Você está na página 1de 601

. . .

to Those Who Served


Foreword
This is the second of five volumes to be published in the series UNITED
STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR. When completed, these vol-
umes will present a comprehensive account of U.S. Army activities in what
was once euphemistically termed a police action. Truce Tent and Fighting
Front covers the last two years in the Korean War and treats the seemingly
interminable armistice negotiations and the violent but sporadic fighting
at the front.
The scene therefore frequently shifts from the dialectic, propaganda,
and frustrations at the conference table to the battles on key hills and at
key outposts. The author presents a solid and meaningful reconstruction
of the truce negotiations; he develops the issues debated and captures the
color of the arguments and the arguers. The planning and events that
guided or influenced the proceedings on the United Nations side are thor-
oughly explained. The volume abounds in object lessons and case studies
that illustrate problems American officers may encounter in negotiating
with Communists. Problems encountered by the U.N. high command in
handling recalcitrant Communist prisoners of war within the spirit and
letter of the Geneva Convention are explained with clarity and sympathy.
Truce Tent and Fighting Front is offered to all thoughtful citizens–
military and civilian—as a contribution to the literature of limited war.

Washington, D.C. HAL C. PATTISON


18 June 1965 Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

vii
The Author
Walter G. Hermes received his M.A. from Boston University and his
Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University.
During World War II he served with the U.S. Army in radio intelligence
and military government assignments. After the war he attended the Uni-
versity of Denver and the University of California at Los Angeles.
Dr. Hermes joined the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1949.
For many years he served as Department of the Army representative on the
Department of Defense Liaison Committee with the Department of State
on the Foreign Relations of the United States series insofar as they covered
World War II and the international conferences of that period. Dr. Hermes
is at present a member of the Current History Branch of the Office of the
Chief of Military History.
He has assisted Dr. Maurice Matloff in the preparation of the volume
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 in the UNITED
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, and has edited the volume by
Maj. Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and
War in the ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES.

viii
Preface
This volume is offered as a contribution to the politico-military history
of the Korean War. Unlike nearly all of the previous wars waged by the
United States, the conflict in Korea brought no military victory; in fact,
during the last two years of the struggle neither side sought to settle the
issue decisively on the battlefield. In this respect the Korean War had no
modern American counterpart. It resembled most the War of 1812 when
the nation had also carried on a desultory war while it attempted to negoti-
ate a peace with the British. More important fighting, in both cases, went
on at the peace table than on the field of combat.
Although the action at the front from July 1951 to July 1953 was in-
conclusive, there was a definite interrelationship between the intensity of
the fighting and the status of affairs at the truce meetings. Both the United
Nations Command and its opponents tried with some success to induce
more reasonable negotiating attitudes in their adversaries through the ap-
plication of limited military pressure.
Under the command system operating during the Korean War, the U.S.
Army was given executive responsibility for carrying out U.S. military
policy in Korea and for negotiating the truce agreement. Thus, the volume
crosses service and departmental lines. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Com-
mander in Chief, Far East Command, and his successor, General Mark W.
Clark, commanded U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces as well
as Republic of Korea units. As Commanders in Chief, United Nations
Command, they also controlled ground, air, and naval forces contributed
by some members of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war in
Korea. Although the armistice negotiations were supposed to be strictly
military in nature, political elements entered the discussions and the Army
often had to participate in formulating and carrying out the policy adopted
by the President and his advisors. Army officers, through Army channels,
frequently handled not only military relations between the United States
and the Republic of Korea, but economic and political affairs as well. The
Army story in Korea, therefore, is more than a service account; in essence,
it is the American story of the struggle for peace during the war.
For the focus of the volume, the activities of the theater commander
were chosen as the most appropriate. From this intermediate point the
author could shift to Washington for policy decisions that affected the war,
ix
or move easily to the truce tent or the fighting front in Korea to show how
the policy was carried out. The theater commander served as a moderator
between the world of policy and the world of action, leaving his imprint
on both.
The unavailability of reliable documentation of the Communist Chinese
and North Korean plans, objectives, and casualties has forced the author
to rely upon the U.S. intelligence estimates for information in these areas.
While the information contained in these estimates cannot be regarded as
firm or precise, it was the best available when the volume was written.
Since the last two years of the war produced few large-scale ground op-
erations, battlefront coverage has been selective. Major operations are, of
course, described in some detail, but to attempt to cover the hundreds of
hill actions, patrols, and raids would require an over-sized volume cluttered
with monotonous detail. The emphasis, therefore, has been placed upon
small-scale actions involving U.S. Army units that most typically portray
the fighting of a given period.
No attempt has been made to do more than summarize the combat
operations of the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines during the last two
years of the war, as these services have published, or are in the process of
publishing, their own detailed accounts. Similarly, the Republic of Korea
and many of the other participants in the United Nations Command have
published, or presumably will publish at some future time, accounts of their
participation. The contributions made by the other U.S. services and by
the other nations of the United Nations Command in Korea deserve full
consideration and credit, but the author felt it was quite proper to devote
the majority of his attention to U.S. Army units in the combat portions of the
volume.
The problem of dating the many radio messages exchanged between
Washington and the Far East has been met by accepting the date on the
document used. The time differences between the two areas meant that
different dates were used in each place for the same message, but it was
felt that any attempt to change all the dates to Washington time or to
Tokyo time might lead to further confusion. In most cases the difference
of a day meant little substantively and the messages can be identified and
located by number as well as by date.

In the course of researching and writing this volume the author has
received help from many sources, both within and without the Office of
the Chief of Military History, and gladly acknowledges his indebtedness.
He owes special debts of gratitude to Col. Joseph Rockis, former Chief
of the Histories Division, OCMH, and to Dr. Maurice Matloff, Chief,
Current History Branch, OCMH, for their steadfast confidence and sup-
port during the initial phases of the project. For their many helpful sug-
gestions and wise counsel the author is also deeply grateful to Dr. Stetson
Conn, Chief Historian, Dr. John Miller, jr., Deputy Chief Historian, Mr.
x
Billy C. Mossman, General History Branch, and Dr. Robert W. Coakley,
General History Branch, all of the Office of the Chief of Military History,
as well as to Mr. James F. Schnabel, JCS Historical Division, Mr. Wilber
W. Hoare, JCS Historical Division, and Dr. Jules Davids, Georgetown
University.
Without the cheerful and efficient documentary research assistance of
Mrs. Lois Aldridge and Mrs. Hazel Ward of the World War II Division, Na-
tional Archives and Records Service, the author's task would have been far
more difficult. In the Office of the Chief of Military History the personnel
of the General Reference Branch under Mr. Israel Wice and his successor,
Mr. Charles F. Romanus, have provided services too numerous to mention.
The volume was edited by Mr. David Jaffé, whose interest and pro-
fessional skill were welcomed throughout the writing and revision of the
manuscript. Mrs. Marion P. Grimes performed yeoman service as assistant
editor and Mrs. Frances R. Burdette ably assisted in the preparation of the
manuscript for the printer. The index was prepared by Mr. Nicholas J.
Anthony.
The author was fortunate in having the maps drawn under the direc-
tion of Mr. Billy C. Mossman, whose knowledge of the terrains and the
records to be researched left little to be desired. The photographs were
skillfully selected by Miss Ruth A. Phillips.
It is perhaps needless to say that any substantive errors that remain in
the manuscript are solely the responsibility of the author.
In conclusion the author would be remiss if he failed to express his
appreciation of the encouragement that he received throughout the writing
of this volume from his wife, Esther Festa Hermes.

Washington, D.C. WALTER G. HERMES


18 June 1965

xi
Contents
Chapter Page
I . INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
T h e Battleground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Ideological Conflict, 1945-50 . . . . . . . . . . 5
The First Year, 1950-51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
II. THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Preliminary Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Measure of the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . 20
Battle of the Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Reaction at the Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
III. POINT A N D COUNTERPOINT . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
The 38th Parallel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
T h e Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0
IV. A TIME FOR PREPARATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Conduct of the War—The Washington Side . . . . . . 52
The JCS Ponder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Of Men and Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Developing the ROK Army . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Maintaining U.N. Support . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
V. THE NEW WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
T h e KANSAS-WYOMING Line . . . . . . . . . . 7 3
T h e Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6
The UNC Takes the Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Heartbreak Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6
Advance in the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Internal Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 3
A i r Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 5
The War at Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Postlude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1 0
VI. THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . 112
The Line of Demarcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Opening Skirmishes on Item 3 . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Domestic Problems and Foreign Pressures . . . . . . . 129
xiii
Chapter Page
VII. PRISONERS O F W A R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Voluntary Repatriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
T h e Period o f Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . 139
The Communists Reject Voluntary Repatriation . . . . .144
VIII. T H E PACKAGE PROPOSAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Narrowing t h e Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Settlement o f Item 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
T h e Horse Traders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Screening t h e POW's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
T h e Package I s Delivered . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
I X . "THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
A Choice I s Made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
The War of Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Night Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Interdiction a n d Harassment . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
T h e Shifting o f t h e Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
X . BEHIND T H E LINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 6
Improving t h e R O K Army . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 7
Relations With t h e R O K . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 4
The Japanese Take a Hand . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Ammunition Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 4
Propaganda Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 0
X I . KOJE-DO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
T h e Seeds A r e Planted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
T h e Time o f Ripening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Bitter Harvest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
XII. SUMMER O F FRUSTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Aftermath of the Package Proposal . . . . . . . . . 263
Variations o n a Theme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Narrowing t h e Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
XIII. STALEMATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Holding t h e Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
O l d Baldy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Up the Hill, Down the Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
T h e Battle f o r White Horse . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Jackson Heights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Operation SHOWDOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
XIV. T H E A I R A N D S E A WAR, MID-1952 . . . . . . . . . 3 1 9
Strategic and Tactical Air Operations . . . . . . . . 3 1 9
T h e Kojo Demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 8
xiv
Chapter Page
X V . PROBLEMS O F LIMITED W A R . . . . . . . . . . . 330
Reviewing t h e Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . .330
Budget, Manpower, and Resources . . . . . . . . . . 333
Ammunition Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .336
The Expansion of the ROK Army . . . . . . . . . . 340
Crisis in the Rear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
XVI. CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . 349
T h e Turning Coin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .349
Facets of the Artillery War . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
T h e Bulwark Grows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 5 7
The Reorganization of the Far East Command . . . . . 362
XVII. COLD FRONT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
The Demise of Military Victory . . . . . . . . . . . 366
Winter Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Air and Naval Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
XVIII. THE BEGINNING OF THE END . . . . . . . . . . . 401
The Long Recess: First Phase . . . . . . . . . . . 401
The Republicans Take Over . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
T h e B i g Break . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
Operation LITTLE SWITCH . . . . . . . . . . . 414
Preparations for the Return to Plenary Sessions . . . . .419
XIX. THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS . . . . . . . . 422
T h e Exploratory Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422
Give a n d Take . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
A Goal Is Reached . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
Residue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
XX. LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION . . . . . . . . . . . 436
A Sense of Insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
Friend o r Foe? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 1
The Pacification of Rhee . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
XXI. THE LAST OFFENSIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
T h e Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 9
T h e Tempo Mounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 5
Final Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 0
T h e Tally Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 6
XXII. FINALE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 9
Assurance a n d Reassurances . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 9
T h e Home Stretch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 4
The Big Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
Postlude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 0

xv
Chapter Page
XXIII. RETROSPECT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 8
T h e Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 2
T h e Battlefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 7
Appendixes

A. Strength of the UNC Ground Fortes in Korea . . . . . . . 513


B . Prisoners o f W a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
C . Armistice Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 6
D. Plenary Members of the Armistice Delegations . . . . . . . . 539
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 0
LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
LIST O F CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 6
BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 9

Table
Eighth Army Estimate of Enemy Forces, 1 July 1951 . . . . . . . . 77

Charts
No.
1. Channels of Command, July 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2. U.N. Command/Far East Command, Major Ground Forces,
1 July 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3. Chain of Command of Enemy Forces, 1 July 1951 . . . . . . . . 78
4. Far East Command, Staff and Major Commands Organization,
1 January 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364

Maps
1. The Kaesong Conference Site, 1 July 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2. The Armistice Conference Area, 22 October 1951 . . . . . . . . 48
3. The Punchbowl Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4. The Old Baldy Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
5. The Ch'orwon Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
6. The Triangle Hill Complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
7. Big and Little Nori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
8. The Nevada Complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
xvi
Color Maps
No. Page
I. The Line of Contact, 1 July 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
II. The Battle Lines, 10 July-31 October 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
III. Proposed Demarcation Line, 27 November 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
IV. The Eighth Army Front Line, 30 April 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
V. The Eighth Army Front Lines, 31 October 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
VI. The Eighth Army Front: The West Sector, 31 March 1953 . . . . . . . . 370
VII. The Eighth Army Front: The East Sector, 31 March 1953 . . . . . . . . 376
VIII. The Eighth Army Front Line, 27 July 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
IX. The Demarcation Line, 27 July 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490

Illustrations
President Harry S. Truman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall and General Matthew B.
Ridgway, Tokyo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2
Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Kaesong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8
U.N. Liaison Officers Arrive Near Kaesong . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
U.N. Liaison Group and Communist Escort, Kaesong Rest H o u s e . . . . 23
Former Tea House, Site of the Kaesong Conferences . . . . . . . . . 25
U.N. Delegates to First Armistice Session, July 1951 . . . . . . . . 26
Communist Armistice Delegates, Kaesong . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7
Investigating Alleged Neutrality Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
General Ridgway a t t h e Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0
President Syngman Rhee With U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio . . . . 65
Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Col. Arthur S. Champeny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
KMAG Instructor Addressing ROK Troops Through an Interpreter . . 68
Port o f Pusan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1
T h e Punchbowl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3
2d Infantry Division Troops on Bloody Ridge . . . . . . . . . . 84
Heartbreak Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7
North Korean Rail Line After Interdiction Bombing . . . . . . . . 106
USS New Jersey 16-inch Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Truce Tents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 4
General Pien Chang-wu Arrives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Col. James C. Murray and Col. Chang Chun San Initial Line of
Demarcation M a p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 0
General Nam Il and a Staff Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Winston S. Churchill in Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 1
xvii
Page
General J . Lawton Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 3
The UNC Delegates, December 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
General Yu Chae Heung, Maj. William K. Harrison, Jr., and Vice Adm.
C . Turner Joy, Panmunjom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 7
UNC Delegates at Base Camp, Munsan-ni . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
White Horse Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 9
Captured Guerrillas in Chiri-san Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
155-mm. Self-Propelled G u n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 5
Evacuating Wounded ROK Soldier by Helicopter . . . . . . . . . 186
Industrial Area of Ch'ongjin After Bombardment . . . . . . . . . 198
R O K Army Recruits Receiving Initial Issues . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 7
KMAG Instructor Assisting ROK Trainee . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Korean Military Academy, Main Building . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Antiarmistice Demonstration in Seoul . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Unloading Rice a t Pusan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 8
POW's in a Koje-do Compound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
POW's Learn To Work Tin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
A Communist POW Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Brig. Gen. Francis T. Dodd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Stalin Portrait Displayed During POW Demonstration . . . . . . . 241
A Koje-do Commandant Talking to POW's . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Brig. Gen. Charles F. Colson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
General Mark W. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Weapons Seized in Compound 76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
Cross-Marked Grave Sites of Murdered POW's . . . . . . . . . . 260
A New Compound on Koje-do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Screening POW's on Koje-do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
UNC Delegates at Panmunjom, 6 July 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . 274
Flooded Bridge Crossing on Main Supply Route . . . . . . . . . . 294
Setting Up Barbed Wire Entanglements on Old Baldy . . . . . . . 295
South Korean Mortar Emplacement on Capitol Hill . . . . . . . . 298
Bomb Strike on Suiho Hydroelectric Plant . . . . . . . . . . . 321
B-29 Attack on P'yongyang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
An 8-inch Howitzer and Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Brig. Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
Salvaged Cartridge Shells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Korean Military Academy Cadets on Parade . . . . . . . . . . . 359
President-Elect Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins
Near Ch'orwon, December 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
Entrance to a Communist Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
Part of 25th Infantry Division Bunker Area . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
Marine Pfc. Pulls Shrapnel From His Armored Vest . . . . . . . . 373

xviii
Page
Hot Food Being Carried to Front Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
2d Infantry Division Patrol Wearing Winter Camouflage Suits . . . . . 380
View o f t h e T-Bone Hill Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 3
Pongam-do POW Camp, Enclosure 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
Signing Agreement for Sick and Wounded Prisoner Exchange . . . . . 4 1 6
Communist P O W Exchange Site a t Panmunjom . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 7
Operation LITTLE SWITCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 8
UNC Delegates at Panmunjom, 26 April 1953 . . . . . . . . . . 423
President Rhee Greets the Tasca Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
Assistant Secretary Walter S . Robertson. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 8
T h e Armistice Building, Panmunjom . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 2
Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Arrives at the Armistice Building. . . 493
General Harrison and General Nam Il Signing the Armistice . . . . . 494
T h e Bound Armistice Agreement Documents . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 5
General Clark Signs t h e Armistice Agreement . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 6

Illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

xix
CHAPTER I

Introduction
After a year of bitter combat, the war litical considerations increasingly over-
in Korea lost momentum. By the first shadowed the battleground as the
of July 1951, the war of movement had Chinese Communists forced the U.N.
come to an end and a new, more static units to draw back of the 38th Parallel.
phase began. As the battle lines stabi- To defeat the North Korean forces had
lized, the impetus for a political settle- been one thing; the immense manpower
ment of the conflict mounted. This shift reserves of China and possibly the So-
in emphasis introduced a new set of viet Union were another. After U.N.
values and changed the complexion of counterattacks had pushed the Com-
the fighting completely. For the rest munists back to the general area of the
of the war, battle was to be the hand- 38th Parallel, the prospects for a mili-
maiden of policy rather than its consort. tary victory for either side without a
The first year had been quite differ- tremendous expenditure of lives and
ent. When the military forces of the matériel became evanescent. The time
Democratic People's Republic of Korea for a reappraisal had arrived.
moved southward across the 38th Par- There could be little doubt that the
allel in June 1950, the United Nations outbreak in Korea was but a segment
had supported the efforts of the Repub- of the larger contest between the Soviet
lic of Korea to halt the Communist Union and the United States. The ma-
invasion. The United States bore the jor question revolved about the impor-
brunt of the burden as the United Na- tance of that segment. Was Korea simply
tions had first contained, then driven a local test of power, a part of the con-
back the North Koreans in defeat. Only tinuous Communist probing for soft
the entry of the Chinese Communists spots that could be easily brought under
into the war in November had pre- control by direct action? Or could it be-
vented the United Nations from attain- come something more serious—the first
ing a clear-cut military victory as well step toward World War III if the Soviet
as a potential political triumph in the Union felt her basic interests threatened
unification of Korea. by a setback in Korea? The search for
But from this point on, the war had an answer to this problem was to plague
become more complicated. The expan- the United States and her allies through-
sion of the conflict to include Red China out the war and to exert a profound
might also presage the entry of the influence on the direction of political
Soviet Union at a future date. Po- and military affairs.
2 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

The Battleground ing most of its dry crops in the north


and the bulk of its rice in the south.
Before the war broke out in mid-1950, The majority of its heavy industry and
few people in the Western World either hydroelectric development is located in
knew or cared to know a great deal the north. Average precipitation and
about Korea or its people. Under the mean temperatures are similar to those
impact of war, knowledge became essen- in the Middle Atlantic States of the
tial. Old books on the subject were United States, but the winters are much
dusted and new ones were quickly colder and over 80 percent of the rain-
rushed to the printers. Maps of Korea fall is concentrated in the seven months
filled the newspapers and slowly some between April and October. Floods are
of the strange-sounding names became fairly frequent during this period.
familiar to the man on the street. The With such a long salt-water frontier,
candle of indifference was replaced fishing villages dot the coast of Korea.
by the searchlight of interest as Korean Ironically, the best ports are on the
geography and history assumed new southern and western coasts, where tidal
importance. variations are more extreme. There are
Korea shares a long, common frontier few good harbors on the Sea of Japan
with Manchuria along the Yalu and which has a tidal range of only about
Tumen Rivers and touches the Soviet three feet.
Union at the mouth of the Tumen. Located at the strategic crossroads of
From the northernmost bend of the Tumen, east Asia, Korea has had a long and
Korea extends some 600 miles to the south- checkered history. For many centuries
ern tip of the peninsula with a width varying the peninsula experienced a series of
from slightly over 100 miles at the waist to petty wars between rival powers seeking
approximately 220 miles at its broadest to establish hegemony. Finally, during
part. The dominant feature of the topogra- the seventh century, the kingdom of
phy is the mountainous Taebaek chain Silla managed with Chinese aid to gain
covering northeastern Korea and running control of most of Korea. The influence
south along the eastern coast. As one of Chinese civilization at this time
observer has remarked: "There is no brought about Korean acceptance of the
spot in the country in which a moun- Confucian system of social relationships
tain does not form a part of the land- and left a lasting imprint upon Korean
scape."1 The mountain slopes dip ethics, morals, arts, and literature. De-
sharply down to the sea in the east, but spite invasions of barbarian hordes
are more gentle in the west. Roads, during succeeding centuries, Korea re-
railroads, and the communications net- mained faithful on the whole to its
work follow the valleys and mountain father-son relationship with China and
passes in the broken terrain. regarded itself as inferior to its mentor.2
Korea is an agricultural country rais- 2
1
An excellent account of early Korean history
E. de Schweinitz Brunner, quoted in Andrew and the Confucian system of association of nations
J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York: The may be found in M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and
John Day Company, 1944), p. 9. the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1946).
INTRODUCTION 3
When the Western nations attempted phan, but Japanese intrigue miscued in
to establish commercial relations with 1896 when the Korean queen, who op-
Korea in the mid-nineteenth century, posed Japanese control, was murdered.
they encountered a steadfast resistance Popular reaction in Korea forced the
to any contacts with foreigners. Un- Japanese to desist for the time being and
familiar with the Confucian tradition, the Korean king turned to the Russians
which placed Korea in the position of to neutralize Japanese influence.
a son or younger brother to China, the The Russians proved to be as inept
West misinterpreted the relationship as the Japanese as they quickly tried to
and considered it a vassal state to China. secure valuable mining, lumber, and
But China disclaimed suzerainty over commercial concessions. Thus, when the
Korea and the Japanese later used this Russian representatives inadvertently
admission in their efforts to detach gave the king a chance to dispense with
Korea completely from China. further Russian assistance in 1898, the
Japan, whose interest in Korea had latter, much to the discomfort of the
covered many centuries, understood the Russians, eagerly seized his opportunity.
Confucian relationship perfectly, yet its Although both Russia and Japan were
desire to extend the Japanese Empire temporarily checked in their plans for
and to secure its flanks led to economic gaining the favored position in Korea,
penetration of Korea in 1876. By apply- they watched each other jealously for
ing pressure on the Chinese, Japan se- the next few years. Finally in 1904 the
cured a commercial treaty that opened Japanese decided to halt Russian ma-
some of Korea's ports. neuvering in Manchuria and Korea.
Six years later the United States also The Russo-Japanese War ended with
concluded a treaty of peace, amity, com- another Japanese triumph and this time
merce, and navigation with Korea. As a they were determined not to lose the
result of this agreement the United prize. Japanese administrators, officials,
States sent its first military assistance and police moved into Korea and grad-
group to Korea in 1888, when several ually increased their control. Japanese
military instructors were dispatched to diplomats negotiated successfully for
train the Korean Army. By introducing British and American acceptance of
U.S. participation in the opening of their special interests in Korea. The
Korea, the able Chinese statesman, Li Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905 traded
Hung-chang, sought to balance Japanese U.S. acquiescence to Japanese suzerainty
political aims with American commer- over Korea for Japanese denial of ag-
cial interest. gressive designs upon the Philippines.
As Li attempted to strengthen China's When formal annexation of Korea by
position in Korea from 1885 to 1894, he the Japanese occurred in 1910, there was
clashed directly with the Japanese and little protest except from the Koreans
the rivalry erupted into war. The Jap- themselves.
anese emerged victorious, and by the During the next thirty-five years,
treaty of 1895 Korea was completely cut Korea became a Japanese colony. There
off from the old familiar ties with China. were several Korean attempts at rebel-
Clumsily Japan tried to adopt the or- lion, but the Japanese swiftly suppressed
4 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

any opposition and tightened their con- When the Soviet Union later declared
trol. Japanese officials and spies blan- war upon Japan in August 1945, it ad-
keted the peninsula and helped the hered to the Potsdam Declaration of 28
Japanese police maintain strict order. In July 1945 and joined the United States,
the meantime they exploited the coun- the United Kingdom, and China in sup-
try economically and attempted to as- porting the independence of Korea "in
similate it culturally. They modernized due course."5
the industrial and communications sys- During the hectic days of early August
tem of Korea considerably. When World 1945, the necessity for a quick decision
War II began, Korea became an armed on the division of responsibility for ac-
camp and an important part of the cepting the surrender of Japanese forces
Japanese war base. in Korea became pressing. The dropping
In late 1943, Korean patriots received of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
their first words of outside encourage- Nagasaki on the 6th and 9th of August
ment. In the Cairo Declaration of 1 and Russia's entry into the war on the
December, President Franklin D. Roose- 8th proved to be the final straw that
velt, Prime Minister Winston S. Church- broke Japan's back. But while the Jap-
ill of the United Kingdom, and anese were negotiating, the Russians
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China prepared to invade Korea. The situation
issued the following statement: "The called for immediate action and U.S.
aforesaid three great powers, mindful of War Department planners suggested the
the enslavement of the people of Korea, 38th Parallel of north latitude as an
are determined that in due course Korea arbitrary dividing line of operations.
shall become free and independent." 3 The Americans would receive the sur-
The patriots might have been a little render of Japanese forces south of the
less enthusiastic if they could have parallel and the Russians would have
listened to the conversation of President the same responsibility to the north.6
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Joseph V. By 14 August, the Army recommen-
Stalin of the Soviet Union at Yalta in dation had been approved by the U.S.
February 1945. In discussing a possible Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the State
four-power trusteeship for Korea in the Department, and, finally, by President
postwar period, Roosevelt stated that he Harry S. Truman. The next day, the
thought it would take twenty to thirty President proposed to Marshal Stalin
years before Korea was ready for com- that the 38th Parallel be accepted as the
plete independence. The Soviet leader demarcation line between the American
hoped it would take less time, but he and Russian operational zones of re-
was pleased that the President felt that sponsibility. On 16 August Stalin agreed
no foreign troops should be stationed in and orders were issued to General of the
the liberated country.4 Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander
3
Department of State, In Quest of Peace and in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, con-
5
Security: Selected Documents on American Foreign Department of State, The Conflict in Korea
Policy, 1941-51 (Washington, 1951), p. 10. (Washington, 1951), p. 2.
4 6
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the For a detailed study of the decision to use the
United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 38th Parallel as a dividing line, see Paul C. Mc-
1945 (Washington. 1955), p. 770. Grath, The 38th Parallel Division. MS in OCMH.
INTRODUCTION 5
taining detailed instructions on pro- amounted to a great deal, since they
cedures and arrangements for receiving exist to some degree in most countries.
the surrender and including the pro- Unfortunately for Korea, the conditions
vision concerning the 38th Parallel. that developed after the end of World
With Russian forces already advancing War II were not normal. The collapse
into Korea and American troops still of the Axis nations brought an inevita-
some six hundred miles away on Oki- ble shifting of the balance of interna-
nawa, the 38th Parallel seemed to be tional power. A divergence between
an advantageous line for the latter. American and Soviet policies had ap-
Without the zonal agreement, there was peared even before the defeat of their
a distinct possibility that the Russians common enemies and the temporary re-
could occupy all of Korea before Amer- lief from tension that the end of a war
ican soldiers could reach the peninsula. usually brings did not follow World
There was no intention on the part of War II. Instead, a period of mounting
the Americans that the 38th Parallel pressure began during which the basic
should serve any purpose other than conflict between the Soviet Union and
as a temporary line of convenience. the United States became more and
The development of the line into a more apparent. In the contest of these
permanent wall came later. titans, Korea was but one of the prizes.
The line of division was arbitrary. It
cut across roads, rivers, and railroads The Ideological Conflict, 1945-50
willy-nilly and separated the primarily
agricultural south from the more in- When the first U.S. troops arrived at
dustrialized north. There were about Seoul in early September 1945, Korean
16,000,000 people in the 37,000 square civil affairs were in a state of complete
miles of the southern zone and 9,000,- confusion. With the country in dire
000in the 48,000 square miles to the need of assistance—economic, financial,
north. As for regional differences, there administrative, and political—the Amer-
were shades of the American Civil War ican military commander, Lt. Gen. John
period. The North Korean "Yankee" R. Hodge, decided to retain many of the
was more likely to be independent and Japanese officials temporarily to provide
hard working and to own his own farm, order and continuity in the period of
while the "Southerner" was apt to be the transfer of power. In time, he felt,
more tractable and a tenant farmer. The they could be gradually replaced by
"Southerners" looked down upon their American civil affairs officers or by new-
northern countrymen as unpolished ly trained Koreans.
troublemakers and the North Koreans A quick storm of protest arose from
viewed their southern neighbors as lazy the politically minded Koreans. After
rascals.7 forty years of subjugation, they wanted
These regional prejudices, under all of the Japanese removed and sent
normal conditions, might not have home as soon as possible. The excite-
7
ment generated by the prospects of in-
George M. McCune with Arthur L. Gray, Jr.,
Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University dependence would brook no halfway
Press, 1950), pp. 58-59. measures at this point and General
6 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Hodge was forced to speed up the proc- viet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav M.
ess of replacing and repatriating the Molotov agreed to establish a joint com-
Japanese officials. This successful use of mission to consult with Korean demo-
political pressure upon the American cratic parties and social organizations on
military leaders established a pattern the formation of a provisional govern-
that the Koreans would skillfully repeat ment. The commission would also sub-
many times in the years ahead. mit proposals for putting into effect a
With the removal of the Japanese four-power trusteeship over Korea for a
under way, the American occupation period of up to five years.9
forces created a small Korean constabu- The reaction of most of South Korea's
lary, armed with Japanese small arms political parties to the concept of trus-
and rifles to preserve internal order. teeship was violent. With the scent of
Dozens of political parties had sprung independence in the air, they were firm-
up overnight and each claimed to have ly opposed to five more years of foreign
the support of the majority of the peo- control. But their vehement protests
ple. Demonstrations and altercations be- succeeded only in providing the Soviet
tween the partisans became common in Union with a political weapon. When
South Korea as the rival factions strove the Joint Commission met in March
for improved positions.8 But General 1946, the Soviet representatives stated
Hodge soon became convinced that that they would not consult with any
none of the political parties had either parties or organizations that had op-
the broad support that it claimed or the posed the idea of trusteeship. Since this
political experience necessary for assum- would have eliminated all of South
ing the tremendous task of rehabilitating Korea's important political parties, ex-
Korea. He steadfastly opposed the recog- cept for the Communists, the United
nition of any provisional government States refused to accept the Soviet in-
for Korea at that time. terpretation and the meetings adjourned
The problem of channeling the sine die in May.10
mounting Korean nationalism into pro- In the meantime, the Russians built
ductive areas was made increasingly dif- up the Communist Party organization
ficult by the failure of the Russians to in North Korea and brought in an
remove the artificial barrier imposed at exiled Korean Communist, who called
the 38th Parallel. Efforts at the military himself Kim Il Sung after a former guer-
level to dispose of the political wall rilla hero, to assume the leadership in
proved unavailing and Secretary of State late 1945. With the facade of a native
James F. Byrnes finally took up the mat- government, the Soviet Union carried
ter directly with the Soviet Union. At out its program and by mid-1946 had
the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at managed to withdraw all but 10,000 of
Moscow in December 1945, he and So- its troops from Korea.
8
For the sake of convenience the American zone The split between the north and the
of occupation and the later Republic of Korea south became more permanent as later
(ROK) will be referred to as South Korea and
9
the Russian zone of occupation and the later Department of State, Korea's Independence
Democratic People's Republic of Korea will be re- (Washington,
10 1947), pp. 18-19.
ferred to as North Korea. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
INTRODUCTION 7
efforts of General Hodge to negotiate alternatives of either continuing the oc-
with the Soviet commander in Korea cupation of southern Korea indefinitely
were ignored. As the north became more —a course becoming more unpopular in
oriented toward the Soviet Union po- the United States and offering a mount-
litically, economically, and militarily, ing of the tensions between the South
the south tended to depend increasingly Koreans and the occupation force—or of
upon the United States for assistance. withdrawal. The United States balked
As President Truman pointed out in at the latter action, for weakness in
July 1946, Korea had become "an ideo- Korea would probably have adverse re-
logical battleground upon which our percussions in the Far East, especially
entire success in Asia may depend." 11 in Japan and China. The United Na-
With both of the great powers pur- tions offered another recourse.
suing their own goals in Korea and The Soviet Union tried to forestall
elsewhere, the prospects for unification the United States by proposing that all
grew more remote. The United States troops be withdrawn from Korea in
began to concentrate to a greater extent early 1948, but the Americans refused
on establishing sound economic and to be diverted. After some discussion,
fiscal policies and the formation of a the General Assembly approved in prin-
trained civil administration in South ciple the U.S. resolution calling for
Korea. And looking ahead to the future, over-all elections in early 1948 under
the problem of creating a defense force U.N. observation, to be followed by the
came in for more detailed study. By withdrawal of foreign troops after a
November 1946 the native constabulary legal government was formed. The So-
had been expanded to 5,000 and the viet Union served notice that it would
basis for a South Korean army had been neither permit U.N. observers to enter
laid. the North Korean zone nor would it
Secretary of State George C. Marshall consent to general elections.
made another effort to come to terms While a U.N. commission investigated
with the Russians in the spring of 1947 conditions in South Korea, the United
and succeeded in obtaining a reconven- States began to increase the Korean con-
ing of the Joint Commission in May. stabulary in preparation for the eventual
But, after a promising start, the meet- withdrawal of U.S. troops.12 The Joint
ings foundered once more on the ex- Chiefs of Staff had authorized an ex-
clusion of political parties opposed to pansion of the police force to 50,000
trusteeship. men, equipped with light and heavy
Faced with the possibility of another weapons, and provided for additional
long impasse, the United States decided U.S. officers and men to train them.
to place the Korean question before the After the U.N. commission completed
General Assembly of the United Nations its inquiry in February 1948, it recom-
in September 1947. The lack of agree- mended that elections be held in as
ment with the Soviet Union posed the 12
A short account of the problems of the United
Nations Temporary Commission on Korea may be
11
Ltr, Truman to Edwin S. Pauley, 16 Jul 46, found in Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948
in S/W Korea. (Washington, 1948), pp. 10ff.
8 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

much of Korea as possible by May. The to a close, however, for the U.S. Army
General Assembly quickly approved the desired to do away with this commit-
commission's proposals and General ment. It saw little strategic value in
Hodge made the arrangements for the Korea and wanted to use the troops
elections. On 10 May over 92 percent located there in other areas. General
of the registered voters in South Korea MacArthur believed that U.S. forces
went to the polls and selected their rep- would be dissipated in any large-scale
resentatives to a National Assembly. A Communist attack on Korea. Further-
constitution was soon drawn up and more, budgetary limitations dictated that
adopted and Syngman Rhee was chosen the Army withdraw by the end of June.
the first President of the Republic of In March 1949, the United States
Korea on 15 August 1948. agreed to support a South Korean Army
The Communists in North Korea had of 65,000 to meet some of the misgiv-
carried on a vigorous campaign op- ings of President Rhee. And when
posing the elections in South Korea, but American forces were withdrawn on 30
the failure of their attempt necessitated June, the Provisional Military Advisory
another approach. On 9 September they Group set up in August 1948 to train
established the Democratic People's Re- the South Korean Army was redesig-
public of Korea which claimed jurisdic- nated the U.S. Military Advisory Group
tion over all Korea. The Soviet Union to the Republic of Korea (KMAG).
and its satellites swiftly recognized the About 500 officers and men were in-
new government and the USSR an- cluded in the group that was to complete
nounced that all Soviet troops would be the instruction of the South Korean
withdrawn from Korea by the end of the military forces.14
year. KMAG faced a difficult situation. For
Despite the willingness of the U.S. though the United States wanted the
Army to match the Soviet plan and new army to be able to repel Communist
withdraw its forces from Korea, neither aggression, it did not intend to make
President Rhee nor the State Depart- it powerful enough to launch any attack
ment desired such quick action. They upon North Korea. Therefore, when
doubted the ability of the new South equipment was assigned to the Republic
Korean Army to maintain internal se- of Korea Army (ROKA), tanks, heavy
curity and deter Communist aggression. guns, and aircraft were withheld. Even
Besides, the U.S. Army had agreed to the equipment allocated to the ROKA
remain until the South Korean security was slow in arriving. Thus, despite ex-
forces could be trained and equipped. pansion of the ROKA to 100,000 men
Thus, at the end of 1948 some 16,000 in 1950, its arms and equipment were
American soldiers still were stationed in more suitable to a police force than to
Korea.13 an army. KMAG decided to train the
The occupation of Korea was drawing South Koreans in individual arms first
13
For a good short account of the U.S. Army in 14
Korea from 1945-50, see Lt. Col. James F. Schnabel, See Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors
Policy and Direction: The First Year, a forth- in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington,
coming volume in the series UNITED STATES 1962) for a detailed account of the U.S. advisory
ARMY IX THE KOREAN WAR, Chapter II. group and its work.
INTRODUCTION 9
and some progress was made along this United Nations. Within hours of the
line. In the field of leadership for the attack the U.N. Security Council de-
ROKA, the task proved less easy. Polit- manded the immediate cessation of
ical appointments were customary and hostilities and the withdrawal of North
resulted in weak military leadership. In Korean forces back to the 38th Paral-
addition there were language barriers to lel.15 When the North Koreans con-
be overcome and a constant struggle to tinued to advance, the Security Council
secure training time for the eight South passed a resolution on 27 June urging
Korean divisions that had been organ- U.N. members to provide military assist-
ized. Guerrilla activity demanded their ance to South Korea. President Truman
use in stamping out centers of Commu- quickly ordered General MacArthur to
nist and bandit resistance in South send air and naval forces to aid the ROK
Korea. On the whole, the ROKA had troops and when these proved insuffi-
made a beginning by mid-1950, but was cient to halt the fast-moving Communist
far from being a well-trained or well- battle forces, the President instructed
equipped force. MacArthur to commit U.S. ground
Across the 38th Parallel the Russians units, too.16
had fashioned a more potent force. Since other members of the United
Leavened with Korean veterans of the Nations indicated that they intended to
Chinese civil war, the North Korean send contingents to Korea, the U.N.
Army had grown to 135,000 men by June Security Council asked the United States
1950 and included some heavy arms and to form a unified command and appoint
equipment. Not only did the Commu- a commander. President Truman ac-
nists have heavy artillery, armor, and cepted the responsibility of American
planes but they were also better trained. leadership and named MacArthur as
Border clashes broke out along the the first U.N. commander. MacArthur
parallel during early 1950 and Commu- would receive his instructions through
nist political propaganda in South Korea the Army Chief of Staff, acting as ex-
mounted. After the elections of May ecutive agent for the Joint Chiefs of
1950 in South Korea failed to strengthen Staff.17 The U.N. commander appointed
their cause, the Communists decided 15
The Soviet member was absent from the Securi-
upon sterner action. They demanded ty Council in protest against the continuance of a
new elections, to establish a legislative Nationalist Chinese representative on the council
instead of a Communist Chinese.
body for all Korea with unification under 16
The complete account of these events and the
the Communists as the objective. When plans and operations of the first year of the war
the South Koreans refused to accept their will be found in: (1) Roy E. Appleman, South to
the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington,
proposals, the Communists launched a 1961); (2) Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The
full-scale attack on 25 June 1950 across First Year; and (3) Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and
the Parallel. Flow. All in the series UNITED STATES ARMY
IN THE KOREAN WAR. The last two are in
The First Year, 1950-51 preparation.
17
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of General
The United States reacted swiftly to of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, General J.
Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral For-
the North Korean invasion and imme- rest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen-
diately presented the problem to the eral Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff.
10 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker and his In mid-September, Army and Marine
Eighth Army to take charge of all U.N. forces landed at Inch'on and quickly re-
ground forces in Korea. President Rhee captured Seoul. The Eighth Army broke
later placed the ROK Army units under through the North Korean ring and
General Walker. raced north to link up with the amphib-
Although the United Nations sought ious attack. With their rear threatened,
to bolster the South Korean cause, the the Communists fell back behind the
war proceeded at a disastrous pace. Tak- 38th Parallel as best they could—de-
ing full advantage of surprise and supe- feated but still resisting.
rior troops, the North Korean Army The status quo was restored but was
overran the ROK defenses at the 38th that enough? The North Koreans could
Parallel and reached Seoul in four days. reorganize and try again. Now seemed
The South Korean forces fell back, to be the propitious moment to destroy
broken and disorganized. To slow down the enemy army and unify Korea.
the victorious advance of the North Prompted by the United States, the
Koreans, General MacArthur was forced United Nations gave tacit approval in
to commit his major ground units on a early October and the U.N. forces
piecemeal basis and trade space for time. pushed northward against token resist-
Finally, the U.S. and ROK defensive ance. The goal became military victory
lines were driven back to a narrow pe- and political unification rather than re-
rimeter around the port of Pusan in the pelling aggression and restoring the old
southeastern corner of the peninsula. situation. So quickly had the modest
As the battle lines stabilized along the aims of June been expanded by the
Pusan Perimeter, the initial advantage heady successes of September.
of the North Koreans passed. They had With triumph on the horizon, the
counted upon overwhelming ROK resist- Eighth Army rolled ahead toward the
ance and securing control of all of South Yalu and the X Corps made another
Korea before American aid could be- amphibious landing on the east coast.
come effective. The extension of the con- The war appeared to be just about over
flict exposed their own weaknesses. when reports of Chinese troops in
Their longer lines of supply and com- Korea were confirmed at the end of Octo-
munication became more vulnerable to ber. After a brief moment of doubt,
U.N. air attack and their small navy was MacArthur decided to continue the ad-
destroyed by the U.S. naval forces which vance to the Yalu. The Chinese reaction
imposed a blockade on the Korean coast. to MacArthur's move was swift and
With the arrival of U.S. reinforcements violent as they launched strong attacks
and the reorganization of ROK troops that halted and then turned back the
into effective combat units, MacArthur U.N. forces. By December they had
was able to plan a counterattack. followed the withdrawing Eighth Army
Leaving Walker to carry out a co-or- south of the 38th Parallel and in early
dinated ground attack upon the perime- January they retook Seoul. With the pre-
ter, MacArthur organized a separate cipitous transformation of victory into a
corps, the U.S. X, for an amphibious galling reverse, a thorough reappraisal
assault behind the North Korean lines. of the situation appeared mandatory.
INTRODUCTION

The U.N. Command (UNC) had


gambled, even as the North Koreans had
initially, on concluding the war before
the Russians or Chinese could intervene
effectively while hoping that they would
not intervene at all. And like the North
Koreans, the U.N. Command forfeited
its wager, as the Chinese recouped the
Communist losses. Combining Confu-
cian concepts with Communist dialectic,
the Chinese appeared to be reasserting
their ancient role of father-elder brother
to Korea and after a lapse of fifty-five
years again assumed a dominant part in
determining the destiny of Korea.18
The entry of the Communist Chinese
into the war and the retreat of the UNC
forces led to a resurgence of domestic
and Congressional pressure upon Presi-
dent Truman to use atomic weapons in
Korea to attain military victory. Earlier
the President had told the press on 27 PRESIDENT TRUMAN
July that he was not even considering rate, the pressure had eased as the UNC
the use of atomic bombs in Korea.19 forces had gained the ascendancy and it
The fact that the Soviet Union had ex- was not until late November that the
ploded its first atomic bomb in 1949 and Chinese threat gave it fresh impetus.
broken the U.S. monopoly may have had The President, however, declared in a
some influence upon this decision, but press conference on 30 November that
it is just as possible that the fluid nature although the use of all weapons at the
of the war and the moral implications United States' disposal, including the
of using the terrible weapon again may atom bomb, had been considered, he did
also have served as deterrents.20 At any not want to see the bomb employed on
18 innocent people who had nothing to do
For an absorbing account of the development
of Chinese interest in the Korean War and the with military aggression.21 The contin-
Chinese decision to enter the conflict, see Allen S. ued reluctance of the President to use
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to the bomb in Korea unless it was abso-
Enter the Korean War (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1960). Whiting maintains that the North lutely necessary was strongly bolstered
Korean attack was planned and directed by the by the obvious disinclination of its
Soviet Union and that although Communist China principal allies—Great Britain and
was probably informed of the plan late in 1949 or
early in 1950, it had no direct responsibility for its France—to risk a possible broadening of
initiation or outcome.
19
New York Times, July 28, 1950. the destruction of the North Korean capital. for
20
The influential Bulletin of Atomic Scientists example, would not destroy the fighting capacity of
maintained in an editorial on 24 July 1950 that the the enemy's army.
21
atom bomb would be utterly useless in Korea since New York Times, December 1, 1950.
12 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

SECRETARY MARSHALL AND GENERAL RIDGWAY leave the Dai Ichi Building, Tokyo.

the war that the introduction of atomic desired. Little could be expected in the
bombs might have produced. Unless way of U.N. reinforcements, since most
circumstances changed radically, it ap- of the contributing countries had other
peared that atomic weapons would be commitments. Without sizable incre-
kept in reserve. ments the possibility of defeating China
By mid-January 1951, the tempo of appeared forlorn. As the battle lines be-
the war slackened. The Chinese had came more stable, the United Nations
outdistanced their suppliers and began started to look upon a negotiated settle-
to suffer heavier casualties. Under a new ment of the Korean problem as the best
commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridg- method of ending the war-
way, the Eighth Army stiffened and The initial approach of the United
struck back at the enemy.22 But the Nations to the Peiping government on
question of military victory was no arranging a cease-fire met with no en-
longer dominant. China's immense couragement. General Ridgway soon
manpower potentialities presented the provided the United Nations with a
prospect of a long, costly, and expanded more potent persuader. Moving for-
war that none of the United Nations ward cautiously, the Eighth Army ad-
22
General Walker was killed in an accident in
vanced for the second time toward the
December. 38th Parallel inflicting heavy losses upon
INTRODUCTION 13
Truman decided to replace MacArthur
with Ridgway; Lt. Gen. James A. Van
Fleet became Eighth Army commander.
Communist counterattacks in late
April and May were repulsed, but the
United States was inclined to proceed
cautiously. The JCS withheld permis-
sion for any general advance by Ridgway
without its approval. Although the U.N.
commander still had the mission of de-
stroying the Communist armed forces in
Korea, he was instructed to accomplish
this objective subject to the overriding
considerations of the security of his forces
and his basic mission of defending
Japan. On the other hand, he was
authorized to conduct limited tactical
operations that might be desirable to
insure the safety of his command, main-
GENERAL VAN FLEET tain contact with the enemy, and keep
the latter off balance.24 The Eighth
the Communist troops. Seoul was taken Army would repel aggression and inflict
again in March and constant pressure maximum personnel losses upon the
was applied upon the Communist forces. Communist forces. By this line of resist-
As the U.N. troops edged closer to the ance the United States hoped to make
old boundary line, resistance stiffened. further Communist efforts to advance
But the general situation had improved in Korea too costly and to induce them
in favor of the United Nations. to consider negotiation as an alternative.
While the Eighth Army was pressing With the Eighth Army ensconced north
forward, General MacArthur was re- of the 38th Parallel for the most part,
lieved of the U.N. command by the Van Fleet shifted to the defensive in
President.23 Since the entry of the mid-June.
Chinese into the war, MacArthur had The cycle was now complete. The
voiced deep differences of opinion with United States had returned to the same
the President, his advisors, and the U.N. position it had held so uncomfortably
members participating in Korea over the in 1947-48. It wanted very much to
conduct of the war. In April, President end the Korean commitment, but could
not withdraw without an unacceptable
23 loss of face both at home and abroad.
A full account of the relief of MacArthur will
be found in Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The The American public was not accus-
First Year. The Senate investigation of this action tomed to entering into a fight with the
is covered in Hearings Before the Committee on current international bully and then not
Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 82d Congress, 1st Session, Military Situation
24
in the Far East, 1951, Parts 1-5. Msg, JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE. 1 May 51.
14 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

giving him a decisive beating. A stale- field in the hope that this would end
mate or draw might not be popular in the troublesome affair quickly. With the
the United States, yet the alternative reversal in North Korea fresh in their
would probably be even less agreeable. minds, it was not surprising that they
To drive the Communists out of North displayed little enthusiasm for a second
Korea might entail the bombing of the attempt. Only the Republic of Korea
Chinese mainland and the blockade of was anxious to prosecute the war ener-
the Chinese coast with large expendi- getically to a successful conclusion, but,
tures of men and matériel and could lead without the assistance of the United
to the possible outbreak of a global war States, it lacked the power. The United
with Soviet participation. In addition, States might have provided the power,
the allies of the United States in the but the prize did not seem to justify
Korean conflict were strongly opposed the effort or the risks. The Korean War
to another large-scale effort to settle the had already had an unfortunate effect
war militarily. Although they recog- in delaying the build-up of the newly
nized the value of Korea as a symbol of formed North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
resistance to Communist encroachment, tion (NATO) by which the United
they had other problems and commit- States hoped to strengthen its defensive
ments to take into consideration. The position vis-à-vis the USSR. To seek
European powers were concerned over military victory now might result in fur-
Soviet capabilities on the European con- ther postponement in strengthening the
tinent. While the Soviet Union and its West's defense in Europe besides in-
satellites retained the power to ignite curring prohibitive expenditure of lives
brush fires around the world, deep in- and money and the risk of World War
volvement in Korea seemed unwise. III. Discretion appeared the better part
They had gone along with the United of valor at this point and a negotiated
States in the endeavor by MacArthur to settlement preferable to military deci-
settle the Korean problem on the battle- sion.
CHAPTER II

The Initial Negotiations


Despite the willingness of the United The first sign of a change in the Com-
Nations to bring the Korean conflict to a munist position came from a radio
close by negotiations, the prospects for address by the Soviet representative to
a peaceful settlement based on a unified, the United Nations on June 23. Deputy
democratic, and independent Korea ap- Foreign Minister Jacob Malik, speaking
peared dim in the late spring of 1951. on the U.N. "Price of Peace" radio pro-
The United Nations' efforts in the open- gram, stated that the Soviet peoples
ing months of the year had been ignored believed that a peaceful settlement
by the Chinese Government at Peiping could be achieved in Korea. As a first
and the latter had given no indication step, he suggested that the belligerents
that it was inclined to discuss a cessation could start discussing the possibilities of
of hostilities except on its own terms. a cease-fire and an armistice "providing
Since the Peiping conditions included for the mutual withdrawal of forces from
the withdrawal of the UNC forces from the 38th parallel." 1 If both sides had
Korea, the return of Taiwan to Red a "sincere desire" to end the fighting in
China, and the seating of a Chinese Korea, he felt that this would not be too
Communist delegate to the United Na- great a price to pay for peace.2
tions, there was little chance that the Although the Peiping government ap-
United States would accept them. In the proved Malik's suggestions several days
face of this stalemate, patience and con- later, it served notice that it had not
tinued military pressure seemed to be given up hope of pressing its own terms.
the most potent UNC weapon. Yet despite the warning note from the
Chinese Communists, initial reaction to
Preliminary Arrangements the Soviet proposal was cautiously favora-
ble among the United Nations. The very
After the Communist offensive in May 1
For literary reasons, the terms "armistice,"
had been turned back, many U.N. ob- "truce," and "cease-fire" have been used inter-
servers were optimistic that the Chinese changeably throughout this volume. According to
the Office of the Judge Advocate General, "truce"
might now find the cost of carrying on signifies a temporary interruption of fighting be-
the war too high in casualties and equip- tween local forces for some reason such as the
ment and be more receptive to negotia- collection of the dead and wounded. The word
"armistice" has a similar connotation, but is utilized
tions. Trygve Lie, Secretary General of to cover a temporary cessation of hostilities on a
the United Nations, proffered another broader scale. "Cease-fire" applies when all acts of
peace bid in early June and U.N. diplo- war are halted, bringing about an informal end to
the war and stabilizing the situation until formal
mats sought to fashion a proposal palat- negotiations can be completed.
able to the Communists. 2
New York Times, June 24, 1951.
16 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
existence of a disposition to negotiate the discussions with the Communists,
was a welcome sign and they awaited a General Ridgway was instructed to
further amplification of the vague ref- broach the matter to the Commander
erences to peace and of procedures ac- in Chief, Communist Forces Korea.5 On
ceptable to the Communists. 30 June, Ridgway broadcast via radio
It did not take long. On the 27th, his willingness to establish a date for
Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei the first meeting and suggested to the
Gromyko informed American Ambassa- Communist leader that a Danish hospital
dor Alan G. Kirk in Moscow that the ship in Wonsan Harbor might be a
armistice should be negotiated by the suitable place.6
field commanders and should be limited On the same day, Ridgway was ad-
to strictly military questions without in- vised on the general policy and objec-
volving any political or territorial tives of the United States in negotiating
matters. In the meantime, Secretary of a cease-fire with the Communists. These
State Dean G. Acheson, appearing before instructions provided the framework for
the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the American position during the nego-
support of the foreign aid bill, men- tiations.7
tioned in passing that the U.S. military The principal military interests of the
objectives in Korea would be satisfied United States were securing a cessation
if the Communists withdrew behind the of hostilities, assurance against the re-
38th Parallel and gave adequate guaran- sumption of fighting, and the protection
tees against a renewal of aggression.3 of the security of U.N. forces. Recogniz-
It is interesting to note that each side ing quite clearly that the Communists
quickly used the reported statements of might not want to reach a permanent
the opposition in arguing its own posi- political settlement in Korea, the U.S.
tion after the negotiations began. political and military leaders advised
Whatever doubt may have existed over Ridgway that it was essential to obtain
the authority of the Unified Command a military agreement that would be ac-
to initiate and conduct cease-fire nego- ceptable to the United States over an ex-
tiations was soon dispelled by the U.N. tended period of time. Severely
legal advisor, Abraham Feller. He in- restricting the Far East commander to
formed Secretary General Lie that the military matters, they cautioned him
United States had the right to conclude against discussing political questions and
a cease-fire or armistice without further 5
The U.N. leaders were not certain who was in
authorization from the United Nations actual military command of the enemy forces in
as long as the negotiations were limited Korea, therefore the title was made all-inclusive.
6
(1) Msg, JCS 95258, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jun 51.
to military matters and the end result (2) UNC/FEC, Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and
was reported to the Security Council.4 CofS, Jun 51.
7
With the United Nations sanctioning For a discussion of the making of U.S. policy
during the Korean War, see Chapter IV, below. In
the leadership of the United States in general, the JCS, the Departments of Defense and
State, the National Security Council, and the Presi-
3
New York Times, June 27, 29, 1951. dent participated in the formation and approval
4
Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. of political-military national policy. Ridgway's chan-
Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council nel of communication was via the Department of
on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 184. the Army and the JCS.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 17

placed not only the disposition of After receiving these instructions,


Taiwan and the seating of Communist General Ridgway delegated the respon-
China in the United Nations in this sibility for the preparation of detailed
category but also the 38th Parallel. plans and physical arrangements for the
These problems should be considered at truce talks to the Joint Strategic Plans
the political level. and Operations Group (JSPOG),
To provide flexibility in dealing with headed by Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright.9
the Communists, U.S. leaders held that Working closely with this group, Ridg-
the U.S. negotiators could adopt initial way drafted an agenda and on 1 July for-
positions more advantageous than they warded it to the JCS, together with the
expected to obtain, but care must be names of the representatives he had se-
taken that a retreat to the minimum lected to represent the United Nations at
acceptable position should remain open. the conference table. To head the
They did not want the United States to delegation, he had chosen Vice Adm. C.
be accused of bad faith in its negotiating. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval Forces,
As for specific details, the U.S. leaders Far East, a tough veteran of the Pacific
felt that a military armistice commis- campaigns in World War II. Support-
sion with equal representation from both ing Joy there would be: Maj. Gen.
sides should be established. This com- Henry I. Hodes, Deputy Chief of Staff,
mission should have the right of free and Eighth Army, who had led an infantry
unlimited access to all Korea and power regiment in the European war; Maj.
to carry out its task of insuring that the Gen. Laurence C. Craigie, Vice Com-
conditions of the armistice were met. mander, Far East Air Forces, who had
Until the commission was prepared to commanded a fighter wing in North
function, the armistice would not be- Africa; Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke,
come effective. On the battlefield a Deputy Chief of Staff, Naval Forces, Far
demilitarized zone twenty miles wide East, also known as "31-Knot" Burke
should be set up based on the positions because of his handling of destroyers at
occupied at the time the truce was top speed in the Pacific war; and Maj.
signed. There would be no reinforce- Gen. Paik Sun Yup, Commanding Gen-
ment of troops or augmentation of eral, ROK I Corps, a young and able
matériel and equipment except on a one- Korean combat commander.10
for-one replacement basis. In the matter Ridgway also informed the JCS that
of prisoners of war, they would be ex- he intended to send another message to
changed as quickly as possible on a the Communists, who had not yet an-
similar basis, one for one. In the mean- 9
General MacArthur had established JSPOG on
time, representatives of the Interna- 20 August 1949 and staffed the group with Army,
tional Committee of the Red Cross Navy, and Air Force representatives. The group had
should be permitted to visit all prisoner responsibility for high level planning in the theater
and served as the principal planning agency for the
of war (POW) camps to render such U.N. Command during the Korean War.
assistance as they could until the ar- 10
General Ridgway later stated that he had se-
rangements were completed.8 lected Admiral Joy personally and then he and Joy
had picked the other members of the delegation
after consultation. Interv, author with Ridgway,
8
Msg, JCS 95354, JCS to Ridgway, 30 Jun 51. 11 Dec 61. In OCMH.
18 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

KAESONG

swered his first broadcast, suggesting a United Nations commander thought


preliminary meeting of liaison officers Kaesong would be satisfactory, but was
either at Wonsan Airfield or on the main disturbed at an implication that the
Seoul-Kaesong highway between Kae- Communists believed that military op-
song and the Imjin River. The liaison offi- erations would be suspended during the
cers could arrange the details of time, negotiations. He wanted to inform them
place, and procedures to be followed for that there would be no cessation of
the meeting of the chief delegates.11 hostilities prior to the conclusion of the
Before Ridgway could send the second armistice. In addition, he desired to ask
message, the Communists broadcast a them to advance the first meeting so
reply. Following their customary policy that the negotiations could get under
of never accepting a proposal in toto, way immediately.12
they suggested that the representatives Sensitive to the propaganda potential-
meet at Kaesong, the old capital of Korea ity of the last request, the U.S. leaders
located just below the 38th Parallel refused to allow the U.N. Command to
thirty-five miles northwest of Seoul, be placed in the role of petitioner. "We
sometime between 10 and 15 July. The must not appear eager," they told Ridg-
11
Msg, CX 66160, Ridgway to JCS, 1 Jul 51,
way, "to advance [the] date of meeting."
DA-IN 10033.
12
Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 2 Jul 51, DA-IN 10135.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 19

They approved his other suggestions and basic U.S. premise and the delegates
told him that if he had to refer to the would lead from strength not weakness
Chinese commander, Peng Teh-huai, by in the truce conference. On the other
title, he should designate him Command- hand, he recognized that patience would
ing General, Chinese Communist Forces be mandatory, since lengthy and fre-
in Korea rather than as Commander of quent propaganda speeches would be
the Chinese Volunteers, which the inevitable. The wisest course, he coun-
Chinese preferred.13 On 4 July, Kim seled, would be to ignore them. If any
Il Sung, as Supreme Commander of the opportunity arose to detach Communist
Korean People's Army, and Peng Teh- China from the Soviet Union bloc or to
huai agreed to the preliminary meeting increase the tension between them with-
of the liaison officers and proposed 8 out becoming involved politically, the
July as the date.14 UNC delegation should seek to exploit
Although the Communists appeared it.
willing to initiate discussions, reports In dealing with Orientals, the Gen-
from the front indicated that they were eral went on, great care had to be taken
gathering forces and supplies for another not to cause them to "lose face." A
major offensive in mid-July. Air recon- "Golden Bridge" of withdrawal from a
naissance disclosed increased sightings of situation was of high importance to the
vehicular and rail traffic moving south Oriental. Since there might also be
and made Ridgway skeptical of Com- some difficulty with semantics, consider-
munist good faith in conducting armi- ing that English, Chinese, and Korean
stice negotiations. To give the U.N. translations would be used, care would
Command a stronger moral position in have to be taken to insure against basic
the face of the enemy troop and equip- and sustained misunderstandings aris-
ment build-up, Ridgway suggested that ing from inaccuracies in translation.
the deployment of a fighter-bomber wing Ridgway concluded by pointing out
scheduled for movement to the theater that if the negotiators could cap the
be deferred until a more opportune mo- military defeat of the Communists in
ment. But the U.S. leaders had already Korea with successful and skillful han-
taken the propaganda aspects of the dling of the armistice conversations,
shipment into consideration and told "history may record that Communist
Ridgway that a postponement now military aggression reached its high
would only weaken the UNC pos- water mark in Korea, and that there-
ture.15 after Communism itself began its reces-
On 6 July, Ridgway informed his rep- sion in Asia." 16
resentatives of his personal views on To buttress the military members of
the forthcoming negotiations. Implaca- the truce teams, General Ridgway in-
ble opposition to communism was the tended to keep Ambassador John J.
13 Muccio and U.S. Political Advisor
14
Msg, JCS 95438, JCS to CINCUNC, 2 Jul 51.
15
Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 5 Jul 51, DA-IN 11098. William J. Sebald at Munsan-ni, some
(1) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 2 Jul 51, DA-IN
16
10135. (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 5 Jul 51, DA-IN Memo, Gen Ridgway for General and Flag
11527. (3) Msg, JCS 95735, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jul Officer Members of the U.N. Delegation, 6 Jul 51,
51. in UNC/FEC files.
20 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
twenty-odd miles north of Seoul, where electric installations along the Yalu, or
a tent camp had been established for Rashin (Najin) near the Soviet border
the UNC negotiators. But the Army would be carried out without JCS per-
leaders in Washington reacted very mission. Nor could any bombing be
strongly to the suggestion that these two permitted within twelve miles of the
well-known diplomats provide political Soviet frontier. In case the Soviet Union
guidance. It might give the Communists intervened in the war, the U.N. com-
the impression that the talks would go mander was to assume the strategic
beyond the military stage, and further- defensive and report to the JCS, making
more, because of Sebald's connection preparations for the temporary with-
with Japanese affairs and the proposed drawal of UNC forces to Japan.
peace treaty, the Army was very anxious As Commander in Chief, Far East,
not to associate the imminent Japanese Ridgway also had certain U.S. respon-
treaty negotiations with the cease-fire sibilities. He would defend Taiwan and
talks. As a result, Ridgway asked Sebald the Pescadores by air and naval action
to go back to Tokyo and Muccio to only and also defend Japan in the event
remain at Seoul.17 of a Soviet attack. The same restrictions
Before the truce talks opened, the were placed upon him against attacking
U.S. leaders decided to bring Ridgway's Chinese or Soviet territory and he was
directives up to date. They informed reminded that only the President had
him that his mission as the United the authority to order preventive action
Nations commander was to inflict maxi- against concentrations of forces on the
mum personnel and matériel losses upon Chinese mainland.18
the enemy in Korea consistent with the These directives supplemented the in-
security of the forces under his com- structions on the conduct of the armistice
mand. His main objective would be to negotiations and together they de-
attain a settlement to terminate the lineated the realm of action open to
hostilities. Appropriate arrangements in Ridgway for the immediate future.
support of this included establishing the Whether the restrictions laid down by
authority of the ROK over all of Korea the Washington leaders would be lifted
south of the 38th Parallel, providing for or firmly adhered to would apparently
the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean depend upon Communist behavior at
troops, and permitting the building of the negotiations.
ROK military power to deter or repel
further North Korean aggression. He The Measure of the Opposition
could carry out ground, amphibious, air-
borne, air, and naval operations in Korea On 8 July, the UNC liaison officers,
that might support his mission, insure led by Col. Andrew J. Kinney, USAF,
the safety of his command, or harass the set out from Munsan-ni by helicopter.
enemy, but certain restrictions were im- They landed near Kaesong, where the
posed. No air or naval operations against Communists met and escorted them to
Communist China, the USSR, the hydro- the first meeting across the conference
18
17
UNC/FEC Staff Sec, Rpt, Office of CinC and (1) Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.
CofS, Jul 51, p. 7. (2) Msg, JCS 95978, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 21
table. Before the Communists could members of the UNC group would wear
forestall them, the UNC liaison officers arm brassards for identification except
walked in and sat down facing the south, the delegates themselves. As for convoys
causing a great deal of agitation among moving to and from Kaesong, Kinney
their counterparts. According to orien- informed the Communists that these
tal tradition in negotiating peace, the would be exempt from attack provided
conquering nation faces the south and they were properly marked with white
the defeated state the north.19 flags or squares and provided that the
The initial exchange was formal and time and route of the convoys were com-
without cordiality. Refreshments were municated to the U.N. Command.
declined by the UNC party and the Kinney later reported that the Com-
amenities were quickly dispensed with. munist attitude had been co-operative.20
As the first order of business, Kinney The motor convoy of the UNC dele-
submitted the list of UNC delegates and gation, bearing large white flags, was
requested the names of the Communist halted at the outpost of Panmunjom, on
representatives. But evidently the the morning of the 10th, while the Com-
enemy intended to look over the UNC munists made "preparations" for their
list before they revealed their own selec- safe conduct. When the convoy reached
tions, for they proposed a three-hour Kaesong, the nature of these "prepara-
recess so that they could receive instruc- tions" became apparent. Three vehicles
tions from their superiors. filled with Communist officers in full
Food, liquor, and cigarettes were dress swung in front of the line and posed
again offered to the liaison group at this as victors as the procession drove through
time, but were refused. Kinney sent back Kaesong. Communist photographers
to the helicopters for the lunch they had gave full picture coverage to this
brought with them. parade.21
After the recess the Communists an- On the shoulder of a hill on the out-
nounced their delegation, headed by skirts of Kaesong, the convoy stopped
Lt. Gen. Nam Il of the Korean People's before a large granite mansion. This
Army. The first meeting would take was supposed to be the UNC resthouse
place on 10 July in Kaesong and the and consultation area, but since the UNC
Communists would clear the road from officers suspected that the Communists
the outpost of Panmunjom, some six might have wired the house and might
miles east of Kaesong. UNC vehicles be listening in, very little serious con-
would be marked with white flags and versation was conducted inside the build-
the Communists would assume respon- ing. After a brief pause, the delegates
sibility for the safety of UNC personnel moved down the road to the conference
en route and in the conference area. All area.
19 20
When the main delegations convened two days (1) Mtg between Liaison Officers at Kaesong, 8
later, the Communists took no chances on a repe- Jul 51, in G-3 Liaison Officers Rpts, 8 Jul-15 Aug
tition of this situation and for the remainder of the 51. (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Jul 51, DA-IN
negotiations the UNC representatives were pro- 12369.
21
vided with a northern exposure. See Admiral C. Col. J. C. Murray, "The Korea Truce Talks:
Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New First Phase," United States Naval Institute Proceed-
York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 3-4. ings, vol. 79, No. 9 (September, 1953), p. 982.
22 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

U.N. LIAISON OFFICERS BEING MET BY COMMUNISTS who will escort them to Kaesong.
Left to right: Colonel Murray and Colonel Kinney; Lt. Col. Lee Soo Young of the ROK Army;
Lt. Richard Underwood, Korean interpreter; and CWO Kenneth Wu, Chinese interpreter for
the U.S. Army.

Before the war the teahouse chosen by table giving the Communists an advan-
the Communists as the site of the tage in the seating.22 Even in small
meetings had been a fashionable restau- things, the Communists would not allow
rant that had provided music and danc- themselves to be outdone. When the
ing girls. Now it was bullet scarred and UNC delegation placed a small U.N.
some of the buildings had been damaged. flag in a brass stand in front of them on
Armed Communists guards were every- the table, the Communists countered by
where as the negotiators were conducted producing a flag in a larger stand at the
to an inner courtyard and entered the afternoon meeting.
conference room. In dress the contrast among the dele
General Nam sat in a high chair facing
south and Admiral Joy was provided a
low chair on the opposite side of the 22
Joy,How Communists Negotiate, pp. 4-5.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 23
gates was striking. Except for General
Paik, who was clad in fatigues, the UNC
officers wore comfortable summer tans.
The Chinese wore plain, drab uniforms
without insignia, but the North Kore-
ans with high-collar dress blouses, full
insignia, and high leather boots were the
sartorial champions.
The leader of the Communist dele-
gation, General Nam, had other quali-
fications besides his neatness and correct
military bearing. Although only in his
late thirties, he was Chief of Staff of the
North Korean Army and also Vice
Premier of the North Korean state.
Educated in Manchuria, he spoke Chi-
nese and Russian as well as Korean-
Assisting General Nam at the con-
ference table were Maj. Gen. Lee Sang
Cho, Chief of the Reconnaissance
Bureau of the North Korean Army and
a former Vice Minister of Commerce;
Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, Chief of
Staff, I Corps, North Korean Army, a U.N. LIAISON GROUP and its Commu-
late addition to the Communist delega- nist escort arrive at the rest house, Kaesong.
tion; Lt. Gen. Teng Hua, commander
of the 15th Army Group of the Chinese military matters relating to Korea and
Communist Army, who had joined the would not consider political or economic
Communist Party in 1929 and made the subjects. Until agreement on the armi-
Long March to Yenan; and Maj. Gen. stice terms was reached, he went on, and
Hsieh Fang, Chief of Propaganda of a military armistice commission was
Northeast Military District of China, ready to function, hostilities would con-
who was reported to have played a major tinue. He then presented the nine-point
role in the 1936 kidnapping of Chiang agenda drawn up by the U.N. Com-
Kai-shek. Communist representatives in mand: 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2.
most cases had as much political as Location of and authority for Inter-
military experience and this provided national Committee of the Red Cross
another point of difference between the (ICRC) representatives to visit prisoner
two delegations, for the UNC negotiators of war camps. 3. Limitation of discussion
were all professional military men. to purely military matters related to
In his opening address, Admiral Joy Korea only. 4. Cessation of hostilities
tried to counter this political advantage. and of acts of armed force in Korea
He stated quite bluntly that the UNC under conditions that would assure
representatives intended to discuss only against resumption of hostilities and acts
24 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
of armed force in Korea; 5. Agreement safety was the chief factor in imposing
on a demilitarized zone across Korea. the restrictions. He would contact his
6. Composition, authority, and functions superior, Kim Il Sung, on the question
of a military armistice commission. 7. of newsmen.
Agreement on principle of inspection In presenting the Communist agenda,
within Korea by military observer teams, Nam followed the old precept that the
functioning under a military armistice best defense is an offense. He attacked
commission. 8. Composition and func- the UNC program as unduly long and
tions of these teams. 9. Arrangements repetitious. Since the matter of ICRC
pertaining to prisoners of war. representatives visiting POW camps was
Nam then proceeded to state the connected with the over-all POW item,
Communist position. Basically it called it should be taken up when the general
for a return to the old status quo, with problem was considered. U.N. Item 3
both sides withdrawing to the 38th concerning the limitation of discussions
Parallel and removing all foreign troops of military matters pertaining to Korea
from Korea. He proposed an immediate only was unnecessary, he continued, for
cease-fire and the establishment of a the meetings were confined to military
20-kilometer demilitarized zone along matters anyway. As for Items 4 and 5,
the 38th Parallel. Once this was done, the cessation of hostilities and establish-
the question of prisoners of war could ment of a demilitarized zone, they were
be discussed. The Chinese delegate, not concrete. They should be set forth
General Teng, supported Nam on each clearly and then the supplementary mat-
point. ters contained in the next three UNC
But Admiral Joy refused to be led items in regard to a military armistice
into any discussion of substantive matters commission and inspection teams could
at this time and asked for the Com- be settled. The final subject would be
munist agenda. He pointed out that prisoners of war. In conclusion Nam
these were political subjects and outside held that the shorter five-point agenda
the purview of the negotiations. presented by the Communists was more
After the noon recess, restrictions proper and would allow the subjects to
placed by the Communists upon the free be discussed in their correct order:
movement of the UNC couriers in the 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Estab-
conference area drew a protest from lishment of the 38th Parallel as the
Admiral Joy, He also broached the military demarcation line between the
desirability of bringing twenty U.N. two sides and establishment of a de-
newsmen and photographers along with militarized zone, as basic conditions for
the UNC delegation to the conference the cessation of hostilities in Korea.
area, since Communist photographers 3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of
were being given full access. In reply foreign countries from Korea. 4. Con-
General Nam seemed to agree that both crete arrangements for the realization of
sides should have an equal press and pic- cease-fire and armistice in Korea. 5. Ar-
ture coverage of the conference, but he rangements relating to prisoners of war
hedged on allowing UNC personnel following the armistice.
freedom of movement, arguing that Acceptance of this agenda would have
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 25

FORMER TEA HOUSE WHERE THE KAESONG CONFERENCES WERE HELD

settled the question of the 38th Parallel the cessation of hostilities and the agree-
and the withdrawal of foreign troops ment on a demilitarized zone.23
from Korea at the outset, so Admiral At the close of the first meeting, the
Joy refused to discuss any specific line initial objectives of the Communists in
of demarcation. He maintained that the truce negotiations seemed clear—a
the U.N. Command would consider a return to the 38th Parallel and the
line of demarcation and a demilitarized clearing of foreign troops from Korea.
zone but not the 38th Parallel as the Once these were attained and the
demarcation line. As for the withdrawal balance of military power redressed in
of foreign troops, Joy reiterated that this their favor, it would be possible for them
was a political substantive question that to carry on the remainder of the negotia-
could be discussed after an armistice was tions at their own pace and inclination.
agreed upon. The first subject to be
taken up, he said, was the adoption of
the agenda and this could be followed 23
Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice Pro-
by Items 4 and 5 of the UNC proposal, posal in Korea, 10 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea, 348.
26 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

U.N. ARMISTICE DELEGATES TO THE FIRST SESSION. Left to right: General Hodes,
General Craigie, Admiral Joy, General Paik Sun Yup of the ROK Army, and Admiral Burke.

Battle of the Agenda was a meeting to consider military mat-


ters, not humanitarian, he could not
On the night of 10 July, U.N. news- see what business it had on the agenda.
men at Munsan-ni set up a betting pool As long as the UNC delegation insisted
on the length of the armistice negotia- on excluding nonmilitary matters, the
tions. The "pessimists" guessed that it Communists had a point.
would take six weeks,24 As it turned out, There was no progress on other
a fortnight passed before the conferees agenda items. To the Communist brief
could reach agreement on the agenda on the 38th Parallel, Admiral Joy re-
alone. joined that the U.N. Command "is com-
The second meeting on the 11th found pletely uninterested in any imaginary
each side defending its own program and line across Korea which has no military
attacking the opposing agenda. Admiral significance to the existing military situa-
Joy attempted to press the matter of tion." But the Communists refused to
ICRC visits to POW camps as a humani- modify their stand on this or on the
tarian measure, but Nam Il quickly withdrawal of foreign forces.
picked this argument up and turned it In reply to Joy's protest on the restric-
against the U.N. Command. Since this tions imposed on the movement of ve-
24
Rutherford M. Poats, Decision in Korea (New hicles, Nam agreed to permit free
York: The McBride Company, 1954), p. 204. movement of properly marked vehicles
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 27

THE COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVES. Left to right: Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang and Lt. Gen.
Teng Huo of the Chinese People's Army; General Nam Il, Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, and
General Chang Pyong San of the North Korean Army.

provided the Communist liaison officers lowing morning at Panmunjom, the


were informed beforehand. He denied, Communists held firm, perhaps to find
however, the UNC requests for granting out whether the U.N. Command was
U.N. newsmen immediate access to the bluffing or not. In any event the UNC
conferences. Since General Ridgway had liaison officers informed the enemy that
assembled the newsmen at Munsan-ni on the motor convoy with the newsmen
the assumption that they would be per- would be at Panmunjom at 0900. If the
mitted to cover all of the negotiations, newsmen were not allowed to pass, the
Admiral Joy refused to accept the whole convoy would return to Munsan-
Communist rejection. He informed ni.
Nam that the UNC delegation would Matching determination with deter-
return with the newsmen or not at all. mination, the Communists held up the
This firm position surprised the Com- convoy and would not permit the news-
munists and placed the burden squarely men to go to the conference area, where-
on their shoulders—either accept the upon the whole convoy returned to the
newsmen or delay the negotiations.25 base camp. The next two days were
When the liaison officers met the fol- spent in debate at the liaison officer level,
25
Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice Pro-
with the Communists urging the UNC
posal in Korea, 11 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea, 348. delegation to revive the talks and the
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 29

latter steadfastly refusing to go back un-


38th Parallel and showed no signs of
til the newsmen accompanied them.26 giving ground.28
General Ridgway had the complete Behind the scenes the UNC staff
support of his superiors in Washington officers worked feverishly as they sought
on this matter, and they also had ap- to discover chinks in the enemy's nego-
proved his decision to insist upon full tiating armor. Each night in anticipation
reciprocity of treatment at the armi- of the next day's meeting two or three of
stice negotiations. To secure this they the staff officers would prepare position
felt that the Kaesong area should be papers and the other members of the
completely demilitarized and armed UNC delegation would sit around and
guards should be removed from the pick them to pieces. After several hours
Kaesong-Munsan road.27 of critical examination, the position
By 15 July the Communists decided papers were boiled down to the bare
to concede and the third plenary meeting essentials and considered ready for pre-
was arranged for the afternoon. Ac- sentation to the Communists. This
companied by the twenty newsmen, the process of long hours of searching
U.N. delegation returned to Kaesong examination was supplemented by in-
and promptly pressed for equality of formal discussions, and it also es-
treatment en route and in the conference tablished a pattern that was to be
area. A 5-mile circle should be drawn repeated again and again as the nego-
around Kaesong and all armed personnel tiations went on.29
should be eliminated, argued Admiral The first break in the Communist
Joy. Furthermore, freedom of vehicular position came at the fourth meeting on
movement between Panmunjom and the 15 July. The UNC delegation had
conference area without prior notice revised its agenda and condensed it to
should be recognized. The Communists, four points: 1. Adoption of the agenda.
agreeing in principle, suggested that the2. Establishment of a demilitarized zone
liaison officers work out this problem. as a basic condition for the cessation of
(Map 1) hostilities in Korea. 3. Concrete ar-
Since the Communists had assured the rangements for a cease-fire and armi-
U.N. Command that only military mat- stice that would insure against a re-
ters would be discussed at the meetings, sumption of hostilities and acts of
Joy agreed to drop Item 3 from the armed force in Korea periling a final
UNC agenda. As for the visit of ICRC peace settlement, a. Military armistice
representatives to POW camps, Joy in- commission, including composition, au-
formed the enemy that this could be thority and functions. b. Military ob-
taken up when POW's were considered. server teams, including composition,
Thus the U.N. Command dropped two authority, and functions. 4. Arrange-
of its nine items at the third meeting. ments relating to prisoners of war.
But the Communists clung firmly to the
28
Transcript of Proceedings, Mtg, Armistice Pro-
posal in Korea, 15 Jul 51, in G-3 Korea, 348/3.
26 29
UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and Interv, author with Brig Gen James A. Norell,
CofS,
27
Jul 51, pp. 12-15. 12 Jun 61. General Norell served as staff officer at
Msg, JCS 96160, JCS to CINCUNC, 13 Jul 51. Kaesong and Panmunjom.
30 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
After a 2-hour recess to study the new tourists. Should the cease-fire be ordered
agenda, the Communists made their first and armistice achieved, yet the foreign
real concession. They accepted the gen- armed forces still stay where they are, it
eral statement of Item 2, although they is clear that the intention is not possible
affirmed their intent to insist on the to let them enjoy the scenic beauties of
38th Parallel in the substantive discus- Korea. . . . " Possibly Nam had never
sions. They also agreed that Item 3 was seen the recruiting posters in the United
an improvement and they would States, but, at any rate, the speech made
examine it further. As the area of dis- little impression upon the UNC dele-
agreement narrowed, it became apparent gation.32
that the biggest obstacle remaining was Secretary of State Acheson issued a
the withdrawal of foreign troops.30 strong statement to the press supporting
On the following day the Communists the UNC position on the 19th. Making
used a negotiating tactic that soon be- it clear that UNC troops would stay in
came standard—they out waited the UNC Korea until a genuine peace was firmly
delegates and induced the latter to speak established, he maintained that Korea's
first, obviously hoping that they would neighbors knew that the UNC forces
offer a concession of some kind that the posed no threat to them. "Once be-
Communists could seize upon. After fore," he concluded, "foreign forces were
Admiral Joy had explained the func- withdrawn from Korea as a part of a
tions of the military armistice commis- U.N. plan to reach a final settlement of
sion and the observer teams, General the Korean problem. The Communists
Nam declared that UNC Item 3 was still defied this effort and committed aggres-
too specific. He suggested a shorter, sion against the Republic of Korea. The
more general statement, which the U.N. Korean people can be assured that a
Command accepted on the 18th at the repetition of this act will not be tole-
sixth meeting. With agreement on rated." 33 Ridgway was pleased by the
Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the UNC agenda content and timing of the Acheson state-
attained, the UNC delegation was ready ment and felt that it would have a bene-
to open the substantive discussions, but ficial effect the negotiations.34
the Communists continued to insist on At the close of the meeting on the
the inclusion of the item on the with- 19th, Admiral Joy queried Ridgway as
drawal of foreign troops.31 to whether he could recess the conversa-
Despite the adamant position of the tions until the Communists had some-
U.N. Command on this matter, Nam Il thing new to offer. But the U.N. com-
returned to the attack at the next session mander was unwilling to use this tactic
and with a hint of sarcasm declared: at this stage of the negotiations. The
"War is not travel and troops are not onus for any break must fall on the

30 32
Transcript of Proceedings, Mtg, Armistice Pro- Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtg, Armistice Pro-
posal in Korea, 16 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea, 348/3. posal
33 in Korea, 19 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea, 348/3.
31
Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice Msg. JCS 96802, JCS to CINCUNC (Adv), 19
Proposal in Korea, 17, 18 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea, Jul 51.
34
348/3. Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Jul 51, DA-IN 16716.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 31

Communists.35 He recommended, how- mentally. At the end of this meeting,


ever, that the UNC delegation take a the Communists tried another tack.
stronger attitude toward the many dis- They asked for a four-day recess to allow
courtesies and the rudeness that the both sides to reconsider. Reluctantly
Communists had displayed in recent the UNC delegation agreed.38
meetings. In the future, he went on, When the conferees reconvened on
Joy's replies, under similar provocation, the 25th, the Communists made one
should be "terse, blunt, forceful and as last attempt to place the withdrawal of
rude as his remarks may occasion." 36 troops on the agenda, but the UNC
Realizing that the withdrawal of for- representatives held firm. At the after-
eign troops issue might deadlock the noon session the Communists suddenly
conference or even cause the Commu- agreed to drop this controversial subject.
nists to break off negotiations, the Instead they proposed to add a fifth
Washington leaders suggested that a item—Recommendations to the govern-
slightly different approach be tried. The ments of the countries concerned on both
UNC delegation could offer a broad sides. They announced their intention
agenda item that would allow the Com- to suggest a high-level conference to con-
munists to discuss the matter unilaterally sider the question of withdrawal of
without committing the U.N. Command troops by stages soon after the military
to anything. If this failed, Ridgway agreement was reached. Although this
could agree to discussing at some future was vague, Admiral Joy felt that it did
date a mutual reduction of forces. The indicate a desire on the part of the
Washington leaders definitely preferred Communists to get on to the substantive
the first solution.37 discussions. He reported that Nam Il
Nature provided a brief interlude for was more intense and nervous at the
the negotiators on 20 July. The Pan- meeting and that the Chinese delegates
munjom River flooded and damaged the seemed to be taking a more active part.
bridge so that the UNC delegation could As for the concession itself, he believed
not cross. One of the translators, 1st Lt. that the Communists were trying to
Kenneth Wu, climbed across the broken save face by securing acceptance of the
bridge and hiked to the outpost at Pan- new Item 5 at the same time they gave
munjom to carry the news to the Com- in on the withdrawal issue.39
munists. Although the bridge was With Washington approval of the new
repaired by the next day, it did not Communists proposal, the agenda was
bring the negotiators any closer together complete and the first matter—the adop-
tion of the agenda—concluded. Item 2—
35
(1) Msg, HNC 116, Joy to CINCFE, 19 Jul 51. Fixing a military demarcation line,
(2) Msg, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), 21 Jul 51.
Both in UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC
and CofS, Jul 51, incls 11 and 13. 38
36 Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice
Hq UNC/FEC, History of the Korean War—
Korean Armistice Negotiations (hereafter cited as Proposal at Kaesong, 21 Jul 51, in G-3 091 Korea,
Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations), 348/5.
39
July 1951-May 1952, vol. 2, ch. I, pp. 35-36. MS in Msg, HNC 136, CINCUNC (Adv) to Ridgway,
OCMH. 25 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of
37 CinC and CofS, Jul 51, incl 15.
Msg, JCS 96802, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jul 51.
32 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
between both sides so as to establish a War II.40 Foreseeing that the truce
demilitarized zone as a basic considera- talks might produce a similar situation,
tion for a cessation of hostilities in he informed Van Fleet on 4 July of his
Korea—was in general accordance with views. Phrases such as "Let's get the
the U.N. position and avoided mention boys back home" and "the war-weary
of the 38th Parallel. The Communists troops" were being used again, he
had insisted on shortening the several pointed out. To Ridgway's way of
U.N. agenda proposals relating to cease- thinking there could be "no greater
fire arrangements and Item 3 reflected tragedy" for the free world than to have
their work—Concrete arrangements for a repetition of the "disgraceful" conduct
the realization of cease-fire and armis- of American troops after the last war.
tice in Korea, including the composition, To forestall any recurrence, Ridgway
authority, and functions of a supervising went on, Van Fleet should take any
organization for carrying out the terms steps that judgment and common sense
of a cease-fire and armistice. Item 4— dictated to eliminate the development
Arrangements relating to prisoners of of unfavorable attitudes. He suggested
war—had not been tampered with nor an educational program aimed at the
had the Communist suggestion for Item "unequivocal necessity" for prepared-
5. The greatest casualties in the battle ness in Korea until satisfactory peace
of the agenda—the question of with- terms had been "finally" agreed to by
drawal of foreign troops and the visit of all parties. Ridgway realized that some
ICRC representatives to the prisoner of people might disapprove of his action,
war camps—had suffered mere flesh but maintained that if this were
wounds and would reappear later in the "thought control," then he was in favor
substantive discussions. of it. Otherwise the United States would
"cowardly surrender" all that it had
Reaction at the Front been fighting for. A similar message to
his superiors won assurance that they
With the initiation of negotiations, would combat the rise of like attitudes
the tempo of operations on the battle- at home in the event a truce was signed
41
field slackened. The prospect of an early in Korea.
end to the fighting made U.N. com- Although an enemy offensive failed to
manders and troops eager to prevent any materialize in mid-July, intelligence
unnecessary loss of life. But some small- sources indicated that the Communists
scale, limited-objective attacks were were developing their potential and had
mounted and frequent patrols were sent the capability to launch an attack if and
out to collect information on enemy 40
At the close of World War II, American soldiers
activities and to prevent the U.N. troops had staged demonstrations abroad to put pressure
from losing their fighting edge. upon the U.S. political and military leaders to re-
General Ridgway was keenly aware of turn 41
the soldiers home quickly.
Ridgway's letter to Van Fleet is quoted in Ltr,
probable deterioration in troop morale Hodes to Brig Gen Paul F. Yount, CG 2d Logistical
once the shooting war stopped since he Comd, 7 Jul 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning
had witnessed the soldier demonstra- Files, Jul 51. For the JCS exchange, see: (1) Msg,
Ridgway to JCS, 4 Jul 51, DA-IN, 10908; (2) Msg,
tions in Europe at the close of World JCS 96032, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Jul 51.
THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 33

when the negotiations broke down. the offensive. A successful air strike
Ridgway directed his air and naval com- would naturally reduce the enemy capac-
manders to use their air power to the ity to attack and increase the pressure
maximum to interdict road and rail upon him to negotiate. Although Ridg-
communications lines and to punish the way admitted that his views were based
enemy wherever he might be in Korea. on the local situation rather than the
At General Van Fleet's urging, Ridgway global picture, he felt obliged to inform
also sought to build up the level of the JCS of the dangers in allowing the
ammunition in Korea to a 45-day Communists to augment their strength.44
supply, so that Eighth Army would be Two days later, Ridgway advised the
prepared to meet a large-scale enemy Joint Chiefs that he could omit all ad-
offensive.42 vance warning to the civil populace since
The slowdown on the ground front air force attacks on military installations
did not prevent the U.N. commander in urban areas had been made previously
from applying pressure on the enemy and the people notified. In addition, no-
in other ways. On 21 July he informed tice of the raid would permit the enemy
the JCS that he intended to carry out a to improve his defense measures and re-
massive air strike on the North Korean duce the tactical benefits of a strike.45
capital, P'yongyang. After warning the In any event the U.S. leaders reconsid-
civilian population of several cities by ered. They considered it undesirable to
leaflet that an air attack would be made distribute warning leaflets for they
on one of them, he would send his bomb- thought this would give undue publicity
ers and fighters over P'yongyang on the to the raid. They also did not want to
first suitable day after July 24. The single out P'yongyang as a target for an
Communists had stored considerable all-out strike while the conferences were
quantities of supplies and equipment at. in session, since in the eyes of the world
P'yongyang and it was a key transporta- this might appear to be an attempt to
tion center.43 break off the truce negotiations. How-
The Washington leaders immediately ever, if Ridgway would treat the mission
questioned the wisdom of a large-scale as a routine utilization of air power and
bombing raid at this time. In view of if he felt that P'yongyang was the most
the serious political implications in- important objective, they would con-
volved, they asked Ridgway to defer the sent.46
attack on P'yongyang. The U.N. com- Because of bad weather, the strike was
mander realized that a big air assault not mounted until July 30. Even then,
might have repercussions on the negoti- weather conditions were not ideal and
ations, but pointed out that to permit all attacks planned for light and me-
the enemy to grow stronger than the dium bombers had to be canceled.
U.N. Command could mean a heavy loss Nevertheless the Air Force flew close to
in American lives if the Communists dis- 450 fighter and fighter-bomber sorties.
continued the discussions and resumed
44
(1) Msg, JCS 96938, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Jul 51.
42
UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 23 Jul 51, DA-IN 17620.
CofS,
43
Jul 51, pp. 30ff. 45
46
Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 25 Jul 51, DA-IN 18440.
Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 21 Jul 51, DA-IN 17293. Msg, JCS 97223, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jul 51.
34 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Smoke and heavy cloud coverage made morale was good, and the UNC forces
evaluation of the raid damage difficult.47 held strong defense positions. If the early
As the battle of the agenda came to an compromises by the Communists were
end—on 26 July—the U.N. commander any indication of their desire for peace,
toured the front lines. In a cheerful re- the outlook for a quick settlement was
port to General J. Lawton Collins, Chief favorable. But the picture was not all
of Staff, he described the Eighth Army rosy. The enemy was increasing his
as full of confidence and in high spirits. strength steadily and could launch a full-
Training was progressing satisfactorily scale offensive at any time. And although
and recent replacements were in good the Communists had apparently con-
physical and mental condition. Despite ceded several major points on the
the rainy season, logistical capacity was agenda, there was no doubt that they
unimpaired. Troop commanders had would bring them up again in the sub-
turned up no evidence of a "going home stantive discussions. Behind the UNC
attitude" in their units.48 lines, the government of Syngman Rhee
Despite the optimism occasioned by was highly perturbed about the possibil-
this tour, Ridgway cautioned his com- ity of an armistice that might leave Ko-
manders to be ready to meet the most rea permanently divided and had begun
dangerous capability that the enemy to agitate against any compromise with
could exercise. He estimated that an of- the Communists. The storm warnings
fensive might come either when negotia- were clear and promised that the course
tions broke down or during the Japanese of the truce negotiators might be strewn
peace conference.49 with obstacles. If the negotiations bogged
Up to this point, the outlook was hope- down, the battlefield would also be af-
ful. An agenda had been accepted, fected. A loss of confidence in the out-
come at Kaesong could easily lead to an
47
FEAF Comd Reference Book, 1 Aug 51, p. 7.
expansion of combat operations. With
48
UNC/FEC Staff Sec, Rpt, Office of CinC and the price of failure larger casualty lists,
CofS,
49
Jul 51, p. 32. the center of interest continued to focus
Memo for Red, 26 Jul 51, no sub, in UNC/FEC
Staff Sec, Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jul 51, incl
on the negotiations as the substantive dis-
18. cussions got under way.
CHAPTER III

Point and Counterpoint


On the eve of the opening of the sub- delegates at Kaesong soon dispelled any
stantive discussions at Kaesong, the Sov- illusion that they were eager for a truce
iet Union launched a new peace except on their own terms.
offensive. The Russians suggested a five-
power peace pact to include Communist The 38th Parallel
China and the banning of atomic weap-
ons as steps that would lead to an easing The search for a satisfactory formula
of world tensions.1 As the United States for attaining a truce was hindered by the
was in the midst of preparations for the strong positions taken by both sides at
Japanese peace treaty conference and the outset. As soon as the agenda was
also currently negotiating defensive pacts settled, General Nam quickly turned
with the Philippines, Australia, and New back to the 38th Parallel. Since the
Zealand, the vague Russian proposals boundary had been recognized by all
aroused little enthusiasm among the nations as the dividing line before the
American leaders.2 The confluence of war, Nam urged that it be restored.
circumstances intimated that the Soviet Each side held territory north and south
peace drive was mainly inspired by a of the Parallel and neither would incur
desire for favorable propaganda that any great disadvantage by re-establish-
might disrupt the American undertak- ing the status quo. To create a demili-
ings. tarized zone, Nam proposed that a
The dovetailing of the Communist 20-kilometer strip along the parallel be
peace movement with the armistice dis- cleared of troops. Such a realignment
cussions did not cause any important of forces and readjustment of territory
alterations in the U.S. plans for conclud- would be fair and just, Nam maintained.3
ing the treaty with Japan or the defensive The UNC rebuttal followed on 27
pacts. Nor did it have any great effect July. Admiral Joy ended the preliminary
upon the Korean negotiations. For the skirmishing and came out strongly in
uncompromising position concerning favor of a truce line based on battle
the 38th Parallel adopted by the enemy realities rather than the 38th Parallel.
Pointing out that the Communist and
1
Other members of the pact would be the United U.N. forces had crossed the parallel no
States, United Kingdom, USSR, and France.
2
See article of the U.S. Ambassador to the United less than four times during the last thir-
Nations, Warren R. Austin, "International Unity
3
Against Shifting Soviet Tactics," in Dept of State Transcript of Proceedings, Tenth Session, Conf
Bulletin, vol. XXV, No. 637 (September 10, 1951), at Kaesong, 26 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Ar-
pp. 425ff. See also New York Times, August 7, 1951. mistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.
36 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

teen months, he argued that this fact The Communist reaction was a swift
alone proved the unsuitability of the and rude rejection. "Ridiculous," was
parallel as a demarcation line. An effec- Nam's comment on the 28th as he as-
tive delineation of a demilitarized zone serted that military power was the sum
must be made on practical military total of the power of all arms of the
grounds, Joy continued, and should not forces. The UNC battle lines, he went
be influenced by consideration of ulti- on, were the concentrated expression of
mate political objectives; for a military the military effectiveness of its land, air,
armistice an imaginary geographical and sea forces. Although the present bat-
line such as the 38th Parallel had no tle lines were variable, Nam felt that the
validity whatsoever. 38th Parallel approximately reflected the
Ruling out the parallel as a line of de- current situation and should be accepted
marcation, Joy advanced the UNC pro- as the line of demarcation.
posal. There were three battle zones to After rebuking Nam for his rudeness
be considered, he maintained, the and bluster, Joy proceeded to defend the
ground zone, the sea zone, and the air UNC proposal. Ground progress did not
zone. Although the UNC forces occupied always indicate the status of a war, he
definite positions on the ground, they contended, for Japan was defeated with-
had superiority in the air over all Korea out a single soldier setting foot on the
and controlled the entire Korean sea- Japanese home islands.5
coast. Since the Communists would gain Nam refused to accept this statement.
freedom of movement and be able to He derided the American claim that the
rebuild within their sector of Korea United States had defeated Japan. Any-
when the air and sea power of the one knew, Nam said, that it was the
U.N. Command were confined by a Korean people's struggle, the Chinese
cease-fire and therefore would gain more people's war, and the Soviet Union's re-
than the U.N. Command through a sistance that brought Japan to her knees.
truce, Joy suggested that the Communists Had not the United States fought Japan
should compensate the UNC by making for three years without victory until the
concessions on the ground. On the map Soviet Army entered the war and dealt
that he presented to the enemy delegates, Japan a crushing blow? "Can these
UNC staff officers had drawn a demili- historical facts be negated lightly?" he
tarized zone twenty miles wide consider- concluded.6
ably to the north of the ground positions Since each side obviously was using a
then occupied by the UNC forces.4 This different history book, Admiral Joy did
initial offer sought, of course, far more not pursue this subject. Instead he con-
then the UNC delegates expected to tinued to point out the additional
secure, but even so, it was a novel ap- advantages that would accrue to the
proach—an attempt to break total mili- Communists if a truce was signed. They
tary power into its component parts and could repair their roads, bridges, and
give them separate values for bargaining railroads, bring up supplies needed for
purposes. the health and well-being of their
5
Ibid., Twelfth Session, 28 Jul 51.
4 6
Ibid., Eleventh Session, 27 Jul 51. Ibid., Thirteenth Session, 29 Jul 51.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 37

troops, and restore and rehabilitate ence site for propaganda purposes or
their towns and facilities.7 simply made a mistake proved imma-
The Communists were not interested terial. General Ridgway decided to
in the admiral's arguments. They clung adopt a strong position and informed
steadfastly to the 38th Parallel as July Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai that the
passed by and the dog days of August UNC delegation would not hold any fur-
began. The daily sessions became rou- ther conversations with the Communists
tine as each side presented the same until a satisfactory explanation of the
arguments and refused to concede or violation and assurances that it would
compromise. Since apparently the sup- not happen again were received.
port of Marshall and Acheson had helped The first reply from the Communists
convince the Communists that the stated that the troops were guards re-
United States would remain firm on the sponsible for police functions and that
troop withdrawal issue, Joy suggested to they had passed through the area by
Ridgway that high-level backing for the error. Instructions had been issued to
UNC position on Item 2 might also have prevent a recurrence. But although Ad-
a beneficial effect.8 He felt that the con- miral Joy recommended that the U.N.
ference could break up over this matter Command accept this response, Ridg-
for Nam would not even discuss a pro- way determined to press for an inspec-
posal not hinged on the 38th Parallel.9 tion team of equal representation to be
In the midst of this impasse, a strange organized and to carry out a full inspec-
incident occurred. During the lunch tion of the entire neutral zone before the
hour on 4 August a fully armed company next meeting. Ridgway felt that the vio-
of Chinese troops marched past the UNC lation was either a deliberate attempt
delegation house in clear violation of the to intimidate or was due to gross care-
neutrality of the conference zone. This lessness or lack of discipline.11
was a double violation, in fact, for not On the morning of the 6th, a second
only were there supposed to be no armed message was broadcast in Korean, Eng-
troops within a half mile of the confer- lish, and Japanese by the Communists.
ence site but also all troops within a Although the Korean and English ver-
5-mile radius of Kaesong were to be sions were courteous and asked that the
equipped with sidearms only. When the U.N. delegation return to Kaesong, the
conference resumed that afternoon, Joy Japanese broadcast had an insolent and
immediately entered a strong protest and peremptory ending. Ridgway asked for
Nam promised to investigate.10 permission to turn down the Communist
Whether the Communists wished to explanation, but his superiors consid-
demonstrate their control of the confer- ered that the enemy had in effect ac-
cepted the UNC conditions. They
7
Ibid. instructed Ridgway to broadcast his
8
Msg, HNC 148, Joy to Ridgway, 28 Jul 51, in
FEC 387.2, bk. I, 45-D.
acceptance and at the same time to warn
9
Msg, HNC 175, Joy to Ridgway, 4 Aug 51, in the Communists that the resumption of
FEC 387.2, bk. I, 60-C.
10
the talks was conditional upon their com-
Transcript of Proceedings, Nineteenth Session,
11
Conf at Kaesong, 4 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Msg, C 68381, Ridgway to Joy, 6 Aug 51, in
Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs. FEC 387.2, bk. 1, 65.
38 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
plete compliance with the guarantees of their adamant position. If they still
the neutralization of the Kaesong area.12 would not budge, then they would be
Perforce Ridgway agreed, but he vented told that by their own deliberate act
some of his indignation at the Commun- they had terminated the negotiations.
ists in a message to Joy. Blasting the But the Washington leaders disapproved.
enemy as men who considered courtesy They had no intention of presenting an
a concession and concession a weakness, ultimatum at this stage of the discussions.
he enjoined Joy to "govern your utter- If and when the conferences were broken
ances accordingly and you will employ off, the onus should fall squarely upon
such language and methods as these the Communists. After all, they pointed
treacherous Communists cannot fail to out, the 38th Parallel might not be the
understand, and understanding re- breaking point and it would take time
spect." 13 for Moscow and Peiping to amend their
After a 5-day hiatus, the conference stand. Past experience in dealing with
resumed on 10 August. Joy quickly in- the Communists had shown that long
formed General Nam that the UNC and protracted discussions were standard
delegation was through discussing or con- procedure. Calmness, patience, persever-
sidering the 38th Parallel as a military ance, and firmness should characterize
demarcation line. Immediately the Com- the U.N. delegation attitude. This ap-
munists protested against this attempt proach, they concluded, would subject
to limit the discussion, but Joy soon the enemy to the greatest strain while
pointed out that his stand governed only sustaining the unity and strength of the
the UNC response and in no way pre- UNC position.15
vented the Communists from talking On 12 August the Communist repre-
about the 38th Parallel. A very curious sentatives returned to the attack. "You
interlude ensued. For two hours and ten should know that truth is not afraid of
minutes the two delegations faced each repetition, and needs repetition," ad-
other in frozen silence punctuated only monished General Nam as he argued the
by the occasional nervous tapping of case for the 38th Parallel. Unfortunately
Nam's cigarette lighter on the table. Fi- there was no common agreement on what
nally Admiral Joy broke the sound bar- "truth" was or whose "truth" was more
rier and suggested that the conferees turn "truthful" than the other's. Nam termed
to Item 3, since no agreement could be the U.N. proposal for ground compen-
reached on the line of demarcation. The sation "absurd and arrogant" and his
Communists refused.14 own as "reasonable," while Joy attacked
Again General Ridgway urged his su- the Communists' "inflexible and unreal
periors to support a strong course of stand" and defended his own "reason-
action. He proposed to give the Com- able" procedure.16 Since neither side
munists seventy-two hours to modify 15
(1) Msg, C 68672, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Aug 51.
12 (2) Msg, JCS 98637, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Aug 51.
Msg, JCS 98216, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Aug 51.
13 (3) Msg, JCS 98713, JCS to CINCFE, 11
Msg, C 68554, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 8
Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 68-A-1. Aug16 51. All in FEC 387.2, bk. 1, 72.
14 Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-second Ses-
Transcript of Proceedings, Twentieth Session,
Conf at Kaesong, 10 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean sion, Conf at Kaesong, 12 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2,
Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs. Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 39
wished to show any sign of weakness nor work out its recommendations, the plen-
to make concessions without a quid pro ary meetings would stand in recess.19
quo, the sparring in the battle of words The first subdelegate discussion took
continued for several days with no prog- place on 17 August, and although no con-
ress. crete progress resulted, the atmosphere
The Communists fought hard against was more relaxed. General Hsieh seemed
a land advance of the UNC forces as to like this type of exchange. He spoke
compensation. As Pravda put it, "The frequently and acted as a moderator
Korean people have not agreed to the when the comments became sharp. As
negotiations in Kaesong in order to make the talk flowed back and forth around the
a deal with the American usurpers over small table, there was even a tendency on
their own territory." 17 But although the the part of the Communists to consider
UNC delegation admitted that its pro- the demarcation line on the map.
posed demarcation line was entirely At the second session the UNC dele-
within the Communist-controlled area gates managed to shock the Communists
and offered to make some territorial by offering to toss a coin to decide which
adjustments based on the current battle side should make the first new proposal.
line and over-all military situation, it The Communists could not imagine hav-
held firmly to the concept of compensa- ing an important point turn on the flip-
tion.18 ping of a coin. Nevertheless they did
Finally in an effort to break the dead- bring forth a map that slightly modified
lock, Admiral Joy made an important their stand on the 38th Parallel. On the
suggestion that was to have a consider- east they gave the U.N. Command about
able effect upon the conduct of the four kilometers and they took about the
negotiations. On 15 August he proposed same amount in western Korea. Later
that a subcommittee of one delegate and they went further. They proposed to do
two assistants from each side be formed. away with all previous maps and to start
He believed that a less formal round- afresh. Although they refused to answer
the-table exchange might be conducive several pointed questions on the 38th
to freer discussion and might produce a Parallel, General Hodes and Admiral
feasible plan for solving Item 2. On the Burke felt that the Communists might
following day the Communists accepted, be ready to discuss other solutions, pro-
but not without raising the number of vided that the U.N. Command made the
delegates to two instead of one. They opening gambit.20
nominated Generals Lee and Hsieh, and When the third session convened on
Joy named General Hodes and later the 19th, Hodes suggested that, for dis-
Admiral Burke, as his representatives. cussion purposes, the conferees assume
While the subcommittee attempted to that all air and naval effectiveness was
17
reflected in the battle line. The Com-
Quoted in Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A
19
Military-Political History (Philadelphia: University Ibid., Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Sessions,
of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 144.
18
15,16
20
Aug 51.
Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-third and Summary of Proceedings, First and Second Ses-
Twenty-fourth Sessions, Conf at Kaesong, 13, 14 sions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 17, 18 Aug 51,
Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Subdelega-
Min of Conf Mtgs. tion Mtgs.
40 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

munists were willing to talk on this basis, gation had insisted upon an agreement
but warily waited for the U.N. Com- on rules and regulations governing the
mand to make a definite new proposi- conference area. In brief this established
tion. After two days of fruitless fencing, a neutral zone with a 5-mile radius cen-
the Communists retreated further from tered on the traffic circle in Kaesong.
their position on the 38th Parallel. They Each side agreed to refrain from hostile
indicated that if the U.N. Command acts in this zone and all military forces
would give up the concept of compensa- except those performing and equipped
tion, they would present a proposal based for military police functions would be
upon adjustments along the battle line. withdrawn. No armed personnel would
Since this was a definite step forward, be stationed within a half mile of the
the UNC delegates agreed to the princi- conference house. During daylight hours
ple of adjustment. The meeting of the the U.N. delegation was given unre-
22d adjourned with the possibility of stricted use of the road between Pan-
agreement much closer at hand.21 munjom and Kaesong without prior no-
General Ridgway was encouraged. An- tification of the Communists. The U.N.
ticipating that the Communists might liaison officers had already informed
be willing to discuss the "line of contact" their counterparts at the first meeting on
as opposed to the "general area of the 8 July that Communist convoys to and
battle line," he asked and secured ap- from Kaesong, if marked with white
proval for his plan to settle on a demili- crosses and if the U.N. Command was
tarized zone not less than four miles alerted as to their time and route, would
wide with the line of contact as the not be attacked. These arrangements
median.22 seemed fairly clear and simple, yet al-
Unfortunately the promise of progress leged infractions were charged almost at
in the subdelegation meetings was short- once.
lived. A succession of incidents stemming On 16 July the Communists claimed
from alleged violations of the neutral that UNC soldiers had fired in the direc-
zone around Kaesong led the Commun- tion of Panmunjom. Although no one
ists to call off the meetings on the night was injured or any damage committed,
of the 22d. the Communists stated that this was an
act of armed force within the neutral
The Incidents zone. Investigation by the U.N. Com-
mand showed that some firing in the
Charges and countercharges of viola- general area of Panmunjom had taken
tions of the conference area and of the place, but no evidence indicated either
neutrality arrangements had been ramp- that the fire had entered the neutral
ant from the outset of the negotiations. zone or that the UNC forces had done
Following the Communist refusal to ad- the firing.23 In any event, the Commu-
mit the UNC newsmen, the UNC dele- nists did not pursue the matter.
21 23
Ibid., Third and Sixth Sessions, 19, 22 Aug 51. Rpt of Investigation, Col James C. Murray for
22
(1) Msg, C 69346, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Aug 51, CINCUNC, sub: Rpt of Investigation Alleged Vio-
in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 109. (2) Msg, JCS 99477, JCS lation of Neutral Zone, 18 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2,
to CINCFE, 22 Aug 51. Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 41

Five days later Col. Chang Chun San, orable publicity from the incident and
the North Korean liaison officer, in- putting the Communists on the defen-
formed Colonel Kinney that UNC planes sive, the enemy may have decided to
had strafed the Communist delegation's launch a counteroffensive.
supply trucks marked with white flags On 8 August, while the recess con-
at Hwangju and Sariwon. But since the tinued, the Communists reported that
Communists had not notified the UNC two UNC violations of the neutrality
of the movement of this convoy, the arrangements had been committed the
U.N. Command refused to assume any previous day. First, UNC planes had
responsibility for damages incurred un- assaulted a supply truck marked with a
der such circumstances. With the enemy white flag at Sibyon-ni, and, second,
using the roads between P'yongyang and about forty UNC troops had closed on
Kaesong to build up his strength, Ridg- the bridge at Panmunjom and several
way did not intend to extend blanket had fired at unarmed Communist per-
immunity to all vehicles bearing white sonnel. Again, but without much success,
markings, for the UNC suspected that the UNC liaison officers patiently tried
the Communists might well use this de- to convince their opposites that prior
vice to slip through men and matériel notification of convoy movements was
for the front. Furthermore, the U.N. the only guarantee of immunity. The
Command had to take the word of the Communists insisted that the white
Communists that a strafing had actually markings were sufficient. After a thor-
occurred, for no investigations were car- ough investigation of the second charge,
ried on outside the conference area. Admiral Joy found that no UNC units
Ridgway told Admiral Joy to inform had been in the Panmunjom area at that
the enemy that unless advance warning time and therefore could not have been
was given, vehicles would be attacked responsible for the shooting. Because of
wherever found.24 a delay of twenty-eight hours by the
The first two incidents were relatively Communists in laying this claim, Joy
minor and the Communists did not raise questioned its validity.25
too much fuss over them. It may have Less than a week later, on 13 August,
come as quite a shock or revelation to another strafing attack on three Com-
them when the U.N. Command strongly munist supply vehicles took place in the
protested against the already mentioned vicinity of Sibyon-ni and again the enemy
violation of the conference area by a com- protested. Admiral Joy's acknowledge-
pany of fully armed Chinese Communist ment was brief and stated in part: "In
troops on 4 August and suspended the view of the fact that no notification of
meetings for five days until satisfactory this movement was received, no action
assurances against recurrence were re- on the part of the United Nations Com-
ceived from Generals Kim and Peng.
With the U.N. Command garnering fav- 25
(1) Rpts of Investigation, sub: Summary of
Protest and Replies Concerning Alleged Violation
of 7 Aug 51, no date, in FEC 387.2, Korean Ar-
24
(1) Msg, HNC 133, CINCUNC (Adv) to FEAF, mistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation. (2) Msg, CX
25 Jul 51. (2) Msg, CX 67744, CINCFE to CINCFE 68595, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk.
(Adv), 26 Jul 51. Both in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 35. I, 71.
42 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
mand is necessary and none is contem- it safely to the plane and took off as
plated." 26 quickly as possible for Munsan-ni.27
The spate of incidents led the Com- Despite conflicting testimony, investi-
munists to request that the liaison officers gation showed that the patrol had been
meet and work out more satisfactory ar- ambushed, but that no U.N. or ROK
rangements. In mid-August Colonel Kin- units had been close to Songgong-ni at
ney and Col. James C. Murray (a Marine that time. Since some witnesses stated
Corps officer) held a series of conferences that several members of the attacking
with Colonel Chang and reached agree- force had worn civilian clothes and had
ment on a number of items. But even been seen in the area before, the UNC
as they sought to attain final accord, officers surmised that they were partisans
several new incidents occurred. friendly to the ROK but acting inde-
One was another truck strafing, but pendently.28 Needless to say, the Com-
the second was of a more serious nature. munists were not satisfied with this ex-
On 19 August a Chinese military police planation and made full use of the
platoon, patrolling near the village of incident for propaganda purposes.
Songgong-ni in the neutral zone, was Before the furore caused by this epi-
ambushed and the platoon leader was sode had died away, the Communists
killed and another soldier wounded. The summoned Colonel Kinney from his bed
Communists immediately protested and in the early morning hours of the 23d to
accused the U.N. Command of breaching lodge another protest. Upon his arrival
the old agreement. While the UNC of- at Kaesong, Colonel Chang and his Chi-
ficers investigated the charge, the enemy nese colleague, Lt. Col. Tsai Cheng-wen,
made the most of the incident. In the informed him excitedly that a UNC
subdelegation meeting on the 20th, the plane had bombed the conference site.
Communist representatives recessed Despite the darkness and a driving rain,
the session early so as to attend the Kinney and his associates inspected the
funeral of the platoon leader and invited evidence. Although there were several
General Hodes and Admiral Burke to small holes, the so-called bomb frag-
go along with them. This placed the ments appeared to be parts of an aircraft
UNC delegates in an embarrassing po- oil tank and an engine nacelle. The
sition, for if they accepted, the Commu- Communists claimed that one of the
nists would be sure to take pictures and bombs had been napalm, but nowhere
publicize and probably distort the rea- was there any badly scorched earth
sons for their presence. Hodes and area that a napalm explosion would have
Burke decided to decline and hastened caused. After viewing the evidence, Kin-
to their helicopter at the close of the ney termed the whole affair "nonsense."
meeting. Somewhat apprehensive lest
the Communists stop them en route and 27
Interv, author with Col Howard S. Levie, Staff
escort them to the last rites, they made Officer for Subcommittee on item 2, 7 Mar 58. In
OCMH.
26 28
Ltr, Joy to Nam, 14 Aug 51, no sub, Tab 7 in Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest
Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest . . . ... 19 Aug 51, Communist Patrol Ambushed, Com-
Strafing at Sib Yon Ni, no date, in FEC 387.2, munist Truck Attacked, in FEC 387.2, Korean Ar-
Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation. mistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 43

Whereupon Chang retorted that "all ness to gather in the fragments for analy-
meetings from this time" were called sis and the quickness with which the
off. low-echelon liaison officer was able to
As the UNC party drove to Panmun- call off the meetings made the Commu-
jom, the Communist liaison officers over- nist motives suspect. As Ridgway in-
took them and urged them to return formed the JCS, this decision must
and complete the investigation. Kinney have been made in advance and at the
preferred to wait until daylight but highest level. As he saw it, there were
Chang and Tsai insisted that new evi- three possible reasons for the Commu-
dence had been uncovered. Reluctantly nists action: 1. They wanted an excuse
Kinney returned and was shown two to break off the negotiations, with the
more small holes, several small burned blame falling on the UNC. 2. They
patches, and some pieces of aircraft wanted to stall to mesh the timing of the
metal. There was an odor of gasoline conference talks with the Japanese peace
and a substance in one of the holes might treaty and the Russian peace offen-
have been a low-grade napalm that had sive. 3. They desired a suspension to
not been ignited. When the U.N. investi- strengthen their propaganda position
gators requested that all the evidence and to regain the initiative in the nego-
remain in place until it could be in- tiations.30
spected by daylight, the Communists re- Ridgway's suggestions did not exhaust
fused. They intended to gather it all for the list. There were several other inter-
analysis and considered the investigation esting variations. Disappointment in the
over.29 failure of the United States to invite
There were many elements in this af- Communist China to the San Francisco
fair that pointed to a deliberate attempt peace conference on Japan was one sug-
on the part of the Communists to arrange gestion at the time. Another theory rea-
an incident to suspend the negotiations. soned that the Communists had thought
In the first place, the Fifth Air Force the UNC proposal for subdelegation
maintained that it had no planes up in meetings meant that the U.N. Command
the area. Secondly, the plane that sup- was ready to compromise on the 38th
posedly dropped the bombs had its head- Parallel and when this hope proved
lights on, a procedure contrary to all false, decided to play for time while they
UNC practice. Thirdly, the bomb pat- worked out their next move.31
tern of the craters was such that, in the Whatever the motivations might be,
opinion of the UNC investigators, no the truce talks entered a long period of
single plane could have made them. In suspension. The UNC rejection of re-
addition to these technical objections sponsibility for the bombing of Kaesong
and the flimsiness of the evidence, the
haste of the Communists and their eager-
30
Msg, CX 69566, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Aug 51, in
29
FEC 387.2, bk. II, 116.
31
Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom: The
and Replies . . . Bombing of Kaesong, no date, in Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations
FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of In- (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), pp.
vestigation. 66-67.
44 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

INVESTIGATING A POSSIBLE NEUTRALITY VIOLATION. Colonel Darrow (third from


left), with U.N. and Chinese representatives, examines a pine branch allegedly broken by ma-
chine gun strafing northwest of Kaesong.

elicited many angry Communist re- san forces were probably responsible for
sponses but the UNC held firm. In the the ground action.32
meantime the Communists entered sev- Both Ridgway and Joy felt strongly
eral new charges of UNC violations. that the best way to lessen the possibility
They claimed that a UNC plane had of further incidents was to change the ne-
dropped a flare in the Kaesong area on gotiation site. The former had recom-
29 August; that UNC forces had attacked mended that a new location be proposed
a patrol and fired shots across the bridge in early August and after the avalanche
at Panmunjom on 30 August; and that of incidents during that month, Joy rein-
UNC planes had bombed Kaesong a sec- forced him stoutly. The U.S. leaders
ond time on 1 September. Investigation
32
of these charges by UNC officers revealed Rpts of Investigation, sub: Summaries of Protest
and Replies . . . Flare Dropped Over Kaesong, etc..
that no UNC planes could have com- no dates, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers,
mitted the air incidents and that parti- Rpts of Investigation.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 45

were willing to have the U.N. Command Joy wrote and apologized for the infrac-
put forward a suggestion, but at this tion. This drew what could be considered
point they did not wish to make a change almost a friendly response from the
in site a mandatory prerequisite to a re- Communists on 19 September. In view
sumption of negotiations.33 of the UNC willingness to assume re-
The one encouraging factor lay in the sponsibility for this violation, Kim and
Communists' willingness to continue the Peng suggested to Ridgway that the dele-
battle of words over the violations. If gates resume the negotiations at Kaesong
they seriously intended to break off the immediately.35
negotiations completely, they had cre- But Ridgway was unwilling to reopen
ated a situation in which they could have the negotiations until there was a def-
withdrawn and blamed the U.N. Com- inite improvement in the physical setup.
mand. Despite the lack of substance in The Communists had previously brushed
most of their accusations, they had seized aside his suggestion that the site be
the propaganda initiative and forced the changed, but he determined that the
UNC on to the defensive. The U.N. conditions for a resumption must be set-
Command could calmly refute the Com- tled at the liaison officer level and not
munist claims again and again, but the by the delegates. At the same time he
flood of incidents tended to obscure the intended to press for a new location.36
denials. However as September wore on, Communist opposition to any change
there were indications that the Commu- in the site and to the liaison officers
nists had attained their objective, working out the details of neutralizing
whether it was time or the initiative, and the truce zone threatened to lengthen
were prepared to reopen negotiations.34 the recess. The Communists were reluc-
Strangely enough, the occasion was an- tant to give their liaison officers the au-
other incident, only this time it was a thority necessary for coming to an
real violation of the neutral zone. On 10 agreement on either point. Neverthe-
September a plane from the 3d Bomb less, Kinney reported after the first
Group strafed Kaesong through a navi- meeting of the liaison officers on 25
gational error by the pilot. Fortunately September that they seemed anxious to
no damage was incurred, but the Com- get the delegation together. He felt that
munists entered a formal protest. As soon patience and firmness would finally
as the investigation disclosed that a UNC gain the establishment of satisfactory
plane had committed the attack, Admiral conditions.37
In Washington, intelligence sources
33
(1) Msgs, HNC 264 and HNC 272, CINCUNC
35
(Adv) to CINCFE, 24, 28 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. (1) Msg, CX 50634, CINCFE to JCS, 11 Sep 51.
II, 118-B and 121-B. (2) Msg, C 50115, CINCFE to (2) Ltr, Joy to Nam, no sub, 11 Sep 51. (3) Ltr,
JCS, 3 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 131-B. (3) Msg, Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai to Ridgway, no
JCS 80658, JCS to CINCFE, 5 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, sub, 19 Sep 51. All in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice
bk. II, 135. Papers, Rpts of Investigation.
34 36
On 8 September, 48 of the 51 nations which had Msg, C 51315, CINCUNC to JCS, 21 Sep 51, in
been at war with Japan signed the peace treaty at FEC 387.2, bk. II, 147-A.
37
San Francisco. Only the USSR, Poland, and Czech- (1) Msg, HNC 315, CINCUNC (Adv) to
oslovakia failed to sign. The successful conclusion CINCUNC, 24 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 150. (2)
of the treaty may also have influenced the Com- Msg, HNC 323, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 25
munists to resume negotiations. Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 159.
46 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

were reluctant to attach any special sig- even though it seemed to him to be an
nificance to the signs of Communist anxi- artificial issue.40
ety. Since the Communist position in While Ridgway pursued his pressure
Korea had not deteriorated, they held campaign, exchanging letters with Kim
that no new line of action seemed immi- and Peng on the higher level and backing
nent and that the Russians may have a staunch stand at the liaison officers
directed a resumption for their own mil- meetings, several new incidents took
itary or political purposes.38 place. On 19 September a South Korean
In any event Ridgway and his staff invasion of the neutral zone occurred.
drew up a plan of action. Since Chairman Four unarmed ROK soldiers with full
of the JCS General of the Army Omar Red Cross insignia lost their way and
N. Bradley and State Department Coun- crossed the bridge at Panmunjom on a
selor Charles E. Bohlen were in the Far truck loaded with DDT. The bewil-
East, Ridgway submitted his proposed dered health team and the truck were
policy to them and secured their ap- immediately taken into custody, no
proval. The plan posed three altern- doubt on suspicion of conducting bio-
atives based on Communist reactions. logical warfare, and were only released
If they accepted a change of site, the upon the signing of a receipt by the
UNC delegation would offer a 4-kilome- UNC liaison officers.41
ter demilitarized zone based generally On 7 October a UNC B-26 crossed the
along the line of contact. As long as the neutral zone, but no attack was made.
Communists clung to Kaesong but no The crew was officially reprimanded for
break seemed imminent, the U.N. Com- the overflight. Five days later a more
mand would push for a new site without serious violation drew a strong protest
categorically excluding Kaesong. The from the Communists. On 12 October
third alternative would rise if a break a flight of UNC F-80's passed over the
seemed likely: the U.N. commander neutral area en route home. One of them
would send a message with a map to the cleared its machine guns and accidentally
Communists indicating the proposed de- killed a 12-year-old Korean boy and
militarized zone and subdelegations wounded his 2-year-old brother. Al-
would be suggested to discuss this at a though the U.N. Command accepted the
place acceptable to both sides.39 Bohlen responsibility for this unfortunate affair
later reported that Ridgway and his staff and tendered its deep regrets, the atmos-
felt that the U.N. Command had made phere at the liaison officers meeting un-
steady concessions to the Communists on derwent a sudden change.42
procedural matters and had possibly cre- 40
Memo, Bohlen for Secy State, 4 Oct 51, sub:
ated an appearance of weakness that the Rpt on Trip to Japan and Korea with General
military situation did not justify. Bohlen Bradley, in G-3 333 Pacific, 12.
41
recommended that Ridgway be firmly Msg, HNC 309, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE,
19 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 146-8.
supported on the matter of a new site 42
(1) Msg, A 4757, CG FEAF to CINCFE, 12 Oct
51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 184. (2) Msg, HNC 353,
38
JCS 1776/253, 25 Sep 51, title: Evolution of CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 12 Oct 51, in FEC
Recent Developments Pertaining to Cease-Fire Talks 387.2, bk. III, 199. (3) Msg, HNC 359, CINCUNC
in Korea. (Adv) to CINCFE, 14 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III,
39
Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 1 Oct 51, DA-IN 2201. 203.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 47

Until this latest episode progress had elons had become comparatively cordial
been encouraging. The patience and and prospects for quick agreement on
firmness of the U.N. Command had won the conditions for resumption appeared
several concessions from the Commu- bright when the 12 October incident cast
nists. Under steady pressure the latter its shadow. Overnight the Communists
had at last consented on 7 October to a reverted to the old frigid formality and
transfer of the site from Kaesong to Pan- tempers grew short. The following ex-
munjom, where both sides would assume change between Kinney and Chang dur-
responsibility for protecting the confer- ing a long and trying session on the 16th
ence area.43 Ridgway immediately in- was symptomatic of the new climate of
structed Van Fleet to be ready to take opinion:
over the high ground east of Panmunjom Kinney: I find that it is becom-
as soon as final arrangements for the ing a habit of Colonel Chang to read
reopening of negotiations were con- me a lesson on how to conduct my
cluded.44 portion of this particular discussion.
When the liaison officers met on 10 Chang: It seems to me that Colonel
October, the Communists refused ini- Kinney is worrying about things about
tially to discuss anything but the time which he should not worry. Inasmuch
and date of the next meeting of the dele- as I am not in a position of being an
gates. Colonel Chang was rather abrupt instructor of Colonel Kinney, I have no
in his treatment of the UNC officers, but responsibility for educating him.
the Chinese liaison officer, Colonel Tsai, Kinney: I am glad that you realize
intervened and smoothed over the situa- that.46
tion. He accepted the documents and Despite this turn in the personal
map of the neutral area offered by Colo- relationships, the points of official differ-
nel Murray and later escorted Murray ences narrowed. Since the site was mov-
to the door of the tent while his senior, ing to Panmunjom, the U.N. Command
Chang, stood silently by.45 Such an overt wished to limit the neutral area around
action by the junior officer provided a Kaesong to 3,000 yards rather than
good example of where the real power five miles. Such a contraction would les-
lay. sen the area in which incidents could
As soon as the Communists realized occur. But the Communists fought this
that the U.N. Command was not going proposal strongly and would not agree
to hold a meeting on higher level until to delimitation below three miles. The
the liaison officers established the rules UNC representatives finally compro-
and regulations, they reluctantly agreed mised and accepted this figure both for
to work out the details at the staff confer- Kaesong and the U.N. base camp at
ences. Relations between the lower ech- Munsan-ni.47
46
Memo for Red, 16 Oct 51, sub: Liaison Officers'
43
Msg, CX 52498, CINCFE to JCS, 8 Oct 51, in Mtg Held at Panmunjom, in FEC 387.2, Korean
FEC 387.2, bk. III, 179. Armistice Papers, Liaison Officers Mtgs.
44 47
Msg, CX 52506, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, (1) Msg, C 53096, CINCFE to JCS, 16 Oct 51,
8 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 188. in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 206. (2) Msg, HNC 374,
45 CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 20 Oct 51, in FEC
Msg, HNC 345, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE,
10 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 189. 387.2, bk. III, 213.
50 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
A second important item that blocked delegation conference tent and the U.N.
final agreement concerned the violations Command to provide flooring, space
of the air space over the neutral zone. heating, and lights for the tent. Other
After the many instances of UNC planes wise each side would take care of its own
flying over the area through navigational needs in the conference area. To help
error or because of the weather condi- prevent violations of the air space, the
tions, the UNC negotiators wished to U.N. Command agreed to set up a search-
eliminate accidental invasion of the air light and barrage balloons at Panmun-
space as a violation. The Communists jom.49
insisted for some time that this was a Having secured the agreement, the
hostile act of armed force, but at last UNC delegates hoped to steal a march
agreed to compromise and recognized upon the Communists. Admiral Joy an-
that there might be weather and tech- ticipated that the Communists intended
nical conditions beyond human control to discuss the security arrangements all
under which aircraft might fly over the over again at the delegate level, so he
conference area but without any intent dispatched a letter to Nam ratifying the
to attack or damage it.48 liaison officers' accord and told Nam that
On 22 October the liaison officers he would await the Communist concur-
signed the new security agreement which rence before resuming negotiations.
embodied most of the features desired Colonel Kinney also informed Chang
by the U.N. Command. Besides the re- that UNC security troops were moving
striction of the Kaesong area to three in to the high ground east of Panmun-
miles and the provision on accidental jom to eliminate the possibility of inci-
overflight of the neutral zone, the UNC dents from this quarter.50
was also able to except itself from re- General Nam signed the Communist
sponsibility for the acts committed by ratification on 24 October and the first
irregulars or partisans not under its con- meeting of the delegates was scheduled
trol. This had been another troublesome for the following day. Thus after two
matter and the cause of several Com- months the truce conference resumed,
munist complaints in the past. A 1,000- but what had happened in the mean-
yard circle around Panmunjom was time? There seemed little doubt that
neutralized as was a 200-meter area on the Communists had regained the prop-
each side of the road from Kaesong to aganda initiative. Despite the staged in-
Panmunjom to Munsan. (Map 2) In cidents and the question of validity of
the Panmunjom area each side agreed others, there had been enough actual
to station 2 military police officers and violations to provide the leaven for the
15 men armed with small arms while Communist case. If this were the Com-
the conference was in session and 1 offi- munist objective in suspending the meet-
cer and 5 men during other periods.
The Communists offered to supply the
49
Memo for Rcd, Liaison Officers' Mtg Held at
48
(1) Msg, HNC 374, CINCUNC (Adv) to Panmunjom, 21, 22 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean
CINCFE, 20 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 213. (2) Armistice Papers, Liaison Officers Mtgs.
50
Msg, HNC 376, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 21 Msg, HNC 381. CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC,
Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 215. 22 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 220.
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT 51

ings, the mission had been successfully tactics had several by-products. The de-
accomplished. But if the Communists lay in the negotiations led to increased
had hoped to alter the UNC position UNC pressure on the battlefield and in
on the 38th Parallel and secure substan- the air. It provided time for additional
tial concessions by this propaganda cam- training of the South Korean forces and
paign, they had failed. Their action had for the National Police Reserve in Japan.
only strengthened the UNC determina- And it also allowed the United States
tion not to concede. ample opportunity to consider the short-
On the other hand the Communist and long-range situations in the Far East.
CHAPTER IV

A Time for Preparation


As the Korean War entered its second 1951. As the fighting became stabilized
year, American policy had made a full close to the 38th Parallel and especially
turn. When the Communists had after the relief of General MacArthur
launched their attack in mid-1950, the in April, reliance on military victory in
U.S. objective had been to contain the Korea had waned. The costs had become
enemy advance and to restore the status too high and the risks too great. Still the
quo. As the battle situation improved, war continued and had to be prosecuted
this modest goal had been expanded in until a settlement was secured. This had
September and October to the unification turned the thoughts of the American
of all Korea under a democratic regime. leaders to the negotiation of an armistice.
With the advent of the Chinese Com- Barring Soviet entry into the conflict
munist forces, the bright dream of uni- and the outbreak of a global war, a truce
fication quickly faded and the United seemed to offer the best prospect of liq-
States again focused upon the re-estab- uidating the Korean commitment of
lishment of the prewar political redressing the balance of U.S. military
situation. aid in favor of Europe and of rebuilding
The fluctuation of military fortunes the strategic reserves at home.
at the front was reflected in the military War without victory posed a new and
plans. While the UNC forces were falling difficult set of questions to the American
back toward Pusan under the enemy's military leaders who had been taught
initial onslaught, evacuation of Korea that victory was the objective. With the
and a general withdrawal to Japan ap- inception of the armistice negotiations,
peared imminent. The triumph at In- they no longer sought to win by a knock-
ch'on had banished such pessimistic out, but rather on points. They had to
ideas and temporarily induced a feeling hurt the enemy enough to influence him
of aggressive confidence in the ability of to accept the UNC terms for a settle-
the UNC troops to unify the country. ment, yet not enough to provoke an
But the Chinese reintroduced the pos- all-out counterattack and a possible
sibility of evacuation as they drove the widening of the struggle. The United
UNC units back in November and De- States must win the decision, but not de-
cember. The difficulties of fighting a cisively.
war across the Sea of Japan returned to
plague the planners. Conduct of the War—The
The barometric changes in plans as Washington Side
the battle skies clouded or cleared
reached an equilibrium in the spring of The determination of the ways and
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 53
means to attain a satisfactory decision On the civilian level in July 1951, the
in Korea rested ultimately with the Pres- President's foremost assistant in defense
ident, of course. As Commander in Chief matters was the Secretary of Defense,
of the military forces of the United George C. Marshall.3 Under Marshall
States, Mr. Truman required all but the were the three service Secretaries—Frank
most routine directives on the Korean Pace, Jr., of the Army; Francis P. Mat-
War to pass through his office for his thews of the Navy; and Thomas K. Fin-
approval or rejection.1 Since the United letter of the Air Force—and the Joint
States had been given full power by the Chiefs of Staff. General of the Army
United Nations to form a unified com- Omar N. Bradley was Chairman of the
mand, Mr. Truman had no responsi- JCS with General J. Lawton Collins,
bility to clear his strategic decisions Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Admiral For-
with any U.N. agency. (Chart 1) His rest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Opera-
close and complete control of important tions, U.S. Navy, and General Hoyt S.
decisions and plans relating to Korea Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air
must be kept continually in mind, for Force, as the service representatives.4
even though his role in many cases con- As members of the JCS, Collins, Sher-
sisted mainly of approval or disapproval, man, and Vandenberg were the principal
his was the final decision. military advisors to the Secretary of De-
The President's chief advisory group fense and the President and not subject
was the National Security Council to the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of
(NSC), composed of the President, the the Army, Navy, and Air Force in such
Vice President, the Secretary of State, matters as the preparation of strategic
the Secretary of Defense, and the Chair- plans and the strategic direction of mili-
man of the National Security Resources tary forces. In their service capacities as
Board. Other members of the executive Chiefs of Staff or Chief of Naval Opera-
branch, such as the Secretaries of the tions, they were responsible to the service
Army, Navy, and Air Force, could be Secretaries, however. General Bradley
appointed by Mr. Truman to serve on had no vote as chairman, but he did
the council but he chose not to do so. preside over the meetings and delibera-
The principal duties of the NSC were tions of the JCS and represented the
to assess and appraise the objec- group in the meetings with the Presi-
tives, commitments, and risks of the
General Services Administration, National Archives
United States in relation to national se- and Records Service, Federal Register Division
curity and then to advise the President (Washington, no date), p. 63.
3
on the most suitable course of action to General Marshall, after a distinguished career as
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, in World War II and
be followed.2 service as Secretary of State, was recalled from
1
retirement in September 1950, to replace Secretary
For an interesting discussion of the military Louis Johnson. A special waiver had to be passed
conduct of the war, see the article, "Truman," by by Congress on this occasion, since Marshall still
Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., in Ernest R. May, ed.. The held his General of the Army rank and the law
Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander barred military officers from holding the post of
in Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960). Secretary of Defense.
2 4
The composition and functions of the NSC are Admiral Sherman died of a heart attack on 22
described in the United States Government Or- July. He was replaced by Admiral William M.
ganization Manual 1951-1952, prepared by the Fechteler on 1 August.
CHART 1—CHANNELS OF COMMAND, JULY 1951

a
The U.N. Security Council had no command authority, but did receive biweekly reports from the U.N.
commander.
b
The Army Chief of Staff acted as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
c
The UNC/FEC exercised operational control only over the air and naval forces under its command.
d
Although Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, had not been inactivated, it did not become operational
until I October 1952.
e
The Military Advisory Group for Korea was assigned to Eighth Army command. It continued to discharge
its mission of assisting the ROK Army and provided liaison between the Eighth Army and the ROK Army.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 55
dent, the NSC, and the Secretary of De- East Command and its prosecution of
fense.5 the war.7
To insure close co-ordination between Therefore, if General Ridgway and his
the military and political officials who staff devised a plan or a course of action
were responsible for preparing plans and that they wished to have approved, the
positions of policy relating to the Korean following procedure would customarily
War, Secretary Marshall had ordered the be followed. Upon receipt of the Far
resumption of informal consultations be- East Command recommendation, G-3
tween State Department and Defense would pass it on to the Joint Chiefs
officials and instituted weekly meetings of Staff and to the other services for
between representatives of the State De- study. G-3 would then co-ordinate with
partment and the JCS.6 Hence, proposed interested staff divisions in the Army to
military actions with political implica- prepare an official Army position that
tions were discussed with the State De- General Collins could present to his fel-
partment and cleared with the Secretary low members of the JCS. If the FEC
of State before being submitted to the recommendation transcended military
President. matters, State Department officials would
Below the Defense-JCS-State Depart- be consulted and their approval would
ment policy and strategic directive level be sought. Then the recommendation,
came the unified commands. After World perhaps in a form amended by the JCS
War II the JCS had created a number of and State, would go up to the Secretary
unified commands on a geographic basis. of Defense for his comments before it
These operated under the strategic com- finally reached the President's desk for
mand of the JCS who in turn delegated final approval. The process appeared
executive responsibility to the service cumbersome, but if the need for decision
which was considered to have primary was urgent, a consultation or meeting
interest in the command. In the case of between the parties involved could often
the Far East Command (FEC), the produce quick agreement on the position
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, was given or positions to be set forth for the Presi-
executive responsibility and within the dent. Thus, behind every important de-
Army General Collins had made the cision taken in the Korean War lay the
G-3 staff division his executive agent. staff mechanism—gathering information,
The latter usually transmitted the de- preparing, co-ordinating, and assessing
cisions and instructions agreed upon at plans and policies, and presenting recom-
the higher levels to General Ridgway mendations that were forwarded through
and also helped to formulate the Army channels up the military-political ladder
position that General Collins presented to the President.
to the JCS on matters affecting the Far Not all of the plans and proposals em-
anated from the theater, however, since
frequently the G-3 or JCS staffs initiated
5
U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1951-52, their own. These were usually co-ordi-
pp. 116ff. nated with the Far East Command be-
6
Hoare, "Truman" in The Ultimate Decision, p.
7
197. The State-Defense meetings had been discon- See Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First
tinued under Secretary of Defense Johnson. Year, Chapter III.
56 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
fore they ascended the ladder for ship under his command to carry out the
comments and suggestions. evacuation, the JCS refused to divide the
responsibility for the planning of the
The JCS Ponder blockade. The command organization in
such an event would be settled on the
Within the staff mechanism a number basis of actual conditions, they main-
of alternatives on the Korean War were tained, and nothing would be taken
prepared in the early spring of 1951 and away from Ridgway without specific JCS
the JCS presented them to Secretary instructions.9
Marshall. Unless there was a general The naval blockade might also be a
war or a sudden great influx of Soviet weapon if the truce negotiations broke
volunteers in Korea that might jeopard- down. Shortly after the conferees met at
ize the UNC forces, the JCS believed Kaesong in July, the JCS advised Mar-
that the UNC troops should stay in the shall that increased military pressure
peninsula. They recognized that military would have to be applied upon the en-
action alone would not solve the Korean emy if he would not come to terms.
problem and that there probably would Although general war with China was
not be any solution until world tensions to be avoided, they recommended that:
relaxed. In the meantime the American the United States be kept ready for gen-
forces should pursue their current course eral war on relatively short notice; many
of exerting pressure upon the Commun- of the restrictions imposed on Ridgway's
ists in Korea in the hope that eventually ground and air operations should be
a favorable political settlement might lifted if the negotiations failed; and
result that would not sacrifice the U.S. Japanese defense forces and South Ko-
position on Taiwan or on a seat for rean military units should be developed,
Communist China in the United Na- trained, and equipped as quickly as pos-
tions. The JCS also felt that South Ko- sible. The United States should immed-
rean forces should be created in the iately urge the other United Nations
interim to take over the major part of participating in Korea: to support a
the military burden in Korea.8 naval blockade; to bring additional po-
If, however, the war should spread litical and economic pressure upon
and the Communist Chinese expanded China; and to increase their forces in
their actions outside Korea, the JCS Korea.10
were also prepared. In early June they After the long recess over the incidents
directed the Commander in Chief, U.S. terminated, the JCS in early November
Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), at Hawaii, to revised some of these recommendations.
work out a plan for blockading the China For one thing, the Communist build-up
coast in case the U.N. forces were com- of fighter strength in Manchuria during
pelled to evacuate Korea. Despite Ridg- the summer and early fall ruled out the
way's protest that CINCPAC would
9
probably want naval reinforcements at (1) Msg, JCS 92847, JCS to CINCPAC, 1 Jun 51.
a time when Ridgway would need every (2) Msg, CX 65297, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Jun 51. (3)
8
Msg,
10
JCS 80240, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Aug 51.
Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 5 Apr 51, sub: Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 13 Jul 51, sub:
Mil Action in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 167/4. U.S. Courses of Action in Korea. In OCMH.
CHART 2—U.N. COMMAND/FAR EAST COMMAND, MAJOR GROUND FORCES, 1 JULY 1951

Source: Hq Eighth Army, Command Report, ACofS, G-3, bk. 4, pt.1,1Jul 51; DOD General Officers Assignment List, I Jul 51, in OCMH files.
58 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

lifting of the restriction of "hot" pursuit ance, and pressure keynoted the U.S.
of Communist planes across the Man- position, but would these be enough to
churian border. In July this would have persuade the enemy to come to terms?
been profitable; now the cost would be
excessive. However, the JCS did believe Of Men and Arms
that the growing Communist air strength
had reached a dangerous point and the It was a formidable task that the JCS
United States might be forced to move had given to General Ridgway and his
quickly and unilaterally against specific United Nations Command. The colorful
Chinese air bases if the scale of enemy Ridgway, with his ever-present hand
air activity jeopardized the security of grenade, had proved himself an able
U.S. forces in Korea. To meet this con- combat commander and administrator.
tingency and to allow Ridgway more Not only was he responsible for the
freedom in planning air and ground op- conduct of operations in Korea as Com-
erations in the event the negotiations mander in Chief, United Nations Com-
were ended, the JCS favored giving the mand (CINCUNC) and the defense of
U.N. commander broader powers. They the Far East Command area as Com-
realized that only substantial increases mander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE),
in men and equipment could produce a but also the administration of Japan as
military victory, but the wider range of Supreme Commander, Allied Powers
discretion would allow Ridgway to exert (SCAP), and of the Ryukyus as Gov-
pressure as he saw fit with the forces at ernor of these islands. (See Chart 1.)
his disposal. Pointing out that the Ameri- Most of the officers on Ridgway's staff
can public might grow weary of an inde- performed multiple duties as he used
cisive war if the truce talks were not them interchangeably in the UNC, FEC,
successful and might demand adoption of and SCAP headquarters. Lt. Gen. Doyle
measures capable of securing military O. Hickey, for example, was chief of
victory, the JCS recommended that the staff for all three commands.
National Security Council reconsider a The ground weapon of the U.N.
U.S. policy in case a negotiated settle- Command in Korea was the Eighth
ment proved impossible.11 Army under General Van Fleet, which
The general outlines of the JCS strat- included ROK and UNC units partici-
egy were simple. Unless a global war pating in the war. Organized into 4 corps,
broke out, the U.S. forces would remain the Eighth Army had a reported strength
in Korea and exert pressure upon the of 554,577 men at the end of June. Seven
enemy to encourage him to negotiate. of its 17 divisions were American and
There would be no military victory in the remaining 10 were ROK. In addi-
this limited war, but the U.N. com- tion, there were 4 brigades, 1 separate
mander would have considerable lati- regiment, and 9 separate battalions.
tude in the use of the military forces (Chart 2) The breakdown in strength
under his command. Patience, persever- figures showed 253,250 U.S. troops, 28,-
061 other U.N. personnel, 260,548 ROK
11
Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 3 Nov 51, sub: troops, and 12,718 Koreans who were as-
U.S. Courses of Action in Korea. In OCMH. signed to serve with the U.S. units (Ko-
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 59

rean Augmentation to the U.S. Army Army establishment. Since this was not
[KATUSA]).12 practicable at the moment, G-3 sug-
During the Communist offensives in gested that by taking 5,000 men from
the spring of 1951 the Eighth Army had the General Reserve and 5,000 from the
shown itself a highly skilled battle force shipment scheduled to strengthen the
capable of absorbing the stiff punches European Command, at least part of
of the enemy and of dealing stern pun- FEC's needs could be met.14
ishment in return. Although it did not With the Chief of Staff's support, the
have sufficient strength to insure a de- JCS on 17 August approved an increase
cisive military victory in Korea, it was of five AAA battalions and four field
fully competent to man the defense as artillery battalions for Ridgway's com-
long as the war remained limited. mand. These along with other assorted
Under the circumstances General units totaling over 13,000 men were to
Ridgway sought to strengthen the defen- be shipped in the fall.15 Thus by cutting
sive power of his forces in Korea. With back the General Reserve and delaying
the battle lines fairly stable, he requested the European build-up, the Army lead-
that his artillery capabilities be in- ers in Washington tried to fill some of
creased. The enemy, he pointed out to Ridgway's most urgent priorities.
the JCS, was particularly susceptible The Washington staff was under no
to the potential of massed artillery fire illusion insofar as enemy potential was
when he attacked. If five 155-mm. concerned. It realized that dragging out
howitzer, four 8-inch howitzer, one 155- the negotiations through the summer had
mm. gun, and two observation battalions allowed the Communists to build up
were added to the Eighth Army's artil- their forces. At any time, the enemy
lery, Ridgway felt that it could inflict could launch an offensive with a man-
even greater losses upon the enemy.13 power superiority of up to 4 to 1 at the
There was little question over the de- point of contact, lasting nearly a month,
sirability of this augmentation in Wash- and using up to 46 Chinese and North
ington, but Ridgway's requirements Korean divisions and 1,100 aircraft. To
were only a part of the picture. Actually oppose this offensive Ridgway could mus-
the artillery increases when added to ter the 17 divisions in Korea, but would
Ridgway's other requests would necessi- this be enough to halt the enemy threat?
tate raising the FEC troop ceiling by The situation in the United States was
57,000 spaces if all were approved. As not particularly hopeful. Of the 7 Army
G-3 pointed out to General Collins, the divisions stationed at home only 3 were
only way that the Army could fill Ridg- fully trained in September 1951. One of
way's demands completely would be by these, the 82d Airborne, was the stra-
increasing the over-all strength of the tegic reserve; the other 2, the 28th and
12 43d Infantry Divisions, were scheduled
DF, OCA to OCMH, 7 Oct 54, sub: ROK and
U.N. Ground Force Strength in Korea: In OCMH.
13 14
Msg, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jun 51, DA-IN 7369. Summary Sheet, Maj Gen Robinson E. Duff for
The nondivisional artillery assigned to Eighth Army CofS, 2 Jul 51, sub: Re-evaluation of FA Require-
on 1 July 1951 included seven 155-mm. howitzer bat- ments, in G-3 320.2 Pacific, 300.
15
talions, two 155-mm. gun battalions, and two 8-inch Msg, G-3 to CINCFE, 22 Aug 51, DA-OUT
howitzer battalions. 99608.
60 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
ater commander became so immersed
in his own problems that he tended to
overlook the world-wide responsibilities
of the military services, he was liable to
fall prey to this familiar malady. In
fairness it should be noted that General
Ridgway's case was moderate, but none-
theless he worked diligently to secure
reinforcements, especially air and sea
additions, during the summer of 1951.
Ridgway was worried about the Soviet
threat to Japan and in the event of an
expanded war, he wanted to have a little
extra air and naval strength to contain
any Soviet drive and a firm commitment
from the JCS that they would replace
his air and naval losses. The JCS ex-
plained that his command could be built
up only at the expense of other vital
areas and that allocations in case a war
with the USSR broke out would have
GENERAL RIDGWAY AT THE FRONT to depend on world conditions at the
time.17 But this failed to satisfy Ridg-
to go to Europe in October and Novem- way. In September he again expressed
ber. The 11th Airborne would finish its his concern lest the Russian reaction
divisional training cycle in November over the signing of the Japanese peace
and go into the strategic reserve, but the treaty and the uncertain situation in
remaining 3—the 31st and 47th Infantry Germany lead to an attack upon Japan.
and the 1st Armored Divisions—would Once more he asked for naval and air
not be available until early 1952. Thus reinforcements in vain. The JCS evi-
an emergency in Korea would mean that dently did not feel that his anxiety over
the European Command would again be Russian intentions warranted any major
delayed in reaching its full strength.16 shifts in the deployment of the U.S.
The thinly spread U.S. forces had to armed forces.18
cover strategic points around the globe As long as the international situation
in readiness for the broadening of the held firm and the enemy in Korea con-
Korean War or for the outbreak of a tinued to be cautious in risking its air
new conflict. It was also natural that power, the JCS had a point. The Far
each major theater commander should East Air Forces, commanded by Lt. Gen.
suffer from the disease known in World 17
(1) Msg, C 68161, CINCFE to JCS, 2 Aug 51,
War II as "localitis." Whenever the the- DA-IN 1426. (2) Msg, JCS 99220, JCS to CINCFE,
17 Aug 51.
16 18
Memo, Maj Gen Reuben E. Jenkins for CofS, (1) Msg, C 51095, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep 51,
12 Sep 51, sub: Reinforcement of the FEC, in G-3 DA-IN 17897. (2) Msg, JCS 82084, JCS to CINCFE,
320.2 Pacific, 60/23. 21 Sep 51.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 61
Otto P. Weyland, provided medium carried out reconnaissance and antisub-
bomber support of operations in Korea marine patrols and interdicted the
with 99 B-29's of the Strategic Air Com- North Korean railroad net.
mand based on Okinawa and Japan. For In the Yellow Sea and east coastal
tactical air support, the Fifth Air Force, waters off Korea, Task Force 95, com-
under Maj. Gen. Frank F. Everest, had a manded by Rear Adm. Ingolf N. Kiland,
light bomber wing, three fighter-bomb- formed the U.N. Blockading and Escort
er wings, and two fighter-interceptor Force. Headed by the carriers USS
wings—all based on South Korean air- Sicily and H.M.S. Glory, this force con-
fields—and a light bomber wing and a sisted of 85 ships, many provided by
fighter-escort wing stationed in Japan. other members of the United Nations
The bulk of the land-based 1st Marine and by South Korea. Naval units sup-
Air Wing was under the operational plied gunfire support along the coast
control of the Fifth Air Force. In addi- line, patrolled the offshore waters, and
tion the Australians and South Africans controlled the sea approaches to North
had each furnished a squadron of fight- Korea.
ers.19 Although the type of plane varied A third naval force, Amphibious Task
from the propeller-driven F-51 Mus- Force 90, under Rear Adm. George C.
tang to the F-86 Sabrejet, the UNC air Dyer, stood by in Japanese and Korean
forces enjoyed air superiority over Ko- waters to render support to any amphib-
rea. Bombers and fighters, new and old, ious undertakings. In the meantime,
roamed the length of the peninsula Dyer's forces worked with the blockad-
virtually unchallenged except at or near ing UNC naval units.20
the frontier along the Yalu. Neither the Chinese nor the North
Carrier-based naval air squadrons fur- Koreans offered more than nuisance op-
nished additional tactical air support position to the UNC naval forces.
from the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Although the powerful Russian sub-
Sea. On 1 July 1951, Task Force 77 of marine fleet lurked in the background
the Seventh Fleet ranged off the north- as a potential menace in case of a spread-
eastern coast of Korea. Under Rear ing of the war, the chief danger to the
Adm. George R. Henderson, Task Force UNC ships lay in the numerous mines
77 contained three carriers, the USS sown by the Communists along the
Princeton, the USS Bon Homme Rich- coasts.
ard, and the USS Boxer, the battleship Unless there was a radical change in
New Jersey, two heavy cruisers, the USS the global situation, the UNC air and
Los Angeles and the USS Helena, and naval strength seemed more than ade-
eighteen destroyers. Planes from the quate to cope with the enemy. Exercis-
carriers not only flew close support mis- ing complete control of the Korean air
sions for the ground forces but also and seaways, the U.N. Command's
greatest vulnerability was on the ground.

19
USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Operations in
20
the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950-30 June COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, an. 29 to
1952, pp. 84-89, 98-100. FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 51.
62 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Developing the ROK Army Japanese and by the inadequacies of the
Korean language, which had failed to
The major weakness in the ground keep pace with the technological devel-
forces under General Ridgway was opment of weapons and warfare. Names
qualitative rather than quantitative. and expressions had to be invented and
Ten of the seventeen UNC divisions be- the lack of standardization of nomen-
longed to the ROK Army and for diverse clature produced confusion and delay in
reasons the South Korean troops had on training.
occasion proved to be unreliable in time Since the defense assistance funds al-
of crisis. Since the United States in- located to the Republic of Korea were
tended to place more responsibility for limited in 1949-50, heavy equipment
the defense of South Korea upon native and weapons were not provided. As a
forces whether the negotiations were result, when the war broke out, the ROK
successful or not, it became essential to Army had little heavy armament and
improve the caliber of the ROK Army. encountered great difficulty in coping
At least part of the blame for the with the North Korean tanks and artil-
condition of the ROK forces had to be lery. Some ROK divisions had not even
shared by the United States. Partially completed the company phase of their
because it had no desire to offend the training by June 1950 and many soldiers
USSR and partially because of a distrust were unfamiliar with their own weapons.
of the political leadership in South To cap the tragedy, the leadership of the
Korea, the United States had supported ROK Army from top to bottom suffered
the formation of a mobile, lightly armed from political appointments and incom-
constabulary in 1945 to preserve internal petency was rife from company to divi-
order during the occupation period sion level.
rather than a hard-core defense establish- The North Korean invaders easily
ment. Even after American troops had smashed the ROK Army and forced a
been withdrawn in 1949, the U.S. Mili- complete rebuilding and reorganization
tary Advisory Group to the Republic of of ROK forces. In the haste to stem
Korea had only 500 men to help train the enemy advance, recruits were rushed
an army that quickly grew to 100,000 into uniform, given weapons but little
in 1950.21 or no training, and then sent to the
The lack of adequate personnel to pro- front to plug a gap in the line. Such
vide comprehensive coverage of the hit-and-miss efforts to meet the emer-
South Korean Army down to the bat- gency were the best that could be done
talion level and to fully support the under the circumstances, but the defi-
Korean Army school system was but one ciencies in training, equipment, and
problem. When the advisors attempted leadership remained. By October 1950,
to explain tactics or to give the nomen- however, MacArthur had 5 ROK divi-
clature of weapons, they were confronted sions in action and 5 more in the process
by the refusal of the Koreans to use of activation and organization. He
21
recommended that a postwar army of
For a detailed account of the KMAG effort and 10 divisions with a total strength of
the difficulties encountered, see Sawyer, Military
Advisors in Korea. 250,000 men be authorized, and the De-
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 63

partment of the Army and the President needed most were good leaders, better
approved in early November.22 training, and a greater desire to fight
Under the impact of the Chinese for their country.25 Muccio handed Rhee
Communists entry into the war the ROK a letter covering these points on 5 May.
Army suffered another catastrophe. The Evidently Van Fleet's comments made
defects in leadership and training again little impression upon the ROK Presi-
caused defeat and disintegration of the dent, for less than two weeks later he
ROK units and necessitated further re- informed the press that if the United
constitution and rebuilding. Despite his States would equip his already well-
doubts as to the value of South Korean trained divisions, U.S. troops could be
troops, MacArthur clung to the ten-di- withdrawn from Korea. Reaction in the
vision ROK Army as sufficient to main- Army against letting Rhee make such
tain order and repel aggression in the obviously false statements unchallenged
postwar period.23 was immediate. Ambassador Muccio was
Syngman Rhee and his government told to reiterate in the strongest terms
did not share MacArthur's misgivings the concern of the United States over
over the fighting capability of the ROK the issuance of damaging and flagrant
soldier. After MacArthur's recall in statements so contrary to the facts of the
April, they launched a campaign in the matter.26
United Nations and in the United States The reasons behind Rhee's conduct
to have an additional ten divisions or- became somewhat clearer as the armis-
ganized and equipped with American tice negotiations opened in July. He and
arms. Unfortunately, the ROK request his government were pledged to con-
was poorly timed for on 22 April a ROK tinue the drive for Korean unification.
division broke and ran before inferior With a military stalemate in the offing,
enemy forces.24 This incident endan- the ROK Government feared that the
gered the UNC line and caused General UNC troops might withdraw and leave
Van Fleet to urge Ambassador Muccio the Republic of Korea undefended.
to take up the matter with Rhee person- Despite assurances from Muccio and
ally. other official U.S. visitors to Seoul that
Until the lack of leadership was rem- no such course was contemplated, Rhee
edied, Van Fleet warned, there should and his counselors remained skepti-
be no further talk about increasing the cal.27 ROK political opposition to the
ROK forces. What the South Koreans armistice and pressure in behalf of an
22 expanded ROK Army represented their
(1) C 67296, CINCFE to DA, 24 Oct 50, DA-IN response to the challenge. If an armis-
4541. (2) CX 67400, CINCFE to DA, 25 Oct 50,
DA-IN 4938. (3) Memo, Secy Army for the Presi- tice was negotiated, the ROK leaders
dent, 1 Nov 50, sub: Logistic Support of Republic probably wanted to be sure that they
of Korea Army, G-3 KMAG file, folder 2, bk. 1,
tab23 E.
Msg, C 59376, CINCFE to DA, 5 Apr 51, in 25
Ltr, Van Fleet to Muccio, 3 May 51, no sub, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 51, G-3 sec, pt. III, tab G-3 091 Korea, 411.
26
4. 24 JCS 1776/225, 7 Jun 51, title: President Rhee's
CINCFE Presentation to Archibald S. Alex- (ROK) Statements.
27
ander, Under Secy Army, no date, in G-3 091 Korea, Msg, 100438, Muccio to SCAP, 10 Jul 51, in FEC
187/7. 387.2, bk. I, 11.
64 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
would be in a position to at least defendthe training command concept and se-
lected Col. Arthur S. Champeny to direct
themselves and possibly to finish the task
of unification on their own later.28 the program. After a quick survey in
In the meantime, both Washington Korea, Champeny flew to Washington
and FEC headquarters investigated the to look over the U.S. service schools and
problem of improving the battlefield training methods. Since he felt that the
performance of the ROK Army. The South Korean Army needed infantry and
Army G-3, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Tay-artillery officers most, he recommended
lor, visited the Far East Command in that groups of 150 to 200 ROK officers
early May and spoke out in defense of be assigned at a time to the Infantry and
the ROK forces. Everyone had been Artillery Schools in the United States.
criticizing the South Korean Army for With G-3 approval of his plan, Cham-
the lack of leadership, he reported to peny returned to Japan to work out the
General Collins, but the hasty and in- details. For fiscal year 1952, Champeny
adequate training that was unavoidable estimated that 150 infantry and 100 ar-
under the circumstances and the absence tillery officers could be sent to the United
of proper support units might have re- States to take a special twenty-week
sulted in a loss of confidence under course. At the end of September 1951
battle conditions. Basic training, he the first students reported to the
pointed out, often lasted only ten days schools.31
for recruits and emphasis had been While Champeny was busy establish-
placed particularly upon keeping units ing his Replacement Training and
in action. Little attention had been School Command in Korea, Ridgway for-
given to long-range planning for the warded his views on the ROK Army
creation of an effective ROK military to General Collins on 22 July. The first
force in a year or two.29 Taylor's point requirement for any military organiza-
was well taken, but the press of imme- tion, the FEC commander began, was
diate needs had permitted no other an officer and noncommissioned officer
course in the past. corps—competent, aggressive, and loyal.
In the Far East Command, General There was no such group in the ROK
Ridgway ordered investigation of ways Army and it would take a long time to
and means to bolster South Korean lead- develop one. If contemplated school,
ership. One way to accomplish this, Col. replacement, and training plans were
Gilman C. Mudgett, Eighth Army G-3, carried out and if the war continued at
suggested, would be to set up a training its present tempo, the ROK Army might
command similar to the Replacement become completely effective in three
and School Command of World War years. Were the armistice to be signed,
II.30 Ridgway and Van Fleet approved 31
(1) Memo, Gen John E. Hull for Secy Army, 17
28
See Msg, 192311, Muccio to SCAP, 19 Jul 51, in Jul 51, sub: Development of ROK Officers and
FEC 387.2, bk. I, 24. Noncommissioned Officer Corps, in G-3 350.2 Korea,
29
Memo, Taylor for CofS, 15 May 51, sub: Rpt 4/5. (2) Msg, CINCFE to G-3, 20 Aug 51, DA-IN
of G-3 Visit to FEC, in G-3 333 Pacific, 10. 7542. (2) Summary Sheet, Maj Gen Reubin E.
30
Comment Sheet (sgd Mudgett), 4 May 51, sub: Jenkins for CofS and Secy Army, 2 Oct 51, sub:
Troop Leadership School for Senior Korean Officers, ROKA Replacement Training . . . . in G-3 350.2
in KMAG file AG 353, KCRC. Korea, 10/3.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 65

PRESIDENT RHEE WITH AMBASSADOR MUCCIO

Ridgway continued, the task might be ROK units as they showed ability to use
done in two years. He went on to point these profitably. The ten-division South
out that the ROK officer candidate Korean army had to develop its own
course had been lengthened from eight- service units and these would have to
een to twenty-four weeks and that each be equipped by the United States.
ROK division would be given a nine- Finally, Ridgway recommended that
week rehabilitation program. By train- constant pressure be applied on the
ing ROK officers in U.S. service schools ROK Government to take strict disci-
and centralizing all ROK training instal- plinary measures against corrupt, incom-
lations, Ridgway hoped to make the petent, and cowardly officers and govern-
results of the school system more satis- ment officials.32
factory. However, he maintained, the During the summer of 1951 with the
Department of the Army would have to benefit of the lull on the battlefield that
help, too. KMAG would need more per- succeeded the opening of negotiations,
sonnel to man the training installations, Ridgway and his staff went ahead with
and automatic weapons, artillery, and 32
Msg, CX 67484, Ridgway to Hull, 22 Jul 51,
tanks would have to be provided for DA-IN 17555.
66 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
the ROK students.34 By and large there
was a general feeling that definite prog-
ress had been made and that given time
and training the ROK units would prove
to be just as capable as the North
Korean units.35
The future strength of the ROK
Army was as yet undetermined, for ten
divisions seemed to be all that the South
Koreans could develop within two or
three years. As General Taylor in-
formed Secretary of the Army Pace in
August, the long-range requirements de-
pended on too many intangibles to be
clearly estimated then. The outcome of
the war, the political destiny of Korea,
future U.S.-Korean policy, the success of
the short-range program, and the ability
of the United States to equip additional
GENERAL TAYLOR divisions in view of its global require-
ments would help shape the long-range
their plans. New tables of organization plan.36
and equipment for the ROK units were One of the by-products of the peace
developed and the KMAG staff was ex- negotiations, therefore, was the provi-
panded to 1,308 officers and men by the sion of time to strengthen the ROK
end of September.33 The ROK school Army by proper training and instruction.
system was revised and by the first of During the summer interlude, although
October it was operating with a capac- the Communist forces were also built up
ity of over 10,000 students. At the and became capable of major offensives,
Replacement Training Center, Cham- it was possible for Ridgway and Van
peny, now a brigadier general, had Fleet and their staffs to devote considera-
facilities for 23,460 trainees. Schools for ble attention to the ROK Army task
training infantry, artillery, and technical with some degree of success. At the
officers were in operation and the Korean same time, the two leaders interested
Military Academy and the Command 34
and General Staff School were due to DA-IN (1) Msg, CX 50942, CINCFE to DA, 16 Sep51,
17089. (2) Summary Sheet, Jenkins for CofS,
resume courses in early 1952. All of the 2 Oct 51, sub: ROKA Replacement Training and
instruction at these schools was designed School
35
Comd Brochure, in G-3 350.2 Korea, 10/3.
(1) Memo, Alexander for Deputy Secy Defense,
and conducted to instill leadership and 5 Sep 51, sub: Training and Equipping the South
improve the technical qualifications of Korean Army, in G-3 091 Korea, 354/2. (2) Memo,
Jenkins for CofS, 14 Nov 51, sub: Rpt of Field
Training, ROK Army, in G-3 333 Pacific, 15.
36
Memo, Taylor for Secy Army, 24 Aug 51, sub:
Directives to CINCFE Respecting the ROK Force to
33
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 161. be Developed, in G-3 091 Korea, 187/3.
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 67

themselves in a related problem—the


United Nations forces fighting beside the
ROK and U.S. troops in Korea.

Maintaining U.N. Support


When the war had broken out in June
1950, the United States had been anxious
to secure the support of as many U.N.
members as possible. It had welcomed
contributions, large and small, in its
desire to elicit military help and moral
sustenance against the Communist ag-
gression in Korea.37 Gradually combat,
support, and medical units from nine-
teen other U.N. countries joined the
United States and the Republic of Korea.
Ranging in size from a small battalion of
600 men to a brigade of 6,000, this COLONEL CHAMPENY
heterogeneous collection had grown to
over 28,000 ground troops by the end by the United Kingdom, Australia, Can-
of June 1951.38 ada, Colombia, the Netherlands, New
The United Kingdom, Canada, and Zealand, and Thailand and air
Turkey had each shipped a brigade, and squadrons by Australia, Canada, and the
other members of the British Common- Union of South Africa.
wealth, including Australia and New Welding this complex group into a
Zealand, had formed a fourth. Belgium- cohesive and effective war machine
Luxembourg, Colombia, Ethiopia, proved to be a formidable task. The
France, Greece, the Netherlands, the forces of each nation arrived in different
Philippines, and Thailand provided stages of combat readiness. Some, such
battalions. From India, Norway, and as the British Commonwealth troops,
Sweden had come medical and hospital presented few problems since they were
units and Denmark had sent a hospital well trained and well equipped, and
ship. Naval line forces were contributed soon set up their own supply lines and
37
oriented their own units. Since the
The one exception had been the 33,000 troops Commonwealth soldiers all spoke
offered by Chiang Kai-shek in June 1950. Because of
the possibility of political complications with the English, there were no linguistic dif-
Communist Chinese and the deficiencies in training ficulties or major communications prob-
and equipment of the Nationalist forces, President
Truman decided to take the advice of his political
lems.39
39
and military advisors. He declined Chiang's proffer. A detailed account of the problems of co-
See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York:ordinating the U.N. forces will be found in two
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955), vol. II, p. 343. FEC studies, one by Maj. Sam F. Gaziano and the
38
For a breakdown of U.S., U.N., and ROK other by Maj. William J. Fox, both entitled Inter-
ground forces at this period, see Appendix A-1, Allied Cooperation During Combat Operations.
below. MSS in OCMH.
68 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

KMAG INSTRUCTOR ADDRESSING ROK TROOPS THROUGH AN INTERPRETER

But when the Philippine Combat Bat- British Commonwealth forces were
talion arrived in September 1950, the amalgamated into brigades and attached
need for a reception center to equip, to the U.S. I Corps. The parent units
train, and orient new units became ap- provided administrative, logistical, and
parent. The following month the U.N. operational support and guidance. By
Reception Center at Taegu opened and working together on a long-term basis
helped to prepare the Turkish, Thai, both parent and attached groups devel-
Indian, Dutch, French, Greek, Ethi- oped an esprit de corps that fostered a
opian, Belgian, Luxembourg, and Co- better team effort.
lombian forces for their advent into U.S. commanders used the U.N. troops
combat. according to their capabilities for defen-
As soon as the U.N. units were judged sive or offensive missions. Since the ter-
ready, they were usually attached to U.S. rain was mountainous and the winter
outfits—the battalions to U.S. regiments weather severe, some national forces-
and the brigades to U.S. divisions. The like the Greek and Turk—were easily
A TIME FOR PREPARATION 69

acclimatized, while others, like the insisted that there was no substitute for
Thailanders who were from a flat, warm military victory.
country, had more difficulty in adjust- The chief bone of contention was
ing themselves. Many of the U.N, Communist China and several nations,
military groups, such as the Filipino and such as Great Britain and France, feared
Greek, had been trained by U.S. officers that domestic pressure might lead the
and had become accustomed to U.S. United States to pursue an aggressive
weapons, equipment, and tactical doc- policy of bombardment, blockade, and
trine. Others had to become familiar support for an invasion of the mainland
with U.S. methods and machines and by Chiang Kai-shek's forces.40 The initia-
the linguistic barrier did not make this tion of the armistice talks may have al-
hurdle any easier. layed some of the fears, but the possibil-
Customs and traditions also played a ity that the discussions might fail
role in forging the international army. remained. What the American reaction
Religious restrictions and national die- in such an event might be posed a tick-
tary habits made considerable accommo- lish problem, for neither the prospect of
dation of food supplies necessary. As a long war of attrition nor of an ex-
Moslems, the Turks would eat no pork panded conflict against Communist
and the Indians who were Hindu would China offered any occasion for cheer.
touch no beef. The French, Dutch, and Another subject that kept raising its
Belgians liked more bread and potatoes head concerned the size of the U.N. units
than the Americans and the Thailanders in Korea. Although General MacArthur
had to have more rice and hot sauces. initially had suggested that units of ap-
Eventually each nation secured sat- proximately 1,000 men with equipment
isfactory rations, but only after a good and artillery support be sent, both Ridg-
deal of improvisation and juggling of way and Van Fleet came to feel in the
food stores. late spring of 1951 that the member
Although the differences in diet, train- nations should be encouraged to increase
ing, and equipment were obstacles, they their forces to not less than a regimental
were not insurmountable and after a pe- combat team or brigade. Each regimen-
riod of trial and error, improvement tal combat team or brigade should have
usually resulted. There were several its own integrated artillery, logistic, and
continuing problems, however, that administrative support and should be
were not so easily solved. Despite trained prior to its arrival in Korea.41
the fact that all of the United Nations in- Without doubt this would have re-
volved in the Korean War had resisted lieved U.S. units of the bulk of their
the Communist aggression, there was a responsibility for other U.N. forces, but
wide spread of opinion on the ways and the anticipation that an armistice would
means to bring the conflict to an end. be negotiated soon changed the picture.
President Truman had repudiated the On the eve of the armistice negotiations,
MacArthur approach which had threat- Ridgway did a volte-face and recom-
ened an expansion of the war to the 40
See Memo, D. A. (Acheson) for Bradley, 12
Chinese mainland, but there were strong May 51, no sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 176.
elements in the United States that still 41
Msg, CINCFE to DA, 1 Jun 51, DA-IN 19078.
70 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
mended that no U.N. forces be materi- rity, civil affairs, ROKA training, and
ally increased until the results of the prisoners of war as well as over his logis-
truce discussions became apparent.42 tical support. The 2d Logistical Com-
During the summer Ridgway had dif- mand, under Brig. Gen. Paul F. Yount,
ficulty in even maintaining the current with headquarters at Pusan was responsi-
U.N. strength. Both the French and the ble for direct logistical support and was
Belgians had to make special efforts to the primary agency for placing requisi-
provide replacements for their battal- tions upon the Japan Logistical Com-
ions. By August the French had rushed mand. Through Pusan, the chief gate-
fillers to Korea and were at full strength, way to Korea, ran three different supply
but the Belgian problem proved more lines—one for the United States and the
complex. Since only volunteers could majority of the UNC forces, a second for
be sent overseas, the Belgians had to of- the British Commonwealth contingents,
fer extra incentive pay and short tours and the third for the ROK units. The
of duty before they could secure the ad- United States system was the largest
ditional troops. These were airlifted in by far and provided the Commonwealth
October to bring the Belgian battalion forces with perishable foods and petro-
back to its normal complement.43 leum products and the ROK forces with
A somewhat unusual supply system war materials in addition to the total
sustained the UNC forces in Korea. support it gave to the American and
When the first U.S. troops landed on other U.N. troops.44
the peninsula in 1950, a logistical com- Although the United States furnished
mand was established to provide base the major portion of the supplies and
support. Later, as supply lines length- equipment for most of the U.N. contin-
ened, an army service area and forward gents as well as numerous service func-
supply points were organized. Since tions, it expected eventually to be
Korea was in effect a theater reimbursed for these goods and services.
of operations, the next step ordinarily The approach might differ in individual
would have been to set up a communica- cases, but the problem of reimbursement
tions zone headquarters to take over rear continued throughout the war. And the
area logistics and to permit the army Army had the task of keeping the books
commander to devote full time to front- so that when the subject came up, it
line operations. But Ridgway as Eighth could present fair and reasonable esti-
Army commander had insisted that his mates of the charges involved. The
responsibility begin at the shore line and Eighth Army had to submit weekly and
Van Fleet had made no effort to alter monthly reports on equipment, ammuni-
this arrangement. Thus, the Eighth tion, and supplies furnished to the U.N.
Army commander exercised control over units, plus an estimate of handling
the Korean railroad net, rear area secu- charges. In the spring of 1951, Eighth
42
43
Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 6 Jul 51, DA-IN 11527. 44
(1) Military History Detachment, 8086th Army
(1) Msg, Duff to CINCFE, 6 Jul 51, DA-95739. Unit, Eighth Army, Monograph, Organization of
(2) Msg, Jenkins to CINCFE, 1 Sep 51, DA-80536. the Korean Communications Zone, pp. 1-2. In
(3) Msg, Eddleman to CINCFE, 23 Oct 51, DA- OCMH. (2) Eighth Army, Monograph, Logistical
84922. Problems and Their Solutions, p. 20. In OCMH.
A TIME FOR P R E P A R A T I O N 71

PORT OF PUSAN

Army attempted to set up a system Eighth Army had to carry the adminis-
whereby the bill could be figured out on trative and bookkeeping burden. As
the basis of so many dollars-per-man-per- long as the war lasted and the United
day, but this was superseded in June. States retained the responsibility for
The Department of the Army decided supplying its allies, this was a job that
to substitute a cost and replacement would have to be done.
factor as the basis for compiling the All in all, the summer and early fall
amounts to be reimbursed.45 The timing of 1951 proved to be a time for prepara-
of the final settlement rested with the tion. While the U.S. leaders considered
political and military leaders in Wash- broad plans for the prosecution of the
ington, of course, but whatever the sys- war if the peace negotiations failed,
tem used to compute the bill or the General Ridgway and his staff sought
method employed to collect it, the to improve the combat efficiency of the
45
Fox, Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat
forces in the United Nations Command
Operations, MS, pp. 167ff. and to intensify the program for build-
72 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ing a more reliable ROK Army. On the the bulk of the resources and effective
sidelines the U.N. countries with manpower, there were allies to be con-
troops in Korea watched the develop- sulted and placated just as there had
ments at the conference table intently been in the Pacific war. Flexibility and
for the outcome would affect their own opportunism had keynoted the mid-war
plans and preparations. period against Japan, too, but the final
Yet despite the hum of activity, a note objective then had been unconditional
of uncertainty permeated the scene. The surrender rather than a negotiated
on-again, off-again character of the peace peace. Another point of similarity was
talks made all planning tentative. Al- the role of the Soviet Union waiting in
though the United States was pursuing the wings. Only this time it would play
a policy of constant military pressure the villain's part instead of the friend in
upon the enemy in Korea, its plans were need if it entered the war.
flexible and opportunistic rather than The air of indecision as the United
firm at this point. In some ways the States and its allies awaited the results
trends were reminiscent of the war of the peace negotiations was reflected on
against Japan in 1943-44. The United the battlefield as well as behind the
States was attempting to build up a na- scenes. With the opening of the truce
tive army in Korea even as it had sought talks, action at the front had begun to
to create a ground force in China. And take its cue from the course of events
though the United States was supplying at Kaesong.
CHAPTER V

The New War


After the United Nations Command hardly surprising that in June 1951 Van
had halted the enemy offensive in the Fleet concluded: "Continued pursuit of
spring of 1951, there had been no effort the enemy was neither practical nor ex-
by the Eighth Army to launch a counter- pedient. The most profitable employ-
attack. It was not that General Van ment for the Eighth Army, therefore,
Fleet's forces lacked the capability to was to establish a defense line on the
force the enemy to withdraw "far north" nearest commanding terrain north of
of the 38th Parallel, but the question Parallel 38, and from there to push for-
was "how far to push in order to ac- ward in a limited advance to accomplish
complish the greatest damage." Any ad- the maximum destruction to the enemy
vance north of the Parallel would shorten consistent with minimum danger to the
the supply and communications lines of integrity of the Eighth Army." 2
the Communists and correspondingly The decision to strengthen the defen-
increase those of the Eighth Army. The sive lines of the Eighth Army and to
tasks of reconstituting the destroyed confine offensive action at the front to
transport facilities in North Korea and of limited advances marked the end of the
assuming civil affairs functions in that fluid phase of the Korean War and the
desolated area would also be considera- start of the new war.
ble. Most important of all, Van Fleet
had to keep in mind two overriding The KANSAS-WYOMING Line
factors: he did not have sufficient forces
to destroy the enemy by maneuver and Line KANSAS, the defense line
encirclement; and he could not advance selected by Van Fleet, began near the
beyond the KANSAS-WYOMING de- mouth of the Imjin River twenty miles
fense lines that straddled the 38th Paral- north of Seoul and snaked its way to the
lel without the express permission of the northeast on the south side of the river
JCS and General Ridgway.1 In view of through low barren elevations which
these restricting elements and the re- gradually gave way to higher, moder-
luctance of the majority of the nations ately wooded hills. (Map I) Where the
composing the U.N. Command to ad- Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, KANSAS
vance again toward the Yalu, it was veered eastward and upward toward the
1
Directives restricting Van Fleet's actions appear
Hwach'on Reservoir and then angled
in: (1) Ltr of Instr, Ridgway to CG Eighth Army, northeastward again across the steep.
25 Apr 51, in JSPOG 411, Staff Studies on Ad-
2
vances North of the 38th Parallel, 9 Apr-20 Jun 51. Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 51, sec. I,
(2) Msg, JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE, 1 May 51. Narrative, pp. 7-8.
74 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
forested South Taebaek Mountains un- field fortifications along the advance
til it reached the east coast some twenty- Line WYOMING to delay and blunt the
five miles north of the 38th Parallel. force of enemy assaults before they
The terrain from the Hwach'on Reser- reached KANSAS. On the eastern end
voir to the east coast was particularly of the front, the U.S. X and ROK I
rugged. The mountain slopes rose Corps would establish patrol bases ahead
sharply, especially on the west and south of the main line of resistance to main-
laces, and good roads were almost non- tain contact with the enemy. To pre-
existent. The defensive strength of vent enemy agents from posing as
KANSAS was increased by full use of peasants in order to gather intelligence,
the dominating terrain and the numer- Van Fleet told his commanders to clear
ous water barriers along the route. the battle area of all Korean civilians,
Guarding the approaches to KANSAS who were to be evacuated to the rear.4
on the western front, Line WYOMING Since the terrain became more moun-
looped northeastward from the mouth of tainous in the east and was served by
the Imjin towards Ch'orwon, swung east a poor communications network, Van
to Kumhwa, and then fell off to the Fleet had deployed his four corps ac-
southeast until it rejoined KANSAS near cordingly, with the ROK I Corps form-
the Hwach'on Reservoir. In the spring ing the eastern anchor, flanked by the
of 1951 it served as an outpost line U.S. X Corps in the east central sector,
screening KANSAS. the U.S. IX Corps in the west central
Although Line KANSAS permitted area, and the U.S. I Corps defending
the enemy to retain control of the com- the broadest sector on the west. The
munication complex of the area called first three corps fronts were narrower
the Iron Triangle (Ch'orwon-Kumhwa- because of the rugged mountains and
P'yonggang), Van Fleet felt that the line lack of good roads. Most of the ROK
afforded the UNC forces the advantages divisions were placed where the least
of a defensible terrain, a satisfactory logistical support could be provided
road and railroad net, and logistic sup- since they required less to live on and
port. In the event of a cease-fire he rec- fewer auxiliary units.5
ommended in early June that the By 1 July the main fortifications of
Eighth Army be at least ten miles in Line KANSAS were nearly complete.
advance of Line KANSAS in case a 10- To expedite the work, Van Fleet had
mile withdrawal by both sides to form sent three South Korean National Guard
a buffer zone be made part of the terms. divisions forward to serve as labor troops,
For planning purposes Ridgway agreed.3 one to each U.S. corps. The log-and-
In the meantime, Van Fleet instructed sandbag bunkers and deep, narrow
his corps commanders to fortify Line
4
KANSAS in depth and to build hasty For Van Fleet's instructions, see; (1) Ltr of Instr,
3
Van Fleet to CG's U.S. I, IX, X Corps, 1 Jun 51, and
(1) Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 9 Jul 51, sub: (2) Ltr of Instr, Van Fleet to CG I ROK Corps, 1 Jun
Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire (Military 51. Both in FEC, JSPOG 411, title: Staff Studies on
Viewpoint). (2) Ltr, Ridgway to CG Eighth Army, Advances North of the 38th Parallel, 9 Apr-20 Jun
22 Jun 51, same sub. Both in FEC, JSPOG 411, 51.
5
title: Staff Studies on Advances North of the 38th Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 51, sec. I,
Parallel, 9 Apr-20 Jun 51. Narrative, pp. 8-10.
THE NEW WAR 75
trenches along the KANSAS line resem- Structural weaknesses soon appeared
bled World War I entrenchments. in many of the hasty fortifications. Bun-
Bunkers, usually adjoining and forward ker roofs collapsed when an inadequate
of lateral trenches, housed automatic ri- number of supporting timbers were used
fles and machine guns. Most of the and the heavy July rains caved in a num-
bunkers were dug into hillsides or sad- ber of bunkers built in terrain where
dles on the military crests with the larger erosion was swift. These were relocated
ones on the higher hills serving as for- and rebuilt. Inspection and experience
ward command and observation posts. revealed other defects in the defense
Known as "hootchies" in the Army line. When shubbery was allowed to
vernacular, the bunkers were usually wither, it clearly delineated the emplace-
built with solid overhead cover and sep- ment positions and well-beaten paths in
arate living quarters behind the battle front of the bunkers had the same effect.
stations. Each reflected the ingenuity Indiscriminate clearing of trees and
of its occupants in providing the com- shrubs in front of firing positions also
forts of home, such as cots, flooring, and disclosed the defense line. In some
furniture. sectors improper placing of barbed wire
Along the lateral trenches, the rifle- restricted the fields of fire and tactical
men and rocket-launching crews notched wire strung too close to front-line posi-
revetted bays for firing their weapons tions permitted the enemy to toss hand
and slightly behind them recoilless ri- grenades into the trench area. But most
fle emplacements were dug in and revet- of the deficiencies had been corrected by
ted with sandbags. In defilade on the the end of July and Line KANSAS was
reverse slope of the hills, protected mor- considered strong enough to stop any-
tar firing positions were constructed and thing less than a full-scale enemy offen-
roads were cut to permit tanks to move sive.
up and fire from parapeted front-line Instead of the usual general and com-
positions. Camouflage nets and shubbery bat outpost system. Eighth Army organ-
were used extensively to conceal the ized its outposts as a series of patrol
bunkers and prepared positions. bases.7 Developed initially by front-line
To delay enemy offensives barbed units across the army front while reserve
wire fences were laid out and mines troops strengthened defense positions,
were planted in patterns that would fun- patrol bases afforded depth to the
nel attackers into the heaviest defense defense line. They were established up
fires. In the U.S. I and IX Corps sectors, to ten miles in front of the main battle
where WYOMING positions were occu- line on commanding terrain and in most
pied rather than KANSAS, the troops cases were not mutually supporting.
plotted mine fields and dug the holes,
7
then stored the mines nearby to be General and combat outposts were organized to
provide warnings of enemy attacks and to fight
buried when and if a retreat from Line delaying actions only, while the patrol bases be-
WYOMING should prove necessary.6 came outposts that were to be defended except in
6
the case of an all-out enemy offensive. The patrol
For a more detailed account of the KANSAS line, base was used in Italy during World War II, but
see Maj Billy C. Mossman, The War in Korea, did not become standard technique until the
vol. III. ch. III. MS in OCMH. Korean War.
76 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
They were later manned by reserve tions or to punish any attempt by the
troops, usually a reinforced company, for enemy to penetrate the KANSAS-
distances up to 2,000 yards and by a bat- WYOMING lines.
talion or regiment at the more advanced
bases. Operating within range of their The Enemy
supporting medium artillery, patrol base
commanders could maintain contact with Despite the steady build-up of Com-
the enemy, determine enemy disposi- munist forces during June and July, the
tions by vigorous patrolling, capture expected offensive was not launched. In-
enemy prisoners, and provide warning of stead the enemy continued to bring up
attack by absorbing the first assaults. supplies by rail and road and to
Trip flares, mines, barbed wire, planned strengthen his defensive positions. Since
fields of fire, as well as extra ammuni- casualties were light on both sides dur-
tion and firepower, made the patrol base ing the early summer slowdown in the
a difficult position to penetrate. The fighting and the Communists maintained
bases were often subjected to the favorite a high flow of replacements, their offen-
Chinese and North Korean tactic—the sive capability mounted.10
night attack—but they were harder to On 1 July the Communist forces in
infiltrate than outpost lines and units Korea totaled 459,200 men, according
could withdraw intact to the main line to Eighth Army intelligence estimates.
of resistance in the event of a major Of these 248,100 were Chinese and the
offensive.8 remainder North Korean. In addition,
The patrol base system and the lull there were 7,500 North Korean guerril-
in operations during July caused by the las operating in South Korea. (Table 1)
armistice negotiations gave the Eighth Technically the command of the Com-
Army time to improve the defenses of munist troops in Korea was vested in a
Line WYOMING, too. General Van Combined Headquarters, headed by
Fleet decided to add depth to his de- Premier Kim Il Sung and staffed by
fenses by making WYOMING a perma- North Korean and Chinese officers.
nent line and on 30 July he told his Actually enemy operations appear to
corps commanders that it would be re- have been directed by General Peng
garded as the main line of resistance. Teh-huai, from Headquarters, Chinese
Only in the event of heavy losses would People's Volunteer Army, in Mukden.
the Eighth Army withdraw to Line Combined Headquarters served as a
KANSAS to launch its counterattack.9 clearinghouse and message center but the
By midsummer the pattern was set. Chinese made certain that their com-
The Eighth Army had established its manders would receive the instructions
defensive positions and was prepared from Mukden by using direct channels
either to conduct local offensive opera- of communication as well. At the front
8
See C. C. De Reus, "The Perimeter Pays Off,"
the Chinese had five army group head-
in Combat Forces Journal, vol. 3, No. 5 (December, quarters, each of which controlled two
1952).
9
or more armies. (Chart 3)
Msg, GX 894 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CG's I,
IX, and X U.S. Corps, 30 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC, 10
Comd Rpt, Jul 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl 11. UNC/FEC, Rpt, Jul 51, pp. 4-5.
THE NEW WAR 77

TABLE 1—EIGHTH ARMY ESTIMATE OF ENEMY FORCES


1 JULY 1951

a
Besides these units, Eighth Army Intelligence officers suspected but had not as yet confirmed the presence of six other
Chinese armies and two-thirds of a seventh.
Source: Eighth Army G-2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Locations, 1 Jul 51; Eighth Army G-2 OB Br, CCF
Army Histories, 1 Dec 64. Both in ACSI Doc Library DA.

In the Chinese military organization sance, engineer, and transport battalions,


the army was the principal self-sufficient a signal company, and an army hospital.11
tactical unit. At full strength it had be- Owing to battle losses during the spring
tween 21,000 and 30,000 men, roughly offensives the thirteen plus Chinese ar-
comparable to one and a half to two mies in Korea were at reduced strength
U.S. divisions. Each army contained on 1 July. Seven were deployed along
three divisions and usually included an 11
DA Pamphlet 30-51, September 1952, Handbook
artillery regiment, security, reconnais- on the Chinese Communist Army.
CHART 3—CHAIN OF COMMAND OF ENEMY FORCES, 1 JULY 1951

Source: (1) Hq FEC MIS, FEC Intel Digest, 16-30 Sep 51, p. 5. (2) Hq USAFFE (Adv), G-2 Intel Digests,
16-31 Jan 53, pp. 32-33; 1-15 Feb 53, pp. 26-28; 16-28 Feb 53, pp. 27-28. (3) Hq FEC MIS, History of the
North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52. All in ACSI Doc Lib DA.
THE NEW WAR 79
or close to the central front and the the advance. Herein lay a deep differ-
other six were in reserve.12 ence between the Chinese and the North
The Chinese Communist infantry di- Koreans, for the latter fought for the
vision was triangular and an average land and consistently showed a strong
regiment consisted of approximately disinclination to abandon territory.14
3,000 men. Armed with a miscellaneous Premier Kim Il Sung, the titular com-
collection of Russian, Japanese, Ameri- mander of General Headquarters,
can, and domestically manufactured Korean People's Army, at P'yongyang,
copies of foreign weapons, the firepower left direct control over the North Korean
of a typical regiment might be drawn forces to his Deputy Commander, Mar-
from the following weapons: 180 pistols, shal Choe Yong Gun, and Chief of Staff,
400 rifles and carbines, 217 submachine Nam Il. On the battlefield the highest
guns, 60 light machine guns, 18 heavy tactical echelon of command was Front
machine guns, nine 12.7-mm. antiair- Headquarters under Lt. Gen. Kim Ung,
craft machine guns, twenty-seven an able and energetic combat leader.15
60-mm. mortars, twelve 81- or 82-mm. The North Korean military organiza-
mortars, four 120-mm. mortars, six tion varied in several ways from the
57-mm. recoilless rifles, 18 rocket Chinese. The corps was the main North
launchers, and four 70-mm. infantry Korean tactical unit and customarily ap-
howitzers. The artillery regiment, proximated two American divisions in
which was attached to each division, strength. But the component divisions
usually consisted of three battalions and of the corps, unlike the Chinese Army
contained 36 pieces. Chinese artillery in this respect, varied from time to time:
weapons were of Russian, Japanese, and the North Koreans were flexible and
American manufacture and ranged from shifted divisions from corps to corps as
75-mm. guns to 155-mm. howitzers.13 the need arose. There were seven North
The Chinese had shown themselves to Korean corps in July 1951, and all were
be good soldiers. During the first six in the line—three on the west coast and
months of 1951 they had maintained a four on the east. In addition to guard-
fluid battle line and had sought to entice ing the flanks against UNC amphibious
the U.N. Command to overextend its landings, they anchored the Communist
forces which they would then try to de- line at the front.
stroy in detail. Real estate meant little Although the Communist forces could
to the Chinese and withdrawal was as match the U.N. troops in manpower,
important a part of their tactics as was they were deficient in artillery and
armor. According to gun sightings and
12
See Situation Map, 1 Jul 51. The 39th Army, shell reports, the enemy had about 350
with the 115th, 116th, and 117th Divisions, was at artillery pieces spread along the front
Song'chon and the 38th, with the 112th, 113th, and in July. The majority were 75-mm. and
114th Divisions, and the 40th, with the 118th, 119th
and 120th Divisions, were unlocated. Eighth Army 76-mm. with some 105-mm., 122-mm.,
G-2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Locations,
14
1 Jul 51, in ACSI files. Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec. I, Nar-
13
DA Pamphlet 30-51, September 1952, Hand- rative, p. 2.
15
book on the Chinese Communist Army, pp. 37-39. Hq FEC MIS, Hist of the North Korean Army,
89. 31 Jul 52, pp. 84-95.
80 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
and a few 150-mm. guns and howitzers. limited objective attack, but if he has
Neither the Chinese nor the North brought in several more army groups
Korean infantry units had organic armor. —and frankly we don't know; he could
All of the Chinese armored divisions have added up to two more army groups
were in China and the lone North —and has a good amount of supply for-
Korean tank division was stationed on ward, he may be able to launch an all-out
the west coast north of P'yongyang.16 offensive. I don't think he's that strong,
The enemy offensive capability but we must be prepared to meet his
mounted during July despite the lack of maximum capability and we must be
armor and heavy artillery and there were ready to meet him if the cease-fire nego-
indications that the Communists might tiations fail." 18
be preparing to challenge the almost
complete domination of the air enjoyed The UNC Takes the Initiative
by the Far East Air Forces (FEAF). In-
telligence estimates placed total aircraft Although Van Fleet felt that the
based in Manchuria and available to the Eighth Army could best meet and punish
enemy at 1,050, including 595 fighters, the enemy at the KANSAS-WYOMING
175 ground aircraft, 100 transports, and line under the present conditions, he and
180 training and reconnaissance planes. his staff prepared an offensive plan at
Some 445 of the fighters were jet-pro- Ridgway's request. Submitted in early
pelled and included the fast Russian July, Plan OVERWHELMING outlined
MIG-15 which was in some respects a campaign that would take the Eighth
superior to the best UNC fighters. Army to the P'yongyang-Wonsan line
FEAF estimated that the Russians were starting about 1 September, provided
furnishing the aircraft as quickly as the that certain conditions were satisfied. If
Chinese Communist Air Force trained there were a major deterioration of
pilots and maintenance personnel.17 enemy forces or a withdrawal to the
Since the enemy's passive attitude ap- north, if the mission of the Eighth Army
peared to be a repetition of earlier in- were changed, or if additional forces
stances when the Communists had were allocated to the Eighth Army, Van
withdrawn behind a screening force and Fleet thought that OVERWHELMING
prepared for the next offensive, the might be feasible.19
Eighth Army remained alert and wary. On 10 July the Joint Chiefs removed
Van Fleet did not appear to be par- their requirement that Ridgway secure
ticularly concerned. In a conference their prior approval of all major ground
with the new commander of the U.S. I operations, but the Far East commander
Corps, Maj. Gen. John W. (Iron Mike) took no action on OVERWHELMING.20
O'Daniel, on 24 July, Van Fleet said: The rather formidable set of conditions
that Van Fleet had attached to the plan
". . . if the enemy merely assembles
what forces he has, he can only make a 18
Quoted in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51,
16
Eighth Army G-2 PIR 458, 5 Jul 51; PIR 380, sec. I, Narrative, p. 72.
19
27 Jul 51; PIR 392, 8 Aug 51. FEC JSPOG Study 602, Plan OVERWHELMING,
17
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec I, Nar- no20date.
rative, p. 7. Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.
THE NEW WAR 81

coupled with the initiation of the armis- prove successful were a tough combina-
tice negotiations argued for a cautious tion to defeat. As Van Fleet pointed
approach to any large-scale offensive at out later: "A sitdown army is subject
this time. Ridgway therefore decided to to collapse at the first sign of an enemy
observe the course of the peace talks effort. ... As Commander of the Eighth
before he acted on OVERWHELMING. 21 Army, I couldn't allow my forces to be-
Van Fleet could still launch limited come soft and dormant." 23
attacks on his own initiative, but the In the course of disturbing the enemy's
selection of Kaesong as the truce site dispositions and of sharpening the fight-
eliminated one of the areas that ing edge of the Eighth Army troops, Van
he planned to raid. The possibility of Fleet also hoped to improve his own de-
an armistice, moreover, made both sides fense positions along the front. There
reluctant to expend men and equipment were several areas where the seizure of
during most of July. Thus, it was not dominant terrain would remove sags in
until the end of the month that Van the line or threats to the UNC lines of
Fleet issued his first attack order since communication. One of the sags that
early June. Van Fleet wanted to eliminate existed
The Eighth Army shift from the pas- in the rugged Taebaek Mountains in the
sive defense was fostered by both ex- U.S. X Corps sector.
ternal and internal developments. Since Twenty miles northeast of the
the enemy had used the respite on the Hwach'on Reservoir lay a circular valley
battlefield to build up his stocks and to known as the Punchbowl and rimmed
bring his combat units up to strength, by hills rising sharply to heights of 1 ,000
Van Fleet wanted to probe the Com- to 2,000 feet above the valley floor.
munist defenses, determine the disposi- (Map 3) The Soyang River ran south
tion of the enemy troops, and prevent in the valley to the east of the Punch-
them from employing their mounting bowl, and on the west the So-ch'on River
offensive capabilities by keeping them and one of its tributaries separated the
off balance.22 In addition, Van Fleet Punchbowl from the next series of
was aware that the combat efficiency of ridges. In July the North Koreans held
the Eighth Army had slipped during the the commanding terrain ringing the
latter part of July. Patrols were con- Punchbowl on the west, north, and east
ducted indifferently and failed to bring whence they could observe the UNC de-
in prisoners. Gathering intelligence be- fenses and troop movements and could
came an increasingly difficult task. Even direct artillery fire upon the KANSAS
a stepped-up training program was not line. Seizure of the enemy positions on
enough to restore the ability and will of the high ground would lessen the threat
the Eighth Army to fight. Inactivity and of attacks developing from these heights
the hope that the armistice talks would aimed at splitting the X and ROK I
21
FEC G-3 Study, title: Review of Current
Corps along the corps boundary which
CINCFE Letters of Instruction in the Light of JCS ran to the east of the Punchbowl; it
95977 and JCS 95978, 14 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd
23
Rpt, Jul 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl 13. Statement of Van Fleet, 30 Sep 51, in Depart-
22
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec. I, Nar- ment of State Bulletin, vol. XXV, No. 641 (October
rative, p. 8. 8, 1951), p. 589.
82 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

MAP3

would also allow the Eighth Army to patrol base on Hill 1179 called Taeu
straighten and shorten its lines in the San.25 Unusually heavy rains that made
sector and permit Van Fleet to build up roads and trails impassable and restricted
larger reserve forces.24 On 21 July Van air and artillery support delayed the
Fleet directed the X Corps to draw up launching of further operations in the
plans for seizing the west rim of the Punchbowl area until mid-August.26 Di-
Punchbowl. versionary raids in the U.S. I Corps sec-
In late July the U.S. 2d Division, tor in the west on 4 and 8 August had
commanded by Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruff- encountered little enemy opposition;
ner, won a foothold on the western edge most of the difficulties came from the
of the Punchbowl when the 38th In- swollen rivers and treacherous roads.27
fantry Regiment captured and set up a
25
U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 51. Hill numbers
24
(1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, bk. 1, indicate height in meters.
26
CG's Jnl, 21 Jul 51. (2) Hq U.S. X Corps, Comd Rainfall measured nearly twenty inches in
Rpt, Aug 51, p. 45. (3) Hq U.S. X Corps, Comd August.
27
Rpt, Sep 51, p. 3. Hq U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, pp. 8-18.
THE NEW WAR 83

THE PUNCHBOWL

On 18 August the weather had im- eleven days General Paik's forces fought
proved sufficiently to permit the summer to drive the North Koreans from their
campaign to get under way. ROK troops strongly fortified positions. While troops
from the11th and Capital Divisions of from the ROK 8th Division struck north
the ROK I Corps and from the ROK against the hook of the J, the bulk of
8th Division of the U.S. X Corps at- Paik's men swung in from the east and
tacked a J-shaped ridge that lay north- southeast against the stem. The attack-
east of the Punchbowl. Hill 1031, the ing troops reached their objectives on
highest peak of the ridge, was little more the ridge lines, but were not reinforced
than five miles from the northeast rim in time to withstand the enemy counter-
of the Punchbowl. The ROK forces attacks that swiftly followed. The
under the command of General Paik Sun pattern of attack and counterattack with-
Yup, ROK I Corps, met with stubborn out a decision continued until General
resistance from elements of the North Van Fleet visited Paik's headquarters
Korean 45th, 13th, and 2d Divisions and pointed out his tactical mistake. In
who were dug in on the ridge. For the next attempt Paik reinforced the
84 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

20 U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION TROOPS ON BLOODY RIDGE

attack, seized the hook of the J Ridge the new commander of the U.S. X Corps,
on 27 August and cleared the stem two to eliminate important enemy observa-
28
days later. Possession of the J Ridge tion posts that directed heavy and ac-
provided protection for the Eighth Army curate artillery fire upon Line KANSAS
supply route along the Soyang Valley position from the ridge, some two miles
and permitted the ROK I Corps to ob- west and slightly south of Hill 1179.
serve and fire upon enemy positions and Since Van Fleet believed that the South
troop movements north of the Punch- Korean troops lacked self-confidence and
bowl. needed experience to develop faith in
On the same day—18 August—that the their own abilities, he instructed Byers
attack against the J Ridge had begun, to use ROK units in the assault.29 Byers
the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Di- in turn attached the 36th Regiment to
vision had attempted to seize another the U.S. 2d Division.
ridge west of the Punchbowl. Van Fleet The objective was an east-west ridge
had directed Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers, with three peaks, the highest at the west-
28 29
(1) Hq, Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, sec. 1, (1) Msg, GX 1172, Van Fleet to CG U.S. X
Narrative, pp. 62-78. (2) Eighth Army, G-3 Jnls, Corps, 12 Aug 51. (2) Msg, GX 1202, Van Fleet to
18-27 Aug 51. (3) U.S. X Corps, G-3 Jnls, 18-27 CG U.S. X Corps, 14 Aug 51. Both in Hq Eighth
Aug 51. (4) Gen Byer's Diary, 18-28 Aug 51. Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, G-3 sec., bk. 4, pt. 3.
THE NEW WAR 85

ern end rising to 983 meters. The ridge 27 August some units of the regiment
formed the crossbar of an H-shaped hill broke and ran, spreading panic among
mass that overlooked the forward posi- the elements of the U.S. 9th Regiment
tions of the 2d Division some two miles as well.32 The deterioration of the situa-
south of Hill 983. After five days of tion on Bloody Ridge led General Byers
repeated frontal assaults the ROK 36th on 28 August to alter his approach and
Regiment took the ridge, later called he decided upon a limited advance along
Bloody Ridge, but then had to withdraw the whole corps front, starting on 31
under heavy North Korean pressure.30 August. By applying pressure over a
General Ruffner, the 2d Division com- broad front, Byers hoped to force the
mander, had to commit elements of the enemy to disperse his firepower and to
U.S. 9th Regiment to support the South halt the flow of enemy reinforcements
Koreans, but still the enemy refused to to Bloody Ridge. Thus, Byers rear-
give ground.31 The North Koreans were ranged divisional objectives along the
protected by thick mine fields and corps front. The seizure of the north-
strongly built bunkers that resisted de- west rim of the Punchbowl was assigned
struction by anything less than accurate to the ROK 5th Division and the north-
direct fire. With ample supplies of auto- east rim was given to the U.S. 1st Marine
matic weapons and hand grenades, they Division. While the 2d Division re-
waited in their bunkers until the UNC newed its efforts to take Bloody Ridge,
artillery and air support ceased. Then, the ROK 7th Division would attack and
as the Eighth Army soldiers labored up capture terrain west of the ridge.
the last few yards of the steep slopes, the Although the 1st Marine Division and
Communist troops would move out into its attached Korean Marine troops met
their firing positions and send a hail of little opposition on 31 August as they
bullets and grenades at the attackers. began their advance, the enemy forces
The steadily mounting casualty lists stiffened the following day. Yet despite
led to a decline in morale among the the increasing resistance the marines
men of the ROK 36th Regiment. On were able to push forward and take
several hills on the northern rim of the
30
The newspaper Stars and Stripes named this Punchbowl. By a stroke of good fortune,
action and evidently confused many of the men the N.K. III Corps was in the process
who participated in the attack, since they won- of moving from the ROK I Corps front
dered where all this excitement was taking place
and did not suspect that they were the center of and of taking over the defense of this
attention. They were not inclined to regard the sector from the N.K. II Corps. As the
action as a particularly bloody operation. See Capt N.K. 2d Division began the relief of the
Edward C. Williamson, Capt Pierce W. Briscoe,
1st Lt Martin Blumenson, and 1st Lt John Mewha, N.K. 1st Division, the marines hit the
"Bloody Ridge," August-September 1951. MS in latter's positions. By the time the relief
OCMH, p. 1. was completed, in the opening days of
31
Account of the attack on Bloody Ridge is based
on: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Aug 51 and September, the marines had won control
Sep 51; (2) Eighth Army G-3 Jnls, 17 Aug-5 Sep
51; (3) U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpts, Aug and Sep
32
51; (4) U.S. X Corps, G-3 Jnls, 17 Aug-5 Sep 51; See Interv with Col John M. Lynch, CO, 9th
(5) U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpts, Aug and Sep 51; (6) Inf Regt, in Williamson et al., "Bloody Ridge," p.
Williamson et al., "Bloody Ridge." 71.
86 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
of the northern lip of the Punchbowl.33 well-placed defenses, they had fought
The 9th Infantry attacks on Bloody bitterly to hold on to their observation
Ridge at the end of August and the open- posts on Bloody Ridge. Only when the
ing days of September, on the other attack had been broadened to apply
hand, failed to dislodge the enemy, pressure at several points along the corps
whereupon Byers and Brig. Gen. front, and the 2d Division had com-
Thomas E. de Shazo, who had tempo- mitted elements of all three of the di-
rarily taken command of the 2d Divi- vision's regiments, and only after enemy
sion, laid out a double envelopment of forces suffered severe casualties, did the
Bloody Ridge using elements of the U.S. North Koreans concede and evacuate the
23d and 38th Regiments while the 9th ridge.
continued its assault on the ridge itself.34
On 4 and 5 September the anticlimax Heartbreak Ridge
came. With surprising ease the 2d Divi-
sion forces advanced and took over In any event Bloody Ridge had its
Bloody Ridge. The North Koreans, after effects. During the battle Van Fleet
weakened by heavy losses, had finally had submitted an outline plan, called
evacuated their positions and left sub- TALONS, to Ridgway envisioning an
stantial stores of supplies and over 500 advance ranging from one to almost fif-
dead on the heights. After almost three teen miles to remove the sag in the
weeks of fighting and over 2,700 U.N. Eighth Army's eastern front. Ridgway
and ROK casualties, the Eighth Army had turned down more ambitious plans
had won its objective. According to 2d for an amphibious landing near Wonsan
Division estimates, the defense of and for a deep advance into North
Bloody Ridge had cost the enemy over Korea, but he had no objection to a
15,000 casualties.35 modest ground offensive.36 Preparations
The advance by the X Corps in August for TALONS continued until 5 Septem-
demonstrated once again the reluctance ber, when Van Fleet evidently took a
of the North Koreans to part with any close look at the final casualty totals of
of their territory. Taking excellent ad- the Bloody Ridge fight. Since TALONS
vantage of the terrain and constructing would be on a much larger scale, Van
Fleet decided that the operation was not
33 worth the probable cost in lives and
34
U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, sec. 1, pp. 8-9. matériel. Instead he informed Ridgway
General Ruffner went home on normal rotation
on 1 September and Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, that he favored sustaining his "tidying
the new commander, did not arrive until 20 Sep- up" on the Eighth Army right flank dur-
tember.
35
Casualties: 2d Div and attached units, 18 Aug- ing the remainder of September, using
5 Sep, killed in action, 326; wounded in action, "elbowing" tactics without any definite
2,032; missing in action 414; total, 2,772. Enemy
36
casualties: counted killed in action, 1,389; estimated (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, sec.
killed, 4,288; estimated wounded, 9,422; prisoners, I, Narrative, pp. 47-48, 52. (2) Msg, GX 1174
264; total, 15,363. See Williamson et al., "Bloody TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 12 Aug 51, in Hq
Ridge," pp. 203, 211. It should be remembered Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, G-3 sec., bk. 4,
that the estimated killed and wounded figures are pt. 3. (3) Msg, C 69168, Ridgway to JCS, 18 Aug
educated guesses and may be at considerable vari- 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, an. 4, pt. III,
ance with the actual enemy casualties. incl 16.
THE NEW WAR 87

HEARTBREAK RIDGE

objective line assigned. Around 1 Octo- assault, however, Ridgway would only
ber he would stop his offensive opera- approve for planning purposes.37
tions in the east, then launch an attack Acting swiftly, Van Fleet issued a
in the west by the U.S. I Corps about general directive to his corps command-
the middle of the month, provided the ers on 8 September emphasizing limited
armistice negotiations permitted. If this objective attacks, reconnaissance, and pa-
I Corps maneuver were successful, Van trolling.38 He followed up the directive
Fleet would follow up with an amphi- the same day with instructions to the
bious operation on the east coast near X Corps to take the ridge just north of
Tongch'on. This would link up with
a land advance northeast from Kumhwa. 37
(1) Msg, C 50314, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 7 Sep
The quick change in plans by the 51, Paper 17. (2) Msg, GX 1636 TAC, Van Fleet to
Ridgway, 7 Sep 51, Paper 19. (3) Msg, C 50405,
Eighth Army commander caught Ridg- Ridgway to Van Fleet, 8 Sep 51, Paper 20. All in
way by surprise, but he interposed no Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51.
38
objection to the continuance of the Msg, CG 1656 TAC, Van Fleet to CG U.S. I,
U.S. IX, U.S. X, and ROK I Corps, 8 Sep 51, in
limited objective attacks on an oppor- Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Sep 51, G-3 sec., bk.
tunistic basis. The proposed amphibious 4, incls 6-10.
88 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Bloody Ridge and another north of the After withdrawing from Bloody
Punchbowl. Since the North Koreans Ridge, the North Koreans had fallen
opposite the X Corps had just sustained back to prepared bunkers, trenches, and
a defeat on Bloody Ridge, Van Fleet gun positions covering the approach
thought that immediate thrusts would ridges to Heartbreak that were just as
keep the enemy off balance and would strongly fortified and as well camou-
gain the new ridge lines before the Com- flaged as those previously encountered
munists had a chance to recover.39 by the 2d Division. The respite between
The X Corps assigned the task of tak- the end of the Bloody Ridge battle on
ing the peaks north of Bloody Ridge 5 September and the assault on Heart-
to the U.S. 2d Division. The objective break Ridge eight days later permitted
was the southern tip of a long, narrow the North Koreans to strengthen their
ridge running north and south between defenses even further and to reinforce
the Mundung-ni Valley on the west and the units guarding the ridge and its ap-
the Sat'ae-ri Valley on the east; spur proaches. In the Mundung-ni Valley the
ridges arching east and west from the North Korean 12th Division of the III
main ridge caused one observer to de- Corps controlled the hills on the western
scribe the objective as the "spinal col- side of the Suip-ch'on River and the
umn of a fish, with hundreds of verte- 6th Division of the same corps was re-
brae." 40 Possession of the central ridge sponsible for the Heartbreak Ridge and
would prevent the enemy from using the Sat'ae-ri Valley sectors. Aerial photos
adjacent valleys to attack the X Corps de- had disclosed that the enemy had been
fense lines west of the Punchbowl. very active in the Heartbreak Ridge
Heartbreak Ridge, as the objective area, grouping artillery and mortar units
was later named by news correspondents in the valleys flanking the ridge. But
covering the action, had three main the heavy woods and undergrowth had
peaks. At the southern terminus was veiled the elaborate enemy fortifications
Hill 894 which commanded the ap- from the camera's eye and concealed the
proach from Bloody Ridge, three miles fact that the 2d Division was again faced
to the south; Hill 931, the highest peak with the task of breaching the enemy's
in the ridge, lay 1,300 yards to the north; main line of resistance.
and 2,100 yards north of Hill 931 rose Within the 2d Division there was con-
the needlelike projection of Hill 851. siderable difference of opinion on the
extent of the expected enemy reaction
to an attack on Heartbreak Ridge. Col.
39
Msg, GX 1659 TAC, Van Fleet to CG U.S. X Edwin A. Walker, the artillery com-
Corps, 8 Sep 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt,
Sep 51, G-3 sec., bk. 4, incls 6-10. mander, felt that the North Koreans
40
Maj Edward C. Williamson, Maj Pierce W. would "fight like hell" for it, while some
Briscoe, Capt Martin Blumenson, and 1st Lt. John members of the staff contemplated that
Mewha, Action on "Heartbreak Ridge," p. 3. MS
in OCMH. The following account of the Heart- the enemy response would be less vigo-
break Ridge battle is based on: (1) the above ac- rous. General de Shazo, the acting divi-
count and its companion MS, Heartbreak Ridge, sion commander, evidently was among
September-October 1951, also in OCMH; (2) U.S.
2d Div, Comd Rpts, Sep and Oct 51; (3) Mossman, the latter group. He decided to use one
The War in Korea, vol. III, chs. VI and VII. regiment—the 23d—rather than two in
THE NEW WAR 89

the assault force. Approaching from the gan and for thirty minutes the guns
east across the Sat'ae-ri Valley, the 23d, pounded enemy positions on or near
under Col, James Y. Adams, would cut Heartbreak Ridge. Then Colonel Ad-
Heartbreak between Hills 931 and 851. ams, a 6-foot 6-inch West Pointer, gave
One battalion would then turn north to the signal to start the 23d's attack. The
seize Hill 851 while a second would move 3d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Virgil E.
south to capture Hills 931 and 894. As Craven, led the way in a column of com-
soon as Hill 894 came under the control panies, followed by the 2d Battalion,
of the 23d, the 9th Infantry, under commanded by Lt. Col. Henry F.
Col. John M. Lynch, would advance and Daniels. As the assault troops moved
take Hill 728, 2,000 yards to the west north from Hill 702 up the Sat'ae-ri
and slightly south of Hill 894. Valley to reach the east-west spur ridge
On 13 September the elements of the that would serve as the approach
2d Division were in position and ready to Heartbreak, the North Koreans
to attack. The French Battalion, under spotted them. Heavy artillery and mor-
Lt. Col. Ralph Monclar, had taken over tar fire from Heartbreak Ridge posi-
the positions of the 38th Infantry Regi- tions and from the heights around Sat'ae-
ment on Hill 868, a little over two miles ri town began to pour in on the men of
east of Hill 931, and the 38th had be- the 23d Regiment. Despite the growing
come the division reserve with responsi- number of casualties, Craven's forces
bility for surveillance of the KANSAS pressed on, closely followed by Daniels'
line. The 9th Regiment was poised to men. As the 3d Battalion arrived at the
advance on Hill 728 when the 23d Regi- east-west spur and headed up the hill
ment gained Hill 894. Direct support to split the Heartbreak Ridge line, it
for the 23d Regiment would come from ran into a hornet's nest. The 1st Regi-
the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, under ment of the N.K. 6th Division manned
Lt. Col. Linton S. Boatright, and its a series of concealed, mutually support-
105-mm. howitzers, while the 503d Field ing bunkers that covered the approach
Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzer), ridge with machine guns and small
96th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. arms. Added to the artillery and mortar
howitzer), 38th Field Artillery Battalion fire that the enemy observers were direct-
(105-mm. howitzer), and Battery C of ing upon the two attack battalions, the
the 780th Field Artillery Battalion automatic weapons and rifle fire forced
(8-inch howitzer) provided general sup- the assault force to halt and dig in on
port. The 37th and 38th Field Artillery the toe of the spur. The prospects for
Battalions were located about three a swift penetration of the enemy lines
miles southeast of Heartbreak Ridge. vanished as night fell; the 23d had come
The 96th and 503rd were approximately up against the main defenses of the
seven miles south and nine miles south- North Koreans and another Bloody
east of the objective respectively, while Ridge experience loomed ahead.
the battery from the 780th was near When reports of the 23d's situation
Yach'on-ni, about eleven miles south of reached General de Shazo, he realized
Heartbreak. that he had underestimated the enemy's
At 0530 the artillery preparation be- defensive capacity. Since the 9th Regi-
90 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
ment, under Colonel Lynch, was already heavy curtain of fire laid down by the
in position for its contemplated attack enemy.
on Hill 728, de Shazo directed Lynch Secure in their strongly fortified bunk-
on 14 September to use his regiment ers, the North Korean defenders waited
against Hill 894 instead. A successful until the artillery and air support given
seizure of Hill 894 could relieve some to the 2d Division assault forces was
of the pressure on the 23d Regiment. lifted and then returned to their firing
The 2d Battalion of the 9th Regiment positions. As the 23d Regiment's sol-
advanced from Yao'dong up the south- diers climbed the last few yards toward
west shoulder of Hill 894 on 14 Septem- the crest, the North Koreans opened up
ber, supported by tanks of Company B, with their automatic weapons, rifles, and
72d Tank Battalion, the heavy mortar grenades. Since the enemy controlled
company, and a battalion of 155-mm. the Mundung-ni Valley which offered
howitzers. By nightfall the 2d Battalion defiladed and less steep access routes to
had climbed to within 650 yards of the Heartbreak Ridge, the problem of rein-
crest of Hill 894 against light enemy re- forcements and resupply was not diffi-
sistance. The attack continued on 15 cult to resolve. In fact, General Hong
September and by afternoon, the height Nim, commander of the N.K. 6th Divi-
was swept clear of the enemy. Up to this sion, managed to send the fresh 13th
point the 2d Battalion had had only Regiment in to replace the 1st Regiment
eleven casualties, but the next two days on 16 September without any trouble.
cost the battalion over two hundred For the U.S. 2d Division, the outlook
more as the North Koreans counter- was rather grim. The narrow Pia-ri
attacked fiercely and repeatedly in a vain Valley, southwest of Heartbreak, was
effort to drive it off the crest. jammed with vehicles and exposed to
Possession of Hill 894 by the 9th Regi- enemy artillery and mortar fire. Korean
ment failed, however, to relieve the pres- civilian porters frequently abandoned
sure on the 23d as it sought again to their loads along the trails and bolted for
cut the ridge line between Hills 931 and cover when the enemy got too close. To
851. The enemy's firepower kept the keep the front-line units supplied with
assault forces pinned down on the lower food, water, ammunition, and equip-
slopes. On 16 September Colonel Adams ment and to evacuate the casualties often
ordered his 2d and 3d Battalions to shift required that American infantrymen
from the column formation they had double as carriers and litter bearers.
been using to attack abreast. Thus, The rugged terrain and the close enemy
while the 3d Battalion renewed its drive surveillance of the approaches to Heart-
due west, the 2d Battalion swung to the break Ridge made their jobs very hazard-
southwest and approached Hill 931 ous and time consuming, for it could
along another spur. In the meantime, take up to ten hours to bring down a
C Company of the 1st Battalion passed litter case from the forward positions
through the positions of the 9th Regi- held by the 23d Regiment.
ment on Hill 894 and tried to take Hill The stalemate on the ridge led
931 from the south. The three-point Colonel Lynch on 19 September to sug-
attack made little headway against the gest a broadening of the attack to
THE NEW WAR 91

dissipate the enemy's concentrated briefly won their way to the crest on 23
resistance. He urged General de Shazo September, but could not withstand the
to let 1st Battalion of his 9th Regiment enemy's counterattack. An early morn-
move across the Mundung-ni Valley and ing assault from the east by a company
seize Hills 867 and 1024 located about from the 3d Regiment, N.K. 12th Divi-
three and four miles, respectively, south- sion, produced a fierce fight that deci-
west of Hill 894. If the enemy assumed mated the 1st Battalion. When his am-
that this attack marked the beginning of munition ran out, Williams had to pull
an envelopment of Heartbreak Ridge back his men from Hill 931.41
from the west, he might well divert men Across the Mundung-ni Valley the di-
and guns to block the challenge, Lynch versionary attacks against Hills 1024 and
reasoned. But de Shazo rejected the 1142 by the 9th Regiment and the ROK
proposal since General Byers, the 7th Division made good progress. On 25
X Corps commander, had earlier September the 1st Battalion, 9th Infan-
directed that Hill 931 be given first try, cleared the crest of Hill 1024 and
priority. the ROK 7th Division won Hill 1142 the
When Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the following day. Recognizing the threat to
new 2d Division commander, arrived the neighboring Hill 867, a key terrain fea-
following day, he decided that Lynch's ture dominating the valley to the north,
plan was sound. He ordered Lynch to the North Koreans quickly shifted the
take Hills 867 and 1024 and the 9th In- 3d Regiment, N.K. 6th Division, from
fantry commander scheduled the attack Heatbreak Ridge to defend the hill.
on Hill 1024 for 23 September; Hill 867 The North Korean deployment, how-
would be seized after Hill 1024 fell. In ever, did not help the embattled 23d
the meantime. Van Fleet told Byers that Regiment to capture Hill 931. Although
it would be desirable for the X Corps to the French Battalion replaced the 2d
advance its western flank to bring the Battalion and tried to advance south
front line into phase with the U.S. IX along the ridge line while the 1st Battal-
Corps'. Thus, Byers, on 22 September, di- ion sought to press north toward the
rected the ROK 7th Division to capture crest of 931, the N.K. 15th Regiment
Hill 1142, located about 2,000 yards fought them off on 26 September. The
northwest of Hill 1024. The double-bar- 23d's regimental tanks were able to
reled attack upon Hills 1024 and 1142 move far enough north in the Sat'ae-ri
might well cause the North Koreans to Valley to send direct fire against some
take the threat seriously and lessen their of the enemy's bunkers covering the east-
capacity to resist on Heartbreak Ridge. ern approaches to Heartbreak, but could
The attacks by the 23d Infantry not destroy the heavy mortars and ma-
against Heartbreak Ridge had continued chine guns that halted the 2d Division
on 21 and 22 September with little suc- attack.
cess. The 1st Battalion, under Maj. After almost two weeks of futile
George H. Williams, Jr., had tried again pounding at the enemy's defenses on
to take Hill 931 from the south, while 41
The 3d Regiment remained on Hill 931 until
Daniels' 2d Battalion came in from the 26 September when it was relieved by the 15th
north. Elements of the 1st Battalion Regiment, N.K. 6th Division.
92 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Heartbreak, Colonel Adams told Gen- Infantry would advance on the western
eral Young on 26 September that it was side of the Mundung-ni Valley and seize
"suicide" to continue adhering to the Hills 867, 1005, 980, and 1040. To the
original plan. His own 23d Regiment 23d went the task of securing Hill 931
had already taken over 950 casualties and and the ridge line running west of that
the division total for the period was over peak. In addition, the 23d would be
1,670. As Colonel Lynch had the week ready to attack Hill 728 or to help the
before, Adams favored broadening the 38th capture it, as the case might be,
attack and dispersing the enemy's capac- and to take Hill 520, west of Hill 851.
ity to resist on Heartbreak. He felt that The 38th would secure Hill 485 and then
if the North Korean forces in the vicinity provide infantry support to the 72d
of Heartbreak were engaged and unable Tank Battalion. Target date for TOUCH-
to spare reinforcements or replacements DOWN was 5 October.
for the N.K. 15th Regiment, the 23d The preparations for TOUCHDOWN re-
could wear the enemy regiment down quired a period of tremendous activity
and win the ridge. on the part of the 2d Engineer Combat
By 27 September Young and the corps Battalion and its commander, Lt. Col.
commander, General Byers, had come Robert W. Love. The road along the
to agree with Adams and further assaults Mundung-ni Valley was a rough track un-
by the 23d on Heartbreak were called suitable for the medium Sherman tanks
off. Analyzing the initial attempts of 2d of the 72d Tank Battalion and to get it
Division to take Heartbreak, Young later quickly into condition to carry the M4's
characterized them as a "fiasco" because was a herculean task.42 But Love and his
of the piecemeal commitment of units men were willing to try if they had ade-
and the failure to organize fire support quate fire cover while they worked.
teams. The enemy mortars were espe- Craters dotted the track and the North
cially effective, he pointed out, causing Koreans had planted mines along the
about 85 percent of the division's cas- way. At one point they had heaped large
ualties up to this point. rocks six feet high and sprinkled the pile
In the new plan that the division G-3, with hand grenades, each with its pin
Maj. Thomas W. Mellon, prepared in pulled. The 2d Engineers put no
late September, the earlier mistakes pounds of explosives around this road-
were to be avoided. All three regiments block and detonated the grenades when
of the division would launch concen- the explosives went off. Rock from
trated and co-ordinated attacks, sup- neighboring cliff walls was blasted to
ported by all the division's artillery, by provide fill for the craters. Working
a full-scale armored drive by the 72d with shovels because their bulldozers
Tank Battalion up the Mundung-ni Val- were undergoing repair and would, in
ley, and by tank-infantry task force action any case, have drawn artillery fire from
in the Sat'ae-ri Valley. When the divi-
sion issued the operation order on 2 Oc- 42
For an interesting account of the TOUCHDOWN
tober under the code name TOUCHDOWN, operation, see the article by Lt. Col. Virgil E.
Craven, "Operation Touchdown Won Heartbreak
General Young assigned the following Ridge" in Combat Forces Journal (December 1953),
objectives to his regiments. The 9th vol. 4, No. 5, pp. 24ff.
THE NEW WAR 93

the enemy on the heights further up the the Mundung-ni Valley. The 38th
valley, the engineers fashioned a usable would stop near Saegonbae, southwest
road. To take care of the mines along of Hill 894. The 3d Battalion of the
the trail, they placed chain blocks of 38th was to be the division reserve and
tetranol at 50-foot intervals on the sides could be used only with the permission
of the track and then set them off. The of General Young. The attached Neth-
explosions detonated the mines nearby. erlands Battalion, however, provided the
When the craters and mines were too 38th with three full battalions. On
dense, the engineers shifted the road to Heartbreak Ridge the 23d Infantry
the stream bed, which had not been maintained two of its four battalions on
mined, and cleared the boulders block- the lines between Hills 894, 931, and
ing the way. Bit by bit they advanced 851.
northward up the valley. To protect the division's right flank in
While the engineers prepared the path the Sat'ae-ri Valley area and to distract
for the tank attack, the 2d Division regi- the enemy, a task force under Maj. Ken-
ments received replacements to bring neth R. Sturman of the 23d Infantry
their battalions up to full strength and Regiment was organized on 3 October.
built up their supplies of food, equip- Composed of the 23d Tank Company,
ment, and ammunition for the upcoming the 2d Reconnaissance Company, a
operation. The 23d Regiment pulled French pioneer platoon, and an infan-
each of its battalions out of the line for try company from the special divisional
forty-eight hours so that the replace- security forces, Task Force Sturman, as
ments could be integrated while the unit it was called, had the secondary mission
was in reserve rather than on the line. of destroying enemy bunkers on the east
The division established supply points side of Heartbreak Ridge and of acting
forward of Line KANSAS to insure that as a decoy to draw enemy fire away from
the operation did not fail because of the 23d Infantry foot soldiers on the
ammunition shortages. ridge.
General Young also wanted to be cer- On 4 October forty-nine fighter-bomb-
tain that his battalion commanders ers worked over the divisional sector and
would make full use of all the firepower the Sturman force raided the Sat'ae-ri
at their disposal. Each battalion had to Valley. The other units of the 2d under-
submit fire plans showing how it in- went final rehearsals for the attack sched-
tended to employ its tanks, automatic uled for 2100 hours the next night. Fire
weapons, small arms, and mortars in support teams usually consisting of a
TOUCHDOWN. Sand-table models of the combination of mortars, machine guns,
Heartbreak Ridge sector were used ex- rifles, and automatic weapons that could
tensively in positioning the division's be called upon by the attacking infantry
weapons in the best possible locations. whenever the need arose were set up and
Early in October, the three regiments given dry runs. The additional fire-
moved into their attack positions. The power would be extremely valuable
9th was on the left flank, ready to ad- against enemy bunkers and strongpoints.
vance upon Hill 867 while the 38th, un- In the late afternoon of 5 October, the
der Col. Frank T. Mildren, was going up artillery preparation opened up as the
94 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
division's artillery battalions began to from Hill 485 and seized Hill 728 against
pummel the defending enemy units fac- only light enemy opposition. The 2d
ing the 9th and 38th Regiments in the Battalion deployed up the Mundung-ni
Mundung-ni Valley area. Deployed from Valley and attacked Hill 636 which fell
west to east the 3d Regiment, N.K. 12th on 7 October. Possession of these two
Division, occupied Hill 867; the 1st Reg- hills furnished cover for Colonel Love's
iment, N.K. 6th Division, was spread engineers, who could now complete the
from Hill 636 northwest to Hill 974; tank trail for the 72d Tank Battalion's
and the 15th Regiment, N.K. 6th Divi- advance. The 72d, commanded by Lt.
sion, was dug in on Hill 931. As a result Col. John O. Woods, was attached to the
of the constant pressure exerted by the 38th on 7 October and the regiment was
2d Division on these units during Sep- given three new objectives: Hill 605,
tember and early October, none of them 2,000 yards north of Hill 636; the Hill
had a strength that reached a thousand 905-Hill 974 ridge which extended
men. The N.K. 12th and 6th Divi- northwest from Hill 636 toward Hill
sions were both far understrength by 1220 on the Kim Il Sung range; and Hill
the eve of TOUCHDOWN. 841, a thousand yards north of Hill 974.
Air strikes by Marine Corsairs sent Up on Heartbreak Ridge the 23d Reg-
napalm, rockets, and machine gun bul- iment was also able to report encourag-
lets into the North Korean lines before ing news. Colonel Adams' battle plan
the attack jumped off that evening. On had directed Major Williams' 1st Battal-
the west the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, ion to exert diversionary pressure north
pressed on toward Hill 867 and by 7 against Hill 851, while the French Bat-
October had won the crest, meeting only talion feinted south toward Hill 931.
light resistance. The battalion then Daniels' 2d Battalion would hit Hill 931
swung northwest toward Hill 960 while from the south with Craven's 3d Battal-
the 1st Battalion mounted an attack ion as reserve behind Daniels. Under
north against Hill 666. Both hills fell on cover of night and the distractions pro-
8 October. Then the 9th pushed on to vided for the enemy by the rest of the
Hill 1005 northwest of Hill 666 and after division, Daniels' troops moved out.
a bayonet assault took possession on 10 Enemy fire came in quickly upon the
October. On the following day the ROK battalion, but the North Koreans could
8th Division gained Hill 1050 and the not concentrate all their attention upon
Kim Il Sung range to the west of the 9th this assault. With the 3d Battalion in
Regiment.43 support, Daniels' force slowly ap-
The 38th Regiment, in the meantime, proached Hill 931. To preserve the ele-
had also made excellent progress. Colo- ment of surprise, there had been no
nel Mildren's troops had had a windfall artillery preparation. The 37th Field
on 4 October when they discovered that Artillery Battalion opened up on all
the enemy had abandoned Hill 485, a known enemy mortar positions as the
mile south of Hill 728. By noon on 6 attack got under way. The effectiveness
October the 1st Battalion had advanced of the countermortar fire helped the 23d
43
The ROK 8th Division had relieved the ROK infantrymen as they closed with the
7th Division on 29 September. North Koreans after only light losses.
THE NEW WAR 95

Flame throwers, grenades, and small the supply and replacement routes up
arms rooted the enemy from the formid- the western slopes of Heartbreak Ridge.
able bunkers that had blocked the 23d's At intervals of about 100 yards the
advance for so many weeks. By 0300 the tanks, operating without infantry in the
2d and 3d Battalions had won the south- northern reaches of the valley, were able
ern half of Hill 931. The expected to cover each other and fire at targets of
enemy counterattack came and was re- opportunity. They disrupted the enemy
pulsed. With the coming of daylight, relief completely and made the task of
the advance was renewed. The French the infantry much lighter in the days
Battalion moved in from the north and that followed. It was apparent that the
the 2d and 3d Battalions pressed on to enemy had thought that tanks could not
meet it; before noon Hill 931 finally be used in Mundung-ni Valley and the
belonged to the 23d Infantry. feat of Love's engineers in opening a
Craven's 3d Battalion then pushed on road had taken him by surprise.
to join the 1st Battalion in its assault The battle, however, was not quite
against the last objective on Heartbreak over. The 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry,
Ridge—Hill 851. In the Sat'ae-ri Valley, took advantage of the tank advance to
Sturman's tanks sustained their daylight seize Hill 605, but the 2d Battalion's
raids and continued to blast away at the attempts to capture Hill 905 were
bunkers on the eastern slopes of Hill 851. blunted on 10 October. The next day
On the west, in the Mundung-ni Valley, the 2d Battalion overcame enemy oppo-
Woods's 72d Tank Battalion awaited the sition and the 1st Battalion took Hill
go-ahead signal from Love's engineers. 900. On 12 October the 1st Battalion
On 10 October the engineers finished pushed on toward the Kim Il Sung range
their task and the 72d's Shermans, ac- and captured Hill 974. The final objec-
companied by Company L, 38th Infan- tive of the 38th—Hill 1220—fell on 15
try, and an engineer platoon, began to October.
rumble north up the valley. By a fortu- On Heartbreak Ridge the 23d Regi-
nate coincidence the enemy was caught ment, N.K. 13th Division, defended Hill
in the middle of relieving the rapidly 851, backed by its sister regiments, the
disintegrating elements of the N.K. V 21st and 19th. The 21st was to the im-
Corps in the Heartbreak Ridge-Mun- mediate rear and the 19th defended the
dung-ni sector. Advance elements of the Sat'ae-ri Valley. On 10 October, Colonel
204th Division, CCF 68th Army, were in Daniels' 2d Battalion had swung down
the process of taking over positions al- from Heartbreak Ridge and taken pos-
ready vacated by the North Koreans. session of Hill 520, a little over a mile
The tank thrust coupled with the gen- south of the town of Mundung-ni. Hill
eral forward movement of the rest of the 520 was the end of an east-west ridge
2d Division found the Chinese still in the spur leading to Hill 851. During the
open en route to their new positions. next two days, the 1st and French Bat-
Woods's tankers raced to the town of talions inched north toward the objec-
Mundung-ni and beyond, taking losses tive, bunker by bunker, taking few
on the way, but inflicting heavy losses prisoners in the bitter fighting. The
upon the Chinese troops and cutting off North Koreans and their Chinese allies
96 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

who had succeeded in joining them on 13,000 rounds. The division's mortar
Hill 951 had to be killed or wounded crews sent over 119,000 rounds of 60-
before they would cease resistance. Colo- mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch mortar fire
nel Craven's 3d Battalion shifted to the and the 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless
spur between Hills 520 and 851 to apply rifle teams directed nearly 18,000 rounds
pressure from the west. Finally at day- at the enemy.46 Although there were
break on 13 October, Monclar's French shortages in some types of ammunition
troops stormed the peak and after thirty at the theater level, Van Fleet had given
days of hard combat, Heartbreak Ridge the 2d Division commander permission
was in the possession of the 23d In- to fire "all the ammunition thought nec-
fantry to stay. essary to take the positions." When 81-
The costs of the long battle were high mm. mortar shells became short in
for both sides. The 2d Division had suf- supply, the 4.2-inch were used more
fered over 3,700 casualties during the 13 frequently. To keep the 4.2-inch mor-
September-15 October period, with the tars in operation, an airlift from Pusan
23d Regiment and its attached French brought 2,500 rounds a day for four days,
Battalion incurring almost half of this while a special rail shipment with
total.44 On the enemy side the North 25,000 rounds was rushed to the front.
Korean 6th, 12th, and 13th Divisions To supplement the artillery support
and the CCF 204th Division all suffered given the division, the Fifth Air Force
heavily. Estimates by the 2d Division of flew 842 sorties over the Heartbreak
the enemy's losses totaled close to 25,000 Ridge area and loosed 250 tons of bombs
men.45 Approximately half of these cas- on the enemy.47 Against the deep bunk-
ualties had come during the TOUCH- ers of the North Koreans, anything less
DOWN operation. than a direct hit was ineffective, but
The increase in casualties had been Colonel Adams felt that the air strikes
accompanied by a similar rise in ammu- were good for morale. He also gave the
nition expenditures. Besides the mil- fighter-bombers credit for neutralizing
lions of rounds of small arms artillery and mortar fire during a battal-
ammunition that were used, the 2d Di- ion relief on 27 September so that the
vision infantrymen received the follow- 23d could make the shift without casual-
ing artillery support: 76-mm. gun— ties.48
62,000 rounds; 105-mm. howitzer— There were many points of similarity
401,000 rounds; 155-mm. howitzer between the Heartbreak Ridge struggle
—84,000 rounds; and 8-inch howitzer— and its immediate predecessor—Bloody
Ridge. In both cases the North Koreans
had organized strong defensive positions
44
in depth and had had the advantage of
2d Division casualties included 597 killed, 3,064
wounded, and 84 missing. The 23d Regiment took
1,832 casualties. See Williamson et al., Action on
"Heartbreak Ridge," pp. 17n, 18n, 26n.
45 46
The estimates included 1,473 counted killed, Ibid., sec. III, tab A, Ammunition Expendi-
8,389 estimated killed, 14,204 estimated wounded, tures.
47
and 606 prisoners of war. See Williamson et al.,
48
Ibid.
Heartbreak Ridge, sec. III, tab D, extracts from the Williamson et al., Action on "Heartbreak
CG's File, U.S. 2d Inf Div. Ridge," p. 33.
THE NEW WAR 97
defiladed routes to bring in logistical rather than one. Then, unable to funnel
support and reinforcements. The UNC in replacements to all the threatened
forces had to advance over exposed routes positions or to concentrate his artillery
which the enemy artillery and mortar and mortar fire within a small area, the
fire covered very effectively. The 2d Di- enemy had reluctantly withdrawn to his
vision advance was extremely hazardous next defense line. Frequently, despite
and slow as long as the North Koreans the artillery, tank, and air support given
were allowed to concentrate their fire on to the U.N. foot soldiers, the North Ko-
relatively few targets. reans would leave only after they had
In both attacks, enemy capabilities and been flushed from their bunkers by in-
will to resist had been underesti- fantry weapons. The North Koreans at
mated. Each had been planned as a Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges had
small-scale advance to straighten out a fought with determination and courage
front-line sag and each had suffered from throughout the battles until attrition
a lack of adequate reserves to reinforce and superior strength had forced them
and consolidate the objectives after they to yield their real estate.
were won. After the North Koreans With the successful conclusion of the
counterattacked the Eighth Army forces, TOUCHDOWN operation X Corps had re-
the latter had been compelled to with- moved the sag in the Punchbowl area
draw. At Heartbreak the corps com- and in the lines held by the U.S. 2d and
mander, General Byers, had not permit- ROK 8th Divisions to the west of the
ted the 2d Division to use the 38th Punchbowl. Advances of over five miles
Regiment until Operation TOUCHDOWN, along this front had shortened the X
although it was apparent long before Corps' lines and had brought them into
then that the 23d would not be able to phase with those of the U.S. IX Corps
take the ridge as long as the enemy could to the west.
focus his attention upon Colonel Adams'
units. The 38th had remained the di- Advance in the West
visional reserve until October despite the
need for its services. Shortly after the Heartbreak Ridge
At the command level the 2d Division operation got under way in September,
had had a change in leadership during General Van Fleet and his staff drew up
the two operations. General de Shazo plans for an ambitious advance in the
had taken over the division while the U.S. I and IX Corps sectors. Since the
Bloody Ridge fight was still in progress important Ch'orwon-Kumhwa railroad
and he in turn had been succeeded by was exposed to enemy artillery fire and
Young after the Heartbreak contest was attack, Plan CUDGEL envisioned a 15-
well under way. Each had brought the kilometer drive forward from WYOMING
operation he had inherited to a successful to protect the railroad line and to force
conclusion, but only after a considerable the enemy to give up his forward posi-
expansion of the original battle plan. tions. Besides improving communica-
Final attainment of the objective had tions in central Korea, Van Fleet
occurred when the pressure upon the intended to use the railroad to support
enemy had been applied at several points a follow-up operation in October which
98 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
he had named WRANGLER. 49 The latter bank of the Imjin River a little over 9
was equally ambitious, for it aimed at miles northeast of Munsan-ni, then
cutting off the North Korean forces op- arched gently northeast to the town of
posing the ROK I and U.S. X Corps on Samich'on on the Sami-ch'on River. For
the right flank of the Eighth Army by that next 10 miles JAMESTOWN ran north-
an amphibious operation on the east east, rejoining the Imjin River near the
coast. If this operation were successful, town of Kyeho-dong, then hugged the
the forward line of the Eighth Army high ground south of the Yokkokch'on
would run between P'yonggang and for about 12 miles until it reached the
Kojo.50 For the landing force, Van Fleet area of Chut'oso, six miles northwest of
proposed to use U.S. Marine forces with Ch'orwon. From Chut'oso, JAMESTOWN
a ROK division following them into the ran east by north for about 10 miles, end-
Kojo beach area. The Eighth Army com- ing approximately 5 miles northeast of
mander frankly recognized that this op- Ch'orwon at the village of Chungasan.
eration would be a calculated risk and Seizure of the key terrain features along
might lead to a dangerous enemy coun- this line would screen the Yonch'on-
terthrust on the west flank as the am- Ch'orwon Valley lines of communication
phibious forces tried to link up with the from enemy observation and artillery
U.S. IX Corps along the Kumsong-Kojo fire, permit development of the Seoul-
road.51 Ch'orwon-Kumhwa railroad line, and
Although Van Fleet asked Ridgway allow the main line of resistance to be
for a quick decision on CUDGEL and advanced. (Map II) In addition, the
WRANGLER, he discarded them himself I Corps offensive would keep the enemy
within a few days just as he had canceled off balance and prevent the Eighth Army
out TALONS earlier in the month. Con- troops from getting stale.52
sideration of the probable costs of October was a good month for opera-
CUDGEL led him to accept instead a sub- tions in the west central part of Korea,
stitute plan submitted by General since the weather was usually dry. This
O'Daniel, the I Corps commander, at the permitted full air support and elimi-
end of September. O'Daniel outlined a nated the problems of flash floods and
modest 10-kilometer advance by the I heavy mud. Terrain in the I Corps sec-
Corps to a new defense line called JAMES- tor varied from low lands in the west to
TOWN, which would allow that corps to small, steep hills in the center and low
strengthen its supply lines by reducing rolling hills on the eastern fringes of the
the truck hauls during the winter corps boundary.
months. JAMESTOWN began on the west To carry out Operation COMMANDO,
as the I Corps advance was called, Gen-
49
Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 19 Sep 51, sub; eral O'Daniel planned to use four divi-
Outline Plan CUDGEL, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl sions from his own corps and one from
Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 31.
50
Ltr. Van Fleet to CINCFE, 23 Sep 51, sub: the neighboring U.S. IX Corps to pre-
Ground Opns in Korea, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl vent the development of a sag along the
Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 34.
51 52
Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 25 Sep 51, sub: Out- Msg, GX 2180 TAC, CG Eighth Army to
line Plan WRANGLER, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl CINCFE, 3 Oct 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct
Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 35. 51, G-3 Jnl, 3 Oct 51, tab J-4.
THE NEW WAR 99

corps boundaries. On the corps' western visions met only light to moderate oppo-
flank the ROK 1st Division, commanded sition as they advanced to take their
by Brig. Gen. Bak Lim Hang, would assigned objectives along the JAMESTOWN
leave Line WYOMING, cross the Imjin line, but the 1st Cavalry Division units
River, and move toward Kaesong. The had to battle for every foot of ground.
British Commonwealth Division, under Elements of the 139th and 141st Divi-
General A. J. H. Cassels, was on the east- sions of the CFF 47th Army manned the
ern flank of the ROK 1st and would take enemy's main line of resistance facing
the high ground between Samich'on and the 1st Cavalry Division and they had
Kyeho-dong. Still farther east, the 1st constructed defenses similar to those en-
Cavalry Division, under Maj. Gen. countered on Heartbreak Ridge—
Thomas L. Harrold, would move to the strong bunkers supporting each other
northwest on an 8-mile front between with automatic weapons fire, and with
Kyeho-dong and Kamgol.53 On the corps' heavy concentrations of artillery and
right flank, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Soule's mortars interdicting the approach routes
3d Division would advance and capture to the hills and ridges. Barbed wire
Hill 281, six miles northwest of Ch'or- aprons and mines guarded the trenches
won, and Hills 373 and 324, seven miles and bunkers and the Chinese were well
west by north of the city. The 3d Divi- stocked in ammunition and supplies.56
sion would also link up at Chungasan General Harrold had the 70th Tank
with the IX Corps' 25th Division, now Battalion under Maj. Carroll McFalls,
commanded by Maj. Gen. Ira P. Swift, Jr., and the 16th Reconnaissance Com-
as the 25th advanced to take over defensi- pany operate as a task force on his left
ble terrain north of the confluence of the flank. The mission of the Task Force
Hant'an and Namdae Rivers northeast Mac, as it was called, was to advance
of Ch'orwon.54 along the east bank of the Imjin River
Elements, of four Chinese armies— toward Kyeho-dong, tieing in with the
the 65th, 64th, 47th, and 42d—would 1st Commonwealth Division's move to
have to be pushed back before JAMES- the west and protecting the left flank of
TOWN could be reached, but as Van Fleet the 5th Cavalry Regiment. The 5th Cav-
remarked to the press on 30 September, alry, commanded by Col. Irving Lehr-
the basic mission of the Eighth Army feld, and the 7th Cavalry, under Col.
was to seek out and destroy the enemy.55 Dan Gilmer, would attack abreast across
When COMMANDO began on 3 October, the division front. The 8th Cavalry,
the enemy centered his resistance in the with Col. Eugene J. Field in command,
1st Cavalry Division zone. The ROK was the divisional reserve. All of the
1st, 1st Commonwealth, 3d, and 25th Di- division artillery battalions would par-
ticipate in the operation. The 61st and
53
82d Field Artillery Battalions, 105-mm.
Maj. Gen. Charles D. Palmer had been rotated
to the United States in July.
54 56
Eighth Army, G-3 Periodic Report, 2 Oct 51, The following account of the 1st Cavalry Divi-
in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 1951, G-3 sion's advance is based upon: (1) 1st Cav Div,
sec., incls 1-5. Comd Rpt, Oct 51; (2) 5th Cav Regt, Comd Rpt,
55
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, Oct 51; (3) 7th Cav Regt, Comd Rpt, Oct 51; (4)
Narrative, p. 31. 8th Cav Regt, Comd Rpt, Oct 51.
TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

and 155-mm. howitzers respectively, had to abandon the hill and fall back to
would support the 5th Cavalry, and the the north.
77th and 99th (-) Field Artillery Battal- The situation in the 7th Cavalry's
ions— both 105-mm howitzer—would area to the east was quite similar. At-
support the 7th Cavalry. For general tacking with the 3d, Greek, and 2d Bat-
artillery support, I Corps made available talions abreast, Colonel Gilmer's troops
to the 1st Cavalry division the following attempted to storm Hills 418 and 313
field artillery battalion units; the 936th along with the ridge and high ground
Battalion (155-mm. howitzer); A Bat- extending from these points. Both the
tery, 17th (8-inch howitzer); and A and Greek and the 2d Battalion won their
B Batteries, 204th Battalion (155-mm. way to the ridge line only to suffer heavy
guns). The battalions were along the casualties from the Chinese counterat-
main line of resistance, 4 to 6 miles from tacks that followed; neither could hold
Line JAMESTOWN. on. Many positions changed hands three
An hour before the attack was or four times during the course of the
launched, the artillery along the I Corps day as bitter hand-to-hand fighting
front began to soften up the enemy de- marked the intensity of the enemy's re-
fense positions. Then at 0600 on 3 sistance.
October the five UNC divisions moved By the end of the first day, the sup-
out. In the 1st Cavalry Division sector porting artillery had fired over 15,000
the enemy response was immediate rounds at the enemy and the Chinese
and violent. Task Force Mac on the had committed the bulk of their 2d
left flank encountered heavy mine con- Artillery Division to help block the ad-
centrations coupled with strong artillery vance of the 1st Cavalry Division. The
and mortar fire; by the end of the day, enemy's willingness to use most of his
it had made little progress. As Colonel available artillery against the 1st Cavalry
Lehrfeld's 5th Cavalry assaulted the was accompanied by bolder employment
four intermediate hill objectives facing of the artillery pieces in direct support
the regiment—Hills 222, 272, 346, and and counterbattery roles. In the process
287—the Chinese refused to give way. enemy artillery locations were revealed
The enemy forces directed artillery and soon began to receive attention from
and mortar fire at the 5th's three bat- both the I Corps artillery and Fifth Air
talions as they labored up the hills, Force fighter-bombers.
and as soon as the I Corps artillery Despite heavy fighting on 4 October,
lifted, the Chinese rushed out to their there was little forward progress. Ele-
fighting positions and added heavy ments of the 8th Cavalry reinforced the
small arms, automatic weapons, and 7th Cavalry on the right and assaulted
grenade fire to halt the attack. Six the ridges west of Hill 418, but the
attempts by the 3d Battalion won a foot- enemy clung tenaciously to his positions.
hold on Hill 272, but enemy pressure When he was driven off, he expended
forced a withdrawal later in the day. manpower freely to retake the lost
Only against Hill 222 could the 5th reg- ground. Each enemy company was using
ister any lasting success; after a frontal ten to twelve machine guns and large
assault by the 3d Battalion, the Chinese quantities of hand grenades. The latter
THE NEW WAR 101

caused the bulk of the 1st Cavalry Divi- Attacking from the south and southeast,
sion's casualties as the close combat grew the 3d Battalion began to clear the hill
more bitter. During the day elements of at the end of the day. The fall of Hill
the CCF 140th Division moved up to 347 meant that the 1st Cavalry now dom-
reinforce the 139th Division which had inated the high ground comprising
been hard hit by the 1st Cavalry's con- JAMESTOWN in the northeastern half of
tinued battering of the enemy positions. the divisional sector.
The 1st Cavalry, in its drive towards the The breach in the northeast had little
Yokkok-ch'on and Line JAMESTOWN, immediate effect upon the Chinese de-
now had to contend with the bulk of the fense of the hills across the 5th Cavalry
elite 47th Army. front, however, and the relentless ham-
The first crack in the Chinese defense mering of artillery, mortar, and tank
line came on 5 October, when the 1st fire against the formidable bunker sys-
Battalion, 8th Cavalry, discovered that tem failed to produce a breakthrough.
the enemy had withdrawn from Hill 418 Even air strikes with napalm and 1,000-
during the night. By afternoon the 1st pound bombs made little impression
Battalion cleared the ridge 1,400 yards upon the enemy defenders, since the
to the northeast and was able to tie in Chinese had constructed an intricate
with the 15th Regiment, U.S. 3d Divi- trench system and numerous escape
sion. The 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, routes that negated most of the effects of
then moved up the ridge southwest of the air attacks. The dogged enemy de-
Hill 418 and occupied Hill 313 without fense—in many cases to the last man
opposition. On the following day the —took a heavy toll of 1st Cavalry Divi-
2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, launched an sion forces and frequently produced a
attack on Hill 334, 2,200 yards west of situation in which the American assault
Hill 418, and after two attempts, seized forces attained an objective in insuffi-
the objective. Heavy enemy counterat- cient strength to resist the fierce enemy
tacks, day and night, were beaten back. counterattacks that followed.
At Hill 287, over 4,000 yards southwest After eight days of UNC pressure
of Hill 334, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cav- against Hills 346, 230, and 272, the Chi-
alry, fought its way toward the crest and nese still refused to give ground. But the
held on to part of the hill at nightfall. incessant punishment they had absorbed
Prisoners of war taken on 5-6 October and the drain in manpower and ammu-
indicated that the Chinese were falling nition stocks were beginning to tell. On
back on new prepared defense lines 5- the night of 12 October the Chinese
7,000 yards to the northwest and that abandoned Hill 272 and Colonel Field's
many units had been decimated in the 8th Cavalry troops took possession the
opening days of the offensive; food and next day without contact.
ammunition stocks, they also reported, Control of Hill 272 opened the eastern
were becoming exhausted. approach to the key hill in the enemy's
On 7 October the 7th Cavalry com- remaining defense line—Hill 346. On
pleted the seizure of Hill 287 and sent 15 October a new operational plan,
the 3d Battalion to take Hill 347, a little called POLECHARGE, was put into effect-
over two miles southwest of Hill 418. The 5th Cavalry was reinforced with the
102 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Belgian Battalion from the U.S. 3d Di- they intended to stay and defend in
vision and given the mission of taking place. When the 1st Cavalry Division
Hill 346 and then pushing on to Line tried to storm the enemy's main line of
JAMESTOWN. The 8th Cavalry would resistance, the Chinese poured in first-
move in from Hill 272 and if necessary class reinforcements, freely expended
assist the 5th Cavalry. Early on 16 Octo- their ammunition stocks, and fought fa-
ber the assault got under way, but again natically to hold on. Only when losses
the enemy firepower stopped the 5th in men and exhaustion of ammunition
Cavalry's advance. The 8th Cavalry's supplies forced them to withdraw, could
drive northeast of Hill 346 made some the 1st Cavalry take possession of the
progress, yet could not flank the objec- JAMESTOWN line. Intelligence reports at
tive. For the next two days the 5th and I Corps headquarters pointed out that
8th sustained the pressure on Hill 346 there seemed to be a definite lack of
without success. Then on 18 October interest among the Chinese commanders
the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, moved in the fate of front-line regiments which
forward and took the hill against virtu- had been ordered to resist to the end.
ally no opposition. Hill 230 fell the According to the G-2 officers, this sug-
same day to the 3d Battalion. By 19 gested that the Chinese might have come
October the 1st Cavalry Division had around to the belief that fewer troops
seized the last of its objectives on the would be lost through these tactics than
JAMESTOWN line as the enemy retreated in trying to retake lost territory with
north of the Yokkok-ch'on to his next heavy counterattacks.57
line of defense. In any case the cost to the enemy had
The sensitivity of the Chinese to the been high. I Corps estimates of enemy
1st Cavalry Division's advance toward losses during the 3-19 October period
their supply base at Sangnyong-ni did placed the total at well over 21,000 men,
not end with the completion of COM- including over 500 prisoners. Close to
MANDO. Although divisional patrols 16,000 casualties had been inflicted upon
could range freely some 3-4,000 yards the enemy by the 1st Cavalry Division
in front of the main line of resistance alone, as it reduced the crack CCF 47th
positions on the east, the enemy reacted Army to half strength. But the I Corps
strongly to every attempt to send probes had not escaped untouched; it had taken
and patrols across the Yokkok-ch'on to- over 4,000 casualties during the 17-day
wards Sangnyong-ni. During the COM- operation, with the 1st Cavalry suffering
MANDO operation, the Chinese had over 2,900 of the total.58 In the process
shown how valuable they considered the of absorbing losses the I Corps had
control of the terrain in this area. For improved its defensive position and kept
the first time they had shifted from the the enemy from launching an offensive
fluid defense system that formed part of of his own.
their basic tactical doctrine and had dug While the I Corps sought to organize
in in depth. The deep bunkers, complex
57
system of trenches, and large stocks of U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, pp.
16-27.
food, supplies, and ammunition stored 58
Hq, I Corps, Operation COMMANDO, ans. H and
at the front-line positions showed that K. MS in OCMH.
THE NEW WAR 103

the gains of COMMANDO, the U.S. IX The pattern set up during the initial
Corps made plans to launch a similar phase of the IX Corps advance repeated
operation toward Kumsong. On 9 Octo- itself during the second phase. Hoge re-
ber, General Van Fleet visited IX Corps ported that the enemy reaction seemed
headquarters and found Lt. Gen. Wil- to be one of delay rather than a serious
liam H. Hoge and his division command- effort to hold the line. Chinese attacks
ers eager to carry out local advances varied from platoon to battalion size and
along the corps front. The objectives most frequently were launched during
would be to improve the defensive posi- the night or just before dawn. Heavy
tions of the divisions in the line and to artillery and mortar fire accompanied
maintain pressure upon the enemy. the enemy drives and hand grenades
Since both of these coincided with were used plentifully. By 20 October,
Eighth Army directives, Van Fleet gave however, the IX Corps had won through
his approval.59 In case of a successful IX to its second objective line and began to
Corps advance, however, there would be organize the defense. During the follow-
one disadvantage. The sag in the X ing days the 24th Division sent out sev-
Corps lines, which had just been elimi- eral tank forays. One penetrated into
nated, would be replaced by a bulge on Kumsong itself and blew up several
the IX Corps' front. buildings and a tunnel.60
The U.S. 24th Division, the ROK 2d, When the action came to an end on 23
and ROK 6th Division were selected to October, Van Fleet commended the 2d
make the advance to a line about four and 6th ROK Divisions for their excel-
miles south of Kumsong, The American lent showing against the enemy. They
division was flanked on either side by had taken their objectives and beaten off
the South Korean divisions and was ex- the Chinese counterattacks. The sensi-
pected to provide tank support for the tivity of the Communists to probes and
ROK 2d. On 13 October units of the advances in the Kumsong area was dem-
three divisions moved out and registered onstrated by the severe losses that they
gains of almost two miles the first day. sustained in the 13-23 October period
During the night the Chinese mounted while trying to delay the IX Corps of-
several counterattacks which were suc- fensive.61
cessfully beaten off. Despite stubborn
resistance and intense concentrations of Internal Changes
artillery fire, the IX Corps troops pushed
ahead slowly during the next few days The limited offensives of the Eighth
and reached the objective line by 17 Army petered out in late October as the
October. The favorable outcome led truce negotiations resumed at Panmun-
Hoge to direct another advance two jom and another lull set in on the battle-
miles closer to Kumsong. Here the at- 60
Ibid., pp. 50, 56, 61.
tackers would establish a strong outpost 61
Casualty estimates for the enemy listed 12,711
line and patrol aggressively to maintain known killed, 16,818 additional estimated killed,
contact with the enemy. and 1,022 prisoners in the IX Corps area between
13-23 October. The UNC forces lost 710 killed,
59
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, 3,714 wounded, and 73 missing. Hq Eighth Army,
Narrative, pp. 44-45. Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec.I, Narrative, pp. 61-62.
104 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
field. General Van Fleet took advantage flict.64 Army regulations issued in Janu-
of the respite by transferring several of ary 1950 stated that all manpower would
his battered X Corps divisions into re- be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency
serve positions. By exchanging the U.S. in the Army without regard to race,
7th Division with its attached Ethiopian color, religion, or national origin.65
Battalion from the U.S. IX Corps and While these regulations did not require
the U.S. 2d and the French Battalion, integration of units, they did make it
Van Fleet was able to use the latter as possible. In March 1950 the Army fol-
IX Corps reserves. He also switched the lowed up by abolishing the recruiting
ROK 5th Division over to the ROK I quotas which limited the number of Ne-
Corps reserve sector and sent the ROK groes that could be enlisted.66
3d Division to the X Corps.62 With the outbreak of war, Negro en-
One change of particular significance listments grew and Negro units in Korea
took place on 1 October. The all-Negro had little difficulty in maintaining their
24th Infantry Regiment was inactivated authorized strength. By early 1951
and the 14th Infantry Regiment replaced Eighth Army personnel officers began to
it as the third regiment of the 25th Divi- assign excess Negro personnel to under-
sion. During the first year of the war strength white units and the results
some dissatisfaction had been expressed were highly gratifying on the whole.
by senior officers of the division with the The performance of Negroes in inte-
combat performance of the 24th Regi- grated combat organizations improved
ment, but the regiment had been estab- over their past performance, and there
lished by law in 1866 and its disposition was no appreciable lowering of morale
presented special problems.63 among the white personnel of these
The gradual shift in Army integration units. Fears of hostility and tension be-
policies and the exigencies of the battle tween the Negroes and white soldiers in
situation in Korea finally offered a solu- integrated outfits proved to be largely
tion. Since World War II a number of groundless.67
studies had been made on the better The favorable experience in integra-
utilization of Negro personnel within the tion in Korea led General Ridgway in
Army and several steps had been taken May 1951 to recommend the use of a
prior to the outbreak of the Korean con- percentage of Negro troops in all units
62
in the Far East Command as a means of
In minor changes during the August-October
period, the 10th Philippine Combat Battalion be-
improving the over-all combat effective-
came the 20th Philippine Combat Battalion on 6 64
September. In the British Commonwealth Division For a discussion of the developments before
the Royal Ulster Rifles were relieved by a battalion the Korean War, see Freedom to Serve: Equality of
of the Royal Norfolk Regiment on 18 October and Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,
prepared to return to Hong Kong. See Hq Eighth A Report by the President's committee, Charles
Army, Comd Rpts, Sep and Oct 51, sec. I, Narra- Fahy, Chairman (Washington, 1950) .
65
tive. In one command change, Brig. Gen. Thomas Army Special Regulations 600-629-1, 16 Jan 50.
66
J. Cross took over the command of the U.S. 3d Freedom to Serve, app. C.
67
Division on 20 October as General Soule was sent An excellent study on the Korean experience
home on regular rotation. in integration will be found in Operations Research
63 Office Report ORO-R-11, The Utilization of Negro
For an account of the 24th Regiment's early
battle experience, see Appleman, South to the Manpower in the Army (Washington: Operations
Naktong, pp. 190-95, 365-75, 438-41, 479-86. Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1955).
THE NEW WAR 105

ness of his forces. As a first step in Air Operations


eliminating the all-Negro infantry units,
he proposed to inactivate the 24th Regi- Although the bulk of the fighting in
ment and to distribute its personnel Korea from August to October was car-
among all-white or integrated organiza- ried out on the ground, the Far East
tions in the Far East Command. The Air Forces and the Navy forces under
Department of the Army approved on General Ridgway both contributed a
1 July and later in the month announced great deal directly and indirectly to the
that the process of integration of combat success of the ground operations.
units in the FEC would be spread over The Fifth Air Force under General
six months and that service-type units Everest concentrated most of its fighter,
would also be effected eventually.68 fighter-bomber, and light-bomber effort
In addition to the integration of the on the interdiction of the Communist
24th Regiment's personnel as of 1 Octo- lines of communications. Railroads,
ber, several other all-Negro units were bridges, highways, marshaling yards, and
split up during the late summer and supply points were hit repeatedly to slow
early fall of 1951. The Negroes in the down the southward movement of enemy
3d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, troops and equipment. During August,
were distributed throughout the U.S. Everest inaugurated a rail interdiction
2d Division and those in the 3d Battalion program called STRANGLE which empha-
15th Infantry Regiment, were integrated sized rail cutting.70 His pilots soon had
with other infantry elements in the U.S. a new theme song — "We've Been Work-
3d Division. Some members of the 64th ing on the Railroads."71 The attention
Tank Battalion and of the 58th Armored devoted to rear area interdiction less-
Field Artillery Battalion were sent to ened the amount of close air support for
white tank and armored field artillery the front-line troops, but Everest felt
units in exchange for white personnel. that a large-scale effort might uproot the
In some cases, the asterisks which desig- enemy's logistical setup.72 To comple-
nated an outfit as Negro were dropped ment the daytime strikes, the Fifth Air
and integration took place whenever the Force's B-26's searched out enemy motor
unit was placed in reserve and the ex- transport at night. Everest hoped that
changes of personnel could be easily car- 70
ried out.69 The term STRANGLE had been loosely used for
rail interdiction operations from April 1951 on, but
more properly covers the August 1951-March 195.,
68
(1) DA, Press Release, 26 Jul 51. In OCMH. period. See USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns
(2) Hq FEC Mil Hist Sec, History of the Korean in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 51-30 Jun 52, pp.
War, vol. III, Part 2, Personnel Problems, prepared 161-62, for a discussion of the name. It is interest-
by 1st Lt Charles G. Cleaver, pp. 150ff. MS in ing to note that STRANGLE had been used in World
OCMH.
69
War II in the Italian campaign of 1944 to cover
Hq FEC MHS, Hist of the Korean War, vol. a similar interdiction program. See The War Re-
III, pt. 2, Personnel Problems, prepared by Lt ports of General George C. Marshall, General H. H.
Cleaver, pp. 150ff. By the end of the war in July Arnold, and Admiral Ernest J. King (Philadelphia:
1953, over 90 percent of the total Negro personnel J. 71B. Lippincott. 1947), p. 381.
in the Army were serving in integrated units. See John Dille, Substitute for Victory (New York:
ACofS, G-1, "Utilization of Negro Manpower," in Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), p. 62.
72
Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1953. Ltr, CG 5th AF to CG Eighth Army, 23 Aug
MS in OCMH. 51, sub: Fifth AF Opns.
106 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

NORTH KOREAN RAIL LINE AFTER INTERDICTION BOMBING

his forces could weaken the Communist mander wanted to maintain the profi-
forward supply chain and reduce the ciency of his pilots and ground control
enemy's capability to resist the Eighth officers in close support missions.74
Army's ground attacks. And Van Fleet Constant pressure by air upon the
was willing to let him try, since he was enemy's rail lines began to pay off in
still considering TALONS at the time.73 October. Intelligence reports indicated
After cancellation of TALONS, Everest that the lines were being destroyed faster
and Van Fleet decided that 96 fighter than the enemy could repair them. Ini-
sorties a day would be sufficient to pro- tially the pilots had directed most of
vide close air support for the Eighth their attention to railroad bridges, but
Army's limited offensives. The main 74
(1) Msg, GX 1691 TAC, CG Eighth Army to
emphasis remained on the interdiction CG's U.S. I, IX, X Corps, and ROK I Corps et al.,
program but the Fifth Air Force com- 10 Sep 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 51,
G-3 sec., bk. 4, incl 6-10. (2) USAF Hist Study No.
73
Msg, GX 1365 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CG 72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-
5th Air Force, 24 Aug 51. 30Jun 52, p. 199.
THE NEW WAR 107

the Communists had become skillful in B-29 medium bombers and fifty-six
devising methods to bypass or repair the fighters over the enemy capital and con-
cut bridges. They stockpiled spare sec- siderable damage was effected. Although
tions close to the important bridges and no enemy aircraft were seen, enemy anti-
were able to restore service quickly. In aircraft fire was so intense and accurate
any event the Fifth Air Force changed that six fighter planes were lost.77
tactics and inaugurated a system of mul- Ridgway also pressed for JCS permis-
tiple cuts. By damaging or destroying sion to bomb the North Korean port of
the rails at dozens of places, they slowed Rashin which lay close to the Soviet bor-
down enemy repair efforts. There was der. General MacArthur had not been
an interesting parallel between the suc- allowed to raid this important town
cess of this tactic and the UNC experi- because of the dangers of violating the
ences at Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges. Soviet frontier through navigational er-
As long as the UNC concentration of ror. But Ridgway told the JCS on 1
forces at certain key points was main- August that his air reconnaissance had
tained, the enemy was able to cope with discovered extensive stockpiling of ma-
the situation. But once the U.N. Com- terial at Rashin and he desired to destroy
mand spread its attack and applied pres- the industrial area of the port by naval
sure in many places, the Communists shelling and aerial bombing. Not only
found themselves in difficulty. They was the town a key highway and railway
were forced to cannibalize spur lines and center, he reported, but it also had ex-
marshaling yards to keep the main lines tensive oil storage facilities and rail re-
open. The only respite for the harassed pair shops that supported the enemy
Communists came when the weather re- supply lines. Ridgway was convinced
stricted flying.75 that FEAF could destroy Rashin without
In the meantime the medium bombers invading Russian territory.78
of the Strategic Air Command had also Since the United Nations commander
assisted in the air assault upon the en- had but limited means for applying pres-
emy's rear areas. After the first attack sure upon the enemy, the JCS supported
upon P'yongyang in July had had but his stand. They told Secretary Marshall
modest results, General Ridgway ex- on 10 August that Ridgway's reasons
pressed his "keen disappointment" that seemed to be perfectly valid from the
FEAF had not been able to bring massed military point of view. Since they be-
air power to bear against P'yongyang. lieved that a show of military strength
He instructed General Weyland, the rather than weakness would achieve the
FEAF commander, to prepare another U.N. objectives in Korea, they advised
strike and urged him to take all possible the Secretary of Defense that: "It would
care that the weather should be suitable be most desirable to take all possible
this time.76 measures within the scope of operations
On 14 August good weather prevailed
77
over the target area. FEAF sent sixty-six UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, G-3 Staff Sec Rpt, Aug
51.78
75
76
FEAF Comd Rpt, Oct 51. Msg, C 68131, CINCFE to JCS, 1 Aug 51, in
Memo for Rcd, 1 Aug 51, sub: Conf on FEAF UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl
Opns, in FEC files. 16.
108 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
in Korea to deter the Communist supply sanctuary, but in September they began
build-up and thereby obviate the possi- to roam further south in substantial
ble needless loss of lives among United flights.
Nations Troops." 79 The Russian MIG-15 was the work-
Marshall and President Truman horse of the Communist air force. Supe-
agreed with the JCS and the path was rior to the American jet fighters in its
cleared for the bombing of Rashin. But ability to climb, dive, and accelerate, the
some restrictions still applied. The Joint MIG-15 was used with greater profi-
Chiefs told Ridgway he was not to use ciency by the Chinese pilots as the fall
any naval vessels to shell the city nor began. Using the sun as a backdrop to
would he give any unusual publicity to prevent detection and the element of
the air attacks which would be carried surprise as tactics, the enemy aviators
out by fully briefed crews and under became bolder. During the third week
visual conditions only.80 of October they demonstrated how much
In the meantime Ridgway and his they had learned when they shot down
advisors concluded that the marshaling five B-29's and damaged eight more.
yards in Rashin offered the most valu- Only six of the medium bombers had
able targets. Rather than conduct mass been lost during the whole war up to
raids, the FEC commander felt that reg- this point.83
ular daily efforts would utilize his B- The rise in enemy air sorties and the
29's most effectively. Besides, weather new aggressive spirit of the Communist
conditions at Rashin during this time of flyers reached its peak as the peace ne-
the year were too uncertain to mount gotiators prepared to meet at Panmun-
major strikes.81 jom. Whether this activity was designed
The first attack was made on 25 Au- principally to influence the conference
gust by thirty-five B-29's under favor- discussions or signified that the enemy
able weather conditions. Escorted by was actually ready now to seriously chal-
twenty-four Navy fighters, the pilots of lenge the UNC control of the North
the medium bombers claimed excellent Korean skies remained to be seen.
results and not a plane was lost.82
Although August was a quiet month The War at Sea
insofar as enemy air activity was con-
cerned, there was a distinct increase in Naval operations during the August-
the number of planes sighted in Septem- October period complemented the air
ber. Not only were there more planes and ground attacks for the most part.
but the Communists pilots were more Naval and Marine aircraft struck at the
aggressive. Previously they had re- Communist communications, supply
mained fairly close to their Manchurian areas, and troop positions and although
79
Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 10 Aug 51,
weather conditions were unfavorable
sub: Removal of Restriction Against Attacks on during much of August, they mounted
(Rashin)
80 Najin. over 7,300 sorties.
81 Msg, JCS 98632, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Aug 51. During the bombing of Rashin on 25
Msg, C 68643, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Aug 51, DA-
IN 82 4248.
FEAF Comd Rpt, Aug 51, p. 2. 83 FEAF Comd Rpts, Sep and Oct 51.
THE NEW WAR 109

USS NEW JERSEY FIRING HER 16-INCH GUNS NEAR THE 38TH PARALLEL

August, Navy fighters escorted the B- planes participating in the attack.85 Ma-
29's-the first time that this had hap- rine aviation in the meantime concen-
pened during the Korean War.84 And trated on close air support and provided
when the Air Force launched its rail- air strikes along the front lines for the
cutting program in September, the naval limited ground offensives.86
squadrons from Task Force 77 shifted Naval surface craft also furnished aid
from close support and bridge interdic- and assistance to the ground forces with
tion operations and helped to cripple the the resumption of naval gunfire support
enemy rail transport. in the ROK I Corps sector in August.
With British naval aircraft assistance, To create a diversion on the east coast
Task Force 77 struck at Wonsan on 18- and draw the N.K. forces away from the
19 September and then raided Kojo on X Corps and ROK I Corps area during
10 October with Australian carrier the August offensive, Ridgway ordered
85
COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Sep-Oct
84
COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Aug 51, pp. 51 , 86 pp. 1-16, 1-17.
2-1 through 2-6. Ibid.
110 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Admiral Joy to carry out a large-scale closed Han estuary waters and returned
amphibious demonstration at Changjon. without loss.89
On 31 August the amphibious forces Naval blockade along the coast, surface
arrived at the target area. First the fire raids and bombardment behind the front
support group poured high explosives on lines, and naval gunfire to assist the
the beach with the battleship New Jer- ground attack formed but one side of the
sey providing the big guns. When the coin. On the other lay the close air sup-
surface craft completed their task, naval port of the Marine squadrons, the inter-
air forces followed with a rocket satura- diction co-operation of the Navy planes
tion of the beach area. Landing boats and their service as escort fighters. And
were lowered from the transports and behind the scenes, the Navy provided
the troops took their stations. After a amphibious training experience to the
pass at the beach, they returned to their Army divisions stationed in Japan, so
mother ships and the surface craft moved that they might be ready to enter com-
in for a few final salvos.87 The operation bat quickly if the need arose.
was completed without any incidents or The great question mark in the naval
losses and probably caused some anxious situation was the Russian submarine
moments among the North Korean de- fleet in the Pacific. Here was the ever-
fenders around Changjon. present challenge to the UNC control of
Farther north the UNC naval forces the seas. While furnishing surface and
continued their seige of Wonsan. Daily air support to the Eighth Army in Korea,
this important enemy port received naval the naval command had to keep a watch-
bombardment. Twice during August ful eye on the Soviet activities at Vladi-
British Royal Marine Commandos vostok.
landed near Wonsan and raided enemy
installations. On 5 October Hungnam Postlude
was also bombarded, but the resistance
to this move proved intense. During the During the summer and early fall of
fight the USS Ernest G. Small, a radar 1951 the United States and its allies
picket destroyer, was mined and suffered adopted a double-barreled approach to
heavy damage.88 the problem of ending the war in Korea.
Over on the west coast, UNC naval The negotiations at Kaesong provided
forces mounted a special strike in the a politico-diplomatic method of reaching
Han River area on 3 October. Besides agreement on the terms of settlement
the damage inflicted upon enemy instal- while the outbreak of limited offensives
lations, the raid demonstrated UNC at the front coupled with air and naval
naval superiority quite convincingly as action exerted military pressures upon
the attacking elements operated in the the Communists to conclude an armistice
before their position deteriorated fur-
87
(1) Ibid., Aug 51, pp. 2-11, 2-14, 2-15. (2) ther.
Msg. CX 69607, CINCFE TO COMNAVFE, 25 Aug The punishing "elbowing forward"
51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Aug tactics of the Eighth Army during the
51, Paper 40.
88
COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Aug and
89
Sep-Oct 51, sec. 2. Ibid.,Sep-Oct 51, pp. 2-8.
THE NEW WAR

August-October period had inflicted there would be no knockout blow but


heavy casualties upon the enemy forces, rather a constant jabbing and counter-
both Chinese and North Korean. De- punching to wear out the opponent.
spite the constant reports that the Com- If some of the lessons experienced
munist logistical build-up continued, during the ridge battles had proved
intelligence estimates at the end of Octo- costly to the UNC forces as well as to
ber indicated that the enemy offensive the enemy, it was to be hoped that the
capabilities had probably been reduced same mistakes would not be made again.
and that there were no definite signs that The Communist tenacity and courage
the foe intended to launch an attack in in holding well-fortified positions had
the immediate future.90 It was evident been amply demonstrated and the UNC
that the U.N. Command had seized the had several times made the error of
battlefield initiative and forced the underestimating the enemy's will and
enemy to go on the defensive. By keep- ability to resist. Dispersion of the enemy
ing the Communists off balance by raids, forces and resources paid off both on the
probing attacks, and small offensives, the ground and in the air during the period
U.N. Command had neutralized the en- when the UNC had capitalized on the
emy's ability to mount a large-scale drive inferior communications system of the
and in the process had destroyed thou- Communists.
sands of North Korean and Chinese sol- Despite the military advantage that
diers. General Van Fleet's forces had the UNC had gained in the field, the
erected a stout defense line and then set Communists still held the propaganda
the pattern of the fighting for the new initiative won in the battle of incidents
war—the battle for dominating terrain. waged during the long recess of the truce
The efforts of the X Corps at Heartbreak negotiations. The one tended to offset
Ridge and the reaching of the JAMES- the other to some degree, but as the
TOWN line were to be duplicated again peace discussions resumed in late Octo-
and again in the months ahead in grim ber, the improved military position of
but monotonous fashion. In this contest the UNC along the front could not help
90
but strengthen the hand of Admiral
Msg, DA 85150, DA to CINCFE, 26 Oct 51, in
Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Oct 51,
Joy and his staff in the coming debate
Paper 27. over the demarcation line.
CHAPTER VI

The Resumption of Negotiations


As the final arrangements for the had exploded its second and third
reconvening of the truce negotiations atomic bombs in October, serving notice
were made in October 1951, develop- that it had embarked upon an ambitious
ments on the international scene gave nuclear program. Stalin publicly pledged
no indication that a quick settlement friendship to Communist China and re-
of the Korean War might be in the off- ceived a message of thanks from Kim Il
ing. Both the United States and the Sung of North Korea for Russian as-
Soviet Union were engaged in strength- sistance to the N.K. forces. In Moscow
ening their military capabilities and Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky in-
those of their allies. formed the U.S. Ambassador that the
In the United States President Tru- Soviet Union would not bring pressure
man signed the National Security Act upon the Communist negotiators in
on 10 October and Congress voted over Korea to modify their truce demands.
seven billion dollars for foreign eco- Thus, the prospects for swift action on
nomic, technical, and military aid ten the conclusion of an armistice dwindled
days later. The new National Security even before the meetings resumed.
Agency established under the act would
co-ordinate all of the foreign aid pro- The Line of Demarcation
grams. The bulk of the military aid
would go to the countries in the North On 24 October a fleet of nine 2½-
Atlantic Treaty Organization to help ton trucks moved out of Munsan-ni and
bolster their ability to defend themselves crossed the Imjin River. Loaded with
against aggression. On 22 October the tents and equipment the convoy rolled
members of NATO agreed to permit into the tiny village of Panmunjom and
Greece and Turkey to join the organ- its cluster of mud huts. Swiftly the tent
ization, thus broadening the NATO area city to house the conferees rose and a
of responsibility considerably. Of the crew of forty men worked intently to
fourteen nations now included in install the flooring, lighting, and heating
NATO, eleven were contributing units that the approach of cold weather now
to the United Nations Command.1 made necessary. By the following day
The Soviet Union in the meantime the new site was ready.
1
The United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
The main conference area had several
France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Nor- large tents set aside for joint use and
way, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey were repre- three that were to be at the disposal of
sented in the UNC. In November Italy sent a
medical unit to Korea, leaving only Iceland, which the UNC delegates and the press. Half
had no armed forces, and Portugal unrepresented. a mile south the service echelons set up
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 113

the mess, communications, security, and During the August sessions on the line
engineer facilities that would support of demarcation, it will be remembered,
the negotiations and aid in neutralizing the UNC negotiators had given up their
the truce conference area. Overnight, initial stand that air and naval effective-
Panmunjom became famous. ness be reflected in the battle line and
When the delegates convened on 25 the Communists had indicated that they
October in the big conference tent, it might be ready to discuss a line other
almost seemed as though there had been than the 38th Parallel.3 Ridgway had
no hiatus. The Communists were for- won approval to settle on a demilitarized
mally correct and meticulous as always, zone not less than four miles wide with
and only the presence of two new faces the line of contact as the median just
on their side of the table gave evidence before the Communists called off the
of change. Nam Il introduced General meetings.
Pien Chang-wu and Maj. Gen. Chung In the interim the UNC delega-
Tu Hwan who had replaced Teng Hua tion had not been idle. Joy informed
and Chang Pyong San respectively as Ridgway in mid-October that he and his
Chinese and North Korean delegates. staff had worked up a short paper and
Admiral Joy in turn presented the had mapped out a specific demilitarized
credentials of Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung zone based on the line of contact. He
Koon, head of the ROK Field Training did not intend to make the map the sole
Command, and now the ROK represent- basis of discussion, but he would not
ative in lieu of General Paik Sun Yup. permit any major alterations to be made
Since both sides had accepted the in the UNC line.4
security arrangements worked out by the Thus, the UNC subdelegation was
liaison officers during the long recess, the ready to present the new proposal at the
Communists proposed that a joint office first meeting, but the initial exchanges
of the liaison officers be established to between General Hodes and General
supervise the details of the agreement. Lee developed into a sparring match:
The UNC delegates agreed that the liai-
Gen. Lee: Do you have any idea about
son officers should handle the in- the military demarcation line?
vestigation of incidents and carry out Gen. Hodes: We ended the last confer-
inspections at the truce site. This minor ence before the suspension by asking for
matter settled, Nam suggested that the your proposal. Do you have one?
meetings of the subdelegates on the Gen. Lee: We would like your opinion
first.
line of demarcation be resumed. The Gen. Hodes: We gave our opinion many
same four delegates, General Hodes and times, and asked for your proposal based
Admiral Burke for the U.N. Command on our proposal. As it was your proposal
and Generals Lee and Hsieh for the to have the subdelegation meeting, we ex-
Communists, were named to meet on pected you to have a proposal. Let's have it.
Gen. Lee: You said you had made a new
Item 2 that afternoon.2
2 3
(1) Transcript of Proceedings, 27th Session, See Chapter III, above.
4
Mtg at Panmunjom, on the Armistice Proposal, 25 (1) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Oct 51, DA-IN
Oc t 51. (2) Msg, HNC 388, CINCUNC (Adv) to 6758. (2) Msg, HNC 361, CINCUNC (Adv) to
CINCUNC, 25 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 231. CINCUNC, 15 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 197.
114 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

TRUCE TENTS

proposal, but we have heard nothing new was based upon the line of contact, but
which will break the deadlock. in order to make each side's defenses
Gen. Hodes: That's right, you haven't.more secure the UNC forces would with-
Gen. Lee: We have established a sub-
committee to break the deadlock. The draw along the east coast and in the
deadlock can be broken only it we have aKumsong area and the Communists
mutually satisfactory proposal. would be expected to do the same in the
Gen. Hodes: Right. What is your pro- Kaesong area. Not unexpectedly, the
posal to break the deadlock? Communists rejected this proposal the
After the better part of an hour was following day and countered with a map
spent continuing this stimulating con- of their own that was much more favor-
versation, the UNC delegates decided able to them. Their adjustments gave
that the Communists had no proposal to the U.N. Command some indefensible
offer. Following a short recess, they territory on the Ongjin and Yonan Pen-
made the opening gambit—a concrete insulas in return for the J-Ridge, Bloody,
demilitarized zone traced on the map. and Heartbreak Ridges, the Punchbowl,
In general, Hodes explained, the zone Kumhwa, and Ch'orwon. Hodes, in turn,
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 115

GENERAL PIEN CHANG-WU ARRIVES

found the Communist suggestion unac- ing began. The crux of the matter was
ceptable, but at least a start had been the Kaesong area which the UNC dele-
made and the enemy had not mentioned gates claimed was necessary to protect
the 38th Parallel.5 the approach to Seoul. If the site for the
Although General Lee stoutly asserted negotiations had not been placed at
that the Communists were not "mer- Kaesong, the UNC forces would prob-
chants," but rather "military men of ably have taken the city, Hodes declared.
revolutionary spirit," when Hodes in- And besides, since the U.N. Command
quired whether the enemy position was would have to give up the offshore
for bargaining purposes, the horse trad- islands that it controlled adjoining
enemy-held territory, Kaesong would be
5
Summaries of Proceedings, Seventh and Eighth fair compensation. Hodes pointed out
Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 25 and 26 that the Communists would also benefit
Oct 51, in FEC Subdelegates Mtgs on item 2, vol. I.
All meetings through 5 November will be found in
from the UNC withdrawals from the
this file. areas around Kaesong and Kumsong, but
116 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
the enemy wanted no part of a trade Kaesong led Ridgway to issue new orders
that would involve the loss of Kaesong.6 on 2 November. He told the UNC
Possession of Kaesong was important delegates to retreat to the second-line
politically and psychologically as well as position which placed the city in the
militarily since it lay south of the 38th demilitarized zone. The last concession,
Parallel and the ROK Government had Ridgway went on, would be to concede
been insisting upon its return. As a sym- the Kaesong area, provided that the
bol it was worth far more than a greater Communists agreed to the adjustments
amount of territory in central or east on the eastern and central fronts and
Korea.7 permitted the UNC forces to locate its
At first the Communists were willing outpost line of resistance on the west
to barter. They were agreeable to an bank of the Imjin River.10
exchange on the central and eastern For the next two days Hodes and
fronts to straighten out the line of de- Burke conducted a dogged campaign to
fense. But, as the UNC delegates per- budge the Communists, but to no avail.
sisted in their demand for Kaesong, the The enemy was firmly resolved not to
enemy lost interest. After several fruit- give up Kaesong. By 4 November Ridg-
less days of discussion, the Communists way and Joy had decided that a settle-
proposed a 4-kilometer demilitarized ment based on the battle line with ap-
zone based solely on the line of contact. propriate minor adjustments would be
This, they asserted, was their best and the best they could hope for.11
last proposal.8 When the subdelegations met on the
General Ridgway had thought that following day, General Hodes presented
the UNC map which had been presented the UNC compromise offer. This ac-
would be the final offer with only minor cepted a 4-kilometer demarcation zone
changes permitted. But his superiors re- based on the actual line of contact at the
minded him that the U.S. minimum time of the signing of the armistice with
position was the maintenance of the "appropriate adjustments." Three offi-
security of Line KANSAS. If KANSAS had cers from each side would work out the
an adequate outpost line of resistance, battle line and would be prepared to
certain adjustments in the proposed line give it to the delegation prior to the
of demarcation on the map would appear completion of the truce. In the mean-
to be practicable, they informed the Far time, the UNC proposal recommended
East commander on 30 October.9 that the conferees proceed to other items,
The instructions from Washington on the agenda.12
and the determined Communist stand on The Communists showered a barrage
of questions on Hodes and Burke, but
6
Summary of Proceedings, Ninth Session, Sub- their interest swiftly waned when they
delegation Mtg on item 2, 27 Oct 51.
7 10
Msg, HNC 430, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Nov 51, DA- Msg, C 56412, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv),
IN 17036. 2 Nov 51, in FEC 387.2 bk. III, 247.
8 11
Summary of Proceedings, Thirteenth Session, Msg, HNC 423, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC,
Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 31 Oct 51. 4 Nov 51. (2) Msg C 56599, CINCUNC to Ameri-
9
(1) Msg, CX 56073, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Oct 51, can Embassy, Pusan, 4 Nov 51. Both in FEC 387.2,
12
DA-IN 12729. (2) Msg, JCS 85537, JCS to Ridg- Summary of Proceedings, Eighteenth Session,
way, 30 Oct 51. Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 5 Nov 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 117

discovered that the UNC delegation of recent Communist concessions. There-


would not rule Kaesong out of any future fore, if the Communists flatly rejected
adjustments that might be made. Then the UNC proposal to postpone agree-
General Lee launched his assault. Item ment on the line of demarcation, the
2 must be settled now, he declared, and enemy's line of contact in the Kaesong
a military demarcation zone fixed before area should be accepted quickly. To pre-
discussion of other agenda items could vent the Communists from making the
begin. Postponement of the matter until line of demarcation permanent, they
the armistice was signed was out of the suggested to Ridgway that a time limit
question, Lee and his colleague, Hsieh, be set for the completion of the other
maintained, since agreement in prin- agenda items. If no agreement was
ciple was not enough. The Communists reached at the expiration of the limiting
insisted that the current line be deter- period, the demilitarized zone would be
mined and that it should serve as the line subject to revision.15
of demarcation, despite Hodes's asser- General Ridgway did not object to
tion that the present line would have no the JCS counsel on Kaesong, but he felt
validity unless the truce was completed strongly that agreement to the present
quickly. Otherwise, a new line and line of contact as a permanent line, sub-
demilitarized zone reflecting changes on ject only to minor adjustments, would be
the battlefield would have to be agreed a mistake. In the 8 November sub-
upon.13 delegate meeting, Ridgway pointed out,
To Admiral Joy the enemy's stand in- the Communists had indicated that they
dicated that the Communists intended did not think that any major change in
to make the line of demarcation worked the battle lines had taken place since
out at this time a permanent rather than July. If the summer and fall campaigns
a temporary settlement and he thought of the Eighth Army were thus ignored,
that this effort should be resisted.14 In then the enemy obviously intended to
Washington, U.S. political and military cling closely to whatever line was now
leaders agreed, but with definite reser- determined upon. This would in itself
vations. If the UNC delegation main- amount to a de facto cease-fire during
tained a hard-and-fast stand on Kaesong the time period set and time extensions
and the line of demarcation too long, would doubtlessly be sought by the
they told Ridgway, it would appear to be Communists and granted by the U.N.
a major concession when the UNC finally Command for the settlement of other
accepted the Communist position. Public agenda items. A cease-fire while the
opinion at home, Ridgway was told, negotiations were still going on would
would not understand a breakdown of be to the great disadvantage of the U.N.
negotiations over Kaesong, in the face Command, in Ridgway's opinion, and if
13
Summary of Proceedings, Nineteenth Session,
he had to give up Kaesong, he wanted
Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 6 Nov 51. All meet- to stand inflexibly upon the principle
ings of the subdelegation on item 2 from 6 Novem- that the line of contact on the effective
ber-27 November 1951 are in FEC Subdelegation
Meetings,
14
Agenda item 2, volume II.
Msg, HNC 426, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 15
6Nov 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 263. Msg. JCS 86291, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Nov 51.
118 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
date of the armistice must be the line of "the senior delegate of your delegation,
demarcation.16 whose name I forget." 20
The JCS were not willing to go quite Although the UNC delegates ignored
so far. They agreed that the UNC dele- the insults, Hodes evened the score the
gation should press for acceptance of a following day in a reference to Nam Il
postponed line of demarcation, but not as "your senior delegate whose name I
that this would be the final position. trust you are able to recall." But progress
Since the Communists had made sub- in the negotiations outside the jibe level
stantial concessions on the location of was slow.21
the line, the JCS thought that an early Military and political leaders in Wash-
agreement satisfying the UNC major ington were becoming impatient and on
requirements should be sought. Other- 14 November they instructed Ridgway
wise the enemy might even revert to its to accept the Communist line of demar-
former stand on the 38th Parallel.17 cation in the interest of reaching an early
In the meantime the subdelegation agreement. Since the Communist pro-
meetings had reached an impasse. The posal not only met the U.S. basic position
Communists grew more adamant in their on the maintenance of the security of
stand for a 4-kilometer zone based on Line KANSAS, but also provided protec-
the line of contact with no adjustments tion for Line WYOMING, they did not
either at the present or in the final settle- consider that agreement amounted to
ment. They paid little attention to concession. By placing a time limit of
Hodes's charge that they wanted the de- one month for the completion of the rest
marcation line settled so that they could of the agenda, they evidently hoped to
take their time on the other agenda forestall a slowdown of operations for an
items.18 extended period of time and to spur the
The session on 14 November was par- enemy to greater speed in the negotia-
ticularly spirited. After General Lee tions. They told Ridgway that the mili-
admitted that agreement to a demarca- tary pressure upon the enemy should not
tion line now would amount to a de facto be lessened, but at the same time ad-
cease-fire, Hodes attacked the concept. mitted that no major change in the line
General Hsieh became annoyed and then of contact favorable to the United States
abusive. He called Hodes "Turtle egg" was likely during the next month. Air
—an especially insulting term in and naval action, on the other hand,
Chinese.19 "Only the Devil," he charged would not be affected by the agreement.22
later, could believe that the U.N. had The UNC delegation earnestly sought
good faith and loved peace. Hsieh also to eke some advantage from the enemy
slurringly referred to Admiral Joy as as they readied their next offer, but with
16
little success. Each day they would relax
Msg, HNC 430, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Nov 51,
DA-IN 17036.
17 20
Msg, JCS 86654, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Nov 51. Summary of Proceedings, Twenty-seventh Ses-
18
Summaries of Proceedings, Twenty-third and sion, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 14 Nov 51.
21
Twenty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item Summary of Proceedings, Twenty-eighth Ses-
2, 10 and 12 Nov 51. sion,
22 Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 15 Nov 51.
19
According to Chinese legend, a female turtle Msg, JCS 86804, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Nov 51.
had to be fertilized by a snake. (2 ) Msg, JCS 86969, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Nov 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 119

over a few games of solitaire or bridge of a particular hill in the central sector,
to ease the strain of dealing with their General Hodes arranged for a telephone
stubborn opponents before they took up connection between the conferees and
the cudgels again. Finally on 17 Novem- the officer in charge on the hill in ques-
ber, they reluctantly presented the new tion. In Hsieh's presence he called the
proposal which met the Communist unit commander and confirmed that the
position on the line of demarcation, but U.N. Command still controlled the hill.
tacked on the thirty-day time limit. 23 This annoyed Hsieh and he whispered
After several days of questions and in Chinese to his staff officer, "never
careful study of the UNC proposal, the mind. It will be ours tonight." Lieuten-
Communists were almost satisfied. Still ant Wu, the UNC interpreter overheard
they held out for UNC agreement that this remark and when he repeated it to
the line of demarcation would not be Hodes later on, the UNC force on the
revised until after the other agenda disputed hill was alerted for an attack.25
items were settled. Although the ex- However, despite the warning, superior
piration of the thirty-day limit without Chinese forces drove the UNC forces off
the conclusion of a truce would witness the hill and Hodes had to admit the
the termination of the line of demarca- next day that the enemy now had posses-
tion's validity, the psychological effect of sion and had to adjust the line of contact.
placing it along the existing line of con- By 27 November the last details were
tact might carry over into the post-thirty- ironed out and the demarcation line
day period. The U.N. Command balked agreed upon. (Map III) With its task com-
briefly, then accepted the enemy's pro- pleted, the subdelegation on Item 2 ad-
posal. By 23 November the staff officers journed at the end of its thirty-seventh
were hard at work tracing out the battle session.
line.24 It had been a tortuous road that the
Disputes over the real location of the subdelegates had followed since 17 Au-
line of contact that the staff officers could gust when they had held their first meet-
not agree upon were referred back to the ing. Initially the UNC representatives
subdelegation and in the course of one had labored to move the enemy from its
such discussion an unusual incident took stand on the 38th Parallel and toward a
place. As both sides claimed possession settlement along the actual line of con-
tact. This had been successful. During
the long suspension of the talks the
23
Summary of Proceedings, Thirtieth Session, Sub- Eighth Army had carried out its offen-
delegation Mtgs on item 2, 17 Nov 51. According
to Admiral Burke, both he and Hodes felt that
sives and won improved positions along
their usefulness to the delegation had ended at this most of the front. When the conference
point. After they had taken such strong stands, resumed in late October, the UNC
Burke wrote, the order to concede would mark
them as "pushovers" in the eyes of the Com-
delegation had an additional objective
munists. See Ltr, Burke to Mrs. A. A. Burke, 16 —to secure, or at least demilitarize
Nov 51. In OCMH.
24
Summaries of Proceedings, Thirty-first, Thirty-
second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, and Thirty-
25
fifth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 18-23 Interv, Lt Col James F. Schnabel with Lt Wu,
Nov 51. March 1952. In OCMH.
120 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

COLONEL MURRAY AND COLONEL CHANG INITIAL A LINE OF DEMARCATION MAP

Kaesong. But this meant a departure tude and attempted to defer mapping
from the concept of the line of contact, out the line until the armistice was ready
since the Communists still held Kaesong. to be signed, in the hope that the situa-
Despite all the arguments and induce- tion would be altered and the Commu-
ments that the U.N. Command had nists might be more amenable to giving
unveiled, the enemy remained unim- up Kaesong at that time.
pressed and became more firmly re- The Communists, on the other hand,
solved to keep Kaesong. had been more consistent. Once they
While the United Nations Command had discarded the 38th Parallel, they
delegates still felt that they might get had shifted to the line of contact. After
Kaesong, they had been willing to sit a brief flirtation with the idea of adjust-
down and draw a line of demarcation ments, they had been quickly disen-
right away. But as chances for Kaesong chanted by the UNC insistence upon
became slimmer, they changed their atti- adjusting the Kaesong area out of Com-
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 121
munist hands. From this point onward no reinforcing the number of personnel
the enemy delegates clung steadfastly to or increasing the amount of war equip-
an immediate settlement on the line of ment during the armistice period. This,
contact with no adjustments other than of course, did not preclude the exchange
those involving minor terrain features. of individuals or units on a man-for-man
Although the Communists had been basis or the replacement of worn-out
forced to concede on the 38th Parallel, equipment. 28 These two principles in
they had won on establishing a line of modified form—the right to inspection
demarcation that lasted until the closing and replacement but no augmentation-
moments of the war.26 Admiral Joy later formed the cornerstones of the UNC
wrote that he regarded this as a turning approach to Item 3.
point in the negotiations, for the United The modifications stemmed from the
States lacked military pressure to lever field. On 1 August Admiral Joy sug-
the Communists into more reasonable gested that along with no augmentation
attitude after this agreement and Joy of troops or equipment the U.N Com-
believed that it cost the United States a mand should insist that there be no
full year of war in Korea.27 Whether this construction or rehabilitation of air-
29
was true or not, the President and his fields. Two months later, Ridgway
advisors had decided that the U.N. Com- attempted to clarify the UNC position
mand should compromise in the interests on free and unlimited inspection. Point-
of securing an earlier armistice and in ing out to the JCS that the enemy had
view of the fact that the enemy had al- indicated its willingness to permit in-
ready made considerable concessions. spection in the demilitarized zone, but
With Item 2 finally out of the way, work had consistently resisted observation or
could now begin on Item 3, the setting inspection in territory under its exclu-
up of the machinery to administer the sive control, Ridgway questioned the
truce. need for unlimited inspection. Insist-
ence upon this principle might prolong
Opening Skirmishes on Item 3 or even cause the Communists to break
off the negotiations. In the opinion of
The early instructions to Ridgway had the United Nations commander, inspec-
been quite specific on the several points tion at selected ground, sea, and air ports
that were to be taken up under Item 3. of entry would provide sufficient security
They stated that the Military Armistice for his forces. Moreover, he believed
Commission and its observer teams must that the Communists would exploit the
have free and unlimited access to all of right to unlimited inspection in the intel-
Korea so that they could inspect when- ligence field to an unacceptable degree
ever necessary to insure compliance with if it were granted them. Under the cir-
the terms of the armistice. They also cumstance Ridgway felt that the UNC
informed Ridgway that there should be initial position on inspection should
26
insist upon: observation by joint teams
For the discussion of the effects of the line of
28
demarcation upon the battlefield, see Chapter IX, Msg. JCS 95354, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 51.
29
below. Msg, HNC 164, Joy to Ridgway, 1 Aug 51, in
27
Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 129. FEC 387.2, bk. I, 54.
122 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
at ground, sea, and air ports of entry Command and how it could best be
and communication centers, with free- carried out.32
dom of movement for those teams over Ridgway's answer on 23 November
principal transportation lines; joint reinforced his earlier stand. In his de-
aerial observation and photoreconnais- fense of the need for inspection he
sance over all Korea; and complete joint reminded the JCS that enemy air power
observation of the demilitarized zone. had been steadily increasing. In recent
As a final position, the UNC delegation weeks it had challenged the UNC air
could concede aerial observation and effort south of the Ch'ongch'on River.
photoreconnaissance. His superiors ap- If the enemy air bases were set up and
proved the initial position several weeks maintained in North Korea, they could
later, but reserved judgment on any eventually pose a serious threat to Japan
modifications until the negotiations dis- in the event of a war with the Soviet
closed the Communist position more Union. For Ridgway the principle of
thoroughly.30 As Maj. Gen. Reuben E. inspection, which the United States had
Jenkins, the Army G-3, pointed out to been insisting upon since the initiation
General Collins, the Air Force was of negotiations with the USSR in 1946
strongly opposed to sacrificing aerial ob- over the control of atomic energy, was a
servation and it might turn out that the basic U.S. position and could not be dis-
Communists would prefer to dispense carded in Korea without having an ad-
with the ground observer teams.31 verse reaction upon future negotiations
As negotiations on Item 2 drew to a with the USSR. As for the mechanics of
close in November, General Collins and inspection, he believed that forty joint
Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte experienced teams, some located permanently at
some doubts about Communist accept- ports of entry and others roving, could
ance of the inspection principle. The cover Korea adequately. If the enemy
real deterrent to a resumption of hostili- would not accept inspection, Ridgway
ties, they felt, lay in the maintenance of felt that the UNC delegation should be
sufficient power in the Korean area authorized to break off negotiations.33
rather than in inspection. Since the Several days later the U.S. leaders in-
Communists might prefer to permit the formed Ridgway that he should present
negotiations to be broken off over this his initial position requiring inspection
issue, the Chief of Staff and his Deputy on Item 3 and then modify it by conced-
Chief of Staff for Plans, General Bolte, ing aerial observation and photorecon-
questioned whether inspection would naissance if it proved necessary. How-
actually provide security for the U.N. ever, they were still firmly opposed to
having the onus for cutting off the
30
(1) Msg, C 52227. CINCFE to JCS, 4 Oct 51, negotiations over this point fall on the
DA-IN 3575. (2) Msg, JCS 84817, JCS to CINCFE, U.N. Command. Any decision to cease
24 Oct 51.
31
(1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 11 Oct 51, sub:
Clarification of the Degree of Inspection, in G-3
32
091 Korea, 200. (2) General Jenkins succeeded Msg, CSUSA (sgd Bolté) to CINCFE, 19 Nov
General Taylor as G-3 on 1 August 1951. Taylor be- 51, DA-87452.
33
came Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Msg, CX 57838, Ridgway to JCS, 23 Nov 31,
Administration. DA-IN 2085.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 123

the discussions, they declared, must be mission to be jointly responsible for the
made by the Communists.34 concrete arrangements and for the super-
When the plenary session at Panmun- vision of the implementation of the
jom resumed on 27 November, there agreement.
was one newcomer to the conference Basically there was little in the Com-
table. Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, munist proposal to quarrel with, as far
who had commanded a bombardment as it went. But Admiral Joy was quick
division of the Eighth Air Force during to point out to Nam that it failed to
World War II and more recently had cover important areas. The mechanics
been commanding general of the Thir- for beginning a cease-fire and for clear-
teenth Air Force in the Philippines, re- ing all the troops from the demilitarized
placed General Craigie. zone were fairly simple, Joy maintained,
After Admiral Joy had presented but it was essential that both sides adopt
Turner's credentials, he immediately measures to reduce the possibility of a
broached a new subject. To save time in resumption of hostilities. There were
the discussions that would take place on several ways in which this could be done.
Item 4, Joy proposed that prisoner of Neither side should build up its mili-
war data covering the names and na- tary supplies, equipment, or personnel
tionalities of all the prisoners and the in Korea during the armistice and re-
location of POW camps be exchanged strictions should be placed upon the
so that each side could study the infor- construction and rehabilitation of mili-
mation in advance of the formal meet- tary facilities for offensive purposes. If
ings. Nam Il acknowledged the sug- both sides accepted these conditions, Joy
gestion and then proceeded to discuss went on, neither would acquire a sig-
Item 3. nificant advantage. To assure compli-
In Nam's opinion, Item 3 could be ance with these limitations, Joy proposed
settled quite easily if the five principles that a supervisory organization, with
he now advanced were accepted by the joint observer teams, be established and
UNC delegates. The first declared that given sufficient authority and freedom
all armed forces should cease hostilities of movement to keep all Korea under
on the day the armistice was signed. surveillance. The UNC 7-point formula
Within three days all armed forces for solving Item 3 in effect broadened
should be withdrawn from the demil- and clarified the Communist five
itarized zone and within five days should principles.35
be cleared from the rear areas, coastal But the enemy soon indicated that it
islands, and waters of each side. These would not accept the UNC extension of
were principles 2 and 3. Each side would the Communist proposal in its initial
agree that there would be no armed form and on the 28th the attack began.
forces or action in the demilitarized zone Nam centered his guns upon the UNC
as the fourth principle, and finally both
35
sides would designate an equal number Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-eighth Ses-
sion, Mil Armistice Conf, 27 Nov 51, in FEC,
of members to form an armistice com- Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs of the Mil Armis-
34
tice Conf, 25 Oct 51-19 Feb 52, vol. III (hereafter
Msg, JCS 88226, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Nov 51. cited as FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III).
124 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

restrictions upon increases in forces, sup- sired to maintain the status quo and
plies, equipment, and facilities and the preserve its superior air capability dur-
granting of free access to all of Korea ing the armistice period. Hence the
for the joint observer teams. As far as UNC insistence upon no increase in
the Communists were concerned, Nam military facilities, which, in essence,
declared, they believed that the with- meant airfields. To make sure that the
drawal of foreign troops from Korea was enemy did not violate this principle re-
a necessary condition for a final peaceful quired that its companion, inspection,
solution of the Korean problem. How- be also included. The Communists, on
ever, the U.N. Command insisted that the other hand, were just as determined
this be handled by the political confer- to oppose any restrictions upon their op-
ence to follow the armistice and the portunity to strengthen their air capa-
matter of restrictions and reduction of bility during a truce. If they could avoid
forces belonged, therefore, in the prov- agreement upon this principle, there
ince of the political conference. Insofar would be no need for inspection.
as the UNC proposal for the observer The ensuing week witnessed a con-
teams was concerned, this was "entirely tinuous maneuvering for position on
unnecessary" since there would be no both sides. Defending its 7-point pro-
restrictions applicable under the mili- gram, the U.N. Command argued that
tary armistice and consequently no need either side could reduce its forces and
for inspection. Thus, by disposing capabilities during the armistice if it so
of the restrictions, the Communists desired, but since the length of time that
shrugged off the inspection principle, the armistice would endure was un-
too. known, it was vital for the security of
As the UNC delegation counterat- the UNC forces that there be no up-
tacked, Admiral Joy dismissed the Com- setting of the balance of military power.37
munist references to the withdrawal of The enemy delegates in rebuttal charged
foreign troops as inappropriate. The that the U.N. Command was attempting
enemy's 5-point plan, Joy went on, was to prevent the reconstruction and re-
too limited in scope to provide the habilitation of Korea, and to intervene
"bridge to peace" that the Communists in the internal affairs of the People's
spoke so frequently about. He then Republic. This was quickly denied by
proceeded to explain the UNC seven the U.N. Command, which asserted that
principles in more detail and pointedly only airfields would be affected by the
emphasized that restrictions on the restrictions. Roads, railroads, and other
build-up of forces must be part of any facilities could be restored.38
armistice that the U.N. Command would On 3 December, the Communists
accept.36 made the first concession. They offered
The main battle lines were now to expand their original five points to
plainly discernible. Since the U.N. seven. Principles 6 and 7 read as fol-
Command enjoyed a military advantage lows:
in the air over the Communists, it de- 37
Ibid.,
Thirtieth Session, 29 Nov 51.
38
Ibid., Thirty-second, Thirty-third Sessions, 30
36
Ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, 28 Nov 51. Nov, 1, 2 Dec 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 125

6. In order to insure the stability of the


military armistice so as to facilitate the
holding by both sides of a political con-
ference of a higher level, both sides shall
undertake not to introduce into Korea any
military forces, weapons, and ammunition
under any pretext. 7. In order to supervise
the strict implementation of the stipulation
of paragraph 6, both sides agree to invite
representatives of nations neutral in the
Korean war to form a supervisory organ to
be responsible for conducting necessary in-
spection, beyond the demilitarized zone, of
such ports of entry in the rear as mutually
agreed upon by both sides, and to report
to the joint armistice commission the re-
sults of inspection.39
The new Communist proposals threw
the UNC delegation on the defensive as
they were unprepared for either the
drastic restrictions upon all military
forces and equipment or for the intro-
duction of neutral nations to perform
the task of inspection.40 After a brief GENERAL NAM IL and one of his staff
recess they submitted a list of questions officers after the meeting of 27 November
to clarify the new points and then sug- 1951.
gested that Item 3 be given over to a
subdelegation to work out a solution.41 When the subdelegation met that after-
While the UNC delegates explored the noon, Lee soon made it clear that there
implications of the Communist move, would be no rotation of personnel or re-
there would be time to get new instruc- plenishment of equipment under the
tions from Washington. Communist plan and that his side would
On 4 December the enemy accepted brook no interference with the recon-
the UNC proposal for establishing a sub- struction of facilities in North Korea,
delegation and appointed Generals Lee The latter was a purely internal matter
and Hsieh as members. Admiral Joy and inspection was out of the question.
named Generals Turner and Hodes. In the course of the next session, Lee also
39
revealed that the Communists had not
Ibid., Thirty-fourth Session, 3 Dec 51.
40
The term "neutral nations" was used very
fully developed their concept of the or-
loosely during the negotiations and usually meant ganization and utilization of the neutral
those nations that did not have military forces in nations group. Possibly three to five
Korea. The United States would not recognize the
USSR as a neutral and the Communists un-
nations would be invited by both sides,
doubtedly would not have allowed Nationalist Lee stated, and the neutral organ would
China to be placed in this category. operate independently out of agreed-
41
Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fourth Ses-
sion, Mil Armistice Conf, 3 Dec 51, FEC Tran-
upon ports of entry. As for the Military
scripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III. Armistice Commission, its duties and
126 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
authority would be limited strictly to the General Ridgway agreed that the U.N.
demilitarized zone.42 Command had to take a stand soon or
After studying the Communist's ex- face the prospect of an unfavorable re-
planation of the neutral nations' role, action throughout the free world. On
Joy and his staff were hopeful but cyn- 7 December he pressed the JCS to at
ical. They felt that a deal might be least announce the points on which the
worked out within a reasonable time. U.N. Command would not concede.
Since they placed little faith in the First and foremost of these, he held, was
enemy's promises and thought that the the divorcement of the neutral nations'
Communists would eventually find some inspection teams from the authority of
way to circumvent effective inspection the Military Armistice Commission.
behind the lines anyway, the neutral Differing sharply with the UNC Pan-
nations' solution might answer the needs munjom delegation, Ridgway wanted to
of the U.N. Command as well as a mili- reject categorically this portion of the
tary armistice commission.43 But until Communist proposal, since he felt its
guidance arrived from Washington, Joy acceptance would permit the injection
admitted that all the U.N. Command of all sorts of political matters foreign to
could do was to delay and stall by asking a military armistice.45
questions and criticizing the Communist As no immediate answer to Ridgway's
proposal. He urged the submission of a message was forthcoming, the subdele-
UNC counterproposal to regain the gation continued to mark time. Two
initiative: one that would insist upon new officers, Admiral Libby and Maj.
rotation and replenishment but would Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, sat in at
create a neutral nations organization in the 6 December meeting and thereafter
place of the Military Armistice Com- to gain familiarity with the issues and
mission, would drop the claims of the Communist techniques. But until a new
U.N. Command to retain coastal islands policy was laid out, the discussion by the
north of the demarcation line after the UNC delegation had to be vague and
armistice, and also would cease to de- could not get down to cases.
mand restrictions against rehabilitating It should not be assumed, however,
airfields, only against constructing new that the JCS were inactive during the
airfields. In his opinion, this would give period. Policy had to be worked out
the U.N. Command all that it required with the State Department and since
and be very hard for the Communists to the United States was engaged in polit-
refuse.44 ical and military conversations with the
British in early December, the Joint
Chiefs were inclined to be cautious.
42
Transcripts of Proceedings, First and Second Under the circumstances they preferred
Sessions, Subdelegates Mtgs on Agenda item 3,
dated 4, 5 Dec 51, in FEC Subdelegates Mtgs on
not to take irrevocable positions at this
46
Agenda item 3, vol. I (hereafter cited as FEC stage of the negotiations.
Transcripts, item 3, vol. I).
43
Msg, HNC 521, Joy to CINCUNC, 5 Dec 51, in
45
FEC Msgs, Dec 51. Msgs, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Dec 51, DA-IN 7082
44
Msg, HNC 523, Joy to CINCUNC, 6 Dec 51, in and 7121, in G-3 091 Korea, 213/3.
46
FEC Msgs, Dec 51. Msg, JCS 88877, JCS to CINCFE, 5 Dec 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 127
By 7 December, after consultation these arguments and approved the new
with Secretaries Marshall and Acheson, instructions which were forwarded to
the JCS had hammered out a new posi- Ridgway on 11 December.48
tion and requested the President to ap- On that same day there were indica-
prove it. Pointing out that there were tions that the week's delay in the negotia-
tour main issues at stake on Item 3, they tions might have been beneficial. The
told the President that there could be U.N. Command had been constantly
no shift in the UNC stand on rotation urging the Communists to set up a sub-
and replenishment, since these were es- delegation on Item 4 in order to ex-
sential. Some concessions could be made change prisoner of war data and the
in permitting the rehabilitation of facil- enemy finally agreed to meet that after-
ities, but any decision relating to airfields noon. General Lee and Colonel Tsai
under this concession would have to be would take over the negotiations on
referred to Washington if it became the Item 4 while General Hsieh and Colonel
last obstacle to an armistice. As a final Chang would carry on the discussions
position, the JCS went on, the U.N. Com- on Item 3.
mand would agree to withdraw from Later during the debate, Hsieh made
islands north of the demarcation line the first break in the deadlock when he
and to the use of neutral teams of ob- asked in a tentative fashion whether the
servers. However, the neutral nations UNC would accept the idea of the neu-
selected to provide the observers must tral nations carrying out inspections if
be mutually agreed to by both sides and the Communists gave in on the mainte-
the teams must be responsible to and nance of forces and agreed that there be
subject to direction and supervision of a single directing head rather than two
the Military Armistice Commission.47 organs supervising the armistice. Al-
At first President Truman objected though Hsieh apparently was just prob-
to a policy allowing the enemy to re- ing the UNC position, there was now a
habilitate its roads, railroads, and other possibility of a compromise.49
facilities which the United States and its Armed with the instructions from
allies had destroyed at great expense in Washington and the hint from Hsieh
lives and matériel. But the JCS ex- that the Communists might be receptive
plained that there was a strong feeling, to a modification of their stand, the UNC
particularly in the State Department, delegation presented a new package pro-
that the armistice might be the only posal on 12 December. It featured the
agreement reached on Korea for a long concession by the U.N. Command of
time and that it would be impossible to the islands along the coast and in terri-
prohibit rehabilitation over an extensive torial waters north of the demarcation
period. Furthermore, the United States
itself intended to carry out a program 48
Msg, President to JCS, 8 Dec 51, DA-IN 7586.
of reconstruction and rehabilitation in (2) Msg, JCS 89118, JCS to Naval Aide USS Wil-
South Korea. The President bowed to liamsburg, 8 Dec 51. (3) Msg, JCS 89173, JCS
to CINCFE, 11 Dec 51.
49
Transcript of Proceedings, Eighth Session, Sub-
47
Msg, JCS 89114, JCS to Naval Aide USS Wil- delegates Mtgs on item 3, 11 Dec 51, in FEC Tran-
liamsburg, 7 Dec 51. scripts, item 3, vol. I.
128 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
line and agreement to the concept that ceptable and the negotiations began to
the neutral nations acceptable to both bog down again.52
sides furnish personnel for the observer Thus, by mid-December, the Commu-
teams. On the other hand, the Commu- nists had shown a disposition to compro-
nists must permit rotation and re- mise on inspection—the issue which the
plenishment and agree that the neutral JCS and the UNC leaders had feared
nations be under the Military Armistice might be the greatest stumbling block to
Commission. There was no change in an agreement on Item 3. True, there
the UNC stand on airfields, and recon- remained many details to be worked out
struction and rehabilitation were still on the composition of the neutral na-
forbidden. Since this was a package pro- tions organization and its duties and
posal, Turner told Hsieh that it must be relationship to the Military Armistice
accepted in toto or not at all.50 Commission, but the principle, at least,
Hsieh spent the next session attacking had been accepted. The enemy was also
the UNC plan, and Turner in turn willing to retreat from its extreme stand
counterattacked. When Hsieh assailed against rotation provided a suitable quid
the rotation and replenishment prin- pro quo was offered. But the price for
ciple, Turner pointed out that accept- this concession—freedom to develop and
ance of the Communist view would in rehabilitate airfields during an armistice
effect constitute the withdrawal of for- —was one that the U.N. Command was
eign forces from Korea since attrition vehemently opposed to.
eventually would eliminate all but na- General Ridgway flew to Korea on 17
tive troops. The enemy had agreed to December and after canvassing the mem-
discuss this problem under Item 5 and bers of the UNC delegation forwarded
not Item 3, Turner maintained, scoring an estimate of the situation to the JCS.
a point.51 Concerned with the approach of the
On 14 December Hsieh presented an thirty-day deadline on the line of de-
alternate suggestion which accepted the marcation, he told his superiors that an
UNC concessions and in return offered extension, unless it was for a very short
to permit the U.N. Command to rotate period of time and the conclusion of the
5,000 men a month. Turner ridiculed negotiations was in sight, would have a
the low figure. Upon further question- harmful effect upon his forces. He ad-
ing, Hsieh admitted that even the 5,000 mitted that neither he nor his staff were
rotatees would have to be approved by agreed upon what the Communists in-
the Military Armistice Commission each tentions were, but argued that the best
month and that the Communists could way to expose them lay in setting out
conceivably veto any rotation if they so the UNC firm position in unequivocal
desired since they would have equal language. Warning that the time could
membership in this group. This made come when the UNC might have to face
the enemy's proposal even more unac- a breaking off in the negotiations, he
felt that the decision to meet such a crisis

50 52
Ibid., Ninth Session, 12 Dec 51. Ibid., Eleventh and Twelfth Sessions, 14 and
51
Ibid., Tenth Session, 13 Dec 51. 15 Dec 51.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 129

should be readied in advance. Ridgway greater degree of permanency and the


especially deprecated the policy pursued conditions imposed must be of a type
in the past of abandoning positions since that could be enforced over a long
this had only tended to make the enemy period. The U.S. political and military
more obdurate and demanding. leaders felt that Communist violations
Then, turning to the problems at of the armistice would probably consist
hand, he strongly urged that the U.N. of demonstrations, threats, and equivoca-
Command stick to its stand on airfields tions rather than renewed aggression.
and rotation. In addition, the U.N. And in their view the major deterrent
Command should insist upon neutral to another outbreak of hostilities in
aerial inspection and photoreconnais- Korea would be the Communist realiza-
sance to watch the enemy's airfields and tion that further aggression would bring
tor free movement of neutral observer full retribution. The United States was
teams throughout Korea over major lines working on a declaration to this effect
of communication. The tasks assigned which would be signed by as many of
to the Military Armistice Commission the United Nations participating in the
and the neutral observer teams should Korean War as could be persuaded; it
be made mandatory so that the Commu- would be issued after the conclusion of
nists could not block action by these the armistice. The United Kingdom
organs. In the opinion of himself and had already indicated that it would sup-
his staff, the critical matter was airfields port such a statement.
and the making of an armistice might In the light of these considerations.
well hinge on the acceptance or non- U.S. leaders preferred not to take final
acceptance of this principle.53 positions on all the issues now under
discussion, as this would destroy the
Domestic Problems and Foreign ability of the United States to maneuver
Pressures or adjust if new elements were intro-
duced by the Communists. Neither did
After meeting with the State Depart- they care to establish a given point at
ment and securing Presidential approval, which the negotiations would be broken
the JCS replied to Ridgway the follow- off. Instead they listed the positions that
ing day. The Washington leaders ap- Ridgway and his staff should now sup-
preciated the fine effort that Ridgway port. Since it would be impracticable to
and the UNC delegation were making enforce the rehabilitation of airfields for
despite many difficulties. But the con- any length of time, they were willing to
sensus of official opinion held that a permit some airfields, excluding those
political conference after the armistice suitable for jet operations, to be rebuilt
would probably be unsuccessful and con- and maintained. As for aerial observa-
sequently the armistice might be the tion, this was desirable but not essential
only agreement for some time. In that and should not be a part of the UNC
event its character must provide for a final position. Either adequate rotation
of personnel should be authorized or as
53
Msg, HNC 588, Ridgway to JCS, 18 Dec 51, long as there was no over-all increase in
DA-IN 11132. forces, no limit at all should be fixed.
130 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

In the matter of replenishment, the im- reasonable and workable armistice agree-
portant issue was that there be no aug- ment would be reached that would end
mentation of combat aircraft. On this the hostilities in Korea, and the knowl-
Ridgway should be adamant. The edge that as long as the U.N. Command
Washington leaders agreed that the neu- continued to be willing to negotiate, the
tral observer teams should be stationed Communists would be forced to bear the
at the major ports of entry and have onus for a breaking off of the conference.
freedom to move wherever their duties The influence of this latter considera-
demanded. It would not be necessary tion upon the thinking of the govern-
to have all the observer teams in place ment in Washington was constant and
when the armistice went into effect, but important.
the Military Armistice Commission and For behind the American leaders the
some of the teams should be on hand. pressure for an early solution to the
If the deadline of 27 December ap- Korean War through a cease-fire and
proached and progress was still being armistice was mounting. By mid-Decem-
made in the negotiations, Ridgway was ber the desire to halt the growing
authorized to propose an extension of casualty lists and to free U.S. and U.N.
up to fifteen days.54 forces in Korea for redeployment else-
The differences in approach to the where became stronger. As the negotia-
intricate task of negotiating with the tions dragged on, the allies of the United
Communists were sharply delineated in States became more reluctant to apply
this exchange between Ridgway and his additional measures against Communist
superiors. The Far East commander and China and disinclined to contribute
his staff believed that continuing con- more troops to Korea. It was also evident
cessions could only indicate weakness to that as long as the war continued and
the enemy and that the best course was the United States poured resources into
one of strength and firmness. Only when a hot war, the flow of military assistance
the Communists realized that the U.N. to areas engaged in the cold war had to
Command intended to cling steadfastly be restricted. Influences at home and
to its principles and would yield no abroad increasingly favored a minimum
more, would they get down seriously to settlement of the Korean War by means
the business of fashioning an armistice. of an armistice and the unification of
The Washington leaders, on the other Korea by political means.
hand, inclined toward a flexible ap- Since the National Security Council
proach based upon the practical neces- recommended in December that the
sities for a long armistice period. This United States adhere to the policy of
meant playing the Communist game of avoiding a general war with China and
shifting, adjusting, and maneuvering the USSR and of seeking an acceptable
for advantages and avoiding fixed posi- settlement in Korea that would not
tions that might precipitate a break in jeopardize the U.S. positions regarding
the negotiations. Inherent in this ap- Taiwan, a seat for Communist China
proach were the hope that eventually a in the United Nations, or vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union, the chances that the
54
Msg, JCS 90083, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51. war would be broadened in the near
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 131

CHURCHILL IN WASHINGTON, January 1952. Left to right, front row: Secretary Acheson,
Mr. Churchill, Secretary Lovett, and Anthony Eden. Standing: Admiral Sir Roderick R.
McGrigor, W. Averell Harriman, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Sir Norman Brook, and
General Bradley.

future appeared small. The council pre- by the Communists to take over South
ferred to continue the course now being Korea. The council was now convinced
pursued—limited war and economic that with proper training and equip-
pressure upon Red China backed by ment the ROK Army could eventually
the support of the majority of the bear the brunt of the defense of South
United Nations—until a satisfactory Korea. Only if the armistice negotia-
armistice was concluded. This would tions failed, would the council consider
be followed by efforts to reach a the additional measures of mobilization
political settlement of the Korean prob- and forms of military pressure to solve
lem, but in the meantime the ROK the situation.
Army would be strengthened and pre- The NSC decision deferred the im-
pared to deter or repel a further attempt position of a naval blockade against
132 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

China and the extension of the air war to regard the new regime as a permanent
into Manchuria.55 And since the United one. The United States, on the other
States did not feel that the United Na- hand, felt that as long as Communist
tions would support a stricter economic China remained aggressive and showed
embargo on China at this time, there no signs of changing its attitude toward
seemed to be little profit in pursuing the West, there was no point in accord-
that matter either. ing the Communists the advantages that
Perhaps the case of the British may recognition would entail, such as a seat
serve as a graphic illustration of this in the United Nations or formal trade
point. The British had been undergoing relations. Besides, the United States had
a period of economic crisis since World certain obligations toward Chiang Kai-
War II and were loathe to place addi- shek and the Taiwan government, which
tional restrictions upon their trade with it could not easily avoid. Since the
Communist China. It was natural that United States acknowledged the eco-
they should also be concerned about the nomic interests of the British in the Far
exposed position of Hong Kong if more East, the U.S. policy planners felt that
pressure were to be applied against the the British must in turn realize that the
Chinese Communists and that they United States must bear the major re-
should view the growing air strength of sponsibility for the area and supply the
the enemy's air force in Korea uneasily. power to meet this responsibility.57
Under the circumstances they were most Although the conferences produced no
anxious to limit the war to the Korean changes in either British or American
Peninsula until a settlement could be policy, the two countries were able to
worked out at the truce table.56 reassure each other. Neither desired an
British uncertainties over American extension of the Korean War and so long
policy led to consultations in Washing- as there was no collapse of negotiations,
ton during late December and January. their differences in regard to Communist
While British military leaders discussed China could be adjusted. What might
the implications of broadening U.N. happen if the enemy did not agree to
action against Communist China with an armistice or breached it was also dis-
their American counterparts at the mili- cussed, but since the United States had
tary level, Prime Minister Winston not reached a firm decision on an alter-
Churchill and Foreign Secretary An- nate course of action, no positive infor-
thony Eden conferred with President mation could be given to the British.58
Truman and his advisors. Actually there seemed to be little
Fundamentally, divergencies in policy choice for the United States unless the
stemmed from the attitudes of the two situation altered. For those who still be-
countries toward Communist China and lieved that a military decision in Korea
Nationalist China. Since the British was either desirable or necessary to settle
had recognized the former and estab- 57
lished trade relations, they were inclined JCS 2118/28, 28 Dec 51, title: Divergence of
U.S. and British Policies Respecting China.
55 58
JCS 2004/46, 13 Dec 51, title: Method of Cur- Msg, 130305, State Dept to SCAP, 13 Jan 52,
tailment of Wartime Trade with Communist China. in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G-3 sec., an. 4, pt.
56
JCS 1776/272, 27 Dec 51, title: Korea. III, tab 15.
THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS 133

the conflict, even if it meant taking on


Communist China, General Bolté, Dep-
uty Chief of Staff for Plans, had some
sobering counsel at the end of December.
He told Assistant Secretary of the Army
Karl R. Bendetsen that the United
States had no certain current military
capability for reaching a favorable deci-
sion in the Far East and no knowledge
of how long it would take to acquire
such a capability. Only by a drastic
change in the global strategy of the
United States or through an all-out
mobilization of national resources could
the military capability be immediately
increased. As Bolté pointed out, the first
course might cause great danger to the
national security and the second would
create grave economic problems. Either
might play directly into the hands of the GENERAL COLLINS
Soviet Union.59
From General Ridgway came confir- of hostilities to Korea posed a new set
mation of Bolté's position. In comment- of circumstances. Under the recent
ing upon the apparent willingness of the NSC decision the ROK forces would be
U.S. policy makers to rely upon a post- increased, trained, and equipped to as-
armistice U.N. declaration threatening sume the responsibility for the defense
a spread of the war if the Communists of their own territory. Depending upon
made a truce and then broke it, he stated conditions at the time, the United States
frankly that: " . . . conscience compels might or might not intervene again in
me to reiterate my conviction that with Korea if the Communists violated an
presently available military forces this armistice agreement. In any event the
command would be incapable of impos- JCS informed Ridgway that he would
ing a threat to Communist China prepare only contingency plans for U.S.
sufficient in itself to deter it from re- intervention.61
newed aggression."60 As long as the negotiations continued,
But, as General Collins pointed out to however, the prospects for increasing the
the JCS on 10 January, the very fact U.S. effort in Korea appeared forlorn.
that the proposed U.N. declaration did The shift foreshadowed by the National
not necessarily restrict a future outbreak Security Council action was toward a
gradual disengagement provided that a
59
Memo, Bolté for Asst Secy Army (Gen Mgmt) ,
61
28 Dec 51, sub: Comments on Memo . . . Asst Secy (1) Memo, Collins for JCS, 10 Jan 52, sub:
Army (Gen Mgmt), in G-3 091 Korea, 348/24. Renewed U.S. Intervention in Korea . . . , in G-3
60
Msg, CX 61348, Ridgway to JCS. 13 Jan 52, 091 Korea 3. (2) Msg, DA-93080. G-3 to CINCFE,
DA-IN 19740. 27 Jan 52.
134 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
truce could be arranged. But mean- With the action on the battlefield still
time the Joint Chiefs were faced with the at a low ebb and with little hope of
problem of sustaining the present rate accelerating the pace, the sharpest
of military build-up until the world clashes took place over the conference
situation improved. Whether the Presi- table. The airfield question limited
dent or Congress would be receptive to agreement on Item 3 and a new battle
further augmentation of the armed forces was about to break out over the disposi-
while the stalemate in Korea remained tion of prisoners of war.
unbroken was still a moot question.
CHAPTER VII

Prisoners of War
On the surface the problem of prison- not. At the close of the Revolutionary
ers of war seemed simple. The United War the Treaty of Paris of 1783 had
States was a signatory to the Geneva simply stated: "All prisoners on both
Convention of 1949 although it had not sides shall be set at liberty. . . ." Thou-
ratified the convention when the war sands of British and German soldiers
began. The North Korean Foreign decided to stay in the new country and
Minister had declared shortly after the to live under the new form of govern-
outbreak of war in 1950 that his govern- ment rather than go back to Europe.1
ment would abide by its stipulations. But this experience had been the ex-
Since the opening sentence of Article ception to the rule. The common prac-
118 of the convention clearly stated: tice was to exchange all prisoners of war
"Prisoners of war shall be released and at the end of a conflict. When the 1929
repatriated without delay after the cessa- Geneva Convention was fashioned, com-
tion of hostilities," there seemed little pulsory repatriation was taken for
reason for dispute. Yet difficulties arose granted since it was generally accepted
at the outset of the discussions on the that the great majority of prisoners
exchange of prisoners and steadily would wish to return home as soon as a
mounted as the issue became surcharged war was finished. World War II added a
with emotional elements. A series of new chapter to the handling of prisoners
conflicts broke out between the rights of of war when the Soviet Union retained
the individual and those of the majority, large numbers of German and Japanese
between human rights and legal rights, prisoners for a long period after the war
and between humanitarianism and Com- to assist in the rehabilitation of the
munist Party pride. As the controversy USSR. Perhaps to prevent a recurrence
became very involved, a glance at the of this action, the delegates to the Ge-
contributing factors would appear to be neva Conference in 1949 strengthened
in order. the article dealing with repatriation. It
became a flat statement prescribing
Voluntary Repatriation quick and compulsory repatriation.2
1
See Lt. Col. George G. Lewis and Capt. John
Early in its history the United States Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by
had come into contact with the principle the United States Army, 1776-1945, DA Pamphlet
of voluntary repatriation or the right of 20-213, June 1955, p. 20.
2
DA Pamphlet No. 20-150, October 1950, Geneva
each individual prisoner to choose Convention of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of
whether he wanted to return home or War Victims, Article 118, p. 129.
136 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
But in their zeal to protect the right of spread in their ranks and once they had
each prisoner to return home swiftly, become prisoners of the UNC, many
the delegates ignored the other side of soon demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm
the coin. They failed to incorporate es- for a return to Communist control.3
cape provisions to cover the possible As the number of enemy prisoners
exceptions—the prisoners who might be mounted and their composition grew
afraid to go back, those who had fallen more complex, the problem of their ulti-
out of sympathy with their national mate disposition came to the fore. On
regimes, and those who preferred the the eve of the opening of the truce ne-
ways of their captors. gotiations in July, Brig. Gen. Robert A.
The omission was soon revealed by McClure, Army Chief of Psychological
the Korean War. The Communists, Warfare, voiced his concern over the pos-
however, did not allow a scrap of paper sible fate of the former Nationalist sol-
to deprive them of an advantage. As diers in the event of an armistice. Many
soon as they began to accumulate pris- of these men, he told General Collins,
oners in mid-1950, they set about re- claimed that they were forced to join
educating and incorporating as many as the Communist army. If they were now
possible of the former ROK soldiers into compelled to return, they might well be
the Korean People's Army. When the faced with heavy punishment or even ex-
United Nations Command turned the ecution because they had surrendered to
tables after the Inch'on landing in Sep- the U.N. Command. To forestall this
tember 1950, no such easy solution was McClure presented a clever, if some-
permissible. Respecting the provisions what debatable solution. Since the bulk
of the Geneva Convention, the UNC sent of the ex-Nationalist prisoners would
its ever-increasing bag of prisoners, mili- probably elect to go to Taiwan if they
tary and civilian, back to the stockades were given a choice and since it could be
and faithfully reported the names to the officially considered a part of China, he
International Committee of the Red urged the repatriation of the group to
Cross (ICRC). It was inevitable that Taiwan. In this fashion the United
some of the ex-ROK soldiers should fall States would avoid the experience of
into UNC hands and many of them now World War II when it had consented to
claimed that they had been impressed the forcible repatriation of prisoners to
into the Communist forces. This was the the Soviet Union. At the same time,
initial complication. McClure went on, future psychological
When the Chinese entered the war in warfare operations would be strength-
late 1950, another element was added. ened since if enemy soldiers were confi-
For among the Chinese troops were dent that they would not be repatriated,
many quondam members of the Na- they would be more likely to surrender.4
tionalist armies of Chiang Kai-shek. The McClure approach deserved fur-
During the civil war there had been
wholesale desertions and surrenders and 3
Msg, C 67842, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), 28
the Communists had taken the former Jul4 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 1, 44.
Memo, McClure for CofS, 5 Jul 51, sub: Policy
Nationalists into their military organiza- on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners, in
tion en masse. Disaffection was wide- G-3 383.6, 4.
PRISONERS OF WAR 137

ther consideration, in Collins' opinion, tages, Ridgway felt that the concept had
and he submitted it in expanded form definite merit.6
to the JCS on 6 July. Although the Further support for voluntary repatri-
United States had not ratified the Ge- ation came from the Joint Strategic Sur-
neva Convention, Collins and the Army vey Committee, the senior advisory
Judge Advocate General felt that it was group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but
committed to the principles expressed the committee recommended that since
therein. On the other hand, the Chief the problem transcended military con-
of Staff thought that provided adequate siderations, it should be handled on a
safeguards for the protection and safe higher governmental level. Final ap-
return of UNC prisoners were arranged, proval, the committee concluded, should
General Ridgway could repatriate all come from the General Assembly of the
Chinese prisoners claiming Nationalist United Nations. General Jenkins, the
sympathies to Taiwan on the technical Army G-3, disagreed strongly, for he felt
ground that it was still part of China. that giving the matter to the General
Collins was willing to go even further. Assembly would result in no decision at
If it could be accomplished without prej- all on the basic policy. His arguments
udice to the rapid recovery of UNC pris- won over the JCS and General Collins
oners, he suggested that no Chinese or was instructed to inform Ridgway that
North Korean prisoners should be forced he could develop a UNC position for
to go back to Communist-controlled ter- planning purposes based on the principle
ritory without their full consent.5 of voluntary repatriation.7
While the Taiwan proposition com- During the long recess over the inci-
plied with the letter of the Geneva Con- dents at Kaesong, there was a gradual
vention and could be defended, the change within the Defense Department.
voluntary repatriation concept advocated Robert A. Lovett, who succeeded Gen-
by the Chief of Staff was clearly at vari- eral Marshall on 17 September as Secre-
ance with the provisions of the conven- tary of Defense, keynoted this shift.
tion. General Ridgway, when asked for Referring to the instructions of 30 June
his comments, was quick to point this to Ridgway on prisoner of war exchange,
out. The adoption of voluntary repatria- he declared that the Communists might
tion at this time, Ridgway declared, not consent to negotiate on a one-for-one
might establish a precedent that would basis and might well insist upon an all-
work to the disadvantage of the United for-all agreement.8 This possibility im-
States in future wars. In addition, the mediately cast a pall over the doctrine of
Communists might make use of this voluntary repatriation, for the primary
breach of the convention to formulate consideration was to secure the speedy
adverse propaganda and influence the return of all UNC prisoners. In a one-
borderline countries not yet committed 6
Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul 51, DA-IN 17240.
to communism. Despite these disadvan- 7
(1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Aug 51, sub:
Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K.
Prisoners, in G-3 383.6, 4/4. (2) Msg, DA-99024,
5
Memo, CofS U.S. Army for JCS, 6 Jul 51, sub: G-3 to CINCFE, 15 Aug 51.
8
Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K Memo, Lovett for JCS, 25 Sep 51, no sub, incl to
Prisoners, in G-3 383.6, 4. JCS 2095/5.
138 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
for-one exchange, the UNC could easily Although voluntary repatriation was
have held back the enemy prisoners who now de-emphasized, some progress was
did not want to return to the Commu- made on the reclassification of prisoners
nists until all the UNC prisoners were held in the UNC camps. Among the
turned over. An all-for-all agreement thousands of men captured by the
would void this plan completely. United Nations Command, there were
General Jenkins reflected the new cli- many who claimed South Korean resi-
mate of opinion in early October when dence. These fell into five general
he counseled the Chief of Staff to ac- classes: 1. Volunteers from civilian status
cept the Lovett argument that the UNC who joined the North Korean forces;
should be ready to agree to an all-for-all 2. Personnel impressed into North Ko-
exchange if the enemy refused to deal rean military units from civilian life;
on any other basis. Since Ridgway's ar- 3. ROKA personnel captured and im-
mistice instructions were about to be re- pressed into the enemy army; 4. ROKA
vised in preparation for the resumption personnel mistakenly taken into custody
of the truce talks and since voluntary while in a straggler status; and 5. "In-
repatriation was contrary to the Geneva nocent bystanders" who joined prisoner
Convention anyway, the Army G-3 did of war groups or broke into the stockades
not think that the principle should be to get fed or were picked up on suspicion
reaffirmed. Collins and his JCS col- of being North Korean soldiers in civil-
leagues agreed.9 ian clothes. Both the Far East Command
This appeared to be the end of vol- Provost Marshal General and Judge Ad-
untary repatriation. In Tokyo General vocate General felt that only classes 2
Ridgway had also shifted his ground. and 5 could be properly reclassified as ci-
Unless there were a one-for-one ex- vilian internees; the others should be
change, he told the JCS, he did not see held.11
how he could hold back the prisoners There were then about 40,000 South
unwilling to be repatriated. The United Koreans in UNC custody who had earlier
Nations Command had avoided the sub- been impressed into the North Korean
ject of nonrepatriation in its psychologi- Army, according to Ridgway's estimates,
cal warfare program and had not offered and with JCS approval he began to re-
asylum to the Communist soldiers. In- classify members of this group as civilian
stead it had promised food, medical care, internees. He intended to parole indi-
and good treatment to all, plus permis- viduals from this category acceptable to
sion to the North Koreans to return the ROK Government to local officials
home as soon as practicable. And to the gradually when the situation seemed op-
Chinese troops, it had proffered the portune.12
chance to save their lives.10
11
Memo, Lt Col D. T. Hamersley, SGS, for Asst
9
(1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 9 Oct 51, sub: CofS G-1 FEC, 8 Nov 51, sub: Investigation and
Policy on Repatriation . . . , in G-3 383.6, 4/9. (2) Release of ROKA Personnel in UN POW En-
Decision on JCS 2095/7, 12 Oct 51. closures, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jul-31 Dec 51.
10 12
Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Oct 51, DA-IN 12414. (1) JCS 2095/8, 9 Nov 51, title: Policy on
(2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 15 Nov 51, DA-IN 15530. Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners. (2)
(3) JCS 2095/8, 9 Nov 51, title: Policy on Repatria- Memo, Collins for Secy Defense, 15 Nov 51, same
tion of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners. sub, in G-3 383.6, 4/14.
PRISONERS OF WAR 139

After discussion of Item 3 began in question. In the meantime they author-


late November, Ridgway submitted his ized the U.N. Commander to go ahead
proposed approach to the prisoner of on the basis of his 28 November pro-
war problem to the JCS on the 28th. posal.14
Before he would enter into substantive By the time the subdelegation on Item
matters, he intended to insist upon de- 4 opened its meetings on 11 December,
livery of names, numbers, and locations the principle of voluntary repatriation
of all UNC prisoners held by the enemy. was placed in a strange position—neither
Initially he would attempt to secure a in nor out of UNC planning. To the
one-for-one exchange. If this were suc- JCS and to Ridgway it was a desirable
cessful, the U.N. Command could with- objective that should be attained, but no
hold the prisoners it desired. If, on the one was sure if or how it could be won.
other hand, the enemy refused, he would On the other hand, there seemed to be
agree to an all-for-all exchange, even no overriding reason for adhering to the
though it meant turning over suspected concept in the event the Communists
war criminals, intelligence prospects, sol- balked or showed a disposition to with-
diers who had aided the U.N. Command, hold the UNC prisoners in retaliation.
and individuals who did not want to As the talks began, the fate of voluntary
go back.13 repatriation appeared to depend mainly
Faced with the immediate problem of upon future Communist actions and re-
deciding whether or not to sacrifice the actions in handling the prisoner of war
unwilling repatriates, the JCS again de- problem.
bated the question without reaching a
solution. Torn between their natural The Period of Reconnaissance
concern for the safety of the UNC pris-
oners and their humanitarian desire not The repeated efforts of the UNC dele-
to force enemy prisoners to return to gation to initiate discussions on Item 4
the Communists, they could see no sure concurrently with those on Item 3 finally
method of safeguarding both groups. As bore fruit on 11 December when the
a suggestion they informed Ridgway that Communists agreed to hold a subdelega-
he might try to secure an agreement pro- tion meeting that afternoon. Across the
viding for the screening of all prisoners conference table the familiar faces of
by joint teams prior to their release. Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho and Col. Tsai
If, during the screening, a prisoner did Cheng-wen indicated that the enemy
not wish to be repatriated, he could re- had assigned two of its ablest negotiators
main under the jurisdiction of his captor. to the task. On the UNC side, Rear
But there were frank indications that the Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, who had just
JCS did not put a great deal of faith in replaced Admiral Burke officially, and
the possible success of this maneuver Col. George W. Hickman, Jr., USA, were
since they told both the Secretary of De- 14
(1) Decision on JCS 2095/10, 4 Dec 51, Policy
fense and Ridgway that they would wel- on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners.
come any suggestion for resolving the (2) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Dec 51, sub: Pro-
posed Dispatch to CINCFE in Regard to PW's, in
13
Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Nov 51, DA-IN G-3 383-6, 5. (3) Msg, JCS 89172, JCS to CINCFE,
3785. 10 Dec 51.
140 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
chosen to match wits with the Commun- for the transfer of sick and wounded
ists. Libby was a fiery sea dog with a prisoners.
salty tongue who had no difficulty in Lee was interested in probing the sig-
coping with the best or the worst that the nificance of some of the vague terms that
enemy had to offer. He combined quick- Libby had used in setting forth the
ness of mind, common sense, and spirit UNC approach, but the admiral was not
in an admirable blend and made an ideal ready to get down to specifics at this
negotiator for dealing with the Com- stage. All that Lee found out was that
munists. Colonel Hickman was intell- a "fair and equitable exchange" meant
igent and capable, experienced in staff that neither side should gain an undue
work, and provided added balance to the military advantage over the other if hos-
UNC team.15 tilities resumed before a final peace set-
After the credentials were presented, tlement was concluded.16
General Lee made the opening move. After the first session was over, Admi-
The prisoner of war issue could be set- ral Joy informed Ridgway that it ap-
tled very quickly, he declared, if all peared that the Communists were going
POW's were released and allowed to go to support an all-for-all exchange and
home after the armistice. Provided that would oppose a one-for-one trade no mat-
the conferees could agree upon this prin- ter how it might be modified.17 At the
ciple, Lee thought that everything else moment, however, Ridgway was inter-
fell into the category of details and could ested in supporting the visits of ICRC
be straightened out without too much representatives to the camps and he was
trouble. But since, the UNC delegation trying to marshal strong backing from
was not authorized to start the substan- his superiors. The latter were quite will-
tive discussions until the enemy fur- ing to have the U.N. Command secure
nished current lists of prisoners, Libby such a concession from the enemy, but
ignored the Communist gambit. Instead did not want the visits to become an
he pressed for the exchange of POW in- issue.18
formation and for permission for the The next few days were spent in ex-
International Committee of the Red ploring and establishing the lines of bat-
Cross representatives to visit the prisoner tle. Libby concentrated his comments
of war camps. In the preliminary on the failure of the Communists to ob-
sparring that followed, Libby hinted serve the Geneva Convention. Although
that the UNC general position on the North Koreans had promised to com-
POWs was fashioned around a fair and ply with the Geneva rules in 1950, they
equitable exchange of prisoners along had reported only no names of prison-
with suitable supervision to insure
that they received humane treatment 16
Transcript of Proceedings, First Session, Sub-
and comfort until they were repatriated. delegation on item 4, 11 Dec 51, in FEC Subdele-
Naturally, Libby told Lee, the U.N. gation Mtgs, item 4, 11-25 Dec 51 (hereafter cited
as FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. I).
Command desired to establish a priority 17
Msg, HNC 541, Joy to CINCUNC, 11 Dec 51, in
FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 349.
18
(1) Msg, CX 59155. Ridgway to JCS, 11 Dec
15
Hickman later became the Army Judge Advo- 51. (2) Msg, JCS 89474, JCS to CINCFE, 12 Dec
cate General. 51. Both in FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 349.
PRISONERS OF WAR 141

ers taken during the early fighting and munists admitted that the POW data
then ceased. The United Nations Com- were necessary yet refused to release
mand had been obliged to gather later them, Libby accused the Communists of
POW information via Communist news wanting to take a bath without soap or
media and radio broadcasts. Before the water. Lee promptly retorted that they
general problem of prisoners could be were ready with soap and water, but the
discussed intelligently, Libby main- U.N. Command would not get into the
tained, the U.N. Command would have tub. The most important thing, Lee
to know the names, locations, and na- claimed, was to free the prisoners and
tionalities of all the prisoners in enemy not to worry too much about giving each
custody. He also reminded General Lee other lists.20 In any case both sides
that the convention also provided for the seemed eager to take the other to the
visits of ICRC teams. cleaners; the big problem was to settle
Lee was nothing loath to use the con- which one would be cleaned.
vention for his base of argument. The The Communists agreed to furnish
only difference was that he had his own POW data on 18 December. A four-day
favorite articles. First and foremost was recess followed to allow both sides to
Article 118 supporting all-for-all repatri- check the information. For the U.N.
ation on a compulsory basis. There was Command the lists submitted by the
no doubt of the Communist hostility to enemy proved to be a definite disap-
any suggestion of a one-for-one exchange pointment. During the first months of
and Lee sought doggedly to determine the war, the Communists had reported
whether the U.N. Command intended via news releases and radio broadcasts
to insist upon this. Despite Libby's suc- the capture of over 65,000 prisoners.
cessful evasion of debate, the enemy's Yet their lists showed that they now held
position was very clear. On 12 December only 7,142 ROK soldiers and 4,417 U.N.
Lee followed up with a definite proposal personnel, or a total of 11,559 prison-
21
featuring the acceptance by both sides ers. Since the ROK Army carried over
of the all-for-all principle. Once this was 88,000 men missing in action and the
conceded, the Communists were willing United States over 11,500 in the same
to provide POW lists and to carry out category, the discrepancy was particu-
the actual transfer of prisoners at Pan- larly large. The disparity was even
munjom. They remained adamantly op- more striking when compared with the
posed to any visits by ICRC representa- UNC record. Out of 188,000 men listed
tives, however, and Lee made it plain as missing by the Communists, the U.N.
that these were " out of the question." 19 Command held over 132,000 prisoners of
In the absence of substantive discus- war and in addition had another 37,000
sions, the mid-December meetings were recently reclassified as civilian internees.
frequently devoted to assaults upon the When the first shock over the small
opponent's position. Occasionally there 20
Ibid., Fifth Session, 15 Dec 51.
21
was a lighter moment. Since the Com- The UNC POW list was broken down as fol-
lows: 3,198 U.S.; 234 Turkish; 10 French; 1 Dutch;
19
Transcripts of Proceedings, Second and Fourth 40 Filipino; 1 Greek; 4 South African; 919 U.K.;
Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 12 and 14 Dec 6 Australian; 1 Canadian; and 3 "Japanese." The
51, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. I. Japanese later proved to be U.S. citizens.
142 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
number of names listed by the Com- should be repatriated or not, Lee main-
munists wore off, Admiral Joy and Ridg- tained.
way decided to send a cold and factual Libby declined to debate the point
letter to the enemy leaders requesting and instead counterattacked in another
an explanation. Until they received an quarter. Just how, he asked, did the
answer, the UNC delegation would at- Communists propose to justify the ex-
tack the all-for-all plan and probe the change of some ten thousand prisoners
enemy position fully. It would present held by them for the hundred-odd thou-
no counterproposal.22 sand in UNC possession? Reminding
The Communists were not entirely Lee that General Hsieh in the Item 3
satisfied with the United Nations lists discussions had clearly stated that there
either. When the meetings resumed on should be no increase of military forces
22 December, General Lee charged that after the armistice, Libby charged that
there were shortages of 44,259 names on an all-for-all swap would add the equiva-
one list and 1,456 on another. Libby lent of ten divisions to the Communist
explained that the bulk of the missing forces. Then, turning to the POW lists,
persons consisted of former residents of he requested that Lee explain why only
the Republic of Korea who had been 7,142 ROK soldiers were included when
taken prisoner under suspicious or hos- the enemy had claimed that they had
tile circumstances. During the spring of captured tens of thousands.23
1951 the U.N. Command had thoroughly From intelligence reports and POW
screened its prisoners and discovered that interviews, the U.N. Command was well
a large number of them had been caught aware that the North Koreans had in-
in the flow of war or had been impressed corporated a large number of former
into the North Korean armed forces. ROK Army personnel into the Com-
Prisoners in these categories had been munist armed forces. Although the pros-
separated from those who had voluntar- pects for their return were not bright,
ily joined the Communists and 37,000 Joy and Ridgway agreed that the UNC
had been reclassified as civilian intern- negotiators would at least attempt to get
ees. In addition, Libby went on, the them back.24 At the same time the de-
U.N. Command was in the process of mand for the onetime ROK Army mem-
screening another 16,000 prisoners who bers would serve as a counterweight to
had proven to be ROK citizens and these the enemy's request for the return of the
would not be repatriated either. 37,000 reclassified civilian internees.
Branding Libby's arguments "cute and Admiral Libby pressed the attack dur-
strange," Lee quickly protested this uni- ing the holiday meetings. He told Lee
lateral action. It was not the place of that the Communists had not reported
residence but the army in which a man all the prisoners that they held. This
served that determined whether he drew a hot denial from his opposite.
23
Transcript of Proceedings, Ninth Session, Sub-
22
(1) Msgs, HNC 605 and 607, Joy to CINCUNC, delegation on item 4, 22 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on
20 and 21 Dec 51, in FEC Messages, Dec 51. (2) item 4, vol. I.
24
Msg, C 59779, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 21 Msg, HNC 618, Joy to CINCUNC, 22 Dec 51, in
Dec 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 385. FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 396.
PRISONERS OF WAR 143

The lists were small, Lee declared, be- While this census was going on, Joy
cause his side had re-educated and re- hoped to collect more information on the
leased thousands of prisoners at the attitudes of the Chinese and North Ko-
front. If this were true, Libby swiftly rean prisoners toward repatriation and
rejoined, why had only 177 returned to to find out how strongly the ROK Gov-
the UNC lines. He believed that the ernment felt about the recovery of ROK
lists were small because so many ROK civilians in enemy custody.27 Behind this
soldiers had been forced to join the Com- search for knowledge lay the case for
munist army. This was not so, Lee main- voluntary repatriation. Without an esti-
tained, only volunteers were allowed to mate of the numbers of enemy POW's
become members of their forces.25 who would refuse repatriation or of the
During this exploratory period much reaction of the ROK officials toward the
of the wrangling centered about the ap- principle, the U.N. Command could
parent inability of either side to furnish place itself in an awkward and exposed
the other with accurate information. position.
The discrepancies between the numbers As the New Year began, Admiral
missing in action and those reported as Libby brought up the civilian internee
prisoners by the Communists made the question. Although this was a delicate
UNC delegation question the sincerity matter, more political than military,
of the enemy lists. But the UNC was General Lee had demonstrated at an
not blameless, since it had submitted earlier meeting that his side was not
more names of prisoners to the Interna- opposed to its inclusion. In the course
tional Committee of the Red Cross at of the discussion that followed the sides
Geneva than it now had on hand. As it agreed that after the armistice was
turned out, more than 2,000 POW's had signed displaced civilians would be al-
been sent through the processing line lowed to go to the area of their choice.
twice and the later lack of co-operation Libby pressed his advantage. Since the
shown by many Communist soldiers in military commanders would have the
providing identifying information had task of supervising the movement of
made it difficult to correct errors. Other the civilians, he argued successfully that
enemy prisoners had escaped or disap- the agreement should be written into the
peared, increasing the inconsistencies in armistice stipulations.
the UNC figures. Recognizing the vul- Once this matter was settled, Libby
nerability of the UNC position as long was ready to present the first UNC sub-
as the variances persisted. Joy requested stantive proposal. There were three ma-
a complete audit of all POW's so that he jor areas of disagreement to be resolved,
could present an up-to-date, accurate, he began. Both parties wanted all of the
and complete list to the enemy.26 prisoners released, but the U.N. Com-
25
mand wished to do this under an equi-
Transcripts of Proceedings, Tenth through
Seventeenth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, table formula. Secondly, there was the
23-30 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vols. I and 27
II.
26
(1) Msg, HNC 619, CINCUNC (Adv) to CG
Msg. HNC 682, Joy to CINCUNC, 30 Dec 51, in
EUSAK (Main), 22 Dec 51. (2) Msg, HNC 629
UNC/FEC, Comd R p t , Dec 51, G-3 Jnl, 30 Dec CINCUNC (Adv) to American Embassy Pusan, for
51, tab J-8. Muccio, 23 Dec 51. Both in FEC Msgs Dec 51.
144 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
disposition of the ex-ROK soldiers who against them. They had provided the
had been impressed into the North Ko- United Nations Command with a prop-
rean Army. The United Nations Com- aganda lever and with only a compara-
mand desired all in this category re- tively small bag of prisoners to bargain
turned to POW status. And lastly, there with, the Communists were placed at a
was the question of what standards to distinct disadvantage. If a large propor-
use in determining to which side a pris- tion of the prisoners in UNC hands re-
oner belonged: the UNC claimed that fused to return to communism, the
the place of residence should be the de- adverse publicity would be hard to com-
ciding factor and the Communists main- bat, no matter how it was rationalized.
tained that the army in which a man Unusual as the doctrine of voluntary
served when captured should establish repatriation might be, its humanitarian
his nationality. aspects were bound to appeal to a large
The U.N. Command proposed to solve part of the world. Only on legal grounds
these differences, Libby continued, by a could the principle be freely attacked
fair compromise. It would accept the and whether this would be successful in
concept advanced and advocated by the the face of world opinion was a matter
Communists that a soldier who becomes for conjecture.
a prisoner can, upon his "release," exer- Obversely, the United States and its
cise his individual option as to whether allies were now officially linked with vol-
he will return to his own army or join untary repatriation. Although it was in
the other side. The UNC wished to ex- the nature of trial marriage, the possi-
tend this principle to all prisoners, mili- bility existed that once public opinion
tary and civilian. To supervise the inter- had been marshaled in its support di-
views of the prisoners, Libby suggested vorce might prove to be out of the ques-
the ICRC. All POWs in excess of the tion.
one-for-one exchange would be paroled
and could not fight against their captor The Communists Reject Voluntary
again. None of those who refused repat- Repatriation
riation would be allowed to bear arms
against the other side, Libby concluded.28 The first reaction of the Communists
It was neatly done. Since the Com- to the UNC proposal of 2 January was
munists had permitted the ROK troops not unexpected. On the following morn-
captured in the early stages of the war ing Lee led the assault. Calling the plan
to join the North Korean forces or to "absurd," he insisted that it was a one-
choose release at the front, they had for-one exchange. In his complete rejec-
practiced voluntary repatriation. At that tion of the proposal, Lee waxed elo-
time it had been to their advantage to quent. "The release and repatriation
swell their ranks and to lighten the bur- of prisoners of war is not a trade of
den of guarding large numbers of pris- slaves," he charged, nor was the twenti-
oners. Now this policy was being turned eth century "the barbarous age of slav-
28
ery." He paid no attention to Libby's
Transcripts of Proceedings, Nineteenth and
Twentieth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 1-2
explanations nor to the admiral's barbed
Jun 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. II. references to the inconsistencies of the
PRISONERS OF WAR 145

Communist position in attacking a policy slurring remarks about Syngman Rhee,


that they themselves had introduced in Chiang Kai-shek, and the United Na-
the Korean War.29 tions Command.32
But Libby was not easily put off. He It did no good to point out the incon-
twitted Lee for his concern over the pos- gruities of the Communist opposition to
sible defection of the Chinese Commun- voluntary repatriation after they had in-
ist soldiers. After all, he reminded Lee, troduced and practiced the principle.
the Chinese troops were all volunteers Lee had no hesitation in accusing the
according to the enemy's own avowals U.N. Command of educating the POW's
and part of "an army composed entirely politically to influence their choice even
of men eager to fight for the Korean Peo- though he had admitted at an earlier
ple's Army." If this were true, Libby meeting that the Communists had re-
went on, he could not understand why educated many UNC prisoners and then
the Communists were worried about any released them at the front. On the other
of these volunteers not wanting to go hand, even Lee could see the somewhat
back home. When Lee refused to rise distorted humor in his own arguments
to this bait, and persisted in branding at times. At the meeting on 11 January
the UNC proposal a slave trade, Libby as he defended the Communist system
became ironic. "Your analysis is faulty, of prisoner education and called it right-
your arguments are specious, and your eous and benevolent, he become so con-
conclusions are wrong," he told Lee, vulsed with laughter that he could
"outside of that it was a nice piece of scarcely finish his remarks.33
30
work." When Libby charged that the North
Despite the spirited accusations of the Koreans had impressed thousands of
Communists, Admiral Joy detected a ray ROK soldiers into their army, Lee de-
of hope behind the façade. He noted nied it vehemently. He asserted with a
that although they had termed the UNC straight face that only volunteers could
proposal too unreasonable to discuss, serve in the Communist forces. And de-
they had soon begun to argue its spite the fact that the enemy had violated
merits.31 the Geneva Convention many times since
In the subdelegation meetings, Ad- the war began, the Communists ex-
miral Libby tried to dispel some of the tracted the last measure of benefit in
hostility of General Lee by careful ex- propaganda and argument from the
planation of the UNC proposal of 2 Jan- provisions that favored their own posi-
uary. But the detailed statements had tions and blithely ignored the rest.34
little effect upon the Communist dele- There was little progress made on
gate. As January wore on, Lee became Item 4 during mid-January. The efforts
more abusive in his attacks and Libby
32
had to rebuke him several times for his Transcripts of Proceedings, Twenty-fourth and
Twenty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4,
6-7 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. II.
29 33
Ibid., Twenty-first Session, 3 Jan 52. Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations
30
Ibid., Twenty-second and Twenty-third Ses- (Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. III, p. 50.
34
sions, 4-5 Jan 52. Transcripts of Proceedings, Twenty-sixth and
31
Msgs, HNC 715 and 716, Joy to CINCUNC, 4 Thirty-first Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 8 and
Jan 52, in FEC Msgs, Jan 52. 13 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vols. II and III.
146 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
of Admiral Libby to indicate the advan- the possibility was suggested that Ridg-
tages that would accrue to the Commun- way might conduct, under ICRC super-
ists if they accepted the UNC proposals vision, a poll of the POW's to discover
were regarded with deep suspicion by the approximate number desiring repat-
General Lee. He reminded Libby that riation. It was also proposed that at the
the U.N. Command was not doing any proper moment Ridgway might transfer
favors for the Communists and could not the POW problem back to the plenary
without betraying its own cause and in- conference and present a trade to the
terest.35 When Libby confirmed the enemy—the U.N. Command conceding
Communist apprehension that the Chi- on the airfield issue while the Commun-
nese POW's would be allowed to choose ists agreed to the UNC prisoner pro-
between Communist China and Nation- posal.37 This was the first indication of
alist China, Colonel Tsai became very the package deal that was to be drawn
agitated. The Chinese people, he de- up in April.
clared, "will never tolerate it and will In his reply on 19 January the U.N.
fight to the end," 36 Under questioning, commander agreed that it might be pos-
Tsai refused to state whether he was sible to combine unresolved issues once
speaking for the Chinese Volunteers in these could be reduced to a minimum.
Korea or all the Chinese people. He did not favor a poll of the prisoners
In view of the static condition of the since he believed that one of the strong-
negotiations, General Ridgway re- est points of the UNC proposal was that
quested that the JCS approve a final the POW choice would be expressed at
position for the UNC delegation. But the exchange point in the presence of
all that the JCS could provide was a representatives of both sides and of neu-
quasi-final position. On 15 January they tral observers. As the UNC delegation
authorized Ridgway to agree to an all- had denied the existence of any program
for-all exchange provided that no force- to influence or coerce the decision of the
ful return of POW's would be required. POW's, the Communists might very well
However, since this position would be seize upon the poll as a means of preju-
taken only as a last resort and since pub- dicing the prisoners' choice and refuse to
lic pressure might influence the Presi- accept the results. If the International
dent to modify this stand in the interim, Committee of the Red Cross conducted
there was in reality nothing conclusive the poll, the enemy would have further
to the JCS instructions. The UNC dele- cause to impugn its neutrality. There
gation was to continue its attempts to was little doubt that the Communists
secure an agreement on the return of already regarded the ICRC as a UNC
selected U.N. and ROK civilians held by agent and not as a neutral body anyway.
the Communists. To convince the en- Besides, Ridgway concluded, he and his
emy that the U.N. Command was not staff did not think that the enemy had
using voluntary repatriation as a pretext any real concern about the numbers of
for holding on to most of the prisoners prisoners who might return to them, "it
35
is the principle which is anathema to
Ibid., Thirty-second Session, 14 Jan 52, in FEC
Mtgs on item 4, vol. III.
36
Ibid., Thirty-fourth Session, 16 Jan 52. 37 Msg, JCS 92059, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Jan 52.
PRISONERS OF WAR 147
them since the question of the individual righteousness and standing upon the truth,
versus the state is the essential difference we do our work; and from righteousness
between democracy and communism." 38 and truth, we speak and insist. 39
To listen to General Lee as he de- Whether the Communists were stand-
nounced the UNC proposal in the sub- ing on the truth or trampling it was un-
delegation meetings as immoral and in- important, for the key fact was that they
humanitarian might have confused the would not recognize the principle of vol-
casual observer into believing that the untary repatriation. They argued stead-
Communists were the ones who were fastly and with considerable justice that
concerned over the plight of the individ- it was in conflict with the Geneva
ual. But when Admiral Libby asked Convention. To provide Admiral Libby
him to cite an example, he dodged the with some counterarguments, the State
question deftly and after a long speech Department forwarded its interpretation
wound up asking a couple of questions of the convention on 22 January. Under
of his own. The exchange that followed Article 6, it pointed out, parties to a
illustrated the tenor of the conversations conflict could make special agreements
and the Communist technique. covering prisoners of war as long as the
prisoners were not deprived of their
Admiral Libby: "You are extremely rights under the rest of the convention.
adept at refusing to give a direct answer to
any question which our side asks; you are Since the spirit of the convention was to
also extremely adept at capping your re- protect individuals, the State Depart-
fusal to answer a question with two or ment felt that voluntary repatriation was
three questions of your own, and then in- not inconsistent with its provisions.40
sisting that we must answer them. That is
typical of the whole spirit with which your
Thus, there was some legal as well as
side approaches these negotiations. You abundant humanitarian justification for
have made blanket charges against our pro- the UNC position in the interpretation
posal: that it is immoral, that it is inhu- of the State Department.
manitarian, that it is unfair, and that it is The Communists not only opposed
unreasonable. When we attempt to pin you
down, to get you to show how in the sim-
voluntary repatriation, but strongly chal-
plest case—in any one particular—our pro- lenged the parole features of the UNC
posal is any one of these things, you wiggle proposal. Since all the prisoners who
out of it, you will not answer. You will not would be paroled belonged to the Com-
answer because you can not answer. . . . munists, the enemy delegates claimed
General Lee: "One thing we have found that it was a unilateral requirement upon
through the meeting is that when you try
to delay the time of the meeting, you say their side. Admiral Joy was inclined to
we did not give any answer, although we agree with them and suggested that there
really have given one; and when we were two possible solutions. Either he
shrewdly pursue any question, you say we could be given authority to extend the
make a smoke screen. . . . This seems to be
your only weapon and this is a special stunt parole feature to both sides to guarantee
which you alone have. . . . But we have a that repatriated POW's would not be
sound standpoint. We love truth and 39
Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-first Session,
Subdelegation on item 4, 23 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs
38
Msg, CX 61829, Ridgway to JCS, 19 Jan 52, on40item 4, vol. III.
DA-IN 2276. Msg, JCS 92490, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Jan 52.
148 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

permitted or compelled to bear arms illegible copies of the lists. With the
against the other side or he should be enemy delegates constantly reminding
allowed to drop the parole feature en- Admiral Libby of the UNC promise to
tirely from the UNC position. Since the produce a corrected roster, the admiral
ROK Government opposed the paroling in turn sought to apply the pressure
of prisoners and the Communists prob- upon Eighth Army headquarters to sup-
ably would not let the detail stop them ply the data. But it was not until Jan-
from reusing their recovered personnel, uary 28 that Libby was able to hand
General Ridgway agreed that Joy could over the new lists. According to these,
delete the requirements at his own there were 20,720 Chinese, and 111,360
discretion.41 Koreans, or a total of 132,080 prisoners
Actually concession even on minor in U.N. custody. This was less than the
matters was contrary to Admiral Joy's 13 December roster, but the 394-man
usual stand. Both he and Ridgway felt differential was due to reclassifications to
that the enemy regarded concessions as civilian internees, Libby explained. He
signs of weakness. In a published inter- also told Lee that the U.N. Command
view in late January 1952, Joy declared had completed work on the 44,000 re-
that patience and unmistakable firmness classified civilian internees and was ready
backed by applied military power were to exchange this information on 72-hour
the elements that influenced the Com- notice if and when the enemy would
munists. In the presence of a military agree to supply similar data on the 65,-
stalemate, he was doing his best to nego- 000 prisoners captured by them.43
tiate an effective and stable armistice. Although Lee ignored the last offer,
But unless the enemy had a change of he did begin to demonstrate some signs
heart voluntarily, sufficient military of resuming negotiations. On 3 February
force would have to be applied to induce he introduced a Communist counterpro-
such a change, Joy maintained.42 posal, designed to meet most of the UNC
One of the stumbling blocks in the requirements except on the voluntary
path of the UNC negotiators during Jan- repatriation issue. The enemy was will-
uary had been the inability to present ing to promise that none of the POW's
the Communists with a complete and would again take part in acts of war
accurate list of the prisoners in its hands. and to allow the ICRC representatives
The normal delays occasioned by the along with Chinese and North Korean
necessity to check over a hundred thou- Red Cross members to attend the camps,
sand men and women were compounded but held steadfastly to an all-for-all ex-
by the technical failure of the mimeo- change.44
graphing machines which turned out Recognizing a more co-operative atti-
tude across the table, Libby tried to set-
41
(1) Msg, HNC 785, Joy to CINCUNC, 22 Jan
43
52. (2) Msg, CX 62010, CINCUNC to CINCUNC Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-sixth Session,
(Adv), 23 Jan 52. Both in FEC Msgs, Jan 52. Subdelegation on item 4, 28 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs
42
An interview with Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, on item 4, vol. IV.
44
"Russia Calls the Turn in Korea—Chinese do the Communist Proposal of 3 Feb, incl to Tran-
Arguing," in U.S. News and World Report (Janu- script of Proceedings, Fifty-second Session, Sub-
ary 25, 1952), pp. 24-25. See also Msg C 62217, delegation on item 4, 3 Feb 52, in FEC Mtgs on
Ridgway to JCS, 25 Jan 5, DA-IN 4540. item 4, vol. IV.
PRISONERS OF WAR 149
tle some of the details. He told Lee that asked for permission to drop the matter
the parole item should be made less at an appropriate moment.46 Washing-
ambiguous. First, it should apply solely ton officials concurred, but stipulated
to soldiers and not civilians, and secondly that agreements on the return of both
the agreement should pertain only to Korean and U.N. civilians be written
the Korean War since some of the sol- into the armistice terms regardless of
diers were professionals and forbidding whether specific safeguards were in-
them to engage in acts of war in the cluded.47
future would deprive them of their liv- It was evident from Joy's report and
ing. Libby suggested that the staff offi- from staff conversations with the admiral
cers get together and work out the that he had little confidence that the
particulars. On 5 February Lee con- Communists would conclude a satisfac-
sented. He also agreed that the parole tory armistice in the near future. Not
feature should bind only the soldiers only did he believe that the enemy
and be valid just for the Korean War, would never concede on voluntary re-
but warned the UNC delegation again patriation, but he also felt that the U.N.
that the Communists would not accept was on unsound ground in insisting
the ICRC as a neutral agency.45 upon the principle. Most prisoners in
As the staff officers conferences began his opinion surrendered because they
on 6 February, Admiral Joy submitted were hungry, poorly equipped, or out
a candid report on Item 4. The delega- of ammunition and not because they
tion felt that the Communists would not were promised nonrepatriation. Joy
offer additional lists of prisoners, but thought that now that the Communists
thought that the U.N. Command could had stabilized positions, good supplies,
assure that it received back all on the food, equipment, and ammunition, they
present rosters by giving itself ninety would be content to maintain the status
days to dispose of its larger holdings of quo and negotiate as long as time
POW's while granting the enemy only seemed to be operating to their ad-
thirty days to return the smaller num- vantage. In the past the negotiations
bers in Communist custody. Provided had been influenced by considerations
the U.N. Command was willing to ac- other than military even though they
cept the good faith of the enemy as were basically a military matter. Un-
sufficient guarantee, the delegation til the armistice effort concentrated
thought that provision for the return of upon a direct and simple approach
all ROK civilians who lived south of to resolve the remaining issues, Joy did
the present line of demarcation and not feel that it would be successful. And
wanted to be repatriated could be writ- if the direct effort failed, he still was
ten into the armistice agreement. As for convinced that the negotiations should
the ex-ROK soldiers now serving in the be terminated.48
North Korean Army, Joy and his staff 46
Msg, CX 63013, CINCUNC to JCS, 6 Feb 52,
held that this was a hopeless cause and DA-IN 102022.
47
Msg, JCS 900383, JCS to CINCUNC (Adv) for
45
Transcripts of Proceedings, Fifty-third and Ridgway, 6 Feb 52.
48
Fifty-fourth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 4 Msg, OT 577, Col James R. Davidson to DA,
and 5 Feb 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV. 12 Feb 52, DA-IN 104519.
150 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
As voluntary repatriation threatened were about to be exchanged, it it had to
to stall progress at Panmunjom, General be done he preferred a quick, single-day
McClure, one of the founding fathers of screening that would be done openly.
the doctrine, suggested a new approach Each prisoner would be informed that
which would avoid the term completely. the choice would be final and segregated
The U.N. Command would agree to an as soon as he made it.50
all-for-all exchange but since there were Before he resorted to screening, Ridg-
many prisoners who claimed they were way wanted to try and trade off the re-
impressed or did not live in an area con- habilitation of airfields for voluntary
trolled by the Communists, and others repatriation. If this failed, he would go
who might claim political asylum, pris- ahead and screen the prisoners and then
oners in these categories would be held propose an all-for-all exchange of the
and the matter referred to the govern- remaining POW's. Were the Commun-
ments concerned under Item 5 as essen- ists to insist, he would grant the airfield
tially political rather than military. rehabilitation as a final concession. In
McClure thought that this suggestion his opinion, the linking of the issues
might allow the Communists to save face would permit a breaking off of the ne-
and should be broached on the staff gotiations to occur over two points rather
officer level.49 than one.51
Another avenue was explored in Ridgway's chief objection to the ideas
Washington during the early part of 1952 advanced for the release of the prisoners
that offered a more daring solution to who indicated that they would forcibly
the nonrepatriate problem. When As- resist repatriation stemmed from his be-
sistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. lief that subterfuge at this time would
Johnson and Vice Chief of Staff General nullify the prestige that the UNC had
John E. Hull were in Tokyo in mid- won in supporting voluntary repatria-
February, they broached to General tion. He feared that the UNC might be
Ridgway the concept of unilateral re- accused of treachery and deceit such as
lease of all nonrepatriates. Once the had characterized the enemy's dealings
prisoners were freed, the U.N. Com- and that the lives of the prisoners in
mand could present the Communists Communist hands might be endangered.
with a fait accompli and then attempt to Under the circumstances he recom-
ride out the storm of protests that would mended that voluntary repatriation and
follow. This plan also had the advantage airfields be presented in one package
of allowing the enemy to save face. But and then if the enemy refused to accept
Ridgway was not yet ready to abandon the former, the UNC should be author-
the old approach. He looked with dis-
favor upon schemes to reclassify and re-
50
lease certain categories unilaterally. Suggestions that the nonrepatriate prisoners be
released unilaterally to break the deadlock were
Although he still was not enthusiastic advanced several times during the last year and a
about screening the prisoners before they half of the war and were always disapproved. See
below, Chapters VIII, XII, and XVII; also Vatcher.
Panmunjom, pp. 157-58.
49 51
Memo for Rcd, by Gen McClure, sub: POW Memo for Rcd (sgd M. B. Ridgway), 19 Feb
Exchange, 16 Feb 52, in G-3 383.6, sec. I, 4. 52, no sub, in G-3 383.6, 5/1.
PRISONERS OF WAR 151

ized to announce its final position on no utilizing the enemy's own tactics in han-
forced repatriation.52 dling the prisoner of war problem uni-
Despite the arguments of Ridgway, laterally. How the Communists would
the President decided to go ahead with react to this turnabout was unknown,
the plan to remove from POW status but one thing was certain—they would
the prisoners that might be expected to protest loudly and at length.
resist repatriation violently because of By the first of March, the negotiations
their fear of the consequences if they on Item 4 had been narrowed to one
returned to enemy control.53 If the Com- issue—voluntary or forced repatriation.
munists rejected a voluntary repatria- The details of the exchange would be
tion-airfield trade, Ridgway would re- easily settled as soon as this principle
move the names of the violent registers was decided. But the Communists gave
from the POW lists and indicate that the no sign that their adamant opposition to
UNC was willing to agree to an all-for- any form of voluntary repatriation—no
all exchange on the basis of the revised matter how it was disguised—was weak-
list.54 This would be the final U.S. posi- ening. The UNC position, too, had
tion and one full of intriguing possibili- hardened during January and February.
ties if it were used, for it would mean Although the ideal objective of full vol-
that the U.N. Command would be untary repatriation seemed unattainable,
the UNC delegation had finally received
the support of the U.S. policy makers to
52
Msg, C 64383, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Feb 52, hold out firmly for no forced repatria-
DA-IN
53 109858. tion and had been further armed by
(1) Msg, JCS 902159, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb authority to effect a unilateral release of
52. (2) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 5 Feb 52, sub:
Armistice Negotiations in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, nonrepatriates. Now it appeared to be
15.54 a question of whether the irresistible
Memo, Maj Gen Clyde D. Eddleman for CofS,
4 Mar 52, sub: Status of Korean Armistice Negotia-
force or the immovable object or per-
tions as of 4 March, in G-3 091, Korea, 23. haps both would have to give way.
CHAPTER VIII

The Package Proposal


The dramatic development of the matter of rotation, the composition of
prisoner of war issue during the winter the neutral nations observer teams, and
months tended to obscure the questions the number of ports that were to be per-
of a more technical nature confronting mitted to handle rotation and replenish-
the two delegations at Panmunjom. ment of men and supplies. These
Human emotions were involved in the promised to be the most difficult to set-
fate of the men confined behind the tle, since the positions taken by the two
barbed wire, while the matter of airfield sides were so far apart.
construction and rehabilitation appeared It was at this juncture that the UNC
dull and prosaic in comparison. Yet the delegation lost another of its capable
struggle in the conference tent over Item spokesmen. General Hodes was given
3 was every bit as spirited as the dispute another assignment just a few days after
over the prisoners; for the delegates of Admiral Burke had been transferred.
both sides were also military technicians. Able and tough, the two men had
They understood only too well that the worked well together and proved them-
disposition of the prisoners of war was a selves competent to match the best that
transient problem which would be short- the enemy had to offer in the negotia-
lived no matter which way it was finally tions. Instead of Hodes, General Feren-
decided. The keeping of the truce, on baugh, who had been serving his ap-
the other hand, seemed likely to become prenticeship for several weeks, joined
a long-term affair that might plague the General Turner on 17 December as a
Korean scene for years to come. Under full-fledged delegate.1 It was a difficult
these conditions it seemed essential to as- task that faced the new Army represent-
sure that adequate safeguards and guar- ative for he not only had to replace Gen-
antees were written into the armistice eral Hodes but also had to contend with
agreement. the best man on the Communist team
—the sometimes profane but always effi-
Narrowing the Issues cient General Hsieh.
1
By mid-December the discussion on Ferenbaugh had served with the Operations
Division of the General Staff and as an assistant di-
Item 3 had disclosed the main areas of vision commander of the 83d Division in World
disagreement. First and foremost among War II. In January 1951 he had taken over as
these was the knotty question of airfields commander of the 7th Division in Korea. Feren-
baugh's experience with political affairs during his
which had engendered the bulk of the tenure on the General Staff provided him with a
arguments. And close behind lay the good background for handling the negotiations.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 153

In the skirmishes that had taken place concession most willingly, but would
so far the U.N. Command had adopted not budge in his stand on the airfields.
an adamant position against the con- Furthermore, he told Turner frankly:
struction or rehabilitation of airfields "you want to sit on top of other people's
and the Communists had refused to heads, and when you come down from
listen to any argument imposing re- that position you say that is a concession
strictions on their freedom to do as they on your part." 4 The implication that
pleased in this matter. Several times the U.N. Command had simply re-
during the debates in the latter half of ceded from an unreasonable and un-
December, Hsieh had intimated that his tenable position rather than offered
side would be willing to forget its ob- something of value was plain. In Ad-
jections to rotation and replenishment miral Joy's opinion, the weakening
if the U.N. Command would reciprocate of the UNC position merely hardened
on the airfield issue, but his hints fell the enemy's determination to secure fur-
upon barren ground.2 ther concession on the airfield issue.5
In an attempt to break the impasse, The Communists were well advised on
the negotiators briefly turned the prob- this score, for during the latter part of
lem over to their staff officers for several December, there had been a steady de-
days to see if they could narrow the dif- terioration in the United Nations reso-
ferences in a less formal atmosphere, but lution to insist upon a strict limitation of
this proved to be a futile hope.3 The airfield construction and rehabilitation.
arrival of the thirty-day limit on the line This could be traced to the growing
of demarcation on 27 December was reliance on the part of the United States
marked by no significant change in the upon a "broader sanction" declaration
negotiations or on the battlefield. It ap- to be issued as soon as an armistice was
peared that the forebodings that the line signed.6 As the emphasis shifted from
might become a permanent one until an dependence upon control of local condi-
armistice was signed were well founded. tions in Korea to the threat of a larger
Toward the end of December the war if the armistice were violated, the
United Nations Command offered a con- airfield question became less important,
cession. If the Communists would accept especially since it was recognized that it
the restrictions on airfields, the UNC would be difficult if not impossible to
would forego aerial observation and prevent the enemy from rehabilitating
photoreconnaissance flights. The enemy and building airfields once the armistice
reaction seemed to sustain the oft- went into effect.
repeated complaints of Ridgway and To General Ridgway this trend was
Joy over the unwisdom of giving the disturbing. He failed to see how the
Communists an opportunity to get some- U.N. Command could pose a deterrent
thing for nothing. Hsieh accepted the threat to a later outbreak of hostilities if
the enemy were permitted to strengthen
2
Transcripts of Proceedings, Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 4
Ibid., Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Sessions,
3, 19-20 Dec 51, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. II. 29 Dec 51 and 2 Jan 52.
3
Ibid., Seventeenth and Eighteenth Sessions, 20 5
Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 123-24.
and 22 Dec 51. 6
See Chapter VI, above.
154 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

THE UNC DELEGATES, DECEMBER 1951. Left to right: General Turner, Admiral
Libby, and General Ferenbaugh.

its air capabilities at will while the UNC airfield construction or rehabilitation if
air power remained static or decreased. the issue became the sole obstacle to an
He felt that the Communists sensed the armistice. But until the Communists
lack of a firm and final UNC position on showed that this would be their breaking
airfields and that newspaper reports point, there should be no open conces-
from the United States intimating that sion. As a suggestion they urged that the
the U.N. Command was considering fur- delegations settle all the other matters
ther concessions did not help the situa- outstanding under Items 3, 4, and 5 and
tion.7 defer further discussion of airfields until
Ridgway's brief for a hard and fast then. At that time, the U.N. Command
stand was too late. On 10 January the could drop the airfields requirements if
U.S. military and political leaders in- the Communists would sign the armis-
formed him that his final position would tice. In this way, they argued, the con-
be the omission of any prohibition on cession could soon be followed by the
7
Msg, C 60961, Ridgway to DA, 7 Jan 52, DA-
U.N. declaration including the "broader
IN 17600. sanction" of an expanded war. The
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 155

issuance of the declaration should coun- On 9 January the Communist delega-


teract the propaganda value that the tion introduced a new version of Item 3
enemy might attempt to gain from the that was closer to the objectives that the
UNC retreat on airfields.8 U.N. Command sought. But as a matter
With considerable misgivings, Ridg- of tactics Turner attacked the weak
way agreed. He did not have the confi- points and omissions in the enemy's pro-
dence that his superiors possessed in the posal. He could not understand, he told
possible effectiveness of the U.N. decla- Hsieh, why the Communists were will-
ration, but he proposed to shunt the ing to allow the neutral nations observa-
airfield question aside if the enemy tion teams to inspect behind the lines—
would consent. Under the present condi- a clear case of internal interference in
tions, he was extremely dubious that the his opinion—and yet balked at airfield
Communists would neglect to press their restrictions. But Hsieh could see no in-
advantage. Anticipating further conces- consistency in the two matters. The neu-
sions, he believed that they would refuse tral nations were acceptable as a measure
to take up new topics until the matter to stave off foreign interference, he main-
was settled.9 tained.
There were no immediate effects of There was no provision for restrictions
the Washington instructions in the tent upon airfields in the Communist version,
at Panmunjom, for an opportune mo- but it did permit replenishment of mili-
ment had to be selected for the presenta- tary personnel, aircraft, weapons, and
tion of the UNC proposal. In the ammunition as long as there were no
meantime, the arguments between increases. Since this had been the UNC
Turner and Ferenbaugh on the one hand contention from the beginning, Turner
and the wily Hsieh on the other contin- quickly took a leaf from Hsieh's book
ued. The latter stood foursquare behind and termed this provision no concession
the slogan "no interference in internal at all, but merely recognition of the just-
affairs" whenever the UNC delegates ness and reasonableness of the UNC
brought up airfields. Hsieh's concern stand. Although Turner turned down
over the invasion of North Korea's sov- the Communist offering because it ig-
ereign rights led Turner to question his nored the airfield issue, the area of dis-
sincerity. Since the North Korean air pute was growing smaller.11 The enemy's
force was depleted, whose sovereign withdrawal from a firm antireplenish-
rights was Hsieh interested in—North ment position served to compensate for
Korea's or China's, Turner asked. The the UNC surrender of aerial inspection
Chinese general ignored the question.10 and photoreconnaissance and indicated
that there was still room to bargain on
8
Msgs, JCS 91600, and JCS 91606 to CINCFE, 10 Item 3 as long as the discussion avoided
Jan 52. airfields.
9
Msg, C 61348, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Jan 52, DA-
IN 19740. In any event there was a gradual shift
10
Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fifth Session, in the UNC drive to secure modification
Subdelegation Mtg on item 3, 8 Jan 52, in FEC of the enemy attitude during mid-Janu-
Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 8 Jan-19 Apr 52, vol.
III (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol.
11
III). Ibid., Thirty-sixth Session, 9 Jan 52.
156 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
ary. The UNC delegates directed their This would permit further discussion of
fire at the Communist motives in insist- airfields to be postponed as the Washing-
ing upon freedom to rebuild their air- ton leaders had suggested and allow the
fields, but the attempts to pin down negotiation of some of the minor differ-
General Hsieh were unsuccessful. He ences to be given more attention. Hsieh
insisted that an agreement not to intro- agreed on 27 January that the subdele-
duce any reinforcing aircraft into Korea gation should recess until the staff offi-
covered the UNC objections yet refused cers finished their efforts.14 If the latter
to state categorically that the Commun- could eliminate all issues except the
ists would not increase their military air question of airfields, the U.N. Command
capability during an armistice. This would then be in a better position to
placed the matter in the realm of good offer a final trade.
faith and since the U.N. Command was
unwilling to lean on so slim a reed, little Settlement of Item 5
progress was made.12
Hsieh was not content to remain on As the staff officers began their meet-
the defensive, however, for he vigorously ings, General Ridgway and Admiral Joy
attacked the UNC concept that the bal- determined to suggest simultaneous dis-
ance of military capabilities in Korea cussion of Item 5 of the agenda. It will
should be maintained after the armistice. be remembered that this had been sim-
It was a familiar argument urging that ply stated in July as "Recommendations
the state of war should be eliminated to the governments of the countries con-
entirely and all foreign forces with- cerned on both sides." The was inten-
drawn from Korea; still, on the surface tionally vague, since the United States
at least, it sounded reasonable. The Chi- had no desire to commit itself in advance
nese general asserted that it would be on political matters beyond the purview
impossible to retain the status quo dur- of the military armistice.
ing a truce since the U.N. Command In early December General Ridgway
was already engaged in increasing its and his staff had drawn up an initial posi-
postarmistice strength by expanding the tion that hewed closely to the July form-
ROK Army.13 Hsieh did not mention ula. Each side would recommend to the
that the Communists were engaged in governments concerned a political con-
the same task with the North Korean ference to discuss appropriate matters
forces, but he had a point. left unsolved by the armistice agreement.
In late January, the U.N. Command This was a nice indefinite proposal that
decided that the time was propitious to would bind no one.15
turn the problem of working out the Two weeks later, the President and
details on Item 3 over to the staff officers. his advisors decided that mention should
12 14
Ibid., Thirty-seventh through Forty-fifth Ses- (1) Msg, C 62064, Ridgway to Collins, 23 Jan
sions, 10 Jan-18 Jan 52. During the 18 January 52, DA-IN 3851. (2) Transcripts of Proceedings,
meeting, Hsieh became quite profane again, but the Fifty-second and Fifty-fourth Sessions, Subdelegation
U.N.C delegates had come to realize that his bark Mtgs on item 3, 25 and 27 Jan 52, in FEC Tran-
was worse than his bite and paid little heed. scripts, item 3, vol. III.
13 15
Ibid., Forty-sixth and Fifty-first Sessions, 14 Jan Msg, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 5 Dec 51,
and 24 Jan 52. DA-IN 7008.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 157

GENERAL YU CHAE HEUNG, GENERAL HARRISON, AND ADMIRAL JOY at Panmunjom.

be made of the unification of Korea un- left open to settlement on a political


der an independent, democratic govern- level after the armistice was signed.
ment, and they instructed Ridgway to Ridgway initially did not question
include this in his first approach to the these instructions, but by the end of
Communists. If the enemy insisted upon January he had some second thoughts.
a reference to the withdrawal of foreign Suppose the Communists tried to insert
troops, they authorized the Far East com- the names of the countries that would
mander to put it in.16 They cautioned take part in the political talks, he asked
him a few days later, however, not to his superiors, should he reject all names
make any commitment on the countries or accept only the North Korean and
that would participate in the political Chinese Communist Governments? And
conference nor on the form or forum of since the enemy probably would press for
the discussions.17 These details would be the inclusion of a ninety-day time limit
16
Msg, JCS 90083, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51.
for calling a conference, the U.N. com-
17
Msg, JCS 90388, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Dec 51. mander felt that he could make the U.N.
158 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
proposal more palatable to the Commun- the place of Gen. Lee Hyung Koon.20
ists by anticipating this move.18 The De- As soon as the amenities were dis-
partment of Defense and the Joint Chiefs posed of, Nam introduced the Commun-
had no objection to the latter suggestion, ist solution to Item 5. He proposed that
but they were still reluctant to have within three months after the armistice
names of countries mentioned in the was signed, each side should appoint five
agreement. If it became necessary, on representatives to hold a political confer-
the other hand, they conceded that the ence. As for the topics to be discussed,
recommendation to take steps at a polit- Nam listed three: 1. withdrawal of all
ical level to deal with matters unresolved foreign forces from Korea; 2. specific rec-
by the military armistice might be ad- ommendations for a peaceful settlement
dressed to the specific states concerned. of the Korean question; and 3. other
The Soviet Union would be addressed problems related to peace in Korea.21
only as a member of the United Nations After a three-day recess the U.N. Com-
and not as an individual government.19 mand made its counterproposal. Since
Thus, on the eve of the reconvening Ridgway felt that the differences be-
of the plenary conference in early Feb- tween the two sides were not large, he
ruary, the United States position on Item recommended that the UNC version
5 was extremely cautious. Since the out- adopt as much of the Communist word-
look for an early and satisfactory solution ing as possible and the JCS agreed.
of the political situation in Korea did Nevertheless, reference to five represent-
not appear to be encouraging, the Amer- atives was eliminated and the withdrawal
ican political and military leaders pre- of "foreign troops" became "non-Korean
ferred to go very slowly and to operate troops." Under the third topic the Com-
on an opportunistic basis. Foreseeing a munists had listed for discussion, the
long and involved struggle with the U.N. Command had changed the word-
Communists over Korea's future, they ing so that it now read, "Other Korean
favored a flexible approach with few or questions related to peace." The Re-
no advance commitments. Under these public of Korea was named along with
conditions, if no final arrangement could the United Nations as an addressee for
be reached, the chances for working out the recommendation of the military
a modus vivendi would be improved. commanders and the portion pertaining
The Communists had insisted that the to the political conference was made
principles involved in Item 5 be taken more vague.22
up in a plenary session, and on 6 Febru-
20
ary the full delegation met once again. General Harrison was the deputy commander
of the Eighth Army. He had served in the Opera-
Joy presented two new members of the tions Division of the General Staff and as assistant
UNC group, Lt. Gen. William K. Har- division commander of the 30th Division during
rison, Jr., and Maj. Gen. Yu Chae World War II and on the staff of the Supreme
Commander, Allied Powers, in the postwar period.
Heung, to General Nam. Harrison re- General Yu was Vice Chief of Staff of the ROK
placed General Ferenbaugh and Yu took Army.
21
Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-sixth Session,
18
Msg, CX 62465, Ridgway to JCS, 30 Jan 52, Mtgs on the Mil Armistice Conf, 6 Feb 52, in FEC
DA-IN 6207. Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III.
19
Msg, JCS 900075, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Feb 52. 22
Ibid., Thirty-seventh Session, 9 Feb 52.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 159

Most of these changes were minor but the Communist statement afforded the
the Communists preferred their own wide latitude desired by the Joint Chiefs
proposal and a week's debate ensued. of Staff and could be interpreted in al-
The U.N. Command made it clear that most any fashion since at best it was only
it did not intend to recommend that the a recommendation.25
political authorities discuss any matter It had only taken eleven days to reach
not directly related to Korea since this an agreement on Item 5—by far the best
lay outside the UNC province. When record of all. Even the agenda had taken
the Communists complained that the longer. Perhaps because of its very
U.N. Command did not represent all vagueness, both sides could easily accept
the United Nations and that use of this such a noncommittal statement since in
term would be incorrect, Joy countered essence it settled nothing and promised
that the Chinese Volunteers did not rep- little. If it later became inconvenient
resent the People's Republic of China or unnecessary, it could be ignored. On
either. He told Nam that the UNC was the other hand, if both sides found it
willing to drop all references to specific worth pursuing, a conference could be
governments in the recommendations if called. Regardless of the meaningless-
the enemy so desired.23 ness of Item 5, three items were now out
Finally on 16 February, the Commu- of the way. But the discussion on Items
nists brought forth a revised proposal: 3 and 4 showed no signs of a imminent
meeting of the minds and they were the
In order to insure the peaceful settlement most important of all.
of the Korean question, the military com-
manders of both sides hereby recommend
to the government of the countries con- The Horse Traders
cerned on both sides that, within three (3)
months after the Armistice Agreement is Since the perplexing problem of air-
signed and becomes effective, a political fields had been temporarily shelved, the
conference of a higher level of both sides staff officers on Item 3 were able to con-
be held by representatives appointed re- centrate on the less troublesome details
spectively to settle through negotiation the
questions of the withdrawal of all foreign in late January. Cols. Don O. Darrow
forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement and Kinney of the Air Force and Lt.
of the Korean question, etc. Col. Howard S. Levie of the Army had
to cope with Colonel Chang of the North
With the understanding that "for- Korean Army and Col. Pu Shan of the
eign" meant non-Korean forces and that Chinese Communist forces—all in all a
"etc." did not pertain to matters outside very competent group of officers.
of Korea, the U.N. Command accepted To get these informal talks under way,
the Communist version in toto on 17 the UNC delegation had prepared a
February.24 draft armistice covering all the topics to
As Joy informed General Ridgway, be considered under Item 3. Actually
23
there were four main areas that the UNC
Ibid., Thirty-eighth through Fortieth Session,
9-12 Feb 52.
24 25
Ibid., Forty-first and Forty-second Sessions, 16- Msg, HNC 924, Joy to CINCUNC, 16 Feb 52, in
17 Feb 52. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1, case 58.
160 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
staff officers hoped to settle: rotation; the Gradually the differences between the
number of ports to handle rotation and two sides shrank. The enemy offered
replenishment; the composition of the 25,000 for rotation and the U.N. Com-
neutral nations' supervisory organ and mand lowered its figure to 40,000, pro-
inspection teams; and the control of vided that the Communists accepted
coastal islands still in dispute. The draft eight ports of entry on each side. In a
armistice submitted by the U.N. Com- counterproposal, Colonel Chang put for-
mand provided a convenient point of ward a total of 25,000, excluding per-
departure for the staff conferences. sonnel leaving or entering on rest and
There was a refreshing atmosphere in rehabilitation passes and those on tempo-
the truce tent during the first meetings rary duty, but he insisted on limiting
that followed. On the Communist side the number of ports to three for each
there was less haranguing and speech- side.28
making; their staff officers had an air of At this point General Ridgway and
serious intent to make progress. They his staff wanted to take a final position,
were inclined to accept as much of the holding fast to the 40,000 figure and
UNC wording as possible and their sug- reducing the number of ports to six.
gested changes were frequently regarded They believed that the enemy would
as improvements by the U.N. Com- give in if confronted with a firm offer.
mand.26 In Washington, however, the Depart-
Nevertheless, the Communists were ment of Defense and State did not wish
not ready to surrender, despite their the negotiations to break down over such
more businesslike approach. They open- relatively minor issues, but they agreed
ed the discussion of rotation by ex- to a stand at 40,000 and six ports per
pressing great astonishment at the side provided there were no implied ul-
"enormous" figure of 75,000 per month timatum. 29
proposed by the U.N. Command. It By mid-February the UNC require-
may be remembered that earlier they ments had decreased to seven ports and
had offered to permit a monthly rotation 40,000 men, while the enemy had ex-
of 5,000 and the U.N. Command had panded its proposals to four ports and
declared this would be totally insuffi- 30,000 men. The dickering went on for
cient. In the bargaining that followed, another week and then the U.N. Com-
rotation and the number of ports that
would be permitted to handle the flow Manp'ojin, Hyesanjin, Hoeryong, Ch'ongjin, Si-
of personnel and equipment were closely nanju, Hamhung, P'yongyang, Wonsan, Pyoktong,
linked together. The Communist staff Songjin, and Haeju. The ports in South Korea
were: Seoul, Yangyang, Ch'ungju, Taejon, Andong,
officers were disposed to place the UNC Chonju, Taegu, Wonju, Sunch'on, and Pusan. See
suggestion that twelve ports be used in First Mtg of Staff Officers on Details of Agreement
North Korea and ten in South Korea in of Agenda item 3, 27 Jan 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff
Officers ... on item 3, bk. I.
the same category as the 75,000 rotation 28
Seventh through Eleventh Mtgs of Staff Officers
figure.27 ... on item 3, 3-7 Feb 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff
Officers ... on item 3, bk. I.
26 29
Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (1) Msg, CX 63438, Ridgway to JCS, 12 Feb
(Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. II, p. 58. 52, DA-IN 104463. (2) Msg, JCS 901022, JCS to
27
The North Korean ports included: Sinuiju, CINCFE, 13 Feb 52.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 161

mand went down to 35,000 men and six whether the Communists were using in-
ports and the Communists came up to spection solely for bargaining purposes
35,000 men and five ports per side.30 or not, the matter of rotation and ports
With only one port separating the two of entry were now agreed upon at 35,000
sides from agreement, General Ridgway men per month and five ports of entry
gave Joy permission on 7 March to settle per side.34
for five ports if and when he felt that it Insofar as the question of coastal is-
would encourage settlement of other lands was concerned, the Communists
problems. Ridgway was worried at that proved to be particularly amenable. On
time about the growing indication that 3 February they agreed to let the U.N.
the Communists intended to use the neu- Command retain control over the five
tral nation's inspection teams to examine island groups under dispute on the west
classified equipment closely for the col- coast of Korea.35 The U.N. Command
lection of technical intelligence. He felt had expected a fight on this provision of
that the wording of the armistice agree- the draft armistice, but the enemy had
ment must insure that this would not surprisingly decided not to contest it.36
happen.31 There was some discussion on the
This was a rather odd turnabout, since topic of coastal waters which the U.N.
traditionally the Communists had op- Command had defined as comprising a
posed inspection and argued that good distance of three miles from shore at
faith was enough. As Colonel Kinney mean low tide. The Communists were
pointed out to Chang in the staff officer reluctant to go into the subject, since
meetings, the Communists had originally they felt that it did not matter what the
tried to apply restrictions on all activities distance might be, provided each side
of the inspection teams, but now were ceased naval blockade and patrol in its
insisting upon the full rights of the teams opponent's waters. When the UNC
to examine all equipment carefully.32 officers pressed for a 3-mile limit to pre-
The aftermath to this switch on inspec- vent unintentional violations, the Com-
tion laid the Communists' sincerity on munists came out in support of a 12-mile
the subject open to question, however, zone. This slowed the UNC eagerness
for when Kinney offered to settle for to have a precise figure written into the
five ports if the enemy would give up armistice, for the United States pre-
detailed inspection, Chang quickly ac- ferred not to set a precedent by accepting
cepted on 15 March.33 Regardless of a 12-mile definition of coastal waters in
30
Fourteenth through Twenty-seventh Mtg of 34
Staff Officers ... on item 3, 10-23 Feb 52, in G-3 The final list of ports included: Sinuiju,
Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on item 3, bk. II. Ch'ongjin, Hungnam (for Hamhung), Manp'ojin
31
Memo, Ridgway for Joy, 7 Mar 52, sub: Armis- and Sinanju in North Korea and Inch'on (for
tice Negotiations, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan- Seoul), Taegu, Pusan, Kangnung (instead of Yang-
31 Dec 52. yang) and Kunsan (for Chonju) in South Korea.
32 35
Forty-sixth Mtg of Staff Officers ... on item 3, These were Paengnyong-do, Paechong-do,
13 Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on Soch'ong-do, K'unyonp'yong-do, and U-do—all lo-
item 3, bk. III. cated below the 38th Parallel.
33 36
Forty-eighth and Forty-ninth Mtgs of Staff Offi- Seventh Mtg of Staff Officers ... on item 3, 3
cers ... on item 3, 15-16 Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Feb 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on item 3,
Staff Officers ... on item 3, bk. III. bk. I.
162 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Korea. The upshot was that both sides sustenance to the Chinese and North
took the matter under further considera- Korean Communists. By no stretch of
tion.37 the imagination could the Russians be
Three of the four issues that the staff considered neutral in the estimation of
officers wished to settle had proved open the American military and political
to negotiation and bargaining, but the leaders, and they showed an early and
fourth—the composition of the neutral fixed determination to deny them a neu-
nations supervisory organ and inspection tral status. The trump card in the U.S.
teams—soon developed into a bottleneck hand was the agreement with the Com-
second only to the airfields dispute. It munists that the neutral nations must be
may be recalled that the original Com- acceptable to both sides. The power of
munist suggestion that neutral nations the veto—long a favorite Russian weapon
serve on the supervisory organ had been —might now be turned against the
general and vague. As General Lee had USSR.
defined "neutral nation," the term meant Diplomatic approaches to Sweden,
a nation that had not participated in the Switzerland, and Norway during Decem-
fighting in Korea. He had indicated that ber drew affirmative responses and Ridg-
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and way was authorized to nominate them
Sweden would qualify under this de- as the UNC selections at an appropriate
scription.38 moment.40 The opportunity did not
When Ridgway had asked for guid- arise until 1 February when the U.N.
ance, his superiors responded quickly Command submitted its choices in the
that as UNC choices, Sweden, Switzer- staff officer meeting, but the Commu-
land, and Norway would be acceptable nists were in no hurry. Despite frequent
if they would consent to serve. As for the reminders and proddings, it was not
possible Communist selections, there was until the 16th that they named Poland,
no real difference among the satellites Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. The
and any three would be agreed to. Un- U.N. Command immediately accepted
der no circumstances, however, would the first two and rejected the Soviet
the USSR be considered acceptable as a Union.41
neutral nation, they warned.39 Here was Since Ridgway's superiors hoped that
the crux of the matter, for despite the the Communists would not insist upon
fact that the Soviet Union had not for- the inclusion of the USSR, they pre-
mally intervened in the Korean War, the ferred to de-emphasize Russian partici-
United States did not doubt that she pation in the war as the reason for the
was delivering both moral and physical UNC rejection. Unless the enemy per-
sisted, they favored giving no reason at
37
Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations all. If the enemy pressed for an explana-
(Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. II, pp. 64-65.
38
Transcript of Proceedings, Second Session, Sub-
40
delegation Mtgs on item 3, 5 Dec 51, in FEC Msg, JCS 90381, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Dec 51,
Transcripts, item 3, vol. I. DA-OUT 90381. Army and State Departments ap-
39
(1) Msg, C 59130, CINCFE to JCS, 11 Dec 51, proved this message.
41
DA-IN 8536. (2) Msg, JCS 89473, JCS to CINCFE, Twentieth Mtg of the Staff Officers ... on item
12 Dec 51. This message was approved by the JCS, 3, 16 Feb 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on
State and Defense Departments, and the President. item 3. bk. II.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 163

tion, the U.N. Command could fall back ment could be gained. They suggested
upon the proximity of the Soviet Union that both sides select nations, regardless
and its record of past participation in of their status in the Korean War, to man
Korea as disqualifying factors.42 the supervisory organ and inspection
Ridgway and Joy agreed with the ap- teams. This would include the United
praisal so far as it went, but warned that States for the UNC side and the Commu-
the staff officers suspected that the enemy nists could appoint the Soviet Union if
might be trying to lay the groundwork they wished.45 Since this would divorce
for a trade of concessions on rotation the Russians from a neutral designation,
and ports in return for acceptance of the there was no objection to the Russians
Soviet Union. If this were true, then serving on frankly partisan organs.
the U.N. Command would be better off When the Communists showed no
telling the Communists unequivocally interest in forming nonneutral groups to
that the USSR would never be acceptable conduct supervision and inspection, the
before the enemy involved its prestige.43 staff officers were forced to put the mat-
Not prepared to take this step until other ter aside. Their earnest efforts had re-
possibilities had been exhausted, the sulted in the solution of the rotation,
Washington leaders told Ridgway that port, and coastal island controversies, as
the U.N. Command might offer to drop well as the settlement of a number of
Norway if the Communists would re- lesser details on Item 3. By mid-March
ciprocate on the Soviet Union.44 only differences over airfields and the
On 25 February the UNC staff officers Soviet Union remained outstanding.
followed through on these instructions, As the negotiations ground to a stand-
but Colonel Chang and his assistants still in both Item 3 and Item 4, Admiral
refused to bargain. Their continued in- Joy and staff took stock of the over-all
sistence upon the USSR convinced Ridg- truce situation and concluded that there
way that the U.N. Command must make were two promising methods of obtain-
a final stand on the issue. The JCS con- ing a satisfactory armistice from the
sulted with their colleagues at the De- enemy. The more drastic solution en-
fense and State Department level and tailed the presentation of a complete
received Presidential approval to inform armistice document incorporating some
Ridgway that the United States was will- concessions to the enemy along with an
ing to have the UNC refusal to accept ultimatum. Either the Communists
the USSR made "firm and irrevocable." would have to accept within a stated time
Ridgway might proffer an alternative limit or the negotiations would be termi-
solution of the problem concomitantly nated and hostilities resumed. Such a
with the rejection, if he thought agree- course would require a high-level deci-
42
sion and willingness to open up on the
Msg, DA 901353, G-3 to CINCFE, 17 Feb 52. battlefield if the ultimatum were turned
43
(1) Msg, C 63913, Ridgway to JCS, 19 Feb 52,
DA-IN 107012. (2) Msg, C 63918, Ridgway to JCS. down, but Joy believed that it offered
19 44Feb 52, DA-IN 107018.
(1) Msg, JCS 901451, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Feb
45
52. (2) Msg, DA 901845, CofS to CINCFE, 23 Feb (1) Msg, CX 64342, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Feb 52,
52. Norway was selected since it had supported the DA-I N 109768. (2) Msg, JCS 902160, JCS to
U.N. action in Korea. CINCFE, 27 Feb 58.
164 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

UNC DELEGATES AT THEIR BASE CAMP IN MUNSAN-NI. Admiral Joy is in the


center with clasped hands.

the best hope for a quick and favorable position would not be altered nor any
settlement. further concessions made.46
The second choice would be the sub- In brief, Joy and his associates ad-
mission of a complete armistice docu- vocated the threat of force or the com-
ment without the open ultimatum. The bined use of the recess and an inflexible
enemy delegates would be informed that front on the major issues to produce an
this was the final UNC effort and only armistice. As Ridgway pointed out, both
minor changes in wording would be con- of the suggested courses were ultima-
sidered. The plenary sessions would re- tums; the chief difference was that the
cess and the United Nations Command alternative course had no time limit.
would decline to enter into further sub- Either one would bring censure to the
stantive discussions. Although there U.N. Command if the negotiations were
would be no breaking off of the negotia- 46
Msg, HNC 1027, Joy to CINCUNC, 9 Mar 52,
tions, since the liaison officers would be in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1, CofS, incl
available for consultation, the UNC 27.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 165

broken off and this would be contrary pressed for an open and flat rejection of
to the JCS instructions. Despite the ad- the Soviet Union's membership on the
vantages in the Joy suggestions, Ridgway neutral nations supervisory commission
did not think that the time was ripe for as a first step in attaining a final posi-
the open or the implied ultimatum as tion.48
yet.47 Army staff members in Washington
This was Ridgway vis-à-vis the UNC supported the U.N. commander's argu-
delegation, acting as a moderating in- ment for stiffening the Panmunjom
fluence and tempering the bolder and front. However, G-3 questioned the ad-
riskier proposals emanating from Pan- visability of approaching the issues on a
munjom. On the other side of the coin piecemeal basis. Maj. Gen. Clyde D.
was Ridgway, the theater commander, Eddleman, the Deputy G-3, told the
versus the Washington policy makers. Chief of Staff that the impact would be
Here was the more aggressive leader far greater if the major unsolved prob-
urging the adoption of a determined lems were presented in a single package.
plan of action that would make the Then if the Communists would not ac-
enemy realize that the U.N. Command cept and the negotiations ended, the
would grant no more concessions. Just U.N. Command would be in a stronger
one day after he told Joy that he should position for having made an effort to
continue the "present course of action" break the deadlock. Secretary of State
in the truce negotiations, he sent off a Acheson favored the idea of an over-all
frank appraisal of the situation to the proposal, Eddleman added.49 So, too, did
JCS. General Collins, his fellow Joint Chiefs
Neither he nor his staff knew whether of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the
the Communists wanted an armistice or President. But before a single package
not, he told the Joint Chiefs on 11 could be fashioned, they wanted the
March, or how they really felt on the issues reduced to an absolute minimum.
current issues. On the other hand, it was Then, when an impasse developed at the
clear that the enemy attitude was be- subdelegation level and Ridgway was
coming more arrogant and obdurate and prepared to segregate and reclassify the
that the position of the UNC delegates nonrepatriate prisoners, the U.N. com-
was deteriorating daily. To arrest this mander would have the plenary con-
trend, the U.N. Command either had to ference assemble. Joy would deliver a
take a public, hard and fast stand backed letter from Ridgway to Kim and Peng
by official support from Washington and urging a personal meeting of the com-
as many of the U.N. participants in manders. If the Communists agreed,
Korea as possible or apply the one in- Ridgway would present the package on
fluence that the Communists evidently an all-or-nothing basis. The U.N. Com-
respected—force. Since the latter seemed mand would concede on airfields and
to be out of the question, he strongly
48
Msg, HNC 1033, Ridgway to JCS, 11 Mar 52,
47
DA-IN
49
114495.
Msg, C 65020, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Mar 52, sub:
10 Mar 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. Courses of Action in the Korean Armistice Negotia-
1, incl 28. tions, in G-3 091 Korea, 3/7.
166 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
the Communists would be expected to to confer with the Communist com-
give in on forcible repatriation and the manders, a plenary session of the dele-
Soviet Union. Although there would be gates would serve. They had believed
no substantive debate, the Washington that Ridgway's presence would help
proposal went on, the liaison officers underline the seriousness of the final
would remain available and the UNC proposal and the importance that the
delegates would be willing to meet to U.N. Command attached to it. Although
explain their proposal.50 they had seen no indication of an early
Ridgway must have been taken aback solution to the USSR issue, they would
by the new proposal. He had just turned be happy to have this solved before the
down a similar method of approach by package was offered. The essential fac-
Joy and then within a week to receive tor here, they reminded Ridgway, was
from his superiors a counterpart which not Russian participation on the super-
he liked even less must have astonished visory commission, but designation of
him. In any event he recovered quickly the Soviet Union as a neutral nation. A
and protested vigorously. A meeting of compromise that avoided the latter
the field commanders would imply au- would be perfectly acceptable.
thority which he did not believe existed With this out of the way, the Washing-
on the Communist side and would cause ton leaders got down to some cold facts.
untold administrative delays. Moreover, They did not want an ultimatum de-
the U.N. Command would be asking the livered openly or implied with the
enemy to concede on two issues while it package proposal. Since the United
yielded on a single one. As for the States and its allies had little inclination
segregation and reclassification of to undertake increased military action
POW's, he opposed any such action since to back an ultimatum, it could only be
it might jeopardize the lives of the an empty gesture. If there were to be a
prisoners in Communist hands. The break over the package offer, the blame
Soviet Union he was extremely reluctant must still fall upon the enemy.52
to accept on any terms, even on a frankly This was a frank admission by the JCS
partisan commission. If a package were that neither the United States nor its
to be offered to the enemy, the U.N. fellow nations in Korea wanted a re-
Command should be given authority to sumption of full-scale hostilities and had
indicate that refusal would mean termi- no intention of posing an idle threat that
nation of the negotiations in the UNC the Communists might challenge. Few
eyes. His own recommendations, he con- actions could do more danger to the
cluded, had not changed. First eliminate UNC cause politically than a bluff that
the Soviet Union controversy—then a the enemy called. After this message,
package deal could be presented.51 talk of ultimatums dwindled. Ridgway
The U.S. political and military leaders continued to oppose the USSR's partici-
were willing to meet some of the objec- pation in any capacity, but, from this
tions Ridgway raised. If he did not want time on, he tended to support the con-
50
Msg, JCS 903687, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Mar 52.
51
Msg, C 65430, CINCFE to JCS. 17 Mar 52,
52
DA-IN 116955. Msg, JCS 904101, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Mar 52.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 167

cept of a package proposal as the best until all possibilities had been tried and
hope for an armistice.53 exhausted, agreement was no nearer at
By the first of April, the staff officers the end of February than it had been a
had been in conference for over nine month earlier.
weeks. Despite the real progress they The subdelegations reconvened for a
had made on the lesser problems and on series of meetings during the first half
many details of Item 3, the question of of March with a similar lack of success.
airfields and the Soviet Union still re- Admiral Libby pressed for the exchange
mained unsolved. So, on 3 April, the of sick and wounded prisoners, for the
subdelegation reconvened, with General delivery of POW packages, and for
Harrison replacing Ferenbaugh as the formation of joint Red Cross teams to
Army member. The U.N. Command visit the camps, but Maj. Gen. Lee Sang
accepted Hsieh's suggestion that the Cho would not consider a piecemeal ap-
agreements reached by the staff officers proach to a settlement.55
be confirmed, but this was the last Instead, Lee attacked the U.S. stand on
accord. The arguments took up where "no forced repatriation," which he char-
they had left off and the meetings be- acterized as a verbal trick rather than a
came shorter and shorter. At the 14 concession by the U.N. Command. He
April session, a record time of fifteen again charged that the United Nations
seconds elapsed between the opening Command intended to hand over the
and closing of the meeting.54 With both Chinese prisoners to the enemy of the
sides refusing to budge an inch, the staff Chinese people—Chiang Kai-shek. And
took over again on 20 April. In the in between his jousts with Libby on the
meantime the discussions on prisoners main topic, Lee found the subject of the
of war had reached a new climax. recent riots of prisoners on Koje-do
rewarding. The outbreak of violence on
Screening the POW's 18 February at the UNC prisoner camps
made good propaganda for the Com-
During February the staff officers had munist delegate.56
met twenty-two times to discuss Item 4. In fact Lee became so enthusiastic in
Despite their earnest efforts, the chief his work that Libby had to ask him not
bone of contention—forced repatriation to scream at him. He was not deaf, the
—still remained. Some of the details Admiral declared, and, besides, he did
were cleared up, but the Communists not understand Korean and much of the
were reluctant to settle subsidiary mat- effect of the emotional delivery was lost
ters until the controlling principle was in the translation.57
determined. In the face of the unwil- After two fruitless weeks of debate,
lingness of both sides to retreat further 55
Ibid.,Fifty-sixth through Fifty-eighth Sessions,
Subdelegation on item 4, 29 Feb-2 Mar 52, in FEC
53
Msg, C 65650, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Mar 52, DA- Subdelegates Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV, 28 Jan-7 Mar
IN 118696. 52.56
54
Transcripts of Proceedings, Fifty-fifth through For more detail on this riot, see Chapter XI,
Sixty-sixth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 3, 3-14 below.
57
Apr 52, in FEC Transcripts of Proceedings, Sub- Ibid., Fifty-ninth and Sixtieth Sessions, 3-4 Mar
delegation on item 3, vol. III, 8 Jan-19 Apr 52. 52.
168 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
the staff officers took up the task again. action. Only by allaying Communist
The shifting of problems back and forth suspicion of UNC double-dealing could
between the subdelegation and staff the United Nations Command protect
officers during the January to April itself against retaliatory measures. He
period was reminiscent of a café that had and his staff thought that the enemy
two orchestras so that there would be no might agree to a trial screening.60
interruption to the dancing. In this case, In the staff officer meetings there were
however, both combinations featured the increasing signs that the Communists
same kind of music—discordant and were shifting their ground. They hinted
cacophonous—making it impossible to on 22 March that there might be cases
dance. among the prisoners that could be given
In an effort to introduce a new note special consideration before the present
to the proceedings, General Ridgway lists were checked. And they also inti-
decided to explore another line at the mated that the initiation of closed, exe-
staff officer level in mid-March. It will cutive sessions might promote freer
be recalled that he had been given per- conversation. The UNC officers quickly
mission to remove prisoners who might followed up by proposing executive
forcibly resist repatriation because of meetings until one side or the other
their fear of the consequences from POW desired to revert to the open conference
status. With this object in mind Ridg- again and the Communists agreed.61
way now wanted to find out whether This marked a definite turn for the
revised lists eliminating all in this cate- better, but the enemy soon demonstrated
gory by overt screening might be ac- that they would give "special considera-
ceptable to the Communists. The non- tion" only to the prisoners who had been
repatriates could then be called special former residents of the Republic of
refugees or some such name and all the Korea. In no case would North Koreans
other prisoners would be exchanged. To or Chinese be placed in special cate-
screen the prisoners unilaterally and gories, they insisted. Their hatred of
covertly, Ridgway and his staff felt, Chiang and fear that the Chinese would
might gravely imperil the safe return or be sent to Taiwan if they were not
even the lives of the UNC prisoners in repatriated came through again and
enemy custody, but the Communists again during the staff sessions in late
might consent to an overt screening.58 March.62
His superiors were a little dubious, One of the major weaknesses of the
since they feared that the enemy might UNC proposals on revising the POW
try to revise the lists of UNC prisoners lists was the fact that the UNC staff had
downward if Ridgway attempted openly
to prune the Communist rosters.59 On 60
Msg, C 65650, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Mar 52,
the contrary, Ridgway rebutted, the en- DA-IN 118696.
emy would never accept a fait accompli 61
Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Mtgs of Staff Offi-
brought about by secret and unilateral cers on Details of Agreements on item 4, 22-23
Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on item 4.
58 62
Msg, CX 65424, Ridgway to JCS, 17 Mar 52, Thirty-sixth Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . .
DA-IN 116952. on item 4, 29 Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers
59
Msg, JCS 904101, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Mar 52. ... on item 4.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 169

no idea as to just how many prisoners resist repatriation in the obvious hope
would refuse repatriation. Based on that the number would be no more than
guesswork, General Hickey, UNC chief around 16,000. Two days later Hick-
of staff, estimated that of the 132,000 man agreed and asked if the Communists
military prisoners, about 28,000 would would issue an amnesty statement before
prefer not to go home, but probably only the screening to reassure the prisoners
16,000 would resist repatriation. And of that they would not be punished when
the 37,000 civilian internees, 30,000 they returned. Although the enemy of-
would elect not to return and 2,000 ficers protested that such a statement
would put up a fight to prevent going would be unnecessary since the Com-
back. He thought that over half of the munists desired nothing more than to
20,000 Chinese prisoners would use return the prisoners to a peaceful life,
every means at their disposal to present they lost little time in providing the
a solid block of opposition since they U.N. Command with a florid amnesty
were well organized, disciplined, and declaration on 6 April. This statement
controlled by strong leaders with Nation- was given wide publicity throughout all
alist sympathies.63 the prisoner camps before the screening
Early in April, Colonel Hickman, to encourage as many prisoners as possi-
UNC staff officer, told his counterpart, ble to go home.65
Colonel Tsai, that the U.N. Command The insistence of the Communists
was reluctant to take a poll to form a upon a round figure implied their tacit
rough estimate of the number of military assent to the screening process and re-
repatriates, but about 116,000 might be moved most of the previous objections
involved in an exchange.64 The figure to revising the prisoner lists. After Ridg-
of 116,000 tallied with the estimate of way had conferred with Joy at Munsan-
General Hickey which was admittedly a ni, he submitted his plan to carry out
guess, but it evidently intrigued the the interviewing and segregating of the
Communists. It also may have been a POW's. The screening and separation
tactical error on the part of the U.N. of repatriates from nonrepatriates would
Command, for it misled the enemy into be a one-shot operation, he told the JCS,
thinking that they would recover ap- and no one would be allowed to change
proximately that number of prisoners. his mind once he had made his choice.
At any rate, Colonel Tsai suggested on The Communists would expect to re-
2 April that both sides immediately ceive whatever number was announced
check their lists and defer the debate on by the U.N. Command, he went on, so
principles until this was completed. The no downward revisions could be made
Communists showed a desire to get a after the enemy was informed. In his
round figure of those who would forcibly opinion, screening was inevitable sooner
or later and the quicker it was done the
63
Memo, Hickey for Hull, no date, no sub, in G-3 better. He frankly admitted that an ex-
383.6, 5/1. This memo dates approximately in mid-
65
February 1952. (1) Fortieth, Forty-first Mtgs of Staff Officers on
64
Thirty-ninth Mtg of Staff Officers on Details Details ... on item 4, 2 and 4 Apr 52. (2) Msg,
... on item 4, 1 Apr 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Tsai to Hickman, 6 Apr 52. Both in G-3 Mtgs of
Officers ... on item 4. Staff Officers ... on item 4.
170 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
plosive situation existed in the POW clerk related the disadvantages of refusal
camps and the U.N. Command did not and the uncertainties that would face
have the capability on hand to break up the nonrepatriates. He also warned the
the camps into small dispersed units to prisoner of the fate that might befall his
reduce the danger. family if he did not return. Then the
Once the screening was finished, Ridg- prisoner was told again of the Commu-
way intended to give the totals to the nist amnesty that had been offered and
enemy, reclassifying the nonrepatriates asked a series of seven questions: 1. Will
and ROK residents who did not want to you voluntarily be repatriated to North
go to North Korea into a status other Korea (China) ? 2. Would you forcibly
than POW. If the Communists accepted resist repatriation? 3. Have you care-
these figures, he would follow up by an fully considered the impact of such ac-
effort to trade airfield restrictions for the tion on your family? 4. Do you realize
dropping of USSR, thus completing the that you may remain here at Koje-do
armistice. If the enemy did not accept long after those electing repatriation
the figures, Ridgway would present a have been returned home? 5. Do you
package proposal with the same objec- realize that the UNC cannot promise that
tives on which the U.N. Command you will be sent to any certain place? 6.
would stand firm.66 Are you still determined that you would
Permission was received on 3 April to violently resist repatriation? 7. What
start the screening at once and two days would you do if you were repatriated in
later Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to spite of this decision? If at any point
initiate Plan SCATTER.67 This plan was the POW indicated that he would accept
openly designed to make the maximum repatriation, the questions ceased. On
number of POW's available for repatri- the other hand, if he mentioned suicide,
ation. All were cautioned beforehand fight to the death, escape, etc., the POW
not to discuss the choice they had made was segregated and put in a new com-
with other prisoners prior to the inter- pound.68
view lest they be subjected to violence On 8 April Van Fleet began the
and injury to force a change of mind. screening. For the most part it pro-
The final nature of the decision was ceeded smoothly and the separation of
strongly stressed to make each man think the nonrepatriates from those who
it over carefully. As each prisoner ap- wanted to return was accomplished with-
proached the interview area, he carried out serious incident. But there were
his clothing and equipment with him, seven compounds containing over 37,000
so that there would be no need to return determined North Korean Communists
to his former enclosure if he chose not who would not permit the UNC teams to
to return. In the interview that followed screen them. In one of these compounds,
the unarmed interrogating officer or an altercation between the prisoners and
ROK guards erupted into stone throw-
66
Msg, HNC 1118, Ridgway to JCS, 3 Apr 52, ing and then to the use of machine gun
DA-IN 123736.
67 68
(1) Msg, JCS 905426, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Apr (1) Msg, C 66649, Ridgway to G-3, 10 Apr 52,
52. (2) Msg, CX 66469, Ridgway to JCS, 5 Apr 52, DA-IN 126222. (2) Msg, C 67178, Ridgway to G-3,
DA-IN 124553. 19 Apr 52, DA-IN 129603.
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 171
fire. Before the fighting could be figures, Ridgway proposed to permit
stopped, there were seven dead and sixty- either an international neutral body or
five other casualties.69 joint Red Cross teams to rescreen all of
Despite the opposition of the ardent the nonrepatriates if the Communists so
Communist elements, the results of the desired. If they turned this suggestion
first three days of screening were amaz- down, then the UNC delegation would
ing even to the U.N. Command. With move back into plenary sessions and
approximately half of the 132,000 inter- would present the package proposal.71
views completed, over 40,000 prisoners Although the 70,000 figure was by no
had declared that they would forcibly means final, the JCS agreed that the U.N.
resist repatriation.70 It was a surprising Command should convey it to the enemy
demonstration of the strength of feeling right away rather than risk a leak to the
among the POW's that must have been press. At the meeting of the staff officers
heartening to the psychological warfare on 19 April Colonel Hickman calmly in-
experts, but it immediately cast a pall formed Tsai that 7,200 civilian internees,
over the prospects for an armistice. Even 3,800 ROK prisoners, 53,900 North Ko-
were all the unscreened prisoners to reans, and 5,100 Chinese—a total of
return, the total would bear little re- 70,000 men—would be available for re-
semblance to the 116,000 the Commu- patriation. The effect was dramatic!
nists anticipated. For once Tsai was speechless, overcome
In the days that followed the U.N. with emotion. When he finally recov-
Command made no attempt to screen ered himself enough to talk, he quickly
the seven recalcitrant compounds and requested a recess ostensibly to study the
automatically put the prisoners in these figures.72 The evident shock to Tsai inti-
enclosures among the repatriates. The mated that the Communists were com-
remainder of the POWs and civilian pletely unprepared for such a low
internees were sent through the inter- estimate and the immediate recess was
views, and by 15 April Ridgway was able probably necessary not only for him to
to provide the JCS with the "round" regain his composure but also to get new
figure the Communists desired. Of the instructions from his superiors.
over 170,000 military and civilian pris- The tenor of these instructions was
oners in UNC hands, only about 70,000 crystal clear the following day. The
would return to the Communists without Communists felt that they had been
the use of force, he told the Joint deliberately deceived by the UNC's
Chiefs. Since he realized that the enemy earlier estimate of 116,000 and Tsai
was not going to be happy about these mounted a full-scale assault upon the
70,000 figure. It was "completely im-
69
(1) Msg, C 66761, Ridgway to G-3, 11 Apr 52, possible for us to consider," he cried,
DA-IN 126801. (2) Msg, C 66838, Ridgway to G-3, and "you flagrantly repudiated what
12 Apr 52, DA-IN 127294. Casualties included: 4
ROK dead, 4 wounded, 1 U.S. lieutenant wounded;
71
3 North Korean dead, 60 wounded. See below, Msg, CX 66953, Ridgway to JCS, 15 Apr 52,
Chapter XI, for further details on prisoners' refusal DA-IN 128107.
72
to be screened. Forty-second Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . .
70
Msg, CX 66734, CINCUNC to G-3, 11 Apr 52, on item 4, 19 Apr 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers
DA-IN 126732. on ... item 4.
172 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
you said before." In a counterblast, had been duped and led into a propa-
Hickman charged that the U.N. Com- ganda trap. Their natural suspicion of
mand had felt the same sort of dismay the motives of the U.N. Command
when they had been given the 11,559- needed little impetus to assume the
prisoner figure by the Communists worst.
in December. The UNC had conducted
the screening in the fairest way possi- The Package Is Delivered
ble and the percentage of prisoners
that the Communists would get back was The violent Communist opposition to
far greater than the 20 percent that the the results of the UNC screening de-
12,000 UNC prisoners represented.73 limited the course of events at Panmun-
Through the wrangling that ensued jom. If the POW issue could have been
during the next few days, one fact stood settled, Ridgway could probably have
out. The Communists had been stung exchanged the airfield rehabilitation
once by the screening procedure and concession for the exclusion of Soviet
they would have nothing more to do with Union and completed the armistice.
it. They repulsed the offers to permit Rejection of the no forced repatriation
rescreening by neutral or Red Cross concept meant that a package proposal
teams summarily and insisted that the would have to include three issues and
U.N. Command come up with a more that one side would have to give way on
favorable figure.74 The screening proc- two points. This complicated the matter
ess which momentarily seemed to be a since it introduced a sense of imbalance
way to break the deadlock had merely re- allowing an apparent advantage to the
sulted in increasing it. In justice to the side that secured the two concessions.
U.N. Command, they had acted in good Under the circumstances it might well
faith. Regrettably they had given the have been better to have had a fourth
enemy a rough initial estimate based on issue, real or manufactured, which the
what turned out to be incomplete and U.N. Command could have used to
inaccurate information. During the in- sweeten the pill that they now wanted
terviews the UNC teams had sought to the enemy to swallow.
discourage the nonrepatriates as much While the enemy was launching its
as possible and encourage the POW's to broadsides at the screening procedure,
go home. On the other side, it is not Ridgway made his final arrangements
difficult to understand the attitude of the for presenting the package deal. He
Communists and their feeling that they planned to support the UNC offer with
a strong statement that might convince
the Communists that this was the final
73
Forty-third Mtg of the Staff Officers ... on item position for the United Nations Com-
4, 20 Apr 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . item mand. Either the enemy must accept
4. Hickman later said that his counterattack actually
caused Tsai to blush for the first and only time
the whole package without debate or the
during the meetings. Interv, author with Maj Gen responsibility for continued hostilities
George W. Hickman, Jr., 7 Mar 58. In OCMH.
74
would rest on its shoulders. To bolster
Forty-fourth through Forty-sixth Mtgs of the
Staff Officers ... on item 4, 21-23 Apr 52, in G-3
his stand, Ridgway asked that public
Mtgs of Staff Officers ... on item 4. statements along this line be made by
THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL 173

the U.S. Government and other U.N. General Ridgway and Admiral Joy
participants.75 were not concerned at this point whether
Ridgway's superiors, however, were the sessions were secret or open. In their
not willing to go quite so far. As long opinion there was little need for secrecy
as the truce meetings remained in exec- since the separate elements of the pack-
utive session, public statements were age deal had been fully publicized in the
not possible, they pointed out. In the press.79 But the military and political
second place, they did not want Ridgway leaders in Washington disagreed. The
or the U.S. Government to make state- open sessions generated more heat than
ments that could be interpreted as ulti- light, they maintained, and they there-
matums. Uncompromising declarations fore preferred an executive meeting of
might decrease the probability of Com- the plenary conference. Then if the
munist acceptance of the package and Communists disregarded the under-
raise domestic and international expec- standing to gain the propaganda ini-
tations of quick military action if the tiative or if they turned down the
enemy did not accept the proposal. In suggestion for the executive meetings,
any case they moderated Ridgway's ap- the onus for failure to reach agreement
proach to eliminate the implication of in the negotiations would fall upon the
an ultimatum.76 At the same time, the enemy.80
JCS and its staff worked diligently with Through the liaison officers the
the political advisors to fashion a state- plenary conference was set up for April
ment that President Truman could 28. When the delegates met, Admiral
release to support the UNC position.77 Joy requested an executive session and
Judging from the actions of the Com- after a recess, the Communists agreed.81
munists at the staff officer level, the Joy then went over the outstanding issues
executive meetings were about to end. carefully and set forth the UNC solution
On 24 April Colonel Tsai threatened to which had been incorporated into a com-
return to open meetings and the follow- plete draft of the armistice. All mention
ing day he carried out the threat. The of the rehabilitation of airfields, had
Communists immediately issued a long been deleted and the Neutral Nations
résumé of the April developments and Supervisory Commission was to be
the U.N. Command countered with a formed of Switzerland, Sweden, Poland,
release setting forth its own version. As and Czechoslovakia. The paragraph re-
the debate moved out into the open ferring to the disposition of POW's read
again, Colonel Hickman requested a as follows:
recess so that the UNC could make the
All prisoners of war held in the custody
last-minute arrangements for the formal of each side at the time this Armistice
delivery of its offer.78
75 79
Msg, CX 67235, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Apr 52, Msg, C 67640, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Apr 52, DA-
DA-I N 129944. IN 132562.
76 80
Msg, JCS 906923, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Apr 52. Msg, JCS 907378, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Apr 52.
81
This message was drafted by State and approved by Besides Admiral Joy, the UNC delegation now
the services, Defense Department, and the President. consisted of Harrison, Turner, Libby, and Yu. The
77
Msg, JCS 907375, JCS to CINCFE, 26 Apr 52. Communists were represented by Nam, Hsieh, Lee,
78
Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations General Pien Chang-wu, and Rear Adm. Kim Won
(Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. III, pp. 97-98. Mu, who had replaced Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan.
174 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Agreement becomes effective shall be re- plished anything, it did reduce the num-
leased and repatriated as soon as possible. ber of issues to one—the number of
The release and repatriation of such pris- POW's who would be repatriated. The
oners of war shall be effected in conformity
with lists which have been exchanged and other two soon canceled each other out,
have been checked by the respective sides but as long as there remained such a
prior to the signing of this Armistice Agree- wide discrepancy between the 70,000
ment.82 figure that the U.N. Command had of-
fered and the 116,000 the Communists
In effect this meant that the U.N. expected, hopes for an early armistice
Command would swap the 70,000 repa- would be small.
triates that it held for the 12,000 in Yet despite the indifferent reception
enemy custody, since it intended to re- that the enemy had given the package
classify the nonrepatriates into a status proposal, this was a key moment in the
other than POW in the meantime. negotiations. The UNC had officially
The package proposal created as much fallen back upon its "final and irrev-
stir as a pebble dropped into the ocean. ocable" position and the period of debate
Nam simply stated that "our side fails to was over. There had been no ultimatum
see how your proposal of this morning or threat of increased activity at the
can really be of help to the overall front, but the U.N. Command had
settlement of the remaining issues" and passed the crossroads and embarked
then called for an indefinite recess.83 upon a firm course. Patience and firm-
Under the circumstances the Commu- ness—the old standbys—were to be the
nists reaction was not surprising. The chief weapons in the battles that lay
UNC offer had revealed nothing that the ahead rather than force. In the mean-
enemy had not anticipated as a result of time the battle at the front would go on
discussions in the U.S. and U.N. press as it had all winter, essentially a defen-
before the presentation. If it accom- sive war on both sides. Fought within
82
Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-fourth Session, carefully defined boundaries and under
28 Apr 52, in FEC Transcripts of Proceedings, Msgs tacit rules, the war of the active defense
on the Mil Armistice Conf, vol. IV, 28 Apr-3 Jun
nonetheless continued and took its daily
52.83
Ibid. toll of casualties.
CHAPTER IX

"The Active Defense"


When the armistice negotiations re- Communists intended to use the negoti-
sumed at the new site at Panmunjom ations to win a breathing period while
in late October 1951, Item 2—the line of they replenished their battered forces
demarcation—was still in dispute and the and strengthened their defenses, the first
knotty problems arising from Items 3 course offered certain long-term ad-
and 4 but dimly envisioned. In the light vantages. It might be far less costly to
of past experience, however, the task of keep up the limited offensive punch al-
threshing out a truce proposal acceptable ready developed and maintain the
to both sides promised to become a long, initiative until an agreement was signed
drawn-out affair. rather than to permit the enemy to re-
There was little doubt that the punish- gain his balance and settle down to a
ment dealt out as the Eighth Army long war of attrition.
"elbowed forward" into the enemy posi-
tions had sorely depleted the offensive A Choice Is Made
capabilities of the Communists and had
influenced them to return to the con- On 27 October, just three days after
ference table. But whether they had the truce talks reopened, General Van
come back to conclude an agreement or Fleet set up a plan for an advance into
simply to continue the discussions re- the Iron Triangle on the west and be-
mained to be seen. yond Kumsong on the east. Using the
Under the circumstances there were U.S. I and IX Corps, he intended to take
two courses of action open to the U.N. over the high ground north of the
Command: (1) it could have the Eighth Ch'orwon-Kumhwa Railroad and estab-
Army sustain the pressure built up by the lish a firm screen along a new defensive
summer campaigns upon the enemy line called DULUTH, south of P'yonggang
until a satisfactory settlement was and north of Kumsong. After the IX
reached; or (2) it could accept the Corps attained the dominating terrain
Communist reappearance at the negoti- around Kumsong, it would push on to
ations as a sign that the enemy was now the northeast along the road to Tong-
willing to end the fighting. If the latter ch'on. In the meantime, the ROK I
proved correct and a line of demarca- Corps would move forward along the
tion was to be established along the east coastal road to Tongch'on and link
general trace of the battle front, then up with the IX Corps just south of the
further sustained fighting and heavy town.1
casualties would be wasteful and un- 1
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec 1, Nar-
necessary. On the other hand, if the rative, p. 68.
176 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
The operation toward Tongch'on, line and even as far as the Yalu were
called SUNDIAL, eliminated the amphib- brought up to date, but Ridgway thought
ious operation which the earlier that under present circumstances neither
WRANGLER plan had envisaged for the of these offensives would be worth the
east coast, but the objectives were the casualties they would cost.4
same—to cut off the North Korean forces The lack of enthusiasm for ambitious
caught between the double envelopment offensive operations while the line of
and to set up a new defensive line. As demarcation was being arranged was
things turned out, SUNDIAL was short- clearly reflected in Ridgway's 12 Novem-
lived, for on 31 October Van Fleet was ber directive to Van Fleet to assume the
instructed to postpone his attack toward "active defense." Along the general
Line DULUTH until he received further trace of present positions, the order ran,
orders from Ridgway. The debate over Van Fleet would seize terrain most suit-
the line of demilitarization was the able for defense. He would, however,
reason for the delay, since the JCS be- limit his offensive action to the taking
lieved that ultimately the U.N. Com-of outpost positions not requiring the
mand might have to modify its stand commitment of more than one division.
and withdraw several kilometers to the At the same time, the Eighth Army
south. If this proved to be true, there commander would be prepared to ex-
seemed to be little reason to take casual- ploit favorable opportunities to inflict
ties for territory that would soon have heavy casualties upon the enemy.5
to be evacuated.2 On the following day the JCS sus-
On 5 November Van Fleet again tained the UNC approach. They con-
sought permission to move toward sidered the line of contact existing at
DULUTH, but without success. Ridgway that time to be acceptable as the line of
waited until 11 November, then can- demarcation and that contact expected
celed the operation. Without the in the next month would not affect its
preliminary advance to DULUTH, SUN- acceptability. "Ground action could still
DIAL was automatically ruled out.3 A continue even though gains and losses
new wait-and-see policy at UNC head- would not be of significance to location
quarters was inaugurated with the line . . . ," the JCS concluded.6 With
elimination of the DULUTH-SUNDIAL of- the JCS and Ridgway in agreement over
fensives. the unwisdom of other than minimum
As the line of demarcation assumed operations at the front, the fighting
increasing importance to the battlefield, settled down to small-scale actions and
planning at the UNC and Eighth Army patrolling.
headquarters operated on a contingent Evidently the JCS and Ridgway both
basis. If the negotiations broke down believed that the Communists were
or became hopelessly ruined, then an
offensive might be launched. Plans for 4
Memo, E.K.W. [Edwin K. Wright], no addressee,
an advance to the Wonsan-P'yongyang no sub, 8 Nov 51, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 410,
Feasibility of Offensive Operations.
2 5
Msg, C 56283, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army Msg, CX 57143, CINCFE to JCS, 12 Nov 51.
(Adv), 31 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 245. DA-IN 18285.
3 6
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, pp. 4-5. Msg, JCS 86804, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Nov 51.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 177

ready to come to terms or perhaps the less otherwise directed by this headquarters.
wish was father to the thought. At any Every effort will be made to prevent un-
rate Ridgway informed Chief of Staff necessary casualties.9
Collins that he believed the Communists The Van Fleet order in effect hinged
had been badly hurt by the UNC offen- Eighth Army operations upon the
sives and wanted the earliest possible enemy's actions and granted what
suspension of hostilities. He pointed to amounted to a cease-fire if the enemy so
a speech by Andrei Vishinsky, Russian desired. As the order filtered down to
Foreign Minister, before the U.N. Gen- the small unit level, few commanders
eral Assembly on 8 November, in which were willing to risk the lives of their
he proposed a cessation of the Korean troops unless it became a case of neces-
fighting within ten days and also to the sity. But when the war correspondents
report of the UNC delegates at Panmun- in Korea found out about Van Fleet's
jom that the enemy seemed to want an instructions, they broke the story, charg-
immediate de facto cease-fire as indica- ing that the order had "brought Korean
tion of the Communist desire for a ground fighting to a complete, if tem-
speedy end to the Korean War.7 Army porary, halt." 10
intelligence authorities in Washington Since this charge was essentially true,
were cautiously inclined to agree.8 it caused embarrassment in Washington
In the light of this general feeling of and in the UNC headquarters. The
optimism in Tokyo and Washington, it Associated Press implied that the halt
was not surprising that Eighth Army had come on orders possibly from the
should absorb some of the complacency. White House itself and a strong state-
As soon as the line of demarcation was ment was issued by the President on
agreed upon on 27 November, Van Fleet 29 November to counteract the impres-
told his corps commander that they sion. On the other side of the world,
would make sure that every UNC soldier Ridgway was quick to explain that
was aware that hostilities would continue Eighth Army had assumed "a function
until an armistice was signed. He then entirely outside its field of responsi-
went on to instruct them that: bility" and that efforts were being made
to correct any false impressions that
Eighth Army should clearly demonstrate might have been drawn from the Eighth
a willingness to reach an agreement while
preparing for offensive action if negotia- Army order.11 Artillery fire began to
tions are unduly prolonged to this end. A sound again from the UNC lines and
willingness to reach an agreement will be Ridgway reported on the 29th that 68
demonstrated by: Reducing operations to patrols had been sent out and 14 separate
the minimum essential to maintain present attacks repulsed ranging from two
positions regardless of the agreed-upon
military demarcation line. Counterattacks 9
Msg, G 3192 TAC, EUSAK to CG 187th Abn
to regain key terrain lost to enemy assault Regt, 27 Nov 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Plan-
will be the only offensive action taken un- ning Files, Nov 51.
10
7
Msg, C 58327, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Nov 51, in
Msg, C 57297, CINCFE to DA, 16 Nov 51, in Hq FEC,
11 387.2, bk. 4, 1951, Paper 316.
Eighth Army Opnl Planning Files, Nov 51.
8
(1) Ibid. (2) Msg, G 3247 THC, CG Eighth
Msg, DA 87685, DA to CG Eighth Army, 23 Nov Army to CINCFE, 30 Nov 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 4,
51. 1951, Paper 315.
178 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

squads to a regiment in size.12 The un- U.N. Command and resulted in short-
favorable publicity from the news stories ages of heavy winter clothing and equip-
put an end to the virtual cease-fire and ment among some units at the front. By
insured that at least lip service would be the fall of 1951, with the war entering
paid to the oft-repeated avowal that a static phase, the situation was well in
hostilities would continue until an ar- hand. Distribution was a comparatively
mistice was signed. simple matter and experience had led to
But a choice had been made, for as the modification and improvement of
soon as the Washington leaders and the many items of clothing and equipment.
U.N. Command had agreed to the line The advent of the cold weather
of demarcation and the thirty-day dead- seemed to favor the UNC forces slightly.
line that went with it, they had also For the most part, the U.N. Command
tacitly recognized that further large- held the south slopes of the hills and
scale offensive operations would not be mountains which were frequently free of
mounted unless the Communists broke snow and warmed by the sun. The
off or mired down the negotiations. As enemy had to look into the sun and into
long as the enemy continued to discuss the deep shadows cast by its rays. In the
the matters under debate, there was rear areas, the UNC accommodations
little danger that the U.N. Command were much more comfortable than those
would again resort to strong ground of the Communists.
pressure on the battlefield. In the air Offsetting those advantages, however,
and from the sea no such limitations was the enemy ability to overcome the
applied. Here the mastery of the UNC rigors imposed by weather and terrain.
still prevailed and casualties could be The Communist soldiers, many of whom
kept low. But the war for real estate that were already acclimated to the weather
might eventually be forfeited under an of North Korea and North China, had
armistice offered little inducement. The borne the harsh winter of 1950-51 with
winter that lay ahead promised to be less physical distress than the U.N. Com-
filled with frustration for the ground mand. Under trying conditions, they
soldier unless agreement at Panmunjom had managed to live off the land and to
followed swiftly upon the heels of the fight vigorously on rations that would
drawing of the line of demarcation. barely have provided subsistence for the
majority of the U.S. troops.13
The War of Position And although the UNC forces were
adequately supplied with clothing and
Memories of the first winter in Korea cold-weather equipment, these were only
and its hardships were still fresh in the as good as the men who used them. To
minds of the UNC troops. The swift- remain outdoors in the often arctic cold
ness of the advance into North Korea of the Korean mountains for any length
and the equally rapid withdrawal that of time required a high degree of cold-
followed in late 1950 had dislocated weather discipline. What good did it do
the supply and distribution lines of the to provide the soldiers with insulated

12 13
Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Nov 51, DA-IN 4170. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, p. 32.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 179

WHITE HORSE HILL

boots if they did not keep spare, dry Ordinary entrenching tools were ade-
socks on hand and did not change socks quate for digging as long as the ground
often? Among many of the UNC troops, was not frozen more than three inches,
a winter environment team sent out but tended to break under sterner tests.
from Washington reported, there was a Picks and shovels were better suited to
fear of frostbite and a lack of knowledge the task, but were too ponderous to be
of how to prevent it. This resulted in a carried by the troops. One infantry unit
high cold-injury incidence and reduced met the situation by issuing a 2-pound
the time that could be devoted to patrol block of TNT to each soldier for use in
and ambush to an almost ineffective breaking through the frozen top layer.15
level. Even the bunkers and front-line The distaste of the UNC troops for
shelters reflected a lack of ingenuity, the winter fighting was but an added factor
team went on, and were devoid of the in the course of the ground war. Para-
simplest principles of winterization.14 mount, of course, was the disinclination
As the ground became frozen, new on both sides to disturb the status quo
problems arose for the infantryman. radically during the negotiations. But
14
when the cold weather was combined
DA, Winter Environment Team, Report on
Winter Combat Problems, December 1951-February
15
1952, in G-3 091 Korea, Bulky, 62/2. Ibid.
180 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
with the halfhearted ground maneuvers, on a 7-mile front toward a new defense
a note of restraint reminiscent of the line. Despite strong resistance from
summer lull of July pervaded the battle- elements of the Chinese 68th Army, the
field. The policy of "live and let live" ROK division advanced up to two miles.
was immediately reflected in the lower Reaching the new line on the 18th, they
casualty reports. dug in against Chinese counterattacks
Before the agreement on the line of and succeeded in beating them off.18
demarcation on 27 November, the desire As the discussions on the line of
for better positions did produce a num- demarcation came to an end in late
ber of minor engagements along the November, a change in Chinese tactics
front. Basically it was a battle for hills was completed. As mentioned earlier,
and the pattern became all too familiar. the Chinese had begun to shift from
The experience of the ROK 9th Division their customary tactics based upon fluid
in November was repeated across the warfare during the early autumn.19 The
trace of battle. Fighting for Hill 395 static conditions of December allowed
(White Horse Hill) northwest of Ch'or- them to finish their switch to fixed,
won in the U.S. I Corps sector, the ROK positional warfare. Adopting a defense-
9th first lost the hill on 5 November, in-depth pattern, both Chinese and
then retook it the following day; lost it North Koreans proceeded to fortify their
again on 16 November and recaptured it lines. Digging in on hills, they set up
once more on the 17th.16 Counterattack! gun replacements and personnel shel-
Take the hill! Hold the hill!—these ters interconnected by communication
were the key commands that dominated and supply trenches. Everything at hand
the winter war. —logs, rocks, and sand—was used to
During the daylight hours the Eighth provide overhead cover and to protect
Army sent out its patrols and small-scale their troops against anything but a direct
raids which the enemy sought to inter- hit. On the reverse slopes their trenches
cept. Enemy action, on the other hand, followed the contours and were 5 to 6
took place chiefly at night, under cover feet deep. Small one-man shelters were
of darkness and unhindered by air sur- dug into the rear wall every 15 to 20
veillance. The Communists confined feet. Through the crown of the hill, the
themselves primarily to patrols and Communists fashioned other trenches
limited probes of the UNC defensive leading to machine gun and rifle posi-
positions.17 tions along the front and to kitchen and
The principal clash during November ammunition supply points at the rear.
took place in the IX Corps sector east In some cases, they tunneled through
of Kumsong. On 17-18 November the the hills and hollowed out huge under-
ROK 6th Division, supported by two ground bunkers. Using high terrain fea-
tank companies of the U.S. 24th Infantry tures effectively, they laid out fire
Division and the attached ROK 21st patterns and often employed personnel
Regimental Combat Team, moved out shelters as alternate firing positions.
18
16 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, sec I,
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, NOV 51, pp. 17-18. Narrative, p. 47.
17 19
Ibid. See Chapter V, above.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE"

The enemy firing positions were prac- December, Ridgway asked Van Fleet for
tically artillery proof and certainly a report on his plans to return to the
mortar proof.20 offensive. The Eighth Army comman-
The U.N. Command had made little der's reply showed clearly the change in
attempt to disturb the enemy's efforts to the tactical situation. He contemplated
strengthen his defenses. Not that the no offensive action in the near future. In
thirty-day limit on the line of demarca- the eyes of his commanders, minor at-
tion dictated a suspension of hostilities, tacks to strengthen the present UNC
but rather a self-imposed restriction on positions would be costly and without
large-scale operations in December pre- value. The UNC defensive line was
cluded any moves of great tactical signif- strong and could be held against the
icance. The Eighth Army "reduced its enemy. Obviously, the Communists
offensive operations during the month were now well entrenched and immune
as a demonstration of good faith." In to normal artillery preparation. Only by
turn the Communists launched mostly bold assault could the enemy be dis-
company and platoon-sized attacks on lodged and this could not be done at a
the UNC outposts. Only rarely was a low cost. The benefits to be won, Van
battalion-sized assault mounted.21 Fleet concluded, would not justify the
Lest the Eighth Army lose its edge casualties certain to be incurred.24
completely, Van Fleet instructed his More ambitious plans for an advance
corps commanders "to keep the Army to the P'yongyang-Wonsan line met with
sharp through smell of gunpowder and a similar response. The Joint Strategic
the enemy" by intensifying their pro- Plans and Operations Group found that
grams to capture prisoners of war while such an operation was feasible and
through ambush. If it appeared that the could be logistically mounted, it would
peace talks would fail, new plans would probably mean that close to 200,000
be prepared around 20 December for a UNC casualties would be registered.
series of limited objective attacks in General Weyland, FEAF commander,
January designed to strengthen defensive was not in favor of extending the UNC
positions.22 With the Communists im- lines so close to the Communist air bases
proving their positions daily, further in Manchuria and suggested a more
"elbowing forward" might prove more modest advance as an alternative. And
costly than it had been during the the Navy pointed out that naval vessels
August-October period. As for the cap- and amphibious forces might suffer con-
ture of prisoners of war via the ambush siderably if the enemy mounted major
method for intelligence purposes, the air attacks from bases in North Korea.25
total log for December was a paltry 247, Under the existing conditions, there
only a quarter of what it had been the seemed to be little possibility of more
previous month.23
As the thirty-day limit expired on 27 24
(1) Msg, C 60195, CINCFE to Van Fleet, 27
Dec 51. (2) Msg, G 3758 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridg-
20
21
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dee 51, p. 36. way, 31 Dec 51. Both in Hq Eighth Army Opnl
Ibid., pp. 2, 16. Planning Files, Dec 5.
22 25
Eighth Army CofS Jnl, Dec 51, tab 4. JSPOG Staff Study, 10 Dec 51, in JSPOG Staff
23
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt. Dec 51, Table 1. Study No. 410, Feasibility of Offensive Operations.
182 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

than academic consideration of large- December. Since the Chiri-san held the
scale offensive ventures at the end of core of guerrilla resistance, Van Fleet
1951. The losses would be too heavy and directed that the first phase of the task
the reaction of the USSR uncertain. As force operations cover this mountainous
long as the desire to settle the war stretch some twenty miles northwest of
through negotiation remained predomi- Chinju.27
nant, it was doubtful that other than On 1 December the ROK Government
minor ground activity would be allowed. took the first step by declaring martial
The calm on the battlefield, however, law in southwestern Korea. This re-
did permit more attention to be paid to stricted the movement of civilians, es-
one troublesome problem that bothered tablished a curfew, and severed tele-
the U.N. Command almost from the be- phone connections between villages.
ginning of the Korean War. Behind the On the following day Task Force Paik,
lines in South Korea there were over named after the commander, Lt. Gen.
8,000 guerrillas and bandits, 5,400 of Paik Sun Yup, initiated its antiguerrilla
whom were reported armed. Concen- campaign, sardonically called RAT-
trated mainly in the mountains of the KILLER. Moving in from a 163-mile
rugged Chiri-san area of southwestern perimeter, Task Force Paik closed on
Korea, they were a constant thorn in the the Chiri-san. The ROK 8th Division
side of the ROK Government. Although pushed southward toward the crest of
they were chiefly of nuisance value, there the mountains and the Capital Division
was always the chance that in the event of a edged northward to meet it. Blocking
major offensive, they could pose a real and forces, composed of National Police,
dangerous threat to supply and communi- youth regiments, and security forces
cation lines and to rear areas.26 located in the area, were stationed at
During November there was an up- strategic positions to cut off escape
surge in raiding operations as the guer- routes. As the net was drawn tighter,
rillas launched well-co-ordinated attacks groups of from ten to five hundred
upon rail lines and installations. For- guerrillas were flushed, but only light
tunately, the raids were lacking in suffi- opposition developed. After twelve days,
cient strength to follow through and Task Force Paik ended the first phase
inflict serious damage, but Van Fleet on 14 December with a total of 1,612
decided that the time had come to elimi- reported killed and 1,842 prisoners.28
nate this irritation. In mid-November The hunt shifted north to Cholla
he ordered the ROK Army to set up a Pukto Province for Phase II with the
task force composed of the ROK Capital mountains around Chonju the chief
and ROK 8th Divisions, both minus objectives. From 19 December to 4
their artillery units. Van Fleet wanted January the ROK 8th and Capital Divi-
the group organized and ready to stamp
out guerrilla activity by the first of 27
(1) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, p. 34. (2)
Ltr, Van Fleet to CofS ROK Army, 14 Nov 51, no
sub, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Nov
26
51.28
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, pt. I, Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, G-3 sec.
Narrative, p. 8. bk. 4, incls 1-5, p. 7.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 183

sions ranged the hills and sought to trap


the guerrillas and bandits hiding in the
rough terrain. By the end of December
it was estimated that over 4,000 men had
been killed and another 4,000 had been
captured.29
When Phase III opened on 6 January,
the task force returned to the Chiri-san
to catch the guerrillas who had filtered
back into the area after Phase I. On
19 January, the Capital Division carried
out the most significant action of the
campaign. While the ROK 26th Regi-
ment took up blocking positions north
of the mountains, the ROK 1st and
Cavalry Regiments attacked from the
south, in two consecutive rings. Al-
though one small group broke through
the inner ring, it was caught by the
outer circle of troops. What was believed
to be the core of the resistance forces in
South Korea perished or was taken CAPTURED GUERRILLAS, CHIRI-SAN
prisoner during this drive. When Phase area.
III ended at the close of January, over
19,000 guerrillas and bandits had been While Task Force Paik carried out its
killed or captured in the RATKILLER campaign in South Korea, action at the
operation.30 The last phase became a front was limited to the patrol clashes
mopping-up effort against light and and small forays that characterized the
scattered resistance. The ROK 8th defensive, positional war. Chinese forces
Division returned to the front in early attacked ROK 1st Division positions on
February, while the Capital Division's the western front near Punji-ri and man-
mobile units sought to catch up with the aged to drive the ROK forces off in
remnants of the guerrillas. RATKILLER early January. Later in the month, raids
officially terminated on 15 March, when by elements of the U.S. 45th Infantry
the local authorities took over the task.31 Division south of Mabang-ni drew strong
29
Ibid., p. 8. enemy reactions.32 But there was no
30
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G-3 sec., major change in the line of contact.
bk. 4, incls 1-5, pp. 4-5. Although there was little activity on
31
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Feb and Mar 52,
G-3 sec., bk. 4, incls 1-5. Although there were re- the battlefield, several interesting ex-
portedly only 8,000 guerrillas in southwestern Korea periments were conducted during the
before RATKILLER and supposedly over 9,000 were
killed and captured during the operation, Ridgway's great many innocent bystanders were caught up in
headquarters estimated in March that there were the dragnet.
32
still over 3,000 guerrillas left in the area. Either The 45th Division had just replaced the 1st
there were far more guerrillas to begin with or a Cavalry Division. See below, p. 203.
184 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
winter months. Van Fleet was rather period of respite to strengthen his defen-
disappointed in the lack of improvement sive positions. When the Eighth Army
of his artillery units. He wrote Ridgway resumed full-scale patrolling at the end
in December that until early October of the period, only a few prisoners were
"there was not a single instance in which taken.35 The stratagem was not repeated.
a 155-mm. self-propelled gun had been In a third field, the results were much
used for close direct fire destruction of more promising. The rough terrain in
enemy bunkers, although this had been Korea had proved to be well suited for
developed and extensively used by U.S. the use of helicopters. The light and
forces in World War II against the easily maneuverable aircraft could land
Siegfried Line." 33 in small clearings and evacuate the
Thus, in January, the U.S. I Corps wounded or bring in needed supplies to
artillery mounted project HIGHBOY. isolated units. In Korea the Eighth Army
Heavy artillery and armored vehicles soon discovered another use for them.
were placed on the tops of hills where On 11 November, Marine Helicopter
they could pour direct fire into the Transport Squadron 161 lifted 950
enemy positions and bunkers that could troops to the front and brought back an
not be damaged by normal artillery and equal number and the following month
mortar fire. Van Fleet noted some prog- it effected the relief of a second bat-
ress in the system of reducing enemy talion.36
fortifications located on steep mountain The performance of the Marine heli-
slopes, but the basic problem remained copters convinced General Ridgway that
unsolved.34 the multipurpose craft were vital neces-
The second experiment was more sities in Korea. He recommended that
intriguing, though perhaps even less four Army helicopter battalions be made
rewarding. Designed to confuse the available to the Far East Command to
Communists and lead them into miscues, supplement the Marine squadron. In
Operation CLAM-UP imposed silence order to insure a steady flow of replace-
along the front lines from 10-15 Febru- ment craft, he suggested that procure-
ary. No patrols were sent out; no artil- ment be started on a scale that would
lery was fired; and no air support per- permit manufacturers to expand produc-
mitted within 20,000 yards of the front. tion immediately.37
Theoretically this change of tactics was In December, Marine and Air Force
supposed to arouse the curiosity of the helicopters recorded another first. Dur-
enemy and make him think that the ing the summer of 1951, the hospital
UNC troops had pulled back from their ship USS Consolation had been fitted
positions. Then when the enemy sent with a helicopter landing platform. An-
out his patrols to investigate, the U.N.
35
Command would net a big bag of pris- UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, p. 24.
36
COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Nov-Dec 51,
oners by ambushing them. In practice, p. 1-10. For an interesting account of the develop-
the enemy was not fooled and used the ments and use of Marine helicopters in the Korean
War, see Lynn Montross, Cavalry in the Sky: The
33
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, pp. 83-84. Story of the U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New
34
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G-3 sec., an. 5, York: Harper & Brothers, 1954).
37
p. 5. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, pp. 88-89.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 185

chored at a small port on the east coast of


Korea just above the 38th Parallel, the
Consolation received 245 patients flown
in from front-line battle aid stations
during the holiday season and early
January. These were emergency cases
in which speedy attention often meant
the difference between life and death or
the loss or saving of a limb. In as little
as five minutes the egg-beaters could
make the trip from aid station to ship
and in forty-five seconds they could un-
load the wounded and clear the deck.
Even in choppy seas, when small boats
could not be used, the helicopters carried
out their mission. The success of the
operation was hailed by the captain of
the Consolation as "one of the greatest
advances made in years for handling of
battle casualties." 38
Yet despite the improved facilities
for rushing the wounded to the hospitals,
there were many who fell who were be-
yond medical help. The task of patrol- 155-MM. SELF-PROPELLED GUN
ling and probing was both monotonous
and deadly—monotonous in its dull
routine and deadly in the slow but fense in depth with its barbed wire and
steady toll of casualties that it claimed. intricate series of trenches, the accent on
No matter how cautious the commanders artillery and mortar fire and the ever-
might be in risking lives unnecessarily, lasting patrols and raids—all harked
enemy artillery and mortar fire often back to the 1914-18 period. There were
found their target and enemy ambushes many points of difference, of course, for
and probes caused the list of dead and the airplane had become far more im-
wounded to mount. It was a frustrating portant in the intervening years and
period of the war—deadlock at the truce gas warfare had been shelved. Better
negotiations at Panmunjom and stale- sanitation facilities and the discovery
mate at the front. In many ways the of DDT made life more livable
Korean ground war in 1952 seemed to in Korea than it had been in France. But
be an anomaly—a throwback to the there was no denying the similarities and
Western Front of World War I rather for troops and officers trained in the war
than a successor to World War II. The of movement, in fluid tactics, the return
static quality of the battlefield, the de- to another era necessitated a period of
38
COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan 52, pp. adjustment and many of the lessons of
10-1, 10-2. World War I had to be relearned.
186 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

EVACUATING A WOUNDED ROK SOLDIER BY HELICOPTER

Under most circumstances the drag- winter of 1951-52 a soldier had to have
ging out of the negotiations and the in- nine months of service in the combat
action at the front might have led to a zone in Korea or a total of thirty-six
deterioration in morale, but in March points. Each month at the front was
the Army G-3, General Jenkins, con- worth four points and service elsewhere
firmed Van Fleet's avowal that Eighth in Korea was valued at two points a
Army morale was high. On a trip along month. From the summer of 1951 on,
the battle trace he found both com- increasing numbers of personnel became
manders and troops were confident of eligible for relief. During the fall and
their ability to resist anything the enemy winter of 1951-52 between fifteen and
could throw at them.39 Van Fleet attrib- twenty thousand men were rotated each
uted the healthy mental state of his month and this was an important factor
troops to the liberal rotation policy that in sustaining troop morale. On the other
had been adopted early in 1951.40 hand, rotation lowered troop efficiency
To qualify for rotation during the considerably, since it became difficult to
39
maintain training standards and to fash-
Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 25 Mar 52, sub: Rpt
of Staff Visit to FEC . . . , in G-3 333 Pacific, 2. and World Report, vol. XXXII, No. 13 (March 28,
40
Interv with General Van Fleet, in U.S. News 1952).
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 187

ion battle-hardened teams as long as the and Van Fleet considered that the recov-
units remained in a state of constant flux. ery of the old capital of Korea would be
The replacements had to undergo a pe- an excellent tonic for his ROK forces.
riod of indoctrination and of testing be- If BIG STICK were ruled out, Van Fleet
fore they became battle-wise and by that wanted to try HOME COMING about 1
time another new group of replacements April.42
would be on hand to be absorbed. For- Since the negotiations at Panmunjom
tunately, the combat requirements at the were making some progress by the end
time made few demands for veteran of February, Ridgway did not favor any
troops and the rotation system worked operation that would lead to a rise in
fairly well. casualties. "Pending further orders," he
The inactivity at the front did not informed Van Fleet in early March, "of-
mean that there was a lack of planning. fensive action will be limited to such
On the contrary, during the winter and reconnaissance and counter-offensive
early spring, Van Fleet's staff forwarded measures as necessary to provide for the
plans to Ridgway setting forth a variety security of your forces." 43
of limited operations that might be car- The lack of enthusiasm for his offen-
ried out. The first arrived early in Feb- sive plans at Ridgway's headquarters did
ruary and was called BIG STICK. It pro- not prevent Van Fleet from trying again
posed to destroy the Communist supply on 1 April. Still anxious to use his ROK
complex based on Sibyon-ni and to ad- divisions in a series of limited objective
vance the Eighth Army left flank to the attacks, he set up CHOPSTICK 6 and CHOP-
Yesong River. In the process Kaesong STICK 16. The first envisaged the envel-
would be captured and four Chinese opment of the high ground south of
armies dispersed at an expected cost of P'yonggang by a reinforced ROK divi-
over 11,000 UNC casualties. BIG STICK sion, and the second laid out a two-divi-
could be mounted with present capabil- sion attack to drive the enemy from the
ities about 15 April and would use an area east and south of the Nam River
amphibious feint on the east coast by the in eastern Korea. In both plans, the
1st Marine Division to bolster its chances ROK forces would be strongly supported
of success.41 by air and artillery and could take ad-
On Washington's birthday, Van Fleet vantage of their cross-country mobility
followed up with a second offering. This and gain valuable training. Ridgway,
was a more limited operation called however, did not like the terrain on the
HOME COMING and contemplated using defensive line set up for CHOPSTICK 6,
only ROK troops. The objectives of and he turned it down. He approved
HOME COMING were similar to BIG STICK the concept of CHOPSTICK 16 on 16 April
in that the Yesong River would again be and left its execution to the discretion of
the target, but the attack toward Sibyon- Van Fleet with the proviso that no U.S.
ni and the amphibious feint would be
omitted. Kaesong would be regained 42
Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 22 Feb 52, sub:
Outline Plan HOME COMING, in Hq Eighth Army
41
Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 4 Feb 52, sub: Ltr Gen Admin Files, Feb 52, Paper 68.
43
of Transmittal, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Msg, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 2 Mar 52, in FEC
Files, Feb 52, Paper 7. Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949-52.
188 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
troops would be used and that he would Yonch'on. Company K, under 1st Lt.
be notified before the operation was car- Sylvanus Smith, was responsible for a
ried out. But, as had happened so often piece of the front about eight miles west
in the past, Van Fleet decided to suspend of Yonch'on, just to the west of the big
CHOPSTICK 16 indefinitely on 29 April— double horseshoe bend of the Imjin
the day after the package proposal was River.45 In this area the terrain was
presented at Panmunjom.44 Once again made up of small hills flanked by flat
the negotiations made their influence valleys covered with rice paddies.
felt upon the battlefield. Since the patrol mission was to bring
back prisoners, the choice of objectives
Night Patrol was extremely limited. The Chinese
maintained only three positions within
The UNC decision to forego limited patrolling distance of Company K and
objective attacks in the spring of 1952 the routes to these objectives were well
meant that the Eighth Army would con- known to both sides. As it turned out,
tinue to make contact with the enemy the 3d Battalion commander, Lt. Col.
through patrols and raids unless the Gene R. Welch, selected a position
Communists changed their tactics. From manned by what appeared to be a Chi-
an intelligence point of view patrols and nese reinforced rifle platoon, located
raids often proved to be quite futile; about 1,500 meters north of the main
few prisoners were taken and frequently line of resistance. On a boot-shaped hill,
no enemy contact was effected. Yet the called Italy, some 150 meters high, the
planning and carrying out of these activ- enemy outpost kept watch over the ac-
ities kept the front-line troops alert and tivities of the 3d Division units to the
gave them valuable experience and train- south. Five hundred meters to the east
ing under combat conditions. of Italy across a broad rice valley with
In April 1952 each Eighth Army regi- a meandering stream lay Greece, a
ment at the front usually sent out at many-ridged hill that resembled the
least one patrol and set up several am- Greek peninsula in its outline.
bushes for the enemy every night. The Lieutenant Smith drew up the patrol
assignment to carry out the daily patrol plan and had it approved at battalion
was rotated among the battalions and and regimental level. It visualized two
companies of the regiment, customarily rifle platoons reinforced by a machine
by a prepared roster indicating the re- gun section from Company M moving
sponsibility for patrols some two to three out in three groups during the evening
weeks in advance. Thus in late March, toward Italy. The security group, com-
Company K, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry posed of the machine gun section and a
Division, learned that it had drawn the rifle squad, would take its position on
assignment for 16 April. Hill 128 overlooking the valley between
The 15th Infantry, commanded by
Col. William T. Moore, occupied a sec- 45
The following account is based upon Hq
tor southwest of Ch'orwon and west of Eighth Army, Night Combat Patrol by Co K, 15th
U.S. Inf, 16-17 Apr 52, prepared by Majs
Robert H. Fechtman and William J. Fox. MS in
44
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, p. 3. OCMH.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 189

Italy and Greece. One rifle platoon, that a regimental patrol would set up an
serving as the base of fire group, would ambush on Greece that night.
move forward to Italy and halt 350 me- The majority of the riflemen carried
ters from the Chinese outpost. Once the Mi rifles with about 140 rounds of am-
base of fire group got into position, the munition and two or three hand gre-
assault platoon would pass through and nades apiece. The light machine guns
attack the outpost from the southwest. in the base of fire group were provided
Each group would have a telephone with 1,000 rounds of ammunition and
(EE-8) and a radio (SCR-300) to main- the crews also carried carbines. Each
tain contact with the others and with man wore a protective nylon vest for
battalion in case it became necessary to protection against shell fragments. In
request aid or the laying down of pre- the security group heavy machine guns
planned artillery fire along the patrol were substituted for light at the last
route. The handles were removed from moment, since they were to be used in a
the phones to eliminate the ringing and fixed support mission and the heavier
noise which might betray the patrol's mount would give more accurate over-
position and the instruments were to be head and indirect fire.
spliced into the assault line running for- A hard rain had turned the ground
ward from the main line of resistance. into a sea of mud on 16 April and the
Flare signals were arranged but not used night was dark, chilly, and windy with
during the patrol. To provide prepara- temperatures in the mid-fifties. At 2110
tion fire, two batteries of 155-mm. guns hours the security group under Lieuten-
and one battery of 105-mm. howitzers ant Smith led the way through the
would fire for five minutes after the base barbed wire and mine fields fronting the
of fire group got into position on Italy. company positions. Next came the as-
Two 105-mm. howitzers would continue sault group, led by M/Sgt. George Curry,
to fire until the assault group was ready composed of 26 men of the 2d Platoon
to attack the objective. and 3 aidmen and 2 communications
Since the patrol was to be conducted men from company headquarters. The
at night, the riflemen selected to go on base of fire group, under 2d Lt. John A.
the mission were given intensive training Sherzer, the patrol leader, completed the
in night fire techniques. Using battery- column as it sloshed through the muck
operated lights to simulate enemy fire, down into the valley below. Sherzer had
the riflemen were taught to aim low and 26 men from his own 1st Platoon, 1 aid-
take advantage of ricochets. Sand-table man, and 2 communications men. There
models of the patrol route and objective were also 12 Korean litter bearers ac-
were carefully studied and the patrol companying the assault and base of fire
leaders were flown over the whole area groups in the event of casualties.
to familiarize themselves with the ter- Smith's security force had no trouble
rain. Since most of the personnel already as they climbed Hill 128 and emplaced
had been over the ground on several their machine guns. But a sudden ex-
occasions, the members of the patrol plosion from the mine field in front of
were thoroughly briefed by the evening the company positions soon halted the
of 16 April. They were also informed assault group. Sgts. Frederick O. Brown
190 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
and William Upton went back to investi- to Italy, the base of fire group set up
gate and discovered that one of the med- four light machine guns along the bank
ics and a Korean litter bearer had startedof the small stream traversing the valley.
late. Losing their way in the dark, they With Chilquist's squad leading, Sergeant
had wandered into the mine field and Curry's force moved in single file across
tripped a mine. Fortunately the mine the exposed area along the top of an
had fallen forward into an old foxhole, earthen paddy dike where the footing
so that the blast had carried away from was less sloppy. At 3-yard intervals, the
the two men, who were unharmed. members of the platoon then began to
Brown located the approximate spot climb to the first small rise on Italy.
where the mine had exploded and noti- As the lead elements reached this spot,
fied battalion headquarters to rescue the a voice, speaking in conventional Chi-
men. nese, broke the silence. A quick word of
By the time Brown and Upton joined command, a few seconds of quiet, and
the waiting patrol, a half hour had been then the chatter of a burp gun shattered
lost. As the assault group resumed its the night. From the lower reaches of
advance and rounded the shoulder of Greece, machine gun and rifle fire swiftly
Hill 128, another element of delay en- joined in as the Chinese sprang their
tered the picture. From the 1st Battalion ambush. Evidently the enemy had set
sector off to the right, flares went off their trap along the north-south valley
lighting up the two platoons as they between Italy and Greece, expecting the
swung to the west up the valley leading patrol to approach their outpost by this
to Greece and Italy. Everytime a flare route which had been used many times
illuminated the sky, the patrol hit the by Americans in the past. Only the fact
ground and waited until the glare sub- that the ridge rather than the valley had
sided. Pleas back to the battalion to been chosen as the access path prevented
have the flares stopped were unsuc- a greater catastrophe.
cessful. The initial enemy burst tore through
The snaillike pace of the patrol was the assault patrol and hit four men. A
further slowed by the practice of halting rifle bullet pierced the protective vest of
the groups in place whenever a burnt-out Pfc. John L. Masnari, one of the BAR
cluster of huts was encountered. Cpl. men, and ripped into his chest. Mortally
William Chilquist, in charge of the lead wounded, he told his buddies not to
squad, checked the huts thoroughly to be bother about applying first aid, moaned
sure that none of the enemy was lurking slightly, asked for a priest, and then died
in the ruins. Between the flares and the a few minutes later. He was the first
three groups of huts along the route man to be killed in Korea while wearing
that had to be reconnoitered, it was well body armor. The other three men took
after 2300 hours by the time the patrol wounds in the head, arm, and leg—pain-
reached the last burnt-out settlement ful, but not critical injuries.
close to the foot of Italy. After the shock of the Chinese on-
Since the assault platoon now had to slaught wore off, the assault platoon be-
cross a broad stretch of open ground came angry and opened up with every
to get to the selected approach ridge available weapon on the enemy. Ser-
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 191

geant Curry tried the phone to inform pleas of Sergeant Brown to "get the
the other groups and battalion of his damned flares out." This meant that
situation, but the instrument did not the patrol and its wounded had to drop
work. The radio was of no assistance or be dropped quickly each time a flare
either, since the aerial had been put out dissipated the darkness. Not only did
of action by a Chinese slug. For the this delay the return of the patrol, but
moment, the assault platoon was com- the rough handling also made the trip
pletely on its own. very painful for the wounded. The men
Back at the battalion headquarters, of the base of fire platoon, in addition,
Colonel Welch knew that something had were wet and chilly from their stay in
gone wrong, but refused to lay on artil- the stream. Nevertheless, the combined
lery fire until the patrol's location could
group inched their way back toward
be pinpointed; otherwise, he might shell Company L's position, where they could
his own men. The base of fire group, in get the litters through the barbed wire
the meantime, took cover when the en- obstacles with less difficulty. At 0330
emy opened up by jumping into the hours the weary patrol crept into the 3d
hip-deep stream, since there were no Battalion lines and gratefully gulped
rocks or fences and only one tree to down the hot coffee and doughnuts that
crouch behind. One of the machine gun- awaited them.
ners was caught by an enemy burst of Meanwhile the regimental ambush
fire and took four or five bullets in hisparty set up on Greece had moved for-
leg—the only casualty in Sherzer's pla- ward and covered the area used by the
toon. Chinese to ambush Company K's patrol;
For ten minutes the two engaged pla- they found no signs of the enemy. In the
toons from Company K exchanged brisk morning, however, a battalion raiding
fire with the Chinese, then the enemy group discovered a bloody cap and a
troops withdrew. Curry's force, with number of bloody bandages on Greece,
four casualties, no communications, very indicating that the 8,000 rounds of am-
little ammunition left, and the element munition fired by the 3d Division patrol
of surprise gone, decided to pull back at the enemy had found some targets.46
and rejoin Sherzer's group. Since the Since the patrol route had been
Korean litter bearers had dropped their screened the afternoon before, the Chi-
loads and headed back toward the UNC nese evidently had sent their ambush
lines at the outbreak of the fight, Curry's
party into position during the early eve-
platoon had to carry its own dead and ning hours. Lieutenant Sherzer recom-
wounded. Using M1's and field jackets, mended that a screening force be sent
the men fashioned supplementary make- ahead of the main patrol in the future
shift litters and started back down the to guard against further ambushes. The
hill; there was no further enemy fire. battalion commander decided that in the
Shortly after midnight, the two pla- next patrol action the screening force
toons combined forces and communica- would cover the patrol route by day and
tions with headquarters were re-estab-
lished. The flares from the 1st Battalion 46
The patrol estimated that the enemy suffered
still were going off, despite the urgent five killed and twenty wounded in the fight.
192 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

then would remain in position until it had begun to concentrate on disrupting


was contacted by the night patrol. the enemy's supply lines with some suc-
Company K's experience was but one cess.47 It was not surprising, therefore,
of hundreds encountered by the Eighth that when the truce negotiations resumed
Army during the winter and spring of at Panmunjom in October and ground
1951-52. Some patrols were more suc- operations sputtered out, the interdic-
cessful and managed to bring back a pris- tion or STRANGLE operations received top
oner. Others exchanged shots with the priority.
enemy and inflicted casualties, but made By striking at enemy communication
no close contact. Many returned with lines and supply points, the U.N. Com-
negative reports, for they had found no mand could take full advantage of its
one to capture or even to shoot at. dominance of the air over North Korea
Patrol, raid, and ambush by the Eighth and make good use of the mobile fire-
Army was matched by similar action by power represented in its air forces. The
the Communists, for this was the pattern destruction of enemy equipment and war
of ground fighting for the period. matériel would hinder the development
Taken as a whole the ground war of reserve stocks so necessary for a sus-
from November 1951 to April 1952 pro- tained offensive, and the disruption of
duced few surprises and little change transportation lines would further snarl
in the defensive positions held by either the logistics problems facing the Com-
side. The Chinese dragon kept to his munists. Even on minimum rations, the
caves and bunkers and appeared chiefly feeding and supplying of one-half to
at night, while the American eagle de- three-quarters of a million men repre-
voted his activity to the sky and hunted sented a real challenge to the enemy so
mostly by day. As the pressure on the long as UNC planes ranged constantly
ground subsided, the emphasis on the overhead.
war in the air mounted. The Air Force, Thus, during the November to April
Marine, and Navy planes and pilots pro- period, the Far East Air Forces averaged
vided the main offensive punch during over 9,000 sorties a month on interdic-
the long winter. tion and armored reconnaissance mis-
sions while close air support sorties
Interdiction and Harassment varied from 339 to 2,461 a month.48 Al-
though the interdiction campaign was
The term "offensive punch" may be a undertaken with the approval of General
trifle misleading in the case of the air Van Fleet, the disparity between the two
interdiction campaign in Korea, since efforts occasioned some comment at the
basically this was a defensive action. It time and in this connection the FEAF
was designed as a preventive measure to commander, General Weyland, later
keep the Communists from building up wrote a defense of the distribution that
sufficient supplies and ammunition to bears repeating:
launch a general offensive rather than as
47
preparation or support for a UNC at- 48
See Chapter V, above.
(1) FEAF, Comd Rpts, Nov 51-Apr 52, vol. I.
tack. During the summer and early fall (2) FEAF Command Reference Book, May 1952,
of 1951 both Air Force and Navy efforts p 11.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 193

I might suggest that all of us should keep or a direct hit by a bomb had any effect
in mind limitations of air forces as well as upon him. Airplanes could not possibly
their capabilities. Continuous close support provide the former and found it ex-
along a static front requires dispersed and
sustained firepower against pinpoint tar- tremely difficult to carry out pinpoint
gets. With conventional weapons there is no bombing of such small and well-camou-
opportunity to exploit the characteristic flaged targets. As long as the war re-
mobility and firepower of air forces against mained static, interdiction seemed to be
worthwhile concentrations. In a static situa- the most efficient use of the UNC air
tion close support is an expensive substitute
for artillery fire. It pays its greatest divi- capability.
dends when the enemy's sustained capa- The other side of the coin was the
bility has been crippled and his logistics effect of the interdiction campaign upon
cut to a minimum while his forces are im- the enemy. As the pace of STRANGLE
mobilized by interdiction and armed re- quickened in November, Air Force and
connaissance. Then decisive efforts can be
obtained as the close support effort is Navy pilots sought to cripple the rail-
massed in coordination with determined roads of North Korea. Fighters and
ground action. fighter-bombers attacked locomotives,
Thus in the fall of 1951 it would have railroad cars, and vehicular traffic as well
been sheer folly not to have concentrated without serious challenge from the Com-
the bulk of our effort against interdiction
targets in the enemy rear areas. Otherwise munist air forces. Light bombers (B-
the available fire power would have been 26's) covered the main supply routes at
expended ineffectively against relatively in- night and medium bombers (B-29's)
vulnerable targets along the front, while kept the enemy airfields unserviceable in
the enemy was left free to build up his addition to bombing marshaling yards
resources to launch and sustain a general
offensive. Such a general offensive, if it and flying close support missions.50 On
could have been sustained with adequate 18 November carrier-based aircraft in-
supplies and ammunition, might well have augurated a combined program of bridge
been decisive. Failure to appreciate these and rail destruction. Naval reconnais-
facts caused some adverse comment about sance jets carrying 1,000-pound bomb
the amount of close support given the
Army, particularly during late 1951 and loads were sent out regularly for the first
early 1952.49 time in the war against rail facilities and
proved to be excellent at cutting roads.
In view of the situation on the ground By December it often took the enemy as
in this period, there was considerable much as three days to repair the railroad
justice in Weyland's observations. There breaks he had previously restored in a
were no important ground offensives that single day. Yet, despite this, rail traffic
got beyond the tentative planning or continued to move.51 The Communists
contingent phase and even limited ob- succeeded in bringing up and issuing
jective attacks found little favor after winter clothing to the troops even
November 1951. With the enemy well though it often had to be hand-carried on
dug in and protected by heavy overhead a piecemeal basis. Interdiction made
shelter, only accurate flat trajectory fire
49 50
General Otto P. Weyland, "The Air Campaign FEAF, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, vol. I, p. 24.
51
in Korea" in Air University Quarterly Review, vol. COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Nov-Dec 51,
6, No. 3 (Fall, 1953), pp. 20-21. pp. 1-3, 1-4.
194 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
transportation more difficult, but not im- his forces as well, the UNC commander
possible.52 maintained, and improvement of Com-
One reason for the failure of STRANGLE munist Countermeasures and repair ca-
to live up to the expectations of the op- pabilities would weaken the effects of
timistic code name was the ingenuity of the interdiction program in the future.54
the enemy in devising Countermeasures In other words, although the enemy was
to negate the interdiction program. At being hurt and impeded in his build-up,
the key railroad junction at Sunch'on, Ridgway believed that unless there was
northeast of P'yongyang, pilots reported a change in the battle situation in which
in early November that the railroad the Communists were forced to increase
bridge was still out of service since two their expenditures of supplies and am-
spans were missing. It was only after a munition, eventually they would be in a
night photo was taken that the U.N. position to launch and sustain a major
Command discovered that the Commu- offensive.
nists brought up removable spans each Contrary to the usual pattern of
night and had been using the bridge events, things improved before they got
right along.53 worse. During January, the carriers
Early in January, General Ridgway Essex, Valley Forge and Antietam de-
sent his assessment of the interdiction voted their attention to track cutting.
program to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each carrier was assigned two or three
He was convinced that the air campaign 12-mile sectors to cut and naval aircraft
had slowed down the enemy's supply subjected stretches from 1,500 to 4,000
operations, and raised the time required yards in length to such concentrated
to get supplies to the front. It had also bombing that almost total destruction
diverted personnel and material from of the roadbed resulted. They then fol-
the front to maintain and protect the lowed up by constant surveillance to pre-
line of communications. By destroying vent quick repair. This shift in tactics
rail and road transportation and a sig- evidently caught the enemy by surprise
nificant quantity of the goods carried, and cuts remained unrepaired for as
interdiction had placed increased de- much as ten days. During the last two
mands upon the production facilities of weeks in January the rail line from
Communist China and the USSR. These Kowon to Wonsan was kept out of oper-
were all valuable, Ridgway went on, but ation.55
under static defense conditions the Com- To meet the UNC challenge, the en-
munists were still able to support their emy shifted his antiaircraft guns to the
troops adequately, and the UNC air threatened areas and began to take a
forces within their current resources heavier toll of the attacking planes. In
could not hope to prevent them from turn, the naval planes sought to counter-
continuing to do so. Over a period of act the antiaircraft concentration. A flak
time the enemy could manage to stock- suppression strike was mounted with jets
pile supplies at the front and to build up
54
Msg, C 60744, Ridgway to JCS, 4 Jan 52, DA-IN
52
UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Dec 51, p. 37. 16359.
53 55
USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan 52, pp.
Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, pp. 149-51. 1-2, 1-3.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 195

hitting the antiaircraft just before the full use of the many tunnels in the moun-
prop-driven planes arrived to bomb the tainous terrain to conceal their trains
rail lines. This proved effective espe- during the daylight hours. Ammunition
cially after photoreconnaissance had and fuel cars were placed in the middle
spotted antiaircraft positions in ad- section of the trains, so that UNC at-
vance.56 tempts to skip bombs into the tunnel
In addition to heavier flak concentra- mouths resulted merely in temporarily
tions, the Communists also used their blocking the entrances. With local labor
manpower resources to the hilt. The the Communists were able to clear the
North Korean railroad bureau had three debris quickly and proceed on their way
brigades of 7,700 men each that devoted by nightfall.59
full time to railroad repair. At each At any rate the returns from STRANGLE
major station 50 men were assigned to became less and less in the face of the
handle the more skilled tasks and 10- Communist Countermeasures and the
man teams were spaced every four miles costs mounted. Even the weather seemed
along the tracks. As soon as a rail walker designed to help the enemy, for as
reported a break, these units swung into the ground froze many of the bombs
action. Local labor was rushed to the bounced off the hard surface and ex-
scene to refill the holes and rebuild road- ploded harmlessly in the air. Some even
beds. At night the experienced crews sent their blast upwards and damaged
could move in and restore the ties and low-flying UNC planes. Finally, in
rails. The Fifth Air Force estimated that March, after the spring thaws began,
as many as 500,000 soldiers and civilians FEAF decided to initiate a new phase,
were engaged at one time or another in which was called SATURATE, based on the
counteracting STRANGLE.57 tactics used by the Navy in January. By
The increasing effectiveness of the focusing the destructive power of the
Communist crews and labor forces was air forces upon a specific stretch of
attested by the naval pilots in February: roadbed on an around-the-clock basis,
"The Communists have constantly been FEAF hoped to wreak havoc with rail
able to repair a given stretch of track service. An intense effort on 25-26
on a vital rail line in twelve hours or March against the line between Chongju
less. On occasion repair crews were and Sinanju proved disappointing. Al-
found repairing fresh cuts while strikes though 307 fighter-bombers, 161 fighters,
were still being made." 58 Primitive as and 8 B-26's were used in the strikes,
his tools and methods might be, the the Communists repaired the breaks in
enemy managed to restore service six days and in the meantime, other
quickly and that was all that counted in portions of the rail net were free from
this battle of machines against men. interference.60
The Communists were also making The greatest weakness in the cycle of
rail attack lay in the inability of the
56
57
Ibid.,pp.1-4. UNC to devise effective techniques to
USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the
59
Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, 157. Ibid., Mar 52, pp. 2-4.
58 60
COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Feb 52, pp. USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the
1-4. Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, pp. 153-54.
196 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
continue the bombing at night and dur- Although the interdiction operations
ing the foul weather. Despite the con- in the air were more widely publicized,
stant destruction of rail and bridges by naval surface vessels also contributed to
day, the enemy was organized to cope the effort, especially along the eastern
with the air assault and repair the dam- coast of North Korea. During poor flying
age quickly at night and during poor weather the 5-inch guns of the fleet de-
flying weather. By the end of April the stroyers kept the coastal railroad under
interdiction campaign had reached an fire. The destroyer barrages could not
impasse. Based upon past experience, it make the initial break in the rails, but
was evident that the air forces available they could help keep the line cut by har-
to General Ridgway could not maintain assing fire.63
the sustained effort required to keep the Heavy naval ships concentrated on
railroads inoperable. And obversely, it troop targets along the east coast. The
was also apparent by this time that the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin,
large augmentations that would be the heavy cruisers Toledo, Los Angeles,
needed to do the job adequately were Rochester, and St. Paul, and the light
out of the question.61 cruiser Manchester supported the ROK
In assessing the value of interdiction, I Corps during November and Decem-
Eighth Army had these thoughtful words ber close to the bomb line.64 Farther
to pass on to Ridgway in mid-March: north British Royal Marine Commando
units carried out several raids on Tan-
The success of the interdiction program ch'on and one on Wonsan Harbor during
can best be estimated by assuming its December. In the meantime, the Com-
absence. If there had been no Operation munists became active on the west coast.
STRANGLE the enemy would now have a rail
head in the vicinity of SIBYON-NI served Under cover of night they landed raiding
by an excellent double track line and in parties on offshore islands held by ROK
the central sector he would have another adherents north of the 38th Parallel.
important rail head somewhere between The vulnerability of many of these is-
PYONGGANG and SEPO-RI. In this
event, his expenditure of artillery and lands lying close to the coast to seizure
mortar ammunition could have been in- by determined enemy efforts led Ad-
creased many times. miral Joy to seek ways and means to
The air interdiction program has not strengthen the guerrilla garrisons. By
been able to prevent the enemy from ac- adding ROK Marine units as reinforce-
cumulating supplies at the front in a static
situation. It has, however, been a major ments to the guerrillas, Joy hoped to
factor in preventing the enemy from attain- stiffen their defensive capabilities.65 On
ing equality or superiority in artillery and 6 January the responsibility for island
other weapons employed at the front. Thus defense north of the 38th Parallel was
it has also decreased the offensive and de- turned over to the Navy, and Task Force
fensive capability of the enemy.62
95 was given the task of providing sup-
61
See below, Chapters XIV and XV.
62 63
Ltr, with incls, Lt George F. Bless, AG, to COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Nov-Dec 51,
CINCFE, 19 Mar 52, sub: Air Interdiction Program, pp.64 2-7.
in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Mar 52, 65 Ibid., pp. 2-2.
Paper 21. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 2-10.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 197

port for the ROK marines and guerrillas The commander in chief of the U.S.
holding the outposts.66 Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur W. Rad-
As the island defenses were tightened, ford, picked up the idea of a China
the Communists encountered more re- sweep in March, but General Ridgway,
sistance in their amphibious operations. too, had some doubts. He told Radford
In February a battalion-sized attack on that while he favored such an operation
the island of Yang-do about twenty at an opportune moment, he felt that it
miles northeast of Songjin on the east would cause adverse political repercus-
coast was repulsed as United States and sions if it were carried out at that time.
New Zealand surface vessels helped the Under the circumstances, Ridgway pre-
ROK marines and guerrillas. Eleven ferred to hold off and wait for further
sampans were sunk by naval gunfire and developments at Panmunjom.70
over 75 of the attacking forces were The postponement of the carrier
killed.67 After this setback the enemy sweep delayed the introduction of a
shifted his attack back to the west coast change in pace in naval operations until
and in March overwhelmed the Korean the following month. In mid-April, how-
Marine garrison on Ho-do which lay ever, the carriers Boxer and Philippine
about twenty miles southwest of Chin- Sea sent out four strikes against the im-
namp'o. Although the enemy withdrew portant communications center of
after three days, Ho-do was not reoccu- Ch'ongjin and dropped 200 tons of heavy
pied since it lay too close to the mainland bombs on the city. From the sea the
and was open to follow-up raids.68 cruiser St. Paul and three destroyers
While the battle for the islands went fired their 8- and 5-inch guns at Ch'ong-
on, the JCS considered the possibility of jin for a whole day. Not only was con-
introducing a more dramatic note into siderable damage done to installations,
the war. In early February they recom- but the naval pilots also got welcome
mended that the Air Force and the Navy relief from the monotonous rail inter-
conduct a sweep along the China coast diction campaign.71
to spur the Chinese in the peace negotia- Naval operations during the Novem-
tions. But the State Department did not ber-April period produced little major
want to cause Prime Minister Churchill excitement. The North Korean port of
any further embarrassment. Since Brit- Wonsan received its daily bombardment
ish opposition leaders had been accusing and mine sweepers ploughed their way
Churchill of approving new courses of with regularity along the coast. Almost
action in the Korean War during his every month hits were scored on UNC
January visit to Washington, the State vessels by the Communist shore batteries,
Department felt that a China sweep at but the damages were usually small and
this time would tend to confirm these the casualties low. The interdiction cam-
suspicions.69 paign occupied the bulk of the carrier
66
Ibid., Jan 52, pp. 2-6, 2-7. planes, but the Marine air squadrons
67
Ibid., Feb 52, pp. 2-3, 3-6.
68 70
Ibid., Mar 52, pp. 2-6, 2-7. Msg, CX 65327, CINCFE to CINCPAC, 15 Mar
69
Memo, Fechteler for Secy Defense, 8 Feb 1952, 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1, incl 4.
71
sub: Proposed Sweep Along the China Coast, in COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Apr 52, pp.
G-3 091 China, 4/2. 1-4.
198 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

INDUSTRIAL AREA OF CH'ONGJIN AFTER AIR AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT

managed to devote most of their attack gotiations upon the battlefield was dem-
to close air support missions. Normal onstrated time and time again during
blockade and reconnaissance operations the winter and spring of 1951-52. In
continued as in the past, with a close the shuffle one offensive plan after an-
watch on the enemy build-up. Although other was examined and discarded either
there was no significant change in the use as being too costly in casualties or too
of the Communist air potential during likely to have an adverse influence upon
the period, the danger of sudden and the course of negotiations. Some of the
powerful strikes was always a possibility ramifications of the pursuit of the "active
and the UNC naval forces had to remain defense" have already been considered
alert and ready for hostile air action. in connection with the ground, air, and
sea campaigns, but there were others
The Shifting of the Balance that deserve to be examined.
As soon as the war settled down into
The paralyzing effect of the truce ne- its static phase, the number of casualties
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 199

dropped dramatically. Estimates of first of the year.74 The North Koreans


Communist casualties fell from 80,000 evidently were not required to do more
in October 1951 to 50,000 in November, than maintain their forces at about 225,-
to 20,000 a month in December and 000 men during the last months of
January, and then hovered between the 1951.75
11-13,000 a month mark through The UNC, on the other hand, chose
April.72 During the same period the the third alternative. During the six
UNC battle casualty rate decreased from months between 1 November and 30
20,000 in October to 11,000 in Novem- April, U.S. ground force strength, includ-
ber, to 3,000 a month in December and ing the marines, dropped from 264,670
January and remained under the 2,500- to 260,479. Each month between 16,000
a-month mark from February through and 28,000 replacements were sent out
April.73 from the United States and men who
The sinking casualty figures could had served enough time at the front to
have a number of end results: an ex- qualify for rotation were sent home. As
panding replacement pool; a cutback in has been noted before, the policy helped
the number of replacements requisi- to sustain morale but it also served to
tioned each month to keep the front-line depress the relative strength of the UNC
units up to strength; or the initiation of ground forces vis-à-vis the Communists.
a rotation program to relieve front-line Despite a small increase in the contribu-
troops. The Communists decided on the tions of the other U.N. countries—from
first course of action in their desire to 33,258 to 35,912—and an almost 60,000-
improve their position vis-à-vis the U.N. man rise in ROK ground force strength
Command. From a low of 377,000 men —from 281,800 to 341,113—during the
on 1 November, the Chinese Commu- same six months' span, enemy superior-
nists grew to an estimated 570,000 on 1 ity in manpower continued to mount.76
December and a total of 642,000 by the Just how much the enemy had im-
72
Estimates of enemy casualties under fixed posi-
proved his military position since the
tional war conditions are difficult to confirm and initiation of negotiations in July became
probably tend to be excessively high. During the apparent in a comparative estimate sub-
November-April period the UNC estimated that the
Communists suffered 88,000 dead and 40,000 mitted by the Army G-2, Maj. Gen.
wounded, a proportion of two killed to one wounded. Alexander R. Bolling, in late April. In
Contrast this rather unusual statistic with the more
74
normal proportion of UNC casualties during the UNC/FEC, Comd Rpts, Nov, Dec 51. There were
same period—4,600 killed, 21,000 wounded, and 800 8 Chinese armies on the front with 6 armies and 1
missing in action, a ratio of one death to four other armored division in reserve behind the front and 3
casualties. Statistics may be found in the UNC/FEC armies and 2 infantry divisions in the rear reserve
reports for the period. at the end of December. In addition there were
73
Naturally there were also many nonbattle casual- 5 artillery divisions and 35,000 security troops. See
ties—victims of sickness and accidents—and these Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, bk. 3, G-2
were usually far more numerous than the battle sec., incls 5-8.
75
casualties. The Greek Battalion, however, after a Ibid. There were still seven N.K. corps plus a
year in Korea, reported only 79 nonbattle casualties mechanized division (the 17th) and the N.K. 23d
as opposed to 350 battle casualties, a complete re- Brigade. Only three corps—the I, II, and III—were
versal of the usual ratio. Investigation revealed that at the front and all were located in the east coast
the Greeks simply held no sick call. See Memo, sector.
76
Jenkins for CofS, 25 Mar 52, sub: Rpt of Staff DF, OCA to OCMH, 31 Jul 53, sub: ROK and
Visit to FEC, in G-3 333 Pacific, 2. UN Ground Forces Strength in Korea. In OCMH.
200 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the ten months, enemy strength mounted December, but thereafter the total de-
from 502,000 with 72 divisions to 866,- clined to about 2,300 in April. After 1
000 with 82 divisions. Artillery sup- January they made little attempt to keep
plies quintupled from 8,000 rounds to their airfields in North Korea serviceable
over 40,000 rounds and artillery units and few enemy fighters strayed south of
climbed from 4 CCF divisions and some Sinanju.79 The air potential was there,
underequipped North Korean units to but like the ground challenge, it seemed
8 CCF divisions and 4 well-equipped to be latent rather than patent during
N.K. brigades. From practically no the dormant phase of the war.
armor in July, the Communists now had Despite the quiescence of the enemy,
2 Chinese armored divisions, 1 North General Ridgway and his staff were wor-
Korean armored division, and 1 mech- ried about the growth of Communist air
anized division, with an estimated 520 power. As he told the JCS in December,
tanks and self-propelled guns. Most of he believed that he needed a total of
the new material was of Russian design eight F-86 Sabrejet wings to maintain
or manufacture. Supply problems had a bare numerical parity with the enemy
lessened for the Communist forces dur- in fighter-interceptor strength.80 But his
ing the negotiation interval and the message met with little encouragement
combat efficiency of the enemy had in Washington. The Joint Strategic
shown steady improvement.77 Certainly Plans Committee pointed out that Ridg-
the Communists had made good use of way had five squadrons of F-86's or one
the respite generated by the truce talks and two-thirds wings now. To provide
and were in excellent position to con- him with six and one-third more wings
tinue the stalemate as long as it suited was impossible, since U.S. production
them. amounted to only thirteen planes a
In the air a similar development had month and Canada's production of
taken place. Bolling estimated that the twenty a month was committed to
Communists had raised their forces in NATO. The JCS realized that they
Manchuria from about 500 planes in could not fill Ridgway's request, but they
July to approximately 1,250 in April, of attempted to work out a lesser increase.
which about 800 were Russian jets. In early January a carrier was being sent
Seventy-five transports had also been to the Pacific and he could have that if
added to the enemy air fleet.78 Actually he wanted it; there was also one Marine
the Communist air forces had imitated jet squadron due to arrive in the west-
the pattern set forth on the ground. Al- ern Pacific in January that could be as-
though their air capability had increased signed to the Far East Command.81
steadily, they had made no serious at- These were frankly stopgap measures,
tempt to challenge the UNC during the
79
winter and early spring. They flew an FEAF Comment to Staff Study, 24 Apr 52, in
JSPOG Staff Study No. 407. Korean Air Opns 12
estimated peak of 4,000 jet sorties in Dec 51.
80
Msg, CX 59092, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Dec 51, DA-
77
Memo, Bolling for ACofS G-2, 25 Apr 52, sub: IN 8325.
81
SE-25, Communist Short Term Intentions in Korea, (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 14 Dec 51, sub:
in G-3 091 Korea, 59. Augmentation of FEAF, in G-3 320.2 Pacific, 81/2.
78
Ibid. (2) Msg, JCS 89641, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Dec 51.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 201

but the Air Force staff examined its re- carriers due for retirement as a result of
sources and quickly came up with several the reconversion program then under
suggestions. Three squadrons of F-94 way. The Air Force opposed the reten-
Starfire all-weather fighters could be tion since it thought that the Navy could
spared from the Air Defense Command transfer two carriers from the Atlantic-
in the United States although it would Mediterranean on a temporary basis. In
mean sending pilots who had already the absence of agreement on this matter
served a tour in Korea back again. The among the JCS, Secretary Lovett ruled
Air Force also wanted to have the State that the Navy was justified in hanging on
Department negotiate the release of sev- to the carriers as long as there was no
enty-five F-86's in the U.K. and seventy- sign of settlement in the Far East and
five in Canada which could then be the possibility of a widening of the war
shipped to Korea if crews were available. existed. If reduction was made in
This would cut Canadian air defense to American naval forces in the European
a minimum and delay the build-up of area, unfortunate political repercussions
NATO air forces, but under the circum- might result. The President agreed and
stances, Army planners joined their Air Ridgway was informed that he could
Force counterparts in supporting Ridg- keep the additional carrier until either
way's need for additional air power as a truce was arranged or his air forces
being more urgent.82 were built up to a point where he could
As it turned out, the upshot of all the release the carrier.84
efforts to increase Ridgway's fighter Ridgway was less fortunate in his plea
force was a fairly modest augmentation, to the Chief of Staff for additional anti-
but considering the complicated factors aircraft battalions. It will be remem-
involved it was a good try. One squadron bered that Collins had granted him an
of F-94's was sent to the Far East Com- increase of 5 battalions in mid-1951 and
mand in February and the United States 4 of these had arrived in the theater by
made arrangements with the Canadian November. But the growth of enemy
Government to purchase sixty F-86's at air power and the construction of several
ten per month. Adding this to the U.S. UNC airfields had created new require-
production available would enable Ridg- ments for antiaircraft defense. Accord-
way to achieve by June two operational ingly, in January, the Far East com-
full strength F-86 wings that would be mander asked for 9 more battalions to
backed by a 50-percent reserve.83 be sent as soon as possible. In this
The carrier Philippine Sea arrived in instance, he encountered a stone wall.
the Far East in January to fulfill the JCS There were no AAA battalions that
promise of another carrier, but Admiral could be spared, Collins told him, in
William M. Fechteler, the Chief of view of the many world-wide U.S. com-
Naval Operations, notified the JCS that mitments.85
it could not remain permanently unless 84
Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 5 Feb 1952, sub:
the Navy were allowed to retain two Deployment of Aircraft Carriers to the Western
Pacific, in G-3 320.2 Pacific, 2.
82 85
Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 27 Dec 51, sub: Air (1) Msg, CX 61561, CINCFE to DA, 16 Jan 52,
Reinforcement for Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 219. DA-IN 945. (2) Msg, DA 92425, CSUSA to CINCFE,
83
Msg, JCS 900404, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Feb 1952. 18 Jan 52.
202 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Lack of action on the battlefield risk in leaving Japan partially exposed
dimmed prospects for large augmenta- temporarily to be far less than the threat
tions to the UNC but did permit several in Korea. Furthermore, he pointed out
shifts within the command. Without to Collins, many of the National Guards-
doubt the most important of these trans- men in the 40th and 45th would come
fers involved the movement of the U.S. to the end of their term of service in
45th and 40th Infantry Divisions from August 1952 and would have to be sent
Japan to Korea to take the places of the home. He recommended that one Na-
1st Cavalry Division and the 24th In- tional Guard division be shipped to
fantry Division. Korea and then, at an opportune mo-
On the surface this appeared to be a ment, one of the combat divisions could
routine rotation of divisions, but actually be withdrawn and rotated to Japan.
there was considerable background to This process could be repeated later on
the exchange. The 40th and 45th were with the second division. Both the JCS
both National Guard divisions that had and the President approved of this pro-
been sent to Japan in April 1951 to finish cedure in mid-September.88
their training while furnishing extra But Ridgway was not convinced. He
security for Japan. In view of the inter- held that until at least 15 November the
est of Congress in the commitment of danger of a Soviet move against Japan
National Guard divisions to combat, the would still be possible. The Russian re-
Army sought and received confirmation action to the Japanese peace treaty was
from Ridgway in July that he did not as yet unclear and the situation in Ger-
intend to commit either of the divisions many was also doubtful. He urged post-
to combat piecemeal.86 ponement of any movement until
In August the JCS informed Ridgway November when the matter could be re-
that they wanted the divisions employed viewed. In the light of Ridgway's
in Korea when they completed their reclama, the JCS, with Presidential ap-
training and the U.N. commander proval, rescinded their directive to effect
agreed. But the development of the sum- the National Guard transfer.89
mer offensive caused Ridgway to change When early November arrived, Ridg-
his mind. He did not want to give up way changed his reasons for objecting to
combat-wise divisions for untrained the shift of the two divisions to Korea.
troops as long as there was any danger Although the Eighth Army had com-
of an enemy counteroffensive. Besides, pleted the fall offensive by this time,
he told the JCS, a transfer would disrupt Ridgway did not want to reduce its com-
his ability to defend Japan for a period bat effectiveness in case other operations
of three months while the transfer was might be carried out to put pressure
taking place.87
In Washington, the Army G-3, Gen- 88
(1) Memo, Jenkins to CofS, 14 Sep 51, sub:
eral Jenkins, disagreed. He thought the Rotation of 40th and 45th Divs to Korea, in G-3
320.2 Pacific, 60/18. (2) Msg, DA 81600, G-3 to
86
Summary Sheet, Jenkins for CofS, 10 Aug 51, Eddleman, 15 Sep 51.
89
sub: Employment of 40th and 45th Infantry Divs, in (1) Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep 51, DA-IN
G-3 320.2 Pacific, 60/15. 17897. (2) Msg, JCS 82084, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Sep
87
Msg, CINCFE to DA, 3 Sep 51, DA-IN 12693. 51.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 203

upon the enemy in the negotiations. In- speeded up the whole exchange proce-
stead he urged that restrictions against dure.93
using the National Guard divisions for The 45th and 1st Cavalry Divisions
replacements be lifted.90 began their rotation cycle in early De-
General Collins would have no part cember. As the first echelon—the 180th
of this. In his opinion an attempt to Infantry Regiment—arrived on 5 De-
break up the divisions would invoke a cember, it was assigned to the U.S. I
storm of protests from Congress and im- Corps. Two days later, the 5th Cavalry
ply that the National Guard divisions Regiment sailed for Hokkaido to be-
were not fit for combat duty after a year come part of the U.S. XVI Corps. On 17
of training. He informed Ridgway that December the 179th Regiment reached
it appeared mandatory to use the divi- Inch'on and the following day the 7th
sions as units as soon as possible before Cavalry Regiment left for Japan. The
their time expired.91 final echelon—the 279th Regiment-
The Chief of Staff's arguments settled came into Korea on 29 December and on
the matter. On 20 November, General the 30th the 8th Cavalry Regiment com-
Hickey told Van Fleet that the 45th Di- pleted the exchange. By that time the
vision would begin its movement in 180th Regiment had taken its place on
December to replace the 1st Cavalry Di- the line and received its baptism of fire.94
vision.92 With the experience of this shift under
When the actual transfer began, the its belt, the Far East Command pre-
Far East Command employed a tech- pared for the second step. The warning
nique that had been developed during order for the exchange of the 40th Di-
World War II in the Pacific. In 1944 vision and the 24th Division was issued
the 38th Division had been shipped to in December and in early January the
Hawaii, disembarked, and had taken movement commenced. The 24th Divi-
over the quarters, equipment, and weap- sion left behind the 5th Infantry Regi-
ons of the 6th Division. The 6th had ment which had been attached to it in
been loaded on the ships that had Korea, since it was contemplated that
brought the 38th and had then been sent the 34th Infantry Regiment which was
to the Southwest Pacific. By using the organic to the 24th Division would rejoin
same shipping for both relieving and re- it in Japan. By early February the 40th
lieved elements and swapping all heavy Division had taken over the responsibil-
equipment and supplies, all the men ity of the 24th in the IX Corps area near
would have to carry would be personal Kumsong. The smoothness of the oper-
arms and equipment. It was an econom- ation was reflected in the story of the
ical method that obviated on- and off- gunner in a 24th Division artillery unit
loading of divisional equipment and who was engaged in carrying out a fire
mission. He reportedly passed the lan-
90 93
Msg, C 56484, CINCFE to DA, 3 Nov 51, DA-IN See Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Co-
15036. alition Warfare, 1943-1944, UNITED STATES IN
91
Msg, DA 87224, Collins to CINCFE, 16 Nov 51. WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), p. 463.
92 94
Ltr of Instr, Hickey to CG Eighth Army, 20 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, G-3 sec.,
Nov 51, no sub, in G-3 320.2 Pacific, 80. bk. 4, incls 1-5, pp. 4-5.
204 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

yard to his 40th Division replacement in Korea. The French Government


and set out for the waiting trucks while wished to withdraw its battalion from
his guns sent a 40th Division salute to the line for three months while replace-
his departure at the enemy.95 ments were brought in and the battalion
All in all, the divisional exchanges was reorganized. But Van Fleet strongly
were very efficiently carried out with a opposed this procedure. Instead he
minimum of disruption to the fighting urged that the participating nations
strength of the Eighth Army. In assess- send a trained replacement unit to
ing tht performance of the 40th and Korea. After its arrival the exchange
45th Divisions in April, the Eighth Army could be carried out in the immediate
G-3 concluded that the combat effective- rear area with no loss of combat effective-
ness of the two new divisions after a short ness to the Eighth Army.98 Van Fleet's
period in combat was equal to the old recommendations were approved and
divisions that had been decimated by the rotation of U.N. units followed this
rotation program.96 method of relief in the future.
Although the exchange of the four In late March the first increment
divisions was the largest during the six- of an Ethiopian replacement battalion
month period under consideration, lesser reached Korea and the Ethiopian rotat-
moves were also effected to take advan- ees returned home on the same ships.
tage of the static phase of the war. In And in April the Australian Govern-
March the ROK 8th Division completed ment sent a second infantry battalion—
its role in the antiguerrilla campaign the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian
and relieved the 1st Marine Division on Regiment—to join its sister 3d Battal-
the U.S. X Corps front. Van Fleet moved ion.99
the marines to the west flank on 25 The lull on the battlefield also per-
March and pulled back the ROK 1st mitted General Van Fleet to reconstitute
Division. He felt that the marines' am- in early April the ROK II Corps which
phibious capability could be exploited had been eliminated after the Com-
in the anchor position and in the mean- munists had twice overrun it, once in the
time Seoul could be better protected.97 fall of 1950 and then again in early 1951.
The rotation problem also struck some The new ROK II Corps consisted of the
of the United Nations units that had ROK 3d, 6th, and Capital Divisions and
been in Korea for a year or more. In was commanded by General Paik Sun
November Van Fleet established the Yup. The corps boundaries between the
pattern for rotation of non-U.S. forces U.S. IX and X Corps were redrawn and
95
the ROK II assumed control of a sector
The problems and solutions to the 40th Divi-
sion-24th Division movement are set forth in Capt.
from Kumsong to T'ongson'gol, fifteen
James L. Holton, "Operation Changey-Changey" in miles to the southeast.100 (Map IV)
National Defense Transportation Journal, vol. VIII,
98
No. 3 (May-June, 1952). (1) Msg, DA 86544, G-3 to CINCFE, 10 Nov
96
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, G-3 sec., 51. (2) Msg, G 2932 TAC, CE Eighth Army to
bk. 4, incl 1-5. CINCFE, 12 Nov 51, in Hq Eighth Army Opnl
97
(1) Msg, E 4871 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 9 Planning Files, Nov 51.
99
Mar 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin File, Mar UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, pp. 85-95.
100
52. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, sec. Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, G-3 sec.,
I, Narrative. bk. 4, incls 1-5.
"THE ACTIVE DEFENSE" 205

There was little question but that ro- carefully leashed, the center of attraction
tation and realignment of troops were shifted to the air war. The Communist
made fairly simple by the absence of transport and supply network was crip-
activity on the ground, but the over-all pled by the interdiction campaign and
effect could only mean at best the main- enemy capabilities were sufficiently
tenance of the status quo for the U.N. blunted so that a major attack no longer
Command. At the worst it could lead to appeared likely.
a weakening of Ridgway's forces as ro- The enemy was stronger and better
tation drained off his experienced com- prepared by April 1952, but still not
bat troops and replaced them with eager to change the tenor of the war.
unproven soldiers. As long as there was no break in the
In the meantime the enemy had im- negotiations and there were no outstand-
proved his defenses, increased his forces, ing pressures on the battlefield, the Com-
and stockpiled supplies. Six months of munists appeared ready to continue their
the "active defense" had produced a present tactics of defense at the front
monotonous war of position with the and attack in the discussions and in the
Communists now firmly ensconced be- propaganda field. The UNC, on the
hind well-prepared and fortified defense other hand, pursued the defense all along
lines. The patrol and the ambush, remi- the line with the possible exception of
niscent of the Indian wars in the nine- the air and sea war and even these could
teenth century, furnished the chief action be termed as much defensive as offensive.
on the ground, but even these encounters And, behind the UNC lines, other prob-
were limited to a very small scale. lems, produced in part as by-products
With the ground forces on both sides of the static war, came to light.
CHAPTER X

Behind the Lines


A settlement of the truce negotiations ever, an event of considerable impor-
or a continuation of the hot war might tance for NATO took place when the
have obscured several of the problems NATO conference held at Lisbon ap-
that became important during the winter proved plans for a fifty-division NATO
of 1951-52. But the absence of conclu- ground force that would include Ger-
sive developments either at Panmunjom man elements for the first time. The
or on the battlefield focused more atten- news of the rearmament of West Ger-
tion upon the flow of affairs in the rear many and its future participation in
areas. The lack of decision in the de- NATO evoked protests from the Soviet
bates and at the front did not obviate Union, but these were rejected by the
the need for decisions behind the scenes. United States, the United Kingdom, and
Regardless of the details of the eventual France. The addition of West Germany
agreement at Panmunjom, the basic forged another link in the European de-
problem of the Communist threat in the fense line, but whether this link would
Far East would remain. By November be a source of strength or a weakening
1951 it was evident that no military de- liability was as yet unknown.
cision would be won or even sought. In the Far East, on the other hand,
What, then, would come after the armis- the United States stood alone. The co-
tice? lonial commitments of Great Britain and
Since World War II the United States France in Africa and Southeast Asia
had provided the chief opposition to the ruled out hope of major assistance from
spread of communism all over the world. them in the near future. Unless the
The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- United States wanted to continue to
tion, formed in 1949, offered a nucleus shoulder the burden, only one practical
for resisting further Communist aggran- alternative remained—to tap the man-
dizement in Europe. By the close of power potential at hand in the Far East.
1951 the United States had built up the To fashion an effective force that would
American forces on the European conti- have the training and equipment as well
nent to six divisions and was asking the as the will to fight against Communist
other NATO member nations to increase encroachments would be expensive and
their contributions. Progress was slow time consuming, but not as costly as
since rearmament and upkeep of armed maintaining large numbers of U.S.
forces were expensive items and the troops in the area. Fortunately a start
threat of war in Europe did not appear had been made in the Republic of Ko-
to be critical. In February 1952, how- rea, Nationalist China, the Philippines,
BEHIND THE LINES 207

ROK ARMY RECRUITS RECEIVING INITIAL ISSUE OF CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT

and Japan. Military assistance advisory sored and supported by the United States
groups had begun the long-term tasks of —a threat that could not be ignored or
developing national forces to withstand evaded without endangering the entire
aggression. The main problem would U.S. position in the Far East. To meet
be to strengthen and accelerate the mili- the Communist challenge the bulk of
tary aid program so that ultimately the the U.S. military forces in the Far East
United States could delegate some of the had been committed to the war in 1950
responsibility for the defense of the Far and reinforcements from the United
East against Communist expansion. States had quickly followed with a re-
sultant drain upon the strategic reserve.
Improving the ROK Army The only hope for halting this flow of
manpower seemed to rest in the substi-
As long as the war continued, the Re- tution of Korean troops for U.S. soldiers.
public of Korea would remain the most But before Korean forces could take over
critical link in the defense chain. Here and successfully defend their own liber-
lay the direct threat to a nation spon- ties, much remained to be done.
208 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

KMAG INSTRUCTOR CORRECTS THE BAR FIRING POSITION FOR ROK TRAINEE
The Army, as has been mentioned pre- Basically the chief impediment had
viously, had begun to work on the task.1 been time. Until the pressure on the
Operating through the Korean Military battlefield had lessened, it was impossi-
Advisory Group, active steps were under ble to withdraw units for training or
way to improve the quality and efficiency refresher courses. Replacements fre-
of the ROK Army. Both the Secretary quently were rushed up to the front lines
of the Army, Mr. Pace, and the Chief of with insufficient instruction in tactics and
Staff were personally interested in the weapons. It was a wasteful process, but,
progress of the KMAG plan of action under the circumstances, necessary.
and this helped to remove some of the When the fighting slacked off in July,
obstacles that had hampered the pro- General Ridgway and his advisors began
gram.2 to devote more attention to the adequate
1
See Chapter IV, above. preparation of men and units for combat.
2
Msg, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 3 Sep 51, in The raw material supplied by the ROK
Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper
was good, although often undernour-
9.
BEHIND THE LINES 209

ished. If properly led, the average Another element in the complex un-
Korean youth showed courage, stamina, dertaking of building a capable officer
and a great deal of native patience—all corps was the instilling of confidence
excellent qualities, especially in a defen- at all levels—confidence in the officers
sive war. Despite the variable perform- among the soldiers and confidence of the
ance of the South Korean forces during officers in themselves. The average South
the first year of the war, military observ- Korean officer was young, and in many
ers were convinced that most of their cases regiments were commanded by
worst moments could be traced directly men under thirty. Yet despite the leav-
to poor leadership and lack of training. ening factor of youth, caution was char-
It was against these weaknesses that acteristic. In the absence of higher au-
KMAG launched its main assaults. thority or direct command, juniors were
In the program outlined by Ridgway usually reluctant to act lest they offend
in July 1951, the chief objective was their superiors. The dearth of initiative
to correct the leadership problem by would not be simple to compensate for.
re-establishing and reinvigorating the It was a basic deficiency that arose from
South Korean military school system. the emphasis that the Koreans placed
Now that time was available, he hoped upon rank and seniority—you bowed to
eventually to create a professionally com- those above you and bullied those below
petent officer and noncommissioned of- you. As long as this condition lasted,
ficer corps.3 This did not promise to be few ROK officers would be willing to
an easy project. The ROK Army did not risk offending their superiors by taking
pay its officers or enlisted men more than independent action. To counter this
a pittance, considering the inflationary tendency, KMAG instructors would have
trend of the South Korean economy. It to exert skill and patience over a consid-
was hardly surprising that many of the erable length of time.5
officers should try to make ends meet by While KMAG attempted to implant
resorting to questionable expedients, but confidence, initiative, and professional
it was not conducive to the creation of a skill in the upper echelons, a Field
good army when these same officers put Training Command was put into opera-
personal benefits ahead of military ne- tion behind the lines to bolster the
cessity. D spite the continual pressure morale of the soldiers. As each ROK
that KMAG applied upon the ROK division was rotated through a nine-
Government to take severe disciplinary week course of basic training, refresher
measures against corrupt officers, the instruction in weapons and tactics
problem was likely to remain until the helped to weld the fighting units into
officers received sufficient compensation better combat teams. The success of the
to support themselves and their fami- course of training led to the establish-
lies.4
27, 189. MS in OCMH. (Hereafter cited as Myers,
3 KMAG's Wartime Experiences). (2) Memo, Jenkins
Msg, CX 50942, CINCFE to DA, 16 Sep 51, in
Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper for CofS, 9 Nov 51, sub: To Determine What Can
28. be Done Now to Make Better Use of Korean Man-
4
(1) Kenneth W. Myers, The U.S. Military Ad- power, in G-3 091 Korea, 187/7.
5
visory Group to the ROK, Part IV, KMAG's War- Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experiences, pp. 26-27,
time Experiences, 11 July 1951-27 July 1953, pp. 26- 189.
210 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
ment of three additional camps—one in to go to the U.S. service schools were the
each corps area—in September 1951.6 pick of the crop and did well at their
By the beginning of November 1951 studies. The chief problem, as usual, was
considerable progress was made in the that of language and interpreters had to
organization of the school and training be sent along with the students, but
system. The Replacement Training and many of the latter took advantage of
School Command under General Cham- their tour in the United States and
peny had acquired additional personnel learned some English as well. Since few
and was ready to handle large groups.7 Americans learned to speak Korean, this
To centralize training installations the was to be of great value when these
RTSC recommended that the Infantry officers later returned to Korea. The
School, Artillery School, and Signal problem of communication between Ko-
School all be relocated at Kwangju in rean and American soldiers was a con-
southwestern Korea, about 120 miles tinuing and perplexing one, especially
west of Pusan. The consolidated school when technical exchanges took place.
opened in early January and was given The first group of ROK officers gradu-
a new name the following month—The ated from the U.S. schools in March 1952
Korean Army Training Center. Up to and a second contingent of 250 officers
15,000 troops could be instructed at one left Korea the same month to begin the
time at this installation.8 next cycle.10
At the officer candidate school level The growing effort in behalf of the
the course was extended from eighteen ROK Army increased the demands upon
to twenty-four weeks to provide extra KMAG and led to a request from Ridg-
training for the new company grade of- way that the group be augmented. On
ficers. And on 1 January 1951 the Ko- 1 November the Department of the
rean Military Academy reopened its Army approved an expansion of over
doors at Chinhae near Pusan with a full 800 spaces for KMAG, bringing its total
four-year curriculum patterned after strength to over 1,800 officers and men.11
West Point. For field grade officers a As the ROK Army began to improve
Command and General Staff School was in quality. Acting Secretary of Defense
established at Taegu and officially William C. Foster raised the question of
launched on 11 December 1951.9 its ultimate quantity. On 10 November
In the meantime 150 ROK officers he requested the JCS views on the mis-
attended the Infantry School at Fort Ben- sion and size of the postwar ROK de-
ning, Georgia, and another 100 took the fense force.12 Since both MacArthur and
course at the Artillery School at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma. From this group trained in 10
(1) Ibid., pp. 174-79. (2) Memo, Jenkins for
U.S. schools the Army hoped to recruit DCofS, 21 Nov 51, sub: ROKA Students . . . , in
the future instructors for the ROK G-3 350.2 Korea, 5/16.
11
Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 9 Nov 51, sub: To
Army, As a whole, the officers chosen Determine What Can Be Done Now to Make Better
6 Use of Korean Manpower . . . , in G-3 091 Korea,
7 Ibid., pp. 134-36. 187/7.
12
8 Ibid., pp. 128-31. Memo, Foster for JCS, 10 Nov 51, sub: Post-
Ibid. Hostilities Military Forces of the ROK, in G-3 091
9
Ibid., pp. 201-04. Korea, 208.
BEHIND THE LINES 211

Ridgway had consistently favored a ten- rea, Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball
division, 250,000-man army the JCS rec- discovered that General Van Fleet fa-
ommended that this figure be maintained vored the formation of ten additional
despite the fact that the President and ROK divisions. When he reported this
his advisors had decided in the meantime item to the Army Policy Council upon
to increase ROK military strength.13 his return there was considerable con-
The Joint Chiefs informed the Secretary sternation. This was the first intimation
of Defense in late January 1952 that the that the Army had received of strong
ROK economy did not have the capabil- support for ROK Army expansion and
ity to sustain a significant expansion of it was a little humiliating to have to get
military forces in the near future. In the information from the Navy. In any
their opinion, the present ROK units, event General Hull immediately asked
when properly trained, equipped, and Ridgway for an explanation.15
led, should constitute a sufficient deter- Ridgway was just as surprised as his
rent to further aggression or, if the oc- superiors had been and forthwith que-
casion demanded, could delay Commu- ried Van Fleet. In this roundabout man-
nist advance until reinforcements could ner he was finally informed by the Eighth
be brought in.14 The ROK Government Army commander that the latter did be-
was in the throes of a serious financial lieve in the expansion of the ROK Army
crisis as a result of steady inflation and to twenty divisions. Van Fleet main-
hardly in a position to assume additional tained that the ROK had the manpower
heavy expenses, it is true, but this was and the desire to fight and the United
but one facet to the problem. It should States could support ROK troops in
not be forgotten that the United States Korea much more economically than
had made commitments to supply many American forces. As a conclusion to a
of the military requirements of its somewhat amazing performance, Van
NATO allies and was about to sponsor Fleet referred his commander to an in-
the renascence of the Japanese defense terview he had just had published in the
forces as well. With U.S. production not U.S. News and World Report, if Ridg-
on a full war scale and with heavy de- way desired more information on his
mands at home and abroad to be met, views.16
it appeared that ROK Army expansion Whatever Ridgway's personal reaction
would have to await a more opportune to this turn of events may have been,
moment. he exercised remarkable restraint. He
The ROK Government and its most told Hull that he had not seen Van
effective spokesman, President Rhee, did Fleet's magazine interview, but neverthe-
not, of course, agree that an army of ten less he flatly disagreed with his subordi-
divisions would be enough to defend nate on doubling the ROK Army. Not
South Korea in the postwar period, but only was the ROK economy unable to
the matter lay quiescent until late March 15
Msg, DA 905814, Hull to Ridgway, 9 Apr 52.
16
1952. During an inspection trip to Ko- Msg, G 5347 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 9
Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1,
13
See Chapter VI, above. incl 18. See also Interv with General Van Fleet, in
14
Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 23 Jan 52, sub: U.S. News and World Report, vol. XXXII, No. 13
Post-Hostilities Military Forces of the ROK. (March 28, 1952).
212 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

MAIN ACADEMIC BUILDING OF THE KOREAN MILITARY ACADEMY, CHINHAE

sustain additional forces, but he thought affects the U.S. I cannot believe due
that the development of the Japanese consideration has been accorded to the
defense forces should be given prefer- inseparable relation of the Japanese,
ence at this time. The training program Chinese Nationalists, and Southeast Asia
for the ROK ten-division army was just military programs to which the United
beginning to bear fruit, he went on, but States Government is committed, or
it would take another ten months before which it has under study." 17
it was completed. If the United States General Ridgway's disapproval was
started to organize ten additional divi- enough to prevent an increase in the
sions it would require eighteen months ROK ground forces and when he left
to prepare them for action and the the Far East Command in May for a
United States would also have to furnish new assignment as Supreme Allied Com-
all subsistence, clothing, and pay. Al- mander, Europe, no change had been
though he had the utmost respect for made in the size of the army. In the
General Van Fleet, Ridgway informed matter of ROK air and marine forces,
Hull that "His outlook, however, in this however, the Far East commander ran
particular case is in my opinion quite into more difficulty. The ROK Air
naturally focused almost exclusively on 17
Msg, CX 66647, Ridgway to Hull, 8 Apr 52, in
the Korean situation, as that situation UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 19.
BEHIND THE LINES 213

Force was small and equipped with pro- vember Ridgway authorized Van Fleet
peller-driven planes. In Ridgway's view, to increase the strength of the Korean
a 4,000-man air force with seventeen Service Corps to 60,000 men. This
obsolescent fighters and twenty-nine mis- would permit all the laborers and car-
cellaneous craft could offer no real oppo- riers in the combat areas to be organized
sition to a future Communist air sweep and brought under tight control and dis-
and would probably be wiped out cipline. It would also assure the fighting
quickly. Maintenance of a tiny, impo- corps of more reliable service support.
tent force was wasteful, Ridgway contin- Eventually Ridgway planned to raise the
ued, since in the event of renewed ceiling of the Korean Service Corps to
aggression the United States would still 75,000.21
have to provide air support for the ROK. The U.N. commander also made ef-
"A second best Air Force is worse than forts to correct one of the basic weak-
none," he told the JCS.18 But the U.N. nesses of the ROK Army—the lack of
commander found that it was next to adequate integral artillery support. In
impossible to abolish a service once it the past ROK divisions had been forced
gained a firm foothold. The JCS showed to rely upon U.S. artillery support for
no disposition to tamper with the ROK most of their offensive and defensive mis-
Air Force and no action was taken on sions. Only one 105-mm. howitzer bat-
Ridgway's recommendation. talion was assigned to each ROK division
The same reception met his proposal as opposed to three 105-mm. and one
to dispense with a separate marine force 155-mm. battalions in each U.S. division.
after the war. To his way of thinking, In addition, the latter had tank support
a marine division would require separate and more heavy mortar companies avail-
overhead and support elements that able to perform its tasks. Previously the
would duplicate those of the Army and Eighth Army and Far East Command
this needless expense would have to be staffs had argued that the rough terrain,
borne by the U.S. taxpayer.19 The U.S. lack of roads, and resupply problems
Navy, however, had already established added to the dearth of trained artillery-
both a Naval Advisory Group and a Ma- men and unavailability of equipment
rine Advisory Group to the ROK in had precluded expanding the ROK ar-
February, and Ridgway's plea went un- tillery. But as the war lengthened and
heeded.20 settled into its static phase, many of these
Despite the mixed success of Ridg- objections were overcome. In Septem-
way's efforts to restrict the size of the ber four ROK 155-mm. howitzer battal-
ROK armed forces, he and his staff did ions were authorized for activation
manage to effect several internal im- before the end of the year. These bat-
provements aimed at bolstering the talions were trained for eight weeks by
efficiency of the ROK troops. In No- U.S. corps personnel. Three headquar-
ters batteries and six 105-mm. howitzer
18
Msg, C 65987, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Mar 52, DA- battalions were added in November and
IN 121000. began their training in January 1952.
19
Ibid.
20
COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Feb 52, pp.
21
4-2, 4-3. Msg. CINCFE to DA, 18 Nov 51, DA-IN 354.
214 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Finally in March Ridgway approved a When the armistice negotiations were
full complement of three 105-mm. and initiated, President Rhee and his gov-
one 155-mm. howitzer battalions for each ernment had firmly opposed a compro-
of the ten ROK divisions. In May the mise settlement with the Communists.
Department of the Army sent interim They had no desire to return to the
authorization for the Far East Command status quo that had been so unsatisfactory
to proceed with this program.22 in the prewar period and regarded the
The process of improving the ROK time as ripe for the unification of Korea
Army was well on its way by April 1952. —under ROK hegemony. As long as the
Schools and training programs to raise talks appeared to be making little prog-
the leadership level and confidence of ress, there was scant reason for vehement
the troops had been started and began action on their part. During the break-
to produce demonstrable results. In- down of negotiations in August, a ROK
creased service and combat support to spokesman had frankly welcomed the
bolster the ROK forces in combat was turn of events and claimed that the Com-
being organized and equipped. Given munists had simply used the discussions
time, the ROK Army could become one as a cover for their military build-up.23
of the better armies in the Far East. On 20 September, Rhee set forth his
terms for dealing with the enemy—terms
Relations With the ROK that the Communists could not possibly
accept without admitting defeat. First
Military affairs were but one aspect of the Chinese should withdraw from Ko-
the problem of conducting a war on the rea and the North Koreans should be
soil of an ally. As the United States had disarmed. Then the latter would be
discovered during the World War II given full representation in the Korean
campaigns in China, politics played an National Assembly and presumably this
important role that seemed to increase would settle the whole problem. The
in inverse ratio to the pressures gener- ROK President felt that the Communists
ated at the front. If the fighting were should be given a time limit for accept-
heavy and external crises dominated the ance; otherwise the negotiations should
scene, internal politics might be played be concluded. In his opinion, the enemy
down or overshadowed. But a static war was using the talks to humiliate and dis-
permitted domestic dissensions to come credit the United Nations in the eyes of
24
to the surface and frequently required the Communist world.
delicate and diplomatic handling. The After the negotiations resumed in Oc-
situation in South Korea followed this tober, the ROK Government expressed
pattern during the armistice period and its dissatisfaction in many ways. A fav-
was to occasion many a tense moment orite method was through "spontaneous"
for the U.N. Command in its efforts to demonstrations similar to the one staged
fight a war and conclude a peace at the by students in Pusan in early December.
same time. Close to 500 students gathered and pa-
22
raded through the city carrying signs
(1) Msg, DA 909826, G-3 to CINCFE, 27 May
23
52. (2) Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experience, pp. New York Times, August 24, 1951.
24
87-96. New York Times, September 21, 1951.
BEHIND THE LINES 215

and placards bearing such anticease-fire arrived to negotiate with the ROK Gov-
slogans as "No Armistice Without Uni- ernment on the future control of its
fication." 25 These apparent popular out- military power. To reach an understand-
bursts of indignation against the truce ing while ROK emotions were running
meetings could be mounted quickly high might result in the imposition of
whenever there seemed to be a possibil- conditions unacceptable to the U.N.
ity of agreement at Panmunjom. Command and jeopardize the achieve-
The continual ROK agitation and ment of an armistice. Therefore they
hints from Rhee that the government preferred to work out the terms of the
might not observe the terms of an ar- truce first and use the presence of UNC
mistice disturbed General Ridgway. It forces in Korea and the supply and train-
may be remembered that the UNC con- ing of South Korean troops as persuasive
trol over the ROK armed forces rested points to gain ROK compliance later.27
upon Rhee's July 1950 letter to Mac- They were more sympathetic to the
Arthur assigning command to the latter suggestion that President Truman might
and anyone he delegated for the duration make an appeal to Rhee to halt the mas-
of the hostilities only. In the months sive ROK assault on the armistice. On
that had followed the ROK Government 4 March the President informed Rhee
had faithfully observed this pledge and of the concern of the United States over
it had not been considered necessary to the ROK attitude toward the truce. He
seek a firm written understanding on the pointed out that the U.N. unity of pur-
matter. But by early 1952 Ridgway felt pose in Korea must be maintained at all
that a formal agreement covering the costs since divergencies might threaten
armistice period should be secured to the support of the U.N. and then issued
forestall independent action by the Re- a note of warning:
public of Korea in opposition to the
truce stipulations. Unless the ROK mil- The degree of assistance which your
itary forces remained under UNC con- Government and the people of Korea will
trol after the truce was concluded, there continue to receive in repelling the aggres-
sion, in seeking a just political settlement,
was a distinct possibility that the truce and in repairing the ravages of that ag-
would be short-lived. Under the circum- gression will inevitably be influenced by the
stances, Ridgway urged a high-level gov- sense of responsibility demonstrated by
ernmental approach to secure a written your Government, its ability to maintain
the unity of the Korean people, and its de-
commitment on armed forces and, at the votion to democratic ideals.28
same time, to stop the ROK antiarmi-
stice campaign.26 The stress that the President laid on
While the U.S. political and military the relationship between ROK actions
leaders recognized the danger, they and U.N. assistance could not but have
doubted that the proper moment had its effect upon President Rhee and his
27
Msg, JCS 902158, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52.
25
Msg, 070801, American Embassy, Pusan, to SCAP, This message was drafted by the State Department
7 Dec 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov-Dec 51, an. and cleared with the JCS, Defense Department, and
1, incl 45. the President.
26 28
Msg, CX 64241, Ridgway to JCS, 25 Feb 52, DA- Msg, DA 902912, Eddleman to CINCFE, 6 Mar
IN 109112. 52. This transmitted the Truman message to Rhee.
216 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

AN ANTIARMISTICE DEMONSTRATION IN SEOUL

staff. From the close of World War II under way. The United States also had
down to the outbreak of the Korean War long-range plans for relief and rehabili-
the United States had made substantial tation that it intended to carry out under
contributions to the South Korean econ- U.N. auspices as soon as the war was
omy. When the war began in 1950, again over. It had taken the lead in proposing
it was the United States which had taken and supporting the formation of the
the lead in sending military and eco- United Nations Korean Reconstruction
nomic aid. Food, clothing, and supplies Agency (UNKRA) that was established
for the thousands who were displaced on 1 December 1950 and had provided
and for the sick and wounded were pro- the new agency the bulk of its funds.29
vided not only for humanitarian motives, 29
For a discussion of U.S. aid policy in Korea see
but also with the realization that unrest Gene M. Lyons, "American Policy and the United
Nations Program for Korean Reconstruction," in
and disease within the UNC area would International Organization, vol. XII, No. 2 (1958),
complicate the military operations then pp. 180-92.
BEHIND THE LINES 217

Although the prolongation of the war not siphon off the growing supply of
delayed the effective functioning of money in circulation by increasing indus-
UNKRA, the U.N. Command set up the trial production or by larger imports of
U.N. Civil Assistance Command in Ko- consumer goods. U.S. aid helped some-
rea under the Eighth Army in early 1951 what, but the $150,000,000 that had been
to prevent disease and unrest. Designed expended by 15 September 1951, plus
to safeguard the security of the rear fifty million dollars' worth of services
areas, UNCACK engaged primarily in and ten million dollars in raw materials
relief work, providing consumer goods could not stem the tide of inflation.31
to meet the immediate needs of the civil- By January 1952 the ROK financial
ian population. The comparative inac- situation had become critical. Although
tivity at the front during the truce the deficit spending indulged in by the
negotiations permitted reconstruction ROK Government and the bank credit
and rehabilitation to begin while the expansion practices that were permitted
fighting was still going on. By the end contributed to the inflationary trend, the
of 1951, Ridgway and the UNKRA ROK officials placed the principal blame
officials had fashioned a working agree- upon the advances in Korean won made
ment that allowed UNKRA to start on a to the UNC for military requirements.
limited reconstruction program subject They charged that the U.N. Command
to the approval of the UNC.30 had failed to settle in dollars for the
Thus the actual control over relief and won issued and intimated that they
economic assistance to South Korea re- would not be able to provide more cur-
mained under UNC control as long as rency to the UNC after January.32
military operations continued and for a By an agreement signed on 28 July
six-month period after an armistice was 1950 the ROK Government had pledged
concluded. This, of course, strengthened itself to supply the currency needed by
the hand of Ridgway in his dealings with the UNC and to defer the settlement of
the ROK Government. But the exigen- claims arising from this procedure until
cies of war and the pouring into Korea a time satisfactory to both parties. The
of U.S. money, goods, and services led to hint that the ROK might not meet its
a repetition of the U.S. experience in obligation worried Ridgway. He had no
China in World War II. The undevel- objection to making monthly settlements
oped economy of the ROK, disrupted in dollars for the won advances as long as
by war and essentially agricultural, could the UNC retained some control over
not absorb the added purchasing power ROK foreign exchange. To help coun-
that large military expenditures brought teract inflation he proposed that the
into being. While the ROK Government UNC secure ROK currency by sale of
resorted to the printing press to meet imported commodities to the Korean
the demands for more currency in con- people and by purchasing won at the
nection with military operations, it could

31
Msg, CINCUNC to DA, 20 Sep 51, DA-IN 18653.
30 32
Memo of Understanding between UNC and U.N. Msg, C 62218, Ridgway to Collins, 25 Jan 52,
Korean Reconstruction Agency, 21 Dec 51. DA-IN 4572.
218 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

UNLOADING RICE FOR SOUTH KOREANS FROM THE ANDREW JACKSON, PUSAN

best rate through any legal source.33 In negotiations between the two came to a
addition, Ridgway believed that by mak- halt in February. In the meantime the
ing book settlement for UNC services, UNC had drawn eight million dollars'
with no actual use of money, the amount worth of won in January as opposed to
of currency in circulation could be held only six million dollars' worth in Decem-
down.34 ber and Ridgway asked Van Fleet to give
But the ROK Government balked at his personal attention to the problem of
permitting the U.N. Command to main- holding down expenditures involving
tain control of its foreign exchange and the use of won.35 The gravity of the
spiralling inflation can be easily seen in
33
The legal exchange rate of 6,000 won to the the increase of currency in circulation
dollar was not considered to be approximate to
actual value of the won. In January 1952 a rate of between 1 July 1951 and 1 March 1952
12,000 won to the dollar would have been closer to
the actual value.
34
(1) Msg, GX 60526, CINCFE to G-3, 31 Dec
35
51. DA-IN 15295. (2) Msg, CINCFE to G-3, 24 Jan Msg, C 63175, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 9 Feb 52,
52. DA-IN 4192. in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1, incl 24.
BEHIND THE LINES 219

—from 122 billion to 812 billion won.36 compromise. The most important pro-
The impasse in the financial negotia- vision established a Combined Economic
tions and the ever-rising inflation Board with one Unified Command and
coupled with the ROK attitude toward one ROK member to promote effective
the armistice and domestic complications economic co-ordination. The board
in the ROK Government prompted would make recommendations that
Ridgway and Ambassador Muccio to sug- would be binding on the use of all for-
gest in early March that a high-level eign exchange and integrate it with the
mission be sent from Washington to UNC assistance programs. As for the
reach an understanding on the entire UNC won advances, the Unified Com-
field of ROK-UNC relations.37 Im- mand agreed to settle up for all advances
pressed by the urgency of Ridgway's re- made between 1 January 1952 and 31
quest, the Department of the Army May 1952 at the 6,000-won-to-a-dollar
moved quickly to prepare for the dis- rate. Claims for 1950-51 would be
patch of a mission. Defense and State deferred until a later date and claims
Department approval was soon obtained. for future months would be paid for at
On 28 March the President named Clar- a more realistic rate than 6,000 to 1.
ence E. Meyer, head of the Mutual Se- Ten percent of the amount advanced
curity Administration mission to each month would be written off by the
Austria, as chief of the delegation. The ROK Government as its contribution to
Department of State agreed to act as the war effort. In addition, the ROK
monitor since the mission was given a Government agreed to take internal
broad directive to negotiate "financial, measures to control inflation and the
economic and other appropriate agree- Unified Command would attempt to
ments between the United States or the draw won from the market by bringing
Unified Command and the Republic of in as many salable goods as possible.39
Korea."38 If both sides made sincere efforts to
The end result was an agreement carry out the terms of this agreement,
signed on 24 May between the Unified the economic situation in Korea could
Command and the ROK. Considering improve considerably in the near future.
the political turmoil that was rampant Whether this might also have a favorable
in South Korea and the strong feelings influence upon the political and armi-
expressed about national sovereignty, the stice problems was another matter. By
Meyer understanding represented a fair May 1952 the armistice negotiations had
again reached a stalemate and ROK agi-
36
Charles N. Henning, Economic and Related tation against the truce had subsided,
Political Factors in Civil Affairs Operations, Re- but President Rhee's internal conflict
public of Korea, ORO Study T-211 (Washington:
Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins Uni- with his fellow politicians threatened to
versity, 1952), p. 43.
37
build up into another crisis. In any case
(1) Msg, C 65015, Ridgway to CofS, 10 Mar
52, DA-IN 114192. (2) Msg, C 65121, Ridgway to
39
CofS, 12 Mar 52, DA-IN 115005. Ltr, Meyer to Osborn, no sub, 24 May 1952, to
38
Draft Directive, sub: Terms of Reference for G-3, 091 Korea, 42/16. The United States agreed to
the Unified Command Mission to the ROK, no pay $75,000,000 for the January-May 1952 period
date, in G-3 091 Korea, 42/11. A copy of this and an initial payment of $35,000,000 was made on
directive was sent to Meyer in Japan in April. 29 July.
220 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
the U.N. Command might only have nese facilities would be worked out by an
adjusted the economic differences in administrative agreement between the
time to be dragged into the political two countries.40
arena. But, at least, one thorn in ROK- Since the end of the war in Korea
UNC relations had been amicably re- remained uncertain and the utilization
moved. of Japanese facilities and ports appeared
necessary as long as the conflict contin-
The Japanese Take a Hand ued, the Security Treaty afforded the
legal basis for the continued presence of
All of General Ridgway's problems U.S. forces in Japan. Even under opti-
behind the lines did not involve the mum conditions, it would take consider-
Republic of Korea directly, but many able time for the Japanese to organize,
had an influence upon events taking train, and equip adequate units to de-
place on the peninsula. Across the Sea of fend Japan on their own. And the re-
Japan new and complicating elements nunciation of war by the Japanese
were introduced in late 1951 and early constitution would make the develop-
1952. From the outset of the war the ment of armed forces a delicate matter.
United States had used the islands of Fortunately, insofar as Japanese de-
Japan as a huge supply and staging base fense forces were concerned, a start had
for the UNC forces fighting in Korea. been made in mid-1950 shortly after the
In his role as Supreme Commander, Al- Korean War began. When General Mac-
lied Powers, Ridgway could employ the Arthur realized that he would have to
facilities available in Japan as he saw fit deploy the majority of his U.S. units to
to support the UNC effort. The signing Korea, he authorized the Japanese offi-
of the peace treaty in September 1951, cials to set up a National Police Reserve
however, foreshadowed a period of force of 75,000 men. Although the or-
change as the military government ganization ostensibly was formed to
closed out its regime and the Japanese preserve internal order, the recruits went
civil authorities once more assumed con- through a thirteen-week basic training
trol of their nation's affairs. In the in- course during which they became famil-
terim, arrangements had to be made iar with small weapons and then moved
defining the relationship between the into an eighteen-week course which
U.S. military and civil representatives stressed small unit training and used
and the Japanese Government and pro- machine guns and rocket launchers. In
vision had to be made for the defense of June 1951 the Police Reserve engaged
Japan. in battalion maneuvers. When the arm-
Under the Security Treaty signed on istice negotiations got under way in July,
8 September between the United States the force was organized into four infan-
and Japan, the former was granted the try divisions of 15,200 men each, but it
right to maintain armed forces on the lacked heavy equipment and had not had
islands until the Japanese could build up
sufficient strength to defend themselves. 40
See the text of the treaty in Department of State
The conditions governing the disposi- Bulletin, vol. XXV, No. 638 (September 17, 1951),
tion of U.S. troops and the use of Japa- pp. 463-65.
BEHIND THE LINES 221

sufficient training to qualify for other


expended, it is my considered opinion
than internal security functions.41 that the U.S. can purchase more security
Despite these deficiencies, in May through the creation of Japanese forces
1951 President Truman approved plan- than can be purchased by similar ex-
ning and budgeting for sufficient ma- penditures in any other nation in the
terial to equip ten National Police Re-world, including the United States."
serve Japan (NPRJ) divisions by 1 The alternative, Ridgway went on,
July 1952. After studying the politicalwould be to maintain U.S. troops at far
and economic factors involved, Ridgway greater cost in the Far East. He did not
recommended in September that a see how he could discuss the NPRJ mat-
phased expansion to a balanced ten- ter any further with the Japanese until
a firm U.S. policy was forthcoming.
division force be adopted. The difficult
Vacillation on the part of the United
part, in his opinion, would be the prep-
aration of Japanese public opinion for States would create a similar response in
training of the NPRJ with heavy equip- the Japanese. If the United States de-
ment and armament. This would have sired to expand the NPRJ more slowly,
to be done by the Japanese Government this might fit in very well with Japanese
and Ridgway would see Prime Minister desires, but Ridgway regarded the pro-
Shigeru Yoshida on this point soon.42 posed cutback "as nothing less than cat-
While arrangements for an increased astrophic to the vital interests of our
NPRJ went forward in Tokyo, the De- country." 44
partment of the Army came up with The fervent plea of the Far East com-
some disconcerting facts. General Col- mander produced a quick reaction in
lins informed Ridgway in mid-December Washington, and by 23 December, Col-
that a lack of funds might force the lins was able to allay Ridgway's appre-
drastic reduction of the NPRJ program. hensions. Secretary Lovett had approved
There was no money available from the the inclusion of three hundred million
Mutual Defense Assistance Program and dollars in the Army budget for the Japa-
funds for the NPRJ had been cut from nese defense program.45
the Army fiscal year 1953 budget. Under Armed with this reassurance, the
the circumstances Collins advised Ridg- SCAP staff reviewed NPRJ planning and
way to revise his plans and endeavor to recommended on 1 January 1952 that
get along on the funds already allo- priority during the first stage of the ex-
cated.43 pansion be accorded to nondivisional
Ridgway was shocked, "It is to me combat units, such as antiaircraft, tank,
incredible that from a national defense and artillery, rather than to the forma-
budget of $57 billion, we cannot find tion of new divisions.46 But further im-
the relatively meager funds required to plication from Washington that the
support the rapid establishment of a UNC program could not be carried out
small Japanese army... . For each dollar in its present form led to another round
41 44
CINCFE G-3 Presentation to Asst Secy Army Msg, C 59752, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Dec 51, in
Alexander, no date, in G-3 091 Korea, 187/7. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 4, incl 1.
42 45
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, pp. 35-36. Msg, DA 90318, CofS to CINCFE, 23 Dec 51.
43 46
Msg, DA 89795, CofS to CINCFE, 18 Dec 51. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, pp. 43-44.
222 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
of messages. The upshot of the affair opinion could be conditioned for the
was that a SCAP delegation, headed by return of Japan to a position of responsi-
Maj. Gen. William F. Marquat, was sent bility in the Far East. The United States
to the United States in late January to intended to help Japan by assisting the
thresh out the matter. After five weeks nation to secure access to raw materials
of consultation, the Army and SCAP and markets and by encouraging Japa-
representatives fashioned a modus oper- nese industry to provide the means by
andi acceptable to both groups. Ridg- which the country could once again de-
way would complete the equipping of fend itself. Some offshore procurement
the four divisions already established and of ammunition and equipment might be
see to it that they became and remained arranged to give the Japanese munitions
combat-ready in the future. During the industry a start, but the Department of
next fiscal year the NPRJ would be in- the Army felt that the main task had to
creased to six divisions with supporting be accomplished by the Japanese them-
units and the expansion to ten divisions selves.49
would be phased over fiscal 1954 and The re-emergence of Japan as a sov-
1955, as funds and equipment became ereign nation spawned a host of other
available.47 problems as well. To General Ridgway
Actually the decision to stretch out the in his role as Supreme Commander, Al-
expansion program was not influenced lied Powers, one of the most important
by the lack of money and equipment was the future status of the U.S. and U.N.
alone. As it turned out, the Japanese military forces in Japan. After the peace
Government had no desire to move treaty was ratified, the occupation would
quickly in rearming the country. Prime end and SCAP would be abolished. Be-
Minister Yoshida would not approve an fore the latter came to pass, Ridgway
increase of the NPRJ beyond 110,000 wanted to settle the future relationship
for the 1953 fiscal year. Although SCAP between the UNC/FEC and the Japa-
pressed for an augmentation to between nese Government.
150-180,000, Yoshida declined to make On 18 September he outlined his ap-
a commitment until after general elec- proach to the subject to the JCS. Ridg-
tions were held in early 1953.48 Since way pointed out that while theoretically
Japanese reluctance to rearm swiftly Japan would enjoy full political control,
dovetailed with U.S. financial and pro- its national security would depend for
duction deficiencies in connection with some time upon both Japanese and U.S.
the program, the slowdown in develop- forces. Since this was a military reality,
ing adequate Japanese defense forces the Far East commander felt that he
probably represented a workable com- should have adequate authority to coun-
promise. teract any threat to the security of the
In the meantime Japanese public U.S. forces under his command and to
deal directly with the Japanese Govern-
47
48
Msg, DA 902603, CofS to CINCFE, 4 Mar 52. ment on all military matters. His orders
Memo, Civil Affairs Sec SCAP to CofS SCAP, should come, as in the past, from the
28 Feb 52, sub: Conf by SCAP with Prime Minister
Yoshida, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1,
49
incl 11. Msg, DA 902855, DA to SCAP, 7 Mar 52.
BEHIND THE LINES 223
JCS or their superiors. He would, of their superiors and this channel of com-
course, co-ordinate with the chief of the mand remained as before. His authority
U.S. diplomatic mission to Japan when- to select the U.S. representative of the
ever it was necessary.50 Joint Committee also came from the JCS
The prospective end of military rule as he had desired. The Joint Committee
in Japan and the return of civilian con- stemmed from the Administrative
trol, however, had a concomitant—the Agreement signed on 28 February 1952
restoration of normal diplomatic rela- between the United States and Japan
tions and of the pre-eminence of the U.S. in Tokyo. In the process of establishing
Ambassador in intergovernmental inter- the terms under which U.S. forces would
course. On 22 December the Army remain in Japan and contribute to Japa-
informed Ridgway that the JCS had nese defense, a Joint Committee with
submitted most of his recommendations one U.S. and one Japanese member was
to the Secretary of Defense, but that the set up for consultation on the imple-
chief of the diplomatic mission would mentation of the agreement. Since such
take precedence over him and be the complex matters as the use of ports and
channel for all governmental matters ex- facilities, custom regulations, taxes,
cept those specifically of a military na- postal privileges, and legal jurisdiction
ture.51 were covered, the Joint Committee was
During February and March, State held necessary to straighten out differ-
and Defense Department representatives ences of opinion.53
worked out further compromises in de- On 28 April the occupation of Japan
tail, but it was not until April that they ended and U.S. military forces assumed
arrived at an agreement that was satis- a new and diminished position as guests
factory to both sides and approved by and allies rather than conquerors. But
the President. It provided that the since there would be a long period dur-
Ambassador would be responsible for all ing which Japanese security would be
government relations between the dependent upon U.S. forces, the Far East
United States and Japan, but that Ridg- commander and his staff retained con-
way would not be subordinate to him in siderable prestige. The need for protec-
military matters. The Far East com- tion until Japanese defense forces were
mander could negotiate directly with the ready to take over the major responsibil-
Japanese Government on security, de- ity argued that Ridgway and his succes-
fense, and military assistance affairs and sors would wield a goodly measure of
was authorized to appoint the U.S. mem- influence in Japanese affairs despite the
ber of the newly formed Joint Commit- loss of the bulk of their powers. On the
tee.52 other hand, civilian ascendancy had been
Ridgway had insisted upon receiving re-established and the importance of the
his orders directly from the JCS and U.S. Ambassador was certain to increase
as military dependence upon the United
50
Msg, C 50742, CINCFE to JCS, 13 Sep 51, in States lessened.
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, an. 4, incl 10.
51 53
Msg, DA 90317, G-3 to CINCFE, 22 Dec 51. See text of Administrative Agreement of 28 Feb-
52
(1) Msg, JCS 905965, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Apr ruary 1952, in Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVI,
52. (2) Msg, JCS 907213, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Apr 52. No. 663 (March 10, 1952), pp. 383ff.
224 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
The Far East commander meanwhile quite simple when compared to the per-
had the problem of finding out where the plexing and tortuous labyrinth of ammu-
Japanese forces would fit into the over- nition shortages. In the spring of 1953
all defense picture. Would they fight as a Senate subcommittee conducted a
separate units or be integrated with U.S. lengthy investigation of the matter and
troops if war broke out? Would they heard from Van Fleet and Lt. Gen. Ed-
come under U.S. supreme command or ward M. Almond as well as Washington
remain under their own leadership? As defense officials. The testimony given
yet, no intergovernmental arrangement revealed the confusion that existed at
on the control of Japanese security forces the time on the causes and effects of the
had been reached and the Administra- shortages.55 Much of the confusion
tive Agreement merely provided for con- stemmed from the lack of background
sultation between the two governments information on the subject.56
if hostilities threatened. These ques- At the end of World War II, the
tions would have to be settled definitively United States had a tremendous inven-
and quickly, General Ridgway believed, tory of ammunition on hand, but unfor-
and the development of the security tunately it was not a balanced stock.
forces of Japan closely correlated with There were enormous quantities of some
those of the Republic of Korea lest they types of ammunition and only small
get out of proper balance.54 Since the amounts of others. The hasty demobili-
United States was sponsoring both na- zation that followed stripped the Ord-
tions and bad feeling existed between nance Department of the military and
them, the formation of formidable mili- civilian personnel that might have prop-
tary forces on one side might eventually erly assessed and cared for the huge
lead to an unstable situation unless it inventories of ammunition in its custody.
were matched by a similar development During the years preceding the Korean
on the other. It seemed apparent by the War, powder packed in cotton bags and
end of April that although the Japanese fuzes made of substitute metals deterio-
were now officially in the game on their rated. The Army drew freely upon the
own, the United States would be supply- big stockpile for training purposes yet
ing the stakes with which they would made no real effort to replace consump-
play. It would be part of the U.S. task tion or to balance the items in stock.
to make sure that the Japanese played Lack of personnel to take a complete
along with and not against the other inventory and the drive for economy
members of the team. among the Armed Forces contributed to
this oversight. Ammunition was expen-
Ammunition Shortages
55
Hearings Before the Preparedness Subcommittee
The complexities of dealing with the No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, 83d Congress, 1st session, on Ammunition
ROK and Japanese Governments seem Shortages in the Armed Services, 1953.
56
The following summary is based upon the ex-
54 cellent study made by the former Deputy Assistant
(1) Msg, C 66619, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Apr 52, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 12. (2) Chief of Staff, G-4, Maj. Gen. William O. Reeder,
Msg, C 67740, Ridgway to DA, 29 Apr 52, DA-IN after the war was over, and entitled: The Korean
133087. Ammunition Shortage. Copy in OCMH files.
BEHIND THE LINES 225

sive and the amounts on hand seemed supply of finished rounds of ammuni-
adequate for years to come under peace- tion, there were also large quantities of
time conditions. component parts available that could be
The lack of postwar orders sent the used. Since the first months of the war
ammunition industry into eclipse. were characterized by a high degree of
Manufacturers converted to civilian mobility that required less artillery ex-
goods and purchased available surplus penditure, it appeared that the shells on
machine tools to service the booming de- hand and those that could be readily
mands for consumer items that the war finished were sufficient to carry the
had held in leash. When the United United States and its allies through the
States entered the Korean struggle so war.57
suddenly in 1950, ammunition facilities As the war ground to a slower pace in
and plants were at a low ebb and the mid-1951, artillery assumed a new im-
prosperity then prevalent made business- portance. Static warfare required more
men reluctant to reconvert their factories artillery missions to harass and interdict
to wartime products. Another element the enemy. This meant that the day of
that restrained a shift to the immediate supply—the average number of rounds
production of ammunition was the prev- that a gun was expected to fire daily over
alent belief that the Korean War would a considerable period of time—had to be
be short and did not warrant a sizable raised.58 Since the day of supply in turn
dislocation of the U.S. industrial effort. determined the number of shells that
Even after this fallacy was shattered by were held in reserve in the Far East
the entry of the Chinese into the war in Command, an expansion in reserve
late 1950, the policy of butter and guns stocks followed.59 The increased de-
continued and no large-scale mobiliza- mands upon the stockpiles and the
tion of industry took place- knowledge that there was no possibility
The sense of complacency that per- of replenishing the heavy consumption of
vaded the nation during the early phase artillery rounds until at least late 1952
of the Korean War cost dearly, for valu- formed the backdrop to the events of the
able time was lost in getting the lan- fall of 1951.
guishing munitions industry back on its Concern over the theater artillery situ-
feet. Under optimum conditions it took ation began to arise during the battle
from eighteen to twenty-four months for Bloody Ridge in August-September
after funds were voted to produce fin- 1951. 2d Division artillerymen fired
ished ammunition in quantity. Since over 153,000 rounds during the fight
Congress did not approve the first large and the 15th Field Artillery Battalion
appropriation for ammunition until
early January 1951, this meant that even 57
It should be noted that small arms ammunition
under optimum conditions the end prod- was always plentiful and caused no concern.
58
ucts of this money could not arrive on The day of supply was based upon World War
II experience.
the scene until late 1952 or early 1953. 59
The reserve was computed by multiplying the
In the meantime the U.S. and ROK day of supply by the number of guns on hand and
then multiplying the result by seventy-five days,
forces in Korea had to live off the stock- which was the safety-level factor in case deliveries
pile. Fortunately, in addition to the should be halted or cut off for a period.
226 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
set a new record for light battalions by quickly consumed the supplies on hand
firing 14,425 rounds in twenty-four in the firing units since original plans
hours. By the end of the action artillery for the taking of Heartbreak Ridge en-
supplies in the theater reserve were visioned the task as a relatively short and
greatly reduced but no rationing was simple one.
introduced except for illuminating The I Corps COMMANDO operation in
shells which were in very short supply.60 October demonstrated another phase in
Despite denials from the divisions that the ammunition saga. When the Com-
ammunition was wasted or misused, munists massed their artillery against
thousands of rounds of 105-mm. howit- this advance, UNC guns depleted the
zer ammunition were hurled fruitlessly stores at ammunition supply points and
against enemy bunkers on Bloody Ridge. I Corps had to place restrictions on its
The high trajectory of their fire lessened artillery units. As it pointed out later,
the chances of direct hits upon the Com- the I Corps did this not only to replenish
munist strongpoints and reduced their the supply points, but also to compel
penetrating power. The job of knocking units to use up the ammunition they
out the pillboxes and bunkers had to be were stockpiling in excess of what they
done by the heavier and more accurate were normally allowed to have on hand.63
8-inch howitzers with concrete-piercing Stockpiling was a long-established prac-
shells set for delayed firing and by flat tice to guard against sudden emergencies
trajectory gun fire. It is interesting to and to provide a cushion in case supplies
note that after the battle Van Fleet is- were temporarily cut off.
sued a warning against waste of 8-inch Although the experiences during the
and 105-mm. howitzer ammunition since August-October period had to do with
these were then in short supply and at local and temporary shortages that were
the same time the Eighth Army com- due to a high volume of daily fire, Gen-
mander advocated the use of 155-mm. eral Ridgway decided to bring the mat-
ammunition instead.61 ter to the attention of the JCS. The
During the assault on Heartbreak withdrawals had left the theater artillery
Ridge, however, Van Fleet imposed no reserve in a weakened condition and, in
restrictions upon the 2d Division artil- Ridgway's opinion, had revealed the
lery. But because of the heavy expen- danger in accepting World War II rates
ditures, local deficits appeared. For of daily fire for the Korean War. World
example, 4.2-inch mortars had to be War II corps had far more artillery bat-
used when 81-mm. ammunition ran low talions assigned to them than did the
and air and rail shipments to the front corps in Korea and could maintain a
had to be made to keep the 4.2-inch lesser rate of fire per gun each day to
ammunition on hand.62 It was not sur- carry out comparable missions success-
prising that the sustained barrages fully. With relatively fewer guns and
60
Williamson et al., "Bloody Ridge," ch. V Aug-
Communist artillery strength constantly
Se p 51, pp. 27-28. mounting, the U.S. artillery units in Ko-
61
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, sec. I, rea had to fire more frequently. Ridg-
Narrative .
62
Williamson et al., Action on "Heartbreak
Ridge," p. 32. 63 U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, pp. 63, 75.
BEHIND THE LINES 227

way argued earnestly for an increase in The approval of Ridgway's requests


the day of supply for his 8-inch, 105-mm., on 20 October did not, of course, pro-
and 155-mm. howitzers and for his 155- duce an immediate improvement in the
mm. guns, pointing out the grim rela- ammunition situation in the FEC.67 But
tionship between artillery and casualties: the end of the fall campaign and the
negotiation of the line of demarcation
Whatever may have been the impression stabilized the battle line and lowered the
of our operations in Korea to date, artillery intensity of the fighting. The possibility
has been and remains the great killer of
Communists. It remains the great saver of that an armistice might be concluded
soldiers, American and Allied. There is a soon led Van Fleet to secure Ridgway's
direct relation between the piles of shells permission in early December to bring
in the Ammunition supply points and the his ammunition level up to a forty-five
piles of corpses in the graves registration
collecting points. The bigger the former, day reserve rather than thirty. Van Fleet
the smaller the latter and vice versa. 64 feared that the Communists might suc-
ceed in getting a clause freezing
The increase for his heavy caliber ammunition stocks at their current level
howitzers and guns were but one part of written into the armistice and preferred
Ridgway's request. If they were granted, to bolster his own before this hap-
he wanted to raise the reserve of these pened.68
shells from 75 to 90 days as quickly as At the end of 1951, the ammunition
possible. He in turn would augment the tale took a new twist. The records of
supplies in Korea from 30 to 40 days ammunition expenditures during the
and keep 20 days' supply in the pipeline summer and fall campaigns evidently
leaving only 30 days' reserve in Japan.65 were brought to Ridgway's attention and
But even as Ridgway sent off his request, disturbed him deeply. Although it was
he informed Van Fleet that the Eighth too late to do anything about the ammu-
Army would have to live within its am- nition already spent, the Far East com-
munition income in November. Since it mander decided that the phenomenal
would take considerable time to build rates of fire were due to "either extrava-
up the theater reserve again, "There gant waste or expenditure of ammuni-
must be no mental reservation that re- tion, or misuse of artillery, or both."
gardless of disapproval of subordinate Since excessive use of artillery shells im-
commanders wishes for ammunition that posed heavier demands upon U.S. indus-
such ammunition will be supplied in try and drained raw materials, Ridgway
case stocks get low. Your ammunition told Van Fleet to maintain constant su-
resources, present and predicted, are as pervision lest the performance be re-
stated above. Their increase is beyond peated.69
the capability of this theater." 66
155-mm., and 20 rounds of 8-inch howitzer shells.
64
Msg, GX 53171, CINCFE to JCS, 17 Oct 51, in Ridgway had asked that these be raised to 55, 40,
FEC
65 G-3 471 Ammunition. and 50, respectively.
66
Ibid. 67
68
Msg, DA 84571, DA to CINCFE, 20 Oct 51.
Msg, CX 53155, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 17 Oct UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov-Dec 51, CofS sec.,
51, in Hq Eighth Army Opnl Planning Files, Oct an. 1, p. 8.
69
51, p. 17. The Department of the Army daily rate Msg, C 60169, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 26 Dec 51,
authorized was: 50 rounds of 150-mm., 33 rounds of in FEC G-3 471 Ammunition.
228 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
This was a serious charge and Van winter months and there was no prospect
Fleet was not inclined to let it pass un- of relief in the heavy shell category in
challenged. He did not believe that the near future. 72
there had been either waste or misuse of The time lag between obligating funds
artillery and warned against rigid com- for ammunition production and the de-
parisons of World War II firings with livery of the finished shells was empha-
those in Korea. "Based on World War II sized during early 1952. Despite the fact
European standards," he went on, "I that billions of dollars of contracts had
estimate that the Eighth Army is short been let, the end result in many cases
approximately 70 battalions of field ar- was still six months or more in the offing.
tillery. Hence, the greatly reduced in- In the meantime shortages in the Far
tensity of field artillery battalions per East Command became more difficult to
mile of front, has required more rounds explain to Congress and the U.S. public.
per individual tube to achieve the effec- Although little was happening at the
tiveness required. The effectiveness of front in Korea and efforts were made to
one volley from four battalions is far restrict nonessential artillery missions,
greater than four volleys from one bat- General Collins felt that expenditures
talion." He admitted using his artillery were still too heavy. Pointing out that
freely to kill the enemy during the two and a half billion dollars of the three
offensives, but, taking a leaf from Ridg- and a half requested for Army procure-
way's own book, he reminded the Far ment in fiscal year 1953 must be spent
East commander that if he had tried to for ammunition, Collins asked Ridgway
take the objectives with limited artillery on 10 March to see whether major re-
fire, the casualty lists of the Eighth Army ductions should not be made at once and
would have been materially higher. In retained unless large-scale fighting re-
closing, Van Fleet maintained that he sumed. Ridgway in turn assigned the
kept a watchful eye on the ammunition problem to Van Fleet.73
level and that he had conserved a con- Considering the small number of cas-
siderable amount of shells during the ualties inflicted upon the enemy during
static October-December period.70 the early part of 1952, the Eighth Army's
As the Ridgway-Van Fleet exchange expenditures of artillery ammunition ap-
mirrored the increasing concern in the peared rather high.74 But Van Fleet was
Far East Command over the situation, quick to remind Ridgway that during
supply officials in Washington offered
little hope that there would be improve- 72
Memo, Col Davidson, G-3, for Asst CofS G-3,
ment in the calibers that were short until 29 Feb 52, sub: Rpt of Staff Visits During Period 23
Jan-19 Feb 52, in G-3 333 Pacific, 1.
late in 1952.71 Mortar ammunition and 73
(1) Msg, DA 903815, Collins to Ridgway, 10 Mar
shells for 8-inch guns and 155-mm. how- 52. (2) Msg, C 66253, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 2 Apr
itzers became less plentiful during the 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 8.
74
In January 1952, FEC expended 57,000 tons of
70
Msg, G 3789 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 29 Dec ammunition costing about $114,000,000. Estimated
51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov-Dec 51, CinC enemy casualties were about 20,000, so that each
and CofS sec., an. 1, incl 12. enemy casualty on the average took $5,700 worth of
71
Memo, Magruder (G-4) for ACofS G-3, 28 Dec ammunition before he was injured or killed. See
51. sub: Augmentation from FEC, in G-3 320.2 Check Sheet, EKW [Wright] for CofS, 31 Mar 52,
Pacific, 79/1. FEC G-3 471 Ammunition.
BEHIND THE LINES 229

the winter months, Eighth Army had II had been a blessing and a curse. For
used less than 60 percent of the ammu- while it had provided a substantial back-
nition allocated it and at present rates log on which the United States could
would expend about three-quarters of a draw to meet the demands of Korea, the
billion dollars worth in 1952. Heavy imbalance in its stocks had gone unno-
mortar ammunition was under rigid al- ticed and the very mass of the stockpile
location already and could not be re- had introduced a dangerous sense of
duced further, Van Fleet continued. If complacency. The expectation of a short
savings were mandatory, the only cate- war had fostered this complacency and
gory that he could afford to reduce was permitted the rebuilding of the defunct
interdictory fire. Since 66 percent of ammunition industry to be delayed.
Eighth Army's missions were interdic- Compounding the situation, the lack of
tory, as against 19 percent for counter- industrial mobilization that followed the
battery and 15 percent for meeting outbreak of the war led to further set-
enemy actions, Van Fleet was ordering backs in the battle for ammunition pro-
his corps commanders to cut interdic- duction. In the meantime the imbal-
tory fire by 20 percent, but this was as ances had come to light and, as it
far as he could go.75 happened, many of these were in mortar
When Ridgway replied to Collins on and howitzer ammunition that were
9 April, he had increased the estimate of most in demand for the artillery war
ammunition costs for 1952 to slightly that set in from mid-1951 on. The tre-
over one billion dollars, but after report- mendous costs of the ammunition pro-
ing the 20-percent reduction contem- gram that were cited in late 1951 and
plated by Van Fleet in interdictory fire, early 1952 reflected the decelerated pace
Ridgway struck at the heart of the mat- of the war and served as an excuse for
ter: reducing the rate of expenditure of am-
munition. A lower rate of daily fire in
It still seems to me that the most funda- turn would help alleviate the problem
mental factors in this problem are the ones of dwindling ammunition reserves in the
most frequently obscured by the search for
economies. Those factors are that we are at essential categories. On the other hand,
war in Korea, and that ammunition must restrictions in the number of rounds that
be provided to meet essential requirements, could be used each day caused the man at
both of expenditures and stock levels. Pro- the front to complain and brought the
vided these requirements are reasonable, whole matter to the attention of Con-
economy ceases to be a factor. The only
alternative is to effect savings of dollars by gress and the public.
expenditure of lives.76 Despite the charges and counter-
charges in the ammunition free-for-all,
By the end of April several facts were the principal enemy was time. Until
readily apparent. The huge ammuni- production could begin on a scale that
tion stockpile left over from World War would replenish stocks as well as current
needs, the ammunition crises would go
75
Msg, G 5382 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 7 Apr on. The rationing which was adopted in
52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 9.
76
Msg, C 66608, CINCFE to Collins, 9 Apr 52, in the winter and spring of 1952 was a
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 10. temporary expedient to bridge the gap
230 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
between the decreasing stockpile and Although there had been several vio-
new production, but until the transition lations of the neutral zone and of the
was complete, shortages and expedients agreements made between the Commu-
would be the rule. nists and the UNC on convoys to the
The disadvantages of fighting even a Panmunjom area, the enemy's reaction
small war without an adequate produc- to these breaches had been mild during
tion base in being or capable of quick December and January. A B-26 light
expansion are readily discernible in the bomber had strafed a truck in the Kae-
ammunition situation of 1951 and 1952. song sector on 11 December because of
Feeding the hungry maw of the Far East the pilot's navigational error and an-
Command drained the reserves in the other pilot had unloaded a bomb on
United States and led to reductions in Kaesong on 17 January instead of drop-
allocations for the Army units in Europe. ping his pylon fuel tank. On the follow-
An expansion of the war might well ing day a prescheduled air strike on a
have been catastrophic for no amount of bridge at Hanp'o-ri, some 18 miles north
money or effort could buy the most price- of Kaesong, caught the Communist con-
less commodity—time. voy to Panmunjom as it approached the
Fortunately, the Communists matched bridge and damaged one of the trucks.
the UNC in their disinclination to press The enemy accepted the expressions of
the fight on the battlefield or to broaden regret in each instance and made no at-
the war. It appeared that as long as the tempt to use the incidents for other
moderate pace of the conflict continued, purposes.77
U.S. ammunition supplies would be suf- As the negotiations began to bog down
ficient to maintain the status quo until over Items 3 and 4 at Panmunjom, indi-
new production took up the slack. cations of a new propaganda campaign
were disclosed in February. In a United
Propaganda Assault Nations meeting Soviet Delegate Jacob
Malik accused the United States of using
The general indisposition toward com- poison gas in Korea. While this was not
bat in early 1952 confined itself wholly the first time the charge had been lev-
to the front and did not extend to the eled, it seemed significant that Malik
battle behind the lines for world opin- had made it himself. It caused a flurry
ion. Since words had proven themselves in Washington since it might be a warn-
effective in the matter of the incidents ing that the Communists were preparing
during the summer and fall of 1951, the to employ gas warfare themselves. On
Communists began once again to in- the other hand, the enemy may have
crease the flow and intensity of their discovered that Ridgway had ordered all
propaganda. As events at the conference his commanders to organize, equip, and
table at Panmunjom revealed the basic train their forces to defend themselves
differences in approach to the problem against chemical, biological, and radio-
still outstanding, the enemy fell back
77
upon its tried and tested method of ex- (1) Msg, HNC 535, Joy to CINCUNC, 11 Dec
51, in FEC Msgs, Dec 51. (2) Liaison Officers Mtg
erting pressure upon the UNC by means at Panmunjom, 23 Jan 52, in G-3 Liaison Officers
of a series of new "incidents." Mtg at Panmunjom, bk. II, 1952.
BEHIND THE LINES 231

logical attack and deduced from this that agents into Communist areas. Complete
the UNC was getting ready to introduce with pictures, one article "proved" that
new forms of warfare.78 The Ridgway on 17 February a UNC plane had
order was purely routine, but the enemy dropped a weapon north of P'yongyang
could not be certain of this. filled with hideous, infected flies that
At any rate the Communists evidently could live and fly in snowy weather.80
were taking no chances and attempted to Intelligence reports estimated that the
forestall the possible use of chemical Communists were not only trying to dis-
warfare. Actually the Far East Com- credit the United States through this
mand was in no position to launch a gas campaign but also were attempting to
attack. The theater was not permitted cover up their lack of success in prevent-
to stock toxic chemicals, in the first place, ing and controlling epidemics and to
and there was also a shortage of over whip up new enthusiasm for the Korean
50,000 gas masks in the Far East. Be- War in China and among Communist
cause the individual soldier in World sympathizers throughout Asia.81 In 1951
War II had frequently been inclined to there had been extensive typhus, cholera,
discard his gas mask, none had been typhoid, and smallpox outbreaks in
issued in Korea. Instead they were North Korea and it was quite possible
stored at depots where they could be that the enemy expected reoccurrences
distributed within twenty-four hours.79 and desired a scapegoat.
The absence of toxic materials in the Despite strong and immediate denials
FEC and the lack of special preparation of the use of germ warfare by Secretary
within the theater to wage or defend of State Acheson and other officials in
against chemical warfare belied the Washington, there was evidence that
Communist charges, but as so frequently some Asian countries were lending cre-
happens, accusations, no matter how dence to the enemy's claims. Both the
false, leave residual damage. State and Defense Departments began
Before the furore over the poison gas to show concern as the attack grew more
had completely died down, the enemy intense and instructed Ridgway to do all
opened a full-scale attack in another he could in the way of categoric dis-
quarter. In late February radio broad- avowals if the subject were brought up
casts from Moscow, Peiping, and P'yong- at Panmunjom.82 In the meantime the
yang openly charged the United States State Department sent an invitation to
of conducting bacteriological warfare in the President of the International Com-
North Korea and Manchuria. Enemy mittee of the Red Cross in Geneva sug-
newspapers picked up the story and re- gesting that the United States would
lated how UNC planes had dumped 80
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, p. 31. For an
infected insects and materials and artil- interesting discussion of the germ warfare charges
lery had fired shells filled with bacterial of this period, see John Clews, The Communists'
New Weapon—Germ Warfare (London: Lincoln
Pragers, 1953). See also the statement of U.S. Rep-
78
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51. resentative to the UN Assembly, Ernest A. Gross,
79
Check Sheet, JHR [Col Jacquard H. Roths- 27 March 1953 and 8 April 1953, in Dept of State
child] to G-3, 9 Feb 52, sub: Questions Arising Bulletin, vol. XXVIII, No. 722 (April 27, 1953)
81
From Statement Made By Soviet Delegate Malik UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, p. 32.
82
Before U.N., in FEC G-3 471.6 Bombs, etc. Msg, JCS 903060, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Mar 52.
232 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
welcome a full investigation of the Com- As Ridgway prepared his statement,
munist charges by a disinterested body the U.N. World Health Organization
to reveal the falsity of the enemy propa- volunteered to send technical assistance
ganda.83 The ICRC accepted the U.S. to North Korea to help combat disease
offer in mid-March, but there was little and epidemics and the United States
hope that the Communists would have quickly agreed that the WHO should
anything to do with representatives of a communicate directly with the Commu-
committee that they regarded as an agent nists on this matter. If the enemy refused
of the United Nations Command and to receive WHO teams, it would tend to
not as a disinterested body.84 discredit the charges and reflect badly
On 8 March Chinese Foreign Minister upon the Communist concern for the
Chou En-lai had hinted at another facet welfare of their people.86
of the antigerm campaign. In a broad- Although the propaganda drive gath-
cast he implied that if the Chinese caught ered momentum during March and
U.S. Air Force personnel engaged in April with the Communists reporting
spreading disease over China, they would the dropping of infected spiders, fleas,
be treated as war criminals. The Air beetles carrying anthrax, voles carrying
Force could not let this threat go unchal- plague, and even poisoned clams in
lenged and the JCS told Ridgway to North Korea and in China, the rejection
issue a strong statement holding the of the ICRC and WHO offers to investi-
Communists responsible for proper treat- gate the incidents and to aid in the con-
ment of prisoners of war. At the same trol of disease did much to weaken the
time he could again deny the accusations effect of the later claims.87 Besides, the
and warn the enemy against using an Communists were about to be given a
epidemic to mask ill treatment of pris- far more potent propaganda weapon as
oners. Army G-3 held that this would the trouble that had been simmering
allow the UNC to shift over to the prop- for months in the UNC prisoner of war
aganda offensive.85 camps reached the boiling stage.
83
(1) Msg, DA 903096, G-3 to CINCFE, 8 Mar by the JCS, Defense and State Departments, and
58. (2) Msg, C 64368, CINCFE to DA, 9 Mar 52, DA- the President.
86
IN 114089. (1) Msg, C 65348, Ridgway to JCS, 16 Mar 52,
84
Msg, JCS 903547, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Mar 52. DA-IN 116709. (2) Msg, JCS 903786, JCS to
85
(1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Mar 52, sub: CINCFE, 17 Mar 52.
87
Chinese Communist Threat . . . , in G-3 385, 8. (2) (1) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, p. 24. (a)
Msg, JCS 903686, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Mar 52. This Clews, The Communists' New Weapon—Germ War-
message was drafted by the Air Force and cleared fare, pp. 14-24.
CHAPTER XI

Koje-do
Although the situation in the prisoner maneuver and sent to the rear. The bag
of war camps did not attain international of prisoners rose from under a thousand
prominence until May 1952, there had in August 1950 to over 130,000 in No-
been numerous indications of the poten- vember. Unfortunately, little provision
tial danger prior to that time. Riots, had been made for so many prisoners
demonstrations, and violence had be- and facilities to confine, clothe, and feed
come common in the compounds housing them were not available. In addition,
the Communist prisoners, but the U.N. there were not enough men on hand to
Command had preferred to cope with guard the prisoners nor were the guards
them on a day-to-day basis. The hope assigned adequately trained for their
1
that a truce soon would be negotiated mission. The quantity and quality of
and eliminate the need for drastic UNC the security forces continued to plague
actions fostered a policy of delay. In the UNC prison-camp commanders in
turn, the lack of strong UNC measures the months that lay ahead.
encouraged the Communist prisoners to While the prisoners were housed near
become bolder and more demanding. Pusan, there was a tendency for former
As UNC control dissipated, the enemy ROK personnel who had been impressed
prisoners took charge of their compounds into the North Korean Army and later
and began to plan for a coup that would recaptured by the UNC to take over the
focus the eyes of the world upon the leadership in the compounds. Since
whole prisoner of war problem. these ex-ROK soldiers professed them-
This remarkable turnabout wherein selves to be anti-Communist and were
prisoners dealt with their captors on usually favored by the ROK guards, they
what amounted to terms of equality were able to win positions of power and
must properly begin with the landings control.
at Inch'on in September 1950. As the prisoner total reached 137,000
in January 1951, the UNC decided to
The Seeds Are Planted isolate captured personnel on Koje-do,
an island off the southern coast of Korea.
After the surprise attack at Inch'on But before the move was made, the South
and the follow-up advance by the Eighth Korean prisoners were segregated from
Army, the North Korean Army began to the North Koreans. This left a power vacu-
fall back. But large numbers of the
enemy were taken prisoner in the swift 1
Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 2.
234 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
um in many of the compounds that were caliber, proper control was difficult at
abruptly deprived of their leaders.2 the outset and later became impossible.
On Koje-do security problems were But the elusive hope of an imminent
reduced, but there were serious engi- armistice and a rapid solution of the
neering obstacles to be overcome. Since prisoner problem delayed corrective ac-
there were little or no natural water tion.5
resources on the island, Col. Hartley F. It is only fair to point out that al-
Dame, the first camp commander, had though there were frequent instances of
to build dams and store rain water to unrest and occasional outbreaks of re-
service the 118,000 natives, 100,000 ref- sistance during the first months of the
ugees, and 150,000 prisoners.3 Construc- Koje-do prison camp's existence, much
tion began in January on the first of the early trouble could be traced to
enclosure of UNC Prisoner of War Camp the fact that ROK guards were used
Number 1 and by the end of the month extensively. Resentment between ROK
over 50,000 POW's were moved from the and North Korean soldiers flared into
mainland to Koje-do.4 angry words, threats, and blows very eas-
Swiftly, in two rock-strewn valleys on ily. Part of the tension stemmed from
the north coast, four enclosures, each the circumstance that at first the pris-
subdivided into eight compounds, were oners drew better rations than the
built. Originally intended to hold 700- guards, but eventually this discrepancy
1,200 men apiece, the compounds were was adjusted. In the internecine dis-
soon jammed to five times their capacity. putes the U.S. security troops operated
Since available land was at a premium at a disadvantage since they knew little
on the island, the space between the or no Korean and were reluctant to in-
compounds soon had to be used to con- terfere. Bad blood between guards and
fine the prisoners too. This conserved prisoners, however, formed only one
the construction of facilities and the segment of the problem.
number of guards required to police the Although the United States had not
enclosures, but complicated the task of ratified the Geneva Convention of 1949
managing the crowded camp. Packing on prisoners of war, it had volunteered
thousands of men into a small area with to observe its provisions.6 The Geneva
only barbed wire separating each com- Convention, however, was designed pri-
pound from the next permitted a free marily to protect the rights of the pris-
exchange of thought and an opportunity oners. It completely failed to foresee
to plan and execute mass demonstrations the development of hard-core, organized
and riots. With the number of security prisoner groups such as those that grew
personnel limited and usually of inferior up on Koje-do in 1951-52 or to provide
protection for the captor nation in deal-
2
Samuel M. Myers and William E. Bradbury, The ing with stubborn resistance. In their
Political Behavior of Korean and Chinese Prisoners
of War in the Korean Conflict: A Historical Analy-
5
sis, Tech Rpt 50 (Human Resources Research (1) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May
Office, George Washington University, 1958), p. 65. 52, vol. II, tab F. (2) Interv with Col Dame, 20 Oct
3
Interv with Col Dame, 20 Oct 59. In OCMH. 59. (3) Interv with Col Maurice J. Fitzgerald,2
4
Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. Dec 59. In OCMH.
6
2-3. See Chapter VII, above.
KOJE-DO 235

PRISONERS IN A COMPOUND OF THE KOJE-DO POW CAMP

zeal for defending the prisoners from the defenseless captives and the Com-
hardship, injustice, and brutality, the munists capitalized on this situation.
makers spelled out in detail the privi- The outbreaks of dissension and open
leges of the prisoners and the restrictions resistance were desultory until the ne-
upon the captor nation, but evidently gotiations at Kaesong got under way.
could not visualize a situation in which Then the prisoners realized that their
the prisoners would organize and present future was at stake. Many had professed
an active threat to the captor nation.7 strong anti-Communist sentiments and
Under these conditions every effort at were afraid to return, while others, an-
violence by the prisoners that was coun- ticipating repatriation, swung clearly to
tered by force reflected badly upon the the side of Communist groups in the
U.N. Command. Regardless of the prov- compounds. From North Korea, agents
ocation given by the prisoners, the UNC were sent to the front lines and permitted
appeared to be an armed bully abusing themselves to be captured so that they
7
could infiltrate the prison camps. Work-
DA Pamphlet 20-150, October 1950, Geneva Con-
vention of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War ing through refugees, civilians, and local
Victims. guerrillas, the agents were able to keep
236 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

PRISONERS LEARN TO WORK TIN IN THE KOJE-DO CAMP

in touch with their headquarters and to agents stood their chiefs, none other than
plan, organize, and stage incidents at Lt. Gen. Nam Il and Maj. Gen. Lee Sang
will. Inside the camps, messages were Cho, the principal North Korean dele-
passed visually by signals, hurled by gates to the armistice conference.8 The
rocks from compound to compound, or close connection between Panmunjom
communicated by word of mouth. The and the prison camps provided another
hospital compound served as a clearing- instance of the Communists' untiring
house for information and was one of efforts in using every possible measure
the centers of Communist resistance. Al-
though the agents wielded the actual
power in the compounds, they usually 8
Hq UNC/FEC MIS, The Communist War in
concealed themselves behind the nomi- POW Camps, 28 January 1953, pp. 6-8. This ac-
count is based upon seized enemy documents,
nal commanders and operated carefully interviews with prisoners and captured enemy
to cloak their identities. And behind the agents, and intelligence reports.
KOJE-DO 237

to exert pressure upon the course of the of democracy with the fallacies of com-
armistice talks. munism in an unmistakable manner and
As the Communists struggled for con- the Communists protested vehemently.
trol of the compounds, a defensive coun- It should be noted that by far the greater
termovement was launched by the portion of the education program aimed
non-Communist elements. Former Chi- at assisting the prisoners in developing
nese Nationalist soldiers and North Ko- vocational and technical skills to help
rean anti-Communists engaged in bloody them after their release.11 The Commu-
clashes with their opponents. When oral nists readily accepted the instruction in
persuasion failed, there was little hesi- metalworking and soon began to produce
tancy on both sides to resort to fists, weapons of all varieties instead of sanita-
clubs, and homemade weapons. Kanga- tion utensils, stoves, and garden tools
roo courts tried stubborn prisoners and and used these arms to gain interior
sentences were quick and often fatal. control in the compounds whenever they
Since UNC personnel did not enter the could.
compounds at night and the prisoners In September 1951 fifteen prisoners
were usually either afraid or unwilling were murdered by a self-appointed peo-
to talk, the beatings and murders went ple's court. Three more were killed
unpunished.9 It should also be noted when rioting broke out on the 19th in
that even if the beaten prisoners had Compound 78. Troops had to be rushed
been willing to give evidence against in to restore order and remove two hun-
their attackers, as sometimes happened, dred prisoners who were in fear of their
the camp commander was not in a posi- lives. As unrest mounted, the 2d Logisti-
tion to prosecute. He was not permitted cal Command, in charge of all prison
by his superiors in Washington to insti- camps, asked Van Fleet for more security
tute judicial procedures against the cul- personnel. Pointing out that protracted
prits. Deprived of this weapon of confinement, uncertainty over the future,
disciplinary control, the prison command and Communist agitation against the
was forced to operate under a distinct UNC information and education pro-
disadvantage.10 gram had combined to produce increas-
Another instance in which higher ing tension among the prisoners, the
headquarters contributed unwittingly to chief of staff of the 2d Logistical Com-
the discontent of the prison camp mand also reminded Van Fleet that the
stemmed from an information and edu- caliber of the guard troops left much to
cation program instituted in 1951 to be desired.12
keep the prisoners occupied profitably. The September disturbances led to a
For the Communists the orientation visit by Van Fleet and a reinforcing and
course became the chief target of criti-
11
cism and abuse. Although attendance at Msg, C 50603, CINCUNC to DA, 21 Jun 52, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS,
these lectures was purely voluntary, the Supporting Docs, tab 83.
subject matter contrasted the advantages 12
(1) Ltr, Col Albert C. Morgan to CG Eighth
9 Army, 18 Sep 51, sub: Security for POW's in Hq
Ibid.,pp. 26-28.
10
2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. II, tab
Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. A-10. (2) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May
II, tab E. 52, vol. II, tab H.
238 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

U.S. and ROK personnel were stationed


on the island. This was still some 6,000
fewer then the number requested.14
During December the rival factions-
Communist and anti-Communist—vied
for control of the compounds with both
sides meting out beatings and other pun-
ishment freely. A large-scale rock fight
between compounds on 18 December
was followed by riots and demonstra-
tions. Fourteen deaths and twenty-four
other casualties resulted from this
flare-up.15
The acceleration of violence could be
attributed in large part to the inaugura-
tion of the screening process in the prison
camps. General Yount, commanding the
2d Logistical Command, later told the
Far East commander: "Until the incep-
tion of the screening program, American
personnel had full access to compounds
and were able to administer them in a
satisfactory manner although never to
the degree desired." 16
A COMMUNIST POW LEADER, KOJE-DO In November and December over 37,-
000prisoners had been screened and re-
reorganization of the prison security classified as civilian internees.17 As more
forces. From the opening of the camp prisoners indicated that they did not
in January down to mid-September when wish to be repatriated or evinced anti-
Col. Maurice J. Fitzgerald assumed com- Communist sympathies, the sensitivity
mand, there had been eight different of the Communist prisoners to screening
commanders or about one a month. As intensified. Thus, when the commander
Fitzgerald later commented, "Koje-do of Koje-do camp decided early in Jan-
was a graveyard of commanders." 13 Van uary 1952 to give the civilian internees
Fleet's recognition of the difficulties of. a second screening, the basic ingredients
the problems led to the activation of the for trouble were on hand. The object of
8137th Military Police Group in Octo- the second round of interviews by ROK
ber. Besides three assigned battalions, civilian teams was to correct the mistakes
four additional escort guard companies
14
were attached to the group. In Novem- Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol.
ber one battalion of the 23d Infantry II, tab 3, pp. 8-9; tab G, Chart 3.
15
Msg, CX 69250, Clark to CofS, 28 May 52, DA-
Regiment was made available for duty IN 144360.
16
on Koje-do and by December over 9,000 Gen Yount's Statement to Gen Clark, no date,
in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File.
13 17
Interv with Col Fitzgerald, 2 Dec 59. In OCMH. See Chapter VII, above.
KOJE-DO 239

made in the first series and also to segre-


gate the nonrepatriates from the staunch
Communist elements.
Despite numerous incidents all the
civilian internee compounds were
screened during January and early Feb-
ruary except for the 5,600 inmates of
Compound 62. Here the Communists
had firm control and refused to permit
the teams to enter. The compound
leader stated flatly that all the members
of Compound 62 desired to return to
North Korea and there was no sense in
wasting time in screening. Since the
ROK teams were equally determined to
carry out their assignment, the 3d Bat-
talion of the 27th Infantry Regiment
moved in during the early hours of 18
February and took up positions in front
of the compound.18 With bayonets fixed, GENERAL DODD
the four companies passed through the
gate and divided the compound into four
segments. But the Communists refused their point, for the infantry withdrew
to bow to the show of force. Streaming and the compound was not screened.19
out of the barracks, they converged on The fear that the story might leak out
the infantry with pick handles, knives, to the Communists in a distorted version
axes, flails, and tent poles. Others hurled led the U.N. Command to release an
rocks as they advanced and screamed official account placing the blame
their defiance. Between 1,000-1,500 in- squarely on the shoulders of the Com-
ternees pressed the attack and the sol- munist compound leaders. The Depart-
diers were forced to resort to concussion ment of the Army instructed Ridgway
grenades. When the grenades failed to to make it clear that only 1,500 of the
stop the assault, the UNC troops opened inmates took part in the outbreak and
fire. Fifty-five prisoners were killed im- that only civilian internees—not prison-
mediately and 22 more died at the hospi- ers of war—were involved.20 In view of
tal, with over 140 other casualties as 19
(1) Msg, G 71528, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 19
against 1 U.S. killed and 38 wounded. Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1,
This was a high price for the Commu- incl 11. (2) Msg, G 71542, Van Fleet to CINCUNC,
nists to pay, but human life counted for 19 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an.
1, incl 12. (3) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt,
little. In any event the Communists won May 52, p. 7.
20
(1) Msg, G 4615 TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE,
18
The 27th Regiment of the 25th Infantry Di- 20 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, an. 1, incl 14.
vision was called the Wolfhounds and had been (2) Msg, DA 901675, CSUSA to CINCFE, 20 Feb
moved to Koje-do during January to bolster the 52. (3) Msg, DA 901709, CSUSA to CINCFE, 22
security forces. Feb 52.
240 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
the outcry that the Communist delegates Communists stoned the detail and its
at Panmunjom were certain to make over ROK guards. Without orders the guards
the affair, this was an especially impor- retaliated with gunfire. Before the ROK
tant point. Civilian internees could be contingent could be brought under con-
considered an internal affair of the ROK trol, 12 prisoners were killed and 26
Government and outside the purview of were wounded while 1 ROK civilian and
the truce conference.21 1 U.S. officer, who tried to stop the shoot-
But Communist protests at Panmun- ing, were injured.23
jom were not the only results of the bat- April was a momentous month for the
tle of Compound 62. On 20 February prisoners on Koje-do. On 2 April the
Van Fleet appointed Brig. Gen. Francis Communists showed their interest in
T. Dodd as commandant of the camp to finding out the exact number of pris-
tighten up discipline, and the following oners that would be returned to their
week Van Fleet received some new in- control if screening was carried out.
structions from Tokyo: Spurred by this indication that the en-
emy might be willing to break the dead-
In regard to the control of the POW's at lock on voluntary repatriation, the U.N.
Koje-do, the recent riot in Compound 62 Command inaugurated a new screening
gives strong evidence that many of the com-
pounds may be controlled by the violent program on 8 April to produce a firm
leadership of Communists or anti-Com- figure.24 During the days that followed,
munist groups. This subversive control is UNC teams interviewed the prisoners in
extremely dangerous and can result in all but seven compounds, where 37,000
further embarrassment to the U.N.C. North Koreans refused to permit the
Armistice negotiations, particularly if any
mass screening or segregation is directed teams to enter. As noted previously, the
within a short period of time. I desire your results of the screening amazed even the
personal handling of this planning. I wish most optimistic of the UNC when only
to point out the grave potential conse- about 70,000 of the 170,000 military and
quences of further rioting, and therefore civilian prisoners consented to go back
me urgent requirement for the most effec-
tive practicable control over POW's.22 to the Communists voluntarily. The
enemy, on the other hand, was at first
Although the orders from Ridgway stunned and then became violently indig-
covered both Communists and anti- nant, having been led to expect that a
Communists, the latter were co-operative much higher percentage of repatriates
in their relations with the UNC person- would be turned up by the screening.
nel and ruthless only when they encoun- Negotiations at Panmunjom again came
tered Communist sympathizers in their to a standstill and the Communists re-
midst. The hatred between the two newed their attack upon the whole con-
groups led to another bloody encounter cept of screening. In view of the close
on 13 March. As an anti-Communist connection between the enemy truce
detail passed a hostile compound, ardent delegates and the prison camps, it was
21
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1.
22 23
Memo, Maj Gen Bryan L. Milburn, G-1 FEC, (1) Msg, CX 65213, CINCUNC to JCS, 14 Mar
for Gen Van Fleet, 29 Feb 52, sub: Planning for 52, DA-IN 115842. (2) Msg, CX 65281, CINCUNC
POW's . . . , in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 to JCS, 14 Mar 52, DA-IN 115919.
24
Corresp. See Chapter VIII, above.
KOJE-DO 241

PICTURE OF STALIN DISPLAYED DURING A POW DEMONSTRATION, KOJE-DO

not surprising that the agitation of the dents.25 Segregation and dispersal, how-
Communists over the unfavorable im- ever, had a negative side as well, for the
plications of the UNC screening should removal of anti-Communists and their
communicate itself quickly to the loyal replacement by pro-Communists in the
Communist compounds. compounds on Koje-do could not help
During the interviewing period, Van but strengthen the hand of the Commu-
Fleet had informed Ridgway that he was nist compound leaders. Relieved of the
segregating and removing the anti- necessity to conduct internecine strife,
Communist prisoners to the mainland. they could now be assured of whole-
Although the separation would mean hearted support from the inmates of
more administrative personnel and more their compounds as they directed their
equipment would be required to organ- efforts against the U.N. Command. An
ize and supervise the increased number 25
Msg, GX 5410 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 13
of camps, Van Fleet felt that dispersal Apr 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal
would lessen the possibility of inci- Msg File, 1949-52.
242 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

energetic campaign to discredit the would probably demonstrate violently


screening program backed by all the when UNC forces moved into the com-
Communist compounds was made easier pounds still holding out. In anticipation
by the transfer of the chief opposition to of trouble Van Fleet moved the 3d Bat-
the mainland and the alteration of the talion of the 9th Infantry Regiment to
balance of power on the island. Koje-do to reinforce the 38th Infantry
In addition to the general political Regiment and ordered the 1st Battalion
unrest that permeated the Communist of the 15th Infantry Regiment and the
enclosures, a quite fortuitous element of ROK 20th Regiment to Pusan. Barring
discontent complicated the scene in early accident, he intended to begin screening
April. Up until this time responsibility shortly after the 1st of May.28
for the provision of the grain component Confronted with almost certain vio-
of the prisoners' ration had rested with lence, Ridgway decided to ask for per-
the ROK Army. But the ROK Govern- mission to cancel forced screening:
ment informed the Eighth Army in
March that it could no longer bear the These compounds are well organized and
effective control cannot be exercised within
burden and Van Fleet in turn told the them without use of such great degree of
2d Logistical Command that it would force as might verge on the brutal and re-
have to secure the grain through U.S. sult in killing and wounding quite a
Army channels. Unfortunately, the U.N. number of inmates. While I can exercise
Civil Assistance Command could not such forced screening, I believe that the
risk of violence and violence involved,
supply grain in the prescribed ratio of both to U.N.C. personnel and to the in-
one-half rice and one-half other grains mates themselves, would not warrant this
without sufficient advance time to fill the course of action. Further, the unfavorable
order. Instead a one-third rice, one-third publicity which would probably result . . .
barley, and one-third wheat ration was would provide immediate and effective
Communist material. . . .29
apportioned to the prisoners in April
and this occasioned an avalanche of com- This request and Ridgway's plan to
plaints.26 list the prisoners in the unscreened com-
The 17 compounds occupied by the pounds as desiring repatriation were ap-
Communist prisoners at the end of April proved. Although failure to interview
included 10 that had been screened and all the inmates in these enclosures might
7 that had resisted all efforts to interview well prevent some prisoners from choos-
them. There was little doubt in Van ing nonrepatriation, Ridgway's su-
Fleet's mind that force would have to periors held that if the prisoners felt
be used and casualties expected if the strongly enough about not returning to
recalcitrant compounds were to be Communist control, they would some-
screened.27 As he prepared plans to use how make their wishes known.30
force, Van Fleet warned Ridgway on 28 28
Msg, GX 5637 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 28
April that the prisoners already screened Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl
26
Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. 73.29
II, pp. 13ff. Msg, CX 67750, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Apr 52, DA-
27
Msg, GX 5410 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 13 IN 133133.
30
Apr 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal (1) Msg, JCS 907528, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Apr
Msg File, 1949-52. 52. (2) Msg, JCS 908093, JCS to CINCFE, 7 May 52.
KOJE-DO 243

As forced screening was cast into without violence; and the latter had ex-
limbo, the prospects for a relaxation of terior control, but could not get in with-
tension on Koje-do should have im- out violence. With the cancellation of
proved. But in early May, after a tour of forced screening, the U.N. Command
inspection, Col. Robert T. Chaplin, pro- indicated that it was willing to accept
vost marshal of the Far East Command, the status quo rather than initiate an-
reported that there was a dangerous lack other wave of bloodshed in the camps.
of control within the Communist com- The next move was up to the Commu-
pounds, with the prisoners refusing even nists.
to bring in their own food and supplies.
The possibility of new incidents that The Time of Ripening
might embarrass the U.N. Command,
especially at Panmunjom, led Ridgway It did not take long for the Communist
to remind Van Fleet that proper control prisoners to act. As investigation later
had to be maintained regardless of revealed, they had become familiar with
whether screening was conducted or the habits of General Dodd, the camp
not.31 As it happened, Van Fleet was commandant, during the spring and by
more concerned over the fact that Colo- the beginning of May they had readied
nel Chaplin had not informed Eighth a plan. Well aware that Dodd was anx-
Army of his impressions first than he ious to lessen the tension in the camp,
was over the prisoner-camp situation. they also knew that he often went un-
There was no cause for "undue anxiety" armed to the sally ports of the com-
about Koje-do, he told Ridgway on 5 pounds and talked to the leaders. This
May.32 system of personal contact kept Dodd in
Actually Eighth Army officers admit- close touch with camp problems, but it
ted freely that UNC authorities could exposed him to an element of risk. Only
not enter the compounds, inspect sanita- the guards carried weapons on Koje-do
tion, supervise medical support, or work and there were no locks on the com-
the Communists prisoners as they de- pounds gates, since work details were
sired. They exercised an external con- constantly passing in and out. Security
trol only, in that UNC security forces personnel were not authorized to shoot
did prevent the prisoners from escap- save in case of grave emergency or in
ing.33 Thus, on 7 May the Communist self-defense, and were not permitted to
prisoners and the UNC appeared to have keep a round in the chamber of their
reached a stalemate. The former had guns. In the past the Communists had
interior control, but could not get out successfully kidnapped several UNC sol-
diers and although they had later re-
31
Msg, CX 67988, Ridgway to CG Eighth Army, leased them unharmed after Communist
5 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, an. 1, complaints had been heard, the practice
incl 56.
32
Msg, GX 5746 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 5 was neither new nor unknown. Since
May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal the technique had proved profitable in
Msg File, 1949-52. previous instances, the enemy prisoners
33
Extract, Visit to Eighth Army Headquarters with
Col Chaplin, 8 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, evidently decided to spread their net for
May 52, an. 1, incl 58. the biggest fish of all—the camp com-
244 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

A KOJE-DO COMMANDANT TALKING TO POW's at a compound gate during a demon-


stration.

mandant. Taking advantage of his will- compound and searched them for con-
ingness to come to them, they made care- traband. When he promised to investi-
ful plans.34 gate the charges, they seemed satisfied,
On the evening of 6 May members of but asked to see General Dodd on the
a Communist work detail from Com- next day to discuss matters of impor-
pound 76 refused to enter the enclosure tance. Raven was noncommittal since
until they had spoken to Lt. Col. Wilbur he did not wish the prisoners to imagine
R. Raven, commanding officer of the that they could summon the comman-
94th Military Police Battalion and the dant at will, but he promised to pass the
compound. The prisoners told Raven message on to the general.35
that guards had beaten members of the Since the prisoners indicated that they
34
Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp.
would be willing to let themselves be
12ff. The compound leaders were afraid that the listed and fingerprinted if Dodd would
UNC would transfer them to another area if they come and talk to them, the trap was
left the safety of their own compounds. This made
35
them reluctant to go to Dodd's office and if Dodd Statement of Col Raven, 12 May 52, before a
wanted to talk to them, he had to go to the com- Board of Officers at Koje-do, in FEC Gen Admin
pound. Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers.
KOJE-DO 245

shrewdly baited. Dodd had just been in- planned and that the other compounds
structed to complete an accurate roster would have made an attempt to seize
and identification of all the remaining him if the opportunity had arisen.36
prisoners of war on Koje-do and the With the successful completion of the
chance to win a bloodless victory was too first step disposed of, the Communists
good to be missed. lost no time in carrying out the second
Colonel Raven finished his discussions phase. Within a few minutes of Dodd's
with the leaders of Compound 76 shortly capture, they hoisted a large sign an-
after 1400 on 7 May and Dodd drove nouncing—"We capture Dodd. As long
up a few minutes later. As usual they as our demand will be solved, his safety
talked with the unlocked gate of the sally is secured. If there happen brutal act
port between them and the Communists such as shooting, his life is danger."37
launched a whole series of questions con- The threat was soon followed by the first
cerning items of food and clothing they note from Dodd that he was all right
felt they should be issued. Then branch- and asking that no troops be sent in to
ing into the political field they asked release him until after 1700.38 Appar-
about the truce negotiations. Several ently General Dodd felt that he could
times they invited Dodd and Raven to persuade the prisoners to let him go by
come inside and sit down so that they that time.
could carry on the discussion in a more In the meantime word had passed
comfortable atmosphere. Raven turned swiftly back to General Yount, the com-
down these suggestions bluntly since he manding general of the 2d Logistical
himself had previously been seized and Command, and through him to Van
held. More prisoners had meanwhile Fleet, of the capture of Dodd. Van Fleet
gathered in the sally port and Dodd per- immediately instructed Yount not to
mitted them to approach and listen to use force to effect Dodd's release unless
the conversation. In the midst of the Eighth Army approved such action.
talk, a work detail turning in tents for Yount in turn sent his chief of staff, Col.
salvage came through the sally port and William H. Craig, by air to Koje-do to
the outer door was opened to let them assume command.39 Repeating Van
pass out. It remained ajar and the pris- Fleet's injunction not to use force, Yount
oners drew closer to Dodd and Raven told Craig: "We are to talk them out.
as if to finish their discussion. Suddenly Obviously if somebody makes mass break
they leaped forward and began to drag we most certainly will resist. . . . But
the two officers into the compound. unless they attempt such a thing, under
Raven grabbed hold of a post until the no circumstances use fire to get them
guards rushed up and used their bayo- out. Wait them out. One thing above
nets to force the prisoners back, but all, approach it calmly. If we get them
Dodd was hauled quickly inside the com- excited only God knows what will hap-
pound, whisked behind a row of blankets 36
(1) Ibid. (2) Statement of Gen Dodd, 14 May
draped along the inner barbed wire 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board
fence, and hurried to a tent that was of Officers.
37
Exhibit O4(1), in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.
prepared for him. The prisoners told 38
Exhibit N4(1), in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.
him that the kidnapping had been 39
Ibid.
246 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
76 for a meeting to work out the de-
mands that would be submitted to the
U.N. Command. Colonel Craig at-
tempted to use one of the senior North
Korean officers, Col. Lee Hak Koo, to
talk inmates of Compound 76 into re-
leasing Dodd, but Lee, as soon as he was
permitted to enter the compound, re-
mained and became the spokesman of
the prisoners.41
As the Communist representatives met
on the night of the seventh, Dodd urged
that no troops be employed to get him
since he did not think he would be
harmed.42 This was a reasonable assump-
tion, since if anything happened to
Dodd, the Communists would have noth-
ing to bargain with. In any event,
Dodd's plea coincided with the wishes
of Yount and Van Fleet at this point.
Colonel Craig, stalling for time, agreed
GENERAL COLSON to sit tight. With the UNC troops under
general alert orders, the night of 7 May
pen." 40 The fear of a concerted attempt passed uneasily.43
to break out of the compounds and the One fact seemed evident—the Com-
resultant casualties that both the UNC munists had won the first round. Not
and prisoners would probably suffer only had they managed to kidnap Dodd,
dominated this conversation and mir- but they had also succeeded in using
rored the first reaction of Dodd's him to open negotiations. Playing upon
superiors to the potential explosiveness the UNC fears of a general breakout of
of the situation. A major uprising would prisoners and the concern over Dodd's
mean violence and unfavorable publicity life, they pressed their advantage to the
that the enemy would exploit. hilt.
Dodd's actions in Compound 76 com- As the prisoner representatives recon-
plemented this desire to localize the vened the next day, they presented Dodd
incident. He consented to act as go-be- with a list of their demands. The chief
tween for the prisoners and relayed their preoccupation of the prisoners during
demands to the outside. A telephone was this early phase concerned the formation
installed and upon Dodd's recommenda- and recognition by the UNC of an associ-
tion, representatives from all of the other 41
Ibid., pp. 22-23.
compounds were brought to Compound 42
Exhibits M4(2) and M4(4), in FEC Gen Admin
Files, Exhibits.
40 43
Hq ad Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52,
21. pp . 23-24.
KOJE-DO 247

ation of the prisoners with telephone As Colson assumed command, Van


facilities between the compounds and Fleet confirmed this impression that mil-
two vehicles for intracompound travel. itary measures would now be employed.
Dodd consented to most of the items of His first instructions to Yount set forth
equipment that the prisoners were in- the steps to be followed quite clearly.
sisting upon even though he had no com- First official written demands were to be
mand authority to make any agreements. delivered to Compound 76 asking that
After the meeting concluded, the rep- Dodd be freed immediately. At the same
resentatives wanted to return to their time the prisoners would be informed
compounds and report to the rest of the that Dodd no longer was in command
prisoners; thus another delay ensued. and could make no decisions. If they
General Yount refused to allow them to refused to let him go, Yount would set
leave until Van Fleet overruled him late a time limit and warn the Communists
in the afternoon. By the time the rep- that they would be held responsible for
resentatives discussed events with their Dodd's safety when force was used. As
compound mates and returned to Com- soon as the deadline expired, Yount
pound 76, evening had begun.44 would enter the compound by force, re-
While the prisoners were carrying on lease Dodd, and gain full control.46
their conversations, Colonel Craig sent Yount passed Van Fleet's orders on to
for trained machine gun crews, grenades, Colson late on 8 May.
and gas masks. The 3d Battalion of the There were other factors that had to
9th Infantry Regiment boarded an LST be considered as the drama unfolded.
(landing ship, tank) at Pusan and set Within the compound Dodd was treated
out for Koje-do. ROK Navy picket boats royally. The prisoners did all they could
ringed the island in case of a major es- to provide him with small comforts and
cape attempt and Navy, Marine, and Air permitted medicine for his ulcers to be
Force planes remained on alert. Com- brought in. They applied no physical
pany B of the 64th Medium Tank pressure whatsoever, yet they left no
Battalion was detached from the 3d In- doubt that Dodd would be the first cas-
fantry Division and started to rumble ualty and that they would resist violently
toward Pusan. And from the U.S. I any attempt to rescue him by force.
Corps, Van Fleet sent Brig. Gen. Charles Under the circumstances they expected
F. Colson, chief of staff, to take charge Dodd to co-operate and help them reach
of the camp and get Dodd out. The a bloodless settlement and Dodd decided
selection of a combat leader to resolve to comply.
the crisis indicated that a military solu- Early on the morning of 9 May Colson
tion would now be tried. Colson had no sent in his first official demand for
knowledge of conditions on Koje-do Dodd's safe deliverance and six hours
until he was chosen and only a sketchy later he issued a second order. When
acquaintance with the issues being dis- Col. Lee Hak Koo finally responded, he
cussed at Panmunjom.45 countered with the statement that Dodd
44 46
Ibid., pp. 24-25. Msg, GX 5775 TAC, CG EUSAK to CG 2d
45
Interv, author with Gen Colson, 4 Oct 59. In Logistical Comd, 8 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files,
OCMH. Exhibits.
248 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
had already admitted that he had prac- that Dodd would be freed after the meet-
ticed "inhuman massacre and murder- ing if all went well. Since the U.N.
ous barbarity" against the prisoners. Command was not going to make a move
Recognizing Colson as the new camp until 10 May anyway, the prisoners were
commander, Lee asked him to join Dodd informed that they could meet in
at the compound meeting.47 Obviously, safety.50
the Communists had no intentions of As the prisoners convened on the 9th,
letting Dodd go until they had resolved the capture of Dodd assumed a new per-
their differences with the U.N. Com- spective. They informed their hostage
mand. that they were going to discuss the al-
The refusal of the prisoners to meet leged brutalities committed against their
Colson's order should have led to the members, repatriation and screening, as
presentation of an ultimatum with a well as the prisoner of war association.51
time limit, but Colson decided to wait Whether the expansion of the Commu-
until the tanks arrived from the main- nists' objectives was spurred by their
land before he tried force. Since the success in using Dodd and the willingness
tanks would not arrive until late on the of the UNC to negotiate or was a planned
9th, the action to bring the compound development is difficult to determine—
into line could not begin until the fol- it may well have been a combination of
lowing morning. Both Yount and Maj. these elements that emboldened them to
Gen. Orlando Mood, chief of staff of the press their luck.
Eighth Army, agreed to this postpone- Setting themselves up as a people's
ment.48 In the meantime Colson in- court, the prisoners drew up a list of
tended to put a halt to further nineteen counts of death and/or injury
concessions to the prisoners; his first to compound inmates and had Dodd
move in this direction was to stop the answer to each charge. Although they
POW representatives from circulating were generally disposed to accept his
back and forth between their compounds explanations and dismiss the accusations,
and Compound 76.49 the spectacle of prisoners, still captive
Perturbed by the stiffening attitude of and surrounded by heavily armed troops,
Colson and the apparent preparations trying the kidnapped commanding of-
for action around the compound, the ficer of the prison camp on criminal
Communists evidently became nervous counts and making him defend his rec-
and had Dodd ask Colson whether they ord was without parallel in modern mil-
could hold their meeting without fear itary history.52
of interruption. They again promised While the Communists sat in judg-
47
(1) Ltr, Colson to POW Compound 76, 9 May ment upon Dodd, Colson had the 38th
52, Exhibit E4(6). (2) Ltrs, Lee to Colson, 9 May 52,
50
Exhibits E4(2) and E4(4). Both in FEC Gen Admin Teleconf, Gen Dodd and Col Alvin T. Bowers,
Files, Exhibits. G-2, 2d Logistical Comd, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical
48
Teleconf, Mood and Yount, 9 May 52, in 2d Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52, Tab
Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May- 34.51
52, tab 20. Teleconvs, Colson and Dodd, 9 May 52, in 2d
49
Teleconf, Colson and Yount, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May
Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May 52, 52,52 tabs 38 and 39.
tab 28. Ibid.
KOJE-DO 249

Infantry Regiment reinforce the guards


on all the compounds and had automatic
weapons set up in pairs at strategic loca-
tions. He directed Lt. Col. William J.
Kernan, commanding officer of the 38th,
to prepare a plan for forcible entry into
Compound 76, using tanks, flamethrow-
ers, armored cars, .50-caliber multiple
mounts, tear gas, riot guns, and the like,
with a target date of 1000 on 10 May.53
In the early afternoon, Van Fleet flew
into Koje-do for a conference. He had
discussed the situation with Ridgway and
his appointed successor, General Mark
W. Clark, who had just arrived in the
Far East, and they were all agreed that
no press or photo coverage of the emer-
gency would be permitted.54 They
wanted Colson to be sure to give every
opportunity to nonbelligerent prisoners
to surrender peaceably while he engaged
in battle for control of the compound.
Van Fleet added that he did not think GENERAL CLARK
that U.S. troops should go into the com-
pound, until firepower from the outside pounds carried out. He left the timing
had forced obedience and driven the of the Compound 76 operation in Col-
prisoners into small adjacent compounds son's hands, but the negotiating period
that had been constructed in the mean- should end at 1000 on 10 May.55
time. If necessary he was willing to grant Dodd's trial dragged on through the
the prisoners' request for an association afternoon as the translation process was
with equipment and communication fa- slow and laborious. By dusk it was evi-
cilities, but he reminded Colson that he dent that the proceedings would not
had full authority to use all the force finish that night and Dodd phoned Col-
required to release Dodd and secure son asking for an extension until noon
proper control and discipline. Regard- the next day. He felt that they would
less of the outcome of this affair, Van keep their promise to let him go as soon
Fleet wanted dispersion of the com- as the meeting finished. But Eighth
53
Army refused to alter the 1000 deadline
Ltr of Instr, Colson to Staff, 8137th Army Unit and Colson passed the word back to
et al., 9 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceed-
ings of Board of Officers. Dodd. It was at this point that the
54
General Clark served as U.S. commander in Italy Communists asserted that they had in-
during World War II, then became American High
55
Commissioner for Austria after the war. He was CG Conf at 091340 May at Koje-do, tab 55, in
Commanding General, Army Field Forces, prior to 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15
his assignment as CINCFE. May 52.
250 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tended to conduct meetings for ten days, the English translation is awkward and
but in the light of the UNC stand they some of the phrases difficult to under-
would attempt to complete their work stand, this bold demand deserves quota-
in the morning.56 tion in full.
During the night of 9-10 May, twenty
tanks, five equipped with flamethrowers, 1. Immediate ceasing the barbarous be-
arrived on Koje-do and were brought havior, insults, torture, forcible protest with
into position. Extra wire was laid and blood writing, threatening, confinement,
the sixteen small compounds were ready mass murdering, gun and machine gun
shooting, using poison gas, germ weapons,
to receive the prisoners of Compound 76. experiment object of A-Bomb, by your com-
All of the guns were in place and gas mand. You should guarantee PW's human
masks were issued; the last-minute prep- rights and individual life with the base on
arations were completed and the troops the International Law.
2. Immediate stopping the so-called il-
tried to get some rest. When Dodd and legal and unreasonable volunteer repatria-
Colson spoke to each other for the last tion of NKPA and CPVA PW's.
time that night, they said goodbye, since 3. Immediate ceasing the forcible investi-
neither expected Dodd to be alive when gation (Screening) which thousands of
the operation was over.57 PW's of NKPA and CPVA be rearmed and
failed in slavery, permanently and illegally.
There was another dampening note as 4. Immediate recognition of the P.W.
heavy rain began shortly after dark and Representative Group (Commission) con-
came down steadily all night. As dawn sisted of NKPA and CPVA PW's and close
signaled its arrival, fog obscured the cooperation to it by your command. This
compounds. Yet Colson was ready to go Representative Group will turn in Brig.
Gen. Dodd, USA, on your hand after we re-
in despite the weather. He held out ceive the satisfactory declaration to resolve
little hope to Yount that the Communists the above items by your command. We will
would release Dodd since this would be wait for your warm and sincere answer.59
"silly" on their part and he placed little
trust in their good faith.58 The Communist objectives were now
But as daylight broke on the tense fully in the open, for admission by the
island the prisoners' latest demands U.N. Command of the validity of the
reached Colson. Since he and Dodd had first three demands would discredit the
already agreed to most of the eleven screening process and repatriation policy
requests on the prisoner of war associa- backed so strongly by the UNC delega-
tion, the Communists wasted little time tion at Panmunjom. If the UNC was
on this matter. Instead they directed violating the Geneva Convention and
their attack against UNC prisoner policy, conducting a reign of terror in the prison
repatriation, and screening. Although camps, as the Communist prisoners
56
charged, then how much reliance could
(1) Teleconvs, Yount, Bowers and Colson, Yount the rest of the world place in the screen-
and Mood, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon
File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52, tabs 48 and 49. (2) 2d ing figures released by the United Na-
Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 35.
57
tions Command?
Interv, author with Colson, 4 Oct 59. In OCMH.
58 59
Teleconv, Yount and Colson, 9 May 52, in 2d Msg No. 2, Lee to CG Koje-do PW Camp, 10
Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May May 52, Exhibit E4(8), in FEC Gen Admin Files, Ex-
52, tab 57. hibits.
KOJE-DO 251

Colson had already sent a final request Colson postponed taking action and sent
to Compound 76 to free Dodd, but the off an answer to the prisoners:
receipt of the four demands and of two
other pieces of information gave him 1. With reference to your item 1 of that
message, I am forced to tell you that we are
pause. A disturbing report from his in- not and have not committed any of the of-
telligence officer indicated that the fenses which you allege. I can assure you
other compounds were ready to stage a that we will continue in that policy and the
mass breakout as soon as he launched prisoners of war can expect humane treat-
his attack and, as if to substantiate this ment in this camp.
2. Reference your item two regarding
item, the native villages near the com- voluntary repatriation of NKPA and CPVA
pound were deserted.60 The prospect of PW, that is a matter which is being dis-
a large number of casualties, on both cussed at Panmunjom, and over which I
sides, including General Dodd, decided have no control or influence.
3. Regarding your item three pertaining
Colson. Since the UNC had not com- to forcible investigation (screening), I can
mitted most of the charges leveled by the inform you that after General Dodd's re-
prisoners, he called Yount and simply lease, unharmed, there will be no more
told him that Colson could inform Dodd forcible screening of PW's in this camp,
that the accusations were not true. Col- nor will any attempt be made at nominal
screening.
son was willing to recognize the POW 4. Reference your item four, we have no
association, but had no jurisdiction over objection to the organization of a PW
the problem of repatriation. If Yount representative group or commission con-
could get authority to renounce nominal sisting of NKPA and CPVA PW, and are
screening, Colson thought he could fash- willing to work out the details of such an
organization as soon as practicable after
ion an answer acceptable to the prison- General Dodd's release.
ers. General Mood felt that nominal
screening could be dropped and gave his Colson added that Dodd must be freed
approval to Yount to go ahead.61 by noon and no later.63
Naturally the Communists wanted With the exception of the word
Colson's answer in writing and this de- "more" in Item 3, Colson's reply was
stroyed any hope of meeting the 1000 noncommittal and the Communists
deadline. For some reason the translator refused to accept it or release Dodd.
available to Colson was not particularly Always opportunistic, they were deter-
quick or accurate and this slowed down mined to win more from the U.N. Com-
the negotiating process.62 At any rate, mand before they surrendered their
trump card. The haggling began in the
60
Interv, author with Colson, 4 Oct 59. In OCMH.
late morning and lasted until evening as
61
Teleconvs, Yount and Colson, tab 60, Yount and the prisoners argued about the wording
Mood, tab 61, 10 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, of Colson's answer.64
Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52.
62
See Teleconv, Bowers and Murray, 10 May 52,
63
in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May- Ltr, Colson to Compound 76, 10 May 52, in 2d
15 May 52, tab 85. It was unfortunate that a first- Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May
class translator was not called in until too late to 52 , tab 55.
64
help in these intricate negotiations, but it should Msgs Nos. 4 and 5, Lee to Colson, 10 May 52,
be remembered that the decision to negotiate did Exhibits E4(6) and E4(12), in FEC Gen Admin Files,
not come until the morning of the 10th. Exhibits.
252 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
As the antagonists on Koje-do wran- prisoner leaders sitting beside, him,
gled over the details, Ridgway and Van Dodd passed on their and his own sug-
Fleet encountered increasing difficulty in gestions for preparing Colson's reply in
finding out what was going on. When an acceptable form and then offered to
news of the four demands seeped back write in the changes that the prisoners
to UNC headquarters, Ridgway had at- considered mandatory. Colson agreed
tempted to forestall Colson's reply, but and informed Yount in general terms of
had been too late. He realized the prop- the prisoners' objections.67
aganda value of an admission of the After a second version failed to satisfy
prisoners' charges, but Van Fleet had as- the Communists, Colson attempted to
sured him that Colson's answer carried meet their demands clearly so that there
no implied acknowledgment of illegal would be no further excuse for delay:
or reprehensible acts.65 As the afternoon
drew to a close and no report of Colson's 1. With reference to your item 1 of that
negotiations arrived in Tokyo, Ridgway message, I do admit that there has been in-
became impatient. Pointing out that in- stances of bloodshed where many PW have
been killed and wounded by UN Forces. I
calculable damage might be done to the can assure in the future that PW can ex-
UNC cause if Colson accepted the pris- pect humane treatment in this camp ac-
oners' demands, he complained of the cording to the principles of International
lack of information from Koje-do. "I Law. I will do all within my power to
eliminate further violence and bloodshed.
have still been unable to get an accurate If such incidents happen in the future, I
prompt record of action taken by your will be responsible.
camp commander in response to these 2. Reference your item 2 regarding vol-
latest Communist demands. I am se- untary repatriation of Korean Peoples
riously handicapped thereby in the issu- Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army
PW, that is a matter which is being dis-
ance of further instructions." 66 cussed at Panmunjom. I have no control or
Actually Van Fleet knew little more influence over the decisions at the peace
than Ridgway at this point. Colson had conference.
been so busy that even Yount was not 3. Regarding your item 3 pertaining to
completely abreast of all the develop- forcible investigation (screening), I can in-
form you that after General Dodd's release,
ments. When the noon deadline passed unharmed, there will be no more forcible
without incident, Dodd phoned Colson screening or any rearming of PW in this
and presented the prisoners' case. He ar- camp, nor will any attempt be made at
gued that there had been incidents in nominal screening.
the past when prisoners had been killed 4. Reference your item 4, we approve the
organization of a PW representative group
and Colson's answer simply denied every- or commission consisting of Korean Peoples
thing. Most of the difficulties stemmed Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer
from semantics, Dodd admitted, but un- Army, PW, according to the details agreed
til these were cleared up, the Commu- to by Gen Dodd and approved by me.
nists would not free him. With the
67
(1) Testimony of Colson before Board of Offi-
65
Teleconv, Hickey and Van Fleet, 10 May 52, cers, 12 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceed-
in FEC, Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File. ings of Board of Officers. (2) Teleconv, Yount and
66
Msg, C 68268, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 10 May 52, Colson, 10 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon
in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File. File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52, tab 74.
KOJE-DO 253

The release hour was advanced to UNC personnel had not been permitted
2000 since so much time had been con- to enter many of the compounds and the
sumed in translating and discussing the possibility of violence was no secret.
changes.68 Koje-do was like a chronic appendix;
By the time the final version had been the Far East Command and Eighth Army
translated and examined by the prison- knew it would have to undergo radical
ers, it was evening and the Communists treatment sooner or later, but they pre-
endeavored to add one last oriental touch ferred to postpone the operation until
to what Yount called the "comic opera." the situation became acute.
They wanted to hold Dodd overnight so Since the prisoners had set up a defi-
that they might hold a little ceremony in nite plan to capture Dodd, they probably
the morning. In recognition of his serv- would have seized him eventually. His
ices Dodd was to be decked with flowers contacts with the prisoners laid him open
and escorted to the gate. But Colson had to kidnapping and as long as they refused
had enough and would concede no more. to come out of the compounds to talk to
He demanded that Dodd be brought out him, it meant that unless he used force
that night as agreed and the Communists to bring the prisoner leaders out, he had
decided that they could afford to give in to go to them or break off relations with
now that they had won their main ob- them. In view of his orders to complete
jectives. At 2130 Dodd walked out of the fingerprinting and rostering of the
Compound 76 and was immediately prisoners and the disinclination to em-
taken to a place where he could be ploy violent means, Dodd had little
kept incommunicado.69 choice. Better security procedures, locks
The "comic opera" with all the over- on the gates, a screen of guards between
tones of a tragedy reached its climax Dodd and the prisoners during the talks,
with the release of Dodd, but the after- might have prevented the kidnapping,
math promised to be just as exciting. but Dodd was careless in this respect and
Before the repercussions of the incident placed too much confidence in the pris-
are discussed, however, a brief analysis oners' sincerity and good faith.
of the affair might be helpful. Actually the seizure of Dodd in itself
There is little doubt that the condi- might have been relatively unimportant.
tions on Koje-do were clearly known by It was only when the Communists skill-
Ridgway and Van Fleet before the kid- fully used Dodd as a pawn and then
napping took place. For several weeks backed his capture with the threat of a
mass breakout that they were able to
68
(1) Testimony of Colson before Board of Of- practice extortion in so bold a fashion.
ficers, 12 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceed-
ings of Board of Officers. (2) Transcript of Con-
Despite the fact that there were over
ference in Office of DCofS FEC, 18 May 52, in FEC eleven thousand armed troops supported
Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File. Colson had con- by tanks and other weapons and despite
fused his second and third letters in his earlier
testimony. The version quoted above was the third
the instructions from Ridgway and Van
and final letter accepted by the Communists. Fleet to employ force if Dodd was not
69
(1) Teleconvs, Craig and Yount, 10 May 52, freed, the Communists carried off the
tab 81 and tab 97; Yount and Mood, 10 May 52, tab
103. All in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol.
honors. What had begun as a military
I, 7 May-15 May 52. problem to be solved by military means
254 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
became a political problem settled on ened later resistance in the prison
the prisoners' terms. The Communists camps. While it is impossible to judge
had seized the initiative and never re- the importance of these probabilities,
linquished it. Using the menace of mas- they should not be forgotten or over-
sive resistance as a club, they successfully looked.
blocked the use of force and played upon
the desire of Colson to bring the affair Bitter Harvest
to a bloodless conclusion.
During the last day of negotiations Although Van Fleet tended to discount
Dodd's role as intermediary became the value of the Colson letter, Clark and
more vital. Given a new lease on life by his superiors in Washington were quite
the postponement of action, he labored concerned. They realized the damaging
zealously to help work out a formula that implications that the Communists would
the prisoners would accept. Under these be certain to utilize. Phrases like "I can
circumstances, the concessions that he assure in the future that PW can expect
urged upon Colson tended to favor the humane treatment" implied that the
Communist position on the controversial prisoners had not received humane treat-
items. The pressure of time and of trans- ment in the past. The promise that there
lation added to confusion. It is evident would be "no more forcible screening
that the Communists knew what they or rearming of PW in this camp . . ."
wanted and that Dodd and Colson were conveyed an entirely erroneous impres-
more interested in preventing casualties sion since there never had been any re-
than they were in denying political and arming of prisoners and forcible screen-
propaganda advantages to the enemy. ing had been canceled.70
Unfortunately the hurried and con- Since the press was becoming impa-
tinual negotiations cut down the flow of tient for more information. Clark de-
information to higher headquarters or cided to publish a statement on the
the statements open to distortion or mis- incident. He included both the prison-
interpretation might have been caught ers' demands and Colson's reply. Dodd
in time and excised. As it turned out, also met the press and issued a brief ac-
Colson traded Dodd's life for a propa- count of his capture and release.71 In
ganda weapon that was far more valuable general the response to the affair and the
to the Communists than the lives of their letter was unfavorable and at Panmun-
prisoners of war. jom the Communist delegates made full
It would not be fair to close without use of the propaganda value of the epi-
mentioning two matters that were bound
up in the Dodd incident and in the 70
(1) FEC Memo for Rcd, Teleconv, Clark and
events that followed. If force had been Van Fleet, 12 May 52. (2) DA-CINCFE Teleconf,
employed, there was the distinct possibil- 13 May 52. Both in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen
Clark's File.
ity that reprisals might have been taken 71
Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu
against the UNC prisoners under Com- (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954) , pp. 45-46.
munist control. And secondly, the at- Colson later stated that he never understood why
Clark published his letter and aggravated the situa-
tainment of Communist aims in these tion. See interview of the author with General Col-
negotiations may very well have soft- son, 4 October 1959. In OCMH.
KOJE-DO 255

sode to discomfort the UNC representa- mission to issue a concise and factual
tives. release. The Chief of Staff felt that the
At 2d Logistical Command headquar- U.N. Command had always abided by
ters, Yount established a board to invest- the Geneva Convention and allowed the
igate the matter and it found Dodd and ICRC regular access to the camps.
Colson blameless. This did not satisfy Clark's account, he went on, should stress
Van Fleet, who felt that Dodd had not this and emphasize that the incidents
conducted himself properly nor had his stemmed from the actions of the fanati-
advice to Colson been fitting under the cal, die-hard Communists. In closing,
circumstances. He recommended admin- the Far East commander should outline
istrative action against Dodd and an ad- the corrective measures being taken.75
ministrative reprimand for Colson.72 In the wake of Koje-do came a series
Clark was even more severe; he proposed of actions. The stiffening attitude of the
reduction in grade to colonel for both UNC revealed itself first at Prisoner of
Dodd and Colson and an administrative War Enclosure Number 10 at Pusan for
reprimand to Yount for failing to catch hospital cases. Among the patients and
several damaging phrases in Colson's attached work details, 3,500 in Com-
statement.73 The Department of the pounds 1,2, and 3 had not been screened
Army approved Clark's action. and segregated. Hoping to forestall con-
The quick and summary punishment certed action, the camp commander, Lt.
of the key officers involved did not solve Col. John Bostic, informed the prisoners
the problem of what to do about Col- on 11 May that food and water would be
son's statement or the more basic ques- available only at the new quarters pre-
tion of how to clean up the long-standing pared for them. He planned to screen
conditions in the prison camps. Al- and segregate the nonpatients first as
though the Washington leaders did not they moved to the new compounds and
want to "repudiate" the letter, they told then take care of the sick. Although he
Clark to deny its validity on the grounds had two battalions of infantry in posi-
that it was obtained under duress and tions around the three compounds, only
Colson had not had the authority to Compound 3 made any attempt to ne-
accept the false charges contained in the gotiate conditions under which they
Communist demands.74 The first count would be screened and moved. Bostic
was no doubt true but the second was refused to treat with the leaders of Com-
certainly moot. pound 3; the other compounds simply
Denial was not enough for the press, remained indifferent to his order.76
and on 27 May Collins gave Clark per- After a deceptively quiet night, the
prisoners became restive. Signs were
72
See: (1) Rpt of Board of Officers, 12-15 May 52; painted, flags waved, demonstrations
(2) Memo, Van Fleet for CINCFE, 16 May 52, sub: mounted, and patriotic songs sung as
Proceedings of Board of Officers. Both in FEC Gen
Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers. feelings ran high. Infantrymen of the
73
Ltr, Clark to TAG, 20 May 52, sub: Proceedings 15th Regiment surrounded the com-
of Board of Officers, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen
75
Clark's File. Msg, DA 909857, CofS to CINCFE, 27 May 52.
74 76
(1) Msg, JCS 908789, JCS to CINCFE, 15 May Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp.
52. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 46. 56-57.
256 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the guards, but the deadlock continued.


To break the impasse, Van Fleet per-
mitted several ICRC representatives to
interview the prisoners. Compound1
requested the first conference with the
Red Cross men and then the other com-
pounds followed suit. The prisoners be-
came quieter after the ICRC talks, but
they were not ready to obey Bostic's
orders. On 15 May Yount won Van
Fleet's approval to put the emphasis on
control rather than screening, with the
prisoners not screened to remain unros-
tered until a settlement was reached at
Panmunjom. Armed with this authority
and with ICRC help, Bostic reached an
agreement with the leaders of Com-
pound 1 on 17 May. There was no
screening and the prisoners moved with-
GENERAL BOATNER out incident to their new compound.79
Hope that the other two compounds
pounds with fixed bayonets and a couple would follow the example of Compound
of tanks were wheeled into positions, but 1proved forlorn. On 19 May, Van Fleet
no attempt was made to start the screen- approved the use of force to clear the
ing.77 recalcitrant compounds. After a brief
Despite complaints from the prisoners, announcement the following morning
they made no effort to comply with Bos- warning the prisoners that this was their
tic's instructions. Compound 3 set up last chance to obey, infantry teams en-
sandbags during the night of 12 May tered Compound 3 and advanced against
but no further violence occurred. On the mounting resistance. Armed with stones,
next day, loudspeakers started to ham- flails, sharpened tent poles, steel pipes,
mer home the UNC orders over and and knives, the defiant prisoners
over again, yet the prisoners laughed at screamed insults and challenges. The in-
offers of hot food and cigarettes available fantry maintained excellent discipline,
to them in the new compounds.78 using tear gas and concussion grenades
A few stray shots were fired on the to break up the prisoners' opposition.
14th and the prisoners hurled rocks at Herding the prisoners into a corner, the
U.N. troops forced them into their new
compound. Only one prisoner was killed
Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May
52, Tab 172. and twenty-nine were wounded as
78
Teleconvs, Bostic and Murray, SGS; Bostic and
Col77 Morton P. Brooks, 2d Logistical Comd, Bostic
and Teleconv,
Murray; 13Bostic
May and Yount,
52. All in 2d 12 May 52, Comd,
Logistical in 2d 79
Ltr, Craig to CO 93d Mil Police Bn, 17 May 52,
Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May-15 May 52, tabs 179, 181, sub: Segregation of Personnel, in 2d Logistical
191. Comd, Comd Rpt, vol. II, May 52, tab 2.
KOJE-DO 257

against one U.S. injury. The example of tank support would have to be supplied
Compound 3 evidently was borne home by Eighth Army if it were required.81
to Compound 2, for on 21 May they Besides the reinforcement of the Koje-
put up no resistance as the infantrymen do forces, Van Fleet intended to
moved them into new quarters without construct barricades and roadblocks at
casualties to either side.80 strategic points until he was prepared to
Whether the prisoners were screened deconcentrate the prisoners. The new
or not became secondary after the Dodd enclosures would be located on Koje-do,
incident. Van Fleet was most anxious Cheju-do, and on the mainland and he
to regain control over all the compounds estimated that twenty-two enclosures,
and he had his staff examine the situa- each holding 4,000 prisoners and at least
tion carefully in mid-May. They sub- one-half mile apart, would be sufficient.
mitted three alternatives on 16 May: 1. Compounds would be limited to 500
Remove all prisoners from Korea; 2. Dis- men apiece with double fencing and con-
perse the prisoners within Korea; and certina wire between compounds.
3. Combine 1 and 2 by removing some When the new camps were finished, Van
prisoners and dispersing the rest. If all Fleet was going to try to use the pris-
of the POW's were transferred out of oners' representatives to induce them to
the country, the Eighth Army com- move voluntarily. But if resistance de-
mander would be free to concentrate on veloped, as he expected it would, food
his primary mission and be relieved of a and water would be withheld and the
rear area security problem. Under the prisoners would receive these only at the
third alternative, at least some of the new compounds. As a last resort, he
prisoners would be shifted and the would employ force. Both Clark and his
Eighth Army responsibility lessened. superiors agreed that although the plan
Van Fleet preferred the first, but found might incur unfavorable publicity and
the third more desirable than the reten- had to be handled carefully, the Commu-
tion of all of the prisoners in Korea. nist control on Koje-do had to be bro-
Dispersal within Korea would ensure ken.82
better control, to be sure, but it would Van Fleet accepted the recommenda-
entail more logistic support and more tions that ICRC assistance be utilized as
administrative and security personnel. much as possible and that other UNC
But Clark did not accept the movement contingents be added to the forces on
of any of the prisoners out of Korea and Koje-do. He had the Netherlands Bat-
he instructed Van Fleet to go ahead with talion already on the island and he would
his dispersal plan as quickly as possible. send a U.K. company, a Canadian Com-
He was willing to send the 187th Air- pany, and a Greek company to provide
borne Regimental Combat Team to Van
Fleet to aid in the operation. Additional
81
(1) Msg, C 68728, Clark to CG Eighth Army,
20 May 52, in FEC Prisoners of War. (2) Hq 2d
80
(1) Memo for Rcd, by Col Craig, 21 May 52, Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 62-64.
82
sub: Opns at No. 10, in 2d Logistical Comd, Comd (1) Msg, CX 68852, Clark to JCS, 17 May 52,
Rpt, vol. II, May 52. (2) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, DA-I N 140107. (2) Msg, JCS 909231, JCS to CINCFE,
Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 60-61. 20 May 52.
A FEW OF THE WEAPONS SEIZED IN COMPOUND 76
KOJE-DO 259

a U.N. flavor. As for the press, normal prisoners restored the flagpoles the fol-
coverage facilities would be provided.83 lowing day, the experience gained in the
To supervise the difficult task of mov- exercise seemed helpful.
ing the prisoners, Van Fleet appointed Satisfied by this test run, Boatner de-
Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, assistant cided to tackle the big task next. On the
division commander of the 2d Division, morning of 10 June, he ordered Col. Lee
as the new commander of Koje-do.84 Hak Koo to assemble the prisoners of
Using infantrymen as well as engineers, Compound 76 in groups of 150 in the
Boatner pushed the construction of the center of the compound and to be pre-
smaller, stronger enclosures by working pared to move them out. Instead the
his troops in two twelve-hour shifts. He prisoners brought forth their knives,
also moved over 6,000 civilians away spears, and tent poles and took their
from the camp and off the island.85 positions in trenches, ready to resist.
By early June Boatner was prepared Crack paratroopers of the 187th Air-
to test his plan for securing control of borne Regimental Combat Team wasted
the Communist compounds. Despite re- little time as they advanced without
peated orders to remove the Communist firing a shot. Employing concussion gre-
flags that were being boldly flown in nades, tear gas, bayonets, and fists, they
Compounds 85, 96, and 60, the prisoners drove or dragged the prisoners out of the
ignored Boatner's commands. On 4 trenches. As a half-dozen Patton tanks
June, infantrymen from the 38th Regi- rolled in and trained their guns on the
ment supported by two tanks moved last 300 prisoners still fighting, resistance
quickly into Compound 85. While the collapsed. Colonel Lee was captured and
tanks smashed down the flagpoles, the dragged by the seat of his pants out of
troops tore down signs, burnt the Com- the compound. The other prisoners
munist banners, and rescued ten bound were hustled into trucks, transported to
prisoners. Half an hour later they re- the new compounds, fingerprinted, and
peated their success at Compound 96 given new clothing. During the two-and-
and brought out seventy-five prisoners a-half-hour battle, 31 prisoners were
who wished to be freed of Communist killed, many by the Communists them-
domination. The only enemy flags still selves, and 139 were wounded. One U.S.
aloft were in Compound 60 and the in- soldier was speared to death and 14 were
fantry did not need the tanks for this injured.87 After Compound 76 had been
job. Using tear gas, they went in and cleared, a tally of weapons showed 3,000
chopped down the poles. Not a single spears, 4,500 knives, 1,000 gasoline gre-
casualty was suffered by either side dur- nades, plus an undetermined number of
ing these quick strikes.86 Although the clubs, hatchets, barbed wire flails, and
hammers. These weapons had been fash-
83
Msg, G 6001 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE,
21 May 52, in FEC Prisoners of War.
84
Msg, G 5849 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 13 May
52,86in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File. Jun 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,
85 Teleconf, Lt Hall and Maj John E. Murray, 4 tab 1.
Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 87
66. Hq 2d Logistical Comd; Comd Rpt, Jun 52, vol.
I, tab 5.
260 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

CROSS WHERE MURDERED POW's WERE FOUND IN A DITCH. Two more crosses
mark similar burying places.

ioned out of scrap materials and metal- other compounds on Koje-do to their
tipped tent poles by the prisoners.88 new stockades during the rest of June.
The aftermath proved how quickly the With the dispersal plan successfully
lesson was learned. After leaders of completed, Clark decided to remove the
Compounds 78 and 77 had witnessed the POW problem from Eighth Army juris-
fight, they swiftly agreed to move where- diction. On 10 July the Korean Com-
ever Boatner wanted them to. In Com- munications Zone was established under
pound 77 the bodies of sixteen murdered the Far East Command and took over re-
men were found. The show of force was sponsibility for rear area activities from
effective in eliminating the core of Com- the Eighth Army.89 One of the lessons
munist defiance and paved the way for that had to be relearned during the Koje-
the relatively uneventful transfer of the do affair was that an army commander
should not be burdened with the admin-
89
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52. istration of his communications zone,
88
UNC Rpt No. 47, 1-15 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC,
Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting
Docs, tab 76.
KOJE-DO 261

ONE OF THE NEW COMPOUNDS ON KOJE-DO, showing the double rows of barbed wire
surrounding each enclosure. An evacuated village in the background is being burned to prevent
the exchange of information between prisoners and villagers.

since the distraction could not fail to de- ganize and well-disciplined, the loyal
tract from his efficiency in carrying out Communist prisoners required strict con-
his primary mission—to fight the enemy. trol or they would exploit their position
There were other lessons that were for propaganda purposes. Death or in-
brought home during this period. In jury was readily accepted if the ends
most cases, after a prisoner was captured, were worthwhile and soft treatment
he might attempt to escape and this was merely made them more insolent and
about as far as he would go. With the disobedient. Only force and strength
Communists a new element of experi- were respected, for these they recognized
ence was added. The Communist and understood. As for the administra-
prisoner's service did not end with his tion of the Communist prison camps, the
capture but frequently became more necessity for high quality personnel at
important. In the prison camp his re- all levels was plain. Unless the leader-
sponsibilities shifted from the military ship and security forces were well briefed
to politico-military duties. Easy to or- politically and alert, the Communist
262 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

would miss no opportunity to cause trou- sults of a discredited screening opera-


ble. At Koje-do the lack of information tion." 90
of what was going on inside the com- The presence of International Com-
pounds pointed up another deficiency. mittee of the Red Cross representatives
Trained counterintelligence agents had during the clean-up activities at Pusan
to be planted inside to keep the camp and Koje-do did little to enhance the
commander advised on the plans and reputation of the UNC prisoner of war
activities of the prisoners and to prevent policies. Although the ICRC could offer
surprises like the Dodd capture from little constructive advice on how the
happening. UNC could regain control and admitted
In assessing the effects of the Koje-do that the prisoners were committing
incidents, it is difficult to escape the con- many illegal acts, they protested vigor-
clusion that they seriously weakened the ously against the tactics of the UNC.
international support that the UNC Violence, withholding food and water-
Command had been getting on its screen- even if these were available elsewhere—
ing program and on voluntary repatria- and the use of force on hospital patients
tion. In Great Britain, questions were were heavily scored and the reports that
raised in Parliament implying that the the ICRC submitted to Geneva were
screening in April had been improperly bound to evoke an unfavorable reaction
or ineffectively carried out. Japanese in many quarters.91
press opinion reflected a growing suspi- Despite the fact that focus shifted from
cion that the U.S authorities had lost Koje-do as the dispersal program
control of the screening process and per- brought the Communist prisoners under
mitted ROK pressure to be exerted di- tighter controls, the mushroom cloud of
rectly or indirectly against repatriation. doubt and suspicion that hovered over
As General Jenkins, Army G-3, pointed the Koje-do episode could not help but
out to General Collins early in June: make the task of the UNC delegates at
"The cumulative effect of sentiment such Panmunjom more complex.
as that reflected above may tend to ob- 90
Memo, DA 145230, Jenkins for CofS, 3 Jun 52,
scure the UNC principle of no forcible sub: International Concern over UNC Prisoners
Screening Opns, in G-3 091 Korea, 8/33.
repatriation, and appear to make the 91
Msg, CX 69236, Clark to JCS, 28 May 52, DA-
armistice hinge on the questionable re- IN 144163. This forwarded a letter from Dr. Otto
Lehner of the ICRC to Clark.
CHAPTER XII

Summer of Frustration

At the outset Admiral Joy and his so that the enemy's rejection had not
fellow delegates paid little attention to been unexpected. The net result of the
the kidnapping of General Dodd. They proposal was to eliminate the question
were preoccupied with the difficult task of the rehabilitation of airfields and the
of convincing the Communists that the USSR as a member of the supervisory
package proposal of 28 April was a firm commission as issues and to focus the
and final offer and not just an interim spotlight of attention unswervingly upon
UNC position. Moreover, there were no the disposition of prisoners.
indications at the start that the abduc- Although the prospects of enemy ac-
tion represented more than another in- ceptance of the UNC proposal were re-
cident in the prisoner of war camps. mote, General Ridgway felt that they
Not until the contents of the Colson could be materially improved by resolute
letter were revealed did the full impact backing of his position at the highest
of the Communist coup affect them. level in the United States and among the
For the enemy the riots at Koje-do other United Nations participating in
and the Colson letter provided a custom- Korea. He recommended a strong state-
made weapon to discredit the basic stand ment that would bluntly inform the
of the United Nations Command on the Communists that this was the final offer.1
only issue that remained—repatriation. But neither the military services, the
The Communists eagerly seized the op- State Department, nor the United States'
portunity to weaken the UNC position allies wished to go so far. They were
in the eyes of the world and in the proc- perfectly willing to issue communiques
ess to strengthen their own case of the demonstrating their support of the UNC
repatriation of all prisoners of war. stand and implying that this was the last
and best offer, but not to put it so baldly
Aftermath of the Package Proposal that it could be interpreted as an ulti-
matum. If a break in the negotiations
The relentless attack on the UNC con- were to occur, they still desired to let
cept of no forced repatriation was the Communists bear the onus.2
scarcely interrupted by the presentation The President, however, did not want
of the package proposal. Actually there
1
had been little hope that the Commu- (1) Msg, CX 67235, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Apr 52,
nists would concede on two issues while DA-IN 129944. (2) Msg, C 67655, Ridgway to JCS,
28 Apr 52, DA-IN 132680.
the U.N. Command gave in on only one, 2
Msg, JCS 907676, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Apr 52.
264 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

to prevent Joy from using the terms May, Nam launched the following broad-
"final" and irrevocable" in the state- side:
ments on the package deal, but his own
official statement on 7 May reflected a As long as your side does not change this
peremptory attitude and give up your un-
more moderate approach. It contained reasonable proposal, our side will continue
no flat assertion that this was the end of to expose at these conferences the absurdity
bargaining and left the door open to fu- of your proposal. Since you are insisting
ture maneuvering.3 upon your absurd proposition, you will
With the Communist delegation hold- not be able to escape the inevitable conse-
quences of your such [sic] insistence. The
ing firm on their counterproposal for the so-called screening is totally absurd and
exchange of the 12,000 prisoners of war impermissible. The so-called result of your
in their custody for the 132,000 held by so-called screening is doubly absurd and
the U.N. Command, both Ridgway and wholly concocted by your side. The com-
Joy became convinced that there no mandant of your prisoner-of-war camp has
already declared to the whole world6 the
longer existed any reason for meeting utter bankruptcy of your proposition.
in executive session. On 6 May Joy told
General Nam that the UNC desired to Four days later he lodged this accusa-
return to open meetings and the Com- tion with the UNC delegates:
munists give their consent.4
The reversion to open sessions the The unshakable fact is that our captured
following day had no effect upon the pro- personnel would rather die than yield to
your design of retaining them as your can-
ceedings. The Communists would have non fodder. The unshakable fact is that
nothing to do with the UNC's offer to public confessions of the commandant of
permit rescreening of all the nonrepatri- your prisoner-of-war camp have killed and
ates by Red Cross or neutral agencies, buried the myth that our captured per-
and charged the UNC with intent to sonnel refused to be repatriated. In spite of
all your threats and violence, our captured
prevent 100,000 prisoners from return- personnel rose in heroic and just resistance
ing home.5 against your forced screening. The com-
At this juncture the Dodd incident mandant of your prisoner-of-war camp
and the Colson letter supplied the enemy could not but confess before the whole
with fresh ammunition for its assault on world your inhuman treatment and mur-
derous violence against our captured per-
the UNC screening procedure. On 16 sonnel, and the criminal and unlawful acts
committed by your side in screening and
3
(1)Msg, JCS 907937, JCS to CINCFE, 2 May 52. (2) re-arming war prisoners by force.7
Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 460-61.
These samples of the continuous at-
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS tack sustained by the Communists during
sec., incl 30. (2) Msg, C 67976, Ridgway to CIN-
CUNC (Adv), 4 May 52, in same place, incl 31. (3) May were difficult to refute and, inter-
Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-ninth Session of nationally, the damage to the UNC
Mil Armistice Conf, 6 May 52, in FEC Transcript of position on repatriation and screening
Proceedings, Mtgs on Mil Armistice, 28 Apr-3Jun
52, vol. 41 (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts,
Plenary Conf, vol. 4.
564
Ibid.,
(1) Msg,Fifty-ninth
TranscriptHNC Session
of 1211, Joy toofCINCUNC,
Proceedings, Mil Armistice
Fifteenth 2 MayConf,
Session52,
of 16 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.
7
Mil Armistice Conf, 7 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Ibid., Sixty-third Session of Mil Armistice Conf,
Plenary Conf, vol. 4. 20 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 265

was considerable. Although the situa- nothing left to negotiate. I now turn
tion on Koje-do provided the bulk of over the unenviable job of further deal-
the grist for the Communist mill, the ings with you to Major General William
enemy produced a steady stream of K. Harrison, who succeeds me as Senior
additional charges. On 11 May, Nam Delegate of the United Nations Com-
stated, UNC planes bombed a Com- mand Delegation. May God be with
munist prisoner of war camp and in- him." 9
jured a number of UNC personnel. Joy had done well in a difficult situa-
The next day, Nam informed Joy, tion. Despite frequent harassment he
supply trucks en route to Panmunjom had restrained himself and maintained
were strafed, and on 14 May para- the dignity of his office under trying cir-
chute flares were dropped on the neutral cumstances. Yet whenever weak points
conference area and strafing carried out.8 in the Communist arguments had ap-
While the UNC representatives denied peared, he had hit hard. During the
responsibility for some of these accusa- ten months that he had led the delega-
tions, there were enough infractions to tion, all of the issues under discussion
place the UNC delegation constantly on had been settled with the exception of
the defensive. repatriation of prisoners. And even on
In the midst of the Communist bar- this thorny problem, the debate was
rage, Admiral Joy's tour as chief spokes- over. One side or the other would have
man at Panmunjom came to an end. to give in before an armistice agreement
In his farewell speech on 22 May, Joy could be reached. As Joy left the Far
managed to strike back at the enemy. East, he could contemplate his accom-
Recalling that on 10 July 1951 he had plishments with some satisfaction. The
stressed that "the success or failure of deadlock on repatriation was not his re-
the negotiations begun here today de- sponsibility and all other matters had
pends directly upon the good faith of been successfully negotiated. In many
the delegations present," he pointed out instances he had attained more than ex-
that that hope had proved to be forlorn. pected and if, in some cases, the United
The Communists had caviled over pro- States also had had to surrender more
cedural matters, manufactured spurious than it had bargained for, this was a
issues, denied agreements, and indulged normal part of negotiating and certainly
in abuse and invective- when all else no vital objectives had been given up.
failed, the admiral charged. Comparing There was little doubt that Joy had
the records of the two sides, he noted often grown restive at the caution exer-
that "they are as different as night and cised by his superiors in their dealings
day. No amount of propaganda, how- with the Communists and wished to
ever oft repeated, can hide your ignoble adopt a firmer position. Yet despite his
record." Joy urged the acceptance of the personal conviction that continued
package proposal, then concluded: "Af- haggling with the enemy would be in-
ter ten months and 12 days I feel there terpreted as a sign of weakness and
is 9Ibid.,
nothing moreSession
Sixty-fifth for me
of to
Mil do. There
Armistice is
Conf,
8
Ibid., Fifty-eighth Session of Mil Armistice Conf,
15 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4. 22 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.
266 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

indecision by the Communists, he had cated that they were prepared to accept
suppressed his own feelings and carried the UNC proposals.11
on the negotiations with patience and General Clark soon came to agree with
forbearance. his negotiators at Panmunjom. He
The composition of the UNC delega- granted the argument that regular meet-
tion underwent several other changes ings with the enemy did provide the
during the latter part of May. As Gen- UNC with ample opportunity to remind
eral Harrison moved up to assume the the Communists and, of course, the rest
duties of chief delegate, Brig. Gen. Frank of the world of the fairness of its 28
C. McConnell took over his position as April proposal. Obversely, however, he
Army representative.10 On 28 May, Brig. pointed out, they also afforded the en-
Gen. Lee Han Lim replaced Maj. Gen. emy an excellent means of exploiting
Yu Chae Heung as ROK Army delegate. the deterioration of the UNC position
The replacements in both instances were after the Koje-do incident. The Com-
of lower rank than their predecessors, munist attack was constantly being re-
possibly because there remained little to fueled by fresh charges and thus was
be done and major generals could be more dramatic and newsworthy. Con-
better utilized elsewhere. At any rate, stant repetition of the UNC formula
the rotation of personnel had little effect —no matter how attractive the original
upon the UNC policies and attitudes in concept might be—had only resulted in
the truce tents. diminishing returns in press coverage
and had allowed the enemy to retain the
Variations on a Theme initiative.12
To counter the present Communist
While the Communist delegates advantage and convince the enemy that
probed for weak spots in the UNC de- the U.N. Command would not alter its
fenses, the internal conflict over a stiffer stand, Clark suggested at the end of May
approach to the enemy continued. Gen- several possibilities that might be
eral Harrison staunchly supported Joy's adopted as alternatives to indefinite sus-
pleas for avoiding any signs of weakness. pension of the truce talks. These in-
In their opinion daily sessions with the cluded: turning over the problem of
enemy could only lead the Communists rescreening to the liaison officers; one
to believe that the UNC was still ready week recesses; delaying tactics by post-
to bargain. Actually both Joy and Har- poning meetings shortly before they were
rison would have preferred an im- scheduled to convene; and launching a
mediate indefinite suspension of the strong propaganda counterattack against
negotiations until the Communists indi-

11
(1) Msg, HNC 1236, Joy to CINCUNC, 12 May
52, in UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and
CofS sec., incl 35. (2) Msg, HNC 1277, Harrison to
his12
10 career in organizing and training troops. During
CINCUNC, 30 May 52, in same place, incl 50.
World(1)
General
Msg, McConnell
JCS
War II he 908988, had
JCS spent
had devoted tohimself
CINCFE,
a great 16
to thepart
Mayof
prepa-
ration of antiaircraft units for combat and after the 52. (2) Msg, C 69351, Clark to JCS, 31 May 52, DA-
war he assisted in training Philippine ground forces. IN 145230.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 267

the enemy. But Clark did not recom- munist would deem this a breach of
mend them. Instead he felt that the faith.14
UNC should meet as infrequently as pos- After the Koje-do affair, the Washing-
sible with the Communists until it had ton leaders felt even more strongly about
completed its final rosters of all those informing the enemy of the 80,000-plus
who were willing to return to the control figure. In their opinion, it could only
of the enemy. When the lists were ready, strengthen the Communist allegation
the new firm figures should be presented that the initial screening had been con-
and if the Communists did not accept ducted improperly and had no validity.
them, the UNC would recess unilaterally This, in turn, could weaken the support
until they did.13 that the United States was receiving
The use of the expanded repatriation from its allies and the neutral nations.15
lists led to another point of debate dur- The refusal of the Washington leaders
ing May between U.S. leaders in Wash- to release the new figure limited the
ington and the U.N. Command. As UNC negotiators to a defense of the 28
rescreening proceeded during late April April proposal. On 23 May—the second
and early May, it became apparent that day of Harrison's assumption of the role
not 70,000 but over 80,000 prisoners and of chief delegate—the Communists pre-
civilian internees wished to be sent back. sented him with an opportunity to call a
The obvious disadvantage in revealing three-day recess to the talks. Despite the
the increase to the enemy immediately expressed Washington desire that daily
lay in the fact that the Communists sessions be held as long as the Commu-
would probably assume that this was an- nists wished them, Harrison postponed
other interim figure and adopt a policy the next meeting until 27 May. This
of delay anticipating further augmenta- contrary action brought a query from the
tion of the repatriate totals. On the U.S. leaders, but Clark held it was per-
other hand, knowledge of a 2-percent
boost might well spur Communist accept-
14
ance of the UNC offer. Admiral Joy (1) Msg, HNC 1214, Joy to CINCUNC, 5 May
and General Harrison wanted to submit 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and
CofS sec., incl 38. (2) Msg, CX 67989, CINCUNC to
the revised estimate to the enemy CINCUNC (Adv), 5 May 52, in same place, incl 39.
through the liaison officers, but their
superiors were less inclined to act in Eighth Army tallies as of 16 May had produced the
following results on those to be repatriated:
haste. They pointed out that since many
of the prisoners included in the new
figures were members of compounds that
were completely unscreened because of
the threat of violence, a considerable
number might refuse to be repatriated
at the time of exchange and the Com-
15
13
Msg, C
JCS 909104,
69351, JCSto to
Clark CINCFE,
JCS, 31 May 18
52,May 52.
DA-IN In addition there were 3,500 unscreened personnel
at Pusan. See Msg, CX 68567, Clark to JCS, 16 May
145230. 52, DA-IN 139602.
268 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

fectly proper under the circumstances might be requested to send representa-


since the enemy had agreed to the recess. tives to interrogate the nonrepatriates
Technically, the U.N. Command had a prior to the armistice. This could be
point and soon won permission to ask for accomplished with Communist observers
additional recesses on this basis in the on hand and with both sides agreeing to
future provided that none was longer abide by the results. If the enemy re-
than four days.16 fused to participate, the U.N. Command
Although the approach of the Wash- could proceed unilaterally and present
ington political and military chiefs to the the corrected figures to the Communists.
Communists might have seemed over- If they did not accept these, the UNC
cautious or perhaps oversolicitous under would recess indefinitely.17
other conditions, there were several fac- On the same day—6 June—that the
tors on the international scene that Washington leaders forwarded this ex-
strongly influenced their actions during planation of the difficulties facing them
the hectic month of May 1952. As they at home and their suggestions for possi-
informed Clark in early June, the strong ble solution of the impasse, they also
support that the UNC had won for the informed Clark that they were going to
principle of nonforcible repatriation had inaugurate an intensified campaign to
been undermined by the incidents on counteract the increased flow of Com-
Koje-do. Many of the United States' munist propaganda. The enemy was en-
principal allies were urging that some gaged in a world-wide "Hate America"
type of rescreening take place now rather attack, they maintained, using biological
than prior to the armistice. If the United warfare and prisoner of war charges as
States invoked a unilateral indefinite the chief ingredients. If Clark agreed,
suspension of the talks at this juncture, they were prepared to set up an Inter-
the Soviet Union might take advantage departmental Watch Committee with
of the opportunity and bring the matter representatives of Defense, State, and
before the U.N. Security Council. In the Central Intelligence Agency to work on
opinion of the Washington chiefs, the quick exchange of information and the
question of the number of prisoners to development of Countermeasures to the
be returned appeared to be all-impor- enemy's sowing of doubt and suspicion.18
tant. They felt that a total of 100,000, General Clark was quite willing to
if it included all of the Chinese, might have the committee established, but he
be acceptable to the Communists, but a felt that the strongest weapon that the
figure in the eighty thousands would U.N. Command could employ against
only cast further doubts on the original the enemy was truth. The removal of
screening process. the "shroud of secrecy" from all matters,
To restore confidence in the UNC's save those vital to military security, and
position, they suggested a step that might the prompt release of full and factual
alleviate the situation. A group of information to the press would be the
countries not participating in the conflict best method to insure domestic and
18
16Msg,JCS CX
910473, JCSClark
to CINCFE, 6 Jun
(1) Msg, 68975, to DA, 23 May52.
52, DA-
17
IN 142347. (2) Msg, JCS 909747, JCS to CINCFE, Msg, JCS 910484, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jun 52.
26 May 52.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 269

world support in the long run, he be- unilateral action as delaying or prevent-
lieved. He pointed out that although ing an armistice, but at this stage the
many of the stories emanating from propaganda was being issued at such a
Koje-do had not reflected credit on the rapid rate that a little more or less would
UNC, the situation was improving and make no difference. Clark, in informing
the freedom accorded to the press was the JCS of his intention to make the
producing increasingly favorable re- release, agreed with Harrison's analysis
sults.19 and went on to add that the continued
The Communist propaganda cam- detention of the internees had been a
paign produced one side effect that the constant source of irritation to Rhee and
enemy probably did not anticipate. the ROK people. He did not think that
While there appeared to be a chance letting the internees go free would have
that an armistice might be concluded any impact upon the internal crisis in
during March and April, Ridgway had the ROK Government at this time and
decided to hold all civilian internees it would materially reduce the logistical
until a final settlement was reached. He burden imposed upon the Far East Com-
did not wish to endanger a quick agree- mand and result in a savings of vitally
ment by releasing prematurely the civil- needed administrative personnel.20
ian internees desiring to remain in the With the Army supporting Clark's
Republic of Korea. But as the prospects argument, the JCS, the State Depart-
for agreement receded in May, the ment, and the President consented on
reasons for delaying action on the civil- 10 June to the release of the civilian in-
ian internees became less important. ternees.21 Two days later Clark for-
The primary deterrent to immediate re- warded his schedule and his plans to
lease—the adverse effect upon the nego- co-ordinate the discharge of some 27,000
tiations—was no longer considered valid internees with the ROK Government.
in view of the depressed state of affairs The rate of release, he noted, would de-
at Panmunjom. pend upon the ability of the Republic
As Harrison informed Clark in early of Korea to receive the internees, but a
June, the Communists had already ac- minimum of sixty days would be neces-
corded the civilian internees special sary to do the job in an orderly fashion.
status when they accepted the prisoner Responsibility would rest with the 2d
lists of 18 December. He felt there was Logistical Command for drawing up lists
little risk that the enemy would break and providing transport and subsistence
off the negotiations over the freeing of en route with the UNC Civil Assistance
these people nor would the Communists Command furnishing liaison with the
retaliate by holding on to UNC prisoners ROK Government, insuring that no
since this would violate the principle interference with military operations re-
they had been defending so staunchly. 20
Doubtlessly, Harrison continued, the Msg, CX 69687, Clark to JCS, 5 Jun 52, DA-IN
146933. For the ROK internal crisis, see Chapter
Communist propaganda machine would XIV, below.
attempt
19
21
(1) toJenkins
Msg,Memo,
C 69888, make full
ClarkfortoCofS, use
JCS,69Jun
Jun52,
52,of
sub: this
DA-IN
Pro-
posal by CINCFE to Release Civilian Internees, in
G-3 383.6, 24. (2) Msg, JCS 910811, JCS to CINCFE,
148276. 10 Jun 52.
270 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

suited, issuing thirty-day rations to each tion violently, he was placed on the list
internee as he was freed, and assisting to be repatriated and assigned to a re-
the ROK Government in the task of patriate compound.24
distributing the civilians to their areas By the end of June the last compound
of residence. Clark thought that the had been screened and a new total of
unscreened internees should and could slightly over 83,000 repatriates segre-
be screened before the 27,000 were dis- gated.25 The question of whether to dis-
charged lest the release influence the close the revised figures to the enemy
choice of those left unscreened. On 13 immediately came under discussion
June the Clark plan was approved.22 again. General Bradley evidently felt as
Screening the recalcitrant civilian in- Clark and Harrison did on the subject.
ternees was but one aspect of the prob- The danger that the Communists would
lem facing Clark during June. On learn of the corrected total through a
Koje-do General Boatner was still en- leak or via their quite competent in-
gaged in wresting control of several of telligence system argued for a quick pre-
the compounds from the enemy pris- sentation of the figures at Panmunjom,
oners. Clark wanted this task to be com- but the Department of the Army was
pleted as quickly as possible and the still reluctant. The possibility of further
remainder of the unscreened prisoners discrediting of the original screening
of war to be polled. Once this was fin- process at this time and the lack of deci-
ished, the U.N. Command would be in sion over a later rescreening by neutral
possession of more accurate figures on nations prompted G-3 to urge that the
the number of repatriates. If the United U.N. Command confirm the 83,000 fig-
States desired eventually to have the non- ure only in the event that it were dis-
repatriates rescreened by neutral nations covered by the Communists.26
before the armistice, Clark declared, the On 3 July the Washington leaders ef-
job would be much simpler since all fected a compromise between the two
the hard-core Communists would be in positions. Clark was authorized to
the repatriate compounds and would not
have to be rescreened.23 24
Msg, GX 50636, CINCUNC to JCS, 22 Jun 52,
The U.S. leaders agreed and Clark DA-IN 153229.
25
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, p. 69. The com-
informed them of the Eighth Army plan plete breakdown was as follows:
for concluding the segregation of pris-
oners. In general, the procedure paral-
leled that followed in April. Prisoners
would be rostered and fingerprinted first,
then taken to the interview tent. If a
prisoner refused to answer the questions
or indicated he would not resist repatria-
22 26
(1) Msg, CX 50051, Clark to JCS, 12 Jun 52, DA- (1) Msg, CX 51050, CINCUNC to JCS, 28 Jun
IN23 149495. (2) Msg, JCS 911250, JCS to CINCUNC, 52, DA-IN 155625. (2) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 30
13 Msg, CX 50050, Clark to JCS, 12 Jun 52, DA-
Jun 52. Jun and 1 Jul 52, sub: Proposal to Submit to the
Communists a New Final Figure . . . , in G-3 091
IN 149501. Korea, 8/37.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 271

SCREENING POW's ON KOJE-DO, JUNE 1952

divulge the revised numbers to the and passed on to the enemy as a point of
enemy, but only if the Communists in- information and not as a subject for de-
sisted upon discussing them.27 bate.28 One week later the first group of
In the meantime, Clark and his staff 1,800 internees were moved from Yong-
completed their preparations for the re- ch'on to their homes throughout South
turn of the internees to civilian life. On Korea and by mid-July about 10,000 had
23 June Harrison quietly announced at been set free.29
Panmunjom that the UNC intended to On the whole, June was an uneventful
release 27,000 internees in the near fu- month at Panmunjom. Harrison re-
ture. As expected, the Communists bit- sorted several times to three-day recesses
terly protested this action as unilateral despite Nam Il's remonstrations but
and designed to delay the fashioning of there was little change in the course of
an armistice. But Harrison made no ef-
28
fort to explain or defend his statement. Transcript of Proceedings, Eighty-eighth Session
As far as the UNC was concerned, he of Mil Armistice Conf, 23 Jun 52, in FEC Main Dele-
gate's Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52.
told Nam, this was an internal matter 29
Msg, G 74961, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 2
Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and
27
Msg, JCS 912791, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52. CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 63.
272 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

negotiations.30 The recess from 8 to 10 Panmunjom was reflected in a plan that


June drew a letter of protest from Kim Harrison presented at the end of June
and Peng and a brief, firm response from to Clark. He recommended that the re-
Clark affirming the right of either side vised figures be given to the Communists.
to request recesses in the event there If they refused to accept a settlement on
were no new proposals to discuss. the basis of these totals, then an attempt
Whether the enemy was worried and to secure rescreening by neutral nations
feared that the U.N. Command might should be carried out. Were the enemy
be preparing to break off relations, as still reluctant to conclude an armistice
Clark and Harrison asserted, or simply after rescreening was finished and firm
did not want to lose the daily forum for and final figures furnished, then the U.N.
its complaints and charges, was difficult Command would simply release and pa-
to assess, but in either case the recess role all prisoners except those desiring
could do little harm to the UNC cause.31 repatriation. The negotiations would
There were two changes in the com- remain at recess until the Communists
position of the UNC delegation in late conceded the fait accompli and signed
June and early July. On 22 June fiery, an armistice.34 The resuscitation of the
capable Admiral Libby attended his last concept of unilateral release of nonrepa-
meeting at Panmunjom and was replaced triates met with little encouragement
the following day by Rear Adm. John from Harrison's superiors but the possi-
C. Daniel.32 At the beginning of July bilities were intriguing. Although the
another veteran member of the team fin- Communists would have protested vocif-
ished his service as a negotiator. erously, it might well have permitted
General Turner, who had so often them to save face and eventually to give
clashed with Hsieh Fang on airfields and in more gracefully on repatriation.
other Item 3 matters, was rotated and As July began there was a brief flurry
replaced by Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris, of excitement at Panmunjom. Both
USAF.33 With the departure of Turner, sides had agreed on every article of the
Harrison became senior in length of serv- draft armistice except Article 51. At the
ice on the delegation as well as chief meeting on 1 July Harrison discussed
delegate. this article and urged the enemy to ac-
The lack of progress and prospects at cept it as written: "All prisoners of war
30
held in the custody of each side at the
The meetings recessed from 8 to 10 June, from time this Armistice Agreement becomes
18 to 20 June, and from 28 to 30 June.
effective shall be released and repatria-
DA-IN 148567. (2) Msg, JCS 910892, JCS to ted as soon as possible. The release and
CINCFE, 10 Jun 52. repatriation of such prisoners of war
a destroyer commander during World War II and shall be effected in conformity with lists
had organized and commanded the Navy's first which have been exchanged and have
underwater demolition team for the Sicily invasion been checked by the respective sides
of 1943.
prior to the signing of the Armistice
manded
31
32
33
(1)
the VIII and later the XII Air Force
Msg,Morris
Admiral
General CX 69901,
Daniel was Clark
hadanseen to War
JCS,
engineer
extensive
who
Agreement." The interest of the Com-
Service Commands during World II10and
Junmore
service
had 52,
com-as
34
recently had served as commanding general of the Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations
Spokane Air Depot. (May 52-Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 54-55.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 273

munist delegation was immediately considered and the UNC consented. But
stirred, for they evidently considered the inception of the closed meetings soon
that the U.N. Command, in bringing revealed how far apart the two delega-
this matter up, was about to alter its tions were on Article 51. Both agreed to
basic position. Harrison, on the other the article as it was written, but the
hand, became very optimistic that the interpretations accorded were widely di-
more conciliatory attitude evidenced by vergent. The phrase "held in custody
Nam Il meant that the enemy really of each side at the time this Armistice
wanted an armistice. Since the enemy Agreement becomes effective" was the
desired more than 100,000 repatriated, crux of the matter. The U.N. Command
Harrison proposed to juggle the figures contemplated changing the nomencla-
and permit the Communists to save face. ture or categories of the prisoners who
83,000 would be repatriated directly, did not desire repatriation and removing
26,000 internees were then being re- them from prisoner status prior to the
leased, and there were 11,000 South effective date of the armistice. To the
Koreans that would be released. This Communists, the phrase included all
would give a total of 121,000, but only prisoners on the 18 December lists.
83,000 actual repatriations to the Com- They were willing to except the
munists need be made.35 prisoners living below the 38th Parallel,
Neither Clark nor his superiors in but all others must be returned. As soon
Washington shared Harrison's feeling as they discovered that the UNC envi-
that the Communists were ready to sioned submitting new lists based upon
change their stand and advised him to the screening results, the Communists
secure further elaboration from the quickly became disenchanted. Nam told
enemy delegation. As the Washington Harrison frankly on 6 July that if the
leaders noted, there was as yet no solu- UNC could come up with a figure ap-
tion to the question of the disposition of proximating 110,000 and including all
the Chinese prisoners and this was basic the Chinese prisoners, an armistice could
to any final agreement.36 easily be concluded.37
One effect of the discussion of Article Although the sparring continued for
51 was immediately noticeable; the prop- several days, neither side gave ground.
aganda attack on the UNC faded to a The Communists were waiting for a
whisper. On 3 July the Communists UNC concession and had no interest in
asked for executive sessions the next day juggling figures—they wanted 110,000
so that the article could be thoroughly bodies returned to them.38 After another
week of stalemate, Clark and Harrison
concluded that presentation of the 83,000
sion of Mil Armistice Conf, 1 Jul 52, in FEC Main figure offered the only hope to break the
Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52- (2) Msg, 37
HNC 1364, Harrison to CINCUNC, 3 Jul 52, in Transcripts of Proceedings, Ninety-fourth
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec., through Ninety-seventh Sessions of Mil Armistice
Supporting Docs, tab 32. Conf, 3-6 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs,
36
35
(1) Msg, C 51299, Clark to CINCUNC (Adv), vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52.
38
3 Jul(1)52,Transcript of Proceedings,
in UNC/FEC, Ninety-third
Comd Rpt, Jul Ses-
52, CinC and Msg, HNC 1371, Harrison to CINCUNC, 6 Jul
CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 33. (2) Msg, JCS 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS
912791, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52. sec., Supporting Docs, tab 38.
274 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

THE UNC DELEGATES AT PANMUNJOM, 6 JULY 1952: Generals Lee Han Lim
(ROK Army), Morris, Harrison, and McConnell and Admiral Daniel.

impasse. The leaders in Washington fi- long as the final total approximated
nally agreed provided that the UNC did 110,000, he added.40
not express the number in such a way The Communists refusal to accept the
as to preclude later expansion in case UNC figures evidently occasioned some
of rescreening by an impartial agency.39 second thoughts in Washington. G-3
On 13 July Harrison informed Nam forwarded a suggestion that the release
that revised tallies showed that 76,600 of civilian internees be suspended so that
Koreans and 6,400 Chinese desired re- the final list of persons to be repatriated
patriation and suggested that new, up- might be increased. In his reply Clark
to-date lists be prepared. After a five-day could find little to recommend in this
recess to study the figures, Nam com- concept. To the enemy the important
pletely rejected them. He was perfectly prisoners were the Chinese and not the
willing
39
to have the lists rechecked as 40
(1) Msg, C 51780, Clark to JCS, 11 Jul 52, DA- Transcripts of Proceedings, 104th and 105th
Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 13 and 18 Jul 52,
IN159939.(2) Msg, JCS 913383, JCS to CINCFE, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul
11 Jul 52. 52.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 275

Koreans, he noted, and the Communists tives to be sent. Recalling his World
did not appear to be too concerned over War II experience, he reminded the
the fate of the internees. On the other JCS that the Russians had carried out a
hand, Clark went on, interruption of the similar operation in Austria when the
release program would cause the ROK war ended. Their teams had invested
Government to become upset, the intern- displaced person camps and used every
ees to turn restless, and the Communists subversive means available, including es-
to have a propaganda holiday.41 The pionage. In their wake violence and a
Army did not pursue the subject further. wave of suicides had followed and Clark
From Washington also came a pro- feared that this might well be repeated.43
posal that the U.N. Command free all The incidence of fresh suggestions re-
Chinese prisoners and permit the enemy flected the realization that the Commu-
to send representatives to persuade them nists were less than happy over the
to return home. No force would be al- revised figures submitted. With the end
lowed, of course, and neutral observers of the brief era of good feeling on 18
would be invited to watch the operation. July, the Communist attack on the UNC
When Harrison learned of this scheme, at Panmunjom and via press and radio
he protested strongly. To his way of recommenced. One week later, Nam Il
thinking, the enemy agents would swarm asked that the executive meetings of the
over the prisoners and it would be ex- delegates be ended on the 26th and that
tremely difficult to rid the camps of the staff officers resume their conferences
them. If the Communist agents were on the details of the armistice.44
successful in getting a large number of Since there seemed to be little point
prisoners to return, Harrison argued, it in holding executive sessions while the
would reflect very badly upon the UNC enemy remained in an uncompromising
defense of screening and nonforcible re- frame of mind, Clark's superiors con-
patriation.42 sented to a return of open meetings.
While Clark also had serious doubts They then inaugurated a new stage in
about the feasibility of this plan, he was the UNC handling of the repatriations
willing to try it in the event that the by giving Clark and Harrison permission
alternatives previously advanced failed. to propose and carry out immediately,
To cut down on some of the dangers in- if necessary, a seven-day recess in the
herent in the proposal, he advocated that plenary meetings as soon as they saw
reindoctrination of the nonrepatriates by fit.45
enemy representatives be attempted Harrison wasted little time. On 26
after an armistice was effective with a July he advised the enemy delegates that
specific time limit and a ceiling upon the staff officers' meetings could begin
the number of Communist representa- again, but that the plenary session should

(2) Msg, C 52204, Clark to G-3, 19 Jul 52, DA-IN UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS,
162816. Supporting Docs, tab 53.
44
41
42
43
Transcript of Proceedings, 112th Session of Mil
52. (1)
Msg,
(2) Msg,
Msg,
CX
Msg,DA
52284,
JCS913958,
HNC913758,
CINCFE
G-3
1410, JCSto
toto
CINCFE,
JCS,
CINCUNC CINCFE,
21 Jul
18 Jul
18
52, Jul
(Adv) 52.
in
to Armistice Conf, 25 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates
CINCUNC, 18 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53.
45
Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 52. Msg, JCS 914523, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jul 52.
276 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

take a seven-day recess in the meantime. Many troublesome questions had been
When Nam opposed a break in the high- dealt with through compromise, but now
level discussions, Harrison made a few both sides had maneuvered themselves
brief, but cutting remarks: into positions that severely limited nego-
tiations. Yet the search for a solution
In these meetings we have been restrained continued, for the pressures to conclude
in our statements and have tried to be ac- the Korean conflict increased as the war
curately factual. Your statements, on the
other hand, have demonstrated utter hy- dragged on indecisively and the casual-
pocrisy. You have said we want to retain ties continued to grow.
your personnel. What we know and what
the world knows as a fact is that those Narrowing the Choices
prisoners are afraid to be returned as slaves
to the tender mercies of Communist con-
trol. Although many plans were proffered
You have said we violate the Geneva and alternate approaches were advanced
Convention—a covenant intended to protect during the summer by individuals and
the rights of individual human beings, not nations for ending the Korean War, none
the tyranny of totalitarian rulers. Probably of the proposals presented an answer
no government or armies have more con-
sistently ignored or violated the Geneva that would satisfy both sides and none
Convention than you have. You have no could as long as they remained diamet-
moral right to raise the issue or the ques- rically opposed in their principles.
tion of the Geneva Convention. You have What then remained to be done? In
made utterly false statements about our ac- Munsan-ni, Tokyo, and Washington this
tions. Such lies are recognized by everybody
as typical of Communist propaganda. question was accorded mounting atten-
tion during the waning weeks of the
Finishing his speech, Harrison added summer.
that the UNC delegation would return At the truce site there were four
on 3 August. Then he and his staff rose plenary meetings during August—one
and walked out of the tent without giv- every eight days starting on the 2d.
ing Nam a chance to reply.46 Aside from name-calling indulged in
As the era of the one-week recesses by the Communists and the unsuccessful
began, three months of frustrating bar- attempt by Harrison to drive a wedge
gaining ended. The 28 April proposal between the Chinese and the North Ko-
had resulted in narrowing the three out- reans by stressing the inequity in the im-
standing issues to one, but settlement of portance granted the Chinese prisoners
the prisoner of war problem was no and the casual way in which the fate of
closer in July than it had been in April. the North Koreans was being handled,
A year of negotiation had produced an the sessions contained little of note.48
estimated 2,000,000 words of discussion The U.N. Command deliberately
and nearly 800 hours of meetings.47 spaced the meetings at these intervals
and made no effort to introduce anything
48
Armistice
46
Conf, 26 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Transcripts of Proceedings, 114th-117th Ses-
Mtg,Transcript of Jul
vol. VI, 24 Proceedings,
52-15 May 113th
53. Session, Mil sions of Mil Armistice Conf, 3, 11, 19, 27 Aug 52,
47
Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15
(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 67. May 53.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 277

new. And while the U.N. Command could either make a perfunctory an-
sought to convince the Communists nouncement, explaining the legal basis
through this procedure that their stand for the action or not raise the matter
was firm, Clark did his best to apply at all. If the enemy protested under
maximum air pressure against enemy the latter plan, Harrison could use the
targets.49 Only routine publicity was argument employed in the case of the
given to the air strikes and they were civilian internees, that this was a purely
justified on military grounds alone. The internal affair. Harrison preferred this
U.S. leaders did not wish to engage Com- approach.51
munist prestige so seriously that agree- On 25 August Clark embarked upon
ment to an armistice might be further the more difficult task of securing ap-
delayed.50 proval of his plan in Washington. As
In line with the build-up of pressure it happened, his request arrived while
upon the enemy, Clark investigated the the State and Defense Departments were
possibility of releasing the 11,000 South considering the significance of the Sino-
Koreans who were still in the custody of Soviet talks at Moscow and the issuance
the UNC. His judge advocate informed of a Presidential statement. The State
him in early August that the only legal Department was reluctant to consent to
basis for taking such action lay in Article anything that might prejudice such a
5 of the Geneva Convention which cov- statement.52
ered doubtful cases. The holding power, After the decision to discard the
in this instance the UNC, could convene project for a Presidential release in
a "competent tribunal" according to early September, the State Department
Article 5 to determine the status of these dropped its objections. A State-JCS
doubtful cases. If the tribunal found meeting on 8 September concluded that
that these prisoners should not be classi- the South Koreans should be let go be-
fied as POW's, then they might be freed. fore the U.N. Command presented new
Under the circumstances, Clark told suggestions on prisoner exchange to the
Harrison, there were three simple cri- Communists. One week later Clark was
teria for recommending release of a instructed to go ahead, but not on the
prisoner: 1. residence south of 38th basis of the tribunal system. Instead, in
Parallel prior to 25 June 1950; 2. after the interest of speed, he should follow
screening, election not to return to Com- the policy set up during the release of
munist control; and 3. profession of al- the civilian internees. As the Army G-3
legiance to the Republic of Korea. had pointed out, if Clark reclassified the
The tribunals, Clark went on, could 11,000 immediately as civilian internees,
be composed of U.S. and ROK personnel then he could quickly screen and release
or include other U.N. representatives if 51
this could be arranged. As for telling (1) Msg, CX 53436, CINCUNC to CINCUNC
(Adv), 10 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug
the Communists, the UNC delegation 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 29. (2)
Msg, HNC 1472, Harrison to CINCUNC, 10 Aug
49
Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 7 Aug 52, sub: Re 52, in same place, tab 30.
52
Armistice Negotiations in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, (1) Msg, CX 54177, Clark to JCS, 25 Aug 52,
8/44. For air pressure, see Chapter XIV, below. DA-IN 176419. (2) Msg, DA 917089, G-3 to
50
Msg, JCS 915579, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Aug 52. CINCFE, 27 Aug 52.
278 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

them without bothering with the cum- them to the Communists in a final pack-
bersome tribunals.53 age proposal. If the Communists turned
Clark waited until after the plenary them all down, then the UNC could
session of 20 September was over before either recess indefinitely or terminate
he announced that 11,000 South Koreans the negotiations.56
who had been improperly classified pri- When Clark consulted him, Harrison
marily because of the great dislocation of had a number of reservations on the
population in late 1950 and early 1951 type of proposal that should be made to
were now in the civilian internee cate- the enemy. He did not want to include
gory. Their release would begin about any plan that might leave the nonrepa-
1October and take about six weeks to triates to the mercy of a nation on which
complete.54 As planned, the delay in pub- the Communists might apply pressure.
licizing this action prevented the Com- Neither did he desire a postarmistice
munists from using the 20 September political conference to determine a pris-
meeting for their protests, but Nam sent oner's fate—all issues should be worked
a strong letter decrying this unilateral out before a truce was signed. If the
disposition of prisoners of war to Har- Communists persisted in refusing to
rison on 24 September.55 The UNC swallow nonrepatriation in its various
ignored Nam's warnings against carrying guises, Harrison still felt that the UNC
out the plan. should let all the nonrepatriates go free.57
While the U.N. Command was ap- Although Clark was not ready to
plying military and political pressure accept Harrison's last suggestion, he evi-
upon the enemy through the air cam- dently did come to agree that the pris-
paign and the release of civilian intern- oner problem should not be handed over
ees, Clark and his staff began to sift to a later political conference. On1
through the various solutions put for- September he forwarded his recommen-
ward for resolving the POW question. dations for a final approach to the Com-
These ranged from rescreening the pris- munists. The keynote remained UNC
oners by neutral nations teams to the firmness backed by public and interna-
outright discharge of all the nonrepa- tional opinion. Pointing out that most
triates, as suggested by Harrison in June. of the proposals made since 28 April
As Clark saw the situation in August, were similar to or modifications of the
it was time to assemble all the alterna- plans already rejected by the enemy,
tives acceptable in the UNC and present troducing new variations could only
53
make the Communists think that the
(1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Sep 52, sub: Clark maintained that to continue in-
Release of 11,000 Anti-Communist South Korean
POW's, in G-3, 383.6, 28/5. (2) Msg, JCS 918515, U.N. Command had as yet not reached
JCS to CINCFE, 15 Sep 52. This message was ap- its final position.
proved by the JCS, Defense and State Departments,
and the President.
54
Msg, CX 55410, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep 52, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, 9 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC
Supporting
55
56
Docs, tab 25. and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 35.
Ltr, Nam
Msg, to Harrison,
C 53390, CINCUNC24to Sep 52, no sub,
CINCUNC in
(Adv), 57
Msg, HNC 1473, CINCUNC (Adv) to
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, CINCUNC, 20 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
Supporting Docs, tab 27. Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 36.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 279

Therefore, at one plenary session, he of Korea and disposed of by this group.


went on, Harrison would preface his pre- The last four proposals, Clark went on,
sentation of the last UNC offer with would require time limits to insure that
some carefully chosen remarks on the disposition was concluded before a polit-
differences between the UNC and Com- ical conference was convened. Harrison,
munist attitudes and performances on after finishing his presentation, would
POW matters and note that most of the recess unilaterally to give the Commu-
controversy had hinged on the disposi- nists time to study the alternatives
tion of 14,000 Chinese, presumably thoroughly. In the meantime wide pub-
volunteers. After his opening remarks, licity and strong U.S. and U.N. support
Harrison would review the choices pre- should be accorded to the UNC propo-
viously offered and turned down by the sals. Were the enemy to refuse this offer-
enemy and then set forth the other al- ing, then the UNC would recess indefi-
ternatives acceptable to the UNC. All nitely until the enemy either accepted
of the latter were contingent upon the or submitted new solutions in writing.
signing of the armistice first and, of As far as Clark was concerned, Com-
course, the acceptance of the principle munist rejection would signify the end
of nonrepatriation. of military negotiations since further
In Clark's opinion, five merited discussion would be pointless. If the
consideration: (1) All nonrepatriates UNC plan were carried out in this man-
would be delivered to the demilitarized ner, he concluded, the Communists
zone and released from military control. would have to demonstrate whether they
There would be no screening or inter- really wanted an armistice or not.58
view and the ex-prisoner would then go It was evident that neither Clark nor
to the side of his choice. Observers could Harrison believed that the enemy would
be military or civilian, participants or accept any of the alternatives. But both
neutrals, as the Communists wished. were convinced that it would be very
(2) All nonrepatriates would be de- unwise to permit the matter of the pris-
livered to the demilitarized zone and oners to be handed over to a postarmis-
turned over to representatives of im- tice political conference. While the fate
partial nations for disposition with both of the prisoners was decided on the polit-
sides agreeing to abide by the decisions ical level, the Communists could improve
of this body. (3) Both sides would agree their military position substantially and
that the supervision, control, and respon- the U.N. Command would be unable to
sibility for the determination of the ul- employ its air and naval power to induce
timate disposition of all nonrepatriates a quicker settlement.59
would pass to a group of impartial na- Thus, when the JCS informed Clark
tions once the armistice was signed. (4) on 9 September that a proposed Depart-
Both sides would maintain custody of ment of State plan involving the
their nonrepatriates until a group of
mutually acceptable impartial nations 58
Msg, C 54499, Clark to JCS, 1 Sep 52, DA-IN
decided
59 on their
Msg, HNC disposition.
1503, Harrison (5) Non-
to CINCUNC, 6 Sep
179066.
repatriates would be delivered to custody 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and
of impartial nations either in or outside CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 10.
280 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

exchange of 12,000 UNC prisoners for decided advantage militarily and could
83,000 Communists with the nonrepa- use this as a club to gain its objectives.61
triates to be left for subsequent repatria- Since efforts to reconcile the State-
tion was again under consideration, Defense differences were unsuccessful,
Clark was not enthusiastic. If such a President Truman had to make the de-
plan were to be used, Clark told the cision on 24 September and he approved
JCS two days later, then it should be the Defense view, ruling out the possi-
brought forward as a last resort only bility of postponing the nonrepatriate
after the other alternatives had been re- question to the postarmistice period.
jected. Although the State Department The following day G-3 prepared new
had not accepted four of Clark's five instructions for Clark and the President
alternatives for turning over nonrepa- accepted them.62
triates to impartial nations for disposi- The general procedure set forth in
tion, it was more receptive to his sugges- the message approved by the President
tion for bringing the nonrepatriates to followed closely that recommended by
the demilitarized zone, releasing them Clark on 1 September. But the discard
from military control, and then letting of the proposals to handle the nonrepa-
them choose their own side without in- triates either by handing them over to a
terview or screening.60 group of impartial nations or to a sub-
Clark's objections to "subsequent ne- sequent conference for disposition nar-
gotiations" after an armistice were sup- rowed the number of new choices to
ported by the JCS and the Secretary of three.63 In presenting them to the en-
Defense in mid-September. During emy, Clark told Harrison, he should
meetings between State and Defense De- exercise care not to make a commitment
partment officials, Secretary Lovett and that the Chinese prisoners would not be
Admirals Fechteler and Libby opposed permitted to go to Taiwan.64
the suggestion of State that the President Mr. Truman sent a personal word of
issue a proclamation based upon the encouragement to Clark the day before
Mexican recommendation urging the ex- the meeting at Panmunjom. He ex-
change of those desiring repatriation and pressed his hope that the UNC proposal
the deferral of further consideration of would be made "with utmost firmness
the nonrepatriates problem until a later and without subsequent debate." If the
date. Fechteler and Libby felt that once Communists failed to accept the UNC
an armistice was signed, the U.S. public offer and indefinite recess was invoked
would increase pressure upon the govern- by the UNC delegates, it would be es-
ment to bring the boys back home and sential that "the military pressure should
the U.S. military position in Korea
would deteriorate while the Commu-
nists improved their capabilities. By the Conf on Korean Armistice Negotiations.
62
Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 6 Oct 52, sub: Sum-
time subsequent negotiations got under mary of Actions with Respect to the Armistice
way, the enemy would have attained a Negotiations, in G-3 091 Korea, 70.
63
61
64 Msg, JCS 919368, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Sep 52.
60 Memo
Msg, CX
ofJCS
Conv,
55856,
17 CINCUNC
Sep
(1) Msg, 917910, JCS 52, sub:
toState-Defense
to CINCFE, CINCUNC
9 Sep 52.
(2) Msg, CX 55003, Clark to JCS, 11 Sep 52, DA- (Adv), 26 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep
IN 182579. 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 18.
SUMMER OF FRUSTRATION 281

not be lessened" during the period be carried out under military or civilian
ahead, the President concluded.65 observers if the Communists so wished.
On 28 September, just five months To give the enemy delegates time to
after the package proposal of April had consider the new choices, Harrison pro-
been delivered, Harrison opened the ses- posed a ten-day recess, but Nam asked
sion with a brief restatement of the pre- that the meeting reconvene that after-
vious plans brought forward by the U.N. noon. At that time he expressed his
Command breaking the POW deadlock. disappointment in the UNC proposals.
He then proceeded to the alternatives, "You have only used different forms and
all of which were dependent upon the ways to decorate the unreasonable
prior formal acceptance of an armistice: demand upon which your side has per-
(a) All prisoners would be brought to sistently insisted," he charged. The
the demilitarized zone, identified, and Communists would continue to demand
checked off by one or a combination of full repatriation, he concluded, but were
Red Cross and joint military teams. agreeable to a recess of ten days so that
They would then be considered as fully the U.N. Command might reconsider its
repatriated. If a prisoner stated at this basic stand.66
time that he desired to return to the side The meeting on 8 October repeated
that had detained him, he would be free the Communist rejection of the UNC
to so do. In that case, he would assume offering. After Nam finished, Harrison
civilian status and would not be em- began a thirty-four minute speech in
ployed again in acts of war in the Korean which he covered the Communist re-
conflict. (b) All prisoners desiring re- sponsibility for starting the war in Korea
patriation would be exchanged expedi- and the UNC's many efforts to reach a
tiously. All nonrepatriates would be de- reasonable settlement. The UNC had
livered to the demilitarized zone in small now reached the end of the trail; it had
groups, released from military control, no further proposals to make. Further-
and then interviewed by representatives more, the UNC did not intend to come
of countries not participating in the to Panmunjom merely to listen to the
Korean hostilities. This could be done abuse and false propaganda issued by
with or without military representation the Communist delegation. Therefore,
and under the observation of the ICRC, Harrison continued, the UNC was de-
joint Red Cross teams, or joint military claring a recess until the Communists
teams, as the Communists desired. (c) were willing to accept one of the UNC
All prisoners wishing repatriation would plans or submit in writing a constructive
be exchanged as quickly as possible. All proposal of its own. With that, Harrison
nonrepatriates would be delivered to the and the rest of the UNC delegation rose
demilitarized zone and freed from mili- and left the conference tent.67
tary control. Then, without questioning, The talking stage was over; it was
interview, or screening, each individual 66
Transcript of Proceedings, 121st Session, Mil
so released would be free to go to the Armistice Conf, 28 Sep 52, in FEC Main Delegates
side
67 of his choice. This plan also could Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53.
Transcript of Proceedings, 122d Session, Mili-
65
Msg, Truman to Clark, 27 Sep 52, in FEC Gen tary Armistice Conf, 8 Oct 52, in FEC Main Dele-
Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949-52. gates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53.
282 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

now a matter of "fish or cut bait." But though the air assault was a constant
the prospects for an armistice appeared thorn in the side of the enemy, there
no closer than they had been after the was considerable doubt whether it alone
April proposal. As long as the UNC could provide sufficient pressure to make
persistently opposed no forcible repatria- the Communists desire an armistice.
tion and the Communists stubbornly in- Without a powerful stimulus, the enemy
sisted upon full repatriation, compro- had no special incentive to seek peace
mise appeared impossible without one other than on its own terms. Operating
side conceding political defeat. Neither within a fairly rigid set of restrictions,
the United States nor the Communists the U.N. Command had a complex task
seemed willing to apply sufficient force —just how much military pressure could
to insure a military victory that might and should be applied against the enemy
have produced conditions amenable to a to induce him to make concessions and
political defeat. At the front the defense yet not provoke a resumption of large-
lines grew stronger each month and al- scale war.
CHAPTER XIII

Stalemate

I emphatically disagree with so-called nese base area, giving it the same inviola-
military experts who say that victory was bility that the UNC granted Manchuria.
ours for the taking at any time during my At the front, Communists troops reacted
period of command with the limited forces
at our disposal and without widening the strongly to attack, yet showed no signs
scope of the conflict. We never had enough of preparing to resume major offensive
men, whereas the enemy had sufficient man- operations of their own. The rules were
power not only to block our offensives, but tacit, but nonetheless observed in mid-
to make and hold small gains of his 1952; this was a sparring match and not
own. . . . To have pushed it [the war] to
a conclusion would have required more a fight for the championship.
trained divisions and more supporting air
and naval forces, would have incurred Holding the Line
heavy casualties and would have necessi-
tated lifting our self-imposed ban on at- Across the front the two opponents
tacks on the enemy sanctuary north of the
Yalu.1 were fairly evenly matched. Stretched
from the west coast to the Taebaeks lay
So argued General Clark some months eight Chinese armies numbering an es-
after the signing of the armistice. What timated 207,800 men and there were
he was saying, in effect, was that there three North Korean corps anchoring the
was no disposition in Washington toward eastern end of the line with 83,000
undertaking the risks or the losses that troops. (See Map IV.) Four U.S. Army
military victory would have demanded divisions, the 1st Marine Division, the
during the year when he was in com- Commonwealth Division, and nine ROK
mand. The limitations within which the divisions, totaling 247,554 soldiers, faced
Far East Command had to operate and the enemy. In depth of manpower the
the strength ceilings imposed upon the Communists enjoyed a much greater ad-
Eighth Army insured that no all-out ef- vantage, for an estimated 422,000
fort against the enemy could be Chinese, 185,300 North Koreans, and
mounted. On the other hand, the Com- 10,000 Soviet or satellite troops disposed
munist forces of Kim and Peng evidently throughout North Korea supported the
labored under similar restrictions. They front-line forces. Thus, the 617,300
made no attempt to strike at the Japa- enemy troops in the immediate and gen-
1
eral reserve plus the 290,800 on the fir-
Mark W. Clark, "The Truth About Korea,"
Colliers, vol. 133, No. 3 (February 5, 1954), pp.
ing line formed an estimated grand total
34-35. of 908,100 Communist soldiers in North
284 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Korea on 1 May 1952.2 The average enemy was carrying out similar action.
strength of UNC forces in South Korea Although prisoner of war interrogations
during May was a little less than revealed no Communist preparations for
700,000.3 an imminent offensive, the enemy was
The presentation of the package pro- engaged in improving the quality of his
posal in late April occasioned no in- bunkers, planting mines, and stringing
terruption in the general pattern of more barbed wire. The enemy defensive
operations at the front. Characterized positions in many places extended
by patrols, probes, raids, and limited- twenty miles to the rear with adequate
objective attacks, the active defense gen- lines of communication.6
erated only a low level of ground action. Perhaps more significant was the
It was a contest of light jabs and feints steady growth of enemy artillery fire-
with neither side attempting to sting the power during the spring of 1952. From
other into a violent, large-scale reaction.4 a total of 710 active pieces in April the
Since the lull on the battlefield im- enemy by June increased the number
posed no severe strain upon the Eighth along the front to 884. The chief mis-
Army's combat troops, Van Fleet in- sion of the Communist artillery was to
structed his corps commanders in mid- provide close support for the infantry on
May to take full advantage of the respite offense and defense and gradually
to improve their defensive positions. enemy fire had become more accurate.
Noting that many of the present deficien- Using eight to ten pieces, enemy massed-
cies stemmed from the haste in planning fire techniques also improved. The
and setting up the installations, he or- Communists employed deceptive meas-
dered special attention to be given to ures such as the firing of alternate,
relocating bunkers below the topograph- widely spaced guns, numerous firing po-
ical crest of hills, to resiting automatic sitions, and a number of roving guns to
weapons to obtain maximum grazing and make the task of accurate location of
flanking fires, and to strengthening bunk- pieces more difficult for UNC units. By
ers to withstand light artillery and mor- moving his artillery frequently and not
tar fire. In addition, he wanted more concentrating the guns for long in any
tactical wire laid down and increased one sector, the enemy hindered effective
consideration devoted to the problem of counterbattery fire by the U.N. Com-
draining communications trenches and mand. Intelligence estimated that the
bunkers before the rainy season arrived.5 Communists had about 500 prepared po-
Intelligence reports indicated that the sitions opposite the ROK II Corps alone
in May.7 Also impressive was the steady
2
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 52, sec. I, climb in the number of rounds directed
Narrative, p. 7. at UNC positions. From a daily average
of 2,388 rounds in April, the enemy al-
Eighth Army, 229,893; U.S. Marines, 26,843; Fifth
Air Force, 35,951; U.N. Forces (less U.S. and most tripled his fire in June to 6,843
ROK), 34,026; ROK, 366,466; total, 693,179.
4
3 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 13.
5
Ibid.,
Msg, GXp. 5831
44. The breakdown
TAG, CG EUSAK wasto as
CGfollows:
I U.S.
6
Corps et al., 11 May 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 29.
7
Rpt, May 52, bk. 4, pt. 2, incl 11. Ibid., May 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 18-20.
STALEMATE 285

rounds a day.8 The increase in ammuni- off by both sides when the exchanges
tion fired demonstrated that the enemy threatened to grow to larger proportions.
had over a period of months gradually (Map 4) In early June, however, the
increased his forward supply levels. tempo began to pick up.
To counteract the mounting effect of The U.S. 45th Division of the I Corps
Communist artillery fire, Clark inves- manned main line of resistance positions
tigated the feasibility of utilizing two from Hill 281, five miles northeast of
280-mm. battalions, then being organ- Ch'orwon, to the village of Togun-gol,
ized in the United States, to provide the about eleven miles east of Ch'orwon.
Eighth Army with more firepower and Except for Hill 281, all of the 45th
longer-range weapons. Unfortunately Division front lines lay south of the
these battalions would not be available Yokkok-ch'on which meandered through
until the end of 1952 and the Joint a rice paddy valley overlooked by low-
Chiefs were loath to make a definite lying, forested hills. Elements of the
commitment so far in advance.9 CCF 38th and 39th Armies controlled
The enemy was not alone in improv- the dominant terrain to the north and
ing his artillery techniques during the in many cases were close enough to the
spring. As the Communists conducted a 45th Division's main lines to enjoy
series of nightly probes in the ROK 1st excellent observation of the division's
Division sector in May, the troops began activities and to have convenient bases
to practice a ruse designed to inflict heav- for dispatching their nightly raids and
ier enemy casualties. When the Chinese probes. The enemy's advantages be-
attacked, the ROK soldiers resisted for came a matter of concern to Maj. Gen.
five to ten minutes, then withdrew David L. Ruffner when he assumed com-
slightly. After giving the enemy time to mand of the division in late May, for
occupy the evacuated positions, artillery, they pointed up the lack of a strong out-
previously zeroed in on the outposts, post line of resistance. If the 45th Divi-
opened up. Within a half hour to an sion could establish a chain of strong
hour the Chinese usually withdrew and outposts across its front, it could deny
although the forces involved were enemy observers the use of much of the
seldom large, enemy losses were com- surrounding terrain dominated by the
paratively high.10 outposts and could also provide addi-
tional defensive depth to the division's
Old Baldy lines.
In early June General Ruffner and
Operations along the Eighth Army his staff selected eleven outpost sites sit-
front during May were confined to small- uated at strategic locations in front of
scale actions that were quickly broken the division and decided that these sites
would be taken and occupied on a 24-
8
Ibid., Apr and Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative. hour basis beginning on the night of
6 June. A twelfth objective would be
DA-IN
9 147813. (2) Msg, JCS 911155, JCS to raided and the enemy positions de-
(1) Msg,
CINCFE, CX52.
13 Jun 69787, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Jun 52,
10
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 52, sec. I, stroyed later during the two-phase
Narrative, p. 29. operation, which was to be called
286 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

H. C. Brewer, Jr.

MAP 4

COUNTER.11 Anticipating that the enemy would take and hold objectives 1-6 and
might react quickly and strongly the 180th Infantry Regiment, com-
to the UNC move, Ruffner instructed his manded by Lt. Col. Ellis B. Ritchie,
regimental commanders to carry out the would seize and occupy objectives 7, 9,
operations after dark and to follow up 10, and 11. Objective 8, known as Out-
immediately with sufficient reinforce- post EERIE, would be taken at a later
ments to fortify the outposts before day- date.12
break. Opposing the 45th Division from east
The 279th Infantry Regiment, under to west were elements of the 338th and
Col. Preston J. C. Murphy, held the 339th Regiments, 113th Division, CCF
eastern half of the divisional front, and 38th Army; 350th and 349th Regiments,
117th Division, CCF 39th Army; and the
11
Opnl Instr No. 58, in Hq 45th Div, Comd Rpt
12
Jun 52, G-3 sec., bk. VI. Ibid.
STALEMATE 287

344th Regiment, 115th Division, CCF by a BAR and machine gun, and made
39th Army. The other infantry compo- a sweep to the rear of the enemy. "We
nents of the 113th, 115th, and 117th saw a group of soldiers and thought they
Divisions were in reserve, as was the were our own men at first," he later
116th Division, CCF 39th Army. The reported. "We advanced to within 25
Chinese had over ten battalions of artil- feet of them when we heard Chinese
lery positioned along the front in direct voices. Then we opened up and saw
or general support roles.13 five men run out and get hit." As the
Several air strikes on known enemy enemy resistance crumbled, the infantry-
strongpoints close to the outpost objec- men from A Company pushed their way
tives took place during the daylight toward the crest of Old Baldy. Enemy
hours of 6 June. Then, after dark, artillery immediately began to come in.
Murphy and Ritchie sent out their units, "There were no bunkers or trenches to
ranging from a squad to almost a com- get into," M/Sgt. Gerald Marlin related
pany, to take possession of the outposts. afterward," so we started digging while
Evidently the enemy had not anticipated the shells burst all around us. I almost
the operation, for the attack units en- crawled into my helmet." Despite the
countered little opposition except at enemy fire, the A Company squads hung
Outpost 10 on Hill 255 and Outpost 11 on and took possession of Old Baldy
on Hill 266. The former, which was to shortly after midnight.14
become better known as Porkchop Hill, Once the outposts were seized, the task
was taken by two platoons from I Com- of organizing them defensively got
pany, 180th Infantry, after a 55-minute under way. Aided by Korean Service
fire fight with two Chinese platoons. On Corps personnel the men of the 279th
Hill 266, which had won the name of and 180ht Infantry Regiments brought
Old Baldy when artillery and mortar in construction and fortification mate-
fire destroyed the trees on its crest, two rials and worked through the night.
squads from A Company, 180th Infantry, They built bunkers with overhead pro-
exchanged small arms and automatic tection so that their own artillery could
weapons fire with two enemy squads, use proximity fuze shells when an enemy
then withdrew and directed artillery fire attack drew close to the outpost. They
upon the Chinese. ringed the outposts with barbed wire and
Pfc. James Ortega, a forward observer placed mines along the avenues of ap-
for the 171st Field Artillery Battalion, proach which were also covered by
jumped into a trench and directed the automatic weapons. Whenever possible,
artillery concentration which pounded they sited their machine guns and re-
the top of the hill with 500 rounds. coilless rifles in positions where they
When the artillery ceased, the men from could provide support to adjacent out-
A Company again probed the enemy's posts. Signal personnel set up communi-
positions. Meeting intense fire, M/Sgt. cations to the rear and laterally to other
John O. White took a squad, reinforced outposts by radio and wire and porters
13 14
(1) U.S. 279th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, (1) U.S. 180th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,
S-3 Jnl. (2) U.S. 180th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun POR 178, 7 Jun 52. (2) 45th Division News (13
52, pp. 9-10. Jun 52), pp. 1, 4.
288 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

brought in stockpiles of ammunition. into difficulty. Six tanks were disabled


Back on the main line of resistance, in- by enemy mines en route, but the re-
fantry, tank, and artillery support weap- mainder fired at enemy bunkers and gun
ons had drawn up fire plans to furnish positions on the hill mass west of Ori-
the outposts with protective fires and a jong and then withdrew. Five of the
prebriefed reinforcing element was pre- disabled tanks were later recovered.17 In
pared to go to the immediate assistance the meantime, K Company, 180th In-
of each outpost in the event of enemy fantry, under Capt. Richard J. Shaw, and
attack. By morning the new 24-hour one platoon of the regimental tank com-
outposts were ready to withstand coun- pany moved north to the Pokkae area
terattacks, and garrison forces of from 18 and engaged the enemy. The infantry
to 44 men were left behind as the bulk closed in to hand grenade range, but
of the forces from the 279th and 180th found that the Chinese had honey-
Infantry Regiments withdrew to the combed the heights east of the town
main line of resistance.15 with bunkers, trenches, and tunnels.
Chinese probes and attacks on the Since there was little hope of penetrating
outposts during the next few days met and destroying the strong enemy installa-
with no success despite an increase in tions on the hill, the raiding party broke
their artillery and mortar support. At contact and returned to the main line
Porkchop Hill the outposts of the 180th of resistance. Losses were light, with
Infantry Regiment repulsed several four men wounded and one tank disa-
enemy drives of up to a company in bled for the raiders, while the enemy
strength. suffered an estimated sixty-five casual-
On 11 June General Ruffner directed ties.18
that the second phase of Plan After an air strike by Fifth Air Force
COUNTER be carried out the following fighter planes and an artillery and
day. While two platoons of the 245th mortar barrage on EERIE, E and F
Tank Battalion mounted a diversionary Companies, 180th Infantry, under 1st Lt.
raid along the Yokkok-ch'on valley from John D. Scandling and Capt. Jack M.
Chut'oso westward to the town of Ori- Tiller, respectively, attacked from the
jong, the 180th Infantry would use up southeast against heavy small arms, auto-
to three rifle companies to seize and matic weapon, artillery, and mortar fire
hold Outpost 8 (EERIE) and to destroy and took the objective. G Company,
enemy installations in the vicinity of the 180th Infantry, quickly moved up under
town of Pokkae (Objective A).16 the command of 1st Lt. Richard M. Lee
Two platoons from B Company, 245th to reinforce its sister companies before
Tank Battalion, under the command of the expected enemy counterattack took
1st Lt. Eugene S. Kastner, launched the place. The Chinese came back strongly
raid toward Orijong at 0600 and ran and casualties were heavy on both sides,
but the 180th Infantry units hung on
15
See U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G-3 tenaciously until the enemy broke off the
sec., bk; VI, tab 11.
16 17
Opns Order No. 29, Plan COUNTER (Phase 245th Tank Bn, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, S-3 sec.
18
II), 12 Jun 52, in U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun U.S. 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G-3
58, G-3 sec., bk. VI. sec., POR 283, 13 Jun 52.
STALEMATE 289

engagement. During the next two days attack upon them. At approximately 0130
the Chinese attempted fruitlessly to hours on June 16th, the battle ended vic-
drive the 45th Division from EERIE.19 toriously.
An estimated enemy force of over 1000
From a Chinese document captured men who attacked both of the hills were
later came an entirely different account annihilated.
of the action in this section: Meanwhile, in another spot, 4 squads
making up the main force bravely resisted
From 0500 hours on 12 June 52, the the enemies in tunnel warfare and achieved
enemy [the UNC] fought against us on victory.20
Hill 190.8 and battled heroically for 5 days.
The result of the fighting on the 16th was The Chinese resort to tunnel warfare
2300 enemy casualties and 9 tanks de- led to the sealing of tunnel entrances by
stroyed. We had an honorable victory as the UNC troops. According to later
above. prisoner of war interrogations, Chinese
At 0550 hours on 12 June 52, enemy at-
tacked our positions on Hill 190.8 with a officers had killed a number of soldiers
force of 7 companies and 74 tanks which in the tunnels because the latter had
were covered by airplanes against our 1st wished to dig their way out and
Co, 50th Co. surrender to the U.N. Command. After
We met the attackers and killed and in-
jured them. At 0900 hours, they finally oc- the 45th Division forces secured the hills,
cupied Hill 190.8. About 5-6 squads of the they opened the tunnels and captured
1st Co., the defending force on Hill 190.8 the Chinese who were still alive and
began tunnel warfare. At 2237 hours, the willing to give up.21
3d Co. counterattacked against the enemy On 16 June the 179th Infantry Regi-
under cover of heavy artillery barrage and
reoccupied the position. Casualties in- ment, commanded by Lt. Col. Joseph C.
flicted against the enemy amounted to 772 Sandlin, relieved the 180th on the line
personnel and 8 tanks destroyed. and took over the outpost positions on
In the dawn of the 13th the enemy at- Old Baldy, Porkchop, and EERIE. Enemy
tacked our 1st Co. positions on the 1st, 2d attacks during the next ten days ranged
and unknown hill with a force of 5 com-
panies and 15 tanks which were given air from platoon to battalion strength, dem-
cover by 12 planes. The intense battle con- onstrating the Communist determination
tinued until 1500 hours. We counterat- to eliminate these outposts. By the same
tacked with the 2d Co, 5th Co and the 1st token the 45th Division's repulse of
Co. Enemy casualties were 600 personnel the many enemy efforts along this line
and 2 tanks destroyed.
For 2 days from 14th to 15th, the enemy attested to the division's equal determi-
attacked the 2d unknown hill continuously nation not to be dislodged.22
but the enemy was repulsed. The enemy The contest for Old Baldy became
casualties were 56 personnel. very heated on 26 June. The hill was
On this night of the 15th, our 50th Co
and 51st Co counterattacked in large force 20
against the enemy who occupied both of Document Captured by 11th ROK Regiment
the hills by attacking with a force of 7 During the Action on Hill 168, in 45th Inf Div,
Comd Rpt, ACofS G-2 sec., an. 2 to PIR 191, 30
companies which were covered by artillery Jun 52.
fire and tanks. After bombarding the posi- 21
See 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, ACofS
tions
19 forPOR's
lbid., 35 minutes, we13 made
283 and 284, a sudden
and 14 Jun 52. G-2 sec., POW Interrogation Rpts, 17 Jun 52.
22
See U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,
S-3 Jnl, 16-25 Jun 52.
290 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the high point of an east-west ridge and force regrouped, with F Company taking
dominated the terrain to the north, west, over the holding of the left and right
and south. Almost 1,000 feet west of the fingers of Old Baldy, C Company hold-
crest the Chinese had established posi- ing the old Outpost 11 position, and A
tions that posed a constant threat to the Company working its way around the
45th Division outpost and the 179th In- right flank of the enemy defenders. For
fantry Regiment's troops in the area. two hours the battle continued as the
Colonel Sandlin decided to destroy the Chinese used hand grenades and ma-
enemy strongpoints. Early in the morn- chine guns to repel each attempt to drive
ing the 179th Infantry Regiment vacated them from their positions. Late in the
its outpost on Old Baldy to permit air day two tanks lumbered up the hill to
strikes and artillery and mortar barrages help reduce the enemy strongpoints; one
to be placed on the enemy positions. turned over and the second threw a track,
Eight fighter-bombers from the Fifth Air but they managed to inflict some damage
Force dropped bombs and loosed rockets before they were put out of action.
and machine gun fire; then 45th Divi- Gradually the enemy evacuated his posi-
sion artillery and mortar units began to tions and the 179th was able to send engi-
lay concentrations on the enemy strong- neers and several more tanks up to the
points. crest.23
C Company (Reinforced), 179th In- During the night of 26 June and the
fantry, under 1st Lt. John B. Blount, and following day the three companies dug
F Company, 180th Infantry, commanded in to consolidate their defense positions
by Captain Tiller, which was attached to on Old Baldy. On the afternoon of 27
the 179th, attacked after the artillery June L Company, 179th Infantry, under
and mortar fire. With C Company mov- 1st Lt. William T. Moroney, took over
ing in from the left and F Company, defense of the crest and F Company,
supported by a tank, coming in from the 180th Infantry, moved back to a sup-
right finger of Old Baldy, the assault porting position. C Company and ele-
forces soon ran into heavy small arms ments of A Company held the ground
and automatic weapons fire from the northwest of the crest which had been
two Chinese companies who comprised won from the enemy.
the defense force. After an hour of fight- When night fell, enemy activity
ing the Chinese suddenly pulled back around Old Baldy increased. Mortar
and directed artillery and mortar fire and artillery fire began to come in on
upon the attacking units. When the fire the 179th Infantry Regiment's positions
ceased, the enemy quickly came back and and enemy flares warned that the Chi-
closed with the men of C and F Compa- nese were on the move. At 2200 hours
nies in the trenches. A Company, 179th the enemy struck the defenders of L
Infantry, under 1st Lt. George L. Company from the northeast and south-
Vaughn, came up to reinforce the attack west. An estimated reinforced battalion
during the afternoon, for the enemy ma- pressed on toward the crest until it met
chine guns were making it difficult for 23
(1) U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,
men of C and F Companies to move Jnl, tab 7. (2) U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,
over the crest of the hill. The attack G-3 sec., POR's 296 and 297, 26 and 27 Jun 52.
STALEMATE 291

a circle of defensive fire. From the main Chinese disengaged to the north, having
line of resistance, artillery, mortar, tank, suffered losses estimated at close to 700
and infantry weapons covered enemy men. In return the enemy had fired over
avenues of approach. L Company added 4,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire
its small arms, automatic weapons, and and the 179th Infantry had suffered 43
hand grenades to the circle which kept casualties, including 8 killed in action.25
the Chinese at bay. Unable to penetrate As June ended, the 45th Division, de-
the ring, the enemy withdrew and re- spite the lack of combat experience of
grouped at midnight. many of its troops, had acquitted itself
The second and third attacks followed well on the battlefield. In the fight for
the same pattern. Each lasted over an the outposts the division had withstood
hour during the early morning of 28 more than twenty Chinese counterattacks
June and each time the enemy failed to and inflicted an estimated 3,500 casual-
break through the wall of defensive fires. ties on the enemy. It had also won a
After suffering casualties estimated at commendation from Van Fleet.26 The
between 250 and 325 men, the Chinese enemy made one more attempt to wrest
broke off the fight. The 179th Infantry control of Old Baldy from the 45th Divi-
reported six men killed and sixty-one sion's possession on the night of 3-4
wounded during the three engage- July. Three separate attacks—the last in
ments. 24 battalion strength—met the same fate as
Late in the evening of 28 June, the their predecessors as the concentration of
Chinese artillery and mortar fire on Old defensive firepower first blunted and
Baldy signaled the approach of another then forced the Chinese to desist in their
attack. Four enemy squads reconnoi- assaults.27 The thorough manner in
tered the 179th positions at 2200 hours, which the division had organized the
exchanging automatic weapons and small defense of the outposts and the skill with
arms fire. About an hour later the main which it had used its positions during
assault began with a force estimated at the fighting were a testimonial to the
two reinforced battalions moving in from leadership on all levels and to the cour-
the northeast and northwest behind a age of its troops.
very heavy artillery and mortar barrage. The 45th Division was less successful
This time the Chinese penetrated the in another field. On 8 June Clark di-
perimeter and hand-to-hand fighting rected Van Fleet to prepare a plan for
broke out. Shortly after midnight a capturing Chinese prisoners in the Ch'or-
UNC flare plane began to illuminate the won area. Clark wanted to discover the
battle area and the defensive fires from identity of the enemy forces in that sec-
the main line of resistance, coupled with tor and learn more of their role. Several
the steady stream of small arms and auto-
25
matic weapons fire from the three com- (1) U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G-3 sec.,
POR 299, 29 Jun 52. (2) U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd
panies of the 179th on the hill, became Rpt, Jun 52, Jnl, tab 7.
more effective. By 0100 on 29 June the 26
Msg, G 6671 KGO, CG Eighth Army to
27
CINCUNC, 27 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
24 U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, G-3 sec.,
(1) U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G-3 Jnl, 29 Jun 52.
Jnl, tab 7. (2) U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,
G-3 sec., POR 298, Jun 52. Jnl.
292 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

days later Van Fleet submitted two plans, any soldier capturing an enemy prisoner
one envisaging the use of a regiment amply demonstrated the problem.30
from the ROK 9th Division and the Nevertheless, in July Clark approved
second a reinforced battalion from the another attempt, this time by the ROK
45th Division. The latter contemplated 11th Division of the ROK I Corps, to
tank, air, and artillery support and the capture North Korean prisoners. BUCK-
45th Division was authorized to carry it SHOT 16, as the plan was dubbed, sent a
out as quickly as possible.28 reinforced battalion into the sector west
Early on 22 June, the 2d Battalion, of the Nam River on 8 July. The bat-
279th Infantry Regiment, set out to cap- talion suffered casualties of 33 killed,
ture enemy prisoners on the north bank 157 wounded, and 36 missing as against
of the Yokkok-ch'on. The difficulty en- estimated enemy losses of 90 killed and
countered by the battalion in taking 82 wounded. Not a prisoner was taken.31
Chinese prisoners was later succinctly The results of these abortive raids con-
related by the Eighth Army historian: vinced Clark that the UNC losses in
"The raiding party had destroyed enemy their efforts to take prisoners were not
positions, inflicted numerous casualties worthwhile. On 19 July he turned down
and captured three prisoners. The pris- Van Fleet's request for a similar opera-
oners, however, were not interrogated: tion in the 1st Commonwealth Division
two of them died of wounds inflicted by area. If the Eighth Army did not feel
enemy troops as the prisoners were being an enemy attack was imminent, Clark
brought to the MLR and the third was did not think the high UNC casualty
killed when he attempted to throw a rate incurred in such raids was war-
grenade after being captured." Despite ranted.32
other efforts on a smaller scale to take For General Van Fleet, who may have
prisoners, the 279th Regiment's total bag hoped that the change-over in command-
for the month of June was but six pris- ers from Ridgway to Clark might result
oners.29 in less restriction upon his activity along
The experience of the 279th Regi- the front, June and July may have been
ment was by no means isolated. In com- disillusioning. Van Fleet's plans for the
bat the Communist soldier could be IX U.S. Corps to advance to new posi-
killed or wounded, but seldom taken tions north of P'yonggang and secure
prisoner during this period. The fact control of all the Iron Triangle met with
that General Ruffner issued a letter to little enthusiasm from Clark in late
his troops in June providing for a special June. To the Eighth Army commander's
rest and recuperation leave in Japan to arguments that the operation would pro-
vide intelligence of enemy positions, give
28 30
(1) Msg, C 69843, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, Ltr, Hq 45th Inf Div, 18 Jun 52, sub: Rest
8 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, an 4, pt. II, and Recuperation in Japan, in Hq 45th Inf Div,
J-6, 8 Jun 52. (2) Msg, 50431, CINCFE to CG Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G-3 sec., tab 32.
31
Eighth Army, 18 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, pp. 4-5.
32
an. 4, pt. II, J-15, 18 Jun 52. (1) Ibid., p. 5. (2) Memo, Col J. B. Crawford,
29
(1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. SGS, for CofS, 11 Jul 52, no sub, UNC/FEC, Comd
I, Narrative, p. 63. (2) 279th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab
Jun 52, p. 23. 21.
STALEMATE 293

the UNC troops experience, destroy en- commanders on 18 July. Van Fleet told
emy stockpiles, and utilize U.S. firepower them there were indications that, in
and ROK Army mobility, Clark listed some sectors, the enemy had shifted
corresponding disadvantages. The pos- forces and evacuated a number of for-
sibility of adverse effects upon the ne- ward positions. When this occurred, he
gotiations, the numbers of friendly cas- desired contact with the enemy main-
ualties involved, the lack of UNC tained and the evacuated positions to be
reserves if a heavy enemy counterattack occupied for at least twenty-four hours.
followed, and the unprofitable nature of Commanders should be ready for a vio-
an advance beyond P'yonggang without lent Communist reaction, Van Fleet con-
further exploitation, Clark told Van tinued, and complete fire plans should
Fleet in disapproving the plan, exceeded be made and communications insured.35
the advantages.33 It was evident that the As soon as Clark heard of this directive,
new commander would be as reluctant he instructed his staff to determine
as Ridgway had been to step up the pace whether the Eighth Army should be al-
of the ground war merely to gain real lowed to carry out such a procedure. His
estate. own reaction was that all plans for raids
Behind Clark's disinclination to ap- by units of battalion size or larger should
prove even limited objective attacks lay be approved by the Far East Command
his realization that the enemy ground first.36 In late July, he told his staff that
and air strength had almost doubled he intended to discourage attacks against
since the initiation of negotiations. The hills like Old Baldy in the future. Clark
Communists' divisions along the front wanted the U.N. Command to confine
were at full combat strength and their itself to patrolling and let the enemy do
air forces based in Manchuria now num- the attacking.37
bered about 2,000 aircraft of which ap- The concern of the United Nations
proximately half were jets. In addition, commander over the merit in seizing
the enemy had an increased number of terrain features like Old Baldy was
rocket launchers and field artillery, caused by the resurgence of activity in
around 400 tanks, an improved supply that area in mid-July. The enemy had
situation, and stronger defense lines. not attempted to take the hill again until
Under these circumstances, Clark felt the U.S. 2d Division relieved the 45th
that the best way to punish the Commu- Division during mid-July. All of the
nists lay in letting the enemy take the Eighth Army's corps followed a policy
offensive and not vice versa.34 of rotating their divisions periodically on
Thus it was not surprising that the
Far East commander became disturbed 35
Msg, GX 7022 KGO-O, CG Eighth Army to
over Van Fleet's instructions to his corps CG I U.S. Corps et al, 18 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC,
Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting
33
(1) Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 10 Jun 52, sub: Docs, tab 28.
36
Limited Objective Attacks, in FEC G-3 Completed Memo, Crawford for CofS, 19 Jul 52, no sub, in
Actions. (2) Msg, CX 50832, Clark to Van Fleet, UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS Sup-
25 Jun 52, DA-IN 154621. porting Docs, tab 23.
34 37
Msg, C 50218, CINCFE to JCS, 15 Jun 52, in Memo, Crawford for CofS, 26 Jul 52, no sub,
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS,
Supporting Docs, tab 40. Supporting Docs, tab 26.
294 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

FLOODED BRIDGE CROSSING ON THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE, CH'ORWON VALLEY

the line and the 45th had spent over six supported by air strikes and artillery and
months at the front. The Chinese took mortar fire, did not succeed in driving
advantage of the relief as they mounted the Chinese from the newly won posi-
two attacks on the night of 17-18 July tions. By 20 July the 2d Division ele-
in strengths exceeding a reinforced bat- ments had regained only a portion of the
talion. Through quick reinforcement of east finger of Old Baldy. The onset of
the Old Baldy outpost and heavy close- the rainy season made operations exceed-
defensive fires, E and F Companies, ingly difficult to carry out during the rest
23d Infantry Regiment, who were de- of the month.38
fending the hill managed to repel the As the torrential downpours converted
first enemy assault. But the second won a the Korean battleground into a morass
foothold on the slopes which the enemy in the last week of July, the U.N. Com-
reinforced and then exploited. Chinese mand counted its losses on Old Baldy
artillery and mortar fire became very during the month. Through 21 July
intense; then the enemy infantry fol- the tally showed 39 killed, 234 wounded,
lowed up swiftly and seized the crest. 38
(1) U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, G-3 sec.,
Counterattacks by the 23d Regiment Jnl. (2) 23d Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jul 52.
STALEMATE 295

SETTING UP BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS ON OLD BALDY

and 84 missing for the UNC and an esti- to surmount nature's obstacles.40 Since
mated 1,093 killed and wounded for the the Communists had to cope with similar
Chinese.39 Although the totals were not problems both sides devoted their main
unusually high considering the intensity efforts against the common enemy and
of the fighting and the artillery ex- tactical operations were strictly limited.
changes, it is not difficult to understand When the rain eased off at the end of
General Clark's concern over the casual- July, the 23d Infantry Regiment again
ties suffered in the fight for one more sought to secure complete control of Old
hill. Baldy. Since the Chinese had an esti-
Six consecutive days of heavy rain mated two platoons on the crest, the 23d
flooded the streams and rivers and swept sent two reinforced companies up the
away bridges. As the water seeped into slopes after artillery and mortar prepar-
the ground, landslides began and roads atory fires on the enemy positions. Edg-
were blocked or washed away. The task ing toward the Chinese defenses, the 2d
of resupply became a distinct challenge Division forces used small arms fire and
39
Hq Eighth Array, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, sec. I,
40
Narrative, p. 75. Ibid., p. 52.
296 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

hand grenades as they reached the enemy of the battles waged during the summer
trenches. After bitter hand-to-hand com- and fall of 1952, a savagely contested,
bat, the two companies finally gained seemingly endless struggle for control of
the crest early on 1 August and dug in to another hill. And there seemed to be
prepare for the customary counterattack. little hope that there would be any sig-
Two hundred flares were distributed nificant change in the pattern.
around the friendly positions and forty-
two air sorties were flown during the day Up the Hill, Down the Hill
in support. That night the enemy sent
first mortar, then artillery, fire at the The renewal of activity at the front
crest, dropping an estimated 2,500 and the lack of great expectations from
rounds on the 23d Regiment elements. Panmunjom produced several intelli-
But counterattacks were driven off. gence estimates during the summer of
Mines, bunkers, and additional wire 1952 that were discouraging in tone. In
helped to strengthen the UNC hold on Washington and in the Far East the
Old Baldy on 2 August and extremely planners and intelligence experts fore-
heavy and effective artillery fire broke saw little change in the tenor of the war.
up another enemy assault on 4 August. The enemy, in his estimate, was
For the remainder of the month, the strongly entrenched, had expanded his
Chinese refrained from further attempts air and ground strength, and showed no
on Old Baldy.41 signs of accepting an armistice on UNC
In mid-September, the enemy em- terms. On the other hand, the Commu-
ployed two reinforced companies, sup- nists evidenced no disposition to return
ported by artillery and mortar fire and to large-scale fighting and seemed con-
two tanks, in another desperate effort to tent to rest on their increased defensive
regain control of the controversial hill. strength, confident of their ability to
Infiltrating groups fought their way into wait out the UNC. Unless the United
2d Division positions on 18 September Nations Command mounted a major of-
and hand-to-hand fighting broke out. fensive and broadened the geographical
Under the pressure of the assault, the limits of the war, the intelligence officials
defending forces withdrew more than did not believe that sufficient military
400 yards from the crest and regrouped. pressure could be applied upon the en-
Elements of the 38th Infantry Regiment emy to bring about a swift conclusion to
tried unsuccessfully to envelop the Chi- the war. Since there was small likelihood
nese defenders on 20 September, but the of securing substantial troop augmenta-
following day a platoon of tanks moved tions for the U.N. Command that would
up and supported a second two-pronged have to precede any major offensive, or
drive that forced the enemy to withdraw of gaining approval of more than limited
once more.42 objective attacks, the prospects of a dra-
The fight for Old Baldy was typical matic shift in the tempo of the conflict
appeared remote. As long as the Com-
41
42
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, sec. I, munists made no attempt to alter the
Hq Eighth
Narrative, Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. I,
pp. 67-69.
status quo, the outlook was for more of
Narrative, p. 75. the same type of hill warfare that had
STALEMATE 297

characterized the second year of the applied by the UNC to help its negotia-
war.43 tors at Panmunjom led to the outbreak
Although the fight for Old Baldy had of several bitter, small-scale battles for
received the bulk of the publicity during favorable terrain features. Four miles
the summer months, sporadic excite- east of Panmunjom elements of the 1st
ment had flared up in other sectors. In Marine Division on 9 August lost an out-
early July on the U.S. I Corps front the post to the Chinese on Hill 58. The posi-
ROK 1st Division had carried out a suc- tion changed hands five times during the
cessful battalion raid against Chinese next two days, but the enemy eventually
positions south of Sangnyong-ni, approxi- gained the upper hand. The marines
mately seventeen miles southeast of then shifted their attack to nearby Hill
Ch'orwon. Two days later, on 3 July, 122 which dominated Hill 58 and caught
the 1st Marine Division sent a company the enemy unawares. From 12 to 14
raiding party against the Chinese posi- August a reinforced Marine company
tions at Punji-ri, three and a half miles turned back Chinese counterattacks of
northeast of Panmunjom. The marines up to a battalion in strength. Despite
destroyed enemy troops and bunkers, the failures of these attempts, the enemy
then withdrew to the main line of resist- tried again on 16 and 25 August, sustain-
ance.44 ing heavy casualties and no success in its
Other forays were not quite so fortu- efforts to drive off the marines. Hill 122
nate. On the ROK II Corps front, the won a proud name in these encounters-
ROK Capital Division's attempts to take Bunker Hill.46
over Communist hill positions near Yul- About seven miles east of Kumsong,
sa-ri, fifteen miles northeast of Kumhwa, on the ROK II Corps front, the ROK
were repulsed. The ROK 5th Division, Capital Division became embroiled in
ROK I Corps, also met determined another fierce struggle. Overlooking the
North Korean resistance when it tried to division's positions stood a hill, later to
drive the enemy from a hill close to be known as Capitol Hill, where the en-
Oemyon, seven miles south of Kosong emy maintained outposts. On the night
on the east coast. The North Koreans of 5-6 August elements of the Capital
mounted a retaliatory attack on 10 July Division infiltrated and captured two of
against a nearby hill controlled by the the outposts. The response was imme-
ROK 5th Division and held it for four diate. Building up from a reinforced pla-
days before they were forced to with- toon to two companies, the Communists
draw.45 hurled their troops against the ROK's
In August the limited ground pressure manning the positions. For the next four
days control seesawed back and forth,
43
(1) Memo, J. Weckerling, G-2, for ACofS G-3, but the ROK 26th Regiment stubbornly
28 Jul 52, sub: Communist Capabilities and Prob- fought back and drove the enemy off.
able Courses of Action in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea,
64. (2) JSPOG Memo, 9 Aug 52, sub: To Obtain a On 10 August, the Communists broke
Military Victory in Korea . . . , in JSPOG Staff off the attack, having suffered casualties
Study No. 410. of 369 dead, an additional 450 estimated
44
(1) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, Narrative.
(2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, p. 22.
45 46
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, pp. 22-23. Ibid., Aug 52, an. 4, G-3 sec., p. 2.
298 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

A SOUTH KOREAN MORTAR EMPLACEMENT ON CAPITOL HILL

dead, and 190 wounded. The ROK 26th ment to retake the hill on 9 September.
Regiment lost 48 killed and 150 Up to three enemy companies sought to
wounded during the action and won a fight their way back to the top at a time,
commendation from Van Fleet for its but the ROK units refused to be dis-
courageous defense.47 lodged again.48
While the negotiators at Panmunjom Two miles west of Capitol Hill lay a
were meeting once a week in August long, finger-shaped ridge, which unsur-
and the Korean rainy season continued, prisingly soon came to be known as
activity along the front eased. Then in Finger Ridge. Held as an outpost by the
early September the weather improved Cavalry Regiment of the Capital Divi-
and the Chinese hit Capitol Hill again. sion, the position was overrun by the
They gained possession of the crest tem- enemy on 6 September—the same day it
porarily until the ROK 26th Regiment launched its assault on Capitol Hill. The
joined forces with the ROK 1st Regi- Cavalry Regiment struck back, but had
to withdraw as the enemy increased his
47
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, sec. I,
48
Narrative, p. 72. Ibid., Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 71-72.
STALEMATE 299

defending forces. Up the hill, down the around KELLY were the 2d and 3d Bat-
hill went friendly and hostile forces as talions, 348th Regiment, 116th Division,
they wrestled for control during the rest CCF 39th Army. There had been an
of September and well into October. increase in the number and aggressive-
By mid-October, Finger Ridge was once ness of enemy patrols in the entire 65th
more in the hands of the Capital Divi- Regiment sector during September and
sion.49 also an increase in the frequency of
After the heavy rains of August came enemy mortar fire. These signs usually
to an end, the Chinese renewed the Bat- heralded an impending enemy attack.
tle of Bunker Hill (Hill 122) in the 1st On the night of 17 September an esti-
Marine Division sector. On 5 September mated enemy company from the 2d
the Marine positions were first subjected Battalion, 348th Regiment, probed Out-
to a heavy artillery concentration and post KELLY'S defenses. When C Com-
then to an assault by an enemy battalion. pany requested reinforcements to fight
For two hours the contest for the heights off this probe, Col. Juan C. Cordero,
swung back and forth, but the marines commanding officer of the 65th, ordered
would not give in. Finally the Chinese B Company to relieve its sister company
began to disengage. Over the next ten on KELLY. B Company took over KELLY
days the enemy sent a number of raids and passed to the operational control of
and harassing expeditions against the 2d Battalion commander, Lt. Col.
Bunker Hill with the marines success- Carlos Betances-Ramirez, early in the
fully defending their outposts on each morning of 18 September.
occasion.50 The enemy mortar fire on KELLY con-
The Chinese probing for soft spots in tinued throughout the day and 1st Lt.
the UNC lines continued in mid-Septem- William F. Nelson, B Company com-
ber. In the U.S. 3d Infantry Division mander, in the early evening requested
sector of the JAMESTOWN line there were that the artillery supporting his position
a series of outposts manned by forces be prepared to fire variable time fuze
varying from a squad to a company in shells in the event of an enemy attack.
strength on the low-lying hills in front Less than an hour after his request an
of the main line of resistance. One of estimated two companies from the 2d
these was Outpost KELLY, situated three Battalion, 348th Regiment, attacked the
miles south of Kyeho-dong and about outpost from the southwest, northwest,
one mile west of the double horseshoe and northeast. The northeast attack
bend of the Imjin River. On 17 Septem- evidently surprised Lieutenant Nelson
ber C Company, under the operational and his men, for the Chinese swept across
control of the 2d Battalion, 65th Infan- the hill and took the B Company ma-
try, defended KELLY.51 chine gun position on the northwest
Facing the 65th Regiment in the area corner of the hill from the rear. Killing
49
(1) Ibid., Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 73-74. the gunner, the enemy advanced along
(2) Ibid., Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 59-60. the trenches and closed in hand-to-hand
50
Ibid., Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 71. combat. The sergeant in charge of the
51
The following account is based upon: (1) 65th
Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Staff Sec Jnls and Bn Jnl's, machine gun position managed to escape
Sep 52; (2) 3d Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Sep 52. after he sustained arm injuries in the
300 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

fight. Communications between KELLY second was still on the porters' trail mov-
and battalion headquarters were cut off ing forward slowly. The Chinese, how-
and the situation was very confused by ever, had no intention of surrendering
midnight, but reports of Chinese herding possession of KELLY for they quickly sent
American prisoners down the slopes of reinforcements to bolster their defend-
KELLY indicated that the position had ing forces. Lieutenant Gensemer's pla-
been lost. There were also reports that toon began to take casualties from the
some of the Chinese were wearing U.S. small arms, machine gun, and mortar
uniforms, but it was not clear whether fire, and the second platoon was forced
the enemy had donned the American to fall back as it encountered similar
clothes before or after the attack. enemy opposition on its way to the crest.
To find out whether the enemy in- Faced with the Chinese determination
tended to occupy the outpost, the regi- to hang on to the outpost and the mount-
mental intelligence officer ordered the ing casualty list, the two platoons with-
2d Battalion to send a platoon as quickly drew to the main line of resistance.52
as possible from E Company to recon- In the meantime, the 1st Battalion,
noiter the hill. The patrol cleared the commanded by Maj. Albert C. Davies,
main line of resistance shortly before prepared to counterattack through the
daylight on the 19th, but soon ran into 2d Battalion's positions. During the eve-
machine gun and rifle grenade fire as it ning of 20 September, A Company,
advanced up the hill. under 1st Lt. St. Clair Streett, Jr., moved
Convinced that the Chinese planned forward to take up the attack from the
to remain, Colonel Cordero made an as- south and C Company, under 1st Lt.
sessment of the situation. The heavy Robert E. Stevens, advanced to the base
mortar fire and the attack that had fol- of the hill on which KELLY was located.
lowed had badly depleted B Company, The enemy mortar and artillery became
although there might be some remnants very heavy as the men crossed the valley
of the company still on the hill. He floor en route to the hill approaches.
assumed that the enemy now held the As the two companies began their as-
position with small arms, light machine cent, B Company moved forward toward
guns, and light mortars. There was a the outpost line to support the attack.
waist-deep, circular trench that ringed Mortar fire came in swiftly and with
the military crest of the hill completely deadly effect as casualties cut the
and four bunkers. At the base of the strength of B Company to twenty-six
hill, on the approaches, the Chinese had men and forced the cancellation of the
established combat outposts of squad company mission.
size. The Chinese small arms, machine gun,
Colonel Betances, the 2d Battalion and mortar fire was also taking its toll of
commander, ordered two platoons from A and C Companies. In addition, the
E Company to advance on KELLY on the Chinese used time-fuzed artillery fire as
morning of 20 September. By late after- the 1st Battalion troops edged their way
noon one platoon under the company
commander, 1st Lt. Harold L. Gense- 52
E Company reported 33 casualties when it
mer, had fought its way to the top. The closed at the assembly area.
STALEMATE 301

to the top. The airbursts over the heads English, would attack from the east and
of A and C Company were demoralizing L Company, under 1st Lt. Frederick Bo-
and caused panic. Lieutenant Streett gell, would come in from the west. 1st
had to fall back and reorganize A Com- Lt. Ben W. Alpuerto's I Company would
pany, while Lieutenant Stevens clung to be the reserve.
a finger of the hill with two platoons. At 0520 on 24 September the 105-mm.
The forces under Streett and Stevens to- howitzers of the 58th Field Artillery Bat-
taled about 60 men each at this juncture, talion, commanded by Lt. Col. Mario
while the enemy had an estimated 100 DeMaio, opened up on the Chinese posi-
men on the hill and was reinforcing tions on and around KELLY for thirty
freely. minutes. Meanwhile a platoon of tanks
A UNC artillery barrage pounded the from the 64th Tank Battalion rumbled
Chinese positions on KELLY early in the into position to support the 3d Battalion
morning of 21 September. But when attack. Artillery and tanks sent 25,000
the remnants of A and C Companies rounds against the Chinese in support of
tried to close in on the Chinese positions, the attack. K and L Companies were in
the enemy again met them with small their attack positions by 0540 and
arms and hand grenades. Two squads launched their assault half an hour later.
from C Company almost reached the As Captain English and his K Company
crest of KELLY shortly before noon only troops approached KELLY, the Chinese
to receive mortar concentrations that opened up with intense small arms, ma-
forced them to fall back to the trenches. chine gun, artillery, and mortar fire and
No sooner had the enemy mortar fire soon had K Company pinned down. The
ceased when the Chinese counter- heavy enemy concentration of firepower
attacked and forced C Company to pull and the growing list of casualties led to
out completely. In the early afternoon panic and confusion in the company.
Major Davies ordered A, B, and C Com- With control of the company disinte-
panies to return to their company areas. grating and the casualties mounting,
They had suffered over seventy casualties English asked for permission to pull back
in the fight for KELLY. That night the and reorganize. Colonel Cordero at 0700
1st Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion ordered that this request be denied
and the action around KELLY slowed and that the company continue its
down for several days. attack. Shortly thereafter contact with
As the 3d Battalion took over respon- K Company was lost. The artillery for-
sibility for the 1st Battalion positions, ward observer managed to hold together
Lt. Col. Lloyd E. Wills, who had assumed ten men from the company, however,
command of the 3d Battalion on 20 Sep- and Colonel Wills, the battalion com-
tember, and his staff, drew up an attack mander, instructed him to continue the
plan to recapture KELLY. Since the prev- attack on KELLY with his small force.
ious efforts by forces ranging from one On the western slopes of KELLY, L
to four platoons had failed to dislodge Company assaulted the Chinese positions
the enemy, Colonel Wills received ap- at 0635 hours. Despite heavy mortar fire,
proval to use his three rifle companies. one squad reached the top at 0720 and
K Company, under Capt. William C. quickly asked for tank fire. Clinging to
302 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the trenches on the south slope of KELLY, bat. General Dasher told Wills to cease
the L Company squad was unable to to attack and to continue the reorganiza-
move forward against the stubborn en- tion of the battalion, which had suffered
emy resistance. Chinese artillery and 141 casualties in the action. By early af-
mortar fire continued to be very heavy. ternoon the squads from L Company had
Since contact with K Company had been withdrawn and the stragglers re-
not been regained by 0800 hours, Colo- assembled. But the division commander,
nel Cordero ordered I Company to move Maj. Gen. Robert L. Dulaney, decided
to the rear of Hill 105, 800 yards east that the battalion and the regiment
of KELLY, and to prepare to take over should not resume the battle for KELLY.
K Company's zone. Lieutenant Alpuerto The 3d Battalion went into reserve posi-
moved his men toward Hill 105, but the tions on the night of 24 September and
enemy artillery zeroed in on the com- the 65th Regiment confined itself to rou-
pany and scored several direct hits. The tine patrolling until the ROK 1st
men began to scatter and drift back to Division relieved the 3d Division on 30
the main line of resistance. Colonel September.
Wills sent his S-3, Capt. Paul O. Engle, During the action between 17 and 24
to help reorganize the company, since September for KELLY and the surround-
contact with Lieutenant Alpuerto had ing outposts, the 65th Regiment suffered
been lost after the enemy artillery con- casualties of approximately 350 men, or
centrations had begun. Colonel Wills almost 10 percent of its actual strength.
left at 0900 hours to take over the re- Yet the casualties alone do not serve to
organization of both I and K Company explain the weaknesses that arose when
stragglers as they returned to the main the regiment went on the offense. Colo-
line of resistance without weapons or nel Cordero in his command report for
equipment. the month attributed the poor perform-
With only the remnants of L Com- ance of his combat units to the rotation
pany still on KELLY, and the other two program.
companies depleted and demoralized, the During the nine-month period Jan-
situation appeared grim. The two uary—September 1952, Colonel Cordero
squads from L Company hung on to one stated, the regiment had rotated almost
of the trenches on the south slope and 8,700 men, including close to 1,500 non-
at 0920 hours Colonel Cordero ordered commissioned officers. Only 435 non-
them to stay there at all costs. commissioned officers had been received
When Colonel Wills finally regained to replace the losses, and company com-
contact with Lieutenant Alpuerto at manders had been forced to assign in-
1000 hours, I Company had reorganized experienced privates first class and pri-
and had two platoons intact; the remain- vates to key positions in many rifle pla-
der of the company's whereabouts was toons. Out of an authorized strength of
unknown. Colonel Wills telephoned the 811 noncommissioned officers in the
assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. upper three grades, the 65th Regiment
Charles L. Dasher, Jr., and informed had only 381 and many of the latter had
him that the battalion had approxi- been developed from recent replace-
mately two platoons available for com- ments. The lack of experienced platoon
STALEMATE 303

sergeants and corporals had affected the The Battle for White Horse
combat efficiency of the regiment, Colo-
nel Cordero went on, despite the high Communist activity along the front
esprit de corps shown by the many increased in the early fall of 1952 as the
Puerto Rican members of the regiment. enemy sought to improve his defensive
In many cases, as soon as the company positions before the onset of winter. The
and platoon leaders became casualties, fight for Outpost KELLY was but one of
the inexperience and lack of depth at several contests for hill positions waged
the combat company level became read- by the Eighth Army. Perhaps one of
ily apparent. There was a failure to the most dramatic came in early October
sustain the momentum of the attack and in the U.S. IX Corps sector west of
a tendency to become confused and dis- Ch'orwon.
organized after the leaders became cas- On 3 October the Eighth Army
ualties. Colonel Cordero recommended learned through interrogation of a Chi-
that his regiment be provided with a nese deserter that the enemy proposed
monthly quota of 400 replacements in- to attack White Horse Hill (Hill 395),
cluding a fair proportion of the upper which was five miles northwest of Ch'or-
three grades so that he could remedy won on the ROK 9th Division front.
this basic weakness.53 White Horse was the crest of a forested
Although Colonel Cordero did not hill mass that extended in a northwest-
mention the language barrier, it should southeast direction for about two miles.
not be overlooked that the great majority Overlooking the Yokkok-ch'on Valley, it
of enlisted men in the regiment spoke dominated the western approaches to
only Spanish, creating a problem of com- Ch'orwon. (Map 5) Loss of the hill
munication between the continental would force the IX Corps to withdraw
English-speaking officers and the enlisted to the high ground south of the Yokkok-
men from Puerto Rico. ch'on in the Ch'orwon area, would deny
On the other side of the coin had been the IX Corps use of the Ch'orwon road
the determination and skill with which net, and would open up the entire Ch'or-
the Chinese 348th Regiment had de- won area to enemy attack and penetra-
fended Outpost KELLY. The enemy had tion.55
used his artillery, mortars, automatic Since other intelligence sources sup-
weapons, and small arms fire extremely ported the prisoner's story, IX Corps
effectively and had sent in reinforce- reinforced the ROK 9th Division, under
ments liberally to blunt and turn back Maj. Gen. Kim Jong Oh, with additional
the 65th Regiment's attacks. Thus, the tanks, artillery, rocket launchers, and an-
failure of the 65th Regiment to take tiaircraft weapons to be used in a ground
KELLY could be attributed both to its
personnel weaknesses and the enemy's 55
Unless otherwise specified, the account of the
strong performance and skill in using White Horse action is based upon the following
his weapons.54 sources: (1) Hq IX U.S. Corps, Special After Ac-
53
tion Rpt, Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain), 6-15
65thInf Regt, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. VI. Oct 52; (2) Hq IX U.S. Corps, Comd, Rpt, Oct 52,
bk. I; (3) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 52,
54
U.S. 3d Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, an. 1. sec. I, Narrative.
STALEMATE 305

role. General Kim stationed two bat- CCF 38th Army, moved up to the north-
talions of infantry on the threatened hill west end of the White Horse Hill com-
and held a regiment plus a battalion in plex. After heavy artillery and mortar
ready reserve. On the flanks of White fire upon the ROK 9th Division posi-
Horse he positioned the tanks and anti- tions on the heights, the Chinese tried
aircraft guns to cover the valley ap- three times to penetrate the ROK de-
proaches. Searchlights and flares were fenses. Each time they were hurled
distributed to provide illumination at back by troops of the ROK 30th Regi-
night and a flare plane was made avail- ment, suffering an estimated 1,500
able to supply additional light on call casualties the first night as against only
during the hours of darkness. From the 300 for the defenders. Notwithstanding
Fifth Air Force came extra air strikes the heavy losses, the Chinese committed
against enemy artillery positions adja- the remnants of the original two battal-
cent to White Horse. As the hour of the ions and reinforced them with two fresh
attack approached, the ROK 9th and its battalions from the same division the
attached units were well prepared. following day. Cutting off a ROK com-
Just before the Chinese began their pany outpost, the Chinese pressed on
advance on White Horse on 6 October, and forced the elements of the ROK
they opened the floodgates of the Pong- 30th Regiment to withdraw from the
nae-Ho Reservoir, which was located crest. Less than two hours after the loss
about seven miles north of the objective, of the peak, two battalions of the ROK
evidently in the hope that the Yokkok- 28th Regiment mounted a night attack
ch'on which ran between the ROK 9th that swept the enemy out of the old ROK
and the U.S. 2d Division would rise positions. Again the enemy losses were
sufficiently to block reinforcement dur- heavy and a Chinese prisoner later re-
ing the critical period. Although the lated that many of the companies com-
water level rose several feet, at no time mitted to the attack were reduced to less
did it present a tactical obstacle. But the than twenty men after the second day
Chinese did not rely upon nature alone. of fighting.
They threw a battalion-sized force at By the third day Chinese diversionary
Hill 281 (Arrowhead), two miles south- attacks elsewhere along the corps front
east of White Horse across the valley, decreased and the main enemy effort
to pin down the French Battalion astride concentrated on Hill 395. Chinese artil-
the hill and to keep the 2d Division lery and mortar fire averaged 4,500
occupied. Before the night was over six rounds a day in support of the infantry
additional companies joined in the ac- assaults, and the enemy continued to
tion. The French held firm and inflicted assemble fresh troops to renew the bat-
heavy casualties upon the attackers. Two tle. On 8 October two battalions from
later assaults on 9 and 12 October met the 334th Regiment, 112th Division, and
with similar responses. As a diversion to one from the 342d Regiment, 114th Di-
the main attack on White Horse, Hill vision, relieved the depleted Chinese
281 proved effective but expensive. forces around White Horse. Elements of
In the meantime, two battalions of the 542d fought their way to the crest
the 340th Regiment, 114th Division, during the afternoon, only to lose it to a
306 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ROK 28th Regiment counterattack that Leapfrogging the battalions of the lead-
night. ing regiment and substituting attack reg-
Nothing daunted, the Chinese com- iments from time to time, the ROK 9th
mitted another battalion to the attack Division began to inflict extremely large
on the following day. General Kim, the casualties on the enemy. By 15 October
ROK 9th Division commander, moved the battle for White Horse was over.
two battalions of his 29th Regiment over Although the Chinese had used a force
to Hill 395 to help the 28th Regiment. estimated at 15,000 infantry and 8,000
Throughout the day the battle seesawed supporting troops during the ten-day
as first one side controlled the peak, then contest, they had failed to budge the
the other. Early on 10 October, the 29th ROK 9th Division. Despite ROK losses
Regiment reported that it was in pos- of over 3,500 soldiers during the nine
session of the crest. ROK and twenty-eight Communist at-
The UNC forces apparently were for- tacks, the 9th Division and its supporting
tunate on 9 October, for a Chinese pris- troops had exacted a heavy toll from the
oner later related that Fifth Air Force Chinese 38th Army. Seven of the 38th
planes had caught elements of the 335th Army's nine regiments had been com-
Regiment, 112th Division, in an assem- mitted to the White Horse and Hill 281
bly area north of Hill 395, had inflicted battles and taken close to 10,000 casual-
heavy casualties upon the regiment, and ties.
had delayed its commitment to the at- Throughout the fight, the timely in-
tack. jection of fresh troops by General Kim
By 10 October the pattern of the fight- on both offense and defense had sparked
ing was well established. Regardless of the ROK effort. The ROK units had
casualties, the enemy continued to send withstood the determined drive of the
masses of infantry to take the objective. Chinese infantry and taken over 55,000
Evidently, once given a mission, Com- rounds of enemy artillery during the
munist commanders adhered to it de- battle. The performance of the ROK
spite their losses. On White Horse, the 9th Division under fire provided an ex-
Chinese kept funneling their combat cellent testimonial to the type of leader-
troops into the northern attack ap- ship, skill, and experience that the ROK
proaches where Eighth Army artillery, Army was capable of developing and
tanks, and air power could wreak havoc. won high praise from Van Fleet.56
The enemy's determination to win The ROK 9th Division received out-
White Horse made sitting ducks out of standing support from the air, armor,
the Chinese infantry as the IX Corps and artillery units that backed up the
defenders saturated the all-out assaults division. During the daylight hours, the
with massed firepower of every caliber. Fifth Air Force had dispatched 669 sor-
On 12 October there was a break in ties and another 76 sorties had been sent
the bitter struggle. The 30th ROK Reg- out on night bombing missions. In ten
iment passed through the dug-in 29th days the tactical air support had dropped
Regiment and counterattacked. In the 56
Msg, GX 30376 KGO-O, CG EUSAK to
morning the 28th Regiment moved up CINCUNC, 28 Oct 52, in IX U.S. Corps, Comd
through the 30th and pressed the assault. Rpt, Oct 52, G-3 sec., bk. V, tab 13.
STALEMATE 307

over 2,700 general-purpose bombs and when enemy counterattacks regained


358 napalm bombs and launched over possession of the hill for the next two
750 5-inch rockets at enemy concentra- days. On 23 October, after a bitter hand-
tions and positions. From IX Corps to-hand encounter, elements of the
artillery alone, 185,000 rounds of artil- ROK 51st Regiment drove the Chinese
lery ammunition had been hurled at off again, repulsed a counterattack, then
the Chinese. Tanks and antiaircraft withdrew. On the following night the
quad-50's had protected the flanks of 65th Infantry Regiment relieved the
the hills and prevented the enemy from ROK 51st on the line.58
dispersing its attacks. At White Horse, Since the unsuccessful battle for Out-
prebattle preparation, made possible by post KELLY the 65th Regiment had been
effective intelligence, added to well- undergoing a vigorous program of train-
trained troops, skillfully employed, and ing under a new commander, Col. Ches-
backed by co-ordinated air, armor, and ter B. De Gavre. Two weeks of intensive
artillery support, demonstrated what training, however, could not remedy the
might be accomplished on defense. basic weakness of the regiment—the lack
White Horse seemed a prime example of experienced noncommissioned offi-
of the kind of action that General Clark cers at the infantry platoon level—but
had argued for earlier in the summer. the unit was again assigned to assume
responsibility for a portion of the main
Jackson Heights line of resistance.59
On the night of 24-25 October, G
In addition to the diversionary attack Company, under Capt. George D. Jack-
on Hill 281, the Chinese had attempted son, took over the defense of the high
to disperse the ROK 9th Division forces ground immediately south of Hill
by threatening the ROK outpost posi- 391.60 Jackson Heights, as it was soon to
tions on Hill 391 almost seven miles be called, had enough bunkers to house
northeast of White Horse Mountain on the command posts of the three rifle pla-
the eastern divisional front. Sporadic toons, the company headquarters, and
and indecisive fighting continued from the forward artillery observer, but none
6 to 12 October when the enemy made of these was adequate for fighting off
a serious effort to storm the hill. After an attack. Captain Jackson's plans for
the ROK units pulled back, a reinforced improving his defenses had little chance
company from the U.S. 7th Division at- for early success, since the Chinese artil-
tempted in vain on 13 October to regain lery and mortar fire upon the heights
the lost positions.57 was accurate and the enemy had excel-
Once the White Horse issue was set- lent observation of the G Company
tled, the ROK 9th Division sent a bat-
talion from the 28th Regiment to clear 58
Hill 391 on 16 October. The battalion lbid., p. 22.
59
The following account of the action at Jackson
won through to the crest and was able Heights is based on: (1) 65th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt
to maintain control until 20 October, and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (2) 3d Inf Div, Comd
Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52.
60
Stars and Stripes named the hill after Captain
57
U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, bk. I, p. 21. Jackson.
308 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

movements from the surrounding hills. Chinese pulled back, taking an estimated
Facing the company were elements of 17 casualties with them.
the 3d Battalion, 87th Regiment, 29th The next eight hours were relatively
Division, CCF 15th Army. The 87th quiet. Then, about 0930 hours on 27
Regiment was commanded by Hwueh October, the 76-mm. guns on Camel
Yiang-hua. On the afternoon of the 25th Back Hill opened up again. One enemy
the artillery supporting the 87th Regi- round scored a direct hit on the mortar
ment began to send direct 76-mm. gun- ammunition supply and blew up all but
fire against the Jackson Heights positions some 150 rounds. By nightfall the Chi-
from Camel Back Hill, 2,800 yards to nese firepower had reduced the mortar
the northwest. Enemy 82-mm. and 120- platoon to two mortars and seven men
mm. mortars followed and by dusk G and the second platoon had lost both its
Company had received 250 rounds of platoon leader and sergeant. Captain
mortar and artillery fire and suffered 9 Jackson reported to 2d Battalion that
casualties. he needed aid for his wounded and
During the night the enemy sent out wanted smoke laid about the heights to
patrols that probed G Company's dis- obstruct the enemy's ability to pinpoint
positions and continued to send harass- the company's movements. He was told
ing artillery and mortar fire onto Jackson to be calm, that smoke and aid were on
Heights. Captain Jackson used his own the way.
60-mm. mortars and supporting mortar So were the Chinese. An hour after
and artillery fire to break up the Chinese Jackson called, they loosed a heavy con-
probes. centration of artillery and mortar fire on
Late in the afternoon of 26 October G Company's positions and then sent an
the enemy sent over 260 rounds of direct estimated company in from the north.
76-mm. gunfire from Camel Back Hill Using the remaining mortars, automatic
and caused 14 more casualties. From weapons, small arms, and hand grenades,
the company listening posts that night Captain Jackson and his men beat off
came frequent reports of the enemy this attack.
moving about and digging in. Two Chi- The second enemy assault of the eve-
nese approached within hand grenade ning came after the Chinese artillery and
range of one of the listening posts on mortar crews had fired an estimated
the southwest flank. The men at the 1,000 rounds at Jackson Heights within
post were given permission to use gre- half an hour. One estimated Chinese
nades against the interlopers. As the company struck from the north and a
two men hastily withdrew, mortar fire second from the south. Jackson called
was called in to speed their departure. for final defensive fire on the area until
An enemy platoon probed the north- the situation clarified. His ammunition
ern approach to Jackson Heights shortly dump had been hit again and the enemy
after midnight, then fell back under in- attack had fanned out and become gen-
terdicting artillery and mortar fire. An- eral on all sides.
other platoon advanced from the north At this point the company communi-
an hour later and closed to hand grenade cations sergeant evidently reported that
range. After a 15-minute fire fight, the there were only three men left in the
STALEMATE 309

platoon in his area and asked battalion by 1000 hours. In the meantime, progress
for permission to withdraw. Whether by Lieutenant Porterfield's A Company
the sergeant acted on his own or not was had been slowed down by artillery and
unclear, but Colonel Betances, the bat- mortar fire. Despite the enemy fire, two
talion commander, assumed that the re- platoons pushed on and joined F Com-
quest was from the company commander pany on the heights; the remaining pla-
and ordered G Company to withdraw. toon was pinned down by mortar fire at
When Captain Jackson learned of the the base of the hill.
withdrawal order, he attempted to verify The operation seemed to be well in
it, but the communications lines were hand, until the Chinese artillery put all
out and radio contact proved unsatisfac- of A Company's officers on the hill out of
tory. action. One platoon leader was killed by
At any rate, Captain Jackson passed a direct hit and then a shell landed in
the order to withdraw back to his platoon the middle of the company command
leaders. The first and second platoons post killing Lieutenant Porterfield and
went down the east side of the heights the forward observer and wounding the
and Captain Jackson went with the third one remaining platoon leader. The loss
platoon down the western slope. His of leadership became immediately ap-
platoon ran into heavy enemy small arms parent, for enlisted men in both A and
fire on the way and he was separated F Companies began to "bug out." Slip-
from his men during the action, finally ping away from the heights alone or in
rejoining them on the trail back to the groups, the men drifted back toward the
main line of resistance. main line of resistance. By late after-
When Colonel De Gavre learned of noon only Captain Cronkhite and his
G Company's withdrawal, he quickly or- company officers remained on the hill;
dered that A Company, commanded by all of his men had left along with those
1st Lt. John D. Porterfield, be placed of A Company.
under the operational control of Colonel Efforts by the 2d Battalion to round
Betances for a counterattack to regain up the stragglers and send them back to
Jackson Heights. A Company was to be Jackson Heights met with no success.
used for the attack phase only and F The men by this time evidently regarded
Company, commanded by Capt. Willis the hill as a suicide post and refused to
D. Cronkhite, Jr., would take part in the return. When night fell, Colonel Be-
attack and then would man the outpost. tances ordered Captain Cronkhite and
C Company, under Lieutenant Stevens, his fellow officers to withdraw from the
would prepare to pass to the operational hill.
control of the 2d Battalion, if it were On the following day the 65th Regi-
necessary to back up the attack. ment made one more effort to take Jack-
As daylight broke on the 28th, Captain son Heights. Colonel De Gavre put
Cronkhite led F Company toward Jack- Major Davies, the 1st Battalion com-
son Heights. The Chinese platoon de- mander, in charge of the operation.
fending the hill resisted with small arms, Davies sent C Company, under Lieuten-
automatic weapons, and hand grenades, ant Stevens, to Jackson Heights in the
but F Company won control of the crest morning of 29 October. The company
310 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

moved up and took possession of the hill assignment of the excess Puerto Ricans
without encountering any enemy resist- to other infantry units.63
ance. Again all seemed well. The en- At any rate, the U.S. 15th Regiment
emy artillery was quiet and no counter- took over the defensive positions of the
attack developed. Suddenly fear set in 65th in late October. Outposts set up on
and the enlisted men left en masse. Jackson Heights were subjected to fre-
Lieutenant Stevens and his fellow officers quent probes by the enemy throughout
found themselves alone with a handful the first half of November. By the mid-
of men.61 Once more the stragglers were dle of the month only a couple of out-
gathered together and ordered back up posts at the base of Jackson Heights
the hill and over 50 refused. Major Da- remained in the possession of the 3d Di-
vies finally recalled Lieutenant Stevens vision. Although the Chinese exerted
and his little group to the main line of considerable pressure upon the outposts
resistance. during the remainder of November and
This proved to be the last attempt of overran them several times, elements of
the 65th Regiment to take Jackson the 15th Regiment managed to maintain
Heights. Maj. Gen. George W. Smythe, their precarious positions at the end of
the division commander, ordered the the month.64
15th Infantry Regiment to take over
responsibility for the 65th's sector begin- Operation SHOWDOWN
ning that same night.62 In November the
65th Regiment returned to an intensive As the indications that the Commu-
training program. General Smythe re- nists were seizing the initiative on the
quested that a combat-trained regiment ground became more apparent in late
be either assigned permanently or for at September and early October, General
least four months while the 65th Regi- Van Fleet grew concerned. In his letter
ment underwent its retraining. If of 5 October to Clark urging the ap-
neither of these alternatives were possi- proval of a limited objective attack on
ble, Smythe went on, he favored the the U.S. IX Corps front, he commented:
reconstitution of the regiment with 60- "It is extremely desirable that we take
percent continental personnel and the the initiative by small offensive actions,
which will put the enemy on the defen-
61 sive in order to reverse the present situ-
Colonel De Gavre suggested later that the pres-
ence of many dead bodies on the hill and the lack ation. Our present course of defensive
of good NCO's to counteract the fear may have
63
been responsible for the "bug out." See 65th In- Ibid., Nov 52, an. 1. The 65th did not return
fantry Regiment, Command Report, October 1952. to the line until 22 December when it took over the
62
This was not the end of the affair, however, 15th Regiment's sector for a few days before the re-
for during November and December, the only re- lief of the 3d Division by the ROK 2d Division. In
maining officer of A Company, twenty-nine mem- early 1953 the bulk of the Puerto Rican personnel
bers of F Company, and thirty-eight members of C were transferred to other Eighth Army units and
Company were charged and the majority were tried integrated. Some 250 Puerto Ricans remained with
at general courts-martial. The officer received a sen- the regiment and were integrated with the new
tence of 5 years and the men tried received sentences replacements. See 3d Infantry Division, Command
varying from 6 months to 13 years for their con- Reports, November 1952-April 1953.
64
duct during the operation. 65th Inf Regt, Comd U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, bk. I, pp.
Rpt, Nov, Dec 52. 17-19.
STALEMATE 311

action in the face of the enemy initiative artillery mounting some 280 guns, and
is resulting in the highest casualties since over 200 fighter-bomber sorties in sup-
the heavy fighting of October and No- port, the infantry was not expected to
vember 1951." 65 encounter serious obstacles.67 At any
To offset this trend, Van Fleet recom- rate, Clark approved SHOWDOWN on 8
mended the adoption of the IX Corps October, but cautioned Van Fleet to give
plan, called SHOWDOWN, that was de- the operation only routine press cover-
signed to improve the corps defense lines age and to stress the tactical considera-
north of Kumhwa. Less than three miles tions arguing for the seizure of the hills.68
north of this city, Van Fleet pointed out, Efforts to treat SHOWDOWN as a routine
IX Corps and enemy troops manned po- operation were doomed from the start
sitions that were but 200 yards apart. On by the Chinese. Although the five days
Hill 598 and Sniper Ridge, which ran of preparatory air strikes had to be re-
northwest to southeast a little over a duced to two because of the demands of
mile northeast of Hill 598, the opposing White Horse Hill and because the artil-
forces looked down each other's throats lery support also had to be curtailed, the
and casualties were correspondingly Chinese were ready for the attack and
high. If the enemy could be pushed off soon demonstrated that they intended to
these hills, Van Fleet went on, he would hold on to the Hill 598-Sniper Ridge
have to fall back 1,250 yards to the next complex.
defensive position. Counting on maxi- Hill 598, the objective of the Ameri-
mum firepower, consistent with ammu- can troops, was V-shaped with its apex
nition allowances, and maximum close at the south. (Map 6) At the left ex-
air support, the Eighth Army com- tremity of the V lay Pike's Peak and on
mander was optimistic about the possi- the right arm were two smaller hills
bilities of SHOWDOWN.66 christened Jane Russell Hill and Sandy
Although Clark had voiced his opposi- Ridge, from north to south. The resem-
tion to hill-taking expeditions in the blance of the Hill 598 complex to a
past, he evidently decided that SHOW- triangle soon led to the designation of
DOWN offered a better than average the area as Triangle Hill. On 14 Octo-
chance for winning its objectives without ber 1952 the hill mass was defended by a
excessive casualties. If all went accord- battalion of the 135th Regiment, 45th
ing to plan, two battalions, one from the Division, CCF 15th Army, one of the
U.S. 7th Division and the other from the Chinese elite armies. As usual, the en-
ROK 2d Division, would be sufficient to emy was well dug in, had adequate am-
accomplish the mission. The field com- munition supplies, and defiladed rein-
manders estimated that the operation forcement routes.
would take five days and incur about 200 Maj. Gen. Wayne C. Smith, the 7th
casualties. With sixteen battalions of Division commander, assigned the mis-
65
Ltr, Van Fleet to Clark, 5 Oct 52, no sub, in
67
FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 78-
66
Ibid. SHOWDOWN was submitted by General 79.68
Jenkins, former Army G-3, who succeeded Lt. Gen. Msg, C 56547, Clark to CG Eighth Army, 8
Willard G. Wyman as corps commander on 9 Oct 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files,
August 1952. Oct 52.
312 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

D. Holmes, Jr.

MAP 6

sion of taking Triangle Hill to the 31st Myron McClure, and the mission of gain-
Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. ing possession of the left arm to the 3d
Lloyd R. Moses. Although the original Battalion, commanded by Maj. Robert
plan had called for the use of one bat- H. Newberry. The forces committed to
talion in the assault, Colonel Moses and the assault had doubled before the opera-
his staff estimated that enemy resistance tion began.69
would be greater than previously antici-
69
pated and that it would be impossible The account of the U.S. Army participation in
Operation SHOWDOWN is based upon the following
for one battalion commander to control sources: (1) 31st Inf Regt, After Action Rpt, Opn
all the forces operating in the entire SHOWDOWN; (2) 31st Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and
objective area. Thus, he assigned the Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (3) 32d Inf Regt, Comd
Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (4) 17th Inf Regt,
task of seizing the right arm of Triangle Comd Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (5) 7th Inf
Hill to his 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col. Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 52.
STALEMATE 313

After the air strikes and artillery prep- by the 1st Battalion, and then moved
arations had placed tons of explosives on southwest along the ridge line toward
Triangle Hill, Major Newberry sent the Hill 598. Since the Chinese were well
3d Battalion in a column of companies to dug in, I Company had to proceed slowly,
take the apex of the hill complex. L rooting the enemy out of the holes and
Company, commanded by 1st Lt. Ber- trenches. As night fell, Captain Stover's
nard T. Brooks, Jr., moved out first, fol- men began to meet with increasing artil-
lowed by K Company, under 1st Lt. lery and mortar fire. Enemy troops were
Charles L. Martin. In reserve, ready to spotted massing for a counterattack
assist either of its sister companies, was and Stover called for defensive fire.
I Company, commanded by Capt. Max Disregarding the artillery and mortar
R. Stover. concentrations laid down by the units
As Lieutenant Brooks led his company supporting the 3d Battalion, an esti-
out of the assault positions, he ran into mated two companies from the 135th
immediate trouble. From a strongpoint Regiment passed through the fire and
on Hill 598 the Chinese sent hand gre- hit I Company with small arms, auto-
nades, shaped charges, bangalore torpe- matic weapons, and grenades.
does, and rocks to disrupt L Company's The fierce enemy resistance and the
attack. In less than half an hour, Lieu- growing casualty list led to a consultation
tenant Brooks and all his platoon leaders between Colonel Moses and Major New-
became casualties and the remainder of berry early in the evening. They decided
the company was pinned down in a small to pull back all three rifle companies to
depression below the enemy strongpoint. the main line of resistance. By 2100
After the assault bogged down, Lieu- hours, the 3d Battalion had reassembled
tenant Martin moved K Company for- and taken up blocking positions.
ward. Securing tank fire to knock out On the 1st Battalion front, Colonel
the Chinese strongpoint that had domi- McClure selected A Company, rein-
nated the fight thus far, Martin rallied forced, under 1st Lt. Edward R. Sho-
L Company and got the men again mov- walter, Jr., to lead the attack against
ing ahead. Jane Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge. B
A few men from the two companies and C Companies, commanded by Capts.
managed to work their way into the William B. Young and Roy W. Preston,
outlying trenches on Hill 598, but the respectively, would be in reserve.
Chinese evidently had no intention of Part of the experience of the 3d Bat-
withdrawing from the crest. They talion was repeated as the 1st Battalion
hurled numerous hand grenades and attacked. An enemy strongpoint on Jane
liberally expended small arms ammu- Russell Hill quickly pinned down Lieu-
nition, shaped charges, and torpedoes to tenant Showalter's men with small arms
repel the 3d Battalion. and automatic weapons fire. Showalter
With the casualty list mounting and became an early casualty during the ac-
the attack again slowing down, Major tion and had to be evacuated. Colonel
Newberry committed I Company to the McClure had to commit B Company,
battle. Captain Stover took his men up then C Company, to reinforce the assault
Sandy Ridge, which had been captured and to get the troops moving forward
314 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

again. By early afternoon members of ment despite heavy casualties. The next
B and C Companies had fought their move was up to the 7th Division.
way to the crest of Jane Russell Hill and On 15 October General Smith com-
began to prepare defensive positions to mitted two fresh battalions to take Tri-
ward off the expected enemy counter- angle Hill. The 1st Battalion, 32d In-
attack. fantry Regiment, was placed under the
They were not disappointed. In a very operational control of the 31st Regiment
violent reaction to the loss of Jane Rus- and given the mission of taking Jane
sell Hill, the Chinese mounted four Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge. For the
counterattacks to regain possession. Each attack on Hill 598 Colonel Moses had
was preceded by heavy concentrations of his 2d Battalion, commanded by Maj.
artillery and mortar fire. By the end of Warren B. Phillips.
the third enemy assault, Colonel Mc- Major Phillips decided to use the same
Clure's men were in trouble, because plan employed by Major Newberry the
their supply of ammunition was running day before. The battalion would attack
low and the Korean supply carriers were in a column of companies, with E Com-
extremely reluctant to run the gauntlet pany leading off, followed by F and G
of enemy fire on the hill. Companies.
As a reinforced battalion from the After artillery and mortar preparatory
135th Regiment began the fourth coun- fire had been laid on the hill mass, 1st
terattack, a strange event occurred. The Lt. William C. Knapp led E Company
Chinese assault troops moved right toward the crest. Against light enemy
through both their own artillery and artillery and mortar fire, Knapp and his
mortar fire and the final protective fire men reached the outlying trenches and
called for by the 1st Battalion. With a started to clean out the bunkers and
disregard for their own safety that sug- strongpoints. They won possession of
gested to some observers of the battle Hill 598 without meeting strong resist-
that they might have been under the ance and then pushed on to the base of
influence of drugs, the Chinese closed in Pike's Peak where they found the Chi-
on the trenches in hand-to-hand combat. nese entrenched in deep caves and tun-
By this time the 1st Battalion had run nels capable of holding entire units.
out of ammunition and Colonel Moses In the meantime, Capt. Joseph V.
decided to pull his troops back to the Giesemann took F Company through E
main line of resistance. Carrying their Company positions on Hill 598 and ad-
casualties and as much equipment as they vanced along the northeast arm toward
could bring out, the remnants of the Sandy Ridge. G Company moved up to
three companies returned to the main the crest of Hill 598 to reinforce its sister
line shortly after midnight. companies in case of trouble and to help
At the end of the first day of fighting, prepare the defensive positions for Chi-
the Chinese had shown that they in- nese counterattacks.
tended to hold Triangle Hill and were Maj. Seymour L. Goldberg, the com-
willing to pay the costs. They had mander of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry
blunted and then repelled the two-battal- Regiment, also employed a column of
ion attack launched by the 31st Regi- companies against Jane Russell Hill. A
STALEMATE 315

Company, under 1st Lt. Rudolph M. take Pike's Peak. With the approach of
Tamez, spearheaded the attack, followed darkness on 16 October, the Chinese
by C Company, commanded by Capt. began a series of counterattacks on the
James E. Early. B Company, under 1st 2d Battalion positions abutting the peak.
Lt. John H. Green, was the reserve com- During one of these, the gallant com-
pany. mander of E Company, Lieutenant
The attack started auspiciously as A Knapp, lost his life. The 2d Battalion
Company, supported by elements of B fought off the Chinese attempts to dis-
Company, met only light resistance. As lodge it, but in turn could not budge
they neared the crest, a reinforced bat- the enemy from Pike's Peak on 17
talion from the 135th Regiment swept October.
down and counterattacked vigorously. The situation at this juncture found
The enemy assault forced the 1st Battal- Colonel Russ with three battalions atop
ion to withdraw and regroup. I Com- Triangle Hill. His own 1st Battalion
pany of the 31st Regiment was placed was on Hill 598; the 2d Battalion, 31st
under Major Goldberg's operational Regiment, was on the left arm facing
control. The 1st Battalion (+) then Pike's Peak; and the 2d Battalion ( - ) ,
joined the 2d Battalion, 31st Regiment, 17th Regiment, occupied Jane Russell
on Sandy Ridge to prepare for the enemy Hill. The Chinese, in the meantime,
counterattack. had committed the 134th Regiment,
Late on 15 October operational con- 45th Division, to the fight. They still
trol of the 3d Battalion, plus I Company, held the well-fortified Pike's Peak posi-
passed to the 32d Regiment, commanded tions.
by Col. Joseph R. Russ. Colonel Russ, On the afternoon of 17 October the
therefore, became responsible for the 3d Battalion, 17th Regiment, under Lt.
direction of the fight for Triangle Hill Col. James L. Spellman, relieved the 2d
at this point. Battalion, 31st Regiment, in place. At
Heavy artillery and mortar barrages the same time the 1st Battalion, 32d Reg-
were laid on the American positions on iment, was withdrawn from Triangle
Triangle during the night of 15-16 Oc- Hill. Colonel Russ, therefore, was in
tober, but the Chinese attacks were pla- operational control of two battalions of
toon size and repulsed without difficulty. the 17th Regiment as the fight entered
On the morning of 16 October Gen- its fifth day.
eral Smith approved the attachment of Colonel Spellman's battalion took the
the 2d Battalion (less F Company), 17th task of seizing the one remaining objec-
Regiment, to the 32d Regiment for an- tive—Pike's Peak—on 18 October. After
other assault upon Jane Russell Hill that heavy preparatory fires were laid on the
afternoon. Under Maj. Louis R. Buck- Chinese positions, L Company, under
ner, the 2d Battalion won possession of 1st Lt. William E. Cantrell, fought its
the hill without meeting serious opposi- way to the top and began to organize the
tion. defense. I Company, commanded by
On the left arm of Triangle Hill, how- Capt. Joseph H. Hoffman, passed
ever, the 2d Battalion, 31st Regiment, through L Company and tried to drive
had made no progress in its efforts to the Chinese, entrenched on the fingers,
316 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

off the hill. Again the Chinese showed stated simply, "complied with." 70 In any
that they would not be ousted and forced event, the Chinese pulled back to their
I Company to break off its attack. caves and tunnels on Pike's Peak.
During the early evening hours of 19 In the lull that followed, the 1st and
October two companies from the 134th 3d Battalions, 32d Regiment, relieved
Regiment stormed into Company L's the 17th Regiment's forces. On 22 Oc-
trenches and hand-to-hand combat en- tober the 2d Battalion, 32d Regiment,
sued. Prisoners later reported that they under Maj. John W. Szares, relieved the
had been ordered to fight to the death. 1st Battalion on the left arm of Tri-
Colonel Spellman quickly asked for a angle Hill. The 3d Battalion, com-
reinforcing company, since Lieutenant manded by Maj. Thomas W. Brown,
Cantrell, the company commander, had defended the right arm.
been hit and the enemy had rewon pos- On 23 October the action picked up
session of Pike's Peak. Platoons from M when the Chinese made another attempt
and H Companies, 17th Infantry, were in force to clear the 32d Regiment's
rushed up to the aid of L Company, forces from the hill complex. Shortly
which by this time had lost all of its after nightfall the Chinese artillery and
officers and was falling back southeast- mortar units opened up and pounded
ward toward Hill 598. To make matters the 32d Regiment's positions on Trian-
worse, artillery and mortar fire support- gle Hill for an hour. Then a force esti-
ing the 3d Battalion began to land mated at from three to six companies
uncomfortably close to the withdrawing from the CCF 45th Division advanced
troops and had to be lifted until the from Pike's Peak on F Company's de-
situation became more stable. fensive positions, using small arms, auto-
Two companies from the 1st Battalion, matic weapons, machine guns, and hand
32d Regiment, were dispatched by Colo- grenades as they closed in. For almost
nel Russ to succor the beleaguered 3d an hour an intense fire fight went on.
Battalion and all available artillery and Elements of G Company had to move up
mortar fire was directed against the left and reinforce F Company before the
arm of Triangle Hill to break up the Chinese attack faltered.
fierce enemy attack. The reinforcements Over at Jane Russell Hill an estimated
and the intense firepower finally slowed two Chinese companies had launched an
and then stopped the Chinese. About attack at the same time as the assault on
0600 on 20 October, Colonel Spellman the 2d Battalion. Only a slight penetra-
reported that some of the enemy troops tion was made in the 3d Battalion lines
were beginning to "bug out." He and this was quickly restored as rein-
asked that the heavy concentrations of forcements counterattacked.
artillery and mortar fire be continued on As the ROK 2d Division relieved the
the withdrawal routes to Pike's Peak. 7th Division on 25 October, the Chinese
As the "bug out" became general, Spell- still held Pike's Peak. Twelve days of
man requested regimental headquarters combat had involved 8 of the division's
to "hit Pike's Peak with everything we 9 infantry battalions and cost the division
have." A parenthetical note following 70
17th Inf Regt, Oct 52, 3d Bn Staff Jnl, 20
this entry in the 3d Battalion Journal Oct 52.
STALEMATE 317

over 2,000 casualties, mostly in these 8 night, when the Chinese usually at-
battalions. tacked, and arrive in time to reinforce
Many of the lessons in Operation the threatened positions. Finally, lead-
SHOWDOWN had been learned before in ership, especially by officers and men
the battles for other hills, General known to the attacking unit, was a key
Smith's report on the action revealed.71 factor in fighting the troops effectively.
The rehearsal of an operation over sim- Operation SHOWDOWN had an ironic
ilar terrain with all arms and services ending. The ROK 2d Division, which
participating so that each man and each had taken over the U.S. 7th Division's
unit would know their objectives was positions on 25 October, had engaged in
vitally important to the success of the a bitter and frustrating fight for Sniper
operation. The value of closing quickly Ridge. Attack and counterattack had
with the enemy and of keeping the at- followed as the Chinese and South Ko-
tack moving was also stressed by General reans had struggled for possession, but
Smith. If the attack leaders would not neither could win complete control of
allow the troops to become pinned down, the ridge. Thus, when the ROK 2d Di-
fewer casualties would result in the long vision assumed responsibility for Trian-
run. Once the men had won the objec- gle Hill, it was still engaged on Sniper
tive, General Smith went on, they must Ridge.
dig in quickly and provide adequate On 30 October three Chinese battal-
overhead cover for their defensive posi- ions swept the ROK defenders from the
tions. The enemy's ability to bring crest of Hill 598 and on 1 November the
heavy concentrations of artillery and enemy seized Jane Russell Hill after an
mortar fire quickly upon positions newly attack in force. The Chinese then beat
won from him and to counterattack off the ROK counterattacks until the
swiftly made rapid organizations of the mounting casualty lists caused the corps
defense and the setting up of overhead commander, General Jenkins, to suspend
cover mandatory. further attacks on Triangle Hill on 5
To keep his troops at the front fresh November.
and to prevent battle losses from seri- The Sniper Ridge battle continued
ously affecting morale, General Smith until 18 November when the ROK units
had rotated his battalions frequently took part of the ridge for the fourteenth
during the fight for Triangle Hill, much time since the initiation of SHOWDOWN.
as General Kim had done at White Horse At this point the Chinese pressure slack-
Mountain. He believed that the use of ened and the probes and light attacks
fresh forces had proved effective in win- against the ROK forces during the re-
ning most of the hill complex and in mainder of the month were repulsed.
repulsing the enemy counterattacks. Re- Thus, after six weeks of hard fighting,
serve forces must be kept close to the the UNC forces controlled a portion of
front in the difficult terrain of Korea, the Sniper Ridge and none of Triangle Hill.
7th Division commander noted, since The original two-battalion attack lasting
they could not travel long distances at five days and costing 200 casualties had
drawn in over two divisions and cost over
71
See 7th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, pp. 71ff. 9,000 casualties. Although estimates of
318 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Chinese losses ran to over 19,000 men, nese reserves had been built up and en-
the enemy had no shortage of manpower. emy armies in the areas behind the lines
The Chinese time and time again had now contained an estimated 36,000 men
shown themselves willing to incur heavy each. Four additional artillery regi-
casualties in order to hold on to key ments swelled the number of guns and
terrain features during the past year. At crews available to the Communists. But
Triangle Hill they gained face as their on the front there were over 80,000 less
tenacious defense reversed the offensive soldiers facing the UNC forces at the
defeat at White Horse and forced the end of October.72 What this reduction
U.N. Command to break off the attack. might signify in terms of future Com-
The heavy fighting begun in the mid- munist strategy was not clear. Although
dle of October subsided in November. no indications of a shift to the offensive
As cold weather approached, the front on a large-scale were evident, the enemy
settled back to the previous pattern of over-all strength had increased by over
patrolling, probes, and small-scale at- 60,000 during the same time period.
tacks. Surprisingly enough, despite the Should it be offense or defense during
increase of activity in the combat zone the winter ahead, the enemy had the
during October, the Communists actu- manpower on hand.
ally had fewer forces on the front line
than they had had in May. (Map V) 72
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, May and Oct
During the six-month period the Chi- 52, sec. I, Narrative.
CHAPTER XIV

The Air and Sea War, Mid-1952


Strategic and Tactical Air interdiction operations was broadened.
Operations Along the front, the Fifth Air Force's
fighter-bombers concentrated their at-
On the ground the Communist advan- tacks upon enemy supplies, equipment,
tage in manpower was substantial, but and personnel massed within striking
the U.N. Command still had control of distance of the battlefield, while medium
the air space over North Korea. Despite bombers began to devote their attention
the build-up of the enemy air strength to airfields, railway systems, and supply
in Manchuria, the Communists made no and communications centers, in that
serious effort to challenge the UNC dom- order. One of the first endeavors of the
inance aloft during the spring of 1952. change came on 8 May when 485 fighter-
Fighters and bombers roamed at will bombers descended on Suan, about forty
with only occasional brushes with the miles southeast of P'yongyang, and over
enemy. a 13-hour period caused widespread dam-
But a significant change in UNC air- age to buildings, supplies, trucks, and
combat operations policy came about in gun positions in the biggest single attack
May. The rail interdiction program had of the war up to that time.2
reached the same status as the truce ne-
gotiations. As fast as the UNC pilots The North Korean Power Complex
disrupted the rail system, Communist
repair crews put them back in operation As interest in rail interdiction less-
again. It was apparent that "to continue ened, the search for profitable targets
the rail attacks would be, in effect, to pit soon led the air planners back to the
skilled pilots, equipped with modern, important, undamaged hydroelectric
expensive aircraft, against unskilled ori- complex in North Korea. The location
ental coolie laborers, armed with pick of certain dams and plants, such as that
and shovel."1 If military pressure was at Suiho on the Yalu, made them sensi-
to be maintained upon the enemy to tive targets, since they furnished power
influence the Communists to agree to a to the Chinese as well as to the North
truce, then a shift from the diminishing Koreans. To avoid giving the Chinese
returns of rail interdiction seemed in an excuse to intervene, U.S. leaders had
order. placed a ban upon the bombing of dams
Accordingly, in early May the scope of and plants along the Yalu on 6 Novem-
1
USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the
2
Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, p. 26. Ibid., p. 87.
320 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ber 1950 and it had never been re- bomber sorties could do the job over a
scinded.3 Later, when the truce negotia- period of several good flying days.7
tions began, the restrictions on Yalu It was not very surprising that Wey-
power plant bombing had been repeated, land's views should be communicated
but no mention had been made of the swiftly to the JCS by the Air Force or
remainder of the power complex.4 that Ridgway showed a little annoyance
Fearing that an effort to destroy the when the JCS questioned him on the di-
power installations might have an ad- vergence between Weyland and himself
verse effect upon the armistice proceed- on the subject. The U.N. commander
ings, Ridgway had been reluctant to informed his superiors that there had
permit the Air Force to bomb them. In been no unusual circumstances that
March 1952, he informed General Wey- would necessitate them to direct an at-
land that if the Communists appeared tack upon the hydroelectric installations
to be deliberately delaying an agreement rather than follow the normal procedure
and strengthening their offensive capa- of waiting for a recommendation from
bilities, he might change his mind, but him. He was keeping a close watch on
in the meantime, he would not recom- the situation, Ridgway concluded, and
mend an attack.5 It seemed to him that he did not want an attack unless he
as long as the primary use of the power decided that it was warranted and oppor-
facilities was for the civilian economy, tune.8
their destruction was not justified.6 On 12 May, Clark took over as Ridg-
General Weyland did not agree. In way's successor. Shortly thereafter, he
response to a request for his views on the surveyed the situation and decided to
matter from the Air Force planners in intensify the air pressure campaign as
Washington, he stated that the disrup- much as possible. One of the most lucra-
tion of electric power would complement tive targets, he discovered, was the
other air attacks. By cutting off this untouched hydroelectric complex. Al-
power, the U.N. Command could make though he did not have the authority to
it difficult for the enemy to carry out re- bomb the Yalu installations, he in-
pair work that was done in small estab- structed Weyland to prepare plans for
lishments and in railway tunnels. destroying all other major hydroelectric
Through reduction of small-scale produc- facilities. The Air Force would be the
tion, Weyland went on, added pressure co-ordinating agent and the Navy would
might be put on the Communists and participate in the initial attack which
spur them to speed up the negotiations. was to be staged as soon as possible.9
As for the means, Weyland estimated When the Joint Chiefs learned of
that 500 fighter-bomber and 80 medium Clark's desire to strike the hydroelectric
targets, they approached the Secretary of
3
Ibid., pp. 27-30.
4 7
Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51. Msg, VCO 118, CG FEAF to Hq USAF, 29 Apr
5
Memo, EKW [Wright] for CofS, 2 Apr 52, sub: 52,8 5285.
N.K. Hydroelectric Power Installations, in FEC Msg, CX 67909, CINCFE to JCS, 2 May 52, in
G-3 091 Korea, folder 1, Jan-Feb 52. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, an. 4, incl 2.
6 9
Memo, MBR [Ridgway] for CofS FEC, 26 Apr Msg, CX 50328, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and
52, no sub, in FEC G-3 091 Korea, folder 1, Jan- CG FEAF, 17 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
Feb 52. Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 15.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 321

BOMB STRIKE ON SUIHO HYDROELECTRIC PLANT BY CARRIER-BASED PLANES

Defense to secure Presidential approval Vice Adm. Joseph J. Clark, who had
that would remove the restrictions on assumed command of the Seventh Fleet
the Suiho plant, since this was the largest on 20 May, was anxious to have naval
and most important installation in North air units take part in the Suiho attack
Korea. President Truman's consent as well as those against other power tar-
opened the entire complex to air destruc- gets.11 He flew to Seoul and easily con-
tion and the JCS told Clark to go ahead vinced Maj. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus that
at his own discretion. The JCS warned he should allow Navy dive bombers and
that the ban on operations within twelve fighters to join the Fifth Air Force as-
miles of the Soviet border still applied sault force.12 Thus, on 23 June, 35 Navy
and care should be exercised not to bomb attack bombers (AD-Skyraiders) and 35
Manchurian territory inadvertently.10 11
Clark succeeded Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe,
10
(1) Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 19 Jun who was appointed Commander, Naval Forces, Far
52, sub: Removal of Restriction on Attacks Against East, on 4 June when Admiral Joy was rotated.
12
Yalu River Hydroelectric Installations. (2) Msg, General Barcus took over command of the Fifth
JCS 911683, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jun 52. Air Force on 30 May from General Everest.
322 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Panther jet fighters (F9F's) from the had not been approved by the JCS until
carriers Princeton, Boxer, and Philip- after Alexander had left Korea on 18
pine Sea hit the Suiho plant while squad- June, but it was difficult to convince the
rons of Air Force Sabrejets (F-86's) British on this score. The Churchill gov-
provided overhead cover. The Navy ernment narrowly survived a Laborite
dive bombers dropped their bombs motion of censure after Secretary of State
while the Panthers provided antiaircraft Acheson admitted in London that the
suppression. As soon as the Navy planes United States had been at fault and
completed their mission, 79 Thunderjets should have consulted the British before-
(F-84's) and 45 Shooting Stars (F-80's) hand. Although there was no compul-
followed and dropped their loads. Over sion for the United States to keep the
200 Communist fighters, perched on air- British informed, Acheson said that
fields across the Yalu, made no attempt they should have been told about the
to halt the attack; many of them took power plant operations as a matter of
off in haste and flew inland. courtesy.14
During the next three days the Fifth Most of the British concern seemed to
Air Force mounted over 700 fighter- rest in the fears that the power plant
bomber sorties and over 200 counterair destruction might lead the Chinese to
sorties while the Navy launched well break off the truce negotiations or to
over 500 sorties against the power system. attempt retaliation. Clark later stated
Suiho was badly damaged, according to that he was somewhat surprised by the
the pilot reports, and ten other plants furor the attacks had caused in Britain,
were made unserviceable. Two installa- but was determined to repeat them,
tions suffered less vital hits. For two wherever profitable, until an armistice
weeks a power blackout existed in North was concluded.15 It should be noted that
Korea with only gradual restoration although the Communist negotiators
thereafter.13 complained that the bombings were wan-
The bombing of the hydroelectric in- ton, they neither ended the meetings nor
stallations drew immediate fire in Great sought revenge.
Britain from the Labour Party and from In the United States, the reaction was
the press. Since the British Defence Min- quite the reverse of that in the United
ister, Lord Alexander, had but recently Kingdom. The question of why the
visited Clark, the British were upset that power complex had not been bombed
he had not been informed of the pro- earlier was raised in Congressional and
posed strikes. Actually the Clark request other quarters. Clark could do little to
13 help the JCS answer this query since he
Msg, CX 50733, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Jun 52, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, saw no reason why they should have been
Supporting Docs, tab 18. For more complete ac- spared so long. On 19 July, Mr. Lovett
counts of these raids, see: (1) R. Frank Futrell, told a congressman that seven factors
The United States Air Forces in Korea, 1950-1953,
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), pp. had forestalled prior efforts to strike the
451-52; (2) James A. Field, Jr., History of the
14
United States Naval Operations, Korea (Washing- Dept of State, Press Release No. 516, 30 Jun 52,
ton, 1962), pp. 436-39; (3) Malcolm W. Cagle and in Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVII, No. 681
Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (An- (July 14, 1952), p. 60.
15
napolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), pp. 441ff. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 72-74.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 323

B-29 ATTACK ON P'YONGYANG


power targets: 1. the postwar reconstruc- some of these factors had obviously been
tion problem; 2. the knowledge that overrated or had become obsolescent.
some of the plants had been dismantled One by-product of this flurry was the
and only recently reconstructed; 3. the appointment of a British representative
status of excess capacity in the plants; on the UNC staff. This had been dis-
4. possible losses of UNC air forces; 5. cussed previously and rejected, since
use of North Korean power in Man- Ridgway had felt that making an excep-
churia and in the USSR and possibility tion in favor of the United Kingdom
that destruction of the plants might in- would lead to similar requests for repre-
vite a Communist offensive; 6. estimated sentation from other U.N. countries par-
effect upon the armistice talks; and 7. ticipating in Korea. When Alexander
other priority targets.16 As it turned out, visited Korea, Clark told the JCS that
he was willing to accept a British staff
16
officer despite the possible disadvantages.
(1) Msg, JCS 912750, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52.
(2) Msg, C 51395, Clark to JCS, 5 Jul 52, DA-IN
To counteract opposition criticism that
157923. (3) Msg, JCS 914021 to CINCFE, 21 Jul 52. had led to the censure motion, Churchill
324 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

announced on 1 July that a representa- On 5 July, subject to these conditions,


tive would be named shortly. Actually, Clark approved the operations against
it was not until the end of the month that P'yongyang. In the course of eleven
Maj. Gen. Stephen N. Shoosmith was hours on 11 July, 1,254 sorties were
designated as a deputy chief of staff of flown. Fifth Air Force Sabrejets and
the U.N. Command. His directive, how- Thunderjets, ROK and Australian fight-
ever, made it clear that his appointment ers, British Meteors, and Navy Panthers
was solely as a normal staff officer and and Corsairs from the Seventh Fleet vec-
that liaison between the United States tored in three waves to hit the forty-odd
and the United Kingdom would be car- targets in and around the city. When
ried on through normal political and night fell, B-29's arrived to bomb tar-
military channels as it had been in the gets specially reserved for them. Supply
past, both in Korea and in Washington.17 depots, factories, billeting areas, railway
At any rate, the bombing of the hydro- centers, and gun positions were de-
electric system became an accepted part stroyed and damaged and the Commu-
of the air campaign. Suiho was subjected nist radio claimed that 1,500 buildings
to a B-29 raid on 11-12 September and had been leveled and 900 others had
other plants were hit whenever they suffered harm from the 1,400 tons of
seemed to be getting back into operation. bombs and 23,000 gallons of napalm
dropped on the capital. Despite heavy
P'yongyang and accurate antiaircraft fire, only one
air force and two naval fighters were
During May the Far East Air Forces lost. Eight air force planes, however,
also proposed to mount another attack were seriously damaged.19
upon the North Korean capital of On 4 August the Fifth Air Force fight-
P'yongyang. New military targets near er-bombers hit P'yongyang again with
the city had been uncovered and could 273 sorties, bombing buildings, a fuel
be destroyed, Weyland told Clark. The dump, gun positions, and military per-
latter was not averse to a strike on sonnel. A third huge effort against the
P'yongyang, but he was worried about city came on 29 August. Clark and Wey-
Prisoner of War Camp No. 9 which the land decided that a psychological air
Communists had placed close to the city. blow should be struck while the Soviet
Since air reconnaissance had not located and Chinese representatives were confer-
this camp, Clark wanted the Far East ring in Moscow. In another three-wave
Air Forces to conduct the attack by visual assault, 1,403 Air Force and Navy sorties
means or with the assistance of short- blanketed the capital and inflicted ad-
range navigational beacons so that the ditional damage. After this pounding
prisoner camp would not be bombed.18 P'yongyang possessed too few worthwhile

17 19
(1) Msg, C 50318, Clark to JCS, 17 Jun 52, DA (1) USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opera-
151297. (2) Msg, DA 914543, Jenkins to CINCFE, tions in the Korean Conflict, 1 July 1932-27 July
26 Jul 52. 1953, pp8.8-99. (2) Futrell, United States Air
18
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, an. 4, pt. I, p. Force in Korea, 1950-53, pp. 481-82. (3) Cagle and
20. Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp. 450-53.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 325

targets to warrant major strikes for a oil supply center and reports indicated
time.20 that the destruction was extensive.23
Despite the nearness of many of the
Air Pressure and Air-Ground Support Air Force and Navy operations to the
Chinese border during the summer and
General Clark realized that although the impressive fighter strength of the
there was little he could do to increase Chinese Air Force located just across the
the ground pressure against the Com- Yalu, enemy air activity was conspicuous
munists in Korea, he could give the Air by its absence. The MIG-15's generally
Force and Navy full encouragement to avoided combat and the majority of the
step up the pace of the air campaign.21 aircraft losses was due to antiaircraft fire.
The attacks on the power plants and on As the bombing of industrial targets in-
P'yongyang were the most spectacular creased in July and August, enemy
during the summer of 1952, but by no aircraft began to be sighted more fre-
means the only ones that were launched. quently, but they showed little disposi-
In late July 63 B-29's mounted their tion to fight. When they did, the
greatest single-target effort thus tar Sabrejets usually took a heavy toll of
against the Oriental Light Metals Com- Communist planes.24
pany, an aluminum alloy plant within The reluctance of the Communist
five miles of the Yalu River. Enemy jet fighters to defend their troops, cities,
and propeller-driven night fighters pro- and plants offered a contrast to the ef-
vided but slight and ineffective opposi- forts of the UNC air forces to afford their
tion to this raid, which inflicted heavy ground forces support during the sum-
damage on the plant.22 mer of 1952. However, there had been
On 27 July naval aircraft from the complaints from ground force command-
Bon Homme Richard attacked a lead ers regarding the Van Fleet-Everest
and zinc mine and mill at Sindok and agreement which had specified that 96
others from the Princeton bombed a close air support sorties a day would
magnesite plant at Kilchu the next day. meet Eighth Army requirements under
On 1 September, carrier aircraft from conditions of limited ground activity.25
the Essex, Princeton, and Boxer struck In December 1951, Van Fleet himself
the oil refinery at Aoji, just eight miles had sought in vain to have one squadron
from the Soviet border. Special permis- of fighter-bombers assigned to each of
sion from the JCS enabled the Navy to his corps, maintaining that this would
send over 100 fighters and fighter-bomb- improve close air support operations.
ers against the previously undisturbed The parceling out of air combat units
23
Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp.
20
(1) USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in 454-59.
24
the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, p. 99. (2) Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-
Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-5), 53,25 pp. 477-78.
pp.21483, 489. (1) USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in
Msg, CX 53391 CINCFE to CG FEAF and the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, pp. 206ff.
COMNAVFE, 8 Aug 52, in JSPOG Staff Study No. (2) USAF Historical Study No. 127, USAF Opns
410. in the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, pp.
22
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, p. 28. 184ff.
326 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ran counter to Air Force doctrine and forces on the role of tactical aviation.
had been firmly rejected on the grounds On 1 July he turned down the Eighth
that such a system would be inflexible Army commander's proposal and di-
and wasteful inasmuch as the squadrons rected his staff to improve procedures for
could not be shifted to the more active carrying out air-ground operations doc-
fronts as necessity arose. But Van Fleet trine.28
was not easily dissuaded. After Clark Six weeks later Clark issued his plan
became commander in chief, he tried for improving conditions. He did not
again. Early in June he suggested that find anything basically wrong with the
the 1st Marine Wing be placed under present system. One of the difficulties,
the operational control of the Eighth he maintained, was a lack of understand-
Army.26 ing at subordinate levels of the limita-
Van Fleet's plan was essentially the tions of the air arm and of the fact that
same as it had been six months earlier. air policies were only arrived at after
He would put one squadron under each consultation between the Air Force and
corps commander and establish a joint Army commanders. Clark felt that
operations center to control the use of ground commanders frequently called
the Marine units at each corps headquar- for air strikes when their organic artil-
ters. To counteract the Air Force lery could do the job better. After all,
argument that this system would be in- he went on, the air forces in the FEC
flexible, he intended to retain sufficient had only limited forces and had many
control at Eighth Army level to divert tasks to perform. The Army could not
aircraft not being used adequately to afford to adopt the Marine air-ground
other corps or back to the Fifth Air team system because it was not designed
Force. The chief benefits, the Eighth for the same kind of operations and had
Army commander maintained, would be entirely different allocations of artillery
to reduce the time lag between the re- to carry out its missions.29 Actually,
quest for support and its arrival; to allow Clark suggested, the tactical air forces
the pilots to become familiar with the were engaged in three types of action—
terrain that they would be called upon antiair, antimatériel and installations,
to attack and the ground personnel they and antipersonnel. Ground support was
would be working with; to increase the not the least of these, although it seemed
number of sorties per day by having the 28
(1) Memo, for CofS, 1 Jul 52, no sub, in UNC/
aircraft stationed close to the corps front FEC, Comd Rpt, G-3 Jnl, J-3, 12 Aug 52. (2)
lines; and to insure better control of air Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 91-92.
29
strikes by eliminating the spotter aircraft The 1st Marine Division had the 11th Marine
Regiment as its artillery regiment. The regiment
that now directed them.27 had basically the same armament as the four sep-
Although Clark sympathized with Van arate battalions employed by the Army to support
Fleet's approach, he had no desire to stir divisions—three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers
and one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. In Korea,
up the old feud between air and ground it was part of a corps and received corps artillery
support. Ordinarily, however, Marine divisions did
26 not have corps artillery at their disposal to take
Msg, G 6262 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 6 Jun
52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg care of the long-range, heavy-duty artillery tasks,
File, 1949-52. and Marine air support was often used as a sub-
27
Ibid. stitute.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 327
always to be mentioned last. He thought in.32 Admiral Clark, Seventh Fleet com-
that co-operative training between the mander, was also eager to help. After
air and ground forces would do much a tour of the Eighth Army front in May
toward eliminating many of the miscon- and talks with Van Fleet, he came to the
ceptions that existed and proposed that conclusion that naval aircraft were par-
steps be taken to allow more understand- ticularly well suited for the type of pin-
ing of mutual problems.30 point attacks that would be necessary to
In the meantime, Van Fleet had con- hit enemy personnel and supply bunkers.
sulted with General Barcus, Fifth Air Van Fleet and his ground commanders
Force commander, in June about apply- were all in favor of naval air aid and the
ing the maximum air effort to destroy Seventh Fleet staff began to lay plans for
the enemy air offensive potential close to joining in the close combat support pro-
the battle front. He feared that the gram.33
build-up of Communist strength close to As the number of air support missions
the front might portend a possible of- increased, fighter-bombers and medium
fensive before the rainy season, so he bombers (B-29's) began to unload their
urged de-emphasis of the rail interdic- bombs and guns on targets in the enemy's
tion program and increase in close air immediate rear. Van Fleet was encour-
support. In addition, Van Fleet asked aged. During the rainy season in July,
Clark to let the B-29's, which were run- he was successful in securing light
ning into mounting enemy night fighter bomber and medium bomber support
opposition on their raids close to the from Barcus and Weyland, who were
Manchurian border, hit Communist per- eager to co-operate if suitable targets
sonnel, supplies, and material close to could be uncovered for the heavier air-
the front lines by employing night radar- craft.34
controlled bombing techniques.31 There is little doubt that the end of
Barcus was willing. He informed Van the rail interdiction campaign opened a
Fleet that the air effort from the main new and—to the ground forces—more
line of resistance to areas forty miles satisfactory phase of the air war. The
behind the enemy front was growing growing numbers of aircraft overhead
substantially. But there were difficulties, meting out punishment to the enemy
he continued. Personnel and supply across the lines could not help but boost
bunkers were extremely hard targets to front-line morale. During the bitter bat-
destroy since the enemy was so well dug
32
Msg, CG 117, CG Fifth AF to CG EUSAK, 19
30
Ltr, Hq FEC to CG Eighth Army et al., 11 Jun 52, in Hq Eighth Army Gen Admin Files, Jun
Aug 52, sub: Air Ground Opns, in UNC/FEC, 52, p. 43.
33
Comd Rpt, G-3, Jnl, J-3, 12 Aug 52. See discussion Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp.
in Chapter XVII, below, of the results of the experi- 461ff. The naval support program did not get
ments ensuing from this plan. See also USAF Hist under way until October. See Chapter XVII, below.
34
Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, (1) Msg, G 6644 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 25
1Jul-27 Jul 53, pp. 197ff. Jun 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files,
31
(1) Msg, G 6267 TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE, Jun 52, Paper 82. (2) Msg, GX 7229 KCG, Van
7 Jun 52. (2) Msg, G 6390, Van Fleet to CINCFE, Fleet to CINCFE, 31 Jul 52, in FEC G-3 Com-
12 Jun 52. (3) Msg, GX 6490, Van Fleet to Barcus, pleted Actions. (3) Msg, GX 52915, Clark to Van
17 Jun 52. All in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Fleet, 1 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52,
Files, Jun 52, Papers 20, 28, and 38. CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 17.
328 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ties of October, the U.N. Command air artillery support whether on offense or
force flew almost 4,500 close support defense.
sorties against enemy personnel, equip- But the biggest naval operation was
ment, supplies, and strongpoints, and of the demonstration at Kojo on the east
these over 2,200 were in support of Oper- coast of Korea. In July Clark had asked
ation SHOWDOWN alone. General Jen- Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe, the naval
kins, the IX Corps commander, sent his commander, whether it might not be
"grateful thanks" for the Fifth Air wise in the interest of economy to hold
Force's outstanding assistance.35 a landing exercise in connection with the
As the ground and air force officers movement of the 1st Cavalry Division's
began to swap visits to the front and to 8th Regimental Combat Team to Korea.
the air control centers, some of the mis- Owing to housing difficulties in Japan,
understanding between the two groups Clark had decided to rotate the three
started to fade. The ground troops RCT's of the 1st Cavalry to Korea, one
learned that they could help the pilots at a time. Since the first team was sched-
by using proximity fuzes before air uled to be transferred from Japan in
strikes to suppress antiaircraft fire. Since October, Clark felt that the opportunity
losses of friendly planes had mounted for alarming the Communists should not
during the close support campaign be- be missed.
cause of heavy flak, the efforts of the Admiral Briscoe was heartily in favor
artillery to reduce the hazard were appre- of some action and suggested that an
ciated by the air force. Another symp- amphibious demonstration be mounted.
tom of the change for the better, This could conceivably lure enemy rein-
according to the official Air Force histor- forcements out on the roads and expose
ian, came from Van Fleet himself. By them to attack by air and surface craft.
fall he no longer was urging that air In addition, the training would be ex-
squadrons be assigned to his corps.36 cellent for all the UNC forces involved,
This in itself seemed to denote an over- Briscoe concluded. Encouraged by this
all improvement. reception, Clark told his naval com-
mander to go ahead with the planning
The Kojo Demonstration and to co-ordinate with Eighth Army and
XVI Corps staffs on the role of the 1st
Naval surface operations during the Cavalry Division units.37
summer of 1952 consisted mainly of rou- Under Admiral Clark, the Seventh
tine patrol and blockade of the Korean Fleet commander, Joint Amphibious
coast, mine sweeping operations, and the Task Force Seven was set up and 15 Oc-
shelling of targets along the coast to tober established as the target date. The
harass and interdict the enemy's lines of demonstration was scheduled for the
communication. For the ROK I Corps area near Kojo and planning for the
the naval surface guns provided splendid land, sea, and air phases proceeded at a
swift pace. For purposes of deception,
35
USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the only the highest echelon of command
Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, p. 188.
36
Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 1950- 37
53, pp. 505-07. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, p. 5.
THE AIR AND SEA WAR, MID-1952 329

knew that the maneuver was to be only quickly or perhaps a preference to wait
a demonstration.38 until the UNC troops had landed and
Although the 187th Airborne Regi- then to launch a counterattack was im-
ment was to be withdrawn and prepared possible to surmise. Evidently the dis-
for an airdrop and Eighth Army was to covery that the operation was only a
prepare for an offensive to link up with feint added to the frustration of all the
the amphibious forces, Clark told Van UNC personnel who had not been in on
Fleet this was simply to confuse enemy the secret. The realism of the planning
intelligence and no more than limited and mounting of the operation had built
land objectives would be attacked.39 up UNC expectations and although the
On 12 October rehearsal operations training was adjudged valuable, the dam-
held at Kangnung ran into high surf age to morale served to balance this off.40
conditions and had to be broken off. For As operations tapered off in the fall,
the next three days, FEAF and naval the results of the fighting during the
planes hit the enemy positions around May-October period remained open to
Kojo and naval surface craft, led by the speculation. Although the air pressure
battleship Iowa, shelled the beach area. campaign had evoked some protests from
The assault troops climbed down to the the Communists at Panmunjom, it had
assault landing craft in the early after- in no way softened their attitude toward
noon of 15 October and made a pass at an early armistice on the UNC terms.
the shore. Sudden high winds made re- On the ground the hill battles had caused
covery of the boats a difficult task, but the enemy more casualties than the
there were no serious casualties. UNC had suffered, but gains on both
The enemy response to the elaborate sides had been minor and neither could
scheme was disappointing. Little evi- claim a victory. Communist attrition in
dence of significant troop transfers came men, supplies, matériel, and installations
to light and the Communist shore bat- was considerable during the six-month
teries threw only a few answering shells span, but they showed no sign of cracking
at the assault force. Whether this de- or of submitting to a truce. From every
noted a lack of mobility to respond aspect it was still a stalemate and no end
38
Ltr, Clark to Collins, 4 Sep 52, no sub, in FEC
was in sight.
Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.
39 40
Ltr, Clark to Van Fleet, 13 Sep 52, no sub, in See Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea,
FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. pp. 391-96.
CHAPTER XV

Problems of Limited War


The frustrating conditions at Panmun- How this obstacle was to be sur-
jom and on the battlefield in Korea could mounted remained unclear, but it was
not fail to affect domestic affairs in the inevitable that the settlement of the
United States during mid-1952. As long Korean problem should become the out-
as the objective in Korea had been mili- standing issue of the Presidential cam-
tary victory, opposition to the expendi- paign of 1952. The debates, personali-
tures of American lives, funds, and re- ties, and political maneuvers of the race
sources had not been difficult to cope for the White House had but little effect
with. But a slow process of reaction had upon the war itself, yet it was against
set in, once the decision to end the war this backdrop that events of the period
through negotiation was taken. The unfolded. Both General of the Army
political and military leaders of the Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican
United States had to deal with a phenom- candidate, and Adlai E. Stevenson, his
enon new to them—limited war—and all Democratic opponent, made peace the
its ramifications. With the passage of keynote of their platforms. The slack-
time and the failure to reach an agree- ening of interest in military victory and
ment on a truce, criticism of the conduct the avowed intentions of both political
of the war, set off by the Congressional parties to make an end of the Korean
investigation of the dismissal of General commitment meant that requests for
MacArthur in 1951, mounted. additional manpower, expenditures, and
To many people it seemed that the resources would be closely scanned by
conflict in Korea had served its purpose. both the executive and the legislative
The North Koreans had been pushed branch. In view of the election year
back of the 38th Parallel and the Com- atmosphere that fostered criticism of the
munists now knew that the United States administration's policies and the possi-
would fight in the event of outright ag- bility—of which the Army was well
gression. On the other hand, the United aware—that there might be a change in
States and its allies had learned not to the direction of the war if the Republi-
underestimate Chinese military strength. cans proved victorious, mid-1952 was
From all indications, both sides desired characterized by caution.
peace since little further gain could be
expected from the stalemate. Only the Reviewing the Alternatives
principle of repatriation lay between the
increasing casualty lists and the signing A radical change in the course of ac-
of an armistice. tion being pursued in Korea was impos-
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 331

sible under the circumstances. Although sure then being exerted upon the Com-
the military leaders in the field might munists seemed to warrant increases in
chafe under the restrictions imposed ground, sea, and naval forces in the esti-
upon them, there was little prospect that mation of the Joint Planners, but, until
these would be altered except in detail. decisions on a national level established
They could not be, in fact, without aug- the long- and short-range objectives of
menting the military forces at the dis- the United States in Korea clearly, even
posal of General Clark. It had been this limited support was impossible. As
patent since July 1951 that, as presently they stated in May 1952: "At the present
constituted, the Eighth Army could hold time we are faced with a set of conditions
the line and punish the enemy, but that in Korea which preclude, from a military
was all. Limited war meant limited point of view, a conclusion which can
forces. One of the assumptions that mili- be termed satisfactory. Under these un-
tary planners in Washington and the favorable conditions, it is necessary to
Far East had to contend with constantly determine what immediate objectives
in plotting courses of action was the dic- and lines of action can be taken which
tum that the military strength of the Far will be least damaging to our national
East Command would remain substan- security, international prestige, and long-
tially as it was.1 Only a return to full- range objectives." 2
scale warfare by the Communists or a The Washington planners seemed
breaking off of the negotiations could doomed to the same kind of frustration
have caused a shift from this policy and, that hobbled their counterparts in the
as noted earlier, the enemy seemed con- Far East Command. Unless the Com-
tent to maintain the status quo. munists erupted militarily in Korea or
Thus, the studies produced by the cut themselves off completely from the
Joint Chiefs in Washington reflected the negotiations, intensification or broaden-
static conditions in Korea and the politi- ing of the war, except in its air phase,
cal atmosphere in the United States. was not likely to be considered. In the
The Joint Staff Planners frankly admit- event the Eighth Army could not contain
ted that the war in Korea could not be an enemy offensive, the conflict would
brought to a successful conclusion with probably no longer be limited to Korea,
the currently authorized force levels in but might well become global in nature.
the three services. If increased forces If the Communists refused to continue
were sent to Korea, the strategic reserve the truce talks, however, the question of
in the United States would be depleted increased military pressure might again
and allocations for Europe would have become vital and herein lay the weak-
to be cut back. The alternative was an ness of the U.S. military position, for it
accelerated mobilization effort and this did not have the strength in being to
appeared to be out of the question. To insure Communist acceptance of an ar-
maintain successfully the military pres- mistice on UNC terms without leaving
1
the United States and Europe unaccept-
See Memo, Col John T. Hall, G-3, for Chief
Training Br G-3, 13 May 52, sub: The Effect on
2
the Army of Possible Resumption of Hostilities in JSPC 853/106, 9 May 52, title: U.S. Courses of
Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 77. Action in Korea.
332 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ably exposed. And any attempt to secure East Command examined ambitious out-
the additional personnel and means lines of operations that would increase
would have taken at least a year and re- the military pressure on the enemy or
quired some additional industrial and carry the Eighth Army through to vic-
manpower mobilization as well as a tory. But the hard fact remained that
change in the global concept of placing none of these plans could be carried out
the defense of Europe first.3 by the forces then at Clark's disposal.
To be sure, the United States retained To a JCS query on 23 September for his
its atomic superiority, but the question comments on possible courses of action
of use of nuclear weapons in a moun- if the negotiations failed, Clark said that
tainous area like North Korea which he could do little more on the ground
offered few worthwhile targets was still front.
moot. In addition, the moral issue of
whether the United States should em- We confront undemoralized enemy
ploy atomic bombs again unless it were forces, far superior in strength, who oc-
cupy excellent, extremely well-organized de-
attacked had not been settled. It was fensive positions in depth and who con-
doubtful that the United States would tinue to provide themselves with sufficient
have initiated atomic warfare against a logistic support. Under these conditions, it
stubborn, but static enemy in Korea. appears evident that positive aggressive ac-
This, then, reduced the U.S. position in tion, designed to obtain military victory
and achieve an armistice on our terms, is
Korea to a gamble that the Chinese did not feasible by this command with current
want peace and that the limited military forces operating under current restrictions.
pressure that the FEC forces could apply Only with increased forces and the removal
would secure that peace. In the mean- of certain restrictions could the FEC mount
time, the ROK and Japanese defense intensified operations with some hope of
winning success without "highly unpalat-
forces would be built up in the hope that able personnel costs."
they eventually would be capable of
handling the Communist threat by them- Clark did not think that the United
selves. This was the insurance policy Nations Command should take the losses
that the United States took out against inherent in decisive offensive operations
an interminable prolongation of the unless it intended to carry the fight to
Korean affair. Eventually, whether an the Yalu. Intermediate objectives would
armistice was concluded or not, the non- be costly and undecisive, he felt.5
Korean forces would be gradually with- Although Clark did not believe that
drawn from the peninsula.4 the USSR would enter the Korean War
Under these circumstances, planning if the UNC drove to the Yalu, his con-
for military victory appeared to be an cept of military victory had no chance for
academic exercise. The Joint Staff acceptance on the eve of the elections
worked up plans and consulted with or thereafter. It ran squarely against the
Clark's headquarters. In Tokyo the Far trend that favored the quick liquidation
3
of the Korean commitment by political
Ibid.
4 5
Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 12 May 52, sub: (1) Msg, JCS 919187, JCS to CINCFE, 23 Sep
Courses of Action in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 52. (2) Msg, CX 56022, CINCUNC to JCS, 29 Sep
29/11. 52, in Transcript of Briefings G-3 091 Korea, 78.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 333

action. It was well for Clark to be ready request for the armed services was de-
in the event of an unexpected change of ceptive, for it was predicated upon the
conditions, but the possibilities for such hope that the Korean War would be over
a shift were remote. The alternatives to a by the end of the fiscal year. Extension
continuation of the policy of seeking of the war beyond 30 June 1952 meant
a political settlement backed by limited that supplementary appropriations
military pressure in the field meant more would have to be requested later on to
men, more casualties, more expendi- take care of deficiencies. General Collins
tures, and more resources. By 1952 it and his staff had found it difficult to plan
was obvious that the era following the their fiscal estimates on this restricted
outbreak of the war when men, money, basis and in May he asked the JCS to
and matériel had been supplied on a press the Secretary of Defense again for
comparatively liberal basis was over and consideration of the assumption that hos-
the time for retrenchment was at hand. tilities would continue through the next
In this climate of opinion, broadening fiscal year, subject to review at the be-
or intensifying the war to any great de- ginning of each fiscal quarter. In late
gree would appeal to but few. June, Secretary Lovett agreed that the
JCS could assume that the war would last
Budget, Manpower, and Resources until 30 June 1953 insofar as planning
for fiscal year 1954 estimates was con-
The Presidential budget message in cerned.7
January 1952 had foreshadowed the time Nevertheless the original Army esti-
of austerity. In previous estimates the mate of 22.2 billion dollars for fiscal
JCS had hoped to build up military year 1953 had been tapered down by the
forces to what might be considered ac- President and his budget advisors to 14.2
ceptable defense levels by 1954. Presi- billion dollars and Congress had lopped
dential budget restrictions now made off nearly two billion dollars more in
this impossible for the Chief Executive July. This would mean that the combat
cut back the funds requested by the serv- readiness date for the Army would be
ices. By lowering the allocations he postponed until fiscal year 1956 and the
stretched the period of preparedness expanded production base for items such
from 1954 to 1956. This meant that, in as trucks, tanks, and artillery would be
the opinion of the JCS, if the Soviet reduced. In addition, Army personnel
Union attacked in full force before 1956, requirements would have to be lowered.8
the United States capacity to resist suc- In Secretary Lovett's opinion, the
cessfully would be reduced. Although Army had only itself to blame for the
the cuts would affect the Air Force's budget cuts. He told Secretary of the
attainment of 126 modern combat wings Army Pace that Congressional commit-
primarily, the Army would also have to 7
draw in its belt.6 (1) Memo, CofS for JCS, 21 May 52, sub: As-
sumption of Termination of Hostilities in Korea,
In some respects, the lower budget in G-3 091 Korea, 1/15. (2) Memo, Lovett for
JCS, 24 Jun 52, no sub, incl to JCS 1800/195.
6 8
JCS 1725/175, 20 May 52, title: Information for Draft Statement of Secy Army before the Senate
the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee . . . , ca. 10 Jun 52, in
Armed Services Committee. G-3 1 10
, 10.
334 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tees invariably asked Army witnesses of the men called into service during
why they had not obligated the funds 1950 would have completed their two
already advanced if the need for maté- years of duty and would be eligible for
riel were so great. Evidently the wit- discharge. Almost three-quarters of a
nesses had not answered these questions million trained troops were scheduled to
satisfactorily, he went on, and could not be released and an estimated 650,000
as long as undelegated funds continued raw recruits would replace them. To
to pile up and production was not accel- train this tremendous number of men,
erated to turn the money into usable the Army would have to devote about
goods. He found the excuse of "no 25 percent of its total manpower to this
funds" offered by the Army "tiresomely task alone. If hostilities did not end
threadbare."9 shortly, the effective strength of Army
The failure of the Army to obligate forces in the United States would be lim-
all the funds previously voted by Con- ited to one airborne division because of
gress was due in part to the administra- the influx of the untrained troops. Other
tive delays inherent in arranging and divisions would be undermanned and
concluding large contracts with hun- would have to be utilized as replacement
dreds of firms. In this case the care and and training divisions. To cope with the
caution exercised by the Army in nego- problem, General Collins urged the JCS
tiating contracts redounded to its disad- in June to support his request for an
vantage. Instead of having all the increase of 92,000 men for overhead for
moneys deemed necessary on hand at the the Army.10 Although Mr. Lovett tried
beginning of the fiscal year, it seemed to secure this augmentation, he ran into
that the Army would again have to de- opposition from the Bureau of the Budg-
pend upon supplemental appropriations et and the National Security Resources
to cover future deficiencies in carrying Board and was unsuccessful. From a
on the war. total of almost 1.7 million in April 1952,
This piecemeal approach to financing Army personnel steadily shrank to about
the war on a contingent basis made it 1.58 million at the end of October.11
difficult for the Army planners to formu- Cuts in personnel required reduction
late firm programs, for frequently it took of officer strength as well. In the Far
eighteen months to two years to secure East Command the Army officer strength
production of many items and few could was to be cut by almost six hundred of-
guess how long the war would drag on. ficers because of the budget limitations.
But the knowledge that money could be Clark protested vigorously but G-3 in-
gotten if the need could be demonstrated formed him in June that the reduction
was at least comforting. In the field of on a world-wide basis had amounted to
manpower, the situation was more seri- 5 percent. In the case of the FEC, Korea
ous and the prospects were less encour- 10
Memo, CofS for JCS, 14 Jun 52, sub: Assump-
aging. tion of Termination of Hostilities in Korea, in
During the remainder of 1952, most G-3 091 Korea, 1/28.
11
(1) Memo, Jenkins for Taylor, 11 Jul 52, sub:
9 Implication of Continued Hostilities in Korea, in
Memo, Secy Defense for Secy Army, 15 Aug 52,
incl to Summary Sheet, Eddleman for CofS, 15 G-3 091 Korea, 1/32. (2) STM-30, Strength of the
Oct 52, in G-3 091 Korea, 36/3. Army, 30 Apr and 31 Oct 52.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 335

had been excluded and the actual cut all echelons, if the Army were going to
had been made on the officer strength weather it successfully.14
in Japan and the Ryukyus; otherwise it The tone of Collins' letter left no
would have been more.12 doubt but that the Army manpower situ-
At the end of July, G-3 suggested to ation would deteriorate further. As
Clark that he might be able to decrease ROK forces became trained and demon-
the number of officers training the Jap- strated their ability to take on further
anese defense forces and give additional responsibility, they would replace the
responsibility to Japanese instructors at U.S. troops in the line. If the status quo
battalion level and below. If U.S. officers in Korea continued, the U.S. contribu-
could be confined to the higher echelons, tion would be gradually diminished.15
the saving would help meet the antici- The changing attitudes to U.S. funds
pated over-all shortage of officers. Clark, and manpower were also reflected in the
in his reply, asserted that the Japanese distribution of resources during the mid-
forces would experience a large turnover 1952 era. When General Clark in May
in trained personnel in late 1952 as two- voiced his concern over a possible Com-
year enlistments expired and were also munist air build-up in North Korea once
about to undergo training in heavy arm- an armistice was concluded, and asked
aments that would preclude a reduction that his fighter force be increased by
of U.S. officers for the present.13 four F-86 fighter-interceptor wings and
In a frank letter to Clark on 1 August, eight automatic weapons battalions to
General Collins discussed Army person- counter this threat, the Joint Chiefs were
nel prospects for the year ahead. The sympathetic. But after carefully survey-
loss of half of the strength of the Army ing F-86 production and the availability
and the huge problem of training all the of antiaircraft units, they could only offer
new replacements would sharply affect limited support. By October, the JCS
the status and quality of the reserve informed Clark in early July, the F-86
forces in the United States. Each month, Sabres that had been promised him in
Collins continued, the Army had to send February would be delivered. In addi-
40,000 replacements overseas and this tion, 65 Sabrejets and 175 F-84's would
demand could be met until November. be diverted to the FEC from other com-
After that, FEC would receive its full mitments to bring all FEAF fighter
quota, but other areas would go under- wings up to full strength and provide a
strength. Collins felt that this would be 50-percent reserve. To help out on the
a difficult period and much would de- defense of Japan, the JCS continued, one
pend upon the character of leadership at Strategic Air Command fighter wing of
60 F-84's would be deployed to Japan
12
(1) Ltr, TAG to CINCFE, 14 May 52, sub: on a rotational basis. As for the antiair-
Military and Civilian Personnel Authorization, in craft battalions, one 90-mm. gun and two
G-3 091, 46. (2) Msg, CINCFE to DA, 22 May 52,
DA 141852. (3) Msg, DA 911831, G-3 to CINCFE,
14
22 Jun 52. Ltr, Collins to Clark, 1 Aug 52, no sub, in
13
(1) Msg, DA 914690, G-3 to CINCFE, 30 Jul FEC G-3 320.2 Strength No. 1.
15
52. (2) Msg, C 53302, CINCFE to DA, 8 Aug 52, Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 16 Oct 52, sub:
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, and CinC and Reduction of U.S. Manpower in Korea, in G-3
CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 47 320.2 Pacific, 13.
336 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

automatic weapons battalions could be Pace heard about this, he directed that
provided by taking them from the con- the entire question of expanding the
tinental United States defense forces.16 ammunition production base be re-ex-
Although the provision of these air and amined.18
antiaircraft units and equipment in- Early in May another discordant note
volved some risk in spreading out very sounded from. Korea. A newspaper story
thinly the forces not involved in the claimed that the American soldiers were
Korean War, the JCS attempted to fighting with secondhand equipment and
scrape together at least part of what the a shortage of ammunition. When the
FEC requested. Army asked the Far East commander to
comment, he replied that ammunition
Ammunition Again was plentiful and rationing was a normal
military precaution. Since this informa-
One of the problems that continued to tion seemed diametrically opposed to
plague the Army during the summer and the stand then being taken by General
fall of 1952 was the supply of ammuni- Collins before Congress to secure add-
tion. As noted earlier, there was little itional funds for ammunition, G-3 asked
expectation that conditions would im- FEC to explain further. As it turned out,
prove noticeably before the end of the the theater staff had based its estimates
year.17 And if the war waxed hot in upon action on the battlefield continuing
Korea once more, even an increase in at the limited pace of the April-May
production would do little more than period. If the action should quicken, the
replace the rounds expended. ammunition situation might alter radi-
At a briefing in late April, the Army cally. The one round whose supply did
chiefs in Washington were informed that appear to be in a precarious position con-
in the five major deficient categories— sidering proposed production schedules
60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch mortars, in the United States was the 155-mm.
105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers—the howitzer shell, the theater staff con-
situation was especially serious. If war cluded.19
broke out in Europe on 1 January 1953, The dependence upon restricted oper-
the United States would only be able to ations at the front to maintain ammuni-
supply six divisions with these five types tion levels came to the fore again in early
of rounds and a year later the total that June. When Van Fleet toured his corps
could be kept in action would be fifteen headquarters, he discovered that it had
divisions. Current U.S. ammunition pro- been necessary to limit deliveries of 105-
duction facilities by early 1953 would mm. and 155-mm. howitzer shells to the
have reached their maximum capacity other corps in order to provide the U.S.
and it would take another year and a half I Corps with adequate quantities for its
before new ones could be brought into
production. When Secretary of the Army 18
(1) G-3 Memo for Rcd, 22 Apr 52, sub: Am-
munition Supply Situation, in G-3 470, 4. (2)
16
(1) Msg, CX 68196, CINCFE to JCS, 9 May 52, Memo, Col H. C. Hine, Jr., for Jenkins, 29 Apr 52,
DA-IN 136993. (2) Msg, JCS 913020, JCS to sub: Ammunition Supply Situation in FY 1953, in
CINCFE, 8 Jul 52. G-3 337, 23.
17 19
See Chapter X, above. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 129-30.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 337

missions. The corps commanders were provide Clark with the full 40 rounds
aware that the situation would become a day for 486 pieces would require about
even more complicated as additional 583,000 rounds a month, a rate that
ROK battalions were activated and sup- would not be reached until March 1953,
plied.20 Collins continued. The most the Army
By the end of June Clark had become could provide, without leaving Europe
gravely concerned over supplies of the critically short and eliminating firing in
155-mm. howitzer shell. The Commu- training, would be on the order of 400,-
nists had almost doubled their artillery 000to 500,000 rounds during the 1 July
and mortar fire during the month and -31 October 1952 period. Of course,
the Eighth Army had to increase its ex- Collins went on, in the event of a major
penditures in self-defense. As mentioned attack, the Eighth Army could fire what-
earlier, the 105-mm. howitzer was not ever was necessary to halt it, but it would
effective against enemy bunkers and take time to replace ammunition ex-
lacked the range for counterbattery fire. pended at a higher daily rate than 15
Clark pointed out that when the 6 ROK rounds. If the steel strike, which had
155-mm. battalions became active, the begun on 2 June, lasted for a consider-
FEC would have to supply 486 pieces able length of time, Collins felt that
instead of 378. Although the authorized improvement in the situation would be
day of supply was 40 rounds per tube, delayed further. 22
Clark had had to restrict the expendi- Actually the Christie Park plant at
tures to a bit over 15 rounds a day. If the Pittsburgh which produced over 60 per-
scheduled delivery of 155-mm. ammuni- cent of the 155-mm. shell forgings had
tion during the summer were main- already lost production of 60,000 forg-
tained, only 140,000 rounds would arrive ings during the first month of the strike.
in the FEC and this would require fur- Secretary Pace urged Mr. Lovett on 5
ther limitations. By 1 September, Clark July to bring this loss to the attention of
concluded, theater stocks would be re- both labor and management in the hope
duced to about 350,000 rounds or only that further damage might be averted.23
62 days supply instead of 90.21 The urgency of the 155-mm. shell situ-
General Collins recognized that the ation was reflected at the army and corps
situation in the Far East Command was level in Korea several days later. Van
far from ideal, but he relayed several Fleet informed his subordinates that the
hard production facts to Clark in early resupply rate through October would
July. At the present, only about 100,000 amount to about six to eight rounds per
rounds of 155-mm. ammunition were day and therefore the Eighth Army
coming off the lines each month and this would employ its 155's only on the most
would gradually climb to 650,000 rounds remunerative targets, using other caliber
a month in approximately a year. To
22
Msg, DA 912775, Collins to Clark, 3 Jul 52.
20
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I, The strike was not settled until 25 July 1952 and
Narrative, pp. 139-41. endured fifty-four days in all.
21 23
Msg, CX 51020, Clark to Collins, 28 Jun 52, in Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 5 Jul 52, sub:
Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, Paper Opening of Christie Park Plant . . . , in G-3
53. 470. 7.
338 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

weapons and tactical air wherever possi- full rate of forty rounds per day per tube
ble as substitutes.24 would be sought. When this was at-
On 13-14 July, Collins and his deputy tained, Clark would only requisition
assistant chief of staff, G-4, General ammunition on the basis of the number
Reeder, visited Eighth Army and assured of rounds actually fired.28
Van Fleet that he would get a minimum As the action on the front mounted
of five rounds of 155-mm. ammunition in September and October, ammunition
per day per tube including the tubes in expenditures on both sides climbed. In
the new ROK battalions. To help out one week in September the UNC artil-
during the emergency, Reeder suggested lery and mortar units hurled over 370,-
to Van Fleet that he might convert some 000rounds at the enemy and received
of his 105-mm. to 8-inch howitzer bat- over 185,000 in return. During the fierce
talions since tubes were available and battles of October, the Eighth Army sent
ammunition was plentiful. 25 423,000 rounds of 105-mm. howitzer and
Clark was not willing to let the daily 108,000 rounds of 155-mm. howitzer
rate rest at such a low figure and he shells at the Communists in a six-day
authorized Van Fleet in early August to period.29
expend fifteen rounds of 155-mm. how- The sharply accelerated rate of fire
itzer shells a day per tube. General Col- per tube per day from less than 8 rounds
lins was able to secure approval of this of 155-mm. in September to 18 in Oc-
rate later in the month by curtailing tober posed a new worry for General
other allocations severely.26 Clark. If the rate should continue,
To help alleviate the shortage, Clark theater stocks would be reduced to 26
had asked for permission to procure 600,- days of supply instead of 60 by the end of
000rounds of 155-mm. ammunition (less November.30 The prospect led him to
explosives) in Japan. But when the urge the Army to review its efforts to
Army discovered that the cost would be expedite deliveries and rebuild the
more than 60 percent over the U.S. rate, theater stocks. Clark also pointed out
it turned down the request.27 that the 155-mm. howitzer shells were
However, the Army did agree in mid- not the only cause for concern. 81-mm.
August to replace ammunition expended high explosive light shells for mortars
in Korea. This would mean that a nine- and 155-mm. high explosive gun shells
ty-day level for the Korean area at the had been slow in arriving and what was
more serious, only 355 fragmentation
24
Msg, GX 6904, CG EUSAK 10 CG I U.S. Corps hand grenades had been shipped to the
et al., 10 Jul 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin FEC between 15 August and 7 October.31
Files, Jul 52, p. 15.
25
Memo, Mudgett for Clark, 15 Jul 52. sub: Items 28
of Personal Interest to CINCFE . .., in UNC/ Msg, DA 915951, G-4 to CINCFE, 14 Aug 52.
29
FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Support- (1) Memo, Eddleman for DCofS Opns and
ing Docs, tab 16. Admin, 29 Sep 52, sub: Statistical Data, in G-3 091
26 Korea, 93/3. (2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52,
(1) Msg, CX 53249, Clark to CofS, 7 Aug 52, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, p. 32.
30
Supporting Docs, tab 62. (2) Memo, Ralph J. Msg, CX 57223, Clark to DA, 18 Oct 52, in
Watkins for Bendetsen, 28 Aug 52, no sub, in FEC UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CinC and CofS,
Gen Admin Files. Supporting Docs, tab 51.
27 31
Msg, DA 915309, G-4 to CINCFE, 7 Aug 52. Ibid.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 339

AN 8-INCH HOWITZER AND CREW

In its reply the Army assured Clark ties had broken out there, the situation
that it was doing all it could to improve would have been disastrous.33
the situation and that the supply picture There were two points that should
was steadily becoming better.32 Some be kept in mind in considering the am-
production was lost in the 155-mm. how- munition situation during the last two
itzer shell because of the steel strike and years of the war. First, there were no
this had held down the delivery rate of shortages of more than a temporary na-
this critical round. Yet in this and in ture in the hands of the troops. When-
the other rounds that were in short sup- ever it was necessary, the Eighth Army
ply, the FEC got the lion's share. The could use whatever ammunition it
real danger, General Reeder commented needed to protect itself. Secondly, de-
later on, lay in the precarious position spite the restrictions on the rounds per
of theater stocks in Europe. If hostili-
33
Reeder, The Korean Ammunition Shortage,
32
Msg, DA 922080, G-4 to CINCFE, 25 Oct 52. ch. VI, p. 9.
340 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

day during the more quiescent periods, provement in the performance of some
the Eighth Army consistently fired far ROK units during the mid-1952 period
more ammunition than it received from was definitely encouraging.
the Communists. And this did not in- With the replacement of General
clude the bombs, gun, and rocket fire Ridgway by General Clark in May, there
launched by the UNC air forces. The had been a change of attitude toward
troops could not fire as much as they the enlargement of the ROK Army.
desired all the time, it was true, but theBoth MacArthur and Ridgway, it will
picture was not all black. The bleakest be remembered, had favored a ten-divi-
spot was in the U.S. global ammu- sion force of 250,000 men as a desirable
nition situation rather than in Korea. size and strength. But Clark was in-
Provided that Korean demands re- clined from the start toward an ex-
mained fairly stable, this condition panded ROK Army. Several times dur-
would not be alleviated until production ing the first two weeks of his assumption
facilities reached their peak in 1953. In of command, he remarked that the big-
the meantime, restrictions would remain ger the ROK Army was, the better he
in effect and the dispute over shortages would like it.34
would continue. In reality the ROK Army had grown
steadily above the 250,000-man level and
The Expansion of the ROK Army had long been overstrength. Just before
Ridgway had left the theater, he had
Discussion of the domestic problems submitted a new troop list totaling over
of budget, manpower, and availability 360,000 spaces, covering the additional
of resources for the Korean War could artillery, tank, and security forces being
hardly avoid the closely related subject organized and providing for ten addi-
of the role of indigenous forces in the tional infantry regiments.35 The ten-
conflict. Since the United States wished division ceiling had been retained, but
to decrease gradually its commitments the independent regiments could be
in the Far East, the contributions of the used as cadres for new divisions if and
ROK, Japanese, Chinese Nationalist, when this became desirable.
and the armed forces of the other free Clark was thoroughly in accord with
nations in the area became more im- the expansion of the troop list. As he
portant. U.S. funds invested in native pointed out in June to the Washington
troops produced multiple returns, for staff, the ROK Army had supplanted the
the same amount of money would train, National Police in the corps areas and
equip, and maintain more Far East na- had taken on increased security duties
tionals than Americans and by the same in guarding prisoners of war and in sup-
token should permit the United States pressing guerrillas in the rear. In addi-
eventually to reduce its responsibilities tion, the replacement and training
and its manpower in the theater.
Whether the additional quantities of 34
Memo, Moorman for CofS, 26 May 52, sub:
indigenous soldiers would also succeed Expansion of the ROK Forces, in FEC Gen Admin
in attaining a high degree of quality Files,35
CofS, 1952 Corresp.
Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experiences, pt. IV,
was as yet undetermined, but the im- pp. 43-44.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 341

system which produced seven hundred cated, Ridgway had opposed the exist-
ROK soldiers a day had begun to pile ence of a small, ineffective ROK
up surpluses because of the low attri- air force which he thought would be an-
tion rate at the front. To disrupt this nihilated at the outset by superior Com-
smoothly functioning process, Clark rea- munist air power.39 The objections to an
soned, would not be wise, since it formed augmentation of the ground forces
insurance against a period of heavy ac- stemmed from altogether different rea-
tion. It should not be forgotten, Clark sons. Owing to the shortages in artillery
concluded, that there were 30,000 pa- equipment and ammunition, ROK
tients carried on the rolls because the Army increases in these categories could
ROK had no veteran's organization to be supported only by equivalent reduc-
care for them. Under these conditions, tions in U.S. or U.N. forces that were
he felt that the Army should grant him being currently maintained. If there
authorization for 92,100 bulk personnel were to be an expansion in the ROK
and 19,458 to form six separate regi- Army, both G-3 and G-4 preferred the
ments.36 increase to be in separate regiments that
Four days later, Clark followed up would not require additional artillery
with another request. He wanted to add support rather than in divisions.40
two more ROK divisions to the troop The JCS, however, were not yet pre-
list and increase the total for logistical pared to approve an augmentation of
support from 363,000 to about 415,000. the ROK armed forces. At the end of
With the creation of the new divisions, June they decided to hold to the ten-
Clark maintained, the number of Asians division, 250,000-man Army and the
fighting communism would rise and the existing Navy and Air Force.41
number of American casualties would When General Collins visited Korea
decline. The ROKA replacement sys- in mid-July, he approved raising the
tem would sustain the extra divisions Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army
and the six separate regiments, and help (KATUSA) to 2,500 men per division,
make the best use of South Korean man- but this was as much as he could do at
power.37 the time. Clark had to inform Van Fleet
As it turned out, the movement for not to activate further separate light
expanding ROKA ground forces was not infantry regiments and that ROK Army
opportune. The Korean Ambassador to strength could not exceed 362,945 men.
the United States, You Chan Yang, was To insure that the replacement and
at the time urging the State Department, training system did not cause the total
the Air Force, and Congress to adopt a strength to go over this figure, Clark told
three-year plan for building up the ROK the Eighth Army commander to take
Air Force tactically.38 As already indi- action to separate the physically dis-
36
Msg, C 50459, Clark to DA, 19 Jun 52, DA-
IN 152025. The bulk allotment included patients,
39
trainees, interpreters, general prisoners, etc. See Chapter X, above.
37 40
Msg, CX 50698, Clark to JCS, 23 Jun 52, DA- Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Jul 52, sub:
IN 153560. Strength, Organizational and Logistical Support of
38
Ltr, You Chan Yang to Bradley, 18 Jun 52, Wartime ROK Army, in G-3 091 Korea, 74.
41
no sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 82. Decision on JCS 1776/281, 30 Jun 52.
342 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

abled and other nonuseful members of distributed among the UNC units. Not
the ROK Army from the service.42 only would the South Koreans bolster
The Collins tour and his discussions the fighting strength of the UNC organ-
with Clark and Van Fleet bore fruit in izations, he argued, but they would also
early August. The Chief of Staff over- receive the training that would make
rode his staff by approving the requested them the finest cadres.46
bulk allotment of 92,100 men and di- The FEC requests for augmenting the
recting Army support for a two-division ROK Army and KATUSA were passed
augmentation for the ROK Army. As along to the JCS together with a third
Collins envisioned the divisional expan- Clark recommendation covering the en-
sion, it would be progressive and fitted largement of the ROK Marine forces
within current budget guidelines and from 12,376 to 19,800.47 The Joint
availability of logistical resources. He Chiefs also were reconsidering whether
felt it would be desirable to capitalize to allow the ROK Air Force to grow as
on the ROK capability to supply trained Ambassador You had suggested in June.
manpower economically and to pave the In mid-September, they determined to
way for the eventual withdrawal and hold firm to their earlier position and
redeployment of U.S. Army forces.43 maintain the ROK Air Force as it was.48
While the JCS studied the implica- The following week the JCS approved
tions of adding two divisions to the ROK Clark's plan for increasing the ROK
Army, the strength of this army grew to Army, Marine forces, and KATUSA,
over 350,000 men in August.44 Since lifting the troop ceiling for the ROK
KATUSA was not included in the Army and marines to 463,000. In their
ROKA totals, Van Fleet asked Clark to memorandum to Secretary Lovett, the
seek a further increment in KATUSA JCS admitted that to supply and equip
strength to a ceiling of 27,000.45 Clark the ROK increments would mean that
agreed and urged the Army to permit the continental U.S. forces would have to
up to 28,000 KATUSA soldiers to be go on operating under a 50-percent ceil-
ing on critical items, that 105-mm. how-
42
(1) Memo, Mudgett for Clark, 15 Jul 52, sub: itzers would have to be diverted from
Items of Personal Interest to CINCFE . . . , in FEC
Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. (2) Msg, C NATO programs, and that other critical
52744, CINCFE to Van Fleet, 29 Jul 52, in UNC/- items would have to be withdrawn from
FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, an. 4, pt. III, incl 3.
43
Memo, Brig Gen John C. Oakes, SGS, for
46
ACofS G-3, 8 Aug 52, sub: Additional Logistical Msg, C 55066, Clark to DA, 12 Sep 52, DA-IN
Support of War Time ROK Army, in G-3 091 183011.
47
Korea, 71/5. Msg, CX 54489, CINCFE to JCS, 1 Sep 52, DA
44
The strength figures broke down as follows: 179035.
48
10 divisions, 144,420; corps troops, 16,004; Army Memo, Brig Gen Charles P. Cabell for Secy
troops, 101,113; bulk allotment, 92,100; total, Defense, 19 Sep 52, sub: A Three Year Plan for
353.637. See Msg, CX 54184, CINCFE to DA, 25 the ROK Air Force, in G-3 091 Korea, 60/5. It
Aug 52, DA-IN 176440. should be noted that this decision was somewhat
45
At 2,500 men per division, KATUSA strength deceptive, for the U.S. Air force had added twenty
could reach 20,000 since there were 8 divisions—6 more fighter planes to the ROK Air Force between
U.S. Army, 1 Marine, and 1 Commonwealth. The the JCS decision of 30 June and the end of Sep-
other 7,000 would be placed in combat support tember. See Ltr, Col C. C. B. Warden, TAG FEC,
units. See, Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, for JCS, 30 Oct 52, sub: Peacetime ROK Air Force,
sec. I, Narrative, p. 90. Marine Corps and Navy, in G-3 091 Korea, 74.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 343

mobilization reserve stocks. Despite the new influx would soon send the
these disadvantages, the JCS felt that ROKA total above the present ceiling.
the opportunity to add more Asians to If the ROK Army were not going to be
the fight against communism made the enlarged, Clark told the JCS, he would
program worthwhile.49 have to cut back the number of replace-
On 1 October, on the heels of the JCS ments to the current attrition level.51
memo, Clark sent an urgent request for Before the Secretary of Defense gave
decision on the expansion of the ROK his support to ROK expansion, however,
armed forces. The efficient replacement he wanted to know more about the im-
and training machine that was feeding pact of the program upon NATO, the
the ROK Army seven hundred recruits Japanese defense forces, the Chinese Na-
a day was working all too well. In July tionalist Army, and military assistance
the Eighth Army had tried a subterfuge to the countries of Southeast Asia. Gen-
to hold down the flow of recruits by eral Bradley quickly informed him that
carrying all the new trainees as civilians deliveries of critical items like 105-mm.
until they had completed basic training; and 155-mm. howitzers and 75-mm. re-
otherwise the ceiling would have been coilless rifles to other nations would be
exceeded in August. Rather than delayed by two months and that the
disrupt the steady input into the induc- necessity to supply ammunition for these
tion stations, the Eighth Army decided weapons, if they were assigned to the
to gamble that the requests for ROKA ROK Army, would further limit the
increases would be approved ultimately capability of the United States to provide
and resorted to civilian trainees. If and ammunition for Europe and the zone of
when the augmentation were granted, interior. As for other items that
the men would be trained and ready would be required, these could be fur-
to go into the new units as they were nished from Army mobilization and
organized.50 depot stocks.52
There were certain advantages to this On 25 October, Mr. Lovett forwarded
procedure since it permitted the phys- to the President his recommendation
ically unfit and undesirables to be that the ROK forces be expanded with
weeded out before they were sworn into a new ceiling of 463,000 men and five
the Army. But the delay in the decision days later Mr. Truman approved the
at Washington had led to a crisis. The proposal.53 In the meantime, the Repub-
training cycle was only eight weeks long lican candidate, General Eisenhower,
and by September the first civilian train- had made his famous announcement
ees were finishing the course and begin- that he would go to Korea if he were
ning to funnel into the Army officially. 51
Msg, CX 56149, Clark to JCS, 1 Oct 52, DA-
With casualties still at a moderate level, IN 190069.
52
(1) Memo, Deputy Secy Defense Foster for JCS
49
Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 26 Sep 52, 8 Oct 52, sub: Augmentation..., incl to JCS 1776/-
sub: Augmentation of the Wartime ROK Army 322. (2) Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 10 Oct
and Marine Corps, in G-3 091 Korea, 66. 52, sub: Augmentation . . . , in G-3 091 Korea, 66/8.
50 53
(1) Memo, GCM [Mudgett] for CINC, 20 Sep (1) Ltr, Lovett to the President, 25 Oct 52, no
52, sub: Strength of the ROK Army, in FEC G-3 sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 66/17. (2) Memo, Lovett
320.2 Strength No. 1. (2) Msg, CX 56149, Clark for JCS, 30 Oct 52, sub: Augmentation . . . , G-3,
for JCS, 1 Oct 52, DA-IN 190069. Korea, 66/16.
344 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

elected and had urged that the ROK cadres of the six ROKA 155-mm. how-
forces be increased. On 29 October, at itzer battalions authorized were sent out
a political speech, he had read excerpts in June—one to each U.S. division. By
of a letter from Van Fleet to his former November they were ready to take their
chief of staff, General Mood, in which battalion firing tests.56
the Eighth Army commander expressed The assignment of ROKA artillery
his familiar theme that the ROK Army battalions to U.S. artillery units in the
should be doubled from ten to twenty combat zone complicated the problems
divisions so that U.S. forces could be re- of the latter considerably. In addition
leased.54 Whether the political pressure to surmounting the language barrier, the
of the campaign had an appreciable ef- U.S. artillery commanders had to devote
fect upon President Truman's decision a great deal of time to the training of
would be difficult to ascertain, but it was the ROKA outfits and to the finding of
possible that it might have speeded up suitable firing positions for the ROKA
favorable action. pieces in their often crowded sectors.
At any rate, the first big step toward To improve the caliber of the ROKA
building a more formidable ROKA officer corps, Clark requested the Army
force had been taken and Eisenhower's in June to raise the allocations of student
victory at the polls in early November spaces in U.S. service schools to 581 for
indicated that this move was only the fiscal year 1953. Three months later, he
forerunner of further developments asked that 100 spaces in the Artillery
along the same line. School and 150 spaces in the Infantry
The drive for expansion had garnered School be made available for ROKA
the major share of the attention during officers in the session that was to begin
the summer and fall of 1952 and tended in March 1953.57
to throw into the shadows the other de- Under Brig. Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan
velopments in the ROK Army. During the Korean Military Advisory Group
April the ROK 1st Field Artillery Group (KMAG) had almost 2,000 U.S. per-
of two 105-mm. howitzer battalions com- sonnel assisting in ROK training by Oc-
pleted its training and in May moved tober, but the lifting of the troop ceil-
into the line in support of the ROK 6th ing to 463,000 betokened additional
Division. By October eight of the duties. Van Fleet levied twenty-four
ROKA artillery groups were available officers from his corps and divisions and
for duty and the remaining two would channeled sixty-eight more from his
be ready before the end of the year. In pipeline into KMAG. Unfortunately,
the field of armor, four ROKA and one losses to rotation deprived KMAG of
Korean Marine tank companies were op- many officers and enlisted men during
erational by the close of October and
three others were awaiting the arrival 56
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, June and Oct
of tanks from the United States.55 The 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 73 and 63, respectively.
57
(1) Msg, CX 50924, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jun 52,
54
New York Times, October 30, 1952. in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, an. 4, pt. II,
55
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, May and Oct 52, J-17, 27 Jun 52. (2) Msg, CX 55484, CINCFE to
sec. I, Narrative, pp. 41-42 and pp. 62-64, re- DA, 20 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52,
spectively. CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 55.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 345

the last half of 1952 and imposed a heavy


burden upon the KMAG staff.58
In mid-September, Van Fleet asked
the ROK Army to increase the Korean
Service Corps (KSC) from 75,000 to
100,000. He planned to form six new
regiments and bring the existing units
up to strength. Since members of the
KSC served six-month terms, the ROK
Army would have to bring in 4,000 per-
sonnel each week to keep the program
at full strength.59

Crisis in the Rear

In addition to the support and train-


ing functions behind the lines, the ROK
Army had to cope with security problems
as well. Prisoners of war and the safe- GENERAL RYAN
guarding of the lines of communication
were two facets of this function. ROKA ROK Government during the spring of
units joined other UNC forces in pro- 1952. The basic cause for the rise of
viding personnel to watch over the pris- domestic dissension lay in the conflict
oner camps as they were dispersed in between President Rhee and the mem-
May and June. In the rural areas, bers of the National Assembly who op-
guerrillas or bandits—it was difficult posed him. With the national elections
to distinguish one from the other- destined to be held in the summer, Rhee
formed a constant threat to the lines of determined to have the constitution
communication. In some sections the changed so that the President could be
roads were unsafe during the hours of elected by popular vote rather than
darkness and many farmers were afraid chosen by the Assembly. His foes Were
to cultivate their land even under the equally resolved to keep this function in
protection of guards during the day- the legislative branch.61
time.60 On 24 May matters came to a head.
Although guerrilla activity was mainly Rhee placed Pusan under martial law
of nuisance value only, the bands op- and had some of his opponents in the
erating in the important Pusan port sec- Assembly arrested. Evidently he in-
tor assumed an important role in the tended to dissolve the Assembly and have
development of the internal crisis in the a new one elected to amend the constitu-
58
Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experience, pt. IV, tion so that there would be a bicameral
pp. 8-10. legislature and popular election of the
59
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. I,
Narrative, pp. 105-06.
President. At any rate, he charged the
60
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I,
Narrative, p. 204. 61
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, pp. 46-47.
346 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

arrested assemblymen with complicity existed.64 As an added safety measure


in treason in a Communist conspiracy the JCS authorized Clark to divert up
and justified the continuation of martial to a regimental combat team from Japan
law as a measure to counteract guerrilla if the political situation deteriorated.65
operations in the Pusan area.62 The chief concern of the UNC rested
The consternation caused by Rhee's in the uninterrupted flow of supplies to
actions was immediate both within and the front, since Pusan was the major
outside Korea. Political and military port of South Korea and handled the
representatives of the U.N. and the bulk of shipments for the Eighth Army.66
United Nations Command sought to dis- But the State Department requested full
suade him from further steps that might support from the UNC in its efforts to
result in weakening Korean democratic alter Rhee's stubborn stand on martial
institutions and might endanger mili- law and the National Assembly and Col-
tary operations at the front. Since the lins instructed Clark to back the U.S.
problem was primarily political, Clark political representatives firmly.67
and Van Fleet preferred to let the State On 2 June President Truman sent a
Department handle the affair, although note to Rhee deprecating the loss of
Van Fleet did go to see Rhee on 28 confidence in Korean leadership that was
May, together with General Lee Chong taking place and asking him to defer
Chan, the ROKA Chief of Staff, in an further action until Ambassador Muccio
effort to persuade the President to lift returned from the United States.68 Tru-
the martial law edict.63 Rhee promised man's request may have given Rhee
to consider this, but took no action. pause, for although he did not lift mar-
In the meantime, Van Fleet took pre- tial law, he evidently decided not to
cautionary steps to safeguard the UNC dissolve the National Assembly.
personnel and installations. Security The impasse between Rhee and his
guards were reinforced and plans pre- legislature eased as they began to nego-
pared to protect UNC troops, vehicles, tiate a compromise during June. It took
and property from mob violence. Since the form of a constitutional amendment
the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry on 3 July that among other things pro-
Regiment was engaged in prisoner of vided for the popular election of the
war duties at Pusan, Van Fleet ordered President and Vice President and the
the unit pulled back to the United Na- establishment of a second legislative
tions Reception Center at Taegu to act chamber. Despite the clear-cut victory
as a mobile reserve. He warned General over his opponents, Rhee did not end
Yount of the 2d Logistical Command martial law until 28 July.69
that extreme care should be taken to 64
Msg, GX 6155, CG Eighth Army to CG 2d
avoid participation in civil disturbances Logistical Comd, 30 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd
where no danger to the U.N. Command Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS, incl 27.
65
Msg, JCS 910146, JCS to CINCFE, 30 May 52.
66
Msg, C 69322, Clark to DA, 30 May 52, DA-IN
145040.
62 67
Ibid., p. 48. Msg, DA 910149, CSUSA to CINCFE, 31 May
63
Msg, LC 893, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 28 May 52.
68
52, in Hq Eighth Army, Opn Planning Files, May UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, p. 47.
69
52, item 106A. Ibid., Jul 52, pp. 54-55.
PROBLEMS OF LIMITED WAR 347

During the tense moments in late line and sent to southwestern Korea to
May and early June, the U.N. Com- help eliminate the nuisance. This had
mand carefully watched the effects of been tried before with only moderate
the crisis upon the military supply lines success and the ROK 1st Division had to
and on the ROK Army. Since the polit- undergo a similar experience. As the
ical parties had abstained from inter- division moved through the mountain-
ference in military logistics and Van ous Chiri-san region with National Po-
Fleet had taken a firm stand against lice units attached, it met no organized
political tampering with the leadership resistance. The guerrillas followed the
of the ROK Army, Clark and Van Fleet same pattern of dispersion and evasion
were inclined to remain aloof and let that they used before. Breaking up into
the Koreans work out their own internal small groups until the ROK forces passed
problems.70 They had supported the them by, they came together again after-
U.S. political representatives faithfully, wards and resumed their depredations.
if without great enthusiasm, in the ef- After a campaign of more than three
forts to end the Korean political war.71 weeks chasing the elusive bandits, the
While the guerrilla threat that Rhee ROK 1st Division returned to the front
had used as a reason for imposing mar- and the National Police again resumed
tial law had not posed a significant chal- responsibility for the rear areas. From
lenge to either the ROK Government August to October, about three to four
or the UNC, small-scale action of hundred guerrillas were reported killed
a bandit nature mounted during June. and a hundred or so were captured each
On 24 June guerrillas or bandits blew month, yet the over-all guerrilla strength
up a train in southwest Korea, destroyed declined very slightly.73
eleven coaches, and killed over forty It was evident that the problem did
passengers.72 not admit of an early solution and would
ROK Army and police units waged a probably continue. In Clark's opinion,
constant skirmish with these predators— however, hunting of guerrillas, like the
whose chief objectives seemed to be food settlement of political squabbles, was an
and clothing. But despite the toll that internal ROK affair and in September
the ROK forces exacted, the guerrilla he told Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren,
bands managed to gain new recruits and commander of the newly formed Korean
to carry out harassing raids. In July the Communications Zone, that American
ROK 1st Division was pulled out of the soldiers could be used to guard prisoners,
safeguard property, and protect supply
70
(1) Msg, GX 74495 KCG, Van Fleet to Clark, routes and U.N. nationals, but not to
17 Jun 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal
Msg File, 1949-52. (2) Memo, Col Walter R. chase bandits.74
Hensey, Jr., G-5, for SGS, 19 Jun 52, no sub, in Although the United Nations com-
FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.
71 73
(1) Msg, GX 6632, Van Fleet to Clark, 24 Jun Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Jul 52, sec. I,
52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personel Msg Narrative, p. 6; Aug 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 80-
File, 1949-52. (2) Msg, GX 51399, CINCUNC to 81; Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 118; Oct 52, sec. I,
JCS, 5 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, Narrative, p. 66.
74
CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 15. Msg, C 54962, CINCFE to CG KCOMZ, 10 Sep
72
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I, 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and
Narrative, p. 204. CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 6.
348 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the UNC lines of communication and to


prevent enemy agents from being
landed, but in reality designed to form
a buffer area between the ROK and Jap-
anese vessels.75
Hardly had this uneasy moment passed
when Rhee decided to put an end to the
UNC practice of employing about 2,000
Japanese in Korea. Most of the Japanese
were working in port areas, installing
equipment and training Korean replace-
ments. But ROK resentment at the pres-
ence of its former overlords in positions
of responsibility led Rhee to direct the
arrest of all Japanese who came ashore
without the permission of the ROK Gov-
ernment. Clark countered by instructing
all Japanese employees to remain on
shipboard except in case of absolute ne-
GENERAL HERREN cessity. Since the Department of the
Army did not wish Clark to make an
mander was able to remain neutral in issue of the matter, Collins told him to
the ROK domestic situation, he found intensify his efforts to replace the Japa-
it difficult to avoid participation in the nese with Koreans and to work out a
republic's embroilment with Japan. Re- program for doing this that Rhee might
lations between the two countries, approve.76 In early October Clark passed
embittered by the controversy over Japa- these instructions on to General Herren,
nese claims to vested properties in advising him that the emphasis should
Korea, were aggravated by the Japanese be put upon training Koreans quickly
practice of fishing off the Korean coast. as replacements and upon an amicable
In September the ROK Navy seized sev- solution of the altercation.77
eral Japanese fishing vessels that had 75
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, pp. 44-46.
violated ROK territorial waters and ten- 76
(1) Msg, DA 919564, DA to CINCFE, 27 Sep 52.
sion mounted. Clark was forced to estab- (2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, pp. 46-49.
77
Msg, CX 56725, CINCUNC to CG KCOMZ, 9
lish a sea defense zone on 22 September Oct 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CinC
off the Korean coast, ostensibly to secure and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 55.
CHAPTER XVI

Conservation of Resources
The return of sporadic activity on the The Turning Coin
battlefield in November 1952 and the
suspension of other than liaison officer's Paradoxical though it may seem, rota-
meetings at Panmunjom forecasted a tion was both the main strength and the
long, uneventful winter. With raids, pa- chief weakness of the Eighth Army in
trols, and small-unit actions characteriz- late 1952. As a bolster to morale, rota-
ing operations at the front and with tion played a vital and necessary role in
bickering over incidents and infractions sustaining the ground forces through the
of the neutrality of the conference area depressing and frustrating conditions
highlighting the contacts between the created by a deadlocked battle situation.
negotiators, the problems of limited war By rotating units in and out of the lines
continued to receive a considerable share at regular intervals, the monotony of rou-
of attention during the winter of 1952- tine patrolling and defensive warfare
53. In Washington and in the Far East was broken and a change of pace pro-
the accent remained on conserving and vided. But even more important was
protecting the most precious commit- the point system that promised a quick
ment of the United States to the war—its return home to the individual as soon as
manpower. Since military victory was he had served his time at the front.
no longer at stake, there seemed to be Before September 1951, a soldier in
no reason why American lives should be Korea had to have a minimum of 6
expended needlessly nor for the burden months in a combat division or 12
of fighting to be carried on by the old months in a support unit to be eligible
hands. Under static conditions along the for rotation. New criteria were drawn
battle lines, more ROK troops could be up in August establishing the point sys-
trained and utilized and units could be tem. For each month in the close combat
rotated more frequently. This would zone, a soldier received four points. For
allow U.S. forces to be placed in reserve service in the rear areas two points were
more often and decrease the number of earned, and duty in the rest of the FEC
U.S. casualties. The United States could merited one point. In September the
not end the Korean War nor could it requirements were 55 constructive
withdraw its troops from the peninsula, months service (CMS) for officers and
but it could trim its losses and equalize 43 for enlisted men.1
the risks that each soldier would have to 1
Under these standards, eleven months in the
take. close combat zone (11 x 4) would be enough to
make an enlisted man eligible for rotation.
350 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

As Army strength increased in the fall were going to be necessary to meet the
of 1951 the criteria were lowered to 40 FEC quotas during the coming months.
CMS for officers and 36 for enlisted men. Personnel shortages in the European
The officer standards were raised to 45 Command, he went on, had already re-
CMS in December to cope with an ex- sulted and overseas tours in all other
pected shortage of officer replacements theaters had been extended six months.5
scheduled for early 1952.2 To keep the point total at 36 for the
March 1952 witnessed an overhauling combat zone during the winter, Clark
of the rotation system. Effective 1 April, had to transfer combat troops from Japan
four points were still awarded for a and Okinawa to the Eighth Army and to
month in the close combat zone, but only increase the point requirements for the
three were given to the troops in the rear areas, first to 38, and later, to 40
divisional reserve, now called the inter- points.6
mediate combat zone. By June require- To Clark's request for additional re-
ments stood at 37 CMS for officers and placements to cover the rotational needs,
36 CMS for enlisted men.3 Generally, General Collins replied in December
slightly less than a year in Korea in a that the Army's ability to furnish re-
combat division would suffice to put a placements was determined by the
man on the rotation list and it was small budget, Army strength ceilings, and by
wonder that the point score became the draft calls. The point system, he contin-
chief topic of conversation among the ued, was devised to establish priority of
combat troops.4 There could be no individuals for rotation and not to set up
doubt of the value of this bright side of the rate at which the Army was supposed
the coin in maintaining the fighting to supply replacements. Collins, how-
spirit of the Eighth Army during the ever, was able to offer some comfort, for
last year of the war. he informed Clark that the shipments
But the reverse side disclosed some of of replacements in January and February
the disadvantages in adhering to the would be well over 30,000 and this would
practice rigidly. To supply the Far East permit some of the November and De-
Command with the 20,000 to 30,000 re- cember deficits to be made up. 7
placements a month that were necessary At the front, rotation also had an ad-
to meet rotational demands imposed a verse effect upon combat efficiency. By
severe strain on the Army's manpower October 1952, most of the junior officers
resources. As General Hull told Clark with World War II experience had re-
in early October, drastic levies on the turned home as their tours expired and
zone of interior units and installations their replacements usually had little or
2
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Oct and Dec 51,
no acquaintance with the battlefield.
sec. I, Narrative, p. 10 and p. 13, respectively. Many of the troops sent over from the
3
(1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, G-1 United States lacked field training and
sec., p. 3. (2) Ibid., Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative,
5
p. 83. Msg, DA 920367, Hull to Clark, 7 Oct 52.
4 6
Memo, Watkins for Bendetsen, 28 Aug 52, no (1) Msg, C 57617. Clark to Collins, 24 Oct 52,
sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Aug 52. It should in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls 1-89, incl
not be inferred that the service units at the rear 32. (2) Msg, C 58392, Clark to Collins, 6 Nov 52,
were uninterested in the point score, but there was in same place, incl 33.
7
less at stake here—time not life. Msg, DA 925905, CSUSA to Clark, 10 Dec 52.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 351

had to learn the hard way under combat hazards. Terrain familiarization was dif-
conditions. By the time the new men ficult as the outfits constantly shifted in
became proficient soldiers, they had and out of the line.
amassed enough points to qualify them The enemy also used the terrain much
for rotation and the process had to start more adeptly. While UNC positions
all over again. Proficiency standards were often located on the crest of hills
were extremely difficult to maintain and and ridges or on the forward slopes,
the artillery and the technical services where they were more exposed to enemy
were especially hard hit. General Van fire, the enemy used the reverse of slopes
Fleet complained that the artillery had for his sleeping and supply bunkers and
lost the ability to shoot quickly and accu- dug tunnels deep into the hills. When
rately and blamed this on the rotation the enemy built his trenches, they were
program that had stripped the artillery angled and parapeted with raised firing
units of their veteran gunners.8 positions; the UNC trenches, on the
There were other unfortunate by- other hand, too frequently were deep,
products as well. In a defensive war straight, and difficult to fire from. All
such as in Korea in 1952, strong fortifica- too often enemy soldiers could infiltrate
tions in depth, with carefully laid out and sweep a long straight trench with
fire patterns for supporting weapons, automatic weapons fire.9 The difference
well-planned mine fields, and barbed between the enemy and UNC attitude
wire entanglements to prevent or delay toward defense during this period was
enemy access to strongpoints or outposts similar to that between a homeowner
were required. The enemy had devel- and an overnight guest at a hotel. The
oped a high degree of skill in establish- enemy became well-acquainted with the
ing his defensive lines and in providing neighborhood and took every precaution
for their protection. In many instances, to protect his property, while the UNC
enemy units defending the forward areas forces adopted the short-term, casual ap-
had remained in the same sectors for proach of the transient.
long periods and become thoroughly fa-
miliar with the terrain. Spurred by the Facets of the Artillery War
knowledge that they would stay in posi-
tion for some time, they took every With rotation as the carrot dangling
possible step to increase the strength of before his eyes, the individual soldier's
their defenses. main concern was to stay alive until his
For the UNC troops, the opposite was year of combat service expired. Neither
often true. Since they did not usually officers nor enlisted men were particu-
man a given sector of the front for any larly interested in taking undue chances
considerable length of time, the tend- under these conditions and an air of
ency was to lay as few mines and as little caution arose. As the reluctance to jeop-
barbed wire as possible so that the pa- ardize lives grew, the effort to substitute
trols would not have to worry about these firepower for manpower increased. In
9
FEC G-3 Staff Study, Sep 52, title: Defensive
8
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, sec. I, Capabilities of Eighth Army, in UNC/FEC, Comd
Narrative, pp. 68-69. Rpt, Sep 52, an. 4, pt. III, Paper 3.
352 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

October and November, UNC gunners artillery, Van Fleet determined to try
fired eight rounds of artillery and four out his plan to concentrate heavy fire-
rounds of mortar fire for every enemy power against the enemy's artillery.
round received. By December, although Choosing the Triangle Hill-Sniper
the mortar ratio dipped to three to one, Ridge area in the U.S. IX Corps sector
the preponderance in artillery rounds as the locale for the test, Van Fleet at-
favored the UNC by nineteen to one.10 tached the 1st Observation Battalion
The attempt to bury the enemy under and major elements of two 8-inch how-
tons of explosive hardware generated itzer and two 155-mm. gun battalions
some interesting experiments. from the U.S. I and X Corps to the IX
General Van Fleet was quite con- Corps artillery. During the long and
cerned over the Eighth Army's use of difficult struggle for control of this hill
artillery during the fall of 1952. After complex, Van Fleet wrote to Clark, each
conferring with his corps commanders time that the UNC forces had gained
in September, he decided to alter the the top, intense artillery and mortar fire
ratio of 155-mm. guns to 8-inch howit- had made retention of the crest too ex-
zers. The Eighth Army had forty-four pensive. When the enemy forces had
8-inch howitzers and twenty-eight 155- moved onto the heights, the UNC artil-
mm. guns in September and was in the lery had forced them to withdraw. The
process of converting a battalion of 155- only way to break this sequence, Van
mm. guns to 8-inch howitzers. Van Fleet Fleet went on, was to destroy the enemy
halted this conversion and ordered the artillery. Then, the ROK 2d Division
conversion of a 105-mm. howitzer bat- could seize and hold on to the hard-
talion to 8-inch howitzers instead. When contested hill mass.12
the change-over was completed, the Clark was willing to permit Van
Eighth Army would have forty-eight 8- Fleet's counterbattery program to pro-
inch howitzers and thirty-six 155-mm. ceed and to countenance the extra ex-
guns. Van Fleet believed that this ratio penditure of ammunition for a five-day
would provide his army with a better period, but he did not want the ROK
balance in heavy artillery and allow it to 2d Division to renew the battle for Tri-
get maximum benefit from its superior angle until he was sure the results would
firepower.11 be commensurate with the risks. If ex-
Once he had reorganized the heavy cessive casualties or abnormal ammuni-
10
tion outlays were going to be required
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, sec. I,
Narrative, p. 1, gives the following figures: to keep Triangle, Clark was opposed to
the move.13
Using aerial photography and sound,
flash and radar plots, supplemented by
shelling reports, the IX Corps artillery
12
Ltr, Van Fleet to Clark, 3 Nov 52, no sub, in
FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.
13
Msg, C 58517, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 8
11
Ibid., Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. Nov 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files,
61-65. Nov 58.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 353

staff compiled a target list of enemy his fighter-bombers. He believed that


weapon locations. On 3 November the the use of artillery against enemy anti-
experiment began as the greater part of aircraft artillery weapons before and
three 8-inch howitzer and three 155-mm. during the strikes would help cut down
gun battalions fired single guns and sal- Fifth Air Force plane losses to AAA fire.
vos at the Communist gun positions. Van Fleet approved a thirty-day test pe-
During the next week the heavy artillery riod that began on 25 September. As
shot close to 20,000 rounds in an effort the fighter-bombers approached the tar-
to eliminate the enemy's artillery in the get in the IX Corps sector, the artillery
vicinity of Sniper Ridge and Triangle fired proximity fuze shells at the known
Hill. But the success was only limited. enemy AAA positions in the area. When
Artillery observers estimated that it took the planes closed on the target, the artil-
approximately 50 rounds of accurate fire lery switched to quick-fuze ammunition
to achieve destruction of an enemy artil- and continued to fire until the air attack
lery piece because of the Communist's was over. At the conclusion of the ex-
skillful use of caves, tunnels, and heavy periment on 25 October the Fifth Air
overhead protection. During the test Force reported only 1 plane had been
period over 250 enemy gun emplace- lost and 13 had been damaged by enemy
ments were damaged or destroyed, but antiaircraft fire during the test. A total
only 39 artillery and 19 antiaircraft of 1,816 sorties had been flown and, ac-
pieces were put out of action. The Com- cording to statistics based on previous
munist artillery was not silenced and the experience, the losses should have
battle for the hills continued.14 been between 4 and 5 planes destroyed
General Clark was not averse to the and about 64 damaged. No Fifth Air
continuance of a counterbattery pro- Force plane had been hit by IX Corps
gram, but he told Van Fleet on 10 No- artillery fire during the test. In view of
vember that it would have to be carried the favorable outcome of the experiment
on within the normal ammunition allo- under static ground front conditions,
cations assigned to the Eighth Army—at Barcus and Van Fleet instructed their
least, until the over-all supply of heavy units to make the flak-suppression pro-
artillery shells increased.15 gram standard operating procedure in
Better success attended a second ex- the future.16
periment conducted in September and The heavy expenditure of ammuni-
October on the IX Corps' front. The tion during the October fighting stimu-
Fifth Air Force commander, General lated a suggestion from Under Secretary
Barcus, requested a flak-suppression ef- of the Army Johnson in the latter part
fort by Eighth Army artillery units in of the month. Impressed by the magni-
conjunction with close support strikes by tude of the task of providing adequate
14
105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer ammu-
Report of Counter Battery Destruction Pro-
16
gram IX Corps Artillery, 3-10 November 1952, in (1) Ltr, Fifth AF to CG Eighth Army, 11 Nov
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, bk. 8: Ar- 52, sub: Results of Thirty Day Flak Suppression
tillery, tab 2. Experiment ... (2) Ltr, Eighth Army to CG
15
(1) Ltr, Clark to Van Fleet, 10 Nov 52, no sub. U.S. I Corps et al., 13 Nov 52, sub: Artillery Fire
(2) Ltr, Van Fleet to Clark, 15 Nov 52, no sub. During Air Strikes. Both in Hq Eighth Army,
Both in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. Comd Rpt, Nov 52, bk. 8: Artillery, tab 2.
354 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

nition for the Eighth Army, Johnson version of shipments for other theaters
requested General Collins to investigate if it proved necessary. To help him
the feasibility of substituting mortar fire correct deficiencies in the United States,
for artillery fire whenever possible. Not Lovett asked Clark to send a complete
only were mortar shells easier to produce appraisal of the UNC ammunition situa-
and transport, Johnson pointed out, but, tion and its effects.19
he claimed, they also were causing the In his reply two days later, Clark main-
bulk of the casualties in Korea.17 tained that the currently authorized
When Collins passed Johnson's pro- ninety-day level of supply for the FEC,
posal on to the Army Field Forces, they at the Department of the Army approved
made a quick rebuttal. While granting day-of-supply rates for ammunition, was
that two more 81-mm. mortars might quite adequate.20 The trouble, Clark
profitably be added to each infantry went on, was that many of the items
battalion, they stated that both artillery were below the ninety-day level and that
and mortars were designed for particu- the shipments scheduled for the remain-
lar missions. To use mortars, which were der of the year would not make up the
meant for close-in support, to replace deficits. Since a high rate of artillery
artillery, which handled the longer- fire resulted in lower friendly casualties,
range tasks, would result in an over-all he deplored the need to reduce the allo-
loss of firepower and battlefield effective- cations of 155-mm. howitzer ammunition
ness. The Field Forces staff doubted that from 15 to 9.4 rounds per day. The
the mortars were producing more casual- necessity to watch and hoard ammuni-
ties than artillery fire, for the statements tion had also curtailed the ability of his
of prisoners of war indicated just the command to retain the initiative by
opposite.18 launching limited objective attacks,
The Under Secretary's concern over Clark continued, and worse than that,
the slow progress of ammunition produc- made the U.N. Command particularly
tion was reflected in Secretary of De- vulnerable to critical shortages in the
fense Lovett's message to Clark on 21 event of a general offensive by the Com-
November. Noting that the problem had munists. Under the circumstances, he
been a continuing one for two years concluded, the only prudent solution was
despite large appropriations and at- to increase ammunition production as
tempts to expedite the program, Mr. soon as possible to the point where the
Lovett informed Clark that he would FEC could be supported at the author-
use all his powers to insure that the ized Department of the Army rate.21
shortages did not affect the U.S. forces Secretary Lovett promised Clark that
in combat. He had already ordered a the Army would deal with the shortages
maximum effort to move the necessary
19
stocks to meet FEC needs, including di- Msg, DEF 924436, Lovett to Clark, 21 Nov 52.
20
If the day-of-supply rate was 50 rounds for a
17
Memo, Under Secy Army Johnson for CofS, 23 particular caliber gun, the number of guns in the
Oct 52, sub: Employment of Mortar vs. Artillery FEC of that caliber would be multiplied by 50 and
in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 103. then that total would be multiplied by 90 for
18
AFF Staff Study, 21 Nov 52, title: Employment ninety days of supply.
21
of Mortars vs. Artillery in Korea, in G-3 091 Msg, C 59373, Clark to Lovett, 23 Nov 52, in
Korea, 103/2. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls 1-89, incl 67.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 355

COLLECTION POINT FOR SALVAGED CARTRIDGE SHELLS


in ammunition as though the United smoother."22 As the appropriations
States were under full production mobi- voted in 1951 for ammunition produc-
lization and that overriding priorities tion expansion finally began to bear fruit
would be granted as needed. One way in late 1952 and early 1953, the prospects
in which the FEC could help, Mr. Lovett for some relief in the ammunition situa-
said, would be in returning brass cart- tion would become much brighter.
ridge cases from expended 105-mm. In the meantime, the Far East Com-
rounds, since this had become a choke- mand and Eighth Army resorted to sub-
point in production. Clark immediately stitutions to tide themselves over the
asked Van Fleet to aim as close as period of shortages. When the supply of
possible at a 100-percent return of re- 81-mm. mortar shells became low in
usable cartridge cases. "While we are January 1953, the Eighth Army units on
still a long ways from being 'out of the the line were directed to fire 4.2-inch
woods,' " he told Van Fleet, "I am con- mortars or to use artillery fire until thea-
vinced that our repeated requests for
increased supply have finally struck 22
Msg, C 59528, Clark to Van Fleet, 1 Dec 52,
home and that the ammunition supply in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, inch 1-89, incl
road ahead will be considerably 68.
356 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ter stocks could be replenished.23 To determine Eighth Army has never been
lessen the drain on 155-mm. howitzer 'out' of ammunition nor denied authority
ammunition, Clark again sought to con- to shoot ammunition in adequate quanti-
ties when required by the tactical situation.
vert two of his battalions to 240-mm. Insofar as can be determined, no unit in
battalions, since there supposedly was Korea was refused ammunition for an
sufficient ammunition of this caliber essential mission.
available to sustain two battalions at a While Eighth Army was never 'out' of
rate of fifteen rounds per day. The De- ammunition the shortage limited the com-
bat potential of theater forces. The con-
partment of the Army informed him tinued increase in enemy artillery activity
that equipment and spare parts would with a corresponding increase in friendly
arrive in March.24 casualties required an increase in Eighth
As the ammunition situation began to Army's counterbattery effort which in-
improve in early 1953, General Van cluded the employment of the Corps and
Division artillery 155mm Howitzer material
Fleet returned to the United States to and therefore necessitated the expenditure
retire. In March and April he appeared of a critical type of artillery ammunition.
several times before Congressional com- In addition, the attack of targets character-
mittees for questioning on conditions in istically dug-in at considerable depths
Korea. His statements that he had been required increased expenditures to accom-
plish their neutralization or destruction.
handicapped during his twenty-two With the knowledge of shortages of critical
months of command by shortages of am- types of ammunition and their limited pro-
munition brought the subject out into duction, the amount of ammunition avail-
the open and the Army had to defend able for day to day operation was
necessarily restricted and care was taken to
publicly its handling of the problem.25 hold down expenditure whenever possible
General Collins quickly asked Clark without denying their use when necessary.
to prepare a statement and on 16 March Had the enemy launched and sustained an
the Far East commander complied. His all-out offensive during the periods of am-
assessment of the situation was as fol- munition shortage, theater stocks would
have been reduced dangerously low since
lows: this type of operation always results in the
expenditure of 3 or 4 times the DA day of
There has been no shortage of small arms supply of ammunition and therefore would
ammunition in the theater; stocks of other have placed us in an unfavorable position
ammunition as indicated below have been in our capability of striking back hard at
less than they should have been. However, the most opportune time and place.
such shortages were mostly in theater stocks
and the pipeline and not in forward area He listed the types that had been in
combat units. As far as I have been able to short supply at various times and then
23
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, went on to state that he considered the
Narrative, p. 126.
24
(1) Msg, CX 59611, CINCFE to DA, 3 Dec 52, present levels of ammunition in the thea-
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl ter to be adequate for maintaining cur-
46. (2) Msg, DA 925751, G-3 to CINCFE, 7 Dec 52. rent operations and to counter a general
The 159th Field Artillery Battalion and the 213th
Field Artillery Battalion were converted to 240- Communist offensive if it should mate-
mm. battalions on 20 March 1953. rialize, provided "on-hand assets are
maintained at the 90-day level'' 26
25
For a detailed account of the matter, see U.S.
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 83d Con-
26
gress, 1st session, Hearings on Ammunition Supplies Msg, C 61525, Clark to Collins, 16 Mar 53, in
in the Far East. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72, incl 37.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 357

The complexities of the ammunition Thus as early as November, the ROK


story made the accuracy of the short- ground forces had a strength ceiling of
age charges extremely difficult to evalu- 463,000 men.28 But a twelve-division
ate. But it was doubtful whether more army was only a stopgap measure, in
ammunition in the critical categories Clark's opinion, and he submitted a plan
would have substantially influenced the and schedule on 1 November for aug-
battle situation in the last two years of menting the total to 20 divisions by
the war, for the restrictions on offensive August 1953. The number of ROK
operations were not dependent upon the Army Corps would be increased from
ammunition supply, but rather upon the 2 to 6 to handle the additional divisions.
political and military objectives of With a 16-week training period set up
the United States and its U.N. allies at for the new divisions, the last one acti-
the time. As long as they preferred to vated would be ready for combat before
settle the war at the conference table and the close of 1953. As the ROK units were
to delimit the Korean commitment, even organized, equipped, and trained, Clark
full stocks of ammunition could have informed Collins, 1 U.S. or other U.N.
made no real difference in the outcome. division could be placed in reserve for
The Communist disregard for the loss of each 2 new divisions prepared. By
lives involved in protracting the war ar- May 1953, he could begin to release the
gued that a few thousand more casualties U.S. divisions—one at a time—for em-
alone would not have impelled them ployment elsewhere. If all went well, up
more quickly toward a settlement of the to 4 U.S. divisions and 2 corps headquar-
dispute. ters could be redeployed by mid-1954.
ROK Army expansion, Clark cau-
The Bulwark Grows tioned, also had its negative side. The
Military Advisory Group would have to
As already related, one way in which be enlarged to carry the increased load
the United States could limit the com- and over five hundred officers and en-
mitment in Korea was by building up listed men would have to come from
the ROK fighting forces. Shortly after outside the theater. If U.S. forces were
President Truman approved the expan- withdrawn from the line and eventually
sion of the ROK Army to 12 divisions in from Korea, pressure from other UNC
late October, the ROK 12th and 15th countries to decrease their commitments
Divisions were activated, along with 6
28
separate regiments. The Eighth Army Msg, CX 58179, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,
1 Nov 52, in FEC G-3 320.2 Strength No. 1, gives
estimated that the 12th Division and 3 the following breakdown:
separate regiments would be operation-
ally ready by the end of December and
the 15th Division and the other 3 regi-
ments would be prepared for action a
month later.27

27
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I,
Narrative, pp. 44-46.
358 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

could also be expected. And as ROK be adopted and that the problem of
troops began to assume more responsi- budgeting the cost of the program—
bility for manning the front lines, the which could not be absorbed by the U.S.
United States would have to turn over Army under present limitations—be
more and more matériel and equipment taken up by the Joint Staff.30
to them and this could never be recov- Secretary of the Army Pace and Gen-
ered regardless of the outcome of the eral Collins agreed that the time had
war. Much of this would come from the come to consider the ultimate goal for
FEC's strategic reserve and would affect ROK forces. On 17 November Pace
the growth of the Japanese defense passed the matter on to Secretary Lovett,
forces. If the ROK Army were expanded as the implementation of the twenty-
to double its present size, its combat effi- division program was beyond the pur-
ciency would suffer as cadres were taken view of the Army. The broader aspects
from the present units, Clark continued. of such an increase would involve the
To counter this watering-down, he rec- over-all conduct of the war in Korea,
ommended that the balance of the pro- governmental relations with nations who
gram be implemented as U.S. logistical were recipients of Mutual Defense
capabilities permitted, with the empha- funds, and the structure of the federal
sis being laid on the development of budget, Pace declared, but the Army fav-
sound forces as well as U.S. personnel ored the establishment of a ROK capa-
savings.29 bility to man the entire battle line as
In Washington, the Army G-3 ap- quickly as possible.31
proved Clark's note of caution. ROK Although Mr. Lovett turned the prob-
manpower, General Eddleman pointed lem over to the JCS early in December,
out, was not a limiting factor, but the there was small chance that a decision
scarcity of competent leaders from non- would be reached until the new adminis-
commissioned officers up to the corps tration took over in January. Both
level would restrict the effectiveness of President-elect Eisenhower and his des-
the newly formed units. Since the ignated Secretary of Defense, Charles
United States would have to provide the E. Wilson, were briefed in the interim
bulk of the logistic support, including on the implication of raising a twenty-
initial equipment, the Mutual Defense division ROK Army. General Collins
Assistance Program and NATO aug- pointed out that 105-mm. and 155-mm.
mentation would both incur delay. Ed- howitzers and certain types of ammuni-
dleman urged that Clark's moderate tion were the most critical items of
approach to the ROK Army expansion equipment and supply that would have
to be considered, but the main question
29
Ltr, Clark to CofS, 1 Nov 52, sub: Expansion 30
in ROKA, in G-3 091 Korea, 77/2. Although Clark (1) Summary Sheet, Eddleman for DCofS, 3
did not mention comparative costs in maintaining Nov 52, sub: Proposed Two Year Program . . . .
U.S. and ROK divisions, a study by the Eighth in G-3 091 Korea, 75. (2) Memo, Eddleman for
Army in November estimated that the monthly pay CofS, 4 Nov 52, sub: Development of Wartime
and rations for a U.S. division amounted to $6,104,- ROK Army, in G-3 091 Korea, 73/3.
31
164 as against $76,745 for a ROK division. See Hq Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 17 Nov 52, sub:
Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I, Narrative, Further Expansion of ROK Forces, in G-3 091
p. 55. Korea, 76.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 359

CADETS OF THE KOREAN MILITARY ACADEMY ON PARADE

remained that of financing the program. plementary two billion dollars were
In the past, the Chief of Staff declared, added to the Army budget for fiscal year
there had been no specific Congressional 1954 and the cost of supporting twenty
authority for the Army's support of ROK divisions were budgeted far in advance;
forces. There was, however, tacit ap- and if estimated delays in the completion
proval; Congress had been informed and of the NATO program and in the pro-
had voted appropriations for the Army vision of normal artillery strength of
to provide replacement of equipment four battalions for all the ROKA divi-
furnished the Republic of Korea. Col- sions were accepted.32
lins felt that the expansion program
32
was feasible: if the current stalemate (1) Memo, Collins for Bradley, 26 Nov 52, no
sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 82. (2) Briefing for the Secy
continued and the enemy did not in- Defense Designate by the CofS, ca. mid-Dec 52, in
crease his forces appreciably; if a sup- G-3 337, sec. IV, 64.
360 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

As the Republicans under President Fleet activated the two new divisions.35
Eisenhower took over control of the gov- The pattern for permitting the ROK
ernment in January and began to weigh induction machine to generate pressure
the pros and cons of the ROKA expan- for the formation of additional organized
sion, events in Korea provided an addi- units seemed likely to continue. Since
tional impetus to their deliberations. the Eisenhower administration favored
The ROK induction machine, still work- the increased use of indigenous forces in
ing in efficient fashion, had continued order to lessen the eventual demands
to train replacements at a brisk pace. on the United States, the chief prob-
By mid-January Clark had informed the lems in the future, as in the past, would
JCS that if the present induction rate center upon the timing and the financing
were maintained, all major ROKA units of the expansion. In the meantime, the
would be overstrength by the end of the ROK Army began to take on the propor-
month. It was basically the same prob- tions of a well-rounded force. By Janu-
lem as before; curtailment would inter- ary, five of the ten original divisions had
rupt the flow of trainees and entail a been assigned organic artillery of three
loss of time if the operation were to be 105-mm. and one 155-mm. howitzer bat-
resumed at a later date. Since cadres talions, and the other five were being
and replacements for two more divisions supported as they entered the line by a
were now available, Clark recommended full complement of four ROK artillery
approval of the activation of two divi- battalions. Seven ROK tank companies
sions in January and the raising of the were operational and each had twenty-
strength ceiling to 460,000, exclusive of two M36 medium tanks mounting 90-
KATUSA. If possible he would like to mm. guns. The eighth and ninth tank
have the entire ten-division augmenta- companies were expected to become op-
tion approved in principle and theater erational in March and April.36
stocks expended in outfitting the elev- Although Clark and Van Fleet were in
enth and twelfth ROK divisions expedi- favor of adding a second Korean Marine
tiously replaced.33 regiment (less one battalion) and an-
While the decision was pending, the other 105-mm. howitzer battalion to pro-
JCS told Clark that he should proceed vide a Marine force of 23,506 men, they
under the assumption that favorable ac- opposed further expansion. The small
tion would be taken in Washington.34 ROK Navy did not have the personnel
On 31 January Clark instructed Van or sea transport to support a larger Ma-
Fleet to go ahead with the formation of rine Corps, they maintained in February
the 20th and 21st ROK Divisions and 1953, and there were no known or antici-
three days later official permission came pated requirements for such a force. If
from the President for fourteen divisions
35
and six separate regiments. Including (1) Msg, EX 40140, Clark to Van Fleet, 31 Jan
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, G-3 sec., pt.
KATUSA and marines, the new ceiling III, tab 5. (2) Msg, JCS 930325, JCS to CINCFE, 3
would be 507,880. On 9 February Van Feb 53. (3) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53,
sec. I, Narrative, p. 45.
33 36
Msg, CX 60941, Clark to JCS, 14 Jan 53, DA- Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Jan and Mar
IN 226714. 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 42-43 and p. 53, re-
34
Msg, JCS 929141, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jan 53. spectively.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 361

equipment were committed for develop- ing to gain a settlement of $87,000,000


ing more Marine units, they went on, for all advances up to 16 December 1952.
the ROK infantry division program In the agreement reached in late Feb-
would be delayed.37 Clark also urged ruary, the United States agreed to pay a
that the ROK Air Force strength of total of $85,800,000 for advances through
8,600 men and one F-51 fighter wing 7 February, but secured ROK agreement
be maintained. The JCS agreed in Feb- to a quarterly adjustment of rate of ex-
ruary that the ceiling should be 9,000 change that could more accurately reflect
personnel rather than the 11,550 desired the actual value of the ROK currency.40
by the ROK Government.38 The influx of American dollars, coupled
The growing military strength of the with a ROK currency conversion in Feb-
Republic of Korea was matched by its ruary that forced the South Koreans to
mounting economic instability. As more turn in all their won for new whan at a
of its resources, both human and mate- 100 to 1 rate, was expected to ease the
rial, were devoted to the prosecution and crisis somewhat, at least for the time
support of the war, inflation increased. being.41 But the indications grew as
The large U.S. demands for advances of spring approached that the ROK Gov-
ROK currency to sustain the UNC ernment intended to push for increased
forces were the main target of ROK U.S. support of the South Korean war
complaints on the shaky status of the effort to alleviate the internal economic
South Korean financial position, but as situation.42
already indicated, this was but one cause. Across the Sea of Japan, the efforts of
To help stabilize the Korean economy, the United States to strengthen its bul-
the United States went on making its warks met with a different response. The
dollar payments during the winter. In Japanese seemed content to hold their
December, Clark paid the ROK Govern- defense forces at the four-division, 110,-
ment over $8,500,000 for the won 000man level until the political climate
advances of October and November, of opinion became favorable to a change
bringing the total of payments to over in the Constitution that would permit
$74,000,000.39 armed forces to be raised legally. In the
Although the unofficial rate of ex- meantime, the funds set aside for equip-
change was over 20,000 won for one dol- ping the proposed ten-division Japanese
lar, the ROK officials insisted upon defense forces were held in abeyance,
maintaining the old 6,000 to 1 rate in its pending the conclusion of a Japanese-
dealing with the U.N. Command. Ne-
40
gotiations between the ROK and UNC (1) Msg, CX 60997, CINCUNC to DA, 21 Jan
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67,
in January 1953 found the former striv- incl 56. (2) Msg, CX 61338, CINCUNC to DA, 25
Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls
37
(1) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, pp. 36-37. 1-88, incl 48. The payment was made to the
(2) Msg, GX 2084 KGO, CG EUSAK to CG AFFE, Korean Ambassador in Washington on 10 March.
10 Feb 53 in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files,
Jan-Jun 53. (3) Msg, CX 61365, CINCFE to DA, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incl
28 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 51.
38
39
41
42
1-88,Msg,
Hqincl
FEC,
CX
JCS
AX
30.61258,
931029,
Press
73181,CINCUNC
Release,
CG
JCS KCOMZ
to 12
CINCFE,
toDec
DA,
to52.CINCUNC,
11
17 Feb 53,
53.
28 Mar 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls
1-72, incl 41. See Chapter XX, below.
362 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

U.S. bilateral agreement.43 By February Army commander more time "to fight
1953, the Department of Army esti- the war without having to look over his
mated that only $350,000,000 of the shoulder to keep tabs on what was hap-
$528,600,000 allocated for Japan would pening in the rear areas." 45
be expended by the end of the fiscal With headquarters at Taegu the Ko-
year, because of the Japanese reluctance rean Communications Zone, under Gen-
to build up their forces further. 44 Under eral Herren, extended over the southern
these circumstances, the lion's share of two-thirds of the Republic of Korea. Its
the available equipment went to the new responsibilities included the pris-
ROK and the imbalance between Japa- oner of war camps, supply movement
nese and ROK armed strength became and stockpiling, maintenance of ports
greater. The Japanese lack of enthusi- and railroads, and co-ordination of relief
asm only provided a stronger stimulus and reconstruction work insofar as was
for the growth of the military power of possible under the divided authority ex-
the Republic of Korea. isting between the UNC and other U.N.
agencies.46
The Reorganization of the As the separation of combat and serv-
Far East Command ice functions on the Korean peninsula
got under way, Clark decided to reorgan-
Since the winter of 1952-53 reflected ize his Tokyo headquarters into a truly
in many ways the eagerness of the United joint command. Under MacArthur and
States leaders in Washington and in the Ridgway, the Far East Command staff
Far East to conserve manpower at the had consisted almost entirely of Army
front, it was not surprising that retrench- officers and enlisted men. Ridgway had
ments in the administrative and house- considered the possibility of setting up
keeping functions in the rear should also a joint staff, but had not gotten around
be considered. Shortly after Clark as- to putting the plan in effect before his
sumed command, he decided to make a departure.47
careful study of the command organiza- As noted in the previous discussion of
tion of the FEC. the channels of command, there was a
The Koje-do crisis had demonstrated U.S. Army Forces, Far East, on paper,
the weakness of the Eighth Army com- in 1951, but it had no staff and was
mander's relationship with his rear areas not operational. (See Chart 1.) Instead
and one of the first steps that Clark had the Eighth Army operated on the
taken was to establish a separate Korean same level as the Naval Forces, Far East,
Communications Zone on 10 July 1952. and the Far East Air Forces, despite
By relieving Van Fleet of concern over the fact that it was technically below
his lines of communications, logistical them in the chain of command. To
support, prisoners of war, and civil af- dispel any resentment that this ar-
fairs, Clark hoped to give the Eighth 45
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 145-
46.
43 46
47
Incl to Memo, G-3 for JSPOG, ca. 10 Dec 52, Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, sec. I,
sub:SeeU.S.
USAF Hist Study
Military No. 72,
Assistance USAF Opns
to Japan, in
in FEC Narrative, pp. 205-07.
G-3 322.01, Commanders and staffs.
44
Msg, DA 931246, G-3 to CINCFE, 13 Feb 53. the Korean Conflicts, 1 Nov 50-30 Jun 52, p. 72.
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 363

rangement may have incurred among reallocation in addition to saving a con-


Navy and Air Force commanders, Clark siderable number of U.S. and Japanese
decided to staff the Army Forces, Far civilian spaces.50
East headquarters, and place it on a With the establishment of AFFE,
par with the top naval and air com- Clark proceeded to the second task of
manders. He would remain Command- making the Far East Command a joint
ing General, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, organization in the hope that if the other
as he had been before, to avoid the services shared the top assignments and
necessity for putting another four-star the personnel burden, "it would increase
general senior to Van Fleet in the posi- the effectiveness of the team play that
tion. When Clark informed the JCS of was so needed in Korea." 51 His first in-
his intention on 20 August, he noted that clination was to assign the J-1 (Person-
the Army Forces, Far East (AFFE) com- nel) , J-3 (Operations), and J-5 (Civil
mand would eventually replace the Affairs) slots to Army officers, the J-2
Japan Logistical Command. This would (Intelligence) position to an Air Force
make possible the elimination of subor- officer, and the J-4 (Logistics) task to a
dinate commands, such as the Northern, Navy officer.52 But when the Joint Staff
Central, and Southwestern Commands as began its operation on 1 January 1953,
well as the Headquarters and Service J-1, J-2, and J-3 were filled by the
Command in Tokyo.48 Army and J-4 and J-5 were manned by
On 1 October the Japan Logistical Navy officers. It was not until after the
Command was discontinued and all of armistice was signed that an Air Force
its functions were transferred to AFFE. general took over the operations job.
At the same time the Northern Com- Three deputy chiefs of staff, one from
mand of the Japan Logistical Command each service, were set up under General
was also abolished.49 Clark appointed Hickey, the chief of staff, to provide ad-
General Harrold as his deputy in com- ditional triservice representation.53
mand of AFFE, and staff sections from (Chart 4)
the Far East Command were assigned Thus the FEC entered the last stages
to perform similar functions in the new of the war with an organization that
organization. Later in the month, Clark finally conformed to the concept of a
set up a manpower board to survey joint command. Whether the change
the requirements of AFFE and the rest would have a real effect upon the con-
of the joint FEC staff. He estimated duct of a static war would be difficult to
that the reorganization would take until determine, since the prospects for facing
the end of the year and would release
initially over 1,100 military spaces for
50
Msg, C 57646, Clark to DA, 23 Oct 52, in
48
Msg, C 53964, Clark to JCS, 20 Aug 52, in UNC/ UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CINCUNC and
FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CINCUNC and CofS, CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 45.
51
Supporting Docs, tab 3. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 133.
49 52
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, p. 3. Although Msg, C 54992, Clark to JCS, 11 Sep 52, in
the Headquarters and Service Command was also UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CINCUNC and
eliminated in early 1953, the Central and South- CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 1.
53
western Commands both endured to the end of Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 133-
the war and beyond. 34.
CHART 4—FAR EAST COMMAND STAFF AND MAJOR COMMANDS ORGANIZATION, 1 JANUARY 1953
CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 365

major challenges seemed remote. None- if the battlefield erupted in grandiose


theless, the arrival of Navy and Air Force fashion, General Clark's team might be
officers to fill positions on the Joint Staff in better shape to organize its defenses
meant that the Army could expect fur- and prepare for the counterattack more
ther personnel savings in this area. And quickly.
CHAPTER XVII

Cold Front
After the bitter fighting of October ently at his disposal, Clark told Collins,
and early November 1952, the approach positive aggressive action was not feasi-
of another winter witnessed a rapid de- ble, but he had developed an outline
cline in the scale of operations at the plan of action that would compel the
front. The enemy retired into his deep enemy to seek or accept an armistice. If
bunkers and caves to hibernate, and ac- the JCS would approve the outline plan,
tion settled down to the old routine of he went on, the FEC staff could draw up
raids, patrols, and small unit skirmishes. supporting plans.1
Waiting patiently for a break in the re- In mid-October, a task force of three
cessed armistice negotiations, both sides FEC officers arrived in Washington to
seemed content to watch each other explain and defend Clark's proposal.
warily along the battle lines and to con- Basically it was a drive to the P'yong-
serve their energy. The slackening of yang-Wonsan line in three phases, each
operations permitted the enemy to re- lasting about twenty days. It included
plenish his supplies and to bring up enveloping drives by ground forces, a
replacements, despite the efforts of the major amphibious assault, airborne ac-
UNC air forces to destroy Communist tion as opportunities developed, and air
depots and communications lines. But and naval action against targets in China.
the build-up appeared to be perfunctory To expand the war would require an
and not directed toward the resumption accompanying augmentation of the FEC
of large-scale fighting. As the cold forces and the tally was impressive.
weather set in, its influence dominated Three U.S. or U.N. divisions (1 infantry,
the front. 1airborne, and 1 Marine), 2 ROK divi-
sions, 2 Chinese Nationalist divisions, 12
The Demise of Military Victory field artillery battalions, and 20 antiair-
craft artillery battalions would be re-
Despite the stalemate, General Clark quired in addition to those already in
had not given up all hope of mounting a the U.N. Command to sustain the of-
large-scale operation against the enemy. fensive successfully.2
During the flare-up of activity in Octo- According to Clark's later account,
ber, he had voiced his concern to the
Chief of Staff that the UNC failure to 1
Ltr, Clark to Collins, 9 Oct 52, no sub, in G-3
achieve an armistice stemmed from the 091 Korea, 8/56.
2
G-3 Staff Study, ca. 21 Jan 53, title: Capability
lack of sufficient military pressure upon of U.S. Army to Implement CINCUNC Operations
the Communists. With the forces pres- Plan 8-52, in G-3 381 Pacific, 4/4.
COLD FRONT 367

every subordinate commander in the settlement to be won by the force of


FEC "heartily endorsed this course of UNC arms; it was evident that the
action." With the possibility of a change political leaders, whether they were
in the political administration in the Democratic or Republican, intended to
United States and the elevation of a mili- negotiate an end to the conflict.
tary man to the leadership of the
country's affairs, the prospects of an ad- Winter Action
ditional effort to wind up the Korean
War did not seem to be far-fetched. As As long as the desire to negotiate was
Clark remarked later on, "I knew we not matched by a willingness to concede,
had to be ready with the plan if the turn the future course of the war seemed
of events called for a more vigorous pros- likely to be a repetition of what had
ecution of the war.3 gone before. The enemy had taken
The military leaders of the FEC were losses in October that had cut its esti-
doomed to disappointment. President- mated strength from 1,008,900 to 972,-
elect Eisenhower arrived in Korea on 2 000at the end of the month.5 But when
December with a large and distinguished the fighting tapered off in November,
party, including the Secretary of De- the enemy total began to climb slowly
fense-designate, Charles E. Wilson, once again.
General Bradley, and Admiral Radford. Reports from the front indicated that
He toured the front and visited Presi- the Communists were digging in to stay.
dent Rhee, talking with a great many Although it took from three to five
people on the scene, but never once did months to excavate their large caves,
he bring up the matter of seeking a they steadily hollowed out space for
military victory in Korea. Speaking to a squads and platoons in the bowels of
press conference at Seoul on the last day strategic hills. Here, protected from
of the visit—5 December—the President- UNC air and artillery as well as cold
elect admitted that he had "no panaceas, weather, the enemy could comfortably
no tricks" for bringing the war to a sit out the winter. Interrogation of pris-
close. The most significant thing about oners revealed no knowledge of a general
Eisenhower's visit, in Clark's opinion, offensive, and the disposition of enemy
was that he, Clark, was given no oppor- forces along the front gave no indication
tunity to set forth the detailed estimate of other than a usual defensive align-
of forces required and the plans formu- ment. On the immediate front there
lated to increase the military pressure were 7 Chinese armies with 166,000 men
upon the enemy. The conversations and 2 North Korean corps of 49,700 sol-
with General Eisenhower clearly dem- diers on 1 November 1952; the latter
onstrated to Clark that the new Presi- anchored the extreme eastern end of the
dent would follow the course set by Mr. line. (See Map V.) Ten Chinese ar-
Truman and seek an honorable peace.4 mies containing over 350,000 troops and
Thus died the last hope for a military 5
4
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I,
Ibid., p. 233. Narrative, p. 5. CCF strength declined from 732,300
3
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 81. to 705,200 and the North Korean Army dipped
from 266,000 to 257,000.
368 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

PRESIDENT-ELECT EISENHOWER AND GENERAL JENKINS NEAR CH'ORWON

4 North Korean corps with about 140,000 showed little sign of increasing aggres-
soldiers were in reserve positions where siveness. Of the 1,227 planes sighted
they could either reinforce the front or during the month, only 395 engaged
defend against possible amphibious land- UNC aircraft with estimated enemy
ings by the UNC. Facing them were losses of 21 destroyed, 4 probably de-
eighteen UNC divisions and their sup- stroyed, and 19 damaged.7
porting troops totaling about 350,000 The enemy made one major relief in
men.6 November, moving the CCF 47th Army
As the ground operations fell off in into the Imjin River sector and the 39th
mid-November, Communist road traffic Army back into reserve. On the UNC
mounted as the enemy strove to rebuild side, the U.S. 25th Division took over
his stocks. More enemy aircraft began the positions of the U.S. 7th Division
7
to appear
Ibid., over North Korea, but they
pp. 15-16. on 12 November and the ROK 9th Divi-
6
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I,
Narrative, Figure 2.
COLD FRONT 369

sion relieved the ROK 2d Division on


24 November; both of these changes
were routine as the U.S. IX Corps ro-
tated its divisions on the line.

The IX Corps
The U.S. IX Corps had taken the
brunt of the Chinese attacks at White
Horse, Triangle Hill, and Jackson
Heights during October, but the pres-
sure along the corps front eased after
mid-November. Only in the Sniper
Ridge sector north of Kumhwa did the
Chinese continue to demonstrate their
sensitivity to ROK possession of outposts
on the hill.
On 2 December an enemy platoon
probed the ROK 9th Division outposts
on Sniper Ridge and a second platoon
joined in the action. Intense fire from
artillery and mortars was exchanged for
a time, and then the Chinese advanced ENTRANCE TO A COMMUNIST BUNKER
and took over the crest. But the UNC
artillery concentrations soon made en- The pattern held steadily through
emy possession of the newly won posi- January as the Chinese sent frequent
tions too costly. As the enemy withdrew, probes of up to three platoons in
the ROK forces returned to the outposts. strength against the Sniper Ridge out-
A brief respite followed, then a second posts with no success. Outside the ROK
Chinese attack led to a hand grenade 9th Division area, the Chinese were hard
duel. Once again the ROK defenders to find. The IX Corps divisions sent out
fell back. On the next day two ROK 2,668 night patrols during the month of
platoons carried on a seven-hour battle January and reported only 64 engage-
with the enemy before regaining the ments initiated by these patrols.9
crest. During the ensuing ten days, the In February and March the corps dis-
Chinese launched 40 probes against patched over 2,500 patrols to raid, am-
Sniper Ridge without success. It is in- bush, or reconnoiter and fewer than a
teresting to note that of the 114 probes hundred made any contact with the en-
reported along the corps front during emy. All of March witnessed the capture
December, the Chinese directed 105
against the ROK 9th Division.8 9
U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, G-3 sec., pp.
11-12. It is quite possible that neither the UNC
8
U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, G-3 sec., nor the enemy patrols were searching too. intently
pp. 13-14. for the opposition during the cold winter nights.
370 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

of only one prisoner of war by a patrol.10 the company positions, especially those
Neither side showed any inclination to located on the valley floor. In the hilly
disturb the quiet state of affairs on the area on the eastern end of the company
central front and IX Corps was able to front, the Chinese positions were only
effect two routine division reliefs—one 500 yards distant. As usual, the enemy
at the end of December when the ROK had constructed the bulk of his bunkers
2d Division moved into the U.S. 3d Divi- and trenches on the reverse slopes and
sion positions and the other a month carefully camouflaged the openings on
later when the U.S. 3d came back into the forward slopes whence he fired his
the line and permitted the U.S. 25th weapons.
Division to pull back into corps reserve Since October 1952 1st Lt. Travis J.
—without incident. (Map VI) Duerr had commanded the company and
What was life like in the average in- he was one of the few officers in the unit
fantry company during the last winter? who had some combat experience. Un-
I Company, 35th Infantry Regiment, der him were 5 officers, 174 enlisted men,
25th Division, was a typical example.11 and 48 KATUSA's. One officer and 13
About six miles northeast of Ch'orwon, enlisted men were Negro, 10 were
the 3d Battalion of the regiment manned Puerto Ricans, one was a native Irish-
main line of resistance positions, with man, and one a native Hawaiian.
B Company, 1st Battalion, attached, Lieutenant Duerr distributed the
holding the left flank, I Company the KATUSA personnel along the front line,
middle, and K Company the right flank assigning each Korean to an American
of the battalion front. I Company's posi- "buddy." The "buddy" system enabled
tions extended 1,500 yards from the the Americans to train and supervise
broad floor of a valley to the crest of a the Koreans in U.S. methods, care of
north-south ridge more than 100 meters weapons, and at the same time to teach
above the valley. Because of the wide his "buddy" some words of English. For
front, all three rifle platoons were sta- the most part, the language barrier pre-
tioned on the main line. This meant vented the two from becoming close
that the company headquarters and mor- friends and, in I Company, many Ameri-
tar crews were the only force located on cans adopted a paternalistic or patroniz-
the reverse slopes of the hilly portion of ing attitude toward their "buddies."
the front and had to assume the coun- The company had 39 bunkers placed
terattack role usually assigned to a sup- at intervals across the front; 34 contained
port platoon. automatic weapons and 5 were used as
Elements of the 130th Regiment, 44th living quarters only. Many of the fight-
Division, CCF 15th Army, controlled the ing bunkers were divided into fighting
higher terrain to the north of I Company and living quarters housing from two to
and enjoyed excellent observation of all seven men. Eighty percent of each
10
U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Feb and Mar 53,
bunker was underground and could be
G-3, Sec. pp. 7-8 and p. 7, respectively. entered from the trenches which linked
11
The following account of I Company is based the entire front in this sector. Thick
upon the study by 2d Lt. Joseph J. Comps, Eighth
Army Historical Unit, A Rifle Company in Winter logs and sandbags covered by a burster
Defensive Positions. MS in OCMH files. layer of loose sand, stones, and sticks
COLD FRONT 371

PART OF THE BUNKER AREA OF THE 25TH U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION

protected the bunker roofs from artil- inch rocket launchers, and two M2 flame
lery and mortar hits. In some instances throwers were located in open emplace-
the bunkers had been originally located ments. The .50-caliber machine gun,
close to the topographical crests of the five of the heavy .30's, and six of the
hills rather than on the military crests light .30's, sited to provide interlocking
and had not been moved. In others the bands of fire, were sector weapons and
steep, uneven nature of the terrain per- I Company would leave them in place
mitted the automatic weapons sited in when it left the area. The added
these bunkers only limited fields of graz- strength in automatic weapons permit-
ing fire. ted Lieutenant Duerr to throw "a sheet
Since I Company defended an extend- of steel" at the enemy when he attacked.
ed front, it had additional automatic Three tanks from the regimental tank
weapons on hand to cover the enemy company with firing positions on the
approach routes. One .50-caliber, six ridge line and on the reverse slopes pro-
.30-caliber heavy, and twelve .30-caliber vided antitank defense from approxi-
light machine guns were backed by fif- mately the center of the company front.
teen automatic rifles in the bunkers. The tanks were M4's with 76-mm. rifles.
Three 57-mm. recoilless rifles, three 3.5- Besides the 60-mm. company mortars,
372 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the 60-mm. mortars of L Company, the armored vest. In I Company, the ma-
81-mm. mortars of M Company, 4.2- jority preferred the Marine-type vest,
inch mortars of the 27th Infantry Regi- which fitted more comfortably and ap-
ment, and the 105-mm. howitzers of the peared to provide more protection to the
64th Artillery Battalion could be called wearer. The Marine vest was sleeveless,
upon for direct support. had nylon padding around the upper
From one to four double aprons of chest and shoulders, and had plates of
barbed wire guarded the approaches to Fiberglass bonded with resin that covered
ICompany's positions, and Duerr placed the lower chest, back, and abdomen.
bands of triple concertina wire in front The Army vest relied upon layers of
of and behind the aprons for increased basket-weave nylon to take the impact
protection. Four combat outposts of shell fragments. Neither vest could
lay athwart the Chinese approach trails stop a bullet at close range, but both
along the company front. Each consisted could help decrease the number of cas-
of four two-man foxholes arranged in a ualties caused by mortar and artillery
diamond shape with the point toward fire and hand grenade fragments. There
the north. Concertina, double aprons of was general agreement in I Company
barbed wire, mines, and trip flares sur- that the vests had saved the lives of the
rounded the combat outposts, which men on the lines on many occasions.
were manned only at night by 3 relief The men of I Company also liked the
teams, of 1 noncommissioned officer, 2 mountain sleeping bag and the insulated
riflemen, and 1 automatic rifle crew of rubber combat boot called the "Mickey
2 men in each outpost. The outposts Mouse." Both afforded excellent pro-
stayed in place if they were attacked and tection against the Korean winter
fought until ordered to pull back. weather.
Because most of the riflemen in the Nightly, the three rifle companies of
company were inexperienced, they car- the 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry, sent out
ried M1 rifles rather than carbines. patrols. Col. Autrey J. Maroun, the reg-
Lieutenant Duerr felt that new men un- imental commander, and his staff
accustomed to fire fights often had "a planned the patrols one day in advance.
tendency, often a fatal tendency, to fire They set up the sector, route, objective,
all their ammunition in the first two or mission, strength, time of departure, and
three minutes of a firefight." Since the equipment to be carried if anything un-
M1 ammunition clips held fewer car- usual were to be taken along on the
tridges than the carbine clips, they could patrol. Lt. Col Victor G. Conley, the
not be expended so rapidly. Each pla- 3d Battalion commander, frequently
toon had two snipers with rifles equipped briefed the patrol leader, who had been
with telescopic sights. All weapons were selected by Lieutenant Duerr, on impor-
test fired daily, and the riflemen stripped tant missions. One company of the bat-
and cleaned their weapons every day to talion furnished the combat patrol on a
make sure they would be ready to meet rotational basis and the other two pro-
an enemy attack. vided screening patrols. In some cases,
Next to his weapons, the most impor- the combat patrol probed 1,000 or more
tant item to the infantry soldier was his yards in front of the main line of resist-
COLD FRONT 373

MARINE PFC. PULLS PIECE OF SHRAPNEL FROM HIS ARMORED VEST

ance while the screening patrols rarely the bunkers' living quarters exceeded
went more than 500 yards. five feet by eight feet in size, double
No soldier went on a patrol until he and triple bunks constructed out of logs,
had been on the line for at least ten steel pickets, and telephone wire were
days; then, under average conditions he the norm. Plastic bags used for packing
could expect patrol duty once every batteries served as windows, straw mat-
seven to ten days. The rest of the time ting covered the floor, and candles shed
he would serve as a guard in the their pale light in the bunkers at night.
trenches, man a fighting bunker or com- Oil stoves provided heat in most cases,
bat outpost at night, hack trenches in but charcoal and wood stoves sunk into
the frozen ground, or erect tactical wire the earth to keep the ground warm were
along the slopes. Since there was a 50- also used.
percent alert, two men shared one sleep- Breakfast and dinner were hot meals
ing bag to discourage any shirking of served in the two mess areas, while the
night chores. Eighty percent of the com- noon meal consisted of C-rations. The
pany's work was accomplished at night. company jeep carried the hot food in
Living conditions depended upon marmite cans from the kitchen to the
each man's own ingenuity. Since few of mess area. Since I Company had twenty
374 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Korean Service Corps personnel assigned to become cautious and less dependable
to it, the latter performed all kitchen in combat.
police (KP) duties. Considering that each company ro-
To insure cleanliness, each man had tated its platoons on the line, that each
to shower at least once every five days. battalion rotated its companies, and so
By groups the soldiers rode to the battal- on right up to the corps level, the chances
ion shower point and got a complete for an individual to survive during the
change of clean clothes after the shower. period of comparative inaction on the
Every man was required to change his battlefield were fairly good. This pros-
socks daily to guard against trench foot; pect could not fail to have a favorable
in addition, the company aidmen in- effect upon most of the combat troops
spected the feet of all members of the of the Eighth Army.
unit each day. The aidmen also sprayed The limited nature of the war and the
the bunkers with disinfectant once a static conditions at the front had an un-
month and spread rat poison to control favorable side as well. The absence of
the rodent problem. enemy air operations imparted a false
Although the biggest morale booster sense of security that might well have
among I Company troops was the rota- been disastrous had the Communists
tion system, there were several other mounted a large-scale air sweep of the
programs to provide the men with a battlefield and the supply lines and cen-
change of pace at the local level. A ters to the rear. Lulled by the lack of
warm-up bunker behind the lines served enemy air activity over South Korea, the
as a day room for reading, writing let- troops tended to become careless in their
ters, washing clothes, and getting a hair- use of camouflage and in their massing
cut. Normally a man could spend several of supplies and equipment at the major
hours in the warm-up bunker every three ports and depots. Fortunately, the Com-
or four days. Ten men per day left for munists did not exploit this weakness,
the Regimental Service Company area but the possibility always existed of a
to the rear for a 24-hour rest period. swift and bitter lesson in the advantages
During a tour of duty with I Company, of dispersion and concealment.
every man could generally count on one Another mixed blessing was the pres-
5-day rest and recuperation (R and R) ence of the Korean Service Corps. In the
leave in Japan being granted. These process of relieving the combat troops of
privileges helped to make the waiting many of the distasteful tasks of soldier-
for rotation home a little easier. ing, the KSC had a spoiling and soften-
When an I Company soldier ap- ing effect upon the men in the same
proached the magical mark of thirty-six fashion that the provision of Italian and
points which qualified him for rotation, Polish displaced persons and prisoners
he usually stopped going on combat pa- of war had had upon U.S. units in Eu-
trols. There were two reasons for this: rope during World War II. At another
first, consideration for the soldier whose time there might not be any servants
time was "getting short"; and second, available to perform the unpleasant
consideration for the other men in the chores.
patrol, since the high-point man tended A third by-product of the stationary
COLD FRONT 375

KOREAN SERVICE TROOPS CARRYING INSULATED CONTAINERS OF HOT FOOD to


U.S. troops.

front was the quantity of possessions that and personal impedimenta from the
the average unit and individual began to Ch'orwon sector to the Kumhwa area.
collect after a period in the combat zone. The loss of mobility indicated that
Extra equipment and clothing could front-line inspections and inventories of
easily be kept on hand even though they unit and individual equipment should
went far beyond the amounts called for have been held frequently to restrain
in the tables of organization and equip- unwarranted accumulations.
ment. As long as mobility was not essen-
tial, the surplus might not prove X Corps, ROK I and II Corps
detrimental. But the necessity to shift
a unit quickly to meet an enemy threat Only one important encounter with
demonstrated the disadvantages of hav- the enemy in the U.S. X Corps sector
ing too much. During the Triangle Hill had taken place during November. In
battle, one 7th Division artillery battal- the Heartbreak Ridge area, on Hill 851,
ion took three days to move all its unit the 2d Battalion, 160th Infantry Regi-
376 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ment, U.S. 40th Division, manned the apparently intended to seize, hold, and
Eighth Army lines. The terrain north reinforce Hill 851, then strike south
of the 2d Battalion's defensive positions against Hill 930.
was held by the 14th Regiment, 1st Divi- The North Korean attack failed as the
sion, N.K. III Corps. In the opening four front-line companies threw back the
days of November the North Korean enemy assault without calling for rein-
artillery and mortar units devoted in- forcements. Direct fire from the sup-
creasing attention to the Hill 851 area, porting units helped to disrupt and
and intelligence information gleaned decimate the North Korean ranks.
from a deserter and from papers taken When the enemy broke contact four
from a dead North Korean indicated hours later, he had suffered 140 counted
that the enemy intended to attack the casualties and 7 prisoners of war had
2d Battalion's positions. (Map VII) fallen into the 2d Battalion's hands. The
Lt. Col. Robert H. Pell was the com- 160th Regiment had taken 73 casualties,
manding officer of the battalion and had including 19 dead, in the fight.
deployed his own E and F Companies After a relatively quiet interval of pa-
and attached C and A Companies from trols during the rest of November and
west to east along the battalion front. most of December, the Communists
The 143d Field Artillery Battalion, one chose Christmas Day to make their next
platoon of 4.2-mm. mortars, H Com- serious attack. On Hill 812, five miles
pany's 81-mm. mortars, and one platoon north of the Punchbowl, K Company,
from the 140th AAA Battalion provided 179th Infantry Regiment, U.S. 45th Di-
direct fire support to the 2d Battalion. vision, manned the outpost positions on
G Company and attached B Company, the northern slopes of the hill. Early on
1st Battalion, were in reinforcing posi- Christmas morning the North Korean
tions south of Hill 851. guns and mortars opened up and sent
On 3 November the enemy artillery about 250 rounds on the K Company
and mortar fire became intense. Ap- positions. During the bombardment, a
proximately 4,500 rounds were hurled reinforced company from the N.K. 45th
at the 2d Battalion during the night. Division advanced from Luke the Gook's
At 2030 hours a reinforced battalion Castle, a rocky hill nearby, and overran
from the N.K. 14th Regiment at-the forward positions defended by K
tacked from the north in a general Company. Capt. Andrew J. Gatsis, the
assault along the 2d Battalion front.12 company commander, called for artillery
Proceeding along the ridge which ran and mortar defensive fires.13 Tanks from
north and south and up the draws that the 179th Tank Company joined with
led to the 2d Battalion's positions, the the artillery and mortar to halt the en-
North Koreans closed and made slight emy advance.
penetrations in the E, F, and C Com- Captain Gatsis then sent the second
pany sectors. Based on later evidence platoon, under 2d Lt. Russell J. Mc-
from POW interrogations, the enemy 13
The account of the Hill 812 action is based
12
The account of the attack upon the 2d Bat- upon: (1) 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Jnls,
talion is based on: 160th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Dec 52; (2) 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, bk.
Bn Jnls, Nov 52. VII.
COLD FRONT 377

Cann, to counterattack. McCann's pla- ROK 12th Division reported enemy


toon closed with the North Koreans and troops concentrating for an attack. In-
pushed them back. In the hand-to-hand tense artillery fire poured into the as-
fighting in the trenches, Lieutenant Mc- sembly area, but a North Korean battal-
Cann was killed. Col. Jefferson J. Irvin, ion pushed on toward the hill. Within
the regimental commander, approved fifty yards of the ROK positions, a sav-
the attachment of A Company to K Com- age hand grenade battle broke out and
pany, and L Company was also on hand lasted until a reinforcing ROK company
to reinforce K Company's positions, if turned the tide. The North Koreans
necessary. During the early morning used close to 7,000 rounds of mixed ex-
hours, the North Koreans sent three pla- plosive ammunition in this heaviest ac-
toon-sized attacks and over 2,000 rounds tion of the month and suffered over a
of mixed mortar and artillery fire against hundred estimated casualties. They re-
the K Company defenders, but failed to ceived over twice as many rounds from
dislodge Captain Gatsis and his men. the UNC artillery.16
The company suffered 25 casualties in During the remainder of February
the holiday fighting, including 5 dead, and the following month, operations in
while the enemy incurred an estimated X Corps sector were more or less rou-
36 casualties. tine. Patrols were sent out regularly,
On 27 December the newly organized but contacts with the enemy were on a
ROK 12th Division began to take over small scale and no sizable attacks took
the 45th Division's sector and the relief place.17
was completed on 30 December.14 The North Korean forces had mean-
The ROK 12th Division received its while been more active on the ROK I
baptism of fire some two weeks later Corps front along the east coast of Ko-
when a North Korean battalion launched rea. The ROK main line of resistance
a surprise attack against outpost posi- positions rested on Anchor Hill (Hill
tions on Hill 854, seven miles northeast 351), less then four miles south of Ko-
of the Punchbowl. Three enemy com- song. On 9 November, two North Ko-
panies advanced against elements of the rean battalions struck Anchor Hill and
51st Regiment and made some progress pushed the ROK 5th Division defenders
on the left flank. Pushed back by a off the crest. It was only after two coun-
counterattack, the North Koreans tried terattacks marked by hard close fighting
once more, then withdrew. Over 19,000 and backed by intense artillery and mor-
rounds of UNC artillery, mortar, and tar support that the ROK troops were
tank fire were hurled into the enemy able to eject the enemy and restore
zone of attack and the ROK units re- their positions. At the same time, fur-
ported that over 200 casualties were ther to the south, the North Koreans
suffered by the North Koreans.15
In early February the North Koreans Narrative, p. 36.
returned to Hill 812 again. On the night 17
There was one major relief during the first
of16Hq
2 February, the 37th Regiment of the three months of 1953. The U.S. 45th Division re-
Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I, turned to the line without incident and assumed
14
U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, p. 7. responsibility for the positions occupied by the
15
U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, p. 6. U.S. 40th Division.
378 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

dispatched platoon-sized groups to as- less than a mile south of Sindae-ri, with
sault Hills 268 and 345, less than two the aid of about 6,000 rounds of mortar
miles south of Anchor Hill. On the fire, then withdrew to the main line of
former they won a brief foothold but resistance at dusk.20
were driven off on 10 November. Close The ROK II Corps had patrolled vig-
defensive fires dispersed the enemy at- orously during November and Decem-
tack force as it approached Hill 345. ber, but operations had remained on a
Nothing daunted, the North Koreans small scale. Its greatest challenge arose
hit both hills again on 11 November in mid-January when an increase in en-
with a larger force and engaged the emy artillery and mortar fire on a pla-
ROK troops for an hour and a half toon outpost on Hill 394, three miles
before they withdrew.18 southeast of Kumsong, alerted the ROK
The failure of this effort marked the 6th Division to the possibility of immi-
beginning of a period of comparative nent attack. The commanding general
calm on the ROK I Corps front. Active of the division alerted his artillery units
patrolling and small skirmishes occurred and had three tanks move into support-
frequently, but the over-all situation was ing positions.
not affected. In early January patrols On the night of 17 January the enemy
from the ROK 5th Division located a guns hurled over 5,000 rounds of mixed
tunnel entrance and ventilating shaft artillery and mortar fire at the ROK
near Anchor Hill, where the enemy was positions in the vicinity of Hill 394.
digging his way close to the ROK posi- Close on the heels of the barrage, four
tions. After the enemy's work detail Chinese platoons advanced to engage
entered the tunnel on 7 January, a ROK the ROK defenders. When the ROK
patrol blew up the entrance and sealed artillery and tanks opened up on the
the shaft with explosives. Within a few enemy and threatened to halt the at-
days the enemy had reopened the en- tack, the Chinese sent in two more re-
trance, so the South Koreans called for inforced platoons. So great was the vol-
an air strike and closed it once again.19 ume and accuracy of ROK fire that only
Little unusual activity marked the seven Communist soldiers reached the
ROK I Corps sector until the end of ROK lines and they were killed or cap-
March. The ROK 15th Division com- tured in hand-to-hand combat. After
pleted its organization and training pe- regrouping, the enemy tried again with
riod in late January and moved into the like results. The ROK soldiers esti-
ROK 5th Division's position on the mated that they had killed 125 Chinese
northeastern tip of the battle line. in this fray as compared to losses of 3
On 30 March the 13th Regiment of killed and 14 wounded for their own
the ROK 11th Division carried out two side.21 After this brief but bitter action,
raids on enemy hill positions just west activity on the corps front settled back
of the Nam River. The regiment took into its familiar routine and contacts
the crest of Hill 350, which was
20
Ibid., Mar 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 51-52.
18 21
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I, (1) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, ROKA Combat
Narrative, pp. 41-42. Units, ROK II Corps. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd
19
Ibid., Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 39-40. Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 16.
COLD FRONT 379

occurred infrequently and involved very heavy firing followed; then an enemy
small groups of men. company sought to close with the Black
Watch. But the Commonwealth forces
The U.S. I Corps took cover in nearby tunnels and di-
rected an artillery concentration on the
Over on the western flank the U.S. I assault troops. As soon as the artillery
Corps had not encountered a great deal ceased, the Black Watch seized the ini-
of opposition during the last two months tiative, and drove the Chinese off the
of 1952. U.S. 2d Division outposts on Hook. While the Communists tried to
Porkchop defended by the Thailand regroup on adjacent ridges, artillery and
Battalion were attacked twice in the first tank fire forced them to disperse.
part of November, once by a Chinese On the following day the Chinese
company and the second time by two brought up reinforcements and sent two
companies. On 7 November a heavy companies against the Hook. Common-
artillery and mortar concentration on wealth tanks and reinforcements moved
Porkchop heralded the Chinese ad- up and after a hard-fought exchange that
vance. After a 45-minute fire fight the witnessed hand-to-hand combat, the Bri-
enemy broke off and regrouped, then tish forces turned the Communists back.
stormed back again and was repulsed. Again the Chinese reorganized and dis-
Four days later, the Chinese bombard- patched a company to pierce the Black
ment of Porkchop announced the second Watch line. The third try effected a
assault. Approaching from the north, penetration of 100 yards before it was
east, and southwest, two enemy com- contained. Finally, the 3d Battalion of
panies reached the Thailand trenches the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light
before they were thrown back. Later Infantry mounted a counterattack and
that night the Chinese made two further in close combat ejected the enemy troops.
attempts to penetrate the Porkchop posi- There were 100 counted Chinese dead
tions and then disengaged completely.22 on the battlefield after the engagement
The 1st British Commonwealth Divi- and 85 Commonwealth casualties.23 Evi-
sion came in for a bit of excitement on dently convinced that the British in-
18 November when a sudden increase tended to hold the Hook, the Chinese
in Chinese artillery and mortar fire sig- made no further serious attempts to
naled forthcoming enemy action. After seize the hill until the following March,
shelling the positions of the 1st Battal- after the U.S. 2d Division had taken
ion, King's Liverpool Regiment, as a over the Commonwealth Division's sec-
diversion, the Chinese quickly shifted tor.
their efforts to a hill known as the Hook. The first ten days of December gave
The Hook was part of an east-west ridge little indication that the enemy intended
four miles northwest of the confluence to test the ROK 1st Division's defense
of the Sami-ch'on and Imjin Rivers and in the vicinity of the double horseshoe
was held by the 1st Battalion of the
Black Watch. Forty-five minutes of 23
(1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I,
Narrative, pp. 42-43. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt,
22
U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, pp. 20, 26-27. Nov 52, pp. 37-38.
380 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

2D U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION SQUAD ON PATROL IN CAMOUFLAGE SUITS

bend of the Imjin River. On the west upon the ROK outposts on Little Nori,
bank of the river, as it began its first Betty, and Hill 105. The main weight
horseshoe turn, lay a low hill complex fell on Little Nori as two enemy com-
known as Nori; Big Nori formed the panies sought to dislodge the men of the
western half of the ridge and Little Nori ROK 15th Infantry. After a bitter 3-
the eastern half. (Map 7) The ROK hour exchange at close range, the ROK
15th Regiment maintained outposts on defenders were ordered to pull back to
these hills and also on Hill Betty, about Hill 69, 300 yards to the east of Little
three-quarters of a mile south of Little Nori. After regrouping, the ROK 15th
Nori, and on Hill 105, approximately a launched two counterattacks, but the
mile southwest of Little Nori. The Chi- two platoons committed failed to drive
nese controlled outposts on the terrain the enemy off the heights. The Chinese
to the north and west of Nori, but had waited until the attack forces neared
remained fairly inactive in that sector in their defensive positions, then hurled
early December. hand grenades and loosed a withering
On the 11th, however, two battalions artillery, mortar, and small arms fire.
of the 420th Regiment, 140th Division, Later in the morning, however, a small
47th Army, closely followed 800 rounds force from the ROK 11th Regiment,
of artillery and mortar fire in an attack which had relieved the 15th Regiment,
COLD FRONT 381

D. Holmes, Jr.

MAP 7

reoccupied Little Nori without opposi- attacking force to a battalion, and the
tion. ROK's again withdrew to Hill 69. Air
In the meantime, the ROK units on support was called in and six B-26's
Betty had held, but those on Hill 105 dropped over one hundred 260-pound
had to fall back temporarily. Evidently fragmentary bombs on the hill. Twelve
the Chinese movement against Hill 105 battalions of artillery poured a continu-
was only a diversion, for the enemy left ous hail of shells on the Chinese, but
shortly thereafter and the ROK forces four counterattacks by the ROK 11th
reoccupied the positions without inci- Regiment on 12 December failed. De-
dent. spite the punishment administered by
On the night of the 11th, the Chinese large and small arms and the mounting
first launched a two-company drive toll of losses, the Chinese refused to be
against Little Nori, then increased the budged.
382 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

The artillery concentrations went on total for the enemy ranged between
during the night of 12-13 December 2,290 and 2,732. According to a deserter
and when morning arrived, a battalion from the Chinese 420th Regiment in
from the ROK 11th Regiment moved in January, the regiment was removed from
with two companies in the attack. Fight- the line because of the heavy casualties
ing steadily forward, they won their way it took in the battle and placed in re-
back to Little Nori, but met with little serve.25
success in their efforts to clear Big Nori. Action in the Nori sector settled down
On the evening of the 13th, the South to patrols and raids during January. The
Koreans dug in and awaited the expected enemy dispatched two platoon-sized
enemy counterattacks. Two Chinese probes during the month and on 23 Jan-
companies vainly attempted to penetrate uary the ROK 11th Regiment sent a
the ROK positions during the night and three-platoon raiding party against Big
as the morning of 14 December dawned, Nori. Air strikes, artillery, and mortar
the contest resolved itself into a stale- fire, and fire from twelve supporting
mate.24 tanks enabled the raiders to gain the
Although this encounter lasted but crest, destroy enemy bunkers, and then
four days, the statistics are quite signifi- withdraw safely.26
cant. The entire action on Big and After a 6-week period of comparative
Little Nori took place in an area 300 quiet, the Chinese chose Christmas Eve
yards wide and 200 yards deep. During to launch an attack upon the outposts of
the engagement the UNC artillery fired the U.S. 2d Division on T-Bone Hill.
120,000 rounds, and the mortar crews (See Map 4.) The southern tip of T-
over 31,000 while tankmen added over Bone, which contained the outposts of
4,500 90-mm. shells to the deadly con- EERIE and ARSENAL, lay approximately
centration. Supporting aircraft flew 39 two miles northeast of Porkchop Hill.
missions of 177 sorties to bomb and strafe On 23 December, two platoons from B
the enemy positions with napalm, high Company, 38th Infantry Regiment,
explosives, and rockets. In return the manned ARSENAL, located about 600
ROK's received over 18,000 rounds of yards north of EERIE. On the terrain to
mixed artillery and mortar fire from the the north two battalions of the 338th
Chinese guns. Not counting the aerial Regiment, 113th Division, CCF 38th
contribution, the UNC forces took one Army, held the enemy lines.
round for every eight they hurled at the A message intercepted that morning
Communists. It was an excellent exam- indicated that the Chinese might stage
ple of air, artillery, and tank co-ordina- an attack either on the night of the 23d
tion in support of the infantry. As for or the morning of the 24th, so all bat-
casualties, the ROK's suffered about 750, talions were alerted. Despite the warn-
including 237 dead, while the estimated ing, the enemy achieved the element of
surprise when the 7th, 8th, and 9th
25
(1)
24
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, sec. I, U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, p. 25.
The account of the(2)Nori battle is based 26
Narrative, pp. 41-42; U.S. I Corps, Comdupon:
Rpt, (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I,
Dec 52, pp. 6-10; (3) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, Narrative, p. 33. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt,
ROKA Combat Units, Jnl, 1st ROK Div. Jan 53, p. 7.
COLD FRONT 383

VIEW OF THE T-BONE HILL SECTOR

Companies, 338th Regiment, opened ing force between EERIE and the main
their attack about midnight. The line of resistance and sent over 2,000
Chinese departed from their customary rounds of artillery and mortar fire
tactic of heavy preparatory artillery and against nearby 38th Regiment outposts.
mortar fire before the assault.27 Instead Evidently the Chinese hoped to isolate
they infiltrated the B Company outposts the ARSENAL-EERIE outposts until they
on ARSENAL, cutting through the barbed could gain possession of the hill complex.
wire and successfully bypassing the lis- In this they were disappointed, for
tening posts. Approaching from several Col. Archibald W. Stuart, the com-
directions, the Chinese reached the mander of the 38th Regiment, quickly
communication trenches and closed in alerted Lt. Col. George C. Fogle, his
hand-to-hand combat with the defend- 3d Battalion commander, to move his
ers of B Company. To prevent the 1st four companies forward to reinforce the
Battalion, 38th Regiment, commanded 1st Battalion. Two squads from EERIE
by Lt. Col. Roy I. Brooks, from reinforc- advanced to reinforce ARSENAL, in the
ing ARSENAL, the enemy placed a block- meantime, and a platoon from C Com-
27
pany reinforced EERIE.
The account of the ARSENAL action is based
upon the 38th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Bn Staff The battle in the ARSENAL trenches
Jnls, Dec 52. had also turned against the Chinese at-
384 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tackers. B Company had requested close have. I have already checked the 700 dol-
defensive fires to deter the enemy from lars [7th Company] has 17 back. 800
reinforcing the infiltrators and then set dollars [8th Company] has 13 back. 900
dollars unknown.
about to wipe out the Chinese already
in the outpost positions. How successful Two hours later the enemy had gotten
the defensive fires and the stout defense back two more men from the 8th Com-
mounted by B Company proved to be pany, but there was no news from the
was graphically illustrated by the fol- 9th Company. The Chinese battalion
lowing intercepts of enemy messages had been heavily hit with 11 counted
during the early morning hours of 24 killed in action and estimated casualties
December. of 500 more. The 38th Regiment suf-
0026 hours. Send reinforcements quick. fered 47 casualties, including 6 killed in
There are around 30 enemy coming now— action.
pause—lots of enemy coming now. When Brig. Gen. James C. Fry, the
0040 hours. How soon will the reinforce- 2d Division commander, learned of the
ments arrive? high ratio of enemy casualties to those
Very soon. They are running over. They of the 38th Regiment, he commented:
got plenty of prisoners now, but they can't
find a way to get back. "Very nice piece of work." He enjoined
0050 hours. Our reinforcements haven't his unit commanders to "mention what
reached No. 25 yet. They won't be able to happens when you stand in your trenches
get down themselves even without the and fight." 28
prisoners. The men of B Company had fought
0052 hours. Can you come down?
No. bravely and systematically cleaned out
Try if situation allows. We don't have a the enemy infiltrators. Yet without the
chance without reinforcements. superb defensive fire that had been pro-
0120 hours. Where are the reinforce- vided by the artillery, mortar, tank, and
ments now? I am sure they will reach your AAA units in direct support of the 38th
place pretty soon. Now there are too many
enemy. We are all surrounded. I don't Regiment, the infantrymen might not
think our reinforcements can break through have fared so well. The enemy had
and come up either. Our situation is pretty wanted desperately to reinforce his at-
dangerous, besides we have to watch the tacking forces on ARSENAL, but had
prisoners. In time of emergency what shall
we do with the prisoners? been unable to get them through the
0130 hours. If it's possible, your people curtain of fire laid down by the direct
had better just come down yourselves, as to support crews. The success could justly
the PW's or wounded, just bring any num- be shared by infantrymen and gun-crew
ber you can or leave them there. This is an members alike.
order. You must come down or we won't
contact you anymore. On 29 December the U.S. 7th Divi-
0132 hours. Send more reinforcements or sion completed the relief of the 2d
we won't be able to come back with Division in this sector and the Chinese
the PW's. evidently decided to take advantage of
0217 hours. Our 900 dollars [9th Com- the change-over. A reinforced enemy
pany] probably has been annihilated. One
of the men in the 900 dollars escaped and
28
reported this. Briefing Notes, 24 Dec 52, in 38th Inf Regt,
0435 hours. Check how many men we Dec 52, Comd Rpt, Regtl Opnl Jnls.
COLD FRONT 385

company that night hit an outpost at shank of T-Bone Hill, about 1,300 yards
Chongjamal, two miles southwest of Old north of EERIE. After the Air Force had
Baldy, and forced the defenders to pull launched 125 fighter-bomber sorties and
back. Since the U.S. artillery units had 8-12 radar-controlled light and medium
the co-ordinates of the outpost, they be- bomber sorties on selected targets in the
gan to zero in on the Communists and T-Bone area, the artillery would carry
the punishment finally forced the Chi- on the bombardment. One field artil-
nese to evacuate the position.29 lery battalion and elements of 6 others
The 7th Division took part in an ex- with 78 light and 32 medium artillery
periment in air-tank-artillery-infantry pieces would fire in direct and general
co-ordination in late January that pro- support of the raiding party, from their
duced loud repercussions in the United positions behind the main line of resist-
States. In mid-December a joint Army- ance. For the attack force 1 platoon
Air Force conference at Seoul had dis- from the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infan-
cussed the carrying out of General try Regiment and 3 platoons of medium
Clark's direction that a series of air- tanks, mounting 90-mm. guns, were des-
ground operations experiments be ignated. Two additional platoons of in-
mounted.30 Three experiments were fantry, 1 light tank company, and 6
planned: A. An air strike by 24 fighter- platoons of medium tanks would act in
bombers with briefing and observation a supporting role.
of the target by air force personnel be- During the period 12-20 January, the
fore the operation; B. An air strike by 8 57th Field Artillery Battalion, alone in
fighter-bombers, without prebriefing, direct support of the 31st Regiment,
which would be controlled by the tacti- poured close to 10,000 rounds of 105-
cal air control party at the divisional mm. fire into the T-Bone complex, seek-
level; and C. An operation similar to B ing to destroy enemy bunkers, mortars,
above, but with 4 fighter-bombers. and automatic weapons in preparation
When Eighth Army G-3 officers ap- for the attack. As D-day—25 January—
proached General Smith of the 7th Divi- approached, Air Force officers visited the
sion on the matter, he suggested using 7th Division command post and received
the air effort in conjunction with a tank- their briefing and reconnoitered the
infantry raid to capture prisoners. The target area.
task of preparing the operations plan Since the experiment promised to be
fell upon the 31st Infantry Regiment of interest to both air and ground officers,
and the S-3, Capt. Howard H. Cooksey, General Barcus and members of his Fifth
on 15 January drew up what was to be Air Force staff arrived at the battle lo-
called Operation SMACK. cale and were joined by General Smith
The objective selected for the test was and Lt. Gen. Paul W. Kendall, the I
called Spud Hill and was an enemy Corps commander, along with some of
strongpoint on the eastern side of the his staff. Also present were about a
29
U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, p. 12. dozen members of the press. To help
30
The following account, unless otherwise stated, these visitors understand the schedule
is based upon Hq Eighth Army, Mil Hist Detach-
ment, Operation SMACK, by 2d Lt Samuel M. Kind. and purpose of the exercises, the 7th
MS in OCMH. Division had prepared a combination
386 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

itinerary, description of the experiment, sairs attempted to lay a smoke screen in


and a scenario outlining the main events. front of the tanks and infantry to con-
The cover for this six-page collection of ceal their approach, but some released
information was in three colors, showing the bombs too soon and others failed to
a 7th Division black and red patch super- place them where they would shield the
imposed on a map of Korea in blue.31 attack force.
The choice of a tricolor cover and use of Once the air phase was completed, the
the word "scenario" was unfortunate, as supporting artillery, mortars, AAA, and
it turned out. automatic weapons along the main line
On 24 January the Air Force dropped of resistance opened fire. As the sup-
136,000 pounds of bombs and 14 napalm porting tanks reached their firing posi-
tanks on the target complex. The next tions close to Spud Hill, they joined in
morning, as the infantry and tankers the bombardment of the enemy strong-
gathered in the assembly areas, the Air points and trenches. To co-ordinate the
Force began the first of eighteen strikes. available firepower, a communications
Carrying two 1,000-pound bombs each, network had been set up between all
eight F-84 Thunderjets swept over the supporting units, fire direction centers,
cross of T-Bone and unloaded their the 2d Battalion command post, and the
cargo. By midmorning, 24 more Thun- infantry Fire Support Co-ordination
derjets, in flights of eight, had bombed Center. Major Phillips, the 2d Battalion
enemy positions on T-Bone. Then came commander, directed the operation from
a mass strike by 24 Thunderjets, with his command post and had an artillery
48,000 pounds of bombs. This com- liaison officer at his side.
pleted experiments A and B. Twenty For the assault of the hill, Major Phil-
additional Thunderjets in 2 flights hit lips had ordered E Company to furnish
the objective before the tanks and in- the platoon and the company com-
fantry began to move out. mander had chosen his 2d Platoon, un-
Diversionary tank movements and fire der 2d Lt. John R. Arbogast, Jr., for the
to confuse the enemy began as the assault task. The platoon had rehearsed the
troops made their final preparations. operation nine times on similar terrain
Then the 15 supporting tanks from the and knew what it had to do. To increase
73d Tank Battalion (M) crossed the line the possibilities for success, two flame-
of departure. While the tanks rumbled thrower teams had been added to the
forward to their positions, Experiment platoon for the operation.
C was attempted by two flights of four Since the infantry had to wait until
F-84 Thunderjets each. The first flight the air strikes were completed, the at-
missed Spud Hill with its bombs and the tack was not set up for a prescribed time,
second flight put on the target only one but rather was to begin on Major Phil-
of the eight napalm tanks that the planes lips' order. Unfortunately, a radio fail-
carried. Shortly after the last strike ure caused a fifteen-minute delay in the
by the Air Force, eight F4U Marine Cor- receipt of the attack order and Arbogast
31
Msg, G 1733 KCG, Van Fleet to Clark, 29 Jan
and his men were late in crossing the
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67,
line of departure. As they moved for-
incl 8. ward to the base of Spud Hill in person-
COLD FRONT 387

nel carriers, the supporting tanks and operator managed to get off one short
artillery continued to pound the objec- burst before the machine malfunctioned.
tive and enemy positions in the sur- Flames engulfed the Chinese trenches
rounding areas. for a few seconds and halted the flow of
Arbogast's platoon dismounted quick- grenades briefly. After the fire died
ly when it reached the foot of the hill out, however, the Chinese sent increas-
and divided into two groups. Two ing numbers of grenades into the hollow
squads began to climb up the northern and the list of wounded grew.
finger and the remaining two squads Seeing that the assault platoon was
took the southern finger of Spud Hill. pinned down, Major Phillips ordered
During this ascent, the supporting weap- the 1st Platoon to reinforce Arbogast's
ons, with the exception of the three tank remaining troops. The 1st Platoon fol-
platoons, shifted their fire to targets lowed the same route up the fingers and
north of the objective. enemy machine guns soon forced it to
Desultory fire from small arms and take cover. Efforts by the supporting
automatic weapons greeted the 2d Pla- tanks to silence the enemy's automatic
toon as it headed for the crest. It was weapons met with little success since
not until the squads neared the point smoke and dust obscured the tankers'
where the two fingers met, reuniting the view. Every half hour four Thunderjets
attacking troops, that the Chinese started dropped bombs on the T-Bone complex,
to react strongly. Then, suddenly, the but they, too, had little influence upon
machine gun fire became intense, driving the fight on Spud Hill.
the men of the 2d Platoon into a defi- Lieutenant Arbogast tried to get his
laded hollow between the two fingers. men moving out of the trap. But even
The depression gave Arbogast's men as he sought to organize a charge, he
respite from the chattering machine was again hit by grenade fragments, this
guns, but exposed them to another dan- time in the face and eye. Although he
ger. Boxed in in a small area, they fell refused to be evacuated at first, the seri-
easy prey to the hand grenades that the ousness of his injuries soon forced him
Chinese lobbed into the hollow from to give in. His platoon sergeant and
their trenches on the crest of the hill. several of the squad leaders had already
As grenade after grenade fell into the been put out of action.
midst of the hemmed-in platoon, the With two platoons now pinned down
casualty list mounted. Lieutenant Ar- short of the objective, Major Phillips
bogast was hit in the arm, but refused to decided to commit the 3d Platoon to the
leave. With grenade fragments filling attack, but the end result proved to be
the air, the litter bearers found it diffi- the same. The stream of automatic
cult to keep up with the growing num- weapons and rifle fire coupled with the
ber of wounded. grenades from the enemy trenches
In an attempt to break up the grenade halted the advance of the 3d Platoon
attack, the two flame thrower teams were and inflicted numerous wounds on its
called forward. A rifle bullet instantly members.
killed one of the operators as he worked When Col. William B. Kern, the regi-
his way toward the crest. The second mental commander, learned of the fate
388 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

of the 3d Platoon, he called off the row front, as was the case in the earlier
attack and ordered the men remaining Bloody Ridge-Heartbreak Ridge opera-
on the approaches to Spud Hill to with- tions, the enemy could concentrate on
draw. By this time all three platoon containing the small attack force. The
leaders had been wounded and the cas- latter was fairly green and its leadership
ualty total had reached 77 men. was impaired early in the fight through
The expenditures in ammunition for the effective enemy use of hand grenades
Operation SMACK had also been rather while the platoon was pinned in. In
costly. Besides the bombs and napalm addition the available flamethrowers
dropped the day before the attack, the which might have saved the situation
Air Force had loosed 224,000 pounds malfunctioned and some of the auto-
of bombs and eight napalm tanks on 25 matic weapons jammed. The assault
January. The supporting artillery fired platoon had rehearsed the operation
over 12,000 rounds of 105-mm. and 155- many times and felt overrehearsed, while
mm. and nearly 100,000 rounds of .50- the two supporting platoons that had
caliber and 40-mm. ammunition. From been thrown in late had not been ade-
the tanks came over 2,000 rounds of quately rehearsed or briefed. All in
90-mm. and over 75,000 rounds of lesser all, Operation SMACK was a fiasco.
caliber. A heavy mortar company added Yet since the entire exercise was on a
over 4,500 rounds of mortar fire to the small scale insofar as the number of in-
attack and the infantry assault force shot fantrymen and tanks engaged was con-
over 50,000 rounds of machine gun and cerned, it might well have been chalked
small arms ammunition and threw over up to experience and quietly passed over,
650 hand grenades at the enemy. Even but for a zealous member of the press.
if the highest estimate of enemy casual- Although the correspondent had but re-
ties was accepted, all of this potential cently arrived in Korea and had not
death and destruction cost the Chinese been present at the scene of action, the
fewer than 65 men, while the enemy, attendance of high-ranking officers of the
using but a fraction of this amount of Air Force and Army at the experiment
ordnance, had inflicted greater losses and the use of the three-color cover
upon the 7th Division force. To top it and the term "scenario" for the infor-
off, since the infantry had not closed with mation sheets assumed roles of impor-
the enemy, not a prisoner had been taken. tance in the story that he wrote. The
What went wrong? In review, one implication that a show involving need-
might say—everything. The air bom- less loss of life had been put on for the
bardment evidently had little effect visiting brass created a furore in the
upon the enemy in his deep, protected United States and led to a brief Congres-
bunkers and caves and the strikes at- sional investigation.32
tempted to hit too many targets periph- An official statement by Van Fleet's
eral to the infantry objective. Secondly, headquarters and appearances by Gen-
the infantry's late start in setting out for 32
(1) Msg, DA 392127, CINFO to CINCFE, 28
the objective after the strikes allowed Jan 53. (2) Msg C 61077, CINCFE to DA, 30 Jan
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67,
the enemy time to prepare for the at- incl 9. (3) Msg, DA 393167, CINFO to CINCFE, 31
tack. By confining the assault to a nar- Jan 53.
COLD FRONT 389

eral Collins before Congressional armed were indications the enemy might try
services committees served to put the to take advantage of the period before
SMACK operation in proper perspective the ground thawed to launch an offensive
as a test of methods of co-ordinating a toward Seoul. During the winter the
combined attack on enemy outposts and Communists had built up their forces
not as a "gladitorial" exhibition staged in Korea to an estimated total of 1,071,-
in the Hollywood style to entertain vis- 080 by 1 February and had been stock-
itors.33 Congressional leaders accepted piling ammunition and rations at the
the Army's explanations and the ill-fated front. In January three Chinese armies
SMACK incident was closed. It was an and one North Korean corps had been
expensive lesson that demonstrated again replaced on the line by fully equipped
that firepower in itself, whether dropped and combat-trained units and the
from above or hurled from the ground, strength of the remainder of the divi-
was not enough to neutralize an enemy sions at the front had been increased
well dug in and that the advantage in from reserve elements. It was, of course,
this limited war lay on the defensive side. quite conceivable that the Communist
Elsewhere on the U.S. I Corps front, preparations were only defensive in na-
the action was confined chiefly to small ture since considerable publicity had
raids during January. A platoon from been given to the possibility that the
the Marine 7th Regiment on 8 January new Republican administration in the
took Hill 67, which was a mile and a United States might change the tenor of
half east of Panmunjom, with the aid of the Korean War and go over to the
air, artillery, and seven flame-throwing offensive.35
tanks, then withdrew. A week later three Van Fleet was not worried. He was
platoons from the same regiment hit this going ahead with the divisional reliefs
hill and another close by for three hours scheduled for the closing days of Janu-
before breaking off the fight. On 24 Jan- ary and told Clark that the Eighth Army
uary two platoons of the Ethiopian Bat- was in better condition insofar as re-
talion attached to the U.S. 7th Division serves were concerned than ever before
seized a hill south of Old Baldy after a in the war. He was sure that Eighth
45-minute battle and fought off a coun- Army could handle anything that the
terattack. Both the enemy and the Ethi- enemy could throw at it.36 In his last
opians built up their forces the following
day, as two Chinese companies tried to 24 Jan 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495. (2) Hq
win back the hill from four platoons of Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative,
Ethiopians. The latter made a good pp. 5-8, 21.
36
Msg, GX 1607 KCG, CG EUSAK to CG AFFE,
showing and did not break contact and 25 Jan 53, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin files,
withdraw until they were ordered to.34 Jan-Jun 53. The four reliefs were: the U.S. 45th
Toward the end of the month, Gen- Division for the U.S. 40th Division in the X Corps
area; the U.S. 2d Division for the 1st Common-
eral Clark warned Van Fleet that there wealth Division in the U.S. I Corps sector; the
U.S. 3d Division for the U.S. 25th Division in the
33
35
IX Corps front; and the ROK 15th Division for
Msg,
(1) Msg,
UNC/FEC, Z 35701,
GX 61016,
Comd CINCFE
Rpt,CINCFE
Janto53,
Hull,
toIncls
CG30AFFE
Jan 53,
1-67, etincl
al.,
in 10. the ROK 5th Division along the ROK I Corps
34
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, battle line. These were all completed by 31 January
Narrative, pp. 33-34. without incident.
390 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

days as commander of the Eighth Army, pointed out to the JCS in early February,
Van Fleet remained confident that the the Communists' recent expansion in
force he had helped build up into an men and planes might well be only de-
efficient and reliable army could meet fensive, but the publicity given UNC
the Communists head on at any time and ammunition shortages, personnel defi-
emerge victorious. Despite the frustra- ciencies, weakness in reserve divisions,
tions of fighting a limited war, the ener- and difficulties in building up NATO
getic and aggressive old warrior had lost strength, coupled with predictions of
none of his drive or desire to deal the UNC augmentation and offensive action
enemy a crippling military blow. He because of the change in political ad-
had frequently shown his impatience at ministration, could influence the enemy
being forced to play a waiting, defensive to use his offensive strength.38
game, but had never wavered in his The growth of Communist air power
efforts to maintain Eighth Army featured the addition of jet bombers and
at peak efficiency in case either the fighters which gave the enemy a broad
United States or the Communists de- air capability. If the Chinese carried out
cided to alter the complexion of the a surprise low-level attack with the
conflict. As he left for retirement and MIG's escorting the jet bombers, Clark
home in February 1953, his contribu- felt that they might knock out the UNC
tions to the maintenance of his command interceptor bases and gain a respite dur-
as one of the better armies fielded by ing which they could repair the North
the United States were beyond question. Korean airfields. This, in turn, could
Notwithstanding Van Fleet's assur- lead to a ground offensive, backed by
ances, Clark told General Weyland to piston fighters, bombers, and ground at-
have his air reconnaissance planes inten- tack planes. Under the circumstances,
sify their observations of Communist Clark asked for permission to attack the
ground forces, supplies, and equipment Chinese air bases if the security of the
along the P'yongyang-Kaesong route. UNC forces seemed to be threatened.39
The Far East commander was concerned As in the past, the American leaders
over the mounting ability of the enemy in Washington were sympathetic but
to stage an air offensive and ordered his noncommittal. They recognized the po-
subordinates to take all possible passive tential danger, but told Clark that they
air defense measures to absorb hostile wished to be informed of the immediate
air attacks. If trouble developed, Clark situation before they gave their authori-
wished every precaution possible taken zation.40
to lessen the blow and he was ready to Clark's air chief, General Weyland,
move the 1st Cavalry Division and 187th shared his commander's concern over
Airborne RCT back to Korea in the
event of an emergency.37 As Clark 38
Msg, CX 6115?, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Feb 53, in
JSPOG Staff Study No. 495.
39
Msg GX 61172, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Feb 53, in
37
(1) Msg, CX 61087, CINCFE to CG FEAF, 31 JSPOG Staff Study No. 495, in JSPOG files. The
Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls estimate of Communist air strength in Manchuria
1-67, incl 41. (2) Ltr, Clark to CG AFFE et al, was 830 jet fighters, 250 piston fighters, 220 piston
4 Feb 53, sub: Communist Offensive . . . , in light bombers, and an estimated 100 jet bombers.
40
JSPOG Staff Study No. 495. Msg, JCS 931744, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Feb 53.
COLD FRONT 391

the Communist air threat, but had no try force from the 5th Marine Regiment
doubt about the ability of the UNC followed air strikes and artillery fire in
forces to turn the enemy back. "I have a raid on Hill 101 and Un'gok, ten miles
no fears," he told Clark on 11 February, north of Munsan-ni. The marines de-
"that the enemy could take the Seoul stroyed installations and beat off several
complex if faced with concerted and determined counterattacks until they
aggressive counteroperations. In fact, I were ordered to withdraw. Estimate of
believe that an attempted air and ground enemy killed during the engagement ran
offensive by the Communists can be to about 400 men while the marines lost
made a most costly venture for him and 15 killed and 55 wounded.44
would provide opportunity for an out- On 20 February the Chinese sent two
standing UN victory." 41 companies along the shank of T-Bone
As February progressed and no larger Hill to attack Outpost EERIE and ran
enemy attacks developed, Clark's anx- into a 7th Division ambush patrol. Re-
iety diminished. On 11 February, Lt. inforcements from the 17th Infantry
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor took over Gen- Regiment were rushed forward to bol-
eral Van Fleet's post as Eighth Army ster the patrol and finally a platoon of
commander and began to make his own tanks moved forward to screen the battle-
impression upon his troops.42 He field and help evacuate the wounded.
stressed the need for planning and re- Although all the members of the patrol
hearsing patrols; for providing a com- were either killed or wounded, they had
plete eight-week training program for evidently staved off a battalion-sized as-
reserve divisions before they re-entered sault on ARSENAL and EERIE. 45
the line; for moving artillery battalions Across the valley at the lower Alliga-
frequently to maintain their basic mo- tor's Jaw, which was located a mile and
bility; and for better concealment meas- a half northeast of EERIE, another Chi-
ures for troops on skyline positions. He nese company caught a 7th Division
also decided to drop the designation of combat patrol and subjected it to heavy
"Korea" from the Eighth Army. In the fire on 24 February. Before the engage-
future, the title would simply be Eighth ment finished, the entire 20-man patrol
U.S. Army.43 became casualties. The day before, on
Although the pattern of fighting un- the 1st Marine Division front, a tank-
derwent little change during early Feb- infantry patrol was surrounded by the
ruary, the enemy reacted strongly to any enemy at Hill 90, two miles east of Pan-
challenge. On 3 February a tank-infan- munjom, and a reinforcing platoon had
41
to be dispatched to help them break
Ltr, Weyland to CINCFE, 11 Feb 53, sub:
Communist Offensive . . . , in JSPOG Staff Study through the Chinese circle. Hand-to-
No. 495. hand combat ensued as the marines bat-
42
General Taylor had commanded the 101st Air-
borne Division in World War II; had served as
44
superintendent at West Point until 1949; was com- (1) Ibid., p. 32. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt,
mander in Berlin from 1949-51; and lately had Feb 53, p. 11. (3) First Marine Div, Comd Diary,
been G-3, Department of the Army, and Deputy Feb 53, p. 4.
43 45
ChiefHq ofEighth Army,
Staff for Comd Rpt,
Operations Feb 53, sec. I,
and Administration. (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec.
I, Narrative, pp. 32-33. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd
Narrative, pp. 28, 29, 62. Rpt, Feb 53, p. 10.
392 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tled their way back to the main line of cepted an estimated enemy battalion ap-
resistance. On 25 February a Marine parently on the way to attack Porkchop
patrol started out to capture prisoners Hill and the surprise contact disrupted
of war and destroy installations on Hill the Chinese plans. The Communists
Detroit, a little over a mile southwest of gunners dropped 8,000 rounds of artil-
the Hook, and encountered a reinforced lery and mortar fire on Porkchop during
enemy company. The marines used the night, but the enemy infantry made
flame throwers in the caves and bunkers no serious attempt to push on toward
to root out the Chinese and a bitter the 7th Division's outposts.47
45-minute fight took place before the There was brief lull along the front
raiders disengaged.46 with the advent of the late winter rains.
The growing Chinese sensitivity to the Mud restricted the movements of vehi-
I Corps raids was the prelude to a shift cles but did not deter the enemy from
in the enemy's tactics. As March began, resuming the attack shortly after the
the Chinese went over to the offensive middle of March. Hill 355, located
again—on a limited scale, to be sure. about three and a half miles southwest
Dropping the passive role of the early of the Nori Hill complex, was also
winter period, the enemy started to take known as Little Gibraltar. Defended by
advantage of the prethaw season. As the elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Regi-
Chinese sent out larger forces in an ef- ment, 2d Division, Hill 355 received a
fort to regain the initiative, pressure battalion-sized attack on 17 March. The
along the I Corps front mounted. enemy breached the wire entanglements
On 1 March, a Communist company and pushed through the mine fields into
struck at the positions of the French the trenches of the 9th Infantry Regi-
Battalion after an intense artillery and ment. One platoon's position was over-
mortar preparation. The French were run but the remaining platoons held firm
attached to the U.S. 2d Division, now in their blocking positions until rein-
manning the section of the line formerly forcements arrived. As the Chinese be-
held by the 1st Commonwealth Division. gan to disengage, 2d Division artillery
They met the Chinese attack and beat it fire interdicted their route of with-
off after a brief hand-to-hand encounter. drawal. The action cost the 9th slightly
Two days later, the Chinese overran a over 100 casualties, but enemy losses
38th Regiment outpost on the Hook. were estimated at over 400 men.48
On 6 March the scene moved to the The 2d Division came in for a bit
ROK 1st Division line where the Chi- more action four days later when two
nese launched two fruitless company- enemy companies fell on a patrol near
sized attacks on the outposts of the 11th the Hook. While the patrol tenaciously
Regiment. That same evening, a fought off the Chinese attackers, artillery
combat patrol from the 31st Infantry and mortar fire were called in and rein-
Regiment of the U.S. 7th Division inter-
47
(1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, sec.
46 I, Narrative, pp. 41-42. (2) U.S. 7th Inf Div, Comd
(1)HqEighth
Narrative, Army, (2)
pp. 33-34. Comd
U.S.Rpt, Feb 53,
I Corps, sec. I,
Comd Rpt, Rpt, Mar 53, pp. 23-25.
48
Feb 53, p. 15. (3) First Marine Div, Comd Diary, Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, sec. I,
Feb 53, p. 10. Narrative, p. 43.
COLD FRONT 393

forcements rushed up. The Chinese battalion from the 423d Regiment, 141st
pulled back the next morning.49 Division, attacked Old Baldy and caught
On 20 March the 7th Division had the Colombian Battalion in the middle
indications that the enemy contemplated of relieving the company outpost on the
an attack in the Old Baldy-Porkchop hill. The Chinese closely followed an
area. The increase in artillery and mor- intense artillery and mortar concentra-
tar rounds on the division's positions on tion upon Lt. Col. Alberto Ruiz-Novoa's
these long-contested hills usually signi- troops and fought their way into the
fied a Communist offensive move, and trenches. To reinforce the Colombians,
the capture of two deserters in the sector Colonel Kern placed B Company, 31st
strengthened the belief that action would Regiment, under Colonel Ruiz' opera-
soon be forthcoming.50 tional control. 1st Lt. Jack M. Patteson,
The Old Baldy-Porkchop area was B Company commander, led his men
held by the 31st Infantry Regiment, com- toward Old Baldy at 2130 hours, ap-
manded by Colonel Kern, and its proaching from Westview, the next hill
attached Colombian Battalion. Colonel to the southeast. As B Company drew
Kern had deployed his 2d Battalion on near the outpost, the Chinese first called
the left, the Colombian Battalion in the in intense artillery and mortar fire along
center, which included Old Baldy, and the approach routes and then took Pat-
the 3d Battalion on the right in the Pork- teson's men under fire with small arms,
chop Hill sector. One rifle company automatic weapons, and hand grenades.
from the 1st Battalion manned blocking B Company slowly made its way into the
positions behind each of the three front- first bunkers on Old Baldy at 0200 hours
line battalions. 51 and began to clear them out one by one.
Elements of two Chinese armies faced As the company came up against the
the 7th Division. The 141st Division, main strength of the Chinese on Old
CCF 47th Army, manned the enemy Baldy, however, progress lessened and
positions opposite Old Baldy and to the then ground to a halt.
west and the 67th Divisions, CCF 23d In the 3d Battalion sector on Porkchop
Army, defended the terrain from the Hill, Lt. Col. John N. Davis' L Com-
Porkchop Hill area to the east. pany had been attacked by two compa-
On the evening of 23 March the Chi- nies from the 201st Regiment, 67th Divi-
nese staged a double-barreled attack on sion. As in the Old Baldy assault, the
both Old Baldy and Porkchop. A mixed Chinese had laid down heavy mortar
and artillery concentrations on the L
50
Company positions before they ad-
Believing that the men would fight better if
they knew what they were about to accomplish,
vanced. 1st Lt. Forrest Crittenden, the
the Communists discussed the operation on the company commander, and his men
lower levels before an attack. The knowledge that fought until their ammunition began to
an attack was to be carried out often led some of
the Communist soldiers to desert.
run low, then had to pull back from the
51
The account of the Old Baldy-Porkchop Hill crest of the hill and await resupply and
action
49 is based upon: (1) 31st Inf Regt, Comd reinforcement. Proximity fuze fire was
Rpt lbid.,
and p. 46. Jnls, Mar 53; (2) 32d Inf Regt,
Staff
Comd Rpt and Staff Jnls, Mar 53; (3) 7th Inf
laid directly on Porkchop while ammu-
Div, Comd Rpt, Mar 53. nition was brought forward and A Com-
394 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

pany, under 1st Lt. Gerald Morse, assault with artillery and mortar fire as
advanced to the aid of L Company. Ele- B Company approached and then
ments of I Company were ordered to opened up with small arms and auto-
secure Hill 200, a mile southeast of matic weapons, inflicting heavy casual-
Porkchop, which had also been reported ties on Lieutenant Smith's men. The 1st
as under attack. Battalion's assault stalled on the south-
Colonel Davis had to wait until the west finger of Old Baldy.
early morning hours of 24 March before Colonel Juskalian reorganized his
he could launch a counterattack against forces and sent B Company and A Com-
Porkchop. Lieutenant Morse's company, pany, under 1st Lt. Jack L. Conn, in a
en route to join L company, was pinned second attack during the afternoon of
down for two hours by proximity fuze the 24th. The two companies reached
fire. Attacking abreast with A Com- Lieutenant Patteson's B Company, 31st
pany on the right, the two companies met Regiment, positions and passed through
only light resistance from the few Chi- them. By nightfall they had won back
nese left on the crest. They reported one quarter of Old Baldy, but were
that Porkchop was a shambles with many forced by enemy resistance to dig in and
of the bunkers aflame and many dead hold. Lieutenant Patteson suffered a
and wounded. Colonel Davis dispatched broken jaw during the fighting and had
the ammunition and pioneer platoon to to be evacuated.
repair the damage and sent aidmen and At 0430 hours on 25 March, Colonel
litter bearers to clear the dead and Juskalian sent C Company, under 1st
wounded from the hill. Lt. Robert C. Gutner, around the right
In the meantime, Maj. Gen. Arthur G. flank to attack up the northeast finger of
Trudeau, who had just assumed com- Old Baldy. Again the Chinese used their
mand of the 7th Division, had arrived individual and crew-served weapons ef-
at the 31st Regiment's command post fectively and reinforced their units on
and had taken charge. He ordered the Old Baldy to halt the 1st Battalion
1st Battalion, 32d Regiment, under Lt. attack. By 0930 Juskalian reported that
Col. George Juskalian, to move forward B and A Companies were one-third the
and placed it under the operational con- way up the left finger, halted by small
trol of the 31st Regiment. The 1st Bat- arms and hand grenades. C Company
talion with B Company, 73d Tank Bat- was "pretty well shot up" and had to be
talion, in support, would carry out a withdrawn and reorganized. Some mem-
counterattack to regain Old Baldy. The bers of the company were still pinned
tanks would fire from positions in the down on the right flank of Baldy and
valley to the northeast of the hill. could not get out. Colonel Juskalian
B Company, 32d Regiment, under 1st called for tank support to knock out the
Lt. Willard E. Smith, led the 1st Battal- Chinese bunkers being used to pin down
ion's attack from the southwest on the the 30 to 40 C Company men left on the
morning of 24 March. Two platoons hill.
from the 73d Tank Battalion and one Despite the tank support, the 1st Bat-
platoon of the 31st Tank Company sup- talion's situation had not improved by
ported the assault. The Chinese met the 1315 hours. Colonel Juskalian's three
COLD FRONT 395

rifle companies were clinging to their of the sector and that consequently no
positions, but A Company had only 2 attack would be carried out.
officers and 14 men; B Company and C The two days of fighting for Old Baldy
Company had 2 officers and 40 men be- and Porkchop had been costly for the 7th
tween them. The colonel asked for Division. Casualties had run over 300
smoke and medical aid so that he could dead, wounded, and missing in action.
evacuate his casualties. Although Chinese losses were estimated
With the 1st Battalion's effective at between 600 to 800 men, the enemy
strength reduced to less than sixty men, had committed his troops freely to main-
Colonel Kern ordered Juskalian to with- tain possession of Old Baldy. The Chi-
draw his men from Old Baldy during nese willingness to expend their man-
the night of 25-26 March. Air Force, power resources offered a clear contrast
Navy, and Marine fighters and bombers to the UNC reluctance to risk lives for
mounted air strikes against nearby hills, tactical objectives of questionable value
strongpoints, and supply routes during at this stage of the war.
the night and then hit Old Baldy the On the 1st Marine Division front the
next morning after the 1st Battalion had Chinese had also accelerated the tempo.
cleared the hill. From reports made An outpost of the Korean Marine regi-
later by Colombians who had hidden in ment was overrun by two enemy platoons
bunkers during the Chinese domination on 18 March and the following day the
of the heights, it appeared that the en- Chinese threw two company attacks
emy troops left Old Baldy when the air against 5th Marine Regiment outposts.
strikes came, and this, incidentally, The latter were beaten off and the ma-
had enabled the Colombians to make rines quickly mounted a counterblow—
their way back to the UNC lines on a raid into the enemy's positions. This,
16 March. in turn, elicited retaliation from the Chi-
General Kendall, I Corps commander, nese. On the night of 22 March they
ordered another attack to regain Old sent two companies supported by 1,700
Baldy to be scheduled for either 27 or rounds of artillery and mortar against
28 March after rehearsals had been the 1st Marine Regiment's outposts and
held. To carry out the assault, General main line of resistance positions at Hill
Trudeau selected the 2d Battalion, 32d Hedy and Bunker Hill, four miles east
Infantry Regiment. The battalion held of Panmunjom. Hand-to-hand combat
two rehearsals on terrain similar to Old and a brisk fire fight ensued before the
Baldy in the closing days of March and Chinese began to disengage. During the
was prepared to execute the attack. On encounter a UNC flare plane and search-
30 March, however, General Taylor, the lights lit up the battlefield and enabled
Eighth Army commander, arrived at the marines to spot the enemy's move-
General Trudeau's headquarters for a ment.52
conference. After considering the psy- The biggest engagement of the month
chological, tactical, and doubtlessly the took place in the closing days of March.
casualty aspects of the planned opera- 52
(1) First Marine Div, Comd Diary, Mar 53,
tion, General Taylor decided that Old p. 9. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53,
Baldy was not essential to the defense sec. I, Narrative, pp. 44-45.
396 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

D. Holmes, Jr.

MAP 8

After a series of diversionary squad at- sources later indicated that the mission
tacks on 1st Marine Regiment outposts, of the 358th was to seize and hold the
the 358th Regiment, 120th Division, three outposts before an expected UNC
CCF 40th Army, launched an assault up- spring offensive could get under way.
on combat outposts of the 5th Marine On 26 March, the Chinese overran
Regiment, 10 miles northeast of Pan- VEGAS and RENO after heavy, close fight-
munjom and between 2 to 3 miles south- ing. The marines fell back and hastily
west of the Hook. Outpost VEGAS was on prepared blocking positions between the
Hill 157; Outpost RENO was on Hill 148, lost positions and the main line of resist-
less than half a mile to the west; and ance. Despite the arrival of reinforce-
Outpost CARSON was on an unnumbered ments during the night, efforts to rewin
hill 700 yards south of RENO. (Map 8) VEGAS and RENO failed because of in-
Prisoners of war and other intelligence tense enemy artillery, mortar, and small
COLD FRONT 397

arms fire. A battalion from the 7th enemy. Marine losses were 118 killed,
Marine Regiment was placed under the 801 wounded, and 98 missing in action,
operational control of the 5th Regiment figures which testified to the bitterness
on 27 March, but even with the addi- of the battle.53
tional troops, the counterattacks made
little progress. As the day wore on, 3 Air and Naval Operations
light battalions, 2 medium battalions, 2
8-inch batteries, 1 4.5-inch rocket bat- The uneven tenor of ground opera-
tery, 2 companies of 4.2-inch mortars, tions was reflected in the type of activity
and 1 battalion of 25-pounders pum- that the air and naval forces carried out
meled the enemy positions, and close during the winter of 1952-53. During
air support sought to destroy Chinese the sporadic fighting of November 1952,
strongpoints. Over 100,000 artillery the Far East Air Forces devoted over
rounds, 54,000 mortar shells, 7,000 3,000 sorties to close combat support and
rounds of 90-mm. tank ammunition, and a lesser amount of its effort to interdic-
426 tons of explosives were directed at tory missions. Bomber components of
the Communists during the fight, while the command continued to work over
the Chinese sent back about 45,000 at rail lines and bridges, storage facilities,
the marines. The decision was made repair shops, supply centers, and troop
not to recapture RENO for the time being concentrations in addition to their
and the Marine units, increasing the at- strikes against strongpoints along the
tacking force to the infantry strength of battle line.
two battalions, concentrated on VEGAS. According to the basic FEAF opera-
Not until the afternoon of 28 March tions policy that was in effect until the
were the marines able to battle their way end of 1952, the air forces were trying:
back to the top, for the Chinese fire was to maintain pressure on the Communist
heavy and deadly. military units; to influence the armistice
Enemy counterattacks followed each negotiations, so that UNC could obtain
other swiftly during the night of 28-29 the most favorable terms; to retain the
March, but were broken up by defensive capability for other operations, in the
fires. Despite the Chinese pressure, the event of a general emergency; to prevent
Marine defenders worked hard to or minimize enemy air attacks against
strengthen their hold on VEGAS. When the U.N. Command; to furnish air sup-
the Communists moved forward to the port to the UNC, including close combat
assault, the marines called for boxing support; and to interdict the enemy's
fires, and flare planes exposed the enemy logistical and communications system.
to Marine automatic weapon and small First priority went to the task of main-
arms fire. One Chinese concentration taining air superiority and second to the
was neutralized by rocket fire before it close support of ground operations,
could organize its attack. Before the whenever the tactical situation required
enemy broke off the fighting on 29
53
March, the marines had repelled several (1) First Marine Div, Comd Diary, Mar 53, pp.
10-12. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, pp.
battalion-sized attacks and inflicted over 28-37. (3) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53,
1,300 estimated casualties upon the sec. I, Narrative, p. 49.
398 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

it.54 The emphasis on close support and town were all bombed by means of
the successful suppression of antiaircraft visual methods.55
fire during the FEAF strikes by friendly On 9 December the carriers Oriskany,
artillery promoted better air-ground re- Bon Homme Richard, and Essex sent
lationships during the winter months. 350 sorties to blast rail facilities at Rash-
Navy and Marine planes also contrib- in, Musan, Hyesanjin, and Hunyung—
uted greatly to the support of the ground the latter was the northernmost raid of
forces during November. Task Force 77 the Korean War. One week later, planes
devoted half of its combat effort to from the same carriers traveled to the
"Cherokee" strikes on behalf of the Manchurian border to reach hitherto un-
Eighth Army. A Cherokee strike was a damaged rail targets at Yuson-dong.56
prebriefed operation against a specific Although intelligence reports pointed
target in front of friendly ground posi- to a steady increase of Communist air
tions and differed from regular close air strength in Manchuria, enemy air activ-
support in that it was not directed by ity remained at a low ebb during the
spotters. Usually a control plane was closing months of the year. In December
assigned by the Air Force, however, to reconnaissance planes observed a grow-
assist in locating the target and for as- ing number of Soviet-built I1-28, twin-
sessing the damage caused by the strike. engine jet bombers close to the border
In addition to the Cherokee opera- and the threat of a surprise attack against
tions, Navy planes pounded industrial UNC airfields ballooned. This, coupled
centers in northeastern Korea. On 17- with the statements of UNC pilots that
18 November, they bombed Ch'ongjin, their MIG opponents seemed to be get-
Kilchu, Kyongsong, and other coastal ting more competent in their attempts
rail facilities, factories, and mines. Dur- to intercept the F-86 Sabrejets, aroused
ing these operations separate targets some concern. But the Communists, as
were assigned to the air groups of each noted earlier, demonstrated no enthus-
carrier to eliminate the impromptu ex- iasm for aggressive operations either on
changes between group leaders who, the ground or in the air. By the end of
when they were assigned to the same tar- 1952, Air Force and Navy pilots were
gets, normally did their co-ordination in once again devoting the bulk of their
the air. The Ch'ongjin attack found five combat effort to the North Korean rail
air strikes co-ordinated with the concen- and highway network.57
trated firepower of the battleship Mis- Typical of the air assaults of the pe-
souri and the cruiser Helena. On the riod was the bombardment of the Sin-
18th, Task Force 77 sent 64 attack anju complex beginning on 9 January.
planes, 16 piston-type fighters, and 24
jet fighters against Hoeryong on the
Yalu River. The synthetic oil plant, Nov 52, sec. 1-1, 1-15. (2) Msg, CX 58908, CINCFE
to DA, 17 Nov 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov
supply buildings, power plant, iron fac- 52, G-3 sec., pt. III, tab 3.
tory, and other facilities in this border
54
55
56
sec. 1-1, 1-2.
COMNAVFE,
FEAF
(1) COMNAVFE,
Comd Rpt,
ComdNov
Comd
and
52,and
Hist
vol.Hist
II.
Rpt,
Rpt,
Dec
Oct-
52, 57
(1) FEAF Comd Rpt, Dec 52, vol. I, pp. 1, 2,
8; vol. II. (2) COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt,
Dec 52, sec. 1-1, 1-6.
COLD FRONT 399

Seventeen B-29's launched the attack When the concern voiced by General
and then, for the next six days, Fifth Clark over the possibility of a Com-
Air Force fighter-bombers raided the munist air attack coupled with an at-
important freight yards and bridge ap- tempt to take Seoul before the spring
proaches daily. Flying 1,243 sorties in thaw proved groundless, the Air Force
support of the program to knock out and Navy commanders continued
Sinanju's transportation system, the to press the campaign to make the con-
fighter-bombers managed to render all tinuance of hostilities as expensive as
the bridges into the town unserviceable possible to the Communists. On 18-
by 14 January. Rail traffic between Sin- 19 February 511 Air Force and Marine
anju and P'yongyang was severed for fighters and fighter-bombers raided the
about eleven days and the Communists tank and infantry school near P'yong-
had to strain their truck transport system yang with 541 tons of high explosives,
to take up the slack.58 and 24 fighter-bombers hit Suiho again
During the Sinanju raid period, the in a surprise low-level attack. Despite
Sabrejets ran into a number of MIG's the intense antiaircraft concentrations
and on 14 January the F-86's claimed around Suiho, not a plane was lost or
a banner day. They reported that 8 damaged.
enemy planes had been knocked down, Twenty-four Thunderjets from the
2 others probably destroyed, and 8 had Fifth Air Force made an 800-mile round
been damaged. But outside an excep- trip to Ch'ongjin, some sixty-three miles
tional occasion like the foregoing, the from the Soviet border, to bomb the
Chinese air forces evidenced little city's industrial facilities on 5 March.
change in their indisposition toward Only sixteen days later, planes from
combat in January.59 three Navy carriers hit the same town
A month later, on 16 February, the again with 169 sorties, causing huge
Navy celebrated the completion of the secondary explosions in the ammunition
second year of the longest effective siege storage area. In the meantime, the Fifth
in United States naval history. Almost Air Force sent twenty-six B-29's to de-
daily since February 1951, Navy aircraft stroy a troop and factory complex near
had swarmed over the key port of Won- Sinuiju on 17 March. The bombardiers
san and surface guns had added to the claimed 147 buildings, 4 warehouses, and
destruction. On 31 January and on 9- 1manufacturing plant were wiped out
10 February, the carriers Kearsarge, in this raid.
Philippine Sea, and Oriskany mounted Emphasis continued on air interdic-
large-scale air attacks on Wonsan, with tion during the December-March pe-
the battleship Missouri and other sur- riod, but it was not the same type that
face vessels also taking part in the Jan- the air forces had tried unsuccessfully
uary operation.60 in the STRANGLE rail cutting program of
the previous year. Rather the air forces
58
FEAF Comd Rpt, Jan 52, vol. I, pp. 11-12; aimed at striking and destroying vulner-
vol II, Opns, tab 3. able enemy targets that would not only
59
Ibid., vol. I, p. 13.
60
COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan-Feb 53,
impede the Communist supply effort but
sec. 1-1, 1-12. also apply pressure on them to end the
400 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

hostilities. By the destruction of com- Marine aircraft added 77 tons of bombs


munications centers and supply facilities, and 66 tons of napalm to the assault.62
such as factories, warehouses, and de- The advent of spring and the acceler-
pots, the task of supporting the enemy's ated tempo of enemy operations at the
troops at the front became a bit more close of March seemed to presage a de-
complicated every day. But the quiet- parture from the somewhat uneventful
ness along the battle lines during most pattern of the winter months. From
of the period did not require extraordi- time to time the actions had grown
nary expenditures of matériel and warmer during the period, but the
ammunition and, despite the air forces' fighting had never decided more than
efforts, the Communists were able to the temporary possession of another hill.
stockpile supplies to sustain themselves Air and sea operations had provided a
from thirty to forty-five days in the for- measure of pressure upon the enemy as
ward areas.61 towns and installations were destroyed
As the enemy increased his ground ac- or damaged, but the Communists' pow-
tivity during March, both the Air Force ers of recuperation had been adequate to
and Navy began to put more stress upon readjust to these losses and irritations.
close air support and Cherokee-type As April arrived, the military situation
missions. The outbreak of fighting at remained essentially unchanged—nei-
Old Baldy and VEGAS brought a spate of ther side was vitally hurt nor willing to
calls for air operations against Chinese risk a vital hurt. The sparring match
strongpoints, supply dumps, and person- continued as both opponents awaited an
nel concentrations close to the front. On opportune moment to end the contest
Old Baldy, FEAF provided 483 fighter- on terms favorable to their own cause.
bomber, 87 light-bomber, and 11 me- In view of this reluctance to seek a mili-
dium bomber sorties during the last tary decision, the truce tent still ap-
week of March. The FEAF planes peared to offer the only arena in which
dropped about 400 tons of bombs on the a settlement would be effected.
enemy ground positions, and Navy and
61 62
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I, FEAF Comd Rpts, Feb and Mar 53, vol. I, pp.
Narrative, p. 24. 1-2 and 1-3, respectively.
CHAPTER XVIII

The Beginning of the End


When General Harrison and his asso- The Long Recess: First Phase
ciates walked out of the tent at Panmun-
jom on 8 October, they neither knew The first nonmilitary attack by the
when they would return nor if they Communists in October was aimed at the
would come back at all. The possibility UNC tactics at Panmunjom. As soon
that the Communists would alter their as the Harrison team left the tent, the
attitude toward repatriation appeared enemy began to charge that the UNC
extremely unlikely at that time and the had broken off the negotiations. Since
military pressure that the U.N. Com- the onus for a collapse in the talks had
mand could hope to muster gave no always been a sensitive point to the polit-
promise of producing a change in the ical and military leaders in Washington,
enemy's stand. Since the UNC had they quickly instructed Clark not to use
fallen back upon its final negotiating po- the term "indefinite recess" in the UNC
sition, the discussion phase and the pe- statements. They informed him that
riod of maneuvering were at an end. there was no desire to have the armistice
Until a break occurred in the adamant negotiations debated in any forum other
fronts presented by both sides, the pros- than that of Panmunjom and that all
pects for a settlement remained remote. the efforts of the United States in the
The liaison officers meanwhile con- U.N. General Assembly were directed to-
tinued to meet at Panmunjom and furn- wards facilitating an agreement at the
ished one point of contact for reflecting meetings in the tents.1
a shift in the situation. The activity on As the letters flew back and forth be-
the battlefield, especially during the tween the liaison officers in October,
October-November operations, pro-the courses adopted by the opponents
vided another. And in the air over became clear. The UNC stand rested
North Korea, the Far East Air Forces did upon the conclusion that the Commu-
its best to help speed up the enemy's de- nists had neither accepted any of the
sire to reach an agreement. To counter plans offered by the U.N. Command nor
the application of military pressure, the proffered any of their own that were new
Communists reverted to their old stand- or reasonable; therefore, the UNC dele-
bys—political and psychological warfare. gation would wait until the enemy satis-
But the efficacy of either the UNC or fied one of the two conditions listed
the enemy method was doubtful, since above before it would reconvene. Har-
both had been tried before and found
wanting. 1
Msg, JCS 920838, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Oct 52.
402 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

rison and Clark denied repeatedly that UNC was ready to reconvene the meet-
the UNC had ended the negotiations.2 ings at Panmunjom at any time that the
The Communists, on the other hand, Communists were willing to accept the
pursued two tactics. While they pressed "fundamental principle of nonforcible
their accusations that the UNC had return." 5
ended the truce talks, they missed no While the debates in the General
opportunity to cite UNC violations, real Assembly over the U.S. resolution
and alleged, of the neutral zone around against forcible repatriation were going
Panmunjom. And as the incidence of on, other suggestions and resolutions
violence in the prisoner of war camps were brought forth. One of these was an
started to increase again, the enemy ne- informal Canadian proposal that the
gotiators strongly censured the UNC UNC seek a cease-fire in Korea and leave
for its treatment of the Communist the nonrepatriate problem to later ne-
prisoners.3 gotiations. Both Army and State De-
To lessen the impact of the enemy's partment staffs objected to this proce-
charges and to explain the UNC position dure. To remove the threat of military
in the negotiations to the rest of the compulsion would amount to a surren-
world, Secretary of State Acheson ad- der of the UNC's most potent weapon,
dressed the U.N. Political Committee on they maintained, while, at the same
24 October. Tracing the beginnings of time, the Communists would keep their
the talks and the development of the trump card—the UNC prisoners. The
issues, he admitted that the growth of enemy could protract the discussions on
the conflict over repatriation had been the disposition of prisoners and in the
"wholly unexpected" and "surprising" meantime rebuild its airfields, roads,
to the U.N. Command.4 He pointed out bridges and restock its supply dumps.
the inconsistencies of the position If the talks proved fruitless and hostil-
adopted by the USSR in opposing the ities again broke out, the Communist
concept of no forced repatriation in military position could be greatly im-
Korea when it had on various occasions proved and UNC morale would be sadly
previously upheld the right of the pris- depressed.6
oner of war to choose or refuse repatria- Several weeks later when the Joint
tion. In closing he stressed that the Chiefs forwarded their views on the
matter to the Secretary of Defense, they
2
(1) Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 15 Oct 52, no sub.
endorsed the Army-State staff argu-
(2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 19 Oct 52. Both ments. There could be no justification
in G-3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan for giving up the UNC air superiority
Mun Jom, 1952, bk. II. in Korea, they told Mr. Lovett, unless the
sub, in G-3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at
Pan Mun Jom, 1952, bk. II.
4
From the context it is evident that Secretary
5
Acheson used the term "UNC" loosely, encom- Department of State Publication 4771, The
passing the political and military leadership in the Problem of Peace in Korea, a report by Secretary
U.S.
3 and other allied U.N. countries. As already of State Dean Acheson, October 24, 1952 (Washing-
Ltrs, Nam to Harrison, 16 and 29 Oct 52, no
noted, General Ridgway had had misgivings about ton, 1952).
6
the UNC position on voluntary repatriation before G-3 and State Dept Staff Paper, no title, no
it became the official stand. See Chapter VII, above. date (ca. 28 Oct 5 2 ) , in G-3 091 Korea, 3/22.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 403

Communists accepted the concept of no of ninety days too long for the interro-
forced repatriation.7 gation period, but the U.S. still op-
On 17 November the Indian delega- posed turning over the nonrepatriates to
tion presented its plan to end the Ko- a political conference.9
rean War to the United Nations. The But the Communist response proved
Indian resolution recognized the U.S. to be even stronger. Soviet Foreign Min-
contention that no force should be used ister Vishinsky roundly denounced the
to prevent or effect the return of Indian plan in the United Nations, and
prisoners to their homeland. Yet in def- Chou En-lai rejected it by stating on 28
erence to the Communist stand, it November that the Russian-sponsored
suggested that a repatriation commis- proposal calling for forcible repatriation
sion, composed of two Communist and was the only reasonable one. When it
two UNC nations, be set up to receive came to a vote on 3 December, the U.N.
all the prisoners in the demilitarized voted down the USSR's resolution, 40
zone. There they would be classified to 5, and adopted the Indian plan, 54 to
according to nationality and domicile, 5. Only the Communist bloc supported
as the Communists had wished, and be the Russian and opposed the Indian pro-
free to go home. Each side would have posal. The latter provided that if the
the freedom of explaining to the prison- peace conference did not settle the non-
ers their rights, and all prisoners who repatriates' fate in thirty days, the pris-
still had not chosen repatriation after oners would be turned over to the
ninety days would be referred to the United Nations for disposition.10
political conference recommended in There was small chance that the Com-
the armistice agreement. In case the munists would pay much heed to the
four members of the repatriation com- action of the General Assembly in the
mission could not agree on the interpre- matter beyond attacking it vigorously.
tation of the details of handling the But the bitter assault that they launched
prisoners and their disposition, an um- on the Indian suggestion served two
pire would be named by the members or purposes: it alienated public opinion in
the General Assembly to break any dead- some of the neutral countries that had
lock.8 supported this solution; and it helped
Although many of the United States obscure the milder disapproval evi-
allies favored the Indian proposal, at denced by the United States.
least in principle, the U.S. official reac- The unfavorable publicity garnered
tion was quick and adverse. Most of the by the Communists on this score, how-
objections voiced by the United States ever, was soon to be matched by the
concerned the vagueness of the duties gathering storm of unfortunate events
and responsibilities that the repatriation
9
commission would carry out and the in- (1) Msg, DA 924551, G-3 to CINCFE, 23 Nov
52. (2) U.S. Reaction to India's Proposal on Prison-
definite procedure for handling non- ers of War, Statement made by Secretary Acheson,
repatriates. Not only was the time limit in Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVII, No. 702
(December 8, 1952), pp. 910ff.
7 10
Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 17 Nov 52, Text of Resolution on Prisoners of War, 3 Dec
sub: U.S. Position on Korea. . . . 52, in Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXVII, No. 702
8
Msg, DA 924505, G-3 to CINCFE, 22 Nov 52. (December 8, 1952), pp. 916-17.
404 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

taking place in UNC prison camps. Al- that if the UNC intended to accuse the
though the Communist prisoners had enemy of fomenting trouble, concrete
been relocated in smaller, more man- evidence of such activity would have to
ageable groups and scattered on a num- be presented to substantiate the charges.
ber of islands to lessen the threat of con- This would mean that intercepted
certed action, the hard-core leaders and orders, confessions, plans that were un-
their followers had shown no disposition covered, and other proof of enemy direc-
toward ending their fight in the com- tion would have to be produced and
pounds. publicized.11 The concern of the Far
As already indicated, the problem of East Command with the enemy's tech-
maintaining order and discipline in the niques in exploiting the situation in the
Communist enclosures was fraught with prison camps was to produce results
pitfalls. A policy of leniency and lax- later on, but for the time being nothing
ness would allow the zealous partisans was done.
full opportunity to control and adminis- Meanwhile the enemy seldom at-
ter the compounds as they saw fit. On tended a meeting of the liaison officers
the other hand, a ruthless, hard policy without citing a violation of the Geneva
with tight control and discipline meant Convention in regard to the treatment
continual clashes and bloodshed. The of prisoners or an infringement of the
Communists seemed to welcome vio- neutral zone around Panmunjom by
lence and—even more—to encourage it. UNC aircraft or ground troops. On 30
For every man that the UNC was in- November the Communists alleged that
veigled into wounding or killing meant the UNC had wounded thirty-two pris-
another propaganda advantage to the oners at Koje-do five days earlier and
enemy. The Communist prisoners acted then went on to claim that during Octo-
therefore as a double weapon since they ber and November a total of 542 Com-
forced the UNC to maintain strong munist prisoners had been killed or
guard forces in the rear and since their wounded.12 By the end of the year,
agitation placed the UNC constantly on General Nam charged that the UNC had
the defensive to justify its repressive caused 3,059 casualties among the Com-
measures. munist internees since July 1951 and
When the Joint Strategic Plans and noted that the Communists had lodged
Operations Group suggested in early 45 protests on this score since February
October that the UNC Armistice Delega- 1952.13
tion should seek to forestall Communist
propaganda gains by charging the enemy
with instigation of the disturbances in 11
Ltr, Col S. D. Somerville, Exec to UNC Dele-
the camps each time one occurred, the gation, to Chief JSPOG, 14 Oct 52, sub: Letter on
delegation agreed that this approach had POW Incidents, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan-
31 Dec 52.
merit. But it pointed out that seizing 12
Memo for Rcd, sub: Liaison Officers' Mtgs, 30
the initiative would probably neither Nov 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls
deter the Communists from causing the 1-89, incl 1.
13
Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 30 Dec 52, no sub, in
disorders nor from magnifying them to UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incls 1
suit their purpose. The delegation felt and 2.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 405

ENCLOSURE 1 OF THE POW CAMP AT PONGAM-DO

The growing toll in the prison Pongam-do had been chosen for a prison
camps caused UNC leaders a great deal camp site. The island was small and
of uneasiness as December began. Di- compounds had to be located on the
rect disobedience of orders was a com- side of a steeply terraced hill. Since the
mon occurrence and was usually coun- prisoners were placed on the upper ter-
tered by direct application of force. races and access could only be gained
Indications from the UNC Prisoner of by proceeding level by level up the hill,
War Command pointed to considerable the Communist internees were given all
planning among the prisoners for a mass the advantages of terrain. For some
breakout from the camps in early De- time, the prisoners at Pongam-do had
cember and one of the worst trouble been getting bolder and bolder. They
spots was at the civilian internee com- organized and conducted military drill
pounds on Pongam-do, a tiny island not in defiance of UNC orders and mounted
far from Koje-do.14 demonstrations at will. Among the 9,000
It was difficult to understand why inmates on the island were many of the
14
Msg, CX 59869, CINCUNC to DA, 8 Dec 52,
prisoners who had been participants in
the February 1952 outbreak on Koje-do.
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl 6. They were guarded by one ROK security
406 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

battalion and some U.S. administrative request.16 These measures would help
personnel. to cope with the results of the prisoner
On 14 December matters came to a agitation if not with the causes.
head. Around 3,600 internees in six To strengthen his hand against fur-
compounds were ordered to disband ther outbreaks in the prison camps,
their drilling and to cease causing a Clark pressed anew for authority to
commotion. Instead they formed three establish a U.N. military commission to
ranks on the upper terrace and locked try prisoners charged with postcapture
arms. Others gathered behind this pro- offenses. His urgings in July and August
tective screen and began to hurl rocks had elicited no positive action, despite
and debris on the ROK troops as they the support of General Collins, but
ascended the hill to enforce the order. with the example of Pongam-do fresh in
Ordinarily concussion grenades and non- the news, Clark reminded his supe-
toxic gas would have been used, but, in riors that the lack of appropriate judicial
this instance, the prisoners could throw machinery weakened the disciplinary
the grenades back down the hill and a powers of the camp commanders.17 In
strong cross-wind ruled out the employ- view of the legal and political complica-
ment of gas. Thus, when orders and tions involved in conducting trials of
warning shots were disregarded, the prisoners of war, the U.S. political and
ROK soldiers began to take aim at the military leaders had been reluctant to
solid, defiant ranks above them. At close use this weapon in the past, but Clark's
range the bullets opened gaps in the plea reopened the matter. Speedy ac-
human chain and resistance collapsed. tion approving such authority, however,
But when the melee was over, 85 pris- appeared to be out of the question,
oners lay dead, 113 were hospitalized, since the JCS intended to have the en-
and there were over 100 minor injuries. tire POW problem reviewed at the high-
Only four ROK personnel received ma- est level.18 This meant consideration by
jor wounds.15 the new President and his advisors and
The affair at Pongam-do again led would take time.
to a flurry of activity on POW matters. Pongam-do produced protests from
Clark told Van Fleet to have available the Communists and criticism by the In-
one U.S. infantry battalion that could be ternational Committee of the Red Cross
shifted to the Korean Communications of the methods used by the U.N. Com-
Zone on twenty-four hours' notice and mand. The latter complaint was more
authorized General Herren to utilize one difficult to cope with, for the ICRC was
battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division on highly regarded throughout the non-
the prisoner of war mission. When Her-
ren asked that helicopters be furnished
16
so that tear gas grenades could be (1) Msg, CX 60234, CINCFE to CG Eighth
dropped on rioters to disperse them Army, 16 Dec 52. (2) Msg, CX 60303, CINCFE to
CG Eighth Army, 18 Dec 52. Both in UNC/FEC,
without casualties, Clark approved his Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incls 9 and 10.
17
Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 19 Dec 52, sub:
15
Msg, CX 60206 and CX 60301, CINCUNC to Trial of POW's for Post-Captive Offenses, in G-3
DA, 15 and 18 Dec 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, 383.6, 64.
18
Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl 8. Msg, JCS 928298, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jan 53.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 407

Communist world. In answer to the Red ities of the prisoners to incite unrest. To
Cross allegation that the UNC control eliminate the necessity for visiting the
of prisoners had been overly strict and latrines at night, the prison command
the members of the security forces had installed facilities in each barracks. In
been unnecessarily harassing the pris- the corridors between the compounds
oners, Clark issued a statement defend- guards were armed with shotguns so that
ing the UNC actions and attacking the prisoners moving around in disobedience
Communist prisoners' behavior. He re- to the camp curfew could be identified
minded the ICRC representatives that by the buckshot they absorbed, but not
the UNC had voluntarily observed the killed or seriously injured.21
Geneva Convention while the Commu- In early January, the Department of
nists had ignored it. When it came to the Army and the Far East Command
deliberate disobedience, marked by decided that the time had come to ex-
mutiny, riots, or refusal to carry out or- pose the Communist methods and tech-
ders, on the one hand, and terrorism niques of stirring up trouble in the
in the camps, on the other, the UNC had prison camps. The Military Intelligence
used force, but only after all other Section, G-2, of the FEC was assigned
methods had been tried. Clark pointed the task of compiling a report on the
out that the UNC had constantly sought organization, control, and methods used
to improve the physical facilities and by the enemy to exploit their faithful
supply procedures for the camps and followers and to demonstrate the prob-
that only the pro-Communist enclosures, lems facing the U.N. Command as it at-
whose inmates had never accepted their tempted to deal with the matter. The
nonbelligerent status as prisoners, had end result was the study entitled The
turned to organized violence.19 Communist War at POW Camps, pub-
Despite the voluminousness of the lished in late January.22 The press reac-
enemy's protests during the latter part of tion in the United States to the release of
1952, Clark did not believe that the this report was highly favorable, but
Communists had any intention of ter- complete copies were not available there
minating the negotiations. The contin- and full advantage of the study could
uous barrage of enemy grievances not be attained.23
seemed designed, in his opinion, to play The enemy seemed to hold the upper
upon the fears of the United States' allies hand in the battle of indirect pressures
and to create sympathy for the Com- as 1953 began. However, the UNC still
munist position on prisoners of war.20 retained several weapons that it had not
Nevertheless, the Far East comman-
der took steps to lessen the opportun-
21
(1) Msg, CX 60811, CINCUNC to Herren, 3
Jan 53. (2) Msg, AX 72028, Herren to Clark, 8
19
(1) Msg, C 60412, CINCFE to DA, 21 Dec 52, Jan 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53,
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl incls 1-67, incls 17 and 18.
22
19. (2) Msg, CX 60820, CINCUNC to CSUSA, 5 Msg, DA 928223, DA to CINCFE, 9 Jan 53.
23
Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls (1) Msg, ZX 35682, CINCFE to DA, 28 Jan 53,
1-67, incl 16. in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67, incl
20
Msg, CX 60789, CINCFE to JCS, 2 Jan 53, in 23. (2) Msg, DA 930068, DA to CINCFE, 30 Jan
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67, incl 15. 53.
408 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

used. In mid-December, Col. Charles W. since the enemy had not extended any
McCarthy, senior UNC liaison officer, like consideration to the UNC. 25
had urged that the UNC strike back. In
a letter to the Joint Strategic Plans and The Republicans Take Over
Operations Group he pointed out that
the UNC pilots were allowing the Com- When Dwight D. Eisenhower became
munists to utilize the P'yongyang-Kae- President of the United States on 20 Jan-
song road for convoys to the truce area uary, John Foster Dulles succeeded Dean
every day. In effect, what this meant, Mc-
Acheson as Secretary of State and
Carthy continued, was that the enemy Charles E. Wilson became Secretary of
had a main supply route open all day de-Defense. Yet, as noted above, there was
spite the fact that the negotiations were
no basic change in U.S. policy insofar as
in recess. He proposed that the UNC cut the Korean War was concerned. The
back the number of convoys permitted new administration had no panacea for
the enemy to three or less a week and ending the conflict expeditiously and no
require the Communists to adhere intention of expanding the military
to a tight timetable for each trip al- pressure to force a settlement upon
lowed. Such action would strike a blow the Communists. On the whole the Re-
at the enemy and perhaps let the people publicans adopted the policy of watchful
back home know that the UNC was not waiting pursued by the Truman admin-
adopting a passive approach to the Com- istration.
munists' behind-the-scenes tactics.24 The new President quickly changed
Thus, when the liaison officers met one of the procedures followed by Mr.
on 15 January, Colonel McCarthy's suc- Truman during his term of office. No
cessor, Col. William B. Carlock, longer were all the important messages
informed Col. Ju Yon, who had recently concerning the Korean War routed
taken Colonel Chang's place, of the across his desk for final approval. This
new UNC policy. Starting on 25 Janu- task now fell largely to the Secretaries
ary, the Communists would be allowed of State and Defense and Mr. Dulles'
to run only two convoys a week as long role in the making of Korean policy in-
as the negotiations were in recess. One creased during the early months of 1953.
would leave P'yongyang and the other In one substantive respect, too, Presi-
Kaesong every Sunday morning; both dent Eisenhower swiftly divorced him-
would be required to finish their jour- self from the course followed by his
neys by 2000. To the protest by the predecessor. In his State of the Union
Communists that the UNC could not message to Congress on 2 February, Mr.
unilaterally break the agreement of No- Eisenhower revealed that he had de-
vember 1951, Colonel Carlock informed cided to end the U.S. naval blockade of
Ju that there was no "agreement" on Taiwan.
the immunity granted the Communists,
25
(1) Ltr, Carlock to Ju, 15 Jan 53, no sub. (2)
24 Ltr, Ju to Carlock, 21 Jan 53, no sub. (3) Liaison
Ltr, McCarthy to Col Donald H. Galloway, Officers Mtgs, 21 Jan 53. All in G-3 File, Liaison
Deputy Chief JSPOG, 16 Dec 52, no sub, in FEC Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53,
SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan-31 Dec 52. bk. III.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 409

No longer would the U.S. Seventh phibiously trained. Without greater


Fleet serve as a screen for the Chinese support in equipment from the United
Communists and prevent Chiang Kai- States and the preparation of more di-
shek from attacking the mainland, the visions for assault landings, the National-
President affirmed. As might be ex- ist threat could become little more than
pected, reaction to this shift was loud a threat. The principal result of the
and varied. General MacArthur, Sen- "unleashing" was to stir up the political
ator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, Chiang Kai- and diplomatic waters of the world,
shek, and President Rhee all supported while those about Taiwan remained
the rescinding of the restriction, while militarily serene. As the historian of
leading Democrats and prominent news- the Far East Naval Forces remarked:
papermen in Great Britain and India "Despite internal uneasiness over the
immediately voiced their concern lest decision, it did not have the immediate
the act provoke an extension of the war strategic significance expected, and, tac-
into the Taiwan area. Backers of the tically, had no effect on the operation
President hailed the "unleashing" of of the Formosa Patrol." 27
Chiang's forces and praised Eisenhower Gradually the Eisenhower adminis-
for having seized the initiative in the tration became more familiar with the
battle with communism. But if it were problems in Korea and began to consider
true that the enemy might be confused what positive steps could be taken
and forced to guess at the next move that within the accepted political framework
the United States might make, it was also to break the impasse. Once again the
fair to state that the sword was two- concept of unilateral release of the non-
edged. It was also conceivable that the repatriates and the presentation to the
Communist Chinese might attack Tai- Communists of a fait accompli was re-
wan. vived and Clark was asked to comment
British Foreign Secretary Eden was on this approach. Because of the sensi-
quite cool to the "unilateral" decision tivity of the matter, Clark sent a member
taken by the new government without of his staff, Lt. Col. Arthur W. Kogstad,
consultation with its allies and warned to Washington to present his views.
that the move might "have very unfor- Meeting with Washington officials in
tunate political repercussions without early March, Kogstad informed the
compensating military advantages." In group that Clark was fully in favor of
India, one newspaper accused the Presi- releasing the Korean nonrepatriates and
dent of "hunting peace with a gun." 26 did not think that such a move would
Despite the excitement generated by have an appreciable effect upon the
this announcement, there was no sudden UNC's prospects for an armistice in Ko-
outbreak of operations in the Taiwan rea. As for the Chinese nonrepatriates,
sector. The Nationalist Chinese forces their disposition would require careful
had but few landing craft and only a attention, since it would have political
small number of their troops were am- implications. Kogstad later reported
that the tenor of opinion among the
26
The reaction to the 2 February speech may
27
be found in the New York Times, February 3, 4 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan, Feb 53,
1953. p. 4.
410 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

conferees attending the meeting had no undue publicity would be given to


been favorable to Clark's recommenda- the trials. This was only a halfway
tion, but other factors were at work. Mr. measure. Clark immediately protested,
Dulles, who had a major hand in making since most of the violence had been di-
policy in Mr. Eisenhower's administra- rected at fellow prisoners rather than at
tion, was busy with the U.N. General the U.N. Command. In the face of this
Assembly and unable to devote his time reclama, the JCS secured authority for
to the POW question in early the UNC to try prisoners charged with
March. Then, too, the sudden demise offenses committed after June 1952
of Joseph Stalin of a cerebral hemor- against other prisoners.31
rhage on 5 March had injected any num- Despite this apparent victory, events
ber of new elements into the world conspired to delay the trial and punish-
political picture, and time was required ment of the Communist troublemakers
to assess them before bold ventures in the prison camps. Before the Far
were embarked upon.28 At any rate time East Command brought the first cases
overtook the concept of unilateral re- to court, the State Department wanted
lease insofar as the U.N. Command was to line up judicial support and partici-
concerned and the next time it reared pation in the trials from the United
its head, it bore the visage of Syngman States' allies in Korea. By the end of
Rhee.29 March, however, only four nations had
The rash of incidents in the prison agreed to serve on military commis-
camps meanwhile continued unabated. sions.32 This reluctance to share the
Clark decided in February to sound out responsibility for trying prisoners of
the new political chiefs on the old ques- war for postcapture offenses and the
tion of trial of prisoners for their post- swift flow of developments on the ne-
capture offenses. Pointing out that the gotiating front in late March seemed to
publication of the study of the Commu- offer small hope that the ringleaders of
nist prisoners had raised questions violence would ever come to trial.
among the press and his own troops as The Communist threat to Seoul in
to why no disciplinary action had been February, discussed in the preceding
taken against the prison leaders, Clark chapter, produced several exchanges be-
requested immediate consideration for tween Tokyo and Washington concern-
this pressing problem.30 ing the neutral city of Kaesong. Under
The Far East commander received the October 1951 agreement, Kaesong
some solace in late February. In cases of was protected from UNC attack. Yet,
flagrant attack against UNC security Clark told the JCS in early February, the
personnel, the JCS told him, Clark
might bring the offenders to justice, but 31
(1) Msg, DA 931969, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Feb
53. (2) Msg, CX 61323, CINCUNC to DA, 24 Feb
28
A good account of the Kogstad mission will be 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88,
found in Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotia- incl 17. (3) Msg, JCS 932476, JCS to CINCFE, 28
tions (May 52-Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 271ff. See Feb 53.
32
also Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 262. (1) Msg, JCS 933135, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Mar
29
See Chapter XX, below. 53. (2) Msgs, CX 61627 and CX 61647, CINCUNC
30
Msg, CX 61135, CINCUNC to DA, 4 Feb 53, in to G-3, 25 and 27 Mar 53. Both in UNC/FEC,
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incl 15. Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72, incls 13 and 14.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 411

enemy was using the town for restaging able response. Back in December, Clark
troops, for resupply, and as an espionage had read a news despatch from Geneva
headquarters. If and when he became which reported that the Executive Com-
convinced that a major Communist of- mittee of the League of Red Cross So-
fensive was in the offing, Clark wanted cieties had passed a resolution on 13 De-
authority to abrogate the 1951 agree- cember calling for the immediate ex-
ment and attack Kaesong. On 9 Febru- change of sick and wounded prisoners.
ary, just two days after his initial re- Clark suggested that, although he did
quest, the United Nations commander not think the Communists would agree
asked for permission to open up Kaesong to such an exchange in the light of their
to assault.33 previous reaction to similar proposals, he
When Clark's recommendation came felt that the UNC should support the
up for discussion in Washington, Mr. resolution for its psychological and pub-
Dulles urged that the U.N. Command licity value.35
should unilaterally abrogate the security No action was taken on his suggestion
agreement of 1951 as of a specific date until February. Then the State Depart-
and remove Kaesong and Munsan, but ment learned that the question of an
not Panmunjom, from a neutral status, exchange of sick and wounded would
if an enemy offensive of division size or probably be raised when the U.N. Gen-
larger seemed imminent. The JCS, in eral Assembly met on 24 February. The
passing the decision on to Clark, pointed political advantage in having the United
out that such an action would help al- States propose and support a resolution
leviate an adverse military situation, of this nature was obvious and the State
while lessening the political implica- Department had little difficulty in se-
tions that the negotiations were being curing the approval of the JCS and of
completely broken off.34 As it turned Clark.36
out, the large-scale Communist offensive On 22 February the Far East com-
failed to materialize and Clark did not mander thus sent a letter to Kim and
have to retract Kaesong's immunity. Peng requesting an immediate exchange
of sick and injured prisoners. He be-
The Big Break lieved they would turn it down, as they
had earlier efforts along this line.37
Amidst the search for ways and means The matter lay fallow during the re-
to apply pressure upon the enemy and mainder of the month and most of
to strengthen General Clark's hand in March. In the meantime, the enemy
the conflict, the UNC made a rather per-
35
functory gesture that, at the time, Msg, CX 60418, CINCUNC to 6-3, 21 Dec 52,
DA-IN 220029.
seemed to offer little chance of a favor- 36
(1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 16 Feb 53, sub:
Proposal to Exchange Sick and Wounded POW's,
33
Msgs, CX 61160 and CX 61173, CINCUNC to in G-3 383.6, 13/4. (2) Msg, JCS 931724, JCS to
JCS, 7 and 9 Feb 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No. CINCFE, 19 Feb 53. (3) Msg, CX 61281, Clark to
495, in JSPOG Files. DA, 19 Feb 53, DA-IN 239084.
34 37
(1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 12 Feb 53, sub: (1) Msg, CX 61281, Clark to DA, 19 Feb 53,
Abrogation of Security Agreement Re Kaesong- DA-IN 239084. (2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng,
Panmunjom-Munsan, in G-3 091 Korea, 12/4. (2) 22 Feb 53, no sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers
Msg, JCS 931311, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Feb 53. Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
412 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

sustained the flow of complaints on pris- might be approaching.39 On 21 March


oner of war incidents, infringements of Moscow radio, for the first time since
the vital area by UNC aircraft, and even the close of World War II, admitted that
resurrected the charge that the UNC the United States and Great Britain had
was resorting to germ warfare. On 24 played a role in the defeat of the Axis
February Clark issued a statement refut- Powers. The Russians also agreed to
ing the Chinese claim that captured intervene to obtain the release of nine
American personnel had admitted the British diplomats and missionaries held
employment of germ warfare. He captive in North Korea since the out-
pointed out that Communists evidently break of the Korean War. In Germany,
expected new outbreaks of disease dur- the Soviet reaction to the West German
ing the spring and were trying to cover ratification of the European Defense
up the inadequacy of their own health Community treaty was fairly mild.40 The
service to cope with epidemics. In con- possibility that a new Communist peace
clusion, he reaffirmed that the U.N. com- offensive was in the making evoked a
mand had never engaged in germ war- spirit of hope in diplomatic circles
fare in Korea.38 throughout the non-Communist world.
As March opened, events began to The big break came on 28 March.
change the world situation dramatically. Replying to Clark's request for the ex-
Stalin's successor, Georgi M. Malenkov, change of sick and wounded prisoners,
assumed the reins of government on 5 Kim and Peng said that they were per-
March and another transition period for fectly willing to carry out the provisions
world communism was inaugurated. of the Geneva Convention in this respect
Whether the policies of the new control- and then went on to state: "At the same
ling group surrounding Malenkov would time, we consider that the reasonable
differ radically from those of Stalin was settlement of the question of exchanging
unknown, but that there would have to sick and injured prisoners of both sides
be a period of consolidation to establish during the period of hostilities should
Malenkov and his associates in power be made to lead to the smooth settle-
seemed self-evident. Under the circum- ment of the entire question of prisoners
stances, the United States and its allies of war, thereby achieving an armistice
cautiously awaited indications of the di- in Korea for which people throughout
rection that the Malenkov regime in- the world are longing." 41
tended to take. What the Communist leaders meant
Although the Communist prisoners of by their vague reference to a "smooth
war seemed little affected by Stalin's settlement of the entire question of pris-
death and mounted an attack on the oners of war" was a matter of conjecture,
prison commandant on the island of but their acceptance of the sick and
Yoncho-do on 7 March, which resulted wounded exchange promoted optimism.
in the death of twenty-three prisoners 39
Msg, EX 13138, CG AFFE to DA, 9 Mar 53, in
and the wounding of sixty more, there UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72, incl 16.
were signs that a shift in Soviet strategy 40
New York Times, March 20, 21, 25, 1953.
41
Ltr, Kim and Peng to Clark, 28 Mar 53, no
38
Msg, Z 35882, CINCFE to DA, 24 Feb 53, in sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incl 7. Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 413

Clark immediately told the JCS that he maining prisoners of war to a neutral
would go ahead with the arrangements state so as to ensure a just solution to the
for the sick and wounded through the question of their repatriation." Lest
liaison officers, but would decline to re- the U.N. Command assume that the
sume plenary sessions until the enemy enemy had surrendered its views on re-
either came forward with a constructive patriation, Chou strongly affirmed that
proposal or demonstrated willingness to the Communists believed that the pris-
accept one of the offers that the UNC oners of war had been filled with appre-
had made.42 In their reply, his superiors hensions and were afraid to return home
suggested that Clark's letter imply that "under the intimidation and with op-
the Communists intended to meet in pression of the opposite side." He was
substance the UNC position on prison- confident that once explanations could
ers if the negotiations were reconvened. be tendered to the prisoners, they would
In this way the burden would be placed quickly decide to be repatriated.45 At
upon the enemy to either agree to that any rate, the Chou proposal, which was
assumption or admit publicly that there quickly seconded by Kim Il Sung the
was no change in their stand on repatria- following day, presented the brightest
tion. In no case, the Washington leaders hope of settling the Korean War since
concluded, would the resumption of ne- screening in April 1952.
gotiations be tied in as a condition for The initial reaction to Chou's com-
the exchange of the sick and wounded.43 munication in Washington was contin-
Clark followed the instructions and dis- ued caution. While not denying that it
patched his response to Kim and Peng held promise, the U.S. leaders main-
on 31 March.44 tained that the Communists still had
While Tokyo and Washington pon- to come forward with a detailed plan
dered the significance of the Communist for implementing their proposal. They
move, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of could foresee a number of questions that
Communist China, provided a measure would have to be answered such as:
of clarification. On 30 March he issued What did Chou mean by a "neutral"
a statement covering the course of the state? Where would the neutral state
negotiations and the agreements already take over control of the prisoners—in or
reached. Chou then went on to the pris- outside of Korea? Who would make the
oner of war problem and offered what explanations? Who would determine
apparently was the key concession, as he the final disposition of the nonrepatri-
urged that both sides "should undertake ates? If the Communists went forward
to repatriate immediately after the cessa- with the exchange of sick and wounded
tion of hostilities all those prisoners of and produced a detailed statement indi-
war in their custody who insist upon cating their good faith in desiring a set-
repatriation and to hand over the re- tlement of the over-all problem, the
42 American leaders were willing to permit
Msg, CX 61673, Clark to JCS, 29 Mar 53, DA-
IN 252152.
43
Msg, JCS 935136, JCS to CINCUNC, 30 Mar 53.
44 45
Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 31 Mar 53, no Statement of Chou En-lai, 30 Mar 53, in G-3
sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom,
Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III. Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
414 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

concurrent discussion of Chou's proposal other news media to observe the whole
during the exchange.46 process, but to restrict their numbers to
Clark agreed fully that the enemy fifty at Panmunjom and to allow inter-
must produce a concrete plan for dis- views only with the prisoners selected by
cussion before the plenary sessions could medical personnel as physically and men-
reconvene and that the Communist per- tally up to being questioned.48
formance in following through on the
sick and wounded trade would provide Operation LITTLE SWITCH
a demonstration of their good faith. In
a letter to the enemy leaders on 5 April, Admiral Daniel and General Lee Sang
he proposed that the liaison officers meet Cho led the liaison officers groups when
the following day and requested that they gathered at Panmunjom on 6 April.
Kim and Peng furnish the UNC with Relieved of the task of lodging and re-
more particulars on the Communist futing charges and complaints, the rep-
method for disposition of the nonrepatri- resentatives quickly got down to business
ation question.47 and Admiral Daniel launched into an
In preparation for the first meeting of account of the UNC proposal. The
the liaison officers on the arrangements United Nations Command was ready
for the transfer of the sick and wounded, to start immediate construction of the
Clark and his staff formulated a UNC facilities necessary for the delivery and
plan. It contemplated that each prisoner receipt of the sick and wounded at Pan-
to be exchanged would be brought to munjom and to begin delivery of 500
Panmunjom, furnished with a medical prisoners a day within seven days of the
tag on his condition and treatment and agreement on procedures. To expedite
given unmarked, serviceable clothing. matters Daniel suggested that each side
No incapacitated prisoner accused of turn over its lists of names and national-
postcapture war crimes would be held ities of the prisoners to be exchanged
back for this reason, since it did not ap- and that officers be appointed to discuss
pear probable now that war crimes administrative details. Lee pointed out
trials would ever be held. To insure that that the Communists wanted to repatri-
the enemy return the maximum number ate all sick and wounded eligibles under
of UNC personnel, Clark told Harrison Articles 109 and 110 of the Geneva Con-
to avoid the use of the term "seriously" vention.49
sick and wounded. As for the treatment
of the prisoners turned back to the UNC 48
(1) Msgs, CX 61741 and 61743, Clark to JCS,
through the exchange, Clark wanted to 4 Apr 53, DA-IN's 254454 and 254434. (2) Msg,
permit the members of the press and CX 61751, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 4 Apr
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256,
incl 7. (3) Msg, CX 61767, Clark to DA, 6 Apr 53,
46
Msg, JCS 935344, JCS to CINCUNC, 1 Apr 53. in same place, incl 48.
49
The message was drafted by the State Department First Meeting of Liaison Group for discussing
and approved by the Services, General Bradley, and arrangement for repatriation of sick and wounded
the Department of Defense. captured personnel, 6 April 53, in G-3 file, Trans-
47
(1) Msg, C 61723, Clark to JCS, 3 April 53, cript of Proceedings, Meetings of Liaison Group,
DA-IN 253841. (2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 6 April-2 May 1953. All the meetings of the group
5 Apr 53, no sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers are in the above file and will be henceforth re-
Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III. ferred to only by number and date.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 415

After some hesitation, while the UNC at Panmunjom were increased to thirty
checked the Geneva Convention care- for each side during the exchange period
fully, Daniel informed the Communists and the UNC agreed to let the Com-
on 7 April that his side was prepared to munists move the prisoners up to the
repatriate all prisoners eligible under conference area in convoys of five vehi-
the two articles, subject to the proviso cles over routes that were clearly marked
that no individual would be repatriated out.53
against his will. Daniel stressed that the The agreement that was signed on 11
UNC would give the broadest interpre- April completed the general arrange-
tation possible to the term "sick and ments. Within ten days the exchange
wounded." 50 at Panmunjom would begin, with the
The effort of the United Nations enemy delivering 100 and the UNC 500
Command to encourage the enemy to a day in groups of 25 at a time. Rosters
return as many prisoners as possible met prepared by nationality, including name,
with a disappointing response. When rank, and serial number would accom-
Lee announced the total on 8 April of pany each group and receipts would be
450 Korean and 150 non-Korean sick and signed for a group as it was turned over
wounded, Daniel called the figure "in- to the other side.54
credibly small." Actually, considering April 20 was established as the date
that the enemy was returning 600 of the for initiating LITTLE SWITCH, as the U.N.
12,000 prisoners under its control, or 5 Command dubbed the operation, and in
percent, the figure compared favorably the interim trucks and trains began to
with that presented by the UNC. For transport the Communist prisoners north
the latter intended to transfer 700 Chi- from Koje-do and the other offshore is-
nese and 5,100 Koreans over to the en- lands. On 14 April, twenty-three vehicles
emy out of the 132,000 prisoners in its left the North Korean prison camps with
custody and this averaged out to the first contingent of UNC sick and
only about 4.5 percent. Nevertheless, wounded. Five days later the first train-
Daniel again asked the Communists to load of enemy prisoners set out from
be more liberal in their classification of Pusan to Munsan. But even as the Com-
the sick and wounded.51 As he told Clark munist invalids prepared to go home,
after the meeting, the enemy liaison of- they sought to embarrass the UNC.
ficers relaxed their strained attitudes Some refused a new issue of clothing
visibly after the UNC disclosed its fig- because the letter "P" for prisoner had
ures and he felt that he should press not been stenciled on the shirts. Others
strongly for an increase in the totals the would not permit UNC personnel to
UNC would receive.52 dust them with DDT powder. Demon-
In the succeeding days the details were strations broke out, with chanting and
gradually worked out. Security guards singing, until camp authorities warned
the leaders that failure to obey orders
50
Second Mtg, Liaison Group, 7 Apr 53. would result in loss of their opportunity
51
Third Mtg, Liaison Group, 8 Apr 53.
52 53
Msg, HNC 1611, CINCUNC (Adv) to Fourth and Fifth Mtgs, Liaison Group, 9-10
CINCUNC, 8 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53.
54
Apr 53, incls 1-256, incl 20. Sixth Mtg, Liaison Group, 11 Apr 53.
416 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

SIGNING THE AGREEMENT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF SICK AND WOUNDED PRISONERS,
Panmunjom, 11 April 1953.

for repatriation. As the prisoners rode Pusan to Munsan, many of the prisoners
to the waiting LST for shipment to the cut off buttons, severed the half-belts of
mainland, they threw away their rations their overcoats, and removed their shoe-
of tooth powder, soap, and cigarettes laces in an attempt to create the impres-
with hand-printed propaganda messages sion that they had been poorly treated.55
cached inside, charging the United States As the U.N. Command gathered all of
with "starvation, oppression and barba- the Communist prisoners eligible for
rous acts against the Korean people." At return, it discovered that there were
Pusan they demanded the right of in- more than 5,800 who could be repatri-
spection of hospital facilities before they ated. The question immediately arose
debarked and had to be told they would whether to include the additional 550
be forcibly removed unless they com- Communists in the exchange or to ad-
plied with instructions. Some of the here to the original tally. General Clark
Chinese went on a hunger strike for felt that the advantages of demonstrating
several meals because they claimed that 55
Msg, PWCG 4-386, POW Comd to AFFE, 19
the food had been poisoned. When the Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls
time came for the final train ride from 1-256, incl 106.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 417

THE COMMUNIST POW EXCHANGE SITE AT PANMUNJOM

the good faith of the UNC and of pos- hospitals in South Korea. As the press
sibly spurring the enemy to increase its descended upon the prisoners for ac-
total of returnees outweighed the disad- counts of their experiences while in
vantages of introducing a new figure and Communist hands, stories arose of other
his superiors agreed.56 ill and injured prisoners still remaining
A new element was injected into the in the enemy camps. Harrison quickly
situation after LITTLE SWITCH got under suggested that the UNC use the 550
way on 20 April. When the UNC sick extra Communist prisoners as a lever to
and wounded were delivered to Panmun- pry more UNC personnel away from the
jom they were rushed back to Munsan enemy. But Clark preferred that Har-
for initial processing. Some were then rison simply ask the Communists to re-
flown to Japan for rest and treatment examine the matter, since many pris-
preparatory to shipment home, while the oners might not be in a fit condition to
ROK patients were transferred to base be moved.57
57
(1) Msg, HNC 1637, CINCUNC (Adv) to
56
(1) Msg, HNC 1634, CINCUNC to DA, 20 Apr CINCUNC, 21 Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62028,
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv) , 22 Apr 53. Both
incl 111. (2) Msg, JCS 936993, JCS to CINCFE, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256,
20 Apr 53. incls 114 and 117.
418 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

OPERATION LITTLE SWITCH. Left, a wounded U.N. soldier is repatriated. Right, a


wounded Communist is carried by a North Korean soldier.

Whether the enemy was influenced by UNC added more enemy prisoners to its
the UNC revelation that it was going list, but on 26 April General Lee ab-
to turn over 550 more patients than ruptly stated that his side had com-
originally estimated, or by the uproar pleted its share of the exchange. When
that the press stories of the UNC sick Admiral Daniel protested that evidence
and wounded reportedly still in Com- in UNC possession showed that there
munist custody occasioned in the were still about 375 UNC sick and
United States, was difficult to ascertain. wounded who could be repatriated, Lee
On 23 April, however, the Communists termed it a groundless accusation and
did announce that they would also ex- refused to consider the matter. Faced
ceed the 600 figure that they had sub- with an unyielding stand, the U.N. Com-
mitted.58 mand on 3 May finished delivering the
Hoping to encourage further relaxa- last group of Communists that it in-
tion of the Communists' standards, the tended to turn over.59
58
(1) Msg, C 62042, Clark to DA, 23 Apr 53. (2) The final tally of deliveries disclosed
Msg, HNC 1639, Harrison to CINCUNC, 23 Apr
59
53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls Tenth and Eleventh Mtgs, Liaison Group, 1
1-256, incls 121 and 122. and 2 May.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 419

that the UNC had relieved itself of Repeating in essence the same line that
5,194 North Korean and 1,030 Chinese Chou had used about the Communist de-
soldiers and 446 civilian internees, sires to find a peaceful solution to the
for a total of 6,670. Of these patients conflict and to permit the prisoners to re-
357 were litter cases. In return the turn home quickly, Nam went on:
enemy had brought 684 assorted sick
and wounded, including 94 litter cases, It is precisely on the basis of this prin-
to Panmunjom.60 ciple of repatriation of all prisoners of war
Perhaps the Communists had not that our side firmly maintain that the de-
taining side should ensure that no coercive
been as liberal as many had hoped, means whatsoever be employed against all
but at least they had carried out their the prisoners of war in its custody to ob-
part of the bargain and thrown in a struct their returning home. . . . The
small bonus. In the light of this per- Korean and Chinese side does not acknowl-
formance and the apparent disposition edge that there are prisoners of war who
are allegedly unwilling to be repatriated.
of the enemy to put an end to the shoot- Therefore the question of the so-called
ing war in Korea, the resumption of 'forced repatriation' or 'repatriation by
plenary negotiations seemed to be in force' does not exist at all, and we have al-
order. ways opposed this assertion. Based on this
stand of ours, our side maintains that those
captured personnel of our side who are
Preparations for the Return to filled with apprehensions and are afraid to
Plenary Sessions return home as a result of having been sub-
jected to intimidation and oppression,
While the Communists were evidenc- should be handed over to a neutral state,
ing their sincerity in following through and through explanations given by our
side, gradually freed from apprehen-
with the LITTLE SWITCH exchange, Gen- sions. . . .61
eral Clark and his advisors sought to
find out more about the intent and ex- Based on Nam's reply, the problem
tent of the concession that Chou had was quite simple—if the U.N. Command
offered on 30 March. As already would stop trying to detain the pris-
pointed out, the Chinese statement had oners forcibly and would hand them
produced a mixed atmosphere of hope over to a neutral nation, the Commu-
and caution throughout the non-Com- nists would soon convince the so-called
munist world, but it had been couched nonrepatriates of the needlessness of
in such vague terms that it generated their fears and all would be glad to go
more questions than it answered. home. It was a glib attempt to save
Clark's letter to Kim and Peng on 5 face and dismiss their concession as only
April had asked for further details and procedural and not substantive.
clarification. Although Nam's letter failed to an-
The response came from Nam Il swer the questions that the Washington
rather than his superiors on 9 April. leaders had raised earlier on the identity
60
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, app. I, p. 51. of the neutral nation or on the treat-
A breakdown of the UNC and Communist repatri-
61
ates and nonrepatriates involved in the prisoner of Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 9 Apr 53, no sub, in G-3
war exchanges in 1953-54 will be found in Ap- file, Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtgs of Liaison
pendixes B-1 and B-2. Group at Pan Mun Jom, 6 Apr-2 May 53.
420 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ment of the nonrepatriates once they request for acceptable nominations for
were surrendered to the neutral nation, the neutral state, his superiors advanced
these were details that the plenary con- Switzerland and Sweden in that order.
ference would have to settle. But to They felt that he could agree to a 90-day
maintain the initiative, the UNC noti- limit for the custody of the nonrepatri-
fied Nam on 16 April that since his letter ates by neutral nations. As a talking
had not offered concrete proposals, it point, General Collins told Clark that
assumed that the Communists were the U.N. Command should emphasize
either ready to accept one of the UNC's the fact that it had the absolute legal
earlier plans or to offer a constructive right to grant asylum and was making
one of their own. To prepare the enemy a major concession in permitting a neu-
with some idea of what the UNC con- tral nation to assume control of the
sidered constructive, Harrison cited nonrepatriate prisoners.64
Switzerland as a neutral state in view of To acquaint Clark with current pol-
its long tradition in this respect and icy on a Korean settlement, the JCS
urged that the neutral state take custody forwarded some basic instructions on 23
of the nonrepatriates in Korea itself. April for his guidance. The first two
As for the time limit for persuading the items were direct inheritances from the
nonrepatriates to come back home, sixty previous administration and reaffirmed
days appeared sufficient. In closing that it was to the interest of the United
Harrison warned that if the plenary States to obtain an acceptable armistice,
meetings did not give promise of an ac- yet not at the expense of a compromise
ceptable agreement within a reasonable on the principle of no forced repatria-
time, the UNC would recess them tion. Until proved to the contrary, the
again.62 instructions stated, the Communist pro-
On the eve of the LITTLE SWITCH op- posal would be taken at its face value;
eration, Admiral Daniel proposed 23 however, the United States would not
April as a date for the resumption of countenance long and inconclusive hag-
plenary conferences, but the Communist gling. Since the UNC had seized the
representative preferred 25 April. initiative through the Harrison sugges-
Later on they postponed the opening tions of 16 April, it should strive to re-
date to 26 April.63 tain this favorable position to keep the
The few days before the first meeting enemy on the defensive. Any of the
proved a busy period of last-minute former plans submitted by the UNC
preparations and instructions. Clark told would be satisfactory as a basis for agree-
Harrison to reject the Soviet Union or ment, but it might be desirable to
any of its satellites as candidates for the confine the task of processing nonrepat-
neutral state role and to insist upon the riates to the Chinese and to release the
retention of the nonrepatriates in Korea.
In response to the Far East commander's
64
(1) Msg, C 62022, CINCUNC to DA, 22 Apr
62
Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 16 Apr 53, no sub, in 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256,
G-3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun incl 182. (2) Msg, JCS 937205, JCS to CINCUNC,
Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III. 23 Apr 53. (3) Msg. DA 937371, CSUSA to
63
Seventh Mtg, Liaison Group, 19 Apr 53. CINCUNC, 24 Apr 53.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 421
North Koreans without further process- the new peace offensive, or as Secretary
ing, the instructions concluded.65 Dulles termed it, peace "defensive,"
Thus, in the six months of recess, the launched after Stalin's demise, the Com-
top political personnel in the United munists' concession on the nonrepatriate
States had been replaced, but the politics question dangled the hope of a settle-
lingered on. The new leaders had tried ment before the eyes of the United States
several minor expedients to induce the and its allies.66 Based on past experi-
Communists to halt the fighting in Ko- ence, however, the UNC was properly
rea and the enemy had reciprocated with cautious as it prepared to discover just
its own brand of pressure. Under ordi- what the Communists had in mind. The
nary circumstances, this game could have brightening prospect for an armistice
been played indefinitely, without reach- was tempered by the rising tide of oppo-
ing a decision. But, with the death of sition in South Korea to any agreement
Stalin, the balance shifted to the advan- that accepted a disunited Korea. In the
tage of the U.N. Command. It would critical days that lay ahead the UNC
appear from Soviet actions in March and might well find it more difficult to deal
April that the removal of external dis- with the dissension behind its lines than
tractions such as the Korean affair with with the enemy.
its drain on Russian resources acquired a
new sense of urgency during the period 66
For Dulles' views on the Soviet shift in tactics,
of consolidation of power. As part of see his address of 18 April 53, reprinted in the
Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVIII, No. 722 (April
65
Msg, JCS 937205, JCS to CINCUNC, 23 Apr 53. 27, 1953), pp. 603-08.
CHAPTER XIX

The Communists Come to Terms

Against a backdrop of heightening ten- other assignments. But the new faces
sion stemming from the bitter opposition joining Nam Il and Lee Sang Cho were
of the ROK Government to an armistice, not all unfamiliar. Former liaison
the plenary sessions of the negotiations officers Chang Chun San and Tsai
reconvened at Panmunjom on 26 April.1 Cheng-wen had been promoted to gen-
The UNC delegates found themselves eral officer rank and elevated to the
confronted with the doubly difficult task plenary delegation. Only General Ting
of reaching an agreement with the Com- Kuo-yu, replacing General Pien, was a
munists in the face of open ROK threats newcomer to the negotiations. Both
to continue the war alone if the solution Chang and Tsai had been involved in
failed to satisfy their objections. Doubt the conferences from the outset and
over the future intentions of President were thoroughly acquainted with the
Rhee and his followers hung like a pall issues at stake.
over the UNC truce tents. With the The UNC situation at the table was
enemy enjoying the United Nations' em- in definite contrast. General Harrison
barrassment in being unable to control and Admiral Daniel were joined by
its agitated fosterchild, the delegations three officers who had had no previous
assembled to discover whether the last part in the proceedings. Generals Lee
obstruction—repatriation—could be ov- Han Lim, Morris, and McConnell were
ercome. replaced by Maj. Gen. Choi Duk Shin of
the ROK Army, Brig. Gen. Edgar E.
The Exploratory Stage Glenn, USAF, and Brig. Gen. Ralph M.
Osborne, USA.2 Thus, the experience
Since the last meeting in October
1952 a large personnel turnover had 2
General Glenn had been chief of staff to Maj.
taken place on both sides. The redoubt- Gen. Claire L. Chennault and the Fourteenth Air
Force in China during World War II and had had
able Hsieh Fang with his scurrilous considerable experience as an air attache in Latin
tongue was no longer a member of the America. General Osborne had been director of
enemy delegation and General Pien the Research and Development Division, Army
Services Forces, in World War II and served later
Chang-wu of the Chinese Volunteer as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, in Washington.
Army and Maj. Gen. So Hui of the General Choi had been Commanding General, 11th
North Korean forces had been given ROK Division; Commandant, ROKA Infantry
School; and Deputy Commanding General, ROK
1
An account of the ROK efforts to prevent or I Corps, before being appointed as liaison officer
delay the armistice will be found in the next between the ROK Army and the U.N. Command
chapter. in December 1952.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 423

UNC DELEGATES AT PANMUNJOM, 26 APRIL 1953: General Glenn, Admiral Daniel,


General Harrison, General Choi Duk Shim (ROK Army), and General Osborne.

level of the Communist delegation in belonged should have the opportunity


the intricacies of negotiations was much and facilities to talk to and persuade
higher than that of the UNC group. them to come back. (4) All prisoners
After the introduction of his new as- changing their minds during this time
sociates Nam Il wasted little time in pre- would be repatriated. (5) Disposition of
senting the Communist proposal for any prisoners remaining in the hands of
solving the POW question. There were the neutral state at the end of the six-
six points in all: (1) Within two months month explaining period would be
after the armistice agreement became decided by the political conference pro-
effective, both sides would repatriate all vided for in the armistice agreement.
the prisoners desiring to return home. (6) All expenses of the nonrepatriates
(2) During the following month all non- in the neutral state would be borne by
repatriates would be sent to a neutral the nation to which the prisoners be-
state and turned over to its jurisdiction. longed.
(3) Then, for a period of six months, To the UNC two features of the Com-
the nations to which the nonrepatriates munist plan were unacceptable and Gen-
424 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

eral Harrison immediately turned it neutral. If plans of the Communists


down. There was no justification, he went off as well as they expected, there
told Nam, for removing the nonrepatri- would be no further problem with non-
ates from Korea to the neutral state for repatriates since, they maintained, once
the exorbitant period of six months to they had an opportunity to talk to the
persuade the prisoners to go home. recalcitrant prisoners, all would be will-
Sixty days should be ample for this pur- ing to go back home.
pose and the neutral state could take The U.N. Command held otherwise.
over custody in Korea itself, he went on. After the waiting and uncertainty of the
Noting that the Communists had not past two years, the UNC did not want
nominated a nation to perform the neu- to move the nonrepatriates into a strange
tral function, Harrison suggested that country and then subject them to an-
Switzerland would be the obvious other six months of doubt and detention
choice.3 while the Communist persuaders sought
Nam was just as quick in rejecting to break down their resistance. Sixty
Switzerland. Since the U.N. Command days, the UNC argued, was enough time
had already selected this country as one for the enemy to talk and the explan-
of its nominees on the Supervisory Com- ations could be made in Korea.
mission, Nam stated that it would be Thus, the initial positions were as-
unsuitable for the neutral nation role. sumed and the delegations settled down
He defended the need for six months to to the chore of finding out how much
eliminate the prisoners' fears on the the other side was willing to concede.
ground that these apprehensions were a General Harrison felt that the Commu-
result of their long detention and time nists were ready to bargain and wanted
would be required to neutralize them.4 the UNC to submit a counterproposal.
By the end of the second session, the But his Washington and Tokyo super-
differences between the two sides were iors decided to do nothing until the
quite clear. The selection of the neutral neutral state was selected. This was the
power, the place of custody, the duration first issue, they believed, and discussion
of the custody, and the disposition of the should be confined to eliciting agree-
nonrepatriates after the explaining pe- ment from the enemy on a nation ac-
riod remained to be settled. Although ceptable to both sides.5
the Communists had frowned upon On 29 April the Communists gave
Switzerland, they showed no inclination their first indication of preference by
to produce a nomination of their own. stating that the neutral nation should be
The enemy continued to insist upon a Asian, but refused to submit specific
long period of captivity for the nonrepa- names. Nam also revealed that the six-
triates while the explanations went on month explaining period might be "dis-
and preferred to have the prisoners trans- cussed" in view of the UNC objections to
ported out of Korea to the territory of the
3 5
Transcript of Proceedings, 123d Session of Mil (1) Msg, HNC 1647, CINCUNC (Adv) to
Armistice Conf, 26 Apr 53, in FEC Main Delegates CINCUNC, 28 Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62139,
Mtgs, vol. VI. CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 28 Apr 53. Both
4
Ibid., 124th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 27 in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to
Apr 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI. app. I, incls 205 and 206.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 425

its length. Since the UNC delegation until the neutral state was selected.
could make no counterproposal until the Finally, on 7 May, the Communist dele-
neutral nation was selected, Harrison gation brought forward an expanded
came back the following day to prod eight-point plan that contained several
the enemy. Pointing out that the Com- concessions.
munists had "released" large numbers
of personnel at the front during the Give and Take
early stages of the war, Harrison sug-
gested that it would now be appropriate In the new proposal the enemy
and humane to release all the prisoners dropped the earlier requirement that
who desired to remain in South Korea. the nonrepatriates be transported phys-
Needless to say, Harrison's proposal met ically to the neutral state and reduced
with no encouragement from Nam Il, the explaining period from six months
but the Communists were apprised of to four. To handle the nonrepatriates,
the possibility of eventual UNC action Nam suggested that a Neutral Nations
along this line if the negotiations threat- Repatriation Commission with five
ened to bog down again.6 members—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switz-
The enemy lines held firm until the erland, Sweden, and India—be set up.
2 May meeting when Nam offered the Each of these countries would provide
names of India, Burma, Indonesia, and an equal number of armed personnel
Pakistan as suitable Asian neutrals. Be- and would share in the task of main-
fore he would commit the Communists taining custody of the nonrepatriates in
to support any one of these four, how- their original places of detention. If
ever, Nam tried to persuade the U.N. their plan were adopted, the Commu-
Command to send the nonrepatriates nists desired all of its terms communi-
to the neutral state chosen.7 This ma- cated to the prisoners.9
neuver failed. Since the Communists had yielded on
Although the United States would the most objectionable features of their
have preferred Switzerland or Sweden, first proposal, President Eisenhower and
it was willing to accept Pakistan as the some of his top political and military
neutral state. When the session recon- advisors met in Washington to discuss
vened on 4 May, Harrison told Nam that the latest offer. Encouraged by the spirit
the UNC nominated Pakistan.8 of compromise reflected in the 7 May
It took two more days of fruitless dis- plan, they agreed that it represented
cussion before the enemy became con- a significant shift in the enemy position
vinced that the UNC would do nothing and provided a basis for negotiating an
6
Transcripts of Proceedings, 126th and 127th acceptable armistice. They found in the
Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 29 and 30 Apr 53, plan close resemblance to the Indian
in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI. resolution in the General Assembly, but
7
Transcript of Proceedings, 129th Session of
Mil Armistice Conf, 2 May 53, in FEC Main Dele- several matters required clarification.
gates' Mtgs, vol. VI. Chief among these were fixing a limit
8
(1) Msg, DA 938041, G-3 to CINCFE, 2 May
9
53. (2) Transcript of Proceedings, 130th Session of Transcript of Proceedings, 133d Session of Mil
Mil Armistice Conf, 4 May 53, in FEC Main Dele- Armistice Conf, 7 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates'
gates' Mtgs, vol. VI. Mtgs, vol. VI.
426 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

upon the length of time to be accorded tactics designed to block an armistice.12


to the political conference for deciding Actually the two sides were fairly close
the disposition of the nonrepatriates on most points by this time. On 10 May,
and the problems certain to arise from General Collins told Clark that if the
the stationing of Communist troops in UNC could secure Communist agree-
the rear of the UNC forces. The Presi- ment on the following matters, the
dent and his counselors did not consider United States would be willing to con-
these insurmountable and they felt that clude the prisoner of war issue. First,
the selection of India as the fifth member the repatriation commission should con-
of the repatriation commission was ac- duct its business on the basis of unanim-
ceptable if the other four members ity, except in procedural affairs when a
acquiesced.10 While the political and majority vote would suffice. Secondly, a
military chiefs mulled over the broad time limit of thirty days should be im-
pros and cons of the enemy proposition, posed upon the political conference for
the UNC delegation explored the details. settling the nonrepatriates' future. Af-
Harrison asked Nam for more informa- ter this period the prisoners would be
tion, especially on the connection be- released and given civilian status.
tween the political conference and the Thirdly, India should supply all the
final fate of the nonrepatriates and on armed forces and operating personnel to
the manner in which the repatriation handle the custodial task and should
commission would operate. In his reply act as supply chairman and executive
Nam reiterated that once the Commu- agent of the commission. And lastly, al-
nists had opportunity to talk to the non- though up to ninety days could be
repatriates, there would be no problem allowed for the Communist explanations
since all would return. As for the oper- to the prisoners, the United States pre-
ation of the repatriation commission, ferred restricting the period to sixty.13
Nam felt that it should reach decisions As the UNC labored to fashion its
by majority vote and work out its own counterproposal, developments in South
operating procedures.11 Korea took a serious turn.14 Syngman
As the arguments developed during Rhee had become disturbed by the trend
the ensuing few days, it became evident of events that pointed toward the prob-
that the Communists thought that the able conclusion of an armistice in the
next move should come from the U.N. near future. With agitation mounting
Command. They dismissed the objec- in the ROK Government and demon-
tions and questions of Harrison as small strations reaching new peaks of inten-
points that could be ironed out later and sity in South Korean cities, Clark de-
accused the UNC of employing dilatory cided to see Rhee in person. On 12 May
he flew to Korea and had a frank dis-
10
cussion with the ROK President. From
Msg, DA 938429, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 7 May
12
53. General Hull attended the meeting with the Ibid., 136th and 137th Sessions of Mil Armistice
President on 7 May and reported its conclusions Conf, 11 and 12 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates'
to Clark. Mtgs, vol. VI.
11 13
Transcripts of Proceedings, 134th and 135th Msg, DA 938571, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 10
Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 9 and 10 May 53, May 53.
14
in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI. See Chapter XX, below.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 427

the conference two facts emerged that repatriates remaining at the end of the
Clark reported to Washington. First, explaining period be released.17
Rhee was "in dead earnest" about his The enemy's reaction to these points
rejection of the release of the Korean was less than warm. Having yielded on
nonrepatriates to another state or group several controversial issues, the Com-
of states, particularly if any were con- munists evidently expected that their
trolled by the Communists. And second, adversary would reciprocate. Instead
Rhee did not consider India to be a neu- the UNC had taken a leaf from the
tral state and did not want Indian troops Communist book, accepted the con-
to set foot on any part of South Korea. cessions, and then pressed for more.
In the light of Rhee's strong feelings and Nam and his fellow delegates moved in
in sympathy with his position, Clark to attack this "incooperative" attitude of
urged the JCS to allow the UNC dele- the UNC and were particularly critical of
gation to propose that the Korean non- the attempt to secure release of the Ko-
repatriates be released as soon as the rean nonrepatriates. This was "a back-
armistice was effective. He felt that this ward step" and another effort at "forced
would be the only solution to the prob- retention," Nam charged. When Har-
lem and that the Communists would ac- rison again referred to the 50,000 UNC
cept it if the UNC supported it firmly. personnel that the Communists had re-
Release of the Korean nonrepatriates leased at the front, Nam dismissed his
would also lessen the number of cus- remarks as groundless, irrelevant, and
todial personnel required to care for the unworthy of refutation.18
non-Korean nonrepatriates and might Since the Communist response was
eliminate some of Rhee's opposition.15 not unexpected, Harrison marked time
Although the response from Washing- until 16 May. By then, the military
ton was swift, it granted Clark permis- and political leaders in Washington and
sion to present release of the Korean in the Far East had begun to concentrate
nonrepatriates as a tentative position on the preparation of the final UNC posi-
only. In the meantime, the policy tion. While they readied this last offer,
makers would study the question fur- Harrison first asked for a four-day recess
ther.16 and when this proved insufficient he re-
Thus, when the U.N. Command dis- quested and secured a five-day extension
closed its counterproposal on 13 May, re- to 25 May.19
lease of the Korean nonrepatriates was In the event that the enemy did not
included. In addition, it advocated that accept the final terms and another long
India supply the chairman and operat- 17
Transcript of Proceedings, 138th Session of Mil
ing force of the repatriation commis- Armistice Conf, 13 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates'
sion; that the explaining period be Mtgs, vol. VI.
18
limited to sixty days; and that all non- Ibid., 139th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 14
May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.
19
15
(1) Msg, C 62435, CINCUNC to American
Msg, HNC 1678, CINCUNC (Adv) to JCS, 12 Embassy, Pusan, 15 May 53. (2) Msg, C 62449,
May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls same to same, 16 May 53. (3) Msg, CX 62496,
1-194 to app. I. CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 19 May 53. All
16
Msg, JCS 938704, JCS to CINCUNC, 13 May in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194 to
53 app. I.
428 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

recess developed, Clark laid plans to ex- bore little resemblance to Clark's plan.
pand air operations, to remove Kaesong's In the first place, they did not want the
immunity, and to engage in limited UNC to imply that this was to be final
ground operations around Kaesong or an ultimatum. Therefore, Harrison
later on. He also urged his superiors to was to present the proposal at a closed,
agree to the unilateral release of the secret session. Secondly, since the United
35,000 North Korean nonrepatriates if States had supported the Indian resolu-
the stalemate at Panmunjom remained tion of 3 December, its allies had ap-
unbroken.20 plied "intensive pressure" upon the U.S.
Clark felt that the time had come to leaders to adhere closely to the princi-
take positive steps to make the Commu- ples embodied therein. Hence the
nists choose between accepting an arm- UNC final offer would embrace terms in
istice or demonstrating their bad general consonance with the Indian reso-
faith. In his comments of 16 May on the lution, so that if the enemy rejected
content of the final UNC position, he them, the UNC would be in the "strong-
urged that the five-nation repatriation est possible position to terminate nego-
commission be dropped and that either tiations."
Sweden or Switzerland be given custody There were six important elements
of the nonrepatriates. Possibly an Asian that the President desired to have pre-
neutral might be added, if the Commu- sented at Panmunjom when the confer-
nists insisted, to take charge of the ence resumed on 25 May. The U.N.
Chinese nonrepatriates either in or out- Command would accept the five-nation
side of Korea. At the end of ninety days custodial arrangement if all armed
of explanations, the political conference forces and operating personnel were
would be given an additional thirty days provided by India. This represented no
to reach agreement on the disposition of change from the 13 May proposal.
the remaining nonrepatriates. If it failed However, the UNC would discard its in-
to meet or reach an agreement, the pris- sistence upon the immediate release of
oners would be released. Clark believed the Korean nonrepatriates when the ar-
that the U.N. Command should present mistice became effective and instead
this proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. would agree to turn these prisoners over
He would then recess unilaterally until to the repatriation commission.22 In
the enemy accepted or came up in matters requiring decision by the re-
writing with a new plan in detail.21 patriation commission, the UNC would
On 23 May the policy makers in consent to the Communist argument for
Washington completed and forwarded a majority vote rather than unanimity.
their conclusions to the U.N. commander The treatment of the prisoners while
through the JCS. Other considerations they were in the custody of the repatri-
and pressures evidently had exerted a ation commission was a fourth field of
great influence upon their decision, for it interest. To insure that no threats or
20 22
Msg, C 62419, CINCUNC to JCS, 14 May 53, The United States preferred the term "cus-
in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495. todial commission" to "repatriation commission,"
21
Msg, CX 62456, Clark to JCS, 16 May 53, DA- but to save possible confusion "repatriation com-
IN 268196. mission" has been used throughout.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 429

coercion were used, limitations were to especially with the provision turning
be imposed upon the number of Com- over the Korean nonrepatriates to the
munist explainers permitted access to repatriation commission. Therefore,
the prisoners. In addition, the UNC Clark and Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs
observers were to be present at the inter- received instructions to meet with the
views along with members of the repa- ROK President on the morning of 25
triation commission. As for the period May to inform him of the contents of
allowed to the persuaders, the President the UNC proposal and to attempt to
desired to hold it to ninety days. Lastly, soften the blow.24 This promised to be
the UNC would agree either to turn dis- a delicate matter, since each effort to pla-
position of the nonrepatriates over to a cate the Communists was certain to in-
political conference with a thirty-day crease the intensity of ROK opposition.
time limit and then release them, or al- Even if the enemy could be induced to
ternatively let the U.N. General Assem- reach agreement on the issues remain-
bly determine their final fate. ing, there was still no guarantee that
If the Communists failed to accept the Rhee would permit the fighting to cease.
UNC proposal or to provide a basis for
further discussion, the JCS informed A Goal Is Reached
Clark, the negotiations would be termi-
nated and the immunity granted the Despite the risks involved in attain-
conference area withdrawn. But, they ing rapprochement with the enemy on
continued, such a decision should and the armistice terms at the cost of alienat-
would be made in Washington, if it ing its strongest supporter in the con-
proved necessary, and not by Clark or flict, the United States was determined to
Harrison. make a serious effort to end the Korean
In defense of the administration's commitment. When the negotiators
abandonment of support for the release met at Panmunjom on 25 May, Harrison
of the Korean nonrepatriates, the JCS asked that the meeting be conducted as
explained that the measure "is not an a closed or executive session "to rein-
essential element of our position on no force the solemn, nonpropaganda char-
forced repatriation and has failed to acter of the proceedings." After a brief
command any support outside Korea. It recess, the Communists consented.25
is not an issue on which we can permit Harrison prefaced his remarks by em-
negotiations to break down." Only in phasizing the UNC intention to adhere
the case that the Communists rejected firmly to the concept of no forced repa-
the UNC plan and negotiations were ter- triation, then launched into a discussion
minated would all the nonrepatriates be of the four major concessions that the
promptly released.23 U.N. Command was now willing to
There was little doubt that Syngman
Rhee and his government would be 24
See Chapter XX, below.
highly disappointed with the concessions 25
Nam presented the replacement for Maj. Gen.
contained in the final position and Chang Chun San after the recess. This was Rear
Adm. Kim Won Mu of the North Korean Navy
23
Msg, JCS 939673, JCS to CINCUNC, 23 May who had served an earlier tour on the delegation
53. in 1952.
430 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

make. In consenting to the enemy argu- sure full consideration. Nam finally
ments for turning Korean nonrepatriates agreed.26
over to the repatriation commission, for To underline the importance that the
allowing more time for the explaining U.N. Command attached to this offer,
period, for submitting the disposition Clark followed it up with a letter to Kim
of nonrepatriates to a political confer- and Peng on 27 May. After strongly
ence after the explaining period, and urging the two leaders to accept the
for permitting decisions on the repatri- terms put forward by the UNC as a
ation commission to be by majority vote, "just solution to the prisoners of war
Harrison maintained that the UNC had question," Clark finished on a note of
done all that it could to reach agreement warning. "I believe you are aware that it
with the Communist proposal of 7 May. is not our purpose to engage in pro-
However, there were certain matters longed and fruitless repetition of argu-
that remained in dispute, which he pro- ments. It is our earnest hope that you
ceeded to set forth. There must be no will give urgent and most serious con-
force or threat of force used against the sideration to our delegation's alterna-
prisoners and India must supply all tive proposals regarding the sole issue
armed forces and operating personnel. on which an armistice still depends. If
Only 90 days would be permitted for the your Governments' stated desire for an
explanations and the political confer- armistice is in good faith, you are urged
ence would be given but 30 days to dis- to take advantage of the present oppor-
pose of the nonrepatriates. Thus, Har- tunity." 27
rison concluded, 120 days after the cus- It was not until 4 June that the
todial force assumed control of the non- plenary sessions reconvened, for the
repatriates they should be released or Communists had requested a three-day
the problem should be turned over to extension of the recess for what they
the U.N. General Assembly. called "administrative reasons." In the
After an hour-and-a-half break, Nam meantime, the ROK delegate to the con-
and his associates returned. They ference, General Choi, had expressed
limited their comments to the UNC his opposition to the 25 May formula
proposition that either nonrepatriates publicly and the tenor of feeling
be released after 120 days or the ques- throughout South Korea was being
tion of their fate be given to the General fanned to fever pitch by the ROK Gov-
Assembly. Neither of these solutions ernment. Despite this ominous trend,
was permissible, since the former was the Communists showed that they were
still "forced retention" while the latter ready to conclude the armistice. It was
was "inconceivable" since the United true that Nam had a revised version of
Nation was one of the belligerents in the the UNC proposal which he presented
affair. The other provisions of the UNC
offer required further consideration,
Nam went on, and he suggested meeting 26
Transcript of Proceedings, 142d Session of Mil
again on 29 May. But Harrison insisted Armistice Conf, 25 May 53, in FEC Main Dele-
gates' Mtgs, vol. VII.
that the enemy give the proposal thor- 27
Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 27 May 53, no
ough study and take until 1 June to in- sub, in G-3 Misc Material, Jan 53-Dec 53.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 431

on 4 June, but basically it did not differ explainers for each thousand nonrepatri-
greatly from the original. ates, arguing that it would take this
There was, however, some question number to talk the prisoners out of their
over the exact meaning of the Commu- ingrained fears of repatriation. Al-
nist provision for the nonrepatriates left though the UNC would have preferred
over after 120 days. It read: "There- the more modest figure of five per thou-
after, according to the application of sand, it was willing to settle for seven.
each individual, those who elect to go to After surprisingly little haggling the
neutral nations shall be assisted by the enemy agreed. As for the size of the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commis- communications team that would serv-
sion and by the Red Cross Society of ice the Communist personnel at the
India." In Harmon's mind this phras- prison camps, the enemy stated that one
ing did not make clear whether the team of six men would suffice for each
Korean nonrepatriates could stay in location where the explaining represen-
Korea, but the Communists refused to tatives were quartered. If all the non-
amplify this sentence. Clark's superiors, repatriates were brought together in
in commenting on the enemy revision, one place, then a maximum of two
advised him to assume that the text communications teams would be ade-
meant what it said and that the UNC quate.30
should not seek clarification at this On 7 June the staff officers were given
time.28 the task of straightening out the final de-
In Washington, it was the consensus tails of the terms of reference for hand-
of the State and Defense Department ling prisoners of war.31 Since the re-
policy makers that the Communist pro- maining differences were minor and the
posal afforded the Chinese a face-saving disposition on both sides now favored a
device to cover their actual acceptance quick settlement, the staff officers were
of voluntary repatriation. Except for able to finish their assignment and to
several items relating to the number of present the document for the signatures
explainers that would be permitted ac- of the chief delegates on 8 June.32
cess to the prisoners refusing to go back After a year and a half of debate, in
and the number of communications and out of the conference tent at Pan-
personnel that the enemy intended to munjom, punctuated by the long recess
introduce into South Korea, the State- during the winter of 1952-53, the
Defense group felt that the Communist troublesome question of the right of a
plan was satisfactory.29 prisoner of war to determine whether he
During the next two meetings at Pan- would return home or not had been set-
munjom the negotiators worked on the tled. Regardless of how it was disguised
last important points at issue. The
30
Communists had asked for a total of ten Transcripts of Proceedings, 144th and 145th
Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 6 and 7 Jun 53,
28
(1) Transcript of Proceedings, 143d Session of in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII.
31
Mil Armistice Conf, 4 Jun 53, in FEC Main Dele- The complete terms of reference will be found
gates' Mtgs, vol. VII. (2) Msg, DA 940674, CSUSA in Appendix C.
32
to CINCUNC, 4 Jun 53. Transcript of Proceedings, 146th Session of
29
Msg, DA 940728, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 5 Jun Mil Armistice Conf, 8 Jun 53, in FEC Main Dele-
53. gates' Mtgs, vol. VII.
432 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

or negatively acknowledged in the final effort to complete the negotiations, both


instrument, the principle of no forcible sides chose to ignore the threat.
repatriation had been recognized on the Among the matters intrinsic to the
international level by the Communists. truce that still had to be settled was the
Previously they had used the concept setting up of the line of demarcation and
when it had been to their interest and the demilitarized zone. When the orig-
ignored it when their own nationals had inal line was established back in Novem-
been involved, as in World War IL The ber 1951, it was agreed that it would be
establishment of the precedent had been valid for thirty days. If the rest of the
a long and costly venture for the U.N. armistice terms were completed within
Command, since thousands of casual- that time, the line would not be re-
ties had been suffered in the interim in drawn. On the other hand, if the discus-
the fight to protect the defectors from sions dragged on for more than thirty
communism. On the other hand, the days, the line would be renegotiated
UNC had kept faith with the non- prior to the signing of the armistice.
repatriate prisoners and won a psycho- Shortly before the agreement on pris-
logical victory. The efforts of the Com- oners of war was reached, General Har-
munist prisoners to discredit the UNC rison suggested to the Communists that
approach through disobedience, riot, since the changes that had taken place
and rebellion had taken some of the in the battle line during the preceding
luster from this victory, but the Korean year and a half were relatively minor in
example of permitting prisoners to de- nature, the old line of demarcation
cide whether to go home or not was should be retained. This would simplify
bound to have an influence upon future and expedite the task of concluding the
conflicts and their settlement. The con- armistice, Harrison pointed out.33 But
cept of no forcible repatriation now be- the enemy delegation was noncommital
came a part of the body of international and indicated only that it would study
law and the next time a similar situation the UNC proposal.34
arose, Korea could be invoked and ar- On 9 June the Communists expressed
gued as a case in point. Whether the their views. In keeping with the No-
Communists would yield a second time vember 1951 agreement, Nam stated, his
on the principle remained moot, but, at side desired to have the line revised and
least, their armor, once pierced, might brought up to date so that it would
henceforth prove to be more vulnerable. correspond with the current battle po-
sitions. However, Nam continued, the
Residue Communists were willing to postpone
33
In a message to the JCS on 18 April, Clark
With repatriation resolved there had informed them that the line of contact at that
seemed to be little standing in the way time was south of the November 1951 line in
twelve places by from one to two-and-a-half kilo-
of bringing the war to an end insofar meters and north of the line in only one place by
as the enemy was concerned. The rising one kilometer. See Msg, C 61971, Clark to JCS, 18
rumblings of discontent from the ROK Apr 53, DA-IN 258819.
34
Transcript of Proceedings, 145th Session of
Government gave warning of serious Mil Armistice Conf, 7 Jun 53, in FEC Main Dele-
trouble ahead, it was true, but in the gates, Mtgs, vol. VII.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 433

the actual revising of the line until after the line indefinitely. We think it prefer-
the armistice was signed. Harrison able to settle the line on the basis of the
quickly demurred. If the enemy wished present dispositions." 37
to negotiate, the UNC was ready to go By 16 June the Communist offensive
ahead with the task at once. He ap- came to a halt and the staff officers were
pointed the capable and experienced able to finish their task. All in all, the
Colonel Murray of the Marine Corps to altercations had been minor and a spirit
head the UNC staff group for determin- of give and take had prevailed. The
ing the line of demarcation. After a bargaining had indicated that when the
mild effort to secure reconsideration of Communists wanted to come to terms,
the Communist suggestion, Nam con- they could unbend and compromise.38
sented the next day to the immediate On the following day the plenary con-
initiation of work on the project by the ference met and ratified the line of de-
staff officers. He named Col. O Hung marcation that the staff officers had
Song of the Korean People's Army and fashioned. The latter were given a word
Col. Huang Chen-chi of the Chinese Vol- of praise by Nam Il and then were in-
unteers as the Communists' representa- structed to go ahead and delimit the de-
tives.35 militarized zone.39
On the night of 10 June the enemy The imminent conclusion of the arm-
opened up a limited offensive prin- istice meanwhile focused attention upon
cipally on the ROK II Corps front in the necessity for securing the quick ac-
Central Korea with the evident inten- ceptance of the nations agreed upon for
tion of improving the Communist posi- membership on the Neutral Nations Re-
tions.36 It was against this background patriation Commission and on the Neu-
that the staff officers met on 11 June and tral Nations Supervisory Commission.
sought to reach agreement on a new line On 9 June, Sweden had announced that
of demarcation. In the areas where the it would serve on both commissions, but
battle line was stable, they had little Switzerland had proved to be less eager.
difficulty in compromising their dif- The Swiss Government did not want to
ferences. The fluid portions of the send its citizens into Korea unless all
front where the action was taking place the belligerents, including the Republic
occasioned more discussion. As Colonel of Korea, agreed to observe the terms of
Murray told his counterparts on 15 June: the armistice. In rebuttal, the United
"Attack begets counter-attack, and coun- States pointed out to the Swiss author-
ter-attacks in turn lead to further ities that the ROK forces were under the
counter-attacks. The action of any one 37
side in seeking to improve the position Transcript of Proceedings, Fifth Mtg of Staff
Officers To Renegotiate the Military Demarcation
during the negotiation of the Demarca- Line, 15 Jun 53, in G-3 File, Transcripts of Pro-
tion Line could easily lead to a situation ceedings To Renegotiate the Military Demarcation
which would delay the determination of Line . . . , Jun-Jul 53.
38
The 11-16 June meetings of the staff officers
will be found in the G-3 file mentioned in the
35
Transcripts of Proceedings, 147th and 148th previous footnote.
39
Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 9 and 10 Jun 53, Transcript of Proceedings, 149th Session of
in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII. Mil Armistice Conf, 17 Jun 53, in FEC Main Dele-
36
See Chapter XXI, below. gates' Mtgs, vol. VII.
434 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

command of the U.N. commander who when and how the neutral personnel
had full authority to negotiate an arm- could be transported to Korea. The
istice with the Communists. Further- gathering together of the military and
more, all of the prisoners of war were civilian staffs depended entirely upon
held by the UNC and not by individual the five neutral nations, of course, and
belligerents. After some hesitation, the the United States could only recommend
Swiss Federal Council voted to accept that these be assembled as quickly as
membership on the two neutral na- possible so that they could assume their
tions organizations. Switzerland's agree- responsibilities when the armistice was
ment arrived on 13 June and was concluded. In the days following the
based on the proviso that Swiss members signing of the prisoner of war terms of
would be allowed to carry out their reference there was a sense of urgency
functions satisfactorily by both sides.40 and concern on the part of Clark and his
In view of the ROK actions which staff lest there be too much of a gap be-
were demonstrating the strong antiarm- tween the beginning of the truce and the
istice feeling prevalent in the country in arrival of the members of the super-
early June, Clark and Ambassador visory and inspection teams. If the
Murphy called in the Indian Ambas- Communists were given considerable
sador to Japan and informed him of the time free of both UNC air observation
problems that would face India if it de- and inspection by the neutral nations
cided to serve as chairman of the repatri- groups, they might easily build up their
ation commission. ROK hostility to airfields, stocks, and the like. On 11 June
India as a member of the commission Clark asked that the United States make
and to any introduction of Indian troops every effort to expedite the arrival of
into Korea had been unmistakably ex- the supervisory commission staffs, since
pressed in this period and Clark and there was a serious risk involved in hav-
Murphy felt it only fair that the Indian ing an armistice without the inspection
Government have adequate warning teams being in place and ready to carry
of the potential explosiveness of the out their duties.42
situation. Despite the threatening The news from Washington was not
signs, however, the Indians conveyed encouraging on this score. Although
their official acceptance of the difficult the Department of State was urging the
assignment confronting them to the Swiss and Swedish Governments to send
State Department on 13 June. Two days their representatives as quickly as they
later the Polish and Czech Governments could, the advance parties would not be
also signified through their embassies in able to leave until 21 June and the main
Washington that they were willing to bodies would follow about 1 July, all on
become members of the repatriation U.S. air transports. Since both groups
commission.41 would travel via the United States, the
Once all the acceptances had been 42
Msg, CX 62984, Clark to DA, 11 Jun 53, in
received, the main question became 150, incl 34.Comd
UNC/FEC, See also:
Rpt, (1)
Jun Msg, V 0399,Papers,
53, Source FEAF 1-
to
40 CINCFE, 14 Jun 53, incl 96; (2) Msg, COMNAVFE
Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations
(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 425ff. to CINCUNC, 14 Jun 53, incl 97; (3) Msg, G 6069
41
Ibid., pp. 431-34. KCG, Taylor to Clark, 16 Jun 53, incl 98.
THE COMMUNISTS COME TO TERMS 435

prospects of their arrival in Korea before tral agencies were to detect Communist
8 July were small. Clark estimated that reinforcements of personnel and mate-
it would take another week before the riel including air forces, it is unlikely
Swedes and Swiss became briefed and that such violations of the Armistice
oriented, which would mean that 15 Agreement would result in a resump-
July would be the earliest date that their tion of hostilities." Under the circum-
inspection teams could be prepared to stances, he requested permission to
go into action. However, it appeared accept an interval of up to twenty days
that the Poles and Czechs would not be between the cease-fire and the inception
on hand until approximately the same of inspection.44 Although the U.S. lead-
time anyway; therefore it would not ers in Washington agreed to this con-
make much difference whether the tingency, later developments were
Swedes or Swiss arrived earlier or not.43 to make the question "largely aca-
By this time—mid-June—Clark had demic." 45
changed his mind about the dangers of With the Communists behaving in an
having a hiatus between the signing of almost agreeable fashion and the end of
the armistice and the advent of the the war apparently within hailing dis-
supervisory personnel on the scene. In tance, the focus of attention shifted
the interests of securing an earlier truce, dramatically in mid-June to the last
he was now willing to take the risk that roadblock in the way of the armistice.
the enemy might bring in reinforce- The oft-mentioned opposition building
ments in the interim. In explaining his up in the Republic of Korea was about
volte-face to the JCS, the United Nations to reach its climax and to cause the
commander commented: "As I see it, member nations of the UNC some uneasy
the matter is largely academic. The moments. Faced with the possibility of
Communists could easily circumvent the a truce contrary to the aspirations of his
provisions of the armistice agreement, young republic, the formidable Syng-
particularly with respect to aerial rein- man Rhee found himself in a difficult
forcements, even if the Neutral Nations situation that appeared to call for des-
Inspection Teams were in place and perate measures.
functioning. Furthermore, if the Neu-
43 44
(1) Msg, DA 941357, G-3 to CINCUNC, 13 Jun Msg, CX 63109, CINCUNC to DA, 16 Jun 53,
53. (2) Msg, DA 941369, G-3 to CINCUNC, 14 in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers
Jun 53. (3) Msg, CX 63109 CINCUNC to DA 1-150, incl 104.
45
16 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Msg, JCS 941491, JCS to CINCFE, 16 Jun 53.
Papers 1-150, incl 104. See Chapter XX, below.
CHAPTER XX

Leader of the Opposition

"During the hectic final four months succession of provocative or embarrass-


before the cease-fire in Korea," General ing incidents, a paper truce would be of
Clark commented in his memoirs, "the little value. The United States had too
U.N. Command was confronted almost much at stake in Korea to abandon its
literally with a crisis a day. Never, it investment lightly. On the other hand,
seemed to me, was it more thoroughly the Republic of Korea depended and
demonstrated that winning a satisfac- would continue to depend heavily upon
tory peace, even a temporary one, is economic, financial, and military assist-
more difficult than winning a war." 1 ance from the United States for its
It was perhaps ironic that the major- existence as a nation. It was clear that
ity of the problems to which the U.N. each needed the other. The uncertainty
commander referred emanated from the centered on whether Rhee would come
actions of the ROK Government and its to terms or refuse to accept the condi-
shrewd chief, Syngman Rhee, rather tions of the armistice. If he chose the
than from the machinations of the former course the price for his acquies-
enemy. But such was the case. Although cence might come high in financial and
none of the political, economic, and economic aid. If he elected to carry on
military questions that were at the bot- the war on his own, the cost in UNC
tom of the ROK agitation were arising casualties and prestige might be even
for the first time, there was a new sense less palatable. This was a turning point
of urgency on the scene. With the UNC for the Republic of Korea; a wise or a
and the Communists on the verge of hasty decision might make or break its
composing their differences, the ROK future.
Government felt it had to find the an-
swers to the problems considered vital A Sense of Insecurity
to the future of the nation before the
war ended or its bargaining powers The roots of ROK resistance to the
would be materially lessened. armistice rested in a bed of insecurity
Conceivably the UNC could sign a and frustration. As the United States and
military armistice without the concur- its U.N. allies had shown less and less
rence of the ROK, but how long would interest in the active prosecution of the
it last? If the Rhee Government de- war, President Rhee and his advisors
cided to fight on alone or to create a had seen their hopes for a Korea unified
1
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 257. by force become more and more un-
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 437

PRESIDENT RHEE GREETING DR. TASCA and members of the Tasca mission at the
President's residence, Seoul.

attainable. They had no way of know- light of past experience with the Com-
ing what role the United States would munists, few realists expected that such
assume in Far East affairs during the a meeting would produce results of any
years ahead; it was quite possible that importance.
the United States might again decide that On the bright side, the ROK was re-
Korea lay outside its area of strategic ceiving from the United States financial
concern and abandon the ROK after the and economic help that enabled the
truce was arranged.2 Of course, there country to fight the tide of inflation
was still the political conference stipu- and to begin the task of reconstruction.
lated in the truce agreement, but, in the The ROK Army was expanding and
2
was better trained and equipped than
In January 1950 Secretary of State Acheson had
declared that the United States would fight to de-
it had ever been before. But the in-
fend Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, omitting escapable fact remained to plague the
both Korea and Taiwan as strategic objectives of ROK leaders—all of this depended upon
vital concern to the United States. Department of
State Bulletin, Vol XXII, No. 551 (January 23,
the United States and they had no
1950), pp. 111ff. guarantee of the future policy of the
438 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

United States in the postwar period. The U.S. political and military leaders
During the spring of 1953, the ROK supported Clark's stand against bring-
search for security formed the backdrop ing the governmental machinery back
to the action taking place on stage. to Seoul. In early March the U.N. com-
There were evidences of ROK feel- mander was able to approach Rhee on
ings of doubt and uncertainty even the matter and secure his assurance that
earlier. In February General Clark the chief ROK ministries would remain
heard that the ROK Government in Pusan.5 Yet the desire of Rhee and
wanted to move its seat back to the cap- his followers to bolster the feeling of
ital city of Seoul. During the two-and- governmental stability by a return to
a-half years of war the government had Seoul and their jealousy of Japan's
spent most of its time in Pusan. The status reflected the tenor of the times.
instability of the battle situation had On the economic front ROK news-
argued against the re-establishment of paper stories in mid-January claimed
the administrative and legislative func- that the prisoners of war were fed more
tions so close to the lines, and the U.N. adequately than the ROK Army security
Command had opposed placing such a forces guarding them. As the accounts
tempting target within reach of a Com- were picked up by the U.S. news services,
munist offensive again. Besides, as President Eisenhower became concerned
Clark had pointed out in his request for over the situation. He remembered that
U.S. support to block a move to Seoul, during World War II he had encoun-
if the ROK Government returned, it tered a similar problem in Europe. The
would mean that thousands of people German prisoners, living off U.S. rations,
would flow into the capital and dozens of had fared far better than the French
buildings would have to be rehabili- and British soldiers who comprised the
tated.3 custodial troops. The President wanted
While Clark was protesting, the ROK to know what measures were being
Government asked the U.N. Command taken to remedy the discrepancies and
to transfer its headquarters from Tokyo whether U.S. surplus foods might help.6
to Seoul. Rhee also wanted the eco- Actually the ROK Government was
nomic reconstruction organizations, responsible for the food consumed by
such as UNKRA, to move to Seoul along its own troops, Clark commented, but
with the UNC. In view of his mission as frequently, because of poor distribution
Far East commander, which precluded facilities and command failures, the
leaving Japan, and the lack of adequate ROK soldiers had not always received
housing and communications facilities their quotas. The United States fur-
in the South Korean capital, Clark re-
jected the suggestion. He felt that
5
Rhee's dislike of Japan had inspired this (1) Msg, JCS 932503, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb
53. (2) Msg, C 61511, CINCUNC to JCS, 13 Mar
recommendation .4 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72,
3
Msg, CX 61134 and CX 61225, CINCUNC to incl 47.
6
DA, 4 and 14 Feb 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd (1) Msg, CX 61237, CINCUNC to CSUSA, 15
Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incls 57 and 58. Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls
4
Msg, C 61247, CINCUNC to DA, 16 Feb 53, in 1-88, incl 40. (2) Msg, DA 932033, Secy Army
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incl 45. Stevens to Clark, 22 Feb 53.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 439

nished only the materials for making carry out a full investigation of ways
biscuits and for canning purposes. He and means to strengthen the Korean
did not think that malnutrition was the economy and to make recommendations
primary cause of the poor physical con- as to the amounts and types of assistance
dition of many ROKA troops, but rather that should be provided by the United
it was secondary to the chronic diseases, States.10 Dr. Tasca arrived in mid-April
such as tuberculosis, which had gone un- and spent the next seven weeks in sur-
detected during the initial physical veying the scene. When he returned to
examination of recruits. As spring ap- the United States in June, he submitted a
proached, Clark noted, the availability bulky and comprehensive report on ex-
of fresh produce would increase and the isting conditions and suggested a num-
ROKA rations would improve. The ber of remedial actions that could be
Eighth Army, meanwhile, would study taken. The initial recommendations
the matter and help set up a food super- called for the expenditure of a billion
visory service for the ROKA.7 dollars over a period of three years and
Clark suspected the motivation be- urged the reorganization of U.S. eco-
hind the publicity accorded the ROKA nomic activities under a single head to
and prisoner of war rations, for he sur- promote more co-ordination and ef-
mised that the objective sought was ficiency in the spending of funds.11 The
more financial aid from the United Tasca mission offered evidence that the
States.8 At the end of March he received United States contemplated a long-term
a confirmatory report from General Her- financial investment in the Republic of
ren, the Korean Communications Zone Korea and served to allay some of the
commander. Although Herren felt that ROK's fears about its economic future.
the ROK Government was seeking In the military field, meanwhile, the
greater financial aid without accurately efficient mechanism established to pro-
appraising its own assets or attempting duce recruits for the ROK Army con-
to rectify its deficiencies, he estimated tinued to dominate the making of policy
that the United States would have to pro- on ROKA expansion. Feeding some 7,-
vide more assistance in its drive to build 200 inductees a week into the training
up the armed forces and yet maintain units during a period of low casualties at
reasonably stable economic conditions.9 the front inevitably led to a rapid in-
Early in April the President decided crease in the over-all strength of the
to get a firsthand report on the eco- ROK Army. In early April Clark re-
nomic situation in South Korea. On 9 ported that the induction machine's
April he named Dr. Henry J. Tasca to pace would send the ROK Army beyond
7 10
Msg, C 61376, CINCFE to DA, 2 Mar 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, pp. 46-47. Dr.
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1-72, incl 39. Tasca had formerly served as Treasury Attache in
8
(1) Msg, CX 61237, CINCUNC to CSUSA, 15 Italy and more lately as deputy for economic mat-
Feb 53. (2) Msg, CX 61259, CINCFE to DA, 17 ters to the Special U.S. Representative in Europe,
Feb 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, William H. Draper, Jr.
11
incls 1-88, incls 40 and 41. (3) Clark, From the Discussion of the Tasca mission and its report
Danube to the Yalu, pp. 182-84. will be found in the UNC/FEC Command Reports
9
Msg, AX 73191, CG KCOMZ to CINCUNC, 28 of June and July 1953. Study and revision of the
Mar 53, UNC/FEC, in Comd Rpts, Mar 53, incls report was still going on when the armistice was
1-72, incl 41. concluded.
440 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

its authorized strength of 460,000 before if the fighting stopped, it could help to
the month ended.12 Since he was still re- guarantee ROK independence. The Sec-
luctant to curb the flow of replacements, retary of Defense granted Clark permis-
Clark suggested that he be granted sion on 17 April to raise the total of
authority to build up to a balanced, activated ROK divisions to sixteen and
twenty-division force of approximately G-3 informed him that an increase of
655,000 men. At the present rate, this 65,000 in the ROKA ceiling strength
total would be reached around late was under consideration.14
August and would constitute the ulti- Behind the gradual, piecemeal ap-
mate strength of the ROKA. He proach to ROK Army augmentation
pointed out that if permission were adopted by the Eisenhower administra-
given now, he could cut back promptly tion lay the hope that the promise of
on the men assigned to training duties further expansion might reassure Presi-
when the time arrived and could acti- dent Rhee. Clark was concerned lest the
vate the additional divisions quickly enemy seek to block the growth of
as they were needed. As an extra in- ROK forces through stipulations writ-
ducement for approval of his request, ten into the truce agreement and in
the U.N. commander mentioned that May he again pressed for approval of
when the seventeenth of the twenty the twenty-division program.15 General
ROKA divisions attained the halfway Collins supported Clark's request and
mark in training, he would be able to on 14 May the President approved the
release the first U.S. division from twenty-division, 655,000-man ROK
Korea.13 Army. Activation of the last four di-
Two days later, on 9 April, Clark asked visions was left to Clark's discretion, but
for authorization to activate two new Collins warned him that certain critical
ROK divisions. He desired that the De- items of equipment such as artillery
partment of the Army replenish theater might not be available until later.16
stocks used to outfit the thirteenth and In view of the increasing tension of
fourteenth ROK divisions and provide the ROK situation in late May, Clark
enough equipment to take care of deferred action on the augmentation.
the two new ones. Despite the possibil- When he finally decided to bring up the
ity of a cease-fire, he urged the contin- matter again in early June, the JCS in-
uance of the twenty-division pro- formed Clark that if he decided to go
gram. As he pointed out, if the war went ahead with the increase, then he should
on, the expanded ROK Army could make it clear to Rhee that the expan-
either contribute toward the winning of sion would be effected on the assump-
a military victory or make possible the
eventual withdrawal of U.N. forces and,
14
(1) Msg, CX 61837, CINCFE to DA, 9 Apr 53.
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-110, incl
12
The ROKA had 438,000 men at this time, plus 39. (2) MSG, DA 936843, G-3 to CINCFE, 17 Apr
75,000 trainees and 16,000 KATUSA, for a total of 53.15
over 529,000 men. Msg, CX 62372, Clark to Collins, 12 May 53,
13
Msg, CX 61791, CINCFE to Secy Army, 7 Apr DA-IN 266645.
16
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-110, Msg, DA 938886, CSUSA to CINCFE, 14 May
incl 38. 53.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 441

tion the ROK would co-operate with the firmer base for the future security and
U.N. Command.17 development of the Republic of Korea
As it turned out, the difficulties that were not enough. President Rhee and
the UNC continued to have with the his advisors were deeply concerned over
ROK Government led to the deferment the present and with what they could
of the activation of the additional di- salvage from the dying embers of a
visions until after the armistice was three-year war.
signed.18 The strengthening of the
ROK Army, in this case, was delayed by Friend or Foe?
the unwillingness of the ROK Govern-
ment to accept the conditions attached. During the long winter recess ROK
It was, of course, another effort by the opposition to the armistice had lain
United States to bolster the security of dormant. There seemed to be little
the Republic of Korea and to prepare purpose in beating a dead horse. But
the young nation for the task of even- when the Communists indicated in late
tually defending itself, but the build-up March that they would be willing to
had to await a more opportune moment. resume negotiations and to settle the
In the matter of Marine, Navy, and prisoner of war question, the ROK
Air Forces, the ROK Government fared Government quickly awoke to the im-
somewhat better. President Rhee had plications of what this could mean to its
expressed a personal interest in the national aspirations.
status of the augmentation of the ROK Within a week of the Communist offer
Marine Corps to Clark in late April and Rhee and his staff had reopened their
the U.N. commander in turn told the campaign to block a truce that did not
JCS that a favorable answer might be meet their terms. The ROK National
helpful in mitigating ROK discontent. Assembly adopted a resolution in the
In mid-May the Secretary of Defense in- opening days of April urging the United
formed Clark that an increase in the States to avoid any plan not guarantee-
ROK Marine Corps to 23,500 had been ing the complete unification of Korea.
approved by the President, along with On 5 April Rhee addressed the soldiers
new personnel ceilings of 10,000 for the of the ROK II Corps on their first an-
ROK Navy and 9,000 for the ROK Air niversary. He called for military victory
Force.19 and a drive to the Yalu rather than a
But the planned growth of ROKA truce along the present lines. In Seoul,
forces and the economic assistance that on the next day, 50,000 people attended
the United States hoped would provide a a rally that featured a succession of
speakers denouncing the armistice and
17
(1) Msg, CX 62955, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jun posing five demands as prerequisites to
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, an. 3, sec a settlement in Korea. First on the list
II, tab J-66. (2) Msg, JCS 941344, JCS to CINCFE,
12 Jun 53. came the matter of ROK representation
18
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 90-93. in the United Nations; second, the total
19
(1) Msg, C 62181, Clark to JCS, 30 Apr 53, disarmament of North Korea; third, the
DA-IN 262924. (2) Msg, JCS 938796, JCS to
CINCFE, 14 May 53. The 10,000 for the ROK removal of all Chinese forces from
Navy was 6,000 less than Clark had requested. North Korea; fourth, ROK representa-
442 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tion at all meetings discussing Korean Rhee, Herren suggested that an ap-
problems; and last, cessation of support proach be made along the lines of a bi-
of North Korea by certain U.N. mem- lateral security pact, which the ROK
bers.20 Government appeared to desire very
As the full weight of the ROK drive much, coupled with postwar economic
against the armistice began to make it- aid and the promise of U.S. support of
self felt, Clark and his advisors started Korean unification by peaceful means
to worry. General Herren warned of and of ROK participation in the politi-
stubborn resistance ahead which should cal conference.22
not be discounted. When the U.N. com- Clark shared Herren's anxiety over the
mander communicated his anxiety to deterioration of the situation, but did
his superiors in Washington, they ad- not think that the United States should
mitted their own concern over the sit- offer Rhee a bilateral security pact un-
uation.21 der pressure. One of the weaknesses of
On 10 April 50,000 students paraded the UNC's position, he informed the
in Pusan displaying "Unification or JCS on 18 April, lay in the fact that
Death" posters in great numbers as they under the present arrangements Rhee
wended their way through the city. The could make independent use of the
theme of national unification by force ROK forces after the armistice was
was repeated by public officials on every signed, since no agreement on UNC
level. As General Herren pointed out to control in the posttruce period existed.
Clark on 14 April, the motivation be- He did not think, however, that it was
hind the rising clamor linked the strong the proper moment to raise this matter
23
national desire for unification with the either.
feeling of insecurity stemming from the As it happened, Clark did not have to
1950 aggression, with the reality of bring up the problem. On 21 April the
political pressure of the Russo-Chinese ROK National Assembly passed resolu-
powermass, and with the fear that the tions in support of Rhee's position on
United States would not again come to the military unification of Korea by an
the ROK's aid in the event of future advance to the north. Rhee followed
aggression. Herren was afraid that Rhee this move by having Ambassador You
might do something rash to achieve his deliver a message to the State Depart-
objectives, since the ROK President ment three days later. The message in-
seemed to be in a position to channel formed Mr. Eisenhower that Rhee was
"public opinion" in whatever direction preparing to withdraw ROK forces from
he desired. To prevent hasty action by the U.N. Command if the latter made
any arrangement permitting the Chi-
20
(1) Msg, G 3731, Taylor to Clark, 5 Apr 53. nese Communists to remain south of the
(2) Msg, G 3756, Eighth Army to AFFE, 6 Apr Yalu. Under such circumstances, the
53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls
1-256 to app. I, incls 222 and 223.
21 22
(1) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 261. Msg, C 61949, CINCFE to DA, 16 Apr 53, in
(2) Msg, C 61736, CINCFE to DA, 4 Apr 53, UNC/- UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to app.
FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to app. I, I, incl 230.
23
incls 218 and 216. (3) Msg, JCS 936213, JCS to Msg, CX 61976, Clark to JCS, 18 Apr 53, DA-
CINCUNC, 10 Apr 53. IN 258833.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 443

ROK armed forces would fight on— conceivably lead to the loss of all that
alone if necessary.24 the Republic of Korea had gained at
The arrival of this brief document such terrific cost.26
created consternation in Washington On 27 April, Clark flew to Seoul to
and Tokyo, for with the plenary sessions talk to the ROK President. Rhee was
about to reconvene the threat of ROK "calm, dispassionate and unemotional,"
non-co-operation loomed large. Since the the U.N. commander reported, and ex-
timing of the withdrawal of ROK forces pounded his views "in a friendly man-
was the critical point, Clark told Gen- ner." But these views had not changed
eral Collins that he intended to see a whit. What Clark did discover during
Rhee immediately and discover when the course of the conversation was that
the ROK President intended to pull out Rhee was not thinking of taking the
his troops from the UNC. If Rhee ROK forces away from UNC control ex-
would wait until after the posttruce cept as a last resort. The ROK Presi-
political conference was held, arrange- dent told Clark that he would pull out
ments could be made to disengage other his troops only after "thorough and
U.N. units and Clark could retain a frank discussions" with the U.N. com-
large measure of control over the ROK mander. After talking privately for
forces by restricting their logistical sup- over an hour with Rhee, Clark felt that
port. On the other hand, if Rhee made the old man was bluffing and would not
his move as soon as the armistice was go it alone without giving the matter
signed and initiated action against the long and careful consideration.27
enemy, the UNC would be caught in the One of the topics that Rhee had
middle.25 stressed in the dialog with the U.N. com-
Word came quickly from Washington mander was the feasibility of the simul-
for Clark to delay his visit until Ambas- taneous withdrawal of both Chinese
sador Briggs turned over a message from Communist and U.N. forces. By 30 April
Eisenhower to the ROK President. In the ROK leader had thought over this
this missive, Mr. Eisenhower attempted question and decided that only if cer-
to reassure Rhee. The United Nations tain safeguards were applied could the
he pointed out, had successfully repelled U.N. troops be removed. The conditions
the Communist invasion and would con- laid down by Rhee included in part: a
tinue to press for the peaceful unifica- bilateral defense pact; U.S. guarantees
tion of Korea. But it had not and would of immediate help in the event of Soviet
not commit itself to achieving this latter aggression; the continuance of the naval
objective through war. The U.S. Presi- blockade and air defense until peace was
dent urged Rhee not to attempt to block 26
Ltr, Eisenhower to Rhee, 23 Apr 53. From p.
the armistice, for such a course could 182 of THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MANDATE
FOR CHANGE, 1953-1956, by Dwight D. Eisen-
24
(1) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. hower. Copyright (c) 1963 by Dwight D. Eisenhower.
261. (2) Msg, G 4404 KGI, Eighth Army to AFFE, Reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company,
26 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls Inc.
27
1-256 to app. I, incl 237. (1) Msg, C 62143, Clark to Collins, 28 Apr 53,
25
Msg, C 62098, Clark to Collins, 26 Apr 53, in in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to app. app. I, incl 255. (2) Clark, From the Danube to
I, incl 250. the Yalu, pp. 261-62.
444 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

firmly established; and the expansion soil. General Choi, the ROK delegate,
and strengthening of ROK armed forces quickly introduced a counterproposal
in the meantime.28 amending the UNC plan. Provided that
Behind the adamant front presented Switzerland was selected to serve as
publicly by the ROK President on uni- chairman of the repatriation commission
fication and the ousting of the Chinese and furnished all of the custodial forces,
Communists, therefore, lay a disposition which would be concentrated on the
to bargain. He wanted the U.N. Com- island of Cheju-do, more than 50 miles
mand to remain to bolster the ROK po- south of the mainland, the ROK Gov-
sition even though this was clearly in- ernment would be willing to agree to a
consistent with his stand on the Chinese neutral nation taking over control of the
forces. But, unfortunately, his speeches nonrepatriates in Korea.31
and press releases were leaving him very On 12 May Clark again visited Rhee
little room to maneuver without mak- to discuss the ROK attitude toward the
ing important concessions. The parades repatriation Commission and found him
and demonstrations went on unabated "in dead earnest" about not turning over
even while he cautioned his people Korean nonrepatriates to any state or
against improper acts that might be group of states having Communist in-
interpreted abroad as malicious in their clinations. During this meeting Rhee
intentions.29 asked Clark about the possibility of his
During the early part of May another having the ROK security troops guard-
facet of the problem of relations with ing the Korean nonrepatriates release
the ROK Government came into them without involving the U.N. com-
sharper focus. Rhee and his counselors mander. Clark reminded Rhee that the
had stated on several occasions that they ROK security forces were under the
would never permit the Korean nonre- UNC and the ROK President did not
patriates to be transferred to a neutral pursue the subject. In this matter Clark
state.30 When the Communists dropped admitted his sympathy with Rhee's de-
their demand on 7 May that the non- sire and urged the JCS to insist upon the
repatriates be physically moved out of release of the Korean nonrepatriates as
the country, the ROK Government en- soon as the armistice was signed.32 As
tered a new spate of objections. Both has been mentioned above, the Wash-
the Communist and UNC plans for ington policy makers allowed Clark's
disposing of the nonrepatriates were stand on the release as an initial position
predicated upon the stationing of cus- only and later gave way to the Commu-
todial personnel and troops upon ROK nists' objections. But it was a clear
28
Ltr, Rhee to Clark, 30 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC,
indication of the seriousness of the sit-
Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256 to app. I, incl 253.
29 31
(1) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. Msg, HNC 1680, CINCUNC (Adv) to
263. (2) Msg, AX 73675, KCOMZ to CINCFE, 27 CINCUNC, 12 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
Apr 53. UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1- May 53, incls 1-194 to app. I.
32
256 to app. I, incls 247 and 245. Msg, HNC 1678, Clark to DA (JCS), 12 May
30
(1) Msg, AX 73525, KCOMZ to CINCFE, 16 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194
Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62143, Clark to Collins, 28 to app. I. For Clark's account of the meeting and
Apr 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, his views on the release of the nonrepatriates see
incls 1-256 to app. I, incls 103 and 255. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 262-65.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 445

uation in ROK eyes and foreshadowed altered a great deal, of course, for now
later developments. the chief concern lay in the observance
Since he had received no encourage- of the armistice once it was signed.
ment in his efforts to gain unification by Much would depend upon the response
force, to secure the eviction of the of the ROK Army and populace to an
Chinese Communists, or to arrange for actual appeal from Rhee to continue
the release of the Korean nonrepatriates, the conflict, and plans were hinged to
Rhee cast his line into other waters. Af- the various degrees of co-operation that
ter the 12 May talk with Rhee, the U.N. might be given to Rhee by his people.
commander relayed his impressions of The task of disengaging UNC forces
the course that the ROK leader was fol- from the battle line during active hos-
lowing: "I feel Rhee realizes that, in tilities between the ROKA and the
spite of some of his heated objections, Communists would present the most
we will go ahead and obtain an armistice acute problem if it arose, and instruc-
if we can get one that does not sacrifice tions were issued to the major com-
the principle of no forced repatriation. manders involved to cover such an even-
He is bargaining now to get a security tuality.34
pact, to obtain more economic aid, and The possibility that the U.N. Com-
to make his people feel he is to have a mand and the ROK Government would
voice in the armistice negotiations." be able to reconcile their differences
Clark saw no reason why a mutual se- without serious incident lessened after
curity arrangement could not be worked the middle of May. When the Commu-
out as quickly as possible to satisfy this nists rejected the 13 May UNC proposal
ROK goal. And he had suggested to at Panmunjom, policy makers in Wash-
Rhee that the staff of General Choi, the ington began to prepare the final UNC
ROK representative at Panmunjom, be position. The abandonment of the stand
increased by several administrative of- on the release of the Korean nonrepatri-
ficers to magnify the role of the ROK in ates and the acceptance of India as chair-
the negotiations. Rhee had agreed and man and supplier of custodial forces
on 20 May three assistants of general of- would be extremely difficult for the Re-
ficer rank joined Choi in the confer- public of Korea to accept in the light of
ence area.33 the strong declarations by Rhee and his
Although the threat of ROK action fellow-leaders condemning such con-
to prolong the war by fighting on alone cessions. As the UNC gravitated closer
diminished in early May, the Eighth to the Communist views on the outstand-
Army staff dusted off the plans prepared ing issues, it drifted as a matter of course
during the ROK domestic crisis of a farther away from ROK desires.
year earlier for safeguarding UNC Since the United States realized that
forces and supplies in the event of in- the final UNC position would be dis-
ternal disturbances. The situation had
34
(1) Eighth Army, Plan EVERREADY, 4 May 53,
33
(1) Msg, CX 62406, CINCFE to JCS, 13 May in G-3 381 Pacific, 15/3. (2) Memo, Brig Gen
53. (2) Msg, G 5100 KCG, Taylor to CINCFE, 19 James A. Elmore, Chief Opn Div, for Gen Eddle-
May 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, man, 4 May 53, sub: CINCUNC Plans . . . , in
incls 1-194 toapp.I. G-3 091 Korea, 34/3.
446 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tasteful to Rhee, officials in Washington aspects of the Korean efforts and might
fashioned a statement in the form of a be hard to justify to the U.S. Congress
personal message from President Eisen- under current circumstances.
hower designed to reassure the ROK The aftermath of this interview was
Government that the United States hardly surprising. Since Rhee had not
would not desert it in the days ahead. been consulted on the formulation of the
Clark and Briggs were instructed to de- final position and was kept in the dark
liver and discuss this with Rhee on 25 on the extent of UNC concessions, Clark
May. Perhaps the most important item and Briggs were merely apprising him of
at the moment was the bilateral security the fait accompli. At the same time, to
treaty, but because of ROK agitation make matters worse, they had to tell him
against the armistice, the United States that he was not going to get a security
was not ready to negotiate a pact. The treaty now and if he did not behave he
disinclination of the Washington policy might also not get all the assistance that
makers to conclude a mutual security had been promised him. According to
arrangement puzzled Clark, for he be- the two U.S. representatives the armistice
lieved that Rhee attached great impor- proposals came as "a profound shock" to
tance to this matter. Without a security Rhee. He immediately declared them
agreement they would have little to unacceptable to his country and said
offer Rhee that would serve to soften therefore he could give none of the
the impact of the concessions that the assurances of co-operation which the
United States was about to make.35 United States desired. Rhee did, how-
Nevertheless, while the UNC delega- ever, ask that the points covered by Clark
tion was presenting the new offer at and Briggs be submitted in writing.
Panmunjom on 25 May, Clark and What Rhee would do to retrieve the
Briggs met with Rhee and informed situation remained unknown, but Clark
him of the terms that were being prof- warned his superiors shortly after the 25
fered to the Communists. They then May meeting of one dangerous possibil-
informed Rhee in effect that the United ity:
States would support the Republic of ... he may either covertly or overtly
Korea militarily, economically, and initiate action to cause the release of all
politically provided Rhee accepted and Korean non-repatriates. He has the capa-
bility, and should he attempt this action,
co-operated in carrying out the condi- there are few effective steps that I can take
tions agreed upon in the armistice. To to counter it. Accordingly, I am bringing
bolster the prospects of peace after a this matter to your attention, for such an
truce, a "greater sanctions" statement by eventuality would be most damaging to the
the U.N. countries participating in the UNC cause. It would be practically im-
possible to avoid charges of UNC duplicity,
Korean War would be issued immedi- not only from the Communists but from
ately following the conclusion of the our allies as well.36
cease-fire. A bilateral security pact, how-
ever, could not be considered at the 36
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pages
present, for it would weaken the U.N. 268-71, contains a detailed account of this meeting.
See also, Msg, C 62630, Clark to JCS, 26 May 53,
35
Hq UNC/FEC Korean Armistice Negotiations in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194 to
(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 129ff. app. I.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 447

It was true, Clark continued, that he pose of them, and for permitting Com-
could replace the ROK security battal- munists to enter ROK territory.38
ions with U.S. troops, but this might ag- When Choi's statements were given to
gravate an already delicate state of the press, thus violating the executive
affairs and might also result in placing nature of the plenary meetings, Harrison
the U.S. forces in a position of having to remonstrated with him in vain. After
employ force against the nonrepatriates Choi declared that he would not attend
if they attempted to escape. Since the further executive meetings and refused
only motive of these Koreans was to resist to promise compliance with the security
return to Communist control, it would rules, Harrison had little choice but to
be "particularly unfortunate" if U.S. per- halt the flow of classified information to
sonnel had to use violent means to avert the ROK representative and his staff.39
a breakout. He had discussed the prob- As emotions began to run high, espe-
lem with his subordinate commanders cially in ROK official circles, and warn-
and all were alerted to the potential ings of trouble streamed in from U.S.
explosiveness of the prisoner of war situ- military and diplomatic sources, the
ation. They would take what preven- leaders in Washington wondered
tive measures they could under the whether they might not have been too
circumstances, but these might well be hasty in denying Rhee a mutual defense
inadequate.37 pact. On 29 May, Secretary of State
During the interim between the pres- Dulles and Secretary of Defense Wilson
entation of the 25 May proposal to the agreed that Clark could offer Rhee a bi-
Communists and the next meeting of lateral security treaty if the U.N. com-
the plenary conference, the tempo of mander thought that this might stave
ROK denunciations of the UNC offer off a dangerous situation. Mr. Eisen-
increased. On 27 May the major points hower approved on the following day.40
of the plan found their way into the The belated decision had only one
ROK newspapers, apparently leaked by drawback—there was no guarantee that
governmental sources. The ROK Na- Rhee would accept the bargain now.
tional Assembly listened on the next day Neither Clark nor Briggs were sure of
to Foreign Minister Pyun Yung Tai at- the reception that Rhee might give the
tack the concessions granted and then tardy offer, but both felt that it should
lined up solidly in support of President be held in abeyance until the Commu-
Rhee. From General Choi, the ROK nists responded to the UNC 25 May
representative at Panmunjom, came a proposal and Rhee had an opportunity
blast at the provisions for turning over
the nonrepatriates to the repatriation
commission, for holding the prisoners 38
Msg, HNC 1706, CINCUNC (Adv) to
until either the political conference or CINCUNC, 29 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
the U.N. General Assembly could dis- May 53, incls 1-194 to app. I.
39
Msg, HNC 1711, CINCUNC (Adv) to
CINCUNC, 1 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
37
(1) Msg, 250610, Clark to JCS, 25 May 53, in May 53, incls 1-194 to app. I.
40
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194 to app. Memo for Rcd (sgd Eddleman), 1 Jun 53,
I. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. sub: Conf on the Current Difficulties with the
272-74. ROK Govt . . . , in G-3 091 Korea, 46.
448 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

to react to the Communists' reaction.41 Approval for deferring the visit ar-
Before the Communists could enter rived from Washington the following
the picture again, however, Rhee sent day. Collins informed Clark that he and
an answer to the President's message of Briggs could use their own discretion on
25 May. Surprisingly enough, this letter whether to bring up the matter of the
was mild in tone and omitted all refer- pact.43 In the opening days of June
ence to the controversial matters of the everything hinged upon the Communist
Korean nonrepatriates and the repatri- acceptance or rejection of the UNC pro-
ation commission. Instead the ROK posal. Despite the fact that both Rhee
leader concentrated upon what he con- and the UNC expected the enemy to
sidered the four major conditions that agree to the 25 May offer, they pre-
would make an armistice acceptable to ferred to wait and make sure before
the ROK people. First, the United taking the next step.
States would conclude a mutual defense During this brief interlude there was
pact with the Republic of Korea and, sec- one development that was quite signifi-
ond, would pledge military and eco- cant in the light of later events—Rhee
nomic support to strengthen ROK de- appointed Lt. Gen. Won Yong Duk, a
fenses. Third, the U.N. and Chinese trusted henchman, to the command of
Communist forces would withdraw si- the Provost Marshal General's office.
multaneously from Korea and, fourth, This command was directly under the
U.S. air and naval forces outside Korea Minister of National Defense rather than
would remain in the area to act as a de- under the ROKA Chief of Staff and
terrent to further aggression. As Clark placed all military police at Rhee's dis-
pointed out to the JCS on 2 June, the position.44
U.N. Command could satisfy all of these When the Communists signified on 4
conditions except for the question of June that they would go along with
withdrawal of all non-Korean forces. most of the UNC suggestions, the ROK
This would have to be taken up at the antiarmistice machine gathered fresh
political conference unless the Commu- momentum. But it was operating now
nists would agree to include it in the on two levels. On the level below Rhee,
armistice. Clark did not think that they speeches, parades, and demonstrations
would, but admitted that Rhee's answer continued to be inflammatory in tone,
was encouraging and showed no disposi- while the ROK President himself pro-
tion toward undertaking rash acts. ceeded at a more cautious pace. At the
Nevertheless, Clark and Briggs still meeting with Clark and Briggs on 5
wanted to wait until after the next June, Rhee attacked the armistice as ap-
plenary session before they talked to peasement, a Communist victory, and as
Rhee again.42 the first step toward World War III. On
41
the other hand, he hedged on ROK fu-
(1) Msg, GX 5478 KCG, Eighth Army to ture action and refused to commit him-
CINCUNC, 30 May 53. (2) Msg, CX 62747,
CINCFE to JCS, 30 May 53. Both in UNC/FEC,
Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1-194 to app. I. Source Papers 1-150, Paper 149. (3) Msg, CX
42
(1) Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953- 62781, Clark to JCS, 2 Jun 53, DA-IN 273323.
43
1956, p. 183. (2) Msg, Eighth Army to CINCUNC, Msg, DA 940543, CSUSA to Clark, 3 Jun 53.
44
2 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 46.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 449
self on whether a mutual defense treaty indicated that he and his people would
would counterbalance his objections to never accept the armistice and that from
the truce. Clark and Briggs decided not now on he would feel free to take what-
to make the definite offer of a pact un- ever steps were necessary. He refused to
til a more favorable moment arose.45 elaborate on what he would do or when
Rhee issued a public statement on 6 he would act, causing Clark to conclude:
June that was very similar in content to "He himself is the only one who knows
the letter he had sent Clark on 30 April. how far he will go, but undoubtedly he
He proposed a simultaneous withdrawal will bluff right up to the last." 47
of all non-Korean forces from the penin- The first measures adopted by Rhee
sula after a mutual defense treaty be- came on 7 June when "pseudo-extraor-
tween the United States and the Repub- dinary" security restrictions were im-
lic of Korea had been concluded. The posed on all of South Korea and all
pact would guarantee U.S. military as- ROK officers on duty in the United
sistance, support in the event of aggres- States were ordered home. By the time
sion, and the retention of U.S. air and the terms of reference on prisoners were
naval forces in the Far East area. If such signed on 8 June at Panmunjom, the
an arrangement were not possible, then ROK campaign was in full swing.48
the ROK troops would fight on.46 It There were three principal themes
was Rhee's wish that the UNC delegation stressed in the speeches, slogans, and
introduce the matter of non-Korean placards: the unification of Korea; the
troop withdrawal at Panmunjom, but release of the anti-Communist prisoners
there was little chance that his desire of war; and the use of military force to
would be gratified at a time when the prevent the entry of the "so-called"
UNC and Communists were so close to neutral nations forces that were to take
finishing up the truce arrangements. over custody of the prisoners.
Shortly after Rhee released this state- In the midst of the wave of increasing
ment, President Eisenhower decided to internal excitement, General Taylor
try again. In his letter, delivered on 7 called on Rhee and introduced an allevi-
June by Clark, Eisenhower defended ating factor into the situation. After a
the negotiating of the armistice and then diatribe against the armistice Rhee re-
went on to again pledge U.S. support- iterated his intention of continuing the
political, military, and economic—in the struggle alone. Taylor proceeded to
posttruce period. The message seemed point out that the ROK Army still suf-
to have little effect upon Rhee. Clark, fered from many deficiencies and
reporting on his meeting with the ROK needed time to convert itself into a bal-
President, noted: "I have never seen 47
(1) "Public Papers of the Presidents," Dwight
him more distracted, wrought up and D. Eisenhower, 1953 (Washington, 1960), pp. 377-
emotional." During the interview Rhee 80. (2) Msg, CX 62876, CINCUNC to Eighth
Army, 7 Jun 53. (3) Msg, CX 62890, CINCUNC
to JCS, 7 Jun 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
45
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 274- Jun 53, Source Papers, 151-297, Papers 163 and
76. 166.
46 48
Msg, CX 62854, CINCUNC to JCS, 6 Jun 53, Robert C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Rut-
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, land, Vermont, Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., 1960),
151-297, Paper 157. p. 160.
450 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

anced force capable of defending South On 12 June Secretary of State Dulles


Korea. Evidently the thought that the sent a letter to President Rhee suggest-
truce and the political conference would ing that the latter come to Washington
provide time to allow completion of the for high-level talks with the President
twenty-division program had not and himself. Although the offer report-
occurred to Rhee. In a more temperate edly pleased Rhee, he turned it down
tone, he told Taylor that he needed as- because of the press of affairs. Ap-
surances to convince the Korean people parently the ROK President was not yet
of the palatability of the armistice. ready to come to terms; instead he asked
These would include: 1. the limiting Dulles to visit him in Korea, where
of the political discussion, preferably to he would have the psychological advan-
sixty days; 2. a mutual security treaty tage. This time Dulles had to decline.
with the United States; 3. the expansion As an alternative he proposed sending
of the ROKA to twenty divisions and the Assistant Secretary of State Walter S.
development of the ROK Navy and Air Robertson, who had the full trust of
Force; 4. the barring of Indian and Eisenhower and Dulles, in his place. On
Communist representatives from Ko- 17 June Rhee told Briggs that he
rean soil. However, Rhee went on, he would be delighted to see Robertson
was not yet ready to take a final stand when he arrived.51
on this matter and wanted to think it On the same day, 17 June, Rhee called
over a bit more. Taylor received the Briggs back and gave him his answer to
impression that the ROK President was Eisenhower's letter of 6 June. While
out on a limb because of the extreme expressing appreciation at the U.S. offers
position he had assumed on the with- of assistance and a mutual security pact,
drawal of foreign troops and was cast- Rhee did not feel that these could be
ing desperately for a means to save face accepted if they entailed ROK consent
while extricating himself.49 to the armistice.52 Later in the day he
The uncertainty reflected in Rhee's addressed a group of U.S. and ROK offi-
conversation with Taylor was mirrored cers at ROK II Corps headquarters and
in the domestic events of the second became quite emotional in his speech
week in June. Demonstrations in Seoul denouncing the armistice and repeating
led to the injury of some high school the ROK intention to carry on the fight-
girls and unfavorable publicity for the ing by itself.53
U.S. Military Police, even though they The vague threats and hints of ROK
were not responsible for the cuts and action to block the truce cropped up
bruises suffered. Yet, at the same time, again in Rhee's talk to the ROK officers,
many Koreans were weary of war and
realized the futility of fighting on 51
(1) Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-
alone.50 1956, p. 184. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the
Yalu, p. 279.
52
(1) Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-
49
Msg, G 58155 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 9 Jun 53, 1956, p. 185. (2) Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice
in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jan-Jun 53. Negotiations (May 52-Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 223-25.
50 53
Msg, A 6661, FEAF to CINCFE, 16 Jun 53, in Msg, G 6092 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 17 Jun 53,
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers 151- in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers,
297, Paper 178. 151-297, Paper 199.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 451

but the U.S. officials could do little to availing. The large quantities of non-toxic
forestall a hostile or embarrassing act irritants employed proved ineffective be-
without aggravating the situation. By cause of the great number of prisoners
involved in the nighttime breakouts. Nine
the same token Rhee faced a similar prisoners were killed and 16 injured by rifle
dilemma, for he was personally friendly fire. There were no casualties among U.S.
to the United States and appreciated the personnel.
help it had given South Korea. Yet his As of 1 o'clock this afternoon 971
implacable opposition to the armistice escaped POW's had been recovered.
ROKA Security Guard units which have
could not be suddenly altered without left their posts at non-repatriate camps are
loss of face in his own land. And any being replaced by U.S. troops.54
daring move that might save his face
was bound to produce strained relations Despite the celerity with which the
between his country and the United U.S. security units took over their duties
States. Rhee's choice was a difficult one, at the prison camps, they were forced
but it had to be made. to operate at a distinct disadvantage. In
the event of mass escapes the custodial
The Pacification of Rhee troops were authorized to use riot con-
trol measures but not gunfire. The
On 18 June Rhee revealed his deci- United States was especially reluctant
sion and confirmed the worst expecta- to use force against the anti-Communist
tions of General Clark. The UNC prisoners and thus could only employ
press release issued was brief and suc- nontoxic gases and other nonlethal
cinct: methods of control. Although the bulk
of the prisoners gained their freedom on
Between midnight and dawn today, ap- 18 June, mass attempts continued and
proximately 25,000 militantly anti-com- hundreds more broke out in spite of the
munist North Korean prisoners of war presence of U.S. guards. On 17 June
broke out of the United Nations Command there had been around 35,400 Korean
prisoner of war camps at Pusan, Masan,
Nonsan, and Sang Mu Dai, Korea. nonrepatriates in the compounds; by the
Statements attributed to high officials of end of the month, only 8,600 remained.
the Republic of Korea now make it clear The price of liberty had become more
that the action had been secretly planned costly, however, for 61 prisoners had
and carefully co-ordinated at top levels died and 116 had been injured in the
in the Korean Government and that out- 55
side assistance was furnished the POW's in escape attempts.
their mass breakout. ROKA Security units The uproar caused by Rhee's uni-
assigned as guards at the POW camps did lateral action did not center on whether
little to prevent the breakouts and there is the freeing of the prisoners was justified
every evidence of actual collusion between or not; it concerned itself rather with
the ROK guards and the prisoners. . . .
U.S. personnel at these non-repatriate the effects of the ROK coup upon the
camps, limited in each case to the camp
commander and a few administrative per- 54
Msg, ZX 36907, CINCFE to DA, 18 Jun 53, in
sonnel, exerted every effort to prevent to- UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers,
day's mass breakouts, but in the face of 151-297, Paper 217. The number of prisoners still
collusion between the ROKA guards and at large on 18 June was 25,131.
55
the prisoners, their efforts were largely un- UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 46.
452 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

negotiations. Although Clark had use force. Neither he nor the U.S.
known that Rhee was in a position to officials wished to have armed clashes
release the nonrepatriates at any time, between the ROK and UNC troops. In
he told the ROK President that he was response to Clark's request that Rhee
"profoundly shocked" at the abrogation promise not to free the Chinese non-
of the personal commitment that Rhee repatriates and any of the Communist
had previously given him not to take uni- prisoners, the ROK President agreed not
lateral action involving ROK troops to take any action along this line.58
under UNC control without informing The uncertainty over Rhee's next
Clark. A message from President Eisen- move and the delicate situation in the
hower echoed Clark's charge and inti- nonrepatriate prison camps made the
mated that unless Rhee quickly agreed latter part of June a very unsettled
to accept the authority of the U.N. period. The escaped prisoners, for the
Command to conclude the armistice, most part, were integrated with the
other arrangements would be made.56 local population and were nearly im-
Actually the accusation by Clark was possible to recapture because of the as-
not entirely pertinent. The promise sistance furnished them by the ROK
made by Rhee had applied to the with- authorities. In the newspapers, stories of
drawal of ROK forces from UNC con- UNC collusion on the prisoner escapes
trol. After Rhee had appointed General appeared and Clark had to issue a strong
Won as Provost Marshal, he had placed statement on 21 June denying that he
the security troops at the prison camps had known about or abetted the release
under him. Won, in turn, was responsi- of the nonrepatriates.59
ble to the ROK Minister of National De- To forestall similar charges from the
fense and Rhee rather than to the Communists, Harrison had informed
ROKA Chief of Staff and the UNC. As Nam Il immediately on 18 June of the
for giving Clark prior warning of the breakouts and placed the responsibility
plan to free the prisoners, Rhee pointed squarely on the shoulders of the ROK
out: "Under the circumstances, if I had Government. But the enemy refused to
revealed to you in advance my idea of believe that the U.N. Command had not
setting them free, it would have em- known about the plan in advance and
barrassed you. Furthermore, the plan had not "deliberately connived" with
would have been completely spoiled." 57 Rhee to carry it out. Despite this, the
Although the ROK Government Communists did not threaten to break
wanted to let all of the Korean non- off negotiations as they might well have
repatriates go, Rhee made no effort to done. Instead they posed several perti-
56
(1) Ltr, Clark to Rhee, 18 Jun 53, quoted in
58
Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (1) Msg, CX 63216, CINCUNC to Taylor, 20
(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 239-40. (2) Msg, CX Jun 53. (2) Msg, CX 63230, CINCUNC to DA, 20
63164, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jun 53, Jun 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53,
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, Source Papers, 151-297, Papers 227 and 233.
59
151-297, Paper 221. (3) Eisenhower, Mandate for (1) Msg, DA 941831, Parks to Clark, 19 Jun 53.
Change, 1953-1956, pp. 185-86. (2) Msg, C 63212, CINCFE to CINFO, 20 Jun 53,
57
Ltr, Rhee to Clark, 18 Jun 53, quoted in full in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers,
in Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations 151-297, Paper 237. (3) Msg, C 63242, Clark to
(May 52-Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 246-47. JCS, 21 Jun 53, in same place, Paper 240.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 453

nent questions that struck at the heart of but very friendly. Both Clark and
the matter. Is the United Nations Taylor, when they compared impres-
Command able to control the South sions, felt that the adverse comments of
Korean government and army? If not, the world press on Rhee's unilateral re-
does the armistice in Korea include the lease of the prisoners was making an
Rhee group? If the Rhee group is not impact on him. The U.N. commander
included, what assurance is there for the got straight to the point and told the
implementation of the armistice agree- ROK leader that he must accept the
ment on the part of South Korea?60 premises that the United States was de-
The Communists had a right to know termined to sign an armistice under
the answers to these queries, but the honorable terms and would not try to
UNC was in no position to provide eject the Communist troops from Korea
them. Only Rhee could supply this in- by force. Moving on to the four points
formation and he seemed disinclined to of 9 June, Clark said he thought
be helpful. that there should be a time limit on the
At a meeting with Taylor on 20 June political conference; that the United
the ROK President appeared surprised States could sign a security treaty, but
that the Eighth Army commander had would never agree to come to the aid of
not gotten an official reaction to the four the ROK if the latter were the aggres-
points he had made on 9 June.61 He had sor; and that the ROK forces would be
evidently forgotten that he had not been built up. As for the last point, Clark
ready at that time to present them as aired his purely personal view that some
an official position. During this confer- modification in the prisoner of war
ence he gave notice that the signing of agreement might be worked out. The
an armistice would automatically free 8,600 Korean nonrepatriates might
him for further unilateral action, remain in U.N. custody and the ROK
though he refused to commit himself on representatives might be given full op-
what this action might be.62 The mix- portunity to explain the terms of ref-
ture of threat, on the one hand, with erence to them. When the time came
interest in further horse trading, on the to turn these prisoners over to the
other, indicated that he had not closed repatriation commission they could be
the door to bargaining. moved to the demilitarized zone and
When Clark visited Rhee two days ROK representatives might sit in as
later, he found him nervous and tense, observers while the Communists ex-
plainers carried on their sessions. The
60
(1) Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 18 Jun 53, in G-3 Chinese non-Communist prisoners could
file, Liaison Officers' Mtgs at Pan Mun Jom, Jan
53-Jun 53, bk. III. (2) Ltr, Kim and Peng to
be turned over to the custody of a
Clark, 19 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, neutral state for final disposition. Such
vol. 7.
61
an arrangement, Clark told Rhee, would
These had included a time limit on the politi-
cal conference, a mutual security pact, expansion eliminate the need for Indian or Com-
of the ROK armed forces, and the barring from munist personnel to enter ROK rear
Korea of Indian and Communist representatives.
62
areas.
Msg, GX 6228 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 20 Jun
53, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jan-
Turning to another subject, Clark
Jun 53. gave his frank opinion on the status of
454 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the ROK Army. It could not fight on and diplomatic leaders in the Far East
its own, offensively or defensively, at the and Robertson and Collins took place
present and needed time to prepare for on 24 June. All agreed that the armistice
the assumption of larger tasks. should be signed as quickly as pos-
Throughout the discussion Rhee had sible. Clark and Murphy felt that the
listened intently, Clark noted, and he enemy would accept an armistice even
had appeared to be interested in the though the UNC could not specifically
tentative solution that the U.N. com-guarantee that Rhee would live up to all
mander had proposed. Although Rhee of its provisions.65
would not commit himself, Clark felt At a meeting held in Washington the
that he made one very significant re- same day the report of this conference
mark. Despite the fact that he could not arrived, Mr. Eisenhower told his coun-
sign an armistice, since this would be selors that since Clark was on the spot
an admission of the division of Korea, and in the best position to assess the
the ROK leader had indicated that he situation, he should be given wide au-
could support it. Clark requested quick thority to go ahead and conclude the
guidance as to whether the United armistice. In the instructions sent to
States desired him to continue further Clark on 25 June he was told that as
along the avenue he had suggested to long as he did not compromise the prin-
Rhee.63 ciple of no forced repatriation and did
Before an answer could arrive from not imply that the UNC would force
Washington, Clark forwarded an the Republic of Korea to accept the
amendment to one of his proposals: in- armistice terms, he could handle the
stead of turning over the Chinese non- rest of the arrangements on his own.
repatriates to a neutral country, he There should be no UNC commitment
advocated transporting them to the to withdraw from Korea, the Washing-
demilitarized zone in the same fashion ton leaders stated, but if Clark thought
as the Korean nonrepatriates and it would be helpful, he could let the
delivering all of the prisoners who were ROK leaders think that the UNC in-
unwilling to return home to the repatri- tended to pull out.66
ation commission.64 After the demonstrations and
By this time the President and his speeches attendant upon the celebration
advisors had decided to send Assistant of the third anniversary of the war's out-
Secretary of State Robertson and Army break were over, Robertson conferred
Chief of Staff General Collins to Korea. with Rhee on an almost daily basis. His
Clark had been told to discuss the matter chief mission was to clear up the mis-
of armistice modifications with the understandings that threatened to dis-
emissaries upon their arrival. The con- rupt U.S.-ROK unity and to reassure
ference in Tokyo between U.S. military President Rhee of U.S. friendship and
63 65
(1) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. (1) Msg, DA 942047, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 22
282-84. (2) Msg, Clark to JCS, 22 Jun 53, DA-IN Jun 53. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu,
280121. pp. 284-85.
64 66
Msg, Clark to JCS, 23 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, (1) Msg, JCS 942368, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jun
Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151-297, paper 53. (2) Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p.
250. 289.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 455

concern for the future of the Republic of insofar as possible to insure observance
Korea. He immediately encountered of the terms. Clark suggested that the
the deep fear of the ROK Government delegations meet immediately and dis-
that the United Nations might be weary cuss the final arrangements.69
of the war and might be ready to sacri- Both Clark and Harrison became im-
fice Korea. As Robertson later reported, patient as the diplomatic talks dragged
the bitterness found in the United States on into early July. They felt that it was
and among its allies over the release of time to stop letting the ROK Govern-
the prisoners was duplicated in South ment call the turn. General Clark be-
Korea by a bitterness "distilled of their lieved that Mr. Eisenhower had made
fears." 67 maximum concessions to Rhee and that
Although at the meeting of 27 June it was time to let him know that there
Rhee admitted that President Eisen- would be no more. In accord with the
hower had met all of the conditions he permission he had gained on 25 June to
had laid down and requested that they give the impression that the UNC in-
be given to him in writing, agreement tended to withdraw from Korea, Clark
was fleeting. Rhee added new condi- told the Secretary of Defense on 5 July,
tions and modified his assurances.68 he had been pursuing a campaign of
While the private conferences be- counterpressure upon the ROK. He
tween Rhee and Robertson continued, had held conferences with his senior
Clark acted on the permission he had commanders, carried out some troop
received to go ahead with the effort to movements, consolidated the camps of
wind up the armistice agreement. In the Korean nonrepatriates, slowed down
his letter of 29 June to Kim and Peng, the movement of supplies and equip-
Clark attempted to answer the questions ment to Korea, and suspended the ship-
asked by the Communists. He pointed ment of equipment for the activation
out that the UNC did command the of the last four ROKA divisions. In the
ROK Army, but did not exercise control future, he intended to curtail projects
over the Republic of Korea, which was a employing indigenous labor and reduce
sovereign nation. As to whether the the use of Korean hwan. Military and
armistice included the government of naval activity would be aimed at foster-
Rhee, he reminded his opposites that ing the belief that the UNC was prepar-
the armistice was a military agreement ing to pull out of Korea. As the indi-
between the military commanders. cations that the UNC was leaving
Since the co-operation of the ROK Gov- mounted, Clark thought that they would
ernment was necessary in this case, how- have a considerable impact upon Rhee
ever, the UNC and the U.N. govern- and his advisors.70
ments concerned would make every ef- 69
Msg, HNC 1796, CINCUNC (Adv) to JCS, 29
fort to obtain ROK co-operation and Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source
would also set up military safeguards Papers, 151-297, Paper 264.
70
(1) Msg, HNC 1800, CINCUNC (Adv) to
67
Radio Address of Dulles and Robertson, July CINCUNC, 4 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
17. 1953, reported in Congressional Record, July Jul 53, incls to app. I, 1-143, incl 2. (2) Msg, CX
18. 1953, vol 99, pt. 7, p. 9128. 63500, CINCUNC to Secy Defense, 5 Jul 53, in
68
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 286- UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,
87. incls 144-286, incl 176.
456 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

On the same day—5 July—one of the While Robertson worked to allay the
facets of Clark's campaign produced en- ROK President's doubts, the Commu-
couraging results. In an interview with nist liaison officers on 8 July delivered
the press, General Taylor remarked the long-awaited answer to Clark's re-
that he could extricate the U.N. forces quest for the resumption of negotiations.
from the battle line amicably if the Kim and Peng were still highly suspi-
ROK Government decided to continue cious of the role the UNC had played in
the fighting after the armistice. He went the escape of the prisoners of war and
on to note, however, that the Eighth bitterly critical of the actions of Rhee
Army was like a twenty-cylinder auto- and his government. Despite their de-
mobile with a complex system of wires tailed reservations about accepting the
and cogwheels. If the U.N. forces were UNC explanations, the key sentence
taken away, the ROK troops that re- came in the last paragraph: "To sum
mained would have to fashion a com- up, although our side is not entirely
pletely new automobile, Taylor con- satisfied with the reply of your side, yet
cluded.71 The implication was clear in view of the indication of the desire of
that the ROK Army would face a major your side to strive for an early Armistice
problem of reorganization in the event and in view of the assurances given by
it fought on alone. your side, our side agrees that the dele-
The evident U.S. determination to go gations of both sides meet at an
on with the armistice negotiations was appointed time to discuss the question
matched by Robertson's patience and of implementation of the Armistice
tact with Rhee behind the scenes. As agreement and the serious preparation
President Eisenhower has noted: "Day prior to the signing of the Armistice
by day he argued with this fiercely patri- agreement."74 Although this was a
otic but recalcitrant old man on the long-winded way of saying "yes," the
futility of trying to go it alone. He gave fact that the Communists were willing
assurance of United States support if to proceed in spite of the uncertain
Rhee would be reasonable." 72 To satisfy status of the ROK situation demon-
Rhee's fears that a postarmistice politi- strated how much they wanted an
cal conference might be carried on in- armistice.
definitely to breed uncertainty and to The enemy's agreement to return to
serve as a cover for infiltration of hostile Panmunjom and the UNC counter-
propaganda in South Korea, Robertson pressure campaign evidently combined
agreed that if it turned out that way, the to have an effect upon Rhee. During the
United States would try to end the con- next three days Robertson was able to
ference "as a sham and a hostile trick." 73 wind up his conversations with Presi-
71
(1) Msg, CX 63524, CINCFE to DA, 7 Jul 53, dent Rhee. When Robertson left Korea
in UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, on 12 July he had a letter signed by
incls 144-286, Incl 178. (2) New York Times, Rhee expressing his appreciation of
July 6, 1953, p. 3.
72
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, Robertson's performance and "his fine
p. 187.
73 74
Radio Address of Dulles and Robertson of Msg, HNU 7-1, CINCUNC (Adv) to
July 17, 1953, reported in Congressional Record, CINCUNC, 8 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
July 18, 1953, vol 99, pt. 7, p. 9128. Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incl 7.
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 457
rea would withdraw from the political
conference after ninety days if nothing
substantial was achieved; 4. agreement
to carry out the planned expansion of
the ROK Army; and 5. agreement to
hold high-level U.S.-ROK conferences
on joint objectives before the political
conferences were held.76
These were important concessions, to
be sure, but in the process of negotiation
Rhee had dropped many of his previous
demands. Through his agreement not
to obstruct the armistice, he abandoned
his insistence upon the withdrawal of
Chinese Communist Forces from Korea
and for the unification of Korea before
the signing of the armistice. He also
gave up his objections to the transporta-
tion of Korean nonrepatriates and
Chinese prisoners to the demilitarized
zone for the period of explanations, pro-
vided that no Indian troops were landed
in Korea.
This was not the end of the Rhee
MR. ROBERTSON story. During the closing days of the
truce negotiations his presence was felt
even as it had been before, but to a
spirit of consideration and understand- lesser degree. The reservations he had
ing." Rhee also assured President attached to his promises not to impede
Eisenhower that "he would not obstruct the armistice allowed him some room
in any way the implementation of the to maneuver and he caused the United
terms of the armistice" despite "his States and its allies several anxious mo-
misgivings over the long-term results." 75 ments up to the end. But the period of
In return for this promise Rhee his dominance of the negotiation was
obtained five main pledges from the over when he agreed in writing to go
United States: 1. the promise of a U.S.- along in general with the conclusion of
ROK mutual security pact after the the truce terms.
armistice; 2. assurance that the ROK What the old warrior had accom-
would receive long-term economic aid plished by his fight was difficult to
and a first installment of two hundred assess immediately. He had not suc-
million dollars; 3. agreement that the ceeded in gaining United States support
United States and the Republic of Ko-
75 76
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 287-
p. 187. 88.
458 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

for his drive to unify Korea by military desired an end to the fighting and the
force nor had he carried the day for his casualties. The use of speeches and
plan to have the Chinese Communists mass information media such as the
withdraw from Korea before the armis- radio and press to fan public emotion
tice was signed. On the other hand, he and the organization and encourage-
had won the pledge of a bilateral se- ment of demonstrations and parades to
curity pact with the United States make clear ROK opposition to the arm-
coupled with economic and military as- istice were quite effective, but in the
sistance; he had freed thousands of long run may have cost Rhee more than
Korean nonrepatriates from the prison they gained. The United States was will-
camps; and he had blocked the entry of ing to meet all reasonable demands to
Indian and Communist personnel into compensate the ROK for its acceptance
South Korea. Because of the delicate of the truce; the campaign of open
situation vis-à-vis the Communists at pressure merely made it more difficult
Panmunjom, the United States had been for the United States to yield gracefully.
forced to cater to Rhee's desires in sev- In retrospect, it appeared that through
eral instances to prevent further inci- diplomatic bargaining Rhee could have
dents and Rhee had gained face among had all that he eventually won and
his own people on these occasions. He could have avoided giving the Commu-
had also shown the world that the Re- nists a chance to gloat over the falling
public of Korea was not a puppet state. out of allies. No one could belie his de-
At the same time his tactics in blocking votion to the national objectives of his
the arrangement of a cease-fire in Korea country or his sincerity in pursuing
could not help but cause him to suffer a them, but his tactics and judgment in
loss of friends and confidence among the attaining these goals were certainly open
other nations around the globe who to question.
CHAPTER XXI

The Last Offensive


While the U.N. Command was at- viously the offensive must be on a large
tempting to allay the doubts and fears enough scale to merit Communist asser-
of Syngman Rhee and his government tion of a military victory, yet on the
over the armistice, the Communists had other hand not so large as to threaten
not been idle. The disturbed state of the loss of more territory along the front
affairs behind the UNC lines offered the than the UNC was willing to sacrifice.
enemy an opportunity to reap psycho- As later developments showed, the prob-
logical and propaganda advantages by lems of when to launch the assault and
exploiting the differences. In addition, where to delimit it probably demanded
the winter lull in the fighting had en- much attention by enemy military plan-
abled the Communists to build up their ners in the spring of 1953.
stockpiles of ammunition and matériel
and to bring their combat units up to The Preliminaries
full strength despite the constant efforts
of the Fifth Air Force to interdict the During the month of April, while the
lines of communication. With a plenti- negotiators at Panmunjom were arrang-
ful supply of well-fed, well-equipped, ing the details for the exchange of the
and battle-hardened troops at their dis- sick and wounded and for the resump-
posal, the Communists were in a good tion of the plenary conferences, the
position to launch a military offensive tempo of operations had slackened. The
as well. If they could conclude the flurry of activity in March had been
fighting with a successful assault upon superseded by a return to the small-
the UNC lines, the general impression of scale probes and raids so characteristic
a Communist military victory in the war of the winter months. Seldom was an
might, in the eyes of the Asian commun- enemy attack mounted with more than
ity, be sustained. But there were dif- two companies; more often it was one or
ficulties that the enemy would have to less. Since April was the spring thaw
surmount if he determined to pursue period, the sloppy condition of the
such a course, particularly in timing the ground helped to restrict the scale of
offensive and in selecting the objectives. operations; the uncertain status of the
Unless the victory could be tied in negotiations was also a factor. Eighth
closely with the conclusion of the truce, Army intelligence reports estimated that
the Communist claims could be dis- the enemy would continue to employ the
counted. As for the seizing of terrain, active defense with the twenty-nine di-
the question was more complicated. Ob- visions available in or near the front line
460 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

and would not stage a general offen- tended to muzzle the antiaircraft fire in
sive in the near future.1 (See Maps VI that vicinity. Evidently the Commu-
and VII.) nists gunners could not be resupplied
For the U.N. Command the resump- quickly and once they had fired the
tion of the talks at Panmunjom had shells on hand were forced to sit and
some side effects, especially upon stra- watch the attacks helplessly.4
tegic air operations. General Weyland On 21 April naval force jet pilots
had intended to mount a high altitude, were given a chance to select their tar-
B-29 night attack upon the Yangsi tar- gets. The flyers on the U.S. carrier
get complex near the mouth of the Yalu Oriskany chose the Hamhung highway
River in mid-April and Clark gave his bridge in northeast Korea and suc-
personal approval on 12 April. But his ceeded in demolishing two spans and
superiors decided that since the sick and damaging a third in their attack. From
wounded prisoners were going to be as- the naval night fighter patrol along the
sembled in that general area for move- rail lines of northeastern Korea came an
ment to Panmunjom, the operation interesting report of two fighter flights
should be postponed. They did not wish chasing two fast-moving enemy trains in-
to give the Communists any excuse not to opposite ends of a short tunnel.
to go through with the prisoner ex- Shortly after the trains vanished from
change.2 Another attack, upon facilities sight there was a rush of steam and
at Koksan, fifty miles east of P'yongyang, smoke pouring from the mouth of the
was postponed for the same reason ten tunnel that indicated a probable col-
days later.3 lision and damage to both trains.5
In the matter of close air support, the With the completion of the sick and
negotiations played a less important wounded prisoner of war exchange and
role. Air Force, Navy, and Marine the initial plenary conferences at Pan-
fighters and fighter-bombers continued munjom, the main reasons for restrict-
to strike enemy troops and strongpoints ing the UNC air forces disappeared.
whenever opportunity arose. During Since the meetings showed that the
April, Navy and Marine pilots concen- Communists were not going to come to
trated on Cherokee-type missions terms quickly, Clark approved Wey-
against targets that were out of reach of land's request to increase the air
the artillery. They discovered that pressure upon the enemy by striking
making successive runs in the same sensitive targets in North Korea. On 10
area for several days allowed them to be- May, 8 Thunderjets bombed the Suiho
come familiar with the terrain and power plants again in the face of heavy
antiaircraft fire, but did not succeed in
1
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 55, pp. 19, knocking out the two generators still
30.
2
functioning. The attack on the Yangsi
(1) Msg, A 4390, FEAF to CINCFE, 11 Apr 53. complex, deferred by the prisoner trade,
(2) Msg, CX 61886, CINCFE to JCS, 122 Apr 53.
Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1- was staged on the night of 10-11 May
110, incls 1 and 3. (3) Msg, DA 936440, CSUSA
4
to CINCUNC, 14 Apr 53. COMNAVFE, Comd and Rpt, Apr 53, sec. 1-3,
3
Msg, CINCFE to CG AFFE, 24 Apr 53, in 1-10.
5
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-110, incl 10. Ibid., sec. 1-4, 1-5, 1-23.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 461

by 39 B-29's, and eight days later 18 two miles of highway and five highway
B-29's returned and dropped another bridges suffered the same fate. Build-
load of bombs on the area.6 ings, crops, and irrigation canals were
One of the most dramatic strikes of all swept away in the devastating tor-
the war came on 13 May. About twenty rent.
miles north of P'yongyang lay the big Elated by the success of the Toksan
Toksan irrigation dam with a three- mission, the Fifth Air Force followed
square-mile lake behind it. Air Force up on 15-16 May and breached another
planners had long realized that destruc- dam north of P'yongyang at Ch'osan,
tion of irrigation dams would have a thereby cutting a second railroad line
serious effect upon the rice crop of North and washing away three rail bridges. A
Korea, but humanitarian considerations third attempt to break through the dam
had argued against the bombing of such at Kuwonga, also north of P'yongyang,
targets. As the war progressed, how- on 21-22 May revealed that the enemy
ever, more and more of the rice crop was now ready to counter the attack. As
found its way into military and inter- soon as the B-29's dropped their loads,
national barter channels and this knowl- the Communists lowered the water level
edge decreased the objections against by twelve feet and reduced the water
destroying the dams. The Toksan dam pressure. A later raid forced the enemy
was an especially strategic target for it to drain the lake completely in order to
was close to the main Sinanju-P'yong- make repairs, so that although there was
yang rail line and to a major north- no flood damage, the reserve water sup-
south highway as well. Thus, 59 F-84 ply was dissipated. Both of the rail lines
Thunderjets of the 58th Fighter-Bomber north from P'yongyang were out of
Wing set out in four waves to eliminate commission until 26 May and this prob-
the dam on 13 May. The first 4 skip- ably placed a temporary strain upon
bombed the exposed face of the 2,300- the enemy's lines of communication.7
foot dam and a second 4 loosed their The Communists had learned their
bombs on the water side. Then 12 jets lesson by this time and efforts in June
raced along the length of the dam and to repeat the earlier success at Toksan
let go their loads. The fourth wave found the enemy quickly draining the
flew in close to the water side of the reservoirs under attack. The water was
dam and tried to use the hydraulic lost, but flood damage was averted.8
pressure caused by the bomb explosions Retaliation by the Communist air
to complete the task, but as the planes forces was always a possibility during
returned to their base, the dam still the last months of the war since Russian
held. Sometime during the night, how- jet bombers were made available to the
ever, the weakened dam succumbed to Chinese Communists. Yet no effort to
the pressure of the lake. Floodwaters strike back materialized. The enemy
poured forth and left a trail of havoc. carefully hoarded his air forces in the
Over six miles of rail lines and five rail
7
bridges were damaged or destroyed and (1) FEAF Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 1-6. (2)
Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea
6
Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, pp. 624ff.
8
1950-1953, p. 684. FEAF Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 3.
462 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Manchurian sanctuary as he had previ- Turkish Armed Forces Command under


ously and made no serious attempt to Brig. Gen. Sirri Acar on 5 May.10
challenge UNC domination of the Ko- Facing the Turkish forces were the
rean skies. three regiments—358th, 359th and
Instead the Communists adhered to 360th—of the 120th Division, CCF 46th
the type of pressure that had been ap- Army. Since the enemy seizure of Out-
plied so frequently in the past—the post RENO in March, the area had re-
ground assault. After a quiet first half mained quiet except for the customary
of May, the enemy launched a series of probes and patrols. But the Chinese
limited objective attacks ranging in capability of mounting a large-scale at-
strength from company to regimental tack upon Outposts VEGAS, ELKO, and
size; eighteen of these drives were of CARSON from RENO and other nearby
battalion size or larger. Despite the in- hills posed a constant threat that de-
crease in tempo at the front, there were manded constant vigilance.
still no indications that the Communists Tactically, possession of NEVADA com-
intended to broaden the scale of oper- plex by the enemy would mean
ations into a general offensive. Rather improved observation of the I Corps
they seemed to be concentrating upon main line of resistance positions that lay
winning dominating terrain features south and east of the outposts. Since I
along the line to improve their positions Corps regarded these defensive positions
both on the battlefield and at the truce as critical, the Turkish forces were in-
tents at Panmunjom. 9 structed to hold them against all enemy
The most ambitious enemy offensive attacks. This promised to be a difficult
came in the closing days of May in the task if the Chinese were determined to
U.S. I Corps sector. When the U.S. take the outposts, for the latter were at
25th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. a considerable distance from the main
Samuel T. Williams, had shifted over line of resistance and the enemy's ap-
to the I Corps in early May in exchange proach routes were easier than those of
for the U.S. 2d Division, it had promptly I Corps.
relieved the 1st Marine Division on the It was not until 25 May, after the U.N.
line. The new 25th Division sector was Command had made its final offer at
generally east of Panmunjom and north- the truce talks, that the Chinese artillery
east of Munsan-ni. On low hills, approx- began to open up on the NEVADA com-
imately ten miles northeast of Panmun- plex. For the next three days the shells
jom and the same distance north of came in with growing frequency and
Munsan-ni, lay a series of outposts enemy troop movements in the area in-
called the NEVADA complex. (See Map creased. General Acar secured artillery
8.) General Williams assigned the re- support from I Corps and the 1st Marine
sponsibility for the defense of these po- Division artillery, in addition to that
sitions and neighboring outposts, BER-
LIN and EAST BERLIN, to the attached 10
The following account is based upon: (1) Hq
Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 50-57; (2)
U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 18-28; (3)
U.S. 25th Div Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 9-10;
9
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 1, 8. (4) U.S. 14th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, May 53.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 463

which the 25th Division could provide, hand combat broke out in the trenches.
to counter the Communist concentra- Meanwhile the Chinese had added a
tions. From the 1st Marine Tank Bat- second battalion to the assault on CAR-
talion, 34 tanks rolled into position to SON and ELKO and closed upon the
funnel direct fire support to the out- Turkish positions. Bayonets and hand
posts. grenades were used freely as the Turks
When the first attack came on the managed to throw back the attack. The
evening of 28 May, the Turkish units battalion commander sent an engineer
defending the outposts were well dug in platoon, then committed the rest of the
and adequately armed. Barbed wire, engineer company to the defense of
trip flares, and mines were in place and CARSON. Shortly after midnight the
automatic weapons sited to cover the pace slackened, but observers reported
enemy approach routes. There were that a third enemy battalion was as-
140 men at VEGAS, 44 at CARSON, 33 at sembling to join in the assault. Fire
ELKO, 27 at BERLIN, and 16 at EAST support from the 1st Battalion of the
BERLIN. Turkish force and the U.S. 35th Infantry
On the heels of an intense artillery Regiment helped to disperse this rein-
and mortar preparation, the 120th Di- forcing enemy battalion.
vision sent four battalions forward—two As the night wore on, ELKO held out
to the east against the main objective, against continuing Chinese attacks, but
VEGAS, one to the south against CARSON the Turkish soldiers on CARSON were
and ELKO, and one in a diversionary at- dying one by one. A few managed to
tack against BERLIN and EAST BERLIN. slip over and join their comrades on
The last was halted and broken off early ELKO, but the majority died in the
in the evening. trenches and bunkers from enemy fire.
Over on VEGAS the Chinese suc- By morning CARSON belonged to the
ceeded in taking one small finger of the Chinese.
hill and clung tenaciously despite the Convinced of the Chinese determina-
heavy automatic weapons, small arms, tion to take the NEVADA outposts, Gen-
artillery, and mortar fire at them. The eral Williams placed the 1st Battalion of
Turks sent a reinforcing platoon in to the U.S. 14th Infantry Regiment under
bolster the defenders and it arrived in General Acar so that the latter could
time to help throw back a three-pronged commit his reserves to the counterattack.
enemy assault on the outpost. After re- Gradually the enemy gained control
organizing, the Chinese again sent a of the northwest portion of VEGAS and
force estimated at two battalions to take Turkish casualties were increasing. In
the position. Ammunition began to a desperate effort to blunt the Chinese
run low and the Turkish 2d Battalion drive, the Turks began a counterat-
commander sent another platoon accom- tack to clear the hill. Savage in-fighting
panied by Korean Service Corps person- followed as the Turks slowly swept the
nel to resupply the embattled troops. enemy off of VEGAS.
After a brief respite in the fighting, the Nothing daunted, the Chinese re-
enemy tried again and this time the grouped and reinforced their offensive
Chinese pushed through and hand-to- units, then came back again. They
464 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

edged their way up VEGAS and met the mortar, and automatic weapons fire,
indomitable Turks, who refused to be forced the enemy to break off the attack
budged. Late in the morning of 29 May, each time and ELKO remained in UNC
the Turks launched a four-platoon at- possession.
tack that cleared VEGAS with cold steel. By midafternoon, General Williams
But the enemy in turn would not accept and I Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Bruce
defeat and sent wave after wave of men C. Clarke evidently felt that the Chinese
against the Turkish stone wall, as cas- intended to remain on the offensive un-
ualties on both sides increased sharply. til the outposts were taken. The
The struggle for ELKO continued strength on VEGAS was down to 40-odd
throughout of the night of 28-29 May, men, many of them wounded, and to
as the enemy increased his pressure 20-odd on ELKO. Over 150 men had
against the remnants of the Turkish been killed and 245 had been wounded
force on the hill. General Acar ordered in the defense of the NEVADA complex.
Lt. Col. Carl E. Mann, the commander On the other hand, the Chinese casual-
of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, to ties were estimated roughly at 3,000
send one of his companies to reinforce men. The question was: Should the
ELKO and to retake CARSON on the U.N. Command hang on to the outposts
morning of 29 May. Company B ap- while the losses on both sides mounted,
proached ELKO from the southeast, over- or should the terrain be evacuated and
ran the Chinese holdings around the out- more UNC lives be conserved? Under the
post, and secured the objective after a circumstances the commanders decided
25-minute fight. that the outposts had served their main
Using two platoons in the attack and purpose in uncovering and delaying
two in the support roles, Company B the enemy attack. Early in the evening
then advanced west on CARSON. Midway of 29 May orders went out for the Turks
between ELKO and CARSON, the company to withdraw from VEGAS and for the
began to receive heavy automatic wea- U.S. troops to leave ELKO.
pons, artillery, and mortar fire, and the It had been a bitter struggle as the
assault slowed, then halted. Withdraw- losses on each side attested. Over 117,-
ing to ELKO, Company B tried twice to 000rounds of artillery fire and 67 close
gather momentum enough to break air support missions had aided the UNC
through the Chinese wall of fire on CAR- ground units in withstanding the de-
SON. Each time it failed and had to turn termined assaults of the Chinese. The
back. UNC artillery, mortars, and auto- enemy had sent 65,000 rounds of artil-
matic weapons could not silence the lery and mortar fire in return, up to
Chinese weapons nor dislodge the this point an unprecedented volume in
enemy defenders. the Korean War.
After the third assault ground to a The tenacity of the enemy attack fol-
halt, the Chinese retaliated. Six times lowing the submission of the UNC 25
they crossed from CARSON to ELKO and May proposal at Panmunjom indicated
on several occasions managed to advance that the Communists were beginning to
within hand grenade range. Company jockey for improved positions along the
B, stoutly supported by artillery, tank, front in anticipation of an armistice.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 465

Undeterred apparently by the casualties centrated. The enemy seized Hill 812,
incurred, the enemy now seemed ready four miles northeast of the Punchbowl,
to use personnel and carefully hoarded from the ROK 12th Division, U.S. X
supplies of ammunition with a free Corps, on 1 June and Anchor Hill on the
hand as the negotiations entered the ROK I Corps front three days later. De-
final phase. spite heavy ROK counterattacks, the
North Koreans accepted the casualties
The Tempo Mounts involved and continued to reinforce the
holding forces. In view of the growing
To General Taylor, as he watched toll of ROK losses, the U.N. Command
the enemy gather strength for offensive halted the attacks to regain Anchor Hill
action in the early days of June, the and sealed off Hill 812. By tying in all
weakest links in the Eighth Army line the positions abutting Hill 812 and then
lay in the U.S. I and IX Corps areas. As concentrating heavy artillery fire and
he pointed out to Clark on 2 June, the close air strikes on the 1,000-square-
UNC positions north of the Imjin and meter area held by the North Koreans
Hant'an Rivers had not been chosen atop the hill, the UNC reportedly forced
for their defensive strength. Relatively the enemy to use about seven battalions
shallow penetrations would force the during the period 7-15 June to main-
UNC to pull back behind the rivers and tain possession of this small piece of
the enemy had the capability to push terrain.12
the Eighth Army troops back if he de- Following the agreement on 8 June
sired to expend the effort. In this event, on the terms of reference for the ex-
Taylor continued, he would have to face change of prisoners, the Communists
the alternative of conceding the lost mounted their biggest drive since the
territory or of making costly counter- spring of 1951. Again the chief targets
attacks to regain the positions. Taylor of the enemy assault were the sectors
was ready for an offensive and had guarded by ROK forces. Beginning on
alerted the reserves, increased photo- 10 June the Communists shifted their
reconnaissance by the Fifth Air Force, offensive threats from the east flank to
and enlarged the stockage of ammuni- the ROK II Corps and western X Corps
tion, but the problem of how long the lines in the Eighth Army center.
Eighth Army should cling to present According to later reports, the enemy
battle lines in the face of intense pres- followed a customary pattern for the of-
sure remained to be settled.11 fensive. Before the attack, detailed
The Communists, however, did not plans were drawn up and carefully re-
choose to take advantage of the defen- hearsed on terrain similar to the con-
sive weaknesses of the Eighth Army in templated objectives. Before the actual
the west. Instead they began to attack assault, heavy concentrations of artillery
the eastern and central sectors of the and mortar fire saturated the objective,
line, where the ROK forces were con- then small forces moved up quickly to
carry out a frontal attack. Other units
11
Msg, G 5558 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 2 Jun 53,
12
in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jan-Jun (1) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 16. (2) U.S.
53. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 1-3.
466 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

joined in on the flanks of the objective For the first ten days of the month the
until the pressure caused a penetration enemy had been deceptively quiet on
or breakthrough. Once an advantage was the central front. Then, on the evening
won, the Communists would seek to ex- of 10 June, the artillery fire became in-
ploit it rapidly.13 tense and the Chinese followed up with
The enemy's objective was the bulge co-ordinated attacks ranging from a bat-
in the Eighth Army lines that began talion to a regiment in strength on the
roughly about 3 miles northeast of sector held by the ROK 5th Division.
Kumhwa, extended northeast to the Using elements of both the CCF 68th
hills south of Kumsong, leveled off to the and 60th Armies, the Communists be-
east for about 10 miles, then dipped to gan to build up the pressure. Smashing
the southeast for some 13 miles to the through the outposts, the Chinese seized
village of Mundung-ni, northwest of Hills 973 and 882, ten miles northwest
Heartbreak Ridge. Since the terrain of Heartbreak Ridge and part of the
was very rough, ranging from hills 400 main line of resistance.15 ROK II Corps
to 600 meters high in the west to some- quickly released the 22d Regiment of
what over 1,000 meters at the eastern the ROK 3d Division to the operational
end of the bulge, the ROK troops de- control of the ROK 5th Division to re-
fending the sector had great difficulty in dress the enemy inroads on 11 June.
maintaining lateral lines of communi- Elements of the ROK 35th Regiment
cation. Five ROK divisions manned po- counterattacked to recapture Hill 973,
sitions in the bulge, with the ROK Cap- but were only partially successful.
ital Division of the U.S. IX Corps on the Enemy units swiftly moved to the offen-
left flank, the 6th, 8th, and 5th Divisions sive again and forced the ROK troops to
of the ROK II Corps in the center, and pull back 1,000 meters south of Hill 973.
the ROK 20th Division of the U.S. X Two battalions of the 22d Regiment at-
Corps on the right. The ROK 3d Di- tempted to regain Hill 882 that same
vision was II Corps reserve. day and were able to approach the crest
Facing the ROK forces were three and dig in. Using the 22d, 27th, and 35th
Chinese armies. During the early days Regiments to launch counterattacks on
of June the enemy had brought in the 12 June, the ROK 5th Division was un-
CCF 68th Army and placed it between able to drive the Chinese off the hills.
the 60th and 67th Armies. In addition, Heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms
the Chinese had strengthened the 60th
UNC, the ROK 5th Division relieved the ROK 3d
Army by attaching to it the 33d Division. Division in the ROK II Corps area on 18 April
Thus, the enemy had available for the and the U.S. 40th Division relieved the ROK 20th
attack on the bulge four new divisions Division in the U.S. X Corps sector on 25 April.
Two days later the U.S. 2d Division had passed to
that had been training on a similar type the operational control of the U.S. IX Corps. On
of terrain in the rear.14 16 May the ROK 20th Division had relieved the
ROK 7th Division at the front in the U.S. X Corps
13
U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 34. area.
14 15
In addition to those already mentioned, the The account of the mid-June enemy attack is
following major deployment changes had taken based upon the following sources: (1) Hq Eighth
place prior to the outbreak of the June offensive. Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 36ff. (2) U.S. X
For the enemy the CCF 1st Army replaced the Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 4-8. (3) KMAG,
CCF 47th Army on the western front. For the Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 11ff.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 467

fire, coupled with the enemy's willing- Division, the ROK 20th Division of the
ness to reinforce his units and counter- U.S. X Corps, guarding the sector
attack the ROK assault forces, prevented known as Christmas Hill, four miles
the UNC troops from recouping their southeast of Hill 882, had also been sub-
terrain losses. jected to enemy attack. On 10 June two
The Chinese broadened the pressure enemy companies from the CCF 33d
upon the ROK II Corps on 12 June by Division captured a company outpost on
attacking elements of the ROK 8th Di- the approaches to Hill 1220, part of the
vision on the left flank of the ROK 5th Christmas Hill area. The ROK 61st
Division. In the Capitol Hill sector, six Regiment counterattacked, rewon, and
miles northwest of Hill 973, which was then relost the outpost. Further action
defended by the 21st Regiment, the to regain the position was suspended as
Communists used two companies ini- the gravity of the situation on the ROK
tially, reinforced later with three more, 5th Division front increased. When the
and penetrated first the outposts and Communists showed that they intended
then the main line positions of the regi- to retain possession of Hills 973 and 882,
ment. Two battalions of the ROK 10th which were located on the main ridge
Regiment moved up to counterattack leading to Hill 1220 from the west, the
early on the morning of 13 June, but X Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Isaac D.
were unable to restore the original line. White, moved up the ROK 7th Division,
Another enemy attack by an estimated the corps reserve, and placed it on the
two companies during the afternoon left flank of the ROK 20th Division.
forced the abandonment of a company While the ROK 7th Division was ad-
outpost and further withdrawal by the vancing north, the 61st Regiment made
ROK forces. several efforts to relieve some of the
The next morning the Chinese con- pressure on the ROK 5th Division. The
tinued the offensive, employing several Chinese reacted quickly and managed
companies to sustain pressure against to blunt each attack.
the 21st Regiment. Although the ROK On 14 June the CCF 33d Division
units fought off these drives, disaster renewed the offensive against the ROK
struck on the evening of 14 June. First 5th and ROK 20th Divisions and forced
a reinforced battalion enveloped the 3d the former to fall back south of the Puk-
Battalion of the 21st, causing it to break han River. This withdrawal exposed
up into small groups fighting independ- the flank of the ROK 7th Division,
ently to regain UNC lines. Two enemy which had just reached its defensive
companies then hit the main line posi- lines. Fortunately, the Chinese this time
tions of the 1st Battalion and forced it to failed to reorganize their attacking force
pull back. A third attack by a rein- quickly enough. X Corps artillery and
forced battalion succeeded in enveloping Fifth Air Force close air support were
the 2d Battalion. Assembling behind concentrated on the enemy units facing
the lines, the remnants of the 21st man- the ROK 5th Division while the ROK
aged to establish a new main line of re- 7th readjusted its front-line positions to
sistance that was to prove short-lived. tie in with the new ones established by
On the right flank of the ROK 5th the ROK 5th. On the other flank of the
468 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

5th, the ROK 8th Division also had to southeast of Finger Ridge, but did not
retreat over a mile to tie in its main line attempt to follow up the breakthrough.
of resistance with its sister division on By the evening of 16 June, enemy oper-
15 June. ations on the 8th Division front had be-
The two remaining regiments of the come sporadic.
ROK 3d Division were ordered on 15 During the next two days, the Chinese
June to assume responsibility for the sec- launched several minor assaults on the
tor east of the 8th Division along the ROK 20th and 8th Divisions, effect-
south bank of the Pukhan River, where ing slight penetrations. By 18 June
they served to strengthen the left flank the situation began to be stabilized and
of the ROK 5th. As the ROK 3d Divi- the Eighth Army had an opportunity to
sion took over its defensive positions, the survey the damage of the nine-day of-
ROK 22d Regiment reverted to the fensive.
control of its parent unit. At the same The enemy had driven the ROK
time the ROK 5th Division was at- forces back an average of 3,000 meters
tached to the X Corps, which became along a 13,000-meter front and in the
responsible for the ground east of the process had taken over a series of hill po-
Pukhan. The corps immediately made sitions east of the Pukhan River. As a
efforts to speed supplies and equipment result of the Chinese drive, three ROK
forward to the ROK 5th and to replace divisions had been redeployed in rein-
its personnel losses. Since lateral roads forcing and counterattacking roles.
were scarce, twelve H-19 helicopters During the action the ROK units had
were allocated to help out and they taken a total of over 7,300 casualties
lifted a quarter of a million pounds of while enemy losses were estimated at
material forward to the front. On 16 over 6,600. In close support of the
June the ROK 11th Division shifted UNC defense, Air Force, Navy, and Ma-
over from the ROK I Corps area to be- rine aircraft had flown 810 sorties in
come ROK II Corps reserve. the nine-day period and the strategic
The action tapered off during the air program had been delayed.
next few days. In the ROK 8th Divi- Elsewhere along the Eighth Army
sion territory west of the Pukhan on 16 front, the Chinese had mounted a series
June the enemy overran an outpost of of diversionary attacks on the U.S. IX
the ROK l0th Regiment on Finger Corps lines to keep the corps fully occu-
Ridge, two miles east of Capitol Hill, pied while the main offensive was in
but the Chinese units broke contact and progress. In the ROK 9th Division sec-
withdrew that evening. The ROK 21st tor, the 70th Division of the CCF 24th
Regiment repelled several company- Army launched a three-company drive
sized attacks during the day. Later, on 11 June at outposts on Sniper Ridge.
aided by the 19th Regiment of the ROK The next day 2 enemy companies pene-
6th Division, the 21st Regiment trated main line positions of the division
mounted a counterattack and the enemy four miles west of Sniper Ridge in the
pulled back. Two Chinese companies area known as Boomerang. During the
penetrated the main line positions of action the Chinese were reinforced with
the ROK 16th Regiment, 8th Division, several additional companies and the
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 469
ROK's brought up 6 infantry companies positions in the White Horse Hill area
and 1 tank company before the enemy the next day, using a force estimated at a
broke off the engagement. On the night battalion, but did not retain possession
of 13 June the Chinese committed 3 long. In the morning hours they pulled
battalions of the 70th Division in the back to their own lines.17
same sector and returned the following The U.S. I and ROK I Corps sectors
night with elements of 3 more battalions. were quiet during the big offensive,
On each occasion the enemy made no with only small unit actions, patrols,
effort to hold on to the terrain gained; and probes. After 18 June the whole
the Chinese withdrew before daylight Eighth Army front settled back to the
to their own lines. The three-day assault old pattern.
on Boomerang proved to be costly for It was on this same date that Syng-
the 70th Division for its casualties were man Rhee released the Korean nonre-
estimated at over 2,200 and close to patriates and introduced a new note of
2,000 of these were killed and tallied by uncertainty into the truce negotiations
the ROK forces.16 and into the course of military opera-
The U.S. 3d Division on the left flank tions as well. If the Communists had
of the ROK 9th also received its share of geared their offensive operations to co-
attention. On 10 June the CCF 74th Di- incide with the last days of the war, as
vision opened a succession of assaults some UNC officers believed, so that
against Outpost Harry, two-and-a-half they might reap the political and psy-
miles southeast of Jackson Heights. chological advantages of ending the long
Beginning with a company, the Chinese struggle on a high note, the ROK
added two battalions and penetrated Government's provocative action that
the position. Counterattack was fol- threatened to postpone the conclusion
lowed by counterattack with the U.S. of the armistice must have been discon-
forces emerging on top on the morning certing.18 If the cease-fire were unduly
of 11 June. The enemy came back with delayed, the June effort by the Commu-
an estimated regiment that night and nists might well become ancient history
the pattern of the preceding encounter and the enemy might have to mount
was repeated. There was a small-scale another offensive close to the end of the
probe on 14 June and then a two- war. Thus, the possibility existed that
battalion assault on 18 June, but the end the fighting might flare up again later
result was the same. The 3d Division on.
estimated that the Communist efforts to Since the ROK Army had been the
take Harry had cost over 4,200 casual- chief target of the recent enemy attack
ties during the nine-day period. and might also have to bear the brunt
Over in the Arrowhead (Hill 281) of future Communist pressure, the ques-
sector, five to six miles northwest of tion of its efficiency and reliability under
Ch'orwon, the ROK 2d Division experi- fire was of considerable significance.
enced a company-sized attack on 11 During the course of the enemy assault,
June. The enemy took three outpost 17
Ibid., pp. 3-6.
18
See U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp.
16
U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 8-10. 31-32.
470 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the Korean Military Advisory Group moot question, but there could be little
personnel had ample opportunity to ob- doubt about their improvement.
serve the progress of the ROK Army
under heavy enemy attacks. They con- Final Test
cluded that the size and intensity of the
Chinese assault accounted for the initial The brief respite on the battlefield
enemy successes in the battle. Although ended on 24 June and the Communists
hard hit, in many cases ROK units had disclosed their decision to devote special
continued to fight and had inflicted attention to the ROK divisions along
many casualties upon the foe. When the front. Concentrating on the eastern
pressure had increased, they had and central sector of the line, they evi-
promptly taken up blocking positions denced their intention to demonstrate
behind the line to stem further ad- to the South Koreans that continuation
vances. On the other side of the ledger, of the war would be a costly business.
KMAG reported, there was a tendency First to feel the effects of the resump-
among ROK officers to depend too tion of operations was the ROK 9th
heavily upon one type of communica- Division. In the Boomerang area, north-
tion. When this broke down, units often west of Kumhwa, the CCF 70th Division
lost contact with their companion and sent two separate company-sized attacks
supporting forces, making co-ordination against the main line positions of the
between them difficult or impossible. ROK 29th Regiment and then rapidly
The question of "face" continued to reinforced them to battalion size during
play an important role in the ROK the night of 24-26 June. The ROK
Army, KMAG went on, since officers forces fought off these attempts to pierce
delayed informing their superiors their lines until the Chinese broke off
quickly and fully about unfavorable de- the fight and withdrew, carrying an esti-
velopments that might cause the officers mated 700 casualties with them. In the
to lose face. Thirdly, the ROK leaders Sniper Ridge area, the ROK defenders
frequently placed too much reliance were less successful. A reinforced
upon artillery fire when small arms and Chinese company drove them from an
mortar fire would be more appropriate. outpost and refused to be ejected in
KMAG reported that it was attempting turn. On 25 June the Chinese tried
to remedy these defects immediately.19 again to seize a neighboring outpost, but
Despite the deficiencies, the ROK the ROK troops clung tenaciously to
Army appeared to be far more mature their positions despite the loss of over
and effective than it had been during 240 dead and wounded. In repulsing the
the spring of 1951 under comparable Communist drive, the 29th Regiment
conditions. The training and experi- estimated that the Chinese casualties
ence acquired in the interim were begin- were more than double their own.20
ning to pay off. Whether or not the Southeast of the confluence of the
ROK forces could stand by themselves Imjin and Yokkok Rivers in the U.S. I
against an all-out offensive was still a Corps sector lay a series of outposts

19 20
KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 17. U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 10-12.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 471

manned by the ROK 1st Division. The voiced his objections to the practice of
increase in vehicle traffic and in artillery attempting to cling unyieldingly to iso-
fire from the enemy in front of these lated points far in front of the main line
outposts warned the I Corps that the of resistance. The garrison could not be
Chinese were preparing for an offen- reinforced easily because of the distance
sive late in June but gave no indication and terrain between the outposts and
of the scale. On 25 June elements of two the main line, whereas the enemy's task
regiments of the 7th Division of the was much simpler. Once the enemy
CCF 1st Army, supported by heavy ar- closed in, artillery, mortar, and air
tillery fire, struck the outposts on Bak, strikes were of little value because of
Hannah, and Hill 179 and mounted the danger of hitting friendly forces.
diversionary attacks against five other Under conditions like these, the out-
strongpoints. The ROK 1st Division re- come could only be a high cost of casual-
ceived orders from the U.S. I Corps to ties far above the worth of the outposts,
hold on despite the strength of the of- Clarke declared.21
fensive units, and artillery fire started Over on the ROK II Corps-U.S. X
to interdict the enemy lines of approach Corps front the quiescent period had
to the defensive positions. Gradually been spent in reorganizing the battered
the Chinese pushed their way into the ROK 5th Division. By 26 June the ROK
trenches and bunkers where bitter hand- 5th was adjudged ready for action once
to-hand combat broke out. Grenades again and control of the division was
flew back and forth. Bit by bit the returned to the ROK II Corps. In the
ROK troops were forced to pull back meantime the ROK 7th Division had
until the enemy won the crests of the taken over the ROK 20th Division's po-
hills. By the morning of 26 June the sitions on the right flank of the ROK
Chinese were in possession of Bak, Han- 5th.22
nah, and Hill 179. The ROK 12th Regi- During the night of 26 June the 179th
ment moved up to reinforce the ROK Division of the CCF 60th Army dis-
15th, which had borne the brunt of the patched one regiment against elements
battle, and they launched two battalion- of the ROK 5th east of the Pukhan River
sized drives on Bak on 26 June and one and a second regiment against units of
on Hill 179 on 27 June. Neither was the ROK 7th Division on the main ridge
able to regain the outposts. leading to Hill 1220. Heavy artillery
The Chinese moved forward against and mortar fire accompanied the at-
nearby Outpost Queen on 28 June and tacks and the Chinese pressed on vigor-
penetrated ROK positions on this hill. ously despite a staunch defense by both
Counterattacks against the determined ROK divisions. As the ROK 5th stub-
Chinese forces on Queen, Hill 179, and bornly gave ground and retreated to the
Bak on the same day were all repulsed. next terrain line, the ROK 7th also had
When the I Corps commander, General to pull back to protect its left flank. The
Clarke, broke off the efforts to retake the Chinese pressed on and managed to pen-
lost outposts on 29 June, the enemy re- etrate the ROK 7th's positions on Hill
mained in control. 21
U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 10-12, 29.
After the action General Clarke 22
U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 6.
472 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

938 just northwest of Hill 1220. For Regimental Combat Team from the IX
several days the ROK 7th counterat- Corps on 1 July. While the X Corps
tacked to regain Hill 938, but the enemy was shifting its forces the action on the
refused to yield possession. The Chi- corps front fortunately subsided to a
nese held the hill with a small force and level that did not interfere with the re-
permitted the ROK troops to move in, deployment.
then directed heavy artillery and mortar To bolster the rear areas and the se-
fire on the area and counterattacked in curity of the prisoner of war camps,
mass. After several experiences along Clark in late June ordered the 24th
this line and study of the growing list Infantry Division, under Maj. Gen.
of ROK casualties, Lt. Gen. Isaac D. Charles L. Dasher, Jr., to prepare for a
White, the corps commander, shifted temporary move from Japan to Korea.
to a policy of containment on 3 July. Moving by air and water the 34th Regi-
Terrain to the rear was readied for de- mental Combat Team ( —) arrived in
fense and helicopters rushed up mate- the Korean Communications Zone on 3
rials and ammunition to prepare the July; the 19th Infantry Regiment fol-
new fortifications for further attacks. lowed on 11 July; and the 21stInfantry
The Chinese made two attempts on 4 unloaded at Pusan on 12 July.24
July to move in closer to Hill 1220, but In the first days of July the Commu-
the ROK 7th fought off both of these nists carried out few attacks in strength,
assaults.23 but the Eighth Army had no illusions
The intensification of enemy opera- about the future. Reports of troop
tions and the reports from intelligence movements, heavy traffic, and stockpil-
sources that the enemy intended to ing behind the enemy lines alerted all
launch a major offensive in the ROK commanders that the Communists were
II Corps-U.S. X Corps sectors, with the preparing to strike again in force. En-
Hwach'on Reservoir as the objective, led emy counterreconnaissance screens made
General White to redeploy his forces in it difficult to ascertain how much
an effort to buttress the right flank of the strength the Chinese were massing, but
ROK II Corps. Beginning on 1 July he the concentrations were greatest on the
sent the U.S. 45th Division westward to central front around Kumsong.25
relieve the ROK 20th and one regiment The first offensive, however, came in
of the ROK 7th Division. The latter the Ch'orwon rather than in the Kum-
became responsible for a smaller seg- song sector. On 6 July elements of the
ment of the front and was placed under CCF 73d Division attacked through the
the ROK II Corps. On 10 July the ROK defensive positions of the CCF 69th
20th Division relieved the U.S. 40th Di- Division and struck two ROK 2d Divi-
vision in the Heartbreak Ridge area and sion outposts on Arrowhead. For over
the 40th Division displaced west to thirty hours the defenders had to repel
strengthen the right flank of the 45th the Chinese forces, often at close range.
Division. The X Corps was also rein- The Communists drew back on 8 July
forced by the movement of the U.S. 5th to regroup, but that night they returned
23 24
(1) Ibid., pp. 7-8. (2) U.S. X Corps, Comd U.S. 24th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 1-8.
25
Rpt, Jul 53, p. 3. Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 25-26.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 473

in the wake of 6,500 rounds of artillery vious intent to hold on to the outpost on
and mortar fire, and won possession of Porkchop outweighed the tactical value
the north slope of one of the ridges. of UNC retention of the position. The
A ROK counterattack on 9 July failed Eighth Army commander believed that
to oust them and action became inter- the withdrawal should be carried out
mittent. Early on 11 July, two ROK by night, but the 7th Division G-2, who
companies, in a fight lasting almost three had recommended the move, pointed
hours, forced the Chinese to pull back. out that the Chinese were accustomed
During the battles for Arrowhead the to the daily sight of armored personnel
ROK commander rotated his assault carriers taking ammunition and sup-
troops. In the 11 July encounter he used plies to the troops on the hill. Since the
four battalions to exert maximum pres- carriers were inclosed, the G-2 went on,
sure and to provide a continuous flow of the enemy had no way of knowing what
fresh troops. The six-day struggle for they contained. A daylight evacuation
Arrowhead caused over 500 casualties for using the carriers would avoid the haz-
the ROK 2d Division while the esti- ards of a night operation and would
mated Chinese losses were slightly over keep the Chinese in the dark to boot, he
750.26 concluded. After hearing these argu-
In the Porkchop Hill area, the U.S. ments, General Taylor agreed.27
7th Division met an attack from its op- On the afternoon of 11 July, after the
posite number in the Chinese Army on carriers moved up over the usual route,
6 July. An unknown number of enemy the troops climbed aboard and rode
soldiers fought their way up the slopes back without incident. From intelli-
of Porkchop and took up squatter's gence sources the I Corps later learned
rights on a part of the crest. The 17th that the Chinese had thought that the
Regiment quickly reinforced its defend- vehicles were moving forward to support
ers at the outpost with two additional another attack rather than a withdrawal.
companies. On the night of 7-8 July When nearly two days after the evacua-
the U.S. troops launched two counterat- tion they realized what had happened
tacks to drive the Chinese from the crest and advanced to occupy the hill, they
with no success. The enemy struck back were hit with all the artillery at the
on the next evening and the U.S. 7th disposal of the 7th Division and had to
Division tried to counterattack again on contend with a great number of booby
9 July, but neither could dislodge the traps as well.28
other. On the following day the Chinese The resumption of armistice negotia-
executed a series of assaults, ranging tions at Panmunjom on 10 July and the
from company to battalion size, which apparent pacification of Syngman Rhee
the U.S. forces again withstood. during early July provided an incentive
Generals Taylor, Clarke, and Tru- for the last Communist offensive. With
deau, the army, corps, and division com- the end of hostilities at long last in sight,
manders respectively, conferred on the
night of 10 July and decided that the 27
Interv of author with Col Leonard G. Robin-
Chinese disregard for casualties and ob- son, 6 December 1960. Colonel Robinson was G-2
of the 7th Division at that time.
26 28
U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 2, 27, 28. U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 23-24.
474 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the enemy was faced with its final oppor- Sniper Ridge sector—long a bone of con-
tunity to give the world a convincing tention—friendly forces had to pull back
display of Communist military might; to avoid being cut off. Throughout the
to teach the upstart ROK forces another night the pressure continued, with huge
lesson; and to improve defensive terrain expenditures of artillery and mortar fire
positions in the bargain. The June offen- from both sides.30
sive had accomplished these aims to In the ROK 6th Division area adja-
some degree, but much of the Kumsong cent to the Capital Division, four battal-
salient still remained.29 Furthermore, ions from the 204th Division of the CCF
the ROKA units had bent but not bro- 68th Army hit a company-sized outpost
ken under the Communist assault; per- of the ROK 19th Regiment. By the
haps this time the Chinese might really morning of 14 July, they had penetrated
give them a trouncing. the main line positions of the regiment
By evening of 13 July the Communists and surrounded one friendly battalion.
had moved elements of five Chinese ar- Elements of the 204th Division moved
mies into attack and support positions through the ROK 6th Division sector
along the central sector that encom- and then swung to the west and joined
passed the Kumsong salient. Facing in the attack upon the Capital Division.31
them from west to east lay the ROK To the east the Chinese on 13 July
9th and Capital Divisions of the U.S. IX sent four companies to surround an out-
Corps and the ROK 6th, 8th, 3d, and post in the ROK 8th Division lines and
5th Divisions of the ROK II Corps. a battalion against a company outpost in
The increase in the tempo of artillery the ROK 3d Division area on the right
and mortar fire on 13 July corroborated shoulder of the Kumsong salient. They
earlier intelligence reports from pris- also attacked the ROK 5th and 7th Di-
oners, deserters, agents, and reconnais- visions to keep them occupied while the
sance that the Communists were about main assault was in progress.
to launch a major drive aimed primarily By the morning of 14 July the pattern
at ROK units on the central front. After of the Communist offensive attack had
darkness descended, the Chinese forces developed as the enemy increased the
moved forward en masse. A reinforced weight of his pressure upon the ROK
regiment from the 72d Division of the 3d Division. Battalion and two-battalion
CCF 24th Army struck the ROK 9th attacks accompanied by heavy artillery
Division's right flank while the 203d and mortar support broke through the
Division of the CCF 68th Army smashed ROK 3d outpost system and drove into
into the ROK Capital Division guarding the main line positions. The 22d and
the left shoulder of the Kumsong bulge. 23d Regiments received assault after as-
Friendly outposts were overrun as wave sault, but with the aid of the 18th Regi-
after wave of Chinese joined the assault.
30
By midnight, enemy units had pene- U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 3-4,
trated the main line of resistance up to 30-32.
31
The account of the July offensive is based on
1,000 meters in some places. In the the following sources: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd
Rpt, Jul 53; (2) U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53;
29
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 25- (3) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jul 53; (4) G-3 Opns Jnls,
26. 13-20 Jul 53.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 475

merit in blocking positions managed to structions, however, the ROK command-


hold on. Then four enemy companies ers lost contact with and control of some
filtered in through the adjacent ROK of their units, with the result that many
5th Division sector and swung in be- of them did not stop at the Kumsong
hind the 23d Regiment. When the in- line. Instead they continued to retreat
dication of a double envelopment farther south replacing the bulge with
became apparent, the ROK 3d began a sag in the Eighth Army lines.
to pull back. The intensity and determination of
As the Chinese pierced the ROK lines the Chinese offensive impressed Clark
along the central front and cut off units and Taylor to the point that they de-
from their parent organizations, the sit- cided to fly reinforcements from Japan
uation became confused. Soldiers from to Korea to bolster the front. The U.S.
the 6th, 8th, and Capital Divisions found 187th Airborne RCT was rushed to
themselves defending strongpoints to- Korea and on 14 July Taylor attached
gether. Lateral and front-to-rear lines the unit to the U.S. 2d Division. The
of communications were soon out of com- latter took over the U.S. 3d Division's
mission and radio and foot messengers positions, and the airborne troops re-
became the chief means of sending and lieved elements of the ROK 9th Divi-
receiving instructions and information. sion, permitting the ROK's to narrow
Sister regiments were often out of con- their front and to strengthen the left
tact and unaware of what the other was flank of the retreating Capital Division.
doing. Reports trickling in from the In the meantime, the U.S. 3d Division
front were often delayed and usually shifted over into blocking positions be-
incomplete as the ROKA commanders hind the Capital Division to stem the
displayed their customary unwillingness enemy advance. As the Capital's units
to forward unfavorable news that would fell back, they passed through the 3d
cause them to lose face. Division and were reorganized and re-
Despite the lack of details, it was ap- habilitated in the rear. On 15 July the
parent after the first day of the Chinese 3d took over responsibility for the Capi-
assault that the enemy's use of major tal Division's sector and assumed oper-
elements of six divisions had made seri- ational control of the division.
ous inroads in the ROK Capital and 3d In the ROK II Corps area, Taylor
Divisions' sectors. Since these guarded released the ROK 11th Division to the
the shoulders of the salient, the ROK corps commander, Lt. Gen. Chung Il
6th and 8th Divisions were in danger of Kwon, who dispatched the division for-
having their flanks exposed to a double ward to relieve the ROK 3d Division.
envelopment. General Taylor, there- The ROK 6th Division was also with-
fore, on 14 July ordered the ROK Capi- drawn from the line and, along with the
tal, 6th, 8th, 3d, and 5th Divisions to ROK 3d, was reorganized and recon-
fall back south of the Kumsong River stituted. Thus, on 15 July, the Eighth
line at the base of the bulge. This would Army had the ROK 9th, the U.S. 3d
straighten out the defensive line and with the remnants of the Capital Divi-
shorten the front to be covered. In the sion, the ROK 11th, 8th, and 5th Divi-
process of complying with Taylor's in- sions on the front lines from west to
476 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

east to check the Communist offensive. loudly claimed military victory for its
On 16 July the ROK II Corps received side. On the other hand, the price that
orders to counterattack and restore the the enemy had paid to sustain a major
Kumsong River line. The enemy offen- drive was extremely high; the Eighth
sive had slowed by this time and the Army estimated that over 28,000 casual-
Chinese were engaged in the involved ties had been inflicted upon the Chinese
task of organizing the defense of the during their breakthrough and its after-
terrain they had taken and in re- math.32
placing the heavy casualties they While the ROK II Corps was carrying
had suffered in breaking through the out its counteroffensive, the Communists
ROKA positions. exerted pressure upon several scattered
The ROK 11th, 8th, and 5th Divi- points along the Eighth Army line in an
sions, attacking abreast, launched the effort to take long-contested hills and
counteroffensive the same day. Against outposts prior to the signing of an armi-
variable enemy opposition they edged stice. The reasons behind this pressure
forward toward the Kumsong River east were difficult to fathom, since all of the
of Kumhwa. Between 16-19 July the threatened points fell in the demilita-
three divisions, with the 6th, 3d, and rized zone and would have to be aban-
7th ROK Divisions in blocking positions doned by the UNC forces anyway. As it
in reserve, attained the high ground turned out, the Communists had to sur-
south of the river. On 19 July the ROK render possession of their new gains
6th Division passed through the 5th Di- shortly thereafter.
vision and assumed responsibility for its The operations along the front dur-
sector. Efforts to cross the river and take ing the last week of the Korean War
defensive positions on the north bank of subsided again to small-scale probes and
the Kumsong met with increasing enemy patrols, as each side now anticipated that
resistance and were abandoned after 20 the armistice soon would be signed.
July. For the last week of the war the
ROK II Corps held the Kumsong River The Tally Sheet
line against minor enemy pressure.
Despite the gains of the counteroffen- A recapitulation of enemy activity in
sive, the Chinese had removed the Kum- the final months might prove helpful in
song salient and straightened out their assessing the military situation when
lines on the central front. Their pene- hostilities ended.33 (Map VIII)
tration had been approximately six The close relationship between the
miles and the weight of their assault had Communist military operations and the
cut off and disorganized many of the truce negotiations at Panmunjom were
ROKA units facing them. It had taken apparent through the April-July period.
nine ROK and U.S. divisions in blocking As the two sides moved toward settle-
and counterattacking roles to halt the 32
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 17,
Communist advance and to regain some 51,33 58.
of the lost terrain. The enemy offensive The statistics in the following section have
been extracted from the Headquarters, Eighth
had also provided additional grist for Army, Command Reports, for April, May, June,
the Communist propaganda mill, which and July 1953.
THE LAST OFFENSIVE 477

ment, the intensity of the enemy's oper- Of some significance was the fact that
ations varied according to the prospects the enemy used Chinese rather than
for reaching final agreement. Beginning North Korean troops during most of the
in late March, the Communists assumed important attacks and that the bulk of
an increasingly offensive attitude at the the offense was directed against the
front and displayed a willingness to em- ROK forces. It suggested that the Com-
ploy their forces more lavishly than they munists desired to improve the relative
had in the past. strength of the North Korean and ROK
While the negotiations dragged in late forces prior to the truce. If this were
April and early May, the tempo of en- their hope, they were doomed to disap-
emy action slackened again. In the clos- pointment, for despite the losses of the
ing days of May, after the 25 May UNC period, the ROK ground forces rose
proposal, which seemed to offer the pos- from 537,350 at the end of March to
sibility of a truce within the near future, 590,911 at the close of July, while the
the Communist attacks commenced to North Korean ground forces remained
pick up impetus once again. The agree- close to 260,000 during the four-month
ment on prisoners of war on 8 June was span.35
followed by the large-scale assaults of The following table of casualties and
10-17 June which succeeded in attaining artillery expenditures serves to depict
better terrain positions, cowing the more graphically the intensification of
growing ROK opposition to the armi- combat activity between April and July:
stice, and providing the Communists
with a propaganda mantle of military
victory.
The dramatic release of the Korean
nonrepatriates by Syngman Rhee on 18
June reintroduced the elements of un-
certainty into the situation and ground
operations again declined until the truce
meetings resumed on 10 July. Then,
in their largest offensive since the spring a
Highest total during the Korean War.
of 1951, the Communists sought to re-
peat the June objectives on a more The Communists established two ar-
grandiose scale. tillery records for themselves in July,
As Clark later commented: "There is the highest total for any month and the
no doubt in my mind that one of the highest total for a ten-day period—
principal reasons—if not the one reason 197,550 rounds during the 11-20 July
—for the Communist offensive was to span. The freedom with which enemy
give the ROK's a 'bloody nose,' to show troops expended artillery and mortar
them and the world that 'PUK CHIN'—
Go North—was easier said than done." 34
35
The ROK totals includes ROKA combat, serv-
34
General Mark W. Clark, "The Truth About ice, and security troops, KATUSA, and the ROK
Korea," Collier's, vol. 133, No. 5 (March 5, 1954), marines while the North Korean figures include
p. 48. combat, security, and support troops.
478 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

shells demonstrated clearly that their quately clothed. The enemy transporta-
supply situation had improved greatly tion and communications systems had
and that they were willing to fire the been continually bombed and harassed
rounds necessary to support their at- during the conflict, but the prodigious
tacks. Even after the drains of June and use of manpower, on the one hand, and
July, there were no shortages of ammu- camouflage, deception, and subterfuge,
nition except on a local basis. on the other, had permitted the Com-
Thus, at the close of the shooting war munists to maintain their forces at the
the Communists were in fairly good con- front and to create stockpiles as well.
dition, militarily speaking. Despite the The enemy armies were in a position to
large personnel losses of June and July, continue the limited type of warfare of
there were over a million Chinese and the 1951-53 period for a considerable
North Korean soldiers under arms in length of time if the need had arisen.
Korea. They were eating three meals Fortunately, the developments at Pan-
a day as compared to two during the munjom during July obviated this even-
earlier stages of the war and were ade- tuality, at least for the nonce.
CHAPTER XXII

Finale
Amid rumbles of ROK discontent and Panmunjom, he asked his superiors in
the mounting roar of Communist can- Washington for confirmation of the
non warning of the impending offensive power granted him in late June to ter-
at the front, the plenary session of the minate the conflict with or without as-
truce conference reconvened at Panmun- surances of co-operation from the ROK
jom on 10 July. The ominous signs in Government. The reply on 8 July reaf-
the background were offset somewhat by firmed his authority but, at the same
the simple fact that the enemy was will- time, cautioned him against implying to
ing to resume the armistice discussions. the Communists that the UNC would
After the ROK President had effected employ force to insure ROK compli-
the release of the Korean nonrepatriate ance with an armistice.1
prisoners, the Communists might well Since the U.N. Command could not
have broken off the talks completely on guarantee that it would use force if nec-
the grounds that the U.N. Command essary to prevent the ROK forces from
had not kept faith with the tentative violating the truce, Clark approached
understandings already reached. Never- the question from another direction. On
theless, they had returned. Whether 9 July he suggested to the JCS that if
they now intended to use the negotia- Harrison were pressed by the Commu-
tions as a forum for their complaints on nists, the senior delegate might inform
this score or earnestly desired to con- them that the UNC would immediately
clude the arrangements for a cease-fire withdraw all logistical and military sup-
could not be presaged, but at least the port from any ROKA unit that sought to
possibility of a settlement had not been contravene the armistice through aggres-
entirely ruled out. If the Communists sive action. General Collins quickly ad-
proved to be seriously interested in fin- vised him that the State Department
ishing the military phase of their Korean objected to such a commitment since it
experiment, the chief task of the United would restrict Clark's freedom of ac-
Nations Command delegation might tion.2 Thus, on the eve of the resump-
well be to allay the misgivings of the
enemy over the future conduct of the 1
government of Syngman Rhee. (1) Msg, CX 63548, CINCUNC to JCS, 8 Jul
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app.
1-143, incl 12. (2) Msg, DA 943508, CSUSA to
Assurances and Reassurances CINCFE, 8 Jul 53.
2
(1) Msg, CX 63567, CINCUNC to JCS, 9 Jul 53,
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,
General Clark was well aware of the 1-143, incl 12. (2) Msg, DA 943508, CSUSA to
problem. Before the truce teams met at CINCFE, 9 Jul 53.
480 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

tion of plenary sessions, Clark and the inescapable responsibility for put-
Harrison found themselves in an awk- ting forward concrete and effective
ward situation. The only answers that measures in regard to the various ques-
they could offer to the specific and tions mentioned above and putting
pointed questions certain to be posed by them into effect," he concluded.
the enemy would have to be phrased in In his reply Harrison could only state:
vague and general terms.
The first plenary conference exposed We assume that Republic of Korea
the weakness of the UNC position.3 In Forces presently under the command of the
his opening statement Nam Il harked United Nations Command will remain so
after an armistice and that they will carry
back to Clark's letter on 29 June to Kim out the instructions of the United Nations
and Peng. He wanted to know what Command and withdraw from the part of
steps had been taken to recapture the the demilitarized zone in which they are
prisoners released by Rhee and what now deploying in accordance with the
measures had been adopted to prevent Armistice Agreement.
As stated in General Clark's letter of 29
further moves by the ROK Government June, the United Nations Command will
in the same vein. Did the armistice in- make every effort to abide by the provisions
clude the ROK Government and Army, of the Armistice Agreement. We cannot
he went on, and what guarantees could guarantee that the Republic of Korea
the UNC provide to insure that the Government will lend full support to it,
but the United Nations Command shall
South Korean forces would abide by its continue to do everything within our power
terms? In view of the inflammatory to cause them to cooperate.
statements made by Rhee against both
the personnel of the United Nations Harrison went on to promise police
Commissions and the Communist side, protection for the members of commis-
how could the UNC protect these people sions and Red Cross teams to insure their
in the pursuit of their postarmistice re- safety. Then, using the risk factor pre-
sponsibilities, Nam continued. "If an sented by ROK opposition, he took the
armistice does not include the South Ko- opportunity to bring up the suggestion
rean Government and Army, the war in that all the nonrepatriate prisoners be
Korea will not actually stop even if the moved to the demilitarized zone and
representatives of the United Nations turned over to the Neutral Nations Re-
Command undertake to sign the Korean patriation Commission. Although this
Armistice. . . . Therefore, in order to would impose heavy logistical burdens
insure that the Armistice Agreement upon the U.N. Command, Harrison de-
can become truly effective, your side has clared that the commission personnel
3
The composition of the delegations had not could operate unmolested in the demili-
changed since the last meeting on 20 June, but tarized zone. Possibly this matter could
two of the delegates were relatively new. Maj. be handled after the armistice through
Gen. Kim Dong Hak of the North Korean Army
had replaced Rear Adm. Kim Won Mu on 17 June
the Military Armistice Commission, he
4
and Maj. Gen. George G. Finch, USAF, had replaced said.
General Glenn. General Choi of the ROK Army did
4
not attend the meetings after 16 May. General Finch Transcript of Proceedings, 151st Session, Mil
had been a lawyer and had organized the first Air Armistice Conf, 10 Jul 53, in FEC Min Delegates
National Guard wing in 1946. Mtgs, vol. VII.
FINALE 481

While the Communists studied the He did, however, inject into the record
UNC statements, Harrison and Clark the general declaration proposed by the
sought to strengthen their position at State-Defense group the day before.
the conference. Harrison had been en- But the enemy delegates wanted more;
couraged by the attitude of the enemy they insisted that the commanders on
delegation during the meeting. The each side should order and enforce the
questions asked by the Communists had complete cessation of hostilities by all
been logical and pertinent and their be- units under their control.6
havior was calm, matter of fact, and not The inability of the U.N. Command
aggressive, he reported. In view of the to relieve adequately the Communists'
reasonable approach of the Communists, doubts about the future conduct of the
both he and Clark felt that they should ROK armed forces led Clark to cast
offer more concrete assurances at the about for another expedient. He found
next meeting. If the ROK forces should one in the Rhee letter of 9 July to Rob-
violate the armistice, they thought that ertson wherein the ROK President
the enemy was entitled to know where stated that he would not obstruct the
the UNC would stand. The policy mak- truce. But Robertson pointed out that
ers in Washington, however, were still he had agreed not to release this letter
unwilling to be too specific. After con- publicly pending further negotiations.
sultation with Defense and State Depart- On the other hand, Robertson saw no
ment representatives, the JCS informed reason why Harrison could not tell the
Clark that although he had the power to Communists that suitable assurances had
withdraw logistical support from the been received from the ROK Govern-
ROK forces, they preferred that a more ment that it would work during the post-
general answer be offered to the enemy. hostilities period in close collaboration
They suggested the following response: with the UNC for common objectives.7
"The UNC will not give support during On 12 July Harrison passed this in-
any aggressive action of units of ROKA formation on to the Communist delega-
in violation of the armistice. In saying tion and told them that the UNC, which
this we do not imply that we believe included the ROK forces, was prepared
any such violation to be probable." 5 to carry out the terms of the truce. After
At the 11 July meeting the Commu- a recess, Nam commented that while the
nists dismissed the UNC statements of UNC statement was "very good" and
the previous day as "full of contradic- "helpful," it still was not quite enough.
tions" and "not satisfactory." Nam The rest of the session witnessed a series
pressed again for definite "yes" or "no" of thrusts and parries, with the enemy
answers to his queries without success. pressing for definite pledges and the
In responding, Harrison pointed out the UNC shunting aside the demands and
measures adopted by a side to fulfil its 6
armistice obligations were internal mat- Transcript of Proceedings, 152d Session, Mil
Armistice Conf, 11 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates
ters to be determined by that side alone. Mtgs, vol. VII.
7
(1) Msg, CX 63627, Clark to JCS, 11 Jul 53,
5
(1) Msg, CX 63583, Clark to Collins, 10 Jul 53, DA-IN 286476. (2) Msg, CX 63635, CINCUNC to
DA-IN 285965. (2) Msg, JCS 943567, JCS to CINCUNC (Adv), 12 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd
CINCUNC, 10 Jul 53. Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incl 29.
482 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

standing pat on the general assurances militarized zone. It would guarantee the
already given.8 safety of the personnel connected with
To assess whether the Communists the various commissions and of the Com-
were genuinely worried about the ROK munists engaged in carrying out post-
threats at this point or had simply de- armistice duties in South Korea. If the
cided to delay a settlement until the ROK forces violated the truce and
results of their July offensive were de- the Communists took counteraction, the
termined, would be difficult. Probably UNC would continue to maintain the
both factors entered into their calcula- state of armistice and would give no
tions, since the disturbing press releases support in equipment and supplies to
attributed to Rhee indicated that the the ROK units carrying out the aggres-
old warrior viewed the truce merely as sive operations.9 It was true that the
a temporary rather than a long-term halt UNC would not promise to use force
in the fighting. This, of course, ran to secure ROK obedience to the truce,
counter to the soothing statements made but it must have been obvious to the
by the UNC at Panmunjom arid might enemy that no ROK offensive could have
well have made the Communists suspi- been successful for long without UNC
cious. On the other hand, the July offen- assistance.
sive had been planned for some time and Nam, however, was not prepared to
it was unlikely that the enemy would accept the UNC responses as yet. He
have come to terms before its comple- reverted to the matter of the escaped
tion regardless of whether Rhee had nonrepatriates despite the fact that there
been silent or even co-operative. At any was little hope of recovering them at
rate, the Communists used the uncer- that late date. Then he proceeded to
tainty over Rhee's actions as a convenient press Harrison for a reconciliation be-
screen—real or fancied—for the defer- tween the ninety days, mentioned in
ment of final agreement. Rhee's recent speeches as the length of
After the 13 July meeting the enemy time that he had agreed to for not ob-
clearly was awaiting the outcome of its structing a truce, and the armistice,
operations at the front. During this ses- which specified no such time limit. Har-
sion Harrison gave some frank answers rison repeated several times that the
to the questions previously raised. He UNC recognized that there was no time
told the Communists that the U.N. limit to the cease-fire and would act in
Command would turn over the rest of conformity with this knowledge.10
the nonrepatriates to the Neutral Na- When this meeting was over, Harri-
tions Repatriation Commission to quiet son urged that the U.N. Command re-
their anxiety lest the ROK Government cess the conferences, unilaterally if
seek to release additional prisoners in necessary, until the Communists realized
this category. The UNC was prepared that no more promises or pledges would
to insure that the ROK forces observed be made. He regarded the enemy tac-
the cease-fire and withdrew from the de-
9
Transcript of Proceedings, 154th Session, Mil
8
Transcript of Proceedings, 153d Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 13 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates
Armistice Conf, 12 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VII.
10
Mtgs, vol. VII. Ibid.
FINALE 483

tics of the succeeding days as plainly Clark flew to Korea on 17 July and
harassing while the Communists conferred with Harrison at Munsan-ni.
watched the progress of the actions on They informed the JCS that they in-
the central front.11 tended to reject further enemy demands
By 14 July Clark and his superiors for the return of the escaped prisoners
had come to agree with Harrison and and for firmer pledges on ROK future
they gave him authority to walk out of behavior. If the Communists requested
the discussions the following day if the a renegotiation of the demarcation line
enemy persisted in pursuing its policy because of the current military opera-
of procrastination.12 The UNC delega- tions, the U.N. Command would agree
tion left the tent on 15 July after point- and then recess unilaterally for four
ing out that the scale of the Communist days. The Washington leaders con-
offensive belied their sincerity in reach- curred in this course of action, provided
ing agreement on an armistice. But that the Communists consented to nam-
before the UNC recessed the conference ing a date on which the armistice would
for a longer period, Clark suggested that be signed and insisted upon renegotia-
Harrison give the enemy a more explicit tion of the demarcation line.15
answer on the ROK position as it had When the conferees returned to Pan-
been developed in the Rhee-Robertson munjom on 19 July, the enemy offensive
talks. Clark wished to inform the Com- was over and the battle line had been
munists that the ROK President had stabilized once again. The Communists
given the UNC "written assurances" that were now ready to go ahead with the
he would not obstruct the truce, but the final arrangements for the cease-fire,
political and military leaders in Wash- Nam declared, although they were not
ington modified the phrase to "necessary yet completely satisfied with the UNC
assurances." 13 guarantees. They reserved the right to
As it turned out, the change in word- bring up the problem of the released
ing made little difference. On 16 July prisoners at the postarmistice political
the Communist delegation stole a march conference. And since the ROK Gov-
on the UNC and suggested a two-day ernment had refused to admit the Indian
recess in the negotiations.14 They later forces into their territory, Nam de-
asked that it be extended to 19 July manded that the truce conference settle
and the UNC agreed. In the meantime the matter of handing over the remain-
the enemy consolidated its gains along der of the nonrepatriates to the repatria-
the front and halted the UNC counter- tion commission now rather than
attack in the ROK II Corps area. committing the task to the Military
Armistice Commission. As Clark and
11
Msgs, HNC 1819 and 1821, CINCUNC (Adv) Harrison had anticipated, Nam also
to CINCUNC, 13 and 14 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, asked for renegotiation of the demarca-
Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, tion line. He evaded the efforts of Har-
incls 38 and 43.
12
Msg, JCS 943836, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Jul 53. 15
13 (1) Msg, C 63749, CINCUNC to JCS, 17 Jul 53
Msg, JCS 943913. JCS to CINCFE, 15 Jul 53.
14
Transcript of Proceedings, 157th Session, Mil in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,
Armistice Conf, 16 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates incls 144-286, incl 273. (2) Msg, JCS 944074, JCS
Mtgs, vol. VII. to CINCFE, 17 Jul 53.
484 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

rison to establish a target date for the than two years, the original ten members
signing of the truce. of the delegations had dwindled to two
The UNC senior delegate tried to —Nam Il and his fellow countryman,
discover when the Communists expected Lee Sang Cho, who had helped to sustain
the Czech and Polish contingents for the the fiction that the Democratic People's
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commis- Republic of Korea was directing the
sion to arrive, by announcing that the truce discussions for the Communist
Swiss and Swedish advance components side. Despite the loss of continuity oc-
would be prepared to function shortly. casioned by the rotation of personnel,
If all went well, Harrison stated, the the major issues had finally been solved
details could be concluded within five and the prospects for peace became
days and he urged that the effective date brighter.
of the cease-fire be twelve hours after Now the task of reaching agreement
the signing. The supervisory commis- on the minor problems descended upon
sion should be ready to take over as soon the shoulders of the staff officers as it
as the armistice went into effect, he went frequently had in the past. They would
on, and until that time each side should have to work their way through the maze
be responsible for the safety of the mem- of petty details that would determine
bers it had nominated. when the fighting officially would come
The Communists agreed that the to a halt.
plenary sessions should be suspended
and that the staff officers should now The Home Stretch
begin at once to settle all the points still
in dispute. For the U.N. Command, There were four areas in which the
Harrison informed Nam, Col. Douglas two sides still had to come to an agree-
W. Cairns, USAF, would replace Colonel ment: the line of demarcation and de-
Darrow and join Colonel Murray on the militarized zone; the place of delivery
staff group on the renegotiation of the of the nonrepatriate prisoners; the in-
demarcation line and revision of the ception of activities by the various
armistice agreement. Col. Louis C. Frie- commissions established under the armi-
dersdorff, USA, would head the UNC stice; and the physical arrangements for
officers discussing the repatriation of the actual signing of the truce docu-
prisoners, and Col. John K. Weber, ment. Negotiations on the staff level
USA, would be in charge of the UNC began almost immediately on these mat-
staff group considering physical arrange- ters and continued, in at least one case,
ments and rules of procedure pertaining until the final day of the war.
to the functioning of the Military Armis- On 20 July Colonel Murray and his
tice Commission.16 opposite, Col. Huang Chen-chi of the
Late in the afternoon the plenary con- Chinese Communist delegation, set to
ference finished its penultimate session. work on the revision of the demarca-
After 158 meetings spread over more tion line. In many places the job was
16
relatively simple, since there had been
Transcript of Proceedings, 158th Session, Mil
Armistice Conf, 19 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates
little or no action in the locale and the
Mtgs, vol. VII. line of contact was easy to determine.
FINALE 485

In others, where recent fighting had agreement for consideration at the open-
shifted the front line, the problem be- ing session on 22 July, proposing that
came more complex. Here bargaining the Communist prisoners who did not
proved to be necessary, as each side wish to return home should be turned
sought to retain possession of as much over to the repatriation commission
favorable terrain as possible. Indeed, in the southern part of the demilitarized
on occasion both sides claimed more zone.18
than they had a right to, since it was Col. Ju Yon, senior staff officer for the
apparent that the Communists and the Communists, accepted the suggestion in
U.N. Command could not both control principle, but dismissed the idea that an
a particular hill simultaneously. But, on amendment would be necessary. In-
the whole, the sessions were without stead he proposed that a temporary sup-
rancor and even had their moments of plementary agreement be used covering
humor. On 22 July Murray tried to end the terms of admission for the nonrepa-
the haggling over several points in dis- triates and the administrative personnel
pute along the line by making a package into the demilitarized zone. The
compromise offer. Colonel Huang, in Communist draft permitted each side to
typical fashion, accepted only the por- use its own half of the demilitarized zone
tion favorable to the Communists, lead- for turning over nonrepatriates to the
ing Murray to comment: "In other repatriation commission and for estab-
words, in the interest of getting agree- lishing the facilities required to handle
ment, I offered you the shirt off my the prisoners of war. Since the substance
back. In place of accepting it gracefully, rather than the form of the understand-
you returned to the conference table and ing was the important thing, Clark and
asked for my drawers." Nevertheless, Harrison approved the enemy's alterna-
the horse trading continued until early tive. The Communists, in turn, agreed
the next morning, when all differences that, to save time, the supplementary
had been settled. Murray and Huang proposal should be typed up and signed
then initialed the copies of the maps to separately instead of being printed and
be printed and included with the armi- added to the text of the armistice agree-
stice agreement.17 ment. By 25 July the staff officers had
Before the staff officers took up the worked out the details and ordered the
disposition of the nonrepatriates, Harri- interpreters to go ahead with putting
son and Clark decided that the expressed the terms into final shape.19
desire of the Communists to settle the
18
place of delivery before the armistice (1) Msg, HNC 1833, CINCUNC (Adv) to
went into effect should be exploited. To CINCUNC, 19 Jul 53. (2) Msg, C 63821, CINCUNC
to CINCUNC (Adv), 19 Jul 53. Both in UNC/-
accomplish this, they instructed Murray FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-
to introduce an amendment to the draft 143, incls 70 and 71.
19
A copy of the supplementary agreement is re-
produced in Appendix C. (1) Msg, C 63904,
17
Transcripts of Proceedings, Eighth through CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 23 Jul 53. (2)
Tenth Mtgs of Staff Officers To Renegotiate the First through Fourth Mtgs of Combined Staff Of-
Military Demarcation Line, 20-22 Jul 53, in G-3 ficers, 22-25 Jul 53. All in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
File, Transcripts of Proceedings To Renegotiate Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incls 88, 83,
the Military Demarcation Line . . . , Jun-Jul 53. 89, 93, and 96.
486 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

During the staff meetings the Com- of prisoners, headed by Colonels Frie-
munists had on several occasions evi- dersdorff and Lee Pyong Il of the North
denced great interest in learning the Korean Army, had the task of determin-
exact number of prisoners that were to ing the rate of delivery for the repatri-
be repatriated directly and of those that ates. To a large degree the rate
would be given over to the repatriation depended upon the transportation fa-
commission. The U.N. Command re- cilities and the administrative capacity
fused to supply other than round figures of each side to handle the prisoners.
to the enemy, reasoning that there At first, the UNC had calculated that
might well be some last-minute changes it would be able to bring 1,800 repatri-
and that it would be simpler not to have ates a day to Panmunjom plus 360 sick
to explain them to the Communists. and wounded. When Friedersdorff
Thus, leaving some margin for shifts in passed the information on to Lee, the
loyalty or homesickness, the UNC an- latter immediately asked for 3,000 a day,
nounced on 21 July that there would be in addition to the sick and wounded.
69,000 Koreans and 5,000 Chinese re- As it was, the UNC would be transfer-
turning to Communist control. Three ring more than seven times as many
days later the UNC followed up with prisoners over to the Communists each
the release of the totals on the nonre- day than it received. For Lee disclosed
patriates—14,500 Chinese and 7,800 Ko- that his side would turn over only 300
reans. In contrast, the Communists a day because of the paucity of transpor-
evidently had made up their minds on tation facilities and the fact that the
the exact figure they would deliver to Communist prisoner camps were distant
the United Nations Command. The tally and scattered. On 26 July a reassessment
came to 12,764, including 3,313 U.S. of UNC capabilities revealed that it
and 8,186 Korean personnel.20 Since the could bring daily to Panmunjom 2,400,
enemy totals were not too far off from plus the 360 sick and wounded, but the
the numbers the UNC had estimated enemy clung to its earlier figure.22 At
they could expect, Clark recommended that rate the U.N. Command would re-
they be accepted and his superiors patriate all of the prisoners in its custody
agreed.21 desiring to return home in about thirty
The staff committee on repatriation days, while the Communists would
spread their deliveries over a forty-day
20 period.
Msg, CX 63970, CINCUNC to CG AFFE, 25
Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to Meanwhile, over in the committee
app. I, incls 144-286, incl 227. The remaining considering the preparations for the
UNC personnel were broken down as follows: functioning of the Military Armistice
U.K., 922; Turkey, 228; Philippines, 40; Colombia,
22; Australia, 15; Canada, 14; France, 13; South Commission, Colonel Weber and his as-
Africa, 6; Belgium, 1; and Greece, 1. Three Jap- sociates presented the UNC plans for the
anese were also to be returned, according to the rules and modus operandi on 20 July.
Communist tally, to total 12,764 in all. For the
22
final figures on repatriation, see Appendix B. Second and Fourth Meetings of Staff Officers
21
(1) Msg, CX 63929, CINCUNC to JCS, 23 Jul on the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of
53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. War, 23 and 26 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
I, incls 1-143, incl 102. (2) Msg, JCS 944523, JCS Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incls 104 and
to CINCUNC, 24 Jul 53. 105.
FINALE 487

Clark had already selected Maj. Gen. that although the UNC interpretation
Blackshear M. Bryan, USA, Deputy was at variance with the provisions of the
Chief of Staff, FEC, as senior UNC mem- armistice agreement in some respects,
ber and established headquarters for the they were willing to accept it.25 Whether
group at Munsan-ni on 20 June. During the Communists would scrupulously ob-
the succeeding month General Bryan serve the restrictions imposed by the
had gathered his staff together and was truce during the interim week was a
ready to take up his duties as soon as matter for conjecture, but at least the
the armistice went into effect.23 casualty lists would not be increased by
The Communists did not have any an extra seven days of fighting.
basic objections to the UNC recom- The first target date for the signing of
mendations, but showed no disposition the cease-fire had been 24 July, since
toward haste. They agreed that the five days had been adjudged sufficient
Military Armistice Commission should to take care of the details and the physi-
hold its first meeting on the day after the cal arrangements. But complicating
armistice was signed. Once the sessions factors soon made this choice appear
got under way, they went on, the staff unduly optimistic—the demarcation
members could arrange the details of maps had to be printed and checked af-
the operation.24 ter the line had been settled, the build-
As one item after another was settled, ing for the signing ceremony had to be
the question of timing assumed greater constructed and outfitted, and a differ-
importance. From the outset, the UNC ence in opinion had broken out over
staff officers had sought to have the armi- the signing procedure.
stice take effect twelve hours after the The debate over this formality pro-
signing. The Communists, estimating duced the final enemy effort to eke out
that the personnel of the Neutral Na- political advantage during the conflict.
tions Supervisory Commission might not In the initial exchange on the ways and
arrive in Korea and be able to exercise means that might be adopted, the Com-
their functions for at least a week after munists stated on 20 July that, in view
the signing, had proposed that the effec- of the uncertain ROK situation, they
tive date be seven and a half days later. did not think it wise for the military
In his rebuttal, Colonel Murray argued commanders to attend and sign in per-
that even if the supervisory groups did son. Colonel Ju suggested that the com-
not begin to carry out their responsibil- manders affix their signatures before the
ities for a week, the agreement not to ceremony and then the senior delegates
augment forces should become effective could countersign at Panmunjom.26
twelve hours after the cease-fire. On 22 Clark looked with disfavor upon the
July the enemy representatives stated enemy plan, for he strongly felt that the
23 25
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, app. I, pp. 313- (1) Liaison Officers Mtg, 21 Jul 53. (2) First
14. Combined Mtg of Staff Officers, 22 Jul 53. Both
24
First, Second, and Third Mtgs of Committee in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,
for Making Preliminary Arrangements for the incls 1-143, incls 111 and 83.
26
MAC, 20, 22, and 26 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Liaison Officers Mtg, 20 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC,
Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144-286, incls Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-43, incl
252, 253, and 255. 74.
488 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

commanders should show their good and included no press members, the
faith by personally signing the armistice, Communists might reconsider and have
thus lending prestige to the agreement. their military commanders sign in per-
When Murray pressed the Communist son.29
representatives on 21 July to change Clark's initial reaction to the lat-
their position, however, he met with est enemy suggestion was to accept even
little encouragement.27 Nevertheless he though he knew that the press would
returned to the fray two days later and be very unhappy over being excluded
sought to assure the enemy that all pos- from the signing room. General Taylor
sible precautions would be taken at Pan- had conversed with Rhee and discovered
munjom to guarantee the safety of the that the ROK leader did not desire to
commanders during the ceremonies. send a representative to Panmunjom, so
The U.N. Command, Murray said, this potential obstacle was removed.
would be willing to increase the number But after further study of the enemy's
of guards, to limit and carefully screen demands, Clark changed his mind. He
all the representatives admitted to the had no intention, he told the JCS, of
conference area, and to provide immun- banning ROK and Chinese Nationalist
ity from attack for the Communist com- correspondents from the conference site
manders en route to Panmunjom. But area as the Communists insisted. If the
Colonel Ju pointed to the disconcerting enemy refused to allow the ROK and
statements that Rhee and other mem- Nationalist newsmen to be present at the
bers of the ROK Government were still signing, he would settle for the senior
making as prejudicial to personal ap- delegates holding the ceremony first,
pearances by the commanders. To with the commanders countersigning
answer some of the UNC objections to later.30
the Communist proposal, Ju continued, When the liaison officers convened
his side was willing to have the senior their meeting on 25 July, Colonel Mur-
delegates sign the armistice first and to ray made several fervent pleas in behalf
have the truce go into effect twelve hours of the ROK and Nationalist press mem-
later. Thus any delay in securing the bers, but they fell upon deaf ears. Ju
commanders' signatures would not hold would not consider their being in the
up the actual cease-fire.28 area during the signing. If the UNC
At the liaison officers meeting on 24 consented to their exclusion, Marshal
July, Ju offered a third alternative. If no Choe Yong Gun, Kim's deputy, and Gen-
representatives of Syngman Rhee and eral Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the
Chiang Kai-shek were admitted to the Chinese People's Volunteers, would
conference area and if the number of come to Panmunjom on 27 July at 1000
personnel permitted to witness the sign- to sign for the Communists, Ju de-
ing were restricted to 100 for each side 29
Liaison Officers Mtg, 24 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC,
27
Liaison Officers Mtg, 21 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143,
Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incl 112.
30
incl 111. (1) Msg, CX 63963, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Jul 53.
28
Liaison Officers Mtg, 23 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, (2) Msg, CX 63969, CINCFE to JCS, 25 Jul 53.
Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to
incl 119. app. I, incls 1-143, 144-286, incls 121 and 277.
FINALE 489

dared. Otherwise, he went on, his side session countersigned by Clark. This
would not allow any press representa- procedure would necessitate only one
tives to be present.31 exchange, Murray explained. Ju insisted
The adamant stand by the enemy upon absolute equality right to the end;
against ROK and Nationalist participa- each side would have 9 copies for coun-
tion decided Clark. Early on 26 July he tersignature despite the fact that two
instructed Harrison to go ahead and sign exchanges would be required under this
at Panmunjom; he would countersign method. In arguing for the Communist
afterwards at Munsan-ni since President view, Ju discounted the time lost under
Eisenhower wanted him to do this on his scheme as unimportant, causing Mur-
Korean soil.32 ray to retort: "Do I understand you cor-
At the liaison officers conference later rectly in that the strong point of your
that day, Murray and Ju completed the proposal is that it takes a long time to
arrangements. Each side would be given carry it out?" Ju ignored the thrust and
350 spaces in the Panmunjom area, but early on 27 July Murray agreed to the
only 150 persons would be granted ac- Communists' proposal to end the mat-
cess to the signing building. Newsmen, ter.33
photographers, and cameramen would
be included in the 150 figure. The con- The Big Day
ference site would be divided into two
sections and all personnel from one side Although there were occasional pud-
should remain in its own half. Addi- dles in low-lying spots and a heavy cloud
tional security guards would be on hand cover, the sun managed to break through
to preserve order and prevent disturb- intermittently on 27 July. A strong wind
ances. As previously suggested, the cere- whipped across Panmunjom stirring up
mony would be held at 1000 on 27 July. little whirls of dust here and there. In
Murray and Ju encountered little dif- the background the sound of artillery
ficulty in straightening out these matters. served as a reminder that the war was
But an attempt by Murray to simplify not quite over.
the exchange of documents after they The building constructed for the cere-
were signed by the commanders met mony had had a deletion and an addi-
with immediate suspicion and rejection tion in recent days. A UNC complaint
by his opposite number. Since only 6 had succeeded in securing the removal
of the 18 copies of the truce were to of two Communist peace doves from the
remain in UNC possession, Murray sug- gables of the peace pagoda and General
gested that the Communists take 6 copies Clark had insisted upon the provision
to Kim and Peng while the UNC had of a south entrance to the structure. In
the 12 copies intended for enemy pos- the original plan the only door lay on
31
the north side and this would have re-
Liaison Officers Mtgs, 25 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, quired all of the UNC entourage to pass
Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143,
incls 122 and 97.
32
(1) Msg, DA 944648, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 25
33
Jul 53. (2) Msg, CX 64002, CINCUNC to Liaison Officers Mtgs, 26 and 27 Jul 53, in
CINCUNC (Adv), 26 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,
Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incl 126. incls 1-143, incls 127 and 136.
490 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

through the enemy section to enter the greeting was exchanged between the
building.34 two men as they began to write their
Along the south approach to the pa- signatures on the documents. The at-
goda a UNC honor guard composed of mosphere was marked by cold courtesy
members of the nations that had fought on both sides. At 1012 the task was com-
in Korea lined the walk, with only the pleted and Harrison allowed himself a
Republic of Korea not represented. small smile at the cameras. As he and
Smartly turned out in white gloves, Nam rose to leave, they locked glances
scarves, and helmets, the guard added for a moment, but neither spoke. Har-
a dash of color to the scene. On the rison went out and chatted with the
north side the Communists, clad in olive- newsmen for a few minutes, then left
drab fatigue uniforms and canvas shoes, for Munsan-ni by helicopter. Nam and
were busily cleaning up the area near his group climbed into their Russian-
the entrance. built jeeps and drove out of the area.
A half hour before the ceremony the The armistice but for twelve hours was
spectators began to drift into sight. finally a fact. (Map IX)
Correspondents and cameramen went
into the building and took up their sta- Postlude
tions, followed soon after by the military
Surrounded by his top military advi-
officials from each side assigned to act
sors, including a ROKA representative,
as observers. In severe contrast to the
General Clark countersigned the blue-
casual, informal entrance and appear-
bound copies on the afternoon of 27
ance of the UNC officers, the Commu-
July at Munsan-ni. In the speeches that
nists were stiff and disciplined as they
followed, the U.N. commander cau-
filed into the hall and took their seats.
tioned that the armistice was only a
Both Chinese and North Koreans "sat
military agreement to cease fire while
straight and rigid like students at a grad-
the opposing sides sought a political solu-
uation ceremony, sized and posed."
tion to the conflict. Until the diplomats
Upon one of the tables at the head
negotiated a permanent conclusion,
of the room lay nine blue-bound copies
Clark warned, there could be no UNC
of the agreement and a small U.N. flag
withdrawal from Korea nor any lessen-
and upon another, nine maroon-colored
ing of alertness and preparedness.35
copies and a North Korean flag.
While Clark was speaking, the guns
At 0957 the associate delegates of the
along the front continued to bellow out
plenary conference came in and sat down
their lethal salutes. Ground activity had
at the front. As the minute hand sig-
come to a halt, but artillery and mortar
naled the hour, Generals Harrison and
fire lasted until the end. In the air the
Nam briskly walked in from opposite UNC planes pounded North Korean air-
ends of the building and took their fields, rail lines, and road systems in a
places behind the tables. Not a word of
35
(1) ZX 37264, CINCFE to CG AFFE et al, 26
34
The description of the ceremony is based on Jul 53. (2) Msg, C 64152, CINCUNC to JCS, 31
UNC/FEC, Command Report, July 1953, Appendix Jul 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls
I, pages 134ff. to app. I, incls 144-286, incls 159 and 156.
FINALE 491

last-ditch effort to curtail Communist the ROK authorities, if the latter were
activities until the supervisory commis- agreeable to the acceptance of the gift.
sion and its inspection teams could begin Rhee seemed glad to receive the news
to function. The air program, carried and gave his consent, Clark reported.39
out by Air Force, Navy, and Marine Despite these favorable signs, Rhee
aircraft, had been intensified during the and his aides in their public utterances
last week of the fighting, but unfortu- and interviews continued to indicate that
nately, inclement flying weather had per- the truce might not last long and that
mitted the enemy to bring a number of the ROK forces might again resort to
airplanes into Korea before the armistice arms if and when the political conference
was signed.36 On the sea naval warships failed.40 It was impossible to estimate
bombarded Kosong and finally ended whether these threats might be serious
the longest naval siege in history by or were simply delivered for home con-
shelling Wonsan for the last time.37 sumption to soften the blow of ROK
When the clock hands reached 2200 the acquiescence to the armistice. But they
guns fell silent across Korea and the did inject into the situation a note of
shooting war was over. uneasiness that would have to be elimi-
How long the truce would last was nated if the cease-fire were to be other
uncertain. When Taylor had gone on than temporary. The United States
the eve of the truce to inform Rhee that could only hope that when fulfilled the
it would be signed on the morrow, the pledges of military and economic assist-
ROK President had seemed relieved ance made to the ROK Government
that the long and trying struggle was would overcome its objections to the
almost over.38 During Clark's visit with truce and induce the ROK leaders to
Rhee on 27 July the latter had told the halt their agitation for a resumption of
U.N. commander that he would tell his hostilities in the future.
people that the ROK would co-operate The inability of the UNC participants
with the armistice and that he would to depend upon Rhee's behavior made
prepare a message to be read to the non- them very hesitant about issuing the
repatriate prisoners to reassure them. joint declaration, agreed upon earlier,
In the course of their chat, Clark told providing for "greater sanctions" in the
the ROK President of an offer from event the Communists began anew the
Eisenhower to make 10,000 tons of food fighting in Korea. As long as there was
available immediately to the civilian reasonable doubt about Rhee's inten-
population. The rations would be dis- tions, the U.N. countries who had joined
tributed through the Korean Civil As- in the war preferred not to give broad
sistance Command in conjunction with publicity to their commitments under
the agreement. Instead they decided to
36
Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea,
1950-1953, pp. 639-40.
37 39
Hq UNC, Communiqué No. 1689, 28 Jul 53, in Msg, GX 7452, CINCUNC to JCS, 27 Jul 53, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls
144-286, incl 158. 144-286, incl 286.
38 40
Msg, G 7445 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 27 Jul 53, Msg, GX 7608, Taylor to Weyland, 31 Jul 53,
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I,
incls 144-286, incl 206. incls 144-286, incl 209.
492 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

THE ARMISTICE BUILDING, PANMUNJOM

issue notice of the warning through a of that armistice. We expect that the other
special report that the U.N. commander parties to the agreement will likewise
would submit to the United Nations on scrupulously observe its terms.
The task ahead is not an easy one. We
the armistice about a week after it was will support the efforts of the United Na-
signed. Thus, in place of an independ- tions to bring about an equitable settle-
ent statement which would have been ment in Korea based on the principles
given wide distribution, the following which have long been established by the
item was included in Clark's summary United Nations, and which call for a
united, independent and democratic Korea.
of the negotiations presented to the U.N. We will support the United Nations in its
on 7 August: efforts to assist the people of Korea in re-
pairing the ravages of war.
We the United Nations members whose We declare again our faith in the prin-
military forces are participating in the ciples and purposes of the United Nations,
Korean action support the decision of the our consciousness of our continuing re-
Commander-in-chief of the United Nations sponsibilities in Korea, and our determina-
Command to conclude an armistice agree- tion in good faith to seek a settlement of the
ment. We hereby affirm our determination Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests
fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of world peace, that if there is a renewal
FINALE 493

GENERAL HARRISON TAKES SALUTE FROM HONOR GUARD on his way to the
Armistice Building.

of the armed attack, challenging again Clark's report. Whether the Commu-
the principles of the United Nations, we nists would heed the warning or not,
should again be united and prompt to re- only the future could reveal. It was
sist. The consequences of such a breach of
the armistice would be so grave that, in all possible that Syngman Rhee might take
probability, it would not be possible to con- the decision out of their hands and place
fine hostilities within the frontiers of both sides in a quandary. In the mean-
Korea. time an armed truce during which the
Finally, we are of the opinion that the opponents could seek to improve their
armistice must not result in jeopardizing
the restoration or the safeguarding of peace relative positions offered a modus vi-
in any other part of Asia.41 vendi less costly than open war.
The organizations which the U.N.
Regardless of the manner of presenta- Command and the Communists had de-
tion, the commitment was made and no signed to prevent one side from improv-
less noted for having been slipped into ing its military position significantly
41
during the truce quickly assumed their
Unified Command's Special Report on Korean
Armistice, in the Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXIX, duties and enjoyed some initial success.
No. 739 (August 24, 1953), p. 247. On 28 July the Military Armistice Com-
494 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

SIGNING THE ARMISTICE—GENERAL HARRISON AND GENERAL NAM IL

mission held its first meeting and the rized zone usually had to submit split
proceedings were conducted in a busi- reports.42
nesslike manner. Arrangements were Even more important were the experi-
made in subsequent sessions for the with- ences of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
drawal of troops from the demilitarized Commission and its inspection teams.
zone, the conduct of salvage operations, The latter were stationed at the ten ports
the removal of hazards such as mines, of entry specified in the truce agreement
and the matter of credentials and identi- to observe and report on the arrival and
fication of personnel entering or working departure of personnel and the replace-
in the zone. But the era of co-operation ment of combat matériel. In North Ko-
was soon shattered by a series of inci- rea the inspection teams soon ran into
dents in August which arose from the difficulties, and the UNC charged that
Communist Red Cross activities in the the enemy was violating the spirit and
UNC prisoner of war camps. The at- letter of the agreement by using other
mosphere at the MAC meetings grew ports of entry to introduce more men
strained and charges and countercharges and equipment. Little could be done to
again became the order of the day. Each enforce the maintenance of the status
side denied the accusations of the other 42
UNC Summary of the Implementation of the
and the joint observer teams set up to Armistice Agreement in Korea, Part Two, no date.
investigate violations of the demilita- In OCMH.
FINALE 495

THE NINE BOUND COPIES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

quo under the circumstances, the UNC militarized zone and the enemy sent
concluded, and the Communists would back over 12,000 to the UNC. 44 Then,
continue to gain in strength as long as on 23 September, the United Nations
the UNC closely observed the provisions Command turned over more than 22,000
of the truce.43 Whether the apparent en- nonrepatriates to the Neutral Nations
emy build-up was offensive or defensive Repatriation Commission in the demili-
in nature or simply opportunistic, only tarized zone; the Communists delivered
time would reveal. over 350 UNC nonrepatriates to the
Another of the armistice's creations— NNRC the following day.45
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com- The Communists soon complained
mission—also suffered its share of frus- that the facilities provided them for per-
trations. Shortly after the truce was suading their nonrepatriates to return
signed, the flow of prisoners north and 44
See Appendix B for a breakdown of the statis-
south got under way. Between 5 August tics on prisoners of war.
45
and 6 September the U.N. Command The following account is based upon the In-
terim Report, 28 December 1953, and the Final
transferred over 75,000 prisoners of war Report, no date, of the Neutral Nations Repatria-
directly to the Communists in the de- tion Commission and the United Nations Command
43
Report on Operations of the Neutral Nations Re-
Ibid. patriation Commission, no date. All in OCMH.
496 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

GENERAL CLARK COUNTERSIGNS THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AT MUNSAN-NI, while


Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe and Vice Adm. Joseph J. Clark look on.

home were inadequate and it was not except for some 86 who chose to go with
until 15 October that they began their the Custodial Forces of India when they
explanations. Between this date and 23 sailed for home.46
December, when the ninety-day period Of the 359 UNC nationals who had
agreed upon for explanations expired, decided not to be repatriated, two of the
they utilized only ten days for explana- Americans and eight Koreans changed
tions. Large groups of the prisoners re- their minds before the 120-day period
fused to listen to the enemy representa- was up and two Koreans elected to go to
tives at all and the number of those who India with the custodial forces. The
chose repatriation after hearing the ex- remainder were turned back to the Com-
planations amounted to only a little over munists in January 1954.
600 out of the 22,000 involved. The When the American prisoners of war
NNRC retained custody of the remain- were interviewed after their repatria-
der until the 120 days stipulated in the tion, disturbing charges of collaboration
truce agreement was up and then re- and moral and physical softness were
turned them to the UNC. In the early leveled at many of the returning soldiers.
part of 1954 the Korean nonrepatriates Criticism of the U.S. prisoner of war
were released and the Chinese were behavior became widespread in the press
shipped by plane and boat to Taiwan, 46
See Appendix B.
FINALE 497

during the fall and winter of 1953-54. Delegations from the Republic of
Over 500 of the repatriated prisoners Korea and from all the nations partici-
were investigated, but only a few were pating in the United Nations Command
convicted of misconduct. The Secretary except the Union of South Africa met
of Defense did, however, appoint a ten- with delegations from the USSR, Com-
man Advisory Committee on Prisoners munist China, and North Korea on 26
of War to investigate the matter. As a April 1954 in Switzerland.49 The funda-
result the committee drafted a new code mental differences in the approaches of
of conduct for the armed services, which the two groups to the unification prob-
President Eisenhower signed on 17 Au- lem quickly demonstrated that agree-
gust 1955. It was hoped that the code ment would be impossible unless one
would prevent a recurrence of the Ko- side made wholesale concessions. The
rean experience.47 UNC nations proposed free elections
Since the war had never been de- throughout Korea under U.N. auspices
clared, perhaps it was fitting that there after the Chinese Communist forces had
should be no ending. In late August been withdrawn from the country. To
1953 the U.N. General Assembly had the Communists, the U.N. was one of
welcomed the holding of a political con- the belligerents and could not act as an
ference which the truce agreement had impartial international body; they were
recommended, but it was not until Feb- willing to have free elections but only
ruary 1954 that the Foreign Ministers of under the auspices of a body composed
the United States, the United Kingdom, of equal representation from both sides
the Soviet Union, and France agreed to wherein they would have veto privileges.
participate in a conference at Geneva To the UNC delegations the Commu-
to discuss the peaceful settlement of the nist proposals seemed to offer the pros-
Korean question.48 pects for elections only after long delays
47
New York Times, August 18, 1955. The justice and on the Communists' terms. After
and validity of the charges have been discussed in nearly two months of discussions, the
detail in postwar writings. For the arguments up- conference came to a close in mid-June
holding the thesis that the prisoners did collaborate
excessively with the enemy and demonstrated signs
with neither side willing to accept the
of moral and physical weakness, see Eugene Kin- other's solution. A negotiated unifica-
kead, In Every War But One (New York: W. W. tion of Korea appeared to be as distant
Norton and Co., Inc., 1959). For a convincing
rebuttal of the thesis, see Albert D. Biderman, in 1954 as it had been in 1948.
March To Calumny (New York: The Macmillan
49
Co., 1962). For the record of the proceedings at the
48
See Department of State, The Record on Geneva Conference see Department of State, The
Korean Unification, 1943-1960 (Washington, 1960), Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April
p. 25. 26-June 15, 1954 (Washington, 1954).
CHAPTER XXIII

Retrospect
What had the war in Korea accom- in the U.N. and their willingness to put
plished? While it may still be too soon teeth in the enforcement provisions of its
to view the conflict in proper perspective, charter. The Korean War marked a real
some of the immediate consequences are departure from the dismal experience of
not difficult to discern. the League of Nations in this respect.
Despite the claims of the enemy, there For the United States the Korean War
had been no victory—political or mili- was also a crucial test. The United
tary—in Korea. At best, the outcome States had entered World Wars I and II
could be called a draw. Yet several de- at a relatively late date and as a member
velopments were momentous. Facing its of a coalition. At the conclusion of
sternest test, the United Nations had World War II, however, the realign-
weathered a challenge, which, if unan- ment of power had placed the United
swered, might have resulted in disaster States in a position of dominance and
and eventual disintegration. Under the cloaked it with the mantle of leadership
U.N. flag, the original objective of the of the non-Communist world. When the
intervention in Korea—halting Commu- foe threw down the gauntlet by invading
nist aggression—had been successfully South Korea, the responsibilities that
carried out and the independence of its went with the new position of power
foster child, the Republic of Korea, had became agonizingly apparent. No longer
been preserved. This practical demon- could the nation rely upon some other
stration of how the United Nations could country to battle the aggressor until it
function when peace was threatened was ready to join the fray. Now only
greatly enhanced the prestige of the or- the United States had the resources to
ganization and established a precedent do the task. Fortunately, it had re-
for future U.N. military action if the sponded quickly, meeting force with
need should again arise. force. By working within the framework
The effort had not been given unan- of the U.N., it had at the same time
imous support by U.N. members, it is helped give increased stature to that or-
true, but twenty-one nations had con- ganization. The amazingly swift re-
tributed forces of one kind or another course to armed action had shown the
to sustain the U.N. decision. Although Communists that the United States had
many of these countries had supplied accepted its role of leadership and would
only small token units, the mere fact not permit outright aggression on their
that they had participated at all was en- part to go unchecked. In an instance
couraging, since it indicated their belief when failure to act might well have led
RETROSPECT 499

to a repetition of the tragic events fol- In forces in being, the ROK units had
lowing Hitler's uncontested march into a considerable advantage over the North
the Rhineland, the United States had Koreans at the end of the war. With
won its spurs as the champion of the further training and development of the
anti-Communist powers. officer and noncommissioned officer
In the course of leading the UNC corps, the ROK forces could eventually
team during the hostilities, the United become a bulwark against future Com-
States had to devote far more attention munist aggression or, conversely, an in-
to Pacific-Asian affairs than it had in strument for the fulfillment of the ROK
preceding years. Before the war the em- dream—the unification of Korea—when
phasis had been placed upon Europe, the Chinese Communists withdrew from
and the NATO pact had linked many Korea.
of the nations of Europe to the United The other state that had added to its
States. This policy had been rewarded, status as a result of the war was Com-
for most of them had sent forces to serve munist China. From the stout defensive
with the U.N. Command. Under the and offensive capabilities that the Chi-
impetus of war the United States de- nese had displayed throughout the fight-
cided to expand its system of alliances ing, the United States and its allies had
and began to conclude security pacts learned the hard way that Communist
with the countries in the Pacific-Asian China was a formidable foe who bore
area. New Zealand, Australia, the Phil- little resemblance to the feeble nation
ippines, Japan, and Korea entered de- of World War II. With a tremendous
fensive alliances with the United States pool of manpower at its disposal and
during or shortly after the war and oth- energetic leadership, Communist China
ers, such as Nationalist China, followed had also won its spurs on the battlefields
later. The Korean experience demon- of Korea and appeared ready to assume
strated that allies are helpful in marshal- its place as the leader of the Communists
ing favorable world opinion and that in the Far East and western Pacific
their contributions in men, matériel, areas.
and political support are very valuable In the passage at arms in Korea the
in the search for peace. The multiplica- United States and the Chinese had an
tion of U.S. politico-military ties with opportunity to test each other's mettle
non-Communist nations throughout the and to learn each other's strengths and
western Pacific and on the Asian main- weaknesses. Both had discovered that
land was a direct consequence of the war. the price of military victory was more
In the Far East, two nations had than they were prepared to pay and
emerged from the conflict stronger than neither was likely to underestimate the
before. The armed forces of the Re- immense task that a further resort to
public of Korea had increased sixfold arms with military victory as the goal
during the three-year period and at the would entail.
conclusion of the truce totaled close to The rise of Communist China also
600,000 men. The bulk of these troops raised some intriguing questions con-
were trained and equipped and had cerning the future role of the Soviet
steadily improved in battle efficiency. Union in the Far East. Before the war
500 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the Russians had exercised a controlling the ROK or the Chinese Nationalist
interest in the affairs of North Korea. Governments any official status whatso-
With the entry of Communist China ever. The advantage in this field lay de-
into the struggle, the USSR had seem- cidedly with the Communists.
ingly been content to provide much of On the other hand, the United States
the war matériel for both the North had established the precedent for no
Koreans and Communist Chinese and to forced repatriation of prisoners of war,
support their proteges vigorously in the although this victory had been tarnished
United Nations debates. During the by the spate of outbreaks of violence in
negotiations the North Koreans ap- the camps that tended to discredit the
peared to take their cue from the Com- screening process. Nevertheless, the
munist Chinese, and the Soviet influence United States had clung firmly to the
in the making of policy became difficult concept for fifteen months, refusing to
to discern. But the growth of Commu- consider a settlement on any other terms.
nist Chinese power and prestige could Alternatives had been proposed, includ-
not fail to have an adverse effect upon ing the 1952 suggestions by Harrison
Soviet leadership of Communist ele- and others to simply free the nonrepatri-
ments in the Far East. As the voice of ates as Rhee did with many in June 1953.
Peiping gained in strength, Moscow's Such a fait accompli approach to a solu-
could not help but diminish. What the tion by the U.N. Command might well
long-range consequences of this shift in have afforded the Communists their eas-
power would be upon Sino-Soviet rela- iest way out, since they could have
tionships were impossible to forecast, charged the UNC with unilateral action
yet it seemed evident that there would and might have avoided the loss of face
be an immediate elevation in the posi- that came from having to meet the prob-
tion of Communist China in the Com- lem directly. But until the archives at
munist hierarchy. For the first time Peiping are opened to researchers, the
since 1917 a potential rival for the lead- Chinese reaction to such a move in 1952
ership of the Communist world had ap- will remain merely a matter for conjec-
peared upon the scene. ture.
In an indirect fashion both Commu- The long-term effects of no forced
nist China and North Korea had bene- repatriation may also be a matter for
fited diplomatically from the lengthy conjecture, but the fact that 50,000 pris-
truce negotiations. Although the United oners had taken advantage of the UNC
States recognized neither of these re- stand and had rejected return to Com-
gimes officially and the U.S. representa- munist control cannot be disputed. Yet
tives had acted in behalf of the United the humanitarian approach in protecting
Nations when they negotiated and nonrepatriates had been expensive. To
signed the armistice, it was difficult to safeguard their rights had cost over
dismiss the argument that the United 125,000 UNC casualties during the fif-
States had given them a sort of de facto teen-month period while the enemy lost
recognition in the process. In the mean- well over a quarter of a million men—
time the Communists throughout the killed, wounded, and captured—accord-
discussions had refused to grant either ing to Eighth Army estimates. Viewed
RETROSPECT 501

from this angle, the precedence given that had resulted had not generated a
the 50,000 nonrepatriates and the disgruntled loser seeking revenge.
12,000-odd prisoners held by the enemy Syngman Rhee might be unhappy over
over the hundreds of thousands of sol- the truce, but as long as he was depend-
diers at the front raised a complicated ent upon the United States for mili-
question. In negotiating a military truce, tary assistance, it might be difficult for
should the prime consideration be for him to rekindle the flame of military
the men on the line and in action or for conflict.
those in captivity? Such a decision would In addition to these international con-
always be difficult to make. Compara- sequences, there were several significant
tively speaking, the casualties incurred domestic developments. In the course
during the fifteen-month span were but of fighting this indecisive bout in
a small part of the over-all total suffered Korea the United States had begun to
during the war. The UNC suffered over overhaul and strengthen its own mili-
500,000, including more than 94,000 tary machine once again. The deteriora-
dead.1 For the Communists the esti- tion of the once-powerful U.S. military
mates reached over 1,500,000, including organization after World War II had
prisoners of war. The monetary costs been checked and rebuilding and reno-
were more difficult to compute, espe- vation had been started. In this respect,
cially on the Communist side, but one the Korean experience had been salu-
U.S. expert figured that the war and its tary and the failure to defeat the enemy
by-products had cost the United States served to remind leaders and public
over 83 billion dollars by 1956, placing it alike that the country could not afford
second to World War II in this depart- to relax its vigilance or its capability to
ment.2 act in the face of future challenges.
Since the territorial adjustments in After the armistice there was no effort
Korea had been minor in character, the to disband the armed forces, to junk the
absence of a clear-cut winner, frustrating implements of war, and to return to the
as it might have been to the participants, military status quo, as there had been
was not necessarily a poor solution after World Wars I and II. The Korean
under the circumstances. Both sides had War helped to convince most of the U.S.
sought an armistice and the compromise leaders that military spending on a large
scale to provide adequate forces and
weapons in a state of readiness to coun-
teract the growing Communist threat
1
U.S. losses: 33,629 dead, 103,284 wounded, 5,178 must be sustained. In the postwar pe-
missing or captured—total, 142,091. riod the huge sums allocated to the de-
2
Raymond E. Manning, Cost of U.S. Wars, pre- fense budget were stark evidence that
pared by the Library of Congress, Legislative Ref- the need for preparedness had not been
erence Service, 1956. Manning deducts the costs
which would presumably have been incurred re-
promptly forgotten.
gardless of whether there had been a war or not The United States had also gained val-
and includes the cost of expanding U.S. forces at uable experience in the difficulties of
home and abroad, foreign aid, stockpiling, etc.,
which grew out of the war and the atmosphere it
fighting a limited war. The lack of def-
created. inite military objectives had complicated
502 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

the task of military planners, since all The Negotiations


plans for large-scale operations had to
be placed on a contingency basis. As the The initiation of the negotiations in
war dragged on, the problem of budget- July 1951 was in many ways a turning
ing its costs followed the same pattern. point in the war. As long as fluid condi-
The length of the conflict argued tions had prevailed on the battlefield
strongly for the maintenance of a liberal during the first year of the conflict, the
rotation program that was uneconomical United States, which had been supply-
and inefficient as a practical solution, but ing the bulk of the forces and carrying
valuable as an answer to the morale the financial burden of supporting the
problem. war, had largely determined the policy
The desire to minimize the war in pursued by the U.N. Command with
Korea politically made it hard for the only token opposition. After the static
U.S. administration to convince the na- phase began, however, the UNC allies
tion's manufacturers that they should and the Republic of Korea became less
convert to war production on what reticent. The length of the armistice ne-
might well have turned out to be a gotiations gave ample opportunity for
short-term basis. Since war conversion the disagreements to be aired privately
was expensive and domestic civilian con- and publicly. Disturbed by the drains of
sumption was at a high level, the manu- the Korean commitment, some of the
facturers were very reluctant to disrupt European members of the United Na-
normal production. In this instance, tions Command became anxious to re-
the need for a war production base sus- direct the attention of the United States
tained in peacetime by regular orders towards the needs of NATO. But until
and capable of immediate expansion was the war was concluded, there was little
demonstrated once again. The inescap- hope for a shift in emphasis. Thus,
able fact that it took eighteen months NATO national interests dictated that
to two years to develop and get new an armistice be negotiated quickly, so
production into the fighting areas was that they could devote their efforts to
clearly shown by the ammunition situ- their own domestic and colonial prob-
ation, yet only limited mobilization of lems and, at the same time, secure more
industrial resources was put into effect. sympathetic consideration, militarily
The civilian economy was scarcely dis- and economically, from the United
turbed by the butter and guns policy. States. For the ROK Government, the
Perhaps it was only by making it as easy opposite was true. A truce would mean,
as possible upon soldiers and civilians in all probability, the end of ROK
alike that the United States was able to aspirations for a united Korea and the
be so patient in the negotiations at Pan- eventual waning of U.S. concern for
munjom. Excessive hardship upon Korean affairs.
either category might have generated With pressure mounting from both
strong sentiment for an end to the war groups, the United States had to play the
either through direct action or through role of mediator. Self-interest ar-
further concessions on the prisoners of gued for the liquidation of the Korean
war. diversion and a return to the primary
RETROSPECT 503

task of safeguarding the NATO com- limited pressure had been applied by
munity, but the protection of South both sides to induce swifter consent to
Korea and Japan was a responsibility a truce. But extreme measures had
that could not be denied. For two years, been shunned. The U.N. Command had
therefore, the United States sought an not wilfully violated the Manchurian
equitable solution that would permit the sanctuary nor had the United States
attainment of both objectives. The con- pushed strongly for sterner military or
tinuing effort to end the fighting in economic steps against the rest of Com-
Korea was matched by the concomitant munist China. The enemy in turn had
drive to establish in the ROK and in made no hostile moves against the Jap-
Japan adequate defense forces that one anese base or even against the crowded
day would be capable of resisting the port of Pusan. To localize the war
Communist threat effectively. As has politically and militarily both sides had
been noted, the expansion of the ROK voluntarily imposed limitations upon
forces was far more significant than that their military operations.
of the Japanese, but this was not the The manner in which the United
fault of the United States; the Japanese, States opened the negotiations has been
for a number of reasons, had chosen to attacked by some critics as overhasty.
move cautiously down the road to re- Admiral Joy felt that the quick response
armament. given by the United States to Malik's
The dissension from within the alli- offer of June 1951 created the impression
ance was all too usual in coalition war- that this country wanted or needed a
fare. With so many diverse national ob- cease-fire badly and that this was inter-
jectives involved, agreement upon a preted by the Communists as a sign
common goal was but the initial step. of weakness.3 Perhaps the United
Generally all could agree that the enemy States might have avoided the injection
must be stopped, contained, or defeated, of a sense of urgency into the atmosphere
as the case might be. The debates on by a slower and more devious approach
the means and methods, however, were and deprived the enemy of a psycho-
quite another thing and even in general logical and propaganda edge. But it is
war, such as World War II, were likely doubtful whether the truce would have
to occasion some heated and tense been concluded any sooner in the long
moments. The Korean War was no ex- run, since the UNC actions at Kaesong
ception to this rule, despite its limited and on the battlefield during the sum-
nature. mer of 1951 must have quickly dispelled
After the United States had decided to any illusions that the enemy might have
open negotiations with the Commu- had concerning the UNC need for an
nists, it had refused to be hurried by its armistice.
U.N. allies into an agreement or to Among the UNC delegates and news-
be deflected from its objective by men who attended the first meetings at
ROK opposition to an armistice. Fortu- Kaesong, there had been an initial note
nately the enemy had shown no dispo- of optimism on the length of time that
sition toward seeking a military solution
during the negotiating period, although 3
See Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 165.
504 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

it would take to arrange a truce. Just Korean troops or to build up material


three days after the negotiations opened, in Korea from outside sources was un-
Admiral Burke wrote to his wife and known, but they had made a paper
closed with: "Hope I'm not in this or- pledge. The enemy had narrowed the
chard [at Munsan-ni] when the apples demilitarized zone to four kilometers as
ripen." But, by the end of the battle of opposed to the U.S. desire for a broad
the agenda in late July, he sent a far twenty-mile strip. On the other hand,
different postscript: "Maybe leave in a the Communists had given up their in-
year or so if things don't break soon." 4 sistence upon a return to the 38th Paral-
Exposure to Communist demands and lel and settled for the line of contact.
tactics had quickly induced the admiral Eventual withdrawal of non-Korean
to discard his expectation of a fast settle- troops from the country, which the
ment. United States had maintained was a
Perhaps there might have been a rel- political question, had also been shelved.
atively swift truce if the discussions had It was impossible to shun the political
been limited strictly to military affairs. aspects of many of these points in the
Originally the United States had in- discussion, for there could be no real
tended to bar political questions and to separation of political and military mat-
restrict the delegations to the military ters. The Communists were keenly
considerations inherent in a cease-fire. aware of the relationship and they let
There was to be no debate on the dis- no opportunity pass to make political,
position of Taiwan nor on the seating of psychological, or propaganda capital out
Communist China in the United Nations of the causes they espoused. Before the
and these matters had been successfully negotiations began, Ridgway had accu-
avoided. Recognizing that a political rately predicted that the enemy would
settlement in Korea might not be possi- make many propaganda speeches that
ble in the near future, the United States would require rare patience on the part
had sought a long-term truce and the of the UNC delegates. The performance
Communists had not contested this of the Communist delegates, who had
point. The U.S. proposal for a Military had far more extensive political experi-
Armistice Commission had been ac- ence than their UNC counterparts, had
cepted, although the Communists had borne him out.
inserted the Neutral Nations Supervisory Yet it had not been the enemy that
Commission and its inspection teams as had introduced the very touchy subject
the instruments to carry out the super- of voluntary repatriation, with all of its
visory functions outside the demili- political implications, into the negotia-
tarized zone. Surprisingly enough, the tions. The Communists had wanted to
Communists had permitted the concept effect a simple all-for-all exchange of
of inspection, on a limited basis to be prisoners and it was the United States
sure, to be written in the final agree- who decided, for combined humanitar-
ment. How closely they would observe ian and political reasons, to insist upon
their promise not to increase their non- letting the prisoners have the right of
4
Ltrs, Adm Burke to Mrs. Burke, 13 and 27 July.
self-determination.
In OCMH. The reluctance of the enemy to accept
RETROSPECT 505

defection from the Communist world The validity of these observations was
on a wholesale scale was hardly astonish- sustained during the negotiations. Time
ing, for it constituted a direct admission after time the Communists waited out
that life in the free world was better the UNC delegation, so that they could
than that under the Communist system. accept the advantageous portions of the
From the beginning of the truce meet- UNC proposal and probe for more con-
ings the enemy had been extremely cessions. Eventually, if the UNC refused
sensitive to any suggestion of inequality. to yield further, the Communists would
The rapidity with which they had pro- produce a counteroffer that surrendered
duced a flag and stand to match the a corresponding part of the Communist
UNC flag at the first plenary session had demands. As long as both sides could
been followed up by swift construction give in on an equal number of items,
of colorful sanitation facilities to outdo a compromise agreement could be
those erected by the UNC and by the im- reached. The quickest results had come
portation of a sedan from Russia to pro- when the UNC had been able to balance
vide transportation for Nam Il compar- the give-and-take in its final offer on an
able to Admiral Joy's. This attitude had item and then had refused to discuss the
lasted until the very end when the Com- matter further. For until the enemy
munists had persisted in their demand delegates were convinced that they were
that each side sign nine copies of the not going to get a better deal, they would
armistice agreement. continue to delay and argue tirelessly.
Despite the Communists' strong de- As Barrett had cautioned, the Com-
nials that they were horse traders, their munist tactics had run the gamut. Ad-
actions had belied their words. Back in miral Burke gave his impression of their
the spring of 1951, an old China hand impact early in the negotiations. "No
had offered some sage counsel to the amount of reading about Communists'
Army high command on this score. Col. tactics in conferences," he commented,
David D. Barrett, military attache to "can ever prepare a man completely for
Nationalist China, had warned of the the rude shock he is bound to receive
hazards of bargaining with the Chinese. when he is first exposed to those tac-
If the U.N. Command would set its price tics." 6 Overnight they could shift from
and then calmly sustain a firm position, the harsh, brow-beating, name-calling
the Chinese might howl, bluster, and attacks of a Hsieh Fang, which were
threaten, but they would finally give in, designed to harass or to secure further
Barrett declared. If, on the other concessions, to a quiet, reasonable, and
hand, the U.N.C. showed weakness or businesslike approach to a problem
vacillation, the Chinese would persist in they were ready to settle. The flow of
haggling until they won their point. It propaganda could become a trickle if
was only when they informed you calmly they scented a UNC concession or a
and without bluster, Barrett concluded, veritable flood, if things were going
that you would be sure that they defi- badly for them.
nitely had made up their mind not to Since the Communist dialectic per-
accept your price.5
5 6
Msg, AT 174, Barrett to DA, 17 May 51, in Ltr, Adm Burke to Comdr Alan Brown, USN,
FEC 387.2, bk. 1. 13 Aug 51. In OCMH.
506 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

mitted the ends to justify the means, the were translated, and since some of the
enemy had no hesitation in employing flavor and harshness of the original
any method calculated to achieve success speech was usually lost in the process,
in the negotiations. The distortion of the effect was diminished. On the other
history, the manufacturing of false hand, the semantic difficulties were con-
charges, and the creation of incidents in siderable. General Ridgway had
the prisoner of war camps were as much warned the delegation of this pitfall and
a part of the Communist arsenal as the advised the groups to take great care
yelling, cursing, insults, and discourtesy about possible misunderstandings. Be-
in the conference tent. They were all cause of the contrasts in tradition, back-
part of the game to discompose the op- ground, and training, words like "logic,"
ponent through every kind of pressure. "reason," "injustice," and "democracy"
If the UNC delegates became emo- meant entirely different things to each
tional, they might make mistakes. The side and literal interpretation served
cold war at the truce table comple- only to complicate the problem. Only
mented the hot war at the front, such when these terms were meticulously
as it was. spelled out and clarified, could they take
In this battle of nerves, Admiral on intelligible meaning to the other
Burke noted: side.
As the negotiations wore on, the two
It is essential, of course, in dealing with delegations began to sound more and
these people that you have no personal more like each other. "The peace-loving
feelings whatsoever. Emotion can never af- peoples of the world" were always
fect a conference at all. The only possible
way of winning, in such a conference as solidly lined up behind the UNC or the
this, is by coldly calculating every move and Communist proposal, as the case might
every statement and exercising the maxi- be, since the sincerity and reasonable-
mum amount of patience, calmness and ness of the proposal as a "bridge to
stamina. Once in a while, after a partic- peace" was unmistakable. Sentences
ularly long series of sessions in which these like "Your logic is untenable, while ours
qualities have been displayed, the Com-
munists appear to be a little bit perturbed.7 is reasonable" were freely used by both
delegations. After several weeks of con-
Both Joy and Harrison had done an ad- ferences, Admiral Burke warned his
mirable job in displaying these charac- wife that: "We all will have difficulty
teristics despite the constant Communist in the future, I imagine, in writing
provocations and had resisted, except on statements without superlative adjec-
rare occasions, the temptation to lash tives. Unjust, unfair, unreasonable are
back at the enemy in kind. becoming standard usage in our vocabu-
The lack of language qualifications of laries." 8
the UNC delegates, except for the ROK The semantic bouts with the enemy
member, was a blessing as well as a dis- illustrated the necessity for thorough
advantage. Since they could not under- staff work prior to negotiations in order
stand the loud harangues until they to investigate the exact meaning of each
8
Ltr, Adm Burke to Mrs. Burke, 4 Aug 51. In
7
Ibid. OCMH.
RETROSPECT 507
word in translation and so prevent mis- negotiations period and had won valu-
interpretation. The enemy was quick able defensive terrain as well. More-
to notice and take advantage of lapses over, there was little doubt that the
when he desired to prolong the hag- UNC success on the battlefield was a
gling. factor in the enemy's decision to resume
In all the verbal encounters in the negotiations.
truce tents, the key qualities of patience But this success not been won lightly.
and firmness appeared to be the most The hard fact that 40,000 UNC casualties
essential ones for the UNC delegates. had been suffered in the offensive could
They needed patience to endure all the not be ignored. For the remainder of
attacks, slurs, false charges, and the like,
the conflict the dominating element in
that the Communists emitted to erode making military decisions was the esti-
an opponent's resistance, and they also mated cost in personnel losses. The de-
had to have firmness to present the velopment of the "active defense" in No-
UNC stand in a manner that could not vember 1951 was an outgrowth of this
be misinterpreted when the final or sentiment as well as of the resumption
minimum position was reached. If the of negotiations, and Ridgway and Van
delegation weathered the storm of in- Fleet disapproved or discarded several
vective, the half truths, and distortions ambitious offensive plans during the fall
convincingly, the enemy eventually and winter because of the high estimates
would come up with a better offer or of casualties involved.
even with acceptance of the UNC pro- The wisdom of relaxing the ground
posal. For representatives of a people pressure upon the enemy and of fixing
that have frequently been accused of ex- a provisional line of demarcation in No-
cessive impatience, the U.S. delegates, de-
vember was later questioned by some
spite their personal feelings, acquitted observers, who maintained that this
themselves extremely well in the nego- course of action permitted the enemy
tiations. to strengthen his lines and deprived the
U.N. Command of the means to induce
The Battlefield the Communists to take more reason-
able positions at Panmunjom.9
During the last two years of the war Whether or not sustained ground
the battlefield received its cue from the pressure would have persuaded the
negotiations. The first reaction of the enemy to come to terms sooner is an aca-
UNC to the policy of delay adopted by demic matter. Continued heavy losses
the Communists in the summer of 1951 might have altered their attitude toward
at Kaesong had been a resort to military negotiating, but human life was one of
pressure. Without question, the limited the Communists' most abundant re-
operations that had followed repre- sources and was freely used during the
sented the best military effort of the war. And it should not be forgotten
UNC during the last two years of the
war. In October 1951 the Eighth Army 9(1) Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 129.
(2) Memo, Kinney for CINCUNC, no date, sub:
had inflicted upon the enemy the high- Armistice Negotiations, in FEC Gen Admin Files,
est monthly total of casualties for the CofS, 1952 Corresp, Paper SGS 3718.
508 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

that maintaining the offensive would operation that had gone far beyond its
have meant a rapidly growing list of original plan. After this test of the for-
casualties for the Eighth Army as well. midable strength and depth of the Com-
With mere terrain rather than military munist lines, Clark remained strictly on
victory as the objective, how long could the defensive.
the Eighth Army have sustained a Only at the end of the war did the
costly offensive before stern criticism ground front return to the fore. In the
arose in the United States? spring of 1953 the Communists decided
It was evident that the thirty-day ac- to use the battlefield to apply pressure
ceptance of the demarcation line late in upon the negotiations and to prepare
1951 had resulted in a de facto cease-fire some basis for their claim of military vic-
that lasted until October 1952. The low tory. They had little hesitation in ex-
casualty rate on both sides during the pending lives to take a few more hills
December 1951-September 1952 pe- when the sacrifice seemed to promise a
riod attested to this fact, with the UNC future political gain.
averaging less than 3,500 and the enemy The UNC renunciation of major
less than 15,000 (estimated) per month. ground operations led to the attempt to
By way of comparison, the totals in Octo- substitute air for ground pressure in late
ber 1951 showed almost 20,000 for the 1951 and most of 1952. The valiant ef-
U.N. Command and over 80,000 (esti- forts by Air Force, Navy, and Marine
mated) for the Communist forces.10 pilots in the air campaigns hurt the
Given the strait jackets that the op- enemy considerably, to be sure, but, be-
ponents had voluntarily donned for the cause of the lesser logistical demands of
last two years of the war, the struggle the static war, not enough to force con-
resolved itself into a pushing and shov- cessions on the vital prisoner of war
ing contest with a ten-mile strip of issue.
Korea as the arena. With both parties How great a role the military opera-
keeping one eye on the truce tent, the tions of both sides played in influencing
attritional battles at the front, punctu- the course of negotiations would be dif-
ated by long and frequent pauses ficult to assess with any degree of accu-
between the rounds, went on incon- racy. It is far easier to show the direct
clusively. For the greater part of the relationship between the negotiations
fight, neither side made efforts to ex- and the battlefield than to demonstrate
pend large amounts of men and the indirect effects of combat operations
matériel simply to take the terrain, upon the truce settlement.
since this process had proved to be ex- Nevertheless, the stalemate on the
tremely costly. The one ground effort ground did establish conditions which
of any proportion mounted under Gen- were far-reaching in other respects, such
eral Clark—the expensive Triangle Hill as the very real problem of morale at
venture—had been a suction pump type the front. The liberal UNC rotation
policy and the rest and recreation pro-
10
gram in Japan helped to ease some of
Casualty figures are based on UNC/FEC, Comd the frustration, but as General Taylor
Rpts, Jul 51-Jul 52 and Hq Eighth Army, Comd
Rpts, Aug 52-Jul 53. pointed out in May 1953, one factor
RETROSPECT 509

tended to spoil the otherwise excellent all encountered the same fate—oblivion
morale situation. —and the war had ended, as it had be-
gun, on a defensive note.
That factor stems from the fluid, un- With the infantry confined to trenches
certain political circumstances which exist and bunkers for the most part, the artil-
through the world, and which are apparent
in a unique fashion in Korea. Political lery arm had taken on additional im-
objectives hold little appeal and are not portance. In December 1952, Van Fleet
highly evaluated generally by soldiers in had characterized the war as an artillery
battle positions, whereas a clearly defined duel and told an observer team from
physical objective constitutes a goal, attain- the United States that he placed 90 per-
ment of which tends to hold promise of a
cessation of conflict, physical hazards, and cent of the task of defeating the enemy
the other unpleasant facts of war. Particu- upon the UNC artillery.12 Through
larly to the American soldier, the mission huge expenditures of artillery ammuni-
of occupying or defending a static line tion the U.N. Command helped to com-
during an extended period tends to create pensate for the enemy's superiority in
an impression of futility, as well as uncer-
tainty regarding an ultimate outcome.11 manpower and to hold down its own
losses. This was especially true when the
Here was the crux of the matter in the Communists employed their "human
field—the lack of meaningful battle sea" attacks to overwhelm UNC posi-
objectives that could not help but build tions. Out in the open the enemy was
frustration and impatience, especially completely vulnerable to co-ordinated
among the military commanders. firepower and suffered heavy losses. In
Despite its lack of purpose during the addition, counterbattery, interdictory,
truce negotiations, the Eighth Army had and harassing fire served to continue
performed well. There were several in- pressure upon the Communists, to inflict
stances when components of the UNC damage and casualties, and to lower ene-
forces conducted themselves less than my morale while bolstering that of the
nobly, but these were exceptions and not UNC forces.
the rule. The Eighth Army, as rebuilt However, as long as the Communist
by Ridgway and later strengthened by troops remained in their well-prepared
Van Fleet and Taylor, had impressed ob- field fortifications, they were extremely
servers as an excellent field army. It difficult to hit. During the relatively in-
had been tested defensively and had active month of April 1953, the UNC
managed to blunt the limited enemy artillery had fired over a million and a
assaults and to counterattack effectively. quarter rounds at the enemy and Com-
But the Eighth Army had not had a real munist battle casualties from all causes
opportunity to prove how good it was had been estimated at 10,500 men.13
offensively during the last half of the Even assuming that all of the casualties
war, because of restrictions on its scale had resulted from the artillery fire—
of operations. The outline plans for which they did not—the ratio would still
launching major attacks northward had
12
Summary Sheet, Eddleman for CofS, 17 Dec
52, sub: Survey . . . Artillery Units in Korea, in
11
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 55- G-3 091 Korea, 109.
13
56. Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 53.
510 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

be well over a hundred rounds per Communists were able to improve their
casualty. supply situation. Despite the air attacks
The UNC advantage in artillery lay on enemy lines of communication, stock-
in better fire control equipment and piles of ammunition grew and enemy
techniques and in the supply of ammu- fire techniques became more skilfull.
nition, rather than in numbers of bat- Artillery fire in June and July 1953 was
talions and pieces. The Communists both heavy and accurate in support of
had over twice as many battalions in their final offensives.
Korea as the UNC had and a consider- The greater supply of ammunition
able edge in the number of guns as well. enjoyed by the U.N. Command and its
The big difference stemmed from the control of the air meant that the Com-
number of rounds fired by each gun and munists had to construct field fortifica-
here the UNC, with more ample stocks tions that would be able to take severe
and a speedier resupply system, had the poundings from artillery and air attack.
advantage. In this respect, the UNC air In organizing the defense, the enemy
interdiction campaign did yeoman serv- troops dug deeply, using overhead cover
ice, for it made the enemy task of effectively to absorb heavy punishment,
bringing ammunition to the front espe- and then carefully camouflaged their
cially hazardous and laborious. By re- positions. As one senior observer later
stricting the number of rounds on hand commented, they built their fortifica-
at the front, the air forces helped to tions much closer to the specifications
curtail enemy operations and to save set forth in the U.S. Army field manual
UNC lives. than most Eighth Army soldiers did.14
Control of the air over Korea and of Only a direct hit by a large bomb or
the sea approaches gave the U.N. Com- from a flat trajectory weapon could
mand other advantages as well. It penetrate the enemy's defense bunkers
meant that all of the enemy's supplies and gun positions, in most cases. Many
had to come in on the limited overland outfits in the Eighth Army were not so
route and the strain on the line of com- thorough and built their bunkers and
munications was greatly increased. On shelters without adequate interior sup-
the other hand, the UNC had a free rein port or overhead cover. After a heavy
in using both sea and land lines to sup- Korean rain, cave-ins were all too com-
ply its own forces. The air and sea mon, especially before the winter of
domination also provided a valuable 1952-53.
psychological advantage, for the threat The Chinese Communist concept of
of a major enemy attack from the air tactics had in the past embraced a fluid
and on the water, although it was always rather than a positional type of warfare,
a possibility, never materialized and the and the shift had been rapid and adept.
challenge offered to the Communists to Fortifying their lines in great depth, the
break the UNC control was ignored. Chinese defended their positions skil-
This was perhaps very fortunate since fully. And, within the framework of
areas like Pusan were very vulnerable positional defense, they still clung to
to surprise attacks. 14
Conversation of author with Maj Gen Patrick
As the war became more static, the H. Tansey, 11 Feb 60.
RETROSPECT 511

vestiges of the fluid concept. Often wounded. Therefore, we must control the
when a UNC attack was launched, they scene of a battle when the fight is over.15
would fall back quickly, let the UNC The report then sums up:
take over an objective, and then mount The Chinese soldier is not a superman.
a swift counterattack. He is well and courageously led at the
In late 1952, the U.S. 2d Division small unit level and the results of actions
compiled a volume of data on the at this level offer definite proof that he is
Chinese in battle, which the Eighth thoroughly disciplined. His industry is
shown by his thorough fortifications. His
Army considered worth reproducing. conduct of the defense is accomplished in
The following excerpts are from this spite of UN air superiority, UN liaison air-
study: craft, lack of his own liaison aircraft and
inferior communications equipment. He
a. The enemy makes good use of the ter- is operating on a shoestring basis as is
rain during an attack. He maneuvers his evidenced by the hodge-podge of equipment
troops regardless of the size of the unit and picked up on the battlefield after every
habitually attacks from more than one di- encounter.16
rection.
b. When using artillery and mortar sup- To these encomiums might be added
port in the attack the Chinese follow their the observation that the enemy was not
preparatory artillery and mortar fires close- only brave and resourceful, but also
ly. This is done to the extent of accepting tough. Growing up in an underdevel-
some casualties from their own fire.
c. Positive steps must be taken to protect oped nation, where famines were com-
and to insure communications. Heavy mon, the Chinese could subsist on very
Chinese bombardments prior to an attack little and endure great privation. They
have usually rendered our communications had to be tough to survive in an atmos-
useless. phere where life was held so cheaply.
d. The Chinese employ a system of
mutually supporting strong points in the And the comment about "operating on
defense. The areas between and the ap- a shoe-string basis" could be applied to
proaches to their positions are covered with the whole Chinese effort in Korea in
fire. many respects. Pitted against opponents
e. The Chinese soldier digs in quickly who had attained a high degree of tech-
and deeply which effectively protects him
from all UN bombardments. He immedi- nological skill and who were able to
ately takes up his fighting position to de- bring superior matériel into play against
fend his sector when the shelling subsides. them in the air, on the ground, at sea,
f. Chinese patrols are well planned, have and in matters of communication and
a definite purpose, i.e., reconnaissance of transportation, they still managed to
UN positions to determine strength and
disposition of weapons. He also watches hold their own by the prodigious use
our patrol routes and habits in preparation of manpower. Lacking construction
for ambush patrols. equipment, Chiang Kai-shek had used
g. The enemy's implementation of ma- hand labor to construct the airfields for
neuver also applies to his patrols. Elements U.S. planes in World War II and had
of Chinese patrols move to the flanks and successfully completed the huge task.
rear of our patrols in an attempt to en-
circle them.
h. The enemy makes a determined effort 15
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, sec. I,
to police the battlefield of material and Narrative, pp. 25-27.
16
both his own and friendly dead and Ibid.
512 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

In Korea the Chinese again demon- nesses of the UNC or the Communists
strated how manpower could be used are absolute, and a second encounter,
in quantity to take the place of ma- even if limited in nature, might find an
chines. Although this process might be entirely different set of circumstances in
uneconomical and wasteful in principle, operation and might result in an out-
it was effective as an expedient and as come quite unlike the first. The frantic
a countermeasure. In this case superior efforts to industralize Communist China
technology, far from leading to an easy might remedy some technological de-
victory, produced no victory at all. ficiencies, only to breed others in their
But the enemy's armor was not with- place. As industrial development moves
out weaknesses and the Chinese were by forward, weapons and tactics would
no means "supermen." Their practice probably change and the relative capa-
of informing the troops of the objectives bilities of the opposing sides would shift
before an attack and discussing the op- as well.
eration in open session frequently led On the other hand, a later clash might
to desertion by soldiers who had de- prove to have a great deal in common
cided that their chances for surviving with the Korean venture. Even if much
the action were not particularly good. of the military experience had to be
From these deserters the U.N. Com- scrapped because of the growth of the
mand was sometimes forewarned of an new weapons and tactics, the knowledge
approaching assault and had time to pre- of the foe gained in Korea would help
pare a warm reception for the enemy. to formulate future plans and strategy
It was on such occasions that another and should avert the possibility of again
flaw in the Chinese system appeared. underestimating the opponent. And
Once the orders for an attack were is- since the Communist objective of even-
sued, a certain amount of inflexibility tual world domination is not likely to
crept in. Unit leaders persisted in trying change, regardless of the variety of
to carry out the original plan even when means adopted to achieve this end, the
it became clear that unpredictable fac- political experience with the Commu-
tors had entered the picture and had nist techniques obtained in Korea could
made the execution of the plan impos- turn out to be invaluable in working out
sible.17 The failure to use initiative and a settlement if it came to open conflict
to cancel the operation led to some of again or to counteracting Communist
the heaviest enemy casualties of the two- efforts on the political level. It would
year period, as the battle for White indeed be unfortunate if the hard-won
Horse Hill bore witness. lessons learned in the Korean War, both
Neither the strengths nor the weak- on the battlefield and in the negotia-
tions, should be ignored or forgotten
17
Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 10. because of the absence of victory.
Appendix A
Strength of the UNC Ground Forces in Korea
Appendix A-1

a
Includes Marine and Navy personnel under operational control of U.S. Army.
b
Includes KATUSA, ROK marines under operational control of U.S. Army, and civilian
trainees.
c
See Appendix A-2 for distribution by country.
Source: Comptroller of the Army Summary, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces Strength in
Korea, 7 Oct 54. OCMH Files.
Appendix A-2

a
Contribution consisted of noncombat medical units only.
b
Includes Luxembourg detachment of approximately forty-four men.
Source: Comptroller of the Army, Summary, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces Strength in
Korea, 7 Oct 54. OCMH files.
Appendix B
Prisoners of War
Appendix B-1—Repatriates

a
Included 446 civilian internees, of which 3 were female and 18 female POW's.
b
Included 60,788 male POW's, 473 female POW's, 23 children, and 8,899 civilian internees.
c
Included 1 female POW.
Source: See Hq, U.S. Army, Pacific, Mil Hist Office, The Handling of Prisoners of War
During the Korean Conflict, by John A. McReynolds, pp. 67, 89. MS in OCMH.
APPENDIX B 515

Appendix B-2—Nonrepatriates
Held by UNC

Held by Communists

a
Final action completed on 19 Feb 54.
Source: Final Report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, no date, in OCMH.
Hq, U.S. Army, Pacific, Military History Office, The Handling of Prisoners of War During the
Korean Conflict, by John A. McReynolds, pp. 97-98. MS in OCMH.
Appendix C
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED


NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SUPREME
COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COM-
MANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER
HAND, CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, on


the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and
the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the
interest of stopping the Korean Conflict, with its great toll of suffering and
bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice
which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed
force in Korea until a final peace settlement is achieved, do individually, col-
lectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the
conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Para-
graphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in
character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

ARTICLE I
MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall with-
draw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone
between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a
buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a re-
sumption of hostilities.
2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached
map.
3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary
as indicated on the attached map.
4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by
the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders
of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary
between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armis-
tice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the
APPENDIX C 517

Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.
5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of
both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is
controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall pre-
scribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated
on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access
to the land under the military control of that side.
6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the
Demilitarized Zone.
7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military
Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armis-
tice Commission.
8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be per-
mitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless
specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry
is sought.
9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demili-
tarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration
and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice
Commission.
10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone
which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of
the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration
and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military
Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander
of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Vol-
unteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are
permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administra-
tion and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no
case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand
(1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to
be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission.
Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by
the Military Armistice Commission.
11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the com-
plete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the
Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with
their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter estab-
lished, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants,
and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to
enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Con-
venience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the
military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points
within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads
lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.
518 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ARTICLE II
CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

A. GENERAL
12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a com-
plete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control,
including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective
twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63
hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice
Agreement).
13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate
the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a
political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides
shall:
a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the
Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, mine-
fields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel
of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to
exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of the military forces
therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be
reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side
whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be
cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the
seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demili-
tarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice
Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for
unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage
operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a
police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commis-
sion and agreed by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel au-
thorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be
permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.
b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective,
withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and
coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are
not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and
valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action
which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term
"coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by
one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were con-
trolled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands
lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANG-
HAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N,
APPENDIX C 519

124°40'E), TAEGHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N,


124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N,
125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-
chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying
south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military
control of the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command.
c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel;
provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea
of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel
after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted
within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of
units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of
duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from
Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rota-
tion shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more
than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be ad-
mitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy.
No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the intro-
duction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of
that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement
to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have de-
parted from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures
from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice
Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall
include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or
departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission,
through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and
inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports
of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.
d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, ar-
mored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat
aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, dam-
aged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on
the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such com-
bat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into
Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In
order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons,
and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports
concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military
Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such
reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being
replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed
only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams,
shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft,
armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of
entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.
520 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of
the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.
f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves
are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side
to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of
proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased
military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific
procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be
determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the
opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining
to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.
g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the
Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the
carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and
accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Na-
tions Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters
of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enu-
merated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon
by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have
been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of
alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the
main lines of communication are closed or impassable.
h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transpor-
tation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.
i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their re-
spective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the
Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.
j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the
proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immuni-
ties to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under inter-
national usage.
14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces
under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the
Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the op-
posing side.
15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which
naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to
the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall
not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.
16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air
forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of
APPENDIX C 521
Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters con-
tiguous to both.
17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and
provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their
successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish
within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure
complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their
commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military
Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in
requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of
this Armistice Agreement.
18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared
equally by the two opposing sides.

B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION


1. COMPOSITION
19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.
20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior
officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-chief, United
Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Su-
preme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the
Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall
be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be
major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.
21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use
staff assistants as required.
22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary
administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the
Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such
other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the
Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized
personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean,
and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.
23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with
and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced
by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Com-
mission.
b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4)
nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by
the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be
appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and
the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as
drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the
functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.
522 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY


24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to
supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through
negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.
25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:
a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29"N,
126°40'00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate its headquarters
at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior mem-
bers of both sides on the Commission.
b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.
c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem nec-
essary.
d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agree-
ment pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and the Han River Estuary.
e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.
f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.
g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all
reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other
reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission.
h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Com-
mittee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the
Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.
i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the
Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall
not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating
with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.
j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint
Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels,
used in the performance of its mission.
26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military
Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this
Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River
Estuary.
27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side
thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations
of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone
or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one-half of
the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Ar-
mistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of
either side on the Commission.
28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side
thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to
conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized
Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have
occurred.
29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of
APPENDIX C 523
this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation
to the Commanders of the opposing sides.
30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of
this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report
to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. GENERAL
31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to
exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides;
provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice
by the senior member of either side.
32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military
Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing
sides as soon as possible after each meeting.
33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military
Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall
make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be
required by the Commission.
34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the
reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The
Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, rec-
ords, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dis-
solution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each
side.
35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the
Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to
this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those
designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION


1. COMPOSITION
36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.
37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four
(4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nomi-
nated by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN
and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral
nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's
Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND
and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined
as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in
Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of
the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to
attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to
attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their princi-
pals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever
the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side
524 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated
by the other side.
38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be per-
mitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These
staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.
39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish
a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary
record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Com-
mission may assign to it.
40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially pro-
vided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams,
which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides
on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams
shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of,
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.
b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less
than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the
neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Com-
mand, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of
the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations
Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In
order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less
than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated
by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall
be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the
Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers,
may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers,
clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may
be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the
Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the
territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commis-
sion may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of
the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided,
however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of
which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY


41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to
carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation,
as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to
report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation
to the Military Armistice Commission.
42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:
a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military
Armistice Commission.
APPENDIX C 525

b. Adopt such rules of procedures as it may, from time to time, deem


necessary.
c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and
13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph
43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph
28 hereof at those places where violations of the Armistice Agreement have been
reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles,
weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be
such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft,
armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into
Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations
of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle,
weapon, or ammunition.
d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams.
e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry
enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military
control of the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command; and five (5)
Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph
43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations
Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters
of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced
by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice
Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the
senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.
f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct
without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement,
including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement
as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior
member of either side on the Commission.
g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral
Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft,
and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.
43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following
ports of entry:
Territory under the military control of Territory under the military control of
the United Nations Command the Korean People's Army and the
Chinese People's Volunteers
INCHON (37°28'N, 126°38'E) SINUIJU (40°06'N, 124°24'E)
TAEGU (35°52'N, 128°36'E) CHONGJIN (41°46'N, 129°49'E)
PUSAN (35°06'N, 129°02'E) HUNGNAM (39°50'N, 127°37'E)
KANGNUNG (37°45'N, 128°54'E) MANPO (41°09'N, 126°18'E)
KUNSAN (35°59'N, 126°43'E) SINANJU (39°36'N, 125°36'E)
526 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of
movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on
the attached map.

3. GENERAL
44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses
of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be
terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.
45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice
Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in
English, Korean, and Chinese.
46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports
concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investi-
gations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the
Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed
necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be
submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more
individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more
individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.
47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams
shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received.
They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the
earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice
Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not
take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has
been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to
appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the
senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarifica-
tion of any report submitted.
48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate
files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agree-
ment. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other
reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon
eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned
over to each side.
49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommenda-
tions to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or
additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should
generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.
50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof,
shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice
Commission.
APPENDIX C 527
ARTICLE III
ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of
each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected
in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to
the signing of this Armistice Agreement.
a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and
hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on
repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Re-
patriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of
this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each
side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total
numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of
prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters,
prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or
military serial number.
b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are
not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand
them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in
accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."
c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of
three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other
side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation"
in English, " " (SONG HWAN) in Korean, and " " (CH'IEN
FAN) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such
prisoners of war.
52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean
conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into
effect of this Armistice Agreement.
53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation
shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured
medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of
war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.
54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph
51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this
Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side under-
takes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its
custody at the earliest practicable time.
55. PANMUNJOM is the place designated where prisoners of war will be
delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and recep-
tion of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary,
by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby estab-
lished. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom
528 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
shall be appointed by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, and
three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the
Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Mili-
tary Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of
both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execu-
tion by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to
the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to
coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery
and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoners of war camps of both sides;
to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with
regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to
coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57
hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the
implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of
war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, addi-
tional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for
security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry
out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners
of war.
b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its respon-
sibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately
refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Com-
mittee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in
proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved
by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of
repatriation of prisoners of war.
57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint
Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies
of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one
hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's
Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross
teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this
Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war
specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the
performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the
welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross
teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war
by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and
shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war
and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the
prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of
war while en route from prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and
reception of prisoners of war.
b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:
APPENDIX C 529
(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten
(10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist
in delivery
of the delivering and receiving
and reception of prisoners
of prisoners of war. of
Thewarchairmanship
by both sidesofatthis
theteam
place(s)
shall

alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two
sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee
for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty
(30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit
the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army
and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners
of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery
and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the
People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.
(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty
(30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit
the prisoners of war camps under the administration of the United Nations
Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route
from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of
prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing
forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.
(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team,
sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from this team, with an
equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances
require.
(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and
such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform
their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, to the team
operating in the territory under his military control.
(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides
on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased,
subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red
Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the
security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his
military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, ad-
ministrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team
operating in the territory under his military control.
d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the
program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph
51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation.
58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the
other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this
Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning
prisoners of war:
530 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped


since the effective date of the data last exchanged.
(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality,
rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial,
of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.
b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the
supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to
the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War,
the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph
58a thereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the com-
pletion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.
c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the de-
taining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of
prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for
disposition.
59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes ef-
fective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-chief,
United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the
Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if
they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-chief,
United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarca-
tion Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander
of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's
Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarca-
tion Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return
home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean
People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to
return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander
of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout territory
under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph,
and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance
and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.
b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice
Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the
Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under
the military control of the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, be
permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the
time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the
military control of the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, shall,
if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of
each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory
under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph,
APPENDIX C 531

and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance
and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed
to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.
c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-para-
graph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph
59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this
Armistice Agreement becomes effective.
d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of the Displaced Civilians
is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade,
two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-chief, United Na-
tions Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the
Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general super-
vision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for
coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the
above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of
all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the
above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make
necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and
coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the
crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the
Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s);
and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return
of the above-mentioned civilians.
(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its
responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians
shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for
decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall
maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military
Armistice Commission.
(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians
shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its
mission.

ARTICLE IV

RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED


ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the
military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of
the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the
Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of
a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively
to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.
532 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

ARTICLE V
MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutu-


ally agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.
62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain
in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments
and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful set-
tlement at a political level between both sides.
63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph
12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.
Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953,
in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.
(Signed) (Signed) (Signed)
KIM IL SUNG PENG TEH-HUAI MARK W. CLARK
Marshal, Democratic Commander, General, United States
People's Republic Chinese People's Army
of Korea Volunteers Commander-in-chief,
Supreme Commander, United Nations
Korean People's Army Command
PRESENT
(Signed) (Signed)
NAM IL WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
General, Korean People's Army Lieutenant General, United States
Senior Delegate, Army
Delegation of the Korean People's Senior Delegate,
Army and the Chinese People's United Nations Command Delegation
Volunteers

ANNEX
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

(See Sub-paragraph 51b)

I
GENERAL

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exer-
cise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland,
Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to
appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall
be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in
the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be re-
patriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its
APPENDIX C 533

headquarters within the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and


shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation Com-
mission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both sides shall
be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and
its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.
2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to
assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its func-
tions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose repre-
sentative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132
of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be chairman and executive agent of
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of
the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to
exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations
is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate repre-
sentative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The
arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph shall be limited to military
police type small arms.
3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war
specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no
violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be per-
mitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below).
This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all
times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the
Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.

II
CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation
following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the
military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practi-
cable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date
of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.
5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes con-
trol of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side
shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding
Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining side
shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order
in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and
for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed
forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion
against locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.
534 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in this


agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and re-
sponsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary
jurisdiction.

III
EXPLANATION

8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and


taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right
to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety
(90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the
custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom
and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of
war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these
nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return
to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a
peaceful life, under the following provisions:
a. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven
(7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Re-
patriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a
total of five (5);
b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have
access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission, and generally in accord with Article 531 of the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;
c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of
a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission and a representative from the detaining side;
d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be pre-
scribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed
to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this Para-
graph;
e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall
be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless
communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited
to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence,
except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in
which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not
more than six (6) communications personnel.
9. Prisoners of war in ils custody shall have freedom and facilities to make
representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-
mission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter
concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements
made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.
APPENDIX C 535

IV
DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall
make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a repre-
sentative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commis-
sion. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies
so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such applica-
tion. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or
one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately
be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready
to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of
war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure pre-
scribed in the Armistice Agreement.
11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of
the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access
of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above,
shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who
have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Politi-
cal Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice
Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days,
during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall con-
tinue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatri-
ation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to
civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be
repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Politi-
cal Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, ac-
cording to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral
nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and
the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within
thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution.
After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, when-
ever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been re-
lieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the
authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting
them in returning to their fatherland.

V
RED CROSS VISITATION

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral
536 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance


with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VI
PRESS COVERAGE

13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall insure freedom of


the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated
herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission.

VII
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the
area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity
of each prisoner of war installation.
15. The cost of repatriating prisoners of war to the exchange point at Pan-
munjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange
point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118
of the Geneva Convention.
16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such
general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.
17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical
support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall
provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive
treatment or Hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The
detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment,
prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified
in Paragraph 4 above.
18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from
both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties
and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere
or exert influence.

VIII
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS
REPATRIATION COMMISSION

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the
personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the
APPENDIX C 537

area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal
basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The precise arrangements
shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission and the detaining side in each case.
20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the ex-
plaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of com-
munication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the
vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are
in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible
for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations
where the prisoners of war are in custody.
21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, com-
munication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representa-
tives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such
services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX
PUBLICATION

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agree-
ment shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody
of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

X
MOVEMENT

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation


Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communica-
tion as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communica-
tion shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within
locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and
escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken;
however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.

XI
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission,
and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by
538 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of
the majority vote.
25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly
report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its
custody, indicating the number repatriated and remaining at the end of each
week.
26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five
powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice be-
comes effective.
Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in
English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

NAM IL WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.


General, Korean People's Army Lieutenant General, United
Senior Delegate, States Army
Delegation of the Korean People's Senior Delegate,
Army and the Chinese People's United Nations Command
Volunteers Delegation
Appendix D
Plenary Members of the Armistice Delegations a

United Nations Command Delegation


Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, USN 10 July 1951 - 22 May 1952
Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, USA 10 July 1951 - 17 December 1951
Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, USN 10 July 1951 - 11 December 1951
Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie, USAF 10 July 1951 - 27 November 1951
Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, ROKA 10 July 1951 - 24 October 1951
Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, ROKA 24 October 1951 - 6 February 1952
Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, USAF 27 November 1951 - 5 July 1952
Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, USA 17 December 1951 - 6 February 1952
Rear Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, USN 11 December 1951 - 23 June 1952
Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., USA 6 February 1952 - 27 July 1953
Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung, ROKA 6 February 1952 - 28 May 1952
Brig. Gen. Frank C. McConnell, USA 22 May 1952 - 26 April 1953
Brig. Gen. Lee Han Lim, ROKA 28 May 1952 - 26 April 1953
Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris, USAF 5 July 1952 - 26 April 1953
Rear Adm. John C. Daniel, USN
Brig. Gen. Ralph M. Osborne, USA 23 June 1952 - 27 July 1953
Brig. Gen. Choi Duk Shin, ROKA 26 April 1953 - 16 May 1953
Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn, USAF 25 April 1953 - 20 June 1953
Brig. Gen. George M. Finch, USAF 20 June 1953 - 27 July 1953
North Korean and Chinese Communist Delegation
Lt. Gen. Nam Il, KPA 10 July 1951 - 27 July 1953
General Teng Hua, CCF 10 July 1951 - 24 October 1951
Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, KPA 10 July 1951 - 27 July 1953
Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang, CCF 10 July 1951 - 26 April 1953
Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, KPA 10 July 1951 - 24 October 1951
General Pien Chang-wu, CCF 24 October 1951 - 26 April 1953
Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan, KPA 24 October 1951 - 28 April 1952
Rear Adm. Kim Won Mu, KPN 28 April 1952 - 11 August 1952
Maj. Gen. So Hui, KPA 11 August 1952 - 26 April 1953
General Ting Kuo-yu, CCF 26 April 1953 - 27 July 1953
Maj. Gen. Chang Chun San, KPA 26 April 1953 - 25 May 1953
Maj. Gen. Tsai Cheng-wen, CCF 26 April 1953 - 27 May 1953
Admiral Kim Won Mu, KPN 25 May 1953 - 17 June 1953
Maj. Gen. Kim Dong Hak, KPA 17 June 1953 - 27 July 1953
a
In this appendix the tour of duty of a delegate is concluded on the date that
his replacement is officially accredited in a plenary session, even though in many
cases the delegate may have been relieved and reassigned while the meetings were
in recess.
Bibliographical Note
This volume was written primarily Army and the Far East Command/
from records kept by the Department United Nations Command was carried
of the Army and subordinate commands on by radio communication. A complete
during the Korean War, interpreted file on the messages sent and received
with the help of a number of other by the JCS/Department of the Army
sources, principally armed forces' his- to the UNC/FEC is kept in the Staff
tories, reports, and monographs. Un- Communications Center, Office of the
less otherwise specified, the primary Chief of Staff, DA.
materials discussed below may be found Messages exchanged between UNC/
in the collections in the custody of the FEC and subordinate commands in the
National Archives and Records Service field are available in The Adjutant Gen-
of the General Services Administration, eral's files, FEC, at the Federal Records
Washington, D.C. Center, GSA, Kansas City, Missouri, and
in the files cited in the footnotes of the
Primary Sources text.
For the theater story the most valu-
For the Washington side of the nar- able sources are the command reports
rative, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, submitted on a monthly basis by each
Operations, official central correspon- major command. The narrative sec-
dence file, arranged according to the tions of the reports provide an excellent
Army decimal system, forms the most guide to the major activities of the
complete and useful Army collection of month; the accompanying staff section
high-level policy and planning papers. reports, annexes, appendices and
Since G-3 acted as the executive agent inclosures amplify the narrative sections
for the Chief of Staff, most of the im- and include copies of many of the
portant letters, memorandums, reports, basic documents discussed. The UNC/
and studies pertinent to the direction of FEC and the Eighth Army Command
the war in Korea passed through this reports were especially helpful in the
office. preparation of this volume.
G-3 also maintained a special collec- Theater files on plans, operations,
tion of the official transcripts, letters, and command, administration, and the
other documents pertaining to the truce armistice are in several collections. Far
conference. The minutes of meetings of East Command files covering 1951 and
the plenary, subdelegate, liaison, and 1953 activities in these departments and
staff officers sessions and the correspon- a small group of numbered binders orig-
dence between the delegations will be inating in the Joint Strategic Plans and
found in this collection. Operations Group are in the custody of
The bulk of the correspondence be- the National Archives and Records Serv-
tween the JCS/Department of the ice. But the FEC G-3 and General
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 541

Administrative files for 1952 are at the Books


Kansas City Records Center, as are the
Eighth Army Operational Planning and Appleman, Roy E. South to the Nak-
General Administrative files. tong: North to the Yalu. UNITED
The combat story is based principally STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN
upon battalion, regimental, and di- WAR. Washington, 1961.
visional journals and reports. These Barclay, Brigadier C. N. The First
contain both narrative accounts of the ac- Commonwealth Division: The Story of
tion and much of the raw materials that British Commonwealth Land Forces in
provided the basis for the narrative. Korea, 1950-1953. London: Aldershot,
The journal entries and transcripts of Gale and Polden, Ltd., 1954.
exchanges were especially helpful. Berger, Carl. The Korean Knot: A
During and shortly after the war, Military-Political History. Philadelphia:
members of the Historical Detachments University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957.
attached to the Far East Command and Biderman, Albert D. March to
to the Eighth Army produced a number Calumny. New York: The Macmillan
of monographs, studies, and after action Company, 1963.
reports on different phases of the con- Cagle, Malcolm W., and Frank A.
flict. Covering the armistice, small unit Manson. The Sea War in Korea. An-
actions, logistics, and a myriad of other napolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957.
subjects, these manuscripts are invalu- Chung Kyung Cho. Korea Tomor-
able, especially the comprehensive four- row: Land of the Morning Calm. New
volume study on the armistice negotia- York: The Macmillan Company, 1959.
tions. Copies of the FEC and Eighth Clark, Mark W. From the Danube to
Army monographs are in the Office of the Yalu. New York: Harper and Broth-
the Chief of Military History files. ers, 1954.
The records of the interviews con- Clews, John. The Communists' New
ducted by the author and the corre- Weapon—Germ Warfare. London: Lin-
spondence between the author and coln Pragers, 1953.
various participants in the events cov- Department of State. The Conflict in
ered in the volume will also be found in Korea. Washington, 1951.
OCMH files. Department of State. In Quest of
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke graciously Peace and Security: Selected Documents
turned over to the author a number of on American Foreign Policy, 1941-1951.
personal letters written during his tour Washington, 1951.
as a member of the armistice delega- Department of State. Korea, 1945 to
tion. These letters are in OCMH files. 1948. Washington, 1948.
Department of State. Korea's Inde-
Secondary Sources pendence. Washington, 1947.
Dille, John. Substitute for Victory.
The following list is by no means New York: Doubleday and Company,
complete but notes the works the author Inc., 1954.
found most useful. Field, James A., Jr. History of U.S.
542 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Naval Operations: Korea. Washington, Department of the Army. Korea 1951-
1962. 1953. Washington, 1956.
Futrell, R. Frank. The United States Oliver, Robert T. Verdict in Korea.
Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. New State College, Pennsylvania: Bald Eagle
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961. Press, 1952.
Goodrich, Leland M. Korea: A Study Poats, Rutherford M. Decision in
of U.S. Policy in the United Nations. Korea. New York: The McBride Com-
New York: Council on Foreign Rela- pany, 1954.
tions, 1956. Sawyer, Maj. Robert K. Military Ad-
Grajdanzev, Andrew J. Modern Ko- visors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and
rea. New York: John Day Company, War. Washington, 1963.
1944. Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years
Joy, Admiral C. Turner. How Com- of Trial and Hope, vol. II. New York:
munists Negotiate. New York: The Mac- Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956.
millan Company, 1955. United Nations and Far East Com-
Kinkead, Eugene. In Every War But mand, The Communist War in POW
One. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Camps. Tokyo: United Nations and
Inc., 1959. Far East Command, 1953.
Lyons, Eugene M. Military Policy United States Senate, 83d Congress,
and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1st Session, Hearings Before the Com-
1950-1953. Columbus: The Ohio State mittee on Armed Services on Ammuni-
University Press, 1961. tion Supplies. Washington, 1953.
McCune, George M., with Arthur L. Vatcher, William H., Jr. Panmun-
Gray, Jr. Korea Today. Cambridge: jom: The Story of the Korean Military
Harvard University Press, 1950. Armistice Negotiations. New York: Fred-
Marshall, S. L. A. Pork Chop Hill. erick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958.
New York: William Morrow and Com- White, William L. The Captives of
pany, Inc., 1956. Korea: An Unofficial White Paper of the
Montross, Lynn. Cavalry in the Sky: Treatment of War Prisoners. New
The Story of the U.S. Marine Combat York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Helicopters. New York: Harper and Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses The
Brothers, 1954. Yalu, New York: The Macmillan Com-
Montross, Lynn, Maj. Hubard D. Ku- pany, 1960.
okka, and Maj. Norman W. Hicks.
"U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, Articles
1950-1953," Vol. IV. The East-Central
Front, Jan 1951-March 1952. Washing- Bradley, General of the Army Omar
ton, 1963. N. "The Question of War or Peace in
Nelson, M. Frederick. Korea and the Korea," in Department of State Bulletin,
Old Orders in Eastern Asia. Baton vol. XXVIII, No. 716 (March 16, 1953).
Rouge: Louisiana State University DeReus, C. C. "The Perimeter Pays
Press, 1946. Off," in Combat Forces Journal, vol. 3,
Office of the Chief of Military History, No. 5 (December, 1952).
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 543
Holton, Captain James L. "Operation Factors in Civil Affairs Operations, Re-
Changey Changey" in National Defense public of Korea. Washington: Opera-
Transportation Journal, vol. VIII, No. tions Research Office, Johns Hopkins
3 (May-June, 1952). University, 1952.
Kinney, Col. Andrew J. "Secrets From Operations Research Office, Report
the Truce Tent," in This Week Maga- ORO-R-11, The Utilization of Negro
zine, New York Herald-Tribune (Au- Manpower in the Army. Washington:
gust 31, 1952). Operations Research Office, Johns Hop-
Lyons, Eugene M. "American Policy kins University, 1955.
and the United Nations Program for
Korean Reconstruction," in Interna- Manuscripts
tional Organization, vol. XII, No. 2
(1958). Mossman, B. C. Ebb and Flow. In
Murray, Col. James C. "The Korea preparation for the series UNITED
Truce Talks: First Phase," in U.S. STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN
Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 79, No. WAR.
9 (September, 1953). Schnabel, Lt. Col. James F. Policy
and Direction: The First Year. In
Studies preparation for the series UNITED
STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN
Henning, Charles N. ORO Study WAR.
T-211, Economic and Related Political
List of Abbreviations
AAA Antiaircraft artillery
Abn Airborne
ACSI Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Admin Administration
AFF Army Field Forces
AFFE Army Forces, Far East
an. Annex
AU Army unit
BAR Browning automatic rifle
Bn Battalion
Br Branch
CCF Chinese Communist Forces
CG Commanding general
CinC Commander in chief
CINCFE Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCUNC Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINFO Chief of Information
CMS Constructive months service
Cmte Committee
CofS Chief of Staff
COMNAVFE Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East
Comd Command
Conf Conference
Cong Congress
Corresp Correspondence
DA Department of the Army
DA-IN Incoming message
DCofS Deputy Chief of Staff
Dept Department
DF Disposition Form
EUSAK Eighth U.S. Army in Korea
FA Field artillery
FEAF Far East Air Forces
FEC Far East Command
G-1 Personnel section of divisional or higher staff
G-2 Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff
G-3 Operations and training section of divisional or higher staff
G-4 Logistics section of divisional or higher staff
G-5 Civil affairs section of divisional or higher staff
Hist History, historical
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
Instr Instructions
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 545

Intel Intelligence
Interv Interview
IRQ International Refugee Organization
J-1 Joint Staff personnel section
J-2 Joint Staff intelligence section
J-3 Joint Staff operations section
J-4 Joint Staff logistics section
J-5 Joint Staff civil affairs section
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jnl Journal
JSPOG Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group
KATUSA Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army
KCOMZ Korean Communications Zone
KMAG United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of
Korea
KSC Korean Service Corps
LST Landing ship, tank
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC Military Armistice Commission
MIS Military Intelligence Service
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPRJ National Police Reserve Japan
NSC National Security Council
OCA Office, Comptroller of the Army
Opnl Operational
Opns Operations
ORO Operations Research Office
PIR Periodic Intelligence Report
Plng Planning
POR Periodic Operations Report
POW Prisoner of war
Rcd Record
RCT Regimental combat team
ROK Republic of Korea
ROKA Republic of Korea Army
RandR Rest and recuperation
SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
Sec Section (office unit)
sec. Section (document)
Secy Secretary
Sess Session
SGS Secretary of the General Staff
TAC Tactical Air Command
TAG The Adjutant General
Teleconf Telephone conference
UNC United Nations Command
UNKRA United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
List of Code Names
BIG STICK Operation plan to destroy the Communist supply complex
based on Sibyon-ni, to advance Eighth Army left flank to
the Yesong River, and regain Kaesong.
BUCKSHOT 16 Operation by 11th Division, ROK I Corps, to take North
Korean prisoners.
CHOPSTICK 6 Plan for envelopment of the high ground south of P'yong-
gang by a reinforced ROK division.
CHOPSTICK 16 Plan for a 2-division attack to drive the enemy from the
area east and south of the Nam River.
CLAM-UP Operation to delude the Communists which imposed silence
along the front lines from 10 to 15 February 1952.
COMMANDO Operation plan for offensive to establish the JAMESTOWN
line.
COUNTER Plan for 45th Division, I Corps, to capture strategic outpost
sites.
CUDGEL Plan for advance from WYOMING line in the U.S. Army I
and IX Corps sectors.
DULUTH Line of defense to be established by operation SUNDIAL.
EVERREADY Plan covering eventualities of ROK domestic disturbances
and disengaging UNC forces.
HIGHBOY U.S. I Corps artillery operation to bring direct fire onto
enemy positions and bunkers not accessible to other artil-
lery and mortar fire.
HOME COMING Limited operation plan offered as substitute for BIG STICK.
JAMESTOWN Defensive line to be established by Operation COMMANDO.
KANSAS-WYOMING Defense lines in the vicinity of 38th Parallel.
LITTLE SWITCH Operation for repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners
of war.
OVERWHELMING Plan for offensive by Eighth Army to the P'yonggang-
Wonsan line.
POLECHARGE Operational plan for capture of hill objections on JAMES-
TOWN line during Operation COMMANDO.
SATURATE Plan for interdiction bombing of North Korean railroads.
SCATTER Screening plan for repatriation of prisoners of war.
SHOWDOWN Operation plan designed to improve IX Corps defense line
positions north of Kumhwa.
SMACK Operation plan for combined air-tank-infantry-artillery test
strike.
STRANGLE Air operations to disrupt North Korean logistics by inter-
diction bombing.
SUNDIAL Operation plan to establish DULUTH defensive line.
TALONS Outline plan for ground offensive to bolster Eighth Army's
eastern front.
TOUCHDOWN Operation to gain control of Heartbreak Ridge.
WRANGLER Plan to follow up CUDGEL with an amphibious operation on
the east coast.
Basic Military Map Symbols
Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within
a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply
point.

Military Units—Identification
Antiaircraft Artillery
Armored Command
Army Air Forces
Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery
Cavalry, Horse
Cavalry, Mechanized

Chemical Warfare Service


Coast Artillery
Engineers
Infantry
Medical Corps
Ordnance Department
Quartermaster Corps
Signal Corps
Tank Destroyer
Transportation Corps
Veterinary Corps
Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing
symbol with the arm or service symbol:
Airborne Artillery
Airborne Infantry
Size Symbols
The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or
above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying
arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:
Squad
Section
Platoon
Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight
Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron
Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT fol-
lowing identifying numeral)
Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force
Wing
Division or Command of an Air Force
Corps or Air Force
Army
Group of Armies

EXAMPLES
The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the
unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent
unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below
boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:
Company A, 137th Infantry
8th Field Artillery Battalion.
Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division.
Observation Post, 23d Infantry
Command Post, 5th Infantry Division
Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry

Weapons
Machine gun
Gun
Gun battery
Howitzer or Mortar
Tank
Self-propelled gun
Index
Acar, Brig. Gen. Sirri (Turkish): 462-64 Aircraft carriers
Acheson, Dean G.: 16, 30, 37, 127, 165, 231-32, 322, retention of: 201
402, 408, 437n units in UNC: 61
AD-Skyraiders: 321-22 Aircraft production: 200
Adams, Col. James Y.: 89, 90, 91-92, 94, 96, 97 Airfields
Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War: 497 attacks on: 319, 490-91
Aerial bombardment. See Bombardment, naval; restrictions on rebuilding: 123-30, 152-74
Strategic air support, carrier- and land-based; Airlifts: 70, 184, 475
Strategic air support, enemy; Tactical air sup- Alexander, Lord: 322-24
port, carrier- and land-based; Tactical air sup- Alligator's Jaw: 391-92
port, enemy. Almond, Lt. Gen. Edward M.: 224
Aerial observation. See Reconnaissance, aerial. Alpuerto, 1st Lt. Ben W.: 301-02
Agriculture: 2 Ambush actions: 181, 184, 188, 191, 369-70, 391
Air build-up Ambush actions, enemy: 190-92
Chinese Communist Forces: 293, 319, 398, 399 Ammunition. See Artillery ammunition; Ammuni-
Communist forces: 80, 200, 368, 390 tion shortages; Ammunition stocks; Mortar Am-
Far East Command: 335-36 munition.
United Nations Command: 32-34, 107-08, 128-29, Ammunition shortages
153-55, 194, 200-201, 320 causes: 224-25
Air Defense Command, U.S.: 201 charges of: 336-37
Air Force, Fifth: 43, 60-61, 96, 100, 105-07, 195, 288, Congressional hearings on: 224, 356
289, 290, 305, 321-22, 324, 326-28, 353, 385-86, Ammunition stocks: 33, 96, 224-30, 336-40, 354-57
398-400, 459, 461, 465, 467-68 Amphibious operations
Air Force, ROKA. See Republic of Korea Air Force. Changjon: 109-10
Air-ground co-ordination: 385-89, 398 east coast: 97-98, 175-76, 187
Air operations. See Bombardment, naval; Photog- enemy: 197
raphy, aerial; Strategic air support, carrier- Kojo: 328-29
and land-based; Strategic air support, enemy; support for: 61
Tactical air support, carrier- and land-based; Tongch'on: 87
Tactical air support, enemy. training for: 110
Air sorties. See Strategic air support carrier- and Wonsan: 86
land-based; Tactical air support, carrier- and Anchor Hill (Hill 351): 377-78, 465
land-based. Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 140th: 376
Air superiority: 36, 60-61, 192, 319, 510 Antiaircraft defenses: 201, 335-36
Antiaircraft defenses, enemy: 107, 194-95, 353
Air support, strategic. See Strategic air support,
Antiaircraft weapons, in ground support: 303-05,
carrier- and land-based; Strategic air support,
307, 376, 384, 386
enemy.
Antietam: 194
Air support, tactical. See Tactical air support, Antisubmarine patrols: 61
carrier- and land-based; Tactical air support, Aoji: 325
enemy. Arbogast, 2d Lt. John R., Jr.: 386-87
Airborne Divisions Armies, Chinese Communist Forces
11th: 59-60 First: 466n, 471
82d: 59-60 Twelfth: 77
Airborne Infantry Regiment, 187th: 257, 259, 329, Fifteenth: 77, 308, 311, 370
390, 475 Twentieth: 77
Aircraft. See also by type or designation. Twenty-third: 393
diversion to Korea: 200-201 Twenty-fourth: 468-69, 474
losses: 107, 108, 324, 353 Twenty-sixth: 77
production of: 200 Twenty-Seventh: 77
types in UNC: 60-61 Thirty-eighth: 77, 285, 286, 305, 306, 382
550 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Armies, Chinese Communist Forces—Continued Armistice negotiations—Continued
Thirty-Ninth: 77, 285, 286-87, 299, 368 press correspondents at: 24-29, 488-90
Fortieth: 77, 396 propaganda gains emanating from: 17-23, 37-38,
Forty-second: 77, 99 42-45, 111, 115-16, 155, 167-68, 268-69, 273, 275-
Forty-sixth: 462 76, 401-02, 404, 459, 476-77, 489-90, 504-05
Forty-seventh: 77, 99-100, 102, 368, 380, 393, 466n recesses of: 275-76, 401-02, 420, 456-57, 479, 483-
Sixtieth: 77, 466-67, 471-72 84
Sixty-third: 77 ROK opposition to: 422
Sixty-fourth: 77, 99 ROKA training during: 66-67
Sixty-fifth: 77, 99 rotation and replacements, restrictions on: 160-61
Sixty-seventh: 466 security arrangements: 50-51, 488-89
Sixty-eighth: 95, 180, 466, 474 semantic difficulties: 19-20, 506-07
Armies, U.S. See Eighth Army. sites chosen: 16-23, 44-50, 112-13
Armistice negotiations Soviet role in: 15-16, 112
agenda, discussions on: 26-34 38th Parallel issue: 35-40, 504
airfields and forces, restrictions on: 123-30, 152-74 as turning point: 502
armistice, legal definition: 15n UNC declaration on: 492-93
attitude of UN troops toward: 32 U.S. leadership in: 16
casualties during: 500-501, 507-08 Armor support. See Tank Battalions; Tank Com-
coastal islands, control of: 161-62 panies; Tank fire support; Tank fire support,
commission membership changes: 17, 21, 113, 123, enemy; Tank-infantry actions; Tank strength,
126, 139-40, 152, 158-59, 173n, 266, 272, 422, enemy.
429n, 445, 480, 484 Armored Division, 1st: 59-60
commission proposed: 17 Armored Divisions, North Korean
Communist bargaining tactics: 505-07 4th: 77
Communist build-up during: 66-67, 81, 122, 130, 5th: 77
149, 199-200, 402, 407-08, 433, 434, 459, 464-65, 105th: 77
483, 490-91, 494-95, 507-08 Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 58th: 105
Communist insults: 118, 505-06 Armored vest: 189-91, 372
concessions as weakness: 130 Army budget, cuts in: 333-34
concluding ceremony: 489-91 Army Field Forces: 354
contact made: 20-21 Army Forces, Far East (AFFE): 362-63
demilitarized zone, discussions on: 17-20, 24-32, Army Policy Council: 211
36-40, 45-47, 112-21, 123, 153, 176-77, 432-33, Army Training Center, ROKA: 210
485, 504, 507-08 Arrowhead (Hill 281): 98-99, 285, 305-06, 307, 469,
domestic pressures affecting: 130 472-73
effect on Eighth Army: 177, 198-99 ARSENAL outpost: 382-85, 391-92
effective date of armistice: 487-91 Artillery, Communist: 79-80, 199-200, 284
Foreign Ministers conference on: 497 Artillery ammunition. See also Ammunition short-
foreign troops, discussions on: 24, 28-32, 123-24, ages; Ammunition stocks,
504 day of supply: 225
inspection teams, discussions on: 121-30, 153, 155, enemy expenditures: 284-85, 291, 305-09, 338, 351-
161-63, 165 52, 376-78, 382, 392, 396-97, 464-65, 472-73,
international developments, effect on: 1, 13-14, 52, 477-78
112, 129-34 industry's production capacity: 225, 229-30, 336-
JCS policies and directives: 17-20, 46, 117-19, 121- 37, 354-55
23, 126-30 limitations on expenditures: 96, 224-30, 354-59
military operations, relation to: 476-78, 507-09 mortar ammunition as substitute: 354
military operations ended: 490-91 rounds expended: 96, 225-26, 228-29, 338, 351-53,
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission: 173- 377, 382, 385-88, 396-97, 464-65, 477-78, 509
74, 504 stockpile fluctuations: 75-76, 93, 96, 288, 313-14,
neutrality violations, alleged and real: 36, 40-51, 336-40, 510
129, 230, 402, 411-12 Artillery build-up: 53-55, 213-14, 284-85, 344, 360
NSC viewpoint: 130 Artillery Division, CCF, 2d: 100
package proposal: 152-67, 172-74, 263-66 Artillery fire support: 82, 84-85, 89-90, 92-95, 97,
policy papers, preparing: 29 99-101, 103, 183-85, 187-89, 191, 226-27, 284-9
political affairs incident to: 156-59, 421, 504 294-95, 299-301, 306-08, 311, 313-16, 352, 355-
ports, restrictions on use: 160-61 56, 369, 376-79, 381-89, 391-94, 397, 462-68, 471,
POW issues. See Prisoners of war, enemy. 473-74, 509
INDEX 551
Artillery fire support, enemy: 81-82, 84, 88-89, 97, Bombardment Group, 3d: 45
99-100, 199-200, 284, 287-91, 293-96, 298-303, Bon Homme Richard: 61, 325, 398
305, 307-09, 313-16, 318, 375-80, 383, 392-97, Booby traps: 473
462-64, 466-67, 471-75, 510-11 Boomerang Hill: 468-71
Associated Press: 177. See also Press correspondents. Boot, combat: 372
Atomic weapons Bostic, Lt. Col. John: 255-56
banning of: 35 Boxer: 61, 197, 321-22, 325
first use: 4 Bradley, General of the Army Omar N.: 46, 53-55,
potential use: 332 270, 343, 367
pressure to use: 11-12 Bridge repair and construction, enemy: 106-07
Soviet acquisition: 112 Bridges, air attacks on: 105-07, 194, 397-99, 460-61
Atrocities, alleged: 264-65, 404 Briggs, Ellis O.: 429, 443, 445-48, 450-51
Australia: 35, 499 Briscoe. Vice Adm. Robert P.: 321n, 328
Australian Air Force: 60-61, 67 British Army forces: 67
Australian Army forces: 67 British Commonwealth forces. See Infantry Battal-
Australian Navy: 67 ions, British; Infantry Division, British Com-
Automatic rifle fire: 74-75, 287 monwealth; Infantry Regiments, British.
British Navy. See Royal Navy, British.
B-26 Marauder: 46-47, 105-06, 193, 195-96, 230, 381 Brooks, 1st Lt. Bernard T., Jr.: 313
B-29 Superfortress: 60-61, 107-09, 193, 324-28, 398- Brooks, Lt. Col. Roy I.: 383
400, 459-61 Brown, Sgt. Frederick O.: 189-91
Bacteriological warfare. See Biological warfare, Brown, Maj. Thomas W.: 316
alleged. Bryan, Maj. Gen. Blackshear M.: 486-87
Bak Hill: 471 Buckner, Maj. Louis R.: 315
Bak Lim Hang, Brig. Gen. (ROKA): 98-99 BUCKSHOT 16: 292
Bangalore torpedoes: 313 "Buddy" system: 370
Barbed wire obstacles: 75-76, 284, 287-88, 295-96, Bunker defenses: 74-75, 178-79, 284, 287-88, 295-96,
371-72, 383, 392, 462-63 307, 370-71, 373, 509-11
Barbed wire obstacles, enemy: 99, 189, 284 Bunker defenses, enemy: 84-85, 88-90, 94-97, 99,
Barcus, Maj. Gen. Glenn O., USAF: 321-22, 326-28, 101-02, 180-81, 284, 288, 370, 391-92, 510-11
353, 385-86 Bunker Hill (Hill 122): 297-89, 395
Barrett, Col. David D.: 505-06 Bureau of the Budget: 334
Bathing facilities: 374 Burke, Rear Adm. Arleigh A.: 17, 39-40, 42, 118,
Bayonet attacks: 94, 463-64 116-17, 119n, 139-40, 152, 504, 505, 506
Belgian forces: 67-70, 101-02 Burma: 425
Bendetsen, Karl R.: 132-33 Byers, Maj. Gen. Clovis E.: 84-86, 90-92, 97
BERLIN outpost: 462-63 Byrnes, James F.: 6
Betances-Ramirez, Lt. Col. Carlos: 299-300, 308-09
Betty Hill: 380-81 C rations. See Rations.
BIG STICK: 187 Cairns, Col. Douglas W., USAF: 484
Biological warfare, alleged: 230-32, 268-69, 411-12 Cairo Declaration: 4
Blockade operations: 110 Camel Back Hill: 308
against Communist China, proposed: 56, 131-32 Camouflage measures: 75, 374-75
against Nationalist China: 408-09 Camouflage measures, enemy: 88, 370, 510
Blockading and Escort Force, UNC: 61 Canada
Bloody Ridge: 84-88, 96-97, 106-07, 114-15, 225-26, aircraft from: 200, 201
388 cease-fire proposal by: 402
Blount, 1st Lt. John B.: 290 Canadian Air Force: 67
Boatner, Brig. Gen. Haydon L.: 257-61, 270 Canadian Army forces: 67, 257, 379
Boatright, Lt. Col. Linton S.: 89 Canadian Navy: 67
Body armor: 189-91, 372 Cantrell, 1st Lt. William E.: 315, 316
Bogell, 1st Lt. Frederick: 301 Capitol Hill: 297-98, 467
Bohlen, Charles E.: 46 Carbine: 189, 372
Bolling, Maj. Gen. Alexander R.: 199-200 Carlock, Col. William B.: 408
Bolte, Lt. Gen. Charles L.: 122, 132-33 CARSON outpost: 396, 462, 463, 464
Bombardment, aerial. See Strategic air support, Cassels, General A. J. H. (Br.): 99
carrier- and land-based; Tactical air support, Casualties
carrier- and land-based. Chinese Communist Forces: 96, 102, 103, 477, 478
Bombardment, naval: 108, 110, 196-97, 398, 490-91 Communist forces: 86, 198-99, 500-501
552 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Casualties—Continued China, Nationalist—Continued
concern over: 292-95 aid from declined: 67n
during armistice: 500-501, 507-08 impressment of Nationalists into Communist
Eighth Army: 89, 90, 92, 96, 102 forces: 136
enemy guerrillas: 183, 347 and invasion of mainland: 69, 409
evacuation methods: 90, 185, 191 naval blockade ended: 408-09
helicopter evacuation: 184-85 nonrecognition by Communists: 500
North Korean: 86, 96 POW repatriation to: 136-37, 167-68, 280, 495-96
ROKA: 86 security pact with U.S.: 499
UNC: 86, 103n, 198-99, 477, 500-501, 507, 508 Chinese Communist Air Force: 80, 325
Cavalry Battalions Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). See also Com-
1st, 5th Cavalry: 101-02 munist forces.
1st, 7th Cavalry: 101 air build-up and losses: 293, 319, 325, 398-99
1st, 8th Cavalry: 101 artillery armament and organization: 79
2d, 7th Cavalry: 100-101 callousness to human life: 395, 507-08
2d, 8th Cavalry: 101 casualties: 96, 102, 103, 477, 478
3d, 5th Cavalry: 100-102 combat effectiveness: 79, 293, 478, 499
3d, 7th Cavalry: 100-101 in demilitarized zone: 476
Cavalry Division, 1st: 98-102, 202-03, 328, 390, 406estimate of Chinese soldier: 511-12
Cavalry Regiment, ROK: 183, 298-99 human sea attacks: 306, 474, 509
Cavalry Regiments infantry armament and organization: 79
5th: 99-102, 203 leadership, faults in: 512
7th: 99-101, 203 lines of communication: 12
8th: 99-102, 203, 328 manpower, exploitation of: 511-12
Cave defenses: 314-15, 353, 367-68, 392 matériel, paucity of: 511-12
Cease-fire talks. See Armistice negotiations. Nationalists impressed into: 136
Central Command, Japan Logistical Command: 362- number and organization: 76-79
63 pressure on ROKA: 470-71, 473-74, 477
Central Intelligence Agency: 268 supply system: 293, 477-78, 510
Champeny, Brig. Gen. Arthur S.: 64-66, 210 tactics employed: 79
Chang Chun San, General (NKPA): 40-43, 47, 50- tank strength: 293
51, 127, 159-61, 163, 408, 422, 429n tenacity of troops: 100-101, 102, 111, 292
Chang Pyong San, Maj. Gen. (NKPA): 23-24, 113 troop unit strength: 318, 367-68
Changjon: 109-10 Chinese People's Volunteer Army. See Chinese Com-
Chaplin, Col. Robert T.: 243 munist Forces.
Cheju-do: 257, 444 Chinhae: 210
Chemical warfare, alleged: 230-31, 250 Chinju: 182
Chemicals, nontoxic, use authorized: 406, 451 Chiri-san: 182-83, 347
Cherokee air strikes: 398, 400, 460 Choe Yong Gun, Marshal (NKPA): 79, 488-89
Chiang Kai-shek: 4, 23, 67n, 69, 132, 145, Choi167,
Duk Shin,1Maj.
68,Gen. 409,(ROKA): 422-23, 430-31,
488, 511 444-45, 447, 480n
Chief of Staff. See Collins, General J. Lawton. Cholla Pukto Province: 182-83
Chilquist, Cpl. William: 190 Ch'ongch'on River: 122
China, Communist. See also Chinese Communist Chongjamal: 384-85
Forces; Communist forces. Ch'ongjin: 197, 398, 399
attacks on forbidden: 20, 130 Chongju: 195
biological warfare, charge of: 411-12 Chonju: 182-83
blockade of, proposed: 56, 131-32 CHOPSTICK 6 and 16: 187-88
emergence, effect on Far East: 499-500 Ch'orwon: 74, 98-99, 114-15, 180, 188, 285, 303, 370,
entry into war: 1, 10-11 375, 472-73
industrial potential: 512 Ch'orwon-Kumhwa railroad: 97-98, 175
interest in Korea: 10-11 Ch'orwon Valley: 98
knowledge of, future application: 512 Ch'osan: 461
naval sweep of, proposed: 197 Chou En-lai (Chinese): 232, 403, 413-14, 419
recognition, tacit: 500 Christie Park plant, Pittsburgh: 337
sanctions against, proposed: 130-32 Christmas Hill: 467
and UN membership: 15, 16-17, 56, 130, 132, 504 Chung Il Kwon, Lt. Gen. (ROKA): 475-76
China, Empire of: 2-3 Chung Tu Hwan, Maj. Gen. (NKPA) : 113, 173n
China, Nationalist: 15-17, 20, 56, 130 Chungasan: 98, 99
INDEX 553
Churchill, Winston S.: 4, 132, 197, 323-24 Collins, General J. Lawton—Continued
Chut'oso: 98, 288 and ammunition stockpiles: 228-29, 336-38, 356
Civil disturbances: 441-42, 450, 457-58 and armistice negotiations: 177, 454, 479
Civilians and Army budget: 333
control of: 182 and Army staff position: 55
evacuation of: 74 and escalation of conflict: 133
internees. See Prisoners of war, enemy. and Japanese in Korea: 348
CLAM-UP: 184 and Japanese National Police Reserve: 221
Clark, Vice Adm. Joseph J.: 321-22, 327, 328 and KATUSA: 341-42
Clark, General Mark W. and martial law: 346
and air support: 320, 322-27, 335-36, 459-61 and mortars as substitute for artillery: 354
and ammunition stocks: 336-39, 354-57 and National Guard commitment: 203
and armistice negotiations: 271-72, 275, 277, 401- and package proposal: 165
02, 407, 419-20, 435, 436, 445, 448-49, 451-56, and POW issues: 137, 255, 406
479-83, 486-93 and POW repatriation: 136, 426
and artillery support: 285, 352-53 and Rhee's ROK defense proposal: 448
and biological warfare allegation: 411-12 and ROKA combat efficiency: 208
and combat effectiveness of ROKA: 453-54 and ROKA expansion: 357-59, 440
concept of victory: 283, 332 and rotation and replacements: 350
concern over casualties: 292-95 and SMACK: 388-89
concern over enemy offensives: 335, 389-91, 399, at Tokyo conference: 454
410-11, 435 and troop unit strength: 59, 334-35
conference with Rhee: 443 Colombian Army forces: 67, 68, 393, 395
and control of ROKA: 480-81, 483 Colombian Navy: 67
and demilitarized zone: 483 Colson, Brig. Gen. Charles F.: 247-55, 263, 264
and economic aid: 491 Combat effectiveness
and enemy propaganda campaign: 268-69, 477 Chinese Communist Forces: 79, 293, 478, 499
and expansion of ROK forces: 340-44, 357-61, 439-Communist forces: 199-200
41 CONUS divisions: 59-60
and financial crises: 361, 438-39 Eighth Army: 34, 58-59, 81, 284, 350-51, 389-90,
and Japanese in ROK: 347-48 391, 509
and limited offensives: 292-94, 311, 465 insistence on: 177, 181, 350-51
and manpower resources: 334-35, 350 ROKA: 62-64, 71-72, 84, 208-09, 306-07, 469-70
and military settlement: 366-67, 427-28 UNC: 67
and naval support: 328-29 Combined Economic Board: 219
and package proposal: 266-68 Command and General Staff School. ROKA: 66, 210
and political situation: 346-48, 438, 442-43 Command and staff
and POW issues: 249, 254-55, 257, 260-61, 269-81, Communist forces: 76-79
291-92, 406-07, 409-17, 426-30, 434-35, 444-47, FEC: 362-65
451-53, 483, 485-86 North Korean: 79
and press correspondents: 488-89 UNC: 58-59
and rations of ROKA: 438-39 Commander in Chief, Far East. See Clark, General
reorganized FEC: 362-65 Mark W.; MacArthur, General of the Army
and security of ROK: 445-49, 453, 455-56 Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B.
and SHOWDOWN: 310-11 Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) : 56
and transfer of UNC headquarters: 438 COMMANDO: 98-103, 226
and unification of Korea: 445 Communications, tactical: 74, 188-89, 287-88, 308-
and withdrawal of ROK forces: 442-44, 452 09,386-87,475, 511
and withdrawal of UNC support: 445, 455-56, 490- Communist forces. See also Chinese Communist
91 Forces.
Clarke, Lt. Gen. Bruce C.: 464, 471, 473 air build-up and losses: 80, 200, 368, 390
Close air support. See Tactical air support, carrier- aircraft supplied by Soviet Union: 80, 461
and land-based; Tactical air support, enemy. armament deficiencies: 79-80
Clothing, changes of: 374 armor strength: 79-80, 200
Code of conduct: 496-97 artillery armament: 79-80, 200
Cold-weather discipline: 178-80 build-up during armistice: 34, 59-60, 66-67, 81,
Collins, General J. Lawton: 34, 53, 64, 122, 202, 262, 122, 130, 149, 199-200, 402, 407-08, 433, 434, 459,
366, 443 464-65, 483, 491, 494-95, 507-08
and AA artillery augmentation: 201 casualties: 86, 198-99, 500-501
554 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Communist forces—Continued Craig, Col. William H.: 245-47
combat effectiveness: 80, 199-200 Craigie, Maj. Gen. Laurence C., USAF: 17, 123
command and staff structure: 76-79 Craven, Lt. Col. Virgil E.: 89, 94-96
impressments into: 138, 143-45, 150 Crittenden, 1st Lt. Forrest: 393-94
lines of communication: 73 Cronkhite, Capt. Willis D., Jr.: 309
manpower superiority: 59-60 Cross, Brig. Gen. Thomas J.: 104n
and military settlement: 503 CUDGEL: 97-98
as naval threat: 61 Currency inflation: 217-19
reinforcements: 85 Curry, M/Sgt. George: 189-91
supply system: 399-400 Czechoslovakia: 162, 173-74, 425, 434-35, 484
troop unit strength: 76-77, 199-200, 283-84, 367-
68, 389 Dame, Col. Hartley F.: 234
Congressional hearings Dams, air attacks on: 319, 461
on ammunition shortages: 224, 356 Daniel, Rear Adm. John C.: 272, 414-15, 418, 420,
on foreign aid: 16 422-23
on SMACK: 388-89 Daniels, Lt. Col. Henry F.: 89, 91, 94-96
Conley, Lt. Col. Victor G.: 372 Darrow, Col. Don O., USAF: 159-60, 484
Conn, 1st Lt. Jack L.: 394 Dasher, Maj. Gen. Charles L., Jr.: 302, 472
Consolation: 184-85 Davies, Maj. Albert O.: 300-301, 309
Constabulary forces, ROK: 6, 7, 8, 62 Davis, Lt. Col. John N.: 393-94
Convoys, motor, attacks on: 105 Deceptive measures. See Ruses; Tactical lessons.
Cooksey, Capt. Howard H.: 385 Defense, Department of: 53-56. See also Joint Chiefs
Cordero, Col. Juan C.: 299-300, 301-03 of Staff; Lovett, Robert A.; Marshall, General of
Corps, Artillery the Army George C.; Wilson, Charles E.
I: 184, 352 Defensive plans: 13-14, 73-75, 80-82, 465
IX: 352-53 De Gavre, Col. Chester B.: 307, 309
X: 352 DeMaio, Lt. Col. Mario: 301
Corps, North Korean Demilitarized zone
I:77 CCF operations in: 476
II: 77, 85-86 discussions on: 17-20, 24-32, 36-40, 45-47, 112-21,
III: 77, 85-86, 88, 375-76 123, 153, 176-77, 432-34, 484-85, 493-94, 504,
IV: 77 507-08
V: 77, 95 influence on operations: 175-81
VI: 77 Democratic People's Republic of Korea. See North
VII: 77 Korea.
Corps, ROKA Demolition operations: 92-93, 378
I: 74, 81-86, 97-98, 103-04, 109-10, 196-97, 292, Denmark: 67
297, 328, 377-78, 389n, 465, 468-69 Department of Defense. See Defense, Department of.
II: 204, 284-85, 297-98, 378, 433, 441-42, 450, 465- Department of State. See State, Department of.
68, 471-72, 474-76, 483 De Shazo, Brig. Gen. Thomas E.: 85-86, 88-91, 97
Corps, U.S. Detroit Hill: 391-92
I: 68, 74, 75, 80, 82, 86-87, 97-100, 102, 203, Diet, differences in: 69
226, 247, 285, 297, 336-37, 379-97, 462-65, 469,Artillery
Division
470-71, 473 2d: 225-26
IX: 74, 75, 91, 97-99, 102-04, 180, 203-05, 292- 7th: 375
93, 303-07, 311, 328, 352-53, 368-75, 465-66, 468- Dodd, Brig. Gen. Francis T.: 240, 243-55, 263-64
69, 472, 474 Duerr, 1st Lt. Travis J.: 370-72
X: 10, 74, 81-84, 86-88, 90-91, 97-98, 102-04, 109- Dulaney, Maj. Gen. Robert L.: 302
10, 111, 204, 375-77, 389n, 465-68, 471-72 Dulles, John Foster: 408-11, 421, 447, 450
XVI: 203, 328 DULUTH defense line: 175-76
Cost of war: 500-501 Dumsong: 115-16
COUNTER: 285-88 Dyer, Rear Adm. George C.: 61
Counterattacks: 294, 305-06, 309, 317, 377-78, 379,
380-81, 394, 395, 397, 463-64, 466-67, 468, 469,
471, 472, 473, 476 Early, Capt. James F.: 315
Counterattacks, enemy: 95, 97, 101, 103, 180, 288-89,EAST BERLIN outpost: 462-63
290-91, 295-96, 297, 301, 307, 313, 314, 315, 317,Economic aid: 215-16, 437-38, 491. See also Foreign
382, 388, 391, 397, 461, 466-67, 471-72, 511 aid.
Counterbattery fire: 100, 284, 352-53, 356, 509 Eddleman, Maj. Gen. Clyde D.: 165-66, 358
INDEX 555
Eden, Anthony: 132, 409 Engineers, as infantry: 463
EE-8 (telephone): 189 Engle, Capt. Paul O.: 302
EERIE outpost: 285-89, 382-83, 391-92 English, Capt. William G.: 301-02
Eighth Army. See also Taylor, General Maxwell D.; Entrenchments. See Trench systems.
Van Fleet, General James A. Equipment: 374-75. See also Matériel
antiaircraft defense build-up: 59-60 Ernest G. Small: 110
artillery support structure: 59-60, 352, 355-56 Escalation of conflict, efforts to avoid: 13-14, 56-58,
assessment of strategic air support: 196 69, 130-33, 153-55
casualties: 89-92, 96, 102-03 Essex: 194-95, 325, 398
combat effectiveness: 8, 34, 58-59, 81, 284, 350-51, Ethiopian Army forces; 67-68, 204-05
389-90, 509 Ethiopian Battalion: 103-04, 388-89
controls UN forces: 9-10 European Command: 59-60, 350
defensive plans: 13-14, 73-75, 80-82, 465 European Defense Community: 412
drive to Yalu: 10-11 Everest. Maj. Gen. Frank F., USAF: 60-61, 105-07,
effect of armistice negotiations on: 177, 198-99 325
"Korea" designation dropped: 391
language barriers: 303 F4U Corsair: 324, 386
limited offensives: 73, 74, 76, 86-88, 103-04, 106- F9F Panther: 321-22
07, 110, 141, 175-78, 180-81, 187, 292-93, 311, F-51 aircraft: 60-61, 360-61
330-32, 465, 488-90, 501-02, 507-09 F-80 Shooting Star: 46-47, 322
lines of communication: 73, 98 F-84 Thunderjet: 200-201, 322, 324, 335-36, 386-87,
morale: 32-33, 186-87, 508-09 399, 460-61
Negroes, integration of: 104-05 F-86 Sabrejet: 60-61, 200-201, 321-22, 324-25, 335-
noncommissioned officers, paucity of: 302-03, 307 36, 398-99
offensive plans: 80-81, 86-88, 97-99, 101-02, 176 Far East, U.S. policy in: 499
order of battle shifts: 103-04 Far East Air Forces: 60, 79-80, 105-07, 192-93, 195-
organization and strength: 58-60 96, 329, 335-36, 362-63, 397-98, 400-401
outpost system: 75-76 Far East Command (FEC). See also Clark, General
point system: 186-87, 349-50, 374 Mark W.; MacArthur, General of the Army
Puerto Ricans, integration of: 310n Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B.
reinforcements: 59-60, 93, 475 AAA build-up: 335-36
reports on supply expenditures: 70-71 air build-up: 335-36
repulses invasions: 10-13 command and staff reorganized: 362-65
reserve forces: 82 control by Chief of Staff: 13, 55-56, 80-81
retreat to 38th parallel: 10-11 cuts in officer strength: 334-35
rotation and replacements: 186-87, 199, 201-04, Negroes, integration of: 104-05
302-03, 317, 349-51, 357, 374, 508-09 Puerto Ricans, integration of: 310n
supply routes and methods: 73, 82-84, 90, 93, 98 reorganization: 362-65
training program: 81 Fechteler, Admiral William M.: 53n, 201, 280
troop unit strength: 199 Feller, Abraham: 16
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 330-31, 343-44 Ferenbaugh, Maj. Gen. Claude B.: 126, 152, 155, 158,
and armistice negotiations: 443, 449, 451-55, 488- 167
89 Field, Col. Eugene J.: 99, 101
becomes President: 408 Field Artillery Battalions. See also Armored Field
conference with Rhee, proposed: 450 Artillery Battalion, 58th.
and economic aid: 491 15th: 225-26
and economic situation: 439 17th: 99-100
and expansion of ROK forces: 358-60, 440 37th: 89, 94-95
and military settlement: 367, 408-10 38th: 89
and political situation: 409, 442-43 57th: 385-86
and POW issues: 409-10, 425-26, 428-29, 438 58th: 301
and security of ROK: 445-51, 455-56 61st: 99
signs code of conduct: 497 64th: 371-72
and Taiwan blockade: 408-409 77th: 99-100
and withdrawal of ROK forces: 443 82d: 99-100
and withdrawal of U.S. support: 456 96th: 89
ELKO outpost: 462-65 99th: 99-100
Engineer Combat Battalion, 2d: 92-93 143d: 375-76
Engineer support: 92-95 171st: 287
556 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Field Artillery Battalions—Continued Germany
204th: 99-100 enters EDC: 412
503d: 89 unstable conditions in: 60
780th: 89 Gieseman, Capt. Joseph V.: 314-15
936th: 99-100 Gilmer, Col. Dan: 99-100
Field Artillery Group, ROKA, 1st: 344 Glenn, Brig. Gen. Edgar E., USAF: 422-23, 480n
Field Artillery Observation Battalion, 1st: 352 Glory: 61
Field Training Command, ROKA: 209-10 Goldberg, Maj. Seymour L.: 314-15
Fields of fire. See Fire patterns; Fire patterns, enemy. Great Britain. See also British Commonwealth forces
Fifth column activities: 74 by nationality and arm.
Fighter-Bomber Wing, 58th: 460-61 Army forces: 67
Finch, Maj. Gen. George G., USAF: 480n fear of escalation: 69
Finger Ridge: 298-99, 468 interests in Far East: 131-32
Finletter, Thomas K.: 53 and POW screening: 262
Fire control equipment: 510 reaction to air bombardment: 322
Fire patterns: 75-76 representation on UNC: 323-24
Fire patterns, enemy: 180-81 in support of armistice: 129
Fire support co-ordination center: 386 and Taiwan blockade: 409
Fitzgerald, Col. Maurice J.: 237-38 Greece: 112
Flame throwers: 94-95, 371, 386-89, 391-92 Greece Hill: 188-91
Flares: 189, 291, 295-96, 304-05, 371-72, 395, 397,Greek Army forces: 67-69, 100, 257-59
462-63 Green, 1st Lt. John H.: 315
Flares, enemy: 290-91 Grenade attacks: 94-95, 288, 290-91, 295-96, 308, 369,
Fleet, Seventh: 61, 321-22, 324, 327, 409 377, 387-88, 463, 471
Fogle, Lt. Col, George C.: 383 Grenade attacks, enemy: 75, 84-85, 90, 100-101, 103,
Foreign aid. See also Economic aid. 290, 300-301, 309, 313, 316, 380, 387-88, 393-94
Congressional hearings on: 16 Grenade stocks: 338
legislation on: 16, 112 Gromyko, Andrei: 16
Foreign Ministers conference: 496-97 Guerrillas, enemy: 76
Foreign troops, withdrawal of: 8, 24, 29-32, 123-24, attacks by: 182, 345-48
156-57, 443-44, 447-49, 455-57, 504 casualties and prisoners: 183, 347
Formosa. See China, Nationalist. number behind UNC lines: 182
Fortifications: 74-75, 284, 287-88, 351. See also operations against: 182-83, 204
Bunker defenses; Bunker defenses, enemy; RATKILLER: 182-83
Trench systems. Guerrillas, friendly: 196-97
Fortifications, enemy: 88, 96-97, 180-81, 284, 351, Guns. See also Howitzers; Mortars; Recoilless rifle;
510-11 Rifles.
Forward observers: 287 25-pounder: 396-97
Foster, William C.: 210 75-mm.: 79-80
France: 69 76-mm.: 79-80, 96, 308, 371-72
French Army forces: 67-70, 88-89, 91-96, 103-04, 204, 90-mm.: 382, 385, 387-88, 396-97
305, 392 105-mm.: 79-80
Friedersdorff, Col. Louis C.: 484, 486 122-mm.: 79-80
Frostbite: 178-79 150-mm.: 79-80
Fry, Brig. Gen. James C.: 384 155-mm.: 59, 99-100, 188-89, 226-27, 338, 352-53
Gutner, 1st Lt. Robert C.: 394-95
Gas masks, shortage of: 231
Gatsis, Capt. Andrew J.: 376-77 H-19 helicopters: 468
General Headquarters, Far East Command. See Mac- Hamhung: 460
Arthur, General of the Army Douglas; Ridgway, Han River: 110
General Matthew B. Hannah Hill: 471
General Headquarters, United Nations Command. Hanp'o-ri: 230
See MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas; Hant'an River: 99, 465
Ridgway, General Matthew B. Harrison, Lt. Gen. William K., Jr.
Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers: 497 in armistice negotiations: 158, 167, 265, 271-72,
Geneva Conventions: 135-38, 140-41, 145, 147, 234- 275-77, 401-02, 420, 422-23, 429, 455, 479-84,
35, 255, 275-77, 404, 406-07, 412, 414-15 490, 506
Gensemer, 1st Lt. Harold L.: 300 and control of ROKA: 480-83
Germ warfare. See Biological warfare, alleged. and demilitarized zone: 432-33, 483
INDEX 557
Harrison, Lt. Gen. William K., Jr.—Continued Hill 391: 307. See also Jackson Heights.
and package proposal: 266-68 Hill 394: 378
and POW issues: 267, 269-81, 414, 417, 419-20, Hill 395. See White Horse Hill.
423-31, 447, 452-53, 480-83, 485, 500 Hill 418: 100-101
and security of commission members: 480-81 Hill 485: 92, 94
and session recesses: 401-02, 482-83 Hill 520: 92, 95-96
Harrold, Maj. Gen. Thomas L.: 99, 363 Hill 598. See Triangle Hill.
HARRY outpost: 469 Hill 605: 94-95
Headquarters and Service Command, Japan Log- Hill 636: 93-94
istical Command: 362-63 Hill 666: 94
Heartbreak Ridge: 86-97, 99, 106-07, 110-11, 114-15,Hill 702: 89
225-26, 375-76, 388, 472 Hill 728: 88-90, 94
Hill 812: 376-78, 465
Hedy Hill: 395 Hill 841: 94
Helena: 61, 398 Hill 851: 88-90, 92-96, 375-76
Helicopters Hill 854: 377
in casualty evacuation: 184-85 Hill 867: 90-94
formation of units: 184 Hill 868: 88-89
suitability to operations: 184 Hill 882: 466-67
in supply role: 468, 471-72 Hill 894: 88-91, 93
Henderson, Rear Adm. George R.: 53-55 Hill 900: 95
Herren, Maj. Gen. Thomas W.: 347-48, 362, 406, Hill 905: 94-95
438-39, 442 Hill 930: 376
Hickey, Lt. Gen. Doyle O.: 56-57, 168-69, 203, 362-63 Hill 931: 88-95
Hickman, Col. George W., Jr.: 139-40, 169, 171-73 Hill 938: 471-72
HIGHBOY: 183-84 Hill 951: 95-96
Highways. See Road Construction and Repair; Road Hill 960: 94
systems; Roads, air attacks against. Hill 973: 466-67
Hill 58: 297 Hill 974: 93-95
Hill 67: 388-89 Hill 980: 92
Hill 69: 380-81 Hill 983: 84-85
Hill 90: 391-92 Hill 1005: 92, 94
Hill 101: 391 Hill 1024: 90-91
Hill 105: 302, 380-81 Hill 1031: 82-84
Hill 122. See Bunker Hill. Hill 1040: 92
Hill 128: 188-90 Hill 1050: 94
Hill 148: 395-96 Hill 1142: 90-91
Hill 157: 395-96 Hill 1179: 82-84
Hill 179: 471 Hill 1220: 94-95, 467, 471-72
Hill 190.8: 289 Hiroshima: 4
Hill 200: 393-94 Hitler, Adolf: 498-99
Hill 222: 100 Hodes, Maj. Gen. Henry L: 17, 39-42, 113-19, 125-26,
Hill 230: 101-02 152
Hill 255. See Porkchop Hill. Hodge, Lt. Gen. John R.: 5-8
Hill 266. See Old Baldy. Ho-do Island: 197
Hill 268: 377-78 Hoeryong: 398
Hill 272: 100-102 Hoffman, Capt. Joseph H.: 315-16
Hill 281. See Arrowhead. Hoge, Lt. Gen. William M.: 102-03
Hill 287: 100-101
Hill 313: 100-101 HOME COMING: 187
Hill 324: 98-99 Hong Kong: 131-32
Hill 334: 101 Hong Nim, General (NKPA): 90
Hill 345: 377-78 Hook, the: 379, 392-93
Hill 346: 100-102 Howitzers
Hill 347: 101 8-inch: 59, 89, 96, 99-100, 225-28, 338, 352-53,
Hill 350: 378 396-97
Hill 351. See Anchor Hill. 105-mm.: 89, 96, 99-100, 188-89, 225-27, 301, 336-
Hill 355. See Little Gibraltar. 38, 343, 352-54, 358-60, 371-72, 385-88
Hill 375: 98-99 150-mm.: 79-80
558 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Howitzers—Continued Infantry Battalions—Continued
155-mm.: 53-55, 89-90, 96, 99-100, 225-28, 336-39, 3d, 9th Infantry: 94, 105, 242, 247
342-43, 352-56, 358-60, 387-88 3d, 15th Infantry: 188, 191
240-mm.: 355-56 3d, 17th Infantry: 315-16
Hsieh Fang, Maj. Gen. (Chinese): 23-24, 39, 113, 3d, 23d Infantry: 89-90, 94-96
116, 118-19, 125-28, 142, 152-56, 167, 272, 422, 3d, 27th Infantry: 239, 371-72
505-06 3d, 31st Infantry: 311-15, 393-94
Huang Chen-chi, Col. (Chinese): 432-33, 484-85 3d, 32d Infantry: 316-17
Hull, General John E.: 150, 211-12, 350 3d, 35th Infantry: 369-73
Human sea attacks: 306, 474, 509 3d, 38th Infantry: 93, 95, 383
Hungnam: 110 3d, 65th Infantry: 301-02
3d, 179th Infantry: 290-91, 376-77
Hunyung: 398 3d, 180th Infantry: 287-88
Hwach'on Reservoir: 73-74, 81-82, 472 Infantry Battalion, Canadian, Princess Patricia's 3d
Hwangju: 40-41 Light: 379
Hwueh Yiang-hua (Chinese): 308 Infantry Battalions, British
Hyesanjin: 398 1st, Black Watch: 379
1st, King's Liverpool Regiment: 379
Iceland: 112n Infantry Battalions, CCF
Il-28 aircraft: 398 2d, 348th Regiment: 299-300
Illumination, battlefield: 304-05, 371-72, 395, 397 3d, 87th Regiment: 308
Imjin River: 17-19, 73, 98-99, 112-13, 116, 176, 299, 3d, 348th Regiment: 299
368-69, 379-80, 465, 470-71 Infantry Battalions, Philippine
Inch'on: 10, 52, 233 Combat: 67-69
India 10th: 104n
forces in Korea: 67-69 20th: 104n
as POW custodial force: 426, 431, 434, 496 Infantry Brigades, North Korean
Indonesia: 425 26th:77
Industry 63d: 77
air attacks on: 324-25, 398-400, 459-61 Infantry Divisions. See also Airborne Divisions; Cav-
ammunition production capacity: 225, 229-30, alry Divisions; Marine Division, 1st.
336-37, 354-55 2d: 82, 84-86, 88-89, 92-97, 103-05, 293-97, 305,
Communist China's potential: 512 379, 382-84, 389n, 392-93, 461-62, 466n, 475, 511
short-term conversion difficulty: 502 3d: 98-99, 101-02, 188, 191, 247, 299-303, 369-70,
Infantry 389n, 469, 475-76
CCF armament and organization: 79 6th: 203
typical life of: 370-75 7th: 103-04, 307-17, 368-69, 384-89, 391-95, 473-74
Infantry Battalions. See also Cavalry Battalions. 24th: 102-03, 180, 201-04, 472
1st, 9th Infantry: 90-91, 94 25th: 98-99, 103-04, 368-70, 389n, 461-63
1st, 14th Infantry: 463-64 28th: 59-60
1st, 15th Infantry: 190-91, 242, 346 31st: 59-60
1st, 23d Infantry: 90-91, 94-96 38th: 203
1st, 31st Infantry: 311-14, 393-95 40th: 200-204, 375-76, 377n, 381, 389n, 466n
1st, 35th Infantry: 370 43d: 59-60
1st, 38th Infantry: 94-95, 382-85 45th: 183, 201-04, 285-94, 376-77, 389n, 472
1st, 65th Infantry: 299-301, 309-10 47th: 59-60
1st, 160th Infantry: 376 Infantry Division, British Commonwealth: 98-99,
1st, 179th Infantry: 290, 376-77 104n, 283-84, 292, 379, 390n, 392
2d, 9th Infantry: 89-90 Infantry Divisions, CCF
2d, 17th Infantry: 315-16 29th: 77, 308
2d, 23d Infantry: 89-92, 94-96, 293-94 31st:77
2d, 31st Infantry: 314-16, 385-87, 393 33d: 466-68
2d, 32d Infantry: 316-17, 395 34th: 77
2d, 38th Infantry: 94-95 35th:77
2d, 65th Infantry: 299-300, 307-11 44th: 77, 370
2d, 160th Infantry: 375-76 45th: 77, 311-12, 315-16
2d, 179th Infantry: 290 58th:77
2d, 180th Infantry: 290-91 59th:77
2d, 279th Infantry: 291-92 60th:77
INDEX 559
Infantry Divisions, CCF—Continued Infantry Divisions, North Korean—Continued
67th: 393-94 46th: 77
69th: 472-73 47th: 77
70th: 468-71 Infantry Divisions, ROKA
72d: 474 Capital: 82-84, 182-83, 204-05, 298-99, 465-66,
73d: 472-73 474-76
74th: 469 1st: 98-99, 183, 204, 284-85, 302, 335, 379, 392,
76th: 77 470-71
77th: 77 2d: 103, 311-17, 352, 368-69, 469, 472-73
78th: 77 3d: 103-04, 204-05, 465-68, 474-76
79th: 77 5th: 84-86, 103-04, 297, 377-78, 389n, 465-68, 471-
80th: 77 72, 474-76
112th: 77, 305-06 6th: 103, 180, 204-05, 344, 378, 465, 468, 474-76
113th: 77, 285-87, 382-83 7th: 85-86, 90-91, 466n, 467-68, 471-72, 474-76
114th: 77, 305 8th: 82-84, 94, 97, 182-83, 204, 465, 467-68, 474-75
115th: 77, 285-87 9th: 291-92, 303-07, 368-69, 468-71, 474-76
116th: 77, 287, 299 11th: 82-84, 292, 378, 468, 475-76
117th: 77, 285-87 12th: 357, 377, 465
118th: 77 15th: 357, 378, 389n
119th: 77 20th: 360, 465, 466n, 467-68, 471-72
120th: 77, 395-96, 462-63 21st: 360
124th: 77 Infantry Regiments. See also Airborne Infantry Regi-
125th: 77 ment, 187th; Cavalry Regiments; Marine Reg-
126th: 77 iments.
139th: 99-101 5th: 203-04, 472
140th: 77, 100-101,380 9th: 84-85, 88-94, 98
141st: 99, 393 14th: 104n
179th: 77, 471-72 15th: 101, 105, 188, 255-56, 310-11
180th: 77 17th: 316, 391-92, 473
181st: 77 19th: 472
187th: 77 21st: 472
188th: 77 23d: 85-86, 88-97, 237-38, 292, 295-96
189th: 77 24th: 103-05
190th: 77 31st: 313, 385-86, 392-94
191st: 77 32d: 315
192d: 77 34th: 203-204, 472
193d: 77 35th: 463
194th: 77 38th: 82, 85-86, 88-89, 92-95, 97, 242, 248-49, 259,
203d: 474 296, 383-85, 392
204th: 95-96, 474 65th: 302-303, 307
Infantry Divisions, North Korean 160th: 376
1st: 77, 85-86, 375-76 179th: 203-04, 289-91
2d: 77, 82-88 180th: 203-04, 285-89
3d: 77 279th: 203-04, 285-88, 291-92
6th: 77, 88-91, 93-94, 96 Infantry Regiments, British
7th: 471 Royal Norfolk: 104n
8th: 77 Royal Ulster Rifles: 104n
12th: 77, 88, 91, 93-94, 96 Infantry Regiments, CCF
13th: 77, 82-84, 95-96 87th: 308
15th: 77 130th: 370
18th: 77 134th: 315-16
19th: 77 155th: 311-15
23d: 77 201st: 393-94
334th: 305
24th: 77
335th: 306
27th: 77 338th: 285-87, 382-84
32d: 77 339th: 285-87
37th: 77 340th: 305
45th: 77, 82-84, 376-77 342d: 305
560 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Infantry Regiments, CCF—Continued Irvin, Col. Jefferson J.: 376-77
344th: 285-87 Italy: 112n
348th: 303 Italy Hill: 188-90
349th: 285-87
350th: 285-87 J Ridge: 82-84, 114-15
358th: 395-97, 462 Jackson, Capt. George D.: 307-09
359th: 462 Jackson Heights: 307-11, 369
360th: 462 JAMESTOWN defense line: 98-102, 110-11, 299
420th: 380-82 Jane Russell Hill: 311-18
423d: 393 Japan
Infantry Regiments, North Korean as air base: 60-61
1st: 89-90, 93-94 interest in Korea: 3-4
3d: 91, 93-94 National Police Reserve: 220-22
13th: 90 nationals in Korea: 347-48
14th: 375-76 occupation ended: 223
15th: 91-94 peace treaty with: 35, 43, 45n, 60, 220
19th: 95-96 and POW screening: 262
21st: 95-96 rearmament sponsored by U.S.: 211-12
23d: 95-96 removal from Korea: 5-6
Infantry Regiments. ROKA ROK opposition to: 347-48, 438
1st: 182-83, 298 security of: 56, 220-24, 334-35, 361-62, 502-08
10th: 467-68 security pact with U.S.: 220, 499
11th: 380-82, 392 surrender by: 4-5
12th: 471 threats to: 20, 60, 122, 202, 283, 503
13th: 378 UNC relations with: 222-23
15th: 380, 471 U.S. responsibility to: 498-99, 502-03
16th: 468 Japan, Sea of: 2, 52, 61
18th: 474-75 Jenkins, Maj. Gen. Reuben E.: 122, 137-38, 186, 202,
19th: 468, 474 262, 311n, 317-18, 327-28
20th: 242 Johnson, Earl D.: 150, 353-54
21st: 180, 467-68 Joint Chiefs of Staff
22d: 466-68, 474 and air build-up: 200-201, 335-36
23d: 474-75 air directives by: 33-34, 107-108, 320-23, 325, 390
26th: 183, 297-98 on airfields build-up: 153-55
27th: 466-67 armistice, policies and directives on: 16-20, 46, 117-
28th: 305-07 19, 121-23, 126-30
29th: 306, 470-71 and artillery build-up: 53-55, 284-85
30th: 305 blockade of China, proposed: 56
35th: 466-67 composition and mission: 9n, 53-55
36th: 84-85 and constabulary forces: 7-8
37th: 377 control of CINCFE: 13, 56, 80-81
51st: 307, 377 and control of ROKA: 480-81, 483
61st: 467 control of unified commands: 55-56
Infantry-tank actions. See Tank-infantry actions. and demilitarized zone: 176-77, 483
Inflation, control of: 217-20 and expansion of ROK forces: 210-13, 341-43,
Inspection teams, neutral: 121-30, 153, 155, 161-63, 358-61, 440-41
165, 173-74, 263. See also Prisoners of war, and inspection teams: 162-63
enemy, inspection by neutrals. and Korean unification: 4, 156-57
Intelligence estimates arid reports: 102, 106-07, 1and 10- National Guard troops: 202
11, 142-43, 176-77, 231, 284, 304-05,and307, naval375-76,
sweep of China: 197
396-98, 459-60, 472-74 operations plans: 56-58
Interdepartmental Watch Committee: 268-69 and package proposal: 165-67, 173
International Committee of the Red Cross: 17, 23- and political situation: 442
29, 136, 140-41, 143-44, 146-49, 167, 171-72, 231-and ports, restriction on use: 160
32, 255-59, 262, 264, 280-81, 406-07, 480-81 and POW issues: 136-39, 146, 149-50, 171, 269-71,
International political developments: 1, 13-14, 52, 273-75, 277-80, 402, 406, 410-14, 420, 427-29,
112 435, 444-45
Iowa: 329 and ROK political crises: 348
Iron Triangle: 74, 175-76, 292-93 and rotation and replacements: 160
INDEX 561
Joint Chiefs of Staff—Continued Kimball, Dan: 211
and security of ROK: 445-48 Kinney, Col. Andrew J., USAF: 20-21, 41-43, 45-47,
and UNC build-up: 60, 133 50-51, 159-61
and withdrawal of foreign troops: 156-57 Kirk, Alan G.: 16
and withdrawal of ROK forces: 443 Kitchen police: 373-74
and withdrawal of UNC forces: 454 Knapp, 1st Lt. William C.: 314-15
Joint Commission on Korea: 6-7 Kogstad, Lt. Col. Arthur W.: 409-10
Joint Strategic Plans Committee: 200 Koje-do: 167-68, 404, 415-16. See also Prisoners of
Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group: 17, 181- war, enemy.
82, 404, 407-08 guard-prisoner relations: 234-35
Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 137 physical plant: 233-34
Joy, Vice Adm. C. Turner: 196-97, 263, 265, 504-05 Kojo: 97-98, 108-109, 328-29
in armistice negotiations: 17, 22-31, 37-38, 50-51, Koksan: 459-60
113, 118, 265-66, 503, 506 Korea. See also North Korea; Republic of Korea.
on building of airfields: 123-24, 126, 153, 158-59 Chinese Communist interest in: 10-11
on demilitarized zone: 35-39, 113, 116-18, 121, 123 climate and weather: 1, 36
on foreign troops withdrawal: 123-24 division of: 5-7
on inspection teams: 121, 126, 162-63 history: 2-5
and neutrality violations: 41-42, 44-45 as Japanese colony: 3-4
and package proposal: 163-66, 173-74, 263-66 localizing war to: 13-14, 56-58, 69, 130-33, 153-55
and ports, restrictions on use: 160-61 republic proclaimed: 7-8
and POW issues: 140-43, 145, 147-49, 169-70, 267 Soviet influence in: 3-7, 499-500
and resolution of political affairs: 156, 159 Soviet troops withdrawn: 8
Ju Yon, Col. (NKPA) : 407-08, 485, 487-89 topography: 2
Judge Advocate General: 136-37 unification: 4, 7, 15, 156-57, 214, 442-45, 449, 457-
Juskalian, Lt. Col. George: 394-95 58
U.S. influence in: 3-7
Kaesong: 17-21, 27-29, 37-38, 40-50, 56, 71-72, 80- U.S. objectives in: 1, 32-53, 56-58
81, 98-99, 110, 114-18, 120-21, 187, 230, 390, 407- U.S. responsibility to: 498-99, 502-03
08, 410-11, 427-28, 503-04, 507 U.S. troops, arrival and departure: 5, 8, 62
Kaesong-Munsan road: 27-28 Korea, People's Republic of. See North Korea.
Kamgol: 98-99 Korea, Republic of. See Republic of Korea.
Kangnung: 329 Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KAT-
KANSAS defense line: 73-75, 80-82, 84, 88-89, 93, 116, USA): 58-59, 341-43, 370
118-19 Korean Civil Assistance Command: 491
Kastner, 1st Lt. Eugene S.: 288 Korean Communications Zone: 260-61, 347-48, 362,
Kearsarge: 399 406, 438-39, 472. See also Herren, Maj. Gen.
KELLY outpost: 299-303, 307 Thomas W.
Kendall, Lt. Gen. Paul W.: 385-86, 395 Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG)
Kern, Col. William B.: 387-88, 393, 395 established: 8
Kernan, Lt. Col. William J.: 248-49 number in force: 62, 64-66, 210, 344-45, 357-58
Kiland, Rear Adm. Ingolf N.: 61 role in ROKA training: 208-09, 469-70
Kilchu: 325, 398 Korean People's Army. See North Korean People's
Army.
Kim Dong Hak, Maj. Gen. (NKPA): 480n
Korean Service Corps: 213, 287-88, 344-45, 373-74,
Kim Il Sung, General (NKPA) 463
and armistice negotiations: 271-72, 419, 455-56,
489 Kosong: 490-91
and POW issues: 411-14, 430 Kowon: 194-95
return to Korea: 6-7 Kumhwa: 74, 86-87, 114-15, 311, 369, 375, 465-66
and Soviet aid: 112 Kumsong: 102-03, 114-15, 175-76, 180, 203-05, 465-
as supreme NKPA commander: 17-19, 24, 37, 41, 66, 472-74, 476
45-46, 76-79 Kumsong-Kojo road: 97-98
Kim Il Sung Range: 94-95 Kumsong River: 475-76
Kim Jong Oh, Maj. Gen. (ROKA) : 304-307, 317 Kuwonga: 461
Kim Ung, Lt. Gen. (NKPA) : 79 Kwangju: 210
Kim Won Mu, Rear Adm. (NKPN): 173-74, 429n, Kyeho-dong: 98-99, 299
480n Kyongsong: 398
562 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Language barrier: 69, 303, 506 MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas-
Leadership, deficiencies in Continued
in CCF: 512 and expansion of UN forces: 69-70
in ROKA: 62-65, 209-10, 474-75, 499 and Japanese surrender: 4-5
League of Nations: 498 named UN commander: 9-10
League of Red Cross Societies: 411 relieved: 13, 52, 330
Lee, 1st Lt. Richard M.: 288-89 and Taiwan blockade: 409
Lee Chong Chan, General (ROKA) : 346 McCann, 2d Lt. Russell J.: 376-77
Lee Hak Koo, General (NKPA): 246-48, 259 McCarthy, Col. Charles W.: 407-08
Lee Han Lim, Brig. Gen. (NKPA): 266, 422-23 McClure, Lt. Col. Myron: 311-14
Lee Hyung Koon, Maj. Gen. (ROKA): 113, 127,McClure, 158 Brig. Gen. Robert A.: 136-37, 150
Lee Pyong Il, Col. (NKPA) : 486 McConnell, Brig, Gen. Frank C.: 266, 402
Lee Sang Cho, Maj. Gen. (NKPA): 23-24, 39, 113- McFalls, Maj. Carroll: 99
18, 125-26, 139-49, 162, 167-68, 235-36, 414-15, Machine gun fire support: 74-75, 93-94, 287-90, 371,
418, 484 387-88
Lehrfeld, Col. Irving: 99-100 Machine gun fire support, enemy: 89, 91-92, 100-101,
Levie, Lt. Col. Howard S.: 159-60 290, 300-301, 316, 387
Li Hung-chang (Chinese): 3 Malenkov, Georgi M.: 412
Libby, Admiral Ruthven E.: 126, 139-49, 167-68, Malik, Jacob: 15-16, 230-31, 503
272, 280 Manchester: 196-97
Lie, Trygve: 15-16 Manchuria: 2, 56-58, 79-80, 131-32, 181-82, 200, 283.
Limited offensives: 73, 74, 76, 86-88, 103-04, 106-07, 293, 319-23, 326-27, 398-99, 503
110, 141, 175-78, 180-81, 187-88, 292-93, 310-11, Mann, Lt. Col. Carl E.: 463-64
330-32, 465, 488-90, 501-02, 507-09 Manpower
Lines of communication: 465-66, 474-75 CCF exploitation of: 511-12
CCF: 12-13, 284 Communist superiority: 59-60
Communist forces: 73 conservation of: 349
Eighth Army: 73, 98 shrinkage in: 334-35
enemy, air attacks on: 105-06, 192, 319, 510 U.S. resources: 334-35, 350-51
North Korean: 96-97 Marine Advisory Group: 213
UNC: 81-82, 96-97 Marine Air Wing, 1st: 60-61, 325-26
Lisbon conference: 206 Marine Corps
Little Gibraltar (Hill 355): 392 ground units of: 97-98
LITTLE SWITCH: 414-21 strategic air support by: 399, 490-91, 508-09
Logistical Commands tactical air support by: 94, 108-10, 197-98, 326,
Japan: 70, 362-63 386, 395, 398, 400, 460, 468
2d: 70, 237-39, 242, 255, 269-70, 346 Marine Corps, ROK. See Republic of Korea Marine
Logistical system. See also Supply system; Supply sys- Corps.
tem, enemy. Marine Division, 1st: 85-86, 187, 204, 283-84, 296-
Eighth Army: 74 99, 391-92, 395, 461-63
enemy, air attacks on: 105-08, 192-93, 324, 397-98, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron, 161st: 184
510 Marine Regiments
UNC: 70, 510 1st: 395-96
Los Angeles: 61, 196-97 5th: 391, 395-97
Love, Lt. Col. Robert W.: 92-94 7th: 388-89
Lovett, Robert A.: 137-39, 165-66, 201, 221, 280, 322- Marlin, M/Sgt. Gerald: 287
23, 333-34, 337, 342-44, 354-55, 358-59, 402 Maroun, Col. Autrey J.: 372
Luke the Cook's Castle: 376-77 Marquat, Maj. Gen. William F.: 221-22
Luxembourg forces: 67-68 Marshall, General of the Army George C.: 7, 36-37,
Lynch, Col, John M.: 88-92 53-56, 107-08, 127
Martial law, declaration of: 182-83
Mabang-ni: 183 Martin, 1st Lt. Charles L.: 313
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas: 220 Masan: 451
and drive to Yalu: 10-11 Masnari, Pfc. John L.: 190-91
on effectiveness of U.S. forces: 8 Matériel. See also items by name.
and escalation of conflict: 69 CCF paucity of: 511-12
establishes JSPOG: 17n U.S. shortages: 178
and expansion of ROK forces: 63, 210-11, 340 Matthews, Francis P.: 53
INDEX 563
Mechanized Divisions, North Korean Muccio, John J.: 19-20, 63-64, 219, 346
9th: 77 Mudgett, Col. Gilman C.: 64
17th: 77 Mukden: 76-79
Mellon, Maj. Thomas W.: 92 Mundung-ni: 95-96, 465-66
Mess systems: 373. See also Diet, differences in. Mundung-ni Valley: 88, 90-95
Meteor's: 324 Munsan-ni: 19-21, 26-29, 42, 47-50, 98, 112-13, 411,
Meyer, Clarence E.: 219 415-17, 462, 483, 486-91
MIG-15's: 79-80, 108, 325, 390, 398-99 Murphy, Col. Preston J. C.: 285-87
Mildren, Col. Frank T.: 93-94 Murphy, Robert D.: 434, 454
Military Academy, ROKA: 66, 210 Murray, Col. James C., USMC: 41-42, 47, 432-33, 484
Military advisors, first in Korea: 3 85, 487-89
Military Armistice Commission. See Armistice nego- Musan: 398
tiations. Mutual Defense Assistance Program: 221, 858
Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Far East:
206-07. See also Korean Military Advisory Nagasaki: 19-20
Group. Nam Il, Lt. Gen. (NKPA): 79, 113, 504-05
Military police: 237-38, 450 in armistice negotiations: 21-27, 31, 50-51, 118,
Military police, ROKA: 448 24, 271-72, 275-76, 419, 422, 480, 484, 490
Mine clearing: 92-93 atrocity charges by: 264-65, 404
Mines contact with POW: 235-36
enemy: 84-85, 92-93,-99, 100, 189-90, 284, 288 and control of ROKA: 480-82
marine: 61 and demilitarized zone: 36-39, 432-34, 483-84
UNC: 75, 76, 287, 296, 372, 392, 463 and package proposal: 173-74, 263-64
Mine sweeping: 197-98, 328 and POW issues: 264, 270-75, 278, 281, 418-19,
Missouri: 398-99 422-27, 430-31, 452-53, 480, 482-84
Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 6 stand on 38th Parallel: 35-40
Monclar, Lt. Col. Ralph (French) : 88-89, 95-96 Nam River: 187-88, 292, 378
Mood, Maj. Gen. Orlando: 248, 250-51, 343-44 Namdae River: 98-99
Moore, Col. William T.: 188 Napalm attacks: 94, 101, 306-07, 324, 382, 386-88, 400
Morale National Guard, ROK. See Republic of Korea Na-
decline in ROKA: 85 tional Guard.
effect of air strikes on: 96-97 National Guard troops: 202
in Eighth Army: 32-33, 186-87, 508-09 National Police, ROK. See Republic of Korea Na-
in UNC: 32-33 tional Police.
Moroney, 1st Lt. William T.: 290-91 National Police Reserve Japan: 220-21
Morris, Brig. Gen. Joseph T., USAF: 272, 422-23 National Security Act: 112
Morse, 1st Lt. Gerald: 393-94 National Security Council: 56-58
Mortar ammunition armistice, viewpoint on: 130
expenditures by enemy: 351-52, 382, 392, 464-65 on build-up of ROK forces: 130, 133
expenditures by UNC: 96, 351-52, 382, 388, 397 composition and mission: 52-53
shortage: 96 escalation, attitude on: 130
as substitute for artillery ammunition: 354 National Security Resources Board: 334
Mortar fire support: 89-90, 93-94, 101, 185, 287-91, Naval Advisory Group: 213
293-96, 308, 313-16, 353-54, 369, 371-72, 375-78, Naval Forces, Far East: 362-63, 409
382, 384-88, 392-93, 463-64, 471, 474 Naval gunfire support: 61, 107-10, 196-97, 328-29,
Mortar fire support, enemy: 88-89, 91-92, 97, 99- 398-99
100, 103, 288-91, 295-96, 299-303, 305, 307-09, Naval operations: 20, 108-10, 197-98, 328-29
313-16, 375-80, 383, 392-97, 464-67, 471-75, Naval 511 support: 328-29. See also Strategic air support,
Mortars carrier- and land-based; Tactical air support,
4.2-inch: 96, 226, 336, 355-56, 371-72, 375-76, carrier- and land-based.
396-97 composition and strength: 61, 67
60-mm.: 96, 308, 336, 371-72 nations represented: 67
81-mm.: 96, 226, 336, 338, 353-56, 371-72, 375-76 reinforcements in: 60
82-mm.: 308 in UNC: 61
120-mm.: 308 Navy, ROK. See Republic of Korea Navy.
Moscow Foreign Ministers conference: 6 Negroes, integration of: 104-05
Moscow radio: 231 Nelson, 1st Lt. William F.: 299-300
Moses, Col. Lloyd R.: 311-14 Netherlands forces: 67-69, 93, 257-59
Motor convoys, attacks on: 105 Netherlands Navy: 67
564 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission: 419-20, Okinawa: 5, 60-61
423-35, 444-45, 453, 480-84, 486-87, 494-96 Old Baldy (Hill 266): 285-97, 392-95, 400
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission: 173-74, Ongjin Peninsula: 114-15
487, 494, 504 Operations plans, strategic. See Defensive plans; Of-
Neutrality violations, alleged and real: 36,40-51,129, fensive plans; Strategic plans.
230, 402, 411-12 Oriental Light Metals Company: 325
NEVADA outpost complex: 462-65 Orijong: 288
New Jersey: 61, 109-10, 196-97 Oriskany: 398-99, 465
New Zealand: 35, 499 Ortega, Pfc. James: 287
New Zealand forces: 67 Osborne, Brig. Gen. Ralph M.: 422-23
New Zealand Navy: 67, 197 Outpost positions: 75-76, 285-88, 299, 307, 310-11,
Newberry, Maj. Robert H.: 311-15 369, 371-72, 376-77, 379-80, 382-85, 395-96, 461-
Night actions: 188-92, 285-88, 304-05, 369 76. See also by name.
by enemy: 76, 103, 180, 196-97, 284-85, 290-91, Outpost positions, enemy: 300, 380
293-94, 305, 308, 379, 382-85, 397 OVERWHELMING: 80-81
training for: 189
Noncommissioned officers, paucity of: 302-03, 307 Pace, Frank. Jr.: 53, 66, 208, 333-34, 337, 358
Nonsan: 451 Paik Sun Yup. Maj. Gen. (ROKA): 17, 22-23, 82-84,
Nori, Big and Little: 380-82, 392 113, 182-83, 204-05
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 14, Pakistan: 425
112, 200-201, 206 Palmer, Maj. Gen. Charles D.: 99n
armistice, importance to: 502 Panmunjom: 21, 27-29, 31, 40-41, 43-44, 46-51, 108,
dissension in: 502-03 112-13, 122-23, 141, 401-02, 411, 414, 417, 462
Germany admitted: 206 Panmunjom River: 30-31
impact of ROKA expansion on: 343, 358 Panther aircraft: 324
link to U.S.: 499 Paris Treaty (1783): 135-36
North Korea Patrol actions: 74-76, 81, 87-88, 102-03, 178, 180,
Communist Party build-up: 6-7 185, 188-92, 300, 369-70, 372-73, 374, 377-78,
Democratic People's Republic established: 8 391-93, 469
invasion by: 1, 9-10 Patrol actions, enemy: 180, 184, 299, 308, 376-77,
recognition of, tacit: 499-500 382, 511
North Korean People's Army. See also Communist Patrol actions, naval: 61, 328
forces. Patrol base system: 75-76, 82
armament and training: 9 Patrol duty, frequency of: 373
casualties: 86, 96 Patteson, 1st Lt. Jack M.: 393-95
command and staff structure: 79 Peace negotiations. See Armistice negotiations.
impressment into: 138, 142 Peiping radio: 231
lines of communication: 96-97 Pell, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 375-76
matériel losses: 86 Peng Teh-huai. General (Chinese): 19, 37, 41, 45-
numbers and organization: 9, 76-77, 79 46, 76-79, 271-72, 411-14, 419, 430, 455-56, 480,
reinforcements: 90 488-89
supply system: 90 Personnel carriers: 386-87
tenacity of troops: 97 Pescadores Island: 20
troop unit strength: 199, 367-68, 477 Pest control: 374
Northern Command, Japan Logistical Command: Philippine Sea: 197, 201, 321-22, 399
362-63 Philippines: 35, 499
Norway: 162-63 Phillips, Maj. Warren B.: 314-15, 386-87
Norwegian forces: 67 Photography, aerial: 88, 194-95, 352-53
Nuclear weapons. See Atomic weapons. Pia-ri Valley: 90
Pien Chang-wu, General (Chinese): 113, 173n, 422
O Hung Song. Col. (NKPA) : 432-33 Pike's Peak: 311-12, 314-17
Observation battalions: 59 Plans, operational. See Defensive plans; Offensive
Observation posts, enemy: 84, 285, 308, 370 plans; Strategic plans.
O'Daniel, Maj. Gen. John W.: 80, 98-99 Point system: 186-87, 349-50, 374. See also Rotation
Oemyon: 297 and Replacements.
Offensive plans. See also Limited offensives. Pokkae: 288
Eighth Army: 80-81, 86-88, 97-99, 101-02, 176 Poland: 162, 173-74, 425, 434-35, 483-84
UNC: 175-76 POLECHARGE: 101-02
Officers, reduction in numbers: 334-35 Pongam-do: 405-07
INDEX 565
Pongnae-Ho Reservoir: 305 Prisoners of war, enemy—Continued
Population: 5 ROKA collusion with: 451-52, 454-55
Porkchop Hill (Hill 255): 287-89, 379, 392-95, 473- SCATTER: 170
74 security measures and forces: 237-39, 242, 247-
Porterfield, 1st Lt. John D.: 309 50, 253-57, 345, 405-07, 410, 415, 451-52
Ports, restrictions on use: 160-61 segregation of: 233-34, 241-42
Portugal: 112n stress on capture of: 291-93
Potsdam Declaration: 4 weapons improvised by: 237, 239, 256, 259-60
Power plants, air attacks on: 319-24, 398, 460-61 Prisoners of war, UNC
Pravda: 38 defectors among: 495-96
Press correspondents impressment into NKPA: 138, 142
at armistice negotiations: 24-29, 488-90 indoctrination by enemy: 136, 145
Clark's attitude toward: 488-89 misconduct among: 496-97
and POW issues: 414, 417-18, 438, 447, 452-53 numbers captured and delivered: 141-43, 148, 168-
and SMACK incident: 385-86, 388-89 72, 418-19, 486, 494-95
Preston, Capt. Roy W.: 313 reporting on, by enemy: 136, 140-43, 148-49
Princeton: 59, 321, 325 Propaganda, Communist: 17-19, 37-38, 42-45, 111,
Prisoners of war, enemy: 101, 181, 438 115-16, 154-55, 167, 232, 268-69, 273, 275-76,
atrocities against, alleged: 264-65, 404 401-02, 404, 459, 476, 477, 489-90, 504-05
chemical warfare against, alleged: 250 Provost Marshal General, ROKA: 448
chemicals, nontoxic, authorized against: 406, 451 Proximity fuzes: 287, 328, 353, 393-94
classification and screening: 138-39, 141-43, 148, Pu Shan, Col. (Chinese): 159-60
150-51, 167-72, 238-40, 242-43, 250-51, 255-57, Puerto Ricans, integration of: 310n
262, 264-70, 272, 275, 277-79 Pukhan River: 467-68, 471-72
defectors among: 495-96, 504-05 Punchbowl: 81-88, 97, 114-15
demands by: 246-54 Punji-ri: 183, 296-97
dispersal of compounds: 257-61 Pusan: 10, 52, 70, 96, 214-15, 233, 247, 255, 345
disturbances by and among: 170-71, 233, 235-40, 415-16, 437-38, 442, 451, 472, 503, 510
243, 255-57, 259, 263-66, 270, 403-07, 410-12, P'yonggang: 97-98, 196, 292-98
415-16, 451 P'yongyang: 33-34, 40-41, 74, 79-80, 107-08, 175-76,
indoctrination of: 237, 275 181-82, 187-88, 324, 366-67, 390, 398-99, 407-08
infiltration of agents into: 235-36 P'yongyang-Kaesong road: 407-08
inspection by neutrals: 140-41, 255-59, 262, 268, P'yongyang radio: 231
275, 278-81. See also Neutral Nations Repatri- Pyun Yung Tai: 446-47
ation Commission,
interrogations of: 284, 289, 303, 306, 367, 375-76, QUEEN outpost: 471
382, 392-93, 396-97, 512
kidnappings by: 243-53 Radar plotting: 352-53, 385
lessons from incidents: 260-62 Radford, Admiral Arthur W.: 197, 367
LITTLE SWITCH: 414-21 Radios, tactical: 188-89, 287-88, 386-87
murders among: 237-39 Raid actions: 82-84, 180, 183, 185, 196-97, 285-87,
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission: 419- 292, 296-97, 369-70, 378-79, 382, 385, 388-89,
20, 423-35, 444-45, 453, 480-84, 486-87, 494-96 392
numbers captured and delivered: 141-43, 148, 168-Raid actions, enemy: 196-97, 285, 288, 298-99, 369,
72, 233-34, 291-92, 369-70, 418-19, 486, 494-96, 382
500-501
Railroads
paroles of: 147-49
air attacks on: 61, 105-08, 192-96, 319, 324, 397-99,
polling: 143-44, 146-47, 168-69
460-61, 481-82
and press correspondents: 414, 417-18, 438, 447,
452-53 enemy construction and repair: 195-96, 319
Korean network: 74
questionnaire sample: 170-71
rations, complaints against: 242, 438-39 Rashin (Najin): 20, 107-09, 398
repatriation of: 17, 23-24, 26-32, 122-23, 127, 135- Rations: 375
51, 167-74, 240, 263-64, 266-67, 269-75, 277-82, components for enemy POW: 242
402-03, 411-35, 444-47, 451-53, 480, 484-86, 493- enemy POW complaints: 242, 438-39
96, 500, 504-05 ROKA complaints: 438-39
report compiled by G-2, FEC: 407, 410 RATKILLER: 182-83
reporting on, by UNC: 136, 140-43, 148-49 Raven, Lt. Col. Wilbur R.: 244-45
restrictions on disciplining: 237 Reception Center, UNC: 68, 346
566 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Recoilless rifle Republic of Korea Army (ROKA)—Continued
ammunition, expenditures of: % expansion of: 56, 210-13, 840-45, 357-62, 487-41,
fire support: 74-75, 287-88, 871 457, 477, 499
supply of: 343 Field Training Command: 209-10
Reconnaissance, aerial: 19, 61, 107, 192-93, 324, 385, impressment of POW's into NKPA: 138, 142
465 improvement program: 207-14
Reconnaissance, ground: 87-88, 369-70 KMAG role in training: 208-09, 469-70
Reconnaissance, ground, by enemy: 472-73 leadership deficiencies: 62-65, 209-10, 474-75, 499
Reconnaissance Companies Military Academy: 66, 210
2d: 93 morale, decline in: 85
16th: 99 numbers, armament and training: 8-9, 62-67, 199,
Red Cross, Communist: 493-94 340-41, 357, 360, 477, 499
Red Cross, International. See International Commit- placed under UN: 9-10
tee of the Red Cross. rations, complaints about: 438-39
Reeder, Maj. Gen. William O.: 339 reorganization of units: 65-66
Regimental combat teams. See Cavalry Regiments; Replacement Training Center: 65-66
Infantry Regiments; Marine Regiments. Replacement Training and School Command: 64-
Rehabilitation by UNC: 217 65, 210
Reinforcements. See Rotation and replacements. security problems: 345
Service Corps augmentation: 213
RENO outpost: 395-97, 462 service schools: 64-65, 210, 344
Replacement and School Command, ROKA: 64 training during armistice negotiations: 66-67
Replacement Training Center, ROKA: 65-66 training program, over-all: 209-10, 213-14, 343-44
Replacement Training and School Command, training at U.S. service schools: 64-65, 210, 344
ROKA: 64-65, 210 Republic of Korea Marine Corps: 85-86, 196-97, 212,
Replacements. See Rotation and replacements. 213, 342-44, 360, 395, 441
Republic of Korea. See also Rhee, Syngman. Republic of Korea National Guard: 74-75
armistice, opposition to: 215-16, 422 Republic of Korea National Police: 182-83, 347
and armistice negotiations: 215-16, 422, 435-37, Republic of Korea Navy: 61, 247, 341-42, 347-48,
441-42, 445-46, 448-49, 455, 502-03 360-61, 441
civil disturbances: 441-42, 450, 457-58 Rest areas: 374
constabulary force: 62 Rhee, Syngman: 145, 367. See also Republic of Korea.
economic aid to: 215-16, 437-38, 491 and armistice negotiations: 215-16, 422, 435-37,
enemy guerrillas in: 76, 182-83, 204, 345-48 441-42, 445, 448-58, 481-83, 487-88, 491, 501
expansion of armed forces: 130, 133, 210-13, 340- conference with Clark: 443
45, 357-61, 439-41 conference with Eisenhower, proposed: 450
financial crises: 217-20, 361, 439 conference with Taylor: 449-50
Japanese in: 347-48 conferences with Robertson: 454-55
martial law declared: 182 elected President: 8
military police force: 448 and expansion of armed forces: 211, 440-41
nonrecognition by Communists: 500 and military settlement: 441-42, 491-94, 501
opposition to Japanese: 347-48, 438 and national unification: 214-15, 442-44, 449,
political crises: 62, 345-48, 441-42, 444 457-58
security of: 8, 54, 63-64, 445-49, 453, 455-56 opposition to Japanese: 347-48
unification aspirations: 441-45, 502 and political crises: 345-46
withdrawal of forces: 449-52 and POW issues: 269, 426-27, 429, 434, 444-49,
Republic of Korea Air Force: 212-13, 324, 341-43, 451-52, 456-57, 469, 477, 478-80, 500
360-61, 441 and ROKA combat effectiveness: 63
Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and security of ROK: 8, 34, 63-64, 445-57
Army Training Center: 210 and Taiwan blockade: 409
artillery units formed: 344, 360 and transfer of government seat: 438
casualties: 86 and transfer of UNC headquarters: 438
CCF pressure on: 470-71, 473-74, 477 and withdrawal of foreign forces: 443-44, 447-49,
collusion with POW: 451-52, 454-55 455-57
combat effectiveness: 62-64, 71-72, 84, 208-09, and withdrawal of ROK forces: 442-44, 449-52
306-07, 453-54, 469-70 Rhineland: 498-99
Command and General Staff School: 66, 210 Ridgway, General Matthew B.
control of: 215, 480-81, 483 abilities proved: 58
divisions in UNC: 62-63 and air support: 33-34, 107-08, 194, 200-201, 320
INDEX 567
Ridgway, General Matthew B.—Continued Rockets, 4.5-inch: 396-97
and ammunition stocks: 33, 226-29 Rodent control: 374
and antiaircraft defenses: 201 Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 4
appointed SACEUR: 212 Rotation and replacements
and armistice negotiations: 16-20 Communist forces: 85
and blockade of China: 56 Eighth Army: 59-69, 93, 160, 186-87, 199, 201-04,
and build-up of airfields: 128-29, 153-55 302-03, 317, 349-51, 357, 374, 475, 508-09
on capability for general war: 133 North Korean: 90
and CHOPSTICK 6 and 16: 187-88 restrictions on during armistice negotiations: 160-
as CINCFE: 55-58 61
as CINCUNC: 13, 58, 129-30 UNC: 201-05
and control of ROK forces: 215 Royal Marine Commandos, British: 110, 196-97
and CUDGEL: 97-98 Royal Navy, British: 67, 108-09
and demilitarized zone: 16-20, 26-33, 36-41, 43- Ruffner, Maj. Gen. Clark L.: 82, 84-85, 86n, 285-88,
47, 113, 116-19 292
and DULUTH-SUNDIAL: 176 Ruiz-Novoa, Lt. Col. Alberto (Colombia): 393
as Eighth Army CG: 12-13, 70 Ruses: 284-85, 473
and expansion of ROKA: 210-13, 340-41 Ruses, enemy: 284, 314, 472
and financial crisis: 217-19 Russ, Col. Joseph R.: 315-16
and helicopters: 184 Ryan, Brig. Gen. Cornelius E.: 344-45
and inspection teams: 121-23, 126, 128-29, 160,
162-63, 166-67 Saegonbae: 93
and Japanese security: 220-24 St. Paul: 196-97
and limited offensives: 176-78, 187, 507 Salvage, battlefield, by enemy: 511
and National Guard troops: 202-03 Samich'on: 98-99
and naval sweep of China: 197 Sami-ch'on River: 98, 379
and Negro integration: 104-05 San Francisco peace conference: 43, 45n
and OVERWHELMING: 80-81 Sanctions, proposed against Communist China:
and package proposal: 163-67, 172-73, 263-64 130-32
and ports, restrictions on use: 160-61 Sand tables, use of: 93, 189
and POW issues: 137-43, 146-48, 150-51, 166, 168- Sandlin, Lt. Col. Joseph C.: 289-90
71, 241-43, 249, 252-54, 269 Sandy Ridge: 311-15
propaganda, warns of: 504 Sang Mu Dai: 451
and ROK Air Force: 212, 213, 341 Sangnyong-ni: 102, 296-97
and ROKA artillery expansion: 213-14 Sanitation methods: 374
and ROKA training: 64-65, 208-09 Sariwon: 40-41
and rotation and replacements: 160 Sat'ae-ri: 89, 93
as Ryukyus Governor: 58 Satae-ri Valley: 88-89, 91-96
as SCAP: 58, 220, 222 SATURATE: 195
and semantics barrier: 506 Scandling, 1st Lt. John D.: 288-89
on size of UNC units: 69-70 SCATTER: 170
and TALONS: 86-88 SCR-300: 188-89
and troop morale: 32-33 Sea, control of: 510
and WRANGLER: 98 Searchlights: 305, 395
Rifles Sebald, William J.: 19-20
automatic: 74-75 Seoul: 5, 10-13, 115-16, 204, 367, 385, 389-91, 399,
carbine: 184, 372 410-11, 437-38, 441-42, 450
M-1: 372 Seoul-Ch'orwon-Kumhwa railroad: 98
recoilless: 74-75, 96, 287-88, 343, 371 Seoul-Kaesong highway: 18-19
Ritchie, Lt. Col. Ellis B.: 285-87 Sepo-ri: 196
Road construction and repair: 74-75, 92-95 Service schools, ROKA: 64-65, 210, 344
Road systems: 74, 105-06, 398, 490-91 Shaw, Capt. Richard J.: 288
Roadblocks, enemy: 92-93 Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.: 53-55
Roads, air attacks against: 105-06, 398, 490-91 Sherzer, 2d Lt. John A.: 189, 191-92
Robertson, Walter S.: 450, 453-57, 481, 483 Shoosmith, Maj. Gen. Stephen (British): 323-24
Rochester: 196-97 Showalter, 1st Lt. Edward R.: 313-14
Rocket fire support: 75, 94, 109-10, 289-90, 303-05, SHOWDOWN: 311-18, 327-28
306-07, 371, 382, 396-97 Sibyon-ni: 41-42, 187, 196
Rocket launchers, enemy: 293 Sicily: 61
568 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Siegfried Line: 184 Strategic air support, carrier- and land-based—
Silla: 2 Continued
Sinanju: 195-96, 200, 398-99 against airfields: 319, 490-91
Sinanju-P'yongyang railroad: 460-61 assessment of: 192-94, 196, 322, 324
Sindae-ri: 378 against bridges: 105-07, 194, 397-99, 460-61
Sindok: 325 against combat points: 397-98
Sinuiju: 399-400 enemy Countermeasures: 194-95
Sleeping bag: 372 against dams: 319, 461. See also Power plants, air
SMACK: 385-89 attacks on.
Small arms ammunition, expenditure of: 372 against industry: 324-25, 398-400, 459-61
Smith, 1st Lt. Sylvanus: 188-90 against lines of communication: 105-06, 192, 319,
Smith, Maj. Gen. Wayne C.: 311-12, 314-17, 385-86 510
Smith, 1st Lt. Willard E.: 394 against logistical facilities: 105-08, 192-93, 324,
Smoke, tactical use: 386, 394-95 397-98, 510
Smythe, Maj. Gen. George W.: 310 near Manchuria: 181-82, 398
Sniper Ridge: 311, 317-18, 352-53, 369, 468-71,by474 Marine Corps: 399, 490-91, 508-09
Snipers: 372 against motor convoys: 105-06
So Hui, Maj. Gen. (NKPA): 422 number of sorties: 192, 322, 324, 398-99
So-ch'on River: 81-82 against power plants: 319-24, 398, 460-61
Songgong-ni: 42-43 purpose: 397-98
Soule, Maj. Gen. Robert H.: 98-99, 104n against railroads: 61, 105-08, 192-96, 319, 324, 397-
Sound-and-flash plotting: 352-53 99, 460-61, 481-82
South African forces: 60-61, 67 replacement of losses: 60-61
South Korean Army. See Republic of Korea Army restrictions by JCS: 20, 107-08, 320-21
(ROKA). against roads: 105-06, 398, 490-91
Southwestern Command, Japan Logistical Com- against troop quarters: 324
mand: 362-63 Strategic air support, enemy: 60, 108
Soyang River and Valley: 81-84 Strategic plans: 52-56, 129-34. See also Defensive
Spellman. Lt. Col. James L.: 315-16 plans; Offensive plans.
Spud Hill: 385-88 Streett, 1st Lt. St. Clair, Jr.: 300-301
Staff. See Command and staff. Strongpoints, enemy: 511
Stalin, Joseph V.: 4, 112, 409-10, 412, 421 Stuart, Col. Archibald W.: 383
Stars and Stripes: 85n Sturman, Maj. Kenneth R.: 93
State, Department of. See also Acheson, Dean G.; Suan: 319
Dulles, John Foster. Suiho: 319-22, 324, 388-89, 399, 460-61
and armistice negotiations: 126-27, 129, 479-80 Suip-ch'on River: 88
on control of ROKA: 481 Sunch'on: 194
on diversion of aircraft to Korea: 200-201 SUNDIAL: 175-76
and foreign troops withdrawal: 8 Supply system. See also Logistical system.
and inspection teams: 163 airlift in: 96. See also Helicopters.
and Korean unification: 4 difficulties in: 294-95
meetings with Department of Defense: 53-56 by hand-carry: 90, 286-87
and naval sweep of China: 197 helicopters in: 468, 471-72
and package proposal: 263 railroads in: 96
and ports, restrictions on use: 160 reports on expenditures: 70-71
and POW issues: 147, 269-70, 277-80, 402, 410-11, routes and methods: 84, 90, 93
431, 434 in UNC: 70, 510
and ROK political crises: 346 Supply system, enemy
and rotation and replacements: 160 air attacks on: 395
Steel strike: 337, 339 CCF: 399-400, 478, 510
Stevens, 1st Lt. Robert E.: 300-301, 309-10 by hand-carry: 193
Stevenson. Adlai E.: 330 Surprises, tactical, by enemy: 382-83
Stover, Capt. Max R.: 313
STRANGLE: 105-06, 192-96 Sweden: 162, 173-74, 420, 425, 428, 433-35, 483-84
Strategic Air Command (SAC): 60-61, 335-36 Swedish forces: 67
Strategic air support, carrier- and land-based: 20, Swift, Maj. Gen. Ira P.: 98-99
Switzerland: 162, 173-74, 419-20, 423-25, 428, 433-
33-34, 105-10, 192-95, 197-98, 319, 397-400, 459-
60, 490-91, 510 35, 444-45, 483-84
aircraft losses: 108, 324 Szares, Maj. John W.: 316
INDEX 569
Tactical air support, carrier- and land-based: 60-61, Taylor, General Maxwell D.—Continued
82, 84-85, 90, 93-94, 96-97, 100-101, 108-09, on combat effectiveness: 391
187-88, 193, 287-92, 294-96, 304-07, 311-13, conference with Rhee: 449-50, 488, 491
325-28, 381-82, 385-89, 391, 395-98, 400, 460, as Eighth Army CG: 390-91
465, 467-68, 471 and limited offensives: 465, 508-09
against AAA weapons: 353 and Old Baldy: 395
aircraft losses: 353 and Porkchop Hill: 473
bomb tonnages expended: 96-97, 386-88, 400 and security of ROK: 449-50, 453
Cherokee strikes: 398, 400, 460 and withdrawal of UNC forces: 455-56
doctrine, understanding on: 326-28 T-Bone Hill: 382-83, 385-87, 391
by Marine Corps: 94, 108-10, 197-98, 326, 386, Technology, enemy manpower versus: 511-12
395, 398, 400, 460, 468 Telephone (EE-8): 189
number of sorties: 96-97, 106-07, 192, 306, 327-28, Teng Hua, Lt. Gen. (Chinese) : 23-24, 113
353, 382, 385, 397-98, 400, 464-65, 468 Thailand forces: 67-69, 379
against supply system: 395 Thailand Navy: 67
against tunnels: 578 38th Parallel: 35-40, 504
Tactical air support, enemy: 374 Tiller, Capt. Jack M.: 288-90
Tactical lessons: 97, 316-17 Ting Kuo-yu, General (Chinese) : 422
Tactical methods, enemy: 465-66, 510-12 Togun-gol: 285
Taebaek Mountains: 2, 73, 81-82, 283-84 Toksan: 460-61
Taegu: 68, 210, 346, 362 Toledo: 196-97
Taeu San: 82 Tongch'on: 86-87, 175-76
Taft, Robert A.: 409 T'ongson'gol: 204-05
Taft-Katsura agreement: 3 Topography: 2, 73-74, 98
Taiwan: 408-09, 503-04. See also China, Nationalist. TOUCHDOWN: 92-94, 96-97
TALONS: 96-S8, 98, 105-07 Traffic jams: 90
Tamez, 1st Lt. Rudolph M.: 314-15 Training
Tanch'on: 196-97 in amphibious operations: 110
Tank, medium, M4 (Sherman): 92-93, 95, 371-72Eighth Army program: 81
Tank Battalions North Korean Army: 9
1st Marine: 462-63 in ROKA: 8-9, 62-67, 208-09, 215-14, 340-41, 348-
64th: 105, 247, 253 44, 357, 360, 499
70th: 99 UNC program: 68-69, 71-72, 199, 288-84, 367-68
72d: 89-90, 92-95 Treaties, defensive: 35
73d: 386, 394 Trench systems: 370-71, 509
245th: 288 enemy: 180-81, 288, 300, 351, 370
Tank Companies improving: 284
23d: 93 weapons emplacements in: 75
31st: 394 Triangle Hill (Hill 598) : 311-18, 352-53, 369, 375,
179th: 376-77 508
Tank fire support: 75, 90-91, 93, 97, 101, 103, 192, Trip flares: 75-76
288, 290-92, 296, 301-02, 307, 371-72, 377-79, Troop quarters, air attacks on: 324
382, 384-85, 387-88, 391, 394-95, 462-64 Troop unit strength:
Tank fire support, enemy: 199-200, 296 CCF: 318, 367-68
Tank-infantry actions: 92-95, 103, 288, 385-87, 391- Communist forces: 199-200, 283-84, 367-68, 389
92 Eighth Army: 199
Tank losses: 288, 290 North Korean Army: 9, 76-77, 199, 367-68
Tank strength, enemy: 79-80, 200, 293 U.S., in prewar Korea: 8
Tasca, Henry J,: 439 Truce line. See Demilitarized zone.
Task Force, 7th Amphibious: 61, 328 Truce negotiations. See Armistice negotiations.
Task Force Paik, ROKA: 182-83 Trudeau, Maj. Gen. Arthur G.: 394-95, 473
Task Forces, Army Truman, Harry S.
Mac (McFalls): 99-100 and air operations: 108, 201, 321
Sturman: 93-95 and armistice negotiations: 121, 127, 215
Task Forces, Navy and atomic weapons: 11-12
77th: 61, 108-09, 398 Churchill-Eden conference: 132
95th: 61, 196-97 as Commander in Chief: 53
Taylor, General Maxwell D.: 64, 66-67, 475-76 on complacency: 177
and armistice negotiations: 488, 491 and escalation of conflict: 69
570 TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT
Truman, Harry S.—Continued United Nations Command—Continued
and expansion of ROK forces: 343-44, 357 mand; MacArthur, General of the Army Doug-
and Japanese defense forces: 221 las; Ridgway, General Matthew B.
and Korean unification: 4, 7, 156-57 acclimatization of troops: 68-69
and military settlement: 408 advance to Yalu: 73
and National Guard troops: 202 aircraft types in: 60-61
and package proposal: 165-66, 173, 263-64 airlift of units: 70
and POW issues: 151, 269-70, 280-81 armistice, attitude toward: 32, 491-93
reaction to invasion: 9-10 assignment of units: 68
and ROK antiarmistice stand: 215-16 Blockading and Escort Force: 61
Tsai Cheng-wen, General (Chinese): 42-43, 47, 127, British representation on: 323-24
139-40, 145-46, 169, 171, 173, 422 build-up of forces: 60, 69-70, 133
Tumen River: 2 casualties: 86, 198-99, 478, 500-501
Tunnel defenses: 195, 288-89, 314-15, 352-53, 379 combat effectiveness: 67
Turkey: 112 command and staff structure: 58-59
Turkish Armed Forces Command: 67-69, 462-65 control of inflation: 217-20
Turner, Maj. Gen. Howard M., USAF: 122-23, 125- customs and traditions: 68-69
28, 152-53, 155, 272 headquarters transferred: 438
language barriers in: 68-69
Un'gok: 391 limitations on operations: 330-32
Unified commands lines of communication: 81-82, 96-97
control of: 55-56 logistical system: 70, 510
parochialism in: 60 and military settlement: 503
roles and missions: 55 military units. See Eighth Army; see also by type
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): 2 or nationality.
and aid to Communist bloc: 112, 499-500 morale status: 32-33
aircraft supplied to Communist forces: 80, 461 nations represented: 67, 112, 498
armistice negotiations, role in: 15-16, 112 naval units: 61
atomic weapons development: 11-12, 112, 122 offensive plans: 175-76
attacks on forbidden: 20 reception center: 68, 346
influence in Korea: 3-7, 499-500 relations with Japan: 222-23
as neutral: 157-58, 162-63, 165-67, 420 relief and rehabilitation mission: 217
peace overtures by: 15-16, 35, 43, 176-77, 412, 421 ROKA divisions in: 62-63
as potential belligerent: 1, 52, 56, 60, 72, 122, 130 rotation and replacement: 201-05
332-33 size of units: 67, 69-70
and POW issues: 402-03, 412 supply system and routes: 70, 510
submarine threat: 61, 110 training program: 68-69, 71-72
troops withdrawn: 8 troop unit strength: 199, 283-84, 367-68
United Kingdom. See Great Britain. withdrawal of forces: 454-56
United Nations withdrawal of support: 445, 455-56, 490-91
and armistice negotiations: 402, 496-97 United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
Chinese Communist membership in: 15-17, 56, (UNKRA): 215-17, 438
130, 132, 503-04 United States
combat forces of. See Eighth Army; United Na- armed forces, postwar rebuilding: 501
tions Command. armistice negotiations, leadership in: 16
declaration on armistice, proposed: 130 capability for general war: 132-34, 330-33
dissension in NATO: 502-03 contribution to Korean economy: 215-16, 437-38
on escalation of conflict: 153-55 CONUS divisions, combat effectiveness: 59-60
forces of, control by Eighth Army: 9-10 cost of war to: 500-501
and Korean independence: 7-8 defensive treaties: 35
and POW issues: 137, 402-04, 425-26, 428, 430 Far East policy: 499
prestige enhanced: 498-99 influence in Korea: 3-7
reaction to invasion: 9 limited war, lessons gained from: 501-02
ROKA placed under: 9-10 link to NATO: 499
support from requested: 56 objectives in Korea: 1, 52-53, 56-58
United Nations Civil Assistance Command: 217, 242, political settlement, pressures for: 330-33
269-70 reimbursement for supplies: 70-71
United Nations Command (UNC). See also Clark, responsibility to Korea and Japan: 498-99, 502-03
General Mark W.; Eighth Army; Far East Com- security pacts concluded: 220, 499
INDEX 571
United States—Continued Welch, Lt. Col. Gene R.: 188, 191
sponsors Japanese rearmament: 210-12 Westview Hill: 393
troop strength in prewar Korea: 8 Weyland, Lt. Gen. Otto P., USAF: 60-61, 107, 181-82,
troops, number in Korea: 5, 62 192-93, 320, 324, 327-28, 390-91, 459-61
troops withdrawn after World War II: 8 White, Lt. Gen. Isaac D.: 467, 471-72
Upton, Sgt. William: 189-90 White, M/Sgt. John O.: 287
U.S. News and World Report: 211 White Horse Hill (Hill 395): 180, 303-07, 311, 317-
USSR. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 18, 369, 469, 512
Williams, Maj. George H., Jr.: 91, 94
Valley Forge: 194-95 Williams, Maj. Gen. Samuel T.: 461-65
Van Fleet, General James A.: 46-47 Wills, Lt. Col. Lloyd E.: 301-02
and air support: 106-07, 192-93, 325-28 Wilson, Charles E.:358-59,367, 408, 431, 440-41,
and ammunition stocks: 33, 96, 224-29, 336-38, 447, 496-97
354-56 Wire, communications
and antiguerrilla operations: 182 improper placement: 75
and artillery fire support: 183-84, 352-53, 509 installation, field: 287-88
on basic mission: 99 Wisconsin: 196-97
combat effectiveness, insistence on: 177, 181, 350- Won Yong Duk, Lt. Gen. (ROKA): 448, 451-52
51 Wonsan: 16-19, 80, 86-87, 108--10, 176, 181-82, 194-
and CUDGEL: 97-98 98, 366-67, 399, 490-91
and DULUTH: 175-76 Woods, Lt. Col. John O.: 94-95
as Eighth Army CG: 13, 58-59, 70, 390 World Health Organization: 232
and expansion of ROK forces: 211-12, 341-45, 360 World War I, similarities to: 185
and Iron Triangle: 175-76 World War II, experience from: 203
and limited offensives: 177, 187-88, 292-93, 507 WRANGLER: 97-98, 175-76
and morale status: 32-33, 186, 390 Wright, Brig. Gen. Edwin K.: 17
and OVERWHELMING: 80-81 Wu, 1st Lt. Kenneth: 31, 119
and POW captures: 291-92 Wyman, Lt. Gen. Willard G.: 311n
and POW issues: 170-71, 240-43, 245-49, 252-59, WYOMING defense line: 74-76, 80, 97-99, 118-19
406
on pursuit of enemy: 73 Yach'on-ni: 89
and ROK combat effectiveness: 63, 84 Yalta Conference: 4
and ROK political crises: 346-47 Yalu River: 2, 10-11, 20, 60-61, 176, 320, 398, 441-42,
and rotation and replacements: 204 459-60
and SHOWDOWN: 311 Yang-do Island: 197
on size of UN units: 69-70 Yangsi: 459-61
and SMACK: 388-89 Yao'dong: 89-90
as tactician: 389-90 Yellow Sea: 61
and TALONS: 123 Yesong River: 187
and WRANGLER: 97-98 Yokkok River and Valley: 98, 100-102, 285, 288, 291-
Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., USAF: 53-55 92, 303, 305, 470-71
Vaughn, 1st Lt. George L.: 290 Yonan Peninsula: 114-15
VEGAS outpost: 395-97, 400, 462-66 Yoncho-do: 412
Vests, protective: 189-91, 372 Yonch'on: 188
Vishinsky, Andre.: 112, 176-77, 403 Yonch'on Valley: 98
Vladivostok: 110 Yongch'on: 270-71
Yoshida, Shigeru: 221-22
Walker, Col. Edwin A.: 88-89 You Chan Yang: 341-43, 442-43
Walker, Lt. Gen. Walton H.: 9-10, 12n
Young, Maj. Gen. Robert N.: 86n, 90-93, 97
War, U.S. capability for: 132-34, 330-33
Weapons fabrication by POW: 237, 239, 256, 259-60 Young, Capt. William B.: 313
Weapons types. See entries for various types. Yount, Brig. Gen. Paul F.: 70, 238-39, 245-53, 255-
Weather, effect on operations: 33-34, 82-84, 98, 107- 56, 346
08, 178-80, 189, 195-96, 294-95, 298-99, 392, Yu Chae Heung, Maj. Gen. (ROKA) : 158, 266
510-11 Yulsa-ri: 297
Weber, Col. John K.: 484, 486-87 Yuson-dong: 398

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1992 O - 304-306 : QL 3

Você também pode gostar