c





It is interesting to find that only some political economists emphasize the fact that Japanese
colonialism in Korea played a large part in the development of a high-growth economy. In
both readings we get to see that Japanese colonialism greatly differed from European
colonialism. In one way, this is because European colonialism rarely introduced heavy
industry into the economy, or even pushed the economy with such a heavy hand. As well,
Japan left Korea with a relatively high level of industrialization, not something we commonly
see with European colonialism. There have been only a handful works which manifestly
indicate the substantiality of the similarities between the West and Japan in achieving the
modernisation, especially in terms of the political economic contribution of the colonisation
process to it. Focusing on commonality is rather demanding however, as we have been
accustomed to political economic theories of traditional area studies literature, international
relations in particular, which are inclined to overemphasise peculiarity and locality. As a
result, we frequently find ourselves getting destined to write Japanese political economy as
deviation or being dominated by local irregular trading and commercial customs.

  


Korea was under Japanese rule as part of Japan's 35-year imperialist expansion (22 August
1910 to 15 August 1945). Japanese rule formally ended on 2 September 1945 upon
the Japanese defeat in World War II that year.

Korea was occupied and declared a Japanese protectorate in the 1905 Eulsa Treaty, and
officially annexed in 1910 through the annexation treaty. Japan's involvement in the region
began with the 1876 Treaty of Ganghwa during the Joseon Dynasty and increased with the
subsequent assassination of Empress Myeongseong (also known as "Queen Min") in 1895.
The 1905 and 1910 treaties were eventually declared "null and void" by both Japan and South
Korea in 1965.

The debate referred to as Seikanron (Debate to conquer Korea) was a major political
conflagration which occurred in Japan in 1873. Saigō Takamori and his supporters insisted
that Japan should confront Korea due to Korea's refusal to recognize the legitimacy
of Emperor Meiji as head of state of the Empire of Japan, and insulting treatment meted out
to Japanese envoys attempting to establish trade and diplomatic relations. Those in favour
also saw the issue in Korea to be an ideal opportunity to find meaningful employment for the
thousands of out-of-work samurai, who had lost most of their income and social standing in
the new Meiji social and economic order. These samurai posed a threat to the government,
and (as a samurai himself) Saigō sympathized with their situation. According to orthodoxy,
"Saigo himself volunteered to go to Korea as a special envoy, inviting an assassination
attempt that would provide justification, if any were needed, for a punitive expedition."

   
  

One of the Meiji era's most famous statesmen, Ito was Japan's first prime minister and served
a record four times as such (see Japanese prime ministers).
 R? Ito Hirobumi was born in the feudal province of Choshu. In 1863, in gained the title
of samurai, and left the same year for England to study sciences. In 1871, he travelled
abroad again with the mission led by Prince Iwakura to revise the unequal treaties
with the Western powers and study Western technology.
R? In 1873, was made a full councillor working on the modernization of Japan. He
became Home Minister following Okubo Toshimichi's assassination in 1878, then
assured his dominance at the government by forcing Okuma Shigenobu to resign in
1881.
R? Ito travelled to Europe again in 1882 to study foreign government systems. Back to
Japan, he established a cabinet and civil service in 1885, and became the country's
first prime minister.
R? He supervised the drafting of Japan's first constitution from 1883 to 1889 and created
the Privy Council in 1888. Ito became an intimate advisor to the emperor.
R? Ito supported the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, then became the leader of Japan's
first political party, the Seiyukai.

 c   

Japan had her own reasons to sign an alliance with Britain. A major consideration was to gain
an ally to neutralize the Franco-Russian Alliance in the event of a showdown with Russia.
Japan¶s resentment on Russia was intense ever since the Triple Intervention and the
threatening Russian activities in Korea. But in case of war, Japan would need an ally to
checkmate Russia¶s ally - France.

A second consideration was that of prestige. Japan¶s position in the family of nations had
risen with her defeat of China in 1895 and with her partial success in treaty revision. If she
could enter into an alliance with Britain, a major western power, her prestige would be
further increased. Such a sentiment persuaded many Japanese to favour an Anglo-Japanese
Alliance.

A third consideration was the failure of Ito to reach an agreement with Russia. In late 1901,
Ito paid a private visit to St. Petersburg, but he failed to secure meaningful concessions from
Russia over disputes in Manchuria and Korea. He had wished to recognize Russia¶s
hegemony in south Manchuria in return for Russian acceptance of Japan¶s dominant position
in Korea. This being the case, war seemed inevitable and imminent, and an alliance with
Britain the more demanding.

Finally, powerful personalities in the official circle desired an ally with Britain. They
included Yamagata and Katsura. Both military men were strongly anti-Russia and they
disagreed with Ito¶s search for a local compromise with Russia over Manchuria and Korea.
They were determined to secure the British alliance.


c   

Britain, on her part, needed an ally in the Far East to counter Russian expansion without
violating her splendid isolation in Europe. Moreover, the Admiralty prepared the Selbourne¶s
Memorandum in September 1901 which stressed the impossibility of maintaining a ³two-
power standard´ without an alliance with Japan in Asia. As such, the Japanese alliance grew
out of arguments and facts which emanted from the Naval Department. Finally, Britain was
apprenhensive of a possible Russo-Japanese agreement in the Far East as witnessed from
Ito¶s visit to Russia. Should this be the case, Britain¶s position in the Far East would be
gravely jeopardised.