting, and supply of
the assault forces taxed Allied resources to
the limit, especially with respect to sea
transport. The British components were
drawn from such widely separated areas
as the United Kingdom and the Middle
East, and the U.S. 45th Division had to
be loaded in the United States, with a re-
sultant heavy drain on shipping. Apart
from combat-loading one division, the
principal contribution of the zone of inte-
rior lay in dispatching a greatly increased
troop and cargo lift to the North African
theater and in procuring the ships, men,
and matériel for the task.24
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
One of the first problems was to provide
the assault vessels required for the 45th
Division. In order to avoid transshipment
after arriving overseas, the theater had
urgently requested that this unit with its
equipment and vehicles be loaded in the
United States in the same ships that were
to be used in the invasion. The U.S. Navy
helped meet this need by withdrawing
combat loaders from the Pacific, and also
procured, manned, and operated the land-
ing craft and ships for the American task
force. The 45th Division alone had ten
LST's, which carried tanks, bulldozers,
and other heavy equipment from the
United States.
Even more pressing than the require-
ments for assault ships were the ever-
increasing demands for troop and cargo
lift to support the operation. Rather than
risk an excessive accumulation of shipping
for the build-up in North Africa, more
intensive use of the available troop and
cargo fleet was sought by increasing the
size of the slow (UGS) cargo convoys from
45 to 60 ships, to which the U.S. Navy
agreed in February 1943, and by reducing
the UGS convoy interval in the following
month from 25 to 15 days.25 With regard
22
The 82d Airborne Division, for example, moved
from Casablanca to Oujda, French Morocco, for
training and then to Kairouan, Tunisia, for final as-
sembly before the assault. Its follow-up troops came
by air from Kairouan and by sea from Bizerte.
Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, Pt. II, G-3 Rpt, p. D-3.
23
Ibid., G-3 Rpt, Ch. IV. Cf. CinC's Dispatch,
Sicilian Campaign, pp. 17-18.
24
For the basic data on preparations in the United
States, see Diary of a Certain Plan (ASF Plng Div,
DRB AGO), a daily compilation prepared at Head-
quarters, ASF; and OCT HB Wylie BIGOT I and II.
25
Later in 1943, beginning with UGS-14, the cargo
ship convoys sailed at ten-day intervals, and the
maximum number of ships per convoy was increased
to 80. See C.M.T. [Combined Military Transporta-
tion] Study 40/1, 13 May 43; App. B to Atlantic Con-
voy Conf (Rpt of Escort and Convoy Committee,
1 Mar 43), pp. 3-4; and Memo, King for Marshall,
23 May 43. All in OCT HB Top Convoys.
SICILY AND ITALY
to the troop lift, the immediate objective
was to deliver approximately 160,000 men
to the theater by the end of May 1943.
This was achieved by increasing the num-
ber carried on the troop convoys, begin-
ning with UGF-6, and by employing large
troop transports, such as the West Point,
which were fast enough to travel without
escort. The troop transports docked at
26
Casablanca.
Although troop transports could be
found, the assembling of additional cargo
vessels presented a problem for which
there was no ready solution, since shipping
was tight throughout the world. Also, the
theater and the War Department gave di-
vergent estimates on the number of vessels
required. In April 1943, according to
Washington, for instance, the four UGS
convoys for HUSKY (7, 7A, 8, and 8A)
would require only 169 cargo ships. The
theater scheduled 181. Although the the-
ater was willing to accept a reduction of
not more than 10 cargo ships on UGS 8A—
so as to avoid the increased hazard in an
unduly large and unwieldy convoy—in
the final analysis the theater demands for
cargo ships had to be and were met. 27
Still another complication arose when
certain cargo ships had to be specially
equipped in the United States for reten-
tion and use in the theater. The theater
wanted twenty-four motor transport ves-
sels to deliver vehicles and drivers from
North Africa to the beaches in Sicily. Each
ship was to be fitted with removable wash-
rooms, mess facilities, and standee bunks
for 300 men. An additional eight cargo
ships were needed to lift overflow vehicles
and other impedimenta of the 45th Divi-
sion. All thirty-two vessels were Liberty
ships. The standee bunks were to be in-
stalled overseas so as not to waste cargo
space on the transatlantic voyage. Each
ship carried three LCM-3's on deck and
193
had sufficient cargo-handling gear aboard
to accomplish all discharge. Shaded cluster
lights in all holds facilitated discharge at
night, and a control switch permitted
28
instant blackout.
The cargo requirements of the theater
created additional problems. At times the
editing of requisitions by the Oversea Sup-
ply Division of the New York Port of Em-
barkation disclosed what appeared to be
excessive demands in the light of the ship-
ments already dispatched. When asked to
reconsider, the theater often scaled down
its requests, notably for gasoline and am-
munition, of which sizable stocks were
already on hand in North Africa. Last-
minute requests were filled by the stated
deadlines wherever possible, even though
hurried changes in cargo loading in the
zone of interior were necessary.29 Despite
the strain on transportation, tactical
organizations, for fear of being caught
short, tended to request supplies substan-
tially in excess of amounts really re-
quired.30
Mounting the Attack
The build-up of men and matériel for
26
Diary cited n. 24, entries for 20 and 27 Feb, 2
and 5 Mar 43.
27
The theater's shipping requirements mounted
steadily, and it viewed any reduction as likely to im-
peril success. See Rads, OPD WD to FORTUNE Al-
giers, 8 Apr 43, CM-OUT 3425, Algiers to WAR, 15
Apr 43, CM-IN 8901, and Algiers to AGWAR, 29
Apr 43, CM-IN 17440. All in OCT HB Wylie
BIGOT I.
28
For basic rads, Apr-May 1943, see OCT HB
Wylie BIGOT I. Similarly equipped vessels were later
employed in the Italian and French campaigns. See
Interv with Col John T. Danaher, 2 Apr 45, OCT HB
North Africa Misc.
29
See Diary cited n. 24, entries for 29 Apr, 27, 29,
and 31 May, 1, 3, 4, 15, and 29 Jun 43.
30
On 22 August 1943, by the most conservative
estimates, Stewart reported, a total of 8 ships carrying
40,000 dead-weight tons of cargo that were not
needed and could not be discharged in Sicily. Hist
Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation to 31 Oct
43, Tab AL, OCT HB North Africa.
194 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

HUSKY, coupled with the demands of the assembling additional cargo called for in
Tunisian campaign, taxed severely the the plan.
limited transportation facilities in North As a first step to insure a successful load-
Africa. Since the entire burden of mount- ing of General Middleton's men, equip-
ing the forces to invade Sicily clearly could ment, and supplies, the War Department
not be shouldered by the theater alone, issued a basic directive establishing in de-
the theater urgently requested that one tail the requirements for the movement,
subtask force be combat-loaded in the outlining the responsibilities of all agencies
zone of interior. concerned, and setting up effective control
Subtask Force CENT, the reinforced 45th measures.32 For the Army Service Forces,
Infantry Division under General Middle- all matters pertaining to this movement
ton, was to embark from the Hampton were channeled through Col. William E.
Roads Port of Embarkation, where valu- Carraway in Washington and a single
able experience had already been gleaned Transportation Corps staff officer at the
from the loading of the Western Task Force port, Maj. Maynard C. Nicholl. Insistence
for TORCH. Late in 1942 the major respon- upon a minimum of change after the plans
sibility for preparing the 45th Division for were firm was a further factor in forestall-
overseas shipment was delegated to the ing confusion.33
Army Ground Forces, but the latter was The time schedule permitted practice
hampered somewhat because it was not in combat loading at the port and am-
brought into the supply picture until mid- phibious training at Solomons Island,
April 1943. At that time plans and prepa- Maryland.34 The men of the 45th were
rations for the force were well advanced.31 first concentrated at Camp Pickett, Vir-
With a view to avoiding a situation ginia. Next they moved to the newly com-
similar to the confusion caused by con- pleted staging area, Camp Patrick Henry,
flicting instructions for the TORCH loading, thereby coming under the control of the
a conference was held at the Hampton Hampton Roads port. The last step was
Roads Port of Embarkation on 19 April the actual embarkation.
1943 at which all interested agencies—
31
Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces—were See Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and Wil-
represented. Detailed plans and proce- liam R. Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground
Combat Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
dures were worked out, and effective con- WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp. 567-68,
trol measures were set up for the move- 580. 32
Memo, CofS WD for CG 45th Inf Div (rein-
ment of the CENT subtask force. The force forced), CG AGF, and CG ASF, 14 Apr 43, sub:
was to remain under the control of the Overseas Mvmt of 45th Inf Div Reinforced, OPD
Army Ground Forces until it reached the 370.5 Sec (4-14-43); History of Preparation for Move-
port staging area, Camp Patrick Henry. ment of the 45th Infantry Division, Reinforced (here-
after cited as Hist of Preparation for Mvmt of 45th
The port commander and his staff dealt Div), Vol. IV, Sec. II, Tab A, AG Mob Div ASF
very closely and directly with General Files. 33

Middleton's organization, and no serious Mass.,See30Proceedings, 1st Port Comdrs' Conf, Boston,
Aug-1 Sep 43, pp. 54-60, OCT HB PE Gen.
difficulties were encountered. Neverthe- 34
General Middleton later described the port and
less, some shipping space was not utilized the island as "very poor places" for this training,
because the task force stowage plan was which he thought might better have been given in the
theater. See Hist of Preparation for Mvmt of 45th
received at the port too late to permit Div, Vol. IV, Sec. II, Tab F.
SICILY AND ITALY
Supplies and equipment for the 45th
were assembled at the port much more
efficiently than had those for TORCH, in
large measure because a standard proce-
dure had been developed by the Move-
ments Branch, ASF. A few last-minute
items had to be delivered by air. Vehicles
required the usual protective waterproof-
ing for an amphibious landing. Stowage
was planned by a ship transportation offi-
cer (formerly called transport quartermas-
ter) assigned to each combat-loaded vessel.
Middleton's force was to carry 21 days'
supply of rations and packaged gasoline,
together with 7 units of fire.
Part of the cargo for this assault group
was palletized, that is, lashed to wooden
pallets so as to form compact bundles ca-
pable of being picked up by a fork-lift
truck or pulled over a beach by bulldozer
or other vehicle.35 Opinion within the War
Department was divided as to the feasi-
bility of this innovation, and within the
Army Service Forces it was doubted if the
necessary pallets could be procured and
properly loaded by the deadline date of
10 May 1943 for the arrival of supplies at
the port. Palletizing was therefore limited
to 10 days' supply of 5-in-1 rations and 50
percent of the motor oil, gasoline, and
water. The last two items, which were
transported in 5-gallon "blitz" cans, were
stacked in two rows, forming a pallet 43
inches high with a total of 2,512 pounds.
Although palletization obviously entailed
some loss of shipping space, it was favor-
ably regarded by General Middleton's
36
G-4.
Altogether, the movement of men and
matériel to the port proceeded without
serious hitch. The subtask force with most
of its supplies and equipment was loaded
aboard 13 attack transports (7 APA's and
6 XAP's) and 5 cargo attack vessels
195
(AKA's), in two separate groups.37 Headed
by an elaborately equipped communica-
tions ship, the USS Ancon, the assault con-
voy—UGF-9—sailed on 8 June 1943, car-
rying approximately 22,000 troops and
46,000 measurement tons of cargo.38 All
19 vessels arrived safely at Mers el Kébir
on 22 June.
The 1st Embarkation Group, a provi-
sional organization built around the 10th
Port and Company G of the 591st Engi-
neer Boat Regiment, was to load the re-
inforced 3d Infantry Division (subtask
force Joss) at the newly captured port of
Bizerte.39 Under the command of Lt. Col.
William F. Powers, the embarkation group
began taking over its mission from the
Eastern Base Section in late May 1943.
Meanwhile, the Corps of Engineers had
started reconstruction of damaged shore
facilities at Bizerte, and American and
British naval salvage crews were working
to clear the surrounding waters of sunken
enemy vessels. The proximity of this port
to Sicily made it an ideal jumping-off-
35
Cf. OCT HB Monograph 19, pp. 143-46.
36
Diary cited n. 24, entries for 12-16 Apr 43; Hist
of Preparation for Mvmt of 45th Div, Vol. IV, Sec.
II, Tab E. The G-4 later reported that palletizing
had expedited the unloading of ships and the clearing
of beaches in Sicily. On the development of the useful
5-gallon blitz can (sometimes called Jerry can) see
Erna Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Sup-
ply and Services, I, U N I T E D STATES A R M Y IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), 144-46.
37
The remainder of the force's organizational
equipment, including 54 tanks, was dispatched in a
slow convoy composed of 8 Liberty ships and 10
LST's.
38
Available troop and cargo figures vary. See Hist
Rpt 4, HRPE, Apps. I and II, OCT HB HRPE;
Compilation of 3 1 Jul 43, Plng Div, TC, OCT HB
North Africa Misc Data—Sicily; II Corps, Rpt of
Opns, App. "C"; and Wheeler (ed.), The Road to Vic-
tory, I, 87-88.
39
See the detailed Report of Operations, May-
August 1943, by the 1st Embarkation Group (OCT
HB North Africa, 1st Emb Gp), upon which this ac-
count is based.
196
place for the invasion, and the deep land-
locked Lake Bizerte provided an excellent
site for amphibious training.
The 1st Embarkation Group established
its headquarters on 8 June, barely a month
before D Day. Lacking any precedent to
serve as a guide, the group developed its
own procedure. It encountered the usual
last-minute changes, and because of secu-
rity restrictions it was frequently forced to
ferret out necessary information by "devi-
ous and informal channels." Apart from
the headquarters staff, the 105 officers and
682 enlisted men of the unit were divided
into three detachments to supervise oper-
ations at the three loading areas on Lake
Bizerte. These three sites had been selected
with a view to insuring protected waters,
an adequate road net, the least possible
construction, sufficient suitable space
ashore for assembly, and a minimum of
interference with normal port and naval
activities.
After a preliminary exercise in moving
troops and vehicles, the loading of supplies
began on 28 June. Difficulty developed at
once because cargo failed to arrive in the
proper order. To meet this problem dumps
were set up at dockside where supplies that
could not be loaded immediately were
stored. The trucks could thus be released
for further use. The supply phase was
completed on 5 July. On the same day,
the first 6,437 assault troops marched
aboard 47 LCI's, which sailed on 6 July.
The remainder of the initial force em-
barked on the following day on 5 LCI's,
87 LCT's, 38 LST's and 2 LSI's (landing
ships, infantry), accompanied by 1 head-
quarters ship and 1 tug. The assault con-
voy comprised approximately 26,000 men,
3,732 vehicles, and 6,676 long tons of
supplies.
The third American contingent, the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
DIME subtask force, was built around the
reinforced 1st Infantry Division. Because
the harbor at Oran was crowded, the as-
sault units were loaded at the British port
of Algiers. According to the Naval Com-
mander, Western Task Force, the main
difficulty arose from "the absence of an
authoritative central agency with a com-
plete knowledge of all loading plans, pri-
orities, etc., and capable of rendering deci-
sions." 40 Various American and British
organizations attempted to exercise con-
trol but none saw the entire picture. The
transport quartermasters were plagued by
frequent changes in the loading plans, and
the ships were crowded with barracks bags
and similar items not essential to the
assault.41 Despite these drawbacks, the
19,251 troops of this contingent were
finally embarked at Algiers aboard 8 com-
bat loaders, 15 LST's, 19 LCI's (L) and 2
LSI's (S). Like the assault units for Joss,
they carried maintenance for 7 days plus
21/3units of fire. 42
With the loading completed, the three
U.S. subtask forces sailed for Sicily under
strong naval escort. The landings, which
began in the early morning hours of
10 July 1943, were preceded by airborne
assaults and naval gunfire. At the last mo-
ment the weather worsened. A high wind
and rough seas hampered the invaders.
Fortunately, the elements also threw the
defenders off guard. The 45th Division,
landing near Scoglitti, was hit the hardest
by wind and sea, but its landing was vir-
tually unopposed. Near Gela, the 1st Divi-
sion met heavy enemy opposition at some
beaches but very little at others. Around
Licata, the 3d Division ran into enemy
40
WNTF Action Rpt, Sicilian Campaign, p. 32.
41
Ibid., pp. 32 and 47.
42
Seventh Army Rpt of Opns Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, pp.
E-3, E-13, and E-14.
SICILY AND ITALY
counterfire at only a few points. Because
of Allied air superiority, shipping losses
from enemy aircraft were surprisingly
light.43
Beach and Port Activities
Once ashore, the American forces faced
the difficult task of establishing a satisfac-
tory supply system. Adverse weather at
first delayed discharge. The principal
task, however, was to prevent confusion
and congestion on the beaches, since sup-
plies and equipment soon were being un-
loaded faster than they could be forwarded
to dumps or to troops. The most critical
period was from about noon of D Day to
the night of D plus 1 when the Americans
had begun to advance inland and the
enemy air attacks were most determined.
Chaotic conditions continued on all the
beaches until D plus 3. Although inexperi-
enced personnel, an absence of effective
control measures, a lack of suitable exit
areas, and a grave shortage of vehicles
contributed to the congestion, the main
handicap was a shortage of labor for cargo
discharge and beach clearance. Supplies
were piled high in hopeless disorder, and
enemy strafing attacks caused frequent
fires.
Initially, each subtask force set up
beach dumps. Each force contained sig-
nal, ordnance, medical, and DUKW units,
as well as a naval beach battalion, but no
port units. In Sicily the shore groups at-
tempted many tasks, including combat
duty, for which they had not been trained.
As a result, their efforts to fulfill their basic
mission were scattered and not very effec-
tive. During the assault phase, in fact, the
unloading was completed only because of
the help of naval working parties from the
transports and prisoners of war. 44
197
In time the difficulties of the Engineer
shore groups were overcome. Conditions
improved most rapidly on the beaches in
the Joss area, where the U.S. Navy had
stationed three able and effective beach-
masters. In the DIME area some beaches
had to be closed temporarily because of
enemy shelling. The most undesirable
beaches were those near Scoglitti, where
the CENT force had to contend with a high
surf, huge sand dunes, and no suitable
exits to the hinterland. 45 During the first
three days, 10-12 July inclusive, the fol-
lowing results were achieved in the land-
ing of men and matériel over the assault
beaches in Sicily:46
The newly devised 2½-ton DUKW was
amazingly successful in landing mainte-
nance supplies.47 It could deliver directly
from ship to dump thereby eliminating
double handling of cargo at the beaches.
Because the Seventh Army did not have
enough trucks, the DUKW frequently was
43
CinC's Dispatch, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 12-13,
20, 23-25. See also Howard M. Smyth, Sicily: The
Surrender of Italy, Ch. IV.
44
Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, Pt. II, Engr Sec,
Annex 12. Cf. Hist of Preparation for Mvmt of 45th
Div, Vol. IV, Sec. II, Tab F.
45
WNTF Action Rpt, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 55-
57, 59, 61; Hist of Preparation for Mvmt of 45th Div,
Vol. IV, Sec. II, Tab F, G-4 Rpt.
46
Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, pp.
E-15 and E-16. Total of vehicles has been corrected.
47
In addition to DUKW's, LCT's were used exten-
sively. The average rate of cargo discharge in long
tons per hour was 13.1 tons for the LCT, 10.3 tons
for the DUKW. Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA,
activation to 31 Oct 43, Tab AL, Trans Notes, par.
III, OCT HB North Africa.
198
diverted from its proper ship-to-shore orbit
and driven far inland, thus restricting its
availability for cargo discharge. In several
instances DUKW's capsized and sank be-
cause of overloading. Despite limited car-
rying capacity and the constant problem
of maintenance, the advantages of the
DUKW far outweighed its shortcomings.48
By D plus 4, the initial beachhead of
the Seventh Army had been secured. The
first few days in Sicily showed that, given
good weather, air and naval support, and
sufficient small ships, landing craft, and
DUKW's, a fairly large force could be
maintained over captured beaches. The
fear that the beaches would deteriorate
rapidly under heavy traffic proved ground-
less.49 Nevertheless, ports were necessary
to provide for continued and growing sup-
ply needs. Licata was captured and opened
to Allied craft on D Day, and on 16 July
Porto Empedocle was taken. At Licata,
Companies A and B of the 382d Port Bat-
talion, supplementing their C rations by
raids on local tomato and melon patches,
feverishly unloaded subsistence, water,
gasoline, and ammunition from LST's.
Since these ports lacked the capacity to
support the Seventh Army by themselves,
beach maintenance was still necessary.50
By 19 July 1943, the 1st Engineer Spe-
cial Brigade had relieved the division
commanders of responsibility for cargo
discharge and over-the-beach mainte-
nance in the American sector. With only
modest shore facilities, the small ports and
beaches on the southern coast received
104,134 long tons of cargo during the
period 10-31 July. Of this total, Licata
accounted for 37,766 long tons, Gela for
35,310, Porto Empedocle for 17,305, and
Scoglitti for 13,753.51
The capture of Palermo on 22 July 1943
gave the U.S. Seventh Army its first deep-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
water port capable of accepting cargo
ships direct from the United States. In
peacetime a thriving commercial center
and later an important Italian naval base,
Palermo normally afforded ample berth-
ing space for ocean-going vessels. Its pro-
tected harbor had four large piers and
excellent rail and highway facilities. Re-
peated air and naval bombardment, how-
ever, had wrought terrific destruction,
leaving the water front a tangled mass of
upturned and blackened hulls, spars, and
funnels. The Americans found 44 vessels
of various types sunk in the channel and
at the piers and the port reduced to about
30 percent of its normal capacity.52
Reconstruction in the port area was
begun by Seventh Army engineers on
23 July, chiefly to furnish berths for land-
ing craft and coasters and ramps for
DUKW's. Removal of debris, the filling of
bomb craters, and preparation of port exits
were given primary consideration. One
useful expedient, first employed at Pa-
lermo, was to build ramps over sunken
vessels lying alongside the piers so as to
obtain additional berthing space. The ex-
48
Rpt, Operation of 2½-ton Amphibious Truck
(DUKW) in the Sicilian Campaign, OCT HB North
Africa Sicily—Misc; Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, Pt.
II, Engr Rpt, p. 1-17.
49
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Tab AL, Notes on Working of Sicilian
Beaches, pars. 2, 38, 50, OCT HB North Africa.
50
WNTF Action Rpt, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 65,
68; Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, p.
E-12; Hist, 382d Port Bn, 16 Jun 42-May 44, AG
Opns Rpts TCBN-382-0.1 (29991).
51
Scoglitti closed on 17 July and Gela ceased to be
important by 28 July. Licata and Porto Empedocle,
which had good rail and highway connections, were
utilized well into August 1943. See Seventh Army Rpt
of Opns, Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, p. E-15.
52
On the Palermo port situation, see CinC's Dis-
patch, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 28-29; WNTF Action
Rpt, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 68-69; and Seventh
Army Rpt of Opns, Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, p. E-12 and Engr
Rpt, p. 1-4.
SICILY AND ITALY 199

perience gained here later proved valuable small ports and beaches on the southern
in reconstructing other war-torn ports in coast, and 187,882 tons were landed at
Italy and France. The first ships to enter Palermo, leaving a backlog of 94,702
Palermo harbor were six coasters. They tons.54
came on 28 July 1943, carrying essential Port activity at Palermo was limited
supplies heretofore trucked overland from until the harbor had been cleared of ob-
the south coast. On 1 August the 10th structions. Tons of rubble also had to be
Port began operating at Palermo, remain- removed from the devastated port area.
ing there until the following summer. As late as 29 August 1943 this once busy
After Palermo was opened, several tem- seaport had been restored to only 60 per-
porary beach supply points were estab- cent of its normal capacity. Apart from
lished along the northern coast for the the extensive destruction, a major factor
support of the American troops advancing in the shipping congestion at Palermo was
toward Messina. Beginning on 1 August the Army's inability to effect the prompt
supply points were set up, first at Termini forwarding of discharged cargo because of
Imerese, then at Torremuzza beach near insufficient service troops, particularly
San Stefano, and finally at Brolo beach truck drivers, and delay and difficulty in
and Barcellona beach, to which supplies setting up a satisfactory system for deliv-
were moved by rail, truck, and craft. At ery to the dumps.
times water transport was the only way to Despite the foregoing factors that pre-
insure prompt supply for combat units, vented optimum cargo discharge, U.S.
since the rail line was only partly open Army engineer and transportation troops
and the coastal road at one point had been were remarkably successful in restoring
blown from the face of the cliff. Urgently order from chaos at Palermo. During the
needed rations, ammunition, and gasoline period 28 July to 31 August 1943 this port
were delivered to the beach points by received 48 vessels, consisting of 5 troop
landing craft, coasters, and schooners carriers, 32 Liberty ships, and 11 coasters.
from the south coast, Palermo, and di- In the same period a total of 120,706 long
rectly from North Africa. 53 tons of cargo was discharged. The average
With the fall of Messina on 17 August daily discharge was 3,658 long tons, with
1943, enemy resistance collapsed and the a peak of 5,718 long tons on 12 August.
island was completely occupied. The U.S. Army cargo continued to pour into
build-up and maintenance continued, and Palermo long after the Sicilian campaign
soon the harbor at Palermo became so had ended.55
congested with shipping that cargo dis-
charge lagged. The original supply plan Supplying the Seventh Army by Rail
had called for five convoys from the
United States (UGS-11 through UGS- In Sicily, as in North Africa, the dis-
15), consisting of 57 ships with 347,237 tribution of men and matériel to the in-
long tons of cargo, all scheduled for dis- terior was effected principally by railway
charge in Sicily between 19 July and 53
WNTF Action Rpt, Sicilian Campaign, p. 69;
8 September 1943. The discharge sched- Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, p. E-2.
54
ule was not met. All told, during this Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, p.
E-13.
period 64,653 tons were discharged at the 55
Ibid., Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, pp. E-2, E-21, and E-22.
200
and motor transport. Although only part
of the Sicilian trackage was taken over by
the U.S. Army, it was important in ad-
vancing the supply line. A measure of the
achievement in rail transportation is
found in the statistics coverinsr freight car-
ried during the campaign.56 For the
period 12 July to 1 September 1943, in-
clusive, in the combined southern and
central districts, which bore the brunt of
the initial assault, the heaviest movement
was from Gela to Licata and from Licata
northward to Caltanissetta. Within this
area a total of 112,406 net tons was moved
by rail. In the northern district, where the
railway did not become available until
late July, the most tonnage was lifted on
the coastal line running eastward from
Palermo to San Stefano. There, for the
period 28 July to 1 September 1943, in-
clusive, a total of 61,617 net tons was car-
ried by rail.
The task of running the Sicilian rail-
ways for the U.S. Seventh Army was as-
signed to the 727th Railway Operating
Battalion, which had gained valuable ex-
perience in North Africa. An advance de-
tachment landed at Licata on 12 July,
where it made a reconnaissance of the
railway facilities, organized native rail-
waymen, and located equipment. On the
following day approximately 400 tons of
supplies were sent forward by rail to the
3d Division. By the end of July the entire
battalion had arrived and was busily or-
ganizing and directing American railway
operations.57
Principal operating difficulties encoun-
tered by the 727th stemmed from bombed
and sabotaged trackage, tunnels, bridges,
yards, stations, and locomotives, and in-
adequate signal communications. From
the start, too, trains were delayed for lack
of water, and various expedients were
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
adopted, including delivery by water
trucks and cars and in five-gallon blitz
cans. Nevertheless, with the co-operation
of Italian train crews, the 727th rapidly
restored rail service in southern and cen-
tral Sicily, and soon the battalion was de-
livering more tonnage to the railheads
than could be promptly unloaded. The
first train, carrying approximately 400
tons of supplies, moved eastward from
Palermo on 29 July. With Italian help the
tracks soon were opened along the north-
ern coast as far as Cefalu and, later, to
San Stefano.
Throughout the Sicilian campaign the
727th Railway Operating Battalion sta-
tioned men at strategic points to organize
and utilize native railway workers, open
rail lines, effect repairs, and keep supplies
moving from ports to railheads. Working
day and night in strange surroundings,
with strange equipment, and frequently
without regard for personal safety, the
men of the 727th won warm praise from
General Patton. Its island mission accom-
plished, the unit began the trek into Italy
in October.
Highway Operations in Sicily
Planning for highway operations in
Sicily began in April 1943.58 A complete
study was made of the Sicilian road net,
and action was initiated to obtain essen-
tial highway equipment and supplies. The
procurement of sufficient qualified per-
5S
Ibid., Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, pp. E-16-19.
57
On the 727th in Sicily, see its Historical Record,
July-October 1943, (OCT HB North Africa Ry
Units), and its published history, The 727th Railway
Operating Battalion in World War II (New York: Sim-
mons-Boardman Publishing Corp. [1948]), pp. 35-37.
58
This section is based upon Seventh Army Rpt of
Opns, Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, pp. E-21-37, and Engr Rpt,
p. 1-3.
SICILY AND ITALY
sonnel proved difficult, especially for
manning a proposed traffic control organ-
ization. Early in July the creation of the
provisional 6623d Regulating Company
of 50 officers and 200 enlisted men, how-
ever, solved the problem of a traffic con-
trol unit. The 6623d also furnished part
of the staff and all of the operating per-
sonnel for a Highway Division under the
Transportation Branch of G-4, U.S.
Seventh Army.
A small advance party of the Highway
Division landed on the beach east of Li-
cata on 14 July. On the following day it
began operating from Seventh Army
headquarters at Gela, making recom-
mendations on main and alternative sup-
ply routes for the American sector. Or-
ganic motor transport was utilized to haul
supplies from beach and port to dump
during the first week of the campaign, but
thereafter this task was assigned to the
trucks and DUKW's of the 1st Engineer
Special Brigade. Late in July additional
highway troops arrived. Various Quarter-
master truck units also debarked, but
highway operations were handicapped
continually by a shortage of drivers.
After the capture of Palermo, the High-
way Division moved to that city, complet-
ing its transfer on 26 July. A traffic circu-
lation plan was developed immediately,
and the traffic engineer was active in the
selection of depot and dump sites and sup-
ply routes in the Palermo area. On 28 July
motor freight activity was inaugurated at
the port with 69 trucks and 19 DUKW's,
under the operational control of a detach-
ment of the 6623d Regulating Company.
Lack of familiarity with the city and in-
adequate route and cargo markings,
coupled with the blackout, were among
early difficulties. A road patrol of three
officers constantly roamed the city, direct-
201
ing drivers to destinations and expediting
truck turnaround. By 1 August a total of
eleven dumps had been designated, lo-
cated at distances from .3 miles to 10.3
miles from the main port gate. Within a
month the first day's record of 75 trucks
delivering a total of 802.3 tons had soared
to 230 trucks carrying a total of 4,641.9
tons. Contributing to greater efficiency
was the assignment to the Highway Divi-
sion of centralized dispatch control of all
vehicles of Quartermaster truck units as-
signed or attached to the Seventh Army.
Orders for trucks at shipside were placed
through a central dispatching office and
filled from the motor pool.
For the movement of supplies from
Palermo, the Highway Division organized
motor convoys, establishing the procedure,
routes, and schedules. With the capture
and repair of rail lines along the northern
coast, an effort was made to reduce move-
ment by highway. Instead, dispatch was
made by truck from forward railheads at
Campofelice, Cefalu, and San Stefano,
the last being as far eastward as the rail-
way was made operative. From two to five
truck companies operated from these rail-
heads, delivering to local dumps or to ad-
vanced supply points. The peak of high-
way activity was reached early in August,
declining sharply thereafter.
In general, the main roads of Sicily
were in excellent condition. Demolished
highway bridges caused no serious diffi-
culty, since they were easily bypassed.
Towns and villages, with their sharp
curves and narrow streets, were often bot-
tlenecks for vehicular traffic. Within more
densely populated areas military trans-
port had to contend with heavy civilian
traffic. To prevent the natives' carts and
bicycles from interfering on main supply
routes, the Highway Division prepared a
202
set of regulations for civilian traffic, which
was issued by the American Military
Government (AMGOT).
Although truck, train, and ship bore
the brunt of the load, the Seventh Army
also made use of animal transport. Be-
cause of the rough terrain of Sicily, ap-
proximately 4,000 pack animals—horses,
mules, and donkeys—had to be employed.
Variously procured within the theater by
capture, purchase, and hire, these animals
were employed by the troops for both
combat and supply missions. The average
pack weighed from 250 to 275 pounds and
consisted of water, rations, signal equip-
ment, and ammunition. During the cam-
paign about 1,500 animals were lost
through enemy action.59
The U.S. Army's experience in Sicily
demonstrated that all types of transporta-
tion were necessary in invaded areas, and
that no one alone could meet the need.
This lesson was repeated in subsequent
activity on the Italian mainland.
Transportation in the Italian Campaign
The brief Sicilian campaign of thirty-
eight days formed the prelude to the
longer and much more exacting cam-
paign in Italy. Several factors—notably
the stiff resistance and superb delaying
tactics of the enemy, the difficult terrain,
adverse weather conditions, and inade-
quate transportation—accounted for the
slow and painful progress of the Allied
forces up the Italian boot.
The belief that with the overthrow of
Mussolini war-weary Italy could soon be
eliminated from the conflict entered into
the Allied decision of late July 1943 to
launch an amphibious assault against the
Italian mainland. At that time the U.S.
Fifth Army, under General Clark, was di-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
rected to develop plans for the seizure of
Naples and the nearby airfields with a
view to preparing a firm base for further
offensive action. The target date for this
operation, known as AVALANCHE, was set
for early September. The ground forces
initially made available to Fifth Army for
AVALANCHE were the American VI Corps
and the British 10 Corps. D Day was fi-
nally fixed for 9 September 1943, since
the moon would set well before H Hour
on that date and a sufficient number of
serviceable landing craft would be avail-
able by then. The site for the landings
would be the area skirting the Gulf of
Salerno, to the south of Naples, principally
because it lay within the range of Allied
air support from bases in Sicily.60
Mounting the Assault Forces
Loading the troops, weapons, and sup-
plies for the attack on Salerno was com-
plicated by the critical shipping situation
and the congested condition of the North
African ports. Of the huge armada as-
sembled for the assault, a total of 90 ships
and landing craft had been assigned to lift
38,179 troops and 3,204 vehicles for the
U.S. VI Corps.61 The main portion of the
American contingent was loaded at Oran,
that of the British at Bizerte. Supporting
convoys were dispatched from both North
Africa and Sicily.
59
Ibid., Pt. II, G-4 Rpt, p. E-37.
60
Fifth Army History, Pt. I, pp. 18-20, OCMH
Files; Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 174-76.
61
Including escort vessels, the Western Naval Task
Force, which made the assault landing, comprised 642
ships and landing craft, under the command of Vice
Adm. Henry Kent Hewitt. See Action Rpt, Western
Naval Task Force, The Italian Campaign, Salerno
Landing, September-October 1943 (hereafter cited as
WNTF Action Rpt, Salerno Landing), pp. 161 and
204, AG Analysis Files 6-2.009/14 (9727).
SICILY AND ITALY
American and British plans were co-
ordinated by the U.S. Chief of Transpor-
tation, AFHQ, through his Operational
Planning Branch. The Transportation
Officer, SOS, NATOUSA, was responsi-
ble for preparing prestowage plans. His
staff co-operated closely with the base sec-
tion commanders, whose personnel super-
vised the loading of the troops and cargo
in accordance with priorities set by the
task force commanders. Transportation
officers were bedeviled by frequent though
necessary changes in troop lists, loading
priorities, and allocations of ships and
craft. Despite the usual last-minute flurry
of loading, unloading, and reloading, by
5 September 1943 the bulk of the U.S. VI
Corps had sailed from Oran for the ren-
dezvous off the Salerno beaches.62
By midnight of 8-9 September the en-
tire task force had reached the assembly
area. The weather was clear. Under cover
of darkness the troops clambered down
the nets into assault craft. Because of en-
emy mine fields and reportedly strong
coastal defenses, the troopships anchored
about twelve miles offshore, thereby slow-
ing the unloading operations and adding
to the discomfort of the attackers aboard
the pitching and rolling invasion fleet.
From the transportation point of view two
important immediate objectives were the
port of Salerno and, about six miles in-
land, the rail and highway center of
Battipaglia.63
Beach and Port Operations
The Salerno landings were preceded by
stepped-up strategic bombing of Italian
transportation facilities. Railway bridges,
in particular, were singled out for destruc-
tion from the air. The resultant damage,
together with the subsequent demolition
203
activities of the retreating enemy, were to
present the Allies with the difficult task of
rehabilitating and operating badly bat-
tered ports and railways. 64 Although the
capture of Naples was set for D plus 12—a
target date that later proved overly opti-
mistic—plans were made for over-the-
beach supply for an entire month if
necessary.
Under heavy enemy fire on 9 Septem-
ber 1943 the American VI Corps, spear-
headed by the reinforced 36th Infantry
Division, surged ashore at four beaches
near the site of the ancient Greek city of
Paestum. Discharge of vehicles and sup-
plies began shortly after the troops landed,
and before the close of the day about
2,000 tons of supplies had been unloaded.
Apart from enemy action, the principal
hindrance to prompt cargo discharge and
beach clearance was insufficient man-
power and a shortage of cargo trucks.
Both service troops and vehicles had been
limited in number because of limited
shipping space. Beach personnel on occa-
sion had to be withdrawn for combat
duty, and being given no relief the drivers
worked until exhausted.65
62
For a somewhat critical view of the loading at
Oran, which was supervised by the 3d Port, see
WNTF Action Rpt, Salerno Landing, pp. 93-95.
Neither the 3d Port at Oran nor the 8th Port at
Bizerte has left any detailed account of the loading
for the Salerno landings.
63
Fifth Army History, Pt. I, pp. 27, 31-32, and
Map 4, OCMH Files.
64
Craven and Cate, AAF, II, 554-58. General
Gray subsequently questioned the wisdom of the
wholesale bombing of railway tracks and bridges in
Italy. See his Memo for CAO AAI, 20 Jul 44, sub:
Bombing of RRs, and atchd Corres, OCT HB North
Africa MRS Misc.
65
On beach operations, see Observers Notes on
Italian Campaign, 25 Aug-7 Oct 43, OCT 370.2 Italy
Campaign Rpts; and Report of SOS Observers of
Operation AVALANCHE, in Hist Rpt, Trans Sec SOS
NATOUSA, 31 Oct 43, Incl 1, OCT HB North
Africa.
204
The effective employment of various
types of landing craft (LST's, LCT's,
LCM's, LSI's, and LCI's) and of the am-
phibious DUKW's contributed materially
to successful discharge. The versatile
LST's transported troops, tanks, and ve-
hicles directly to the shore, spanning the
last water gap to the beach by attached
ponton landing ramps. Some vessels dis-
charged as much as 80 percent of their
cargo into LCT's, which shuttled between
ship and shore. As in Sicily, DUKW's
proved useful, landing not only personnel
and supplies but also light artillery and
antitank guns.66
Enemy shellfire on D Day forced tem-
porary abandonment of all activity on
Yellow Beach and Blue Beach in the
American sector. Congestion then devel-
oped on Red and Green Beaches. Work-
ing parties had to be sent ashore from the
transports to supplement the insufficient
labor. The first shore dump, located about
a quarter of a mile inland from Red
Beach, began functioning on D plus 1.
Additional dumps were established by D
plus 4, and thereafter beach clearance was
satisfactory.67
The small port of Salerno, entered on
D Day and taken shortly thereafter, could
accommodate only a few coasters and
landing craft, and its usefulness was
limited by enemy interference. As a result,
heavy reliance had to be placed upon
beach operations. At first, the beach or-
ganization consisted of the reinforced 531st
Engineer Shore Regiment and a beach
party of the U.S. Navy 4th Beach Battal-
ion. As the need arose, the men of the
531st, veterans of North Africa and Sicily,
took time out for combat assignments such
as cleaning out a nest of German snipers
in the old Tower of Paestum.68
The first port battalion to function in
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the Salerno area was the 389th, which ar-
rived with the assault convoy. The bulk of
its personnel, 18 officers and 853 enlisted
men, had been distributed among the
combat loaders to assist in cargo dis-
charge. Working around the clock, by the
afternoon of 10 September the 389th had
unloaded 5,635 tons of general cargo and
1,630 vehicles from 18 vessels of the D-
Day convoy. This task completed, the bat-
talion was put ashore, where it was
attached to the 531st Engineer Shore Reg-
iment. After establishing a bivouac, the
389th continued to discharge cargo from
incoming vessels. Repeated enemy bomb-
ing and strafing caused many casualties,
and a few men "cracked up" under the
strain.69
About a week after D Day it became
apparent that the task of over-the-beach
supply had grown beyond the capability
of the existing organization, and that at
least one more port battalion was needed.
On 17 September 1943 a detachment of
the 6th Port arrived to take charge. The
531st Engineer Shore Regiment, however,
continued to assist in beach operations.
Newly arrived port personnel, including a
Negro unit, the 480th Port Battalion,
bivouacked amid the impressive ruins of
Paestum. Italian labor was recruited
nearby and brought to the beaches by
truck and train. With this larger force the
66
See WNTF Action Rpt, Salerno Landing; and
SOS observers rpt cited n. 65.
67
See WNTF Action Rpt, Salerno Landing, pp.
150-52; and SOS observers rpt cited n. 65 pp. 4, 6,
10.
68
WNTFAction Rpt, Salerno Landing, passim;
Military Intelligence Division, War Department,
Salerno, American Operations from the Beaches to the Vol-
turno (9 September-6 October 1943), AMERICAN
FORCES IN ACTION SERIES (Washington, 1944),
pp. 25-26.
69
Hist, 389th Port Bn, 1 May 43-30 Apr 44, OCT
HB North Africa Misc Data—Italy.
SICILY AND ITALY
daily cargo discharge soared. As the
month drew to a close, rough seas pre-
vented continuous operation. On the night
of 28-29 September a sudden gale blew
several craft up on the beach, a coaster
went aground, and cargo discharge was
halted for two days.
Because of delay in the capture of
Naples, the Salerno beaches were used
longer than originally intended, and dis-
charge of supply was therefore at the
mercy of the elements. Naples fell on 1
October, and thereafter over-the-beach
discharge became less imperative, ceasing
altogether on 13 October 1943.70
Port Activity at Naples
At Naples Allied bombers and Axis
demolition teams had achieved a new
high in destruction. An advance party of
Fifth Army personnel, consisting of fifty
officers and enlisted men under the com-
mand of General Pence, entered the city
on 2 October and prepared to open the
port. With the party came its transporta-
tion officer, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Robert H.
Clarkson, and a detachment of the 6th
Port. The original plan called for joint
American and British operation under a
British port commandant, with Colonel
Clarkson as his deputy.
Within the port area of Naples, Clark-
son and his men found utter desolation.
At the principal pier, where the luxury
liner Rex had formerly docked, nothing
was operative. Buildings had been blasted,
roads were blocked with rubble, and fires,
which the Germans had ignited, were
still burning in the piles of coal. No part
of the port or its equipment had escaped
damage.71
Wherever possible, the gantry cranes
had been dynamited so that they would
205
fall into the water. Several large Italian
naval vessels, including one cruiser, lay on
their sides. A capsized hospital ship with
Red Cross markings lent a splash of color
to the otherwise somber array of masts,
booms, funnels, and cranes protruding
from the oil-slicked harbor. The ap-
proaches to every pier and berth were
jammed with partially and totally sub-
merged hulks. A survey of 7 October 1943
disclosed only three deepwater berths for
Liberties, three berths for coasters, and
fourteen anchorages for ships within the
harbor that could be worked with landing
craft, lighters, or DUKW's.72
According to the same survey, the only
available cranes were the crawlers brought
in by the Americans. Barges and lighters
were urgently needed. Fortunately, Colo-
nel Clarkson was able to obtain enough
cargo nets, pallets, fork-lift trucks, and
cranes from Palermo. Since Naples had
no electric power, the dynamos of three
Italian submarines were used to furnish
electricity for port operations. Rail con-
nections had been broken, and most of the
locomotives and rolling stock had been
either destroyed or damaged. The princi-
pal railway tunnel was entirely obstructed
by the wreckage of two trains that had
been rammed into each other head on.
Rehabilitation of the port facilities was
achieved through a tremendous co-opera-
tive effort. American and British naval
70
Hist, 6th Port, III, 3-5 and Exhibit B-3, OCT
HB Oversea Ports; Interv, Sidney T. Mathews with
Brig Gen Ralph H. Tate (Ret.), former G-4 of Fifth
Army, 19 Jan 49, OCMH Files.
71
On the destruction and subsequent port recon-
struction, see Hist, 6th Port, III, 7-12, OCT HB
Oversea Ports; and the copiously illustrated special re-
port, Rehabilitation of the Port of Naples, prepared
by the Peninsular Base Section (c. May 1944), OCT
HB North Africa PBS.
72
Hist, Trans Sec SOS NATOUSA, 31 Oct 43,
Incl 2, OCT HB North Africa.
206 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

units, including divers and mine sweepers, night work. In the last quarter of 1943,
cleared the harbor. The 1051st Port Con- the Italians in the port area earned a half
struction and Repair Group, aided by million dollars—no mean stimulant for
other engineer units, removed rubble and the stricken local economy. During this
debris to permit the operation of vehicles period the 6th Port had a daily average
in the port area, razed tottering structures, employment of 4,200 common laborers,
and reconstructed berths and quays. The 729 stevedores, 1,368 contract laborers,
6th Port operated the port and scheduled and 1,200 classified workers, including in-
the rehabilitation program. The 703d terpreters, clerks, typists, and stenog-
Railway Grand Division restored rail raphers.
service, repairing the yards, track, and The 6th Port began cargo discharge at
rolling stock.73 Naples with the 684th and 687th Port
The reconstruction of the port was Companies of the 389th Port Battalion.
marked by a high degree of ingenuity. By the close of 1943 it had been joined by
Clearing the most readily operable berths five more port battalions. Still other port
naturally received top priority. Small battalions were obtained from Sicily and
hulks were cut up, but the removal or sal- North Africa. An initial shortage of man-
vage of the larger ships blocking the piers power was eased by converting former
would have entailed excessive time and Italian infantry regiments into port units,
effort. Therefore, superstructures of the which worked under American super-
capsized vessels were removed and ramps vision. Discharge from landing craft com-
were built over the hulks, in effect impro- menced on 3 October, and the first Lib-
vising new docks at which ships could be erty, the Elihu Yale, docked on the follow-
moored for discharge. Considerable steel ing day. Among the earliest vessels were
was salvaged on the spot, but nearly all those that had been loaded by the 6th
heavy timbers had to be imported, since Port at Casablanca in mid-August 1943
the Italians had very little wood for con- and held within the theater until the cap-
struction. Various types of ramps were de- ture of Naples.75
vised to fit the situation. For example, a At first, ship's gear and mobile cranes
long personnel ramp, connected to the discharged cargo, either at such berths as
shore by a steel span, was attached to the were open or from anchorages offshore
curved hull of the capsized Italian cruiser into barges, landing craft, and DUKW's.
to provide a complete pier for troop de- In October 1943 offshore discharge (89,-
barkation. In another instance, after a 358 long tons) actually exceeded discharge
disabled tanker had been sunk on an even at the piers (58,887 long tons). There-
keel the entire superstructure was cut after, as more berths became available
down to the level of the main deck, which 73
For a convenient summary, see Rpt, OCT, Uti-
was then covered with a wooden plat- lization of Vessels Employed by U.S. Army in the
form so as to form a full-length berth for Supply of Theaters from United States, 16-30 Jun 44,
a Liberty ship. 74 OCT HB Water Div Vessel Utilization Rpt. Cf.
Clark, op. cit., pp. 216-18.
From, the beginning, local labor was 74
See photographs in PBS rpt cited n. 7 1, pp. 19,
employed extensively at Naples. As an in- 29-31. 75
Hist, 6th Port, HI, 9, 11, 14-1.8, OCT HB Over-
centive, native workers were served nour- sea Ports; Hist, 389th Port Bn, 1 May 43-30 Apr 44,
ishing food and received extra pay for OCT HB North Africa Misc Data—Italy.
SICILY AND ITALY
and winter weather limited operations,
the amount discharged offshore declined.
As port reconstruction progressed, the
total cargo discharge naturally increased.
By 1 November 1943, when the port
came under the complete control of the
Americans, it had twelve Liberty, four
coaster, and three ponton berths, plus
three hards for landing craft. During the
period 4 October to 31 December 1943,
the average cargo discharged per day, in-
cluding general cargo and vehicles,
amounted to 13,383.5 long tons.76
Apart from the critical need for more
tugs, barges, lighters, and other harbor
craft to facilitate offshore discharge and
the limited number of berths suitable for
direct discharge, the early operations of
the 6th Port at Naples were hampered by
insufficient labor, inadequate lifting
equipment at depots and dumps, enemy
air raids, and adverse weather. Starting
in mid-September 1943 the rainy season
brought muddy roads, and loaded trucks
sometimes bogged down. Storms, accom-
panied by high winds and rough seas, fre-
quently forced complete cessation of off-
shore discharge because of the low free-
board on loaded craft and DUKW's. In
mid-October the weather worsened. In
order to assure a supply of warm, pro-
tective clothing for troops at the front,
General Clark personally directed that
ships containing overcoats, raincoats,
boots, woolen clothing, and the like be
discharged first. Detailed data for unload-
ing these items were furnished on the
same afternoon as requested, and the nec-
essary action was promptly taken. 77
Overflow tonnage at Naples was ab-
sorbed by its satellite ports of Salerno,
Castellammare di Stabia, and Torre An-
nunziata. Like Naples, they were released
from British control and were assigned to
207
the 6th Port in November. Their peak
daily discharge of 4,930 long tons was at-
tained on 16 December 1943. Since Naples
had only limited facilities for troop de-
barkation, three small personnel ports
were opened nearby at Pozzuoli and Baia
and on the island of Nisida. Termed craft
ports because their shallow waters could
only accommodate the landing craft that
brought troops from North Africa, they
were all situated within a three-mile
radius and within easy marching distance
of the staging area at Bagnoli near
Naples.78
Thanks in no small measure to the
Corps of Engineers and the Transporta-
tion Corps, within six months devastated
Naples was transformed into the busiest
Allied port in the theater. Because of ex-
tensive damage to rail facilities, port
clearance in the early months was effected
largely by truck, but as the railways be-
came operative they carried a sizable por-
tion of the load. In the peak period, 27
February to 1 April 1944, cargo dis-
charged totaled 591,597 long tons, of
which 226,797 were cleared by rail and
299,216 by truck, leaving a backlog of
65,584 long tons. 79 The maximum daily
cargo discharge, 33,142 long tons, was at-
tained on 21 April 1944.
Among the difficulties encountered at
Naples were strong winds and high seas,
enemy air raids, the usual absence of
Italian civilians on Sundays, occasional
76
Hist, 6th Port, III, 14-15, OCT HB Oversea
Ports.
77
Hist, Trans Sec PBS, Ch. I, OCT HB North
Africa PBS.
78
Hist, 6th Port, III, 12-13, 21, OCT HB Oversea
Ports. Troops debarked at Naples and moved by train
to Bagnoli so as not to deprive the port of trucks. Hist
Rcd, Trans Sec PBS, 1 Dec 44, OCT HB North
Africa PBS.
79
Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec AAI, 27 Feb-1 Apr 44,
OCT HB North Africa AFHQ AAI Rpts.
208
shortages of railway cars and trucks, and,
in March 1944, a dramatic eruption of
ashes and cinders from Mt. Vesuvius that
interrupted rail and highway traffic. In
general, the 6th Port made an impressive
showing, though perhaps some of its
claims were extravagant.80
Naples remained an important U.S.
Army supply port throughout the Italian
campaign. Beginning in January 1944
normal port discharge operations were
frequently curtailed because of outloading
for amphibious assaults, of which the first
was for the Anzio landing. This operation
featured preloaded supply trucks, which
were delivered by LST to Anzio.
An even greater burden fell upon the
port of Naples when it helped mount the
U.S. Seventh Army for the invasion of
southern France (DRAGOON) in mid-
August 1944. A special group headquar-
ters, composed of 10th Port personnel, was
created to take charge of this undertaking.
All task force units were required to fur-
nish complete data, including size and
weight, for all equipment and vehicles.
The loading was based upon a Seventh
Army priority list. The units were assigned
to specific concentration areas, from
which they were called forward as desired
to the embarkation points in and near
Naples.81
All this activity cut sharply into the dis-
charge capacity. Port personnel were hard
pressed since requirements of the Fifth
Army were still heavy, and the Seventh
Army had taken many port and truck
units that had to be replaced by less effi-
cient Italian personnel. On 1 July 1944
the 8th Port began relieving the 6th Port,
which was slated for Marseille.82 With
simultaneous cargo discharge and out-
loading, the 8th Port faced a busy summer
at Naples.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
To avert port congestion during the
period of outloading for DRAGOON, only
essential items were discharged at Naples.
As many vessels as possible were diverted
to other Italian ports, reductions were
made in the scheduled shipping to the the-
ater from the zone of interior, and cargo
discharge at Naples and its satellite ports
was placed on a priority basis. Some port
congestion was accepted as inevitable, for
with 22 of the available 29 berths assigned
to operational loading, only 7 berths re-
mained for cargo discharge. While prais-
ing the performance of the port in loading
379 ships and craft for the assault convoy,
the U.S. Chief of Transportation, AFHQ,
admitted on 15 August 1944 that the
backlog of undischarged vessels in the the-
ater was "embarrassingly large." 83 Maxi-
mum cargo discharge was therefore abso-
lutely essential in order to release these
ships for employment elsewhere.84
At the close of October 1944 the port
situation again was nearly normal, since
phased shipments to southern France had
been completed and Leghorn opened.
Subsequent operations were under no
great pressure. When the Italian cam-
paign ended on 2 May 1945, Naples and
its satellite ports had discharged 5,711,417
80
The 382d Port Battalion reportedly discharged
6,503 long tons of ammunition from the Liberty ship
Zachary Taylor in 24 hours. By comparison with ton-
nages unloaded at other ports, this was an extremely
high figure—approximately 54 long tons per hour per
hatch. See Hist, 6th Port, IV, 17-19, OCT HB Over-
sea Ports.
81
See Hist Rcd, Trans Sec PBS, 1 Dec 44, OCT
HB North Africa PBS.
82
In ten months at Naples the 6th Port discharged
4,384,900 long tons and outloaded 967,874 long tons
of general cargo and vehicles. Hist, 6th Port, IX, 25,
OCT HB Oversea Ports.
83
Memo, CofT AFHQ for Trans Officer PBS, 15
Aug 44, Hq MTOUSA Trans Sec Naples Perform-
ance PBS 1944, KCRC AGO.
84
Ibid.; Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA,
p. 109.
SICILY AND ITALY 209

long tons of general cargo, 2,485,921 long and provision made for at least thirty-five
tons of bulk petroleum, and 675,098 long days. To allow for possible bad weather,
tons of coal.85 Other major accomplish- the schedule called for supply ships to ar-
ments included the outloading of 2,140,- rive every three days. Heavy equipment
271 long tons of cargo, the embarkation was to be forwarded by Liberty ships from
of 1,307,919 passengers, and the debarka- North African ports. To save time in load-
tion of 1,768,249 personnel. ing and unloading, resupply of ammuni-
tion, packaged gasoline, and rations was
Anzio
to be accomplished by loaded trucks de-
The Anzio assault was developed to livered by LST's from Naples. Prime
avoid a continued and painful overland Minister Churchill, Admiral Sir John
advance by staging an amphibious land- Cunningham, and Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell
ing on the west coast of Italy behind the Smith all disapproved the latter scheme,
enemy lines.86 Throughout the planning, but circumstances ultimately forced its
88
the principal restriction was the relatively adoption.
small number of operational LST's—ap- The Peninsular Base Section was to
proximately ninety—in the theater, most maintain the U.S. forces. Initial responsi-
of which were scheduled for early with- bility for supply and evacuation at the
drawal for use in the forthcoming invasion beachhead fell upon the Headquarters,
of Normandy. U.S. VI Corps. To it was attached the
The Anzio project (Operation SHINGLE) 540th Engineer Combat Regiment, which
was pushed by Prime Minister Winston with accompanying U.S. Army and Navy
Churchill. Eager to see Rome in Allied personnel constituted a beach party of ap-
89
hands, he took direct action to arrange proximately 4,200 men.
for the provision of sufficient landing
craft. Fifth Army was charged with the 83
The general cargo discharged included U.S.
preparations for launching the assault, military (2,796,185 long tons), British military (2,249,-
397 long tons), French military (39,376 long tons),
with a target date as close as possible to 20 Italian (14,082 long tons), and Allied Commission,
January 1944. The immediate objective Italy (612,377 long tons). See Logistical History of
was to seize and secure a beachhead in NATOUSA-MTOUSA,pp. 109-10.
86
On the Anzio operation, see Rpt, AFHQ Allied
the vicinity of Anzio. Ground forces for Comdr's Dispatch, 8 Jan-10 May 44, AGO Analysis
the operation were to consist of the Head- Files 99-33.4 (12280); Historical Division, Depart-
quarters, U.S. VI Corps, commanded by ment of the Army, Anzio Beachhead (22 January-25
Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, the veteran May 1944), AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION
SERIES (Washington, 1947); and Clark, op. cit., pp.
U.S. 3d Division, the British 1st Division 254-60, 283-310. See also Hist Rpt, G-4 Sec Hq Fifth
from the Eighth Army front, and other Army, Phase IV, and Fifth Army Daily Journal, Daily
supporting units.87 Rpt to Gen Tate, entries for 29 Jan-2 Jun 44, AG
Opns Rpts.
Originally conceived as a subsidiary 87
Clark, op. cit., pp. 254-60; Diary, Gen Lucas, III,
project, the Anzio assault ultimately de- 1-7, 11-15, and App. 4, OCMH Files.
88
veloped into a major operation. Since the Fifth Army History, Pt. IV, pp. 20, 23-24; Diary,
Lucas, III, 14 and App. 4; Clark op. cit., p. 303; In-
expedition would have to be supplied by terv, Sidney T. Mathews with former G-4 VI Corps,
sea for an indefinite length of time, a pre- 22 Jan 48. All in OCMH Files.
89
vious plan to land with maintenance for See Rpt, 540th Engr Combat Regt, Port and
Beach Operations at Anzio, 3 May 44, OCT HB
seven days without resupply was scrapped North Africa Italy Anzio.
210
The target area was the Anzio-Nettuno
district, about thirty miles south of Rome.
The small port of Anzio had only one
jetty, enclosed by a breakwater 600 yards
long. The harbor, which accommodated
only shallow-draft vessels, was subject to
sudden storms and heavy swells. Nettuno,
to the east of Anzio, possessed practically
no port facilities. Both towns, formerly
popular seaside resorts, were tied in by
road with the important north-south
Highway 7. The nearby beaches, although
of gentle slope, were flanked by offshore
sand bars, lay exposed to the whims of the
weather, and had awkward gradients for
the discharge of landing craft. The pro-
jected Allied beachhead, roughly an area
seven miles deep and fifteen miles wide
around Anzio, included a reclaimed por-
tion of the famous Pontine Marshes. Win-
ter weather and poor beaches made the
entire enterprise extremely hazardous,
but success of the operation really hinged
upon whether or not the Germans could
90
organize an effective resistance.
With the approach of D Day, set for 22
January 1944, Naples and its satellite
ports presented a scene of intense activity
as men and matériel were loaded. Long
lines of waterproofed vehicles rolled down
to the embarkation points, and troops filed
aboard waiting vessels. As dawn tinted the
hills above the Bay of Naples, the first
ships slipped their hawsers and the assault
convoy sailed. The landing was virtually
unopposed, for the enemy had been
caught completely off guard. By noon of
D Day, VI Corps had attained all its pre-
liminary objectives.
The port of Anzio was taken almost in-
tact. Except for minor damage along the
water front, the only obstacles were a few
small vessels scuttled in the harbor. By
early afternoon of D Day the dock area
was ready to receive landing craft, and by
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
0800 of D plus 2 all the LST's and LCT's
of the assault convoy had been completely
unloaded. A maximum of eight LST's
could be berthed at one time. Because of
shallow water all Liberty ships had to
anchor about two miles offshore, discharg-
ing their cargo mainly into LCT's and
DUKW's. The average load of each LST
(American and British types) was 151
long tons and of the DUKW, 3 long tons.
The weather during the first week was
more favorable than anticipated. High
winds and surf halted beach activity on
only two days.
After recovery from the initial shock,
the reaction of the Germans was sharp
and severe. With artillery skillfully em-
placed on high ground and, later, with the
280-mm. railway gun known as Anzio
Annie, the enemy bombarded the Anzio
beachhead day and night, inevitably caus-
ing some supply losses but never really
halting the operation. Frequent air raids,
although annoying, had no appreciable
adverse effect. Antiaircraft guns, barrage
balloons, and smoke generators afforded
some protection for the port. However,
winter storms, particularly during Febru-
ary, led to several temporary shutdowns
in beach and port activities.91
Originally, activities on the beaches
and in the harbor were carried on inde-
pendently. On 6 February 1944, in order
to obtain centralized control, the 540th
Combat Engineers, under Col. George W.
Marvin, took over all beach and port op-
erations for Fifth Army, using a detach-
ment of the 10th Port as a port headquar-
ters. At first an entire port battalion, the
488th, was sent to Anzio, where its men
90
See AFHQ, Allied Comdr's Dispatch cited n. 86;
and Anzio Beachhead, pp. 3-5, 7-8.
91
See 540th Engr Combat Regt rpt cited n. 89; and
Anzio Beachhead, pp. 8-9, 13-19, 24-26, 113.
SICILY AND ITALY
moved from ship to ship discharging
cargo. The unit had a harrowing experi-
ence because of enemy aircraft, E-boats,
and long-range artillery. Under almost
constant harassment, the 488th managed
to discharge an average of 1,498 long tons
per day in 37 working days. Nevertheless,
by 18 February 1944, fatigue, casualties,
and illness had greatly lowered the bat-
talion's efficiency. Aboard the ships the
men often had no rations. Special gear to
discharge heavy items was also lacking.
To remedy this situation sufficient port
personnel and rations, plus adequate gear
for discharge, were placed aboard each
Liberty ship or LST sailing for Anzio.
After discharge these men returned on the
same vessel to the home port, and a differ-
ent group made the next trip. The new
arrangement took effect early in March
1944. Since completing discharge meant
leaving this dangerous area, the port
troops sent to Anzio worked doubly hard.
The average Liberty ship carried about
150 enlisted men with 2 or 3 officers, and
the initial operation was around-the-clock.
As a rule each gang consisted of 17 en-
listed men, of whom 6 worked in the hold,
8 in the LCT alongside, and 3 on the
deck. Under the new system the amount
of tonnage unloaded at Anzio from 1
through 31 March (157,274 long tons)
was more than twice the amount (73,251
long tons) discharged from 6 to 29 Febru-
ary 1944. At the peak, on 29 March,
7,828 long tons were unloaded. 92
Anzio resupply at first involved mainly
landing craft, although cargo ships be-
came increasingly important in the spring
93
months. The ever-present possibility of
death or destruction placed a premium on
rapid discharge and a quick turnaround.
Beginning in late January 1944 a convoy
of six LST's was dispatched daily from
Naples. Each vessel brought fifty loaded
211
2½-ton trucks, which were backed into
the LST to permit a quick discharge at
Anzio. Each truck carried about five tons,
mostly ammunition but also rations and
such important items for defense as barbed
wire and sandbags. A Fifth Army G-4
representative at the beachhead made a
daily check of the matériel on hand and
reported the critical needs, operating
much like a grocer ordering for subsequent
delivery. After being unloaded at the An-
zio dumps, the vehicles were filled with
salvage and other items and then parked
in a concealed waiting line for the return
voyage.
Every week a fleet of fifteen LCT's
brought bulk shipments from Naples.
LCI's were employed almost exclusively
as personnel carriers. At ten-day intervals,
Liberty ships arrived with additional ma-
tériel. This unfailing seaborne supply line
and their own stout resistance enabled the
beachhead forces to hold out until the
Allied break-through in late May brought
relief. Following the occupation of Rome
on 4 June 1944, the spotlight shifted from
grim and battered Anzio to the forward
ports of Civitavecchia and Piombino.94
Civitavecchia and Piombino
Three days after securing Rome, the
Allied forces had pushed ahead some fifty
miles to capture the small city of Civita-
92
540th Engr Combat Regt rpt cited n. 89; Fifth
Army Daily Journal, Daily Rpt to Gen Tate, entries
for 29 Jan-9 Feb, 18 and 26 Feb 44, AG Opns Rpts;
Rpt, 6th Port, Anzio Port Battalions, 26 May 44,
OCT HB North Africa Italy Anzio. Also see Hist,
382d Port Bn, 16 Jun 42-May 44; Rpt of Mission to
Anzio, 677th Port Co, 27 Mar 44; and Ernie Pyle's
article in Detention Times, Vol. I, No. 25 (6 May 1945).
All in AG Opns Rpts TCBN-382-0.1 (29991).
93
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec PBS, 1 Dec 44, OCT HB
North Africa PBS.
94
Anzio Beachhead, pp. 107-12, 116-17; Interv,
Mathews with Gen Tate, 19 Jan 49, OCMH Files.
212 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

vecchia.95 There, bombing and demolition port under Fifth Army but were assisted
had played havoc with port and rail facil-by a detachment from the 8th Port, which
ities. The harbor was filled with sunken was shortly replaced by personnel from
craft and the breakwater had been dam- the 6th Port.
aged. Speedy rehabilitation was essential Port reconstruction later brought
to provide an additional port, since the berthing space for two Liberty ships and
available land transport was inadequate one coaster, but during the summer of
for the rapidly advancing Fifth Army. 1944 most cargo ships were discharged
Through the efforts of the U.S. Navy, the offshore into LCT's. A pressing problem
Corps of Engineers, and a daily labor was the lack of a rail connection with the
force of 500 to 700 Italians, salvage and main line between Rome and Leghorn,
reconstruction proceeded so rapidly that which meant that all cargo had to be
within a week cargo was being discharged cleared by truck. In spite of insufficient
from five ships, four Liberties and a craft, cargo discharge at Piombino mount-
coaster, that arrived on 13 June. A de- ed, reaching a peak of 44,009 long tons for
tachment of the 8th Port supervised the week ending 5 August, or almost four
operations.96 times the figure recorded for the same
At Civitavecchia all ships at first had to period at Civitavecchia. During the fol-
be discharged from anchorage, but four lowing months when Leghorn became
Liberty berths were eventually developed available, port activity at Piombino
for alongside use. The maximum dis- sharply declined, and on 20 September its
charge was about 6,000 long tons per day. cargo operations ceased.
As a supply port Civitavecchia had only
fleeting significance. Until late July 1944 Leghorn
as much as 27,000 long tons was dis-
charged per week, but thereafter the vol- The large commercial port of Leghorn
ume dwindled. Civitavecchia, like fell to the Allies on 19 July 1944, but ex-
Piombino, took ships diverted from tensive damage prevented its immediate
Naples when that port became congested. use. The northern and southern entrances
As activity increased at Piombino, Civita- to the harbor were blocked by sunken
vecchia declined in importance and on 12 ships, the harbor and town were heavily
September 1944 ceased to function as a mined, and enemy shelling for a time de-
military port. layed clearance. Quay walls had been
The history of Piombino as an Allied
port roughly parallels that of Civitavec- 95
The account of activities at Civitavecchia and
chia. Captured by elements of the 39th Piombino is based on the following: Hist, 8th Port,
1 May-30 Jun 44, OCT HB Oversea Ports; Hist Rcd,
Engineer Combat Regiment, the battered Trans Sec AAI Adv Ech, 28 May-1 Jul 44, 30 Jul-2
port facilities at Piombino required con- Sep 44, and 3-30 Sep 44, OCT HB North Africa; Hist
siderable rehabilitation. Discharge began Rcd, Trans Sec PBS, 1 Dec 44, OCT HB North
Africa PBS. Also see TCPI Bull 5, Items 12 and 16,
on 30 June. In the first two days of opera- 6 Sep 44, Bull 6, Items 24 and 25, 26 Sep 44, and Bull
tion, 3,437 long tons of general cargo and 10, Item 27, 13 Nov 44, OCT HB North Africa PBS.
96
93 vehicles were unloaded by landing From 1 May 1944 the 8th Port was divided into
detachments, which functioned in Corsica and at
craft, barges, and DUKW's. The 39th Anzio, Civitavecchia, and Piombino until reunited in
Combat Engineers retained control of the Naples at the close of June 1944.
SICILY AND ITALY
shattered by explosives, alongside berths
were inaccessible, and rail facilities were
inoperable. However dismal the prospect,
reconstruction had to begin immediately
because of the urgent need of another
large port fairly close to forward elements
of Fifth Army.97
With the help of the U.S. Navy and the
Corps of Engineers, mines and under-
water obstacles were removed, a channel
was blasted through the scuttled ships to
permit large vessels to enter the south har-
bor, extensions were added to the blasted
quays to facilitate cargo discharge, and,
as at Naples, the sunken vessels were
made into piers. Preliminary operations
commenced on 20 August 1944 when the
first Liberty ship, the Theodore Sedgwick,
arrived and began offshore discharge of
essential engineering and stevedoring
equipment. Bight days later two Liberty
berths were available. Cargo discharge
climbed rapidly to a peak, for the week of
24-30 September, of 45,328 long tons. At
the close of the month Leghorn boasted
eleven Liberty berths for alongside dis-
charge, six berths for lighterage, and one
berth for tankers.98
Port operations were started by an En-
gineer combat battalion assigned to the
Peninsular Base Section, and on 1 Sep-
tember 1944 the 10th Port under the
command of Col. John M. Cobb replaced
the battalion. At Leghorn the 10th Port
faced problems similar to those of the 6th
Port at Naples—widespread destruction,
inadequate service personnel, insufficient
motor transport, limited port and rail
facilities, adverse weather conditions, and
unskilled native labor. For several months
Leghorn was uncomfortably close to the
front, as evidenced by the landing of
enemy saboteurs. Fortunately, the person-
nel of the 10th Port and of the Peninsular
213
Base Section had the requisite experience
99
to cope with the situation.
Both American and British port batal-
lions were assigned to Leghorn. The for-
mer, mostly Negro units, worked on
American ships, and the latter on British
vessels. Considerable use was made of
Italian labor, both civilians and service
units. Many barges and other harbor
craft were required for offshore discharge,
and frequent breakdowns among such
vessels caused much concern until trained
personnel were obtained to make repairs.
At the outset only three cranes were in
use, one 30-ton floating crane and two
mobile shore cranes of 5-ton capacity, but
thirty additional cranes were procured be-
fore the end of the year.100
Since building damage had been exten-
sive, much of the cargo had to be stored
in the open. In the absence of rail lines,
trucks at first carried all supplies for-
warded northward from the port to the
Fifth Army. Restoration on 7 November
1944 of rail service from Leghorn to Pisa
on Line 50 lessened the load on motor
transport.101 Trucks, however, were always
the mainstay in port clearance.
By 24 November 1944, since sufficient
97
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec PBS, 1 Dec 44, OCT HB
North Africa PBS; Rpt, Port of Leghorn, Hist Rcd,
U.S. Trans Sec AAI Adv Ech, 2-29 Jul 44, OCT HB
North Africa.
98
TCPI Bull 10, Item 26, 13 Nov 44, and Bull 12,
Item 33, 7 Dec 44; Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec AAI
Adv Ech, 3-30 Sep 44, OCT HB North Africa.
99
Hist Rpt, 10th Port, Sep-Dec 44, AG Opn Rpts
TCPT-10-0.2; Logistical History of NATOUSA-
MTOUSA, p. 107.
100
TCPI Bull 10, Item 26, 13 Nov 44, Bull 11,
Item 40, 24 Nov 44, and Bull 16, Item 24, 12 Feb 45;
Hist Rpt, 10th Port, Jan 45, AG Opns TCPT-10-0.2.
101
Rpt, Transportation Corps Activities in the
Mediterranean Theater of Operations, June 1944-
May 1945, p. 5, OCT HB North Africa OCT AFHQ;
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ, MTOUSA, Oct-Dec 44, Ex-
hibit P-6, OCT HB North Africa.
214
berthing space had been developed, all
supply for Fifth Army was concentrated
at Leghorn. The port then had twelve
berths ready for Liberties and another
almost completed, one for coasters and one
for colliers, two for tankers, and several
hards for landing craft. During the period
20 August 1944 to 31 May 1945, 1,375,-
205 long tons of general cargo, 471,926
long tons of bulk petroleum, and 21,854
vehicles were unloaded at Leghorn. In the
same period the port outloaded 233,185
102
tons of general cargo.
Passenger traffic was also significant at
Leghorn. Troops were transshipped from
Naples, reinforcements arrived for Fifth
Army, and patients were evacuated. The
first personnel ship, the Colombie, docked
on 6 October 1944, bringing elements of
the 92d Division. Thereafter the port
handled both inbound and outbound pas-
sengers. In the last quarter of 1944 de-
barkations featured U.S. Army replace-
ments and elements of the Brazilian
Expeditionary Force, the latter arriving
by LCI from Naples. Embarkations con-
sisted of evacuated prisoners of war, mis-
cellaneous troops for France, rotation
personnel for the United States, and
patients leaving the theater. At the peak,
in December 1944, almost 3,000 patients
were evacuated from Leghorn aboard
seven hospital ships.103
Since the harbor was too shallow to
accept large troopships, and adverse
weather could impede the offshore dis-
charge of personnel, the Sestriere, a fast but
shallow-draft cargo vessel taken from the
Italians at Taranto, was converted by the
8th Port into a personnel carrier for shut-
tle service between Naples and Leghorn.
Fitted with standee bunks for about 1,900
passengers, the Sestriere completed her first
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
21-hour run from Naples to Leghorn on
27 December 1944. By July 1945 she had
transported 41,042 passengers.104
Embarkations at Leghorn narrowly
exceeded debarkations during the wartime
period, the former totaling 145,434, and
the latter 139,021. Beginning in February
1945, the number embarked was swollen
by the inclusion of 68,906 British and
Canadian troops redeployed through this
port to Marseille.105 When the German
armies surrendered on 2 May 1945, Leg-
horn and Naples were the principal Allied
ports in the theater.
Rail Transport
Movement by sea was the predominant
factor in U.S. Army transportation in the
Mediterranean. Yet, as in other theaters,
all practicable means of transport had to
be exploited to meet the transportation
needs. Among the available alternatives
the Italian railways naturally bulked
large, and their prompt utilization became
an important objective.
Extensive Allied bombing and wide-
spread Axis destruction had left the Italian
railways almost completely inoperable
when U.S. and British forces invaded the
peninsula. American railway operations
were initiated in the Salerno area on
23 September 1943. The Corps of Engi-
neers, assisted by Italian labor, opened the
102
Hist Rcd, Trans Sec PBS, 1 Dec 44, OCT HB
North Africa PBS; Rpt, Transportation Activities in
the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, p. 5, OCT
HB North Africa OCT AFHQ.
103
Hist Rcd, 10th Port, Oct-Dec 44, AG Opns
TCPT-10-0.2; Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec Adm Ech
AAI, 1 Oct-4 Nov 44, OCT HB North Africa.
104
See data in OCT HB Ocean Trans Vessels
Name File Sestriere.
105
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Apr-Jun 45,
Exhibit W-1, OCT HB North Africa.
SICILY AND ITALY
first steam and electric line, which ran
from Agropoli, just below Paestum, to
Battipaglia, approximately twenty-four
miles. Since the overhead wires had been
cut on the electrified portion, at first the
only source of power was one recondi-
tioned steam locomotive discovered at
Agropoli. Switching service was supplied
by four 2½-ton U.S. Army trucks that had
been specially equipped with flanged
wheels to run on rails. More than a hun-
dred boxcars and open-top cars were found
available, together with about 300 tons of
coal. During the last week of September
1943,215 carloads of ammunition, rations,
gasoline, oil, and grease were forwarded
over this line.106
According to Colonel Burpee, who
headed the advance echelon of the 703d
Railway Grand Division in this area, the
first railway line was opened to Salerno on
5 October. However, the condition of the
tracks at Salerno made it necessary to
establish a railhead at Pontecagnano, five
miles to the south, whence supplies were
forwarded by truck to the dumps at Avel-
lino. Two trains per day were operated to
the railhead. Following track and bridge
repairs north of Salerno, the line was fur-
ther extended for a total distance of about
43 miles. Railway service was handicapped
by an inadequate water supply, by the
temporary diversion of vehicular traffic to
the railway bridge across the Sele River,
and by the necessity of transporting nu-
merous homebound Italian refugees. De-
spite these difficulties, the line to Naples
was gradually made operable by Ameri-
can and British railway troops and Italian
labor.107
On 7 October 1943 General Gray,
Director General, Military Railway Serv-
ice, AFHQ, took command of all U.S. and
215
British railway troops in Italy. This action
was followed on 22 October by an AFHQ
directive assigning Gray responsibility for
the rehabilitation, technical development,
and operation of all Italian State Railways
and all privately owned railways in Italy
except those that might be returned from
time to time to civilian control. All Ameri-
can rail troops, the railway portion of the
British Transportation Service, and Italian
State Railways personnel and matériel
were placed at his disposal and were to
operate under his direction. Control of the
Italian State Railways personnel and Ital-
ian military railway units was to be
effected through General di Raimondo,
Director of the Italian State Railways
under the Italian High Command, who
would report to Gray to carry out assigned
duties.
As in North Africa, the MRS headquar-
ters at Naples was an international organ-
ization, staffed by both British and Ameri-
can personnel. Gray exercised command
of the British railway units through the
senior British transportation service officer
in Italy, Colonel Parkes, who also served
as Gray's deputy. Colonel Burpee was ap-
pointed Director, Military Railways in
Italy, and headed up the American rail
activities for Gray.108 Continuing MRS
operations in North Africa were handled
by Brigadier Gage, the British director of
transportation and deputy to the director
general, and Col. Alexander W. Campbell
106
Hist Rcd, 6th Port, Vol. III, Exhibit B-5, OCT
HB Oversea Ports.
107
Ibid., Vol. III, Exhibit B-6.
108
Slated to head MRS operations in northern
France, Burpee left for the United States in late No-
vember 1943. Thereafter, his position was abolished,
and the commander of the principal U.S. organiza-
tion in the field, the 703d Railway Grand Division, re-
ported directly to Gray.
216
(U.S.), Director, Military Railways of
North Africa.109
In Italy, U.S. and British railway units
were assigned to separate zones, as far as
practicable. In general, the British troops
were employed behind the British Eighth
Army along the eastern side of the penin-
sula, working their way northward from
the Bari area; the American units were
placed in support of the American Fifth
Army on the Mediterranean side.110 Ital-
ian troops were used in both zones to assist
in railway rehabilitation.
American railway troops began arriving
at Naples shortly after its capture. An
advance echelon of the 703d Railway
Grand Division reached that city on
3 October 1943. Three days later the
713th Railway Operating Battalion de-
barked and began the tremendous job of
restoring rail service in the Naples area by
clearing away debris and repairing the
damaged tracks, bridges, and equipment.
Its maintenance of way group, Company
A, repaired the trackage at the port and
then moved seven miles to the north, lay-
ing 8,500 feet of track in four days despite
inadequate equipment, adverse weather,
and land mines. During October and No-
vember 1943 the unit restored as much as
16,200 feet of track in a single week, and
with Company A of the 727th Railway
Operating Battalion it reconstructed a
300-foot bridge over the swift and muddy
Volturno River north of Capua.
Other units of the 713th were also busy
during these months. By 23 October Com-
pany B had placed nine locomotives in
operation and had four more under repair.
For a few days Company C had no tracks
on which to operate, but thereafter its
services were in great demand. The first
test train left Naples on 10 October. The
locomotives and railway cars taken from
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the enemy were found to be superior to
similar French equipment in North Africa.
However, operation of the engines was
111
hampered by poor coal.
By mid-October 1943 the trains leaving
Naples for the front hauled an average of
700 tons. It is difficult to reconcile the con-
flicting reports on the total number of cars
loaded and the total tonnage carried dur-
ing October in the Naples area, but in any
event the trend was definitely upward as
more operating equipment became avail-
able and more trackage was opened to
112
Allied traffic. According to the 6th Port,
the monthly carloadings at Naples in-
creased to approximately 5,500 during
November and 7,700 during December
1943. As the year drew to a close, General
Gray found the Military Railway Service
in far better shape than he had antici-
pated. A number of important facilities
such as the steam locomotive repair shop
at Naples had escaped serious damage,
and the Italian railway workers soon were
busily engaged on Allied orders.113
109
Hist Rcd, Hq MRS, Oct 43, Exhibits 10-11,
Nov 43, p. 2, and Dec 43, Exhibits 1-2, OCT HB
North Africa Hq MRS; Memo, Col D. E. Brisbine,
Chief Mil Ry Br, for CofT, 28 Oct 43, OCT HB MRS
Misc; Ltr and Comments, Gray to Ward, 18 Jul 52,
OCMH Files. Both Gage and Campbell later moved
to Italy.
110
Some British rail troops served in the Salerno
area in September and October, before being trans-
ferred to the east. For an account of British railway
activities in Italy, involving two railway operating
groups and two railway construction and mainte-
nance groups, see Micklem (ed.), Transportation, pp.
110-13, 117-22. Cf. Gray ltr and comments cited n.
109.
111
Hist Rcd, 703d Ry Grand Div, Oct 43, and Hist
Rcd, 713th Ry Operating Bn, Oct-Nov 43, OCT HB
North Africa Ry Units.
112
For conflicting figures, compare Ltr, Gen Gray
to Col Brisbine, 23 Nov 43, OCT HB North Africa
MRS Misc; and Hist, 6th Port, Vol. IV, Exhibit L,
OCT HB Oversea Ports.
113
Ltrs, Gray to Brisbine, 6 and 13 Dec 43, OCT
HB North Africa MRS Misc.
SICILY AND ITALY
During their first six months in Italy,
the MRS troops were plagued most by
damaged or demolished tracks and struc-
tures and insufficient coal for the locomo-
tives. As they pushed northward from
Naples they discovered that the retreating
Germans had been amazingly clever in
the art of demolition. Bridges were blasted,
tunnels blocked, and rails, ties, and
switches rendered useless. Among the more
ingenious devices was the so-called big
hook, which was carried on a flat car and
towed behind a train. While the hook tore
up the ties, TNT charges were dropped to
damage the rails.114 Luckily, not all the
destruction came off according to plan.
For example, only part of the eight-mile
railway tunnel north of Naples was shat-
tered, and the Americans were able rap-
idly to open the demolished portion and
to begin moving trains through the tunnel.
The brunt of railway reconstruction in the
area behind the Fifth Army was borne by
the A Companies and signal sections of
the 713th, 715th, 719th, 727th, and 759th
Railway Operating Battalions, assisted by
two battalions of Italian construction
troops.115
Even when tracks and bridges were
ready for service, there was the problem of
providing fuel to run the trains since Italy the rooter plow, was later employed by the Germans
lacked coal. In order to make the maxi- in the European Theater of Operations. HRPE (Tech
mum use of fuel oil, by late October 1943 Intel)
Misc; Hist Rcd, 703d Ry Grand Div, Dec 43, OCT
General Gray had decided to obtain as HB North Africa Ry Units.
115
many diesel engines as possible and to
convert U.S. and Italian coal-burning
locomotives into oil burners. At the close
of February 1944 a total of forty-nine U.S.
diesel engines had been placed in opera-
tion in Italy. Of the fourteen U.S. stand-
ard 2-8-0 coal-burning locomotives re-
ceived from North Africa during that
month, eleven were made into oil burners.
Sizable quantities of both coal and fuel oil
217
had to be imported to keep the trains in
operation.116
The MRS had considerable shop work
done under its direction. Two American
and three British hospital trains were con-
verted from captured equipment and used
to transport patients during the winter of
1943-44. The second American fourteen-
car hospital train, completed on 11 Febru-
ary 44, was much superior to the first,
having both electric lighting and steam
heat throughout. Other jobs performed
during 1944 included the construction of a
nine-car "delousing" train for Fifth Army
troops at the front and the manufacture of
replacement parts for baking equipment
at the Anzio beachhead.117
Highly significant in all this activity
was the success of the MRS in repairing
electric engines and restoring service on
the electrified lines that the Germans had
left in a seemingly hopeless state. The first
electric-driven military train began run-
ning in the Salerno area on 16 January
1944. Subsequently, electric trains were
operated between Naples and Bagnoli and
later between Benevento and Foggia.
Diesel-electric engines were kept rolling
by the machinists and electricians of the
114
The big hook, also known as the track ripper or
Rpt 43, 7 Aug 44, OCT HB North Africa MRS
Ltrs, Gray to Brisbine, 23 Oct, 23 Nov 43, OCT
HB North Africa MRS Misc.
116
Ltr, Gray to Brisbine, 23 Oct 43, OCT HB
North Africa MRS Misc; Hist Rcd, Hq MRS, Feb 44,
OCT HB North Africa Hq MRS; Hist Rcd, 703d Ry
Grand Div, Jan-Mar 44, OCT HB North Africa Hq
MRS.
117
Hist Rcd, 703d Ry Grand Div, Oct 43, Jan-Apr
44, OCT HB North Africa Ry Units; Hist Rcd, Hq
MRS, Jan, Feb, and Jun 44, OCT HB North Africa
Hq MRS; Hist Booklet, SOLOC, American "Rails"
in Eight Countries, the Story of the 1st Military Rail-
way Service, pp. 14-16, OCT HB.
218
760th Railway Diesel Shop Battalion,
which began functioning at Bagnoli in late
118
November 1943.
By January 1944 Allied rail traffic in
Italy had begun to boom. Lines totaling
approximately 2,400 miles were then
under MRS operational control, and be-
cause of the temporary slow down in the
Allied advance the rehabilitation and
operation of the railways had been pushed
forward almost within sight of the combat
zone.119 During the closing months of
1943 the military demands for movements
by rail were co-ordinated and the allot-
ments of rail tonnage decided by means of
weekly rail Priority of Movements meet-
ings attended by representatives of the
Peninsular Base Section, the Advance
Administrative Echelon, AFHQ, and the
Military Railway Service. These meetings
functioned on the base section level. How-
ever, when the demand for rail transport
began to exceed the available capacity,
serious backlogs developed. Therefore, in
late January 1944 the Advance Adminis-
trative Echelon, AFHQ, instituted a POM
conference to allocate tonnage movements
by rail.
At the first AFHQ POM meeting, held
on 27 January 1944, principal bidders for
rail space, both American and British,
were represented, including all the U.S.
supply services, the Army Air Forces, and
the Peninsular Base Section. Although
rail capacities would not permit accepting
all bids received, a total of 18,537 tons was
allocated for the east-west movement in
the week beginning 31 January. The
chairman at these meetings was a British
movements officer, and the deputy chair-
man was an American, Colonel Fuller.
American and British bids were submitted
separately and then consolidated. After
the allocations had been decided the final
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
arrangements for shipment were made by
the appropriate U.S. and British agencies,
respectively, for their accepted bids.120
Since the POM conference concerned only
rail traffic for the Allied armies, other
arrangements had to be made for nonmili-
121
tary passengers and freight.
While the MRS struggled to restore rail
service and to satisfy both military and
civilian demands, its operations were by
no means trouble-free. The thick blanket
of volcanic ash and cinders left by the vio-
lent eruption of Mt. Vesuvius in March
1944 halted railway traffic for nearly two
days. Also, enemy aircraft continued to
strafe trains and to bomb railway facilities,
striking in the Naples area as late as April
1944, but doing relatively little damage.
As in North Africa, trains carried antiair-
craft guns and gunners.122
With respect to pilferage, Gray drew
upon his previous experience. To protect
railway shipments in Italy he obtained the
794th Military Police Battalion from
North Africa. In January 1944, in order
to counter stepped-up pilferage, detach-
ments of the 794th were stationed at Torre
Annunziata, Salerno, Potenza, and Batti-
paglia, to guard equipment and supplies
both while awaiting shipment and in
118
Hist Rcd, 703d Ry Grand Div, Jan and Mar 44,
OCT HB North Africa Ry Units; Hist Rcd, 760th Ry
Diesel Shop Bn, 2 Apr 44, OCT HB North Africa
760th Ry Diesel Shop Bn.
119
Ltr, Gray to Brisbine, 17 Jan 44, OCT HB
North Africa MRS Misc.
120
The rail POM conference met throughout 1944.
See Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec AFHQ AAE (AAI),
Jan-Dec 44, OCT HB North Africa.
121
A basic schedule of trains for essential civilian
requirements was established on 11 December 1943.
Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec AFHQ AAE, 12-18 Dec 43
and 2-8 Jan 44, OCT HB North Africa; OCT HB
Monograph 17, pp. 156-66.
122
Ltrs, Gray to Brisbine, 23 Mar and 23 Apr 44,
OCT HB North Africa MRS Misc; Hist Rcd, Hq
MRS, Apr 44, OCT HB North Africa Hq MRS.
SICILY AND ITALY 219

transit. Throughout the Italian campaign service had been restored to the newly
the MRS employed military police to pro- acquired port of Civitavecchia, and two
tect rail shipments by riding the trains and days later the first train ran from Anzio to
123
guarding the freight yards. Rome. During the same month an ad-
On 30 April 1944 the MRS, undervance echelon, commanded by Col. James
General Gray, had the following U.S. K. Tully, set up the MRS headquarters in
Army military railway units stationed in Rome. British railway troops had com-
Italy: two railway grand divisions, four pleted the reconstruction of Line 90 from
railway operating battalions and Com- Cassino to Rome by 2 July. The formal
pany A of another; one railway shop bat- entry came on Independence Day, when
talion; a detachment of one railway diesel the Secretary of War and his official party
shop battalion; one provisional base depot were brought into Rome aboard a special
127
company; and a military police battalion train.
and a separate military police company. During July and August outloading for
On the same date the strength of all U.S. the invasion of southern France placed a
units assigned to MRS in the theater, in- heavy burden upon the railways in the
cluding several still on service in North Naples area. Among the first MRS units
Africa, totaled 7,418 officers and enlisted transferred to southern France were the
men.124 During this period rail activity 703d Railway Grand Division and the
continued at a high level, especially in the 713th Railway Operating Battalion. On
Naples and Bari areas. At the close of 15 September 1944 General Gray officially
April 1944 the MRS had 504 locomotives, opened a new MRS headquarters at Lyon,
of which 296 were available and 208 were France. Temporarily, the MRS in Rome
under repair. Railway cars in service was represented by a rear echelon under
numbered 18,961.125 Colonel Campbell and the 704th Railway
In May 1944 a new Allied push north- Grand Division. However, since both
ward brought additional responsibilities Campbell's group and the 704th were
for Gray's men. On occasion, the Military slated for service in France, a new railway
Railway Service engaged in activity nor- grand division, the 774th, was activated
mally pertaining to the Corps of Engi-
neers. An outstanding example was the 123
Hist Rcd, Hq MRS, Jan 44, OCT HB North
reconstruction by military railway troops Africa Hq MRS.
124
of a 237-foot bridge over the Garigliano This figure does not include the British and
Italian military railway personnel and the many
River at Minturno, at that time reportedly civilian railway workers under General Gray's con-
the largest single span replaced in the the- trol or supervision.
125
ater. Rebuilt with captured German Hist Rcd, Hq MRS, Apr 44, OCT HB North
Africa Hq MRS.
bridging material, the new structure was 126
Hist Rcd, 703d Ry Grand Div, May 44, OCT
opened to traffic early in June. 126 HB North Africa Ry Units; Hist Rcd, Hq MRS, Jul
Following its capture, Rome quickly 44, Exhibit 15, OCT HB North Africa Hq MRS. Cf.
Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., "Rebuild Blasted Bridges
developed into the main center for the in Italy," Railway Age, CXVII, 25 (December 16,
MRS in Italy. Meanwhile, railway lines to 1944), 920, 928-29.
127
and from the Eternal City were being re- Hist, 715th Ry Operating Bn, Jun-Jul 44, OCT
HB North Africa Ry Units; Hist Rcd, Hq MRS, Jun-
constructed much more rapidly than orig- Jul 44, OCT HB North Africa Hq MRS. The first
inally contemplated. By 27 June 1944 rail trains were operated by military personnel.
220
and placed under the command of Lt. Col.
William P. Wilson with headquarters at
Rome. In late October 1944 Brigadier
R. D. Waghorn, the theater British trans-
portation service chief, was appointed
director of the Allied MRS in Italy, and
128
Wilson became his deputy.
Amid these changes, military railway
operations centered increasingly in the
Leghorn-Pisa-Florence area of northern
Italy. The coastal lines from Rome to Leg-
horn became available on 22 September
1944. Early in November Line 50 was
opened from Leghorn to Pisa, after con-
siderable track repair and the replacement
of five bridges by the maintenance of way
companies of the 715th and 719th Rail-
way Operating Battalions. Subsequently,
reconstruction was begun on the two rail
lines from Pisa to Florence. The most stra-
tegically located of the two, Line 218,
passed through the Serravalle Tunnel via
Pistoia and Prato to Florence. However,
because the demolition of the tunnel was
unexpectedly thorough, repairs were
rushed on the alternative route to Flor-
ence, Line 219, which ran approximately
fifty miles along the valley of the Arno
River.129
Originally double-tracked and electri-
fied, Line 219 had been one of Italy's high-
speed lines. Because of German demoli-
tion and Allied bombing, rail service had
been completely halted. Track, yards, sig-
nal communications, and rolling stock had
been heavily damaged, and most bridges,
culverts, and arches had been completely
destroyed. Rehabilitation of the major
portion of the line began ahead of the tar-
get date of 30 April.130 The job was done
by Italian railway troops, the maintenance
of way companies of the 715th and 719th
Railway Operating Battalions, and several
engineer construction companies. The
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
project involved 44 miles of main line
track, 1,776 lineal feet of bridging, 5,173
lineal feet of fill, 2,425 lineal feet of pipe
culvert, and 23 miles of yard, sidings, and
spur track at 17 locations.
As the war in Italy drew to a close, the
major emphasis of MRS activity was
placed upon the reconstruction and resto-
ration to service of the lines in the north,
which were vital to Fifth Army. To the
south as the wartime urgency lessened,
portions of the rail network were progres-
sively released to the Italian State Rail-
ways. Military traffic continued heavy in
1945. In April 377 military freight trains
delivered 151,827 net tons from Leghorn
to Pisa.
There was also considerable troop travel
during the first five months of 1945, espe-
cially on the leave trains, which in March
carried a record total of 88,683 passengers.
Coupled with the movement of repatriates
and prisoners of war, all this activity
brought a constantly increasing demand
for rail equipment, which was met only by
tapping all available sources in the United
States, Sicily, and North Africa and by
instituting a vigorous program of repair
and recovery of rolling stock on the Italian
mainland.
On 30 April 1945 the American con-
tingent of the MRS in Italy comprised 190
officers, 5 warrant officers, and 3,685 en-
listed men. The units involved were the
128
Hist Rcd Hq MRS, Aug 44, OCT HB North
Africa Hq MRS; Hist Rcd, 774th Ry Grand Div, 2
Sep-7 Oct, 22 Oct-30 Nov 44, OCT HB North
Africa Ry Units.
129
Hist Rcd, 774th Ry Grand Div, 20 Oct-30 Nov
44, OCT HB North Africa Ry Units.
130
part of the line, about six miles from Pisa, had
already been opened to serve forward ammunition de-
pots. See Pamphlet, 774th Ry Grand Div, Reconstruc-
tion of Line 219 Florence to Pisa, Italy, 4 Apr 45,
OCT HB North Africa Ry Units.
SICILY AND ITALY 221

774th Railway Grand Division, with vious experience in the rugged terrain of
headquarters at Rome; the 701st Railway North Africa and Sicily.
Grand Division, with headquarters at Both the Peninsular Base Section and
Florence; two railway operating battal- the Fifth Army had sizable aggregations
ions, the 715th at Florence and the 719th of trucks, the former for service operations
at Leghorn; the 753d Railway Shop Bat- and the latter for combat missions. The
talion at Naples; the 760th Railway Diesel main burden fell upon the highway officer
Shop Battalion at Rome; and six military of the Peninsular Base Section, Lt. Col.
police companies, stationed at various Chester R. Weaver, and upon the Trans-
points from Naples to Grosseto, with head- portation Officer, G-4, Fifth Army, Major
quarters at Rome. Almost as numerous as Kreml. Weaver and Kreml were experi-
the Americans were the attached Italian enced highway officers who had learned
railway engineer units, totaling 131 offi- their jobs the hard way—in North
cers and 3,287 enlisted men. When hostili- Africa.132
ties ended, practically all lines on the It was fortunate that Col. (later Brig.
mainland were being operated by the Gen.) Ralph H. Tate, who became G-4 of
Italian State Railways.131 Fifth Army in August 1943, was firmly
convinced of the need of a separate trans-
Truck and Highway Operations portation section to function under his
direction. Despite the unwillingness of the
Despite the impressive contribution of Fifth Army quartermaster to relinquish
the Military Railway Service, motor trans- the transportation function, Tate suc-
port was in constant demand throughout ceeded in setting up a new special staff
the Italian campaign. Since rail facilities Transportation Section, which was headed
were badly damaged, trucks initially had by Major Kreml. Tate considered this
to be relied upon to clear the beaches and action the most important single step he
ports and to provide inland transporta- took as G-4, Fifth Army, for it meant that
tion. As the railways were restored to serv- all Fifth Army truck units were put in a
ice they assumed an increasing share of pool under the centralized control of the
the load, but motor transport remained Army G-4 and were not, as before, under
important in port clearance, base and the control of the Fifth Army quartermas-
depot hauling, and deliveries forward from ter, who was himself a user of transporta-
133
the railheads. Providing close and flexible tion.
support to the combat forces, trucks were Motor transport activity in Italy began
less susceptible to enemy attack than the at the Salerno beachhead. With the as-
fixed rail lines, and they could easily be sault force came the 1st Battalion of the
diverted to meet new or emergency de-
mands. Generally speaking, there were
131
never enough trucks to fill current needs. Hist Rcd, 774th Ry Grand Div, Apr and May
45, OCT HB North Africa Ry Units.
In Italy, which lacked the modern high- 132
See copy of Kreml's talk at the Transportation
way network of the United States, the war School, Ft. Eustis, 29 October 1948, pages 8-14 (OCT
brought many problems in motor trans- HB North Africa Hwy Rpts), for a helpful summary
portation. However, the U.S. Army was of highway 133
operations in Italy.
Interv, Mathews and Tate, 19 Jan 49, OCMH
better prepared for its task because of pre- Files.
222
468th Quartermaster Truck Regiment and
a platoon of the 22d Quartermaster Car
Company. Other trucking units soon fol-
lowed.134 Early operations at Salerno were
confined to moving supplies from the
beaches to nearby dumps. At first, both
trucks and drivers were far too few to keep
the beaches cleared. As the invaders
pushed inland, trucks carried the bulk of
the supplies, although the opening of rail
service in late September lightened the
load on Highway 18.135 Thereafter, avail-
able rail and highway facilities generally
provided a combination lift, with rail
transport being employed as much as and
as far forward as possible before turning
to trucks.136
Within two weeks after the initial
assault, traffic control had to be inaugu-
rated on Highway 18, the main overland
supply route. By late September 1943
bumper-to-bumper traffic was common, a
condition that could have led to disaster
had there not been Allied air superiority.
To relieve highway congestion, a central-
ized motor pool was established for all
beaches, traffic control posts were set up,
and traffic dispersal areas were selected
near the highway into which vehicles were
diverted until the jams were broken.
Blown bridges, difficult bypasses, and the
narrow streets of the towns and villages,
combined with the constant flow of Italian
civilians, gravely complicated the task of
the military police in directing highway
traffic. 137
Following the capture of Naples the
principal trucking operations concerned
port clearance and the delivery of cargo to
the depots and dumps and from the rail-
heads to Fifth Army. Because of severe
damage, the trains lagged behind the
trucks in accomplishing port clearance.
During the week 13-20 November 1943,
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
an average of 3,000 tons was cleared daily
by rail, compared with the 3,447 tons per
day removed by truck. At this time, be-
cause of excessive rain and mud both the
Peninsular Base Section and the Fifth
Army had many inoperative vehicles, the
daily average of the former being 938
operative as against 235 inoperative vehi-
cles, and of the latter 397 operative as
against 166 inoperative vehicles. Through-
out the remainder of 1943 the tonnage
moved by truck from the docks and the
depots steadily increased. In December
alone almost 200,000 tons were delivered
by truck from Naples to Peninsular Base
Section dumps.138
Despite inclement weather, rugged ter-
rain, shortages of spare parts, tires, and
batteries, and almost constant operation—
all contributing to a high percentage of
deadlined vehicles—highway traffic con-
tinued heavy as Fifth Army sought to
break through the Winter Line.139 Behind
the combat zone, the Corps of Engineers
repaired and maintained roads while the
Transportation Corps labored to keep
traffic fluid. Toward the close of 1943 in-
creasingly heavy highway movements
134
For the complete list through D plus 49, see Hist
Rcd, SOS NATOUSA, 1-30 Sep 43, Incl 6, OCT HB
North Africa.
135
Skirting the invasion beaches, Highway 18, a
macadam road, ran along the west coast from the toe
of the Italian boot to Naples.
136
See Kreml's remarks in Trans School, Ft. Eustis,
Highway Unit Training Pamphlet 9, pp. 96-98, OCT
HB North Africa Hwy Rpts.
137
Observers Notes on Italian Campaign, 25 Aug-
7 Oct 43, OCT 370.2 Italy Campaign Rpts; Conf with
Maj Kreml, TC School, New Orleans, 21-26 Feb 44,
OCT HB North Africa Hwys.
138
Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec AFHQ AAE, 13 Nov
43-1 Jan 44, OCT HB North Africa.
139
See Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War De-
partment, Fifth Army at the Winter Line (15 November
1943-15 January 1944), AMERICAN FORCES IN
ACTION SERIES (Washington, 1945).
SICILY AND ITALY
pointed up the need of closer supervi-
sion. 140 After preliminary discussion, the
Advance Administrative Echelon, AFHQ,
on 24 December 1943, published a basic
policy for traffic control in the areas be-
hind the armies. In order to eliminate un-
authorized travel, traffic police were em-
powered to remove from the road any
convoy or casual vehicle not in possession
of a road movement order or dispatch slip
from the American or British agency
authorizing the movement. Detailed regu-
lations were issued for convoy travel, and
a convoy commander was made respon-
sible for control and operation of each
convoy.141
Highway traffic continued to increase
in early 1944. During January the Penin-
sular Base Section reported a total of 904
motor convoys, composed of 40,686 vehi-
cles carrying 7,717 tons of freight and 84,-
623 passengers.142 Apart from the usual
hauling from beach to dump, large num-
bers of loaded trucks were delivered by
LST for the resupply of the Anzio forces.
For this last mission a reserve of approxi-
mately 1,500 2½-ton trucks was estab-
lished under a single command, the 6723d
Truck Group (Provisional). 143
At Anzio the first increment of 500
waterproofed trucks, each carrying five
tons, arrived aboard 14 LST's in the as-
sault convoy. Each LST had been "spread
loaded" in Naples with Class I, III, and
V supplies, rather than with one class
alone, so that loss of the entire cargo
would not seriously reduce any particular
supply category. After completing deliv-
ery to the dumps, the trucks were driven
to an assembly area for eventual return by
sea. The second and third increments
were loaded in the same manner and like
number as the first, 35 trucks per LST.
Each truck had only one class of supply,
223
so that it stopped at only one dump in
Naples and one dump in Anzio.
Beginning on 28 January 1944, a pro-
gram was initiated for the daily dispatch
of 300 trucks by LST from Naples to
Anzio. This arrangement was designed to
furnish a daily lift of 1,500 tons, of which
60 percent was allotted to ammunition, 20
percent to rations, and 20 percent to pe-
troleum products. Adverse weather con-
ditions and the diversion of LST's to other
missions prevented attainment of this goal,
but the deficit was not serious.
Within a week after the initial landing,
four LST's were able to discharge simul-
taneously at the Anzio docks, and trucks
no longer needed to be waterproofed.
Also, the U.S. Navy allowed each LST to
carry 50 rather than 35 trucks. As ulti-
mately developed, the cycle began with
loading at Naples, sailing at 1700, and
arrival at Anzio at 0600 in the following
morning. After completion of discharge,
trucks awaiting return were driven
aboard head on to save time in departing
from this hazardous area. The LST's then
assembled in the harbor and proceeded
back to Naples.
Direct delivery of loaded trucks from
docks to dumps was of immense advan-
tage at Anzio, enabling the combat troops
to obtain their immediate needs on short
140
In December 1943, a spot 24-hour check in the
Fifth Army area revealed 7,108 casual vehicles on the
road. In the same month the Peninsular Base Section
reported 636 motor convoys. Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec
AFHQ, AAE, 19-25 Dec 43 and 26 Dec 43-1 Jan 44,
OCT HB North Africa.
141
See copy with Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec AFHQ.
AAE, 26 Dec 43-1 Jan 44, OCT HB North Africa.
142
Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec AFHQ AAE, 23-29
Jan 44, OCT HB North Africa.
143
See Fifth Army History (hereafter cited as Fifth
Army Hist), Pt. IV, G-4 History, pp. 2-3, 5-6, 9, 14,
and Incls 10 and 11, AG Opns Rpts. The following
account is based on this history.
224
notice. This truck-and-LST shuttle sys-
tem was a vital factor in supporting the
beachhead defenders until the break-
through of late May, which relieved the
enemy pressure. On 1 June 1944 the first
overland motor convoy arrived at Anzio
via historic Highway 7, bringing 150
truckloads of ammunition.
For the advance to Rome, considerable
reliance was placed upon Highways 6 and
7 running northward from Naples, of
which the former became the main supply
route for the British Eighth Army while
the latter performed a similar function for
the U.S. Fifth Army. 144 Fortunately, the
acquisition of additional ports and rail
facilities to the north of Rome shortened
the highway hauls and made possible the
movement of larger tonnages by motor
transport, since the trucks could operate
directly from the forward ports rather
than all the way from Naples. Through-
out the summer of 1944 highway traffic in
Italy remained heavy.
In September 1944 the loss of several
truck units to the U.S. Fifth and Seventh
Armies forced the Peninsular Base Section
to operate its trucks on a twenty-four-hour
basis and to employ a civilian motor pool
for the Naples area in order to meet all
demands. The onset of the rainy season
brought several washouts, which dam-
aged roads and bridges and led to tem-
porary suspension or rerouting of highway
traffic. Gold weather also pointed up the
need for determining which highways
would be safe during the winter months,
especially in the mountains of northern
Italy.145
During the ensuing autumn, apart from
occasional personnel shortages, the bur-
den of maintenance, a scarcity of spare
parts, the elements, and the enemy effec-
tively hindered highway operations. Con-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
tinual rains flooded the roads. Adverse
weather and German demolition impeded
the restoration of rail service and in-
creased the load on motor transport. Early
in November 1944 abnormal rainfall
caused several breaks in the track on Line
50 near Grosseto. While repairs were
being made, a temporary truck line was
established that moved approximately 400
net tons per day from the railhead at
Alberese to the railway cars at Grosseto.
Restoration of normal rail traffic on 25
November released the drivers and the
thirty-six trucks of the 3826th Quarter-
master Truck Battalion engaged in this
shuttle service. Similar truck ferries were
often improvised during the Italian cam-
paign in order to keep supplies rolling
forward.146
Highway traffic was kept fluid by close
control and supervision. As a rule, mili-
tary police actually directed traffic, the
Transportation Corps attended to routing
and movement control, and the Corps of
Engineers repaired and maintained the
roads. Military police had both fixed posts
and motorized patrols. Traffic Control
Posts (TCP's) were usually located at im-
portant road junctions and were intended
to control and expedite traffic. Each
Traffic Control Post maintained a heavy
wrecker to remove disabled trucks and
had a convoy park adjacent that would
hold at least fifty vehicles. With the ap-
proach of winter, snow and ice threatened
to cut off the highways in the mountain-
ous area beyond Florence. The Fifth
144
145
Fifth Army Hist, Pt. V, pp. 4, 5, and 6.
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, Jul-Sep 44,
pp. 26-27, OCT HB North Africa.
146
Hist Rcd, U.S. Trans Sec AAI, 1 Oct-4 Nov 44,
OCT HB North Africa; Hist Rcd, 719th Ry Operat-
ing Bn, Nov 44, OCT HB North Africa Ry Units;
Trans News Ltr, MTOUSA, 10 Nov 44, OCT HB
North Africa.
SICILY AND ITALY
Army engineer therefore set up a tem-
porary system of "snow posts," whose per-
sonnel were responsible for snow removal,
first aid and medical service, assistance to
drivers of damaged or stalled vehicles,
road information, and emergency food,
fuel, and shelter.147
Toward the close of 1944 motor trans-
port in the Peninsular Base Section and
the Fifth Army areas was under severe
strain because of lengthening lines of com-
munication, inadequate equipment, and
insufficient personnel. The theater des-
perately needed newer and larger motor-
ized equipment to replace its old, war-
weary vehicles. Specifically, the chief of
transportation had recommended pro-
curement of cargo vehicles of greater
capacity than the standard 2½-ton truck.
He also wanted to increase the lift capac-
ity of the truck companies by means of
truck-tractors, semitrailers, and heavy-
duty trucks capable of carrying 8 to 10
tons. To meet his needs the theater requi-
sitioned 576 truck-tractors and 720 semi-
trailers, of which the first increment, 289
truck-tractors and 240 semitrailers, ar-
rived in December 1944. At the end of
March 1945 the Peninsular Base Section
had 587 6-ton to 10-ton truck-tractors and
semitrailers, 23 4-ton 6x6 trucks, 3,349
2½-ton 6x6 trucks, 381 1½-ton 4x4 trucks,
1,626 1-ton two-wheel trailers, and 116
miscellaneous types of cargo vehicles.
Meanwhile, Fifth Army had built up its
stock of motorized equipment by a vigor-
ous program of rehabilitation and re-
148
placement.
Actual operation in the theater dis-
closed various drawbacks of the trucks in
use. Although the tractor-trailer combi-
nation gave greater capacity, its utility
was much restricted by rain, mud, ice,
snow, and rugged terrain. The 1-ton two-
225
wheel trailer was found almost useless on
the mountainous roads and in the mud-
filled dumps of Italy. The standard 2½-
ton cargo truck, which carried a maxi-
mum of 4 to 5 tons, was considered the
most efficient general-purpose vehicle. Its
body, however, would not hold long pieces
of pipe or lumber. The theater needed a
new single-unit 8x8 truck in order to in-
sure better performance on rough and
winding roads. The desired vehicle was to
have a capacity of 8 to 10 tons, an 18-foot
to 20-foot stake body, and a minimum of
600 cubic feet of cargo space. The cab-
over-engine type was preferred because of
the greater visibility afforded the driver.
During the war this proposal never got
beyond the paper stage.149
Apart from proper maintenance above
the second echelon and an adequate sup-
ply of spare parts and tires, both problems
of the Ordnance Department, the Trans-
portation Corps had difficulty in obtain-
ing sufficient troops for the trucks under
its supervision or control. The Table of
Organization of the truck company did
not, for instance, include the guards re-
quired to curb pilferage. Experience in
the North African campaign also demon-
strated that at least twenty-four extra
drivers had to be added to the standard
truck company to permit continuous op-
eration. Such augmentation teams finally
were authorized for the theater in 1944.
By January 1945 Fifth Army had
twenty-seven augmented truck companies
and the Peninsular Base Section twenty-
147
Fifth Army Hist, Pt. VIII, 21-22, 26-27; Engi-
neer History, Fifth Army, MTO, II, 162, AG Opns
Rpts.
148
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ, MTOUSA, Jan-Mar
45, Exhibits L-1 and O-1-12, OCT HB North Africa;
Fifth Army Hist, Pt. VIII, pp. 29-30.
149
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp.
169-71.
226
two, of which the latter were all Negro
units. In addition to the civilian truck
pool at Naples, the theater made exten-
sive use of Italian service units. Originally,
there were thirty Italian military truck
companies, but this number was reduced
by the necessity for screening out the un-
satisfactory personnel, who were later
pooled in seven companies and employed
chiefly as labor. For various reasons, in-
cluding the fact that they were equipped
largely with 1½-ton trucks, the Italian
trucking units had less lift capacity than
similar U.S. Army units. As established by
a personnel utilization survey in April
1945 of all trucking units attached to the
Peninsular Base Section Transportation
Section, the performance standard for the
augmented Quartermaster truck com-
pany manned by U.S. military personnel
was set at 680 truck-hours per day under
continuous operation, as compared with
520 truck-hours per day for the Italian
military truck company.150
When hostilities ceased, highway oper-
ations had reached a peak. In the week
ending 5 May 1945 the Peninsular Base
Section and Fifth Army reported the fol-
lowing results in ton-miles for the two
principal categories of cargo vehicles:151
Peninsular
Type
Truck-tractors and semitrailers..
2½-ton 6x6 t r u c k s . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The extent of trucking operations in Italy
in the closing phase of the campaign is re-
flected in the statistics covering port clear-
ance by truck from Leghorn. From its
opening in late August 1944 through May
1945, a total of 1,382,872 long tons of
cargo was cleared from Leghorn. Of that
amount 1,202,934 long tons were moved
by truck. During the same period, 1,924,-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
038 long tons were cleared by truck from
Naples, as compared with 1,471,501
cleared by rail.152
Many valuable lessons in highway
transportation were learned in the Italian
campaign, particularly by Fifth Army,
which depended mainly upon motor
transport. 153 As the result of its wartime
experience, the Fifth Army Transporta-
tion Section laid great stress upon a sys-
tem of strict control for all highway move-
ments, military and civilian; the augmen-
tation of truck companies to provide extra
drivers and other auxiliary personnel for
around-the-clock operations; the procure-
ment of additional heavy-duty equipment
such as the 20-ton truck-trailer unit; an
adequate communications network; and
good marking of the roads.
Other Transport
Although it was dependent upon ships,
trains, and trucks to move the bulk of its
traffic, the Transportation Corps was in-
terested in all other types of transport that
could help lighten its load. In Italy, for in-
stance, the pipelines for the delivery of
gasoline were not a Transportation Corps
responsibility, but their use lessened the
Base
Section
Fifth
Army
strain on the limited motor and rail facil-
237, 473 170, 309
150
286, 571 293, 758 Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ, MTOUSA, Jan-Mar
45, p. 4 and Exhibits O-4 and O-9, OCT HB North
Africa; Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp.
165-69, 171-72.
151
The Peninsular Base Section was then using 266
tractor-trailers (6 to 20 tons) and 1,920 2½-ton trucks;
comparable figures for Fifth Army were 167 tractor-
trailers (10-ton) and 760 2½-ton trucks. Hist Rcd,
OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Apr-Jun 45, Exhibits T-1
and T-2, OCT HB North Africa.
152
See rpt cited n. 101.
153
See Trans Sec Fifth Army, Lessons Learned in
the Italian Campaign, summarized in OCT HB
Monograph 17, pp. 253-56.
SICILY AND ITALY 227

ities.154 Movement of the vast quantities of function with respect to air transport. The
100-octane gasoline required for airplanes Air Facilities Board, AFHQ, established
and 80-octane gasoline for tanks and vehi- the priorities. All demands from the
cles was possible only because of pipelines, ground forces for air space for personnel
since neither tank cars nor tank trucks and freight were first screened by the Air
were available in sufficient numbers. 155 Branch of the AFHQ Movements and
Transportation Section, of which the
Pipelines
American staff became in effect the Air
Pipeline deliveries were made from branch of the office of the U.S. theater
Taranto, Bari, and Manfredonia to Allied chief of transportation. 158
airfields in the Foggia area, and from Air transport was employed mainly to
Naples northward in support of the Fifth move personnel, mail, and critical items
Army ground troops advancing up the such as serums, spare parts, mortars, mor-
west coast. Both 4-inch and 6-inch pipes tar ammunition, and signal equipment.
were laid, the former handling approxi- During the early months of the Italian
mately 4,000 barrels of gasoline per day campaign air cargo for Italy proper ran
and the latter triple that amount. By 22 fairly heavy. Most air freight originated
December 1943 gasoline was being within the theater, but some shipments
pumped over two pipelines from Naples came directly from the United States. In
to Calvi Risorta, twenty-five miles beyond. December 1943 a total of 160,188 pounds
The daily capacity of 260,00 gallons filled of SOS freight arrived at airfields on the
the requirements of Fifth Army. During Italian mainland, principally in the
January 1944 the utilization of this double Naples area. Air freight remained impor-
pipeline saved an average of 50 railway tant throughout the campaign, although
cars daily, or from 250 to 300 trucks. Sub- the actual tonnages hauled were not
sequent extensions of the system resulted impressive.159
in similar saving in transportation. 156 Because the constantly increasing de-
Although subject both to pilferage and mand threatened to overtax the existing
sabotage, the pipeline presented such a facilities, on 10 December 1943 AFHQ
small target as to be well-nigh immune to
enemy air attack and artillery fire. Unlike 154
Overseas, the Corps of Engineers was responsi-
the average road, the pipeline was un- ble for the procurement, maintenance, and operation
affected by the weather, and it could be of pipelines.
155
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp.
used constantly and without fear of con- 172-76. Cf. Interv, Mathews and Tate, 19 Jan 49,
gestion. It is therefore no wonder that the OCMH Files.
156
pipelines were pushed steadily northward 1st Ind, Exec Officer OCT AFHQ to OCT ASF,
Washington, 29 May 44, OCT HB North Africa
from Naples to the Po Valley and to all Pipelines.
points where gasoline had to be furnished 157
Fifth Army Hist, Pts. II, 68, III, 70, V, 5, VI,
in appreciable amounts for any length of 115-16, and IX, 30; Logistical History of NATOUSA-
MTOUSA,pp. 194-203.
time.157 158
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, activation
to 31 Oct 43, Sec. III (4) and Tab AE, OCT HB
Air Transport North Africa.
159
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp.
The theater chief of transportation and 176; Hist Rcd, Trans Sec SOS, NATOUSA, Dec 43,
his staff performed largely a co-ordinating OCT HB North Africa.
228
directed that passenger traffic by air be
reduced at once and that transportation
by air be authorized only on the basis of
importance to the war effort. Thereafter,
the number of personnel moved by air
was reduced appreciably by closer screen-
ing of travel requests and by employing
surface transportation except for the most
urgent missions. In May 1944 the Air
Branch, OCT AFHQ, was also made re-
sponsible for receiving and processing all
ground forces requests for air travel orders
and collecting and distributing air tickets.
Effective 14 June 1944, a separate aircraft
pool (three Hudsons and one Dakota) was
formed for VIP's in order to enable gen-
eral officers and important officials to
travel with their own parties on special
missions.160
The removal in July 1944 of AFHQ
and the Headquarters, SOS, NATOUSA,
from Algiers to Caserta eliminated much
of the previous shuttling back and forth
between North Africa and Italy. How-
ever, at the same time air evacuation of
patients to the zone of interior was begun
on a large scale. The primary purpose was
to relieve congestion in the theater hospi-
tals, since evacuation by water was not
sufficiently effective. In July 900 patients
were evacuated by air from the Mediter-
ranean and Peninsular Base Sections.
The invasion of southern France
brought a decided spurt in air travel, with
daily flights scheduled to Marseille and
Dijon by the Mediterranean and Euro-
pean theaters. From 6 December 1944 on,
the integrated American-British Air
Group under the Movements and Trans-
portation Section, AFHQ was made re-
sponsible for all matters pertaining to
demands of the ground forces for air
movement, including policy, planning,
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
and operations. Air traffic continued im-
portant throughout the remainder of the
Italian campaign, especially for evacu-
ation of sick and wounded personnel to
161
the zone of interior.
Animal Transport
In sharp contrast to the speed of aircraft
was the slow steady pace of the pack horse
and the mule. Yet the latter could deliver
a load in rugged tracts of land where
neither jeep, truck, nor plane—except for
airdrop—normally could be counted
upon for supply. In the mountains of
Italy, the highly mechanized U.S. Army
was forced to fall back upon primitive, but
nonetheless effective, animal transport.
When the Italian campaign began, Fifth
Army had only the one pack train that
the 3d Division had used in Sicily. Its per-
formance had impressed General Clark.
Looking at the map of Italy in late Sep-
tember 1943, he foresaw the need of more
of this type of transportation for the long
trek northward. At his request a study was
made that showed that 1,300 mules were
needed for the Fifth Army. However, few
animals could be had and equipment and
forage were scarce both in Italy and North
Africa. 162
As Fifth Army advanced beyond
Naples, pack trains had to be employed to
insure the supply of units operating in the
high mountains. Accordingly, the G-4,
Fifth Army, requisitioned several hundred
160
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, Oct-Dec
43. Jan-Mar 44, p. 6 with atchd air rpt, and Apr-Jun
44. p. 6, and Exhibits J and K, OCT HB North Africa.
161
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, Jul-Sep
44, p. 5, Oct-Dec 44, pp. 3-4, 10, 15-16, and Exhibits
D-5, D-6, D-8, D-9, D-11, E-7, and H-2, Jan-Mar 45,
pp. 2, 7-8, 13-14 and Exhibit D-9, Apr-Jan 45, pp.
2-3, OCT HB North Africa.
162
Fifth Army Hist, Pt. II, pp. 67-68. Cf. Diary,
Gen Lucas, II, 25-26, OCMH Files.
SICILY AND ITALY 229

mules to equip hastily organized Italian units were secured from North Africa and
pack-train companies. The Peninsular Sardinia. The troops of the Italian pack-
Base Section acquired mules from every train companies performed admirably.
possible source within the theater but it Poorly clad, they worked long hours with-
was unable to meet all demands. Impor- out food or rest, trudging along with their
tation of American mules was deemed in- mules in all sorts of weather and over the
166
advisable because they would require most difficult terrain.
large amounts of hay and grain that could The Italian units were equally indis-
not be procured locally, whereas Italian pensable during the second winter of the
mules were accustomed to getting along war in Italy. The forage problem was
on home-grown hay and tibben (chopped magnified when the U.S. 10th Mountain
straw).163 The forage problem in Italy be- Division reached Italy late in 1944, bring-
came so serious that in the fall of 1943 an ing American mules accustomed to eating
AFHQ Joint Purchasing Forage Board American hay and grain. Altogether, this
was established. The necessary shoes, division required the importation of ap-
nails, and pack equipment also proved proximately 7,120 mules, plus another
hard to procure. However, by 12 Decem- 500 mules per month as replacements. In
ber 1943, Fifth Army had 2,257 pack ani- order to transport these animals from the
mals, and the number increased steadily United States to Italy, nine mule ships
during the winter months.164 were withdrawn from the Burma-India
Fifth Army operations along the Winter run. The first of these vessels, the William
Line were highly dependent upon mules. J. Palmer, was discharged at Civitavecchia
On the flatlands, jeeps and trucks could early in March 1945. Other mule ships
plow through the thick Italian mud, but arrived in April, but thereafter no further
167
miles of rough trail could be traversed shipments were required.
only by mules. Each mule usually carried
about 220 pounds of supplies. In the for-
ward areas this type of transport was in The Final Phase
165
constant demand.
For many American soldiers mules Mountains and mules marked the close
were unique, and at first everything had of combat for the Allied armies in Italy.
to be improvised, even to the mule skin- Although the Germans did not surrender
ners. A provisional pack troop was organ-
ized for each division, with personnel 163
drawn mostly from service companies. On the respective merits of American and Italian
mules, see Interv, Mathews and Tate, 19 Jan 49,
Except for the 3d Division, which brought OCMH Files.
its own mules from Sicily, the first mules 164
Eudora Ramsay Richardson and Sherman Al-
used by Fifth Army units were purchased len, Quartermaster Supply in the Fifth Army in World War
II(Fort Lee, Va., 1950), p. 19.
in the rear areas or requisitioned from 165
Fifth Army at the Winter Line, p. 90.
nearby farmers. Late in 1943 a French 166
See Interv, Mathews and Tate, 19 Jan 49,
veterinary hospital was obtained to help OCMH Files.167
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ, MTOUSA, Jan-Mar
conserve the small supply of animals and 45, Exhibit O-9, Apr-Jim 45, Exhibit X-2, OCT HB
regular French and Italian pack-train North Africa.
230
until 2 May 1945, redeployment of Amer-
ican troops had already begun during the
preceding month, when approximately
3,200 Air Forces personnel left for the
United States. The two major ports for
outloading redeployed personnel were
Naples and Leghorn, especially the latter
since most U.S. troops were stationed
north of Rome. As in other theaters, rede-
ployment struck hard at the Transporta-
tion Corps, adding to its work at the very
time when its most experienced personnel
were being sent home.
Upon the cessation of hostilities and
after clearance with Washington, the the-
ater diverted various vessels carrying ma-
tériel no longer needed, and stopped the
discharge of nonessential cargo from
others. In several instances ships already
on hand were reloaded with ammunition,
pierced-steel planking, vehicles, and
heavy weapons, and then rerouted to the
Pacific. All told, sixteen vessels arriving
in Convoys UGS-84 to 89 were returned
to the United States undischarged. Dur-
ing May 1945 the bulk of the redeployed
military personnel leaving Italy belonged
to the Air Forces.168
The tempo of redeployment began
picking up during June. In that month
twenty units under Transportation Corps
control were redeployed from the theater,
including five port companies and six
Quartermaster truck companies destined
for the Southwest Pacific. Because of the
shortage of service troops incident to the
redeployment, both the Peninsular Base
Section and the Fifth Army made exten-
sive use of surrendered enemy personnel.
In June the Peninsular Base Section
Transportation Section organized ap-
proximately 4,500 German POW's into
various service units, including 8 port
companies and 10 Quartermaster service
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
companies. In the same month the Trans-
portation Section of Fifth Army had about
2,000 Germans working at the railheads
and 1,000 Germans operating trucks.
Subsequently, increasing reliance was
placed on the use of German POW's,
along with Italian service units, to fill the
gaps left by departing American trans-
169
portation troops.
Redeployment traffic continued on the
upswing during July 1945. A total of 54,-
609 passengers was moved out of the thea-
ter by sea transport, and outloading of
cargo constituted a major port activity.
The bulk of the general cargo and vehi-
cles, 107,478 dead-weight tons, was out-
loaded at Naples, as compared with 50,-
747 tons at Leghorn. In the Peninsular
Base Section trucking operations were
hard hit by a severe shortage of trained
drivers, necessitating the transfer of low-
score personnel from Fifth Army units to
the trucking companies. Rail movements
to port staging areas and redeployment
centers increased, and early in the month
the MRS completed the rehabilitation of
Line 69 running from Bologna through
Verona to the Brenner Pass. This project
linked northern and southern Italy for the
first time since February 1943. Apart from
playing a vital role in the redeployment
and demobilization of the U.S. Army, the
reconstructed line also proved useful in
repatriating American and British person-
nel, evacuating German prisoners of war,
168
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ. MTOUSA, Apr-Jun 45,
pp. 4-5 and Exhibit X-6, OCT HB North Africa.
169
Ibid ., p. 13; Logistical History of NATOUSA-
MTOUSA, pp. 287-88. As of 2 September 1945 there
were 34 Italian Service units and 112 German POW
units performing transportation duties in the theater.
The Germans were then manning 20 port, 41 truck,
and 19 service companies. See Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ
MTOUSA, Jul-Sep 45, Exhibit F-4, OCT HB North
Africa.
SICILY AND ITALY
and returning Italian refugees to southern
170
Italy.
Upon the cessation of hostilities with
Japan in August 1945, outloading for the
Pacific was abruptly curtailed. Seaborne
personnel movements reached a peak in
August 1945 of almost 92,000 passengers,
of whom the vast majority, about 84,000,
were destined for the United States. All
available shipping was employed to move
U.S. personnel from the theater, includ-
ing the regular troopships, hospital ships,
converted Italian liners, and many fitted
Liberty and Victory ships.
Loading beyond the normal passenger
capacity was the rule, the Liberty and
Victory ships being overloaded as much
as 30 percent.171 This was far from luxury
travel, but since ships were scarce it was
necessary to sacrifice comfort in order to
speed the repatriation process. The Wake-
field set a theater record by lifting 8,227
passengers from Naples on 13 August. The
former Italian passenger liner, Vulcania,
made her first voyage as a U.S. troopship,
sailing from Naples for New York at noon
on 25 September with 4,770 passengers
aboard, among whom were the majority
of the Wacs in MTOUSA. By late Octo-
ber 1945, when the U.S. Army hospital
ship Algonquin lifted more than 450 pas-
sengers, the theater had cleared from Italy
almost all patients scheduled for transfer
to the United States. 172
As U.S. Army strength in Italy dimin-
ished, American transportation activities
were progressively curtailed and consoli-
dated. The transfer of the operation and
maintenance of remaining lines to the
Italian State Railways had been com-
pleted in late June 1945, and thereafter
the Allies devoted their efforts primarily
to supervisory control. During that sum-
mer plans were laid for the removal of
231
ports from military control, and, as troops
were withdrawn from the north, motor
transport activities were increasingly con-
centrated in the Naples and Leghorn
areas. By September 1945 the bulk of the
Fifth Army had left Italy. Early in that
month the Fifth Army Transportation
Section closed operations upon the trans-
fer of its highway functions to the Penin-
sular Base Section. Meanwhile, the latter
had become the principal legatee of the
theater transportation headquarters. 173
Port operations continued to be carried
on by the 8th Port at Naples and the 10th
Port at Leghorn. On 25 November 1945
the 8th Port was inactivated, and there-
after the 10th Port was responsible for
operations at both Naples and Leghorn.
At the end of the year the Peninsular Base
Section Transportation Section and Head-
quarters, 10th Port, were consolidated
under the commanding officer of the
latter unit, Colonel Cobb, who was
also designated Chief of Transportation,
MTOUSA.174
Continuing U.S. rail activities, includ-
ing the maintenance and disposal of sur-
plus property and equipment and the
supervision of Italian rail operations sup-
porting American forces, were handled by
170
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Jul-Sep 45,
Ch. I, p. 3 and Exhibit G-1; MRS, Italy, Rehabilita-
tion of Line 69, Bologna-Brenner, 1 Sep 45, OCT HB
North Africa MRS; Logistical History of NATOUSA-
MTOUSA, pp. 453-54.
171
Because of inclement weather, overloading on
the Liberties was discontinued on 1 October 1945.
Overloaded, the Liberty vessel could carry about 700
men and the Victory ship from 1,900 to almost 2,000
men.
172
Trans News Ltrs, MTOUSA, issues of Jul-Oct
45, OCT HB North Africa.
173
Trans News Ltr, 18 Jun 45, p. 1; Hist Rcd, OCT
AFHQ MTOUSA, Jul-Sep 45, Ch. I, pp. 1-3, Ch. II,
pp. 1-3, Ch. III, pp. 1-3, and Exhibits E-2 and E-3.
Both in OCT HB MTOUSA.
174
Hist, 10th Port, Nov and Dec 45, DRB AGO.
232 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

the 774th Railway Grand Division, under seas the need of U.S. Army transportation
the Office of the Deputy Director, MRS, activities persisted long after hostilities
Italy. The 774th, which by mid-1946 had ceased.
been converted into a small supervisory
175
group, remained active until November On the 774th and its successors, see the follow-
175 ing: Hist Rcd, 774th Ry Grand Div, Oct 45; Monthly
1947. The principal reason for pro- Statistical and Progress Rpt, 774th Ry Grand Div,
longed service of the 774th was the use of Feb-Mar 46; Hist Rcd, MRS Italy, 6603d Ry Super-
the Italian railways for the maintenance visory Gp; Hist Rcd, 7107th Ry Supervisory Gp
(Ovhd), Oct 46, Aug 47. All in OCT HB North Africa
of American occupation forces in the area Ry Units. Also see Ltr, Sidney E. London to Larson,
around Trieste. In Italy as elsewhere over- 6 Jul 51, OCT HB Inquiries.
 CHAPTER VI
The Invasion of Normandy
After the severe setback occasioned by
the decision to undertake the North Afri-
can operation, planning for the invasion
of northern France was revived in the
spring of 1943. The approval of COSSAC's
OVERLORD plan at QUADRANT in August,
and subsequent decisions at the SEXTANT
Conference, gave new impetus to prepara-
tions for the cross-Channel operation. In
the latter half of 1943 the major Allied
and U.S. tactical commands and subcom-
mands of the forces to be engaged in con-
tinental operations were set up in the
United Kingdom, and in January 1944
COSSAC became Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).
During the next five months the pro-
jected OVERLORD operation underwent
continued study, and detailed plans for its
implementation were worked out. As
finally developed, OVERLORD called for
airborne landings in the Caen and Caren-
tan areas, closely followed by amphibious
assaults on the Normandy beaches on the
east side of the Cotentin peninsula and
between the Orne River and the Carentan
estuary. The assault was to be followed by
the early capture of Cherbourg in the west
and a rapid advance inland. The beach-
head would be simultaneously expanded
southward and eastward to include the
Brittany peninsula and the area between
the Loire and Seine Rivers. This lodgment
Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, I, 176-
area, which would serve as the spring- 89; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 1, p. 24, OCT HB
board for further offensive operations, was ETO.
1
to be secured in a three-month period.
The mounting of OVERLORD was begun
in mid-May 1944, and on 6 June the
assault on the Continent got underway.
The transportation task involved in the
execution of the operational plan was
formidable. A force of 1,350,000 U.S.
troops, together with their organizational
equipment and vehicles, had to be moved
from the United Kingdom to the Conti-
nent in a ninety-day period. The support
of this force required the shipment from
Britain and directly from the United
States of vast amounts of ammunition, ra-
tions, clothing, fuel and lubricants, con-
struction materials, rolling stock, and other
materials. On the far shore, men and cargo
had to be received over beaches and
through badly damaged ports. Motor
transport operations had to be established
to handle beach and port clearance and
all other interior transport pending the
capture and rehabilitation of railways.
Obviously, such operations required
months of intensive planning and prepa-
ration. In the period before D Day, the
Transportation Corps in the United King-
dom played an important part in laying
the groundwork for outloading and sup-
porting U.S. forces engaged in OVERLORD,
and for developing transportation opera-
tions on the Continent.
1
234 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Establishment of Planning Machinery on the Continent during the entire ninety-
for Continental Operations day period, and to precede it to the Conti-
nent and prepare the way for a Commu-
Transportation Corps planning for con- nications Zone headquarters. The Ad-
tinental operations began early, but was vance Echelon, under Colonel Traub,
limited by the lack of firm tactical plans. became the Transportation Section of
Until the fall of 1943 Transportation plan- FECZ.
ning was handled for General Ross by a Within FECZ, the Transportation Sec-
small section under Colonel Traub. Traub tion was delegated the task of developing
participated in various conferences held the transportation aspects of the plan.
by COSSAC, worked with the British on Working closely with SHAEF, the 21
plans for a joint stockpile of transportation Army Group, which was to be the first
matériel, and pushed through troop lists Allied headquarters on the Continent, and
and operational projects prepared by vari- the U.S. First Army, which was to control
ous divisions in the Transportation Corps' initial U.S. forces and operations on the
theater headquarters. In the absence of far shore, Traub's organization was able to
definite operational plans, determination formulate the general outlines of the per-
of matériel requirements was made on the sonnel and equipment requirements and
basis of the theater's projected troop the functions and responsibilities of the
2
strength. Transportation Corps on the Continent.
Once the OVERLORD plan was given The transportation plan was incorporated
limited distribution, and various Allied into the FECZ plan, which was issued for
3
and U.S. headquarters had come into be- distribution on 14 May 1944.
ing, the theater chief of transportation was The logistical plan proved a valuable
able to begin detailed planning. On 14 contribution, but FECZ headquarters
September 1943 he activated an advance never operated on the Continent in the
echelon to plan for transportation opera- manner intended. For reasons that will be
tions on the Continent. Headed by Colo- discussed later, the date at which it was to
nel Traub, who was designated a deputy take over direction of logistical operations
chief of transportation, the Advance was delayed, and Communications Zone
Echelon was set up to parallel the parent headquarters was phased forward to arrive
organization. By the spring of 1944 it had on the Continent earlier than planned.
seven divisions—Military Railways, Ma- Transportation Corps personnel of FECZ
rine Operations, Movements, Motor 2
Memo, Traub for Chief Contl and Plng OCT
Transportation, Administration, Intelli- COMZONE ETO, 10 May 45, sub: Summary of
gence, and Supply. Plng, atchd to Annex 1 of Rpt, Consolidated His-
torical Report on Transportation Corps Activities in
As the Army's logistical agency, SOS the European Theater of Operations, May 1942
was not only responsible for mounting and Through V-E Day (hereafter cited as Consolidated
supporting U.S. forces engaged in OVER- Rpt on TC Activities in ETO); Hist Rpt, TC ETO, I,
14-17. Both in OCT HB ETO. Ltr, Ross to Larson, 9
LORD but was also charged with develop- Mar 49, OCT HB Inquiries.
ing the communications zone on the Con- 3
Ross ltr cited n. 2; Consolidated Rpt on TC Ac-
tinent. At the direction of SHAEF, SOS tivities in ETO, p. 24; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, II, 138-44;
activated the Forward Echelon, Commu- COMZONE Trans Plan, Hq FECZ ETO, 10 May 44,
Annex 13 to COMZONE Plan, AG Opns Rpts RG
nications Zone (FECZ), in February 1944, 207 Red Vault USFET COMZONE Trans Plan;
to draw up plans for logistical operations Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 207-11,215.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
who moved to the Continent served with
the Advance Section, and were later re-
turned to the chief of transportation upon
his move to the Continent with Communi-
cations Zone headquarters.
The Advance Section (ADSEC), Com-
munications Zone, formally activated at
Bristol in February 1944, was to be the
first U.S. Army logistical agency on the
Continent. Initially attached to the U.S.
First Army, ADSEC would gradually take
over Communications Zone activities, and,
upon the assumption of control of those
activities by FECZ and the establishment
of additional base sections, move forward
behind the armies to provide close con-
tinuous support. ADSEC was charged
with detailed planning for the period from
D Day to D plus 41, at which time FECZ
was expected to take over.4
The formation of an ADSEC transpor-
tation headquarters began in February
1944 when a small group of men from the
4th Port and the 3d Group Regulating
Station under Colonel Sibley, former com-
mander of the Mersey area ports, was
gathered together at Transportation Corps
headquarters at London. Initial activity
dealt mainly with plans for the operation
of Cherbourg, since Sibley had been desig-
nated to take command of that port.
Shortly thereafter, Col. William C. Koenig
was appointed transportation officer, and
served in that capacity until the transfer
of the Transportation Section to Bristol in
March. There, Col. George W. Beeler was
appointed transportation officer, his staff
was augmented, and the scope of planning
was greatly expanded. By the end of the
month, divisions had been established cov-
ering all major transportation activities,
including movements, and highway, rail,
and marine operations. In the remaining
period before D Day, additional Transpor-
tation Corps personnel were assigned from
235
traffic regulating groups and replacement
centers, and on 8 May an Ordnance offi-
cer, Col. Clarence W. Richmond, was as-
signed to the section to organize a motor
transport brigade, which was to control all
motor transport units on the beaches and
at the Normandy ports. During this
period, the section prepared several stand-
ing operating procedures covering traffic
control, motor convoy operation, and
other projected activities of the Transpor-
tation Section or its divisions.
The principal planning achievement of
the ADSEC Transportation Section was
its program for the period from D Day to
D plus 41, which was issued as part of the
ADSEC NEPTUNE plan on 30 April 1944,
and finally revised on 1 June. This plan
was drawn up in co-ordination with the
FECZ Transportation Section, and while
it differed in some respects from the FECZ
plan it had the effect of filling in the out-
lines of that plan for the ADSEC period of
responsibility. While the plans in general
agreed on the role of the Transportation
Corps at various phases of OVERLORD, the
ADSEC plan was more specific and de-
tailed. For example, the FECZ plan only
set forth the type of transportation units
required at each stage of operations, while
the ADSEC plan included detailed sched-
ules for the timing of the arrival and the
initial location of each of the 234 transpor-
tation units that were to engage in opera-
tions on the far shore during the first
forty-one days.5
4
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 213-14.
5
Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC COMZONE ETOUSA,
activation to 30 Sep 44, OCT HB ADSEC; Opns
Plan, ADSEC COMZONE, 30 Apr 44, Annex 14,
Trans, AG Adm ETO 377; COMZONE Trans Plan
cited n. 3.
The code name NEPTUNE was used for security
reasons after September 1943 on all OVERLORD
planning papers which referred to the target area and
date.
236 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Planning as of D Day pervision of ADSEC would be exercised

by FECZ, first attached to the 21 Army
By D Day there were in existence plans Group staff and later to the 1st Army
covering virtually every aspect of transpor- Group.
tation operations to be undertaken on the It was expected that beginning approx-
Continent during the OVERLORD period. imately D plus 41 the lines of communica-
These were part of over-all plans for the tion would gradually shift from a north-
development of logistical operations in an south to a west-east direction. With the
evolving communications zone. In gen- uncovering of the Brittany ports, the flow
eral, it was contemplated that U.S. and of supplies would more and more move
British forces would control separate lines eastward along the axis Brest-Le Mans. A
of communication, with co-ordination pro- base section would be brought in to de-
vided by 21 Army Group. In the Ameri- velop the Brest and Quiberon Bay areas in
can zone, the First U.S. Army would Brittany. At this point, FECZ headquar-
control all tactical and administrative ters would become operational and
activities until the advent of the 1st U.S. assume control of the entire Communica-
Army Group, which would take over upon tions Zone. As the west-east line of com-
the arrival of a second American army munications was developed, ADSEC
headquarters. would move forward to provide direct
During the first forty days after D Day, support to the armies, and a base section
according to the plan, the U.S. lines of would be organized to take over command
communication would be extended in a of the area it had relinquished. The
north-south direction along the axis groundwork would then be laid for the
Cherbourg-Vitre. Men and supplies transfer of Communications Zone head-
would come in over the beaches and quarters from the United Kingdom to the
through the ports of the Cotentin penin- Continent on D plus 90.6
sula and flow southward to depots or
direct to using units. All logistical opera- General Concepts
tions were initially to be under the com-
mand of the First Army. Personnel and The phasing of logistical operations and
equipment for beach operations were to commands was planned with a keen
be provided by the First Army and its awareness of their transportation implica-
attached Advance Section, Communica- tions. From a transportation point of
tions Zone. As tactical forces moved for- view, the major problems were expected
ward, ADSEC would gradually take over to be the development of sufficient beach
communications zone activities, including and port capacity and the establishment
the operation of ports, motor transport, of adequate motor transport operations.
and railways. By about D plus 20, First Since Allied planners recognized that pro-
Army would draw a rear boundary.
ADSEC would then be detached from 6
COMZONE Plan, Hq FECZ ETOUSA, 14 May
First Army, take control of activities be- 44, Sec. IV, AG Opns Rpts RG 207 Red Vault
hind the rear boundary, including the USFET COMZONE Ord Plan; History of G-4, Com-
beaches and ports, and in effect act as munications Zone, ETO (hereafter cited as Hist of G-4
COMZONE ETO), Sec. VII, pp. 19-21, OCMH
Communications Zone headquarters. Su- Files; Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 108-09.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
longed dependence on beaches and un-
protected anchorages might well prove
disastrous, they provided for the erection
of two artificial ports on the far shore, one
to be American-operated, and for the early
opening of Cherbourg and a number of
minor Normandy ports. Mindful of the
World War I experience, the Allied plan-
ners relied on the capture of the Brittany
ports, notably Brest, to furnish enough
capacity to handle a large part of the in-
coming traffic in the latter stages of the
operation. It was contemplated that the
lines of communication would have to
depend on motor transport for much of
the OVERLORD period, with such relief as
could be provided by pipelines. Destruc-
tion of rail facilities was expected to make
rail operations impracticable before D plus
50, other than for local port clearance, and
to limit traffic for some time thereafter. 7
Transportation planning dealt with the
phasing in of transportation headquarters,
units, and equipment and the progressive
development of activities at each stage of
operations. During the first phase, D to D
plus 25, the Transportation Corps would
provide troops and equipment to assist the
Engineer special brigades assigned to the
First Army in the discharge of cargo,
vehicles, and personnel through the St.
Laurent-sur-Mer (OMAHA), La Madeleine
(UTAH), and Quineville beaches, the
artificial port at St. Laurent-sur-Mer
(MULBERRY A), and the nearby minor
ports of Isigny, Grandcamp-les-Bains, and
St. Vaast-la-Hougue. The Corps would
also furnish men and equipment to
ADSEC to operate the ports of Cher-
bourg, Barfleur, and Granville; clear sup-
plies from ports to forward depots and
units; establish traffic control in the major
port area; operate any rehabilitated rail-
way rolling stock that had been captured;
237
and supplement pipelines and the Army's
organic transportation in hauling bulk
and packaged POL to the First Army.
These activities would be directed by the
ADSEC Transportation Section, which
also would be preparing to take over
transportation responsibilities for the area
that was to become the communications
zone. By D plus 25, some 24,242 Trans-
portation Corps personnel would be on
the Continent, exclusive of those on the
beaches.8
From D plus 26 to D plus 41, the
ADSEC Transportation Section would in
effect be the transportation headquarters
for the communications zone, assuming
responsibility for the provision of trans-
portation for the support of the U.S.
forces. It would operate all major and
minor ports, including St. Malo; control
marine traffic by recommending ports of
entry to SOS headquarters; operate and
maintain railways as they were brought
into service; conduct motor transport op-
erations necessary for port clearance,
static operations, and line of communica-
tions hauling, including the movement of
POL from ports, beach areas, and pipe-
line terminals; provide traffic regulation
on highways and railroads; and set up
regulating stations to control movement
across Army rear boundaries. It would
also prepare to turn over to Communica-
7
Hist of G-4 COMZONE ETO, Sec. VII, Pt. I,
Tab 2b, Special Problem—Continental Transporta-
tion; COMZONE Plan, Hq FECZ ETOUSA, Sec.
XI, AG Opns Rpts RG 207 Red Vault USFET
COMZONE; Memo, Col Hugh A. Murrill, Contl and
Plng, for Ross, 7 Jul 44, sub: Rpt on Normandy Ports,
USFET OCT 323.3 Cotentin Ports Survey, KCRC
AGO. On the artificial ports see below, pp. 275-76.
8
Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion of
transportation planning is based upon: COMZONE
Trans Plans cited n. 3; and NEPTUNE Opns Plan, Hq
ADSEC COMZONE, 30 Apr 44, Annex 14, Trans,
AG Adm ETO 377 Annexes 7-15, Item 4.
238
tions Zone headquarters and base sections
such transportation units, installations,
and activities as could not be carried for-
ward in the advance. By D plus 41, there
would be 36,811 Transportation Corps
troops under ADSEC. The bulk of this
personnel would consist of port and truck
troops, although railway, harbor craft,
marine maintenance, amphibian truck
(DUKW), traffic regulation, and base
depot units also would be on duty.
During this period the FECZ Transpor-
tation Section would be concerned mainly
with the provision of units and equipment
to ADSEC, and with preparations to take
over communications zone operations. It
was also to begin organizing rail oper-
ations and to phase in Transportation
Corps troops and equipment for attach-
ment to the two base sections that were to
be set up behind ADSEC.
In the final phase, D plus 41 to D plus
90, the FECZ Transportation Section
would operate as the transportation corps
in the communications zone. It would as-
sume control of rail and motor operations,
allocate to ADSEC and the base sections
personnel and equipment to operate ports,
line of communications hauling, and traf-
fic control, and phase in additional units
which would be required. It was expected
that during this period the Brittany ports
of Brest, Quiberon Bay, and Lorient
would be opened, rail operations would
be organized under FECZ direction by
the 2d Military Railway Service, and
planned rail and road networks would be
placed in operation.
Beach and Port Operations
The development of beach and port op-
erations was planned to provide for a
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
capacity somewhat in excess of that actu-
ally required for the support of the forces
moved to the Continent.9 Discharge capa-
bilities were expected to expand from ap-
proximately 14,700 long tons per day on
D plus 10 to about 45,950 long tons by D
10
plus 90. The OMAHA, UTAH, and Quine-
ville beaches were to begin discharge on
D Day. The artificial port at OMAHA
would be opened on D plus 12, and the
small nearby ports of Isigny, St. Laurent-
sur-Mer, and St. Vaast-la-Hougue be-
tween D plus 12 and D plus 21. These
installations would be operated by the
Engineer special brigades, with the assist-
ance of Transportation Corps troops, in-
cluding a major port headquarters, port,
amphibian truck, harbor craft, and truck
units, and a large supply of floating and
materials handling equipment. 11
Meanwhile, Cherbourg would be
opened on D plus 11, and was to be oper-
ated by the 4th Port, with attached troops
and equipment. Rehabilitation activities
of the Engineers were to increase the port's
discharge capacity to 5,000 long tons per
day by D plus 20, and 8,000 long tons per
day by D plus 90. The 4th Port was also
scheduled to operate Barfleur and Gran-
ville, ports capable of handling coasters
only, which would be opened on D plus
20 and 25, respectively. At each of these
installations, port troops would be phased
9
See Chart, Beach and Port Capacity (D plus 20-
D plus 90), as assessed by SHAEF Memo, 7 Jun 44,
USFET OCT 323.3 Cotentin Ports Survey, KCRC
AGO.
10
SHAEF, G-4 FECZ, and ADSEC estimates of
port capacities and opening dates of ports varied, but
discrepancies were relatively minor. For the sake of
convenience FECZ estimates have been used here.
11
COMZONE Trans plan cited n. 3, pp. 1-2. The
major port, the 11th, attached to the Provisional Engi-
neer Special Brigade Group, was to operate the arti-
ficial port and the minor ports. See NEPTUNE Opns
Plan, Annex 14, cited n. 8, p. 6.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY 239

in to keep pace with the discharge capac- requests, he had been unable to obtain
12
ity of rehabilitated facilities. troops and equipment in quantities suffi-
In the Brittany area, St. Malo and the cient to meet what he considered essential
nearby beaches were scheduled to begin requirements.
operation under the 12th Port on D plus Immediately upon the reassignment of
25. With anticipated capacity of 2,000 motor transport operations to the Trans-
tons per day by D plus 40 and 3,000 tons portation Corps in July 1943, General
daily by D plus 90, this area was to sustain Ross had ordered his Motor Transport
the U.S. Third Army and possibly to Division to begin planning for continental
handle the debarkation of Third Army operations. Lacking an over-all oper-
troops. The other Brittany ports were ex- ational plan, Ross's planners relied on the
pected to come into the logistic picture be- theater troop basis to work out motor
tween D plus 53 and 57, with the opening transport requirements for projected port
of Brest and the Rade de Brest, Lorient, clearance, depot and other static oper-
and Quiberon Bay.13 The planners esti- ations, and line of communications haul-
mated that these ports would provide a ing. They assumed the use of standard
daily discharge capacity of 8,040 long tons truck companies, each operating forty so-
by D plus 60, and 14,550 long tons by D called 2½-ton vehicles, which actually
plus 90. moved a 5-ton pay load. Estimating the
Port planning proved overoptimistic. maximum average forward range of a
The capture of Cherbourg was delayed, single driver at fifty miles per day, each
and its rehabilitation was slower than ex- truck company would have a capacity of
pected. Moreover, the Brittany ports were 10,000 forward ton-miles per day. On this
not opened as planned because of the late basis, they calculated that 240 truck com-
date of the capture, the extent of destruc- panies would be necessary. The G-4 staff
tion, and the rapid eastward advance of believed the number to be excessive, and
the armies. In the end, only a few minor the theater approved only 160 truck com-
ports were operated in the Brittany area. panies. Although the theater troop basis
The failure of plans for the Brittany ports was later increased, and the scope of U.S.
to materialize made a heavier and more tactical operations expanded, no changes
extended dependence on the beaches were made before D Day in the number
necessary, forced a sharp upward revision of projected units. 14 An officer who served
of Cherbourg's capacity, and posed a port
development problem that was not solved 12
Unless otherwise cited, the discussion of port
until the opening of Antwerp in late planning is based on the FECZ (COMZONE Trans
November 1944. Plan cited n. 3) and the ADSEC (NEPTUNE Opns
Plan, Annex 14, cited n. 8) transportation plans.
13
Quiberon Bay, an undeveloped area, was to be
Motor Transport captured about D plus 40 and undergo extensive de-
velopment. On this project, called CHASTITY, see
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 187-89, 294-96.
When D Day arrived, the least satisfac- 14
History of Motor Transport in the European
tory aspect from the standpoint of the the- Theater of Operations (hereafter cited as Hist of MT
ater chief of transportation was the prep- in ETO), p. 16; Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in
ETO, Annex 7, A Brief Outline History of the Motor
aration for U.S. motor transportation Transport Service (hereafter cited as Outline Hist of
operations on the Continent. Despite early MTS), p. 2. All in OCT HB ETO.
240
with the SHAEF Movements and Trans-
portation Division has stated that the the-
ater Transportation Corps planners were
unable to back up their claims because
they lacked basic operational and logis-
tical data such as detailed information re-
garding the planned deployment of U.S.
forces on the Continent, and that the G-4
staff disregarded their recommendations
without sufficiently reanalyzing the
15
problem.
Equally frustrating were the Transpor-
tation Corps' efforts to secure heavy-duty
equipment. A study of the experience in
North Africa had clearly revealed the
need for trucks capable of handling over-
sized and bulky supplies and equipment
and had demonstrated that the larger ve-
hicles were much more economical in
over-the-road hauling than the 2½-ton
truck. Profiting from this lesson, Ross di-
rected his Motor Transport Division to in-
clude in its plans provision for such heavy-
duty and special equipment as would be
required for a balanced truck fleet. In
August 1943 requisitions were sent to
Washington for special vehicles with
which to re-equip over two thirds of the
projected 160 truck companies. Fifty-nine
companies were to be provided with 28-
foot, 10-ton semitrailers; 36 companies
with 2½-ton 6x6 cab-over-engine trucks,
which because of their longer body and
greater cubic capacity could carry heavier
and more bulky freight than the standard
2½-ton truck; 27 companies with 750-gal-
lon tank trucks; 9 companies with 2,000-
gallon semitrailer tankers; and 2 com-
panies with 45-ton tank transport trailers
and 5-ton refrigerator vans.
16
The requisitions fared badly in Wash-
ington. Considerable time was consumed
in processing papers, and final War De-
partment approval of the projects was not
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
given until December 1943. Several more
months transpired before production was
initiated so that few of the vehicles had ar-
rived in the United Kingdom by 31 May
1944.17 Pending the receipt of the equip-
ment, the Transportation Corps, shortly
before D Day, agreed to accept several
alternative types then available for imme-
diate shipment to the theater. Among the
substitutions were 1½-ton truck-tractors
with 3-6-ton semitrailers, and 4-5-ton
truck-tractors with 16-foot semitrailers
that had been designed originally for use
in the China-Burma-India theater. Also,
some increased carrying capacity became
available in May 1944 when the War De-
partment authorized loading up to 100
percent in excess of the rated capacity for
2½-ton 6x6 trucks operating under favor-
able conditions on smooth hard-surface
roads. The heavy-vehicle project was not
to be completed until late in November
1944. In the interim, the Transportation
Corps was compelled to rely heavily on
2½-ton trucks, supplemented by such
18
other vehicles as could be provided.
Believing that there would be insuffi-
cient carrying capacity even if the heavy
equipment should be made available, the
Transportation Corps planners sought to
15
Ltr, Col Vissering to Gen Ward, Chief Mil Hist,
14 Aug 52, OCMH Files.
16
Outline Hist of MTS, pp. 2-3.
17
On the requisitioning of heavy vehicles, see the
following: Memo, Dir of Sup ASF for TAG, 3 1 Dec
43, sub: Ord Project GS 20 and GS 21 for ETO; 1st
Ind, Dir of Plans and Opns ASF to Dir of Sup ASF,
18 Dec 43; Memo, Lutes for CG ASF, 25 Mar 44, sub:
ETO Projects GS 20 and GS 21. All in AG400 (31
Jul 43) (7) Sec 6A Opnl Projects for 1943 and 1944 for
ETO. Also see Study, OCT Hwy Div, Motor Vehicle
Requirements for the European Theater of Opera-
tions, 8 Apr 44, OCT HB Hwy Div; and Hist of MT
in ETO, pp. 13-14.
18
Outline Hist of MTS, pp. 2-5; WD AR-212, 20
May 44; Annual Rpt, Strategic Studies Br Hwy Div
OCT, 17 June 44, pp. 22-23, OCT HB Hwy Div.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
apply another lesson learned during the
North African campaign by providing
two drivers for each vehicle in order to
make possible twenty-four-hour vehicle
operation. Their request for overstrength
truck units was at first turned down by
the theater G-3, on the grounds that such
operations would not be required over an
extended period of time and that the nor-
mal truck company could work continu-
ously over short periods of time if
necessary.
After repeated efforts by the Transpor-
tation Corps to have the matter reconsid-
ered, General Lee became interested in
the problem in early 1944 and intervened.
Requests for men to provide forty extra
drivers per company were then submitted
to the War Department. The War Depart-
ment notified the theater that its troop
strength could not be increased, and sug-
gested that the extra personnel be secured
within the theater. In April 1944 General
Lee directed the base sections to furnish
quotas of drivers by a deadline date. Al-
though he specifically stated that he
would tolerate no unloading of undesir-
ables, many of the men received proved to
be of poor quality. This factor, together
with the fact that insufficient time re-
mained for proper training, was later to
have an adverse effect upon vehicle main-
tenance and operation. Additional drivers
were secured by distributing personnel
from fourteen truck companies among
other units, and assigning their equipment
to two Engineer general service regiments
that were converted into truck com-.
19
panics.
Meanwhile, FECZ and ADSEC organ-
ization and planning had gone forward.
Most of the Motor Transport Division staff
members at Transportation Corps head-
quarters had been reassigned to the FECZ
241
Transportation Section, and within
ADSEC a Motor Transport Brigade had
been organized.20 From D Day to D plus
25, the ADSEC Transportation Section,
through its Motor Transport Brigade,
would operate the motor transport re-
quired to clear ports and to supplement
the First Army's organic transportation.
Thereafter, until D plus 41, it would be
responsible for furnishing general-purpose
transport for hauling supplies forward
from the beaches, ports, and depots in
support of the armies, the Ninth Air
Force, and Communications Zone instal-
lations. On D plus 41 the FECZ Trans-
portation Section would assume control
of motor transport operation in the com-
munication zone and allocate to ADSEC
and the two other base sections personnel
and units to perform truck hauling and
traffic control. There were to be 130 truck
companies on the Continent by D plus 41.
Transportation Corps theater planners
were unhappy about this number, and as
D Day approached they were endeavor-
ing to arrange for the earlier employment
of some of the thirty truck units scheduled
to arrive between D plus 41 and D plus
90.21
The effort to phase in units at an earlier
date than originally planned, as well as
the last-minute attempts to increase car-
rying capacity through the assignment of
extra drivers and the acceptance of mis-
cellaneous types of heavy vehicles imme-
diately available, reflected a growing
anxiety regarding the adequacy of prep-
arations for motor transport operations.
19
Outline Hist of MTS, pp. 5-6; Supplement to
Conf Notes of Monday 10 Apr 44, USFET OCT 322
Overstrength of QM Truck Cos, KCRC AGO.
20
Hist of MT in ETO, pp. 23-24; Outline Hist of
MTS, pp. 7-8.
21
See COMZONE Trans Plan cited n. 3, and
NEPTUNE Opns Plan, Annex 14, cited n. 8.
242 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

In the spring of 1944 a study by the during the first ninety days was premised
SHAEF G-4 Movement and Transporta- on the expectation that extensive destruc-
tion Branch, based on the latest informa- tion of railway equipment, track, and
tion regarding projected troop deployment structures would severely limit the imme-
and phase lines, indicated that there diate use of rail transportation. The thea-
would not be enough truck units ade- ter planners therefore placed the main
quately to support the U.S. advance, par- emphasis on repair and rehabilitation of
ticularly in the period after D plus 41. captured railway track and equipment,
After a review by SHAEF logistical plan- and assumed that rail operations would
ners in April had confirmed these find- have only limited importance even in the
25
ings, the matter was brought to General latter phases of OVERLORD.
Eisenhower's attention. Eisenhower then Planning for continental railway oper-
called in General Lee, and a reanalysis ations had a long history. The Transporta-
was undertaken by the Communications tion Corps Military Railway Division had
Zone staff. 22 As D Day approached it was begun working on equipment require-
evident to the Communications Zone G-4 ments in 1942, and plans for the develop-
that there would be a shortage of truck ment of a joint stockpile were made by an
companies if maximum traffic developed, American-British committee on which the
but he believed that the shortage might be Transportation Corps and Corps of Engi-
relieved through temporary SOS utiliza- neers were represented along with their
tion of truck units of the second and third British opposites. During the BOLERO
armies to land on the Continent. More- period a large quantity of motive power,
over, he anticipated that the transporta- rolling stock, and other rail equipment
tion system as a whole would be adequate, was assembled in the United Kingdom for
if the heavy vehicles on order materialized eventual transfer to the Continent. A joint
in time arid rail operations were begun by British-American Cross-Channel Ferrying
D plus 60.23 Committee, operating under SHAEF, was
In actual operations, the shortage of responsible for programming the sailings
heavy-duty vehicles and truck companies to move the pool of equipment to the
did not immediately become apparent. Continent.
Indeed, by late July 1944, only 94 of the Detailed Transportation Corps opera-
planned 130 truck units were in operation tional planning got underway in early
under ADSEC, and up to that time they 1944 when Colonel Bingham was ap-
were adequate because tactical progress pointed head of the Military Railways
had been unexpectedly slow and road Division, FECZ Transportation Section.
hauls relatively short. 24 With the rapid
advance of the armies after the break- 22
Vissering ltr cited n. 15; Ruppenthal, op. cit., p.
through at St. Lo, the deficiencies soon 315.
23
became painfully evident. Hist of G-4 COMZONE ETO, Sec. VII, Pt. I,
Tab 2b, pp. 7-8.
24
Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC COMZONE ETOUSA,
Rail Transportation activation to 30 Sep 44, pp. 9-10, OCT HB ETO;
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 557-58.
25
COMZONE Plan, FECZ ETOUSA, cited n. 6,
The assumption that motor transport Sec. XI, Trans, pp. 33, 35; Hist of G-4 COMZONE
would bear the brunt of overland traffic ETO, Sec. V, Pt. I, Tab 2b, p. 7.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
Bingham was succeeded in April by Gen-
eral Burpee, who had given distinguished
service in North Africa and Italy. Burpee
commanded the 2d Military Railway
Service, which had arrived in the United
Kingdom at the end of March, and was
scheduled to direct rail operations on the
Continent. While railway troops under-
went training and made preparations for
their move to the Continent, Burpee and
his staff continued work on the FECZ
plan and maintained close co-ordination
with the ADSEC transportation and engi-
26
neering staffs.
As visualized on D Day, the main func-
tions of military railway troops up to D
plus 41 would be to reconnoiter and sur-
vey lines to be operated; provide construc-
tion-work trains and crews to assist the
Engineers in rehabilitating the railways;
set up and prepare for operation the
equipment ferried over or captured; co-
operate with the Engineer and Signal
Corps in completing required construc-
tion; and start rail operations as soon as
conditions would permit. Ferrying oper-
ations for rail equipment would begin on
D plus 25. Rolling stock and locomotives,
at first mainly work equipment, would be
landed at Cherbourg, the only port capa-
ble of handling them and the starting
point for rail operations. It was assumed
that no repairable locomotives would be
captured within the first 30 days, and that
until D plus 41 captured rolling stock
capable of being rendered serviceable
would not be sufficient to offset losses at
sea during the ferrying operation.
Personnel requirements for this period
were modest. A small party from MRS
headquarters would land on UTAH Beach,
join the 382d Engineer General Service
Regiment, and proceed to the rail line.
Upon the capture of Cherbourg, the party
243
was to make a reconnaissance of rail facil-
ities at that port and follow up with a sur-
vey of the line as far south as Valognes.
Beginning on D plus 18 the remainder of
the 2d MRS headquarters would be
phased in to complete detailed surveys
and initiate operations, and assigned op-
erating units would be brought in. By D
plus 41, the 2d MRS was to have avail-
able on the Continent one railway grand
division, two railway operating battalions,
and two railway shop battalions. Oper-
ations would have been pushed as far
south as Lison, and preparations would
have been started to extend them farther
southward. 27
In the latter half of the OVERLORD
period, rail operations were to be ex-
panded as lines were rehabilitated, addi-
tional troops and equipment were made
available, and the tactical forces ad-
vanced. By D plus 90, the MRS would be
operating a rail net bounded by Cher-
bourg on the north, Auray to the south-
west, and Le Mans to the southeast. The
net would include the double-track line
running south from Cherbourg to Lison,
where it was connected by a single-track
line with Le Mans. Other lines expected
to be in operation extended from Lison
southwestward via Granville and Dol-de-
Bretagne to Rennes, from Rennes west-
ward to Auray in the Quiberon Bay area,
and from Rennes eastward to Le Mans.
For the operation and maintenance of
these lines, the 2d MRS was to be pro-
vided with two railway grand divisions,
five railway operating battalions, two rail-
way shop battalions, and considerable rail
26
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO,
Annex 8, Military Railway Service, pp. 13-16; Ltr,
Ross to Col J. A. Appleton, Chief Rail Div OCT WD,
25 Oct 43, USFET OCT 320.2 Strength, KCRC
AGO. Also see above, p. 126.
27
NEPTUNE Opns Plan, Annex 14, cited n. 8.
244 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

equipment. Equipment to be ferried to activity was confined to the north-south

the Continent by D plus 90 included 354 lines between Cherbourg and Lison. Be-
locomotives, 4,136 20-ton covered cars, ginning in August the MRS-operated
1,862 20-ton open freight cars, 519 50-ton lines had expanded, and American rail
flatcars, 395 cabooses, 152 tank cars, 30 personnel were greatly augmented. By D
refrigerator cars, 54 40-ton gondolas, and plus 90 (4 September) rail operations had
other rolling stock including 6 ambulance been pushed southward to Rennes and
28
trains. eastward beyond Le Mans.31 The progres-
Rail transportation was expected to be sive extension of rail lines, however, did
the backbone of the transportation system not keep pace with the lightning advance
in the post-Overlord period. Transporta- of the armies, necessitating prolonged de-
tion Corps railway planners believed that pendence on motor transport. Not until
by D plus 120 there would be in operation the last quarter of 1944 did the railways
an extensive railway system, consisting catch up and surpass truck transportation
mainly of double-track lines, which would in the volume of traffic handled. 32
be based on Cherbourg and the Brittany
ports of Quiberon Bay and Lorient and Movement Control and Other
would extend eastward as far as Dreux Transportation Activities
and Chartres. The planning staff also
drew up plans for subsequent utilization Control of personnel and supply move-
of rail lines up to and beyond the German ments in the communications zone was an
border.29 important aspect of transportation plan-
Provision was also made for the even- ning, for without such regulation traffic
tual transfer of rail operations to the could become quickly and seriously
French. As set forth by a SHAEF directive snarled. Responsibility for this function
in July 1944, the transfer in each liberated was to pass successively from the First
area was to take place in three stages: Army to ADSEC to FECZ. Personnel to
Stage (later called Phase) I called for ex- carry out the responsibility during the
clusive military operation of the railways;
ADSEC and FECZ phases were to be pro-
Stage II was characterized by assistance vided by the Transportation Corps.
from the French; and Stage III con- The U.S. First Army was initially to
templated French assumption of respon- control all traffic. During this period de-
sibility for railway maintenance and tachments from the 3d Group Regulating
operation.30 28
COMZONE Trans Plan cited n. 3, and atchd
As in the case of the ports and motor Incls 1 and 3.
29
transport, the actual development of rail- Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO,
way operations did not proceed according Annex 8, MRS, Map, Pre-Invasion Planned Develop-
ment of Railways on the Continent; Gen Bd Rpt,
to plan. The delay in capturing Cher- USFET, Study 123, p. 11, OCT HB ETO.
30
bourg set back the phasing in of railway SHAEF Adm Memo 24, 18 Jul 44, sub: Coopera-
troops and equipment. Although destruc- tion of French Mil and Civ Trans Authorities, OCT
HB ETO France Rys.
tion of rail facilities proved somewhat less 31
Since Quiberon Bay and Lorient were not placed
serious than anticipated, operations were in operation, the line planned to connect them with
at first limited by the shallow lodgment Rennes was not developed.
32
For details on continental rail operations, see
area. At the end of July 1944, U.S. rail below, pp. 340-54.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
Station would arrive, establish traffic con-
trol in the Cherbourg port area, and move
out to strategic points along the road net-
work. On D plus 25 the ADSEC Trans-
portation Section would assume respon-
sibility for controlling all traffic behind
the First Army's rear boundary. Its Move-
ment Control Branch, through co-ordina-
tion with the services, would issue cargo-
disposal instructions and allocate tonnages
for land movement. Additional traffic
regulation groups would be brought in
and would provide troops for traffic regu-
lation (RTO) installations. These stations,
operating under the ADSEC Transporta-
tion Section, would be located at strategic
roadheads, railheads, and other vital
points along the lines of communication.
Beginning on D plus 41, movement
control would become a responsibility of
FECZ and would be exercised through
the medium of base and advance section
agencies. Movements by rail or road were
to be arranged by base section transpor-
tation officers, with the FECZ Trans-
portation Section providing over-all co-
ordination. As an exception to this
decentralized traffic control scheme, the
planners anticipated that certain through
motor routes would be regulated by
FECZ headquarters. Control of move-
ments along the lines of communication
was to be handled by regulating stations,
which by D plus 90 would be manned by
men from six traffic regulating groups. As
visualized in the FECZ plan, these sta-
tions were to be responsible for the orderly
movement of supplies and personnel to
proper railheads and roadheads, and for
the evacuation of casualties, prisoners,
and salvage. They were to organize clas-
sification and dispatch areas and other
traffic control points in order to keep
traffic moving and prevent congestion at
245
rail and truck terminals and along the
33
lines of communication.
Regulating stations were also to be set
up immediately behind the Army areas to
control movements between the commu-
nications zone and the combat zone. Al-
though Field Service Regulations pro-
vided that such stations would be directly
under the theater commander, it was
decided to assign them to ADSEC, which
was the Communications Zone agency
adjacent to the combat area. The regulat-
ing officer was to handle movement
requests from tactical forces, set priorities,
and regulate the flow of men and mate-
rials into and out of the Army areas. As
will be seen, two such stations were actu-
ally set up, one operating behind the U.S.
First Army and the other behind the U.S.
Third Army.34
Before closing the discussion of trans-
portation planning it should be noted that
two pipeline systems were to be operated
on the Continent—one based on Cher-
bourg and the other on Port-en-Bessin.35
Since the Engineers were responsible for
construction, operation, and maintenance
of the lines, Transportation Corps plan-
ning did not deal with them other than to
examine their impact on other transpor-
tation operations.
Scant attention was given to the devel-
opment of inland waterways. No impor-
tant use of this means of transportation
was contemplated during the OVERLORD
period.
33
On planned movement control activities in the
Communications Zone, see the following: Opns Plan
NEPTUNE, Annex 14, cited n. 8; COMZONE Plan,
FECZ ETOUSA, cited n. 6, Sec. XI, pp. 33-38; and
COMZONE Trans Plan cited n. 3, pp. 4 and 7.
34
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 497-98.
35
On plans for pipelines see the following: Hist of
G-4 COMZONE ETO, Sec. V, Ch. 2; COMZONE
Plan, FECZ ETOUSA, cited n. 6, Annex 8; Ruppen-
thal, op. cit., pp. 319-26.
246
Mounting the Invasion
In order to effect the planned invasion
of northwestern France by U.S. forces, it
was necessary to move troops, equipment,
and supplies from stations and depots in
the United Kingdom to proper far shore
destinations and to deliver them in the
amounts and sequence and at the times
desired by tactical commanders. 36 This
task had to be performed without inter-
fering with the simultaneous movement of
British forces. It was a complicated under-
taking requiring close collaboration
among Allied, British, and American
agencies. Machinery had to be set up to
control the flow of men and materials and
to allocate vessels and landing craft. Areas
for the assembly, processing, and embar-
kation of troops and accompanying maté-
riel had to be apportioned for the move-
ment of cargo necessary to support the
invasion, and uniform procedures had to
be worked out governing the flow of both
U.S. and British forces.
The mounting operation involved the
advance loading of the assault forces and
a portion of those designated for the subse-
quent build-up. This was to be followed
by a gigantic prescheduled build-up, de-
signed to meet the requirements of the
tactical forces, that had to be kept within
the limits of the shipping available, the
outloading capacity of the United King-
dom ports, the receiving capacity of
beaches and ports on the far shore, and
the uncertainties that might arise as the
result of bad weather, enemy sea action,
and changes in the tactical situation. In
view of the short sea voyage, the build-up
was to be effected by a shuttle service be-
tween the southern coast of England and
northern France. Support shipping direct
from the United States would play a
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
minor role in the early stages of the build-
up, but would become increasingly im-
portant thereafter and contribute the bulk
of the supply requirements on the Conti-
nent in the latter phases of the OVERLORD
operation.
The theater SOS commander had the
responsibility for mounting and support-
ing the U.S. forces engaged in OVERLORD.
Within SOS, the chief of transportation,
in co-ordination with the British, exer-
cised executive control of movements of
U.S. troops, vehicles, and supplies, includ-
ing outloadings from the U.K. ports.
Actual direction of U.S. mounting activi-
ties, including movement control, port,
and other transportation activities, was
delegated to the base section commanders.
Over-all control of the mounting ma-
chinery, both American and British, was
made the function of the Allied Build-up
Control Organization (BUCO).
Participation in Embarkation Planning
Detailed Transportation Corps planning
for the mounting of OVERLORD began in
early September 1943 when General Ross
established an Operational Branch in his
Movements Division.37 One of the branch's
first tasks was to participate in the develop-
ment of joint American-British movement
control and embarkation procedures. The
British Movements Directorate had been
working on plans for the movement and
control of an amphibious force to be em-
barked from the southern coast of Eng-
36
For a more detailed treatment of plans and prep-
arations for the mounting of OVERLORD, see Ruppen-
thal, op. cit., Ch. IX.
37
Historical Critique of the United Kingdom
OVERLORD Movements, 1 Nov 45 (hereafter cited as
Hist Critique), pp. 21-30; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET. Study
129, pp. 2 - 3 ; Consolidated Rpt of TC Activities in
ETO, p. 27. All in OCT HB ETO.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
land, and in September the British held
the exercise HARLEQUIN to test their effec-
tiveness. In this exercise troops were moved
rapidly through pre-established movement
control areas, passing successively through
a concentration area, an assembly area,
and a transit area before embarking. Upon
the completion of HARLEQUIN, the Opera-
tional Branch joined with representatives
of the 21 Army Group and the British
Movement Control and, on the basis of
experience gained in the exercise, began
to formulate uniform procedures govern-
ing the movement and embarkation of
both U.S. and British forces.
In the months that followed, general
agreement was reached on movements
and embarkation procedures. The south-
ern part of England, roughly south of a
line between London and Bristol, was
accepted as the mounting area, with U.S.
forces concentrating in the southwest and
British forces in the southeast. In view of
the large number of troops involved and
the limited camp facilities available in
southern England, it was recognized that
it would be impossible to move all of the
build-up forces into the mounting area
before D Day. Therefore, it was decided
to have a prescheduled movement of
troops into concentration areas, and thence
through marshaling areas to embarkation
points, either directly or through embar-
kation areas.
The concentration areas were to be
located fifty to sixty miles from the point
of embarkation. While in a concentration
area units were to be self-sufficient, were
to continue their training, and were to
take preliminary steps in preparing equip-
ment and securing supplies for the sea
voyage. Next, the units were to be sent
southward by road or rail into a marshal-
ing area in the order indicated by priority
247
tables prepared by appropriate army
headquarters. There, they were no longer
self-sufficient and had to be billeted and
fed by a static organization. In the mar-
shaling area the units were placed under a
security seal, were briefed on the forth-
coming invasion, received final issues of
supplies and equipment, and their vehicles
final waterproofing. Movement from the
marshaling area to the point of embar-
kation was to be by craft or shiploads as
required for the assault and the subsequent
build-up.
The make-up of an embarkation area
was a compromise between British and
American points of view. In the American
zone of southwest England, the marshal-
ing areas lay comparatively near the coast.
In the southeast, the British marshaling
areas were located further inland to afford
maximum concealment and protection.
Therefore, the British desired an interme-
diate transit area adjacent to the embar-
kation point so as to control movement. To
reach a common method of procedure the
embarkation areas were set up to include
an embarkation regulating point, which
for the British could accommodate both
troops and vehicles but for the Americans
served simply as a traffic control point.
In practice, the Americans found no
great need for the embarkation areas,
since the proximity of marshaling areas to
embarkation points could have made pos-
sible control of embarkation of troops and
vehicles merely by parking the units along
the roads leading to embarkation points,
and then bringing craft or shiploads to the
embarkation point with motorcycle escort.
Each marshaling area was to be employed
for that purpose up to 75 percent of its
capacity. The remaining 25 percent was
to be kept in reserve to accommodate
troops and vehicles that might be unable
248 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

to move out because of enemy action, ad- possible, these training exercises helped
verse weather, or other circumstances. disclose matters calling for correction.
Troops generally were to stay longest in Assigned to Headquarters, V Corps, the
the concentration area, which in many first American large-scale exercise, DUCK I,
cases was their home station, rarely more was completed early in January 1944.
than forty-eight hours in the marshaling DUCK I involved the movement of Ameri-
area, and usually only a few hours in the can troops and equipment, their embar-
embarkation area. Apart from movement kation in landing craft, and a subsequent
priorities, the availability of motor, rail, assault with naval and air support on the
and, above all, water transport was the beach at Slapton Sands near Dartmouth,
key factor in the embarkation cycle. Devon, where tide, beach, and terrain
The procedures worked out by the conditions roughly resembled those on the
British Movements Director and the U.S. Normandy coast. In accordance with
theater chief of transportation were pub- planned movement tables, the troops and
lished by the theater on 10 January 1944 equipment were moved from the marshal-
in a manual entitled "Preparation for ing areas to the embarkation points. De-
Overseas Movement—Short Sea Voyage" spite several deficiencies, notably in docu-
(ETO-POM-SSV). The publication di- mentation and timing, the exercise dem-
vided the mounting operation into four onstrated that the normal transportation
phases—assault, follow-up, build-up, and procedure sufficed.
normal reinforcement. In all four phases Other assault exercises were performed
troops would flow through concentration, before D Day. Among other things, they
marshaling, and embarkation areas in the simulated the conditions likely to be found
sequence dictated by priority tables set up in unloading supplies over an enemy-held
by the tactical command involved. Among beach and provided training for Transpor-
other things, procedures were laid down tation Corps port troops in discharging
for stripping units of overhead personnel cargo from coasters into landing craft and
and excess equipment, for loading unit amphibian vehicles. They also furnished
vehicles with organization equipment, and experience in handling skidloaded, or pal-
for preparing necessary embarkation doc- letized, cargo.38 Continuous study and
umentation. On 31 March detailed tech- analysis brought further improvements in
nical instructions covering procedures to procedure. The prevailing point of view
be followed by U.S. and British movement was that, if difficulties were to develop, it
control personnel in implementing ETO- was better by far that they be detected at
POM-SSV were issued. this time rather than after the assault had
been launched. The major series closed
Amphibious Exercises
38
Used earlier in the invasion of Sicily, such cargo
The movement control and embarka- consisted of supplies lashed to small wooden platforms
tion procedures, as well as loading and that could be readily handled by mechanical equip-
ment or, if necessary, could be pulled over the beach
unloading techniques and other aspects of like sleds. Skidloads could be handled ashore with
amphibious operations, were tested in sev- comparative ease and dispatch, but they were often
eral U.S. exercises, in which transportation wasteful of shipping space. See OCT HB Monograph
19, pp. 143-46; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, II, 102-05, OCT
troops participated. Made as realistic as HB ETO.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY 249

with two full-dress rehearsals for the inva- was established in the spring of 1944 under
sion, TIGER and FABIUS. The first took on the joint direction of the Allied Army,
a grim touch when German surface craft Navy, and Air commanders in chief. This
attacked unexpectedly, causing a heavy Allied agency was composed of a U.S.
39
loss of life among the Americans. zone staff and a British zone staff, under
the chairmanship of a representative of 21
Movement Control Organization Army Group. The U.S. zone staff was
and Procedures made up of representatives of the Ameri-
can tactical commands and FECZ.
While the amphibious exercises were BUCO's principal functions were to con-
being held, planning and organization for trol the build-up of personnel and vehicles
the actual mounting operation had gone and to set priorities for their movement as
forward. Skeleton staff tables indicating desired by the tactical commands and in
the planned sequence in which ground, line with available shipping and craft. 41
air, and service units would embark from Under the control of BUCO were two
the United Kingdom had been drawn up subordinate agencies, Movement Control
by the First U.S. Army for the period to (MOVCO) and Turnaround Control
D plus 15, and by the 1st U.S. Army Group (TURCO). MOVCO had general con-
for the period thereafter. These tables were trol over the movement of troop units from
referred to the Concentration Plan Com- their home stations to embarkation points,
mittee established by the Communications issuing instructions for movement to trans-
Zone G-4 Planning Branch, on which the portation agencies concerned. TURCO, a
theater chief of transportation and the traffic control agency staffed by American
Southern Base Section commander were and British naval personnel, was formed
represented. On the basis of these tables, to assist naval commanders in the control
the committee determined the location of of the cross-Channel movement of ships
each unit as of D minus 35, the sector and craft, with a view to minimizing the
through which the unit would move, the turnaround time.
concentration area camp to which it Although BUCO itself remained in the
would be assigned, and the projected date United Kingdom, shortly after D Day an
of its arrival at that camp. 40 organization called Little BUCO was set
The concentration plan assumed a pre- up on the far shore and in effect functioned
scheduled movement of troops and vehi- as BUCO's advance echelon. This agency
cles from their home stations to concentra- was attached to the First Army and was
tion area camps, and then through mar- staffed by Army, Army Air Forces, and
shaling areas to points of embarkation, Communications Zone representatives. It
but it was evident from the first that tacti- 39
Other important amphibious exercises included
cal developments and other considerations Fox, BEAVER, CARGO, and CELLOPHANE. See Hist
would in all probability cause the actual Critique, pp. 12-18; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, II, 112-37a;
Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 269-70; Ruppen-
flow of units to differ from that set up in thal, op. cit., pp. 348-54.
advance. In order to provide centralized 40

41
Hist Critique, p. 31.
and flexible control of the build-up on the On BUCO, MOVCO, TURCO, and Little
BUCO, see Gen Bd Rpts, USFET, Study 22, pp. 5-
Continent on a day-to-day basis, the 11, Study 122, pp. 6-12, and Study 129, pp. 2, 22-23,
Build-up Control Organization (BUCO) OCT HB ETO.
250 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

screened and consolidated requests for Within this framework, U.S. movement
changes in priorities of troop units and control functions were performed by Trans-
passed them on to BUCO for implementa- portation Corps personnel at the theater
tion. and base section levels. The chief of trans-
The procedures developed by BUCO portation exercised technical supervision
were designed to provide movement con- over American movements and, through
trol machinery that could be adapted to his Operational Branch, issued instruc-
the needs of the tactical commanders and tions for the movement of units and vehi-
the transportation available. At daily cles to concentration area camps. The
meetings BUCO made alterations in pri- flow of troops and vehicles forward from
orities desired by the tactical commanders the concentration area was controlled by
and modified the planned allocation of the base sections, through the medium of
shipping and craft to meet current require- the regional movement control organiza-
ments. Any alterations of lift as between tion, which had been set up in the BOLERO
the Americans and British were arranged period.42
by BUCO with 21 Army Group, which Encompassing virtually the entire
was responsible for the allocation of ship- mounting area, the Southern Base Section
ping. BUCO broke down the modified was responsible for the great bulk of the
priority lists into lists for the several em- marshaling and embarkation, although
barkation sectors, showing the sequence inthe Western Base Section assisted in
which units would embark in each. The mounting two airborne divisions and a
lists were set up three weeks ahead of portion of the seaborne build-up forces.
movement, and on the basis of this infor- Southern Base Section's four districts,
mation MOVCO issued a force loading bearing the Roman numerals XVI, XVII,
forecast for each embarkation sector, cov- XVIII, and XIX, were the principal ad-
ering anticipated movements during the ministrative units in the mounting process.
next ten days. These data were subject to The latter two districts, on the southern
change, but provided the base sections and coast of England, corresponded to the
sectors with a basis for planning and prep- staging zones. The zones, in turn, were di-
arations. vided into nine marshaling areas, lettered
More important were the force move- alphabetically from east to west. Marshal-
ment tables prepared by MOVCO. Dis- ing areas were commanded by officers re-
tributed daily to base section headquar- sponsible to the district commanders. The
ters, marshaling areas, and sectors, these Center Zone, or XVIII District, contained
tables covered a twenty-four hours' flow four marshaling areas. Area A, contain-
into marshaling areas. Showing the allo- ing the marshaling camps and embarka-
cation of units to ports, the dates on which tion points clustered about Portsmouth
units would move to marshaling areas, and Gosport, was to be entirely British;
and the priority of loading, the force move- Areas B and C, in the vicinity of South-
ment tables served as instructions to trans- ampton, were to be used jointly by the
portation agencies to move units into Americans and British; and Area D,
marshaling camps, and provided the basis emptying into Portland and Weymouth,
for breaking down units into ship and craft was to be completely American. The
loads. 42
Hist Critique, p. 30.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
Southwestern Zone, or XIX District, con-
tained five marshaling areas, all American-
operated. These areas, lettered K through
O, were to empty through embarkation
points in the vicinity of Torquay, Dart-
mouth, Brixham, Plymouth, and Fal-
mouth.43
Embarkation facilities in the Southern
Base Section included a large number of
artificial loading points as well as piers.
Since there were insufficient piers to load
all personnel and vehicles on landing craft
and vessels, it was decided to construct so-
called hards along the south coast of Eng-
land from Deal westward. Selected and
constructed by the British Admiralty, the
hards were beaches paved with concrete
slabs and connected with the main high-
ways. At these hards, landing craft could
lower their ramps and take on men and
vehicles. Similar construction was unnec-
essary in the Western Base Section, which
loaded fewer troops and employed coasters
and deep-sea vessels.44
Movement through Southern Base Sec-
tion was effected by Transportation Corps
personnel at the various echelons of com-
mand. On the basis of MOVCO daily
force movement tables, the Regional
Transportation Officer, Southern Base
Section, issued road and rail instructions
for the movement of units from concentra-
tion areas into marshaling areas. These
instructions were carried out by the district
transportation officers and their RTO's.
Sector headquarters, agencies set up by
the Southern Base Section, controlled
movements from the marshaling areas to
embarkation points within their assigned
territories. Upon receipt of TURCO vessel
availability notices and MOVCO force
movement tables, the sector broke units
down into craft and shiploads, and called
them forward from the marshaling areas.
251
In the embarkation areas Transportation
Corps personnel received craft and ship-
loads, and assigned them to temporary
parking places pending actual embarka-
tion. The appropriate port commander
was responsible for the loading of troops
and vehicles at the piers and hards. Actual
loadings at the hards were handled by
Transportation Corps embarkation staff
officers, in conjunction with naval hard-
45
masters.
To co-ordinate its marshaling and em-
barkation activities, the Southern Base
Section established an elaborate agency
known as Embarkation Control (EM-
BARCO). Its purpose was to maintain
current data on units to be moved and the
location and capacity of each camp in the
U.S. Army concentration and marshaling
areas under its jurisdiction. The Western
Base Section, which had a far more mod-
est role in the mounting process, had a
simpler control mechanism. There the
Transportation Corps was made responsi-
ble for all movement orders, and, through
a sector headquarters at Newport and a
subsector headquarters at Swansea, regu-
lated all movements from marshaling areas
to embarkation points.46
43
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 129, p. 5, OCT HB
ETO; Hist, Southern Base Sec, Aug 43-Aug 44, pp.
12-13, AG Adm ETO 601; Hist Monograph, Hist Div
USFET, Administrative and Logistical History of the
European Theater of Operations, Pt. VI, Vol. I, pp.
254-55, OCMH Files. The Southern Base Section ob-
jected to the joint operation in the Southampton area
but was overruled. Ltr, Brig Gen Charles O. Thrasher
(Ret.) to Larson, 6 Jun 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
44
Hist Critique, pp. 19-20; Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp.
361-62.
45
Hist Critique, pp. 30-31; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, II,
108-110, OCT HB ETO.
46
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 364-65; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, Vol. III, Ch. V, pp. 1-2, OCT HB ETO. Called
EMBARGO by its critics, EMBARCO proved cum-
bersome and difficult to maintain. See Hist Critique,
p. 32.
 252
The Embarkation Machinery
Is Set in Motion
Using the embarkation machinery out-
lined above, the U.S. assault, follow-up,
and a portion of the build-up forces were
to be loaded before D Day; additional
forces were then to be outloaded as re-
quired, by a shuttle operation between the
south coast of England and the Continent.
Assault Force O, consisting of the U.S. 1st
Infantry Division and attached troops,
was to make the initial attack on OMAHA
Beach. This force and its vehicles were
scheduled for loading at Portland, Wey-
mouth, and Poole, with the preponder-
ance of vehicles being loaded through
Portland. Assault Force U, made up of the
4th Infantry Division and attachments,
was to attack UTAH Beach. Personnel and
vehicles of the 4th were to embark at Tor-
quay, Salcombe, Dartmouth, and Brix-
ham. A follow-up unit, Force B, built
around the 29th Infantry Division, and
two airborne divisions (the 82d and 101st)
completed the first American contingent
in the Normandy invasion. Troops and
vehicles of Force B were to embark at
Plymouth, Falmouth, and Fowey. The
1st, 4th, and 29th Divisions, which were
to be combat loaded, prepared their own
loading tables with the assistance of the
Transportation Corps. All together, ten
transports (APA's and XAPA's) and 539
landing craft were assigned to carry the
troops and vehicles for the assault. (Chart
3) The troop and vehicle lift, by sector,
47
was as follows:
Sector Troops
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90,562
Falmouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,035
Plymouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,790
Dartmouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,857
Weymouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31,880
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
The preloaded build-up forces, consist-
ing of the 2d and 90th Divisions and at-
tached troops, were to embark from the
Bristol Channel ports on coasters and
deep-sea ships, including a number spe-
cially fitted for carrying vehicles. The 2d
Infantry Division and attachments, aggre-
gating 23,100 troops and 3,280 vehicles,
was to land on OMAHA Beach on D plus 1
and D plus 2. The 90th Division, consist-
ing of 19,340 assault and attached troops
and 2,835 vehicles, was to land on UTAH
at the same time. Outloading the normal
build-up forces that were to follow was to
begin on D Day and would be dependent
on the utilization of craft and vessels re-
turning from the far shore. The principal
obstacles anticipated during this period
were the discharge capacity of the beaches,
adverse weather conditions, enemy action,
and marine casualties.
The embarkation machinery was set in
motion in late April 1944, when forces
were marshaled to participate in the last
amphibious exercises. The loading of the
assault and follow-up forces began at the
end of May, and was completed on 3 June
1944. The preloaded build-up forces were
aboard one day later. Aside from the 5th
and 8th Divisions, which embarked from
Northern Ireland in late June and early
July and the 9th Armored Group which
loaded at Swansea in the Bristol Channel
area, the bulk of the normal build-up
forces moved through the Southern Base
Section, with Southampton and its sub-
ports playing the major role in outload-
48
ing.
47
Rpt, Stat Br OCT ETO, Tran Statistics ETO, 6
Vehicles Jun 44-8 May 45, May 45, p. 7, OCT HB ETO Staff
11,850 Rpts.
48
Hist Critique, pp. 33-35; Gen Bd Rpts, USFET,
Study 122, p. 22, Study 129, p. 6, OCT HB ETO; Ltr,
2,604 Ross to Larson, 15 Jun 49, OCT HB Inquiries; Hist
2,595 Rpt, 17th Port, Aug 44, and Hist, 17th Port, Ch. VI
3,516 and App., OCT HB Oversea Ports. Cf. Ruppenthal,
3,135 op. cit., pp. 365-73.
 CHART 3—LOADING OF U. S. ASSAULT FORCES FOR NORMANDY INVASION: JUNE 1944

Source: Statistics Branch, TC Hq ETO.

254 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

As men and vehicles began flowing from difficult than the mounting of troops and
concentration areas to marshaling camps vehicles, and required comparable
and embarkation points in the last weeks planning.
before D Day, southern England became
the scene of intense activity. The traffic in The Overlord Supply Movement
the Southern Base Section was particu- Program
larly heavy, and in certain cities such as
Oxford, Gloucester, and Cheltenham, spe- The Transportation Corps had begun
cial movement control points had to be to plan for cargo movements incident to
set up with RTO's. The Medical Corps OVERLORD in September 1943, about the
assisted by taking care of casualties en time that it commenced its study of em-
route, and the Ordnance Department su- barkation procedures. In conjunction
pervised the important task of waterproof- with the British Office of the Director of
ing vehicles for the amphibious landing Freight Movements, the Transportation
and made necessary last-minute repairs. Corps Operational Branch undertook a
To control traffic in the Southern Base survey of the outloading capacities of
Section, the regional transportation officer, U.K. ports and of the ability of the British
Col. Walter D. McCord, required more railways to handle traffic from depots to
than one hundred railway traffic offices ports. This study was only exploratory
for operation under the district transpor- since tonnage requirements of the forces
tation offices. Although eleven traffic reg- to be engaged in OVERLORD had not yet
ulating groups were in operation on D been determined. By mid-February 1944
Day, the tremendous movement of troops G-4 was able to provide the Operational
and supplies necessitated the procurement Branch with the tonnage requirements of
of an additional fifty officers and enlisted the Army supply services, and although
men for duty in the XVIII District, which data on requirements for Air Forces tech-
became the main outlet for all movements nical supplies and for the U.S. Navy and
following the initial assault. During this Civil Affairs were still lacking, the Oper-
period the Transportation Corps was ham- ational Branch decided to set up a tenta-
pered either by an actual shortage of per- tive freight movement and shipping
sonnel or by the limited value of traffic program for OVERLORD. In early March
regulating units, which had arrived so late berths with an estimated outloading ca-
that proper training and co-ordination pacity of 27,678 dead-weight tons daily
proved very difficult. Between 4 June were allocated .for U.S. and British re-
(D minus 2) and 13 June (D plus 7), no quirements, with each nation receiving
fewer than 152,000 troops and 29,000 ve- about half the capacity. The American al-
hicles were moved into the marshaling location was later increased to 17,903
areas. During the remainder of the month dead-weight tons daily, based on the use
an average of 15,000 troops and 3,000 ve- of the Bristol Channel ports, Fowey, Ply-
hicles per day entered these areas.49 mouth, and part of Southampton. To
Meanwhile, the loading of supplies and assist in lifting this American tonnage, the
equipment for the support of the assault
and build-up forces had begun. This 49
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. VI, pp. 1-6,
transportation task was to prove no less OCT HB ETO.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
British Ministry of War Transport made
available 184 coasters.50
Meanwhile, the First U.S. Army had
been assembling supply requirements data
for the first twenty days of OVERLORD, and
on 15 March 1944 it published its supply
plan. The plan outlined daily tonnage re-
quirements for the assault phase, D Day
through D plus 2, and the build-up that
was to follow. All supplies for the first
three days would be preloaded on coast-
ers, LCT's, and LBV's (landing barges,
vehicle). Thereafter, shipments would be
made by coasters and deep-sea vessels.
Tonnage requirements were to rise from
5,326 dead-weight tons on D Day to 23,-
362 dead-weight tons on D plus 18. An
additional 12,000 tons of supplies, mainly
ammunition, packaged petroleum prod-
ucts, and Engineer equipment, would be
preloaded on dumb barges. The barges
would be towed to Normandy and there
driven onto the beaches, where their car-
goes could be used as a reserve in the
event adverse weather conditions inter-
fered with the discharge of coasters. Later,
the First Army published a breakdown of
tonnages to be delivered separately to the
OMAHA and UTAH Beaches, and projected
preloading operations, originally intended
to cover only cargo for the assault phase,
were expanded to include all supplies re-
quired for both the assault and the build-
up during the first eight days of the cam-
paign.
At this time the Operational Branch
was at work on a plan for the entire OVER-
LORD period, including the phases after D
plus 20 when the 1st Army Group would
be responsible for assembling supply re-
quirements. After consultation with the
British War Office, the Operational
Branch on 26 April 1944 published pro-
cedures covering the movements and doc-
255
umentation of supplies from depots
through U.K. ports. These were further
elaborated in SOS movement instructions
issued on 6 May.
As finally conceived, supply movements
were to be divided into four phases. Dur-
ing the first (prestowed) phase, all cargo
to land on the far shore from D Day
through D plus 8 would be loaded be-
tween Y minus 21 (Y Day being the readi-
ness date for the invasion) and Y minus 8.
During this period, cargo would be tac-
tically loaded as required by the First
Army, using LBV's, LCT's, barges, coast-
ers, and Liberty ships (MTV's) specifi-
cally fitted to handle vehicles. The coasters,
varying in capacity from 200 to 2,500
tons, were to be the backbone of the fleet.
To insure the arrival of the right quanti-
ties of required supplies at each beach,
vessels would be loaded with mixed cargo.
They would be prestowed in accordance
with detailed plans worked out by the
Transportation Corps' Marine Operations
Division in line with tactical requirements.
Every effort was to be made to keep the
composition of cargo as simple as possible
so as to facilitate its discharge and distri-
bution on the far shore.
In the second (sustained movement)
phase, supplies would be loaded in the
period of Y minus 21 through D plus 11
for delivery on the far shore D plus 9
through D plus 21. In this phase the coast-
ers, including those returning from the far
shore, would still be the major carriers,
supplemented by MTV's and commodity-
loaded Liberties. The coasters, based on
specific U.K. ports, would operate on
50
Unless otherwise indicated, the account of sup-
ply movement planning and preparations is based on
the Hist Critique, pp. 54-73. Also, see Consolidated
Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, Annex 5, pp. 11-16.
256 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
shuttle runs between the ports and the be necessary to outload supplies to fill re-
Normandy beaches, and cargo would be quirements on a day-to-day basis.51
consigned to U.K. ports for outloading as Although the primary emphasis was
shipping became available. Certain com- placed on the regularly scheduled move-
modities, notably ammunition, packaged ment of supplies, it was recognized that
POL, and heavy Engineer equipment, the shipment of certain items might have
were to be commodity loaded at desig- to be expedited to meet urgent needs on
nated U.K. ports. Since it was not known the far shore. Therefore, blood, medical
precisely when individual vessels would supplies, radio sets and parts, and other
return and since such ships varied greatly high-priority freight were to be carried
in size and capacity, the preparation of under a Red Ball express system. 52 Dis-
detailed prestowage plans would be im- patched through Southampton, express
practicable. The port commanders there- shipments were limited to approximately
fore were to be responsible for planning 100 dead-weight tons per day. The first
the stowage of vessels as they returned shipment comprised nearly a ton of radio
from the far shore. sets and parts destined for OMAHA Beach.
Loading for phase three (maintenance Forwarded by truck to the port, Red Ball
movement) was to take place from D plus items as a rule received top stowage so as
12 through D plus 31 and was to include to facilitate discharge in France. Unfor-
cargo required on the far shore between tunately, the desire of the supply services
D plus 21 and D plus 41. In this period and agencies on the Continent to utilize
coasters would continue to be important, fully the allotted tonnage capacity occa-
but ocean-going vessels—Liberties pre- sionally led to the shipment of razor
stowed or commodity loaded in the United blades, grass seed, and other cargo that
States as well as those loaded at British could scarcely be considered critical.53
ports—would be used in increasing num- A Greenlight system, limited to ap-
bers. It was anticipated that almost all proximately 600 dead-weight tons per
small vessels could be commodity loaded. day, was set up to transport ammunition
During the fourth (change over) phase, and engineer construction material across
loadings would take place on D plus 32 the Channel to meet unforeseen tactical
through D plus 80 for delivery to the Con- requirements. A total of five days was re-
tinent D plus 42 through D plus 90. In quired to move such shipments from the
this period, the brunt of the shipping bur- depots to the port by special train and
den would be shouldered by ocean-going then by coaster to France. To streamline
vessels, largely from the United States, the operation, documentation was simpli-
supplemented by a reduced coaster fleet fied. Ships carrying these supplies had a
from the United Kingdom. It was ex- large green disk painted on the bow. The
pected that the prestowage of ships in the 51
United States with supplies of known ac- Opn "OVERLORD" Sup Mvmt (U.S.) Instructions,
Hq SOS ETOUSA, 6 May 44, USFET OCT 523 Sup
ceptability for immediate discharge on the Mvmt OVERLORD 1944, KCRC AGO; Hist Critique,
Continent would eliminate transshipment pp. 5-6.
52
through the United Kingdom. Also, since This must not be confused with the Red Ball
truck route subsequently established on the Continent.
reserves would have been built up on the 53
Hist Critique, pp. 69-71; Ltr, Ross to Larson, 15
Continent by this time, it would no longer Jun 49, OCT HB Inquiries.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY 257

Greenlight project began on 21 June, and the system governing the flow of supplies
the last shipment left Southampton on 23 and equipment from United Kingdom
July. Most shipments consisted of ammu- depots through the ports to the far shore.
nition and were delivered mainly to On the basis of projected daily require-
OMAHA Beach.54 ments assembled by the tactical com-
Implementation of the supply move- mands, the chiefs of supply services of the
ment program involved a multitude of de- Army, Air Forces, and Navy determined
tails. Among other things, detailed proce- from which United Kingdom depots the
dures for traffic control, documentation, required supplies and equipment were to
packing, and marking were worked out, be shipped, and indicated to the depots
and specific berths at the various ports on the specific quantities under each priority
the Bristol Channel and the southern rating, the destination, and the date of de-
coast of England were selected to handle livery at the far shore.
general cargo, ammunition, or packaged Upon notice from the appropriate chief
petroleum. Various ports were designated of service, the depot or the supply service
to outload special supplies. Engineer out- headquarters involved would prepare the
of-gauge and heavy equipment, for ex- supplies or equipment for shipment and
ample, was to move through Cardiff, prepare a separate Depot Supplies Ship-
lumber and piling through Southampton ment Data (DSSD) form covering supplies
and Barry, and coal through Cardiff and or equipment for each destination and
Swansea. each date of delivery on the far shore. 56
To effect the most economical use of rail Copies of this form were then forwarded
transportation and to facilitate outload- to the Transportation Corps Operational
ing, depots were assigned to serve specific Branch and the local U.S. RTO at the
port areas, port storage space was pro- depot. On the basis of the DSSD and the
vided to accommodate stocks which could outloading capacity of the ports, the Op-
be drawn upon during peak operations, erational Branch published the Opera-
and provision was made for the maximum tional Movement Instructions. These in-
utilization of pier sheds for the reception structions included the Supplies Shipping
and loading of cargo arriving from the Index number of the shipment—identify-
depots. Cargo would be called forward ing in code the port of loading and the
initially in boatloads in line with prestow- port or beach of destination—a descrip-
age plans. Subsequent shipments, consist- tion of the cargo, its dead-weight and
ing of several days' supply for specific far measurement tonnage, rail or road paths
shore areas, would be consigned to the to be followed, and the time of arrival at
United Kingdom port commander con- the ports. These instructions in effect
cerned, who would develop stowage plans
to provide for vessels to arrive at the 54
Emergency shipments were also made by air. See
proper beach on the day designated in Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 129, pp. 3-4, OCT HB
ETO.
movements instructions.55 55
"OVERLORD" Sup Mvmt Instructions cited n. 51;
The Operational Movement Instruc- Hist Critique, pp. 58-60, 96-100; Consolidated Rpt of
tion, issued jointly by the theater chief of TC Activities in ETO, p. 27.
56
The theater chief of ordnance provided similar
transportation and the British director of information on an Ammunition Ship and Reference
freight movements, was the cornerstone of Sheet, instead of a DSSD.
258 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

served as an order to the depot to ship cer- 500 men on each outbound voyage. As
tain supplies to specified ports on desig- indicated earlier, the 14th Port at South-
nated dates; to the railway concerned to ampton took the lead in dispatching
move such traffic; and to the port to out- MTV's to support the invasion force. At
load such supplies on the date and to the first, vehicles were discharged on the far
destinations indicated. shore by barge or lighter, using the ship's
58
As the rail cars or vehicles were dis- own gear.
patched from the depot, the local RTO Under the supervision of the 14th Port,
forwarded by teletype a Traffic Dispatch American and Canadian personnel co-
Advice to the port of embarkation. Upon operated in building huge rafts, similar
arrival of the shipment, the port com- to those employed to float lumber on the
mander manifested the cargo to be loaded Columbia River in the Pacific Northwest
aboard a particular ship, drew up a cargo and consisting of large bundles of wooden
stowage plan showing the cargo's location poles and piling bound together by cables.
in the vessel, and prepared a "Breakdown They were to be towed across the Chan-
of Manifest" for each supply service with nel and landed on the far shore for the
cargo aboard. This last form gave a de- use of Engineer and Signal Corps con-
scription of the cargo, its tonnage, and struction units. At Southampton and
hatch location. As the ship was loaded, Poole the 14th Port had the preinvasion
the port prepared a Graphic Stowage project of stowing 104 self-propelled
Plan, and indicated the location of any barges (LBV type) with ammunition, pe-
items that would require heavy cargo- troleum products, and Quartermaster
handling equipment at destination. Once supplies. Because of the supreme impor-
the ships were loaded, their delivery to the tance of having sufficient gasoline and oil
far shore was a responsibility of to sustain the Allied air and ground offen-
57
TURCO. sive, the 14th Port was also made respon-
While supply movement plans and sible for loading a special pool of tankers
procedures were being developed, the at the Solent installations of Hamble and
Transportation Corps devised several spe- Pawley.59
cial expedients for delivering essential Specially equipped LST's were sched-
equipment and material across the Chan- uled to move assembled railway cars to
nel. Among these was the use of converted France. Rails were laid on the lower deck,
Liberty ships as motor transport vessels to and the ramp was modified. The cars were
carry trucks and drivers to Normandy. loaded and unloaded over track laid on
The conversion, which was accomplished improvised shore-side ramps that could be
by U.S. military railway shop battalion 57
Hist Critique, p. 67; "OVERLORD" Sup Mvmt In-
detachments, involved ballasting and structions cited n. 51; Consolidated Rpt on TC Ac-
flooring off the lower hold, so as to provide tivities in ETO, pp. 34-35; Hist, 17th Port, Ch. VI,
space for vehicles in four of the hatches; pp. 14-15, OCT HB ETO Oversea Ports.
58
OCT HB Monograph 18, pp. 75-76; Hist, 14th
the installation of deck latrines; and the Port, Opn OVERLORD (6 Jun-6 Sep 44), pp. 10, 14,
conversion of the fifth hatch into living 16-17, and App., Sec. IV, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
59
quarters for the drivers who accompanied Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. VII, pp. 6-8,
OCT HB ETO; Hist, 14th Port, Opn OVERLORD, pp.
each shipment. The average vessel lifted 6-7, 9-11,17, and App., Sec. III, OCT HB Oversea
approximately 120 loaded vehicles and Ports.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
raised or lowered with the tide. The LST
was made fast to the tracked ramp, and
the cars were pulled on or off as required.
Such ramps were constructed first at
Southampton and later in Cherbourg, the
principal terminals for cross-Channel rail-
way traffic. By 6 June 1944 some 15 LST's
had been converted to ferry rolling stock.
Actual ferrying to the Continent was be-
gun in the following month. Larger rolling
stock, such as locomotives and tank, re-
frigerator, and passenger cars were lifted
on British sea ferries, on the two American
seatrains—the Texas and the Lakehurst—
and aboard a number of large car floats
that had been towed to the theater from
New York. The seatrains operated mainly
between Cardiff and Cherbourg, while
the ferries shuttled between Southampton
and Cherbourg. A Transportation Corps
officer, Colonel Bingham, was in charge
of the entire ferrying program. 60
Among its other preparatory activities,
the Transportation Corps submitted spe-
cial procurement projects to augment the
supply of floating equipment and to fur-
nish replacements for inadequate cargo-
handling equipment on British coasters.
The Transportation Corps marine equip-
ment, consisting of tugs, barges, small Y-
type tankers, and various types of tow-
boats and other craft and manned by both
military and civilian personnel, was to
prove extremely useful. In the United
Kingdom they towed invasion craft to and
from assigned berths within the ports. Ap-
proximately thirty-four Transportation
Corps tugs were assigned to cross-Channel
operations. They moved landing craft on
and off the beaches, towed units for the
artificial harbors, and did sea rescue work.
Ten MTL's (motor towboat, large) and at
least one tug were lost or damaged beyond
repair. Only one of the tankers, the Y-24,
259
was reported a casualty. Beached on the
far shore, she pumped gasoline directly
into the tanks of waiting trucks. Eventu-
ally, most of these vessels were assigned to
harbor craft companies and then dis-
patched to the Continent.61
The signal to begin mounting cargo
was given in late April 1944 when Oper-
ational Movement Instruction 61 was is-
sued to cover the movement of cargo for
preloading on LBV's, LCT's, and dumb
barges. Also, separate movement instruc-
tions were published for each of the 132
coasters to be loaded at U.K. ports before
D Day. A total of 274 vessels and craft
were involved in the preload, and stowage
plans had been drawn up for each before
the issuance of the movement instructions.
The preloading of the large fleet of
coasters, barges, and landing craft com-
menced on 4 May 1944. Cargo destined
for discharge at OMAHA was loaded be-
tween that date and 5 June. During this
period 12 dumb barges were loaded at
Fowey, 68 LBV's at Southampton and
Poole, 7 LCT's at Plymouth, and 80 coast-
ers at Port Talbot, Garston, Swansea,
Newport, Barry, Cardiff, and Portishead
in the Bristol Channel area. Cargo in-
tended for delivery to UTAH Beach was
loaded between 6 and 26 May. In this op-
eration 8 dumb barges, 11 LCT's, and 7
LBV's were loaded at Plymouth, 29
LBV's at Southampton, and 52 coasters at
Sharpness, Penarth, Portishead, and
60
Hist, 14th Port, Opn OVERLORD, p. 22, OCT HB
Oversea Ports; Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in
ETO, Annex 8, pp. 16-17; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 6 Jun
44, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Special Rpt,
Cherbourg Port Reconstruction, 5 Mar 45, compiled
by Lt Col Joseph A. Grist, OCofE ETO, pp. 41, 46-
47, 130, OCT HB ETO France Ports.
61
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. VII, pp. 10-14;
OCT HB ETO; Hist, 14th Port, Sep 45, App. (Saga of
Y-Boat Fleet), OCT HB Oversea Ports. Cf. Ltr, Ross
to Gross, 6 Jun 44, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
260
Avonmouth. By D Day a total of 107,606
dead-weight tons had been preloaded for
shipment to the far shore. This figure may
62
be broken down as follows:
On the eve of the invasion the U.S. as-
sault, follow-up, and initial forces, and the
supplies and equipment necessary for their
support had been loaded and were await-
ing call forward. The larger and in many
respects the more difficult job of sustain-
ing the build-up on the Continent was still
to be performed. United Kingdom out-
loadings of U.S. troops, supplies, and
equipment attained greatest proportions
during the OVERLORD period, but con-
tinued important through V-E Day.
Outloading From the United Kingdom
On D Day the preloading program had
been completed, and the sustained build-
up phase had begun. Detailed plans had
been formulated for a smooth predeter-
mined flow of men, vehicles, and cargo to
U.K. ports, and for a continuous shuttle
service to transport them to continental
destinations. Subject to uncertainties re-
garding the return of vessels and craft
from the far shore, the tactical situation,
and the weather, the build-up program
ran into difficulties almost from the
beginning.
Troops and Vehicles
The build-up of troops and vehicles was
handled through Southampton and Port-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
land-Weymouth, although Falmouth and
Plymouth were also used somewhat in the
early stages. The marshaling of units in
the areas that backed up these ports began
before D Day. When the invasion was
postponed from the 5th to the 6th of June,
the British temporarily halted their troop
flow, but the Americans continued to
move units from concentration areas to
marshaling camps and embarkation
points.63 This led to the first signs of con-
gestion in the marshaling camps and at
the ports. U.S. activities at Southampton,
the principal port of embarkation, were
almost nil on D Day, since the British
were using the area to embark their
forces, but beginning 7 June the port was
crowded with marching columns of U.S.
troops and long convoys of vehicles, tanks,
and other matériel. At the outset the port
experienced a serious shortage of person-
nel, and there were not enough vessels and
craft to lift all the forces moving into the
port area.
The week that followed was attended
by congestion, confusion, and a temporary
loss of control of the mounting machinery.
There were several factors responsible for
this state of affairs. In the first few days,
movements forward from concentration
areas conformed to the U.S. First Army's
build-up priority tables, but thereafter the
tactical situation dictated frequent
62
Hist Critique, pp. 64-67.
63
According to the former chief of staff of the
Southern Base Section, the failure to delay enough
troops to counteract the one-day delay was attribut-
able to security requirements, Movement orders to all
units had to be transmitted by officer courier. Realiz-
ing that the troops already on the move could not be
halted without great confusion, Southern Base Section
permitted them to continue to move. When it was
found that additional delays would be caused by the
nonreturn of ships, orders were dispatched by couriers
to hold back units. See Ltr, Col Charles R. Broshous to
Maj Gen Albert C. Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 9 Jun 54,
OCMH Files.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY 261

changes in priorities. These changes were issued by sector headquarters before the
incorporated into MOVCO's force move- arrival of units proved erroneous, so that
ment tables, which were implemented by all planning and loading had to be
Southern Base Section. Soon there was effected after the units had arrived, when
little relation between the planned se- the actual number of troops and vehicles
quence of movements and the actual flow could be determined.
into marshaling and embarkation areas. In an effort to dissipate the tie-up, on
The frequent changes in priority caused 9 June BUCO ordered the loading of units
heavy congestion in the marshaling on vessels as rapidly as possible regardless
camps, for once a unit had been moved of priority and directed the temporary
forward, it had to be held in the camp curtailment of movements into the mar-
while higher-priority units were processed shaling camps behind Southampton.
and sent through ahead of it. Moreover, Units were then moved into embarkation
priorities were often set by the tactical points and loaded on ships and craft as
command on the far shore without regard rapidly as they became available. At the
to the readiness of units. This resulted in piers and hards, embarkation had to be
many being called forward before they accomplished on short notice and often
were properly equipped and organized. without the benefit even of hurriedly pre-
Other units, desiring to keep their troops pared plans. In some cases no records
and organizational equipment intact, did were kept of these loadings, a deficiency
not shed their overhead personnel and that might have proved serious had ship-
excess equipment in the concentration ping losses occurred.
area as provided for in the embarkation Through strenuous efforts, which left
procedure, but took them along to the not a few officers and enlisted men on the
marshaling camps, thereby contributing point of exhaustion, the situation on the
to the congestion. Finally, ships and craft near shore was improved. There is little
did not return from the far shore in the evidence that either administrative con-
number or at the time expected, so that fusion or congestion of the marshaling
more troops were in embarkation areas areas persisted after 12 June. Outloadings
64
than could be loaded promptly. continued to lag, however, because of the
The magnitude of the operation, fre- limited reception capacity on the far
quent changes in priorities, the lack of shore, the slow turnaround of vessels, and
shipping, and other difficulties caused a the shipping shortage. The decline in out-
disorganization of the mounting machin- 64
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 422-24; Hist, 14th Port,
ery that attained serious proportions be- Opn OVERLORD, pp. 11-13, OCT HB Oversea Ports;
tween 9 and 12 June. 65 Marshaling areas Hist Critique, pp. 37-38; Interv, Larson with Col
were clogged, ports were crowded, and McCord and Lt Col Leo J. Meyer, 27 Oct 49, OCT
HB ETO SBS; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 129, p.
advance information regarding the avail- 12, OCT HB ETO.
ability of craft was lacking. EMBARCO 65
For a graphic account of the situation in the
could not keep up with the frequent XVIII District, see Brig. Gen. Paschal N. Strong's
article, "An Invasion Is Jeopardized," in the Combat
changes in the status of troops, and in Forces Journal, IV, 4 (November 1953), 29-33. The
many cases was unable to furnish accurate article, drawn largely from personal recollection,
information regarding the location of should be read in conjunction with Dr. Richard
Leighton's documented study, Commentary on a
units. At Southampton loading tables Memoir (OCMH Files).
262 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

loadings was halted and reversed on 18 concept representatives from the Southern
June, but the onset of the violent storm of Base Section and its districts and from
19-22 June reduced cross-Channel move- theater general staff sections should have
ments to a trickle. Thereafter, the build- been placed at BUCO to plan and change
up proceeded in a far more orderly priorities and indicate the concentration
fashion. 66 Toward the end of the month area or marshaling area to which they
the theater requested and received addi- desired units moved. These instructions
tional LST's and MTV's. By July the could have been given to the Operational
control of movements was effective, and Branch, which through Transportation
vessel availability had greatly improved. Corps channels would have controlled
Although difficulties continued to arise, actual movement from home station to
67
the principal bottlenecks had been concentration and marshaling areas.
broken. As has been stated, the frequent changes
From the experience in the United in the priority of units posed serious prob-
Kingdom, particularly during the first lems. Such changes tended to congest
weeks of the build-up, certain conclusions marshaling areas, hindered normal troop
may be drawn regarding some of the movements, created confusion, and some-
major causes of the difficulties encoun- times resulted in split shipments. Occa-
tered. One deficiency that appears evident sionally, units were phased forward as
in retrospect is that BUCO lacked suffi- much as three weeks, and in several in-
cient authority to regulate the mounting stances units were called up before they
machinery in a fully effective manner. Al- had been fully equipped. However, the
though charged with responsibility for difficulties were to a large extent unavoid-
controlling the build-up, BUCO was not able, since most changes were dictated by
formally an agency of SHAEF, 21 Army the tactical situation.
Group, or the First U.S. Army. To carry Less justifiable was the failure of many
out its mission BUCO had to deal with unit commanders to adhere to established
the many agencies involved in the embar- mounting procedure. This applied par-
kation process, and its uncertain authority ticularly to the provision for stripping
made the co-ordination of activities ex- units in the concentration areas of over-
tremely difficult, and sometimes delayed head personnel and of organizational
corrective action. A theater General equipment other than that carried in unit
Board study made after the war con- vehicles. According to the plan, the equip-
cluded that a central organization should ment would then be shipped as freight so
have been set up, responsible directly to as to arrive on the far shore shortly before
the highest tactical commander involved 66
Leighton, Commentary on a Memoir, passim,
in the operation, and authorized to repre- OCMH Files; Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 424-26; Hist,
sent him on all matters affecting the 14th Port, Opn OVERLORD, p. 14, OCT HB Oversea
build-up. Ports. Also, see Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in
ETO, Annex 5, Movements Division, Office of the
A Transportation Corps movements of- Chief of Transportation, Operations in the European
ficial suggested that wasteful duplication Theater of Operations, Annex A, p. 2; and Interv,
in higher headquarters could have been Larson with McCord and Meyer, 27 Oct 49, OCT HB
ETO SBS.
eliminated if all build-up planning had 67
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 22, p. 13, OCT HB
been centralized in BUCO. Under this ETO; Hist Critique, p. 38.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
the unit. The residual personnel would
follow later. During the actual mounting
process, however, many unit commanders
took all their vehicles, troops, and equip-
ment into the marshaling camps, insisted
that they be loaded, and resisted the split-
ting up of their unit into craft loads for
embarkation. This aggravated the conges-
tion in marshaling camps, and tended to
disorganize movement and loading activ-
ities. Since the constant shifting of prior-
ities for units upset the scheduling of ship-
ments of organizational equipment and
occasionally caused delays in delivery or
losses, the attitude of unit commanders is
understandable. Nevertheless, there is
little doubt that had the commanders
conformed to the procedure set down in
the POM-ETO-SSV, the flow of troops
and equipment would have been greatly
expedited. The problem of placing organ-
izational equipment on the far shore when
needed could have been handled by giv-
ing such equipment priority treatment. 68
Another deficiency involved the man-
ning of camps and other installations
engaged in the mounting operation. Still
heavily engaged in the BOLERO program,
the SOS organization had been unable to
provide sufficient personnel in advance to
receive training in mounting procedures.
Also, it proved necessary to use units in-
tended for eventual movement to the Con-
tinent for housekeeping functions, and
when these units were moved out they
were replaced by troops not trained for
their work. Inexperience and lack of train-
ing inevitably had an adverse effect on
the processing of units and slowed the
mounting process.69
Outloadings of personnel and vehicles
reached a peak in July 1944 and contin-
ued heavy through September. During
this period there was some simplification
263
of organization and procedures in the
Southern Base Section. Beginning in July,
troops scheduled for loading on deep-sea
troop transports were entrained at con-
centration area camps and moved directly
to the water front. In the following month,
Marshaling Area "C," which funneled
units into Southampton, was turned over
to the 14th Port. Previously, this marshal-
ing area had been run by the Sector
Headquarters, which had controlled the
movement of units to the embarkation
points. With this transfer, the area be-
came the staging area of the 14th Port,
which was given responsibility for the
movement of troops from there to loading
points.70
By the end of September 1944, a total
of 1,462,426 personnel had been out-
loaded from the United Kingdom for the
Continent. The heaviest embarkations of
men and vehicles were over the piers and
hards at Southampton. In the period
6 June-6 September 1944, 686,868 per-
sonnel were embarked at this port on
LSI's, MTV's, LST's, LCI's, and LCT's,
and 140,303 vehicles were loaded aboard
MTV's, LST's, and LCT's. Southampton
also handled patients and prisoners of war
evacuated from the Continent. In addi-
tion, the port played an important role
in the outloading of cargo, rolling stock,
and bulk POL.71 The port facilities were
shared by the Americans and the British
on a day-to-day allocation made in
accordance with the tactical needs.
68
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO,
Annex 5, p. 16; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 129, p.
12, OCT HB ETO; Hist Critique, pp. 42-43.
69
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 129, p. 25, OCT HB
ETO.
70
Hist, 14th Port, Opn OVERLORD, pp. 15-16, OCT
HB Oversea Ports.
71
See below, pp. 268-69.
264
Portland-Weymouth ranked second as
an embarkation area, handling a daily
loading program of 10,500 troops and
1,500 vehicles aboard LSI's, LST's, LCI's,
and LCT's. Plymouth and Falmouth were
active as MTV loading ports until the
latter part of July, moving a total of
60,152 troops and 17,386 vehicles. The
Bristol Channel ports were primarily used
for loading cargo and played only a small
part in personnel and vehicle embarka-
tions. After preloading 42,410 troops and
6,435 vehicles, these ports outloaded less
than 6,200 personnel and accompanying
equipment during the next three months.72
In September, when the great bulk of
troops scheduled for the movement from
the United Kingdom to the Continent
had been outloaded, BUCO and EM-
BARCO ceased to function. Their re-
sponsibilities were turned over to the
United Kingdom Base Section, and the
U.S. MOVCO staff was absorbed by the
office of the theater chief of transporta-
tion. Thereafter, priorities were set by the
United Kingdom Base Section G-4, with
the Transportation Corps Operational
Branch (later Movements Division) con-
trolling the movement of all units through
all stages into the marshaling (staging)
area. Movement control was effected in
co-ordination with base section (later dis-
trict) transportation officers, and United
Kingdom port commanders.73
It had been expected that troops would
move from the United States directly to
the Continent after September, but inade-
quate port and staging facilities on the far
shore led to a continuation of important
outloading activities from the United
Kingdom. From September 1944 through
V-E Day, large troopships, including the
Queens, the Mauretania, and the Aquitania,
brought U.S. troops into the Clyde and
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Mersey ports for immediate transship-
ment to the Continent. These troops were
then moved by train to Southampton and
its subports in the Portland-Weymouth
area, which at that time was handling all
cross-Channel troop shipments. Despite
some interference with the normal move-
ments of units to the Continent, a shortage
of shipping, and bad weather, the trans-
shipment program was accomplished
smoothly. With the exception of periods of
adverse weather conditions, troops were
disembarked at the Clyde and Mersey
areas and re-embarked at Southampton
and Portland within eighteen hours. The
transshipment operation ultimately in-
volved eighty-two troop transports, over
300,000 troops, and the operation in Great
Britain of 742 special trains.
The U.K. base also was called upon,
beginning on 1 October, to handle con-
voys carrying troops and their organiza-
tional equipment and supplies from the
United States that were intended origi-
nally for discharge in France. These
troops were staged and processed in the
United Kingdom, and later moved to the
Continent. The Transportation Corps
Operational Branch was responsible for
moving the troops and their equipment
from ports of debarkation to designated
locations in the United Kingdom. The
convoys, which continued to arrive
through 6 January 1945, totaled 83 troop-
ships and 91 cargo vessels, carrying 269,-
822 troops, 547,608 measurement tons of
organizational equipment, and 330,027
measurement tons of general cargo. Most
72
Hist Critique, pp. 35-37, 53; Hist, 14th Port, Opn
OVERLORD, Sec. IV, Statistics, Daily Rcd of Vehicles
Loaded, 6 Jun-6 Sep 44, and Daily Rcd of Personnel
Embarked, 7 Jun-6 Sep 44; Hist, 17th Port, Ch. VI,
pp. 33, 39. Last two in OCT HB Oversea Ports.
73
Hist Critique, p. 33; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study
22, p. 12, OCT HB ETO.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY 265

of the cargo vessels were discharged at the not materialize. At the Bristol Channel
Bristol Channel ports, while troopships ports, for example, coasters did not begin
were unloaded at ports on the southern to arrive from the far shore until the
coast and in the Bristol Channel, Clyde, second and third weeks following D Day.
and Mersey areas. Also, forty-five vessels Meanwhile, the chief of transportation
carrying boxed vehicles intended for had ordered supplies and equipment from
troops who had arrived in the convoys depots to U.K. ports to meet the projected
74
were discharged at U.K. ports. daily requirements of the tactical forces on
As the result of the continued move- the Continent. As a consequence, the
ment of men and vehicles into the United ports were soon glutted with cargo far in
Kingdom, outloadings to the Continent excess of available shipping, and deliveries
remained important into the spring of to the far shore lagged behind the require-
1945. By V-E Day, a grand total of 2,480,- ments of the tactical forces.
432 U.S. troops and 422,608 vehicles had The underlying cause of the tie-up at
been loaded out from the United King- the ports was the failure of vessels to re-
dom for delivery to the Continent.75 These turn promptly for reloading, and this was
figures represent but part of the activity of the result of delays in landing cargo on the
the U.K. ports, for at the same time they far shore. As will be seen, selective dis-
had been handling the large volume of charge, adverse weather conditions, de-
supplies and equipment required to sup- layed delivery of manifests, and depend-
port the build-up of U.S. forces on the far ence on lighterage and improvised cargo-
shore. handling methods all contributed to this
lag. As the result of prolonged beach oper-
Cargo ations and delays in opening and develop-
ing ports on the Continent, ship turn-
As in the case of troop embarkations around continued to be a problem well
and vehicle loadings, the supplies and into the fall of 1944, and the coaster fleet
equipment for the assault and initial build- failed to live up to its planned capabili-
up phases of OVERLORD had been pre- ties.76
loaded. On D Day cargo destined for de- As early as 10 June 1944 it became ap-
livery to the Normandy beaches during parent that the coaster fleet would not
the first eight days of the invasion had deliver the tonnage required on the far
been placed aboard coasters, barges, and shore. Although the Operational Branch
landing craft. Although some additional argued that loading additional vessels
vessels were immediately available for would not necessarily increase the dis-
loading supplies for delivery after D plus 74
Hist Critique, pp. 38-41.
8, the sustained build-up phase of the sup- 75
This figure includes troops and vehicles of the as-
ply movement program was dependent on sault and preloaded build-up forces. Trans Statistics
the return from the far shore of the coasters ETO, 6 Jun 44-8 May 45, Stat Br OCT ETO, May
45, p. 8, Table, U.K. Loadings to 8 May 45, OCT HB
that were to operate on continuous shuttle ETO Stat Rpts.
runs from southern coast and Bristol 76
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 129, pp. 17-21,
Channel ports. OCT HB ETO; Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in
ETO, Annex 5, p. 16; Hist, 17th Port, Ch. VI, p. 35,
Despite light losses at sea, the antici- OCT HB Oversea Ports. On discharge operations at
pated prompt turnaround of vessels did the beaches see below, pp. 269-78.
266
charge over the beaches, it received orders
to increase outloadings. The Operational
Branch accordingly arranged for the load-
ing of 100,000 measurement tons of cargo
77
on ten Liberties by the end of June.
Meanwhile, the U.S. First Army had
steadily increased its supply requirements.
Since not enough shipping was available
to lift such tonnages, the problem of priori-
ties arose. Each service understandably
pressed to accelerate the movement of its
own supplies from the United Kingdom.
The constant interjection of priority ship-
ments had a disturbing effect on the flow
of traffic from depots to ports. Depots often
had to suspend work in the middle of a
shipment to work on priority cargo, and
therefore the port found itself with an in-
complete shipment on hand and had to
wait several days for the remainder.
Priority shipments upset packing and
marking at the depots; tended to cause
congestion at the ports; and necessitated
the cancellation of previously scheduled
trains, thereby causing congestion at the
depots and tying up rolling stock for
extended periods.
Although Transportation Corps move-
ment officials realized that priorities were
inevitable in view of the tactical situation,
they believed that requests should have
been more carefully screened and that
they should have been limited to justifi-
able cases. In their opinion the priorities
granted were often unnecessary, a conten-
tion that was given weight since some
ships carrying priority cargo in the latter
part of 1944 were allowed to lay at anchor
off the far shore for weeks at a time. 78
The necessity for meeting far shore re-
quirements on a daily basis hampered the
efficient movement of supplies from
United Kingdom depots. As already indi-
cated, tonnage requirements were prede-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
termined by the First Army and 1st Army
Group according to the date of discharge
on the Continent. The idea behind this
procedure was that a certain amount of
each type of supply, including ammuni-
tion and packaged POL, should be dis-
charged daily. A portion would be im-
mediately used, and the remainder would
be held to build up a reserve. Requisitions
processed by the tactical commands were
prepared for each day of discharge. Each
item of supply was broken down into daily
shipments, and vessels were to be loaded
so that cargo scheduled for discharge on a
designated date would be available at the
proper time.
Implementation of this procedure in-
volved a tremendous amount of planning
by Transportation Corps movements con-
trol personnel and complicated the work
of the U.K. depots and ports. The move-
ment of supplies for delivery on a day-to-
day basis made it necessary for depots to
prepare a large number of small packages
for shipment. The packages had to be
scheduled for movement by rail or high-
way in such a manner as to arrive at the
port when required. At the ports, coasters
had to be loaded in such fashion that a
certain tonnage would be available for dis-
charge on a given day. For example, a
coaster that required three days to un-
load, would be bottom-stowed with cargo
for discharge on the third day. The second
day's cargo would be placed above that,
and the first day's cargo would be top-
stowed. Since coasters varied greatly in
size and construction, stowage for each
had to be carefully planned in order to
meet these daily requirements. Aside from
the elaborate paper work and documenta-
77
Hist Critique, pp. 68-69.
78
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO,
Annex 5, pp. 15-16.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
tion involved, this procedure placed a
heavy burden on port storage facilities
since the port could not load cargo for de-
livery on the first and second day until the
third day's cargo had arrived and been
stowed. The task was further complicated
by continuous changes in supply require-
ments and by delays in processing requisi-
tions. In some instances, shipping bids
(DSSD's) actually arrived at the Opera-
tional Branch after the date set for dis-
charge on the Continent. Adjustments
naturally proved difficult in view of the
fact that the supply plan was based on the
maximum capacity of depots and ports
and the meticulous scheduling of rail and
highway transport.79
The scheduling of shipments for de-
livery to the Continent on a daily basis
was continued longer than was necessary.
A theater General Board study concluded
that while the setting up of daily supply
requirements was essential in the initial
operations, it was not desirable once some
reserve stocks had been accumulated on
the Continent. The board found that con-
tinuation of this procedure had compli-
cated depot operations, movement to the
ports, and port activities. Its wastefulness
becomes even more apparent when it is
realized that the vessels on the far shore
were not discharged in the planned se-
quence, but according to needs arising out
of the immediate tactical situation. Actual
requirements could have been met more
readily if the daily requisitions had been
eliminated earlier.80
Despite a continuing lag of shipping,
the U.K. ports had shipped out a huge
volume of cargo by the end of September
1944. Including the preloaded cargo, a
total of 1,439,227 long tons of ammuni-
tion, packaged POL, and general cargo
had been outloaded. Peak loadings came
267
in July 1944, when almost 450,000 long
tons were moved out. Although it had
been planned to reduce the coaster fleet in
the latter phases of OVERLORD, the coaster
continued to be the backbone of the sup-
ply movement program, being assisted by
relatively few deep-sea vessels. Aside from
the tonnages listed above, large amounts
of railway equipment, bulk coal, and bulk
POL were moved to the Continent.81
The Bristol Channel ports of Avon-
mouth, Barry, Cardiff, Newport, Penarth,
Portishead, Port Talbot, Sharpness, and
Swansea were all important in the ship-
ment of OVERLORD cargo. Operations
were supervised by the 17th Port, under
the command of Col. Edward H. Connor,
Jr. In addition to loading regular opera-
tional tonnage, such as general cargo,
packaged POL, and ammunition, a num-
ber of these ports handled specialized
cargo. Cardiff loaded Engineer heavy
equipment and locomotives, principally
on Liberties and seatrains. Bulk POL was
loaded on tankers at Swansea. From
Barry timber was shipped on coasters and
Liberties or rafted to the far shore. Bagged
coal was loaded at Cardiff and Swansea.
Between May 1944, when preloading
began, and the end of September, the
Bristol Channel ports loaded a total of 868
vessels with 1,037,332 long tons of U.S.
cargo. This task was accomplished in ad-
dition to routine discharges and loadings,
which fluctuated between 104,000 and
246,000 long tons per month. 82
79
Ibid., pp. 13-14; Hist Critique, pp. 66-67.
80
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 129, p. 20, OCT HB
ETO.
81
Hist Critique, pp. 76-77; TC MPR, 30 Jun 45,
Table 10, Cargo Loaded Out of U.K. for Continent,
OCT HB ETO Stat Rpts.
82
Hist, 17th Port, Ch. VI, pp. 35-38, OCT HB
Oversea Ports.
268 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

On the southern coast, the 14th Port at ing outloading targets. By this time, how-
Southampton, in addition to handling the ever, movements and loadings in the
greatest part of the troop and vehicle em- United Kingdom had become a less im-
barkation program, outloaded a large portant consideration than the discharge
proportion of the supplies and equip- and clearance of cargo at continental
ment moved to the Continent. The 14th ports. To facilitate the latter activities, the
Port handled the loading of coasters at theater chief of transportation and the
Southampton and its subport at Poole; Communications Zone G-4 agreed on the
loaded approximately 90 percent of the adoption of a commodity-loading pro-
rail equipment being shipped to the Con- gram. On 26 October the theater assigned
tinent aboard LST's, seatrains, and fer- ten Liberty ships to shuttle cargo from the
ries; and maintained a detachment at U.K. ports to the Continent. As far as
Hamble and Fawley to assist in the joint practicable, each of the vessels was to
loading of British and American tankers. carry one class of supply for a single sup-
During the first ninety days of the in- ply service. It further directed that coast-
vasion 14th Port outloadings, including ers should be commodity loaded when-
ammunition, packaged POL, general ever possible, and that as a general rule all
cargo, bulk POL, and vehicles, totaled Quartermaster Class I and II, Ordnance
990,341 long tons. In the course of loading Class II, and Engineer Class I and IV
troops, vehicles, and cargo during this supplies should be so loaded. The supply
period, the port handled no fewer than services and the Air Forces were to project
3,517 vessels and landing craft. Other im- shipping bids for a minimum of one
portant south coast ports were Fowey and month ahead and to indicate the relative
Plymouth, which were used under the priority of the supplies they desired
supervision of the 13th Port to load am- shipped. All coasters were to anchor off
munition and packaged POL, respec- Le Havre and be diverted to Le Havre or
tively.83 Rouen as the situation warranted. The
Continental discharge of cargo arriving commodity-loading program got under
directly from the United States attained way in November 1944.
significant proportions in July 1944, and At the outset, the U.K. ports encoun-
beginning in October increasingly out- tered some trouble, since it was necessary
stripped the tonnage being shipped from to segregate their rather sizable cargo
the United Kingdom. Outloadings from backlogs to conform to the new loading
U.K. ports fell off appreciably in the fall schedules. Also, the services failed to
of 1944, but again increased early the next maintain the prescribed month's backlog
year, reaching near peak proportions in of shipping bids, so that it was difficult to
84
the period March-May 1945. select and organize complete trainloads at
Despite a substantial cut in the tonnage the depots and ship supplies in the order
allocated for movement from the United of their priority.
Kingdom to the Continent in September
1944, erratic turnaround of coasters and 83
Hist, 14th Port, Opn OVERLORD, pp. 17-24, and
the limited availability of supplementary appended Stat tables, OCT HB Oversea Ports; Hist
deep-sea shipping caused the U.K. ports Critique,84
p. 60.
TC MPR, COMZONE ETOUSA, 30 Jun 45,
to experience continued difficulty in meet- Tables 7 and 10, OCT HB ETO Stat Rpts.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
In early 1945 it was decided to cut the
turnaround time of the coasters by assign-
ing the entire coaster fleet to the south
coast ports and to use the Bristol Channel
ports to load most of the deep-sea vessels,
chiefly of the Liberty and Hog Island
types. The coaster fleet then operated
mainly between Southampton, Poole, and
Plymouth and Rouen. The larger vessels,
except for a few used to load packaged
POL from Plymouth, operated princi-
pally between the Bristol Channel ports
and Ghent. The bulk of the cargo on both
the coasters and the larger vessels was
either commodity loaded or block stowed.
This reassignment of shipping paid off in
increased outloadings, and in March and
April of 1945 the tonnage was surpassed
only by the peak month of July 1944.85
Shipments of U.S. cargo from the
United Kingdom to the Continent con-
tinued until several months after V-E Day.
The tonnage total is impressive. Including
preloaded cargo, a total of 3,065,682 long
tons of general cargo, ammunition, and
packaged POL was moved from U.K.
depots to U.K. ports and thence to the
Continent by 8 May 1945. This tonnage
was transported principally by a fleet of
small coasters, which were supplemented
by Liberties and other deep-sea vessels. It
does not include approximately 1,151,000
tons of bulk coal and rolling stock, and a
large volume of bulk POL outloaded from
the United Kingdom. When the 422,608
vehicles and 2,480,432 troops moved from
Britain to the Continent are added, the
full magnitude of the outloading opera-
tion may be realized.86
Beach and Early Port Operations
With the assaults on the OMAHA and
269
UTAH Beaches on 6 June 1944, Engineer
special brigade troops, assisted by assigned
or attached service units, began the task of
beach development and operation.87 Ger-
man resistance was stronger at OMAHA
than at UTAH, but on both beaches enemy
shelling and sniping caused delay, damage
to equipment, and casualties among the
service troops. Cargo discharge was hin-
dered initially by the many beach ob-
stacles set up by the enemy and the
inevitable debris and wreckage of the as-
sault period. Mines had to be cleared to
permit safe passage across the beaches,
and roads had to be constructed.
Transportation units participated in
beach operations almost from the begin-
ning. Port troops discharged cargo from
vessels anchored offshore into amphibian
trucks (DUKW's) and Navy ferry craft;
amphibian truck units transported cargo
from shipside to transfer points or dumps;
and truck companies cleared the beaches.
The Transportation Corps also furnished a
major port headquarters, which had an
important role.
85
Hist Critique, pp. 76-86; TC MPR, COMZONE
ETOUSA, Jun 45, Table 10, OCT HB ETO Stat
Rpts.
86
Trans Statistics ETO, 6 Jun 44-8 May 45, Stat
Br OCT ETO, May 45, p. 8, Table, U.K. Loadings
to 8 May 45, and p. 19, Table, Total Cargo Handled
Up to 8 May 45, OCT HB ETO Stat Rpts; Hist Cri-
tique, pp. 87-89.
87
For details of the assaults see Historical Division,
U.S. War Department, Omaha Beachhead (6 June-13
June 1944) (Washington, 1945), and Historical Divi-
sion, Department of the Army, Utah Beach to Cherbourg
(6 June-27 June 1944) (Washington, 1948), both part
of AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES.
Plans for opening Quineville beach, to the north of
UTAH Beach, were abandoned shortly after the in-
vasion landing, and troops and equipment set up for
that operation were employed at UTAH. Rpt, Hq 1st
ESB, Operation NEPTUNE, Utah Beach, 6 June 1944-
24 October 1944 (hereafter cited as NEPTUNE Rpt,
Utah Beach), OCT HB ETO Assault and Beach
Opns.
270
Omaha Beach
The magnitude of the attack by the
U.S. V Corps at OMAHA caused the First
U.S. Army to provide the support of two
Engineer special brigades (the 5th and
6th) and one port headquarters (the 11th).
Over-all control was vested in a single
headquarters, which, with various at-
tached units, constituted the Provisional
Engineer Special Brigade Group, under
the command of Brig. Gen. William M.
Hoge.88 Included in the headquarters was
a Port, or G-5, Section, headed by Lt. Col.
Carl Biehl, formerly with the 11th Port.
While being readied for their mission,
the brigades were heavily reinforced with
transportation troops. Each brigade was
provided with two port battalion head-
quarters and ten port companies, one
amphibian truck battalion headquarters
and three amphibian truck companies,
and one Quartermaster truck company
with 104 vehicles. These transportation
units aggregated approximately 6,300
troops, almost one third the total strength
of the two brigades. Among other units
assigned to the brigades were Quarter-
master service companies, which were to
handle unloading activities on the
beaches, and railhead companies.
The 11th Port was furnished three port
battalion headquarters and eighteen port
companies, one Quartermaster trucking
battalion headquarters and three com-
panies, two amphibian truck battalion
headquarters and six companies, one
harbor craft company, three Quarter-
master service battalions, and other serv-
ice units, giving it a total strength of about
8,600 officers and enlisted men. In com-
mand was Colonel Whitcomb, an ex-
perienced officer who had previously
served at ports in Iceland and the United
Kingdom.89
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Transportation Corps units serving with
the brigades were scheduled to begin
operations on D Day or shortly thereafter.
In the United Kingdom, the brigade port
companies were placed aboard cargo
vessels, which were scheduled to arrive
during the first three days of the invasion.
After unloading their own vessels, the port
troops were to go ashore and there dis-
charge other vessels and craft anchored
offshore and under the control of the
brigades. Brigade DUKW units, their ve-
hicles preloaded with ammunition, con-
struction materials, and other cargo im-
mediately needed, were to be launched
from LST's beginning on D Day. After
delivering their cargoes onto the beach,
the DUKW's were to shuttle between the
ships at anchor and the initial dumps. All
DUKW's were scheduled to be in opera-
tion by the end of D plus 2. Brigade
trucks were to be brought ashore during
the first day of operations.90
The 11th Port was not to engage in
initial operations. Although an advance
party was to arrive fairly early, its port
troops were not to begin coming in until
D plus 10 (17 June), when the artificial
harbor (MULBERRY A) would be about
ready for operation. The principal mission
of the 11th Port was to be the conduct of
pierhead operations at MULBERRY A and
at the small ports of Grandcamp-les-
Bains and Isigny, which were to be opened
at about the same time, but its port troops
were also to discharge ships anchored off-
88
Rpt, Prov ESB Gp, Operation NEPTUNE, Omaha
Beach, 26 February-26 June 1944, 30 Sep 44 (here-
after cited as NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach), p. 7,
OCT HB ETO Assault and Beach Opns.
89
Ibid., App. A, Troop List; Hist Rpt, TC ETO,
Vol. IV, Sec. II, p. 1, OCT HB ETO; Interv, Larson
with Whitcomb, 28 Jun 45, OCT HB ETO France
Ports.
90
On truck operations on the beaches, see below,
pp. 282-84.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
shore, and along with brigade troops
operate cranes on the beaches.91
The brigade DUKW units began their
operations on schedule, first delivering
their preloaded priority cargoes ashore,
and then carrying cargo from ship to shore
and evacuating casualties. Operational
difficulties were encountered early. Many
DUKW's were sunk or damaged during
the landings when they struck enemy-laid
mines or other obstacles. Some overloaded
DUKW's were swamped, and others,
launched too far offshore, ran out of fuel
and were lost at sea. Adequate mainte-
nance and repair proved almost impossi-
ble because of the shortage of spare parts
and the round-the-clock activity.92
The story of the 453d Amphibian Truck
Company is illustrative. The unit was
alerted on 28 May 1944, and all vehicles
with their drivers and assistant drivers
were loaded aboard LST's. All other per-
sonnel embarked on the APA 77 (USS
Thurston). The convoy sailed from Wey-
mouth on 5 June and laid off Normandy
until debarkation time on 6 June, when
the bows of the LST's were opened some
ten to fourteen miles from the coast. The
DUKW's rolled off stern first, formed
columns, and headed for shore. The one
officer and seventy-five enlisted men on
APA 77 landed at approximately 1330 of
D Day from an LCI, which was hit several
times by enemy fire during the debarka-
tion. In the initial operation six enlisted
men were killed and seventeen DUKW's
were lost. The vehicles could be put
ashore only at low tide, when passage was
possible through wrecked landing craft
and beach obstacles to Road Exit 1.
By daylight of 7 June most of the 453d
Company's men and serviceable DUKW's
had been assembled on the beach. After
delivering its ammunition (thirty-six
loads) to the 1st Infantry Division, the
271
unit began evacuating the wounded. On
the following day the drivers began to
move supplies from ship to shore, continu-
ing this assignment around the clock in
twelve-hour shifts until 8 September 1944.
Most types of cargo were delivered to
DUKW's in sling or net loads. The aver-
age load was approximately three tons,
but in the first week as much was ac-
cepted as was thought could be carried
safely. During that period, because of the
shortage of trucks, the DUKW's delivered
directly to the dumps, which were located
in the fields behind the beaches. There-
after, service troops operating cranes on
the beach transferred cargo to standard
2½-ton 6x6 trucks, freeing the amphibian
trucks for their most vital function of
spanning the water gap from ship to
beach.93
Despite the difficulties encountered in
their operation, the DUKW's proved in-
valuable during beach operations, as they
had earlier at Salerno and Anzio. Al-
though not adapted to the transport of
bulky cargo such as Bailey bridge sec-
tions, they were well suited to carry com-
pact supplies such as ammunition and
subsistence. They not only performed the
function of a lighter, but also eased the
burden of other vehicles and cargo-han-
dling equipment ashore by transporting
91
NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 183-86, 203,
211.
92
The three DUKW companies of the 131st Quar-
termaster Battalion, assigned to the 5th Engineer
Special Brigade, lost 41 DUKW's on 6 and 7 June.
See Unit Hist, 7 Sep 44, OCT HB ETO Assault and
Beach Opns (Rpt of Units of 5th ESB); and Hist Rpt,
TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. 2, p. 2, OCT HB ETO. For
a detailed account of DUKW operations, see NEPTUNE
Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 203-08.
93
Later, the drivers and DUKW's of the 453d oper-
ated at Le Havre, assisted the 90th Infantry Division
in crossing the Moselle River, took part in the cross-
ing of the Rhine, and were active on the Danube. See
Unit Opnl Survey, 453d Amphib Truck Co, 2 Jul 45,
OCT HB ETO Hwy MTB.
272
supplies overland. In its after action re-
port, the Engineer Special Brigade Group
reported that the DUKW's had been in-
strumental in the establishment of an
orderly flow of cargo from ships across the
beaches to the dumps.94
The unloading of cargo vessels, sched-
uled to begin on D Day, was delayed one
day by heavy enemy fire and then pro-
ceeded slowly while the Engineers per-
formed the necessary tasks of organizing
and clearing the beaches. Among the earli-
est Transportation Corps units at OMAHA
Beach was the 184th Port Company of the
487th Port Battalion, which was attached
to the 5th Engineer Special Brigade.95 The
184th arrived aboard four coasters at 1700
on 6 June. Very little of the cargo aboard
the vessels was removed during the first
twenty-four hours, and at 1800 on 7 June
enemy shellfire forced all the ships to with-
draw. After the enemy guns had been
silenced the vessels returned to the beach
and discharge continued. As each coaster
was unloaded, the port troops aboard came
ashore and settled in foxholes on a hill
overlooking the sea. The unit worked
around the clock in twelve-hour shifts. Al-
though it had landed with only a field
desk and personal equipment, by borrow-
ing from other units and by salvaging cap-
tured and abandoned enemy material, the
184th Port Company soon managed to
erect suitable quarters and to serve two hot
meals every day from two field ranges. Be-
cause of the scarcity of cargo-handling
gear, special slings had to be fashioned
from spare lengths of cable and chain. For
lack of docks or other shore facilities all
cargo was unloaded from vessels at anchor
into DUKW's, rhino barges, lighters, and
LCT's.96
Activities of the other units of the port
battalions attached to the brigades fol-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
lowed a similar pattern. After unloading
their vessels, mainly coasters and MTV's,
they moved ashore, set up their bivouac
areas, and began working assigned vessels.
The port companies were ordinarily di-
vided into 16-man to 18-man hatch gangs
for the discharge of coasters, while 10
winch operators and 5 other men were
assigned to each motor-transport ship.
Again, crews worked around the clock on
twelve-hour shifts. Cargo handling on the
shore was performed principally by Quar-
termaster service companies.97
Meanwhile, an advance party of the
11th Port headquarters had waded ashore
at OMAHA Beach on D plus 2 and estab-
lished a command post in a partially de-
stroyed building. Although the area was
then being cleared, snipers fired sporadi-
cally from surrounding cliffs and enemy
mines were more numerous than antici-
pated. The men of the 11th Port immedi-
ately joined Engineer brigade troops in
removing the wreckage of landing craft
and vehicles so as to permit cargo opera-
tions. The remainder of the 11th Port
headquarters reached Normandy in five
increments between 9 and 22 June. Upon
the arrival of its first attached operating
unit, a Quartermaster service company,
the 11th Port was assigned to the right
hand sector of the beach, where MULBERRY
A was under construction. On 11 June the
94
NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, p. 208.
95
NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, p. 187; Unit Hist,
184th Port Co TC (7-30 Jun 44), OCT HB ETO As-
sault and Beach Opns (Rpts of Units of 5th ESB).
96
Rhino barges or ferries were constructed of
ponton units and propelled by outboard motors.
They could carry a heavy load and could discharge
vehicles on a beach of almost any gradient. See Rpt,
WTF, Amphibious Operations, Invasion of Northern
France, Jun 44 (hereafter cited as WTF Rpt, Invasion
of France), Ch. VII, p. 3, OCT HB ETO Assault and
Beach Opns; and NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, p.
201.
97
NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 183, 191.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
attached company began unloading its
98
first vessel, the Liberty ship Henry M. Rice.
The first weeks of cargo-handling oper-
ations at OMAHA Beach were beset with
difficulties. Tonnage targets for the dis-
charge of vehicles and supplies were not
reached until D plus 18. For one thing, it
was hard to learn exactly what was stowed
in the ships lying offshore. Although such
information had been compiled, it was
often not on hand because of delay in
transmission and inadequate ship-to-shore
communications. To solve this problem a
special organization known as WATCO
(Water Transportation Control) was set up
to maintain complete data on the ship-
ment of supplies to the Continent. Operat-
ing under the Amphibious Section, First
U.S. Army, but manned largely by per-
sonnel of the ADSEC Transportation Sec-
tion, WATCO functioned until late in
June. Its work was especially important in
the early days of the invasion since vital
equipment frequently had been left on
ships anchored off the beach, while less
urgently needed items were being un-
loaded. The situation was aggravated by
the tendency of the coaster captains to
shift positions because of air raids. As a
result, it was not easy to find the vessels
designated for discharge. One helpful ex-
pedient adopted by 11th Port officers was
to tour the anchorage area in an LCM,
spotting the desired ships and recording
the location of others."
A distinct hindrance to prompt dis-
charge was the priority unloading system
set up by the First Army. Although priori-
ties were necessary in the first days of
hand-to-mouth operations, the resultant
delay became so serious that all priorities
were abandoned on 11 June. For a time
ships were unloaded as rapidly as possible
regardless of priority, and thus the num-
273
ber of vessels at anchor awaiting discharge
was cut down. But circumstances soon
forced the resumption of selective dis-
charge. A large backlog of ships again de-
veloped during the severe storm of 19-22
June, which caused the virtual suspension
of discharge operations. Thereafter, in
order to relieve arising supply shortages,
particularly of ammunition, it again
proved necessary to give priority to the
locating and unloading of critically needed
cargo. The effect of this selective unload-
ing on ships' turnaround and its impact
on outloading activities from the United
Kingdom have already been discussed. As
long as incoming shipping exceeded the
capabilities of the continental beaches and
ports, pressure for some type of selective
discharge would remain. Nevertheless, the
sound and effective procedure would have
been to work each ship to completion.100
Some delay developed because the
Navy, at the outset, would not allow LST's
to be beached and "dried out" for fear of
damage.101 A later reversal of this stand
permitted direct landing of tanks and ve-
hicles and made waterproofing unneces-
sary. Ferry craft were also dried out and
their cargoes discharged into trucks at low
98
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. II, p. 1, OCT
HB ETO; Memo, CO 11th Port for CO Omaha Beach
Comd, 19 Jul 44, sub: Opn Rpt Neptune, OCT HB
ETO Assault and Beach Opns.
99
Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC, activation to 30 Sep 44,
pp. 6-7, OCT HB ETO; Interv with Col Biehl, 29 Jun
46, OCT HB ETO Misc; Extract from MS, Col Whit-
comb, One War, Jan 46, OCT HB ETO Assault and
Beach Opns; Rpt, 12 Army Gp, Final Report of
Operations, VI, 21, OCT HB ETO.
100
Ltr, Whitcomb to Larson, 5 Jul 49, OCT HB In-
quiries; NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 113, 177-
78, 188.
101
"Drying out" involved the beaching of craft at
low tide so that their cargoes could be discharged di-
rectly on the shore or to waiting trucks. The craft were
refloated at high tide. NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach,
pp. 247-49; WTF Rpt, Invasion of France, Ch. V, p.
21.
274
tide. Another problem was to effect satis-
factory arrangements for anchoring the
ships and for the utilization of ferry craft.
Co-ordination with the U.S. Navy, the re-
sponsible agency, was a necessary part of
the arrangements. Many ships at first were
anchored so far offshore that they could
not be worked efficiently. In desperation,
beach personnel unloaded any ship that
was near enough to be worked, regardless
of its cargo. Subsequently, such measures
as the assignment of additional ferry craft,
the anchorage of ships closer to shore, and
generally improved co-ordination between
the Army and Navy brought appreciable
relief.102
It was also found that the vessels at
anchor frequently lacked suitable equip-
ment to discharge bulky cargo. Ship's gear
on some of the British coasters was in a
poor state of repair, and damage resulted
when winch brakes slipped or other break-
downs occurred. Another hindrance to
efficient unloading was the lack of slings
and other gear for the discharge of deck-
loaded vehicles aboard Liberty vessels ar-
riving directly from the United States.103
During this period, the 11th Port oper-
ated under a number of serious handicaps.
Its port companies, scheduled to begin ar-
riving on 16 June, did not appear on the
scene until a week later. In the interim,
vessels were discharged by inexperienced
troops from Quartermaster service units
with officers drawn from port headquar-
ters providing training and supervision.
This was in marked contrast to the Engi-
neer special brigades, which from the be-
ginning had trained port units unloading
the ships assigned to them. To make mat-
ters worse, approximately 90 percent of
the port's equipment, including tractors,
warehouse trailers, mobile cranes, and
pallets, was discharged at incorrect beach
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
destinations. Considerable time elapsed
before this equipment could be recovered.
Moreover, the three attached Negro
DUKW units, the first of which arrived on
D plus 10, had inadequate training, and
in some instances assistant drivers were
barely able to operate the vehicles. Inex-
perience in coping with tides and currents
caused loss of time and damage to equip-
ment, and considerable difficulty was en-
countered in locating specific ships at night
even after they had been found during
daylight. Nevertheless, in the period of
11 through 26 June, inclusive, the 11th
Port worked 14 coasters and 11 motor
transport vessels, discharging 2,679 vehi-
cles and 12,200 long tons of cargo.104
By this time the 11th Port had also be-
gun activities at the ports of Isigny and
Grandcamp-les-Bains. Its other assigned
mission, the operation of the artificial har-
bor, had failed to materialize. The 11th
Port continued to function at OMAHA
Beach until 21 July, when it moved out to
concentrate its efforts at Isigny, Grand-
camp-les-Bains, and a number of other
minor Normandy ports.105
The experience gained during the
period that the 11th Port worked along-
side the two Engineer special brigades
gave rise to divergent views regarding the
suitability of these organizations for beach
operations. In its report covering beach
102
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. 2, p. 2, OCT
HB ETO; NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 173-77,
179-80, 197-98.
103
Memo, CO 11th Port to CO Omaha Beach
Comd, 19 Jul 44, sub: Opn Rpt Neptune, OCT HB
ETO Assault and Beach Opns; NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha
Beach, p. 191.
104
Memo, CO 11th Port for CO Omaha Beach
Comd, 19 Jul 44, sub: Opn Rpt Neptune, OCT HB
ETO Assault and Beach Opns; MS, Whitcomb, One
War, Ch. X, p. 10, OCT HB.
105
MS, Whitcomb, One War, Ch. XI, p. 16, OCT
HB.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY 275

operations through 26 June 1944, the En- tected anchorage for cargo discharge and
gineer Special Brigade Group recom- to supply a safe harbor for small craft dur-
mended that "a port headquarters should ing storms. In addition, various floating
not again be used to supervise beach oper- piers and ponton causeways were to be
ations, since it is not designed nor has it constructed. The floating piers were in-
been trained for this mission." 106 On the tended to give space to unload tanks,
other hand, the 11th Port commander trucks, troops, and general cargo from
contended that while the Engineer special ships moored alongside, and the ponton
brigades were invaluable in clearing land causeways were to be employed to dis-
mines, building roads, and otherwise charge troops and light vehicles.
opening beaches, they were not set up to To tow the elements of the artificial
handle continuing beach operations. He harbors across the channel and site them
pointed out that after the first few days thewas a sizable job, and Transportation
principal activities were lighterage and Corps harbor craft companies and tugs
cargo handling, with port, DUKW, Navy gave valuable assistance. MULBERRY A
ferry craft, and other service troops per- had a planned minimum capacity of 5,000
forming the necessary jobs. The brigades long tons of supplies and 1,440 vehicles
and brigade group, he maintained, lacked daily. The first blockships—selected from
the staff personnel and the experience to obsolete and damaged vessels—were sunk
supervise this work properly. After the at OMAHA Beach on D plus 1. During the
initial phases, in his opinion, a beach oper-ensuing fortnight considerable progress was
ation was basically a matter of handling made toward completing this installation.
vessels and cargo, a mission for which a The unloading of men, equipment, and
port headquarters was specifically in- supplies had barely begun at MULBERRY
tended.107 A when, on 19 June, a severe storm lashed
the Normandy coast. On 20 June adverse
The Artificial Harbors weather stopped most operations on the
artificial harbor and over the beaches, and
In order to supplement discharge over by afternoon of that day the strong winds
the beaches during the period before the had halted all DUKW activity. By eve-
capture of a major port, Allied planners ning it was impossible to moor or control
had projected two complete artificial har- any LCT's, LCVP's, or rhino barges. As
bors, or MULBERRIES, one ("A") in the the last personnel unloaded at OMAHA
American sector at OMAHA Beach and the Beach—a group of Army nurses—walked
other ("B") in the British sector of Arro- the length of Causeway No. 2, it began to
manches.108 Each was to include an outer
floating breakwater of bombardons, an 106
NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, p. 365.
inner breakwater of sunken concrete cais- 107
MS, Whitcomb, One War, Ch. IX, pp. 4-5, Ch.
sons or phoenixes, and a partial break- XI, p. 11, OCT HB.
108

water, or GOOSEBERRY, formed by sinking Chs. For additional details, see Ruppenthal, op. cit.,
VII and X. See also Alfred Stanford, Force Mul-
blockships moored bow-to-stern and de- berry (New York: W. Morrow and Company, 1951);
signed to provide a sheltered area for tugs, and Chapters IV and V of John Worth's projected
barges, landing craft, and DUKW's. The volume, The American Merchant Marine at the Nor-
mandy Landings, prepared under the supervision of
primary objectives were to furnish a pro- the U.S. Maritime Commission.
276
weave and buckle, but they arrived safely
ashore.
Throughout 21 and 22 June the storm
raged. The bombardons of the outer
breakwater were lost, the inner breakwater
was severely damaged, and the backs of
seven blockships were broken. OMAHA
Beach was strewn with the wreckage of
stricken craft and shattered remnants of
the artificial harbor. High winds and
heavy seas halted all unloading, except for
that of a few beached LCT's. Troops from
the 11th Port rescued a number of men
and assisted in salvage and beach clear-
ance. By 23 June the storm had abated
and cargo operations on the beaches were
resumed. Meanwhile, the DUKW's had
been safely assembled ashore, serviced,
and repaired. They were, in fact, in better
shape after than before the gale.109
Apart from practically destroying MUL-
BERRY A, the storm interrupted the normal
over-the-beach activity of the Engineer
special brigades and the 11th Port, and for
a time it widened dangerously the gap be-
tween planned and actual discharge. But
recovery on the beaches from the effects of
the storm was amazingly fast. By late June
1944 the daily discharge over OMAHA
Beach had soared to almost 15,000 long
tons. No attempt was made to restore the
artificial harbor, and since it never was
completed as scheduled, its potential value
can only be conjectured. The GOOSEBERRY
later was reinforced with more blockships
and phoenixes, and it afforded consider-
able protection for small craft. One pon-
ton causeway, which was sufficiently shel-
tered to escape damage, proved very use-
ful in landing personnel and light vehicles.
Jurisdiction over the beach command
passed from the First Army to ADSEC
and then to the Communications Zone.
On 26 June 1944 the Provisional Engineer
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Special Brigade Group, which had re-
cently been detached from the First Army
and attached to ADSEC, was dissolved
and replaced by the OMAHA Beach Com-
mand. The latter assumed control of all
personnel and units formerly comprising
the group. The OMAHA Beach Command
in August was placed under Base Section
No. 3 (later redesignated the Normandy
Base Section). During the first ninety days
of activity at OMAHA Beach, U.S. Army
personnel discharged 926,689 long tons, or
an average of 10,296 long tons per day.110
Utah Beach
Since the operation at UTAH Beach was
planned on a smaller scale than at OMAHA,
the task was assigned to a single Engineer
special brigade (the 1st), reinforced by
necessary service troops.111 Among the
units assigned or attached to the brigade
were one amphibian truck battalion with
seven companies, three port battalions
with sixteen companies, and one Quarter-
master truck battalion with five compa-
nies. Also, on 10 June 1944, a detachment
of six officers and thirty-two enlisted men
from the 11th Port arrived to assist in the
discharge of ships at anchor. The mission
of the brigade and its attached troops was
to support the U.S. VII Corps. The latter,
after consolidating the beachhead, was to
109
NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 76-77, 141-
58, 208; WTF Rpt, Invasion of France, Ch. V, pp. 17-
28 and Ch. VII, p. 2; Hist Rpt, 11th Port, 16-30 Jun
44, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
110
Summary of Opns, Omaha District, 23 Dec 44,
Pt. VII; WTF Rpt, Invasion of France, Ch. V, pp. 17-
28; NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 154-58; Hist of
5th ESB, p. 196. All in OCT HB ETO Assault and
Beach Opns.
111
As in the case of OMAHA Beach, the brigade
headquarters was ultimately converted into a beach
command under the Normandy Base Section. See
NEPTUNE Rpt Utah Beach, p. 6.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
capture Cherbourg so as to obtain a major
port.
The brigade headquarters landed on D
Day and assumed control of beach activi-
ties on the following morning. As port,
truck, and DUKW units came ashore,
they were placed on duty with the beach
battalions. As soon as conditions permitted
they reverted to their parent battalions,
which were operated under the control of
brigade headquarters. Activities of trans-
portation units were similar to those at
OMAHA Beach. Port troops discharged ves-
sels at anchor. The DUKW's first deliv-
ered directly from shipside to shore dumps.
Later, when sufficient motor transport be-
came available, transfer points were set up
near the beach, where the loads were lifted
by crane from DUKW's to trucks. The
truck companies cleared supplies from the
beach and transfer points. The average
round-trip distance from transfer points
to dumps was approximately thirteen
miles.112
At UTAH, as at OMAHA, operations were
at first hampered by the Navy ban on dry-
113
ing out LST's. At UTAH Beach also, in-
formation as to expected arrivals of troops
and matériel was at first inadequate, and
data on vessels offshore were lacking.
These deficiencies were caused in part by
poor ship-to-shore communications and in
part by delays in the delivery of docu-
ments from the United Kingdom. Be-
cause of the large number of loading ports
in the United Kingdom and the short sea
voyage, it proved difficult to furnish timely
advices to the far shore on scheduled
arrivals. Moreover, although provision
was made for their advance delivery by
dispatch boat or aircraft, ships' manifests
often were delivered after the ships arrived
off the beaches, and in some instances did
not arrive at all. In many cases, the mani-
277
fests were delivered promptly to the far
shore, but did not reach those responsible
for unloading. The anchorage area,
roughly four miles long by five miles wide,
was congested with a fleet comprising at
one time as many as 75 Liberty ships, 20
coasters, 80 LCT's, 10 LCI's, 2 hospital
ships, 20 LST's, and approximately 300
smaller craft.
Some relief was afforded shortly after
D Day when responsibility for transmit-
ting documents for all ships loading out of
U.K. ports was centralized at Southamp-
ton. The principal difficulties were gradu-
ally overcome during the following month,
as communications improved and agencies
on both sides of the Channel worked out
effective procedures. During the same
period, a satisfactory communications sys-
tem was established, which included ship-
to-shore radio and telephone service at all
beach installations.114
During June UTAH Beach received
109,134 long tons of cargo. The storm
forced a temporary suspension of discharge
operations but did less damage than at
OMAHA. Cargo removal was resumed as
soon as the weather moderated. In July
cargo discharge reached a record level of
193,154 long tons. By mid-November
1944, when beach activity ceased, the
total cargo discharged had risen to 726,014
long tons. In addition, approximately
801,000 troops and 163,529 vehicles were
landed. This achievement compared fa-
112
Ibid., pp. 1, 4-5, 7-8, Incl 2, Troop List, and
Annexes 2 and 3; Memo, CO 11th Port for CO
Omaha Beach Comd, 19 Jul 44, sub: Opns Rpt Nep-
tune, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
113
NEPTUNE Rpt, Utah Beach, p. 7.
114
NEPTUNE Rpt, Utah Beach, Annex 1, pp. 1-2;
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 130, p. 41, OCT HB
ETO; Ltr, Gen Thrasher to Larson, 21 Apr 50, OCT
HB Inquiries; Hist, 14th Port, Opn OVERLORD, pp.
25-26, OCT HB Assault and Beach Opns.
278
vorably with that at OMAHA Beach, where
the original plans had called for more
elaborate shore facilities and greater dis-
charge.115
Discharge operations over the Nor-
mandy beaches were vital to the success of
the U.S. armies in France, but the con-
tinuance of this activity well into Novem-
ber 1944 entailed considerable property
loss because of adverse weather.116 Despite
obvious drawbacks, far more cargo was
landed over the beaches than the planners
had thought possible. At both OMAHA
Beach and UTAH Beach the Americans
demonstrated beyond doubt that, given a
foothold on a coast with a suitable gradi-
ent, adequate air and naval support, and
the necessary ships, landing craft, harbor
boats, and DUKW's, a sizable invasion
force could be maintained regardless of
the lack of established port facilities. The
elements, however, always would be a lim-
iting factor, and beach operations at best
could be only a stopgap measure pending
the seizure of a major port.117
Normandy Minor Ports
To supplement cargo discharge at
OMAHA Beach, operations were planned
at Grandcamp-les-Bains and Isigny, which
together were estimated to have an ulti-
mate capacity of 1,000 to 1,500 tons per
day. The fishing port of Grandcamp-les-
Bains, located five miles west of OMAHA
Beach, was taken relatively undamaged
on 9 June 1944. The port consisted of an
artificial basin with a concrete wharf and
quay, which could be reached by an en-
trance channel. Not having been dredged
in six years, the channel and basin had less
than five feet of water at low tide. A de-
tachment from the 11th Port began opera-
tions on 23 June 1944, unloading 158 tons
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
of cargo from a small Dutch coaster that
had entered in error and so became the
first Allied vessel to berth in the American
sector of Normandy. Grandcamp-les-
Bains was found ideal for LBV's, which
were discharged by two 9-ton crawler
cranes. Port activity at Grandcamp-les-
Bains, never extensive, ceased on 18 Sep-
tember 1944.118
Captured on 10 June, the coaster port
of Isigny had a narrow channel three
quarters of a mile long and three undam-
aged 600-foot quays, accessible only at
high tide for vessels with a maximum draft
of 13 feet. Men of the 11th Port began
functioning there on 14 June, and ten days
later the first coaster berthed for discharge.
Isigny was employed on a modest scale
throughout the summer and early fall, and
cargo discharge ceased on 16 October
1944.119
Upon its suspension of operations at
OMAHA Beach, the 11th Port was assigned
to develop the minor Normandy ports of
St. Vaast-la-Hougue, Carentan, and Bar-
fleur, while continuing its work at Grand-
camp-les-Bains and Isigny. All the newly
acquired ports had limited cargo capacity.
115
TC MPR, 30 Jun 45, OCT COMZONE
ETOUSA, Tables 8A, 8B, 12, and 13, OCT HB ETO
Stat Rpts; Summary of Opns, Omaha District, 23 Dec
44, p. 5, OCT HB ETO Assault and Beach Opns.
116
General Ross recommended that all beach
operations be discontinued not later than 1 November
1944. Operating beyond that date, he warned, would
invite disaster, with a loss of personnel and equipment.
See Memo, Ross to ACofS G-4 COMZONE, 10 Oct
44, sub: Ports and Shipping, OCT HB ETO Antwerp.
117
Ltr, Whitcomb to Larson, 5 Jul 49, OCT HB In-
quiries; Summary of Opns, Omaha District, 23 Dec
44, Pt. VII, p. 9, OCT HB ETO Assault and Beach
Opns.
118
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. II, p. 10, and
Vol. V, Pt. I, Ch. II, p. 62, OCT HB ETO; NEPTUNE
Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 166-71.
119
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. II, pp. 10, 13,
and Vol. II, Pt. I, Ch. II, p. 62, OCT HB ETO; NEP-
TUNE Rpt, pp. 159-66.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
Shallow water restricted them to small
craft or coasters. Because Carentan could
be reached only through a long and diffi-
cult channel, little use was made of its port
facilities. Barfleur averaged about 800 long
tons per day. St. Vaast-la-Hougue was
consistently good for about 1,200 long tons
per day. The long delay in the full utiliza-
tion of Cherbourg and the insistent supply
demands of the American forces after the
St. Lo break-through made even the mod-
est intake of these minor ports important.
However, by mid-October 1944 adverse
weather had halted cargo discharge both
at Barfleur and St. Vaast-la-Hougue.120
Meanwhile, the 11th Port had become
active also at the coaling port of Gran-
ville, where it continued operations until
relieved about a month later by the 4th
and 12th Ports. The port facilities at
Granville required extensive reconstruc-
tion. The first coal ship to arrive was the
Mellissa, which began discharge on 22 Sep-
tember 1944. The shallow waters were
satisfactory for most colliers and lighters,
and within a week coal was being un-
loaded on a regular schedule. Granville
was a valuable coal port throughout 1944,
but adverse weather conditions and a
shortage of ships of the required draft re-
stricted the daily discharge to approxi-
mately 80 percent of the projected goal of
3,000 long tons per day. The principal
operating problem was to maintain and
repair the mechanical equipment for un-
loading coal, since skilled labor and spare
parts were scarce.
Except for one exciting episode, Gran-
ville's experience as an American port was
prosaic. On the night of 8-9 March 1945
the usual quiet of this quaint Norman
town was suddenly shattered when Ger-
man commandos from the nearby Chan-
nel Islands raided the port and escaped.
279
Col. August H. Schroeder, the 12th Port
commander, was seriously wounded dur-
ing the encounter.
Of the minor Normandy ports only
Granville remained in operation in 1945.
All had made extensive use of prisoners of
war both for port reconstruction and for
cargo discharge, as well as such civilian
labor as was available. The principal con-
tribution of these small installations was
to augment the flow of desperately needed
supplies to the combat forces during the
critical period in 1944 while Cherbourg
was being developed and before Antwerp
became available.121
The Opening of Cherbourg
Figuring prominently in the decision to
assault the Continent through Normandy
and in plans for the sustained support of
U.S. invasion forces, Cherbourg was
scheduled for capture on D plus 8 and
immediate development as the first major
American port on the Continent. Al-
though considerable destruction was ex-
pected within the port area, the planners
counted upon speedy reconstruction and
rehabilitation with the 4th Port to begin
unloading troops and cargo on D plus 11.
By D plus 90 the discharge rate was ex-
pected to reach 8,500 long tons per day.
Shortly before D Day, intelligence re-
ports indicated that the plans for the tak-
ing of Cherbourg were unduly optimistic.
As it turned out, organized resistance
within the city did not cease until 27 June
120
Hist Rpt, 11th Port, Aug and Sep 44, OCT HB
Oversea Ports; MS, Whitcomb, One War, Ch. XII,
pp. 7-8, OCT HB.
121
Hist, 4th Port, 1 Oct-15 Nov 44, OCT HB
Oversea Ports; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Ch.
III, pp. 8-10, and Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. III, pp. 2-4,
OCT HB ETO; Ltr, Schroeder to Larson, 25 Apr 50,
OCT HB Inquiries.
280
1944, and plans for liberation were de-
layed almost two weeks. Moreover, the
Germans had damaged or destroyed so
many port facilities and had laid so many
mines on land and in the water that it was
mid-July before the first Allied vessel
could begin discharge.
About noon of 26 June 1944, Colonel
Sibley arrived with the advance detach-
ment of the 4th Port. Despite sporadic
enemy action, he began an immediate re-
connaissance of the port facilities. The
main body of the 4th Port reached Cher-
bourg early in July, by which time head-
quarters had been established in the Hotel
Atlantique. Widespread demolition made
the setting up of offices and billets for port
personnel difficult. 122
In peacetime, Cherbourg was the site
of an important French naval base and a
familiar gateway for travelers to the Con-
tinent. At its Gare Maritime, passengers
debarked from transatlantic liners and
boarded waiting trains for Paris. Little
cargo was discharged there. 123 The port
did not lend itself to the prompt unload-
ing and clearance of cargo. The naval
base was very cramped, railway facilities
were inadequate, and the streets and
124
access roads were narrow.
Entirely artificial, the harbor at Cher-
bourg provided two anchorages—an ex-
posed outer roadstead, the Grande Rade,
and an inner roadstead, the Petite Rade—
where ships could be worked in all weath-
ers. The Petite Rade, which served the
main harbor installations, was protected
by two jetties, and had about 12,000
linear feet of quayage, which afforded
ample berthing space. It was divided into
three main sections; (1) the Arsenal, on
the west; (2) in the center, Nouvelle Plage
(New Beach), the Darse Transatlantique
(a deepwater slip that could take the
largest liners afloat), and the Old Com-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
mercial Port; (3) on the east the sandy,
filled-in land known as the Terre Plein
and Reclamation areas.125
Before surrendering Cherbourg, the
Germans had performed a masterful job
of demolition. Although the city itself was
virtually intact and damage to rail facil-
ities was not as severe as expected, the port
was a shambles. Fire and explosives had
accomplished wholesale destruction of the
port installations. The harbor was strewn
with wreckage and all important ap-
proaches were blocked by sunken craft.
In the Petite Rade, for example, the en-
trance to the Darse Transatlantique was
completely blocked by a 350-foot coaster
resting on a submerged 12,346-ton whal-
ing ship. The entrances to the Commer-
cial Port and the Arsenal area were
blocked by submerged or capsized ships,
tugs, barges, and floating cranes. Other
vessels and craft were sunk alongside
berths in the Grande Rade. All utilities
were inoperative, cranes and other equip-
ment were wrecked, and everywhere
deadly mines had been planted.
American and British naval personnel
122
MS, Hist Sec ETO, Cherbourg—Gateway to
France, Ch. I, pp. 1-5, and Ch. II, pp. 4-7, OCMH
Files; Hist, 4th Port, Jun 44-Oct 45, pp. 1, 3, 5, 15,
OCT HB Oversea Ports; Utah Beach to Cherbourg, pp.
197-99.
123
Even during World War I, the Army Transport
Service discharged almost no cargo at Cherbourg. The
troops debarked there reached a peak of 49,077 men
in July 1918. See William J. Wilgus, Transporting the
A.E.F. in Western Europe, 1917-1919 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1931), p. 445.
124
Illustrated Rpt, Cherbourg D + 20-D+ 177 1944,
compiled by ACofS G-4 SHAEF, 20 Jan 45; Progress
Rpt, 4th Maj Port, 27 Jun 44-15 Mar 45, p. 1. Both
in OCT HB Oversea Ports. Cf. Ruppenthal, op. cit.,
pp. 290-92; Ltr, Ross to Larson, 22 Jan 51, OCT HB
Inquiries.
125
Hist, 4th Port, Jun 44-Oct 45, pp. 8-14, OCT
HB Oversea Ports; Special Rpt, Cherbourg Port Re-
construction, 5 Mar 45, compiled by Col Crist, OCT
HB ETO France Ports. See also Memo, Col Beeler,
Trans Officer ADSEC, to CofT ETOUSA, 3 Jul 44,
AG 319.1 Rpts from the Far Shore TC USFET.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
cleared the harbor, a slow, tough, and
hazardous task. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers reconstructed the port facilities
ashore. Some debris went into the build-
ing of ramps for landing craft and
DUKW's, and some captured supplies,
notably cement, proved useful. French
civilians and German prisoners of war
were employed extensively to speed the
rehabilitation. Late in June a four-point
priority program was adopted by Engi-
neer, Navy, and Transportation officers,
calling for construction, first, of landing
hards or concrete aprons for DUKW's,
and then, in turn, an area for receiving
barges, space for the discharge of railway
rolling stock from LST's, and berths for
Liberty ships and seatrains.126
The 4th Port was ready to receive the
first four ships, which arrived on 16 July
1944 and dropped anchor in the Grande
Rade. Cargo discharge began immedi-
ately, but with only one DUKW unit, the
821st Amphibian Truck Company. The
first DUKW was driven ashore at 1738
hours at Nouvelle Plage. There, in the
shadow of Napoleon's statue its load of
Signal Corps wire was transferred to a
truck to be hauled to a dump. For lack of
deepwater berths, discharge at first was
confined largely to barges and DUKW's,
from which loads were shifted to trucks by
crawler cranes. The DUKW's operated
between the anchorage and the Nouvelle
Plage transfer point. The barges, which
began arriving shortly after the first Liber-
ties, carried cargo from the vessels into the
Commercial Port and later to the Recla-
mation Project and the Terre Plein dock.
Since these facilities were accessible only
during periods of high tide, a "stake boat"
had to be set up in the Petite Rade, where
barges could temporarily be tied up.
LCT's, and rhino ferries, brought from the
beachheaus, played an important part in
281
unloading deck cargo. Tugs, floating
cranes, and other marine equipment were
also employed.
Much of the initial cargo at Cherbourg
consisted of material for port reconstruc-
tion, for the building of railway lines into
the interior, and for the erection of pipe-
lines. The discharge of locomotives and
railway rolling stock began late in July
1944 when the seatrains Lakehurst and
Texas brought sufficient organizational
equipment to operate a railway grand
division. Until the quays were ready to
receive large ocean-going vessels and
coasters, such ships were unloaded by
lightering cargo from the anchorage. In
the beginning, port clearance was effected
entirely by motor transport because there
were no operable rail facilities.
Among early handicaps was the lack of
cargo handling-gear. The gear had not
arrived as planned. Fortunately, fork-lift
trucks arrived promptly, but the French
dock workers had to learn how to operate
them and training was hampered by the
language barrier. During the first fifteen
days only about 31,600 long tons of cargo
were unloaded. Although the opening of
the port had been delayed, ships contin-
ued to arrive from the United Kingdom
according to the original schedule, result-
ing in a backlog of cargo to be dis-
charged.127
126
Hist, 4th Maj Port, Jun 44-Oct 45, pp. 15-16,
18; Daily Diary, 4th Port T-410, Opns Vehicle Sec,
entries for 16 and 21 Jul 44; Hist, 4th Port, activa-
tion to 14 Sep 44, p. 11. All in OCT HB Oversea
Ports. Also see MS, Hist Sec ETO, Cherbourg—Gate-
way to France, pp. i-iv, OCMH Files.
127
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. II (4th Port),
pp. 5-13, OCT HB ETO; Hist, 4th Port, Jun 44-Oct
45, p. 17, OCT HB Oversea Ports; Phone Conv, Ross
and OCT ASF WD, 8 Jul 44, OCT HB Gross ETO—
Gen Ross; Memo, CO Port Hq Cherbourg for CG
ADSEC, 24 Jul 44, sub: Devel of Port of Cherbourg,
OCT HB Oversea Ports; MS, Hist Sec ETO, Cher-
bourg—Gateway to France, Ch. VI, pp. 1-13, OCMH
Files.
282
Meanwhile, Cherbourg's tonnage tar-
gets had been greatly increased. The de-
lay in capturing and opening the port
meant that Cherbourg, the minor Nor-
mandy ports, and the invasion beaches
would have to receive tonnages far in ex-
cess of those originally planned. Moreover,
fall and winter weather would severely
restrict over-the-beach operations. At the
same time, the unexpectedly slow advance
of the armies indicated that the Brittany
ports of Brest, Lorient, and Quiberon Bay,
counted on heavily for the period after D
plus 50, would probably not be taken on
schedule.
During July 1944 U.S. and Allied
transportation planners cast about anx-
iously for ways and means of securing ad-
ditional cargo-intake capacity. With
regard to Brittany, they explored the pos-
sibility of abandoning the Quiberon Bay
project in favor of the earlier development
of Cancale, and of opening a number of
small ports that had been considered but
rejected early in 1944.128 For more imme-
diate results, the planners turned to Nor-
mandy. The relief of the 11th Port from
beach operations in order to let it concen-
trate on the development of the minor
ports represented one expedient. The
other and more promising alternative ap-
peared to be the expansion of the capabil-
ities of Cherbourg. On 11 July 1944 the
port's daily tonnage goal was raised from
8,500 to 20,000 long tons, and its com-
mander was directed to draw up a plan
for the attainment of that capacity by 14
September 1944.129
Colonel Sibley's plan, submitted on 24
July, among other things called for addi-
tional cargo-handling equipment and
expanded port, rail, and highway facil-
ities. Although he was convinced of the
feasibility of the new mission, he warned
that its accomplishment was dependent
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
upon the prompt clearance of underwater
mines and obstructions and continued re-
habilitation of the port. Late in that
month his organization was strengthened
by the attachment of the 12th Port, under
Colonel Schroeder.130
At the end of July 1944, Cherbourg was
the only major port in American hands in
France. Since the beaches would have
limited use beginning in the fall and the
minor Normandy ports were incapable of
great expansion, Cherbourg would have
to bear the brunt of incoming cargo traffic
until other major ports could be taken
and developed.131
Initial Motor Transport Activities
Until the end of July, principal motor
transport activities centered in beach and
port clearance, involving short hauls to
forward areas or to Army depots. Few
truck units were required for over-the-
road operations, and even in those cases
distances were relatively small. Although
fewer vehicles were provided than
planned, they proved adequate for the
support of the armies, which were con-
fined to a shallow lodgment area.132
128
On the Brittany ports, see below, pp. 315-16.
129
Ltr, Col Hugh A. Murrill, Contl and Plng, to
Ross, 7 Jul 44, sub: Rpt on Normandy Ports, USFET
OCT 323.03 Cotentin Ports Survey, KCRC AGO;
Memo, Murrill for G-4 SHAEF, 19 Jul 44, USFET
OCT 319.1 Chastity Project Rpt 44, KCRC AGO;
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 130, pp. 19-21, OCT HB
ETO; MS, Hist Sec ETO, Cherbourg—Gateway to
France, Ch. I, p. 17, OCMH Files.
130
Hist, 4th Port, activation to 14 Sep 44, pp. 13-
14; Hist, 4th Port, 1 Oct-15 Nov 44, p. 3. Both in
OCT HB Oversea Ports. MS, Hist Sec ETO, Cher-
bourg—Gateway to France, Ch. I, pp. 17-18, OCMH
Files.
131
On operations at Cherbourg after July 1944, see
below, pp. 313-15.
132
Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC COMZONE ETO-
USA, activation to 30 Sep 44, p. 16, OCT HB ETO
ADSEC; Rpt, 12th Army Gp, Final Report of Opera-
tions, Vol. VI, G-4 Sec, p. 21, OCT HB ETO.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
At the two American invasion beaches
the Army's vehicles were put ashore as
rapidly as possible, at first from landing
craft and later from the motor transport
vessels that shuttled across the Channel.
On D Day two Quartermaster truck com-
panies, the 3704th and 4042d, landed on
OMAHA Beach only a few hours after the
assault wave. These two units arrived on
LCT's accompanied by their trucks
loaded with ammunition, rations, and
Engineer equipment. The LCT's beached,
the ramps were lowered, and the vehicles
were driven through the water to the
shore. The 4042d, the first truck company
to land in force at OMAHA Beach, lost
much of its equipment during debarka-
tion. Many trucks were "drowned out"
when discharged in deep water, and others
were damaged by enemy gunfire. Illustra-
tive of the more severe losses were those of
the fifth section. It set forth from an LCT
at approximately 1630 hours on 6 June
with seven 2½-ton trucks, of which only
two made the beach.133
Meanwhile, an advance detail of the
3683d Quartermaster Truck Company
had landed at UTAH Beach. In spite of
enemy gunfire and air attacks, the unit
began operating at once. As at OMAHA
Beach, several trucks were lost in the sea,
while others were damaged by enemy
action. One driver described his work as
hauling "dead Jerries, ammunition, per-
sonnel, and rations." Of necessity, the
trucks at first operated on a piecemeal
basis to meet the immediate need until
enemy action had abated sufficiently to
allow for more orderly operations.134
At both beaches incoming cargo for a
time piled up faster than it could be
moved inland. Though often inexperi-
enced and untrained, the drivers worked
long and hard, snatching sleep wherever
283
possible and subsisting on K rations. Be-
cause the trucks ran twenty-four hours a
day, there was no time for the normally
prescribed maintenance. Mechanics sal-
vaged parts from deadlined trucks in
order to keep others running. White strips
of tape were laid to indicate the cleared
roads through the mine fields. Sacks of
sand were piled on the floor of the cabs as
a protection against land mines. German
snipers were active for several days, and
enemy air raids and shellfire kept all
beach personnel on the alert. Rain and
mud also hindered the trucking oper-
ations.135
As already indicated, in order to per-
mit the DUKW's to perform their major
function of bridging the gap from ship to
shore, special DUKW-to-truck transfer
points were set up near the beaches.
There, crawler cranes were so arranged
that the incoming DUKW's could be
driven along one side and have their sling
loads picked up and transferred to trucks
waiting on the other side to complete de-
livery to the dumps. At the 6th Brigade
transfer area at OMAHA Beach all traffic
was controlled from a tower, and instruc-
tions were given over a public address
system. Operating personnel could also
communicate with each other by tele-
phone and radio. Luminous markers
made night operations possible. In addi-
tion to the usual crawler cranes, an in-
clined platform was constructed to facil-
itate removal of barrels and bombs. Steel
133
See NEPTUNE Rpt, 5th ESB, 20 Jul 44, p. 2; and
NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 209-11. The 4042d
and 3704th Quartermaster Truck Companies were
attached, respectively, to the 5th and 6th Engineer
Special Brigades.
134
Rpt, 3683d QM Truck Co, Record of Events, 7
Aug 44, OCT HB ETO France—QM Truck Co.
135
Ibid. See also Ltr and atchd comments, Col
Ayers to Larson, 19 Apr 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
284
beams salvaged from German beach ob-
structions were made into a special
transfer rig, through which DUKW's and
trucks were alternately driven. A hoist at-
tached to the rig lifted and held suspended
a complete DUKW load until a truck
could be moved into position to receive
136
it.
After a period of comparative inactivity
during the storm of 19-22 June, the ton-
nage removed by the truck companies at-
tached to the Engineer special brigades
and the 11th Port continued on the in-
crease. During this period the daily haul
at each beach often totaled more than
10,000 tons. Since the stress laid on daily
around-the-clock clearance by motor
transport did not allow time for satisfac-
tory maintenance, the normal plan that
each truck unit should have forty trucks
working while eight were being main-
tained was not followed, with the usual
sad effects. Driving through sand, sea,
rain, and mud naturally added to the
wear and tear. By the autumn of 1944, 50
to 60 percent of the trucks available for
port hauling in the OMAHA District were
deadlined because of constant use, poor
roads, inadequate maintenance, and a
lack of spare parts. Since trucks were es-
sential, adequate first and second echelon
maintenance obviously should have been
insisted upon from the beginning of the
invasion.137
Meanwhile, ADSEC's Motor Transport
Brigade (MTB) had arrived on the
scene.138 Its commander, Colonel Rich-
mond, landed with M. Sgt. Robert J.
Logan at OMAHA Beach on D plus 3. His
first bivouac area was set up in a large
apple orchard near St. Pierre-du-Mont.
Additional troops arrived on D plus 6 and
D plus 8, but because of delays in phasing
MTB personnel into the Continent, the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
headquarters was not fully staffed until
July. After assisting the 5th and 6th Engi-
neer Special Brigades and the 11th Port
in organizing their operations, the staff as
then constituted moved to Catz with the
rest of the ADSEC Transportation Section
on 20 June. By the end of the month other
trucking units had landed, and operations
began in what was to become the largest
motor transport assignment in the history
of the U.S. Army. 139
During the following month several key
figures in General Ross's Motor Transport
Division who were intended for duty with
the Forward Echelon, Communications
Zone, reached France and were attached
to various branches of the Motor Trans-
port Brigade for the interchange of plans
and other data. Colonel Ayers, Chief,
Motor Transport Division, was made
deputy to Colonel Richmond, and Capt.
Horace Lehneis became the executive
assistant. This arrangement lasted until
August 1944, when the theater chief of
transportation arrived with the main body
of the Communications Zone headquar-
ters. The Motor Transport Division per-
sonnel were then returned to Communi-
cations Zone headquarters, which was
located at Valognes, France. There, the
Motor Transport Division was reorgan-
136
See NEPTUNE Rpt, Omaha Beach, pp. 210,
213-19, and NEPTUNE Rpt, Utah Beach, Annex 3.
137
Outline Hist of MTS in ETO, p. 11; Hist, Trans
Sec ADSEC, activation to 30 Sep 44, pp. 2, 10, 15,
and Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 122, p. 47, OCT HB
ETO; Summary of Opns, Omaha District, 28 Oct-
4 Nov 44, AG Adm 321; Ltr and comments, Ayers to
Larson, 19 Apr 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
138
The Motor Transport Brigade, a provisional
organization under ADSEC, functioned from May to
November 1944.
139
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. III, pp. 1-5,
and Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC, activation to 30 Sep 44,
pp. 7, 11-12, OCT HB ETO; Hist, Hq MTB TC
(Prov), 8 May to 30 Jun 44, ADSEC COMZONE
OCT HB ETO MTB Rpts.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
ized into a Motor Transport Service with
Colonel Ayers as chief. The new service
was charged with technical supervision of
motor transport, but operational control
was retained by the Motor Transport
140
Brigade, ADSEC.
By 30 July there were more than 90
Quartermaster truck companies (TC),
along with parent group and battalion
headquarters, assigned to and operating
under the supervision of the MTB. Major
operations were still being performed at
the beaches and the port of Cherbourg.
The truck units were attached to the
beach or port commands and were dis-
patched from pools in accordance with
their operational orders. Other truck pools
operating on short line of communications
hauls were controlled directly by the
MTB. The latter activity, though rela-
tively minor at this time, became increas-
ingly important. In mid-June routes were
set up for the transportation of petroleum
products. Among the more impressive
feats performed was the movement of
300,000 gallons of gasoline and 300,000
empty five-gallon containers from UTAH
Beach to La Haye-du-Puits on 29 July for
the Third U.S. Army. As road movements
increased over the Normandy highway
network, traffic control points manned by
Transportation Corps personnel were set
up at Cherbourg, Bricquebec, Valognes,
and Montebourg.141
The generally satisfactory motor trans-
port situation began to deteriorate as soon
as the armies broke out of the Normandy
lodgment area at St. Lo and moved swiftly
eastward across France. The previously
constricted lines of communication were
stretched longer and longer. The speed of
the advance did not permit the establish-
ment of intermediate depots, so that sup-
plies had to be transported from the beach
285
and port areas directly to the armies.
Since the railroads were not ready, the
task of supplying the combat forces fell on
motor transport, which alone could pro-
vide the required flexible support.
Demands on motor transport soon ex-
ceeded the supply of drivers and equip-
ment. The desperate effort to keep pace
with the advancing armies was to prove
one of the most difficult transportation
jobs of the war.142
Early Rail Operations in Normandy
Early rail activities were concerned
largely with reconnaissance, rehabilita-
tion, and organization for operations on
the lines running south of Cherbourg. An
advance party of the 2d Military Railway
Service landed at OMAHA Beach in two
groups on 17 and 24 June 1944 and began
a survey of the rail situation. This party
followed the combat troops to Cherbourg,
arriving there on 27 June. The main rail-
way lines in the Cotentin peninsula were
found in fair condition, although the tun-
nel east of Cherbourg had been blasted.
The rail facilities in the vicinity of Cher-
bourg had been severely damaged, and
the enemy had planted the usual mines
and booby traps. The nearby marshaling
yards and the Cherbourg roundhouse
were largely intact, but at the important
junction of Folligny the yard was a mass
of burned cars and twisted steel amid
bomb craters.
140
Hist of MT in ETO, Ch. III, pp. 1-2, 5, 6;
Ltr, H. Lehneis to Larson, 10 Jan 50, OCT HB In-
quiries.
141
Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC COMZONE ETOUSA,
activation to 30 Sep 44, pp. 11-12, 17; Consolidated
Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, Annex 7, p. 11; Hist
Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. III, pp. 8-14. All in
OCT HB ETO.
142
For a discussion of subsequent motor transport
operations, see below, pp. 327-40.
286
On the other hand, American troops
had captured considerable useful rolling
stock, including locomotives, railway
wagons, and passenger coaches, all of
which had to be examined carefully before
being used. The French locomotives were
generally old, many dating from the last
war. Although a number of the most com-
petent French railway workers had been
spirited away by the Germans, those left
behind were anxious and willing to work
for the Americans. Several French railway
men were commissioned in the French
Army and then attached to the 2d MRS,
where they proved helpful in re-establish-
ing train service.
The 2d MRS commander, General
Burpee, arrived in France late in June
and was followed by the remaining ele-
ments of his headquarters and the first op-
erating units. At the end of July one rail-
way grand division, the 707th, three
railway operating battalions, and one
railway shop battalion were functioning
on the Continent. Meanwhile, the Engi-
neers had begun the rehabilitation of the
railways, maintaining close contact with
the Transportation Corps to insure that
the lines reconstructed were those the
latter desired. Native railway personnel
143
were employed wherever possible.
Actual train operation began early in
July. On the 7th, General Ross rode the
railway from Cherbourg to Carentan in a
jeep with flanged wheels. The first sched-
uled train over this route was dispatched
on 11 July. Manned by personnel of the
729th Railway Operating Battalion, this
train consisted of a French steam engine
and two streamlined passenger cars, pre-
ceded by a boxcar to cushion the blast of
any mine that might be encountered. The
run was made without incident. On
17 July Timetable No. 1 was published
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
for passenger service on the main line
from Cherbourg via Carentan to Lison, a
distance of 46.8 miles, and on 22 July the
first troop train was operated on that
route. To regulate rail traffic, RTO per-
sonnel drawn from the 3d Group Regulat-
ing Station were placed at Cherbourg,
Sottevast, Valognes, St. Vaast-la-Hougue,
Carentan, and Isigny.144
The first American railway equipment
to reach the Continent from the British
Isles arrived at UTAH Beach on 10 July.
Intended for work trains, it consisted of
two 150-horsepower diesel locomotives
and several flatcars, which had been
mounted on trailers and loaded aboard
LCT's. The trailers were unloaded di-
rectly on the beach, attached to prime
movers, and hauled to the main rail line
at Chef-Dupont. Later in the same month
a large shipment of railway rolling stock
was landed at Cherbourg from the sea-
trains Lakehurst and Texas. Subsequent
cross-Channel deliveries were made at this
port. By 31 July 1944, forty-eight diesel
and steam locomotives and 184 railway
cars had been received from the United
Kingdom, and the captured equipment
included 100 steam locomotives, 1,641
freight cars, and 76 passenger cars.145
143
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, pp. 1-7, OCT HB
ETO; Final Rpt, Chief Engineer ETO, 1942-45, pp.
281-87, OCT HB.
144
Phone Conv, Col Stokes, OCT, with Gen Ross,
8 Jul 44, OCT HB ETO—Gen Ross; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. IV, pp. 7-8, and Hist, Trans Sec
ADSEC COMZONE ETOUSA, activation to 30
Sep 44, p. 17, OCT HB ETO.
145
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. IV, pp. 9, 13,
OCT HB ETO. Deliveries of rail equipment from the
United Kingdom to the Continent under the joint
U.S.-British rail ferrying program ultimately totaled
approximately 2,000 locomotives, 20,000 freight cars,
500 passenger cars, and a large amount of miscellane-
ous equipment. See Consolidated Rpt on TC Activi-
ties in ETO, Annex 8, p. 17.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
In addition to the difficulty caused by
wartime damage and destruction of
bridges, marshaling yards, and tracks,
early rail operations in northern France
were hindered by frequent breakdowns in
communication. Isolated enemy units
could easily cut the single temporary wire,
usually strung along the right of way.
When this happened, a courier in a jeep
had to dash through the countryside to
deliver the orders that kept the trains
moving. The water problem also was
grave because many of the tanks and
pumps were destroyed or damaged. Train
crews lacked experience with French fa-
cilities and skilled natives were not always
available. The equipment for directing
traffic at night was poor, and on occasion
military railway personnel had to signal
with flashlights and cigarette lighters.
Much trouble came from overloading, a
problem that was solved after the 2d MRS
began to make up its own trains. 146
At the end of July 1944, rail operations
had been extended from Cherbourg to
Lison, and reconnaissance of recently
captured lines to the south had begun.
Traffic was still light; only 31,907 long
tons of freight and 4,524 passengers were
hauled during the month. The great
period of expansion lay in the future. 147
The Transfer of Transportation Headquarters
to the Continent
Like other phases of OVERLORD, the
organization of logistical activities de-
parted from its planned development. It
will be remembered that the First Army
had been assigned initial responsibility for
both logistical and tactical operations,
with ADSEC serving as a supporting or-
ganization. It was expected that by about
287
D plus 20 the First Army would draw a
rear boundary, behind which ADSEC
would take control of operations. The
Forward Echelon, Communications Zone,
would first enter the field as a supervisory
agency, and on D plus 41 take over direc-
tion of the activities of ADSEC and the
newly organized base sections. FECZ
would also prepare the way for the arrival
of Communications Zone headquarters.
Governed as it was by the tactical situa-
tion, the planned sequence of headquar-
ters, including their transportation
organizations, underwent considerable
modification.
The first transportation headquarters
on the Continent was the ADSEC Trans-
portation Section. Its commander, Colo-
nel Beeler, arrived with a small party at
OMAHA Beach on D plus 3, and set up a
temporary headquarters nearby with that
of the First Army. Other troops arrived on
18 June. After a stay at the beach area,
during which it helped organize and staff
the Water Transportation Control organ-
ization, the section moved to Catz along
with other ADSEC elements on 20 June.
At its new location, the organization be-
gan to develop its planned functions. Its
principal activities involved the co-ordina-
tion of marine and port operations and
the supervision of motor transport, rail
activities, and traffic control. By the end
of July the 51 officers and 103 enlisted
men of the Transportation Section were
heading up a large-scale operation, in-
volving the use of a motor transport and
a military railway service headquarters,
three major ports, and approximately 230
146
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. IV, pp. 12,
14-16, OCT HB ETO.
147
On MRS operations in northern Europe after
July 1944 see below, pp. 341-44.
288
port, truck, DUKW, rail, and traffic
148
regulating units.
The Transportation Corps command
party of FECZ left the United Kingdom
on 6 July, but did not take up its planned
functions on the far shore. Because of the
limited area of operations and the First
Army's understandable reluctance to give
up its direct control of logistical oper-
ations, a rear boundary still had not been
drawn. As a result, ADSEC remained
under First Army jurisdiction, and FECZ,
which was to become active after the
drawing of the rear boundary, become a
fifth wheel. As they arrived, the transpor-
tation personnel with FECZ were placed
on duty with the ADSEC Transportation
Section.149
Meanwhile, the theater chief of trans-
portation, scheduled to move to the Con-
tinent with COMZONE headquarters on
D plus 90, was growing increasingly ap-
prehensive regarding the serious port de-
velopment problem and other transpor-
tation difficulties on the far shore. On 9
July 1944, D plus 33, General Ross in-
formed the COMZONE commander that
the situation made imperative the imme-
diate transfer of his headquarters to the
Continent. To provide sufficient discharge
capacity on the far shore, it would be nec-
essary to effect the maximum develop-
ment of the minor Normandy ports and
push Cherbourg over the 20,000-ton-per-
day mark. Efficient use of these and other
transportation facilities, he believed, could
only be achieved by centralizing executive
control and technical direction of oper-
ations. Contingent on approval of his
request, Ross proposed a number of steps
calculated to improve the transportation
situation. Among other things, he recom-
mended the relief of the 11th Port at the
beaches so that it could concentrate on the
minor Normandy ports, the assignment of
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the 12th Port to assist the 4th Port at Cher-
bourg, and the merger of the Transporta-
tion Corps element of FECZ with the
ADSEC Transportation Section until
COMZONE headquarters became oper-
150
ational on the Continent.
The request for the immediate transfer
of Transportation Corps headquarters was
rejected by the COMZONE G-4 as being
out of line with existing command ar-
rangements on the Continent, but action
was taken along the lines of specific rec-
ommendations. The proposals regarding
port development and the assignments of
the 11th and 12th Ports were carried out.
On the organizational side, Colonel
Traub, Ross's deputy and head of the
Transportation Corps element of FECZ,
was appointed ADSEC transportation
officer on 17 July. The other Transporta-
tion Corps personnel with FECZ, includ-
ing officers from the Motor Transport
Division and the Marine Operations Divi-
sion, were attached to parallel divisions of
the ADSEC Transportation Section.
These officers, drawn from theater Trans-
portation Corps headquarters, provided
an element of continuity for policy and di-
rection that otherwise would have been
lacking.151
148
Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC COMZONE ETOUSA,
activation to 30 Sep 44, pp. 6-10, 15-16, OCT HB
ETO.
149
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, p.
47. On the failure of FECZ to become operational as
intended, see Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 434-37.
150
Memo, Ross for CG COMZONE ETOUSA
(through G-4 ETOUSA), 9 Jul 44, sub: Exec Contl
and Tech Direction of Trans Opns on Continent,
USFET OCT 500 Trans Analyses Northern Opns,
KCRC AGO.
151
Memo, Brig Gen James H. Stratton, G-4
ETOUSA, to CofT ETOUSA, 13 Jul 44, USFET
OCT 500 Trans Analyses Northern Opns, KCRC
AGO; Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC COMZONE
ETOUSA, activation to 30 Sep 44, pp. 9, 18, OCT
HB ETO; Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO,
p. 47; Ltr, Ross to Larson, 15 Jun 49, OCT HB In-
quiries.
THE INVASION OF NORMANDY
On 1 August 1944 the First Army
finally drew its rear boundary and
ADSEC took over responsibility for the
communications zone area. This was the
logical point for FECZ to enter the pic-
ture, but it never became operational, for
by this time COMZONE headquarters
had been phased forward so as to arrive
shortly afterwards. The headquarters was
established at Valognes on 7 August, and
during the weeks that followed the Com-
munications Zone organization under-
went rapid development. ADSEC moved
forward to give direct support to the now
swiftly advancing armies, and Base Sec-
tion No. 3 (later called the Normandy
Base Section) took over the territory for-
merly under ADSEC jurisdiction. A base
section was also established in Brittany,
and preparations were made to activate
new base or intermediate sections to take
over areas progressively opened up behind
ADSEC.152
The main party of the office of the thea-
289
ter chief of transportation set up head-
quarters at Valognes on 17 August. Colo-
nel Traub and other FECZ transportation
personnel attached to ADSEC rejoined
General Ross there, and the entire Marine
Division of the ADSEC Transportation
Section was transferred to the new head-
quarters. The organization at Valognes
was established along the same lines as it
had been in the United Kingdom. Oper-
ating within the framework of an expand-
ing communications zone, the chief of
transportation and his staff turned to the
task of giving direction to transportation
operations during the critical months
ahead.153
152
Ruppenthal, op. cit., p. 436; Hist Monograph,
Hist Div USFET, Administrative and Logistical His-
tory of the European Theater of Operations, Pt. II,
Vol. II, pp. 178-92, OCMH Files.
153
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, pp.
47-48; Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC COMZONE
ETOUSA, activation to 30 Sep 44, p. 19, OCT HB
ETO.
 CHAPTER VII
The Assault on Southern
France
Originally scheduled for execution si-
multaneously with the cross-Channel in-
vasion, the assault on southern France was
finally launched on 15 August 1944.1 After
making successful landings on beaches in
the area between Toulon and Nice, the
forces of the Seventh U.S. Army and the
French First Army captured Marseille and
several smaller ports and then moved
rapidly northward. The new invasion
route served primarily to bring reinforce-
ments and supplies for the American and
French armies that formed the 6th Army
Group. By mid-September the Allied
forces in southern France had advanced
approximately 330 miles and had effected
a junction with the U.S. armies to the
north.2
Plans and Preparations
As in the case of OVERLORD, the inva-
sion of southern France was preceded by
an extended period of careful planning
and preparations. The initial ANVIL plan
was drawn up by AFHQ, Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, in December 1943.
American logistical planning began in
January 1944, when Task Force 163, a
staff drawn from the Seventh Army, set
up headquarters near Algiers and sent a
group to Oran to co-ordinate planning
with the North African theater and SOS
headquarters. In the weeks that followed,
a troop build-up program was developed,
supply and equipment requirements were
determined, and requisitions were sub-
mitted to the zone of interior. Also, ar-
rangements were made for flatting 100
ships in the United States to be employed
as motor transport carriers. The cargo
used for flatting was to consist mainly of
rations and ammunition, which would be
floored off and held as a floating reserve
for use in emergencies. After being tempo-
rarily curtailed by the March decision to
delay the assault, planning activities
picked up in May, as the probability that
the DRAGOON operation would be under-
1
The operation, first called ANVIL and later
DRAGOON, had been called off in March 1944, but
not abandoned as an ultimate objective. After a pe-
riod of considerable debate and uncertainty, the com-
bined planners in June reached a firm decision to
mount the invasion. For details see Lt. Col. James D.
T. Hamilton, Southern France and Alsace, a volume in
preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY
IN WORLD WAR II, Chs. I-IV, and Report by the
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Southern France,
August 1944 (hereafter cited as SACMED Report)
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946),
pp. 2-7.
2
Hist Monograph, Hist Div USFET, Administra-
tive and Logistical History of the European Theater of
Operations (hereafter cited as Adm and Logistical
Hist ETO), Pt. VIII, pp. 28-30, OCMH Files.
THE ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN FRANCE
taken became evident. From the outset,
General Stewart—the chief of transporta-
tion for AFHQ, NATOUSA, and SOS,
NATOUSA—worked closely with Force
163 in arranging for shipping, setting up
schedules for the movement of men and
materials to and through outloading ports,
and dealing with other transportation
problems involved in the mounting, out-
loading, and support of DRAGOON. 3
As finally formulated, logistical plans
for DRAGOON called for the movement to
southern France of 522,000 U.S. and
French troops, 101,000 vehicles, and sup-
porting supplies and equipment during
the first sixty days of the invasion. The
Seventh Army would determine supply
and personnel requirements for this
period, designate the order and destina-
tions of arrival, and initially control all
logistical activities on the far shore. Re-
sponsibility for mounting the DRAGOON
forces and effecting their continued supply
was assigned to SOS, NATOUSA, which
would draw upon sources within the
theater and from the United States.
The SOS organization also furnished a
base section to provide early and close
logistical support to the tactical forces,
and after the operation got under way
established an advance echelon to set
up a communications zone headquarters.
Roughly 72,410 troops of the total per-
sonnel set up for DRAGOON were in service
units earmarked for eventual transfer to
the base section. As the combat forces ad-
vanced these units would be turned over
to the base section, which would progres-
sively take over supply and transportation
operations in the rear. Such a base section
was organized in North Africa in June
1944 and, in the following month, was
formally activated at Naples as the
4
Coastal Base Section. Both the advance
291
echelon of SOS, NATOUSA, and the
Coastal Base Section had transportation
staffs.5
On the operational side, the seaborne
assault was to be made by the 3d, 4th, and
36th U.S. Divisions, each constituted as a
subtask force, with attached service
6
troops. The three subtask forces were to
land on beaches between Cap Cavalaire
and Agay. French forces were to land in
the early follow up. Beach operations
would be handled for each division by an
Engineer shore regiment, assisted by
DUKW, truck, port, and other specialized
troops. The subtask forces were to operate
independently until D plus 3, when the
Beach Control Group, under the Seventh
Army G-4, would assume over-all control.
Consisting of representatives of the Army
services and the Navy, the group was to
supervise and co-ordinate cargo discharge,
troop debarkation, and the setting up of
dumps. The arrangement would continue
until about ten days after a major port was
taken, at which time control would be
transferred to the Coastal Base Section.7
3
MS, Hq COMZONE ETO, Communication
Zone Activities in Support of the European Campaign,
30 July 1943-25 February 1945, Sec. II, Pt. IV, Plan-
ning for Operation DRAGOON, OCT HB ETO; Adm
and Logistical Hist ETO, Pt. VIII, Ch. III, pp. 2-14;
Hist Rcd, OTO SOLOC, p. 1, OCT HB ETO
SOLOC.
4
The Coastal Base Section was successively redes-
ignated the Continental Base Section and the Conti-
nental Advance Section (CONAD).
5
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 130, p. 46, OCT HB
ETO; CONAD History, Communications Zone, European
Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944-1945 (Heidel-
berg, Germany: Aloys Graef, 1945), pp. 1-2.
6
Provision was also made for a simultaneous air-
borne landing at Le Muy, near the coast. Also, the
1st Special Service Force and a French commando
group were to land ahead of the assault forces in order
to neutralize enemy batteries on the islands of Port
Cros and Levant and near Cap Negre.
7
SACMED Report, pp. 19-20; Adm and Logistical
Hist ETO, Pt. VII, pp. 112-13; CONAD History, p.
30.
292 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The ports were to enter the picture after struction of rail facilities would render rail
D plus 20, when it was anticipated Toulon operations impracticable until after the
would be taken. Marseille, the major port ports were taken. The mission of operat-
in the area and the first main objective of ing, maintaining, and rehabilitating the
the Allied forces, was not expected to fall railroads was assigned to the 1st Military
until D plus 40. Because of enemy demoli- Railway Service, under General Gray.
tion, the planners forecast that both ports This organization had successfully han-
would require extensive rehabilitation. dled similar assignments in North Africa,
The job of operating the ports in southern Sicily, and Italy and had developed a far
France was assigned to the 6th Port, a greater degree of autonomy than its coun-
veteran organization that had seen serviceterpart in northern France. In the Medi-
in North Africa and Italy. The 6th Port, terranean, General Gray had reported to
commanded by Colonel Clarkson, was re- the theater commander. He had also been
lieved of its duties at Naples on 30 June responsible for planning and supervising
and embarked for France aboard three all railway reconstruction and rehabilita-
Liberties on 15 and 16 August. The port tion, and for the procurement of all railway
personnel were accompanied by the main equipment and material, including track
body of the Coastal Base Section's Trans- and bridges. The command relationship
portation Section, which was scheduled to and functions were carried over into
arrive in southern France at the same southern France.10
time. Other Transportation Section per- The first rail units were to be phased in
sonnel had already been placed on tempo- to coincide with the capture of the ports.
rary duty with the Seventh Army to assist Two railway operating battalions would
in ship discharge and cargo-handling arrive on D plus 20, and a railway grand
activities on the beaches.8 division on D plus 40. Thereafter, addi-
Pending the capture and development tional units would arrive and important
of Marseille, it was expected that the ad- rail operations would be undertaken as
vance northward would be slow. Principal the combat forces advanced. In prepara-
reliance for the overland movement of tion for its mission, the 1st MRS submitted
men and supplies was placed on motor requisitions for locomotives, track mate-
transport. A total of sixty-two truck com- rials, bridging, signal communications
panies was scheduled to arrive by D plus
25, with the first units landing on D plus 4. 8
Hist, 6th Port, Vol. V, Jul-Oct 44, pp. 1-2, OCT
Some thirty-two of these units were to be HB Oversea Ports; Adm and Logistical Hist ETO, Pt.
employed for the support of U.S. forces, VII, p. 109; Hist Rpt, Office of Trans and Mvmt
and thirty for the French. Twelve DUKW CONAD, Jul-Nov 44, OCT HB ETO Hist Rpts.
9
Adm and Logistical Hist ETO, Pt. VII, p. 116;
units were also provided, making possible SACMED Report, p. 2.
the movement of cargo from ships at 10
Gray was not relieved of his military railway re-
anchor across the shore at both the sponsibility in Italy until October 1944. After the
Southern Line of Communications was established in
beaches and the ports.9 southern France on 20 November, he became directly
Rail transportation was not expected to responsible to its commanding general, under the
play an important role in the early phases European theater. OCT HB Monograph 29, pp. 298-
303; Hist Rcd, OTO SOLOC, pp. 5-6, OCT HB
of the invasion. The limited beachhead ETO SOLOC; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 2,
area and the anticipated extensive de- Ch. IV, pp. 1-2, OCT HB ETO.
 THE ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN FRANCE
equipment, and other required materials.11
Mounting Dragoon
While final plans for operations in
southern France were being evolved, the
process of mounting and outloading the
DRAGOON forces got under way. With the
setting of a definite invasion date in mid-
June 1944, schedules for the loading of
troops and cargo were issued by SOS,
NATOUSA, to its base sections, and the
necessary tasks of packing, waterproofing,
moving troops and cargo into port areas,
and preloading were begun. The opera-
tion was mounted from bases in Italy,
North Africa, and Corsica. The principal
port for outloading the assault forces was
Naples, which loaded 307 landing craft
and 75 merchant vessels and combat
loaders. French assault forces destined to
land in the immediate follow-up were
loaded at Oran, Brindisi, and Taranto.
Ajaccio and Porto Vecchio also were used
in mounting DRAGOON.
For the most part the invasion was sup-
ported from Naples and Oran and directly
from the United States. Troops and cargo
to follow the assault forces into southern
France were loaded at the two ports and
dispatched in convoy every five days. The
principal carrier, as usual, was the Liberty,
although coasters and other craft were also
employed. Convoys from the zone of in-
terior were scheduled to arrive at ten-day
intervals, and were phased into the other
convoys moving to southern France.12
Prescheduled shipments for the DRA-
GOON build-up ended in mid-October
1944, and normal supply procedures were
followed thereafter. By that time (D plus
60), a total of 477,903 troops and 93,585
vehicles had moved out of Naples, Oran,
Corsica, and Taranto for southern
France.13
293
Beach Operations
The initial assault forces landed on the
beaches in the Cavalaire Bay, St. Tropez,
and St. Raphael areas on 15 August, en-
countering relatively light enemy resist-
ance. During the next two days each sub-
task force operated independently while
their supporting Engineer regiments and
attached service troops cleared and or-
ganized the beaches, began unloading
operations, and evacuated casualties and
prisoners. On D plus 2, a day ahead of
schedule, the Beach Control Group as-
sumed over-all direction of beach opera-
tions for the Seventh Army. The group
was augmented by members of the staff of
the Coastal Base Section, which was later
to take over control of the beaches.
As at the OMAHA and UTAH beaches,
supplies were discharged from ships
anchored offshore into DUKW's and
Navy ferry craft. After delivering pre-
loaded artillery and priority cargo ashore,
the DUKW's operated between the vessels
and the dumps behind the beaches. In
order to provide for the quick turn-
around of DUKW's, ships' anchorages
and dumps were kept close to the shore
line. Trucks and tractors transported cargo
from beached LCT's and other ferry craft
to dumps and performed other clearance
11
Adm and Logistical Hist ETO, Pt. VII, pp. 116-
17; Rpt, Consolidated Historical Report on Transpor-
tation Activities in the European Theater of Opera-
tions . . ., Annex 8, Military Railway Service, p. 60,
OCT HB ETO; Hist Rcd, OTO SOLOC, p. 21,
OCT HB ETO SOLOC.
12
For details on the mounting of DRAGOON see MS,
Hq COMZONE ETO, Communication Zone Activi-
ties in Support of the European Campaign …, Sec.
II, Pt. IV, OCT HB ETO. Also see Adm and Logis-
tical Hist ETO, Pt. VII, pp. 26-27; and SACMED
Report, p. 24.
13
Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Oct-Dec 44,
p. 1, OCT HB North Africa.
294
activities. Motor cranes, "A" frames
mounted on DUKW's, and other devices
were used to transfer cargo at the shore
and at the dumps.
At the outset, difficulties were en-
countered that kept tonnage discharge
behind schedule. One arose because cargo
ships had been top stowed with ammuni-
tion. Since the anticipated heavy combat
did not materialize and the tactical forces
advanced more rapidly than had been ex-
pected, the demand for gasoline and
rations became more urgent than that for
ammunition. As a result, it was necessary
to move the ammuntion in order to get at
items stowed below. Some relief was pro-
vided when coasters were loaded exclu-
sively with POL and rations.
Cargo discharge was also handicapped
by a shortage of trucks for hauling from
LCT's to dumps. The first truck com-
panies had to work on a round-the-clock
basis to keep supplies moving. Additional
units arrived, but the lengthening supply
line necessitated their assignment to hauls
between the beach dumps and forward
Army supply points.
Other obstacles tended to slow up the
operations. Nets, used to transfer cargo
into trucks and DUKW's, were not avail-
able in sufficient quantity. Dumps were
mired by rain and had to be relocated. In
many cases manifests were found to be in-
correct. Nevertheless, by D plus 10 enough
reserves had been accumulated on the
beach to warrant a shift of emphasis from
building up stocks in dumps to the inland
movement of supplies.
Beach operations continued under the
direction of the Beach Control Group until
D plus 24 (9 September), when they were
turned over to the Coastal Base Section.
The Engineer shore regiments were then
relieved of duties, and unloading opera-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
tions were assigned to the 6th Port, under
Coastal Base Section supervision. By this
time the beach at Cavalaire-sur-Mer
(ALPHA) had been closed, and in view of
the capture of developed ports the other
two beaches were scheduled for closing. A
port battalion at each beach handled the
remaining activities. The St. Tropez
(DELTA) beach was officially closed on 16
September, and activities were concluded
at the St. Raphael (CAMEL) beach on 28
September.
During the first six weeks after the as-
sault, approximately 380,000 troops, 306,-
000 long tons of general cargo, 69,312 ve-
hicles, and 17,848 long tons of bulk gaso-
line were brought in over the beaches.
This constituted the bulk of the traffic into
southern France in this period, for al-
though the ports had been captured far
earlier than expected, they did not come
into operation in an important way until
14
mid-September 1944.
Opening the Ports
After landing at the beaches, French
and American combat forces swept rap-
idly toward Toulon and Marseille. Both
ports were cleared of the enemy on D plus
13 (28 August). Meanwhile, French re-
sistance forces had captured Port-de-Bouc,
a satellite port of Marseille. As expected,
all three ports were found to be heavily
damaged. Early reconnaissance indicated
the unsuitability of Toulon for develop-
ment as a major port, and it was decided
to use it primarily for the reception of
14
On beach operations in southern France see the
following: CONAD History, pp. 30-35; Adm and
Logistical Hist ETO, Pt. VIII, Ch. III, pp. 32-39;
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 130, pp. 50-52, OCT HB
ETO; Hist, 6th Port, Vol. V, pp. 3-4, OCT HB Over-
sea Ports; Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ. NATOUSA, Jul-
Sep 44, p. 2, OCT HB North Africa.
THE ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN FRANCE
Civil Affairs cargo. Rehabilitation efforts,
concentrated at Marseille and its satellite,
were begun on 1 September by the Corps
of Engineers, assisted by U.S. Navy per-
sonnel and the French. Port activities
were handled by the 6th Port and its as-
signed or attached units, operating first
under the Seventh Army and later under
15
base section control.
A small detachment of the 6th Port ar-
rived at Port-de-Bouc early in September
but found it impossible to begin opera-
tions immediately. Sunken craft blocked
the harbor, the dock area was filled with
debris and rubble, and cranes were
wrecked. Within two weeks the cranes
were placed in operating order and dock-
side discharge had commenced. By the
end of the month, the port had unloaded
23 ships, discharging 36,837 long tons of
supplies and 331,600 barrels of petroleum
products. At that time four Liberty berths
and one tanker berth were available.
Thereafter, Port-de-Bouc was to serve pri-
marily for the discharge of bulk POL, for
which it had excellent storage facilities.16
Toulon served briefly as a port for the
U.S. Army and was the scene of only lim-
ited activity. A small detachment from the
6th Port handled operations there between
20 September and 31 October 1944, when
the port was turned over to the French.
During that period 27,020 long tons of
general cargo and 11,542 vehicles were
landed.17
The principal peacetime port of France
and the largest in the Mediterranean,
Marseille had suffered almost unbeliev-
able destruction. The 6th Port, which
functioned at both Marseille and Naples,
reported that of the two Marseille was the
more completely devastated. At Marseille
warehouses were ruined, utilities knocked
out, cranes wrecked, railway tracks torn
295
up, and all berths blocked by sunken craft
or other obstructions. Moles, jetties, and
docks had been blasted, no bridges within
the port area could be used, and the ad-
jacent railways and highways were clut-
tered with rubble and debris. All told,
seventy-five vessels had been sunk in the
harbor, closing all possible entrances.
Both the harbor and the port area were
strewn with mines, and the quay walls
were pierced with many gaping holes.18
On 8 September 1944 the 6th Port
began operating at Marseille with cranes
brought from Naples. The first Liberty
ship was berthed one week later. At first,
however, most cargo was lightered ashore.
Troops and vehicles were unloaded from
beached landing craft. The port facilities
were rapidly rehabilitated, entrance chan-
nels were opened, and by the close of
September Marseille had complete berth-
ing space for fifteen Liberty ships and
five coasters, and had discharged 146,297
long tons of cargo at piers or into lighters.
In the last two weeks of September the 6th
Port discharged an average of approxi-
mately 5,000 tons of general cargo per day
at the southern French ports.19 The de-
pendence on the beaches ceased, and
Marseille, assisted by Port-de-Bouc, be-
15
CONAD History, pp. 40-42.
16
Ibid., p. 41; Hist, 6th Port, Vol. VI, pp. 21-22,
and Exhibit D, OCT HB Oversea Ports; Hist Rcd,
OCT AFHQ,NATOUSA, Jul-Sep 44, pp. 25, 30, and
Exhibit 1-1, and Oct-Dec 44, p. 2, OCT HB North
Africa.
17
Hist, 6th Port, Vol. V, pp. 18-19, OCT HB Over-
sea Ports.
18
Hist, 6th Port, Vol. V, pp. 7-11, OCT HB Over-
sea Ports; Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ, NATOUSA, Jul-
Sep 44, Exhibit 1-1, OCT HB North Africa; Memo,
6th Port Hq for CofT ETO, 6 Jan 45, sub: Port of
Marseilles, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
19
Hist, 6th Port, Vol. V, pp. 10-11, 13, and Ex-
hibit F, OCT HB Oversea Ports; 6th Port Hq memo
cited n. 18; Hist Rcd, AFHQ, Jul-Sep 44, pp. 25, 30,
and Exhibit G, OCT HB North Africa.
296 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

came the funnel through which the line of furnish adequate relief. Matters became
communications in southern France was serious early in September when the
supplied.20 Seventh Army shifted most of its truck
companies from the beaches to the for-
Initial Motor Transport Activities ward area. In order to provide vehicles for
freight movement from the beach dumps
Following the fall of Toulon and Mar- to the forces, the Coastal Base Section re-
seille, Allied forces moved rapidly north- quired units landing on the beaches to
ward. After taking Montélimar and reload their organic vehicles with Seventh
Grenoble, they continued their advance Army cargo and make one round trip to
through Lyon, Dijon, and Besangon, and forward destinations. To ease the load on
on 12 September made contact with the motor transport further, efforts were made
Third Army at Chatillon-sur-Seine. The to clear the beach dumps and close the
junction of southern and northern forces beaches as soon as possible after the open-
was effected eleven days before the date ing of the ports.
set for the capture of Marseille. The un- By mid-September trucks were hauling
expected speed of the advance resulted over a highway network extending from
in an early shortage of motor transport the coast to Haute-Saone province. Major
and made the sustained support of the operations included line of communica-
armies difficult. tions hauling from the beaches and ports
Aside from beach and port clearance, to forward destinations, base and port
the principal U.S. trucking activities in- activities at Marseille and Port-de-Bouc,
volved increasingly long hauls from beach and a shuttle operation between Sisteron
dumps to forward dumps and shuttle runs and Manosque, which had been separated
between breaks in newly captured rail by enemy demolition of bridges. Vehicle
lines. The principal highway route used strength was concentrated at the two ends
during this period ran from the coast of the line, with communications zone
through Aix to Grenoble, and as Army trucking units centered in the south in the
supply points were pushed farther north Marseille-St. Raphael area, and the
it was extended to Voiron, Bourg, Lons- Army's units in the north. Vehicles load-
Le-Saunier, Poligny, and forward. Both ing in the south were generally dispatched
Seventh Army and communications zone in small groups to Army destinations.
truck units were employed. The Seventh Movement control, also heaviest at either
Army G-4 determined priorities and con- end of the route, was provided through
trolled operations and movements. traffic control points manned by personnel
Provided on the assumption of a slow from two traffic regulation units. Little
advance, truck companies were hard control was required at intermediate
pressed to keep supplies flowing along the points, since favorable weather permitted
lengthening line of communications. Some vehicles to make their overnight halts at
fifteen truck companies arrived during the almost any point along the road.
first four days, but proved insufficient to Meanwhile, a communications zone
meet both beach and over-the-road re-
quirements. Efforts to phase in additional 20
For subsequent operations at Marsaille, see below,
units earlier than planned failed to pp.319-20.
THE ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN FRANCE 297

motor transport organization had entered
the picture. With the transfer of the first
trucking unit from the Seventh Army to
the Coastal Base Section on 3 September,
the CBS Transportation Section's High-
way Division came into operation at Mar-
seille. Additional transfers and arrivals
followed. On the 25th a Movement Con-
trol Office was opened at CBS headquar-
ters for the control of both the U.S. and
the French military convoy movements.
Shortly afterward, U.S. traffic was di-
verted from the mountainous Grenoble
section to the Rhone Valley route, extend-
ing from Aix to Vienne and Lancin and
rejoining the old route at Bourg. New
traffic control points were set up at these
four locations, and French liaison repre-
sentation was provided both at the Mar-
seille office and at the field installations.
By the end of the month, the Highway
Division had a total of fourteen truck com-
panies and thirteen DUKW units under
its supervision, and steps had been taken
to convert two antiaircraft artillery battal-
ions into Quartermaster truck battalions
and to organize other trucking units with
Italian prisoners of war. Communications
zone trucks were used for long hauls for
only a brief time thereafter, since the rail-
roads had undergone considerable devel-
opment and by mid-October were carry-
ing the bulk of the Army's requirements
in southern France.21
Early Military Railway Operations
tated Marseille port area and the many
demolished bridges, the destruction of
railway facilities was relatively slight. As a
consequence, railroads were brought into
operation sooner than anticipated and
became increasingly important.
Only a day after the initial assault,
General Gray's representative with the
Seventh Army, Lt. Col. Benjamin H.
Decker, made a preliminary reconnais-
sance of the railway facilities. Operations
were begun within two days of the assault,
when Seventh Army troops opened the
narrow-gauge line spanning the fifteen
miles between St. Tropez and Cogolin. On
the night of 23-24 August a standard-
gauge railway began running from Frejus
via Carnoules to Ste. Maxime. The first
train, running without signals or lights,
carried rations, gasoline, and ammunition.
Rail operations at Marseille were late in
starting because of the destruction within
the port area. Fortunately, some railway
equipment was found that could be used,
and there was enough coal on hand for the
first train. 22
The first military railway units in south-
ern France, the 703d Railway Grand
Division and the 713th Railway Operat-
ing Battalion, arrived in late August and
commenced supervisory and operational
activities. On 14 September General Gray,
Director General, 1st MRS, departed Italy
by air with an advance party, and estab-
lished a new headquarters at Lyon. Other
operating units, including the 727th Rail-

The restoration of rail service in south- 21

Hist Rcd, OTO SOLOC, OCT HB ETO
ern France proceeded more rapidly than SOLOC; Hist Rpt, Office of Trans and Mvmt
CONAD, OCT HB ETO Hist Rpts; CONAD History,
in Normandy. The liberation of the area p. 61; Adm and Logistical Hist ETO, Pt. VII, pp.
was accomplished so quickly that the re- 41-44.22
treating Germans had no time to effect Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ NATOUSA, Jul-Sep 44,
pp. 15-16, OCT HB North Africa; U.S. Seventh
their usual thoroughgoing sabotage on the Army, After Action Report, Annex 287, 1 Jan-31 Dec
railways. With the exception of the devas- 44, DRB AGO.
298
way Operating Battalion and A Company
of the 759th Railway Operating Battalion,
arrived in southern France before the end
23
of the month.
During September railway operations
expanded considerably. The two main
double-track routes from Marseille to the
north ran parallel to the Rhone River. A
third single-track line extended to Greno-
ble. Several key bridges were down, which
prevented immediate utilization of the
tracks along the Rhone River. With the
exception of two blown-out bridges at
Meyrargues and Sisteron, the Grenoble
line, or Alps route, was comparatively un-
damaged. It was therefore used for initial
traffic from the beaches, even though the
tracks passed through mountainous ter-
rain where eventually snow and ice could
be expected. Trucks filled the gaps in the
rail line until the bridges could be restored.
Meanwhile, the railway on the east bank
of the Rhone River was being quickly re-
habilitated by the A Companies of the
713th, 727th, and 759th Railway Operat-
ing Battalions, assisted by French railway
personnel and Seventh Army engineers.
By the 25th of the month, the line was
open as far north as Lyon and had a ca-
pacity of 3,000 tons per day. With con-
tinued development, it became the princi-
pal supply route for the 6th Army Group.24
At first the demands for rail transporta-
tion exceeded the capability of the lines.
In order to allocate the available rail ton-
nage among the various bidders, the first
Priority of Movements meeting was held
at Lyon on 26 September 1944. At this
meeting the bids accepted amounted to
only 4,923 tons per day, slightly more than
one half the tonnage offered for move-
ment. However, as the rehabilitation of
lines progressed and additional motive
power and rolling stock were obtained, the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
rail capacities increased sharply. By 4 Oc-
tober, bids totaling 8,350 tons per day
were being accepted, and shortly there-
after an embargo was placed on the use of
communications zone trucks for long
hauls. The railroads were now ready to
bear the brunt of the overland transport
load in southern France and were to carry
a steadily increasing amount of traffic
through the end of the year. 25
The Transition to a Communications Zone
As in the case of OVERLORD, the direc-
tion of logistical activities passed succes-
sively from army to base section to com-
munications zone headquarters as the
combat forces advanced and supply and
transportation operations were developed
behind them. Personnel of the Coastal
Base Section arrived with the invasion
forces, and upon the capture of Marseille
the section set up its headquarters there.
During the first twenty-five days of opera-
tion, CBS, attached to Seventh Army, as-
sisted with beach and other activities and
prepared to assume responsibility for
communications zone activities. After
turning over control of the beaches to
CBS, the Seventh Army on 10 September
23
Hist Rcd, Hq 1st MRS, Sep 44, OCT HB ETO
France 1st MRS; Hist Rcd, 703d Ry Grand Div, 10
Sep 44, and Hist 713th Ry Operating Bn, 1 Aug-1
Sep 44, OCT HB North Africa Ry Units; Memo,
GHQ MRS TSFET (Trans Sv Forces European
Theater) for OCT TSFET, 13 Oct 45, sub: Hist of
Hq MRS Units in Southern France, Aug and Sep 44,
OCT HB ETO—France GHQ MRS.
24
Hist Rcd, OTO SOLOC, pp. 4, 20, OCT HB
ETO SOLOC; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 123, p.
15, OCT HB ETO. Also see Ltr, DG 1st MRS
AFHQ to Maj R. B. Baldwin, OCT, 25 Oct 44;
Memo, ACofS G-4 AFHQ for CAO NATOUSA, 30
Aug 44, sub: Visit of G-4 AFHQ to Southern France.
Both in OCT HB ETO France Rys.
25
Hist Rcd, OTO SOLOC, pp. 20, 23, OCT HB
ETO SOLOC.
THE ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN FRANCE
1944 drew a rear boundary along the line
Moulin-Macon-Bourg-Geneva. Admin-
istration of the territory behind the line
was then taken over by CBS, which was
now redesignated Continental Base Sec-
tion.26
The CBS Transportation officer, Colonel
Fuller, arrived in southern France late in
August 1944. Several of his staff were
already on the ground, helping the Sev-
enth Army discharge ships and organize
transportation activities in support of the
advance from the beaches. After surveying
newly captured port and rail facilities,
Colonel Fuller activated water, highway,
and rail divisions within his Transporta-
tion Section. By D plus 25 (10 Septem-
ber), the section had taken over supervi-
sion of beach and port operations and had
begun its motor transport and rail move-
ment control activities. An air section also
was set up. Operating principally at Salon
airport, it assisted passengers and recorded
inbound and outbound cargo and person-
nel traffic. 27
With the rapid advance of the combat
forces and the resultant extension of the
lines of communication, the Continental
Base Section was redesignated Continen-
tal Advance Section (CONAD), SOS,
NATOUSA, on 26 September. Like
ADSEC to the north, CONAD became a
mobile organization, moving forward be-
hind the armies to provide close continu-
ous support. CONAD headquarters moved
to Dijon early in October, and the Mar-
seille area was turned over to the newly
activated Delta Base Section.28
By this time, a communications zone
headquarters had been phased in. An
advance echelon of SOS, NATOUSA
SACMED Report, p. 30; CONAD History, Chs. II
(later redesignated Advance COMZONE, and III.
Hist Rpt, Office of Trans and Mvmt CONAD,
MTOUSA), had been organized at Ca- Jul-Nov 44, OCT HB ETO Hist Rpts.
serta, Italy, and had departed for Lyon on CONAD History, pp. 69-72, 86-88.
299
12 September. This group included the
first detachment of a Transportation Sec-
tion, headed by Lt. Col. Thornton A.
Magee. After establishing headquarters at
Lyon, Magee moved with the advance
echelon to Dijon on 5 October.
COMZONE, MTOUSA, continued re-
sponsible for the logistical support of the
forces in southern France until 20 Novem-
ber 1944. At that time a Southern Line of
Communications was established under
General Lee, Commanding General,
Communications Zone, ETO. Under the
new setup, General Larkin, formerly com-
mander of COMZONE, MTOUSA, was
designated SOLOC commander and be-
came Lee's deputy. Larkin, however, was
given wide latitude in directing his opera-
tions, and existing arrangements for sup-
plying the area from sources in the Medi-
terranean and the zone of interior were
retained. CONAD and the Delta Base
Section continued in operation under
SOLOC.
As part of the reorganization, General
Stewart was appointed SOLOC Transpor-
tation officer. He absorbed the advance
echelon's Transportation Section, and
drew other men from his former head-
quarters in the Mediterranean. Serving on
Larkin's staff, Stewart exercised technical
supervision over Transportation Corps
activities, installations, and troops, and
co-ordinated transportation operations
between sections. Unlike Ross in the
ETO, Stewart did not have jurisdiction
over rail operations. The director of the
1st Military Railway Service was directly
responsible to the SOLOC commander.
26
27
28
300 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Stewart's principal activities pertaining to

motor transport. Port development pro-
rail operations involved the allocation of ceeded more slowly than anticipated, and
rail tonnage and the supervision of the usethe rail facilities in Allied hands were lim-
of available rail capacity. The SOLOC ited and in need of extensive rehabilita-
transportation office was patterned after tion. The operations on beaches exceeded
the organization developed at Allied expectation but the opening of Cherbourg
Force Headquarters in the Mediterra- was delayed, and prospects for the early
nean theater. Stewart directed his activi- capture of the Brittany ports grew increas-
ties through an executive officer and threeingly dim. These developments, together
major branches—Operations, Planning, with the likelihood that adverse weather
and Administration. Under the Opera- conditions beginning in September would
tions Branch, groups were set up to handle curtail beach operations, led to a decision
movements and rail, water, highway, and to expand Cherbourg's intake capacity far
air activities.29 beyond that originally planned and to
Although SOLOC was placed under develop the minor Normandy ports. Inte-
the Communications Zone of the Euro- rior transport was less of a problem, for
pean theater, it exercised a large measure although motor transport equipment and
of autonomy. The northern lines and troops were not furnished in the quantities
southern lines of communications were planned, they were capable of meeting re-
operated independently, with a separate quirements along the short line of commu-
and distinct transportation organization nications.
for each. As will be seen, the direction of The situation altered radically with the
transportation activities in the theater was
break-through at St. Lo, and the ensuing
finally consolidated in early 1945, when lightninglike advance across France.
SOLOC was inactivated and jurisdiction Spearheaded by the Third Army, the
over its transportation organization and combat forces soon carried operations
the 1st MRS was turned over to General ahead of schedule and consequently ahead
Ross.30 of the supply program. The resultant in-
crease in demands lent new urgency to the
DRAGOON was accomplished swiftly and problem of developing additional port dis-
made a heavy contribution to Allied vic- charge capacity and bore down heavily on
tory, but it was a secondary action. The the carriers, particularly motor transport,
main Allied force had been committed in which were engaged in supplying the
northern France, and a successful action armies over the rapidly expanding lines of
was necessary there before Germany could communication. From the transportation
be defeated. standpoint, at least, the months immedi-
Until late July 1944 operations in Nor- ately following the break-through were
mandy were confined to a relatively shal- among the most critical of the war.
low lodgment area. During this period 29

principal reliance for the support of the A, D,Hist Rcd, OTO SOLOC, pp. 2, 5, and Exhibits
E, F, G, and H, OCT HB ETO SOLOC.
armies was placed upon the beaches and 30
For details see below, pp. 304-05.
 CHAPTER VIII
France, Belgium, and Germany
Breaking out of Normandy, the Allied
armies quickly drove south and west into
Brittany and surged eastward across
northern France. By late August 1944
they had overrun the territory slated in
OVERLORD for capture by D plus 90, with
the exception of the principal Brittany
ports, and in addition they had captured
Paris and established bridgeheads across
the Seine. Following on the heels of the re-
treating and disorganized enemy forces,
the Allies moved weeks, then months
ahead of the tactical timetable. Mean-
while, the DRAGOON forces had invaded
southern France and had driven swiftly
toward a junction with the armies to the
north. At the end of September the Allies
had gained possession of practically all of
France, Luxembourg, and Belgium, and
the southern part of Holland.1
Transportation in Relation to Tactical
Developments
The rapid advance across France soon
outstripped the means of logistical support,
forcing constant readjustment of plans,
improvisation, and hand-to-mouth supply
operations. From a transportation point of
view two problems loomed large in sus-
taining the onrushing Allied forces: the
development of sufficient port facilities to
receive and clear the growing volume of
men and materials arriving on the Conti-
nent; and the distribution of troops and
supplies from the beach and port areas
over greatly extended lines of communica-
tion. Neither of the problems was satisfac-
torily solved during the two months fol-
lowing the break-through.
Plans for the development of the Brit-
tany ports were upset by stubborn Ger-
man resistance and extensive enemy and
Allied destruction of facilities. The urgent
need for additional ports to augment
Cherbourg, the invasion beaches, and the
minor Normandy ports caused Allied
transportation planners to reassess the
port situation, and in September finally
led to a decision to abandon the idea of a
major port development in Brittany and
to concentrate on the newly captured ports
of Antwerp, Le Havre, and Rouen. In the
absence of adequate discharge capacity,
port congestion was chronic, and a grow-
ing number of ships had to be held off-
shore to serve, in effect, as floating ware-
houses.
The problem of providing transporta-
tion to the interior was even more press-
ing. The lengthening lines of communica-
tion and the increased requirements of the
combat forces did not permit the estab-
1
On tactical developments following the break-
through and their logistic implications, see the follow-
ing: Gen Bd Rpts, USFET, Studies 1 and 130, OCT
HB ETO; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies,
Vol. I, Ch. XII; and Paper, Col C. S. Napier, Allied
Transportation in Europe—D Day to V Day, 14 Jan
46, OCT HB ETO France.
302
lishment of the planned series of base, in-
termediate, and advance depots, and
created a growing gap between the Nor-
mandy supply installations and the
forward areas. Transportation facilities
were too limited to bridge the gap. Rail
line rehabilitation and pipeline construc-
tion were pushed forward vigorously, but
they simply could not keep pace with the
advancing armies. The main reliance had
to be placed upon motor transport. Aside
from performing the essential tasks of port
clearance and base hauling, trucks carried
the bulk of the troops and supplies that
were moved forward during this period.
As transportation planners had feared,
there were not enough drivers and equip-
ment to meet the needs. Minimum re-
quirements were met only by overworking
the men and vehicles, neglecting proper
maintenance, and diverting trucks from
port clearance and other essential work.
Supplementing the overland carriers, air
supply played a minor but important role
in meeting emergency needs of the tactical
forces.2
Overextended supply lines and in-
creased German resistance brought the
Allied advance to a virtual halt by the
latter part of September. The relatively
stable period that followed was marked by
an improved transportation situation. The
ports of Le Havre and Rouen were placed
in operation, taking up some of the slack
caused by the failure to open the Brittany
ports and making it possible to close the
beaches and a number of minor Nor-
mandy ports. Cherbourg continued as a
major port, although it never attained its
planned discharge capacity, and in the
south Marseille satisfactorily handled
traffic for the 6th Army Group. Consider-
able progress was made in rehabilitating
the railways, which then took over an in-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
creasing share of the burden from the
hard-pressed motor transport facilities.
The great turning point in the develop-
ment of transportation operations was the
opening of Antwerp on 28 November
1944. The huge port had been captured
virtually intact early in September, but it
could not be used until the Germans had
been cleared from the approaches to the
Scheldt Estuary. Possessing sufficient facil-
ities to handle the bulk of the incoming
U.S. and British cargo and located far
closer to the fighting front than the ports
already in operation, Antwerp was a
major factor in solving the tight interior
transport situation. The opening of
Antwerp, to be sure, did not immediately
resolve all transportation difficulties. It
took some time to dissipate the shipping
congestion; port clearance remained a
limiting factor; and other ports and lines
of communication had to be kept in use.
Nevertheless, placing Antwerp in opera-
tion made it possible to provide increas-
ingly better transportation service and
placed the logistical support of the Allied
armies on a far sounder basis.
New difficulties were encountered dur-
ing the German Ardennes counteroffensive
of December 1944-January 1945, when
cargo piled up at Antwerp, movements to
threatened areas were embargoed, motor
transport was diverted to handle emer-
gency shifts of men and materials, and
bitter winter weather handicapped all
operations. The setback was only tempo-
rary, and dislocations in the transporta-
tion system were rapidly corrected once
the crisis had passed and the tactical
situation improved.
The Allied armies resumed the offensive
early in February 1945, and in March
2
On air supply operations in the period June-
September 1944 see Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 572-82.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
they crossed the Rhine. The ensuing east-
ward drive from the Rhine to the Elbe was
in some respects reminiscent of the ad-
vance following the St. Lo break-through,
but this time there was no comparable
transportation crisis. With Antwerp in full
operation and Ghent coming into the pic-
ture, port capacity was ample. For over-
land transportation detailed plans had
been worked out in late 1944 and early
1945 for the support of the offensive, in-
cluding provisions for extending rail and
highway operations to, across, and beyond
the Rhine. Rail lines were pushed forward
rapidly, bridges were opened, and begin-
ning in April an increasing proportion of
the tonnage moved east of the river was
carried by rail. As in the earlier advance,
the railroads were outdistanced by the
tactical forces. Although air supply was
increasingly important in meeting urgent
needs in the forward areas, the brunt of
the transportation burden fell on motor
transport. The required over-the-road
hauling was effected through the so-called
XYZ project, involving trucking opera-
tions over a system of highway routes
established behind the onrushing Ameri-
can armies. Carefully planned and well
organized, XYZ proved to be the largest
and most successful of the long-haul truck-
ing operations of the war.3
With the achievement of victory in
Europe, the transportation effort shifted to
vital postwar tasks. Redeployment and
then repatriation of the bulk of the mas-
sive U.S. force built up in the theater were
huge and complex undertakings. Special
projects, including the movement to the
United States of patients, recovered
American military personnel, and war
brides, also had to be carried through.
Over and above these programs, there re-
mained the significant and long-term job
303
of supporting U.S. occupation forces in
Europe. Having established itself as an es-
sential service during the wartime years,
the Transportation Corps continued im-
portant as a permanent part of the peace-
time Army.
The Evolution of the Transportation
Organization
Until February 1945 two major U.S.
Army transportation headquarters existed
in France. In the north, General Ross's
Transportation Corps headquarters was
transplanted from the United Kingdom to
handle planning and staff functions relat-
ing to transportation and to supervise
marine, rail, highway, and movement
control activities in the ETO communica-
tions zone. In the south, where the ad-
vance echelon of COMZONE, MTOUSA
(previously SOS, NATOUSA), was sup-
planted in November 1944 by the South-
ern Line of Communications headquar-
ters, technical direction was exercised
independently of Ross by the SOLOC
Transportation Section, headed by Gen-
eral Stewart.4
Other transportation headquarters were
established within the subordinate terri-
torial commands set up under COM-
ZONE and SOLOC. By the end of 1944
five contiguous base sections (Normandy,
Brittany, Seine, Channel, and Oise) had
been activated behind the mobile Ad-
vance Section in COMZONE. In SO-
3
On Transportation Corps planning for the final
offensive, see Rpt, Consolidated Historical Report on
Transportation Corps Activities in the European The-
ater of Operations, May 1942 Through V-E Day
(hereafter cited as Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities
in ETO), Annex 1, pp. 14-15, OCT HB ETO.
4
For organizational developments in southern
France before the activation of SOLOC, see above,
pp. 298-99.
304 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

LOC, the Continental Advance Section COMZONE G-4 controlled shipping and
had moved forward, and the Delta Base exercised important functions with regard
Section had taken over the territory be- to movements control. To the theater chief
hind it. As in the United Kingdom, the of transportation these activities appeared
base and advance sections directed per- to be an unwarranted invasion of his
sonnel and operations within their respec- sphere of operations. After prolonged con-
tive jurisdictions. Each had a transporta- troversy the matter was finally settled in
tion staff to supervise Transportation Corps his favor, and late in the year he was given
activities and control intrasectional move- authority to develop a port and supply
5
ments. movement program. Subsequently, the
Upon moving his headquarters to control of shipping also was turned over to
Valognes in August 1944, General Ross him. Another important step in the direc-
set about developing an effective working tion of centralizing the direction of trans-
organization and turned to the formidable portation activities was taken after Gen-
transportation tasks involved in support- eral Somervell visited the theater. On his
ing the advancing armies. The stay at recommendation, the G-4 Transportation
Valognes was brief. Early in September Section was transferred to Ross's head-
the Transportation Corps, along with the quarters in February 1945.8
rest of COMZONE headquarters, moved The attainment of a unified theater-
forward to Paris. From the beginning the wide transportation organization was
Transportation Corps operated under achieved in February 1945. During that
great pressure. Expansion of port, rail, month SOLOC was dissolved, and the
and motor transport capacities was im- Delta Base Section and CONAD were
perative, and with the increase in the brought directly under COMZONE
number of base sections heavy demands headquarters. As part of the general reor-
were made on the Transportation Corps ganization, the functions and key per-
6
for staff and operating personnel. sonnel of the SOLOC Transportation Sec-
In general, this headquarters was or- 5
ganized along the same lines as it had Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 122, p. 5, OCT HB
ETO; Hist Monograph, Hist Div USFET, Adminis-
been in the United Kingdom. The princi- trative and Logistical History of the European The-
pal divisions were Administration, Con- ater of Operations (hereafter cited as Adm and Logis-
trol and Planning, Supply, Movements, tical Hist ETO), Pt. II, Organization and Command
in the European Theater of Operations, Vol. II,
Marine Operations, Motor Transport p. 269. The Loire Section, activated late in August
Service, and the 2d Military Railway 1944. was incorporated into the Brittany Base Section
Service. With the exception of an Inland in November. The Brittany Base Section, in turn, be-
came part of the Normandy Base Section in February
Waterways Division, which was separated 1945.
6
from the Marine Operations Division in Ltr, Ross to Gross, 2 Sep 44, sub: Activities of TC,
November, the structure remained bas- European Theater, August, OCT HB ETO.
7
7 Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Ch. I, pp. 1-2, and
ically unchanged at the end of 1944. Vol. V, Pt. I, Ch. II, p. 1, OCT HB ETO.
8
Although General Ross's organization Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, An-
was marked by stability during 1944, it nex 1, pp. 12-13; Adm and Logistical Hist ETO, Pt.
II, Vol. II, pp. 294-96, 303. For details on the control
encountered considerable delay in attain- of shipping and supply movements, see below, pp.
ing its full stature. As will be seen, the 309-11,324-26.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
tion were absorbed by Transportation
Corps headquarters in Paris. General
Stewart became deputy chief of transpor-
tation, assuming responsibility for the
supervision of movements and the opera-
tional services, exclusive of marine opera-
tions. Colonel Traub, previously the sole
deputy chief of transportation, was as-
signed responsibility for the planning and
administrative services. Since Traub was
familiar with the shipping situation, he re-
tained supervision of marine activities. At
the same time a General Headquarters
was established to co-ordinate the activi-
ties of the 1st and 2d Military Railway
Services, and its director was placed under
the chief of transportation. No other sig-
nificant organizational changes were
made during the remainder of the war.9
(Chart 4)
After V-E Day, Transportation Corps
headquarters was divided between France
and Germany. Ordered by SHAEF to
establish an office to direct transportation
activities within the U.S. occupied area in
Germany and to co-ordinate movements
with other areas, the chief of transporta-
tion shifted part of his staff from Paris to
Wiesbaden. He appointed an additional
deputy, Col. Charles Z. Case, to head the
new forward headquarters, which in-
cluded Planning and Control, Move-
ments, Motor Transport, and Administra-
tive Divisions. The Office of the Chief of
Transportation (Forward) continued to
operate at Wiesbaden until 21 August
1945, when it was transferred to Frank-
furt. Shortly thereafter, General Ross
moved to the new location, dividing his
time between Frankfurt and Paris. The
division into forward (later main) and
rear offices continued into the peacetime
10
period.
305
The Expansion of Port Capacity
The Allied offensive in the summer and
early fall of 1944 accentuated the need for
developing additional ports. Concentrat-
ing their main effort on the eastward pur-
suit of the retreating enemy, the tactical
forces were unable to take Brest, Quiberon
Bay, and Lorient on schedule. Other ports
of potential importance in Brittany, in-
cluding St. Nazaire and Nantes, also were
denied to the Allies by the stubborn de-
fense of German garrisons. As a result, the
northern armies had to rely on the inva-
sion beaches, Cherbourg, and the minor
Normandy ports. The facilities barely suf-
ficed to keep the Allied offensive rolling.
The probability that over-the-beach oper-
ations would be severely curtailed by ad-
verse weather beginning in September
lent additional urgency to the problem of
securing other suitable deepwater ports.
As previously indicated, delays in im-
plementing OVERLORD plans for port de-
velopment had caused transportation
planners to cast about in search of addi-
tional discharge capacity. By the end of
July Cherbourg's planned discharge tar-
gets had been greatly increased, but much
rehabilitation was required before they
could be attained. The minor Normandy
ports were also being developed, and pro-
posals were made to develop Cancale, in
Brittany, as a substitute for Quiberon Bay.
In August efforts were made to open the
small Brittany ports that had been cap-
9
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, pp.
62-64. For details on the changes in the organization
of military railway activities, see below, pp. 345-46.
Also see organizational chart, p. 306.
10
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. I, Ch. II, pp.
2-6, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp. 1-3, Vol. IX, Ch. II,
p. 1, OCT HB ETO.
CHART 4—ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION, COMZONE, ETOUSA: 1 APRIL 1945

Source: Rpt, Consolidated Historical Report on Transportation Corps Activities in the European Theater of Operations, May 1942 Through V-E Day, Chart VII, OCT HB ETO.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
tured, including St. Malo, Cancale, St.
Brieuc, and Morlaix.
Prospects for major port development
in Brittany faded in September, as the
enemy continued to cling tenaciously to
key points and as the Allied forces drove
farther eastward. Early in the month Gen-
eral Ross reported that the Quiberon Bay
project was "definitely out," in view of the
impracticability of getting tows from the
United Kingdom into the Bay of Biscay at
that time of year. Brest was captured on
17 September but was so badly damaged
that it was not worth rehabilitating. The
Lorient-St. Nazaire area remained in
enemy hands throughout the war.
During the same month, meanwhile,
the advancing forces had uncovered Le
Havre, Rouen, and Antwerp. While
Le Havre and Rouen had suffered exten-
sive damage, Antwerp was taken virtually
intact, a development that even the most
optimistic planner could not have fore-
seen. The prospective availability of these
ports placed the entire matter of ship dis-
11
charge in a new light.
Until the newly captured ports could
be placed in operation, the supply situa-
tion remained critical. In a communica-
tion to his major commands on 13 Sep-
tember 1944, General Eisenhower ex-
pressed his belief that the availability of
additional deepwater ports was prereq-
uisite to a final invasion of Germany. The
current port situation was such that a
week or ten days of bad channel weather
might well "paralyze" the Allied effort. In
order to support the Allied forces, Eisen-
hower stated, it would be necessary to se-
cure the approaches to Antwerp or Rotter-
dam and to capture additional Channel
ports.12
Shortly thereafter, in a communication
to Eisenhower, General Lee noted that
307
while tactical progress had exceeded ex-
pectations, port development was still be-
hind schedule. In Lee's opinion the devel-
opment of Brest and the other principal
Brittany ports to the tonnage previously
planned was impracticable. Since Le
Havre was reported seriously damaged
and since its location did not materially
shorten the lines of communications, he
recommended that it be placed in opera-
tion as rapidly as possible but with a mini-
mum expenditure for reconstruction. Lee
recommended that the major port devel-
opment be confined to Cherbourg, Le
Havre, and Antwerp.13
The port problem underwent continu-
ous study during the month, and on 27
September COMZONE issued a revised
port development directive tailored to the
current tactical and logistical situation.
The main emphasis was now placed on
the development of Antwerp, Le Havre,
and Rouen. 14 Under the new plan, Ant-
werp was slated to become the major
British-American port on the Continent.
Le Havre would be immediately devel-
oped to receive cargo from Liberty ships
11
Memo, Col Hugh A. Murrill, Contl and Plng Div
OCT, for G-4 COMZONE, 29 Aug 44, USFET OCT
319.1 Sup Info Rpts 1944-45, KCRC AGO; Rpt, Ross
to Gross, 2 Sep 44, sub: Activities of the TC, ET, Aug,
OCT HB ETO. Also see below, pp. 320-21; and His-
tory of G-4, Communications Zone, ETO (hereafter
cited as Hist of G-4 COMZONE ETO), Sec. I, Ch.
III, pp. 36-37, 43-46, OCMH Files.
12
Msg, SCAF 81, SHAEF Fwd, signed Eisenhower,
for action of AMCXF, CINC EXFOR, CINC 21
Army Gp, et al., 13 Sep 44, MTOUSA Trans Sec
AFHQ Opnl, KCRC AGO. Written before the cap-
ture of Brest, the message also emphasized the need for
the rapid reduction of that port so that it might be used
for the staging of troops.
13
Memo, CG COMZONE for SHAEF, 14 Sep 44,
AG 800 Rivers, Harbors, and Waterways, Vol. I, 1944
EUCOM.
14
Plans were also made for the development of
Ostend, a port operating under the British, but han-
dling POL for the U.S. forces.
308 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

discharging into DUKW's or lighters, and the Allies were denied the port facilities
its capacity would be eventually increased and the shortened lines of communication
to 7,000 tons per day. Rouen was sched- required for the adequate support of the
uled to discharge 3,000 tons daily from tactical forces.
coasters. Until Antwerp became available, Once Antwerp came "into production,"
Cherbourg would be used at maximum port capacity was no longer a serious
capacity, and although unfavorable problem. Thereafter, the emphasis in
weather would reduce their intake the planning shifted from port discharge to
beaches would have to be kept open. Of port clearance and inland distribution.
the minor Normandy ports, Grandcamp- The subsequent opening of Ghent in-
les-Bains was closed; Granville was desig- creased the port reception capacity on the
nated for coal discharge only; and the Continent still further and provided in-
coaster ports of Barfleur, St. Vaast-la- surance should the enemy interfere with
Hougue, and Isigny were to continue in operations at Antwerp. No additional
operation on second priority. ports were opened until after V-E Day.17
By this time, the Brittany ports had
ceased to be an important consideration. The Problem of Shipping Congestion
With regard to Brest, plans were made
only for a survey regarding its possible The prolonged delay in attaining ade-
future use and development. Cancale was quate port capacity, coupled with expand-
abandoned before it was opened, and port ing military requirements and other con-
reconstruction work at St. Malo had ditions, resulted in a growing backlog of
stopped. Only Morlaix and St. Brieuc undischarged cargo vessels in European
were scheduled for continued operation.15 waters. Early in July 1944 the War De-
With the opening of Le Havre and partment manifested anxiety over exces-
Rouen in October, the port situation im- sive retentions of cargo ships in the Euro-
proved somewhat, making possible the pean theater. During the following
elimination of minor or expensive opera- months, in view of the critical shipping
tions. Early in November 1944 General situation throughout the world, the com-
Eisenhower made available to the French manders of the European and North
St. Brieuc, Barfleur, St. Vaast-la-Hougue, African theaters were urged to release and
Carentan, Grandcamp-les-Bains, and return cargo vessels as quickly as possible.
Isigny—shallow-draft ports that the Allies 15
Memo, CofS COMZONE for Chiefs of Gen and
no longer required. The invasion beaches, Special Staff Secs, 27 Sep 44, sub: Devel of Continen-
where operations had been severely cur- tal Ports, AG 800 Rivers, Harbors, and Waterways,
tailed by bad weather and high seas, were Vol. I, 1944 EUCOM; Rad, Eisenhower to Marshall,
26 Oct 44, CM-IN 24750; Rpt, Ross to Gross, 18 Oct
closed later in the month.16 44, OCT HB ETO Misc; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study
While Le Havre and Rouen furnished 130, p. 21, OCT HB ETO.
16
some relief, no real solution to the problem Memo, CG SHAEF for Hq SHAEF, Mission
(France), 9 Nov 44, sub: Release of Ports in France,
of port capacity was possible until Ant- AG 800 Rivers, Harbors, and Waterways, Vol. I,
werp could be opened. This was delayed 1944 EUCOM; Opns Rpt, Omaha District, Nov 44,
until late November because of the diffi- Introduction
17
and Sec. II, AG ETO Adm 231.
Hist of G-4 COMZONE ETO, Sec. I, Ch. III, pp.
culty of clearing the Germans from the 45-46, 52-56, 63; Consolidated Rpt.on TC Activities
approaches to the port. During this period in ETO, Annex 1, p. 9.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
The problem was especially serious in
northern France where the bulk of the
shipping to support the invasion had been
18
concentrated off the coast of Normandy.
The War Department advised the Euro-
pean theater on 31 August 1944 that the
theater was retaining too many vessels and
so was interfering seriously with the avail-
ability of ships for other theaters. Accord-
ingly, the currently scheduled sailings
were to be cut by sixty vessels at the rate of
ten per convoy. The theater protested that
it wanted to crowd in the maximum ton-
nage for August and September before the
equinoctial storms, but computations in
Washington indicated that the existing
program of sailings from the United States
exceeded possible discharge on the Conti-
nent and the reduction was made.19
By October 1944 the shipping situation
in northern France had become worse.
Therefore, early in that month, the War
Department advised the theater that sail-
ings for the last quarter of the year would
be scheduled in accordance with demon-
strated ability to discharge, in order to
reduce the backlog to about seventy-five
vessels. General Gross, in particular, con-
sidered the theater's discharge estimates
too high on the basis of past performance
and too wasteful of shipping. The theater
again protested the cut; it expected the
discharge rate to increase rapidly, and it
also believed that the employment of ships
as floating warehouses could be justified.
The number of idle ships in European
waters continued to mount. The antici-
pated rate of cargo discharge failed to ma-
terialize, in part because of storms, rain,
and mud, which hampered unloading and
clearance. The previously projected open-
ing dates of additional ports, notably Ant-
werp, were not realized. Although Eisen-
hower and Lee made personal pleas for
309
more ships, citing the grave status of their
ammunition supply, the War Department
remained adamant. The situation, said
Somervell, did not permit the use of ships
20
for base depot storage.
Recalling how effectively shipping had
been controlled in the United Kingdom,
General Gross concluded that in France
the influence of the theater chief of trans-
portation had waned. The shipping tie-up
in Europe, he asserted, was delaying oper-
ations in the Pacific and postponing the
end of the war. Accordingly, with the ap-
proval of the theater, he detailed his direc-
tor of water transportation, Brig. Gen.
John M. Franklin, to the theater "to sug-
gest means to improve the discharge rate,
to discourage the huge assembly of ships
for storage purposes, and to give appropri-
ate emphasis to the fundamental need to
use shipping efficiently." Franklin, a
former shipping executive with consider-
able prestige, arrived in Paris on 28 Octo-
ber 1944. To help him in his mission Gen-
eral Ross placed Franklin in charge of the
Marine Operations Division. Gross hoped
18
Shipping congestion in southern France was
temporary and never as serious as in northern France.
See Adm and Logistical Hist ETO, Pt. VII, pp.
191-96.
19
See Corres and Statistics re Shipping Congestion
in Theaters 1944-45, OCT HB Wylie; Rad, CG
USFOR ETO to WD, 1 Aug 44, CM-IN-1123 (2
Aug 44), OCT HB ETO Shipping; Draft, Rad to CG
ETOUSA, 15 Aug 45, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks;
Rad, WD to CG ETOUSA, 31 Aug 44, CM-OUT
89859, 31 Aug 44. Cf. Wardlow, Responsibilities, Or-
ganization, and Operations, pp. 286-91.
20
Memo, Gross for Somervell, 5 Oct 44, OCT HB
ETOUSA Ship Situation; Rads: WD to Hq COMZ
ETO, 5 Oct 44, CM-OUT 42318; Hq COMZ ETO
to WD, 8 Oct 44, CM-IN 8626; WD to Hq COMZ
ETO, 9 Oct 44, CM-OUT 43793; Eisenhower to
Marshall, 22 Oct 44, CM-IN 21143; Lee to Somervell,
26 Oct 44, CM-IN 25856; and Somervell to Lee, Oct
44, CM-OUT 53834. Cf. Rpt, ACofS G-4 COM-
ZONE ETO, Shipping Situation and Supply Require-
ments, 1 Dec 44, OCT HB ETO France Ports.
310
that with Franklin's help Ross would be
restored to a dominant status in the con-
trol of shipping at General Lee's head-
quarters. The seriousness of the situation
is shown by the fact that of the 243 cargo
vessels in the theater on 30 October only
21
about 60 were actually being discharged.
General Franklin reported that Ross
had been sidetracked and that the COM-
ZONE G-4, Brig. Gen. James H. Stratton,
was exercising complete control over the
berthing and discharge of vessels. Shipping
from the United States to the theater was
scheduled on the basis of requests drawn
up by the G-4 Section, "with only nomi-
nal coordination" with the theater chief
of transportation. Franklin termed the
G-4 estimates of cargo discharge "com-
pletely erroneous." In a series of high-level
theater conferences, in which General
Eisenhower participated, Franklin stressed
and secured the acceptance of the princi-
ple that the theater's calculation of ship-
ping requirements must be subject to
continuing review and revision. Like
Gross, Franklin believed that the basic
problem was not a lack of ships but the
discharge performance in the theater.
With the assistance of two officers of the
Water Division in Washington, Franklin
therefore undertook a survey of cargo-
discharge and port-clearance capacities on
the Continent with a view to obtaining a
sound basis for realistic estimates.22
During November 1944, despite vigor-
ous efforts to expedite the release and re-
turn of ships, no appreciable drop occurred
in the number of idle vessels awaiting dis-
charge. In part, this situation reflected the
setback from the severe October storms,
but basically it stemmed from the inability
to develop adequate port discharge and
clearance capacity. Antwerp, although
consistently and optimistically included in
theater estimates of port capacity, did not
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
begin cargo operations until 28 Novem-
ber, and it gained little momentum be-
fore mid-December. The theater's con-
tinued failure to meet the target for dis-
charge of cargo stimulated the growth of
skepticism in the War Department as to
the value of the ETOUSA estimates and
led to a renewed determination not to dis-
patch additional ships to the theater until
the existing backlog had been reduced. 23
Late in November General Eisenhower
sent several senior staff officers including
three major generals (Lucius D. Clay,
Harold R. Bull, and Royal B. Lord) to
Washington to explain in detail his serious
ammunition and shipping situation. Gen-
eral Franklin accompanied the party. The
ensuing discussion at the War Department
brought no significant change in policy.
As before, the War Department was will-
ing to give the theater all the ships it
needed, provided they could be discharged
promptly.24
21
Ltr, Gross to Ross, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen
Ross; Annual Rpt, Water Div OCT, FY 45, pp.
16-17, OCT HB Water Div; Memo, Franklin for
CofT ASF, 19 Jan 45, sub: Shipping Situation, OCT
HB Gross ETO.
22
Ltr, Franklin to Gross, 5 Nov 44; Memo, Frank-
lin for CofT ASF, 19 Jan 45, sub: Shipping Situation
ETO. Both in OCT HB Gross ETO. See also Annual
Rpt, Water Div OCT, FY 45, pp. 16-17, OCT HB
Water Div; and Rpt, Franklin, Port Conditions and
Estimated Capacities, ETO, 31 Jan 45, OCT HB
ETO France Ports. For the story from the G-4 view-
point, see Hist of G-4 COMZONE ETO, Sec. I.
23
ACofS G-4 COMZONE ETO rpt cited n. 20.
The G-4, COMZONE, claimed that the theater chief
of transportation consistently overestimated the capac-
ity of OMAHA Beach and that similar estimates led to
a wide difference between the expectations reported
by G-4 and the actual discharge. See Hist of G-4,
COMZONE ETO, Sec. I, Ch. V, p. 85. For a critical
analysis from the Washington viewpoint see Memo,
CofT ASF for ACofS OPD, 1 1 Nov 44, sub: Cargo
Shipping for ETO, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.
24
Memo, ACofS OPD, 25 Nov 44, sub: Presenta-
tion … of ETO Ammunition and Shipping Diffi-
culties, OCT HB Gross ETO; Memo, Marshall for
Somervell 25 Nov 44, ASF Hq Shipping 1944; Hist
of G-4 COMZONE ETO, Sec. I, Ch. V, pp. 95, 104.
 FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
Upon return of the theater delegation
to Paris early in December, a Shipping
Control Committee was set up. It was
composed of General Lord, Chief of Staff,
COMZONE, General Stratton, Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-4, COMZONE, and
General Franklin as the representative of
the theater chief of transportation. This
committee, whose basic task was to effect
the requisite co-ordination between supply
and transportation, was designated as the
agency through which all shipping matters
were to be cleared with the War Depart-
ment. It was to receive requests for the
allocation of shipping, which the G-4 orig-
inated on the basis of tonnage require-
ments, and to scale them down to the esti-
mated capacity for reception. To insure
proper allocation of vessels to discharge
ports and to reduce turnaround a Diver-
sion Committee was formed. Headed by
the Transportation Corps Control and
Planning Division chief of the theater, the
committee included representatives of the
COMZONE G-4, the technical services,
and the Transportation Corps Operations
and Movements Divisions.25
Meanwhile, the impact of the world-
wide shipping shortage had made itself
felt at the highest level in Washington. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War Shipping
Administrator, whose vessels in large
numbers had long been immobilized over-
seas, presented the matter to the President
in November 1944. In accordance with
instructions from the President, the Joint
Chiefs in December issued a directive de-
signed to improve the utilization of vessels
in the oversea commands. Applied to all
theaters, it prohibited the use of ocean-
going vessels as floating warehouses,
banned partial or selective discharge ex-
cept in emergency, and enjoined a realistic
appreciation of port and discharge capac-
ity in arriving at shipping requirements. A
311
system of weekly ship activity reports
(short title, ACTREP) also was instituted
to provide prompt and uniform informa-
tion for all interested agencies in Washing-
26
ton. The tide had already begun to turn
in Europe when this action was taken.
After Antwerp became available for cargo
discharge, the reserve of commodity
loaders began to melt away.
However, more rapid improvement of
the shipping situation was hindered by the
fact that more cargo could be discharged
than could be promptly forwarded by the
available inland transport. Even after ad-
ditional rail facilities had been obtained,
the restricted capacity of the forward
depots to receive cargo was a serious lim-
iting factor, and this difficulty was intensi-
fied by the absence of intermediate depots.
Temporary relief was secured by storing
cargo in the port area, a practice that was
also adopted at Le Havre. By mid-Decem-
ber thirty or more vessels could be worked
simultaneously at Antwerp, and each
could be turned around in ten or eleven
days.
The ensuing German counteroffensive
temporarily checked progress in clearing
the shipping backlog. At Antwerp for a
time vessel discharge was curtailed, addi-
tional cargo accumulated on the quays,
and with the exception of critical items
forward movement of cargo was further
restricted. The port congestion was soon
relieved, once the enemy threat was turned
25
The Diversion Committee for the Continent was
patterned after the BMWT Diversion Committee,
which had long functioned in the United Kingdom.
On the latter, see Ch. III.
26
JCS 1173/8, 8 Dec 44; Rad, JCS to All Theaters,
WARX 74985, 9 Dec 44, CM-OUT 74985. The
WSA representative (Thomas Monroe, previously as-
sociated with Franklin and Ross) kept a watchful eye
on the G-4 shipping estimates. See Ltr, Granville Con-
way, WSA, to Gen Gross, 2 Oct 44, OCT HB Wylie,
Corres and Statistics re Shipping Congestion in The-
aters 1944-45.
312
back and port clearance operations were
expanded. The result was that ships that
had idled as floating depots for months at
last could be sent home.27
On 19 January 1945 General Franklin
reported the accomplishment of the War
Department objective of bringing the the-
ater's cargo shipping and discharge pro-
gram into substantial balance. Between
30 October 1944 and 7 January 1945 the
number of cargo vessels in the theater had
been reduced from 243 to 99. He also
noted the need of intermediate depots with
sufficient capacity to absorb tonnage that
the forward dumps could not receive.
Such depots, although deemed essential to
prevent port congestion and long desired
by the theater, had not yet been estab-
lished.28 On 17 February General Lord,
on behalf of General Lee, assured General
Somervell that there would be no excessive
accumulation of idle ships and that he
would see to it that his staff maintained "a
vigilant and accurate estimate of the situ-
ation at all times." Both the discharge rate
and the forward movements from the
ports, he reported, were finally showing
signs of consistent improvement. By late
March 1945 General Gross was satisfied
with the shipping and transportation situ-
29
ation in the European theater.
U.S. Army Port Operations
Despite the delay in developing the port
discharge and depot capacities envisaged
in OVERLORD and the consequent shipping
congestion, the U.S. Army-operated
beaches and ports in France and Belgium
handled an enormous volume of traffic
originating in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the Mediterranean.
Between the invasion of Normandy and
8 May 1945, approximately eleven
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
months, they discharged 15,272,412 long
tons of Army cargo and handled the de-
barkation of 3,702,180 personnel. In most
cases, port operations were handicapped
by extensive destruction of facilities, per-
sonnel and equipment shortages, and lim-
ited means of transportation to the inte-
rior. The workloads carried by the various
Army port and beach installations during
this period are indicated in the following
table: 30
27
Ltrs, Franklin to Gross, 11 and 31 Dec 44; Memo,
Franklin for CofT ASF, 19 Jan 45, sub: Shipping Situ-
ation ETO. All in OCT HB Gross ETO. Cf. Memo,
Col Coughlin for Gen Ross, 19 Feb 45, sub: Visit to
ETO Ports, OCT HB ETO France Ports; and Hist of
G-4 COMZONE ETO, Sec. I, pp. 101, 105-06. For
the WSA story, see MS, John Worth, The American
Merchant Marine at the Normandy Landings, pre-
pared under the supervision of the U.S. Maritime
Commission, Chs. XI and XII.
28
The lack of intermediate depots and the conse-
quent adverse effect on the supply situation were
pointed up by General Somervell and his director of
operations on visits to the theater in late 1944 and
early 1945. For details on these reports and subsequent
efforts to improve the depot structure, see Adm and
Logistical Hist ETO, Pt. VII, section entitled Supply-
ing Twelfth Army Group, 16 December 1944-22 Feb-
ruary 1945, Chs. II and VII.
29
Memo, Franklin for CofT ASF, 19 Jan 45, sub:
Shipping Situation ETO, and Ltr, Lord (for Lee) to
Somervell, 17 Feb 45, OCT HB Gross ETO; Ltr,
Gross to Ross, 22 Mar 45, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen
Ross.
30
Stat Br OCT ETO, Trans Statistics ETO, 6 Jun
44-8 May 45, May 45, pp. 9-10, OCT HB ETO Stat
Rpts.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
Cherbourg
The first major port on the Continent to
fall into American hands, Cherbourg, had
begun operations on 16 July 1944. Late in
the month, the port was given the objec-
tive of discharging 20,000 tons per day by
mid-September 1944. An expanded pro-
gram for the rehabilitation of the shattered
port facilities was undertaken by the En-
gineers and plans were made to provide
additional unloading equipment and to
improve rail and highway facilities.31
During the summer and fall of 1944
every effort was exerted to reach the de-
sired daily discharge of 20,000 tons, but
progress was disappointingly slow. Mine
sweeping and ship salvage proved more
difficult than anticipated, causing delays
in port reconstruction. Cargo operations
were carried on around the clock, but
night work was slowed by poor lighting.
Manpower was insufficient, despite the
employment of thousands of prisoners of
war and hundreds of French civilians. As
winter approached, inclement weather
often interrupted the port activity, and in
September, alone, ten days were lost. Also,
much of the incoming cargo consisted of
bulky construction and rail rehabilitation
materials, items that were difficult to han-
dle expeditiously. Diversion of trucks and
rolling stock from Cherbourg to hauls
along the lengthening supply lines further
32
handicapped port operations.
Although General Ross had warned
that the goal of 20,000 tons per day might
not be achieved if passenger traffic were
allowed to interfere with cargo operations,
American troops began debarking at
Cherbourg as early as July. In anticipa-
tion of additional troop movements, suit-
able space for staging areas was found
southeast of the city. Evacuation of casu-
313
alties was started in mid-August and was
an important port activity thereafter. On
7 September 1944 the first troop convoy of
four ships arrived direct from the United
States, carrying approximately 19,000
military personnel who were unloaded by
means of barges and rhinos. During that
month a total of 67,022 troops landed at
Cherbourg, and 5,059 casualties were
evacuated. These passenger movements,
while not extraordinarily heavy, had an
adverse effect upon cargo discharge since
they tied up badly needed floating equip-
ment and port personnel.33
After discharging 12,911 long tons on
30 August, the port hit a new high of
14,426 long tons on 18 September. During
the remainder of the month, the tonnage
unloaded daily fluctuated between 8,150
and 13,888 long tons. Notwithstanding
the difficulties already mentioned, the
port commander, Colonel Sibley, believed
that the main deterrent to the accomplish-
ment of the port's mission was the delay in
reconstructing sufficient deepwater berths.
On 14 September 1944 the port rehabili-
tation program was reported 75 percent
complete, but a large part of this work
consisted of lighterage facilities and the
uncompleted 25 percent consisted chiefly
of berths where cargo could be discharged
directly from ship to shore. At that time,
only five of twenty-eight planned Liberty
31
On the opening of Cherbourg and the assignment
of its new mission, see above, pp. 279-82.
32
Hist, 4th Port, 1 Oct 44-15 Nov 44, pp. 1-3, 6-8,
10, OCT HB Oversea Ports; Interv with Col Sibley,
28 Jan 53, OCT HB ETO Ports; MS, Hist Sec ETO,
Cherbourg—Gateway to France, Ch. X, p. 4, OCMH
Files.
33
Phone Conv, CofT ETO and OCT ASF WD, 8
Jul 44, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Hist Rpt,
TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. II (4th Port), pp. 7, 27, 29,
OCT HB ETO; Hist, 4th Port, Sep 44, and Progress
Rpt, 4th Port, Jul 44-Jun 45, pp. 13, 14, OCT HB
Oversea Ports; Ltr and Appended Remarks, Sibley
to Larson, 9 Sep 49, OCT HB Inquiries.
314
berths were available. The lack of deep-
water docks compelled the port to rely
heavily on lighterage, a process that re-
quired double handling and inevitably
slowed cargo discharge. Of the 439,660
long tons of Army cargo discharged at
Cherbourg by 13 September, only 38.4
percent was unloaded directly at quayside
or at special LST ramps. The remaining
tonnage was carried ashore from ships at
anchor by DUKW's, barges, and other
34
craft.
Other problems arose in the realm of
administration. As in the United King-
dom, the ports on the Continent were
under the jurisdiction of the base sections.
The Normandy Base Section commander,
with headquarters at Cherbourg, took an
active part in the direction of the port
activities, and in Colonel Sibley's opinion
prevented the port commander from effec-
tively exercising his authority. Moreover,
the presence of base section headquarters,
as well as various naval headquarters,
served to crowd the port area and added
to the congestion.35
Colonel Sibley was relieved on 19 Sep-
tember 1944 and was succeeded late in
the month by Col. James A. Crothers.36
During the following month continued
progress was made in rehabilitating the
port as much additional cargo-handling,
marine, motor transport, and rail equip-
ment and personnel became available.
Improvement was also reported in the
maintenance and repair of port equip-
ment. A growing percentage of the cargo
was discharged directly at dockside, and
despite worsening weather conditions the
average daily discharge rose from 10,481
tons in September to 11,793 long tons in
37
October.
As cargo discharge operations improved,
port clearance became the principal limit-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ing factor. By October it had become ap-
parent that although it was physically pos-
sible to unload 20,000 tons of cargo per
day, this objective was being blocked by
the difficulty of moving cargo forward
once it had been placed ashore. There it
tended to pile up, awaiting transport. As
at any port, when clearance failed to keep
up with discharge congestion developed.
The continuous fall rains brought thick
mud and impassable roads and caused
trucks to bog down at the dumps. Motor
transport for port use was severely limited
by the demands of the rapidly advancing
armies. As a result, greater use had to be
made of rail facilities.
General Ross had foreseen that rail
facilities would have to be greatly ex-
panded and ultimately relied upon for
most quay clearance at Cherbourg. Ac-
cordingly, an additional ninety miles of
track were constructed within the port
area. At his insistence, two large marshal-
ing yards were built outside the city. The
4th Port also took over the operation of
the Cherbourg Terminal Railway from the
Normandy Base Section in order to
achieve control and co-ordination of port
and rail activity.38
34
Hist, 4th Port, Sep 44, Incl 6, Daily Statement of
Tonnage Handled, OCT HB Oversea Ports; MS,
Cherbourg—Gateway to France, Ch. VI, pp. 18, 22,
and Ch. X, p. 4, OCMH Files; Interv with Col Sibley,
28 Jan 53, OCT HB Inquiries.
35
Interv with Col Sibley, 28 Jan 53, OCT HB In-
quiries; MS, Cherbourg—Gateway to France, Ch. II,
pp. 9-10, 13, OCMH Files.
36
Colonel Sibley was removed at the request of the
acting Normandy Base Section commander, Col.
Benjamin B. Talley. General Ross disagreed with this
action, thought Sibley was doing a very good job, and
later gave him an important niche in his office. See
Ltr, Ross to Larson, 22 Jan 51, OCT HB Inquiries.
37
Hist, 4th Port, 1 Oct 44-14 Nov 44, pp. 1, 3, and
Incl 11, Table, Daily Average, Comparison with Sep-
tember Performance, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
38
Hist, 4th Port, 1 Oct-15 Nov 44, pp. 1-3, 6-8, 10,
OCT HB Oversea Ports.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 315

Until August 1944 port clearance at The Brittany Ports

Cherbourg was effected mostly by motor
transport, but thereafter rail traffic in- The supply problem of the U.S. forces
creased rapidly. In September almost as was so pressing and the lag in cargo dis-
much cargo was dispatched by rail as by charge so serious that every effort had to
truck. Beginning in October, movement be made to develop auxiliary ports, no
by rail took the lead as additional track- matter how small. With the Allied advance
age became available and more trains following the St. Lo break-through, a
were placed in operation. The following number of northern Brittany ports, includ-
are the comparative figures, in long tons, ing St. Malo, Cancale, Morlaix, St. Brieuc,
for cargo discharge and port clearance by and St. Michel-en-Greve, became avail-
rail and by truck during the last half of able. The job of operating these installa-
39
1944: tions was assigned to the 16th Port under
General Hoge, former commander of the
Cargo
Discharged
Cleared by
Rail
Cleared
by Truck
Engineer Special Brigade Group at
July. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31,627 1,212 27,257OMAHA Beach.
August. . . . . . . . . . . . . 266,444 94, 692 152,731 Early in August 1944 General Hoge
September.......... 314,431 162,021 166,118 flew to France with an advance party,
October............ 365, 592 191, 307 161, 814 which was followed later in the same
November.......... 433, 301 242,004 150,026
month by the main body of the port or-
December.......... 250,112 155,797 97,202
ganization. Preliminary reconnaissance
disclosed that the beaches at Cancale and
The peak in cargo discharge at Cher- St. Malo were not usable and that the lock
bourg was reached during November gates at St. Brieuc had been severely dam-
1944, and on one day the 20,000-ton tar- aged. On 11 August the 16th Port was or-
get was almost reached. An abrupt drop dered to discharge three LST's that had
in December brought the discharged cargo just arrived at St. Michel-en-Greve with
down to about the August level, where it trucks, ammunition, rations, and miscel-
remained during the first quarter of 1945. laneous supplies urgently needed by the
The decline was due primarily to the VIII Corps of General Patton's Third
opening of other ports—Rouen, Le Havre, Army. The unloading, which began on
and Antwerp—which were closer to the the following day when the beach had
combat zone. Cherbourg remained useful, dried out, was completed in sixteen hours.
particularly for the discharge of ammuni- Later, other LST's were discharged here
tion, which was not moved through Ant- in similar fashion. Meanwhile, operations
werp because of the buzz bombs. also started at Morlaix. In September
After November 1944 Cherbourg stead-
ily declined as a major port. In the process
39
of slackening off, much of its cargo-han- Progress Rpt, 4th Port, 27 Jun 44-15 Mar 45,
p. 13, OCT HB Oversea Ports. Cf. Hist Rpt, TC ETO,
dling equipment was turned over to other Vol. IV, Sec. II (4th Port), pp. 18-22, OCT HB ETO.
installations. After V-E Day Cherbourg 40
TC USFET MPR, 31 Jul 45, Table 8A, and Hist
was used chiefly for the evacuation of pa- Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. I, Ch. III, pp. 25-26, and
Vol. VIII, Pt. I, Ch. III, pp. 1-2, 7-8, 11, OCT HB
tients. The port was returned to French ETO; MS, Cherbourg —Gateway to France, Ch. X,
40
control on 14 October 1945. p. 4, OCMH Files.
316 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

1944 the 16th Port was relieved in this tember 1944, the port development pro-
41
area by the 5th Port. gram called for the immediate reception
The 5th Port found the facilities at of approximately 1,500 long tons per day
Morlaix very poor. The retreating Ger- by means of DUKW's or lighters and an
mans had done some damage, but follow- eventual discharge of about 7,000 long
ing reconstruction Morlaix and its sub- tons per day. This was to be accomplished
ports of Carentan, Roscoff, St. Michel-en- without major reconstruction.43
Greve, and St. Brieuc were serviceable, The 16th Port, which was assigned to
and they discharged and forwarded ap- operate Le Havre, had completed its
proximately 54,000 long tons of supplies transfer from Brittany by the end of Sep-
44
in September 1944. At the tiny port of tember 1944. Meanwhile, Engineer
Roscoff more cargo was discharged and troops had arrived and had begun the job
cleared every day than had been handled of rehabilitation. This work was scheduled
there in an entire year before the war. A for completion in three phases. In the first
small fleet of Army harbor boats, assisted phase the Engineers cleared and prepared
by Navy landing craft and some local the beaches for operation, removed mines
shipping, furnished the required water and booby traps, provided storage space,
transportation. Through these minor in- and built access roads. In the second phase
stallations flowed a steady though not emphasis was placed on the repair of quays
heavy stream of ammunition, rations, and and lighterage berths, the improvement of
petroleum products for the support of the the road network, and the removal of
Third Army. The service of the 5th Port sunken vessels. The latter job was done in
in Brittany was terminated in December close co-ordination with U.S. Navy salvage
1944 when the unit transferred to Ant- crews. The first phase was completed and
42
werp. the second well under way by the end of
Counted on heavily in OVERLORD plan- November. Thereafter work was con-
ning, the Brittany ports played only a centrated on the provision of facilities of
minor role in the support of the armies. a more permanent nature—the third
Morlaix and its subports proved useful, phase.45
but none of the larger ports was ever 41
Hist, 16th Fort, 1 Jul-16 Sep 44, (OCT HB Over-
opened. As already indicated, enemy re- sea Ports; Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO,
sistance, destruction of port facilities, and Annex 1, pp. 5-6.
42
Fifth Major Port, Story of Three Years Overseas,
the rapid Allied progress eastward led to 1942-45, pp. 43, 47, 63, OCT HB Oversea Ports; T/4
abandonment of the hope of any signifi- Charles E. Adams, "The 5th," Army Transportation
cant port development in Brittany. By the Journal, II, 2 (March 1946), 13-15; Hist Rpt, TC
ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. II, 16th Port, pp. 1-10, and 5th
latter part of September, the emphasis in Port, pp. 1-3.
planning had shifted to ports recently un- 43
Memo, CofS COMZONE ETO for Chiefs of Gen
covered by the advancing armies. and Special Staff Secs, 27 Sep 44, sub: Devel of Conti-
nental Ports, AG 800 Rivers, Harbors, and Water-
ways, Vol. I, 1944 EUCOM.
44
Le Havre The 16th Port was commanded by General
Hoge until his departure on 21 October 1944. Colonel
Koenig temporarily headed the port until the arrival
The port of Le Havre, at the mouth of of Col. Thomas J. Weed on 31 October.
the Seine River, had suffered severely from 45
On port rehabilitation and cargo operations at Le
Allied artillery and air attacks and from Havre during the last quarter of 1944, see Hist Rpt,
TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. I, 16th Maj Port, OCT HB
enemy demolition. As planned in late Sep- ETO.
 FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 317

Work was sufficiently advanced by sumed increased importance, DUKW's

2 October 1944 to begin over-the-beach and barges continued to be the chief
discharge from LST's. Despite almost con- means of discharge. During the first quar-
tinuous rainfall, rehabilitation progressed ter of the year the seven DUKW compa-
and the discharge rate mounted steadily. nies brought ashore 35.2 percent of the
By the end of the year the port troops, aug- tonnage landed at Le Havre. Quayside
mented by French civilians, had unloaded discharge accounted for 23.3 percent of
434,920 long tons of cargo from a variety the total. Barges and other craft accounted
of vessels including Liberties, LST's, re- for the remainder. The volume of inbound
frigerator ships, and coasters.46 The bulk shipments—largely ammunition—contin-
of the tonnage was discharged from ships ued heavy, and by 31 May 1945 Le Havre
at anchor into DUKW's, barges, and had received a total of 1,254,129 long
landing craft. As at other ports, operations tons of cargo.
were conducted around the clock.47 Port clearance at first was effected by
During the German counteroffensive of motor trucks, which rumbled through the
December 1944, Le Havre played an im- debris to the dumps. Later, rail and canal
portant role in supporting the hard-pressed facilities also were used to remove cargo
U.S. forces. In that month the port dis- from the port area, where suitable storage
patched ninety-two trainloads of ammu- space was scarce. As elsewhere, port clear-
nition to the forward area; critically ance activities were at first handicapped
needed rockets were rushed by truck from by insufficient ship-to-shore discharge
the port to troops defending a large depot facilities and by truck and rail equipment
at Liege; and certain types of small arms shortages. By early 1945, however, these
ammunition were given expedited han- conditions had been materially improved.
dling.48 The tonnage moved forward then ex-
A major feat during this period was the ceeded that discharged, permitting the
rehanging of the gates of the Lock Roche- reduction of cargo previously accumulated
mont. This project, participated in by in port storage.50
Engineer and harbor craft troops, U.S.
46
Navy salvage personnel, and French civil- In late 1944 about 4,000 French civilians were
ian contractors, opened the inner basins to employed in unloading ships, warehousing, clean-up
operations, and other activities in the port area. Later,
Liberty ships. Despite adverse weather, a large number of prisoners of war were used. In
underwater obstructions, and limited April 1945 there were on duty at the port 12,601
equipment, the job was finished at the end American troops, 3,785 French civilians, 729 French
military personnel, and 6,216 prisoners of war. See
of November. The first Liberties passed Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, p. 219, OCT HB
through the lock on 16 December. Other ETO. 47
important undertakings, completed early Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. I, 16th Maj Port,
pp. 33-35, 43, OCT HB ETO; Hist, 16th Maj Port,
in the following year, involved the rehabil- 1 Oct-30 Nov 44, pp. 7-8, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
48
itation of the Tancarville Canal for barge Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. I, 16th Maj Port,
traffic up the Seine from Le Havre, and pp. 22-23, OCT HB ETO; MS, Supply Front: The
16th Port Story, p. 10, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
the rehanging of the gates of the Bassine 49
Hist Rpt, 16th Maj Port, Oct-Nov 44, pp. 8-9,
49
de-la-Citadelle. and Qtrly Hist Summary, 16th Maj Port, Jan-Mar
In January 1945 a peak monthly dis- 45, pp. 1-2, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
50
Qtrly Hist Summary, 16th Maj Port, Jan-Mar
charge of 198,768 long tons was achieved. 45, pp. 3-4, OCT HB Oversea Ports; TC USFET
Although quayside operations had as- MPR, 31 Jul 45, Table 8A, OCT HB ETO.
318
Aside from serving as a cargo port, Le
Havre also developed into the principal
troop debarkation point in the European
theater. Debarkation activities became
important in November 1944, and reached
a peak during March 1945, when 247,607
personnel debarked. The landing of troops
was facilitated by direct ship-to-shore
operations at a long steel ponton pier and
at a rehabilitated troopship berth at the
Quai d'Escale. In mid-January 1945 the
52d Port, newly arrived from the Bristol
Channel, was attached to the 16th Port.
Its commander, Col. William J. Deyo,
was assigned the job of handling troop
movements. During the same month the
Red Horse Staging Area was established
nearby to stage inbound and outbound
personnel.51
With the coming of V-E Day, emphasis
shifted from troop debarkation activities
to outloading personnel. On 1 June 1945
the Le Havre Port of Embarkation was
established and included the port, the
depots, and the adjacent staging camps.
During the month a total of 207,759 Amer-
ican military personnel embarked from Le
Havre. The port was used for outbound
American personnel, including war brides,
until the end of July 1946, when this
activity was assigned to the 17th Port at
52
Bremerhaven, Germany.
Rouen
U.S. Army activities at the Seine River
port of Rouen were begun early in Octo-
ber 1944. A detachment of the 16th Port
arrived to direct operations; rehabilitation
and salvage activities were undertaken by
the French, U.S. Army Engineer troops,
and U.S. Navy personnel; and French
civilians were hired to assist in the conduct
of port activities. The first two ships,
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
coasters carrying POL from the United
Kingdom, were berthed on 15 October
1944.
After four days the 16th Port detach-
ment was replaced by the 11th Port, which
with its attached units had been trans-
ferred from the Normandy minor ports.
There were then nine berths available,
and rehabilitation was estimated to be 20
percent complete. The 11th Port com-
menced unloading activities on 20 Octo-
ber, and during the remainder of the
month it discharged 23,844 long tons from
53
forty-eight vessels, most of them coasters.
At first, port operations were retarded
by enemy destruction, inadequate railway
facilities, a shortage of labor, and insuffi-
cient motor transport for cargo clearance.
Also, larger cargo vessels, such as Liberties
and MTV's, had to be loaded lightly or
were lightened in order to negotiate the
shallow channel between Le Havre and
Rouen. As rehabilitation progressed, the
port's performance improved. During No-
vember 1944, the 11th Port discharged
127,569 long tons, and in December it un-
loaded 132,433 long tons. Meanwhile,
troop debarkations had become important.
Beginning with the debarkation of troops
from an LSI on 10 November, Rouen by
the end of the year had received 51,111
51
Short Report on Important Transportation De-
velopments in the European Theater of Operations,
1 December 1944 through 8 May 1945, pp. 6-7, OCT
HB ETO Special Hist Rpt; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol.
V, Pt. I, 16th Maj Port, p. 42, and Vol. VI, Pt. II,
16th Maj Port, pp. 117, 132, OCT HB ETO; Hist
Rpt, 12th Maj Port, 25 Jun 45, pp. 4-7, OCT HB
Oversea Ports.
52
Hist, 16th Maj Port, Jun 45, pp. 1-4, OCT HB
Oversea Ports; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 1,
pp. 240-41, and Pt. III, App. 3, and Vol. XVIII, Pt.
1, Ch. 1, p. 2, and Pt. 2, Sec. II, p. 151, OCT HB
ETO.
53
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, 11th Maj
Port, p. 1, OCT HB ETO; Hist, 16th Maj Port, pp.
19G and H, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 319

personnel and 22,078 vehicles, which ar- since the backlog continued to mount, a
rived aboard LST's, MTV's, coasters, and temporary embargo had to be placed on
landing craft. sailings to Marseille from Italian and
The port rehabilitation program was North African ports. The procurement of
pushed to within 75 percent of completion additional motor transport and the rela-
by the close of 1944, and subsequently a tively rapid rehabilitation of rail facilities
total of fifteen Liberty and twenty-six proved major factors in relieving this port
coaster berths were made available. Activ- congestion. By 1 November some 1,100
ity reached a peak during March 1945, trucks were available for port clearance,
when the port discharged 268,174 long the backlog of cargo awaiting removal had
tons of cargo. At that time approximately been reduced to normal, and the ports of
9,000 U.S. Army troops, 5,000 French Marseille and Port-de-Bouc were discharg-
civilians, and 9,000 prisoners of war were ing and clearing an average rate of 16,000
engaged in operations at Rouen. Traffic at long tons per day for five days each week.56
the port fell off drastically after V-E Day, The 6th Port ran into a shortage of
and on 15 June 1945 the port was returned experienced labor at Marseille since the
to French control.54 best dock hands had been removed by the
Germans. Nevertheless, many indigenous
Marseille workers were hired. In February 1945 an
average of 7,339 French civilians worked
In contrast with the delayed port devel- each day in the dock area. The French
opment in northern France, Marseille was served under their own supervisors but re-
brought into operation earlier than antici- ceived U.S. Army rations to supplement
pated. When Marseille and its satellite, their diet. Because the demand for labor
Port-de-Bouc, were captured late in Au- exceeded the available supply, the port
gust 1944, about a month ahead of sched- requested and received prisoners of war to
ule, operation was assigned to the 6th Port. assist in port operations. During the same
Despite extensive destruction, rehabilita- month, in addition to French civilians, the
tion proceeded rapidly, and by late Sep- daily labor force at Marseille included
tember 1944 it was possible to close the 1,268 Indochinese, 4,621 prisoners of war,
beaches in southern France and rely on and 5,646 U.S. troops. The large number
the ports to receive the men and materials of foreign workers accentuated the pilfer-
required for the support of the 6th Army 54
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, 11th Maj Port,
Group.55 pp. 1-7, and Vol. VI, Pt. 2, 11th Maj Port, p. 58,
During October prompt removal of OCT HB ETO; TCPI Bull 27, 9 Aug 45, pp. 37-39;
cargo from the port area at Marseille be- MS, Col R. S. Whitcomb, One War, Ch. XIV, OCT
HB; TC USFET MPR, 31 Jul 45, Table 8A, OCT
came very difficult because of a shortage HB ETO.
of motor transport. Large amounts of 55
See above, pp. 294-96.
56
cargo were piled on the quays, many Hist, 6th Port, Vol. V, pp. 14-15, 20-22; Memo,
6th Port Hq for CofT ETO, 6 Jan 45, sub: Port of
berths were idle, and on a single day as Marseilles. Both in OCT HB Oversea Ports. See also
many as forty-four ships were awaiting Memo, Col Danaher for CofT AFHQ, 27 Oct 44, sub:
discharge. In this emergency every avail- Back Piling-Marseilles Port; and Rad, DELTABASE
to TRANS COMZONE MTOUSA, 1 Nov 44. Both
able vehicle was seized for port clearance. in MTOUSA G-4 Sec Trans Southern France, KCRC
Even horses and wagons were used. But AGO.
320
age problem. Efforts to minimize black
market activity originating in the port
were only partially successful, chiefly be-
cause of an insufficient number of military
police to serve as guards.57
During November 1944 Marseille
achieved a record of 486,574 long tons of
cargo discharged. In the period from No-
vember 1944 through March 1945 the
port unloaded a total of 2,249,389 long
tons. For the same five months troop de-
barkation figures aggregated 269,579.
Port-de-Bouc, in addition, had received
large amounts of petroleum products,
which in March 1945 alone totaled
162,245 long tons. By April 1945 the Army
had sixty-eight berths available at Mar-
seille. In the following month part of the
port area was relinquished to French
agencies for handling much-needed civil-
ian foodstuffs and supplies.58
When V-E Day came the port of Mar-
seille had discharged more U.S. Army ton-
nage than any other European port. It had
also debarked a large number of American
military troops in addition to forwarding
prisoners of war to the zone of interior. Fol-
lowing the German surrender, Marseille
was the principal port for direct redeploy-
ment of personnel, equipment, and sup-
plies to the Pacific. Here were concentrated
the "flatted" Liberties that were to trans-
port organizational vehicles for the rede-
ployed units. These were the ships origi-
nally requested by the theater to furnish
vehicle lift and an emergency floating
reserve of ammunition and subsistence for
the invasion of southern France.59
After V-J Day the main mission of the
6th Port was to return troops and matériel
to the zone of interior. The peak came in
November 1945 when 139,785 troops and
41,062 long tons were outloaded. Activi-
ties at Port-de-Bouc were ended on
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
23 March 1946, and on the last day of
that month all U.S. port operations ceased
60
at Marseille.
Antwerp
Situated on the Scheldt River about
fifty-five miles from the sea, Antwerp had
the important advantage of excellent
shipping facilities, good connections with
the hinterland, and proximity to the front
lines. In peacetime Antwerp had been one
of the world's busiest ports with activity
comparable to that of Hamburg and
New York. Besides many modern docks
equipped with 270 electric cranes, 322 hy-
draulic cranes, and much heavy lift equip-
ment, the port had considerable shed and
storage space, several large dry docks, and
more than 400 connected tanks with a ca-
pacity of over 120 million gallons for
petroleum products.
Since the Germans had left the port and
its facilities relatively undamaged, no
major reconstruction work was required.
The river and harbor had to be swept of
mines, and considerable dredging accom-
61
plished. Some sunken craft had to be
cleared from the basins, sand and gravel
57
Hist, 6th Port, Vol. VI, pp. 17-19, and Exhibit
A, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
58
Ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 5, 7-8, 21-22, 24, and Exhibits
D and I.
59
Loaded as bottom cargo, the ammunition and
subsistence provided ballast over which was built a
false deck to carry vehicles. See Annual Rpt, Water
Div OCT, FY 45, pp. 22-23, 38-39, OCT HB Water
Div; and Rad, SOS NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA,
5 Mar 45, MTOUSA Trans Sec ANVIL, KCRC AGO.
60
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. III, pp.
115, 118, Vol. X, Ch. III, pp. 7-8, and Vol. XIV, Ch.
III, pp. 1-2, OCT HB ETO. See also Hist, 6th Port,
Vol. VI, pp. 8-10, 14-15, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
61
Mine sweeping and dredging were performed by
joint U.S.-British navy teams. By the time the port
was opened for operations, mine sweeping had been
completed and dredging was in progress.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 321

removed from the quays, and hard surfac-Although over-all command of the port
was vested in a British naval officer, the
ing provided for fork lifts and other mate-
rials-handling equipment. The damaged British and American sections were each
headed by a separate port commander.
gates of the Kruisschans Lock at the main
The co-ordination of activities, including
entrance to the American sector had to be
repaired, ripped-out rails replaced, andthe determination of requirements for
repairs to sheds, warehouses, and quay civilian labor and port equipment, was
walls made. The rehabilitation work was controlled through a Port Executive Com-
performed by British and American mili- mittee, which was headed by the British
tary units, assisted by civilian labor. An naval officer in charge and included the
early report indicated that the port of British and American port commanders.
Antwerp was capable of meeting the com- Provision also was made for the estab-
bined requirements of the British and lishment of a joint American-British
American Armies.62 movements and transportation committee
Preliminary negotiations between the to plan and co-ordinate movements by
British and Americans had assured the highway, rail, and canal. After a Belgian
latter a minimum of sixty-two working representative had been included, this
berths. On 14 October 1944 General Ross committee became known as BELMOT
designated the chief of his Control and (Belgian Movements Organization for
Planning Division, Col. Hugh A. Murrill, Transport). Insofar as possible, American
as his representative in the over-all plan- cargo was to be moved from quayside to
ning for the development of the port. advanced depots, and any storage in the
Ross, in particular, wanted the maximum port area was to be of an in-transit charac-
freedom of operation accorded the U.S. ter. It was estimated that the U.S. Army
port commander. Four days later a formal would move approximately 22,500 tons of
agreement was reached between the Brit- cargo per day, exclusive of bulk POL, to
ish 21 Army Group and the U.S. its depots in the Liege-Namur and Lux-
COMZONE headquarters providing for embourg areas. The British were expected
a division of the inner harbor, or basins, to move 17,500 tons daily, exclusive of
64
between the British and the Americans, bulk POL, to their forward depots.
and for the joint use of the outer harbor,
that is, the docks along the river. Subject to
62
later amendments, this agreement as- Memo, Col Murrill for Gen Ross, 10 Sep 44, sub:
Antwerp, AG USFET TC 34 Port Info. On mine
signed a large portion of the northern sec- sweeping, dredging, and port rehabilitation at Ant-
tion of the port to the U.S. Army and re- werp, see Adm and Logistical Hist ETO, Pt. VII, pp.
served the southern section, including the 165-72; and Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Ch. III, 13th
Maj Port, pp. 7-10, OCT HB ETO.
city of Antwerp, for the British forces.63 63
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Ch. III, 13th
Under the agreement, the British as- Maj Port, pp. 1-5, and Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. III, Sec. VI,
sumed responsibility for the local adminis- pp. 73-74, OCT HB ETO; Memo, CofT SOS for
CofS COMZONE, 19 Sep 44, sub: Antwerp, OCT
tration and defense of the Antwerp area, 500 (Gen).
while the Channel Base Section, 64
Ibid.; Memo, Col Hugh A. Murrill, TC, for CofT
COMZONE, was given the task of co- COMZONE, 28 Sep 44, sub: Necessary Action on
Antwerp, OCT HB ETO Antwerp; Memo, Ross for
ordinating," controlling, and administer- Murrill, 14 Oct 44, OCT HB Oversea Ports (13th
ing all U.S. forces within the area. Port, Misc Corres).
322
The 13th Port, previously stationed at
Plymouth, was assigned initially to Ant-
werp. Its personnel began arriving in
October 1944. Later, the 5th Port also
was moved to Antwerp, coming in two de-
tachments during November and Decem-
ber. Technically, the 5th Port was attached
to the 13th Port, but the officers and men
were placed wherever needed so as to form
a single working organization. The head-
quarters companies of the two ports re-
mained separate. In command of this
combined organization was Col. Doswell
Gullatt, who formerly headed the 5th
Engineer Special Brigade at OMAHA
Beach.65
The first American cargo vessel at Ant-
werp, the James B. Weaver, arrived on 28
November 1944 with men of the 268th
Port Company and their organic equip-
ment aboard. By mid-December the port
at Antwerp was operating in high gear.
The American section was divided into
eight areas, each of which functioned as a
unit. Cargo handling was greatly helped
by the large amount of American equip-
ment, notably harbor craft and cranes,
brought in to supplement the Belgian port
facilities. As the year closed, the pool of
floating equipment was augmented by the
arrival of 17 small tugs, 6 floating cranes—
2 of 100-ton capacity—20 towboats, and
a number of other harbor craft. Military
personnel for the most part simply super-
vised cargo discharge, since the bulk of the
unloading was done by Belgian longshore-
men. The number of civilians employed
by the U.S. Army steadily increased, and
at the close of 1944 the average was ap-
proximately 9,000 per day. The principal
problem was that of transporting the
workers to and from their homes, since
enemy activity had forced many natives
into temporary quarters outside the city.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
During the winter of 1944-45, despite oc-
casional short-lived strikes, the Belgian
civilians on the whole performed excel-
lently and proved both co-operative and
66
industrious.
Buzz bombs, rockets, and enemy air at-
tacks often interrupted but never entirely
halted port operations. Casualties, prop-
erty damage, and frayed nerves were in-
evitable concomitants. In late October the
persistent enemy bombardment of the
Antwerp port area had aroused fear in the
Army's Operations Division at Washing-
ton that this might be another case of put-
ting "all the eggs in one basket." In reply,
the theater commander had stressed the
importance of the additional port capac-
ity. The defense of the city, he said, was
being strengthened, but at the same time
every other available port on the Conti-
nent was being developed to the maxi-
mum as insurance against disaster at
Antwerp. 67
Regardless of the grave hazards, port
personnel soon succeeded in unloading
more cargo than could be moved promptly
to the dumps and railheads. Although
cargo forwarding lagged behind vessel dis-
charge, the rate of port clearance steadily
improved. Rail clearance, initially limited
by shortages of rolling stock, was stepped
up, and by mid-December 1944 it out-
stripped other means of transportation
from the port. During that month removal
by rail accounted for 44 percent of all ton-
nage cleared, as against 40 percent for
69
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. III, Sec.
VI, pp. 77-78, OCT HB ETO.
66
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Ch. III, 13th
Maj Port, pp. 9-10, and Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. III, Sec.
VI, pp. 78-82, OCT HB ETO. See also U.S. Army
ETO, The 13th Port, 1943-1946.
67
Rads, Marshall to Eisenhower, 25 Oct 44, CM-
OUT-51862, and Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Oct 44,
CM-IN-24750.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
motor transport. The inland waterways
accounted for the remainder.
Normal port operations at Antwerp
were interrupted by the German counter-
offensive of mid-December 1944. Because
outlying depots and dumps, particularly
those in the Liege area, were threatened,
large quantities of supplies again accumu-
lated in the port. Items such as winter
clothing, tanks, Bangalore torpedoes, jeeps,
mortars, and snowplows were rushed to
the front. Port personnel were diverted
from their regular assignments to assist in
the rescue of V-bomb victims and to guard
supply trains moving into the forward
areas. The port troops also formed road
patrols and did sentry duty at vital dock,
installations in order to forestall possible
attack by saboteurs and enemy para-
troopers. Fog, icy roads, and bitter cold
added to the operating difficulties.68
Despite constant harassment by long-
range V-1 and V-2 weapons and occa-
sional bombing and strafing from aircraft,
port activity continued at a steady pace.
During December 1944 the impressive
total of 427,592 long tons of cargo was
taken off U.S. vessels at Antwerp. The
nuisance bombing was countered by de-
termined and effective defenders utilizing
antiaircraft fire, radar screens, and every
other modern protective device. Yet the
bombs came through, bringing death and
destruction. Despite the incessant noise
and the constant terror, longshoremen
worked feverishly around the clock. Lights
burned all night, controlled by master
switches for protection against enemy air-
craft. A steady stream of trucks and trains
moved the cargo forward to the armies.69
Early in 1945 the halting of the Ger-
man Ardennes offensive, continued prog-
ress in the rehabilitation of port facilities,
and the acquisition of additional harbor
323
craft and port equipment permitted sub-
stantial improvement in the amount of
cargo moved through Antwerp. 70 The fol-
lowing tabulation shows, in long tons, the
cargo discharge and clearance at the port
during the first half of 1945.71
By V-E Day the American section of
Antwerp had become the leading cargo
port operated by the Transportation Corps
in the European theater. After the close of
hostilities the port did not lose its signifi-
cance. In July 1945 ammunition, tanks,
vehicles, and personnel were shipped to
the Pacific. The capitulation of Japan led
to a change in the outloading program,
which thereafter was directed to the re-
turn of troops and equipment to the zone
of interior. As at other ports, the frequent
turnover of personnel and the progressive
reduction of strength incident to redeploy-
ment and demobilization resulted in low-
ered operating efficiency. Because an
adequate military guard could not be
68
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Ch. III, 13th
Maj Port, pp. 14-16, OCT HB ETO; Hist Rpt, 13th
Port, 28 Nov-31 Dec 44, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
69
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Ch. III, 13th
Maj Port, pp. 12-13, OCT HB ETO; Hist Rpt, 13th
Port, 28 Nov-31 Dec 44, OCT HB Oversea Ports; The
13th Port, 1943-1946, pp. 13-33.
70
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. III, Sec.
VI, pp. 80, 82-88, OCT HB ETO.
71
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 3, App. 3, Pt. 5,
Statistics, Port Opns, OCT HB ETO.
324
72
maintained, cargo pilferage increased.
The 5th Port was inactivated on 18 No-
vember 1945. In that month, despite the
loss of many key men, 156,743 long tons of
cargo were outloaded. The 13th Port re-
mained as the headquarters unit at Ant-
werp. However, as the year drew to a
close, activity was on the decline. On 31
October 1946 the 13th Major Port was in-
activated and all U.S. Army port oper-
ations ceased.73
Ghent
The Belgian port of Ghent was opened
in January 1945 under joint American
and British operation to serve as a stand-
by port for Antwerp. Having been used
by the Germans only for barge traffic, the
harbor had to be dredged and the port fa-
cilities rehabilitated. The 17th Port was
assigned to Ghent, and on 23 January it
began unloading the first cargo ship. A
steady increase in American acitvity dur-
ing the ensuing months culminated in a
peak discharge in April of 277,553 long
tons. Late in that month the Americans
took complete charge of port facilities, ex-
cept for a few berths reserved for the Brit-
ish. By 31 May a total of 793,456 long tons
of U.S. Army cargo had been unloaded.
On 24 June the 13th Port relieved the
17th Port at Ghent. The main body of the
latter organization then proceeded to
Bremerhaven, which was to be developed
as the supply port for the American occu-
pation forces in Germany and Austria. 74
U.S. Army port operations ceased alto-
75
gether in the last week of August 1945.
Movement Control
Movement control operations on the
Continent differed markedly from those
in the United Kingdom. France lacked
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the well-organized military transportation
system that existed in the British Isles and
there was no established movement con-
trol organization upon which the U.S.
Army could rely. Movement control on
the Continent was further complicated by
wartime damage or destruction. At the
outset it was almost impossible to deter-
mine how much traffic might be handled
in a given area. Movements therefore
could not be planned, as in the United
Kingdom, on the basis of known perform-
ance and a relatively predictable logistical
situation. On the Continent the estimates
of port, rail, and highway capacity were
never free from the uncertainty inherent
in a changing tactical situation.
The control of movements on the Con-
tinent was initially handled on a decen-
tralized basis. As the advance and base
sections were established, they set up
movement control staffs within their trans-
portation sections and assigned traffic
regulating personnel to important rail ter-
minals and truck traffic control points.
On the Continent the RTO did much the
same work as in the United Kingdom,
performing the actual movement control
operations in the field. Although under
the technical supervision of the theater
chief of transportation, the RTO was di-
72
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VIII, Pt. 1, Ch. III, Sec.
III, pp. 34-35, 38, 43, 51-52, 53-54, and Vol. X, Ch.
III, Sec. II, p. 27, OCT HB ETO.
73
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. X, Ch. III, Sec. II, pp.
23-24, Vol. XI, Ch. III, Sec. II, p. 30, and Vol. XIX,
Pt. 1, Ch. III, Sec. III, pp. 20, 26, OCT HB ETO.
74
On the initial port activity at Bremerhaven, see
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VIII, Pt. 1, Ch. III, Sec. V,
pp. 100-106, OCT HB ETO.
75
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. III, Sec.
VIII, pp. 136-48, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. III, Sec. IX,
pp. 259-65, and Vol. VIII, Pt. 1, Ch. III, Sec. III, pp.
31-32, 52-53. See also, 17th Maj Port, Apr-Jun 45,
OCT HB Oversea Ports. Cf. TC COMZONE
ETOUSA MPR, 31 May 45, Table 8A, OCT HB
ETO.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
rectly responsible to the transportation of-
ficer of the base section in which he
functioned. 76
The decentralized command structure,
coupled with the intervention of the
COMZONE G-4 in the realm of oper-
ations, delayed the development of cen-
tralized direction of supply movements by
the theater chief of transportation until
the end of 1944. Until that time, the com-
manders of the various base sections took
almost complete responsibility for the con-
trol of movements originating in their re-
spective areas. The "technical supervi-
sion" of the theater chief of transportation
was construed in the narrowest sense, with
the result that his personnel in the base
sections refused to act without a move-
ment order from the G-4, COMZONE,
whose office therefore became an operat-
ing agency. The Freight Branch of the
chief of transportation's Movements Divi-
sion was primarily advisory. There was
no strong civilian organization, such as
the British Ministry of War Transport that
could bring pressure to bear on the supply
services.77
The depots and dumps on the Conti-
nent generally were set up without con-
sulting the theater chief of transportation
and often without regard for limitations
that he might have detected. Such prac-
tices resulted in many unsatisfactory
locations being chosen, and rail and truck
congestion followed because freight was
scheduled for arrival at a rate beyond the
capacity of the installation. 78 Since many
of the factors affecting the control of
freight movement were unknown or vari-
able, and since large reserves ashore were
lacking, the supply of the U.S. Army
usually was on a hand-to-mouth basis,
governed by a system of priorities and
daily allocations.
325
By late 1944 it was clear that the ability
of the ports to discharge and forward
cargo exceeded the combined receiving
capacity of the U.S. Army depots. This
situation called for a movements program
geared to realistic goals. However, the
priority system and movement control
exercised by G-4, COMZONE, prevented
the theater chief of transportation from ef-
fectively restricting and policing freight
traffic in accordance with depot capac-
ities. Moreover, the G-4 of each base sec-
tion was free to use the movement capac-
ity that remained after the priority
allocations of G-4, COMZONE, had been
met. This often led to the arrival of addi-
tional freight at depots that were already
overburdened.
The period of extreme decentralization
in movement control came to an end on 1
January 1945 with the publication of the
first monthly port operations and supply
program. 79 The new program had its be-
ginning in the daily allocation made for
the Red Ball Express in late August 1944.
Further impetus was given by the subse-
quent shipping crisis, in which it was
demonstrated that cargo discharge, port
clearance and forward movement would
have to be planned on a realistic basis. De-
tails of the new system were worked out in
76
Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC, activation to 30 Sep 44,
pp. 10, 17, 17A; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2,
Ch. IV, pp. 5-6; Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities
in ETO, Annex 5, Annex F; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET,
Study 122, p. 5. All in OCT HB ETO.
77
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, An-
nex 5, Pt. 1, p. 17.
78
In contrast, the pertinent American and British
transportation officials were consulted on all depot
sites in the United Kingdom before the final selection
was made. Memo, Capt Ashton Bonaffon for RTO
and Port Comdrs, 9 Nov 42, sub: Selection of Depot
Sites, AG 320 Responsibilities & Functions of TC.
79
Variously titled, the program covered both per-
sonnel and freight movements. For details see OCT
HB Monograph 29, pp. 374-407.
326
periodic conferences with the chief of
transportation, whose position, as has
been pointed out, was greatly strength-
ened at this time. 80 During March 1945
General Ross was also instrumental in
establishing a workable procedure where-
by an immediate embargo could be pro-
claimed to prevent congestion at a given
depot. The monthly personnel and supply
movement program, as it was later called,
proved extremely useful during 1945.81
In order to effect the orderly movement
of supplies and replacements into the com-
bat zone and the prompt evacuation to
the rear of casualties, prisoners of war,
and salvage, provision was made for the
assignment of regulating stations. This
type of traffic control agency, a hold-over
from World War I, should not be confused
with the traffic regulating units, on which
the Transportation Corps relied heavily
throughout operations on the Continent.
As a rule, a separate regulating station
was established behind each army, com-
manded by a regulating officer who theo-
retically was the direct representative of
the theater commander.82
As provided for in OVERLORD planning,
the regulating officers serving each of the
armies under the 12th Army Group were
assigned to ADSEC, which then func-
tioned as the armies' regulating agency.
When the 24th and 25th Regulating Sta-
tions reached France in late July 1944, no
one clearly understood what was expected
of such units since they had not been used
previously. By mid-August, however, the
25th Regulating Station had begun to
assist ADSEC in controlling the flow of
supplies to the U.S. First Army, its mission
until the German surrender.
Meanwhile, the 24th Regulating Sta-
tion began supporting the fast-moving
U.S. Third Army. Especially during Au-
gust and early September 1944, the de-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
mand always exceeded the supply and the
transportation facilities proved inade-
quate. Priorities of movement had to be
established to prevent highway conges-
tion, and shipments were forwarded on a
day-to-day basis. Under these circum-
stances the unit did more expediting than
regulating, a condition that lasted until
December 1944. The 24th Regulating
Station followed the Third Army into
Germany, operating as a control agency
in its support until the end of hostilities.83
In view of the extensive employment of
motor transport on the Continent, the
control of highway traffic became an im-
portant staff function of the theater chief
of transportation and was assigned to his
Movements Division. This work fell into
two main phases. The initial phase ob-
tained from D Day until about mid-Au-
gust 1944. During this period, when the
tactical situation was the governing fac-
tor, highway traffic was regulated by the
U.S. First Army and ADSEC. The second
phase began with the establishment of the
office of the chief of transportation in
France, when the Movements Division be-
came responsible for highway traffic regu-
lation and issued the necessary directives
and procedures. For about three months
it also issued motor movement instructions
and made its own reconnaissance in the
field. As soon as the base sections were
80
See above, p. 304.
81
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, An-
nex 5, Pt. I, pp. 18, 20-21, and Annex "A."
82
According to Ross, in World War II the regu-
lating station was a "fifth wheel" whose work could
better have been done by RTO's. Comments, Ross to
Larson, 12 Jun 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
83
Information has been found on only two regulat-
ing stations. See Hist Rpt, 25th Regulating Station,
5 Feb 44-12 May 45, pp. 1 and 24, and Rpt, Regu-
lating Officer to CG ADSEC, 28 Jun 45, sub: Opns
of 24th Regulating Station, AG ETO Adm 585. Cf.
Memo on Phone Conv with Col Charles H. Blumen-
feld, former CO 25th Regulating Station, 10 May 49,
OCT HB ETO France Regulating Gps.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
fully staffed and trained in the proper
procedure, they took over this activity.
For security reasons as well as to facil-
itate communication, a key-letter system
of recording and dispatching information
on the movement of convoys and units was
inaugurated by the theater chief of trans-
portation. Co-ordination with civilian
traffic agencies was achieved through two
liaison officers, one French and the other
Belgian, who were attached to the Move-
ments Division. To supplement his small
staff, General Ross requested fifteen civil-
ian highway engineers from the United
States. They began to arrive in December
1944 and were assigned where needed,
but they might have proved more accept-
able in the field had they been commis-
sioned officers. The experience of the
Movements Division indicated that traffic
control on a decentralized basis, through
the base sections, was the key to efficient
traffic regulation.
At the close of hostilities in Europe the
entire continental highway movement
plan had to be altered to embrace the use
of motor transport for the redeployment
and readjustment of military personnel.
Late in May 1945 a theater directive was
issued that provided a complete standing
operating procedure for such movements.
To facilitate smooth and rapid transfer of
personnel by highway from the army
areas to the assembly areas and the port
staging areas, a forward Road Traffic
Branch was established at Wiesbaden,
Germany, on 10 June 1945. It formed a
helpful link between the armies and the
theater chief of transportation. 84
Motor Transport
By late August 1944 three types of truck
operations had developed as planned: (1)
so-called static operations, which included
327
short hauls around depots and other in-
stallations; (2) port clearance; and (3) line
of communications hauling, or long hauls.
Static operations, though unspectacular,
absorbed the bulk of motor equipment.
Port clearance, which chiefly concerned
cargo but might also involve troop move-
ment, was essential to the smooth flow of
supplies and troops into the combat zone
and to insure the prompt return of ships
to the United Kingdom and the zone of
interior. Line of communications hauling
had the most dramatic role in bringing
85
lifeblood to rapidly moving armies.
The main highways on the Continent
were generally in good condition, thanks
to reconstruction and repair by the Corps
of Engineers. In a changing military situ-
ation, motor vehicles constituted the most
flexible type of transportation, since they
allowed hauls to be made to any location
at any time and could be adapted readily
to loads of varying weights and sizes. To
meet the mounting demands of the ad-
vancing armies and to link the ports and
beaches with the forward army supply
areas, several express highway routes were
established. But before describing these
routes, it may be helpful to trace the prin-
cipal developments with respect to the
supply and operation of motor transport
during the campaign on the Continent. 86
Factors Effecting Operations
Throughout the summer of 1944 the
burden laid on motor transport increased
sharply, and the length of the hauls grew
84
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO,
Annex 5, Pt. III, pp. 1-4.
85
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 122, pp. 47-48, and
Study 125, pp. 23-25, OCT HB ETO. On U.S. Army
trucking operations in France during June and July
1944, see above, 282-85.
86
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 1-2,
OCT HB ETO.
328
greater as the Transportation Corps vainly
tried to keep up with the armies. Had
there been more truck units and more
heavy-duty vehicles, the situation might
never have become so acute, but the thea-
ter chief of transportation and his staff had
not received the trucking units and heavy-
duty cargo-hauling equipment that they
had considered necessary for operations
on the Continent. The resultant shortage
in truck capacity was undoubtedly a fac-
tor in slowing the Allied advance, particu-
larly that of the U.S. Third Army, across
France in the summer and fall of 1944.87
Other factors also played a part. The
Motor Transport Brigade (MTB) experi-
enced considerable difficulty because of
inadequate communications, congested
highways, and frequent delays in loading
and unloading. By late August 1944 the
MTB had a daily lift of approximately
10,000 tons and the average haul was
somewhat over 100 miles. At that time,
General Ross reported that the rapid ad-
vance had proven extremely burdensome
to the Transportation Corps and that only
the trucks had saved the situation. It was,
he added, pretty hard to keep pace with
armies that covered in less than three
months what they were expected to do in
ten, especially when only one major port
(Cherbourg) and the beaches were in
operation.88
Despite the failure to get the motor
transport that he wanted before D Day,
the theater chief of transportation contin-
ued his efforts after the invasion. Then, as
earlier, he had to contend with insufficient
and inadequate equipment and inexperi-
enced and untrained troops in hastily or-
ganized provisional truck companies.
During the last half of 1944 General Ross
tried to obtain additional trucking units
and in particular to re-equip the 2½-ton
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
standard companies with truck-tractors
and 10-ton semitrailers that could carry
a large pay load. Most of the re-equip-
ping, begun in November, was accom-
plished by sending truck companies to
Marseille where approximately 1,800
semitrailers and 690 truck-tractors had
been discharged because of limited port
capacity in northern France. After taking
a short course in nomenclature and oper-
ation, these units brought the new heavy-
duty equipment north from Marseille.89
Replacement of vehicles was a frequent
necessity. Enemy action caused some
damage, but the many accidents and
mechanical failures due to inexperienced
drivers and inefficient maintenance were
the principal contributing factors. Because
of constant wear and tear, the supply of
tires and tubes for replacement became
especially critical in the last quarter of
1944. Preventive measures were taken to
ease the strain on such items, and late in
the year the chief of transportation suc-
ceeded in procuring 16,053 tires and tubes
of various types and sizes. Although the
major supply problem in motor transport
concerned vehicles, tires, and tubes, a host
of other requirements developed, ranging
from cotter pins to 750-gallon skid tanks.
During this period the Motor Transport
Service also stressed improved mainte-
87
According to Colonel Ayers, General Patton
could have had plenty of gasoline for his tanks had
the Transportation Corps been given all the ten-ton
semitrailers that it had requested. Ltr, Ayers to Lar-
son, 19 Apr 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
88
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, An-
nex 7, A Brief Outline History of the Motor Transport
Service, pp. 11-12; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, In-
troduction, pp. 3-4, and Hist, Trans Sec ADSEC,
activation to 30 Sep 44, p. 18, OCT HB ETO; Ltr,
Ross to Gross, 28 Aug 44, OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen
Ross.
89
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. II, Pt. 2, pp. 3-4, OCT
HB ETO.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
nance procedures in an intensive effort to
lessen the number of deadlined vehicles
90
and to root out unsound practices.
The lack of qualified personnel, notably
truck drivers, was especially serious be-
cause of the damage done to equipment
by inept handling. In light of the havoc
they wrought, some provisional truck
units were dubbed derisively truck de-
stroyer battalions. Maintenance often was
omitted in order to keep the vehicles con-
tinuously in service, and they never re-
covered from such abuse. Nor were the
field armies always economical in their
use of motor transport. On occasion, when
a convoy arrived in the forward area, the
trucks were not allowed to unload. In-
stead, the entire convoy was moved ahead
for days as a sort of mobile dump. The
Motor Transport Service had to keep
liaison officers constantly in the field to
effect the return of such convoys. Properly
used and supported, truck transportation,
said Colonel Ayers, could have done a
much better job than it did.91
The provisional Motor Transport Bri-
gade, originally intended to function only
forty-four days, was not dissolved until
early in November 1944. Its personnel
then joined the Motor Transport Service,
which took over the operational duties
previously performed by the Motor Trans-
port Brigade. On 5 December 1944 Col.
Ross B. Warren succeeded Colonel Ayers
as commanding officer of the Motor Trans-
port Service. The responsibilities of the
MTS and the base sections were consider-
ably clarified by March 1945, at which
time the administration of the COM-
ZONE truck units was assigned to the
base sections, as was also operational con-
trol when the haul was entirely intrasec-
tional. If the movement was intersectional
the MTS had operational control, together
329
with the technical supervision that it
maintained under all circumstances. At
the close of 1944 the MTS had 198 truck
companies under its technical supervision,
including the 84 units that were also
under its operational control. Of the 198
units, well over half, or 104 truck com-
panies, were equipped with standard 2½-
ton 6x6 trucks.92
A gradual shift in the need for motor
transport from the Cherbourg and Nor-
mandy areas to the north and the east
began in November 1944. Operation on
the Normandy beaches ceased during that
month. The tonnage landed at Le Havre
and Rouen increased, and Antwerp was
opened. Simultaneously, plans were pre-
pared for the employment of motor ve-
hicles in support of an extensive advance,
in the event of a possible break-through
into German territory.
The enemy counteroffensive of Decem-
ber 1944 soon altered the situation, neces-
sitating the diversion of many vehicles to
deliver combat troops into the forward
areas and to remove aviation gasoline
from imperiled dumps at Liege. Apart
from the semitrailers used to lift gasoline,
the equipment used during this crisis was
predominantly 2½-ton standard cargo
trucks and 10-ton semitrailers with 4-5-
ton truck-tractors. The Transportation
Corps moved more than 1,000,000 tons of
supplies by motor during the Battle of the
Bulge. In the process it lost fifty trucks,
90
Ibid., Vol. II, Pt. 2, Ch. II, pp. 5-6 and App. 4.
91
Rpt, 12th Army Gp, Final Report of Operations,
Vol. III, G-4 Sec, pp. 36-37, 40, DRB AGO; History
of Motor Transport in the European Theater of Oper-
ations, Ch. VII, pp. 6-8, 13-14, OCT HB ETO; Ltrs,
Lehneis to Larson, 10 Jan 50, and Ayers to Larson,
19 Apr 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
92
Hist, TC ETO Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. II, pp. 67-71,
Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 2-3, and Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. V, p. 1,
OCT HB ETO.
330
and twenty-eight of its men were reported
killed, wounded, or missing.93
Increasingly heavy demands were made
on motor transport during the closing
months of the war. For the Rhine River
crossing a small fleet of landing craft was
moved from the seacoast on large M-19
and M-25 tank transporters. 94 In the
spring of 1945, an acute motor transport
equipment shortage arose as tonnage re-
quirements increased, and truck units
were pulled out of port clearance and
static operations and placed in support of
the final offensive east of the Rhine. In
mid-March and again in April 1945 Gen-
eral Ross apprised the base section trans-
portation officers of the critical situation
and urged them to make the most efficient
use of the facilities at their disposal. He
listed certain ideal conditions to be
achieved, such as two drivers for each ve-
hicle so as to permit round-the-clock oper-
ation; forty vehicles per day per company
doing task duties and the other eight
being serviced; and maximum utilization
of trucks with regard to pay loads and
turnaround time. He also recommended
the policy of pooling vehicles at all in-
stallations, a return-loads program, and
the utilization wherever possible of addi-
tional civilian motor transport, as well as
horses and wagons and rail and barge
lines.
By V-E Day the situation had improved
somewhat, but new requirements served
to keep the pressure on. In the summer of
1945 General Ross stressed the difficulty
caused by redeployment of motor trans-
port units to the Pacific. Only by the
resourceful and economical utilization of
the equipment remaining in the theater
could the armies be redeployed and the
many displaced persons and prisoners of
war be relocated. The accomplishment of
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
these missions required a continued maxi-
mum effort by all COMZONE transpor-
tation officers in the months immediately
95
following the termination of hostilities.
Express Highway Routes
To meet the ever-growing requirements
of the field armies, several express high-
way routes were established, usually for
limited periods, for special missions, and
until the railways could carry the load.
The express highway routes served their
primary purpose in 1944. Although they
became less essential, as rail and barge
services became operative, late in the year,
fast highway transport again became a
major factor in logistical support when the
armies drove beyond the Rhine in 1945.96
The POL routes were opened on the
Continent on 14 June 1944 and were con-
tinued throughout the war. Organized
first to supply petroleum products during
the critical phase of the invasion, the POL
truck routes usually ran from pipeheads,
although some loading was done directly
at the ports, especially at Rouen. Bivouac
areas, vehicle maintenance depots, and
routes were constantly changing as the
pipelines were pushed forward. The
drivers hauled both MT 80 (Motor Trans-
port 80 octane) gasoline for vehicles and
AV 100 (Aviation 100 octane) gasoline for
aircraft. Petroleum products were carried
either in bulk or in packaged form, the
latter being prepared from bulk lots at the
93
Ibid., Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 8-11, and Vol. VI,
Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 1-2.
94
95
Ibid., Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 23-24.
Memos, CofT for All Sec Trans Officers, 16 Mar,
14 Apr, 2 May, 6, 14, and 21 Jul 45, sub: Critical
Situation of OCT Facilities, in History of Motor
Transport in the European Theater of Operations,
App. B, OCT HB ETO Hwy.
96
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. V, p. 2,
OCT HB ETO.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
decanting areas. Packaged POL usually
was transported in 5-gallon Jerry cans on
2½-ton 6x6 cargo trucks, and bulk ship-
ments were made in tank trucks.
In mid-November 1944 fourteen tank
truck companies comprised the backbone
of the POL truck fleet. Five of these com-
panies had 750-gallon tankers and nine
had 2,000-gallon tankers with 2,000-
gallon trailers. Since additional tonnage
was required, standard cargo trucks were
added to carry packaged POL or were
equipped with skid tanks to haul bulk
gasoline. In the closing months of the war,
three companies were equipped with ten-
ton semitrailers, each fitted with four 750-
97
gallon skid tanks. During the period
from 14 June through 31 December 1944,
a total of 423,434 tons of petroleum prod-
ucts was carried by the Motor Transport
98
Service.
Express motor routes for the movement
of general cargo were established as the
need arose. The impetus to the first such
route, the Red Ball Express, came in late
August 1944 when the G-4, COMZONE,
asked if a total of 100,000 tons of various
classes of supply could be delivered from
Normandy to the U.S. Army dumps in the
Chartres-La Loupe-Dreux area by 1 Sep-
tember, in order to support a projected
advance. Since the available rail facilities
would lift only 25,000 tons, the remaining
75,000 tons would have to be moved by
truck. ADSEC accepted the assignment,
and the first hauling began almost im-
mediately and with little advance prep-
aration. The Motor Transport Service,
under Colonel Ayers, supervised the
project, the supply services furnished the
cargo, and the Normandy Base Section
loaded it, but the Motor Transport Bri-
gade, under Colonel Richmond, actually
operated the trucks.99
331
Realizing that the roads of Normandy
were too narrow to support continuous
heavy two-way traffic, both Richmond
and Ayers demanded and were granted
the one-way restricted roads that later
became known as the Red Ball Express
Route. Provision was made for a loop run,
using the northern road for loaded ve-
hicles, and the southern road for the re-
turning empty vehicles. Later, after the
operation had been extended, Maj.
Gordon K. Gravelle of the Forward
Echelon, COMZONE, prepared detailed
traffic circulation plans for critical loca-
tions and co-ordinated the project with
ADSEC, the COMZONE headquarters,
the theater provost marshal, and the U.S.
First Army.100
The initial Red Ball route extended
from St. Lo, which was the control point
for dispatching outbound convoys, to the
delivery area in the La Loupe-Dreux-
Chartres triangle west of Paris. (Map 4)
The route was restricted to Red Ball con-
voys. The operation began on 25 August
1944 with 67 truck companies, which
hauled a total of 4,482 long tons on that
97
The skid tanks were used to convert cargo trucks
to bulk fuel haulers. Four skid tanks mounted on a
25-foot flat-bed semitrailer provided a vehicle that
could carry 3,000 gallons of petroleum products. Ltr
and Comment, Ayers to Larson, 19 Apr 50, OCT HB
Inquiries.
98
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 22-
25, OCT HB ETO. See also Hist Rcd and Opnl
Study, MTS OCT ETO, Express LofC Motor Hauls
(hereafter cited as Express LofC Motor Hauls), OCT
HB ETO France Hwys. Cf. Gen Bd Rpt, USFET,
Study 122, pp. 99-100, and Study 125, pp. 14-15,
OCT HB ETO.
99
Ltrs, Ayers to Larson, 6 Dec 49 and 19 Apr 50,
and Lehneis to Larson, 10 Jan 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
Cf. Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 558-60.
100
Gravelle was an experienced traffic engineer.
Ltrs, Ayers to Larson, 6 Dec 49 and 19 Apr 50, OCT
HB Inquiries. See also Memo, DCofT for CG ETO,
26 May 45, sub: Rcd for Award (Maj Gordon K.
Gravelle), AG 200.6 Awards and Decorations
EUCOM.
332 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

MAP 4
day. Only four days later, when the peak drivers received instructions and enjoyed
performance was reached for the first a brief rest, hot coffee, and sandwiches.
phase of Red Ball, 132 truck companies The Red Ball road signs were easy to
with a strength of 5,958 vehicles were as- follow, especially at night when the
signed to the project. The average num- markers and directional arrows could be
ber of truck companies utilized was 83. readily distinguished. Traffic was carefully
The largest amount hauled on a single regulated to prevent highway congestion.
day (29 August 1944) was 12,342 tons.101 The maximum speed allowed was twenty-
Traffic control points were set up in the five miles per hour. Colonel Ayers, with
main centers along the route. There, the the support of Colonel Richmond, insisted
convoy movements were checked and that the drivers be relieved and replaced
recorded, and the trucks were refueled 101
Hist Rpt, TG ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 12-
and given emergency repairs while the 13, OCT HB ETO; Express LofC Motor Hauls.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
regularly at bivouac areas located at a
midway point, in place of having them
cover the route in segments as some
ADSEC officers had recommended. The
latter method of operation, in Ayers's judg-
ment, would have resulted in widespread
equipment breakdowns through inade-
quate preventive maintenance, since
drivers would not be assigned to any given
vehicles, but would take their turns driv-
ing whatever trucks arrived at their seg-
ment station. Although operational con-
trol rested in the Motor Transport Bri-
333
gade, its jurisdiction was confined to the
boundaries of ADSEC, an arrangement
not conducive to the best results in inter-
sectional moves. The success of the pro-
gram was dependent upon assistance from
other services, notably military police to
control and direct traffic, Ordnance units
to make truck repairs, and Engineer
troops to maintain the roads. When neces-
sary, French agencies were called upon to
deal with civilian traffic.
Up to 1 September the freight moved
fell slightly short of the 75,000-ton target.
334
The project was then extended for four
days and the tonnage target was increased
because the railways as yet were unable
to carry their full share. By 5 September
when the first phase ended, approximately
89,000 tons of supplies had been lifted by
truck. From then until 16 November
1944, when Red Ball officially closed,
shipments were made on the basis of a
daily tonnage commitment. As the armies
raced across France, the Red Ball route
was stretched and stretched. By the time
the convoys reached the point where the
Army dumps should have been, the latter
had usually been moved forward. As a re-
sult, the trucks sometimes had to travel
another fifty miles or more to discharge
their loads. Although the established route
was not extended beyond Hirson on the
north fork (for the U.S. First Army) and
Sommesous on the south fork (for the U.S.
Third Army), some truck companies oper-
ated as far east as Verdun and even to
Metz.102
During the second phase of Red Ball
operation, efforts were made to shorten
the length of hauls by transferring freight
to the railways after reaching the Paris
area. The rail net east of the capital city
was more extensive than that in the north-
west of France and had suffered less dam-
age. Much of the damage, including the
wrecking of all permanent rail and road
bridges across the Seine and the Loire,
had been inflicted by Allied air forces in
an effort to seal off the Normandy battle-
field. A prominent SHAEF transportation
official later raised the question as to
whether the immediate advantage gained
actually outweighed the disadvantages, in
view of the limiting effect the air attacks
had on transportation and therefore on
the Allied advance. Without arriving at a
definite conclusion, he pointed out that
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the matter of air attacks on communica-
tions was one requiring careful study by
air staffs in conjunction with movements
103
and transportation officers.
In order fully to utilize the rail net east
of Paris and to ease the strain on the
drivers, trucks, and tires, the theater chief
of transportation proposed that truck-to-
rail transfer points be established near
Paris. Exclusive of items too heavy to be
manhandled, approximately 4,000 tons
daily were to be transferred at these
points, of which the first was established at
Vincennes-Fontenay-Sous-Bois on 27 Sep-
tember. At the peak four such freight
transfer points were operated by Ameri-
can military personnel and French labor,
under the direction of the Transportation
104
Officer, Seine Section, COMZONE.
During the eighty-one days of the Red
Ball operation, approximately 412,193
tons were carried, at an average rate of
5,088 tons per day. The accomplishments
were impressive and were widely ac-
claimed, but there were serious defi-
ciencies. As the runs grew longer, some-
times as much as 600 miles forward, more
and more trucks were deadlined. With
fatigue increasing, the drivers also became
less efficient and more likely to have ac-
cidents. The desperate gamble made in
sacrificing maintenance in an all-out effort
to hasten victory took a terrific toll in
trucks, tires, and gasoline. Moreover, the
centralized control that Ross and Ayers
wanted was lacking, and the operation
102
Ltr, Ayers to Larson, 6 Dec 49, OCT HB In-
quiries; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 122, App., "Red
Ball," OCT HB ETO.
103
Paper, Col Napier, Allied Transportation in
Europe—D Day to V Day, 14 Jan 46, OCT HB ETO
France.
104
Rpt, Trans Officer Seine Sec, 27 Aug-31 Dec
44, OCT HB ETO France Base Secs; Ltr, Ayers to
Larson, 6 Dec 49, OCT HB Inquiries; Hist of G-4
COMZONE ETO, Sec. III, Ch. IV.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
was often hampered by the base sections.
COMZONE failed to give adequate sup-
port in military police patrols, in labor for
loading and unloading the trucks, and in
maintenance and communication facili-
ties. Many of the truck companies were
hastily organized units, and the drivers
were often inexperienced and untrained.
Despite the glamour given Red Ball by
press and radio, the work was hard, drab,
and monotonous, but it was often prefer-
able to the life in a combat unit, even
when the combat troops were just waiting
to get into the line. Many men from com-
bat units welcomed a temporary assign-
ment to Red Ball as a change from the
muddy tent camps where they had been
staged. There was also a sordid side to
driving the Red Ball route, however. Dog-
tired drivers occasionally sabotaged their
equipment or resorted to outright malin-
gering to obtain needed rest, and some
were found guilty of selling their loads,
especially gasoline, on the lucrative black
105
market.
The Red Ball fleet did not have suffi-
cient cargo-handling capacity to give ade-
quate support to the advance of the
armies beyond eastern France since the
Transportation Corps, to repeat, never re-
ceived all the trucks, including the heavy-
duty equipment, that it deemed necessary
for the task. Red Ball men did a magnifi-
cent job, but at a tremendous expenditure
in human effort, trucks, tires, gasoline, and
oil. As Colonel Ayers observed, trucks can
haul what the railways do, but at a much
greater cost in manpower and equipment.
The Red Ball route was terminated as a
large-scale operation because additional
rail and inland waterway facilities had be-
come available, and because new ports
such as Antwerp had been acquired, from
which supplies could be moved with
335
shorter inland hauls. To meet the con-
tinued need for an expedited movement of
a limited amount of supplies from Nor-
mandy to Paris, a so-called Little Red Ball
route was established on 15 December
1944. For a month it provided fast de-
livery for high-priority items by means of
a single truck company with five-ton
truck-tractors and ten-ton semitrailers.
The average daily tonnage carried was
approximately 100 tons. The route was
discontinued on 18 January 1945, by
which time the railways were able to
106
furnish express service.
The White Ball Express Route was
established on 6 October 1944 to utilize
the shorter line of communications from
the ports of Le Havre and Rouen. The
operation, resembling that of the Red Ball
Express, was much improved because of
the experience gained on that route. The
largest number of truck companies as-
signed to White Ball was forty-eight, with
a daily average through December 1944
of twenty-nine. The route extended from
Le Havre and Rouen to intermediate
depots and rail transfer points in the
vicinity of Paris, Beauvais, Compiegne,
Soissons, and Reims. Most of the freight
was loaded at Rouen, where a traffic con-
trol regulating point was established.
Operations ceased on 10 January 1945.
From 6 October through 31 December
1944 approximately 140,486 tons were
105
Express LofC Motor Hauls, Summary of Red
Ball Express; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 125, pp.
18-19, 33-35; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Ch. III,
pp. 15-18, and Ch. V (NBS), pp. 1, 3, and Vol. V, Pt.
2, Ch. V, pp. 11-13. Last two in OCT HB ETO. See
also Ruppenthal, op cit., pp. 568-72; L t r , Ayers to
Larson, 6 Dec 49, OCT HB Inquiries; and Memo, R.
W. Coakley to Lt Col Leo J. Meyer, Deputy Chief
Historian, sub: Review of TC Vol. III, p. 12, OCT
HB.
106
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. V, p. 13,
and Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 7-8, OCT HB ETO.
336
transported over the White Ball route, at
an average rate of 1,614 tons per day. 107
The average forward trip was 113 miles.
The Green Diamond Express Route
was inaugurated to move supplies ap-
proximately a hundred miles from dumps
and depots in Normandy to rail loading
points at Avranches and Dol-de-Bretagne.
Activity began on 14 October and closed
on 1 November 1944. The daily average
number of truck companies employed was
fifteen. They moved forward approxi-
mately 15,590 tons. The operation was
controlled entirely by the Normandy Base
Section. It was not a success, largely be-
cause of confusion as to the responsibility
for initiating movements, unsatisfactory
command and supervision, and the thick
mud at the dumps in which most large
tractor-trailer units could not function
satisfactorily.108
The Red Lion Express Route was set
up to move 500 tons of British gasoline
and American supplies daily from Ba-
yeaux to the 21 Army Group railhead at
Brussels, Belgium, in order to give addi-
tional support to airborne operations in
Holland. The Red Lion (or B.B., Bayeaux
to Brussels) route was used only twenty-
seven days, 16 September to 12 October
1944. The U.S. Army furnished the oper-
ating personnel, but the British provided
camp and control sites and supplied ra-
tions, water, and other necessities. A total
of 17,556 tons was transported, of which
9,631 tons went to the British. The aver-
age haul per day was 650 tons and the
average trip forward was 306 miles.
Eight U.S. Army truck companies were
assigned to this route over much of the
period. Red Lion was considered a suc-
cessful operation.109
The ABC (Antwerp-Brussels-Char-
leroi) Express Route was established to
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
clear incoming supplies from the port of
Antwerp. The initial operation lasted from
30 November 1944 to 26 March 1945 and
was based on a surge pool, or marshaling
yard, outside the port area. There, motor
convoys dropped empty ten-ton semi-
trailers (the only type of equipment used in
this haul) and picked up loaded semi-
trailers for the forward trip to the depot
areas near Liege, Mons, and Charleroi.
Other marshaling yards were set up at the
points where the convoys dropped loaded
semitrailers and picked up empties for the
return trip. Truck-tractors placed in each of
the marshaling yards facilitated the shut-
tling of the loaded and empty semitrailers
and reduced turnaround time consider-
ably.
During the 117 days of the ABC opera-
tion, nearly a quarter of a million tons
were moved forward approximately ninety
miles to the dump areas from which the
U.S. First and Ninth Armies were sup-
plied. An average of fourteen truck com-
panies was assigned to the route. A profit-
able outcome was the experience gained
in the use of truck-tractors and semi-
trailers in an almost continuous operation.
The principal difficulties arose from the
mixed loads, which delayed unloading at
107
Express LofC Motor Hauls, Summary of White
Ball Express; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 125, pp.
35-36, and Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. V,
pp. 14-15, OCT HB ETO.
108
Express LofC Motor Hauls, Summary of Green
Diamond LofC Haul; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study
125, p. 36; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. V,
p. 22, and Pt. 3, Ch. VI (NBS), p. 13. OCT HB ETO.
109
See Express LofC Motor Hauls, Summary of
Red Lion LofC Haul; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study
125, p. 37, OCT HB ETO. Cf. Lt. Col. Robert E.
O'Brien, "Influence of Transportation on Oper-
ations," Army Transportation Journal, IV, 5 (September-
October 1948), 13-14; Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret
(New York: Harcout, Brace and Company, 1946) p.
221; Ltr and Comments, Ayers to Larson, 19 Apr 50,
OCT HB Inquiries.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 337

destination, and the failure of the depots May 1945. To provide for the control of
to operate twenty-four hours a day. operations in support of each of the four
Shortly after the surrender of Germany U.S. Armies in the field, the Motor Trans-
a second ABC operation was begun in port Service organized three provisional
order to clear freight that had accumu- highway transport divisions, and assigned
lated at Antwerp and Ghent. This was a an augmented Quartermaster group with
peacetime project, carried out by fourteen similar functions. Within a period of 63
well-trained truck companies that had days, approximately 871,895 tons were de-
previously served in Iran. For the first livered. The average daily lift was 12,895
time in the European theater, an entire tons. At the peak of operations truck units
fleet was composed of diesel-powered ten- of various types, equivalent in capacity to
ton 6x6 cargo trucks. Like its predecessor, 244 2½-ton truck companies, were as-
this ABC project was very successful, signed to the XYZ project.112
achieving an average lift of 2,670 tons per The 6957th Highway Transport Divi-
day. It served to illustrate how, with sion (Provisional) supported the U.S.
proper co-ordination and control, well- Third Army, which for daily maintenance
trained and supervised personnel, and required approximately 7,500 tons of sup-
suitable heavy-duty equipment, motor plies, including about 2,000 tons of bulk
transport could be integrated into a com- POL. To carry this load forward, 62 truck
plete transportation system.110 companies were used, including 34
The last and greatest of the long hauls equipped with 10-ton semitrailers and 14
was over the XYZ Express Route, which with bulk tankers. By the end of May
was planned and organized to support the 1945 this division had moved forward
American forces in the final stage of the 354,015 tons of supplies and almost 30
campaign against Germany. (Map 5) million gallons of bulk POL. In addition
Realizing that the rapid advance of U.S. it had transported 381,019 personnel. At
troops and the widespread destruction of the peak, somewhat over 10,000 tons of
railway facilities would place heavy de- supplies and 1,000,000 gallons of bulk
mands upon the trucking units, General POL were moved in a single day. The
Ross had requested the Motor Transport chief of the Motor Transport Service
Service to plan for this contingency. A
three-phase system was devised to meet 110
Express LofC Motor Haul, Summary of ABC
possible varying tonnage requirements. Haul; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 125, pp. 37-38;
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 7-9,
Plan X called for 8,000 tons per day, Y for 32-34, OCT HB ETO.
10,000 tons per day, and Z for 12,000 tons 111
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp.
per day, all three based on a two-day 9-14, OCT HB ETO.
112
In computing their requirements and recording
turnaround. The four XYZ routes began operational data pertaining to XYZ, the MTS staff
near the western border of Germany, listed truck units in terms of their capacity in relation
pushing out from Liege, Duren, Luxem- to the standard 2½-ton truck company. Thus, the 62
bourg, and Nancy to support respectively, truck companies under the 6957th Highway Trans-
port Division, which included 10-ton semitrailer and
the U.S. Ninth, First, Third, and Seventh bulk tanker as well as 2½-ton truck units, were re-
111
Armies. ported as 80 "2½-ton company equivalents." Hist
The XYZ program was put into effect Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Ch. V, pp. 6-7, 28, OCT
HB ETO; Hist, MTS ETO, App. B, Summary of
on 25 March and continued through 31 XYZ Plan, OCT HB ETO France Hwys.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 339

credited the 6957th Highway Transport heavy-duty cargo vehicles. Also, the rapid
Division with an ideal operation from the rehabilitation of the railroads behind the
standpoint of unified command and com- armies kept road hauls sufficiently short to
plete support.113 give the tactical forces effective support.
In support of the U.S. Ninth Army, the The same system was continued after the
most northerly of the forces, the 6956th end of hostilities in order to build up sup-
Highway Transport Division (Provisional) plies for the occupation forces and for
had a total of 15 truck companies. Of troops being redeployed.
these, 12 were equipped with 10-ton Despite the high level of efficiency gen-
semitrailers and the rest with 2,000-gallon-erally achieved, the XYZ operation dis-
capacity semitrailers. By V-E Day the closed some minor deficiencies such as im-
drivers of the 6956th had delivered 122,- proper documentation and inadequate
684 tons of supplies. Supporting the U.S. communications facilities. It also demon-
First Army, the 6958th Highway Trans- strated the desirability of using a single
portation Division (Provisional), with a agency, such as a highway transport divi-
peak strength of 31 truck companies, de- sion, to operate behind each army in the
livered 182,425 tons of supplies between field. Experience gained on the express
28 March and 8 May 1945.114 highway routes indicated that motor trans-
Working closely with the U.S. Seventh port should be used to haul from railheads
Army, which it supported, the 469th to army forward dumps in accordance
Quartermaster Group operated as a high- with a well-developed and properly co-
way transport division along the Yellow ordinated schedule. Where possible, it was
Diamond route through southern Ger- found preferable to restrict the total turn-
many into Austria. At the peak, twenty around distance of the trucks to approxi-
truck companies were employed, of which mately 350 miles. Adequate supply sup-
all but three had 10-ton semitrailers. The port from COMZONE sections and close
total haul for the period from 31 March to co-ordination with the armies in troop and
V-E Day was 146,000 tons. Apart from a supply movements obviously were neces-
shortage of tires and replacement parts, sary.116
the Yellow Diamond trucks were handi- On V-E Day the Motor Transport
capped because of winding, narrow roads Service had a total of 260 truck companies
and mountainous terrain, but they turned under its control on the European conti-
in a creditable performance.115 113
On the 6957th, also known as Highway Trans-
The XYZ project, rather than the port Division No. 2, see Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII,
better-known Red Ball Express, was Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 3, 16-28, OCT HB ETO.
114
deemed the most successful of the several The 6956th and 6958th were also called, respec-
long hauls undertaken by the Motor Trans- tively, Highway Transport Divisions No. 1 and No. 3.
See Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 2,
port Service. The planning and execution 29, OCT HB ETO.
115
were superior, and co-ordination with the Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp.
3, 13-15, Ch. VI (CONAD), pp. 172-74, OCT HB
available railways proved excellent. Con- ETO; Ltr and Comments, Ayers to Larson, 19 Apr
tributing to these results were the experi- 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
116
ence gained in organizing previous opera- Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp.
2, 7, OCT HB ETO; Summary of XYZ Plan cited n.
tions, the assignment of veteran trucking 112; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 125, pp. 39-42,
units, and the increased availability of OCT HB ETO.
340 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

nent. The largest number of units, 125, through 31 May 1945. When asked in late
were equipped with 4-5-ton truck-tractors 1944 to list the outstanding achievements
and 10-ton semitrailers, while 92 had 2½- of the Transportation Corps in the Euro-
ton standard or cab-over-engine trucks. pean theater, General Ross gave promi-
Other companies were operating 10-ton nence to the operations of the Motor
diesel trucks, tankers, miscellaneous types Transport Service. The basic credit for its
of truck-tractor-semitrailer combinations, accomplishment, he said, belonged to the
117
and refrigerator trucks. As Transporta- soldiers who drove the trucks day and
tion Corps planners had anticipated, the night, in all kinds of weather, and all too
10-ton semitrailer companies proved the often without adequate rest and food.
most valuable for general-purpose cargo These men, he added, had done a "won-
hauling, particularly over long distances. derful job." 119
Within the limitations of its capacity, the
standard 2½-ton 6x6 truck performed Railway Operations
well. Other vehicles giving satisfactory
service included the 10-ton diesel and the The railways of France totaled some
2,000-gallon semitrailer tanker.118 26,400 miles of single-track and double-
It would be difficult, indeed, to over- track lines operated as a unified national
estimate the significance of the role played system. All the important main lines had
by motor transport in the war against standard-gauge track. Before the war the
Germany. It served as the principal long- French passenger schedules were consid-
distance hauler on land pending the resto- ered very satisfactory, but freight traffic
ration of railway service, provided close had no scheduled movement. The French
and flexible support to the advancing railway cars, like the British, were small in
armies, and performed vital port clearance comparison with American equipment.
and base-hauling functions. In appraising Despite wartime handicaps the French
its performance, it is necessary to bear in railways were in reasonably good operat-
mind that the theater chief of transporta-
tion did not receive the personnel or the 117
The following is a breakdown of truck units by
number and type of vehicles he considered type: 125 companies with 4-5-ton truck-tractors and
semitrailers; 64 with 2½-ton standard 6x6 trucks; 28
essential for OVERLORD, and that the with 2½-ton cab-over-engine trucks; 14 with 10-ton
drivers and equipment that were made diesels; 9 with 2,000-gallon POL tankers; 5 with 750-
available were called upon to support a gallon POL tankers; 3 with 3,000-gallon POL car-
riers; 6 with 3-6-ton truck-tractors and 5-ton semi-
tactical advance that outstripped the time- trailers; 2 with 4-5-ton truck-tractors with 12½-ton
table set up for OVERLORD. Improvisation, semitrailers; 2 with 4-5-ton semitrailers; and 2 with
overwork, inadequate maintenance and refrigerator trucks. In addition to the 260 units on the
Continent, the MTS controlled the six standard 2½-
communications, and rough operating ton 6x6 truck companies stationed in England. See
conditions all attended the effort to keep Hist, MTS ETO, Ch. IV, p. 14, OCT HB ETO
the armies supplied. Despite the difficul- France Hwy s.
118
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO,
ties, U.S. Army truck units engaged in Annex 7, pp. 27-29.
119
port clearance, static operations, and line TC COMZONE USFET MPR, 30 Jun 45,
of communications hauling moved 22,- Tables 20 and 21, OCT HB ETO; IRS, CofT
COMZONE to Theater Historian, 29 Nov 44, sub:
644,609 long tons and covered 702,925,988 Accomplishments of TC, AG 320 Responsibilities of
ton-miles in the period from 17 June 1944 TC, 1943-45 EUCOM.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
ing condition, although two years of
bombing had left much destruction, espe-
cially on the lines west of Paris. As the
Germans retreated, they did considerable
damage, but not to the degree expected
120
by the Allies.
The Expansion of Rail Activities
in Northern France
In northern France, as we have seen,
U.S. rail activities were initially slow in
developing, but with the St. Lo break-
through the situation changed radically.
To support the swift advance, rail recon-
struction was given high priority, and as
rapidly as the lines could be opened the 2d
MRS followed in the wake of the U.S.
First and Third Armies.
The first heavy rail traffic was handled
in mid-August 1944, when the 2d MRS
began to move gasoline, ammunition, ra-
tions, and medical supplies over a single-
track route from Normandy to a dump at
Le Mans, where they were picked up by
Third Army trucks. Each train carried an
average of 1,000 tons. Since the main line
was not yet open, the trains ran over
branch lines for a considerable portion of
the route. The railway facilities at Le
Mans had been bombed repeatedly and
had to be restored by the Americans. At
the close of August MRS-operated trains
were arriving in the French capital.121
Beginning in September, considerable
tonnage was forwarded on the rail lines
east of Paris. They were relatively undam-
aged, since the rapid retreat of the enemy
had prevented his usual effective destruc-
tion. 122 Late in the month, because of the
swift advance and extended lines of com-
munication, the theater chief of transpor-
tation put into effect a new plan for the
movement of supplies to the armies,
341
whereby approximately 6,900 tons were to
be brought into the Paris area daily by
truck and then forwarded by rail. Al-
though the diversion of trucks to other
missions restricted the daily haul to about
4,000 tons, this combination of motor and
rail transport had good results. As indi-
cated earlier, the railways east of Paris
could accommodate much more tonnage
than could be shipped on the compara-
tively few rail lines entering the city from
the west. Therefore, the material trucked
to Paris to be forwarded by rail increased
the total amount delivered to the combat
troops. By shortening the truck routes,
turnaround time was lessened, and more
trucks became available.123
In the autumn of 1944, as the Ameri-
cans drove deeper into France, the 2d
MRS units were relocated to facilitate the
flow of supplies by rail. Railway rehabili-
tation was accomplished as required, but
as a rule only on a stopgap basis. In Sep-
tember 1944 the railway line from the
Brittany peninsula, via Rennes, Le Mans,
and Chartres to Paris, was turned over to
the French for operation, thereby releas-
ing American MRS personnel for more
critical assignments elsewhere. Early in
that month the 2d MRS headquarters
shifted to Paris, the city that formed the
hub of the French railway system. The
120
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp.
1-4, 6-7, OCT HB ETO.
121
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, pp. 12, 17-19, 21-
22, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp. 7-8, OCT HB ETO;
Ruppenthal, op. cit., pp. 546-51; Gen Bd Rpt,
USFET, Study 122, p. 53, OCT HB ETO.
122
Except for a small area near Metz, where the
Germans had used their "track-ripper" and demoli-
tion charges to destroy about eleven kilometers of
track. See Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Ch. IV, pp.
10, 19, OCT HB ETO.
123
Rpt, CofT SOS ETO to CofT ASF, 18 Oct 44,
OCT HB Overseas Opns Gp; Hist Rpt, TC ETO,
Vol. IV, Introduction, p. 4, and Sec. IV, pp. 21-22,
OCT HB ETO.
342
MRS units within the various sections of
COMZONE were responsible to the com-
manding officers of their respective sec-
tions for administration and discipline,
and to the 2d MRS for technical opera-
tion. Their activities were co-ordinated
through the transportation officers of the
124
sections.
The 2d MRS found itself handicapped
by the lack of experienced railway officers.
To fill the need, the European theater
made an urgent request to Washington for
twenty-five field grade officers to serve as
executives, operating experts, and engi-
neer technical specialists. By hurried re-
cruiting in early September a number of
experienced American railway officials
were commissioned directly from civil life
and dispatched at once to France. The de-
sired number was rounded out by taking
MRS officers released from less active
oversea commands, notably from Iran and
Alaska. Placed in key positions these men
brought knowledge and experience to
their jobs, but, as was to be expected, the
appointments led to some dissatisfaction
among lower-ranking MRS officers al-
ready in the theater, who feared loss of
promotion after long service overseas.125
With approximately 4,788 miles of sin-
gle and double track under 2d MRS oper-
ation by 1 October 1944 (Map 6), the
demand for additional locomotives and
rolling stock became urgent. Accordingly,
locomotives and railway cars in large
numbers were drawn from the joint stock-
pile in the United Kingdom and ferried
across the Channel. Meanwhile, as early
as June 1944, General Ross had antici-
pated the demand for additional railway
equipment and had sounded out the War
Department on the subject. Ross found
Gross none too sanguine about the pros-
pects for more American-built locomo-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
tives. In fact, the latter reported that the
Director of Materiel, ASF, General Clay,
was adamant in his stand that the British
had to produce their share of locomotives,
as they had originally agreed to do.126
Behind the growing clamor for railway
equipment lay a significant shift from mo-
tor to rail as the principal means of sup-
porting the U.S. armies—the railways, as
the prime long-distance carriers, were as-
suming a larger proportion of the line of
communications hauling. In the last quar-
ter of 1944 the Paris area became an ex-
tremely busy railway center and an
important truck-to-rail transfer point.
During October alone, 798 freight trains
arrived at the French capital from Nor-
mandy and Brittany, and 999 freight
trains departed for northern and eastern
points with U.S. Army shipments. From
November on, more than half of all ton-
nage forwarded from the rear areas in
northern France moved by rail.127
A number of developments made possi-
ble the steady growth in the volume of
traffic handled by the 2d MRS. Chief
among them were continued progress in
the reconstruction of tracks and structures;
the opening of the ports of Le Havre,
Rouen, and, finally, Antwerp; the arrival
on the Continent of more MRS units, loco-
motives, and rolling stock; the recovery of
additional railway equipment in the liber-
ated areas; the superior operating condi-
124
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IV, Ch. IV, p. 22, and
Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, p. 5, OCT HB ETO.
125
Ltrs, Gross to Ross, 29 Aug and 29 Sep 44, OCT
HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross; Interv, H. H. Dunham
with Lt Col R. B. Baldwin, Rail Div OCT, 28 Dec
44, OCT HB ETO France Rys.
126
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, An-
nex 8, History of Military Railway Service, pp. 15-17,
and Table in App. 10; Ltr, Gross to Ross, 29 Aug 44,
OCT HB Gross ETO—Gen Ross.
127
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, Apps.
1, 2, and 3, OCT HB ETO.
344
tion of the rail lines east of Paris; and the
mounting assistance from French and Bel-
gian railway workers. On 15 December
1944 the 2d MRS attained a daily peak of
50,000 tons moved by rail, after which
came a sharp but temporary downward
trend because of resurgent enemy activ-
128
ity.
An advance echelon of the 2d MRS was
established at Antwerp on 7 November
1944. Headed by Colonel Beeler, it super-
vised the planning and development of
that port for rail traffic. In the first month
of activity at the Antwerp Terminal, 268
freight trains were dispatched, moving a
total of 150,824 tons. Operations were
never seriously affected by the almost con-
stant German bombing of the port. The
708th Railway Grand Division, the first to
function in Belgium, was responsible for
the rail support of the U.S. First and Ninth
Armies.129
By mid-December 1944, railway troops
under the jurisdiction of the 708th Rail-
way Grand Division were operating almost
within sight of the enemy. The 740th Rail-
way Operating Battalion was operating as
far forward as Malmedy, Belgium. The
advanced lines in Holland and Germany
north of Malmedy, extending as far east
as Herzogenrath and Geilenkirchen, were
then being operated by Company C of the
734th Railway Operating Battalion. The
German counteroffensive soon forced the
evacuation of the forward railheads at
Malmedy, Eupen, and Herbesthal.
The activity of the 2d MRS was broadly
affected by the Battle of the Bulge. Supply
movements declined from 50,000 tons to
approximately 30,000 tons per day be-
tween 15 and 20 December. Rail ship-
ments were held back pending improve-
ment in the tactical situation, and many
rail cars were diverted to remove supplies
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
from endangered areas. Although no units
of the 2d MRS were in direct contact with
the Germans, enemy strafing and bomb-
ing resulted in considerable damage, espe-
cially at Soissons where bombs set fire to
cars loaded with ammunition and tempo-
rarily halted activity on the main line.130
Although it had been hoped that all
railway lines west of Paris could be re-
leased to the French as early as 1 Decem-
ber 1944, action had to be postponed, first
because of the delay in opening the port of
Antwerp, and second because of enemy
activity in the Ardennes. At the close of
1944 the 2d MRS had a total of 757 offi-
cers, 26 warrant officers, and 16,763 en-
listed men on the Continent. In addition
to the headquarters, there were five rail-
way grand divisions, eighteen railway op-
erating battalions and two detachments,
four railway shop battalions, five railway
workshop (mobile) units, and ten hospital
131
train maintenance platoons and sections.
Military Rail Activity
in Southern France
In southern France, meanwhile, the 1st
MRS was vigorously pushing its opera-
tions northward. As already indicated, the
lack of systematic destruction in that area
permitted more rapid restoration of rail-
128
OCT HB Monograph 29, pp. 314-16; Consoli-
dated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, Annex 8, pp. 28,
32-33.
129
Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO,
Annex 8, pp. 29-30, 36; Interv with Col Beeler, 1 Dec
49, OCT HB ETO France 2d MRS. Cf. Andrew
Grant Gregory, The Saga of the 708th Railway Grand
Division (Baltimore, 1947).
130
Hist Rpt, 740th Ry Operating Bn, Jan-Mar 45,
OCT HB ETO France Rys; Memo of Fact by 1st Lt
William W. Steele, Asst Chief of Tng and Doctrine
Br RTS Div OCT, 10 Jul 52, OCT HB Critique Vol.
III; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp. SI-
35, and Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, p. 12, OCT HB ETO.
131
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, p.
35 and App. 6, OCT HB ETO.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 345

way service than in the north. By mid- At the close of 1944, with the assistance
October 1944 rail transportation had be- of Engineer units, the 1st MRS had re-
come the principal carrier for long-haul built 42 bridges and repaired 800 miles
deliveries, and as more lines were repaired of track. It was operating 4,000 miles of
and additional motive power and rolling rail lines. Further expansion was tempo-
stock were obtained rail capacities in- rarily checked by the tactical situation,
creased sharply. Late in the month Gen- but railway rehabilitation in the areas to
eral Gray reported a rail commitment of the rear of the forward railheads contin-
12,000 tons per day for delivery from Mar- ued in preparation for the resumption of
seille to the railheads at Montbéliard, offensive operations.134
Vesoul, and Epinal, where it was shared
on a sixty-forty basis between the U.S. Activation of General Headquarters
Seventh Army and the French First Army.
In the last quarter of the year an average After the German counteroffensive of
of 644 freight cars was forwarded daily late 1944 had been repulsed, the 2d MRS
from the Delta Base Section to the Conti- made ready to move across the Rhine
nental Advance Section, and from there River. It was then supporting the 12th
an average of 557 was moved forward to Army Group, under which were the U.S.
the armies. During this period rail lines First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies,
were extended northward to Metz, Sarre- while the 1st MRS supported the 6th
bourg, and the vicinity of Sarregue- Army Group, comprising the U.S. Seventh
mines.132 Army and the French First Army. With
The French civilian railway personnel the inactivation of SOLOC and its absorp-
co-operated wholeheartedly with the U.S. tion by COMZONE in early 1945, the
Army, taking over complete operation of theater took steps to attain closer co-
the trains much faster than originally con- ordination of rail activities by bringing
templated. Since demolition of the right of them under a single supervisory head. The
way was less than expected, requisitions for 1st MRS and 2d MRS were accordingly
most track material for this area were can- assigned to a new General Headquarters,
celed. However, the expansion of rail Military Railway Service, which was acti-
traffic was handicapped for a time by the vated on 10 February 1945 with General
shortage of motive power and rolling stock. Gray as the director general. Col. Arthur
French equipment was employed exclu- E. Stoddard, formerly with the SHAEF
sively until late October 1944, when the G-4 Division, became the new General
first four American 65-ton diesel-electric
132
locomotives arrived. Altogether, ten diesel Hist Rcd, OTO SOLOC, p. 20, OCT HB ETO
SOLOC; Ltr, Dir 1st MRS AFHQ to Maj R. B. Bald-
locomotives and eighty-seven 2-8-0-type win, OCT, 25 Oct 44, in Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study
steam locomotives had been ordered for 122, p. 60, OCT HB ETO.
133
southern France, but deliveries of the lat- Hist Rcd, OTO SOLOC, p. 22, OCT HB ETO
SOLOC; Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Oct-
ter lagged. Considerable railway equip- Dec 44, p. 4, OCT HB North Africa; Hist Rpt, TC
ment was obtained by transfer from North ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp. 32-37, OCT HB
Africa and Italy. By the end of 1944 addi- ETO. 134

tional shipments from the United States nex 8,Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, An-
pp. 62, 79, and Chart VII; Gen Bd Rpt,
133
brought definite relief. USFET, Study 122, p. 60, OCT HB ETO.
346
Manager, 1st MRS, and General Burpee prescribed that railroad construction
remained as General Manager, 2d MRS. would be a responsibility of the Engineer
As the result of this merger, all military
railway units in the European theater for
the first time came under the control of
the theater chief of transportation. Gen-
eral Gray, who as head of the 1st MRS
had reported directly to the SOLOC com-
mander, now functioned under the tech-
nical direction of General Ross. Ross found
Gray's work at the new MRS headquar-
ters helpful, especially in relieving Burpee
of the heavy administrative burden at
Paris. General Gross, who had never liked
having the MRS in a separate camp, was
delighted to see it placed under the theater
chief of transportation.135
General Gray established his new GHQ
at the Gare St. Lazare in Paris. The duties
assigned to him as Director General, MRS,
included:
. . . the command of all Military Railway
Service units; advance planning, develop-
ment and operations of all railroads required
for U.S. military operations; stocking and
issue of all railway stock material for ordinary
maintenance; distribution, for operational
use, of all U.S. railroad rolling stock, and all
other railroad property that may come under
the control of the U.S. Army; and authority
to order and execute the move of Military
Railway Service units, together with person-
nel and units attached thereto, within the
theater.
Gray commanded all MRS troops in the
theater and was responsible for the stock-
ing and distribution of all rolling stock and
other railway equipment. On the other
hand, he did not retain the responsibility
for railway reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion that he had undertaken in southern
France. In a directive covering procedures
for the operation, maintenance, and con-
struction of all railways in the U.S. areas
on the Continent, the theater commander
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
service, under the technical supervision of
the Chief Engineer, COMZONE. 136
To be closer to the front, the 2d MRS
moved its headquarters from Paris to
Brussels on 25 February Since Brus-
sels was controlled by the British Army, it
had to be consulted on housekeeping mat-
ters. By the end of March a new commu-
nications system of telephone and teletype
circuits was set up whereby the principal
2d MRS units in the field could be con-
tacted readily. Brussels was centrally lo-
cated for current operations, and if neces-
sary the headquarters organization could
get into direct contact with any unit
within six to eight hours by jeep.
With the advance into Germany the
problems of the MRS multiplied. The
communication system required extensive
repairs. Jeep courier service and special
radio networks had to be used to maintain
contact between headquarters and the
field units. Measured by American stand-
ards, the railway facilities were often in-
adequate. Sabotage was considered an
ever-present hazard. On the other hand,
the German civilian railway workers were
well-disciplined and usually co-operated
with the MRS in restoring railway service.
Meanwhile, additional trackage in the
rear was turned over to the French,
thereby releasing MRS personnel for duty
135
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp.
2-3, and Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 122, p. 13,
OCT HB ETO; Ltrs, Ross to Gross, 25 Mar 45, and
Gross to Ross, 31 Mar 45, OCT HB Gross ETO —
Gen Ross; Ltr, Gross to Gray, 12 Feb 45, OCT HB
Gross ETO—Rail; Interv with Gen Ross, 8 Mar 52,
OCT HB France Rys.
138
Hist Rpt, GHQ MRS, Feb 45, pp. 1-2 and Ex-
hibits 1, 2, 4, 5, and Hist Rpt, Mar 45, Exhibit, SOP
32, Hq ETOUSA, 3 Apr 45, OCT HB ETO France
GHQ MRS. See also Interv with Gen Gray, 6 Dec 49,
OCT HB ETO France Rys.
 FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 347

in the forward areas. But the last was no at the approaches to the bridge, and laid
unmixed blessing, since the French rail- rail over the bridge. The 729th Railway
way officials frequently failed to deliver Operating Battalion transported rail and
locomotives and equipment or to supply construction materials and furnished 24-
train services at the times and places hour switching service with six diesel-
137
required by the Americans. electric locomotives. On 9 April 1945 the
720th Railway Operating Battalion
Bridging the Rhine moved the first train across the river.
Muenster was the destination. Other rail-
The plans to support the U.S. combat way bridges subsequently erected for Army
forces beyond the Rhine called for erection use included the President Roosevelt
of the first railway bridge across that river Bridge at Mainz, completed on 14 April,
at Duisburg, Duesseldorf, or Cologne, and the Victory Bridge at Duisburg, which
with Wesel as the fourth choice. After the was opened on 8 May and gave access to
capture of the Ludendorff rail way bridge the vital Ruhr coal fields.139
at Remagen on 7 March 1945, immediate Because of their limited number and
steps were taken to exploit this windfall by capacity, the railway bridges over the
rehabilitating the rail lines leading to the Rhine became centers of serious rail con-
bridge from the west. The collapse of this gestion during the spring of 1945. In fact,
structure ten days later forced the MRS to special committees representing all inter-
return to the original program. The only ested agencies had to be set up to control
one of the four locations previously consid- traffic at the Mainz and Wesel bridges.
ered that was then safely in Allied hands The backlog of loaded railway cars was
was Wesel. There, the first railway bridge especially heavy behind the Mainz bridge,
over the Rhine was completed on 8 April where the situation was complicated by
1945, after approximately ten days and the U.S. Third Army's tendency to call
five hours of concentrated effort by Engi- forward selected items rather than all
neer troops, assisted by MRS and other requisitioned freight. A shortage of cars
Transportation Corps personnel and a few developed, which was not eased until after
Seabees. By V-E Day the eastbound freight V-E Day. During this period there was a
over the Wesel bridge amounted to 273,141 137
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp.
long tons, consisting principally of POL, 6-9, OCT HB ETO.
rations, and ammunition.138 138
Rpt, Brig Gen P. H. Timothy, The Rhine Cross-
The Wesel railway bridge involved con- ing, Twelfth Army Group Engineer Operations, pp.
29-30, 44-45, OCT HB; Ltr and Enclosed Data,
struction of a 1,752-foot single-track span CofT COMZONE ETO to Col James B. Cress, AG
over the Rhine River, the laying of ap- WD, 18 Sep 45, OCT HB Gross Day Files. Cf. OCT
proximately two miles of connecting track, HB139Monograph 29, p. 326, n. 30.
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp.
and the preparation of the required yard 8, 10, 11, 23-47, OCT HB ETO. See "The Soxos,"
facilities at Wesel and Buederich. The published by the 729th Ry Operating Bn, 29 Jul 45,
717th Railway Operating Battalion De- OCT HB ETO France Ry Units; Memo of Fact, Maj
G. P. Hayes, Jr., Chief of Tng and Doctrine Br RTS
tachment repaired track at the two yards, Div OCT, 9 Jul 52, OCT HB Critique Vol. III; Hist,
assisted the Engineers in constructing the 720th Ry Operating Bn, OCT HB ETO France Rys
Unit Rpts; Final Report of the Chief Engineer, European
line from the Buederich Yard to the west Theater of Operations: 1942-1945 (Paris, n. d.), pp.
side of the bridge and in building turnouts 283-85.
348
heavy and constant demand for all types
of railway equipment. In April 1945, the
2d MRS alone operated 4,287 freight
trains, which carried forward 1,926,947
long tons of supplies and equipment for a
total of 329,813,897 ton-miles. The aver- 22 January. At Paris it was divided into
age load for a single car was 13.6 tons. In two 20-car freight trains, one of which ran
the same month the 2d MRS also ran 108 to Namur (and later to Liege) in Belgium,
hospital trains, 278 prisoners of war trains,
71 troop trains, 97 leave trains, and 93
140
refugee trains.
The accompanying chart (Chart 5), de-
picting the tonnages moved east of the
Seine and north of the Rhone in the period
from 30 August 1944 through 8 May 1945,
indicates the prime importance of the rail-
ways in supporting the U.S. armies in the
field. The largest movement of freight by
rail occurred in the months from February
through April 1945. The actual accom-
plishment of the MRS, assisted by native
railway personnel, was even greater than
is here indicated since considerable rail
traffic was confined to the area south of
the Rhone and west of the Seine.
On 14 May 1945 the MRS organization
on the Continent consisted of the follow-
ing: 1 general headquarters, 2 headquar-
ters and headquarters companies, 7 rail-
way grand divisions, 24 railway operating
battalions, 7 railway shop battalions, 8
military police battalions and 2 separate
military police companies, 2 base depot
companies, 1 railway transportation com-
pany, 5 railway workshops (mobile), and
10 hospital train maintenance detach-
ments.141
Freight Expresses
During the war various specialized
types of railway service had to be devel-
oped to meet specific needs of the U.S.
Army on the Continent. Among such inno-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
vations was the "Toot Sweet Express." It
was inaugurated early in 1945 to carry
high-priority freight on a fast schedule
from Cherbourg via Paris to the forward
areas. The first train left Cherbourg on
and the other to Verdun, France. Specially
marked railroad equipment was used.
The car space was allotted on the basis of
bids from the supply services. Total run-
ning time from Cherbourg via Paris to
either terminal was fixed at thirty-six
hours. Shipment of mail on these trains
sharply reduced the time in transit and
cut pilferage to a minimum. The Toot
Sweet Express continued to follow the U.S.
armies into Germany, until the close of
hostilities made expedited freight service
unnecessary. In March 1945 a similar
special train, called the "Meat Ball Ex-
press," began hauling perishables—mostly
meat—from Namur to the U.S. First and
Ninth Armies.142
Hospital Trains
A program for the procurement and
adaptation of old British railway equip-
ment for use as American hospital trains
had been undertaken in the United King-
dom before D Day. Most of this equipment
was eventually ferried across the Channel
140
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 123, pp. 17, 24-25;
Hist Rpt, TG ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, p. 26.
Both in OCT HB ETO.
141
Memo, DG MRS to CofT COMZONE ETO,
17 May 45, sub: MRS Activities, OCT HB ETO
France GHQ MRS.
142
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. VI, pp.
60-61, 84-85, and Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. VI, pp. 145-46,
OCT HB ETO; S. Sgt. George Pillette, "Toot-Sweet
Express," Army Transportation Journal, I, 3, (April 45),
10-12; Ltr, Col Frank H. Erhart, GHQ MRS, to Lar-
son, 14 Dec 49, OCT HB Inquiries.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 349

CHART S—TONNAGE MOVED EAST OF THE SEINE AND NORTH OF THE RHONE: 1944-45

Source: Statistics Branch, TC Hq ETO.

and provided the bulk of the hospital train point, the French cars with steel bodies
service for the U.S. Army on the Conti- were much superior to the wooden British
nent. The first of these trains began evacu- cars. The train procured by the Transpor-
ating wounded Americans from the front tation Corps in the United States was of
on 20 August 1944.143 Earlier in the month an experimental design and did not prove
an improvised hospital train had been set satisfactory. The heating equipment in all
up at Cherbourg for emergency use. It hospital cars was unsatisfactory. The
consisted of twenty French freight cars movement of the trains was subject to
equipped to accommodate litter cases and many delays en route. Their distinctive
three cars for ambulatory patients. In the markings did not afford complete immu-
course of the war other trains were impro- nity, for hospital trains at Liege and Paris
vised from French rolling stock or were were damaged by enemy aircraft. 144
specially built in France. Only one hospi-
tal train was obtained from the United 143
Hist Rpt, TG ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Sec. I, pp. 27-
States. 28, OCT HB ETO. On the procurement and con-
At the close of 1944 forty hospital trains version program in the United Kingdom, see above,
pp. 131-32.
were serving the U.S. forces on the Conti- 144
Administrative and Logistical History of the
nent, of which twenty-five were of British Medical Service, Communications Zone, European
origin, fourteen were built or improvised Theater of Operations, Pt. III, Vol. XII, Ch. XIII,
pp. 34-42, SGO Hist Div Files; Interv with Capt
of French material, and one was of Ameri- James M. Rowe, formerly with MC in ETO, 9 Dec
can construction. From the safety stand- 49, OCT HB ETO Evacuation.
350
During 1944 the Transportation Corps
moved 194,842 patients by rail on the
Continent Although the hospital trains
were under the control of the theater's
chief surgeon, their operation as railway
equipment was assigned to the theater
chief of transportation. He established
movement schedules on the basis of re-
quests from the chief surgeon. Patients
moved by rail generally were transferred
from evacuation or field hospitals in the
forward areas to the coast, via Paris, in
trains of fourteen or fifteen cars. The main-
tenance of U.S. Army hospital trains was
the responsibility of the 764th Railway
Shop Battalion, which had headquarters
at Paris.145
During the winter of 1944-45 evacu-
ation by rail was severely handicapped by
adverse weather and enemy activity. The
rugged operating conditions slowed the
turnaround of trains and caused much
equipment to be deadlined for major re-
pairs. Also, medical personnel complained
of both the lighting and the heating of the
hospital trains. The French railways were
suffering from the war, the weather, and
coal shortages, and the deficiencies of the
hospital trains were simply part of the
general picture. The situation was im-
proved by March 1945, largely because of
the advent of more moderate weather.
Meanwhile, at the request of the chief sur-
geon, the theater chief of transportation
had undertaken a program to provide
additional hospital trains. The first of these
was placed in operation in February 1945
and a number of others were subsequently
delivered, but reduced Medical Corps re-
quirements made completion of the pro-
gram unnecessary. In mid-April 1945
there were on the Continent forty-seven
hospital trains, a number sufficient to
meet operational needs.146
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Leave Trains
Most American soldiers were in Europe
for the first time, and when they had leave
they naturally wanted to see the sights.
Leave travel therefore became a large un-
dertaking. Late in 1944 plans were laid to
furnish rail and water transportation so
that selected personnel on duty in France
could spend seven days of sight-seeing in
the United Kingdom. The program got
underway early in February 1945 and by
March it was in full swing, with a total of
14,922 arrivals and 16,329 departures at
Southampton. This phase of the leave
program drew considerable criticism, since
the men were not properly briefed or in-
spected before leaving France and fre-
quently carried excess baggage, such as
blankets and weapons, which the South-
ampton port commander had to collect
and hold until their return. 147
In March 1945, in response to repeated
requests by the field commanders, two spe-
cial leave trains commenced daily opera-
tion to and from Paris for the accommoda-
tion of personnel of the U.S. First and
Ninth Armies. Each train had a capacity
of approximately 1,000 passengers. Also,
three leave trains per week were scheduled
to run to the Cannes-Nice area without
entering Paris. During the ensuing months
145
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 2, Ch. III, pp.
24-25, 27-29, OCT HB ETO. Air transport played
an important role in patient evacuation and at times,
particularly in early 1945, carried most of the
evacuees from the forward areas. See Med Dept Com-
ments, OCT HB Critique, Vol. III.
146
Med Sv hist cited n. 144, Pt. III, Vol. XII, Ch.
XIII, pp. 35-40; Diary, Evac Br Office of Chief Surg
ETO, 11 and 29 Jan and 6 Feb 45, SGO 314.81 Daily
Diary of Evac Br; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. I,
Ch. II, p. 130, OCT HB ETO.
147
Historical Critique of the United Kingdom
OVERLORD Movements, 1 Nov 45, pp. 47-51, OCT
HB ETO; Hist, 14th Port, Feb 45, Ch. I, p. 3, and
Mar 45, Pt. I, Incl 13, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 351
Paris, Brussels, and especially the golden detail of infantrymen and service troops as
149
Riviera, enjoyed great popularity among train guards.
officers and enlisted men hunting rest and Both military personnel and native
recreation. Apart from arranging for the civilians pilfered, encouraged by the enor-
required rail accommodations, the theater mous black-market profits. Wholesale
chief of transportation exercised move- thefts of such items as cigarettes, rations,
ment control through RTO's stationed at shoes, and post exchange supplies on such
strategic points. a scale as to contribute to theater short-
In the spring and summer of 1945 the ages—notably in cigarettes—led to under-
pressure for additional leave trains cover activity by the Army's Counter-
mounted. As quickly as tactical considera- intelligence Division (CID) agents. As a
tions and the prevailing shortages of mo- result of their work, the spotlight of pub-
tive power and rolling stock would permit, licity was thrown on extensive pilferage by
the theater chief of transportation placed the personnel of a railway operating bat-
such trains in operation. Long and difficult talion in the Paris area. Altogether, 8
negotiations were necessary to get the help officers and 190 enlisted men were tried,
of the French, who naturally preferred to and of this number only 5 officers and 17
restore their own railway services. For enlisted men were acquitted. The major-
morale purposes the leave trains were ity of those convicted took advantage of
made as comfortable and attractive as an offer of clemency by the theater com-
possible, but they obviously did not meas- mander whereby they were restored to
ure up to peacetime standards and com- duty in a special combat unit. After this
plaints were frequent. 148 unsavory episode, stricter supervision of
the freight trains and railway installations
Train-Cargo Security curtailed further malfeasance of this
type.150
Thefts from U.S. Army supply trains Pilferage by civilians from military
and diversion of the loot into the French trains and railway yards remained
black market became a serious problem troublesome throughout the war. The
during the closing months of 1944. Every Army had to hire many native workers
stolen item represented a dual loss, first in for freight-handling operations, thereby
critical shipping space, and second to the offering opportunities for theft that were
military personnel for whom delivery was bound to appeal to the needy and the un-
intended. In southern France, where the scrupulous. The only effective way to deal
1st MRS had enough military police units
148
assigned as train guards, security proved For details see corres, Jan-Jul 45, especially
no problem. There, General Gray had fol- IRS, DCofT to G-4 COMZONE ETO, 25 Feb and 7
Feb 45; and Memo, Dir of Trans GHQ, MRS to G-4
lowed the common practice of American ETOUSA, 14 Apr 45, sub: Leave Trains. All in OCT
railways and assigned special police to the HB ETO France Rys. See also, Hist Rpt, TC ETO,
Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp. 44-46, 84, OCT HB ETO.
task. In northern France the base section 149
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 123, p. 7, OCT HB
commanders were unable to furnish suffi- ETO.
150
cient MP's. In both the Normandy and See History of Branch Office of the Judge Ad-
vocate General, USFET, 17 July 1942-1 November
Channel Base Sections excessive and heavy 1945, Vol. II, App. 58, JAG Files. Cf. Eisenhower, Cru-
losses caused by pilferage necessitated the sade in Europe, pp. 315-16.
352

with this problem was to station military gaps in the Eclipse Line were closed in
police as guards aboard trains and at mili- August.
tary installations. Upon the establishment Berlin, which formerly had excellent
of the General Headquarters, MRS, in rail connections with western Germany,
February 1945, Lt. Col. Frederick H. was almost isolated at the end of the war.
Owen was appointed director of security For the support of the British and Amer-
to exercise staff supervision over the train- ican personnel in that city the Soviet
cargo security program in the 1st and the authorities made available only a single-
2d MRS.151 At the close of hostilities Gen- track railway with no signal facilities. It
eral Gray recommended that a railway ran from Berlin to a truck transfer point
security department be made a permanent at Helmstedt and was operated by Ger-
feature of the Military Railway Service, man civilians under Soviet supervision.
and that specially trained military police The first U.S. supply train entered Berlin
be provided on the basis of two companies on 27 July 1945. Railway service between
per railway operating battalion. 152 Berlin and Helmstedt was unsatisfactory,
the slow-moving cargoes were often pil-
After V-E Day fered, and the Soviet officials proved gen-
erally un-co-operative.154
With the end of hostilities, the direction The main task confronting the MRS in
and character of railway traffic changed the summer and fall of 1945 was the re-
abruptly. Temporary congestion resulted moval of men and matériel from the thea-
while the necessary adjustments were ter. The job had to be done under unre-
made. The forward movement of freight mitting pressure and by units whose
was drastically curtailed, and the great effectiveness was progressively impaired
bulk of U.S. Army personnel began mov- because of personnel losses incident to re-
ing out of the theater. In addition to the deployment and demobilization. The staff
outbound American troops, the railways of the MRS spent the greater part of June
carried large numbers of German prison- 1945 assembling approximately 2,000 pas-
ers of war and displaced persons. All this senger cars and the necessary motive
activity placed a heavy strain on the power for the movement of redeployed
slender supply of railway equipment, even personnel from railheads in Germany to
though some relief was provided by equip- 151
ment received from the United States and Hist Rpt, TG ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 3, Ch. VI
(NBS), p. 18 and (CBS), p. 8, and Vol. VI, Pt. 2, Ch.
by the repair and utilization of much cap- IV, pp. 2-4, 10-12, 17-18, OCT HB ETO. See also
tured German rolling stock.153 Hist Rpt, 2d MRS, 1st Qtr 1945, OCT HB ETO
A single rail corridor, known as the France
152
2d MRS.
Memo, DG MRS for CofT COMZONE ETO,
Eclipse Line, served the American occu- 17 May 45, sub: MRS Activities, OCT HB ETO
pation forces in Germany and Austria. France 153
GHQ MRS.
This link between the U.S. Army ports of Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp.
8-9, 13-15, 26-27, 37, 42, and Ch. VI, pp. 152-55,
Bremen and Bremerhaven and the Amer- OCT HB ETO.
ican zone was opened to traffic as far as 154
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp.
Eichenberg in June 1945, but the necessity 33-34, 36-37, Vol. VIII, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, pp. 5, 10, and
Ch. VI, pp. 112-17, OCT HB ETO. See Paraphrase
of rehabilitating several bridges to the of Cbl, Ross to OCT FWD, AG 453 Ry Equip (Steam
south delayed its completion. The last or Electric) Etc., Jan-Dec 45, EUCOM Trans Sec.

the Reims assembly area in France and
thence to the ports of Marseille, Le Havre,
and Antwerp. Because of the inevitable
time lag, many officers and men awaiting
shipment to the United States or transfer
to the Pacific were allowed leave or fur-
lough, which created a competing demand
for rail transportation. In July 1945 Gen-
eral Gray reported that an "unbelievable
total" of 1,729 cars was being used for
leave and redeployment travel. 155
All available American, British, French,
and German passenger equipment—even
boxcars—was pressed into service to ac-
commodate U.S. Army personnel on the
move. Such equipment was seldom first
class and usually it was in poor condition.
In order to provide the maximum lift, the
MRS carried 1,000 soldiers or more per
train, as compared with about 500 in the
United States. Under these circumstances,
good service was impossible.156
Following the return of complete oper-
ation and control of the French rail lines
to their own officials in August 1945, the
U.S. Army became simply another cus-
tomer. Thereafter, it was more difficult to
obtain prompt and satisfactory train serv-
ice for American movements. Uncom-
fortable and inconvenient though they
were, there was no alternative to the
French railways in moving troops destined
for redeployment and demobilization, and
rail traffic therefore remained brisk
throughout the summer and autumn
months. The peak outloading of personnel
from the Continent to the United States
came in November 1945, after which the
pressure on the railways began to ease.157
With its wartime mission ended and
demobilization in full swing, General
Headquarters, MRS, was closed on 24
October 1945 and General Gray relin-
quished his post as director general. In the
353
same month MRS troops were withdrawn
from the Belgian railways, and plans were
laid to turn over the German railways to
civilian control under the American mili-
tary government. Upon the departure of
General Gray, General Burpee assumed
command.158
At the close of hostilities and on the
basis of his experience overseas, General
Gray made recommendations for future
MRS operations. He advocated additional
personnel, particularly for communica-
tions, map reproduction, handling sup-
plies, and cargo security. He contended
that the director general should be re-
sponsible for both restoration and repair
of military railways; that he should plan
for, requisition, stock, and issue all railway
equipment and material, including track
and bridge items; and that he should be
charged with insuring the safe transit by
rail of military freight. General Gray fur-
ther recommended that the MRS be set
up as an exempted command responsible
to the chief of transportation, except that
the COMZONE section commanders
should have administrative authority over
certain functions such as the supply of
common items, financial transactions, hos-
pitalization, and evacuation. A subsequent
theater General Board study of Transpor-
155
Memo, Gray for Ross, 9 Jul 45, AG 531.1 Trans
by Land … 1945.
156
Ibid.; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Ch.
IV, pp. 9, 39, OCT HB ETO.
157
Memo, CofT for CG USFET, 12 Oct 45, sub:
Delays to Troop Trains; Memo, CofT to ACofS
G-4 USFET, 19 Oct 45, sub: Delinquencies of
S.N.C.F. Both in AG 531 RR Trans EUCOM. See
also Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. XI, Ch. II, Sec. I, App.,
OCT HB ETO.
158
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. IX, Ch. I, p. 1, Ch. IV,
pp. 4-5, 11-12, 18-19, 31, 44, OCT HB ETO; GO
82, Hq COMZONE ETO, 19 May 45, Sec. I, OCT
HB ETO France GHQ MRS; Memo, DG for All
Units 2d MRS, 13 Dec 45, sub: Opn of RR's by Mil
Govt, OCT HB ETO France Rys.
354
tation Corps operations and organization
supported most of these recommendations
but held that the Corps of Engineers
should retain its normal responsibility for
railway construction and reconstruction,
other than maintenance of way.159
Later General Gray took a somewhat
different stand and maintained that the
Military Railway Service should be a
major command—as it had been in North
Africa and Italy—and that the director
general should report directly to the thea-
ter commander. He then expressed his
opinion that the MRS could not succeed
if operated below the theater level.
Neither General Gross nor General Ross
shared this view. During the war they be-
lieved that the MRS should be under the
control of the theater chief of transporta-
tion in order to have proper co-ordination
with highway and water transportation.
Gray's concept of the MRS as a separate
command was not adopted, and it has re-
mained part of the U.S. Army Transpor-
tation Corps.160
Inland Waterways
By the late summer of 1944 it was evi-
dent that the inland waterways of France
and Belgium would have to be developed
to lighten the increasingly heavy load on
rail and highway transport. Although the
slow-moving barge never would deliver
supplies as quickly as train or truck, it
could be made a valuable adjunct. Imme-
diate utilization of the inland waterways
was impossible because of damaged
bridges and locks, sunken craft, and other
obstructions that hindered navigation.
Usable towboats and barges were scarce,
and there was a shortage of skilled oper-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ating personnel. Under these circum-
stances an Inland Waterways Committee,
which included representatives of G-4,
COMZONE, the chief of engineers, and
the chief of transportation, was appointed
in September 1944 to survey the facilities
and initiate rehabilitation with a view to
the resumption of barge traffic. 161
Soon after the work of rehabilitation
had begun it became obvious that the
eventual scope of the program was such as
to require a larger staff and a more per-
manent organization than the Inland
Waterways Committee. Accordingly, on 7
November 1944, an Inland Waterways
Division was established at Paris under
the theater chief of transportation. Its
primary mission was to assist the French
and Belgian Governments in opening
their canal systems. Supervision was to be
its main function, and actual operations
were to be left to the appropriate local
governmental agencies. The Inland
Waterways Division was headed by Colo-
nel Ryan, who had previously represented
General Ross on the Inland Waterways
162
Committee.
U.S. Army engineers reconstructed the
159
Memo, DG MRS for CofT COMZONE ETO,
17 May 45, sub: MRS Activities, OCT HB ETO
France GHQ MRS; Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 122,
pp. 65-68, OCT HB ETO.
160
Maj. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., "The Military
Railway Service," Army Transportation Journal, IV,
4 (July-August 1948), 44-45; Ltr, Gross to Gray,
17 Dec 43, OCT HB Gross MRS; Ltr, Ross to Gray,
18 Apr 45, AG 531 Rail Policy & Orgn Spec File
EUCOM. On the question of the desirability of the
MRS as a separate command, see also Gen Bd Rpt,
USFET, Study 122, pp. 13, 66, OCT HB ETO.
161
Memo, CG SOS COMZONE ETO for CG
ADSEC, 13 Sep 44, sub: Procedure f o r … Inland
Waterways, OCT HB ETO France Inland Water-
ways.
162
Gen Instructions and Policy, IWD, n. d., AG
320 Functions of TC EUCOM.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
waterways system but with considerable
assistance from civilian contractors. As
more waterways became navigable and
barge operations increased, Ryan's organ-
ization expanded. Liaison representatives
were stationed at several ports including
Le Havre and Antwerp, and operating
personnel were assigned to various inland
points such as Reims and Liege, where the
barges were unloaded. The Inland Water-
ways Division furnished floating equip-
ment, spare parts, fuel, and even clothing
for the native bargemen. By the end of
1944, with the exception of the Rhone
River, all waterways in France and Bel-
gium had been rehabilitated sufficiently to
permit limited use. Projected operations
on the Rhone were later abandoned be-
cause of the lack of tugs suitable for its
swift and rather shallow waters. 163
Barge Operations in France
and Belgium
In France the Oise and Seine river and
canal systems became the principal water-
ways employed by the U.S. Army. Be-
cause of the urgent need of coal for
civilians in Paris, the Inland Waterways
Committee gave top priority to the open-
ing of the Oise, which was a vital link in
the coal transport system of northern
France. The 1057th Engineer Port Con-
struction and Repair Group was assigned
to repair the locks, remove the obstruc-
tions, and rebuild the damaged bridges.
With French assistance this waterway was
made navigable by 28 October 1944.
High water delayed the opening and later,
contrary to expectations, the water froze.
Despite these handicaps the barges began
moving. By mid-November seven barges
355
carrying approximately 2,000 tons of coal
had reached Paris via the Oise river canal
system. Early the following month the
Seine was opened for limited traffic in
military supplies and essential civilian im-
ports from Rouen to Paris. To improve
operations on the Oise and Seine Rivers,
twenty-five surplus American tugs were
transferred to the French on a lend-lease
164
basis.
Meanwhile, barge operations were be-
gun in Belgium. There, the main artery
was the Albert Canal, extending a dis-
tance of approximately 60 miles from
Antwerp to Liege. Restoration was a mili-
tary requirement because much U.S.
Army tonnage discharged at Antwerp
could be dispatched by barge through the
Albert Canal to the various depots in the
vicinity of Liege. The Americans and Brit-
ish co-operated in the reconstruction, and
by 24 December 1944 the canal could be
used by barges not exceeding 700 tons in
capacity. When the canal froze, sea mules
equipped with bulldozer blades were em-
ployed as ice breakers. The barge oper-
ators were given a daily bonus, called
"danger money," for work in the extra-
hazardous Antwerp area. The Belgian
Government also insured their craft
against damage by enemy action. In Bel-
gium, during the period from December
1944 to July 1945 a total of 1,222,000 tons
168
Final Report of the Chief Engineer, European The-
ater of Operations: 1942-1945, pp. 277-81, and App. 30;
Consolidated Rpt on TG Activities in ETO, Annex 6,
History of the Inland Waterways Division, pp. 3-9,
11-12.
164
Unsigned memo on French canal system, com-
piled by Hist Sec OCT ETO, and Memo, Col Ryan,
OCT, for TC Newsletter, 20 Nov 44, both in OCT
HB ETO France Inland Waterways; Memo, Ryan to
Ross, 15 May 45, sub: Rpt on Activities, TWO, AG
320 Functions of TC EUCOM.
356
of Army cargo was forwarded by barge, as
compared with approximately 580,000
tons moved by the same means during the
same period in France. The difference is
explained by the heavy shipments through
Antwerp and the comparatively short
haul over the Albert Canal.165
Although the inland waterways were
helpful auxiliaries to rail and motor trans-
port, the tonnage forecasts and targets for
river and canal traffic were never at-
tained, mainly because the French and
Belgian personnel could not be persuaded
to make the maximum effort of operating
around the clock. Adverse weather condi-
tions also were a handicap. After the ice
had melted, floods halted movement from
24 January to 25 February 1945 on most
rivers and canals. The Inland Waterways
Division gave the bargemen both supplies
and floating equipment. A special canal
patrol of nine small boats was established
in Belgium to prevent pilferage and to
keep traffic moving. Colonel Ryan's policy
was to push the French and the Belgians
continually so as to improve the turn-
around. At best, however, the barges were
a slow means of transport, and much de-
pended upon the degree of co-operation
166
received from the individual operator.
Barge Traffic on the Rhine
and the Danube
Toward the end of the war, the theater
chief of transportation also made plans to
use the waterways of Central Europe,
especially of the Rhine and the Danube.
Normally, fleets of large barges had oper-
ated on these rivers, but much equipment
had been sunk or damaged. Apart from
obtaining barges and operators, the prin-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
cipal problem was to remove navigational
obstructions—almost all bridges across the
Rhine and its tributaries were down and
many vessels had been scuttled. Before
mid-May 1945, rehabilitation was largely
a paper project pending delineation of the
American sector and determination of the
role of the U.S. Army. On the basis of ex-
perience gained in France and Belgium it
was decided that the Transportation Corps
would supervise and police barge traffic
and would establish a chain of offices at
key points along the inland waterways.
Insofar as possible German civilians were
to operate the barges, and the U.S. Army
was not to requisition such craft on a large
scale.167
The Rhine River Branch of the Inland
Waterways Division was activated in mid-
April 1945, and its four officers and three
enlisted men set up their headquarters at
Biebrich, Germany. The first assignment
was to survey available facilities, inspect
damaged craft, and estimate the time re-
quired to remove the hindrances to navi-
gation. Clearing the river and restoring
barge traffic became a joint effort of the
Corps of Engineers and the Transporta-
tion Corps. German firms were employed
for salvage and reclamation, and the dam-
165
Memo, Lt Col Herbert H. Heuman, Chief of
Belgium Br IWD, for CofT SOS ETO, 10 Mar 45,
sub: Increased Use of Barges, and IRS, G-4 to OCT,
7 Apr 45, sub: Maximum Use of Barge Trans, both
in AG 560 Barges 12/44-12/45 EUCOM; Consoli-
dated Rpt on TC Activities in ETO, Annex 6, pp. 17,
19, and App. 1.
166
Memo, CofT COMZONE ETO for CofT ASF
WD, 28 Feb 45, sub: Rpt on Inland Waterways,
OCT HB ETO Inland Trans; Memo, ACofT IWD
for CofT COMZONE ETO, 15 May 45, AG 320
Functions of TC EUCOM.
167
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 1, Ch. II, p. 54,
and Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp. 92-93, OCT HB
ETO. See also Hist Rpt, IWTS, 2d Qtr 1945, OCT
HB ETO Inland Trans.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
aged craft were towed to predesignated
shipyards for repair. After the withdrawal
in late April 1945 of U.S. Navy personnel,
the Transportation Corps' 329th Harbor
Craft Company took over their vessels and
spare parts and began operating on the
Rhine. Because many sunken craft had to
be raised and repaired and many naviga-
tional hazards such as demolished bridges
had to be removed, the Rhine was not
open for large-scale barge traffic until Sep-
tember 1945. At the close of that year the
Rhine River Branch had 74 tugs and 288
barges in operation. Coal was the prin-
cipal commodity transported.168
The Danube River Branch of the In-
land Waterways Division was established
at Linz, Austria, on 27 May 1945. Two
days later the 337th Harbor Craft Com-
pany arrived and began functioning. A
major responsibility of this branch was to
take charge of a captured enemy fleet, the
so-called Danube Navy. For the time
being it was used mostly for the movement
of essential military and civilian supplies.
However, two of the captured vessels pro-
vided daily pleasure cruises for U.S. Army
personnel, and other craft were employed
169
to repatriate displaced persons.
For the most part, actual operations on
the Danube were carried on by civilian
agencies. An indication of the initial activ-
ity on this river may be gained from the
following. During the week of 8-15 June
1945, 6,933 displaced persons were trans-
ported between Linz and Melk, Austria;
3,569 American troops were carried on
recreational cruises; 1,645 tons of miscel-
laneous cargo were unloaded; crude oil
was discharged from 21 tankers; and con-
siderable repair work was accomplished
on engines and hulls. Operations were
hampered by a shortage of personnel and
357
occasional low-water levels. Fortunately,
the Danube was comparatively unob-
structed, enough river boats were avail-
able, and all necessary repairs and spare
parts could be had at Linz.170
On 1 June 1945 Colonel Schroeder suc-
ceeded Colonel Ryan as chief of the In-
land Waterways Division. Early in August
the division was redesignated the Inland
Waterways Transport Service (IWTS),
headed by a director general (Colonel
Schroeder), but still under the theater
chief of transportation. Meanwhile, the
activity in France and Belgium had been
reduced to liaison with local operators.
The Rhine River Branch and the Danube
River Branch functioned throughout
1945. The IWTS was inactivated on
1 January 1946, and its operating person-
nel and equipment in Germany and
Austria were transferred to the Office of
Military Government, U.S.171
Transportation Corps Supply
on the Continent
After D Day the chief of transportation's
Supply Division, under Lt. Col. Maurice
168
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp.
94-96, Vol. VIII, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp. 114-18, and Vol.
IX, Ch. II, p. 51, OCT HB ETO. See Ltr and Data,
Col A. H. Schroeder to Larson, 25 Apr 50, OCT HB
Inquiries.
169
This fleet of about fifty vessels had surrendered
to the Americans, but later was claimed by the Soviet
Army. Interv with Col Vissering, OCT, 23 May 49,
and Memo, Col Vissering to ACofS G-4 SHAEF, 21
May 45, sub: Rpt on Contact with the Russians con-
cerning Danube Navy, both in OCT HB ETO Inland
Trans.
170
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp.
96-99, and Vol. VIII, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp. 118-23, OCT
HB ETO. See also IRS, DACOT to OCT, 2 Jun 45,
OCT HB ETO Inland Trans.
171
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. II, p.
113, and Vol. XI, Ch. II, p. 50, OCT HB ETO.
358
G.Jewett, was chiefly concerned with the
transfer to the Continent of transportation
items stored in various Transportation
Corps depots in the United Kingdom and
with the establishment and operation of
similar installations in France. In the
initial planning, the first Transportation
Corps depot was to be set up at Cher-
bourg. Because of the delay in the capture
of the port and the general confusion after
the Normandy landings, some Transpor-
tation Corps items were lost or misdi-
rected, including organizational equip-
ment belonging to the 11th and 4th Ports.
Some of the missing equipment was re-
covered but only after considerable delay.
For example, spare parts for Chrysler
marine engines, which were scheduled for
discharge at Cherbourg, landed instead
at Barfleur and Isigny and were over-
looked for a month. 172
The transportation items stored and is-
sued on the Continent fell into two main
categories: port and marine equipment,
and railway equipment.173 The first Trans-
portation Corps supplies to reach Nor-
mandy were placed in a large dump
behind OMAHA Beach. A similar but
smaller dump was set up near UTAH
Beach. Later, as Transportation Corps de-
pots were established, those for railway
supplies usually were located near the
main railway lines, while those for port
and marine items were generally adjacent
to the principal ports. A rear area depot
was maintained in the United Kingdom
to store and issue matériel received from
American and British sources and to for-
ward supplies and equipment to France as
they were needed. The supply problem
was complicated by the necessity of han-
dling some 30,000 different items for ma-
rine operations and some 20,000 separate
items for military railways.174
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
By D plus 30 a Transportation Corps
dump had been established at Bricquebec,
which in August 1944 developed into a
permanent depot (T-700) for marine and
railway equipment. Another Transporta-
tion Corps depot (T-701) was established
at Rennes during the following month,
but it was closed when projected port op-
erations in Brittany did not materialize.
Also in September, a depot (T-704) was
set up at Cherbourg to receive, store, and
issue spare parts for all types of harbor
craft, but some time elapsed before it was
fully stocked. The growing volume of
emergency air shipments from the United
States necessitated the setting up of a
small depot (T-703) adjacent to the Le
Bourget airfield near Paris. Intended
chiefly for critical marine and electrical
items, it was later expanded to meet spe-
cial needs at Antwerp, to which reason-
ably rapid rail service was available. The
principal northern depot (T-705) was at
Liege. All these installations were manned
by base depot companies. A chronic prob-
lem of the Transportation Corps depots
was to procure personnel with enough
technical knowledge to do a satisfactory
job.175
After SOLOC was absorbed by the
European theater, there were eight Trans-
portation Corps depots in operation on the
Continent. The following tabulation gives
172
Hist Rpt. TC ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. I, pp. 9-10,
and Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 122, p. 101, both in
OCT HB ETO.
173
The procurement, storage, and issue of vehicles
and spare parts were the responsibility of the Ord-
nance Department.
174
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp.
23-25, OCT HB ETO.
175
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 122, pp. 101-02,
OCT HB ETO; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 18 Oct 44, OCT
HB Overseas Opn Gp; Hist, 781st Base Depot Co,
TC, 1 Mar-15 Sep 44, OCT HB ETO Brittany Base
Sec.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY 359

their location and other pertinent infor- Transportation Corps supplies and equip-
176
mation as of April 1945: ment from the United States continued to
arrive in large quantities: approximately
68,000 tons in April, 56,000 tons in May,
and 81,000 tons in June. After V-E Day
came the task of scaling down require-
ments and striking out items no longer
needed. Much of this adjustment was ac-
complished automatically because the
New York Port of Embarkation imme-
diately put into effect a prearranged plan,
whereby requisitions marked "STO" were
not filled and only those marked "SHP"
The organization of the Supply Divi- were processed for shipment to the
sion on the Continent was essentially the theater.178
same as that in the United Kingdom. The After Germany surrendered, the Trans-
primary mission was to furnish all marine portation Corps supply organization had
and rail equipment and all organizational the task of redeploying transportation
and miscellaneous equipment required by matériel to the United States and the
Transportation Corps units, and to main- Pacific, and at the same time of setting up
tain adequate stock records and stock con- new depots in Germany to support the
trol for all Transportation Corps items re- U.S. occupation forces. Originally four
ceived and issued on the Continent. Ma- such depots were planned, but only three
tériel from the United States was obtained were found necessary. A depot at Bremer-
by requisition upon the New York Port of haven, primarily for marine engine parts,
Embarkation through G-4, COMZONE. sufficed for the Bremen Port Command.
Extensive use was made of local procure- At the request of the U.S. Seventh Army
ment in order to save shipping space. the Supply Division accepted a site in
Captured enemy equipment was used Karlsruhe for a general depot to support
whenever possible. Contributions from transportation activity in the American
local sources were difficult to evaluate occupation zone. An experienced base
since they often included services and re-
176
pairs as well as matériel. The British and Figures are in long tons per twenty-four-hour
period. Only estimates were available for Depot
the French supplied considerable railway T-708, which handled knocked-down railway cars.
equipment for American use. The Supply The three depots at Marseille and Depot T-709 at
Division, in turn, assisted our allies by dis- Chaligny were taken over from SOLOC. See Hist
tributing clothing among railway workers Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp. 88-92, OCT
HB ETO.
and by supplying railway parts. During 177
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp.
the first quarter of 1945 an emergency 21-24, and Vol. VI, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp. 82-87, OCT
HB ETO.
trucking service was organized to move 178
Qtrly Hist Rpt, TC Supply Div, 28 Sep 45,
critically needed items. Among the items OCT HB ETO Misc Rpts. Colonel Jewett, who
so delivered were life preservers for com- served as assistant chief of transportation for supply
throughout the campaign in France and Germany,
bat troops crossing the Rhine.177 was succeeded, on 1 June 1945, by Lt. Col. James C.
During the closing months of the war, Waddell.
360
depot company functioned at each of these
installations. A third depot, at Munich,
was designated exclusively for diesel-loco-
rnotive spare parts. It operated under the
supervision of the 762d Railway Shop
179
Battalion.
The Transportation Corps supply pro-
gram on the Continent had two major de-
ficiencies, each traceable to the absence of
previous experience in this field. They
were a lack of basic information in the
form of stock catalogs, drawings, spare-
parts lists, interchangeability lists, main-
tenance factors, and standard nomencla-
ture lists; and a shortage of men familiar
with technical equipment and supplies.
Both deficiencies were beyond the control
of the Transportation Corps Supply Divi-
sion in the theater. Standardization of
equipment data was prevented by produc-
tion difficulties in the zone of interior,
which necessitated frequent substitutions,
and sufficient trained personnel could not
be had.180
Throughout the war neither the supply
of spare parts nor the initial issue proved
adequate. Slowness in getting the required
parts into production was attributable in
part to the comparatively late entry of the
Transportation Corps into the field of sup-
ply and the specialized nature of its re-
quirements. In its initial procurement pro-
gram the emphasis necessarily was placed
on the production of the basic equipment,
with a resultant lag in the output of spare
parts. Even after they had been received,
the theater had difficulty in identifying
parts because of unsatisfactory numbering
and listing.
In this connection, Colonel Jewett rec-
ommended that spare parts be shipped in
bulk rather than in sets and that each item
be stamped with its Transportation Corps
stock number. In his opinion the ideal ar-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
rangement in any future oversea under-
taking called for a Transportation Corps
Supply Division with clearly defined re-
sponsibilities and an adequate staff that
would have sole responsibility for the
operation of the Transportation Corps
181
depots.
Outbound Passenger and Cargo Traffic
The inbound flow of troops, supplies,
and equipment remained a vital consid-
eration until victory came into view. How-
ever, as the war in Europe drew to an end,
outbound shipments took on increased
importance. The climax, of course, came
after the close of hostilities in May 1945
when the redeployment and demobiliza-
tion programs swung into action. Included
within the broad and varied outbound
category were returning U.S. Army per-
sonnel, enemy prisoners of war, and pa-
tients being evacuated to the zone of
interior, liberated persons, redeployed and
demobilized troops, redeployed and excess
supplies and equipment, and military de-
pendents. All these movements threw a
heavy load on the available transporta-
tion, greatly complicating the task of
traffic control.
Returning U.S. Army Personnel
U.S. Army personnel returning to the
zone of interior did not bulk large until
the summer of 1943 when the troop rota-
tion program got under way. The purpose
of the program was to effect an exchange
of military personnel between the zone of
179
180
Ibid.
Gen Bd Rpt, USFET, Study 122, pp. 102-03,
OCT HB ETO.
181
Ibid., p. 103; Consolidated Rpt on TC Activities
in ETO, Annex 3, pp. 24-25.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
interior and the oversea commands in
order to give relief to officers and men who
had seen unusually long or arduous serv-
ice overseas. The theater commander pre-
scribed the period that rendered indi-
viduals eligible for rotation. Replacements
had to reach the theater before the de-
parture of the rotational personnel. While
the traffic involved in implementing this
program was not heavy, the net result was
to impose an additional burden upon the
transportation system.182
During 1944, in addition to the rota-
tional category (RO groups), many tem-
porary duty personnel (the so-called TD
groups) returned to the United States for
rest, recuperation, and rehabilitation. The
latter were limited in number only by the
availability of shipping and by the needs
of the theaters. Small numbers of military
personnel also left the theater on emer-
gency leave, on furlough, or as officer
candidates. However, the total movement
of Americans from the European theater
to the zone of interior was on a modest
scale, amounting to slightly under 260,000
passengers for the entire year of 1944.
Meanwhile, the evacuation of enemy
prisoners of war had developed into an
operation of considerable magnitude.
Enemy Prisoners of War
The break-through at St. Lo and the
subsequent rapid advance eastward
brought a host of captured Germans into
Allied hands. Many of these prisoners
were put to work at once, but the theater
had to feed and guard a large number
who could not be used readily on the Con-
tinent. When this burden became too
great, relief was obtained by evacuation,
initially to the United Kingdom and later
to the United States, where the Germans
361
were needed because of a critical labor
shortage. The theater chief of transporta-
tion was charged with the supervision of
the movement of prisoners of war and pro-
vided the necessary land and sea transpor-
tation. The provost marshal was responsi-
ble for guarding en route.183
The summer and fall of 1944 saw a
heavy movement of German prisoners of
war to the United States. To provide suffi-
cient shipping space, the Transportation
Corps again made use of the hastily con-
verted Liberty ships, which had been em-
ployed previously to remove Germans and
Italians from the Mediterranean. During
the peak month of September 1944 a total
of 55,359 Germans arrived in the United
States. By that time the influx had reached
such alarming proportions as to cause the
Army Provost Marshal General in Wash-
ington to oppose further shipments by the
theater. General Somervell agreed and
urged that this view be pressed more
firmly upon the War Department Gen-
eral Staff and the European theater.184
Convinced of the seriousness of the
problem, the Under Secretary of War in
late September requested that as an emer-
gency measure the removal of prisoners of
war to the United States be halted. Com-
pliance was not immediate because of
pressure from the European theater,
which reported a "huge volume of pris-
oners" on hand and asked to be permitted
to load vessels beyond the authorized pas-
182
OCT HB Monograph 30, pp. 56-58; WD Cir
(unnumbered), 28 Jun 43, Cir 58, 9 Feb 44, and Cir
8, 6 Jan 45; Memo, Exec Officer for CofT, 23 Jan 45,
sub: Summary of Policy and Procedures in Mvmts of
Pers from Oversea Theaters, OCT HB Ocean Trans
Oversea Troop Mvmts; Statistics Br Contl Div Hq
ASF WD, Statistical Review, World War II, pp. 34,
126-27.
183
OCT HB Monograph 30, pp. 105,120-21.
184
ASF, Statistical Review, World War II, p. 158;
Min, ASF Staff Conf, 26 Sep 44, OCT HB.
362 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

senger capacities. The War Department made with the Axis powers, through the
replied that the decision as to the number co-operation of the U.S. War and State
of prisoners carried rested with the captain Departments, and the British, Canadian,
of the ship, and then on 27 October it and Swiss Governments. The exchanged
ordered the theater to suspend the move- persons normally traveled on the Swedish
ment of prisoners of war to the zone of in- liner Gripsholm. The role of the Trans-
terior. A subsequent modification of this portation Corps, both overseas and in the
directive restricted evacuation to "rabid" zone of interior, was confined to embarka-
Nazis and prisoners of war wanted for tion and debarkation arrangements, and
interrogation.185 the total number involved was small.188
After a temporary lull, the last heavy Liberated military personnel, usually
movement of prisoners of war to the called RAMPS (Recovered Allied Mili-
United States came in the spring of 1945 tary Personnel), formed a much larger
as the result of mass surrender of Germans group. As a matter of policy the War De-
to the advancing American forces. The partment had determined that all U.S.
traffic was at its height in April and May personnel who had been prisoners of war
1945, with arrivals of 31,559 and 28,260 longer than sixty days were to be returned
prisoners, respectively. This exodus to the United States unless they elected to
brought relief to the theater and helped remain overseas or requested reassignment
alleviate the tight manpower situation in to their former units. After U.S. armies
the United States. In order to evacuate as entered Germany the number of RAMPS
many prisoners as possible, the capacity of rapidly increased. Most American
the POW Liberty ships was raised from RAMPS embarked from the Le Havre
the normal 300-500 to 750 and, finally, to Port of Embarkation after having been
1,000 men, by opening additional hatches fed, clothed, and processed at Camp
and by employing more guards.186 Lucky Strike—later known as Ramp
Anticipating an early end of hostilities Camp No. 1. Although the Army under-
General Somervell, on 6 April 1945, di-
185
rected General Gross to take "positive ac- OCT HB Monograph 30, pp. 121-22; Rad,
tion" to discontinue the shipment of Ger- OCS for Hq COMZONE ETO, 27 Oct 44, CM-
OUT 53129, OCT 383.6 German POWs; Hist Rpt,
man prisoners to the United States on V-E TC ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Ch. II, p. 30, OCT HB ETO.
186
Day. Appropriate instructions were then ASF, Statistical Review, World War II, p. 158;
issued to the oversea commands. When WD Press Release, 3 Mar 45; OCT HB Monograph
30, p. 123; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Ch.
V-E Day came, the Chief of Transporta- III, p. 102, OCT HB ETO.
187
tion at once directed that all POW Liberty Memo, Actg Dir of Plans and Opns ASF for
ships which were then en route to the CofT ASF, 6 Apr 45, and latter's reply, 12 Apr 45,
sub: V-E Day Action, OCT HB Ocean Trans POW;
United States turn back to the European Memo, Convoy Schedules Br for Stat Br Mvmts Div
ports from which they had sailed.187 OCT, 13 Jun 45, sub: Hist, May 45, OCT HB
Mvmts Div. On the repatriation of German prisoners
from the United States, undertaken on an important
Liberated Persons scale in January 1946, see the following: Hist Mono-
graph, POW Opns Div PMGO, Prisoner of War
The term "liberated persons" covers Operations, Supplementary Narrative, pp. 10, 23-26,
32-33, and Tab 3, OCMH Files; and OCT HB
both recovered and exchanged Allied per- Monograph 30, pp. 124-30.
sonnel. During the war exchanges were 188
Exec Officer memo cited n. 182, p. 3.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
took to give these men the best treatment
possible, it could not repatriate them as
rapidly as was desirable and at the same
time carry out the schedule for rede-
ploying troops and evacuating patients.
Largely because of this delay, low morale
and poor discipline were reported at
Le Havre and also at Southampton, where
many RAMPS were staged pending repa-
triation.189
Patients
The evacuation of sick and wounded
U.S. Army personnel was a joint under-
taking of the Medical Department and the
Transportation Corps, the former provid-
ing medical personnel, care, and equip-
ment, and the latter furnishing transporta-
tion. The procedure for the return of pa-
tients from oversea commands was pre- United Kingdom for hospitalization before
scribed by War Department directive. As being returned to the zone of interior.
developed by June 1944, it called for each When D Day arrived, careful plans had
theater commander to submit a monthly
report on the number and class (mental,
litter, ambulant, or troop) of U.S. Army
patients awaiting evacuation by water at
each oversea port under his jurisdiction.
In addition, he indicated the number of
patients of each class expected to accumu-
late during the succeeding thirty days for
removal by ship to the zone of interior—
vital data for plans and operations of both
the Transportation Corps and the Medical
Department. Evacuation policy was ex-
pressed in terms of days. Thus, a 120-day
evacuation policy meant that all patients
likely to be hospitalized in excess of 120
days would be evacuated. Within the
theater the movement of patients was to
be accomplished, as the need arose, by
litter, motor ambulance, airplane, and/or
hospital train.190
Patients evacuated to the zone of in-
363
terior by water traveled in one of two
ways. By far the larger number occupied
the hospital spaces of troopships leaving
the theater. The other method of evacua-
tion was by hospital ship, but despite
early planning the development of a fleet
of U.S. Army hospital ships was consid-
191
erably delayed. The first was the Acadia,
which began operating as a convention-
protected vessel in June 1943. For the in-
formation of the oversea commander the
patient capacity of each ship employed for
evacuation was established by a special
survey at the home port. All such vessels
carried the medical personnel, equipment,
and supplies deemed necessary for the
patients aboard.192
Following the invasion of France, the
majority of the patients evacuated from
the Continent were first moved to the
been laid by General Ross and Maj. Gen.
Paul R. Hawley, the Chief Surgeon, ETO.
Special railway equipment had been pro-
vided for use in the United Kingdom and
on the Continent. Since U.S. hospital
ships were not available for the purpose,
specially equipped and manned LST's as
189
Ibid.; Hist, 16th Port, Book I, Hist Summary,
Port Surgeon, 2d Qtr 45, and Qtrly Hist Rpt, 524th
Port Bn, Book 3, p. 4; Hist Rcd, 14th Maj Port, Jun
45, p. 4. All in OCT HB Oversea Ports. Cf. Eisen-
hower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 420-22.
190
On the development of War Department proce-
dure and policy regarding sea evacuation from over-
sea commands, see Clarence M. Smith, The Medical
Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of In-
terior, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, 1956), pp. 331-40.
191
See Wardlow, Movements, Training, and Supply,
pp. 215-20.
192
Remarks of Lt Col John C. Fitzpatrick, Med
Liaison Officer, at Junior Officers' Mtg, Mvmts Div,
15 Nov 44, OCT HB Mvmts Div OCT, 15 Nov 44,
OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen; OCT HB Monograph 7,
Chs. II and III, and Monograph 30, pp. 49-56.
364
well as several British hospital carriers
were assigned to move American patients
across the Channel. Provision for evacua-
tion by air also had been made.193
As quickly as possible after the assault
landings, the casualties were collected on
the beaches. Evacuation activities were
carried out jointly by U.S. Army and U.S.
Navy personnel. Initially, all patients
were ferried by DUKW's and small craft
to LST's lying offshore. The first hospital
carrier arrived on D plus 1, and patients
were delivered to it in a similar manner.
Although removals from the beaches
began on D Day, the casualties did not
begin to arrive in large numbers in the
United Kingdom until 9 June because of
the time required for the formation of a
convoy. In the United Kingdom, South-
ampton and Portland initially served as
reception ports. Patients debarking at
piers and hards were either moved by
ambulance and truck to nearby transit
hospitals, or were placed in hospital trains
for movement direct to general hospitals.194
Of the five British hospital carriers as-
signed to the Normandy beachheads,
three were staffed with U.S. and two with
British Army medical personnel. Their
role may be illustrated by the activity of
the American 13th Hospital Train, a
medical unit attached to the 14th Port at
Southampton but stationed aboard the
hospital carrier Lady Connaught. Anchored
off UTAH Beach, at 1730 on 8 June 1944,
her staff began the loading and treating of
casualties despite continuous enemy air
action, which luckily caused no loss of life
or damage to the ship. Loading ceased at
1310 on 9 June, and the vessel weighed
anchor and proceeded to Southampton,
where the 449 patients were discharged at
1030 on 10 June. Subsequently, this ship
evacuated casualties from both the Ameri-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
can and British sectors in Normandy.
During the period from D Day to 30 Sep-
tember 1944, the 13th Hospital Train
completed 16 medical operational mis-
sions, evacuating and treating a total of
195
3,795 patients.
Meanwhile, Cherbourg had begun to
function as an evacuation port, loading its
first hospital carrier on 15 August. Evacu-
ations from the invasion beaches fell off
thereafter and were halted in September.
During that month the use of LST's was
discontinued, Portland ceased to be a re-
ception port for patients, and sea evacua-
tion to the United Kingdom was then
effected entirely by hospital carriers, which
operated between Cherbourg and South-
ampton. Upon arrival at Southampton,
most patients moved by rail directly to
196
general hospitals.
Evacuation by water was necessarily
slow, but patients flown from France were
sometimes delivered to general hospitals
in the United Kingdom within three
hours after they had become casualties.
Air evacuation from the invasion beaches
began on D plus 4. By D plus 14 the airlift
193
Diary, Evac Br Office of Chief Surg ETO, entry
of 1 Jun 44, SGO 314.81 Daily Diary of Evac Br; Rpt,
12th Army Gp, Report of Operations, Vol. VI, G-4
Sec, p. 20, DRB AGO; Annual Rpt, Evac Br Office
of Chief Surg ETO, 1944, pp. 2-3, 15, SGO HD
319.1-2 (Evac Br).
194
Rpt, Prov ESB Gp, Operation NEPTUNE, Omaha
Beach, 26 February-26 June 1944, 30 Sep 44, Ch.
XXIV, OCT HB ETO Assault and Beach Opns; His-
torical Critique of the United Kingdom OVERLORD
Movements, 1 Nov 45, pp. 44-46, OCT HB ETO;
Rpt, WTF, Amphibious Operations, Invasion of
Northern France, Jun 44, pp. V-35-40, OCT HB
ETO Assault and Beach Opns; Diary, Evac Br Office
of Chief Surg ETO, entries for 8-10 Jun 44, SGO
314.81 Daily Diary of Evac Br.
195 WTF rpt cited n. 194, p. V-35; Hist, 13th Hosp
Train, activation to 30 Sep 44, in Hist of Units Atchd
to 14th Port, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
196
Annual Rpt, Evac Br Office of Chief Surg ETO,
Aug 44, pp. 5, 7, SGO HD 319.1-2 (Evac).
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
to Great Britain was so successful that
thereafter, until their use was discon-
tinued, LST's were employed only when
unfavorable weather kept aircraft
grounded. During the storm of 19-22 June,
when sea evacuation was impossible, many
patients left by air. In the last six months
of 1944 aircraft accounted for 56 percent
of all patients moved from the Continent
to the United Kingdom. This traffic
reached its wartime peak in December
1944, when 33,878 patients were flown to
the United Kingdom.197
Evacuation by U.S. Army hospital ship
to the zone of interior began on 15 June
1944 when the Chateau Thierry sailed from
Liverpool with 466 patients.198 The only
other U.S. Army hospital ship then in the
European theater, the Acadia, had to be
diverted to Naples to assist the Mediter-
ranean theater. Consequently, there were
no further hospital ship sailings until 22
July, when the Blanche F. Sigman embarked
557 patients, mainly casualties of the Nor-
mandy invasion, for the passage from
Liverpool to Charleston, South Caro-
lina.199
Evacuation continued on a modest
scale during the summer of 1944. Only a
few hospital ships were available and
although there was ample space for pa-
tients on troop transports little of it was
used. Even in September 1944 when the
patient movement increased sharply, the
total number of evacuations by troopship
was only 4,012 (including 330 U.S. Navy
and 1,786 POW patients), a figure that
was far below the number that could have
been taken.200
The poor showing in the clearing of
casualties from the theater during this
period can be attributed to three major
causes: (1) the chronic shortage of hospital
ships; (2) the reluctance of the chief
365
surgeon of the theater (General Hawley)
to use troopships for evacuation of pa-
tients, particularly litter cases; and (3)
sharply divided opinion between Hawley's
medical staff and the War Department
concerning the suitability of hospital ac-
commodations on the troop transports.
With regard to the last cause, disagree-
ment had developed as early as June 1944
as to the numbers and types of cases that
could be accommodated aboard a given
vessel. Although each ship had been sur-
veyed and the patient capacity had been
determined at the home port, say, the New
York Port of Embarkation, the transport
surgeon and the port surgeon in the
theater often disagreed with the accuracy
201
of that figure.
In Washington the matter was of com-
mon concern to the Chief of Transporta-
197 NEPTUNE rpt cited n. 194, pp. 335-37, 339; Med
Sv hist cited n. 144, Pt. III, Vol. XII, Ch. XIII, pp.
42-44 and Apps. 6 and 7, SGO HD Hist Div Files;
Memo, Col F. H. Mowrey, Exec Officer to Evac Br
Chief Surg ETO, 16 Jun 45, sub: Air Sup and Evac,
SGO 370.05 Evac.
198
Before this time, some U.S. patients had been re-
turned to the United States by Canadian and British
hospital ships. See Med Dept Comments on Ch. V,
OCT HB Critique Vol. III.
199
See Hist Rcd, 208th Hosp Ship Complement,
USAHS Chateau Thierry, Voyage No. 3; Annual Rpt,
220th Hosp Ship Complement, USAHS Blanche F.
Sigman. Both in Hist, Med Liaison Office to OCT and
Med Regulating Sv, SGO, Tabs 4 and 6, OCT HB
Mvmts Div Med Regulating Sv.
200
See Memo, Officer in Charge Inbound Troop
Mvmt Sec Mvmts Div for Trans Office U.K. Base, 26
Oct 44, sub: Evac of Patients, OCT 319 Evac of
Patients.
201
Clarence M. Smith, op. cit., p. 234; Interv with
Col J. C. Fitzpatrick, 16 Feb 50, OCT HB ETO Evac;
Ltr, Ross to Gross, 28 Oct 44, OCT 319.1 Evac of
Patients; Memo, Chief Surg for CG ETO, 27 Sep 44,
sub: Evac from ETO to ZI, OCT HB Gross Hosp and
Evac; Extract Phone Conf between Lt Col D. E. Farr,
OCT, and Col D. S. McConnaughy, OCT COM-
ZONE ETO, 12 Jun 44, OCT 319.1 Gen Ross, Jun-
Oct 44; IRS, Chief Surg to G-4 COMZONE ETO, 3
Mar 45, SGO 370.05 Evac.
366
tion and The Surgeon General, both of
whom had a vital interest in the prompt
removal of patients to the zone of interior.
The Surgeon General, Maj. Gen. Norman
T. Kirk, was critical of General Hawley's
failure to fill the hospital spaces on return-
ing U.S. and British troopships, especially
since hospital ships were arriving with
more of certain types of patients than they
were supposed to carry. There was a
strong conviction in Washington that
maximum utilization would have to be
made of troop transports before they be-
came unavailable because of redeploy-
ment demands, and it was foreseen that
greater use would have to be made of air
evacuation.202
General Hawley challenged this point
of view. He claimed that the greatest use
had been made of airlift, but that it was
limited because returning airmen had a
higher priority than casualties. He stated
that approximately 50 percent of the cas-
ualties to be evacuated were litter cases,
whereas only 10 percent of the troopship
accommodations were, by War Depart-
ment classification, satisfactory for such
patients. As to the alleged failure to utilize
British troopships, notably the Queen
Elizabeth, he declared that the theater
rarely received all the space requested and
that facilities on such vessels were so poor
as to warrant only emergency use.203
Hawley's comments were transmitted
to General Gross, who in turn forwarded
them to General Ross with a letter stress-
ing the need of an early remedy. In his
reply of late October 1944, Ross reported
that his staff had done its utmost to find a
solution. Like Hawley, Ross had made a
study, from which emerged these salient
points: (1) the chief surgeon had been
offered and had refused certain troopship
hospital spaces; (2) the disagreement as to
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
hospital accommodations on the troop
transports should be settled in Washington,
not in the theater; (3) exclusive of Class IV
(troop) patients, who presented no prob-
lem, the troop transports were carrying
only about 50 percent of their patient ca-
pacity; and (4) the only vessels currently
being filled to capacity were the hospital
ships, which Hawley preferred. 204
In the letter that accompanied his com-
ments, General Hawley had promised
General Kirk that he would exploit the
available patient lift to the fullest extent.
This decision, prompted no doubt by
prodding from Washington, was followed
by a decided spurt in the number of pa-
tients embarked. This trend was aided by
a change in evacuation policy from 180 to
120 days, effective in October. Some lift
was lost while Hawley's medical per-
sonnel evaluated patients in relation to the
new policy. Meanwhile, the Transporta-
tion Corps continued to press for maxi-
mum utilization of the available shipping,
including the British Queens.205
As already indicated, the chief surgeon
of the European theater was reluctant to
employ British vessels for patient evacua-
tion. A permanent American medical staff
(one officer and twelve enlisted men) had
functioned aboard both the Queen Mary
and Queen Elizabeth since 1942, but the
202
See copy of estimates with Memos, Chief Surg
for CG ETO, 27 Sep 44, OCT HB Gross Hosp and
Evac.
203
Ltr, Hawley to Kirk, 29 Sep 44, OCT HB Gross
Hosp and Evac.
204
Ltr and Rpt, Ross to Gross, 28 Oct 44, OCT
319.1 Evac of Patients.
205
Ltr, Hawley to Kirk, 29 Sep 44, OCT HB Gross
Hosp and Evac; Memo for Rcd, Chief Surg ETO, 13
Dec 44, OCT 319.1 ETO; Memo, Chief Surg for CG
COMZONE ETO, 24 Mar 45, sub: Casualty Evac to
ZI, SGO 370.05 Evac; Conf, Col Farr OCT, and Lt
Col J. L. Bartley, OCT, 12 Oct 44, OCT 319.1 Gen
Ross, Jun-Oct 44.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
voyage reports of the American transport
surgeons carried frequent complaints
about the hospital facilities, food served,
quarters, and lack of water. A further
source of difficulty was the recurring fric-
tion between American and British medi-
cal personnel. Although the U.S. Army
furnished its own medical supplies, equip-
ment, and personnel, the British main-
tained a strict control, allegedly even to
the extent of restricting the issue of the
new marvel drug, penicillin, to American
206
patients.
The Queens carried fairly small numbers
of American patients until late in 1944.
On 25 July of that year the Queen Eliza-
beth brought only 344 patients, although
her rated capacity was much greater. 207
In mid-August when she arrived at New
York with no patients aboard, there was
instant complaint from Washington. Since
the patient capacity of the Queens was dis-
puted, both vessels were resurveyed at
New York and specific berthing assign-
ments were made for the several classes of
patients. By mid-October this matter had
become a "pretty hot subject" for both
Ross and Hawley. Subsequently, action
was taken to increase the number of pa-
tients carried on the Queens by providing
more American medical personnel, equip-
ment, and supplies. After further negotia-
tion, arrangements were completed in No-
vember 1944 whereby approximately
1,700 Class II and III patients could be
lifted on each of these ships. 208
Early in December 1944 the War De-
partment directed the European theater
to exploit all possible U.S. and British lift
(air and sea) for the evacuation of pa-
tients, even if it entailed lowering the
evacuation policy to 90 days or less. The
backlog of patients who were awaiting
removal to the zone of interior was re-
367
duced. However, the number of new pa-
tients was then on the increase, in part
because of severe winter weather and in
part because of casualties incident to the
Battle of the Bulge.209
By mid-December 1944 it was clear
that the U.S. Army hospitals in the United
Kingdom would soon be filled to capacity
and that during the first half of 1945 the
admissions would be considerably in ex-
cess of releases. The situation was so seri-
ous that it aroused attention at the highest
level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took action
to meet the deficit in evacuation capacity
by authorizing the conversion of six troop
transports to ambulance-type hospital
ships. In addition, the British were re-
quested to furnish four hospital ships for
temporary service. Having no hospital
ships to offer, the British countered by pro-
posing an equivalent lift through increased
patient capacity on the Queens. After fur-
ther negotiation in London and Washing-
ton, an understanding was obtained in
January 1945 whereby both Queens were
to be employed on the westbound voyage
206
See Voyage Rpts, 1942-44, of Transport Surg,
OCT 721.5 Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary, excerpted
in Vessels—Name File, OCT HB Ocean Trans. Note
especially rpts for the Queen Elizabeth, Voyages 2, 3, 7,
10, and 15, and for the Queen Mary, Voyages 3, 18,
and 24.
207
Rated capacity was limited by lifeboat facilities,
which for the Queen Elizabeth restricted litter cases
(Class II) to 729, and the ambulatory type (Class III)
to 948. See OCT Form 46, Survey of 18 Apr 44,
Binder J-Z, Personnel Capacity of Transport, OCT
HB Ocean Trans.
208
Phone Conf, Col Farr and Col Bartley, 27 Sep
and 12 Oct 44, OCT 319.1 Gen Ross Jun-Oct 44;
Memo, SG WD for Gen Wylie, OCT, 14 Nov 44, no
sub, OCT 319.1 Evac of Patients; Diary, Evac Br
Chief Surg ETO, entry of 16 Nov 44, SGO 314.81
Daily Diary of Evac Br.
209
Rad, WD to Hq COMZONE ETO, 2 Dec 44,
CM-OUT 72113; Memo, Chief Surg for CG COM-
ZONE, 24 Mar 45, sub: Casualty Evac, SGO 370.05
Evac.
368
for the return of U.S. sick and wounded
personnel. Upon completion of certain
structural alterations and with additional
medical personnel and supplies, the ca-
pacity of the Queen Elizabeth was raised to
2,500 Class II and IV and 1,000 Class III
patients, and that of the Queen Mary to
2,000 Class II and IV and 1,000 Class III
patients.210
During this period efforts also were
made to increase air evacuations to the
zone of interior. The cross-Channel airlift
had been successful from the start, but
transatlantic air evacuation at first was
disappointing. Most patients had to em-
bark at Prestwick in northern Scotland,
which was far removed from the general
hospitals in the United Kingdom. More-
over, as previously indicated, combat-
weary air crews were given preference over
patients in the use of the limited air space.
In December 1944 direct air evacuation to
the United States began from the more
conveniently located Orly Field near
Paris. Air evacuation to the zone of inte-
rior reached a record high of 5,945 patients
in May 1945.211
Although aircraft had a prominent role,
most patients reached the United States
by water. From January through April
1945 the number of patients evacuated
from the theater by ship never fell below
23,000 a month. The principal evacuation
ports were Cherbourg, Marseille, and
Southampton. On 22 March 1945 a de-
tachment of the 17th Port started evacu-
ating patients from Boulogne to the British
Isles, thereby relieving the pressure on
Cherbourg. Port facilities at Boulogne suf-
ficed for two hospital ships per day, one
departing at each tide.212
The War Department never relaxed its
pressure for the greatest possible utiliza-
tion of evacuation facilities. On 23 Febru-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ary 1945 General Somervell cautioned
General Gross to make due allowance in
his redeployment planning for the removal
of the sick and wounded from Europe, a
process that Somervell believed had been
inexcusably prolonged in World War I.
During that month almost 30,000 patients
were evacuated to the zone of interior by
sea and air. General Marshall termed this
an excellent showing on the part of all
concerned, but he continued to insist that
the number of patients in the theater be
kept at the lowest possible level in order to
release the maximum number of medical
units for redeployment to the Pacific. Ac-
cordingly, the European theater was di-
rected to retain the temporary 90-day
evacuation policy.213
The favorable showing of February was
repeated in March and April. The re-
moval of casualties was further expedited
when the War Department set a new evac-
uation policy of 60 days for the European
theater, effective 1 May 1945. This change,
plus a marked increase in the available
lift, resulted in a total of 41,848 patients
being shipped to the United States by
water and air in May, the peak month for
this traffic. 2 1 4
After V-E Day the evacuation of pa-
210
See JCS 1199, 16 Dec 44, Hosp Ship Program;
CCS 751/1, Memo of British CofS, 3 Jan 45, and Incl;
CCS Info Memo 364, 20 Jan 45. All in OPD ABC
370.05, Secs 2 and 3 (2-8-42).
211
Memo, Mowrey to Evac Br Chief Surg ETO, 16
Jun 44, sub: Air Sup and Evac, SGO 370.05 Evac;
Med Sv hist cited n. 144, Pt. IV, Vol. XII, Ch. XIII,
pp. 44-46 and App. 8.
212
Per Rpt, Evac Br Opns Div Office of Chief Surg
ETO, Jan-Jun 45, p. 9 and Incl 8, SGO Hist Div
Files; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VI, Pt. 1, Ch. II, p.
131, and Pt. 2, Ch. VI, Sec. II, p. 24, OCT HB ETO.
213
Memo, Somervell for Gross, 23 Feb 45, OCT HB
Gross Hosp and Evac; Memo, ACofS for CG SOS, 6
Feb 45, sub: Evac of Patients, Hq ASF Trans 1945.
214
Med Sv hist cited n. 144, Pt. III, Vol. XII, Apps.
8and 15.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
tients proceeded rapidly with all available
means. By the fall of 1945 the bulk of the
transportable patients had been returned
to the zone of interior. The last battle cas-
ualty to be evacuated from the United
Kingdom left Southampton on 19 August
1945 aboard the U.S. Army hospital ship
Adela E. Lutz.215
Redeployment and Demobilization
Redeployment planning by the Trans-
portation Corps in the European theater
commenced during the last quarter of
1944 when General Ross's staff undertook
a preliminary survey of the transportation
aspects and began drafting necessary
changes in existing movement procedures.
In March 1945 a deputation from the the-
ater, including two Transportation Corps
officers, came to the United States to study
packing and stowage for the movement of
cargo from Europe to the Far East. Fur-
ther planning developed from a theater
conference of late April, at which the chief
of transportation was asked to make sug-
gestions and to approve details on such
questions as time phasing, documentation,
and movement procedures. In this connec-
tion Ross insisted on certain arrangements
that he considered fundamental to an or-
derly process. In particular, he deemed it
necessary for his port commanders to be
informed sufficiently in advance of pro-
spective movements so that stowage plans
could be developed, ships allocated, and
staging areas prepared for the reception of
troops. He also considered it essential that
trucks and supplies should not move until
called forward by the port commanders.
In view of the critical shortage of railway
freight cars and the great difficulty in ob-
taining passenger coaches, the maximum
use was to be made of organic motor trans-
369
port to deliver men and matériel to the
ports.216
As the result of a series of sessions in
Paris, at which these and other redeploy-
ment problems were discussed, a standing
operating procedure was devised in late
May 1945 for outloading redeployed
troops and cargo. In that month General
Ross also visited Washington on behalf of
the G-4, COMZONE, to ascertain the re-
quirements for the Pacific in sufficient time
to pack, mark, and load supplies, to ready
the units, and to preship their organiza-
tional equipment. Redeployment was to
be either direct—from France to the Pa-
cific—or indirect—via the United States.
So rapid was the march of events that rede-
ployment lasted only three months, and
after Japan surrendered, it disappeared in
the larger program of demobilization. 217
As of May 1945 there were approxi-
mately 3,500,000 American troops in the
European and Mediterranean theaters,
most of whom were to be returned to the
United States for demobilization, reassign-
ment, or retention incident to further re-
deployment. The Chief of Transportation
in Washington estimated that the return
movement could be accomplished at the
rate of approximately 280,000 men per
month in the first quarter after V-E Day,
395,000 per month in the second quarter,
and 269,000 in the third quarter. There-
after, redeployment was to continue at the
same rate until the agreed garrison strength
of 400,000 troops (later reduced to
215
1st Ind, Chief Surg to G-4 USFET, 1 Aug 45,
SGO 370.05 Evac; Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VIII, Pt.
2, U.K. Base Sec, Annex I, p. 18, OCT HB ETO.
216
Short Report on Important Transportation De-
velopments in the European Theater of Operations,
pp. 18-19, and Apps. 13 and 15, OCT HB ETO
France Special Hist Rpt.
217
Ltr and Notes, Ross to Larson, 5 Dec 49, OCT
HB Inquiries.
370 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

370,000) was attained on the Continent. at the direction of General Ross, the re-
All available water transportation, includ- spective Transportation Corps units were
ing British vessels and converted Liberties, designated for service in occupied Ger-
was to be employed. The use of seized many, for the communications zone in-
enemy shipping was contemplated, but cluding the United Kingdom, or for rede-
actually only two such vessels, the Europa ployment. Although the general policy was
and the Vulcania, were placed in operation. to assign units with the shortest oversea
The Air Transport Command was ex- service for redeployment, many exceptions
pected to assist with an airlift of about had to be made in order to retain Trans-
50,000 men per month. 218 portation Corps organizations with train-
The principal redeployment ports in the ing essential to successful execution of the
221
European theater were Southampton in outloading program.
the United Kingdom and Le Havre and Outbound troops normally moved by
Marseille in France. Other ports met spe- rail or truck from their unit stations to
cial needs, notably Cherbourg and Bou- camps in a huge assembly area near
logne for patient evacuation and Antwerp Reims, and thence to staging areas near
for cargo outloading. Marseille was respon- the embarkation ports from which they
sible for heavy shipments of redeployed were called forward by the port com-
vehicles and ammunition. That port also manders as shipping space became avail-
222
dispatched many service units to the Pa- able. Motor convoys from Germany to
cific, including the transportation person- the assembly area camps followed three
nel required to receive redeployed troops main routes—the Brown, the Red, and
and cargo. In keeping with their new role, the Green—each of which had its own
both Le Havre and Southampton were bivouac camp. Other motor routes were
formally designated ports of embarka- established for movements from the assem-
tion.219 bly area to staging camps in the Marseille
Despite preliminary work on redeploy- 218
ASF Press Conf (Statement by Gen Gross), May
ment policies and procedures, the Euro- 45, p. 13. 219
pean theater was not wholly prepared for Memo, ACofT MOD OCT for G-4 CZ, 29 Jun
45, sub: June Shipping Program of Equip from
immediate action following the declara- Marseilles, AG 523 Instruction—Folder 10, EUCOM;
tion of R Day (12 May 1945). The first Hist, 6th Port, Apr-Jun 45, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
difficulty arose in timing the shipment of For port missions, see Basic Directive for Redeploy-
ment and Readjustment, AG 387 OCT—AGO
organizational equipment from Europe. USFET, 1 Aug 45, p. 19, OCT HB TC Gen Rede-
In some instances it proved necessary to ployment.
220
delay troop movements and to expedite Hist, Mvmts Div OCT, 1 Jul 44-30 Jun 45, p. 4,
OCT HB Mvmts Div.
the shipment of their equipment so that 221
Memo, Chief Contl and Plng OCT for Gen
both would arrive in the Pacific at approx- Stewart, 16 Apr 45, sub: TC Rqmts for Continent and
imately the same date.220 Redeployment; Memo, ACofT for Chief Contl and
Plng, OCT, 21 Apr 45, sub: Nomination of Units.
The theater chief of transportation, him- Both in AG 322 TC Troop—Units, EUCOM.
self, had difficult adjustments to make. He 222
The assembly area camps were named after
had to provide for the movement of per- American cities, e. g., Camp Baltimore, Camp Pitts-
sonnel and cargo while at the same time burgh. The staging area camps were frequently called
"cigarette camps," because most of them in the Red
his own organization was being depleted Horse staging area near Le Havre bore the names of
by redeployment. Beginning in April 1945, popular brands of cigarettes.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
and Le Havre areas. Regular daily sched-
ules and train routes were set up for rail
movements from Germany to the assembly
area and from the assembly area to stag-
ing areas for the ports of Antwerp, Le
Havre, and Marseille. Troop trains had
special main numbers for ready identifica-
tion of each train and movement. Effective
liaison had to be maintained at all times
with the French railway officials, since
they furnished the bulk of the train service.
A train normally consisted of 17 coaches
and 3 baggage cars, with a capacity of
approximately 1,000 men.
Rail traffic was very heavy in the Reims
area, which was under the jurisdiction of
the transportation officer of the Oise Inter-
mediate Section. To assist in clearing the
rail congestion that developed there, a
Paris Railway Grand Division (Provi-
sional) was organized on 1 June 1945. It
gave special attention to rail transporta-
tion from the assembly area to the ports.223
The redeployment program strained to
the utmost the resources of the theater
chief of transportation. Additional trans-
portation personnel was necessary for the
staging and assembly areas. The principal
demand was for staging area companies,
truck companies, and traffic regulation
units. The RTO remained an important
figure as the local trouble shooter in trans-
portation matters. Two special radio cir-
cuits were established to expedite the flow
of information on U.S. Army movements
to the assembly area at Reims. At first,
direct movement to the ports by train and
motor convoy exceeded that by way of the
assembly area, a development that had not
been foreseen in the planning period. For-
tunately, because of the selection of suit-
able direct routes for the motor convoys to
Le Havre and Marseille, this traffic did
not conflict with the movement to the
371
assembly area. To facilitate travel by mo-
tor, detailed strip maps were prepared and
issued giving routes and mileages in much
the same way as the road maps distributed
by American oil companies. Camp direc-
tional signs were posted along each
route. 224
Redeployment travel was crude, partic-
ularly during the early phase. The trains
were usually slow and poorly equipped.
On occasion troops had to travel in box-
cars, subsisting on cold rations en route.
Because of faulty maintenance and driver
abuse, the trucks in the motor convoys
often broke down, causing delay and in-
convenience. The veterans complained of
the lack of co-ordination and the failure to
make adequate provision for their needs.
At certain installations, notably Camp
Twenty Grand, the food was poor and
housing unsatisfactory. The picture usually
brightened when the redeployed soldier
finally reached the port and embarked for
the homeward voyage, even though the
transport also might be crowded and
uncomfortable.225
The first large unit redeployed from
Europe through the United States was the
86th Infantry Division. It embarked at Le
Havre for New York aboard four troop
transports on 8-9 June 1945. In that month
a total of 185,929 military passengers sailed
223
Hist, TC Oise Intermediate Sec, Jun 45, passim,
OCT HB ETO France Base Secs; Hist Rpt, Paris Ry
Grand Div (Prov), 12 Jul 45, OCT HB France Rys—
Unit Rpts.
224
IRS, Chief Troops and Tng Br OCT to Contl
and Plng, 28 Mar 45; IRS, ACofS G-3 to G-1 OCT
et al., 27 May 45. Both in AG 322 TC Troops—Units,
EUCOM. For additional details and sample strip
maps, see Hist, TC Oise Intermediate Sec, Jun 45,
OCT HB France Base Secs.
225
Note the complaints in DID Rpt 817, BPE, 21
Jun 45, OCT 319.1 Boston. For additional details, see
DA Pamphlet, Maj. John C. Sparrow, History of Per-
sonnel Demobilization in the United States Army (Wash-
ington, 1952), pp. 220-54.
372
from Le Havre for the United States.226
During the same period the port personnel
at Marseille were busily engaged in direct
redeployment, which was their primary
mission. The first troopship dispatched
from ETO to the Pacific was the Admiral
C. F. Hughes. She departed Marseille on
16 June, went through the Panama Canal,
and arrived at Manila late in July with
4,832 service troops aboard. Direct rede-
ployment ceased as soon as Japan capitu-
lated, but Marseille remained an impor-
tant embarkation port.227
Many troops being returned to the
United States traveled via the United
Kingdom, and such routing made possible
the employment of the Queens. Since these
vessels at first sailed from the Clyde, con-
siderable rail travel was involved and the
burden on the British railways was heavy.
By June 1945 plans had been laid for the
Queens to sail from Southampton, but nec-
essary dredging of the harbor delayed
their return to their prewar home port
until August.228
Although redeployment was a serious
drain on all theater transportation, the
greatest problem was to provide sufficient
ocean shipping. The Transportation Corps
and the War Shipping Administration
therefore arranged the hasty conversion of
several hundred Liberty and Victory cargo
ships. As a rule, all redeployment vessels
left the theater with maximum passenger
loads. American soldiers, at least before
sailing, were generally willing to sacrifice
comfort and travel in the hold of a
freighter, if necessary, to reach home.
Ultimately, every available vessel, in-
cluding Army hospital ships and British
craft, was pressed into service for the home-
bound armada. After the surrender of
Japan the U.S. Navy supplemented the
personnel lift by using its combatant ves-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
sels to carry troops. At Southampton the
loss in U.S. troop space resulting from the
removal in October 1945 of the Cunard
liners Queen Elizabeth and Aquitania from
American service was made up by con-
verted U.S. Navy vessels. The first ship so
used was the aircraft carrier Lake Cham-
229
plain.
Apart from the heavy troop traffic, the
European theater outloaded considerable
cargo after V-E Day. Procedures govern-
ing packing, marking, and documentation,
had been worked out before the cessation
of hostilities in Europe, and provision was
made for a minimum of fourteen mobile
packing squads to supervise and assist units
in these activities. Later, courses were
offered in Paris on redeployment packag-
ing, and a procedure was established for
230
reporting the status of redeployed cargo.
At the height of the redeployment pro-
gram, in the twenty-four weeks between
R Day and 27 October 1945, the Euro-
pean theater loaded 446,878 long tons of
equipment and supplies for shipment di-
rect to the Pacific. Of this total by far the
greatest portion, 295,628 long tons, was
loaded at Marseille; the next largest
amount, 73,505 long tons, was shipped
226
Hist, 16th Maj Port, Book 3, Jun 45, p. 4, OCT
HB Oversea Ports.
227
Hist, Mvmts Div OCT, 1 Jul 44-30 Jun 45, p. 4,
OCT HB Mvmts Div Br Hist. Cf. Roland W. Charles,
Troopships of World War II (Washington: The Army
Transportation Association, 1947), p. 70.
228
See Hist Rcd, 14th Maj Port, Aug 45, pp. 1-2,
and Oct 45, pp. 1-2, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
229
Hist, Convoy Schedules Br Mvmts Div OCT,
Nov 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Br Hist; Hist Rcd, 14th
Maj Port, Oct 45, pp. 1-2 and App. C, Press Release,
22 Oct 45, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
230
Memos, G-4 for G-1, 29 Mar, G-1 for G-4, 31
Mar, and G-4 for G-3 and G-1, 5 Apr 45, sub: Mob
Packing Squads, AG 322 TC Troops—Units EU-
COM; Redeployment Instructions 2, Hq ETO, 27 Jan
45, AG 320 Resp and Functions of TC EUCOM; Hist
Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp. 29-30, and
Vol. VII, Pt. 2, Annex I, pp. 8-9, OCT HB ETO.
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY
through Antwerp. During the same period
the European theater forwarded a total of
847,149 long tons of cargo to the United
States, of which 337,837 long tons were
loaded at Antwerp, 209,464 long tons in
the United Kingdom, and 102,739 long
tons at Cherbourg. At the same time the
European theater outloaded 1,470,779
troops to the zone of interior. Of this total
701,761 embarked at Le Havre, 297,568
at Marseille, and 321,327 from the United
Kingdom, particularly Southampton. Si-
multaneously, the European theater also
shipped 117,085 men to Pacific destina-
tions, of whom a total of 109,555 embarked
at Marseille.231
In late November 1945 General Gross
estimated that by the close of the year
shipping would be no longer a critical fac-
tor in redeployment from Europe. At the
end of January 1946 he anticipated the
withdrawal of all U.S. forces, except for
troops to occupy enemy territory and the
minimum personnel to dispose of the
Army's surplus property. In a comprehen-
sive report on troop returns released on
20 November 1945, Gross listed a rede-
ployment fleet in the Atlantic with the
following composition and capacity: 232
Number and Type of Vessels Total Personnel Capacity
80 U.S.-controlled troopships.. 242, 489
210 Converted Liberty ships . . 115, 000
87 Converted Victory ships. . . 168, 450
1 British ship (Queen Mary)... 11, 400
15 U.S, Navy combatant ves- 36,212 (U.S. Army
sels. only)
7 Hospital ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,969 ( p a t i e n t s
only)
Never before, concluded General Gross,
had so many troops been moved so far and
so fast. American soldiers were returning
to the zone of interior from bases all over
the world at a rate slightly more than
three times faster than that at which Gen-
373
eral Pershing's men were repatriated from
France at the close of World War I.
Despite this favorable showing, during
the winter of 1945-46 American troops
overseas became more and more restive.
They wanted to go home as quickly as
possible, and no talk of the shipping short-
age or the international situation could
still the angry wave of discontent. The
worst demonstration occurred in Manila,
but American soldiers also paraded in pro-
test in Paris and Frankfurt. Behind the
unrest lay the continued need for troops
overseas, which resulted in slowing down
the Army's rate of demobilization. In
Washington, in January 1946, the Army
Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, de-
fended the demobilization program before
Congress, stating that if repatriation were
continued at the current rate, by the fol-
lowing April the Army would have noth-
ing left but a "woefully inadequate num-
ber of volunteers." As a matter of fact,
when Eisenhower spoke, the demobiliza-
tion program had already reached the
peak.233
At the close of 1945 the troop require-
ments, rather than shipping, constituted
the governing factor in demobilization.
The current replacements were simply not
sufficient to cope with the progressive re-
duction in troop strength. Since the avail-
ability of shipping was no longer a prob-
lem, in January 1946 the loading of troops
aboard converted Liberty vessels was
halted, and the ports of embarkation in
the theater were authorized to place only
1,000 men on each Victory ship. At Mar-
seille, troop redeployment ceased, and the
emphasis shifted to outloading the remain-
231
ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Trans, 31 Oct 45, pp. 16, 20.
232 WD press Release, 20 Nov 45, Rpt on Trans Re-
turns, OCT HB TC Gen Demob Trans.
233
OCT HB Monograph 30, pp. 71-73; Hist Rpt,
TC ETO, Vol. XII, Ch. I, pp. 1-2, OCT HB ETO.
 374
ing surplus cargo. At the same time, at
Le Havre, both personnel and cargo
movements fell off perceptibly. In all ports
the transportation personnel dwindled in
number as more and more men left for
home. Symptomatic of the change to post-
war activity, the 14th Port at Southamp-
ton directed its attention toward the ship-
ment to the United States of thousands of
British dependents of American service-
men. The Transportation Corps at last was
nearing the end of its immediate postwar
mission in the theater. After the cessation
of hostilities, General Ross had said that
his job was not finished until the bulk of
redeployment was accomplished. That
goal was attained on 26 February 1946
when he sailed from Le Havre to the
United States, closing a colorful and suc-
cessful career as the U.S. Army Chief of
Transportation, European Theater of
Operations.234
War Brides
While the nation was at war the move-
ment of brides and other dependents of
American military personnel necessarily
was restricted, but when peace came many
of these wanted to come to the United
States as soon as possible. The shipping
requirements of redeployment and demo-
bilization were so overwhelming as to rule
out any large-scale evacuation of depend-
ents during 1945, but this movement
finally got under way early in 1946. Mean-
while, in line with War Department direc-
tives issued pursuant to Congressional and
Presidential action on the subject, the
Chief of Transportation in Washington
had formulated a plan for the shipment of
approximately 45,000 war brides and
their children from Europe to the United
States.235 Certain vessels were to be spe-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
cially equipped for this purpose with, for
example, such unmilitary items as high
chairs, play pens, toys, nursing bottles, and
disposable diapers. Nurses and Red Cross
workers were to be added to the usual
ship's complement. The first large move-
ment was to be from the British Isles,
which had the greatest number of depend-
ents (40,000 or more) and where demon-
strations by war brides seeking passage to
the United States had already aroused
concern in the U.S. Department of State.
Southampton was selected as the principal
port for embarking dependents, and re-
ception areas were set up nearby at Tid-
worth and Bournemouth.
The first "bride and baby special" car-
ried approximately 630 dependents to
New York. They sailed aboard the SS
Argentina from Southampton on 26 Janu-
ary 1946, inaugurating the European
phase of the Army's highly publicized
"Operation Diaper." The next major ship-
ment of approximately 2,340 British war
brides and children left on the Queen Mary
in the following month. A fleet of eleven
vessels, including several hospital ships,
was assigned to this program, which even-
tually involved the movement of depend-
ents of virtually all nationalities in western
and southern Europe. A human interest
story that attracted widespread attention,
the exodus of war brides to the United
States continued well into the postwar
period.236
234
Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. XII, Ch. I, pp. 1-2, 4-
5, Vol. XIII, Ch. I, pp. 2-4, 7, OCT HB ETO. Cf.
Hist Rcd, 14th Maj Port, Jan 46, pp. 1-3 and App.,
OCT HB Oversea Ports. Ross was succeeded as chief
of transportation by his deputy, Colonel Traub.
235
for details on War Department policies and pro-
grams regarding war brides and other dependents, see
Wardlow, Movements, Training, and Supply, pp. 231-37.
236
OCT HB Monograph 30, pp. 74-79; Hist Rcd,
14th Maj Port, Jan 46, pp. 1-3 and App., and Feb 46,
pp. 1-2, OCT HB Oversea Ports.
MOVEMENT OF TROOPS to and within oversea areas was one of the important
Transportation Corps activities. Troops aboard ship (above); RTO, a familiar figure at oversea
rail terminals (below).
THE VERSATILE DUKW being used in training at the Waimanalo Training Center,
Hawaii (above), and at Slapton Sands, England (below).
DUKW'S IN USE in ship-to-shore movements on the beach at Cherbourg, France (above),
and off Bougainville (below).
INGENIOUS USE OF TERRAIN FEATURES by individual units facilitated the
delivery of supplies and equipment. The gravel bed of a stream used as a road when equipment
bogged down in the tundra on Attu (above), and a roadside bank used as a loading ramp in
Australia (below).
WIDESPREAD DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES at major European ports
hampered transportation operations. Ships were scuttled in an effort to make rehabilitation of
the ports difficult. Typical were Cherbourg (above) and Marseille (below).
SUNKEN SHIPS in the harbor at Naples converted into piers for the berthing of Allied ships.
PORT CONGESTION from Manila (above) to Naples (below) caused a serious shortage
of available bottoms.
THE PORT OF ANTWERP. Captured virtually intact, Antwerp (above) became a major
port of entry for cargo. Soon, more cargo was discharged (below) than could be immediately
transported inland.
MRS OPERATIONS IN INDIA. Overhauling equipment in the shops at Saidpur (above),
and breaking bottlenecks at such points as the Amingaon-Pandu Ferry (below).
RAIL EQUIPMENT. Stored on sidings in Great Britain (upper left) before the invasion of
over the repaired tracks of the continental rail systems (lower right).
Europe, the equipment was ferried to France (lower left, upper right) and then put into service
CLIMATIC EXTREMES encountered and overcome. Supplies and personnel were moved
through heavy snow in Alaska and Western Canada (left) and over the arid mountains of Iran (right).
OVERLAND MOVEMENTS EAST OF KUNMING were hampered by rugged
terrain features. Note road with twenty-one switchbacks at An-nan, China.
CONVOYS FOR CHINA were sent from Ledo, Assam, over the Stilwell Road to Kunming,
China.
TRUCK REFUELING STATION on the Ledo Road at Myitkyina. New equipment
delivered to China replaced old, worn out vehicles that frequently had to be repaired on the road.
ROAD CONDITIONS IN BURMA AND IRAN (above and below, respectively).
During the monsoon periods in Burma mud delayed deliveries. In Iran dust storms caused similar
delays.
DELIVERING THE GOODS by captured Italian tanker directly into a pipeline at Naples
Belgium (upper right), and by sampan at Chihkiang, China (lower right).
(upper left), by the Red Ball Express in France (lower left), by barge on the Albert Canal in
 SUPPORT OF THE FINAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY included rail
and truck movements across and beyond the Rhine. The first train moved over the Wesel Bridge
(above) on 9 April 1945; 10-ton semitrailers of the Yellow Diamond Express, with supplies
for the Seventh U.S. Army, on an autobahn (below).
 CHAPTER IX

The Persian Corridor

The rapid advance of Axis armies limited number of trucks and aircraft
across the Soviet Union and North Africa were routed to the Persian Gulf for assem-
in the summer of 1941 threatened the se- bly and delivery through the Persian Cor-
curity of the Middle East. In August Brit- ridor, the territory between the Persian
ish and Soviet forces moved into Iran, the Gulf and the Caspian Sea. (Map 7)
former occupying the area from Tehran to The U.S. Military Iranian Mission
the Persian Gulf, and the latter the terri- (USMIM), created in September 1941,
tory north of Tehran. The British had only served as an auxiliary of the British both
recently put down a revolt in Iraq and in supporting their forces and in the de-
were busily engaged in expanding their livery of supplies to the USSR. Elaborate
defensive forces in that area. Not yet a projects planned by the mission were de-
belligerent, the United States undertook signed to accomplish both purposes, but
to bolster the British and Soviet efforts these were severely curtailed by the ship-
through the medium of lend-lease. In the ping shortage and the lower priority given
fall of 1941 U.S. military missions were the area after Pearl Harbor. Upon arrival
dispatched to the Iran-Iraq area, as well of the first small group of American oper-
as to North Africa and the Soviet Union, ating personnel in February 1942, the
to provide technical advice and assistance U.S. Army concentrated its efforts on the
in the receipt, utilization, and transporta- construction of port facilities at Umm
tion of lend-lease materials. Qasr, in Iraq, a project designed to im-
prove the British Basra-Baghdad line of
The Significance of the Persian Corridor communications. In April 1942, however,
in Allied Strategy the War Department ordered abandon-
ment of work on Umm Qasr and gave first
Initially, the Persian Gulf was more im- priority to projects that would assist the
portant as an avenue for the support of British in moving supplies to the USSR,
British forces in Iraq and Iran than as a including port and road construction and
supply route to the USSR.1 In conformity 1
The discussion of the Persian Corridor's strategic
with the desires of the USSR, the bulk of significance is based on the following: T. H. Vail
the Soviet lend-lease materials shipped by Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia,
the British and Americans to fulfill com- UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1952), Chs. I, X, XIX; Leighton and
mitments under the First Protocol of Oc- Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943, Chs.
tober 1941 moved across the North XX-XXI; Hist Monograph. Hq Office of Tech Info
PGC, History of the Persian Gulf Command (here-
Atlantic to Archangel and Murmansk or after cited as HOTI Hist), Pt. VI, Ch. 4, OCMH
via the Pacific to Siberian ports. Only a Files.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
the assembly of trucks, aircraft, and
barges. These activities, performed by
American civilian contractors under the
supervision of USMIM and its successor,
the Iran-Iraq Service Command, were
slow in development, principally because
of the scarcity of shipping and the area's
2
low priority.
The April 1942 decision marked the be-
ginning of an increasing emphasis on the
use of the Persian Corridor for the deliv-
ery of lend-lease materials to the USSR.
In view of the .growing difficulty in getting
convoys through to Murmansk because
of weather conditions and enemy action,
the Allies were compelled to place greater
reliance on shipments to the Persian Gulf.
In May the British and Americans as-
sumed commitments under the Second
Protocol to deliver 1,000,000 short tons
via the Persian Gulf route during the year
ending 30 June 1943.
This movement alone would have ne-
cessitated considerable expansion of Ira-
nian transportation facilities, but by mid-
summer of 1942 a crisis developed that re-
sulted in the imposition of an even greater
burden on the supply line. Submarine and
air attacks on the Murmansk route, com-
mitted to deliver 3,000,000 short tons, had
caused the curtailment of convoys in the
spring and dictated their discontinuance
in July. To complicate matters, the United
States and Great Britain found that they
would be unable to mount a cross-Chan-
nel invasion and decided to undertake a
North African campaign. Faced with the
problem of confronting the USSR with
the postponement of the cross-Channel
operation and the discontinuance of con-
voys on the northern route, Allied leaders
intensified their interest in developing
other less vulnerable supply routes to the
Soviet Union.
377
Of the various substitute routes, only
the Persian Gulf offered a good alternative
to the northern one. The Pacific route, the
only other sea line of communications
capable of rapid expansion, was limited to
the movement of nonmilitary supplies
since the USSR was not at war with
Japan, and there was no certainty that
Japan would continue to permit ships to
reach Soviet ports. The air ferry routes via
Alaska and Siberia and across the Atlan-
tic via Africa and Iran were limited to the
delivery of aircraft. On the other hand,
the Persian Gulf route, although long and
expensive and limited in its overland
capacity, was relatively secure and could
be used for the shipment of war materials.
The British, who controlled and oper-
ated Iranian transportation facilities south
of Tehran, possessed neither the man-
power nor the equipment required to han-
dle greatly increased tonnage for the
Soviet Union in addition to essential Brit-
ish and Iranian needs. Necessarily hasty
planning on the highest levels in Washing-
ton and London and in Army headquar-
ters in Iran and Egypt was distilled into a
plan by the Services of Supply that pro-
vided for the transfer to the U.S. Army of
the job of maintaining and increasing de-
liveries to the USSR. After the Combined
Chiefs of Staff approved the plan in Sep-
tember 1942, preparations were made to
effect the early transfer to Iran of enough
American troops and equipment to move
Soviet-aid materials in excess of 200,000
long tons a month through the Corridor.
On 12 August 1942 the Iran-Iraq Service
Command had been redesignated the Per-
sian Gulf Service Command, and a head-
2
USMIM was placed under U.S. Army Forces in
the Middle East (USAFIME) headquarters in Cairo
in June 1942, and was redesignated the Iran-Iraq
Service Command.
378 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

quarters was set up in Washington to plan route, used only intermittently after July
for the movement and take command of 1942, was reopened on a year-round basis
the expanded force in Iran. in July 1944, and the Black Sea ports be-
With the arrival of the first large body came accessible by the end of the year.
of troops in December 1942, the Army Together with the greatly expanded
command in Iran commenced the process Pacific route and shipments to Soviet arc-
of taking over rail and pertinent port op- tic ports, these routes could meet and
erations from the British, took steps to or- exceed commitments without resort to the
ganize an American motor transport Persian Gulf. The possibility of Japanese
service, and undertook the expansion and interference with the Pacific route, how-
militarization of assembly and construc- ever, necessitated retention of Army oper-
tion projects already set up to expedite the ations in the Persian Corridor, albeit on a
flow of goods to the Soviet Union. Ulti- greatly curtailed basis. Beginning in late
mately, a service force of 30,000 American 1944 successive reductions were made in
troops and a considerable amount of shipping dispatched to the Persian Gulf,
American rail, motor, and other equip- and activities in Iran were scaled down
ment were committed directly to or in accordingly. The U.S. Army mission of
support of the transportation mission. transporting supplies to the USSR
For reasons which will be discussed sub- through the Persian Corridor was finally
sequently, the transfer of men and mate- terminated on 1 June 1945, leaving only
rials to Iran was delayed and there was a the tasks of evacuating personnel and dis-
lag in the development of the Persian Cor- posing of surplus property, equipment,
ridor. The disappointing rate of increase and supplies.
in deliveries to the USSR in the first The U.S. Army's role in the Persian
months of 1943 proved embarrassing for Corridor was indispensable in terms of
the western Allies in their relations with global strategy. Of the nearly 5,150,000
the Soviet Union,but by midyear trans- long tons of Soviet-aid materials moved
port facilities in Iran were reaching a point over this supply line between early 1942
of development whence they could go on and the end of May 1945, over four fifths
to meet goals set earlier in the year. In were delivered during the period of Amer-
October 1943 Soviet-aid deliveriesican operation. The Persian Gulf ranked
through the Persian Corridor exceeded second only to the Pacific route in the
200,000 long tons, roughly the commit- movement of Soviet-aid shipments from
ment under the Third Protocol for com- the Western Hemisphere, and third if
bined monthly shipments via the Persian United Kingdom and British Empire
Gulf and the northern routes. Thereafter, shipments to the Soviet Union are in-
the Persian Corridor was capable of ful- cluded.3 Since the Pacific route was con-
filling its strategic mission of handling the fined to shipments of nonmilitary supplies,
bulk of the war materials destined for the it was the Persian Gulf and the transport
USSR. 3
See Motter, op. cit., App. A, Table 1, "Cargo
The Persian Corridor reached the peak Shipped From the Western Hemisphere to the USSR
of its development in the summer of 1944, by Route of Delivery, 22 June 1941-20 September
but an improved strategic situation soon 1945," and Table 4, "Supplies Delivered to the USSR
Through the Persian Corridor, By Type of Transport,
robbed it of its importance. The northern 1942-1945."
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
facilities of the Persian Corridor that made
possible the delivery of urgently needed
war materials to the Eastern Front during
the period when convoys to Murmansk
and Archangel were discontinued or oper-
ated intermittently.
The Period of British Operation
The Persian Corridor was far from an
imposing supply line when Iran was occu-
pied. Situated approximately 12,000 miles
from U.S. ports via the Cape of Good
Hope, the Corridor contained few good
ports and extremely limited transport to
the interior. Extremes of climate, desert
and mountainous terrain, the presence of
hostile tribesmen and bandits, and the
pro-Nazi sentiments of a significant num-
ber of Iranians all added to the difficulties
of the route.4
The hub of British transportation activ-
ities in the area was the Iraqi city of Basra,
at the southern terminus of a meter-gauge
railway leading to Baghdad. Basra was
served by the fairly modern port of Margil,
situated approximately eighty-five miles
north of the head of the Persian Gulf on
the left side of the Shatt-al-Arab River.
Under British operation, Margil by late
1942 developed a capacity for discharging
about 5,000 long tons a day at twelve
berths and by lighter from anchorage. The
port was used primarily to meet British
needs along the Basra-Baghdad line of
communications, with incoming Soviet-
aid shipments accounting for but a minor
part of the total cargo discharged. Lack-
ing direct access to Iranian rail and high-
way facilities, Margil shipped forward
Soviet-aid cargoes by rail, barge, and road
to Khanaqin in Iraq for onward move-
ment by truck to Tabriz in northern Iran.
Some supplies landed at Margil were
379
transshipped by barge to Cheybassi
(Tanuma), an Iraqi lighterage basin on
the east side of the river opposite Margil,
to supply British military installations in
the vicinity.
The only other developed port in the
area was on the Iranian island of Abadan,
the site of the world's largest oil refinery,
located thirty-two miles below Margil and
owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany. Here, the availability of a large
floating crane made possible the discharge
of heavy equipment from vessels to lighters
that then moved upstream to barge docks
at Khorramshahr or Ahwaz. Beginning in
April 1942, when an American assembly
plant was established on the island, the
port also discharged cased aircraft.
The remaining Iranian ports were
limited in berthing facilities, cargo-han-
dling equipment, and storage space.
Khorramshahr, destined to become the
principal American port, was in early
1942 little more than an anchorage.
Situated southeast of Margil on the east
bank of the Shatt-al-Arab just above its
junction with the Karun River, Khorram-
shahr had a single concrete deepwater
berth, Sentab Jetty, which in April 1942
was cluttered with construction materials.
Cargo was lightered from ships at anchor
and unloaded at this berth, landed at
Customs Jetty, or moved up the Karun
River to Ahwaz, the railhead 110 miles to
the north. During 1942 the British took
over operations from a civilian firm and
assigned port troops to augment native
labor and supervise cargo-handling oper-
ations. The U.S. Army completed three
woodpile berths at Sentab Jetty and
started a fourth before the end of the year,
4
For an account of British military transportation
activities in Iran and Iraq, see Micklem, Transporta-
tion, pp. 73-100.
380 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

while the British built lighterage facilities a truck convoy route to Tehran. Before the
at Failiyah Creek about a mile and a half American assembly plant was opened at
above Sentab Jetty, completed a branch Andimeshk in the spring of 1942, Bushire
rail line from Ahwaz to Khorramshahr, received shipments of American trucks
and built tracks into both vessel and barge and truckable cargo. Thereafter, Bushire
berths to permit direct discharge into rail was used to discharge trucks that could
cars. Expansion of port operations, how- not be handled at American assembly
ever, was slow because of the construction plants and some cargo.
work and the shortage of cargo-handling Control of shipping and port operation
equipment, switching engines, and rail was exercised largely through the Basra
cars. In October 1942 Khorramshahr dis- Port Directorate, an Iraqi agency con-
charged only 23,293 long tons, less than trolled by the British. In October 1941 the
half of it tonnage for the USSR. War Transport Executive Committee
Initially the most important of the Ira- (WTEC) was established in the Basra
nian ports, Bandar Shahpur was located Port Directorate Office to take over con-
on the Khor Musa, a Persian Gulf inlet trol of the assignment of ships and sched-
about forty-five miles east of Khorram- ule their unloading. The WTEC was
shahr, and was the southern terminus of headed by the British Ministry of War
the Iranian State Railway (ISR). The Transport representative at Basra and in-
port was situated on a small reclaimed cluded representatives of the British Tenth
area, surrounded except to seaward by Army. Later, the British Inland Water
mud flats that were submerged at high Transport Agency, the U.S. naval observer
tides. It had a narrow rail-served jetty, at Basra, the American War Shipping Ad-
capable of berthing one large or two small ministration, and the U.S. Army were
5
vessels, and one lighterage wharf. In given representation on the committee.
March 1942 its estimated receiving capac- The principal means of inland clear-
ity was 15,000 tons of general cargo and ance from Iranian ports was the Iranian
2,000 trucks a month. The British began State Railway, a government-owned line
construction of three additional berths, a placed in operation in 1939. The 865-mile
project scheduled for completion in June trunk line of this standard-gauge, single-
1942 but still unfinished at the end of that track railroad linked Bandar Shahpur
year. with the Caspian Sea port of Bandar
At Ahwaz, sixty-seven miles by rail Shah, passing through Tehran en route.
north of Bandar Shahpur, two barge ter- Branch lines totaling 468 miles joined
minals, jointly operated by the British Tehran with Mianeh to the northwest and
Tenth Army and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Shahrud to the northeast. The railway
Company, handled Iranian civil and Brit-
ish military cargo barged up the Karun 5
Unless otherwise cited, the account of port and
River from Khorramshahr, Margil, and shipping operations during the British period is based
Abadan. The only other Iranian port of on the following: HOTI Hist, Pt. IV, Ch. 1, pp. 1-13;
MID Rpt, Mil Attache, Baghdad, Iraq, 17 Nov 42,
consequence was Bushire, a small lighter- OCT HB PGC Basra; Rpt, U.S. Naval Observer,
age port on the west coast of the Persian Basra, 31 Oct 42, OCT HB PGC Abadan; Rpt, Col
Gulf that was the site of a British truck as- Benjamin C. Allin and Capt Robert G. Stone, TC,
Report on Transportation at Persian Gulf Ports,
sembly plant and the southern terminal of Annex 9B, OCT HB PGG.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
traversed varied and difficult terrain. The
main line extended northward from Ban-
dar Shahpur through marshlands and the
Khuzistan Desert to Andimeshk. The line
north of Andimeshk crossed the Zagros
Mountains, climbing to altitudes in excess
of 7,000 feet. This section was heavily tun-
neled, steep, and subject to landslides and
snowslides. Emerging on a high plateau,
the line went on to Tehran, 575 miles from
the southern terminus. After a dip south-
eastward to Garmsar, the line resumed its
northward course, crossing the Elburz
Mountains. Then, negotiating steep
grades, sharp curves, and numerous
switchbacks, the railroad finally descended
to fairly level country and proceeded
eighty miles to Bandar Shah.
Shortly after the occupation in August
1941, the British took over the portion of
the ISR between the Persian Gulf and the
north switch at Tehran, and the Russians
assumed control of the remainder of the
line. During the following year, the Brit-
ish assigned a military force of 4,000 to
supervise, regulate, and assist the Iranian
operation of the railway. They doubled
the ISR's rolling stock and motive power
by importing British and American equip-
ment, completed a 77-mile branch line
from Ahwaz to Khorramshahr, and built
a 27-mile connecting line from this branch
to Cheybassi. In the period from August
through December 1942, the daily aver-
age of all freight hauled by the ISR was
1,530 long tons a day, over seven times the
traffic before the occupation, and in Sep-
tember 1942 the volume of Soviet-aid
freight reached a high of 790 long tons a
6
day.
Highways accounted for the other im-
portant form of interior transport. Al-
though the British military hauled some
of its own cargo, it relied heavily on the
381
United Kingdom Commercial Corpo-
ration (UKCC), a quasi-governmental
agency, to provide motor transport for the
support of British forces and to deliver
Soviet-aid materials. During the period of
British operation, the UKCC used four
principal routes. The most important ex-
tended from the Andimeshk railhead
through Khurramabad, Hamadan, and
Kazvin to Tabriz. This route, later to be
taken over by the Americans, was oper-
ated by the UKCC beginning in April
1942 and was probably the most active for
Soviet-aid purposes. A second route was
used to move assembled trucks 1,179 miles
from Bushire via Shiraz, Isfahan, and
Tehran to Tabriz, the Soviet transfer point
where freight was hauled by rail into the
USSR.
The two other UKCC routes originated
outside Iran. The so-called Khanaqin Lift
involved the shipment of cargo from Basra
to Khanaqin in Iraq where UKCC vehi-
cles picked up freight for delivery to Tabriz
via Hamadan and Kazvin. At first this
supply line was used principally for Brit-
ish military purposes, but beginning in
late 1942 the UKCC used the Khanaqin
Lift increasingly for Soviet-aid deliveries
and ultimately concentrated all its motor
transport activities on this route. The
fourth UKCC route was the Karachi-
Zahidan-Meshed route. Supplies, orig-
inating in India, were moved from Kara-
chi to Zahidan by rail and then trucked to
Meshed, for delivery to Ashkabad in
Soviet Turkestan. Since the delivery point
was far distant from the fighting front,
shipments were made irregularly during
1942, and finally ceased in late 1943.
6
Motter, op. cit., pp. 331, 346-48; HOTI Hist, Pt.
V, Ch. 1, pp. 3-5; Personal recollections of Lt Col
L. D. Curtis on rail opns in PGC World War II, OCT
HB PGG 3d MRS.
382
A Soviet motor transport operation was
inaugurated shortly after the opening of
an American plant for the assembly of
lend-lease vehicles at Andimeshk in
March 1942. Although the British were
reluctant to permit Soviet activities in
their zone, they accepted the American
point of view and permitted Soviet drivers
to take over the vehicles at the assembly
plant. The trucks were loaded with cargo
at Andimeshk, and then traveled north
via the CMT (cased motor trucks) route,
following the UKCC route as far as
Malayer, where they turned northeast-
ward to Tehran.7
All barge and lighterage operations
were conducted by the Inland Water
Transport (IWT), a branch of the British
Tenth Army established in October 1941.
To assist in these activities, the U.S. Army
established a barge assembly plant at
Kuwait, and by the end of 1942 had as-
sembled 186 prefabricated barges that
had arrived from the United States. By
June 1943, when the plant was closed, 368
barges had been assembled and turned
8
over to the British.
The Russians moved cargoes from the
transfer points to ports on the Caspian Sea
for delivery by vessel or barge to Soviet
territory, or to Tabriz for rail movement
to Baku. All nontruckable supplies and a
large proportion of other freight were car-
ried on the Soviet-operated portion of the
ISR from Tehran to Bandar Shah, the
only Caspian Sea port with rail connec-
tions. In some instances freight was
shipped northwestward by rail from
Tehran to Mianeh and thence trucked by
the Russians to Tabriz. Assembled trucks
delivered to Tehran moved, after Amer-
ican inspection, to Tabriz or to the Caspian
Sea ports of Nau Shahr, Astara, and
Pahlevi.9
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
The improvements effected by the Brit-
ish were noteworthy, but they were
inadequate after the decision to use the
Persian Gulf as a primary route for the
supply of the USSR. The British lacked
the facilities, the resources, and the organ-
ization to handle the large increases in
shipping routed to the Persian Gulf begin-
ning in May 1942. As increasingly heavy
Soviet-aid shipments arrived in the fall
and winter, they soon outran the capacity
of the Persian Gulf ports and the inland
transportation facilities. Khorramshahr
and, to a lesser extent, Bandar Shahpur
became congested. Margil, heavily in-
volved in meeting British military needs,
could offer little relief. As a result, ships
were tied up for weeks awaiting discharge,
the ports were glutted, and the rail line
and motor trucks could not clear the cargo
discharged. In January 1943 the WSA
estimated that by the end of the month
twenty-eight vessels would be in the
Persian Gulf area. Sixteen of these would
be idle awaiting opportunity to discharge
165,000 tons of cargo.10
The U.S. Army Assumes a Transportation
Mission
By this time, the decision to transfer
transportation operations to the U.S.
Army had been made and the first large
body of American troops had arrived.
British and American suggestions that the
7
HOTI Hist, Pt. VIII, Chs. 5-6; Rpt, Hwy Div
OCT, Highway Transportation in Iran, 24 Oct 42,
PGF 255, OCMH Files.
8
Motter, op. cit., pp. 109-12; Paiforce: The Official
Story of the Persia and Iraq Command, 1941-1946 (Lon-
don: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), pp. 85-91.
9
HOTI Hist. Pt. VII, Ch. 6, pp. 42-45.
10
Rpt, U.S. Naval Observer, Basra, Iraq, 1 Aug 42,
PGF 255, OCMH Files; Memo, Maj J. C. Vaeth, TC,
20 Jan 43, sub: Shipping Situation in PG, OCT HB
PGC Abadan; HOTI Hist, Pt. IV, Ch. 1, p. 22.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 383

U.S. Army should participate in transpor- ramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, Cheybassi,

tation operations had been put forward on Bushire, Ahwaz, and Karachi, and the
various occasions, but none was acted partial use of Basra (Margil), he expected
upon until the closing of the northern to bring port discharge to 399,500 long
route became imminent.11 On 13 July tons a month. Rail clearance north of
1942 W. Averell Harriman, lend-lease rep- Andimeshk would be brought to 180,000
resentative in London, cabled Harry long tons a month, and, by using all possi-
Hopkins urging that all trucks, and all air- ble motor transport routes, deliveries by
craft other than those that could be British, U.S. Army, and assembled lend-
moved by way of Alaska and Siberia, be lease trucks to the USSR would reach
sent via the Persian Gulf. To this end, he 139,500 long tons. Attainment of these ca-
suggested that the United States offer to pacities would make it possible to meet
take over operation of the ISR. Three essential British and Iranian needs and to
days later, President Roosevelt sent such a deliver 242,000 long tons monthly to the
proposal to Prime Minister Churchill. USSR.13
Churchill delayed reply until he had con- After a final conference at Cairo with
ferred with Stalin at Moscow and visited Harriman, Maxwell, and British com-
Tehran, Basra, and Cairo to study the manders, Churchill on 22 August 1942 ac-
situation on the ground. 12 cepted the President's proposal that the
Meanwhile, both American and British railway should be taken over by the U.S.
representatives were exploring the po- Army and added that this should also in-
tentialities. Among others, Brig. Gen. clude the ports of Khorramshahr and
Sidney P. Spalding, personal representa- Bandar Shahpur. He requested the rail
tive of the Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Philip personnel and equipment necessary to ex-
R. Faymonville, lend-lease representative pand the ISR's capacity to 6,000 long tons
at Moscow, Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, a day, double the British estimate of the
commanding general of U.S. Army Forces line's performance by the end of 1942. The
in the Middle East (USAFIME), and Col. railway and ports would be operated by
(later Brig. Gen.) Don G. Shingler, com- the U.S. Army, subject to traffic control
manding officer of the Iran-Iraq Service by the British for whom the railway was
Command, made inspection trips and an essential channel of communication for
conferred regarding the capacity of the operational purposes.
Persian Corridor and the means for its On the same day, General Maxwell
expansion. sent to Washington the broad outline of
The fact finders used all sources at their an American plan, which proposed also
disposal but relied mainly on data pro- American operation of Cheybassi and
vided by various British agencies. Much of Bushire and the establishment of an
this information was channeled through 11
Colonel Shingler's headquarters and be- For details see Motter, op. cit., pp. 180, 335-37.
12
Paraphrase of Cbl, Harriman to Hopkins, 13 Jul
came the basis for later recommendations 42, OCT 000-400 PG 41-42; Plan for Opn of Certain
by General Maxwell. In early August Iranian Communications Facilities … , prepared
Shingler drew up estimates of port and in- by Col D. O. Elliott, Dir Strategic Logistics Div SOS
(hereafter cited as SOS Plan), Incl I, Summary of
terior clearance capacities to be achieved Basic Corres, PGF 235, OCMH Files.
by June 1943. Through the use of Khor- 13
Motter, op. cit., pp. 182-89; SOS Plan, Incl III.
384
American trucking agency. He set targets
of 251,000 long tons a month for the dis-
charge capacity of the four ports, 180,000
long tons to be hauled by the ISR north of
Andimeshk, and 172,000 long tons a
month by American, British, and Soviet
trucking agencies. The use of Karachi
and the Zahidan-Meshed route, pro-
posed by Shingler, was not included. To
achieve these targets, Maxwell recom-
mended the assignment of two reinforced
railway operating battalions, one railway
shop battalion, 75 locomotives, 1,200 20-
ton rail cars, three port battalions, two
truck regiments supplemented by native
drivers, and 7,200 trucks of 7-ton capacity.
Following up on Churchill's message,
Harriman on 23 August warned that un-
less the U.S. Army took over the opera-
tion USSR deliveries would shrink as
British military requirements increased.
He urged that a young, top-flight railroad
man be commissioned as a brigadier gen-
eral and move immediately by air with a
small advance party to arrange for the
gradual transfer to the U.S. Army of the
British portion of the ISR. He also sug-
gested the early shipment of port troops to
improve the excessively slow ship turn-
around at the Persian Gulf ports. Although
he endorsed Maxwell's proposal for a
truck service, he believed it second in im-
portance to the development of the rail-
road and ports.14
At the direction of the President, the
Chief of Staff on 25 August undertook the
task of drawing up a plan for the U.S.
Army operation of communications facili-
ties in Iran. The job was delegated to the
Strategic Logistics Division of SOS, which
on 3 September completed a detailed plan
setting forth the operations to be assumed
by the U.S. Army, the target capacities to
be achieved, the amount and availability
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
of troops and equipment needed, and the
shipping required to effect their transfer to
Iran.
Under the SOS plan, the U.S. Army,
subject to British control of traffic, would
take over operation of the ISR south of
Tehran and the ports of Khorramshahr,
Bandar Shahpur, Tanuma, and Bushire.
To supplement the railway and existing
trucking agencies, an American motor
transport service would be established to
operate over the Khorramshahr-Andi-
meshk-Kazvin, the Bushire-Shiraz-Te-
hran, and probably the Khanaqin routes
to Tabriz, Pahlevi, and other delivery
points inside the Soviet zone.
In general, the plan accepted the Max-
well and Shingler targets for the capacities
of the transport facilities to be operated.
With the exception of goals for motor
transport deliveries, set by Maxwell at
172,000 long tons a month in contrast to
Shingler's figure of 139,500 tons, the esti-
mates were similar. Both approximated
8,700 tons a day for the discharge capacity
of the four ports to be operated and pro-
posed 6,000 tons a day as the hauling ca-
pacity of the railway north of Andimeshk.
The SOS plan noted that Harriman and
Spalding believed the target figures set by
Shingler for attainment by June 1943
could be achieved earlier, possibly by
February 1943.
To direct the new operations and absorb
existing U.S. Army activities in the area,
the plan proposed the establishment of a
headquarters that would take over the
Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC).
An advance party, including the new
commanding general and the heads of the
rail, port, and motor transport services,
would be sent to Iran without delay.
14
SOS Plan, Incl I, Summary of Basic Corres.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
There, they would arrange first for Ameri-
can operation of the railroad and then
complete arrangements for the other oper-
ations. The commanding general of the
PGSC would continue under the com-
mand of USAFIME, but was to have wide
power in dealing with the British, Ira-
nians, and Russians and in directing
operations.15
The plan called for a force of 23,876
officers and enlisted men to take over the
operations contemplated. To the 338
troops already in Iran, there were to be
added a railway grand division, two rail-
way operating battalions, a railway shop
battalion, and a rail transportation com-
pany, a port headquarters and three
battalions, a motor transport service head-
quarters, two truck regiments, two auto-
motive maintenance battalions, and mis-
cellaneous supporting service units. There
were also included 4,515 troops, primarily
road maintenance personnel, who would
be shipped if experience on the ground
proved them necessary. Since less than one
half the troops were immediately avail-
able, over 10,400 would have to be di-
verted from BOLERO and units aggregat-
ing 1,501 men activated. The various units
were grouped so as to arrive in the order
that operations were set up. The first
group of 5,000 would consist of troops
primarily engaged in railroad operations;
a second group of 5,000 would be port
troops; and the third group, 8,114 strong,
would consist of those necessary for road
operations.
Equipment required by the U.S. Army
included 75 steam locomotives, 2,200 rail-
way cars of 20-ton capacity, 7,200 trucks
of an average of 7-ton capacity, and cargo-
handling equipment. Little difficulty was
expected in procuring the rail equipment
from available stocks or new production,
385
but trucks as heavy as 7 tons were unavail-
able. Since time did not permit putting
them in production, the SOS plan pro-
vided that aside from approximately 1,100
lend-lease trucks that might be repossessed
from the British or diverted from Karachi,
truck tonnage would be provided in the
form of 2½-ton trucks with 1-ton trailers
then available or in production in the
United States. Lacking definite informa-
tion concerning cargo-handling equip-
ment at the Persian Gulf ports, the SOS
plan indicated that a supply of equipment
available at the New York Port of Embar-
kation would accompany the port bat-
talions.
Plans for the movement of the troops
and equipment to Iran were based on a
shipping schedule drawn up by the Chief
of Transportation on 30 August 1942.16
Fifty-one vessels were needed to move ap-
proximately 475,000 measurement tons of
cargo and some 24,000 troops. Since all
ships already had assigned missions, the
movement depended on diversions from
other projects, principally BOLERO and the
northern convoy route. Shipment of 11,000
troops could be made late in October on
the West Point and the Wakefield, while the
remainder of the force could be moved in
late January on British troopships. It was
expected that the initial echelon with a
proportionate share of its equipment
would arrive and be in operation by the
end of December 1942, and that the en-
tire movement would be completed by late
February or early March 1943.
The SOS plan concluded by emphasiz-
ing the need for immediate action in in-
15
PGSC remained under USAFIME until Decem-
ber 1943, when it was made an independent com-
mand and redesignated the Persian Gulf Command
(PGC).
16
Memo, Gross for Somervell, 30 Aug 42, sub:
Trans Sv for PG, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.
386
creasing the Persian Gulf route's capacity.
Since unforeseen demands for shipping in
Europe and North Africa might clash
with commitments to Iran, it assumed
that deliveries by that route would be as-
signed the same high priority as other aid
to the Soviet Union.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff adopted
the basic recommendations of the SOS
plan on 22 September 1942, setting forth
the maintenance and expansion of the
flow of supplies into the USSR as the pri-
mary mission of U.S. forces in the Persian
Corridor. Over and above minimum re-
quirements for British forces and essential
civilian needs, Soviet-aid materials would
have highest priorities. The British Persia
and Iraq Command would control traffic
as part of its responsibility for the security
of the lines of communication, but this
control was not to be permitted adversely
to affect the attainment of the U.S. Army
mission. Deviating from the SOS plan in
two particulars, CCS added Ahwaz to the
ports to be operated by the U.S. Army
and cut back monthly cargo sailings from
ten to five. The latter decision was made
on the recommendation of the Combined
Military Transportation Committee,
which had reported that the Persian Gulf
ports could not handle more than 34,000
long tons of U.S. Army cargo monthly
without reducing essential Soviet, British,
and Iranian cargoes. Following the CCS
decision, the President on 2 October di-
rected the Secretary of War to give the
project the priority and support necessary
17
to insure its speedy implementation.
The first steps to effect the plan were
taken before its final approval. Brig. Gen.
(later Maj. Gen.) Donald H. Connolly
had been selected to assume command of
the expanded American force in Iran, and
on 14 September he moved to SOS head-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
quarters in Washington to make the neces-
sary preparations. After organizing Head-
quarters 1616 to direct the implementa-
tion of the SOS plan and act as a rear
echelon of his command until completion
of the movement, Connolly departed for
Basra on 1 October.18
Working in close collaboration with
SOS officials, Headquarters 1616 re-
viewed and modified troop and equip-
ment requirements and set up final move-
ment priorities. Among other changes,
personnel and equipment for port opera-
tions were given higher priority than those
required for the railroad, and the number
of troops to be assigned to PGSC was
raised to 25,000. This strength included
the road maintenance forces originally
given only a contingent status. The ad-
vance in priority of these forces resulted in
the shipment of Engineer dump truck
companies that were to prove valuable in
motor transportation operations. Con-
tinued studies indicated that even with the
employment of native labor an additional
5,000 troops would be needed, but action
was deferred until General Connolly could
determine his needs on the ground. Later
increases made on Connolly's recom-
mendation brought his command's
strength to nearly 30,000.19
A number of modifications were made
in plans for the railroad. When a suitable
civilian railroader proved unavailable, the
task of heading the operation was assigned
to Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Paul F. Yount, a
17
CGS 109/1, approved 22 Sep 42, OPD 500
(4-30-42) Sec 1, Cases 1-45; CPS 46/3, 16 Sep 42,
Devel of Persian Trans Facilities, ASF Plng Div The-
aters Br 10-Gen File II PGSC 44-192; Memo, Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt for SW, 2 Oct 42, ASF Plng Div The-
aters Br 12A Gen File 43 Dr G 516.
18
Motter, op. cit., pp. 206-08; HOTI Hist, Pt. I,
Ch. 4.
19
History of Planning Division, Army Service
Forces, Pt. III, Ch. 6, pp. 113-15, DRB AGO.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
regular Army officer who had accom-
panied the original Iranian mission as a
transportation expert and later had
moved to India to assist in the establish-
ment of the Services of Supply in the
China-Burma-India theater. As events
were to prove, his selection was a sound
one.
With regard to rail equipment, it was
decided to assign the command only 1,650
cars, but these were to have the same total
tonnage capacity as the 2,200 20-ton
freight cars originally planned. At the sug-
gestion of W. Averell Harriman, who was
an experienced railway man, 57 diesel lo-
comotives were substituted for the 75
Mikado steam locomotives provided for in
the SOS plan. The diesels were more suit-
able for operation on the rail line, which
had an inadequate water supply and a
large number of tunnels. To maintain the
diesels, a railway shop battalion (diesel)
was added to the list of railway units.
Upon recommendation of MRS head-
quarters, the two railway operating bat-
talions were reinforced, and the rail trans-
portation company originally called for
was deleted. It should be mentioned that
the diesels and rail cars were not the only
American rail equipment provided, for
steam locomotives and rolling stock that
had been ordered by the British under
lend-lease continued to come out of pro-
duction and were shipped to Iran.
Plans for motor transport equipment
were also changed. In an effort to conserve
shipping space, drivers, and maintenance,
arrangements were made to secure 820
2½-ton truck tractors with 7-ton semi-
trailers and 1,046 10-ton trucks that were
already stocked or scheduled for early pro-
duction. These were to be substituted for
the 2½-ton trucks with 1-ton trailers. As
for port operations, the troops at Karachi,
387
which were to have been transferred to
Iran, could not be spared, so that all three
port battalions had to be provided from
the United States.20
As these changes were being made,
headquarters for the operating services
were organized, and their commanders
and selected staff members departed for
Basra. Units already available or diverted
from BOLERO were readied for shipment to
Iran, while others were activated and
given a brief period of training. Equip-
ment was assembled and began moving to
the ports of embarkation. By December
1942, key port, rail, and motor transport
personnel were on duty with General
Connolly. The development of the Persian
Corridor now depended on the rate at
which American troops and equipment
could be delivered in Iran.
From the outset, the movement to Iran
was beset by difficulties and delays. When
the CCS cut back the number of monthly
cargo ship sailings to five, the Chief of
Transportation had to readjust his origi-
nal plan, preparing a new schedule on 4
October 1942 designed to deliver 15,500
troops and 160,000 measurement tons of
cargo to Iran between 24 December and
18 February 1943. Troop movements got
under way auspiciously when the West
Point, carrying 5,430 PGSC personnel
among her 8,300 passengers, left New
York on 1 November 1942. The transport
sailed around the Cape of Good Hope to
Bombay, where troops were transshipped
to smaller British transports that arrived
at Khorramshahr on 11-12 December.
20
Memo, Gen Gray, Gen Mgr MRS, for CG SOS,
9 Sep 42, Trans Iranian Ry; Memo, Elliott for Somer-
vell, 12 Sep 42; Memo, Gen Handy, ACofS, for CG
SOS, 8 Sep 42, sub: Transfer of Port Bn from India to
Iran. All in ASF Contl Div Plans for Opn of Certain
Iranian Communications Facilities. Cf. OCT HB
Monograph 25, pp. 48-61.
388
Meanwhile, the submarine threat
around the Cape of Good Hope caused
the British to cancel the tentative alloca-
tion of one of their Queens, scheduled for
mid-December sailing. The submarine
menace also caused the Ile de France to be
dispatched from San Francisco by the
longer route across the Pacific via Fre-
mantle, Australia, to Bombay, where 4,600
troops were transferred to British vessels
and arrived at Khorramshahr in the latter
part of January. No troops arrived in
February, so that only 12,868 officers and
enlisted men, or about one half the total
force, were actually in Iran at the end of
the month. The Mauretania., obtained as a
substitute for the canceled Queen, departed
from San Francisco on 13 January 1943
and followed the same route as the Ile de
France. By this means, an additional 6,611
officers and enlisted men arrived at
Khorramshahr early in March. Smaller
shipments in subsequent months brought
U.S. Army strength in Iran to 27,320 by
the end of July.21
Delays in cargo shipments were even
more serious. The rate of five ship sailings
per month was not maintained. In the
three months ending 31 January 1943 only
eight vessels sailed for the Army, although
some space was made available on vessels
carrying USSR lend-lease materials.
Basically, the difficulty lay in the inability
of the War Shipping Administration to al-
locate enough vessels for the movement of
PGSC equipment. In February 1943 the
Chief of Transportation reported a back-
log of 70,000 tons of equipment for troops
enroute to or already in Iran, for which
shipping was not available, and he com-
plained "the WSA attitude has not been
one of intense cooperation." 22 In fairness
to the WSA, it should be pointed out that
the North African campaign had pro-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
duced a critical shipping shortage, so that
it was difficult to secure vessels even for
the high-priority movement to Iran.
Moreover, the decision to increase greatly
Soviet-aid shipments to the Persian Gulf,
made at the highest policy levels, had re-
sulted in a tie-up at the Persian Gulf ports
of ships that otherwise could have been
available. It is ironic that the increased
Soviet lend-lease shipping should have
impeded the movement of equipment
intended to expedite its handling.
There were also other factors delaying
the transfer of cargo to Iran. Routing
ships via the Pacific to avoid the dangers
of the Cape of Good Hope route added
two weeks to the voyage, increasing time
in transit to three and a half months.
Additional complications arose from using
a variety of ports for loading. Hampton
Roads had been designated the port of
embarkation for all shipments, but the
initial lack of heavy lift equipment and
the necessity of utilizing the space on
Soviet-assigned vessels forced the use of
additional ports, including New York,
Baltimore, and Los Angeles.
Difficulties in lifting accumulated PGSC
cargo continued well into 1943. In April
the Chief of Transportation complained to
WSA that of twenty-two vessels requested
in the previous five months, only twelve
were allocated, with space equivalent to
four more in Russian-assigned vessels, and
21
HOTI Hist, Pt. I, Ch. 4, pp. 66-67; Hist, Khor-
ramshahr Port and Station, 11 Dec 42-1 May 43,
OCT HB 9th Port Hq; Memo, Gross for Somervell,
15 Oct 42, sub: Transfer of Opns from Atlantic to
Pacific for ME Opns, OCT 337-900 ME 42; Memo,
Gross for Somervell, 17 Oct 42, sub: Revision of
Mvmt to PG, OCT 400 PG 41-42; OCT HB Mono-
graph 25, pp. 44-45; STM-30, Strength of the Army,
1 Dec 45, p. 62.
22
Memo, Gross for Somervell, and atchd Draft
Memo, Somervell for the President, 17 Feb 43, OCT
HB Wylie Staybacks.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 389

that even with a firm allocation of seven
ships for April a backlog of 27,827 meas-
urement tons, including vital rail, port,
and motor transport equipment, would
mands in the zone of interior. In January
1943 PGSC headquarters was moved from
Basra to Tehran, reflecting the primary
emphasis on the deliveries to the USSR.
24

remain. At the end of May 1943 only 48 Actual transfer of operations was begun
percent of the equipment had arrived in with the arrival of the first large body of
Iran, while 80 percent of the troops were troops on 11-12 December 1942. Ameri-
there. Even by August, when virtually the can port personnel began work at Khor-
entire PGSC force had arrived, only 74 ramshahr under British tutelage, assum-
percent of the equipment was on hand. 23 ing full control of the port on 7 January
The implications of the delayed arrival 1943. Bandar Shahpur came under Amer-
of men and equipment were clear. The ican operation in the following month.
development of the Persian Corridor to American military railway troops began
target capacity, set for some time materi- running trains between Khorramshahr
ally in advance of June 1943, would not and Ahwaz on 1 January, and during the
be effected on schedule. Until the move- next three months extended their opera-
ment was completed, deliveries of lend- tions over the entire portion of the railroad
lease to the USSR would lag and Protocol between the Persian Gulf ports and Te-
commitments would suffer. hran. The third major American transpor-
The Months of Transition tation operation got under way on 1 March
when the Motor Transport Service com-
While the logistical pump was being menced hauling Soviet-aid cargo from
primed in Washington in the fall of 1942, Andimeshk to Kazvin. As will be seen,
the U.S. Army in the field prepared to re- Cheybassi was not taken over until July,
ceive the flow of men and materials. Gen- and plans to transfer the ports of Ahwaz
eral Connolly arrived at Basra on 20 Octo- and Bushire and to utilize additional
ber, took over command from Colonel motor transport routes were dropped.
Shingler, and began laying the ground- Experience in the field dictated numer-
work for the transition of operations from ous modifications in PGSC organization,
British to American control. Colonel but a basic pattern emerged by late spring
Yount, who was to head the American rail- of 1943 that, as it affected transportation
way service, had arrived from India two operations, continued in force throughout
weeks before and was already in process of most of the command's existence. Since
making preliminary arrangements for the PGSC was a command with a predomi-
transfer of the British portion of the ISR nantly transportation mission, it was not
to the U.S. Army. After the arrival of the necessary to have a separate transporta-
port and motor transport service com- tion service. On the top level, the com-
manders and their advance personnel, 23
OCT HB Monograph 25, pp. 45-47; Memo, Lt
Connolly in December reorganized the Col N. M. Martin, GSC, for CG PGSC, 4 Jan 43, sub:
PGSC, setting up seven general staff divi- Rpt of Activities, PGF 131, OCMH Files; Ltr, Col
sions and five operating services, including R. M. Hicks, Dep Chief of Water Div OCT, to WSA,
Rail, Port, and Motor Transport. He also 2 Apr 43, OCT HB PGSC Plng; Table, PGSC Per-
formance—Affected by Arrivals of Troops and Equip-
retained the PGSC territorial districts, ment, ASF T/O PGSC 43-44 (13).
with functions similar to service com- 24
Motter, op. cit., Ch. XI; HOTI Hist, Pt. I, Ch. 4.
390
manding general, directly or through his
chief of staff, in effect exercised over-all
direction of transportation operations. On
the general staff level the Operations Divi-
sion, headed by an assistant chief of staff,
performed functions that in other com-
mands were the responsibility of the chiefs
of transportation and their immediate
staffs. In addition to its duties relating to
construction and assembly, the Operations
Division planned the movement of ship-
ping to the area, co-ordinated American
transportation operations and related
them to British and Soviet activities, and,
after 1 May 1943, exercised control over
movements on American-operated routes.
On the operating level, directly under
General Connolly, Military Railway Serv-
ice, Motor Transport Service, and Port
Service directed their own operations and
commanded the troops assigned to them.
The Port Service was unique in that it was
merged with the Basra District, and the
director of Port Service was given com-
mand of both organizations.
The transition period, January-March
1943, saw an immediate improvement in
the Persian Corridor's capacity. Increases
were effected in port discharge and rail
hauling, American trucking operations
were introduced, and monthly deliveries
to the USSR by American and all other
agencies rose from 51,285 to 75,605 long
tons. But this acceleration of traffic did not
match the increased flow of cargo to the
Persian Gulf. The first months of 1943
witnessed the most serious port congestion
in the history of the command. Ship turn-
around time in the gulf averaged over fifty
days, with individual ships in some in-
stances waiting over three months for dis-
charge.25 The cargo that was landed could
not be moved forward, and large backlogs
accumulated in port storage areas.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Much of the difficulty arose out of the
situation that prevailed at the time the
American troops arrived. The developing
port congestion arising from the large in-
crease in shipping dispatched to the Per-
sian Gulf after May 1942 and the delays
in completing the construction of port
facilities and highways have already been
mentioned. In December 1942 Connolly
termed the ports "inefficient" and lacking
in storage space but capable of more rapid
expansion than rail and truck transport.
Assuming that ports would be the major
bottleneck, he had placed the movement
of men and equipment for their operation
on a higher priority than those for railway
and motor transport. Upon his arrival, he
had found that the problem of transport to
the interior should have been handled
first. Connolly also pointed out that the
Persian Corridor could not be developed
any more rapidly than the rate at which
men and equipment arrived. 26 Anticipat-
ing their prompt delivery, his estimates of
port discharge and interior clearance
proved overoptimistic. The arrival of
American troops was delayed, and an even
longer interval elapsed before their equip-
ment arrived. Consequently, shipments of
Soviet lend-lease, based on optimistic esti-
mates, continued to arrive in quantity
while insufficient American resources were
brought into the area to land the cargoes
and transport them inland.
In such circumstances American units,
often inexperienced, shorthanded, and
ill-equipped, were called upon to take over
and rapidly expand British operations
that had fallen behind schedule. Even
25
Table, Ships Turnaround in PG Ports, OCT HB
PGSC WSA Rpts; HOTI Hist, Pt. IV, History of the
Ports, pp. 21-22.
26
Ltr. Connolly to Gross, 1 Dec 42, OCT HB Gross
File ME.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
nature conspired to impede operations.
Heavy rains and floods in March washed
out the temporary road between Khor-
ramshahr and Andimeshk and slowed rail
traffic. The situation inevitably resulted in
some inefficiency in operations, continued
port congestion, and disappointingly low
deliveries to the USSR.
Still another factor producing difficulty
was the lack of unified control of move-
ments to and through the Persian Corri-
dor. Although the Americans were respon-
sible for supply deliveries to the USSR,
they lacked authority over the flow of
those materials, since the British by CCS
decision retained over-all control of move-
ments as a necessary adjunct to their re-
sponsibility for the area's security. This
problem was solved by British-American
agreement, and on 1 May 1943 the U.S.
Army assumed control of movements over
American-operated routes, subject to final
control by the British. The British retained
direct authority over the movements re-
quired for their military and essential
civilian needs. These included inland
water transport, the Iraqi ports, the Basra-
Baghdad line of communications, USSR
deliveries via the Khanaqin Lift, and,
with assistance from PGSC, the improve-
ment and maintenance of roads. Also, the
allocation of incoming shipping as between
Iraq and Iran remained a function of the
War Transport Executive Committee.
With these exceptions, the Americans
were granted control over the movement
of PGSC, British, and USSR cargo and
assumed responsibility for obtaining dis-
posal instructions and priorities from
Soviet officials for all cargo destined for
USSR over U.S. Army-operated routes.
Under the agreement, a procedure was
set up to co-ordinate the flow of cargo to
and within the Persian Corridor. Early
391
each month, representatives of British and
American military and civilian transporta-
tion agencies and operating services met
to determine capacities of the ports, rail-
way, motor transport, and assembly
plants. These estimates were sent to Wash-
ington and London so that the proper
number of ships could be allocated to the
Persian Gulf. Later in the month, Ameri-
can and British representatives were joined
by Soviet transportation officials at a tar-
get meeting, where the maximum cargo
that could be moved by the various trans-
portation agencies was determined. At the
meeting, essential requirements of the U.S.
Army, the USSR, the local civilian econ-
omy, and the British military were worked
out and targets set up for port discharge
and interior transport. The Assistant Chief
of Staff for Operations, PGSC, had staff
responsibility for the program. Various
branches of the Operations Division drew
together information from the operating
services, analyzed traffic operations, and
compiled information on the number of
trucks and aircraft arriving and being as-
sembled, as well as on the cargo that
assembled vehicles could carry. British
representatives furnished information per-
taining to Iranian civil and all British re-
quirements, and consideration was given
the requests of Soviet representatives.
Alongside this machinery there developed
numerous contacts between the Opera-
tions Division, the American operating
services, and British Army movements.27
The transfer of movements control to
the U.S. Army completed the transition
from British to American operations. De-
spite the fact that the Persian Corridor's
27
Motter, op. cit., pp. 200-205, 233-39; HOTI
Hist, Pt. I, Ch. 8, pp. 5-8, and Pt. VII, Ch. 6, p. 10
and appended PAIFORCE-PGSC Agreement-
American British Responsibilities.
392 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

development was behind schedule, much carried more than 217,000 long tons to
29
had been accomplished. A sound admin- Soviet transfer points in Iran. At this
istrative structure had been developed, time, cargo discharged monthly at Ameri-
the transfer of the major Iranian ports and can-operated ports had more than dou-
the ISR had been completed, the Ameri- bled; the ISR was nearing the target of
can Motor Transport Service had begun 180,000 long tons a month hauled north
operations, and centralization of authority of Andimeshk; and although the 92,000
over Soviet-aid deliveries had been long tons delivered to the USSR by Amer-
achieved. ican, British, and Soviet trucking agencies
was far below original SOS estimates, it
The Development of American Transportation was more than adequate for the achieve-
Operations ment of the USSR delivery goal.
From October onward, the transporta-
Under American operation and control, tion facilities in the Persian Corridor gen-
ports and interior transport facilities con- erally possessed a capacity greater than
tinued for some time to lag behind incom- the shipments arriving at Persian Gulf
ing shipping. Personnel shortages, inexpe- ports. Shipping congestion had been
rience, and inadequate equipment hin- greatly relieved, backlogs at storage areas
dered efforts to dissipate the shipping were substantially cleared, and the rare
congestion and to attain scheduled in- shortfalls in port, rail, and motor transport
creases in rail and truck deliveries. By targets were caused primarily by the lack
mid-1943, however, many of the difficul- of available cargo for movement. To be
ties were being resolved as troop and sure, operational problems continued to
equipment arrivals, improved operations, arise, but the major obstacles had been
effective movements control, and progress surmounted.
in construction of port facilities and roads Operations reached their peak in July
began to make themselves felt. In June the 1944 when deliveries to USSR transfer
PGSC chief of staff admitted that past points by American, British, and Soviet
capacity estimates had been too optimis- carriers totaled approximately 282,000
tic, but he pointed to the threefold increase long tons, some 40,000 tons more than the
in deliveries to the Soviet Union since the Shingler goal set in August 1942. The
previous January and expressed his con- PGG handled two more months of near-
viction that the command was now in a capacity traffic, but the diversion of ship-
position to meet the targets set for the ping to shorter and more economical
Persian Corridor.28 routes soon left the Persian Corridor with
The development of operations bore out a far greater capacity than was needed.
the accuracy of this estimate. By the sum- Since the railroad alone was able to han-
mer of 1943 port, rail, and motor trans- 28
Ltr, Brig Gen S. L. Scott, CofS PGG, to Col. J. B.
port facilities began regularly to exceed Luscomb, PGSC Plans Br ASF Opns Div, 19 Jun 43,
targets set by the command, backlogs in OCT HB Overseas Opns Gp PGC.
29 for statistics on monthly USSR deliveries through
port storage areas were reduced, and
the Persian Corridor by U.S., British, and Soviet-
USSR deliveries were rapidly accelerated. operated transport facilities, 1942-45, see Motter, op,
In October American and other agencies cit., App. A, Table 4.
 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 393

dle the burden of interior transport, MTS shahr and Bandar Shahpur. 31 As a result,
operations were discontinued late in 1944 the Army command concentrated on these
and, as inbound traffic declined, port oper- two ports, deferred operation of the others,
ations were concentrated at Khorram- which for a variety of reasons were less
shahr. After January 1945 shipping dis- valuable in carrying out the Soviet-aid
patched to the Persian Gulf was negligible, mission, and requested a fourth port bat-
and the principal Soviet-aid traffic carried talion. The 385th Port Battalion arrived
by the railroad consisted of petroleum in July 1943. No other port units were pro-
products produced in Iran. With the end vided until February 1945, when the new
of the war in Europe, the Army mission 380th Port Battalion arrived to replace
was brought to a close, and Army trans- units being transferred out of the com-
portation operations other than those in- mand.
volving evacuation were discontinued.
The Organisation of Port Service
Port Operations
Shortly after his arrival in PGSC, Booth
Implementation of the plans for port moved to Khorramshahr, where he set up
operations got under way with the assign- a skeleton Port Service organization and
ment of the 9th Port, placed under the arranged with the British for the reception
command of Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) of the troops scheduled to arrive. After the
Donald P. Booth, an Engineer officer, in first large group landed, Booth left behind
October 1942. While his headquarters was a local port commander with part of the
being readied for movement, Booth visited 9th Port and the 378th Port Battalion and
Washington to discuss his mission and then on 21 December 1942 moved his head-
departed by air with five officers, arriving quarters to Basra, where the British War
at Basra on 1 November. The second Transport Executive Committee and Basra
echelon of the 9th headquarters and the District headquarters were located.
378th Port Battalion debarked at Khor- At first there was an overlapping of
ramshahr on 11-12 December. They were functions between Port Service and Basra
followed late in January 1943 by the rest (later Gulf) District, since the latter exer-
of the 9th Port and the 380th Port Battal- cised direct administrative control over
ion. The last port battalion originally individual ports and bore the responsibil-
planned for, the 482d, reached Khorram- ity for port construction and liaison with
30
shahr in March. the British and WSA in the collection of
As approved by the CCS, Army plans shipping information. This duplication
called for these troops to take over opera- was eliminated on 3 March 1943 when
tions at Bandar Shahpur, Khorramshahr, Booth was made commander of the Basra
Cheybassi, Bushire, and Ahwaz, but by District, retaining his positions as Director,
January 1943 Booth found that the force Port Service, and Commander, 9th Port.
to be placed at his disposal would be insuf- 30
Unless otherwise cited, the section of port opera-
ficient to handle all the operations con- tions is based on Motter, op. cit., Ch. XVIII, and
templated. Indeed, an additional port HOTI Hist, Pt. IV.
31
Draft Memo, Col Booth, Dir of Ports for Control,
battalion would be required for Khorram- 28 Aug 43, PGF 126A, OCMH Files.
394 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

He then consolidated Port Service and The Movements Branch, through its
Basra District headquarters, using 9th Ocean Traffic Section in Tehran, also pro-
Port troops to staff both. Wearing three vided liaison with Soviet headquarters to
command hats, Booth was able to central- obtain cargo disposal instructions. The
ize control of operations and bring under section broke down manifests in advance
unified direction the port organizations of ship arrivals and drew up itemized lists
established at Khorramshahr, Bandar of cargo according to priorities and desti-
Shahpur, and, in July 1943, Cheybassi. nations desired by the Russians. The list-
With minor modification, this organiza- ings were transmitted to the ports, which
tional structure remained in effect through routed cargoes to their proper destinations.
the major period of activity of the com- At first, the arrangement proved cumber-
mand. some since manifests were slow in arriving
Port Service activities were closely tied and the Russians frequently insisted on
in with those of other American operating changes in instructions after listings had
services and Allied transportation agen- been forwarded, but eventually the proce-
cies. From the outset, Port Service main- dure became efficient and routine. 32
tained close co-operation with American Three other agencies, one American
rail and motor transport services in relat- and two British, were closely related to
ing their activities at docks, terminals, and port operations. The WSA regional direc-
storage yards. Furthermore, the Opera- tor was important in scheduling shipping
tions Division, the agency responsible for to the Persian Gulf and, before the Ameri-
co-ordination of all operations pertaining cans began transportation operations, rep-
to USSR deliveries, dealt intimately with resented the shipping interests of the
port operations. Its Control Branch re- United States. As PGSC took over port
ceived data from Port Service and incor- operations and control of movements,
porated them into port capacity estimates WSA functions became increasingly ad-
and port discharge goals. Another Opera- visory. The British War Transport Execu-
tions Division agency, the Movements tive Committee, on which were repre-
Branch, assigned officers to American- sented the British Ministry of War Trans-
operated ports beginning in the spring of port, WSA, the U.S. naval observer, Brit-
1943. Responsible for implementing ish transportation and movements officials,
monthly movement targets, these officials and the PGSC Movements Branch, con-
determined which cargoes were to move trolled berthing and allocation of ships
and their priority of movement, arranged and set loading and unloading priorities.
for the distribution of empty rail equip- In January 1943 the American port com-
ment, and furnished the port commander mander at Khorramshahr became a mem-
information to fulfill traffic and operating ber. As U.S. Army operations got under
requirements. In 1944 most of these func- way, American members increasingly
tions were turned over to port transporta- influenced the committee's policies and
tion officers and Movements Branch actions. The British Inland Water Trans-
offices at Bandar Shahpur were closed. A port continued to operate and control
small office staff remained at Khorram- barge and lighterage facilities, except for a
shahr to provide liaison among the oper-
32
ating services. HOTI Hist, Pt. I, Ch. 8, pp. 6-31.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 395

few small boats assigned the U.S. Army at handling commercial cargo. Shortly after
Khorramshahr. Shortages of barges and the Americans took over the port, U.S.
lighters brought American complaints in Engineer troops with native labor ex-
the first months of operation" but the prob-tended the Failiyah Creek wharf 600 feet
lem was greatly relieved as additional and installed lighting, and reconstructed
floating equipment assembled at Kuwait Khumba Wharf, a facility used to land
was turned over to the IWT. Engineer supplies and crated trucks.
Bandar Shahpur still had only one two-
Initial Operations berth jetty and a lighterage wharf. British
construction of a second jetty, begun in
Actual operations began at Khorram- 1942. progressed slowly, the first of these
shahr on 13 December 1942, when the berths not being completed until June
378th Port Battalion began work at Sen- 1943. Like Khorramshahr, storage areas
tab Jetty under British supervision. On 20 were away from the port, one at Sar Ban-
December Maj. James Rattray was named dar, six miles distant, and the other in the
port commander and set up his headquar- railroad classification yard.
ters with 9th Port troops. The U.S. Army At the outset, port operations were con-
formally took over operations on 7 Jan- ducted by an undermanned organization
uary 1943, although British personnel lacking virtually all the necessities for
stayed on until the 380th Port Battalion efficient operation. The 9th Port, contain-
was placed on duty at the end of the ing most of the experienced shipping and
month. longshoremen in the area, was spread too
Bandar Shahpur was transferred to the thin to give effective supervision. The
Americans in similar fashion. After a pre- 378th Port Battalion, the first to arrive
liminary survey of operations and facil- and until June the only white operating
ities, Maj. (later Col.) Harry C. Doden- port organization in the command, was
hoff and an advance party drawn from called upon to provide cargo checkers,
the 9th Port headquarters arrived from crane operators, warehouse foremen, and
Khorramshahr on 28 January. The main the like, and to take over operations at the
body, including a detachment of the 378th Russian Dump, the staging area, and the
Port Battalion, arrived on 2 February. motor pool. Lacking sufficient personnel
After sixteen days of studying British op- to conduct longshore operations, hatch
erations, Major Dodenhoff took over as crews were reduced from twenty-one to
port commander. Some British assistance five members, and native labor was hired
continued until April. to work under their supervision. With the
At the time of transfer, Khorramshahr opening of Bandar Shahpur, the 378th
had four berths at Sentab Jetty, with two provided a company for that port to en-
others under construction. The port's gage in similar supervisory duties.
main lighterage wharf, on Failiyah Creek, The arrival of the 380th and 482d Port
measured 1,000 feet in length and had a Battalions did not bring sufficient relief.
100-ton crane, obtained from Ahwaz, to To curb pilferage, it was necessary to place
handle heavy lifts such as locomotives and part of the 380th on guard duty at the
tanks. Another lighterage dock, Customs docks, sorting sheds, and storage areas.
Jetty, was available when not engaged in Many of the officers and men of the port
396 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

units had little experience in longshore tion of shipping aroused concern in Wash-
work and had to learn on the job. Native ington and Iran alike. Studies, reports,
labor was entirely inexperienced and at and correspondence in this early period
first extremely inefficient. The personnel analyzed deficiencies in port operation
problem was more than matched by the and emphasized the necessity for improve-
lack of cargo-handling equipment. Much ment. In the spring of 1943 Colonel Allin
of the cargo had to be discharged with and Capt. Robert G. Stone, representa-
ship's gear and improvised rigging, and at tives of the Chief of Transportation mak-
the Russian Dump two small gantry ing a world-wide tour of oversea ports,
cranes were at first the sole power machin- made a study of operations in Iran. Their
ery for loading and unloading rail cars. findings, submitted to the Commanding
Complicating the entire operation was General, PGSC, and the Chief of Trans-
the shortage of rail cars and trucks for portation, called attention to problems of
local and through hauling. Rail cars and which the command was already aware,
switch engines were unavailable in the and also made several contributions to
number or type desired, slowing oper- their solution.34
ations at docks and storage areas. In the Allin and Stone concluded that PGSC
first three months the MTS was not yet estimates of future capacities had been
ready to operate, although Soviet-oper- overoptimistic and that the two bottle-
ated assembled trucks provided some necks in the Persian Corridor were port
interior clearance and a locally activated clearance and interior transportation,
American provisional truck company per- with the latter constituting the major
formed some local hauling and carried problem. During April 1943 some 200,000
PGSC freight to Ahwaz and Andimeshk. long tons had accumulated aboard ships
Floods north of Khorramshahr in March and in the dumps. Unless one-half
impeded rail traffic and compelled MTS month's shipment to the Gulf, some 100,-
to load its first Soviet-aid convoys at the 000 tons, were suspended, this backlog
Andimeshk railhead. In these circum- would not be cleared until the following
stances, port backlogs accumulated September.
rapidly. By 10 April 1943, some 52,000 In addition to difficulties already ap-
long tons had piled up at the Russian parent to the command—such as troop
Dump at Khorramshahr, and congestion and equipment shortages, inexperience,
on a smaller scale was experienced at and the dispersion of supervisory person-
Bandar Shahpur.33 nel—the observers pointed out that the
Despite these difficulties, Khorram- wharves at both ports were so narrow that
shahr increased its cargo discharge from they became quickly congested unless rail-
41,426 long tons in January 1943 to 81,- way cars or trucks were immediately
437 long tons in March, while Bandar
Shahpur showed a slight improvement. 33
Hist, 9th Port (Mob), 19 Jul 42-1 Mar 43, PGF
This performance was inadequate to keep 12B; Ltr, Booth to CG PGSC, 7 Jan 43, PGF 126A;
pace with inbound shipping, and in the Hist Rpt, 378th Port Bn, 31 Jul 42-31 Jul 43, PGF 19;
first four months of 1943 the average turn- Hist Rpt, Basra District, Mar-Apr 43, PGF 13; Memo,
Maj H. B. Veith, Officer in charge of Opns Khor-
around of vessels in the Persian Gulf ex- ramshahr, 6 May 43, PGF 126A. All in OCMH Files.
ceeded fifty days. The continued conges- 34
Allin and Stone rpt cited n. 5.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
available. Thus, lack of enough cars to
clear cargo to dumps or northern termi-
nals and delays in switching constituted
the greatest single cause of lost time in
wharf operation. The absence of storage
areas adjacent to the docks created a situ-
ation of rigidity. The operation of the
dumps at both ports was unsatisfactory,
little attention being given to sorting, clas-
sification, and recooperage of supplies.
Recooperage was also necessary at the
docks, where a considerable amount of
cargo was damaged due to poor pack-
aging, faulty stowage, and careless dis-
charge methods of native labor.
Allin and Stone also emphasized the
need for men with port-operating experi-
ence to be placed in key positions. Refer-
ence was made to the fact that in late
February 1943 the Khorramshahr port
commander and his operations officer,
both of whom had previous shipping ex-
perience, had been replaced with officers
who apparently lacked such qualifications.
The observers suggested that an experi-
enced stevedore officer be assigned to the
command and that the PGSC make such
adjustments as were necessary to correct
apparent friction among officers.
The difficulties did not arise solely from
conditions in Iran. Cargo loaded in the
United States was often improperly
stowed, causing damage or slowing dis-
charge. It was recommended that heavy
cargo be deck-loaded or top-stowed to
permit easy discharge at Abadan before
the vessels proceeded to other ports, that
similar types of cargo be stowed in the
same location so that the rigging of vessels
would be simplified, and that shipments
requiring it be accompanied by special
gear for unloading. The report also stated
that the failure to provide PGSC with
proper notice of Soviet-aid vessel arrivals
397
had prevented efficient advance planning
in the command.
The Allin-Stone findings received care-
ful attention. In Iran, the Army under-
took a construction project to widen the
Khorramshahr docks and instituted a
more vigorous recooperage program. In
Washington, the Chief of Transportation
joined WSA in recommending a tempo-
rary reduction of shipments, and in June
only 28,786 long tons of USSR cargo
sailed from the Western Hemisphere for
the Persian Gulf. The problem of delays
in the arrival of advance shipping infor-
mation was also taken up with WSA, and
the subsequent improvement of cargo-dis-
posal procedures in PGSC would indicate
that this deficiency was rectified. On the
basis of the observers' recommendations,
too, an experienced stevedore officer,
Maj. Emory C. Creager, was transferred
to Iran in July 1943 and placed on duty at
Khorramshahr.35
Allin and Stone also reported that the
PGSC was the only oversea area they had
visited in which the assistance of the WSA
was not accepted. That co-operation be-
tween the Army and WSA was not close
soon became evident when Oscar A. J.
Henricksen, the assistant WSA regional
director at Basra, let fire a blast at U.S.
Army port operations. Writing to his
Washington office on 20 June 1943, Hen-
ricksen reported that the Army port troops
at first had been inexperienced but were
willing to learn. Suggestions by WSA
representatives had been followed and for
a time close co-operation existed between
the Army and WSA. With the change in
administration in late February, however,
35
Ltr, Gen Wylie, ACofT, to W. S. McPherson,
WSA, 16 May 43; Ltr, McPherson to Wylie, 20 May
43; Memo for File, Allin, 2 Jun 43. All in OCT HB
Overseas Opns Gp PGG (Corres).
398
apparently "the one aim in mind was to
hit the target at the cost of damage to
cargo and expense of vessels," and sug-
gestions of WSA representatives were no
longer accepted "in the same faith in
which they were offered."
The use of native labor, Henricksen
wrote, was "more of a detriment to the op-
eration than otherwise." Furthermore, the
majority of the port troops were colored.
Their officers had little control over them,
and suggestions to the troops from ships'
officers regarding the handling of cargo to
avoid damage brought forth insolent
answers in some cases. No attempts were
made at recooperage, and improper dis-
charge and inadequate supervision had
resulted in damage to cargoes and ships'
36
gear.
The letter was called to the attention of
General Somervell on 8 July and evoked
a strong reaction. He instructed the Chief
of Transportation to dispatch an experi-
enced officer to investigate port conditions
and requested Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D.
Styer, his chief of staff then visiting India,
to examine the situation at Khorramshahr
on his return trip to the United States. At
the same time, Somervell wrote to Con-
nolly acknowledging the handicaps under
which port operations were begun, but
suggesting that, in view of WSA and other
criticism, Connolly should personally in-
vestigate the matter.37
Within a few days, Styer, in company
with Connolly, Henricksen, and others,
investigated conditions at Khorramshahr.
In effect, Styer reported that Henricksen's
charges had been exaggerated and that
valid deficiencies were being corrected. A
recooperage program, begun at the time
of the Allin-Stone visit, had reduced spill-
age and waste. To be sure, unskilled native
labor and inexperienced Army supervi-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
sion were responsible along with defective
packaging for cargo losses and damage,
but there had been no way of avoiding the
use of native labor since there were insuffi-
cient port troops to handle incoming
cargo. Cases of insubordination by port
troops were few and had been dealt with
summarily. The second port commander
at Khorramshahr, like the first, had been
relieved by Connolly for his "failure to
produce," and gratifying results had been
shown by his successor, who was given
command in May. Port targets set by the
command had been exceeded in June, and
it was evident to Styer that PGSC port
operations were "over the hump."
General Styer was followed by Col.
Hans Ottzenn, superintendent of the
Water Division of the New York Port of
Embarkation, detailed by the Chief of
Transportation to inspect port operations.
On 5 August Ottzenn reported that all
PGSC ports were being run efficiently and
that continued improvement could be ex-
pected since additional equipment and
gear were arriving and training of port
troops and native labor on the job was
well advanced. Army morale and disci-
pline were excellent, and port operations
a credit to the Transportation Corps.
Commenting on the Styer and Ottzenn
reports, Connolly wrote Somervell that
any unbiased observer would conclude
that the entire PGSC operation, including
ports, was sound. Despite the heat, delays
in troop and equipment arrivals, and
other difficulties, morale was high and the
36
Ltr. Henricksen to McPherson, Foreign Sv Div
WSA, 20 Jun 43, PGF 26A, OCMH Files.
37
Memo, Maj Gen J. H. Burns for Somervell, 8 Jul
43, PGF 26A, OCMH Files; Ltr, Somervell to Con-
nolly, 10 Jul 43, ASF Theaters of Opns PGG (13)
42-43; Ltr, Somervell to Lewis W. Douglas, Dep Ad-
ministrator WSA, 21 Jul 43, OCT HB Overseas Opns
Gp PGC (Corres).
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
movement of supplies through the Persian
Corridor to the Russians was four times
greater than before the Americans began
their operations. The situation where in-
experienced personnel were called upon
to take over operations without adequate
equipment no longer obtained. The com-
mand now had a trained team, and
equipment was rapidly being made
38
available.
"Over the Hump"
The sharp contrast between the Allin-
Stone report and the Henricksen letter on
one hand and the Styer and Ottzenn re-
ports on the other stemmed from a num-
ber of developments that had produced a
marked improvement in port operations
in the intervening period. The arrival of
the 385th Port Battalion and the relief of
port troops from guard duty in June had
eased the personnel shortage; native labor
had gained in experience; and the arrival
of cargo-handling equipment in the mid-
dle of 1943 had been of great assistance,
although much improvisation continued
to be necessary.
At the same time, physical facilities
were being expanded. At Khorramshahr,
the sixth new berth at Sentab Jetty was
completed late in May, making a total of
seven. The jetty had been lengthened from
400 feet to over 3,000 feet and was being
widened from 50 to 100 feet, a project
completed in April 1944. In June 1943 the
first berth of the new jetty at Bandar
Shahpur was put in operation. By the end
of August all three berths had been com-
pleted, making a total of five, and a sec-
ond lighterage wharf opened.
Increases in troops, equipment, and 11 Aug 43. All in OCT HB Overseas Opns Gp
port facilities were accompanied by oper- (Corres).
ating improvements. Upon assuming com- Port Hq; Monthly Hist Rpts, Bandar Shahpur, Jun-
mand of the Khorramshahr port late in Aug 43, PGF 9, OCMH Files.
399
May 1943, Col. Bernard A. Johnson intro-
duced a highly effective competitive sys-
tem whereby each company was assigned
a regular berth. Each day numbered flags
were flown from the berths showing rela-
tive discharge performance. Other innova-
tions included the direct loading of
assembled Soviet-operated trucks at ship-
side as well as at the Russian Dump and
the use of additional fork-lift trucks and
tractors with four-wheel trailers. At Ban-
dar Shahpur the 482d Port Battalion was
brought in to work the three berths at the
new jetty, while one company and a de-
tachment of the 378th Port Battalion per-
formed technical tasks and supervised
native labor at the old jetty. Ships in the
stream were worked either by soldiers or
by native labor.
Port clearance by truck and rail also
improved. During May 1943 flood dam-
age was sufficiently repaired to enable
MTS to extend its operations to Khorram-
shahr and load directly at the docks,
lighterage berths, or the Russian Dump.
Rail traffic was accelerated under Amer-
ican control, and the availability and vari-
ety of cars increased. In June improved
interior transport permitted the Russian
Dump at Khorramshahr to reduce its
backlog by 17,445 long tons, while Bandar
Shahpur cleared 3,000 tons more than
had been discharged.39
By this time the situation had improved
sufficiently for the Army to begin opera-
tions at the Cheybassi lighterage basin.
The port was officially taken over on
1 July 1943 by a detachment of 120 men
38
Rad, Styer to Somervell, 15 Jul 43; Rpt, Ottzenn
to CG PGSC, 5 Aug 43; Ltr, Connolly to Somervell,
39
Hist Rpt, 9th Port (Mob), Jun 43, OCT HB 9th
400
drawn mainly from the 9th Port and the
378th Port Battalion. Cheybassi handled
petroleum products barged from Abadan
for transshipment to the Soviet Union,
nontruckable USSR cargo lightered across
the stream from Margil, and a small
volume of British military stores. USSR
supplies were forwarded from Cheybassi
by rail. Operations were carried on at
three rail-served wharves, using native
labor with enlisted men supervising,
checking, operating cranes, and perform-
ing other skilled work.40
The other two ports at which American
operations had been contemplated were
never taken over. Low water, slow turn-
around time, and unsuitable cargo-han-
dling equipment caused abandonment of
attempts begun in early 1943 to increase
shipment of Soviet lend-lease and U.S.
Army cargo via the Karun River to the
Ahwaz barge terminal. In July PGSC
ceased river shipments to Ahwaz, divert-
ing traffic to other lighterage ports. Bu-
shire similarly proved of limited value to
the command, Possessing poor facilities
and a long, unimproved trucking route to
the interior, the port received only small
numbers of crated trucks and truckable
cargo during the first half of 1943, and
after July was no longer used for the entry
of USSR cargo.
Beginning in June 1943, cargo landed
monthly at American-operated ports,
with few exceptions, exceeded PGSC tar-
gets. In August more cargo was being dis-
charged and forwarded than could be
handled by Soviet-operated facilities to
the north, and by October the ports' ca-
pacity for landing and clearing cargo ex-
ceeded the amount available. In the latter
month there were vacant berths at Sentab
Jetty for the first time since the beginning
of American operations, and the Bandar
Shahpur jetties were not being used to
capacity.41
The increase in port capacity did not
immediately reduce ships' turnaround
time to normal. The opening of the shorter
Mediterranean route in May 1943, the
substitution of 14-knot and 15-knot ships
for five Liberty vessels, and the shipment
of 40,000 tons of cargo from the United
Kingdom earlier than anticipated caused
a bunching of vessels in the late summer
and fall. During September 1943 the
average turnaround time of ships was
twenty-six days, a considerable improve-
ment over the fifty-eight-day average of
the previous January, but still excessive.
In January 1944, the average number of
ship days in port had been reduced to
fifteen by more efficient co-ordination of
port activities, increased quantities of
mechanical equipment and gear, and bet-
ter operating methods. Of assistance, too,
was the decision to discharge planes at
Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur and
then lighter them back to Abadan, there-
by eliminating delays of three to five days
for ships that previously had stopped first
at Abadan to offload aircraft for the as-
sembly plants. General Gross wrote in
February 1944 that the Persian Gulf at
one time had been "quite a headache,"
but that Connolly's command was now
doing "a superb job" that was "of benefit
to the entire world-wide shipping
problem." 42
40
Monthly Hist Rpts, Cheybassi, Jul-Sep 43, PGF
162, OCMH Files.
41
Hist Rpt, Port of Khorramshahr, Oct 43, PGF
16; Hist Rpt, Port of Bandar Shahpur, Sep 43, PGF
9. Both in OCMH Files.
42
Ltr, Gross to Connolly, 5 Feb 44; Memo, Col
L. W. Finlay for Wylie, 2 Oct 43, sub: Port Discharge
Capacities in the PG; Ltr, Col Creager to Capt D. V.
Brandon, OCT, 31 Jan 44. All in OCT HB Overseas
Opns Gp (Corres). Memo, WSA Russian Div, PG
Position No. 8, 28 May 43, OCT HB PGG WSA Rpts.
 THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
After setting a record of 226,942 long
tons discharged in December 1943, the
two major ports discharged tonnages fluc-
tuating between 71,358 and 213,534 long
tons a month during the first half of 1944.
The reason for this less than capacity per-
formance lay in the over-all strategic situ-
ation. Protocol commitments were being
exceeded. The Pacific route had expanded
beyond expectation, and opportunities
arose in late 1943 and early 1944 to run
convoys to Murmansk, making it unneces-
sary to keep the Persian Gulf pipeline full.
In April 1944 both Bandar Shahpur and
Khorramshahr reported slack periods
caused by a shortage of ships at the port.
Average ship turnaround time was re-
duced to seven days and, although it again
increased as more shipping arrived, the
release of ships never again became a
serious problem.
In this period the ports consistently im-
proved the efficiency of their operations.
Khorramshahr had topped the SOS plan's
discharge goal of 120,000 long tons a
month in November and continued to ex-
ceed that figure when cargo was available.
In April 1944 the port discharged the
William Byrd in 4.4 days, averaging 1,529
long tons per day. Bandar Shahpur did
not reach its discharge goal of 90,000 tons
until July, but only because its capacity
was not fully used. In May the port set a
record for the command when it dis-
charged 4,475 long tons in a single day
from the SS Dorothy Luckenbach, a remark-
able performance made possible by the
employment of an unusually large num-
ber of personnel and amount of equip-
ment discharging easy cargo—bagged
sugar—from eight hatches instead of the
five found on a Liberty ship. 43
Port operations reached their peak in
July, after the closing of the northern route
401
in the spring had brought a heavy increase
in shipments to the Persian Gulf. Despite
temperatures exceeding 100 degrees in the
shade, Khorramshahr discharged 192,761
long tons. During the month Sentab Jetty
completely discharged 28 vessels at the
berths or in the stream; Failiyah Creek
wharf landed over 70,000 tons; and
Khumba Wharf and Customs Jetty to-
gether handled some 11,000 tons. The
Russian Dump, now equipped with seven
large gantry cranes, unloaded 90,000 long
tons and loaded close to 50,000 long tons.
Altogether, over 180,000 long tons were
cleared from the port. Under similar cli-
matic conditions, Bandar Shahpur dis-
charged 95,156 long tons and cleared
93,119 long tons from its five berths, two
lighterage wharves, and storage areas.
Over 90 percent of the cargo handled by
both ports was destined for the Soviet
Union.44
After another month of heavy opera-
tions, port traffic began to decline.
Monthly USSR shipments to the Persian
Gulf from the Western Hemisphere after
June 1944 did not exceed 157,000 long
tons and in December totaled only 67,497
45
long tons. As ship arrivals fell off,
secondary ports were closed, and continu-
ing activities were concentrated at Khor-
ramshahr.
Cheybassi was the first port to close.
Originally intended to develop a capacity
of 30,000 long tons a month, the lighterage
basin was never called upon to handle
more than 19,840 long tons, mainly tanks
and nontruckable equipment lightered
43
Monthly Hist Rcd, Gulf District, Apr and May
44, PGF 13, OCMH Files.
44
Hist Rcd, Gulf District, Jul 44, PGF 13; Hist Rpt,
Port of Bandar Shahpur, Jul 44, PGF 9; Hist Rpt,
Khorramshahr Port, Jul 44, PGF 16. All in OCMH
Files.
45
Motter, op. cit., App. A, Table 1.
402
from Margil and petroleum products
barged from Abadan. The immediate
cause for closing Cheybassi was the end of
Soviet-aid activities at Basra, the chief
source of its cargo. Basra had discharged
approximately 446,000 long tons of USSR
cargo over the Margil wharves between
June 1943 and September 1944, forward-
ing truckable tonnage over the Khanaqin
route and moving heavier equipment
across the river to Cheybassi. With the
abandonment of the Khanaqin route in
the fall of 1944, all USSR cargo was as-
signed to Khorramshahr and Bandar
Shahpur. Continuing traffic, consisting of
drummed alkylate and cumene barged
from Abadan, was diverted to Failiyah
Creek, and effective control of Cheybassi
was returned to the British late in Septem-
ber. Formal transfer was made in No-
vember.46
Bandar Shahpur was the next to termi-
nate operations. The failure to receive any
USSR cargo in October 1944 gave notice
that the ports' active days were num-
bered. Only light traffic was handled in
the following month, and in December
35,876 long tons of USSR and British
cargo were discharged, all USSR cargo
was cleared from the port, and prepara-
tions were made to evacuate men and
equipment. Port operations ceased in
January 1945, and personnel departed for
Khorramshahr or Ahwaz, leaving behind
only a small caretaker detachment. 47
In February 1945 the Gulf District,
which had moved from Basra to Ahwaz in
September 1943, was abolished and a sep-
arate Port Service headquarters was
established at Khorramshahr. Colonel
Dodenhoff was appointed director of Port
Service and, in addition, was authorized
to perform most of the duties formerly
carried on by the commander of the Gulf
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
District.48 The 9th Port, which had staffed
Gulf District headquarters, moved to
Khorramshahr where it was merged with
its detachment there, ending the disper-
sion begun in December 1942. Previously,
detachments from Cheybassi and Bandar
Shahpur had returned to their parent
unit.
The concentration of activities at Khor-
ramshahr did not halt the general decline
in traffic handled by that port. In March
1945 the port discharged only 30,216 long
tons from seven ships at Sentab Jetty;
Failiyah Creek activities were at a low
ebb; operations at Customs Jetty and
Khumba Wharf had been discontinued;
and the Russian Dump had been cleared
of all USSR cargo. The evacuation of sur-
plus American equipment was assuming
some importance but drew on only a small
part of the port's capacity.
As traffic decreased, operations were
curtailed and port units were shipped out.
By 31 May the 9th Port had been alerted
for oversea movement and only one of the
four port battalions, the 378th, remained
on active duty. With the official end of the
Soviet-aid mission in June, Failiyah Creek
wharf was returned to the British and ar-
rangements were completed for a civilian
stevedore firm to handle British and civil-
ian cargo. Sentab Jetty was retained by
46
Monthly Hist Rpts, Gulf District, Sep-Nov 44,
PGF 13, OCMH Files.
47
Monthly Hist Rpts, Port of Bandar Shahpur,
Oct-Dec 44, PGF 9; Hist Rpt, Gulf District, Jan 45,
PGF 13. Both in OCMH Files.
48
Colonel Booth had served as Director of Ports
and Commander, Gulf District, until 17 November
1943, when he was succeeded by Col. Theodore G.
Osborne. Osborne served until 31 October 1944, when
command was assumed by Col. Bernard A.Johnson.
When Gulf District was abolished, Colonel Dodenhoff
became Director, Port Service, and Commander, 9th
Port. Dodenhoff was succeeded on 23 May 1945 by
Col. Harry C. Vickers.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 403

the U.S. Army for the evacuation of formidable task. Notwithstanding the rail-
American troops and equipment. 49 road's recent construction, it presented
In the period from January 1943 many obstacles to expanded operations.
through May 1945, Khorramshahr and Equipment had been augmented under
Bandar Shahpur discharged a total of British operation, but was insufficient to
3,900,815 long tons, the bulk of which was handle the greatly increased traffic. Loco-
consigned to the Soviet Union. In addi- motives were without headlights and some
tion, Cheybassi, while in American hands, of them were almost toylike in comparison
landed 234,922 long tons initially dis- with American equipment. The majority
charged elsewhere. The U.S. Army had of the freight cars lacked brakes, while
inherited a backlog of shipping, partially many of the others were hand-braked.
developed port facilities, and an inade- The entire line was laid with light rail,
quate interior transport system. These which under heavy wartime traffic kinked,
factors, together with shortages of men buckled, and ran. Communications be-
and equipment, at first retarded expan- tween stations were poor. Lacking an
sion of port operations but after the first automatic signal system, the railroad was
months of 1943 the ports steadily im- operated on the block system, whereby a
proved their performance, providing in train was not permitted to pass from one
time an efficient bridge between the sea- section to the next until the stationmaster
going vessel and rail and truck transport had ascertained by telephone that the line
to the interior. ahead was clear.
Other difficulties arose from climatic
The Military Railway Service and geographic conditions. The desert sec-
tion in the south was subject to rains and
The existence of a railroad connecting floods in the spring and was hot and dry in
the Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea was the summer and fall. The mountainous
a basic consideration in the decision to de- section north of Andimeshk was a bottle-
velop the Persian Corridor as a primary neck affecting the entire line. Trains ar-
supply route to the USSR. Counting on riving from the south had to be "rebuilt"
the Iranian State Railway to bear the to provide sufficient braked cars to assure
brunt of mounting Soviet-aid tonnages as safe operation. Trains moving north had
well as civilian and British and American to be pulled by two engines and were
military traffic, the CCS approved a goal limited in the tonnage they could carry.
of 6,000 long tons a day, nearly four times Snow in the high mountain passes, land-
the line's performance in the latter part of slides, and long, poorly ventilated tunnels
1942, as the total to be hauled northward all impeded effective operation. Through-
from Andimeshk. To implement this out the line the chronic water shortage
decision, the U.S. Army provided a rail- made it difficult to obtain an adequate
way force ultimately numbering approxi- supply for locomotives.
mately 4,000 and imported substantial 49
Monthly Hist Rpts, Port Sv, Feb-Jul 45, PGF 26,
amounts of motive power and rolling OCMH Files.
stock.50
50
Unless otherwise cited, the account of Army op-
eration of the Iranian State Railway is based on the
In assuming control and operation of following in Motter, op. cit., Ch. XVII, and HOTI
the ISR, the U.S. Army undertook a Hist, Pt. V.
404 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Moreover, the U.S. Army was faced British portion of the line on 1 April 1943,
with the task of supervising a civilian rail- the MRS reached the CCS goal of 180,000
way force averaging 15,000 in number long tons a month in November, and in
and consisting of 30,000 employees at its the month of September 1944 delivered
peak. Not only were the Americans re- more tonnage to the Russians than they
quired to overcome language difficulties had received in all of 1942. Of the 5,149,-
and gain the co-operation of the ISR man- 376 long tons delivered to the Russians
agement and workers, in order to keep through the Persian Corridor in the period
trains running they also found it necessary from 1 January 1942 through 31 May
to enter such fields as the sale and dis- 1943, a total of 2,989,079 tons was carried
tribution of food, local procurement, and by rail. Roughly nine tenths of the rail de-
accounting. The Iranians, accustomed to liveries were made during the period of
practices often archaic and lax, did not American operation.51
always appreciate American efforts to in-
crease the efficiency of operations. The Organization of American
The Iranians were but one of four inter- Rail Operations
ested parties. Close co-operation with the
British was required during the transi- Active preparations for American rail
tional period, and afterward, although the operations began with Colonel Yount's ar-
British were primarily responsible for the rival at Basra on 5 October 1942. At this
security of the line, the Americans found it time military railway units were being set
necessary to supplement their effort to pre- up in the United States for duty in Iran.
vent sabotage, brigandage, and pilferage. The 711th Railway Operating Battalion,
The Russians, as the recipients of the bulk activated in June 1941, was ready for ship-
of the tonnage carried by the line, also ment. A second operating battalion, the
were vitally interested in security meas- 730th, had been activated in May 1942
ures. Even more important, the Americans and was in training. Each battalion was
had to co-ordinate their operations with reinforced with three extra track mainte-
those of the Russians, who controlled the nance platoons. The 702d Railway Grand
ISR north of Tehran. Failures in the north Division and the 754th and 762d Railway
could delay the return of cars to the south Shop Battalions were all activated on 15
and handicap the line between Tehran October 1942 and given brief military
and the ports. The necessity for dealing training before shipment.52
with Iranians, British, and Russians in- As these units were activated, selected
evitably made operations far more com- personnel departed by air for Basra. With
plicated than if the Americans had as- this advance party, Yount undertook a
sumed sole responsibility.
These difficulties make the ISR's per- 51
Unless otherwise noted, statistics on rail opera-
formance under American operation all tions are based on Motter, op. cit., App. A, Table 5,
"Freight Hauled by Rail North of Andimeshk, August
the more remarkable. During 1942, while 1942-May 1945."
in British hands, the railroad had hauled 52
Mil Hist, 711th Ry Operating Bn, PGF 45A; Hist
212,000 long tons north of Andimeshk, of Rcd, 713th Ry Operating Bn, PGF 94A; Mil Hist,
762d Ry Diesel Shop Bn, 13 Apr 45, PGF 60C; Rpt,
which 162,655 tons were delivered to the Mil Hist, MRS PGSC (through Feb 43), PGF 132.
Russians at Tehran. Taking over the entire All in OCMH Files.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
preliminary survey of the line, studied
operations, selected camp sites, and ar-
ranged for the gradual process of taking
over. In December, as the time for begin-
ning operations drew near, Yount moved
his headquarters from Basra to Ahwaz.
Operations were begun soon after the
arrival of the 711th Railway Operating
Battalion at Khorramshahr on 12 Decem-
ber 1942. The battalion took over the line
between Khorramshahr and Ahwaz on
1 January 1943 and gradually extended
its activities until by the 18th it was oper-
ating 363 miles of main and branch line
between Dorud in the north and Bandar
Shahpur in the south. The 730th Railway
Operating Battalion arrived late in the
month and moved into stations along the
line between Dorud and Tehran, taking
over that division between 27 and 29
March 1943.
Meanwhile, the 702d Railway Grand
Division, assigned as the Military Railway
Service headquarters, had arrived late in
January and moved to Tehran, where
Yount finally made his headquarters. On
9 February Yount formally assumed com-
mand as Director and General Manager,
Military Railway Service, and Com-
mander, 702d Railway Grand Division.
Staff sections were established to handle
administration, transportation, engineer-
ing, supply, and equipment. To deal with
problems peculiar to the ISR, additional
sections were created to handle security
and safety, labor and public relations, and,
later, accounting.
Yount's headquarters immediately
swung into action. A new book of operat-
ing rules was prepared to co-ordinate
Iranian operations with American prac-
tices. Switch engines were assigned and
track improvements were started at the
ports and rail yards to expedite car han-
405
dling. Surveys were made of water facili-
ties, truck construction, sidings, tunnels,
and bridges, and plans were laid for the
installation of diesel fuel oil storage tanks.
MRS also took over responsibility for the
erection of locomotives and rolling stock
and prepared for the introduction of the
new diesels into ISR operations.
The two shop battalions arrived in Iran
early in March. The 754th Railway Shop
Battalion moved to Tehran, taking over
the ISR's principal locomotive and car re-
pair shops. The 762d Railway Shop Bat-
talion (Diesel), leaving a detachment at
Khorramshahr to handle the erection of
diesel locomotives that were beginning to
arrive, moved to Ahwaz and took over the
shop and wagon assembly facilities there.
Detachments were sent to Bandar Shah-
pur, Andimeshk, and Sultanabad to in-
struct battalion engine men in the use of
the diesels. In mid-April both shop battal-
ions were reported to have taken hold in
excellent fashion.53
Although the U.S. Army took over full
responsibility for the operation and main-
tenance of the ISR between the Persian
Gulf ports and Tehran on 1 April 1943
and one month later, when the Anglo-
American movements control agreement
went into effect, also assumed control over
priorities, the scheduling of trains, and the
distribution of rolling stock, these transfers
left unresolved two vital matters. One in-
volved the question whether the Ameri-
cans had also taken over from the British
responsibility for guaranteeing the ISR an
annual net profit. The matter of financial
responsibility was the subject of prolonged
controversy, but it never interfered with
railway operations.54 Of greater conse-
53
Hist, MRS, Mar-15 Apr 43, PGF 132, OCMH
Files.
54
For details see Motter, op. cit., pp. 339-46.
406
quence was the fact that since the United
States was not a signatory to the Tri-
Partite Treaty of January 1942, it had no
legal basis for its presence in Iran. Both
the Russians and Iranians questioned
whether this was not a breach of Iran's
sovereignty.
Efforts to arrive at a four-power agree-
ment defining the status of the American
command in general and the railway oper-
ation in particular were inconclusive, and
the matter was never settled satisfactorily.
In effect, the Americans in Iran were
guests of the British and dependent on the
acquiescence of the other two powers. On
occasion, this proved embarrassing. Colo-
nel Yount reported in April 1943 that the
Russians were refusing to admit that the
Americans were in operational control
pending a formal agreement. 55 In time,
however, Russian suspicion diminished
and few difficulties arose on this account.
With regard to the Iranians, the Ameri-
cans were fortunate in finding in the ISR
director-general, Mr. Hossain Nafisi, an
official who, despite criticism from many
governmental quarters, gave his full co-
operation to the U.S. Army.
The MRS organization was rounded
out on 1 May 1943. Until that time the
711th Railway Operating Battalion had
jurisdiction over 363 miles and the 730th
operated 289 miles. Since the normal oper-
ating battalion was set up to handle from
60 to 120 miles of single track, it was self-
evident that these units were overex-
tended. The command therefore activated
the 1st Provisional (later the 791st) Rail-
way Operating Battalion, drawing on rail-
way units already in the field. The rail
line was then divided into three divisions,
each under the jurisdiction of a railway
operating battalion. The divisions, super-
vised by battalion headquarters at Tehran,
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Andimeshk, and Ahwaz, respectively,
varied from 199 to 266 miles in length.
These operating divisions were directly
responsible to the MRS director, as were
56
the shop battalions.
By the end of June 1943 almost all of
the MRS force, aggregating 3,821 troops,
was on the ground. Thereafter, troop
strength fluctuated, reaching a peak of
4,051 in late 1944. The staff sections and
operating divisions continued in existence
until the completion of the U.S. Army
mission. Only one other important change
was effected. From its arrival in Iran, the
702d Railway Grand Division had acted
as MRS headquarters. This was officially
recognized by the War Department on
10 April 1944, when the 702d was inacti-
vated and reconstituted as the 3d Military
Railway Service.
Command of MRS continued to be
exercised by Colonel Yount until May
1944, when he left to head American rail
operations in CBI. Yount had seen the
organization through its most critical
period and left MRS ready for peak oper-
ations under his successor, Col. (later Brig.
Gen.) Frank S. Besson, Jr., who stayed on
as director until May 1945. Besson was
succeeded in turn by Col. Audrey M.
Bruce and Lt. Col. L. D. Curtis, who
headed the MRS operation in its final
stages.
The Development of Operations
During the first months of operation
MRS, like Port Service, experienced diffi-
culty in meeting PGSC targets. ISR
traffic north of Andimeshk and deliveries
55
Ltr, Yount to Col J. A. Appleton, Chief of Ry Sec
OCT, 28 Apr 43, OCT HB PGC 3d MRS.
56
Rpts, MRS PGSC, Ry Opns, Apr, May, and Jul
43, PGF 132, OCMH Files.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
to the Russians fell short of estimates, and
rail clearance failed to keep pace with port
discharge. Although effecting moderate
increases in traffic in early 1943, the ISR
fell short of its target for USSR deliveries
in March, hauling only 28,181 long tons
of Russian-aid supplies north of Andi-
meshk in contrast with 33,585 tons in
February.
The March shortfall was in part caused
by a flood that washed out a section of the
Khorramshahr-Ahwaz line. This catas-
trophe, together with a train wreck and a
second flood crest, virtually halted traffic
northward from Khorramshahr during
the last ten days of the month. At the same
time, the scarcity of food in this area made
it almost impossible to recruit native labor
to repair and maintain the line. MRS
solved this problem by providing rations
for ISR employees south of Ahwaz.
While the Americans were coping with
wrecks and floods in the south, the Rus-
sians were having serious difficulties in the
north due to heavy rains and snowstorms.
They refused to accept trains from Tehran
for 24-hour to 48-hour periods, thereby
delaying car turnaround and causing a
shortage of empty cars in the south. 57 To
deal with this problem, Yount and three
other American officers met with Soviet
officials in Tehran on 22 March. The rep-
resentatives of both nations agreed to take
all possible steps to reduce car turnaround.
In order to place damaged sections of the
line back in service, joint approval was
given immediately to the temporary as-
signment of railway cars to haul track-
ballasting materials for repairs on the
Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur lines
as well as those north of Tehran. The
Americans agreed to furnish locomotives
to assist Soviet train movements and of-
fered to turn over, upon their repair,
407
deadlined locomotives belonging to the
ISR.
At this meeting, Yount also proposed a
system of car assignment by territory and
according to types of car and freight. The
Russians professed general satisfaction
with the allocations, but apparently were
reluctant to recognize the Americans'
authority to make car assignments pend-
ing a formal operating agreement. At a
second meeting on 19 April, car assign-
ments were again considered. The Rus-
sians requested that the target for tonnage
north of Andimeshk be increased, but the
U.S. representatives maintained that the
target assumed a turnaround of twenty-
two days between the ports and Soviet
transfer points to the north, a figure below
current turnaround time. Until over-all
car turnaround improved, MRS could not
use a lower figure for estimating purposes.
Despite the inconclusiveness of these meet-
ings with regard to car allotments, they
marked the beginning of closer co-oper-
ation. In time, car assignments and ton-
nage targets were worked out satisfac-
torily, and MRS officers were permitted
to observe loading practices and other op-
erations on the northern portion of the
line.58
After the March setback, rail traffic
mounted steadily. In April the USSR re-
ceived at Tehran more rail freight than in
any previous month, although only 85
percent of the target was attained. Targets
for deliveries were exceeded during the
next three months, but the heavy increase
in traffic from the south proved too much
for the Russians to handle. The Tehran
yards became congested, loads had to be
stored south of Tehran, car turnaround
57
See Yount ltr cited n. 55.
58
OCT HB Monograph 25, pp. 155-59; Mil Hist,
MRS PGSC, Oct 43, PGF 132, OCMH Files.
408
lagged, and a critical car shortage devel-
oped at the Army-operated ports. To give
the Russians an opportunity to catch up,
an embargo on the loading of cars for
Bandar Shah was placed on the American
ports between 8 and 18 August. With the
relief of congestion in the north, the em-
bargo was lifted, and a more normal flow
of traffic was resumed.59
Although it never again reached such
serious proportions, the problem of getting
the Russians promptly to lift the tonnage
delivered by MRS persisted. The Amer-
icans continued to loan locomotives to the
Soviet sector of the ISR, providing a total
of seventy-six in 1943, and made available
an increasing number of air-braked cars
for operation over the Elburz Mountain
section. To make these air-braked cars
available without placing an unduly
heavy burden on reclassification facilities
in the Tehran yards, MRS began to make
up trains at Andimeshk consisting of cars
destined for the same locations in the
Soviet zone. By this and other means,
MRS increased the percentage of air-
braked cars for Soviet operation from fif-
teen to seventy. In the case of tank cars,
average turnaround time from Khorram-
shahr was reduced from thirty days in July
1943 to ten days in 1944 by organizing
them into special trains and giving prior-
ity to the movement of gasoline for the
USSR. These measures, together with a
tightening of Russian operations, resulted
in a gradual improvement in over-all car
turnaround and a continued increase in
traffic.
After August 1943 MRS never again
failed to meet monthly targets for deliv-
eries to Tehran or, with minor exceptions,
for total tonnage movements north of
Andimeshk. The ISR began to outstrip
the combined USSR deliveries of Amer-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ican, British, and Soviet trucking agencies,
and rail and motor transport increasingly
exhibited an ability to keep pace with port
discharge. The original goal of 6,000 long
tons a day was exceeded in December,
when the ISR hauled 199,255 long tons
north of Andimeshk. The railroad was
now able to handle all tonnage offered.
The ISR's improved performance dur-
ing 1943 reflects the application of Amer-
ican "know-how" to ISR operations. New
operating and safety rules had been intro-
duced and an effective waybilling system
instituted. Although the Iranian block sys-
tem was retained, American personnel
took over dispatching duties at main and
wayside stations.60 To facilitate operations
at the Tehran yards, a procedure was in-
troduced whereby the "consist" of each
train leaving Andimeshk was teletyped to
Tehran, the message showing the number,
contents, and destination of each car in
the train. This procedure facilitated as-
signment of tracks to trains, inspection,
and make-up of trains according to desti-
nation and braking requirements. The
making up of trains at Andimeshk, already
mentioned, further simplified operations
at Tehran and speeded car turnaround.
These operating improvements were
accompanied by an improvement of the
physical plant. Water facilities and diesel
storage tanks were built or improved; ad-
ditional passing tracks were installed and
new trackage was constructed at freight
yards, ports, and rail-to-truck transfer
points; and engine sheds, sanding houses,
and warehouses were erected. Early atten-
tion was given to renewing ties, reballast-
ing, anchoring rail, and repairing dam-
59
Rpt, MRS PGG, Ry Opns, Jul 43, and Mil Hist,
MRS PGC, Aug 43, PGF 132, OCMH Files.
60
Hist, 791st Ry Operating Bn, PGF 120E, OCMH
Files.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
aged tunnels and bridges. With the arrival
of Signal Corps troops, work was begun
on improving or installing railway signal
communications. By the end of the year
telephone, teletype, and telegraph com-
munications were satisfactory, although
hampered by wire thefts along the line.
Meanwhile, American shop battalion
troops, with native labor supervised and
trained by them, had placed a greatly in-
creased amount of equipment in service
through erection and repair. By 10 July
1943 all of the fifty-seven 246-ton 1,000-
horsepower diesel locomotives ordered for
Iran had arrived from the United States
and had been assembled and placed in
operation. From the outset, they lived up
to expectation. Because of their low water
consumption they were not handicapped
by the inadequate water facilities along
the route, and their light exhaust made
for safer passage through the tunneled
mountain section. American lend-lease
Mikado steam locomotives had begun ar-
riving late in 1942, and assembly was
started by the British. The Americans
took over this job, and by August 1943
had erected the eighty-ninth of ninety-one
Mikados shipped from the United States.
By the year's end all motive power had
been erected, except eight small switch
engines which arrived later, and in addi-
tion 2,100 freight cars were assembled. 61
The railway shop personnel also turned
out a growing volume of repair work and
introduced modifications in equipment to
assure safer and more efficient operation.
During 1943 the number of cars repaired
increased from 144 in June to 2,404 in
December. Although the latter were
largely light running repairs, they indicate
the increasing productivity of the MRS
shops. In the same period 854 cars were
provided with air brakes, 1,076 were
409
equipped with heavy coupling and friction
gear, and cabooses were converted for use
as Red Cross, PX, dental, and chaplains'
cars. Modifications were made in the
Mikados to adapt them to the difficult op-
erating conditions. In the beginning the
shop battalions, short of tools and spare
parts, had to rely on ISR tools and much
improvisation to keep work going. The
arrival in mid-1943 of parts and tools re-
lieved shortages, although such items as
62
car wheels and axles continued scarce.
Rail traffic increased through January
1944 and then fluctuated with cargo avail-
able at the ports. During July, when MRS
celebrated the delivery of its 1,500,000th
ton to the USSR, the railroad hauled a
record of 233,132 long tons north of Andi-
meshk. On the ISR traffic was heavy dur-
ing the rest of the year, limited only by the
amount of cargo being discharged at the
ports. With the discontinuance of the
Motor Transport Service on 1 December,
the railroad carried all tonnage delivered
to the Soviet Union, other than assembled
trucks and cargo moved along the high-
way by the Russians.
During 1944 operational practices were
standardized and perfected, and increas-
ing attention was given to the mainte-
nance of way and the improvement of
equipment. One innovation, designed to
cut car turnaround time, involved mak-
ing up trains at the ports instead of
Andimeshk. Also, Iranians were trained
on diesel locomotives and operated them
under the supervision of American con-
ductor-pilots. Language difficulties dimin-
ished, and MRS and ISR personnel were
working co-operatively side by side.
61
Mil Hist, 762d Ry Diesel Shop Bn, 15 Oct 42-
31 Dec 43, PGF 60, and Rpts, MRS PGSC, Ry Opns,
Aug-Dec 43, PGF 132, OCMH Files.
62
Monthly Mil Hists and Rpts of Ry Opns, MRS
PGSC, 1943, PGF 132, OCMH Files.
410
Factors in the MRS Achievement
The ISR's impressive record under
American operation can in large measure
be attributed to improved operating
methods and maintenance, but augmen-
tation of motive power and rolling stock
also played a significant part. In the
spring of 1943 there were 240 locomotives
and 5,088 freight and work cars on the
ISR. By the summer of 1945, there had
been added 2,906 American railway cars,
the majority of them air-braked, 57 U.S.
Army diesel locomotives, 91 lend-lease
Mikado steam engines, and 8 U.S. Army
45-ton diesel switchers.63
In part, the success of the rail operation
was also the result of the favorable solu-
tion of several unanticipated problems for
which no provision had been made in set-
ting up the MRS organization. One of the
most chronic of these was the prevention
of pilferage, banditry, and sabotage. Al-
though the British were primarily respon-
sible for this function, MRS found it
necessary to set up a supplementary
Security and Safety Section in February
1943. Arms and ammunition, tires, copper
wire, brass, sugar, and other U.S. Army
and Soviet-aid materials were inviting
loot and were highly prized on the black
market. Moreover, the threat of sabotage
was ever present. In August 1943 British
security forces arrested some fifty ISR em-
ployees, including a number of key offi-
cials, for active pro-Nazi sympathies. As a
result of these arrests, not a single official
remained in charge on the Sultanabad
division, on which 3,000 Iranians were
employed.
Although sabotage was held in check,
car pilferage persisted, becoming increas-
ingly serious in the latter part of 1943.
Some Americans were involved, and when
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
detected they were court-martialed. Far
more serious were thefts by organized
bands and individual Iranians. To deal
with this situation, Iranian Army units
were stationed along the line, Soviet
guards were placed on trains running
north of Andimeshk, and monthly secu-
rity meetings of American, British, and
Soviet representatives were held. Self-
locking American car seals were put into
use in February 1944, and later American
guards were assigned to trains carrying
PGC cargo. Security in shops and camps
was tightened by installing a system of
button and card identification for Iranian
laborers.
These measures had some beneficial
effects, for in April 1944, for the first time,
no PGC cargo was pilfered in transit.
That the over-all problem was not solved
was indicated by the resumption of loot-
ing raids south of Andimeshk and con-
tinued large-scale thefts of wire along the
line. Wire thefts were finally curtailed
after the Signal Corps installed a "tattle
tale" system giving instant warning of in-
terrupted circuits. Although pilferage was
never completely eliminated, the Russians
were able to report in August 1944 that it
was currently at the lowest point since
USSR supplies had started moving over
the ISR.
MRS early encountered a problem in
labor relations. 64 When the Americans
took over, they found a disgruntled civil-
ian force on the ISR. The scarcity of food,
63
Rpt, Lt Col L. D. Curtis, Exec Officer, Hq MRS
PGC, to CG PGC, 31 May 45, sub: Aids and Favors
to Iranians, PGF 132, OCMH Files; PGC Dispatch,
souvenir ed., 1 Aug 45, p. 8, OCT HB PGC Misc;
OCT HB Monograph 25, pp. 36-37, 58.
64
On MRS labor relations activities see Rpt, Maj
Henry Dawes, TC, ISR Liaison Officer MRS, to Col
Cooper, Civ Pers Officer, 12 Jan 45, sub: Rpt of Labor
Sec, 3d MRS, PGF 132, OCMH Files.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
spiraling inflation, unwieldy regulations,
and poor personnel administration had
produced much discontent and threatened
to result in work stoppages and decreased
recruitment. Because of these circum-
stances, MRS created a Labor and Public
Relations Section in February 1943.
The section's first task was to deal with
the labor shortage in the desert section
south of Ahwaz, caused principally by a
lack of food. The problem was solved
when the Labor Section in March 1943
arranged for ISR employees in the area to
purchase at a nominal charge a ration of
sugar, tea, and flour provided by the
Army. Later the charge was eliminated
and the ration was provided free. No
serious labor shortage again developed on
the lines south of Ahwaz.
The food problem was acute all along
the line. At Tehran, where the lack of
bread and other subsistence caused a large
number of worker absences, the Labor
Section arranged for the ISR to distribute
government-rationed bread to its em-
ployees. This distribution, supervised by
the Labor Section, reached a peak of
12,500 loaves a day. The Labor Section
also reorganized the previously inefficient
ISR Food Department, extending its
activities to include the purchase and re-
sale of cloth, clothes, and fuel as well as
food. In twenty months after the reorgan-
ization, sales totaled 67,116,000 rials
($2,147,700). The program helped keep
wages down, encouraged labor recruit-
ment, and kept employees healthy enough
to work.
Other Labor Section efforts were aimed
at correcting inequities in the ISR's wage
and classification system. Many skilled
and semiskilled employees were drifting
away because their wages had not kept
pace with rising living costs. Older, ex-
411
perienced employees received low wages,
while new employees, who were hired in a
competitive market, were engaged at
higher levels. Thus, men doing the same
job side by side were receiving different
wages. MRS arranged with the ISR to
adjust wages up to the authorized mini-
mum for each job classification, and, as
evidence of good faith, immediate adjust-
ment was made in the wages of one cate-
gory of workers.
The task of adjusting wages required a
complete reorganization of the job classi-
fication system. When the Americans
commenced operation, there were no
satisfactory lists of workers or statistics re-
garding such information as date of em-
ployment, salary, and job classifications.
Lists, prepared by Iranians, were full of
errors and omissions, and those who paid
were put down at higher grades. Under
the Labor Section's supervision, person-
nel files were reorganized, new lists were
compiled, and orders were issued for pro-
motion, pay increase, and wage adjust-
ment covering 8,899 employees.
Another difficulty arose from excessive
employee transfers and dismissals, in some
cases contrary to the best interests of the
MRS. In July 1943 the Labor Section se-
cured an agreement with the ISR requir-
ing mutual consent on all hirings, trans-
fers, and discharges. Later, MRS adopted
the practice of transferring to its payroll
any employee whom the ISR wished to
discharge but whom MRS deemed
essential.
A new problem arose in late 1943 when
several strikes were threatened, due pri-
marily to fear that the ISR would not pay
a high cost-of-living bonus authorized for
all government employees. The strikes
were averted by having the ISR publish
a notice promising payment. The first
412
monthly installment was paid in Decem-
ber and the crisis passed. At this time at-
tempts were being made to organize ISR
employees, but the unions apparently
were opposed to strikes or to interference
with the movement of war materials to
the Soviet Union. MRS personnel occa-
sionally met with union leaders, reported
few unreasonable requests, and acted on
some of their recommendations. Only two
strikes, both minor, occurred during 1944.
These were confined to Tehran and were
speedily settled.
The varied labor problems encountered
by MRS were solved by a competent
though improvised staff, assisted by civil-
ian interpreters and other employees.
Nevertheless, MRS experience indicated
that the War Department should make
provision for trained labor and personnel
men in MRS units in the field whenever a
large group of civilians was used in rail-
way operation.
MRS also found it necessary to inter-
pret its services to the Iranian public. To
correct the widespread misapprehension,
fostered by a segment of the press and
some government officials, that Allied op-
eration of the ISR had disrupted the civil-
ian economy and damaged the railroad,
MRS in December 1944 arranged for a
tour of the Tehran yards and shops by
representatives of sixty-five Iranian news-
papers, along with Soviet officers and offi-
cials of the ISR and the Ministry of
Roads. During the tour, ISR accomplish-
ments under Allied operation were pointed
out, and the visitors were able to see the
railroad at work. Another tour was ar-
ranged in May 1945 for the Shah and
other Iranian dignitaries and officials.
As in the case of security and labor and
public relations, there was no provision for
accounting personnel in the initial MRS
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
organization. The need early became evi-
dent. ISR accounting was inefficient,
erroneous, and considerably in arrears.
Requisitioning four qualified officers from
the United States, MRS set up an Ac-
counting Section in June 1943. Under its
guidance the ISR effected numerous im-
provements. Material accounting, previ-
ously six to eight months in arrears, was
centralized and brought up to date; bank-
ing procedures were improved; records
were made current and more accurate;
and a new time system was introduced in
two ISR departments whereby employees
were paid only for the time worked. The
section also instituted a program for
authenticating ISR waybills to facilitate
the checking of charges; and to insure final
settlement of accounts, it abstracted all
waybills prepared at ISR stations since
the beginning of Allied traffic, eventually
compiling a complete transcription of all
bills rendered against the Allied govern-
ments and of all payments received.
One other activity in which MRS en-
gaged was that of local procurement.
Lacking a dependable source in Iran,
MRS relied largely on the United States
for railway maintenance supplies. These
were requisitioned through Army chan-
nels from the Charleston Port of Embar-
kation and paid for by the ISR. Arrival of
tools, spare parts, and other supplies in
mid-1943 relieved many of the acute
shortages, but it still proved necessary to
supplement these materials through local
purchase. Under supervision of the MRS
Stores Department and later a separate
Purchase Section, ISR purchases were fa-
cilitated through the elimination of time-
consuming routines, and overpayment was
avoided through a study of price trends
and other marketing data. In addition, a
variety of common items of supply was ob-
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 413

tained from the Iranian Government bassi and Bandar Shahpur, and only
State Supply and Service Corporation limited rail service to those ports was being
and other state agencies, permitting MRS maintained. During April 1945 traffic was
to avoid purchasing in the local market or at its lowest ebb since the Americans had
requisitioning from the United States. begun operations. Indeed, as surplus rail
A radical change in procedures ap- and other PGC materials began moving
peared in the offing when the War De- to Khorramshahr for evacuation, south-
partment in early 1944 recommended that bound traffic for the first time was com-
66
railway maintenance supplies be procured parable to northward movements.
from U.S. lend-lease materials provided Upon the termination of the PGC mis-
to the Iranian Government. To this pro- sion on 1 June, MRS speedily ended its
posal General Connolly vigorously dis- operations. The ISR was transferred on
sented, arguing that the resultant inter- 25 June to the British, who promptly re-
jection of Iranian politics and business turned it to the Iranian Government.
methods might well jeopardize his com- With the exception of a small detachment
mand's mission. As a case in point, he re- assigned to handle the dismantling of
viewed the efforts to obtain railway ties, equipment, all railway personnel were
begun in September 1943. It had been readied for evacuation. The 3d MRS was
necessary to deal in turn with the ISR, the discontinued on 15 July and the job of dis-
Ministry of Communications, under posing of locomotives and rolling stock
which the ISR operated, and the Minis- was assigned to the new Military Railway
try of Agriculture, which controlled the Division at PGC headquarters.
cutting of lumber. Primarily because offi-
cials in each of the three agencies were The Motor Transport Service
interested in getting their so-called per-
quisites, no ties had been delivered by The third major American transporta-
February 1944. In the end, the PGC pro- tion activity, motor transport, was de-
curement officer purchased the ties on the signed primarily to supplement the ISR
open market, turned them over to the and British and Soviet operated trucks in
ISR, and requested reimbursement. At hauling Soviet-aid goods from the Persian
Connolly's request, MRS continued to Gulf to Soviet transfer points in northern
rely mainly on Army channels for the rail- Iran. Providing additional interior trans-
road's supply, supplemented by local port capacity, the American trucking
procurement.65 service also afforded a measure of protec-
tion against interruption to the railroad
The Termination of MRS Operations and made possible deliveries to destina-
tions not served by rail. Secondary mis-
As 1945 opened, substantial tonnages sions of the service included the transport
were still being moved by the ISR, but the of U.S. Army supplies that could not
sharp decline in ship arrivals soon made otherwise be carried, the performance of
itself felt. In February USSR freight de-
liveries were the smallest since August 65
OCT HB Monograph 25, pp. 184-85.
1943. By this time MRS personnel had 66
Monthly Mil Hists, 3d MRS, Sep 44, Jan-May
been removed from the terminals at Chey- 45, PGF 132, OCMH Files.
414
heavier maintenance work on all PGSC
vehicles, and the supervision of all vehicle
maintenance in the command. 67
Preparations for the establishment of an
American trucking operation in Iran got
under way on 9 October 1942, with the
activation of a Motor Transport Service
headquarters at Camp Lee, Virginia. Col.
Mark V. Brunson assumed command and,
with the assistance of two other regular
Army officers, quickly brought the unit
up to its authorized strength of 121 officers
and enlisted men. Three civilians experi-
enced in commercial trucking operations
and maintenance were commissioned and
assigned to the unit. Remaining personnel
were drawn from Army sources.
After setting up MTS headquarters
Brunson, accompanied by his transporta-
tion experts, proceeded to Washington to
confer with Headquarters 1616 and SOS
officials. There, it was decided that the ex-
tensive use of native labor that was con-
templated would require white truck
units to provide the necessary supervision
and control. Consequently, the War De-
partment granted authority to recruit two
white truck regiments, less one battalion,
through truck associations in the United
States. In order to get some drivers to Iran
as soon as possible, PGSC accepted one
trained Negro battalion that was avail-
able for early shipment. This organiza-
tion, the 3d Battalion, 26th Quartermas-
ter Truck Regiment, left the United States
in December and arrived in Iran late in
January 1943.68
Following this decision Brunson ar-
ranged with the American Trucking Asso-
ciations to recruit white personnel through
its affiliates. The 516th Quartermaster
Truck Regiment was activated in Novem-
ber 1942 and, with the exception of the
regimental commander and a cadre pro-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
vided by the Army, was filled to author-
ized strength with experienced ex-civilian
personnel. Less fruitful results befell efforts
similarly to recruit a second truck regi-
ment. Early enlistments had been made
under the misapprehension that the vol-
unteers would be exempt from certain
features of military training and would be
eligible for early advancement. When this
impression was corrected, enlistments fell
off drastically. The 517th Quartermaster
Regiment (less one battalion), organized
in December, received only 200 affiliated
enlisted men, making it necessary to fill
the regiment from Army sources. After a
period of military training, the regiments
moved to Iran, the 516th arriving at
Khorramshahr in May and 517th in July
1943.
Having set the recruitment machinery
in motion, Colonel Brunson and his three
motor transport officers flew to Basra and
joined General Connolly, who on 17 De-
cember established the MTS as an oper-
ating service of PGSC. In January 1943
Brunson and his staff moved with PGSC
headquarters to Tehran. The rest of the
MTS headquarters, moving to Iran by
water, joined Brunson in the following
month.
The first American trucking operations
got under way early in 1943, when a
locally activated truck company and the
429th Engineer Dump Truck Company
were assigned to MTS to ferry new trucks
received from the British at Bushire and
67
Unless otherwise noted, the account of the Motor
Transport Service is based upon the following: Motter,
op. cit., Ch. XVI; HOTI Hist, Pt. 6; History of the
Motor Transport Service, Persian Gulf Command,
PGF 131, OCMH Files.
68
Memo, Scott for Connolly, Oct 42, PGF 131, and
Initial Hist Rpt, Hq 114th QM Bn Mob, 1 May 42-
1 Feb 44, PGF 22, OCMH Files.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
Tehran and to drive administrative vehi-
cles for PGSC districts. In February a sec-
ond provisional truck unit was activated
at Khorramshahr to perform local haul-
ing and carry U.S. Army cargo to depots
at Ahwaz and Andimeshk.
Meanwhile, Brunson and his staff had
made a reconnaissance of potential routes
and were preparing for the initiation of
Soviet lend-lease hauling. By mid-January
1943 plans took on definite shape. USSR
cargo hauling was scheduled to begin on
1 March, and a target of 40,000 tons
monthly hauled northward from Khor-
ramshahr and Andimeshk was set for at-
tainment in December. Agreement was
reached with the United Kingdom Com-
mercial Corporation, which was already
using the route, whereby that agency ar-
ranged for all loading and unloading
under PGSC supervision and made avail-
able to MTS its maintenance and com-
munications facilities. It was further
agreed that when American installations
were completed and the main body of
MTS troops arrived, PGSC would assume
control of the route. At that time, UKCC
temporarily would augment the MTS
fleet until PGSC determined that UKCC
vehicles could be released for transfer to
other Soviet-aid routes. American use of
the Bushire-Tehran and Khanaqin routes,
called for in the SOS plan, was con-
sidered impracticable because of the lim-
ited number of men and trucks available
and the fact that Khorramshahr was the
only American-operated port served by
road.
There was one major problem involved
in the determination of the route. Initial
plans, approved by the Russians, called
for the delivery through Kazvin to Tabriz
and later to the Caspian Sea ports at Nau
Shahr and Pahlevi. But upon making
415
preparations to move advance parties to
stations near Tabriz, Brunson found that
the Soviet authorities would neither con-
firm their locations nor permit movement
beyond Kazvin. As a result, the command
decided to make Kazvin the northern
69
transfer point. Although the Russians
again changed their minds soon after
operations were begun, this decision stood
until the final months of MTS hauling,
when a number of special convoys were
sent into the Soviet zone.
The MTS route was a two-lane, gravel
highway extending 636 miles from Khor-
ramshahr to Kazvin. The first 170 miles—
from Khorramshahr to Andimeshk—
crossed a flat desert area, characterized by
intense heat and dust storms in summer
and rains and floods in winter. A tempo-
rary highway had been completed by
American construction forces in late 1942,
but much of this road was washed away in
March 1943. From Andimeshk to Hama-
dan, 338 miles distant, the road traversed
rugged mountain country, climbing three
passes up to 7,000 feet high. In this sec-
tion, grades up to 12 percent were en-
countered, land and rockslides interfered
with traffic, and heavy snow storms often
blocked the high mountain passes. Be-
tween Hamadan and Kazvin, 128 miles,
the route traversed high plateau country
with long stretches of straight roadway.
The only serious obstacles in this section
were sub-zero temperatures and heavy
snows at Avej Pass, over 7,700 feet high.
Despite some British improvements, the
road north of Andimeshk was in a poor
69
Rpt, Col M. V. Brunson, QMC, Historical Out-
line of MTS 1616-D, U.S. Army PGSC; Plan for Opn
of MTS PGSC, 15 Jan 43; UKCC Conf with Mr. Sin-
clair, UKCC, Col Brunson, PGSC, Lt Col Edgell,
British, Col Glenn R. Ward, PGSC, 18 Jan 43. All in
PGF 131, OCMH Files.
416
state of repair and required much con-
70
struction and maintenance work.
Other preparations were also in prog-
ress. In January 1943 a school for civilian
interpreter-instructors was opened at
Tehran, and during the following month
thirty-eight graduates and twenty-four
MTS personnel opened the first civilian
drivers school at Andimeshk. Meanwhile,
the 429th Engineer Dump Truck Com-
pany, the 1st Provisional Truck Company,
and the four companies of the 3d Bat-
talion, 26th Quartermaster Truck Regi-
ment, were readied for Soviet cargo haul-
ing at Andimeshk. The six companies
were assigned 400 of 600 lend-lease 2½-
ton truck-tractors with 20-foot semitrailers
of 7-ton capacity that had been assembled
by the British and turned over to MTS.71
The remaining vehicles were employed for
PGSC and district use and driver training.
The 3430th Ordnance Medium Mainte-
nance Company was assigned to MTS
and established temporary relay, service,
and repair stations at Khorramshahr,
Ahwaz, Andimeshk, Khurramabad,
Hamadan, and Kazvin. At the end of
February 1943, the first trucks of the small
MTS fleet were loaded and stood poised
at Andimeshk. 72
The MTS Organization
The organization set up to handle MTS
operations consisted of the director, his
staff, and a decentralized field service. At
Tehran, the director had a control officer
to co-ordinate staff and operating divi-
sions; an executive officer, who supervised
administration; Training and Supply Di-
visions; and a manager, who directed and
co-ordinated field activities through an
Operations Division and a Maintenance
Division. On the basis of experience in the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
field, the organization underwent some
change. In time the Control Division was
eliminated, and its functions were ab-
sorbed by the executive officer. To the Ad-
ministration, Operations, Maintenance,
and Supply Divisions was added an Engi-
neering Division, which performed liaison
with the PGSC Construction Service re-
garding plans for MTS facilities and later
took on traffic control functions. As con-
struction neared completion, this division
was abolished and traffic control was
turned over to Operations. With the in-
crease in civilian employment, a separate
division was established to handle such
matters as payment, housing, and feeding,
and driver training.
In the field, the route was divided into
the Northern Division and the Southern
Division, with commanders directly re-
sponsible to the director exercising juris-
diction over all MTS troops and activities
within their respective areas. Under them,
officers were appointed to command MTS
stations within the divisions and direct
operations on the road between stations.
After the arrival of the two truck regi-
ments, their commanders headed the di-
visions, and battalion commanders gen-
erally served as MTS station commanders,
each responsible for operations on the por-
tion of the route, the "block," extending
from his station to the next one to the
north. Both divisions and stations were
provisional organizations staffed by regi-
mental and battalion personnel.
70
Rpt, Engr Br Opns Div PGC, Completion Re-
port, Aid-to-Russia Highway [1945], PGF 127,
OCMH Files; Interv with Col Ward, Mgr Opns Div
MTS, 26 Nov 43, OCT 537 PG 43.
71
These vehicles, originally provided the British
under lend-lease, were turned over to PGSC only
after long debate. For details, see Leighton and
Coakley, op. at., Ch. XX, pp. 579, 582.
72
Brunson rpt cited n. 69; Hist Rpt, MTS PGSC,
Mar 43, PGF 131, OCMH Files.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
The Development of MTS Operations
The first convoy of forty-six truck-
trailers left Andimeshk on 1 March 1943.
Brunson and two of his staff preceded the
convoy to arrange with Soviet authorities
for its reception. The vehicles arrived at
Kazvin on 4 March and were unloaded by
the Russians on the next day. Regular de-
partures of USSR, PGSC, and MTS
cargoes from Andimeshk followed daily.
Operations during the first month were
performed under severe handicaps. Heavy
snows hampered movements in the north,
while heavy rains and floods washed out
sections of the road between Khorram-
shahr and Ahwaz, forcing all USSR cargo
hauling to originate at Andimeshk. A
shortage of troops and equipment and in-
adequate station facilities added to the dif- enced motor transport man, Shingler was
ficulties. In an effort to increase deliveries,
another dump truck company was as-
signed, a third provisional truck unit was
activated, and overhead personnel were
pressed into service as drivers. The 3430th
Medium Maintenance Company, its per-
sonnel and equipment spread over six
main stations, was able to keep the fleet
rolling only by borrowing tools from truck
organizations and working around the
clock. Only limited relief was afforded by
the 68th Ordnance Medium Maintenance
Battalion, which arrived without its or-
ganizational equipment. Its men were as-
signed to MTS stations to assist the 3430th
and to perform administrative and house-
keeping duties, while others were tempo-
rarily assigned as drivers. Not until May
did the battalion receive all its organiza- joining station, eight to twelve hours travel
tional equipment. A Quartermaster serv-
ice company was also assigned to MTS,
and was used for vehicle servicing and
general shop labor.
Other early problems involved traffic 43, PGF 131, OCMH Files.
417
control and pilferage. Although a military
police company was attached to MTS on
17 March, the first platoon was not actu-
ally placed on the route until April. Not
until June was the full company on duty
with MTS. In the absence of traffic con-
trol and road patrol troops, road discipline
of American as well as Soviet, British, and
Iranian vehicles was poor, traffic was un-
regulated, and a certain amount of pil-
ferage occurred.73
In this difficult period, a change of com-
mand occurred. On 13 March Brunson
was transferred to a new command and
was succeeded by General Shingler, a
member of the original Iranian mission
and U.S. Army commander in Iran be-
tween Wheeler's departure and Connolly's
arrival. Although he was not an experi-
an able administrator and was completely
familiar with the local situation. Upon as-
suming command, he made only minor
organizational changes, but effected a
basic modification in fleet operation. At
first, standard unit convoy operations
were in effect, with each driver making a
complete round trip from his own station.
Since MTS was operating over a fixed
route and the vehicle shortage was more
acute than the shortage of personnel,
Shingler believed that the maximum
possible tonnage could be delivered by the
"block" system, whereby trucks operated
continuously with changes of drivers en
route. Under this type of relay operation,
adopted on 28 March, drivers took trucks
from their home station to the next ad-
time away, and returned the next day
with empty trucks. After servicing and re-
pair, the loaded trucks with new drivers
73
Monthly Rpts of Opns, MTS PGSC, Mar-Jun
418
proceeded over the second block to the
next station.
Reorganization of operations, the ad-
vent of better weather, and the arrival of
additional vehicles brought a significant
improvement. In March MTS hauled
6,464 long tons, of which 3,705 tons repre-
74
sented USSR cargo. Although no addi-
tional operating troops were made avail-
able in April, both PGSC and USSR
freight hauled by MTS doubled. Road
conditions in the south were improved
sufficiently in May to permit loading at
the Khorramshahr docks and dumps as
well as at Andimeshk, and after June all
loadings were made at Khorramshahr,
except when truckable cargo was unavail-
able there. This development, together
with the arrival of the main body of driver
personnel, reduced the railroad's burden
and eliminated much double handling at
Andimeshk.
By the fall of 1943 personnel arrivals
had been completed, equipment greatly
augmented, operations standardized, se-
curity and traffic control tightened, and
construction of facilities and roads had
gone forward. When on 4 September
Shingler was recalled to the United States,
U.S. Army and USSR freight hauled
monthly by MTS was about to pass the
40,000-long-ton mark. 75 Under his suc-
cessors, MTS deliveries continued to
climb, reaching a peak in December 1943.
In that month MTS vehicles, operating
8,027,496 truck-miles, hauled 52,143 long
tons. Of this total, 34,385 long tons were
USSR supplies delivered to Kazvin. The
remaining tonnage consisted of U.S. Army
supplies hauled within the command.
One of the major factors in the im-
provement during 1943 was the increase
in MTS personnel. By the end of July vir-
tually all troops planned for shipment had
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
arrived, and provisional truck units had
been eliminated. Driver organizations
were rounded out in August with the local
activation of a third truck battalion for the
517th Quartermaster Truck Regiment.
There were now on duty under MTS two
truck regiments, seven truck battalions,
and a total of twenty-nine truck com-
panies. Also assigned to MTS were two
Ordnance medium maintenance bat-
talions, a total of seven Ordnance medium
companies, and a military police com-
pany. Assignment of a second MP unit
completed the MTS organization, which
in November aggregated approximately
5,200 officers and enlisted men.
American troops were supplemented by
Iranian civilian drivers. To the first MTS
drivers school established at Andimeshk
were added others at Hamadan and
Kazvin. These turned out a steadily grow-
ing number of graduates in six-week to
eight-week courses. At first the lack of
separate quarters and messing facilities at
stations caused MTS to restrict the use of
native drivers to hauling at Khorramshahr
and for PGSC deliveries to Ahwaz and
Andimeshk, but by July there were suffi-
cient facilities available to permit their
employment over the entire route. 76 Each
Quartermaster truck company was even-
tually assigned from 105 to 120 graduate
drivers, who operated under Army super-
vision as part of serial teams.
Large-scale training and employment
74
For statistics on MTS traffic, see Motter, op. cit.,
App. A, Table 6, "Freight Hauled in the Persian Cor-
ridor by the Motor Transport Service, 1943-1944."
75
Shingler's successor, Col. Glenn R. Ward, was in
turn recalled to Washington on 27 October 1943. He
was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Sweet, who
carried on until the end of operations. During Sweet's
two extended absences on temporary duty Col. Gus-
tave A. M. Anderson acted as MTS director.
76
Monthly Rpts of Opns, MTS PGC, Apr-Jul 43,
PGF 131, OCMH Files.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
of native drivers involved many difficul-
ties. A short, intensive course taught
through interpreters to students unfamiliar
with machines obviously could not and
did not turn out graduates comparable to
American drivers. As will be seen, the use
of native drivers was a major cause for the
high MTS accident rate. Nevertheless,
close supervision in time produced a large
number of passable civilian drivers. In-
deed, the Andimeshk school in December
1943 opened a section to teach experi-
enced MTS civilian drivers to operate
10-ton Mack diesel trucks and graduated
several hundred men. 77 A problem never
satisfactorily solved was the high employee
turnover, caused principally by losses of
drivers to competing agencies, particu-
larly to the Russians. Over 7,500 civilian
drivers were graduated during the course
of MTS operations, but the number on
duty at any one time never exceeded
3,155.
Although no schools were set up for
civilian mechanics, a large number were
employed and trained at MTS stations.
Civilians used by MTS during peak oper-
ations included 1,200 mechanics, 1,300
engine attendants, 90 canvas repairers,
200 technical supervisors, and 20 welders.
Others were hired to operate civilian
messes and perform other overhead duties,
and native laborers were used extensively
in operations, housekeeping, and main-
tenance. Civilian employees, including
drivers and mechanics, reached a high of
9,275 in November 1943.78
The development of MTS operations
also depended on the rate at which ve-
hicles were delivered to the command.
Initially, all vehicles were Studebaker
2½-ton 6x4 truck-tractors with 20-foot
semitrailers of 7-ton capacity. These con-
tinued to arrive, and in addition Stude-
419
baker 2½-ton 6x4 trucks, 1-ton 2-wheel
trailers, and 10-ton Mack diesel trucks
were received, the latter eventually be-
coming the standard replacement vehicle
for the command. 79 Deliveries to the
command, reaching a peak in the summer
and early fall of 1943, increased the ve-
hicles assigned to MTS from the original
600 truck-trailer units to a total, in De-
cember, of 4,183 trucks and trailers, of
which 2,770 were in fleet operation. Ar-
rivals during 1944 were to bring the num-
ber of MTS vehicles to 3,430 trucks and
truck-tractors and 2,779 trailers in July, of
which 5,644 were available for fleet use.
The vehicles proved satisfactory, but
not entirely suitable for MTS operations.
The Studebaker trucks and truck-tractors
were serviceable for at least 50,000 miles,
surprisingly good in view of the severe
operating conditions and driver abuse,
and the basic chassis was sound. But their
motors were insufficiently powered for
operation over mountainous terrain, and
many parts and minor assemblies were
not sturdy enough for such hard usage
and therefore deteriorated rapidly. In
addition, the bodies of the truck and the
semitrailer drawn by the truck-tractor
were too small to carry bulky cargo. The
semitrailer also had a number of struc-
tural weaknesses, while the one-ton trailer
exhibited a high mortality rate.
The Mack diesel truck was capable of
giving good service for 100,000 miles
before repair became uneconomical, parts
consumption was fairly low, and failures
were less frequent. The vehicles, however,
77
Rpt, Maj Robert B. Harrison, Exec Officer Opns
Div MTS, The Motor Transport Service, Persian Gulf
Command, U.S. Army, 22 Aug 44, pp. 3-5, PGF 131,
OCMH Files.
78
Hist Rpt, MTS PGSC, Nov 43, PGF 131,
OCMH Files.
79
Harrison rpt cited n. 77, pp. 3-5.
420 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

had many shortcomings, including small tions at each station were manned by
and structurally weak bodies, clogged fuel truck company mechanics and supervisory
lines, and excessive failures of such parts personnel. Both Ordnance and truck units
as radiators, cowls, starter and series were augmented by civilian mechanics,
parallel switches, fuses, emergency-brake helpers, and laborers. By this time most
linings, and generators. More desirable organizational tools had arrived, and other
than the vehicles provided, in the opinion equipment, such as lathes, large air com-
of MTS officers, would have been an air- pressors, and pneumatic hammers, was
braked 6x4 tractor capable of operating borrowed from the Andimeshk Ordnance
100,000 miles over mountainous terrain. Depot. Parts began to arrive in quantity
Powered by a 150-horsepower engine with in September, and resulted in improved
10 forward speeds, the tractor would be vehicle maintenance, although as late as
able to attain a speed of 45 miles per hour August 1944 over 680 fleet vehicles were
and move 15 tons of net cargo up grades deadlined for lack of parts.80
of 15 percent. The tractor would haul a Of considerable assistance in improving
28-foot, dual-axle, air-braked, van-type the output of maintenance units was the
semitrailer. provision of station facilities. By October
The provision of unsuitable vehicles, 1943 construction of permanent main sta-
together with poor road conditions, vehi- tions at Khorramshahr, Andimeshk,
cle abuse, and a high accident rate, re- Khurramabad, Hamadan, and Kazvin
sulted in a high vehicle mortality rate and was substantially completed. In addition
required extensive servicing, maintenance, to parking areas and American and native
and repair. In the beginning, under- quarters and messes, there were provided
manned and widely dispersed Ordnance refueling points, grease pits, open sheds for
units were required to perform all first, second and third echelon repair, and
second, and third echelon work. Mainte- storage space. Secondary camps for refuel-
nance facilities were lacking, organiza- ing and messing had also been erected be-
tional equipment was delayed in arrival, tween main stations at Ahwaz, Jelogir,
and few tools and parts could be procured Burujird, and Avej. In the desert section,
locally. In order to keep the fleet rolling, water points were established, which ma-
maintenance units relied on such field ex- terially reduced failures due to cracked
pedients as welding with iron wire, and cylinder blocks. During 1943, too, radio
manufactured parts such as cylinder communications were improved or in-
heads, distributor rotors and caps, cowl stalled at all main and midway stations,
sides, emergency-brake linings, and series and much progress was made in installing
parallel switches and bolts. telephone and teletype lines. The latter
The situation began to improve with were completed by March 1944, eventu-
the arrival of the two truck regiments and ally supplanting radio service.
additional Ordnance units. Their assign- Meanwhile, American Engineers had
ment helped relieve the personnel short- completed a permanent, black-topped
age and permitted the transfer of all first road from Khorramshahr to Andimeshk,
and second echelon work to the truck 80
Monthly Hist Rpts, MTS PGSC, Jun-Oct 43,
companies in August 1943. Service lines Aug 44, PGF 131, OCMH Files; Harrison rpt cited
and second echelon maintenance installa- n. 77.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
and together with British forces and native
labor improved or rebuilt much of the
highway between Andimeshk and Kazvin.
At the close of 1943, less than fifty miles of
road remained unpaved. When construc-
tion was completed in 1944, the entire
highway had been surfaced with bitumen
and was comparable to an American sec-
ondary road.
Along with construction projects, steps
were taken to develop an effective system
of traffic control. Early operations had
been characterized by a lack of co-ordina-
tion of motor vehicle movements of the
various using agencies. The unregulated
use of the highway led inevitably to con-
gestion which in turn was aggravated by
poor road discipline. Some relief was
afforded on 1 July 1943 when the UKCC
removed its vehicles to the Khanaqin Lift,
but the problem of congestion was far from
solved.81 The Khanaqin route merged with
the MTS highway from Hamadan north-
ward, and both MTS and Soviet vehicles
operated on the road north of Khorram-
shahr.
By agreement with UKCC, British
military, and USSR representatives, MTS
received authority to regulate all traffic
on the highway between Khorramshahr
and Takistan, twenty miles south of Kaz-
vin, and set up a traffic regulation system
as of 1 September 1943. The new system
provided for certain time bands, or allot-
ments of operating time, during which
each using agency would have priority of
movement over given sectors of the road.
Within any given time band, a maximum
of ten vehicles of other agencies could
operate in a twenty-four-hour period. A
Highway Traffic Committee, composed of
USSR, UKCC, British military, and MTS
representatives, met monthly to supervise
the agreement and discuss traffic prob-
421
lems as they arose; traffic control officers
were appointed at each station to co-ordi-
nate the movement of traffic; and enforce-
ment of the system was placed in the
hands of the two military police compa-
nies on the route.82
Another difficulty that appeared early
was pilferage. In time, foodstuffs, cloth,
and other "hot" cargoes were loaded al-
most exclusively on semitrailers with tar-
paulins tied down over their steel sides
and sealed. At main stations heavy interior
guards were posted and cargoes spot-
checked. On the road, serial commanders
posted guards at each routine halt and
midway station, and MP's either accom-
panied convoy serials or patrolled a given
sector during convoy movement to dis-
courage pilferage and banditry. Thieves
discovered among MTS employees were
discharged, black-listed from further em-
ployment by any Allied agency, and
turned over to Iranian authorities for pun-
ishment. Although pilferage was never
eliminated, it was cut down to minor pro-
portions. One report places total losses
from all sources, wrecks and misbillings as
well as pilferage, at .5 percent of all
tonnage moved.83
One aspect of MTS operations that
worsened steadily during 1943 was the oc-
currence of accidents. Although such fac-
tors as speeding, vehicle failures, blinding
desert sand storms, poor road conditions,
driver fatigue, and inadequate traffic con-
trol were partially responsible, the accel-
erating accident rate can in large measure
be attributed to the large-scale employ-
ment of native drivers. In September 1943
81
Hist Rpts, MTS PGSC, Jun and Jul 44, PGF 131,
OCMH Files.
82
Hist Rpts, MTS PGSC, Aug and Sep 43, PGF
131, OCMH Files.
83
History of Motor Transport Service, Persian Gulf
Command, Sec. V, pp. 9-10, PGF 131, OCMH Files.
422
soldier drivers had an accident rate of 22.2
per million truck miles, while the rate for
civilian drivers stood at 189.9. To check
the growing number of accidents, which
in November attained the alarming rate
of 103 per million truck miles, MTS late
in 1943 undertook an intensive accident-
prevention campaign, stressing safe-driv-
ing methods and such inducements as trips
to Palestine for soldier drivers and nomi-
nal pay increases for deserving civilian
drivers. The accident rate was soon
brought under control, reaching the low
point of 6.7 per million truck miles in
October 1944.
The steady increase in MTS traffic was
halted in January 1944 when a shortage
of truckable cargo developed at Khorram-
shahr. During the next three months, as
incoming tonnage fell off and the railroad
lifted an increasing proportion of the car-
goes discharged at the ports, MTS deliv-
ery targets were cut drastically. Heavy
cargo arrivals at Khorramshahr in the
summer again brought an upswing in
MTS traffic. Although the total tonnage
hauled monthly by MTS never exceeded
that carried in December 1943, USSR
cargo movements in July reached a peak
of 36,727 long tons. After another month
of large-scale operations, less-than-peak
cargo arrivals and the railroad's increas-
ing ability to handle them resulted in a
sharp drop in highway traffic. 84
Operations under the block system were
suspended on 28 August 1944 and once
more a driver operated his vehicle over the
entire route. Although fleet vehicles oper-
ated only half the time they would have in
continuous day-and-night operations un-
der the block system, maximum tonnage
deliveries were no longer required. The
standard convoy system, on the other
hand, required fewer station overhead
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
personnel, and through assignment of one
driver to a vehicle improved maintenance
85
and reduced accidents and pilferage.
With only light USSR tonnages avail-
able for truck transport, the MTS was
able to undertake a number of special
missions. In August and September MTS
drivers took lend-lease vehicles from Haifa
and Cairo to Tehran, for delivery to the
Iranian Government. During the latter
month, MTS operated trucks north of
Kazvin for the first time, delivering gen-
erator parts to Pahlevi and, in October,
carrying vehicle assembly equipment to
Tabriz. On return trips, MTS trucks
picked up American cargo at Tabriz for
movement to depots at Andimeshk and
Ahwaz; carried grain for the Iranian Gov-
ernment; and backhauled supplies of the
Eastern Command, U.S. Strategic Air
Force, which had engaged in shuttle
86
bombing from Soviet bases.
Meanwhile, the entire scope of U.S.
Army operations in Iran and its relation
to over-all Protocol commitments had
been placed under review in Washington.
On 3 November 1944 General Somervell
informed the Operations Division that the
Persian Corridor's interior capacity, ex-
clusive of MTS, exceeded the shipping
scheduled to arrive, and that discontinu-
ance of MTS would make available for
redeployment more than 9,000 service
troops. By War Department directive,
MTS was disbanded on 1 December and
command of its troops was transferred to
the districts. MTS personnel were then re-
deployed, some of them moving in the
"Lux" convoy, destined to play an impor-
tant part in revitalizing motor transport in
84
Hist Rpts, MTS PGC, Jan-Oct 44, PGF 131,
OCMH Files.
85
Min, Hwy Traffic Com Mtg 14, Tehran, 2 Oct
44, pp. 4-5, PGF 131, OCMH Files.
86
See MTS PGC hist rpts cited in n. 84.
THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR 423

China, while others shipped out to the which was retained to handle the evacu-
European theater.87 Since the UKCC had ation of supplies, equipment, and troops,
ceased operating in September, the elimi- remaining U.S. Army transportation
nation of MTS left as a continuing motor activities were then speedily concluded.
transport operation the delivery of Soviet-Failiyah Creek facilities and the railroad
operated vehicles assembled by the Amer- were transferred to the British, MRS was
icans, an activity terminated in April 1945.
inactivated, and railway troops other than
During its existence MTS hauled a total those engaged in disassembling equipment
of 618,946 long tons, two thirds of it departed the command.
Soviet-aid materials, and operated 99,- The last USSR cargo was discharged at
967,863 truck-miles. Conceived as a sup- Sentab Jetty in July 1945, only insignifi-
plementary service, MTS had received a cant U.S. Army tonnages arriving there-
priority lower than either port or rail oper-
after. The principal activities of Port Serv-
ations. Delays in the arrival of personnel ice personnel at the port involved loading
and equipment and the lack of suitable out from 10,000 to 12,000 long tons of sup-
heavy vehicles hindered the development plies and equipment a month to the
of the MTS operations, so that it failed toUnited States, and staging and embarking
provide the additional interior clearance of troops. By the end of September only
required to lift the cargo being laid down 6,922 troops were still in the command.
at the Persian Gulf ports during the period Meanwhile, PGC installations were be-
of greatest congestion. Beginning in the ing closed, and with the exception of care-
summer of 1943, however, MTS increas- taker detachments troops moved to Teh-
ingly was able to fulfill its mission of plug-
ran, Andimeshk, and Khorramshahr,
ging the gap between port discharge and eventually falling back on the last city.
interior clearance until it was bridged by In mid-September, PGC headquarters it-
the railroad. self moved to Khorramshahr, where it
assumed direct responsibility for port op-
The Close of U.S. Army Transportation erations. Port Service was abolished on
Operations 10 October, and its functions were trans-
ferred to the Operations Division's Trans-
By 1 June 1945, the date set by the War portation Branch. 89 Ten days previously,
Department for the termination of the the PGC had been redesignated Persian
PGC's Soviet lend-lease mission, much Gulf Service Command and placed under
had already been done in that direction. Headquarters, Africa-Middle East The-
MTS had long been disbanded; American ater.
operations at Cheybassi and Bandar Final evacuation was hastened when
Shahpur had ceased; and MRS had be- 87
PGC Study, prepared by ASF Plng Div, 24 Oct
gun to disassemble excess rail equipment 44, ASF Plng Div Theaters Br A47-192; Memo,
and was preparing to evacuate one of the Somervell for ACofS OPD, 3 Nov 44, and Rad, Mar-
railway operating battalions. Troop shall to Connolly, 9 Nov 44, CM-OUT 64 163, OCT
HB PGC MTS. On the Lux convoy see below, pp.
strength in the command had been cut 597-98.
88
from a peak of 30,000 to approximately STM-30, Strength of the Army, 1 Dec 45, p. 62.
89

16,000. With the exception of the opera- FinalMonthly Hist Rpts, Port Sv, Jul-Aug 45, and
88
Hist Rpt, Port Sv, 1 Sep-10 Oct 45, OCMH
tion of Sentab Jetty at Khorramshahr, Files.
424
uprisings in Azerbaijan caused the Presi-
dent in November to order the return by
1 January 1946 of all U.S. Army troops
except military attaches and those as-
signed to two small missions. In the in-
terim, the U.S. Army was to evacuate all
U.S. property possible and make provision
for Iranian agencies to care for such prop-
erty as remained behind. This job in-
volved the loading of eleven vessels and
the evacuation of 4,200 troops. By the
close of Army port operations in late De-
cember, PGSC troops assisted by a civilian
contractor had loaded two and a half ves-
sels. Cargo loadings were completed by
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the American Iraqi Shipping Company,
the last vessel leaving Iran for China in
February 1946. Meanwhile, caretaker de-
tachments had been called in, and by
mid-December 1945 all U.S. Army per-
sonnel were in Khorramshahr being read-
ied for departure. About 1,000 troops were
lifted by aircraft or freighter during the
month, and remaining personnel left for
the United States aboard the General W. P.
Richardson on 30 December. On the next
day, the command was officially discon-
tinued.90
90
HOTI Hist, Pt. VII.
 CHAPTER X
The Southwest Pacific
War struck in the Pacific amid hasty
efforts by the U.S. Army to strengthen the
defenses of the Philippine Islands. After
the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese
for a time pushed steadily southward from
their home islands. By mid-March 1942
they had taken most of the Philippines
and had captured Hong Kong, Guam,
Wake, Rabaul, Malaya, and Singapore,
as well as the richest prize of all, the
Netherlands East Indies. Japanese forces
had already occupied Lae and Salamaua
in New Guinea, and they threatened to
isolate Australia. The remnants of the
U.S. Army in the Philippines surrendered
early in May. Shortly thereafter, in the
Battle of the Coral Sea, Japanese aggres-
sion in the southwest Pacific was checked.
Although the Allies were not yet ready to
seize the offensive, the enemy had been
halted. Ahead lay the long and painful
climb up the island ladder of the Pacific,
leading to the liberation of the Philippines
and the capitulation of Japan. 1 (Map 9)
But before victory was achieved, many
changes took place in the command, sup-
2
ply, and transportation picture.
The Organizational and Logistical Setting
During the months immediately pre-
ceding Pearl Harbor, U.S. Army activity
had quickened perceptibly in the Pacific.
Late in July 1941 the U.S. Army Forces
in the Far East (USAFFE) had been
established and placed under the com-
mand of Lt. Gen. (later General of the
Army) Douglas MacArthur with head-
quarters at Manila. During the ensuing
four months, as the storm clouds grew
more ominous in the Far East, the rein-
forcement of MacArthur's new command
became a major concern of the War
Department.3
While MacArthur's men fought the
Japanese invaders in a gallant delaying
action, two other important Pacific com-
mands came into being. The first was the
American - British - Dutch - Australian
(ABDA) Command, embracing Burma,
Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the
Philippines, and most of the north and
northwest coast of Australia, which func-
tioned only from 10 January to 25 Febru-
1
Samuel Milner, "The Japanese Threat to Aus-
tralia," Military Review, XXIX, 1 (April 1949), 19-
28; History of USAFISPA During World War II
From 30 March 1942 to 1 August 1944, Pt. I, pp.
1-11, OCMH Files. See Map 9. inside back cover.
2
Except where otherwise indicated, this chapter
represents a condensation with a few additions, revi-
sions, and corrections of the detailed OCT HB Mono-
graph 31 of October 1949, prepared by James R.
Masterson, Transportation Unit, Historical Division,
SS USA, entitled U.S. Army Transportation in the
Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-1947 (hereafter cited
as Masterson, Trans in SWPA).
3
For a detailed treatment of the prewar back-
ground and the events leading up to the surrender of
the Philippines, see Louis Morton, The Fall of the Phil-
ippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, 1953). See also, Watson, Chief
of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XIII; and
OCT HB Monograph 5, pp. 81-86.
426 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ary 1942.4 The second, entirely American, and supplies for the Philippines. Because
began with the impromptu Task Force, of the Japanese blockade these two vessels,
South Pacific. the Willard A. Holbrook and the Bloemfon-
Task Force, South Pacific, was consti- tein, never reached that destination.6
tuted at sea on 12 December 1941 by Subsequently, in response to urgent ap-
Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Julian F. peals from General MacArthur and Presi-
Barnes, the senior officer aboard a U.S. dent Quezon, desperate attempts were re-
Army troop and cargo convoy originally peatedly made to bring relief to the de-
destined for the Philippines but diverted fenders of Bataan and Corregidor. Several
to Australia after America was drawn into small vessels were chartered as blockade
the war. Escorted by the Navy and carry- runners and a few submarines carried
ing approximately 4,600 U.S. Army per- critical cargo, but virtually all such efforts
sonnel—chiefly Air Corps and Field were unsuccessful. The Japanese air and
Artillery troops—52 unassembled A-24 sea blockade of the approaches to the
dive bombers, 18 P-40E fighters, about Philippines effectively prevented substan-
340 motor vehicles, and sizable amounts tial reinforcement either by ship or by
of aviation oil and gasoline, bombs, and airplane.7
ammunition, the convoy reached Bris- Although the reinforcement of the
bane on 22 December 1941. On the same Philippines remained the principal mis-
day General Barnes and his staff went sion of the U.S. Forces in Australia for
ashore and established Headquarters, some time, as early as mid-December the
U.S. Forces in Australia (USFIA). War Department had decided also to
USFIA, on 5 January 1942, was redesig- establish on the continent a stable base
nated U.S. Army Forces in Australia capable of anchoring the Allied defenses
(USAFIA).5 in the southwest Pacific as a whole. With
Ships of the convoy docked on 23 De- the deterioration of the Allied position in
cember 1941. The troops debarked and the Philippines and in the ABDA Com-
moved to tent quarters provided by the mand during the first months of 1942,
Australian Army. Cargo was discharged emphasis shifted increasingly to the de-
by Australian labor working around the fense of Australia and its development as
clock and all through the Christmas holi- the main U.S. Army base in the area.8
iday. Certain items were difficult to locate,
and vital parts of the A-24's, such as trig- 4

ger motors, solenoids, and gun mounts, AreaDespatch by the Supreme Commander of the ABDA
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in
were never found. the South-West Pacific: 15 January 1942 to 25 February
For the Americans in Australia the 1942 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948).
prompt reinforcement of General Mac- Cf. Masterson, 5
Trans in SWPA, pp. 10-12.
To facilitate direct contact with key Australian
Arthur's hard-pressed Americans and military and governmental agencies in Melbourne,
Filipinos had already become the supreme USFIA headquarters was soon transferred to that city
objective. Under the supervision of the fromMasterson,
Brisbane.
6
Trans in SWPA, pp. 6-8; Craven and
quartermaster of Task Force, South Pa- Cate, AAF, I, 226-27.
7
cific, and with the help of the Australians, See Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 5-9, 24-31.
by 28 December 1941 the two fastest ships Cf. Morton, 8
op. cit., pp. 390-404.
Morton, op. cit., pp. 152-57, 240-42; Leighton
of the convoy were reloaded with U.S. and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943,
Army troops, equipment, ammunition, pp. 166-77.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 427

Such an eventuality had not been quate, and use of them was complicated
anticipated before Pearl Harbor. The by differences in gauges. Motor transport
USAFIA staff, then headed by Maj. Gen. was handicapped by unimproved roads,
George H. Brett, was small, aggregating an acute shortage of gasoline, and insuffi-
23 officers and 13 enlisted men on 5 Jan- cient and unsatisfactory vehicles. The
uary 1942. Few of them possessed the ex- ocean linked the large cities along the
perience necessary to deal with the for- coast, but water transport was hampered
midable supply and transportation prob- by a war-induced scarcity of ships. How-
lems in the command. The first officer ever unpromising, this was the transpor-
assigned from Washington to fill this need tation situation that confronted Wilson
was Brig. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson. Accom- and his staff.
panied by several assistants, General Wil- As Chief Quartermaster, USAFIA,
son proceeded to Australia, arriving at General Wilson had both supply and
Melbourne on 11 March. Ten days later transportation functions. Following the
he was appointed Chief Quartermaster, precedent newly established in the zone
USAFIA, subsequently serving as Assist- of interior, where transportation for the
ant Chief of Staff, G-4, in that command, U.S. Army had been taken from The
until his return to the United States in Quartermaster General and placed under
late May 1942.9 a Chief of Transportation, Wilson recom-
The magnitude of General Wilson's mended that a similar change be made in
task may be gleaned from his instructions. Australia. Despite initial disapproval by
Among other things, he was to survey and General Barnes, who clung to the old
report on the local port and warehouse fa- order, in mid-April 1942 General Wilson
cilities, make recommendations as to re- succeeded in setting up a separate U.S.
serves and levels of supply, and arrange Army Transportation Service, charged
for a system of local procurement. He was with the transportation duties previously
to charter all available craft in Australian assigned to the chief quartermaster.
waters in order to relieve the burden on Before his departure from the United
American shipping, and he was to expe- States General Wilson had been instru-
dite the unloading and clearance of all mental in recruiting and commissioning
troop and cargo vessels. "Finally and most from civilian life a number of experienced
important," he was to spare no effort in transportation executives, who began ar-
getting food, ammunition, and other crit- riving in Australia in March and April
ical supplies forwarded to the Philippines 1942 to fill important positions involving
and the Netherlands East Indies. Wilson water, rail, highway, and air traffic in
carried out his mission with vigor and dis- Australia. These men included Thomas
patch, although enemy action made effec- B. Wilson and Thomas G. Plant, each of
tive compliance with the last part of his whom was later to serve as theater chief of
instructions almost impossible.10
Wilson and his staff discovered that 9
Wilson's relief came as a result of disagreement
Australia's transport system left much to with General Barnes. See Interv with Maj Gen
11
be desired. Except for a narrow coastal Arthur R. Wilson (Ret.), 17 Jan 51, OCT HB SWPA
fringe, the continent was largely unin- Misc. 10
Rpt, Wilson to Somervell, 1 Jul 42, sub: Rpt on
habited desert. Judged by American Australia, OCT HB Inspection Trips.
standards the railroads were quite inade- 11
Ibid.; Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 136-37.
428 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

transportation, as well as Paul W.John- bane, Australia, in September 1944, to

ston, Roy R. Wilson, and Thomas F. Hollandia, New Guinea; then to Taclo-
Ryan, of whom the last three, respec- ban, Leyte; and finally, in April 1945, to
tively, had specialized in rail, highway, Manila.
and air transportation. Apart from pro- The history of USASOS was character-
viding such top personnel, General Wilson ized by constantly changing supply situa-
gave energy and direction to the newly tions and repeated reorganizations to fit
created U.S. Army Transportation Serv- these changes. Arrangements suitable for
ice, which unquestionably owed its early one locale, such as New Guinea where
autonomy to his efforts. bases had to be carved from the jungle,
USAFIA, including the Transportation often proved undesirable in another, such
Service, was placed under the new and as the Philippines. In general, USASOS
vast Allied command established on headquarters tended to decentralize oper-
18 April 1942, when General MacArthur ational responsibility to the greatest extent
set up a general headquarters at Mel- to the base section commanders, whose
bourne as Commander in Chief, Allied domains flourished or faded in accord-
Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area ance with the varying requirements of
(GHQ SWPA). As then constituted, each campaign. The commander of each
SWPA included the Philippine Islands, base section maintained a transportation
the South China Sea, the Gulf of Siam, officer on his staff who was responsible for
the Netherlands East Indies (except operations of the Transportation Corps
Sumatra), the Bismarck Archipelago, the within that section, under the technical
Solomons, Australia, and the waters to supervision of the Chief of Transportation,
the south. 12 Some three months later, on USASOS.14
20 July 1942, USAFIA was succeeded by Beginning in the spring of 1945, the
the U.S. Army Services of Supply commands under General MacArthur,
13
(USASOS). including both USAFFE and USASOS,
Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, the first entered another cycle of change, prepara-
USASOS commander, was succeeded tory to the final drive against Japan. On 6
early in September 1943 by Brig. Gen. April, with the establishment of the U.S.
(later Maj. Gen.) James L. Frink, who re- Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), command
mained at the helm until 30 May 1945. of all U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific was
Under General Frink USASOS continued given General MacArthur, thereby per-
to support huge military operations ex- mitting him to operate north of the Philip-
tending from Australia into New Guinea, pines beyond the original confines of
Biak, and the Philippines. New bases SWPA. USAFFE was absorbed by AFPAC
were developed as needed and abandoned
when no longer desired, all as part of the
12
process familiarly known as the "roll-up" GO 1, GHQ SWPA, 18 Apr 42; Rad, USAFFE
to AGWAR, 20 Apr 42, CM-IN 5422.
whereby men and materiel were pushed 13
For further details on the effect of the various
forward as the war progressed. Reflecting higher command changes on the transportation or-
the change of scene dictated by tactical ganization in SWPA, see the following section.
14
See Masterson, Trans in SWPA, Chs. I and II;
considerations Headquarters, USASOS, Ltr, Maj Gen James L. Frink (Ret.) to Larson, 31 Oct
was transferred successively from Bris- 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
on 10 June. In the same month USASOS
SWPA was replaced by the U.S. Army
Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC),
under Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, with
headquarters at Manila. Following the
close of hostilities SWPA disappeared, and
on 17 September 1945 Headquarters,
AFPAC, was transferred to Tokyo.15
Throughout World War II, several
characteristics of the Southwest Pacific
Area, either as a geographical entity or as
a melange of military organizations, pro-
foundly affected the supply situation and,
in particular, the task of the Transporta-
tion Corps.
Distances were enormous. San Fran-
cisco, the main port of embarkation sup-
plying the Southwest Pacific, is 6,193
nautical miles from Brisbane, 5,800 from
Milne Bay, 6,299 from Manila. Ships re-
quired more time to sail from the United
States to SWPA and return than to any
other area except China-Burma-India
and the Persian Gulf. The long turn-
around, coupled with the frequent reten-
tion of vessels for local service, severely
taxed the limited available shipping.
Nearly all military operations took
place within coastal areas. There were few
interior railways and fewer inland water-
ways. The Army therefore was highly de-
pendent upon ships and small craft to
deliver its men and supplies.
Local transportation facilities were gen-
erally poor. Australian railways and high-
ways were far from adequate; New
Guinea had no railways, few roads, and
only the most primitive and undeveloped
ports; and the Philippines had suffered
from wartime destruction. Throughout,
American equipment and spare parts had
to be supplied and new construction had
to be undertaken.
Labor was often unsatisfactory. The
429
best manpower of Australia was in mili-
tary service, and the workers available to
the U.S. Army were frequently slow and
un-co-operative. The natives of New
Guinea served willingly but were too few
and too untrained to afford much assist-
ance. Filipino labor, though good, was by
no means entirely satisfactory. American
service troops had to be used extensively
in New Guinea and the Philippines, and
their maintenance added to the transpor-
tation load.
Except in central and southern Aus-
tralia, the theater was hot and humid.
Rust, rot, mold, and vermin were ever-
present plagues, and loss of supplies was
bound to occur despite the most scrupu-
lous care in packaging. Malaria, dysentery,
and other tropical diseases, combined
with the enervating effect of damp heat,
undermined the efficiency of the service
troops, especially in New Guinea, and
swelled the number of patients requiring
removal to more salubrious areas. Tor-
rential rains and destructive typhoons
hampered and on occasion halted trans-
portation activity.
Naval, ground, and air forces of the
United States, the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia, and to some extent the Netherlands
East Indies were all engaged in transpor-
tation. Each operating force had its own
organization and methods, but all com-
peted for the limited resources in equip-
ment and fuel.
Against this background in which the
geographic, climatic, and military factors
all contrived to complicate the task, the
Transportation Corps sought to develop a
working organization.
15
On 1 January 1947, AFPAC was redesignated
Far East Command (FEC), under General MacAr-
thur, and AFWESPAC became the Philippines-
Ryukyus Command (PHILRYCOM).
430
The Transportation Office
U.S. Army transportation in Australia
began as a Quartermaster function per-
formed by a pitifully small staff feeling its
way in a strange land where the first
American troops had arrived almost by
chance. As originally constituted on 5
March 1942, the Transportation Division,
Office of the Chief Quartermaster, USA-
FIA, consisted of only one officer and
one assistant. The organization hardly
attained stature by 1 April 1942, when
Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Thomas B. Wilson
became deputy chief quartermaster and
chief of the Transportation Division.
An alumnus of Kemper Military School
and a veteran of World War I, Colonel
Wilson had previously held civilian execu-
tive positions in the United States, involv-
ing rail, highway, water, and air trans-
port. He was a natural selection to head
the Transportation Service set up at Mel-
bourne in mid-April 1942 to take over the
transportation function from the chief
quartermaster. The new chief of Transpor-
tation Service, USAFIA, was assigned a
twofold mission: to co-ordinate the em-
ployment of all transportation for the U.S.
Army; and to operate all transport ac-
quired for its use, except that assigned to
combat units, service organizations, or the
Air Forces.16
Under Wilson a separate branch was
established for each major type of trans-
port. The principal activity in the new
office involved water transport. The Rail
Branch had only a secondary role, that of
arranging and supervising the movement
of U.S. Army personnel and supplies over
the Australian railways. Motor transpor-
tation was negligible, since automotive
equipment was organic to the base sec-
tions and to the divisions in training.
Initially, the Air Branch established a
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
useful chartered air service between the
bases in Australia. Later, air transporta-
tion became a function of the Air Trans-
port Command, and the transportation
office simply provided a booking agency
for airlift of U.S. Army passengers and
17
freight.
The Water Branch of the Transporta-
tion Service was headed at first by a
former steamship operator, Col. Thomas
G. Plant. His main concern was with the
large ocean-going vessels bringing U.S.
Army personnel and cargo to SWPA.
Plant's small staff arranged for and super-
vised the discharge and subsequent intra-
theater activity of such ships, generally
utilizing Australian stevedoring firms and
dock workers.
Set up in 1942 and at first operating di-
rectly under USAFIA, the Small Ships
Supply Command was charged with pro-
curing, manning, maintaining, and oper-
ating a fleet of small craft for the U.S.
Army in the waters north of Australia. Its
vessels were used primarily to deliver am-
munition, medical supplies, and perish-
able foods to outlying bases that could not
be readily reached by large ships. The
Small Ships Command also assisted when
required in tactical operations and in
emergency transfers of troops and equip-
ment. Because of possible enemy action, its
fleet carried both armament and gun
crews. The Small Ships Supply Command,
later called the Small Ships Division, came
under the control of the Transportation
Service on 29 May 1942. Thereafter,
emphasis was laid upon the procurement
in SWPA and in the United States of addi-
16
For a more detailed treatment of the transporta-
tion office, see Masterson, Trans in SWPA, Chs. III
and IV.
17
Ltr, Thomas G. Plant to Harold Larson, 23 Oct
50, OCT HB Inquiries; Interv with Thomas B. Wil-
son, 8 Nov 50, OCT HB SWPA Misc. On air trans-
port, see Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 721-29.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
tional small craft to satisfy the almost
insatiable demands of the theater.18
In the first week of September 1942 the
transportation office, with the rest of the
USASOS headquarters, was removed
from Melbourne to Sydney. By that time
Melbourne was too far to the rear to be
useful except for storage. As General
Arthur Wilson had already said, using
that city as a base for troops poised in
northern Australia for a potential offen-
sive in New Guinea was about like trying
to operate from New Orleans, Louisiana,
for action in the area around St. Paul,
Minnesota. From the transportation
standpoint the switch to Melbourne elimi-
nated a troublesome change in railway
gauge at Albury on the border of Victoria
and New South Wales. Sydney had a fur-
ther advantage in being able to accom-
19
modate deep-draft vessels.
The next significant organizational
change resulted from the reactivation at
Brisbane on 26 February 1943 of the U.S.
Army Forces in the Far East under the
20
command of General MacArthur. An
American theater headquarters essentially
administrative in character, USAFFE
interposed another echelon between
GHQ, SWPA, the Allied theater head-
quarters, and USASOS, the supply agency
for U.S. Forces in SWPA. The chiefs of the
several services, including the chief trans-
portation officer, were now transferred
from USASOS headquarters at Sydney to
USAFFE headquarters at Brisbane, and
the authority of USASOS was reduced to
routine operational matters.
For the Transportation Corps, as well as
the other services, the new arrangement
presented a very awkward situation. From
February to September 1943, two separate
transportation offices had to be main-
tained, one for USAFFE and the other for
USASOS. At Brisbane Colonel Thomas
431
Wilson functioned as chief of transporta-
tion on the USAFFE Special Staff, assisted
by a small number of key men engaged in
planning and staff work for water, rail,
air, and motor transport. At Sydney, as
Transportation Officer, USASOS, Col.
Melville McKinstry was made responsible
for day-by-day operations. In order to
keep in touch with McKinstry, Wilson
had to make frequent calls over Australian
telephones, for which he had no high
regard. In his opinion the entire system of
two offices was impractical, and it would
have been much simpler if all his organi-
zation had been consolidated in one city.
Actually, Brisbane lacked office space and
housing for both USAFFE and USASOS,
but in the late summer of 1943 as addi-
tional accommodations became available
at Victoria Park, a progressive transfer of
USASOS personnel was effected from
Sydney to Brisbane.21
Two transportation offices were main-
tained in Brisbane until 27 September
1943, when the Office of the Chief of
Transportation ceased to function in
22
USAFFE and was returned to USASOS.
In the same month General Frink, the
18
The first extensive use in SWPA of small boats to
supply combat troops was made during the Buna-
Sanananda campaign in New Guinea. For these oper-
ations, conducted by the American and Australian
Combined Operational Service Command (COSC),
set up in that area in October 1942, see below, pp.
460-61.
19
Rpt, Wilson to Somervell, 1 Jul 42, sub: Rpt on
Australia, OCT HB POA Inspection Trips; Interv
with Wilson cited n. 17.
20
See Hist, GHQ FEC MIS, History of USAFFE,
1943-1945, Jun 48, OCMH Files.
21
Interv with Wilson cited n. 17; Ltrs, Plant to
Larson, 23 Oct 50 and 27 Jan 51, OCT HB Inquiries.
22
This was incident to the return of the chiefs of
services to USASOS and the reduction of USAFFE to
a paper command post with a general staff. Interv
with Wilson cited n. 17; Masterson, Trans in SWPA,
pp. 40-41, 143-44; History of USAFFE, 1943-1945,
OCMH Files.
432
new USASOS commander, selected Colo-
nel Plant to head up the consolidated
transportation office, and arranged for
him in turn to relieve Colonel McKinstry
and General Thomas Wilson.23 General
Gross, who was then visiting SWPA, was
disturbed by the change. He believed that,
as good men who were complementary,
both Wilson and Plant should have been
retained. Frink, however, was apparently
sold on Plant as his transportation chief,
and he preferred to have Wilson serve in
some other capacity.24
Within a few weeks after this reshuffling
had been completed, a new regulating
system was established in GHQ, SWPA,
which subsequently was to have a far-
reaching effect upon both USASOS and
the Transportation Corps. Under Wilson
as well as Plant, the transportation organi-
zation served not only the U.S. Army,
Navy, and Air Forces but also the Aus-
tralian military services. With a chronic
shortage of tonnage and many claimants
for shipping space, priorities had to be set.
This problem was attacked in several
ways and with varying degrees of success
in the period before 12 November 1943,
when a GHQ theater-wide regulating sys-
tem was set up in SWPA under a chief
regulating officer (CREGO), whose pri-
mary function was to control on a priority
basis all personnel and cargo movements
by water, rail, and air. Even opponents of
the new regulating system ultimately
acknowledged that its basic concept was
sound and that it was necessary for GHQ
to determine the respective priorities of
shipment for the U.S. Army, Navy, and
Air Forces and as between Americans and
Australians. However, considerable dif-
ference of opinion developed as to the de-
gree of control to be exercised, and as to
whether the regulating system might not
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
have worked better under the Chief
Transportation Officer, USASOS, subject
only to general priorities and tonnage
allotments determined by GHQ. In any
event, during the remainder of the war-
time period the transportation office func-
tioned in the deepening shadow of the
GHQ regulating system.25
Colonel Plant fortunately encountered
no difficulty with the chief regulating offi-
cer. As a matter of fact, during his com-
paratively brief tenure as Chief of Trans-
portation Officer, USASOS, the regulating
system was just starting and it therefore
presented no serious problem. While
Plant was in charge, no significant change
occurred in the transportation office.
Although his technical competence was
beyond question, evidently and under-
standably Plant lacked familiarity with
military procedures and organization.
General Frink, desiring to get an officer
who could see the picture "from a mili-
tary standpoint," relieved him on 8 April
1944 26 palnt was replaced by Col. (later
Brig. Gen.) William W. Wanamaker, an
officer without previous transportation ex-
perience. At Washington Generals Somer-
vell and Gross were dismayed at the loss
first of General Wilson and then Colonel
23
Subsequently, McKinstry became transportation
officer at Milne Bay. Upon the recommendation of
Generals Somervell and Gross, in November 1943
Wilson was transferred to the China-Burma-India
Theater, where he organized the Transportation
Service. On his work there, see Chapter XII. Also see
Interv with Wilson cited n. 17; Plant ltr, 27 Jan 51,
cited n. 21.
24
Interv with Wilson cited n. 17; Ltr, Gross to
Wylie, 6 Oct 43, OCT HB Wylie Ltrs from Gen
Gross.
25
See Ltrs, Frink to Larson, 25 Jan 51, and W. W.
Wanamaker to Larson, 6 Mar 51, OCT HB Inquiries.
For further details on the regulating system see below,
pp. 437-47.
26
For Frink's views, see Ltr, Frink to Larson, 31
Oct 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
Plant, who were regarded as "transporta-
tion stalwarts." 27
A graduate of the U.S. Military Acad-
emy, Colonel Wanamaker had been
trained as an engineer. He had come to
SWPA in January 1944 to serve with the
Sixth Army, which he left reluctantly
when General Frink personally requested
him for USASOS. The new assignment
had been described as an excellent oppor-
tunity, and for Wanamaker it represented
a real challenge. USASOS was no static
command. As the center of activity shifted
from Australia to New Guinea and thence
to the Philippines, the organizational pat-
tern of USASOS had to be adapted to a
constantly changing supply and transpor-
tation situation. The necessary readjust-
ment must have been especially trying for
Wanamaker, since he had no previous ex-
perience to stand him in good stead. At
the outset he discovered the need of new
personnel, since several of his best officers
were already suffering from malaria con-
tracted in New Guinea. The base com-
manders did not always realize the im-
portance of transportation, and Wana-
maker's organization frequently found its
activity restricted by the GHQ regulating
system.28
Wanamaker had hardly settled in his
new niche when a wave of administrative
change swept over USASOS. In May 1944
General Frink embarked upon a "work
simplification" program, designed to pro-
mote greater operating efficiency in the
command. An efficiency expert, Capt.
Louis Janos, carried out the prescribed
measures for the transportation office,
which led to the elimination of three offi-
cers, thirteen enlisted men, five civilians,
and many forms, reports, and other
records. With respect to transportation,
Wanamaker thought that this program
433
was completely out of place and might
well have been delayed until operations
were less pressing and more stable. His
problem was the bigger one of improving
port operations, in the mud and rain of
New Guinea, from an efficiency of, say, 40
percent to 70 percent.29
The same influence from above brought
a drastic streamlining of Wanamaker's
transportation office, effective 1 June
1944. In essence, the change involved the
wiping out of the previous organization by
type of transportation (water, rail, high-
way, and air, with supporting administra-
tive units), and the reorganization of the
transportation office along functional
lines (planning, administration, opera-
tions, and engineering). Any advantage
that might have accrued from the func-
tional approach must have been offset by
time lost in reshuffling personnel and
functions. In any event, the new order did
not last. By the end of the year the new
branches had been replaced by a divi-
sional arrangement similar to the system
previously in effect. (Chart 6)
Meanwhile, Colonel Wanamaker and
his men had begun the long trek from
Australia by way of New Guinea to the
Philippines. The rear echelon officially
closed at Brisbane on 20 September 1944,
and by 8 October the entire Transporta-
tion Corps headquarters had moved to
Hollandia, New Guinea. Late in Novem-
ber 1944, Transportation Corps and other
USASOS personnel began to trickle into
Tacloban, Leyte. By mid-April 1945
27
At Somervell's suggestion Wanamaker visited the
United States for orientation. He eventually won high
praise for his work as Chief Transportation Officer,
USASOS, a position that he held until 23 July 1945.
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 146-47.
28
Wanamaker ltr cited n. 25.
29
Ibid.
 CHART 6—ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, TRANSPORTATION CORPS, USASOS, SWPA: DECEMBER 1944

Source: OCT HB Monograph 31, James R. Masterson, U. S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-1947, App. 5.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 435

Wanamaker's staff had set up offices in the where conditions warranted it, USASOS
Far Eastern University at Manila. took over the responsibility for these ac-
Throughout his tenure as Chief Trans- tivities from the task force commander
portation Officer, USASOS, Wanamaker and established an advance base. Any
headed a comparatively small service. elements and functions left behind by the
Available figures, by no means satisfac- task force in moving on to a new mission
tory, indicate that the Transportation were assigned to the base commander.
Corps personnel, both military and civil- The latter had his own transportation
ian, did not exceed 40,000 until February staff, and except for technical supervision
1945 and reached their peak of almost he was independent of the Chief Trans-
97,000 in the following September, when portation Officer, USASOS.32
the war had ended in the Pacific. The The autonomy of the base commanders,
civilian component was always consider- perhaps inevitable in a theater where
able, approximately one third of all bases and headquarters were so widely
Transportation Corps personnel in separated, was no more disturbing to
SWPA.30 Wanamaker than the pervasive control of
Wanamaker's staff was responsible for shipping developed by the chief regulat-
only part of the U.S. Army transportation ing officer. Some duplication and con-
load in the theater. Organic transport as- fusion arose as between CREGO and the
signed to the various combat and service USASOS transportation office in the
units carried a major portion, including issuance of orders for ship movements, and
virtually all short hauls by motor vehicles.
in Wanamaker's judgment CREGO's reg-
The bulk of the burden naturally fell ulation was so detailed as to infringe on
upon the base commanders whose per- USASOS operating responsibilities. He
sonnel operated under the technical super- argued that either USASOS should oper-
vision of the transportation office.31 ate, under general staff direction from
Beginning with the operations in New GHQ or that GHQ should have a chief
Guinea, the theater developed a pattern of transportation and operate all transpor-
for establishing new bases and arranging tation directly.33 Neither alternative was
for supply and transportation. In each of adopted.
the succeeding island campaigns, USA- Under these circumstances the Chief
SOS rendered logistical support, but did Transportation Officer, USASOS, obvi-
not bear responsibility for initial transpor-
tation, supply, and base development 30
See Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 171-72, and
in the areas forward of its advance bases. Apps. 16 and 17.
31
Shipping for the movement of assault and For a detailed treatment of transportation activi-
ties in the principal bases in Australia, New Guinea,
supporting forces and for resupply was and the Philippines, see Masterson, Trans in SWPA,
controlled by the Allied Naval Forces Ch. II.
32
until such time as it was relieved by Ibid., pp. 56 and 86. Cf. Robert Ross Smith, The
Approach to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY
USASOS. Service and supply functions IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 26,
ashore were at first the responsibility of 34, 82-83, 396.
33
the ground task force commander, and all Wanamaker ltr cited n. 25. For a fuller discussion
of the regulating system, including a presentation of
service troops assigned were under his the views of its supporters as well as its opponents, see
command. After the area was secured and below, pp. 437-47.
436 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ously functioned in a severely restricted had previously served with distinction in

sphere. By 23 February 1945 Wana- North Africa, Italy, and France. After his
maker's dissatisfaction with his situation arrival at Manila, Stewart spent a month
had reached the point where he requested in diligent study in order to understand
immediate reassignment to the Corps of the prevailing cumbersome and involved
Engineers. Transportation activity in supply and transportation system in
SWPA, he said, seemed "destined to be SWPA. He was not pleased with what he
run by several Colonels in several echelons found. Control of transportation was dis-
of command." In ETO the chief of trans- persed, and in his opinion the results were
portation was a major general, although not good. The Transportation Corps, he
his problems were neither more intricate said, had been browbeaten and held down
nor involved than those facing Wana- by curbs on its authority and responsibility.
maker. Despite all talk of the importance Its personnel were timid, and they lacked
of his task, the Chief Transportation Offi- pride, leadership, and initiative.
cer, USASOS, felt keenly "the difficulties As Chief of Transportation, AFWES-
and discouragements in trying to get PAC, and with the support of General
things done as just another Colonel." As Styer, Stewart at once adopted an aggres-
a matter of fact, General Frink had sive attitude with a view to raising the
already recommended a promotion for prestige and strengthening the position of
Colonel Wanamaker, who finally was his office. He made considerable progress
made a brigadier general on 6 June 1945. along these lines, particularly in the field
Other observers shared Wanamaker's of water transportation. Shortly after the
dissatisfaction. In Washington Generals end of hostilities, the GHQ regulating
Somervell and Gross both felt very system was abolished and most of its func-
strongly that transportation activities in tions were turned over to Stewart's organi-
SWPA would never function efficiently zation. This change, which was incident
until there was "one Chief of Transporta- to the regrouping of U.S. and Australian
tion, speaking with the authority of the forces into separate commands and the
theater commander on transportation emergence of GHQ, as a predominantly
matters."34 A long step was taken in that U.S. Army organization, was regarded by
direction in June 1945 when General Stewart as "a great victory for the Trans-
Somervell's former chief of staff, General portation Corps." In any event, in the
Styer, was appointed to head AFWESPAC period of demobilization and postwar
so as to furnish logistic support for the adjustment the chief of transportation
invasion of the Japanese homeland. Som- occupied a far stronger and more authori-
ervell urged Styer to organize AFWESPAC tative position in the theater than he had
36
in such a way as to give his chief of trans- enjoyed during the wartime period.
portation the necessary authority to co-
ordinate and control transportation activi- 34
Ltr, CG ASF to CG AFWESPAC, 25 Jun 45,
ties from the theater level, by wearing two OCT HB Gross Pac Theater.
35
hats if necessary. 35
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 178-79..
36
General Wanamaker was succeeded on Ltr, CofT AFWESPAC to CofT ASF WD, 30
Aug 45, OCT HB SWPA Misc; History of the GHQ
23 July 1945 by General Stewart, an Regulating System, 31 Aug 45, p. 10, Box G-1519
experienced transportation officer who KCRC AGO.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
The Regulating System
As a U.S. Army organization function-
ing under USASOS during the wartime
period, the Transportation Corps was but
one of several transportation agencies
operating in the Allied SWPA theater.
The U.S. Navy, the Air Forces, the Air
Transport Command, and the Australian
military services were all operators and
users. In view of the limited amount of
available shipping and other transport,
the even more limited receiving capacity
of most of the ports, and the multiplicity
of customers, there was a need to regulate
on a priority basis all cargo and troop
movements, regardless of service or nation-
ality. After attempts to cope with the
problem at various echelons in the theater,
the task was assigned to a GHQ agency,
CREGO, in November 1943.
The need of centralized control of
military traffic had become apparent as
soon as the first Americans landed in Aus-
tralia. At the outset the co-ordination of
American and Australian traffic was
accomplished by a Movements Subcom-
mittee of the Administrative Planning
Committee, which had been established
by the Australian War Cabinet in early
January 1942 to facilitate inter-Allied
co-operation. The subcommittee, which
included both Americans and Australians,
was headed by Sir Thomas Gordon, the
Australian representative of the British
Ministry of War Transport. The Adminis-
trative Planning Committee determined
where incoming personnel and goods
would be sent, and the Movements Sub-
committee determined schedules and
routes and allocated carriers. These
arrangements were especially helpful to
the U.S. Army in co-ordinating shipping
and transportation during the first quarter
437
of 1942, until the creation of GHQ, SWPA,
provided new machinery for Allied
37
collaboration.
Under USAFIA, the chief of Transpor-
tation Service and his representatives
became responsible, in mid-April 1942,
for all U.S. Army liaison with Australian
transportation agencies. Such liaison was
concerned primarily with incoming Amer-
ican vessels, which after clearance by the
Royal Australian Navy were routed into
the port selected by the U.S. Army for
discharge. The G-3 of USAFIA prepared
the troop movement directives and the
G-4 was responsible for the shipment of
supplies. Questions of priority of transpor-
tation involving only American troops or
materiel were settled in conference be-
tween G-3 and G-4, USAFIA.
American and Australian forces both
utilized the same slender resources in
water transport. With a chronic shortage
of tonnage, priorities had to be established.
Initially, the decision as to which troops
or cargo should move first was reached
through informal negotiation between the
Transportation Service and G-3 and G-4
of USAFIA, with final recourse if need be
to G-3 and G-4 of GHQ SWPA.38
As military operations expanded in
New Guinea, there developed a growing
need of a more formal theater organization
to control traffic. On 13 September 1942 a
joint G-3/G-4 movement control office
was established in Headquarters, USA-
SOS, to handle all priorities for personnel
and supply movements within the theater
and to supervise the assignment of service
units. After USAFFE was reactivated in
37
Edward Ronald Walker, The Australian Economy
in War and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1947), pp. 57-58.
38
Ltrs, Plant to Larson, 23 Oct and 4 Nov 50, OCT
HB Inquiries.
438
late February 1943, the co-ordination of
troop and cargo movements was assigned
to the executive for Supply and Transpor-
39
tation in USASOS, subject to the super-
vision of USAFFE. On 20 June 1943 a
USAFFE movement priority system was
established, nominally in the Office of the
Chief of Transportation, USAFFE, to
determine and supervise priorities of U.S.
Army troop and supply movements in
SWPA. In addition to a central office,
branch priorities offices were organized in
Headquarters, USASOS, and at each
USASOS port headquarters.
Early in the following month Lt. Col.
(later Col.) H. Bennett Whipple was des-
ignated Chief Movement Priority Officer,
USAFFE, under G-4, USAFFE. At the
same time twelve USAFFE movement
priority officers (including three Trans-
portation Corps officers) were named to
determine priorities locally, in addition to
their supply and troop movement duties.
When the Office of the Chief of Transpor-
tation, USAFFE, was discontinued in
September 1943, the USAFFE movement
priority system was retained in USAFFE
under G-4.
Stirred by his own experience as a
movement priority officer, Colonel Whip-
ple became an ardent advocate of a GHQ
regulating system.40 His views were set
forth in a detailed memorandum of
22 August 1943, which described a current
situation at Port Moresby. There, twelve
ships already were in the harbor, many
more were due to arrive, and conflicting
demands on the limited port facilities were
rampant. Everything was top priority.
Using Port Moresby as a typical example,
Colonel Whipple argued that traffic regu-
lation in SWPA should be made a GHQ
and not a USAFFE function, since Allied
Land, Air, and Naval Forces, and not
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
merely U.S. Army Forces, were involved.
Deciding among these competing "cus-
tomers" generally required information
that the local operators did not have and
only GHQ SWPA, was likely to possess.
The proposed regulating system was also
to include air shipments, for which there
existed no over-all booking and priority
organization. In short, in the light of his
broad knowledge of the supply and ship-
ping situation and the combat plans, the
chief regulating officer was to determine
the priority of all movements.
The Establishment of the GHQ
Regulating System
Colonel Whipple's recommendation
met with approval, and on 12 November
1943 a GHQ regulating system was estab-
lished under the direction of a chief regu-
lating officer, Col. Charles H. Unger. His
functions were to assign priorities to indi-
viduals, troops, organizational equipment,
and cargo for water, air, and rail move-
ment and to co-ordinate schedules, except
for combat vessels and aircraft; to establish
direct contact with supply, transportation,
and other similar agencies as required;
and to issue detailed instructions to imple-
ment the regulating system. Whipple
became Colonel Unger's executive officer
and the principal proponent of the new
system. The headquarters organization
included two former Transportation Corps
officers: Lt. Col. Charles A. Miller, chief
of the Water Section, and Lt. Col. Thomas
F. Ryan, chief of the Air Section. The staff
for CREGO was drawn chiefly from the
39
This office combined the normal functions of G-3
and G-4.
40
Ltr and Atchd Data, Whipple to Larson, 3 Nov
50, OCT HB Inquiries. Cf. History of the GHQ Reg-
ulating System, 31 Aug 45, Box C-1519, KCRC AGO.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
U.S. Army, but it also included personnel
of the U.S. Navy and the Australian armed
services. The entire regulating system
depended upon direct communication
with all agencies and elements in the the-
ater, without which the whole structure
would have been ineffectual.
Regulating system procedures, set up
on a tentative basis immediately following
the establishment of CREGO, were
worked out in detail and issued by
CREGO during January 1944.41 The
instructions covered all air, water, and
rail movements to, within, and from the
theater, except those by small ships as-
signed to local commanders and, as
already indicated, combat vessels and
aircraft.
For water transportation within SWPA,
G-3 at GHQ determined priorities for
troop movements, while G-4 set those for
special cargo movements. CREGO set up
these movements in the priorities indi-
cated, directly established priorities on
requests for the assignment of shipload
lots, and arranged for the movement of
individuals or small detachments on avail-
able shipping space. The priority of other
water cargo movements was determined
by the local regulating officer at the desti-
nation point. The tool for making these
decisions was the weekly consolidated
booking list. Prepared at the point of
origin by the local transportation officer,
the list included all cargo movement
requests of the commands being served,
all booked cargo remaining unshipped,
and the relative priority of movement
desired by the commands. The list was
then turned over to the point of origin
regulating officer or, if movement origi-
nated on the Australian mainland, directly
to CREGO. It was then transmitted to the
regulating officer at destination, who, in
439
consultation with the operating and re-
ceiving agencies involved, used the list as
the basis for determining the priority of
movement. The loading-point regulating
officer also provided the regulating officer
at destination with information regarding
ships loading out for, and those awaiting
call forward to, their ports. Based on the
local port situation and the recommenda-
tions of the local commander or on instruc-
tions from CREGO, the destination regu-
lating officer called forward, through the
local naval officer in charge (NOIC), ships
reported as ready for call to his port. The
release of the ships for forward movement
was arranged for by the regulating officer
at the loading port through the local
NOIC. Actual loading of cargo and oper-
ation of vessels was performed by the
commands that operated transportation.
Intra-SWPA cargo shipments by water
were classified according to four priorities,
lettered from "B" to "E," in descending
order of importance. To expedite such
movements, commands operating trans-
portation were to reserve until thirty-six
hours before departure 2 percent of cargo
space for high-priority items. All priority
cargo was to be moved as rapidly as possi-
ble, even if items in two or more priority
classifications had to be moved simultane-
ously.
Provisions for the regulation of intra-
theater air movements were similar to
those for water movements. Since all air
traffic was emergency or special in charac-
ter, priority classifications were set up
according to degree of urgency. Five clas-
sifications were used to cover priorities
41
See History of the GHQ Regulating System, App.
E, Regulating System Instructions 1-4, Box C-1519,
KCRC AGO. For subsequent modifications in in-
structions, see Apps. I and L of the GHQ Regulating
System history.
440
for movements varying in urgency from
immediate precedence to ninety-six hours.
So far as rail movements were con-
cerned, CREGO was to assign priorities
for movements of special interest to GHQ
and to prescribe procedures for priority
movements where regulating officers were
not assigned. The regulating officer at
Townsville was to establish local priorities
on requests submitted by local commands
and arrange for the transfer of GHQ pri-
ority movements to and from rail. In both
cases, actual moves of troops and cargo
were handled by the Australian Army's
movement control organization.
Transpacific air passenger and cargo
traffic on aircraft allocated to SWPA was
classified according to four priorities
(Classes 1 through 4), set up in descending
order of urgency. CREGO was to co-
ordinate air transport requirements and
available aircraft space, clear all priorities
for movements to and from the United
States and intermediate points, assign
identification numbers to all priorities,
and advise USAFFE and Seventh Fleet of
changes in the availability of aircraft. He
would maintain a liaison office at Hickam
Field, Hawaii, and at such other terminals
as necessary. The liaison officers would
represent CREGO and act as advisers to
commands operating air transport, and
provide CREGO with information regard-
ing actual and projected movements. The
commands operating air transport were
requested to make all shipments in accord-
ance with assigned priorities and to pro-
vide CREGO with monthly estimates of
available westbound tonnage, airway bills
for all shipments, and passenger and cargo
manifests upon arrival at the western
terminal.
Provision was also made for CREGO to
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
take over the functions pertaining to trans-
pacific water movements previously exer-
cised by the GHQ Priorities Division.
CREGO assumed responsibility for clear-
ing the assignment of special transpacific
water cargo priorities. Special priority
requisitions were to be submitted by
USASOS and Fifth Air Force through
USAFFE to CREGO, and directly from
Seventh Fleet to CREGO.
From modest beginnings the GHQ
regulating system developed into a huge
completely centralized agency for the de-
tailed control on a priority basis of troop
and cargo movements in the Southwest
Pacific Area. Functioning under the imme-
diate supervision of the Deputy Chief of
Staff, GHQ the chief regulating officer
sought to serve as an impartial referee
among the various claimants for the
limited transportation within the theater.
The chief concern of CREGO was with
transportation by air and by water, for
which he built up an elaborate control
organization. Branch regulating offices
(later called stations) were created in the
forward areas as the need arose. Through
liaison officers the regulating system's
influence was ultimately extended far be-
yond the confines of SWPA. In connection
with the regulation of transpacific air
traffic, air liaison offices were established
in February 1944 at Hickam Field, Ha-
waii, and Hamilton Field, California. In
June 1944, CREGO assigned two liaison
officers to the Headquarters, South Pacific
Area (SPA), at Noumea, New Caledonia,
to regulate the flow of troops and their
equipment from SPA into SWPA. In the
following month a SWPA liaison group
was set up at the San Francisco Port of
Embarkation to advise as to the desired
priorities for movement of SWPA cargo
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 441

and personnel and the approximate dates cards posted on large boards. These cards,
when specific shipping could be received which were kept current, were reproduced
at destination ports. Other liaison officers periodically by a photographic process,
served at the convoy assembly point of and copies were distributed to interested
42
Kossol Roads, in the Palaus, and at Guam. agencies. The system involved numerous
CREGO moved his headquarters suc- records, all containing in substance the
cessively from Brisbane to Hollandia, then same information but compiled from vari-
to Leyte and Manila. At the height of his ous points of view. The most important
activity, in mid-January 1945, the chief data, however, concerned conditions at
regulating officer had twenty-two branch the destination port, which was always
regulating stations and liaison offices, considered the bottleneck.
sprawling over the Pacific from Australia The GHQ regulating system in SWPA
to California. His headquarters staff, num- was, indeed, a far cry from the individual
bering about 150, directed the intra- U.S. Army regulating station designed
theater traffic of approximately 500 primarily for rail transport. The tremen-
noncombatant vessels and had access to dous movement control organization de-
the available space on about the same veloped by the chief regulating officer
number of transport planes. Priorities were presented a tempting target for critics, who
assigned in the light of the workload and suspected that an unnecessary empire was
capacity of each port, the vessels and air- being built. The system was vulnerable,
planes available, and the relative urgency for in determining the priority of move-
of the shipment. During 1944 CREGO ments as between powerful competing
arranged for the movement into the for- interests, CREGO almost inevitably
ward areas of approximately 110,000 aroused resentment. Among the interested
troops per month with all vehicles and agencies were USASOS, the Transporta-
equipment and, in addition, one million tion Corps, and the Air Transport Com-
measurement tons of supplies and equip- mand, each of which on occasion felt that
ment. its normal activity was hampered by inter-
The chief regulating officer could not ference from CREGO. With the demand
function successfully without a thorough for transportation usually greater than the
up-to-date knowledge of the supply and supply, priority became all important and
transportation situation throughout the one or more would-be "customers" neces-
theater. He kept elaborate records on all sarily met with disappointment. Except
matters pertaining to the personnel and during a brief period of outstanding co-
cargo traffic under his jurisdiction. Direct operation when Colonel Plant was Chief
contact between CREGO and his regulat- Transportation Officer, USASOS, the
ing and liaison officers was maintained struggle between the regulating system
around the clock by means of an excellent and the transportation office went on
communications network, which made "pretty continuously."43
possible a steady flow of information,
42
orders, and other operational and admin- See Exhibits A to W for samples of these records,
istrative data. The status of ports, ships, OCTLtrs,HB SWPA CREGO.
43
Whipple to Larson, 3 Nov 50, and Plant to
and movements was shown by entries on Larson, 4 Nov 50, OCT HB Inquiries.
442
The first big offensive against the regu-
lating system was led by the commanding
general of USASOS, General Frink. In a
memorandum of 19 May 1944, addressed
to General MacArthur, General Frink
made the following charges. Under the
prevailing arrangement the local base
commanders had the last word in regard
to the booking lists and so could in effect
veto USASOS decisions, thereby interfer-
ing with the build-up of stocks for opera-
tional requirements. Local regulating
officers might, and often did, try to run
the ports, when their work should have
been confined to refereeing conflicting
requirements of the several U.S. and
Allied forces. The regulating system en-
compassed the complete control of all
vessels, amounting to virtual management
of intratheater transportation. Specifically,
Frink urged a relaxation of the centralized
control exercised by CREGO and a peri-
odic allotment to USASOS of tonnage
available for cargo movement on a prior-
ity basis but accomplished with shipping
scheduled by USASOS. GHQ, SWPA,
however, was unwilling to make any dras-
tic change in the prevailing system, which
it described as basically sound.
Although the regulating system emerged
victorious from this encounter, it remained
under almost constant attack throughout
1944. According to its most ardent advo-
cate, Colonel Whipple, the main difficulty
arose because CREGO was unable to sell
his system to USASOS and G-4 of GHQ
and to win their complete co-operation.
Furthermore, in 1944 an increasingly seri-
ous congestion of shipping in SWPA drew
heavy fire from the War Department, the
Transportation Corps, and the War Ship-
ping Administration, culminating in a
stern call from Washington for drastic
action in the theater to expedite the turn-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
around of the cargo vessels so desperately
needed to fight a global war.
By its very nature, the regulating sys-
tem often led to duplication and confusion.
Within the theater no ships could sail from
their loading ports without being cleared
by instructions from CREGO. Such ship-
ping instructions were issued simultane-
ously by CREGO to the Chief Transpor-
tation Officer, USASOS, and the local
regulating officer. The latter, by virtue of
his direct contact with CREGO, received
instructions, and often also the changes,
long before the USASOS data, which
passed through command channels,
reached the port. On occasion the base
port commander was confronted by ap-
parently conflicting instructions, which
had to be reconciled by reference to
USASOS headquarters and consultation
with CREGO. Such instances obviously
hindered efforts to co-ordinate ship
movements efficiently, and undoubtedly
strained relations between CREGO and
USASOS.44
Still more disturbing for CREGO was
the repeated tendency in USASOS to by-
pass the regulating system and to appeal
directly to G-4, GHQ. From about July
1944, G-4, GHQ, built up its Transporta-
tion Section. The Transportation Section
then began to relegate CREGO to a sub-
ordinate "bookkeeping agency," which
had to submit even the most minor action
for final decision. According to Colonel
Whipple, the belligerent attitude of
USASOS and the aggressive stand of G-4
at GHQ in large measure represented a
very human urge "to get into the act,"
which was coupled with a burning desire
44
See data compiled by Colonel Whipple and for-
warded to Harold Larson in letter of 3 November
1950, OCT HB Inquiries. Cf. Masterson, Trans in
SWPA, p. 772.
 THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 443

to control theater shipping. 45 In his opin- Similar difficulties were encountered,

ion, USASOS could have gained the same successively, at Hollandia, Leyte, and
ends without confusion or turmoil by Manila. At each forward base, cargo dis-
merely booking its cargo in the prescribed charge generally was slowed by the lack of
manner and applying for priorities, refer- port facilities, a shortage of labor, a short-
ring any conflicts to CREGO for settle- age of trucks, mud, rain, and enemy air
46
ment by G-4 at GHQ, if so desired. raids. Under these circumstances, with
storage space ashore limited or almost
The Problem of Shipping Congestion
nonexistent, the natural tendency in the
Much of the heat and friction generated theater was to use Liberty ships as floating
by this unwholesome situation might be warehouses and to meet the most urgent
dismissed simply as the byproduct of dis- requirements by means of selective dis-
agreement as to who should regulate and charge. As a result, vessels in increasing
control traffic within the theater, but the numbers lay idle, the scarcity of bottoms
matter unfortunately had wider and more became more acute, and drastic expedi-
serious ramifications. By autumn 1943 ents ultimately had to be adopted in order
shipping congestion had already become to bring relief.
a problem in SWPA. Despite strenuous Aware of the growing congestion, the
efforts by CREGO to control the flow of chief regulating officer unsuccessfully at-
shipping in accordance with supply re- tempted to obtain satisfactory corrective
quirements and the receiving capacity of action, by which he meant the retarding of
destination ports, the immobilization of
vessels in the theater assumed increasingly 45
Two former chiefs of transportation, General
serious proportions.47 Thomas Wilson and General Wanamaker, also com-
plained of meddling in shipping matters by G-4 and
Congestion developed at Milne Bay, others at GHQ. According to Wanamaker, many out-
New Guinea, in September and October side his office were fascinated by water transport,
1943. It came of routing more ships to the thought they could operate ships, and "wanted to
have a hand in the intricate and challenging job of
port there than could be promptly dis- ordering several hundred ships of all descriptions
charged and of holding other vessels until over transportation lines several thousand miles in
they could be called forward to Finsch- length." Interv with Wilson cited n. 17; Wanamaker
hafen. Later, in January 1944, the harbor ltr cited n. 25.
46
Interv with Wilson cited n. 17; Wanamaker ltr
at Milne Bay held as many as 140 ships, cited n. 25; Whipple ltr cited n. 40. Whipple had dif-
some of which had been there more than ficulty solely with G-4, GHQ, and USASOS. He
a month. During the first half of February, foundThe
G-3, GHQ most co-operative.
47
chief sources of information on shipping
Milne Bay had the lowest average dis- congestion in SWPA are the reports of visiting officers
charge—261 measurement tons—per ves- and mariners and the official compilation (October
1943-August 1945) of the Office of the Chief of Trans-
sel per day of any port in SWPA. Seven of portation, ASF, initially entitled "Relative Standing
the vessels awaiting discharge at the end of Theaters, Commands, and Ports in Discharging
of this period had been in port for forty Ships," and finally "Monthly Vessel Utilization Sum-
mary" (MOVUS). Designed to improve the rate of
days or more. The War Department de- cargo discharge overseas by comparing individual
manded immediate corrective action. Al- port performance, this compilation offered both pats
though the theater tried to comply by of approval and critical comments. See Masterson,
Trans in SWPA, pp. 773-77 and Apps. 54-56. Cf.
expediting cargo discharge, the congestion Wardlow, Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations,
continued. pp. 291-96.
444
scheduled loadings. His office reported on
18 October 1944 that there were 87 ships at
Hollandia—12 discharging, 3 loading, 24
awaiting call to Leyte, 33 waiting to dis-
charge, 5 waiting to load, and 10 miscel-
laneous. Of the 45 ships discharging or
waiting to discharge, 7 were troop trans-
ports and 38 were cargo ships, of which
only 9 had been scheduled for Hollandia
by CREGO. The remaining 29 evidently
had come directly from the zone of inte-
rior. These last 29 shiploads could just as
well have remained in the United States,
because they were no closer to being in
the hands of combat troops than if they
had been held in San Francisco and loaded
at a time that would have permitted im-
mediate discharge on arrival at Hollandia.
The invasion of Leyte in late October
1944 brought further difficulty. Major
changes in operational plans calculated
by the theater commander to speed up the
campaign in the Philippines created un-
anticipated requirements. The effort to
meet these needs, together with delays in
cargo discharge caused by the elements
and enemy action, resulted in a large
accumulation of vessels at Leyte. Mean-
while, despite some improvement at Hol-
landia, a major supporting base, too many
freighters were still being held entirely
too long. Thoroughly alarmed, CREGO
again attempted to arrange for a cutback
in scheduled loadings, notifying G-4,
GHQ, on 11 November that information
on hand indicated that by early January
1945 approximately 100 vessels would be
idle awaiting discharge or call forward to
Leyte. No action was taken, and the ship-
ping tie-up materialized as predicted. Ac-
cording to Colonel Whipple, both G-4,
GHQ, and USASOS realized the situ-
ation but appeared unable to resist pres-
sure from various agencies to "load out
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
more and more items and more and more
ships" for Leyte; apparently the supply
people "found some security in having
their supply backlogs on ships" even
though the vessels might not be discharged
for some time to come.48 As for the theater
commander, he believed that the speed-
up of the campaign had justified the ex-
pense in shipping.49
The tie-up of shipping at Hollandia and
Leyte finally led to drastic action in late
November 1944 by the President acting
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The the-
ater was notified that from May through
October 1944, inclusive, a total of 270
ships had been loaded and sent out, of
which 177 were completely discharged.
Only 98 of the latter had been released for
return to the zone of interior. Vessel reten-
tions had swollen from 112 on 15 May to
190 on 11 November, and the theater com-
mander was therefore ordered to release
at once at least 20 vessels in this category.
He was not to exceed 170 retentions at
any time during December 1944, and he
was asked to report the number of addi-
tional vessels to be released for return to
the United States by the end of January
1945. Further, the planned sailings from
the west coast to SWPA during December
1944 were to be reduced arbitrarily from
40 to 30 ships.
In view of the growing port and ship-
ping congestion in the Philippines, the
War Department, on 8 December 1944,
notified the theater commander that only
two courses of action seemed open: (1) re-
duction of vessel retentions from 170 on
20 December 1944 to 100 by 15 January
48
Ltrs and Atchd Data, Whipple to Larson, 3 Nov
50 and 31 Jan 51, OCT HB Inquiries; Masterson,
Trans in SWPA, p. 795.
49
Rad, CINC SWPA to CG ASF, 23 Nov 44, CM-
IN 23048, OCT HB Wylie Ships for Pacific Theaters.
Cited in Masterson, Trans in SWPA, p. 795.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 445

1945; and (2) elimination, where practica- had "consistently requisitioned tonnages
ble, of U.S. sailings for SWPA in Decem- in excess of ability to receive and unload,"
ber and in January 1945. The War De- and that a total of 750,000 tons of cargo
partment called for "immediate drastic was awaiting shipment from the west
action." General MacArthur asked to coast to SWPA. According to Colonel
have the proposed reduction postponed Whipple, USASOS had built up a tre-
for two months because of the impending mendous backlog of cargo in San Fran-
invasion of Luzon, but before his reply cisco despite repeated objections by
could reach Washington, where patience CREGO that fell upon deaf ears in G-4 of
51
had worn thin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff GHQ.
had already directed all theater com- In SWPA, as in ETO, efficient utiliza-
manders to cease using ships as floating tion of shipping had obviously been made
warehouses, to reduce sailing schedules to secondary to a comfortable supply position.
conform to port discharge capacities, to Transportation Corps officers in Washing-
discontinue selective discharge except for ton, however, felt that the operations in
urgent operations, and to submit detailed SWPA could be supported without an ex-
reports on the position and employment cessive floating reserve of idle vessels. None
of ships. of General Eastwood's comments, said
General MacArthur again protested, General Wylie, could excuse ships lying at
but to no avail. He also sent a representa- anchor 40, 50, and 60 days awaiting dis-
tive, Brig. Gen. Harold E. Eastwood, to charge. This firm stand had a salutary
Washington to urge reconsideration of the effect upon SWPA, which at long last
cut in shipping to SWPA. General East- sought to adjust shipping requests to the
wood felt that the War Department was approximate discharge rates.
hostile to SWPA while other theaters grew Experience with confusion and conges-
fat at its expense. General Wylie, Assistant tion at Milne Bay, Hollandia, and Leyte
Chief of Transportation for Operations, by no means prevented similar conditions
regretted this misconception and pointed at Manila. General Wylie, who visited
to the fact that ETO, the top-priority the- that port in the spring of 1945, found that
ater, had suffered far deeper proportionate USASOS, in dealing with G-4, GHQ,
cuts in shipping than had as yet been ap- often bypassed the chief transportation of-
plied against SWPA. ficer as well as CREGO. General Mac-
General Wylie believed that the theater Arthur personally accepted full blame for
had consistently leaned far over on the any shipping congestion, for he believed
safe side in setting up its supplies and in that getting into Manila at an early date
loading for operations on the basis of "too justified some logistic difficulties. What he
early and too much." 50 There had been did not mention, said Wylie, was that his
no realistic appreciation of discharge ca- staff had been slow to adjust the shipping
pacity and no inclination to reduce re- requirements to the changed target dates.
quirements once it had become apparent As a result, the War Department had to
that optimistic forecasts would not be met. 50
Memo, ACofT for Opns for Dep Dir of Plans and
Later, in June 1945, a study of Pacific Opns ASF, 19 Dec 44, sub: SWPA Shipping Situation,
supply, based on data from San Francisco OCT HB Wylie Shipping in Pacific.
51
See Whipple ltr and atchd data cited n. 40. Cf.
Port of Embarkation, disclosed that SWPA Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 804-05.
446 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

make arbitrary cuts in tonnage, action trol of AFWESPAC, and of such other
that might better have been taken by the vessels as might be assigned by GHQ
theater in light of its own needs and AFPAC; and (5) assignment and publica-
52
capabilities. tion of SWPA and local numbers of all
In fairness to SWPA, it should be Army-allocated and Navy-allocated ves-
pointed out that the port facilities at sels in the area. Movements of assault
Manila had suffered severely from war- shipping and assignment and release of
time damage and destruction, with a re- vessels from the local fleet continued to be
sultant adverse effect upon the rate of as directed by GHQ.
cargo discharge. A shortage of trucks and As already indicated, the newly ap-
labor at the dumps hampered port clear- pointed Chief of Transportation, AFWES-
ance. However, the worst congestion came PAC, General Stewart, regarded this
in the late summer and early fall of 1945, transfer as a triumph for the Transporta-
when ships arrived from the United States tion Corps. But irrespective of the aggres-
and Europe but could not be unloaded sive stand taken by Stewart, the end of the
because of the scrambled situation after war against Japan and the ultimate re-
the surrender of Japan. The subsequent grouping of the Allied forces in SWPA
outloading of forces for occupation duties into separate independent commands un-
and demobilization further complicated doubtedly would have led to the abandon-
the picture. ment of the GHQ regulating system. The
reversion of SWPA from an Allied head-
The Disbandment of CREGO quarters to one predominantly U.S. Army
in make-up made logical a shift of regu-
Following the end of hostilities, the the- lating responsibilities from the Allied
54
ater took steps to dismantle the GHQ GHQ level to AFWESPAC.
regulating system. Effective 31 August While it functioned, the GHQ regulat-
1945 the CREGO organization was for- ing system all too often provided a con-
mally disbanded. Priority controls over venient scapegoat for the frequent failures
water traffic were transferred to to tie in transportation and supply within
AFWESPAC, but GHQ, SWPA, retained the theater. The chief regulating officer
the function of establishing and im- undoubtedly took the blame for many
plementing air priorities.53 Among the conditions beyond his control, such as in-
CREGO functions assumed by AFWES- adequate port facilities and unexpected
PAC as of 1 September were: (1) control demands created by changes in tactical
of "intra-area water movements of Army plans. Accusations and countercharges
personnel and cargo except movements tended to obscure substantial achievement
made in assault shipping"; (2) preparation attained in the priority control of theater
and submission of ACTREP's (activity re- traffic. Like many another referee,
ports) and PACTREP's (Pacific activity CREGO discovered that his decisions
reports); (3) preparation and distribution
of a "consolidated daily port status re- 52
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 800-801.
53
port"; (4) routing of intra-area vessels as- History of the GHQ Regulating System, 31 Aug
45, p. 10, Box C-1519, KCRC AGO.
signed to AFWESPAC, of transpacific 54
Colonel Whipple is also of this opinion. See
vessels destined for ports under the con- Whipple ltr cited n. 40.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
were not always cheered. The maze of
controls, regulations, and reports was for-
bidding, particularly for the transporta-
tion operator who felt that he could direct
his own traffic.
The chief regulating officer had neither
a perfect nor an infallible system. Given
the same handicaps, another agency
might or might not have done the job with
fewer headaches. Even the critics of the
regulating system, such as Generals Frink
and Wanamaker, conceded that the con-
trol of Allied traffic on a priority basis was
necessary. The problem was to determine
the proper place and scope of the control
mechanism within the theater organ-
ization.
According to Frink, the regulating sys-
tem would have worked better in SWPA
had GHQ been content simply to allot
tonnages to the various forces involved
and left the regulating function to his chief
of transportation. As it was, he believed
that CREGO attempted to exercise a
much too detailed control over the move-
ment of ships, personnel, and cargo.55 On
the other hand, CREGO found that he
lacked the necessary authority and sup-
port to do a fully effective job. Apparently
with the encouragement of some staff
members of G-4, GHQ, USASOS in
many instances circumvented CREGO
directives. Moreover the G-4 Transporta-
tion Section, which was actually dupli-
cative in function, increasingly dominated
CREGO from the summer of 1944
onward.
The division of transportation respon-
sibilities and functions as between the
GHQ G-4 Transportation Section,
CREGO, and the Chief Transportation
Officer, USASOS, almost inevitably led
to misunderstandings, clashes, and some
56
duplication. Colonel Whipple, who had
447
been instrumental in the establishment of
the regulating system and the guiding
spirit behind it, believed that better re-
sults would have been attained if the con-
trol of all transportation and regulation
had been placed in the hands of one
officer, responsible only to the Chief of
Staff, GHQ. Located in the Allied head-
quarters and utilizing all port facilities,
ships, railways, and transport aircraft, in-
cluding the necessary personnel, this
officer would meet the requirements of
G-3 and G-4, referring to the chief of staff
any conflicts that could not be settled by
conference. Such a system, if supported by
all concerned, he contended, would have
eliminated much of the difficulty en-
countered.57
The U.S. Army Fleet in SWPA
From beginning to end the war in the
Southwest Pacific was highly dependent
upon movement by water. Almost all
American support in men and material
had to be sent by ship from the United
States, a distance of approximately 6,000
nautical miles. Within SWPA the bulk of
wartime traffic was by sea, from island to
island and along the coastal fringes of the
larger land masses.
The shipping that supported the U.S.
Army in SWPA consisted of ocean-going
vessels moving back and forth between the
United States and the theater, and vessels
55
Frink ltr cited n. 25.
56
The separation of regulating and operating
functions in SWPA was in contrast with the situation
in MTOUSA. There, the U.S. theater chief of trans-
portation, who also served as SOS transportation
officer, not only performed traffic management func-
tions at the Allied theater headquarters but also
supervised U.S. Army operations. For details see
above, Ch. V.
57
Whipple ltr and atchd data cited n. 40.
448
used solely within the theater. Ships nor-
mally engaged in transpacific runs might
be retained for temporary service in
SWPA, and while so employed they were
in effect part of the local fleet. Within
SWPA all shipping was under the control
of the Allied theater commander.
Fortunately, except for a brief period
before and after Pearl Harbor, ocean traf-
fic to and from the Southwest Pacific was
unhampered by the convoy system, which
of necessity obtained in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean areas. In October 1941,
because of growing concern over possible
hazardous conditions in the Pacific, the
U.S. Navy recommended that all troop
transports, as well as freighters carrying
valuable military cargo such as airplanes
and tanks, be convoyed between Hono-
lulu and Manila. The Army acquiesced,
and thereafter the required escorts and
routing were furnished by the Navy. The
Navy announced on 26 December 1941
that it could not escort more than one fast
troop convoy to Australia per month and
that all slow cargo ships bound for that
area would simply be "turned loose to
proceed individually."58
The policy of protecting only the troop
transports and letting the cargo vessels
fend for themselves was agreeable to Gen-
eral Somervell, who was willing to accept
the risk of loss at sea in order to move
urgently needed supplies to the Far East.
In the first few months of the war provid-
ing escorts proved troublesome. The Army
generally was impatient of the delay in
setting up convoys, and the Navy was re-
luctant to carry troops in vessels with a
speed of less than 15 knots. Luckily, en-
emy submarine activity never became
serious in the Southwest Pacific. From the
fall of 1942 on, troop and cargo ships
usually traveled without escort, except in
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the forward areas where naval and air
protection had to be given.59
Like the other Pacific areas, SWPA ex-
perienced an urgent need for ships be-
cause of its utter dependence upon water
transport. The world-wide shortage of
bottoms precluded full compliance with
SWPA requests, and until V-E Day the
shipping needs of the war in Europe took
priority over those of the conflict with
Japan. In Australia, as in the United
Kingdom, local resources were exploited
as fully as possible so as to reduce shipping
requirements. An unexpected but wel-
come source of supply for SWPA was the
"distress cargo" from sixty-one American,
British, and Dutch ships that had taken
refuge in Australian ports during the early
months of the war.
Ocean-Going Vessels in Intratheater
Service
With ocean shipping short everywhere
and Australian tonnage already depleted
by two years of war, the U.S. Army had
difficulty in assembling a local fleet for
intratheater use.60 The initial acquisitions
for this purpose were effected by purchase
or charter from private owners, but there-
after new construction provided the prin-
cipal source of supply. Vessels of Austral-
ian registry were procured through Sir
Thomas Gordon, director of shipping for
the Australian Commonwealth. American
flag vessels and available ships of other
flags were obtained by the War Depart-
ment through the War Shipping Adminis-
58
OCT HB Monograph 5, pp. 83, 161-62.
59
Memo, King for Marshall, 4 Mar 42, AG 045.4,
Escorting of Army Transports by Navy; Memo, Col
Farr, OCT, for Chief of Hosp and Evac Br SOS, 30
Oct 42, OCT HB Ocean Trans Convoys.
60
No attempt is here made to tell the story of trans-
pacific shipping.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 449

tration, which had its representatives in ate draft and had large hatches. That
Australia.61 number, minus one sunk en route, was
After Pearl Harbor the theater, under procured ship by ship in the United
desperate pressure to supply the Philip- States, and delivered to the theater by the
pines and Java, had been forced to seize Transportation Corps. The first Laker,
every ship within reach. Enemy action re- City of Fort Worth, reached SWPA on 12
sulted in severe losses, notably at Darwin March 1943, and the others arrived at
where Japanese bombers destroyed almost various dates thereafter. These vessels
all the shipping in the harbor, including were generally about 251 feet long, of ap-
the veteran Army transport Meigs. In proximately 2,600 gross tons, and had a
mid-March 1942 the USAFIA local fleet speed of 8 to 9 knots. They were supple-
totaled only seven vessels: three U.S. craft, mented by a dozen other vessels, some-
one Philippine ship, and three small ves- what larger but with similar charac-
sels belonging to the British-controlled teristics.
China Navigation Company. The Lakers had seen hard service for
With the fall of Java and the impend- twenty years or more, and all required
ing loss of the Philippines, Australia be- considerable reconditioning before being
came the main base of operations in the sent across the Pacific. Originally de-
Southwest Pacific. A local fleet was there- signed for short voyages, they had limited
fore essential in order to move personnel, water and fuel capacity. After a year of
equipment, and supplies from the Austral- experience with these vessels, Colonel
ian ports to the forward areas. The first Plant, Chief Transportation Officer,
substantial increment for this fleet came USASOS, reported that they were "a con-
in the spring of 1942, when 21 small ves- stant repair problem" and had been "very
sels were obtained by charter from the much of a headache." Yet unsatisfactory
Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij as these ships were, the theater could not
(KPM). Known as KPM vessels, the ships have done without them.
had formerly operated in the Netherlands Indeed, to meet the ever-urgent de-
East Indies. Loaded with refugees, they mand for intratheater shipping, an addi-
had limped into the nearest Australian tional assortment of ocean-going vessels,
62
ports to avoid capture by the Japanese.
Large ships generally were obtained by 61
The main WSA office was in Sydney, with
retention of WSA vessels dispatched to branch offices at Melbourne and Brisbane. WSA
agents in SWPA paid stevedoring, port, and other
SWPA from the zone of interior. Since charges for the WSA vessels, which were mostly
such ships were retained only for tempo- Liberty ships. The WSA also booked return cargoes
rary assignments, the theater had to se- and, at the request of the theater commander, ar-
ranged for the temporary retention of its vessels in
cure other vessels that could be kept for a the theater. Plant ltr, 27 Jan 51, cited n. 21.
longer time in a so-called permanent local 62
Despite costly maintenance and repairs, these
fleet. Beginning in the summer of 1942, vessels were indispensable. See Interv with Wilson
SWPA repeatedly requested additional cited n. 17; Plant ltrs cited n. 21; Masterson, Trans in
SWPA, pp. 321-38, 619.
vessels, large and small, that could be used 63
So termed because they were built mainly under
for intratheater missions. Initially, the World War I contracts in Great Lakes shipyards and
theater demanded at least twenty ships of were small enough to pass through the Sault Ste.
Marie locks and the Welland Canal. See Masterson,
63
the "Laker" type, which were of moder- Trans in SWPA, pp. 342-43.
450
ranging from 200 to 400 feet in length,
was acquired from private owners. Of
both American and foreign registry, these
ships became part of the local SWPA fleet,
which by December 1943 totaled 52 ves-
sels, varying in speed from 8 to 16 knots.
At that time one KPM ship, the Maet-
suycker, had been converted into a hospital
ship, ten vessels were employed as troop
carriers, and the remaining forty-one
served as freighters.64
From the very beginning the slow but
versatile "work-horse of the sea," the
EC-2 Liberty ship, was included in the
local fleet. Ultimately, most of the Liber-
ties in intratheater traffic consisted of ves-
sels temporarily withdrawn from trans-
pacific runs, a practice that had been au-
thorized on an emergency basis as early
as mid-February 1942. To the dismay of
the War Shipping Administration and the
Transportation Corps at Washington, the
theater's appetite for such retentions grew
and grew until it finally had to be
curbed.65
The theater found Liberty ships very
useful as cargo carriers because of their
large hatches and deep 'tween decks and
lower holds. These vessels also gave good
service as emergency troopships. Under
the direction of Colonel Plant, in the fall
of 1942 Liberty ships were converted over-
night into troopers to meet a pressing
need for that type of transport for op-
erations in New Guinea. Field kitchens,
protected by shelters made of dunnage,
were placed on the port side between
numbers two and three hatches. Trough
latrines were installed on both sides on the
after deck between numbers four and five
hatches. They were flushed by lengths of
hose connected to the fire hydrants. A few
fresh water outlets were added at each
end of the amidships house. No standee
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
bunks were installed, and the 'tween decks
were kept clear of all cargo. Usually, both
officers and men slept on the deck in good
weather. Normally, each ship carried
900 troops. These conversions provided
the necessities such as lifesaving equip-
ment but no frills, and the ships could
be quickly reconverted into freighters
when so needed. Division commanders
later told Plant that the passage on a
Liberty troopship served well as prepara-
tion for the hardships that lay ahead.66
Liberty ships, while highly desirable for
ocean voyages between Australia and
New Guinea, were too large for coastal
service in shallow and uncharted waters.
Accordingly, early in 1943 the theater
urged the development and standardiza-
tion of a medium-size vessel, 250 to 300
feet long, with adequate cargo gear, large
hatches, refrigeration, and a speed of
around 14 knots. At least 200 ships with
these specifications were desired for intra-
theater supply missions. They were
needed to expedite deliveries, to minimize
transshipment delays, and to avoid pos-
sible loss of large vessels in the poorly
charted and frequently hazardous waters
of the forward areas.
All told, in June 1943 the theater re-
quested a total of 420 vessels of various
types, a requirement deemed "excessive"
by the Office of the Chief of Transporta-
tion at Washington. Although that de-
mand could not be met, the theater's ves-
sel requirements were partially filled by
64
See list in ibid., p. 346.
65
Vessel retentions in SWPA during the early
phase of the Philippine invasion contributed to an
acute world-wide shipping crisis in November 1944.
See ibid., pp. 353-68.
66
Ltrs, Plant to Larson, 23 Oct and 4 Nov 1950,
OCT HB Inquiries; Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp.
344-45, 572; Ltr, MacArthur to Somervell, 16 Oct 42,
OCT HB Wylie Australia.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
the continued procurement of older ves-
sels. Lacking enough ships for local assign-
ments, the theater relied increasingly on
the temporary retention of WSA vessels.
Relief came in 1944 with the construction
by the U.S. Maritime Commission of
three types of vessels that were especially
suited for service in SWPA—C1-M-AV1
vessels, Baltic coasters, and concrete
storage-ships.
The C1-M-AV1, a steel cargo vessel of
3,805 gross tons, diesel powered, with a
length of approximately 339 feet and a
speed of 11 knots, became the answer to
the theater's request for 200 craft of me-
dium size. Production difficulties delayed
deliveries of the C1-M-AV1 type to the
theater. Bearing such salty names as Clove
Hitch, Star Knot, and Sailor's Splice, these
ships began to reach SWPA in limited
numbers in February 1945. The Cl-M-
AVl's were satisfactory, and their earlier
availability might have made unnecessary
the employment of the old Lakers, which
were costly to convert, maintain, and
repair.
As partial substitutes for Cl-M-AVl's,
the theater requisitioned fifteen Baltic
coasters on 16 March 1944. The Baltic
coasters delivered to SWPA were oil-fired
cargo ships of 1,791 gross tons, with a
length of approximately 259 feet and a
draft when loaded of almost 18 feet. These
vessels were well adapted for operations in
the shallow waters of New Guinea. The
Baltic coasters began arriving in Septem-
ber 1944, in time for the landings on
Leyte.
Much less desirable than the Baltic
coasters were the concrete vessels, which
began to anchor in the theater in late No-
vember 1944. Described as Type Cl-S-Dl,
they were of 4,826 gross tons, with an ap-
proximate length of 367 feet and a speed
451
of 7 knots. Because of known deficiencies,
such as seepage through the porous con-
crete bulkheads of the fuel and water
tanks, these ships were employed solely as
floating warehouses.
The local ocean-going fleet in SWPA
increased by almost one half between
15 July 1944 and 24 January 1945, but it
remained almost stationary in size there-
after. By 1 August 1945 the proportion of
these vessels built in the United States for
use in World War II had increased to
about 54 percent as compared with about
3 percent on 15 July 1944. The following
tabulation indicates the change in the
composition of the local fleet between
1 December 1943 and 1 August 1945:67
The foregoing figures illustrate force-
fully that, at the peak of its wartime
strength, the entire SWPA local fleet of
ocean-going vessels was well under a
fourth of the 420 ships requested in June
1943. This discrepancy explains why the
theater resorted increasingly to the reten-
tion of WSA vessels for local use. On the
other hand, some believed that more
could have been done with the ships at
hand. According to General Frink, there
was one problem in SWPA over which
neither USASOS nor the Transportation
67
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, p. 352, and Apps.
30 and 31.
452
Corps had any control—the wasteful em-
ployment of ocean transport because of
the overestimation of the requirements of
the troops, with the result that thousands
of tons of cargo remained afloat for
months on end without being unloaded.
Much of this excess was the natural fruit
of fear that the commanders in the field
might not have enough to do the job, but
much of it also came from sudden and
sweeping changes in tactical plans. What-
ever the cause, in Frink's opinion more
realistic estimates of requirements would
have made it possible to do the job with
fewer vessels.68
Small Ships and Craft
The local fleet formed only part of the
shipping resources of the theater. The war
in the Southwest Pacific required a large
number and a wide variety of small ships
and craft, ranging from native canoes to
vessels of nearly 1,000 gross tons. At the
outset the available floating equipment at
the Australian ports was in poor condition
and obviously unsuited to wartime traffic.
Operations off New Guinea and neigh-
boring islands called for small vessels of
shallow draft that could navigate among
coral reefs and reach primitive landing
places. At all ports operated in the theater
small craft were needed for lighterage and
other harbor duties.
At first, of necessity, the U.S. Army's
small ships consisted entirely of craft ob-
tained from the Australians—battered
schooners, old ferry boats, rusty trawlers,
luggers, launches, lighters, tugs, surf boats,
ketches, yachts, and yawls—a miscella-
neous collection known officially as the
"catboat flotilla." The Americans in the
Inquiries.
beginning took anything they could get
since urgency forbade discrimination or SWPA, pp. 378-80 and App. 36.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
selection. Ultimately a large fleet was as-
sembled in three ways: 69 by charter or
purchase from Australian owners, requisi-
tion from the United States, and local
construction in Australia and New
Zealand.
A program for the construction in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand of small craft for
the U.S. Army was begun by Colonel
Thomas Wilson in September 1942 on a
reverse lend-lease basis. The Australian
Shipbuilding Board, a governmental
agency, contracted directly with the local
shipbuilders, who then geared their pro-
duction to meet American needs. Austral-
ian construction was confined mainly to
hulls. Engines, navigational instruments,
and auxiliary equipment were supplied
from the United States and installed by
the Australians.
Construction was hampered by labor
shortages, delays in the shipment of lum-
ber and steel, and slow deliveries of en-
gines and other equipment from the
United States. The Chief of Transporta-
tion, USAFFE, reported in April 1943
that no appreciable amount of major
equipment had arrived, that a number of
hulls "built on promises" awaited engines,
and that the entire project might be
abandoned. Nevertheless, the Australians
were persuaded to continue, and a con-
certed effort was put forth in the United
States to expedite the production and
shipment of engines and accessories. Local
builders made considerable use of ply-
wood, notably for the small but seaworthy
motor dories. Steel and wooden barges,
for which the need was critical, were the
most numerous single item produced.
68
Ltr, Frink to Larson, 31 Oct 50, OCT HB
69
Available statistics vary. See Masterson, Trans in
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
All together, almost 3,200 small craft were
completed in the theater for the Transpor-
tation Corps. In 1944, with increased de-
liveries from the United States, local pro-
duction was curtailed. In the opinion of
Colonel Plant, this program was of real
assistance to the U.S. Army. 70
It was recognized before the close of
1942 that neither the Australian vessels
acquired from private owners nor the
craft to be constructed locally would
satisfy all requirements of the theater. The
deficiency had to be met by craft acquired
or constructed in the United States and
then delivered to the theater under their
own power, under tow, or as cargo. Dur-
ing the period from January 1944 through
August 1945 a total of 1,149 units was
procured in the United States and de-
livered to SWPA for the Transportation
Corps. Most of these were of new construc-
tion and were larger and heavier than
those produced in the theater. The total
included 531 barges, 203 freight supply
vessels, 138 tugs, and 106 marine tractors,
as well as smaller numbers of floating
cranes, small tankers, and launches.71
Because small craft were essential to the
development of port operations in the
forward areas, the Transportation Corps
had to organize and direct the most exten-
sive interisland towing projects in his-
tory—from Australia to New Guinea,
thence to the Philippines, and lastly from
the Philippines to Okinawa. Deliveries of
towed barges from Australia to New
Guinea began in the summer of 1943 and
reached their peak during 1944. The first
Philippine convoy left Hollandia for
Tacloban on 10 October 1944. Its 13 tugs
hauled 40 units, chiefly barges. The officer
responsible for the outstanding success of
this towing operation was Lt. Col. (later
Col.) Leon J. Lancaster, whose work was
453
highly commended by both Army and
Navy personnel.72
Maritime Personnel
The Army's ships in intratheater service
were manned throughout the war by mili-
tary as well as civilian personnel. The
military contingent, which had both com-
bat and service elements, came originally
from Ship and Gun Crew Command No.
1, USAFIA, activated at Sydney on 3 July
1942. Two years later, it was reorganized
and expanded to form the 35th Transpor-
tation Corps Composite Group, which
subsequently underwent further organiza-
tional shuffling. Its major function was to
furnish gun crews and operating personnel
for Army vessels in SWPA. Soldiers as-
signed to this duty received rigorous train-
ing in both gunnery and seamanship. The
work was dangerous, and the men were
almost always at sea. As the war pro-
gressed, ship and gun crew pools were
established at the principal ports in
SWPA for convenience in providing for
replacements, for paying crews, and for
other administrative details. At Finsch-
hafen in January 1945, for example, the
commanding officer of the pool supplied
gunners, radio operators, signalmen,
cooks, and seamen for the Army's local
fleet.73
The first civilian maritime personnel in
the theater came aboard the KPM and
other locally procured vessels.74 These
70
Plant ltr, 23 Oct 50, cited n. 21; Interv with Wil-
son cited n. 17; Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 372-
76 and App. 32.
71
For a detailed list see Masterson, Trans in
SWPA, App. 37.
72
Interv with Wanamaker, 2 Jul 51, OCT HB
SWPA Misc; Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 601-
10.
73
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 613-19.
74
Ibid., pp. 619-36.
454
men were a conglomerate lot of Austral-
ians, Dutch, Javanese, Chinese, Lascars,
Malays, and Hindus. Strikes were fre-
quent among them. At Brisbane in Janu-
ary 1943 a Chinese crew in jail for mutiny
refused freedom and the chance to work
on another ship unless paid in full for their
time behind bars. Fortunately, the KPM
and other local ship operators, and not the
Americans, had to cope with these crews.
It was another matter when the U.S.
Army had to man its own vessels. Since
there were no units on hand to provide
crews, the theater activated ten Quarter-
master boat companies (the 316th through
the 325th) on 1 January 1943 from avail-
able personnel in SWPA. Despite subse-
quent accretions, the Transportation
Corps never had enough military per-
sonnel to operate more than a fraction of
its ships in local service. As a result, exten-
sive use had to be made of Australian
civilians. However, by May 1943 the sup-
ply of maritime labor in SWPA was almost
exhausted.
At the request of the theater, the Chief
of Transportation, ASF, in 1943 carried on
a vigorous program of recruitment and
training in the United States. In June of
that year Colonel Plant personally pre-
sented the theater's case in Washington.
Plant, in particular, was responsible for
obtaining the adoption by the Army and
the War Shipping Administration of a
new type of contract for civilian maritime
employees that featured a 100-percent in-
crease in compensation in lieu of all
bonuses. This change ended the previous
lucrative but often farcical bonus system
for service in hazardous waters. Among
other advantages it facilitated the calcula-
tion of pay and reduced the number of
controversial claims. Inevitably, in SWPA
as in ETO, considerable dissatisfaction
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
arose because of the disparity in pay be-
tween civilians and military service per-
sonnel doing the same work.
The first group of approximately 700
American maritime employees, recruited
in the United States to man small vessels
in SWPA, arrived at Sydney in Septem-
ber 1943. During the ensuing months of
the war the theater continued to depend
heavily upon American and Australian
civilians to operate its ships. In August
1945 the U.S. Army employed a total of
4,699 civilian maritime personnel, of
whom 1,372 were Americans engaged in
the United States on contract. Of neces-
sity, the policy in the theater was to make
the maximum use of civilians. Although
the Army took the lead in procuring
maritime personnel, the Navy supplied
Coast Guard crews on a number of larger
sea-going vessels operating in SWPA.75
Reefers, Tankers, and Hospital Ships
Apart from the vessels already men-
tioned, other types of ships were required
in the theater to perform specialized func-
tions. Among these were the refrigerated
vessels. According to General Frink, the
main gripe he encountered in the South-
west Pacific concerned the lack of an ade-
quate supply of fresh meat in the forward
areas and the consequent reliance by the
troops on Australian canned rations.76
Humid heat, especially in New Guinea
and the Philippines, prevented the ship-
ment of perishable foods such as Austral-
ian beef unless refrigeration could be
furnished. Unfortunately, in the begin-
75
For a time the Navy manned and operated five
Liberty ships in SWPA. It also had Coast Guard
crews on a number of American-built craft employed
in direct support of naval and military operations in
combat and forward areas. See ibid., pp. 636-47.
76
Frink ltr cited n. 68.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
ning very few vessels offered any refrig-
erated space other than the ship's icebox.
The soldier's frequent diet of canned
rations therefore had to be supplemented
by vitamin pills.
The efforts of the Transportation Corps
to procure refrigerated vessels for SWPA
may be summed up in the familiar words
"too little and too late." Throughout
1943-44 the theater suffered from a criti-
cal shortage of reefer space. When the first
Laker arrived in March 1943, its refrig-
eration was hailed as "manna from
Heaven." Yet at best such ships could give
only partial relief. For the forward areas
where the need was acute, the suggestion
was made that refrigerated barges be built
to serve as floating warehouses from which
daily issues could be made to the troops
on shore.
Both the proposed barges and the Cl-
M-AV1 vessels, which together were cal-
culated to furnish adequate reefer space,
were late in reaching the theater. Reefer
barges began arriving in August 1944, but
the first two Cl-M-AVl's did not arrive
until February 1945. Meanwhile, unsuc-
cessful efforts were made to get aid from
the U.S. Navy and the British Ministry
of War Transport. Within the theater, the
number of issues of perishables per month
to forward areas dropped from nine in
July to four in November 1944. Then, as
before, the forces in New Guinea, the
most unhealthful and uncomfortable part
of the theater, existed on canned rations
and vitamin tablets. However, some relief
was obtained by large direct shipments of
perishables from San Francisco and New
York.
Ample reefer space finally began to ma-
terialize in the summer of 1945. The most
urgent need had passed when, consider-
ably after V-J Day, three large refrigerated
455
barges arrived in the theater. These were
of a new type 265 feet long. Each was
equipped to produce 5 tons of ice per day
and to make 10 gallons of ice cream every
7 minutes, and each had a capacity of ap-
proximately 64 carloads of frozen meat
and 500 measurement tons of other perish-
ables.
Another shipping problem that con-
fronted the theater was the distribution of
sufficient petroleum products to keep the
Army's aircraft and motorized equipment
in operation. Initially, American oil was
delivered to Australia either in drums or
in bulk and then transshipped where re-
quired. As new bases were established in
New Guinea and later in the Philippines,
a demand developed for small tankers and
oil barges that could deliver bulk petro-
leum at landing places in shallow waters
or that could be used to discharge large
tankers lying offshore.
Construction both in Australia and in
the United States made available a con-
siderable number of oil barges varying
from 80 to 120 feet in length. These were
supplemented by at least 31 of the so-
called Y-tankers, 162 to 182 feet long, that
began to trickle into the theater in August
1943. The Y-tankers usually were dam-
aged crossing the Pacific and had to be re-
paired before going into service. Their
activity was hampered by inexperienced
crews and a shortage of spare parts.
Toward the close of the war, with the help
of Navy-owned vessels, commercial oil
carriers, and the Army's own tankers and
barges, there was material improvement
in the tight petroleum shipping situation.77
The evacuation of patients called for
another specialized type of ship. In the
early months of the war most of the sick
77
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 402-07.
456
and wounded were hospitalized in Aus-
tralia. The first officially designated hos-
pital ship in the theater, the Mactan, was
chartered by the American Red Cross. At
the close of 1941 she brought a load of pa-
tients from Manila to Brisbane, but the
ship was not used for this purpose there-
after. As in other theaters, except for cer-
tain cases moved by air, evacuation to the
United States normally involved the use
of hospital space aboard returning troop-
ships.
The principal problem in evacuation by
ship concerned the inadequate facilities
for neuropsychiatric patients. By August
1943 it had become evident that almost 12
percent of all casualties returned from
SWPA were psychotic and required se-
curity accommodations, whereas previ-
ously only 1 percent of the hospital space
aboard ship had been allowed for this type
of patient. Subsequently, at Washington,
the Transportation Corps and the Mari-
time Commission took action to provide
additional specially equipped quarters on
the ships, and the allotment of troop space
for the returning mental patient was in-
creased to 4 percent as recommended by
the U.S. Army Medical Department.
The arrival of registered hospital ships
in SWPA was delayed in part by the dif-
ficulties of vessel conversion and in part by
the superior urgency attached to evacua-
tion of casualties from the North African
and European theaters. Beginning in the
summer of 1944, Army patients were
evacuated to the Los Angeles Port of Em-
barkation by the three Navy-owned and
Navy-operated hospital ships, Comfort,
Hope, and Mercy, all new, superbly
equipped floating hospitals with complete
78
U.S. Army medical staffs.
No Army hospital ships were dispatched
from the United States to SWPA until
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
after the invasion of Leyte on 20 October
1944. First to arrive was the USAHS
Mangold, a converted troop transport that
sailed from Charleston, South Carolina,
on 9 October and reached Finschhafen on
14 November. The Mangold had a gross
tonnage of 11,350, a speed of 13 knots,
and a patient capacity of 761. She saw ex-
tensive service in the theater, calling at
Hollandia, Milne Bay, Biak, Leyte,
Lingayen Gulf, Subic Bay, and Manila,
before returning with a load of patients to
Los Angeles on 12 May 1945. Later in the
same year, several other U.S. Army hos-
pital ships, notably the Emily H. M. Weder
and the Dogwood, were sent to SWPA.79
Port Operations
The ports in Australia, New Guinea,
and the Philippines formed three separate
groups, each with distinctive character-
istics and each vital to the U.S. Army at
different stages of the war against Japan.80
The Australian ports in general consti-
tuted the chief transportation centers of a
continent on which the rail, highway, and
air facilities were limited. They were in-
dispensable to the U.S. Army, first in the
build-up of Australia as a defensive base
and then in the funneling of troops, equip-
ment, and supplies into New Guinea.
Army use of Australian installations de-
78
Later, in April 1945 while evacuating wounded
from Okinawa, the USS Comfort was attacked by a
Japanese suicide plane with a resultant heavy loss of
life among the U.S. Army personnel aboard. See
OCT HB Ocean Trans Vessels, Name File, Comfort.
79
The Transportation Corps in SWPA exhibited
remarkable ingenuity in converting and adapting old
vessels to new uses. Thus, a molasses carrier became
the first diesel tanker in SWPA, and two fast refrig-
erated cargo ships were made into leave ships for
shuttle service between New Guinea and Australia.
See Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 570-75.
80
Only the main ports are here discussed. For de-
tails, see ibid., Ch. VIII.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 457

clined somewhat after the ports of New the largest city in Australia. The port con-
Guinea became available and direct ship- sisted of a series of harbors in the coves of
ments could be received from the United a large irregular bay with a deep, mile-
States, and declined still further after the wide entrance. In April 1942 the port had
invasion of the Philippines. 177 ship berths, of which 44 were directly
connected with railways and most were
Ports in Australia provided with electric cranes. Ample stor-
age space was available on or adjacent to
After the first months of the war, when the wharves. In 1942 the docks could ac-
American forces were being established in commodate 81 ocean-going vessels at one
the theater and when Australia itself ap- time in addition to 10 to 15 ships unload-
peared to be threatened with invasion, the ing at anchor. Depths alongside varied
U.S. Army tended increasingly to utilize from 7 to 35 feet. Sydney was the main in-
the ports on the east coast of Australia. By dustrial shipping and commercial center
mid-1942 it was obvious that Darwin, of Australia and had the best facilities for
Adelaide, Perth, and Melbourne were too marine construction and repair. Army
remote to support activity in New Guinea. traffic through Sydney was consistently
The volume of U.S. Army traffic through heavy. Available statistics, beginning with
Darwin, Adelaide, and Perth was very February 1944, show that almost 95,000
small. A well-equipped port, Melbourne long tons of cargo were handled during
had no heavy American traffic after the the peak month of May 1945, practically
summer of that year, although it was used all of which was outloaded.82
for a time as a storage area.81 Of continu- Brisbane, a much smaller port than
ing importance to the U.S. Army were the Sydney, had the advantage of lying 515
ports of Sydney, Brisbane, Townsville, miles nearer New Guinea. The city and
and Cairns. However, at none of these in- port were situated on the Brisbane River,
stallations was there a regularly assigned 15 miles from the sea. The river, con-
U.S. Army port organization functioning stantly dredged, could take vessels 650
as in the United Kingdom. Except for feet long with a draft of 26 to 27 feet,
occasional employment of troop labor, which meant that the port was able to
during a strike for example, cargo dis- berth Liberty ships but not large troop
charge in Australia was generally accom- transports. In 1942 Brisbane had 50 mar-
plished by civilian employees of local ginal wharves providing 28 berths for
stevedoring firms working at the direction large vessels, of which 14 had rail connec-
of the base commanders and under the tions. At first there were no cranes capable
technical supervision of the Transporta- of lifting more than 10 tons, but by March
tion Corps. Australian labor was averse to 1943 the U.S. Army had added one 50-ton
the employment of U.S. port troops. Only crane and two 15-ton cranes. Consider-
two U.S. port battalions reached Aus-
tralia in 1942, and they spent very little Ibid., pp. 77-80; Plant ltr, 27 Jan 51, cited n. 21.
81

time there before being hurried off to New 82

Statistics on U.S. Army cargo loaded and dis-
Guinea, where the need for their services charged at Australian ports have not been found for
the months before February 1944. Figures for 1944
was more urgent. are in short tons and thereafter in long tons. See Mas-
Sydney was both the largest port and terson, Trans in SWPA, App. 42.
458 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

able cargo was accumulated in Brisbane Australian longshoremen, who by Ameri-

for transshipment to New Guinea, and the can standards were considered slow and
process of discharging, sorting, storing, none too efficient. Masters of WSA vessels
and outloading the matériel to be for- often complained of delay at this port.
warded was time consuming and a fre- Townsville was a stopover point for north-
quent cause of delay in turnaround. bound convoys, and in September 1943 as
Because of widely scattered storage space many as thirty-six ships at one time were
and a change in gauge at the railway lying at anchor awaiting call forward to
yards that prevented the free movement of New Guinea. The peak activity came in
cars, motor transportation had to be used that year.
extensively and there was constant danger The subtropical port of Cairns, still
of congestion in the port area. closer to New Guinea, became a tempo-
Following the arrival of the first Ameri- rary base in September 1943 when the
can convoy at Brisbane on 22 December heavy demands of New Guinea exceeded
1941, that port became for a time the the capacity of Townsville. Situated at the
principal one for sending supplies to the mouth of the Barron River, Cairns could
Philippines and to the advance base and receive a maximum of seven ocean-going
transshipment point at Darwin. After the vessels at one time. The harbor had to be
loss of the Philippines, Brisbane supported dredged. Port equipment was poor, and
the operations in New Guinea. In July the civilian longshoremen there, as else-
1942 General MacArthur moved GHQ, where, were slow in discharging cargo.
SWPA, to Brisbane, and late in the fol- U.S. Army activity at Cairns rapidly
lowing year the Headquarters, USASOS, dwindled as traffic shifted to Port Moresby
was also shifted to that city, the latter re- and Milne Bay.
maining there until November 1944. As a
result, Brisbane was a busy port with con- Ports in New Guinea and Adjacent
siderable U.S. Army traffic. Islands
Townsville, although much smaller
than Brisbane and poorly equipped, was In contrast with the fairly well-devel-
785 miles nearer New Guinea. In conse- oped Australian ports, most of those in
quence, its limited port facilities were used New Guinea and neighboring islands were
to the utmost by the U.S. Army, though little more than temporary creations that
no new piers were built. Anchorage was came into being as the focus of Allied ac-
available for at least 75 vessels from two to tivities moved northward from Australia.
six miles offshore. By constantly dredging To the few small ports in that area remain-
the entrance channel to the port, sufficient ing in Allied hands in the spring of 1942
depth was obtained to accommodate were added numerous others in the course
Liberty ships at the two piers. The six of the Papua Campaign (23 July 1942-
berths had rail connections, were equipped 23 January 1943) and subsequent ad-
to handle lifts up to 20 tons, and were ad- vances on the northern side of eastern
jacent to 112,010 square feet of enclosed New Guinea, in the Admiralties, and in
storage space. Only minor marine repairs western New Britain. These operations,
were possible. Except for occasional troop conducted in concert with a drive of the
labor, cargo discharge was performed by South Pacific forces up the Solomons,
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
were aimed principally at the reduction
of the Japanese base at Rabaul.
Since there were no railways and only
a few miles of surfaced roads in New
Guinea and on the adjacent islands, at
least 95 percent of the movements in the
region north and east of Australia had to
be made by water. As islands and coastal
points were taken in eastern New Guinea
and vicinity, it was necessary to develop
ports for the transshipment or reception of
the men and matériel required for local
maintenance, base development, and for
the staging and support of new advances.
The task was difficult. Port facilities and
equipment, where they existed at all,
were generally primitive. The import ca-
pacities of the principal New Guinea ports
in early 1943 ranged from 100 ship-tons
per day at Salamaua to 2,500 ship-tons
daily at Milne Bay. At most points cargo
had to be lightered ashore, at best a slow
and time-consuming process. Such native
labor as was available was unskilled, and
the hot and humid climate hampered
operational efficiency and caused the
rapid deterioration of supplies and equip-
ment.
The conditions in and around eastern
New Guinea necessitated considerable
port construction by the Corps of Engi-
neers before the Transportation Corps
could function effectively. In these rugged
mountainous islands, fringed with man-
grove swamps and coral reefs, the Army's
facilities had literally to be "hewn from
the jungle." The standard pier or wharf,
built on hardwood piles, was 30 feet wide
and 330 feet long, usually set parallel to
the beach and connected with it at each
end by approaches 30 feet wide. Jetties
had to be built for smaller craft, and earth
and rock fills were made to serve as land-
ing points. Such improvements were
459
quickly effected with the aid of dredges,
tractors, bulldozers, and portable saw-
mills, and, though primitive by modern
standards, met the immediate need.
Much the same situation prevailed at
ports in the New Guinea area uncovered
during the accelerated SWPA drive
toward the Philippines in the period
April-September 1944. Bypassing the
strongly held enemy positions in the New
Britain-New Ireland area, SWPA forces
launched a series of leapfrog advances
along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis.
They struck in turn at Hollandia and
Aitape, Wakde, Biak, the Vogelkop Pen-
insula, and Morotai.83 As these objectives
were taken and built up as forward air,
naval, staging, and/or supply bases, it was
necessary to repeat the process of port de-
velopment. At the new forward ports,
notably Hollandia and Biak, docks and
storage facilities had to be built, and
troops, floating and materials-handling
equipment, and trucks had to be brought
in.
Port Moresby, headquarters of the ter-
ritorial government of Papua, was the first
U.S. Army port developed in New Guinea.
This small tropical port was entered
through a narrow channel between reefs
leading to a deep almost landlocked har-
bor with anchorage for about fifty ships.
Cordial relations obtained between the
Americans, who arrived in April 1942,
and the local Australian forces, who origi-
nally were responsible for all port activity.
The main Australian wharf consisted of a
wooden causeway 250 feet long and 25
feet wide, ending in a T pier, 330 feet long
and 30 feet wide. It was supplemented late
in 1942 by new docks constructed by U.S.
Army Engineers on nearby Tatana Island.
83
On SWPA operations during this period, see
Robert Ross Smith, op. cit.
460
The first port company, the 611th, ar-
rived on 19 June and was joined on 26
November by the 609th and 610th, all
three being colored units of the 394th
Port Battalion. During this period dis-
charge was hampered by the lack of
barges, tugs, and heavy lift gear. Supply
dumps were scattered in the hills as far
as twenty-five miles from Port Moresby;
the roads were poor; and most cargo was
stored in the open. The lack of storage
space at the water front and a serious
shortage of trucks limited the rate of cargo
discharge, so that the harbor was crowded
with ships waiting to be unloaded. The
turnaround for vessels from Townsville to
Port Moresby was from 11 to 13 days, of
which 5 to 7 days were spent in awaiting
discharge at the New Guinea end. Despite
these difficulties and frequent air raid
warnings, 125 vessels were worked at this
port between May and November 1942.
Port Moresby was not only an impor-
tant U.S. Army advance supply base dur-
ing 1942 but also the headquarters for a
unique Allied operating command that
played an important role in the support
of the advance in the Buna-Gona area. In
the absence of roads and railways, Allied
combat troops operating on the northern
coast of Australian New Guinea could be
supplied only by sea or air. In order to
render the most effective support with the
limited resources available, in October
1942 an Allied Combined Operational
Service Command was established at Port
Moresby under the command of the U.S.
Brig. Gen. Dwight F. Johns. 84 Serving
under the Commander, New Guinea
Force, General Johns was assigned opera-
tional control of all USASOS and Aus-
tralian lines of communications in New
Guinea. He was charged with responsibil-
ity for co-ordinating construction, dock
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
operations, sanitation, and hospitalization
and evacuation activities, as well as for
providing transportation in the line of
communications areas. Branches of his
command were set up at Milne Bay, the
principal center for transshipping cargo
from ocean-going ships to smaller vessels,
and later at Oro Bay, which was devel-
oped as an advanced base.
The water transportation activities were
handled by a combined small-boat organi-
zation, which operated under the com-
mand of COSC. Beginning in late October
the COSC fleet, consisting principally of
fishing boats and luggers, began operating
northeastward from Milne Bay toward
Oro Bay. Subsequently, COSC vessels
also operated directly from Oro Bay. As
the combat troops moved up the coast,
these ships moved personnel, tanks, guns,
and supplies to forward supply points
established on small bays and inlets. After
picking up men and cargo from an ocean
freighter at Milne Bay, the typical lugger
would hide from enemy attack by day and
then move ahead by night to complete
delivery to the forward coastal supply
points. Along the practically uncharted
coast of New Guinea the personnel of the
small ships had to set up their own markers
and buoys, consisting of 55-gallon drums
painted red. At the coastal supply points,
where operations were carried on by the
quartermaster of the 32d Infantry Divi-
sion, the cargo was landed by small boats
for delivery by native carriers to the com-
bat troops. Maintained under extremely
difficult conditions, the seaborne line was
a vital factor in sustaining the Allied forces
in the area. The Combined Operational
Service Command was discontinued about
84
General Johns was also commander of the
USASOS advance base, established in August 1942
with headquarters at Port Moresby.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
April 1943, and U.S. Army elements re-
verted to USASOS.85 By that time Ameri-
can activities at Port Moresby had begun
to decline, although the U.S. Army did
not withdraw completely until September
1945.
Milne Bay, at the eastern extremity of
New Guinea, was approached from the
open sea by a difficult and dangerous
channel. When the war began there was
available only one small jetty. The roads
in the area were native trails, and most of
the hinterland was mud and swamp. All
supplies except fresh fruit had to be
shipped in from Australia. American
troops arrived at Milne Bay in July 1942
and began assisting the local Australian
contingent at the Gili Gili docks, where
the first U.S. Army discharging facility, a
floating pier, was made of dunnage and
empty oil drums.86 Only jeeps, which had
four-wheel drive, were able to move
through the mud, and cargo was stacked
in the open. In spite of heavy rains the
Americans and Australians, with native
Papuan labor, embarked at once on an
extensive construction program. Port areas
were developed at Gili Gili, Ahioma, and
Waga Waga, comprising a total of 14
docks and an oil jetty, mostly in water 35
to 40 feet deep.
At the principal American installation,
Ahioma, a typical dock consisted of a
planked platform on piles, which was 400
feet long and 25 feet wide, paralleled the
shore line at a distance of 100 feet, and
was connected to the land at each end and
in the center by ramps wide enough to
permit the passage of two trucks. Cargo
was moved by motor transport to inland
storehouses and open dumps, usually sev-
eral miles from the docks. Eventually, the
port acquired a 30-ton and a 60-ton float-
ing crane, a floating dry dock, 17 cargo
461
barges, 3 tugs, 4 10-ton caterpillar cranes,
several LCM's, and 6,000 cubic feet of
refrigerated space. The 608th Port Com-
pany, a Negro unit of the 394th Port Bat-
talion, was stationed at Milne Bay from
23 July 1942 to 9 April 1943.
The Milne Bay area was essentially a
point of storage and transshipment, where
cargo was shifted from Liberties and other
large ships to smaller craft for delivery to
Oro Bay, Lae, and other forward areas.
Although its usefulness declined when the
port of Finschhafen began to open up in
late 1943, during the first nine months of
1944 the U.S. Army cargo loaded and dis-
charged at Milne Bay ran as high as
202,000 short tons per month. The volume
fell off sharply thereafter. By April 1945
several of the wooden piers were disinte-
grating and traffic was light. The last U.S.
Army forces left Milne Bay in the follow-
ing October.
Oro Bay, 211 miles from Milne Bay,
provided anchorage for as many as eight
vessels. Located only fifteen miles from
Buna Village, the port was valuable in the
support of the Buna-Gona campaign. Like
Milne Bay, it was an important base of
operations for the Combined Operational
Service Command's small-boat fleet in the
winter of 1942-43. Thereafter, Oro Bay
85
Available data on the Combined Operational
Service Command is fragmentary. The account here
is based on the following: Masterson, Trans in SWPA,
pp. 82-84; CinC Allied Land Forces SWPA, Report
on New Guinea Operations, Apps. A, C, and E,
OCMH Files; Hist, TC USASOS, New Guinea,
1942-44, pp. 5, 11, 33, and 35, OCT HB SWPA New
Guinea Rpts; MS, Hist Sec USASOS, Origin and
Purposes of the Combined Operational Service Com-
mand and Supply Plan for New Guinea at That
Time, OCMH Files; Interv with Wilson cited n. 17;
Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, a volume in prep-
aration for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II.
86
Ltr, Plant to Larson, 4 Nov 50, OCT HB
Inquiries.
462
retained importance as a supply base and
staging area for both Australian and U.S.
forces.
The first Transportation Corps port
personnel, an advance party of Port De-
tachment E, under Maj. Carroll K. Mof-
fatt, arrived on 13 December 1942. This
group was augmented later in the month
by troops of the 387th Port Battalion. Al-
though their actual experience was limited
to a short stay on the docks at Brisbane,
the battalion performed creditably at Oro
Bay despite enemy harassment.
Wharves were built, beginning in mid-
1943, and by 1 August eight docks had
been completed. Cargo discharged and
loaded reached a peak of 125,000 short
tons between July and September 1944,
declining thereafter. The largest wharf
was a wooden structure on piles, was
1,500 feet long, had four shore connec-
tions, and could berth four Liberties.
Ultimately, the port acquired a floating
dock, facilities for minor underwater re-
pairs, a fresh-water line, 66,500 cubic feet
of refrigerated space, and an ample supply
of marine and cargo-handling equipment.
Since no storage facilities were available
in the port area, all cargo had to be
trucked to storehouses and dumps five to
twenty miles away. On occasion, heavy
rains washed out bridges and flooded sup-
ply dumps. By April 1945 the wharves,
like those at Milne Bay, were in great
need of repair. Already, Oro Bay was far
in the rear of the combat forces, and at the
end of October 1945 the port reverted to
Australian control.
Lae was less a harbor than an unshel-
tered beach on the open sea with deep
water a quarter of a mile from shore.
American and Australian combat troops
were still disposing of the enemy in mid-
September 1943 when an advance detach-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ment of a base port command arrived
aboard an LST. The sole discharge facili-
ties were two rickety jetties unable to hold
trucks. The first cargo was delivered by
LST and discharged on the beach at night
in heavy rain. Small ships later were dis-
charged by DUKW, LCM, and lighter.
Ashore, cargo clearance was impeded by
bomb craters, shattered gun emplace-
ments, barbed-wire entanglements, and
the wreckage of Japanese landing craft.
The first ponton dock in New Guinea
was erected at Lae. It was made of steel
pontons that had been assembled into
units at Oro Bay in October 1943. Loaded
with Quartermaster and Engineer equip-
ment and propelled by large diesel out-
board motors, the entire assemblage then
moved under its own power to Lae, where
the cargo was discharged and the units
were moored into place.87 At Lae a dock
for Liberty ships, completed in December
1943, was destroyed in June 1944 by an
earthquake. A series of storms severely
damaged the port installations, necessitat-
ing considerable repair and replacement.
At best, no more than five or six large
ships could be worked at one time, and
cargo handling was always difficult
because of the heavy ground swell.
The principal mission of the port organ-
ization at Lae was not to supply the for-
ward areas but to support the Air Forces
installation at nearby Nadzab, to which
bombs, ammunition, and spare parts were
delivered by truck. Despite adverse
weather conditions the port handled con-
siderable cargo, especially in the first half
of 1944. During the peak month of April
1944 a total of 85,623 short tons of cargo
was loaded and discharged at Lae. The
87
These ponton units later were removed to Finsch-
hafen. Similar units were then assembled at Lae and
installed there.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 463

volume declined sharply in 1945, although sels and its potentialities for airdrome de-
the U.S. Army made use of Lae through velopment, the capture of this enemy-held
August. area was calculated to provide a valuable
Captured early in October 1943, Finsch- base for future operations against the Jap-
hafen lay on the blunt eastern extremity anese. Early in March 1944 a number of
of the Huon Peninsula. The port installa- Transportation Corps officers assigned to
tions were at Finsch Harbor, Langemak the 2d Port Headquarters began deter-
Bay, and Dreger Harbor. The first Trans- mining the transportation facilities and
portation Corps unit, the 608th Port Com- personnel needed for a major supply port
pany, arrived on 17 November 1943. The and staging area at Hollandia. Subse-
first Liberty ship docked on 20 December quently, a small transportation group,
at the ponton unit towed from Lae and under the command of Lt. Col. Reeford
installed in Dreger Harbor. Cargo dis- P. Shea, was attached to the I Corps in
charge was interrupted by more than a order to furnish technical advice and assist-
hundred air raid warnings in January ance to the assault force. The landings,
1944 and ninety in February. By July made at Tanahmerah and Humboldt Bays
1944 Finschhafen had a total of 12 Liberty- on 22 April 1944, were unopposed. Cargo
ship docks and 2 small-ship docks, mostly was at first discharged by the men of the
wooden structures on piles paralleling the 532d and 542d Engineer Boat and Shore
shore line. The largest number of vessels Regiments, employing all available Navy
berthed at one time was thirty-five. landing craft plus their own equipment,
Before the docks were built, cargo was the latter including two 30-ton floating
delivered by LST and LCT. As late as cranes, twenty 80-foot steel barges, six
January 1945 a total of 10 LCM's, 33 harbor tugs, and nine motor dories. The
LCVP's, and 50 DUKW's operated day first Transportation Corps port troops at
and night. Ultimately, the port facilities Hollandia were drawn from the 244th,
88
at Finschhafen were expanded to include 296th, and 609th Port Companies.
two small dry docks, a marine railway, a In the opinion of the task force G-4, the
portable machine shop, and two repair operation ran into logistical difficulties
shops. Virtually no covered storage space primarily because too great a volume of
existed until July 1944. The supply of traffic was directed too early into too re-
trucks was limited, causing occasional stricted an area. Ashore, serious conges-
delay in port clearance. Cargo operations tion quickly developed. Difficult terrain
were especially heavy from March through at one beach and a disastrous fire at an-
December 1944, with a peak of 237,480 other complicated the task. Truck opera-
short tons loaded and discharged in July. tions were hampered by tortuous roads,
Through 1945, with activity on the decline, steep grades, and almost continuous mud.
the port personnel and equipment at However, as more dumps became avail-
Finschhafen were gradually transferred to able and access roads were constructed,
the Philippines. the congested beaches were gradually
Hollandia, on the rugged northeast
88
coast of New Guinea, lay in the shadow of Hist, TC USASOS, New Guinea, 1942-44, pp.
51-58, OCT HB SWPA New Guinea Rpts; History
the Cyclops Mountains. Because of its fine of the Hollandia Operation, Reckless Task Force,
anchorage for both combat and cargo ves- passim, AG Opns Rpts 98-TF7-0.3 (11308).
464
cleared. An acute labor shortage was re-
lieved by the procurement of additional
port companies. Early in June 1944 a base
port command was organized with Colonel
Shea as the Base Port Commander. 89
At the close of 1944, the base port com-
mand had under its direction one Trans-
portation Corps port battalion headquar-
ters, the 394th, and eleven port companies.
Available for operations at Hollandia were
5 Liberty docks, 4 small-ship jetties, 2 fuel
jetties, 12 LST ramps, 22 80-foot steel flat-
top barges, 4 LCM's, 2 LCV's, 2 crane
barges, 1 refrigerated barge, and a variety
of other equipment. However, the port
evidently was never able to berth more
than 8 deep-sea vessels at one time. The
first Army marine repair ship in SWPA,
the William F. Fitch, arrived at Hollandia
in August. It was followed by another re-
pair ship, the James M. Davis, both vessels
ultimately being sent to the Philippines.
The maximum port activity coincided
with the preliminaries to and the early
stages of the Philippine campaign. Cargo
loaded and discharged reached a peak of
117,643 short tons in August 1944. In the
fall of 1944 the waters around Hollandia
were crowded with vessels awaiting call
forward to Tacloban and Lingayen Gulf.
Beginning in October vast quantities of
equipment and supplies that had accumu-
lated at this base and large numbers of
harbor craft were removed to the Philip-
pines in a series of impressive towing oper-
ations managed by the Transportation
Corps. Progressive transfers of personnel
to the Philippines resulted in a kaleido-
scopic turnover of transportation units at
Hollandia. The volume of traffic began to
fall off in January 1945, and thereafter,
until the inactivation of the base one year
later, the effort was concentrated on
"rolling up the rear."
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Biak, fringed with reefs and islets, is the
largest of the Schouten Islands and lies off
the north coast of New Guinea. Army
facilities were located at the village of
Sorido on Biak and on the adjacent islets
of Owi and Mios Woendi. The invasion of
Biak began on 27 May 1944, and much
bitter fighting followed before the Japa-
nese resistance was finally broken. The
296th Port Company was temporarily at-
tached to the task force for the primary
purpose of cargo discharge in direct sup-
port of combat operations. After a landing
had been made, the 296th unloaded sup-
plies from beached LST's, even as enemy
planes strafed the area. The discharge of
cargo vessels began on 18 June, with the
port troops working two six-hour shifts
daily. Two days later, the 296th Port Com-
pany was assigned to the newly created
USASOS Base H at Biak.90
The earliest port facilities, set up on
Owi Island while the fighting was still in
progress on Biak, including a Liberty dock,
a jetty for barges, and approaches for
landing craft. Discharge at Owi was ham-
pered by rough seas and water too deep
for anchorage. Better facilities were found
at Sorido in and near a lagoon about six
miles long, skirted by an ample level area
with good coral roads. All told by 1 Feb-
ruary 1945 Base H had five Liberty docks,
seven jetties, four small dry docks, two
30-ton floating cranes, six 5-ton shore
cranes, sixteen landing craft, two refriger-
ated barges, and 80,000 cubic feet of re-
frigerated space. The only USASOS base
between Hollandia and Tacloban, Base H
shared in mourning and supporting the
89
Hist of Hollandia Opn, p. 41, and TC USASOS
hist, p. 53, both cited n. 88. See also Robert Ross
Smith, op. cit., Chs. I-II.
90
Hist Rpt, 296th Port Co, Biak Opn, 15 Sep 44,
AG Opns Rpts TCCO-296-0.3 (7848) M, 25 May-20
Aug 49.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
invasion of the Philippines in late October
1944.91
Ports in the Philippines
By mid-September 1944 the Allied
advance in the Southwest and Central
Pacific was within effective striking dis-
92
tance of the Philippines. At that time it
was decided to drop plans for further
intermediate operations and proceed di-
rectly to the invasion of Leyte. The sched-
uled date for the assault was moved for-
ward by two months, to 20 October, and
forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas theater,
which were intended originally to capture
Yap, were made available for participation
in the Leyte operation. The conquest of
the island, substantially completed by the
end of the year, was the first of a series of
amphibious operations calculated to liber-
ate the Philippines. Landings were made
in Mindoro in December, and in January
1945 Luzon was invaded. In subsequent
months other amphibious landings were
made in the Philippines at Palawan, in
the Sulu Archipelago, and on Mindanao.
The end of organized resistance on Luzon
in June 1945 marked the liberation of the
93
Philippines.
The Philippine Archipelago, with its
7,083 islands extending 1,152 miles north
and south and 688 miles east and west,
was dependent on ocean transport, and its
ports had been fairly well developed long
before Pearl Harbor. However, wartime
destruction of port facilities and equip-
ment, enemy action, adverse weather con-
ditions, and limited interior transport,
among other difficulties, severely restricted
the reception and clearance capacity of
captured ports and necessitated consider-
able port development by the U.S. Army.
The five principal port areas placed in
465
operation in the course of the campaign in
the Philippines were Tacloban on Leyte,
Lingayen Gulf, Batangas, Manila on
Luzon, and Cebu City on Cebu Island.
Tacloban was only one of several adja-
cent ports on the east coast of Leyte fac-
ing San Pedro Bay that was used by the
Army. From Tacloban, the headquarters
of USASOS Base K, a series of sand and
coral beaches extended approximately
fifty miles to the south, past the villages of
Tolosa and Dulag to Abuyog. A coastal
highway connected these beaches, behind
which lay heavy woods and dense jungles.
San Pedro Bay provided anchorage for
about 75 ocean-going vessels. Navigation
was impeded by shoals, reefs, and wreck-
age. There was no protection from heavy
swells, and the coastal waters were too
shallow for any but small craft. Only at
Dulag were LST's able to approach as
close as 50 feet to shore. Although Taclo-
ban had a concrete wharf, the first Liberty
ships could not dock without preliminary
partial discharge to reduce their draft. At
all times a large part of the cargo received
in the Tacloban area had to be moved in
landing craft and DUKW's.94
The Port Command, Base K, began
functioning in late October 1944, only a
few days after the first landings. Its work
was greatly hampered by inadequate
cargo-handling facilities, persistent enemy
91
Robert Ross Smith, op. cit., pp. 393-96.
92
On the drive across the Central Pacific by Ad-
miral Nimitz' Pacific Ocean Areas forces, see Ch. XI.
For an account of the Leyte Campaign, see M. Ham-
lin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1954).
93
Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff . . . July 1,
1943 to June 30,1945 . . ., pp. 71-73.
94
See Brig. Gen. S. E. Sturgis, Jr., "Engineer Op-
erations in the Leyte Campaign," pp. 4-6, 15, re-
printed from The Military Engineer, Vols. XIL and XL
(November and December 1947 and January 1948).
466
action, and adverse weather. At Tacloban
discharge of the first Liberty ship was
slowed by no fewer than fifty-six air raids
in four days. Suicidal attacks by Japanese
planes on Army vessels resulted in casual-
ties, damage, and delay. Within three
months three typhoons struck and 33
inches of rain fell, further impeding cargo
clearance. Supplies deteriorated in open
storage, and trucks stalled in the mud and
water. Improved roads and additional
transportation equipment helped relieve
port congestion during the early phase
when Leyte had the only U.S. Army dis-
charge facilities in SWPA north of Biak.
At the peak, in December 1944, the port
command loaded and discharged 240,051
short tons of U.S. Army cargo.
The U.S. Sixth Army landed on the
beaches in Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, on
9 January 1945. No fewer than 4 port bat-
talion headquarters, 20 port companies,
and 8 DUKW companies were involved
in the campaign, and a total of 60 LCT's,
360 LCM's, 400 DUKW's, and 44 barges
were scheduled to arrive during the initial
phase. Of the Transportation Corps units
set up for the operation, a total of 2 port
battalion headquarters, 10 port compa-
nies, and 6 DUKW units were attached to
the tactical forces, including the I Corps,
the XIV Corps, and the 158th Regimen-
tal Combat Team. These troops, together
with other attached service units, operated
under the five Engineer boat and shore
regiments, which were responsible for
lighterage and beach operations at the
divisional beachheads.95
The Transportation Corps units, along
with others that were to begin arriving
two days after the first landings (S plus 2),
were to be assigned to the Army Serv-
ice Command (ASCOM), the logistical
agency operating directly under the Sixth
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Army, which, among other things, would
take over responsibility for all unloading
operations approximately S plus 6. This
responsibility, as well as the command of
the Transportation Corps units, would
then be delegated to Base M, a subordi-
nate command of ASCOM. At that time,
too, the Engineer boat and shore regiments
were to be relieved of attachment to the
tactical forces and would be placed under
the 4th Engineer Special Brigade com-
mander. Serving as a member of the
ASCOM staff, the brigade commander
would assign them to assist with lighterage
and other port activities. All craft organic
to the Engineer units and LCT's made
available to Sixth Army by the Navy were
to be pooled and allocated by him.
The assault beaches faced only unpro-
tected roadsteads, where troops and cargo
ships had to anchor about a half mile from
shore. Cargo was discharged into landing
craft, DUKW's, and barges. Considerable
difficulty was experienced because of the
heavy surf, and many of the landing craft
were broached. At the beaches, the un-
loading and clearing of cargo was handi-
capped by intermittent enemy mortar and
artillery fire, muddy roads, and a shortage
of trucks.
Because of the difficulties encountered
at the beaches and the delay in bringing
in additional service units and equipment,
95
The initial landings were made in the vicinity of
Lingayen (Orange and Yellow Beaches), between the
Dagupan and Bued Rivers (Blue Beach), and in the
San Fabian area (White Beaches 1, 2, and 3). Red
Beach, adjacent to White Beach 1, was taken on 11
January by the 158th RCT. Each of the four assault
divisions, as well as the 158th RCT, was accompanied
by an Engineer boat and shore regiment, augmented
by supporting service units, including two port com-
panies and a DUKW company. For an account of the
activities of the Engineer regiments, see Hist Rpt, 4th
ESB, Participation in LUZON Campaign, 9 January-
15 February 1945, AG Opns Rpts ENBR-4-0-3.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
the transfer of control to ASCOM was not
made until 19 January 1945 (S plus 10).
Meanwhile, the first Port Command, Base
M, personnel had arrived at Blue Beach
on S plus 2. There, they provided ships
and beach details and undertook a recon-
naissance of the area. By mid-January,
San Fabian had been selected as the port
command headquarters, and White
Beach 2, Dagupan, and Port Sual had
been designated for development as the
principal landing and dump areas. By
that time one port battalion, nine port
companies, and three DUKW units, all
earmarked for the port command, had re-
ported for duty.
Upon the ASCOM's delegation of
responsibility for all unloading activities
to Base M, the port command assumed
command of the Transportation Corps
units and commenced operations at the
three installations as planned. Elements of
the 4th Engineer Special Brigade con-
tinued to assist with lighterage and other
port activities.96 During the remainder of
the month a 450-foot dock was completed
at Dagupan for small vessels and reefers.
All operations at Port Sual were closed,
and port command units there were trans-
ferred to White Beach 2, where two 2,700-
foot jetties were built. One jetty was em-
ployed for the discharge of rail equipment.
The other, equipped with four pipelines,
was used to provide vessels with water and
to discharge oil tankers.
The logistical responsibility in the Lin-
gayen Gulf area was transferred from
Sixth Army to USASOS on 13 February
1945. ASCOM, which was then redesig-
nated the Luzon Base Section (later
Philippine Base Section), continued to be
responsible for the development of Base
M. The Port Command, Base M, concen-
trating its activities principally at White
467
Beach 2 and Dagupan, handled a peak
load of 303,377 long tons during the
month. Operating under the port com-
mand at the end of February were 5,710
troops, including those of port, DUKW,
harbor craft, base depot, ship repair, and
marine maintenance units, and 495
Filipino civilians.
Port command headquarters was trans-
ferred on 21 April 1945 to San Fernando,
La Union, which, because of the safe an-
chorages afforded by its harbors, was
selected for development as the principal
port in the area. A small rear echelon was
left behind at White Beach 2 to supervise
activities there and at Dagupan and
Damortis. By this time the availability of
Manila had caused activity to decline at
the Lingayen Gulf ports. 97
Batangas, on the southwest coast of
Luzon, was nearly intact when occupied.
Early operations were carried on by the
592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment.
Considerable cargo was discharged di-
rectly from landing craft to the beach. The
first Liberty ship docked on 17 June, and
96
The 494th Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,
assisted by two port companies, continued to be re-
sponsible for unloading at Subbase 3, in the vicinity
of Lingayen, until the close of activities there on 20
February 1945. Also, the port command did not as-
sume full responsibility for beach operations at Dagu-
pan until 4 March 1945, when the 544th Engineer
Boat and Shore Regiment was relieved. Hist, TC
USASOS, Philippine Islands, Feb 45, pp. 5-6, and
Mar 45, p. 6, OCT HB SWPA Philippine Rpts.
97
On the Lingayen Gulf ports, see the following:
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 454-56; Rpt, Trans
Sec, Sixth U.S. Army, Luzon Campaign, Vol. III, AG
Opns Rpts 106-0.3 (20430); MS, SOS Operations
During Initial Phase of Invasion and Reconquest of
Luzon, Pt. I., 28 Dec 44-13 Feb 45, pp. 15, 18-20,
and appended Staff Memo 5, Hq ASCOM, 20 Nov
44, and FO 3, Hq ASCOM, and atchd Annexes 3a
and 45, OCMH Files; Hist, TC USASOS, Philippine
Islands, 24 Oct 44-Jan 45, pp. 8-16, Feb 45, pp. 5-10,
Mar 45, pp. 6-9, Apr 45, pp. 14-17, May 45, pp. 8-
10, and Jan 45, pp. 10-12, OCT HB SWPA Philip-
pine Rpts.
468
in August the last of five new Liberty piers
was completed. Anchorage for fifty-three
vessels was available not far from shore.
Rough water and the tides repeatedly in-
terrupted cargo discharge. After mid-
1945, when the maximum tonnage was
handled, this port fell increasingly into
disuse.
Unlike Batangas, the port at Cebu City,
on Cebu Island west of Leyte, suffered
severely from the war. The harbor
afforded good anchorage. The long mar-
ginal wharf had been largely repaired
when the port command took over from
the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regi-
ment in June 1945. The peak of 113,120
long tons of cargo handled—mainly in-
bound shipments—was reached in the
following August. At the close of the year
the port was no longer important.
The port and capital city of Manila on
Luzon had seen extensive development
during some four decades of American
control. Within a few months after its
liberation in January 1945, the volume of
U.S. Army traffic at this port far exceeded
that of any other port in SWPA. The re-
sults attained at Manila determined the
rate at which Army activity was curtailed
at other ports within the theater. Manila
became the site of the principal U.S.
Army base for the final phase of the war
against Japan.
The port of Manila, on the eastern
shore of the almost landlocked Manila
Bay, consisted of three areas: the Pasig
River, and, protected by long break-
waters, North Harbor and South Harbor.
Before the war South Harbor had an an-
chorage of about 1,250 acres, dredged to
hold large ocean-going vessels. It con-
tained four large, well-equipped piers. Of
these, Pier 7, reportedly the largest finger
pier in the world, could accommodate
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
seven ocean-going ships at one time.
North Harbor, still under construction in
1941, was designed mainly to hold small
craft and coastwise shipping. Marginal
wharves along both banks of the Pasig
River could receive ships with a draft
under 18 feet.
Restoration of the war-torn facilities of
this highly developed port presented prob-
lems comparable to those encountered at
Naples, Marseille, and Cherbourg. De-
struction by the Japanese had been sys-
tematic. Approximately 500 ships, rang-
ing in size from harbor craft to an 18,000-
ton liner, had been sunk in Manila Bay
and the Pasig River. According to Com-
modore William A. Sullivan, USN, who
was in charge of rehabilitating the Manila
Harbor, the salvage job involved was the
greatest in history. The entrances and
channels had all been severely damaged,
the piers and wharves were blocked, and
the harbor and shore were strewn with
mines. Within the city the streets, high-
ways, arid railways were badly damaged,
and traffic was impeded by water-filled
bomb craters. Most of the larger buildings
were twisted skeletons in mounds of
rubble. Oil tanks and water reservoirs
were destroyed, and the local power sys-
tem had been methodically dismantled.
When the port command arrived at
Manila on 13 February 1945, the Jap-
anese were still holding much of the city
in a desperate last-ditch stand. About the
only available material for cargo dis-
charge was a quantity of rope, wire, and
blocks to make slings and nets. Electricity
was lacking until mid-March, and lights
were being installed on the piers as late
as July. The first cargo vessel entered
Manila Harbor on 1 March, followed on
the same day by a convoy of eleven large
freighters, which brought Army supplies
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
as well as food and clothing for civilian
relief.
At first, all port operations were con-
trolled by the 4th Engineer Special
Brigade, and the port command served
only in an advisory capacity. On 3 March
1945 the port command was assigned con-
trol of all port operations, although the
Engineers continued for some time to pro-
vide most of the troops and equipment
used in discharge activities. The Navy also
rendered valuable assistance through the
temporary assignment of LCT's to aid
Transportation Corps and Engineer units
in working vessels. By the end of April
1945 a total of 10,713 military personnel
was on duty at the port. Roughly one half
of this number consisted of 4th Engineer
Special Brigade units working under the
operational control of the port command.
The remaining port troops, exclusive of
those at port headquarters, were adminis-
tered for the port command by the 54th
Transportation Corps Service Group. The
troops were augmented by 7,494 local
civilians, who were employed by the port
command to serve as longshoremen, la-
borers, and clerks. Within the port, sep-
arate pier commands were set up to
handle operations in the North Harbor,
in the South Harbor, in the stream, and
on the Pasig River.98
Early operations were conducted under
grave handicaps. Much lighterage was
necessary until the approaches to the
wharves and piers could be cleared of
mines, wreckage, and debris so as to per-
mit unloading directly from ship to shore.
While the port was being rehabilitated,
an extremely heavy burden was placed
upon all transportation equipment. Cargo
clearance was retarded by a shortage of
trucks and by a lack of depots and dumps.
Many of the landing craft used at Manila
469
had seen hard service in New Guinea,
Leyte, and Lingayen Gulf, and the pro-
portion of deadlined equipment was there-
fore high. Because of the physical handi-
caps, no great output was attained at
Manila until April 1945, when a total of
274,186 long tons of cargo was handled.
Considerable confusion and congestion
obtained during the ensuing months. In
large part, this came of insufficient means
for the job, but it also came of an inade-
quate and unstable port organization. In
the period 3 March-2 June 1945, there
were three changes in the command of the
port, and as many port reorganizations."
Although such changes were probably
more a result than a cause of the operat-
ing difficulties encountered at Manila,
they reflected the need for a more satis-
factory organization. According to Gen-
eral Wanamaker there were too many
cooks. When General Styer took over at
Manila, he at once began to reorganize
and to hold frequent conferences on how
to speed up port clearance. Pilferage was
common and entire truckloads disap-
peared. Wanamaker urged that the port
work on a twelve-hour daylight basis with
picked personnel, so as to minimize the
98
Hist, TC USASOS, Philippine Islands, Mar 45,
pp. 14-15, and Apr 45, pp. 7, 9-10, OCT HB SWPA
Philippine Rpts. The 544th and 594th Engineer Boat
and Shore Regiments were withdrawn from port op-
erations in June 1945. Other 4th Engineer Special
Brigade units remained in Manila until August. Ibid.,
Jun 45, p. 5, and Aug 45, pp. 1-5.
99
Col. John H. Holder, who at first headed the
Manila Port Command, was relieved on 6 April 1945
by Brig. Gen. Henry Hutchings, Jr., who was also the
4th Engineer Special Brigade commander. As part
of a reorganization of the Philippine Base Section, in-
volving principally the establishment of Base X at
Manila, Hutchings was relieved by Lt. Col. Sidney E.
Walker on 20 April. Walker in turn was relieved by
Col. John A. Barthrop on 2 June 1945. Hist, TC
USASOS, Philippine Islands, Mar 45, p. 10, Apr 45,
pp. 1, 7, and Jun 45, pp. 1-2, OCT HB SWPA Philip-
pine Rpts.
470 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

loss at night, but Styer preferred to con- plained that the Transportation Corps
tinue operating around the clock. During had no voice in outloading the occupation
this period port personnel was increased, forces, a project planned and arranged by
aggregating 13,800 troops and 28,347 the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies and
civilians on 31 July, and continued prog- the U.S. Navy. He found that a basic
ress was made in rehabilitating port facili- weakness at Manila, as well as the other
ties. ports in the theater, had been the impro-
Despite the efforts to improve oper- vised nature of the port headquarters. In
ations, the port remained crowded until his opinion, the absence of organized ports
well after the cessation of hostilities. Dur-of the type found in the Mediterranean
ing the summer of 1945 Manila received and European theaters had been a major
an increasingly heavy volume of shipping, factor in preventing the Transportation
intended to meet the requirements in the Corps from playing a more prominent role
Philippines and for the projected invasion in operations in SWPA.101
of Japan. Incoming traffic included ves- U.S. port activity at Manila actually
sels carrying men and matériel shipped reached its height during the postwar
directly from the United States, rede- period. The peak in personnel movements
ployed from Europe, and "rolled up " came in November 1945, when major em-
from rear Pacific bases. The port was able phasis was being laid upon the quickest
to increase the tonnage handled from possible return of Army personnel to the
278,224 tons in May 1945 to 421,530 United States. The peak in cargo han-
long tons in July, but the situation again dling had already been reached in the
worsened with the sudden capitulation previous month, when 400,305 long tons
of Japan. Although cargo discharge was were discharged, and 79,355 long tons
halted, ships already en route to the were outloaded. During the ensuing win-
Philippines on 15 August 1945 continued ter, Manila, the last large Army port in
to arrive. Several months were to pass be- the Southwest Pacific, reverted to a peace-
102
fore the theater could make the logistical time status.
readjustments necessary to dissipate the
immobilized shipping at the port. Mean- Port Personnel and Equipment
while, the outloading of occupation forces
for Japan and the return of troops to the In each of the foregoing ports the major
zone of interior for demobilization had problem was to secure the men and the
become major activities at Manila.100 100
Intervs, Larson with Wanamaker, 2 Jul 51, Col
Writing to Washington on 30 August Fuller, 14 Jul 48, and Lt Col Thomas R. Palmerlee,
1945, General Stewart, the Chief of Trans- 16 Jul 48, OCT HB SWPA Misc. Also see Hist, TC
USASOS, Philippine Islands, Jul 45, p. 1, OCT HB
portation, AFWESPAC, characterized SWPA Philippine Rpts; and Wardlow, Responsibil-
the performance of the port of Manila as ities,101
Organization, and Operations, p. 297.
"disgraceful." There had been a "lack of Ltr, CofT AFWESPAC to CofT ASF, 30 Aug
45, OCT HB SWPA Misc. On the organization of
discipline" and an "almost total absence ports in SWPA see below, p. 473.
of leadership." Life, he wrote, was "a state 102
The minor port of Naha in Okinawa began op-
of daily crises," and there was "great erating in June 1945, but this island was not placed
hullabaloo and confusion over the loading under General MacArthur's control until 31 July. See
below, Ch. XI. and Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp.
of every ship." In particular, he com- 98-100, 459-60.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
means needed for satisfactory operation.
Large quantities of port equipment were
necessary as soon as the Americans be-
came active in the Southwest Pacific.
Since the local resources were insufficient,
many mobile cranes, fork-lift trucks, trail-
ers, and tractors had to be requested im-
mediately. When the fighting extended
into the forward areas in New Guinea,
practically all cargo-handling equipment
for the initial operation had to be brought
in from Australian bases. To meet the de-
mand, which always exceeded the supply,
enormous requisitions had to be drawn
upon the zone of interior. Primitive dis-
charge facilities, hard usage, and a high
percentage of deadlined items resulted in
almost constant complaint from the thea-
ter that it did not have enough equipment.
At first, there was a scramble for any
cargo-handling equipment that could be
obtained. Later, the theater's require-
ments were computed systematically on
the basis of the specific items needed for
the discharge of a standard 5-hatch
Liberty ship. For example, three LCM's
and at least three DUKW's were desired
for each hatch. The prescribed list also in-
cluded lighters, barges, cranes, gravity
conveyors, fork-lift trucks, pallets, slings,
103
wires, ropes, shackles, and spreaders.
The theater's equipment needs were
not fully met until late in the war. By the
summer of 1945 huge quantities of trans-
portation matériel had been shipped to
the theater and a large Transportation
Corps general depot had been established
at the old, battered Fort Santiago in
Manila.104 The irony was that when relief
finally came on an appreciable scale, the
war against Japan was already in its last
phase.
If the theater lacked sufficient cargo-
handling equipment, much the same
471
could be said of its manpower in the ports.
As already indicated, the theater used
both military and civilian personnel. In
Australia most cargo was handled by
local labor, which in accordance with War
Department policy was to be substituted
for military labor to the fullest extent pos-
sible. In New Guinea most of this work
had to be done by troops. In the Philip-
pines the U.S. Army port activities were
carried on by both native civilians and
American service troops.
The use of local civilian labor was at-
tended by many difficulties, which were
most pronounced in Australia. The Aus-
tralian longshoremen were organized in
"a strong, militant, articulate union," the
Waterfront Workers Federation. Its bar-
gaining position was excellent, both be-
cause of political influence and because of
the acute wartime labor shortage. As in
the United Kingdom and the United
States, the Army did no direct hiring but
dealt instead with stevedoring firms,
which secured dock workers from the
unions.
The Transportation Corps frequently
found the Australian dockers trying, none
too efficient, and costly. The water-front
workers sometimes refused to handle re-
frigerated or other special cargo, or they
suspended operations because of rain. On
occasion they were described as insolent,
thievish, and resentful of the presence of
the U.S. Army. They resorted to frequent
strikes and walkouts, thus requiring the
use of American and Australian troops to
insure the movement of urgent cargo. Ac-
cording to Colonel Plant, the Australian
longshoremen had an average discharge
rate of five tons per hatch per hour,
whereas untrained American soldiers
103
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 476-77.
104
Ibid., pp. 223-25.
472
under the same conditions could turn out
four to five times as much cargo.
Much of the Australian output at the
ports entailed costly overtime, premium,
and penalty rates. Overtime could not be
avoided since an Australian law required
that every vessel arriving there be worked
around the clock. Premium and penalty
cargoes were determined by contract. One
effect of the high wages resulting from this
system was that the workers often took
vacations after three or four weeks of
steady employment. Considerable time
was lost each day because of the morning
and afternoon "smoke-o," the lunch hour,
and, of course, the "tea-o." The actual
working time of a shift was about five
hours, although the men were paid for
eight. American transportation officers
were well aware of this unsatisfactory situ-
ation, but they could do little except com-
plain in their reports. Since the local gov-
ernment was under union dominance, the
U.S. Army in Australia had to preserve a
delicate balance between its own desires
and the demands of labor, employing
troops at the ports only under the direst
circumstances.105
Both in New Guinea and in the Philip-
pines, native labor proved much less
exacting and disappointing than in Aus-
tralia. The Papuans, though limited in
numbers and totally unskilled, were loyal
and co-operative workers. Weak from un-
dernourishment, the Filipinos were forti-
fied with rice and canned fish. They
worked on Sundays and holidays without
overtime pay. Filipino laborers were dili-
gent and careful, and while the war lasted
they caused no difficulty.
No port units were included among the
first U.S. Army personnel that reached
Australia. Indeed, General Arthur Wilson
believed that the U.S. Army could rely
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
upon Australian labor, and he warned
against sending Negro units to "white
Australia," since this was likely to cause
trouble. Because of the higher priority ac-
corded the requests of the European thea-
ter and the natural tendency in the South-
west Pacific Area to prefer combat to serv-
ice troops if a choice had to be made be-
cause of shipping limitations, a serious
shortage of service units soon developed.
As a result, the Transportation Corps in
SWPA at first got very few units, either
white or colored, from the United States.
The first port battalions sent to SWPA
arrived at Brisbane in 1942, the 394th on
9 March and the 387th on 15 August.
Later, both units were shifted to New
Guinea, where they were urgently needed.
At the end of 1943, seven additional port
battalions had reached the theater, and
another was en route. Others followed.
On the whole, these port units gave effi-
cient and valuable service in the heavy
and monotonous task of cargo handling,
although their living conditions, especially
in New Guinea, often were far from con-
ducive to high morale.
The wide dispersion of ports and the
limited amount of traffic at some of them,
notably in New Guinea, led to a demand
for composite service units suitable for as-
signment to small installations. This need
was ultimately met by the creation of
Transportation Corps composite (later re-
designated Transportation Corps service)
platoons, companies, and battalions.106
This type of organization enabled the the-
ater to order the numbers, kinds, and
combinations of large or small groups
needed to meet the various requirements
of different ports. This type of unit appar-
105
Ibid., pp. 497-504; Lapham Rpt, 6 Mar 43, pp.
18-22, OCT HB POA Inspection Trips.
106
T/O&E 55-500, TC Sv Orgn, 17 Aug 43.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
ently was not used until mid-1944. In
addition to port battalions and port com-
panies, the ports in SWPA generally made
use of amphibian truck units and harbor
craft companies. 107
The theater was handicapped by a
shortage of transportation officers able to
supervise stevedoring, barge, and small-
boat operations. Appropriate instruction,
first given at the SWPA Officer Candidate
School in April 1943, naturally stressed
water transportation. The need was espe-
cially great for units skilled in the port
operations, and such training therefore
became extensive. By March 1944, 230
men—among them 15 Negroes and 1
Filipino—had graduated and had been
commissioned as second lieutenants in the
Transportation Corps. Short-lived courses
for special purposes were given at various
ports. At Manila, in the fall of 1945, trans-
portation personnel were trained in the
use of harbor craft, cargo documentation,
and fork-lift trucks.
The 2d, 22d, and 23d Ports of Embar-
kation were mere pools of personnel from
which various headquarters had been
formed.108 The procedure in SWPA of
trying to build a port organization on the
ground from individuals gathered to-
gether and directed to run the port, as
was done at Manila, proved far less effec-
tive than the system in ETO of sending
in a regular port, fully organized,
equipped, and manned to do the job.
For most SWPA ports in World War II
the prevailing organizational pattern was
that of the base port command under the
base section. Water transportation was al-
ways the principal function of the base
port commander. Early in 1944, control
of the base motor pool and its operating
personnel was taken away from the base
port command and was centralized in a
473
separate and co-ordinate base motor
command. 109 In effect, this change made
the base port commander responsible only
for loading and unloading ships, thereby
unfortunately leaving him without juris-
diction over motor transport, the princi-
pal means of accomplishing port clear-
ance.
Port operations in SWPA were by no
means confined exclusively to the base
port command since it would function
only after a base had been established. A
few ports such as Merauke, Morotai, and
Zamboanga remained under tactical com-
mands and were never transferred to
USASOS. In the forward areas, particu-
larly during the assault phase, -combat
troops were used to discharge and deliver
cargo over the beaches to inland dumps,
a task for which they often had little train-
ing and less liking. Both in New Guinea
and in the Philippines, Engineer special
brigades or components thereof partic-
ipated in many assault landings and were
responsible for port operations until re-
lieved by a base port command under
USASOS. For example, elements of the
Americal Division, with the 542d Engi-
neer Boat and Shore Regiment attached,
captured Cebu City, which contained the
second largest port in the Philippines. The
Cebu City port then functioned under the
542d until the base port command took
over in June 1945. Throughout the war,
excellent co-operation obtained between
the Transportation Corps and the Engi-
107
For details see Masterson, Trans in SWPA, App.
41.
108
The 22d and 23d Ports were inactivated at
Manila on 15 October 1945. The 2d Port absorbed
the Port Command, Base X (Manila), on 10 August
1945 and gradually became an "organized port." The
system of major and medium ports was not fully
adopted in the theater until after the end of the war.
Ibid., pp. 103-07, 117-21.
109
Ibid., pp. 69-71,708-15.
474
neer special brigades in SWPA. As a rule,
Transportation Corps units relieved Engi-
neer special brigade units after the initial
110
assault and supply phase had ended.
Cargo Shipment Problems
Apart from persistent difficulty in get-
ting enough equipment and personnel to
insure satisfactory operations, the ports
had other problems by no means peculiar
to this theater. A common complaint was
that the shipping information from the
zone of interior that the theater had to
have to assure prompt and effective un-
loading and distribution of cargo was
either inadequate or not available. This
condition naturally was most serious in
1942, but despite corrective measures such
as air delivery of manifests the base port
commander at the destination in SWPA
often did not know exactly what to expect.
The inevitable time lag because of sheer
distance and the many echelons within the
theater contributed on occasion to both
delay and confusion. A distressing corol-
lary of this situation was that the War
Department often was at a loss to deter-
mine the precise ships or shipments that
111
had arrived in the Southwest Pacific.
Deficiencies in the packaging and
marking of the cargo received in SWPA
were often noted during the first year of
the war, but such complaints became less
frequent thereafter as the originating sup-
ply services in the zone of interior im-
proved their methods and procedures and
the ports of embarkation policed out-
bound shipments. The Transportation
Corps had only a general responsibility to
inspect U.S. Army cargo, other than
Transportation Corps items, so as to deter-
mine the adequacy of the marking and
packaging for safe shipment overseas. The
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
extraordinary heat, dampness, and rough
handling encountered in the forward
areas of the Southwest Pacific called for
sturdy containers—not plywood or fiber-
board boxes that collapsed or disinte-
grated—and for other suitable measures
against rust, mold, and corrosion. Since
many supplies had to be transported by
native bearers trudging over jungle trails,
the ideal container had to be light enough
to be carried by one man. Although some
loss of supplies was inevitable, on-the-spot
inspections within the theater indicated
that as of late 1944 packaging had defi-
nitely improved and outside markings
were usually satisfactory.112
Another problem encountered in
SWPA, as well as other theaters, was the
improper stowage of incoming cargo. The
first shipments received in Australia were
badly scrambled because of hasty loading
in the United States. Normally, the ports
in the zone of interior resorted to commer-
cial loading, in which the goal was the
maximum utilization of the cargo-carry-
ing capacity of each ship. The theater,
however, preferred unit loading, which
meant keeping an organization and its
equipment and supplies together, either
on the same vessel or in the same convoy,
even if some cargo space was sacrificed.
The tight shipping situation precluded
any wide application of unit loading at
first, but in the spring of 1942 the U.S.
ports were directed to practice unit load-
ing and block stowage as far as
practicable.
The theater's insistence upon unit load-
ing was grounded upon practical consid-
110
Ibid., pp. 159-62, 456-57; Francis D. Cronin,
Under the Southern Cross; The Saga of the Americal Divi-
sion (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1951), Chs.
XIII-XIV; Heavey, Down Ramp!, passim.
111
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 267-70.
112
Ibid., pp. 282-89.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
erations. The great distances and the in-
adequate local transport systems between
the widely separated bases in SWPA made
the assembly and distribution of scattered
shipments most difficult. Moreover, cer-
tain units were kept idle for months await-
ing the delivery of their organizational
equipment.
At first the forwarding of cargo to
SWPA was attended by a complete lack
of knowledge as to the ultimate port or
ports of discharge. Of necessity, U.S. ports
of embarkation simply loaded the ships for
Australia, leaving further determination
to the theater. In the spring of 1943,
USAFFE promised to indicate the desired
port of discharge for all material requi-
sitioned from the zone of interior. Follow-
ing an exchange of views between the War
Department and the theater, the latter
agreed, on 10 November, to notify the
San Francisco Port of Embarkation of the
destination of units as early as practicable
and to request unit loading only for spe-
cific units when the necessity was urgent.
It was anticipated that the new system
would eliminate considerable unloading
and transshipment. Later in the same
month, the port commander at San Fran-
cisco reported that he had arranged with
the Commanding General, USASOS, to
ship directly to designated advance bases
whenever the latter so requested.113
Cargo Pilferage
Pilferage, a problem common to all
theaters, was particularly prevalent in
Australia, and no great progress was
made in protecting U.S. Army property or
in punishing the thieves. At Melbourne,
in October 1942, extensive thefts were re-
ported at the piers, in warehouses, and on
freight trains. The U.S. Army made every
475
effort to reduce the loss, but the co-opera-
tion of civilian authorities was deemed
114
inadequate.
Pilferage continued heavy and constant
in 1943. Australian dock workers sus-
pended activity or went on strike if armed
guards were posted to watch the removal
of cargo. USASOS directives, aimed at
preventing pilferage by closer supervision
of cargo discharge, generally proved in-
adequate or were not enforced. The re-
ports of cargo security officers made after
visiting Australian ports merely confirmed
the existence of widespread and persistent
theft and the general apathy of the local
authorities. At Brisbane the U.S. Army
obviously was unwilling to employ armed
guards and to search Australian long-
shoremen as they left the ships or wharves,
lest such action provoke a strike that
would halt all cargo operations. Only at
Cairns, where armed military police were
plentiful, was the thievery kept within
bounds.
As elsewhere overseas, pilferage in Aus-
tralia was motivated largely by the lure of
fantastic black-market prices. On occa-
sion, both military and civilian personnel
were implicated. Although the Chief
Transportation Officer, USASOS, recom-
mended stern measures both by military
and by civilian authorities to cope with re-
curring losses, cargo pilferage at the ports
was not and evidently could not be elimi-
nated while the U.S. Army remained in
Australia.
Little complaint of pilferage came from
New Guinea, but it developed in the
Philippines as soon as the U.S. Army
came on the scene. A shortage of military
police to guard the hatches and docks led
113
Ibid., pp. 270-82.
114
For further details on pilferage in SWPA, see
ibid., pp. 506-14.
476
to losses. Cargo security officers tried to
prevent pilfering and obtained the arrest
of a few offenders. Stolen cigarettes,
candy, and sugar found a ready and lucra-
tive market among the Philippine civil-
ians. It was a common practice for men
working in the holds of the ship to break
cartons of beer or candy for consumption
on the spot. Hungry Filipinos also were
likely to break open any boxes that they
thought might contain rations. Despite
various measures taken by the provost
marshal to check pilferage at Manila, it
remained a vexing problem long after
hostilities had ceased.
The problems—and they were many—
at the U.S. Army ports in SWPA must
not be allowed to obscure the pattern of
substantial accomplishment under war-
time conditions. In this theater, where the
ocean was the main highway through a
maze of islands large and small, ports and
ships were a must. Though most traffic
was by water, here as elsewhere the Army
made use of all available rail and motor
transport in order to accomplish its mis-
sion.
Rail Transport
The only railways of military signifi-
cance in the Southwest Pacific Area were
in Australia and Luzon. The U.S. Army
had no control over the Australian rail-
ways, but it assisted with advice, with
lend-lease equipment, and with personnel
to arrange for the movement of troops and
freight. In the Philippines the U.S. Army
operated the railways of Luzon from
January 1945 to January 1946.115
Rail Operations in Australia
Concentrated mainly along or near the
ocean and built essentially to serve local
interests, the railways of Australia had not
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
been welded into an effective national sys-
tem. Differences in gauge, of which there
were five in all, and the generally small
capacity of rail equipment tended to slow
traffic and limit the utilization of rail
transportation for military purposes. Even
in peacetime the Australian railways,
which were mostly government-owned,
carried only about 10 percent of the inter-
state traffic. The balance moved by water
transport, since coastal shipping usually
involved no greater distances and was
somewhat less expensive than movement
by rail.
The three main railway gauges were: 5
feet 3 inches (the Victoria Government
Railway and part of the South Australian
Government Railways); 4 feet 8½ inches
(the New South Wales Government Rail-
ways and part of the Commonwealth
Government Railways); and 3 feet 6
inches (the Western Australian Govern-
ment Railways and the Queensland State
Railways). When the war began, only
about one quarter of the total mileage had
the standard gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches.
Transfer of freight at the breaks in gauge
was usually made by manual labor and
with an average delay of twenty-four
hours. On the most heavily traveled route,
between Melbourne and Townsville, there
were changes in gauge at Albury and at
Brisbane.116
The railways in the Victoria-New South
Wales area had fairly modern rolling stock
of larger capacity (average, 20 to 30 tons)
than other lines, but they were heavily
committed to meeting the local needs of
that industrialized region. The Queens-
land State Railways, which became in-
creasingly important as the concentration
of men and matériel shifted to Brisbane
115
For further details see ibid., Ch. XII.
116
Walker, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
and northward, had only 10-ton boxcars
(American average, 50½ tons). Moreover,
floods on the coast of Queensland, which
has the heaviest rainfall in all Australia,
frequently interrupted rail traffic between
Brisbane and Townsville. The narrow-
gauge, 18-foot wooden cars at Townsville
held 8 to 12 tons. Darwin, developed
initially for Army use as the port nearest
the Netherlands East Indies and the
Philippines, was not connected by rail
with the rest of the continent. The gap,
consisting of 636 miles of gravel road
through the most desolate part of Aus-
tralia, greatly complicated the task of sup-
plying Darwin during the period when
supply by sea was unsafe.
According to the Chief of Transporta-
tion, USASOS, the average Australian
train capacity was 300 tons (American, as
much as 10,000 tons) and the Australian
train speed averaged 15 miles an hour
(American, about 20). None of the rail-
ways had any reserve of cars or locomo-
tives. Hand signaling was used on narrow-
gauge lines; dispatch methods varied;
railway workers were not deferred from
military service; and the working hours
were limited. Regardless of congestion,
about 75 percent of the Queensland loco-
motives stood idle on Sunday. The Aus-
tralians, themselves, realized the inade-
quacy of their railways, but any basic im-
provement such as uniformity of gauge
had to be postponed to the postwar
period.117
Railway matters for the U.S. Army in
Australia were assigned initially to the
Chief Quartermaster, USAFIA, who was
advised and assisted by two Australian
railway employees. When a separate
Transportation Service was established in
Australia in mid-April 1942, it included
a Rail Section headed by Col. Paul W.
477
Johnston, an experienced American rail-
way executive. His main functions were to
co-ordinate all phases of railway service
for the U.S. Army and to arrange and
supervise all movements of its personnel,
supplies, and equipment. Following John-
ston's transfer to a new position in Decem-
ber 1942, these activities were handled
under various designations in the USA-
SOS and USAFFE transportation organi-
zations. In 1944, when USASOS head-
quarters moved to Hollandia, the respon-
sibility was left with the Base Section,
USASOS (later Australian Base Section),
which continued active into the postwar
period.
Pending the arrival in October 1942 of
thirty additional American railway offi-
cers, about twenty experienced Austral-
ian railway men were borrowed from vari-
ous government railways to assist in super-
vising the loading, unloading, and trans-
fer of troops, supplies, and equipment.
Meanwhile, Colonel Johnston had culti-
vated friendly relations with the Austral-
ian railway officials. With their help, his
staff sought to improve operating effi-
ciency of the railways for military pur-
poses by such measures as curtailment of
civilian travel, full utilization of available
car capacities, exemption of railway labor
from military service, and the reduction of
service on branch lines to release person-
nel and equipment for the main lines serv-
ing the American and Australian forces.
Considerable materiel, including rails
and rolling stock, was requisitioned from
the United States early in 1942, but pro-
duction difficulties and the lack of ship-
117
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 657-59;
Walker, op. cit., p. 363. Cf. Alvin P. Stauffer, Quarter-
master Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1956), pp. 49-50.
478
ping delayed delivery. Although large-
scale replacement of old and worn-out
rail equipment at first appeared to be
necessary, further study by Johnston's staff
revealed that the railway shops in Aus-
tralia were adequate for the production of
new equipment, and that imports from
the United States could be limited to
boiler plate and a few locomotive ac-
cessories.
All rail transport for the American
forces was highly dependent on the Aus-
tralians, who were generally helpful and
co-operative. Utilizing its movement con-
trol organization, the Australian Army
regulated all military traffic, both Aus-
tralian and American. Beginning in the
spring of 1942 U.S. regulating officers
(later separate rail transportation officers)
were assigned to each base section. Sub-
ject to the technical direction of the theater
chief of the Transportation Service, these
officers received and consolidated all re-
quests for troop and freight movements,
arranged for intrabase section hauls di-
rectly with local Australian Movement
Control officers, and forwarded requests
for interbase section movements to the
U.S. Rail Section, which made the neces-
sary arrangements through Movement
Control headquarters. In November 1943
a CREGO regulating officer was assigned
to Townsville, and, among other duties, he
set priorities for rail movements of special
interest to General Headquarters, SWPA.
After the first few months, U.S. Army
traffic increasingly was confined to the
east coast, especially Queensland. Time
and distance were formidable factors. In
August 1942, for example, it required ap-
proximately ten days to move freight over
the 2,246 miles on the main line from
Melbourne to Cairns via Albury, Sydney,
Brisbane, and Townsville. Wartime short-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ages of cranes, trucks, labor, and coal
brought periodic crises in rail traffic;
errors in the billing of cars were frequent;
and, on occasion, Australian and Ameri-
can rail movements were not properly
co-ordinated. Also, military demands on
the railways were limited by the need of
providing for essential civilian traffic.
As in other oversea areas, pilferage was
a serious problem, necessitating such pre-
ventive measures as the assignment of
U.S. Army troops to guard trains and
check freight at change-in-gauge points
and the use of large steel packing cases for
the shipment of specially valuable or vital
freight.
Available statistics of Australian rail
movements for the U.S. Army, though
only fragmentary, suggest that the volume
of traffic was its highest in 1944, with the
movement of 93,000 passengers in Janu-
ary and 116,167 tons of freight in March.118
In all other months the passengers carried
were under 85,000, and the total freight
was less than 100,000 tons. During the
U.S. Army's stay in Australia, the need
for rail transportation exceeded the sup-
ply, the service received was slow and un-
certain, and no reform of the fundamental
shortcoming—the differences in gauge—
was possible. Nonetheless, careful and ex-
tensive co-operation enabled the Austral-
ian railways to handle far more traffic
than they were originally intended to
carry. No Transportation Corps railway
troops were found necessary in Australia.
Rail Operations in the Philippines
In May 1944 the Philippines had ap-
proximately 708 miles of railways, includ-
ing 454 miles of main track on the island
118
See Masterson, Trans in SWPA, p. 670 and
App. 51.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 479

of Luzon. As the plans developed, it be- When the 790th Railway Operating
came clear that only the Luzon railways Company began running the Luzon Mili-
would assume military importance. Trans- tary Railway in January 1945, all rail
portation Corps railway troops of the facilities showed the results of wartime
775th Railway Grand Division, com- neglect, sabotage, and destruction. The
manded by Lt. Col. Henry G. Balch, Japanese had removed rails and other
began taking over the railways in Linga- equipment. Enemy demolition and Amer-
yen Gulf area on 10 February 1945, where ican bombing had destroyed or damaged
operations had already been started in the rolling stock, bridges, stations, and yards.
previous month by the 790th Railway Reconstruction was started at once, and
Operating Company. In March most considerable trackage was ready before
elements of the 775th were transferred to additional military railway operating per-
Manila, which then became headquarters sonnel could be obtained. By mid-March
for U.S. Army railway activities in Luzon. train service had been restored from San
The planning for and the early super- Fabian, on the Lingayen Gulf, southeast
vision of the 775th Railway Grand Divi- to Manila, a distance of 150 miles. New
sion had been the responsibility of the railway equipment was received from the
U.S. Army Service Command, which was United States, Philippine rolling stock
redesignated the Luzon Base Section was reconditioned and put into service,
(LUBSEC) on 13 February 1945. One and at the close of March 1945 eight
week later, on 20 February, a Transporta- scheduled trains a day were arriving and
tion Command, embracing the 775th departing at the Manila terminal. By the
Railway Grand Division and the High- following month the 775th Railway
way Transportation Division, was set up Grand Division had been reinforced by
under the Luzon Base Section. When the arrival from the United States of the
LUBSEC, including its Transportation 131st, 132d, and 133d Service Detach-
Command, was abolished on 1 April, the ment Workshops, the 793d Transporta-
775th Railway Grand Division and the tion Corps Depot Company, and the
Highway Transportation Division became 737th and 749th Railway Operating
separate field agencies of a new Philippine Battalions.120
Base Section (PHIBSEC). Subsequent U.S. Army railway activity
The 775th Railway Grand Division in the Philippines was marked by steady
remained under PHIBSEC until 13 July expansion of personnel, equipment, and
1945, when it was transferred to Head- traffic. The maximum wartime freight
quarters, Special Troops, AFWESPAC. movement on the Luzon Military Rail-
Operational control was then delegated to way occurred in July 1945, when 152,628
the Chief Transportation Officer, AF-
119
WESPAC, but traffic control was retained See ibid., pp. 92-96, 671-74, 678. The Army's
Luzon trackage was known as the Luzon Military
by PHIBSEC. In the same month a Mili- Railway.
tary Railway Service, staffed by the 775th 120
Early operations were hampered by a lack of
Railway Grand Division, was established men with training and experience in railway work.
Ltr, Chief of Land Trans PHIBSEC (Col John P.
as a division under the Deputy Chief of Johnson) to Lt Col Richard B. Baldwin, Rail Div
Transportation for Operations, AFWES- OCT ASF, 23 Apr 45, OCT HB SWPA Philippines
119
PAC. Rys.
 480 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

net tons were hauled. Thereafter, because bridges and ferries incapable of support-
of demobilization, passenger traffic was ing heavy loads. The best roads were in
unusually heavy, reaching a peak of the southeast, between Melbourne and
353,310 in December 1945. Following Brisbane. Queensland was so poorly pro-
V-J Day the military railway organization vided with improved highways that long-
in the Philippines was gradually dis- distance travel was not feasible much
mantled. Various military railway units beyond Brisbane. Australian motorized
went to Japan, and Filipinos replaced equipment was insufficient to permit full-
American personnel on the railways of est use of the available highways. In
Luzon. A strike by the civilian employees March 1942 the Australian Army found
temporarily delayed the return of private that 70,149 Australian vehicles were suit-
control, which finally took place at mid- able for military purposes, of which only
night on 31 January 1946. 307 exceeded 3-ton capacity, the re-
mainder ranging from motorcycles to light
Motor Transport trucks.
Administration of highway matters for
Motor transport in the Southwest Pa- the U.S. Army in the Southwest Pacific
cific was used mainly for short hauls, was originally under the Chief Quarter-
rarely more than 25 miles, between dock master, USAFIA, but on 15 April 1942
the technical supervision and co-ordina-
and supply dump, storehouse, rail yard, or
tion of motor transport operations passed
airport. Only two long-distance highway
projects were undertaken by the U.S. to the Motor Transportation Section of the
Army. These were operated by Motor newly organized Transportation Service,
Transport Command No. 1 in Australia under Lt. Col. Roy R. Wilson. The sec-
(1942), and the Highway Transportation tion was successively redesignated a
Division (later the 100th Highway Trans- branch and division, and then, in Febru-
port Service) in Luzon (1945-46). ary 1944, it was combined with the Rail
Transport Division to form the Land
Highway Operations in Australia Transport Division with Colonel Wilson as
chief. When USASOS headquarters
Australian highways in June 1941 shifted to Hollandia in September 1944,
stretched 473,114 miles, distributed as supervision of highway matters in Aus-
follows: tralia was assigned to the base section at
State Mileage Brisbane, an arrangement that obtained
Western A u s t r a l i a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 210 until the withdrawal of the U.S. Army
South A u s t r a l i a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S3, 199 from Australia.
Victoria............................... 104, 004
As in other theaters, the Transportation
New South W a l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126, 059
Queensland............................ 124, 642 Corps in SWPA shared responsibilities
pertaining to motor transport with the
Ordnance Department and the Quarter-
Less than a quarter of this mileage was master Corps. The duties of the several
surfaced, and more than half was not fit services were outlined by USASOS on 14
for military use. Some highways that September 1942. Briefly, the theater chief
might have been employed included of the Transportation Service was re-
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
sponsible for the supervision of all U.S.
Army motor transport operations, except
those performed by organic vehicles; the
chief of ordnance was charged with the
supervision of the procurement, storage,
distribution, and maintenance of motor
vehicles; and the chief quartermaster
supervised the procurement of the operat-
ing personnel, other than for maintenance.
In the beginning the Americans had to
depend heavily on Australian vehicles
since comparatively few trucks were ob-
tained from the United States. By 21
August 1942 the U.S. Army had procured
6,706 vehicles from local sources, includ-
ing Dutch distress cargo. However, at that
date only 2,930 units had been delivered,
the rest being in process of rehabilitation
or manufacture. Subsequently, thousands
of additional vehicles were received from
the United States. Despite this fact, the
supply of motor transport was never ade-
quate, and the U.S. Army had to be as-
sisted by local trucking firms and the
Australian Army Motor Transport Service.
Since ocean transport was limited and
since Australia had fairly good facilities
for assembling Ford, General Motors, and
Chrysler sedans and trucks, these makes
were generally shipped from the United
States completely knocked down. Other
vehicles could be sent partially unas-
sembled. The resultant saving in shipping
space was considerable.121
Although American-built trucks were
reported to be the best, poor roads, care-
less operation, and inadequate mainte-
nance inflicted severe punishment on the
Army's vehicles in Australia. All types
showed excessive consumption of brake
shoes and lines, brake fluid, batteries, and
springs. The chief fault of the standard
Army 2½-ton 6x6 cargo truck was the
ease with which the hydraulic brake hose
481
was broken by careless handling or by
driving through brush or wiry grass. This
vehicle was classed as essentially a low-
speed, short-haul type. 122
The rough operating conditions, driver
abuse, and the shipment of used trucks to
the theater in lieu of new ones meant that
considerable labor and equipment had to
be assigned for maintenance and repair.
Keeping the trucks in operation became
"a mammoth problem." Abnormal con-
sumption of critical parts under peculiar
local conditions made the standard auto-
matic supply system unsatisfactory. The
resultant shortage of spare parts placed a
premium on improvisation and ingenuity.
Vehicles had to be kept going, if need be,
with parts salvaged or made on the spot.
Motor Transport Command No. 1
The first long-haul trucking operation
in the theater was undertaken in the
spring of 1942. At that time the Japanese
were within striking distance of Darwin,
and the sea lanes to that port were inse-
cure. Since Darwin was not completely
linked by rail with the rest of Australia,
a decision was made to supply its defenders
by highway. The Australian Army oper-
ated the 636-mile road filling the gap be-
tween the Central Australian Railway's
northern terminal at Alice Springs and
Birdum, the southern terminal of the
North Australia Railway, a 316-mile
narrow-gauge line extending to Darwin.123
121
The assembly program in SWPA was extended
to New Guinea late in 1943, with the establishment of
a "Little Detroit" assembly plant at Milne Bay. Mas-
terson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 439, 691-92.
122
Ibid., pp. 692-93.
123 The Central Australian Railway, running from
Port Augusta in South Australia to Alice Springs,
Northern Territory, was also narrow gauge. Total rail
and highway distance from Port Augusta to Darwin
was 1,723 miles. Ibid., pp. 694-95.
482
The U.S. Army assumed responsibility for
operating a convoy system on the 687-mile
road connecting Birdum with the railhead
at Mt. Isa, Queensland, to the southeast.
The total distance from Brisbane via this
route was 2,438 miles. Though later it was
much improved, the highway at that time
was "nothing more than a dirt track
stretched across a vast expanse of dry
wasteland."124
The mission of operating the motor
transport service between Mt. Isa and
Birdum, via Tennant Creek, was assigned
to Motor Transport Command No. 1,
established on 26 May 1942, with head-
quarters at the mining town of Mt. Isa.
Col. Lewis Landes, the commanding offi-
cer, functioning under the direct control
of the chief of Transportation Service,
USAFIA, was made responsible for all
Quartermaster supplies, equipment, and
personnel replacements. The units as-
signed to the command were the 48th and
29th Quartermaster Regiments (Truck),
the 92d Quartermaster Railhead Com-
pany, the 169th Quartermaster Heavy
Maintenance Company, the 86th Quar-
termaster Medium Maintenance Battal-
ion, the 190th Quartermaster Gas Com-
pany, the 17th Station Hospital, and
elements of the 394th Port Battalion.
Operations were begun on 28 June with
a fleet of 1,482 vehicles manned by nearly
3,500 Negro drivers. The camp at Mt. Isa
was located in an area abounding with
wallabies, rock pythons, and spinifex, a
wiry, oily grass that blazed fiercely when
ignited. Three intermediate camps were
established along the route, each of which
had a driven well for water supply, radio
communication facilities, a gasoline sup-
ply, and an open-hearth kitchen. Night
Camp 4 was at Birdum. A twelve-day
round-trip schedule was followed.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
The motor convoys traversed "some of
the grimmest, hardest country on earth,"
almost entirely uninhabited. 125 Even in
the middle of the Australian winter, when
the project began, the days were hot.
Vehicles, drivers, and landscape were
coated with a red "bull dust," as fine as
talc, which impaired visibility and neces-
sitated wide spacing between trucks in the
convoys. Dust respirators were necessary.
Tiny bush flies filled eyes, ears, nose, and
mouth and invaded mess kits. The drivers
serviced their vehicles after each day's run.
Heavy repairs were made by mechanics,
who sometimes worked all night. Mainte-
nance costs increased steadily during
months of operation on rough roads.
Spring leaves snapped, radiator hoses gave
way, and abnormal engine wear was
shown by a steeply rising oil-mile curve.
The experiment of removing outer dual
wheels to halve tire maintenance made
tires burst into flame at noon temperatures
of 130 degrees. By September 1942 a mess
hall, a dispensary, power pumps, showers,
and latrines had been constructed at each
camp. However, the weaker men were
breaking down under the strain. Because
of the dust, respiratory and eye infections
were on the increase, and one of every
three drivers had kidney complaints
caused by constant jolting.126
Motor Transport Command No. 1 was
disbanded on 30 October 1942, when
water communication with Darwin had
become less hazardous. Between 28 June
and 29 October Colonel Landes' men had
124
Hist Rcd, U.S. Army Motor Transport, Main-
land of Australia, 6 Apr 42-17 Apr 43, OCMH Files.
Cited in Masterson, Trans in SWPA, p. 695.
125
Ibid. Cited in Masterson, Trans in SWPA, p.
697.
126
See Special Sanitary Rpt, Med Inspector to
Chief Surg USASOS to SGO, USA, Aug 42, and Rpt,
135th Med Regt, 31 Mar 43, pp. 20-33, Hist Div
SGO.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 483

driven 9,504,948 vehicle miles (173 con- provisional basis from troops already in
voys) and had carried 30,329 tons of cargo, the theater. During the first half of 1945
2,402 mail bags, 3,487 Australian soldiers, the War Department and SWPA debated
and 842 Americans. Most units left early the exact organizational pattern to be
in November 1942, but a few remained to adopted for a highway transportation
continue the operation on a reduced scale. service in the theater. 127
During the ensuing summer months the In the meantime, trucking operations
noon temperatures soared as high as 146 had been carried on in Luzon by a provi-
degrees. The drivers in increasing num- sional Highway Transportation Division.
bers fell prey to kidney and respiratory ail-
Activated 13 February 1945 and headed
ments, scurvy, and heat exhaustion. The by Lt. Col. Ralph H. Sievers, it was as-
rainy season in the following February signed to the Luzon Base Section,
flooded the ordinarily dry river beds, USASOS. On 15 February Sievers and
bringing mud and high waters to impede his men took on long-distance hauling
motor traffic. On 26 April 1943 the last of from Base M, on Lingayen Gulf. Seven
the Americans, with trucks loaded on flat- Quartermaster truck companies were at-
cars, pulled out of Mt. Isa for the east tached to the organization for operational
coast, leaving behind a series of wells, a control. These units had already served in
bitumen highway, and a telephone line. two campaigns, and their equipment was
No other comparable long-distance motor battered and poorly maintained. All facil-
transport was found necessary until the ities were pooled and operations contin-
Army entered Luzon. ued around the clock, chiefly over the
excellent main road between Lingayen
Highway Operations in Luzon Gulf and Manila.
In March Colonel Sievers obtained
Before the war, the Philippines pos- sixteen provisional truck companies
sessed 14,267 miles of highway (of which formed from the personnel of four Coast
7,315 miles were first class), 33,898 motor Artillery battalions, but these new units
cars, 20,236 trucks, and 630 motorcycles. were only partially trained and had no
Although much improvement and repair equipment. By the following month he
proved necessary, the highways of Luzon had a total of 454 2½-ton trucks, which
had suffered less damage than might have ran in convoys of five to ten vehicles oper-
been expected from the Japanese occupa- ated on twelve-hour shifts. In spite of later
tion. accessions, the available motorized equip-
In preparation for Philippine opera- ment at the end of June was still consid-
tions, a Highway Branch was established ered inadequate. Throughout this period
in the Rail, Highway, and Air Division the principal mission of the Highway
under the Chief Transportation Officer, Transportation Division was to support
USASOS, in December 1944. The chief Sixth Army activity in northern and
transportation officer recommended, and central Luzon.
USASOS approved the proposal, that
127
long-haul transportation be made a func- Transportation Corps officers in SWPA and
tion of the Transportation Corps and that Washington co-operated in devising a new T/O&E
55-402T, 7 May 45; Ltr, Chief of Hwy Div OCT to
heavy truck companies be organized on a CofT, 31 May 45, OCT HB SWPA Philippines Hwy.
484
The provisional status was terminated
by the activation of the 100th Highway
Transport Service at Manila on 17 July
1945, with an authorized strength of 28
officers, 1 warrant officer, and 101 enlisted
men.128 The organization, whose primary
mission was long-distance hauling, con-
tinued under the command of Colonel
Sievers. In order to attain maximum utili-
zation, its vehicles were operated as a fleet,
all maintenance was pooled, and its men
worked around the clock. In the summer
of 1945 the main job of the 100th High-
way Transport Service was to truck sup-
plies over difficult mountainous terrain in
direct support of American combat units
and Filipino guerrillas. Additional respon-
sibilities came after victory over Japan,
when large numbers of enemy troops and
recovered Allied prisoners of war had to
be evacuated by truck. During demobili-
zation the movement of personnel natur-
ally took precedence over freight traffic.
The first military bus service, from Manila
to Baguio, was inaugurated in October,
and other routes were soon developed.
The peak in daily tonnage hauled
(3,604) was attained in August 1945. The
heaviest passenger traffic came after V-J
Day, with a peak in September of 253,648
persons transported. The strength of the
100th Highway Transport Service reached
the maximum in the following month,
aggregating approximately 4,600 military
and civilian personnel.129
Motor Operations in Bases
With the exception of the two special
motor transport organizations described
above that functioned respectively in Aus-
tralia and in the Philippines, the motor
operations supervised by the Chief Trans-
portation Officer, USASOS, were admin-
istered in detail in the bases and base sec-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
tions. Differing arrangements as to the
supervision of vehicle operations obtained
in the various bases, but as a rule a motor
transport officer was appointed to serve
within the transportation section (later
base port command) of the base headquar-
ters. In practice the base motor transport
officer in SWPA had only limited means
with which to discharge his responsibili-
ties. He was obliged to requisition labor
for each separate operation, and the only
experienced truck drivers available to him
from U.S. Army sources were from the
Quartermaster truck companies, which
were limited in number. Most units,
whether service or combat, depended
heavily upon their organic equipment for
personnel and cargo movements. In many
base sections the motor transport officer
was little more than an agent who bor-
rowed or hired motorized equipment, on
occasion competing with other officers for
trucks and drivers.
As already mentioned, the establish-
ment of separate base motor commands
early in 1944 deprived the base port com-
manders of jurisdiction over motor trans-
ports. Trucks, though essential for port
clearance, henceforth were provided and
operated by the base motor command.
The Chief Transportation Officer, USA-
SOS, objected to this arrangement, but
he was unable to win approval for his
recommendation of August 1944 that the
port and motor commands be placed
under a single transportation officer on the
staff of the base commander. Subse-
quently, in each of the new Philippine
bases a motor command was established
independent of the port command.130
128
A Transportation Corps unit set up under the
new T/O&E 55-402T, 7 May 45, noted above.
129
For details see Rpt, 100th Highway Transport
Service, February-December 1945, OCT HB SWPA
Philippines Hwy.
130
See Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 708-12.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 485

The Transportation Load in SWPA Guinea and Australia in every month

thereafter. Significantly, this record ton-
An adequate appraisal of the tremen- nage in the Philippines came near the end
dous wartime movement of men and matériel of the long and arduous in the climb up the
Southwest Pacific is d
island ladder of the Southwest Pacific.
because the available statistics covering Milne Bay was the port that handled
personnel and cargo traffic are frequently the largest quantity of Army cargo in Feb-
neither complete nor satisfactory. From ruary and March 1944. It was succeeded
the data at hand it is, however, possible to by Finschhafen (April-November 1944),
draw certain conclusions with respect to Leyte (December 1944-January 1945),
the volume of cargo handled and the Lingayen Gulf (February-March 1945),
variation in peak activity as between the and Manila (April 1945-June 1946). Sep-
respective areas and ports in SWPA.131 arate figures for discharge and loading
show that by May 1945, as was to be ex-
Cargo Traffic pected, outloading exceeded cargo dis-
charge in each of the Australian and New
The total tonnage of Army cargo han- Guinea ports, which were then support-
dled (that is, discharged and loaded) in ing the forward areas to the north. In the
all ports of SWPA varied little between Philippines the loading first exceeded dis-
February 1944 and January 1945, averag- charge at Leyte and Cebu City in October
ing under 800,000 tons a month. The total 1945.
exceeded 900,000 tons each month there-
after, reaching a peak of 1,368,303 tons in Personnel Traffic
August 1945, when hostilities ended in the
Pacific. Tonnage declined after October During the 44 months from January
1945.132 1942 through August 1945, inclusive, a
Total tonnage handled in Australia at- total of 1,073,673 troops and other pas-
tained a peak of 246,424 tons in March sengers was embarked by the Army in the
1944 and thereafter exceeded 200,000 tons United States for destinations in the
only in April 1944 and May 1945. It first Southwest Pacific Area. 133 Of this total,
fell below 100,000 tons in January and approximately 36 percent sailed in the
April 1945, and remained below that
monthly total after August 1945. Total 131
See ibid., pp. 514-16 and Apps. 42-46. Master-
tonnage handled in New Guinea reached son's figures, compiled from theater sources, begin
with 1944.
a peak of 693,111 tons in August 1944, ex- 132
Figures for February-December 1944 are in
ceeded 500,000 tons in each month from short tons and in long tons thereafter.
133
March through December 1944, suddenly Theater figures based on arrivals are generally
larger than the embarkations from the United States.
declined in January and February 1945, The difference may be accounted for by the time in-
remained without much change through terval and by personnel shipments from other thea-
August 1945, and fell again with extreme ters. See Masterson, Trans in SWPA, p. 293 and
Apps. 20, 23, 25. Masterson's figures on embarkation
abruptness in September 1945. In the and debarkations in the United States are drawn from
Philippines, the total tonnage handled Statistics Br Contl Div Hq ASF WD, Statistical Re-
reached a peak of more than a million view, World War II, pp. 122, 127. His data on per-
sonnel arrivals and departures in SWPA are based on
tons in July and August 1945, and greatly periodic Transportation Corps historical reports pre-
exceeded the combined total for New pared in the theater. All may be found in OCT HB.
486
first eight months of 1945 after the most
pressing requirements of the European
theater had been met. The peak embar-
kation of 129,354 occurred in August
1945. During the wartime period the vast
majority of the personnel sent to SWPA
consisted of U.S. Army troops. Most of the
rest were U.S. Navy personnel, with some
Allied military personnel and a few
civilians.
During the 28 months from June 1943
to September 1945, the Army debarked a
total of 267,755 troops and other passen-
gers in the United States from SWPA.
Available figures show that of those de-
barked in the United States between July
1943 and September 1945, approximately
89 percent consisted of U.S. Army troops,
including 59,730 Army patients. Of the
remainder more than one half were U.S.
Navy personnel. In each month through
August 1945, the numbers embarked for
SWPA greatly exceeded those debarked
from it. Reflecting the change in direction
of personnel traffic brought about by the
end of the war against Japan, during each
month between September 1945 and De-
cember 1946 debarkations from SWPA
exceeded embarkations. The total de-
barked from SWPA was especially heavy
during the five-month period from Sep-
tember 1945 to January 1946 inclusive,
amounting to 52,378 in September, 73,721
in October, 80,221 in November, 191,490
in December, and 175,919 in January—
altogether 573,729, or more than 58 per-
cent of all debarkations between August
1943 and December 1946.
Until Japan surrendered, for the aver-
age American soldier an assignment to
the Southwest Pacific usually signified a
long tour of duty with no hope of relief. At
first there was little opportunity to return
troops from SWPA, since all men were
needed desperately for its defense, and re-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
placements were not easily procured.
General MacArthur announced on 29
July 1943 that lack of shipping would
"operate to prevent the return of individ-
uals or units to the United States under
any rotation policy or at the end of any
specified period of duty." 134 Individuals
and units were to be rotated within the
theater—for example, from New Guinea
to Australia—so as to furnish relief in re-
mote and isolated stations and in localities
where climatic conditions were severe.
Special consideration was given to the
sick and wounded and to Air Forces per-
sonnel, and in November 1943 the War
Department notified the theater of the in-
creasing pressure to establish a policy for
return to the zone of interior of personnel
long engaged in "especially hard, debili-
tating, or isolated service overseas." How-
ever, the return of any appreciable num-
ber of military personnel could not be
effected until the latter stages of the war.
In each often of the fifteen months from
August 1943 through October 1944, fewer
than 1,000 troops from SWPA were de-
barked in the United States.135 The num-
ber debarked per month fell as low as 11
in October 1944, but thereafter troop de-
barkations increased substantially, ex-
ceeding 20,000 per month in July and
August 1945.
The end of the fighting in Europe made
available additional troops for the South-
west Pacific Area, of which the first con-
tingent, 4,725 men, arrived at Manila
aboard the Uruguay from Naples on
15 July 1945. For a short time the Panama
Canal was the busy gateway to the Pacific,
through which passed a steady succession
of ships carrying redeployed troops.136
134
Ltr, CG USAFFE to All Commanders USA
Units, SWPA, 29 Jul 43, sub: Return of Pers to U.S.,
cited in Masterson, Trans in SWPA, p. 294.
135
See Masterson, Trans in SWPA, App. 26.
138
See above, p. 30.
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 487

Demobilization 534 homebound troops on 28 October

1945. Two more vessels were completed in
Demobilization began with the close of that month.
hostilities in mid-August 1945. During In November, twenty-seven Liberty
this period much bitter criticism arose ships and two Victory ships were con-
from American soldiers anxious to leave verted at various ports in the Philippines.
the theater at once and impatient of any Despite crude temporary accommoda-
delay in the homeward trek. In the United tions such as trough latrines and wash-
States a distraught public, an alert press, stands consisting of helmets suspended in
and a querulous Congress complained holed planks, all these conversions had to
vigorously about the low rate of repatria- conform to established minimum safety
tion, particularly from the Pacific.137 The and health standards. On the long trans-
Army was blamed for not converting more pacific voyage of at least a month, consid-
cargo vessels in the United States to trans- erable discomfort could be expected and
port returning troops, to which the Army was borne willingly by troops eager to get
replied that additional conversions of home.139
freighters could not be justified since com- Although the hastily converted Liberty
pletion could not be assured in time to ships helped relieve the pressure, they
make any appreciable contribution to the proved poor substitutes for speedy, well-
138
repatriation program. equipped troop transports with large pas-
As a matter of fact, in SWPA as else- senger capacities. Within the theater the
where overseas all available types of ocean most acute crisis developed at the crowded
transport were employed by the Army, port of Manila, where the shortage of
the Navy, and the War Shipping Admin- shipping for demobilization was aggra-
istration to bring the men back. In order vated by the need of redeploying U.S.
to provide more passenger space the thea- troops for occupation duty, evacuating
ter was authorized to make hasty conver- liberated American and Allied prisoners
sions of a limited number of Liberty ships of war, and removing captured Japanese
into troop carriers, an expedient that to their homeland. Time was required to
Colonel Plant had introduced in SWPA divert more ships to the Southwest Pacific.
some three years before. The operations Meanwhile, the replacement camps re-
officer of the 2d Port at Manila, Lt. Col.
Cecil H. Davidson, took the lead in this
137
program. Under his direction a Ship Con- On the reaction of the public, the press, and the
Congress see, Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobiliza-
version Branch was established in late tion in the United States Army, Ch. III.
138
October 1945. Upon learning of the WD Press Release, 20 Nov 45, OCT HB TC
project, hundreds of soldiers immediately Gen Demob Trans. Cf. Wardlow, Responsibilities, Or-
ganization, and Operations, Ch. III.
volunteered their labor in converting 139
At the end of November 1945, the Ship Conver-
Liberties. A typical conversion involved sion Branch at Manila consisted of 7 officers, 57 en-
the installation of bunks, a sick bay, a listed men, and 1,655 civilian employees. Vessel con-
version had become a major function of the 2d Port.
storeroom, a recreation room, a post ex- The conversion program, which continued into 1946,
change, sanitary and messing facilities, also provided space for evacuating Japanese prisoners
and lifesaving equipment. Completed in of war. They were packed into Liberty ships "like
beans in a bowl," with passenger loads ranging from
five days, the first converted Liberty ship, 1,500 to 2,000 men. See Masterson, Trans in SWPA,
the Otto Mears, sailed from Manila with pp. 572-75.
488
mained full of restless men. Attempts to
explain the emergency to the average sol-
dier frequently fell on deaf ears, and in
Manila the cry of the disgruntled troops
was: "No boats, no votes. Get us home."
Under unrelenting pressure from the
American public, the Congress, and the
press, the theater made extraordinary ef-
forts to speed demobilization. The result
is shown in the following figures for per-
sonnel embarked by the Army for return
140
to the United States.
Early in December 1945 General Mac-
Arthur praised all echelons of his com-
mand for the efficient and expeditious
manner in which the readjustment pro-
gram had been carried on within the the-
ater, even though the responsible agencies
had been handicapped by the return of
their own eligible experienced personnel
to the United States. He urged continued
effort to complete the program "with the
least possible delay and upon the most
equitable basis." 141 During that month
the homeward movement was more than
eight times as great as the return move-
ment in the previous August.142
The transfer in 1946 of additional
troopships to the Pacific brought marked
relief. Among these vessels was the USS
West Point, a former luxury liner and the coast staging areas and railway facilities. Cf. OCT HB
largest American-built ship afloat. It Monograph 30, pp. 70-73; and Wardlow, Movements,
sailed in mid-January from Manila di- Training, and Supply, pp. 204-07.
rectly to New York, via Pearl Harbor and Div, 12 Data from Kardex files, OCT, Terminal Opns
the Panama Canal, arriving on 7 Feb-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ruary 1946 with 7,616 passengers, of
whom 6,106 were Army personnel.143
Demobilization continued well into
1946, but the trend was steadily down-
ward. Apart from the repatriation of lib-
erated American and Allied prisoners of
war, which had been substantially com-
pleted by the end of 1945, the only other
significant personnel movement con-
cerned the dependents of U.S. Army per-
sonnel. Mostly Australian war brides and
their children, such passengers began to
pose a problem as early as 1944. The lack
of suitable shipping, coupled with pro-
cedural difficulties, led to long delays in
their transportation. Comparatively few
dependents were removed to the United
States during the period of hostilities. The
great bulk of this traffic developed after
the surrender of Japan. 144
For the U.S. Army in the theater de-
mobilization signified the end of the long
trek from Brisbane to Tokyo, in which
transportation had always been a limiting
factor. But much remained to be done.
Even after the bulk of the U.S. Army
forces was repatriated, it would still be
necessary to perform important transpor-
tation jobs, including those involved in
the "roll-up" of supplies and equipment
awaiting shipment forward from inactive
rear bases and in the maintenance of the
U.S. Army troops assigned to occupation
and garrison duties in Japan, Korea, the
Ryukyus, the Philippines, and other Pa-
cific bases. These tasks were to keep the
Transportation Corps in the theater oc-
cupied well into the postwar period.
140
Ibid., p. 298, Apps. 27 and 28.
141
Cited in Ibid., p. 298.
142
The great influx for a time overtaxed the Pacific
143
Dec 50.
144
Masterson, Trans in SWPA, pp. 299-306.
 CHAPTER XI
The South and Central Pacific
The war in the South and Central
Pacific involved logistical problems of
unusual complexity. As in the Southwest
Pacific, the conduct of operations was
heavily dependent on water transporta-
tion. The lack of large land masses and the
paucity of physical facilities ruled out ex-
tensive rail, river, or motor operations. To
be sure, there were small railroads in the
Hawaiian Islands and New Zealand and
a tiny, obsolete rail line on New Cale-
donia, but these were operated effectively
by civilian agencies with military control
or played an extremely minor role in
operations. Truck transportation was im-
portant largely in connection with port,
depot, and other base activities. With the
exception of larger islands, such as Saipan
and Okinawa, hauls were short and were
concerned principally with clearing sup-
plies from beaches or piers to storage areas
and forward dumps. These activities may
well be considered together with port
operations. Air transportation, though in-
creasingly important in the latter stages of
the war, was limited primarily to emer-
gency and high-priority movements.
The main transportation problems were
concerned with shipping and port activi-
ties. Army, Navy, and Marine forces had
to be moved over vast ocean areas to
occupy or capture isolated, far-flung ob-
jectives. The limited amount of shipping
available and the distances involved made
difficult the task of mounting and sup-
porting assault and garrison forces and,
particularly in the early war years, dic-
tated strategy to a considerable degree.
Operations were further complicated
by the generally primitive nature of the
bases forward of Hawaii. Pending the con-
struction of adequate port and storage
facilities badly needed shipping piled up,
congesting harbors and intensifying the
over-all shortage of vessels. Cargo was
usually discharged by lighterage, supplies
were stacked in the open, and ships were
kept in port for weeks, sometimes months.
Although the problem was mitigated by
the echeloning procedure evolved in the
Central Pacific, whereby shipping was
directed to a destination in accordance
with its discharge capabilities, the recep-
tion capacity of forward ports remained a
limiting factor until the end of the war.
These difficulties were accentuated by
the secondary priority given the Pacific
until mid-1943. With the major effort de-
voted to the defeat of Germany, only lim-
ited support could be given Pacific opera-
tions during the first year and a half of
war. Amphibious campaigns were exe-
cuted with the scanty means at hand, and
shipping, troop, and equipment shortages
were the rule. By mid-1943, American
productivity and manpower mobilization
had developed to such an extent that it
was possible to provide an increasing vol-
ume of support to the Pacific over and
490
above the requirements of the transatlan-
tic theaters; and during 1944 the general
condition of scarcity was being overcome.
When the end of the war in Europe at last
made possible the provision of fully ade-
quate support, the last great battle of the
Pacific was already in progress.
Of the various shortages, none was more
chronic than that of service personnel.
Amphibious campaigns required a larger
proportion of service troops than was ordi-
narily provided—to man ports and depots
in rear areas as well as to garrison and
develop forward bases. The Pacific never
received a sufficient number of service
troops, and as a result combat troops were
used extensively in port and other activi-
ties. Although Army commanders de-
plored this practice, the absence of service
units left no alternative. This was particu-
larly true of the South Pacific, where origi-
nal task forces arrived with an extremely
low proportion of service personnel. Not
until early 1944 was a more equitable
number on hand. To a somewhat lesser
extent, the same situation prevailed in the
Central Pacific. Although the shortage
there was relieved in the latter part of the
war, it was never completely remedied.1
The handicaps would have rendered
operations difficult even if they had in-
volved only one service, but participation
by Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied forces
further complicated the picture. In order
to insure that the limited means available
achieved the strategic aims, close co-
operation was necessary between the serv-
ices in the utilization of manpower,
materiel, and shipping. This was accom-
plished within the framework of the uni-
fied command structure established in the
theater.2
Unified command carried with it power
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
to take steps to insure logistical support of
all participating services, but such meas-
ures were not effected immediately be-
cause of the newness of joint action and
the differences in supply systems. Effective
joint Army-Navy logistical action was first
developed in the South Pacific, the arena
of the first sustained operations in the Pa-
cific Ocean Areas.3 There, co-operation
on such matters as local procurement,
supply, port operations, and shipping was
developed on an improvised basis. In the
spring of 1943 more formal provision was
made in both the South and the Central
Pacific for Army-Navy co-operation in the
field of logistics and, ultimately, joint
logistical staffs were established under the
unified commanders in both areas. De-
spite many difficulties, such as the imprac-
1
Rpt, Lt Gen Robert C. Richardson, Jr., CG
USAFMIDPAC, to CofS WD, 15 Mar 46, sub: Final
Rpt of CG AFMIDPAC, p. 6, AG Opns Rpts 98-
USFS-0.5(22663); Rpt, Lt Gen Millard F. Harmon,
CG USAFISPA, The Army in the South Pacific, p.
20, Incl to Ltr, Harmon to Gen Handy, ACofS OPD,
6 Jun 44, OPD 314.7 PTO.
2
On 30 March 1942, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
was named Commander in Chief of the Allied forces
in the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), a command em-
bracing the South, Central, and North Pacific Areas.
Under Nimitz the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, was responsible for the Hawaiian
area's defense and, in his capacity as military gov-
ernor, for the security and supply of the civilian popu-
lation. In April 1942 Vice Adm. Robert Lee
Ghormley was assigned as Nimitz' subordinate to
exercise unified command of operations in the South
Pacific Area. Later, in July 1942, a separate Army
command, subordinate to Ghormley, was established
to administer the Army forces in the South Pacific.
See History of USAFISPA During World War II
From 30 March 1942 to 1 August 1944 (hereafter
cited as USAFISPA Hist), Pt. I, Ch. 1, pp. 14-25, and
Ch. 2, pp. 32-38, OCMH Files.
3
For the organization of the unified Pacific Ocean
Areas and South Pacific Area commands, and the
subordinate Army commands in those areas, see be-
low, pp. 496-97, 510-11, 523, 527-28, 537, 544-45.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
ticability of unifying the supply systems,
large amounts of material were inter-
changed, personnel and supplies were
pooled in the forward areas, and shipping
was utilized effectively in meeting the
requirements of all three services.4
The scope and emphasis of Army trans-
portation operations varied with changes
in the strategic picture. Initially, transpor-
tation activities were concerned princi-
pally with the effort to strengthen the de-
fenses in the Hawaiian area and to secure
the air and sea lanes to the Southwest
Pacific. With the elimination of the threat
to Hawaii as the result of the Battle of
Midway (4-6 June 1942), the emphasis
shifted to operations in support of the
limited offensive in the South Pacific
(August 1942-March 1944). Meanwhile,
the Central Pacific had become the scene
of important transportation operations,
beginning in the summer of 1943 with the
build-up for and execution of the Gilberts,
Marshalls, and Marianas Campaigns. By
the summer of 1944 there was a marked
contrast between transportation activi-
ties in the South Pacific and those in the
Central Pacific. In the South Pacific,
which had become inoperational, the
transportation effort was directed toward
the redeployment of Army forces to the
Southwest Pacific, the support and reha-
bilitation of Central Pacific forces, and
the "roll-up" of inactive bases. In the Cen-
tral Pacific activities were concentrated
on the accelerated drive to Japan, which
was climaxed by the conquest of the
Ryukyus. Following the Japanese surren-
der, attention was turned to the outload-
ing of troops for demobilization, the dis-
position of supplies piled up in the Pacific,
and the continued support of bases re-
tained for peacetime occupation.
491
The Hawaiian Area—Pearl Harbor
to Midway
In the first months following the Pearl
Harbor attack, the Japanese posed a seri-
ous threat to the Hawaiian area and the
lines of communication to the Southwest
Pacific. In response to this danger, the
Army and Navy acquired the use of avail-
able shipping and hurriedly dispatched
troops, supplies, and equipment to rein-
force the Hawaiian area and to occupy
the islands commanding the air and sea
lanes to New Zealand and Australia.
The effort to build up the defenses in
the Hawaiian area precipitated the first
shipping crisis of the war. The Navy's in-
sistence on convoy protection, congestion
and some confused loadings at the rapidly
expanding San Francisco Port of Embar-
kation, and the general vessel shortage
inevitably produced delays. To add to
these difficulties, the convoys' turnaround
times increased when fast vessels were
taken off the Hawaiian run and placed on
the longer, more dangerous routes to the
South and Southwest Pacific.
These developments slowed the flow of
supplies to the Hawaiian area. Apprehen-
sive of this threat to the delivery of the
essential needs of the Army forces and the
4
USAFISPA Hist, Pt. I, Ch. 1, pp. 14-25, and Ch.
2, pp. 32-38; History of the South Pacific Base Com-
mand (hereafter cited as SPBC Hist), Vol. 2, Ch. VIII,
pp. 206-10, OCMH Files. Also see Interv with Maj
Gen Edmond H. Leavey, former J-4 on the CinCPOA
staff, 30 Oct 50, OCT HB CP Rpts and Intervs. For
the attitude of the two subordinate Army command-
ers, both of whom criticized the joint staffs as being
dominated by naval officers, see the Harmon rpt, p.
24, and the Richardson rpt, pp. 5-6, both cited in n.
1. For a general treatment of the subject of joint
Army-Navy logistics, see Duncan Smith Ballantine,
U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947).
492
civilian population, Lt. Gen. Delos C.
Emmons, Commanding General, Hawai-
ian Department, sent a steady stream of
complaints about the shipping situation to
Washington. The crisis was short lived.
The lifting of the ban on unescorted ves-
sels in late January 1942 improved load-
ing at San Francisco, and the assignment
of additional vessels combined to break
the west coast bottleneck. In March, over
200,000 measurement tons of Army cargo
were shipped to the Hawaiian area, dou-
ble the amount received during January
when the first wartime convoys had ar-
rived. In April General Emmons reported
the shipping situation considerably im-
proved. Construction of fortifications and
airfields, deployment of troops on Oahu
and to the outlying islands, and support of
Army task forces at the air ferry bases
within the jurisdiction of the Hawaiian
Department were all progressing satisfac-
torily.5
The influx of shipping resulted in an
expansion of transportation activity in the
Hawaiian Department. At the outbreak
of the war a small Army Transport Serv-
ice staff, operating as the Transportation
Division of the Hawaiian Quartermaster
Depot, directed water transportation
activities concentrated at one Army-
owned and three Army-leased piers at
Honolulu. Longshore work was handled
by civilians augmented by one Army port
company. A limited amount of Army har-
bor and cargo-handling equipment was
available, and the ATS had one small
vessel, the General Royal T. Frank, to trans-
port passengers and freight to other islands
in the Hawaiian group.6
As the main destination for Army ship-
ping routed to the area, Honolulu was
called upon to handle greatly increased
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
traffic. Handicapped by an inadequate
labor force and insufficient equipment,
the port was hard pressed. Contributing
to its problems was the replacement of
workers of Japanese ancestry with inexpe-
rienced Filipino plantation laborers. Nev-
ertheless, the institution of around-the-
clock operations enabled the port to
discharge approximately 180,000 meas-
urement tons of Army cargo in March,
over four times the tonnage discharged in
the last prewar month. More than 170,000
measurement tons were discharged in
each of the next two months. During this
period additional cargo-handling equip-
ment arrived, and on 9 March ATS was
established as a separate branch directly
under the department commander and
was given an authorized strength of 13
officers and 33 enlisted men to manage
activities at Honolulu and its subports.
The arrival of two port companies from
the mainland in June and the drop in in-
coming tonnage relieved congestion at the
port.
Whenever possible, troops and cargo
were moved from the Honolulu docks by
the small Oahu Railway and Land Com-
pany rail line. Because of the acute motor
fuel shortage, the use of trucks was re-
5
Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy:
1940-1943, Ch. VI. Also, see Ltr, Emmons to Somer-
vell, 19 Apr 42, and Memo, Gen Styer, CofS SOS, to
CofT, 7 May 42, sub: Investigation of Sups for
Hawaiian Dept, OCT 320.22-400.162 CPA 41-42.
6
Unless otherwise cited, the treatment of oper-
ations in the Hawaiian area in the first half of 1942 is
based on the following: Hist Rpt, Trans Sv Hawaiian
Dept, 1 Jul 41 -31 Jul 42, OCT HB CPA Hist Rpts;
History of USAFMIDPAC and Predecessor Com-
mands During World War II, 8 December 1941-
2 September 1945 (hereafter cited as USAFMIDPAC
Hist), Vol. 12, Pt. 1, Sec. III, pp. 277-86, OCMH
Files.
The General Frank saw little service, for it was de-
stroyed by enemy action in January 1942.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
stricted, but the railroad's limited facilities
often made recourse to motor transport
necessary. Trucks allotted to ATS for the
movement of freight were increased from
45 to 100, and arrangements were made
by ATS for the use of tactical vehicles to
move troops from shipside. By mid-1942
little difficulty was being encountered in
moving either troops or freight from the
piers.
Aside from receiving incoming traffic,
Honolulu served as the transshipment
center for the support of troops deployed
to outlying islands. To accomplish this
mission ATS was given the use of six small
vessels that had been acquired by the
Corps of Engineers, for the transport of
materials to air ferry bases then under
construction in the Central and South
Pacific. In addition, troopships from the
mainland were either diverted to these
islands or were used to transship troops
from Honolulu.
On the more important islands, ATS
established subports to handle cargo and
passengers. In March 1942 an ATS officer
was assigned to each of the islands of
Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai to direct port
activities performed by civilian workers
and supervise equipment obtained through
hire or on contract. In a few instances,
some ATS operating personnel and equip-
ment were also provided. Although some
vessels arrived at these subports directly
from the mainland, that practice was soon
abandoned since the ports were inade-
quately equipped to handle large vessels.
As a result, cargo was generally discharged
at Honolulu for transshipment to the
other ports on the small interisland
vessels.
To the shipping requirements of the
outlying islands were added those of the
493
air ferry bases. In February 1942 Army
task forces dispatched from the United
States landed on Christmas and Canton
Islands to defend airfields on which con-
struction had been started in 1941. In
April troops were shipped from Oahu to
Fanning Island to relieve a New Zealand
garrison stationed there. The support of
these islands was assigned to the Hawai-
ian Department, placing a strain on ATS-
operated vessels, which were also carrying
on transshipment activities between Hono-
lulu and the outlying islands. In the mid-
dle of 1942 five additional freighters were
made available to ATS by the War De-
partment for interisland and ferry-base
shipping. Also, arrangements were made
for the use of space available on Navy
supply vessels destined for the South
Pacific.
For a time the evacuation of civilians
from the Hawaiian Islands to the United
States required considerable attention.
ATS had complete responsibility for the
removal of military dependents, depend-
ents of federal employees, and all civilians
returning on a commercial basis. Using
ships calling at Honolulu, 12,547 civilians
were embarked between December 1941
and the end of July 1942. The Army han-
dled the small continuing flow of evacuees
until August 1943, when the job was
turned over to WSA.
In the first six months of the war, only a
limited degree of co-operation was devel-
oped between the Army and Navy. In
January 1942 the Cargo and Passenger
Control agency was established under the
Office of the Military Governor. Headed
by a naval officer and containing Army,
Navy, and civilian representation, it con-
trolled and allotted berthing space and
longshoremen and co-ordinated all ship-
494
ping in the Honolulu harbor. Other rela-
tionships were informal and were carried
on by Army officers with their Navy
counterparts as the need arose. In general,
Army and Navy operations were handled
separately, each service maintaining its
own construction program, priorities of
materials, and shipping.7
In April 1942 General Emmons had
considered the idea of pooling all trans-
portation in the Pacific and placing the
determination of priorities of shipments
under Admiral (later Fleet Admiral)
Chester W. Nimitz, the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. Before dis-
cussing the matter with Nimitz, Emmons
wrote to General Somervell, then com-
manding general of the newly organized
SOS in Washington, to ascertain the War
Department's attitude. Emmons' proposal
received a cool response. Somervell in-
formed him that the Army had to "control
the means" if it was to carry out its re-
sponsibility for the supply of its forces.
"We are moving along these lines," he
wrote, "and preserving our control over
supply of all forces served out of San Fran-
cisco and out of Australia and partially
out of Hawaii."8 Emmons abandoned the
idea.
By July 1942 Army transportation oper-
ations in the Hawaiian area presented few
serious problems. Although there was still
some congestion at Honolulu, incoming
tonnage had fallen off from the March
peak and the scheduled arrival of addi-
tional port troops and equipment was ex-
pected to clear up the situation. Activities
at the subports and the support of the ferry
bases were being effectively accomplished.
The air of urgency that had characterized
early operations was fading, and the mis-
sion of the Hawaiian Department had
reverted to that of static defense.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Safeguarding the Lines of Communication
in the South Pacific
The emergency in the Hawaiian area
was soon overshadowed by events in the
South and Southwest Pacific. The swift
Japanese drive through the Netherlands
Indies, New Guinea, and the British Solo-
mons threatened to sever the vital air and
sea lanes to Australia and New Zealand.
In order to avert this possibility, Army,
Navy, and Marine forces were organized
in the United States and, beginning in
January 1942, occupied a series of friendly
bases extending from the Society Islands
through New Caledonia and thrusting
northward into the New Hebrides. By
July there were over 50,000 Army ground
and air troops in the South Pacific. The
principal Army task forces were located in
the Fiji Islands and on New Caledonia,
Tongatabu, and Bora Bora. Smaller Army
forces were stationed in New Zealand and
on Efate and Espiritu Santo. Other islands
occupied by U.S. Army troops during
1942 included Wallis, Upolo, Aitutaki,
and Tongareva (Penrhyn). Navy and
Marine forces, meanwhile, had landed on
many of these islands and, in addition,
garrisoned a number of others in Samoa
and the Ellice Islands.9
The islands occupied in the South
Pacific were scattered across an immense
expanse of ocean, some 3,000 miles sep-
arating the two most distant bases. With
the exception of New Zealand, which had
7
History of Army Port and Service Command,
USAFMIDPAC (hereafter cited as AP&SC Hist), Pt.
I, pp. 20-21, OCT HB CPA Hist Rpts; Styer memo
cited n. 5; USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 4, Pt. 1, Ch. 3,
pp. 1014-16.
8
Ltrs. Emmons to Somervell, 19 Apr 42, and
Somervell to Emmons, 28 Apr 42, OCT 320.22-
400.162 CPA 41-42.
9
Harmon rpt cited n. 1, p. 1; USAFISPA Hist, Pt.
IV, Ch. l, p. 723.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
fairly adequate facilities for handling
troops and cargo, the islands were small
and often possessed only meager material
and human resources. At Noumea, on
New Caledonia, the Army had access to
one three-berth dock—the Grand Quay—
and could occasionally use the berth at
the Nickel Dock when it was not being
used for commercial activities. Cargo-
handling equipment was rudimentary
and only a small number of tugs, barges,
and other craft was available. Similar
facilities were on hand in the Fijis, but the
other bases lacked even these limited re-
sources. Espiritu Santo had an excellent
natural harbor but was bereft of piers
capable of berthing ocean-going vessels.
On this island and virtually all the others,
cargo had to be lightered to barge piers or
the beach until more adequate facilities
could be constructed. Throughout the
area, except in the Fijis, there was a sparse
native population. Laborers were few and
often incompetent. Although conditions
varied from island to island, the limited
facilities and the inadequate supply of
native labor limited the development of
Army transportation operations through-
out the South Pacific.10
Upon their arrival at the various island
bases the Army task forces provided de-
tails to unload the ships. Where berthing
facilities were available, cargo and troops
were unloaded directly from vessels, using
ships' gear and such local cargo-handling
equipment as there was. Where berthing
facilities were lacking or inadequate,
locally owned and manned craft were
hired to carry troops and cargo. Once
ashore, the task forces set up informal port
organizations to supervise troops, and
native labor where available, in the con-
duct of continuing port activities. Provi-
sion was made for clearing dock areas by
495
using the limited number of trucks
brought in and other available transport.
Generally, the units themselves picked up
their supplies with organic vehicles. In a
number of instances, coastwise vessels were
hired to move supplies to outlying por-
tions of the islands. On many of the islands
the Navy and Marines were handling
their ships with their own personnel and
equipment and without relation to similar
Army activities.
On New Caledonia, a unique operation
was instituted in April 1942 when the
Army took over the obsolete, long-unused
Noumea-Paita Railroad. Operated by a
small Army Engineer detachment and
French and Javanese employees, this
twenty-mile meter-gauge line relieved the
burden on truck transport by carrying
supplies from the Grand Quay to various
supply dumps in the area.
In the course of developing its transpor-
tation operations, the Army early experi-
enced a severe shortage of service troops.
Desiring to retain the highest possible
combat effectiveness, task force com-
manders had kept the number of service
troops to a minimum. This was particu-
larly true in the case of port personnel.
The only organized port headquarters
provided to the South Pacific was the 1st
Port of Embarkation (Mobile), which ar-
rived at Auckland, New Zealand, in May
1942 as part of an Army task force. The
1st Port, consisting originally of 10 offi-
cers, 100 enlisted men, and 21 civilians,
took over control of Army port activities
at Auckland, supervising local labor at
10
Unless otherwise cited, the analysis of port facil-
ities and early port operations on the individual
islands is based on port histories compiled by the
Transportation Division, SOS, in the South Pacific
Area and now located in the South Pacific Area File
of the Office of the Chief of Transportation Historical
Branch.
496
Prince's Wharf. In June 1942 a portion of
the 1st Port's personnel was transferred to
the Fijis and there took over supervision of
port operations at Suva and Lautoka.
At Noumea, a provisional port com-
pany, with 4 officers and 69 enlisted men,
was activated in June. Under the Water
Transportation Section established under
the task force in April, the port company,
assisted by native labor and heavily sup-
plemented by details of combat troops,
managed Army port activities. Cargo
handling and allied activities on other
islands were performed by tactical troops,
assisted by such native labor as was avail-
able. The shortage of experienced port
personnel, together with inadequate port
and other base facilities and limited,
usually obsolete, cargo-handling equip-
ment, adversely affected efficiency. Ships
were slow in being discharged and oper-
11
ations were often confused.
The difficulties experienced at the in-
dividual island bases were intensified by
the lack of co-ordination between bases
and poor communications with the
United States. Army task forces had been
rushed out with little opportunity to con-
sider the details of their administration
and supply. Each Army task force com-
mander reported directly to the War De-
partment. With the exception of some
limited and temporary support of Bora
Bora, the Fijis, and New Caledonia from
Hawaii and Australia, Army command-
ers were supplied directly from the San
Francisco Port of Embarkation. Requisi-
tions were made without regard to person-
nel and equipment on other islands.
Moreover, because of poor communica-
tions, manifests were late in arriving and
estimated times of arrival of vessels were
frequently unknown. Some ships arrived
with supplies stowed below cargo destined
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
for other ports, necessitating unloading,
searching, and reloading. Others were
properly loaded but were difficult to han-
dle with the cargo-handling equipment
on hand.12
Some order began to emerge out of the
confused situation with the organization
of the South Pacific Area. Vice Adm.
Robert Lee Ghormley, Commander,
South Pacific Area, assumed active com-
mand of his headquarters at Auckland in
June 1942. In addition to the protection of
the lines of communications to New Zea-
land and Australia, he was charged with
the preparation of a counteroffensive
against Japanese positions. By early July
1942 plans were made and forces selected
for the invasion of the southern Solomons.
With active combat operations in the
offing, Ghormley decided to shift his
headquarters from New Zealand, and on
1 August he moved his advance echelon
to Noumea. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Mil-
lard F. Harmon, the Commanding Gen-
eral, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pa-
cific Area (USAFISPA), had arrived from
the United States with a small forward
echelon and had established his head-
quarters at Noumea on 29 July. Under
the operational control of Admiral
Ghormley, Harmon was responsible for
the administration and training of U.S.
Army ground and air forces and for assist-
ing the Commander, South Pacific, in
11
Narrative Rpt of Activities, 1st PE, 7 Apr-29 Jul
42, AG Opns Rpts TCPT-1-0.1 (47013) M; Hist, 1st
PE, activation to 31 Dec 43, AG Opns Rpts TCPT-
1-0.1 (30957) M; Rpt, Col Abbott Boone, Chief of
OSD SFPE, Visit to Pacific Bases, 11 Feb 43, OCT
HB Pac Gen.
12
History of the Transportation Division, SOS,
SPA, July 1943 to December 1943 (hereafter cited as
Trans Div Hist), p. 1, OCT HB SPA Hist Rpts; His-
tory of Port Operations, Fiji Islands, June 1942 to
January 1944, p. 8, OCT HB SPA Fiji Islands.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
preparing and implementing plans for
their employment.
The establishment of the South Pacific
Area and USAFISPA headquarters
marked the beginning of efforts to co-
ordinate the use of the limited resources at
hand. In June 1942 a Joint Purchasing
Board (JPB) was set up in New Zealand,
under the Navy Commander, Service
Squadron, South Pacific, to procure lo-
cally obtainable supplies. On 15 July a
joint logistical plan was formulated divid-
ing responsibilities for the support of the
South Pacific bases between the services.
The Army commander was assigned
supervision of all items of logistical sup-
port for which the Army was responsible.
With the exception of JPB-procured sup-
plies, this included the provision of sub-
sistence for all services at bases com-
manded by the Army and supplies other
than petroleum products for all Army
units. The Navy was responsible for petro-
leum products for all services, subsistence
for all services at Navy-commanded bases,
other classes of supply for all Navy units,
and all supplies procured by JPB. It was
also charged with the control of all ships,
the assignment of space in vessels, and the
designation of ports available to shipping.
This rough and ready division of re-
sponsibility laid the foundation for joint
logistical action, but Harmon's skeleton
staff had its hands full assisting Ghormley
in planning and executing the Guadal-
canal Campaign. Harmon's rear echelon,
organized in Washington, did not arrive
in the South Pacific until late September
1942. Without a central logistical agency,
it was virtually impossible to co-ordinate
supply requirements of the various bases,
direct the flow of shipping into the area,
and control transportation activities with-
in the command. Furthermore, despite
497
joint local procurement and the assump-
tion of joint supply responsibilities by
commanders at individual bases, wasteful
duplication of manpower and equipment
continued as each service handled its own
port and construction activities. In large
measure, integration of Army and Navy
supply and transportation activities at this
time was a goal yet to be attained. Under
the pressure of combat operations it later
became a reality.13
Transportation in Support of the
South Pacific Offensives
Conditions for the initiation of the
Guadalcanal Campaign could scarcely
have been less favorable. Shipping, troops,
and equipment were all in short supply,
leaving little margin for error. Neverthe-
less, it was imperative that the Japanese
advance toward the Allied lines of com-
munications to the Southwest Pacific be
contained. On 2 July 1942 the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff ordered a limited offensive
to be mounted against the Japanese, and
in line with this directive plans were made
for a drive on the southern Solomons.
Marine forces assaulted Tulagi and Gua-
dalcanal on 7 August 1942.14
Five island bases were important in the
support of the Guadalcanal action—New
Caledonia, Espiritu Santo, Efate, the Fijis,
and New Zealand. The other islands
played a minor role and were concerned
mainly with maintaining their own garri-
son forces. New Caledonia became the
13
For further details regarding the establishment
of South Pacific Area and USAFISPA headquarters
and the beginnings of joint logistical action, see
USAFISPA Hist, Pt. I, Chs. 2, 3, and Pt. II, Chs. 1, 2.
14
For details on the planning and execution of the
Guadalcanal Campaign, see John Miller, jr., Guadal-
canal: The First Offensive, UNITED STATES ARMY
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1949).
498
principal administrative and supply cen-
ter. Much of the cargoes for all services
arrived there for discharge and for trans-
shipment forward. Espiritu Santo and
Efate were developed as forward naval
and air bases. The Fijis had an important
air base and were the training ground for
the 37th Infantry Division. New Zealand,
initially a major base, was too far from the
scene of operations to be important in di-
rect support of the campaign, though it
retained significance as a source of local
procurement and as a rehabilitation cen-
ter for troops returning from combat.
With the exception of New Zealand,
none of the bases were equipped or
manned to handle the growing volume of
shipping that came into the South Pacific
in connection with the Guadalcanal
Campaign. In the fall of 1942 the growing
number of troop and cargo arrivals pre-
cipitated a major shipping crisis at Nou-
mea and, to a lesser extent, at ports of
other island bases. The ports' inability to
handle the load threatened the success of
operations on Guadalcanal.15 While
troops engaged in combat were experienc-
ing critical shortages, thousands of tons of
supplies and equipment destined for their
use awaited discharge from ships in the
harbors of supporting bases.
While the shipping crisis was coming to
a head, a theater-wide Army logistical
agency came into being. Late in Septem-
ber 1942 the rear echelon of Harmon's
headquarters arrived at Auckland, where
it was activated as the Service Command,
USAFISPA, on 8 October. Under the
command of Brig. Gen. Robert G. Breene,
the Service Command, USAFISPA, was
assigned responsibility for the logistical
support of Army forces in the South
Pacific.
A Transportation Section was estab-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
lished as part of the service command
under Maj. (later Col.) Jack A. Fraser,
who had had civilian experience in water
transportation. Assisted by a captain and
an enlisted man, Fraser set his organiza-
tion in motion. Before leaving the United
States, he had arranged for the San Fran-
cisco Port of Embarkation to forward in
advance copies of all manifests of ships
bound for South Pacific ports. Measures
were also taken to control intratheater
Army shipping and to develop contacts
with Navy authorities. Through October
and early November, the Transportation
Section arranged all movements of Army
personnel and cargo directed by
USAFISPA, using space on Navy and
WSA vessels. In this early period, the sec-
tion also handled all Army rail bookings
in and air bookings from New Zealand.
Scarcely had the service command
completed its organization when it was
ordered to Noumea. On 10 November its
duties were expanded, and it was redes-
ignated Services of Supply headquarters
for the South Pacific Area, General
Breene continuing in command. The SOS
organization took on the responsibility for
general theater and base supply and as-
sumed command of all organizations, per-
sonnel, installations, and equipment en-
gaged in SOS activities for U.S. Army
ground and air forces. On the same date
that SOS was activated, Army service
commands were organized in New Zea-
land, on New Caledonia, and in the Fijis
to operate under SOS headquarters, and
provision was made for Breene to main-
tain direct contact with commanders of
other islands regarding SOS activities.
Under Breene's aggressive leadership,
SOS made rapid progress in controlling
15
Ibid., p. 223.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
and co-ordinating Army supply and
transport in the South Pacific.
Among the responsibilities assigned
SOS were the direction of water transpor-
tation, port operations, and motor trans-
portation pertaining to its activities. Fraser
and his staff turned over their air and rail
functions to the newly activated service
command in New Zealand and moved to
Noumea to set up the SOS Transporta-
tion Division. There, Fraser concentrated
on building up his functions pertaining to
port and shipping operations. The isolated
nature of the islands made impossible cen-
tralized direction of motor transportation,
and these activities were handled inde-
pendently at each base. By the end of 1942
manifests were arriving more regularly
and the Transportation Division was exer-
cising an increasing measure of control
over port operations and intratheater
shipping.16
Meanwhile, congestion at the port of
Noumea had reached alarming propor-
tions. The arrival of supplies, ammunition,
and construction material destined for
Guadalcanal and other bases to the north
seriously taxed Noumea's facilities. Ad-
ding to the burden on the port were the
Americal Division's departure to reinforce
the marines on Guadalcanal and the coin-
cidental arrival of the 43d Infantry Divi-
sion and the 3d New Zealand Division.
Moreover, there was a backlog of cargo
awaiting movement forward, and convoys
to Guadalcanal were limited in size be-
cause of the tactical situation and the in-
adequate receiving facilities there. These
difficulties were compounded by the lack
of co-operation between the services.
Army personnel and equipment some-
times lay idle while the Navy worked its
vessels and vice versa. The Navy tended
to use vessels as floating warehouses, keep-
499
ing cargoes aboard ship until they were
needed. Both services practiced selective
discharge, unloading emergency supplies
from one vessel and then halting work to
begin on another. It was not unusual for
ships to be kept in port for as long as
ninety days. By the end of November the
number of vessels awaiting discharge in
the Noumea harbor reportedly had in-
creased to ninety-one.17 Many of the ships
carried cargo destined for transshipment
forward. Immobilization of shipping of a
lesser magnitude was developing at
Espiritu Santo.18
The port bottleneck at Noumea en-
dangered the support of Guadalcanal
where fighting was reaching a climax. To
deal with this crisis, Admiral William F.
Halsey, Jr., who had succeeded Ghormley
in October, requested the Army to take
over responsibility for all discharge and
loading activities at the port as of 20 No-
vember. In line with Halsey's directive,
direction of port activities at Noumea was
16
USAFISPA Hist, Pt. III, Ch. 1, pp. 426-30;
Trans Div Hist, pp. 1-5.
17
This figure, taken from the SOS Transportation
Division history, is one of several conflicting estimates.
According to the Army service commander at New
Caledonia, 37 ships with 88,000 long tons of cargo
were awaiting discharge in the harbor on 20 Novem-
ber, with 52 additional vessels scheduled for arrival
for complete or partial discharge during the ensuing
month. Another source, Ballantine's U.S. Naval Logis-
tics, p. 123, places the number of vessels awaiting dis-
charge at 100. Apparently, the Transportation Divi-
sion history and Ballantine must have included loaded
vessels awaiting convoy forward and naval vessels that
did not require discharge. See Leighton and Coakley,
op. at., pp. 398-404.
18
Ltr, Brig Gen Raymond E. S. Williamson, CG
Sv Comd APO 502, to CG SOS SPA, 19 Dec 42, sub:
Congestion of Shipping in Port of Noumea, OCT HB
SPA New Caledonia; Boone rpt cited n. 11, p. 8;
Memo, Lt Col A. W. Parry and Lt Col R. G. Lehnau,
TC, for Gen Robinson, sub: Rpt on Inspection Trip,
SWPA and SPA, 16 Mar to 4 May 43, OCT HB Pac
Inspection Trips; Trans Div Hist, p. 6.
500 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

given to SOS. Operational control of ations were moved in from New Zealand.
Navy equipment and longshoremen was To facilitate discharge of vessels at anchor,
assumed by the Army Service Command small boats were purchased in New Zea-
at New Caledonia and ships were handled land. In the meantime, emergency requi-
regardless of ownership or control. sitions for Transportation Corps troops
Although the unification of port activ- and equipment were forwarded to
ities at Noumea brought immediate im- Washington.
provement, the combined local resources At Noumea, the service command reor-
of the Army and Navy were woefully in- ganized and expanded port operations,
adequate. Immediately available to Col. arranged for the use of the Nickel Dock
(later Brig. Gen.) Raymond E. S. Wil-berth, and embarked on a program of im-
liamson, the service commander on New proving port facilities. By mid-February
Caledonia, were the three berths at the 1943, the situation was considerably im-
Grand Quay, a barge dock, seventeen proved. General Williamson now had a
barges and four towboats, and a small port headquarters aggregating 23 officers,
amount of cargo-handling equipment. To 178 enlisted men, and 80 civilians, all ex-
direct port operations, he had a small perienced in terminal operations. Army
transportation section staffed by seven port company strength had been increased
officers. Available for cargo-handling by 130 enlisted men through transfers
activities were an improvised port com- from other units; the Navy had provided
pany of 4 officers and 98 enlisted men, 280 520 cargo-handling personnel; and 764
Navy Seabees and casuals, 539 native other men were secured from combat
laborers, and the incidental services of units for longshore duties. A significant
three Quartermaster truck companies amount of cargo-handling equipment and
with a total of 69 serviceable trucks. None twenty-five additional Navy barges had
of the Army personnel had had experi- been secured, and trucks of combat and
ence in longshore work before arriving on other local units had been pressed into
the island.19 service. Army and Navy construction
In an effort to break the Noumea troops had completed a two-berth finger
bottleneck, steps were taken to prevent pier at Nickel Dock, making a total of six
further aggravation of the situation and to sure berths, and work was begun on an-
make additional troops and equipment other. Other improvements included the
available to the port. In December 1942, repair and extension of the railroad tracks
the 25th Infantry Division, then en route along the Grand Quay.
from Hawaii to Noumea and the Fijis, Unification of port operations and aug-
was diverted directly to Guadalcanal. At mentation of personnel, equipment, and
about the same time, the bulk of the 1st facilities resulted in a spectacular accelera-
Port was transferred from Auckland, tion of activity. The following reveals, in
Suva, and Lautoka to Noumea to aug- short tons, the increasing amount of traffic
ment and reorganize the service command handled at Noumea:
port organization, and a Navy construc-
tion battalion was assigned to provide 19
Rpt, Williamson to CofT, 15 Feb 43, sub: Trans
more longshore labor. Also, civilians ex- Sv Hist Rcd, OCT HB SPA New Caledonia;
perienced in port and small-boat oper- USAFISPA Hist, Pt. III, Ch. 6, p. 646.
 THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC 501

At this base and at Efate and in the Fijis

unified or co-operative operations were
developed. Priority of unloading and divi-
sion of labor were worked out jointly by
Army port commanders and Navy port
directors, and responsibility for port con-
Despite this increase in activities, incom- struction and cargo operations was
21
ing shipping piled into the already shared.
crowded harbor and continued for some The discharge of cargo at the rear base
time to outrun the port's capabilities. At ports was in many respects a job half-
the end of February 1943 there were still done, for much of it, particularly at
113,030 short tons awaiting discharge, but Noumea, was destined for transshipment
from that point on congestion rapidly forward. The limited amount of shipping
cleared up. The port organization, now available, the lack of facilities at forward
set up as a provisional port of embarka- destinations, and, due to the tactical situa-
tion, was operating efficiently, an Army tion, the necessity of organizing the ships
port company had arrived from the moving to the Guadalcanal area into
United States, and a second finger pier small convoys resulted in the accumula-
and a ponton floating dock were com- tion of large backlogs of supplies. In these
pleted. In the middle of April, with only circumstances, it became necessary to de-
24,000 short tons awaiting discharge, Gen- cide what could be sent to, and discharged
eral Breene reported the problem of con- at, Guadalcanal. On 31 December 1942
gestion at Noumea definitely solved.20 Admiral Halsey placed responsibility for
During this period the congestion at co-ordinating logistical support of Guadal-
Espiritu Santo was also being relieved by canal in the hands of General Breene. To
the acquisition of personnel and equip- assist and advise in determining priority of
ment and the construction of terminal shipment of supplies and equipment, and
facilities. In February 1943 the 390th Port of personnel other than tactical units to
Battalion, the first such organization to ar- Guadalcanal, the Commanding General,
rive in the South Pacific, debarked at I Marine Amphibious Corps, and the re-
Espiritu Santo and immediately took over spective commanders of naval bases, air-
cargo-handling operations. A month later craft, amphibious force, and service squad-
the 390th was followed by the 3d U.S. ron of the South Pacific Force appointed
Navy Construction Battalion (Special). representatives to an advisory group
Upon the arrival of the port troops, ar- known as the Priorities Board. As Breene's
rangements were made for the unification representative, the Director of Transporta-
of port activities along lines similar to 20
Williamson rpt cited n. 19; Trans Div Hist, pp.
those developed at Noumea. In early 1943 6-7; Hist Rcd, Prov PE APO 502, 3 Dec 43, pp. 5-10,
the remaining members of the 1st Port of OCT HB SPA New Caledonia; Ltr, Breene to Gen
Lutes, Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 19 Apr 43, Lutes
Embarkation at Auckland, with the ex- File SP 1942-43-mid '44.
ception of the commanding officer and a 21
History of Water Transportation at Espiritu
small cadre, were transferred to Espiritu Santo, pp. 1-4; Hist, Port Operations, Fiji Islands,
June 1942 to January 1944, pp. 12-16; History of Op-
Santo to take over port operations for the erations, Efate, May 1942 to May 1944, pp. 25-26.
newly organized local service command. All in OCT HB SPA.
502
tion, SOS, served as chairman of the
board.
All requests for the movement within
the area of Army cargo and personnel
and, after 31 December, of Navy and
Marine cargo and personnel moving for-
ward to Guadalcanal area, were received
by the SOS Transportation Division. After
the requests were considered by the Priori-
ties Board, the Transportation Division ar-
ranged for the use of Army, Navy, or
WSA vessels for movement forward of
urgently needed supplies from New Cale-
donia, the New Hebrides, New Zealand,
and the Fijis and issued directives to the
individual ports to load specific personnel
or cargo aboard the vessels in their
harbors.22
By April 1943 transportation operations
were improved. On the theater level, the
SOS Transportation Division had become
an effective supervisory and co-ordinating
agency. At the major bases Army service
commands handled port operations
through provisional ports of embarkation.
Close co-operation and co-ordination be-
tween the Army and Navy was the rule in
port and construction activities. More
Transportation Corps units and equip-
ment were beginning to arrive. Noumea
was being cleared of congestion, and
Espiritu Santo, although still experiencing
difficulty because of a lack of facilities, was
being relieved. But a new crisis had arisen.
In February 1943 Guadalcanal was se-
cured and the Russells were taken without
opposition. As Guadalcanal developed
into the principal advance base for new
amphibious operations, shipping was
again immobilized.
The completion of the Guadalcanal
Campaign and the occupation of the
Russells secured the lines of communica-
tions in the South Pacific and provided a
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
springboard for offensive action against
Japanese strongholds in the northern
Solomons and on New Ireland and New
Britain. Since all these objectives were
west of 159 degrees east longitude, the line
of demarcation between the South and
Southwest Pacific Areas, plans were
formulated for a co-ordinated two-
pronged attack by South and Southwest
Pacific forces along the Solomons-New
Guinea ladder toward Rabaul.
The first objective of the South Pacific
under this strategic plan was the New
Georgia group. In preparation for the
forthcoming campaign, Guadalcanal was
selected as the main forward base and as
the staging and stockpiling center. Gua-
dalcanal was even less equipped to han-
dle the burden than Noumea had been.
There were no facilities for berthing
ocean-going vessels. There was a total of
four landing points over an eight-mile
stretch of sea, two of them, Kukum and
Tenaru, being merely beaches. At Lunga
there was a half-sunken barge mounted
with a three-ton crane, while a small jetty
was under construction at Koli Point.
Ships had to anchor about one-half mile
offshore and discharge their cargoes into
lighters or barges, mostly Navy-owned,
which carried them to barge piers or the
shore. The Army service command was
still in the process of organization and was
woefully short of labor and trucks. Vir-
tually all troops on the island were de-
tailed at one time or another to work
aboard ship or on the beach. In addition,
approximately 1,000 native laborers were
utilized. Because of vulnerability to attack
from Munda airfield in New Georgia,
vessels were worked only from daylight to
dusk. Ships would then move out to sea
22
Trans Div Hist, pp. 7-8.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC 503

and return the next morning. If unload- a Liberty ship was erected at Kukum;
ing was urgent, they would move to additional service troops, including the
Tulagi, which was under Marine control, 481st Port Battalion, were brought in; a
for discharge during the night. The fact battalion of the 24th Infantry Regiment
that movements to Guadalcanal had to be and other combat troops were assigned to
organized into a limited number of con- beach operations; large storage areas were
voys complicated matters still further. As provided; and equipment, including
supply, equipment, and troop arrivals in- motorized cranes, barges, lift trucks, cargo
creased, Guadalcanal became congested nets, pallet boards, and floating cranes,
and a large backlog of shipping again de- were shipped in by both the Army and
veloped in the South Pacific. In April 1943 the Navy.25
the Army and Navy had thirty vessels, During this build-up the 2½-ton am-
with approximately 160,000 short tons phibian truck (the DUKW) was placed in
aboard, awaiting convoy to Guadalcanal.23 operation for the first time in the South
In an effort to relieve congestion, Gen- Pacific. The first DUKW's arrived at
eral Breene on 14 April 1943 radioed the Noumea in April 1943. After a successful
San Francisco Port of Embarkation to experimental test, fifty DUKW's and a
cease loading, until further notice, all provisional company, later organized as
cargo destined for the Solomons, except the 451st Amphibian Truck Company,
for certain specified items and cargo-han- moved to Guadalcanal early in May.
dling equipment that would be sent to They were immediately placed in service
Noumea for later transshipment. The after a serious storm smashed the quays
Navy took similar action. Then, in order and wrecked floating equipment. Until
to make possible the target date of 30 June damage could be repaired, the DUKW's
set for the New Georgia assault, Breene were used to bridge the gap between ship
and his staff together with Navy and and shore. In further activities, the
Marine Corps representatives worked out DUKW's proved invaluable in expediting
a scheme whereby 65,000 short tons of the discharge and turnaround of vessels at
supplies needed for the New Georgia oper- ports where berthing facilities were inade-
ation could be extracted and unloaded at quate or nonexistent.26 Other bases at
Guadalcanal with a minimum of han- 23
Draft MS, Hist Sec SPEC, The New Georgia
dling. For the most part, entire shiploads Campaign, AG Opns Rpt 98-USF2-0 (43318)Jan-
were routed directly to Guadalcanal and Jun 43; Rad 2849, New Caledonia to WAR, 31 Jan
43, OCT 560-561.1 SP 43; Parry-Lehnau rpt cited
their cargoes were added to the stockpiles n. 18; Rpt, Lewis Lapharn, WSA, Report on the
there. Ships loaded partially for Guadal- South Pacific Area, 28 Mar 43, OCT HB SP Misc
canal or containing nonessential cargoes Rpts; Trans Div Hist, p. 16.
24
Rad, New Caledonia to SFPE, 15 Apr 43, OCT
were released to Australia or diverted to 560-565.1; Cbl, Bailey, WSA Noumea, to Douglas,
Noumea or New Zealand. By 12 May ap- WSA, 12 May 43, OCT 565.2 Jan-Jun 43; Ltr,
proximately 91,000 short tons had been Breene to Lutes, 11 May 43, Lutes File SP 1942-43-
directed to noncongested ports, thereby mid'44. 25
Trans Div Hist, p. 17; Handwritten Notes, Col
relieving much of the pressure on Guadal- Walker, USAF New Caledonia Port and Trans Sec
canal.24 DD 314.7 42-45, KCRC AGO.
26
Trans Div Hist, p. 23; Ltr, Breene to Lutes, 19
At the same time, Guadalcanal was Apr 43, Lutes File, SP 1942-43-mid'44; Rpt, Breene
being built up. A pier capable of berthing to Somervell, 6 May 43, OCT HB Amph Vehicles.
504
which they were subsequently used were
Espiritu Santo and Munda. But DUKW's
could only handle a portion of the port
load. Docking facilities had to be con-
structed at rear area bases and at forward
destinations as soon as the tactical situa-
tion made such construction possible.
By 7 June 1943 diversions of nonessen-
tial cargo and expanded port operations
relieved the congestion sufficiently to per-
mit resumption of direct deliveries to the
Solomons from the United States. Ar-
rangements were also made with the San
Francisco Port of Embarkation to stow
Noumea cargo over incomplete Solomons
shiploads. The vessels were then routed to
Noumea for partial discharge and top-
ping-off with cargo available for transship-
ment to the Solomons.27 With the initia-
tion of the New Georgia campaign on 30
June 1943, Guadalcanal was called upon
to handle steadily mounting traffic. Dur-
ing August the port discharged 107,821
short tons, more than double the tonnage
discharged during May. Despite the handi-
caps imposed by the limited size of con-
voys moving into Guadalcanal and con-
tinued enemy air attacks, the requirements
of the New Georgia campaign were being
met.
The four months during which the New
Georgia group was assaulted, occupied,
and secured witnessed a marked accelera-
tion in the forward movement of troops
and equipment. Noumea, the destination
for the major portion of the shipping ar-
riving from the United States and the
principal center for transshipment to for-
ward bases, notably Guadalcanal, in-
creased its cargo loadings from 25,477
short tons in June 1943 to 74,800 short
tons in October. Espiritu Santo, which
continued as an important air and naval
base, was growing in importance as a base
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
for transshipment. Loadings there rose
from 5,466 short tons to 19,584 short tons
in the same period. Some support loadings
were made in the Fijis, but these islands
served chiefly as a rehabilitation center.
Efate, because of its proximity to Espiritu
Santo, declined in importance as the latter
was built up. Troop movements within the
theater began rising in June as personnel
were called forward for service duties in
Guadalcanal and staging for combat
operations. During September 1943 some
59,759 Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
New Zealand troops were moved within
the area, exclusive of those shipped for-
ward from the Guadalcanal area to the
combat zone.28
Shipments were made northward from
the rear bases to the Guadalcanal area by
Navy-owned or Navy-controlled cargo
vessels and troopships, supplemented by
Army and Navy allocated WSA ships re-
tained for use in the area after completing
their transpacific runs. Because of enemy
air activity, it was necessary to organize
these vessels into small convoys. In order
to effect the most efficient use of this ship-
ping, Admiral Halsey in April 1943 had
delegated to the Army SOS the booking of
all personnel and cargo moving to Gua-
dalcanal. This authority was expanded
until by the end of August the SOS Trans-
portation Division became the agency for
co-ordinating the movement of all cargo
and personnel within the area. The Priori-
ties Board, which had become experi-
27
Rad, SCR 10, COMSOPAC to VCNO, 7 Jun
43, OCT 560-561.1 SP 43.
28
Statistics on tonnage handled monthly at individ-
ual ports in the South Pacific from May through No-
vember 1943 are listed in Inclosure O of the Trans-
portation Division history. Monthly personnel move-
ments for the period from January through Novem-
ber 1943 are contained in Inclosure K of the same
document.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
enced in supplying Guadalcanal, con-
tinued to advise the SOS in determining
shipping requirements for cargo to all
other South Pacific bases. The assignment
of priorities for intratheater movement of
personnel, however, was taken over and
exercised directly by the Navy. The Trans-
portation Division secured the shipping
from the Navy, the WSA, and the Chief of
Transportation in Washington, and, in ac-
cordance with the priorities laid down,
issued loading instructions to the indi-
vidual ports. Movements from the Gua-
dalcanal-Russells area to positions of ac-
tual combat, however, were effected by
Navy landing ships of all types and were
controlled by the Navy. 29
The influx of shipping into Guadal-
canal from other South Pacific bases and
from the United States continued to out-
run the port's ability to discharge through-
out the New Georgia campaign. In Au-
gust supplies shipped into Guadalcanal
were again limited to those essential for
the support of combat operations and for
the maintenance and construction of port
and other installations vital to the success
of these operations. Furthermore, the
enemy air attacks, which continued until
late in 1943, necessitated continued con-
voying and harassed port operations.
Nevertheless, the port steadily bettered its
performance. Under the Army service
command port organization, Army port
troops and Navy Seabee longshoremen,
heavily augmented by details of combat
troops and assisted by native laborers, ex-
ceeded the discharge performance of
Noumea after August 1943. As the main
forward base, Guadalcanal also loaded
the bulk of support supplies. Monthly
cargo loadings, exclusive of those per-
formed by the troop units themselves in
connection with amphibious operations,
505
rose from 22,631 short tons in July 1943 to
34,048 short tons in October.30
After securing the New Georgia group,
the South Pacific forces continued their
drive into the northern Solomons. The
Treasury Islands were invaded on 27
October. In the meantime, stockpiling for
an assault on the strongly fortified island
of Bougainville had begun at Guadal-
canal, the Russells, and Vella Lavella. In
preparation for the campaign, Admiral
Halsey, on 19 October 1943, expanded
the boundaries of the forward area, which
had originally included Guadalcanal and
the Russells, to encompass New Georgia.
The forward area was placed under the
Army island commander of Guadalcanal,
who was made responsible for assembling
and loading troops, equipment, and sup-
plies from the forward area. His deputy
commander for services arranged for the
necessary shipping with the Navy, which
was responsible for water transport within
the forward area and from the forward
area to the combat area.
In order to meet the increased shipping
requirements forward from Guadalcanal,
the Navy amphibious force commander,
on 7 October 1943, withdrew all but ten of
his ships from the rear areas and concen-
trated his cargo vessels and troopships in
the forward area. The commanding gen-
eral of SOS remained responsible for as-
sembling and loading from the rear areas.
To accomplish this movement, the SOS
Transportation Division called upon the
Navy commander of the Service Squad-
ron, South Pacific, for the use of the ten
29
Trans Div Hist, pp. 15-19; Narrative Account,
Adm William F. Halsey, The South Pacific Area, 20
April 1942-15 June 1944, atchd to Ser. 03450, 11 Oct
44, p. 8, COMINCH File.
30
Trans Div Hist, pp. 19-20; Info from Mariners,
Collection Unit MID WD, No. 142, Guadalcanal
Island, 21 Jan 44, OCT HB SPA Guadalcanal.
506
attack cargo vessels assigned to him by the
amphibious force and, to a much greater
degree than had been done previously, ar-
ranged for the retention in the area of
cargo vessels and troopships that had com-
pleted their transpacific runs. In addition,
a large number of personnel transfers
were made on three Navy hospital trans-
ports (APH's), which ran a continuous
shuttle of evacuated casualties southward
and fresh troops northward. Some troop
movements were also made by LST's.
On 1 November 1943 amphibious land-
ings were effected on Bougainville at Em-
press Augusta Bay. In the months that
followed, Marine and Army units engaged
in heavy fighting to secure a solid and
stabilized foothold. The assault on Bou-
gainville greatly extended the lines of
communications of the South Pacific
Area. Cape Torokina, the principal sup-
ply point on the island, was 409 nautical
miles from Guadalcanal. Yet this cam-
paign did not place as great an emergency
burden on transportation as did the move
on New Georgia. The high level of supply
that had been maintained by the shipping
to the Guadalcanal area through the pre-
vious months had created sufficient re-
serves from which much of the supply for
the Bougainville move was obtained with-
out undue strain on shipping from rear
bases northward.31
Transportation operations had also im-
proved as additional Transportation Corps
personnel and equipment arrived in the
theater. At the end of 1942, the only
Transportation Corps organizations in the
theater had been the 1st Port and the
locally activated 196th Port Company.
One year later there were four port bat-
talion headquarters, nineteen port com-
panies, and six DUKW companies in the
South Pacific. The largest number of port
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
units were assigned at Noumea and on
Guadalcanal and Espiritu Santo. Five of
the DUKW companies were on Guadal-
canal. Single port companies were sta-
tioned at Efate and in the Fijis and a
DUKW company was on duty at Munda.
At Noumea, the 790th Transportation
Corps Railway Operating Company had
been activated in July 1943 to take over
the Noumea-Paita Railroad from the
Engineer detachment. On 1 February 1944
operation of this obsolete line was discon-
tinued and the unit was converted into a
truck company. Although the Transporta-
tion Corps units provided were still in-
sufficient to handle the burden of port
operations, as indicated by the fact that as
late as January 1944 there were as many
combat troops engaged in cargo-handling
activities as there were Transportation
Corps personnel, the time was approach-
ing when combat troops could be relieved
of service duties. In the latter part of 1943
the shortage of marine and cargo-han-
dling equipment was eased by the arrival
in the theater of harbor craft, cranes, nets,
and other items requisitioned earlier in
the year. Through the efforts of the Trans-
portation Division, a portion of the new
equipment destined originally for Noumea
was diverted to Guadalcanal, the Russells,
New Georgia, and Bougainville. In De-
cember alone, thirty-four cranes arrived
and were assigned to ports in the Solomons
31
Unless otherwise cited, the account of transporta-
tion operations in the South Pacific in the period Oc-
tober 1943 to July 1944 is based on the following:
Trans Div Hist, pp. 9, 13-14, 20-21, 24-26; Hist
Rcds, Trans Div SOS SPA, 30 Sep 43-1 Jan 44, 31
Dec 43-1 Apr 44, 1 Apr 44-30 Jun 44, OCT HB SPA
Hist Rpts; Hist Rpt, Trans Sec Sv Comd APO 502, 1
Jan-31 Mar 44, OCT HB SPA New Caledonia;
Notes on Russells, Col A. M. Sheets, FA, 29 Oct 43,
USAF New Caledonia Port and Trans Sec DD 320.2
Russells, KCRC AGO; USAFISPA Hist, Pt. III, Ch.
2, pp. 441-47.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
area. Other equipment that could be
spared from Noumea and the Fijis was
also shipped north.
During these months the small Trans-
portation Division staff was gradually
augmented, and by the end of the year
Colonel Fraser had eight officers, one
warrant officer, and eighteen enlisted
men. In the last quarter of 1943, the
Transportation Division for the first time
had separate branches handling water
transportation, troop movements, and
port and supply activities. In addition to
its regular duties relating to incoming
shipping, intratheater movements, and
co-ordination of port activities, the divi-
sion was giving increasing attention to the
clearing of rear bases and the shifting of
supplies northward. Vessels from the
United States and from the South Pacific
Area were routed to lift supplies from
Efate and the Fijis, which were declining
in importance, and from the now unim-
portant island outposts on Aitutaki, Bora
Bora, Tongareva, and Tongatabu. In some
instances, entire shiploads bound for rear
areas were diverted farther forward to
avoid double handling.
With the Bougainville operation under
way in November 1943, troop and cargo
movement was again accelerated. Major
troop transfers arranged by the Transpor-
tation Division in late 1943 involved the
movement of the Americal Division from
the Fijis to Bougainville to relieve a
Marine division there; the 25th Infantry
Division from Guadalcanal to Auckland
for rest; the 2d Marine Division from
Wellington to Pearl Harbor; and several
naval construction and special battalions
to forward positions and to Australia. The
number of troops moved within the
theater, exclusive of transfers within or
from the forward area, rose from 45,413 in
507
October 1943 to 61,166 in November, and
stayed at a relatively high level.
Cargo-handling operations at major
ports were at or near their peak. Noumea
experienced a decline in discharge activi-
ties as Guadalcanal received an increas-
ing proportion of shipping from the
United States, but this was counter-
balanced by the continued transshipment
forward of a large volume of supplies and
equipment. Espiritu Santo also became in-
creasingly important as a transshipment
point, some 25 percent of the tonnage
handled there in the last quarter of 1943
consisting of shipments to the forward
area. A contributing factor was the
establishment of a drum-fill plant, which
packaged bulk fuel discharged from
tankers for shipment to the Russells, New
Georgia, and points north. Empty drums
were returned for refilling and sent out
again. Guadalcanal, now the main for-
ward base, was beginning to outstrip
Noumea. Forward from Guadalcanal,
islands were opened to direct shipping
from rear bases and the United States as
soon as the tactical situation permitted.
By the end of 1943, Munda in New Geor-
gia, Torokina on Bougainville, and the
Treasury Islands were opened as direct
shipping destinations. Early in 1944 two
or three ships a day were handled at these
discharging points. To support these oper-
ations, Transportation Corps units were
transferred to the Army service commands
established on the islands. The 455th Am-
phibian Truck Company moved from
Guadalcanal to Munda late in November
1943. Another DUKW unit moved from
Guadalcanal to Torokina in January 1944,
and in March two port companies were
transferred from the Fijis and New
Caledonia.
The bulk of the supplies for the forward
508
bases, however, continued to come from
Guadalcanal. Despite improvements in
facilities and augmentation of personnel,
the heavy volume of shipping directed to
Guadalcanal in the latter part of 1943
again outran the island's discharge and
transshipment capacity. To provide the
necessary relief, the South Pacific naval
commander on 17 November ordered the
transfer of all possible staging and trans-
shipment activities to the Russells, which
had been placed under development after
their occupation in February 1943. By
November completed dock facilities con-
sisted of Blue Beach Dock on Renard
Sound and a ponton floating pier at Til-
lotson Cove, each capable of handling one
ship of Liberty size and LST's. A second
ponton pier was being erected. With the
diversion of transshipping activities to the
Russells, the ponton pier was rushed to
completion and numerous warehouses
were built. Ship arrivals initially out-
stripped the port's discharge capacity, but
by the end of the year four or five vessels
were being worked constantly, and the
Russells had replaced Espiritu Santo as
the third ranking port in the South Pacific.
The development of the Russells pro-
vided but temporary relief for Guadal-
canal. To the handling of supplies for the
continuing support of Bougainville was
added the burden of stockpiling for a
large-scale offensive against Kavieng, set
for 1 March 1944. In addition, a severe
storm on 15 January 1944 seriously dam-
aged docks and piers and handicapped
port operations. Despite the fact that
Guadalcanal had unloaded 142,676 short
tons in January, it was unable to keep
pace with incoming shipping. As of 11 Feb-
ruary a total of 280,427 short tons of cargo
aboard 80 vessels was reported as awaiting
discharge in the Solomon area.
The congestion was relieved in March
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
1944. The Kavieng operation was canceled
and the base bypassed. Green Island was
seized in February, and Emirau Island
was taken in March. Little opposition was
encountered in either operation. As a re-
sult, the volume of shipping moving to the
Solomons fell off somewhat. In the mean-
time, two port battalions had arrived in
the theater and had been assigned to
Guadalcanal and the Russells. The arrival
of the 40th and 93d Infantry divisions pro-
vided an additional source of labor. In
March 1944, and again in May, Guadal-
canal discharged and loaded a record total
of over 180,000 short tons. The tie-up of
shipping in the Solomons area in February
1944 was the last one of a serious nature in
the South Pacific area.
In the spring of 1944, transportation
operations were characterized by gradu-
ally declining activity in the rear area,
counterbalanced by increasing activity in
the forward area. Troop movements to the
South Pacific fell off drastically, while the
volume of incoming supplies was stabi-
lized. Within the theater, personnel move-
ments were kept over 40,000 a month as
troops continued to move toward the for-
ward areas. Noumea and Espiritu Santo,
the principal rear bases, were handling a
large, but by now static, volume of tonnage.
Guadalcanal and the Russells were at the
peak of their development as bases han-
dling the bulk of supplies moving into the
forward areas. As successive amphibious
assaults extended the lines of communica-
tions, newly occupied bases were opened
as shipping destinations for cargo vessels.
In March 1944 Emirau and Green Islands
were both opened to shipping from the
rear bases and the United States. In the
same month the 218th Port Company
moved from the Russells to Emirau and
took over operations. Green Island re-
ceived its first Transportation Corps unit
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
in May, when the 313th Port Company
arrived from the United States.
At this time, theater and base transpor-
tation organizations were better able to
handle operations than ever before. On
1 April 1944 the Transportation Division,
staffed by twenty officers, thirty enlisted
men, and four civilian stenographers, was
an experienced agency performing its
functions in a well-defined manner. At the
major bases Army service command trans-
portation sections, formerly known as pro-
visional ports of embarkation, directed
port operations in close co-operation with
Navy and Marine authorities. At their
disposal were six port battalion headquar-
ters, twenty-six port companies, six
DUKW companies, a significant number
of special naval construction battalions,
and an increasing supply of harbor craft
and cargo-handling equipment. 32 Al-
though port facilities often left much to be
desired, they had been considerably
improved.
The rate of movement of troops and
supplies in the South Pacific remained
high through June 1944, but the South
Pacific was rapidly becoming inopera-
tional. With the bypassing of Kavieng and
the seizure of western New Britain and
the Admiralties by Southwest Pacific
forces, isolated enemy forces were left to
die on the vine, and the Japanese airfields
at Rabaul were hammered into impotence
from forward air bases in the South Pacific
and New Guinea areas. The offensive
campaigns of the South Pacific forces were
virtually over.33
From Static Defense to Offensive Operations
in the Central Pacific
For a year after the assault on Guadal-
canal, the Hawaiian area remained in the
background. The Battle of Midway had
509
restored the balance of naval power in the
Pacific and, except for the Aleutians, con-
fined enemy action to the South Pacific.
During this period Army traffic in the
Hawaiian area was relatively light. As the
deployment of troops and construction
activities slowed down, the volume of ton-
nage arriving in Honolulu for discharge
and transshipment to outlying islands and
the ferry bases leveled off. After May 1942
cargo discharged did not exceed 140,000
measurement tons a month, and during
July 1943 the total Army tonnage dis-
charged and loaded at the port amounted
to only 74,672 measurement tons.34
Water transportation operations con-
tinued under the direction of the Army
Transport Service until October 1942,
when the Hawaiian Department SOS was
established. At that time, the ATS staff and
functions were incorporated into the Port
and Transportation Division. Under the
SOS, later redesignated the Hawaiian De-
partment Service Forces, the Port and
Transportation Division supervised Army
port and allied motor and rail activities at
Honolulu and the outlying islands and
operated vessels engaged in interisland and
ferry-base shipping. These operations re-
quired only modest augmentation of labor
and port facilities. The arrival of the 376th
Port Battalion in August 1942 had added
32
In April 1944 there were in the South Pacific
Area ten naval construction battalions (special), ag-
gregating approximately 9,250 officers and enlisted
men. Three of these Navy stevedore battalions were
stationed in the Russells, two at Guadalcanal, and one
at each of the islands of New Caledonia, Espiritu
Santo, Tulagi, Bougainville, and Funafuti. See
Monthly Rpt, Dir Pac Div BuDocks, 1 May 44,
BuDocks Hist File.
33
Halsey rpt cited n. 29, pp. 14-15.
34
Unless otherwise cited, narrative and statistical
data pertaining to transportation operations between
July 1942 and August 1943 are drawn from the fol-
lowing: TC Activities Rpts, Hawaiian Dept, Aug,
Sep, Oct, Nov-Dec 42, Jan-Mar, Apr-Jun, Jul-Aug
43, OCT HB CPA Hist Rpts.
510 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

four companies to the three on duty at was called upon to transfer the 25th Infan-
Honolulu, increasing the number of troops try Division to the South Pacific. Assum-
engaged in cargo-handling duties from 662 ing that the Navy would provide all major
to 1,582. Together with civilian dock work- shipping requirements incident to convoy
ers employed by the division or secured and operational control, the Army G-4
through the Cargo and Passenger Control arranged for the Navy to provide vessels
agency, they formed an adequate labor for the movement. After being loaded at
force. Construction work was begun on Honolulu, three convoys carrying the divi-
new piers during 1942 and additional sion's troops and equipment departed for
cargo-handling equipment, vehicles, and the South Pacific between 25 November
harbor craft arrived. and 16 December 1942. In the first half of
At the miniature ports on the outlying 1943 the Army continued to ship a limited
islands, Transportation Corps officer rep- number of troops and equipment in Navy
resentatives supervised cargo handling vessels. These shipments did not appreci-
and movements from docks to warehouses. ably affect the over-all decline in port
These activities were performed by civil- traffic.
ians, occasionally supplemented by Trans- On the organizational side, the Port and
portation Corps personnel and equip- Transportation Division's administrative
ment. At the ferry-base islands of Christ- staff was increased and more civilians
mas, Fanning, Canton, and, later, Pal-were hired to man harbor craft and the
myra, port operations were handled by small vessels. In January 1943 the division
task force troops. With the exception of had approximately 2,000 military and
that at Canton, all cargo had to be light- civilian personnel engaged in administra-
ered ashore. In early 1943 one Transpor- tive duties, in pier and wharf work, and in
tation Corps officer was on duty with each the operation of harbor craft and inter-
of the task forces on Canton and Christ- island vessels. Water transportation activi-
mas, and later in the year port detach- ties were being handled efficiently and
35
ments were sent out from Honolulu to few serious problems were encountered.
supervise port operations. The supply of During this defensive period, co-ordina-
the outlying islands and ferry bases was tion of Army, Navy, and civilian opera-
maintained through Honolulu on Army- tions was informal and confined largely to
operated vessels manned by civilians and local Hawaiian matters. The Cargo and
Navy ships bound for the South Pacific. Passenger Control agency assigned vessels
In the latter part of 1942, two additional in Honolulu harbor to piers for unloading,
small vessels were received by the Army assigned cargo to ships returning to the
and placed on interisland runs. The only United States, and apportioned cargo-
serious problem in these shipping opera- handling personnel and equipment among
tions was the lack of refrigerator vessels, the various port agencies. In April 1943
which necessitated installation of refriger- joint logistical and working boards were
ator boxes on interisland vessels and the
shipment of many types of perishables in 35
USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 2, Ch. 1, p. 293, and
ventilator space. Vol. 12, Pt. 1, Sec. III, p. 279; Capt. Robert F. Karo-
A new activity became important in levitz (ed.), The 25th Division and World War 2 (Baton
Rouge, La.: Army and Navy Publishing Company,
late 1942 when the Hawaiian Department 1946), p. 17.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
established, and a number of co-operative
practices were added to those already in
effect. The arrangements made by G-4 for
the use of Navy vessels for ferry-base and
forward shipments evolved into a system
whereby the Navy made routine offerings
of space to the Army. Data on cargo ship-
ping requirements from the United States
were exchanged, and beginning in May
1943 joint priority lists were drawn up for
the movement of personnel from the
36
United States.
As long as the Central Pacific's role was
purely that of defense and incoming sup-
plies were limited largely to the mainte-
nance of the Hawaiian area, there was
little inclination further to unify Army
and Navy supply and transportation oper-
ations or greatly to expand the Army's
port organization. By mid-1943, however,
the area's strategic mission was in process
of change. The decisions adopted at TRI-
DENT and QUADRANT to seize the Gilberts
and Marshalls as a preliminary to a gen-
eral westward advance across the Central
Pacific were premised on the use of the
Hawaiian area for the reception, training,
mounting, and support of forces engaged
in the projected campaigns.37 To handle
the expected expansion of operations, the
Army reorganized its command, and as
the first campaign approached Admiral
Nimitz took steps to co-ordinate Army
and Navy logistical efforts for its support.
The Establishment of the Army Port
and Service Command
In August 1943 a new headquarters, the
U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Marshalls, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
Area (USAFICPA), was created with Lt. WAROn
Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., in com- as U.S. Army in the Pacific Ocean Areas
38
mand. General Richardson, who had (USAFPOA) and the establishment of subordinate
assumed command of the Hawaiian De- base
Pacific Areas see below, pp. 527-28, 537.
511
partment in June, retained his responsibil-
ities as department commander and mili-
tary governor, and was charged with the
administration and training of Army
forces throughout the Central Pacific
Area. Since the area was under Nimitz'
unified command, Richardson was sub-
ject to Nimitz' direction in the prepara-
tion and execution of plans for the
employment of Army forces in the area.
In the months that followed, USAFICPA
became the Army logistical agency for the
support of offensive operations, the train-
ing agency for Army forces mounting from
the Hawaiian area, and the administra-
tive agency for all Army forces in the
Central Pacific.
As part of the general reorientation to
its new role, the Army radically altered
the organization of its service functions.
General Richardson abolished the Ha-
waiian Department Service Forces and
centralized Army activities pertaining to
the movement of troops and supplies in a
new agency, the Army Port and Service
Command (AP&SC). This headquarters
was established on 10 August 1943 as a
major echelon of USAFICPA and was
headed by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Roy E.
Blount, a cavalry officer. As commander
of the AP&SC, Colonel Blount also acted
as executive to the Military Governor for
Cargo and Passenger Control. Later, in
36
USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol 2, Ch. 2, App. I, and
Vol. 4, Pt. 1, Ch. 3, pp. 1014-16; Ltr, Gen Leavey, J-4
POA, to Gen Lutes, Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 15 Jul
44, Lutes File POA—'42 thru Nov '45.
37
For details on the planning and execution of the
Gilberts and Marshalls campaigns, see Philip A.
Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and
II (Washington, 1955).
38
the subsequent designation of USAFICPA
commands in the Central, South, and Western
512
February 1944, Blount was appointed
transportation officer on the USAFICPA
special staff in addition to his other duties.
The AP&SC, as its name suggests, com-
bined functions ordinarily performed by
ports of embarkation and service com-
mands in the zone of interior. It directed
port operations at Honolulu and all sub-
ports at territorial harbors, controlled all
rail transportation in the area used by the
Army, and maintained liaison with the
14th Naval District and the Pacific Fleet
in all matters affecting joint shipping on
which a policy had been established by
higher headquarters. As the service com-
mand, the AP&SC commanded all posts,
camps, and stations, and all staging and
billeting areas on Oahu other than Air
Forces installations and certain exempted
stations. It operated the Hawaiian De-
partment Replacement Depot, performed
housekeeping functions, and operated rec-
reational facilities on installations under
its command.
At the time of its activation, the AP&SC
commanded a total of 406 officers and
8,085 enlisted men. These included per-
sonnel of the former Port and Transporta-
tion Division and the port troops under its
control. In the new organization, port and
other water transportation activities were
placed under an Army Transport Service,
and motor and rail operations were as-
signed to a Port Transportation Section.
Other personnel assigned to AP&SC were
those of the Hawaiian Department Re-
placement Depot, the station complements
of the staging and billeting installations,
and the Army and civilian members of
the Cargo and Passenger Control agency.
The AP&SC established its headquarters
on Sand Island in Honolulu harbor and
began the task of building an effective
organization.39
Established as a provisional headquar-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ters company to be staffed from sources
within the Hawaiian area, the AP&SC ex-
perienced a severe shortage of administra-
tive and service personnel. Accretions to
the staff were slow, handicapping Colonel
Blount in his efforts to build up his head-
quarters. It was not until 13 April 1944,
when the War Department authorized the
activation of the 24th Port (Oversea) with
an authorized strength of 111 officers, 1
warrant officer, and 408 enlisted men, that
the basis for an adequate administrative
organization was provided. The shortage
of port and other service troops was even
more chronic. Although several new port
companies arrived in the fall of 1943, the
growing volume of supplies moving across
the docks at Honolulu and the necessity
for shipping Transportation Corps units
forward left the port shorthanded. Like
the South Pacific, the Central Pacific
made up for this deficiency by employing
combat troops extensively. During the
height of operations, as many as 10,000
tactical troops a week were employed on
the docks and at the depots. Still another
problem was the inadequacy of pier facili-
ties at Honolulu. With the establishment
of AP&SC, construction work on the two
piers begun early in 1942 was accelerated.
Army Engineers completed the first pier
in December 1943 and finished work on
the second in July 1944. The two new piers
could handle six Liberty ships simultane-
ously and solved the problem of berthing
space.40
39
USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 2, Ch. 2, App. I, pp.
49-53; AP&SC Hist, Pt. I, pp. 5-9, and Pt. IV, p. 61;
History of the Central Pacific Base Command During
World War II, 1 July 1944-15 September 1945, Vol.
XIII, Army Port and Service Command (hereafter
cited as Unit Hist AP&SC), p. 1, OCMH Files.
40
AP&SC Hist, Pt. I, pp. 5-17; Memo, Col Carter
B. Magruder, GSC, Plng Div ASF, for Dir of Plans
and Opns ASF, 10 Mar 44, sub: Brief of Address by
Gen Richardson, 8 Mar 44, ASF Plng Div—1a Policy
File-CP.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
Even while the infant AP&SC was in
process of organization, it was called upon
to handle the supplies and troops pouring
into Honolulu in addition to the normal
flow of supplies for the maintenance of the
Hawaiian and ferry-base islands. In the
last three months of 1943, a total of 518,193
measurement tons of cargo was discharged
and 36,505 troops debarked at Honolulu,
largely destined for use in the Gilberts and
Marshalls campaigns. To handle this in-
flux and to train port units for duty in for-
ward areas, the Army port units were
removed from the control of the Army
Transport Service and formed into a pro-
visional port group in November 1943.
Together with civilian workers, the port
group personnel performed longshore and
allied services at the Honolulu port and
the subports.
In addition to its primary mission of
handling the cargo and troops moving
across the docks at Honolulu and the sub-
ports and providing billeting, training,
and staging facilities, the AP&SC assisted
in the mounting and support of amphibi-
ous operations. Beginning with the Gil-
berts campaign, the AP&SC co-ordinated
traffic control from staging areas to troop-
ships; aided assault and garrison forces in
loading; provided materials for and super-
vised palletizing and crating; selected,
equipped, and trained Transportation
Corps personnel scheduled to participate
in assault and garrison phases; handled
returning casualties; and, as consignor for
Army shipments, loaded the supplies
required for the support of operations.41
The Development of Joint
Logistical Action
While Army port and supply operations
were being reorganized, the unified com- OCTRpt
mand was intensifying its efforts to corre- 27-29.
513
late Army and Navy logistical activities in
support of projected operations. In the
months preceding the Gilberts campaign
assault forces were selected, initial require-
ments for classes of all supplies were deter-
mined, and garrison forces were organized
to follow the assault troops and take over
responsibility for the defense and develop-
ment of the islands. In order to provide
for continued Army-Navy co-operation in
support of this and subsequent campaigns,
Admiral Nimitz on 6 September set up a
joint staff, appointing Brig. Gen. (later
Maj. Gen.) Edmond H. Leavey as J-4 for
Logistics. The J-4 Division took over the
duties of the joint logistical and working
boards and the usual functions of a theater
G-4 Section.
The mechanics for joint logistical sup-
port of advance bases were set down in a
directive issued by Nimitz on 20 Septem-
ber. In this directive he prescribed main-
tenance supplies to be carried in the initial
movement of garrison troops as well as the
levels to be maintained at each captured
base. The J-4 Division was given general
supervision over supply for the island
bases. Responsibility for providing all
services at forward islands with common
supplies, such as subsistence and gasoline,
was divided between the Army and Navy,
and provision was made for pooling con-
struction equipment and personnel. The
Navy was given responsibility for furnish-
ing the shipping required to support the
bases, arranging for convoys, escorts, and
routing all ships, assigning shipping space,
and the delivery of all supplies to the
beach. The service providing the garrison
force was to furnish the necessary working
parties aboard ship to assist in the dis-
charge of vessels and to handle cargo de-
41
of TC Activities, AP&SG, Jan-Mar 44, p. 6,
HB CPA Hist Rpts; AP&SC Hist, Pt. II, pp.
514
livered at the beach.42 With numerous
modifications, these principles were ad-
hered to in the drive across the Central
Pacific.
Admiral Nimitz also established a Joint
Overseas Control Office (JOSCO) on
Oahu on 8 November 1943. Operating
under the Commander, Service Force, Pa-
cific Fleet, and containing Army and Navy
representatives, JOSCO controlled load-
ings and shipping originating in the Ha-
waiian area for forward areas, excluding
shipping to the ferry-base islands. In the
spring of 1944 Nimitz set up a Joint Army-
Navy-WSA Committee to discuss and in-
terchange information on all port facilities
and ships' status, utilization, priorities,
cargo, and personnel. This agency took
over many of the functions of JOSCO, al-
though the latter continued to perform all
paper work and routine staff activities.43
The various measures instituted by
Admiral Nimitz were successful in bring-
ing the Army, Navy, and Marines into an
unprecedented correlation of logistical
efforts. So far as water transportation was
concerned, joint action was secured
through increasing centralization and in-
tegration of shipping control. From the
Gilberts campaign to December 1944, all
shipping for the initial movement and
continuous support of U.S. forces in POA
forward from the Hawaiian area was allo-
cated to the Navy. This shipping included
vessels operated by the WSA, Army, and
Navy that were dispatched from the main-
land as well as those moving forward from
Hawaiian ports. Upon the establishment
of the J-4 Division, Admiral Nimitz dele-
gated to it responsibility for the control
and employment of support shipping,
other than routing and escorting. Through
its Transportation Section, J-4 controlled
water movements into operational areas
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
once operations had passed from the
assault to the garrison phase. It set up
shipping, allocated it, scheduled its move-
ment to forward ports, and in general
planned for, supervised, and co-ordinated
movements required for the logistical sup-
port of POA forces regardless of service.
In this manner, a centralized cargo-prior-
ity and shipping-control system evolved
under the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Ocean Areas.
The arrangements for the allocation and
control of shipping into the forward area
naturally limited the role played by the
Army in the Central Pacific in the field of
water transportation. The Army was allo-
cated shipping from the United States for
the support of Army forces and civilians in
the Hawaiian area and, after August 1944,
the South Pacific. In addition, the Army
owned or operated vessels engaged in
intratheater shipping in the Hawaiian
area. But it was dependent on shipping
allocated to the Navy and regulated by
the commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas
for movements to, from, and within the
forward areas west of Hawaii. This de-
pendence was particularly disturbing to
General Richardson. Charged with the
logistical support of Army forces in the
theater, he found existing procedures in
effect denied him the means of imple-
menting this responsibility. The system
was also distasteful to the Chief of Trans-
portation in Washington, who was unable
to trace arrivals, diversions, and depar-
tures of vessels loaded in the United States
42
CINCPOA Ser 02248, Incl A, 20 Sep 43, sub:
Adv Base Logistic Policy—Promulgation of, OCT
565-900 CP; USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 4, Pt. 1, Ch.
1, pp. 809-10.
43
First Draft Narrative, Hist Sec COMSERVPAC,
U.S. Naval Administration in World War II, C o m -
mander in Chief Pacific Fleet Service Force, Ch. IX,
pp. 114-18, Navy Dept Hist Div.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
with Army cargo moving to the forward
areas of POA.44
Nevertheless, control of shipping by the
commander of POA was not only retained
but strengthened. As part of its effort to
cope with a world-wide shipping crisis,
JCS in December 1944 made Nimitz re-
sponsible for the supervision of the utiliza-
tion of all shipping in his command. All
dry shipping tonnage for the area was
allocated by Washington to Nimitz, who
in turn allocated tonnage to meet require-matters, and sympathetic consideration
ments for operational areas and suballot- was generally given Army requests. The
ted tonnages to the Army and Navy to Army was also given representation on
meet their respective needs in nonopera- joint committees controlling port and
tional areas. In addition, Nimitz was given
specific responsibility for many of the
functions already being performed by his
J-4 Transportation Section, including de-
termining dry cargo shipping required for
operational areas, scheduling and control-
ling support shipping to operational objec-
tives, and matching shipping with beach
and discharge capacities of forward desti-
nations. Nimitz' over-all control of ship-
ping was retained through the remainder
45
of the war.
Centralized control of shipping was a
natural sequel to unity of command. In a
theater so dependent on water transport,
it was imperative that the limited ship-
ping available be effectively utilized to
meet the needs of all participating services.
In General Leavey's opinion, if each serv-
ice had been permitted to provide its own
shipping in the quantity it considered nec-
essary, the resultant duplication, waste,
conflict, and congestion would have been
disastrous. He believed that Nimitz' cen-
tral control had made possible the ade-
quate supply of Army as well as Navy and
Marine forces through enforcing a
planned, impartial, balanced flow of ship-
ping.46 Nor did control by the commander
515
of POA mean that Army interests were
neglected. Aside from the fact that the J-4
Division, including its Transportation Sec-
tion, was staffed by Army as well as Navy
officers, the Army was consulted in devel-
oping shipping requirements, in the prep-
aration of joint personnel priority lists, and
in the allocation and scheduling of ship-
ping. Army staff and operational agencies
maintained contact with joint staff and
Navy officers dealing with transportation
shipping activities. On the whole, control
by the commander of POA worked well
and probably represented the best possible
arrangement. 47
44
Rad 020145 NCR 2694, CINCPOA to COM 12,
2 May 44, OCT HB Wylie Sup and Shipping in Pac
44-45; Ltr, CINCPAC and POA to CNO, 20 Oct 44,
sub: Centralization of Contl of Dry Cargo Shipping in
POA, OCT HB Meyer Stayback File; Ltr, Gross to
Leavey, 24 Oct 44, OCT HB Gross Pac Theater;
Memo, Somervell for CofS, 11 Dec 44, sub: Proce-
dures for the Allocation and Contl of Cargo Shipping
in POA, OCT HB Meyer Stayback File; U.S. Naval
Administration in World War II, ONO NTS, No. 5,
Shipping in Naval Logistics, History of the Naval
Transportation Service, Op 9 (Op 421), pp. 262-79,
Navy Dept Hist Div.
45
JCS Policy Memo 8, 26 Dec 44, OPD ABC 561
Pac (Sec 1-B) 6 Sep 43; Ser 00496, CINCPAC and
POA to COMGENPOA, COMSOPAC, et al., 4 Feb
45, sub: Allocation and Contl of Cargo Shipping in
POA, Tab D, Folder V, Pac Trip, OCT HB Pac Gen;
USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 32, History of Transporta-
tion Section (hereafter cited as USAFMIDPAC Trans
Sec Hist). For details on the procedures for the allo-
cation and control of shipping in POA after December
1944 see below, pp. 529-30.
46
Interv with Leavey, 30 Oct 50, OCT HB CP
Rpts and Intervs.
47
For discussion of the efficacy of the POA supply
and transportation system, see the minutes of the third
meeting of the Joint Army-Navy Supply and Ship-
ping Conference, 1-6 May 1945, pp. 48, 69-77, in
OPD ABC 337 (1 May 45). The general opinion ex-
pressed there was that, despite the fact that the sys-
tem was unusual so far as the Army was concerned,
it had worked and had given the Army "a fair break."
516 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

If the Army was dependent on the plement equipment available to the Navy
commander in chief of POA for the ship- at Pearl Harbor, where most of the trans-
ping necessary to fulfill the responsibility ports were loaded. It also furnished winch
for the logistical support of Army forces in operators and an officer adviser to assist
the forward areas, it nonetheless played a Army combat units in loading; provided
direct and vital role in transportation prefabricated boxes and crates, strapping
operations in the Central Pacific cam- materials, and lumber for the construction
paigns. It received, staged, and mounted of pallets and dunnage; and assigned MP's
Army personnel and their equipment, to convoy troops to the docks, route traffic,
loaded the supplies for the support, and, and guard the piers. The Army garrison
when an Army garrison force was pro- force, which was organized on Oahu and
vided, handled port and other operations was to follow the 27th Division into
at the forward island bases. Makin, was completely loaded by AP&SC
troops. Finally, the AP&SC handled the
Participation in the Gilberts, Marshalls, debarkation of the returning force.
and Marianas Campaigns The Gilberts campaign marked the
innovation of techniques and practices
The assault on the Gilberts touched off that became standard for subsequent op-
offensive operations in the Central Pacific. erations. Palletization of supplies was
Between 20 and 23 November 1943, the adopted on an experimental basis for
27th Infantry Division assaulted and se- assault force and high-priority garrison
cured Makin, while Marine forces seized force supplies. As a result of favorable re-
Tarawa and Apamama. During the prep- ports from the 7th Infantry Division re-
aration for the campaign, the AP&SC garding their use in the Aleutians, 1,850
received, stored, and reshipped a steadily pallets of the toboggan and sled type were
growing volume of Army supplies and constructed with towing bridges and
equipment, together with the personnel cargo-handling slings. Supplies were
necessary for the seizure and development strapped to the pallets. The experiments
of the island objectives. At the same time, in the Gilberts were successful, and a high
it directly assisted in the training and percentage of assault force supplies con-
mounting of assault and garrison forces.48 tinued to be palletized in subsequent oper-
Beginning in October 1943, AP&SC ations. The Gilberts operation also marked
conducted transport quartermaster the first use of an AP&SC-trained and
(TQM) classes to train selected personnel AP&SC-equipped Transportation Corps
from tactical units in principles and prac- port company in the combat area. Com-
tices of loading and unloading. Some pany D of the 376th Port Battalion, which
ninety officers and enlisted men of the had seen service at Honolulu and the sub-
27th Infantry Division and attached units ports, accompanied the Army garrison
received training in teams of one officer force to Makin and took over port and
and two men for the assault on Makin. depot activities.49
When the assault forces mounted out, the
48
AP&SC partially stripped Army-operated AP&SC Hist, Pt. II, pp. 31-33.
49
piers at Honolulu of cargo-handling USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 2, Ch. 3, App. IV, pp.
13-15; TC Journal 1, AP&SC, 15 Jan 45, OCT HB
equipment and provided vehicles to sup- CPA AP&SC Newsletter.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
Concurrently with preparation for the
Gilberts operation, plans were developed
for the invasion of the Marshalls. In early
February 1944 the 7th Infantry Division
captured Kwajalein Island and the 4th
Marine Division took Roi and Namur.
Subsequently, the 106th Infantry Regi-
ment and the 22d Marine Regiment
seized Eniwetok Atoll. In the mounting of
this campaign, the AP&SC repeated and
systematized its services for Army assault
and garrison forces. It furnished units with
technical assistance and advice pertaining
to combat loading and the movement of
troops; provided crating, palletizing, and
packing facilities and personnel to the
units involved; assigned Transportation
Corps troops and equipment to unload
freight cars and carry cargo to shipside;
loaded high-priority items for use in the
initial assault; and made available cranes,
fork-lift trucks, and jitneys to the 7th and
27th Divisions to unload supplies arriving
in the staging area, to place supplies on
pallets, and, after strapping, to stack and
load pallets for shipment to the dock.
Training facilities were improved and ex-
panded. The transport quartermaster
school was established on a permanent
basis and instruction of port companies in
cargo handling under combat and for-
ward base conditions was instituted at a
training deck at Camp Kahili. Once more
a Transportation Corps unit was assigned
to participate in the early stages of a cam-
paign. Company B of the 376th Port Bat-
talion was given training at Camp Kahili
and released to the 4th Army Defense
Battalion, the garrison force for Kwaja-
lein. The company moved to Carlson
Island on 31 January 1944 (D minus 1) to
discharge artillery and ammunition used
to shell nearby Kwajalein Island on D
Day. The company completed its mission
517
on D plus 4 and moved to Kwajalein,
where it discharged ships and worked sup-
ply dumps for the next twelve months. 50
The Marshalls campaign was the first
Central Pacific operation in which the
DUKW saw service. Unlike the South
Pacific forces, which used DUKW's in the
garrison phase of operations to compen-
sate for the lack of port facilities and to
expedite ship turnaround, Central Pacific
forces used them in the assault phase as
well. At Tarawa, "various deficiencies
in both the quantity and quality of naval
51
preparatory fire" had been revealed. To
increase the effectiveness of preliminary
gunfire, it was decided to land artillery on
Carlson Island the day before landing on
the adjacent island of Kwajalein. At the
suggestion of Brig. Gen. Archibald V.
Arnold, commander of the 7th Division
artillery, DUKW's were used to land and
emplace the artillery. Sixty DUKW's
were provided and, in the absence of
Transportation Corps amphibian truck
units, drivers and maintenance personnel
were selected from the 7th Division artil-
lery. Four battalions of field artillery em-
barked on four LST's along with their
initial supply of ammunition. On the tank
deck of each LST were twelve DUKW's,
each carrying one 105-mm. howitzer, and
three DUKW's, each equipped with an
A-frame. The LST's closed to within a
short distance of the shore and launched
the DUKW's. The DUKW's carried the
artillery pieces to their beach positions,
where they were lifted from the DUKW's
by A-frame. The LST's were then
beached, the DUKW's shuttling supplies
between LST's and the dumps. After
completing this job, the DUKW's were
employed at Kwajalein and the other
50
Ibid.; AP&SC Hist, Pt. III, pp. 53-55.
51
Crowl and Love, op. cit., p. 161.
518
islands to carry high-priority supplies
ashore.
The preliminary gunfire from the artil-
lery that had been landed on Carlson
Island the day before the invasion, together
with effective and intensive naval and air
bombardment, had a devastating effect
on enemy resistance in the beaches. At the
conclusion of the Kwajalein operation the
Joint Expeditionary Force commander
reported that the DUKW's had proved
invaluable for the rapid transfer of sup-
plies and ammunition immediately
needed. The DUKW was considered ideal
for carrying artillery and effectively sup-
plemented the LVT (landing vehicle,
tracked) in bringing supplies ashore.52 In
February 1944 the first three Transporta-
tion Corps amphibian truck companies
were assigned to AP&SC and began train-
ing for combat operations to come.
While the AP&SC was establishing it-
self as an authority in the preparation for
and support of the Gilberts and Marshalls
assaults, its main functions continued to
center in the handling of the heavy flow of
cargo and troops through the Honolulu
port. The volume of Army tonnage arriv-
ing from the mainland and discharged at
Honolulu had mounted steadily since
August 1943, reaching 256,945 measure-
ment tons in January 1944. During the
same period, monthly loadings for des-
tinations forward from the Hawaiian
Islands increased from 14,639 to 84,389
measurement tons. In January 1944 the
total Army tonnage handled at Honolulu,
including cargo received from or shipped
to outlying islands, amounted to 484,591
measurement tons. This did not include a
substantial amount of commercial and
Navy cargo that crossed the Honolulu
piers under AP&SC supervision. Acceler-
ated cargo traffic was accompanied by an
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
increase in troop movements. In Septem-
ber 1943, as preparations were made for
the Gilberts assault, 23,908 Army troops
arriving from the mainland debarked at
Honolulu. In November, when the assault
was made, 23,912 troops embarked for
forward destinations. After falling off in
October and November, troop debarka-
tions again rose as additional forces were
brought in for the Marshalls assault. In
the next two months a total of 34,702
troops arrived from the mainland, and
32,219 embarked at Honolulu for forward
destinations.
The heavy movement of troops, sup-
plies, and equipment through Honolulu
severely taxed AP&SC personnel and
facilities. On 31 March 1944 there were
four port battalion headquarters and four-
teen port companies on Oahu. The port
load at Honolulu compelled these units,
together with civilian longshoremen, to
work on shifts around the clock and made
difficult the in-service training of port
troops, many of whom were inexperi-
enced. Despite the arrival of additional
units during 1944, there were never
enough men to handle the work without
stress. Other Transportation Corps units
on Oahu at the end of March were three
DUKW companies in training for for-
ward area operations and a harbor craft
company. Port company detachments
were also stationed at Maui, Canton, and
Christmas. At Makin and Kwajalein one
port company was serving with each of
52
Richardson rpt cited n. 1, pp. 3-4; COMINCH
P-002, Amphibious Opns, The Marshall Islands,
Jan-Feb 44, pp. 6-14 to 6-16, 7-6 to 7-8, OCT 370.3
CP 44; Memo, Col J. M. Roamer, Dir of Intel ASF,
24 Apr 44, sub: Use of DUKW's by Arty of 7th Inf
Div in the Marshall Islands, ASF Plng Div-la Policy
File-CP. Cf. Crowl and Love, op. cit., pp. 227, 232,
238, 259.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
the Army garrison forces, while a port
unit and a small detachment were as-
signed to Tarawa, which was under Navy
command.53
The expansion of transportation oper-
ations which had begun in mid-1943 was
again accelerated in the spring of 1944.
By that time, U.S. forces in the Pacific had
established bases and airfields in the Mar-
shalls and had successfully bypassed
strongly held Japanese positions in the
South and Southwest Pacific. It was then
decided to make a bold amphibious strike
at the southern Marianas, including
Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, which were
over 1,000 miles forward of the most ad-
vanced Central Pacific base at Eniwetok.
The assembly and embarkation of am-
phibious forces and the loading of supplies
for the assault on the Marianas were con-
ducted mainly in the Hawaiian area and
the South Pacific. The Marianas forces,
including corps troops of the III and V
Amphibious Corps, three Marine divisions made responsible for lifting all cargo mov-
and a Marine provisional brigade, the ing direct to forward bases, using Navy-
27th and 77th Infantry Divisions, and ele- allocated vessels. In the spring of 1944 a
ments of the garrison forces, embarked in small but growing volume of supplies was
late May and early June 1944 and pro-
ceeded to staging bases at Eniwetok and
Kwajalein. There, all troops assigned to
the initial assaults on Saipan and Guam
were transferred from transports to LST's
and moved to their objectives along with
supporting cargo ships and transports. On
15 June Saipan was assaulted. Following
Saipan's conquest, Marine forces on
Saipan invaded Tinian on 23 July. In the
54
meantime, Guam had been invaded.
The bulk of the immediate support and
resupply of assault and garrison forces was
provided from the Hawaiian area. Sup-
port vessels carrying troops and materials
for resupply and base development were
organized into garrison echelons and fol-
519
lowed behind the assault waves. The gar-
rison echelons moved first to the regulat-
ing point at Eniwetok and were then
called forward as needed. Continued sup-
port and maintenance for the Marianas
came from the Hawaiian area and direct
from the United States. Since the Gilberts
and Marshalls lacked the facilities neces-
sary to establish them as supply bases for
operations to the west, both the Army and
the Navy continued to rely heavily on the
Hawaiian area, but it was evident that it
could not carry the burden alone. In Feb-
ruary 1944 Admiral Nimitz directed that,
to the greatest practicable extent, all ma-
terials, supplies, and equipment for devel-
opment and subsequent replenishment of
advanced bases be loaded at mainland
ports for direct shipment to destinations.
After conferences of representatives of the
Army and Navy commanders in POA,
the Navy, through the commander of the
12th Naval District at San Francisco, was
shipped into the Marshalls and Gilberts.
In the course of the Marianas campaign,
a significant amount of base development
supplies was shipped direct from the
United States. During 1944 over 815,000
measurement tons of Army cargo were
shipped direct to the Marianas, and in
1945 more Army cargo moved from the
53
Rpts, AP&SG, Qtrly Rpts of TG Activities, Jul
43-Mar 44, OCT HB CPA Hist Rpts; AP&SG Hist,
Pt. IV, pp. 63-66; G-4 Rpt, USAFICPA, qtr ended
31 Mar 44, Incl B, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
54
Rpt, Opns in POA, Jun 44, Marianas Opn, AG
Analysis File 6-13.0006/44 (12631). For details on the
planning and execution of the campaign see Philip A.
Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, a volume in prep-
aration for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II.
520 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

United States to the Marianas than was companies, and a DUKW company. Be-
shipped to the Hawaiian group.55 cause the pressure of work at Honolulu
In the months preceding the Marianas made impossible extended training, the
campaign, the Hawaiian area was the port troops were given only one week's in-
scene of busy preparations. Assault and tensive schooling in handling cargo under
garrison forces were selected, plans were combat conditions at Waimanalo Am-
jointly made for their supply and mainte- phibious Training Center and the Kahili
nance, shipping was lined up, and ar- training deck. They were then assigned to
rangements were made for mounting out the Provisional Troop Port Command of
forces. For the AP&SC, the period was the Army Garrison Force for Saipan,
marked by a continuing acceleration of which had been organized on Oahu in
port activities. After reaching a high April 1944. Troop Port Command head-
plateau in February and March 1944, quarters and two of the port companies,
traffic at Honolulu again began to climb, the 311th and 539th, were attached to the
reaching a peak in July, when almost V Amphibious Corps and prepared to
300,000 measurement tons of Army cargo move to Saipan with the 4th Marine Divi-
from the mainland were discharged and sion. Arrangements were made for the
approximately 150,000 measurement tons 376th Port Battalion and two additional
were loaded for destinations forward from port companies to arrive in the first sup-
the Hawaiian Islands, principally the port echelon, followed later by the fifth
Marianas. During the latter month Hono- port company.
lulu handled a record total of 527,783 The 477th Amphibian Truck Com-
measurement tons of Army cargo.56 pany, selected for the Saipan assault, had
In the meantime, the AP&SC was also been activated with inexperienced Negro
engaged in developing its program of as- personnel from disbanded air base secu-
sisting in the mounting of assault and gar- rity battalions. After screening out and re-
rison forces and in the training and equip- placing a high percentage of unqualified
ping of participating Transportation Corps
units.57 In preparation for the campaign,
55
AP&SC trained 275 TQM teams from USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 4, Pt. 2, App. II, pp.
combat units. Although assault forces 3-8; G-4 Rpt, USAFICPA, qtr ended 30 Jun 44, AG
Opns Rpts 319.1; Progress Rpt, USAFPOA, 15 Jan
were responsible for their own loading 45, Ref Coll 87, DRB AGO; Progress Rpt, USAF-
and berthing of assault vessels, AP&SC MIDPAC, 31 Jan 46, Ref Coll 432, DRB AGO.
56
Rpts, AP&SC, Qtrly Rpts of TC Activities, Jan-
maintained close liaison with them, giving Sep 44, OCT HB CPA Hist Rpts.
technical assistance and advice. It also 57
The account of Transportation Corps participa-
furnished materials and assisted Army as- tion in the Marianas campaign and subsequent base
development is based on the following: Rpt, USA-
sault and garrison forces in crating and FICPA, Participation in the Marianas Operation,
palletizing, arranged for transportation of June-September 1944, I, 271-80, and II, 543-47, AG
personnel from staging areas to piers by Opns Rpts 98-USF-0.3 (23505); AP&SC Hist, Pt. IV,
pp. 63-71; Unit Hist AP&SC, Pt. IV, pp. 12-13, Hist
truck and rail, and expedited the loading Rcd, TC Saipan Troop Port Comd, 14 May 45, and
of cargo on board ship. Hist Rcd, TC Hq Island Comd APO 247, 24 Jul-31
AP&SC units selected to participate in Dec 44, 21 Aug 45, OCT HB WPBC Marianas; Rpt,
1st Lt Jack S. Witwer, CO 477th Amph Truck Co, to
the Marianas operation were the 376th TAG, 7 Jan 45, sub: Action Against Enemy Rpt, AG
Port Battalion headquarters, five port Opns Rpts TCCO-477-0.3 (16458) M.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC 521

personnel, AP&SC gave the company in- away and additional crane equipment
tensive training in DUKW operation, was brought in. As these facilities were
beach landings, and swimming at placed in operation, the port companies
Waimanalo and at the Central Pacific unloaded cargo from landing craft at the
Area amphibious training center at piers as well as from ships at anchor. The
Waeanae. The unit was then attached to port units were augmented by the 376th
the V Amphibious Corps and included in Port Battalion headquarters and two port
the assault shipping for Saipan. companies, which arrived in the first sup-
The assault forces made their initial port echelon and assisted in the unloading
landing on the southwestern beaches of of the vessels of that echelon, a task com-
Saipan on 15 June 1944. From the begin- pleted on 27 June (D plus 12). Mean-
ning, Transportation Corps units per- while, the Army troop commander, the
formed creditably despite their inexperi- commanding officer of the port battalion,
ence. On D Day thirty-seven DUKW's of and several of their staff had been placed
the 477th Amphibian Truck Company on full-time duty with the shore party
debarked combat-loaded from LST's and commander to gain experience and pre-
AK's with equipment and supplies for the pare for assumption of control over un-
XXIV Corps artillery. For the duration of loading of ships.
the operation the unit operated under the During initial combat operations, par-
direction and control of the G-4 Section ofties provided by tactical units handled
the XXIV Corps artillery, hauling from cargo on the beaches under the shore
ship to shore dumps and between shore party commander's control, and organic
dumps. vehicles moved supplies from the beaches
Troop Port Command headquarters to dumps and from the dumps forward.
and the 311th and 539th Port Companies Because Saipan was a relatively large
also arrived with the assault forces. The island lacking any but the most primitive
two port units assisted in unloading oper- roads, land transport was a serious prob-
ations under the control of the Marine lem. Trucks were scarce, turnaround time
Corps shore party commander. Since was a matter of hours rather than min-
there were practically no piers available utes, poor roads caused excessive break-
during the early stages of the operation, downs, and the movement of supplies
LCT's, LCM's, LVT's, and DUKW's away from beaches and dumps lagged be-
were used to transport cargo from ship to hind unloading operations. To supplement
beach. Port troops were used offshore to motor transport, many units used bullock
move cargoes from the ships, anchored in carts to carry water and rations to their
the outer harbor, to landing craft. The bivouac areas. Another step to relieve the
men lived on board the vessels they were situation was taken shortly after the land-
working and slept on deck. On approxi- ings when Army Engineer troops took
mately D plus 6, cargo-handling equip- over a seven-mile section of an obsolete,
ment, including cranes, tractors, and low- narrow-gauge Japanese railroad, using it
bed trailers, was brought into a small to carry rations, ammunition, and gaso-
Japanese causeway-type pier at Charan line drums from the beaches to the central
Kanoa, and shortly thereafter a ponton part of the island. The rail line was oper-
pier was constructed about 400 yards ated for about a month, at which time the
522
roads had been sufficiently improved to
permit its abandonment.
The beaches were turned over to the
control of the Army Garrison Force on
29 June 1944 (D plus 14) and cargo han-
dling was performed under the Army
Troop Port Command's supervision by the
port battalion personnel, supplemented
by working parties drawn from using
units or Navy base companies. When
Saipan was secured on 9 July, the Troop
Port Command was responsible for load-
ing and unloading all cargo, Navy and
Marine as well as Army. Despite the
recent capture of Japanese port installa-
tions to the north, pier and storage facil-
ities were still extremely limited. A small
pier at Garapan could handle three LCT's
and a few additional LCM's and was used
for landing cargo from ships in the outer
harbor. At Tanapag, where port activities
were ultimately to be concentrated, an
earth-causeway pier capable of berthing
one vessel was the only space for accom-
modating ocean-going vessels, provided
they were lightened to a draft of twenty-
four feet or less before entering the chan-
nel at Tanapag Harbor.
In the months that followed, port facil-
ities were augmented and operations were
improved. Dredging operations were
started, and by the end of the year ships of
thirty-foot draft could clear the channel.
In August 1944 a ponton pier capable of
berthing two additional vessels was com-
pleted, permitting the port simultaneously
to discharge three ships at the piers while
working four other ships in the outer har-
bor. In the same month, the Troop Port
Command took over responsibility for
truck delivery from the piers to consignees
on the island. Previously, trucks from the
units or dumps had come to the port to
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
pick up their cargo. Ships often arrived
with mixed cargo and the arrival of trucks
was not synchronized with that of the
ships, thereby impeding efficient dis-
charge. To correct this situation, the Troop
Port Command established a Central
Motor Pool. Army, Navy, and Marine
tactical and service units on the island
were required to give up all but the abso-
lute minimum number of heavy vehicles.
Using drivers from two Quartermaster
truck companies as a nucleus, the pool
made rapid progress in eliminating bottle-
necks. Ships no longer had to wait for
trucks in order to unload, and a steady
flow of cargo was maintained for the de-
velopment of base projects.
As supplies from the Hawaiian area
and the United States poured in for the
build-up of B-29 and other operations on
Saipan additional improvements were
made, and Army port troops were aug-
mented by Navy Seabee longshoremen.
Close collaboration was developed be-
tween the Troop Port Command and the
Navy port director regarding the use of
Navy troops, the priority of unloading of
ships, and movements of ships to and from
the piers. By the end of March 1945 the
port had thirteen berths and was handling
over 387,000 measurement tons of cargo
a month.
The initial landing on Tinian was made
on 24 July 1944. Like Saipan, Tinian
lacked berthing facilities. Although a
ponton pier was constructed in short order
by Navy Seabees, most of the supplies were
brought to or across the beach by landing
craft, amphibian tractors, and DUKW's.
The 477th Amphibian Truck Company,
along with provisional Marine DUKW
units, carried artillery, ammunition, and
other high-priority supplies for the 2d
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC 523

Marine Division. The Saipan Troop Port placement of USAFISPA by a zone of

Command provided winchmen and long- communications organization. On 1 Au-
shoremen to load supplies for transship- gust 1944 the South Pacific Base Com-
ment to Tinian, and loaded out casualties mand (SPBC) was established as a major
returned to Saipan after the Tinian action. echelon of USAFPOA. Command of
After occupation by U.S. forces, the dis- SPBC was assumed on 10 August by Maj.
charge of cargo was handled by the Navy Gen. Frederick Gilbreath, former head of
until November 1944, when an Army the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.
Troop Port Command took over. Although the new headquarters was sub-
No Transportation Corps units partici- ordinate to General Richardson, com-
pated in the Guam operation. mand and logistical relationships with the
Commander, South Pacific, remained
Redeployment, Rehabilitation, and Roll-up unaltered.
in the South Pacific The establishment of SPBC produced
little change in the transportation organi-
As the tempo of the war in the Central zation. On 19 August the theater SOS was
Pacific was stepped up, the South Pacific abolished and most of its functions were
declined in importance. Even before the absorbed by the base command G-4. The
Marianas campaign active combat in the Transportation Division became a special
South Pacific had virtually ended, and staff section and retained most of its
the area was fast becoming a zone of com- former duties, although the G-4 Troop
munications. On 15 June 1944 Admiral Movement Section took over the prepara-
Halsey was relieved of combat responsi- tion of troop movement orders and super-
bility along the Solomons-New Ireland vised air and water transportation priori-
axis, all Army forces west of 159 degrees ties. The Transportation Section con-
east longitude were turned over to tinued to direct the loading of Army,
MacArthur's command, and provision Navy, Marine Corps, and Allied person-
was made for the transfer of other troops nel and cargo within and from the base
from the South Pacific when required and command in accordance with established
as shipping became available. Logistical priorities and arranged for the use of the
support of forces west of the boundary vessels to effect the movements. In No-
line, however, remained the responsibility vember a new function was added when
of the South Pacific Area. In the months an Air Priorities Sub-Section was organ-
that followed, the South Pacific's principal ized within the section to take over from
activities involved troop redeployment to G-4 the screening of requests for air trans-
the Southwest Pacific, maintenance of a portation and the co-ordination of air-
dwindling force, rehabilitation of a limited plane space allotted to SPBC with re-
number of Central Pacific troops, and the quirements for air movement of personnel
close-out of inactive bases and the roll-up and cargo. At that time the Transporta-
of excess materials that had accumulated. tion Section had an experienced staff of
The end of combat operations in the fifty officers and enlisted men divided into
South Pacific and its assumption of purely subsections to handle administration,
logistical functions led naturally to the re- water operations and troop movements,
 524 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

port and supply activities, and air priori- used to transport cargo and personnel to
ties control.58 the Southwest Pacific; insured that vessels
At major island bases the service com- were loaded and dispatched to arrive at
mands were abolished and incorporated destinations as ports were ready to receive
into the island commands. The former them; and received desired routing and
service command transportation sections priorities of movement from CREGO.
continued to supervise port operations di- Under the system of co-ordinating troop
rectly under the island commands. Oper- transfers that evolved, ROSOP arranged
ating under the transportation sections, with the Transportation Section for reten-
Army and Navy personnel, assisted by tion of vessels required and planned for
native labor, were handling cargo. On 31 the use of available shipping space in line
October 1944 there were six port battalion with the priorities set up by CREGO.
headquarters, twenty-eight port com- Upon receiving these plans from ROSOP,
panies, and three DUKW companies in the Transportation Section issued loading
the South Pacific. These units were con- instructions to ports, whether in the South
centrated mainly at Noumea, Guadal- Pacific Area or the northern Solomons,
canal, and Espiritu Santo, with a port bat- and the Commander, South Pacific, issued
talion headquarters and one company on routing instructions. In some cases, the
duty in the Russells and a single port unit Southwest Pacific sent in vessels to pick up
at Efate.59 Adequate labor facilities were troops and equipment, but more often,
available and port congestion was now a due to the shipping shortage, transfers
thing of the past. were made on transpacific ships retained
The end of South Pacific combat opera- in the area by Southwest Pacific request to
60
tions brought to the fore the problem of Washington.
redeploying Army forces to the Southwest During the latter half of 1944, loading
Pacific. As of 15 June 1944 approximately directives were issued by the Transporta-
130,000 Army troops were either in the 58
SPBC Hist, Vol. 1, Ch. IV, pp. 77-88, and Vol. 2,
area transferred to MacArthur's com- Ch. VII, pp. 190-96. During the postcombat period,
mand or were scheduled for shipment command of the transportation organization changed
from east of the boundary line. In order to several times. Colonel Fraser returned to the United
States on 28 May 1944 and was succeeded as director
co-ordinate and arrange for the transfer of of transportation by Col. Samuel Rubin, who had
these forces from the South Pacific and been serving with the Deputy Commander for Serv-
northern Solomons, liaison was established ices, Forward Area. Rubin was ordered to the United
States on 6 October, and was replaced as Transporta-
between the Southwest Pacific chief regu- tion Officer, SPBC, by Lt. Col. Cajetan T. Chianese,
lating officer and USAFISPA. A CREGO who had headed port operations in New Zealand. On
representative arrived at Noumea on 24 18 February 1945 Chianese returned to the United
States and was succeeded by Lt. Col. Alfred M. Lee,
June to serve as Regulating Officer, South who had been heading up water operations on the
Pacific (ROSOP), and continued on duty staff. Hist Rcds, Trans Sec SPBC, Apr-Jun 44, p. 11,
after the establishment of SPBC. Jul-Dec 44, p. 9, and Jan-Mar 45, p. 8, OCT HB
SPA Hist Rpts.
Working closely with G-4 Troop Move- 59
Port Sv Units, 31 Oct 44, USAF New Caledonia
ments and the Transportation Section, Port and Trans Sec DD 330.3 Port Br File on TC Pers
ROSOP kept CREGO informed on all and60 Units in SPA, KCRC AGO.
USAFISPA Hist, Pt. III, Ch. 9, pp. 712-18;
troops and cargo to be moved; determined SPBC Hist, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 47, and Vol. 2, Ch. VI,
which vessels in the South Pacific could be pp. 164-73.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
tion Section for the movement of the 43d
Infantry Division from New Zealand, the
93d Infantry Division from New Cale-
donia, and the 37th Infantry Division
from Bougainville. A large part of the
Americal Division was also loaded at
Bougainville for Leyte by the year's close.
All of these forces were supplied and
equipped by the South Pacific. Many
smaller units, including Air Forces and
Navy organizations as well as casuals,
were also moved to SWPA during this
period.61
While some troops were being trans-
ferred to the Southwest Pacific, others ar-
rived in the South Pacific from the Cen-
tral Pacific for rehabilitation, staging, and
mounting. Originally, it had been planned
to send a significant number of Army
divisions to the South Pacific for this pur-
pose, but the diversion offerees intended
for Yap to the Philippines radically altered
these plans. Central Pacific forces were
used in the Leyte operation and were then
prepared for the Okinawa assault without
rehabilitation. As it developed, only two
Army divisions moved into the South
Pacific. The 27th Infantry Division ar-
rived at Espiritu Santo from Saipan in the
fall of 1944, and the 81st Infantry Division
arrived at New Caledonia from the Palaus
in January 1945. After being rested and
outfitted in the South Pacific, the 27th
Division departed for Central Pacific
operations in March, while the 81st Divi-
sion embarked for the Southwest Pacific
during May. In the meantime, the 147th
Infantry Regiment and the remainder of
the Americal Division had departed. By
the end of May 1945, there were no
longer any major combat units in the area,
and operations had moved too far north
to use the South Pacific as a rehabilitation
site.
525
Along with redeployment and rehabili-
tation, the South Pacific's postcombat
mission included the maintenance of the
bases in the area and the logistical support
of forces west of 159 degrees east longitude.
The main receiving and transshipment
bases were New Caledonia, Guadalcanal,
Espiritu Santo, and the Russells. Loading
instructions for the movement of cargo
and personnel within the South Pacific
Area were issued by the Transportation
Section. The co-ordination of troop and
supply movements between the southern
and northern Solomons, however, was the
responsibility of the Guadalcanal Island
Command, which had taken over the
logistical functions of the former Forward
Area. Because of the decline in the num-
ber of vessels bound for South Pacific
ports, most of the troop and cargo move-
ments within the South Pacific-northern
Solomons area were effected by vessels as-
signed to the Navy Commander, Service
Squadron, South Pacific. Beginning in
early 1945, these ships were augmented by
six small Army retriever freighters. The
limited number of available transpacific
vessels were used for shipments to the
Southwest and Central Pacific and
charged to their retention allotments.
During this period the drop in cargo
and troop arrivals from the United States,
departures from the area, and a decrease
in intratheater shipping caused a sharp
decline in port activity in the area. Gua-
dalcanal, which had handled 189,652
short tons in May 1944, handled only
65,105 short tons in December. The same
downward trend was evident at Noumea
and Espiritu Santo and in the Russells.
61
Unless otherwise cited, narrative and statistical
data on transportation operations in SPBC are drawn
from the following: Hist Rcds, Trans Sec SPBC, Jul-
Dec 44, Jan-Mar 45, and Apr-Jun 45, OCT HB SPA
Hist Rpts.
526
Traffic continued to dwindle, and during
May 1945 no port discharged more than
11,000 short tons or, despite increased
shipments out of the area, handled more
than 62,000 short tons.
As activities in the South Pacific de-
clined, preparations were made to close
out nonessential bases. Actually, many
bases in the area had been in the process
of reduction for some time but, after the
establishment of SPBC, efforts in this di-
rection were intensified. By the end of
1944, islands that had been completely
closed out or where only token garrisons
were retained included Efate, Aitutaki,
Tongareva, Bora Bora, and Nukufetau.
New Zealand was closed out on 19 De-
cember, except for a small detachment on
duty with the Joint Purchasing Board. By
7 January 1945, most Army personnel
were removed from the Russells. Continu-
ing operations were left in Navy hands.
The Army force in the Fijis was reduced
to 22 officers and 188 enlisted men by 21
May. Throughout the period, New Cale-
donia, Espiritu Santo, and Guadalcanal
remained the principal bases in the South
Pacific, and as of 30 April 1945 they were
the only islands having Transportation
Corps personnel.
A major problem involved in closing or
reducing the island bases was the disposi-
tion of the large volume of excess Army
stocks that had accumulated. In January
1945 SWPA and SPBC representatives
meeting at Tacloban, Leyte, worked out
the "Transo Agreement," a co-ordinated
plan for the transfer of excess supplies and
equipment, service units, and overhead
personnel from the South Pacific to SWPA
in a fashion that would permit the South
Pacific bases to be closed out in an orderly
fashion. The agreement set up priorities
for the movement of units then available
or to become available as bases closed out,
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
beginning 1 February 1945. Under the
agreement, the Southwest Pacific also ac-
cepted and set up priorities for the move-
ment of 202,744 measurement tons of the
268,157 measurement tons reported as ex-
cess in SPBC as of 15 December 1944. The
remainder was reported to USAFPOA for
disposition. Shipping for the movement of
supplies and personnel was to be provided
by SWPA, supplemented where possible
by vessels that might become available in
the South Pacific.62
The Transo program got under way
slowly. There was a continued shortage of
shipping, and destination ports in the
Philippines were congested. Moreover, it
was far simpler to secure supplies through
regular channels from the United States
than to send ships from Manila to the
South Pacific to pick up excess supplies
there. By the end of April 1945, only
15,000 measurement tons and a small
number of service personnel had been
shipped to SWPA under the agreement.
Meanwhile, surplus supplies continued to
accumulate. As of 1 May, 508,363 meas-
urement tons of excess materials were
reported as committed to SWPA or await-
ing other disposition.
The SPBC mission, meanwhile, was be-
coming steadily more limited in scope.
On 30 April 1945 the South Pacific was
relieved of responsibility for the logistical
support of the forces in the northern
Solomons. By this time, redeployment and
rehabilitation of combat forces were virtu-
ally completed and discharge operations
at ports were minor, being concerned with
supplies lifted from other bases. The main
preoccupation of SPBC was now the prep-
aration and shipment forward of excess
62
SPBC Hist, Vol. 2, Ch. VIII, pp. 229-39; Plan
for Redeployment and Consolidation of Major Island
Bases, SPBC, revised as of 1 May 45, Annex E, OCT
HB SPA Hist Rpts.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
supplies and service units in the area. On
1 May a detailed plan was worked out for
the reduction of New Caledonia and for
the closing of Guadalcanal, Espiritu
Santo, and the bases where small garri-
sons were still stationed as soon as excess
supplies were lifted. New Caledonia, the
last of the Army bases to be rolled up,
was to receive all service units and sup-
63
plies necessary to close the other bases.
At this juncture SPBC headquarters, at
MacArthur's request, was converted into
an Army service command headquarters
and moved to the Philippines. General
Gilbreath and an advance party departed
from Noumea for Manila on 15 May, and
the remaining personnel moved out by
ship and airplane during the next two
months. Lt. Col. Alfred H. Lee stayed
behind with a small staff and continued as
transportation officer. Upon Gilbreath's
departure, remaining SPBC functions
were taken over by the New Caledonia
Island Command. Under the new set-up,
the base command and island command
transportation sections were integrated.
On 26 June new Port and Transportation
Sections were established as special staff
sections operating under the New Cale-
donia Island Command G-4. The Trans-
portation Section continued to perform its
former duties, including preparation of
plans and directives for air and water
movement between and from South
Pacific bases, co-ordination of cargo-han-
dling operations in the area, and mainte-
nance of liaison with the Navy and WSA
in shipping matters. The Port Section,
formerly the New Caledonia Island Com-
mand Transportation Section, supervised
the loading and unloading of ships at
Noumea.64
Beginning in May 1945, better progress
was made in moving excess supplies and
service personnel out of the South Pacific.
527
In that month 132,138 short tons of Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps cargo moved out
of the area to destinations in SWPA, the
Central Pacific, and the United States.
During the same period troopships ar-
rived from SWPA to lift units to the
Philippines. In June another 130,000 short
tons were loaded at Noumea, Guadal-
canal, and Espiritu Santo, and 15,041
service personnel embarked, destined
mainly for the Philippines. At the end of
the month only 23,752 Army troops were
left in the South Pacific, but 692,252
measurement tons of excess supplies still
remained. Troops and materials were lo-
cated principally at the three major bases,
with small concentrations in the Fijis, New
Zealand, the Russells, Tongareva, and
Aitutaki. In preparation for the final
roll-up of the area, the Central Pacific
Base Command assumed logistical re-
sponsibility for the South Pacific on 15
June. Although pressure continued
throughout the rest of the war to move
supplies into active areas, there were still
about 600,000 measurement tons of Army
materials in the South Pacific on 15 Sep-
tember 1945. It was estimated that 150,-
000 measurement tons could be disposed
of locally and that the remainder could be
lifted in four months, provided Philippine
and Central Pacific ports could receive the
amounts consigned to them. 65
Transportation in the Final Phase
of the War
The end of combat operations in the
South Pacific and the stepping up of the
war in the Central Pacific led to a reor-
63
Redeployment plan cited n. 62; SPEC Hist, Ch.
XII, pp. 356-67.
64
Hist Rpt, Port Sec SPBC, Apr-Jun 45, OCT HB
SPA New Caledonia.
65
SPBC Hist, Vol. 2, Ch. XII, pp. 356-67, 392-97;
USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 3, Ch. 6, pp. 757-71.
528 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ganization of the Army theater structure all Army transportation activities in the
in mid-1944. Hoping to move his USA- Hawaiian area, but in forward areas com-
FICPA headquarters to Saipan to direct mand of port and other transportation
the fighting of Army forces in the forward operations was vested in the island com-
areas, General Richardson established the mands, and control from Oahu was
Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC) largely theoretical. In the South Pacific,
on 30 June, assigning it responsibility for the SOS Transportation Division retained
the administration and logistical support its former duties as a SPBC special staff
of the Army in the Central Pacific. On 1 section.
August USAFICPA headquarters was re- Blount's removal from the USAFICPA
designated Headquarters, U.S. Army special staff left Richardson without a
Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas. At the theater transportation headquarters. Con-
same time the Army organization in the currently with USAFPOA's establish-
South Pacific Area was converted into a ment, he appointed Colonel Moore,
base command and became a subordinate recently arrived from duty with the Chief
echelon of USAFPOA. of Transportation in Washington, as trans-
The theater reorganization, in effect, portation officer, directing him to set up a
decentralized logistical operations in the technical staff section and to make a com-
base commands, leaving top-level staff plete survey of the transportation situation
work and policy-making functions to in POA. After visiting the forward areas,
USAFPOA headquarters.66 This was re- Moore returned to Oahu in mid-Septem-
flected in the organization of transporta- ber 1944 and began the task of building
tion. In the Central Pacific, the AP&SC, his section. This proved difficult in view
formerly operating directly under theater of the shortage of qualified officers in the
headquarters, was placed under the Cen- theater, and in December Moore had only
tral Pacific Base Command (CPBC), and three officers on his staff. He was also
its commander, General Blount, was re- handicapped by the necessity of weaning
moved from the theater staff and named away many planning, co-ordinating, and
transportation officer on the CPBC special liaison functions pertaining to transporta-
staff. On 14 August a CPBC Transporta- tion from older and well-established
tion Service was established under the agencies, notably the AP&SC and the
Transportation Office, Blount assuming theater G-4 and G-5.68
command of this organization in addition In these circumstances, Colonel Moore
to his other duties. Although the Trans- was able to make only limited progress.
portation Service was assigned responsi- He began to perform staff functions relat-
bility for the movement of personnel and ing to the utilization and training of
cargo within the base command's jurisdic-
tion, its major activities were in practice 66
USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 2, Ch. 2, pp. 388-91,
concentrated on Oahu, where it assumed Ch. 3, pp. 443-46.
67
History of Central Pacific Base Command Dur-
centralized direction of base motor trans- ing World War II, Vol. XII, Sec. I-III, pp. 1-15,
67
portation operations. Heading the AP&- OCMH Files.
68
SC, the CPBC Transportation Office, and USAFMIDPAC Trans Sec Hist, Ch. 1; Extract
from Ltr, Maj Mark Collarino, TC, to Col R. D.
the Central Pacific Base Section Transpor- Meyer, Asst Opns Officer, OCT, 20 Sep 44, OCT HB
tation Service, Blount controlled virtually CPA Misc.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
Transportation Corps personnel and to
plan for transportation operations, and in
October he took over from G-4 responsi-
bility for general control over the use of all
air transport capacity allocated to USAF-
POA by ATC. An Air subsection was set
up to determine air transport require-
ments, suballocate space to the base com-
mands, and establish policies and pro-
cedures for and supervise the granting of
air priorities. In November priority-con-
trol agencies were set up in CPBC and
SPBC transportation sections, and when
the Western Pacific Base Command was
set up, a similar agency functioned there.
Under the Air subsection, these agencies
screened requests for air transportation,
established priorities for shipments, and
maintained liaison with command com-
ponents and air carriers. But little more
could be done without additional person-
nel. After visiting the Chief of Transporta-
tion in Washington, Moore managed to
secure additional experienced officers and
was finally able to complete his section's
organization in March 1945. The section
was composed of the transportation offi-
cer, an executive officer, an officer to
maintain liaison with the Navy, WSA,
and other transportation agencies, and six
staff sections—Administration and Per-
sonnel, Planning, Troop and Training,
Supply and Maintenance, Troop Move-
ment and Equipment, and Statistics and
Reports. Four service branches, Water,
Rail, Motor, and Air, were also set up.
With the exception of the Air subsection,
the branches existed largely on paper and
were established so that they could be
staffed rapidly in the event the Transpor-
tation Section took on operational as well
as staff functions.69
The Transportation Section organiza-
tion was set up by Moore with the hope
529
that it would evolve into a transportation
service for USAFPOA similar in scope
and functions to that which had proved so
successful in ETO. In early 1945 he sub-
mitted a survey of the transportation situ-
ation in POA to General Richardson and
used it to argue for the establishment of
an integrated, theater-wide Transporta-
tion Service with operational as well as
staff functions relating to water, air, motor,
70
and rail transportation.
At the time of Colonel Moore's survey,
allocation of all POA shipping had re-
cently been centralized by JCS directive
in the hands of the commander in chief of
POA. Dry cargo shipping for all needs
was made available by the Joint Military
Transportation Committee (JMTC) in
Washington on the basis of Army and
Navy tonnage estimates and the over-all
availability of vessels. Admiral Nimitz in
turn allotted tonnage to meet the require-
ments for operational areas and sub-
allotted nonoperational tonnage to the
Army and Navy. He also controlled all
refrigerated cargo vessels assigned to POA,
arranged for retentions, and insured that
shipping would not outstrip the port ca-
pacity and capabilities in areas of combat
operations.71
All shipping in POA, except Army
interisland vessels in the Hawaiian area,
operated from the Pacific Shipping Pool,
controlled by Nimitz. Shipping from the
pool was allocated according to the use for
which it was required. Operational ship-
69
70
USAFMIDPAC Trans Sec Hist, Chs. 1 and 6.
Rpt, Trans Officer HUSAFPOA, Study and
Records on Organization of Transportation Service
for USAFPOA, atchd to Ch. 1 of USAFMIDPAC
Trans Sec Hist. Unless otherwise cited, the description
of the transportation situation in early 1945 is based
on this document.
71
JCS Policy Memo 8, 26 Dec 44, OPD ABC 561
Pac (Sec 1-B) 6 Sep 43.
530
ping was divided into three classifica-
tions—assault, garrison, and maintenance.
Assault shipping was that necessary to lift
the forces of a landing operation. Garrison
shipping was that necessary to transport
garrison forces, their equipment, and ini-
tial base development supplies and mate-
rials. The compilation of Army shipping
requirements during the assault and gar-
rison phases of operations was made by the
USAFPOA G-5 and co-ordinated with
the needs of other services by Nimitz.
Maintenance shipping was that, other
than garrison shipping, required to trans-
port supplies needed to build up and
maintain prescribed supply levels for the
forces in the field. Army requirements for
this phase were estimated by the base
command G-4's and submitted through
USAFPOA to the POA commander.
Nonoperational shipping was limited to
that for the support of the Hawaiian area,
the Marshalls-Gilberts area, and the South
Pacific. Army estimates for this shipping
were prepared by base command G-4's
and, after clearance by the POA com-
mander as to tonnages, submitted by
USAFPOA to the Chief of Transportation
in Washington. The JMTC then allocated
the shipping to Nimitz, who in turn
reallocated to the Army.
Shipping required for the assault was
allocated by Nimitz to the Navy amphibi-
ous force commander involved, who pro-
vided the shipping to the joint expedition-
ary force commander and assisted him in
arranging loading details with local Army
and Navy agencies. Army TQM teams,
when available, were attached to Army
units to plan combat loading and dis-
charge of assault force ships. During the
garrison phase, shipping was divided into
several echelons by Nimitz' J-4 Transpor-
tation Section. The garrison force com-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
mander selected units and cargo to be
moved in echelons, other than those sched-
uled to arrive during the assault. During
the maintenance phase, ship schedules
were set up by the J-4 Transportation Sec-
tion and echeloned according to the dis-
charge capacity of the port of destina-
tion. Echelons of the garrison and main-
tenance shipping moved to regulating
points, first at Eniwetok or other desig-
nated atoll anchorages and later at Ulithi
and Saipan, to await call forward to their
destinations as their cargoes were needed
and the ports could receive them. 7 2 Ship-
ping from the mainland to nonoperational
areas was performed in ships suballocated
to the Army and Navy by Admiral Nim-
itz. Intratheater shipping in the Hawaiian
and other nonoperational areas in the
Central Pacific was handled by the serv-
ices concerned, although joint shipping
was often effected.
In the matter of port operations, Hono-
lulu, the subports on the outlying islands,
and the ports on Christmas, Canton, and
Fanning were operated by the Army. In
the Gilberts-Marshalls area, all port oper-
ations except those at Kwajalein Atoll
were the responsibility of the Navy in
early 1945. Forces on Makin had been
reduced to a token garrison in December
1944, and Transportation Corps troops
had been moved out. In the early spring
of 1945, the Army port company on Kwa-
jalein was returned to Oahu and its duties
were taken over by the Navy, which took
complete control of the atoll on 30 June.
In the meantime, Tarawa was transferred
from Navy to Army command and a small
72
Notes on Lecture, Col David H. Blakelock, Joint
Overseas Transportation Problems Which Confronted
CINCPOA, 27 Jan 47, OCT HB POA Okinawa; Incl,
Joint Oversea Transportation Problems, to Ltr, Col
Frederic H. Nichols, TC, to Gen Leavey, CofT, 5 Feb
47, OCT HB A-N Jt Overseas Trans Problems.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC 531

detachment was assigned to take over port were accomplished by a multiplicity of

73
operations there. staff sections and subordinate commands,
In the forward areas, port and cargo- making effective co-ordination difficult. In
handling responsibilities, like shipping, marked contrast to this situation, the com-
varied with the phase of operation. Dur- mander in chief of POA had a well-
ing the assault phase, the joint expedition- organized J-4 Transportation Section in
ary force commander was responsible for which were centralized theater-wide plan-
the delivery of supplies to the beach. The ning, control, and co-ordinating responsi-
commander of expeditionary troops pro- bilities pertaining to transportation. Other
vided stevedores and working parties on major transportation functions were per-
board ship to assist in the discharge of formed by the Commander, Service Force,
vessels either at piers or at anchor and was Pacific Fleet, whose primary mission was
responsible for the organization and oper- the support of the fleet and naval shore-
ation of the shore party that discharged based units in forward areas. Under him,
cargo delivered at the beach, for keeping the Joint Overseas Shipping Control, con-
the beach clear, and for moving cargo to taining Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
dispersal dumps. When the beachhead representatives, co-ordinated bookings,
was secured, port operations were turned loadings, and movements from the Ha-
over to the service providing the garrison waiian area forward. 74
force. In general, the troop port command On the basis of his survey, Colonel
of the garrison force handled cargo for all Moore concluded that Army transporta-
services. It delivered supplies to the beach, tion activities were conducted by too many
wharf, or other unloading point, dis- staff sections of all echelons. The numerous
charged cargo, and moved cargo to dis- parallel and un-co-ordinated contacts had
persal dumps or depots. At these advanced tended to weaken the Army's position in
bases, the Navy was usually responsible dealing with the commander of POA on
for providing all personnel and equipment transportation matters. To correct this de-
for moving ships into and within the har- ficiency, Moore argued that it was neces-
bor, including boarding, piloting, mooring sary to centralize transportation liaison
and berthing, servicing, and onward functions, combine all means of transpor-
routine. tation throughout the theater, and organ-
Motor transportation was important ize transportation along lines that had
largely in moving supplies to and from the proved successful in the ETO and other
ports. Although truck operations on Oahu theaters. He recommended that a trans-
were consolidated under the CPBC Trans- portation service be organized to plan,
portation Service, motor transport on the control, and co-ordinate all means of
islands in the forward area was handled transportation and to handle all matters
independently by each island command. pertaining to transportation with Nimitz'
Control of air transportation allocated to headquarters and the Army Service Forces
USAFPOA was centralized under the in Washington. It was proposed that the
USAFPOA transportation officer, but
73
with this exception—Moore reported— G-4 Rpt, HUSAFPOA, qtr ended 30 Jun 45, p.
2, AG Opns Rpts 319.1; Rpt of TC Activities,
planning, control, and operation of all AP&SC, Apr-Jun 45, OCT HB CPA Hist Rpts.
types of Army transportation within POA 74
See COMSERVPAC hist cited n. 43.
 532
USAFPOA transportation officer be des-
ignated Chief of the Transportation Serv-
ice and Traffic Manager for the Com-
manding General, USAFPOA. Control of
operations would be exercised through
technical guidance of transportation offi-
cers on the staff of the commander of each
subordinate echelon from the base com-
mander down through the individual
islands.
For a time, prospects for the establish-
ment of a theater-wide transportation
service appeared bright, but adoption of
the plan was postponed and later aban-
doned. The proposal had come late in the
day and ran counter to the existing Army
theater structure, in which USAFPOA
performed purely staff functions, and oper-
ations were decentralized under the base
commands. From March 1945 through
the end of the war, the USAFPOA Trans-
portation Section continued in existence
purely as a special staff section, picking up
an increasing number of planning and
liaison functions. In December 1944 it had
replaced the G-4 representative sitting in
on meetings of the Joint Army-Navy-WSA
Shipping Committee on Oahu, although
AP&SC provided regular representation
on the committee. In April 1945 the sec-
tion also secured representation on
JOSCO. It continued to control air trans-
port priorities and, in increasing measure,
performed staff work in co-ordination with
Nimitz' headquarters and Army agencies
pertaining to current and projected trans-
portation operations.75
Regardless of complaints about the lack
of an integrated theater-wide Army trans-
portation service, operations were con-
ducted effectively and with a large degree
of co-operation between services. In less
than a year the forces under Nimitz moved
from the Marianas to the threshhold of
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Japan. During this period the necessary
troops and supplies were moved forward
to guarantee the success of the assaults and
subsequent base development.
Operational Developments
in the Hawaiian Area
In the months following the Marianas
campaign, outlying bases in the Hawaiian
and Gilberts-Marshalls area were being
closed out or reduced. Oahu, however,
continued as the main rear supply base
and, despite a steady increase in tonnage
shipped direct from the United States to
forward destinations, Honolulu received
and loaded a large proportion of the Army
supplies and equipment in support of
Central Pacific forces. During 1944 ap-
proximately 1,425,000 of the 3,122,225
measurement tons of Army cargo reach-
ing the Hawaiian base were shipped for-
ward from Honolulu as compared with
969,100 measurement tons moved from
the mainland to ports forward of the Ha-
waiian group. In 1945, the 5,900,000
measurement tons shipped direct from the
United States to forward ports greatly
overshadowed those shipped from Hono-
lulu, but even then Honolulu shipped out
over 1,300,000 measurement tons between
January 1945 and the end of September,
in addition to handling Army and civilian
76
tonnage for the Hawaiian area. The port
load at Honolulu was carried successfully
despite a chronic labor shortage. Transfer
of Army port units to forward areas and
losses of civilian longshoremen produced
a serious labor crisis in late 1944 and early
75
Ltr, Moore to Col Finlay, OCT, 15 Feb 45, 210.3
Pac 45; USAFMIDPAC Trans Sec Hist, Chs. 1 and 7;
USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 12, Pt. 1, Sec. III, pp.
294-95.
76
Progress rpts cited n. 55; USAFMIDPAC Trans
Sec Hist, Ch. 1.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC 533

1945. The emergency was partially re- tinued to be a problem. In the spring of
lieved by using combat troops and Navy 1945 arrangements were being made to
Seabees to help load and discharge ships, secure from New Orleans three additional
but continued serious until April 1945, FS vessels. It was anticipated that the
when additional Seabees were assigned to arrival of these ships would enable AP&SC
longshore duties. to relieve the shortage of reefer shipping.
In addition to operating the port of Along with the conduct of port and
Honolulu, AP&SC controlled the small shipping operations, AP&SC continued
ports at the outlying islands and ferry to assist assault and garrison forces mount-
bases and operated a fleet of vessels en- ing from the Hawaiian area. It billeted
gaged in harbor activities and interisland and staged troops at Oahu, supervised
shipping. By June 1945, AP&SC was op- palletizing activities, and controlled the
erating 200 boats and vessels, including movement of troops and cargo from stag-
13 ocean-going cargo and passenger ves- ing areas to piers. Although the assault
sels, 7 freight supply (FS) vessels, 61 forces were responsible for loading and
barges, 27 tugs, 63 launches, 11 cabin berthing their own vessels, AP&SC pro-
cruisers, and 7 sampans. Although sub- vided technical advisers and cargo-
port and interisland operations became handling equipment. Training schools
increasingly routine, there was one per- were expanded and set up on a more per-
sistent problem. Since early 1944 the manent basis. The TQM school evolved
AP&SC had barely met commitments for an elaborate curriculum based on the ex-
chill and freeze shipments to outlying Ha- perience gained in actual operations, and
waiian islands, the ferry bases, and the between 1 July 1944 and 31 May 1945
Gilberts and Marshalls by diverting com- trained over 800 officers and 1,600 en-
bination general cargo and reefer ships listed men from combat organizations as
from other missions. In September 1944 TQM's. For participating Transportation
some relief was provided when the first Corps units, a formal DUKW Operation
two of three FS ships requisitioned by and Maintenance School was organized
AP&SC reached Honolulu, underwent at the Waimanalo Amphibious Training
conversion to reefers, and carried fresh Center and the Stevedoring, Winch Oper-
food and other perishables westward. ating, and Rigging School was set up on a
However, when the Marianas and Palaus regular basis.77
were captured there was an even greater
need for reefer shipping. Other vessels Participation in the Western Carolines
were assigned, and in March 1945 nine and Leyte Campaigns
AP&SC cargo and FS vessels were oper-
ating on regular schedules to theMarshalls
Gilberts area
During-
carrying subsistence
this period and
an increasing num-
ber of Transportation Corps units were
general supplies to Army, Navy, and Ma- trained and provided by the AP&SC for
rine Corps garrisons. Despite the increases participation in assault and garrison oper-
in shipping and a decrease in the allot- 77
ment of chill and freeze products to forces Rpt of TC Activities, AP&SC, Jul-Sep 44, p. 5,
Oct-Dec 44, p. 7, Jan-Mar 45, p. 7, Apr-Jun 45, pp.
in the Hawaiian and Gilberts-Marshalls 7-10; Rpt of TC Activities, CPBC, 1 Jul 44-31 May
area, the provision of reefer supplies con- 45, pp. 1-2. All in OCT HB CP A Hist Rpts.
534
ations. Between 15 and 30 September
1944, Army and Marine forces assaulted
and secured Peleliu, Angaur, and Ulithi.
Two AP&SC-trained units accompanied
the assault forces landing at Angaur on
17 September. The 290th Port Company,
attached to the 1138th Engineer Combat
Group of the 81st Division, provided hold
gangs to discharge cargo into landing craft
and assisted in getting casualties aboard.
The 481st Amphibian Truck Company,
attached to the artillery units, operated
seventy-two DUKW's carrying artillery
and ammunition from LST's to shore.
After emplacing the artillery, the DUKW
crews unloaded and stacked supplies in
dumps and evacuated casualties when
heavy seas made impossible removal by
LCM's and other landing craft. The
DUKW's operated a shuttle service from
beach to hospital ship, each DUKW car-
rying twelve litter cases. The DUKW's
were hoisted aboard ship, eliminating the
need for handling casualties. On 20 Sep-
tember elements of the DUKW company
moved to Ulithi to assist in the assault
there, while a detachment from the port
company accompanied units of the 81st
Division moving to Peleliu to assist Marine
forces. Meanwhile, two DUKW compa-
nies, the 454th and the 456th, had accom-
panied the 1st Marine Division from the
South Pacific and participated in the
Peleliu assault. After Peleliu was secured
these units, under the control of the garri-
son force on the island, continued to carry
cargo from ships to the beach. 78
After the capture of Peleliu, Angaur,
and Ulithi, combat operations were
stepped up and became increasingly op-
portunistic. It had originally been planned
to follow this campaign with the capture
of Yap by the XXIV Corps, which was
composed of the 7th and 96th Infantry
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Divisions. The 504th Port Battalion head-
quarters, three port companies, and a har-
bor craft detachment were provided by
the AP&SC, assigned to the Army garri-
son force, and attached to the XXIV
Corps for assault operations. The XXIV
Corps moved from Oahu to Eniwetok, the
regulating point, and then set out for Yap.
At this point, as already indicated in the
discussion of SWPA operations, it was
decided to attack Leyte immediately. The
XXIV Corps was offered to MacArthur
and was diverted in mid-ocean to Leyte.
The 77th Infantry Division, then en route
to Guadalcanal for rehabilitation, was
turned around and was also made avail-
able for the operation. Between 20 Octo-
ber and 25 December 1944, these and
Southwest Pacific forces assaulted and
secured Leyte.
During the assault the 291st, 292d, and
293d Port Companies, attached to the in-
fantry divisions, were used as ships' work-
ing parties and to augment shore parties
after their ships had been unloaded. After
the beachhead was secured and turned
over to the Army garrison force, the port
companies, under the 504th Port Battal-
ion, took over operation of Dulag on
Leyte. The detachment of the 331st Har-
bor Craft Company, consisting of four
officers and ninety-eight enlisted men, was
the first such unit used in support of an
operational move. The unit was assigned
to the Army garrison force and was in-
tended to handle berthing, towing, and
ferrying at Leyte when that port area was
secured. At the stopover at Eniwetok,
however, most of its harbor equipment was
78
Rpt, Participation in the Western Carolines and
Central Philippines, September-November 1944, pp.
3-4, 227-32, 337, 348-62, AG Opns Rpts 98-USF-
40.3 (21568) M; AP&SC Hist, Pt. V, pp. 81-89. Cf.
Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to thePhilippines, Chs.
XXI-XXIII.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
taken over by the Navy for higher-priority
uses. When the unit arrived at Leyte, it
had to use whatever equipment could be
made available.
The XXIV Corps was also accom-
panied by five DUKW companies that
had arrived at Oahu from the United
States in the middle of 1944 and were at-
tached directly to elements of the assault
force. The 828th Amphibian Truck Com-
pany moved out with the corps troops, the
472d and 480th moved forward with the
7th Infantry Division, and the 823d and
827th accompanied the 96th Infantry
Division. All five DUKW units partic-
ipated in the initial assault on the Leyte
beaches, beginning on 20 October 1944.
Their principal job consisted of moving
artillery pieces, personnel, equipment,
and initial ammunition from LST's and
other craft to shore and from shore to gun
positions. The DUKW's were also used to
evacuate casualties to ships offshore and
to move general cargo as well as ammu-
nition from ships at anchor and beached
landing craft to gun positions and dumps.
As combat operations moved inland, the
DUKW's were used as supporting land
vehicles as well as for ship-to-shore deliv-
ery. Used as a field expedient to make up
for the vehicle shortage and operated over
rough terrain, the DUKW's deteriorated
rapidly. Toward the end of the campaign,
the DUKW units were relieved from their
duties with the XXIV Corps and assigned
to ship-to-shore activities at the ports at
Abuyog, Taragona, and Dulag.79
Iwo Jima
Iwo Jima was the next target for the
POA forces. Although the assault was pri-
marily a Marine Corps operation, sup-
porting Army units were to be provided,
535
and an Army garrison force was to take
over port and base development activities
after the beachhead was secured. Two
Army port companies and three DUKW
companies were assigned to the garrison
force and attached to the V Amphibious
Corps for the assault.80 A fourth DUKW
company was assigned to the garrison
force to carry ashore cargo and equipment
after the initial phases of the assault.
The 471st, 473d, and 476th Amphibian
Truck Companies and two Marine
DUKW units were attached to the 4th
and 5th Marine Divisions and the 1st
Field Artillery Group (Provisional). Their
initial assignment on D Day, 19 Febru-
ary 1945, was to land the artillery. The
DUKW's, preloaded with artillery and
supplies, were launched from the tank
decks of LST's and set out on their sched-
uled runs to the beaches. Initial landings
were severely handicapped by enemy fire
and heavy surf. All of the DUKW's ex-
perienced difficulty in beaching without
aid from tractors or vehicles with winches.
The front wheels of the DUKW's were
not capable of pulling them forward when
79
Hist Summary, 828th Amph Truck Co, 19 Oct
44-31 Jan 45, AG Opns Rpts TCCO-828-0.1 (46377)
M; Unit Hist, 823d Amph Truck Co, 8 Jul 44-31 Jan
45, AG Opns Rpts TOCO-823-0.1 (46375) M; Unit
Hist, 827th Amph Truck Co, 20 Oct 44-30 Jan 45, AG
Opns Rpts TCCO-82 7-0.3 (20448) M; Hist Rpt,
480th Amph Truck Co, 1-28 Feb 45, AG Opns Rpts
TCCO-480-0.1 (46388) M; Unit Hist Rpt, 472d
Amph Truck Co, 11 Oct 43-31 Dec 45, AG Opns
Rpts TCCO-472-0.1 (30361) M.
80
The treatment of Transportation Corps participa-
tion in the Iwo Jima campaign and the subsequent
base development is based on the following: AP&SC
Hist, Pt. VI, pp. 101-15; MS, Capt Clifford P. More-
house, USMCR, Hist Div Hq USMC, The Iwo Jima
Operation, Pt. II, pp. 134-35, and Rpt, USAFPOA,
Participation in the Iwo Jima Operation, February-
March 1945, Pt. 3, pp. 25, 225-27, and Pt. 7, p. 312,
both in OCMH Files; TC Annual Rpt, AGF APO 86,
25 May 45, and TC Hist Rpt, 1 Jul-1 Oct 45, OCT
HB WPBC Iwo Jima.
536
they hit the steep beach. If a vehicle with
sufficient power was not available, the
DUKW's overturned and were pounded
by the surf. Several DUKW's had been
overloaded against the advice of the
DUKW company officers and sank almost
immediately upon leaving the LST's,
while others were swamped when lack of
fuel or mechanical breakdown caused
motors to fail.
Despite the adverse conditions, most of
the artillery was landed successfully. After
emplacing the artillery, the DUKW's
hauled ammunition and other high-prior-
ity supplies from ship to shore and evacu-
ated casualties. Continuous operation
under rugged conditions resulted in heavy
losses of equipment. On 1 March 1945 the
hundred DUKW's that were still sea-
worthy were pooled under the command
of the V Amphibious Corps and used to
unload urgently needed ammunition. On
11 March the three Army DUKW com-
panies and another, the 475th, which had
arrived in the early support shipping,
were transferred from Marine Corps con-
trol to the Army garrison force.
Despite the fact that 133 DUKW's, over
half of those employed, were lost in the
course of the campaign, the DUKW units
were reported to be the most reliable and
rapid means of bringing critical supplies
and ammunition from ship to shore or to
gun positions, and their service in evacu-
ating the wounded was considered
invaluable.
The 592d Port Company, attached to
the 5th Marine Division, landed in the
fourth assault wave and operated as part
of the Marine shore party, unloading
landing craft as they arrived at the beach.
The 442d Port Company, attached to the
V Amphibious Corps, disembarked at
Iwo Jima on 2 March (D plus 11) and was
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
used in operating the 4th Marine Division
dumps. On 9 March attachment to the
Marine Division was terminated, and the
port company's troops were used aboard
ship, serving as hold gangs in discharging
cargo and in getting casualties aboard.
Like the DUKW companies, the port
units had heavy losses in equipment dur-
ing the landings.
In the meantime, the main elements of
the Army garrison force had arrived, in-
cluding a Transportation Section head-
quarters and the 43d Amphibian Truck
Battalion headquarters. On 14 March
1945 (D plus 23), the Transportation Sec-
tion took over port operations and organ-
ized itself as a port group headquarters.
Units under its control included the two
port companies, the DUKW battalion
headquarters and four DUKW com-
panies, two Quartermaster truck com-
panies, and the 23d Naval Construction
Battalion (Special). Standing operating
procedures for port group operations were
prepared, and close liaison was established
with Navy and Marine units to co-ordi-
nate cargo and beach operations.
Like many other forward area islands,
Iwo Jima lacked port facilities. Loading
and discharge of vessels were performed
entirely by lighters and DUKW's. Be-
cause of the steep beach gradient and
heavy surf, tractors had to be used to
anchor lighters to the beach and to tow
trucks from lighters to ground favorable
for operation. A general dump was main-
tained to receive mixed loads of cargo and
to augment the facilities of supply agencies
when the latter were unable to handle the
volume of cargo being discharged. In spite
of the absence of port facilities, the port
group handled 269,520 measurement tons
of cargo and 15,982 passengers during the
period from 14 March to 20 May 1945.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC 537

Harbor development at Iwo Jima was ministrative matters except those specifi-
restricted by the steep beach, heavy winds,cally exempted by him, the WPBC com-
and treacherous surf, and was confined mander was to provide logistical support
mainly to measures to facilitate lighter for all Army forces in the Marianas, the
and DUKW operation. Steel and con- western Carolines, and Iwo Jima, and for
crete hulks were sunk to provide a break- all elements of Navy, Marine Corps, and
water for the harbor and to protect beach- other forces when so directed by the POA
81
ing operations, the beach was given a hardcommander. Because the Ryukyus cam-
paign was under way, logistical support of
surface to facilitate vehicle and equipment
operation, and a ship-to-shore radio com- Army forces on those islands remained a
munications system was set up to control CPBC responsibility.
and dispatch lighters and DUKW's. General Jarman's staff, already serving
Cargo-handling activities were performed as the Saipan Garrison Force and Island
by the Army and Navy units until 11 July Command headquarters, was augmented
1945, when the 23d Naval Construction and formed WPBC headquarters. Al-
Battalion was relieved from duty. Con- though command of the island was subse-
tinuing operations were carried on by the quently turned over to the Navy, the port
Army port and DUKW companies, as- continued to be operated by the Army.
sisted by ground and air force troops. With the activation of WPBC, Col. Ernest
During the three months ending 30 Sep- B. Gray, Troop Port Commander, Saipan,
tember 1945, traffic at Iwo Jima was on was appointed transportation officer on
the decline, port group troops handling the special staff. Under his direction, his
134,930 measurement tons and 12,369 staff acted as WPBC Transportation Sec-
passengers. tion and, in addition, continued to super-
vise local port operations. It performed
Activities in the Western Pacific
planning functions for the command, sur-
Base Command
veyed WPBC port facilities, studied
When Iwo Jima was secured on 16 Transportation Corps supply require-
March 1945, a significant number of ments, and set up an air priorities control
Army troops were stationed in the forward agency. The Transportation Section con-
areas of POA. Principal concentrations of tinued to act both as a special staff agency
Army forces were located at Saipan, and as a port command until 1 October
Guam, and Tinian, with smaller numbers 1945, when the two functions were
82
in Angaur, Peleliu, and Ulithi. The enor- separated.
mous distance separating the islands from 81
CPBC however, continued to provide for the
Oahu made it difficult for USAFPOA and logistical support of Army forces in WPBC until the
CPBC effectively to administer and sup- latter could build up its supply installations and set
up its requisitioning channels. CPBC support finally
port the Army personnel in the forward ceased on 1 July 1945 when WPBC assumed full re-
area. On 25 April 1945 General Richard- sponsibility for troops under its jurisdiction and com-
son established the Western Pacific Base menced requisitioning directly on the San Francisco
Port of Embarkation.
Command (WPBC) and appointed Maj. 82
WPBC Hist, Vol. 1, Sec. 1, pp. 1-6. Sec. 2, p. 13,
Gen. Sanderford Jarman as commanding Sec. 3, pp. 114-15; WPBC Hist, V-J Day-31 Dec 45,
general. Functioning as Richardson's sole AG Opns Rpts 98-BCS-0.l (30797); G-4 Rpt, HUSA-
FMIDPAC, qtr ended 30 Sep 45, pp. 3-4, AG Opns
operating agent in all logistical and ad- Rpts 319.1.
538
The two main Army ports in WPBC
were at Saipan and Tinian. At Guam,
which contained the other major port of
the area, the Navy handled all cargo ac-
tivities through the end of the war. At
both Saipan and Tinian, the Army troop
port command was responsible for load-
ing and unloading ships and controlled
Army and Navy personnel engaged in the
work, while the Navy port director was
responsible for all ship movements in the
harbors, the operation of tugs and lighters,
servicing of vessels, and routing vessels
from the ports. Matters of common inter-
est, such as priorities of discharge and
loading, were jointly determined.
The Saipan port had been considerably
expanded since the island had been se-
cured in July 1944. In March 1945 the
five companies of the 376th Port Battalion
and the 31st Naval Construction Battal-
ion (Special), operating under the Saipan
Army Troop Port Command, were han-
dling vessels at thirteen berths and work-
ing an average of three ships daily in the
water. In addition, three Army FS vessels
had arrived to carry B-29 supplies and
other interisland freight between Saipan,
Tinian, and Guam. At Saipan, between
15 June 1944 and 31 March 1945, 1,790,-
913 measurement tons were discharged
and 228,674 measurement tons loaded,
27,122 passengers embarked and 38,732
debarked. In subsequent months, port
traffic was kept at a high level, reaching a
peak in July, when 302,062 measurement
tons were discharged, 77,192 measure-
ment tons loaded, and 21,400 troops em-
barked and debarked. Despite greatly
improved facilities, the heavy volume of
tonnage moving across the dock produced
a large backlog. Saipan Troop Port Com-
mand units, consisting of the 376th Port
Battalion, the 372d Port Battalion—which
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
arrived with three companies early in
July—the 31st Naval Construction Bat-
talion, and several Quartermaster truck
companies, were unable to handle the
load. To correct this situation, 2d Marine
Division troops were provided and were
integrated with experienced Seabee steve-
dore gangs. In addition, Marine Corps
trucks and drivers were placed under the
operational control of the Central Motor
Pool. By 10 August the port backlog was
eliminated.
Immediately following the end of hos-
tilities, Saipan was directed to discontinue
unloading ships that were carrying air-
craft ammunition. At that time three such
vessels were in the harbor. These and
others arriving later were returned to the
United States. With the end of B-29 oper-
ations and the curtailment of base-devel-
opment activities, ship arrivals fell off and
port activities declined. There then re-
mained one large operation before the
port could turn to purely postwar activ-
ities. Between 10 and 17 September 1945,
the 2d Marine Division loaded out.
Eleven of the thirteen cargo berths were
placed at its disposal and 91,863 measure-
ment tons were loaded during the oper-
ation. Meanwhile, the 115th Port Com-
pany had arrived for assignment to the
372d Port Battalion, bringing the number
of Army port companies on Saipan to
nine. On 18 September the 55th Medium
Port headquarters, the second such unit
employed in the Central Pacific, arrived
at Saipan and prepared to take over port
operations from the troop port command.
During that month, the port load was
small by wartime standards. Although
cargo loadings had been temporarily
increased because of the 2d Marine Divi-
sion's move, cargo discharge had dropped
from 249,165 measurement tons in August
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
to 83,252 measurement tons in Septem-
ber. Work schedules were being lightened
and the emphasis of port operations rested
upon the return of troops for demobiliza-
tion, the disposition of excess supplies, and
the separation of Army and Navy port
activities and installations.83
Port activities at Tinian had been com-
pletely controlled by the Navy until
19 November 1944, when the Tinian
Troop Port Command was assumed by
the Army. During the previous month the
510th Port Battalion had arrived with
three companies and performed longshore
duties under Navy supervision. The Army
Troop Port Commander, Tinian (later
designated Port Superintendent, Tinian),
took over these Transportation Corps
units and, in addition, had under his con-
trol the 1036th Naval Construction Battal-
ion and, later, the 27th Naval Construc-
tion Battalion (Special), plus two Quar-
termaster companies and one Marine
Corps DUKW company. On 28 Decem-
ber 1944, the Marine unit was relieved by
the 474th Amphibian Truck Company.
At the time the Army took over the
Tinian Troop Port Command, pier facil-
ities consisted of a single ponton pier
constructed by the Navy to replace the
two piers that had been destroyed by
heavy seas in October 1944. Additional
berthing facilities were placed under con-
struction by Navy personnel in mid-No-
vember, and four berths were completed
by the end of March 1945. Most of the
cargo, however, continued to be dis-
charged at offshore anchorages into
LCT's, LCM's, barges, and DUKW's.
The cargo was moved to one of two small
landing beaches or, when DUKW's were
employed, transported direct from ship-
side, across the beaches, to the dumps.
By the end of May four additional
539
berths had been completed. All ships were
then unloaded at berthside, although it
was still necessary to lighten some vessels
before they could enter a berth. Move-
ment of cargo from the docks and beach
areas to various supply depots and dumps
throughout the island was handled by six
Quartermaster truck companies. At that
time, units under the supervision of the
Army port superintendent included six
port companies under the 510th Port Bat-
talion and the six Quartermaster truck
companies. The 474th Amphibian Truck
Company had departed from Tinian in
February, and the 27th Naval Construc-
tion Battalion had recently been relieved
in preparation for movement to another
base. Traffic at Tinian continued to in-
crease until July, when an all-time high of
171,159 measurement tons were dis-
charged, 49,375 measurement tons loaded,
and 8,843 troops debarked and embarked.
To handle the load, the 510th Port Battal-
ion was augmented by details from anti-
aircraft battalions and excess hospital
units. With the end of hostilities, port ac-
tivities declined sharply. During Septem-
ber, the 510th Port Battalion had little
difficulty in handling 61,299 measurement
84
tons of cargo and 6,946 passengers.
The Ryukyus
The war in the Pacific was climaxed by
the seizure of the Ryukyus. Between
1 April and 2 July 1945, the Tenth Army,
comprised of Army and Marine forces, as-
saulted and secured the primary objective,
83
Saipan TC hist rcd cited n. 57; Hist Rcd, TC Hq
55th Med Port APO 244, Jul-Sep, Oct-Dec 45, OCT
HB WPBC Marianas.
84
Hist Rcd, TC Island Comd APO 247, 24 Jul-31
Dec 44, 1 Jan-31 Mar, 1 Apr-30 Jun, and 1 Jul-30
Sep 45, OCT HB WPBC Marianas.
540
Okinawa, and captured other islands in
the chain.85 This campaign dwarfed all
previous operations in POA. A postwar
study of the operation has indicated the
magnitude of the transportation tasks in-
volved in its mounting and support and
the basic division of responsibility for their
execution:
For the assault echelon alone, about 183,-
000 troops and 747,000 measurement tons
of cargo were loaded into over 430 assault
transports and landings ships at 11 different
ports from Seattle to Leyte, a distance of
6,000 miles. . . . After the landings, main-
tenance had to be provided for the combat
troops and a continuously increasing garri-
son force that eventually numbered 270,000.
Concurrently, the development of Okinawa
as an advanced air and fleet base and mount-
ing area for future operations involved sup-
ply and construction programs extending
over a period of many months subsequent to
the initial assault. Close integration of as-
sault, maintenance, and garrison shipping
and supply was necessary at all times. . . .
Cargo and troops were lifted on the West
Coast, Oahu, Espiritu Santo, New Cale-
donia, Guadalcanal, the Russell Islands, Sai-
pan, and Leyte, and were assembled at Eni-
wetok, Ulithi, Saipan, and Leyte. . . .
Admiral Turner, as commander of the Am-
phibious Forces Pacific Fleet [and Com-
mander, Joint Expeditionary Force] fur-
nished the shipping for the assault troops and
their supplies, determined the loading sched-
ules, and was responsible for the delivery of
men and cargo to the beaches. General
Buckner [Commanding General, Tenth
Army, and Commander, Expeditionary
Troops] allocated assault shipping space to
the elements of his command and was re-
sponsible for landing the supplies and trans-
porting them to the dumps. The control of
maintenance and garrison shipping, which
was largely loaded on the West Coast, was
retained by CINCPOA.86
Among other preparations, the combat
divisions selected for the initial assaults
were augmented by supporting service
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
units, including Transportation Corps
organizations. Two port and two Trans-
portation Corps DUKW companies ac-
companied each of the three Army divi-
sions mounting from Leyte, and the 504th
Port Battalion headquarters moved with
the corps troops of the XXIV Corps
(Army). One Transportation Corps
DUKW company was assigned to the III
Amphibious Corps (Marine) and to each
of the two Marine divisions loading from
the South Pacific. For the Transportation
Corps units and the elements of the as-
sault echelon to which they were attached,
see table on page 541.
Tenth Army headquarters, attached
troops, and the Army garrison forces
loaded from Oahu. 87 Although the Tenth
Army was responsible for loading its own
vessels, the AP&SC continued to perform
its usual services. It billeted and staged
assault and garrison troops, supervised
palletizing, moved personnel and equip-
85
Unless otherwise cited, the account of Transpor-
tation Corps participation in the Okinawa campaign
and subsequent base development is based on the fol-
lowing: Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A.
Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1948), pp. 19-41, 79-81, 405-06; Actn
Rpt, Island Comd Okinawa, 13 Dec 44-30 Jun 45,
Ch. 8, Sec. XXII, pp. 1-4, AG Opns Rpts 98-ISCI-0.3
(18017); Rpt, USAFPOA, Participation in the
Okinawa Operation, Apr-Jun 45, pp. 411-17, 609,
680-87, 698, OCMH Files; AP&SC Hist, Pt. VII, pp.
125-31; Blakelock notes cited n. 72; Hist, Hq Trans
Office Philippines-Ryukyus Comd, History of Trans-
portation Activities on Okinawa From Inception
Through 1945, 26 Feb 47, OCT HB SWPA.
86
Appleman et al., op. cit., pp. 36-37.
87
For purposes of base development in the Ryu-
kyus, the Island Command, Okinawa, and four
smaller Army garrison forces were activated on Oahu
and assigned to the Tenth Army. Elements of the
Okinawa Island Command were set up to arrive
during the assault phase and lend logistical support to
the assault troops. The remainder of the garrison
troops and base development material were scheduled
to arrive in the support shipping as they could be
handled at the destination beaches.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE RYUKYUS CAMPAIGN
ment to the piers, and assisted in the load-
ing of ships. All units were provided in-
struction at the TQM school and a TQM
team was assigned by the AP&SC to the
Tenth Army. In the course of the cam-
paign, the AP&SC received and shipped
forward a significant proportion of the
Army supplies and equipment, loading
315,294 measurement tons for Okinawa
and 16,427 measurement tons for Ie
Shima.
The AP&SC also trained, equipped,
and assigned Transportation Corps and
other service units to participate in the
Ryukyus operation after the initial land-
ings. For the first time in the Central
Pacific, a formal port headquarters was
established to operate west of Hawaii. On
24 January 1945, the 53d Medium Port
Headquarters and Headquarters Com-
pany was activated and assigned to the
AP&SC. This unit was organized on
Oahu and was scheduled to move to Oki-
nawa to take over the operation of the
port of Naha upon its capture. The per-
sonnel were drawn largely from units
within USAFPOA, although a number of
key officers were secured from the main-
land through the efforts of the USAFPOA
541
transportation officer. After a period of
training with the 24th Port, the 53d Me-
dium Port was assigned to the Tenth
Army on 25 February 1945 and embarked
for Okinawa on 27 March. Other units
drawn from and trained by the AP&SC
and scheduled for departure in the sup-
port shipping were three port battalion
headquarters, a Quartermaster truck bat-
talion with three truck companies, and
four Quartermaster service companies.
As a preliminary to the assault on
Okinawa, the 77th Infantry Division
landed in the Kerama Retto on 26 March
1945 (L minus 6). The 203d and 292d
Port Companies, attached to the division,
participated in the assault landings, as-
sisting in discharging the vessels and in
handling cargo on the beaches. The 477th
and 828th Amphibian Truck Companies
were attached to division artillery.
DUKW's, preloaded with 105-mm. how-
itzers, delivered the artillery and gun
crews from LST's to gun positions on the
beach and then began ship-to-shore move-
ment of ammunition, water, and rations.
They worked in direct support of firing
batteries during the assault and, when the
island was secured on 29 March, carried
542 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

the artillery back to the vessels. The 203d ways for the unloading of lighterage. De-
Port Company and the 828th Amphibian spite a violent storm on 4-5 April and con-
Truck Company then moved with ele- tinued bad weather thereafter, 577,000
ments of the 77th Infantry Division to measurement tons, or four fifths of the as-
Okinawa. The 292d Port Company took sault shipping, were landed by 16 April.
part in the landings on Ie Shima, which During the assault, the four port com-
was captured between 16 and 21 April panies attached to the 96th and 7th In-
1945, and remained there for the unload- fantry Divisions and the 203d Port Com-
ing of resupply shipping. The 477th Am- pany, which had participated in the
phibian Truck Company landed artillery Kerama Retto action, assisted in unload-
in the assaults on Menna Shima and Ie ing the vessels. After coming ashore, the
88
Shima. port companies were relieved from assign-
On 1 April 1945 troops of the XXIV ment with the divisions and reverted to the
Corps and the III Amphibious Corps control of the XXIV Corps shore party.
landed on the Hagushi beaches on the Each unit was attached for operations to a
west coast of Okinawa. Shore parties were combat engineer battalion for work on the
at first attached to the assault battalions of south Hagushi beaches. In the meantime,
participating divisions. As battalion beach- DUKW's preloaded with artillery, am-
heads were established and expanded to munition, gasoline, and water were
regiment, division, and corps beachheads, lowered from APA's and AKA's and
the battalion shore parties were consoli- launched from LST's and carried their
dated and came under the control of the cargoes to shore positions. At the time of
higher headquarters. The Army divisions the assault, twelve DUKW companies, in-
landed on the south Hagushi beaches, cluding Marine DUKW units, were avail-
while the Marines landed on north Hagu- able for operations on the basis of two
shi beaches. Ship-to-shore movement was companies per Army or Marine division.
carried out by landing craft, LVT's, and After completing their initial mission, the
DUKW's. The Navy established control DUKW's worked off both beach areas,
vessels in each sector to regulate the move- carrying priority and bulk supplies to the
ment of supplies to the beach and prevent shore and to inland dumps and assisting in
congestion. the evacuation of the wounded.89
Early unloading operations progressed The number of DUKW companies
smoothly. The major obstacle was a coral proved adequate, but their operations
reef extending the length of the beaches. were handicapped by the long water trip
During flood tide, which lasted four or to the ships' anchorage and by the con-
five hours a day, LCM's and LCVP's tinuous shortage of motor transport.
could cross the reef and unload directly on
the beach. During low and middle tides, 88
however, it was necessary to transfer cargo Action Rpt, 1st Lt Godfrey P. Crackel, Okinawa
Campaign, 477th Amph Truck Co, AG Opns Rpts
to amphibian vehicles at ponton transfer TCCO-477-0.3 (16498) M, 26 Apr-30 Jun 45.
barges equipped with cranes. This diffi- 89
Action Rpt, 1st Lt John R. Ransom, CO, Oki-
culty was soon relieved by the location of nawa Campaign, 474th Amph Truck Co, AG Opns
Rpts TCCO-474-0.3 (20621) M, 26 Apr-30 Jun 45;
DUKW exits over the reef and the con- TC Journal 10, AP&SC, 1 Jun 45, OCT HB CPA
struction of earthen and ponton cause- AP&SC Newsletter.
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
Original estimates of the number of Quar-
termaster truck companies required for
the early phases of the operation had been
too low. One truck company had landed
in the assault and two followed in the first
garrison echelon, but no others were
available for shore operations until the
middle of May. As a result, it was impossi-
ble to establish transfer points for the
DUKW's and it was necessary for the
DUKW's to make long overland trips to
inland dumps. The situation was relieved
somewhat on 15 May when two provi-
sional truck companies were organized,
but it was not until late May, when nine
Quartermaster truck companies, two pro-
visional truck companies, and forty trucks
of the III Amphibious Corps were operat-
ing on the beach, that the situation
emerged from the critical stage.
On 9 April 1945 shore operations at the
Hagushi beaches were turned over to the
control of the 1st Engineer Special Bri-
gade, an experienced Army headquarters
brought in from ETO, and the Okinawa
Island Command assumed the responsi-
bility for the logistical support of the Tenth
Army. All troops engaged in unloading
operations were relieved from their respec-
tive corps, assigned to the Okinawa Island
Command, and attached to the 1st Engi-
neer Special Brigade for operations. The
five Army port companies, under the
504th Port Battalion, which had landed
during the assault, handled cargo on the
south Hagushi beaches. Two additional
port companies arrived on 4 May, one of
which moved to Ie Shima. Eleven DUKW
companies were also attached to the 1st
Engineer Special Brigade. The twelfth was
placed on duty at Ie Shima. Two amphib-
ian truck battalion headquarters arrived
on 28 April and were attached to the bri-
gade. One battalion was placed at each of
543
the Hagushi beaches to operate the com-
panies already assigned. As additional
Transportation Corps and Quartermaster
units arrived, they were attached to the
1st Engineer Special Brigade for work on
the beaches.
On 3 May 1945 the 53d Medium Port
arrived and was placed on duty with the
1st Engineer Special Brigade. This unit
was expected to operate the port of Naha.
The port, however, was not cleared of the
enemy until late in June. The failure to
capture and rehabilitate Naha at an early
stage of the campaign threw plans off
schedule and shipping began to outrun
the unloading capacity of the beaches. By
mid-June the discharge of cargo had fallen
200,000 measurement tons behind sched-
ule. The lack of pier facilities, bad weather,
enemy air raids, and the necessity for
selective discharge slowed unloading and
produced congestion in the harbor.
Throughout the campaign, the bulk of
the tonnage arriving at Okinawa was han-
dled over the beaches in the Hagushi area.
A number of other points, however, were
opened on the west and east coasts to sup-
plement the facilities on the Hagushi
beaches and to provide closer support for
forward elements of the XXIV Corps and
the III Amphibious Corps. The opening of
additional points became necessary when
rains in late May and early June made
overland supply routes impassable. In
order to furnish continuous support to the
combat forces, who were advancing swiftly
after breaking through at Shuri, landing
craft and DUKW's were used to carry
subsistence, POL, and ammunition to
points well south of those already estab-
lished. The diversion of craft from lighter-
age activities adversely affected discharge
operations at the older beaches until the
advent of dry weather, when roads were
544
made serviceable and craft were returned
to their normal duties.
The 1st Engineer Special Brigade was
relieved of all shore party operations on 31
May 1945, and control was assumed by
the Joint Freight Handling Facilities, a
Navy agency. All Transportation Corps
units, Quartermaster service companies,
and Quartermaster truck companies pre-
viously assigned to the 1st Engineer Spe-
cial Brigade were assigned to the 53d
Medium Port, which in turn was attached
to the Joint Freight Handling Facilities for
use in beach and port operations. This
relationship continued until August, when
Army and Navy cargo operations were
separated.
Meanwhile, Naha harbor had been
opened on 7 June 1945 for the limited dis-
charge of cargo by lighters. During the
remainder of the month, construction was
begun on piers and wharves and addi-
tional Transportation Corps and Quarter-
master units arrived. On 21 June trans-
portation units under the 53d Medium
Port consisted of four port battalion head-
quarters, eleven port companies, three
amphibian truck battalion headquarters,
and fourteen amphibian truck companies.
Organized resistance on Okinawa
ceased on 20 June 1945, and the island
was declared secured on 2 July. During
the campaign over 2,000,000 measure-
ment tons had been unloaded on Oki-
nawa. With the end of combat, base
development was stepped up. Airfields
were enlarged, roads constructed, and port
facilities improved as additional labor and
materials were made available. During
July, 1,015,374 measurement tons were
discharged, and average daily discharge
had increased from the 20,400 measure-
ment tons of June to 32,754 measurement
tons. At this point, command responsi-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
bility for the Ryukyus passed from Nimitz
to MacArthur. Effective 31 July, the
Tenth Army and U.S. Army forces on
Ie Shima were transferred from Nimitz to
the Commander in Chief, Army Forces in
the Pacific.
The transfer of command of the Ryu-
kyus was but one phase of a general re-
organization in the Pacific, which had
begun in preparation for the invasion of
the Japanese mainland. With the estab-
lishment of AFPAC in April 1945, ar-
rangements had been made for Nimitz to
release to MacArthur all Army forces not
essential to operations, defense, or base
development. MacArthur was to make
parallel releases of naval personnel.
The creation of AFPAC had little im-
mediate effect on USAFPOA's organiza-
tion and functions. USAFPOA became a
subordinate command of AFPAC but con-
tinued responsible for the administration
and logistical support of all Army forces
engaged in operations for which Nimitz
had earlier received approval, as well as
for all Army forces in the area released
from Nimitz' operational control. Gen-
eral Richardson's headquarters remained
primarily as a planning and policy-mak-
ing agency supervising the supply opera-
tions of the Army base commands within
POA. The subsequent redesignation of
USAFPOA as the U.S. Army Forces in
the Middle Pacific (USAFMIDPAC) was
a change in name only, leaving the Army
structure unaltered. After command of the
Ryukyus was transferred to AFPAC on 31
July, USAFMIDPAC, through CPBC,
continued to provide logistical support of
the Tenth Army and other Army forces in
the Ryukyus until 1 September, when this
responsibility was transferred to AFWES-
PAC. However, USAFMIDPAC delivered
supplies requisitioned by the Tenth Army
THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC
before 1 September until the pipeline of
supplies was emptied.
As long as CPBC remained responsible
for the logistical support of the Ryukyus,
Oahu continued as an important supply
base, but the shipment of an increasing
proportion of supplies for forward destina-
tions direct from the United States and
the decreasing requirements of other areas
serviced by CPBC brought a decline in
activities. Reflecting these developments,
Honolulu discharged or loaded approxi-
mately 300,000 measurement tons a
month during the period from June
through August 1945, much below the
average of 440,000 measurement tons
handled during the first five months of
1945. The port load was now well within
the capabilities of available labor, equip-
ment, and facilities. Other AP&SC opera-
tions, including the subports and inter-
island shipping, had long since become
routine. In the final months of the war
AP&SC's main activities involved the de-
livery of supplies westward to the Ryu-
kyus and the staging and training of the
98th Infantry Division and two garrison
forces on Oahu for participation in the
projected Kyushu operation. With the end
of hostilities, the provision of garrison
forces proved unnecessary, but the 98th
Division was assigned to occupation duties
in Japan and loaded out on 3 September.
Its combat support mission completed,
AP&SC closed its TQM, DUKW, and
stevedore schools and concentrated on
processing returnees and maintaining
Army forces in the Hawaiian area and at
the remaining Central Pacific bases.90
Postwar Transportation Operations
in the Middle Pacific
With the abrupt end of hostilities on 14
August 1945, the westward movement of
545
men and supplies was sharply curtailed
and wholesale diversions of shipping were
effected, some vessels returning to the
United States while others were held at
regulating points awaiting decisions re-
garding their disposition. Meanwhile, the
machinery for demobilization was set in
motion. On the basis of estimates com-
piled by the base commands, USAFMID-
PAC submitted requirements for the east-
bound movement of Army personnel to
the commander of AFPAC and the Chief
of Transportation in Washington. To meet
these requirements, the latter scheduled
troop transports on a round-trip basis
from a U.S. port of embarkation to USAF-
MIDPAC loading ports for embarkation
and return to the United States. Addi-
tional space was procured from the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. After a
slow start because of an initial shortage of
troop carrying vessels and the limited ca-
pacity of reception stations, the rate at
which personnel were returned to the
United States increased steadily. In the
three months ending 30 November, nearly
153,000 Army returnees were lifted from
the South, Central, and Western Pacific.
At the end of this period, demobilization
was at its peak and all areas were ahead
of schedule.91
A far more persistent problem was the
roll-up of excess supplies and property
which had accumulated in USAFMID-
90
G-4 Rpt, HUSAFPOA, qtr ended 30 Jun 45, and
HUSAFMIDPAC, qtr ended 30 Sep 45, AG Opns
Rpts 319.1; Rpts, AP&SC, Qtrly Rpts of Activities,
Oct 44-Jun 45, OCT HB CPA Hist Rpts; TC Journal
16, AP&SC, 15 Sep 45, p. 5, OCT HB CPA AP&SC
Newsletter; AP&SC Hist, Pt. VIII, pp. 137-38.
91
Unless otherwise cited, the account of postwar
operations is based on the following: USAFMIDPAC
Trans Sec Hist, Chs. 5 and 9; G-4 Rpt, HUSAFMID-
PAC, qtr ended 30 Sep 45, AG 319.1; WPBC Hist,
V-J Day-31 Dec 45, AG Opns Rpts 98-BCS-0.l
(30797).
546
PAC. With the coming of V-J Day, inven-
tories of all supplies in the South, Central,
and Western Pacific Base Commands were
undertaken, and arrangements were
made for available excess lists to be
screened by the base commands, other
services, and AFWESPAC for supplies
they could use. It was soon found that the
disposition of these stocks would be a long-
term project. The screening process was
time consuming, and in many cases the
various areas and services had similar
needs and excesses. At the same time, de-
lays by the War Department in determin-
ing a postwar troop basis and the islands
that would be retained for peacetime oc-
cupation made it difficult to determine
surpluses. Despite the shipment of supplies
to the United States, Japan, the Philip-
pines, and China, and the local disposal of
surplus property as authorized by the War
Department, a large volume of excess
stocks remained on Pacific islands await-
ing disposition at the end of the year.
In the postwar period the compelling
reasons for control of shipping by the com-
mander in chief of POA were removed.
Shipping had been adequate to fill all re-
quirements for space in POA since shortly
after V-E Day, but it was still necessary for
Nimitz to control operational and forward
area shipping in order to insure the suc-
cess of amphibious campaigns under his
direction and to match the flow of supplies
moving forward with port and beach ca-
pacities at destinations. With the war's
end, the availability of shipping and the
ability of forward ports to handle peace-
time traffic led to the abandonment of
controls by Nimitz. In October 1945 the
Joint Overseas Shipping Control Office,
the agency controlling shipping out of the
Hawaiian area, was abolished, and the
May 1943 directive providing for joint
priority lists for personnel shipments to the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Pacific was canceled. Finally, on 1 No-
vember Admiral Nimitz declared the
Marianas area, including Iwo Jima and
the western Carolines, nonoperational for
purposes of shipping control. In effect, this
directive abrogated his authority and re-
turned control to the Army and Navy.
This action was given formal sanction on
4 December when JCS rescinded its direc-
tive charging Nimitz with over-all super-
vision of shipping in POA and provided
that in the future Navy requirements for
dry cargo shipping, including reefers,
would be submitted to the Navy Depart-
ment and Army requirements to the War
Department.92
Nimitz' abrogation of shipping control
was accompanied by the separation of
Army and Navy activities in the Western
Pacific Base Command, where port opera-
tion on individual islands had been han-
dled jointly. As part of a general plan for
the divorce of Army and Navy installa-
tions in the area worked out at a confer-
ence at Guam in October 1945, local
agreements were made regarding the divi-
sion of port facilities and equipment,
although co-operation between the two
services was continued. Separation of ac-
tivities was accomplished gradually, and
was not completed until 1946.
At the beginning of 1946 USAFMID-
PAC was in transition from a wartime to a
peacetime basis. Demobilization was mov-
ing toward completion, nonpermanent
bases were being closed out, and efforts
were being made to ship out or effect the
local disposition of excess stocks and prop-
erty. Upon completion of these tasks, the
primary mission of transportation would
be the maintenance of relatively small
forces stationed on peacetime bases in the
Central, South, and Western Pacific.
92
JCS 762/11, 22 Nov 45, approved by JCS on 4
Dec 45, ABC Pac (Sec 1-B) 6 Sep 43.
 CHAPTER XII
China, Burma, and India
The fall of Rangoon in March 1942 and
the subsequent occupation of Burma by
the Japanese cut the Burma Road, the last
practicable overland route linking China
with the other Allied powers, and left as
an immediate alternative only a tenuous
air supply line from Assam in northeastern
1
India over the Himalayas (the Hump).
The sole remaining base from which com-
munications to China could be restored
was India, and it was there that the United
States concentrated its effort to develop
the airlift and, through the recapture of
Burma, to reopen the land route to China.
This effort was designed to support Ameri-
can air operations in China and to deliver
lend-lease supplies intended to assist
China in reorganizing and increasing the
combat efficiency of her armies. It involved
the deployment of relatively small and
scattered American forces, principally Air
Forces and construction and other service
troops, and the support of the north
Burma campaigns, which the Chinese
Army in India fought with the assistance
of British and American forces. (Map 8)
The Strategical and Logistical Setting
From the outset, transportation loomed
as a major problem in the task of deliver-
ing the supplies that would keep China in
the war and eventually enable her to take
the offensive against Japan. Indian ports
were limited in number and were located
10,000 to 12,000 miles from the United
States. None was equipped to handle
greatly expanded traffic. Since the high-
way system, with the exception of that on
the northwest frontier, was undeveloped,
ports were served mainly by railroad, sup-
plemented by coastwise shipping and river
transportation. Before the war the possi-
bility that India would be a base for oper-
ations to the east had received scant
consideration. When, contrary to expecta-
tion, Assam became the scene of airfield
construction and the supply base for con-
struction and combat forces moving into
Burma, transportation facilities in that
area were found to be sadly deficient.
Although Assam was the main opera-
tional center, it was at first necessary to
use ports on the west coast of India since
eastern ports were blocked by Japanese
activity in the Bay of Bengal and the
Indian Ocean. Supplies had to be moved
an additional 2,100 to 3,000 miles, after
being discharged, in order to reach their
destinations in Assam and China. From
Karachi, the first major American port of
entry, supplies were hauled across India
by rail to eastern Assam for local use or for
movement by air over the Hump to the
Kunming area, whence they were trans-
ported to Chungking and to advanced
Chinese bases by rail, highway, river, and
coolie or animal transport.
The Indian railway system was ill-
1
On the Hump operation and other AAF activities
in CBI, see Craven and Cate, AAF, I, 354, 484-513,
and IV, 405-545.
548
MAP 8
prepared to handle additional traffic. The
virtual closing in early 1942 of the eastern
ports, particularly Calcutta, placed a
heavy burden on trans-India rail facilities,
lengthening hauls and forcing movement
by rail of materials normally shipped on
coastwise vessels. The worst bottleneck in
the rail system was the meter-gauge rail-
way serving the eastern frontier. This line
was extremely limited in capacity, and the
Brahmaputra River was unbridged. The
railroads were centrally controlled by the
Railway Department of the Government
of India, and were supervised by a civilian
railway board. Although the board exer-
cised control in matters of general policy,
individual railroads worked as separate
entities and were not fully co-ordinated.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Inland water transport, concentrated
mainly on the Ganges and Brahmaputra
Rivers and their tributaries, supplemented
the rail facilities in east Bengal and Assam.
Handled exclusively by civilian firms,
river transportation was slow and subject
to seasonal disruption. Transfer of craft to
the Persian Gulf area in 1941 and 1942
cut into carrying capacity, and there was
little co-ordination of rail and river move-
ments.2
2
Ltr, Maj Gen Raymond A. Wheeler, CG SOS
CBI, to Gen Somervell, CG SOS, 24 Sep 42, OCT
320.2 India 42; History of Services of Supply, China,
India, Burma Theater, 28 February 1942-24 Octo-
ber 1944 (hereafter cited as SOS Hist, 1942-44), Vol.
I, Ch. 2, p. 1, and App. 24, Transportation Service,
Preface, OCMH Files; Rpt, Rail Div OCT, Railroads
of Northeastern India and Burma, 1943, p. 7, OCT
HB CBI; Miklem (ed.), Transportation, Ch. IX.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
The Pioneer Period
The task of receiving and forwarding
lend-lease and U.S. Army supplies from
the Indian ports was given to Brig. Gen.
(later Lt. Gen.) Raymond A. Wheeler,
then heading the U.S. Military Iranian
Mission. On 28 February 1942 the War
Department placed him in command of
the Services of Supply, under Lt. Gen.
(later General) Joseph W. Stilwell, com-
mander of the U.S. Army forces in the
the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater.
Wheeler and a small staff arrived at
Karachi on 9 March and there established
SOS headquarters. Three days later the
first contingent to arrive in CBI, air force
troops diverted from Java, debarked. Bor-
rowing men from this group as well as
from the Iranian mission and groups of
casuals destined for Stilwell's headquarters
in China, Wheeler organized a temporary
staff and got port and other operations
under way.
At this time, the resources available to
the U.S. Army were meager. Shaken by
the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, scarcely
started in "the battle of production," and
faced with the necessity of holding the
enemy in Europe and the Pacific, the
United States could make only limited
provision for the war in Asia. Instructed to
live off the country insofar as possible,
Wheeler decided to decentralize supply
operations to the areas where American
troops would be stationed in number.
After the arrival of the first service troops
in May, he moved his headquarters to
New Delhi where British General Head-
quarters (India) was located, and divided
the SOS organization into geographical
base and advance sections. As SOS activi-
ties fanned out from Karachi across India
to Bengal and up to Assam and China,
549
existing sections were consolidated or
inactivated and new ones created.
The SOS organization had crystallized
by April 1943. Base Section One, with
headquarters at Karachi, controlled SOS
activities in western India. Base Section
Two, with headquarters at Calcutta, exer-
cised jurisdiction over the area along the
route to Assam. Advance Section Two
(later Intermediate Section Two), with
headquarters first at Dibrugarh and later
at Chabua, received supplies for China or
Burma. Base Section Three (later Advance
Section Three) had its headquarters at
Ledo, Assam, the base for construction
and for the projected combat operations
in north Burma. Advance Section Three,
established at Kunming in June 1942,
conducted SOS operations in China.
Later, Advance Section Four was to be
set up at Kweilin to handle supplies for
U.S. forces in east China. The two sections
were consolidated in January 1944 to form
a single SOS agency for China. Except for
certain exempted installations and opera-
tions directly under control of SOS head-
quarters, section commanders were re-
sponsible for all SOS activities within their
jurisdiction.3
Initially, U.S. Army transportation
operations were controlled by the section
commanders since no theater or SOS
transportation organization existed. As
the sections expanded, they tended to de-
velop transportation organizations and,
depending on the activities in the locality,
assigned water, rail, air, and motor trans-
portation officers. When in April 1943 a
Transportation Section was organized at
SOS headquarters, it was given the status
of a special staff section. Under the com-
mand of Col. Otto R. Stillinger, this sec-
3
SOS Hist, 1942-44, Vol. I, Ch. 1, pp. 9-25, App.
2, Base Section One, Sec. I, pp. 1-2.
550
tion dealt primarily with planning for
motor, rail, and inland water operations.
Stillinger reported to G-4 and the chief of
staff, communicating through these chan-
nels with the base and advance sections,
which directed actual operations.4
The decentralization of U.S. Army
transportation operations and the estab-
lishment of a transportation section with
purely staff functions were natural out-
growths of the situation in CBI. Higher
strategic priorities afforded other areas
precluded the large-scale provision of
American troops, equipment, and sup-
plies. In addition, CBI, as the arena of
diverse and often conflicting national in-
terests, was perhaps more subject to uncer-
tainties of planning than any other over-
sea area. These two factors, together with
the formidable barriers of time and space,
resulted in a limited development of
American transportation activities in the
area. In line with War Department direc-
tives, the U.S. Army wherever possible
relied on the British for transport and
geared its SOS organization to make use
of the resources locally available. Indeed,
when the British in the summer of 1942
proposed that the Americans take over
bottleneck portions of the railroad in
Assam, Stilwell and Wheeler rejected the
idea.5
Aside from air operations, American
transport activities were confined to base
hauling and to small-scale port operations
at Karachi, Bombay, and, as soon as tac-
tical conditions permitted, Calcutta. Dur-
ing 1942 Karachi, which received virtually
all U.S. Army cargo and China Defense G. Stone, TC, Report on Delhi-Calcutta-Madras,
Supplies (CDS), discharged only 130,342 OCT 5
long tons of such freight. Arrangements for
rail or river movement to the interior were Restoration of Communications Facilities in Burma,
made through British movements authori- OCMH Files; See below, pp. 581-82. On the post-
ties. In October 1942 the U.S. Army Casablanca
ington, see Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and
assumed responsibility for construction of Strategy: 1940-1943, pp. 542-47.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
the Ledo Road and, toward the end of the
year, began operations. As in the case of
the ports, transport in support of this proj-
ect was the responsibility of the section
commander. In China, which received
only a trickle of supplies over the Hump,
the U.S. Army was almost totally depend-
ent on the Chinese for interior distribution
from the Kunming air terminal.
As long as the flow of supplies from the
United States was small, the Indian trans-
port system was able to absorb it, albeit
with some difficulty. By early 1943, how-
ever, plans were in the making for greatly
expanded operations. In January, at Casa-
blanca, the Allied planners agreed to
undertake ANAKIM, an operation to retake
all of Burma, and tentatively set up for
mid-November 1943. Following the con-
ference, General Somervell, the Com-
manding General, Army Service Forces,
visited India and discussed logistical prob-
lems with Wheeler. At Somervell's request,
Wheeler submitted a plan for the support
of 100,000 American troops in China,
assuming the early conquest of north
Burma, followed by the recapture of the
remainder of the country, including Ran-
goon. His plan outlined the personnel and
equipment required for motor transport
deliveries on the Ledo-Burma Road and
for a large-scale barge operation on the
Irrawaddy River northward from Ran-
goon. Upon its receipt in Washington, the
plan was used by the ASF as a basis for
the procurement of vehicles and barge-line
equipment.6
Ibid.; Rpt, Col Benjamin C. Allin and Maj Robert
4
HB CBI.
SOS Hist, 1942-44, Vol. I, Ch. 3, p. 5.
6
Memo, Wheeler for Somervell, 8 May 43, sub:
planning in ASF headquarters in Wash-
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
The strategic assumptions upon which
the Wheeler plan was based were soon
altered. At TRIDENT, in May 1943, the
major emphasis was placed on the support
of an air offensive in China, and ANAKIM
was watered down. The Combined Chiefs
of Staff set a goal of 10,000 tons a month
for Hump deliveries by November 1943,
and made definite commitments only for
a campaign to retake north Burma in the
1943-44 dry season. The ensuing expan-
sion of base installations in Assam and
Manipur State in support of the Hump
airlift and the projected Burma campaign
created a heavy demand for supplies and
equipment. To meet these requirements,
supplies were laid down at Calcutta, now
emerging as the major American cargo
port, far in excess of the capacity of the in-
adequate line of communications leading
into Assam. During the latter half of the
year, congestion at Calcutta and along
the rail and river routes reached serious
proportions and endangered construction,
airlift, and combat operations.7
Quadrant—Planning and Implementation
The TRIDENT decisions had been
reached without coming to grips with the
logistical problems involved in their ex-
ecution. This task was undertaken in
August 1943 at the QUADRANT Confer-
ence at Quebec. There, the logistical re-
quirements for augmented Hump deliv-
eries and construction and combat
operations to re-establish land communi-
cations with China were determined. In
the implementation of these decisions, be-
ginning in the fall of 1943, the U.S. Army
received the means with which to break
the bottleneck between the port of Cal-
cutta and operational centers in Assam
and to carry forward projected operations.
During his visit to India in February
551
1943, General Somervell had analyzed
the central logistical problem as the build-
up of communications to Assam and from
Assam into Burma and he believed that
"with firm purpose the Assam LOC [line
of communications] could carry far
greater tonnage than it was then doing
and furthermore, far greater tonnage than
the British had stated was possible." 8 At
QUADRANT this belief was translated into
action when Somervell joined with his
British counterpart, General Sir Thomas
Sheridan Riddell-Webster, to present a
plan for the monthly air and truck delivery
to China of 85,000 short tons of supplies
and up to 54,000 short tons of petroleum
by 1 January 1946. This goal depended on
the development of the capacity of the
Assam LOC from 102,000 short tons
monthly, the estimated capacity for No-
vember 1943, to 220,000 short tons, and
the construction of pipelines to carry an
additional 72,000 short tons of petroleum
monthly.
In making their proposals, Somervell
and Riddell-Webster noted that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had agreed to provide spe-
cial American personnel, equipment, and
supplies to construct and operate the
Ledo-Kunming route, and also to achieve
the increased tonnage on the Assam LOC.
There was a specific proposal to establish
an American barge line on the Brahma-
putra River to deliver 30,000 short tons a
month to Dibrugarh. They also recom-
mended that the Supreme Commander,
Southeast Asia, soon to be appointed, be
7
Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stil-
well's Mission to China, UNITED STATES ARMY
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 327-
35; G-4 Per Rpts, Hq USAF CBI, qtrs ending 30 Jun
and 31 Dec 43, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
8
Ltr, Somervell to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, Chief
of Mil Hist, 1 May 50, OCMH Files. Cf. John D.
Millet, The Organization and Role of the Army Service
Forces, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, 1954), pp. 64-65.
552
directed to take the necessary action for
the development of transportation to
attain the target figures, and that pending
his assumption of command, the Com-
mander-in-Chief, India, be charged with
primary responsibility.
The plan was incorporated by the CCS
into their over-all strategic plan for Asia.
In their final report, the CCS placed the
main emphasis on the establishment of
land communications with China and the
improvement and security of the air route.
These aims were to be furthered by oper-
ations to capture Upper Burma, prepara-
tions for amphibious operations in the
spring of 1944 against a point to be de-
cided, and a continued build-up and
increase of air routes and air supplies
to China. To provide the means with
which to support these operations, the
CCS adopted Somervell's and Riddell-
Webster's plan.9
In the months following the conference,
negotiations were begun with the British
regarding the use of American troops and
equipment in the development of the
Assam LOC. The proposed barge line on
the Brahmaputra, intended to supplement
civilian river lines, was accepted without
reservation, but planning for rail oper-
ations proved more difficult. When the
Americans first proposed militarizing and
placing American railway troops on the
bottlenecked meter-gauge portion of the
Bengal and Assam Railway leading across
Assam to Ledo, Government of India of-
ficials vetoed the idea, believing that the
railroad was doing as well as could be ex-
pected and fearing adverse effects on the
civil economy and political repercussions.
The need for drastic increases in the
movement of supplies to Assam brought
continued pressure for militarization of
the railroad. While Somervell and the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Chief of Transportation, General Gross,
were on a visit to India, an intercommand
meeting was called in New Delhi in Oc-
tober 1943 to consider means of speeding
up the development of the Assam LOC.
Among the participants were Vice-Adm.
Lord Louis Mountbatten (the Supreme
Allied Commander, Southeast Asia), rep-
resentatives of General Headquarters
(India), the War Transport and Railway
Department of the Government of India,
and American officers, including Stilwell,
Wheeler, Somervell, and Gross.
At this meeting Somervell pointed out
that a 50 percent increase in tonnage was
required by April 1944 if commitments to
China were to be met. If the Government
of India was unable to achieve this goal,
he asserted, sufficient American railway
troops could be provided to assure its ac-
complishment. When British and Indian
railway officials were unable to guarantee
the desired 50 percent increase, Mount-
batten considered it necessary to press the
Government of India to accept the Amer-
ican offer. After the conference, opposi-
tion diminished and negotiations pro-
ceeded smoothly.10 A Military Railway
Service was established, railway troops
were brought in, and the Americans took
control of the meter-gauge lines between
Katihar and Ledo, effective 1 March
1944. Meanwhile, additional port troops
and equipment had arrived at Calcutta,
9
QUADRANT Conference, Aug 43, Papers and Min
of Mtgs, CCS 325, Supply Routes in Northeast India,
and App. B, Draft Directive, CCS to SACSEA, 21
Aug 43; CCS 391/5, Final Rpt to President and Prime
Minister, 24 Aug 43.
10
Hist, Mvmts and Trans Div Hq SACSEA, His-
tory and Development of Assam Line of Communica-
tions, Aug 45 (hereafter cited as Assam LOC Hist),
pp. 4-5, OCT HB CBI Rys; Report to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, South-
East Asia: 1943-1945 (London: His Majesty's Sta-
tionery Office, 1951), pp. 12-13.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
an American barge-line organization had
been established in India, and inland
waterway troops and equipment had been
shipped from the United States.
Organization of a Transportation
Service
Expanded American transportation op-
erations brought into being a Transporta-
tion Service with command as well as staff
functions. Maj. Gen. W. E. R. Covell, who
assumed command of SOS in CBI in No-
vember 1943, considered transportation
"our most difficult and most important
problem." l1 One of his first actions was
to propose reorganization of SOS along
the lines of a zone of communications. In-
cluded was a specific recommendation for
the establishment of a transportation serv-
ice that would operate under a division of
the zone of communications headquarters.
Although his plans were not accepted in
their entirety, the proposal for the creation
of a transportation service was adopted.12
The Transportation Service of SOS was
established at New Delhi on 1 January
1944 to direct, co-ordinate, and supervise
all transportation functions of the U.S.
forces in CBI. General Thomas Wilson
was appointed commanding general and
acted as transportation officer on Covell's
staff. Wilson, former Chief of Transporta-
tion, Southwest Pacific, had been trans-
ferred to CBI at the request of Wheeler in
October 1943 in order to replace Colonel
Stillinger, who was to return to the United
States. Wilson's arrival coincided with
that of Covell, and the two worked closely
in organizing the Transportation Service.13
In addition to his staff functions, Wilson
was given command of the Military Rail-
way Service, the American Barge Lines,
and the Bombay Port of Debarkation,
553
which was removed from the jurisdiction
of Base Section One and established as an
exempted installation on 31 December
1943. The order setting up the service also
attempted to co-ordinate its functions
with those of the base and advance sec-
tions. Transportation officers, to be as-
signed to the staff of each section com-
mand, would receive operational and
technical instructions directly from
Transportation Service.
A rather elaborate organization was
outlined, but it did not go into effect im-
mediately, chiefly because of a lack of per-
sonnel. An acute shortage of qualified
officers continued through the early
months of 1944 and retarded full realiza-
tion of the new organization. The
situation was disturbing to Wilson, and in
April he reported to Washington that it
was getting worse rather than better.14
Despite this handicap, the Transporta-
tion Service had begun to function. Staff
and operating divisions were set up sep-
arately or consolidated, according to
available personnel, and liaison channels
were established to co-ordinate American
and British transportation efforts. Wilson
personally maintained constant contact
with the Director of Movements, General
Headquarters, India, and Transportation
Service officers attended meetings at New
Delhi of the British military and Govern-
ment of India agencies that controlled rail
11
Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 4 Jan 44, AG 500 India
42-45.
12
History of Services of Supply, India-Burma
Theater, 25 October 1944-20 May 1945 (hereafter
cited as SOS Hist, 1944-45), Vol. I, Ch. 1, pp. 28-
30, OCMH Files.
13
Unless otherwise indicated, the treatment of the
Transportation Service organization up to 24 Octo-
ber 1944 is based on SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 24,
Sec. I, Pts. II-III, and Sec. II, Pt. I.
14
Ltr, Wilson to Lt Col John E. Russell, Overseas
Opns Gp OCT, 11 Apr 44, OCT HB CBI Gen Corres
(CM-IN).
554
movements and co-ordinated port and
shipping operations. When Southeast Asia
Command (SEAC) headquarters were set
up at Kandy, Ceylon, a Transportation
Service officer was sent to Colombo to act
as port officer and to maintain liaison with
SEAC and the British Eastern Fleet.
During this early period, Wilson, to-
gether with Covell and Brig. Gen. Gilbert
X. Cheves, the new Base Section Two
commander, devoted his major effort to
breaking the bottlenecks at the port of
Calcutta and along the Assam LOC. Ar-
rangements were made with the British to
give the U.S. Army exclusive use of the
modern King George Docks at Calcutta
and to open Madras as an overflow port.
The British were also persuaded to ap-
point a port controller at Calcutta and to
accept an American officer as one of his
deputies. With the assistance of pressure
from Washington, a committee was set up
to control and co-ordinate movements
over the Assam LOC and a Transporta-
tion Service officer was appointed as a
representative.15
Provision was first made for the exten-
sion of the Transportation Service into
China in February 1944, when Wilson as-
signed Col. Maurice E. Sheahan to handle
the critical transportation situation there.
Sheahan, Wilson's deputy in China, also
acted as transportation officer of Advance
Section One and controlled transportation
operations into the forward areas beyond
the section's boundaries. Under his direc-
tion a significant motor transport opera-
tion was developed in support of the
advanced airfields of the Fourteenth Air
Force in China.
In June 1944 the Transportation Serv-
ice was reorganized. The chief of staff was
redesignated executive officer, and staff
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
and operating divisions were consolidated
into four sections each. The Military Rail-
way Service and the American Barge
Lines continued to be assigned to Trans-
portation Service, and the Bombay Port
of Debarkation remained an exempt sta-
tion under Transportation Service. To a
large extent, the reduction of the Trans-
portation Service organization was due to
a shortage of personnel and the curtail-
ment of what had originally been planned
as a large-scale American barge-line
project. Perhaps equally important was
the fact that Covell's plan for a centralized
zone of communications organization, of
which Transportation Service was to be a
part, was never implemented and, as a
consequence, the section commanders re-
tained a large degree of autonomy.
Although Transportation Service gave
technical and operational guidance to
SOS sections, section commanders con-
tinued to control transportation opera-
tions within their areas. Base Section Two,
for example, retained command of the
Army port organization and troops at
Calcutta along with base motor, rail, air,
and liaison activities. In Advance Section
Three, convoy operations on the Ledo
Road were directed by a provisional or-
ganization under the section commander.
Despite Wilson's efforts to bring the oper-
ation under Transportation Service, his
functions relating to motor transport in
Burma were limited largely to planning
for the opening of the road to China. Dur-
ing 1944 Intermediate Section Two also
provided an example of independent
15
Memo, Gen Styer, CofS ASF, for CofT, 29 Dec
43, OCT 567 India 43; Rad, New Delhi to AGWAR
(Sultan to Marshall for Somervell), 8 Feb 44, CM-IN
5860 (9 Feb 44), OCT HB CBI Assam LofC; Ltr,
Wilson to Gross, 13 Jan 44, OCT HB CBI Rpts and
Intervs.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
transportation operations, conducting a
convoy route from the Bongaigaon rail-
head to Chabua, the main base for Hump
deliveries from Assam to China.16
Whatever the deficiencies in the duality
of organization and authority, they were
not serious enough to impair transporta-
tion operations. There was a large degree
of co-operation between Transportation
Service and section commanders. As the
major transportation problems moved to-
ward a solution during 1944, there was
little pressure for change.
General Wilson returned to the United
States in July 1944 and was succeeded by
Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Edward C. Rose.
During Wilson's command, transporta-
tion operations had been greatly ex-
panded. Until December 1943, two port
companies were the only Transportation
Corps units in the command. By the mid-
dle of 1944 there were on duty two port
battalion headquarters, ten port com-
panies, a railway grand division, five rail-
way operating battalions, one railway
shop battalion, and two harbor craft com-
panies. American rail and barge oper-
ations had been instituted and the bottle-
necks at Calcutta and along the Assam
LOC had been broken; American motor
operations had commenced in China;
close relations with British authorities had
been developed; and plans had been for-
mulated for motor transport on the Ledo-
Burma Road. Covell reported that Wilson
had done "a splendid job in building our
Transportation Service from practically
nothing." 17
Under Rose, the Transportation Service
organization underwent several changes
in the latter half of 1944. To its existing air
transportation activities, consisting largely
of screening requests for priorities for air
555
movement of SOS personnel and cargo
from New Delhi, was added responsibility
for administering the Army's contract
with the China National Aviation Corpo-
ration (CNAC). This airline, jointly
owned by the Chinese Government and
Pan American Airlines, flew lend-lease
materials to China. Beginning in July
1944 the Air Section of Transportation
Service kept a record of CNAC opera-
tions, insured compliance with the con-
tract, and assisted CNAC in solving sup-
ply and other problems. This responsibil-
ity was retained until 1 September 1945,
when it was turned over to the China
Theater.
Another new development occurred in
September 1944, when direction of trans-
portation projects in China was turned
over to Advance Section One, and Shea-
han's organization became a special staff
section under the section commander. In
the following month the American Barge
Lines, operating entirely within Base Sec-
tion Two, was assigned to that section.
The division of CBI on 24 October 1944
into the India-Burma and the China
Theaters was effected without causing
major reorganization of SOS. Advance
Section One already had been granted
virtual autonomy and became SOS in the
China Theater. Transportation Service
was little affected. Aside from providing
several key rail, port, and inland water-
way men requested by the China Theater,
its personnel and functions remained
18
unchanged.
16
SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 3, Base Section Two,
Sec. 2, Pt. 2, p. 2, and App. 4, Intermediate Section
Two, pp. 10-19. See below, pp. 568, 582, 585.
17
Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 21 Jan 44, OCT HB
CBI Gen Corres (CM-IN).
18
SOS Hist, 1944-45, App. 26, Transportation
Service, Sec. I, History of Transportation Service.
556
Developments in India-Burma Theater
When the India-Burma Theater came
into being, most of the major transporta-
tion problems had been overcome or ap-
peared susceptible of early solution. The
once congested Calcutta port was now one
of the world's leading U.S. Army port in-
stallations. QUADRANT capacity targets for
the Assam LOC were being exceeded,
and supplies were flowing smoothly to the
forward area thanks to centralized move-
ment control, MRS operations, and
American and British pipeline and other
construction. The American barge equip-
ment proved unsuitable for long hauls on
the Brahmaputra, but proved useful in
Calcutta port operations and for the sup-
port of airfields in east Bengal. Karachi,
now a minor port, and the Bombay Port
of Debarkation were operating efficiently.
There had also been good progress in
the build-up of air deliveries to China and
the prosecution of combat and construc-
tion operations in north Burma. The cap-
ture of the Myitkyina airfield in May 1944
had greatly improved air routes to China
from India and, together with the in-
creased flow of supplies into Assam,
brought a spectacular rise in traffic over
the Hump. In October 1944 Air Trans-
port Command (ATC) and other carriers
delivered 35,131 short tons to China,
dwarfing the 8,632 short tons carried to
19
China in October 1943. The town of
Myitkyina fell to the Allies in August 1944
and was rapidly converted into a forward
supply and air base. It appeared certain
that the reopening of the land route to
China would not be long delayed.
Transportation activities continued to
expand into early 1945 as cargo arrivals
were accelerated in support of developing
airlift, construction, and combat opera-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
tions. Traffic at Calcutta and along the
Assam LOC increased, reaching a peak in
March and April. Meanwhile, the long-
awaited restoration of overland communi-
cations had been effected in January, and
in the following month organized through-
deliveries of vehicles over the Stilwell
Road to China were begun.
By the late spring of 1945, transporta-
tion operations tended to level off and de-
cline. To be sure, the build-up of China
traffic continued from some time. Hump
deliveries reached a peak of over 73,000
short tons in July; the four-inch pipeline
extending along the Stilwell Road from
Ledo to Kunming was opened in June;
and China road deliveries were kept near
peak levels through the middle of the
year. Over-all traffic, however, declined
as fighting in central Burma came to an
end. Burma cargo deliveries fell off, MRS
traffic declined, and cargo arrivals at Cal-
cutta diminished. The port of Karachi
was closed, and, at the request of the Brit-
ish, American troop debarkations were
transferred from Bombay to Calcutta.
With the end of hostilities, shipments to
India-Burma were sharply curtailed and
all projects canceled. After clearing the
supply routes to China, major wartime
operations were speedily concluded. By
the middle of October 1945 the MRS rail-
way had been turned back to the British,
Stilwell Road deliveries completed, and
the American Barge Lines operation
abandoned. Hump and pipeline deliveries
were terminated shortly thereafter.
SOS had been inactivated in May 1945
and its responsibilities turned over to the
19
For Hump tonnage statistics see table, Hump
Tonnage—All Carriers—(India to China), in History
of the India-Burma Theater, 24 June 1945-31 May
1946 (hereafter cited as Hist of IBT, 1945-46), Vol.
II, Ch. 4, following p. 300, OCMH Files.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 557

theater G-4, but the Transportation Serv- ming to the advance airfields of the Four-
ice had retained its functions. In Septem- teenth Air Force, had been cut in half.
ber 1945 General Rose left the theater With the exception of Chihchiang, the
and was succeeded by Col. A. C. Bigelow. eastern airfields had been captured or de-
On 8 October the Transportation Serv- stroyed, and the standard-gauge railway
ice was discontinued as a command and lines had been taken, leaving only two
established as a special staff section, func-
short meter-gauge lines in Chinese hands.
tioning primarily in an advisory capacity On the operable highway portions of the
to G-3 and G-4 in theater headquarters ELOC, freezing weather, hordes of refu-
on evacuation activities.20 Troop depar- gees, and the deterioration of motor
tures and the outloading of supplies and vehicles had reduced the movement of
equipment were substantially completed supplies to a trickle.
by the end of April 1946, and in May the Throughout Free China, transportation
India-Burma Theater was inactivated. facilities were hopelessly inadequate. The
Chinese vehicles, in early 1944 reported
Transportation in China Theater on the verge of collapse, were now a year
older, and the 544 U.S. Army trucks
The military situation in China was flown in between April and the end of De-
critical in the fall of 1944. The Japanese cember 1944 provided little relief. Vehi-
offensive, begun in the spring, threatened cles, drivers, and maintenance personnel
to engulf central and southwestern China. and facilities were lacking, road condi-
After taking Kweilin on 10 November, tions were bad, and the lack of centralized
the Japanese seized Liuchow and Nan- control made for inefficient utilization of
ning. The only bright spot in the tactical the battered and overworked transport.
picture was on the Salween front, where The situation was so critical that Gen-
Chinese forces were clearing a path for the eral Wedemeyer on 13 December 1944
Burma Road engineers, who were pushing sent an emergency request to Somervell
toward a junction with the Ledo Road. for the earliest possible delivery of 5,000
Believing the enemy intended to take lend-lease trucks, already on order, even
the vital Kunming air terminal, Maj. if it meant an increase in the China Thea-
Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Albert C. Wede- ter's allotment of ships. He also asked for
meyer, Stilwell's successor in China, de- the expedited shipment of 2,000 additional
veloped plans to deploy all available 2½-ton 6x6 U.S. Army trucks. In sum-
Sino-American forces for the defense of marizing the transportation situation,
the area and most transport facilities were Wedemeyer reported that the Chinese had
diverted toward that end. The threat to only about 2,000 trucks in good condition
Kunming never materialized. After ad- and that the capacity of Chinese transport
vancing within sixty miles of Kweiyang in was rapidly declining. Wedemeyer's re-
early December, the Japanese offensive quests were approved in Washington, and
stalled.
Although the Japanese failed to take 20
Ltr, Col H. C. Helgerson, Exec Officer Trans
Kunming, they had wreaked enormous Sv USF IBT, to Gross, 6 Jun 45, OCT HB CBI Rpts
and Intervs; Ltr, Helgerson to Gross, 27 Sep 45, OCT
havoc. The East Line of Communications 500 I-B; Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 20, Transporta-
(ELOC), extending eastward from Kun- tion Section, Sec. I, pp. 21-23, Sec. II, pp. 1-2.
558
immediate action was taken to deliver the
trucks. This was followed by the establish-
ment of a program to bring 15,000 vehi-
cles to China by the end of 1945 and an
additional 5,000 trucks shortly there-
21
after.
The establishment of the China Theater
was followed by a general elaboration of
American and Chinese transportation or-
ganizations. Advance Section One became
SOS U.S. Forces China Theater, and its
principal transportation activities shifted
from support of the eastern airfields of the
Fourteenth Air Force to the supply and
movement of U.S.-sponsored Chinese di-
visions, which had been designated by
China to receive supplementary American
training and equipment. SOS was charged
with the responsibility for insuring the un-
interrupted flow of supplies, equipment,
and personnel to the U.S. Forces and to
U.S.-sponsored Chinese forces. This re-
sponsibility extended from the bases where
supplies were picked up to the forward
truckheads where they were turned over
to the American liaison officers with the
Chinese combat commands. Within SOS,
a Transportation Section co-ordinated and
guided transportation operations, while
area commands (later base sections) as-
sumed an increasing degree of control over
transportation operations.22
The Chinese set up a parallel supply
service organization at Kunming in Feb-
ruary 1945. The Chinese supply service
was responsible for the supply and trans-
port of Chinese military forces and oper-
ated under American SOS guidance.
Meanwhile, a War Transport Board
(WTB) had been established at Chung-
king in January as an agency of the
Chinese National Military Council. The
WTB, a Chinese organization with Amer-
ican liaison representation, was to exer-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
cise centralized control over all Chinese
transportation. Liaison with this agency
was an important function of Col. Lacey
V. Murrow, who was appointed theater
chief of transportation in the same month.
Heading a small special staff section at
theater headquarters at Chungking, Mur-
row engaged in planning activities and
worked closely with WTB and other
agencies in integrating American and
Chinese transportation activities. The
WTB was slow in assuming all its assigned
functions, but as finally organized it
proved 23a reasonably effective control
agency.
The turning point in the critical trans-
portation situation came with the open-
ing of the Stilwell Road. The flow of ve-
hicles and drivers from India and Burma
gave new life to motor transport opera-
tions. At the same time, the limited rail
facilities were improved through Ameri-
21
History of the China Theater (hereafter cited as
CT Hist), Ch. IV, pp. 16-18, OCMH Files; Memo,
Maj Gen Walter A. Wood, Jr., Actg Dir Plans and
Opns ASF, for CofS ASF, 5 Jan 45, sub: Interim Rpt
on Truck Trans in CT, AG 451.2 (5 Jan 42); Ltr, Gen
Styer, Actg CG ASF, to CG USF CT, 3 Feb 45, same
sub, AG 400.3295 (3 Feb 45) (1).
22
Colonel Sheahan was succeeded as head of the
SOS Transportation Section by Col. Phillip W. Rica-
more, on 27 November 1944. Col. Clarence C. Benson,
a Cavalry officer, assumed command in January
1945, Ricamore staying on as operations officer. In
June, Benson returned to the United States and was
succeeded by Col. Kent C. Lambert, another cavalry-
man. For details on the Transportation Section
organization and its relations with area commands
and the Chinese SOS, see OCT HB Monograph 32,
pp.309-15.
23
Ltr, Maj Gen Gilbert X. Cheves, CG SOS CT,
to Wedemeyer, 17 Apr 45, sub: Opns of American
and Chinese SOS's, OCMH Files; Trans Sv News-
letter, SOS IBT, Vol. II, No. 1, Jan 45, OCT HB CBI;
Ltr, Col Murrow, CofT USF CT, to Gross, 26 Mar 45,
OCT 500 China 45-46; Resume of Trans Activities,
1st qtr 45, OCT HB CT Rpts; Report of Proceedings
of Board of Officers, pp. 12-13, Tabs C, H, CT Folder
Expenditures Relating to Trans Accounts, KCRC
AGO.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
can technical advice and some material
assistance, and inland water transport,
heretofore restricted in development by
the shortage of supplies and the need for
fast delivery, was more fully exploited.
The increased delivery of supplies to
China and the beginning of an improved
transportation system within China
brightened the tactical situation. In Feb-
ruary 1945 the China Theater drew up a
plan for offensive operations aimed at the
ultimate seizure of the ports of Canton
and Hong Kong. The opportunity to set
the plan in motion came earlier than
anticipated. After resuming the offensive
in March and April 1945, the Japanese,
apparently alarmed by the threat to the
China coast posed by the Iwo Jima and
Okinawa invasions and the possibility of
Russian intervention, began to withdraw
from south and central China. The
Chinese followed and reoccupied the
evacuated territory, retaking Nan-ning,
Liuchow, and Kweilin. With the occupa-
tion of these cities, motor transport routes
were lengthened, inland water routes were
established in liberated areas, and the
possibility of rehabilitating recaptured
standard-gauge railroads was explored.
In June 1945 Wedemeyer notified the
War Department that Fort Bayard, a port
on the Liuchow Peninsula could be taken
by 1 August. This operation would open a
new line of supply to China and provide a
steppingstone for the capture of Canton
and Hong Kong. Five loaded Liberty ships
were readied at Manila for shipment to
Fort Bayard, a program of highway con-
struction and improvement got under way
in the Liuchow area, and arrangements
were made to transfer port companies
from Calcutta. During this period, Hump,
pipeline, and vehicle deliveries to China
were at a peak, and within China a
559
mounting volume of supplies moved to
forward areas from Kunming, Chanyi,
and other points of delivery. Motor trans-
port operations continued to expand as
additional trucks and drivers were as-
signed; rail traffic, although still small in
volume, increased; and inland water de-
liveries were at their highest.
The Fort Bayard project was not car-
ried out because of the end of hostilities
and the opening of Shanghai. After com-
pleting the immediate postwar task of sup-
porting the air deployment of Chinese
troops to east China and clearing the pipe,
air, and road supply lines to China, Amer-
ican wartime operations ended. By the end
of the year, U.S. Army troops had been
completely evacuated from west China
and continuing postwar activities were
confined to the Shanghai area.
The Indian Ports
When U.S. Army transportation opera-
tions began in CBI early in 1942, the ports
available for American use were limited in
number. The presence of Japanese forces
within striking distance of the east coast of
India prevented use of east coast ports.
Bombay, on the west coast, was the main
British port of entry and was heavily con-
gested. Cochin was available, but unsuit-
able rail connections made its use inad-
visable.
Karachi
Karachi, on the northwest coast of
India, offered the most satisfactory service
at the time, and it became the first port of
entry for American cargo and personnel.
Like other Indian ports, Karachi was ad-
ministered by a civilian port trust created
by and operating under the Government
560
of India. There were 22 ship berths, with
maximum drafts varying from 10 to 30
feet, and 12 fixed moorings with drafts up
to 30 feet. Large vessels could be moored
two miles below the end of the wharves in
60 feet of water. There were adequate
water and bunkering facilities, a limited
number of floating cranes and lighters,
and a few tugs and launches; all wharves
were equipped with 1½-ton electric shore
cranes. The wharves were rail served and
most cargo was unloaded from ship to
railway cars. Since there were no shipside
or transit sheds, cargo was at once trans-
ported to warehouses by rail, truck, or
lighter.
Upon the arrival of the first shipment of
American troops in March 1942, Wheeler
set up a provisional port detachment.
Classification, sorting, and movement to
storage areas of 20,000 long tons of China
lend-lease cargo diverted from Singapore
and Rangoon became the first duty of this
group. These supplies had been received
by the Karachi Port Trust and dumped on
the docks without any attempt to classify
and store them.24
The provisional detachment functioned
until May, when its duties were taken
over by the newly arrived headquarters
and two companies of the 393d Port Bat-
talion, consisting of white officers and
Negro enlisted men. With the move of
SOS headquarters to New Delhi, port
operations came under the direction of
Base Section One. Under the section com-
mander, the commanding officer of the
port battalion was appointed port quarter-
master, and junior officers were assigned
to supervise water and port activities and
to arrange for air and rail transportation.
During 1942 practically all equipment
and supplies for CBI entered through the
port of Karachi. Cargo handling was
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
under American direction. The port
troops supervised native coolie labor pro-
vided by stevedoring contractors and
served as drivers, checkers, guards, crane
operators, dock foremen, and riggers.
Although the battalion had no stevedor-
ing equipment upon arrival in India, it
was gradually acquired or constructed by
port personnel. Improvisation and on-the-
job training resulted in a steady improve-
ment of port operations. During the year,
Karachi discharged a total of 130,342 long
tons of cargo, loaded 8,065 long tons, and
arranged for the rail shipment of 54,140
long tons to other parts of the theater. In
addition, approximately 13,800 troops
were debarked and 4,908 were shipped by
rail to other sections.
Although U.S. Army and CDS tonnage
arriving in the theater mounted steadily
during 1943, incoming traffic at Karachi
did not increase. As soon as the tactical
situation permitted, an east coast port
closer to the forward areas was opened.
Beginning in September 1942, supplies
were transshipped from Karachi to Cal-
cutta. The latter was opened to vessels ar-
riving from the United States in March
1943 and soon surpassed Karachi in im-
portance.
With the shift of emphasis from Karachi
to Calcutta, the two port companies were
transferred, one moving to Calcutta in
February 1943 and the other in August.
Continuing port activities at Karachi
were handled by a small Army staff super-
vising native labor. The loss of the port
24
Narrative and statistical data on Army port oper-
ations at Karachi before 25 October 1944 are based on
the following: SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 2 and App. 24,
Sec. I, Pt. IV, Water Section, Karachi, and Sec. II, Pt.
I, Water Section, Karachi; Hist, 541st Port Go TC,
AG Opns Rpts, TCCO-541-0.1 (10962) M 7 Feb 42-
30 Jun 44; Hist, 540th Port Co TC, AG Opns Rpts
TCCO-540-0.1 (10960) M Sep 42-Dec 45.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 561

units did not impair operational efficiency. Troops arriving at Karachi were billeted
During 1943 Karachi three times stood at the Replacement Depot at North Malir,
first among overseas ports in monthly cargo fourteen miles from the port. After proc-
discharge performance, and in December essing and as ships became available, per-
set a new port record for itself, unload- sonnel were trucked to shipside and em-
ing 5,645 long tons from the SS Mark barked. The first troop transport to arrive,
Hopkins in three days and ten hours work- the General McRae, berthed on 22 Septem-
ing time. ber and took on 3,008 passengers. Evacua-
Despite the designation of Karachi as tion operations reached a peak in October,
the main delivery port for assembled air- when 26,352 troops were loaded on eight
craft, it handled a dwindling traffic in transports. The Army port at Karachi was
1944. After January 1944 Karachi was un- closed in January 1946, having embarked
important as a supply base, except for the 80,185 personnel, and all port troops were
units in Base Section One. The major ac- either transferred to Calcutta or returned
26
tivity was the discharge of a monthly aver- to the United States.
age of two ZEC-2 vessels carrying as-
sembled aircraft. The port's outstanding Bombay
performance during the year was the dis-
charge of the Mark Twain. This fully Despite its magnificent deepwater har-
loaded cargo ship carrying 5,597 long tons bor and excellent port facilities, Bombay
was completely unloaded 48.5 hours after was overtaxed by British and Indian
docking. traffic and remained so into 1943. As a re-
With the progressive withdrawal of sult it was never used to handle much
personnel from western India, the need for American cargo. However, since neither
an Army port organization at Karachi Karachi nor Calcutta could accommodate
gradually disappeared. On 15 May 1945 large transports, Bombay became the
Base Section One was officially inac- major port of debarkation for American
tivated, and with the exception of a small troops entering CBI. During 1943 a total
detachment that supervised the unloading of 118,983 Americans passed through the
of small shipments arriving on tankers port, including troops debarked and
and some coastwise cargo, all troops were transshipped to the Persian Gulf Service
transferred to other installations in the Command.
India-Burma and China theaters. 25 During this period American operations
After the termination of hostilities, were conducted by a small staff from Base
Karachi became an important port for the Section One. Much of the work consisted
evacuation of personnel from the theater. of making the necessary arrangements
The Karachi Port of Embarkation was ac- with the British, who directed the debar-
tivated in August 1945, and in the follow- kation of troops and the discharge of
ing month a series of trans-India rail
movements began that brought troops 25
SOS Hist, 1944-45, App. 1, pp. 6-18, 101, 122-
from the Ledo and Chabua areas to 23, and App. 26, Sec. B, Water Transportation, Port
Karachi. As aircraft were withdrawn from of 26Karachi.
the Hump run, they supplemented and App Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 6, Karachi PE, and
20, Sec. I, Water Section, Port of Karachi, Sec.
later supplanted the troop trains. II, Water Section, Port of Karachi.
562
cargo, provided berthing and staging facil-
ities, and handled the onward rail move-
ment. From Bombay the troops traveled
1,300 miles by rail to Calcutta and more
27
than 2,100 miles to east Bengal or Assam.
On 31 December 1943 the Bombay
Port of Debarkation was established as an
exempt station directly under the com-
manding general of Transportation Serv-
ice. A port commander and a military staff
were assigned and civilians were hired to
supplement them. Subsequent accretions
brought the number of port personnel to
approximately 500. The port's principal
mission was the debarkation of U.S. Army
troops, from transports usually berthed at
Ballard Pier. It also handled the embar-
kation of U.S. and Allied military and
civilian personnel leaving on American
vessels and the unloading and transship-
ment of a limited amount of coastwise
cargo.28
Although the U.S. port organization
supervised the debarkation of American
troops, the British at first retained control
of all port installations, staging areas, and
rail movements. Every action had to be
cleared with the British authorities, an ar-
rangement the Americans found unsatis-
factory. They complained that debarka-
tions were delayed by the provision of in-
sufficient rolling stock and poor timing of
trains scheduled to move troops from ship-
side, and that the staging facilities were
not up to American standards.
Gradually, one function after another
was transferred, and eventually the U.S.
port commander assumed responsibility
for most activities pertaining to American
operations, including the actual debarka-
tion and embarkation of personnel, the
loading of special trains, and the discharge
and loading of cargo and organizational
impedimenta. Reliance on British staging
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
facilities ended in July 1944 when an
American staging area was opened at
Lake Beale, 125 miles from Bombay at
one of the main trans-India railway con-
nections. Camp Beale handled debarking
and embarking personnel until October,
when a section of Camp Kalyan, a British
staging area at Bombay, was released to
the U.S. Army and placed under the port
commander. It was used to stage military
and civilian personnel departing from the
India-Burma theater. Camp Beale was
then assigned to SOS Replacement Serv-
ice and was used exclusively as a staging
area for troops arriving in the theater.
Until the late spring of 1944, most U.S.
Army troops arrived on British transports
after transshipment from WSA vessels in
the Mediterranean. Thereafter, they were
brought in by U.S. Navy transports of the
P-2 type. The first of these, the General
Butner, arrived in May, followed in July by
the General Randall. On the basis of the ex-
perience gained in handling these two
vessels, the port staff was reorganized and
operating procedures were modified.
By the latter part of 1944 the Bombay
port operation was proceeding satisfac-
torily. Although the problem of timing the
arrival of troop trains at quayside per-
sisted, there was a steady improvement.
Debarkation procedures were established
to insure a five-day turnaround for the
ships, although the wait for convoy escorts
27
SOS Hist, 1942-44, Vol. I, Ch. 2, pp. 4-5, and
App. 24, Preface; Memo, Maj J. C. Veith, TC, for
Gross, 20 Jan 43, sub: Ports of India, 20 Jun 43, OCT
HB CBI Bombay; SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 2, Sec. 2,
p. 9.
28
On activities of the Bombay Port of Debarkation,
see the following: SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 7, POD,
and App. 24, Sec. I, Pt. IV, Water Section, Bombay,
and Sec. II, Pt. I, Water Section, Bombay; SOS Hist,
1944-45, App. 5, POD, and App. 26, Sec. V, Water
Transportation, Port of Bombay; Hist of IBT,
1945-46, Sec. I, Water Section, Port of Bombay.
 CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 563

occasionally extended the time to seven Karachi to Calcutta, and by the end of the
days. year six small vessels had been discharged
American operations were brought to a under the supervision of an Engineer unit
close when the British expressed their de- that had been detailed to the task. Enemy
sire to secure the exclusive use of Bombay action did not seriously hamper port oper-
for anticipated post-V-E Day redeploy- ations, although an air raid in December
ment of their troops to India. After a suc- 1942 caused a large-scale civilian evacua-
cessful experimental run of two smaller tion and produced a temporary labor
American transports to Calcutta in Febru- shortage. Later raids in January and De-
ary 1945, it was decided to give up the cember 1943 had little effect on port
west coast port. The last transport to ar- activities.29
rive at Bombay, the Admiral Benson, Port operations began to expand when,
berthed late in March, unloading 4,866 upon the recommendation of the Anglo-
troops and taking on 1,363 passengers. All American Shipping Mission, shipping was
debarkation activities were then shifted to routed directly from the United States to
Calcutta, and on 1 June Bombay was Calcutta. About 8,000 long tons of U.S.
officially closed as an American port. Army and China-aid supplies arrived in
March 1943, and incoming tonnage
Calcutta mounted steadily thereafter. Under the
command of Base Section Two, the two
Calcutta is located in Bengal, eighty port companies transferred from Karachi,
miles up the Hooghly River. The stream the 540th and 541st, took over supervision
followed a winding course and was rela- of U.S. longshore and dock operations.
tively shallow, accommodating ships with U.S. Army port activities tended to be
a draft of 22 to 30 feet, depending on the centered at the King George Docks, al-
season. The port had a total of 49 berths, though some cargo was discharged at the
most of which could accommodate ocean- Kiddepore Docks or, in the case of heavy
going vessels, and 44 ships could be items such as steel, at berths outside the
anchored in the stream. The more modern tidal locks.
of these facilities, the King George and The port troops supervised coolie labor,
the Kiddepore Docks, were inside the checked and sorted cargo, prepared tallies,
tidal locks. Most wharves were equipped and loaded cargo into trucks, barges, and
with transit sheds, and there was a fair rail wagons for transshipment to the
amount of shore and floating equipment. proper consignees. In an effort to unload
The port was served by three broad-gauge maximum tonnages, they operated in
rail lines, the Bengal and Assam Railway twelve-hour shifts and often worked as
having tracks into the docks. The labor long as eighteen hours at a stretch. The
supply was ample. 29
Although Calcutta by virtue of its loca- On Army port activities at Calcutta before 25
October 1944, see the following: SOS Hist, 1942-44,
tion and facilities was more desirable than App. 3 and App. 24, Sec. I, Pt. IV, Water Section,
the west coast ports, Japanese activity in Calcutta, Sec. II, Pt. I, Water Section, Calcutta. For
the Bay of Bengal initially barred its use. port discharge statistics see SOS Hist, 1942-44, App.
3, Sec. 1, Statistics and Maps, Table 4, Sec. 2, Activi-
Beginning in September 1942, however, ties, Port; Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 20, Sec. I, Water
supplies were transshipped by water from Section, Chart, Cargo Discharged at Port of Calcutta.
564
port troops trained Indians in cargo check-
ing and the operation of mechanical
equipment. To counteract the acute officer
shortage, noncommissioned officers were
assigned to many responsible positions.30
These measures substantially increased
cargo discharge, but not enough to keep
up with incoming tonnage. There were in-
sufficient port personnel and equipment,
centralized direction of military and civil-
ian activities was lacking, and ships arriv-
ing from Colombo, Ceylon, were bunched
in convoys and were delayed from three to
ten days awaiting berths. At the same
time, the inability of the Assam LOC to
lift the cargo landed caused an accumula-
tion of freight at the docks, warehouses,
and sheds. The developing congestion at
Calcutta in the latter part of 1943 threat-
ened to handicap current and projected
operations, and in December Covell
termed the port "our No. 1 problem." 31
The first solid relief came in late De-
cember 1943 and early January 1944
when two port battalions, the 497th and
408th, including headquarters and head-
quarters companies and a total of eight
port companies, arrived at Calcutta. The
organizations were accompanied by cargo-
handling equipment and possessed a
number of experienced officers and en-
listed men. The two battalions began
operations at the King George Docks,
where they handled all U.S. Army trans-
ports. The 540th and 541st Port Com-
panies were then moved to the Kiddepore
Docks and the Calcutta Jetties, where
they supervised the discharge of com-
mercial vessels and animal ships.
As the new port troops tackled the job
of clearing the congestion at Calcutta,
steps were being taken to facilitate their
task. Arrangements were made to discon-
tinue convoys from Colombo temporarily
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
in order to relieve pressure on Calcutta;
Madras was opened as a subport to which
overflow cargo could be diverted from
Calcutta; British agreement was obtained
to appoint a port controller for Calcutta;
and, effective 1 March 1944, the King
George Docks, with four general cargo
berths, completely equipped sheds, shore
cranes, and a fifth berth under construc-
tion, were leased for the exclusive use of
the U.S. Army. 32
The importation of port troops and
equipment and other measures taken to
relieve congestion had their desired effect.
Tonnage discharged monthly at the port
more than doubled in January 1944, and
in February totaled 128,397 long tons, a
record for the year. By the middle of
March, the base section commander was
able to report that the bottleneck at Cal-
cutta had been broken. With the British
port controller finally arrived in May, the
port was operating smoothly. As a result of
improved methods and the better spacing
of ship arrivals at Calcutta, the maximum
time lost by any vessel waiting for a berth
between June and October was one day.
During this period the port units, spurred
on by friendly competition, steadily im-
proved their operations, and unloading
activities were further facilitated when
American barge equipment and low-bed
trailers and tractors were received. 33 As
will be seen, the Assam LOC's increased
ability to move supplies forward was also
30
See port company hists cited n. 24.
31
Statement quoted in Styer memo cited n. 15.
32
Rad, New Delhi for AGWAR, Covell for Som-
ervell, 23 Jan 44, CM-IN 16816 (26 Jan 44), OCT
565.2 India 44; SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 24, Sec. 1,
Pt. V, App. 5; Rad, New Delhi to AGWAR, cited
n. 15.
33
For a description of methods employed in cargo
discharge and clearance, see Lt Willis Johnson, Jr.,
Inf, History of the 497th Port Battalion, Transporta-
tion Corps, OCT HB CBI Misc Info.
 CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 565

an important factor in making port oper- vised the loading of freight cars, and oper-
ations more fluid. ated all floating cranes and other cargo-
During 1944 Calcutta handled most of handling equipment. The system of com-
the U.S. Army and CDS cargo arriving in petition between units was retained and
the theater. In that year the port dis- intensified, and wherever possible cargo
charged 1,092,625 long tons, while Kara- was unloaded directly from shipside into
chi unloaded less than 100,000 long tons. rail wagons, barges, and trucks for move-
As the theater's major cargo port, Cal- ment to depots or direct to forward des-
cutta played an important role in making tinations.
CBI the leader in port discharge perform- Monthly cargo arrivals fell off after
ance. After February 1944 the theater, March 1945, although they were still
with few exceptions, stood first among the greater than during most of 1944. With
oversea commands in the rate of dis- the exception of a brief period of conges-
charge. Calcutta, however, had a number tion beginning in May, when a large
of advantages. With the exception of a few number of British and foreign flag vessels
air raids, all of them before January 1944, were brought into the port in preparation
the port did not operate under combat for the Rangoon operation, cargo was
conditions; a large supply of native labor handled expeditiously and the average
was available; and the U.S. Army con- cargo vessel was discharged in three days.
trolled a modern, well-equipped dock As the sole cargo port in the command
area. These factors, together with the per- after Karachi closed, Calcutta continued
formance at Karachi, which handled a to function smoothly. Port troops and
relatively small amount of "easy" cargo, native labor, working at five berths at the
helped keep the theater in the number King George Docks, discharged an aver-
one spot. age of 122,549 long tons a month from
Increased cargo arrivals, beginning in June through September 1945, and in July
November 1944, resulted in further ex- established a new theater record, dis-
pansion of port activities.34 Discharge op- charging 3,034 measurement tons and re-
erations reached their peak in March leasing the Alden Besse in thirty hours.
1945, when 173,441 long tons were dis- The port also continued to load some
charged from 66 vessels. This increased coastwise cargo and handled a limited
traffic was handled without increases in amount of export shipping to the United
men or machinery. Operating under the States, loading such items as repairable
Water Division of Base Section Two, the airplane engines and salvage. The one
port troops had developed standardized large loading operation before the end of
operational procedures and were now hostilities was the transfer of personnel
seasoned veterans. Discharge activities and equipment of the XX Bomber Com-
were conducted twenty-four hours a day, mand to the Pacific Ocean Areas. The
the port personnel supervising native labor 34
Unless otherwise noted, the account of Calcutta
in the hatches and on the docks. Arrange- port operations after 24 October 1944 is based upon:
ments had been made with contractors to SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 3, Sec. 3; SOS Hist, 1944-45,
supply the same coolies each day, thereby App. 26, Sec. V, Water Transportation, Port of Cal-
permitting them to develop skills on the cutta; Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 2 and App. 20, Sec.
I, Water Section, Port of Calcutta, Sec. II, Water
job. The Army men checked cargo, super- Section, Port of Calcutta.
566
movement, effected between May and
July 1945, involved the water shipment of
10,257 men and the loading of 10 cargo
ships with 13,932 long tons of cargo, in-
cluding 2,291 special and general type
vehicles.
Meanwhile, Calcutta had taken over
the theater's debarkation and embarka-
tion activities. After the successful experi-
mental run of two C-4 transports into
Calcutta in February 1945, the Bombay
Port of Debarkation was closed and key
personnel were transferred to Calcutta,
where they organized an Embarkation
and Debarkation (E&D) Section under
the base transportation officer. Liaison
was established with U.S. Navy and Brit-
ish port authorities, and plans were made
for handling troop transports. The first two
regularly scheduled C-4's arrived at Cal-
cutta on 27 April 1945 and anchored in
the stream. Under the supervision of the
E&D Section, 5,762 debarking troops
were ferried to Princep Ghat, where they
were loaded on special trains arranged for
with British Movements. Embarking
troops were then ferried to the ships and
were all aboard on 6 May.
Procedures were improved as successive
troopships arrived. However, selection of
Shalimar Siding for embarkation proved
unfortunate, since troops had to carry
their duffle bags one quarter of a mile in
the heat over railroad ties before reaching
the ferry. After the first regular operation,
Princep Ghat was used for both embarka-
tion and debarkation. Another improve-
ment was put in hand when experiments
proved that the transports could come
aside the jetties and deliver personnel di-
rectly to shore without the use of ferries.
To deal with delays in obtaining trains,
troops were moved by river steamer from
Princep Ghat to Kanchrapara staging
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
area, the temporary destination of most
troops. Later, movements to and from
Kanchrapara were made by truck. In the
closing months of the war, as backlogs of
high-point, rotational, and other person-
nel awaiting departure by water began to
develop, efforts were made to ship troops
aboard cargo vessels as well as troop trans-
ports. From 20 May to 2 September 1945,
a total of 17,666 troops embarked at Cal-
cutta, while 16,028 debarked.
With the termination of hostilities, the
flow of traffic into Calcutta was rapidly
reversed. Eleven of twenty-nine ships en
route to the India-Burma theater were re-
turned to the United States and three
were diverted to Shanghai. 35 Cargo and
troop arrivals at Calcutta declined sharply
in September and were negligible there-
after. At the same time personnel being
evacuated from China and all parts of
India and Burma began moving into the
Calcutta area, and programs were formu-
lated to ship supplies accumulated or
backhauled to the port.
The principal postwar cargo operations
involved the shipment of POL and gen-
eral cargo to the newly opened port of
Shanghai, the dumping at sea of deterio-
rating ammunition and chemical warfare
toxics, and the return to the United States
of materials not otherwise disposed of in
the theater. Vessels for these purposes
were allocated by the War Department.
Loadings were performed exclusively by
the U.S. Army port organization until late
1945, when personnel losses caused the
Americans to arrange for the assistance of
commercial shipping agents. By the end of
February 1946, as the shipping program
neared completion, most of the facilities at
the King George Docks were returned to
35
G-4 Per Rpt, Hq USF IBT, qtr ending 30 Sep
45, pp. 4-5, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
 CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
the Calcutta Port Trust. The last port
company was inactivated on 19 April, and
the port was then operated on a purely
commercial basis. From the beginning of
October 1945 through April 1946, a total
of 320,437 long tons was shipped to the
United States, Shanghai, or other oversea
areas, and 73,547 long tons of ammunition
and toxic gas were dumped. With the
exception of minor tonnages loaded at
Karachi for Shanghai in October 1945, all
loadings were made out of Calcutta.36
In the meantime, Calcutta had joined
Karachi in effecting the water evacuation
of troops. The first ship under the postwar
program, the General Black, arrived on 26
September 1945 and took on 3,005 pas-
sengers. Subsequent arrivals were either
other C-4 "General" troopships or smaller
War Shipping Administration "Marine"
vessels, capable of carrying about 2,500
passengers. Transports were generally
berthed at Princep Ghat or the Man-of-
War Mooring. Embarkation activities at
Calcutta reached a peak in November,
when 21,990 embarked on eight trans-
ports. The closing of Karachi in January
1946 kept Calcutta busy for another
month, but activities fell off as evacuation
approached completion. By the end of
April, 187,761 troops had departed the
theater by water. Of these, 107,576 left
from Calcutta. The final embarkation op-
eration of the India-Burma Theater took
place on 30 May, when 812 military and
civilian passengers boarded the Marine
Jumper.37
Madras and Colombo
Used at first as an emergency port to
lighten vessels whose draft did not permit
entrance into the Hooghly River, Madras
was opened as a subport of Calcutta in
February 1944 to handle overflow ship-
567
ping. After discharging a total of 24,363
long tons in February and March, the port
received only minor tonnages. With the
clearing of congestion at Calcutta, the
port's activities were limited to the light-
ening of vessels and the discharge of small
coastwise shipments for the supply of U.S.
Army detachments and a small Army
drum plant located in the vicinity. A
small transportation staff was retained at
Madras to expedite transfer of port oper-
ations in the event Calcutta should be
rendered inaccessible.
Another minor American port oper-
ation was established following the trans-
fer of Southeast Asia Command head-
quarters from New Delhi to Kandy, Cey-
lon. A Transportation Service officer was
stationed at Colombo in April 1944 to act
as port transportation officer and to main-
tain liaison with SEAC and the Eastern
Fleet. Aside from his liaison functions, the
officer's principal activity involved super-
vision of the discharge of cargo for the
supply of the small group of U.S. Army
personnel serving with SEAC. By October
1945 cargo arrivals had ceased, and all
that remained to be accomplished was the
shipment of some surplus supplies to
Calcutta.38
The Assam Line of Communications
The transportation system leading from
Calcutta into Assam, called the Assam
36
Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 20, Sec. II, App. D,
and Sec. III, App. C.
37
Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 2, Sec. 2, History of
E&D Division from V-J Day, and App. 20, Sec. I, p. 7,
Sec. II, pp. 5-7, Sec. III, p. 2.
38
SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 24, Sec. I, Pt. IV,
Water Section, Madras, Colombo, and Sec. II, Pt. I,
Water Section, Madras, Colombo; SOS Hist, 1944-45,
App. 26, Sec. V, Port of Madras, Port of Colombo;
Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 20, Sec. I, Water Sec-
tion, Port of Colombo.
568
LOG, was described by one Army ob-
server as "the most fascinating and com-
plex problem we have in the world."39
(Map 9) It consisted of rail, water, rail/
water, water/rail, and to a limited extent
rail/highway routes.
The Bengal and Assam Railway, a
state-owned line controlled by a civilian
railway board, was the main carrier on
the LOC. Supplies were shipped from
Calcutta over a broad-gauge line 200 and
275 miles respectively to Santahar and
Parbatipur, the principal points for trans-
fer from broad-gauge to meter-gauge rail-
roads. At these stations freight was trans-
ferred to the meter-gauge line, which cut
across the broad-gauge line from the west.
The rail wagons were moved to the Brah-
maputra River where they were ferried
across, and then they proceeded to Tin-
sukia, whence they traveled over the short
meter-gauge Dibru-Sadiya Railway to
Ledo, 576 miles from Parbatipur.
The railroads were supplemented by
two civilian steamship lines, which hauled
supplies approximately 1,100 miles up the
Brahmaputra from Calcutta to Dibrugarh
in Assam. The river and rail systems were
closely intertwined, and there were nu-
merous junctions along the route where
supplies might be shipped by rail to
Goalundo, barged to Dhubri or Neamati,
and thence hauled by rail to final destina-
tion.
There was no all-weather through high-
way from Calcutta to Assam. A motor
road, however, did extend eastward from
Siliguri, at the northern terminus of the
Bengal and Assam Railway, through Bon-
gaigaon to Jogighopa. From this point
vehicles could be ferried across the Brah-
maputra and then proceed over the
Assam Trunk Road to Chabua and Ledo.
Late in 1943, a limited convoy operation
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
was being conducted by Intermediate Sec-
tion Two from Bongaigaon to Chabua.
The LOC was ill-prepared to take on
wartime traffic. Part of the broad-gauge
rail line and most of the meter-gauge line
were single tracked. The meter-gauge line
in particular was a bottleneck: there were
no bridges across the Brahmaputra; the
steep gradient at the eastern end of the
line made travel slow and hazardous; and
monsoon rains annually disrupted serv-
ice by washing out rail lines and dam-
aging rail bridges across smaller rivers
such as the Beki. To add to these difficul-
ties, the Bengal and Assam Railway was
called upon to handle increasing traffic
with little additional equipment; lacking
replacements and proper maintenance,
rail equipment deteriorated. Like the rail-
ways, the inland waterway lines were sub-
ject to disruption during the monsoons,
and, in addition, their operation was slow
and restricted during low-water periods.40
At the outbreak of war, the Assam
LOC carried only about 1,000 to 1,500
long tons daily. In an effort to increase its
capacity to support developing military
activities in northeastern India, military
movement control was gradually intro-
duced, although operation of the carriers
remained in the civilian hands. In March
1943 the British established a Regional
Priorities Committee to allot military and
civilian traffic in the Assam area. By Oc-
tober the capacity for military traffic had
been increased to 2,800 long tons a day,
but this was inadequate to cope with the
supplies poured into the LOC.
During this period, the British also for-
mulated plans to develop the LOC
39
Ltr, Lt Col John E. Russell, TC, to Gen Wylie,
ACofT, 8 Feb 44, OCT HB CBI Assam LOC.
40
Assam LOC Hist, pp. 1-4; SOS Hist, 1942-44,
Vol. I, Ch. 3, pp. 1-3, and App. 24, Preface; Rail
Div OCT rpt cited n. 2, pp. 7-20. See map, p. 569.
570
through new construction. Projects under-
taken in 1943 included construction of
double-track, railway sidings, yards, and
a railway bridge over the Brahmaputra.
Progress was slow, however, and few of the
jobs were completed during the year.41
The LOC's inability to lift the military
supplies laid down at Calcutta became
increasingly evident in the latter half of
1943. The port was congested with accu-
mulated cargo. Supplies forwarded to
Assam required up to fifty-five days for
delivery, and it was not uncommon for
shipments to be held more than thirty
days on river barges. As the year ended,
the theater G-4 reported that congestion
on the LOC had reached serious propor-
tions.
The tie-up on the Assam LOC was a
matter of vital interest to the U.S. Army,
then engaged in expanding construction
and airlift operations in Assam and about
to launch a campaign in north Burma.
The American participation in QUADRANT
planning for the LOC and the arrange-
ments for the use of American railway
troops have already been discussed. In ad-
dition, Covell, Wilson, and other inter-
ested officers in early 1944 pressed the
British to militarize transport on the LOG
completely. After negotiations, a compro-
mise in February 1944 resulted in a sys-
tem of semimilitary control in which the
Americans participated.42
Under this system, the British deputy
director of movements, assisted by a U.S.
Army representative and in consultation
with the railway and river transportation
carriers, periodically estimated the total
capacity of the LOC. Tonnage was then
allotted for British and American military
needs, essential civil requirements, and
railway construction and maintenance. A
LOC panel sitting in Calcutta imple-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
mented the allotments and controlled
day-by-day operation. The Calcutta
panel was headed by the deputy director
of movements and consisted of representa-
tives of the British regional controller of
priorities (Calcutta North), the command-
ing general of the U.S. Army SOS in the
theater, the Bengal and Assam Railway,
the two commercial steamship companies,
U.S. Military Railway Service, and Brit-
ish Movements Control. Although there
was American representation on the panel
and, beginning in March 1944, the Amer-
icans operated a portion of the meter-
gauge railway, over-all control of the
LOC remained in the hands of the British.
However, despite inevitable differences of
opinion between British and American
authorities, a remarkable co-operation
was maintained.
The primary function of the Calcutta
panel was to co-ordinate the transport fa-
cilities on the LOC effectively. In addition
to implementing tonnage allotments, the
panel regulated traffic, issuing orders re-
garding the routes to be followed, the ter-
minals to be used, the means of transport
to be employed, and other operational
practices. The panel ordered diversions
from congested stations and when neces-
sary ordered the complete or partial sus-
pension of movements at points of origin
until congestion was eliminated. In exer-
cising its control, the panel early adopted
the policy of reducing the length of the
rail haul and increasing the use of river
craft. The more rapid train turnaround
41
Assam LOC Hist, pp. 1-4; Memo, Col P. T.
McCarthy, TC, for Wheeler, 28 Jul 43, sub: Operat-
ing Conditions Bengal and Assam Ry, OCT HB CBI
Rys.
42
SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 4, Sec. IV, p. 11; G-4
Per Rpt, Hq USAF CBI, qtr ending 31 Dec 43, pp.
3-4, AG Opns Rpts 319.1; Ltr, Covell, to Somervell,
25 Mar 44, OCT HB CBI Gen Corres (CM-IN).
 CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
that resulted, together with the maximum
use of the river lines, produced an over-all
43
increase in tonnage moved.
The centralization of traffic control was
accompanied by other improvements.
The British built new river ghats (landing
stages) at river-rail junctions, provided
additional labor and supervisory person-
nel, and augmented cargo-handling
equipment at important rail and river
transshipment points. Although rail con-
struction lagged, some progress was made
in double-tracking and in constructing
passing tracks. Another major develop-
ment in 1944 was the construction of pipe-
lines. In March the British completed the
Chandranathpur-Manipur Road (Dima-
pur) sector of a four-inch pipeline that
ultimately was extended from Chittagong,
India, to Tamu, Burma, and in August the
Americans completed construction of a
six-inch line from Calcutta to Tinsukia,
Assam. These new facilities eased the
burden on the hard-pressed railway and
greatly increased the capacity of the
Assam LOC.
Playing a vital part in the LOC's devel-
opment was the transfer to U.S. Army
control of the meter-gauge line from Kati-
harto Ledo, a portion of the LOC long
considered a major obstacle to accelerated
movement of supplies to Assam. American
operations brought an immediate speed-
up of traffic and gave a pronounced
impetus to the entire project.44
The various improvements brought an
immediate and sustained increase in
traffic. What had been the major trans-
portation problem in March 1944 was
being "licked" in May. On 15 July Wilson
was able to inform Somervell that the
QUADRANT target for LOC tonnage set for
January 1946 already had been exceeded,
exclusive of pipelines. Performance was
571
not up to capacity only because sufficient
supplies were unavailable for shipment.
In the ensuing months American and
British tonnage shipped by rail, river, and
45
pipeline increased steadily.
When the India-Burma Theater was
created in October 1944, the Assam LOC
was no longer a major problem in the
movement of supplies to the forward
areas. U.S. and British military shipments
had increased from 112,500 long tons in
March 1944 to 209,748 long tons in Oc-
tober. To be sure, there was some difficulty
in handling heavy lifts at transshipment
points and in meeting the ever-increasing
demand for petroleum products from the
east Bengal and Assam airfields, but in
general shipments were being made
promptly. There was confidence that the
LOC would be able to handle expedi-
tiously "anything now planned or
expected." 46
Traffic mounted steadily into the spring
of 1945. The QUADRANT target for capac-
ity, including pipelines, was reached in
January, although operation to capacity
never proved necessary. In March a rec-
ord 274,121 long tons of U.S. and British
military supplies were shipped by river,
43
Assam LOC Hist, p. 6; Memo for Rcd, Col Leon-
ard M. Rose, TC, U.S. Mil Rep Assam LOC, 24 Nov
44, IBT Trans Sec 314.7 Mil Hists, KCRC AGO.
44
Annual Review 1944, Directorate of Mvmts
GHQ (I), IBT Trans Sec 319.1 Directory of Mvmts,
Monthly Rpts, 44-45, KCRC AGO; Hist of IBT, 24
Oct 44-23 Jun 45, Vol. I, Ch. 1, pp. 17-18, OCMH
Files. On details of U.S. rail operations, see below, pp.
572-78.
45
Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 14 May 44, OCT HB
CBI Assam LOC; Memo, Wilson for Somervell, 15 Jul
44, AG 500 India 42-45; Ltr, Col Rose, Actg CO
Trans Sv, to Covell, 19 Aug 44, OCT HB CBI Rys.
46
Ltr, Covell to Lt Col John E. Russell, TC, 16 Oct
44, OCT 319.1 India 44-45. For statistics on traffic
over the LOC see the following: SOS Hist, 1944-45,
App. 26, Sec. III, Assam LOC; Hist of IBT, 1945-46,
App. 20, Sec, I, Assam LOC; and G-4 Per Rpt, Ho
USF IBT, qtr ending 30 Sep 45, AG 319.1.
572
rail, and pipeline. Although total tonnage
decreased slightly in April, the daily aver-
age tonnage dispatched over the LOC
reached a peak of 8,975 long tons.
During this period control by the Cal-
cutta panel was increasingly effective, the
Military Railway Service continued to
step up its operations, and there was con-
tinued expansion of physical facilities.
British track construction work on the
broad-gauge and meter-gauge lines was
continued, rail yards were improved, and
additional cargo-handling equipment was
provided at transshipment points. The
largest new addition to the physical plant
of the Assam LOC came in March 1945
with the completion of the American six-
inch pipeline from Chittagong to Tin-
sukia. The new pipeline augmented deliv-
eries by the Calcutta-Tinsukia pipeline
and the rail and river carriers. Together,
they provided gasoline and other petro-
leum products needed for Hump deliv-
eries, filled the U.S. pipelines extending
from Tinsukia into Burma toward China,
and supplied fuel for the operation of ve-
hicles on the Stilwell Road.
Tonnage movement over the LOC fell
off after April 1945, when the central
Burma campaign came to an end. As
Chinese, American, and British combat
and supporting forces withdrew, the de-
mand for supplies in the forward areas
lessened. The decline in this traffic, how-
ever, was partially offset by the accelera-
tion of deliveries to China. The demand
for POL, needed for air, truck, and pipe-
line operations, was particularly heavy,
and amounted to 135,796 long tons in
August.
Traffic moving forward on the LOC
dropped sharply with the termination of
hostilities and soon dwindled to minor
proportions. The backhaul of supplies to
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Calcutta was well within the capabilities
of peacetime transportation agencies. The
Calcutta panel was discontinued on 1 Oc-
tober, and by the middle of that month
American railway troops had been re-
moved from the MRS-operated line.
Backhaul operations, involving the move-
ment of 141,512 long tons of American
materials from Assam and east Bengal,
were completed in February 1946.47
The Military Railway Service
in India-Burma
The use of American railway troops on
the bottleneck meter-gauge rail portion of
the Assam LOC, a proposal made by
Somervell at the October 1943 intercom-
mand meeting, was approved in principle
by the Government of India. The final
agreement, reached in February 1944,
provided that effective 1 March the U.S.
Army would operate 804 miles of meter-
gauge railroad, consisting of the main
Bengal and Assam Railway line from
Katihar eastward to Tinsukia, branch
lines from Dhubri and from Neamati and
from Furkating to Jorhat, and the short
Dibru-Sadiya meter-gauge line, which
met the Bengal and Assam Railway at
Tinsukia to complete the rail link to Ledo.
In general, the agreement provided for
the substitution of military for civilian
management and the augmentation of the
civilian staff by military personnel. Com-
mercial work was to be the sole responsi-
bility of the Bengal and Assam Railway,
which was also to provide all normal con-
sumable stores. The general manager of
the railway retained nominal control over
47
Assam LOC Hist, p. 8; SOS Hist, 1944-45, App.
26, Sec. III, Assam LOC; Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App.
20, Sec. I, Assam LOC, Sec. II, Rail and Supply Sec-
tion, Sec. III, Rail and Supply.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
the American-operated line, but in prac-
tice did not interfere in methods of oper-
ation or assignment of staff. Movements
remained under British Movements Con-
trol, and British construction proceeded
48
as before.
In December 1943, before the final
agreement, the SOS had established a
Military Railway Service headquarters at
Gauhati under Col. John A. Appleton,
former Chief of the Rail Division, Office
Chief of Transportation. In January a rail-
way grand division, five railway operating
battalions, and a railway shop battalion
arrived. The units moved to assigned posi-
tions along the line during the latter part
of the month and prepared to begin opera-
tions.
Taking Over the Bengal and Assam
The MRS took over the railroad on
1 March without interference to traffic,
superimposing some 4,200 troops on the
existing civilian staff of 13,000. The 705th
Railway Grand Division was stationed
about midway on the line at Gauhati. The
758th Railway Shop Battalion moved
into the railway shops at Saidpur, a few
miles north of Parbatipur, and sent a de-
tachment to Dibrugarh, near the eastern
end of the line. The railway operating
battalions each controlled a division of the
line, the sectors varying between 111 and
175 miles in length. Three Bengal and
Assam Railway officials were assigned to
each headquarters to advise battalion
commanders and handle the civilian
49
staff.
From the beginning, it was evident that
planned expansion of physical facilities
would not immediately expand the rail-
road's capacity. The British had instituted
a program to double-track the line, in-
573
cluding the section between Lumding and
Manipur Road, which because of its steep
gradient was a limiting factor in move-
ment over the entire Assam LOC. Plans
were also made to break the other major
bottleneck by replacing the Brahmaputra
River Pandu-Amingaon Ferry with a
bridge. However, no major rail construc-
tion was expected to be completed before
August 1944, and plans for the rail bridge,
scheduled for completion in two years,
were dropped because of the time
involved.
If an immediate increase in traffic was
to be achieved, MRS would have to rely
on operational improvements. This Apple-
ton did. Abandoning the previous prac-
tice of maintaining a fixed debit balance
of wagons owed to neighboring lines,
Appleton forced the loading of the maxi-
mum number of wagons at Parbatipur
and moved them to points of unloading.
This measure inevitably resulted in a
large increase in the number of wagons on
loan from other lines and brought British
criticism to the effect that the absorption
of borrowed wagons into the MRS rail-
way was impeding essential supply move-
ments programed by the Government of
India. When the cycle of return move-
ments of empties caught up with dis-
patches, however, the drain on adjoining
lines diminished, and the problem ceased
to be serious. Another innovation was the
operation of longer trains in order to com-
48
SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 24, Sec. I, Pt. V, App.
11; Ltr, Brig Gen Paul F. Yount, CG MRS, to CG
USF IBT, 15 Aug 45, sub: Real Estate and Financial
Transactions MRS, IBT Trans Sec 531 RRs, KCRC
AGO.
49
Hist, 705th Ry Grand Div, and Rpt, Col J. A.
Appleton, Dir MRS, to CG Trans Sv, 25 Apr 44, sub:
Opn by MRS of Bengal and Assam Ry (Meter
Gauge), OCT HB CBI Rys; SOS Hist, 1942-44, Vol.
I, Ch. 3, pp. 13-15.
574
pensate for the motive power shortage and
to increase tonnage movement without in-
creasing traffic density. Also, movements
across the Brahmaputra River from
Amingaon to Pandu were stepped up by
using two locomotives simultaneously on
each of the two ferries to move freight
wagons, and by increasing crews at the
50
river ghats.
As a result of these improvements, over-
all eastbound traffic in March increased
31 percent over February, and deliveries
to the forward areas at Manipur Road,
Chabua, and Ledo were increased 44.6
percent, only 5.4 percent below Somer-
vell's prediction. One surprising result of
this rapid development was that the
meter-gauge railway was actually hauling
more tonnage from Parbatipur than the
233-mile broad-gauge system running
north from Calcutta could provide. Re-
medial measures by the British eventually
brought this problem under control.
In early April 1944 the Japanese, ad-
vancing on the Imphal front, threatened
to cut off the MRS line, but the threat
never materialized. Despite the tension,
heavy troop movements, and the unload-
ing at Pandu of a considerable amount of
supplies destined for Manipur Road, the
increased traffic was maintained.51
At this juncture Appleton was trans-
ferred to another theater and was suc-
ceeded in May by Colonel Yount, formerly
the head of MRS in the Persian Gulf
Command and a member of the early
SOS organization in CBI.52 Under Yount
MRS operations continued to improve.
Procedures were standardized, continued
attention was given to the elimination of
bottlenecks, communication facilities were
augmented, additional rail equipment
was provided, repair and maintenance of
equipment were stepped up, and track
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
construction and maintenance were
pushed forward.
A Period of Development
Since language difficulties and the lack
of sufficient American operators and train
personnel made basic changes in the man-
ner of train operation undesirable, MRS
decided to rely on intensive supervision
and to fit American methods in only
where they were consistent with the
Indian book of rules. In line with this
policy, the Americans retained the Indian
"block" system, whereby a token was
given the engineer of a train entering the
block, the engineer releasing a token to a
station operator after passing through the
block. The operator then inserted the
token into an electrically operated ma-
chine, simultaneously releasing a token at
the other end of the block for the use of
the following train. Within this block sys-
tem, American measures taken to improve
operations included the use of long trains
of approximately 100 wagons, assignment
of U.S. Army stationmasters at many dis-
patching points, and the instruction of
Indian nationals in American methods of
train handling.
Progress was also made in breaking the
main bottlenecks along the line. The con-
50
See Appleton rpt cited n. 49; Ltr, Lt Gen W. G.
Lindsell. PAO GHQ (I), to PAO SEAC, 23 Jun 44,
sub: Meter Gauge Wagon Balances, Bengal and
Assam Ry, OCT 500 India (LOC) 44; SOS Hist,
1942-44, Vol. I, Ch. 3, p. 21; MS, Lt James E. Mc-
Namara, The Military Railway Service, in India, IBT
Trans Sec 000.76 Newspapers and Magazines, KCRC
AGO; ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Dec 44, pp. 14-16.
51
Ltr. Col Rose, CofS Trans Sv, to Lt Col J. E.
Russell, OCT, 29 Apr 44, OCT HB CBI Rys; SOS
Hist, 1942-44, App. 24, Sec. I, Pt. IV, MRS, and Vol.
I, Ch. 3, pp. 21-27.
52
See Hist, 705th Ry Grand Div, OCT HB CBI
Rys.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
struction of additional ghats, changes in
track arrangements, and the institution of
a third ferry line in September greatly in-
creased traffic on the Pandu-Amingaon
Ferry. The number of wagons moved east-
ward over the ferry rose from 10,125 in
March 1944 to 19,076 in October. Al-
though the basic solution of the problem
of the Lumding-Manipur Road section
depended on completion of the double
track, the tonnage moved forward over
that portion of the line increased from
75,110 long tons in February 1944 to
138,393 long tons in October.
As these critical points were brought
under control Parbatipur, the main termi-
nal for transshipment from broad-gauge
to meter-gauge cars, became the limiting
factor in the movement of traffic. MRS
was responsible for transshipment at this
point, but the British controlled facilities
and performed actual operations. Despite
increases in loadings from broad-gauge to
meter-gauge cars, the British were unable
to keep pace with forward movement. In
October MRS took over all transshipment
activities and facilities at Parbatipur, a
U.S. Army terminal superintendent was
appointed, and the 28th Traffic Regulat-
ing Group assumed direction of opera-
tions.53
Contributing heavily to the increase of
traffic during 1944 was the provision of
locomotives and rolling stock. Before MRS
took over, War Department steam loco-
motives, principally Mikados, and eight-
wheel meter-gauge freight cars had been
delivered to India under the lend-lease
program. On 1 March 1944 there were
396 locomotives on the MRS line, of
which 167 were American-built. Rail
equipment continued to arrive, and by the
end of the year there were 238 American
locomotives and approximately 6,500 War
575
Department freight cars on the line. Be-
cause the latter had double the capacity
of the standard four-wheel Bengal and
Assam freight wagon, it was estimated
that they were equal to the road's own
54
meter-gauge equipment.
Railway construction further developed
the line's capacity. By the end of 1944, ap-
proximately 20 percent of the railroad had
been double-tracked, passing tracks were
being extended, and the main railway
yards enlarged. The work was performed
by the British, often with the assistance of
American bulldozers and earth-moving
equipment.
All of these improvements would have
been futile if monsoon rains interrupted
the line as they had done regularly in
years past. In the path of the railroad were
some thirty rivers and tributaries that rep-
resented a constant threat to bridges and
track during the monsoon rains. With the
onset of the monsoon season in May 1944,
the MRS took flood-control measures.
Heavy stone rip-rap provided reinforce-
ment at piers and adjacent embankments.
The important bridge across the Beki
River was saved when the 725th Railway
Operating Battalion cut a diversion chan-
nel from the Beki to the neighboring
Bulkadhoba River to carry away flood
waters. Throughout the year the MRS
gave constant attention to the line's main-
tenance, raising and lining new double
track, ballasting the main track, correct-
53
See McNamara MS cited n. 50; Ltr, Yount to CG
Trans Sv SOS IBT, 15 Mar 45, sub: Ry Opns—MRS,
IBT Trans Sec 531 RRs, KCRC AGO; Trans Sv
Newsletter, SOS USAF IBT, Vol. I, No. 1, Oct 44,
p. 2, OCT HB CBI. For statistics on MRS freight and
passenger traffic see Monthly Freight Opns Rpts,
MRS, Rail Div OCT, Feb-May 44, and Monthly Ry
Opns Rpts, MRS, Jun 44-Sep 45, OCT HB CBI Rys.
54
Ry Opn Rpt, MRS, Dec 44, OCT HB CBI Rys;
ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Dec 44, pp. 14-16.
576
ing kinky rails, and erecting new water
installations.
During the year there was also a
marked improvement in the repair and
maintenance of rail equipment through
the efforts of the 758th Railway Shop Bat-
talion. When the MRS took over the line,
the Bengal and Assam motive power and
rolling stock had deteriorated. The British
were responsible for the procurement of
railway supplies, but spare parts and re-
pair materials were unavailable. The
MRS therefore requisitioned critically
short materials from the United States
through Transportation Service. As Amer-
ican spare parts and other supplies ar-
rived during 1944 it was no longer neces-
sary to cannibalize equipment or hold
engines and cars out of service. Between
March 1944 and the end of the year the
shop battalion repaired over 47,000 cars,
converted 132 boxcars into low-side gon-
dolas and 46 boxcars into refrigerator cars,
and changed others into snack cars for
troop trains.
One problem that plagued the MRS
was the absence of brake equipment on
newly arrived American freight cars com-
ing from British erection plants in other
parts of India. The operation of these cars
caused collisions and other accidents. The
situation was relieved in October 1944,
when the Railway Board assured General
Yount that all cars assembled would be
equipped with brakes and that it would
furnish MRS six hundred sets a month for
installation on cars already in service on
the MRS track.55
From the time the MRS took over the
meter-gauge railroad, records for tonnage
hauled continued to be broken. From
February 1944 to May the over-all traffic
increased 50 percent, and by October the
increase was 125 percent. In the same
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
period the number of troops carried by
rail more than doubled, reaching a peak
of 92,000 U.S. and Allied military per-
sonnel moving eastward through Pandu
56
and 135,900 returning westward. The
MRS, aided by additional motive power
and rolling stock and by British and
Indian co-operation in making available
supplies, construction, and labor, had im-
proved the meter-gauge railroad to a
point where it could handle expeditiously
the forward movement of supplies and
troops.
In December 1944, the Supreme Allied
Commander, Southeast Asia Command,
wrote of the MRS:
In the first few months of my appointment
to this Command the inadequacy of the
Assam L of C (Line of Communication) to
meet in full the requirements of the forces in
the forward area and of the air lift over the
Hump into China was a major obstacle
hindering the full deployment of our strength
against the enemy. . . .
Already the capacity of the Assam L of C
as a whole has been developed to a stage
where planned development is being reached
months ahead of schedule. Through the hard
work and resourcefulness of your railway
battalions and those associated with them,
the volume of traffic handled has mounted
rapidly until the L of C is functioning with a
substantial margin over essential require-
ments which will enable unforeseen con-
tingencies to be met.57
55
Monthly Ry Opns Rpts, MRS, Jim-Dec 44,
OCT HB CBI Rys; Ltr, Maj Bertrand A. Ream, Adj
Hq MRS, to CG Trans Sv USF IBT, 5 Jun 45, sub:
MRS Hist, 24 Oct 44 to 20 May 45, IBT Trans Sec
314.7 Mil Hists, KCRC AGO; Ltr, Yount to Baldwin,
Chief Mil Ry Br Rail Div OCT, 29 Oct 44, OCT HB
CBI Rys.
56
Rpt on First Yr of Opns, MRS SOS IBT, 12 Mar
45, Incl 1, and Ry Opns Rpt, MRS, Sep 45, OCT
HB CBI Rys.
57
Ltr, Adm Louis Mountbatten, SACSEA, to Lt
Gen Dan I. Sultan, CG IBT, 30 Dec 44, quoted in
SOS Hist, 1944-45, App. 26, Sec. II, MRS.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
Traffic over the MRS line continued to
increase into the first months of 1945.
With operations generally standardized
and "choke" points under control, major
emphasis was placed on increased effi-
ciency and further improvement of the
physical plant. At Parbatipur, the arrival
of modern cargo-handling equipment
enabled MRS to increase the number of
meter-gauge wagons transshipped from
13,470 in October 1944 to 26,796 in May
1945. Other transshipment points, such as
Dhubri, Bongaigaon, and Neamati,
showed comparable increases in efficiency.
At Amingaon-Pandu, a fourth ferry was
placed in operation, and loaded freight
cars ferried eastward across the Brahma-
putra rose to a peak of 23,209 in March
1945.58
The double tracking of the 48-mile-line
bottleneck between Lumding and Mani-
pur Road was completed by the British in
January 1945, and movements over that
section reached a peak of 215,170 long
tons in March. With the exception of cer-
tain critical sections, much of the re-
mainder of the double-tracking program
was abandoned at Yount's request. In-
stead, passing tracks were lengthened so
that two or more long trains could travel
over the same track in either direction.
The construction of 47 miles of passing
tracks eliminated 360 miles of double
tracking without loss to operating effi-
ciency. Other improvements jointly
planned by the British and Americans in-
cluded the enlargement of railroad yards
and the erection of new shop and water
59
facilities.
Operations were further improved by
the arrival of additional American equip-
ment. By the end of May 1945 a total of
263 of the 444 locomotives on the line
were American, and 10,113 War Depart-
577
ment freight cars were in operation. This
American rolling stock either arrived with
braking equipment or had it installed in
the MRS shops. In addition to other re-
pair and maintenance work, the shop bat-
talions vacuum-equipped 2,452 American
cars and applied 30,000 hoses between
November 1944 and July 1945. By the
latter month 96 percent of the American
rolling stock was vacuum equipped.
Throughout this period, the MRS Engi-
neering Section concentrated on the main-
tenance of track and bridges and their
protection against the next monsoon sea-
son. Protective measures instituted in 1944
were intensified and others added so that
the line operated through its second
rainy season without interruption.
The Close of MRS Operations
Activity along the MRS line reached a
climax in March 1945 when 34,088 cars
carrying supplies to the forward areas
were shipped east of Lumding or trans-
shipped at Neamati or Dhubri. This traffic
represented a more than 160 percent in-
crease over the tonnage delivered in Feb-
ruary 1944. After April 1945 the MRS
handled a steadily declining volume of
traffic. Like the rest of the Assam LOC,
the MRS railway was affected by the end
of fighting in central Burma and did not
receive sufficient supplies for delivery to
China to offset the lessened demand. After
August 1945 rail movements, with the ob-
vious exception of the westward move-
ment of evacuated troops, fell off sharply.
58
Unless otherwise noted, the account of MRS
operations after October 1944 is based on the follow-
ing: Monthly Ry Opns Rpts, MRS, Nov 44-Sep 45,
OCT HB CBI Rys; Ream ltr cited n. 55; SOS Hist,
1944-45, App. 26, Sec. II, MRS.
59
Ltr, Yount to CG IBT, cited n. 48; Hist of IBT,
25 Oct 44-23 Jun 45, Vol. II, Ch. 1, p. 414.
578
The demands were then well within the
capabilities of the Bengal and Assam
Railway, and the need for military opera-
tion was eliminated.
Evacuation of the railway troops was
begun late in August 1945. The departure
of the units was staggered so that as one
moved out, its territory could be taken
over by one of the remaining units, which
then supervised activities until Bengal and
Assam officials and employees could take
over complete control. Transfer of the line
to the Bengal and Assam Railway was
completed on 15 October, and the last
MRS units then moved to Calcutta for
return to the United States.60
Rail Operations in Burma
During its existence, the MRS also pro-
vided personnel for an unusual rail opera-
tion in support of Allied forces driving
down the rail corridor from Myitkyina. In
the spring of 1944 Allied troops, spear-
headed by Merrill's Marauders, had pene-
trated north Burma and were moving
toward Myitkyina, a vital air base and
rail terminal. Anticipating the capture of
the upper portion of the meter-gauge
Burma Railway, theater headquarters set
up a provisional detachment of 2 officers
and 158 enlisted men drawn from MRS
units.
The detachment was flown into Myit-
kyina in August and began operation of
the captured portion of the railway as the
61st Transportation Corps Composite
Company. At this time Myitkyina had
just been taken and fighting had moved to
Mogaung, with isolated enemy raiding
parties operating between the two points.
Allied aerial bombardment and Japanese
demolition had inflicted heavy damage.
Motive power was inoperable; only 376 of
571 rail wagons were serviceable or in
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
need of minor repair; and yards, track,
bridges, and signal communications had
been torn up or destroyed.
The company set up its shops, mounted
armed jeeps on flanged wheels, placing
them at each end of trains for motive
power and protection, and began moving
supplies and troops to the fighting front,
principally in support of the British 36th
Division. Engineer troops had already
begun to repair track and bridges, making
possible jeep-train operation over the
thirty-eight miles from Myitkyina to
Mogaung. Despite enemy raiding activi-
ties, the line carried 15,616 troops and
1,883 long tons of freight in August 1944.
During the ensuing months, the rail
operation was pushed forward to support
the continued Allied advance. Rail equip-
ment, bridges, and track were repaired,
signal communications restored, and jeeps
gradually replaced by locomotives. By the
end of January 1945, the rail line ex-
tended 128 miles to Mawlu. Meanwhile,
the Tenth Air Force had established a base
at Sahmaw, between Myitkyina and
Mawlu, and the railroad supplied this in-
stallation as well as combat forces farther
forward. In February the line was in oper-
ation as far as Katha and Indaw. By this
time there were in service seven wood-
burning and oil-burning locomotives, and
two diesels that had been shipped to India
from the South Pacific.
After moving 40,271 passengers and
73,312 long tons of freight in January
1945, the traffic declined. As the Japanese
were cleared from the railway corridor,
the 61st Transportation Corps Company's
mission was reduced to serving the Tenth
Air Force and hauling building materials
and local produce. In March the unit re-
60
Hist of IBT, 1945-46, Vol. I, Ch. 3, pp. 168-71;
Min of Mtg at Hq MRS, 3 Sep 45, Trans Sec 531
RRs, KCRC AGO.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 579

turned to Assam, where it acted as a gen- used for harbor duty and short river hauls.
eral utility company for the 721st Railway Subsequent improvements on the Assam
Operating Battalion until late August LOC made further planning for extensive
1945, when it became the first unit from long-haul operations on the Brahmaputra
the theater to return to the United States unnecessary.62
61
for demobilization. Meanwhile, the American Barge Lines
(ABL), with headquarters near Calcutta,
American Barge Lines in India had been established in November 1943
under the supervision of the Chief of
American barge operations had their Transportation, SOS, CBI. A director and
origin in General Wheeler's 8 May 1943 five other officers were appointed, and an
plan for the restoration of communications Engineer unit was assigned. Equipment
in Burma, which included a proposal to began arriving early in 1944, and as-
establish an American barge line on the sembly was started by the Engineer troops,
Irrawaddy River between Rangoon and assisted by native labor. The 326th and
Bhamo. On the basis of this plan, ASF in 327th Transportation Corps Harbor Craft
June began procurement of equipment companies arrived in April, and as equip-
and prepared to secure the necessary per- ment became available they began the
sonnel. By the QUADRANT Conference, operation and maintenance of craft in the
however, the emphasis had shifted to the Calcutta area, where initial ABL activities
development of the Assam LOC, and it were centered. The harbor craft troops
was decided to use a portion of the equip- operated motor towing launches and
ment and troops originally intended for hauled lighters in the port and on the
the Irrawaddy to set up a long-haul Hooghly River. In mid-1944 they were
barge operation on the Brahmaputra hauling approximately 5,000 long tons a
River. Modified requirements set forth in month from shipside to depots and air-
the fall of 1943 included 400 barges of fields upriver.
4-foot and 5½-foot draft, 180 Chrysler sea A second important activity was
mules of 5-foot, 6-inch draft, 114 wooden launched in August in support of Tezgaon
towboats of 3½-foot draft, 26 wooden and Kurmitola, two important U.S. air-
patrol boats, an inland waterways head- fields near Dacca in east Bengal. With
quarters, 4 harbor craft companies, a port 61
Unit Hist, Capt William E. Kerr and Lt John E.
battalion, and an Engineer battalion. Egan, History of the 61st Transportation Corps Com-
The project soon ran into difficulties. posite Company, IBT Trans Sec 461 Publications 45,
KCRC AGO; Co Hist, 61st TC Operating Co, 1 Jul-
The Chief of Transportation found in Sep- 26 Sep 45 (final rpt), OCT HB CBI Rys; Ltr, Yount
tember that equipment then on order ap- to CG USF IBT, 4 Sep 45, sub: Burma Ry —Recon-
parently did not meet the CBI require- struction, Maint, and Opn by USF, IBT Trans Sec
531 RRs, KCRC AGO. For statistics see Ry Opns
ments, the units having too much draft Rpts, MRS, Oct 44-Feb 45, OCT HB CBI Rys.
and insufficient power for the planned 62
See Wheeler memo cited n. 6; List of Papers Per-
operation. Tests in the United States con- taining to Barge Lines, OCT HB CBI BL; See n. 9;
firmed this as did later tests on the Brah- Ltr, Wylie to Stillinger, 8 Aug 43, OCT 560 India 43;
Memo, Wylie for ACofT for Supply, 18 Sep 43, sub:
maputra. Nevertheless, in January 1944 Fltg Equip for Burma Project, OCT 000-900 Burma
the theater requested that the troops and 43; Ltr, Covell to CG Rear Ech Hq CBI, 12 Jan 44,
craft en route or earmarked for shipment sub: Brahmaputra River Line, IBT Trans Sec 600.12
Proj Tig 9A, KCRC AGO; SOS Hist, 1942-44, App.
to CBI be forwarded, since they could be 24, Sec. II, Pt. I, Planning and Development Section.
580
equipment not particularly suited to the
operation, the ABL hauled gasoline and
oil from Goalundo to Dacca, a round trip
of approximately 200 miles. A dry cargo
route for hauling Air Forces general sup-
plies from Khulna to Dacca also was
opened, but it did not handle a significant
63
amount of traffic until November.
Control of the ABL was transferred
from Transportation Service to Base Sec-
tion Two in October 1944. By this time the
bulk of the equipment had been received
and assembled, including 48 Chrysler sea
mules, 38 wooden 46-foot towboats, 17
patrol boats, 87 wooden 60-foot barges, 86
steel 104-foot barges, 12 derrick barges,
and 4 floating cranes.
Operations around the port of Calcutta
continued to expand and proceeded
smoothly. Aside from harbor lighterage
and short hauls, involving the movement
of about 20,000 long tons a month in the
spring of 1945, the ABL provided general
passenger service. But the river hauls from
Goalundo and Khulna presented diffi-
culties. As earlier tests had indicated, sea
mules, the principal towing craft, were
unsuitable for the long continuous haul-
ing of heavy barges against strong cur-
rents. Despite constant maintenance, the
equipment deteriorated rapidly, and in
October 1944 it was estimated that even
with limited use the equipment would not
be suitable for efficient operation much
beyond the spring of 1945.64 In late 1944,
however, developments placed new and
greatly increased demands on the barge
line.
As part of a general plan for augment-
ing deliveries to China over the Hump,
the Air Transport Command was prepar-
ing to accelerate shipments from the east
Bengal airfields. To lighten the load on
rail and pipeline facilities, Transportation
Service prepared a project for ABL to de-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
liver 4,000,000 Imperial gallons of avia-
tion fuel monthly from Goalundo to
Dacca, an increase of almost 3,400,000
Imperial gallons over previous deliveries.65
This project called for more suitable tow-
boats, but even before these were avail-
able ABL began to carry a greatly in-
creased volume of traffic on the Goalundo-
Dacca run. During April 1945 POL de-
liveries exceeded 3,400,000 Imperial gal-
lons, while dry cargo carried from Khulna
to Dacca reached 10,172 long tons. In
July, after six 86-foot, 600-horsepower
diesel tugs had been placed in operation,
the ABL for the first time exceeded its
target, delivering 4,400,000 Imperial gal-
lons to Dacca. Floods and washouts caused
a suspension of operations in August, and
in September the ABL river routes were
officially closed, most equipment was
placed in storage at Khulna, and the re-
maining craft and personnel were used at
Calcutta to assist in the evacuation of
66
troops and supplies.
Motor Transport on the Stilwell
(Ledo-Burma) Road
The task of restoring land communica-
tions with China was put in hand in
December 1942. As an expedient pending
the recapture of the line of communica-
63
SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 24, Sec. I, Pt. IV, ABL,
Sec. II, Pt. I, ABL.
64
SOS Hist, 1944-45, App. 2, Section Hists, Inland
Waterways Division—ABL, and App. 26, Sec. V,
Water Transportation, ABL; Ltr, Col Rose to Covell,
16 Oct 44, sub: Barge Line Opns, IBT Trans Sec Per-
sonnel File on Rose, Edward C, KCRC AGO.
65
Ltr, Maj Kenneth H. Smith, AGD Hq USF IBT,
to TAG, 13 Dec 44, sub: ABL—Project TIG-5E,
OCT 560 (BL Proj) 44-45; TC Annual Rpt, IBT,
1944-45, OCT HB CBI Rpts and Intervs; G-4 Per
Rpt, qtr ending 30 Jun 45, p. 2, and qtr ending 30
Sep 45, p. 6, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
66
Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 20, Sec. I, Water
Section, ABL; Trans Sv Newsletter, USF IBT, Vol.
III, No. 8, Aug 45, OCT HB CBI.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 581

tions extending northward from Rangoon, Assuming that the Allies would recapture
it had been decided to follow a route from
north Burma down to Bhamo by Feb-
Ledo through the Hukawng and Mogaung ruary 1944, and that the rest of Burma
Valleys in north Burma to a junction withwould be retaken by the onset of the
the Burma Road. After the U.S. Army monsoon season in May 1944, the plan
had assumed responsibility for construc- called for the development of lines of com-
tion of the road, American troops took munications, first from India through
over and continued work begun by the north Burma, and then northward from
British. Rangoon. It envisaged water shipments to
The mountainous jungle of the Patkai Calcutta and Rangoon, the latter to re-
Hills between Ledo and Shingbwiyang, at ceive the bulk of the tonnage for China;
the foot of the Hukawng Valley, presentedonward movement from Calcutta by rail
a formidable barrier. After trucks had car-
and river to Ledo and from Rangoon by
ried supplies as far as the road would per-
barge on the Irrawaddy River to Bhamo;
mit, native porters took over, narrow trails
and final deliveries to Kunming by truck
and mud precluding the use of elephants and pipeline from Bhamo and Ledo. An-
and pack animals. Some additional sup- ticipating the complete re-establishment
plies were made available by airdrop, of communications with China by the end
beginning in the spring of 1943. Construc-
of the 1944 monsoon season, the plan
tion proceeded slowly, and virtually halted
called for 18,000 drivers, 12,000 3-4-ton
with the onset of the monsoon season in truck-tractors, and 10,000 5-ton semi-
May. In October Col. (later Maj. Gen.) trailers, all to arrive between January and
Lewis A. Pick was appointed Command- June 1944.
ing Officer, Base Section Three (later Ad- The Wheeler plan was studied by ASF
vance Section Three), and took com- headquarters, and in July 1943 prelimi-
mand of all SOS forces on the Ledo Road. nary arrangements were made for vehicle
With the end of the monsoon season, rapidprocurement. By this time, however, the
progress was made under his leadership. TRIDENT decisions had made it apparent
By the close of the year bulldozers had that the projected operation to retake all
reached Shingbwiyang, at the 103-mile Burma would be delayed and that com-
mark, and in late December the first con-bat operations in the dry season of 1943-
voy arrived there from Ledo. As Allied 44 would be limited to a north Burma
combat forces struck deeper into north campaign. These decisions lessened the
Burma, the road was pushed forward importance of planning for the use of
behind them. 67 Rangoon LOC and concentrated atten-
tion on the Ledo-Burma Road as the
Plans for Ledo-Burma Road Operations means of restoring land communications
with China. Since it was clear that the
Planning for the time when the road strategic goals upon which Wheeler's pro-
would be completed was set in motion by posals were based would be delayed in
Wheeler's memorandum of 8 May 1943, attainment, there remained time for fur-
which set down requirements for a motor ther consideration of vehicle requirements.
transport operation that would deliver 67
SOS Hist, 1942-44, Vol. II, Ch. 9; Rpt, Pick to
89,250 short tons a month to Kunming Wheeler, The Overland Route to China, 9 Aug 45,
and 16,500 short tons for use in Burma. ASF Plng Div A 46-371 Dr 2 Ledo Rd App. G.
582
After correspondence and conferences, the
combination of the 5-ton 4x2 truck-tractor
and the 5-ton semitrailer was selected as
most desirable for the planned operation,
and in September ASF undertook pro-
68
curement of 8,000 of these units.
At QUADRANT, meanwhile, new plans
were made based on the monthly input of
96,000 short tons at Ledo, of which 65,000
tons would be delivered to Kunming. The
Office of the Chief of Transportation in
Washington was asked to study personnel
and equipment requirements, and in
February 1944 presented a report based
on a block system of operation requiring
8,270 truck-trailers and 92,800 motor
transport, road maintenance, pipeline,
and other service troops. QUADRANT tar-
gets were accepted, but with qualifica-
tions. Construction progress on the road
indicated that initial operations, set for
October 1944, would be postponed. More
important still, if tonnage targets were to
be reached, the road would have to be
constructed to certain minimum stand-
ards, including bitumen surfacing and
completion to two-way width. Otherwise,
the report pointed out, it would be next to
impossible to use the proposed truck-
trailer operation during the monsoon and
a change to an all-wheel-drive, single-
unit vehicle would be necessary.69
In India, the newly established Trans-
portation Service prepared its first project
for a self-sustaining motor transport serv-
ice in January 1944, setting up lower tar-
gets than those proposed at QUADRANT
and based on a lower type road than the
Transportation Corps study being pre-
pared in Washington. Assuming the com-
pletion of a two-way, all-weather gravel
road from Ledo to Kunming, the plan
proposed the ultimate monthly input of
57,000 short tons, of which 45,000 tons
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
would be delivered to Kunming, and
recommended 36,727 troops for driver,
maintenance, supply, and other service
units.
Not content with purely planning ac-
tivities relating to Ledo-Burma Road
operations, General Wilson believed that
Transportation Service should take over
motor transport activities as construction
progressed rather than wait upon comple-
tion of the road. In April 1944 he reported
that approximately 300 cargo vehicles
were being dispatched daily over the Ledo
Road, adding that these activities were
directed by the section commander
through a "makeshift" organization.
Upon Wilson's recommendation, the War
Department was requested to forward a
Motor Transport Service headquarters.
When this unit proved unavailable, per-
mission was requested to activate one in
the theater, but this was not granted by
the War Department. Motor transport on
the Ledo Road continued under Advance
Section Three, and Transportation Serv-
ice activities remained in the planning
sphere.70
Until the fall of 1944, plans for Ledo-
Burma Road operations were based on
two-way traffic from Ledo to Kunming
68
Wheeler memo cited n. 6; Memo, Gen Lutes, Dir
Plans and Opns ASF, for Dir of Materiel ASF, 20 May
44, sub: Motor Vehicles for Burma Rd, AG 451 (12
Jun 43) (2).
69
Binder, Proposed MTS, CBI, Rpt and Recom-
mendations, OCT ASF, 10 Feb 44, p. 6, OCT HB
CBI.
70
Ltr, Col Frank Milani, AG Rear Ech Hq USAF
CBI, to CofS U.S. Army, 31 Jan 44, sub: Opn plan,
Burma-Myitkyina-Kunming Rd, Project TIG-1C,
CT SOS Trans Sec 537 Motor Trans in connection
with Restoration of Communications Facilities,
KCRC AGO; Ltr, Wilson to Col F. C. Horner, Chief
of Hwy Div OCT, 26 Apr 44, OCT 537 India 44-45;
SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 24, Sec. II, Pt. I, Planning
and Development Section.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
and the use of truck-trailers, although the
possibility that the vehicles might not be
able to operate over the mountainous
Ledo-Shingbwiyang section gave rise to
proposals for the partial use of standard
2½-ton 6x6 trucks. In the meantime, how-
ever, Army planners in Washington, in an
effort to make additional personnel and
other resources available to the Pacific,
cut back construction plans for the Ledo
Road. In August 1944 the War Depart-
ment notified CBI that a two-track, gravel
all-weather road would be completed
from Ledo to Myitkyina and that the ex-
isting trail from Myitkyina would be im-
proved with the minimum construction
required to complete projected pipelines
into China and to deliver vehicles and
artillery. It now appeared that there
would be two-way traffic to Myitkyina,
but only one-way traffic to Kunming. 71
Since motor transport operations would
be more limited than originally antici-
pated, the scheduled production of truck-
tractors and semitrailers was cut back to
5,050 and 4,210, respectively.72
When the theater was divided in Octo-
ber 1944, the India-Burma Theater as-
sumed responsibility for road construc-
tion to the Burma-China border and for
pipeline, signal, and motor operations
from Ledo to Kunming. China Theater's
responsibility was limited to road con-
struction and maintenance from Wanting
to Kunming and designation of the cargo
to be delivered to China. The Ledo Road
was then operational as far as Warazup,
190 miles beyond Ledo, and was being
pushed rapidly toward Myitkyina.
At this time, theater planners con-
templated only one-way road delivery of
trucks, artillery, and other military sup-
plies to China. Based on construction out-
lined in the War Department directive of
583
August 1944, Engineer estimates placed
maximum traffic at 45,000 tons a month
from Ledo to Myitkyina and 15,000 tons a
month from Ledo to Kunming. Planning
was further dampened by the fact that the
forty to fifty Quartermaster truck com-
panies expected to be available when the
road to China opened would all be re-
quired for construction and combat oper-
ations in Burma, so that no transport
would be available for China deliveries.
In an effort to provide drivers, a training
school was opened in November at the
Ramgarh Training Center in India, with
an initial class of 500 students. Other
Chinese were flown in from China and a
number of Chinese tank battalions at
Ramgarh were converted to truck units.73
During this period vehicle requirements
were again modified. Tests in December
1944 confirmed the unsuitability of truck-
trailers for operation over the mountain-
ous Ledo-Shingbwiyang run, and the
India-Burma Theater requested the War
Department to cease shipment of the un-
floated balance of these vehicles and sub-
stitute 2½-ton 6x6 trucks. After recon-
sideration by the theater, truck-tractor re-
quirements for CBI were reduced in Janu-
ary 1945 from 5,050 to 3,590, including
71
For details on the War Department decision, see
Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's
Command Problems, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), pp. 387-89.
See also, Ltr, Lt Col A. G. Siegle, Hwy Div OCT, to
Col Murrow, 6 Jan 45, OCT 611 India 44-45; and
SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 24, Sec. II, Pt. I, Planning
and Development Section.
72
Memo, Brig Gen Stanley L. Scott, Dir Plng Div
ASF, for Dir Rqmts and Stock Contl Div ASF, 24
Aug 44, sub: Motor Vehicles for the Burma Rd, AG
451 (12 Jan 43) (2).
73
Hist of IBT, 1944-45, Vol. II, Ch. 10, pp. 359-
64; Ltr, [no signature] (for CG SOS IBT) to CG
USAF IBT, 4 Nov 44, sub: Opn of Ledo-Kunming
Rd, IBT Trans Sec 600.12 Proj TIG 1, KCRC AGO.
SOS Hist, 1944-45, Vol. I, Ch. 3, pp. 31-32.
584 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

some 1,430 already delivered or en route. earlier, the dispatch of regular convoys
76
At the same time, because 2½-ton trucks had begun.
were committed to theaters of higher The opening of the Ledo-Burma Road,
priority, arrangements were made to ship soon to be redesignated the Stilwell Road,
all-wheel-drive truck-tractors, which could forged the last link in the chain of land
be used with the originally planned semi- communications between Calcutta and
trailers on the Ledo-Shingbwiyang sec- Kunming. To feed this supply line, vehi-
74
tion. cles were moved by rail from Calcutta to
Meanwhile, as the date for opening the Siliguri, Bongaigaon, or direct to Ledo.
road drew near in late 1944, the entire Under the direction of Intermediate Sec-
scope of motor transport operations came tion Two, vehicles were convoyed from
up for review in Washington and the Siliguri or Bongaigaon to Chabua for de-
theaters. For a brief time, large-scale road livery to Ledo and onward shipment to
deliveries to China appeared likely, but China. Thus, the highway LOC actually
comparison of requirements for road, extended 1,759 miles from Siliguri to
pipeline, and Hump deliveries made ob- Kunming.
vious the advantage of air transport aug- The Stilwell Road itself was 1,079 miles
mentation over motor transport. Final long. From Ledo to Myitkyina the road
decision, reached after the road was was of two-way, all-weather, gravel con-
opened, provided that road operations struction, the first 103 miles traversing the
would be limited to one-way deliveries of Patkai Hills before extending across the
vehicles; that the six-inch pipeline origi- flat jungle country of the Hukawng and
nally planned for extension into China Mogaung Valleys to Myitkyina. From
would be suspended at Myitkyina, leaving Myitkyina to Bhamo, a one-lane route
only a four-inch line to be completed to continued to join the Burma Road at
Kunming; and that Hump deliveries Mong Yu, 470 miles from Ledo. From
would be greatly increased.75 Mong Yu to Kunming, the road was two-
lane, all-weather, and hard surfaced over
The Opening of the Stilwell Road 74
Rad, CG USAF IBT to WD, Sultan to Somer-
vell, info Herbert, 9 Dec 44, OCT 451 India 44-46;
By 12 January 1945 the Ledo Road had Rad, CG USAF IBT to WD, 22 Dec 44, OCT 451.3
been brought to a junction with the old India 44-45; Biweekly Conf, ASF Theater Br, 16 Jan
Burma Road and the Japanese were being 44, OCT HB; Memo for Rcd, sub: Conf, Vehicles for
I-B and CT, 22 May 45, OCT 451 China 45.
cleared from the route. Restoration of 75
Ltr, Siegle to Murrow, cited n. 71; Memo, Col
land communications with China was at G. W. Hall, CofS SOS IBT, for DCofS, Engrs, Trans
hand. Accompanied by press and public Sv, and Pick, 5 Jan 45, IBT Trans Sec 372.4 of LOC,
KCRC AGO; Hist of IBT, 1944-45, Vol. II, Ch. 10,
relations personnel, engineers, military pp. 350-83; Ltr, Lt Col J. A. Bergman, Actg Chief of
police, and Chinese drivers and convoy Hwy Div OCT, to Brig Gen E. C. Rose, 15 Mar 45,
guards, American drivers under Col. sub:76 These Hwy Trans, OCT 537 India 44-45.
vehicles were not actually the first to
Dewitt T. Mullett, convoy commander, arrive in Kunming. Two trucks and a wrecker com-
pushed off for China with the first convoy. manded by 2d Lt. Hugh A. Pock, an Ordnance offi-
After being delayed by fighting en route, cer, crossed the border into China via the Teng-chung
cutoff, between Myitkyina and Pao-shan, on 20 Janu-
the vehicles rolled triumphantly into ary 1945 and arrived at Kunming on the night of the
Kunming on 4 February. Three days 22d. See SOS Hist, 1944-45, Vol. I, Ch. 3, pp. 31-43.
 CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 585

most of the distance, but rough with long Calcutta to Kunming, and technical and
77
grades. operational guidance. In effect, Transpor-
tation Service retained staff responsibility
The Organisation of Stilwell for the LOC to China, but transportation
Road Operations on the Stilwell Road became the responsi-
bility of the MTS, which continued to
Anxious to begin operations as soon as operate under Advance Section Three.79
possible, SOS headquarters on 31 January MTS operations included vehicle and
1945 ordered Advance Section Three to cargo deliveries to China, hauls into
start the one-way movement of vehicles to Burma in support of combat, construction,
China immediately. The section was ill- and supply forces, and intrabase traffic.
prepared, having scheduled operations to Convoys to China involved the one-way
begin on 1 March, and the effort to imple- delivery of vehicles and a small amount of
ment the order was made in an atmos- cargo by a mixed group of Chinese and
phere of stress and confusion. No organi- American drivers and units. Burma hauls
zation had yet been set up for assembling, involved two-way traffic to points within
dispatching, controlling, and document- Burma maintained largely by American
ing convoys, and the only vehicles im- Quartermaster truck companies. Base
mediately obtainable in the Ledo area operations included depot and railhead
were CDS trucks, many of which had hauling and other local transportation
long lain in open storage and were in poor activities. On 15 July 1945 responsibility
repair. A temporary organization was for base transportation was transferred
hurriedly formed and Ordnance per- back to Advance Section and thereafter
sonnel worked through the night recondi- the MTS was concerned exclusively with
tioning vehicles. Drivers were provided by convoys to China and the Burma haul.
the Chinese Army in India, and personnel
from a Quartermaster truck company The Burma Haul
were diverted from Burma operations to
accompany them as far as Myitkyina. On Burma convoy operations had been
the following morning, 50 vehicles and established long before the Stilwell Road
100 drivers made the start. 78 was opened in China. Since late 1943
At first, Transportation Service played Quartermaster truck companies had been
a direct role in the management of convoying supplies and personnel from
through motor transport operations to 77
SOS Hist, 1944-45, App. 35, Incl to History of
China. Early in 1945, however, a Motor Advance Section IBT, Exhibit E, and App. 26, Sec.
Transport Service was activated, and in IV, Stilwell Rd.
78
Unless otherwise indicated, the treatment of
February a headquarters and head- motor transport operations on the Stilwell Road from
quarters company was established at 1 February through 30 September 1945 is based on
Ledo under Advance Section Three. As Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 24, History of MTS, Ad-
vance Section, IBT. For statistics on deliveries to
the MTS, under Col. Charles C. Davis, Burma and China, see Table 3.
began functioning, Transportation Serv- 79
SOS Hist, 1944-45, App. 26, Sec. IV, Stilwell
ice's activities relating to the road were Rd; Hist of IBT, 1945-46, App. 20, Sec. I, Stilwell
Rd; Rpt, Trans Sv IBT, Report on Highway Line of
reduced to record keeping, co-ordination Communications, IBT (final rpt), IBT Trans Sec
of movement over the entire LOC from 319.1 Rpts, KCRC AGO.
586
TABLE 3—VEHICLE AND CARGO DELIVERIES TO CHINA AND BURMA
BY MONTHS: 1945
a
Short tons.
Source: Hist of IBT, 1945-46, Vol. I, Ch. 3, p. 147.
Ledo to Shingbwiyang and beyond as
road construction moved forward. In dry
weather and through the 1944 monsoon,
the drivers carried everything from rations
and PX supplies to ammunition, artillery,
and pipe in support of combat, construc-
tion, and base activities. Although the
men and animals in combat were de-
pendent on airdrop, the forward air sup-
ply bases at Shingbwiyang and Warazup
were themselves supplied by road.
Throughout the year, the Quartermaster
truck drivers moved supplies from Ledo to
Burma bases, negotiating steep grades and
hairpin turns and traveling through dust
and mud. In the rainy season, it was not
unusual to see bulldozers dragging ve-
hicles over flooded-out muddy sections of
the road.
As the monsoon neared its end in Octo-
ber 1944, all available drivers and vehicles
in Advance Section Three were assigned
to Burma convoy operations, and in the
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
latter part of the month about 550 short
tons a day were being carried. By January
1945 forty-six Quartermaster truck com-
panies were engaged in the Burma haul,
carrying an increasing volume of supplies.
At this time thirteen other companies were
assigned to intrabase and depot opera-
tions, and eighteen additional units were
en route to the theater.80
When MTS was activated, that organi-
zation, as an agency of the Commanding
General, Advance Section Three, directed
and supervised movements from Ledo to
destinations in Burma. At first Burma
hauls were directed by the MTS Opera-
tions Division along with other activities,
but by 4 April the MTS was sufficiently
organized to set up a separate Burma
Traffic Branch.
80
Pick rpt cited n. 67; Ltr, Lt Col H. C. Helgerson,
Exec Officer Trans Sv, to Col G. W. Hall, CofS SOS
IBT, 16 Jan 45, sub: Civ Drivers for Ledo Rd Opns,
IBT Trans Sec 372.4 Zone of LOC 45, KCRC AGO.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 587

In early 1945 all cargo deliveries to liaison officers assigned to the units had no
Burma destinations were being made by command functions. Problems of this
2½-ton 6x6 trucks, which returned to nature ceased abruptly with the move-
Ledo. These trucks were retained on the ment of Chinese troops out of Burma.
Ledo-Shingbwiyang section, but begin- Even as truck-trailers were placed in
ning in February 5-ton 4x2 truck-tractors full operation, Burma hauls were begin-
and semitrailers were substituted over the ning to fall off. After a peak of 34,579 tons
rest of the Burma run. A block system was was delivered to Burma in March 1945,
inaugurated, and by mid-April truck- the end of combat operations brought a
trailer operation was in full swing. In decline in traffic. Burma deliveries de-
May there were thirty-eight Quarter- clined markedly after May, making possi-
master truck companies assigned to the ble the diversion of an increasing number
Burma haul, about equally divided be- of Quartermaster truck units to China
tween 2½-ton truck and semitrailer opera- convoy operations, and in August only
tions. A transfer shed had been built at 5,046 tons were hauled.
Shingbwiyang, and Burma control sta- In the course of operations, the Burma
tions were established at Shingbwiyang, Traffic Branch set up an integrated system
Warazup, Myitkyina, and Bhamo, with of loading, dispatching, and controlling
housing, messing, maintenance, and serv- convoys. Convoy discipline, preventive
ice facilities. maintenance, and accurate documenta-
Convoys of 2½-ton 6x6 trucks moved tion were stressed, and, to deal with the
supplies to Shingbwiyang under the block chronic problem of pilferage, a cargo-seal-
system. Cargo destined for onward ship- ing program was instituted. In an effort to
ment was unloaded at the transfer shed, eliminate the transfer of cargo at Shing-
loaded aboard semitrailers, and then bwiyang, all-wheel-drive truck-tractors
hauled to Warazup by truck-tractors. At were assigned to the Ledo-Shingbwiyang
Warazup the truck-tractors dropped the run in June, but their use was soon aban-
semitrailers destined for forward move- doned when it was found that they could
ment and picked up empty trailers or not operate over this section during the
trailers with backhaul shipments and re- monsoon season.
turned to Shingbwiyang. Other truck-
tractors operating out of Warazup picked China Convoy Operations
up the loaded trailers and moved them to
Myitkyina, where a similar exchange was The first month of China convoy oper-
effected. With the exception of a few ations was one of constant crisis, with a
special shipments, Bhamo was the south- lack of drivers the most serious problem.
ern terminal of the Burma haul. There, After the dispatch of the first regular con-
final deliveries were made and all equip- voy on 1 February 1945, efforts were made
ment returned to Myitkyina. to use Chinese drivers with American
For a time, American trucking units officers in charge, but the experiment
employed on the block system were sup- proved a dismal failure. The training at
plemented by convoys driven by Chinese Ramgarh was inadequate, and on 24
military units. The Chinese never proved February General Pick reported that he
satisfactory, largely because American had 1,400 Chinese graduate drivers at
588 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Ledo, none of whom was prepared for obtained through contractors, to base
convoy duty. Despite additional training operations in Intermediate Section Two
in Advance Section Three, the trainees and the Ledo area. Both these develop-
never proved entirely satisfactory and, as ments permitted the release of Quarter-
will be seen, use of them was discontinued master truck companies for China convoy
in June 1945. operations and in June enabled the MTS
In order to keep vehicles moving to completely to discontinue the use of
China, several converted Chinese tank Chinese drivers. On 17 July 1945 a total
battalions, which were en route to China of 26 Quartermaster truck companies was
and possessed experienced drivers, were being used for deliveries to China, arid the
drawn upon, and 150 of these troops were only other vehicles consigned to China
returned by air for an additional haul that were being delivered were those
after delivering vehicles. Other drivers added to the organizational vehicles of
were secured from the 330th Engineer U.S. Army units moving to China on per-
Regiment—volunteers who chose this ex- manent change of station.82
traordinary diversion before returning to While coping with the driver problem,
the United States—and from Chinese the MTS took steps to place operations on
graduates completing advanced training a sound basis. A China Traffic Branch was
at Ledo. In addition, American units set up with full responsibility for the make-
moving to China were assigned vehicles up, supply, maintenance, and control of
consigned to China as well as their own all convoys from the pick-up point near
organizational equipment.81 By using these Ledo to final delivery in Kunming. Co-
expedients, 22 convoys, consisting of 1,333 ordination with Intermediate Section Two
vehicles and 609 trailers and carrying was effected, and commitments were ob-
1,111 short tons of cargo were delivered to tained for the delivery of vehicles loaded
Kunming in February. with cargo for consignment to China. As-
In the months that followed, the MTS sembly areas and dispatch points were
used volunteers from all over the India- selected, and procedures were adopted for
Burma Theater, Chinese and American documenting vehicles and cargo and for
casuals and units moving to China, some the necessary border clearance. By 24
Chinese trainees, and such Quartermaster March 1945 China convoy operations
truck drivers as could be spared from were sufficiently developed to permit the
Burma operations. Volunteers and other publication of a detailed standing operat-
MTS drivers were returned by air over the ing procedure covering the movement
Hump. In this manner, MTS was able to from Ledo to Kunming.
increase deliveries to 2,342 vehicles, 1,185 A pressing problem when MTS took
trailers, and 4,198 short tons of cargo in
April, but a firm solution to the driver 81
Hist of IBT, 1944-45, Vol. II, Ch. 10, pp. 363-
problem had yet to be found. 78; SOS Hist, 1944-45, App. 4, Sec. II, pp. 11-12.
Relief of the driver shortage came in 82
Ltr, Col H. C. Helgerson, Exec Officer Trans Sv,
May and June with the end of combat to Lt Gen R. A. Wheeler, CG USF IBT, 29 Jul 45,
IBT Trans Sec folder Rpt on Devel of Standard Civ
operations in central Burma and the as- Motor Truck Units, KCRC AGO; Hist of IBT,
signment of Indian civilian driver units, 1945-46, App. 1, Sec II, Chronology.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
over operations was the lack of terminals
and traffic control stations. In March
terminals were set up at Makum Junction,
mile 2.8, where vehicles and cargo were
delivered by Intermediate Section; at
Lekha Pani, mile 4, the point of dispatch;
and at Kunming, mile 1,079, where first
and second echelon maintenance was per-
formed and final delivery made to China
Theater. Meanwhile, control station sites
in China had been selected and construc-
tion begun. Ultimately, nine such stations
were established along the route to pro-
vide maintenance, messing, and communi-
cations facilities and overnight quarters.
The stations were manned by detach-
ments drawn from MTS headquarters
and operating units. Rounding out the
China convoy installations was the Border
Guard Station, located first at Wanting
and later at Mong Yu, where American
MP's checked convoys to see that only
authorized personnel passed through.
Other problems continued to crop up in
the course of MTS operations. The India-
Burma Theater complained that road
facilities provided by China Theater were
inadequate, while China Theater pointed
out that India-Burma Theater terminal
personnel and facilities at Kunming were
insufficient to insure the transfer of ve-
hicles in good operating condition. By the
middle of May, the provision of additional
facilities and personnel had corrected both
deficiencies. Poor convoy discipline, par-
ticularly of units moving to China, and
drivers' laxity in performing first and
second echelon maintenance also were
problems. The first was dealt with by
vigorous MP control and the other by as-
signment of tools and native labor at con-
trol stations to assist convoy personnel in
maintaining vehicles. The problem of in-
589
complete and faulty documentation was
remedied in June with the assignment of
documentation officers to each convoy.
By May 1945 China convoy operations
had been placed in high gear; MTS
drivers and units on change of station,
moving in 78 convoys, delivered 4,682
trucks, 1,103 trailers, and 8,435 short tons
of cargo. In this and subsequent months,
vehicle deliveries exceeded theater targets.
With the exclusive use of American drivers
in June, the average time consumed on
the trip from Ledo to Kunming, which
had originally taken about 18 days, was
reduced to 12 to 14 days. In August 1945
the MTS experienced its most difficult
operating month as damage caused by
heavy monsoon rains closed the road to all
China-bound traffic for 17 days and
caused a drastic reduction in deliveries.83
The Close of Stilwell Road Operations
The end of hostilities was followed by
the termination of all motor transport
operations on the Stilwell Road. In Sep-
tember 1945 only 4,112 short tons were
delivered to bases in Burma, where lines of
supply had begun to draw back toward
Ledo as construction halted and outlying
installations were closed. Meanwhile, on
27 August the theater had set up as a final
road mission the delivery to Kunming of
4,000 trucks and 8,000 net tons of cargo,
vehicles along the route that had been re-
paired, and some organic vehicles. The
job got under way in September. On the
23d of the month the theater ordered the
immediate end of vehicle dispatches, with
the exception of a few special movements.
83
Rpts, Trans Sv USF IBT, Hwy LOC, May-Aug
45, OCT HB CBI.
590
Final deliveries were completed during the
first eight days of October, and on 1
November the Stilwell Road was officially
closed. Six days later the MTS was inac-
tivated.84
From 1 February through 8 October
1945, a total of 25,783 vehicles and 6,539
trailers was delivered to China by MTS
drivers and by American and Chinese
units moving on permanent change of sta-
tion. The 2½-ton 6x6 cargo trucks, of
which 12,386 were delivered, led the list,
although jeeps, weapons carriers, Foreign
Economic Administration 3-ton T-234
trucks, and other miscellaneous types con-
stituted more than one half the total.
Trailer deliveries included 4,130 1-ton
trailers and 1,413 ¼-ton trailers. Aside
from 8,055 trucks and 2,794 trailers
brought in as organizational equipment,
the vehicles were delivered to the Com-
manding General, SOS, China Theater,
and were employed under his control to
improve the military transportation sys-
tem in China.85
The vehicles and trailers carried to
China a total of 38,062 short tons of cargo,
mainly artillery, ammunition, and heavy
equipment for U.S.-sponsored Chinese di-
visions. If the weight of the vehicles and
trailers is included, the total tonnage de-
livered is raised to 146,948 short tons. In
making these deliveries, 31,736,078 ve-
hicle-miles were traveled at the cost of .22
tons of fuel for each ton of cargo, including
the weight of the vehicles.
Stilwell Road deliveries were over-
shadowed by the Hump airlift, and after
the pipeline to Kunming was placed in
full operation its deliveries exceeded the
net cargo carried over the road. The fol-
lowing table indicates tonnages delivered
to China by the three carriers from Febru-
ary through September 1945. 86
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
In evaluating the performance of the
Stilwell Road, it should be remembered
that the failure to measure up to goals for
deliveries to China set up in 1943 had its
roots in strategic decisions that cut back
the standards of road construction and re-
duced the highway's mission to one-way
deliveries of vehicles and a relatively small
amount of artillery and other military
supplies. In effect, this ruled out the large-
scale, two-way, truck-trailer operation
originally planned. Truck-tractor and
semitrailer requirements were progres-
sively curtailed, and those that finally
reached the theater were used entirely
within Burma. Driver units were never
provided to the theater for China de-
liveries, compelling the use of Chinese
drivers and American volunteers as ex-
pedients until Quartermaster truck units
could be released from the Burma haul.
In the meantime there had been a rapid
development of the Hump operation, and
84
Hist of IBT, 1945-46, Vol. I, Ch. 3, pp. 143-46,
App. 1, Pt. I, Sec. I, The Situation, and App. 20, Sec.
I, The Stilwell Rd.
85
For details on the employment of vehicles deliv-
ered over the Stilwell Road, see below, pp. 596-99.
86
Hump and pipeline tonnages are taken from G-4
Periodic Report, IBT, quarter ending 30 September
1945, Tab 13b, Deliveries to China Theater via Air,
Road, and Pipeline by IBT, AG 319.1. Road tonnages
are based on Rpt, Hwy LOC, IBT, Oct 45 (final rpt),
Trans Sec IBT 319.1 Rpts, KCRC AGO.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
by the time the road opened it was possible
to rely on air transport as the principal
means of delivering supplies to China.
Considering the limitations imposed on
the mission of the road, the lack of per-
sonnel, and the handicaps of road and
climatic conditions, the record of motor
transport on the Stilwell Road is im-
pressive. The vehicles delivered over the
road greatly relieved the critical transpor-
tation situation in China. Moreover, cargo
delivered to bases in Burma helped make
possible the successful prosecution of the
north and central Burma campaigns and
road and pipeline construction. Within
the confines of its mission and the resources
available, the Stilwell Road made a valu-
able contribution to the war in southeast
Asia and materially improved the intra-
China transportation system.
U.S. Army Transportation in China
Delivery of materials from Calcutta to
Assam and from there over the Hump to
airfields in Yunnan was a job half done.
From Kunming, supplies had to be hauled
forward by rail, road, and water over the
Kunming East Line of Communications,
a complex and difficult route. (Map 10)
Supplies were carried from Kunming to
Kutsing by meter-gauge railroad. From
Kutsing, the Southwest Highway Trans-
port Administration (SWHTA), a quasi-
governmental agency, or other carriers
trucked cargo eastward to Kweiyang, and
thence north to Chungking or south to
Tushan. A standard-gauge railroad de-
livered supplies from Tushan to Liuchow
and/or Kweilin, and from those bases
materials were moved forward by rail,
truck, river craft, animal, or coolie.
Before 1944 the U.S. Army relied almost
completely on Chinese agencies for trans-
591
portation within China. When the first
SOS organization was established at
Kunming in July 1942, few men and vir-
tually no equipment were available for
American transportation operations. The
closing of the Burma Road and the small
Hump capacity made difficult the im-
portation of transport equipment, and
most early SOS activities were devoted to
receiving air freight and expediting the
forward movement of supplies.
SOS in China at first had no transpor-
tation organization, although Mr. Lemuel
K. Taylor, a civilian, rendered valuable
service as consultant on transportation
matters. As SOS activities extended east-
ward, officers were stationed at important
bases and transshipment points to keep
supplies moving. When SOS opened a
branch office at Heng-yang in May 1943,
a few vehicles purchased locally and oper-
ated by SOS personnel joined private
trucks hired by SOS to carry bombs and
ammunition to newly constructed Four-
teenth Air Force bases. In September a
Transportation Control office set up at
Kukong hired Chinese carriers to haul
supplies from the railhead to airfields
farther forward. A transportation officer
for SOS was appointed in December, but
his job consisted mainly in arranging for
rail movement of Army freight out of
Kunming. In February 1944 one Trans-
portation Corps officer was included
among the nine officers assigned to trans-
portation duties east of Kunming.
The only transportation operation di-
rectly controlled by SOS was air-freight
reception and discharge, begun in July
1942 when the first air-freight depot was
established at Kunming. Other depots
were subsequently activated at Yangkai,
Yun-nany-i, Chanyi, and Chungking.
Their function was to unload and ware-
592 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

MAP 10

house cargo from India for transshipment route during 1943, obviously far below
in China and to warehouse and load cargo Chennault's requirements. As a result,
for shipment to India. These activities U.S. Air Forces units east of Kunming
were handled by SOS personnel with the were being compelled to rely heavily on
assistance of Chinese coolies until October the extremely limited air transport facili-
1943, when the Air Transport Command ties for supply deliveries, and Chennault
87
took control of all air-freight depots. had to use his force in accordance with the
supplies available rather than in terms of
Motor Transport
their best tactical use.
The ELOC assumed importance in The transportation situation in China
U.S. Army planning in the latter part of had long been a difficult one. Prewar ve-
1943. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, hicles had been operated over primitive
head of the Fourteenth Air Force, had roads with no replacements and only a
begun to expand his operations and by the 87
SOS Hist, 1942-44, App. 1, SOS in China (here-
end of October had five fighter and two after cited as China SOS Hist), Sec. 1, Pt. 2, pp. 2-4,
medium bomber squadrons in east China, 15; China SOS Hist, App. C, Transportation Section,
pp. 1-3, and App. G, Air Freight and Discharge Sta-
all dependent on the tortuous ELOC for tions, pp. 1-7; Rpt, Nat Mallouf and Walter H. Car-
logistical support. Although what went son, FEA, China's Motor Transportation, Jan 44,
into the ELOC and what came out was IBT Trans Sec 319.1 Rpts, KCRC AGO; Maj. Gen.
Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter; The Memoirs of
unknown, it was estimated that 1,500 Claire Lee Chennault (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
short tons a month were carried over this 1949), p. 239.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 593

small dribble of spare parts. By the end of shops were out in the open and much of
1943 truck fleets were being rapidly re- the work was done on the ground. Worker
duced to junk, bringing motor transport morale was low and SWHTA officials
on the ELOC to the verge of complete were discouraged, having operated this
collapse. The main bottleneck on the transport agency since 1940 under adverse
ELOC was the 400-mile highway linking conditions.89
the railheads at Kutsing and Tushan. This In order to provide more adequate sup-
road, running through the mountainous port for the advanced airfields of the Four-
terrain of Kweichow Province had been teenth Air Force, Sheahan in February
built by hand and was rugged, poorly 1944 proposed the development of a
maintained, and full of hairpin turns and movement rate of 8,000 short tons of mili-
steep grades. It contributed still further to tary cargo per month from Kutsing to
the deterioration of vehicles brought on by Tushan, the goal to be reached through
obsolescence and poor vehicle mainte- co-ordination with Chinese carriers, re-
nance. habilitation of 1,500 Chinese trucks, and
Toward the end of the year, Chennault the establishment of supplementary Amer-
exerted strong pressure to bring about im- ican motor transport operations. Required
provements on the ELOC to support ex- to effect the plan was the air shipment
panded air operations in east China. His from India of 700 l½-ton to 2½-ton
attempts to focus the attention of theater trucks, 2,000 tons of spare parts, three
and SOS headquarters on the problem of Quartermaster truck companies, and a
the ELOC, particularly on the Kutsing- heavy automotive maintenance company.
Tushan highway, were effective. Early in Transportation Service developed Shea-
1944 General Wilson assigned Colonel hans's proposals into Project TIGAR 26-A,
Sheahan to China where, as Wilson's and when the plan was approved in June
deputy and Transportation Officer, Ad- implementation had already begun. An
vance Section One, Sheahan assumed di- immediate increase in tonnage deliveries
rection of U.S. Army transportation oper- to Tushan was achieved by exerting pres-
ations within the section and beyond to sure on SWHTA to speed up operation. As
the forward delivery points.88 a result of negotiations with Chinese offi-
Sheahan's reconnaissance of the ELOC cials, appropriations were made for con-
revealed disheartening conditions. The struction, repair, and improvement of
Southwest Highway Transport Admin- highways, bridges, and roadside facilities,
istration, the principal carrier, owned and rail lines were extended from Kutsing
1,196 vehicles, but in January only 183 eastward to Chanyi and from Tushan
were operable. During that month 2,959 88
Ltr and incls, Chennault to Wedemeyer, 6 Jul
other trucks, governmental, quasi-govern- 45, WDCSA 091 China (29 Aug 45) Case 29; SOS
mental, and commercial, were operated at Hist, 1942-44, Sec. I, Pt. IV, Planning and Develop-
one time or another by SWHTA. Most ment Section; Memo 10-2, Hq Adv Sec One Trans
Sv Orgn, 5 Mar 44, CT SOS Trans Sec 537 Motor
trucks were using substituted fuels—alco- Trans in connection with Restoration of Communica-
hol and charcoal, plus some diesel and tions, 89
KCRC AGO.
Tung oil. Preventive maintenance was Rpt, Sheahan to Wilson, 23 Feb 44, sub: Interior
Transport—China, CT SOS Trans Sec 537 Motor
practically nonexistent and overhaul work Trans in connection with Restoration of Communi-
was primitive and poorly executed. Most cations, KCRC AGO.
594
north to Tuyun, shortening the highway
mileage by about 10 percent. Largely
through such efforts, shipments eastward
from Chanyi increased from 1,931 short
tons in February to 3,068 short tons in
May, before a single new U.S. Army truck
90
was in operation.
While Sheahan tackled the problem of
motor transport on the ELOC, he also
began building a transportation organiza-
tion. Until the end of February, when one
Transportation Corps officer arrived, he
was without trained personnel. In April
he had sufficient staff to assign one officer
each to way stations at Chanyi, An-nan,
Kewiyang, and Tushan to safeguard,
expedite, and keep record of U.S. Army
cargo. By the end of August Sheahan had
nine officers at his Kunming headquarters,
a Motor Transport Division director at
Kweiyang, and eighteen other transporta-
tion officers at key points. The staff, at
best, constituted a skeleton organization
and never numbered more than sixty-five.
After delays in securing air priorities,
the various elements of TIGAR 26-A began
to jell. By the end of May the 857th Ord-
nance Heavy Automotive Maintenance
Company had set up shop at Chanyi and
started maintenance and repair work on
the vehicles that had begun to arrive. The
3843d Quartermaster Truck Company ar-
rived at Chanyi on 1 June and three days
later, with ninety-three trucks available,
began to run convoys to the Tuyun rail-
head. Despite poor road conditions and
the absence of maintenance and drivers'
facilities, the first round trip was made in
seven days, in contrast with the two to
twelve weeks previously required by
Chinese trucks. After the first convoy, a
regular schedule of hauls was set up with
overnight stops at An-nan, Kweiyang, and
Tuyun. By the end of the month, U.S.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Army vehicles were carrying 17 percent of
the total tonnage on this part of the
route.91
Efforts to improve the operation of
Chinese trucks and the institution of
American motor transport operations
brought a substantial increase in ELOC
traffic. During June 3,379 short tons were
dispatched eastward from Chanyi, mainly
aviation fuel and lubricants, bombs, and
ammunition for the Fourteenth Air Force.
This, however, was less than one half the
needs of Chennault, who, along with the
Chinese armies, was faced with the task of
containing a major Japanese offensive.
Among factors hampering expansion of
ELOC operations was the critical shortage
of alcohol, the basic motor fuel. Also, ve-
hicles and spare parts scheduled for July
air delivery were delayed. In June the
lion's share of the Hump tonnage was
allocated to the Fourteenth Air Force, but
ironically, the shipment of high-priority
aviation gasoline, bombs, and ammuni-
tion took air space from the trucks and
spare parts necessary for the movement of
these supplies to the eastern fields. The
limited Hump capacity not only delayed
delivery of additional vehicles, but also
handicapped existing operations, particu-
larly in the field of maintenance, where a
spare-parts shortage kept a high per-
centage of Chinese and U.S. Army ve-
hicles deadlined.
90
Unless otherwise cited, the account of motor
transportation through September 1944 is based on
the report, Implementation of Project TIGAR 26-A,
February-September 1944, by Transportation Serv-
ice in the China Sector, 25 January 1945 (OCT HB
CT). Statistics for the period, January through No-
vember 1944, are derived from Appendix C to China
SOS history, Inclosure 7.
91
China SOS Hist, App. D, Ordnance Section, p. 5;
Ltr, Col Ricamore, Trans Officer SOS CT, to CG
SOS CT, 24 Dec 44, sub: Decoration Award, CT
Trans Sec Reader File Dec 44, KCRC AGO.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
Despite such obstacles, the ELOC's out-
put increased during the summer of 1944,
and in August the arrival of two Quarter-
master truck companies and additional
trucks provided considerable impetus to
supply movements. Operations reached
their peak in September, when 6,112 short
tons were dispatched over the LOC from
Chanyi. The August and September ton-
nage for the first time approximated the
support which Chennault considered
necessary. But the improvement came too
late, for by then the Japanese had de-
stroyed most of the east China air bases
and were threatening those in central and
south China.92
In April 1944 the Japanese had driven
south of the Yellow River, occupying the
Pinghan Railway Zone and an important
segment of the Lunghai Railway Zone. In
their continuing offensive, they took Heng-
yang in August and then moved on
Kweilin. By the end of October, Kweilin
was evacuated and about to fall, and it
appeared that Liuchow and Nan-ning
would follow. As the enemy disrupted
service to the forward bases, alternate
routes were set up but none survived ex-
cept that from Kweiyang to Chihchiang,
which, alone among the eastern airfields,
withstood the Japanese. American trans-
portation personnel were active in the
evacuation of refugees and troops from
the eastern bases and aided in the rescue
or demolition of critical equipment.
Disruption of traffic on the ELOC be-
came increasingly severe during the fall of
1944. In August, highway transport for-
ward of Kweiyang and Chihchiang was at
a standstill except between Liuchow and
Nan-ning. The Chinese Army had com-
mandeered all Chinese-owned transporta-
tion east of Liuchow and the absence of
maintenance and drivers' facilities pre-
595
vented the use of American vehicles in
that area. Roads were clogged with refu-
gees and truck service on the Chanyi-
Tushan highway was overtaxed by Chinese
troop movements. In these circumstances
shipments eastward from Chanyi dropped
to 2,772 short tons in October and, with
the onset of bitter winter weather, fell to
1,760 short tons in November. During the
first twenty days of December, transport
was almost completely immobilized, only
198 short tons moving eastward from
Chanyi. By the end of 1944 the ELOC ex-
tended only as far as Tushan and Chih-
chiang, just half its length, before the
Japanese offensive began.
As a result of the offensive, the ELOC
had been radically shortened to the east,
but at the same time the tactical situation
necessitated expansion of supply opera-
tions to the north. Beginning in October,
two of the three American truck com-
panies were diverted from the ELOC to
support the main B-29 bases in the
Cheng-tu area and other northern air-
fields. Operations were over unsurveyed
routes with no communications and main-
tenance facilities, and were limited by
severe winter weather.93
92
Memo, Sheahan for Maj Gen Thomas G. Hearn,
CofS USAF CBI, 16 Jul 44, sub: Kunming LOC
(Proj 26-A), CT SOS Trans Sec 537 45, KCRC
AGO; Ltr, Sheahan to Maj Helgerson, Dep Chief of
Trans Sv SOS CBI, 10 Jun 44, same sub, CT SOS
Trans Sec Reader File Jun 44, KCRC AGO; Rpt,
Sheahan to Chennault, 6 Aug 44, same sub, CT SOS
Trans Sec Reader File Aug 44, KCRC AGO; Rpt,
Col R. R. Neyland, CO Adv Sec One, to Chennault,
5 Oct 44, same sub, CT SOS Trans Sec 500 Trans
44-45, KCRC AGO; Chennault, op. cit., pp. 236, 307.
93
Rpt, Capt Mark M. Gebhart, AG SOS CT, to
CG 14th AF, CO China ASAC, 29 Dec 44, sub: Kun-
ming East LOC, Proj TIG-26A, CT SOS Trans Sec
537 Motor Truck Trans in connection with Restora-
tion of Communications, KCRC AGO; Supplement,
History of SOS China Theater, 25 October to 31
December 1944, pp. 3-4, DRB AGO.
596
In the meantime, Sheahan's organiza-
tion had ceased to exist as an operating
service. On 1 September 1944 it became a
staff section of Advance Section One,
which soon was designated SOS, China
Theater. The Transportation Section con-
tinued to guide transportation activities,
but operational control was placed in the
hands of the commanding general of SOS.
The last vestige of the Transportation Sec-
tion's operational control over TIGAR
26-A personnel was removed in December
when the 857th Company was placed
under the Ordnance Section.94
The disruption of the ELOC and the
destruction of the eastern airfields should
not detract from credit due Sheahan and
his organization, for with a limited amount
of trucks, personnel, and maintenance and
repair equipment they had done a re-
markable job under difficult conditions.
Under their direction Chinese carriers,
supplemented by American truck units,
had increased shipment eastward from
Kutsing or Chanyi from 1,931 short tons
in February 1944 to 6,112 tons in Septem-
ber. This tonnage did not include fuel
hauls from Nekiang and Chungking to
Kweiyang, evacuation of personnel and
supplies from the eastern bases, or the
westward movement of thousands of
Chinese troops over the ELOC for train-
ing in India. Sheahan was highly com-
mended by the Air Service Command,
and Chennault later characterized his
work as "superb." 95
The critical tactical situation in the
latter part of 1944 was marked by radical
readjustment in the mission of motor
transport. Chinese carriers were pulled off
LOC hauling for the Fourteenth Air Force
and used in evacuation activities and the
movement of troops into defensive posi-
tions. The three American truck units, re-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
inforced with Chinese civilian drivers,
were also affected. Operating from Kwei-
yang, the 3731st Quartermaster Truck
Company assisted in evacuating Liuchow
and Nan-ning and hauled supplies from
Kweiyang to the besieged air base at
Chihchiang. The other two units, after
being diverted to the support of the north-
ern airfields, were returned to the ELOC
for the movement and supply of Chinese
troops. Such vehicles as could be spared
from these activities were used to haul Air
Forces supplies, but the Fourteenth Air
Force was compelled to move most of its
supplies by air from Kunming and Chanyi
to its remaining fields. Operating in freez-
ing weather, Chinese vehicles were de-
teriorating rapidly and American per-
sonnel and equipment were being worn
out.
The transportation picture remained
bleak in early 1945. Chinese civilian car-
riers, then being brought under the War
Transport Board, were failing to meet
their commitments by 50 to 75 percent,
and American truck operations showed no
marked improvement. Such operations as
were carried on centered about the move-
ment of Chinese troops and supplies to
defensive areas and the hauling of some
Fourteenth Air Force supplies over the
Chanyi
The arrival in February of the first ve-
hicles delivered over the Stilwell Road
94
China SOS Hist, App. C, Transportation Section,
p. 2, App. D, Ordnance Section, p. 5.
95
Ltr, Col R. H. Wise, CO Sector 3 China ASAC,
to Sheahan, 10 Oct 44, CT SOS Trans Sec Reader
File Nov 44, KCRC AGO; Chennault, op. cit., p. 236.
96
Ltr, 2d Lt Lloyd J. Weiner, Asst AG SOS CT, to
CO China ASAC, 11 Dec 44, sub: Overland Trans
Rqmts, CT SOS Trans Sec Reader File Dec 44,
KCRC AGO; G-4 Per Rpt, Hq USF CT, first qtr
45, pp. 8-10, AG Opns Rpts 319.1; Hist Rpt, Trans
Sec, Feb 45, CT SOS Trans Sec 314.7 Mil Hists 44-
45, KCRC AGO.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
from India-Burma marked the beginning
of an improved transportation situation in
China, although most of them were used
to fill shortages in organizational equip-
ment of units in the theater. The first large
addition to ELOC operations came with
the arrival of the Lux Convoy in March,
This convoy, consisting of the 517th Quar-
termaster Group (Mobile) headquarters,
two Quartermaster truck battalions with a
total of seven truck companies, an Ord-
nance medium automotive maintenance
company, and a medical company,
brought in over 600 2½-ton trucks and 83
truck-trailers.
The Lux Convoy had its origin in
Project TIGAR 26-B, a plan for the over-
land delivery of vehicles to China. Con-
ceiving of TIGAR 26-A as a stopgap opera-
tion, Transportation Service had hoped to
place support of the Fourteenth Air Force
on a sound basis by delivering a sufficient
number of heavy vehicles to permit the
movement of 10,000 short tons a month
over the ELOC. To this end, in February
1944, it investigated the possibility of using
the trans-Turkestan route, extending 5,534
miles by rail and highway from Khorr-
amshahr, Iran, to Chungking, China, via
Soviet Turkestan. The Soviet Union was
at first unwilling to permit American ve-
hicles to travel through its territory, and
consequently TIGAR 26-B, submitted to
theater by Transportation Service in June,
was held in abeyance. The project was re-
vived in September when the Soviet
Union finally agreed to the delivery of 500
trucks through its territory. A convoy was
organized in the Persian Gulf Command,
given the code name Lux, and readied for
movement, starting 1 December. Shortly
before the convoy was scheduled to leave,
news of disturbances in Sinkiang Province
97
caused it to be delayed. Finally, it was
597
shipped by water to India for movement
over the Stilwell Road, arriving in Kun-
ming early in March 1945.
Later in the month, the 517th Quarter-
master group, reinforced by the three
Quartermaster truck companies already
on duty, began operations out of Chanyi.
In order to make the maximum use of ve-
hicles, a block system was inaugurated
over the 327-mile route from Chanyi to
Kweiyang. Relay and terminal stations
were established about one day's travel
apart at Chanyi, Panhsien, An-nan, An-
shun, and Kweiyang, and supervisory and
maintenance personnel were assigned.
Drivers traveling in convoy delivered
loaded vehicles to the next station, where
new drivers took over for delivery over the
following block. This was continued until
the final cargo destination was reached.
The vehicles then returned by the same
system.98
The 517th Quartermaster Group also
operated a route to carry fuel and food
from Chungking and Nekiang to Kwei-
yang and hauled supplies forward from
Kweiyang to Chihchiang and Nantan.
These routes were not operated on the
block system, convoys carrying supplies to
97
SOS Hist, 1942-44, Sec. I, Pt. V, and Sec. II, Pt.
I, Planning and Development Section. A collection of
radios exchanged between the War Department, CBI,
and PGC relating to the Lux convoy may be found in
CT SOS Trans Sec file folder Pacific, IBT, Trans 634
Hangars, Garages, Shelters and Stables Project "Lux"
Trans-Turkestan Route, KCRC AGO.
98
Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion of
motor transport in China, March-September 1945, is
based on the following: Monthly Hist Rpts, Trans Sec
SOS CT, Mar-Jun 45, CT SOS Trans Sec 314.7 Mil
Hists 44-45, KCRC AGO; Monthly Hist Rpts, Trans
Sec SOS CT, Jul-Aug 45, CT SOS Trans Sec Reader
File, KCRC AGO; G-4 Per Rpts, Hq USF CT, first
qtr 45, pp. 8-10, second qtr 45, pp. 10-13, third qtr
45, pp. 8-10, AG Opns Rpts 319.1. For statistics see
Folder, Expenditures Relating to Trans Accounts,
Tab CC, Road Trans Performance (WTB) and
(U.S.) CT, KCRC AGO.
598 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

their destination and then returning. For picture was being reversed as a system of
purposes of control, two divisions were set American military truck operation
up. The Western Division under the 198th evolved, with civilian carriers under the
Quartermaster Battalion supervised move- War Transport Board relegated to an in-
ment of all freight over the LOC east of creasingly minor role. With the exception
Chanyi, but not including Kweiyang. The of organizational vehicles, trucks delivered
Eastern Division under the 93d Quarter- over the Stilwell Road were consigned to
master Battalion handled movement over the commanding general of SOS and
the routes east, north, and south of operated by American truck companies
Kweiyang. augmented by civilian drivers or Chinese
The introduction of these new trucks military truck units under American con-
and personnel produced immediate re- trol. Only a small number of nonstandard
sults. In March 1945 U.S. Army trucks vehicles was assigned to WTB carriers.
hauled 12,506 metric tons in local, intra- Thus, American and Chinese military-
base, and LOC movements—almost operated trucks steadily increased their
double the February figure. The 517th tonnage movement, while the WTB car-
was heavily reinforced and by the end of riers had difficulty in maintaining their
June had 436 American and 2,367 Chinese movement rate of early 1945. As time
drivers operating 1,318 trucks." went on, WTB vehicles tended to be lim-
Motor transport operations were given ited to hauls from east to west on the main
an additional boost in May, when two LOC and to routes to the north. In May
Chinese tank battalions that had been 1945 American-controlled vehicles were
converted into truck units in India were hauling more than five times the tonnage
placed in operation on the ELOC. By of WTB carriers that early in the year had
July 1945 five such units, now designated been carrying about 80 percent of the sup-
motor transport battalions, and two plies over the LOC.100
Chinese truck regiments were operating As the Japanese began withdrawing
under American supervision. In general, from south and central China, the LOC
they were used on branch routes running was lengthened to the south and east.
west, north, east, and south from the main From May through July, motor transport
Chanyi-Kweiyang LOC. The Chinese had as its primary mission the movement
units were under the command of the of Chinese troops and supplies to areas of
Chinese supply services, but their opera- combat in southwest Kwangsi and western
tions were controlled by the American Hunan Provinces and to support actions
SOS. They did not use the block system resulting in the liberation of Nan-ning
but made regular convoy runs on the and Liuchow and the opening of a drive
routes assigned. from Chihchiang toward Heng-yang.
The establishment of American and Some supplies were also carried to Four-
American-supervised operations pro- 99
Monthly Stat Rpt, Jun 45, Hq 517th QM Gp,
foundly affected the nature of motor trans- SOS Trans Sec Reader File Jul 45, KCRC AGO.
100
port in China. Until early 1945 motor See Cheves and Murrow ltrs cited n. 23; Folder,
transport was performed largely by Chi- Expenditures Relating to Trans Accounts, Tab J
Trans Sec SOS CT, 8 Jul 45, p. 3, CT 40 Dr 4, KCRC
nese civilian carriers, supplemented by a AGO; Hist Rpt, Trans Sec, Jul 45, CT SOS Trans
few American truck companies. Now the Sec Reader File Aug 45, KCRC AGO.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 599

teenth Air Force fields, principally Chih- from Chanyi to Chihchiang, Liuchow,
chiang. Kweilin, and points east became the re-
During this period the 517th Quarter- sponsibility of Base Section Three head-
master Group handled increasing traffic quarters at Kweiyang, and projected
between Chanyi and Kweiyang, con- southern lines of communication along the
tinued operations on the Kweiyang- coast in support of the Fort Bayard project
Chungking highway, and set up a route were assigned to Base Section Two at Nan-
from Chanyi to the newly constructed ning. Plans were being made to extend
Luhsien air base. At the same time, as new operations from Chihchiang to Kweilin
territories were occupied, Chinese military and to open a route connecting the latter
truck units were shifted from old to new base with Nan-ning and Liuchow.
routes and additional units were assigned.
In June and July, Chinese units were Inland Water, Rail, and Air
moved to Kweiyang to haul supplies to Transportation
Chihchiang and forward from there to ad-
vance combat forces. Others were assigned Although inland water transport tradi-
to haul southward from Pai-se to Nan- tionally had been the method of moving
ning and from Kweiyang to Liuchow. personnel and cargo in the interior of
Peak traffic was attained in June 1945, China, before 1945 the time element and
when U.S.-controlled carriers moved the urgent need for supplies severely re-
58,156 metric tons and accomplished a stricted its utilization by the U.S. Army.
total of 11,663,710 ton-kilometers. This The limited number of river routes in
included local and intrabase hauls as well operation in December 1944 were north of
as LOC shipments. the main LOC on the Yangtze River and
As the end of hostilities approached in its tributaries and were used primarily to
August, 546 American, 2,511 Chinese serve air bases in the Cheng-tu and Chung-
civilian, and 7,010 Chinese military king areas and to carry motor fuel to
drivers were operating under American Chungking for truck delivery to Kwei-
control. This included the 517th Quarter- yang. At that time, these routes were new
102
master Group, the 43d Quartermaster and their capacities were unknown.
Battalion, which was engaged in local (Chart 7)
hauling in the Kunming area, six Chinese
motor transport battalions, and five Chi- 101

nese truck regiments.101 Operation over OCT Rpt, SOS USF CT, Trans Progress, Jun-Aug 45,
HB CT Rpts.
the main LOC between Chanyi and 102
On intra-China river, rail, and air transport
Kweiyang had been firmly established on see the following: China SOS Hist, App. C, Transpor-
a block system, and plans were being tation Section, pp. 9-15; Monthly Hist Rpts, Trans
Sec SOS CT, Feb-Aug 45; Resume of Trans Activi-
made to extend the system to all motor ties, CT, first qtr 45, OCT HB CT Rpts; Drafts,
routes. Intra-China Water Trans and Intra-China Rail
In the last months of wartime opera- Trans, CT SOS Trans Sec Reader File Jun 45, KCRC
AGO; G-4 Per Rpts, Hq USF CT, first qtr 45, p. 13,
tions, SOS base sections took over com- second qtr 45, pp. 13-16, third qtr 45, pp. 10-12, AG
plete control of motor transport, leaving Opns Rpts 319.1. For statistics see Folder, Expendi-
tures Relating to Trans Accounts, Tab CG, Tables,
SOS headquarters with purely planning Water, Rail, and Air Trans Performance, CT, KCRC
and co-ordinating functions. The LOC AGO.
 CHART 7—SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF CHINA TRANSPORTATION ROUTES: AUGUST 1945*

*Not drawn to scale.

Source: Trans Progress Rpt, compiled by Stat Sec Hq SOS USF CT, Jun-Aug 45, OCT HB CBI—CT Rpts.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
As the tactical situation improved and
backlogs of supplies accumulated, increas-
ing attention was given to inland water
transport as a method of relieving and
augmenting motor facilities. In January
both the theater and SOS transportation
sections began to explore the possibility of
developing river routes. Information from
Chinese river men indicated that an un-
limited supply of craft could be made
available through the guilds, which con-
trolled portions of the rivers. While the
migratory habits of Chinese boatmen and
the fluctuating number of craft in any one
area made doubtful any program for their
extensive use, they nevertheless repre-
sented a significant resource.
An inventory of water routes and float-
ing equipment was completed by the
WTB and the SOS Transportation Sec-
tion in March 1945. By April the latter
had set up a new route on the Yangtze sys-
tem to carry fuel from the Kansu oil fields
and existing routes were being further de-
veloped. The first new operation away
from the northern waterways was estab-
lished by Transportation Section per-
sonnel on the Yuan River in March be-
tween Chanyuan and Chihchiang, and by
May the river was in use as far east as
Changte with about 950 boats operating
over various sections. When the Chinese
reoccupied Nan-ning, a route was opened
on the Hsiyang River and hauling was
begun in June with sufficient craft to
move 3,000 metric tons a month.
At the end of June, the Yangtze, Yuan,
and Hsiyang river routes had an esti-
mated combined monthly capacity of
14,000 metric tons, although actual traffic
was much below that figure. Supplies were
moved by sampans, junks, power boats,
and other native craft. River guilds con-
trolled sections of the rivers, furnishing
601
boats, pilots, and frequently even insur-
ance for safe delivery. Methods of pay-
ment and rates varied from section to sec-
tion. Loading and unloading were handled
by coolies. Because of the great seasonal
changes in river depths, virtually no dock-
ing facilities existed and advance planning
for shipments was a necessity. Arrange-
ments for movements initially were made
by local transportation officers with the
river guilds, but later, as the WTB took
over control of water transportation activi-
ties, such matters as securing craft and
transportation rates were handled through
that agency. Inland water transport was
coming into its own, and SOS transporta-
tion officials were planning to shift in-
creasing amounts of cargo from truck to
water haul when the end of the war
brought an abrupt halt to the brief period
of development and expansion of Chinese
inland water transport.
In the case of rail transportation, the
Americans endeavored to effect improve-
ments largely through technical advice
and some material assistance. The five
principal railroads on the ELOC in early
1944 were two meter-gauge and three
standard-gauge lines. These railways were
operating worn equipment and lacked
tools and spare parts, but the U.S. Army,
concentrating its meager resources on the
development of highway transport, could
give only limited attention to other means
of transport.
During 1944 Colonel Sheahan per-
suaded the Chinese Government to build
railway extensions from Kutsing to Chanyi
and from Tushan to Tuyun and secured
the air delivery of twenty-three tons of
braking equipment from India for the
meter-gauge Szechwan-Yunnan Railway,
which extended 108 miles eastward from
Kunming to the Chanyi roadhead. At-
602 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

tempts to begin development of the stand- Although other U.S. Army transporta-
ard-gauge lines to the east were frustrated tion operations in China were new in
by the Japanese offensive. In late 1944 1944, air-freight and passenger activities
rail facilities in Free China were limited to were as old as SOS itself. After the Air
two short meter-gauge lines, the Sze- Transport Command took over air-freight
chwan-Yunnan and the Yunnan-An-nan stations in October 1943, SOS still re-
Railways, running east and south of Kun- tained some important air transportation
ming respectively. All other railroads functions. These were delegated to Shea-
were destroyed or in Japanese hands. han's organization, which in July 1944
U.S. Army efforts to improve rail opera- established an Air Division. When the
tions in 1945 were devoted largely to the Transportation Service became a staff sec-
Szechwan-Yunnan Railway. Early in the tion, the division became the Air Branch,
year, the line was dispatching an average retaining its original duties.
of one train a day, and that only during The Air Branch was responsible for the
daylight for fear of landslides. Rail oper- utilization of the monthly air space al-
ations were greatly stimulated following lotted by theater authorities to SOS. Act-
the assignment to the SOS Transportation ing as a screening agent for SOS sections,
Section of two rail officers who advised it booked and secured movement priority
and assisted Chinese officials. Trains were for passengers and arranged for the ship-
put on a twenty-four-hour-a-day schedule, ment of freight by air-cargo services. Like
equipment was borrowed from the adjoin- its counterpart in India, the Air Branch
ing Yunnan-An-nan Railway, and addi- was closely linked with the operations of
tional labor was secured. During June the China National Aviation Corporation.
seven to eight trains were being run in The branch was responsible for seeing
each direction and freight movement in- that all the conditions of the contract be-
creased from 3,552 metric tons in March tween CNAC and the Army were met in
to 15,147 metric tons in June. Traffic fell China. It supervised the loading and un-
off after June as backlogs at Kunming loading of CNAC aircraft, acting through
were cleared and air deliveries were made local transportation officers; receipted for
direct to new air bases farther forward. By and arranged for the delivery of freight to
September 1945 traffic handled by the proper representatives of the Chinese Na-
railroad had been cut by almost two thirds tional Government; and handled arrange-
over June. ments for the westbound movement of
In the spring of 1945 American and American passengers and cargo on CNAC
Chinese transportation officials also in- planes flying from China to India.
vestigated the possibility of rehabilitating The Air Branch also worked closely
a portion of the standard-gauge Kwei- with ATC, receipting for all SOS cargo
chow-Kwangsi Railway, virtually de- delivered from India on ATC aircraft and
stroyed during the Japanese offensive, and delivering the cargo to the proper con-
some work was begun. By August, how- signee. ATC aircraft were handled by U.S.
ever, it became evident that the railroad Air Forces personnel at air-freight depots,
could not be restored to service in time to SOS trucks moving the cargo from ATC
support the war effort and all work was docks to warehouses in the area. In addi-
halted in favor of highway construction. tion, the Air Branch policed the so-called
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA
Jordan Plan, whereby the Chinese Na-
tional Government undertook to supply
sufficient trucks and labor to U.S. Army
airfields to insure the efficient discharge of
ATC and other aircraft flown into China.
This arrangement never proved entirely
satisfactory, although SOS issued a num-
ber of new trucks to the Chinese in the
middle of 1945 for use at the airfields.
Other Air Branch activities included the
co-ordination of the air movement of
Chinese troops to India and the loading at
Kunming of aircraft attached to theater
headquarters at Chungking.
Intra-China air transport available to
SOS was extremely limited until mid-1945
since the theater used the limited number
of cargo aircraft for high-priority Air
Forces supplies and emergency troop
movements. Only 306 short tons of SOS
supplies were airlifted within China in
March 1945, but as an increased number
of aircraft became available some 3,600
tons were hauled in July. With the end of
hostilities, SOS intra-China air traffic
dwindled as aircraft were diverted to new
postwar tasks.
Closing Operations
Following the Japanese capitulation in
August 1945, the immediate U.S. Army
task was to assist the Chinese in disarming
the Japanese and reoccupying liberated
territory. In support of this mission, motor
transport in west China was assigned the
job of hauling supplies, principally avia-
tion gasoline, to Chihchiang, where Chi-
nese forces were being airlifted to Nan-
king. Liuchow, the other main airfield for
deployment to east China, was cut off
from road traffic by rain and floods and
was supplied entirely by air.
In mid-August, all north-south traffic
603
on the LOC, except between Kweiyang
and Chungking, was halted and drivers
and vehicles were placed on the 606-mile
run from Chanyi to Chihchiang. The
block system was extended over the entire
route, and the first trucks assigned to the
mission left Chanyi on 22 August. In gen-
eral, American and Chinese civilian
drivers operated trucks between stations
from Chanyi to Kweiyang and Chinese
military drivers took them forward over
the blocks between Kweiyang and Chih-
chiang. On 21 September, with 9,833
metric tons of aviation gasoline delivered,
the last shipment left Chanyi. LOC opera-
tions were then halted, leaving only intra-
base and local hauling as continuing
American motor transport activities.103
By 21 November the Stilwell Road, the
pipeline, and the Hump operations had
all been discontinued, the wartime lines of
communications with India-Burma were
severed, and all supplies and personnel
were being brought in through the port of
Shanghai. The Shanghai Base Command
had been activated on 2 September 1945
to operate the port as the supply and
evacuation base for the China Theater.
The Shanghai Port Command, operating
first under the Shanghai Base Command
and then directly under theater head-
quarters, was responsible for both port
and general depot operations. By the end
of the year, a total of 47 vessels carrying
104
156,989 long tons had arrived.
103
Hist Rpt, Trans Sec, Aug 45, CT SOS Trans Sec
Reader File Sep 45, KCRC AGO; Hist Rpt, 93d QM
Bn Mob, Aug 45, AG Opns Rpts QMBN-93-Hq-0.2
(29493) M, Mar, Jun-Sep 45; Rpt, Col R. E.
Kernodle, Exec Officer Trans Sec, to G-4, 27 Sep 45,
sub: Weekly G-4 Rpt, CT SOS Trans Sec Reader File
Sep 45, KCRC AGO; G-4 Per Rpt, Hq USF CT,
third qtr 45, pp. 9-11, AG Opns Rpts 319.1.
104
G-4 Per Rpts, Hq USF CT, third qtr 45, p. 12
and Tab 16, fourth qtr 45, pp. 2-6, AG Opns Rpts
319.1.
604
As China Theater built up its new base
in the east, it simultaneously evacuated
west China. There, SOS undertook the
completion of authorized issues of stocks
to the Chinese Army and began to draw
back toward Kunming. Installations were
closed and, with the exception of residual
teams assigned to safeguard and handle
the disposal of equipment and property,
personnel were evacuated. At Camp Ting
Hao, the China Theater Replacement
Center at Kunming, personnel were proc-
essed and arrangements made for their
movement by air to India. Departures
reached a peak in October, when 22,314
troops were airlifted over the Hump and a
few others left by water from Shanghai.
By 31 October theater strength, which
had been about 65,000 in August, had
been reduced to less than 25,000.
Final evacuation was hastened by gen-
eral unrest that threatened the safety of
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
remaining personnel. By 12 November all
SOS districts except Kunming had been
closed. The Hump lift of 8,870 troops dur-
ing that month virtually cleared out west
China, and on 20 November SOS was in-
activated, turning over remaining in-
stallations and responsibilities to the 301st
Air Depot of the Air Service Command.
After China Theater completed an agree-
ment with the Chinese National Govern-
ment whereby the latter paid $25,000,000
for the major portion of U.S. stocks and
installations remaining in west China, the
301st Air Depot departed on 8 December.
The wartime arena of operations was
thereby closed and China Theater's con-
tinuing operations were concentrated in
the Shanghai area.105
105
G-4 Per Rpt, Hq USF CT, fourth qtr 45, pp.
1-2, and Tab A; Narrative History of Disposal of
SOS Property in West China Since 15 August 1945,
15 Nov 45, OCMH Files; Hist of IBT, 1945-46, Vol.
II, Ch. 4, p. 316.
 CHAPTER XIII
Observations and Conclusions
Viewing U.S. Army oversea transporta-
tion operations in retrospect, one may dis-
cern certain broad influences that affected
their development. The diverse transporta-
tion requirements of the oversea com-
mands, the adjustment of operations to
various environments, and the basic prob-
lems of organization, personnel, and equip-
ment invite comparison and appraisal.
Discussion of these themes, it is hoped, will
serve to provide a broad background
against which transportation activities in
the several oversea commands can more
readily be related and evaluated.
The nature and extent of transportation
operations varied with the oversea com-
mand. In ETO, the scene of the principal
Allied effort against the most powerful
enemy nation, the major tasks involved the
accumulations of vast manpower and ma-
tériel resources in the United Kingdom for
an invasion of northwestern France; the
assembly, mounting, and delivery to the
Continent of assault and build-up forces;
the landing of troops and supplies first
over beaches and then at captured ports;
and the movement of these forces and sup-
plies to the interior across lengthening
lines of communication. Although there
had been well-developed ports and rail-
roads on the Continent, many had been
severely damaged by Allied action or
enemy demolition. The extensive port re-
construction required at Cherbourg,
coupled with the delay in capturing the
major Brittany ports, necessitated con-
tinued operation of the invasion beaches
for a protracted period. The lack of suffi-
cient deepwater ports encouraged the
practice of using vessels as floating ware-
houses from which cargoes were selectively
discharged, and led to the accumulation of
a growing backlog of shipping awaiting
discharge. The development of minor
ports in Normandy and Brittany and the
opening of Le Havre and Rouen provided
some relief, but it was not until the huge
and relatively undamaged port of Antwerp
was opened in late 1944 that the bottle-
neck impeding the flow of men and ma-
tériel into the Continent was broken. Rail-
roads were extensively rehabilitated, and
great numbers of trucks were required to
clear the ports, provide base transporta-
tion, and make long hauls. Long truck
hauls were necessary not only to fill in
until the railways could be placed in full
operation but also to provide flexible
means of transportation that could follow
close behind the rapidly advancing com-
bat forces.
To fulfill these requirements, port troops
and equipment were assigned to take over
the operation of major continental ports;
MRS troops were placed on duty to super-
vise and augment local civilian railway
forces, and rolling stock, motive power,
and other rail equipment were provided;
606
and drivers and trucks were supplied. To
relieve the heavy load on rail and motor
transport, the Army assisted in reviving
inland waterway operations in France and
Belgium, and toward the end of the war
took over supervision of barge traffic on
the Rhine and Danube Rivers, providing
supplementary Army harbor craft com-
panies and equipment.
Many of the problems that arose in
France and Germany had been encoun-
tered in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.
All these campaigns had involved am-
phibious landings and port, rail, and truck
operations. In the North African invasion
experience was gained in the techniques
of conducting an amphibious operation.
The necessity for more detailed advance
planning for the development and opera-
tion of ports and for the packing and
marking of supplies were among the les-
sons passed on for the benefit of later cam-
paigns. Initially, the shortages of naval
escorts slowed the shipping cycle and im-
peded the support of the campaign. After
some early confusion, American-operated
ports in West and North Africa were able
to unload the shipping that arrived, and as
the forces advanced eastward additional
ports were opened. After supplies were
landed, they still had to be moved inland
over obsolete, poorly equipped French
railroads. With American assistance and
supervision, the railroads were developed
to a point where they proved capable of
bearing the brunt of interior transport.
Motor transport was used chiefly for short
hauls within Army base sections and for
carrying supplies to combat forces from
forward railheads. When the German
break-through at Kasserine disrupted for-
ward rail operations, motor transport be-
came a critical factor. The arrival of a
special convoy from the United States
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
carrying rail and motor equipment made
a vital contribution to operations in the
later phases of the campaign.
In Sicily and Italy the assaults served as
experimental laboratories for the use of
new landing craft and amphibian vehicles,
providing valuable experience for the
Normandy invasion. For the first time, it
was necessary to cope with extensive de-
struction of port and rail facilities of the
type later encountered in France and Ger-
many. Palermo, Naples, and other ports,
as well as rail equipment, tracks, and
structures had been battered by the Allies
or systematically demolished by retreating
German armies. Ports and railroads re-
quired extensive rehabilitation by Army
Engineer and Transportation Corps forces.
In the long and arduous Italian cam-
paign, American port, rail, and truck
operations proved essential to the support
of Allied forces. As in North Africa, port
operations were moved forward to shorten
supply lines of advancing Allied forces. In
Sicily and in the latter stages of the Italian
campaign, mule pack trains proved valu-
able in operations over rugged mountains
inaccessible to vehicles. The experience
gained by Transportation Corps officers
and troop units in North Africa, Sicily,
and Italy was of inestimable value during
the invasion of southern France.
Unlike the transatlantic theaters, action
in the Pacific was concentrated largely in
coastal areas and on islands scattered
across a vast expanse of ocean. Troops and
supplies had to be moved over great dis-
tances by water to occupy or capture rela-
tively small, isolated islands and to de-
velop them into forward bases that could
bring new enemy islands under attack.
Motor transport was used chiefly for port
clearance, and there were few railroads.
Movements were dependent on shipping
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
and port operations. The primitive nature
of the Pacific island bases required exten-
sive construction of port, storage, and
other facilities, a task rendered difficult by
the lack of local labor and resources and
the area's secondary priority for men, sup-
plies, and equipment. Until adequate port
and storage facilities could be provided,
shipping tended to outrun discharge ca-
pacity, resulting in the delayed release
and turnaround of shipping. This was par-
ticularly true in the South and Southwest
Pacific, where shipping congestion tended
to move forward as new bases were taken
and placed under development. The ship-
ping tie-up was no sooner cleared up at
Noumea, when it developed at Guadal-
canal, which was being built up as the ad-
vanced base for the movement into the
northern Solomons. Similarly, ship con-
gestion moved successively northward
from Milne Bay to Hollandia to Leyte.
The restricted beach and pier capacity of
advanced bases in the Pacific acted as a
deterrent factor in the efficient handling
of shipping throughout the war. Manila
had been a fairly modern port, but exten-
sive destruction of its facilities and the
large volume of shipping directed to it in
preparation for the invasion of the Japa-
nese mainland resulted in port congestion
that continued well beyond V-J Day. In
the Ryukyus, the failure to take Naha on
schedule was an important contributory
factor in the build-up of the large backlog
of vessels awaiting discharge at Okinawa
in May and June 1945.
The limited native facilities, equipment,
and manpower at forward bases in the
Pacific necessitated the employment of all
available resources. In both SWPA and
POA combat troops were used extensively
in port operations, although an increasing
number of port and other service units
607
were provided in the last years of the war.
In POA, where Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps units were intermingled, effective
utilization of supplies and transportation
was made possible through the develop-
ment of joint logistical action, including
unified direction of cargo handling at
forward ports.
As theaters dependent almost entirely
on water transportation, SWPA and POA
required a large number of vessels for
intratheater traffic and floating equip-
ment for lighterage and short hauls. These
requirements were met in part by the War
and Navy Departments and in part by
local purchase and contract. Later in the
war the Army was able to augment intra-
theater fleets with an increasing number
of small, shallow-draft freighters designed
to meet local conditions, but SWPA and
POA still did not have an adequate num-
ber of vessels and were forced to retain
transoceanic ships to make up the de-
ficiency. Refrigerated vessels were never
available in sufficient quantity, resulting
in severe rationing of perishables and the
use of such field expedients as the placing
of reefer boxes on cargo vessels.
The movement forward of troops and
equipment from inactive rear bases con-
stituted a chronic problem in the Pacific.
With most intratheater shipping devoted
to current operations, few vessels could be
made available to go on long voyages to
lift excess supplies from rear bases. More-
over, it was far easier to rely on the regu-
lar supply line from the United States
than to move forward from rear bases sup-
plies and equipment that were in various
states of disrepair and disorganization.
Forward ports, generally congested with
ships from the zone of interior bringing in
supplies for base development and opera-
tional requirements, could receive only
608
limited shipments of excess materials from
rear bases. In practice roll-up tended to be
carried out slowly, with some vessels pro-
vided by the receiving command and
others diverted from transpacific service,
and with a low level of efficiency in the
utilization of shipping as a prevailing con-
dition.
Like the Pacific, other oversea areas
were adversely affected by low priority.
Each of the areas, however, presented dis-
tinctive transportation problems. In
China-Burma-India the central task was
the development of the port of Calcutta
and the Assam Line of Communications
to a point where they could handle the
flow of supplies and equipment for the
support of the Hump airlift and the
Burma campaigns, which were designed
to re-establish land communications with
China. This was accomplished by the as-
signment of American port and rail troops
and equipment, the imposition of an effec-
tive system of movement control over the
Assam LOC, and British and American
construction of pipelines from Calcutta
and Chittagong to Assam. As the Ledo
Road was pushed into Burma, American
motor transport provided support to con-
struction, base, air, and combat opera-
tions. Combat troops fighting in the jungles
in advance of the road carried their own
supplies by mule pack trains and were re-
supplied by airdrop. With the opening of
the 1,079-mile Stilwell (Ledo-Burma)
Road in January 1945, one-way delivery
of vehicles to Kunming, China, was begun,
and ultimately more than 32,000 vehicles
and trailers were sent into China. Addi-
tional aid to China was provided in mid-
1945 by the completion of a pipeline from
Assam along the Stilwell Road to Kun-
ming.
Before the road was opened only limited
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
American participation in transportation
operations within China was possible. In
an effort to provide support to Fourteenth
Air Force fields in east China, the U.S.
Army had undertaken a project in early
1944 to improve the operations and main-
tenance of Chinese trucking fleets on the
Kunming East Line of Communications
and to fly in a small supplementary force
of Army drivers and vehicles. These meas-
ures brought a significant increase in traffic
eastward from the Kunming air terminal,
but the accomplishment was wiped out in
the latter part of the year by the loss of the
eastern airfields to the Japanese. The ar-
rival of vehicles and additional American
trucking units via the Stilwell Road re-
sulted in greatly improved operations.
American driver units, supplemented by
Chinese drivers and American-controlled
Chinese military units, greatly increased
the eastward flow of supplies in support of
advancing Chinese forces. As the general
transportation situation improved in the
first half of 1945, the Army was able to
give increased aid in the form of technical
assistance to the small railways still in
Chinese hands, and successful efforts were
made to increase the use of local inland
waterways.
In contrast with CBI, where major
transportation activities centered in the
development of long interior lines of com-
munications, Alaska was predominantly a
water transportation theater. With the
exception of central Alaska, where the
Army assisted in a railway operation and
conducted minor trucking operations,
principal transportation activities involved
the operation of a large number of isolated
ports scattered from Annette Island to
Nome and Attu. Supply was usually pro-
vided directly from Seattle and its sub-
ports to the individual port, generally for
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
the support of the local garrison and air-
field. As in the Pacific, inadequate facili-
ties made necessary port and other base
development. River transportation, feasi-
ble only during the brief open navigation
season, was limited to the supply of other-
wise inaccessible stations, and tractor-
train operations were confined to emer-
gency hauls.
The maintenance of uninterrupted sea
communications between the United
States and Alaska made the use of the
Alaska Highway unnecessary for the sup-
ply of the Alaska Command, but the road
proved valuable in effecting its immediate
mission, the supply of the airfields, as well
as the support of highway, Canol, and
other construction and service forces along
the route. To facilitate the movement of
men and materials into western Canada,
the Army took over operation of the port
of Skagway in southeastern Alaska and
leased the railroad linking Skagway with
the highway. The return of Alaska to the
status of an inactive defensive area after
the Aleutians campaign was followed by a
general decline of transportation activi-
ties in both Alaska and western Canada.
The Persian Corridor was unique in
that the entire Army command was as-
signed a transportation mission—the de-
livery of lend-lease materials from the
Iranian ports to Soviet transfer points in
the north. The command took over the
major ports and the Iranian State Rail-
way from the British and established a
trucking service to supplement existing
British and Soviet carriers. Large-scale
shipments to the Persian Gulf in advance
of the troops and equipment assigned to
handle them, delays in transferring the
American force to Iran, and the necessity
of transferring control from British to
American hands acted as severe handi-
609
caps. Initially, ports were unable to dis-
charge promptly all the shipping that ar-
rived, and the limited interior transport
facilities were unable to move forward the
supplies landed. Climate, terrain, the lack
of local resources, and the necessity for
dealing with the varied and often conflict-
ing interests of the British, Russians, and
Iranians added to the difficulties. After a
disappointing showing in the first months
of 1943, major bottlenecks were broken,
and by the fall of the year targets for de-
liveries to the Russians were being met
and exceeded. American port, rail, and
motor transport troops and equipment,
augmented by large native labor and oper-
ating forces, were able to develop the
Persian Corridor into a major Russian-aid
supply line. British and American road
construction also proved of assistance.
Large-scale deliveries continued through
late 1944, when the accessibility of shorter
and more economical routes resulted in a
progressive scaling down of operations and
the termination of the command's war-
time mission on 1 June 1945.
Among the most spectacular operations
of World War II were the amphibious
landings. Made possible by the employ-
ment of large numbers of landing craft
and amphibian vehicles, movements of
men and equipment to and across beaches
were effected on an unprecedented scale.
The Transportation Corps assisted in plan-
ning and mounting amphibious opera-
tions, but it was nowhere responsible for
initial landings or cargo handling on the
beaches as it was for later port operations.
After the consolidation of beachheads by
assault forces, control of cargo handling
at the beaches was generally assumed by
Engineer special brigade groups, brigades,
or battalions, depending on the size of the
operation, in Sicily, Italy, ETO, SWPA,
610
and at Angaur and Okinawa in POA. In
other POA campaigns, the responsibility
was given to shore parties headed by
Marine Corps, Navy, or Army officers.
Transportation Corps troops were used
as supporting or supplementary forces. In
Sicily, Italy, the Marianas, Normandy
and the Rhine crossings, the Palaus, the
Philippines, Iwo Jima, and the Ryukyus,
Transportation Corps amphibian truck
(DUKW) companies engaged in the as-
sault, carrying artillery, ammunition, other
high-priority supplies, and personnel
ashore and evacuating casualties. In many
of these campaigns Transportation Corps
port troops arrived with assault and early
support convoys, assisted in unloading the
vessels, and then moved ashore to work
under the control of the Engineers or the
shore party. Although port personnel were
usually provided in company or battalion
strength for participation in the early
landings, the 11th Port arrived on OMAHA
Beach during the assault phase with at-
tached port battalions and DUKW and
truck companies and worked a sector of
the beach alongside the Engineer special
brigades. Transportation Corps tugs also
rendered valuable services during the
cross-Channel invasion, towing units for
artificial harbors, moving landing craft on
and off beaches, and performing sea rescue
work.
After the initial assault and supply
phase, the Transportation Corps often as-
sumed major responsibility for cargo-han-
dling operations. In North Africa, Sicily,
Italy, and the ETO, organized Transpor-
tation Corps ports were provided to take
over and operate newly captured ports.
In SWPA, USASOS base port commands
took over beach and port operations,
Transportation Corps units generally re-
lieving Engineer troops. In POA, gar-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
rison forces were organized in advance of
an operation. When the Army provided
the garrison force, it included a port troop
command or transportation section. Ar-
riving in the assault or early support
echelons, the port troop command worked
under the shore party commander until
the garrison force assumed responsibility
for base operations. The troop port com-
mand then took over control of Navy,
Marine Corps, and Transportation Corps
and other Army personnel engaged in
cargo-handling activities.
The execution and support of amphib-
ious operations were characterized by a
host of new techniques. With regard to
ocean shipping, assault forces were com-
bat loaded to permit ready unloading of
troops and equipment when and as
needed. Prestowage of supporting cargo
vessels in ETO and block loading in the
Pacific were developed to permit unload-
ing balanced stocks of supplies, and com-
modity loading enabled commands to get
at individual types of supplies immediately
required. LST's, LCM's, LCI's, and other
landing craft delivered assault forces and
equipment directly to the beaches, while
LVT's and DUKW's were able to span
the water gap and make deliveries across
the beaches. Cargo-handling activities on
the beaches were facilitated through the
use of mobile cranes, tractors, standard
Army cargo trucks, and A-frames mount-
ed on DUKW's and other vehicles. Pal-
letized supplies, although wasteful of ship-
ping space and occasionally hard to
handle, lent themselves to easy movement
across beaches and were extensively used.
In the Pacific, ponton breakwaters and
piers made possible rapid port develop-
ment on islands such as Saipan and
Tinian. In ETO, where major emphasis
was placed on rehabilitation of existing
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
ports, the need for artificial port facilities
was limited. The American artificial har-
bor at OMAHA Beach, built for temporary
use only, was wrecked by high winds and
heavy seas before its utility could be deter-
mined, but the GOOSEBERRY, formed by
sinking blockships, provided an effective
refuge for small craft.
Keenly aware of the importance of
transportation in oversea operations, the
Chief of Transportation in Washington
sought to make his organization imme-
diately responsive to the needs of theater
commands. As head of an operating serv-
ice, General Gross was responsible not
only for the movement of troops and mate-
rials to oversea commands, but also for the
provision of Transportation Corps units
and equipment necessary for intratheater
transportation operations. As transporta-
tion officer on General Somervell's staff,
Gross also exercised considerable influ-
ence on plans for and the support of oper-
ations overseas. In both capacities, Gross
instilled in his staff and his field installa-
tions a deep sense of urgency. He estab-
lished an Overseas Operations Group to
expedite the processing of requests from
oversea commands and to co-ordinate the
efforts of the several divisions that had to
act on them. Gross made a number of
visits to active theaters to observe oper-
ations at first hand and sent his principal
assistants as well as members of his port
installations on oversea inspection trips.
Wherever possible, too, Gross corre-
sponded informally with chiefs of trans-
portation overseas in order to keep in close
contact with their problems and require-
ments. In many cases, notably in ETO,
the support rendered by him to the over-
sea transportation organizations proved
1 Transportation in Washington with the oversea com-
invaluable.
Throughout the war, General Gross
611
constantly sought to bring home to over-
sea commands the desirability of central-
ized co-ordination and direction of trans-
portation operations. He preached the
need for chiefs of transportation to be
placed high in the theater organization
and to bear both staff and operating
responsibilities. Acting as transportation
officer on the theater commander's staff
and as a service head, the theater chief of
transportation could give central direction
to the planning, management, and oper-
ation of nontactical transportation, in-
cluding shipping, port, rail, highway, and
inland waterways activities, and exercise
movement control over air and pipeline
shipments. This doctrine was nowhere ap-
plied in its totality, although in time it was
approximated in some commands.
To a certain extent, the failure to de-
velop oversea transportation organizations
with the authority and functions desired
by Gross was rooted in the late establish-
ment of the Transportation Corps. The
Corps did not come into being until eight
months after the United States entered
the war, and there was considerable delay
before it received proper recognition in
some oversea commands. During an in-
spection trip in the fall of 1943, General
Gross found that the Transportation Corps
was virtually unknown at many South
Pacific bases.
Much of the difficulty was due to the
absence of official definition of the status
of the Corps in the oversea commands.
Field service regulations in effect when
most theater organizations came into
being had been issued before the war.
They assigned responsibility for planning
1
For a treatment of the relations of the Chief of
mands, see Wardlow, Responsibilities, Organization, and
Operations, pp. 82-94.
612
for and co-ordination of transportation to
G-4. Water transportation was the respon-
sibility of the Quartermaster Corps, rail
and inland waterway transportation were
responsibilities of the Corps of Engineers,
motor transportation was the responsibil-
ity of the Motor Transport Service, and
air transportation a responsibility of the
Air Forces. This archaic doctrine re-
mained on the books until October 1943,
when a revision was made that came
closer to Gross's concept, but not until De-
cember 1945 was an official manual pub-
lished that adequately set forth the func-
tions and authority of theater chiefs of
transportation. In these circumstances,
oversea transportation organizations
tended to vary with local conditions and
the personal preferences of theater com-
manders.
In practice, oversea transportation or-
ganizations differed greatly in authority
and functions, depending on the nature of
the command, the distances involved, the
character of the communications, the re-
sources available, and the theater com-
mander's concept of its place in his organ-
ization. In most areas, SOS organizations,
more or less patterned after their counter-
part in the zone of interior, were in time
established to direct logistical operations.
Chiefs of transportation were appointed
within SOS, usually with both staff and
operating functions. But this did not auto-
matically result in centralized control of
Army operations. In areas of Allied or
unified command, Army transportation
quite naturally was subject to co-ordina-
tion and control from general headquar-
ters. Moreover, there tended to be a
multiplicity of agencies dealing with trans-
portation at various levels of the Army
command. G-4 and other General Staff
offices often retained many staff and oper-
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
ating functions relating to transportation;
transportation officers were sometimes ap-
pointed on the special staffs of theater
commanders quite apart from the SOS
transportation agency; and, particularly
in areas where distances were great and
communications poor, direction of trans-
portation operations was often decentral-
ized to base commands, SOS base sec-
tions, island commands, or even individ-
ual stations. Pipeline construction and
operation continued to be the responsibil-
ity of the Engineers, and, with the excep-
tion of screening requests and setting
priorities for movements on nontactical
aircraft, activities relating to air transpor-
tation remained the responsibility of the
Air Forces. The multiplicity of agencies at
all echelons handling transportation led
occasionally to confusion and conflict,
making difficult the development of cen-
tral control.
A major factor retarding the develop-
ment of effective transportation organiza-
tions in all oversea commands was the
shortage of qualified transportation offi-
cers. Established after the outbreak of
war, the Transportation Corps could draw
only limited numbers of experienced offi-
cers from other branches of the Army and
had to rely heavily on drafts on private
industry to staff zone of interior establish-
ments as well as to meet requests from
overseas. Demands from the theaters con-
sistently outran the supply of available
Transportation Corps officers, and by
early 1944 General Gross found that their
ranks had been seriously depleted. Gen-
eral Thomas Wilson, then engaged in
establishing his Transportation Service in
CBI, was unable to secure enough officers
and complained about "misfits" provided
him by the Office of the Chief of Trans-
portation. Ross made similar reports from
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
ETO.2 Lacking sufficient Transportation
Corps officers, many areas assigned trans-
portation responsibilities to tactical and
other service officers, who had to learn on
the ground. In USAFPOA, a theater-wide
shortage of qualified officers delayed the
organization of the Transportation Section
for half a year. Eventually the shortage
was relieved somewhat through transfer
from Gross's own staff and field installa-
tions and the increasing output of the
Transportation Corps officer candidate
schools, but it was never completely over-
come.
The officer shortage was more than
matched by the shortage of Transporta-
tion Corps units in the oversea commands,
particularly in the early years of the war.
During 1941 and early 1942, emphasis on
combat readiness and the failure to fore-
see the extent to which service troops
would be required for oversea operations
led the War Department to make inade-
quate provision for service troops in its
troop basis. In the Pacific the paucity of
local facilities and labor created an abnor-
mal demand for service troops. The as-
sumption of important line of communica-
tions projects in western Canada and the
Persian Corridor created unanticipated
demands for port, rail, and truck units.
In the North African campaign further
requirements for Transportation Corps
and other service organizations arose.
Even in the United Kingdom, which had
highly developed transportation facilities
and an industrialized population, it
proved necessary to provide a substantial
number of port and other service units.
Since the necessary troops were neither on
hand nor in training, emergency demands
were met by overdrafts on the troop basis,
hasty activations, and hurried equipping
and shipment abroad. Inevitably lower-
613
priority areas such as the Pacific, Alaska,
and CBI were slow in receiving port and
other service personnel. More adequate
provision was made for service troops in
the War Department's troop basis in late
1942, thereby permitting advance pro-
curement, training, and equipping of serv-
ice personnel, but not until the fall of 1943
was it possible to provide an adequate
number of service troops to oversea com-
mands without hurried activation and
training.3
These developments retarded the pro-
vision of an adequate number of Trans-
portation Corps units to the oversea com-
mands. In the Pacific, where port and
other service personnel were at first in ex-
tremely short supply, tactical troops were
put to work as longshoremen, truck driv-
ers, and the like, assisted by such native
labor as was available. In August 1942
SWPA and SPA together could boast only
three organized Army port headquarters,
two port battalions, and one locally acti-
vated port company. A more equitable
proportion of port and other service troops
to tactical personnel was not attained
until the latter part of 1943. Even after
1943 it was frequently necessary to supple-
ment Transportation Corps port troops
with details from ground and other tac-
tical forces at such places as Honolulu,
Saipan, and Tinian. Much the same situ-
ation obtained in Alaska, where garrison
troops either directly handled port oper-
ations or supplemented Transportation
Corps port troops.
Transportation operations were also re-
tarded by the shortage of Quartermaster
2
Ibid., pp. 76-77; Ltr, Wilson to Lt Col John E.
Russell, 11 Apr 44, OCT HB CBI—Extra Copies of
CM; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 30 Jun 44, OCT HB Gross
ETO—Gen Ross.
3
Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strat-
egy: 1940-1943, pp. 346-49.
614 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

trucking units. The lack of two regiments civilian experience in driving trucks. Ex-
required for the Persian Corridor, together perienced ex-civilian longshoremen, truck
with the secondary priority given the drivers, and other technicians were the
motor transport operation, delayed for exception rather than the rule, and defi-
over five months the completion of the ciencies in educational and technical
project to bring trained drivers into Iran. backgrounds could not be completely
To meet urgent requirements for the Red overcome during necessarily brief tech-
Ball Express in ETO, it was necessary to nical training. Inexperienced port,
activate provisional trucking units with DUKW, and truck troops often did re-
combat troops. In the India-Burma The- markable work, but it was usually neces-
ater, as preparations were made to open sary for officers and enlisted men to learn
the Stilwell Road in late 1944, it was under pressure in the midst of operations.
found that there were no Quartermaster On the other hand, Military Railway
truck units available in the command for Service organizations, in large part drawn
through deliveries to China and little from the ranks of American railways, had
prospect of securing a significant number a high proportion of ex-civilian railroad-
from the United States. As a consequence, ers in both officer and enlisted positions.
deliveries of vehicles to China were begun On the whole, their high technical pro-
with inefficient, hastily trained Chinese ficiency was reflected in their performance
drivers, Chinese and American units mov- overseas.
ing on change of station, and American In an effort to provide sufficient person-
volunteers from all over the theater. Not nel for operations, native labor and oper-
until Indian driver units were found for ating forces were utilized to the greatest
base hauls and short hauls was it possible possible extent. The sparse and primitive
to divert a significant number of American population in many areas of the Pacific
trucking units from other operations to greatly limited this resource, but even
China deliveries. there the employment of native manpower
The delay in providing for an adequate was necessary insofar as it was available.
number of service troops also affected the Local labor was used in longshore oper-
proficiency of Transportation Corps and ations on Noumea, Guadalcanal, New
allied units assigned to the oversea com- Guinea, and in the Fijis, and more exten-
mands. The demand for personnel in sively in more developed areas such as
excess of the available supply led to hur- Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand, and the
ried activation and training. This explains Philippines. In the United Kingdom, the
in part the frequent references to "green" Army naturally relied heavily on British
and inexperienced Transportation Corps civilian longshoremen and on local rail
port organizations and DUKW units. transport. Native labor and operating
Much the same can be said of Quarter- forces were used extensively in port opera-
master trucking units, for, with the excep- tions in the Persian Corridor, India-
tion of the two truck regiments for the Burma, North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and
Persian Corridor that were in part re- northwestern Europe. In the Persian Cor-
cruited through the American Trucking ridor and in China, American truck drivers
Associations, most truck units contained a were heavily supplemented by native
large proportion of men with little or no drivers and mechanics. In the case of rail
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 615

operations, full use was made of native su- through interpreters, as drivers. Although
pervisory and operating forces. In India the program resulted in a high accident
and Iran, American military railway rate, a large number of competent drivers
troops were superimposed on far larger were ultimately developed.
civilian forces, making possible greatly ex- Where American military operations
panded operations with the employment of involved the supervision or control of
relatively few Americans. Throughout the large civilian forces, it was necessary not
North African campaign, rail operations only to secure their co-operation but also
depended basically on French civilians to adjust to unfamiliar and often ineffi-
working under MRS supervisory control cient operating, business, and personnel
and reinforced by Allied military person- procedures. In North Africa and India
nel and equipment. Similar reliance was such practices as the use of "paths" and
placed on local civilian railway personnel the maintenance of "debit wagon bal-
in Sicily, Italy, and France. Without the ances" presented obstacles to the imme-
large-scale employment of native labor diate acceleration of traffic. In Iran MRS
and technicians, the job of landing and officials found it necessary to enter the
transporting the huge volume of men and fields of labor relations, food distribution,
supplies within the oversea commands and accounting in order to keep trains
would have been well nigh impossible. moving. Then too, although American
The utilization of native or local civilian practices were more efficient, it was gen-
manpower, while essential, created a new erally found easier to adapt American
set of problems. In Australia and the troops to local practices than to adapt
United Kingdom, for example, well- native forces to American methods. In
organized longshoremen did not readily general, local rail operational practices
accept the necessity for dropping leisurely were retained, and greater efficiency was
peacetime practices and working at the attained through close supervision of dis-
pace the Army deemed necessary. Inevit- patching and loading, improved track and
ably, too, unfavorable comparisons were equipment maintenance, and the aug-
made by American troops between their mentation of motive power, rolling stock,
pay and that received by civilians working passing tracks, and water, yard, and ter-
beside them. In other commands lan- minal facilities.
guage difficulties had to be overcome, and Closely related to the problem of pro-
in backward areas such as Iran, CBI, and viding personnel for oversea commands
North Africa labor, while plentiful, was was the provision of adequate equipment
poor in quality and unfamiliar with most to accompany them. In the first year of
machinery. In these areas, port operations the war, there was a favorable balance of
were adversely affected by the inefficiency troopships over cargo vessels. Moreover,
and inexperience of native labor and pil- troopships were much faster than cargo
ferage became a serious problem, but it ships, and therefore troops usually arrived
was found that with experience on the job in advance of their supplies and
and close supervision, native labor could equipment.4 This was most marked in the
be used effectively. In the Persian Corri- 4

dor Iranians, many of whom had never and For a treatment of the imbalance between troop
cargo shipping, see Leighton and Coakley, op. cit.,
operated a vehicle before, were trained, pp. 202-06, 368-78.
616
Persian Corridor, where there was a lag of
months before port, rail, and truck troops
received the equipment necessary to do
their job properly. Similar instances also
occurred in ETO, North Africa, and CBI.
These incidents pointed up the desirabil-
ity of shipping equipment in advance of or
together with units wherever possible.
In addition to organizational equip-
ment and tools, it was necessary to provide
large stocks of transportation equipment
to supplement existing facilities or to
establish new operations in the oversea
commands. The Transportation Corps was
responsible for providing cargo-handling
and marine equipment and, after Novem-
ber 1942, rail equipment. As in the case of
personnel, demands far exceeded the sup-
ply, and it was some time before procure-
ment and production could begin to re-
dress the balance. Moreover, the Trans-
portation Corps, created after the out-
break of war, did not have the advantage
of established procurement, cataloguing,
and other supply procedures developed
by the older technical services. Until an
effective supply system could be set up,
provision of equipment to theaters tended
to be on a hand-to-mouth basis, with the
Transportation Corps meeting urgent re-
quests for equipment as they arose.
In the case of tugs, barges, and other
floating equipment required for the over-
sea commands, the Chief of Transporta-
tion had to initiate a procurement pro-
gram in the face of serious handicaps,
since shipyards were already heavily bur-
dened with merchant vessel contracts and
the naval ship building program. Pur-
chase of, or contract for, locally available
equipment helped partially to meet over-
sea requirements, but it was not until the
latter part of 1942 that new production
made it possible for the Transportation
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Corps to begin providing the commands
with relatively large numbers of tugs,
barges, lighters, and other craft. Although
a total of 7,791 small Transportation
Corps boats of various types was ulti-
mately assigned to the oversea commands,
the shortage was relieved only gradually,
and in areas such as SWPA, where re-
quirements were particularly urgent and
heavy, large numbers of small vessels and
craft had to be acquired or constructed
within the theater.5
Despite the delay in meeting the large
order for 400 BOLERO locomotives for use
in Great Britain and later transfer to the
Continent, less difficulty was generally ex-
perienced in providing motive power and
rolling stock to oversea commands than
other equipment. Plants were able to
maintain production of railway equip-
ment, although there was some conversion
of railway production to tanks and other
war matériel. Despite differences in gauge
and other difficulties, adjustments were
fairly easy. Moreover, requirements for
new production for the military were
lessened somewhat by the early placement
of lend-lease orders for areas where Amer-
ican MRS troops were later assigned.
Most of the 91 American lend-lease
Mikado steam locomotives and a large
number of railway cars ordered by the
British for the Iranian State Railway ar-
rived or were placed in operation after the
Americans took over. Lend-lease motive
power and rolling stock were also pro-
vided for the MRS-operated railway in
India. By 30 June 1945 a total of 5,578
locomotives, 106 locomotive cranes, and
5
For details on Transportation Corps procurement
of small boats, including data on the number and
types assigned to the various oversea commands, see
Wardlow, Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations,
pp. 249-53.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
83,875 pieces of rolling stock, built in the
zone of interior for the MRS and lend-
lease, had been exported for use by U.S.
military forces or their Allies.6 Other
equipment was purchased from American
railroads, including 58 diesel locomotives
for Iran and narrow-gauge equipment
for the White Pass and Yukon Railroad in
Alaska and western Canada.
Deficiencies in Transportation Corps
supply operations were by no means con-
fined to the zone of interior. As previously
related in the account dealing with the
European continent, the newness of Trans-
portation Corps depot and other supply
activities adversely affected the requisi-
tioning, storage, and distribution of Trans-
portation Corps supplies. Without previ-
ous experience in this field Transportation
Corps depots had few trained personnel
able to handle technical equipment and
lacked such standard basic data as stock
catalogues, parts lists, maintenance fac-
tors, and standard nomenclature lists.
These limitations made difficult the at-
tainment of a smooth flow of supplies to
and within the theater and provided a
constant source of difficulty in depot oper-
ations.
The procurement of motor transport
equipment, a responsibility of the Ord-
nance Department, involved the problem
of the type as well as the number of vehi-
cles to be provided. At the outbreak of war
the 2½-ton Army truck was the heaviest
type of cargo vehicle immediately avail-
able in quantity and being produced in
volume. While the vehicle proved an ad-
mirable work horse for the Army and ex-
perience demonstrated that it could carry
up to five tons, it was found to be lacking
in several respects. It could not carry
bulky items, its use required more drivers,
maintenance, and shipping space than
617
heavier vehicles, and it was not particu-
larly efficient in over-the-road operations.
But other trucks were not immediately
available, and there was an inevitable lag
between procurement of heavier vehicles
and their production.7 During the greater
part of the war the 2½-ton truck, often
used with the 1-ton trailer, was the stand-
by for oversea highway operations. These
were supplemented by such heavier vehi-
cles as the 4-5-ton truck-tractor-semitrailer
combination, the 2½-ton truck-tractor and
7-ton semitrailer, and the 10-ton Mack
diesel truck. In ETO, where long hauls
played a vital role in transportation, heavy
vehicles, particularly 10-ton truck-trailer
units, were requested before the invasion,
but they were late in arriving. Well over
half the truck companies under the tech-
nical supervision of the Motor Transport
Service on the Continent were functioning
with 2½-ton trucks in December 1944,
and the theater never received all the
heavy-duty cargo-hauling equipment
General Ross considered necessary.
Maintenance of equipment proved
troublesome in virtually all theaters.
Rough operating conditions, overwork of
equipment, inadequate maintenance and
repair facilities, abuse by inexperienced
operators, unsuitable equipment, and a
shortage of spare parts all contributed to
the rapid deterioration and the large-scale
deadlining of rail, marine, and motor
transport equipment. In ETO, some 50 to
60 percent of the trucks available for port
6
Annual Rpt, Rail Div OCT, FY 45, Incl 6, OCT
HB Rail Div Rpts. Cf. Wardlow, Movements, Training,
and Supply, pp. 478-79, 489.
7
For a discussion of the problems involved in the
procurement of heavier trucks, see the monograph,
Hist Sec Special Plng Br OCofOrd ASF, Motor Trans-
port Vehicles, 1 July 1940 to 31 August 1945, 31 Dec
45, pp. 4, 25-28, 55, 58.
618
hauling in the OMAHA District were dead-
lined by the fall of 1944 because of con-
stant use, poor roads, inadequate mainte-
nance, and the lack of spare parts. Rail-
way shop troops in India and other areas
were compelled to manufacture parts or
to cannibalize deadlined equipment to
keep trains rolling. The use of DUKW's
for inland transport to make up for the
lack of trucks in the Philippines and the
employment of unsuitable craft for barge
operations on the Brahmaputra River in
India resulted in rapid obsolescence and
breakdowns. In Alaska, the lack of marine
repair facilities and personnel in 1942 and
1943 made inroads into the inadequate
supply of floating equipment. In these cir-
cumstances operations in theaters, already
handicapped by shortages in initial issues,
were further circumscribed by the inabil-
ity fully to utilize the equipment on hand.
Of the various factors adversely affect-
ing the maintenance and repair of trans-
portation equipment none was more uni-
versal or persistent than the lack of spare
parts. Although complaints regarding the
spare-parts shortage in some areas tended
to diminish in intensity after 1943, the
supply of spare parts in ETO was consid-
ered inadequate throughout the war
period. Insofar as items of Transportation
Corps supply were concerned, the short-
age was in part attributable to the late
organization of the Corps. Late in arriv-
ing on the scene, it placed major emphasis
on the procurement of the basic items,
with a consequent lag in spare parts.
Then, too, the shortcomings in Transpor-
tation Corps supply operations overseas,
already discussed in connection with
equipment, undoubtedly impeded effec-
tive distribution of available parts to and
within theaters.
The problem of providing spare parts
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
for vehicles, an Ordnance Department
responsibility, lies outside the scope of this
work. Nevertheless, some tentative obser-
vations appear justified in view of the
effect of spare-parts shortages on MTS op-
erations overseas. Since one type of truck
alone might contain as many as 7,000 sep-
arate parts, the procurement and distribu-
tion of spare parts proved a complicated
task. According to General Somervell,
spare-parts production did not at first
keep pace with the production of new
motor units because of inadequate provi-
sion in early appropriations, but by the
fall of 1942 steps had been taken to in-
crease the output of spare parts with each
vehicle, to ship a year's level of spare parts
with each vehicle, and to provide a
8
monthly flow thereafter. Apparently
spare-parts production improved during
the following year, for in early 1944 there
was little difficulty in obtaining delivery
of parts of most types from production.
Nevertheless, oversea commands contin-
ued to report major problems of repair
arising from shortages of spare parts. Ac-
cording to an Ordnance Department ac-
count, such shortages were usually due to
faulty distribution, arising from a lack of
central parts control, inadequate parts
9
identification, and delays in shipping. It
may also be suggested that the shortage
tended to become relative rather than ab-
solute, since inadequate maintenance,
poor roads, driver abuse, and employment
of unsuitable vehicles could result in ex-
cessive mortality of specific parts.
Problems of organization, personnel,
and equipment should serve to emphasize
8
Memo for Combined Shipping Adjustment Bd, 20
Oct 42, sub: Shipt of Motor Vehicles, Hqs ASF, CofS
WDGS (3A).
9
See monograph cited n. 7, pp. 79-88.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 619

rather than detract from the achievements plished the missions assigned them. World
of the U.S. Army's oversea transportation War II experience demonstrated the in-
operations. Despite these difficulties and dispensable role played by transportation
often in the face of adverse geographic, in logistics and the need for a continued
climatic, and other operating conditions, awareness of its significance in the plan-
American rail, port, truck, inland water- ning and conduct of any future military
ways, and traffic regulating troops accom- operations.
 Bibliographical Note
The Transportation Corps: Operations Over-
seas is based largely on records collections
now in the custody of the Department of
the Army. Principal sources used in the
preparation of this volume were the rec-
ords of The Adjutant General; the Army
Service Forces; the Office of the Chief of
Transportation; the Operations Division
of the War Department General Staff;
oversea headquarters; and the minutes
and papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Combined Chiefs of Staff. The locations of
the various records groups are given in the
Guide to Footnotes.
A valuable foundation for further re-
search was provided by the records collec-
tion of the Historical Branch, Office of the
Chief of Transportation (OCT HB), begun
informally in 1942 in order to make possi-
ble the eventual preparation of a history of
the Transportation Corps. The most useful
of the OCT HB files in the preparation of
this volume are those listed under the
heading Oversea Theaters. These files are
arranged by oversea command and con-
tain correspondence, periodic reports and
histories, reports of visits and inspections,
newspaper and magazine articles, maps,
and technical and miscellaneous informa-
tion. Although the collection is uneven
and contains large gaps, it proved an ex-
cellent starting point. Other pertinent
OCT HB files are:
Transportation Corps General
Office of the Chief of Transportation
(by divisions)
Topical files
General Gross's files (including his day
file or staybacks)
General Wylie's files (including his day
file or staybacks)
Army Service Forces Monthly Progress
Report, Section 3
Historical Branch Monographs
Photographs
All but two of the Historical Branch
Monographs were prepared by members
of the Historical Branch, Office of the
Chief of Transportation, during the years
1943-46, as part of the wartime historical
program of the Army Service Forces.
Since the sources of information were in-
adequate, they are in the nature of interim
reports based on materials then available.
Nevertheless, they present much useful
data. The following of thirty numbered
wartime monographs were consulted in
preparing this volume:
5. Harold Larson, Water Transporta-
tion for the United States Army, 1939-
1942
7. Harold Larson, Army Hospital Ships
in World War II
9. H. H. Dunham, U.S. Army Trans-
portation and the Conquest of North
Africa, 1942-43
11. H. H. Dunham, Transportation
and the Greenland Bases, 1941-1944
12. Harold Larson, Troop Transports
in World War II
13. H. H. Dunham, U.S. Army Trans-
portation and the Conquest of Sicily, 1943
14. H. H. Dunham, Transportation of
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
the U.S. Forces in the Occupation of Ice-
land, 1941-1944
17. H. H. Dunham, U.S. Army Trans-
portation and the Italian Campaign.
18. Harold Larson, The Army's Cargo
Fleet in World War II
19. Harold Larson, Handling Army
Cargo in the Second World War
25. H. H. Dunham, U.S. Army Trans-
portation in the Persian Corridor, 1941-
1945
27. Harold Larson, Role of the Trans-
portation Corps in Oversea Supply
29. H. H. Dunham, U.S. Army Trans-
portation in the European Theater of Op-
erations, 1942-1945
30. Harold Larson, The Army's Over-
sea Passenger Traffic in World War II
Two other numbered monographs, No.
31, U.S. Army Transportation in the
Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-1947, by
Dr. James R. Masterson, and No. 32, His-
tory of Transportation Service in China,
Burma, and India in World War II, by
Joseph Bykofsky, were written in 1949
and 1950 respectively, and are based on
more complete records than the wartime
monographs.
An unusual set of records is to be found
in the files collected by Dr. T. H. Vail
Motter in the course of preparing his vol-
ume, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
(Washington, 1952), one of the volumes in
the series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II. This collection, cited
as the Persian Gulf File (PGF), contains
much material pertaining to U.S. Army
transportation activities in the Persian
Corridor and has been used in the prep-
aration of the chapter dealing with that
area.
The authors have also made extensive
use of manuscript histories prepared in the
oversea commands, most of which are in
621
the custody of the Office of the Chief of
Military History (OCMH). These his-
tories vary greatly in quality and cover-
age, but provide voluminous information
on strategic, tactical, logistical, and organ-
izational developments in the various
theaters, and often contain much valuable
data on transportation. Most of the his-
tories are multivolumed, and many of
them include appended transportation
section or service histories. A listing of
relevant histories prepared in the oversea
commands during or shortly after World
War II is given below:
History of Allied Force Headquarters
and Headquarters NATOUSA
History of United States Army Forces,
Central Canada
History of U.S. Army Forces in the
South Atlantic
The Official History of the South At-
lantic Division, AAF, ATC
Fifth Army History
Logistical History of NATOUSA-
MTOUSA: 11 August 1942 to 30 Novem-
ber 1945
Administrative and Logistical History
of the European Theater of Operations
History of G-4 Communications Zone,
ETO
General Board Reports, U.S. Forces,
ETO
History of U.S. Army Forces in the
South Pacific Area From 20 March 1942
to 1 August 1944
History of U.S. Army Forces in the
Middle Pacific and Predecessor Com-
mands During World War II, 8 December
1941-2 September 1945
History of the Central Pacific Base
Command During World War II, 1 July
1944-2 September 1945
History of the Army Port and Service
Command, USAFMIDPAC
622
History of the Western Pacific Base
Command
History of the South Pacific Base Com-
mand
History of the Persian Gulf Command
History of the China-Burma-India
Theater (Stilwell Report), 21 May 1942-
25 October 1944
History of Services of Supply, China,
India, Burma Theater, 28 February
1942-24 October 1944
History of Services of Supply, India-
Burma Theater, 25 October 1944-20 May
1945
History of India-Burma Theater, 24
October 1944-23 June 1945
History of India-Burma Theater, 24
June 1945-31 May 1946
History of China Theater
Official History of the Alaskan De-
partment
History of the Western Defense Com-
mand
Manuscripts prepared in the Office of
the Chief of Military History and in other
Army agencies also proved valuable.
Among them were:
Drummond, Capt. Nelson L., Jr., The
Attu Operation
Frierson, Maj. William C., Prepara-
tions for Torch
Leighton, Richard M., The Problem
of Troop and Cargo Flow in Preparing the
European Invasion, 1943-44
Sparrow, Maj. John C., History of
Personnel Demobilization in the U.S.
Army
Thatcher, Harold W., The Packaging
and Packing of Subsistence for the Army.
(OQMG Historical Study 10)
Whitcomb, Col. Richard S., One War
ASF Control Division Report No. 175,
The Alaska Highway
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
The Canol Project, report prepared by
committee representing ASF Control
Division, Office of the Chief Engineers,
Office of the Quartermaster General, and
Commanding General, Northwest Service
Command
ASF Planning Division History, pre-
pared by Planning Division, Office of Di-
rector of Plans and Operations, Army
Service Forces, WD, Vols. 1 and 2
Historical Monograph, U.S. Army
Bases, Greenland, ASF, Corps of Engi-
neers, March 1946
Historical Monographs, U.S. Army
Bases, Churchill (January 1946), Fro-
bisher Bay (March 1946), and Fort Chimo
(March 1946), prepared by North Atlan-
tic Division, Corps of Engineers
Historical Monograph, Prisoner of
War Operations Division, Provost Mar-
shal General's Office
Historical Monograph, Motor Trans-
port Vehicles, 1 July 1942 to 31 August
1945, prepared by the Historical Section,
Special Planning Branch, Office of the
Chief of Ordnance, ASF, 31 December
1945
Other useful unpublished works include
the study entitled Shipping in Naval Lo-
gistics, prepared in the Office of Naval
Operations, and the history entitled Com-
mander in Chief, Service Force, Pacific
Fleet, prepared by the Historical Section,
COMSERVPAC. Both are part of the
series, U.S. Naval Administration in
World War II, and are available in the
Naval Records and History Division,
Navy Department. The Office of Naval
Intelligence Combat Narrative, The Aleu-
tians Campaign, June 1942-August 1943,
was also consulted.
Published books, periodicals, and news-
papers have been used chiefly to docu-
ment statements on general aspects of
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
transportation and on activities other than
those of the Transportation Corps that did
not appear to require more extensive re-
search. A notable exception is Dr. Motter's
The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia. Since
the work deals with a command devoted
primarily to a transportation mission, the
chapter on the Persian Corridor in this
volume inevitably duplicates much of the
material presented in the Motter book.
This chapter is intended mainly to round
out the account of transportation opera-
tions in the oversea commands rather than
to contribute strikingly original material
on U.S. Army activities in the Persian
Corridor.
Secondary works particularly useful in
providing a general background for the
accounts of transportation activities in the
oversea commands fall into the following
main groups:
(1) UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II series, published by
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C.
Appleman, Roy E., James M. Burns,
Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens,
Okinawa: The Last Battle (1948)
Cannon, M. Hamlin, Leyte: The Return
to the Philippines (1954)
Cannon, M. Hamlin and Robert Ross
Smith, Triumph in the Philippines (in
preparation)
Cline, Ray S., Washington Command
Post: The Operations Division (1951)
Conn, Stetson and Byron Fairchild,
The Western Hemisphere, Vol. II (in
preparation)
Crowl, Philip A., Campaign in the
Marianas (in preparation)
Crowl, Philip A. and Edmund G.
Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
(1955)
623
Harrison, Gordon A., Cross-Channel
Attack (1951)
Howe, George F., Operations in
Northwest Africa: 1942-1943 (in prepara-
tion)
Leighton, Richard M. and Robert W.
Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-
1943 (1956)
Matloff, Maurice and Edwin M. Snell,
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-
1942(1953)
Miller, John, jr., Guadacanal: The First
Offensive (1949)
Millet, John D., The Organization and
Role of the Army Service Forces (1954)
Milner, Samuel, Victory in Papua (in
preparation)
Morton, Louis, The Fall of the Philip-
pines (1953)
Palmer, Robert R., Bell I. Wiley, and
William R. Keast, The Procurement and
Training of Ground Combat Troops (1948)
Risch, Erna, The Quartermaster Corps:
Organisation, Supply, and Services, Vol. I
(1953)
Risch, Erna L. and Chester L. Kieffer,
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Sup-
ply, and Services, Vol. II (1955)
Romanus, Charles F. and Riley Sun-
derland, Stilwell's Command Problems (1955)
————, Stilwell's Mission to China (1953)
Ruppenthal, Roland G., Logistical Sup-
port of the Armies, Vol. I (1953), and Vol. II
(in preparation)
Smith, Clarence M., The Medical De-
partment: Hospitalization and Evacuation,
Zone of Interior (1955)
Smith, Robert Ross, The Approach to
the Philippines (1953)
Smyth, Howard M., Sicily: The Sur-
render of Italy (in preparation)
Wardlow, Chester, The Transportation
Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply
(1956)
624 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

————, The Transportation Corps: Re- activities and port development. Among
sponsibilities, Organization, and Operations the combat accounts put out by the U.S.
(1951) Marine Corps Historical Division, The
Watson, Mark Skinner, Chief of Staff: Iwo Jima Operation, by Capt. Clifford P.
Prewar Plans and Preparations (1950) Morehouse, proved of assistance, particu-
(2) Other U.S. Army Histories larly with regard to DUKW operations
In the War Department's AMERICAN during the assault phase. The American
FORCES IN ACTION SERIES, pub- Merchant Marine at the Normandy
lished in Washington, D. C., are the fol- Landings (awaiting publication), pre-
lowing: Papuan Campaign: The Buna-Sana- pared by John Worth under the supervi-
nanda Operation, 16 November 1942-23 Janu- sion of the historian of the U.S. Maritime
ary 1943 (1944); To Bizerte With the II Corps: Commission, deals with the activities of the
23 April 1943-13 May 1943 (1943); Salerno, War Shipping Administration in connec-
American Operations from the Beaches to the tion with the invasion of northern France.
Volturno (9 September-6 October 1943) (1944); On the Allied side, Paiforce: The Official
Anzio Beachhead (22 January-25 May 1944) Story of the Persia and Iraq Command, 1941-
(1947); Fifth Army at the Winter Line (15 No- 1946 (London: His Majesty's Stationery
vember 1943-15 January 1944) (1945); Office, 1948), includes sections on British
Omaha Beachhead (6 June-13 June 1944) transportation activities in the Persian
(1945); and Utah Beach to Cherbourg (6 Corridor, while Brigadier R. Micklem's
June-27 June 1944) (1948). The Capture of Transportation, ("History of the Second
Attu, As Told by the Men Who Fought There, World War, 1939-1945, Army") (London:
published as part of the War Department's His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950),
"Fighting Forces Series" (Washington: gives an official account of British military
The Infantry Journal Press, 1944), also transportation operations in the United
proved useful. Kingdom and oversea areas, including
(3) Other Official Histories Iran, Iraq, North Africa, India, Burma,
Volumes in the series, The Army Air and the European continent. The U.S.
Forces in World War II, edited by Wesley Department of State's Peace and War; U.S.
Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, and Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington:
published by the University of Chicago Government Printing Office, 1943), was
Press, Chicago, have been consulted. valuable in filling in the big picture in the
Similar reference has been made to works account of the Atlantic bases.
in the series, History of United States Naval (4) Published Reports
Operations in World War II, written by Dr. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the
Samuel Eliot Morison, and published by United States Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30,
Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, for 1943, to the Secretary of War.
information regarding related Navy activ- Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the
ities. Building the Navy's Bases in World United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30,
War II (Washington, 1947), prepared by 1945, to the Secretary of War.
the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Report by the Supreme Allied Commander,
Navy Department, includes information Mediterranean, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
pertinent to U.S. Army transportation on the Operations in Southern France, August
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
1944. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1946.
Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by
the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East
Asia: 1943-1945. London: His Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1951.
(5) Unofficial Histories and Memoirs
Ballantine, Duncan Smith. U.S. Naval
Logistics in the Second World War. Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1947.
Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L. Way of
a Fighter; The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chen-
nault. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1949.
Cronin, Francis D. Under the Southern
Cross; The Saga of the Americal Division.
Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1951.
Gregory, Andrew Grant. The Saga of
the 708th Railway Grand Division. Baltimore,
1947.
Hancock, William K. and M. M.
625
Gowing, British War Economy. London: His
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949.
Heavey, Brig. Gen. William Francis,
Down Ramp! The Story of the Army Amphibian
Engineers. Washington: The Infantry Jour-
nal Press, 1947.
Padelford, Norman J. The Panama
Canal in Peace and War. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1942.
The 727th Railway Operating Battalion in
World War IL New York: Simmons-Board-
man Publishing Corp [1948].
Walker, Edward Ronald. The Australian
Economy in War and Reconstruction. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947.
To supplement and interpret the record,
the authors have interviewed or corre-
sponded with Army officers and other per-
sonnel who participated in operations.
Records of these interviews and corre-
spondence are on file in OCT HB.
 Guide to Footnotes
An explanation concerning the method
of documentation is necessary to facilitate
the identification and location of material
cited in this volume. In general, footnotes
include the following: the sender, the
addressee, date, subject, the file in which
the document is located, and the classifi-
cation number and/or the subject of the
folder in which it is found. When a single
location applies to several cited docu-
ments, it appears after the last citation to
which it applies.
Documents most frequently cited are
the letter (Ltr), correspondence between
individuals or agencies; the memorandum
(Memo), used chiefly for correspondence
within headquarters, but also for corre-
spondence between headquarters; the re-
port (Rpt), review of a specific subject or
development for a given period; the his-
torical report (Hist Rpt); the historical
record (Hist Rcd); the indorsement (Ind),
used extensively in official Army corre-
spondence as a substitute for separate
memoranda; the informal routing slip
(IRS), used to transmit comments infor-
mally regarding a document being circu-
lated within a headquarters; the inclosure
(Incl), a document attached to basic or
covering correspondence; the radiogram
(Rad); and minutes (Min) of meetings.
The principal record collections cited
and their locations are as follows:
OCT—Records of the Office of the
Chief of Transportation, at present in cus-
tody of the Departmental Records
Branch, Adjutant General's Office (DRB
AGO).
OCT HB—Records of the Historical
Branch (at one time called the Historical
Unit) of the Office of the Chief of Trans-
portation, now in the custody of the Office
of the Chief of Transportation.
AG—Records of Adjutant General's
Office, in custody of DRB AGO.
AG ETO—Records collected by the
Historical Section, European Theater of
Operations, and transferred intact to
DRB AGO in 1946.
ASF—Records of Army Service Forces,
now in custody of DRB AGO.
KCRC AGO—Oversea Organizations
Records, formerly in St. Louis and pres-
ently in the custody of the Kansas City
Records Center, AGO. Documents in this
depository are located by citing the body
of theater records to which they belong,
the specific headquarters file in which
they are found, and the decimal number
and/or subject of the folder in which it
resides. An example is IBT Trans Sec
372.4 Z of LofC, KCRC AGO.
OCMH Files—A collection of histor-
ical manuscripts, correspondence, and
miscellaneous records of the Army and re-
lated services, now in custody of the Office
of the Chief of Military History.
OPD—Records of the Operations
Division, War Department General Staff.
Most OPD documents cited in this volume
are in the custody of DRB AGO, but a
special file, identified by the initials ABC,
is in the custody of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3, Department of the Army.
Occasional references to other records
will be found in the footnotes: WDCSA,
GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES 627

TRIDENT, QUADRANT, and SEXTANT con-

Chief of Staff; OCS, Office of the Chief of
Staff; WPD, War Plans Division of the ferences are available in DRB AGO.
General Staff; G-4, Supply and Evacua- Monographs prepared in the Historical
tion Section of the General Staff; OQMG, Branch, Office of the Chief of Transporta-
Office of the Quartermaster General; tion, as part of its wartime program are
SGO, Surgeon General's Office; and JAG, cited by number only. The authors and
Judge Advocate General. All these records titles will be found in the Bibliographical
are now in the custody of DRB AGO. Note. These monographs are in the records
Documents from the records of the Com- of the Historical Branch, OCT. Pub-
mander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) lished letters of The Adjutant General and
and Navy manuscript materials are avail- Technical Manuals (TM) cited without
able in the Naval Records and History location may be found in the Army Pub-
Division. Other materials cited include lications Service Branch, AGO.
those at present in custody of the Histor- To economize on space, abbreviations
ical Division of the Surgeon General's have been used heavily in citing identify-
Office (SGO Hist Div), the Historical Sec- ing data in footnotes. For the same reason,
tion of the Chief of Ordnance, and the names, titles, and other information given
personal file of the former Director of in the text or appearing in preceding foot-
Plans and Operations of the Army Service notes are frequently omitted from footnote
Forces, Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes (Lutes citations. Footnotes have often been con-
File). solidated because of space limitations and
Where minutes and papers of the Joint sometimes refer to statements immediately
Board (JB), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), following as well as those preceding.
the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), and Where a file contains a number of docu-
their various committees are cited without ments relating to a subject, only the more
location, they will be found in the Joint significant documents have been cited.
Chiefs of Staff, Research and Analysis Reference to the files will often disclose
Section. Bound printed records of the pro- details that it has not been possible to in-
ceedings of the ARCADIA, Casablanca, clude in the text.
 List of Abbreviations
AAE Advanced Administrative Echelon
AAF Army Air Forces
AAI Allied Armies in Italy
ABC American-British Conversations
ABC route Antwerp-Brussels-Charleroi route
ABDA American-British-Dutch-Australian (Command)
ABL Alaska Barge Line
ABL American Barge Line (in India)
ABS Atlantic Base Section
ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff
ACofT Assistant Chief of Transportation
Actg Acting
ACTREP Activity report
ADC Alaska Defense Command
Addtl Additional
Adj Adjutant
Adm Administration or administrative
ADSEC Advance Section
Adv Advance
AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters
AFMIDPAC Army Forces, Middle Pacific
AFPAC Army Forces, Pacific
AFWESPAC Army Forces, Western Pacific
AG Adjutant General
AGD Adjutant General's Department
AGO Adjutant General's Office
AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department
AK Cargo ship
AKA Cargo ship, attack
AMGOT American Military Government
Amph Amphibious or amphibian
A-N Army-Navy
APA Transport, attack
AP&SC Army Port and Service Command
APH Naval hospital ship
APO Army Post Office address
ASC Air Service Command
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 629

ASCOM Army Service Command

ASF Army Service Forces
Asgmt Assignment
Asst Assistant
ASW Assistant Secretary of War
ATA American Trucking Association
ATC Air Transport Command
Atchd Attached
ATS Army Transport Service
Bd Board
BELMOT Belgian Movements Organization for Transport
B/L Bill of lading
BMWT British Ministry of War Transport
Bn Battalion
BPE Boston Port of Embarkation
Br Branch
BS Base section
BUCO Build-up Control Organization
BuDocks Bureau of Docks (Navy)
Bull Bulletin
CAO Chief Administrative Officer
CBI China-Burma-India
Cbl Cable
CBS Central Base Section
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
CDS China Defense Supplies, Incorporated
CE Corps of Engineers
Centl Central
CFA Algerian Railway System (Chemin de Fer)
CFM Moroccan Railway System (Chemin de Fer)
CFT Tunisian Railway System (Chemin de Fer)
CG Commanding general
Chmn Chairman
CID Counterintelligence Division
CinC Commander in Chief
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCPOA Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas
Cir Circular
Civ Civilian
CM-IN Classified Message, incoming
CM-OUT Classified Message, outgoing
CMT Cased Motor Trucks
CMTC Combined Military Transportation Committee
CNAC China National Aviation Corporation
630 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CO Commanding officer
Co Company
CofE Chief of Engineers
CofOrd Chief of Ordnance
CofS Chief of Staff
CofT Chief of Transportation
Com Committee
Comd Command
Comdr Commander
COMGENPOA Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas
COMINCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
COMSERVPAC Commander, Service Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet
COMSOPAC Commander, South Pacific Area
COMZ Communications Zone
COMZONE Communications Zone
CONAD Continental Advance Section (Southern France)
Conf Conference
Cons Construction
Contl Control
Conv Conversation
Corres Correspondence
COSC Combined Operational Service Command
COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
(Designate)
CPA Central Pacific Area
CPBC Central Pacific Base Command
CREGO Chief Regulating Officer
C/S Chief of Staff
CT China Theater
CTF Center Task Force
DCofT Deputy Chief of Transportation
Dep Deputy
Devel Development
DG Director general
Dir Director
Div Division
DRB Departmental Records Branch
DSSD Depot Supplies Shipment Data
DUKW Amphibian truck
E&D Sec Embarkation and Debarkation Section
EBS Eastern Base Section
Ech Echelon
ELOC Kunming East Line of Communications
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 631

Emb Embarkation
EMBARCO Embarkation Control
Engr Engineer
Equip Equipment
ESB Engineer special brigade
Estab Establishment
ETF Eastern Task Force
ETO European Theater of Operations
ETO-POM-SSV Manual entitled Preparation for Overseas Movement-
Short Sea Voyage
Evac Evacuation
Exec Executive
FA Field Artillery
FEA Foreign Economic Administration
FEC Far East Command
FECZ Forward Echelon, Communications Zone
Fltg Floating
FS Freight supply (vessel)
FY Fiscal Year
G-1 Personnel section of divisional or higher headquarters
G-2 Intelligence section of divisional or higher headquarters
G-3 Training section of divisional or higher headquarters
G-4 Supply and evacuation section of divisional or higher
headquarters
G-5 Additional General Staff section, varying in function in
the oversea commands. In the Central Pacific, it was re-
sponsible for future planning.
Gen General
GHQ General Headquarters
GHQ(I) General Headquarters (India)
GO General Order
Gp Group
GSC General Staff Corps
GUF Fast convoy from North Africa to the United States
HB Historical Branch
Hist History or historical
Hosp Hospital
HOTI Headquarters, Office of Technical Information
Hq Headquarters
HRPE Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation
HUSAFPOA Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
HUSAFMIDPAC Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific
Hwy Highway
IBC Iceland Base Command
632 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

IBT India-Burma Theater

IGD Inspector General's Department
Incl Inclosure
Ind Indorsement
Inf Infantry
Info Information
Intel Intelligence
Interv Interview
IRS Informal Routing Slip
ISR Iranian State Railway
ISS Identification of Separate Shipments
IWD Inland Waterways Division
IWT Inland Water Transport
IWTS Inland Water Transport Service
J-4 Logistics Division, Joint Staff of Commander in Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas
JAG Judge Advocate General
JB Joint Board
JCS U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMTC Joint Military Transportation Committee
JOSCO Joint Overseas Shipping Committee
JPB Joint Purchasing Board
JPS Joint Staff Planners
Jt Joint
KCRC Kansas City Records Center
KMF Fast convoy from the United Kingdom to North Africa
KMS Slow convoy from the United Kingdom to North Africa
KPM Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij
LAPE Los Angeles Port of Embarkation
LBV Landing barge, vehicle
LCI Landing craft, infantry
LCM Landing craft, mechanized
LCP Landing craft, personnel
LCT Landing craft, tank
LCV Landing craft, vehicle
LCVP Landing craft, vehicle and personnel
LOC Line of communications
LSI Landing ship, infantry
LSM Landing ship, medium
LST Landing ship, tank
Ltr Letter
LUBSEC Luzon Base Section
LVT Landing vehicle, tracked
Maint Maintenance
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 633

MBS Mediterranean Base Section

MC Medical Corps
ME Middle East
Med Medical
Mgr Manager
MID Military Intelligence Division
Mil Military
Min Minutes
MIS Military Intelligence Section
Misc Miscellaneous
MKF Fast convoy from North Africa to the United Kingdom
MKS Slow convoy from North Africa to the United Kingdom
Mob Mobile
MOVCO Movement Control
MOVUS Monthly Vessel Utilization Summary
MP Military Police
MPR Monthly Progress Report
MRS Military Railway Service
MT Motor transport
MTB Motor Transport Brigade
Mtg Meeting
MTL Motor towboat, large
MTO Mediterranean Theater of Operations
MTOUSA Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
MTS Motor Transport Service
MTV Motor transport vessel
Mvmt Movement
NAD North Atlantic Division
NASBO North African Shipping Board
NATO North African Theater of Operations
NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
NBC Newfoundland Base Command
NOIC Naval officer in charge
NOPE New Orleans Port of Embarkation
NTS Naval Transportation Service
NWSC Northwest Service Command
NYPE New York Port of Embarkation
Obsns Observations
OCMH Office of the Chief of Military History
OCofE Office of the Chief of Engineers
OCS Office of the Chief of Staff
OCT Office of the Chief of Transportation
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
ONO Office of Naval Operations
634 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

OPD Operations Division, War Department General Staff

Opnl Operational
Opns Operations
OQMG Office of The Quartermaster General
Ord Ordnance
Orgn Organization
Orgnl Organizational
OSD Overseas Supply Division
OTO Office of the transportation officer
Pac Pacific
PACTREP Pacific Activities Report
PAIFORGE Persia and Iraq Force (British)
PAO Principal administrative officer
PBS Peninsular Base Section
PE Port of Embarkation
Per Periodic
Pers Personnel
PG Persian Gulf
PGG Persian Gulf Command
PGF Persian Gulf File
PGSC Persian Gulf Service Command
PHIBSEC Philippine Base Section
PHILRYCOM Philippine-Ryukyus Command
Plng Planning
PMGO Provost Marshal General's Office
POA Pacific Ocean Areas
POL Petrol, oil, and lubricants
POM Priority of Movement
POW Prisoner of war
PR. Puerto Rico or Puerto Rican
PRA Public Roads Administration
Prov Provisional
PX Post Exchange
QM Quartermaster
Qtr Quarter
Qtrly Quarterly
Rad Radio
RAMPS Recovered American Prisoners of War
Rcd Record
R Day Redeployment Day
Regt Regiment
Reorgn Reorganization
RO Rotational category
ROSOP Regulating Officer, South Pacific
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 635

Rpt Report
Rqmts Requirements
RR Railroad
RTO Rail or railway traffic officer
Ry Railway
SACSEA Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
SEAC Southeast Asia Command
Sec Section
Secy Secretary
SFPE San Francisco Port of Embarkation
SG Surgeon General
SGO Surgeon General's Office
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
Shipt Shipment
SOLOC Southern Line of Communications
SOP Standing Operating Procedure
SOS Services of Supply
SPA South Pacific Area
SPEC South Pacific Base Command
SPE Seattle Port of Embarkation
SS USA Special Staff, U.S. Army
Stat Statistical
Sup Supply
Supt Superintendent
Surg Surgeon
Sv Service
SW Secretary of War
SWHTA Southwest Highway Transport Administration
SWPA Southwest Pacific Area
TAG The Adjutant General
TAT To accompany troops
T/BA Table of Basic Allowances
TC Transportation Corps
TCP Traffic Control Post
TCPI Bull Transportation Corps Positive Intelligence Bulletin
TD Temporary duty
Tech Technical
Tng Training
T/O Table of Organization
TQM Transport quartermaster
TQMG The Quartermaster General
Trans Transportation
TURCO Turnaround Control
UGF Fast convoy from the United States to North Africa
636 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

UGS Slow convoy from the United States to North Africa

U.K. United Kingdom
UKCC United Kingdom Commercial Corporation
USAF U.S. Air Force
USAFBI U.S. Army Forces, British Isles
USAFFE U.S. Army Forces, Far East
USAFIA U.S. Army Forces in Australia
USAFICPA U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area
USAFIME U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East
USAFISPA U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area
USAFMIDPAC U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific
USAFPAC U.S. Army Forces, Pacific
USAFPOA U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
USANIF U.S. Army, Northern Ireland Forces
USARAL U.S. Army in Alaska
USASOS U.S. Army Services of Supply (Southwest Pacific Area)
USAT United States Army Transport
USF U.S. Forces
USFET U.S. Forces, European Theater
USFOR U.S. Forces (radio address)
USMC U.S. Marine Corps
USMIM U.S. Military Iranian Mission
USN U.S. Navy
VCNO Vice Chief of Naval Operations
WAR or WARX War Department (radio address)
WATCO Water Transportation Control
WD War Department
WDC Western Defense Command
WDCSA War Department, Chief of Staff
Wkly Weekly
WNTF Western Naval Task Force
WP&Y Route White Pass and Yukon Railroad
WPBC Western Pacific Base Command
WPD War Plans Division, War Department General Staff
WSA War Shipping Administration
WTB War Transport Board
WTEC War Transport Executive Committee
WTF Western Task Force
XAK Civilian-manned cargo vessel
XAP Civilian-manned transport
XAPA Civilian-manned transport, attack
Y Day Readiness date for the cross-Channel attack
ZI Zone of Interior
 Glossary of Code Names
ALPHA Invasion beach at Cavalaire, southern France.
ANAKIM Plan to retake Burma and open the line of communications
to China through the port of Rangoon.
ANVIL The planned 1944 Allied invasion of southern France in the
Toulon-Marseille area.
ARCADIA U.S.-British conference at Washington, December 1941-
January 1942.
AVALANCHE Plan to seize Salerno.
BANG Shipping designator for Zone III, ETO.
BEAVER An amphibious exercise in preparation for the cross-Channel
attack.
BIGOT Code for correspondence dealing with plans for future mili-
tary operations.
BOLERO Build-up of troops and supplies in the United Kingdom in
preparation for a cross-Channel attack.
CAMEL Invasion beach at St. Raphael, southern France.
CARGO An amphibious exercise in preparation for the cross-Channel
attack.
CELLOPHANE An amphibious exercise in preparation for the cross-Channel
attack.
CENT Task force built around the 45th Infantry Division for the
invasion of Sicily.
CHASTITY Plan for the construction of an artificial harbor in the Qui-
beron Bay area, on the southern coast of Brittany.
CRIMSON Project to set up in central and northeastern Canada a series
of airfields situated along alternate routes to permit a
choice of landing fields in the event of bad weather.
CRYSTAL I U.S. weather station and airfield at Fort Chimo, Labrador.
CRYSTAL II U.S. weather station and airfield on Frobisher Bay, Baffin
Island.
CRYSTAL III U.S. weather station and airfield on Padloping Island.
DELTA Invasion beach at St. Tropez, southern France.
DIME Task force built around the 1st Infantry Division for the inva-
sion of Sicily.
DRAGOON Allied invasion of southern coast of France, 15 August 1944,
planned under the code name ANVIL.
DUCK I First U.S. large-scale exercise in preparation for the cross-
Channel attack.
638 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

FABIUS A full-dress rehearsal in preparation for the cross-Channel

attack.
FLAMBO AFHQ Advance Administrative Echelon.
FORTUNE Algiers.
Fox An amphibious exercise in preparation for the cross-Channel
attack.
GLUE Shipping designator for Zone II, ETO.
GOOSEBERRY A partial breakwater, formed by sinking blockships moored
bow-to-stern and designed to provide a sheltered area for
tugs, barges, landing craft, and DUKW's.
GYMNAST Early plan for the invasion of North Africa.
HARLEQUIN An exercise in preparation for the launching of an amphibi-
ous force from the southern coast of England.
HUSKY Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943.
Joss Task force built around the 3d Infantry Division for the inva-
sion of Sicily.
MAGNET Movement of U.S. forces to Northern Ireland, 1942.
MULBERRY A Artificial port in American sector at OMAHA Beach.
MULBERRY B Artificial port in British sector at Arromanches-les-Bains.
NABOB Northern Ireland.
NEPTUNE Actual 1944 operations within OVERLORD. This code name
was used for security reasons after September 1943 on all
OVERLORD planning papers which referred to the target
area and date.
OMAHA Invasion beach north of Aure River, northern France.
OVERLORD Plan for the invasion of northwest Europe, spring 1944.
QUADRANT First Quebec Conference, August 1943.
RAINBOW 4 U.S. joint Army-Navy plan of 1940 for defense in the event
that both Britain and France should be defeated.
ROUNDUP Plan for major U.S.-British attack across the Channel in
1943.
SEXTANT Cairo-Tehran Conferences, 22 November-7 December 1943.
SHARK II Corps in the invasion of Sicily.
SHINGLE Plan for landings at Anzio.
SLEDGEHAMMER Plan for a limited-objective attack across the Channel in
1942 designed either to take advantage of a crack in
German morale or as a "sacrifice" operation to aid the
Russians.
Soxo Shipping designator for Zone I, ETO.
TIGER The final rehearsal for the assault on UTAH Beach.
TORCH Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, November
1942.
TRIDENT Washington Conference, May 1943.
GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES 639

UGLY A scheme for numbering requisitions so that the oversea

command could readily identify all items en route in a
convoy by the receipt of a cargo cable listing the identify-
ing numbers and the cargo tonnage under each number.
UTAH Invasion beach on the Cotentin peninsula, northern France.
WILDFLOWER Great Britain.
 *
Glossary of Technical Terms
A-frame Device used as a field expedient in beach operations
when cranes were not available in sufficient quan-
tity. Usually attached to an amphibian truck or
other vehicle, it could lift approximately 4,000
pounds.
Amphibian vehicle Vehicle capable of operating on both land and water.
Balanced cargo A mixture of heavy and light cargo, which approxi-
mately fills the cargo space and weighs the ship
down to its maximum draft.
Balanced stocks An accumulation of supplies of all classes in quanti-
ties necessary to meet requirements for a fixed
period.
Balloon cargo Items, such as assembled trucks, which occupy an
exceptionally large amount of space in relation to
their weight.
Bareboat charter A form under which the charterer hires the vessel
only and provides the crew, supplies, fuel, and
other operating requisites.
Berth Place where a ship lies at pier, quay, or wharf.
Block loading System, used extensively in the Pacific from late 1943
for resupply of invasion troops, involving the load-
ing of vessels with carefully organized blocks of
supplies such as troops were likely to require soon
after landing.
Block system System, often used in single-track operation, whereby
(rail) only one train can operate over a particular section
or block at a time. In order to move a train from
one station to another, the operator must clear the
intervening section with the operator at the end of
the block.
Block system A form of relay operation whereby trucks operate
(trucking) continuously from origin to destination and back
with changes in drivers at intermediate stations,
which are usually located one day's travel time
apart.
*Like most industries, transportation employs technical terms which are not familiar to the lay
reader. Certain Army terms also are not understood outside military circles. The following brief
nontechnical definitions will save the reader the inconvenience of seeking explanations elsewhere.
GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS 641

Bunkerage Fueling or coaling of ships.

Cannibalize The use of equipment or parts from damaged maté-
riel to maintain other matériel.
Combat loader A vessel especially equipped for combat loading.
The Navy provided two types — APA (transport,
attack), and AKA (cargo ship, attack).
Combat loading Loading a ship with equipment and supplies required
by assault forces, and stowing the various items in
such a manner as to make possible their rapid
unloading in the order needed.
Combat zone Forward area of a theater of operations, where com-
bat troops are actively engaged.
Commodity loading The loading of vessels with a specific type of cargo
such as rations, vehicles, or ammunition, to fill an
immediate on-the-spot requirement.
Communications zone The part of a theater of operations behind the com-
bat zone, where supply, transportation, and other
facilities are located and services performed.
Deadline Remove from action, as for repairs.
Dead-weight tonnage Actual carrying capacity of a vessel, including stores,
fuel, water, and cargo.
Double heading The use of two locomotives to pull a train, usually
over rugged hill or mountain country.
Dry cargo ship Any ship, except a tank ship carrying liquids in bulk.
As used in World War II the term applied to pas-
senger ships as well as freighters.
Dumb barges Nonpropelled barges.
Echelon maintenance System of maintenance and repair of matériel and
equipment in which jobs are allocated to organi-
zations in accordance with the availability of per-
sonnel, tools, supplies, and time within the organi-
zations. Categories range from first echelon, which
included simplest forms of upkeep to the fifth,
which included heavier types of repairs.
Filler cargo Packaged and bagged supplies which can be stowed
in small and irregularly shaped spaces in the hold
of a ship.
Flatting Bottom stowing and flooring off of cargo in a vessel
in order to provide ballast or an emergency reserve.
Full and down Term indicating that a vessel has all cargo space
filled and that the cargo is sufficiently heavy to
take the ship down to the legal maximum draft.
642 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

General cargo Broadly used, the term includes all except bulk
cargoes, but in Army usage it may include explo-
sives.
Graving dock Dry dock used for ship repair or construction.
Interior clearance The movement of tonnage from the port area to the
interior.
Landing craft Any vessel used to carry men, equipment, and sup-
plies ashore.
Lighter Boat or flat-bottomed barge used for loading or
unloading ships.
Line of communications The transporting of bulk supplies of personnel over
(LOC) hauling theater main supply roads in accordance with pri-
orities and commitments of the theater or a com-
parable command. This hauling was usually inter-
sectional in scope, in contrast with local or base
hauling.
Long ton Weight ton of 2,240 pounds.
Measurement ton 40 cubic feet; sometimes called ship ton, since it was
used chiefly in connection with ocean transporta-
tion.
Metric ton Weight ton of 2,204.6 pounds.
Packaged gasoline Gasoline in cans or drums.
Palletized or skid- Cargo fastened to a small wooden platform, often
loaded cargo equipped with bridle and runners for towing along
the ground. Facility in moving pallets on beaches
made up for some loss in shipping space.
Passing track or A track adjacent to and parallel to the main track
siding with a switch at both ends connecting it with the
main track. Used in single-track operation, the
passing track was used to permit trains traveling
in opposite directions to pass.
Pier Structure that projects into water where vessels berth
for loading or unloading cargo, usually constructed
at right angles to the shore line.
Port capacity The tonnage that can be discharged daily from ships,
based only on evaluation of the physical facilities
of the port.
Port or beach The tonnage that may be transported inland daily
clearance from a beach or port by available means of inland
communication, including highways, railroads,
and inland waterways.
GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS 643

Prestowing A system similar to block loading, used in connection

with the invasion of Normandy.
Quay Wharf parallel with basin or harbor, with water on
one side.
Rail wagon Railway car.
Reefer box Refrigerated box, used on board ship or brought
ashore.
Reefer vessel Refrigerated vessel.
Semitrailer Wheeled vehicle without motive power, intended
primarily for the transportation of cargo or equip-
ment designed to be towed and attached to a
truck-tractor by means of a fifth-wheel device, a
portion of its weight being carried by the truck-
tractor. It is equipped with retractable gear to
support the front end when detached.
Short ton Weight ton of 2,000 pounds.
Spotting Placing railway car on a track for loading or unload-
ing.
Tanker Tank ship for transporting petroleum products and
other liquids in bulk.
Theater of operations Army command including the area of actual fighting
(combat zone) and the adjacent area utilized for
supporting administrative and supply activities
(communications zone).
Topping off Top stowing of cargo to complete the loading of a
ship.
Trailer Vehicle designed to be towed, provided with a draw-
bar or tongue for attachment to a coupling
mounted on the towing vehicle.
Train-order system A method of train operation used generally in con-
junction with a timetable, showing where sched-
uled trains will meet.
Truck-tractor Wheeled vehicle propelled by a self-contained power
unit, designed primarily as a truck chassis, but
provided with a fifth wheel for attachment to and
for towing semitrailers.
'Tween decks Space between the main deck and the hold.
War flats Flatcars of 56-ton capacity manufactured for the
War Department.
Weight ton (British) 2,240 pounds.
Weight ton (U.S.) 2,000 pounds.
Wharf Structure where vessels berth for loading or unload-
ing cargo, usually constructed parallel to the shore
line.
644 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Zone of interior The area which furnishes manpower and matériel to

the forces in theaters of operation. During World
War II, the zone of interior consisted of the United
States.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
The Army and Economic Mobilization
The Army and Industrial Manpower
The Army Ground Forces
The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
The Army Service Forces
The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces
The Western Hemisphere
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts
The War in the Pacific
The Fall of the Philippines
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
Victory in Papua
CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
Campaign in the Marianas
The Approach to the Philippines
Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
Triumph in the Philippines
Okinawa: The Last Battle
Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
The Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West
Sicily and the Surrender of Italy
Salerno to Cassino
Cassino to the Alps
The European Theater of Operations
Cross-Channel Attack
Breakout and Pursuit
The Lorraine Campaign
The Siegfried Line Campaign
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
The Last Offensive
646 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II
The Middle East Theater
The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
The China-Burma-India Theater
Stilwell's Mission to China
Stilwell's Command Problems
Time Runs Out in CBI
The Technical Services
The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War
The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field
The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat
The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany
The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States
The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor
Theaters
The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply
The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany
The Signal Corps: The Emergency
The Signal Corps: The Test
The Signal Corps: The Outcome
The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations
The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply
The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas
Special Studies
Chronology: 1941-1945
Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945
Rearming the French
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
The Women's Army Corps
Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors
Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces
The Employment of Negro Troops
Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb
Pictorial Record
The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Japan
 Index
Abadan, Iran, 379 Airborne Divisions, U.S.
ABC Express Route (Northwestern Europe), 82d, 192n, 252
336-37 101st, 252
ABDA Command, 425, 426 Airfields. See also Air ferry routes.
Abraham Baldwin, 92 Alaska and western Canada, 31, 32, 33, 34
Acadia, 178, 178n, 179, 363, 365 Aleutian Islands, 51
ACTREP's, 446 China, 554, 556, 557, 558
Adak, Aleutians, 33, 41, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 67 Eastern Canada, 11, 12
Adela E. Lutz, 369 Greenland, 12, 14
Adelaide, Australia, 457 Hawaii, 492
Admiral Benson, 563 Iceland, 14
Admiral C. F. Hughes, 372 India, 547
Admiralty Berthing Office, 115 Italy, 202
Admiralty Islands, 458, 509 Labrador, 12, 14
Advance Administrative Echelon, AFHQ, 185, Newfoundland, 9, 10, 11
218, 223 Panama Canal Zone, 27
Advance Echelon, TC, 83, 126, 129. See also Puerto Rico, 22
Forward Echelon, Communications Zone Scotland, 11, 12
(FECZ), ETOUSA. Sicily, 190
Advance Section (ADSEC), Communications Zone, Trinidad, 24
ETOUSA, 129, 235, 236, 244, 276, 287, 288,Akureyri, Iceland, 17, 20
289, 303, 326, 331, 333 Alaska, 3, 4, 6, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40. See also
Transportation Section, 235, 236-38, 241, 245, Aleutian Islands; Railways, Alaska and west-
273, 284, 287, 288, 289 ern Canada; Roads, Alaska.
Ahioma, New Guinea, 461 inland waterways, 33, 34, 64-67. See also Alaska
Ahwaz, Iran, 379, 380, 383, 386, 389, 400 Barge Line.
Air attacks, Allied, on transportation facilities, 153, motor transport operations in, 39, 57-65
159, 175, 203, 203n, 220, 316, 334, 479, 578 offensive operations in, 33, 49-51
Air attacks, enemy, 119, 158, 159, 167, 210, 218, ports in, 36-39, 46-53. See also individual
323, 344, 377, 449, 460, 463, 464, 466, 504, ports by name.
505, 543, 563, 565 railway operations in, 47, 53-57
Air Depot, 301st, 604 supply of, 32, 33, 35-36, 39-41
Air ferry routes and supply of USSR via Siberia, 33, 34, 64
Alaska-Siberia, 34, 377 transportation organization, 35-39
North Atlantic, 11, 12, 13, 14 transportation problem, 608-09
Pacific, 493 Alaska Barge Line, 32, 41, 43-44, 45
South Atlantic, 21, 377 Alaska Defense Command (ADC), 31, 34, 35, 36, 38
Air Forces, U.S. See also Army Air Forces, U.S. Alaska Highway, 4, 32-34, 35, 57-64, 67, 609
Fifth, 440 Alaska Navigation Company, 65
Eighth, 145 Alaska Railroad, 33, 38, 47, 53-55, 57, 65, 68
Ninth, 241 Alaskan Department, 34, 67, 68. See also Alaska
Tenth, 578 Defense Command.
Fourteenth, 554, 557, 558, 593, 594, 596, 597, Albert Canal, Belgium, 355, 356
608 Akan Highway. See Alaska Highway.
Air Service Command, 604 Alden Besse, 565
Air supply, 5, 23, 28, 35, 67, 135, 195, 227, 228, Aleutian Islands, 5, 6, 31, 32, 33, 34, 41, 46-52,
302, 302n, 303, 547 51n, 509
Air transport, 23, 28, 185, 227-28, 430, 489 Algeria, 137, 168
Air Transport Command, 23, 370, 430, 437, 441, Algiers, 137, 138, 141, 145, 152, 168, 169, 196
556, 580, 592, 602 Algonquin, 231
648
Alice Springs, Australia, 481, 481n
Allen, Maj. Gen. Terry, 191
Allied Air Forces, SWPA, 438
Allied Build-up Control Organization (BUCO),
246, 249, 250, 261, 262, 264
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), 148-49, 169,
173, 184
G-3, 191
G-4, 148-49, 178, 184, 192
Allied Force Headquarters POM meetings, 218
Allied Land Forces, SWPA, 438
Allied Naval Forces, SWPA, 435, 438
Allied Railway Commission, North Africa, 170
Allin, Lt. Col. Benjamin C., 25, 26, 396, 397, 399
Almaack, 18
ALPHA Beach (France), 294. See also DRAGOON.
Ambulances, 178. See also Casualties, evacuation
of.
Amchitka, Aleutians, 33, 38, 49, 51, 52
American Barge Lines (ABL), (India), 553, 555,
556, 579. See also Inland water transporta-
tion, India.
American Expeditionary Forces, 76
American Iraqi Shipping Company, 424
American Legion, 18
American Military Government (AMGOT), 202
American Railroad Company, 22
American Red Cross, 116, 456
American Trucking Associations, 414
Ammunition, 119, 147. See also Units of fire.
overland movement of, 317
shortage of, 143, 273, 294
stowage of, 290, 294, 320n
water shipment of, 233, 255, 256, 257
Amphibian Truck Battalion, 43d, 536
Amphibian Truck Companies
451st, 503
453d, 271, 271n
454th, 534
455th, 507
456th, 534
471st, 535
472d, 535
473d, 535
474th, 539
475th, 536
476th, 535
477th, 520, 521, 522, 541
480th, 535
481st, 534
821st, 281
823d, 535
828th, 535, 541, 542
Amphibian trucks. See DUKW's.
Amphibious exercises, 145, 147, 147n, 192, 194n, Fifteenth, 345
196, 247, 248-49, 249n, 252
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Amphibious operations, 606
Aleutian Islands, 49-51
Burma, 6, 552
Italy, 6, 209
Normandy. See Northwestern Europe, invasion
of; OVERLORD.
North Africa. See TORCH.
Philippine Islands, 465, 473
planning for, 71, 202, 208, 291, 552
Sicily, 6, 189
South and Central Pacific, 489, 502, 505, 508,
513, 519, 534, 535, 539-42
Southern France, See DRAGOON.
ANAKIM, 550, 551
Anchorage, Alaska, 31, 39, 47, 53, 68
Ancon, 195
Anderson, Col. Gustave A. M., 418n
Anderson, Maj. Gen. Jonathan W., 146
Andimeshk, Iran, 380, 381, 383, 389
Anglo-American Shipping Mission, 563
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 379, 380
Angmagssalik, Greenland, 14, 16
Animal transport operations, 202, 228-29
Annette Island, Alaska, 31, 36, 47, 51, 52
Antigua, 8, 22
Antilles Department, 23, 26. See also Puerto Rican
Department.
Antwerp, 239, 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 310, 311,
315, 320-24, 335, 336, 353, 370, 372
ANVIL, 73, 290, 290n. See also DRAGOON.
Anzio, Italy, 208, 209, 210, 211, 223. See also
SHINGLE.
Anzio Annie, 210
APA's. See Attack transports.
Appleton, Col. John A., 573, 574
Aquitania, 264, 372
ARCADIA Conference, 3, 70
Archangel, 375
Argentia, Newfoundland, 9, 10
Argentina, 374
Armies, U.S.
First, 234, 236, 241, 244, 249, 255, 260, 266, 270
273, 276, 287, 288, 289, 326, 328, 334, 337,
345
Third, 239, 285, 300, 315, 316, 326, 331, 334,
336, 337, 339, 344, 345, 348, 350
Fifth, 192, 202, 205, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212,
213, 214, 216, 217, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225,
228, 229, 231
Sixth, 466, 467, 470, 483
Seventh, 190, 191, 197, 198, 200, 208, 224, 290,
291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 337,
339, 345
Eighth, 470
Ninth, 336, 337, 339, 344, 345, 348, 350
Tenth, 470, 539, 540, 544
Armored Corps, U.S., I, 190
INDEX 649
Armored Divisions, U.S. Australian Shipbuilding Board, 452
1st, 145 Austria, 339, 352
2d, 146 AVALANCHE, 202-03
Armored Group, 9th, 252 Avonmouth, England, 118, 119
Army, British Eighth, 190, 216, 224 Ayers, Col. Loren A., 128, 284, 328, 329, 331, 332,
Army, British Tenth, 380, 382 334, 335
Army, French First, 290, 345 Azores, 9
Army Air Forces, U.S., 22, 218, 462. See also
Air Forces, U.S. Back piling, 162
Army Defense Battalion, 4th, 517 Baffin Island, Canada, 11
Army Ground Forces, 194 Baghdad, Iraq, 379
Army Groups, British
Bahama Islands, 8
18, 175, 176
21, 234, 236, 247, 250 Baku, USSR, 382
Army Groups, U.S. Balboa, Panama, 27
1st, 236, 249, 255, 266 Balch, Lt. Col. Henry G., 479
6th, 290, 298, 302, 319, 345 Baltic coasters, 451, 471
12th, 326, 336, 345 Bandar Shahpur, Iran, 380, 381, 383, 384, 389,
15th, 190 394, 395, 399, 401, 402, 403, 423
Army Port and Service Command (AP&SC), 511, BANG, 96
512, 513, 516, 517, 518, 520, 528, 533, 540- Bareboat charter, 40
41, 545 Barfleur, France, 237, 238, 278, 279, 308
Army Service Command (ASCOM), 466, 467 Barge operations. See Inland water transportation.
Army Service Forces, 94, 99, 106, 194, 195, 579.
Barges, 25, 133, 259, 281, 317, 354, 356, 395, 453,
See also Services of Supply. 455, 466. See also Rhino barges.
Army Transport Service, 8, 19, 20, 21, 28, 280n,
Barnes, Maj. Gen. Julian F., 426, 427, 427n
492, 509, 513
Arno River, Italy, 220 Barrett, Lt. Col. Edward T., 151, 152, 152n
Arnold, Brig. Gen. Archibald V., 517 Barthrop, Col. John A., 469n
Artificial harbors. See Harbors, artificial. Barton, Capt. George W., 142, 162
Artificial ports. See Ports, artificial. Base Area Group, 6625th, 191n
Aruba, Dutch West Indies, 21, 24 Base Depot Company, 2682d, 183n
Arzew, Algeria, 156, 157 Base sections, 77-79, 109, 184
Ascension Island, 9, 26 Atlantic (North Africa), 148, 156, 162, 173
ASF. See Army Service Forces. Australian, 477
Assam, India, 547 Brittany, 289, 304n
Assam Line of Communications, 551, 552, 556, Central (London), 87
564, 567-72, 579, 608 Channel, 321, 351
Assault Force O, 252 Coastal (southern France), 291, 291n 293, 294,
Assault Force U, 252 296, 297, 298, 299
Assembly areas, European continent, 370, 370n. Continental (southern France), 291n, 299
See also Redeployment. Delta (southern France), 299, 304, 345
Atlantic Base Section. See Base sections, Atlantic Eastern (Great Britain), 87
(North Africa). Eastern (North Africa), 151, 158, 162, 163, 166,
Atlantic Ocean, 9, 137 167, 176, 178, 195
Attack transports, 192, 195, 203, 252, 542 Island (Sicily), 184, 191n
Attu, Aleutians, 33, 34, 48, 49, 50, 51n, 52 Loire, 304n
Auckland, New Zealand, 495 Luzon, 467, 479, 483
Australia, 4, 426-27, 471, 476, 480-83 Mediterranean, 148, 156, 173, 178
motor transport operations in, 480-83 Normandy, 276, 276n, 289, 303, 304n, 314, 331,
ports in, 456-58. See also individual ports by 336, 351
name. Northern (Corsica), 184
railway operations in, 476-78 Northern Ireland, 87
transportation system, 427, 429 Oise, 303
Australian Army, 481 Peninsular (Italy), 184, 187, 209, 213, 218, 221,
Australian Army Motor Transport Service, 481 223, 223n, 224, 225-26, 226n, 229, 230, 231
Australian Base Section. See Base sections, Philippine, 467, 469n, 479
Australian. Seine, 303
650 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Base sections—Continued Block system—Continued
Southern (Great Britain), 87, 109, 249, 250, on railroads, 574
251n, 252, 254, 260n, 261, 262, 263 Blockships, 275, 276. See also Harbors, artificial.
United Kingdom, 264 Bloemfontein, 426
Western (Great Britain), 87, 251 Blount, Brig. Gen. Roy E., 511, 512, 528
Bases-for-destroyers agreement, 8, 21 Boats, small, 29, 461, 493. See also Equipment,
Basra, Iraq, 379, 383, 402 marine.
Basra District, 393, 402n acquisition of, 430-31, 431n, 452-54, 500
Basra Port Directorate, 380, 390, 393 crews for, 29, 453-54, 500
Basra-Baghdad route, 375, 379, 391 critical need of, in Pacific, 429, 452-54, 607
Batangas, Luzon, 465, 467 for interisland transport, 510, 533
Bates, Lt. Col. Howard U., 131 BOLERO, 4, 5, 71-73, 80, 99-105, 107, 112, 115,
Battle of the Atlantic, 100 140, 385. See also ROUNDUP; SLEDGEHAMMER.
Battle of the Bulge, 302, 311, 317, 323, 329, 344, BOLERO Key Plans, 71, 102
345, 367 Bombay, India, 553, 554, 556, 561-63, 566
Battle of the Coral Sea, 425 Bomber Command, XX, 566
Battle of Midway, 4, 33, 491, 509 Bône, Algeria, 141, 153, 158-59, 167
Bay of Bengal, 547 Bonesteel, Maj. Gen. Charles H., 19
Bay of Biscay, 307 Booth, Brig. Gen. Donald P., 393-94, 402n
Bay St. George, Newfoundland, 10 Bora Bora, 494, 507
Beach Control Group, 291, 293, 294. See also Boston Port of Embarkation, 11, 13, 15, 92
DRAGOON. Bougainville, 505, 506
Beaches. See also Amphibious operations; in- Boyd-Roosevelt Highway. See Trans-Isthmian
dividual beaches by name. Highway.
congestion, 294, 463 Bradley, Lt. Gen. Omar N., 191
operations, 197-98, 203-05, 210, 238-39, Brahmaputra River, India, 7, 548, 551, 556, 568,
269-75, 293-94, 305, 466-67, 542, 543 579
BEAVER, 249n Brazil, 26
Beeler, Col. George W., 235, 287, 344 Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 214
Belfast, Northern Ireland, 73, 74, 112-13 "Breakdown of Manifest," 258
Belgian Movements Organization for Transport, Breene, Brig. Gen. Robert G., 498, 501, 503
321 Bremen Port Command, 359
Belgium, 6, 354, 355 Bremerhaven, Germany, 318, 352, 359
Bengal and Assam Railway, 552, 563, 568, 572, 578 Brenner Pass, 230
Bering Sea, 32, 33, 64 Brest, France, 237, 238, 239, 282, 305, 307, 307n,
Bermuda, 8, 9 308
Berthing facilities, 12, 141, 153, 157, 159, 198, 313,Brett, Maj. Gen. George H., 427
316, 318, 319, 320, 379, 380, 395, 399, 457,Bridges, 201, 217, 219, 220, 303, 347, 352, 356
458, 462, 464, 467, 495, 502, 512, 522, 539, 568
560, 563 Brisbane, Australia, 428, 457-58, 480
Besson, Brig. Gen. Frank S., Jr., 406 Brisbane River, Australia, 457
Bethel, Alaska, 46, 65 Bristol Bay, Alaska, 33
Biak Island, 459, 464-65 Bristol Channel area, 83, 108, 109
Biehl, Lt. Col. Carl, 270 Bristol Channel ports, 92, 118, 119, 252, 254, 259,
"Big hook," 217, 217n. See also Railways, Italy. 264, 265, 267, 269. See also individual ports
Bigelow, Col. A. C., 557 by name.
Bingham, Col. Sidney H., 141, 242, 243, 259 British Admiralty, 251
Birdum, Australia, 481, 482 British Army Groups. See Army Groups, British.
Bizerte, Tunisia, 137, 153, 159, 167, 195-96, 202 British Eighth Army, 190, 216, 224
Black market operations, 158, 320, 335, 351, 410, British Expeditionary Forces, 122
475 British 1st Division, 209
Black Sea, 378 British Guiana, 8, 24
Blanche F. Sigman, 365 British Import Program, 5, 109
"Blitz" can, 195, 195n, 200, 331 British Inland Water Transport Agency, 380
Block stowage, 474, 610 British Military Transport, 127
Block system British Ministry of Labour, 115, 119
in motor transport operations, 167, 416, 417-18, British Ministry of War Transport, 85, 101, 115,
422, 597, 598, 603 128, 161, 255, 325
INDEX
British Movement Control, 115, 127, 247
British Prime Minister. See Churchill, Winston S.
British rail troops, 171, 173, 216, 216n
British Railway Executive Committee, 124
British Railways, 90. See also Railways, United
Kingdom.
British Sea Transport Service, 110, 114, 115
British Tenth Army, 380, 382
British 10 Corps, 202
British Transportation Service, 215
British War Office, 255
British-American Cross-Channel Ferrying Commit-
tee, 242
Brittany, 233
Brittany Base Section. See Base sections, Brittany.
Brittany ports, 238, 239, 282, 282n, 300, 301, 302,
305-07, 308, 315-16. See also individual
ports by name.
Bruce, Col. Audrey M., 406
Brunson, Col. Mark V., 414, 415, 417
Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon B., Jr., 31, 37
Bued River, Luzon, 466n
Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R., 310
Bullock, Col. Kenneth K., 114n
Buna Village, New Guinea, 461
Buna-Gona campaign, 460, 461
Burma, 5, 6, 547
Burma Railway, 578
Burma Road, 557, 581. See also Ledo Road;
Stilwell Road.
Burpee, Brig. Gen. Clarence L., 126, 215, 215n,
243, 286, 346, 353
Bushire, Iran, 380, 383, 384, 389
Bushire-Shiraz-Tehran route, 384, 415
C-47's, 26
C1-M-AV1 vessels, 451, 455
Caen, France, 233
Cairns, Australia, 457, 458
Cairo Conference, 73
Calcutta, 548, 549, 556, 563-67
Calvert, 148
CAMEL Beach (France), 294. See also DRAGOON.
Camp Baltimore, 370n
Camp Lucky Strike, 362
Camp Pittsburgh, 370n
Camp Twenty Grand, 371
Campbell, Col. Alexander W., 215, 219
Canada, 4, 6, 9, 11-13, 32, 35, 64. See also Air-
fields, Alaska and western Canada; Alaska
Highway; Canol Project (Canada) ; CRIMSON
Project; CRYSTAL bases; Inland water trans-
portation, Alaska and western Canada; Rail-
ways, Alaska and western Canada.
Canadian National Railway, 42
Cancale, France, 282, 305, 307, 308, 315
Canol Project (Canada), 4, 32, 34, 35, 65, 67, 609
651
Canton Island, 493, 510
Cape of Good Hope, 136, 379, 388
Cape Spencer, Alaska, 32, 40
Cape Torokina, Bougainville, 506
Cardiff, Wales, 118
Carentan, France, 233, 278, 279, 316
CARGO, 249n
Cargo
marking and packing of, 91-96, 159, 475, 606
stowage, 397, 474
Cargo discharge performance, oversea areas, 10, 14,
18, 312, 485, 485n. See also Civilian labor,
use of; Troop labor, use of.
Alaska, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50
Australia, 457, 457n, 458
Belgium, 322, 323, 324
Canada, 13
France, 294, 295-96, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317,
318, 319, 320
Greenland, 14, 15, 16
Guadalcanal, 504, 508
Hawaii, 492, 509, 513, 518, 520, 545
Iceland, 18
India, 560, 564, 565, 567
Italy, 206-07, 208-09, 209n, 211, 212, 213, 214
Iwo Jima, 536
New Guinea, 461, 462, 463, 464
Newfoundland, 10, 11
North Africa, 154, 155, 156-57, 158, 159, 161
Okinawa, 544
Panama Canal Zone, 29-30
Persian Corridor, 380, 392, 396, 401, 402, 403
Philippine Islands, 467, 468, 469, 470
Puerto Rico, 23
Saipan, 538
Sicily, 198, 199
Tinian, 539
United Kingdom, 74, 105, 106, 113, 115, 117,
119, 120, 121
Cargo manifest system, 89, 91, 93, 142, 160n, 238.
See also Cargo, marking and packing of.
Cargo pallets, 25, 195, 195n, 248, 248n, 516, 610
Cargo security officers, 182n, 475, 476
Cargo ships, 8, 102, 105, 192, 193, 308
Cargo-loading cable, 89, 91, 92, 93, 160n. See
also Cargo, marking and packing of.
Caribbean Defense Command, 21, 21n, 27, 28. See
also Panama Sector; Puerto Rican Sector;
Trinidad Sector.
Carraway, Col. William E., 194
Casablanca, 137, 140, 141, 148, 152, 153-54, 155,
156, 168
Casablanca Conference, 72, 99, 165, 189, 550
Case, Col. Charles Z., 305
Caspian Sea, 375, 382
Casualties, evacuation of, 245, 293. See also Hos-
pital ships; Hospital trains.
by air, 178, 228, 364-65, 366, 368, 456
652
Casualties, evacuation of—Continued
by animal transport, 178
by highway, 167, 178
by rail, 178, 179, 349-50, 350n
by water, 156, 178, 179, 214, 228, 231, 271, 313,
363-70, 455-56
Catz, France, 284, 287
CCS 109/1, 386, 386n
CCS 219/5, 73n
CCS 391/5, 552n
CCS 751/1, 368n
Cebu City, P.I., 465, 468
CELLOPHANE, 249n
CENT Force, 191, 194, 197
Center Task Force (North Africa), 137, 141, 143,
148, 152, 152n, 179
Central Australian Railway, 481, 481n
Central Base Section. See Base sections, Central
(London).
Central Pacific Area, 5, 489-91, 509-13, 516-23,
528-29, 533-37, 539-45
Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC), 527, 528,
529, 537, 537n, 544, 545
Chancy, Maj. Gen. James E., 74, 76, 86
Channel Base Section. See Base sections, Channel.
Charleston Port of Embarkation, 412
CHASTITY, 239n
Chateau Thierry, 73, 365
Cheltenham, England, 79, 254
Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L., 592, 593
Cherbourg, 233, 237, 238, 239, 245, 279-81, 282,
282n, 300, 301, 302, 305, 308, 313-15, 364,
368, 370, 372
Cherbourg Terminal Railway, 314
Chernofski Harbor, Aleutians, 46, 52
Cheshire, Maj. Frank E., 129, 130
Cheves, Brig. Gen. Gilbert, 554
Cheybassi, Iraq, 379, 383, 389, 394, 399, 400, 401-
02, 403, 423
Chianese, Lt. Col. Cajetan T., 524n
Chichagof Harbor, Aleutians, 50
Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander.
See COSSAC.
Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA, 77, 81, 84, 85-
86, 87, 88, 99, 126, 397, 427. See also Ross,
Maj. Gen. Frank S.
Chilkoot Barracks, Alaska, 36
China, 4, 547, 556-59, 599-604. See also Air-
fields, China; Inland water transportation,
China; Lines of communication, Kunming
East; Motor transport operations, China; Rail-
ways, China.
China Defense Supplies (CDS), 550
China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC)
555, 602
China Navigation Company, 449
China Theater, 555, 557-59, 603
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
China Theater Replacement Center, 604
China-Burma-India theater, 5, 547-49, 552, 554-55,
608. See also Services of Supply, CBI.
Chinese Army, 585, 595
Chinese National Military Council, 558
Christmas Island, 493, 510
Chungking, China, 547
Churchill, Canada, 12, 13
Churchill, Winston S., 208, 383
Churchill-Roosevelt Highway (Trinidad), 24
Circle, Alaska, 57
City of Fort Worth, 449
Civilian labor, use of, 10, 18. See also Pilferage;
Prisoner of war labor, use of; Sabotage, danger
of; Service troops, shortage of; Troop labor,
use of.
high accident rate, 421-22
inefficiency of, 28, 111, 112, 113, 119, 155, 396,
397, 398, 429, 459, 471-72
on inland waterways, 355, 356
as maritime personnel, 453-54
in port operations, 13, 14, 16, 21, 23, 25, 28, 36,
47, 157, 212, 213, 313, 317, 317n, 319, 321,
322, 395, 399, 400-402, 426, 457, 459, 461,
467, 469, 470, 471, 492, 493, 496, 500, 505,
510, 518, 560, 563, 614-15
in railway operations and maintenance, 54, 55,
56, 168, 172, 200, 214, 216, 298, 345, 346,
351-52, 403-04, 410-11, 495
shortage, 23, 28, 42, 45, 46, 70, 110, 111, 112,
115, 117, 119, 120, 157, 197, 318, 411, 429,
443, 464, 471, 492, 495, 502
and strikes, 10, 111, 117, 119, 120-21, 411-12
in vehicle operation and maintenance, 162, 167,
226, 414, 416, 418-19, 598, 614-15
Civitavecchia, Italy, 211-12, 219
Claremont Terminal, New Jersey, 15
Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W., 138, 202, 207, 228
Clarkson, Col. Robert H., 205, 292
Clay, Maj. Gen. Lucius D., 310, 342
Clove Hitch, 451
Clyde area ports, 92, 115, 115n, 116, 119, 264, 265.
See also individual ports by name.
Clyde Navigation Trust, 115
Clyde River, Scotland, 114
Coal, 140n, 217, 267, 355
Coast Guard, 454, 454n
Coastal Base Section. See Base sections, Coastal
(southern France).
Coasters, 199, 204, 255, 259, 265, 267, 268, 272,
277, 293, 317
Cobb, Col. John M., 213, 231
Colombie, 214
Combat Engineer Regiment, 540th, 210
Combat loaders (AKA's and APA's), 140, 140n,
145, 192, 195, 252, 542
Combat loading, 140n, 145, 146, 192, 252, 268, 610
INDEX
Combined Chiefs of Staff, 72, 137, 137n, 377, 386, Crothers, Col. James A., 114, 114n, 118, 314
387, 391, 551, 552
Combined Military Transportation Committee, 386
Combined Operational Service Command (COSC),
SWPA, 460, 461, 461n
Comfort, 456, 456n
"Commodity loaders," 108, 108n
Commodity loading, 256, 268
Commonwealth Government Railways, 476
Communications systems, 162, 164, 283, 287, 346,
403
Communications Zone (COMZ), ETOUSA, 276, Danube Navy, 357, 357n. See also Inland water
284, 287, 288, 289, 304, 307, 321, 330, 335,
345. See also Advance Section (ADSEC)
Communications Zone, ETOUSA; Forward
Echelon, Communications Zone (FECZ),
ETOUSA.
G-4, 249, 288, 304, 310, 310n, 324, 331, 359, 369 Dawson Creek, Alaska, 34, 57, 59
Communications Zone, MTOUSA, 299, 303
Communications Zone, NATOUSA, 184
Concentration Plan Committee, 249
Concrete storage-ships, 451, 471
Connolly, Maj. Gen. Donald H., 386, 389, 398, 400, DELTA Beach (France), 294. See also DRAGOON.
413
Connor, Col. Edward H., Jr., 267
Constantine, Algeria, 153, 163, 168, 173, 175
Contessa, 148, 143n
Continental Advance Section (CONAD), 291n,
299, 304, 345
Continental Base Section. See Base sections,
Continental.
Convoys, 4, 14, 18, 32, 92, 140, 144, 145, 375, 379, Trinidad, 26
401, 426, 448
Copper River and Northwestern Railroad (Alaska),
53
Cordova, Alaska, 33, 47
Corps, British 10, 202
Corps, U.S.
I, 463, 466
II, 151, 151n, 164, 167, 175, 176, 191
V, 270
VI, 202, 203, 209, 210
VII, 276
VIII, 315
XIV, 466
XXIV, 521, 534, 539, 540, 542, 543
Corps of Engineers. See Engineers, Corps of.
COSSAC, 72, 73, 233, 234. See also OVERLORD.
Cotentin, France, 233, 285
Counterintelligence Division (CID), 351
Covell, Maj. Gen. W. E. R., 553, 554, 564
Creager, Maj. Emory C., 397
CREGO, 432, 435, 437-47, 478, 524
CRIMSON Project, 12
Cristobal, C. Z., 27, 28, 30
Cross-Channel operation. See OVERLORD; ROUND-
UP; SLEDGEHAMMER.
653
CRYSTAL bases, 11
Cunningham, Admiral Sir John, 209
Curasao, Dutch West Indies, 21, 24
Curtis, Lt. Col. L. D., 406
Cyclops Mountains, New Guinea, 463-64
Dagupan, P.I., 467, 467n
Dagupan River, P.I., 466
Danaher, Maj. John T., 150
"Danger money," 355
transportation, Central Europe.
Danube River, 7, 271n, 356
Darwin, Australia, 457, 481
Davidson, Lt. Col. Cecil H., 487
Davis, Col. Charles C., 585
de Rhe Philipe, Brigadier A. T., 149, 150, 184n
Decker, Lt. Col. Benjamin H., 297
Delta Base Section. See Base sections, Delta
(France).
Demobilization, 323, 369-74, 487-88, 491, 545, 546
Depot Supplies Shipment Data (DSSD), 257, 257n,
267
Depots
European Continent, 311, 325, 325n, 358, 359,
359n, 360
French North Africa, 153, 158, 163
Puerto Rico, 22
United Kingdom, 105, 125, 131, 134, 142, 257
Depots, TC, 183, 183n, 358, 471, 617
Destroyers-for-bases agreement, 8, 21
Deyo, Col. William J., 318
di Raimondo, General, 215
Dibrugarh, India, 549, 551
Dibru-Sadiya Railway (India), 568, 572
Diesel locomotives, 25, 217, 286, 345, 387, 409, 410.
See also Equipment, railway; Locomotives;
Mikado locomotives.
DIME Force, 191, 196, 197
District transportation officer, 88, 89
Diversion committees, shipping
for the European continent, 311, 311n. See also
Shipping Control Committee.
in Mediterranean, 160-61
in United Kingdom, 85, 89, 91, 92, 311n
Dodenhoff, Col. Harry C., 395, 402, 402n
Dogwood, 456
Dorothy Luckenbach, 401
"Double bunking," 74
DRAGOON, 208, 290-94, 300, 301. See also ANVIL.
"Drifters," 17, 19
"Drying out," 273, 273n, 277. See also Beaches,
operations.
DUCK I, 248
654
DUKW Operation and Maintenance School, Oahu,
533
DUKW's 192, 274, 533
use in assaults, 517-18, 521, 535-36, 542
in beach operations, 190, 197, 197n, 201, 204,
210, 212, 270-72, 275, 277, 283, 292, 293,
503, 517-18, 521, 536, 542, 543, 610
and evacuation of casualties, 364, 536
maintenance, 271, 276
for overland transport, 198, 271, 277, 293, 6th, 270, 274, 283, 283n, 284
542-43
in port operations, 281, 308, 314, 317, 462, 463,
503
Dutch Guiana, 24
Dutch Harbor, Aleutians, 31, 33, 36, 46-48, 52
Eastern Base Sections. See Base sections, Eastern
(Great Britain), Eastern (North Africa).
Eastern Task Force (North Africa), 137, 143, 148,
152, 179
Eastwood, Brig. Gen. Harold E., 445
Eclipse Line (Central Europe), 352
Edmonton Rail Regulating Station, 35n, 42
Edmonton Transportation District, 35n
Edmund B. Alexander, 9
Efate, New Hebrides Islands, 494, 497, 498, 501,
504, 507
Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., 76,
138, 140, 141, 149, 166, 166n, 184, 190, 307,
307n, 309, 310, 372
Elbe River, 303
Elburz Mountains, Iran, 381, 408
Electric trains, 217
Elihu Yale, 206
Ellice Islands, 494
Embarkation Control (EMBARCO), 251, 251n,
261, 264. See also OVERLORD.
Embarkation Group, 1st, 195, 196
Emily H. M. Weder, 456
Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos C., 492, 494
Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments
494th, 467n
531st, 161, 204
532d, 463
542d, 463, 468, 473
544th, 467n, 469, 469n
591st, 195
592d, 467
594th, 469, 469n
Engineer Combat Group, 1138th, 534
Engineer Combat Regiments
39th, 212
540th, 209
Engineer Dump Truck Company, 429th, 414, 416
Engineer General Service Regiment, 382d, 243
Engineer Port Construction and Repair Group,
1057th, 355
Engineer Railway Detachment, 9646A, 56
Engineer Regiments
50th, 49
330th, 588
Engineer Special Brigade Group, 275, 315
Engineer Special Brigades
1st, 191, 191n, 192, 198, 201, 276, 543, 544
4th, 466, 467, 469, 469n
5th, 270, 271n, 272, 274, 283n, 284, 322
Engineers, Corps of, 7, 14, 25, 70, 163, 171, 173,
176, 195, 207, 212, 213, 214, 224, 227n, 281,
286, 295, 327, 354, 356, 395, 459
England. See United Kingdom.
Entry into war, U.S., 12, 70
Equipment
cargo-handling, 10, 11, 20, 23, 26, 111, 112, 129,
133, 141, 153, 157, 159, 193, 272, 274, 281,
282, 315, 380, 388, 396, 399, 457, 460, 465,
471-74, 492, 495, 503, 506, 516, 521, 615-16
lifesaving, 181, 183, 367n, 450
marine, 52, 132-34, 615-16. See also Barges;
Boats, small.
motor transport, 165-66, 225, 226, 240, 240n,
241, 328, 328n, 330, 335, 339-40. See also
Vehicles,
organizational, 97, 146, 160, 182, 195n, 358, 616.
See also Preshipment,
personal, 98, 98n, 99
railway, 26, 54, 122, 129-32, 137, 141, 165, 166,
172, 175, 242, 244, 258, 267, 268, 281, 286,
286n, 342, 348, 387, 396, 403, 408, 409, 410,
476-78, 479, 575, 576, 601, 616-17. See also
Locomotives.
Espiritu Santo, 494, 495, 497, 498, 499, 501, 502,
504, 506, 507, 508
Europa, 370
European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA), 143.
See also Services of Supply, ETOUSA.
command and organization, 76-77
co-ordination of U.S. and British transportation
operations, 84-89
inland waterways, 116, 354-57
and misplaced supplies, 142-43
motor transport operations in, 126-29, 282-85,
327-40
movement control in, 85-91, 117, 118-19, 122-
23, 126-27, 246-48, 249-51, 254, 264, 324-27
port operations in, 109-22, 269-82, 305-08,
312-24
railway operations in, 122-26, 285-87, 340-54
ship retention in, 6, 308-09, 309n, 310
transportation organization, 74-83, 287-89,
303-05
transportation problem, 605-06
Eversberg, Col. Eugene A., 114n
Excursion Inlet, Alaska, 32, 43, 44
INDEX
Export Movement Division, 80, 144. See also
TORCH.
FABIUS, 249
Failiyah Creek, Iran, 395, 423
Fairbanks, Alaska, 31, 32, 33, 34, 53, 57
Falmouth, England, 252, 260, 264
Fanning Island, 493, 510
Far East Command (FEC), 429n
Faymonville, Brig. Gen. Philip R., 383
Fedala, French Morocco, 146, 152, 153
Felio, Col. Leonard F., 134
Ferry craft, 273, 274, 293
Field Artillery Group (Provisional), 1st, 535
Fifth Army Invasion Training Center, 192
Fiji Islands, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 501, 504
Finschhafen, New Guinea, 443, 461, 463
First Marine Brigade (Provisional), 17
FLAMBO. See Advance Administrative Echelon,
AFHQ.
"Flatted" Liberty ships, 320, 320n
Floating warehouses, 5-6, 108, 301, 311, 312, 445, Glenn Highway (Alaska), 57
451, 499. See also Ports, congestion at; Selec- Gloucester, England, 254
tive discharge.
Forage, 229
Force 343, 190, 191, 192
Force 545, 190
Force B, 252
"Force marking," 97
Force movement table, 250, 251, 261
Forward Echelon, Communications Zone (FECZ),
ETOUSA, 234, 236, 244, 284, 287, 288, 288n, Granville, France, 237, 238, 279, 308
331
Transportation Section, 234, 235, 238, 241, 245 Gravelle, Maj. Gordon K., 331, 331n
Fowey, England, 120, 252, 259, 268
Fox, 249n
France. See also ANVIL; DRAGOON; Inland water
transportation, France; Motor transport oper-
ations, France; OVERLORD; Railways, France,
northern, 233, 301-08, 324-27, 354
southern, 208, 219, 294-96, 303-08
Franklin, Brig. Gen. John M., 309-10, 311, 311n, Green Project, 26-27. See also Redeployment.
312
Fraser, Col. Jack A., 498, 499, 507, 524n
Freight transfer points, 334
French First Army, 290, 345
French Military Railway Service, 171, 173, 175,
176, 177
French Morocco. See Morocco, French.
French troops, 291, 291n, 293
Frink, Maj. Gen. James L., 428, 431-32, 433, 442,
447, 451, 454
Frobisher Bay, Canada, 11, 13
"Full and down" loading, 108
Fuller, Col. Thomas, 150, 150n, 169, 170, 171, 185,
218, 299
655
G-4, 7, 8, 10, 75
Gaffney, Maj. John M., 116
Gage, Brigadier R. F. O'Dowd, 171, 215
Garigliano River, Italy, 219
Gela, Sicily, 196, 198, 193n, 200, 201
General Black, 567
General Butner, 562
General McRae, 561
General Randall, 562
General Royal T. Frank, 492, 492n
General W. P. Richardson, 424
Germany, 3, 69, 70, 137, 337, 339, 352
Gerow, Maj. Gen. Leonard T., 98
Ghent, Belgium, 303, 308, 324
Ghormley, Vice Adm. Robert Lee, 490n, 496, 497
Gilbert Islands, 5, 491, 511
Gilbreath, Maj. Gen. Frederick, 523, 526
Giles, Col. Benjamin F., 14
Gili Gili, New Guinea, 461
Glandon, Col. Joseph P., 61
Glasgow, 109, 114, 145
GLUE, 96
"Goods wagon," 122, 130
Goose Bay, Labrador, 12, 14
GOOSEBERRIES, 275, 276, 611. See also OMAHA
Beach; UTAH Beach.
Gordon, Sir Thomas, 437, 448
Gourock, Scotland, 114, 116
Grandcamp-les-Bains, France, 237, 270, 274, 278,
308
Graphic Stowage Plan, 258
Gray, Brig. Gen. Carl R., Jr., 165, 171-73, 175,
176, 177, 182, 183, 203n, 215, 215n, 219, 292,
292n, 297, 345, 346, 351, 352, 353, 354
Gray, Col. Ernest B., 537
Great Britain. See United Kingdom.
Green Diamond Express Route (France), 336
Green Island, Solomon Islands, 508
Greenland, 6, 9, 12, 13-16
Greenland Base Command, 14-15
Greenlight system, 256-57
Greenock, Scotland, 114, 116
Grening, Capt. Paul C., 12, 20, 25
Grenoble, France, 296, 298
Grimshaw Road (Canada), 64
Gripsholm, 362
Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P., 71, 71n, 75, 84,
92-93, 97, 107, 108, 149n, 171, 309, 312, 346,
354, 365-66, 368, 369, 400, 432, 432n, 436, 611
Group Regulating Stations
1st, 83, 88
3d, 235, 244-45, 286
Guadalcanal, 497, 502, 503, 506, 507, 508
656
Guadalcanal Island Command, 525
Guam, 519, 538
Gulf of Alaska, 31, 32, 33, 64
Gulf of Arzew, Algeria, 192
Gulf District (Persian Gulf), 393, 402n
Gulf of Mexico, 29
Gulf of Paria, Trinidad, 24
Gulf of Salerno, 202
Gullat, Col. Doswell, 322
Hagushi beaches, Okinawa, 542, 543
Hainault (England) Railway Sheds and Siding,
130-31
Halsey, Admiral William F., Jr., 499, 501, 504, 505,
523
Hamblen, Brig. Gen. Archelaus L., 149, 171
Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, 145, 146, Hudson Bay, 12, 13
147, 166, 194, 388
Harbor craft, 22, 23, 207, 259, 316. See also Hull, England, 119, 120
Barges; Boats, small; Equipment, Marine.
Harbor Craft Companies
326th, 579
327th, 579
329th, 133, 357
331st, 534
337th, 357
Harbors, artificial, 133, 153, 157, 274, 276-77, 280,
611. See also Ports, artificial.
"Hards," 251, 261
HARLEQUIN, 247
Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest N., 146
Harmon, Maj. Gen. Millard F., 496, 497
Harpold, Lt. Col. Harley D., 35
Harriman, W. Averell, 123, 383, 384, 387
Harris, Col. John T., 28n
Hartle, Maj. Gen. Russell P., 73
Hawaiian Department, 492, 493, 509, 510, 532
Hawaiian Department Replacement Depot, 512
Hawaiian Department Service Forces, 509, 511
Hawaiian Islands, 4, 5, 489, 491-94, 509
Hawaiian Shipper, 30
Hawley, Maj. Gen. Paul R., 363, 365, 366, 367
Hayle, England, 120, 133
Headquarters 1616, 386, 414
Heldenfels, Lt. Col. Grover C., 118n
Henricksen, Oscar A. J., 397, 398, 399
Henry M. Rice, 273
Hewitt, Vice Adm. Henry Kent, 202n
Highway Transport Divisions (Provisional)
6956th, 339, 339n
6957th, 337, 339, 339n
6958th, 339, 339n
Highway Transport Service, 100th, 484
Highway Transportation Division (Luzon), 480,
483. See also Highway Transport Service,
100th.
Highways. See Roads; and by name.
Hoge, Brig. Gen. William M., 270, 315, 316n
Holder, Col. John H., 469n
Hollandia, New Guinea, 428, 433, 443, 444, 459,
463-64
Holmes, Maj. Gen. Noel G., 86
Holtz Bay, Aleutians, 49
Hong Kong, 425
Honolulu, 492, 493, 512, 518, 530, 545
Hope, 456
Hopkins, Harry L., 43
Hospital ships, 214, 277, 363, 365, 365n, 366, 372,
450, 456. See also Casualties, evacuation of.
Hospital trains, 131-32, 132n, 178, 179, 217,
348-50, 364. See also Casualties, evacuation
of.
Hsiyang River, China, 601
Hughes, Brig. Gen. Everett S., 150n
Humber River, England, 119
Humber River ports, 119
Humboldt Bay, New Guinea, 463
Hump, the, 547, 547n, 551, 556, 556n, 607
HUSKY, 189, 190-91, 192, 193-97
Hutchings, Brig. Gen. Henry, Jr., 469n
Hyde, Col. Frederick W., 120n
Iceland, 4, 9, 16-21
Iceland Base Command, 19, 20, 21
Identification of Separate Shipments, 95
Ie Shima, Ryukyus, 542, 543
Ikateq, Greenland, 14
Ile de France, 388
Immingham, England, 119, 120
India-Burma, 3, 4, 6
inland waterways, 548, 550, 551, 552, 579-80.
See also American Barge Lines (ABL).
line of communications, 551, 552, 556, 564,
567-72, 579, 608
motor transport operations in, 580-91
pipelines in, 551, 556, 571, 572, 584, 590-91
ports in, 547, 554, 559-67. See also individual
ports by name.
railway operations in, 547-48, 552, 568-70,
572-79
India-Burma theater, 555, 556-57, 571
Infantry Division, British 1st, 209
Infantry Divisions, U.S.
1st, 145, 191, 196, 252, 271
2d, 252
3d, 146, 191, 195, 196, 200, 209, 228, 229, 291
4th, 252, 291
5th, 252
7th, 516, 517, 534, 535, 542
8th, 252
9th, 146
25th, 500, 507, 510
INDEX 657
Infantry Divisions, U.S.—Continued Ivigtut, Greenland, 13, 16
27th, 516, 519, 525 Iwo Jima, 535-57
29th, 98, 252
32d, 460 J. Franklin Bell, 48
34th, 73, 145 J-4 Division, 513, 514
36th, 203, 291 Jabelmann, Otto, 123
37th, 498, 525 Jamaica, 8, 22
40th, 508 James B. Weaver, 322
43d, 499, 525 James M. Davis, 464
45th, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196 Janos, Capt. Louis, 433
77th, 519, 534, 541, 542 Japan, 3, 4, 32, 33, 425, 557, 559, 595
81st, 525, 534 Jarman, Maj. Gen. Sanderford, 537
86th, 371 JCS 1199, 363n
90th, 252, 271n Jean Bart, 153
92d, 214 Jerry can. See "Blitz can."
93d, 508, 525 Jewett, Lt. Col. Maurice G., 358, 359n, 360
96th, 534, 535, 542 Johns, Brig. Gen. Dwight F., 460, 460n
98th, 545 Johnson, Col. Bernard A., 399, 402n
Americal, 473, 499, 507, 525 Johnston, Col. Paul W., 428, 477
Infantry Regiments, U.S. Joint Army-Navy-WSA Committee, 514, 532
10th, 19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6, 6n, 137n, 311, 367, 444,
18th, 152 445, 497, 515, 529, 551
24th, 503 Joint Freight Handling Facilities, Okinawa, 544
106th, 517 Joint Military Transportation Committee (JMTC),
147th, 525 529, 530
Inland water transportation Joint Overseas Shipping Control Office (JOSCO),
Alaska and western Canada, 32, 41, 43-44, 45 514, 531, 546
Belgium, 355-56 Joint Purchasing Board (JPB), 497, 526
Central Europe, 354-57 Joint Purchasing Forage Board, 229
China, 559, 599-601 Joss Force, 191, 195, 197
France, 355-56 Juneau, Alaska, 32, 33, 43, 44
India, 550, 551, 552, 553, 555, 556, 579-80
Persian Corridor, 279, 380, 382, 400
Inland Waterways Committee, 354, 355, 356 Kamy, Maj. Harry D., 183
Inland Waterways Division, 354, 357 Karachi, India, 383, 547, 549, 559-61
Inland Waterways Transport Service (IWTS), 357, Karachi-Zahidan-Meshed route (India-Iran), 381
382, 394, 395 Karun River, Iran, 379, 400
Inside Passage, Alaska, 32, 40, 44 Kasserine Pass, 137, 164, 173, 174
Inter-American Highway, 27, 27n Kavieng Island, New Ireland, 508, 509
Iran, 4, 6, 375, 378, 379, 392 Kazvin, Iran, 389
Iranian Army, 410 Ketchikan, Alaska, 31
Iranian Government State Supply and Service Cor- Khanaqin, Iraq, 379
poration, 413 Khanaqin Lift (Iraq), 381, 384, 391, 402, 415, 421
Iranian State Railway ( I S R ) , 380-81, 383-84, 389 Khorramshahr, Iran, 379, 383, 384, 389, 393, 394,
392, 403-13 395, 399, 401, 402, 403, 423
Iran-Iraq Service Command, 377, 377n Khorramshahr-Andimeshk-Kazvin route, 384
Iraq, 375, 391 Kilpatrick, Brig. Gen. John R., 146
Irrawaddy River, Burma, 550, 579 Kirk, Maj. Gen. Norman T., 366
Iry, Lt. Col. Clarence N., 17 Kiska, Aleutians, 31, 33, 34, 41, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51
Isigny, France, 237, 238, 270, 274, 278, 308 KM convoys, 144n, 145
Island Base Section. See Base sections, Island Kodiak, Alaska, 31, 39, 46, 47, 52
(Sicily). Koenig, Col. William C., 235, 316n
Italian base section. See Base sections, Peninsular. Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM), 449,
Italian State Railways, 215, 220, 221, 231 450
Italy, 3, 5, 6, 202. See also Animal transport opera- Kreml, Lt. Col. Franklin M., 142, 162, 164, 167, 221
tions; individual ports by name; Motor trans- Kunming, China, 557, 558
port operations, Italy; Railways, Italy; Roads, Kunming East Line of Communications, 557, 591-
Italy; Water transport operations, Italy. 601, 608
658 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Kuskokwim River, Alaska, 33, 65 Lend-lease, 4, 5, 11, 70, 123, 547, 560, 563, 575.
Kvichak Bay, Alaska, 33 See also Persian Corridor; Persian Gulf Serv-
Kwajalein Island, Marshall Islands, 517 ice Command.
Kweichow-Kwangsi Railway (China), 602 air route to USSR via Siberia, 34
Kweilin, China, 549 sea routes to USSR, 375-79
Leonard Wood, 10n
La Calle, Algeria, 159, 163, 167 Leopold Canal, Belgium, 7
Labor. See Civilian labor, use of; Troop labor, use Leyte, P.I., 443, 444, 465
of. Liberated persons, 362-63
Labrador, 11, 12 Liberty ships
Lady Connaught, 364 conversions for use as transport vessels, 181, 231,
Lae, New Guinea, 461, 462-63 450. See also Prisoners of war; Ship
Lake of Bizerte, 159, 196 conversions.
Lake Champlain, 372 employment as cargo vessels, 13, 51, 158, 195,
Lakehurst, 146, 147, 259, 281, 286 210, 211, 267, 274, 277, 281, 293, 295, 307,
"Laker," 449, 449n, 451, 455 313-14, 317, 318, 461, 463
Lambert, Col. Kent C., 558n as motor vehicle vessels, 255, 258. See also
Lancaster, Col. Leon J., 453 MTV's.
Landes, Col. Lewis, 482 Licata, Sicily, 196, 198, 198n, 200, 201
Landing craft, 75, 75n, 160, 192, 330, 606. See Liege, Belgium, 323, 329, 336, 337, 355
also Coasters; DUKW's; Ferry craft; LBV's; Lines of communication (LOC), 3, 4, 5, 31, 32,
LCI's; LCM's; LCP's; LCT's; LCVP's; LSI's; 33, 34, 40, 137, 158, 301, 491, 609. See also
LST's; LVT's. Inland water transportation; Motor transport
use in assaults, 48, 49, 202, 252, 466 operations; Railways; Roads.
in beach operations, 50, 51, 190, 204, 316, 317 India, 551, 552, 556, 564, 567-72, 579, 608
shortage, 6, 73, 189 Kunming East, 557, 591-601, 608
Landrum, Brig. Gen. Eugene M., 48 Persian Corridor, 375, 379, 381, 384, 391, 415
Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B., 148, 149, 151, 186, Rangoon, 581
299 southern (France), 187, 292n, 299, 300, 303-04,
Lastayo, Brig. Gen. Edward H., 118, 156, 187 345, 358
LBV's, 255, 259, 278 Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, 464, 465, 466, 466n, 467,
LCI's, 51, 196, 204, 211, 263, 264, 271, 277, 610 479
LCM's, 48, 49, 51, 193, 204, 273, 462, 463, 466, Little BUCO, 249. See also Allied Build-up Con-
521, 610 trol Organization (BUCO).
LCP's, 48 Little Red Ball Express Route (France), 335
LCT's, 49, 50, 51, 196, 197n, 204, 210, 211, 255, Liverpool, 88, 93, 109, 116, 117, 145
259, 263, 264, 272, 275, 277, 281, 283, 286, Liverpool port area, 117
293, 463, 466, 521, 522 Local procurement
LCVP's, 49, 51, 275, 463 European continent, 359
Iran, 404, 412
Le Havre, 268, 301, 302, 307, 308, 315, 316-18, North Africa, 153
335, 370, 372 South Pacific, 497
Le Havre Port of Embarkation, 318, 362 United Kingdom, 102, 110, 111
Leased bases. See Antigua; Bahama Islands; Ber- Locomotives, 25, 26, 54, 123, 123n, 124, 124n, 125,
muda; British Guiana; Jamaica; Newfound- 131, 166, 172, 174, 217, 267, 281, 342, 403,
land; St. Lucia; Trinidad. 407, 408, 410, 477, 478, 575. See also Diesel
Leave trains, 350-51 locomotives; Equipment, railway; Mikado
Leavey, Maj. Gen. Edmond H., 513, 515 locomotives.
Ledo Road, 6, 550, 557, 581 Logan, M. Sgt. Robert J., 284
Ledo-Burma Road. See Stilwell Road. Loire Base Section. See Base sections, Loire.
Ledo-Kunming route, 551 Loire River, France, 233
Lee, 148 London, 109, 119, 120
Lee, Lt. Col. Alfred M., 524n, 527 London base section. See Base sections, Central
Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H., 75, 76, 77, 79, 98, 124, (London).
127, 149, 241, 299, 307, 309 London BOLERO Combined Committee, 71
Leghorn, Italy, 208, 212-13, 214, 230 Lord, Maj. Gen. Royal B., 310, 311, 312
Lehneis, Capt. Horace, 284 Lord Leathers, 85
INDEX 659
Lorient, France, 238, 239, 282, 305 Marshaling. See also OVERLORD.
Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, 388, 456 areas, 247, 250, 251, 254, 261, 263
Lowry, 1st Lt. Thomas S., 119 process, 246-48, 251
LSI's, 263, 264, 318 Marshall, Maj. Gen. Richard J., 428
LST's, 50, 51, 192, 195n, 196, 198, 204, 208, 209, Marshall Islands, 5, 491, 511
210, 211, 223, 258, 259, 262, 263, 264, 270, Marston, Brig. Gen. John, USMC, 17
271, 273, 277, 314, 315, 317, 363, 364, 365, Marvin, Col. George W., 210
462, 463, 464, 517, 536, 610
Massacre Bay, Aleutians, 49, 50, 51
Lubricants. See POL. Mauretania, 264, 388
Lucas, Maj. Gen. John P., 209 Maxwell, Maj. Gen. Russell L., 383, 384
Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy, 100 McCloy, John J., 182
"Lux" convoy, 422, 597 McConnaughy, Col. Donald S., 79, 80
Luxembourg, 337 McCord, Col. Walter D., 120, 254
Luzon, P.I., 465 McGrath, Alaska, 65
Luzon Base Section. See Base sections, Luzon. McKenzie, Col. Kenneth D., 114, 151, 151n, 187
Luzon Military Railway, 479, 479n McKinstry, Col. Melville, 431, 432, 432n
LVT's, 518, 521, 610 McMullen, Maj. Gen. Donald J., 86
Lynn Canal, Alaska, 45 "Meat Ball Express" (France), 348
Medical Corps, 254, 350
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 425, Medical Department, 179, 179n, 363, 456
426, 428, 445, 488, 523 Mediterranean Base Section. See Base sections,
Mackenzie River, Canada, 64, 65, 67 Mediterranean.
Mactan, 456 Mediterranean Shipping Board, 149n, 161
Madras, India, 554, 564, 567 Mediterranean theater lessons in transportation,
Maetsuycker, 450 159-61
Magee, Lt. Col. Thornton A., 299 Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTOUSA),
MAGNET, 71, 74 184n
Major ports. See Ports (Major). Medium Ports. See Ports (Medium).
Manchester, England, 116, 117 Mehdia, French Morocco, 146, 152
Manchester Ship Canal, 116 Meigs, 449
Manila, 443, 445, 446, 465, 467, 468-70 Melbourne, Australia, 457, 480
Manila Bay, 468 Mellissa, 279
Margil, Iraq, 379 Menna Shima, Ryukyus, 542
Mariana Islands, 519 Merauke, New Guinea, 473
Marianas campaign, 491 Mercy, 456
Marigold, 456 Mers el Kébir, Algeria, 156-57, 174
Marine Amphibious Corps Mersey Dock and Harbor Board, 117
I, 501 Mersey River, England, 117
III , 519, 540, 542, 543 Mersey River ports, 83, 92, 116, 117, 118, 264, 265.
V, 519, 520, 536 See also individual ports by name.
Marine Divisions Meyer, Lt. Col. Leo J., 120n, 121
1st, 534 Middle East. See Persian Corridor; Persian Gulf
2d, 507, 523, 538 Service Command.
4th, 517, 520, 535, 536 Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy C., 191, 194, 194n
5th, 535, 536
Midway, 33. See also Battle of Midway.
Marine Jumper, 567
Mikado locomotives, 172, 387, 409, 410, 575
Marine Operations Division, 81, 135, 255
Military police, 158, 180, 221, 222, 224, 320, 333,
Marine Operators, 66 335, 351, 417, 418, 421, 475
Marine Regiment, 22d, 517 Military Police Battalion, 794th, 218-19
Maritime Commission, U.S., 8, 19, 451. See also Military Railway Service Headquarters. See also
War Shipping Administration. Railways.
Mark Hopkins, 561 1st, 292, 299, 300, 305, 344, 345, 346, 351, 352
Mark Twain, 561 2d, 126, 243, 285, 286, 287, 305, 341, 342, 345,
"Marrying Up," 105 346, 348, 352
Marseille, 292, 294, 295, 296, 298, 302, 319-20, 3d, 406-13, 423
345, 353, 368, 370, 372 AFHQ, 169, 170-77, 185, 215-21, 230
Marsh, Maj. John W., 134 GHQ, 345-47
660
Miller, Lt. Col. Charles A., 438
Milne Bay, New Guinea, 443, 459, 460, 461
Mindanao, P. I., 465
Mindoro, P. I., 465
Mizar, 18
Moffatt, Maj. Carroll K., 462
Monroe, Thomas, 311n
Monroe Doctrine, 16
Monterey, 26
Montgomery, General Sir Bernard L., 190
Moore, Col. Werner W., 25, 26, 528-29, 531
Morlaix, France, 307, 308, 315, 316
Morocco, French, 137, 146, 152, 168. See also
towns by name.
Morocco, Spanish, 140n
Morrison-Knudsen Company, 65
Moselle River, France, 271n
Mostaganem, Algeria, 156, 157 Naples, 205-07, 207n, 208-09, 209n, 210, 212, 222,
Motor convoys, 163-64, 201, 223, 223n, 329, 417,
482. See also Motor transport operations.
Motor Transport Brigade (MTB), 129, 241, 284,
284n, 285, 328, 329, 331, 333
Motor Transport Command No. 1 (Australia), 480,
481-83
Motor Transport Division, 284-85
Motor transport operations. See also Roads.
Alaska and western Canada, 57-64
Australia, 480-83
Central Pacific, 489, 521-22, 531
China, 422-23, 554, 557-58, 591-99, 603, 608
France, 235, 239-42, 292, 296-97, 302, 303,
327-40, 348
in French North Africa, 141-42, 155, 157,
162-67
India-Burma, 551, 556, 580-91
in Italy, 221-26, 231
manpower problem, 166, 200-201, 224-26, 230,
239, 302, 328, 329, 335, 417
Northwestern Europe, 282-85
Persian Corridor, 375-424
Philippines, 483-84
Sicily, 200
South Pacific, 489
United Kingdom, 77, 126-29
Motor Transport Service (PGSC), 285, 328-29,
331, 337, 337n, 339, 389, 392, 393, 396, 409,
414, 423
Mt. Vesuvius, 208, 218
Mountain Division, 10th, 229
Mountbatten, Vice Admiral Lord Louis, 552 New
Movement control. See Traffic control. New
Movement Control (MOVCO), 249, 250, 251, 261 New
Movements Control Directorate, 85, 89, 90, 246 New
MP's. See Military Police. New
MTL's, 259 New
MTV's, 116, 255, 258, 262, 263, 272, 318. See New
also Liberty ships; Ship conversions.
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
MULBERRIES, 262, 273, 277, 284, 365
A, 237, 270, 272, 275, 276. See also Ports,
artificial.
B, 275
Muller, Col. Walter J., 154, 155
Mullen, Col. DeWitt T., 584
Mumma, Brig. Gen. Harlan L., 28, 28n
Munargo, 74
Murdoch, Lt. Col. Francis J., Jr., 150, 150n, 191
Murmansk, 4, 375, 401
Murrill, Col. Hugh A., 321
Murrow, Col. Lacey V., 558
Myitkyina, Burma, 556, 578
NABOB. See MAGNET; Northern Ireland.
Naha, Okinawa, 470n, 543, 544
Naknek, Alaska, 33, 46
Napier, Brigadier C. S., 86
230, 293
Narsarssuak, Greenland, 12, 14, 15, 16
Naval Air Transport Service, 23
Naval Construction Battalion, 1036th, 539
Naval Construction Battalions (Special), 509, 509n
3d, 501
23d, 536, 537
27th, 539
31st, 538
Naval District, 14th, 512
Naval escort vessels, 14, 136, 137, 140, 146, 155,
156, 157, 162, 165, 167, 196, 202, 427, 448, 606
Navy, U.S., 18, 102, 180, 190n, 437, 470
convoy regulations, 18, 140-41, 192, 192n, 491,
492. See also Naval escort vessels.
and evacuation of casualties, 364, 372. See also
Hospital ships.
and landing craft, 192, 223, 273, 274, 277, 469
and movement control planning, 161
and port rehabilitation, 212, 213
and procurement of boat crews, 454, 454n
Negro troops, use of, 26, 133, 204, 213, 226, 274,
398, 414, 460, 461, 472, 482, 520-21, 560
Nemours, France, 156, 157
Nenana, Alaska, 39, 65
NEPTUNE, 235, 235n
New Britain Island, 459, 502, 509
New Britain-New Ireland area, 459
New Caledonia, 489, 494, 495, 497
New Caledonia Island Command, 527
New Georgia Island, 502, 505, 506
Guinea, 429, 456, 458-65, 472
Hebrides, 494
Ireland, 502
Jersey. See Lakehurst.
Orleans Port of Embarkation, 29
South Wales Government Railways, 476
York Port of Embarkation, 91, 92, 106, 108,
144, 145, 147, 193, 359, 365, 388
INDEX
New Zealand, 489, 494, 497
New Zealand Division, 3d, 499
Newfoundland, 8, 9-10, 11
Newfoundland Railway, 9, 10
Nicholl, Maj. Maynard C., 194
Nickell, Col. Joe, 38, 39, 48, 49, 50
Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W., 490, 494, 511,
515, 519, 546
Ninth Corps Area, 31
Noble, Col. Curtis A., 13, 37, 38
Nome, Alaska, 31, 33, 46, 52, 67
Norman Wells, Canada, 34, 64, 65, 66
Normandy, France, 7, 116, 118, 233, 237-39, 301, Okie, Lt. Col. Fred W., 174
305. See also OVERLORD.
Normandy Base Section. See Base sections,
Normandy.
North Africa, French, 3, 4, 6, 70, 72, 80, 136-42.
See also GYMNAST; North African Theater of
Operations; TORCH.
North Africa base sections. See Base sections, At-
lantic, Eastern, Mediterranean.
North African lessons in transportation, 136, 182,
200, 221, 225, 240, 241, 606
North African Shipping Board (NASBO), 149,
149n, 161. See also Mediterranean Shipping
Board.
North African Theater of Operations
(NATOUSA), 150, 176, 176n, 177, 177n, 179,
181-83, 185-86. See also Services of Supply,
NATOUSA.
and HUSKY, 183, 189, 193-94
motor transport operations in, 161-68
ports in, 140, 141, 152-61, 203-14. See also
individual ports by name.
railway operations in, 168-77
supply of, 136, 136n, 137, 140-41, 142, 143n
transportation organization, 148-52, 184-89.
See also Allied Force Headquarters.
North Atlantic, 3
North Australia Railway, 481
Northern Base Section. See Base sections, Northern
(Corsica).
Northern Ireland, 71, 74, 109, 112, 113, 114, 119,
252. See also MAGNET.
Northern Ireland Base Command, 113
Northern Ireland Base Section. See Base sections,
Northern Ireland.
Northern Task Force, 140n
Northway, Alaska, 57
Northwest African Air Service Command, 190n
Northwest Engineer Division, 35n
Northwest Service Command, 32, 34, 35, 35n, 45,
56, 61
Northwestern Europe, invasion of, 70, 71, 72, 73,
233. See also BOLERO; NEPTUNE; OVERLORD;
ROUNDUP; SLEDGEHAMMER.
661
Noumea, New Caledonia, 5, 440, 494, 496, 499,
501, 502, 506, 507, 508
Nouméa-Paita Railroad, 495, 506
Noyes, Col. John R., 151n, 184, 186
Oahu Railway and Land Company railway (Ha-
waiian Islands), 492-93
O'Connor, Brig. Gen. James A., 32, 35n
Oil. See POL.
Oise Base Section. See Base sections, Oise.
Oise Intermediate Section, 371
Oise River, France, 355
Okinawa, 489, 540, 544
Okinawa Island Command, 540n, 543
OMAHA Beach (France), 237, 238, 252, 269, 271,
272, 275, 276, 283
OMAHA Beach Command, 276
"Operation Diaper," 374. See also War brides.
"Operation Transit," 30. See also Redeployment.
Operational Branch, 254, 257, 262, 264-66
Operational Movement Instruction, 257, 259
Operations Division, War Department, 60, 99, 100
Oran, Algeria, 137, 138, 141, 145, 148, 152, 153,
156, 157-58, 158n, 168, 169, 187n, 202, 203n,
293
Ordnance Department, 77, 101, 126, 225, 254, 480,
617
Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Com-
pany, 857th, 594
Ordnance Medium Maintenance Battalion, 68th,
417
Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, 3430th,
416, 417
Orléansville, Algeria, 164, 169
Orne River, France, 233
Oro Bay, New Guinea, 460, 461-62
Osborne, Col. Theodore G., 402n
Otto Mears, 487
Ottzenn, Col. Hans, 398
Ouled Rahmoun, Algeria, 158, 163, 165, 166, 174,
175
Ouled Rahmoun-Tebessa railway (Algeria), 175
"Outports," 36, 37. See also Alaska, transporta-
tion organization.
OVERLORD, 73, 135, 233, 238-39, 252, 255-56, 260,
301, 312. See also Northwestern Europe,
invasion of.
command and organization for, 234-35
logistical plan for, 234-35, 254-60, 287
mounting of, 233, 246-48
movement control procedures for, 249-51
training and rehearsing for, 246-52
transportation plans for, 238-44, 246-48
transportation problems, 233, 236-37
Overstrengths, 241
Owen, Lt. Col. Frederick H., 352
662 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Pacific Ocean Area, 490, 490n, 606-07 Pilferage, 153, 154, 158, 182, 182n, 218, 225, 319-
Pacific Shipping Pool, 529 20, 324, 348, 351, 352, 356, 395, 404, 410, 421,
PACTREP's, 446 469-70, 475-76, 478, 479
Palermo, Sicily, 190, 198, 199, 200 Piombino, Italy, 211, 212
Pallets and Palletization. See Cargo pallets. Pipelines, 226-27, 227n, 245, 245n
Panama, 3, 4 oil, 10, 15, 34, 65-66, 67, 330, 556, 571, 608
Panama Canal, 8, 9, 21, 27-30 water, 15
Panama Line, 27 Plant, Col. Thomas G., 427, 430, 432, 441, 449,
Panama Railroad Company, 27, 28, 28n 450, 453, 454, 471, 487
Panama Sector (CDC), 21n Plymouth, England, 252, 259, 260, 264, 268
Pan-American Highway. See Inter-American High- Pock, 2d Lt. Hugh A., 584n
way. POL, 237, 256, 263, 267, 268, 285, 294, 295, 307n,
Pandu-Amingaon Ferry (India), 573, 575, 577 318, 321, 330, 331, 337, 455, 543, 566
Papua Campaign, 458 Ponton docks and piers 462, 462n, 463, 501, 508,
Paris, 301, 341 521, 522, 539, 610
Parkes, Col. E. L., 173, 215 Poole, England, 252, 259
Parrish, Col. Howard, 154, 155
Port Augusta, Australia, 481
Port Battalions, 157
Pasig River, P.I., 468 372d, 538
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr., 146, 190 376th, 509, 516, 517, 520, 521, 538
Peace River, Canada, 64 378th, 393, 395, 399, 400, 402
Peach, Col. Eggleston W., 156n 379th , 156
Peleliu, Palau Islands, 533, 534 380th, 393, 395
Pence, Brig. Gen. Arthur W., 151, 205 382d, 154, 156, 198, 208n
Peninsular Base Section. See Base sections, Penin- 384th, 154, 156
sular (Italy). 385th, 383, 399
Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 31 386th, 133
Persian Corridor, 375, 375n, 378, 389, 390, 391, 387th, 462, 472
392, 609. See also Inland water transporta- 389th, 13, 204, 206
tion; Motor transport operations; Persian Gulf 390th, 501
Service Command; Railways; Roads. 392d, 18
Persian Gulf, 4, 375 393d, 560
Persian Gulf Command. See Persian Gulf Service 394th, 460, 461, 464, 472, 482
Command. 397th, 157
399th, 157
Persian Gulf Service Command, 382, 384, 385,
408th, 564
385n, 393, 423
480th, 156, 204
British military transportation activities in, 377,
379-81 481st, 503
482d, 393, 395, 399
command and organization, 387, 389-90
487th, 272
motor transport operations in, 413-23
488th, 210-11
ports in, 379-80, 389, 393-403. See also indi- 497th, 564
vidual ports by name.
498th, 119
railway operations in, 380-81, 403-13
502d, 115
SOS Plan, 377, 384-86, 387, 401, 415
504th, 534, 540, 543
Perth, Australia, 457 510th, 539
Peterson, Maj. Samuel R., 49, 50 Port Burwell Harbor, Labrador, 11
Petroleum. See POL. Port commanders, 15, 35, 36, 46, 90, 91, 109, 110,
Philippeville, Algeria, 141, 153, 158, 159, 163, 166, 128, 159, 251
174 Port Companies
Philippine Base Section. See Base sections, Phil- 115th, 538
ippine. 184th, 272
Philippine Islands, 4, 425, 426, 444, 456, 465-70, 194th, 16
472, 478-80 196th, 506
Philippines-Ryukyus Command (PHILRYCOM), 203d, 541, 542
429n 218th, 508
Phillips, Brig. Gen. Joseph L., 118n, 120, 120n 244th, 463
Pick, Maj. Gen. Lewis A., 581, 587 268th, 322
INDEX 663
Port Companies—Continued Ports—Continued
290th, 534 operations of—Continued
291st, 534 403, 433, 456-57, 458-70, 473-74, 489, 500,
292d, 534, 541, 542 502, 506, 507, 510, 512, 521, 530, 536, 550
293d, 534 passenger traffic, 80, 113, 114, 115-16, 209, 214,
296th, 463, 464 293, 312, 313, 318, 320, 493, 518, 536, 538,
311th, 520, 521 539, 560, 561, 566
313th, 509 rehabilitation of, 198-99, 205-07, 212-13, 292,
442d, 536 313, 316, 317, 318, 319, 324, 468, 610
539th, 520, 521 storage areas, 395, 397, 457, 460, 463, 469
540th, 563, 564 Ports, artificial, 237, 257n, 238, 238n, 611. See
541st, 563, 564 also Harbors, artificial.
592d, 536 Ports (Major), 473n
608th, 463 1st, 495, 496, 500, 501, 506
609th, 460, 463 2d, 463, 473, 473n, 487, 487n
610th, 460 3d, 80, 83, 118, 156, 157, 203n
611th, 460 4th, 83, 116, 118, 238, 279, 280, 281, 288, 314,
684th, 206 358
687th, 206 5th, 114, 114n, 115n, 116, 118, 316, 322, 324
Port Construction and Repair Group, 1051st, 206 6th, 154, 155, 156, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 212,
Port Detachment E, 462 216, 292, 294, 295, 319, 320
Port Edward, British Columbia, 42 8th, 159, 203n, 208, 212, 212n, 231
Port Heiden, Alaska, 46 9th, 393, 395, 400, 402, 402n
10th, 195, 199, 208, , 210, 213, 231
Port Moresby, New Guinea, 438, 459-61 11th, 118, 118n, 238n, 270, 272, 273, 274, 275,
Port Service, 390, 393-95, 402, 423 276, 278, 279, 282, 284, 288, 289, 358
Portage Bay, Alaska, 33 12th, 13, 37, 119, 120, 279, 288
Port-de-Bouc, France, 294, 295, 296, 319, 320 13th, 120, 268, 322, 324
Port-en-Bessin, France, 245 14th, 120, 121, 268, 364, 374
Portland, England, 364 15th, 118
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, 24, 25 16th, 315, 316, 316n, 318
Ports. See also individual ports by name. 17th, 118, 267, 318, 324, 368
clearance of, 141-42, 157-58, 161, 163, 199, 213, 18th, 20, 21, 21n
314, 315, 317, 319, 322, 327, 380, 396, 399,22d, 473, 473n
463 23d, 473, 473n
congestion at, 5, 10, 11, 24, 25, 28, 41, 153-54, 24th, 512
202, 301, 314, 382, 388, 390, 392, 396, 438, Ports (Medium)
443, 444, 445, 466, 469, 491, 494, 499-500, 52d, 318
501, 502, 503, 508, 526, 556, 564, 570 53d, 541, 543
development of, 10, 14-16, 41-48, 301, 305-08, 55th, 538
315, 375, 379-80, 397, 399, 459, 461, 462, Ports of Embarkation (Mobile). See Ports
463, 503, 512, 537, 544, (Major). 606
facilities, 5, 9, 12, 17-18, 22, 33, 46, 47, 69, Ports of Embarkation, ZI, 89, 90. See also indi-
110, 112, 117, 118, 119, 153, 157, 210, 302, vidual ports of embarkation by name.
316, 379, 395, 396-97, 400, 403, 459, 464, Powers, Lt. Col. William F., 195
468, 489, 492, 495, 500, 502, 512, 521, 522, Preloading, 252, 255, 259, 260, 265, 293
536, 539, 543, 547, 560, 561, 607 "Preparation for Overseas Movement-Short Sea
inactivation of, 21, 44, 156, 315, 318, 319, 320, Voyage" (POM-SSV), 248, 263
324, 401-02, 423, 461, 462, 463, 464, 467n, Prescheduling, 246, 249
470, 508, 526, 527, 532, 539, 556, 561, 563, Preshipment, 96-101, 105, 106, 182n
566, 567 President Roosevelt Bridge (Germany), 347
manpower problem, 10, 16, 17, 19, 26, 28, 38, Prestowage, 108, 108n, 255, 256, 610
46, 47, 48, 50-51, 83, 110, 154, 155, 157, Pribilof Islands, Alaska, 33
313, 319, 390, 392, 393, 395, 396, 403, 470-74, Prince Rupert, British Columbia, 32, 41, 42-43
496, 506, 512, 518-19, 532, 553, 564 Prince William Sound, Alaska, 47
operations of, 11, 13, 24, 79, 109-22, 152-61, Priorities Board, 501, 502
198-99, 205-08, 213, 238-39, 269-75, 292, Priority of Movements (POM) meetings, 161. 169-
294-96, 312-24, 380, 393, 395, 396, 399- 70, 218, 218n, 298
664 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Prisoner of war labor, use of, 157n, 180, 189, 206, Quartermaster Truck Regiments
213, 230, 230n, 281, 297, 313, 317n, 319 26th, 414, 416
Prisoners of war, evacuation of, 156, 180-81, 263, 29th, 482
293, 361-62, 362n, 487, 487n 48th, 482
Project TIGAR 26-A, 593, 594, 596 468th, 222
Project TIGAR 26-B, 579 477th, 61, 63
Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, 238n, 516th, 414
270, 272, 276 517th, 414, 418
Provisional Troop Port Command, 520 Quebec conference. See QUADRANT Conference.
Provisional Truck Company, 1st, 416 Queen Elizabeth, 73-74, 74n, 102, 115, 264, 366,
Provost Marshal General, Office of, 180, 361 367, 368, 372, 388
Public Roads Administration, 27, 59 Queen Mary, 73, 74n, 102, 115, 264, 366, 367, 368,
Puerto Rican Department, 21, 21n, 22, 23 374, 388
Puerto Rican General Depot, 22
Queensland, Australia, 478, 480
Puerto Rican Sector, 21n, 22, 23
Puerto Rico, 3, 8, 9, 21-24 Queensland State Railways, 476
Quenard, Col. E., 170n
Q Movements. See Movements Control Director- Quiberon Bay, France, 238, 239, 239n, 282, 305
ate. Quinéville, France, 238, 269n
QUADRANT Conference, 5, 73, 107, 233, 511, 551,
579, 582 Rabaul, New Britain, 459, 502, 509
Quartermaster Battalions Railway Diesel Shop Battalion, 760th, 218
93d, 598 Railway Grand Divisions, 168n
131st, 271n 701st, 172, 221
198th, 598 702d, 404, 405, 406
Quartermaster Boat Companies 703d, 169, 170, 174, 206, 215, 215n, 216, 219,
160th, 29 297
316th, 454 704th, 219
317th, 454 705th, 573
318th, 454 707th, 286
319th, 454 708th, 344
320th, 454 774th, 219-20, 221, 232, 232n
321st, 454 775th, 479
322d, 454 Paris, 371
323d, 454 Railway guards, 169
324th, 454 Railway Operating Battalions, 168-69
325th, 454 711th, 404, 405, 406
Quartermaster Car Company, 22d, 222 713th, 170, 174, 216, 217, 219, 297, 298
Quartermaster Corps, 7, 8, 28, 70, 75, 77, 126 714th, 53-54, 55
Quartermaster Gas Company, 190th, 482 715th, 172, 217, 220, 221
Quartermaster General, Office of the, 8, 10, 26 717th, 347
Quartermaster Groups (Mobile) 719th, 172, 217, 220, 221
469th, 339 720th, 347
517th, 597, 598, 599 721st, 579
Quartermaster Heavy Maintenance Company, 725th, 575
169th, 482 727th, 170, 174, 200, 216, 217, 297-98
Quartermaster Medium Maintenance Battalion,
729th, 131, 286, 347
86th, 482
730th, 404, 405, 406
Quartermaster Railhead Company, 92d, 482
Quartermaster Truck Battalions
734th, 344
2638th, 167 737th, 479
2640th, 164-65, 167 740th, 344
3826th, 224 749th, 479
Quartermaster Truck Companies, 57, 61, 110, 128 759th, 172, 217, 298
3683d, 283 770th, 56
3704th, 283, 283n 791st, 406
3843d, 594 Railway Operating Company, 790th, 479
4042d, 283, 283n Railway Operating Detachment, 770th, 56
INDEX 665
Railway Shop Battalions Red Ball Express—Continued
753d, 170, 172, 174, 174n, 175n, 176, 221 uneconomical use of vehicles, 334-35
754th, 404, 405 Red Ball Express (shipping service), 356, 356n
756th, 131 Red Horse Staging Area (France), 318
758th, 573, 576 Red Lion Express Route (northwestern Europe),
762d, 360, 404, 405 336
764th, 350 Redeployment, 16, 21, 23, 26, 30, 34, 230, 231,
Railway Transportation Company, 761st, 169, 170, 303, 320, 323, 330, 352, 360, 363, 368, 369-
174n 74, 491, 523, 524, 525, 526
Railway transportation officers (RTC's), 85, 87, Reefer barges, 455
87n, 88, 89, 90, 91, 120, 123, 127, 128, 169, Refrigerator cars, 131, 175n
245, 251, 254, 257, 258, 286, 324-25, 351, 371 Refrigerator ships, 317, 454-55, 510, 607
Railways Regimental Combat Team, 158th, 466, 466n
Alaska and western Canada, 32, 33-35, 38, 42, Regional transportation officers, 87, 88
47, 53-57, 62, 65, 68 Regulating Company, 6623d, 201
Australia, 427, 476-78, 481, 481n Regulating Group, 4th, 84
Austria, 352 Regulating Officer, South Pacific (ROSOP), 524
Belgium, 353 Regulating Stations
China, 557-59, 601-02 24th, 326
France, 242-44, 285-87, 292-93, 297-98, 314, 25th, 326
340-54 First Army, 245
French North Africa, 141, 142, 165, 168-77, Third Army, 245
174n, 176n Regulating System, GHQ SWPA. See CREGO.
Germany, 352-53 Rex, 205
Hawaii, 489, 492-93 Reykjavik, Iceland, 14, 17, 19, 20
Holland, 343-44 Rheims assembly area (France), 353, 370, 371
India-Burma, 547-48, 552, 568, 572-99 Rhine River, 7, 271n, 303, 330, 345, 347, 356, 357
Italy, 213, 214-21, 219-20, 220n, 221, 230, Rhine River Branch, Inland Waterways Division,
231-32 356, 357
manpower problem, 33, 38, 54, 122, 342, 479n Rhino barges, 272, 272n, 275, 281, 313
New Caledonia, 489, 495, 506 Rhone River, 298, 355
New Guinea, 459 Ricamore, Col. Phillip W., 558n
Newfoundland, 8-11 Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr., 511, 514, 528,
Panama, 27, 28, 28n 537
Persian Corridor, 380-81, 383-84, 389, 392, Richardson Highway (Alaska), 33, 47, 57
403-13 Richmond, Col. Clarence W., 235, 284, 331, 332
Philippine Islands, 478-80, 479n Richmond Holding and Reconsignment Point, 147
repair and reconstruction of, 173, 175, 176, 230, Riddell-Webster, General Sir Thomas Sheridan, 551
242, 243 Rio Hato, Panama, 28
Saipan, 521-22 Roads, See also Motor transport operations.
Sicily, 199-200 Alaska and western Canada, 4, 32-35, 47, 57-64,
United Kingdom, 116, 122-26 67, 609
RAINBOW 4, 8 Australia, 427, 477, 480-83
Ramgarh Training Center, India, 583 Canada, 64
RAMPS (Recovered Allied Military Personnel), CBI, 422, 547, 555, 556, 558, 568, 580-91, 597,
362, 363 603, 608
Rangoon, Burma, 547 French North Africa, 141, 142, 163, 167
Rangoon Line of Communications, 581 Greenland, 13
Rations, 146, 154, 175n, 182, 195, 198, 294, 319, Iceland, 17, 19
395 Italy, 207, 210, 221, 222, 222n, 224
Red Ball Express (motor transport on the European New Guinea, 459, 461, 463
continent), 256n, 325, 339 Newfoundland, 10
command and organization, 333, 334-35 Northwestern Europe, 327, 331, 334-39
maintenance of equipment, 333, 335 Persian Corridor, 381-82, 384, 391, 415-16,
regulations, 332-33 418, 420, 421
route of, 331, 334 Philippine Islands, 466, 483
tonnage hauled, 331, 332, 333-34, 335 Puerto Rico, 22
traffic control on, 332-33 Saipan, 521
666
Roads—Continued
Sicily, 10, 200-201
Trinidad, 24
United Kingdom, 126
Rocky Mountain Trench, Canada, 32
Rome, 211, 219
Rommel, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin, 164, 175
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 383
Roscoff, France, 316
Rose, Brig. Gen. Edward C., 555, 557
Ross, Col. Bert C., 119
Ross, Maj. Gen. Frank S., 74, 81, 102, 125, 126,
129, 134, 168, 346
assigned to NATO, 80, 81, 149-50
biographical sketch, 75
on cargo discharge at Cherbourg, 313, 314
on cargo identification, 91, 93, 94, 160
on cargo stowage, 106
on centralized vs. decentralized control of TC
activities, 79, 304
and co-ordination of U. S. and British transporta- Samoa Islands, 494
tion operations, 85-86
on development of Antwerp, 321
on evacuation of casualties, 366, 367
and motor transport operations on European
continent, 328, 330, 334, 337
and mounting of TORCH, 142, 144
movement control doctrine, 86-87
and movement control on European continent,
326
opinion on independent MRS, 354
on personnel requirements, 83-84
and planning for OVERLORD, 234, 239, 240, 246 Scoglitti, Sicily, 196, 197, 198, 198n
on port operations ETOUSA, 109-11
and railway operations ETOUSA, 122, 123, 124 Seabees, 347, 500, 505, 522, 533, 538
and shipping congestion ETOUSA, 309-10, 311n
on shortage of service troops ETOUSA, 111
and transportation organization ETOUSA, 75,
76, 81-82
Rotterdam, 307
Rouen, France, 268, 301, 302, 307, 308, 315, 318-19 Sele River, Italy, 215
ROUNDUP, 70
Royal Air Force, 85
Royal Australian Navy, 437
Royal Navy, 140
Rubin, Col. Samuel, 524n
Russell Islands, 502, 507, 508
Russian Dump, 396, 399
Ryan, Col. Norman A., 76, 80, 354, 356, 357
Ryan, Lt. Col. Thomas F., 428, 438
Ryukyu Islands, 491, 539-45
Sabotage, danger of, 158, 213, 346, 404, 410
Sadler, Col. William H., 22-23
Safi, French Morocco, 146, 152, 153
Sailing cable, 90, 91
Sailor's Splice, 451
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
St. Brieuc, France, 307, 308, 315, 316
St. Croix, Virgin Islands, 22
St. John's, Newfoundland, 9, 10, 11
St. Laurent-sur-Mer, France, 238
St. Lo, France, 242, 285, 300
St. Lucia, Windward Islands, 8, 24
St. Malo, France, 237, 239, 307, 308, 315
St. Michel-en-Grève, France, 315, 316
St. Nazaire, France, 307
St. Raphael, France, 293, 294
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, 22
St. Tropez, France, 293, 294, 297
St. Vaast-la-Hougue, France, 237, 238, 278, 308
Saipan, Mariana Islands, 489, 519, 521, 538
Saipan Army Troop Port Command, 522, 523, 538
Saipan Garrison Force and Island Command, 520,
522, 537
Salamaua, New Guinea, 459
Salerno, Italy, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 215, 222
Salween front, Burma, 557
San Fabian, P. I., 466n, 479
San Fernando, La Union, P. I., 467
San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 39, 429, 440,
445, 475, 491, 496, 503, 504
San Juan, Puerto Rico, 21, 22, 23, 23n
San Pedro Bay, P. I., 465
San Stefano, Sicily, 199, 200
Scheldt Estuary, Belgium, 302
Scheldt River, Belgium, 320
Schouten Islands, New Guinea, 464
Schroeder, Col. August H., 279, 282, 357
Sea Transport Service, BMWT, 85
Seatrains, 146, 259, 267
Seattle Port of Embarkation, 32, 35, 39-40, 41-
42, 67
Seine Base Section. See Base sections, Seine.
Seine River, France, 233, 301, 316, 355
Selective discharge, 265, 273, 499, 543. See also
Floating warehouses; Ports, congestion of.
Semichi Islands, Alaska, 50
Seminole, 179
Service Command, USAFISPA, 498
Service Detachment Workshops
131st, 479
132d, 479
133d, 479
Service Squadron, South Pacific, 505, 525
Service troops, shortage of, 16, 19, 46, 83-84, 146,
155, 165, 199, 203
Services of Supply, 59, 60, 70, 75, 143-44, 234, 377.
See also Army Service Forces.
CBI, 549-50, 553-57, 558, 561, 563, 585
China Theater, 558, 596
ETOUSA, 234, 263
INDEX 667
Services of Supply—Continued Small boats. See Boats, small.
MTOUSA. See C o m m u n i c a t i o n s Zone, Small Ships Division, 430
M T O U S A ; Communications Zone, Small Ships Supply Command, 430
NATOUSA. Smith, Col. Reuben W., 37, 39
NATOUSA, 151, 185-87, 192, 291, 293, 303 Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell, 209
South Pacific Area, 498-99 Society Islands, 494
SWPA, 428-29, 431, 431n, 432, 433, 435, 437, Solomon Islands, 458-59, 496, 497, 502, 503, 504,
438, 442, 443, 461, 464-65, 466, 467, 469n, 505
473, 480, 483 Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 25, 55, 75, 77, 98,
Sestriere, 214 99, 102, 107, 143, 165, 171, 309, 368, 398, 432,
Seventh Fleet, U.S., 440 432n, 436, 494, 551, 552
Seward, Alaska, 33, 36, 39, 46, 47, 52, 53, 67, 68 Sondre Stromfjord, Greenland, 14, 16
SEXTANT Conference, 233 SOS. See Services of Supply.
SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expe- South Australian Government Railways, 476
ditionary Force. South Pacific Area (SPA), 4, 5, 440, 490, 491, 523
Shamrock, 179 command and organization, 490, 490n, 496-97
Shanghai Base Command, 603 joint logistics in, 497, 513-16
Shanghai Port Command, 603 offensive operations in, 5, 491, 499, 502-09
SHARK Force, 191 security of lines of communication in, 494, 496,
Sharp, Lt. Col. Chester F., 141, 185 502, 506
Shea, Lt. Col. Reeford P., 463, 464 transportation organization, 498-99, 501-02,
Sheahan, Col. Maurice E., 554, 558n, 593, 594, 523-24, 527
596, 601 transportation problem, 489-91
Shemya, Alaska, 49, 50, 51, 51n, 52 unified command in, 490, 490n
SHINGLE, 209 unified logistics in, 490, 499-500
Shingler, Brig. Gen. Don G., 383, 384, 389, 417, water transportation in, 489, 504
418n South Pacific Base Command (SPEC), 523, 526,
Ship Conversion Branch, 487, 487n 527, 529
Ship conversions, 145, 181, 258, 367, 372, 450, 456, South Pacific Force, 501
456n, 487, 487n
Southampton, England, 109, 120, 252, 259, 260,
Ship and Gun Crew Command No. 1, USAFIA,
453 263, 268, 364, 368, 370, 372
Ship retention, oversea theaters, 6, 19, 25, 308-09, Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), 554
309n, 310, 382, 396, 429, 443, 444, 449, 450, Southern Base Section. See Base sections, Southern
450n, 451, 471, 499, 499n, 508 (Great Britain).
Shipping, shortage of, 3, 4, 5-6, 19, 32, 69, 70, 73, Southern Base Section districts, 261n
136, 140, 179, 193, 202, 308, 311, 375, 377, XVI, 250
388, 429, 448, 450, 450n, 489, 491, 501, 526 XVII, 250
Shipping Control Committee, 311. See also Diver- XVIII, 250, 254
sion committees, shipping, for the European XIX, 250, 251
continent. Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), 187,
Siberia, 33, 34, 36, 39, 59, 60, 64 292n, 299, 300, 303-04, 345, 358
Sibley, Col. Cleland C., 116, 116n, 117, 235, 280, Southwest Highway Transport Administration
282, 313, 314, 314n (SWHTA), 591, 593
Siboney, 74 Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 4, 5, 6, 426, 429,
Sicilien, 11 439-40, 485-86, 491, 526
Sicily, 72, 189-90, 191-93, 197, 198, 199-200 command and organization, 425-29, 431, 436
Sievers, Lt. Col. Ralph H., 483, 484 GHQ, 428, 431, 432, 433, 436, 437-43, 446-47.
Signal Corps, 91, 258, 409, 410 See also CREGO.
Simpson, Col. Russell G., 118n local fleet in, 449, 450, 451, 452, 461
Sitka, Alaska, 31, 47 logistical organization, 427-29
Sixth Service Command, 35, 35n. See also North- motor transport operations in, 480-85
west Service Command. ports in, 456-74
Skagway, Alaska, 32, 34, 35, 44, 45, 56 railway operations in, 476-80
Skid tanks, 331, 331n ship retention in, 429, 442-46, 450n
Slave River, Canada, 66 transportation organization, 427-28, 428n, 430-
Sled pallets, use of, 50 37, 446-47, 447n, 466, 473, 480
SLEDGEHAMMER, 71 transportation problem, 429
668 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Southwest Pacific Area—Continued Sydney, Australia, 457
and water transport operations, 439, 447-56, Szechwan-Yunnan Railway (China), 601, 602
460, 476
Soviet Protocols, 375, 377, 378, 389, 401, 422 Tabarka, Tunisia, 159, 167, 176
Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist Tabarka-Mateur Railway (North Africa), 176n
Republics. Tables of Basic Allowances, 99
Soxo, 96 Tables of Organization, 36, 110, 158, 225
Spalding, Brig. Gen. Sidney P., 383 Tabriz, Iran, 379, 382
Special Service Force, 1st, 291n Tacloban, Leyte, 428, 433, 464, 465-66
"Spread loading," 223 Tail of the Bank, Scotland, 114, 115
Staging areas, 147, 194, 207, 313, 370, 370n, 562,Talley, Col. Benjamin B., 314n
566 Tanacross, Alaska, 57
Standee berths, 181, 193, 214, 450. See also Ship Tanaga Island, Aleutians, 41
conversion. Tanahmerah Bay, New Guinea, 463
Stanley, Col. Thomas H., 148 Tanana, Alaska, 34
Star Knot, 451 Tanana River, Alaska, 53, 65
Station Hospital, 17th, 482 Tancarville Canal, France, 317
Steese Highway (Alaska), 57 Tank, Lt. Col. Charles F., 146, 155, 156n, 191
Stevedoring, Winch Operating, and Rigging School, Tankers, 10, 29, 140, 258, 268, 455
533 Tanks, 195, 273
Stewart, Brig. Gen. George C., 80, 86, 184, 186-88, Task Force 141, 190, 190n
190-91, 291, 299, 300, 303, 305, 436, 446, 470 Task Force 163, 290, 291
and planning for TORCH, 138, 148, 150-52, 152n, Task Force, South Pacific, 426
171, 181, 183 TAT (tonnage to accompany troops), 98
Stillinger, Col. Otto R., 549, 553 Tatana Island, 459
Stilwell, General Joseph W., 549 Tate, Brig. Gen. Ralph H., 221
Stilwell Road, 556, 558, 580-85, 589-91, 603, 608 Taylor, Lemuel K., 591
Stockton, Col. Richard, VI, 113 Tébessa, Algeria, 153, 158, 163, 166, 167, 174, 175
Stoddard, Col. Arthur E., 345 Tehran, Iran, 375, 381
Stokes, Lt. Col Marcus B., Jr., 71, 138 Tehran Conference, 73
Stone, Capt. Robert G., 396, 397, 399 Texas, 259, 281, 286
Strait of Gibraltar, 137, 153, 177 Thames River, England, 120
Strathaird, 73 The Pas, Canada, 12
Stratton, Brig. Gen. James H., 310, 310n, 311 The Surgeon General. See Kirk, Maj. Gen. Nor-
Strikes. See Civilian labor, use of, and strikes. man T.
Strong, Brig. Gen. Frederick S., Jr., 35n, 67 Theodore Sedgwick, 213
Styer, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D., 165n, 398, 429, 436, Third Lock Project (Panama Canal), 27, 27n
469, 470 Thomas H. Barry, 74
Submarine menace, 4, 5, 22, 29, 69, 136, 152, 377, Thurston, 271
388, 448 TIGER, 249
Sullivan, Commodore William A., USN, 468 Tinian, Mariana Islands, 519, 522, 538, 539
Sulu Archipelago, 465 Tinian Troop Port Command, 539
Supplies, 49-50, 182 Tok Junction-Slana cutoff (Alaska), 57
Class I, 163, 223 Tongareva Island, 494, 507
Class III, 223 Tongatabu Island, Tonga Islands, 494, 507
Class IV, 100, 100n "Toot Sweet Express" (France), 348
Class V, 223 TORCH, 72, 80, 94, 138, 144-146, 194
Supplies Shipping Index, 257 Totnes, England, 120, 133
Supply by air. See Air supply. Toulon, France, 290, 292, 294, 295, 296
Supply flow, 15, 140, 301, 326, 327, 329, 341, 491, Townsville, Australia, 457, 458
558 TQM school, 516, 517, 520, 533, 541, 545
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force Tractor-train hauling, 64
(SHAEF), 233, 234 Traffic control, 84-91, 163, 163n, 164, 167, 201-02,
Surgeon General, The. See Kirk, Maj. Gen. Nor- 222-26, 244-45, 254, 283, 324-27, 391, 417,
man T. 421, 432, 437, 438, 478, 57
Surinam, 21 Traffic Control Posts (TCP's), 164, 167, 224, 296,
Swansea, England, 118, 252 324, 332
Sweet, Brig. Gen. Joseph B., 418n Traffic Dispatch Advice, 90, 258
INDEX 669
Traffic Regulating Group, 28th, 575 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 4, 597
Train guards, 351, 410, 478 lend-lease aid to, 375, 377, 378, 388, 390
Trains. See Electric trains; Equipment, railway; supply of, via Persian Gulf, 375, 377, 378, 382,
Hospital trains; Leave trains; Railways. 386, 388, 389, 392, 392n, 402, 403
Trans-Isthmian Highway (Panama), 27, 27n, 28 Unit loading, 474
Transo Agreement, 526, 545-46 United Kingdom, 69, 70, 74, 85-86, 101-02
Transport Squadron, 330th, 23 build-up of U.S. forces in, 5, 69, 69n, 71, 73,
Transportation Corps Composite Company, 61st, 74, 102, 107
578 motor transport operations in, 77, 126-29
Transportation Corps Composite Group, 35th, 453 movement control in, 246-48, 249-51, 254, 264
Transportation Corps couriers, 160, 160n ports in, 69, 108-22. See also individual ports
Transportation Corps Depot Company, 793d, 479 by name.
Transportation Corps Service Group, 54th, 469 railway operations in, 116, 122-26
Transports. See Troopships. supply, 96-101, 129-32, 134-35
Traub, Col. David W., 80, 234, 288, 305 and TORCH, 80-81, 105, 144-45
Treasury Islands, 505, 507 transportation organization for U.S. forces in,
TRIDENT Conference, 5, 72, 73, 511, 551 74-83, 84-89
Trinidad, 8, 24, 25-26 United Kingdom Base Section. See Base sections,
Trinidad Sector and Base Command, 21n, 23, 26 United Kingdom.
Troop labor, use of in port operations, 11-12, 14, United Kingdom C o m m e r c i a l Corporation
17-18, 19, 36, 46, 47, 48, 115, 117, 457, 471, (UKCC), 381, 415, 421
490, 495, 496, 502, 503, 506, 510, 512, 531,U.S. armies. See Armies, U.S.
533, 607. See also Civilian labor, use of; U.S. Army Engineer Board, 130
Prisoner of war labor, use of; Service troops, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), 428, 429,
shortage of. 429n, 544
Troop movements, 4, 6, 9, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 22, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC),
24, 31, 41, 69n, 70, 71, 73, 74, 90-91, 102, 429, 429n, 436
137, 145, 148, 260, 327, 385, 387, 388, 389, U.S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), 426,
423-24, 426, 437, 486, 504, 507, 508, 509, 426n, 427
510, 518 U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI),
Troopships, 8, 9, 73-74, 74n, 101-02, 105, 178, 74, 76. See also European Theater of Opera-
179, 179n, 193, 264, 365, 366, 367, 371, 448, tions.
450, 456, 487, 493 U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area
Truck Group (Provisional), 6723d, 223 (USAFICPA), 511, 511n, 512, 523, 524, 528
Truro, England, 120, 133 U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE),
Truscott, Maj. Gen. Lucian K., Jr., 146, 147n, 191 425, 428, 431, 431n, 437, 438, 475
Tulagi, Solomon Islands, 497, 503 U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME),
Tully, Col. James K., 219 377n, 385, 385n
Tunis, 137, 167 U.S. Army Forces in the Middle Pacific
Tunisia, 6, 137, 140, 167, 168, 178 (USAFMIDPAC), 544, 545, 546
Turnaround Control (TURCO), 249, 251, 258 U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas
Turnaround cycles (USAFPOA), 511, 526, 528, 529, 537, 544
cargo ships, 4, 18, 19, 20, 25, 92, 265, 268, 269, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area
273, 384, 390, 396, 400, 401, 429, 442, 460, (USAFISPA), 496
491 U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, SOS.
railway cars, 176, 407, 408 See Services of Supply, South Pacific Area.
troopships, 18, 562 U.S. Army Services of Supply (SWPA). See Serv-
trucks, 201 ices of Supply, SWPA.
U.S. Army Transportation Service (SWPA), 427,
U-boats. See Submarine menace. 428
UG convoys, 144n, 148, 155, 165, 166, 192, 192n, U.S. Chiefs of Staff. See Joint Chiefs of Staff.
193, 195, 199, 230 U.S. Forces China Theater, SOS. See Services of
UGLY system, 95, 96. See also Cargo, marking and Supply, China.
packaging of. U.S. Maritime Commission. See Maritime Com-
Ulster, Northern Ireland, 114 mission, U.S.
Umnak Island, Aleutians, 33, 46 U.S. Military Iranian Mission, 375, 377, 377n, 549
Unalaska-Dutch Harbor area, 31 U.S. Navy. See Navy, U.S.
Unger, Col. Charles H., 438 U.S. Navy Beach Battalion, 4th, 204
670
Units of fire, 146, 195, 196
Uruguay, 30, 486
UTAH Beach (France), 237, 238, 252, 269, 269n, Weather, 139, 152, 154, 196, 197, 202, 203, 205,
276, 277, 283
Valdez, Alaska, 33, 47, 57
Valognes, France, 243, 284, 289
Vaughan, Maj. Gen. Harry B., Jr., 118n
Vehicles, 157, 160, 163, 330, 418, 419, 584, 584n, Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C., 557
596, 608, 617. See also Equipment, motor
transport; Motor transport operations,
assembly of, 382, 481, 481n
maintenance, 224, 225, 283, 284, 328, 334, 358n,
417, 420, 557, 558, 593, 617
shortage of, 19, 155, 162, 165, 203, 221, 241,
242, 271, 294, 296, 481, 502
water shipment of, 202, 223, 225, 226, 252, 328,
329, 334
waterproofing, 195, 219, 223, 247, 273, 293
Vickers, Col. Harry C., 402n
Victoria Government Railway (Australia), 476
Victory Bridge (Germany), 347
Victory ships, 231, 231n
Virgin Islands, 21n
Vissering, Col. Norman H., 13n
Volturno River, Italy, 216
Vulcania, 231, 370
Waddell, Lt. Col. James C., 359n
Waghorn, Brigadier R. D., 220
Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center (Hawaiian
Islands), 520, 533
Wakefield, 102, 231, 385
Walker, Lt. Col. Sidney E., 469n
Wanamaker, Brig. Gen. William W., 432-33, 433n,
435, 436, 443n, 447, 469
War brides, 318, 374, 488
War Department, 19, 32, 147, 194, 195, 309, 362, Williams, Brigadier W. D. A., 86
365, 367, 368, 375, 494
War Shipping Administration, 25, 40, 102, 161, 165, Wilson, Brig. Gen. Arthur R., 148, 427, 427n, 428,
181, 311, 372, 382, 388, 393, 397, 448-49,
449n, 454
War Transport Board, 558, 596, 598
War Transport Executive Committee (WTEC),
380, 391, 393, 394
Ward, Col. Glenn R., 418n
Warren, Col. Ross B., 329
Washington BOLERO Combined Committee, 71
Water transport operations
Alaska, 35, 39, 46, 52-53, 67
French North Africa, 184-85, 199
Italy, 211
NATOUSA, 159, 167
South Pacific Area, 448, 459, 460, 489
SWPA, 439, 447-56, 460, 476
Water Transportation Control (WATCO), 273, 287 XAP's. See Attack transports.
Waterfront Workers Federation, 471
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS
Waterproofing, 147, 195, 210, 223, 247, 254, 273,
293
207, 223, 278, 279, 300, 302, 310, 313, 317,
462, 465, 466, 503, 543
adverse effect on beach operations in Normandy,
262, 273, 275-76, 277, 284, 365
Weaver, Lt. Col. Chester R., 221
Weed, Col. Thomas J., 316n
Welty, Col. Maurice D., 9
West Point, 102, 193, 385, 397, 488
Western Australian Government Railways, 476
Western Base Section. See Base sections, Western
(North Africa).
Western Defense Command, 31, 34, 40
Western Naval Task Force (Italy), 202n
Western Pacific Base Command (WPBC), 529,
537-39, 546
Western Task Force (North Africa), 137, 141, 143,
145, 146-48, 152, 156
Wheeler, Lt. Gen. Raymond A., 549, 550, 560
Whipple, Col. H. Bennett, 438, 442, 444, 445, 446n,
447
Whitcomb, Col. Richard S., 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 118n,
270
White, Clifford S., 20
White Ball Express Route (France), 335-36
White Pass and Yukon Railroad, 32, 35, 53, 55-56,
62
Whitehorse, Canada, 33, 34
Whittaker, Brig. Gen. Frank L., 37, 48
Whittier, Alaska, 33, 39, 47, 52, 67, 68
Willard A. Holbrook, 426
William Byrd, 401
William F. Fitch, 464
William F. Palmer, 229
Williams, 1st Lt. Victor E., 174
Williamson, Brig. Gen. Raymond E. C., 500
431, 472
Wilson, Lt. Col. Roy R., 428, 480
Wilson, Brig. Gen. Thomas B., 427, 428, 430, 431,
432, 432n, 443n, 452, 553, 554, 555, 571, 582,
612
Wilson, Lt. Col. William P., 220
Winter Line (Italy), 222, 229
World War I, 280n, 326, 368
Worsham, Brig. Gen. Ludson D., 35n
Worthington, Lt. Col. James R., 79
Wylie, Brig. Gen. Robert H., 105, 165, 445
"X" subtask force, 146, 147. See also Western Task
Force (North Africa).
XAPA's. See Combat loaders.
INDEX 671
XYZ Express Route (Germany), 303, 337-39 Yukon River, Alaska, 33, 53
Yukon Territory, Canada, 32
"Y" subtask force, 146, 147. See also Western Task Yunnan-An-nan Railways (China), 602
Force (North Africa).
Yakutat, Alaska, 31, 36, 47 "Z" subtask force, 146, 147, 147n. See also West-
Yangtze River, China, 601 ern Task Force (North Africa).
Yap, 465 Zachary Taylor, 208n
Yellow Diamond route (Central Europe), 339 Zahidan-Meshed route (Persian Corridor), 384
Yount, Brig. Gen. Paul F., 386, 389, 404, 405, 406, Zinnecker, Maj. Louis, 86, 150
407, 574 Zoning system in United Kingdom, 95-96. See
Yuan River, China, 601 also Cargo, marking and packing of.

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