Kilosbayan v.

Morato
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995
Mendoza, J.

Issue:

W/N the petitioner has the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract
in this case

Held:

Yes. Kilosbayan’s status as a people’s organization give it the requisite

personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution
provides that SEC 15 “the State shall respect the role of independent people’s
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through
peaceful and lawful means,” that their right to SEC 16 “effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall
not be abridged.”

These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in
interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial
power. The jurisdiction of the Court, even in cases involving constitutional
questions, is limited by the “case and controversy” requirement of Art. VIII, §5.
This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what
differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political
departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.

It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded

standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving “paramount public
interest.” Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have indeed been
allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2)
under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.

Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds. or where a tax measure is assailed as
unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to question the validity of election laws
because of their obvious interest in the validity of such laws. Concerned citizens
can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of “transcendental
importance” which must be settled early. Legislators are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives qua legislators.
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have.
Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer’s suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, to wit:

While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money
is “being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections
against abuses of legislative power” or that there is a misapplication of such
funds by respondent COMELEC or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Besides, the institution of a taxpayer’s suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial
review. The Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer’s suit
should be entertained.

Petitioners’ suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers’ suits.

Thus, petitioners’ right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned

citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is
alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue
as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any
infringement of their rights as legislators.
 Tondo Medical Center et al. vs. the Court of Appeals, et al.
2007-07-17 | G.R. No. 167324

ISSUES:
W/N the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violate various constitutional provisions, including
Section 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which could be grounds for their
nullification

HELD:
The Court finds the petition to be without merit.

1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing,

and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as
self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the
inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically
declared by this Court as non self-executing. Some of the constitutional provisions
invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution — specifically,
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically
ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara, wherein the
Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such broad
principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented. Since they failed
to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are
unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and
consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they
would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying
down the compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the
pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any
questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process
provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is
meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive
Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are
not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or disabused, and
may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “The president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an
exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive
department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by
other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court. The law grants the President the
power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of
every President to reorganize his or her office "to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency."