Appendix - Entire Record Optimized 2nd Replacement PDF

CASE NO.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
In Re:
CORECO JA’QAN PEARSON, VIKKI TOWNSEND CONSIGLIO, GLORIA KAY

GODWIN, JAMES KENNETH CARROLL, JASON M SHEPHERD on behalf of the
COBB COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY, and BRIAN JAY VAN GUNDY
Petitioners,
STATE OF GEORGIA, BRIAN KEMP, in his official capacity as Governor of

Georgia, BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his official capacity as Secretary of State
and Chair of the Georgia State Election Board, DAVID J. WORLEY, in his official
capacity as a member of the Georgia State Election Board, REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN, in her official capacity as a member of the Georgia State Election
Board, MATTHEW MASHBURN, in his official capacity as a member of the Georgia
State Election Board, and ANH LE, in her official capacity as a member of the
Georgia State Election Board,
Respondents
Appendix
SIDNEY POWELL
Counsel of Record
Texas Bar No. 16209700
Sidney Powell, P.C.
2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 300
Dallas, Texas 75219
(517) 763-7499
sidney@federalappeals.com
Of Counsel
JULIA Z. HALLER
BRANDON JOHNSON
EMILY P. NEWMAN
/s/ Howard Kleinhendler

HOWARD KLEINHENDLER
New York Bar No. 2657120
Howard Kleinhendler Esquire
369 Lexington Avenue, 12th Floor
New York, New York 10017
(917) 793-1188
howard@kleinhendler.com
HARRY W. MACDOUGALD
Georgia Bar No. 463076
Caldwell, Propst & DeLoach, LLP
Two Ravinia Drive, Ste 1600
Atlanta, Georgia 30346
(404) 843-1956
hmacdougald@cpdlawyers.com
L. LIN WOOD
L. LIN WOOD, P.C.
P.O. Box 52584
Atlanta, GA 30305-0584
(404) 891-1402
Table of Contents
75 Final Judgment.pdf 1
Transcript of 12/7/20 Motions Hearing 3
1 Complaint.pdf 47
1-1 Aff. of Briggs.pdf 151
1-2 Aff. of Redacted.pdf 184
1-3 Aff. of Cardozo.pdf 193
1-4 Aff. of Hursti.pdf 199
1-5 Aff. of Hursti (Embedded).pdf 248

1-6 SOS Certification.pdf 368
1-7 Pro V&V Report.pdf 370
1-8 Study of BMDs.pdf 398
1-9 Aff. of Spider.pdf 432
1-10 Aff. of Ramsland.pdf 450
1-11 Aff. of Romera.pdf 462
1-12 Aff. of Coleman.pdf 467
1-13 Aff of Diedrich.pdf 472
1-14 Aff of Wolf.pdf 478
1-15 Aff. of Zeher.pdf 480
1-16 Aff. of Voyles.pdf 502
1-17 Aff. of Reyes.pdf 513
1-18 Aff. of Johnson.pdf 521
1-19 Aff. of Silva.pdf 525
1-20 Aff. of O'Neal.pdf 532
1-21 Aff. of Fisher.pdf 539
1-22 Aff. of Peterford.pdf 544
1-23 TX SOS Report.pdf 566
1-24 Ltr. Maloney to Smartmatic.pdf 570
1-25 Aff. of Cobucci.pdf 573
1-26 Ltr. from Senator Warren.pdf 579
1-27 Aff. of Quinnell.pdf 595
1-28 Aff. of Harrison.pdf 615
1-29 Aff. of Branton.pdf 619

1-30 Civil Cover Sheet.pdf 623
3 Request for Issuance of Summons.pdf 637
3-1 Le Proposed Summons.pdf 625
3-2 Mashburn Proposed Summons.pdf 627
3-3 Raffensperger Proposed Summons.pdf 629
3-4 Sullivan Proposed Summons.pdf 631
3-5 Worley Proposed Summons.pdf 633
3-6 Kemp Proposed Summons.pdf 635
4 Cert. of Intereseted Persons.pdf 641
5 Motion to File Aff. Under Seal.pdf 688
5-1 Aff. of Redacted.pdf 648
5-2 Redacted Joint Cybersecurity Report.pdf 657
5-3 Redacted Joint Cybersecurity Report.pdf 675
5-4 Proposed Order Granting Motion.pdf 686
6 Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief.pdf 764
6-1 Aff. of Ayyadurai.pdf 699
6-2 Joint Cybersecurity Advisory.pdf 745
6-3 Proposed Order.pdf 756
7 NOF Recacted Declaration.pdf 800
7-1 Redacted Declaration.pdf 794
8 Sullivan Summons.pdf 804
9 Summons to Mashburn.pdf 806
10 David Worley Summons.pdf 808
11 Kemp Summons.pdf 810

12 Summons to Raffensperger.pdf 812
13 Summons to Anh Le.pdf 814
14 Order on Request for ...ency Injuctive Relief.pdf 816
15 Order Certifying for Immediate Review.pdf 820
16 Charlene McGowan Entry.pdf 822
17 Order setting hearing and briefing schedule.pdf 826
18 Minute Entry re- 11-29-20 Proceedings.pdf 828
20 Dem. Party of Georgia...nd Brief to Intervene.pdf 1019
20-1 Proposed Mtn to Dismiss.pdf 830
20-2 Proposed Brief in S...ort of Mtn to Dismiss.pdf 835
20-3 Proposed Answer.pdf 863
21 Ruseell Willard Entry.pdf 1046
22 Amended Order Certify...for Immediate Review.pdf 1050
23-1 NOF Official Transcript.pdf 1052
25 Dem Party of Georgia COI.pdf 1053
31 NOF Aff.pdf 1071
31-1 Aff. of Watkins.pdf 1063
32 Notice of Appeal.pdf 1074
33 NOF Transmittal Ltr. .pdf 1079
34 Transmission of Notice of Appeal.pdf 1080
35 Proposed Amended Answer.pdf 1100
36 USCA Ack. Notice of Appeal.pdf 1214

37 Order staying scheduling.pdf 1217
38 Resp. Mtn Intervne.pdf 1220
39 USCA Order re Expedited Briefing.pdf 1233
40 Order Postponing Hearing.pdf 1236
41 Democrats Emergency Motion to Intervene.pdf 1237
42 Order Granting Intervention.pdf 1245
43 Dems' Motion to Dimiss.pdf 1275
43-1 Dems' Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss.pdf 1247
44 Answer of Dems.pdf 1280
45 NOF Affidavits.pdf 1444
45-1 Report of Braynard.pdf 1392
45-2 Aff. of Quinnell and Young.pdf 1418
45-3 Aff. of Overholt.pdf 1434
47 Noice of Filing COA Transmittal Ltr.pdf 1448
48 Transmission Coy of Notice of Corss-Appeal.pdf 1449
49 Carey Allen Miller.pdf 1474
50 Josh Belinfante Entry.pdf 1478
51 Melanie Johnson Entry.pdf 1482
52 Emergency Motion for Relief from TRO.pdf 1505
52-1 Declaration of Michael Barnes.pdf 1486
52-2 Declaratio of Kristi Royston.pdf 1491
52-3 Declaration of Janine Eveler.pdf 1498
53 11th Cir.. Notice of Docketing.pdf 1521

53 USCA Ack. Cross Appeal.pdf 1523
54 11th Cir. Order Grantin...tion for Expedited Bre.pdf 1525
54 USCA Order re Expedited Briefing.pdf 1527
55 Consolidated Motion to Intervene.pdf 1529
56 Amended Scheduling Order.pdf 1538
57 Order Granting Leave t... affidavits under seal.pdf 1540
58 Intervenors' Response in Opp. to TRO.pdf 1542
59 Intervenors' NOF Aff.pdf 1640
59-1 Aff. of Vailes.pdf 1574
59-2 Aff. of Thomas.pdf 1578
59-3 Aff of Brandon.pdf 1582
59-4 Aff. of Sumner.pdf 1588
59-5 Aff. of Laurie.pdf 1592
59-6 Aff. of Alston.pdf 1598
59-7 Aff. of Cason.pdf 1602
59-8 Aff. of Young.pdf 1606
59-9 Aff. of Graham.pdf 1610
59-10 Aff. of Short.pdf 1615
59-11 Aff. of Ghazal.pdf 1621
59-12 Aff. of Zydney.pdf 1630
59-13 Aff of Patel.pdf 1635
60 States' Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Experts.pdf 1648

61 Brief in Support of ...iss and Opposing TRO.pdf 1762
61-1 Wood 11th Circuit Order.pdf 1683
61-2 Joint Statement from GCC.pdf 1705
61-3 Risk Limiting Audit Report.pdf 1708
61-4 Dec. of Harvey.pdf 1712
61-5 Jones' Order Fair Fight Org. v. Raff.pdf 1729
62 Callais Declaration.pdf 2024
62-1 State Motion to Dismiss.pdf 2084
62-2 Order allowing laptops.pdf 2088
62-3 Notice of Fiiling Electronic Media.pdf 2090
62-4 Notice of Filing of Appendix Vol. 4.pdf 2323
62-5 Notice of Filing of Qu...turza and Winter Decl..pdf 2339
63 Plaintiffs' Consolidated ...rt of Motion Inj. Relief.pdf 2342
63-1 Brief in Support of State Motion to Dismiss.pdf 2031
64 Notice of Filing Favorito, Hall and A.pdf 2405
65 States' NOF Aff.pdf 2627
66 11th Circuit Order.pdf 2631
66-1 Appendix Vol. 4.pdf 2094
67 2020.12.7 Minutes from Hearing.pdf 2644
67-1 Supplemental Quinnell Young Decl..pdf 2329
67-2 Maturza Decl..pdf 2333
67-3 Decl. of Winter.pdf 2336
68 Notice of Appeal.pdf 2646

68-1 Exh. A to Brief.pdf 2395
69 NOTICE Of Filing NOA Transmittal Letter.pdf 2650
69-1 Affid. of Garland Favorito.pdf 2408
69-2 Affid. of Scott Hall.pdf 2415
69-3 Affiant A.pdf 2432
70 Notice of Filing Supplemental Ramsand Report.pdf 2434
70-1 Supplemental Ramsland Report.pdf 2437
72 Transmission of Certifi...py of Notice of Appeal.pdf 2651
72-1 Aff. of Watson.pdf 2472
72-2 Aff. of Gilbert.pdf 2476
73 USCA Ack. of Notice of Appeal.pdf 2679
74 20-11-29 Pearson v Kemp 120cv4809 F old.pdf 2682
76 Ansolbehere Report (Braynard).pdf 1815
77 Ansolobehere Report (Briggs).pdf 1864
78 Rodden Report.pdf 1916
79-1 Notice of Filing Transcript.pdf 2678
80 Mayer Report.pdf 1976
81 Rodden-Marble Report.pdf 1997

Case 1:20-cv-04809-TCB Document 75 Filed 12/07/20 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
JUDGMENT
Ordered and Adjudged
=
1 of 44
1 United States District Court

Northern District Of Georgia
2 Atlanta Division
3
4 Coreco Jaqan Pearson, )
et al., )
5 )
Plaintiff, )
6 ) Civil Action
vs. ) File No. 1:20-CV-4809-TCB
7 )
) Atlanta, Georgia
8 Brian Kemp, et al., ) Monday December 7, 2020
) 10:00 a.m.
9 Defendant. )
_________________________)
10
11
12 Transcript of Motions Hearing
Before The Honorable Timothy C. Batten, Sr.
13 United States District Judge
14
APPEARANCES:
15
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: Sidney Powell
16 Harry MacDougald
Attorneys at Law
17
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: Carey Allen Miller
18 Joshua Barret Belinfante
Charlene Swartz McGowan
19 Melanie Leigh Johnson
Attorneys at Law
20
21
22
23 Lori Burgess, Official Court Reporter
(404) 215-1528
24
Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
25 produced by CAT.
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1 THE COURT: Good morning. I would like to point out
2 that this hearing is being audio streamed nationally, so
3 whatever you say near your microphones will be picked up for
4 the world to hear, so you might want to be discreet in what
5 you have to say this morning with the microphones. Also, I
6 would ask that -- each of y'all should have some plastic bags.
7 As you leave the lectern, take the bag with you, and the next
8 person who comes up should put a new bag. You all have bags,
9 right? Okay. So that is what we are going to do. All right.
10 In this case, the Plaintiffs are a group of
11 disappointed Republican presidential electors. They assert
12 that the 2020 presidential election in Georgia was stolen, and
13 that the results, Joe Biden winning, occurred only because of
14 massive fraud. Plaintiffs contend that this massive fraud was
15 manifest primarily, but not exclusively, through the use of
16 ballot stuffing. And they allege that this ballot stuffing
17 has been rendered virtually invisible by computer software
18 created and run by foreign oligarchs and dictators from
19 Venezuela to China to Iran.
20 The defendants deny all of Plaintiffs' accusations.
21 They begin in their motions to dismiss by rhetorically asking
22 what a lot of people are thinking, why would Georgia's
23 Republican Governor and Republican Secretary of State, who
24 were avowed supporters of President Trump, conspire to throw
25 the election in favor of the Democratic candidate for
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1 President.
2 We are going to turn now to the legal arguments. We
3 have several motions today, but primarily they are grouped
4 into two. First we have a motion to dismiss that has been
5 filed by the State Defendants, the original defendants in the
6 case, and then we have another motion to dismiss filed by the
7 Intervening Defendants in the case. The Plaintiffs of course
8 oppose both of these motions. They've been fully briefed, and
9 I have read everything that has been filed in this case by the
10 Plaintiffs and everything pertaining to these motions. If the
11 Defendants are not successful on those motions to dismiss, we
12 will proceed to hear argument on the substantive merits of the
13 complaint and the claims in the complaint. The way that time
14 is going to be -- well let me begin it this way. In their
15 legal arguments the Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack
16 standing to bring this suit, which is pretty much what the
17 11th Circuit just held in Mr. Woods's own separate suit
18 against the State on Saturday. The Defendants further argue
19 that under Georgia law this kind of suit, one for election
20 fraud, should be filed in State Court, not Federal Court.
21 This too is what the 11th Circuit held in a separate but
22 similar case recently. And next, Defendants assert that
23 Plaintiffs waited too long to file this suit which seeks an
24 order decertifying the election results. The Secretary of
25 State has already certified the election result, and there is
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1 no mechanism that the Court is aware of of decertifying it,
2 but that is that the Plaintiffs seek.
3 And finally, the law is pretty clear that a party
4 cannot obtain the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief
5 unless he acts quickly. And Defendants contend that the
6 Plaintiffs have failed to do that, pointing out that all of
7 Plaintiffs' claims about the Dominion voting machines, the
8 ballot marking devices, could have been raised months ago, and
9 certainly prior to the November 3 election, and certainly
10 before Plaintiffs filed this suit over three weeks after the
11 election took place.
12 So these are the procedural arguments that the
13 Defendants are making today, or at least the main ones, I
14 believe. And then the question is, assuming the Plaintiffs
15 can survive these procedural hurdles, what is the relief that
16 they want? They want me to agree with their allegations of
17 massive fraud. And what do they want me to do about it? They
18 want me to enter injunctive relief, specifically the
19 extraordinary remedy of declaring that the winner of the
20 election in Georgia was Donald Trump and not Joe Biden. They
21 ask me to order the Governor and the Secretary of State to
22 undo what they have done, which is certify Joe Biden as the
23 election winner. We will get to those merits if the
24 Plaintiffs survive the motion to dismiss.
25 At this time we're going to begin with the motion to
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1 dismiss, and the time allotment will be as follows: The State
2 Defendants have 20 minutes -- let me back up. Each side gets
3 30 minutes. The Plaintiffs get all 30 of their minutes, and
4 the Defendants' 30 minutes are divided among the two sets of
5 Defendants. The State Defendants -- the State Defendants get
6 20 minutes, and then the Intervening Defendants get 10
7 minutes, following which we will hear the Plaintiffs'
8 response. They have up to 30 minutes. And then whatever time
9 was saved in -- reserved for rebuttal, the State Defendants
10 and Intervening Defendants will then have.
11 But before we go forward, is there any way we can
12 stop this fuzzy sound that is coming through up here? I don't
13 know if it is coming through in the whole courtroom. I don't
14 think has anything to do with my microphone. (pause). All
15 right, is that better? I think it was the speaker, one of the
16 two speakers up here on the bench. I talk loud enough and I
17 think the lawyers talk loud enough that I can hear what they
18 are going to say. I don't need a microphone. So at this time
19 I will turn the matter over to the State Defendants.
20 MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor. Carey Miller
21 on behalf of the State Defendants. I am joined today by Josh
22 Belinfante, Charlene McGowan, and Melanie Johnson. Mr.
23 Belinfante will be handling the motion to dismiss. I do want
24 to raise with the Court, to the extent that we get there,
25 State Defendants would like to renew their motion to alter the
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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1 TRO that is in place at this point. I understand that we can
2 address that in that section.
3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.
4 MR. BELINFANTE: I am not checking email, I am
5 trying to keep my time.
6 THE COURT: Okay.
7 MR. BELINFANTE: I would ask this. Would the Court
8 allow me to speak without the mask? Or do you prefer I keep
9 the mask on to speak?
10 THE COURT: I think I need to have everybody keep
11 the mask on.
12 MR. BELINFANTE: I'll be happy to do it. Good
13 morning, Your Honor. I think you have hit the nail on the
14 head in terms of what the issues are. This case simply does
15 not belong in this Court. The relief that Plaintiffs seek is,
16 as the Court described, extraordinary. It is to substitute by
17 judicial fiat the wishes of the Plaintiffs over presidential
18 election results that have been certified, that have been
19 audited, that have been looked over with a hand-marked count.
20 There is zero authority under the Federal law, under the
21 Constitution of the United States, or even under Georgia law
22 for such a remedy.
23 If the Plaintiffs wanted the relief they seek, they
24 are not without remedies. They could do what the campaign of
25 the President has done, which is file a challenge in Georgia
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1 court under Georgia law challenging election irregularities.
2 There are three currently pending. I have with me two Rule
3 Nisi orders. One will proceed today at 3:30 in the Cobb
4 Superior Court sitting by designation. Another I believe is
5 Wednesday. And the President's, as I understand it, is to
6 proceed on Friday. That is where these claims should be
7 brought.
8 To the extent that the claims are about something
9 else, the Court need only look at what has happened in Georgia
10 since roughly 2019 and the passage of House Bill 316. It was
11 at that time that the Georgia legislature completely redid
12 Georgia election law. And there had been suit after suit
13 after suit, many of which brought by the Defendant
14 interveners, their allies, and others who question election
15 outcomes. And in every suit no relief has been ordered that
16 has been upheld by the 11th Circuit. In fact, no court has
17 ordered relief. And to the extent that two have, the Curling
18 case and the New Georgia Project case on discrete issues, the
19 11th Circuit stayed those because it concluded that there was
20 a strong likelihood of reversible error.
21 So what does this tell you? It tells you that
22 Georgia laws are constitutional, Georgia elections are
23 constitutional, and Georgia machines are constitutional. The
24 constitutional that the legislature has set forward is
25 constitutional. Now, that's where the Plaintiffs have backed
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1 themselves into a corner from which they cannot escape. In
2 their reply brief, the claims, from the State's perspective,
3 got significantly crystallized. It became much clearer. And
4 they're relying heavily on Bush v. Gore. The problem is that
5 they are turning Bush v. Gore on its head.
6 In Bush v. Gore the challenge was that a Florida
7 Supreme Court decision was going to, as the Plaintiffs repeat
8 often, substitute its will for the legislative scheme for
9 appointing presidential elections. That is exactly what they
10 are asking this Court to do, substitute this Court for the
11 Florida Supreme Court, and you have Bush v. Gore all over
12 again. And that manifests itself in various different forms
13 that the Court has seen in our brief and the Court has already
14 identified. I will not go through all of them. I will try to
15 hit the high notes on some, but we will rely on our briefs.
16 We're not dropping or conceding arguments, but we will rely on
17 our briefs for those that I don't address expressly.
18 Let's talk briefly about what the complaint is,
19 because that has been I think significantly clarified with the
20 reply brief. One, the parties are presidential electors. And
21 they argue that that makes a significant difference. But what
22 are the acts of the State? Not Fulton County, not mullahs in
23 Iran, not dictators in Venezuela. What are the acts of the
24 State that are at issue? And it's in the discussion about
25 traceability and the Jacobson decision in the 11th Circuit
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1 where that gets fleshed out really for the first time in the
2 reply brief, and there are three. And they tell you, and I
3 will keep coming back to it, on Page 20 of their reply brief.
4 The Plaintiffs, describing the State, say they
5 picked the Dominion system. Their policies led to de facto
6 abolition of the signature match requirement, their
7 regulations to permit early processing of absentee ballots is
8 unlawful and unconstitutional. Those are the three acts of
9 the State. Everything else is happening at a county level,
10 period. And from that they raise what appears to now be four
11 claims. One is the Elections and Electors Clause citing the
12 absentee ballot opening rule, I will refer to it as, the
13 settlement agreement. They raise equal protection claims
14 saying that the violation of the Election Clause has led to a
15 vote dilution and discrimination against Republican voters.
16 They argue that due process is violated because they have a
17 property interest in lawful elections, again, under the
18 Elections and Electors Clause. And finally, they raise a pure
19 State claim in Federal Court under a voter election challenge.
20 What is the relief they seek? The Court has
21 identified it. Why do they seek it? The Court is informed of
22 this on Page 25 of the reply brief. And it is -- if the Court
23 will not order a different result than what a certified
24 election has, they seek it through another means. They say on
25 Page 25 that allowing the electors to be chosen by the
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1 legislature under the plenary power granted to them for this
2 purpose by the elections and election laws. One way or the
3 another, the relief they seek is judicial fiat, changing
4 certified election results. And to evaluate these claims the
5 Court does need to consider aspects of State law. And this is
6 where the problem lies. I am going to keep going until you
7 tell me to stop.
8 (noise from courtroom audio system).
9 THE COURT: I am sorry, Mr. Belinfante. I don't
10 know what the issue is. We just have to bear through it
11 unless or until somebody fixes it. I've got six kids. It
12 doesn't bother me.
13 MR. BELINFANTE: I have three, I understand. I also
14 have the loudest dog in America. In any case, to evaluate the
15 claims, you have to look at State law. And because the
16 Plaintiffs raise Code Section 21-2-522 and the statutes that
17 surround it, it's those cases that are important. It allows a
18 challenge based on these grounds - in fact some are pending
19 now - misconduct, fraud, irregularity, illegal votes, and
20 error are all grounds to challenge an election in Georgia.
21 All of these issues can be brought in in those cases. Those
22 election challenges have to be decided promptly under
23 21-2-525. And, and this is critical, the relief sought is not
24 to declare someone else a winner, it is to have another
25 election. This goes to the point that there is simply no
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1 authority for the relief that they seek.
2 Turning first, with that factual predicate in mind,
3 to standing. There has been a fair amount of briefing on
4 whether the status as a presidential elector guarantees
5 standing. The 8th Circuit said yes, the 3rd Circuit said no.
6 And I think the 3rd Circuit's analysis is more persuasive.
7 And to the extent that the Plaintiffs say the 3rd Circuit did
8 not consider their status as an electorate, that is true, but
9 the electorate is not what gives you unique status, it's if
10 the electorate is a candidate. And that is expressly what the
11 3rd Circuit considered in the Bognet decision, and we would
12 suggest that that is the more persuasive one that we rely on
13 in our briefs.
14 But I do want to address two other aspects of
15 standing that are more particularized. One is that when they
16 are seeking to invalidate a State rule or a consent decree
17 that the State has entered into, or anything truly under the
18 Elections Clause, the Bognet case speaks to this as well. And
19 it says that because Plaintiffs are not the General Assembly,
20 nor do they bear any conceivable relationship to the State
21 law-making process, they lack standing to sue over the alleged
22 usurpation of the General Assembly's rights under the
23 Elections and Electors Clauses. That is absolutely true here.
24 The Wood court, the 11th Circuit Wood opinion, says the same,
25 citing Walker, because Federal Courts are not constituted as
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1 freewheeling enforcers of the Constitution and laws. And that
2 is the injury that underlies all of their claims, which is why
3 they lack standing.
4 I am not going to get into traceability as much
5 because I think the most useful aspect of the traceability
6 issue is the crystallizing of Plaintiffs' complaints, and as
7 I've indicated, the isolating of the State acts in particular.
8 On sovereign immunity, I only want to highlight that
9 a decision just came out in Michigan seeking very similar
10 relief. We will get you the cite. It is Michigan -- it is
11 against Whitmer, King versus Whitmer, in the Eastern District
12 of Michigan. Walks through all of the issues in this case and
13 rejects the claims, denies the relief. On sovereign immunity
14 they raise the point that under Young, you can only get
15 prospective injunctive relief. That is not decertification,
16 that is a retrospective. And so sovereign immunity would bar
17 that. They do seek to prevent the Governor from mailing the
18 results; that can be prospective, but there is just no relief
19 for it. So that is all I will says on sovereign immunity.
20 On laches, the Michigan Court also joined in with
21 Judge Grimberg on laches in the Wood case and said that there
22 is time that is inexcusable. The Court is well-aware of the
23 elements, was there a delay, was it not excusable, and did the
24 delay cause undue prejudice. Judge Grimberg has already
25 looked at this argument in the context of the Wood case and
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1 the challenge to the consent order and said laches applied.
2 And it does here for all of the Plaintiffs' arguments, and all
3 you need to do, again, is go back to that Page 20 and see why.
4 They say that their policies, the State's policies, led to a
5 de facto abolition of the signature requirement. The
6 complaint at Paragraph 58 acknowledges in Exhibit A that that
7 happened in March of this year. There has been plenty of time
8 that they thought the Secretary overstepped his bounds to
9 bring a challenge in that case or to bring a challenge even
10 afterwards, challenge the OEB. They did not.
11 They say on Page 20 that they, the State, picked the
12 Dominion system. They tell you on Paragraph 12 that happened
13 in 2019. There has been significant litigation over the
14 Dominion system. Nothing has been held in order that the
15 Dominion system is unconstitutional, is flawed, or anything
16 else that has stuck.
17 Third, they said that their regulation, the absentee
18 ballot regulation, permitted absentee ballots as unlawful and
19 unconstitutional. They tell you in Paragraph 60 that happened
20 in April of 2020. Georgia law, in the Administrative
21 Procedures Act, specifically allows you to challenge rules,
22 50-13-10. That wasn't done. They certainly could have. And
23 you don't need the fraud, as they allege, to happen first,
24 because their argument is not based on the fraud, it is based
25 on usurpation of power by the Executive Branch. That can be
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1 challenged when the rule has been promulgated, when the order
2 is out, and when the Dominion machines were selected.
3 We raise in our brief several forms of abstention.
4 And truly, Your Honor, they all kind of get to the same place
5 under different theories. And again, the reply brief made
6 this point to the clearest. I think at the end of the day,
7 while we will rely on our briefs in terms of why those matter,
8 and the Michigan court found that Colorado River abstention
9 should apply, there are parallel proceedings in State Court --
10 THE COURT: Did they even argue why it shouldn't?
11 MR. BELINFANTE: They argued that in voting rights
12 cases the 11th Circuit does not typically abstain. And those
13 cases are slightly different. They are challenging an
14 underlying statute, for the most part. Siegel is a slightly
15 -- it's a different case. But they are mostly challenging
16 underlying statutes. And there is not a pending election
17 challenge on the same thing in State Court. It's like the
18 other cases that we have seen that we've defended since the
19 gubernatorial election in 2018. So no, I don't think so. But
20 I think the Bush v. Gore analysis is the one that is most
21 critical, and it is that simply the Secretary -- the
22 legislative scheme for electing presidential electors is set
23 forth in the Code in Title 21, it has a means of challenging
24 fraudulent illegal votes, it has a means of allowing the
25 Secretary to address various issues, the State Election Board
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1 to pass regulations. All of that authority has been delegated
2 by, first, Congress to the Georgia Legislature, and then to
3 the Executive Branch. That is the scheme that is put in
4 place, and that is exactly what they seek to turn on its head.
5 And what the three justice concurrence on which they rely
6 says, makes that impossible. Because the Supreme Court said
7 at Page 120, for the Court, in that case the Florida Court, to
8 step away from this established practice prescribed by the
9 Secretary, the State official charged by the Legislature with
10 the responsibility to obtain and maintain uniformity in the
11 application, operation, and interpretation of election laws
12 was to depart from the legislative scheme.
13 Read the proposed order. That is exactly what the
14 Plaintiffs seek here, and that is exactly what their own
15 authority says the Court cannot issue in terms of relief, and
16 that would actually trump the remaining claims because it
17 would violate the Elections Clause in order to arguably save
18 some other vague right in terms of due process.
19 Turning to that, let me talk briefly about the
20 absentee ballot regulation, the return of the ballots. There
21 is nothing that is inconsistent with that, number one, because
22 if you look in the Election Code, there are five times that
23 the General Assembly said something cannot occur earlier than
24 X date. This doesn't say that. This says beginning on this
25 date they can do this, but it doesn't say it can only happen.
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1 And the five times elsewhere in the Code would suggest that
2 the legislature knew how to change it if they wanted. That is
3 121-2-132, 133, 153, 187, and 384. They are simply reading
4 the regulation to create the conflict, when every piece of
5 Federal and State law says you should read it to avoid the
6 conflict. In terms of the settlement agreement itself, I
7 think Judge Grimberg has sufficiently analyzed that. And it
8 fills the gap. There is no conflict. They can't point to any
9 language that it does. And at the end of the day it is an
10 OEB, an Official Election Bulletin, not a statute and not a
11 regulation of the State Election Board anyway.
12 On the Dominion machines, I think we will rely on --
13 Mr. Miller is going to talk about that a good deal, but also
14 they argue that the audit somehow doesn't save it because of
15 Prohm and that we are estopped from raising Prohm. There are
16 two problems with that. One, estoppel doesn't apply. There
17 has been no final order. They're not estopped from doing
18 anything. That's the Community State Bank vs. Strong decision
19 from the 11th Circuit applying Georgia law 2011. And two,
20 there has not been an order in Curling saying that the
21 machines are unconstitutional. There have been nine
22 preliminary injunctions filed, no standard relief, and it
23 ignores -- the entire premise of the argument ignores that
24 when a voter gets a ballot from the machine they can read who
25 they voted for. And when the hand count took place, they
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1 didn't scan it back in, they looked at what the ballot said
2 and who they voted for and that is why things were put in
3 different boxes. Their own affidavits talk about that
4 provision of separating the boxes by hand. It resolves the
5 issue.
6 The remaining theories fail -- again, I want to be
7 cognizant of time and save some time for rebuttal. We rely on
8 our briefs in terms of the merits of those, but the equal
9 protection and due process allegations I think are addressed
10 in Wood from the 11th Circuit. On procedural due process, to
11 the extent that that is the due process claim, they don't
12 challenge the Georgia election means of correcting as somehow
13 invalid or insufficient. In fact, they raised it. And so you
14 can't have a procedural due process claim if you have a
15 remedy. You can't have a substantive due process claim if it
16 doesn't shock the conscience, which having to use the remedy
17 here, they can do. Your Honor, with that, unless there are
18 questions, I would will reserve the rest of my time for
19 rebuttal.
20 THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
21 MS. CALLAIS: Good morning, Your Honor. I am Amanda
22 Callais on behalf of Intervenor Defendants, the Democratic
23 Party of Georgia, the DSCC and the DCCC, and I am mindful of
24 many of the points Mr. Belinfante just made, and I will not
25 repeat them, but for the record, Your Honor, I would just like
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1 to say that for the statements that we've made in our motion
2 to dismiss, this case should be dismissed. The Plaintiffs in
3 this case lack standing. They bring their claims and assert
4 only generalized grievances. This Court also lacks
5 jurisdiction to hear their claims because this case is moot
6 now that the election has been certified, which is what the
7 11th Circuit found just this past Saturday in the Wood v.
8 Raffensperger case. And then Plaintiffs have also failed to
9 state any cognizable claim under the Election and Elections
10 Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause.
11 Where I would like to begin though is where
12 Mr. Belinfante started, and I would like to bring us back to
13 this point about where we are in terms of Georgia elections
14 and with the remedy asked for in this case. Over a month ago
15 five million Georgians cast their ballots in the 2020
16 presidential election with the majority of them choosing
17 Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as their next President. Those votes,
18 both the ballots that were cast on Dominion machines and the
19 ballots that were cast by absentee were counted. Almost
20 immediately after that count took place, those votes were
21 counted again by hand, and then almost immediately after that
22 count finished, the recount began again, a third time, by
23 machine. Each and every one of those counts has confirmed
24 Georgia voters' choice. Joe Biden should be the next
25 President of The United States. At this point there is simply
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1 no question that Joe Biden won Georgia's presidential election
2 and with it all of Georgia's 16 electoral votes. Despite
3 that, Plaintiffs have come to this Court eight months after a
4 settlement agreement they challenged was entered, three weeks
5 after the election is over, and days after certification took
6 place, and they asked this Court to take back that choice, to
7 set aside the choice that Georgia voters have made, and to
8 choose the next president by decertifying the 2020
9 presidential election results and ordering the governor to
10 appoint a new slate of electors.
11 THE COURT: Speaking of taking back, how do the
12 Intervening Defendants respond to the Plaintiffs' point in
13 their complaint that many people, including Stacey Abrams,
14 affiliated with the Democratic Party, opposed these machines
15 from the beginning and said that they are rife with the
16 possibility of fraud?
17 MS. CALLAIS: I think, Your Honor, that the key
18 there is that when we talk about a possibility of fraud, that
19 does not mean that fraud has actually occurred. And here
20 Plaintiffs come after an election has taken place and they say
21 on very -- as we will talk about if we get to the TRO
22 portion -- on very limited specious evidence that there is a
23 possibility of fraud. A possibility of fraud does not mean
24 that fraud has actually occurred. And truthfully, Your Honor,
25 that is what the Plaintiffs would need to show to get some
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1 sort of -- the relief that they are requesting here, that
2 there has been actual fraud. And that is just not in their
3 complaint, it is not in their evidence. It makes no
4 difference whether there has been a possibility of fraud or
5 issues with the machines. That is a case that is in front of
6 Judge Totenberg and that she is deciding. But that is not the
7 evidence that they have presented here, and it certainly does
8 not support their claims.
9 So with that, Your Honor, as the 3rd Circuit
10 explained just a little over a week ago when denying an
11 emergency motion to stop certification in a case similar to
12 this one brought by Donald J. Trump's campaign, voters not
13 lawyers choose the President. Ballots not briefs decide
14 elections. Plaintiffs' request for sweeping relief in this
15 case is unprecedented. It is unprecedented anywhere, and it
16 is particularly unprecedented in Georgia where the ballots
17 have been counted not once, not twice, but three times, and
18 the vote has been confirmed. Their request for relief is not
19 just unprecedented, but also provides a separate and
20 independent grounds for this Court to dismiss this case.
21 As we explained in our motion to dismiss, granting
22 Plaintiffs' remedy in and of itself would require the Court to
23 disenfranchise over 5 million Georgia voters, violating their
24 constitutional right to vote. Post-election
25 disenfranchisement has consistently been found to be a
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1 violation of the Due Process Clause throughout the courts.
2 For example, in Griffin v. Burns the 1st Circuit found that
3 throwing out absentee votes post election that voters believed
4 has been lawfully cast would violate the Due Process Clause.
5 Similarly, in Marks v. Stinson, a number of years later, the
6 3rd Circuit found the same thing in their finding where they
7 found even if there is actual evidence of fraud, discarding
8 ballots that were legally cast or that voters believed to be
9 legally cast violates the Due Process Clause and is a drastic
10 remedy. This is precisely what would happen here if this
11 Court were to order the requested relief. That order would
12 violate the Due Process Clause. And because of that, this
13 Court cannot grant the remedy that Plaintiffs seek and the
14 Court should dismiss this suit.
15 In finding that the Court can't grant this relief,
16 this Court would not be alone, it would be in actually quite
17 good company, not just from the 1st Circuit and the 3rd
18 Circuit in Griffin and Stinson, but also from more recent
19 cases. In 2016 in Stein v. Cortes, the District Court
20 declined to grant Jill Stein's request to a recount because,
21 quote, it would well insure that no Pennsylvania vote counts,
22 which would be outrageous and unnecessary. Just this cycle,
23 in Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar the Plaintiffs
24 sought to invalidate 7 million mail ballots under the Equal
25 Protection Clause, and the Court explained that it has been
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1 unable to find any case in which a plaintiff has sought such
2 drastic remedy in the contest of an election in terms or the
3 sheer volume of votes asked to be invalidated. The Court also
4 promptly dismissed there.
5 Just this last Friday in Law v. Whitmer in Nevada
6 State Court, which actually would have the ability to hear a
7 contest, found that it would not decertify the election in
8 Nevada. And the list goes on, Your Honor. We could talk
9 about findings in State Court in Arizona on Friday. There
10 have been over 30 challenges to this election that have been
11 repeatedly dismissed since -- basically since election day.
12 Since election day.
13 So the Court is in good company, and it's not just
14 in company good company nationwide, but it is in good company
15 with the judge right down the hall from here who, just two
16 weeks ago, in a case nearly identical to this one, found a
17 request to disenfranchise nearly 1 million absentee voters in
18 Georgia to be extraordinary. Judge Grimberg explained that to
19 prevent Georgia certification of the votes cast in the general
20 election after millions of people have lawfully cast their
21 ballots, to interfere with the results of an election that has
22 already concluded would be unprecedented and harm the public
23 and in countless ways. Granting injunctive relief here would
24 breed confusion, undermine the public's trust in the election,
25 and potentially disenfranchise over 1 million Georgia voters.
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1 Viewed in comparison to the lack of any demonstrable harm,
2 this Court finds no basis in fact or law to grant Plaintiff
3 the relief he seeks.
4 That same reasoning applies here. And in fact, it
5 applies here even more because most of the claims that were
6 brought in front of Judge Grimberg are the same, but the
7 amount of votes that Plaintiffs here seek to decertify are far
8 greater in scope.
9 On this last point, Your Honor, about the inability
10 of the Court to order the remedy, I wanted to respond to
11 something that Plaintiffs raised in their brief last night.
12 In their brief last night they react to the briefing on
13 mootness that we included in our TRO and note that this
14 Court -- this case would not be moot because the Court can
15 decertify an election. And that Wood v. Raffensperger that
16 came out by the 11th Circuit didn't discuss decertification of
17 the election, only halting certification.
18 And I would just like to point out that if this
19 Court were to decertify the election and specifically to point
20 a new slate of electors, which is what is asked, that in and
21 of itself would also violate the law. The U.S. Constitution
22 empowers State Legislatures to choose the manner of appointing
23 presidential electors, and that is the Electors Clause that
24 Plaintiffs actually challenge. And pursuant to that clause,
25 the Georgia General Assembly has chosen to appoint electors
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1 according to popular vote. Those are certified by the
2 governor through certificate of ascertainment. That popular
3 vote has already taken place, Your Honor, and if this Court
4 were to order a new slate of electors to be appointed, that
5 would -- that would violate the Electors Clause.
6 In addition, Congress has also provided that
7 electors shall be appointed in each and every state on the
8 Tuesday next after the first Monday in November in every 4th
9 year as also known as Election Day, which this year took place
10 on November 3rd. Georgia has held that election on Election
11 Day, and if this Court were to now, months after the -- over a
12 month after the election, to go and order that a new slate be
13 appointed, it would be violating that statute as well. So for
14 the very reasons that the Plaintiffs -- the very relief that
15 Plaintiffs ask is actually what prevents this Court from
16 issuing any relief in this case, and precisely why it should
17 be dismissed.
18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right, I
19 will hear from the Plaintiffs.
20 MS. POWELL: May it please the Court. Sidney Powell
21 and Harry MacDougald for the Plaintiffs. We are here on a
22 motion to dismiss which requires the Court to view the
23 pleadings and all the facts alleged in the light most
24 favorable to the Plaintiff. In my multiple decades of
25 practice I have never seen a more specifically pled complaint
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1 of fraud, and replete with evidence of it, both mathematical,
2 statistical, computer, expert, testimonial, video, and
3 multiple other means that show abject fraud committed
4 throughout the State of Georgia.
5 Forget that this machine and its systems originated
6 in Venezuela to ensure the election of Hugo Chavez and that it
7 was designed for that purpose. Look just at what happened in
8 Georgia. Let's start, for example, with the language, "the
9 insularity of the Defendants' and Dominion's stance here in
10 evaluation and management of the security and vulnerability of
11 the system does not benefit the public or citizens' confident
12 exercise of the franchise. The stealth vote alteration or
13 operational interference risk posed by malware that can be
14 effectively invisible to detection, whether intentionally
15 seeded or not, are high once implanted, if equipment and
16 software systems are not properly protected, implemented, and
17 audited. The modality of the system's capacity to deprive
18 voters of their cast votes without burden, long wait times,
19 and insecurity regarding how their votes are actually cast and
20 recorded in the unverified QR code makes the potential
21 constitutional deprivation less transparently visible as well;
22 at least until any portions of the system implode because of
23 system breach, breakdown, or crashes" -- all of which the
24 State of Georgia experienced -- "the operational shortcuts now
25 in setting up or running election equipment or software
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1 creates other risks that can adversely impact the voting
2 process."
3 THE COURT: You don't have to get into any of the
4 evidence or any of the statements or averments of the
5 complaint because I have read it. And all these statements, I
6 am assuming that every word of it is true. My question -- the
7 first question I have for you, for the Plaintiffs in the case,
8 is why -- first of all, whether you can or cannot pursue these
9 claims in State Court, specifically in Georgia Superior
10 Courts. Just the question is, can you?
11 MS. POWELL: No, Your Honor, we can't. These are
12 exclusively Federal claims with the exception of the election
13 contest allegation. They are predominantly Federal claims,
14 they are brought in Federal Court for that purpose. We have a
15 constitutional right to be here under the Election and
16 Electors Clause. I was not reading evidence. What I was
17 reading to the Court was the opinion of Judge Totenberg that
18 was just issued on 10-11-20 which defeats any allegation of
19 laches or lack of concern over the voting machines. This has
20 been apparent to everyone who has looked at these machines or
21 discussed them in any meaningful way or examined them in any
22 meaningful way, beginning with Carolyn Maloney, a Democratic
23 Representative to Congress back in 2006 who objected to them
24 being approved by CFIUS. Judge Totenberg went on to say that
25 "the Plaintiffs' national cybersecurity experts convincingly
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1 present evidence that it's not a question of might this
2 actually ever happen but, quote, when will it happen,
3 especially if further protective measures are not taken.
4 Given the masking nature of malware in the current systems
5 described here, if the State and Dominion simply stand by and
6 say we have never seen it, the future does not bode well."
7 And sure enough, exactly the fears articulated in her 147 page
8 opinion, and all the means and mechanisms and problems
9 discussed in that three day hearing she held have now
10 manifested themselves within the State of Georgia in the most
11 extreme way possible.
12 THE COURT: She did not address the question before
13 the Court today though as to the propriety of bringing this
14 suit in this Court, did she?
15 MS. POWELL: There is no other place to bring this
16 suit of Federal Equal Protection claims and the electors.
17 THE COURT: You couldn't bring all of these claims
18 in State Court? Is that your position?
19 MS. POWELL: We are entitled to bring these claims
20 in Federal Court, Your Honor. They are Federal constitutional
21 claims.
22 THE COURT: What do you do with the 11th Circuit's
23 holding in Wood on Saturday that we cannot turn back the clock
24 and create a world in which the 2020 election results are not
25 certified?
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1 MS. POWELL: Actually we can, but we don't need to
2 because we are asking the Court to decertify.
3 THE COURT: Where does that exist?
4 MS. POWELL: Bush v. Gore. Bush v. Gore was a
5 decertification case. There are other cases we've cited in
6 our brief that allow the Court the decertify. And at the very
7 minimum this Court should order a preliminary injunction to
8 allow discovery and allow us to examine the forensics of the
9 machines. For example, we know that already in Ware County,
10 which is a very small precinct, there were 37 votes that were
11 admittedly flipped by the machines from Mr. Trump to
12 Mr. Biden. That is a 74 vote swing. That equates to
13 approximately the algorithm, our experts also believe, was run
14 across the State that weighed Biden votes more heavily than it
15 did Trump votes. That is a systemic indication of fraud that
16 Judge Totenberg was expressing concern about in her decision
17 just weeks before the election. We have witness after witness
18 who have explained how the fraud can occur within the
19 machines. We know for example that there were crashes, just
20 like she feared in the decision, and everybody expressed
21 concern about. We know machines were connected to the
22 internet which is a violation of their certification
23 requirements and Federal law itself. We could not have acted
24 more quickly. In fact, the certification issue wasn't even
25 ripe until it was actually certified.
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1 THE COURT: But you weren't limited in your remedies
2 to attacking the certification, you could have attacked the
3 machines months ago.
4 MS. POWELL: That is what happened in the Totenberg
5 decision, and that is why I read it to the Court. The
6 machines were attacked by parties, and the election was
7 allowed to go forward. And we have come forward with our
8 claims as fast as is humanly possible. This is a massive
9 case, and of great concern not just to the nation and to
10 Georgia, but to the entire world, because it is imperative
11 that we have a voting system that people can trust.
12 They talk about disenfranchising voters, well there
13 are over a million voters here in Georgia that will be
14 disenfranchised by the counting of illegal ballots that render
15 theirs useless. It's every legal vote that must be counted.
16 Here we have scads of evidence. And the vote count here is
17 narrow. I mean, the disparity now is just a little over
18 10,000 votes. Just any one of our categories of that we have
19 identified require decertification. For example, 20,311
20 nonresidents voted illegally. Between 16,000 and 22,000
21 unrequested absentee ballots were sent in in violation of the
22 legislative scheme. Between 21,000 and 38,000 absentee
23 ballots were returned by voters but never counted. 32,347
24 votes in Fulton County were identified to be statistically
25 anomalous. And the vote spike for Mr. Biden, that is
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1 completely a mathematical impossibility, according to multiple
2 expert affidavits we provided, shows that it was like 120,000
3 Biden votes all of a sudden magically appear after midnight on
4 election night. That happens to coincide with the time we
5 have video of the Fulton County election workers running the
6 same stack of rather pristine-looking ballots through the
7 machine multiple times. And as for the recounts, that makes
8 no difference because if you recount the same fake ballots,
9 you achieve -- in the same machines, you achieve the same
10 results. That is why the hand count in Ware County that
11 revealed the 74 swing is so important and indicative of the
12 systemic machine fraud that our experts have identified, and
13 why it is so important that we at least get access for the
14 Department of Defense even, or our own experts, or jointly, to
15 examine the machines in Fulton County and the ten counties
16 that we requested in our protective order, or our motion
17 for --
18 THE COURT: How is this whole case not moot from the
19 standpoint of even if you were to win, and win Georgia, could
20 Mr. Trump win the election?
21 MS. POWELL: Well fraud, Your Honor, can't be
22 allowed by a Court of Law to stand --
23 THE COURT: That is not what I am asking. I am not
24 saying that there may not be other issues that need to be
25 addressed, and that there might not be questions that need to
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1 be investigated, I am asking, as a practical matter, in this
2 particular election, can Mr. Trump even win the election even
3 if he wins Georgia?
4 MS. POWELL: Yes, he can win the election.
5 THE COURT: How would that happen?
6 MS. POWELL: Because there are other states that are
7 still in litigation that have even more serious fraud than we
8 have in Georgia. It is nowhere near over. And it doesn't
9 affect just the presidential election. This fraud affects
10 senate seats, congressional seats, gubernatorial seats, it
11 affects even local elections. Another huge statistic that is
12 enough by itself to change the result is the at least 96,000
13 absentee ballots that were voted but are not reflected as
14 being returned. All of these instances are violations of
15 Federal law, as well as Georgia law. And in addition,
16 Mr. Ramsland's report finds that the ballot marking machine
17 appears to have abnormally influenced election results and
18 fraudulently and erroneously attributed between thirteen
19 thousand seven hundred and twenty-five thousand and the
20 136,908 votes to Mr. Biden just in Georgia. We have multiple
21 witnesses who just saw masses of pristine ballots appearing to
22 be computer marked, not hand marked, and those were repeatedly
23 run through machines until votes were injected in the system
24 that night without being observed by lawfully required
25 observers in violation of Georgia and Federal law that
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1 resulted in the mass shoot-up spike of votes for Mr. Biden.
2 Mr. Favorito's affidavit is particularly important. He talks
3 about the Ware County Waycross City Commission candidate who
4 reported that the Ware County hand audit is flipped those 74
5 votes. That is a statistically significant swing for a
6 precinct that small, and there is no explaining for it other
7 than the machine did it. We have testimony of witnesses who
8 saw that their vote did not come out the same way it was.
9 Mr. Favorito is a computer tech expert. He said that the vote
10 flipping malware was resident on the county election
11 management system of possibly one or more precinct or
12 scanners. There was also an instance where it came out of the
13 Arlo system changed, and there was no way to verify the votes
14 coming out of the individual precincts versus coming out of
15 Arlo because apparently they didn't keep the individual
16 results so that they can be compared. So there was a vote
17 swapping incident through the Arlo process also.
18 There was a misalignment of results, according to
19 Mr. Favorito, among all three presidential candidates. Rather
20 than just a swapping of the results for two candidates, in
21 other words, they would sometimes put votes into a third-party
22 candidate and take those out and put them in Mr. Biden's pile.
23 The system itself according to its own technological handbook
24 explains that it allows for votes to be put in, it can scan to
25 set or overlook anything it wants to overlook, put those in an
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1 adjudication pile, and then in the adjudication process, which
2 apparently was conducted in top secret at the English Street
3 warehouse, where all kinds of strange things were going on,
4 were just thrown out. They could just literally drag and drop
5 thousands of votes and throw them out. That is why it is so
6 important that we at least get temporary relief to examine the
7 systems and to hold off the certification or decertify or ask
8 the Court to halt the proceedings continuing right now until
9 we can have a few days to examine the machines and get the
10 actual evidence off the machines and look at the ballots
11 themselves, because we know there were a number of counterfeit
12 ballots that were used in the Fulton County count that night.
13 It would be a simple matter to examine 100,000 or so ballots
14 and look at which ones are fake. It is possible to determine
15 that with relative ease.
16 This is not about who or which government officials
17 knew anything was wrong with the machine. It's entirely
18 possible that many people did not know anything was wrong with
19 them. But it is about ensuring the integrity of the vote and
20 the confidence of the people that the will they expressed in
21 their vote is what actually determines the election. Very few
22 people in this country have any confidence in that level right
23 now. Very few.
24 The standard is only preponderance of the evidence.
25 We have shown more than enough for a prima facie case to get
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1 to -- meet the standard required -- this Court is required to
2 apply. It is crucial that we decertify and stop the vote. We
3 need to have discovery. It's so important to the American
4 people, particularly in a country that is built on the rule of
5 law, to know that their election system is fair and honest.
6 THE COURT: But that rule of law limits where these
7 suits can be filed and who can bring them. Specifically on
8 the standing issue, how does your -- how do your clients
9 survive the motion to dismiss with respect to the standing
10 issue if I don't follow the 8th Circuit's case opinion in
11 Carson?
12 MS. POWELL: Even the Court's decision in Wood is so
13 distinguishable it should make clear electors have standing.
14 In that case, for example, the State could not even say who
15 did have standing. But under the Constitution, electors
16 clearly do.
17 THE COURT: But Georgia, unlike Minnesota,
18 differentiates between candidates and Presidential electors.
19 Right?
20 MS. POWELL: I am not sure about that. But we also
21 have the Cobb County Republican Party official who is suing,
22 and the electors themselves are part of the Constitutional
23 Clause that entitles them to standing.
24 THE COURT: I just think you have a pretty glib
25 response to what the 11th Circuit has held regarding these
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1 cases. I mean, the 11th Circuit has basically said, you know,
2 we are not -- the Federal Courts are courts of limited
3 jurisdiction and we are not open 24/7 to remedy every
4 freewheeling constitutional issue that comes up. They have
5 made it clear, the Appellate Courts have made it clear, they
6 don't want District Courts handling this matter, they want
7 State Courts handling State election disputes, even regarding
8 in Federal elections. The Federal Government has nothing to
9 do with the State election and how it is conducted. As you
10 said, it is the Secretary of State who is the chief election
11 officer, and decides it. Why shouldn't the State of Georgia
12 investigate this? Why should it be a Federal judge?
13 MS. POWELL: Because we raise Federal constitutional
14 issues that are paramount to --
15 THE COURT: They raised Federal constitutional
16 issues in Wood.
17 MS. POWELL: -- to equal protection. He did not
18 request decertification. That is one of the things that
19 distinguished that case. He was not an elector or
20 representative of a county. He was simply an individual. And
21 I am not sure that decision is correct because, in that case,
22 they were also wondering who could challenge it. Well
23 obviously the Federal Equal Protection Clause and the
24 constitutional issues we have raised here give this Court
25 Federal question jurisdiction. This Court's one of the
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1 primary checks and balances on the level of fraud that we are
2 experiencing here. It is extremely important that this Court
3 exercise its jurisdiction as a gatekeeper on these issues.
4 There were numerous departures from the State statute,
5 including the early processing of votes, and the de facto
6 abolition of signature matches that give rise to Federal Equal
7 Protection claims.
8 THE COURT: Well, back to the standing question.
9 You know, the Plaintiffs allege that their interests are the
10 same, basically one in the same, as any Georgia voters. In
11 Paragraph 156 of the complaint they aver that Defendants
12 diluted the lawful ballots of Plaintiffs and of other Georgia
13 voters and electors. Further, Defendants allege that -- the
14 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants further violated Georgia
15 voters's rights, and they allege, the Plaintiffs, that quote,
16 all candidates, political parties, voters, including without
17 limitation Plaintiffs, have a vested interest. It doesn't
18 sound like your clients are special, that they have some
19 unique status that they enjoy that allows them to bring this
20 suit instead of anyone else. How do they have standing?
21 MS. POWELL: They have the unique status of being
22 the Presidential electors selected to vote for Donald Trump at
23 the electoral college. They were not certified as -- and
24 decertification is required to make sure they can do their
25 jobs that they were selected to do.
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1 THE COURT: Under the 3rd Circuit case, does your
2 theory survive?
3 MS. POWELL: Our theory is -- I think the 3rd
4 Circuit decision is wrong, the 8th Circuit decision is
5 correct. There is no circumstance in which a Federal elector
6 should not be able to seek relief in Federal Court, thanks to
7 our Constitution. It is one of our most important principles.
8 There were multiple means of fraud committed here.
9 We have also the military intelligence proof of interference
10 in the election, the Ware County 37 votes being flipped, the
11 video of the Fulton City vote count, they lied about the water
12 leak, they ran off observers, they brought in unusually
13 packaged ballots from underneath a table. One person is seen
14 scanning the same QR code three different times in the machine
15 and big batch of ballots which would explain why the same
16 number of ballots gets injected repeated into the system.
17 That corresponds with the math and the algorithms showing a
18 spike of 26,000 Biden votes at that time. After Trump's lead
19 of 103,997 votes there were mysteriously 4800 votes injected
20 into the system here in Georgia multiple times, the same
21 number, 4800 repeatedly. That simply doesn't happen in the
22 absence of fraud. All of the facts we have laid out in our
23 well-pleaded complaint require that this Court decertify the
24 election results or at least, at the very least, stop the
25 process now in a timely fashion and give us an opportunity to
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1 examine the machines in ten counties and get further
2 discovery, particularly of what happened in Fulton County.
3 Those things need to be resolved before any citizen of Georgia
4 can have any confidence in the results of this election.
5 Allowing voters to cast ballots that are solely
6 counted based on their voting designations and not on an
7 unencrypted humanly unverifiable QR code that can be subject
8 to external manipulation and does not allow proper voter
9 verification and ballot vote auditing cannot withstand the
10 scrutiny of a Federal Court and cannot pass muster as a
11 legitimate voting system in the United States of America. For
12 those reasons, we request the Court to deny the motion to
13 dismiss, allow us a few days, perhaps even just five, to
14 conduct an examination of the machines that we have requested
15 from the beginning, and find out exactly what went on and give
16 the Court further evidence it might want to rule in our favor,
17 because the fraud that has happened here has destroyed any
18 public confidence that the will of the people is reflected in
19 their vote, and just simply cannot stand.
20 THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. All right, rebuttal?
21 This is Josh Belinfante.
22 MR. BELINFANTE: Just briefly, Your Honor. Your
23 Honor, just a few points. One, I want the get back to
24 Colorado River abstention. There was a means and a process to
25 do that. You had asked earlier about their response. I did
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1 go back and check. The Siegel case they rely on cites to only
2 Burford and Pullman abstention, not Colorado River. It is
3 appropriate in this case, and as the Michigan Court concluded,
4 the Moses Cone case which establishes it says that there is
5 really not a reason not to do so when you have concurrent
6 jurisdiction.
7 And that is one of the problems with the Plaintiffs'
8 argument. They keep telling you that they can't go to State
9 Court because they have Federal constitutional claims. Those
10 can be litigated in State Court pursuant to 1983. They also
11 say on laches that -- it is interesting, they have cited to
12 you and read to you numerous aspects of the Curling case, and
13 they say that going back to 2006 somebody thought that there
14 was something wrong with these machines. Well if that's the
15 case, then it makes the laches argument even stronger. These
16 are the arguments that they are about the machines. They
17 certainly could have been litigated prior to after the
18 certification of the election.
19 The other big problem that they raise is that the
20 Curling case, everything that was read was stayed by the 11th
21 Circuit, presuming that it is reading the part of the opinion
22 that I think it is. If it is going back to a prior opinion,
23 that is about old machines which aren't even used anymore.
24 And then in Ware County, that was provided in an affidavit
25 that was new as part of the reply brief, it should not be
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1 counted. There is authority for that, Sharpe v. Global
2 Security International from the Southern District of Alabama,
3 from 2011. But even still, that can be brought in the State
4 Court under the challenge mechanisms set.
5 You asked what is the authority for decertifying the
6 election. The citation was Bush v. Gore. Bush v. Gore stayed
7 a Florida recount, it did not decertify the election. But
8 most importantly, what Bush v. Gore said is, when there is a
9 State process, the Elections Clause says that has to continue.
10 And they have not shown you that the State process is
11 insufficient, invalid, whatsoever. On standing, they find
12 themselves in a bind. If they are candidates as electors, the
13 State election code says you can bring a challenge under
14 21-2-522. If they are not candidates and the 3rd Circuit
15 reasoning applies, then the 11th Circuit in Wood would apply
16 too, and say that when you are not a candidate you don't have
17 standing. So either way, they find themselves out of Federal
18 jurisdiction on these arguments.
19 Just a few points on closing. They tell you that
20 the voters lack confidence in the election system. Well,
21 since 2018 candidates that were not successful have tried to
22 overturn the rule of voters in the Courts. Since 2018 courts
23 have stayed with the State of Georgia and upheld Georgia's
24 election laws and Georgia's election machines. This Court
25 should do the same. The State is doing what it can to enhance
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1 public confidence. That is why we went the extra step of a
2 hand count, not that pushes ballots through a machine, but
3 that looks at what the ballot says, and when the voter had
4 access to that ballot they could see too. And if they voted
5 for Donald Trump it will show it on the ballot; if they voted
6 for Joe Biden it will show it on the ballot. And if not, they
7 can correct it right there. That is the actions that instill
8 confidence, not this. And if they want to challenge those
9 election results, the State Courts are open for them to do it,
10 there are hearings scheduled now, and those hearings should
11 proceed and not this one. Thank you.
12 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Ms. Callais, did you
13 have anything else?
14 MS. CALLAIS: No, Your Honor.
15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. I have
16 considered the entire record in the case and I find that, even
17 accepting as true every averment of the complaint, I find that
18 this Court must grant the Defendants' motions to dismiss, both
19 of the motions to dismiss, beginning with the proposition that
20 Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they are
21 not the legal equivalent to medical hospitals which have
22 emergency rooms that are open 24/7 to all comers. On the
23 contrary, the 11th Circuit has specifically held that Federal
24 Courts don't entertain post election contests about vote
25 counting and misconduct that may properly be filed in the
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1 State courts. So whether the Defendants have been subjected
2 to a Federal claim, which is Equal Protection, Due Process,
3 Elections Clause and Electors Clause, it does not matter. The
4 11th Circuit has said these claims in this circuit must be
5 brought in State court. There is no question that Georgia has
6 a statute that explicitly directs that election contests be
7 filed in Georgia Superior Courts, and that is what our Federal
8 Courts have said in this circuit, it is that is exactly right.
9 Sometimes Federal judges are criticized for
10 committing the sin of judicial activism. The appellate courts
11 have responded to that and said enough is enough is right. In
12 fact, enough is too much. And the courts have convincingly
13 held that these types of cases are not properly before Federal
14 Courts, that they are State elections, State courts should
15 evaluate these proceedings from start to finish.
16 Moreover, the Plaintiffs simply do not have standing
17 to bring these claims. This Court rejects the 8th Circuit's
18 nonbinding persuasive-value-only holding in Carson vs Simon
19 and I find that the Defendants -- excuse me -- the Plaintiffs
20 don't have standing, because anyone could have brought this
21 suit and raised the exact same arguments and made the exact
22 same allegations that the Plaintiffs have made in their
23 complaint. The Plaintiffs have essentially alleged in their
24 pleading that their interests are one and the same as any
25 Georgia voter. I do not believe that the 11th Circuit would
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1 follow the reasoning of the 8th circuit in Carson.
2 Additionally, I find that the Plaintiffs waited too
3 late to file this suit. Their primary complaint involves the
4 Dominion ballot marking devices. They say that those machines
5 are susceptible to fraud. There is no reason they could not
6 have followed the Administrative Procedure Act and objected to
7 the rule-making authority that had been exercised by the
8 Secretary of State. This suit could have been filed months
9 ago at the time the machines were adopted. Instead, the
10 Plaintiffs waited until over three weeks after the election to
11 file the suit. There is no question in my mind that if I were
12 to deny the motions to dismiss, the matter would be brought
13 before the 11th Circuit and the 11th Circuit would reverse me.
14 The relief that the Plaintiffs seek, this Court cannot grant.
15 They ask the Court to order the Secretary of State to
16 decertify the election results as if such a mechanism even
17 exists, and I find that it does not. The 11th Circuit said as
18 much in the Wood case on Saturday.
19 Finally, in their complaint, the Plaintiffs
20 essentially ask the Court for perhaps the most extraordinary
21 relief ever sought in any Federal Court in connection with an
22 election. They want this Court to substitute its judgment for
23 that of two-and-a-half million Georgia voters who voted for
24 Joe Biden, and this I am unwilling to do.
25 The motion for temporary restraining order that was
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1 entered on November 29 is dissolved. The motions to dismiss
2 are granted. And we are adjourned.
3 (end of hearing at 11:07 a.m.)
4 * * * * *
5 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
6
7 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
8 the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
9
10 _________________________________
Lori Burgess
11 Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
12 Northern District of Georgia
13 Date: December 8, 2020
14
15
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18
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25
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICCT COURT, NORTHERN

DISTRCOICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JA’QAN PEARSON,

VIKKI TOWNSEND CONSIGLIO,
GLORIA KAY GODWIN, JAMES
KENNETH CARROLL, , CAROLYN HALL CASE NO.
FISHER, CATHLEEN ALSTON LATHAM,
and BRIAN JAY VAN GUNDY,
Plaintiffs.
v.
BRIAN KEMP, in his official capacity as
Governor of Georgia, BRAD
RAFFENSPERGER, in his official
capacity as Secretary of State and Chair
of the Georgia State Election Board,
DAVID J. WORLEY, in his official
capacity as a member of the Georgia
State Election Board, REBECCA
N.SULLIVAN, in her official capacity as
a member of the Georgia State Election
Board, MATTHEW MASHBURN, in his
official capacity as a member of the
Georgia State Election Board, and ANH
LE, in her official capacity as a member
Defendants.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY, EMERGENCY, AND

PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This civil action brings to light a massive election fraud, multiple
violations of Georgia laws, including O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-30(d), 21-2-31, 21-2-
33.1 and §21-2-522, and multiple Constitutional violations, as shown by fact
witnesses to specific incidents, multiple expert witnesses and the sheer
mathematical impossibilities found in the Georgia 2020 General Election. 1
1.
As a civil action, the plaintiff’s burden of proof is a “preponderance of
the evidence” to show, as the Georgia Supreme Court has made clear that, “[i]
was not incumbent upon [Plaintiff] to show how the [] voters would have voted
if their [absentee] ballots had been regular. [Plaintiff] only had to show that
there were enough irregular ballots to place in doubt the result.” Mead v.
Sheffield, 278 Ga. 268, 272, 601 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2004) (citing Howell v. Fears,
275 Ga. 627, 571 S.E.2d 392 (2002).

2.
The scheme and artifice to defraud was for the purpose of illegally and
fraudulently manipulating the vote count to make certain the election of Joe
Biden as President of the United States.
3.
The fraud was executed by many means, 2 but the most fundamentally
troubling, insidious, and egregious is the systemic adaptation of old-fashioned
“ballot-stuffing.” It has now been amplified and rendered virtually invisible
by computer software created and run by domestic and foreign actors for that
very purpose. Mathematical and statistical anomalies rising to the level of
impossibilities, as shown by affidavits of multiple witnesses, documentation,
and expert testimony evince this scheme across the state of Georgia.
Especially egregious conduct arose in Forsyth, Paulding, Cherokee, Hall, and
Barrow County. This scheme and artifice to defraud affected tens of
thousands of votes in Georgia alone and “rigged” the election in Georgia for
Joe Biden.
4.
The massive fraud begins with the election software and hardware
from Dominion Voting Systems Corporation (“Dominion”) only recently
purchased and rushed into use by Defendants Governor Brian Kemp,
Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, and the Georgia Board of Elections.
Sequoia voting machines were used in 16 states and the District of Colombia
in 2006. Smartmatic, which has revenue of about $100 million, focuses on
Venezuela and other markets outside the U.S. 3
After selling Sequoia, Smartmatic's chief executive, Anthony Mugica.
Mr. Mugica said, he hoped Smartmatic would work with Sequoia on projects
in the U.S., though Smartmatic wouldn't take an equity stake.” Id.
5.
Smartmatic and Dominion were founded by foreign oligarchs and
dictators to ensure computerized ballot-stuffing and vote manipulation to
whatever level was needed to make certain Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez
never lost another election. (See Redacted whistleblower affiant, attached as
Exh. 2) Notably, Chavez “won” every election thereafter.

6.
As set forth in the accompanying whistleblower affidavit, the
Smartmatic software was designed to manipulate Venezuelan elections in
favor of dictator Hugo Chavez:
Smartmatic’s electoral technology was called “Sistema de Gestión

Electoral” (the “Electoral Management System”). Smartmatic was a
pioneer in this area of computing systems. Their system provided for
transmission of voting data over the internet to a computerized
central tabulating center. The voting machines themselves had a
digital display, fingerprint recognition feature to identify the voter,
and printed out the voter’s ballot. The voter’s thumbprint was linked
to a computerized record of that voter’s identity. Smartmatic created
and operated the entire system.
7.
A core requirement of the Smartmatic software design was the
software’s ability to hide its manipulation of votes from any audit. As the
whistleblower explains:
Chavez was most insistent that Smartmatic design the system in a

way that the system could change the vote of each voter without
being detected. He wanted the software itself to function in such a
manner that if the voter were to place their thumb print or
fingerprint on a scanner, then the thumbprint would be tied to a
record of the voter’s name and identity as having voted, but that voter
would not be tracked to the changed vote. He made it clear that the
system would have to be setup to not leave any evidence of the
changed vote for a specific voter and that there would be no evidence
to show and nothing to contradict that the name or the fingerprint or
thumb print was going with a changed vote. Smartmatic agreed to
create such a system and produced the software and hardware that
accomplished that result for President Chavez. (See Id., see also Exh.
3, Aff. Cardozo, attached hereto)).
8.
The design and features of the Dominion software do not permit a
simple audit to reveal its misallocation, redistribution, or deletion of votes.
First, the system's central accumulator does not include a protected real-time
audit log that maintains the date and time stamps of all significant election
events. Key components of the system utilize unprotected logs. Essentially
this allows an unauthorized user the opportunity to arbitrarily add, modify,
or remove log entries, causing the machine to log election events that do not
reflect actual voting tabulations—or more specifically, do not reflect the
actual votes of or the will of the people. (See Hursti August 2019 Declaration,
attached hereto as Exh. 4, at pars. 45-48; and attached hereto, as Exh. 4B,
October 2019 Declaration in Document 959-4, at p. 18, par. 28).
9.
Indeed, under the professional standards within the industry in
auditing and forensic analysis, when a log is unprotected, and can be altered,
it can no longer serve the purpose of an audit log. There is incontrovertible
physical evidence that the standards of physical security of the voting
machines and the software were breached, and machines were connected to
the internet in violation of professional standards and state and federal laws.
(See Id.)
10.
Moreover, lies and conduct of Fulton County election workers about a
delay in voting at State Farm Arena and the reasons for it evince the fraud.
11.
Specifically, video from the State Farm Arena in Fulton County shows
that on November 3rd after the polls closed, election workers falsely claimed
a water leak required the facility to close. All poll workers and challengers
were evacuated for several hours at about 10:00 PM. However, several
election workers remained unsupervised and unchallenged working at the
computers for the voting tabulation machines until after 1:00 AM.
12.
Defendants Kemp and Raffensperger rushed through the purchase of
Dominion voting machines and software in 2019 for the 2020 Presidential
Election 4. A certificate from the Secretary of State was awarded to Dominion

Voting Systems but is undated. (See attached hereto Exh. 5, copy
Certification for Dominion Voting Systems from Secretary of State).
Similarly a test report is signed by Michael Walker as Project Manager but is
also undated. (See Exh. 6, Test Report for Dominion Voting Systems,
Democracy Suite 5-4-A)
13.
Defendants Kemp and Raffensperger disregarded all the concerns that
caused Dominion software to be rejected by the Texas Board of Elections in
2018, namely that it was vulnerable to undetected and non-auditable
manipulation. An industry expert, Dr. Andrew Appel, Princeton Professor of
Computer Science and Election Security Expert has recently observed, with
reference to Dominion Voting machines: "I figured out how to make a slightly
different computer program that just before the polls were closed, it switches
some votes around from one candidate to another. I wrote that computer
program into a memory chip and now to hack a voting machine you just need
7 minutes alone with it and a screwdriver." (Attached hereto Exh. 7, Study,
Ballot-Marking Devices (BMDs) Cannot Assure the Will of the Voters by
Andrew W. Appel Princeton University, Richard A. DeMillo, Georgia Tech
Philip B. Stark, for the Univ. of California, Berkeley, December 27, 2019). 5
14.
As explained and demonstrated in the accompanying redacted
declaration of a former electronic intelligence analyst under 305th Military
Intelligence with experience gathering SAM missile system electronic
intelligence, the Dominion software was accessed by agents acting on behalf
of China and Iran in order to monitor and manipulate elections, including the
most recent US general election in 2020. This Declaration further includes a
copy of the patent records for Dominion Systems in which Eric Coomer is
listed as the first of the inventors of Dominion Voting Systems. (See
Attached hereto as Exh. 8, copy of redacted witness affidavit, 17 pages,
November 23, 2020).
15.
Expert Navid Keshavarez-Nia explains that US intelligence services
had developed tools to infiltrate foreign voting systems including Dominion.
He states that Dominion’s software is vulnerable to data manipulation by
unauthorized means and permitted election data to be altered in all
battleground states. He concludes that hundreds of thousands of votes that
were cast for President Trump in the 2020 general election were transferred
to former Vice-President Biden. (Exh. 26).

16.
Additionally, incontrovertible evidence Board of Elections records
demonstrates that at least 96,600 absentee ballots were requested and
counted but were never recorded as being returned to county election boards
by the voter. Thus, at a minimum, 96,600 votes must be disregarded. (See
Attached hereto, Exh. 9, R. Ramsland Aff.).
17.
The Dominion system used in Georgia erodes and undermines the
reconciliation of the number of voters and the number of ballots cast, such
that these figures are permitted to be unreconciled, opening the door to ballot
stuffing and fraud. The collapse of reconciliation was seen in Georgia’s
primary and runoff elections this year, and in the November election, where
it was discovered during the hand audit that 3,300 votes were found on
memory sticks that were not uploaded on election night, plus in Floyd county,
another 2,600 absentee ballots had not been scanned. These “found votes”
reduced Biden’s lead over Donald Trump 6.

18.
Georgia’s election officials and poll workers exacerbated and helped,
whether knowingly or unknowingly, the Dominion system carry out massive
voter manipulation by refusing to observe statutory safeguards for absentee
ballots. Election officials failed to verify signatures and check security
envelopes. They barred challengers from observing the count, which also
facilitated the fraud.
19.
Expert analysis of the actual vote set forth below demonstrates that at
least 96,600 votes were illegally counted during the Georgia 2020 general
election. All of the evidence and allegation herein is more than sufficient to
place the result of the election in doubt. More evidence arrives by the day
and discovery should be ordered immediately.
20.
Georgia law, (OCGA 21-5-552) provides for a contest of an election
where:
(1) Misconduct, fraud, or irregularity by any primary or election

official or officials sufficient to change or place in doubt the result; . .
. (3) When illegal votes have been received or legal votes rejected at
the polls sufficient to change or place in doubt the result; (4) For any
error in counting the votes or declaring the result of the primary or
election, if such error would change the result; or (5) For any other
cause which shows that another was the person legally nominated,
elected, or eligible to compete in a run-off primary or election.
21.
As further set forth below, all of the above grounds have been satisfied
and compel this Court to set aside the 2020 General Election results which
fraudulently concluded that Mr. Biden defeated President Trump by 12,670
votes.
22.
Separately, and independently, there are sufficient Constitutional
grounds to set aside the election results due to the Defendants’ failure to
observe statutory requirements for the processing and counting of absentee
ballots which led to the tabulation of more than fifty thousand illegal ballots.
THE PARTIES
23.
Plaintiff Coreco Ja’Qan (“CJ”) Pearson, is a registered voter who
resides in Augusta, Georgia. He is a nominee of the Republican Party to be a
Presidential Elector on behalf of the State of Georgia. He has standing to
bring this action under Carson v. Simon, 2020 US App Lexis 34184 (8th Cir.
Oct. 29, 2020). He brings this action to set aside and decertify the election
results for the Office of President of the United States that was certified by
the Georgia Secretary of State on November 20, 2020. The certified results
showed a plurality of 12,670 votes in favor of former Vice-President Joe Biden
over President Trump.

24.
Plaintiff Vikki Townsend Consiglio, is a registered voter who resides in
Henry County, Georgia. She is a nominee of the Republican Party to be a
Presidential Elector on behalf of the State of Georgia.
25.
Plaintiff Gloria Kay Godwin, is a registered voter who resides in
Pierece County, Georgia. She is a nominee of the Republican Party to be a
26.
Plaintiff James Kenneth Carroll, is a registered voter who resides in
Dodge County, Georgia. He is a nominee of the Republican Party to be a
27.
Plaintiff Carolyn Hall Fisher, is a registered voter who resides in
Forsyth County, Georgia. She is a nominee of the Republican Party to be a
28.
Plaintiff Cathleen Alston Latham, is a registered voter who resides in
Coffee County, Georgia. She is a nominee of the Republican Party to be a

29.
Plaintiff Jason M. Shepherd is the Chairman of the Cobb County
Republican Party and brings this action in his official capacity on behalf of
the Cobb County Republican Party.
30.
Plaintiff Brian Jay Van Gundy is registered voter in Gwinnett County,
Georgia. He is the Assistant Secretary of the Georgia Republican Party.
31.
Defendant Governor Brian Kemp (Governor of Georgia) is named
herein in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Georgia. On or
about June 9, 2019, Governor Kemp bought the new Dominion Voting
Systems for Georgia, budgeting 150 million dollars for the machines. Critics
are quoted, “Led by Abrams, Democrats fought the legislation and pointed to
cybersecurity experts who warned it would leave Georgia's elections
susceptible to hacking and tampering.” And “Just this week, the Fair Fight
voting rights group started by [Stacy] Abrams launched a television ad
critical of the bill. In a statement Thursday, the group called it “corruption at
its worst” and a waste of money on “hackable voting machines.” 7

32.
Defendant Brad Raffensperger ("Secretary Raffensperger") is named
herein in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Georgia and
the Chief Election Official for the State of Georgia pursuant to Georgia’s
Election Code and O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50. Secretary Raffensperger is a state
official subject to suit in his official capacity because his office "imbues him
with the responsibility to enforce the [election laws]." Grizzle v. Kemp, 634
F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011). Secretary Raffensperger serves as the
Chairperson of Georgia's State Election Board, which promulgates and
enforces rules and regulations to (i) obtain uniformity in the practices and
proceedings of election officials as well as legality and purity in all primaries
and general elections, and (ii) be conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly
conduct of primaries and general elections. See O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-30(d), 21-2-
31, 21-2-33.1. Secretary Raffensperger, as Georgia's chief elections officer, is
further responsible for the administration of the state laws affecting voting,
including the absentee voting system. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50(b).
33.
Defendants Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley, Matthew Mashburn,
and Anh Le (hereinafter the "State Election Board") are members of the State
Election Board in Georgia, responsible for "formulating, adopting, and
promulgating such rules and regulations, consistent with law, as will be

conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections."
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(2). Further, the State Election Board "promulgate[s] rules
and regulations to define uniform and nondiscriminatory standards
concerning what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for
each category of voting system" in Georgia. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(7). The State
Election Board, personally and through the conduct of the Board's employees,
officers, agents, and servants, acted under color of state law at all times
relevant to this action and are sued for emergency declaratory and injunctive
relief in their official capacities.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
34.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 which
provides, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
35.
This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1343
because this action involves a federal election for President of the United
States. “A significant departure from the legislative scheme for appointing
Presidential electors presents a federal constitutional question.” Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); Smiley v. Holm,
285 U.S. 355, 365 (1932).

36.
The jurisdiction of the Court to grant declaratory relief is conferred by
28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202 and by Rule 57 and 65, Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.
37.
This Court has jurisdiction over the related Georgia Constitutional
claims and State law claims under 28 U.S.C. 1367.
38.
In Georgia, the "legislature" is the General Assembly. See Ga. Const.
Art. III, § I, Para. I.
39.
Because the United States Constitution reserves for state legislatures
the power to set the time, place, and manner of holding elections for Congress
and the President, state executive officers, including but not limited to
Secretary Raffensperger, have no authority to exercise that power
unilaterally, much less flout existing legislation or the Constitution itself.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
40.
Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and
under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-522 to remedy deprivations of rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States and to contest the election results.
41.
The United States Constitution sets forth the authority to regulate
federal elections, the Constitution provides:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4 (“Elections Clause”).
42.
With respect to the appointment of presidential electors, the
Constitution provides: Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled
in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an
Elector. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Electors Clause”).
43.
Neither Defendant is a “Legislature” as required under the Elections
Clause or Electors Clause. The Legislature is “‘the representative body which
ma[kes] the laws of the people.’” Smiley 285 U.S. 365. Regulations of
congressional and presidential elections, thus, “must be in accordance with

the method which the state has prescribed for legislative enactments.” Id. at
367; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576
U.S. 787, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (U.S. 2015).
44.
While the Elections Clause "was not adopted to diminish a State's
authority to determine its own lawmaking processes," Ariz. State Legislature,
135 S. Ct. at 2677, it does hold states accountable to their chosen processes
when it comes to regulating federal elections, id. at 2668. "A significant
departure from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors
presents a federal constitutional question." Bush, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring); Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365.
45.
Plaintiffs also bring this action under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-522,
Grounds for Contest:
A result of a primary or election may be contested on one or more of

the following grounds:
(1) Misconduct, fraud, or irregularity by any primary or election

official or officials sufficient to change or place in doubt the result;
(2) When the defendant is ineligible for the nomination or office in

dispute;
(3) When illegal votes have been received or legal votes rejected at
the polls sufficient to change or place in doubt the result;
(4) For any error in counting the votes or declaring the result of the
primary or election, if such error would change the result; or
(5) For any other cause which shows that another was the person
legally nominated, elected, or eligible to compete in a run-off primary
or election.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-522.
46.
Under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-10, Presidential Electors are elected.
47.
Under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(l)(B), the Georgia Legislature instructed
the county registrars and clerks (the "County Officials") to handle the
absentee ballots as directed therein. The Georgia Legislature set forth the
procedures to be used by each municipality for appointing the absentee ballot
clerks to ensure that such clerks would "perform the duties set forth in this
Article." See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-380.1.
48.
The Georgia Election Code instructs those who handle absentee ballots
to follow a clear procedure:
Upon receipt of each [absentee] ballot, a registrar or clerk shall write

the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The
registrar or clerk shall then compare the identifying information
on the oath with the information on file in his or her office, shall
compare the signature or make on the oath with the signature or
mark on the absentee elector's voter card or the most recent update
to such absentee elector's voter registration card and application for
absentee ballot or a facsimile of said signature or maker taken from
said card or application, and shall, if the information and signature
appear to be valid and other identifying information appears to be
correct, so certify by signing or initialing his or her name below the
voter's oath. Each elector's name so certified shall be listed by the

registrar or clerk on the numbered list of absentee voters prepared
for his or her precinct.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(l )(B) (emphasis added).
49.
Under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(l)(C), the Georgia Legislature also
established a clear and efficient process to be used by County Officials if
they determine that an elector has failed to sign the oath on the outside
envelope enclosing the ballot or that the signature does not conform with
the signature on file in the registrar's or clerk's office (a "defective absentee
ballot").
50.
The Georgia Legislature also provided for the steps to be followed by
County Officials with respect to defective absentee ballots:
If the elector has failed to sign the oath, or if the

signature does not appear to be valid, or if the elector has failed
to furnish required information or information so furnished does
not conform with that on file in the registrar's or clerk's office,
or if the elector is otherwise found disqualified to vote, the registrar
or clerk shall write across the face of the envelope "Rejected," giving
the reason therefor. The board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk
shall promptly notify the elector of such rejection, a copy of which
notification shall be retained in the files of the board of registrars or
absentee ballot clerk for at least one year.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2 -386(a) (l)(C) (emphasis added).

I. DEFENDANTS' UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS VIOLATED THE

GEORGIA ELECTION CODE AND CAUSED THE PROCESSING OF
DEFECTIVE ABSENTEE BALLOTS.
51.
Notwithstanding the clarity of the applicable statutes and the
constitutional authority for the Georgia Legislature's actions, on March 6,
2020, the Secretary of State of the State of Georgia, Secretary Raffensperger,
and the State Election Board, who administer the state elections (the
"Administrators") entered into a "Compromise and Settlement Agreement
and Release" (the "Litigation Settlement") with the Democratic Party of
Georgia, Inc., the Democrat Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (collectively, the "Democrat
Party Agencies"), setting forth different standards to be followed by the clerks
and registrars in processing absentee ballots in the State of Georgia8.
52.
Under the Settlement, however, the Administrators agreed to change
the statutorily prescribed manner of handling absentee ballots in a manner
that is not consistent with the laws promulgated by the Georgia Legislature
for elections in this state.

53.
The Settlement provides that the Secretary of State would issue an
"Official Election Bulletin" to county Administrators overriding the statutory
procedures prescribed for those officials. That power, however, does not
belong to the Secretary of State under the United States Constitution.
54.
The Settlement also changed the signature requirement reducing it to a
broad process with discretion, rather than enforcement of the signature
requirement as statutorily required under O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(a)(l).
55.
The Georgia Legislature instructed county registers and clerks (the
“County Officials”) regarding the handling of absentee ballots in O.C.G.A. S
21-2-386(a)(1)(B), 21-2-380.1. The Georgia Election Code instructs those who
handle absentee ballots to follow a clear procedure:
Upon receipt of each absentee ballot, a registrar or clerk shall write

the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The
registrar or clerk shall then compare the identifying information on
the oath with the information on file in his or her office, shall
compare the signature or make on the oath with the signature or
mark on the absentee elector’s voter card or the most recent update
to such absent elector’s voter registration card and application for
absentee ballot or a facsimile of said signature or maker taken from
said card or application, and shall, if the information and signature
appear to be valid and other identifying information appears to be
correct, so certify by signing or initialing his or her name below the
voter’s oath …
O.C.G.A. S 21-2-386(a)(1)(B).
56.
The Georgia Legislature prescribed procedures to ensure that any
request for an absentee ballot must be accompanied by sufficient
identification of the elector's identity. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-38 l(b )(1)
(providing, in pertinent part, "In order to be found eligible to vote an
absentee ballot in person at the registrar's office or absentee ballot clerk's
office, such person shall show one of the forms of identification listed in Code
Section 21-2-417 ... ").
57.
An Affiant testified, under oath, that “It was also of particular interest
to me to see that signatures were not being verified and that there were no
corresponding envelopes seen in site.” (Attached hereto as Exh. 10, Mayra
Romera, at par. 7).
58.
To reflect the very reason for process, it was documented that in the
primary election, prior to the November 3, 2020 Presidential election, many
ballots got to voters after the election. Further it was confirmed that “Untold
thousands of absentee ballot requests went unfulfilled, and tens of thousands
of mailed ballots were rejected for multiple reasons including arriving too late
to be counted. See the Associated Press, Vote-by-Mail worries: A leaky
pipeline in many states, August 8, 2020. 9
59.
Pursuant to the Settlement, the Administrators delegated their
responsibilities for determining when there was a signature mismatch by
considering in good faith only partisan-based training - "additional guidance
and training materials" drafted by the Democrat Party Agencies’
representatives contradicting O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31.
B. U N L A W F U L E A R L Y P R O C E S S I N G O F A B S E N T E E B A L L O T S
60.
In April 2020, the State Election Board adopted on a purportedly
“Emergency Basis” Secretary of State Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15, Processing
Ballots Prior to Election Day. Under this rule, county election officials are
authorized to begin processing absentee ballots up to three weeks befoe
election day. Thus, the rule provides in part that “(1) Beginning at 8:00 AM
on the third Monday prior to Election Day, the county election
superintendent shall be authorized to open the outer envelope of
accepted absentee ballots …” (Emphasis added).

61.
Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15 is in direct and irreconcilable conflict with
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(2), which prohibits the opening of absentee ballots
until election day:
After the opening of the polls on the day of the primary, election,
or runoff, the registrars or absentee ballot clerks shall be
authorized to open the outer envelope on which is printed the
oath of the elector in such a manner as not to destroy the oath printed
thereon; provided, however, that the registrars or absentee ballot
clerk shall not be authorized to remove the contents of such outer
envelope or to open the inner envelope marked “Official Absentee
Ballot,” except as otherwise provided in this Code section.
(Emphasis added).
62.
In plain terms, the statute clearly prohibits opening absentee ballots
prior to election day, while the rule authorizes doing so three weeks before
election day. There is no reconciling this conflict. The State Election Board
has authority under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31 to adopt lawful and legal rules and
regulations, but no authority to promulgate a regulation that is directly
contrary to an unambiguous statute. Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15 is therefore
plainly and indisputably unlawful.
63.
The State Election Board re-adopted Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15 on
November 23, 2020 for the upcoming January 2021 runoff election.
C. U N L A W F U L A U D I T P R O C E D U R E S
64.
According to Secretary Raffensperger, in the presidential general
election, 2,457,880 votes were cast in Georgia for President Donald J. Trump,
and 2,472,002 votes were cast for Joseph R. Biden, which narrowed in
Donald Trump’s favor after the most recent recount.
65.
Secretary Raffensperger declared that for the Hand Recount:
Per the instructions given to counties as they conduct their audit

triggered full hand recounts, designated monitors will be given
complete access to observe the process from the beginning. While the
audit triggered recount must be open to the public and media,
designated monitors will be able to observe more closely. The general
public and the press will be restricted to a public viewing area.
Designated monitors will be able to watch the recount while standing
close to the elections’ workers conducting the recount.
Political parties are allowed to designate a minimum of two monitors

per county at a ratio of one monitor per party for every ten audit
boards in a county... Beyond being able to watch to ensure the
recount is conducted fairly and securely, the two-person audit boards
conducting the hand recount call out the votes as they are recounted
, providing monitors and the public an additional way to keep tabs
on the process. 10
66.
The audit was conducted O.C.G.A. § 21-2-498. This code section
requires that audits be completed “in public view” and authorizes the State
Board of Elections to promulgate regulations to administer an audit “to
ensure that collection of validly cast ballots is complete, accurate and
trustworthy throughout the audit.”
67.
Plaintiffs can show that Democrat-majority counties provided political
parties and candidates, including the Trump Campaign, no meaningful
access or actual opportunity to review and assess the validity of mail-in
ballots during the pre-canvassing meetings. While in the audit or recount,
they witnessed Trump votes being put into Biden piles.
68.
Non-parties Amanda Coleman and Maria Diedrich are two individuals
who volunteered to serve as designated monitors for the Donald J. Trump
Presidential Campaign, Inc. (the "Trump Campaign") on behalf of the
Georgia Republican Party (the "Republican Party") at the Hand Recount.
(Attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibits 2 and 3), respectively,
are true and correct copies of (1) the Affidavit of Amanda Coleman in Support
of Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (the "Coleman
Affidavit"), and (2) the Affidavit of Maria Diedrich in Support of Plaintiffs'

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (the "Diedrich Affidavit"). (See
Exh. 11, Coleman Aff.,2; Exh. 12, Diedrich Aff., 2.)
69.
The Affidavits set forth various conduct amounting to federal crimes,
clear improprieties, insufficiencies, and improper handling of ballots by
County Officials and their employees that Ms. Coleman and Ms. Diedrich
personally observed while monitoring the Hand Recount. (See Exh. 11,
Coleman Aff., 3-10; Exh. 12, Diedrich Aff., 4-14.)
70.
As a result of her observations of the Hand Recount as a Republican
Party monitor, Ms. Diedrich declared, "There had been no meaningful way to
review or audit any activity" at the Hand Recount. (See Exh. 12, Diedrich
Aff.,14.)
71.
As a result of their observations of the Hand Recount as Republican
Party monitors, Ms. Coleman likewise declared, "There was no way to tell if
any counting was accurate or if the activity was proper." (See Exh. 12,
Coleman Aff.,10).
72.
On Election Day, when the Republican poll watchers were, for a limited
time, present and allowed to observe in various polling locations, they

observed and reported numerous instances of election workers failing to
follow the statutory mandates relating to two critical requirements, among
other issues:
(1) a voter’s right to spoil their mail-in ballot at their polling
place on election day and to then vote in-person, and
(2) the ability for voters to vote provisionally on election day
when a mail-in ballot has already been received for them, but when
they did not cast those mail-in ballots, who sought to vote in person
during early voting but was told she already voted; she emphasized
that she had not. The clerk told her he would add her manually with
no explanation as to who or how someone voted using her name.
(Attached hereto as Exh. 13, Aff. Ursula Wolf)
73.
Another observer for the ballot recount testified that “at no time did I
witness any Recounter or individual participate in the recount verifying
signatures [on mail-in ballots].” (Attached hereto as Exh. 14, Nicholas Zeher
Aff).
74.
In some counties, there was no actual "hand" recounting of the ballots
during the Hand Recount, but rather, County Officials and their employees
simply conducted another machine count of the same ballots. (See. Exh. 9,
10). That will not reveal the massive fraud of which plaintiffs complain.
75.
A large number of ballots were identical and likely fraudulent. An
Affiant explains that she observed a batch of utterly pristine ballots:
14. Most of the ballots had already been handled; they had been
written on by people, and the edges were worn. They showed obvious
use. However, one batch stood out. It was pristine. There was a
difference in the texture of the paper - it was if they were intended
for absentee use but had not been used for that purposes. There was
a difference in the feel.
15. These different ballots included a slight depressed pre-fold so

they could be easily folded and unfolded for use in the scanning
machines. There were no markings on the ballots to show where they
had com~ from, or where they had been processed. These stood out.
16. In my 20 years of experience of handling ballots, I observed that

the markings for the candidates on these ballots were unusually
uniform, perhaps even with a ballot-marking device. By my estimate
in observing these ballots, approximately 98% constituted votes for
Joe Biden. I only observed two of these ballots as votes for President
Donald J. Trump.” (See Exh. 15 Attached hereto).
76.
The same Affiant further testified specifically to the breach of the chain
of custody of the voting machines the night before the election stating:
we typically receive the machines, the ballot marking devices – on

the Friday before the election, with a chain of custody letter to be
signed on Sunday, indicating that we had received the machines and
the counts on the machines when received, and that the machines
have been sealed. In this case, we were asked to sign the chain
of custody letter on Sunday, even though the machines were
not delivered until 2:00 AM in the morning on Election Day.
The Milton precinct received its machines at 1:00 AM in the morning

on Election Day. This is unacceptable and voting machines should
[not] be out of custody prior to an Election Day. Id.
II. EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
A PATTERN SHOWING THE ABSENCE OF MISTAKE
77.
The stunning pattern of the nature and acts of fraud demonstrate an
absence of mistake.
78.
The same Affiant further explained, in sworn testimony, that the
breach included: “when we did receive the machines, they were not sealed or
locked, the serial numbers were not what were reflected on the related
documentation…” See Id.
79.
An affiant testified that “While in Henry County, I personally
witnessed ballots cast for Donald Trump being placed in the pile for Joseph
Biden, I witnessed this happen at table “A”.’ (See Exh. 14, par. 27).
80.
The Affiant further testified, that “when this was brought to Ms. Pitts
attention, it was met with extreme hostility. At no time did I witness any
ballot cast for Joseph Biden be placed in the pile for Donald Trump. (See
Exh. 14, par. 28).

81.
Another Affiant in the mail-in ballot and absentee ballot recounting
process, testified in her sworn affidavit, that “on November 16, 2020 … It was
also of particular interest to me to see that signatures were not being verified
and there were no corresponding envelopes seen in sight.” (See Exh. 10, at
Par. 7).
82.
Yet another Affiant, in the recount process, testified that he received
push back and a lack of any cooperation and was even threatened as if he did
something wrong, when he pointed out the failure to follow the rules with the
observers while open mail-in ballot re-counting was occurring, stating:
“However, as an observer, I observed that the precinct had twelve

(12) counting tables, but only one (1) monitor from the Republican
Party. I brought it up to Erica Johnston since the recount rules
provided for one (1) monitor from each Party per ten (10) tables or
part thereof…”
(See Attached hereto, Exh. 16, Ibrahim Reyes Aff.)

83.
Another Affiant explains a pattern of behavior that is alarming, in his
position as an observer in the recount on absentee ballots with barcodes, he
testified:
I witnessed two poll workers placing already separated paper

machine receipt ballots with barcodes in the Trump tray,
placing them in to the Biden tray. I also witnessed the same two
poll workers putting the already separated paper receipt ballots in
the “No Vote” and “Jorgensen” tray, and removing them and putting
them inside the Biden tray, They then took out all of the ballots out
of the Biden tray and stacked them on the table, writing on the count
ballot sheet.
(See Attached hereto, Exh.17, pars. 4-5, Aff. of Consetta Johson).
84.
Another Affiant, a Democrat, testified in his sworn affidavit, that
before he was forced to move back to where he could not see, he had in fact
seen “absentee ballots for Trump inserted into Biden’s stack, and counted as
Biden votes. This occurred a few times”. (See attached hereto, Exh. 18 at
Par. 12, Aff. of Carlos Silva).
85.
Yet another Affiant testified about the lack of process and the hostility
only towards the Republican party, which is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. He testified:
I also observed throughout my three days in Atlanta, not once did

anyone verify these ballots. In fact, there was no authentication
process in place and no envelopes were observed or allowed to be
observed. I saw hostility towards Republican observers but never
towards Democrat observers. Both were identified by badges.
(See Id., at pars. 13-14).
86.
Another Affiant explained that his ballot was not only not processed in
accordance with Election law, he witnessed people reviewing his ballot to
decide where to place it, which violated the privacy of his ballot, and when he
tried to report it to a voter fraud line, he never received any contact or
cooperation stating:
“I voted early on October 12 at the precinct at Lynwood Park …

Because of irregularities at the polling location, I called the voter
fraud line to ask why persons were discussing my ballot and
reviewing it to decide where to place it. When I called the state fraud
line, I was directed to a worker in the office of the Secretary of
State…”
(See Attached hereto, Exh. 19, Andrea ONeal Aff, at par. 3).
87.
He further testified that when he was an Observer at the Lithonia
location, he saw many irregularities, and specifically “saw an auditor sort
Biden votes that he collected and sorted into ten ballot stacks, which [the
auditor] did not show anyone.” Id. at p. 8.
88.
Another Affiant testified about the use of different paper for ballots,
that would constitute fraud stating:
I noticed that almost all of the ballots I reviewed were for Biden.
Many batches went 100% for Biden. I also observed that the
watermark on at least 3 ballots were solid gray instead of
transparent, leading me to believe the ballot was counterfeit. I
challenged this and the Elections Director said it was a legitimate
ballot and was due to the use of different printers. Many ballots had
markings for Biden only, and no markings on the rest of the ballot.
(See Attached hereto, Exh. 20, Aff of Debra J. Fisher, at pars. 4, 5, 6).
89.
An Affiant testified, that while at the Audit, ‘While in Henry County,
I personally witnessed ballots cast for Donald Trump being placed in
the pile for Joseph Biden. I witnessed this happen at table “A”’. (See
attached hereto as Exh. 22, Kevin Peterford, at par. 29). Another Affiant
testified, that “I witnessed two poll workers placing already separated
paper machine receipt ballots with barcodes in the Trump tray,
placing them in to the Biden tray. I also witnessed the same two poll
workers putting the already separated paper receipt abllots in the “No
Vote” and “Jorgensen” tray, and removing them and putting them
inside the Biden tray, They then took out all of the ballots out of the
Biden tray and stacked them on the table, writing on the count ballot
sheet. (See Exh. 17, Johnson, pars. 4-5).
90.
Another Affiant, a Democrat, testified in his sworn affidavit,
before he was forced to move back to where he could not see, he had
in fact seen, “I also saw absentee ballots for Trump inserted

into Biden’s stack, and counted as Biden votes. This occurred
a few times”. (See Exh. 18, Par. 12).
91.
A Republican National Committee monitor in Georgia’s election
recount, Hale Soucie, told an undercover journalist there are individuals
counting ballots who have made continuous errors,” writes O’Keefe. Project
Veritas, Watch: Latest Project Veritas Video reveals “Multiple Ballots Meant
for Trump Went to Biden in Georgia. 11
B. THE VOTING MACHINES, SECRECY
SOFTWARE USED BY VOTING MACHINES THROUGHOUT GEORGIA

IS CRUCIAL
92.
These violations of federal and state laws impacted the election of
November 3, 2020 and set the predicate for the evidence of deliberate
fraudulent conduct, manipulation, and lack of mistake that follows. The
commonality and statewide nature of these legal violations renders
certification of the legal vote untenable and warrants immediate

impoundment of voting machines and software used throughout Georgia for
expert inspection and retrieval of the software.
93.
An Affiant, who is a network & information cyber-security expert,
under sworn testimony explains that after studying the user manual for
Dominion Voting Systems Democracy software, he learned that the
information about scanned ballots can be tracked inside the software
system for Dominion:
(a) When bulk ballot scanning and tabulation begins, the

"ImageCast Central" workstation operator will load a batch of ballots
into the scanner feed tray and then start the scanning procedure
within the software menu. The scanner then begins to scan the
ballots which were loaded into the feed tray while the "ImageCast
Central" software application tabulates votes in real-time.
Information about scanned ballots can be tracked inside the
"ImageCast Central" software application.
(See attached hereto Exh 22, Declaration of Ronald Watkins, at par. 11).
94.
Affiant further explains that the central operator can remove
or discard batches of votes. “After all of the ballots loaded into the
scanner's feed tray have been through the scanner, the "ImageCast Central"
operator will remove the ballots from the tray then have the option to either
"Accept Batch" or "Discard Batch" on the scanning menu …. “(Id. at par. 8).
95.
Affiant further testifies that the Dominion/ Smartmatic user manual
itself makes clear that the system allows for threshold settings to be set to
mark all ballots as “problem ballots” for discretionary determinations on where
the vote goes. It states:
During the scanning process, the "ImageCast Central" software will

detect how much of a percent coverage of the oval was filled in by the
voter. The Dominion customer determines the thresholds of which the
oval needs to be covered by a mark in order to qualify as a valid vote.
If a ballot has a marginal mark which did not meet the specific
thresholds set by the customer, then the ballot is considered a
"problem ballot" and may be set aside into a folder named
"NotCastImages". Through creatively tweaking the oval coverage
threshold settings it should be possible to set thresholds in such a way
that a non-trivial amount of ballots are marked "problem ballots" and
sent to the "NotCastImages" folder. It is possible for an administrator
of the ImageCast Central work station to view all images of scanned
ballots which were deemed "problem ballots" by simply navigating via
the standard "Windows File Explorer" to the folder named
"NotCastImages" which holds ballot scans of "problem ballots". It is
possible for an administrator of the "ImageCast Central" workstation
to view and delete any individual ballot scans from the
"NotCastImages" folder by simply using the standard Windows delete
and recycle bin functions provided by the Windows 10 Pro operating
system.
Id. at pars. 9-10.
96.
The Affiant further explains the vulnerabilities in the system when the
copy of the selected ballots that are approved in the Results folder are made
to a flash memory card – and that is connected to a Windows computer
stating:
It is possible for an administrator of the "ImageCast Central"

workstation to view and delete any individual ballot scans from the
"NotCastImages" folder by simply using the standard Windows delete
and recycle bin functions provided by the Windows 10 Pro operating
system. … The upload process is just a simple copying of a "Results"
folder containing vote tallies to a flash memory card connected to the
"Windows 10 Pro" machine. The copy process uses the standard drag-
n-drop or copy/paste mechanisms within the ubiquitous "Windows
File Explorer". While a simple procedure, this process may be error
prone and is very vulnerable to malicious administrators.
Id. at par. 11-13 (emphasis supplied).
97.
It was announced on “Monday, [July 29, 2019], [that] Governor Kemp
awarded a contract for 30,000 new voting machines to Dominion Voting
Systems, scrapping the state’s 17-year-old electronic voting equipment and
replacing it with touchscreens that print out paper ballots.” 12 Critics are
quoted: “Led by Abrams, Democrats fought the legislation and pointed to
cybersecurity experts who warned it would leave Georgia's elections
susceptible to hacking and tampering.” And “Just this week, the Fair Fight
voting rights group started by [Stacy] Abrams launched a television ad

critical of the bill. In a statement Thursday, the group called it “corruption at
its worst” and a waste of money on “hackable voting machines.”13
98.
It was further reported in 2019 that the new Dominion Voting
Machines in Georgia “[w]ith Georgia’s current voting system, there’s no way
to guarantee that electronic ballots accurately reflect the choices of
voters because there’s no paper backup to verify results, with it being
reported that:
(a) Recounts are meaningless on the direct-recording electronic

voting machines because they simply reproduce the same numbers
they originally generated.
(b) But paper ballots alone won’t protect the sanctity of elections
on the new touchscreens, called ballot-marking devices.
(c) The new election system depends on voters to verify the printed
text of their choices on their ballots, a step that many voters might
not take. The State Election Board hasn't yet created regulations for
how recounts and audits will be conducted. And paper ballots embed
selections in bar codes that are only readable by scanning machines,
leaving Georgians uncertain whether the bar codes match their
votes. 14
i. As part of the scheme and artifice to defraud the plaintiffs, the

candidates and the voters of undiminished and unaltered voting
results in a free and legal election, the Defendants and other persons
known and unknown committed the following violations of law:
50 U.S.C. § 20701 requires the retention and preservation of records
and papers by officers of elections under penalty of fine and imprisonment:
§ 20701. Retention and preservation of records and papers by

officers of elections; deposit with custodian; penalty for
violation
Every officer of election shall retain and preserve, for a period of

twenty-two months from the date of any general, special, or primary
election of which candidates for the office of President, Vice
President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the
House of Representatives, or Resident Commissioner from the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are voted for, all records and
papers which come into his possession relating to any
application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act
requisite to voting in such election, except that, when required
by law, such records and papers may be delivered to another officer
of election and except that, if a State or the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico designates a custodian to retain and preserve these records and
papers at a specified place, then such records and papers may be
deposited with such custodian, and the duty to retain and preserve
any record or paper so deposited shall devolve upon such custodian.
Any officer of election or custodian who willfully fails to comply with
this section shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
50 U.S.C.§ 20701.
99.
In the primaries it was confirmed that, “The rapid introduction of new
technologies and processes in state voting systems heightens the risk of

foreign interference and insider tampering. That’s true even if simple human
error or local maneuvering for political advantage are more likely threats 15.
100.
A Penn Wharton Study from 2016 concluded that “Voters and their
representatives in government, often prompted by news of high-profile voting
problems, also have raised concerns about the reliability and integrity of the
voting process, and have increasingly called for the use of modern technology
such as laptops and tablets to improve convenience.” 16
101.
As evidence of the defects or features of the Dominion Democracy Suite,
as described above, the same Dominion Democracy Suite was denied
certification in Texas by the Secretary of State on January 24, 2020
specifically because of a lack of evidence of efficiency and accuracy and
to be safe from fraud or unauthorized manipulation.17
17
102.
Plaintiffs have since learned that the "glitches" in the Dominion
system–that have the uniform effect of taking votes from Trump and shifting
them to Biden—have been widely reported in the press and confirmed by the
analysis of independent experts.
103.
Plaintiffs can show, through expert and fact witnesses that:
c. Dominion/ Smartmatic Systems Have Massive End User

Vulnerabilities.
1. Users on the ground have full admin privileges to machines and

software. Having been created to “rig” elections, the Dominion
system is designed to facilitate vulnerability and allow a select few
to determine which votes will be counted in any election. Workers
were responsible for moving ballot data from polling place to the
collector’s office and inputting it into the correct folder. Any
anomaly, such as pen drips or bleeds, results in a ballot being
rejected. It is then handed over to a poll worker to analyze and
decide if it should count. This creates massive opportunity for purely
discretionary and improper vote “adjudication.”
2. Affiant witness (name redacted for security reasons18), in his sworn

testimony explains he was selected for the national security guard
detail of the President of Venezuela, and that he witnessed the
creation of Smartmatic for the purpose of election vote manipulation
to insure Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez never lost an election
and he saw it work. Id.
“The purpose of this conspiracy was to create and operate a voting

system that could change the votes in elections from votes against
persons running the Venezuelan government to votes in their

favor in order to maintain control of the government.”
(See Exh. 2, pars. 6, 9, 10).
104.
Smartmatic’s incorporators and inventors have backgrounds evidencing
their foreign connections, including Venezuela and Serbia, specifically its
identified inventors:
Applicant: SMARTMATIC, CORP.
Inventors: Lino Iglesias, Roger Pinate, Antonio Mugica, Paul Babic,

Jeffrey Naveda, Dany Farina, Rodrigo Meneses, Salvador Ponticelli,
Gisela Goncalves, Yrem Caruso. 19
105.
The presence of Smartmatic in the United States—owned by foreign
nationals, and Dominion, a Canadian company with its offices such as the
Office of General Counsel in Germany, would have to be approved by CFIUS.
CFIUS was created in 1988 by the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense
Production Act of 1950. CFIUS’ authorizing statute was amended by the
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).
As amended, section 721 of the DPA directs "the President, acting

through [CFIUS]," to review a "covered transaction to determine
the effects of the transaction on the national security of the
United States." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(A). Section 721 defines
a covered transaction as "any merger, acquisition, or takeover …, by

or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control of any
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States." Id. §
2170(a)(3). Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296, 302,
411 U.S. App. D.C. 105, 111, (2014). Review of covered transactions
under section 721 begins with CFIUS. As noted, CFIUS is chaired by
the Treasury Secretary and its members include the heads of
various federal agencies and other high-ranking Government
officials with foreign policy, national security and economic
responsibilities.
106.
Then Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney wrote October 6, 2006 to the
Secretary of Treasury, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Objecting to approval of
Dominion/Smartmatic by CFIUS because of its corrupt Venezuelan
origination, ownership and control. (See attached hereto as Exh. 24, Carolyn
Maloney Letter of October 6, 2006). Our own government has long known of
this foreign interference on our most important right to vote, and it had
either responded with incompetence, negligence, willful blindness, or abject
corruption. In every CFIUS case, there are two TS/SCI reports generated.
One by the ODNI on the threat and one by DHS on risk to critical
infrastructure. Smartmatic was a known problem when it was nonetheless
approved by CFIUS.
107.
The Wall Street Journal in 2006 did an investigative piece and found
that, “Smartmatic came to prominence in 2004 when its machines were used
in an election to recall President Chávez, which Mr. Chávez won handily --
and which the Venezuelan opposition said was riddled with fraud.
Smartmatic put together a consortium to conduct the recall elections,
including a company called Bizta Corp., in which Smartmatic owners had a
large stake. For a time, the Venezuelan government had a 28% stake in Bizta
in exchange for a loan.’ 20 …“Bizta paid off the loan in 2004, and Smartmatic
bought the company the following year. But accusations of Chávez
government control of Smartmatic never ended, especially since Smartmatic
scrapped a simple corporate structure, in which it was based in the U.S. with
a Venezuelan subsidiary, for a far more complex arrangement. The company
said it made the change for tax reasons, but critics, including Rep. Carolyn
Maloney (D., N.Y.) and TV journalist Lou Dobbs, pounded the company for
alleged links to the Chávez regime. Id. Since its purchase by Smartmatic,
Sequoia's sales have risen sharply to a projected $200 million in 2006, said
Smartmatic's chief executive, Anthony Mugica.” Id.
108.
Indeed, Mr. Cobucci testified, through his sworn affidavit, that he born
in Venezuela, is cousins with Antonio (‘Anthony’) Mugica, and he has

personal knowledge of the fact that Anthony Mugica incorporated
Smartmatic in the U.S. in 2000 with other family members in Venezuela
listed as owners. He also has personal knowledge that Anthony Mugica
manipulated Smartmatic to ensure the election for Chavez in the 2004
Referendum in Venezuela. He also testified, through his sworn affidavit, that
Anthony Mugica received tens of millions of dollars from 2003- 2015 from the
Venezuelan government to ensure Smartmatic technology would be
implemented around the world, including in the U.S. (See attached hereto,
Exh. 25, Juan Carlos Cobucci Aff.)
109.
Another Affiant witness testifies that in Venezuela, she was in an
official position related to elections and witnessed manipulations of petitions
to prevent a removal of President Chavez and because she protested, she was
summarily dismissed. Corroborating the testimony of our secret witness, and
our witness Mr. Cobucci, cousin of Anthony Mugica, who began Smartmatic,
and this witness explains the vulnerabilities of the electronic voting system
and Smartmatica to such manipulations. (See Exh. 3, Diaz Cardozo Aff).
110.
Specific vulnerabilities of the systems in question that have been
documented or reported include:

a. Barcodes can override the voters’ vote: As one University of California,
Berkeley study shows, “In all three of these machines [including
Dominion Voting Systems] the ballot marking printer is in the same
paper path as the mechanism to deposit marked ballots into an
attached ballot box. This opens up a very serious security
vulnerability: the voting machine can make the paper ballot (to add
votes or spoil already-cast votes) after the last time the voter sees the
paper, and then deposit that marked ballot into the ballot box without
the possibility of detection.” (See Exh. 7). 21
b. Voting machines were able to be connected to the internet by way of
laptops that were obviously internet accessible. If one laptop was
connected to the internet, the entire precinct was compromised.
c. We … discovered that at least some jurisdictions were not aware that
their systems were online,” said Kevin Skoglund, an independent
security consultant who conducted the research with nine others, all of
them long-time security professionals and academics with expertise in
election security. Vice. August 2019. 22

d. October 6, 2006 – Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney called on Secretary
of Treasury Henry Paulson to conduct an investigation into Smartmatic
based on its foreign ownership and ties to Venezuela. (See Exh. 24)
e. Congresswoman Maloney wrote that “It is undisputed that Smartmatic
is foreign owned and it has acquired Sequoia … Smartmatica now
acknowledged that Antonio Mugica, a Venezuelan businessman has a
controlling interest in Smartmatica, but the company has not revealed
who all other Smartmatic owners are.” Id.
f. Dominion “got into trouble” with several subsidiaries it used over
alleged cases of fraud. One subsidiary is Smartmatic, a company “that
has played a significant role in the U.S. market over the last decade,”
according to a report published by UK-based AccessWire 23.
g. Litigation over Smartmatic “glitches” alleges they impacted the 2010
and 2013 mid-term elections in the Philippines, raising questions of
cheating and fraud. An independent review of the source codes used in
the machines found multiple problems, which concluded, “The software

inventory provided by Smartmatic is inadequate, … which brings into
question the software credibility…” 24
h. Dominion acquired Sequoia Voting Systems as well as Premier Election
Solutions (formerly part of Diebold, which sold Premier to ES&S in
2009, until antitrust issues forced ES&S to sell Premier, which then
was acquired by Dominion). 25.
i. Dominion entered into a 2009 contract with Smartmatic and provided
Smartmatic with the PCOS machines (optical scanners) that were used
in the 2010 Philippine election—the biggest automated election run by
a private company. The international community hailed the
automation of that first election in the Philippines. 26 The results’
transmission reached 90% of votes four hours after polls closed and
Filipinos knew for the first time who would be their new president on
Election Day. In keeping with local election law requirements,
Smartmatic and Dominion were required to provide the source code of

the voting machines prior to elections so that it could be independently
verified. 27
j. In late December of 2019, three Democrat Senators, Warren,
Klobuchar, Wyden, and House Member Mark Pocan wrote about their
‘particularized concerns that secretive & “trouble -plagued
companies”’ “have long skimped on security in favor of
convenience,” in the context of how they described the voting machine
systems that three large vendors – Election Systems & Software,
Dominion Voting Systems, & Hart InterCivic – collectively provide
voting machines & software that facilitate voting for over 90% of all
eligible voters in the U.S.” (See attached hereto as Exh. 26, copy of
Senator Warren, Klobuchar, Wyden’s December 6, 2019 letter).
k. Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) said the findings [insecurity of voting
systems] are “yet another damning indictment of the profiteering
election vendors, who care more about the bottom line than protecting
our democracy.” It’s also an indictment, he said, “of the notion that
important cybersecurity decisions should be left entirely to county

election offices, many of whom do not employ a single cybersecurity
specialist.” 28
111.
An analysis of the Dominion software system by a former US Military
Intelligence expert concludes that the system and software have been
accessible and were certainly compromised by rogue actors, such as Iran and
China. By using servers and employees connected with rogue actors and
hostile foreign influences combined with numerous easily discoverable leaked
credentials, Dominion neglectfully allowed foreign adversaries to access data
and intentionally provided access to their infrastructure in order to monitor
and manipulate elections, including the most recent one in 2020. (See Exh.
7).
112.
An expert witness in pending litigation in the United States District
Court, Northern District Court of Georgia, Atlanta Div., 17-cv-02989
specifically testified to the acute security vulnerabilities, among other facts,
by declaration filed on October 4, 2020, (See Exh. 4B, Document 959-4

attached hereto, paragraph. 18 and 20 of p. 28, Exh. 4, Hursti Declaration).
wherein he testified or found:
1) The failure of the Dominion software “to meet the methods and
processes for national standards for managing voting system problems and
should not be accepted for use in a public election under any circumstances.”
2) In Hursti’s declaration he explained that “There is evidence of
remote access and remote troubleshooting which presents a grave security
implication and certified identified vulnerabilities should be considered an
“extreme security risk.” Id. Hari Hursti also explained that USB drives with
vote tally information were observed to be removed from the presence of poll
watchers during a recent election. Id. The fact that there are no controls of
the USB drives was seen recently seen the lack of physical security and
compliance with professional standards, " in one Georgia County, where it is
reported that 3,300 votes were found on memory sticks not loaded plus in
Floyd county, another 2,600 were unscanned, and the “found votes” reduced
Biden’s lead over Donald Trump 29.
(a) In the prior case against Dominion, supra, further
implicating the secrecy behind the software used in Dominion Systems,

Dr. Eric Coomer, a Vice President of Dominion Voting Systems,
testified that even he was not sure of what testing solutions were
available to test problems or how that was done, “ I have got to be
honest, we might be a little bit out of my bounds of understanding the
rules and regulations… and in response to a question on testing for
voting systems problems in relation to issues identified in 2 counties,
he explained that “Your Honor, I’m not sure of the complete test plan…
Again Pro V&V themselves determine what test plan in necessary based
on their analysis of the code itself.” (Id. at Document 959-4, pages 53,
62 L.25- p. 63 L3).
113.
Hursti stated within said Declaration:
“The security risks outlined above – operating system risks, the

failure to harden the computers, performing operations directly on
the operating systems, lax control of memory cards, lack of
procedures, and potential remote access are extreme and destroy the
credibility of the tabulations and output of the reports coming from a
voting system.”
(See Paragraph 49 of Hursti Declaration).
114.
Rather than engaging in an open and transparent process to give
credibility to Georgia’s brand-new voting system, the election processes were

hidden during the receipt, review, opening, and tabulation of those votes in
direct contravention of Georgia’s Election Code and federal law.
115.
The House of Representatives passed H.R. 2722 in an attempt to
address these very risks identified by Hursti, on June 27, 2019:
This bill addresses election security through grant programs and

requirements for voting systems and paper ballots.
The bill establishes requirements for voting systems, including that

systems (1) use individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots; (2)
make a voter's marked ballot available for inspection and verification
by the voter before the vote is cast; (3) ensure that individuals with
disabilities are given an equivalent opportunity to vote, including
with privacy and independence, in a manner that produces a voter-
verified paper ballot; (4) be manufactured in the United States; and
(5) meet specified cybersecurity requirements, including the
prohibition of the connection of a voting system to the internet.
ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC FRAUD
116.
On November 4, 2020, the Georgia GOP Chairman issued the following
statement:
“Let me repeat. Fulton County elections officials told the media and
our observers that they were shutting down the tabulation center at
State Farm Arena at 10:30 p.m. on election night to continue counting
ballots in secret until 1:00 a.m. 30
117.
It was widely reported that "As of 7 p.m. on Wednesday Fulton County
Elections officials said 30,000 absentee ballots were not processed due to a
pipe burst.” 31 Officials reassured voters that none of the ballots were
damaged and the water was quickly cleaned up. But the emergency delayed
officials from processing ballots between 5:30 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. Officials say
they continued to count beginning at 8:30 a.m. Wednesday. The statement
from Fulton County continues:
"Tonight, Fulton County will report results for approximately 86,000

absentee ballots, as well as Election Day and Early Voting results.
These represent the vast majority of ballots cast within Fulton
County.
"As planned, Fulton County will continue to tabulate the remainder

of absentee ballots over the next two days. Absentee ballot processing
requires that each ballot is opened, signatures verified, and ballots
scanned. This is a labor-intensive process that takes longer to
tabulate than other forms of voting. Fulton County did not anticipate
having all absentee ballots processed on Election Day." Officials said
they will work to ensure every vote is counted and all laws and
regulations are followed.32
118.
Plaintiffs have learned that the representation about “a water leak
affecting the room where absentee ballots were counted” was not true. The
only water leak that needed repairs at State Farm Arena from November 3 –
November 5 was a toilet overflow that occurred earlier on November 3. It
had nothing to do with a room with ballot counting, but the false water break
representation led to “everyone being sent home.” Nonetheless, first six (6)
people, then three (3) people stayed until 1:05 a.m. working on the
computers.
119.
An Affiant recounts how she was present at State Farm Arena on
November 3, and saw election workers remaining behind after people were
told to leave. (See Exh. 28, Affidavit of Mitchell Harrison; Exh. 29, Affid. of
Michelle Branton)
120.
Plaintiffs have also learned through several reports that in 2010 Eric
Coomer joined Dominion as Vice President of U.S. Engineering. According to
his bio, Coomer graduated from the University of California, Berkeley with a
Ph.D. in Nuclear Physics. Eric Coomer was later promoted to Voting Systems
Officer of Strategy and Security although Coomer has since been removed
from the Dominion page of directors. Dominion altered its website after
Colorado resident Joe Oltmann disclosed that as a reporter he infiltrated
ANTIFA, a domestic terrorist organization where he recorded Eric Coomer
representing: “Don’t worry. Trump won’t win the election, we fixed that.” – as
well as social media posts with violence threatened against President Trump.
(See Joe Oltmann interview with Michelle Malkin dated November 13, 2020
which contains copies of Eric Coomer’s recording and tweets). 33
121.
While the bedrock of American elections has been transparency, almost
every crucial aspect of Georgia’s November 3, 2020, General Election was
shrouded in secrecy, rife with “errors,” and permeated with anomalies so
egregious as to render the results incapable of certification.
MULTIPLE EXPERT REPORTS AND STATISTICAL

ANALYSES PROVE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF VOTES
WERE LOST OR SHIFTED THAT COST PRESIDENT TRUMP
AND THE REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES OF
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 6 AND 7 THEIR RACES.
122.
As evidenced by numerous public reports, expert reports, and witness
statements, Defendants egregious misconduct has included ignoring
legislative mandates concerning mail-in and ordinary ballots and led to

disenfranchisement of an enormous number of Georgia voters. Plaintiffs
experts can show that, consistent with the above specific misrepresentations,
analysis of voting data reveals the following:
(a) Regarding uncounted mail ballots, based on evidence
gathered by Matt Braynard in the form of recorded calls and
declarations of voters, and analyzed by Plaintiff’s expert, Williams M.
Briggs, PhD, shows, based on a statistically significant sample, that
the total number of mail ballots that voters mailed in, but were
never counted, have a 95% likelihood of falling between 31,559
and 38,886 total lost votes. This range exceeds the margin of loss of
President Trump of 12,670 votes by at least 18,889 lost votes and by as
many as 26,196 lost votes. (See Exh. 1, Dr. Briggs’ Report, with
attachments).
(b) Plaintiff’s expert also finds that voters received tens of
thousands of ballots that they never requested. (See Exh. 1).
Specifically, Dr. Briggs found that in the state of Georgia, based on a
statistically significant sample, the expected amount of persons that
received an absentee ballot that they did not request ranges from
16,938 to 22,771. This range exceeds the margin of loss of

President Trump by 12,670 votes by at least 4,268 unlawful
requests and by as many as 10,101 unlawful requests. Id.
(c) This widespread pattern, as reflected within the population
of unreturned ballots analyzed by Dr. Briggs, reveals the unavoidable
reality that, in addition to the calculations herein, third parties voted
an untold number of unlawfully acquired absentee or mail-in ballots,
which would not be in the database of unreturned ballots analyzed
here. See O.G.C.A. 21-2-522. These unlawfully voted ballots
prohibited properly registered persons from voting and reveal
a pattern of widespread fraud down ballot as well.
(d) Further, as calculated by Matt Braynard, there exists
clear evidence of 20,311 absentee or early voters in Georgia that
voted while registered as having moved out of state. (See Id.,
attachment to report). Specifically, these persons were showing on the
National Change of Address Database (NCOA) as having moved, or as
having filed subsequent voter registration in another state also as
evidence that they moved and even potentially voted in another state.
The 20,311 votes by persons documented as having moved exceeds the
margin by which Donald Trump lost the election by 7,641 votes.

(e) Applying pro-rata the above calculations separately to Cobb
County based on the number of unreturned ballots, a range of 1,255
and 1,687 ballots ordered by 3rd parties and a range of 2,338 and 2,897
lost mail ballots, plus 10,684 voters documented in the NCOA as
having moved, for a combined minimum of 14,276 missing and
unlawful ballots, and maximum of 15,250 missing and unlawful
ballots, which exceeds the statewide Presidential race total
margin by a range of as few as 1,606 ballots and as many as
2,580 in the County of Cobb alone impacting the Cobb County
Republican Party (“Cobb County Republicans”).
123.
As seen from the expert analysis of Eric Quinnell, mathematical
anomalies further support these findings, when in various districts within
Fulton County such as vote gains that exceed reasonable expectations
when compared to 2016, and a failure of gains to be normally distributed
but instead shifting substantially toward the tail of the distribution in
what is known as a platykurtic distribution. Dr. Quinell identifies
numerous anomalies such as votes to Biden in excess of 2016 exceed the
registrations that are in excess of 2016. Ultimately, he identifies the
counties in order of their excess performance over what would have fit in a
normal distribution of voting gains, revealing a list of the most anomalous
counties down to the least. These various anomalies provide evidence of
voting irregularities. (See Exh.27, Declaration of Eric Quinnell, with
attachments).
124.
In sum, with the expert analysis of William M. Briggs PhD based on
recorded calls and declarations, the extent of missing AND unlawfully
requested ballots create substantial evidence that the mail ballot system has
fundamentally failed to provide a fair voting mechanism. In short, tens of
thousands of votes did not count while the pattern of fraud makes clear that
tens of thousands were improperly counted. This margin of victory in the
election for Mr. Biden was only 12,670 and cannot withstand most of these
criticisms individually and certainly not in aggregate.
125.
Cobb county, based on lost votes, unlawfully requested votes and
NCOA data on these facts alone would consume more than the entire margin
of the statewide difference in the Presidential race. These election results
must be reversed.
126.
Applying pro-rata the above calculations separately to Cobb County
based on the number of unreturned ballots, a range of 1,255 and 1,687 ballots
ordered by 3rd parties and a range of 2,338 and 2,897 lost mail ballots, plus
10,684 voters documented in the NCOA as having moved, for a combined
minimum of 14,276 missing and unlawful ballots, and maximum of
15,250 missing and unlawful ballots, which exceeds the statewide
Presidential race total margin by a range of as few as 1,606 ballots
and as many as 2,580 in the County of Cobb alone impacting the
Cobb County Republican Party (“Cobb County Republicans”). (See
Exh. 1).
127.
Mr. Braynard also found a pattern in Georgia of voters registered at
totally fraudulent residence addresses, including shopping centers, mail drop
stores and other non-residential facilities 34.
128.
In sum, with the expert analysis of William M. Briggs PhD based on
extensive investigation, recorded calls and declarations collected by Matt
Braynard, (See attachments to Exh. 1, Briggs’ report) the extent of missing
and unlawfully requested ballots create substantial evidence that the mail
ballot system has fundamentally failed to provide a fair voting mechanism. In

short, tens of thousands of votes did not count while the pattern of fraud and
mathematical anomalies that are impossible absent malign human agency
makes clear that tens of thousands were improperly counted. This margin of
victory in the election for Mr. Biden was only 12,670 and cannot withstand
most of these criticisms individually and certainly not in aggregate.
129.
Cobb county, based on lost votes, unlawfully requested votes and
NCOA data on these facts alone would consume more than the entire margin
of the statewide difference in the Presidential race.
130.
Russell Ramsland confirms that data breaches in the Dominion
software permitted rogue actors to penetrate and manipulate the
software during the recent general election. He further concludes
that at least 96,600 mail-in ballots were illegally counted as they
were not cast by legal voters.
131.
In sum, as set forth above, for a host of independent reasons, the
Georgia certified election results concluding that Joe Biden received 12,670
more votes that President Donald Trump must be set aside.

COUNT I
D E F E N D A N T S VIOLATED T H E E L E C T I O N S C L A U S E A N D 42 U.S.C. §
1983
132.
Plaintiffs reallege all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
133.
The Electors Clause states that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors” for
President. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Elections Clause
of the U.S. Constitution states that “[t]he Times, Places, and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
134.
The Legislature is “‘the representative body which ma[kes] the laws of
the people.’” Smiley, 285 U.S. at 193. Regulations of congressional and
presidential elections, thus, “must be in accordance with the method which
the state has prescribed for legislative enactments.” Id. at 367; see also Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2668
(2015).
135.
Defendants are not part of the General Assembly and cannot exercise
legislative power. Rather, Defendants’ power is limited to “tak[ing] care that
the laws be faithfully executed.” Pa. Const. Art. IV, § 2. Because the United
States Constitution reserves for the General Assembly the power to set the
time, place, and manner of holding elections for the President and Congress,
county boards of elections and state executive officers have no authority to
unilaterally exercise that power, much less to hold them in ways that conflict
with existing legislation.
136.
Defendants are not the legislature, and their unilateral decision to
create a “cure procedure” violates the Electors and Elections Clauses of the
United States Constitution.
137.
The Secretary of State and the State Election Board are not the
legislature, and their decision to permit early processing of absentee ballots
in direct violation of the unambiguous requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-
386(a)(2) violates the Electors and Elections Clauses of the United States
Constitution.
138.
Many Affiants testified to many legal infractions in the voting process,
including specifically switching absentee ballots or mail-in ballots for Trump
to Biden. Even a Democrat testified in his sworn affidavit that before he was
forced to move back to where he could not see, he had in fact seen, “I also saw
absentee ballots for Trump inserted into Biden’s stack, and counted as Biden
votes. This occurred a few times”. (See Exh. 18, Par. 12).
139.
Plaintiff’s expert also finds that voters received tens of thousands of
ballots that they never requested. (See Exh. 1, Dr. Briggs’ Report).
statistically significant sample, the expected amount of persons that received
an absentee ballot that they did not request one ranges from 16,938 to
22,771. This range exceeds the margin of loss of President Trump by 12,670
votes by at least 4,268 unlawful requests and by as many as 10,101 unlawful
requests.
140.
This widespread pattern, as reflected within the population of
unreturned ballots analyzed by Dr. Briggs, reveals the unavoidable reality
that, in addition to the calculations herein, third parties voted an untold
number of unlawfully acquired absentee or mail-in ballots, which would not

be in the database of unreturned ballots analyzed here. See O.G.C.A. 21-2-
522. These unlawfully voted ballots prohibited properly registered persons
from voting and reveal a pattern of widespread fraud.
141.
Further, as shown by data collected by Matt Braynard, there exists
clear evidence of 20,311 absentee or early voters in Georgia that voted while
registered as having moved out of state. Specifically, these persons were
showing on the National Change of Address Database (NCOA) as having
moved, or as having filed subsequent voter registration in another state also
as evidence that they moved and even potentially voted in another state. The
20,311 votes by persons documented as having moved exceeds the margin by
which Donald Trump lost the election by 7,641 votes.
142.
Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and
irreparable harm unless the injunctive relief requested herein is granted.
Defendants have acted and, unless enjoined, will act under color of state law
to violate the Elections Clauses of the Constitution. Accordingly, the results
for President and Congress in the November 3, 2020 election must be set
aside. The results are infected with Constitutional violations.
COUNT II
THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND GEORGIA COUNTIES VIOLATED

T H E F O U R T E E N T H A M E N D M E N T U.S. C O N S T . A M E N D . XIV, 42
U.S.C. § 1983
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
INVALID ENACTMENT OF REGULATIONS AFFECTING

OBSERVATION AND MONITORING OF THE ELECTION
143.
Plaintiffs refer to and incorporate by reference each of the prior
paragraphs of this Complaint as though the same were repeated at length
herein.
144.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. See also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000)(having
once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later
arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over the value of
another’s). Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)
(“Once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn
which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
145.
The Court has held that to ensure equal protection, a “problem inheres
in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application. The
formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these recurring
circumstances is practicable and, we conclude, necessary.” Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 106, 121 S. Ct. 525, 530, 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2000).
146.
The equal enforcement of election laws is necessary to preserve our
most basic and fundamental rights. The requirement of equal protection is
particularly stringently enforced as to laws that affect the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the right to vote.
147.
In statewide and federal elections conducted in the State of Georgia,
including without limitation the November 3, 2020, General Election, all
candidates, political parties, and voters, including without limitation
Plaintiffs, have a vested interest in being present and having meaningful
access to observe and monitor the electoral process in each County to ensure
that it is properly administered in every election district and otherwise free,
fair, and transparent.

148.
Moreover, through its provisions involving watchers and
representatives, the Georgia Election Code ensures that all candidates and
political parties in each County, including the Trump Campaign, have
meaningful access to observe and monitor the electoral process to ensure that
it is properly administered in every election district and otherwise free, fair,
and transparent. See, e.g. In plain terms, the statute clearly prohibits
opening absentee ballots prior to election day, while the rule authorizes doing
so three weeks before election day. There is no reconciling this conflict. The
State Election Board has authority under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31 to adopt lawful
and legal rules and regulations, but no authority to promulgate a regulation
that is directly contrary to an unambiguous statute. Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15 is
therefore plainly and indisputably unlawful.

Plaintiffs also bring this action under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-522,
Grounds for Contest:
149.
A result of a primary or election may be contested on one or more of the
following grounds:
150.
(1) Misconduct, fraud, or irregularity by any primary or election official or
officials sufficient to change or place in doubt the result;
(2) When the defendant is ineligible for the nomination or office in dispute;
(3) When illegal votes have been received or legal votes rejected at the polls
sufficient to change or place in doubt the result;
(4) For any error in counting the votes or declaring the result of the
primary or election, if such error would change the result; or
(5) For any other cause which shows that another was the person legally
nominated, elected, or eligible to compete in a run-off primary or election.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-522.
151.
Several affiants testified to the improper procedures with absentee
ballots processing, with the lack of auditable procedures with the logs in the
computer systems, which violates Georgia law, and federal election law. See
also, 50 U.S.C. § 20701 requires the retention and preservation of records and
papers by officers of elections under penalty of fine and imprisonment.
152.
The State Election Board re-adopted Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15 on
November 23, 2020 for the upcoming January 2021 runoff election.
153.
A large number of ballots were identical and likely fraudulent. An
Affiant explains that she observed a batch of utterly pristine ballots:
14. Most of the ballots had already been handled; they had been
written on by people, and the edges were worn. They showed obvious
use. However, one batch stood out. It was pristine. There was a
difference in the texture of the paper - it was if they were intended
for absentee use but had not been used for that purposes. There was
a difference in the feel.
15. These different ballots included a slight depressed pre-fold so

they could be easily folded and unfolded for use in the scanning
machines. There were no markings on the ballots to show where they
had com~ from, or where they had been processed. These stood out.
16. In my 20 years of experience of handling ballots, I observed that

the markings for the candidates on these ballots were unusually
uniform, perhaps even with a ballot-marking device. By my estimate
in observing these ballots, approximately 98% constituted votes for
Joe Biden. I only observed two of these ballots as votes for President
Donald J. Trump.” (See Exh. 15).
154.
The same Affiant further testified specifically to the breach of the chain
of custody of the voting machines the night before the election stating:
we typically receive the machines, the ballot marking devices – on

the Friday before the election, with a chain of custody letter to be
signed on Sunday, indicating that we had received the machines and
the counts on the machines when received, and that the machines
have been sealed. In this case, we were asked to sign the chain
of custody letter on Sunday, even though the machines were
not delivered until 2:00 AM in the morning on Election Day.
The Milton precinct received its machines at 1:00 AM in the morning
on Election Day. This is unacceptable and voting machines should
[not] be out of custody prior to an Election Day. Id.
155.
Defendants have a duty to treat the voting citizens in each County in
the same manner as the citizens in other counties in Georgia.
156.
As set forth in Count I above, Defendants failed to comply with the
requirements of the Georgia Election Code and thereby diluted the lawful
ballots of the Plaintiffs and of other Georgia voters and electors in violation of
the United States Constitution guarantee of Equal Protection.
157.
Specifically, Defendants denied the plaintiffs equal protection of the
law and their equal rights to meaningful access to observe and monitor the
electoral process enjoyed by citizens in other Georgia Counties by:
(a) mandating that representatives at the pre-canvass and

canvass of all absentee and mail-ballots be either Georgia barred
attorneys or qualified registered electors of the county in which

they sought to observe and monitor;
(b) not allowing watchers and representatives to visibly see and
review all envelopes containing official absentee and mail-in
ballots either at or before they were opened and/or when such
ballots were counted and recorded; and
(c) allowing the use of Dominion Democracy Suite software and
devices, which failed to meet the Dominion Certification Report’s
conditions for certification.
158.
Instead, Defendants refused to credential all of the Trump Republican’s
submitted watchers and representatives and/or kept Trump Campaign’s
watchers and representatives by security and metal barricades from the
areas where the inspection, opening, and counting of absentee and mail-in
ballots were taking place. Consequently, Defendants created a system
whereby it was physically impossible for the candidates and political parties
to view the ballots and verify that illegally cast ballots were not opened and
counted
159.
Many Affiants testified to switching absentee ballots or mail-in ballots
for Trump to Biden, including a Democrat. He testified in his sworn
affidavit, that before he was forced to move back to where he could not see, he
had in fact seen, “absentee ballots for Trump inserted into Biden’s stack, and
counted as Biden votes. This occurred a few times”. (See Exh. 18, Par. 12).
160.
Other Georgia county boards of elections provided watchers and
representatives of candidates and political parties, including without
limitation watchers and representatives of the Republicans and the Trump
Campaign, with appropriate access to view the absentee and mail-in ballots
being pre-canvassed and canvassed by those county election boards and
without restricting representatives by any county residency or Georgia bar
licensure requirements.
161.
Defendants intentionally and/or arbitrarily and capriciously denied
Plaintiffs access to and/or obstructed actual observation and monitoring of
the absentee and mail-in ballots being pre-canvassed and canvassed by
Defendants, depriving them of the equal protection of those state laws
enjoyed by citizens in other Counties.
162.
Defendants have acted and will continue to act under color of state law
to violate Plaintiffs’ right to be present and have actual observation and
access to the electoral process as secured by the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution.

163.
Defendants further violated Georgia voters’ rights to equal protection
insofar as Defendants allowed the Georgia counties to process and count
ballots in a manner that allowed ineligible ballots to be counted, and through
the use of Dominion Democracy Suite, allowed eligible ballots for Trump and
McCormick to be switched to Biden or lost altogether. Defendants thus failed
to conduct the general election in a uniform manner as required by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Georgia Election
Code.
164.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief holding that the
election, under these circumstances, was improperly certified and that the
Governor be enjoined from transmitting Georgia’s certified Presidential
election results to the Electoral College. Georgia law forbids certifying a tally
that includes any ballots that were not legally cast, or that were switched
from Trump to Biden, through the unlawful use of Dominion Democracy
Suite software and devices.
165.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief holding
that the election, under these circumstances, was improperly certified and
that the Governor be required to recertify the results declaring that Donald
Trump has won the election and transmitting Georgia’s certified Presidential
election result in favor of President Trump.
166.
irreparable harm unless the declaratory and injunctive relief requested
herein is granted. Indeed, the setting aside of an election in which the people
have chosen their representative is a drastic remedy that should not be
undertaken lightly, but instead should be reserved for cases in which a
person challenging an election has clearly established a violation of election
procedures and has demonstrated that the violation has placed the result of
the election in doubt. Georgia law allows elections to be contested through
litigation, both as a check on the integrity of the election process and as a
means of ensuring the fundamental right of citizens to vote and to have their
votes counted accurately. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-520 et seq.
167.
In addition to the alternative requests for relief in the preceding
paragraphs, hereby restated, Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction
requiring the County Election Boards to invalidate ballots cast by: 1) voters
whose signatures on their registrations have not been matched with ballot,
envelope and voter registration check; 2) all “dead votes”; and 4) all 900
military ballots in Fulton county that supposedly were 100% for Joe Biden.
COUNT III
F O U R T E E N T H A M E N D M E N T E Q U A L P R O T E C T I O N C L A U S E U.S.
C O N S T . A M E N D . XIV, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
D I S P A R A T E T R E A T M E N T O F A B S E N T E E /M A I L -I N V O T E R S A M O N G
DIFFERENT COUNTIES
168.
Plaintiffs incorporate each of the prior allegations in this Complaint.
Voting is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the
right to vote from conduct by state officials which seriously undermines the
fundamental fairness of the electoral process. Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873,
889 (3d Cir. 1994); Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1077-78. “[H]aving once granted the
right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and
disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” Bush, 531
U.S. at 104-05.
169.
Defendants are not part of the General Assembly and cannot exercise
legislative power. Rather, Defendants’ power is limited to executing the laws
as passed by the legislature Although the Georgia General Assembly may
enact laws governing the conduct of elections, “no legislative enactment may
contravene the requirements of the Georgia or United States Constitutions.”
Shankey, 257 A. 2d at 898.
170.
Federal courts “possess broad discretion to fashion an equitable
remedy.” Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
781 F.3d 1271, 1290 (11th Cir. 2015); Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837
F.2d 1550, 1563 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The decision whether to grant equitable
relief, and, if granted, what form it shall take, lies in the discretion of the
district court.”).
171.
Moreover, “[t]o the extent that a voter is at risk for having his or her
ballot rejected due to minor errors made in contravention of those
requirements, … the decision to provide a ‘notice and opportunity to cure’
procedure to alleviate that risk is one best suited for the Legislature[,] . . .
particularly in light of the open policy questions attendant to that decision,
including what the precise contours of the procedure would be, how the
concomitant burdens would be addressed, and how the procedure would
impact the confidentiality and counting of ballots, all of which are best left to
the legislative branch of Georgia's government.” Id.

172.
The disparate treatment of Georgia voters, in subjecting one class of
voters to greater burdens or scrutiny than another, violates Equal Protection
guarantees because “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555. Rice
v. McAlister, 268 Ore. 125, 128, 519 P.2d 1263, 1265 (1975); Heitman v.
Brown Grp., Inc., 638 S.W.2d 316, 319, 1982 Mo. App. LEXIS 3159, at *4 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982); Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶ 41, 56 P.3d
524, 536-37 (Utah 2002).
173.
Defendants are not the legislature, and their unilateral decision to
create and implement a cure procedure for some but not all absentee and
mail-in voters in this State violates the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law and will
suffer serious and irreparable harm unless the injunctive relief requested
herein is granted.
COUNT IV
F O U R T E E N T H A M E N D M E N T , U.S. C O N S T . A R T . I § 4, C L . 1; A R T .
II, § 1, C L . 2; A M E N D . XIV, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS ON THE RIGHT TO VOTE
174.
herein.
175.
The right of qualified citizens to vote in a state election involving
federal candidates is recognized as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Harper, 383 U.S. at See also
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554 (The Fourteenth Amendment protects the “the
right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections.”).
Indeed, ever since the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), the United
States Supreme Court has held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects certain rights of federal citizenship from
state interference, including the right of citizens to directly elect members of
Congress. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (citing Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1884)). See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 148-49 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring) (collecting cases).

176.
The fundamental right to vote protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
is cherished in our nation because it “is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562. Voters have a “right to cast a
ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud,” Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992), and “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our
electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory
democracy.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam).
177.
“Obviously included within the right to [vote], secured by the
Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots
and have them counted” if they are validly cast. United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 315 (1941). “[T]he right to have the vote counted” means counted
“at full value without dilution or discount.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555, n.29
(quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
178.
“Every voter in a federal . . . election, whether he votes for a candidate
with little chance of winning or for one with little chance of losing, has a right
under the Constitution to have his vote fairly counted, without its being
distorted by fraudulently cast votes.” Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S.
211, 227 (1974); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962). Invalid or
fraudulent votes “debase[]” and “dilute” the weight of each validly cast vote.
See Anderson, 417 U.S. at 227.
179.
The right to an honest [count] is a right possessed by each voting
elector, and to the extent that the importance of his vote is nullified, wholly
or in part, he has been injured in the free exercise of a right or privilege
secured to him by the laws and Constitution of the United States.” Anderson,
417 U.S. at 226 (quoting Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326, 331 (6th
Cir.), aff'd due to absence of quorum, 339 U.S. 974 (1950)).
180.
Practices that promote the casting of illegal or unreliable ballots or fail
to contain basic minimum guarantees against such conduct, can violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by leading to the dilution of validly cast ballots. See
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”).
181.
In Georgia, the signature verification requirement is a dead letter. The
signature rejection rate for the most recent election announced by the
Secretary of State was 0.15%. The signature rejection rate for absentee ballot
applications was .00167% - only 30 statewide. Hancock County, Georgia,

population 8,348, rejected nine absentee ballot applications for signature
mismatch. Fulton County rejected eight. No other metropolitan county in
Georgia rejected even a single absentee ballot application for signature
mismatch. The state of Colorado, which has run voting by mail for a number
of years, has a signature rejection rate of between .52% and .66%. 35 The State
of Oregon had a rejection rate of 0.86% in 2016. 36 The State of Washington
has a rejection rate of between 1% and 2%. 37If Georgia rejected absentee
ballots at a rate of .52% instead of the actual .15%, approximately 4,600 more
absentee ballots would have been rejected.
COUNT V
T H E R E W A S W I D E -S P R E A D B A L L O T F R A U D .
OCGA 21-2-522
182.
herein.
183.
Plaintiffs contest the results of Georgia’s election, with Standing
conferred under pursuant to O.G.C.A. 21-2-521.
184.
Therefore, pursuant to O.G.C.A. 21-2-522, for misconduct, fraud, or
irregularity by any primary or election official or officials sufficient to change
or place in doubt the result. The foundational principle that Georgia law
“nonetheless allows elections to be contested through litigation, both as a
check on the integrity of the election process and as a means of ensuring the
fundamental right of citizens to vote and to have their votes counted
accurately.” Martin v. Fulton County Bd. of Registration & Elections, 307 Ga.
193, 194, 835 S.E.2d 245, 248 (2019). The Georgia Supreme Court has made
clear that Plaintiffs need not show how the [] voters would have voted if their
[absentee] ballots had been regular. [] only had to show that there were
enough irregular ballots to place in doubt the result.” See OCGA § 21-2-520 et
seq., Mead v. Sheffield, 278 Ga. 268, 272, 601 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1994) the
Supreme Court invalidated an election, and ordered a new election because it
found that,
Thus, [i]t was not incumbent upon [the Plaintiff] to show how the
[481] voters would have voted if their [absentee] ballots had
been regular. He only had to show that there were enough irregular
ballots to place in doubt the result. He succeeded in that task.
Id. at 271 (citing Howell v. Fears, 275 Ga. 627, 571 SE2d 392, (2002) (primary
results invalid where ballot in one precinct omitted names of both qualified
candidates).
185.
The "glitches" in the Dominion system—that seem to have the uniform
effect of hurting Trump and helping Biden have been widely reported in the
press and confirmed by the analysis of independent experts.
186.
Prima facie evidence in multiple affidavits shows specific fraudulent
acts, which directly resulted in the flipping of the race at issue:
a) votes being switched in Biden’s favor away from Trump during the
recount;
b) the lack of procedures in place to follow the election code, and the
purchase and use, Dominion Voting System despite evidence of serious
vulnerabilities;
c) a demonstration that misrepresentations were made about a pipe burst
that sent everyone home, while first six, then three, unknown
individuals were left alone until the morning hours working on the
machines;
d) further a failure to demonstrate compliance with the Georgia’s Election
Codes, in maintaining logs on the Voting system for a genuine and
sound audit, other than voluntary editable logs that prevent genuine
audits. While the bedrock of this Democratic Republic rests on citizens’
confidence in the validity of our elections and a transparent process,
Georgia’s November 3, 2020 General Election remains under a pall of
corruption and irregularity that reflects a pattern of the absence of
mistake. At best, the evidence so far shows ignorance of the truth; at
worst, it proves a knowing intent to defraud.
187.
Plaintiff’s expert also finds that voters received tens of thousands of
ballots that they never requested. (See Exh. 1, Dr. Briggs’ Report).
statistically significant sample, the expected amount of persons that received
an absentee ballot that they did not request ranges from 16,938 to
22,771. This range exceeds the margin of loss of President Trump by 12,670
votes by at least 4,268 unlawful requests and by as many as 10,101 unlawful
requests.
188.
This widespread pattern, as reflected within the population of
unreturned ballots analyzed by Dr. Briggs, reveals the unavoidable reality
that, in addition to the calculations herein, third parties voted an untold
number of unlawfully acquired absentee or mail-in ballots, which would not
be in the database of unreturned ballots analyzed here. See O.G.C.A. 21-2-
522. These unlawfully voted ballots prohibited properly registered persons
from voting and reveal a pattern of widespread fraud.
189.
Further, there exists clear evidence of 20,311 absentee or early voters
in Georgia that voted while registered as having moved out of state.
Specifically, these persons were showing on the National Change of Address
Database (NCOA) as having moved, or as having filed subsequent voter
registration in another state also as evidence that they moved and even
potentially voted in another state. The 20,311 votes by persons documented
as having moved exceeds the margin by which Donald Trump lost the
election by 7,641 votes.
190.
Plaintiffs’’ expert Russell Ramsland concludes that at least 96,600
mail-in ballots were fraudulently cast. He further concludes that up to

136,098 ballots were illegally counted as a result of improper manipulation of
the Dominion software. (Ramsland Aff).
191.
The very existence of absentee mail in ballots created a heightened
opportunity for fraud. The population of unreturned ballots analyzed by
William Briggs, PhD, reveals the probability that a far greater number of
mail ballots were requested by 3rd parties or sent erroneously to persons and
voted fraudulently, undetected by a failed system of signature verification.
The recipients may have voted in the name of another person, may have not
had the legal right to vote and voted anyway, or may have not received the
ballot at the proper address and then found that they were unable to vote at
the polls, except provisionally, due to a ballot outstanding in their name.
192.
When we consider the harm of these uncounted votes, and ballots not
ordered by the voters themselves, and the potential that many of these
unordered ballots may in fact have been improperly voted and also prevented
proper voting at the polls, the mail ballot system has clearly failed in the
state of Georgia and did so on a large scale and widespread basis. The size of
the voting failures, whether accidental or intentional, are multiples larger
than the margin of votes between the presidential candidates in the

state. For these reasons, Georgia cannot reasonably rely on the results of the
mail vote.
193.
The right to vote includes not just the right to cast a ballot, but also the
right to have it fairly counted if it is legally cast. The right to vote is infringed
if a vote is cancelled or diluted by a fraudulent or illegal vote, including
without limitation when a single person votes multiple times. The Supreme
Court of the United States has made this clear in case after case. See, e.g.,
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (every vote must be “protected
from the diluting effect of illegal ballots.”); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election
Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196 (2008) (plurality op. of Stevens, J.) (“There is no
question about the legitimacy or importance of the State’s interest in
counting only the votes of eligible voters.”); accord Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 554-55 & n.29 (1964).
194.
Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. As seen from the expert
analysis of William Higgs, PhD, based on actual voter data, tens of thousands
of votes did not count, and tens of thousands of votes were unlawfully
requested.
195.
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects the right to
vote from conduct by state officials which seriously undermines the
fundamental fairness of the electoral process. Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873,
889 (3d Cir. 1994); Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077-78 (1st Cir. 1978).
196.
Separate from the Equal Protection Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause protects the fundamental right to vote
against “the disenfranchisement of a state electorate.” Duncan v. Poythress,
657 F.2d 691, 702 (5th Cir. 1981). “When an election process ‘reaches the
point of patent and fundamental unfairness,’ there is a due process
violation.” Florida State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d
1153, 1183-84 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580
(11th Cir.1995) (citing Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1315 (11th Cir.1986))).
See also Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1077 (“If the election process itself reaches the
point of patent and fundamental unfairness, a violation of the due process
clause may be indicated and relief under § 1983 therefore in order.”); Marks
v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 889 (3d Cir. 1994) (enjoining winning state senate
candidate from exercising official authority where absentee ballots were
obtained and cast illegally).

197.
Part of courts’ justification for such a ruling is the Supreme Court’s
recognition that the right to vote and to free and fair elections is one that is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights. See Black, 209 F.Supp.2d
at 900 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62 (“since the right to exercise the
franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”)); see also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“the political franchise of voting … is
regarded as a fundamental political right, because [sic] preservative of all
rights.”).
198.
“[T]he right to vote, the right to have one’s vote counted, and the right
to have ones vote given equal weight are basic and fundamental
constitutional rights incorporated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Black, 209 F. Supp. 2d
at 900 (a state law that allows local election officials to impose different
voting schemes upon some portions of the electorate and not others violates
due process). “Just as the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits state officials from improperly diluting the right to
vote, the due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment forbids state
officials from unlawfully eliminating that fundamental right.” Duncan, 657
F.2d at 704. “Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms,
[Defendants] may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one
person's vote over that of another.” Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
199.
In statewide and federal elections conducted in the State of Georgia,
including without limitation the November 3, 2020 General Election, all
candidates, political parties, and voters, including without limitation
Plaintiffs, have a vested interest in being present and having meaningful
access to observe and monitor the electoral process to ensure that it is
properly administered in every election district and otherwise free, fair, and
transparent.
200.
Moreover, through its provisions involving watchers and
representatives, the Georgia Election Code ensures that all candidates and
political parties, including without limitation Plaintiff, Republicans, and the
Trump Campaign, shall be “present” and have meaningful access to observe
and monitor the electoral process to ensure that it is properly administered in
every election district and otherwise free, fair, and transparent.

201.
Defendants have a duty to guard against deprivation of the right to
vote through the dilution of validly cast ballots by ballot fraud or election
tampering. Rather than heeding these mandates and duties, Defendants
arbitrarily and capriciously denied the Trump Campaign and Republicans
meaningful access to observe and monitor the electoral process by: (a)
mandating that representatives at the pre- canvass and canvass of all
absentee and mail-ballots be either Georgia barred attorneys or qualified
registered electors of the county in which they sought to observe and monitor;
and (b) not allowing watchers and representatives to visibly see and review
all envelopes containing official absentee and mail-in ballots either at the
time or before they were opened and/or when such ballots were counted and
recorded. Instead, Defendants refused to credential all of the Trump
Campaign’s submitted watchers and representatives and/or kept Trump
Campaign’s watchers and representatives by security and metal barricades
from the areas where the inspection, opening, and counting of absentee and
mail-in ballots were taking place. The lack of meaningful access with actual
access to see the ballots invited further fraud and cast doubt of the validity of
the proceedings.
202.
Consequently, Defendants created a system whereby it was physically
impossible for the candidates and political parties to view the ballots and
verify that illegally cast ballots were not opened and counted.
203.
Defendants intentionally and/or arbitrarily and capriciously denied Plaintiffs
access to and/or obstructed actual observation and monitoring of the absentee
and mail-in ballots being pre-canvassed and canvassed by Defendants, and
included the unlawfully not counting and including uncounted mail ballots,
and that they failed to follow absentee ballot requirements when thousands
of voters received ballots that they never requested. Defendants have
acted and will continue to act under color of state law to violate the right to
vote and due process as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
204.
irreparable harm unless the injunctive relief requested herein is granted.
205.
than the margin in the state. For these reasons, Georgia cannot reasonably
rely on the results of the mail vote.
206.
Relief sought is the elimination of the mail ballots from counting in the
2020 election. Alternatively, the Presidential electors for the state of Georgia
should be disqualified from counting toward the 2020 election.
207.
The United States Code (3 U.S.C. 5) provides that,
“[i]f any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day
fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination
of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or
any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or
procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least
six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day,
and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the
electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by
such State is concerned.
3 USCS § 5.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
208.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek an emergency order instructing
Defendants to de-certify the results of the General Election for the Office of
President.
209.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek an emergency order prohibiting
Defendants from including in any certified results from the General Election
the tabulation of absentee and mailing ballots which do not comply with the
Election Code, including, without limitation, the tabulation of absentee and
mail-in ballots Trump Campaign’s watchers were prevented from observing
or based on the tabulation of invalidly cast absentee and mail-in ballots
which (i) lack a secrecy envelope, or contain on that envelope any text, mark,
or symbol which reveals the elector’s identity, political affiliation, or
candidate preference, (ii) do not include on the outside envelope a completed
declaration that is dated and signed by the elector, or (iii) are delivered in-
person by third parties for non-disabled voters.
210.
than the margin in the state. For these reasons, Georgia cannot reasonably
rely on the results of the mail vote. Relief sought is the elimination of the
mail ballots from counting in the 2020 election. Alternatively, the electors for
the state of Georgia should be disqualified from counting toward the 2020
election. Alternatively, the electors of the State of Georgia should be directed
to vote for President Donald Trump.
211.
For these reasons, Plaintiff asks this Court to enter a judgment in
their favor and provide the following emergency relief:
1. An order directing Governor Kemp, Secretary Raffensperger and the
Georgia State Board of Elections to de-certify the election results;
2. An order enjoining Governor Kemp from transmitting the currently
certified election results to the Electoral College;
3. An order requiring Governor Kemp to transmit certified election
results that state that President Donald Trump is the winner of the
election;
4. An immediate order to impound all the voting machines and
software in Georgia for expert inspection by the Plaintiffs.
5. An order that no votes received or tabulated by machines that were
not certified as required by federal and state law be counted.
6. A declaratory judgment declaring that Georgia Secretary of State
Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15 violates the Electors and Elections Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4;
7. A declaratory judgment declaring that Georgia’s failed system of
signature verification violates the Electors and Elections Clause by
working a de facto abolition of the signature verification
requirement;
8. A declaratory judgment declaring that current certified election
results violates the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV;
9. A declaratory judgment declaring that mail-in and absentee ballot
fraud must be remedied with a Full Manual Recount or statistically
valid sampling that properly verifies the signatures on absentee
ballot envelopes and that invalidates the certified results if the
recount or sampling analysis shows a sufficient number of ineligible
absentee ballots were counted;

10. An emergency declaratory judgment that voting machines be
Seized and Impounded immediately for a forensic audit—by
plaintiffs’ expects;
11. A declaratory judgment declaring absentee ballot fraud occurred
in violation of Constitutional rights, Election laws and under state
law;
12. A permanent injunction prohibiting the Governor and Secretary
of State from transmitting the currently certified results to the
Electoral College based on the overwhelming evidence of election
tampering;
13. Immediate production of 36 hours of security camera recording of
all rooms used in the voting process at State Farm Arena in Fulton
County, GA from 12:00am to 3:00am until 6:00pm on November 3.
14. Plaintiffs further request the Court grant such other relief as is
just and proper, including but not limited to, the costs of this action
and their reasonable attorney fees and expenses pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 1988.
Respectfully submitted, this 25th day of November, 2020.

CALDWELL, PROPST & DELOACH, LLP
/s/ Harry W. MacDougald

Harry W. MacDougald

Two Ravinia Drive, Suite 1600
Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
Counsel for Plaintiffs
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Julia Z. Haller *
Emily P. Newman*
Virginia Bar License No. 84265
2911 Turtle Creek Blvd, Suite 300
Dallas, Texas 75219
*Application for admission pro hac vice

Forthcoming
L. Lin Wood
GA Bar No. 774588
L. LIN WOOD, P.C.
P.O. Box 52584
Telephone: (404) 891-1402
Howard Kleinhendler*
NEW YORK BAR NO. 2657120Howard Kleinhendler Esquire
Office (917) 793-1188
Mobile (347) 840-2188
www.kleinhendler.com

Forthcoming
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 1:20-cv-04809-TCB Document 1-1 Filed 11/25/20 Page 1 of 33
Exh. 1
An Analysis of Surveys Regarding Absentee Ballots Across Several States

William M. Briggs
November 23, 2020
1 Summary
Survey data was collected from individuals in several states, sampling those who the states listed as not returning absentee
ballots. The data was provided by Matt Braynard.
The survey asked respondents whether they (a) had ever requested an absentee ballot, and, if so, (b) whether they had
in fact returned this ballot. From this sample I produce predictions of the total numbers of: Error #1, those who were
recorded as receiving absentee ballots without requesting them; and Error #2, those who returned absentee ballots but
whose votes went missing (i.e. marked as unreturned).
The sizes of both errors were large in each state. The states were Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Arizona where
ballots were across parties. Pennsylvania data was for Republicans only.
2 Analysis Description
Each analysis was carried out separately for each state. The analysis used (a) the number of absentee ballots recorded as
unreturned, (b) the total responding to the survey, (c) the total of those saying they did not request a ballot, (d) the total
of those saying they did request a ballot, and of these (e) the number saying they returned their ballots. I assume survery
respondents are representative and the data is accurate.
From these data a simple parameter-free predictive model was used to calculate the probability of all possible outcomes.
Pictures of these probabilities were derived, and the 95% prediction interval of the relevant numbers was calculated. The
pictures appear in the Appendix at the end. They are summarized here with their 95% prediction intervals.
Error #1: being recorded as sent an absentee ballot without requesting one.
Error #2: sending back an absentee ballot and having it recorded as not returned.
State Unreturned ballots Error #1 Error #2
Georgia 138,029 16,938–22,771 31,559–38,866
Michigan 139,190 29,611–36,529 27,928–34,710
Pennsylvania⇤ 165,412 32,414–37,444 26,954–31,643
Wisconsin 96,771 16,316–19,273 13,991–16,757
Arizona 518,560 208,333–229,937 78,714–94,975
⇤
Number for Pennsylvania represent Republican ballots only.
Ballots that were not requested, and ballots returned and marked as not returned were classed as troublesome. The
estimated average number of troublesome ballots for each state were then calculated using the table above and are presented
next.
State Unreturned ballots Estimated average Percent
troublesome ballots
Georgia 138,029 53,489 39%
Michigan 139,190 62,517 45%
Pennsylvania⇤ 165,412 61,780 37%
Wisconsin 96,771 29,594 31%
Arizona 518,560 303,305 58%
⇤
Number for Pennsylvania represent Republican ballots only.
3 Conclusion
There are clearly a large number of troublesome ballots in each state investigated. Ballots marked as not returned that were
never requested are clearly an error of some kind. The error is not small as a percent of the total recorded unreturned ballots.
1
Ballots sent back and unrecorded is a separate error. These represent votes that have gone missing, a serious mistake.
The number of these missing ballots is also large in each state.
Survey respondents were not asked if they received an unrequested ballot whether they sent these ballots back. This is
clearly a lively possibility, and represents a third possible source of error, including the potential of voting twice (once by
absentee and once at the polls). No estimates or likelihood can be calculated for this potential error due to absence of data.
4 Declaration of William M. Briggs, PhD

1. My name is William M. Briggs. I am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify in this action. All of the facts
stated herein are true and based on my personal knowledge.
2. I received a Ph.D of Statistics from Cornell University in 2004.
3. I am currently a statistical consultant. I make this declaration in my personal capacity.
4. I have analyzed data regarding responses to questions relating to mail ballot requests, returns and related issues.
5. I attest to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that the resulting analysis are accurate.
I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
23 November 2020
William M. Briggs
5 Appendix
The probability pictures for each state for each outcome as mentioned above.
Probability of numbers of un−requested absentee ballots listed as
not returned for Georgia
0.00025 There is a 95 % chance from
between 16938 and 22771
0.00020 absentee ballots were not
Probability
0.00015 requested but marked as not

returned
0.00010
0.00005
0.00000
0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000
Ballots Listed as Not Returned
Probability of numbers of absentee ballots returned but listed as

not returned for Georgia
0.00015 absentee ballots were
Probability
returned but marked as not

0.00010 returned
0.00005
0.00000
0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000
2

not returned for Michigan
There is a 95 % chance from
0.00020
absentee ballots were not
Probability
0.00015
requested but marked as not
0.00010 returned
0.00005
0.00000
J
"
0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000

not returned for Michigan
0.00020 between 27928 and 34710
absentee ballots were
Probability
0.00015
0.00010 returned
0.00005
J
0.00000
0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000

not returned for Pennsylvania
0.00025 between 32414 and 37444
Probability
0.00020
requested but marked as not
0.00015 returned
0.00010
0.00005
0.00000
0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000

not returned for Pennsylvania
0.00035
0.00030
0.00025
Probability
0.00020 returned but marked as not

0.00015 returned
0.00010
0.00005
0.00000
0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000
3

not returned for Wisconsin
0.0004
Probability

returned
0.0002
0.0001
0.0000
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000

not returned for Wisconsin
0.0005
0.0004 absentee ballots were
Probability
0.0003 returned but marked as not

returned
0.0002
0.0001
0.0000
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000

not returned for Arizona
0.00006 between 208333 and 229937
0.00005 absentee ballots were not
Probability

0.00003 returned
0.00002
0.00001
\
0.00000
0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000 450,000 500,000

not returned for Arizona
0.00010
0.00008 between 78714 and 94975
Probability
0.00006
0.00004 returned
0.00002
0.00000
0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000 450,000 500,000
4
0276 GA Unreturned_Absentee Live ID Topline
11/16/2020 11/17/2020
Completes 8143 7036
Completed survey** -
Q5=01 or 02
Answering Machines
Refused/Early Hang
up/RC
Bad/Wrong
Numbers/Language
MA
List Penetration
Data Loads
Q1 - May I please speak to <lead on
Response 16-Nov 17-Nov
screen>?
1,175 100.00% Sum of All Responses 982 578
Q2 - Did you request an absentee
ballot?
964 100.00% Sum of All Responses 611 411
Q3 - Did you mail back that ballot? Response 16-Nov 17-Nov
Q4 - Can you please give us the
best phone number to reach you Response 16-Nov 17-Nov
at?
Q5 - May we please have an email
address to follow-up as well?
MI Unreturned Live Agent - Mass Markets
11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020 I
Completes - 990 2,825
Q4=01
Refused/Early
VM Hang
Message Left
up/RC
No Answer
Bad/Wrong
Numbers/Language
List Penetration
Data Loads
Response
screen>? 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
100.00% Sum of All Responses - 1,098 2,952
Q2 - Did you request Absentee
Response
Ballot in state of MI?
11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
I
1,515 100.00% Sum of All Responses - 282 1,233
Q3 - Did you mail your ballot back? Response 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
1,090 100.00% Sum of All Responses - 219 871
best phone number to reach you Response
at? 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
352 100.00% Sum of All Responses - 63 289
Q5 - Can you provide us your email
Response
address? 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
WI Unreturned Live Agent - Mass Markets
11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
Completes - 3,483 1,131
Completed survey** - Q4=01
VM Message Left
Refused/Early Hang up/RC
No Answer
Bad/Wrong Numbers/Language Barrier
List Penetration
Data Loads
Response
screen>? 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
100.00% Sum of All Responses - 2,545 950
Q2 - Did you request Absentee Ballot
Response
in state of WI?
11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
I
2,723 100.00% Sum of All Responses - 2,062 661
Q3 - Did you mail your ballot back? Response 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
2,154 100.00% Sum of All Responses - 1,657 497
Q4 - Can you please give us the best
Response
phone number to reach you at?
11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
Q5 - Can you provide us your email
Response
address? 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
0270 PA Absentee Live ID Topline
11/9/2020 11/10/2020 11/11/2020
Completes 4419 13618 0
Completed
survey** - Q4=01
Answering
Machines
Refused/Early
Hang up/RC
Bad/Wrong
Numbers/Languag
MA
List Penetration
Data Loads
Q1 - May I please speak to
Response 9-Nov 10-Nov 11-Nov
<lead on screen>?
2,982 100.00% Sum of All Responses 932 2789 0
Q2 - Did you request an
absentee ballot?
Q3 - Did you mail back that
ballot?
Q4 - Can you please give us
the best phone number to Response 9-Nov 10-Nov 11-Nov
reach you at?
952 100.00% Sum of All Responses 231 788 0
AZ Unreturned Live Agent - Mass Markets
11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020 I
Completes 745 1,881 2,978
Q4=01
Refused/Early
VM Hang
Message Left
up/RC
No Answer
Bad/Wrong
Numbers/Language
List Penetration
Data Loads
Q1 - May I please speak to <lead
Response
on screen>? 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
100.00% Sum of All Responses 769 1,532 2,223
Q2 - Did you request Absentee
Response
Ballot in state of AZ?
11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
I
2,489 100.00% Sum of All Responses 435 754 1,300
Q3 - Did you mail your ballot Response 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
2,129 100.00% Sum of All Responses 390 685 1,054
best phone number to reach you Response
at? 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
Q5 - Can you provide us your
Response
email address? 11/15/2020 11/16/2020 11/17/2020
William M. Briggs, PhD

Statistician to the Stars!
matt@wmbriggs.com
917-392-0691
1. Experience
(1) 2016: Author of Uncertainty: The Soul of Modeling, Probability & Sta-
tistics, a book which argues for a complete and fundamental change in the
philosophy and practice of probability and statistics. Eliminate hypothesis
testing and estimation, and move to verifiable predictions. This includes
AI and machine learning. Call this The Great Reset, but a good one.
(2) 2004-2016 Adjunct Professor of Statistical Science, Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York
I taught a yearly Masters course to people who (rightfully) hate statistics.
Interests: philosophy of science & probability, epistemology, epidemiology
(ask me about the all-too-common epidemiologist fallacy), Bayesian sta-
tistics, medicine, climatology & meteorology, goodness of forecasts, over-
confidence in science; public understanding of science, limitations of science,
scientism; scholastic metaphysics (as it relates to epistemology).
(3) 1998-present. Statistical consultant, Various companies
Most of my time is spent coaxing people out of their money to tell them
they are too sure of themselves. All manner of analyses cheerfully un-
dertaken. Example: Fraud analysis; I created the Wall Street Journal’s
College Rankings. I consultant regularly at Methodist and other hospitals,
start-ups, start-downs, and with any instition willing to fork it over.
(4) 2003-2010. Research Scientist, New York Methodist Hospital,
New York
Besides the usual, I sit/sat on the Institutional Review Committee to assess
the statistics of proposed research. I was an Associate Editor for Monthly
Weather Review (through 2011). Also a member of the American Meteoro-
logical Society’s Probability and Statistics Committee (through 2011). At
a hospital? Yes, sir; at a hospital. It rains there, too, you know.
(5) Fall 2007, Fall 2010 Visiting Professor of Statistics, Depart-
ment of Mathematics, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleas-
ant, MI
Who doesn’t love a visit from a statistician? Ask me about the di↵erence
between “a degree” and “an education.”
(6) 2003-2007, Assistant Professor Statistics, Weill Medical Col-
lege of Cornell University, New York, New York
Working here gave me a sincere appreciation of the influences of government
money; grants galore.
(7) 2002-2003. Gotham Risk Management, New York
A start-up then, after Enron’s shenanigans, a start-down. We set future
weather derivative and weather insurance contract prices that incorporated
information from medium- and long-range weather and climate forecasts.
(8) 1998-2002. DoubleClick, New York
Lead statistician. Lot of computer this and thats; enormous datasets.
(9) 1993-1998. Graduate student, Cornell University
1
Meteorology, applied climatology, and finally statistics. Was Vice Chair of

the graduate student government; probably elected thanks to a miracle.
(10) 1992-1993. National Weather Service, Sault Ste. Marie, MI
Forecast storms o’ the day and launched enormous balloons in the name of
Science. My proudest moment came when I was able to convince an ancient
IBM-AT machine to talk to an analog, 110 baud, phone-coupled modem,
all using BASIC!
(11) 1989-1992. Undergraduate student, Central Michigan Univer-
sity
Meteorology and mathematics. Started the local student meteorology group
to chase tornadoes. Who knew Michigan had so few? Spent a summer at
U Michigan playing with a (science-fiction-sounding) lidar.
(12) 1983-1989. United States Air Force
Cryptography and other secret stu↵. Shot things; learned pinochle. I
adopted and became proficient with a fascinating and versatile vocabulary.
Irritate me for examples. TS/SCI, etc. security clearance (now inactive).
2. Education
(1) Ph.D., 2004, Cornell University. Statistics.
(2) M.S., 1995, Cornell University. Atmospheric Science.
(3) B.S., Summa Cum Laude, 1992, Central Michigan University. Meteorology
and Math.
3. Publications
3.0.1. Popular.
(1) Op-eds in various newspapers; articles in Stream, Crisis Magazine, The
Remnant, Quadrant, Quirks; blog with ⇠70,000 monthly readers. Various
briefs submitted to government agencies, such as California Air Resources
Board, Illinois Department of Natural Resources. Talks and holding-forths
of all kinds.
3.0.2. Books.
(1) Richards, JW, WM Briggs, and D Axe, 2020. UThe Price of Panic: How
the Tyranny of Experts Turned a Pandemic into a Catastrophe. Regnery.
Professors Jay Richards, William Briggs, and Douglas Axe take a deep dive
into the crucial questions on the minds of millions of Americans during one
of the most jarring and unprecedented global events in a generation.
(2) Briggs, WM., 2016. Uncertainty: The Soul of Modeling, Probability &
Statistics. Springer. Philosophy of probability and statistics. A new (old)
way to view and to use statistics, a way that doesn’t lead to heartbreak
and pandemic over-certainty, like current methods do.
(3) Briggs, WM., 2008 Breaking the Law of Averages: Real Life Probability and
Statistics in Plain English. Lulu Press, New York. Free text for undergrad-
uates.
(4) Briggs, WM., 2006 So You Think You’re Psychic? Lulu Press, New York.
Hint: I’ll bet you’re not.
3.0.3. Methods.
(1) Briggs, WM and J.C. Hanekamp, 2020. Uncertainty In The MAN Data
Calibration & Trend Estimates. Atmospheric Environment, In review.
(2) Briggs, WM and J.C. Hanekamp, 2020. Adjustments to the Ryden & Mc-
Neil Ammonia Flux Model. Soil Use and Management, In review.
(3) Briggs, William M., 2020. Parameter-Centric Analysis Grossly Exaggerates
Certainty. In Data Science for Financial Econometrics, V Kreinovich, NN
Thach, ND Trung, DV Thanh (eds.), In press.
(4) Briggs, WM, HT Nguyen, D Trafimow, 2019. Don’t Test, Decide. In
Behavioral Predictive Modeling in Econometrics, Springer, V Kreinovich, S
Sriboonchitta (eds.). In press.
(5) Briggs, William M. and HT Nguyen, 2019. Clarifying ASA’s view on p-
values in hypothesis testing. Asian Journal of Business and Economics,
03(02), 1–16.
(6) Briggs, William M., 2019. Reality-Based Probability & Statistics: Solv-
ing The Evidential Crisis (invited paper). Asian Journal of Business and
Economics, 03(01), 37–80.
(7) Briggs, William M., 2019. Everything Wrong with P-Values Under One
Roof. In Beyond Traditional Probabilistic Methods in Economics, V Kreinovich,
NN Thach, ND Trung, DV Thanh (eds.), pp 22—44.
(8) Briggs, WM, HT Nguyen, D Trafimow, 2019. The Replacement for Hy-
pothesis Testing. In Structural Changes and Their Econometric Modeling,
Springer, V Kreinovich, S Sriboonchitta (eds.), pp 3—17.
(9) Trafimow, D, V Amrhein, CN Areshenko↵, C Barrera-Causil, ..., WM
Briggs, (45 others), 2018. Manipulating the alpha level cannot cure sig-
nificance testing. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 699. doi.org/10.3389/ fp-
syg.2018.00699.
(10) Briggs, WM, 2018. Testing, Prediction, and Cause in Econometric Models.
In Econometrics for Financial Applications, ed. Anh, Dong, Kreinovich,
and Thach. Springer, New York, pp 3–19.
(11) Briggs, WM, 2017. The Substitute for p-Values. JASA, 112, 897–898.
(12) J.C. Hanekamp, M. Crok, M. Briggs, 2017. Ammoniak in Nederland.
Enkele kritische wetenschappelijke kanttekeningen. V-focus, Wageningen.
(13) Briggs, WM, 2017. Math: Old, New, and Equalitarian. Academic Ques-
tions, 30(4), 508–513.
(14) Monckton, C, W Soon, D Legates, ... (several others), WM Briggs 2018. On
an error in applying feedback theory to climate. In submission (currently
J. Climate).
(15) Briggs, WM, JC Hanekamp, M Crok, 2017. Comment on Goedhart and
Huijsmans. Soil Use and Management, 33(4), 603–604.
(16) Briggs, WM, JC Hanekamp, M Crok, 2017. Response to van Pul, van
Zanten and Wichink Kruit. Soil Use and Management, 33(4), 609–610.
(17) Jaap C. Hanekamp, William M. Briggs, and Marcel Crock, 2016. A volatile
discourse - reviewing aspects of ammonia emissions, models, and atmo-
spheric concentrations in The Netherlands. Soil Use and Management,
33(2), 276–287.
(18) Christopher Monckton of Brenchley, Willie Soon, David Legates, William

Briggs, 2015. Keeping it simple: the value of an irreducibly simple climate
model. Science Bulletin. August 2015, Volume 60, Issue 15, pp 1378–1390.
(19) Briggs, WM, 2015. The Third Way Of Probability & Statistics: Beyond
Testing and Estimation To Importance, Relevance, and Skill. arxiv.org/
abs/1508.02384.
(20) Briggs, WM, 2015. The Crisis Of Evidence: Why Probability And Statistics
Cannot Discover Cause. arxiv.org/abs/1507.07244.
(21) David R. Legates, Willie Soon, William M. Briggs, Christopher Monckton
of Brenchley, 2015. Climate Consensus and ‘Misinformation’: A Rejoinder
to Agnotology, Scientific Consensus, and the Teachingand Learning of Cli-
mate Change. Science and Education, 24, 299–318, DOI 10.1007/s11191-
013-9647-9.
(22) Briggs, WM, 2014. The Problem Of Grue Isn’t. arxiv.org/abs/1501.03811.
(23) Christopher Monckton of Brenchley, Willie Soon, David Legates, William
Briggs, 2014. Why models run hot: results from an irreducibly simple
climate model. Science Bulletin. January 2015, Volume 60, Issue 1, pp
122-135.
(24) Briggs, WM, 2014. Common Statistical Fallacies. Journal of American
Physicians and Surgeons, Volume 19 Number 2, 58–60.
(25) Aalt Bast, William M. Briggs, Edward J. Calabrese, Michael F. Fenech,
Jaap C. Hanekamp, Robert Heaney, Ger Rijkers, Bert Schwitters, Pieternel
Verhoeven, 2013. Scientism, Legalism and Precaution—Contending with
Regulating Nutrition and Health Claims in Europe. European Food and
Feed Law Review, 6, 401–409.
(26) Legates, DR, Soon, W, and Briggs, 2013. Learning and Teaching Climate
Science: The Perils of Consensus Knowledge Using Agnotology. Science
and Education, DOI 10.1007/s11191-013-9588-3.
(27) Briggs, WM, 2012. On Probability Leakage. arxiv.org/abs/1201.3611.
(28) Briggs, WM, 2012. Why do statisticians answer questions no one ever asks?
Significance. Volume 9 Issue 1 Doi: 10.1111/j.1740-9713.2012.00542.x. 30–
31.
(29) Briggs, WM, Soon, W, Legates, D, Carter, R, 2011. A Vaccine Against
Arrogance. Water, Air, & Soil Pollution: Volume 220, Issue 1 (2011),
Page 5-6
(30) Briggs, WM, and R Zaretzki, 2009. Induction and falsifiability in statistics.
arxiv.org/abs/math/0610859.
(31) Briggs, WM, 2011. Discussion to A Gelman. Why Tables are Really Much
Better than Graphs. Journal Computational and Graphical Statistics. Vol-
ume 20, 16–17.
(32) Zaretzki R, Gilchrist MA, Briggs WM, and Armagan A, 2010. Bias cor-
rection and Bayesian analysis of aggregate counts in SAGE libraries. BMC
Bioinformatics, 11:72doi:10.1186/1471-2105-11-72.
(33) Zaretzki, R, Briggs, W, Shankar, M, Sterling, M, 2009. Fitting distri-
butions of large scale power outages: extreme values and the e↵ect of
truncation. International Journal of Power and Energy Systems. DOI:
10.2316/Journal.203.2009.1.203-4374.
(34) Briggs, WM, 2007. Changes in number and intensity of world-wide tropical
cyclones arxiv.org/physics/0702131.
(35) Briggs, WM, 2007. On the non-arbitrary assignment of equi-probable priors
arxiv.org/math.ST/0701331.
(36) Briggs, WM, 2007. On the changes in number and intensity of North
Atlantic tropical cyclones Journal of Climate. 21, 1387-1482.
(37) Briggs, WM, Positive evidence for non-arbitrary assignments of probability,
2007. Edited by Knuth et al. Proceedings 27th International Workshop on
Bayesian Inference and Maximum Entropy Methods in Science and Engi-
neering. American Institute of Physics. 101-108.
(38) Briggs, WM, R Zaretzki, 2007. The Skill Plot: a graphical technique for
the evaluating the predictive usefulness of continuous diagnostic tests. With
Discussion. Biometrics. 64(1), 250-6; discussion 256-61. PMID: 18304288.
(39) Zaretzki R, Gilchrist MA, Briggs WM, 2010. MCMC Inference for a Model
with Sampling Bias: An Illustration using SAGE data. arxiv.org/abs/0711.3765
(40) Briggs, WM, and D Ruppert, 2006. Assessing the skill of yes/no forecasts
for Markov observations. Monthly Weather Review. 134, 2601-2611.
(41) Briggs, WM, 2007. Review of Statistical Methods in the Atmospheric Sci-
ences (second edition, 2006) by Wilks, D.S. Journal of the American Sta-
tistical Association, 102, 380.
(42) Briggs, WM, M Pocernich, and D Ruppert, 2005. Incorporating misclassi-
fication error in skill assessment. Monthly Weather Review, 133(11), 3382-
3392.
(43) Briggs, WM, 2005. A general method of incorporating forecast cost and
loss in value scores. Monthly Weather Review, 133(11), 3393-3397.
(44) Briggs, WM, and D Ruppert, 2005. Assessing the skill of Yes/No Predic-
tions. Biometrics. 61(3), 799-807. PMID: 16135031.
(45) Briggs, WM, 2004. Discussion to T Gneiting, LI Stanberry, EP Grimit, L
Held, NA Johnson, 2008. Assessing probabilistic forecasts of multivariate
quantities, with an application to ensemble predictions of surface winds.
Test. 17, 240-242.
(46) Briggs, WM, 2004. Discussion to Gel, Y, AE Raftery, T Gneiting, and V.J.
Berrocal, 2004. Calibrated Probabilistic Mesoscale Weather Field Forecast-
ing: The Geostatistical Output Perturbation (GOP) Method. J. American
Statistical Association. 99 (467): 586-587.
(47) Mozer, JB, and Briggs, WM, 2003. Skill in real-time solar wind shock
forecasts. J. Geophysical Research: Space Physics, 108 (A6), SSH 9 p.
1-9, (DOI 10.1029/2003JA009827).
(48) Briggs, WM, 1999. Review of Forecasting: Methods and Applications (third
edition, 1998) by Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman; and Elements
of Forecasting (first edition, 1998) by Diebold. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 94, 345-346.
(49) Briggs, W.M., and R.A. Levine, 1997. Wavelets and Field Forecast Verifi-
cation. Monthly Weather Review, 25 (6), 1329-1341.
(50) Briggs, WM, and DS Wilks, 1996. Estimating monthly and seasonal dis-
tributions of temperature and precipitation using the new CPC long-range
forecasts. Journal of Climate, 9, 818-826.
(51) Briggs, WM, and DS Wilks, 1996. Extension of the CPC long-lead tem-
perature and precipitation outlooks to general weather statistics. Journal
of Climate, 9, 3496-3504.
3.0.4. Applications.
(1) Jamorabo, Daniel, Renelus, Benjamin, Briggs, WM, 2019. ”Comparative

outcomes of EUS-guided cystogastrostomy for peripancreatic fluid collec-
tions (PFCs): A systematic review and meta-analysis, 2019. Therapeutic
Advances in Gastrointestinal Endoscopy, in press.
(2) Benjamin Renelus, S Paul, S Peterson, N Dave, D amorabo, W Briggs,
P Kancharla, 2019. Racial disparities with esophageal cancer mortality
at a high-volume university affiliated center: An All ACCESS Invitation,
Journal of the National Medical Association, in press.
(3) Mehta, Bella, S Ibrahim, WM Briggs, and P Efthimiou, 2019. Racial/Ethnic
variations in morbidity and mortality in Adult Onset Still’s Disease: An
analysis of national dataset”, Seminars in Arthritis and Rheumatism, doi:
10.1016/j.semarthrit.2019.04.0044.
(4) Ivanov A, Dabiesingh DS, Bhumireddy GP, Mohamed A, Asfour A, Briggs
WM, Ho J, Khan SA, Grossman A, Klem I, Sacchi TJ, Heitner JF. Preva-
lence and Prognostic Significance of Left Ventricular Noncompaction in
Patients Referred for Cardiac Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Circ Cardio-
vasc Imaging. 2017 Sep;10(9). pii: e006174. doi: 10.1161/CIRCIMAG-
ING.117.006174.
(5) Ivanov A, Kaczkowska BA, Khan SA, Ho J, Tavakol M, Prasad A, Bhu-
mireddy G, Beall AF, Klem I, Mehta P, Briggs WM, fpaSacchi TJ, Heit-
ner JF, 2017. Review and Analysis of Publication Trends over Three
Decades in Three High Impact Medicine Journals. PLoS One. 2017 Jan
20;12(1):e0170056. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0170056.
(6) A. Ivanova, G.P. Bhumireddy, D.S. Dabiesingh, S.A. Khana, J. Hoa N.
Krishna, N. Dontineni, J.A Socolow, W.M. Briggs, I. Klem, T.J. Sacchi,
J.F. Heitner, 2016. Importance of papillary muscle infarction detected by
cardiac magnetic resonance imaging in predicting cardiovascular events.
International Journal of Cardiology. Volume 220, 1 October 2016, Pages
558–563. PMID: 27390987.
(7) A Ivanov, J Yossef, J Taillon, B Worku, I Gulkarov, A Tortolani, TJ
Sacchi, WM Briggs, SJ Brener, JA Weingarten, JF Heitner, 2015. Do
pulmonary function tests improve risk stratification before cardiothoracic
surgery? Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery. 2015 Oct 30.
pii: S0022-5223(15)02165-0. doi: 10.101. PMID: 26704058.
(8) Chen O, Sharma A, Ahmad I, Bourji N, Nestoiter K, Hua P, Hua B, Ivanov
A, Yossef J, Klem I, Briggs WM, Sacchi TJ, Heitner JF, 2015. Correlation
between pericardial, mediastinal, and intrathoracic fat volumes with the
presence and severity of coronary artery disease, metabolic syndrome, and
cardiac risk factors. Eur Heart J Cardiovasc Imaging. 2015 Jan;16(1):37-
46. doi: 10.1093/ehjci/jeu145.
(9) Chery J, Semaan E, Darji S, Briggs W, Yarmush J, D’Ayala M, 2014.
Impact of regional versus general anesthesia on the clinical outcomes of
patients undergoing major lower extremity amputation. Ann Vasc Surg,
2014 Jul;28(5):1149-56. PMID: 24342828.
(10) Visconti A, Gaeta T, Cabezon M, Briggs W, Pyle M., 2013. Focused Board
Intervention (FBI): A Remediation Program for Written Board Preparation
and the Medical Knowledge Core Competency. J Grad Med Educ. 2013
Sep;5(3):464-7. PMID: 24404311.
(11) Annika Krystyna, D Kumari, R Tenney, R Kosanovic, T Safi, WM Briggs,
K Hennessey, M Skelly, E Enriquez, J Lajeune, W Ghani and MD Schwalb,
2013. Hepatitis c antibody testing in African American and Hispanic men
in New York City with prostate biopsy. Oncology Discovery, Vol 1. DOI:
10.7243/2052-6199-1-1.
(12) Ziad Y. Fayad, Elie Semaan, Bashar Fahoum, W. Matt Briggs, Anthony
Tortolani, and Marcus D’Ayala, 2013. Aortic mural thrombus in the nor-
mal or minimally atherosclerotic aorta: A systematic review and meta-
analysis of the available literature. Ann Vasc Surg., Apr;27(3):282-90.
DOI:10.1016/j.avsg.2012.03.011.
(13) Elizabeth Haines, Gerardo Chiricolo, Kresimir Aralica, William Briggs,
Robert Van Amerongen, Andrew Laudenbach, Kevin O’Rourke, and Lawrence
Melniker MD, 2012. Derivation of a Pediatric Growth Curve for Inferior
Vena Caval Diameter in Healthy Pediatric Patients. Crit Ultrasound J.
2012 May 28;4(1):12. doi: 10.1186/2036-7902-4-12.
(14) Wei Li, Piotr Gorecki, Elie Semaan, William Briggs, Anthony J. Tortolani,
Marcus D’Ayala, 2011. Concurrent Prophylactic Placement of Inferior Vena
Cava Filter in gastric bypass and adjustable banding operations: An analy-
sis of the Bariatric Outcomes Longitudinal Database (BOLD). J. Vascular
Surg. 2012 Jun;55(6):1690-5. doi: 10.1016/j.jvs.2011.12.056.
(15) Krystyna A, Kosanovic R, Tenney R, Safi T, Briggs WM, et al. (2011)
Colonoscopy Findings in Men with Transrectal Ultrasound Guided Prostate
Biopsy: Association of Colonic Lipoma with Prostate Cancer. J Cancer Sci
Ther S4:002. doi:10.4172/1948-5956.S4-002
(16) Birkhahn RH, Wen W, Datillo PA, Briggs WM, Parekh A, Arkun A, Byrd
B, Gaeta TJ, 2012. Improving patient flow in acute coronary syndromes
in the face of hospital crowding. J Emerg Med. 2012 Aug;43(2):356-65.
PMID: 22015378.
(17) Birkhahn RH, Haines E, Wen W, Reddy L, Briggs WM, Datillo PA., 2011.
Estimating the clinical impact of bringing a multimarker cardiac panel to
the bedside in the ED. Am J Emerg Med. 2011 Mar;29(3):304-8.
(18) Krystyna A, Safi T, Briggs WM, Schwalb MD., 2011. Correlation of hep-
atitis C and prostate cancer, inverse correlation of basal cell hyperplasia
or prostatitis and epidemic syphilis of unknown duration. Int Braz J Urol.
2011 Mar-Apr;37(2):223-9; discussion 230.
(19) Muniyappa R, Briggs WM, 2010. Limited Predictive Ability of Surrogate
Indices of Insulin Sensitivity/Resistance in Asian Indian Men: A Calibra-
tion Model Analysis. AJP - Endocrinology and Metabolism. 299(6):E1106-
12. PMID: 20943755.
(20) Birkhahn RH, Blomkalns A, Klausner H, Nowak R, Raja AS, Summers
R, Weber JE, Briggs WM, Arkun A, Diercks D. The association between
money and opinion in academic emergency medicine. West J Emerg Med.
2010 May;11(2):126-32. PMID: 20823958.
(21) Loizzo JJ, Peterson JC, Charlson ME, Wolf EJ, Altemus M, Briggs WM,
Vahdat LT, Caputo TA, 2010. The e↵ect of a contemplative self-healing
program on quality of life in women with breast and gynecologic cancers.

Altern Ther Health Med., May-Jun;16(3):30-7. PMID: 20486622.
(22) Krystyna A, Safi T, Briggs WM, Schwalb MD, 2010. Higher morbidity
in prostate cancer patients after transrectal ultrasound guided prostate
biopsy with 3-day oral ciprofloxacin prophylaxis, independent of number
of cores. Brazilian Journal of Urology. Mar-Apr;37(2):223-9; discussion
230. PMID:21557839.
(23) Arkun A, Briggs WM, Patel S, Datillo PA, Bove J, Birkhahn RH, 2010.
Emergency department crowding: factors influencing flow West J Emerg
Med. Feb;11(1):10-5.PMID: 20411067.
(24) Li W, D’Ayala M, Hirshberg A, Briggs W, Wise L, Tortolani A, 2010. Com-
parison of conservative and operative treatment for blunt carotid injuries:
analysis of the National Trauma Data Bank. J Vasc Surg.. Mar;51(3):593-
9, 599.e1-2.PMID: 20206804.
(25) D’Ayala M, Huzar T, Briggs W, Fahoum B, Wong S, Wise L, Tortolani
A, 2010. Blood transfusion and its e↵ect on the clinical outcomes of pa-
tients undergoing major lower extremity amputation. Ann Vasc Surg.,
May;24(4):468-73. Epub 2009 Nov 8.PMID: 19900785.
(26) Tavakol M, Hassan KZ, Abdula RK, Briggs W, Oribabor CE, Tortolani AJ,
Sacchi TJ, Lee LY, Heitner JF., 2009. Utility of brain natriuretic peptide
as a predictor of atrial fibrillation after cardiac operations. Ann Thorac
Surg. Sep;88(3):802-7.PMID: 19699901.
(27) Zandieh SO, Gershel JC, Briggs WM, Mancuso CA, Kuder JM., 2009. Re-
visiting predictors of parental health care-seeking behaviors for nonurgent
conditions at one inner-city hospital. Pediatr Emerg Care., Apr;25(4):238-
243.PMID: 19382324.
(28) Birkhahn RH, Blomkalns AL, Klausner HA, Nowak RM, Raja AS, Sum-
mers RL, Weber JE, Briggs WM, Arkun A, Diercks D., 2008. Academic
emergency medicine faculty and industry relationships. Acad Emerg Med.,
Sep;15(9):819-24.PMID: 19244632.
(29) Westermann H, Choi TN, Briggs WM, Charlson ME, Mancuso CA. Obesity
and exercise habits of asthmatic patients. Ann Allergy Asthma Immunol.
2008 Nov;101(5):488-94. doi: 10.1016/S1081-1206(10)60287-6.
(30) Boutin-Foster C., Ogedegbe G., Peterson J., Briggs M., Allegrante J.,
Charlson ME., 2008. Psychosocial mediators of the relationship between
race/ethnicity and depressive symptoms in Latino and white patients with
coronary artery disease. J. National Medical Association. 100(7), 849-55.
PMID: 18672563
(31) Charlson ME, Charlson RE, Marinopoulos S, McCulloch C, Briggs WM,
Hollenberg J, 2008. The Charlson comorbidity index is adapted to pre-
dict costs of chronic disease in primary care patients. J Clin Epidemiol,
Dec;61(12):1234-40. PMID: 18619805.
(32) Mancuso CA, Westermann H, Choi TN, Wenderoth S, Briggs WM, Charl-
son ME, 2008. Psychological and somatic symptoms in screening for de-
pression in asthma patients. J. Asthma. 45(3), 221-5. PMID: 18415830.
(33) Ullery, BW, JC Peterson, FM, WM Briggs, LN Girardi, W Ko, AJ Tor-
tolani, OW Isom, K Krieger, 2007. Cardiac Surgery in Nonagenarians:
10
Should We or Shouldn’t We? Annals of Thoracic Surgery. 85(3), 854-60.

PMID: 18291156.
(34) Mancuso, CA, T Choi, H Westermann, WM Briggs, S Wenderoth, 2007.
Patient-reported and Physician-reported Depressive Conditions in Relation
to Asthma Severity and Control. Chest. 133(5), 1142-8. PMID: 18263683.
(35) Rosenzweig JS, Van Deusen SK, Okpara O, Datillo PA, Briggs WM, Birkhahn
RH, 2008. Authorship, collaboration, and predictors of extramural fund-
ing in the emergency medicine literature. Am J Emerg Med. 26(1), 5-9.
PMID: 18082774.
(36) Westermann H, Choi TN, Briggs WM, Charlson ME, Mancuso CA, 2008.
Obesity and exercise habits of asthmatic patients. Ann Allergy Asthma
Immunol. Nov;101(5):488-94.PMID: 19055202.
(37) Hogle NJ, Briggs WM, Fowler DL, 2007.Documenting a learning curve and
test-retest reliability of two tasks on a virtual reality training simulator in
laparoscopic surgery. J Surg Educ. 64(6), 424-30. PMID: 18063281.
(38) D’Ayala, M, C Martone, R M Smith, WM Briggs, M Potouridis, J S Deitch,
and L Wise, 2006. The e↵ect of systemic anticoagulation in patients un-
dergoing angioaccess surgery. Annals of Vascular Surgery. 22(1), 11-5.
PMID: 18055171.
(39) Charlson ME, Peterson F, Krieger K, Hartman GS, Hollenberg J, Briggs
WM, et al., 2007. Improvement of outcomes after coronary artery bypass II:
a randomized trial comparing intraoperative high versus customized mean
arterial pressure. J. Cardiac Surgey. 22(6), 465-72. PMID: 18039205.
(40) Charlson ME, Peterson F, Boutin-Foster C, Briggs WM, Ogedegbe G, Mc-
Culloch C, et al., 2008. Changing health behaviors to improve health out-
comes after angioplasty: a randomized trial of net present value versus
future value risk communication.. Health Education Research. 23(5), 826-
39. PMID: 18025064.
(41) Charlson, M, Peterson J., Syat B, Briggs WM, Kline R, Dodd M, Murad
V, Dione W, 2007. Outcomes of Community Based Social Service Interven-
tions in Homebound Elders Int. J. Geriatric Psychiatry. 23(4), 427-32.
PMID: 17918183.
(42) Hogle NJ, Briggs WM, Fowler DL. Documenting a learning curve and
test-retest reliability of two tasks on a virtual reality training simulator
in laparoscopic surgery. J Surg Educ. 2007 Nov-Dec;64(6):424-30. PMID:
18063281.
(43) Mancuso, CA, T Choi, H Westermann, WM Briggs, S Wenderoth, 2007.
Measuring physical activity in asthma patients: two-minute walk test, re-
peated chair rise test, and self-reported energy expenditure. J. Asthma.
44(4), 333-40. PMID: 17530534.
(44) Charlson ME, Charlson RE, Briggs W, Hollenberg J, 2007. Can disease
management target patients most likely to generate high costs? The impact
of comorbidity. J Gen Intern Med. 22(4), 464-9. PMID: 17372794.
(45) Charlson ME, Boutin-Foster C, Mancuso CA, Peterson F, Ogedegbe G,
Briggs WM, Robbins L, Isen A, Allegrante JP, 2006. Randomized Con-
trolled Trials of Positive A↵ect and Self-affirmation to Facilitate Healthy
11
Behaviors in Patients with Cardiopulmonary Diseases: Rationale, Trial De-

sign, and Methods. Contemporary Clinical Trials. 28(6), 748-62. PMID:
17459784.
(46) Charlson ME, Boutin-Foster C., Mancuso C., Ogedegbe G., Peterson J.,
Briggs M., Allegrante J., Robbins L., Isen A., 2007. Using positive a↵ect
and self affirmation to inform and to improve self management behaviors
in cardiopulmonary patients: Design, rationale and methods. Controlled
Clinical Trials. November 2007 (Vol. 28, Issue 6, Pages 748-762).
(47) Melniker LA, Leibner E, McKenney MG, Lopez P, Briggs WM, Mancuso
CA., 2006. Randomized Controlled Clinical Trial of Point-of-Care, Limited
Ultrasonography (PLUS) for Trauma in the Emergency Department: The
First Sonography Outcomes Assessment Program (SOAP-1) Trial. Annals
of Emergency Medicine. 48(3), 227-235. PMID: 16934640.
(48) Milling, TJ, C Holden, LA Melniker, WM Briggs, R Birkhahn, TJ Gaeta,
2006. Randomized controlled trial of single-operator vs. two-operator ul-
trasound guidance for internal jugular central venous cannulation. Acad
Emerg Med., 13(3), 245-7. PMID: 16495416.
(49) Milla F, Skubas N, Briggs WM, Girardi LN, Lee LY, Ko W, Tortolani AJ,
Krieger KH, Isom OW, Mack CA, 2006. Epicardial beating heart cryoab-
lation using a novel argon-based cryoclamp and linear probe. J Thorac
Cardiovasc Surg., 131(2), 403-11. PMID: 16434271.
(50) Birkhahn, SK Van Deusen, O Okpara, PA Datillo, WM Briggs, TJ Gaeta,
2006. Funding and publishing trends of original research by emergency
medicine investigators over the past decade. Annals of Emergency Medicine,
13(1), 95-101. PMID: 16365335.
(51) Birkhahn, WM Briggs, PA Datillo, SK Van Deusen, TJ Gaeta, 2006. Classi-
fying patients suspected of appendicitis with regard to likelihood. American
Journal of Surgery, 191(4), 497-502. PMID: 16531143
(52) Charlson ME, Charlson RE, Briggs WM, Hollenberg J, 2006. Can disease
management target patients most likely to generate high costs. J. General
Internal Medicine. 22(4), 464-9.
(53) Milling, TJ, J Rose, WM Briggs, R Birkhahn, TJ Gaeta, JJ Bove, and
LA Melniker, 2005. Randomized, controlled clinical trial of point-of-care
limited ultrasonography assistance of central venous cannulation: the Third
Sonography Outcomes Assessment Program (SOAP-3) Trial. Crit Care
Med. 33(8), 1764-9. PMID: 16096454.
(54) Garfield JL, Birkhahn RH, Gaeta TJ, Briggs WM, 2004. Diagnostic Delays
and Pathways on Route to Operative Intervention in Acute Appendicitis.
American Surgeon. 70(11), 1010-1013. PMID: 15586517.
(55) Birkhahn RH, Gaeta TJ, Tloczkowski J, Mundy TA, Sharma M, Bove JJ,
Briggs WM, 2003. Emergency medicine trained physicians are proficient in
the insertion of transvenous pacemakers. Annals of Emergency Medicine.
43 (4), 469-474. PMID: 15039689.
3.1. Talks (I am years behind updating these).
(1) Briggs, 2016. The Crisis Of Evidence: Probability & The Nature Of Cause.
Institute of Statistical Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
(2) Wei Li,Piotr Gorecki, Robert Autin, William Briggs, Elie Semaan, Anthony
J. Tortolani, Marcus D’Ayala, 2011. Concurrent Prophylactic Placement of
12
Inferior Vena Cava Filter (CPPOIVCF) in Gastric Bypass and Adjustable

Banding Operations: An analysis of the Bariatric Outcomes Longitudinal
Database. Eastern Vascular Society 25th Annual Meeting, 2011.
(3) Wei Li, Jo Daniel, James Rucinski, Syed Gardezi, Piotr Gorecki, Paul
Thodiyil, Bashar Fahoum, William Briggs, Leslie Wise, 2010. FACSFactors
a↵ecting patient disposition after ambulatory laparoscopic cholecystectomy
(ALC) cheanalysis of the National Survey of Ambulatory Surgery (NSAS).
American College of Surgeons.
(4) Wei Li, Marcus D’Ayala, et al., William Briggs, 2010. Coronary bypass and
carotid endarterectomy (CEA): does a combined operative approach o↵er
better outcome? - Outcome of di↵erent management strategies in patients
with carotid stenosis undergoing coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG).
Vascular Annual Meeting.
(5) Briggs, WM, 2007. On equi-probable priors, MAX ENT 2007, Saratoga
Springs, NY.
(6) Briggs, WM, and RA Zaretzki, 2006. On producing probability forecasts
(from ensembles). 18th Conf. on Probability and Statistics in the Atmo-
spheric Sciences, Atlanta, GA, Amer. Meteor. Soc.
(7) Briggs, WM, and RA Zaretzki, 2006. Improvements on the ROC Curve:
Skill Plots for Forecast Evaluation. Invited. Joint Research Conference on
Statistics in Quality Industry and Technology, Knoxville, TN.
(8) Briggs, WM, and RA Zaretzki, 2005. Skill Curves and ROC Curves for
Diagnoses, or Why Skill Curves are More Fun. Joint Statistical Meetings,
American Stat. Soc., Minneapolis, MN.
(9) Briggs W.M., 2005. On the optimal combination of probabilistic forecasts
to maximize skill. International Symposium on Forecasting San Antonio,
TX. International Institute of Forecasters.
(10) Briggs, WM, and D Ruppert, 2004. Assessing the skill of yes/no forecasts
for Markov observations. 17th Conf. on Probability and Statistics in the
Atmospheric Sciences, Seattle, WA, Amer. Meteor. Soc.
(11) Melniker, L, E Liebner, B Ti↵any, P Lopez, WM Briggs, M McKenney,
2004. Randomized clinical trial of point-of-care limited ultrasonography
(PLUS) for trauma in the emergency department. Annals of Emergency
Medicine, 44.
(12) Birkhahn RH, Gaeta TJ, Van Deusen SK, Briggs WM, 2004. Classifying
patients suspected of appendicitis with regard to likelihood. Annals of
Emergency Medicine, 44 (4): S17-S17 51 Suppl. S.
(13) Zandieh, SO, WM Briggs, JM Kuder, and CA Mancuso, 2004. Negative
perceptions of health care among caregivers of children auto-assigned to
a Medicaid managed care health plan. Ambulatory Pediatric Association
Meeting, San Francisco, CA; and National Research Service Award Trainees
Conference, San Diego, CA.
(14) Melniker, L, E Liebner, B Ti↵any, P Lopez, M Sharma, WM Briggs, M
McKenney, 2003. Cost Analysis of Point-of-care, Limited Ultrasonogra-
phy (PLUS) in Trauma Patients: The Sonography Outcomes Assessment
Program (SOAP)-1 Trial. Academic Emergency Medicine, 11, 568.
13
(15) Melniker, LA, WM Briggs, and CA Mancuso, 2003. Including comorbid-

ity in the assessment of trauma patients: a revision of the trauma injury
severity score. J. Clin Epidemiology, Sep., 56(9), 921. PMID: 14505784.
(16) Briggs, WM, and RA Levine, 1998. Comparison of forecasts using the
bootstrap. 14th Conf. on Probability and Statistics in the Atmospheric
Sciences Phoenix, AZ, Amer. Meteor. Soc., 1-4.
(17) Briggs, WM, and R Zaretzki, 1998. The e↵ect of randomly spaced observa-
tions on field forecast error scores. 14th Conf. on Probability and Statistics
in the Atmospheric Sciences Phoenix, AZ, Amer. Meteor. Soc., 5-8.
(18) Briggs, WM, and RA Levine, 1996. Wavelets and image comparison: new
approaches to field forecast verification. 13th Conf. on Probability and
Statistics in the Atmospheric Sciences, San Francisco, CA, Amer. Meteor.
Soc., 274-277.
(19) Briggs, WM, and DS Wilks, 1996. Modifying parameters of a daily stochas-
tic weather generator using long-range forecasts. 13th Conf. on Probability
and Statistics in the Atmospheric Sciences, San Francisco, CA, Amer. Me-
teor. Soc., 243-2246.
Exh. 2
DECLARATION OF
I, , hereby state the following:
1.
2. I am an adult of sound mine. All statements in this declaration are based

on my personal knowledge and are true and correct.
3. I am making this statement voluntarily and on my own initiative. I have

not been promised, nor do I expect to receive, anything in exchange for my
testimony and giving this statement. I have no expectation of any profit
or reward and understand that there are those who may seek to harm me
for what I say in this statement. I have not participated in any political
process in the United States, have not supported any candidate for office
in the United States, am not legally permitted to vote in the United
States, and have never attempted to vote in the United States.
4. I want to alert the public and let the world know the truth about the
corruption, manipulation, and lies being committed by a conspiracy of
people and companies intent upon betraying the honest people of the
United States and their legally constituted institutions and fundamental
rights as citizens. This conspiracy began more than a decade ago in
Venezuela and has spread to countries all over the world. It is a conspiracy
to wrongfully gain and keep power and wealth. It involves political
leaders, powerful companies, and other persons whose purpose is to gain
and keep power by changing the free will of the people and subverting the
proper course of governing.
5.
Over the course of my career, I
specialized in the marines
6. Due to my training in special operations and my extensive military and

academic formations, I was selected for the national security guard detail
of the President of Venezuela.
sophisticated electronic voting system that permitted the leaders of the

Venezuelan government to manipulate the tabulation of votes for national
and local elections and select the winner of those elections in order to gain
and maintain their power.
10. Importantly, I was a direct witness to the creation and operation of an

electronic voting system in a conspiracy between a company known as
Smartmatic and the leaders of conspiracy with the Venezuelan
government. This conspiracy specifically involved President Hugo Chavez
Frias, the person in charge of the National Electoral Council named Jorge
Rodriguez, and principals, representatives, and personnel from
Smartmatic which included . The
purpose of this conspiracy was to create and operate a voting system that
could change the votes in elections from votes against persons running
the Venezuelan government to votes in their favor in order to maintain
control of the government.
11. In mid-February of 2009, there was a national referendum to change the

Constitution of Venezuela to end term limits for elected officials, including
the President of Venezuela. The referendum passed. This permitted Hugo
Chavez to be re-elected an unlimited number of times.
12. After passage of the referendum, President Chavez instructed me to make

arrangements for him to meet with Jorge Rodriguez, then President of the
National Electoral Council, and three executives from Smartmatic.
Among the three Smartmatic representatives were
President Chavez had multiple meetings with Rodriguez

and the Smartmatic team at which I was present. In the first of four
meetings, Jorge Rodriguez promoted the idea to create software that
would manipulate elections. Chavez was very excited and made it clear
that he would provide whatever Smartmatic needed. He wanted them
immediately to create a voting system which would ensure that any time
anything was going to be voted on the voting system would guarantee
results that Chavez wanted. Chavez offered Smartmatic many
inducements, including large sums of money, for Smartmatic to create or
modify the voting system so that it would guarantee Chavez would win
every election cycle. Smartmatic eam ag eed to create such a system
and did so.
13. I arranged and attended three more meetings between President Chavez
and the representatives from Smartmatic at which details of the new
voting system were discussed and agreed upon. For each of these
meetings, I communicated directly with on details of
where and when to meet, where the participants would be picked up and
delivered to the meetings, and what was to be accomplished. At these
meetings, the participants called their project the Chavez revolution.
From that point on, Chavez never lost any election. In fact, he was able
to ensure wins for himself, his party, Congress persons and mayors from
townships.
14. Smartmatic electoral technology was called Sistema de Gestión

Electoral (the Electoral Management System ). Smartmatic was a
transmission of voting data over the internet to a computerized central
tabulating center. The voting machines themselves had a digital display,
fingerprint recognition feature to identify the voter, and printed out the
voter ballot. The voter thumbprint was linked to a computerized record
of that voter iden i . Sma ma ic c ea ed and e a ed he en i e
system.
15. Chavez was most insistent that Smartmatic design the system in a way
that the system could change the vote of each voter without being
detected. He wanted the software itself to function in such a manner that
if the voter were to place their thumb print or fingerprint on a scanner,
then the thumbprint would be tied to a record of the voter name and
identity as having voted, but that voter would not tracked to the changed
vote. He made it clear that the system would have to be setup to not leave
any evidence of the changed vote for a specific voter and that there would
be no evidence to show and nothing to contradict that the name or the
fingerprint or thumb print was going with a changed vote. Smartmatic
agreed to create such a system and produced the software and hardware
that accomplished that result for President Chavez.
16. After the Smartmatic Electoral Management System was put in place, I
closely observed several elections where the results were manipulated
using Smartmatic software. One such election was in December 2006
when Chavez was running against Rosales. Chavez won with a landslide
over Manuel Rosales - a margin of nearly 6 million votes for Chavez versus
3.7 million for Rosales.
17. On April 14, 2013, I witnessed another Venezuelan national election in

which the Smartmatic Electoral Management System was used to
manipulate and change the results for the person to succeed Hugo Chávez
as President. In that election, Nicolás Maduro ran against Capriles

Radonsky.
Inside that location was a control room in which there were

multiple digital display screens TV screens for results of voting in each
state in Venezuela. The actual voting results were fed into that room and
onto the displays over an internet feed, which was connected to a
sophisticated computer system created by Smartmatic. People in that
room were able to see in eal ime hether the vote that came through
the electronic voting system was in their favor or against them. If one
looked at any particular screen, they could determine that the vote from
any specific area or as a national total was going against either candidate.
Persons controlling the vote tabulation computer had the ability to change
the reporting of votes by moving votes from one candidate to another by
using the Smartmatic software.
18. By two o'clock in the afternoon on that election day Capriles Radonsky
was ahead of Nicolás Maduro by two million votes. When Maduro and his
supporters realized the size of Radonsky s lead they were worried that
they were in a crisis mode and would lose the election. The Smartmatic
machines used for voting in each state were connected to the internet and
reported their information over the internet to the Caracas control center
in real-time. So, the decision was made to reset the entire system.
Maduro s and his supporters ordered the network controllers to take the
internet itself offline in practically all parts in Venezuela and to change
the results.
19. It took the voting system operators approximately two hours to make the
adjustments in the vote from Radonsky to Maduro. Then, when they
turned the internet back on and the on-line reporting was up and running
again, they checked each screen state by state to be certain where they
could see that each vote was changed in favor of Nicholas Maduro. At that
moment the Smartmatic system changed votes that were for Capriles
Radonsky to Maduro. By the time the system operators finish, they had
achieved a convincing, but narrow victory of 200,000 votes for Maduro.
20. After Smartmatic created the voting system President Chavez wanted, he
exported the software and system all over Latin America. It was sent to
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile countries that were
in alliance with President Chavez. This was a group of leaders who
wanted to be able to guarantee they maintained power in their countries.
When Chavez died, Smartmatic was in a position of being the only
company that could guarantee results in Venezuelan elections for the

party in power.
21. I want to point out that the software and fundamental design of the
electronic electoral system and software of Dominion and other election
tabulating companies relies upon software that is a descendant of the
Smartmatic Electoral Management System. In short, the Smartmatic
software is in the DNA of every vote tabulating company software and
system.
22. Dominion is one of three major companies that tabulates votes in the
United States. Dominion uses the same methods and fundamentally same
software design for the storage, transfer and computation of voter
identification data and voting data. Dominion and Smartmatic did
business together. The software, hardware and system have the same
fundamental flaws which allow multiple opportunities to corrupt the data
and mask the process in a way that the average person cannot detect any
fraud or manipulation. The fact that the voting machine displays a voting
result that the voter intends and then prints out a paper ballot which
reflects that change does not matter. It is the software that counts the
digitized vote and reports the results. The software itself is the one that
changes the information electronically to the result that the operator of
the software and vote counting system intends to produce that counts.
That how it is done. So the software, the software itself configures the
vote and voting result -- changing the selection made by the voter. The
software decides the result regardless of what the voter votes.
23. All of the computer controlled voting tabulation is done in a closed

environment so that the voter and any observer cannot detect what is
taking place unless there is a malfunction or other event which causes the
observer to question the process. I saw first-hand that the manipulation
and changing of votes can be done in real-time at the secret counting
center which existed in Caracas, Venezuela. For me it was something
very surprising and disturbing. I was in awe because I had never been
present to actually see it occur and I saw it happen. So, I learned first-
hand that it doesn ma e ha he e decides or what the paper
ballot says. It he f a e e a and he f a e ha decide what
counts not the voter.
24. If one questions the reliability of my observations, they only have to read
the words of
a time period in
which Smartmatic had possession of all the votes and the voting, the votes
themselves and the voting information at their disposition in Venezuela.
he was assuring that the voting system implemented or used

by Smartmatic was completely secure, that it could not be compromised,
was not able to be altered.
25. But later, in 2017 when there were elections where Maduro was running
and elections for legislators in Venezuela, and Smartmatic broke
their secrecy pact with the government of Venezuela. He made a public
announcement through the media in which he stated that all the
Smartmatic voting machines used during those elections were totally
manipulated and they were manipulated by the electoral council of
Venezuela back then. stated that all of the votes for Nicholas
Maduro and the other persons running for the legislature were
manipulated and they actually had lost. So I think that's the greatest
proof that the fraud can be carried out and will be denied by the software
company that admitted publicly that Smartmatic had created,
used and still uses vote counting software that can be manipulated or
altered.
26. I am alarmed because of what is occurring in plain sight during this 2020
election for President of the United States. The circumstances and events
are eerily reminiscent of what happened with Smartmatic software
electronically changing votes in the 2013 presidential election in
Venezuela. What happened in the United States was that the vote
counting was abruptly stopped in five states using Dominion software. At
the time that vote counting was stopped, Donald Trump was significantly
ahead in the votes. Then during the wee hours of the morning, when there
was no voting occurring and the vote count reporting was off-line,
something significantly changed. When the vote reporting resumed the
very next morning there was a very pronounced change in voting in favor
of the opposing candidate, Joe Biden.
27. I have worked in gathering

information, researching, and working with information technology.
That's what I know how to do and the special knowledge that I have. Due
to these recent election events, I contacted a number of reliable and
intelligent ex-co-workers of mine that are still informants and work with
the intelligence community. I asked for them to give me information that
was up-to-date information in as far as how all these businesses are
acting, what actions they are taking.
Exh. 3
Exh. 4
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From: Samantha Whitley <cgganalyst2@gmail.com>

Sent: Wednesday, October 7, 2020 9:11 AM
To: elections@lowndescounty.com; elections@lumpkincounty.gov; tdean@mcelections.us; Marion
County Elections & Registrations <marioncountyelect@gmail.com>; Phyllis Wheeler
<Phyllis.Wheeler3@thomson mcduffie.net>; Doll Gale <egale@darientel.net>; Patty Threadgill
<p.threadgill@meriwethercountyga.gov>; Jerry C <registrars@millercountyga.com>; Terry Ross
<tross@mitchellcountyga.net>; Kaye Warren <kwarren@monroecoga.org>; rmoxsand@hotmail.com;
Jennifer Doran <jdoran@morgancountyga.gov>; vote@murraycountyga.gov; Nancy Boren
<nboren@columbusga.org>; Angela Mantle <amantle@co.newton.ga.us>; Fran Leathers
<fleathers@oconee.ga.us>; Steve McCannon <smccannon@oglethorpecountyga.gov>; Deidre Holden
<deidre.holden@paulding.gov>; Adrienne Ray <adrienne ray@peachcounty.net>; Julie Roberts
<jroberts@pickenscountyga.gov>; Leah Williamson <leah.williamson@piercecountyga.gov>; Sandi
Chamblin <schamblin@pikecoga.com>; Lee Ann George <lgeorge@polkga.org>; quit.judge@gqc ga.org;
twhitmire@rabuncounty.ga.gov; Todd Black <rcc.boe@gmail.com>; Lynn Bailey
<lbailey@augustaga.gov>; cynthia.welch@rockdalecountyga.gov; Schley Registrars
<registrars_schley@yahoo.com>
Subject: Followup new unsealed documents and response to Harvey bulletin
Case
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, “Be Wary of False and Misleading

Information re: ICX Update”
Fact
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will
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OFFICIAL ELECTION BULLETIN
TO: County Election Officials and County Registrars
FROM: Chris Harvey, Elections Division Director
RE: Be Wary of False and Misleading Information re: ICX Update
de minimis
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initial
de minimis
1
You probably remember that the EAC was without a quorum for two years, and therefore unable to take any
action.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,

Pa ,
DECLARATION OF
. J. ALEX HALDERMAN
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL.,

D a . C A N . 1:17-CV-2989-AT
P r an o 28 U.S.C. 1746, J. ALEX HALDERMAN declare nder
penal of perj r ha he follo ing i r e and correc :
1. I hereb incorpora e m pre io declara ion a if f ll a ed herein.
I ha e per onal kno ledge of he fac in hi declara ion and, if called o e if a
a i ne , I o ld e if nder oa h o he e fac .
2. I ha e re ie ed he Le er Repor prepared b Pro V&V concerning
er ion 5.5.10.32 of he Dominion BMD of are (Dk . No. 939). The repor make
clear ha Pro V&V performed onl c r or e ing of hi ne of are. The
compan did no a emp o independen l erif he ca e of he ballo di pla
problem, nor did i adeq a el erif ha he change are an effec i e ol ion. Pro
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V&V al o appear o ha e made no effor o e he her he change crea e ne
problem ha impac he reliabili , acc rac , or ec ri of he BMD em.
3. Thi perficial e ing i deepl concerning, beca e Pro V&V
charac eri a ion of he o rce code change indica e ha he are con iderabl more
complica ed han ha Dr. Coomer pre io l e ified a he hre hold for
con idering a change o be de minimi : li erall a one-line config ra ion change
in ome config file ha o ld ha e no ma erial impac on he em (Dk . No. 905
a 102:18-103:14). In ead, Pro V&V ae ha Dominion made o kind of
change and modified line in fi e differen o rce code file . In general, change
ha affec more line of o rce code or more o rce code file are ri kier han maller
change, a here i a grea er likelihood ha he ill ha e nin ended ide-effec .
Change o o rce code file , a Dominion made here, al o end o be ri kier han
change o config[ ra ion] file .
4. The na re of he change gi e me f r her rea on for concern.
According o Pro V&V, one change in ol ed changing a ariable declara ion o
modif he pe of a ariable. A ariable pe de ermine bo h ha kind of da a
i hold and ho opera ion on i f nc ion. Al ho gh changing a ariable declara ion
of en in ol e difference in onl one line of o rce code, he effec i a change o
ho he program opera e e er here he ariable i ed, hich co ld in ol e
2
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man par of he o rce code and pan m l iple file . For hi rea on, changing a
ariable pe freq en l in rod ce ne b g ha are diffic l o de ec . I ha e
of en e perienced ch problem hile ri ing of are m elf.
5. I i no po ible o e al a e he effec of ch a change b anal ing
onl he line of o rce code ha ha e been modified. Ye Pro V&V de crip ion
of i o rce code re ie i con i en i h ha ing done no hing more. The
compan co ld ha e engaged an e per in he pecific programming lang age o
anal e he q ali of he change and look for b le ide-effec hro gho he
code, b i appear ha he did no .
6. In ead, he repor ae ha Pro V&V cond c ed f nc ional
regre ion e ing. Regre ion e ing ha a ell-defined meaning in comp er
cience: checking ha a change o a em doe no break i e i ing f nc ionali .
Af er a change o a o ing em like hi , rigoro regre ion e ing i e en ial
for en ring ha he em reliabili , acc rac , and ec ri are no degraded.
Ye he e ing Pro V&V de cribe performing i no regre ion e ing a all.
In ead, he compan foc ed en irel on checking he her he ballo di pla
problem a fi ed and make no men ion of e ing an o her f nc ionali
ha oe er.
3
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7. E en for hi limi ed p rpo e, Pro V&V e ing me hodolog i
inadeq a e. The fir ried o ob er e he error hile ing he c rren er ion of
he BMD of are, 5.5.10.30. The managed o rigger i ing an ar ificial e
ballo b failed o reprod ce i ing he real ballo de ign from Do gla Co n
( here he problem a ob er ed d ring L&A e ing) e en af er 400 a emp .1
The hen performed he ame check ing he 5.5.10.32 of are. Pro V&V ba i
for concl ding ha he ne of are correc he problem i ha he ere nable
o rigger he error i h ei her ballo af er 400 rie . Ye hi ignore he ob io
po ibili ha he error migh impl be el ding hem, a i did i h he Do gla
Co n ballo nder er ion 5.5.10.30.
8. Tha i he f ll e en of he e ing de cribed in Pro V&V repor .
The did no e ha he o her f nc ionali ie of he machine are no impac ed b
he change. The did no e ha he BMD elec ed and prin ed re l acc ra el ,
nor did he e ha ec ri a naffec ed. Te onl an er he q e ion o
a k. Here regardle of ha Pro V&V in ended he onl q e ion a ked ere:
I he a ed error ob er ed hen ing he old of are? and I he a ed error
ob er ed hen ing he ne of are? The did no a k, I Dominion correc
1
I i c rio ha Pro V&V a nable o reprod ce he problem e perienced in
Do gla Co n , b he appear no o ha e made an effor o in e iga e hi .
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abo he ca e of he problem? The did no a k, Doe hi change ab ol el and
comple el fi he i e? Mo impor an l , he ne er a ked or an ered he ke
q e ion for de ermining he her he change i de minimi , Will he e
modifica ion ha e an impac on he re of he o ing em f nc ionali ?
9. E en if he change doe correc he b g i ho in rod cing ne
problem , i ill repre en a ignifican ec ri ri k, beca e of he po ibili ha
a acker co ld hijack he replacemen of are o pread mal are o Georgia
BMD .
10. Defendan a he ill g ard again hi ing ha h compari on , b
he ha h compari on proce he ha e de cribed i inadeq a e in e eral a .2 A
I ha e pre io l e plained, e amining he ha h ha he BMD di pla on creen
pro ide no ec ri , beca e mal are on he BMD co ld be programmed o
calc la e and di pla he e pec ed ha h. Al ho gh he S a e no a i ill perform
ome accep ance e ing a a cen ral facili , ch e ing ha limi ed al e a be .
E en if performed correc l b ec rel comp ing he ha h of he of are ing
a de ice ha i a redl no affec ed b mal are accep ance e ing can onl
2
The Pro V&V repor li he ha h of a file named ICX.i o, hich pre mabl
con ain he APK a ell a o her file . Wi ho acce o he ICX.i o file, I canno
confirm he her ha he of are p rpor edl being in alled on he BMD i he
ame a he of are Pro V&V b il and e ed.
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confirm ha he ne of are a no modified be een Pro V&V and he e
facili . I doe no en re ha he ne of are ac all ma che Dominion o rce
code or ha i ill no be modified d ring la er di rib ion o co n ie or in alla ion
on he en of ho and of BMD a e ide.
11. The repor men ion ha Pro V&V performed a r ed b ild of he
ne of are. Thi refer o he proce b hich Pro V&V compiled he o rce
code o prod ce he APK file for di rib ion and in alla ion hro gho Georgia.
The re l of compiling o rce code, of en called a of are binar , i in a non-
h man readable forma , and i i no po ible in general o confirm ha a binar
fai hf ll ma che o rce code from hich i a p rpor edl compiled. A a re l ,
if Pro V&V ere o modif he BMD of are o in rod ce malicio
f nc ionali or if a acker ho infil ra ed heir em ere o do o3 here
3
No abl , Pro V&V eb i e (h p:// .pro and .com/) doe no ppor
HTTPS encr p ion, and modern eb bro er arn er ha i i no ec re, a
ho n belo . In m e perience, organi a ion ha fail o ppor HTTPS are
likel o be ignoring o her ec ri be prac ice oo, hich increa e he
likelihood of a acker cce f ll infil ra ing heir em .
C A Not secure I ~rovandv.com
Company Services Facilities
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o ld be no readil a ailable a for he S a e or Dominion o de ec he change.
The S a e elec ion ec ri e per hem el e ha e empha i ed he ri k of elec ion
manip la ion b o-called in ider .
12. Defendan a e ha Pro V&V ha bmi ed he repor o he EAC o
eek appro al for a de minimi change. The EAC de minimi of are change
proce a in rod ced le han a ear ago, and, a far a I am a are, i ha onl
been in oked on one or o occa ion o far. In m opinion, he EAC canno make
an informed de ermina ion a o he her he ne Dominion of are mee he de
minimi andard ba ed on he informa ion con ained in Pro V&V repor , and I
incerel hope he agenc demand more rigoro e ing before allo ing he
of are o be ed nder i cer ifica ion g ideline .
I declare nder penal of he perj r la of he S a e of Georgia and he
Uni ed S a e ha he foregoing i r e and correc and ha hi declara ion a
e ec ed hi 3rd da of Oc ober, 2020 in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
J. ALEX HALDERMAN
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1“Testing and Certification Program Manual,” Section 3.4.2, available at: https://
www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Cert_Manual_7_8_15_FINAL.pdf
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2“Regression Testing”, Wikipedia, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Regression_testing
3 “Testing and Certification Program Manual,” Section 3.4.3
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DECLARATION OF HARRI HURSTI
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, HARRI HURST! declares under penalty of
perjury that the following is true and correct:
1. This declaration supplements my prior declarations (Docs. 680-1,
800-2, 809-3, 860-1, 877, and 923-2) and I stand by the statements in those
declarations.
2. I arrived at the Fulton County Election Preparation Center ("EPC") on
October 1, 2020 around 3 :45pm. I was there in my capacity as an expert engaged by
the Coalition Plaintiffs to conduct a Rule 34 inspection. (Exhibit 1) . I was
accompanied during part of my visit by Marilyn Marks of Coalition for Good
Governance.
3. My goal for this observation and inspection was to review the ongoing
updating of the Dominion software for Fulton County ballot marking device
("BMD") touchscreen units to ICX software version 5.5.10.32. It is my
understanding that Fulton has an inventory of over 3,300 BMD touchscreens, all of
which are to be updated with this software. A number of the machines were in the
EPC warehouse and were staged to be updated or marked after the update had been
completed.
4. Upon our arrival, Ms. Marks and I were informed by Derrick Gilstrap,
the manager of EPC, that all of the people working to upgrade the devices were
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Dominion technicians. Mr. Gilstrap stated that he did not feel comfortable
installing a last-minute software change, and did not want Fulton County staff to
be responsible for installing it. He told us that he told Dominion to conduct this
operation, prior to having his staff install the November 2020 election
programming and Logic and Accuracy testing ("LAT").
5. Mr. Gilstrap told us that after the software update step that LAT
would immediately begin, and made no mention of Acceptance Testing that should
occur prior to LAT.
6. Acceptance Testing is an almost universally mandated basic test of
the hardware and software when a change or repair to either has been made before
counties are permitted to install election programming and deploy voting system
components. Acceptance testing must be performed on each unit, and cannot be
performed on a sample basis. Fulton's failure to conduct such testing should be a
serious warning sign of further recklessness in the installation of inadequately
tested software.
7. Mr. Gilstrap stated that Dominion had started the software update
project with four workers, but soon realized that the task would take extended
periods of time. Mr. Gilstrap stated that Dominion had accordingly increased the
workforce to 14 and expected the installation work to be completed on Monday,
October 5.
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8. The new software was contained on USB sticks. However, there was
no inventory management present for the USB sticks. There also was no inventory
control for the technician authorization smartcards, which provide access to the
controls of the touchscreen. Workers did not sign or otherwise document when
they took possession or returned the technician cards and software upgrade USB
sticks. Those items were in an open plastic bag which was sometimes placed on
table, and sometimes carried around the working area by the manager. Anyone was
able to pick up a USB stick or drop them there freely, permitting the easy
substitution ofUSB sticks containing malware or to leave the premises with copies
of the software update.
9. Some workers worked one BMD touchscreen machine at the time,
while others simultaneously worked on 2 or 3 machines. There was no
accountability for how many sticks and technician smart-cards each worker had in
their possession. Clearly, the USB sticks were not considered to be security
sensitive items at all.
10. Some of the workers had instructions for software update visible in
their pockets, while others did not seem to have the instructions readily available.
One worker showed me the instructions, but it was different from the instructions I
had seen that were sent to the counties. None of the technicians that I observed
were following the instructions as they installed the new software.
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11. Technicians were not following a common process, and they all made
their own variations on the workflow. In my experience, this can negatively affect
the quality and reliability of the software installation. Many workers were texting
and making phone calls while working and not focusing on their work. As a result,
I observed repeated human errors such as skipping steps of the process.
12. Some workers consistently took an extra step to destroy previous
application data before uninstalling the old version of the software. Uninstalling
software packages results in destroying application data, but that is known to be
unreliable in old versions of Android. The step they took is ensuring, among other
things, destruction of forensic evidence of Fulton's use of the equipment in prior
elections.
13. To avoid destruction of all forensic evidence from the BMDs, a
number of images of the electronic data contained on the BMDs should be taken
from a sample of them before installation of the new software.
14. As part of the updating process, the workers are directed to enable the
"Install from Unknown Sources" setting. This is an insecure mode because it turns
off the operating system verification of trusted sources and therefore allows
software from any source to be installed. During the 45 minutes of my observation,
I observed that many units had been left in insecure mode. I estimate 15% of the
units were already in the insecure mode when the work began on them, having
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been left that way during the last software installations, or because of interim
tampering.
15. As described before, most workers I observed were not focusing on
the work they were tasked to do, and as result, they were accidentally skipping
steps. I observed that, as result of these human errors, the units were erroneously
left in the insecure mode either by the workers skipping the step to place the
machine into the secure mode after upgrade, or doing the step at such a fast pace
that the system did not register the touch to toggle the switch and the worker did
not stop to verify the action.
16. The State Defendants and Dominion have repeatedly overstated the
value of their hash test, but my observation showed that they themselves are not
relying on such test as a control measure. Dominion workers are not even
checking the hash value. I deliberately followed many workers when they
processed the units. During over 45 minutes of observation, none of the workers
took the step of verifying the hash value. Some workers did not realize that the
upgrade had failed and the mistake was only caught by persons who were closing
the cabinets when and if they looked at the software version numbers before
closing the doors.
17. I also observed random errors that were not caused by humans. For
example, software sometimes refused to uninstall because the uninstall button was
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disabled, or the installation silently failed. The technicians treated devices with
issues by simply rebooting them. Technicians made no effort to diagnose or
document the cause of the issues. The casual nature of dealing with the
irregularities caused me to conclude that these abnormal incidents are
commonplace.
18. Based on my observations of the software update, I would anticipate
that these machines are likely to behave inconsistently in the polling place,
depending on a number of factors including the care taken in the software
installation process.
19. The current abbreviated LAT protocol adopted by Fulton County and
the State cannot be relied on to identify problems created by the new software or
its installation (or other problems with programming and configuration unrelated to
the new software). Even if counties were conducting the full LAT required, it is
but one step that is needed, and is quite insufficient for ensuring the reliability of
the BMD touchscreens-which at the end of the day, simply cannot be done.
20. In my professional opinion, the methods and processes of adopting
and installing this software change is completely unacceptable. The methods and
processes adopted by Dominion and Fulton County do not meet national standards
for managing voting system technical problems and remedies, and should not be
accepted for use in a public election under any circumstances.
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21. It is important that full details of the software change made be
available for analysis and testing to determine the potential impact of the changes. I
concur with Dr. Halderman's opinion in Paragraph 8 of his September 28, 2020
declaration (Doc. 923-1 ), in which he states that if the problem is as limited as
described by Dominion, it could have been addressed with far less risk by the State
without making an uncertified, untested software change.
22. In my opinion, the installation of the last-minute software change adds
intolerable risk to the upcoming election, and the simple solution of removing the
BMD units from the process and adopting hand marked paper ballots is imperative.
23. I note that I wanted to document the upgrading process, but Mr.
Gilstrap told me that I was prohibited from taking photographs or video. I showed
him the Rule 34 inspection document and pointed out the paragraph permitting
photographing. He read that carefully but told me that he needed to clear that with
his superiors before I could start taking pictures. He never cleared this with his
superiors while we were there.
I declare under penalty of the perjury laws of the State of Georgia and
the United States that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration
was executed this 4 th day of October, 2020 in Atlanta, Georgia.
¢.. am urstl
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ATLANTA DIVISION
DONNA CURLING, et al.
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
v.
FILE NO. 1:17-cv-2989-AT
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, et al.,
Defendants.
STATE DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING

REDACTED VOTING SYSTEM TEST LABORATORY REPORT
Pursuant to the Court’s September 30, 2020 docket entry, and as
discussed in Defendants’ Notice of Filing Regarding the Court’s Request for
Documentation, [Doc. 929], State Defendants provide notice of filing a
redacted copy of the Voting System Test Laboratory Report, attached hereto
as Exhibit 1.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of October 2020,
/s/ Carey Miller

Vincent R. Russo
vrusso@robbinsfirm.com
Josh Belinfante
jbelinfante@robbinsfirm.com
Carey A. Miller
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cmiller@robbinsfirm.com
Alexander Denton
adenton@robbinsfirm.com
Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield LLC
500 14th Street, N.W.
Telephone: (678) 701-9381
Facsimile: (404) 856-3250
Bryan P. Tyson
btyson@taylorenglish.com
Bryan F. Jacoutot
bjacoutot@taylorenglish.com
Diane F. LaRoss
dlaross@taylorenglish.com
Loree Anne Paradise
lparadise@taylorenglish.com
TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA LLP
1600 Parkwood Circle, Suite 200
Atlanta, GA 30339
Telephone: 678-336-7249
Counsel for State Defendants
2
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to L.R. 7.1(D), the undersigned hereby certifies that the
foregoing STATE DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF FILING REDACTED
VOTING SYSTEM TEST LABORATORY REPORT has been prepared in
Century Schoolbook 13, a font and type selection approved by the Court in
L.R. 5.1(B).
/s/ Carey Miller

Carey Miller
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County,Candidacy1
CherieBurgess
Cristopher
Leon
Jay Landry AlfredFreeman
GarthCraft FreidaBuck
Aida Campbell CruzMendoza
TrinidadMcclure MicahLeblanc
ZelmaMcgee NicholePrince
SonyaJohns AlexisSykes
AllysonChan DonnellMaxwell
StevieSanders
CasandraHobbs JodyHoffman
RobbieCarson
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County• Cand·d
1 acy1
CherieBurgess
Jay Landry
GarthCraft
Aida Campbell
TrinidadMcclure
Zelma Mcgee
SonyaJohns
AllysonChan
SethTurner
CasandraHobbs
RobbieCarson
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Exh. 5
Exh. 6
1 INTRODUCTION
The p po e of hi Te Repo i o doc men he p oced e ha P o V&V, Inc. follo ed o
pe fo m ce ifica ion e ing of he Dominion Vo ing S em D-S i e 5.5-A Vo ing S em
Vo ing S em o he e i emen e fo h fo o ing em in he S a e of Geo gia Elec ion
S em Ce ifica ion P og am.
1.1 A
The S a e of Geo gia ha a nified o ing em he eb all fede al, a e, and co n elec ion
a e o e he ame o ing e ipmen . Beginning in 2020, he nified o ing em hall be an
op ical canning o ing em i h ballo ma king de ice .
The Geo gia Boa d of Elec ion , nde he a ho i g an ed o i b he Geo gia Elec ion Code,
ha he d o p om lga e le and eg la ion o ob ain nifo mi in he p ac ice and
p oced e of local elec ion official a ell a o en e he fai , legal, and o de l cond c of
p ima ie and elec ion . The Geo gia Boa d of Elec ion i o in e iga e f a d and i eg la i ie
in p ima ie and elec ion and epo iola ion fo p o ec ion. I can i e o de , af e he
comple ion of app op ia e p oceeding , di ec ing compliance i h he Geo gia Elec ion Code.
The Geo gia Sec e a of S a e i de igna ed a he Chief Elec ion Official and i a o il
a ked i h de eloping, p og aming, b ilding, and e ie ing ballo fo e b co n ie and
m nicipali ie on he nified o ing em in he a e. The Geo gia Elec ion Code p o ide
ha he Sec e a of S a e i o e amine and app o e an op ical canning o ing em and
ballo ma king de ice p io o hei e in he a e. Co n Boa d of Elec ion (CBE) ma
onl e an op ical canning o ing em and ballo ma king de ice ha ha e been app o ed
and ce ified and ha ma be con in o l e ie ed fo ongoing ce ifica ion, b he Sec e a
of S a e. The Sec e a of S a e ha a ho i o dece if o ing em . The Sec e a of S a e
ha p om lga ed le and eg la ion ha go e n he o ing em ce ifica ion p oce .
1.2 R
The doc men li ed belo ee ili ed in he de elopmen of hi Te Repo :
Elec ion A i ance Commi ion Te ing and Ce ifica ion P og am Man al, Ve ion 2.0
Elec ion A i ance Commi ion Vo ing S em Te Labo a o P og am Man al,
Ve ion 2.0
Elec ion A i ance Commi ion 2005 Vol n a Vo ing S em G ideline (VVSG)
Na ional Vol n a Labo a o Acc edi a ion P og am NIST Handbook 150, 2016
-
J l 2016
Na ional Vol n a Labo a o Acc edi a ion P og am NIST Handbook 150-22, 2008
-
P o V&V, Inc. Q ali A ance Man al, Re i ion 7.0
Uni ed S a e 107 h Cong e Help Ame ica Vo e Ac (HAVA) of 2002 (P blic La 107-
252), da ed Oc obe 2002
Dominion Vo ing S em D-S i e 5.5-ATechnical Da a Package
1.3 T A
The e m and abb e ia ion applicable o he de elopmen of hi Te Plan a e li ed
belo :
Ballo Ma king De ice
Comme cial Off-The-Shelf
EAC Elec ion A i ance Commi ion
EMS Elec ion Managemen S em
FCA F nc ional Config a ion A di
PCA Ph ical Config a ion A di
TDP Technical Da a Package
Vo ing S em Te Labo a o
2005 VVSG EAC 2005 Vol n a Vo ing S em G ideline
1.4 B
The S a e of Geo gia iden ified he Dominion Vo ing S em D-S i e 5.5-A Vo ing S em o
be e al a ed a pa of hi e campaign. Thi epo doc men he finding f om ha
e al a ion.
f nc ion , hich a e e en ial o he cond c of an elec ion in he S a e of Geo gia, ee
e al a ed.
The cope of hi e ing e en inco po a ed a fficien pec m of ph ical and f nc ional e
o e if ha he D-S i e 5.5-A Vo ing S em confo med o he S a e of Geo gia e i emen .
Specificall , he e ing e en had he follo ing goal :
En e p opo ed o ing em p o ide ppo fo all Geo gia elec ion managemen
e i emen (i.e. ballo de ign, e l epo ing, eco n , e c.).
Sim la e p e-elec ion, Elec ion Da , ab en ee, eco n , and po -elec ion ac i i ie on
he co e ponding componen of he p opo ed o ing em fo he e i ed elec ion
cena io .
2 TEST CANDIDATE
The D-S i e 5.5-A Vo ing S em i a pape -ba ed op ical can o ing em con i ing of he
follo ing majo componen : The Elec ion Managemen S em (EMS), he ImageCa Cen al
(ICC), he ImageCa P ecinc (ICP), and he ImageCa X (ICX) BMD. The D-S i e 5.5-A
Vo ing S em config a ion i a modifica ion f om he EAC app o ed D-S i e 5.0 em
config a ion. The D-S i e 5.5-A Vo ing S em ill be config ed i h he KNOWiNK
Pollpad hich ili e he eP l e Epoll da a managemen em, fo o e egi a ion p po e .
The follo ing able p o ide he of a e and ha d a e componen of he D-S i e 5.5-A Vo ing
S em ha e e e ed, iden ified i h e ion and model n mbe :
T 2-1 D-S 5.5-A V S
F /S H
D-S 5.5-A V S C
V M
S f a eA ca
EMS Elec ion E en De igne (EED) 5.5.12.1 ---
EMS Re l Tall and Repo ing (RTR) 5.5.12.1 ---
EMS Applica ion Se e 5.5.12.1 ---
EMS File S em Se ice (FSS) 5.5.12.1 ---
EMS A dio S dio (AS) 5.5.12.1 ---
EMS Da a Cen e Manage (DCM) 5.5.12.1 ---
EMS Elec ion Da a T an la o (EDT) 5.5.12.1 ---
ImageCa Vo e Ac i a ion (ICVA) 5.5.12.1 ---
T 2-1 D-S 5.5-A V S (c i ed)
F /S H
D-S 5.5-A V S C
V M
De ice Config a ion File (DCF) 5.4.01_20170521 ---
P P ace Sca e (PPS) a d Pe ea
ImageCa P ecinc (ICP) 5.5.3-0002 PCOS-320C
ICP Ballo Bo --- BOX-330A
EMS S a da d C fig a i
Dell Se e R640 --- R640
Dell P eci ion 3430 --- 3430
Dell Ne o k S i ch --- X10206P
EMS E e C fig a i
Dell P eci ion 3420 --- 3420
Dell Moni o --- P2419H
Dell Ne o k S i ch --- X1008
Ce a Sca De ce (CSD) C e
ImageCa Cen al 5.5.3.0002 ---
Canon DR-G1130 Scanne --- DR-G1130
Canon DR-M160II Scanne --- DR-M160II
Dell Op iple 3050AIO Comp e Windo 10 P o 3050AIO
ADA C a Ba Ma De ce
A al e 5.5.10.30 HID-21V
HP M402dne P in e --- M402dne
eP b S
KNOWiNK Poll Pad --- iPad Ai Re . 2
KNOWiNK eP l e Epoll Da a Managemen
--- ---
S em
2.1 T C
The follo ing i a b eakdo n of he D-S i e 5.5-A Vo ing S em componen and
config a ion fo he e e p:
S T P (D-S 5.5-A):
The em ill be config ed in he EMS S anda d config a ion i h an Adj dica ion
Wo k a ion. Thi pla fo m ill be ed o e all cena io a p o ided b he elec ion
a acce ible o ing a ion .
The KNOWiNK Epollbook ol ion con i ing of he Poll Pad and eP l e Epoll da a
managemen em, ill be e p and in e faced a e i ed i h he EMS S anda d
config a ion.
Dominion Vo ing S em i e pec ed o p o ide all p e io l iden ified of a e and
e ipmen nece a fo he e campaign along i h he ppo ing ma e ial li ed in ec ion
2.2. The S a e of Geo gia i p o iding he elec ion defini ion and ballo .
E T P (D-S 5.5-A):
The em ill be config ed in he EMS E p e config a ion. Thi pla fo m ill be ed o
e all cena io a p o ided b he elec ion defini ion.
The cen al office e p ill be an EMS E p e config a ion accompanied b bo h Canon DR-
G1130 and Canon DR-
a acce ible o ing a ion .
The KNOWiNK Epollbook ol ion con i ing of he Poll Pad and eP l e Epoll da a
managemen em, ill be e p and in e faced a e i ed i h he EMS S anda d
config a ion.
Dominion Vo ing S em p o ided all p e io l iden ified of a e and e ipmen nece a
fo he e campaign along i h he ppo ing ma e ial ,elec ion defini ion , and ballo
2.2 T S E /M
The follo ing ma e ial , if e i ed, ee pplied b Dominion Vo ing S em o facili a e
e ing:
USB Fla h D i e
Ballo Pape
Ma king De ice
Pe i ed ai can
Lin -f ee clo h
Cleaning pad and i op op l alcohol
Label
O he ma e ial and e ipmen a e i ed
3 TEST PROCESS AND RESULTS
The follo ing ec ion o line he e p oce ha a follo ed o e al a e he D-S i e 5.5-A
Vo ing S em nde he cope defined in Sec ion 1.5.
3.1 G I
All e ing a cond c ed nde he g idance of P o V&V b pe onnel e ified b P o V&V o
be alified o pe fo m he e ing. The e amina ion a pe fo med a he P o V&V, Inc. e
facili loca ed in C mming Re ea ch Pa k, H n ille, AL.
3.2 T I
P io o e ec ion of he e i ed e cena io , he em nde e nde en e ing
ini iali a ion o e abli h he ba eline fo e ing and en e ha he e ing candida e ma ched
he e pec ed e ing candida e and ha all e ipmen and pplie e e p e en .
The follo ing e e comple ed d ing he e ing ini iali a ion:
En e p ope em of e ipmen . Check connec ion , po e co d , ke , e c.
Check e ion n mbe of ( em) of a e and fi m a e on all componen .
Ve if he p e ence of onl he doc men ed COTS.
En e emo able media i clean
En e ba e ie a e f ll cha ged.
In pec pplie and e deck .
Re ain p oof of e ion n mbe .
3.3 S F
The o ing em a e al a ed again he e i emen e fo h fo o ing em b he
S a e of Geo gia. A Condi ion of Sa i fac ion Checkli a de eloped ba ed on each iden ified
e e i emen . Th o gho he e campaign, P o V&V e ec ed e , in pec ed e l an
da a and pe fo med echnical doc men a ion e ie o en e ha each applicable e i emen
a me . The Condi ion of Sa i fac ion Checkli i p e en ed in Sec ion 4 of hi e epo .
The S mma Finding f om each a ea of e al a ion a e p e en ed in he follo ing ec ion .
3.3.1 P C A (PCA) S
P io o e ini ia ion, he D-S i e 5.5-A Vo ing S em a bjec ed o a Ph ical
Config a ion A di (PCA) o ba eline he em and en e all i em nece a fo e ing e e
p e en . Thi p oce incl ded alida ing ha he ha d a e and of a e componen ecei ed
fo e ing ma ched ha d a e and of a e componen p opo ed and demon a ed o he S a e
d ing he RFP p oce . Thi p oce al o incl ded alida ing ha he bmi ed componen
ma ched he of a e and ha d a e componen hich ha e ob ained EAC ce ifica ion o he
Vol n a Vo ing S em G ideline (VVSG) S anda d 1.0, b compa ing he bmi ed
componen o he p bli hed EAC Te Repo . The em a hen e p a de igna ed b he
man fac e pplied Technical Doc men a ion Package (TDP).
Pho og aph of he em componen , a config ed fo e ing, a e p e en ed belo :
P 1: EMS E C
P 2: EMS S C
P 6: P
A p e-ce ifica ion elec ion a hen loaded and an Ope a ional S a Check a pe fo med o
e if a i fac o em ope a ion. The Ope a ional S a Check con i ed of p oce ing
ballo and e if ing he e l ob ained again kno n e pec ed e l f om p e-de e mined
ma king pa e n .
S mma Finding
D ing e ec ion of he e p oced e, he componen of he D-S i e 5.5-A em e e
doc men ed b componen name, model, e ial n mbe , majo componen , and an o he
ele an info ma ion needed o iden if he componen . Fo COTS e ipmen , e e effo a
made o e if ha he COTS e ipmen had no been modified fo e. Addi ionall , he
Ope a ional S a Check a cce f ll comple ed i h all ac al e l ob ained d ing e
e ec ion ma ching he e pec ed e l .
3.3.2 S L T
S em Le el Te ing incl ded he F nc ional Config a ion A di (FCA), he Acc ac Te ,
he Vol me and S e Te , and he S em In eg a ion Te . Thi e ing incl ded all
p op ie a componen and COTS componen ( of a e, ha d a e, and pe iphe al ).
D ing S em Le el Te ing, he em a config ed e ac l a i o ld fo no mal field e
pe he man fac e . Thi incl ded connec ing he ppo ing e ipmen and pe iphe al .
3.3.2.1 F C A (FCA)
The F nc ional Config a ion A di (FCA) encompa ed an e amina ion of he em o he
e i emen e fo h b he S a e of Geo gia Elec ion S em Ce ifica ion P og am a
de igned in he Te Plan, and hich a e incl ded in hi epo in he Condi ion of Sa i fac ion
Checkli .
S mma Finding
The D-S i e 5.5-A em cce f ll pa ed he FCA Te i ho an no ed i e . The
indi id al e ing e i emen and hei e l can be een in he incl ded Condi ion of
Sa i fac ion Checkli .
3.3.2.2 A T
The Acc ac Te en ed ha each componen of he o ing em co ld p oce a lea
1,549,703 con ec i e ballo po i ion co ec l i hin he allo able a ge e o a e. The
ida e
ab ence of a elec ion. The e i ed acc ac i defined a
S mma Finding
The D-S i e 5.5-A em cce f ll pa ed he Acc ac Te . I a no ed d ing e
pe fo mance ha he ICP nde e e pe ienced a memo lock p af e canning app o ima el
4500 ballo . The i e a p e en ed o Dominion fo e ol ion. Dominion p o ided he
follo ing anal i of he i e:
The ICP Cli e ai g e d e ha e a e a age e i (MMU) a d, a
ch, i ca be ce ible e f ag e a i . The e all ca i e ice i hi he
ICP a lica i a e de ig ed i i i e he effec f e f ag e a i . H e e , if he
ICP ca a la ge be f ball ( e 4000), i h a e c cle, i ca e e ie ce a
i ai he e he all ca i f a la ge a f e ca fail a he O e a i g S e
le el d e e f ag e a i ac he RAM. Thi i a i d ce a e e age
he ICP hich e i e he P ll W ke e c cle he i , a d c e ed. O ce
e a ed, he ICP ca c i e ce i g ball ih i e. All ball ca ed a d c ed
i he e c cle a e ill e ai ed b he i ; he e i l i da a.
P o V&V pe fo med a po e c cle, a in c ed b Dominion, and e ified ha he i e a
e ol ed and ha he o al ballo co n a co ec . Scanning hen e med i h no addi ional
i e no ed.
A o al of 1,569,640 o ing po i ion e e p oce ed on he em i h all ac al e l
e ified again he e pec ed e l . The indi id al e ing e i emen and hei e l can be
een in he incl ded Condi ion of Sa i fac ion Checkli .
3.3.2.3 V S T
The Vol me & S e Te abili o mee
he e i emen limi and condi ion e fo h b he S a e of Geo gia Elec ion S em
Ce ifica ion P og am a de igned in he Te Plan, and hich a e incl ded in hi epo in he
Condi ion of Sa i fac ion Checkli .
S mma Finding
The D-S i e 5.5-A em cce f ll pa ed he Vol me and S e Te i ho an no ed
i e . The indi id al e ing e i emen and hei e l can be een in he incl ded
3.3.2.4 S I T
S em In eg a ion i a em le el e ha e al a e he in eg a ed ope a ion of bo h ha d a e
and of a e. S em In eg a ion e he compa ibili of he o ing em of a e
componen , o b em , i h one ano he and i h o he componen of he o ing em
en i onmen . Thi f nc ional e e al a e he in eg a ion of he o ing em of a e i h he
emainde of he em.
D ing e pe fo mance, he em a config ed a i o ld be fo no mal field e, i h a
ne elec ion c ea ed on he EMS and p oce ed h o gh he em componen o final e l .
S mma Finding
The D-S i e 5.5-A em cce f ll pa ed he S em In eg a ion Te i ho an no ed
i e . The indi id al e ing e i emen and hei e l can be een in he incl ded
Condi ion of Sa i fac ion Checkli .
3.3.3 -P T
The ePolllbook Te e al a ed he abili of he de igna ed ePollbook o p od ced oe
ac i a ion ca d ha co ld be cce f ll p oce ed b he BMD.
S mma Finding
The D-S i e 5.5-A em cce f ll pa ed he ePollbook Te i ho an no ed i e . The
indi id al e ing e i emen and hei e l can be een in he incl ded Condi ion of
Sa i fac ion Checkli .
3.3.4 B C T
The Ballo Cop Te e al a ed he abili of a pho ocop of a ballo p od ced b he em o
be cce f ll p oce ed b he ab la o .
S mma Finding
The D-S i e 5.5-A em cce f ll pa ed he Ballo Cop Te i ho an no ed i e .
The indi id al e ing e i emen and hei e l can be een in he incl ded Condi ion of
3.3.5 T B S H D
A e campaign concl ion, HASH igna e and of a e in alla ion packe of he e ed
of a e e e gene a ed fo deli e o he S a e of Geo gia.
4 C S
The o ing em a e al a ed again he e i emen e fo h fo o ing em b he
EAC 2005 VVSG and he S a e of Geo gia. Th o gho hi e campaign, P o V&V e ec ed
e , in pec ed e l an da a and pe fo med echnical doc men a ion e ie o en e ha each
applicable e i emen a me . The Condi ion of Sa i fac ion Checkli de eloped fo hi e
campaign i p e en ed in Table 4-1.
T 4-1 C S C
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
Single FCA Te Elec ion da aba e( ) con aining
FCA Rep blican and Democ a ic P ima ie (Open P ima ) PASS
and one Non-Pa i an elec ion
FCA Da aba e i being b il fo a ingle co n j i dic ion PASS
Rep blican P ima = 5 Race (1 a e ide, 2
FCA PASS
co n ide, 3 co n di ic le el)
Democ a ic P ima = 5 Race (1 a e ide, 1
FCA co n ide, 1 a e di ic le el, 2 co n di ic PASS
le el)
FCA Non-Pa i an Elec ion = 1 Race (1 a e ide) PASS
Rep blican and Democ a ic ace con ain 1 o 8
FCA PASS
T 4-1 C S C (c i ed)
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
FCA Non-Pa i an ace con ain 4 candida e and 1 i e-in PASS
FCA All ace a e Vo e fo One PASS
Co n con ain 5 P ecinc , fo e l epo ing
FCA PASS
p po e
Each p ecinc i pli a bo h a e di ic and co n
FCA PASS
di ic le el
Elec ion Da Vo ing [4 o al], 1 Vo e Cen e
FCA PASS
con aining 2 p ecinc
Elec ion Da Vo ing [4 o al], 3 Polling Loca ion
FCA PASS
con aining 1 p ecinc each
Ad ance Vo ing [2 o al], Each polling loca ion
FCA PASS
ho e all 5 P ecinc
FCA PASS
Vo ing Polling loca ion
P epa e elec ion media f
FCA PASS
ion Da Polling loca ion
FCA (Cen al Scan De ice ) em fo p oce ing of mail- PASS
o ab en ee ballo and p o i ional ballo
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
P epa e elec ion med
FCA fo p oce ing Ad ance Vo ing ballo gene a ed b PASS
BMD
FCA fo p oce ing Elec ion Da ballo gene a ed b PASS
BMD
P od ce a e ma ked Sample ballo fo p blic
FCA PASS
di ib ion
P epa e a e deck (Deck 1) of o ed ballo iha
kno n e l ing all a ailable o e po i ion on all
FCA PASS
ballo le gene a ed b he e cena io, incl ding
i e-in , o e o e , nde o e , and blank ballo .
P epa e an Ab en ee e deck (Deck 2) of o ed
ab en ee ballo i h a kno n e l , o be ed on he
FCA PASS
CSD, incl ding i e-in , o e o ed ace , and blank
ballo .
Vo e e deck (Deck 1) on each BMD and p in BMD
FCA PASS
ballo fo each ballo in he e deck
FCA PASS
Scan he Ab en ee e deck (Deck 2) on he CSD and
confi m he CSD epa a e ballo b a io
FCA PASS
condi ion fo ph ical e ie hen canning (i.e..
O e o e , blank ballo , i e-in , e c.)
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
FCA PASS
ab la ed and e if hem again e deck
P epa e p in o f om CSD doc men ing e l PASS
FCA
ab la e and e if hem again e deck
FCA PASS
P epa e p in o f om CSD doc men ing e l PASS
FCA ab la ed and e if hem again Ab en ee e deck
(Deck 2)
Upload o EMS he elec ion media ed in PPS and PASS
FCA
CSD de ice
P epa e p in o f om EMS doc men ing he e l PASS
FCA
ab la ed and e if hem again e deck con en
P epa e p in o doc men ing e l a a io PASS
FCA
epo ing le el :
P epa e p in o doc men ing e l a a io PASS
FCA
epo ing le el : P ecinc
P epa e p in o doc men ing e l a a io
FCA PASS
epo ing le el : Polling Place
P epa e p in o doc men ing e l a a io
FCA PASS
epo ing le el : o e T pe
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
Acc ac Gene al elec ion PASS
Acc ac 21 Con e in elec ion PASS
Acc ac 2 Col mn Ballo PASS
Acc ac 5 P ecinc PASS
Acc ac Elec ion i p od ced a Co n Le el PASS
Acc ac No Co n ing G o p PASS
Acc ac Inc mbenc i ppo ed PASS
Acc ac No S aigh Pa Vo ing PASS
Non-Pa i an con e onl (Candida e a e no PASS
Acc ac di ec l linked o pa ie , b a e labeled b pa on
he ballo )
Pa ie (fo labeling p po e ): PASS
o Democ a ic
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
Acc ac W i e-In p e en in all ace PASS
Acc ac P opo ed S a e Wide Refe end m PASS
Acc ac Ad ance Vo ing (Ea l Vo ing) PASS
Acc ac Elec ion fo J dge a e Non-Pa i an PASS
N of M Vo ing
Acc ac o Te N of M 6 of 8 PASS
o Te N of M 8 of 10
1000 Ballo p in ed f om BMD ing 3 ni a
Acc ac follo (Uni 1: 250 ballo , ni 2: 250 ballo , ni 3: PASS
500 ballo )
R n he Acc ac Te Elec ion on BMD & Ve if PASS
Acc ac
e l again kno n e pec ed e l
R n he Acc ac Te Elec ion on PPS & Ve if PASS
Acc ac
R n he Acc ac Te Elec ion on CSD & Ve if PASS
Acc ac
Repo ing: PASS
Acc ac
Winne : Con e epo e ie
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
Elec ion Nigh Repo ing: E po Elec ion Nigh PASS
Acc ac Re l in he follo ing fo ma :
o Common Da a Fo ma (CDF)
Elec ion Nigh Repo ing: E po Elec ion Nigh PASS
Acc ac Re l in he follo ing fo ma :
o Non-CDF
Acc ac in ballo co n ing and ab la ion hall
Acc ac achie e 100% fo all o e ca (1,549,703 ballo PASS
po i ion )
V&S Vol me & S e Open P ima Elec ion PASS
V&S 400 P ecinc PASS
V&S 1 Co n PASS
V&S 150 Ballo S le PASS
V&S 30 Ballo S le in 1 P ecinc PASS
V&S 3 Lang age (Engli h, Spani h, Ko ean) PASS
V&S 100 Con e PASS
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
V&S 30 candida e in 1 con e PASS
V&S Refe end m (App o ima el 15000 o d ) PASS
Refe end m: Te ing 10p A ial Fon (C en l PASS
V&S
ed in S a e of Geo gia)
Refe end m: Te ing 12p San Se if fon (To PASS
V&S
Accommoda e f e change )
V&S Refe end m: Ve if a No mal Si e PASS
Refe end m: Ve if hen Zoomed-In (Te i e PASS
V&S
inc ea ed)
Candida e Name Leng h (M ppo 25
V&S cha ac e ) Ve if o make e he di pla PASS
p ope l
V&S Candida e Name Leng h Check T an la ion PASS
Candida e Name Leng h Check appea ance on PASS
V&S
BMD P in ed Ballo
Candida e Name Leng h Check appea ance on PASS
V&S
Ballo Re ie Sc een
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
Tab la o Repo Tab la o p in 3 copie of Ze o PASS
V&S
P oof Repo , and Re l Repo
R n he V&S Te Elec ion on BMD & Ve if e l PASS
V&S
again kno n e pec ed e l
R n he V&S Te Elec ion on PPS & Ve if e l PASS
V&S
R n he V&S Te Elec ion on CSD & Ve if e l PASS
V&S
Repo ing: PASS
V&S
Winne : Con e epo e ie
Repo ing: PASS
V&S Re l : P ecinc mma epo , p ecinc -ba ed
epo ing, epo ing b Cong e ional Di ic Le el
Ve if ha he Pollbook can p og am o e ac i a ion PASS
Epollbook
ca d fo BMD
Ve if ha o e ac i a ion ca d ac i a e he co ec PASS
Epollbook
Ve if he he o no a ballo p od ced b he BMD, PASS
Ballo Cop can be pho ocopied, and hen ha e he pho ocopied
ballo be cce f ll ca on:
DOMINION C S C
A C T R
S em R n he SI Te Elec ion on BMD & Ve if e l PASS
In eg a ion again kno n e pec ed e l
S em R n he SI Te Elec ion on PPS & Ve if e l PASS
S em R n he SI Te Elec ion on CSD & Ve if e l PASS
S em Repo ing: PASS
In eg a ion Winne : Con e epo e ie
Repo ing:
S em
Re l : P ecinc mma epo , p ecinc -ba ed PASS
In eg a ion
epo ing, epo ing b Cong e ional Di ic Le el
Exh. 7
Ballot-Marking Devices (BMDs)

Cannot Assure the Will of the Voters
Andrew W. Appel† Richard A. DeMillo†

Princeton University Georgia Tech
Philip B. Stark†
Univ. of California, Berkeley
February 14, 2020
Abstract
The complexity of U.S. elections usually requires computers to count ballots—

but computers can be hacked, so election integrity requires a voting system in
which paper ballots can be recounted by hand. However, paper ballots provide no
assurance unless they accurately record the votes as expressed by the voters.
Voters can express their intent by indelibly hand-marking ballots, or using
computers called ballot-marking device (BMDs). Voters can make mistakes in
expressing their intent in either technology, but only BMDs are also subject to
hacking, bugs, and misconfiguration of the software that prints the marked bal-
lots. Most voters do not review BMD-printed ballots, and those who do often fail
to notice when the printed vote is not what they expressed on the touchscreen.
Furthermore, there is no action a voter can take to demonstrate to election offi-
cials that a BMD altered their expressed votes, nor is there a corrective action that
election officials can take if notified by voters—there is no way to deter, contain,
or correct computer hacking in BMDs. These are the essential security flaws of
BMDs.
Risk-limiting audits can assure that the votes recorded on paper ballots are
tabulated correctly, but no audit can assure that the votes on paper are the ones
expressed by the voter on a touchscreen: Elections conducted on current BMDs
cannot be confirmed by audits. We identify two properties of voting systems,
contestability and defensibility, necessary for audits to confirm election outcomes.
No available EAC-certified BMD is contestable or defensible.
†
Authors are listed alphabetically; they contributed equally to this work.
1
1 Introduction: Criteria for Voting Systems
Elections for public office and on public questions in the United States or any democ-
racy must produce outcomes based on the votes that voters express when they indicate
their choices on a paper ballot or on a machine. Computers have become indispens-
able to conducting elections, but computers are vulnerable. They can be hacked—
compromised by insiders or external adversaries who can replace their software with
fraudulent software that deliberately miscounts votes—and they can contain design
errors and bugs—hardware or software flaws or configuration errors that result in mis-
recording or mis-tabulating votes. Hence there must be some way, independent of any
software in any computers, to ensure that reported election outcomes are correct, i.e.,
consistent with the expressed votes as intended by the voters.
Voting systems should be software independent, meaning that “an undetected change
or error in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election out-
come” [30, 31, 32]. Software independence is similar to tamper-evident packaging: if
somebody opens the container and disturbs the contents, it will leave a trace.
The use of software-independent voting systems is supposed to ensure that if some-

one fraudulently hacks the voting machines to steal votes, we’ll know about it. But we
also want to know the true outcome in order to avoid a do-over election.1 A voting
system is strongly software independent if it is software independent and, moreover,
a detected change or error in an election outcome (due to change or error in the soft-
ware) can be corrected using only the ballots and ballot records of the current election
[30, 31]. Strong software independence combines tamper evidence with a kind of re-
silience: there’s a way to tell whether faulty software caused a problem, and a way to
recover from the problem if it did.
Software independence and strong software independence are now standard terms in
the analysis of voting systems, and it is widely accepted that voting systems should be
software independent. Indeed, version 2.0 of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
(VVSG 2.0) incorporates this principle [11].
But as we will show, these standard definitions are incomplete and inadequate, be-
cause the word undetectable hides several important questions: Who detects the change
or error in an election outcome? How can a person prove that she has detected an er-
1
Do-overs are expensive; they may delay the inauguration of an elected official; there is no assurance
that the same voters will vote in the do-over election as voted in the original; they decrease public trust.
And if the do-over election is conducted with the same voting system that can only detect but not correct
errors, then there may need to be a do-over of the do-over, ad infinitum.
2
ror? What happens when someone detects an error—does the election outcome remain
erroneous? Or conversely: How can an election administrator prove that the election
outcome not been altered, or prove that the correct outcome was recovered if a software
malfunction was detected? The standard definition does not distinguish evidence avail-
able to an election official, to the public, or just to a single voter; nor does it consider
the possibility of false alarms.
Those questions are not merely academic, as we show with an analysis of ballot-
marking devices. Even if some voters “detect” that the printed output is not what they
expressed to the BMD—even if some of those voters report their detection to election
officials—there is no mechanism by which the election official can “detect” whether a
BMD has been hacked to alter election outcomes. The questions of who detects, and
then what happens, are critical—but unanswered by the standard definitions.
We will define the terms contestable and defensible to better characterize properties
of voting systems that make them acceptable for use in public elections.2
A voting system is contestable if an undetected change or error in its software that

causes a change or error in an election outcome can always produce public evidence
that the outcome is untrustworthy. For instance, if a voter selected candidate A on the
touchscreen of a BMD, but the BMD prints candidate B on the paper ballot, then this
A-vs-B evidence is available to the individual voter, but the voter cannot demonstrate
this evidence to anyone else, since nobody else saw—nor should have seen—where the
voter touched the screen.3 Thus, the voting system does not provide a way for the voter
who observed the misbehavior to prove to anyone else that there was a problem, even if
the problems altered the reported outcome. Such a system is therefore not contestable.
While the definition of software independence might allow evidence available only
to individual voters as “detection,” such evidence does not suffice for a system to be
contestable. Contestibility is software independence, plus the requirement that “detect”
implies “can generate public evidence.” “Trust me” does not count as public evidence.
If a voting system is not contestable, then problems voters “detect” might never see the
light of day, much less be addressed or corrected.4
2
There are other notions connected to contestability and defensibility, although essentially different:
Benaloh et al. [6] define a P -resilient canvass framework, personally verifiable P -resilient canvass
framework, and privacy-perserving personally verifiable P -resilient canvass frameworks.
3
See footnote 17.
4
If voters are the only means of detecting and quantifying the effect of those problems—as they are
for BMDs—then in practice the system is not strongly software independent. The reason is that, as
we will show, such claims by (some) voters cannot correct software-dependent changes to other voters’
ballots, and cannot be used as the basis to invalidate or correct an election outcome. Thus, BMD-based
3
Similarly, while strong software independence demands that a system be able to

report the correct outcome even if there was an error or alteration of the software,
it does not require public evidence that the (reconstructed) reported outcome is cor-
rect. We believe, therefore, that voting systems must also be defensible. We say that
a voting system is defensible if, when the reported electoral outcome is correct, it is
possible to generate convincing public evidence that the reported electoral outcome is
correct—despite any malfunctions, software errors, or software alterations that might
have occurred. If a voting system is not defensible, then it is vulnerable to “crying
wolf”: malicious actors could claim that the system malfunctioned when in fact it did
not, and election officials will have no way to prove otherwise.
By analogy with strong software independence, we define: A voting system is

strongly defensible if it is defensible and, moreover, a detected change or error in
an election outcome (due to change or error in the software) can be corrected (with
convincing public evidence) using only the ballots and ballot records of the current
election.
In short, a system is contestable if it can generate public evidence of a problem

whenever a reported outcome is wrong, while a system is defensible if it can generate
public evidence whenever a reported outcome is correct—despite any problems that
might have occurred. Contestable systems are publicly tamper-evident; defensible sys-
tems are publicly, demonstrably resilient.
Defensibility is a key requirement for evidence-based elections [39]: defensibility

makes it possible in principle for election officials to generate convincing evidence
that the reported winners really won—if the reported winners did really win. (We say
an election system may be defensible, and an election may be evidence-based; there’s
much more process to an election than just the choice of system.)
Examples. The only known practical technology for contestable, strongly defensi-
ble voting is a system of hand-marked paper ballots, kept demonstrably physically
secure, counted by machine, audited manually, and recountable by hand.5 In a hand-
marked paper ballot election, ballot-marking software cannot be the source of an error
or change-of-election-outcome, because no software is used in marking ballots. Ballot-
scanning-and-counting software can be the source of errors, but such errors can be
election systems are not even (weakly) software independent, unless one takes “detection” to mean
“somebody claimed there was a problem, with no evidence to support that claim.”
5
The election must also generate convincing evidence that physical security of the ballots was not
compromised, and the audit must generate convincing public evidence that the audit itself was conducted
correctly.
4
detected and corrected by audits.
That system is contestable: if an optical scan voting machine reports the wrong
outcome because it miscounted (because it was hacked, misprogrammed, or miscali-
brated), the evidence is public: the paper ballots, recounted before witnesses, will not
match the claimed results, also witnessed. It is strongly defensible: a recount before
witnesses can demonstrate that the reported outcome is correct, or can find the correct
outcome if it was wrong—and provide public evidence that the (reconstructed) outcome
is correct. See Section 4 for a detailed analysis.
Over 40 states now use some form of paper ballot for most voters [19]. Most of the
remaining states are taking steps to adopt paper ballots. But not all voting systems that
use paper ballots are equally secure.
Some are not even software independent. Some are software independent, but not
strongly software independent, contestable, or defensible. In this report we explain:
• Hand-marked paper ballot systems are the only practical technology for con-
testable, strongly defensible voting systems.
• Some ballot-marking devices (BMDs) can be software independent, but they
not strongly software independent, contestable, or defensible. Hacked or mis-
programmed BMDs can alter election outcomes undetectably, so elections con-
ducted using BMDs cannot provide public evidence that reported outcomes are
correct. If BMD malfunctions are detected, there is no way to determine who
really won. Therefore BMDs should not be used by voters who are able to mark
an optical-scan ballot with a pen.
• All-in-one BMD or DRE+VVPAT voting machines are not software independent,
contestable, or defensible. They should not be used in public elections.
2 Background
We briefly review the kinds of election equipment in use, their vulnerability to computer
hacking (or programming error), and in what circumstances risk-limiting audits can
mitigate that vulnerability.
5
Voting equipment
Although a voter may form an intention to vote for a candidate or issue days, minutes,
or seconds before actually casting a ballot, that intention is a psychological state that
cannot be directly observed by anyone else. Others can have access to that intention
through what the voter (privately) expresses to the voting technology by interacting
with it, e.g., by making selections on a BMD or marking a ballot by hand.6 Voting
systems must accurately record the vote as the voter expressed it.
With a hand-marked paper ballot optical-scan system, the voter is given a paper
ballot on which all choices (candidates) in each contest are listed; next to each candidate
is a target (typically an oval or other shape) which the voter marks with a pen to indicate
a vote. Ballots may be either preprinted or printed (unvoted) at the polling place using
ballot on demand printers. In either case, the voter creates a tamper-evident record of
intent by marking the printed paper ballot with a pen.
Such hand-marked paper ballots may be scanned and tabulated at the polling place
using a precinct-count optical scanner (PCOS), or may be brought to a central place to
be scanned and tabulated by a central-count optical scanner (CCOS). Mail-in ballots
are typically counted by CCOS machines.
After scanning a ballot, a PCOS machine deposits the ballot in a secure, sealed
ballot box for later use in recounts or audits; this is ballot retention. Ballots counted by
CCOS are also retained for recounts or audits.7
Paper ballots can also be hand counted, but in most jurisdictions (especially where
there are many contests on the ballot) this is hard to do quickly; Americans expect
election-night reporting of unofficial totals. Hand counting—i.e., manually determin-
ing votes directly from the paper ballots—is appropriate for audits and recounts.
A ballot-marking device (BMD) provides a computerized user interface that presents

6
We recognize that voters make mistakes in expressing their intentions. For example, they may mis-
understand the layout of a ballot or express an unintended choice through a perceptual error, inattention,
or lapse of memory. The use of touchscreen technology does not necessarily correct for such user errors,
as every smartphone user who has mistyped an important text message knows. Poorly designed ballots,
poorly designed touchscreen interfaces, and poorly designed assistive interfaces increase the rate of error
in voters’ expressions of their votes. For the purposes of this report, we assume that properly engineered
systems seek to minimize such usability errors.
7
Regulations and procedures governing custody and physical security of ballots are uneven and in
many cases inadequate, but straightforward to correct because of decades of development of best prac-
tices.
6
the ballot to voters and captures their expressed selections—for instance, a touchscreen
interface or an assistive interface that enables voters with disabilities to vote indepen-
dently. Voter inputs (expressed votes) are recorded electronically. When a voter indi-
cates that the ballot is complete and ready to be cast, the BMD prints a paper version
of the electronically marked ballot. We use the term BMD for devices that mark bal-
lots but do not tabulate or retain them, and all-in-one for devices that combine ballot
marking, tabulation, and retention into the same paper path.
The paper ballot printed by a BMD may be in the same format as an optical-scan
form (e.g., with ovals filled as if by hand) or it may list just the names of the candidate(s)
selected in each contest. The BMD may also encode these selections into barcodes or
QR codes for optical scanning. We discuss issues with barcodes later in this report.
An all-in-one touchscreen voting machine combines computerized ballot marking,

tabulation, and retention in the same paper path. All-in-one machines come in several
configurations:
• DRE+VVPAT machines—direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines with

a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT)—provide the voter a touchscreen (or
other) interface, then print a paper ballot that is displayed to the voter under glass.
The voter is expected to review this ballot and approve it, after which the machine
deposits it into a ballot box. DRE+VVPAT machines do not contain optical scan-
ners; that is, they do not read what is marked on the paper ballot; instead, they
tabulate the vote directly from inputs to the touchscreen or other interface.
• BMD+Scanner all-in-one machines8 provide the voter a touchscreen (or other)
interface to input ballot choices and print a paper ballot that is ejected from a
slot for the voter to inspect. The voter then reinserts the ballot into the slot, after
which the all-in-one BMD+scanner scans it and deposits it into a ballot box. Or,
some BMD+Scanner all-in-one machines display the paper ballot behind plexi-
glass for the voter to inspect, before mechanically depositing it into a ballot box.
Opscan+BMD with separate paper paths. At least one model of voting machine
(the Dominion ICP320) contains an optical scanner (opscan) and a BMD in the same
cabinet,9 so that the optical scanner and BMD-printer are not in the same paper path;
no possible configuration of the software could cause a BMD-marked ballot to be de-
posited in the ballot box without human handling of the ballot. We do not classify this
as an all-in-one machine.
8
Some voting machines, such as the ES&S ExpressVote, can be configured as either a BMD or a
BMD+Scanner all-in-one. Others, such as the ExpressVoteXL, work only as all-in-one machines.
9
More precisely, the ICP320 optical scanner and the BMD audio+buttons interface are in the same
cabinet, but the printer is a separate box.
7
Hacking
There are many forms of computer hacking. In this analysis of voting machines we
focus on the alteration of voting machine software so that it miscounts votes or mis-
marks ballots to alter election outcomes. There are many ways to alter the software
of a voting machine: a person with physical access to the computer can open it and
directly access the memory; one can plug in a special USB thumbdrive that exploits
bugs and vulnerabilities in the computer’s USB drivers; one can connect to its WiFi
port or Bluetooth port or telephone modem (if any) and exploit bugs in those drivers,
or in the operating system.
“Air-gapping” a system (i.e., never connecting it to the Internet nor to any other net-
work) does not automatically protect it. Before each election, election administrators
must transfer a ballot definition into the voting machine by inserting a ballot definition
cartridge that was programmed on election-administration computers that may have
been connected previously to various networks; it has been demonstrated that vote-
changing viruses can propagate via these ballot-definition cartridges [18].
Hackers might be corrupt insiders with access to a voting-machine warehouse; cor-

rupt insiders with access to a county’s election-administration computers; outsiders
who can gain remote access to election-administration computers; outsiders who can
gain remote access to voting-machine manufacturers’ computers (and “hack” the firmware
installed in new machines, or the firmware updates supplied for existing machines), and
so on. Supply-chain hacks are also possible: the hardware installed by a voting system
vendor may have malware pre-installed by the vendor’s component suppliers.10
Computer systems (including voting machines) have so many layers of software that
it is impossible to make them perfectly secure [24, pp. 89–91]. When manufacturers
of voting machines use the best known security practices, adversaries may find it more
difficult to hack a BMD or optical scanner—but not impossible. Every computer in
every critical system is vulnerable to compromise through hacking, insider attacks or
exploiting design flaws.
10
Given that many chips and other components are manufactured in China and elsewhere, this is
a serious concern. Carsten Schürmann has found Chinese pop songs on the internal memory of vot-
ing machines (C. Schürmann, personal communication, 2018). Presumably those files were left there
accidentally—but this shows that malicious code could have been pre-installed deliberately, and that
neither the vendor’s nor the election official’s security and quality control measures discovered and re-
moved the extraneous files.
8
Election assurance through risk-limiting audits
To ensure that the reported electoral outcome of each contest corresponds to what the
voters expressed, the most practical known technology is a risk-limiting audit (RLA)
of trustworthy paper ballots [35, 36, 23]. The National Academies of Science, Engi-
neering, and Medicine, recommend routine RLAs after every election [24], as do many
other organizations and entities concerned with election integrity.11
The risk limit of a risk-limiting audit is the maximum chance that the audit will not
correct the reported electoral outcome, if the reported outcome is wrong. “Electoral
outcome” means the political result—who or what won—not the exact tally. “Wrong”
means that the outcome does not correspond to what the voters expressed.
A RLA involves manually inspecting randomly selected paper ballots following a

rigorous protocol. The audit stops if and when the sample provides convincing evidence
that the reported outcome is correct; otherwise, the audit continues until every ballot
has been inspected manually, which reveals the correct electoral outcome if the paper
trail is trustworthy. RLAs protect against vote-tabulation errors, whether those errors
are caused by failures to follow procedures, misconfiguration, miscalibration, faulty
engineering, bugs, or malicious hacking.12
The risk limit should be determined as a matter of policy or law. For instance, a
5% risk limit means that, if a reported outcome is wrong solely because of tabulation
errors, there is at least a 95% chance that the audit procedure will correct it. Smaller
risk limits give higher confidence in election outcomes, but require inspecting more
ballots, other things being equal. RLAs never revise a correct outcome.
RLAs can be very efficient, depending in part on how the voting system is designed
and how jurisdictions organize their ballots. If the computer results are accurate, an
efficient RLA with a risk limit of 5% requires examining just a few—about 7 divided by
the margin—ballots selected randomly from the contest.13 For instance, if the margin
of victory is 10% and the results are correct, the RLA would need to examine about
7/10% = 70 ballots to confirm the outcome at 5% risk. For a 1% margin, the RLA
would need to examine about 7/1% = 700 ballots. The sample size does not depend
11
Among them are the Presidential Commission on Election Administration, the American Statistical
Association, the League of Women Voters, and Verified Voting Foundation.
12
RLAs do not protect against problems that cause BMDs to print something other than what was
shown to the voter on the screen, nor do they protect against problems with ballot custody.
13
Technically, it is the diluted margin that enters the calculation. The diluted margin is the number of
votes that separate the winner with the fewest votes from the loser with the most votes, divided by the
number of ballots cast, including undervotes and invalid votes.
9
much on the total number of ballots cast in the contest, only on the margin of the
winning candidate’s victory.
RLAs assume that a full hand tally of the paper trail would reveal the correct elec-
toral outcomes: the paper trail must be trustworthy. Other kinds of audits, such as
compliance audits [6, 23, 39, 37] are required to establish whether the paper trail itself
is trustworthy. Applying an RLA procedure to an untrustworthy paper trail cannot limit
the risk that a wrong reported outcome goes uncorrected.
Properly preserved hand-marked paper ballots ensure that expressed votes are iden-
tical to recorded votes. But BMDs might not record expressed votes accurately, for
instance, if BMD software has bugs, was misconfigured, or was hacked: BMD print-
out is not a trustworthy record of the expressed votes. Neither a compliance audit nor
a RLA can possibly check whether errors in recording expressed votes altered elec-
tion outcomes. RLAs that rely on BMD output therefore cannot limit the risk that an
incorrect reported election outcome will go uncorrected.
A paper-based voting system (such as one that uses optical scanners) is systemat-
ically more secure than a paperless system (such as DREs) only if the paper trail is
trustworthy and the results are checked against the paper trail using a rigorous method
such as an RLA or full manual tally. If it is possible that error, hacking, bugs, or mis-
calibration caused the recorded-on-paper votes to differ from the expressed votes, an
RLA or even a full hand recount cannot not provide convincing public evidence that
election outcomes are correct: such a system cannot be defensible. In short, paper bal-
lots provide little assurance against hacking if they are never examined or if the paper
might not accurately reflect the votes expressed by the voters.
3 (Non)Contestability/Defensibility of BMDs
A BMD-generated paper trail is not a reliable record of the vote expressed by the
voter. Like any computer, a BMD (or a DRE+VVPAT) is vulnerable to bugs, miscon-
figuration, hacking, installation of unauthorized (fraudulent) software, and alteration of
installed software.
If a hacker sought to steal an election by altering BMD software, what would the
hacker program the BMD to do? In cybersecurity practice, we call this the threat model.
The simplest threat model is this one: In some contests, not necessarily top-of-the-
ticket, change a small percentage of the votes (such as 5%).
10
In recent national elections, analysts have considered a candidate who received 60%
of the vote to have won by a landslide. Many contests are decided by less than a 10%
margin. Changing 5% of the votes can change the margin by 10%, because “flipping”
a vote for one candidate into a vote for a different candidate changes the difference in
their tallies—i.e., the margin—by 2 votes. If hacking or bugs or misconfiguration could
change 5% of the votes, that would be a very significant threat.
Although public and media interest often focus on top-of-the-ticket races such as
President and Governor, elections for lower offices such as state representatives, who
control legislative agendas and redistricting, and county officials, who manage elections
and assess taxes, are just as important in our democracy. Altering the outcome of
smaller contests requires altering fewer votes, so fewer voters are in a position to notice
that their ballots were misprinted. And most voters are not as familiar with the names
of the candidates for those offices, so they might be unlikely to notice if their ballots
were misprinted, even if they checked.
Research in a real polling place in Tennessee during the 2018 election, found that
half the voters didn’t look at all at the paper ballot printed by a BMD, even when
they were holding it in their hand and directed to do so while carrying it from the
BMD to the optical scanner [14]. Those voters who did look at the BMD-printed ballot
spent an average of 4 seconds examining it to verify that the eighteen or more choices
they made were correctly recorded. That amounts to 222 milliseconds per contest,
barely enough time for the human eye to move and refocus under perfect conditions
and not nearly enough time for perception, comprehension, and recall [28]. A study
by other researchers [8], in a simulated polling place using real BMDs deliberately
hacked to alter one vote on each paper ballot, found that only 6.6% of voters told a
pollworker something was wrong.1415 The same study found that among voters who
examined their hand-marked ballots, half were unable to recall key features of ballots
cast moments before, a prerequisite step for being able to recall their own ballot choices.
This finding is broadly consistent with studies of effects like “change blindness” or
“choice blindness,” in which human subjects fail to notice changes made to choices
14
You might think, “the voter really should carefully review their BMD-printed ballot.” But because
the scientific evidence shows that voters do not [14] and cognitively cannot [17] perform this task well,
legislators and election administrators should provide a voting system that counts the votes as voters
express them.
15
Studies of voter confidence about their ability to verify their ballots are not relevant: in typical
situations, subjective confidence and objective accuracy are at best weakly correlated. The relationship
between confidence and accuracy has been studied in contexts ranging from eyewitness accuracy [9, 13,
42] to confidence in psychological clinical assessments [15] and social predictions [16]. The disconnect
is particularly severe at high confidence. Indeed, this is known as “the overconfidence effect.” For a lay
discussion, see Thinking, Fast and Slow by Nobel economist Daniel Kahnemann [21].
11
made only seconds before [20].
Suppose, then, that 10% of voters examine their paper ballots carefully enough
to even see the candidate’s name recorded as their vote for legislator or county com-
missioner. Of those, perhaps only half will remember the name of the candidate they
intended to vote for.16
Of those who notice that the vote printed is not the candidate they intended to vote
for, what will they think, and what will they do? Will they think, “Oh, I must have
made a mistake on the touchscreen,” or will they think, “Hey, the machine is cheating
or malfunctioning!” There’s no way for the voter to know for sure—voters do make
mistakes—and there’s absolutely no way for the voter to prove to a pollworker or elec-
tion official that a BMD printed something other than what the voter entered on the
screen.1718
Either way, polling-place procedures generally advise voters to ask a pollworker

for a new ballot if theirs does not show what they intended. Pollworkers should void
that BMD-printed ballot, and the voter should get another chance to mark a ballot.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many voters are too timid to ask, or don’t know that
they have the right to ask, or are not sure whom to ask. Even if a voter asks for a new
ballot, training for pollworkers is uneven, and we are aware of no formal procedure for
resolving disputes if a request for a new ballot is refused. Moreover, there is no sensible
protocol for ensuring that BMDs that misbehave are investigated—nor can there be, as
we argue below.
Let’s summarize. If a machine alters votes on 5% of the ballots (enabling it to

change the margin by 10%), and 10% of voters check their ballots carefully and 50%
of the voters who check notice the error, then optimistically we might expect 5% ⇥
10% ⇥ 50% or 0.25% of the voters to request a new ballot and correct their vote.19 This
16
We ask the reader, “do you know the name of the most recent losing candidate for county commis-
sioner?” We recognize that some readers of this document are county commissioners, so we ask those
readers to imagine the frame of mind of their constituents.
17
You might think, “the voter can prove it by showing someone that the vote on the paper doesn’t
match the vote onscreen.” But that won’t work. On a typical BMD, by the time a paper record is printed
and ejected for the voter to hold and examine, the touchscreen no longer shows the voter’s choice. You
might think, “BMDs should be designed so that the choices still show on the screen for the voter to
compare with the paper.” But a hacked BMD could easily alter the on-screen choices to match the paper,
after the voter hits the “print” button.
18
Voters should certainly not videorecord themselves voting! That would defeat the privacy of the
secret ballot and is illegal in most jurisdictions.
19
This calculation assumes that the 10% of voters who check are in effect a random sample of voters:
voters’ propensity to check BMD printout is not associated with their political preferences.
12
means that the machine will change the margin by 9.75% and get away with it.
In this scenario, 0.25% of the voters, one in every 400 voters, has requested a new
ballot. You might think, “that’s a form of detection of the hacking.” But is isn’t, as a
practical matter: a few individual voters may have detected that there was a problem,
but there’s no procedure by which this translates into any action that election adminis-
trators can take to correct the outcome of the election. Polling-place procedures cannot
correct or deter hacking, or even reliably detect it, as we discuss next. This is essen-
tially the distinction between a system that is merely software independent and one that
is contestable: a change to the software that alters the outcome might generate evidence
for an alert, conscientious, individual voter, but it does not generate public evidence that
an election official can rely on to conclude there is a problem.
Even if some voters notice that BMDs are altering votes, there’s no way to correct
the election outcome. That is, BMD voting systems are not contestable, not defen-
sible (and therefore not strongly defensible), and not strongly software independent.
Suppose a state election official wanted to detect whether the BMDs are cheating, and
correct election results, based on actions by those few alert voters who notice the error.
What procedures could possibly work against the manipulation we are considering?
1. How about, “If at least 1 in 400 voters claims that the machine misrepresented
their vote, void the entire election.”20 No responsible authority would implement
such a procedure. A few dishonest voters could collaborate to invalidate entire
elections simply by falsely claiming that BMDs changed their votes.
2. How about, “If at least 1 in 400 voters claims that the machine misrepresented
their vote, then investigate.” Investigations are fine, but then what? The only
way an investigation can ensure that the outcome accurately reflects what voters
expressed to the BMDs is to void an election in which the BMDs have altered
votes and conduct a new election. But how do you know whether the BMDs
have altered votes, except based the claims of the voters?21 Furthermore, the
investigation itself would suffer from the same problem as above: how can one
20
Note that in many jurisdictions, far fewer than 400 voters use a given machine on election day:
BMDs are typically expected to serve fewer than 300 voters per day. (The vendor ES&S recommended
27,000 BMDs to serve Georgia’s 7 million voters, amounting to 260 voters per BMD [34].) Recall also
that the rate 1 in 400 is tied to the amount of manipulation. What if the malware flipped only one vote
in 50, instead of 1 vote in 20? That could still change the margin by 4%, but—in this hypothetical—
would be noticed by only one voter in 1,000, rather than one in 400. The smaller the margin, the less
manipulation it would have taken to alter the electoral outcome.
21
Forensic examination of the BMD might show that it was hacked or misconfigured, but it cannot
prove that the BMD was not hacked or misconfigured.
13
distinguish between voters who detected BMD hacking or bugs from voters who
just want to interfere with an election?
This is the essential security flaw of BMDs: few voters will notice and promptly
report discrepancies between what they saw on the screen and what is on the BMD
printout, and even when they do notice, there’s nothing appropriate that can be done.
Even if election officials are convinced that BMDs malfunctioned, there is no way to
determine who really won.
Therefore, BMDs should not be used by most voters.
Why can’t we rely on pre-election and post-election logic and accuracy testing, or
parallel testing? Most, if not all, jurisdictions perform some kind of logic and accu-
racy testing (LAT) of voting equipment before elections. LAT generally involves voting
on the equipment using various combinations of selections, then checking whether the
equipment tabulated the votes correctly. As the Volkswagen/Audi “Dieselgate” scandal
shows, devices can be programmed to behave properly when they are tested but mis-
behave in use [12]. Therefore, LAT can never prove that voting machines performed
properly in practice.
Parallel or “live” testing involves pollworkers or election officials using some BMDs
at random times on election day to mark (but not cast) ballots with test patterns, then
check whether the marks match the patterns. The idea is that the testing is not sub-
ject to the “Dieselgate” problem, because the machines cannot “know” they are being
tested on election day. As a practical matter, the number of tests required to provide a
reasonable chance of detecting outcome-changing errors is prohibitive, and even then
the system is not defensible. See Section 6.
Suppose, counterfactually, that it was practical to perform enough parallel testing to

guarantee a large chance of detecting a problem if BMD hacking or malfunction altered
electoral outcomes. Suppose, counterfactually, that election officials were required to
conduct that amount of parallel testing during every election, and that the required
equipment, staffing, infrastructure, and other resources were provided. Even then, the
system would not be strongly defensible; that is, if testing detected a problem, there
would be no way to to determine who really won. The only remedy would be a new
election.
Don’t voters need to check hand-marked ballots, too? It is always a good idea to
check one’s work, but there is a substantial body of research (e.g., [29]) suggesting
14
that preventing error as a ballot is being marked is a fundamentally different cognitive

task than detecting an error on a previously marked ballot. In cognitively similar tasks,
such as proof reading for non-spelling errors, ten percent rates of error detection are
common [29, pp 167ff], whereas by carefully attending to the task of correctly marking
their ballots, voters apparently can largely avoid marking errors.
A fundamental difference between hand-marked paper ballots and ballot-marking

devices is that, with hand-marked paper ballots, voters are responsible for catching and
correcting their own errors, while if BMDs are used, voters are also responsible for
catching machine errors, bugs, and hacking. Voters are the only people who can detect
such problems with BMDs—but, as explained above, if voters do find problems, there’s
no way they can prove to poll workers or election officials that there were problems and
no way to ensure that election officials take appropriate remedial action.
4 Contestability/defensibility of hand-marked opscan
The most widely used voting system in the United States optical-scan counting of hand-
marked paper ballots.22 Computers and computer software are used in several stages
of the voting process, and if that software is hacked (or erroneous), then the computers
will deliberately (or accidentally) report incorrect outcomes.
• Computers are used to prepare the PDF files from which (unvoted) optical-scan
ballots are printed, with ovals (or other targets to be marked) next to the names
of candidates. Because the optical scanners respond to the position on the page,
not the name of the candidate nearest the target, computer software could cheat
by reordering the candidates on the page.
• The optical-scan voting machine, which scans the ballots and interprets the marks,
is driven by computer software. Fraudulent (hacked) software can deliberately
record (some fraction of) votes for Candidate A and votes for Candidate B.
• After the voting machine reports the in-the-precinct vote totals (or, in the case of
central-count optical scan, the individual-batch vote totals), computers are used
to aggregate the various precincts or batches together. Hacked software could
cheat in this addition process.
Protection against any or all of these attacks relies on a system of risk-limiting

22
The Verifier – Polling Place Equipment – November 2020, https://www.
verifiedvoting.org/verifier/, Verified Voting Foundation, fetched February 8,
2020.
15
audits, along with compliance audits to check that the chain of custody of ballots and
paper records is trustworthy. Without such audits, optical-scan ballots (whether hand
marked or machine marked) are neither contestable nor defensible.
We analyze the contestability/defensibility of hand-marked optical-scan ballots with

respect to each of these threats, assuming a system of RLAs and compliance audits.
• Hacked generation PDFs leading to fraudulently placed ovals. In this case, a

change or error in the computer software can change the election outcome: on
thousands of ballots, voters place a mark next to the name of candidate A, but
(because the candidate name has been fraudulently misplaced on the paper), the
(unhacked) optical scanner records this as a vote for candidate B. But an RLA
will correct the outcome: a human, inspecting and interpreting this paper ballot,
will interpret the mark as a vote for candidate A, as the voter intended. The
RLA will, with high probability, conclude that the computer-reported election
outcome cannot be confirmed, and a full recount must occur. Thus the system
is contestable: the RLA produces public evidence that the (computer-reported)
outcome is untrustworthy. This full recount (in the presence of witnesses, in view
of the public) can provide convincing public evidence of its own correctness; that
is, the system is defensible.
• Hacked optical-scan vote counter, reporting fraudulent vote totals. In this case,
a change or error in the computer software can change the election outcome:
on thousands of ballots, voters place a mark next to the name of candidate A,
but the (hacked) optical scanner records this as a vote for candidate B. But an
RLA can detect the incorrect outcome (just as in the case above); the system
is contestable. And a full recount will produce a correct outcome with public
evidence: the system is defensible.
• Hacked election-management system (EMS), fraudulently aggregating batches.
A risk-limiting audit can detect this problem, and a recount will correct it: the
system is contestable and defensible. But actually, contestability and defensibil-
ity against this attack is even easier and simpler than RLAs and recounts. Most
voting machines (including precinct-count optical scanners) print a “results tape”
in the polling place, at the close of the polls (in addition to writing their re-
sults electronically to a removable memory card). This results tape is (typically)
signed by pollworkers and by credentialed challengers, and open to inspection
by members of the public, before it is transported (with chain-of custody pro-
tections) along with the ballot boxes to a secure central location. The County
Clerk or Registrar of Voters can (and in many counties, does) inspect these pa-
per records to verify that they correspond to the precinct-by-precinct machine-
reported aggregation. Errors (or fraud) in aggregation can be detected and cor-
16
rected without the need to inspect individual ballots: the system is contestable
and defensible against this class of errors.
5 End-to-end verifiable (E2E-V) systems
In all BMD systems currently on the market, and in all BMD systems certified by
the EAC, the printed ballot or ballot summary is the only channel by which voters
can verify the correct recording of their ballots, independently of the computers. The
analysis in this paper applies to all of those BMD systems.
There is a class of voting systems called “end-to-end verifiable” (E2E-V), which

provide an alternate mechanism for voters to verify their votes [7] [2]. The basic idea
of an E2E-V system is that a cryptographic protocol encodes the vote; mathematical
properties of the cryptographic system allow the voters to verify (probabilistically) that
their vote has been accurately counted, but does not compromise secret ballot by allow-
ing voters to prove how they voted. E2E-V systems have not been adopted in public
elections (except that Scantegrity was used for municipal elections in Takoma Park,
MD in 2009 and 2011).
Each E2E-V system requires its own analysis of contestability/defensibility.
Scantegrity [10] is a system of preprinted optical-scan ballots, counted by conven-

tional precinct-count optical scanners, but with an additional security feature: when the
voter fills in an oval with a special pen, the oval is mostly darkened (so it’s counted con-
ventionally by the optical scanner), but two-letter code is also revealed that the voter can
(optionally) use in the cryptographic protocol. Scantegrity is contestable/defensible,
but not because of its E2E-V properties: since it’s an add-on to a conventional optical-
scan system with hand-marked paper ballots, RLAs and compliance audits can render
this system contestable/defensible.
Prêt-à-Voter [33] is the system in which the voter separates the candidate-list from
the oval-target list after marking the ballot and before deposit into the optical scanner.
This system can be made contestable, with difficulty: the auditing procedure requires
participation of the voters in an unintuitive cryptographic challenge. It is not clear that
the system is defensible: if this cryptographic challenge proves that the blank ballots
17
have been tampered with, then no recount can reliably reconstruct the true result with
public evidence.
STAR-Vote [5] is a DRE+VVPAT system with a smart ballot box. Voters interact
with a device that captures their votes electronically and prints a paper record that
voters can inspect, but the electronic votes are held “in limbo” until the paper ballot
is deposited in the smart ballot box. The ballot box does not read the votes from the
ballot; rather, depositing the ballot tells the system that it has permission to cast the
votes it had already recorded from the touchscreen. The claimed advantage of STAR-
Vote (and other systems that use the “Benaloh challenge”) is that RLAs and ballot-box
chain-of-custody are not required in order to obtain software independence. To assure
that the E2E-V cryptographic protocol has correctly recorded each vote, the voter can
“challenge” the system to prove that the cryptographic encoding of the ballot records
the vote actually printed on the paper ballot. To do so, the voter must discard (void)
this ballot and vote a fresh ballot; this is because the challenge process reveals the vote
to the public, and a voting system must preserve the secrecy of the (cast) ballots. Thus,
the voter cannot ensure the correct encoding of their true ballot, but (since STAR-Vote
must print the ballot before knowing whether the voter will challenge), the voter can
ensure it with any desired error probability.
STAR-Vote is software independent but it is not contestable or defensible. The

reason is that, while the challenge can produce public evidence that a machine did
not accurately encrypt the plaintext vote on the ballot, if the machine prints the wrong
plaintext vote and a correct encryption of that incorrect vote, there is no evidence the
voter can use to prove that to anyone else.
No E2E-V system is currently certified by the EAC, nor to our knowledge is any
such system under review for certification, nor are any of the 5 major voting-machine
vendors offering such a system for sale.23
23
Some vendors, notably Scytl, have sold systems advertised as E2E-V in other countries. Those sys-
tems were not in fact E2E-V. Moreover, serious security flaws have been found in their implementations.
See, e.g., [22].
18
6 Parallel testing of BMDs
Wallach [41] has proposed (in response to earlier drafts of this paper) that contestabil-
ity/defensibility failure of BMDs could be mitigated by parallel testing, which he also
calls “live auditing.” Stark [38] has analyzed Wallach’s proposal in detail. Here we
provide a summary of the proposal and the analyses.
One might like to test each BMD before the election to make sure it’s not hacked.
Unfortunately, since the computer in a voting machine (including BMDs) has a real-
time clock, the software (including fraudulent vote-stealing software) knows whether
it’s election day or not. Fraudulent software can make sure not to cheat except on
election day.
The idea of parallel testing is to have trained auditors test the BMDs, at random
times during an actual election: use the BMD to prepare a ballot, inspect that ballot
to ensure it’s marked correctly, then discard the ballot. The same BMDs in use during
the polling will be selected, from time to time, for such test, right there in the polling
places.
If the BMDs cheat with uniform random probability p, and if the BMD cannot
distinguish an auditor from an ordinary voter, then after n random audits the probability
of detecting the malware is 1 (1 p)n . If p = 5% and n = 240, then the probability
of detection is 91%.
Unfortunately, the attacker is not constrained to cheat with uniform random prob-
ability; or, to put it another way, BMD malware may indeed be able to distinguish
auditors from ordinary voters. Stark [38] discusses many ways in which the “signa-
ture” of how auditors interact with the BMD may differ from ordinary voters, enough
to give clues to the malware about whether to cheat.24 Therefore, one cannot simply
multiply (1 p)n and calculate a probability of detection.
While auditors might try to build an accurate model of voter behavior for live au-
dits, that approach is doomed by privacy concerns and by the “curse of dimensional-
ity”: election officials would have to record every nuance of voter behavior (preferences
24
For example, BMDs do “know” their own settings and other aspects of each voting session, so
malware can use that information to target sessions that use the audio interface, increase the font size,
use the sip-and-puff interface, set the language to something other than English, or take much longer
than average to vote. (Voters who use those settings might be less likely to be believed if they report that
the equipment altered their votes.) For parallel testing to have a good chance of detecting all outcome-
changing problems, the tests must have a large chance of probing every combination of settings and
voting patterns that includes enough ballots to change any contest result. It is not practical.
19
across contests; language settings, font settings, and other UI settings; timing, includ-
ing speed of voting and hesitation; on-screen review; etc.) for million of voters to
accurately approximate voter behavior.
There are many logistical problems with “live auditing.” It would require additional
voting machines (because testing requires additional capacity), staff, infrastructure, and
other resources, on election day when professional staff is most stretched. One must
be prepared to perform the audits at the busiest times of day, even that will cause lines
of voters to lengthen, because otherwise the malware can simply cheat only at the busy
times. Live auditing must be done in view of the voters (one cannot carry the voting
machine into another room to do it), but some election officials are concerned that the
creation of test ballots in the polling place could be perceived as a threat of ballot-box
stuffing.
No state, to our knowledge has implemented parallel testing or live auditing of

BMDs.
In any case, we can assess the contestability and defensibility of parallel testing.
With a sufficiently high rate of parallel testing, and a sufficiently sophisticated ran-
domization of auditor behavior, it may be possible to make BMDs with parallel testing
contestable: an audit could detect and prove mismarking of paper ballots.
But BMDs with parallel testing is not defensible. It will be extremely difficult for
an election official to generate convincing public evidence that the audit would have
detected mismarking, if mismarking were occurring. To generate that public evidence,
the election official would have to reveal substantial detail about the parallel-testing
protocol: how, exactly, the random selection of times to test is made; how, exactly, the
random selection is made of what candidates to vote for in the tests. Revealing such
details of the protocol allows the attacker to analyze the protocol for clues about how
and when to cheat with less chance of detection.
Furthermore, parallel testing has a severe disadvantage in comparison with other

contestable/defensible paper-ballot-based voting systems: If the auditors detect that the
BMDs have mismarked a ballot—even once—the entire election must be invalidated,
and a do-over election must be held. This is because the auditor will have detected
evidence that the BMDs in this election have been systematically mismarking ballots
for some proportion of all voters. No recount of the paper ballots can correct this.
In contrast, if optical scanners are hacked to cheat on hand-marked paper ballots,
20
the correct outcome can be calculated by a full hand recount of the paper ballots.25
Wallach also suggests, instead of parallel testing, the use of spoiled-ballot rates as
a measure of BMD cheating. Suppose, when BMDs are not cheating the baseline rate
of spoiled ballots (i.e., voters asking for a “do-over” of their BMD marked ballot) is
1%. Suppose the machines are cheating on 5% of the ballots, and 6% of voters notice
this, and ask for a do-over. Then the spoiled ballot rate increases to 1.3%. The election
administrator is supposed to act upon this discrepancy. But the only meaningful action
the administrator could take is to invalidate the entire election, and call for a do-over
election. This is impractical.
Moreover, the underlying “natural” rate of spoilage will not be known exactly, and
will vary from election to election, even if the machines function flawlessly. The natural
rate might depend on the number of contests on the ballot, the complexity of voting
rules (e.g., IRV versus plurality), ballot layout, and many other factors. For any rule,
there will be a tradeoff between false alarms and failures to detect problems.
To continue the previous hypothetical, suppose that spoiled ballots follow a Poisson
distribution (there is no reason to think that they do). Imagine that the theoretical rate
is known to be 1% if the BMDs function correctly, and known to be 1.3% if the BMDs
malfunction. How many votes must be cast for it to be possible to limit the chance
of a false alarm to 1%, while ensuring a 99% chance of detecting a real problem?
The answer is 28,300 votes. If turnout is roughly 50%, jurisdictions (or contests) with
fewer than 60,000 voters could not in principle limit the chance of false positives and
of false negatives to 1%—even under these optimistic assumptions and simplifications.
Twenty-three of California’s 58 counties have fewer than 60,000 registered voters.
7 Other tradeoffs, BMDs versus hand-marked opscan
Supporters of ballot-marking devices advance several other arguments for their use.
• Mark legibility. A common argument is that a properly functioning BMD will

generate clean, error-free, unambiguous marks, while hand-marked paper bal-
lots may contain mistakes and stray marks that make it impossible to discern a
voter’s intent. However appealing this argument seems at first blush, the data
are not nearly so compelling. Experience with statewide recounts in Minnesota
25
Provided, of course, that secure chain of custody of the ballot boxes can be demonstrated.
21
and elsewhere suggest that truly ambiguous handmade marks are very rare.26 For
instance, 2.9 million hand-marked ballots were cast in the 2008 Minnesota race
between Al Franken and Norm Coleman for the U.S. Senate. In a manual re-
count, between 99.95% and 99.99% of ballots were unambiguously marked.27 28
In addition, usability studies of hand-marked bubble ballots—the kind in most
common use in U.S. elections—indicate a voter error rate of 0.6%, much lower
than the 2.5–3.7% error rate for machine-marked ballots [17].29 Thus, mark leg-
ibility is not a good reason to adopt BMDs for all voters.
• Undervotes, overvotes. Another argument offered for BMDs is that the ma-
chines can alert voters to undervotes and prevent overvotes. That is true, but
modern PCOS systems can also alert a voter to overvotes and undervotes, allow-
ing a voter to eject the ballot and correct it.
• Bad ballot design. Ill-designed paper ballots, just like ill-designed touchscreen
interfaces, may lead to unintentional undervotes [25]. For instance, the 2006
Sarasota, Florida, touchscreen ballot was badly designed. The 2018 Broward
County, Florida, opscan ballot was badly designed: it violated three separate
guidelines from the EAC’s 2007 publication, “Effective Designs for the Admin-
istration of Federal Elections, Section 3: Optical scan ballots.” [40] In both of
these cases (touchscreens in 2006, hand-marked optical-scan in 2018), under-
vote rates were high. The solution is to follow standard, published ballot-design
guidelines and other best practices, both for touchscreens and for hand-marked
ballots [3, 25].
• Low-tech paper-ballot fraud. All paper ballots, however they are marked, are
vulnerable to loss, ballot-box stuffing, alteration, and substitution between the
time they are cast and the time they are recounted. That’s why it is so important
26
States do need clear and complete regulations for interpreting voter marks.
27
“During the recount, the Coleman and Franken campaigns initially challenged a total of 6,655
ballot-interpretation decisions made by the human recounters. The State Canvassing Board asked the
campaigns to voluntarily withdraw all but their most serious challenges, and in the end approximately
1,325 challenges remained. That is, approximately 5 ballots in 10,000 were ambiguous enough that one
side or the other felt like arguing about it. The State Canvassing Board, in the end, classified all but
248 of these ballots as votes for one candidate or another. That is, approximately 1 ballot in 10,000 was
ambiguous enough that the bipartisan recount board could not determine an intent to vote.” [1] See also
[26]
28
We have found that some local election officials consider marks to be ambiguous if machines cannot
read the marks. That is a different issue from humans being unable to interpret the marks. Errors in ma-
chine interpretation of voter intent can be dealt with by manual audits: if the reported outcome is wrong
because machines misinterpreted handmade marks, a RLA has a known, large chance of correcting the
outcome.
29
Better designed user interfaces (UI) might reduce the error rate for machine-marked ballots below
the historical rate for DREs; however, UI improvements cannot keep BMDs from printing something
other than what the voter is shown on the screen.
22
to make sure that ballot boxes are always in multiple-person (preferably biparti-
san) custody whenever they are handled, and that appropriate physical security
measures are in place. Strong, verifiable chain-of-custody protections are essen-
tial.
Hand-marked paper ballots are vulnerable to alteration by anyone with a pen.
Both hand-marked and BMD-marked paper ballots are vulnerable to substitution:
anyone who has poorly supervised access to a legitimate BMD during election
day can create fraudulent ballots, not necessarily to deposit them in the ballot box
immediately (in case the ballot box is well supervised on election day) but with
the hope of substituting it later in the chain of custody.30
All those attacks (on hand-marked and on BMD-marked paper ballots) are
fairly low-tech. There are also higher-tech ways of producing ballots indistin-
guishable from BMD-marked ballots for substitution into the ballot box if there
is inadequate chain-of-custody protection.
• Accessible voting technology. When hand-marked paper ballots are used with
PCOS, there is (as required by law) also an accessible voting technology avail-
able in the polling place for voters unable to mark a paper ballot with a pen. This
is typically a BMD or a DRE. When the accessible voting technology is not the
same as what most voters vote on—when it is used by very few voters—it may
happen that the accessible technology is ill-maintained or even (in some polling
places) not even properly set up by pollworkers. This is a real problem. One
proposed solution is to require all voters to use the same BMD or all-in-one tech-
nology. But the failure of some election officials to properly maintain their acces-
sible equipment is not a good reason to adopt BMDs for all voters. Among other
things, it would expose all voters to the security flaws described above.31 Other
advocates object to the idea that disabled voters must use a different method of
marking ballots, arguing that their rights are thereby violated. Both HAVA and
ADA require reasonable accommodations for voters with physical and cognitive
impairments, but neither law requires that those accommodations must be used
by all voters. To best enable and facilitate participation by all voters, each voter
should be provided with a means of casting a vote best suited to their abilities.
• Ballot printing costs. Preprinted optical-scan ballots cost 20–50 cents each.32
30
Some BMDs print a barcode indicating when and where the ballot was produced, but that does not
prevent such a substitution attack against currently EAC-certified, commercially available BMDs. We
understand that systems under development might make ballot-substitution attacks against BMDs more
difficult.
31
Also, some accessibility advocates argue that requiring disabled voters to use BMDs compromises
their privacy since hand-marked ballots are easily distinguishable from machine marked ballots. That
issue can be addressed without BMDs-for-all: Accessible BMDs are already available and in use that
mark ballots with marks that cannot easily be distinguished from hand-marked ballots.
32
Single-sheet (one- or two-side) ballots cost 20-28 cents; double-sheet ballots needed for elections
23
Blank cards for BMDs cost up to 15 cents each, depending on the make and
model of BMD.33 But optical-scan ballots must be preprinted for as many vot-
ers as might show up, whereas blank BMD cards are consumed in proportion
to how many voters do show up. The Open Source Election Technology Insti-
tute (OSET) conducted an independent study of total life cycle costs34 for hand-
marked paper ballots and BMDs in conjunction with the 2019 Georgia legislative
debate regarding BMDs [27]. OSET concluded that, even in the most optimistic
(i.e., lowest cost) scenario for BMDs and the most pessimistic (i.e, highest cost)
scenario for hand-marked paper ballots and ballot-on-demand (BOD) printers—
which can print unmarked ballots as needed—the total lifecycle costs for BMDs
would be higher than the corresponding costs for hand-marked paper ballots.35
• Vote centers. To run a vote center that serves many election districts with dif-
ferent ballot styles, one must be able to provide each voter a ballot containing
the contests that voter is eligible to vote in, possibly in a number of different
languages. This is easy with BMDs, which can be programmed with all the ap-
propriate ballot definitions. With preprinted optical-scan ballots, the PCOS can
be programmed to accept many different ballot styles, but the vote center must
still maintain inventory of many different ballots. BOD printers are another eco-
nomical alternative for vote centers.36
• Paper/storage. BMDs that print summary cards rather than full-face ballots can
save paper and storage space. However, many BMDs print full-face ballots—so
they do not save storage—while many BMDs that print summary cards (which
could save storage) use thermal printers and paper that is fragile and can fade in
a few months.37
with many contests cost up to 50 cents.
33
Ballot cards for ES&S ExpressVote cost about 15 cents. New Hampshire’s (One4All / Prime III)
BMDs used by sight-impaired voters use plain paper that is less expensive.
34
They include not only the cost of acquiring and implementing systems but also the ongoing licens-
ing, logistics, and operating (purchasing paper stock, printing, and inventory management) costs.
35
BOD printers currently on the market arguably are best suited for vote centers, but less expensive
options suited for polling places could be developed. Indeed, BMDs that print full-face ballots could be
re-purposed as BOD printers for polling place use, with modest changes to the programming.
36
Ballot-on-demand printers may require maintenance such as replacement of toner cartridges. This is
readily accomplished at a vote center with a professional staff. Ballot-on-demand printers may be a less
attractive option for many small precincts on election day, where there is no professional staff—but on
the other hand, they are less necessary, since far fewer ballot styles will be needed in any one precinct.
37
The California Top-To-Bottom Review (TTBR) of voting systems found that thermal pa-
per can also be covertly spoiled wholesale using common household chemicals https://
votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/ttbr/red-diebold.pdf, last
visited 8 April 2019. The fact that thermal paper printing can fade or deteriorate
rapidly might mean it does not satisfy the federal requirement to preserve voting materi-
als for 22 months. http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:
USC-prelim-title52-section20701&num=0&edition=prelim, last visited 8
24
Advocates of hand-marked paper ballot systems advance these additional argu-

ments.
• Cost. Using BMDs for all voters substantially increases the cost of acquiring,
configuring, and maintaining the voting system. One PCOS can serve 1200 vot-
ers in a day, while one BMD can serve only about 260 [34]—though both these
numbers vary greatly depending on the length of the ballot and the length of the
day. OSET analyzed the relative costs of acquiring BMDs for Georgia’s nearly
seven million registered voters versus a system of hand-marked paper ballots,
scanners, and BOD printers [27]. A BMD solution for Georgia would cost tax-
payers between 3 and 5 times more than a system based on hand-marked paper
ballots. Open-source systems might eventually shift the economics, but current
commercial universal-use BMD systems are more expensive than systems that
use hand-marked paper ballots for most voters.
• Mechanical reliability and capacity. Pens are likely to have less downtime than
BMDs. It is easy and inexpensive to get more pens and privacy screens when
additional capacity is needed. If a precinct-count scanner goes down, people
can still mark ballots with a pen; if the BMD goes down, voting stops. Thermal
printers used in DREs with VVPAT are prone to jams; those in BMDs might have
similar flaws.
These secondary pros and cons of BMDs do not outweigh the primary security and
accuracy concern: BMDs, if hacked or erroneously programmed, can change votes in
a way that is not correctable. BMD voting systems are not contestable or defensible.
Audits that rely on BMD printout cannot make up for this defect in the paper trail: they
cannot reliably detect or correct problems that altered election outcomes.
Barcodes
A controversial feature of some BMDs allows them to print 1-dimensional or 2-dimen-

sional barcodes on the paper ballots. A 1-dimensional barcode resembles the pat-
tern of vertical lines used to identify products by their universal product codes. A
2-dimensional barcode or QR code is a rectangular area covered in coded image mod-
ules that encode more complex patterns and information. BMDs print barcodes on the
same paper ballot that contains human-readable ballot choices. Voters using BMDs
are expected to verify the human-readable printing on the paper ballot card, but the
presence of barcodes with human-readable text poses some significant problems.
April 2019.
25
• Barcodes are not human readable. The whole purpose of a paper ballot is to be
able to recount (or audit) the voters’ votes in a way independent of any (possibly
hacked or buggy) computers. If the official vote on the ballot card is the barcode,
then it is impossible for the voters to verify that the official vote they cast is the
vote they expressed. Therefore, before a state even considers using BMDs that
print barcodes (and we do not recommend doing so), the State must ensure by
statute that recounts and audits are based only on the human-readable portion of
the paper ballot. Even so, audits based on untrustworthy paper trails suffer from
the verifiability the problems outlined above.
• Ballot cards with barcodes contain two different votes. Suppose a state does
ensure by statute that recounts and audits are based on the human-readable por-
tion of the paper ballot. Now a BMD-marked ballot card with both barcodes
and human-readable text contains two different votes in each contest: the bar-
code (used for electronic tabulation), and the human-readable selection printout
(official for audits and recounts). In few (if any) states has there even been a dis-
cussion of the legal issues raised when the official markings to be counted differ
between the original count and a recount.
• Barcodes pose technical risks. Any coded input into a computer system—
including wired network packets, WiFi, USB thumbdrives, and barcodes—pose
the risk that the input-processing software can be vulnerable to attack via deliber-
ately ill-formed input. Over the past two decades, many such vulnerabilities have
been documented on each of these channels (including barcode readers) that, in
the worst case, give the attacker complete control of a system.38 If an attacker
were able to compromise a BMD, the barcodes are an attack vector for the at-
tacker to take over an optical scanner (PCOS or CCOS), too. Since it is good
practice to close down all such unneeded attack vectors into PCOS or CCOS vot-
ing machines (e.g., don’t connect your PCOS to the Internet!), it is also good
practice to avoid unnecessary attack channels such as barcodes.
8 Insecurity of All-in-One BMDs
Some voting machines incorporate a BMD interface, printer, and optical scanner into
the same cabinet. Other DRE+VVPAT voting machines incorporate ballot-marking,
tabulation, and paper-printout retention, but without scanning. These are often called
38
An example of a barcode attack is based on the fact that many commercial barcode-scanner compo-
nents (which system integrators use to build cash registers or voting machines) treat the barcode scanner
using the same operating-system interface as if it were a keyboard device; and then some operating
systems allow “keyboard escapes” or “keyboard function keys” to perform unexpected operations.
26
“all-in-one” voting machines. To use an all-in-one machine, the voter makes choices
on a touchscreen or through a different accessible interface. When the selections are
complete, the BMD prints the completed ballot for the voter to review and verify, before
depositing the ballot in a ballot box attached to the machine.
Such machines are especially unsafe: like any BMD described in Section 3 they are
not contestable or defensible, but in addition, if hacked they can print votes onto the
ballot after the voter last inspects the ballot.
• The ES&S ExpressVote (in all-in-one mode) allows the voter to mark a ballot by
touchscreen or audio interface, then prints a paper ballot card and ejects it from a
slot. The voter has the opportunity to review the ballot, then the voter redeposits
the ballot into the same slot, where it is scanned and deposited into a ballot box.
• The ES&S ExpressVoteXL allows the voter to mark a ballot by touchscreen or
audio interface, then prints a paper ballot and displays it under glass. The voter
has the opportunity to review the ballot, then the voter touches the screen to
indicate “OK,” and the machine pulls paper ballot up (still under glass) and into
the integrated ballot box.
• The Dominion ImageCast Evolution (ICE) allows the voter to deposit a hand-
marked paper ballot, which it scans and drops into the attached ballot box. Or,
a voter can use a touchscreen or audio interface to direct the marking of a paper
ballot, which the voting machine ejects through a slot for review; then the voter
redeposits the ballot into the slot, where it is scanned and dropped into the ballot
box.
In all three of these machines, the ballot-marking printer is in the same paper path
as the mechanism to deposit marked ballots into an attached ballot box. This opens up
a very serious security vulnerability: the voting machine can mark the paper ballot (to
add votes or spoil already-cast votes) after the last time the voter sees the paper, and
then deposit that marked ballot into the ballot box without the possibility of detection.
Vote-stealing software could easily be constructed that looks for undervotes on the
ballot, and marks those unvoted spaces for the candidate of the hacker’s choice. This
is very straightforward to do on optical-scan bubble ballots (as on the Dominion ICE)
where undervotes are indicated by no mark at all. On machines such as the ExpressVote
and ExpressVoteXL, the normal software indicates an undervote with the words NO
SELECTION MADE on the ballot summary card. Hacked software could simply leave
a blank space there (most voters wouldn’t notice the difference), and then fill in that
space and add a matching bar code after the voter has clicked “cast this ballot.”
An even worse feature of the ES&S ExpressVote and the Dominion ICE is the auto-
27
cast configuration setting (in the manufacturer’s standard software) that allows the voter
to indicate, “don’t eject the ballot for my review, just print it and cast it without me
looking at it.” If fraudulent software were installed in the ExpressVote, it could change
all the votes of any voter who selected this option, because the voting machine software
would know in advance of printing that the voter had waived the opportunity to inspect
the printed ballot. We call this auto-cast feature “permission to cheat” [4].
Regarding these all-in-one machines, we conclude:
• Any machine with ballot printing in the same paper path with ballot deposit is
not software independent; it is not the case that “an error or fault in the voting
system software or hardware cannot cause an undetectable change in election
results.” Therefore such all-in-one machines do not comply with the VVSG 2.0
(the Election Assistance Commission’s Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines).
Such machines are not contestable or defensible, either.
• All-in-one machines on which all voters use the BMD interface to mark their
ballots (such as the ExpressVote and ExpressVoteXL) also suffer from the same
serious problem as ordinary BMDs: most voters do not review their ballots ef-
fectively, and elections on these machines are not contestable or defensible.
• The auto-cast option for a voter to allow the paper ballot to be cast without human
inspection is particularly dangerous, and states must insist that vendors disable
or eliminate this mode from the software. However, even disabling the auto-cast
feature does not eliminate the risk of undetected vote manipulation.
Remark. The Dominion ImageCast Precinct ICP320 is a precinct-count optical scan-

ner (PCOS) that also contains an audio+buttons ballot-marking interface for disabled
voters. This machine can be configured to cast electronic-only ballots from the BMD
interface, or an external printer can be attached to print paper optical-scan ballots from
the BMD interface. When the external printer is used, that printer’s paper path is not
connected to the scanner+ballot-box paper path (a person must take the ballot from the
printer and deposit it into the scanner slot). Therefore this machine is as safe to use as
any PCOS with a separate external BMD.
9 Conclusion
Ballot-Marking Devices produce ballots that do not necessarily record the vote ex-
pressed by the voter when they enter their selections on the touchscreen: hacking, bugs,
and configuration errors can cause the BMDs to print votes that differ from what the
28
voter entered and verified electronically. Because outcome-changing errors in BMD

printout do not produce public evidence, BMD systems are not contestable. Because
there is no way to generate convincing public evidence that reported outcomes are cor-
rect despite any BMD malfunctions that might have occurred, BMD systems are not
defensible. Therefore, BMDs should not be used by voters who can hand mark paper
ballots.
All-in-one voting machines, which combine ballot-marking and ballot-box-deposit

into the same paper path, are even worse. They have all the disadvantages of BMDs
(they are not contestable or defensible), and they can mark the ballot after the voter has
inspected it. Therefore they are not even software independent, and should not be used
by those voters who are capable of marking, handling, and visually inspecting a paper
ballot.
When computers are used to record votes, the original transaction (the voter’s ex-
pression of the votes) is not documented in a verifiable way.39 When pen-and-paper is
used to record the vote, the original expression of the vote is documented in a verifiable
way (if demonstrably secure chain of custody of the paper ballots is maintained). Audits
of elections conducted with hand-marked paper ballots, counted by optical scanners,
can ensure that reported election outcomes are correct. Audits of elections conducted
with BMDs cannot ensure that reported outcomes are correct.
References
[1] A.W. Appel. Optical-scan voting extremely accurate in Minnesota. Freedom
to Tinker, January 2009. https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2009/01/21/
optical-scan-voting-extremely-accurate-minnesota/.
[2] A.W. Appel. End-to-end verifiable elections. Freedom to Tinker,

November 2018. https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/11/05/
end-to-end-verifiable-elections/.
[3] A.W. Appel. Florida is the Florida of ballot-design mistakes. Freedom to Tin-
ker, November 2018. https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/11/14/
florida-is-the-florida-of-ballot-design-mistakes/.
39
It is conceivable that cryptographic protocols like those used in E2E-V systems could be used to
create BMD-based systems that are contestable and defensible, but no such system exists, nor, to our
knowledge, has such a design been worked out in principle. Existing E2E-V systems that use a computer
to print (encrypted) selections are neither contestable nor defensible, as explained in Section 1.
29
[4] A.W. Appel. Serious design flaw in ESS ExpressVote touch-

screen: “permission to cheat”. Freedom to Tinker, Septem-
ber 2018. https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/09/14/
serious-design-flaw-in-ess-expressvote-touchscreen-permission-to-cheat/.
[5] J. Benaloh, M. Byrne, B. Eakin, P. Kortum, N. McBurnett, O. Pereira, P.B. Stark, ,

and D.S. Wallach. Star-vote: A secure, transparent, auditable, and reliable voting
system. JETS: USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems, 1:18–37,
2013.
[6] J. Benaloh, D. Jones, E. Lazarus, M. Lindeman, and P.B. Stark. SOBA: Secrecy-
preserving observable ballot-level audits. In Proceedings of the 2011 Electronic
Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE
’11). USENIX, 2011.
[7] Josh Benaloh, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Philip B. Stark, Vanessa
Teague, and Poorvi L. Vora. End-to-end verifiability. CoRR, abs/1504.03778,
2015.
[8] Matthew Bernhard, Allison McDonald, Henry Meng, Jensen Hwa, Nakul Bajaj,
Kevin Chang, and J. Alex Halderman. Can voters detect malicious manipulation
of ballot marking devices? In 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
page (to appear). IEEE, 2020.
[9] R. K. Bothwell, K.A. Deffenbacher, and J.C. Brigham. Correlation of eyewitness

accuracy and confidence: Optimality hypothesis revisited. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 72:691–695, 1987.
[10] D. Chaum, A. Essex, R.T. Carback III, J. Clark, S. Popoveniuc, A.T. Sherman,
and P. Vora. Scantegrity: End-to-end voter verifiable optical-scan voting. IEEE
Security & Privacy, 6:40–46, 2008.
[11] Election Assistance Commission. Voluntary voting systems guidelines

2.0, September 2017. https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/TGDC_
Recommended_VVSG2.0_P_Gs.pdf.
[12] Moritz Contag, Guo Li, Andre Pawlowski, Felix Domke, Kirill Levchenko,
Thorsten Holz, and Stefan Savage. How they did it: An analysis of emission
defeat devices in modern automobiles. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, pages 231–250. IEEE, 2017.
[13] K. Deffenbacher. Eyewitness accuracy and confidence: Can we infer anything

about their relation? Law and Human Behavior, 4:243–260, 1980.
30
[14] R. DeMillo, R. Kadel, and M. Marks. What voters are asked to verify affects
ballot verification: A quantitative analysis of voters’ memories of their ballots,
November 2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3292208.
[15] S.L. Desmarais, T.L. Nicholls, J. D. Read, and J. Brink. Confidence and accuracy
in assessments of short-term risks presented by forensic psychiatric patients. The
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 21(1):1–22, 2010.
[16] D. Dunning, D.W. Griffin, J.D. Milojkovic, and L. Ross. The overconfidence
effect in social prediction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58:568–
581, 1990.
[17] S.P. Everett. The Usability of Electronic Voting Machines and How Votes Can Be
Changed Without Detection. PhD thesis, Rice University, 2007.
[18] A.J. Feldman, J.A. Halderman, and E.W. Felten. Security analysis of the Diebold
AccuVote-TS voting machine. In 2007 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting
Technology Workshop (EVT 2007), August 2007.
[19] Verified Voting Foundation. The verifier – polling place equipment – november
2018, November 2018. https://www.verifiedvoting.org/verifier/.
[20] P. Johansson, L. Hall, and S. Sikstrom. From change blindness to choice blind-
ness. Psychologia, 51:142–155, 2008.
[21] D. Kahnemann. Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.
[22] S. J. Lewis, O. Pereira, and V. Teague. Ceci n’est pas une preuve:
The use of trapdoor commitments in Bayer-Groth proofs and the im-
plications for the verifiabilty of the Scytl-SwissPost Internet voting sys-
tem, 2019. https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/vjteague/
UniversalVerifiabilitySwissPost.pdf.
[23] M. Lindeman and P.B. Stark. A gentle introduction to risk-limiting audits. IEEE
Security and Privacy, 10:42–49, 2012.
[24] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Securing the Vote:
Protecting American Democracy. The National Academies Press, Washington,
DC, September 2018.
[25] L. Norden, M. Chen, D. Kimball, and W. Quesenbery. Better Ballots, 2008. Bren-
nan Center for Justice, http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/
better-ballots.
31
[26] Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State. Minnesota’s historic 2008

election, 2009. https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/3078/
minnesotas-historic-2008-election.pdf.
[27] E. Perez. Georgia state election technology acquisition: A reality check.

OSET Institute Briefing, March 2019. https://trustthevote.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/06Mar19-OSETBriefing_
GeorgiaSystemsCostAnalysis.pdf.
[28] K. Rayner and M.S. Castelhano. Eye movements during reading, scene percep-
tion, and visual search, 2009. Q J Experimental Psychology, 2009, August 62(8),
1457-1506.
[29] J. Reason. Human Error (20th Printing). Cambridge University Press, New York,
2009.
[30] R.L. Rivest and J.P. Wack. On the notion of software independence in voting
systems, July 2006. http://vote.nist.gov/SI-in-voting.pdf.
[31] Ronald L Rivest. On the notion of ‘software independence’ in voting systems.

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and
Engineering Sciences, 366(1881):3759–3767, 2008.
[32] Ronald L Rivest and Madars Virza. Software independence revisited. In Real-
World Electronic Voting, pages 19–34. Auerbach Publications, 2016.
[33] P.Y.A. Ryan, D. Bismark amnd J. Heather, and S. Schneiderand Z. Xia. The prêt
à voter verifiable election system. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, 4:662–673, 2009.
[34] Election Systems and Software. State of Georgia Electronic Request

for Information New Voting System Event Number: 47800-SOS0000035,
2018. http://sos.ga.gov/admin/files/ESS%20RFI%20-%20Final%
20-%20Redacted.pdf.
[35] P.B. Stark. Conservative statistical post-election audits. Annals of Applied Statis-
tics, 2:550–581, 2008.
[36] P.B. Stark. Risk-limiting post-election audits: P -values from common probability
inequalities. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 4:1005–
1014, 2009.
32
[37] P.B. Stark. An introduction to risk-limiting audits and evidence-based elections,

2018. Testimony prepared for the California Little Hoover Commission, https:
//www.stat.berkeley.edu/˜stark/Preprints/lhc18.pdf.
[38] P.B. Stark. There is no reliable way to detect hacked ballot-marking devices.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.08144, 2019.
[39] P.B. Stark and D.A. Wagner. Evidence-based elections. IEEE Security and Pri-
vacy, 10:33–41, 2012.
[40] U. S. Election Assistance Commission. Effective designs for the administration

of federal elections, June 2007. https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/1/EAC_
Effective_Election_Design.pdf.
[41] Dan S. Wallach. On the security of ballot marking devices, December 2019.
[42] J.T. Wixted and G.L. Wells. The relationship between eyewitness confidence and
identification accuracy: A new synthesis. Psychological Science in the Public
Interest, 2017.
33
Exh. 7
Exh. 9
Exh. 10
Case
1:20-cv-04651-SDG Document
Document1-11
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ATLANTA DIVISION
L. LIN WOOD,JR.,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.

l:20-cv-04651-SDG
V.
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER,in his official

capacity as Secretary of State of the State
of Georgia,REBECCA N.SULLIVAN,
in her offlcial capacity as Vice Chair of
the Georgia State Election Board,
DAVID J. WORLEY,in his official
capacity as a Member of the Georgia
State Election Board, MATTHEW
MASHBURN,in his official capacity as
a Member of the Georgia State Election
Board,and ANH LE,in her official
State Election Board,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF MAYRA ROMERA IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
I, Mayra Romera, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true
and correct:
{00584021.}
Case
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1.1 am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein. I have
personal knowledge ofthe matters stated herein.
2.1 am a Florida Bar licensed paralegal.
3.1 am a registered Democrat.
4.1 was interested in the election process in this country and wanted to be an
observer in the Georgia recount process.
5. On Monday, November 16, 2020, I presented myself to Cobb County Poll
Precinct located at 2245 Callaway Road SW, Marietta, OA. I was able to be
on the floor observing the recount process in Room C. I observed the poll
workers not calling out verbally the names on each ballot. They simply
passed each ballot to each other in silence.
6. It was of particular interest to me that hundreds ofthese ballots seemed
impeccable, with no folds or creases. The bubble selections were perfectly
made (all within the circle), only observed selections in black ink, and all
happened to be selections for Biden.
7. It was also of particular interest to me to see that signatures were not being
verified and there were no corresponding envelopes seen in site.
{00584021.}
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8. At one point in time, while on the floor, I overheard a woman tell someone
else that they should keep an eye on the guy with a blue blazer and a pocket
square, that he was not allowed to come on the floor and observe past the
yellow tape. They also kept an eye on him as he took photographs and video
of some boxes being stored on a rack. Shortly thereafter, I observed a police
officer standing at the door. I had not observed a police officer present up
until that moment. They began to walk towards him to stop him as he was
photographing those boxes, but at that point, he walked away from that area.
9. Based on my observations, I believe there was fraud was committed in the
presidential election and question the validity of the Georgia recount
process.
[SIGNATURE AND OATH ON NEXT PAGE]
{00584021.}
Case
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and
correct.
MayraL. Romera
STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF FULTON
Mayra L. Romera appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the above
jurisdiction, this 17th day of November 2020, and after being duly sworn, made this
Declaration, under oath.
I \
[Affix Se^J ^
jtary Public
My Commission Expires_ (yi'i'\'2DzU
{00584021.)
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Exh. 13
iJI out and m,lil to: Every Legal Vot • lntegrit Pro'ecJ I I 16 lnwood Dr.• uil~ 2 J, DaJ.l , , 52 4
Sc.an th Ex uted orn Affidavit t1nd enrail FraudReport Eve, Lega/Vote.com
T 0
-------
or ·
Fult n----
the und rsignod, on this d t p rsonally appeared

____ ,. ___......,.___
______ ,kt wn t m to beth pe n e i bscribed
eing duJ w m b m , tac d upon his or h r oath as
--Mynamei : ___ Ursula . ol ______ _
On Octob 13. 2020 I v. m to early ote at th Alpharetta Libr located at

10 Park J>la7..a
Alpharetta 0009. 'he lir . · re I ng. l r in rmed tho e in
lin th t the zing nd that onl 2 poll pads were functional and
tht tn lo~ hour w it m turn to g t m ot card cam up. I
present d m GA DL and it w · ca.rm at the poll pad. At which tim poll
worker Jaine ampb .11t ld m l lread, ted. l told hi abs 1.tel
ha not. H th n ask d ifl had rcqu cd an absent ballot and I replied no. H
attempted to make an en n th p ll pad n I to tell m th t th p 11pad
frozen. He a e me an affida it to sign and told me h was addin m to th list of
manual ballots in bis comput rand ga m a vot card from the table without
being proc~ thru th poll pad. 1 a.s.keawho had voted for m and if there was
.n plan ti n i r the error he in ic ted h could n t tell what th pro I m
ignwre:~
Printed am; lhub V, Wert

• 2020.
nd forth
Exh. 14
Case
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22

ATLANTA DIVISION
L. LIN WOOD, JR., )

)
Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
) 1 :20-cv-04651-SDG
v. )
)
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his official)
capacity as Secretary of State of the State )
of Georgia, REBECCA N. SULLIVAN, )
in her official capacity as Vice Chair of )
the Georgia State Election Board, )
DAVID J. WORLEY, in his official )
capacity as a Member of the Georgia )
State Election Board, MATTHEW )
MASHBURN, in his official capacity as )
a Mem her of the Georgia State Election )
Board, and ANH LE, in her official )
State Election Board, )
)
Defendants.
__________ )
)
AFFIDAVIT OF NICHOLAS J. ZEHER IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
I, Nicholas J. Zeher, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is
true and correct:
1. I am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein. I have personal
know ledge of the matters stated herein.
1
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2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Florid

a.
3. On Sunday November 15, 2020 Alyssa Specht appointed me
to serve as a
Monitor for the duration of the Risk Limiting Audit in DeKalb
County (the
"DeKalb Appointment Letter"). A true and accurate copy of the
appointment letter is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit "A."
4. On Sunday at around 12:30 p.m., I showed up to 2994 Turne

r Hill Road,
Stonecrest, Georgia 30038 to begin observing as a Monitor.
Prior to my
arrival, I was sent a handout titled "Audit/Recount Monitor and
Vote Review
Panel Handout" which outlined the rules in place as well
as provided
guidelines for observation. A true and accurate copy of the Audit
/Recount
Monitor and Vote Review Panel Handout is attached to this
Affidavit as
Exhibit "B."
5. After signing in and providing the DeKalb appointment letter

to the check-
in desk, I was permitted to roam throughout the facility
to conduct
observations.
6. The first thing I noticed was signs taped to each table (the "Revi
ew Table"
or "Review Tables") indicated a place for ballots for Trump,
Biden, and
Jorgenson and other signs for "Blanks" (no vote for President)
or overvotes
(multiple votes for President). At each Review Table were
two people
2
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manually reviewing each ballot (the "Recounter"). The first Recounter
would pick up the ballot and orally announce which candidate the ballot was
cast for. The first Recounter would then pass the ballot to the second
Recounter who would again orally announce which candidate the ballot was
cast for. The ballot was subsequently placed in the pile designated for that
candidate as discussed above.
7. Due to the COVID restrictions, we were instructed to stay a minimum of

six
feet away from any Recounter sitting at one of the Review Tables.
8. The ballots would be brought to the Review Table in a cardboard box

by
another worker. I was never able to get close enough to read any writing on
any of the cardboard boxes. After the carboard box was opened, stacks of
ballots were removed and placed on the Review Table. There were notes on
each stack but again, I was never able to get close enough to read what was
written.
9. Once the stack of ballots was on the Review Table, the process of reviewi
ng
the ballot began in the manner outlined above in paragraph 6.
10. At no time did I witness any Recounter or any individual participating

in
the recount verifying signatures.
3
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11. If one of the Recounters encountered a ballot that was questionable, he or
she raised a piece of paper with a "?" and what seemed to be a supervisor
would come to that Review Table. A short conversation was had and the
supervisor would provide the Recounters with instructions. Again, I was
never able to get close enough to hear what was said.
12.When a Review Table completed reviewing a cardboard box full of ballots,
one of the Recounters would write some information (I assume it was the
number of ballots for each candidate the box contained) on a piece of paper
and place it on top of the cardboard box. Then one of the Recounters would
hold a piece of paper with a (check mark) on it in the air and someone
would come pick up the box full of ballots.
13.There was no person verifying the number of votes that the Recounter would
write on the paper.
14.At one point, I was able to get close enough to a Review Table to see the
ballots and the markings on them. It was strange-there were many ballots
where just Joseph Biden was filled in and no other candidate whatsoever.
15.At another table, I watched the Recounters pull out a stack of ballots that
appeared to be strange too. The bubble filled out for Joseph Biden looked
to be a perfect black mark.
4
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16.I spoke to other Observers present that day and they had witnessed the same
thing. Other Observes also informed me that fellow Observers were
removed for getting too close to the Review Tables. That when they would
get close enough to see what was actually filled in on the ballot, one of the
Recounters would begin making a big scene and call over a supervisor. The
supervisor would then remove the Monitor permanently.
17.While in DeKalb County, I saw a lot of hostility towards Republicans and
none towards Democrats.
18. On the evening of November 15, 2020, Alyssa Specht appointed me as an
Monitor in Henry County for the whole duration of the Risk Limiting Audit
("Henry County Appointment Letter"). A true and accurate copy of the
Henry County Appointment Letter is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit
"C."
19. I arrived at 562 Industrial Boulevard, McDonough, Georgia 30253 at
around 9:30 a.m.
20. When I entered the building, I was halted by a woman at the door who
immediately informed me that I was not needed and that all the position had
been filled. At this time, the woman neither asked who I was nor why I was
present. I asked this woman to speak to the person in charge.
5
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21. Within a few seconds, I was greeted by Ameika Pitts ("Ms. Pitts"), Henry
Country's Elections Director. Ms. Pitts informed me that my assistance was
not needed, and I was free to go. Again, this was told to me prior to her
asked why I was there and who I was.
22.I then pulled the Henry County Appointment Letter up on my phone and
presented it to her. Ms. Pitts immediately told me that I was not able to have
my phone inside the building even though the recount was allegedly being
"live streamed." After a brief conversation, I send Ms. Pitts a copy of the
letter and was permitted to enter the building, but only in the public
observation area.
23 .Fortunately, after speaking to several Republican Party volunteers, MS. Pitts
was provided my name from the Henry County Republican Chairwoman
and I was permitted to enter into the observation area.
24. Once inside the observation area, I saw that it was set up very similar to
DeKalb County with the Review Tables having the same designations and
each Review table having two Recounters as described in paragraph 6 above.
25 .As I began walking around, I noticed several differences between DeKalb
County and Henry County. In Henry County, the ballots were brought to
each Review Table in a red, plastic box with security ties used to hold the
6
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box closed. Those ties were cut, and the ballots were then removed and
placed on top of the Review Table in stacks that were wrapped in a rubber
bands and had a pink sticky note on each stack which displayed the number
of ballots each stack contained. The Recounter would then remove the
rubber band and sticky note and begin counting the same was described in
paragraph 6 above.
26.At around 12:05 p.m. I was observing table "G" when the two recount
workers sorted a pile of ballots that had a note which said "93" as the number
of ballots. When the two workers finished sorting and counting the ballots,
there were only 92. The director of the election committee, Ms. Pitts came
to the two workers and simply signed a separate sheet of paper saying that
there were only 92 ballots. Ms. Pitts never recounted to make sure. This
happened several times and Ms. Pitts informed us that she has been directed
to just sign off on the number of ballots the recount worker said was there.
27. While in Henry County, I personally witnessed ballots cast for Donald
Trump being placed in the pile for Joseph Biden. I witnessed this happen at
table "A."
28 .I interviewed a few Observers that same day who informed me that on
multiple occasions, Recounters at tables "A," "B," "G," and "O" were seen
7
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placing ballots cast for Donald Trump placed in the pile for Joseph Bi den.
When this was brought to Ms. Pitts attention, it was met with extreme
hostility. At no time did I witness any ballot cast for Joseph Biden be placed
in the pile for Donald Trump.
29. Based on my personal observations, I believe that additional absentee
ballots were cast for Donald Trump but counted for Joseph Biden. I further
believe that there was widespread fraud favoring Joseph Bi den. This is my
personal experience.
8
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are

true and
correct
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
Nicholas Zeh er, appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the
above
jurisdiction, this 17th day of November 2020, and after being duly sworn
, made this
[Affix Seal]
My Commission Expires ________ _
..~;:••,,, TALLEN
ROBERN. JR.,
/f~•··~\ MYCOMMISSION
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9
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Exhibit A
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I.GOP
November 15, 2020
Monitor Designee - Risk Limiting Audit
To Whom it May Concern:
This letter serves as proper notice, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408, § O.C.G.A

. 21-2-483, State Election
Board Rule 183-1- 13-.06, and/or State Election Board Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15.
The listed designees are to
serve as a Monitor for the whole duration of the Risk Limiting Audit in DeKalb
County:
• William McElligott • Nicholas Zeher • Michael Sasso

• Oleg Otten
• Kevin Peterford • Scott Strauss
David J. Shafer
Chainnan Michael Welsh
Secretary
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Exhibit B
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Audit/Recount
Monitor and Vote Review Panel Handout
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Audit Observer Handout
Arrival:
• Arrive 30 minutes prior to the start of your shift.
• The public is to watch the opening procedures before the audit begins
and after the audit ends
for the day.
• Be respectful and professional, not adversarial.
Audit Observers/Designated Monitors:

• Each political party may have one designated monitor per 10 Audit Teams
or a minimum of two
designated monitors per room.
• Designated monitors may roam the audit room and observe the audit process
• Observe the Check-in and Check-out process of the ballots
• Must wear badges that identify them by name.
• Are allowed to observe but may not obstruct orderly conduct of election.
• May not speak to or otherwise interact with election workers.
• Are not allowed to wear campaign buttons, shirts, hats or other campaign
items.
• Do not touch any ballot or ballot container
• Observe and ensure the room is properly set-up, the Audit Teams are completin
g their tasks,
and the Table is set up properly (see below}.
• Must pose questions regarding procedures to the clerk/election worker
for resolution.
Room Set up
AuditBoardRoomLayout
AuditBoard AuditBoard
Audit Teams Responsibilities
When reviewing a ballot and determining the voter's mark, audit boards
must consider "if the elector
has marked his or her ballot in such a manner that he or she has indicated
clearly and without question
the candidate for whom he or she desires to cast his or her vote." O.C.G.A.
21-2-438(c}.
As a batch is delivered from the check-in/out station:

• Record the County Name, Batch Name, and Batch Type (Absentee, Advance
d Voting,
Provisional, Election Day}, and verify the container was sealed on the Audit
Board Batch Sheet.
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• Unseal the container.

• Recount the Ballots using the "Sort and Stack
" method:
o Pull the ballots out of the container and
stack neatly on the table.
If the container contains more than 1000
ballots, ballots should be removed
from the container and sorted in manageab
le stacks (using an Audit Board Batch
Sheet for each stack), leaving the rest of
the ballots in the container until the
previous stack is done.
For each ballot: audit board member (ABM
) #1 picks up a single ballot from the
stack and reads the vote for the Presidentia
l contest aloud, then hands the
ballot to ABM #2. ABM #2 verifies the vote
that is on the ballot is indeed what
ABM #1 read, then places the ballot in the
"stack" that corresponds to the vote.
ABM #1 should watch to make sure the ballot
is placed in the right stack. There
will be 8 stacks as follows:
• Trump
• Biden
• Jorgensen
• Overvoted ballots - one pile for any ballot
where the voter made more
than one selection for President.
• Blank/Undervoted ballots - one pile for any
ballot where the voter made
no selection for President.
• Write-In - one pile for any ballot conta
ining a write-in vote for President.
(The board does *NOT* need to determine
whether the write-in is for a
qualified candidate: the Vote Review Pane
l does that.)
• Duplicated ballots - one pile for ballots mark
ed as duplicated.
• Undetermined - one pile for any ballot where
the audit board cannot
agree on the voter's intent.
Candidate Ballot Tallies - Count the ballot
s in each stack by having one member
of the audit board verbally count the ballot
while handing· it to the other
member for verification. Count the ballot
s in groups of 10, stacking the groups
at right angles to each other, so you can
easily count the complete groups when
you are done. (For instance, if you have seven
groups of 10 ballots each plus an
extra 3 ballots, the total tally would be 73.)
Record the total tally for each
candidate on the Audit Board Batch Shee
t.
Write-In, Duplicated, and Undetermined
Ballots - count the ballots in the write-
in duplicated, and undetermined ballot piles
and record on the Audit Board
Batch Sheet. Each type should go in a desig
nated folder or envelope by batch.
o Write-in, Duplicated, and Undetermined
ballot folders must be set aside for delive
the Vote Review Panel. ry to
o Return the other ballots to the origin
al container and seal the container.
o Sign the Audit Board Batch Sheet.
o Raiseyour check mark sign for the check
-in/out station to come retrieve your conta
batch sheet, and any ballots for the Vote iner,
Review Panel.
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Audit Board Batch Sheet

Count; ______ _
8atchNamo _____ _
Batch Type: l }Absentee i··~Advanc:e \,.(ElodlonDay t.'lProvlslonaf i·;other
Was the container sealed when mceivod by tho -twdit board? l J Yos
Candidates Enter Audit Totals
Donald J. Trump
Joseph R. Blden
Jo Jorgen1on
Overvote
Blank/Undervote
"-~-~!.,
Ballots sent to tho Vote R•~l!."! .. ..~.!.!'"rl
.....
Write-In
Duplicated
UndotermfneU
When work Is oompjefod,rotum all ballots (except Vote Rovluw Panel ballots)
to tile ballot
container and seal container.
Was the container resealed by tho audit board? C1Yes
Check In/Out Station

L j Recordedbatch returnon Ballot ContainerlnvontorySheet
[l Delivered Vole Review Panel ballots (If any)
CJ Entered f~Uissinto Ario
-~------ lnillals or check In/out statlon member
Table Set up
AuditBoardTableTopOrganization
No Photography is allowed in the observation area.
Check-in/out Process
• Two election workers are required to observe the check in and check out
process of ballots to
ensure there is a secure chain of custody and inventory of ballots is kept
proper.
o One person is to be kept with the ballot containers
o One person delivers the containers to and from the audit boards ("runner'1
)
• There should be at least one "runner" for every 5 audit boards
• When a new container arrives, the election works must record:
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o batch name
o audit board number
• Upon completion, the election worker must:
o Verify proper completion of the Audit Board Batch Sheet
o Ensure contain is resealed
o Return the container and batch sheet to the check-in/out station
o Note the return of the container of the Ballot Container Inventor
y Sheet
o Deliver any necessary ballots/envelopes to the Vote Review
Panel
Duplicates, write-ins, and undermined
o Enter candidate totals for the batch in Ario, mark as "entered
"
Closing of Audit Room:

• All eligible monitors are able to observe the closing and conclus
ion of the audit.
Monitor Observes lssue...What to Do?

1. Respectfully raise issue with precinct clerk for resolution.
2. Do NOT speak to or interact with election workers.
3. Do NOT take pictures or videos.
4. If unresolved, leave polling room and call GOP GA Legal Hotline
with your name, county, and location.
Be on the lookout for:
1. Lapsesin procedure
2. Food or beverage on audit tables (it should be under the table}
3. Any ballots not being delivered from the runners in the regular
course
Statewide Observer and VRP member Hotline: 470-410-8762
Incident Report Form (attached) and at: .b!!P~LLr~J:IQ.f?.:_Q_rg

/auditreport/
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The Vote Review Panel

Vote Review Panel (VRP) Member:
• Each political party must have 1 member per VRP
• You must object when you cannot agree
o If there is a disagreement between the two VRP members,
the Superintendent or their
designee breaks the tie.
• Manually log each ballot that should be adjudicated
• Are not allowed to wear campaign buttons, shirts, hats or other
campaign items.
• Must pose questions regarding procedures to the clerk/ele
ction worker for resolution.
Three types of Ballots:

• Duplicated Ballots
o Retrieve the original ballot and compare the duplicated ballot
to ensure proper
duplication. Using the original ballot, record the vote tally for the
duplicated ballots
using the Vote Review Panel Tally Sheet.
• Undetermined Ballots
o Review the undetermined ballots where the audit board could
not agree on the voter's
intent to make a determination. Record the vote tally for the undeterm
ined ballots
• Write-In Ballots
o Review the write-in ballots to determine if a voter has voted
for a qualified or invalid
write-in candidate. Record the number of votes for each qualified
write-in candidate on
the Qualified Write-In Candidate Tally Sheet.
Vote ReviewPanel TallySheet County;__ _ Page:_of_

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Common Adjudication Scenarios
CommonAdjudication·Sc,enarios
OVERVOTES
With corrections from voters MARKING ERRORS
Consistent patterns
lnconsist,mt patterm,
STRAY MARKS IN TARGET Af~F.AS
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Exhibit C
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I.GOP
November 15, 2020
This letter serves as proper notice, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408, § O.C.G .A. 21-2-483, State Election
Board Rule 183-1- 13-.06, and/or State Election Board Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15. The listed designees are to
serve as a Monitor for the whole duration of the Risk Limiting Audit in Henry County:
• William McElligott
• Oleg Otten
• Kevin Peterford
• Nicholas Zeher
• Ibrahim Reyes-Gandara
• Juan Carlos Elso
• Carlos Silva
• Mayra Romera
David J. Shafer
Secretary
Exh. 15
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ATLANTA DIVISION
L. LIN WOOD, JR., )

)
) 1:20-cv-04651-SDG
)
)
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his official )
a Member of the Georgia State Election )
)
Defendants. )
----------)
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN VOYLES IN SUPPORT OF

I, Susan Voyles, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true
and correct:
knowledge of the matters stated herein.
1
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2. I am a poll manager at Precinct SS02 A and B (Sandy Springs). The Fulton
County Board of Elections ("BOE") sent an email soliciting poll managers
and assistant poll managers for the purpose of participating in the "hand
count" audit of votes cast in the November 3, 2020 presidential election. I
accepted the assignment.
3. My direct supervisor, Marie Wright, asked me ifl could confirm that I could
show up to participate as an auditor in the recount from Saturday, November
14 until Wednesday, November 18, 2020. I was told that it was a
requirement of the accepting the assignment to be available from 7:00 a.m.
until 5:00 p.m on each of those five days. I was to b'e"paid $200 per day.
4. The BOE also solicited Fulton County employees generally, such as workers
from the public libraries. Most had no election experience (other than
perhaps voting themselves).
5. On Saturday at 7:00 a.m., I showed up to the Georgia World Congress Center
at 285 Andrew Young International Blvd. in downtown Atlanta. We had to
watch a very short training video (probably less than 5 minutes) -- there was
no audio, but there were captions. I watched it three times to ensure I had
captured all the information, but there were . some· things that were not
2
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covered, like what an auditor should do ifhe or she saw matters of concern.
I did not see any helpful written materials on that issue.
6. We were required to sign an oath saying that we would conduct an audit
impartially and fairly to the best of our ability, and were told that if we did
anything wrong we would have to go before the State Board of Elections.
7. The BOE did not appear to have standardized operating procedures for the
' '
conduct of the audit. Everything was in total, disarray at the counting
location. The organizers did not have sufficient tables· for all the committed
volunteers. (When I arrived at 7:00 a.m., 134 tables were set up and I was
assigned to table 136; ultimately, I believe 170 tables were set up.)
8. Counting began shortly after 7:00 a.m., as best as I could tell, but we were
held to the side. After 90 minutes of counting had passed, we were assigned
a table from additional tables that had been brought into the counting area.
9. Signs taped to the table indicated a place for ballots for Trump, Biden, and
Jorgenson and to make a separate pile for "Blank~''(no vote for President)
or overvotes (multiple votes for President). One person was to pick up the
ballot and state the vote out loud, and the other ~as to confirm that selection
and place the ballot in the appropriate location.
3
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IO.After counting, we were instructed to pick up each individual "pile" and
count the ballots in each pile and place them in alternating stacks of IO each.
After counting the final tally, we were instructed to compare the number
with the original number from the opening tally sheet. (The tally sheet
provided a road map to the number that was needed to reconcile with the
original reported results.)
I I.We began counting around 9:00 a.m. We were given a tally sheet to record
. .
our findings, and manila envelopes for write-in candidates and disputed
ballots. Again, we were not given any information or standards on how to
interpret spoiled ballots or other discrepancies.
12.We noticed that the supervisors seemed selective as to how to allocate the
assignments. For our first assignment, we were given a cardboard box that
contained only absentee ballots. It was taped shut with packing tape with
the seal of the Secretary of State. But the seal was blank, signed by no one,
and no information had been supplied. There were no markings indicating
the provenance of the box. The box was marked as Box No. 5 -Absentee-
Batch Numbers 28-36.

: °'· \, . :
13.Inside the box were stacks of ballots of approximately I 00 ballots each.
Each stack contained an original tally sheet that said ·the location where the
4
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ballots were picked up. I am assuming these ballots came from the pervasive
ballot boxes that had been placed throughout F~lton ~ounty.
14.Most of the ballots had already been handled; they had been written on by
people, and the edges were worn. They showed obvious use. However, one
batch stood out. It was pristine. There was a difference in the texture of the
paper - it was if they were intended for absentee use but had not been used
for that purposes. There was a difference in the feel.
15.These different ballots included a slight depressed pre-fold so they could be

;1!' }, , .. , p•. ,.
easily folded and unfolded for use in the scanning.machines. There were no
markings on the ballots to show where they had com~ from, or where they
had been processed. These stood out.
16.In my 20 years' of experience of handling ballots: I observed that the
markings for the candidates on these ballots ·were unusually uniform,
perhaps even with a ballot-marking device. By my estimate in observing
these ballots, approximately 98% constituted votes fo~ Joseph Biden. I only
observed two of these ballots as votes for President Donald J. Trump.
17.We left at approximately 4:45 on Saturday. There will still much to be done.
We were told to come back on Sunday. It was estimated at that time that the
5
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ballot recount would not be completed until Monday. evening at the earliest
-that's how many ballots were left.
18.On our way out, we spoke to a GWCC officer and thanked him for being
there and his service. We asked him if he would be leaving shortly, and he
said he was not scheduled to leave until 11:00 p.m. At that point, other
officers would come and guard the room from 11:00 p.m. to 7 :00 a.m.
19.On Sunday morning we arrived at approximately 6:45 a.m. Initially, the fact
that there were so few auditors in the room indic~te·d that others were just
late. However, by 7: 15 a.m., we realized that because so few additional
auditors had arrived, there would not be a lot of auditors present for the
Sunday count.
20.lnterestingly, we were told to go back to our original table. Even though the
} ' ·. . . '.)
room was sparsely occupied, we were surrounded with two auditors
immediately in front of us and two auditors 1inmediately behind us. We
began to notice a greater disparity in the distribution of workloads. Although
the auditing tables surrounding us arrived later, they were assigned large
boxes of ballots before we were given. When our box arrived - after a 45
minute wait - I opened the ballot box to find only 60 ballots from the Quality
Living Center in South Atlanta, a men's housing ~acility for recovering
6
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addicts. The other auditing tables received boxes with over 3,000 ballots
each.
21.After we completed our first ballot box, we raised our "check card" for more
'· ..
ballots. After waiting for an extended period, ·we were told our assistance
was no longer needed and thanked for our work. We were told to go home.
22. We offered to help on some larger piles that were still evident, and the
officials present were adamant that they did not need· any help. I sat at the
table for a while longer and noticed how other auditors were treated. We
were explicitly told we could not have drinks or food of any kind on the table
-- that was understandable. The people behind usand in front of us however

·..
had open water bottles, breakfast burritos supplied by the BOE, and snacks
on their table.
23 .Also, those tables were not counting as a team, with a pass-off from one to
the other. Each auditor was counting individually. The purpose of the pass-
off was to make sure that each auditor agreed that the call for each ballot
was accurate.
24. This recount process was consistent with... the· lack of preparation,
contingency plans, and proper procedures that I e~perienced in this unusual
election. For example, in the setup for Election Day, we typically receive
7
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the machines - the ballot marking devices -:-on the Friday before the
' ' • I
election, with a chain of custody letter to be signed on Sunday, indicating

I \,, •
that we had received the machines and the counts on the machines when
received, and that the machines have been sealed. In this case, we were
asked to sign the chain of custody letter on Sunday, even though the
machines were not delivered until 2:00 a.m. in the morning on Election Day.
The Milton precinct received its machines at 1:00 a.m. in the morning on
Election Day. This is unacceptable and voting, machines should not be out
of custody immediately prior to an Election Day. It is possible that these
ballot marking devices could have been used for other purposes during that
period.
25. When I was asked to sign the chain of custody fett.er,I only signed the letter
with the added language to state that I was accepting chain of custody for
equipment, BMDs, and pole pads that had not been delivered.
26.My precinct should have received the poll pads oii Sunday and should have
been able to store them inside the ballot marking devices. We could not do
that, since we did not receive the ballot marking devices in a timely manner.
27.When we did receive the machines, they were not sealed or locked, the serial
numbers were not what were reflected on the related documentation, and the
8
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green bar coded tags that are supposed to cover the door covering the
memory card was broken. The supervisor told us to use the machines in that
condition. As a poll manager of over 20 years, _I knew this was not the
standard operating procedure for the BMDs and therefore I did not put them
into service.
28.1 believe my honesty in this affidavit will lead to my arrangement as a poll
worker in Fulton County being compromised. ·However, the BOE
operations were sloppy and led me, in the case of at least one box I reviewed,
to believe that additional absentee ballots had been added in a fraudulent
manner. This is my personal experience.
9
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correct
STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF FULTON
Susan Voyles, appeared before me, a Notary Pu~lic in and for the above
10
Exh. 16
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ATLANTA DIVISION
L. LIN WOOD,JR.,

l:20-cv-04651-SDG
V.

in her official capacity as Vice Chair of
MASHBURN,in his offlcial capacity as
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF IBRAHIM REYES.ESOUIRE IN

ISUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
I, Ibrahim Reyes, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true
and correct:
1. My name is Ibrahim Reyes. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the
State of Florida since 2002, my office address is 236 Valencia Avenue, Coral
Gables, FL 33134, and my email address is ireyes@reyeslawyers.com.
{00584025. }
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2.1 am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein. I have personal
knowledge ofthe matters stated herein.
3.1 volimteered to assist in the manual recount in the State of Georgia and was
assigned to work as a Monitor and as a member ofthe Vote Review Panel.
4. On November 16, 2020,1 went to Clayton County from 8:00 A.M. to 6:00
P.M.
5.1 identified myself as a Monitor and Vote Review Panel associated with the
Republican Party, and the person in charge ofthe Clayton County precinct, Erica
Johnston, said that I could not be present on the floor until I received a badge
with my name,that it would be printed shortly, within thirty minutes, but could
stand in the observers area, away from the counting tables.
6.1 did not receive my identification badge until three hours, so I was prevented
from acting as a Monitor all morning.
7. However,as an observer,I observed that the precinct had twelve(12)counting
tables, but only one (1) monitor from the Republican Party. I brought it up to
Erica Johnston since the recount rules provided for one (1) monitor from each
Party per ten(10)tables or part thereof.
8. Erica Johnston said that I was wrong,that there were only ten tables counting
and explained that because there were ten tables, not twenty, only one monitor
was allowed. I explained to her that there were twelve tables counting, and
{00584025. }
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that the rules did not state what she said, and read to her the rule, which I had on
my phone.
9. Erica Johnston proceeded to tell me that it did not matter, that she was in
charge, and that unless there were twenty tables, one monitor for twelve tables
was fine because ofthe limited space. I explained that I did not note an exception
where due to limited space, she could individually determine how many
Monitors to allow, and that she had created her own rules for the manual recount,
which precluded Republican Monitors from monitoring the recount. Erica
Johnston said that if I continued to insist on having one more Monitor for the
Republican Party, she would call the Police.
10.We were inside the Clayton County Police Department. I pointed her where
a Police officer was and asked her to call her over. I explained to the female
police officer that the Clayton County precinct was not counting ballots following
the rules for counting ballots, and I was requesting Erica Johnston to follow the
rules. The police officer told me that she could not do anything about it.
11.A Clayton County journalist named Robin Kemp of @RKempNews,
overheard the exchange, as a member ofthe media went in and photographed the
twelve (12) counting tables, confirmed to me that she had seen twelve counting
tables, and published it in Twitter.
{00584025. }
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12.Soon thereafter, before noon, we were notified that the location would close,
and the recount would be moved to Jackson Elementary to allow for more space
and more monitors.
13. The recount resumed at Jackson Elementary on or about 1:30 P.M., after
boxes of ballots were brought in a Clayton County white van with tag GV57976
and taken into Jackson Elementary.
14.1 had my identification badge by then, so I went in and noticed that one
Republican Monitor was allowed, yet now there were twenty six(26)tables, and
informed Erica Johnston that, again, if there were twenty six tables for
recounting, three(3)monitors from each Party were to be permitted.
15.Erica Johnston told me that she was in charge, and that I should stop
interfering with the process. I informed Erica Johnston that she was interfering
with the process, since she was not following the recount rules, knowingly.
16.At that point in time, a young man named Trevin McKoy,associated with the
Georgia Republican Party, told Erica Johnston that the Republicans were
entitled to three, not one. Monitor, since there were twenty-six tables. Erica
Johnston called over a Police officer. Officer Johnson, and Erica Johnston asked
Officer Johnson to remove Mr. McKoy from the building.
{00584025.)
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17.1 intervened and explained to Officer Johnson that Erica Johnston was not
following the rules, and Officer Johnson replied that Erica Johnston was in
charge, and that we were not in a Courtroom.
18.1 walked outside with Trevin McKoy,and so did the journalist, Robin Kemp,
who proceeded to publish the violation of rules on her Twitter account.
19.Within five minutes of the Twitter having been published. Erica Johnston
approached me and told me that the Republicans could have two additional
Monitors, and two additional Monitors went on the floor.
20.She also offered me to participate in the Voting Review Panel, which I did
until 6:00 P.M.
21.As a Voting Review Panel member, I sat next to two counting tables, and
monitored whether counters were following the rules.
22.For example,the procedure required that the two counters sitting next to each
other would recite the name of the candidate for whom the vote was cast, one
first, the second after, to confirm agreement, and then place the 'ballot' on the
appropriate stack. Trump,Biden, etc.
23.The counters on the two tables next to my table were not doing that, and I
served as a next to them for over three hours. One would give a 'ballot' to the
next, and the next would place it on top ofone ofthe stacks, without confirmation
from counter 2 to counter 1.
{00584025.)
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24,1 witnessed that Erica Johnston did not follow the rules until I complained,
and journalist Robin Kemp published the violations on her Twitter account.
25.1 also witnessed that Officer Johnson, of the Clayton County Police
Department, removed Trevin McKoy from the Jackson Elementary precinct only
because Erica Johnston told him to remove him, even though Trevin McKoy had
not done or said anything improper.
26.1 also observed that the precinct had Democratic Party monitors, Republican
Party monitors, and Carter Center monitors, and only Republican Monitors were
being mistreated by Erica Johnston and by Officer Johnson.
{00584025. }
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correct
STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF FULTON
Ibrahim Reyes appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the above
jurisdiction, this 17*^ day of November 2020, and after being duly sworn, made this
V
I / I
[Affix-Seall qI .o,'A, 'JJAi d.
Notary Public
COBB
My Commission Expires
{00584025. } 7
Exh. 17
11/17/2020
Case
05:54PM
Document1-18
6-8& CONNIE
JIM Filed
Filed 11/17/20
11/25/20
JGHNSGN Page
Page 12 of
of 34 PAGE 01/03

ATLANTA DIVISION
L.LIN WOOD,JR.

l:20-cv-04651-SDG
V.
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER,in Ms official

of Geoiîa,REBECCA N.SULLIVAN,
State Election Board,MATTHEW
MASHBURN,in Ms official capacity as
a Member ofthe Georgia State Election
Board,and ANH L£,in her official
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF CQNSETTA S.JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF'SMOTTON FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
I, Consetta S, Johnson, declare imder penalty of pequiy that the following is

true and correct;
1, I am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein. 1 have personal

{00534a2&}
11/17/2020 Case
05:54PM 1:20-cv-04651-SDG Document
DocumentJIM
1-18
6-8S CONNIE
Filed
Filed 11/17/20
11/25/20
JOHNSON Page
Page 23 of
of 34 PAGE 02/03
2. I was a volunteer audit monitor at the Jim R. Miller Park for the recount process
on November 16,2020.
3. As a floor monitor, I could see by the markings that the ballots being audited
were absentee ballots.
4. I witnessed two poll workers placing already separated paper machine receipt
ballots with barcodes in the Trump tray, placing them in to the Biden tray.
5. I also witnessed the same two poll workers putting the already separated paper
receipt ballots in the'No Vote" and "Jorgensen" tray, and removing them and
putting them inside the Biden tray.
6. They then took out all of the ballots out of the Biden tray and stacked them on
the table, writing on the count ballot sheet. A copy ofthe video reflecting this is
attached as Exhibit A.
7. Although I observed a supervisor provide guidance and instructions, the process

was not uniform, and most poll workers were working in their own format and
style.
8. I also observed the poll workers not calling out verbally the names ofeach ballot.
They simply passed each ballot to each other in silence.
9. I believe the Board of Elections operations were sloppy, unorganized, and

suspicious. As an observer I could not observe presidential vote preference
{(»Sa4Q2&}
11/17/2020 Case
05:54PM 1:20-cv-04651-SDG Document
DocumentJIM
1-18
6-8& CONNIE
Filed
Filed 11/17/20
11/25/20
JOHNSON Page
Page 34 of
of 34 PAGE 03/03
because the font size of the machine paper printed ballots were diflScult to read
from my distance. This is my personal experience.
I declare under penalty of pequiy that the foregoing statements are true and
correct
Consetta S. ^hng^S
STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF COBB
Consetta S. Johnson appeared before me,a Notary Public in and for the above
jurisdiction, this 17^ day ofNovember 2020,and after being duly sworn, made this
Declaration, under pathj'
[Affix Seal] cob6<^V

' taty Public
(005a4Q2&}
Exh. 18
Case
Document1-19
6-9 Filed
Filed 11/17/20
11/25/20 Page
Page 12 of
of 67

ATLANTA DIVISION
L. LIN WOOD,JR.,

l:20-cv-04651-SDG
V.

in her offlcial capacity as Vice Chair of
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF CARLOS E. SILVA IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
I, Carlos E. Silva, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true
and correct:
{00584033.}
Case
Document1-19
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Page 23 of
of 67
1.1 am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein. I have
personal knowledge ofthe matters stated herein.
2.1 am and have been a Florida trial lawyer for over 26 years.
3.1 am a registered Democrat.
4. Me and several people from my firm were very interested in the election
process in this country and wanted to be observers in the Georgia recount
process to see if we had a valid, secure and non-biased voting system.
5. On Sunday, November 15, 20201 arrived to Dekalb County Poll Precinct
located at 2998 Turner Hill Road, Stonecrest, OA 30038.
6.1 was allowed to be an observer and walked over to a table oftwo women
counting votes.
7.1 watched them pull out a pile of what I observed to be absentee ballots and
noticed two very distinct characteristics that these ballots had. One,I noticed
that they all had a perfect black bubble and were all Biden select. I was able
to observe the perfect bubble for a few minutes before they made me move
away from the table. At no time did I speak to the poll workers or obstruct
them in any way. I heard them go through the stack and call out Biden's
name over 500 times in a row.
{00584033.}
Case
Document1-19
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Page 34 of
of 67
8. On the following day, on November 16, 2020, I presented myself to Cobb
County Poll Precinct located at 2245 Callaway Road SW, Marietta, GA. At
first, I was standing next to the panel reviewers in Room B, where I observed
absentee ballots being reviewed with the same perfect bubble that I had seen
the night before at Dekalb County. All of these ballots had the same two
characteristics: they were all for Biden and had the same perfect black bubble.
9. After being there for over an hour, I walked over to Room C where the
absentee ballots were being manually recounted (audited). While in this room,
I did not hear a verbal callout as to each ballot as I had heard the day before
in Dekalb County. It was instead, done in a silent manner between both poll
workers.
lO.I was able to visualize the perfect bubble with the name Biden on it for
approximately ten minutes before a female middle aged (blonde hair with
glasses)supervisor in a ski jacket asked me to move ten feet away and refused
to give me her name. Later on, one of the people traveling with me from my
office, heard her say to keep an eye on the guy with a blue blazer and a pocket
square, he is not allowed to come on the floor and observe past the yellow
tape. I was the only one wearing a blue blazer with a pocket square.
{00584033.)
Case
Document1-19
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11.1 also observed a dispute at one ofthe tables between an observer and
a male supervisor(perhaps in his mid-thirties) who stated that a box had been
certified incorrectly because the recount number was different than the
original number. The observer was also upset because nothing was done about
it.
12.1 also saw absentee ballots for Trump inserted into Biden's stack and were
counted as Biden votes. This occurred a few times.
13.1 also observed throughout my three days in Atlanta, not once did anyone
verify signatures on these ballots. In fact, there was no authentication process
in place and no envelopes were observed or allowed to be observed.
14.1 saw hostility towards Republican observers but never towards Democrat
observers. Both were identified by badges.
15.Lastly, after my frustrating experience, I decided to try to speak one of the

poll workers after hours. I identified myself as an observer that wanted to
know more about the process and any pressure he may have been under. He
advised that they, as poll workers, have been prohibited to speak to observers
at any time, and that the pressure they have been under by their supeiwisors
has been great. Not only in the speed of counting, but in reference to
{00584033.}
Case
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Page 56 of
of 67
irregularities that he was not at liberty to discuss with me. I asked him if he
could find some time to speak with me after he was done counting and relieved
of his duties and he said he was advised to never speak to anyone about the
process.
16.Based on my observations, I have reached the conclusion that in the counties
I have observed,there is widespread fraud favoring candidate Biden only.
There were thousands of ballots thatjust had the perfect bubble marked for
Biden and no other markings in the rest of the ballot.
{00584033.)
Case
Document1-19
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11/25/20 Page
Page 67 of
of 67
correct.
STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF FULTON
Carlos E. Silva appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the
above jurisdiction, this _j^day of November 2020, and after being duly sworn,
made this Declaration, under oath.
[A% l'(ikk)!
U
M L.
Notary Public
My Commission Expires_
{00584033.2 )
Exh. 19
Case 1:20-cv-04651-SDG
1:20-cv-04809-TCB Document 1-20
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Exh. 20
6-11 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 21 of 54

ATLANTA DIVISION
L. LIN WOOD,JR.,

l:20-cv-04651-SDG
V.

Board, and ANH LE,in her official
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEBRA J. FISHER IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF^S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
I, Debra J. Fisher, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true
and correct:
{00584029.)
6-11 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 32 of 54
2. On November 16,2020 I witnessed the various issues on military and overseas
ballots.
3. All military and overseas ballots I reviewed were very clean. No bubbles were
colored outside of the line. Not one ballot used an "x" or check mark. The
ballots I observed were marked in black ink and were for Biden. Not one ballot
had a selection crossed out to change the vote selection.
4. I noticed that almost all ofthe ballots I reviewed were for Biden. Many batches
went 100% for Biden.
5. I also observed that the watermark on at least 3 ballots were solid gray instead
of transparent, leading me to believe the ballot was counterfeit. I challenged
this and the Elections Director said it was a legitimate ballot and was due to the
use of different printers.
6. Many ballots had markings for Biden only, and no markings on the rest of the
ballot. This did not occur on any ofthe Trump ballots I observed.
7. Ballots were rejected because people chose 2 or more candidates.I found it odd
that none ofthis happened with the military ballots.
{00584029.}
6-11 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 43 of 54
8. The military ballots did not have one specific precinct code on them. Instead,
they had multiple precincts printed on it(a"combo"),I challenged this as when
this is done, you do not know what precinct the voter is registered in.
9. Based on my observations above and the fact that signatures on the ballots were
not being verified, I believe the military ballots are highly suspicious offraud.
correct.
{00584029.}
6-11 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 54 of 54
correct
Debra J. Fishe
STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF COBB
Debra J. Fisher appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the above
jurisdiction, this 17*^ day of November 2020, and after being duly sworn, made this
r^.'O =
[AffixISâl]- - - - -
otary Public
(005«4iSS.J
Exh. 22
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 21 of 22
21

ATLANTA DIVISION
L. LIN WOOD, JR., )

)
) 1 :20-cv-04651-SDG
v. )
)
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his official)
a Mem her of the Georgia State Election )
)
Defendants. )
----------)
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN P. PETERFORD IN SUPPORT OF

I, Kevin P. Peterford, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is
true and correct:
1. I am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein. I have persona
l
know ledge of the matters stated herein.
1
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 32 of 22
21
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Florida.
3. On Sunday November 15, 2020 Alyssa Specht appointed me to serve as a
Monitor for the duration of the Risk Limiting Audit in DeKalb County (the
"DeKalb Appointment Letter"). A true and accurate copy of the
appointment letter is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit "A."
4. On Sunday at around 12:30 p.m., I showed up to 2994 Turner Hill Road,
Stonecrest, Georgia 30038 to begin observing as a Monitor. Prior to my
arrival, I was sent a handout titled "Audit/Recount Monitor and Vote Review
Panel Handout" which outlined the rules in place as well as provided
guidelines for observation. A true and accurate copy of the Audit/Recount
Monitor and Vote Review Panel Handout is attached to this Affidavit as
Exhibit "B."
5. After signing in and providing the DeKalb appointment letter to the check-
in desk, I was permitted to roam throughout the facility to conduct
observations.
6. The first thing I noticed was signs taped to each table (the "Review Table"
or "Review Tables") indicated a place for ballots for Trump, Biden, and
Jorgenson and other signs for "Blanks" (no vote for President) or overvotes
(multiple votes for President). At each Review Table were two people
2
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 43 of 22
21
manually reviewing each ballot (the "Recounter"). The first Recounter
would pick up the ballot and orally announce which candidate the ballot was
cast for. The first Recounter would then pass the ballot to the second
Recounter who would again orally announce which candidate the ballot was
cast for. The ballot was subsequently placed in the pile designated for that
candidate as discussed above.
7. Due to the COVID restrictions, we were instructed to stay a minimum of six
feet away from any Recounter sitting at one of the Review Tables.
8. The ballots would be brought to the Review Table in a cardboard box by
another worker. I was never able to get close enough to read any writing on
any of the cardboard boxes. After the carboard box was opened, stacks of
ballots were removed and placed on the Review Table. There were notes on
each stack but again, I was never able to get close enough to read what was
written.
9. Once the stack of ballots was on the Review Table, the process of reviewing
the ballot began in the manner outlined above in paragraph 6.
10. At no time did I witness any Recounter or any individual participating in
the recount verifying signatures.
3
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21
11. If one of the Recounters encountered a ballot that was questionable, he or
she raised a piece of paper with a "?" and what seemed to be a supervisor
would come to that Review Table. A short conversation was had and the
supervisor would provide the Recounters with instructions. Again, I was
never able to get close enough to hear what was said.
12.When a Review Table completed reviewing a cardboard box full of ballots,
one of the Recounters would write some information (I assume it was the
number of ballots for each candidate the box contained) on a piece of paper
and place it on top of the cardboard box. Then one of the Recounters would
hold a piece of paper with a (check mark) on it in the air and someone
would come pick up the box full of ballots.
13.There was no person verifying the number of votes that the Recounter would
write on the paper.
14.At one point, I witnessed a fellow monitor chase after a ballot box that was
supposedly finished being counted.
15.Once this monitor was towards the back of the room, with this ballot box,
the supervisor in charge chased after him, directing him to go back to the
main part of the room and to leave the ballot box.
4
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21
16.It was later learned that this ballot box needed to be recounted because a 0
(zero) had been incorrectly added to the Biden count, making it
approximately 10,000 plus votes for Biden, when it should only have been
in the thousands.
17.I spoke to other Observers present that day and they had witnessed the same
thing. Other Observes also informed me that fellow Observers were
removed for getting too close to the Review Tables. That when they would
get close enough to see what was actually filled in on the ballot, one of the
Recounters would begin making a big scene and call over a supervisor. The
supervisor would then remove the Monitor permanently.
18.While in DeKalb County, I saw a lot of hostility towards Republicans and
none towards Democrats.
19.Further, I noticed a Democrat Monitor speaking to a Recounter, which was
strictly against the rules of conduct during the recount.
20. On the evening of November 15, 2020, Alyssa Specht appointed me as an
Monitor in Henry County for the whole duration of the Risk Limiting Audit
("Henry County Appointment Letter"). A true and accurate copy of the
Henry County Appointment Letter is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit
"C."
5
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11/17/20 Page 76 of 22
21
21. I arrived at 562 Industrial Boulevard, McDonough, Georgia 30253 at
around 9:30 a.m.
22. When I entered the building, I was halted by a woman at the door who
immediately informed me that I was not needed and that all the position had
been filled. At this time, the woman neither asked who I was nor why I was
present. I asked this woman to speak to the person in charge.
23. Within a few seconds, I was greeted by Ameika Pitts ("Ms. Pitts"), Henry
Country's Elections Director. Ms. Pitts informed me that my assistance was
not needed, and I was free to go. Again, this was told to me prior to her
asked why I was there and who I was.
24.I then pulled the Henry County Appointment Letter up on my phone and
presented it to her. Ms. Pitts immediately told me that I was not able to have
my phone inside the building even though the recount was allegedly being
"live streamed." After a brief conversation, I send Ms. Pitts a copy of the
letter and was permitted to enter the building, but only in the public
observation area.
25.Fortunately, after speaking to several Republican Party volunteers, Ms. Pitts
was provided my name from the Henry County Republican Chairwoman
and I was permitted to enter into the observation area.
6
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11/17/20 Page 87 of 22
21
26. Once inside the observation area, I saw that it was set up very similar to
DeKalb County with the Review Tables having the same designations and
each Review table having two Recounters as described in paragraph 6 above.
27 .As I began walking around, I noticed several differences between DeKalb
County and Henry County. In Henry County, the ballots were brought to
each Review Table in a red, plastic box with security ties used to hold the
box closed. Those ties were cut, and the ballots were then removed and
placed on top of the Review Table in stacks that were wrapped in a rubber
bands and had a pink sticky note on each stack which displayed the number
of ballots each stack contained. The Recounter would then remove the
rubber band and sticky note and begin counting the same was described in
paragraph 6 above.
28.At around 12:05 p.m. I was observing table "G" when the two recount
workers sorted a pile of ballots that had a note which said "93" as the number
of ballots. When the two workers finished sorting and counting the ballots,
there were only 92. The director of the election committee, Ms. Pitts came
to the two workers and simply signed a separate sheet of paper saying that
there were only 92 ballots. Ms. Pitts never recounted to make sure. This
7
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
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21
happened several times and Ms. Pitts informed us that she has been directed
to just sign off on the number of ballots the recount worker said was there.
29. While in Henry County, I personally witnessed ballots cast for Donald
Trump being placed in the pile for Joseph Biden. I witnessed this happen at
table "A."
30.I interviewed a few Observers that same day who informed me that
on
multiple occasions Recounters at tables "A " "B " "G " and "O" were seen
' ' ' '
placing ballots cast for Donald Trump placed in the pile for Joseph Biden.
When this was brought to Ms. Pitts attention, it was met with extreme
hostility. At no time did I witness any ballot cast for Joseph Biden be placed
in the pile for Donald Trump.
31. Based on my personal observations, I believe that additional absente

e
ballots were cast for Donald Trump but counted for Joseph B iden. I further
believe that there was widespread fraud favoring Joseph Biden. This is my
personal experience.
8
Case
Document1-22
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Page10
9 of
of 21
22
correct
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
Kevin Peterford, appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the above
[Affix Seal]
My Commission Expires _________ _
......~!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!:1
l:.--il:~~:? ~~\ JOHNZEHER
NICHOLA.S
l :*:
~f... ii
~*: MYCOMMISSION#GG976387
t· ·•,r.k·{.r.~?.,
Bonded···
11tru
EXPIRES:
April6, 2024
Publicundefwlitera
No1ary
9
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
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10 of 22
21
Exhibit A
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
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11 of 22
21
I.GOP
November 15, 2020
This letter serves as proper notice, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408, § O.C.G.A

. 21-2-483, State Election
Board Rule 183-1- 13-.06, and/or State Election Board Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15.
The listed designees are to
serve as a Monitor for the whole duration of the Risk Limiting Audit in DeKalb
County:
• William McElligott • Nicholas Zeher • Michael Sasso

• Oleg Otten
• Kevin Peterford • Scott Strauss
David J. Shafer
Secretary
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 13
12 of 22
21
Exhibit B
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
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13 of 22
21
Audit/Recount
Monitor and Vote Review Panel Handout
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 15
14 of 22
21
Audit Observer Handout
Arrival:
• Arrive 30 minutes prior to the start of your shift.
• The public is to watch the opening procedures before the audit begins
and after the audit ends
for the day.
• Be respectful and professional, not adversarial.
Audit Observers/Designated Monitors:

• Each political party may have one designated monitor per 10 Audit Teams
or a minimum of two
designated monitors per room.
• Designated monitors may roam the audit room and observe the audit process
• Observe the Check-in and Check-out process of the ballots
• Are allowed to observe but may not obstruct orderly conduct of election.
• Are not allowed to wear campaign buttons, shirts, hats or other campaign
items.
• Do not touch any ballot or ballot container
• Observe and ensure the room is properly set-up, the Audit Teams are completin
g their tasks,
and the Table is set up properly (see below}.
• Must pose questions regarding procedures to the clerk/election worker
for resolution.
Room Set up
AuditBoardRoomLayout
Audit Teams Responsibilities
When reviewing a ballot and determining the voter's mark, audit boards
must consider "if the elector
has marked his or her ballot in such a manner that he or she has indicated
the candidate for whom he or she desires to cast his or her vote." O.C.G.A.
21-2-438(c}.
As a batch is delivered from the check-in/out station:

• Record the County Name, Batch Name, and Batch Type (Absentee, Advance
d Voting,
Provisional, Election Day}, and verify the container was sealed on the Audit
Board Batch Sheet.
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 16
15 of 22
21
• Unseal the container.

• Recount the Ballots using the "Sort and Stack
" method:
o Pull the ballots out of the container and
stack neatly on the table.
If the container contains more than 1000
ballots, ballots should be removed
from the container and sorted in manageab
le stacks (using an Audit Board Batch
Sheet for each stack), leaving the rest of
the ballots in the container until the
previous stack is done.
For each ballot: audit board member (ABM
) #1 picks up a single ballot from the
stack and reads the vote for the Presidentia
l contest aloud, then hands the
ballot to ABM #2. ABM #2 verifies the vote
that is on the ballot is indeed what
ABM #1 read, then places the ballot in the
"stack" that corresponds to the vote.
ABM #1 should watch to make sure the ballot
is placed in the right stack. There
will be 8 stacks as follows:
• Trump
• Biden
• Jorgensen
• Overvoted ballots - one pile for any ballot
where the voter made more
than one selection for President.
• Blank/Undervoted ballots - one pile for any
ballot where the voter made
no selection for President.
• Write-In - one pile for any ballot conta
ining a write-in vote for President.
(The board does *NOT* need to determine
whether the write-in is for a
qualified candidate: the Vote Review Pane
l does that.)
• Duplicated ballots - one pile for ballots mark
ed as duplicated.
• Undetermined - one pile for any ballot where
the audit board cannot
agree on the voter's intent.
Candidate Ballot Tallies - Count the ballot
s in each stack by having one member
of the audit board verbally count the ballot
while handing· it to the other
member for verification. Count the ballot
s in groups of 10, stacking the groups
at right angles to each other, so you can
easily count the complete groups when
you are done. (For instance, if you have seven
groups of 10 ballots each plus an
extra 3 ballots, the total tally would be 73.)
Record the total tally for each
candidate on the Audit Board Batch Shee
t.
Write-In, Duplicated, and Undetermined
Ballots - count the ballots in the write-
in duplicated, and undetermined ballot piles
and record on the Audit Board
Batch Sheet. Each type should go in a desig
nated folder or envelope by batch.
o Write-in, Duplicated, and Undetermined
ballot folders must be set aside for delive
the Vote Review Panel. ry to
o Return the other ballots to the origin
al container and seal the container.
o Sign the Audit Board Batch Sheet.
o Raiseyour check mark sign for the check
-in/out station to come retrieve your conta
batch sheet, and any ballots for the Vote iner,
Review Panel.
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 17
16 of 22
21
Audit Board Batch Sheet

Count; ______ _
8atchNamo _____ _
Batch Type: l }Absentee i··~Advanc:e \,.(ElodlonDay t.'lProvlslonaf i·;other
Was the container sealed when mceivod by tho -twdit board? l J Yos
Candidates Enter Audit Totals
Donald J. Trump
Joseph R. Blden
Jo Jorgen1on
Overvote
Blank/Undervote
"-~-~!.,
Ballots sent to tho Vote R•~l!."! .. ..~.!.!'"rl
.....
Write-In
Duplicated
UndotermfneU
When work Is oompjefod,rotum all ballots (except Vote Rovluw Panel ballots)
to tile ballot
container and seal container.
Was the container resealed by tho audit board? C1Yes
Check In/Out Station

L j Recordedbatch returnon Ballot ContainerlnvontorySheet
[l Delivered Vole Review Panel ballots (If any)
CJ Entered f~Uissinto Ario
-~------ lnillals or check In/out statlon member
Table Set up
AuditBoardTableTopOrganization
No Photography is allowed in the observation area.
Check-in/out Process
• Two election workers are required to observe the check in and check out
process of ballots to
ensure there is a secure chain of custody and inventory of ballots is kept
proper.
o One person is to be kept with the ballot containers
o One person delivers the containers to and from the audit boards ("runner'1
)
• There should be at least one "runner" for every 5 audit boards
• When a new container arrives, the election works must record:
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
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17 of 22
21
o batch name
o audit board number
• Upon completion, the election worker must:
o Verify proper completion of the Audit Board Batch Sheet
o Ensure contain is resealed
o Return the container and batch sheet to the check-in/out station
o Note the return of the container of the Ballot Container Inventor
y Sheet
o Deliver any necessary ballots/envelopes to the Vote Review
Panel
Duplicates, write-ins, and undermined
o Enter candidate totals for the batch in Ario, mark as "entered
"
Closing of Audit Room:

• All eligible monitors are able to observe the closing and conclus
ion of the audit.
Monitor Observes lssue...What to Do?

1. Respectfully raise issue with precinct clerk for resolution.
2. Do NOT speak to or interact with election workers.
3. Do NOT take pictures or videos.
4. If unresolved, leave polling room and call GOP GA Legal Hotline
with your name, county, and location.
Be on the lookout for:
1. Lapsesin procedure
2. Food or beverage on audit tables (it should be under the table}
3. Any ballots not being delivered from the runners in the regular
course
Statewide Observer and VRP member Hotline: 470-410-8762
Incident Report Form (attached) and at: .b!!P~LLr~J:IQ.f?.:_Q_rg

/auditreport/
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 19
18 of 22
21
The Vote Review Panel

Vote Review Panel (VRP) Member:
• Each political party must have 1 member per VRP
• You must object when you cannot agree
o If there is a disagreement between the two VRP members,
the Superintendent or their
designee breaks the tie.
• Manually log each ballot that should be adjudicated
• Are not allowed to wear campaign buttons, shirts, hats or other
campaign items.
• Must pose questions regarding procedures to the clerk/ele
ction worker for resolution.
Three types of Ballots:

• Duplicated Ballots
o Retrieve the original ballot and compare the duplicated ballot
to ensure proper
duplication. Using the original ballot, record the vote tally for the
duplicated ballots
• Undetermined Ballots
o Review the undetermined ballots where the audit board could
not agree on the voter's
intent to make a determination. Record the vote tally for the undeterm
ined ballots
• Write-In Ballots
o Review the write-in ballots to determine if a voter has voted
for a qualified or invalid
write-in candidate. Record the number of votes for each qualified
write-in candidate on
the Qualified Write-In Candidate Tally Sheet.
Vote ReviewPanel TallySheet County;__ _ Page:_of_

6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 20
19 of 22
21
Common Adjudication Scenarios
CommonAdjudication·Sc,enarios
OVERVOTES
With corrections from voters MARKING ERRORS
Consistent patterns
lnconsist,mt patterm,
STRAY MARKS IN TARGET Af~F.AS
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 21
20 of 22
21
Exhibit C
6-13 Filed 11/25/20
11/17/20 Page 22
21 of 22
21
I.GOP
November 15, 2020
This letter serves as proper notice, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408, § O.C.G .A. 21-2-483, State Election
Board Rule 183-1- 13-.06, and/or State Election Board Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15. The listed designees are to
serve as a Monitor for the whole duration of the Risk Limiting Audit in Henry County:
• William McElligott
• Oleg Otten
• Kevin Peterford
• Nicholas Zeher
• Ibrahim Reyes-Gandara
• Juan Carlos Elso
• Carlos Silva
• Mayra Romera
David J. Shafer
Secretary
Exh. 23
Exh. 24
Exh. 25
Exh. 26
Exh. 27 – Declaration of Eric Quinnell

Exh. 28 – Affidavit of Mitchell Harrison

809-TCB Document 1-28 Filed 11/25
Exh. 29 – Affidavit of Michelle Branton

AFFIDAVIT
STATEOF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF COBB
Personally appeared before the undersigned attesting officer, duly authorized to administer oaths in
said State and County, Michelle Branton, who after being duly sworn, deposes and says upon oath:
1. My name is Michelle Branton, and I am a resident of Cobb County Georgia. I am employed by
Georgia Republican party as a Field Organizer. I am over the age of 18 and make these
statements based on my personal knowledge of the facts, matters and events described herein.
2. As I stated, I am employed by the Georgia Republican Party and so for the November 3, 2020
General Election, I was to be involved in monitoring the ballot counting process. On the night of
the November 3rd election, I was assigned by Regional Field Director Brandon Moye to be a Poll
Watcher and to report to the Fulton County Board of Elections Warehouse, located at 1365
English Street NW, Atlanta, Georgia, at 6:30 p.m ..
3. After arrival, I was then reassigned to the State Farm Arena in downtown Atlanta to watch
the processing of Absentee Ballots and arrived at around 8:15 p.m. At State Farm arena, I joined
Mitchell Harrison, Field Organizer for the GAGOP. Mitchell and I entered the State Farm Arena at
the same time as the news crew from Fox News which included their broadcaster, photographer,
and producer.
4. Upon arrival in the processing room located on Level S of State Farm Arena, we were
supposed to watch the processing of the Absentee Ballots from the observation area which was
delineated by a fenced area of roping secured by posts. This observation area we were put in
was very distant from the staff actually processing the ballots. The room where the ballot
processing took place is a very large room, and this distance effectively prevented our actual
observation of the process. In addition, other areas of this -- again very large -- room were not
visible at all from our observation area.
5. For example, the machine that copied the UOCAVAelectronically received ballots (sometimes
called military ballots) onto a paper copy of same could only be viewed from the side and the
1
doors to that area were positioned in a way that prevented us from any viewing of this process.
Additionally, the scanners that scanned the absentee ballots were not visible to us at all.
6. The only way we knew that the scanners were located across this large room and was that
Regina Waller, Public Affairs Manager for Elections was onsite and she described the process to
Mitchell and me. There were several different news crews that came and went that evening
from this same observation area. The Chairman of the Fulton County Commission, Robb Pitts,
was there most of the night along with his personal assistant, another lady, and his security
guard. At the time, I thought it was unusual that the Commission Chairman would be personally
involved in the processing of ballots. Chairman Pitts left before the processing stopped later that
evening. Additionally, Joe Carn, another Fulton County Commissioner was also onsite. Mr. Carn
stayed until right before the processing stopped and spoke with Mitchell and me. Regina Waller,
Public Affairs Manager for Elections for Fulton County was also onsite for the entire time and
was still onsite when we departed.
7. As the night progressed, most of the staff processing the removal of the inner envelopes and
ballots from the outer envelope of the Absentee Ballots stopped working; however, there was
one employee that continued working when the others had stopped. That last employee to
finish was a younger woman. After that last employee completed her stack at approximately
10:30 p.m., a woman across the room where the scanners were allegedly located yelled to
everyone to stop working and to return the next day at 8:30 a.m. This lady had appeared
through the night and Mitchell and I believed her to be the supervisor. The supervisor was an
approximately 35-35 year old female, with hair that was blonde and braided which came at least
to the middle of her back in length.
8. After the "supervisor" gave her instruction, nearly all of the staff workers left, except the
supervisor described above, another much older lady that had a shirt on that said "Ruby" on it,
and one other lady that I cannot recall her appearance, and Regina Waller, the Public Affairs
Manager for Elections. so, at the time that work stopped at about 10:30 I recall those four
employees remaining.
9. At this same time,, we along with the Fox News crew were the only other persons as I recall
left in the room. We had been instructed by Brandon Moye to obtain the number of ballots
processed and the number that were still remaining to be processed We attempted to obtain
2
this information three separate times from Regina Waller and she would not give an answer and
she also appeared to be calling someone asking them for advice on how to respond to our
request. Afterwards, Regina Waller would only say "it could be obtained on the website".
10. After concluding that Regina Waller would not give us this information on the number
processed versus the ones still left to be processed,, we along with the Fox News crew left the
State Farm Arena shortly after 10:30 p.m. When we left, Regina, the "supervisor" and only two
other people remained in the area of the scanners, the lady with the "Ruby" on her shirt was
sanitizing the tables and tablecloths, and the third lady was further across the room and I could
not tell what she was doing. Regina Waller was sending an email, as she relayed to us, when we
left.
11. We were then told to return to the Fulton County Board of Elections Warehouse on English
Avenue. Shortly after we arrived at the Warehouse Facility, Regina Waller entered the facility
within 15-20 minutes of when we arrived. The English Avenue facility is a huge warehouse
storing election machines, scanners and other election equipment.
12. Sometime thereafter while still at English Avenue, Mitchell Harrison and Brandon Moye
advised they heard counting was still going on at State Farm Arena and Mitchell Harrison and
Trevin McKoy, field organizers, were sent to confirm the ballots were again being counted at the
State Farm Arena. I did not go with them on the return to State Farm.
FURTHERTHE AFFIANT SAVETHNOT.
f
Michelle Branton
Swag d subscribed before me

this day of November, 2020.
Notary Public
3
CORECO JA’QAN PEARSON, BRIAN KEMP, in his official capacity as Governor of

VIKKI TOWNSEND CONSIGLIO, BJ VAN GUNDY, Assistant Georgia, BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his official capacity
Secretary of the Georgia Republican Party, JASON M as Secretary of State and Chair of the Georgia State
SHEPHERD, on behalf of the COBB COUNTY REPUBLICAN Election Board, DAVID J. WORLEY, in his official capacity
PARTY, GLORIA KAY GODWIN, JAMES KENNETH
as a member of the Georgia State Election Board,
CARROLL, CAROLYN HALL FISHER, CATHLEEN ALSTON
LATHAM
REBECCA N.SULLIVAN, in her official capacity as a
member of the Georgia State Election Board, MATTHEW
Richmond Fulton
Harry W. MacDougald
Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 hmacdougald@cpdlawyers.com
✔ ✔ ✔
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 & 1988; U.S. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 4; Amdts. 5, 14; 3 U.S.C. Sec. 5. Plaintiffs seek immediate injunctive
relief arising from election fraud and illegality in the November 3, 2020 Presidential election.
✔
Amy Totenberg 1:17-cv-2989-AT
✔
Northern District of Georgia

et al
1:20-cv-4809
Brian Kemp, Brad Faffensperger, David J. Worley,

Rebecca N. Sullivan, Matthew Mashburn, and Anh
Le, in their official capacities
Anh Le
Harley, Rowe & Fowler, P.C.
2700 Cumberland Parkway
Suite 525
Harry W. MacDougald
Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
1:20-cv-4809
0.00
Print Save As... Reset


et al
1:20-cv-4809

Anh Le
Suite 525
Harry W. MacDougald
Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
1:20-cv-4809
0.00


et al
1:20-cv-4809

Anh Le
Suite 525
Harry W. MacDougald
Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
1:20-cv-4809
0.00


et al
1:20-cv-4809

Anh Le
Suite 525
Harry W. MacDougald
Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
1:20-cv-4809
0.00


et al
1:20-cv-4809

Anh Le
Suite 525
Harry W. MacDougald
Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
1:20-cv-4809
0.00


et al
1:20-cv-4809

Anh Le
Suite 525
Harry W. MacDougald
Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
1:20-cv-4809
0.00

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT

OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION

VIKKI TOWNSEND CONSIGLIO, GLORIA KAY
GODWIN, JAMES KENNETH CARROLL
CAROLYN HALL FISHER, CATHLEEN ALSTON CASE NO.
LATHAM, JASON M SHEPHERD, on behalf of the
COBB COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY, and 1:20-cv-4809
BRIAN JAY VAN GUNDY,
Plaintiffs
v.
Governor of Georgia, BRAD RAFFENSPERGER,
in his official capacity as Secretary of State and
Chair of the Georgia State Election Board,
DAVID J. WORLEY, in his official capacity as a
member of the Georgia State Election Board,
REBECCA N. SULLIVAN, in her official capacity
MATTHEW MASHBURN, in his official capacity
and ANH LE, in her official capacity as a member
Defendants.
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
(1) The undersigned counsel of record for a party to this action certifies
that the following is a full and complete list of all parties in this action,
including any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation that owns
10% or more of the stock of a party:
Plaintiffs:
Coreco Ja’qan Pearson,
Vikki Townsend Consiglio,
Brian Jay Van Gundy, Assistant Secretary of the Georgia Republican
Party
Jason M Shepherd, on behalf of the Cobb County Republican Party
Gloria Kay Godwin,
James Kenneth Carroll
Carolyn Hall Fisher
Cathleen Alston Latham
Jason M Shepherd, on behalf of the Cobb County Republican Party
Defendants:
The Honorable Brian Kemp, in his official capacity as the Governor of
Georgia;
The Honorable Brad Raffensperger, in his official capacity as Secretary
of State of the State of Georgia;
Rebecca N. Sullivan, in her official capacity as Vice Chair of the
Georgia State Election Board;

David J. Worley, in his official capacity as a Member of the Georgia
State Election Board;
Matthew Mashburn, in his official capacity as a Member of the Georgia
State Election Board; and
Anh Le, in her official capacity as a Member of the Georgia State
Election Board.
(2) The undersigned further certifies that the following is a full and
complete list of all other persons, associations, firms, partnerships, or
corporations having either a financial interest in or other interest which
could be substantially affected by the outcome of this particular case:
DefendTheRepublic.org.
Cobb County, Georgia Republican Party
(3) The undersigned further certifies that the following is a full and
complete list of all persons serving as attorneys for the parties in this
proceeding:
Plaintiffs:
Harry W. MacDougald
Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
Julia Z. Haller *
District of Columbia Bar No. 466921
hallerjulia@outlook.com
Of counsel to Sidney Powell, office address to be updated.
Emily P. Newman*
Virginia Bar License No. 84265
enewman@protonmail.com
Of counsel to Sidney Powell, office address to be updated.
L. Lin Wood
GA Bar No. 774588
L. LIN WOOD, P.C.
P.O. Box 52584
Telephone: (404) 891-1402
lwood@linwoodlaw.com
Howard Kleinhendler*
NEW YORK BAR NO. 2657120
Office (917) 793-1188
Mobile (347) 840-2188
*Applications for admission pro hac vice forthcoming
Defendants
No appearance yet.
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219

forthcoming
CALDWELL, PROPST & DELOACH,

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was prepared in 13-
point Century Schoolbook font and in accordance with the margin and other
requirements of Local Rule 5.1.
s/ Harry W. MacDougald
Harry W. MacDougald
This is to certify that I have on this day e-filed the foregoing Plaintiffs’
Certificate of Interested Persons with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF
system, and that I have delivered the filing to the Defendants by email and
FedEx at the following addresses:
This 27th day of November, 2020.

Governor Brian Kemp
206 Washington Street
111 State Capitol
Atlanta, GA 30334
Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger

214 State Capitol
brad@sos.ga.gov
soscontact@sos.ga.gov
Rebecca N. Sullivan
Georgia Department of Administrative Services
200 Piedmont A venue SE
Suite 1804, West Tower
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9010
rebecca.sullivan@doas.ga.gov
David J. Worley
Evangelista Worley LLC
500 Sugar Mill Road
Suite 245A
david@ewlawllc.com
Matthew Mashburn
Aldridge Pite, LLP
3575 Piedmont Road, N.E.
Suite 500

mmashburn@aldridgepite.com
Anh Le
Suite 525
ale@hrflegal.com
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
Exh. 2
DECLARATION OF
I, , hereby state the following:
1.
2. I am an adult of sound mine. All statements in this declaration are based

on my personal knowledge and are true and correct.
3. I am making this statement voluntarily and on my own initiative. I have

not been promised, nor do I expect to receive, anything in exchange for my
testimony and giving this statement. I have no expectation of any profit
or reward and understand that there are those who may seek to harm me
for what I say in this statement. I have not participated in any political
process in the United States, have not supported any candidate for office
in the United States, am not legally permitted to vote in the United
States, and have never attempted to vote in the United States.
4. I want to alert the public and let the world know the truth about the
corruption, manipulation, and lies being committed by a conspiracy of
people and companies intent upon betraying the honest people of the
United States and their legally constituted institutions and fundamental
rights as citizens. This conspiracy began more than a decade ago in
Venezuela and has spread to countries all over the world. It is a conspiracy
to wrongfully gain and keep power and wealth. It involves political
leaders, powerful companies, and other persons whose purpose is to gain
and keep power by changing the free will of the people and subverting the
proper course of governing.
5.
Over the course of my career, I
specialized in the marines
6. Due to my training in special operations and my extensive military and

academic formations, I was selected for the national security guard detail
of the President of Venezuela.
sophisticated electronic voting system that permitted the leaders of the

Venezuelan government to manipulate the tabulation of votes for national
and local elections and select the winner of those elections in order to gain
and maintain their power.
10. Importantly, I was a direct witness to the creation and operation of an

electronic voting system in a conspiracy between a company known as
Smartmatic and the leaders of conspiracy with the Venezuelan
government. This conspiracy specifically involved President Hugo Chavez
Frias, the person in charge of the National Electoral Council named Jorge
Rodriguez, and principals, representatives, and personnel from
Smartmatic which included . The
purpose of this conspiracy was to create and operate a voting system that
could change the votes in elections from votes against persons running
the Venezuelan government to votes in their favor in order to maintain
control of the government.
11. In mid-February of 2009, there was a national referendum to change the

Constitution of Venezuela to end term limits for elected officials, including
the President of Venezuela. The referendum passed. This permitted Hugo
Chavez to be re-elected an unlimited number of times.
12. After passage of the referendum, President Chavez instructed me to make

arrangements for him to meet with Jorge Rodriguez, then President of the
National Electoral Council, and three executives from Smartmatic.
Among the three Smartmatic representatives were
President Chavez had multiple meetings with Rodriguez

and the Smartmatic team at which I was present. In the first of four
meetings, Jorge Rodriguez promoted the idea to create software that
would manipulate elections. Chavez was very excited and made it clear
that he would provide whatever Smartmatic needed. He wanted them
immediately to create a voting system which would ensure that any time
anything was going to be voted on the voting system would guarantee
results that Chavez wanted. Chavez offered Smartmatic many
inducements, including large sums of money, for Smartmatic to create or
modify the voting system so that it would guarantee Chavez would win
every election cycle. Smartmatic eam ag eed to create such a system
and did so.
13. I arranged and attended three more meetings between President Chavez
and the representatives from Smartmatic at which details of the new
voting system were discussed and agreed upon. For each of these
meetings, I communicated directly with on details of
where and when to meet, where the participants would be picked up and
delivered to the meetings, and what was to be accomplished. At these
meetings, the participants called their project the Chavez revolution.
From that point on, Chavez never lost any election. In fact, he was able
to ensure wins for himself, his party, Congress persons and mayors from
townships.
14. Smartmatic electoral technology was called Sistema de Gestión

Electoral (the Electoral Management System ). Smartmatic was a
transmission of voting data over the internet to a computerized central
tabulating center. The voting machines themselves had a digital display,
fingerprint recognition feature to identify the voter, and printed out the
voter ballot. The voter thumbprint was linked to a computerized record
of that voter iden i . Sma ma ic c ea ed and e a ed he en i e
system.
15. Chavez was most insistent that Smartmatic design the system in a way
that the system could change the vote of each voter without being
detected. He wanted the software itself to function in such a manner that
if the voter were to place their thumb print or fingerprint on a scanner,
then the thumbprint would be tied to a record of the voter name and
identity as having voted, but that voter would not tracked to the changed
vote. He made it clear that the system would have to be setup to not leave
any evidence of the changed vote for a specific voter and that there would
be no evidence to show and nothing to contradict that the name or the
fingerprint or thumb print was going with a changed vote. Smartmatic
agreed to create such a system and produced the software and hardware
that accomplished that result for President Chavez.
16. After the Smartmatic Electoral Management System was put in place, I
closely observed several elections where the results were manipulated
using Smartmatic software. One such election was in December 2006
when Chavez was running against Rosales. Chavez won with a landslide
over Manuel Rosales - a margin of nearly 6 million votes for Chavez versus
3.7 million for Rosales.
17. On April 14, 2013, I witnessed another Venezuelan national election in

which the Smartmatic Electoral Management System was used to
manipulate and change the results for the person to succeed Hugo Chávez
as President. In that election, Nicolás Maduro ran against Capriles

Radonsky.
Inside that location was a control room in which there were

multiple digital display screens TV screens for results of voting in each
state in Venezuela. The actual voting results were fed into that room and
onto the displays over an internet feed, which was connected to a
sophisticated computer system created by Smartmatic. People in that
room were able to see in eal ime hether the vote that came through
the electronic voting system was in their favor or against them. If one
looked at any particular screen, they could determine that the vote from
any specific area or as a national total was going against either candidate.
Persons controlling the vote tabulation computer had the ability to change
the reporting of votes by moving votes from one candidate to another by
using the Smartmatic software.
18. By two o'clock in the afternoon on that election day Capriles Radonsky
was ahead of Nicolás Maduro by two million votes. When Maduro and his
supporters realized the size of Radonsky s lead they were worried that
they were in a crisis mode and would lose the election. The Smartmatic
machines used for voting in each state were connected to the internet and
reported their information over the internet to the Caracas control center
in real-time. So, the decision was made to reset the entire system.
Maduro s and his supporters ordered the network controllers to take the
internet itself offline in practically all parts in Venezuela and to change
the results.
19. It took the voting system operators approximately two hours to make the
adjustments in the vote from Radonsky to Maduro. Then, when they
turned the internet back on and the on-line reporting was up and running
again, they checked each screen state by state to be certain where they
could see that each vote was changed in favor of Nicholas Maduro. At that
moment the Smartmatic system changed votes that were for Capriles
Radonsky to Maduro. By the time the system operators finish, they had
achieved a convincing, but narrow victory of 200,000 votes for Maduro.
20. After Smartmatic created the voting system President Chavez wanted, he
exported the software and system all over Latin America. It was sent to
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile countries that were
in alliance with President Chavez. This was a group of leaders who
wanted to be able to guarantee they maintained power in their countries.
When Chavez died, Smartmatic was in a position of being the only
company that could guarantee results in Venezuelan elections for the

party in power.
21. I want to point out that the software and fundamental design of the
electronic electoral system and software of Dominion and other election
tabulating companies relies upon software that is a descendant of the
Smartmatic Electoral Management System. In short, the Smartmatic
software is in the DNA of every vote tabulating company software and
system.
22. Dominion is one of three major companies that tabulates votes in the
United States. Dominion uses the same methods and fundamentally same
software design for the storage, transfer and computation of voter
identification data and voting data. Dominion and Smartmatic did
business together. The software, hardware and system have the same
fundamental flaws which allow multiple opportunities to corrupt the data
and mask the process in a way that the average person cannot detect any
fraud or manipulation. The fact that the voting machine displays a voting
result that the voter intends and then prints out a paper ballot which
reflects that change does not matter. It is the software that counts the
digitized vote and reports the results. The software itself is the one that
changes the information electronically to the result that the operator of
the software and vote counting system intends to produce that counts.
That how it is done. So the software, the software itself configures the
vote and voting result -- changing the selection made by the voter. The
software decides the result regardless of what the voter votes.
23. All of the computer controlled voting tabulation is done in a closed

environment so that the voter and any observer cannot detect what is
taking place unless there is a malfunction or other event which causes the
observer to question the process. I saw first-hand that the manipulation
and changing of votes can be done in real-time at the secret counting
center which existed in Caracas, Venezuela. For me it was something
very surprising and disturbing. I was in awe because I had never been
present to actually see it occur and I saw it happen. So, I learned first-
hand that it doesn ma e ha he e decides or what the paper
ballot says. It he f a e e a and he f a e ha decide what
counts not the voter.
24. If one questions the reliability of my observations, they only have to read
the words of
a time period in
which Smartmatic had possession of all the votes and the voting, the votes
themselves and the voting information at their disposition in Venezuela.
he was assuring that the voting system implemented or used

by Smartmatic was completely secure, that it could not be compromised,
was not able to be altered.
25. But later, in 2017 when there were elections where Maduro was running
and elections for legislators in Venezuela, and Smartmatic broke
their secrecy pact with the government of Venezuela. He made a public
announcement through the media in which he stated that all the
Smartmatic voting machines used during those elections were totally
manipulated and they were manipulated by the electoral council of
Venezuela back then. stated that all of the votes for Nicholas
Maduro and the other persons running for the legislature were
manipulated and they actually had lost. So I think that's the greatest
proof that the fraud can be carried out and will be denied by the software
company that admitted publicly that Smartmatic had created,
used and still uses vote counting software that can be manipulated or
altered.
26. I am alarmed because of what is occurring in plain sight during this 2020
election for President of the United States. The circumstances and events
are eerily reminiscent of what happened with Smartmatic software
electronically changing votes in the 2013 presidential election in
Venezuela. What happened in the United States was that the vote
counting was abruptly stopped in five states using Dominion software. At
the time that vote counting was stopped, Donald Trump was significantly
ahead in the votes. Then during the wee hours of the morning, when there
was no voting occurring and the vote count reporting was off-line,
something significantly changed. When the vote reporting resumed the
very next morning there was a very pronounced change in voting in favor
of the opposing candidate, Joe Biden.
27. I have worked in gathering

information, researching, and working with information technology.
That's what I know how to do and the special knowledge that I have. Due
to these recent election events, I contacted a number of reliable and
intelligent ex-co-workers of mine that are still informants and work with
the intelligence community. I asked for them to give me information that
was up-to-date information in as far as how all these businesses are
acting, what actions they are taking.
Exh. A
Joint Cybersecurity Advisory

Iranian Advanced Persistent Threat Actor
Identified Obtaining Voter Registration Data
Exh. A

This advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge
(ATT&CK ) framework. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise framework for all referenced threat actor
techniques.
Thi j i c be ec i ad i a c a h ed b he C be ec i a d I f a c e Sec i
Age c (CISA) a d he Fede al B ea f I e iga i (FBI). CISA a d he FBI a e a a e f a
I a ia ad a ced e i e h ea (APT) ac a ge i g U.S. a e eb i e i cl de elec i
eb i e . CISA a d he FBI a e hi ac i e ible f he a di e i a i f e
i i ida i e ail U.S. ci i e a d he di e i a i f U.S. elec i - ela ed di i f ai i
id-Oc be 2020.1 (Refe e ce FBI FLASH e age ME-000138-TT, di e i a ed Oc be 29,
2020). F he e al a i b CISA a d he FBI ha ide ified he a ge i g f U.S. a e elec i
eb i e a a i e i al eff i fl e ce a d i e fe e i h he 2020 U.S. e ide ial elec i .
A al i b CISA a d he FBI i dica e hi ac ca ed a e eb i e , i cl de a e elec i

eb i e , be ee Se e be 20 a d Se e be 28, 2020, i h he Ac e i l e abili ca e
(Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning [T1595.002]). Ac e i i a idel ed a d legi i a e eb
ca e , hich ha bee ed b h ea ac f efa i e . O ga i a i ha d
eg la l e Ac e i h ld i hei l g f a ac i i f he g a ha igi a e f
IP add e e ided i hi ad i a dc ide i alici ec ai a ce beha i .
Addi i all , CISA a d he FBI b e ed hi ac a e i g e l i eb i e b ai c ie f
e egi a i da a be ee Se e be 29 a d Oc be 17, 2020 (Exploit Public-Facing
1
See FBI FLASH, ME-000138-TT, di e i a ed 10/29/20, h :// .ic3.g /Media/Ne /2020/201030. df.
Thi di i f ai he a i he f f a ide i g i a ib e
he ac i i a U.S. d e ic ac a d i lie ha i di id al c ld ca f a d le ball , e e f
e ea . h :// . d i.g /i de . h / e / e - elea e /i e /2162-d i-j h - a cliffe- - e a k -a -
e -c fe e ce- -elec i - ec i .
To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact
your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field,
(855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information
regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of
equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of
contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at
Central@cisa.dhs.gov.
This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information
carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public
release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.
For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see https://us-cert.cisa.gov/tlp.
Application [T1190]). Thi i cl de a e ed e l i a i fk l e abili ie , di ec a e al,

S c ed Q e La g age (SQL) i jec i , eb hell l ad , a d le e agi g i e fla i
eb i e .
CISA a d he FBI ca c fi ha he ac cce f ll b ai ed e egi a i da a i a lea
e a e. The acce f e egi a i da a a ea ed i l e he ab e f eb i e
i c fig a i a d a c i ed ce i g he cURL l i e a e h gh e ec d . A
e ie f he ec d ha e e c ied a d b ai ed e eal he i f ai a ed i he
aga da ide .
CISA a d FBI a al i f ide ified ac i i agai a e eb i e , i cl di g a e elec i eb i e ,
efe e ced i hi d c ca all be f ll a ib ed hi I a ia APT ac . FBI a al i f he
I a ia APT ac ac i i ha ide ified Compromise
Infrastructure [T1584]) i hi a i ila i ef a e, e f IP add e e a d IP a ge i cl di g
e i al i a e e k (VPN) e ice e i de hich c ela e hi I a APT ac
(Gather Victim Host Information [T1592)]), a d he i e iga i e i f ai .
The FBI ha i f a i i dica i g hi I a -ba ed ac a e ed acce PDF d c e f

ae e ie i g ad a ced e - ce e ie (Search Open Websites and Domains [T1539]).
The ac de a ed i e e i PDF h ed
. The FBI ide ified e ie f URL f elec i - ela ed i e .
The FBI al ha i f a i i dica i g he ac e ea ched he f ll i g i f ai i a ec ed
a e f he hei eff e a d e l i a e elec i eb i e .
YOURLS e l i
B a i g M dSec i Web A lica i Fi e all
De ec i g Web A lica i Fi e all
SQL a l
CISA ide ified he ca i g f l i le e i ie b he Ac e i Web V l e abili ca i g

la f be ee Se e be 20 a d Se e be 28, 2020 (Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
[T1595.002]).
The ac ed he ca e a e SQL i jec i i ai field i
ih a c de 404 500:
The ac ed he f ll i g e e a cia ed i h hi ca i g ac i i .
CISA a d FBI ha e b e ed he f ll i g e age a cia ed i h hi ca i g ac i i .
F ll i g he e ie f eb e e acce l g , CISA a al , i c di a i i h he FBI, f d

i a ce f he cURL a d FDM U e Age e di g GET e e a eb e ce a cia ed
ih e egi a i da a. The ac i i cc ed be ee Se e be 29 a d Oc be 17, 2020.
S ec ed c i ed ac i i b i ed e e al h d ed h a d e ie i e a i g h gh e
ide ifica i al e , a d e ie i g e l i h a i g le el f cce [Gather Victim Identity

Information (T1589)]. A a le f he ec d ide ified b he FBI e eal he a ch i f ai i
he af e e i ed aga da ide .
The ac ed he f ll i g e e .
:i ce e i g al e i
CISA a d FBI ha e b e ed he f ll i g e age .
See fig e 1 bel f a alici ac i i .

O ga i a i ca ide if Ac ei ca i g ac i i b i g he f ll i g ke d hile
ef i g l g a al i .
F ad l adable c f IOC , ee AA20-304A. i .

: Many of the IP addresses included below likely correspond to publicly available VPN
services, which can be used by individuals all over the world. Although this creates the potential for
false positives, any activity listed should warrant further investigation. The actor likely uses various IP
addresses and VPN services.
The f ll i g IP ha e bee a cia ed i h hi ac i i .
102.129.239[.]185 (Ac e i Sca i g)
143.244.38[.]60 (Ac e i Sca i g a d cURL e e )
45.139.49[.]228 (Ac e i Sca i g)
156.146.54[.]90 (Ac e i Sca i g)
109.202.111[.]236 (cURL e e )
185.77.248[.]17 (cURL e e )
217.138.211[.]249 (cURL e e )
217.146.82[.]207 (cURL e e )
37.235.103[.]85 (cURL e e )
37.235.98[.]64 (cURL e e )
70.32.5[.]96 (cURL e e )
70.32.6[.]20 (cURL e e )
70.32.6[.]8 (cURL e e )
70.32.6[.]97 (cURL e e )
70.32.6[.]98 (cURL e e )
77.243.191[.]21 (cURL e e a d FDM+3. (F ee D l ad Ma age 3)
e e a i /i e a i )
92.223.89[.]73 (cURL e e )
CISA a d he FBI a e a a e he f ll i g IOC ha e bee ed b hi I a -ba ed ac . The e IP

add e e facili a ed he a di e i a i f e i i ida i e ail e age Oc be 20,
2020.
195.181.170[.]244 (Ob e ed Se e be 30 a d Oc be 20, 2020)
102.129.239[.]185 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
104.206.13[.]27 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
154.16.93[.]125 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
185.191.207[.]169 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
185.191.207[.]52 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
194.127.172[.]98 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
194.35.233[.]83 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
198.147.23[.]147 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
198.16.66[.]139(Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
212.102.45[.]3 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
212.102.45[.]58 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
31.168.98[.]73 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
37.120.204[.]156 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
5.160.253[.]50 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
5.253.204[.]74 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
64.44.81[.]68 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
84.17.45[.]218 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
89.187.182[.]106 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
89.187.182[.]111 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
89.34.98[.]114 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
89.44.201[.]211 (Ob e ed Se e be 30, 2020)
The f ll i g li ide ec e ded elf- ec i i iga i a egie agai c be

ech i e ed b ad a ced e i e h ea ac :
Valida e i a a eh d f a ii i g ed i b i ed b eb a lica i e .
Valida i g i ca ig ifica l ed ce he babili f cce f l e l i a i b idi g
ec i agai ec i fla i eb a lica i . The e f a ack ibl e e ed

i cl de SQL i jec i , C Si e Sc i i g (XSS), a d c a d i jec i .
A di e kf e i g Re e De k P c l (RDP) a d he i e e -
faci g e ice . Di able ece a e ice a d i all a ailable a che f he e ice i
e. U e a eed k i h hei ech l g e d c fi ha a che ill
affec e ce e .
Ve if all cl d-ba ed i al achi e i a ce i h a blic IP, a d a id i g e RDP
, le he e i a alid eed. Place a e iha e RDP behi d a fi e all
a d e ie e e a VPN acce i h gh he fi e all.
E able g a d e ie e a d acc l ck licie defe d agai b e-
f ce a ack .
A l l i-fac a he ica i , he ible.
Mai ai a g d i f a i back- a eg b i el backi g all c i ical da a a d
e c fig a i i f ai a e a a e de ice. S e he back ffli e, e if hei
i eg i , a d e if he e ai ce .
E able l ggi g a d e e l ggi g echa i ca e RDP l gi . Kee l g f a
i i f 90 da a d e ie he eg la l de ec i i a e .
Whe c ea i g cl d-ba ed i al achi e , adhe e he cl d ide ' be ac ice f
e e acce .
E e hi d a ie ha e i e RDP acce f ll i e al e e acce licie .
Mi i i e e ke e f all c l e de ice . Whe e ible, c i ical de ice
h ld ha e RDP e abled.
Reg la e a d li i e e al i e al RDP c ec i . Whe e e al acce i e al
e ce i e i ed, e ec e e h d , ch a a VPN . H e e , ec g i e he ec i
f VPN a che he ec i f he c ec ed de ice .
U e ec i fea e ided b cial edia la f ; e g a d , cha ge
a d f e e l , a d e a diffe e a d f each cial edia acc .
Be P ac ice f Sec i g Elec i S e f ei f ai .
A l all a ailable f a e da e a d a che a d a a e hi ce he g ea e e e

ible (e.g., b i ga da e e ice ided di ec l f he e d ). A a i g da e a d
a che i c i ical beca e f he eed f h ea ac c ea e e e l i f ll i g he elea e f
- -da e l i . E e he a he ici a d
i eg i f e d da e b i g ig ed da e deli e ed e ec ed li k . Wi h he a id
a d h gh a lica i f a che 2
2
NSA "NSA'S T Te C be ec i Mi iga i S a egie " h :// . a.g /P al /70/d c e / ha -
e-d /c be ec i / fe i al- e ce /c i- a - 10-c be ec i - i iga i - a egie . df
Addi i all , e l (e.g., he OWASP De e de c -Check P jec l3) ide if he blicl

k l e abili ie i hi d- a lib a ie de e ded b he a lica i .
I le e a la ca blic-faci g eb e e f c eb l e abili ie (e.g., SQL

i jec i , c - i e c i i g) b i gac e cial eb a lica i l e abili ca e i
c bi a i iha ce c de ca e . Fi i g
4
a chi g l e abili ie af e he a e ide ified i
e eciall c cial f e k h i g lde eb a lica i . A i e ge lde , e l e abili ie
a e di c e ed a d e ed.
De l a eb a lica i fi e all (WAF) e e i alid i a ack a d he a ack de i ed f

he eb a lica i . WAF a e i i /de ec i / e e i de ice ha i ec each eb e e
ade a d f he eb a lica i de e i e if he e e i alici . S e WAF i all
he h e a d he a e dedica ed de ice ha i i f f he eb a lica i . WAF al
eake he effec i e e fa a ed eb l e abili ca i g l .
Pa ch eb a lica i l e abili ie fi c fig a i eak e e ha all eb hell a ack , a d

f ll g ida ce de ec i g a d e e i g eb hell al a e. Malici 5
c be ac f e de l
eb hell f a e ha ca e able e e ad i i a i . Malici
c be ac ca e eb hell e ec e a bi a e c a d c l e e HTTP
HTTPS. A acke f e c ea e eb hell b addi g dif i g a file i a e i i g eb a lica i .
Web hell ide a acke i h e i e acce ac i ed e k i gc ica i
cha el di g i ed ble d i i h legi i a e affic. Web hell al a e i a l g- a di g, e a i e
h ea ha c i e e ade a ec i l .
Pi ii e ec i f acc i h ele a ed i ilege , e e acce , ed high- al e

a e .6 U e h ical ke -ba ed a he ica i e le e k ledge-ba ed fac
ch a a d a d e al ide ifica i be (PIN ).7 O ga i a i h ld ig a e a a
f i gle-fac a he ica i , ch a a d-ba ed e , hich a e bjec e
3
h :// a . g/ - jec -de e de c -check/
4
NSA "Defe di g Agai he E l i a i f SQL V l e abili ie C i e a Ne k"
h ://a . a.g /iaa chi e/lib a /ia-g ida ce/ ech-b ief /defe di g-agai - he-e l i a i - f- l-
l e abili ie - .cf
5
NSA & ASD "C be Sec i I f a i : De ec a d P e e Web Shell Mal a e"
h :// edia.defe e.g /2020/J /09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-
MALWARE-20200422.PDF
6
h :// -ce .ci a.g /cd /e e /Ide if i g-a d-P ec i g-High-Val e-A e -Cl e -L k-G e a ce-
Need -HVA
7
NSA "NSA'S T Te C be ec i Mi iga i S a egie " h :// . a.g /P al /70/d c e / ha -
e-d /c be ec i / fe i al- e ce /c i- a - 10-c be ec i - i iga i - a egie . df
ch ice a d e ce ible c ede ial hef , f ge , a d a d e e ac l i le

e .
Fi , ide if a d e edia e c i ical eb a lica i ec i i k . Ne , e he le c i ical

l e abili ie . F ll a ailable g ida ce ec i g eb a lica i .8,9,10
a d e e
f ci acc di g b i e c i i la . O ga i a i h ld ai ai a d eg la l e
back la , di a e ec e la , a d b i e c i i ced e .
T e a i i a d e e i cide e e e ce ech ical a i a ce, c ac

CISA (Ce al@ci a.g 888-282-0870) he FBI
Di i i (C Wa ch@ic.fbi.g 855-292-3937).
CISA Ti : Be P ac ice f Sec i g Elec i S e

CISA Ti : Sec i g V e Regi a i Da a
CISA Ti : Web i e Sec i
CISA Ti : A idi g S cial E gi ee i g a d Phi hi g A ack
CISA Ti : Sec i g Ne kI fa c e De ice
J i Ad i : Tech ical A ache U c e i g a d Re edia i g Malici Ac i i
CISA I igh : Ac i C e E ail-Ba ed A ack Elec i - ela ed E i ie
FBI a d CISA P blic Se ice A ce e (PSA): S fed I e e D ai a d E ail
Acc P e C be a d Di i f a i Ri k V e
FBI a d CISA PSA: F eig Ac Likel U e O li e J al S ead Di i f ai
Rega di g 2020 Elec i
FBI a d CISA PSA: Di ib ed De ial f Se ice A ack C ld Hi de Acce V i g
I f a i , W ld N P e e V i g
FBI a d CISA PSA: Fal e Clai f Hacked V e I f a i Likel I e ded Ca D b
Legi i ac f U.S. Elec i FBI a d CISA PSA: C be Th ea V i g P ce e C ld
Sl B N Pe e V i g
8
h ://a . a.g /iaa chi e/lib a /ia-
g ida ce/ ec i - i /b ildi g- eb-a lica i - ec i - ec e da i -f .cf
9
h :// a . g/ - jec - - e /
10
h ://c e. i e. g/ 25/a chi e/2020/2020_c e_ 25.h l

FBI a d CISA PSA: F eig Ac a d C be c i i al Likel S ead Di i f ai

Rega di g 2020 Elec i Re l

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to File
Affidavits Under Seal And For In Camera Review pursuant to LR 7.5 and
65.1, and Section II(J) of Appendix H to the Local Rules, and having shown
that the requested relief that certain affidavits be sealed with specific
identification of the portions for which sealing is necessary, the likelihood of

injury to the interests of the affiants if public disclosure were made, and the
lack of less onerous alternatives to the sealing of the affidavits to protect the
personal safety and harm to the interests of the affiants, and for good cause
appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED, and
the affidavits to be filed under seal until further order of the Court, and
Plaintiffs are permitted to file these affidavits with the identifying
information redacted in the public docket.
Dated: November ____, 2020.
___________________________
The Honorable Timothy C. Batten
U.S. District Court Judge

CORECO JA’QAN PEARSON, VIKKI

TOWNSEND CONSIGLIO, GLORIA KAY
GODWIN, JAMES KENNETH CARROLL, CASE NO.
CAROLYN HALL FISHER, CATHLEEN
ALSTON LATHAM, JASON M SHEPHERD, on 1:20-cv-4809
behalf of the COBB COUNTY REPUBLICAN
PARTY and BRIAN JAY VAN GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
v.

RAFFENSPERGER, in his official capacity as
Secretary of State and Chair of the Georgia
State Election Board, DAVID J. WORLEY, in his
official capacity as a member of the Georgia
State Election Board, REBECCA N. SULLIVAN,
in her official capacity as a member of the
Georgia State Election Board, MATTHEW
MASHBURN, in his official capacity as a
and ANH LE, in her official capacity as a
Defendants.
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO FILE

AFFIDAVITS UNDER SEAL AND FOR IN
CAMERA REVIEW
Come now the Plaintiffs, and pursuant to LR 7.5 and 65.1, and Section
II(J), of Appendix H to the Local Rules, respectfully request leave of Court to
file under seal certain identifying information in two affidavits and
declarations submitted as Exhibits to the Complaint.
1.
This case brings a challenge to the November 3, 2020 Presidential
election. Plaintiffs’ evidence shows ballot fraud and illegality, i.e. fraud or
illegality in the ballots that were counted in the election, and counting fraud
and illegality in the Dominion Voting Systems machines and software, and in
the hand audit/recount ordered by the Secretary of State, Brad
Raffensperger.
2.
Two of Plaintiffs’ witnesses are in reasonable fear of harassment and
threats to their physical safety and their livelihoods in retaliation for their
coming forward with their testimony. As described with more particularity in
the brief in support of this motion, as election controversies have unfolded
around the country, there have been multiple incidents of harassment and
threats to destroy the careers of or physically harm witnesses who come

forward with evidence of election fraud and illegality. There was an
organized campaign by The Lincoln Project to destroy the business
relationships of major law firms with their clients for having the temerity to
represent the President of the United States in these controversies. One
Pennsylvania law firm withdrew from representing the President only days
after filing a lawsuit on his behalf because of such harassment, abuse,
threats, pressure and economic coercion. Other lawyers for the President
have been physically threatened and verbally abused and forced to obtain
personal security to protect them. Therefore, the apprehensions of Plaintiffs’
witnesses are serious and well-founded.
3.
Moreover, the testimony of these witnesses is consequential to the
matter before this court, namely a legal challenge to the outcome of the
Presidential election in Georgia.
4.
The Affiant at Exhibit 2, is a Venezuelan Whistleblower, who is not an
American citizen, and swears under oath that “I was selected for the national
security guard detail of the President of Venezuela.” At great risk to himself,
he reveals that,
Importantly, I was a direct witness to the creation and operation of

an electronic voting system in a conspiracy between a company
known as Smartmatic and the leaders of conspiracy with the
Venezuelan government. This conspiracy specifically involved

President Hugo Chavez Frias, the person in charge of the National
Electoral Council named Jorge Rodriguez, and principals,
representatives, and personnel from Smartmatic which included …
The purpose of this conspiracy was to create and operate a voting
system that could change the votes in elections from votes against
persons running the Venezuelan government to votes in their favor
in order to maintain control of the government.
See Exh. 2 to the Complaint, para 10, also attached hereto.
5.
And secondly, the Affidavit “Spyder,” 1 sets forth evidence in his sworn
affidavit, and his background:
I was an electronic intelligence analyst under 305th Military

Intelligence with experience gathering SAM missile system
electronic intelligence. I have extensive experience as a white hat
hacker used by some of the top election specialists in the world. The
methodologies I have employed represent industry standard cyber
operation toolkits for digital forensics and OSINT, which are
commonly used to certify connections between servers, network
nodes and other digital properties and probe to network system
vulnerabilities.
…
In my professional opinion, this affidavit presents unambiguous
evidence that Dominion Voter Systems and Edison Research have
been accessible and were certainly compromised by rogue actors,
such as Iran and China. By using servers and employees connected
with rogue actors and hostile foreign influences combined with
numerous easily discoverable leaked credentials, these
organizations neglectfully allowed foreign adversaries to access
1 This slip sheet for this exhibit as filed with the complaint erroneously
labeled it as Exhibit 7. In fact, it should be Exhibit 8. It is attached to this
document with a corrected slip sheet.
data and intentionally provided access to their infrastructure in

order to monitor and manipulate elections, including the most
recent one in 2020. This represents a complete failure of their duty
to provide basic cyber security. This is not a technological issue, but
rather a governance and basic security issue: if it is not corrected,
future elections in the United States and beyond will not be secure
and citizens will not have confidence in the results.
See Exh. 8 at pars. 1 and 21. 2 His sworn testimony further appears consistent
with a recent October 2020 federal government advisory, which states:
This joint cybersecurity advisory was coauthored by the

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). CISA and the FBI are aware
of an Iranian advanced persistent threat (APT) actor targeting U.S.
state websites to include election websites. CISA and the FBI assess
this actor is responsible for the mass dissemination of voter
intimidation emails to U.S. citizens and the dissemination of U.S.
election-related disinformation in mid-October 2020.1 (Reference
FBI FLASH message ME-000138-TT, disseminated October 29,
2020). Further evaluation by CISA and the FBI has identified the
targeting of U.S. state election websites was an intentional effort to
influence and interfere with the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
A copy of this “Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Iranian Advanced Persistent
Threat Actor Identified Obtaining Voter Registration Data” is Attached
hereto as Exhibit “A,” following the two affidavits in question on this motion.
The Advisory further states, “[f]ollowing the review of web server
access logs, CISA analysts, in coordination with the FBI, found instances of
the cURL and FDM User Agents sending GET requests to a web resource
2 See note 1, above regarding the Exhibit number for this Exhibit.
associated with voter registration data. The activity occurred between
September 29 and October 17, 2020. Suspected scripted activity submitted
several hundred thousand queries iterating through voter identification
values and retrieving results with varying levels of success [Gather Victim
Identity Information (T1589)]. A sample of the records identified by the FBI
reveals they match information in the aforementioned propaganda video.
6.
This testimony has been given at great risk of the Affiant who holds
training and the current knowledge required to obtain such information
related to foreign interference in the 2020 election.
7.
The established pattern of witness and attorney harassment and
coercion, along with the importance of their testimony, increases the
likelihood of the feared harassments, threats and coercion should the
identities of these witnesses become public knowledge. One of the witnesses,
who is testifying about his analysis of hostile foreign power cyber penetration
of Dominion Voting Systems servers and networks, is already subject to
serious threats of harm because of the highly sensitive nature of his regular
professional work and is in particular need of protection.

8.
These witnesses, whom Plaintiffs ask the Court to protect, have shown
great courage in coming forward at a critical moment to deliver the truth to
the Court about matters of great importance to our country. They are in need
of the Court’s protection from the readily foreseeable harms that would
accrue to them if their identities were made public. Thus, good cause exists
for the relief requested.
9.
Due to the concerns described above, these witnesses’ affidavits and
declarations at Exhibits 2 and 8 3 have been filed with the Complaint with
their identifying information redacted, as reflected in the attached copies
thereof
10.
The privacy and personal and financial security interests of the
witnesses are at grave risk of harm if their identities were disclosed. Their
interests, as well as those of the parties and the Court vastly outweigh the
interests of the public in having access to the Affiants’ personally identifying
information, and no less drastic alternatives other than sealing their
unredacted affidavits to conceal their identities will provide adequate
3As noted, this slip sheet for this Exhibit said it was Exhibit 7 when it should
have been Exhibit 8. The filename for the document begins “Exh. 8 …”
protection to the them and the proper functioning of this Court. The common
law right of public access to Court filings must yield to countervailing
interests of the parties, the Court and the Affiants in keeping their identities
undisclosed beyond the parties and the Court in these proceedings to protect
them from readily foreseeable threats. Moreover, the redacted affidavits
conceal only the Affiants’ personally identifying information – all of their
other testimony is public and unredacted.
11.
For the Court’s ease of reference, the affidavits and declarations as to
which this protection is sought are also attached to this motion in redacted
form.
12.
Wherefore, the Plaintiffs respectfully request leave of Court to submit
the unredacted affidavits to the Court under seal for in camera review, and
for an Order of the court that in all public filings their names or personally
identifying information not be revealed to the public.
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775

forthcoming

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was prepared in
13-point Century Schoolbook font and in accordance with the margin and other
requirements of Local Rule 5.1.
Harry W. MacDougald
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Motion To File Affidavits Under Seal and For In Camera Review with the
Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and that I have delivered the filing
to the Defendants by email and FedEx at the following addresses:
This 25th day of November, 2020.

Governor Brian Kemp
206 Washington Street
111 State Capitol
Atlanta, GA 30334
Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger

214 State Capitol
brad@sos.ga.gov
soscontact@sos.ga.gov
Rebecca N. Sullivan
Georgia Department of Administrative Services
200 Piedmont A venue SE
Suite 1804, West Tower
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9010
rebecca.sullivan@doas.ga.gov
David J. Worley
Evangelista Worley LLC
500 Sugar Mill Road
Suite 245A
david@ewlawllc.com
Matthew Mashburn
Aldridge Pite, LLP

3575 Piedmont Road, N.E.
Suite 500
mmashburn@aldridgepite.com
Anh Le
Suite 525
ale@hrflegal.com
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
Exh. A
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Exh. B

Exh. C
I.
II.
I.
II.
I.
II.
I.
II.


ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JA QAN PEARSON,

VIKKI TOWNSEND
CONSIGLIO; GLORIA KAY
GODWIN; JAMES KENNETH
CARROLL; CAROLYN HALL
FISHER; CATHLEEN ALSTON
LATHAM; and BRIAN JAY VAN
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP; BRAD
RAFFENSPERGER; DAVID J.
WORLEY; REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN; MATTHEW
MASHBURN; and ANH LE,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiffs have filed an emergency motion [6] for temporary
injunctive relief. In their motion, Plaintiffs seek an order directing
Defe da all Plai iff e e ( ) i ec he D mi i i g

machines in Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee Counties. The Court
conducted a Zoom hea i g a 7:45 .m. EST c ide Plai iff
motion.
D i g he hea i g, Defe da c el a g ed ha he ec e a
of state has no lawful authority over county election officials, citing
Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1256 58 (11th
Cir. 2020). Plai iff c el e ded ha Plaintiffs could amend
their complaint to add the elections officials in Cobb, Gwinnett, and
Cherokee Counties, thus obviating the issue of whether the proper
officials had been named as Defendants to this case.
Defe da c el al a g ed ha all i g ch forensic
inspections would pose substantial security and proprietary/trade secret
risks to Defendants. Plai iff c el e ded ha Defe da
concerns could be alleviated by an order from the Court (1) allowing
Defe da e e ( ) a ici a e i he requested inspections,
which would be video-recorded, and (2) directing the experts to provide
whatever information they obtain to the Court and no one else for an
in camera inspection.
After c ide i g he a ie email bmi i da a d he
arguments advanced at the Zoom hearing, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.
Defendants shall have until Wednesday, December 2, at 5:00 p.m.
EST, to file a brief setting forth in detail the factual bases they have, if
any, against allowing the three forensic inspections. The brief should be
accompanied and supported by affidavit or other evidence, if
appropriate.
2.
Defendants are hereby ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from
altering, destroying, or erasing, or allowing the alteration, destruction,
or erasure of, any software or data on any Dominion voting machine in
Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee Counties.
3.
Defendants are ORDERED to promptly produce to Plaintiffs a
copy of the contract between the State and Dominion.

4.
This temporary restraining order shall remain in effect for ten
days, or until further order of the Court, whichever comes first.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of November, 2020, at 10:10
p.m. EST.
____________________________________
Timothy C. Batten, Sr.
United States District Judge

ATLANTA DIVISION

VIKKI TOWNSEND
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP; BRAD
WORLEY; REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN; MATTHEW
Defendants.
ORDER
The Court finds that its November 29 order partially granting
Defendants’ motion for a temporary restraining order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1292(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of November, 2020.
____________________________________
2

ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JA QAN PEARSON, e al., )

)
Plaintiffs, )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
v. ) 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
)
BRIAN KEMP, e al., )
)
Defendants. )
ICE FA EA A CE
COMES NOW Charlene S. McGowan, Assistant Attorne General, and
hereb makes an entr of appearance in the above-st led action on behalf of
Defendants Governor Brian Kemp, Secretar of State Brad Raffensperger, and State
Election Board Members Rebecca Sullivan, David Worle , Matthew Mashburn, and
Anh Le (collectivel , State Defendants ). Please direct all further pleadings,
notices, orders, and other matters to her at the following:
Office of the Attorne General

40 Capitol Square, SW
Telephone: (404) 458-3658
E-Mail: cmcgowan@law.ga.gov
1
Respectfull submitted, this 30th da of November, 2020.
/s/ Cha lene S. McG an

CHARLENE S. MCGOWAN 697316
Assistant Attorne General
Office of the Georgia Attorne General

40 Capitol Square SW
Atlanta, GA 30334
cmcgowan@law.ga.gov
Tel: 404-656-3389
Fa : 404-651-9325
C n el f S a e Defendan
2
CE IFICA E F C M LIA CE
I hereb certif that the foregoing has been formatted using Times New
Roman font in 14-point t pe in compliance with Local Rule 7.1(D).
/ /Cha lene S. McG an

Charlene S. McGowan
3
CE IFICA E F E ICE
I hereb certif that I have this da electronicall filed the foregoing ICE
FA EA A CE with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF s stem, which will
send notification of such filing to counsel for the parties of record via electronic
notification.
Dated: November 30, 2020.
/ / Cha lene S. McG an

Charlene S. McGowan
4

ATLANTA DIVISION

VIKKI TOWNSEND
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP; BRAD
WORLEY; REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN; MATTHEW
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter shall come before the Court for hearing on Friday,
December 4, at 10:00 a.m., EST, in Courtroom 2106, in Atlanta. The
Court sets the following schedule: Defendants’ brief in opposition to the

claims in Plaintiffs’ complaint will be due on Wednesday, December 2,
by 5:00 p.m. EST. Any reply brief will be due Thursday, December 3, by
5:00 p.m. EST.
____________________________________
1 of 44

2 Atlanta Division
3
et al., )
5 )
Plaintiff, )
6 ) Civil Action
7 )
) Atlanta, Georgia
8 Brian Kemp, et al., ) Monday December 7, 2020
) 10:00 a.m.
9 Defendant. )
_________________________)
10
11
14
APPEARANCES:
15
16 Harry MacDougald
Attorneys at Law
17
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: Carey Allen Miller
18 Joshua Barret Belinfante
19 Melanie Leigh Johnson
Attorneys at Law
20
21
22
(404) 215-1528
24
25 produced by CAT.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
2 of 44
1 THE COURT: Good morning. I would like to point out
2 that this hearing is being audio streamed nationally, so
3 whatever you say near your microphones will be picked up for
4 the world to hear, so you might want to be discreet in what
5 you have to say this morning with the microphones. Also, I
6 would ask that -- each of y'all should have some plastic bags.
7 As you leave the lectern, take the bag with you, and the next
8 person who comes up should put a new bag. You all have bags,
9 right? Okay. So that is what we are going to do. All right.
10 In this case, the Plaintiffs are a group of
11 disappointed Republican presidential electors. They assert
12 that the 2020 presidential election in Georgia was stolen, and
13 that the results, Joe Biden winning, occurred only because of
14 massive fraud. Plaintiffs contend that this massive fraud was
15 manifest primarily, but not exclusively, through the use of
16 ballot stuffing. And they allege that this ballot stuffing
17 has been rendered virtually invisible by computer software
18 created and run by foreign oligarchs and dictators from
19 Venezuela to China to Iran.
20 The defendants deny all of Plaintiffs' accusations.
21 They begin in their motions to dismiss by rhetorically asking
22 what a lot of people are thinking, why would Georgia's
23 Republican Governor and Republican Secretary of State, who
24 were avowed supporters of President Trump, conspire to throw
25 the election in favor of the Democratic candidate for
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
3 of 44
1 President.
2 We are going to turn now to the legal arguments. We
3 have several motions today, but primarily they are grouped
4 into two. First we have a motion to dismiss that has been
5 filed by the State Defendants, the original defendants in the
6 case, and then we have another motion to dismiss filed by the
7 Intervening Defendants in the case. The Plaintiffs of course
8 oppose both of these motions. They've been fully briefed, and
9 I have read everything that has been filed in this case by the
10 Plaintiffs and everything pertaining to these motions. If the
11 Defendants are not successful on those motions to dismiss, we
12 will proceed to hear argument on the substantive merits of the
13 complaint and the claims in the complaint. The way that time
14 is going to be -- well let me begin it this way. In their
15 legal arguments the Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack
16 standing to bring this suit, which is pretty much what the
17 11th Circuit just held in Mr. Woods's own separate suit
18 against the State on Saturday. The Defendants further argue
19 that under Georgia law this kind of suit, one for election
20 fraud, should be filed in State Court, not Federal Court.
21 This too is what the 11th Circuit held in a separate but
22 similar case recently. And next, Defendants assert that
23 Plaintiffs waited too long to file this suit which seeks an
24 order decertifying the election results. The Secretary of
25 State has already certified the election result, and there is
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
4 of 44
1 no mechanism that the Court is aware of of decertifying it,
2 but that is that the Plaintiffs seek.
3 And finally, the law is pretty clear that a party
4 cannot obtain the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief
5 unless he acts quickly. And Defendants contend that the
6 Plaintiffs have failed to do that, pointing out that all of
7 Plaintiffs' claims about the Dominion voting machines, the
8 ballot marking devices, could have been raised months ago, and
9 certainly prior to the November 3 election, and certainly
10 before Plaintiffs filed this suit over three weeks after the
11 election took place.
12 So these are the procedural arguments that the
13 Defendants are making today, or at least the main ones, I
14 believe. And then the question is, assuming the Plaintiffs
15 can survive these procedural hurdles, what is the relief that
16 they want? They want me to agree with their allegations of
17 massive fraud. And what do they want me to do about it? They
18 want me to enter injunctive relief, specifically the
19 extraordinary remedy of declaring that the winner of the
20 election in Georgia was Donald Trump and not Joe Biden. They
21 ask me to order the Governor and the Secretary of State to
22 undo what they have done, which is certify Joe Biden as the
23 election winner. We will get to those merits if the
24 Plaintiffs survive the motion to dismiss.
25 At this time we're going to begin with the motion to
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LORI BURGESS, RMR
5 of 44
1 dismiss, and the time allotment will be as follows: The State
2 Defendants have 20 minutes -- let me back up. Each side gets
3 30 minutes. The Plaintiffs get all 30 of their minutes, and
4 the Defendants' 30 minutes are divided among the two sets of
5 Defendants. The State Defendants -- the State Defendants get
6 20 minutes, and then the Intervening Defendants get 10
7 minutes, following which we will hear the Plaintiffs'
8 response. They have up to 30 minutes. And then whatever time
9 was saved in -- reserved for rebuttal, the State Defendants
10 and Intervening Defendants will then have.
11 But before we go forward, is there any way we can
12 stop this fuzzy sound that is coming through up here? I don't
13 know if it is coming through in the whole courtroom. I don't
14 think has anything to do with my microphone. (pause). All
15 right, is that better? I think it was the speaker, one of the
16 two speakers up here on the bench. I talk loud enough and I
17 think the lawyers talk loud enough that I can hear what they
18 are going to say. I don't need a microphone. So at this time
19 I will turn the matter over to the State Defendants.
20 MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor. Carey Miller
21 on behalf of the State Defendants. I am joined today by Josh
22 Belinfante, Charlene McGowan, and Melanie Johnson. Mr.
23 Belinfante will be handling the motion to dismiss. I do want
24 to raise with the Court, to the extent that we get there,
25 State Defendants would like to renew their motion to alter the
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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6 of 44
1 TRO that is in place at this point. I understand that we can
2 address that in that section.
3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.
4 MR. BELINFANTE: I am not checking email, I am
5 trying to keep my time.
6 THE COURT: Okay.
7 MR. BELINFANTE: I would ask this. Would the Court
8 allow me to speak without the mask? Or do you prefer I keep
9 the mask on to speak?
10 THE COURT: I think I need to have everybody keep
11 the mask on.
12 MR. BELINFANTE: I'll be happy to do it. Good
13 morning, Your Honor. I think you have hit the nail on the
14 head in terms of what the issues are. This case simply does
15 not belong in this Court. The relief that Plaintiffs seek is,
16 as the Court described, extraordinary. It is to substitute by
17 judicial fiat the wishes of the Plaintiffs over presidential
18 election results that have been certified, that have been
19 audited, that have been looked over with a hand-marked count.
20 There is zero authority under the Federal law, under the
21 Constitution of the United States, or even under Georgia law
22 for such a remedy.
23 If the Plaintiffs wanted the relief they seek, they
24 are not without remedies. They could do what the campaign of
25 the President has done, which is file a challenge in Georgia
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
7 of 44
1 court under Georgia law challenging election irregularities.
2 There are three currently pending. I have with me two Rule
3 Nisi orders. One will proceed today at 3:30 in the Cobb
4 Superior Court sitting by designation. Another I believe is
5 Wednesday. And the President's, as I understand it, is to
6 proceed on Friday. That is where these claims should be
7 brought.
8 To the extent that the claims are about something
9 else, the Court need only look at what has happened in Georgia
10 since roughly 2019 and the passage of House Bill 316. It was
11 at that time that the Georgia legislature completely redid
12 Georgia election law. And there had been suit after suit
13 after suit, many of which brought by the Defendant
14 interveners, their allies, and others who question election
15 outcomes. And in every suit no relief has been ordered that
16 has been upheld by the 11th Circuit. In fact, no court has
17 ordered relief. And to the extent that two have, the Curling
18 case and the New Georgia Project case on discrete issues, the
19 11th Circuit stayed those because it concluded that there was
20 a strong likelihood of reversible error.
21 So what does this tell you? It tells you that
22 Georgia laws are constitutional, Georgia elections are
23 constitutional, and Georgia machines are constitutional. The
24 constitutional that the legislature has set forward is
25 constitutional. Now, that's where the Plaintiffs have backed
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LORI BURGESS, RMR
8 of 44
1 themselves into a corner from which they cannot escape. In
2 their reply brief, the claims, from the State's perspective,
3 got significantly crystallized. It became much clearer. And
4 they're relying heavily on Bush v. Gore. The problem is that
5 they are turning Bush v. Gore on its head.
6 In Bush v. Gore the challenge was that a Florida
7 Supreme Court decision was going to, as the Plaintiffs repeat
8 often, substitute its will for the legislative scheme for
9 appointing presidential elections. That is exactly what they
10 are asking this Court to do, substitute this Court for the
11 Florida Supreme Court, and you have Bush v. Gore all over
12 again. And that manifests itself in various different forms
13 that the Court has seen in our brief and the Court has already
14 identified. I will not go through all of them. I will try to
15 hit the high notes on some, but we will rely on our briefs.
16 We're not dropping or conceding arguments, but we will rely on
17 our briefs for those that I don't address expressly.
18 Let's talk briefly about what the complaint is,
19 because that has been I think significantly clarified with the
20 reply brief. One, the parties are presidential electors. And
21 they argue that that makes a significant difference. But what
22 are the acts of the State? Not Fulton County, not mullahs in
23 Iran, not dictators in Venezuela. What are the acts of the
24 State that are at issue? And it's in the discussion about
25 traceability and the Jacobson decision in the 11th Circuit
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
9 of 44
1 where that gets fleshed out really for the first time in the
2 reply brief, and there are three. And they tell you, and I
3 will keep coming back to it, on Page 20 of their reply brief.
4 The Plaintiffs, describing the State, say they
5 picked the Dominion system. Their policies led to de facto
6 abolition of the signature match requirement, their
7 regulations to permit early processing of absentee ballots is
8 unlawful and unconstitutional. Those are the three acts of
9 the State. Everything else is happening at a county level,
10 period. And from that they raise what appears to now be four
11 claims. One is the Elections and Electors Clause citing the
12 absentee ballot opening rule, I will refer to it as, the
13 settlement agreement. They raise equal protection claims
14 saying that the violation of the Election Clause has led to a
15 vote dilution and discrimination against Republican voters.
16 They argue that due process is violated because they have a
17 property interest in lawful elections, again, under the
18 Elections and Electors Clause. And finally, they raise a pure
19 State claim in Federal Court under a voter election challenge.
20 What is the relief they seek? The Court has
21 identified it. Why do they seek it? The Court is informed of
22 this on Page 25 of the reply brief. And it is -- if the Court
23 will not order a different result than what a certified
24 election has, they seek it through another means. They say on
25 Page 25 that allowing the electors to be chosen by the
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
10 of 44
1 legislature under the plenary power granted to them for this
2 purpose by the elections and election laws. One way or the
3 another, the relief they seek is judicial fiat, changing
4 certified election results. And to evaluate these claims the
5 Court does need to consider aspects of State law. And this is
6 where the problem lies. I am going to keep going until you
7 tell me to stop.
8 (noise from courtroom audio system).
9 THE COURT: I am sorry, Mr. Belinfante. I don't
10 know what the issue is. We just have to bear through it
11 unless or until somebody fixes it. I've got six kids. It
12 doesn't bother me.
13 MR. BELINFANTE: I have three, I understand. I also
14 have the loudest dog in America. In any case, to evaluate the
15 claims, you have to look at State law. And because the
16 Plaintiffs raise Code Section 21-2-522 and the statutes that
17 surround it, it's those cases that are important. It allows a
18 challenge based on these grounds - in fact some are pending
19 now - misconduct, fraud, irregularity, illegal votes, and
20 error are all grounds to challenge an election in Georgia.
21 All of these issues can be brought in in those cases. Those
22 election challenges have to be decided promptly under
23 21-2-525. And, and this is critical, the relief sought is not
24 to declare someone else a winner, it is to have another
25 election. This goes to the point that there is simply no
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LORI BURGESS, RMR
11 of 44
1 authority for the relief that they seek.
2 Turning first, with that factual predicate in mind,
3 to standing. There has been a fair amount of briefing on
4 whether the status as a presidential elector guarantees
5 standing. The 8th Circuit said yes, the 3rd Circuit said no.
6 And I think the 3rd Circuit's analysis is more persuasive.
7 And to the extent that the Plaintiffs say the 3rd Circuit did
8 not consider their status as an electorate, that is true, but
9 the electorate is not what gives you unique status, it's if
10 the electorate is a candidate. And that is expressly what the
11 3rd Circuit considered in the Bognet decision, and we would
12 suggest that that is the more persuasive one that we rely on
13 in our briefs.
14 But I do want to address two other aspects of
15 standing that are more particularized. One is that when they
16 are seeking to invalidate a State rule or a consent decree
17 that the State has entered into, or anything truly under the
18 Elections Clause, the Bognet case speaks to this as well. And
19 it says that because Plaintiffs are not the General Assembly,
20 nor do they bear any conceivable relationship to the State
21 law-making process, they lack standing to sue over the alleged
22 usurpation of the General Assembly's rights under the
23 Elections and Electors Clauses. That is absolutely true here.
24 The Wood court, the 11th Circuit Wood opinion, says the same,
25 citing Walker, because Federal Courts are not constituted as
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LORI BURGESS, RMR
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1 freewheeling enforcers of the Constitution and laws. And that
2 is the injury that underlies all of their claims, which is why
3 they lack standing.
4 I am not going to get into traceability as much
5 because I think the most useful aspect of the traceability
6 issue is the crystallizing of Plaintiffs' complaints, and as
7 I've indicated, the isolating of the State acts in particular.
8 On sovereign immunity, I only want to highlight that
9 a decision just came out in Michigan seeking very similar
10 relief. We will get you the cite. It is Michigan -- it is
11 against Whitmer, King versus Whitmer, in the Eastern District
12 of Michigan. Walks through all of the issues in this case and
13 rejects the claims, denies the relief. On sovereign immunity
14 they raise the point that under Young, you can only get
15 prospective injunctive relief. That is not decertification,
16 that is a retrospective. And so sovereign immunity would bar
17 that. They do seek to prevent the Governor from mailing the
18 results; that can be prospective, but there is just no relief
19 for it. So that is all I will says on sovereign immunity.
20 On laches, the Michigan Court also joined in with
21 Judge Grimberg on laches in the Wood case and said that there
22 is time that is inexcusable. The Court is well-aware of the
23 elements, was there a delay, was it not excusable, and did the
24 delay cause undue prejudice. Judge Grimberg has already
25 looked at this argument in the context of the Wood case and
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LORI BURGESS, RMR
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1 the challenge to the consent order and said laches applied.
2 And it does here for all of the Plaintiffs' arguments, and all
3 you need to do, again, is go back to that Page 20 and see why.
4 They say that their policies, the State's policies, led to a
5 de facto abolition of the signature requirement. The
6 complaint at Paragraph 58 acknowledges in Exhibit A that that
7 happened in March of this year. There has been plenty of time
8 that they thought the Secretary overstepped his bounds to
9 bring a challenge in that case or to bring a challenge even
10 afterwards, challenge the OEB. They did not.
11 They say on Page 20 that they, the State, picked the
12 Dominion system. They tell you on Paragraph 12 that happened
13 in 2019. There has been significant litigation over the
14 Dominion system. Nothing has been held in order that the
15 Dominion system is unconstitutional, is flawed, or anything
16 else that has stuck.
17 Third, they said that their regulation, the absentee
18 ballot regulation, permitted absentee ballots as unlawful and
19 unconstitutional. They tell you in Paragraph 60 that happened
20 in April of 2020. Georgia law, in the Administrative
21 Procedures Act, specifically allows you to challenge rules,
22 50-13-10. That wasn't done. They certainly could have. And
23 you don't need the fraud, as they allege, to happen first,
24 because their argument is not based on the fraud, it is based
25 on usurpation of power by the Executive Branch. That can be
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1 challenged when the rule has been promulgated, when the order
2 is out, and when the Dominion machines were selected.
3 We raise in our brief several forms of abstention.
4 And truly, Your Honor, they all kind of get to the same place
5 under different theories. And again, the reply brief made
6 this point to the clearest. I think at the end of the day,
7 while we will rely on our briefs in terms of why those matter,
8 and the Michigan court found that Colorado River abstention
9 should apply, there are parallel proceedings in State Court --
10 THE COURT: Did they even argue why it shouldn't?
11 MR. BELINFANTE: They argued that in voting rights
12 cases the 11th Circuit does not typically abstain. And those
13 cases are slightly different. They are challenging an
14 underlying statute, for the most part. Siegel is a slightly
15 -- it's a different case. But they are mostly challenging
16 underlying statutes. And there is not a pending election
17 challenge on the same thing in State Court. It's like the
18 other cases that we have seen that we've defended since the
19 gubernatorial election in 2018. So no, I don't think so. But
20 I think the Bush v. Gore analysis is the one that is most
21 critical, and it is that simply the Secretary -- the
22 legislative scheme for electing presidential electors is set
23 forth in the Code in Title 21, it has a means of challenging
24 fraudulent illegal votes, it has a means of allowing the
25 Secretary to address various issues, the State Election Board
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1 to pass regulations. All of that authority has been delegated
2 by, first, Congress to the Georgia Legislature, and then to
3 the Executive Branch. That is the scheme that is put in
4 place, and that is exactly what they seek to turn on its head.
5 And what the three justice concurrence on which they rely
6 says, makes that impossible. Because the Supreme Court said
7 at Page 120, for the Court, in that case the Florida Court, to
8 step away from this established practice prescribed by the
9 Secretary, the State official charged by the Legislature with
10 the responsibility to obtain and maintain uniformity in the
11 application, operation, and interpretation of election laws
12 was to depart from the legislative scheme.
13 Read the proposed order. That is exactly what the
14 Plaintiffs seek here, and that is exactly what their own
15 authority says the Court cannot issue in terms of relief, and
16 that would actually trump the remaining claims because it
17 would violate the Elections Clause in order to arguably save
18 some other vague right in terms of due process.
19 Turning to that, let me talk briefly about the
20 absentee ballot regulation, the return of the ballots. There
21 is nothing that is inconsistent with that, number one, because
22 if you look in the Election Code, there are five times that
23 the General Assembly said something cannot occur earlier than
24 X date. This doesn't say that. This says beginning on this
25 date they can do this, but it doesn't say it can only happen.
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1 And the five times elsewhere in the Code would suggest that
2 the legislature knew how to change it if they wanted. That is
3 121-2-132, 133, 153, 187, and 384. They are simply reading
4 the regulation to create the conflict, when every piece of
5 Federal and State law says you should read it to avoid the
6 conflict. In terms of the settlement agreement itself, I
7 think Judge Grimberg has sufficiently analyzed that. And it
8 fills the gap. There is no conflict. They can't point to any
9 language that it does. And at the end of the day it is an
10 OEB, an Official Election Bulletin, not a statute and not a
11 regulation of the State Election Board anyway.
12 On the Dominion machines, I think we will rely on --
13 Mr. Miller is going to talk about that a good deal, but also
14 they argue that the audit somehow doesn't save it because of
15 Prohm and that we are estopped from raising Prohm. There are
16 two problems with that. One, estoppel doesn't apply. There
17 has been no final order. They're not estopped from doing
18 anything. That's the Community State Bank vs. Strong decision
19 from the 11th Circuit applying Georgia law 2011. And two,
20 there has not been an order in Curling saying that the
21 machines are unconstitutional. There have been nine
22 preliminary injunctions filed, no standard relief, and it
23 ignores -- the entire premise of the argument ignores that
24 when a voter gets a ballot from the machine they can read who
25 they voted for. And when the hand count took place, they
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1 didn't scan it back in, they looked at what the ballot said
2 and who they voted for and that is why things were put in
3 different boxes. Their own affidavits talk about that
4 provision of separating the boxes by hand. It resolves the
5 issue.
6 The remaining theories fail -- again, I want to be
7 cognizant of time and save some time for rebuttal. We rely on
8 our briefs in terms of the merits of those, but the equal
9 protection and due process allegations I think are addressed
10 in Wood from the 11th Circuit. On procedural due process, to
11 the extent that that is the due process claim, they don't
12 challenge the Georgia election means of correcting as somehow
13 invalid or insufficient. In fact, they raised it. And so you
14 can't have a procedural due process claim if you have a
15 remedy. You can't have a substantive due process claim if it
16 doesn't shock the conscience, which having to use the remedy
17 here, they can do. Your Honor, with that, unless there are
18 questions, I would will reserve the rest of my time for
19 rebuttal.
20 THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
21 MS. CALLAIS: Good morning, Your Honor. I am Amanda
22 Callais on behalf of Intervenor Defendants, the Democratic
23 Party of Georgia, the DSCC and the DCCC, and I am mindful of
24 many of the points Mr. Belinfante just made, and I will not
25 repeat them, but for the record, Your Honor, I would just like
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1 to say that for the statements that we've made in our motion
2 to dismiss, this case should be dismissed. The Plaintiffs in
3 this case lack standing. They bring their claims and assert
4 only generalized grievances. This Court also lacks
5 jurisdiction to hear their claims because this case is moot
6 now that the election has been certified, which is what the
7 11th Circuit found just this past Saturday in the Wood v.
8 Raffensperger case. And then Plaintiffs have also failed to
9 state any cognizable claim under the Election and Elections
10 Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause.
11 Where I would like to begin though is where
12 Mr. Belinfante started, and I would like to bring us back to
13 this point about where we are in terms of Georgia elections
14 and with the remedy asked for in this case. Over a month ago
15 five million Georgians cast their ballots in the 2020
16 presidential election with the majority of them choosing
17 Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as their next President. Those votes,
18 both the ballots that were cast on Dominion machines and the
19 ballots that were cast by absentee were counted. Almost
20 immediately after that count took place, those votes were
21 counted again by hand, and then almost immediately after that
22 count finished, the recount began again, a third time, by
23 machine. Each and every one of those counts has confirmed
24 Georgia voters' choice. Joe Biden should be the next
25 President of The United States. At this point there is simply
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1 no question that Joe Biden won Georgia's presidential election
2 and with it all of Georgia's 16 electoral votes. Despite
3 that, Plaintiffs have come to this Court eight months after a
4 settlement agreement they challenged was entered, three weeks
5 after the election is over, and days after certification took
6 place, and they asked this Court to take back that choice, to
7 set aside the choice that Georgia voters have made, and to
8 choose the next president by decertifying the 2020
9 presidential election results and ordering the governor to
10 appoint a new slate of electors.
11 THE COURT: Speaking of taking back, how do the
12 Intervening Defendants respond to the Plaintiffs' point in
13 their complaint that many people, including Stacey Abrams,
14 affiliated with the Democratic Party, opposed these machines
15 from the beginning and said that they are rife with the
16 possibility of fraud?
17 MS. CALLAIS: I think, Your Honor, that the key
18 there is that when we talk about a possibility of fraud, that
19 does not mean that fraud has actually occurred. And here
20 Plaintiffs come after an election has taken place and they say
21 on very -- as we will talk about if we get to the TRO
22 portion -- on very limited specious evidence that there is a
23 possibility of fraud. A possibility of fraud does not mean
24 that fraud has actually occurred. And truthfully, Your Honor,
25 that is what the Plaintiffs would need to show to get some
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1 sort of -- the relief that they are requesting here, that
2 there has been actual fraud. And that is just not in their
3 complaint, it is not in their evidence. It makes no
4 difference whether there has been a possibility of fraud or
5 issues with the machines. That is a case that is in front of
6 Judge Totenberg and that she is deciding. But that is not the
7 evidence that they have presented here, and it certainly does
8 not support their claims.
9 So with that, Your Honor, as the 3rd Circuit
10 explained just a little over a week ago when denying an
11 emergency motion to stop certification in a case similar to
12 this one brought by Donald J. Trump's campaign, voters not
13 lawyers choose the President. Ballots not briefs decide
14 elections. Plaintiffs' request for sweeping relief in this
15 case is unprecedented. It is unprecedented anywhere, and it
16 is particularly unprecedented in Georgia where the ballots
17 have been counted not once, not twice, but three times, and
18 the vote has been confirmed. Their request for relief is not
19 just unprecedented, but also provides a separate and
20 independent grounds for this Court to dismiss this case.
21 As we explained in our motion to dismiss, granting
22 Plaintiffs' remedy in and of itself would require the Court to
23 disenfranchise over 5 million Georgia voters, violating their
24 constitutional right to vote. Post-election
25 disenfranchisement has consistently been found to be a
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1 violation of the Due Process Clause throughout the courts.
2 For example, in Griffin v. Burns the 1st Circuit found that
3 throwing out absentee votes post election that voters believed
4 has been lawfully cast would violate the Due Process Clause.
5 Similarly, in Marks v. Stinson, a number of years later, the
6 3rd Circuit found the same thing in their finding where they
7 found even if there is actual evidence of fraud, discarding
8 ballots that were legally cast or that voters believed to be
9 legally cast violates the Due Process Clause and is a drastic
10 remedy. This is precisely what would happen here if this
11 Court were to order the requested relief. That order would
12 violate the Due Process Clause. And because of that, this
13 Court cannot grant the remedy that Plaintiffs seek and the
14 Court should dismiss this suit.
15 In finding that the Court can't grant this relief,
16 this Court would not be alone, it would be in actually quite
17 good company, not just from the 1st Circuit and the 3rd
18 Circuit in Griffin and Stinson, but also from more recent
19 cases. In 2016 in Stein v. Cortes, the District Court
20 declined to grant Jill Stein's request to a recount because,
21 quote, it would well insure that no Pennsylvania vote counts,
22 which would be outrageous and unnecessary. Just this cycle,
23 in Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar the Plaintiffs
24 sought to invalidate 7 million mail ballots under the Equal
25 Protection Clause, and the Court explained that it has been
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1 unable to find any case in which a plaintiff has sought such
2 drastic remedy in the contest of an election in terms or the
3 sheer volume of votes asked to be invalidated. The Court also
4 promptly dismissed there.
5 Just this last Friday in Law v. Whitmer in Nevada
6 State Court, which actually would have the ability to hear a
7 contest, found that it would not decertify the election in
8 Nevada. And the list goes on, Your Honor. We could talk
9 about findings in State Court in Arizona on Friday. There
10 have been over 30 challenges to this election that have been
11 repeatedly dismissed since -- basically since election day.
12 Since election day.
13 So the Court is in good company, and it's not just
14 in company good company nationwide, but it is in good company
15 with the judge right down the hall from here who, just two
16 weeks ago, in a case nearly identical to this one, found a
17 request to disenfranchise nearly 1 million absentee voters in
18 Georgia to be extraordinary. Judge Grimberg explained that to
19 prevent Georgia certification of the votes cast in the general
20 election after millions of people have lawfully cast their
21 ballots, to interfere with the results of an election that has
22 already concluded would be unprecedented and harm the public
23 and in countless ways. Granting injunctive relief here would
24 breed confusion, undermine the public's trust in the election,
25 and potentially disenfranchise over 1 million Georgia voters.
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1 Viewed in comparison to the lack of any demonstrable harm,
2 this Court finds no basis in fact or law to grant Plaintiff
3 the relief he seeks.
4 That same reasoning applies here. And in fact, it
5 applies here even more because most of the claims that were
6 brought in front of Judge Grimberg are the same, but the
7 amount of votes that Plaintiffs here seek to decertify are far
8 greater in scope.
9 On this last point, Your Honor, about the inability
10 of the Court to order the remedy, I wanted to respond to
11 something that Plaintiffs raised in their brief last night.
12 In their brief last night they react to the briefing on
13 mootness that we included in our TRO and note that this
14 Court -- this case would not be moot because the Court can
15 decertify an election. And that Wood v. Raffensperger that
16 came out by the 11th Circuit didn't discuss decertification of
17 the election, only halting certification.
18 And I would just like to point out that if this
19 Court were to decertify the election and specifically to point
20 a new slate of electors, which is what is asked, that in and
21 of itself would also violate the law. The U.S. Constitution
22 empowers State Legislatures to choose the manner of appointing
23 presidential electors, and that is the Electors Clause that
24 Plaintiffs actually challenge. And pursuant to that clause,
25 the Georgia General Assembly has chosen to appoint electors
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1 according to popular vote. Those are certified by the
2 governor through certificate of ascertainment. That popular
3 vote has already taken place, Your Honor, and if this Court
4 were to order a new slate of electors to be appointed, that
5 would -- that would violate the Electors Clause.
6 In addition, Congress has also provided that
7 electors shall be appointed in each and every state on the
8 Tuesday next after the first Monday in November in every 4th
9 year as also known as Election Day, which this year took place
10 on November 3rd. Georgia has held that election on Election
11 Day, and if this Court were to now, months after the -- over a
12 month after the election, to go and order that a new slate be
13 appointed, it would be violating that statute as well. So for
14 the very reasons that the Plaintiffs -- the very relief that
15 Plaintiffs ask is actually what prevents this Court from
16 issuing any relief in this case, and precisely why it should
17 be dismissed.
18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right, I
19 will hear from the Plaintiffs.
20 MS. POWELL: May it please the Court. Sidney Powell
21 and Harry MacDougald for the Plaintiffs. We are here on a
22 motion to dismiss which requires the Court to view the
23 pleadings and all the facts alleged in the light most
24 favorable to the Plaintiff. In my multiple decades of
25 practice I have never seen a more specifically pled complaint
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1 of fraud, and replete with evidence of it, both mathematical,
2 statistical, computer, expert, testimonial, video, and
3 multiple other means that show abject fraud committed
4 throughout the State of Georgia.
5 Forget that this machine and its systems originated
6 in Venezuela to ensure the election of Hugo Chavez and that it
7 was designed for that purpose. Look just at what happened in
8 Georgia. Let's start, for example, with the language, "the
9 insularity of the Defendants' and Dominion's stance here in
10 evaluation and management of the security and vulnerability of
11 the system does not benefit the public or citizens' confident
12 exercise of the franchise. The stealth vote alteration or
13 operational interference risk posed by malware that can be
14 effectively invisible to detection, whether intentionally
15 seeded or not, are high once implanted, if equipment and
16 software systems are not properly protected, implemented, and
17 audited. The modality of the system's capacity to deprive
18 voters of their cast votes without burden, long wait times,
19 and insecurity regarding how their votes are actually cast and
20 recorded in the unverified QR code makes the potential
21 constitutional deprivation less transparently visible as well;
22 at least until any portions of the system implode because of
23 system breach, breakdown, or crashes" -- all of which the
24 State of Georgia experienced -- "the operational shortcuts now
25 in setting up or running election equipment or software
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1 creates other risks that can adversely impact the voting
2 process."
3 THE COURT: You don't have to get into any of the
4 evidence or any of the statements or averments of the
5 complaint because I have read it. And all these statements, I
6 am assuming that every word of it is true. My question -- the
7 first question I have for you, for the Plaintiffs in the case,
8 is why -- first of all, whether you can or cannot pursue these
9 claims in State Court, specifically in Georgia Superior
10 Courts. Just the question is, can you?
11 MS. POWELL: No, Your Honor, we can't. These are
12 exclusively Federal claims with the exception of the election
13 contest allegation. They are predominantly Federal claims,
14 they are brought in Federal Court for that purpose. We have a
15 constitutional right to be here under the Election and
16 Electors Clause. I was not reading evidence. What I was
17 reading to the Court was the opinion of Judge Totenberg that
18 was just issued on 10-11-20 which defeats any allegation of
19 laches or lack of concern over the voting machines. This has
20 been apparent to everyone who has looked at these machines or
21 discussed them in any meaningful way or examined them in any
22 meaningful way, beginning with Carolyn Maloney, a Democratic
23 Representative to Congress back in 2006 who objected to them
24 being approved by CFIUS. Judge Totenberg went on to say that
25 "the Plaintiffs' national cybersecurity experts convincingly
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1 present evidence that it's not a question of might this
2 actually ever happen but, quote, when will it happen,
3 especially if further protective measures are not taken.
4 Given the masking nature of malware in the current systems
5 described here, if the State and Dominion simply stand by and
6 say we have never seen it, the future does not bode well."
7 And sure enough, exactly the fears articulated in her 147 page
8 opinion, and all the means and mechanisms and problems
9 discussed in that three day hearing she held have now
10 manifested themselves within the State of Georgia in the most
11 extreme way possible.
12 THE COURT: She did not address the question before
13 the Court today though as to the propriety of bringing this
14 suit in this Court, did she?
15 MS. POWELL: There is no other place to bring this
16 suit of Federal Equal Protection claims and the electors.
17 THE COURT: You couldn't bring all of these claims
18 in State Court? Is that your position?
19 MS. POWELL: We are entitled to bring these claims
20 in Federal Court, Your Honor. They are Federal constitutional
21 claims.
22 THE COURT: What do you do with the 11th Circuit's
23 holding in Wood on Saturday that we cannot turn back the clock
24 and create a world in which the 2020 election results are not
25 certified?
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1 MS. POWELL: Actually we can, but we don't need to
2 because we are asking the Court to decertify.
3 THE COURT: Where does that exist?
4 MS. POWELL: Bush v. Gore. Bush v. Gore was a
5 decertification case. There are other cases we've cited in
6 our brief that allow the Court the decertify. And at the very
7 minimum this Court should order a preliminary injunction to
8 allow discovery and allow us to examine the forensics of the
9 machines. For example, we know that already in Ware County,
10 which is a very small precinct, there were 37 votes that were
11 admittedly flipped by the machines from Mr. Trump to
12 Mr. Biden. That is a 74 vote swing. That equates to
13 approximately the algorithm, our experts also believe, was run
14 across the State that weighed Biden votes more heavily than it
15 did Trump votes. That is a systemic indication of fraud that
16 Judge Totenberg was expressing concern about in her decision
17 just weeks before the election. We have witness after witness
18 who have explained how the fraud can occur within the
19 machines. We know for example that there were crashes, just
20 like she feared in the decision, and everybody expressed
21 concern about. We know machines were connected to the
22 internet which is a violation of their certification
23 requirements and Federal law itself. We could not have acted
24 more quickly. In fact, the certification issue wasn't even
25 ripe until it was actually certified.
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1 THE COURT: But you weren't limited in your remedies
2 to attacking the certification, you could have attacked the
3 machines months ago.
4 MS. POWELL: That is what happened in the Totenberg
5 decision, and that is why I read it to the Court. The
6 machines were attacked by parties, and the election was
7 allowed to go forward. And we have come forward with our
8 claims as fast as is humanly possible. This is a massive
9 case, and of great concern not just to the nation and to
10 Georgia, but to the entire world, because it is imperative
11 that we have a voting system that people can trust.
12 They talk about disenfranchising voters, well there
13 are over a million voters here in Georgia that will be
14 disenfranchised by the counting of illegal ballots that render
15 theirs useless. It's every legal vote that must be counted.
16 Here we have scads of evidence. And the vote count here is
17 narrow. I mean, the disparity now is just a little over
18 10,000 votes. Just any one of our categories of that we have
19 identified require decertification. For example, 20,311
20 nonresidents voted illegally. Between 16,000 and 22,000
21 unrequested absentee ballots were sent in in violation of the
22 legislative scheme. Between 21,000 and 38,000 absentee
23 ballots were returned by voters but never counted. 32,347
24 votes in Fulton County were identified to be statistically
25 anomalous. And the vote spike for Mr. Biden, that is
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1 completely a mathematical impossibility, according to multiple
2 expert affidavits we provided, shows that it was like 120,000
3 Biden votes all of a sudden magically appear after midnight on
4 election night. That happens to coincide with the time we
5 have video of the Fulton County election workers running the
6 same stack of rather pristine-looking ballots through the
7 machine multiple times. And as for the recounts, that makes
8 no difference because if you recount the same fake ballots,
9 you achieve -- in the same machines, you achieve the same
10 results. That is why the hand count in Ware County that
11 revealed the 74 swing is so important and indicative of the
12 systemic machine fraud that our experts have identified, and
13 why it is so important that we at least get access for the
14 Department of Defense even, or our own experts, or jointly, to
15 examine the machines in Fulton County and the ten counties
16 that we requested in our protective order, or our motion
17 for --
18 THE COURT: How is this whole case not moot from the
19 standpoint of even if you were to win, and win Georgia, could
20 Mr. Trump win the election?
21 MS. POWELL: Well fraud, Your Honor, can't be
22 allowed by a Court of Law to stand --
23 THE COURT: That is not what I am asking. I am not
24 saying that there may not be other issues that need to be
25 addressed, and that there might not be questions that need to
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1 be investigated, I am asking, as a practical matter, in this
2 particular election, can Mr. Trump even win the election even
3 if he wins Georgia?
4 MS. POWELL: Yes, he can win the election.
5 THE COURT: How would that happen?
6 MS. POWELL: Because there are other states that are
7 still in litigation that have even more serious fraud than we
8 have in Georgia. It is nowhere near over. And it doesn't
9 affect just the presidential election. This fraud affects
10 senate seats, congressional seats, gubernatorial seats, it
11 affects even local elections. Another huge statistic that is
12 enough by itself to change the result is the at least 96,000
13 absentee ballots that were voted but are not reflected as
14 being returned. All of these instances are violations of
15 Federal law, as well as Georgia law. And in addition,
16 Mr. Ramsland's report finds that the ballot marking machine
17 appears to have abnormally influenced election results and
18 fraudulently and erroneously attributed between thirteen
19 thousand seven hundred and twenty-five thousand and the
20 136,908 votes to Mr. Biden just in Georgia. We have multiple
21 witnesses who just saw masses of pristine ballots appearing to
22 be computer marked, not hand marked, and those were repeatedly
23 run through machines until votes were injected in the system
24 that night without being observed by lawfully required
25 observers in violation of Georgia and Federal law that
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1 resulted in the mass shoot-up spike of votes for Mr. Biden.
2 Mr. Favorito's affidavit is particularly important. He talks
3 about the Ware County Waycross City Commission candidate who
4 reported that the Ware County hand audit is flipped those 74
5 votes. That is a statistically significant swing for a
6 precinct that small, and there is no explaining for it other
7 than the machine did it. We have testimony of witnesses who
8 saw that their vote did not come out the same way it was.
9 Mr. Favorito is a computer tech expert. He said that the vote
10 flipping malware was resident on the county election
11 management system of possibly one or more precinct or
12 scanners. There was also an instance where it came out of the
13 Arlo system changed, and there was no way to verify the votes
14 coming out of the individual precincts versus coming out of
15 Arlo because apparently they didn't keep the individual
16 results so that they can be compared. So there was a vote
17 swapping incident through the Arlo process also.
18 There was a misalignment of results, according to
19 Mr. Favorito, among all three presidential candidates. Rather
20 than just a swapping of the results for two candidates, in
21 other words, they would sometimes put votes into a third-party
22 candidate and take those out and put them in Mr. Biden's pile.
23 The system itself according to its own technological handbook
24 explains that it allows for votes to be put in, it can scan to
25 set or overlook anything it wants to overlook, put those in an
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1 adjudication pile, and then in the adjudication process, which
2 apparently was conducted in top secret at the English Street
3 warehouse, where all kinds of strange things were going on,
4 were just thrown out. They could just literally drag and drop
5 thousands of votes and throw them out. That is why it is so
6 important that we at least get temporary relief to examine the
7 systems and to hold off the certification or decertify or ask
8 the Court to halt the proceedings continuing right now until
9 we can have a few days to examine the machines and get the
10 actual evidence off the machines and look at the ballots
11 themselves, because we know there were a number of counterfeit
12 ballots that were used in the Fulton County count that night.
13 It would be a simple matter to examine 100,000 or so ballots
14 and look at which ones are fake. It is possible to determine
15 that with relative ease.
16 This is not about who or which government officials
17 knew anything was wrong with the machine. It's entirely
18 possible that many people did not know anything was wrong with
19 them. But it is about ensuring the integrity of the vote and
20 the confidence of the people that the will they expressed in
21 their vote is what actually determines the election. Very few
22 people in this country have any confidence in that level right
23 now. Very few.
24 The standard is only preponderance of the evidence.
25 We have shown more than enough for a prima facie case to get
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1 to -- meet the standard required -- this Court is required to
2 apply. It is crucial that we decertify and stop the vote. We
3 need to have discovery. It's so important to the American
4 people, particularly in a country that is built on the rule of
5 law, to know that their election system is fair and honest.
6 THE COURT: But that rule of law limits where these
7 suits can be filed and who can bring them. Specifically on
8 the standing issue, how does your -- how do your clients
9 survive the motion to dismiss with respect to the standing
10 issue if I don't follow the 8th Circuit's case opinion in
11 Carson?
12 MS. POWELL: Even the Court's decision in Wood is so
13 distinguishable it should make clear electors have standing.
14 In that case, for example, the State could not even say who
15 did have standing. But under the Constitution, electors
16 clearly do.
17 THE COURT: But Georgia, unlike Minnesota,
18 differentiates between candidates and Presidential electors.
19 Right?
20 MS. POWELL: I am not sure about that. But we also
21 have the Cobb County Republican Party official who is suing,
22 and the electors themselves are part of the Constitutional
23 Clause that entitles them to standing.
24 THE COURT: I just think you have a pretty glib
25 response to what the 11th Circuit has held regarding these
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1 cases. I mean, the 11th Circuit has basically said, you know,
2 we are not -- the Federal Courts are courts of limited
3 jurisdiction and we are not open 24/7 to remedy every
4 freewheeling constitutional issue that comes up. They have
5 made it clear, the Appellate Courts have made it clear, they
6 don't want District Courts handling this matter, they want
7 State Courts handling State election disputes, even regarding
8 in Federal elections. The Federal Government has nothing to
9 do with the State election and how it is conducted. As you
10 said, it is the Secretary of State who is the chief election
11 officer, and decides it. Why shouldn't the State of Georgia
12 investigate this? Why should it be a Federal judge?
13 MS. POWELL: Because we raise Federal constitutional
14 issues that are paramount to --
15 THE COURT: They raised Federal constitutional
16 issues in Wood.
17 MS. POWELL: -- to equal protection. He did not
18 request decertification. That is one of the things that
19 distinguished that case. He was not an elector or
20 representative of a county. He was simply an individual. And
21 I am not sure that decision is correct because, in that case,
22 they were also wondering who could challenge it. Well
23 obviously the Federal Equal Protection Clause and the
24 constitutional issues we have raised here give this Court
25 Federal question jurisdiction. This Court's one of the
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1 primary checks and balances on the level of fraud that we are
2 experiencing here. It is extremely important that this Court
3 exercise its jurisdiction as a gatekeeper on these issues.
4 There were numerous departures from the State statute,
5 including the early processing of votes, and the de facto
6 abolition of signature matches that give rise to Federal Equal
7 Protection claims.
8 THE COURT: Well, back to the standing question.
9 You know, the Plaintiffs allege that their interests are the
10 same, basically one in the same, as any Georgia voters. In
11 Paragraph 156 of the complaint they aver that Defendants
12 diluted the lawful ballots of Plaintiffs and of other Georgia
13 voters and electors. Further, Defendants allege that -- the
14 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants further violated Georgia
15 voters's rights, and they allege, the Plaintiffs, that quote,
16 all candidates, political parties, voters, including without
17 limitation Plaintiffs, have a vested interest. It doesn't
18 sound like your clients are special, that they have some
19 unique status that they enjoy that allows them to bring this
20 suit instead of anyone else. How do they have standing?
21 MS. POWELL: They have the unique status of being
22 the Presidential electors selected to vote for Donald Trump at
23 the electoral college. They were not certified as -- and
24 decertification is required to make sure they can do their
25 jobs that they were selected to do.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
37 of 44
1 THE COURT: Under the 3rd Circuit case, does your
2 theory survive?
3 MS. POWELL: Our theory is -- I think the 3rd
4 Circuit decision is wrong, the 8th Circuit decision is
5 correct. There is no circumstance in which a Federal elector
6 should not be able to seek relief in Federal Court, thanks to
7 our Constitution. It is one of our most important principles.
8 There were multiple means of fraud committed here.
9 We have also the military intelligence proof of interference
10 in the election, the Ware County 37 votes being flipped, the
11 video of the Fulton City vote count, they lied about the water
12 leak, they ran off observers, they brought in unusually
13 packaged ballots from underneath a table. One person is seen
14 scanning the same QR code three different times in the machine
15 and big batch of ballots which would explain why the same
16 number of ballots gets injected repeated into the system.
17 That corresponds with the math and the algorithms showing a
18 spike of 26,000 Biden votes at that time. After Trump's lead
19 of 103,997 votes there were mysteriously 4800 votes injected
20 into the system here in Georgia multiple times, the same
21 number, 4800 repeatedly. That simply doesn't happen in the
22 absence of fraud. All of the facts we have laid out in our
23 well-pleaded complaint require that this Court decertify the
24 election results or at least, at the very least, stop the
25 process now in a timely fashion and give us an opportunity to
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
38 of 44
1 examine the machines in ten counties and get further
2 discovery, particularly of what happened in Fulton County.
3 Those things need to be resolved before any citizen of Georgia
4 can have any confidence in the results of this election.
5 Allowing voters to cast ballots that are solely
6 counted based on their voting designations and not on an
7 unencrypted humanly unverifiable QR code that can be subject
8 to external manipulation and does not allow proper voter
9 verification and ballot vote auditing cannot withstand the
10 scrutiny of a Federal Court and cannot pass muster as a
11 legitimate voting system in the United States of America. For
12 those reasons, we request the Court to deny the motion to
13 dismiss, allow us a few days, perhaps even just five, to
14 conduct an examination of the machines that we have requested
15 from the beginning, and find out exactly what went on and give
16 the Court further evidence it might want to rule in our favor,
17 because the fraud that has happened here has destroyed any
18 public confidence that the will of the people is reflected in
19 their vote, and just simply cannot stand.
20 THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. All right, rebuttal?
21 This is Josh Belinfante.
22 MR. BELINFANTE: Just briefly, Your Honor. Your
23 Honor, just a few points. One, I want the get back to
24 Colorado River abstention. There was a means and a process to
25 do that. You had asked earlier about their response. I did
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
39 of 44
1 go back and check. The Siegel case they rely on cites to only
2 Burford and Pullman abstention, not Colorado River. It is
3 appropriate in this case, and as the Michigan Court concluded,
4 the Moses Cone case which establishes it says that there is
5 really not a reason not to do so when you have concurrent
6 jurisdiction.
7 And that is one of the problems with the Plaintiffs'
8 argument. They keep telling you that they can't go to State
9 Court because they have Federal constitutional claims. Those
10 can be litigated in State Court pursuant to 1983. They also
11 say on laches that -- it is interesting, they have cited to
12 you and read to you numerous aspects of the Curling case, and
13 they say that going back to 2006 somebody thought that there
14 was something wrong with these machines. Well if that's the
15 case, then it makes the laches argument even stronger. These
16 are the arguments that they are about the machines. They
17 certainly could have been litigated prior to after the
18 certification of the election.
19 The other big problem that they raise is that the
20 Curling case, everything that was read was stayed by the 11th
21 Circuit, presuming that it is reading the part of the opinion
22 that I think it is. If it is going back to a prior opinion,
23 that is about old machines which aren't even used anymore.
24 And then in Ware County, that was provided in an affidavit
25 that was new as part of the reply brief, it should not be
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
40 of 44
1 counted. There is authority for that, Sharpe v. Global
2 Security International from the Southern District of Alabama,
3 from 2011. But even still, that can be brought in the State
4 Court under the challenge mechanisms set.
5 You asked what is the authority for decertifying the
6 election. The citation was Bush v. Gore. Bush v. Gore stayed
7 a Florida recount, it did not decertify the election. But
8 most importantly, what Bush v. Gore said is, when there is a
9 State process, the Elections Clause says that has to continue.
10 And they have not shown you that the State process is
11 insufficient, invalid, whatsoever. On standing, they find
12 themselves in a bind. If they are candidates as electors, the
13 State election code says you can bring a challenge under
14 21-2-522. If they are not candidates and the 3rd Circuit
15 reasoning applies, then the 11th Circuit in Wood would apply
16 too, and say that when you are not a candidate you don't have
17 standing. So either way, they find themselves out of Federal
18 jurisdiction on these arguments.
19 Just a few points on closing. They tell you that
20 the voters lack confidence in the election system. Well,
21 since 2018 candidates that were not successful have tried to
22 overturn the rule of voters in the Courts. Since 2018 courts
23 have stayed with the State of Georgia and upheld Georgia's
24 election laws and Georgia's election machines. This Court
25 should do the same. The State is doing what it can to enhance
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
41 of 44
1 public confidence. That is why we went the extra step of a
2 hand count, not that pushes ballots through a machine, but
3 that looks at what the ballot says, and when the voter had
4 access to that ballot they could see too. And if they voted
5 for Donald Trump it will show it on the ballot; if they voted
6 for Joe Biden it will show it on the ballot. And if not, they
7 can correct it right there. That is the actions that instill
8 confidence, not this. And if they want to challenge those
9 election results, the State Courts are open for them to do it,
10 there are hearings scheduled now, and those hearings should
11 proceed and not this one. Thank you.
12 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Ms. Callais, did you
13 have anything else?
14 MS. CALLAIS: No, Your Honor.
15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. I have
16 considered the entire record in the case and I find that, even
17 accepting as true every averment of the complaint, I find that
18 this Court must grant the Defendants' motions to dismiss, both
19 of the motions to dismiss, beginning with the proposition that
20 Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they are
21 not the legal equivalent to medical hospitals which have
22 emergency rooms that are open 24/7 to all comers. On the
23 contrary, the 11th Circuit has specifically held that Federal
24 Courts don't entertain post election contests about vote
25 counting and misconduct that may properly be filed in the
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
42 of 44
1 State courts. So whether the Defendants have been subjected
2 to a Federal claim, which is Equal Protection, Due Process,
3 Elections Clause and Electors Clause, it does not matter. The
4 11th Circuit has said these claims in this circuit must be
5 brought in State court. There is no question that Georgia has
6 a statute that explicitly directs that election contests be
7 filed in Georgia Superior Courts, and that is what our Federal
8 Courts have said in this circuit, it is that is exactly right.
9 Sometimes Federal judges are criticized for
10 committing the sin of judicial activism. The appellate courts
11 have responded to that and said enough is enough is right. In
12 fact, enough is too much. And the courts have convincingly
13 held that these types of cases are not properly before Federal
14 Courts, that they are State elections, State courts should
15 evaluate these proceedings from start to finish.
16 Moreover, the Plaintiffs simply do not have standing
17 to bring these claims. This Court rejects the 8th Circuit's
18 nonbinding persuasive-value-only holding in Carson vs Simon
19 and I find that the Defendants -- excuse me -- the Plaintiffs
20 don't have standing, because anyone could have brought this
21 suit and raised the exact same arguments and made the exact
22 same allegations that the Plaintiffs have made in their
23 complaint. The Plaintiffs have essentially alleged in their
24 pleading that their interests are one and the same as any
25 Georgia voter. I do not believe that the 11th Circuit would
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
43 of 44
1 follow the reasoning of the 8th circuit in Carson.
2 Additionally, I find that the Plaintiffs waited too
3 late to file this suit. Their primary complaint involves the
4 Dominion ballot marking devices. They say that those machines
5 are susceptible to fraud. There is no reason they could not
6 have followed the Administrative Procedure Act and objected to
7 the rule-making authority that had been exercised by the
8 Secretary of State. This suit could have been filed months
9 ago at the time the machines were adopted. Instead, the
10 Plaintiffs waited until over three weeks after the election to
11 file the suit. There is no question in my mind that if I were
12 to deny the motions to dismiss, the matter would be brought
13 before the 11th Circuit and the 11th Circuit would reverse me.
14 The relief that the Plaintiffs seek, this Court cannot grant.
15 They ask the Court to order the Secretary of State to
16 decertify the election results as if such a mechanism even
17 exists, and I find that it does not. The 11th Circuit said as
18 much in the Wood case on Saturday.
19 Finally, in their complaint, the Plaintiffs
20 essentially ask the Court for perhaps the most extraordinary
21 relief ever sought in any Federal Court in connection with an
22 election. They want this Court to substitute its judgment for
23 that of two-and-a-half million Georgia voters who voted for
24 Joe Biden, and this I am unwilling to do.
25 The motion for temporary restraining order that was
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
44 of 44
1 entered on November 29 is dissolved. The motions to dismiss
2 are granted. And we are adjourned.
3 (end of hearing at 11:07 a.m.)
4 * * * * *
6
9
10 _________________________________
Lori Burgess
13 Date: December 8, 2020
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR

ATLANTA DIVISION

)
Plaintiffs, )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
v. ) 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
)
)
Defendants. )
ICE FA EA A CE
COMES NOW Russell D. Willard, Senior Assistant Attorne General, and
hereb makes an entr of appearance in the above-st led action on behalf of
Defendants Governor Brian Kemp, Secretar of State Brad Raffensperger, and State
Election Board Members Rebecca Sullivan, David Worle , Matthew Mashburn, and
Anh Le (collectivel , State Defendants ). Please direct all further pleadings,
notices, orders, and other matters to him at the following:
Office of the Attorne General

Telephone: (404) 458-3316
E-Mail: rwillard@law.ga.gov
1
Respectfull submitted, this 30th da of November, 2020.
/s/ R ell D. Willa d

RUSSELL D. WILLARD 760280
Senior Assistant Attorne General

Atlanta, GA 30334
rwillard@law.ga.gov
Tel: (404) 458-3316
Fa : 404-651-9325
Co n el fo S a e Defendan
2
CE IFICA E F C M LIA CE
I hereb certif that the foregoing has been formatted using Times New
Roman font in 14-point t pe in compliance with Local Rule 7.1(D).
/ / R ell D. Willa d
Russell D. Willard
3
CE IFICA E F E ICE
I hereb certif that I have this da electronicall filed the foregoing ICE
FA EA A CE with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF s stem, which will
send notification of such filing to counsel for the parties of record via electronic
notification.
Dated: November 30, 2020.
/ / R ell D. Willa d
Russell D. Willard
4

ATLANTA DIVISION

VIKKI TOWNSEND
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP; BRAD
WORLEY; REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN; MATTHEW
Defendants.
ORDER
The Court finds that its November 29 order partially granting
Plaintiff f a e a e a de e a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1292(b).
____________________________________
*
Exh. 21
Page 1 of 7
Page 2 of 7
Page 3 of 7
Page 4 of 7
Page 5 of 7
Page 6 of 7
Page 7 of 7

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION

ALSTON LATHAM and BRIAN JAY VAN 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
State Election Board, REBECCA N.SULLIVAN,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF FILING
Come Now the Plaintiffs and submit this Notice of Filing of Exhibit 21,
the Declaration of Ronald Watkins.
Respectfully submitted, this 1st day of December 2020.
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219

(214) 707-1775
forthcoming

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
13-point Century Schoolbook font and in accordance with the margin and
other requirements of Local Rule 5.1.
Harry W. MacDougald
This is to certify that I have on this day e-filed the foregoing Notice of
Filing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will cause
service to made upon counsel of record therein.
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956


GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Defendants.
NOTICE OF EMERGENCY INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AS OF RIGHT
Plaintiffs Coreco Ja’Qan Pearson, et al., hereby file an emergency
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit from
this Court’s interlocutory order of November 29, 2020 (Doc.14) to the extent it
denies the full relief Plaintiffs requested in their motion for a temporary
restraining order. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223,
1225 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Although we ordinarily do not have jurisdiction over
appeals from orders granting or denying temporary restraining orders, in
circumstances such as these, ‘when a grant or denial of a TRO might have a
serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence, and can be effectively challenged
only by immediate appeal, we may exercise appellate jurisdiction.” (quoting
Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995)).1
Plaintiffs respectfully ask that this Court immediately transmit this
notice of appeal to the Eleventh Circuit today so that that court may docket
the matter, thus enabling Plaintiffs to file a motion for an expedited briefing
schedule pursuant to which Plaintiffs propose to file their brief by midnight
December 2, 2020, and Appellee’s brief by December 4, 2020.
Moreover, this Notice of Appeal as of right should divest the district
court of jurisdiction. If not, Plaintiffs would request a stay of the hearing
currently scheduled in the district court for December 4, 2020, until this
Court has ruled on the questions raised by the appeal, including whether
Plaintiffs must add to the suit each of the 600-plus county election officials in
1 While this Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1292(b), has certified its order as
involving a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” (Doc.15),
Plaintiffs would seek permission to appeal under §1292(b) only in the
alternative, if the Eleventh Circuit deems that necessary. Plaintiffs file this
notice, however, as a matter of right, pursuant to Schiavo. (“In these
circumstances we treat temporary restraining orders as equivalent to
preliminary injunctions or final judgments, either of which are appealable.”)
Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1225 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§1291, 1292(a)(1).
addition to the Secretary of State for Georgia, who by law is responsible for
Georgia elections and spent $107 million taxpayer dollars to purchase
Dominion voting systems for the entire state.
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
*Application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming
/s Howard Kleinhendler
Office (917) 793-1188
Mobile (347) 840-2188
(Admitted pro hac vice)

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile

Harry W. MacDougald
This is to certify that I have on this day e-filed the foregoing NOTICE
OF EMERGENCY INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AS OF RIGHT with the Clerk of
Court using the CM/ECF system which will cause service to made upon
counsel of record therein.
This 1st day of December 2020.
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956

2211 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
75 TED TURNER DRIVE, SW
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-3361
JAMES N. HATTEN DOCKETING SECTION
DISTRICT COURT EXECUTIVE 404-215-1655
AND CLERK OF COURT
U.S.D.C. No.: 1:20-cv-4809-TCB

U.S.C.A. No.: 00-00000-00
In re: Coreco Jaqan Pearson et al v. Brian Kemp et al
X
Certified Notice of Appeal, Docket Sheet, Judgment and/or Order appealed
enclosed.
X The court reporter is Lori Burgess.
X Fee paid electronically on 12/1/20. (Receipt# AGANDC-10432999)
in forma pauperis
X The District Judge is Timothy C. Batten, Sr.
DEATH PENALTY
Case
1:20-cv-04809-TCB Document
Document34
33 Filed
Filed12/01/20
12/01/20 Page
Page11of
of20
1

AND CLERK OF COURT
U.S.D.C. No.: 1:20-cv-4809-TCB

U.S.C.A. No.: 00-00000-00
X
enclosed.
in forma pauperis
DEATH PENALTY
20
4months,APPEAL,SUBMDJ
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:20−cv−04809−TCB
Pearson et al v. Kemp et al Date Filed: 11/25/2020

Assigned to: Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. Jury Demand: None
Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Nature of Suit: 441 Civil Rights: Voting
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Plaintiff
Coreco Jaqan Pearson represented by Harry W. MacDougald
Caldwell Propst & DeLoach, LLP
Suite 1600
Two Ravina Dr.
Atlanta, GA 30346
404−843−1956
Fax: 404−843−2737
Email: hmacdougald@cpdlawyers.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard Kleinhendler
369 Lexington Avenue
12th Floor
New York, NY 10017
917−793−1188
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
Defending the Republic
601 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
South Building
Ste 900
Washington, DC 20004
561−888−3166
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

L. Lin Wood, P.C.
P.O. Box 52584
Atlanta, GA 30355−0584
404−891−1402
Fax: 404−506−9111
Email: lwood@linwoodlaw.com
1
LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
Vikki Townsend Consiglio represented by Harry W. MacDougald
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
Gloria Kay Godwin represented by Harry W. MacDougald
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
James Kenneth Carroll represented by
2
Harry W. MacDougald
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
Carolyn Hall Fisher represented by Harry W. MacDougald
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
Cathleen Alston Latham represented by Harry W. MacDougald
LEAD ATTORNEY
3
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
Brian Jay Van Gundy represented by Harry W. MacDougald
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
V.
Defendant
Brian Kemp represented by Charlene S McGowan
in his official capacity as Governor of Office of the Georgia Attorney General
Georgia Assistant Attorney General
Atlanta, GA 30334
404−458−3658
Email: cmcgowan@law.ga.gov
4
Russell D. Willard
Attorney General's Office−Atl
Department of Law
Atlanta, GA 30334
404−656−3300
Email: rwillard@law.ga.gov
Defendant
Brad Raffensperger represented by Charlene S McGowan
in his official capacity as Secretary of (See above for address)
State and Chair of the Georgia State ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Election Board
Russell D. Willard
Defendant
David J. Worley represented by Charlene S McGowan
in his official capacity as a member of the (See above for address)
Georgia State Election Board ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Russell D. Willard
Defendant
Rebecca N. Sullivan represented by Charlene S McGowan
in her official capacity as a member of (See above for address)
the Georgia State Election Board ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Russell D. Willard
Defendant
Matthew Mashburn represented by Charlene S McGowan
Russell D. Willard
Defendant
Anh Le represented by Charlene S McGowan
5
Russell D. Willard
V.
Intervenor Defendant
Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. represented by Adam Martin Sparks
Krevolin & Horst, LLC
One Atlantic Center, Ste 3250
1201 West Peachtree St., NW
Atlanta, GA 30309
404−888−9700
Email: sparks@khlawfirm.com
DSCC represented by Adam Martin Sparks
DCCC represented by Adam Martin Sparks
Date Filed # Page Docket Text

11/25/2020 1 COMPLAINT for Declaratory, Emergency, and Permanent Injunctive Relief,
filed by Gloria Kay Godwin, Vikki Townsend Consiglio, Coreco Jaqan Pearson,
James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Cathleen Alston Latham, Brian Jay
Van Gundy. (Filing fee $400, receipt number AGANDC−10418604)
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavit Exh. 1, Report of William Briggs, # 2
Exhibit Affidavit Redacted Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit Affidavit of Anna Mercedes
Diaz Cardozo, # 4 Exhibit Affidavit Declaration of Harri Hursti, # 5 Exhibit
Affidavit Embedded Declaration of Harri Hursti, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit SoS
Certification of Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite 5.5−A, # 7 Exhibit
Exhibit Pro V&V Test Report, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit Study "Ballot−Marking
Devices (BMDs) Cannot Assure the Will of the, # 9 Exhibit Affidavit Redacted
Affidavit of Cyber−Security Expert, # 10 Exhibit Affidavit Affidavit of Russell
Ramsland, # 11 Exhibit Affidavit of Mayra Romera, # 12 Exhibit Affidavit of
Maria Diedrich, # 13 Exhibit Affidavit of Maria Diedrich, # 14 Exhibit Affidavit
of Ursula Wolf, # 15 Exhibit Affidavit of Nicholas J. Zeher, # 16 Exhibit
Affidavit of Susan Voyles, # 17 Exhibit Affidavit of Ibrahim Reyes, # 18
Exhibit Affidavit of Consetta Johnson, # 19 Exhibit Affidavit of Carlos Silva, #
20 Exhibit Affidavit of Andrea O'Neal, # 21 Exhibit Affidavit of Deborah
Fisher, # 22 Exhibit Affidavit of Kevin Peterford, # 23 Exhibit Report of Texas
Secretary of State Rejecting Dominion Voting Systems, # 24 Exhibit Letter of
6
Rep. Maloney to Smarmatic, # 25 Exhibit Affidavit of Juan Carlos Cobucci, #

26 Exhibit Senator Warren et al letter re: Dominion Voting Systems, # 27
Exhibit Affidavit of of Eric Quinnell, # 28 Exhibit Affidavit of Mitchell
Harrison, # 29 Exhibit Affidavit of Michelle Branton, # 30 Civil Cover
Sheet)(rvb) Please visit our website at
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/commonly−used−forms to obtain Pretrial
Instructions and Pretrial Associated Forms which includes the Consent To
Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate form. Modified on 11/27/2020 to add relief text
(rvb). (Entered: 11/27/2020)
11/27/2020 2 EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO GENERAL ORDER 20−01 RE: COURT
OPERATIONS UNDER THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES CREATED BY
COVID−19 AND RELATED CORONAVIRUS. Signed by Judge Thomas W.
Thrash, Jr. on 09/28/2020. (rvb) (Entered: 11/27/2020)
11/27/2020 Submission of 1 Complaint, to District Judge Timothy C. Batten Sr. (rvb)
(Entered: 11/27/2020)
11/27/2020 3 PROPOSED SUMMONS filed by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend
Consiglio, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Gloria Kay Godwin, Cathleen Alston Latham,
Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy (Attachments: # 1 Summons
Proposed Summons for Anh Le, # 2 Summons Proposed Summons for Matthew
Mashburn, # 3 Summons Proposed Summons for Brad Raffensberger, # 4
Summons Proposed Summons for Rebecca N. Sullivan, # 5 Summons Proposed
Summons for David J. Worley, # 6 Summons Proposed Summons for Brian
Kemp)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 11/27/2020)
11/27/2020 4 Certificate of Interested Persons by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend
Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy. (MacDougald, Harry) (Entered:
11/27/2020)
11/27/2020 5 MOTION for Leave to File Matters Under Seal re: 1 Complaint,,,,,,,, with Brief
In Support by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend Consiglio, Carolyn Hall
Fisher, Gloria Kay Godwin, Cathleen Alston Latham, Coreco Jaqan Pearson,
Brian Jay Van Gundy. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted Exh. 2 from
Complaint, # 2 Exhibit Redacted Exh.8 from the Complaint, # 3 Exhibit Exh. A,
Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Iranian Advanced Persistent Threat Actor
Identified Obtaining Voter Registration Data, # 4 Text of Proposed Order
Proposed Order)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 11/27/2020)
11/27/2020 6 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order IMMEDIATE HEARING
REQUESTED, MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Brief In Support by
James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend Consiglio, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Gloria
Kay Godwin, Cathleen Alston Latham, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van
Gundy. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Dr. Shiva Ayyadurai, # 2
Exhibit Joint CyberSecurity Advisory Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed
Order)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 11/27/2020)
11/29/2020 7 NOTICE Of Filing Emergency Injunctive Relief by James Kenneth Carroll,
Vikki Townsend Consiglio, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Gloria Kay Godwin, Cathleen
Alston Latham, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy re 6 MOTION for
Temporary Restraining Order IMMEDIATE HEARING REQUESTED
MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Redacted
7
Declaration)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 11/29/2020)

11/29/2020 8 Electronic Summons Issued as to Rebecca N. Sullivan. (rsh) (Entered:
11/29/2020)
11/29/2020 9 Electronic Summons Issued as to Matthew Mashburn. (rsh) (Entered:
11/29/2020)
11/29/2020 10 Electronic Summons Issued as to David J. Worley. (rsh) (Entered: 11/29/2020)
11/29/2020 11 Electronic Summons Issued as to Brian Kemp. (rsh) (Entered: 11/29/2020)
11/29/2020 12 Electronic Summons Issued as to Brad Raffensperger. (rsh) (Entered:
11/29/2020)
11/29/2020 13 Electronic Summons Issued as to Anh Le. (rsh) (Entered: 11/29/2020)
11/29/2020 14 ORDER. Please see Order for further specifics and details. Signed by Judge
Timothy C. Batten, Sr. on 11/29/2020. (usw) (Entered: 11/29/2020)
11/29/2020 18 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr.:
Telephone Conference via ZOOM held on 11/29/2020 re briefing, scheduling,
and Plaintiff's request to forensically inspect county voting machines. (Court
Reporter Lori Burgess)(dmb) (Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 15 1292(b) ORDER − Please see order for specifics and details. Signed by Judge
11/30/2020 16 NOTICE of Appearance by Charlene S McGowan on behalf of Brian Kemp,
Anh Le, Matthew Mashburn, Brad Raffensperger, Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J.
Worley (McGowan, Charlene) (Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 17 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 6 MOTION for Temporary Restraining
Order IMMEDIATE HEARING REQUESTED and MOTION for Preliminary
Injunction : Motion Hearing set for 12/4/2020 at 10:00 AM in ATLA Courtroom
2106 before Judge Timothy C. Batten Sr. The Court sets the following schedule:
Defendants' brief in opposition to the claims in Plaintiffs' complaint will be due
on 12/2/2020, by 5:00 p.m. EST. Any reply brief will be due 12/3/2020 by 5:00
p.m. EST. Signed by Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. on 11/30/2020. (dmb)
(Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 19 APPLICATION for Admission of Howard Kleinhendler Pro Hac Vice
(Application fee $ 150, receipt number AGANDC−10426686).by James
Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend Consiglio, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Gloria Kay
Godwin, Cathleen Alston Latham, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy.
(MacDougald, Harry) Documents for this entry are not available for viewing
outside the courthouse. (Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 19 APPLICATION for Admission of Howard
Kleinhendler Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10426686).. Attorney Howard Kleinhendler added appearing on
behalf of James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend Consiglio, Carolyn Hall
Brian Jay Van Gundy (nmb) (Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 20 MOTION to Intervene with Brief In Support by Democratic Party of Georgia,
Inc., DSCC, DCCC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Proposed Intervenors'
8
Proposed Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Exhibit B: Proposed Intervenors' Brief in

Support of Proposed Motion to Dismiss, # 3 Exhibit C: Proposed Intervenors'
Proposed Answer to Complaint)(Sparks, Adam) (Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 21 NOTICE of Appearance by Russell D. Willard on behalf of Brian Kemp, Anh
Le, Matthew Mashburn, Brad Raffensperger, Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J.
Worley (Willard, Russell) (Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 22 AMENDED 1292(b) ORDER − Please see order for specifics and details.
Signed by Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. on 11/30/2020. (dmb) (Entered:
11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 MINUTE ORDER granting Howard Kleinhendler's 19 Application for
Admission Pro Hac Vice. Entered by CRD at the direction of Judge Timothy C.
Batten, Sr. If the applicant does not have CM/ECF access in the Northern
District of Georgia already, they must request access at http://pacer.gov. If they
have electronically filed in this district in a previous case, please omit this
step.(usw) (Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 Clerks Notation re 4 Certificate of Interested Persons. Reviewed and approved
by Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. (usw) (Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 23 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 11/29/2020, before Judge Timothy C.
Batten, Sr.. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lori Burgess. A full directory of court
reporters and their contact information can be found at
www.gand.uscourts.gov/directory−court−reporters. Transcript may be viewed at
the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber
before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may
be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 12/21/2020. Redacted
Transcript Deadline set for 12/31/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for
3/1/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Transcript) (llb) (Entered:
11/30/2020)
11/30/2020 24 APPLICATION for Admission of Julia Z. Haller Pro Hac Vice (Application fee
$ 150, receipt number AGANDC−10429766).by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki
Townsend Consiglio, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Gloria Kay Godwin, Cathleen Alston
Latham, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy. (MacDougald, Harry)
Documents for this entry are not available for viewing outside the courthouse.
(Entered: 11/30/2020)
12/01/2020 25 Certificate of Interested Persons by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of
Georgia, Inc.. (Sparks, Adam) (Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 26 APPLICATION for Admission of Amanda J. Beane Pro Hac Vice (Application
fee $ 150, receipt number AGANDC−10432164).by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic
Party of Georgia, Inc.. (Sparks, Adam) Documents for this entry are not
available for viewing outside the courthouse. (Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 27 APPLICATION for Admission of Amanda R. Callais Pro Hac Vice (Application
9
12/01/2020 28 APPLICATION for Admission of Kevin J. Hamilton Pro Hac Vice (Application
12/01/2020 29 APPLICATION for Admission of Marc E. Elias Pro Hac Vice (Application fee
$ 150, receipt number AGANDC−10432230).by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic
12/01/2020 30 APPLICATION for Admission of Matthew Mertens Pro Hac Vice (Application
12/01/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 24 APPLICATION for Admission of Julia Z.
Haller Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10429766).. Attorney Julia Z. Haller added appearing on behalf of
Gundy (nmb) (Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 31 NOTICE Of Filing by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend Consiglio,
Carolyn Hall Fisher, Gloria Kay Godwin, Cathleen Alston Latham, Coreco
Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of
Ronald Watkins)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 32 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 14 Order by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki
Latham, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy. Filing fee $ 507, receipt
number AGANDC−10432999. Transcript Order Form due on 12/15/2020
(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 33 NOTICE Of Filing NOA Transmittal Letter re: 32 Notice of Appeal. (pjm)
(Entered: 12/01/2020)
10
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ATLANTA DIVISION

VIKKI TOWNSEND
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP; BRAD
WORLEY; REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN; MATTHEW
Defendants.
ORDER
11
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Page13
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4
motion.
12
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Page14
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1.
appropriate.
2.
3.
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Page15
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4.
p.m. EST.
____________________________________
14
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GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Defendants.
NOTICE OF EMERGENCY INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AS OF RIGHT
Plaintiffs Coreco Ja’Qan Pearson, et al., hereby file an emergency
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit from
this Court’s interlocutory order of November 29, 2020 (Doc.14) to the extent it
denies the full relief Plaintiffs requested in their motion for a temporary
restraining order. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223,
1225 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Although we ordinarily do not have jurisdiction over
15
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appeals from orders granting or denying temporary restraining orders, in
circumstances such as these, ‘when a grant or denial of a TRO might have a
serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence, and can be effectively challenged
only by immediate appeal, we may exercise appellate jurisdiction.” (quoting
Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995)).1
Plaintiffs respectfully ask that this Court immediately transmit this
notice of appeal to the Eleventh Circuit today so that that court may docket
the matter, thus enabling Plaintiffs to file a motion for an expedited briefing
schedule pursuant to which Plaintiffs propose to file their brief by midnight
December 2, 2020, and Appellee’s brief by December 4, 2020.
Moreover, this Notice of Appeal as of right should divest the district
court of jurisdiction. If not, Plaintiffs would request a stay of the hearing
currently scheduled in the district court for December 4, 2020, until this
Court has ruled on the questions raised by the appeal, including whether
Plaintiffs must add to the suit each of the 600-plus county election officials in
1 While this Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1292(b), has certified its order as
involving a “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” (Doc.15),
Plaintiffs would seek permission to appeal under §1292(b) only in the
alternative, if the Eleventh Circuit deems that necessary. Plaintiffs file this
notice, however, as a matter of right, pursuant to Schiavo. (“In these
circumstances we treat temporary restraining orders as equivalent to
preliminary injunctions or final judgments, either of which are appealable.”)
Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1225 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§1291, 1292(a)(1).
16
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addition to the Secretary of State for Georgia, who by law is responsible for
Georgia elections and spent $107 million taxpayer dollars to purchase
Dominion voting systems for the entire state.
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
*Application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming
Office (917) 793-1188
Mobile (347) 840-2188

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
17
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Harry W. MacDougald
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OF EMERGENCY INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AS OF RIGHT with the Clerk of
Court using the CM/ECF system which will cause service to made upon
counsel of record therein.
This 1st day of December 2020.
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
19
USCA11 Case: 20-14480 Date Filed: 12/01/2020 Page: 1 of 3

ATLANTA DIVISION

VIKKI TOWNSEND
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP; BRAD
WORLEY; REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN; MATTHEW
Defendants.
ORDER
On November 29, the Court entered an order [14] granting modest
injunctive relief in order to preserve the status quo. This afternoon,
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal [32] with respect to that order.

However, this Court’s November 29 order is a temporary restraining
order, not a preliminary injunction because, inter alia, it is of a limited
duration—ten days. 1 And generally, temporary restraining orders are
not directly appealable. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Int’l Corp. v. Cardinal
Textile Sales, Inc.¸14 F.3d 1507, 1515 (11th Cir. 1994). Although
Plaintiffs cite Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225
(11th Cir. 2005), in their notice of appeal, this Court is of the opinion
that its November 29 order is not within the scope of Schiavo’s
exception to the unappealable nature of a temporary restraining order.
Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal states that it divests this Court of
jurisdiction. If the circuit court disagrees with Plaintiffs, it will dismiss
their appeal, whereupon this Court will probably need to reschedule the
hearing presently set for Friday, December 4 (since the parties’ briefs,
due tomorrow and Thursday, probably will have not been filed). Any
delay in conducting the hearing on the claims in Plaintiffs’ complaint
1 Moreover, the scope of relief sought in Plaintiffs’ motion [6] for emergency
relief is narrower than the scope of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
would be attributable to Plaintiffs—not this Court—since Plaintiffs are
the ones who filed the notice of appeal.2
Accordingly, the scheduling order [17] docketed November 30 is
hereby stayed, subject to further order of the Court if Plaintiffs’ appeal
is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of December, 2020.
____________________________________
2 The Court’s November 30 order [22] certifying the November 29 order for
immediate appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) does not render the
November 29 order directly appealable. This is because the court of appeals has not,
as of this time, granted Plaintiffs permission to appeal.


GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
State Election Board, REBECCA N. SULLIVAN,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION TO

INTERVENE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF
GEORGIA, INC., THE DSCC, AND THE DCCC
Come now the Plaintiffs and submit the following response to the
motion to intervene of the Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc., the DSCC and
the DCCC (collectively, the “Proposed Intervenors”).
The motion to intervene should be denied because the Proposed
Intervenors do not have a significantly protectable interest under the

particular circumstances of this case, because their interests are adequately
represented by the State Defendants, and because their entry in this case as
parties is intended to delay its resolution until it is moot.
I. INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT
1. C LAIMED I NTEREST TO I NTERVENE
The Proposed Intervenors cite authority for the proposition that
political parties and party organizations have a legally cognizable interest
based upon their associational standing to challenge registration and election
laws and regulations they claim disenfranchise their voters. See Motion and
Brief of Proposed Intervenors, at pp. 8-10. This case is distinct from those
relied upon by the Proposed Intervenors because several of the Plaintiffs here
are presidential electors and have clear standing to challenge fraud and
illegality in the presidential election under Carson v. Simon, 978 F.3d 1051
(8th Cir. 2020), in which presidential electors were the plaintiffs. Regarding
the injury-in-fact requirement, the Eighth Circuit held:
As candidates, the Electors argue that they have a cognizable

interest in ensuring that the final vote tally accurately reflects the
legally valid votes cast. An inaccurate vote tally is a concrete and
particularized injury to candidates such as the Electors. The
Secretary’s use of the consent decree makes the Electors’ injury
certainly-impending, because the former necessarily departs from
the Legislature’s mandates. Thus, the Electors meet the injury-in-
fact requirement.
Id. at 1058. The Eighth Circuit held the Elector plaintiffs also met the
causation and redressability requirements of standing:

Next, the Electors meet the causal-connection requirement because

the injury flows from the challenged conduct (the Secretary’s
policy). And, even though the Secretary and the Alliance do not
appear to challenge the redressability requirement, it is likely that
the requested relief (an injunction) will redress the injury (an
inaccurate vote tally) because the former will mitigate the latter.
Id. Therefore, the Elector plaintiffs had constitutional standing and were
found to have prudential standing as well.
The Proposed Intervenors are not presidential Electors and therefore
do not meet the injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability elements of
standing to be considered under Rule 24 intervention standards. Chiles v.
Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 1989), citing, inter alia,
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531, 91 S.Ct. 534, 542, 27 L.Ed.2d
580 (1971); Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir.1986); Athens
Lumber Co., Inc. v. Federal Election Commission, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th
Cir.1982) (“[an interest under Rule 24(a)(2) means a “significantly protectable
interest . . . for an intervenor's interest must be a particularized interest
rather than a general grievance that requires evaluation of standing cases. . .
that are relevant to help define the type of interest that the intervenor must
assert.”). Here, the Proposed Intervenors have not demonstrated that their
interests would be substantially impaired if they were not permitted to
intervene.
The DSCC is the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee and the
DCCC is the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. They are the
Proposed Intervenors under a variant of the Willie Sutton Rule - that’s where
the money is. Yet having the money to finance a litigation war across the
United States does not without more establish a concrete interest sufficient
to support standing. This litigation concerns a presidential election. The
Proposed Intervenors did not nominate former Vice President Joe Biden for
President. That was the Democratic Party of the United States, which is not
a Proposed Intervenor. Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State, 974 F.3d 1236,
1250-1252 (11th Cir 2020).
Finally, the authorities that the Proposed Intervenors cite to in their
Motion all deal with future elections and the effect of election laws and
procedures on their prospects in such elections. This case stands on a
different footing and should be analyzed according to its particular
circumstances. See e.g. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333, 343 (1977)(“[if] the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or
some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the
remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the
association actually injured.”). Unlike the prospective relief sought in the
cases cited by the Proposed Intervenors, the relief sought in this case is
retrospective. The candidates and their parties have finished campaigning

and their voters have voted. Therefore, the Proposed Intervenors’
associational standing analysis no longer pertains. See e.g. Donald J. Trump
for President, Inc. v. Cegavske, No. 220CV1445JCMVCF, 2020 WL 5626974,
at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2020)(relief sought on behalf of an association’s
member voters that “no more directly and tangibly benefits [them] than it
does the public at large” insufficient to confer standing).
The Proposed Intervenors obviously have a strong rooting interest in
the outcome of the presidential election, but no matter how ardent their
interest may be in promoting their preferred candidate, it is not enough to
establish the significantly protectable interest required to warrant
intervention in this case under Rule 24. Jacobson, id.
The certification of statewide presidential election results lies with the
Secretary of State and the Governor. The litigation over the propriety of this
act also lies with them. Not everyone in the country who cares about the
outcome, or even an association of such partisans, is entitled to intervene in
this case.
2. T IMELINESS
Given the short time that has passed since the filing of the Complaint
and the motion to intervene, the timeliness element of the intervention
analysis under Rule 19 would normally be satisfied. However, as Einstein
postulated, time is relative. This case is operating on an extraordinarily short

timeframe because of the constitutionally imposed deadlines for the formal
vote of the Electoral College on December 14, 2020, and for the inauguration
of the President on January 20, 2021. What would certainly have been timely
in any other case is not timely here, despite the speed with which the
Proposed Intervenors have moved, because time is so short in this case.
3. P REJUDICE TO THE P LAINTIFFS
Proposed Intervenors make a related claim that Plaintiffs would suffer
no prejudice from the proposed intervention. This is almost certainly not true,
as it will be in the overwhelming interests of the Proposed Intervenors to
employ imaginative stratagems of delay and obstruction in order to run out
an already incredibly short clock.
4. I MPAIRMENT OF I NTERESTS
The Proposed Intervenors wax indignant at the possibility that millions
of their supporters might be disenfranchised “by judicial fiat” if the Court
grants Plaintiffs the relief they seek. But the Court would only invalidate the
election and order de-certification if it were convinced by the evidence that
the election was so corrupted by fraud and illegality as to be repugnant to the
laws of Georgia and the Constitution of the United States. In that event, the
Proposed Intervenors could have no legitimate or legally cognizable interest
in imposing upon the Plaintiffs, the State of Georgia, or anyone else in
America an election result that was infected by fraud and corruption.

The Proposed Intervenors also contend that absent intervention they
might be forced to “divert resources to safeguard the certified statewide
results, thus implicating another of their protected interests.” The only
possible way they can divert resources to this purpose at this point is by
paying the six lawyers who have filed entries of appearance in this case to
intervene on their behalf. “[N]either [DSCC] nor [DCCC] explained what
activities the [they] would divert resources away from in order to spend
additional resources on … as precedent requires.” Jacobson at p. 1250
(collecting cases).
The election campaign is over and there is no more political
campaigning to be done. Citing cases about campaign expenses is beside the
point. Both political parties have spent vast sums on their respective
campaigns. One of them is going to lose. Fearing that money might go to
waste if one loses is not a legally cognizable interest to support intervention.
Fearing that money might be lost if the election were set aside for fraud and
illegality is not a legally protectible interest either. As the 11th Circuit held
in Jacobsen, partisan interest alone is not enough to confer standing:
An organization's general interest in its preferred candidates

winning as many elections as possible is still a “generalized
partisan preference[ ]” that federal courts are “not responsible for
vindicating,” no less than when individual voters assert an interest
in their preferred candidates winning elections. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at
1933; see also id. at 1932 (rejecting a voter's “hope of achieving a
Democratic majority in the legislature” as “a collective political
interest” that cannot establish standing). Harm to an organization's

generalized partisan preferences describes only “a setback to [its]
abstract social interests,” which is insufficient to establish a
concrete injury in fact. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379, 102 S.Ct.
1114; see also *1251 Arcia v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 772 F.3d 1335,
1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (requiring “a concrete and demonstrable
injury, not an abstract social interest” for organizational standing
(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
974 F.3d at 1250-1251.
5. A DEQUATE R EPRESENTATION
Proposed Intervenors claim their interests would not be adequately
protected unless they are permitted to intervene. The State Defendants have
certified the election results. They are vigorously defending that decision
through highly capable and experienced attorneys from the State Attorney
General’s office. The Proposed Intervenors and their counsel should know,
because that office has beaten them before. See, e.g. Anderson v.
Raffensperger, ___ F.Supp.3d ___ (2020 WL 60480248 N.D. Ga.).
The cases cited to support the right to intervene in this case largely
relate once again to upcoming elections, rather than a challenge to a
concluded election. A rooting interest is not sufficient.
II. PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION
The Proposed Intervenors next argue in the alternative for permissive
intervention. Despite the usual liberal construction of permissive
intervention, the risk of prejudice to the Plaintiffs from delays instituted by
the Proposed Intervenors is excessive. If their claimed interest is no more

than “to defend the constitutional right to vote of all of the eligible voters who
cast valid ballots in the November 3 general election,” brief, p. 19 (emphasis
added), they should intervene on the side of the Plaintiffs, because that is all
we seek as well. Unfortunately, the evidence shows strongly and clearly that
at a minimum tens of thousands of flagrantly illegal and fraudulent absentee
ballots were cast and counted, that the signature match requirement was
abolished de facto, and that enormous statistical anomalies are present in the
results that are almost impossible absent malign intervention through ballot
stuffing or hacking of the election system computers. Moreover, there is
evidence of illegal after-hours non-public counting of ballots at State Farm
Arena that further taints this election beyond redemption. The evidence
shows illegal and fraudulent ballots were counted in sufficient numbers to
place the outcome of the election in question. The election should therefore be
invalidated according to the most basic principles of election law. Why the
Proposed Intervenors want to prevent correction of this wrongdoing is
obvious but of course left unsaid in a fog of lofty rhetoric.
Lastly, that the Proposed Intervenors desire to defend the Settlement
Agreement challenged in this case does not provide a sufficient nexus to the
claims of fraud and illegality in the gathering and tabulation of Presidential
votes to warrant their intrusion into the litigation of those claims. See
SOSS2, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 403 F. Supp. 3d 1233,
1240 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (the claimed interest to justify intervention must “be
one which substantive law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the
[intervenor].”). Even if the Court were to accept the Proposed Intervenors’
interest as a party to the Settlement Agreement as one in which permissive
joinder might be appropriate, intervention should be limited to the issues
concerning the validity of the Settlement Agreement rather than an open
door to dog-pile its resources upon the Plaintiffs in aid of the Defendants that
actually hold the legally cognizable interest in resisting the Plaintiffs’ other
claims. See United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 922 F.2d 704, 707
(11th Cir. 1991) (“A nonparty may have a sufficient interest for some issues
in a case but not others, and the court may limit intervention accordingly.”);
Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 960–61 (11th Cir.1986) (restricting
intervenors to participation in the single, remedial issue for which they had
“standing”).
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Motion to Intervene
of the Georgia Democratic Party, Inc., the Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee be
denied. In the alternative, Plaintiffs request that the Court limit intervention
to issues concerning the validity of the Settlement Agreement at issue in this
case.
Respectfully submitted, this 2nd day of December 2020.
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
forthcoming
Office (917) 793-1188
Mobile (347) 840-2188

LLP
/s Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile

Response to Motion to Intervene of the Democratic Party Of Georgia, the
DSCC, and the DCCC with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system
which causes electronic service to be made upon all counsel of record.
This 2nd day of December 2020.

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956

ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JAQUAN PEARSON,
et al., CIVIL ACTION FILE

No. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
Plaintiffs,
v.
BRIAN KEMP, et al.,

Defendants.
ORDER
In light of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ order today, this
Court’s December 4 hearing is postponed, pending further order of the
Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED this day of , 20 .
_____________________

ATLANTA DIVISION
CO ECO JA AN EA ON,
VIKKI TOWNSEND
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP; BRAD
WORLEY; REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN; MATTHEW
Defendants.
ORDER
The Democratic Party of Georgia, the DSCC, and the DCCC
motion [20] to intervene and emergency motion [41] to intervene are

hereby granted.1 The Clerk is directed to add these entities as parties
and to docket their proposed motion to dismiss [20-1], brief in support of
motion to dismiss [20-2], and answer [20-3].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3d day of December, 2020.
____________________________________
United States District Jud
1Because the motion to intervene involves a collateral matter not involved in

the appeal, the Court retains jurisdiction over the motion.
Exh. A
Expert Report of Matthew Braynard

MATT BRAYNARD
1521 Boyd Pointe Way #3001, Vienna VA 22182 | 202.423.5333 (c) | matt@braynard.com
Matt Braynard is the president of both political consulting firm External Affairs, Inc., and a voter-registration
non-profit, Look Ahead America.
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT
External Affairs, Inc.
Principal 2004 – Present
External Affairs, Inc. works for local, state, and federal candidates and policy
organizations in the areas of voter targeting, polling/research, fundraising,
branding, and online development and strategy. The firm has worked for
over two-hundred candidates from president to town council and over a
dozen DC-based policy/advocacy organizations.
Look Ahead America, Inc.

President March 2017 – Present
Matt founded LAA, a 501(c)(3), along with over thirty other former Trump
campaign staffers with the goal of registering and turning out disaffected,
patriotic voters.
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.

Director, Data Division October 2015 – March
2016
Matt was responsible for developing the voter contact strategy, building
technology infrastructure, managing vendor relationships, recruiting the
data division staff, and supporting and auditing state efforts on door-to-
door, phone, mail, and email operations.
Election Data Services, Inc.

Senior Analyst 2001-2005
Matt Braynard was responsible for analyzing and redistricting states and
municipal political boundaries, as well as analyzing election result
administration data.
Republican National Committee

Political Analyst 1996, 1998-2001
Matt Braynard worked in the political analysis department developing and
deploying voter targeting databases, and directed the precinct election
result research project.
Luntz Research Companies

Research Consultant 1997-2001
Matt Braynard analyzed survey toplines and cross tabulations to create
executive presentation materials.
EDUCATION
Columbia University 2018
Master of Fine Arts
Writing Program
The George Washington University

Bachelors of Business Administration 2000
Concentrations in Finance and Management Information Systems
Date: November 19, 2020
From: Matt Braynard

External Affairs, Inc.
matt@braynard.com
202.423.5333
Re: Georgia Voter Integrity Project: Illegal Ballots Preliminary Results
This is an outline of the six analysis methods we have applied to the State of Georgia S a e and the
results we have obtained as of the date set forth above.
1. Residency Violations
We have evaluated early and absentee voters who were matched to the national change of
address database (NCOA) or are found to have registered to vote in other states subsequent to
their registration in target states (OOSSR), strongly indicating a violation of residency
requirements.
NCOA OOSSR Merged
GA 15,700 4,926 20,312
The OOSSR would be much higher, but we limited due to the lack of full dates of birth available
o f om man a e o e da aba e A f ll comple e bi hda e i nece a fo o ma ch
process.
2. Double Voting (Early/Absentee ONLY)
We compared the target state early and absentee voters to other states voting data and
identified individuals who cast early/absentee ballots in multiple states.
GA: 395
3. Confirma ion of Unre rned Ab en ee Ballo
I obtained data from the State via L2 Political after the November 3, 2020, Election Day. This
data identified 138,029 voters who were sent an absentee ballot but who failed to return the
absentee ballot.
We then called a sample of these voters totaling 772 individuals to ask if they requested the
absentee ballot. Of the 772 individuals our call center contacted and spoke with whom the State
data identified as having requested an absentee ballot but the data identified as having not
returned the ballot, our call center identified 142 individuals who did not request an absentee
ballot. Among those who said they had requested an absentee ballot and answered whether
they had mailed the ballot back, 326 individuals told our call center that they returned a ballot
State Did Not Request Percentage of 2,114 Sample

Georgia 142 18.39%
State Returned Percentage of 2,114 Sample

Georgia 257 33.29%
4. Confirmation of National Change of Address Voters
We contacted individuals who have been recorded having voted but filed a national change of
address to confirm that they did indeed cast a ballot. Once again, our call center staff contacted
a random sample of 2,379 individuals from the State data. From these calls, our staff identified
2,379 individuals who told our call center staff they did cast a ballot and 18 individuals who told
our call center staff they did cast a ballot. The following counts and percent of people we
reached by phone told us they did NOT cast an early or absentee ballot despite the state
recording such a ballot.
State Total Percentage of Sample

Georgia 37 1.53%
5. Confirmation of Low Propensity in Heavy Turnout Precincts
We reached out to Individuals who were marked as having voted despite never voting, not
voting in many years, or just recently registered. We concentrated this in precincts with
unusually high turnout.
State Total Percentage of Sample

Georgia 24 0.85%
Postal Company County Voter Registration # Last Name First Name Middle Name Suffix Street # Street Name Apt/Unit City State Zip Code Application Status Ballot Status Status Reason Application Date Ballot Issued Date Ballot Return Date Ballot Style
UPS BIBB 4876129 FIGUEROA DEBORAH ANN 4339 HARTLEY BRIDGE RD AP 102 MACON GA 31216 A A 9/24/2020 9/25/2020 10/26/2020 MAILED
UPS BIBB 8746353 RUCKER ERICA ANIK 3780 NORTHSIDE DR APT 140 118 MACON GA 31210 A A 10/13/2020 10/13/2020 0/13/2020 IN PERSON
USPS BIBB 8330810 FISHER RENNIE MARIE 1740 ROCKY CREEK RD UNIT 20894 MACON GA 31206 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 0/26/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 10624430 KING BRITTANY ANDREA 4339 HARTLEY BR DGE RD APT 215 MACON GA 31216 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 0/22/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 6345247 JOHNSON GENOA GERALD 3780 NORTHSIDE DR APT 140187 MACON GA 31210 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 0/20/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 10345561 LA FOUNTAIN MARC ANDREW 4339 HARTLEY BR DGE RD STE 104 MACON GA 31216 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 0/26/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 161139 KING SUVONEREE EVANS 4339 HARTLEY BR DGE RD BOX 215 MACON GA 31216 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 0/22/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 5333249 PATTERSON FRANK KIDD III 5962 ZEBULON RD APT 169 MACON GA 31210 A A 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 IN PERSON
USPS BIBB 3323797 DENNIS ROBERT JR 1040 PIO NONO AVE UNIT 2023 MACON GA 31204 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 IN PERSON
USPS BIBB 1760838 CRANFILL MELANIE R 1740 ROCKY CREEK RD UNIT 20591 MACON GA 31206 A A 10/21/2020 10/21/2020 0/21/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 8421878 PFEIFFER KATHERINE ANN 5962 ZEBULON RD UNIT 163 MACON GA 31210 2099 A A 10/28/2020 10/28/2020 0/28/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 812945 RAGIN LELAND K JR 4339 HARTLEY BR DGE RD APT 216 MACON GA 31216 A A 10/19/2020 10/19/2020 0/19/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 5035181 DAVIS KATHERINE ANGELA 4339 HARTLEY BR DGE RD APT 167 MACON GA 31216 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 0/20/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 176527 CROTHERS VINCENT LEE 3780 NORTHSIDE DR STE 140 MACON GA 31210 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 0/14/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 179993 DILL DONALD EDWARD JR 4339 HARTLEY BR DGE RD UNIT 83 MACON GA 31216 5641 A A 4/8/2020 9/18/2020 9/23/2020 MAILED
UPS BIBB 1001890 ENGLISH RODREQUEZ L 5962 ZEBULON RD STE 175 MACON GA 31210 A A 10/21/2020 10/21/2020 0/21/2020 IN PERSON
UPS BIBB 8327966 ABBOTT FRANK M 4339 HARTLEY BR DGE RD #202 MACON GA 31216 A A 10/13/2020 10/13/2020 0/13/2020 IN PERSON
USPS BRANTLEY 2243417 DAVIS JAMES 10119 MAIN ST N 805 NAHUNTA GA 31553 A A 10/9/2020 10/9/2020 0/22/2020 MAILED
USPS BRYAN 12900802 WILSON MITCHELL LASHONDA 9664 FORD AVE RICHMOND HILL GA 31324 A A 10/15/2020 10/15/2020 0/15/2020 IN PERSON
USPS BUTTS 11526038 DEPORRES GERALDO MARTIN VICENTE 461 E 2ND ST #1304 JACKSON GA 30233 A A 4/22/2020 9/18/2020 9/30/2020 MAILED
USPS CAMDEN 12014654 MCCARTHY MARSHA ANN 724 CHARLIE SMITH SR HWY APT 5402 SAINT MARYS GA 31558 A A 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CAMDEN 12014654 MCCARTHY MARSHA ANN 724 CHARLIE SMITH SR HWY APT 5402 SAINT MARYS GA 31558 A C Mailed Ba lot Surrendered to Vote In Person 10/11/2020 10/11/2020 10/27/2020 MAILED
USPS CAMDEN 12549980 WULFFIEND TONY JAMES 724 CHARLIE SMITH SR HWY UNIT 5734 SAINT MARYS GA 31558 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CATOOSA 11812818 KEIM ELIZABETH LUC LLE 862 LAFAYETTE ST UNIT 1625 RINGGOLD GA 30736 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 1528241 ANDERSON DOREEN MARIE 57 0 OGEECHEE RD STE 200 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 0/16/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 7321565 BOSTICK JAMAAR SHA'RON 5501 ABERCORN ST SUITE D214 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 11/3/2020 MAILED
FedEx CHATHAM 10312723 MCGEE ADAM DEAN 5 W BROUGHTON ST SAVANNAH GA 31401 A A 10/28/2020 10/28/2020 0/28/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx CHATHAM 12199576 GONZALEZ REBECCA 5 W BROUGHTON ST UNIT 305B SAVANNAH GA 31401 A A 10/28/2020 10/28/2020 0/28/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 11697835 GONZALEZ ANDREW ROBERT 5710 OGEECHEE RD STE 200 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 0/16/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 5609599 REARDON WALTER MCKINLEY 5710 OGEECHEE RD 200 265 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 0/12/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 8500756 LIU XIN JIAN 57 0 OGEECHEE RD UNIT 150 SAVANNAH GA 31405 9517 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 11/3/2020 MAILED
UPS CHATHAM 8002756 MITCHELL DARLA POTTER 57 0 OGEECHEE RD STE200 208 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/20/2020 10/24/2020 11/3/2020 MAILED
UPS CHATHAM 7463225 GREEN KEON DONTAGUS 57 0 OGEECHEE RD #200 202 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/15/2020 10/15/2020 0/15/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx CHATHAM 12105784 TROPEA ALEXANDRA FLORENCE 5 W BROUGHTON ST UNIT.305A SAVANNAH GA 31401 A A 9/8/2020 9/18/2020 10/19/2020 MAILED
UPS CHATHAM 12042290 WARD KEN EARL 5501 ABERCORN ST SUITE D 326 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/15/2020 10/15/2020 11/2/2020 MAILED
UPS CHATHAM 8761840 KANG DANIEL HONG GU 57 0 OGEECHEE RD # 200228 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 9/18/2020 9/18/2020 0/21/2020 MAILED
USPS CHATHAM 1075107 GREY FRANCES EVELYN 1 8 BARNARD ST UNIT 10703 SAVANNAH GA 31401 A A 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 0/12/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 2219986 PACE MARCUS J 5501 ABERCORN ST STE D205 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/15/2020 10/15/2020 0/15/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CHATHAM 5095798 LOESCH MELANIE MARIE 1030 US HIGHWAY 80 W APT#244 POOLER GA 31322 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 0/14/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 7463225 GREEN KEON DONTAGUS 5710 OGEECHEE RD #200 202 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A C Ballot was Undelivered 9/4/2020 9/18/2020 0/15/2020 MAILED
UPS CHATHAM 8788281 HATHAWAY AUGUSTA DEJUAN 5501 ABERCORN ST STE D SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/29/2020 10/29/2020 0/29/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx CHATHAM 6109251 NELSON DARREN CEDRIC 5 W BROUGHTON ST SAVANNAH GA 31401 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 0/30/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 12454539 CHRISTMAS DIANA L 2126 E VICTORY DR UNIT 313 SAVANNAH GA 31404 A A 5/15/2020 9/18/2020 0/15/2020 MAILED
UPS CHATHAM 1502183 WILLIAMS KEVIN LEROY 2126 E VICTORY DR SAVANNAH GA 31404 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 1916108 CARDEN CLIFTON 2126 E VICTORY DR APT 329 SAVANNAH GA 31404 A A 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 0/27/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CHATHAM 11220744 WRIGHT STEPHEN R 463 JOHNNY MERCER BLVD #STE B 7 SAVANNAH GA 31410 A A 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 0/12/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 1861860 MITCHELL MATTHEW BATES 57 0 OGEECHEE RD UNIT # 200 208 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/19/2020 10/24/2020 11/3/2020 MAILED
USPS CHATHAM 10509083 SETTERS JAMES EARL 407 E US HIGHWAY 80 UNIT 784 BLOOMINGDALE GA 31 02 A A 4/24/2020 9/18/2020 10/2/2020 MAILED
USPS CHATHAM 4443137 PRINCE JENNIFER LYNN 463 JOHNNY MERCER BLVD STE B7 SAVANNAH GA 31410 A A 9/17/2020 9/18/2020 0/28/2020 MAILED
USPS CHATHAM 2243830 PRUDEN RALPH J 1 8 BARNARD ST UNIT 9482 SAVANNAH GA 31401 A A 10/24/2020 10/24/2020 0/24/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CHATHAM 8740303 MULLEN DAVID WILLIAM 5501 ABERCORN ST STE D304 SAVANNAH GA 31405 A A 10/2/2020 10/3/2020 0/23/2020 MAILED
FedEx CHATHAM 3097079 ESTES JACK E MARLENE 5 W BROUGHTON ST UNIT 404 SAVANNAH GA 31401 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 0/22/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CLARKE 1764442 LONG THAD D 1860 BARNETT SHOALS RD 103 ATHENS GA 30605 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 0/20/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CLARKE 1764442 LONG THAD D 1860 BARNETT SHOALS RD 103 ATHENS GA 30605 A C Ballot was Undelivered 10/5/2020 10/20/2020 0/20/2020 IN PERSON
UPS CLARKE 11816715 TERRY CHARLES LEE 1860 BARNETT SHOALS RD STE 103 ATHENS GA 30605 A A 4/10/2020 9/18/2020 9/29/2020 MAILED
UPS CLARKE 12773226 SHIELDS LAUREN CORRIN 1860 BARNETT SHOALS RD STE 103 ATHENS GA 30605 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 5186097 LEONARD OLINKA GEDDES 6691 CHURCH ST UNIT 96105 RIVERDALE GA 30274 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 6147616 ROSS PATRICIA ANN 6450 EVANS DR UNIT 275 REX GA 30273 A A 10/13/2020 10/13/2020 10/13/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 8527984 ANDREW FREDERICK AUGUSTINE II 6450 EVANS DR UNIT 612 REX GA 30273 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 0/14/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 7490170 LAWRENCE CATHERINE 4989 COURTNEY DR FOREST PARK GA 30297 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 0/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 10197275 SIMMONS MARIAN PATRICIA MENDENHALL 6450 EVANS DR UNIT 978 REX GA 30273 A A 9/12/2020 9/18/2020 10/19/2020 MAILED
USPS CLAYTON 3424731 SMITH HANA NICOLETTE 6691 CHURCH ST 962114 RIVERDALE GA 30274 A A 9/11/2020 9/18/2020 10/19/2020 MAILED
USPS CLAYTON 2681033 CRAWFORD TONY 6450 EVANS DR UNIT 256 REX GA 30273 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 4465782 RAY FATIMAH ALI 6450 EVANS DR UNIT 225 REX GA 30273 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 8852967 HODGE ANTHONY QUINN 6450 EVANS DR UNIT 693 REX GA 30273 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 0/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 2681033 CRAWFORD TONY 6450 EVANS DR UNIT 256 REX GA 30273 A C Ballot was Undelivered 9/4/2020 9/18/2020 10/23/2020 MAILED
USPS CLAYTON 10697559 MYHAND TRACEY WANNETTE 6450 EVANS DR UNIT 998 REX GA 30273 A A 10/14/2020 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 3439191 GRIFFIN VERONICA HARRIS 6450 EVANS DR UNIT # 62 REX GA 30273 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 4250384 JOHNSON VANEE LAVEESTA 6691 CHURCH ST 960880 RIVERDALE GA 30274 A A 10/21/2020 10/21/2020 10/21/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 8169111 DALE GLEN FRANK 6691 CHURCH ST RIVERDALE GA 30274 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 IN PERSON
USPS CLAYTON 8852967 HODGE ANTHONY QUINN 6450 EVANS DR UNIT 693 REX GA 30273 A C VOTER DESTROYED THE BALLOT 9/28/2020 10/5/2020 10/23/2020 MAILED
USPS COBB 10082513 BASEL CHRISTIANA YVONNE 2001 DUNCAN DR NW 1821 KENNESAW GA 30144 A C Ballot was Undelivered 0/4/2020 10/6/2020 11/6/2020 MAILED
USPS COBB 5310383 ROBINSON DANA MARCEL 2001 DUNCAN DR NW 831 KENNESAW GA 30144 A A 9/8/2020 9/18/2020 10/20/2020 MAILED
USPS COBB 11391524 SMITH CUVANNA MONIQUE 2001 DUNCAN DR NW 46 KENNESAW GA 30144 A A 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 IN PERSON
USPS COBB 8611055 FRANCOIS MARIE LAURENCE REGINE 2001 DUNCAN DR NW 153 KENNESAW GA 30144 A A 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 0/12/2020 IN PERSON
USPS COLQUITT 4145250 SELPH JOHNNY PAUL JR 215 N MAIN ST MOULTRIE GA 31768 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 IN PERSON
UPS COWETA 6230740 ELLIS ANECIA KEVIA 388 BULLSBORO DR 119 NEWNAN GA 30263 069 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 IN PERSON
UPS COWETA 5848190 SULLIVAN HEATHER FELICIA 388 BULLSBORO DR UNIT #240 NEWNAN GA 30263 A A 10/17/2020 10/17/2020 0/17/2020 IN PERSON
UPS COWETA 11856586 HUDLER LINDY LEE 388 BULLSBORO DR APT 345 NEWNAN GA 30263 A A 0/5/2020 10/5/2020 0/24/2020 MAILED
USPS DAWSON 11471636 SWEENEY JONATHAN WILLIAM 452 HIGHWAY 53 E UNIT 831 DAWSONVILLE GA 30534 A A 10/15/2020 10/15/2020 0/15/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 5897712 KEITH SANDRA R 1551 DUNWOODY VILLAGE PKWY 88052 DUNWOODY GA 30338 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 0/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 8550933 QUEMIE PETER 977 MONTREAL RD UNIT #1072 CLARKSTON GA 30021 A A 4/17/2020 9/18/2020 9/30/2020 MAILED
USPS DEKALB 10559784 PETTY KEVIN CORNELIUS 3328 E PONCE DE LEON AVE UNIT 288 SCOTTDALE GA 30079 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 4103762 HOWARD WILLIAM JESSE III 3035 STONE MOUNTAIN ST UNIT 183 LITHONIA GA 30058 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 0/14/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 8758656 CUMMINGS LINDA LOUISE 3328 E PONCE DE LEON AVE SCOTTDALE GA 30079 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 0/20/2020 IN PERSON
UPS DEKALB 3130326 HANSEN BRAD 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD 254 ATLANTA GA 30338 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 0/16/2020 IN PERSON
UPS DEKALB 6615612 ARROUFI KAYRONNA G 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD # 122 ATLANTA GA 30338 A A 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 0/27/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 5016531 CHRISTMON FENECIA SHEVANDA 1551 DUNWOODY VILLAGE PKWY DUNWOODY GA 30338 A A 10/13/2020 10/13/2020 0/13/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 11896828 SMITH TIMOTHY EUGENE II 3328 E PONCE DE LEON AVE UNIT 288 SCOTTDALE GA 30079 A C VOTED IN PERSON 9/10/2020 9/19/2020 0/14/2020 MAILED
UPS DEKALB 3117437 MCCOWEN KELLY BRYAN 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD 540 243 ATLANTA GA 30338 A A 10/24/2020 10/24/2020 0/24/2020 IN PERSON
UPS DEKALB 5909442 NUNLEY AQUANETTA CORISE 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD A221 ATLANTA GA 30338 A A 10/19/2020 10/19/2020 0/19/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 4844267 PASSMORE GEORGE WILSON E LI'EL II 2724 WESLEY CHAPEL RD UNIT361571 DECATUR GA 30034 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 0/20/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 4992603 HOWARD MARHONDA 3035 STONE MOUNTAIN ST UNIT 83 LITHONIA GA 30058 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 0/14/2020 IN PERSON
UPS DEKALB 7233574 RANKINE CHRISTOPHER CHARLES 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD UNIT 540 ATLANTA GA 30338 5553 A A 10/17/2020 10/17/2020 10/17/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 8480986 STAPLETON RENEE 1920 DRESDEN DR NE #190193 ATLANTA GA 30319 A C VOTED INPERSON 9/4/2020 9/18/2020 10/18/2020 MAILED
USPS DEKALB 8635615 LEWIS ASHTON NICOLAIS 1551 DUNWOODY VILLAGE PKWY 88324 DUNWOODY GA 30338 A A 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 0/12/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 11896828 SMITH TIMOTHY EUGENE II 3328 E PONCE DE LEON AVE UNIT 288 SCOTTDALE GA 30079 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 0/14/2020 IN PERSON
UPS DEKALB 2433780 YOUNG DEIDRA LOUISE 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD UNIT # A414 ATLANTA GA 30338 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 0/20/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 3364665 DAWKINS TONY B 977 MONTREAL RD UNIT 852 CLARKSTON GA 30021 A A 10/24/2020 10/24/2020 0/24/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 1770281 SEBASTIAN GLORIA ANITA 3035 STONE MOUNTAIN ST UNIT 1222 LITHONIA GA 30058 A A 10/21/2020 10/21/2020 0/21/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 3792102 WHEAT MONIQUE SHEREE 5181 W MOUNTAIN ST UNIT 2427 STONE MOUNTAIN GA 30083 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 0/22/2020 IN PERSON
UPS DEKALB 10703552 SHANBHAG RAM 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD #540 626 ATLANTA GA 30338 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 0/22/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 2524398 MORRIS JOHNNY II 5181 W MOUNTAIN ST UNIT 20 STONE MOUNTAIN GA 30083 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 0/30/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 1935242 DANIEL KIMBERLY PYLES 3035 STONE MOUNTAIN ST 161 LITHONIA GA 30058 A A 10/28/2020 10/28/2020 0/28/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 3698478 GIBBS MICHAEL A 1273 METROPOLITAN AVE SE UNIT 18071 ATLANTA GA 30316 A A 10/17/2020 10/17/2020 11/2/2020 MAILED
USPS DEKALB 11780596 AGNEW JAMES FREDERICK II 1920 DRESDEN DR NE T190573 ATLANTA GA 30319 A A 10/29/2020 10/29/2020 0/29/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 11194151 REID RONALD NATHANIEL 5181 W MOUNTAIN ST #2473 STONE MOUNTAIN GA 30083 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 0/30/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 4120734 SMALLS FELONES JR 1273 METROPOLITAN AVE SE UNIT 17563 ATLANTA GA 30316 A A 10/13/2020 10/13/2020 0/13/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 2619531 COX ERWOOD PATRICIA 1551 DUNWOODY VILLAGE PKWY #888966 DUNWOODY GA 30338 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 0/14/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 11320058 TAYLOR BRAY 1920 DRESDEN DR NE 191453 ATLANTA GA 30319 A A 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 0/12/2020 IN PERSON
UPS DEKALB 12644244 MEYER AMY SUE 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD APT 339 ATLANTA GA 30338 A A 10/21/2020 10/21/2020 0/21/2020 IN PERSON
UPS DEKALB 12110438 JORDAN MARCUS TYREE 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD #540 226 ATLANTA GA 30338 A A 10/17/2020 10/17/2020 0/17/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 4315785 MILLER SUBRENA LORRI ANNE 3328 E PONCE DE LEON AVE UNIT 142 SCOTTDALE GA 30079 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 IN PERSON
UPS DEKALB 5680113 WILLIAMS DEREK MCKENZIE 4780 ASHFORD DUNWOODY RD #540 180 ATLANTA GA 30338 A A 10/13/2020 10/13/2020 0/13/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 8070605 GUILLORY LARRY JAMES 3035 STONE MOUNTAIN ST 723 LITHONIA GA 30058 A A 10/19/2020 10/19/2020 0/19/2020 IN PERSON
USPS DEKALB 10893803 MOHAMED ABDIFATAH NURENI 977 MONTREAL RD UNIT 1231 CLARKSTON GA 30021 A A 10/24/2020 10/24/2020 0/24/2020 IN PERSON
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USPS HOUSTON 10421426 PVEL VINCZ NEO 1010 GA HIGHWAY 247 S KATHLEEN GA 31047 A A 9/14/2020 9/18/2020 0/13/2020 MAILED
FedEx HOUSTON 4826601 BURNS DOGAN CHASITY IEISHA 1412 RUSSELL PKWY UNIT 284 WARNER ROBINS GA 31088 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 0/22/2020 IN PERSON
USPS JACKSON 11805170 JOHNSON DYLAN G 424 LITTLE ST UNIT 1785 COMMERCE GA 30529 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 0/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS JACKSON 335051 WARREN JOYCE ANN 424 LITTLE ST COMMERCE GA 30529 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS LAURENS 6274864 SIMMONS MACK ARTHUR 514 BELLEVUE AVE DUBLIN GA 31021 A A 5/20/2020 9/18/2020 10/15/2020 MAILED
USPS LAURENS 10596522 BRYANT EVA M 514 BELLEVUE AVE UNIT 8161 DUBLIN GA 31021 A A 9/2/2020 9/18/2020 10/7/2020 MAILED
USPS LIBERTY 4661804 SMITH TAMARCUS C 744 W OGLETHORPE HWY UNIT 1370 H NESVILLE GA 31313 A A 10/29/2020 10/29/2020 10/29/2020 IN PERSON
USPS LIBERTY 1223148 HENRY MELTON CHARLES 744 W OGLETHORPE HWY H NESVILLE GA 31313 A C VOTER WANTED TO VOTE IN PERSON /23/2020 9/18/2020 10/12/2020 MAILED
USPS LIBERTY 1223148 HENRY MELTON CHARLES 744 W OGLETHORPE HWY H NESVILLE GA 31313 A A 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 IN PERSON
USPS LOWNDES 5930278 ECHOLS SHERRELL BUSSEY 3698 NNER PERIMETER RD UNIT 3603 VALDOSTA GA 3 602 A A 8/25/2020 9/18/2020 9/30/2020 MAILED
UPS LOWNDES 11125103 PEREZ JOSE ISRAEL JR 33 8 COUNTRY CLUB RD 1 UNIT C VALDOSTA GA 3 605 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 IN PERSON
UPS LOWNDES 1208101 VOIGT CATHY REDKEVITCH 33 8 COUNTRY CLUB RD UNIT L 186 VALDOSTA GA 31605 A A 10/18/2020 10/18/2020 0/18/2020 IN PERSON
USPS LOWNDES 5830575 ECHOLS THADDIOUS LAVESTA SR 3698 NNER PERIMETER RD APT 3603 VALDOSTA GA 31602 A A 8/20/2020 9/18/2020 9/30/2020 MAILED
UPS LOWNDES 11716878 TAYLOR STEPHANIE LYNN 3338 COUNTRY CLUB RD APT 141 VALDOSTA GA 31605 A A 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 0/27/2020 IN PERSON
USPS MUSCOGEE 7039546 HIGHTOWER KALEENA NECOLE 4012 HAMILTON RD UNIT 4705 COLUMBUS GA 31904 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 IN PERSON
USPS MUSCOGEE 12350269 PUGH JAMILA A 39 6 MILGEN RD UNIT 8356 COLUMBUS GA 31907 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 IN PERSON
USPS MUSCOGEE 1775709 PHIFER PANSY 39 6 MILGEN RD UNIT 8723 COLUMBUS GA 31907 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 IN PERSON
UPS MUSCOGEE 8321547 WOMACK TAMERA LYNN 1639 BRADLEY PARK DR UNIT 500 COLUMBUS GA 31904 623 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx MUSCOGEE 5599504 BOWERS SONIA LYNN 4519 WOODRUFF RD UNIT # 4 COLUMBUS GA 31904 A A 11/3/2020 11/3/2020 11/3/2020 IN PERSON
UPS MUSCOGEE 855745 BARRETT JOY CEANNE 1639 BRADLEY PARK DR 500 222 COLUMBUS GA 31904 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 0/20/2020 IN PERSON
USPS MUSCOGEE 1851409 JONES LORANE CATHERINE 39 6 MILGEN RD UNIT # 854 COLUMBUS GA 31907 A A 9/17/2020 9/18/2020 0/26/2020 MAILED
FedEx MUSCOGEE 3294577 ABRAM LEWIS F 4519 WOODRUFF RD UNIT 4 COLUMBUS GA 31904 6096 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 0/16/2020 IN PERSON
USPS MUSCOGEE 6370053 PHIFER KEVIN LAMAR 3916 MILGEN RD APT 8723 COLUMBUS GA 31907 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 0/30/2020 IN PERSON
UPS MUSCOGEE 10898658 BROWN RICKEY LEE 1639 BRADLEY PARK DR COLUMBUS GA 31904 A A 10/29/2020 10/29/2020 0/29/2020 IN PERSON
UPS MUSCOGEE 1845735 LUCAS SUE ANN 1639 BRADLEY PARK DR UNIT 63 COLUMBUS GA 31904 620 A A 10/25/2020 10/25/2020 0/25/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx MUSCOGEE 5599504 BOWERS SONIA LYNN 4519 WOODRUFF RD UNIT # 4 COLUMBUS GA 31904 A C Voter Requested 9/7/2020 9/18/2020 11/3/2020 MAILED
USPS MUSCOGEE 8024520 DORMAN GINA NILAY 3916 MILGEN RD UNIT 7882 COLUMBUS GA 31907 A A 10/29/2020 10/29/2020 10/29/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx MUSCOGEE 1845914 MADDEN DENISE BAUER 4519 WOODRUFF RD UNIT 368 COLUMBUS GA 31904 6011 A A 9/6/2020 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx MUSCOGEE 6591877 LEWIS KATRENNA LAVERENDA 4519 WOODRUFF RD UNIT 365 COLUMBUS GA 31904 6011 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 IN PERSON
USPS MUSCOGEE 11408498 BARDGE ALLAYA BONAI 4012 HAMILTON RD UNIT 4705 COLUMBUS GA 31904 A A 10/17/2020 10/17/2020 0/17/2020 IN PERSON
UPS MUSCOGEE 1816178 SHAZIER LISA ANN 1639 BRADLEY PARK DR STE 500 COLUMBUS GA 31904 96310 A A 11/8/2019 9/16/2020 10/28/2020
FedEx MUSCOGEE 5061995 MADDEN KEVIN ERIC 4519 WOODRUFF RD UNIT 352 COLUMBUS GA 31904 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 0/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS MUSCOGEE 7071685 JACKSON BRITTANY TASHA 3916 MILGEN RD COLUMBUS GA 31907 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 0/26/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx NEWTON 5497158 MILES RENEE ANDREA 3828 SALEM RD APT 82 COVINGTON GA 30016 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 0/26/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx NEWTON 1986059 GARMAN LATORSHA MORGAN 3828 SALEM RD COVINGTON GA 30016 A R Ballot Received after Deadline 9/24/2020 9/24/2020 11/9/2020 MAILED
FedEx NEWTON 4106734 GARMAN STERLING MICHAEL 3828 SALEM RD COVINGTON GA 30016 A R Ballot Received after Deadline 9/24/2020 9/24/2020 11/9/2020 MAILED
FedEx NEWTON 2472574 COCHRAN GERALD NELSON JR 3828 SALEM RD APT 10 COVINGTON GA 30016 A A 0/1/2020 10/1/2020 11/3/2020 MAILED
FedEx NEWTON 12335674 SHIPPY MIAUNI SLYVIA 3828 SALEM RD APT 10 COVINGTON GA 30016 A A 0/1/2020 10/2/2020 11/3/2020 MAILED
FedEx NEWTON 7622775 MCCORD MICHELLE YVETTE 3828 SALEM RD APT 97 COVINGTON GA 30016 A A 10/24/2020 10/24/2020 10/24/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx NEWTON 11457549 BOND DEVONANA CHARLON 3828 SALEM RD COVINGTON GA 30016 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 IN PERSON
UPS OCONEE 11663172 CHIN RYAN KENNETH 1720 EPPS BRIDGE PKWY STE 108 ATHENS GA 30606 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 11/2/2020 ELECTRONIC
UPS OCONEE 259457 WALLACE CHARLES E DVM 1720 EPPS BRIDGE PKWY UNIT 108 391 ATHENS GA 30606 6132 A A 9/25/2020 9/25/2020 10/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
FedEx PAULDING 7149393 FRANKS RICHARD GORDON 4813 RIDGE RD UNIT 111 8 DOUGLASVILLE GA 30134 6117 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 0/26/2020 IN PERSON
USPS PICKENS 11969193 HEADQUIST MEREDITH A 4817 HIGHWAY 53 E D TATE GA 30177 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 0/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS RABUN 11292470 BLACK TORI HARTLEY 125 N MAIN ST UNIT 647 CLAYTON GA 30525 A A 9/5/2020 9/18/2020 10/7/2020 MAILED
USPS RABUN 2298298 GRAHAM EUGENE RUSSELL JR 125 N MAIN ST UNIT 111 CLAYTON GA 30525 A A 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 0/27/2020 IN PERSON
USPS RABUN 3888983 HALTER VERN RALPH 17 LAKEMONT INDUSTRIAL DR #3 LAKEMONT GA 30552 A A 4/24/2020 9/18/2020 10/5/2020 MAILED
USPS RICHMOND 7576015 HARMON DEADRIAN 1434 STOVALL ST UNIT # 12696 AUGUSTA GA 30904 A A 10/12/2020 10/12/2020 0/12/2020 IN PERSON
USPS RICHMOND 8586500 YOUNG JUDITH MARIE 4902 WINDSOR SPRING RD HEPHZIBAH GA 30815 A A 9/21/2020 9/21/2020 0/14/2020 MAILED
USPS RICHMOND 7517875 SALCEDO MIGUEL ANGEL 3108 PEACH ORCHARD RD AUGUSTA GA 30906 A A 9/7/2020 9/18/2020 11/3/2020 MAILED
USPS RICHMOND 10270481 SMITH ASHLEE MIKELLA 1434 STOVALL ST UNIT 2666 AUGUSTA GA 30904 A A 9/22/2020 9/22/2020 0/30/2020 MAILED
USPS RICHMOND 3294412 MASSERANT HOLLY MARIE 525 8TH ST AUGUSTA GA 30901 A A 10/16/2020 10/16/2020 10/19/2020 IN PERSON
USPS RICHMOND 1743707 PALMER AUGUSTUS III 4902 WINDSOR SPRING RD APT 544 HEPHZIBAH GA 30815 A A 9/11/2020 9/18/2020 10/8/2020 MAILED
USPS ROCKDALE 5522146 HUGHES WANDA J 1007 GREEN ST SE UNIT 284 CONYERS GA 30012 A A 4/16/2020 9/18/2020 10/19/2020 MAILED
FedEx ROCKDALE 11863283 AFAIRE MINTAH ASHANTI A 2274 SALEM RD SE APT 106123 CONYERS GA 30013 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 IN PERSON
USPS ROCKDALE 5248691 JOSEPH KEITH ANDRE 1705 HIGHWAY 138 SE CONYERS GA 30013 A A 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 10/20/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx ROCKDALE 5864714 PRICE LINDA M 2274 SALEM RD SE UNIT 106 240 CONYERS GA 30013 2097 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 IN PERSON
USPS ROCKDALE 10540538 HART DAWANNA CARRIE 1007 GREEN ST SE CONYERS GA 30012 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx ROCKDALE 8903048 HAYES DERICKA VIRGINIA 2274 SALEM RD SE UNIT 106 203 CONYERS GA 30013 A C VIO AM 8/26/2020 9/18/2020 10/23/2020 MAILED
FedEx ROCKDALE 8903048 HAYES DERICKA VIRGINIA 2274 SALEM RD SE UNIT 106 203 CONYERS GA 30013 A A 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 10/23/2020 IN PERSON
USPS ROCKDALE 322855 LAND CHARLES FRANKLIN 1007 GREEN ST SE UNIT 1897 CONYERS GA 30012 A A 4/6/2020 9/18/2020 10/6/2020 MAILED
UPS ROCKDALE 5108874 BLACKWELL FOLUKE BO 863 FLAT SHOALS RD SE C158 CONYERS GA 30094 6633 A A 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 10/26/2020 IN PERSON
UPS ROCKDALE 8877483 MANN ISRAEL LAYAA 863 FLAT SHOALS RD SE C208 CONYERS GA 30094 6633 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx ROCKDALE 2370993 MINTAH ANGELETHA CHARNANE 2274 SALEM RD SE UNIT 106123 CONYERS GA 30013 2097 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 IN PERSON
UPS ROCKDALE 8220766 BLANKS BRYAN RICHARD 863 FLAT SHOALS RD SE CONYERS GA 30094 A A 10/19/2020 10/19/2020 10/19/2020 IN PERSON
FedEx ROCKDALE 7054418 TIMOTHY MICHELLE A 2274 SALEM RD SE #106103 CONYERS GA 30013 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 IN PERSON
USPS TOWNS 10451398 RICH KAITLIN NOELLE 1 8 N MAIN ST HIAWASSEE GA 30546 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 IN PERSON
USPS TOWNS 2850030 SMITH TONI CHAMBLEE 5171 COLLEGE ST UNIT 1279 YOUNG HARRIS GA 30582 A A 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 10/27/2020 IN PERSON
USPS TOWNS 4134836 MCDONALD KELLY LANE 1 8 N MAIN ST 895 HIAWASSEE GA 30546 A A 9/24/2020 9/24/2020 10/6/2020 MAILED
USPS TOWNS 8361160 BLAKE GWYN MICHAEL 5171 COLLEGE ST 695 YOUNG HARRIS GA 30582 A A 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 10/14/2020 IN PERSON
USPS TOWNS 12645569 MERCIER MARGARET ELIZABETH 1 8 N MAIN ST HIAWASSEE GA 30546 A A 9/28/2020 10/7/2020 10/15/2020 MAILED
USPS TOWNS 10508880 SMITH PIERSON ALEXANDER 5171 COLLEGE ST UNIT 1279 YOUNG HARRIS GA 30582 A A 8/30/2020 10/8/2020 0/16/2020 MAILED
USPS TROUP 898759 TIMBROOK JESSIE LYNN 950 LAFAYETTE PKWY UNIT 911 LAGRANGE GA 30241 A A 10/30/2020 10/30/2020 0/30/2020 IN PERSON
USPS WALTON 11860315 GRAY JAMES WESLEY JR 125 W HIGHTOWER TRL SOCIAL CIRCLE GA 30025 A C VOTED AT POLLS AFFIDAVIT 9/30/2020 9/30/2020 11/3/2020 MAILED
USPS WALTON 4988183 SIMS JULIA MARIERA 125 W HIGHTOWER TRL SOCIAL CIRCLE GA 30025 A A 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 10/22/2020 IN PERSON
USPS WAYNE 3250379 FLOYD MARGARET STAFFORD 405 E WALNUT ST APT 494 JESUP GA 31546 A A 5/23/2020 9/18/2020 10/17/2020 MAILED
USPS WAYNE 3432337 FLOYD GEORGE EDWARD 405 E WALNUT ST 494 JESUP GA 31546 A A 5/23/2020 9/18/2020 10/17/2020 MAILED
Exh. B
Exh. C
AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN A. OVERHOLT
I, Benjamin A. Overholt, Ph.D., declare under penalty of perjury that the
following is true and correct:
knowledge of the matters stated herein.
2. I have an M.S. and a Ph.D. in Applied Statistics and Research Methods from
the University of Northern Colorado. I am currently an active federal civil
servant for over seven years and served in the United States Army for 15 years.
During that time, I spent more than five years reviewing election results for
the Voting Rights Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice in Washington, D.C.
3. I am familiar with and have analyzed public data from the office of the
Secretary of State of Georgia (the "SoS") regarding the recent presidential
election held on November 3, 2020 (the "2020 General Election".)
4. The plaintiff asked me to review the data available on the SoS website to
determine its usefulness in questioning the rejection rates of mailed ballots
("mailed ballots") in the 2020 General Election and to determine whether
anomalies existed that could change the outcome of the presidential race in
1
the 2020 General Election. Based on my experience and because of my
personal interest in the matter, I felt qualified to do so. I am not being
compensated for this work or for my time, rather, I am reviewing the data for
the sake of verifying outcomes.
Anomalies Based on Rejected Ballots - Signature Verificationand Missing Oath
5. I generated tabulations of mailed ballot rejection and spoil rates from 2016 to
2020 to check the accuracy of data on the SoS website and to demonstrate the
discrepancies in the number of mailed ballots that were "rejected" and
"spoiled" when comparing previous elections to the 2020 General Election.
All data used for this analysis was downloaded directly from the SoS 's public
website. The datafile for the 2020 General Election was last updated on
November 16, 2020. 1
6. In the datasets, the variables "Ballot Style", "Ballot Status", and "Status
Reason" are each critical to understanding ballot rejection reasons and rates.
"Ballot Style" is the type of ballot cast - values included are
"ELECTRONIC", "IN PERSON'', and "MAILED". In the results below, I
considered only those ballots marked as "MAILED". "BALLOT STATUS"
is the current status of a ballot, values are "A" for accepted, "C" for cancelled,
1
https://elections.sos.ga.gov/Elections/voterabsenteefile.do
2
"R" for rejected and" "for "spoiled". In this analysis only values "A'', ''R"
and "S" were considered.
7. There are over 6,000 different ''Status Reason" codes. They seem to be
handwritten phrases and include simiJarities such as "R-ADDR MISSING''
and "RADDR NOT A MATCH". The "grepl" function in R was used to search
for key words in "Status Reason". Table 1 shows the keywords searched for
that showed concerning discrepancies from 2016 to 2020 and are related to
signatures. To get the "[Percentage] of Mail In BaJlots" in Table 1, the
"Counts" were divided by the total number of mailed ballots with a Status of
"Accepted", "Rejected", or "Spoiled".
8. The data was sorted for the general and primary elections in 2016, 2018 and
2020 in Georgia, with a "g" or "p'' denominating the information in the
columns below, respectively.
3
Table1: "Status Reason" Search Terms By Year for "Rejected" and "Spoiled Ballots"
Counts % of Mail In Ballots
SearchTerm 201f>R 2018g 2020p 2020g 201Eig 2018g 2020p 2020g
ALLRejections 6,059 7,889 11,772 4,471 2.90°/4 3.46% 1.01% 0.34%
"SIG" 581 457 3,212 1,998 0.28% 0.20% 0.28% 0.15%
"OATH" 1,259 3,029 0 0 0.f,0% 1.33% 0.00% 0.00%
"ADDR" 373 156 0 0 0.18% 0.07% 0.()0%0.00%
"DOB" 598 19 0 0 0.29% 0.01% 0.00% 0.CXJ%
"DATE" 371 24 0 0 0.18% 0.01% 0.CXJ% 0.00%
"DEADLINE" 1,004 1,783 8,495 2,400 0.48% 0.78% 0.73% 0.18%
"BYELECTION" 1,836 1,788 0 0 0.88% 0.79% 0.00% 0.CXJ%
9. Table 1 demonstratesthe reducedrate of rejectionfor reasons with the tenn
"SIG" and the near zero instancesof reasons with the tenn "OATH'' in the
2020 General Election. "SIG" is a shorthanddesignationfor mailed ballots
that were rejectedbecauseof a signaturemismatch.
10.As the oath portion of the ballot is the portionsigned,there is likely overlap
between Oath and Signatureissues. Consideringonly reasons with the tenn
"SIG", the rejectionrates were 0.28%in the 2016 general,0.20%in the 2018
generaland 0.28%in the 2020primarybut droppedto only 0.15%in the 2020
GeneralElection.
1I.Comparingthe 0.15% rate in the 2020 GeneralElectionto the 0.28% rate in
2016 and the 2020primarywouldsuggestsomewherearound 1,600additional
ballots should have been rejectedfor signatureissues.
12.Consideringthe number of ballots classifiedas rejected in the "OATH"row,
the rejectionrates were 0.60%in 2016, 1.33%in 2018, and near zero in 2020.
4
The fact that there were two or three instances of "OATH" in both 2020
electionsfor spoiledballots shows that "OATH"issues are still possible,but
almosteliminatedcomparedto earlierelections.
13.Comparingthe 0.60% rate for 2016 and the 1.33%rejectionrate in 2018 to
the near zero rate in 2020 would suggestan additional7,900or 17,500ballots
should have been rejected,respectively. Togetherthe differencein rejection
reasons with the tenns "SIG" and "OATH"would account for more ballots
than the marginof victoryin the presidentialrace in the 2020GeneralElection
and might have affectedother state-wideor local races.
AnomaliesBasedon SpoiledBallots
14.1observed an additionalissue when I consideredthe rate of spoiled ballots.
Essentially,a spoiledballot is a ballotwith multiplemarkingsor damagethat
make it difficultto detenninethe voter's intent. In both 2016 and 2018, fewer
than 100 Mailed ballots were "Spoiled" (0.03% and 0.04% of Accepted,
Spoiled and Rejectedballots cast, respectively). In 2020, the corresponding
number increasedto 1,794 in the primary (0.15% of Accepted,Spoiled and
Rejected ballots cast) and 4,082 in the 2020 General Election (0.31% of
Accepted,Spoiledand Rejectedballots cast - nearly IOtimes the 2016 rate).
The rate of spoiledballots in the 2020 GeneralElectionwas twice the rate in
5
the primary, over seven times the rate in 2018 and over 9 times the rate in
2016.
Table 2: "Ballot Status Counts by Election

Ballot Status 2016g 2018g 2020p 2020g
Accepted 202,492 219,731 1,150,478 1,308,447
Cancelled 12,053 20,601 116,424 318,086
Rejected 6,059 7,889 11,m 4,471
Spoiled 69 98 1,794 4,082
<blank> 25,948 36,074 333,608 133,886
The Secretary of State Analysis
15.The office of the SoS published the results of its own review of this same data
(the "SOS Analysis")2, concluding that, "The number of absentee ballot
rejections for signature issues increased approximately 350% in the
November 2020 election in Georgia from the 2018 election." This conclusion
is misleading and the SOS Analysis is flawed in two material ways.
16.First, the SOS Analysis does not make any comparison to the most probative
election available, the 2016 General Election. Second, the SOS Analysis
inconsistently applies rules for computing the denominators for their
percentages.
https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/number of absentee ballots rejected for signature issues in the 2020

election increased 350 from 2018
6
17.In calculating the percentage of "Rejected" ballots, the SOS Analysis uses as
numerators (number of rejected ballots) the numbers 454, 3,266 and 2,011.
Those numbers are the number of ballots rejected in the 2018 General
Election, the 2020 Primary Election, and the 2020 General Election,
respectively, and are all reasonably close to the numerators used in my
analysis.
18.But the SOS Analysis uses differing denominators to calculate the reported
percentages. In the 2018 General Election, the SOS Analysis divided the
number of rejected ballots by a denominator which was the sum of all Ballot
Statuses (Accepted, Cancelled, Rejected, Spoiled, even the blanks) to get their
284,393 number, which would minimize the reported percentage.
19.For the 2020 Primary Election, the SOS Analysis divided total rejections by
Accepted ballots only. For the 2020 General Election, the SOS Analysis
divided the number of Rejected ballots by the total of all Accepted, Rejected
and Spoiled ballots (the method employed in this analysis). That was correct,
but the SOS Analysis for the 2018 General Election minimized the percentage
and maximized it for the 2020 Primary Election. The data in the article cited
above reporting the SOS Analysis was therefore generated improperly and
inconsistently and is misleading.
7
Further Anomalies
20.There is one caveat regarding the dataset for the 2020 General Election. The
datafile contains records for 4,505,778 ballots while Georgia's official
election totals currently show a total of 4,998,482 votes cast for the top 3
candidates in the presidential contest. It is surprising that while the dataset I
used is missing around 500,000 votes, it is only missing 13 rejected ballots.
21. There are other anomalies in the reported data that should be analyzed, and
many raise significant questions about the conduct and results of the 2020
General Election. The effect of the difference in ballot totals on this analysis
is unknown and cannot be calculated without better understanding of the
underlying conduct of the election throughout Georgia. The recent "hand
recount" would not resolve these issues. I understand there are further
questions about the conduct and outcomes of that process.
[SIGNATUREAND OATH ON NEXT PAGE]
. ' .. /. :-·.·.-
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America that the foregoing is true and correct.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF PRINCE WILLIAM
CITY OF MANASSAS
Benjamin A. O~e~ho~ppeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the above
jurisdiction, thi;i} day of November 2020, and after being duly sworn, made the
foregoing declaration, under oath.
[Affix Seal]
Not
My Commission Expires _ _J_(_-~

_.:c3_~__ _ )
.. - KIRKDAVIDHILLIARD
- NOTARYPUBLIC
- REG.#7839539
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA --
MYCOMMISSION
EXPIRESMARCH311
2023
9


GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Defendants.
NOTICE OF FILING
Come Now the Plaintiffs and submit this Notice of Filing of the
following:
1. The Expert Report of Matthew Braynard, from other litigation, as
Exhibit “A”;
2. The Declaration of Eric Quinnell, Ph.D. and S. Stanley Young, Ph.D.
as Exhibit “B”;
3. The Affidavit of Benjamin A. Overholt, Ph.D. as Exhibit “C.”
Respectfully submitted, this 3rd day of December 2020.
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
forthcoming

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
2
Harry W. MacDougald
3
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
4

AND CLERK OF COURT
U.S.D.C. No.: 1:20-cv-4809-TCB

U.S.C.A. No.: 00-00000-00
X
Certified Notice of Cross Appeal, Docket Sheet, Judgment and/or Order appealed
enclosed.
X This is not the first notice of appeal. Other notices were filed on: 12/1/20; USCA
Case No. 20-14480-RR.
in forma pauperis
DEATH PENALTY
Case
Document48
47 Filed
Filed12/03/20
12/03/20 Page
Page11of
of25
1

AND CLERK OF COURT
U.S.D.C. No.: 1:20-cv-4809-TCB

U.S.C.A. No.: 00-00000-00
X
Certified Notice of Cross Appeal, Docket Sheet, Judgment and/or Order appealed
enclosed.
X This is not the first notice of appeal. Other notices were filed on: 12/1/20; USCA
Case No. 20-14480-RR.
in forma pauperis
DEATH PENALTY
25
4months,APPEAL,SUBMDJ
U.S. District Court

Assigned to: Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. Jury Demand: None
Case in other court: USCA− 11th Circuit, 20−14480−RR Nature of Suit: 441 Civil Rights: Voting
Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Plaintiff
Suite 1600
Two Ravina Dr.
Atlanta, GA 30346
404−843−1956
Fax: 404−843−2737
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
12th Floor
New York, NY 10017
917−793−1188
Fax: 732−901−0832
Email: howard@kleinhendler.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
South Building
Ste 900
561−888−3166
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

L. Lin Wood, P.C.
P.O. Box 52584
404−891−1402
1
Fax: 404−506−9111
LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
2
Plaintiff
James Kenneth Carroll represented by Harry W. MacDougald
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
LEAD ATTORNEY
3
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
V.
Defendant
Brian Kemp represented by Charlene S McGowan
in his official capacity as Governor of Office of the Georgia Attorney General
Georgia Assistant Attorney General
Atlanta, GA 30334
404−458−3658
4
Russell D. Willard
Department of Law
Atlanta, GA 30334
404−656−3300
Defendant
Brad Raffensperger represented by Charlene S McGowan
Election Board
Russell D. Willard
Defendant
David J. Worley represented by Charlene S McGowan
Russell D. Willard
Defendant
Rebecca N. Sullivan represented by Charlene S McGowan
Russell D. Willard
Defendant
Matthew Mashburn represented by Charlene S McGowan
Russell D. Willard
Defendant
Anh Le represented by Charlene S McGowan
5
Russell D. Willard
V.
Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. represented by Amanda J. Beane
Perkins Coie−WA
1201 Third Avenue
48th Floor
Seattle, WA 98101−3099
206−359−3965
Email: abeane@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Amanda R. Callais
Perkins Coie−DC
Suite 600
700 Thirteenth St., N.W.
Washington, DC 20005−2011
202−654−6396
Email: acallais@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Halsey G. Knapp , Jr
Atlanta, GA 30309
404−888−9700
Fax: 404−888−9577
Email: hknapp@khlawfirm.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
Joyce Gist Lewis

1201 W. Peachtree Street, NW
Suite 3250
Atlanta, GA 30309
404−888−9700
Email: jlewis@khlawfirm.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
6
Kevin J. Hamilton
Perkins Coie LLP
1201 Third Avenue
Suite 4900
206−359−8741
Email: khamilton@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Marc E. Elias
Perkins Coie LLP
700 13th St NW
Ste 800
202−654−6200
Email: melias@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Matthew Joseph Mertens

Perkins Coie
1120 N.W. Couch, 10th Floor
Portland, OR 97209
503−727−2199
Fax: 503−346−2199
Email: mmertens@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Susan Coppedge
Office of the United States
Attorney−ATL600
600 United States Courthouse
75 Ted Turner Dr., S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303
404−581−6250
Email: susan.coppedge@usdoj.gov
(Inactive)
LEAD ATTORNEY
Adam Martin Sparks

Atlanta, GA 30309
7
404−888−9700
DSCC represented by Amanda J. Beane
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Amanda R. Callais
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
LEAD ATTORNEY
Joyce Gist Lewis

LEAD ATTORNEY
Kevin J. Hamilton
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Marc E. Elias
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE

LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Susan Coppedge
LEAD ATTORNEY
Adam Martin Sparks

8
DCCC represented by Amanda J. Beane
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Amanda R. Callais
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
LEAD ATTORNEY
Joyce Gist Lewis

LEAD ATTORNEY
Kevin J. Hamilton
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Marc E. Elias
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE

LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Susan Coppedge
LEAD ATTORNEY
Adam Martin Sparks

9

(rvb). (Entered: 11/27/2020)
(Entered: 11/27/2020)
10
11/27/2020)
11/29/2020)
11/29/2020)
11/29/2020)
11/30/2020 16 NOTICE of Appearance by Charlene S McGowan on behalf of Brian Kemp,
11/30/2020 17
11
ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 6 MOTION for Temporary Restraining

(Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020)
12

11/30/2020)
(Entered: 11/30/2020)
13

(MacDougald, Harry) Modified on 12/2/2020 to correct filing fee amount (pjm).
(Entered: 12/01/2020)
(Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 34 Transmission of Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal, USCA Appeal Fees, Order
and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 32 Notice of Appeal. (pjm)
(Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 35 AMENDED ANSWER to Complaint (Proposed) of Proposed
Intervenor−Defendants by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc..
(Sparks, Adam) (Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 36 USCA Acknowledgment of 32 Notice of Appeal, filed by Cathleen Alston
Latham, James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Coreco Jaqan Pearson,
Brian Jay Van Gundy, Gloria Kay Godwin and Vikki Townsend Consiglio. Case
Appealed to USCA− 11th Circuit. Case Number 20−14480−RR. (pjm) (Entered:
12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 37 ORDER STAYING 17 Order Setting Hearing on Motion. Signed by Judge
12/02/2020 MINUTE ORDER granting Julia Z. Haller's 24 Application for Admission Pro
Hac Vice. Entered by CRD at the direction of Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. If
the applicant does not have CM/ECF access in the Northern District of Georgia
already, they must request access at http://pacer.gov. If they have electronically
filed in this district in a previous case, please omit this step.(usw) (Entered:
12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 26 APPLICATION for Admission of Amanda
J. Beane Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10432164).. Attorney Amanda J. Beane added appearing on behalf
of DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. (nmb) (Entered:
12/02/2020)
R. Callais Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10432211).. Attorney Amanda R. Callais added appearing on behalf
12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 28 APPLICATION for Admission of Kevin J.
Hamilton Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10432219).. Attorney Kevin J. Hamilton added appearing on behalf
12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 29 APPLICATION for Admission of Marc E.
Elias Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10432230).. Attorney Marc E. Elias added appearing on behalf of
DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. (nmb) (Entered: 12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 30 APPLICATION for Admission of
Matthew Mertens Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
14
AGANDC−10432239).. Attorney Matthew Joseph Mertens added appearing on

behalf of DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. (nmb) (Entered:
12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 38 RESPONSE in Opposition re 20 MOTION to Intervene filed by James Kenneth
Carroll, Vikki Townsend Consiglio, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Gloria Kay Godwin,
Cathleen Alston Latham, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy.
12/02/2020 39 USCA Order: Appellants' "Emergency Motion for expedited briefing schedule
and Review" filed by Appellants Coreco Ja'Qan Pearson, Vikki Townsend
Consiglio, Gloria Kay Godwin, James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn Hall Fisher,
Cathleen Alston Latham and Brian Jay Van Gundy is GRANTED re: 32 Notice
of Appeal, filed by Cathleen Alston Latham, James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn
Hall Fisher, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy, Gloria Kay Godwin
and Vikki Townsend Consiglio. Case Appealed to USCA− 11th Circuit. Case
Number 20−14480−RR. (pjm) (Entered: 12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 40 ORDER POSTPONING this Court's December 4th hearing, until further order
of the Court. Signed by Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. on 12/02/2020. (usw)
(Entered: 12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 41 Emergency MOTION to Intervene by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of
Georgia, Inc.. (Callais, Amanda) (Entered: 12/02/2020)
12/03/2020 42 ORDER granting 20 Motion to Intervene; 41 Emergency Motion to Intervene by
The Democratic Party of Georgia, the DSCC and the DCCC. The Clerk is
directed to add these entities as parties and to docket their proposed motion to
dismiss [20−1], brief in support of motion to dismiss [20−2], and answer [20−3].
Signed by Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. on 12/3/20. (rsh) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 43 MOTION to Dismiss by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc.
(Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support)(rsh) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 44 ANSWER to COMPLAINT by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia,
Inc. Discovery ends on 5/3/2021.(rsh) Please visit our website at
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered:
12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 45 NOTICE Of Filing Evidence by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend
Coreco Jaqan Pearson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Expert Report of Matthew
Braynard, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Eric Quinnell, Ph.D. and S. Stanley
Young, Ph.D., # 3 Affidavit Affidavit of Benjamin O. Overholt,
Ph.D.)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 MINUTE ORDER granting Amanda J. Beane {26], Amanda R. Callais 27 ,
Kevin J. Hamilton 28 , Mark E. Elias 29 , and Matthew Mertens's 30
Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice. Entered by CRD at the direction of
Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. If the applicant does not have CM/ECF access in
the Northern District of Georgia already, they must request access at
http://pacer.gov. If they have electronically filed in this district in a previous
case, please omit this step.(usw) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 46
15
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL as to 14 Order by Brian Kemp, Anh Le,

Matthew Mashburn, Brad Raffensperger, Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley.
Filing fee $ 505, receipt number AGANDC−10445305. Transcript Order Form
due on 12/14/2020 (McGowan, Charlene) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 47 NOTICE Of Filing NOA Transmittal Letter re: 46 Notice of Cross Appeal.
(pjm) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
16
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ATLANTA DIVISION

VIKKI TOWNSEND
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP; BRAD
WORLEY; REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN; MATTHEW
Defendants.
ORDER
17
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4
motion.
18
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1.
appropriate.
2.
3.
19
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4.
p.m. EST.
____________________________________
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4

ATLANTA DIVISION

)
Plaintiffs, )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
. ) 1:20-c -4809-TCB
)
)
Defendants. )
STATE DEFENDANTS NOTICE OF PROTECTI E CROSS-APPEAL
Defendants Go ernor Brian Kemp, Secretar of State Brad Raffensperger,
and State Election Board Members Rebecca S lli an, Da id Worle , Matthe
Mashb rn, and Anh Le (collecti el , State Defendants ) hereb gi e notice of their
protecti e cross-appeal to the U.S. Co rt of Appeals for the Ele enth Circ it of the
District Co rt s Temporar Restraining Order entered on No ember 29, 2020
( TRO Order ), hich granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs req ested
emergenc relief. (Doc. 14).
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal of the TRO Order on December 1, 2020.
(Doc. 32). It is State Defendants position that the Co rt of Appeals lacks j risdiction
to re ie the TRO Order nder 28 U.S.C. 1292(a), as the District Co rt has noted.
(Doc. 37) ( [T]his Co rt is of the opinion that its No ember 29 order is not ithin
21
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4
the scope of Schia [e el. Schi dle . Schia ] s e ception to the nappealable
nat re of a temporar restraining order. ). Ho e er, in the e ent that the Co rt of
Appeals determines other ise, the Co rt of Appeals sho ld address the cross-appeal,
hich ill arg e that the partial TRO sho ld be re ersed and acated.
Respectf ll s bmitted, this 3d da of December, 2020.
/s/ Cha le e S. McG a


40 Capitol Sq are SW
Atlanta, GA 30334
cmcgo an@la .ga.go
Tel: 404-458-3658
C el f S a e Defe da
22
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I hereb certif that the foregoing has been formatted sing Times Ne
Roman font in 14-point t pe in compliance ith Local R le 7.1(D).
/ /Cha le e S. McG a
Charlene S. McGo an
23
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CERTIFICATE OF SER ICE
I hereb certif that I ha e this da electronicall filed the foregoing NOTICE
OF PROTECTI E CROSS-APPEAL ith the Clerk of Co rt sing the CM/ECF
s stem, hich ill send notification of s ch filing to co nsel for the parties of record
ia electronic notification.
Dated: December 3, 2020.
/ / Cha le e S. McG a
Charlene S. McGo an
24
Exhibit 1
Declaration of Michael Barnes

ATLANTA DMSION
CORECO JA'QUAN PEARSON, et

al.
Plaintiffs, CMLACTION
V. FILE NO. 1:20-CV-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, et al. ,
Defendants.
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL BARNES
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, MICHAEL BARNES, make the
following declaration:
1. My name is Michael Barnes. I am over the age of 21 years, and I
am under no legal disability which would prevent me from giving this
declaration. If called to testify, I would testify under oath to these facts.
2. I am currently the Director of the Center for Election Systems
within the Office of the Secretary of State. In my role as CES Director, I am
familiar with the operation of the State's Ballot Marking Device ("BMD")
Voting System.
3. Before each election, County officials load certain election data
1
files onto the BMD's. Those data files contain the ballot content associated for
the precinct in which the BMD's will be deployed, the ballot activation codes
which correspond to the voter's appropriate ballot, and the audio files
associated with the ballot content for visually impaired voters.
4. Prior to loading the election data files referenced in Paragraph 3,
the election data files contained on the BMD from the previous election must
be removed since the BMD's host only one set of election files at a time.
Removal of those data files does not alter the source-code or operational
software of the BMDs.
5. Separate from the BMD's are Compact Flash Cards utilized by
the ballot scanners to tabulate results. These Compact Flash Cards contain
election files downloaded from the County's election management server
before each election which, like the BMD data files, correspond to the
particular election.
6. There are only a limited number of these Compact Flash Cards,
so they must be formatted and re-used for each election. When the Compact
Flash Cards are re-formatted, all the data contained therein is removed.
However, prior to re-formatting, the results and ballot images contained on
those Cards are uploaded to the county's election management server and
retained.
2
7. Even prior to use of BMD's in an election, these steps must be
taken so that the counties can conduct Logic and Accuracy testing as required
by Georgia law. See O.C.G.A § 21-2-379.25(c). Logic and Accuracy Testing, in
sum, simulates voting to ensure that the BMD's correctly record the votes
cast by electors. This process thus requires county officials to take the actions
outlined above, mark and print each ballot style, and then scan those test
ballots to ensure the scanners accurately record the votes contained on each
test ballot. County officials must similarly hand-mark and scan test ballots in
the same manner that an absentee-by-mail ballot would be marked as
scanned. Once Logic and Accuracy Testing is complete, and there is
confirmation that the tabulators accurately reflect the votes as intended,
those test results are cleared and ballots removed to prepare for election
voting.
8. Logic and accuracy testing is a labor-intensive and time-
consuming task. Counties normally begin this process of Logic and Accuracy
testing about two weeks in advance of scheduled use, but sometimes sooner
for larger counties with more devices to test. With early in-person voting
slated to begin on December 14th, it is my understanding that some counties
are scheduled to conduct this testing on BMD's and scanners this week.
[Signature on Next Page]
3
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States
of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 3rd day of
December 2020.
~-hM lB
1c ae arnes
=====--=-
4
Exhibit 2
Declaration of Kristi Royston
Exhibit 3
Declaration of Janine Eveler

ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JA’QAN PEARSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
v.
FILE NO. 1:20-cv-04809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, in his official capacity
as Governor of Georgia et al.,
Defendants.
STATE DEFENDANTS’ EMERGENCY MOTION

TO DISSOLVE, ALTER, OR AMEND TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
Defendants Governor Brian Kemp, Secretary of State and Chair of the
State Election Board Brad Raffensperger, and State Election Board Members
David Worley, Rebecca Sullivan, Matthew Mashburn, and Anh Le
(collectively, the “State Defendants”), hereby move1 this Court to dissolve the
November 29, 2020 Temporary Restraining Order entered by the Court, [Doc.
1For the same reasons the Order is due to be dissolved, altered, or amended,
good cause exists to waive the time requirements of Local Rule 7.1 and treat
this motion as an emergency motion pursuant to Local Rule 7.2. Specifically,
without dissolution, alteration, or amendment, the ability of local county
officials to efficiently and securely conduct the upcoming January 5, 2021
Run-Off Elections will be significantly inhibited.
1
14], or, in the alternative, to alter or amend that Order, showing the Court as
follows:
As this Court is aware, Georgians are set to choose their next United
States Senators and a Public Service Commissioner on January 5, 2020.
Early voting in the election commences in just over two weeks, on December
14, 2020. In-person early voting takes place on Georgia’s ballot marking
devices (“BMDs”), which are subject to Paragraph Two of the Court’s
November 29, 2020 Order granting emergency temporary injunctive relief
(the “Order” or “TRO”). Specifically, Paragraph Two provides that the State
Defendants (collectively, the “State”) are “ENJOINED and RESTRAINED
from altering, destroying, or erasing, or allowing the alteration, destruction,
or erasure of, any software or data on any Dominion voting machine in Cobb,
Gwinnett, and Cherokee Counties.”
With this Motion, the State seeks to amend Paragraph Two so that
counties may proceed with Logic and Accuracy testing needed to prepare the
machines for early, in-person and election-day voting as required by State
law.2 Without some modification, non-party Cobb County’s ability to prepare
2 Under Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1253 (11th Cir.
2020), the State does not maintain the BMD’s at issue. Nevertheless, in the
light of the Order, and because the State is subject to the Order, it seeks the
relief articulated in this Motion.
2
for the January 5, 2021 Run-off Election will be significantly hindered if not
practically precluded altogether, while voters in Gwinnett County could be
deprived of the same rights to early voting as voters in other Georgia
counties. Cobb and Gwinnett voters may also be subject to long lines due to
an insufficient number of voting machines. There is no reason for these
outcomes and, consequently, the State respectfully requests that this Court
dissolve the TRO or otherwise modify Paragraph Two of the Order to permit
Cobb and Gwinnett County machines to be used in the rapidly approaching
Run-off Election.
ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY
There are good grounds to grant the State’s Motion. First, the standard
to grant the State’s requested relief is broad, and this Court retains
jurisdiction to do so. Second, evidence attached to this Motion demonstrates
the need to use the Cobb and Gwinnett BMDs, which does not interfere with
any evidence the Plaintiffs may seek at some later time. Third, as this Court
has already recognized, Plaintiffs themselves have caused the delay in this
litigation. See [37, pp. 2–3]. They cannot now complain that immediate relief
remains warranted.
3
I. Applicable Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(4) authorizes the Court to
dissolve the Order quickly—in two days or less. Case law empowers this
Court with broad authority to do so. Collum v. Edwards, 578 F.2d 110, 113
(5th Cir. 1978) (addressing preliminary injunction). See also Mincey v. Head,
206 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting American Home Assurance Co. v.
Glenn Estess & Assocs., 763 F.2d 1237, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 1985) (addressing
Rule 59(e) and amendment of judgments)). Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 62(d) permits this Court to “suspend, modify, restore, or grant an
injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party's
rights,” while an appeal is pending.
Some Courts treat a motion seeking to dissolve or modify an injunction
while an appeal is pending as a motion for reconsideration (which in turn
falls within Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)), justified whenever any one of the following
three instances is demonstrated: “(1) there has been an intervening change in
the law, (2) new evidence has been discovered that was not previously
available to the parties at the time the original order was entered, or (3)
reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice.” Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Conversion Solutions
Holding Corp., No. 1:06-cv-2568-CC, 2008 WL 11407217 (N.D. Ga. Jul. 21,
4
2008) (citing Bryan v. Murphy, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258–59 (N.D. Ga.
2003) (emphasis added) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 59)). Other courts have
taken a broader approach, applying “general equitable principles.” Huk-A-Poo
Sportswear, Inc. v. Little Lisa, Ltd., 74 F.R.D. 621, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal suggests this Court is now divested of
jurisdiction. [Doc. 32]. Plaintiffs are wrong. This Court “retain[s] jurisdiction
over motions for alteration or amendment” of its Order, even after a notice of
appeal is given. Wright & Miller, 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2810.1 (3d ed.
Oct. 2020 Update). At the very least, courts in the Eleventh Circuit consider
motions for reconsideration to be encompassed within the provisions of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Green v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,
606 F.3d 1296 (2010); see also Dixit v. Singh, No. 1:18-cv-403-TWT (N.D. Ga.
Apr. 23, 2018).
II. The Order should be dissolved or amended since information is

already retained and it imposes undue hardship on non-parties.
A. Election data is retained under existing processes.
Plaintiffs contend that an immediate temporary restraining order is
necessary because they fear the voting machines will be “wiped” before the
upcoming elections and forensic data will be lost. [Doc. 6]. Plaintiffs again are
wrong. A basic understanding of the State’s elections system instead shows
5
that data from the election is stored in three different ways following
completion of the election, even in the absence of the Court’s Temporary
Restraining Order.
Before each election, Ballot Marking Devices (“BMDs”) utilize USB
drives to load certain election data files onto the BMDs. See Declaration of
Michael Barnes, ¶ 3, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Those election data files
contain blank ballot images for each precinct associated to the BMD for the
previous election, the ballot activation codes needed to access each associated
ballot, and the audio files associated to the content within the ballot images
for visually impaired voters. Id. Before a new election occurs, the election
data files from the most-recent election must be removed from the BMDs, as
the BMDs host only one set of those files at a time. Id. at ¶ 4. The removal of
election data files does not alter the operational software or source code of the
BMDs. Id.
Separate from the BMDs, scanners are employed to count the paper
ballots produced by the BMD and attached printer; those scanners utilize
Compact Flash Cards. These Compact Flash Cards contain election files
downloaded from the county’s election management server before each
election—like the files used in the BMD, the files employed with the scanners
correspond to the particular election. Id. at ¶ 5. There are only a limited

6
number of these cards, so they must be formatted and re-used for each
election. Id. at ¶ 6. The formatting removes all data previously held by the
Compact Flash Cards. However, before the formatting occurs, the results
contained in the memory cards are uploaded to the specific county’s election
management server, and retained. Id. Thus, the data is securely stored after
each election and before the removal of the data from the Compact Flash
Cards.
Finally, the paper ballots on which votes were cast are also retained. In
Georgia’s BMD System, a voter makes their selection on the BMD which is
connected to a printer that produces a paper ballot. That ballot is then taken
to a precinct scanner which records the votes contained on the paper ballot
and deposits the ballot into a secure box. With respect to absentee-by-mail
and provisional ballots, those ballots are similarly counted by a scanner and,
like the in-person ballots, are retained.
All of this data is required by Georgia law to be retained, even in the
absence of the TRO. Indeed, Code Section 21-2-500 requires the following
information to be stored with the Clerk of Superior Court or other County
Officer designated by the County governing authority:
the used and void ballots and the stubs of all ballots used; one
copy of the oaths of poll officers; and one copy of each numbered
list of voters, tally paper, voting machine paper proof sheet, and
7
return sheet involved in the primary or election. In addition, the

superintendent shall deliver copies of the voting machine ballot
labels, computer chips containing ballot tabulation programs,
copies of computer records of ballot design, and similar items or
an electronic record of the program by which votes are to be
recorded or tabulated, which is captured prior to the election, and
which is stored on some alternative medium such as a CD-ROM
or floppy disk simultaneously with the programming of the
PROM or other memory storage device. The clerk, county records
manager, or the office or officer designated by the clerk shall hold
such ballots and other documents under seal, unless otherwise
directed by the superior court, for at least 24 months, after which
time they shall be presented to the grand jury for inspection at its
next meeting.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500(a). Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs can later demonstrate a
need for any of this information, it remains available for inspection even in
the absence of the Temporary Restraining Order.
B. Enforcement of the Order will impose undue hardship on non-party

counties and their voters.
Continued enforcement of Paragraph Two’s embargo of the BMDs
would cause substantial harm to Georgia voters in Cobb and Gwinnett
counties, and in turn, the State election system and Georgia voters generally.
Specifically, continued segregation of the counties’ voting machines pursuant
to the TRO would significantly and materially interfere with preparation for
the upcoming runoff election.
8
Early voting is set to begin on December 14 for the January 5, 2021
State and Federal General Election Runoff for two seats in the United States
Senate and one seat on Georgia’s Public Service Commission. See O.C.G.A. §
21-2-385(d)(1) (establishing a period for advance voting). These elections will
not happen with the flick of a switch, instead requiring significant advance
preparations that must begin prior to dissolution date of the TRO. These
activities include conducting essential Logic and Accuracy testing on the
machines, a requirement of State law, which must be conducted on the BMDs
prior to their use for both early and election day voting. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-
379.25(c), Ga. Comp. R & Regs. r. 183-1-12-.08. The Logic and Accuracy
testing, in turn, requires removal of the files from the previous election and
utilization of files for the current election, as described in Section II.A., supra.
Ex. 1 at ¶ 7.
Under state law, the BMDs must be utilized for both early in-person
and election day voting. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300. In Gwinnett County, the BMDs
are utilized for the County’s 156 voting precincts and nine advance-voting
locations. See Declaration of Kristi Royston, ¶ 3, attached hereto as Exhibit
2. Prior to entry of the TRO, Gwinnett County intended to begin testing of
BMD’s which will be utilized for early in-person voting this week. Id. at ¶ 9.
Gwinnett County has not yet begun that testing due to the TRO. Id. Unless
9
Gwinnett County is able to begin testing this week, “it will not be possible to
timely execute all of the tasks necessary to facilitate the opening of [early in-
person voting] in the County for what is anticipated to be a high turnout
runoff election.” Id. at ¶ 10. While Cobb County, on the other hand, possesses
sufficient BMDs not subject to the TRO for early in-person voting, it intends
to use BMDs that are subject to the TRO on election day. See Declaration of
Janine Eveler, ¶¶ 4–5, attached hereto as Exhibit 3. However, Cobb County
must begin Logic and Accuracy by December 8, 2020 to ensure the machines
are ready for deployment on election day. Id. at ¶ 6. Put simply, Cobb and
Gwinnett counties will be unable to be prepared for voting under the extant
TRO.
Thus, for at least Cobb and Gwinnett counties, the continued threat of
enforcement of the TRO (to which they are not a party) would rule out, or at
least make extremely difficult, any chance of readiness for early voting on
December 14 and election-day voting. This would unfairly impede Cobb and
Gwinnett election officials, and may well impose significant burden on those
counties’ voters from being able to participate in early voting, and could
ultimately lead to longer lines during the later days of early voting or election
day itself.
10
Furthermore, as a result of the disruption to elections activities in Cobb
and Gwinnett counties, the State would also suffer significant harm. The
State has a strong interest in running an efficient election. New Ga. Project v.
Raffensperger, 976 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2020). Interruption of two
counties’ preparation processes and the resulting impact on early voting, and
on Election Day itself, frustrates this interest. The associated voter confusion
at the unanticipated elimination of the early-voting option, as well as other
realistic impacts on election day voting, is further disruptive. The harm to
the counties, Georgia voters, and the State election process itself cannot be
overstated. At this point, and particularly in the light of the delay caused by
the Plaintiffs’ litigation strategy, Paragraph Two of the Order requiring
segregation of the BMDs is simply not compatible with the Sate’s interest in
running a smooth election. Due to the significant harms imposed on the
counties and on Georgia’s election system, the Order should be dissolved, or
at least amended.
The State has satisfied either Rule 59’s three factor test or Rule
65(b)(4)’s more flexible “general equitable principles” standard. See Little
Lisa, Ltd., 74 F.R.D. at 623. Here, both the second and third circumstances—
new evidence or preventing manifest injustice—are applicable. See
Conversion Solutions Holding Corp., 2008 WL 11407217 at * 1. As explained,

11
evidence which was not previously available at the time this Court’s Order
was entered demonstrates that counties may be unable to complete pre-
election Logic and Accuracy Testing required by State law while complying
with the Order. As to the third circumstance, this new evidence further
shows that this Court’s Order may well impose manifest injustice upon
Georgia voters in the affected counties, hindering their ability to vote with
ease while the State’s other 156 counties are not subject to the Order (to the
extent the three counties named therein are subject to it at all).
III. The Order should be dissolved since Plaintiffs have failed to

add non-party county officials, rendering the relief ordered
improper.
During the TRO hearing on Sunday, November 29, the Plaintiffs
represented to the Court that they seek to bring in the relevant counties, as
they are the ones in the control of the BMDs. Indeed, multiple counsel for the
Plaintiffs indicated that counties could and later would be brought in
“tonight,” meaning over three days ago. [Doc. 23] (TRO Hr’g) Tr. 27:13-14;
36:23-25. Plaintiffs’ counsel went even further and promised that if “the
Court gives us until Tuesday to examine, we will add the counties that the
Court lets us go examine, we will do it add them tomorrow; add them
tonight.” (Id. at 24:11-14).
12
Since Sunday, Plaintiffs have hosted rallies, filed an appeal in the
Eleventh Circuit, and engaged in an aggressive social media campaign falsely
accusing elected State Officials of fraud and crime. They have not, however,
lived up to their representation to this Court to add the necessary parties. As
the Court may recall, it was initially going to deny the TRO, and it may have
granted limited relief under the belief that the Plaintiffs meant what they
said and said what they meant when they represented they would bring in
the proper parties to this litigation.
As the case now sits before this Court, binding precedent forecloses any
of the relief Plaintiffs sought with the TRO (beyond preserving information
held by the State). See Jacobson v. Florida Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1253
(11th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs attempt to evade Jacobson’s binding precedent by
claiming it is only about Florida law. TRO Hr’g Tr. 22:13. Plaintiffs’
argument reads Jacobson far too narrowly, as Judge William Pryor
considered language from a Florida statute that is substantively the same as
Georgia’s (both identify the Secretary as the “Chief Election Officer”). Id. This
language, the same Plaintiffs cite, proved insufficient to establish traceability
of every election issue to the Secretary. Id. Applying Georgia law, United
States District Court Judge Michael L. Brown came to the same conclusion
earlier this year in Anderson v. Raffensperger, 1:20-CV-03263, 2020 WL

13
6048048, at *23 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2020). This lack of State authority and
control provides another reason to amend the Order and allow the BMDs to
be prepared for use in Cobb and Gwinnett Counties.
In sum, the State has demonstrated that “general equitable principles”
warrant modifying the Order. Little Lisa, Ltd., 74 F.R.D. at 623. On the one
hand, a continued embargo of the BMDs will prevent voters in Gwinnett from
having access to the machines during early voting and will inhibit Cobb from
preparing its machines for election day. This will likely cause longer lines,
voter confusion, and longer tabulation times. On the other hand, allowing the
BMDs to be used does not harm Plaintiffs in the slightest. The State is
maintaining all paper ballots, and electronic information is saved on the
State’s Election Database. Time is of the essence, and the Court’s relief is
needed now.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, State Defendants respectfully request this
Court dissolve or modify the TRO to prevent unintended impacts on Georgia’s
Run-off Election.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of December 2020.
14
Christopher M. Carr
Attorney General
GA Bar No. 112505
Russell D. Willard
Senior Assistant Attorney General
GA Bar No. 760280
rwillard@law.ga.gov
Charlene S. McGowan
GA Bar No. 697316
cmcgowan@law.ga.gov
State Law Department
40 Capitol Square, S.W.
/s/ Carey Miller

Carey Miller
cmiller@robbinsfirm.com
Josh Belinfante
jbelinfante@robbinsfirm.com
Melanie Johnson
mjohnson@robbinsfirm.com
Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield LLC
500 14th Street NW
Atlanta, GA 30318
Telephone: (678) 701-9381
Facsimile: (404) 856-3250
Counsel for State Defendants
15
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D), I hereby certify that the foregoing
STATE DEFENDANTS’ EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISSOLVE, ALTER,
OR AMEND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND BRIEF IN
SUPPORT was prepared double-spaced in 13-point Century Schoolbook font,
approved by the Court in Local Rule 5.1(C).
/s/Carey Miller
Carey Miller
16
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELE ENTH CIRCUIT
N . 20-14480-RR
CORECO JA'QAN PEARSON,

IKKI TO NSEND CONSIGLIO,
GLORIA KA GOD IN,
JAMES KENNETH CARROLL,
CAROL N HALL FISHER,
CATHLEEN ALSTON LATHAM,
BRIAN JA AN GUND ,
P A C -A ,
GO ERNOR OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA,

,
SECRETAR OF STATE FOR THE STATE OF GEORGIA,
S S
C G S E B ,
DA ID J. ORLE ,
G
S E B ,
REBECCA N. SULLI AN,
G
S E B ,
MATTHE MASHBURN,
G
S E B ,
ANH LE,
G
S E B ,
D A C -A .
O A U S
D C N D G
ORDER:
A E M E C -A C B
GRANTED.
DA ID J. SMITH
C U S C
A E C
ENTERED FOR THE COURT B DIRECTION

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELE ENTH CIRCUIT
N . 20-14480-RR
CORECO JA'QAN PEARSON,

IKKI TO NSEND CONSIGLIO,
GLORIA KA GOD IN,
JAMES KENNETH CARROLL,
CAROL N HALL FISHER,
CATHLEEN ALSTON LATHAM,
BRIAN JA AN GUND ,
P A C -A ,
GO ERNOR OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA,

,
SECRETAR OF STATE FOR THE STATE OF GEORGIA,
S S
C G S E B ,
DA ID J. ORLE ,
G
S E B ,
REBECCA N. SULLI AN,
G
S E B ,
MATTHE MASHBURN,
G
S E B ,
ANH LE,
G
S E B ,
D A C -A .
O A U S
D C N D G
ORDER:
A E M E C -A C B
GRANTED.
DA ID J. SMITH
C U S C
A E C
ENTERED FOR THE COURT B DIRECTION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JA QAN PEARSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:20-cv-04809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, in his official
capacity as Governor of Georgia,
Defendants.
CONSOLIDATED MOTION TO INTERVENE BY GWINNETT BORE

WITH BRIEF IN SUPPORT
Stephen Day, John Mangano, Alice O Lenick, Ben Satterfield, and
Wandy Taylor, members of the Gwinnett County Board of Registrations and
Elections (“Gwinnett BORE” or “Proposed Intervenors”) file this motion to
intervene as objectors. Intervention is appropriate under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b) for the following reasons.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 20, 2020, Governor Brian Kemp and Secretary of State
Brad Raffensperger certified the election results. This certification followed
an audit by hand recount in Georgia which affirmed the results.

Plaintiffs asked this Court to enter an order decertifying the results
and “requiring Governor Kemp to transmit certified election results that
state that President Donald J. Trump is the winner of the election.” Compl. ¶
211(3). Plaintiffs Complaint was filed more than three weeks after the
general election, and five days after Georgia certified the results.
The Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) issued by this Court on
November 29, 2020 [Doc. 14] is materially delaying the ability for the
Gwinnett BORE to ready its equipment and polling locations for the
upcoming January 5, 2020 runoff election and the early voting process for
that election, which begins on December 14, 2020. A hearing on the TRO was
scheduled to take place today, December 4, 2020, but this Court cancelled the
hearing on December 2, 2020 [Doc. 40] and has not provided any further
indication as to when the TRO will be resolved.
Each day the TRO remains in effect, it is increasingly difficult for the
Gwinnett BORE to ensure it is adequately prepared for the upcoming runoff
election, as outlined in the Declaration of Kristi Royston, filed yesterday.
[Doc. 52-2]. Specifically, if the Gwinnett BORE is unable to begin Logic and
Accuracy testing on its voting machines and other equipment immediately, it
will be unable to open all of its early-voting sites on December 14, as it had
planned to do. Id. at ¶ 14.

The Gwinnett BORE files this motion to object to the TRO because its
interests will be materially and irreparably harmed if the TRO is not lifted.
The Gwinnett BORE has a significant stake in the outcome of this action and,
as one of Georgia s largest counties, can offer the Court useful insight on the
practical needs associated with applying the TRO to those who have a duty to
carry out the administration of elections.
ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY
I. The Gwinnett BORE is entitled to intervention as of right.
Intervention as of right must be granted when (1) the motion to
intervene is timely; (2) the proposed intervenors possess an interest in the
subject matter of the action; (3) denial of the motion to intervene would affect
or impair the proposed intervenors ability to protect their interests; and (4)
the proposed intervenors interests are not adequately represented by the
existing parties to the lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); Georgia v. U.S. Army
Co p of Eng , 302 F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 2002). The Gwinnett BORE
satisfies each of these factors.
A. The Gwinnett BORE timely filed this Motion
The Gwinnett BORE filed this Motion just two days after this Court
signaled it would not resolve the status of the TRO as it had initially
scheduled. Because the Court has not provided a timeline of any kind now
that the hearing on the TRO has been delayed – or possibly outright
cancelled – the Gwinnett BORE is in the unique position of being prevented
by Court Order to prepare for an election that is mere days away.
B. The Gwinnett BORE has an interest in the outcome of this action

and denying its motion impair its ability to protect such interests.
The Gwinnett BORE cannot overstate the effect the TRO has on its
ability to adequately prepare for the upcoming runoff election. It is likely
that, in keeping with the general election one month ago, the runoff election
will have uncommonly high voter turnout, especially during early voting.
[Doc. 52-2 at ¶ 11]. As a result, successful administration of the election in
Gwinnett County will require all of the voting machines and polling places to
function at optimum capacity. [Doc. 52-2 at ¶¶ 9-12]. This capacity is
hindered by the delay brought on by this Court s TRO. [Doc. 52-2 at ¶ 13].
Indeed, if the Gwinnett BORE cannot begin programming machines today or
tomorrow, the county will only be able to have one early-voting site open on
December 14 instead of all nine locations that would be available absent the
TRO. [Doc. 52-2 at ¶¶ 16-18]. The massive diminution of resources and access
to voting sites in one of Georgia s counties could be a disaster for Gwinnett
County voters and potentially result in wholesale disenfranchisement of
hundreds of thousands of Georgians. Put simply, the Gwinnett BORE has an

acute interest in the outcome of this action, and denial of the motion to
intervene would absolutely affect or impair the proposed intervenors ability
to protect their interests.
C. The Gwinnett BORE is not adequately represented by the parties

to this action
While the Governor, Secretary of State, and the various election
officials named in this action have obvious interests in defending the state s
laws and their exercises of authority pursuant to those laws, the Gwinnett
BORE s focus is entirely separate from those interests, but just as important.
Moreover, a proposed intervenor s burden “should be treated as minimal,”
and it is sufficient “if the applicant shows that representation of his interest
may be inadequate.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528,
538 n. 10 (1972) (citing 3 B J. Moore, Federal Practice 24.09—1 (4) (1969));
Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1214 (11th Cir. 1989).
Here, while Defendants have an interest in defending the actions of
state officials, they must parry the litany of accusations cast against them by
Plaintiffs. The Gwinnett BORE, on the other hand, is singularly focused on
expeditious resolution of the TRO that resulted from Plaintiffs accusations.
Moreover, the Gwinnett BORE faces practical hurdles in administering the
upcoming election unique to their circumstances. While there is certainly an

overlap of interests at times, no Defendant shares the interests of the
Gwinnett BORE. And because of this, they cannot rely on Defendants or
anyone else to provide adequate representation. They have thus satisfied the
four requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).
II. The Gwinnett BORE should receive permissive intervention

from this Court.
If the Court does not grant intervention as a matter of right, the
Gwinnett BORE respectfully requests that the Court exercise its discretion to
allow them to intervene under Rule 24(b). The Court has broad discretion to
grant a motion for permissive intervention when it determines that: (1) the
proposed intervenors claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common, and (2) the intervention will not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the original parties rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(1)(B) and (b)(3); Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213; Ga. Aquarium, Inc. v.
Pritzker, 309 F.R.D. 680, 690 (N.D. Ga. 2014). Even where courts find
intervention as of right may be denied, permissive intervention may
nonetheless be proper or warranted. Moreover, “the claim or defense clause of
Rule 24(b)(2) is generally given a liberal construction.” Id. The Gwinnett
BORE meets these requirements.

Initially, the Gwinnett BORE s claims and defenses will inevitably
raise common questions of law and fact because they seek to ensure voters in
all elections have their vote counted. See Franconia Minerals (US) LLC v.
United States, 319 F.R.D. 261, 268 (D. Minn. 2017) (“Thus, applicant[ s]
claims and the main action obviously share many common questions of law
and perhaps of fact.”). At bottom, Defendants are hoping to ensure that
voters in the last election have their votes counted. The Gwinnett BORE, on
the other hand, is focused on ensuring voters in the next election aren t
unnecessarily disenfranchised. And the TRO, as it stands, imperils the
legitimacy of both elections.
Finally, for the reasons set forth above, the motion to intervene is
timely, and given the early stage of this litigation, intervention will not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties.
III. The Gwinnett BORE joins the State’s motion.
For purposes of its claims or defenses for which intervention is sought,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c), the Gwinnett BORE joins the State Defendants
Emergency Motion to Dissolve, Alter, or Amend Temporary Restraining
Order [Doc. 52] and urges the Court to dissolve the TRO as quickly as
practicable to allow programming of voting machines for early voting to
begin.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of December, 2020.
/s/ Bryan P. Tyson

Bryan P. Tyson
btyson@taylorenglish.com
Frank B. Strickland
fstrickland@taylorenglish.com
Bryan F. Jacoutot
bjacoutot@taylorenglish.com
TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA LLP
1600 Parkwood Circle, Suite 200
Atlanta, GA 30339
770.434.6868 (telephone)
Counsel for the Gwinnett BORE

Pursuant to L.R. 7.1(D), the undersigned hereby certifies that the
foregoing CONSOLIDATED MOTION TO INTERVENE BY GWINNETT
BORE WITH BRIEF IN SUPPORT has been prepared in Century
Schoolbook 13-point, a font and type selection approved by the Court in L.R.
5.1(B).
/s/ Bryan P. Tyson

Bryan P. Tyson

ATLANTA DIVISION

VIKKI TOWNSEND
GUNDY,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP; BRAD
WORLEY; REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN; MATTHEW
Defendants.
ORDER
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals having dismissed the
appeals in this case, the Court sets the following revised scheduling
order:
Plain iff complain shall come before the Court for hearing on
Monday, December 7, at 10:00 a.m., EST, in the ceremonial courtroom
on the 23rd floor.
Defendan b ief in oppo i ion o he claim in Plain iff
complaint will be due on Saturday, December 5, by 9:00 p.m. EST. Any
reply brief will be due on Sunday, December 6, by 6:00 p.m. EST.
Plaintiffs are also directed to file their response brief to the pending
motion [43] to dismiss by Sunday, December 6, at 6:00 p.m. EST.
In ligh of he pcoming hea ing, Defendan eme genc mo ion
[52] to dissolve or alter the November 29 temporary restraining order is
denied. This renders moot the Gwinnett County Board of Registrations
and Elec o membe pending eme genc mo ion [55] o in e ene.
Therefore, that motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of December, 2020.
____________________________________
Case
Document 5-4
57 Filed
Filed 12/04/20
11/27/20 Page
Page 11 of
of 22

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to File
Affidavits Under Seal And For In Camera Review pursuant to LR 7.5 and
65.1, and Section II(J) of Appendix H to the Local Rules, and having shown
that the requested relief that certain affidavits be sealed with specific
identification of the portions for which sealing is necessary, the likelihood of

Case
Document 5-4
57 Filed
Filed 12/04/20
11/27/20 Page
Page 22 of
of 22
injury to the interests of the affiants if public disclosure were made, and the
lack of less onerous alternatives to the sealing of the affidavits to protect the
personal safety and harm to the interests of the affiants, and for good cause
appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED, and
the affidavits to be filed under seal until further order of the Court, and
Plaintiffs are permitted to file these affidavits with the identifying
information redacted in the public docket.
Dated: ember , 2020.
___________________________
The Honorable Timothy C. Batten
U.S. District Court Judge
None of [Bra nard ] claims meets scientific
standards of my fields of research, including survey research, political science,
statistics and data sciences. There is no scientific basis for drawing any inferences
or conclusions from the data presented. )

Executed this 17th day of November 2020.
SHAMEIKA VAILES
Sworn to and subscribed to 0 ‘ ‘ckibk Ttio
before me this 17th day of •• s SS10,

1.•
November 2020.
ss C) s.
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MAR
98
2023
otary Public
1/,;,1 ,, p'N.P7, ‘‘
My commission expires: OkaycV1 zoz_
KH620790.DOCX 4

ATLANTA DIVISION
L. Lin Wood, Jr.,

v. 20-cv-04651-SDG
Brad Raffensperger, in his official capacity

as Secretary of the State of Georgia, et al.,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY BRANDON
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned subscribing officer, duly
authorized to administer oaths, Kimberly Brandon, who being duly sworn, deposed
and stated as follows:
1. My name is Kimberly Brandon. I am over 18 years of age, a citizen of
the State of Georgia, suffer from no legal disabilities, and am otherwise competent
to testify to the matters contained herein. I have personal knowledge of the facts
here, and if called as a witness, can testify completely thereto.
2. I am a resident of and registered elector in Cobb County, Georgia.
3. I volunteered to work as the Democratic site volunteer supervisor for
Cobb County, Georgia on November 13 through 15 of 2020, and was present on all
1
three days as a monitor credentialed by the Democratic Party of Georgia to observe
the statewide hand recount of ballots cast in the 2020 Presidential Election in Cobb
County, Georgia (the “Recount”).
4. I arrived at the Event Center in Jim R. Miller Park, in Marietta, Georgia,
where the Recount was held each day I worked as a volunteer supervisor at around
1:00 p.m. My assigned shift on each day I volunteered was from 1:00 p.m. until 6:00
p.m.
5. I did not witness or otherwise observe any Cobb County election
official or officials treat credentialed monitors for the Republican Party any
differently than the way they treated credentialed monitors for the Democratic Party.
6. I did not witness or otherwise observe any Cobb County election
official or officials treat any credentialed monitors, regardless of party affiliation,
with any hostility.
7. I did not witness Cobb County Director of Elections Janine Eveler
treating monitors or public observers any differently based upon their party
affiliation.
8. I did not witness Director Eveler treating anyone with hostility or
behaving in any way that was less than professional.
2
9. Instead, at least based on what I observed, Director Eveler appeared to
respond promptly to all inquiries, complaints, and questions from monitors and
observers regardless of their party affiliation. On Saturday, another election official
was supervising, and she also seemed to treat everyone fairly based on what I
observed.
10. I understand that an individual who claims to have observed the recount
in Cobb County on Monday, November 16, 2020, has submitted that the process was
“sloppy, unorganized, and suspicious.” However, I consider myself to be highly
organized and particular and, based on what I saw, nothing could be further from the
truth.
11. This is not to say that everything was constantly perfect. To be sure,
election officials had to hand count almost 400,000 ballots in Cobb County alone,
and invariably humans will make occasional mistakes. However, whenever anyone
reported any concern or mistake to Director Eveler, it was my observation that any
such issue was promptly, efficiently, and thoroughly addressed.
12. In addition, it was my observation that Director Eveler, or other
elections officials, were constantly available to questions and concerns.
13. On several occasions, I did witness Republican observers standing
closer to the audit tables than is recommended under Centers for Disease Control
3
guidelines as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the first day or two of the
Recount this was reported to Director Eveler and promptly addressed by her. It was
clear to me that the Republican monitors wanted to be close enough to read each
ballot, which is more difficult from the necessary distance of six feet.
14. I did continue to escalate concerns when I observed Republican
credentialed monitors attempting to talk to or engage with the auditors, as this clearly
violated the rules that were explained to us.
15. I understand that an individual has submitted an affidavit to this Court
alleging that certain ballots looked and felt different. While I touched no ballots
personally, in accordance with the rules, I saw many ballots that were cast on
election day and marked by Ballot Marking Devices (“BMDs”) and absentee ballots
during the three days that I volunteered as a monitor. The BMD ballots from election
day do look different than absentee ballots. Absentee ballots are creased from
mailing and longer in size, and the BMD ballots generated by the in-person voting
machines are not creased, shorter, and list the name of the selected candidate, rather
than indicating the voter’s choice with a marked bubble next to the name of the
selected candidate in a list of all candidates.
16. I understand that certain individuals have submitted affidavits to this
Court claiming they observed irregularities in Cobb County during the Recount
4
without providing further evidence of same. Notably, however, I witnessed
credentialed Republican monitors constantly taking video recordings and
photographs on their phone. Indeed, at one point a Republican credentialed monitor
took a video recording of me and my volunteer monitors where we were standing
and sitting outside of the counting area for what felt like ten minutes. We simply
ignored her and continued doing what we were there to do: observe the Recount.
However, if these individuals have credible allegations of irregularities or
improprieties having occurred, it would shock me that they would not have captured
any such occurrences on camera.
17. Each day I was present, there were at least ten monitors from each
political party present. At no point did I observe Republican monitors being denied
access or otherwise turned away.
18. To the extent any minor problems arose, I observed election officials
promptly address and rectify such issues with the audit teams directly. In general,
the process ran smoothly, everyone was treated fairly, and election officials were
working hard to complete the enormous task of hand counting hundreds of thousands
of ballots, under the watchful eye of tens of credentialed observers and more that
remained in the public viewing area, before the Recount deadline.
5
Executed this 17th day of November 2020.
7 — (signed)
Rebecca Hoelting Short
Sworn to and subscribed to

before me this 17th day of
November 2020.
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6

ATLANTA DIVISION
L. Lin Wood, Jr.,

v. 20-cv-04651-SDG

Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SARA GHAZAL
authorized to administer oaths, Sara Tindall Ghazal, who being duly sworn, deposed
1. My name is Sara Tindall Ghazal.
2. I am over the age of 18, and I am a licensed attorney in the state of
Georgia, and a resident and registered voter of Cobb County, Georgia.
3. From February 2018 until December 2019, I served as the voter
protection director for the Democratic Party of Georgia.
4. In 2017, I served as the Cobb County Democratic Party’s representative
on the Cobb Elections Vote Review Panel during the Sixth District Special Election.
5. In 2020, I was a candidate for State House in Georgia.
6. Beginning on midday Wednesday, November 4, through Monday,
November 9, I observed Cobb County officials undertake the intake, signature
verification, separation of ballots from their envelopes, duplication and adjudication
as necessary, and tabulation of absentee and provisional ballots, as a member of the
public.
7. Beginning Friday, November 13, through Monday, November 16, I
observed the audit of the Presidential race in Cobb County on behalf of the
Democratic Party of Georgia at Jim Miller Park, which was used as the main site for
Cobb County election processing, albeit not as a polling precinct.
8. On Wednesday, November 4, and subsequent days, I observed from the
public observation area as Cobb County officials examined incoming absentee
ballots that had arrived on Election Day in Room A of the Jim Miller Park facility.
9. I observed poll workers scan the bar codes with a hand-held bar code
scanner, which subsequently pulled up the individual voter record. Poll workers at
that point compared the voters’ signatures on the back of the absentee ballot
envelope with the signatures that were held on file.
-2-
10. While I could generally see the process of intake and signature
comparison, I was not close enough to the poll workers to be able to evaluate any
signature personally.
11. Monitors of each party who had been accredited in advance by their
political party had access to this room. I observed credentialed monitors from both
the Democratic Party of Georgia and the Georgia Republican Party present in the
facility.
12. I observed that after absentee ballots had been accepted based on the
verification of signatures from the outside of the ballot envelope against the
exemplars that were maintained on file, these ballots were then taken to a machine
in the back of room C that opened the envelopes in a rapid manner.
13. I understand, but did not personally witness, that after the envelopes
were opened, the ballots were separated from the envelopes with signatures in such
a manner as to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot, as is guaranteed under the Georgia
Constitution, Art. II Sec. 1(1)
14. After these ballots were separated, I witnessed poll workers organizing
them according to precinct. This batching process was conducted in room B.
-3-
15. In room C I witnessed multiple boxes that contained the ballot
envelopes with signatures, stacked in the back of the room. I was told by Cobb
County Registrar Beau Gunn that these documents must be retained for two years.
16. I witnessed batches of ballots then run through scanners in room C. In
most batches that were run through the scanners, one or more ballots could not be
read by the scanner. These ballots that could not be scanned were pulled from the
stack of ballots and set aside.
17. I witnessed the ballots that were unable to be scanned by the scanners
were subsequently delivered to tables, also in room C, where teams of two
individuals supervised by a third staff person duplicated the unreadable ballots onto
new, fresh absentee ballots that were not creased and had not been folded.
18. The process by which the rejected ballots were duplicated was as
follows: one staff person read out the voter’s choice while the other staff person
filled in the bubble carefully. The third supervisor would thereafter compare the
original ballot as completed by the voter against the duplicated ballot as completed
by the staff person. These staff people all used black pens to complete the duplicated
ballots.
19. In cases where the voter’s intent was unclear, or where the voter had
changed their mark, both the original unscannable ballot and the duplicated ballot
-4-
were submitted to a vote review panel, make up of representatives of both the county
Democratic and the county Republican Party. On at least one occasion I also
witnessed a representative of the Libertarian party on a vote review panel.
20. I witnessed the conduct of numerous vote review panels over the course
of the five days that I observed the original processing and tabulation of absentee
and provisional ballots. I did not observe a single occasion in which party officials
disagreed about the voter intent.
21. I also witnessed Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting
ACT (UOCAVA) ballots being processed.
22. Based on my knowledge and experience in Georgia election law, I am
aware that Georgia law allows for UOCAVA ballots to be emailed to overseas and
military voters. Voters then use their personal printers to print out their ballot on
normal paper, then complete these ballots by hand.
23. I witnessed UOCAVA ballots that had been printed on a home printer
being duplicated onto the normal absentee ballot forms so that they could be read by
a scanner.
24. I did not witness any actions or behavior that led me to believe that poll
workers were undertaking any activity aside from adhering to normal election
procedures in processing and tabulating absentee ballots.
-5-
25. Beginning the morning of Friday, November 13, through Monday,
November 16, I acted as an accredited monitor for the Democratic Party of Georgia.
26. Based on previous statements from Georgia Secretary of State Brad
Raffensperger and conversations with Cobb County Election Supervisor Janine
Eveler, I had understood that a statewide race other than the Presidential election
would be selected for an audit, as per the requirements of OCGA 21-2-498.
27. I was quite surprised to learn that the race to be selected for an audit
was the Presidential race. Given my understanding of Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs,)
I knew that this meant a huge number of ballots would have to be pulled in order to
ascertain whether the tabulation process had correctly identified the winner of that
race.
28. It is my understanding that based on the extreme challenges of pulling
more than 1,000,000 randomly selected ballots, the exercise of auditing the
Presidential race would instead consist of hand-examining every ballot that was cast
in that race.
29. Because Georgia law does not allow for a hand-recount of ballots
except for the extremely limited circumstances of a court order or a lack of any
functioning scanners, I am not aware of any pre-existing procedures to conduct an
audit (or a hand-recount) of all ballots in Georgia.
-6-
30. In the absence of any written procedures, I witnessed Cobb officials
instructing poll workers who had been brought back in on very short notice to
recount the ballots without providing specific instruction as to how that counting
should be conducted.
31. I heard a poll manager admonish poll workers to keep talking to a
minimum so as not to distract the staff from the task at hand.
32. I witnessed up to 40 teams of individual poll workers hand reviewing
and hand counting both machine-marked and absentee ballots.
33. I witnessed occasional mistakes caused by human error and fatigue,
such as placing a single ballot in the wrong pile or ballots sticking together and being
counted as a single sheet of paper. In every instance of a human error that I
personally witnessed, another poll worker was able to correct this mistake.
34. During the process of the audit, I also witnessed additional vote review
panels re-adjudicating duplicated ballots against the original ballots as completed by
the voter to confirm both that the ballots had been accurately duplicated, and that the
duplicated ballots had been accurately tabulated.
35. I witnessed Cobb officials pulling both the original ballots that had been
rejected by the scanners, as well as the duplicated ballots that had been adjudicated
during the original processing and subsequently tabulated.
-7-
36. The vote review panels first were presented with both the original ballot
and the duplicated ballot, when they confirmed that the serial number that was
provided to each matched, and that the Presidential race was accurately duplicated
from the original to the new ballot.
37. After confirming that each duplicated ballot was matched up to its
corresponding original ballot, each pile was counted to confirm a match.
38. The vote review panel members then separated the ballots according to
the presidential candidate chosen by the voter, and thereafter counted the number of
ballots for each candidate and recorded these numbers on their tally sheet.
39. Several of these panels adjudicated UOCAVA ballots as a part of their
duties. Based on the comments of the panelists that I heard as observing, I believe
that these vote review panel members did not understand how UOCAVA ballots are
transmitted to overseas voters, or why they have to be duplicated onto a ballot paper
that can be read by a scanner.
40. The same procedures were followed over multiple days and multiple
panels.
41. I am aware that several affidavits submitted by the Plaintiff in this case
suggest there was something suspicious or irregular about the fact that certain ballots
appeared “pristine” or “impeccab[ly]” filled in, and that those same ballots lacked
-8-

ATLANTA DIVISION
L. Lin Wood, Jr.,

v. 20-cv-04651-SDG

Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF KOMAL PATEL
authorized to administer oaths, KOMAL PATEL, who being duly sworn, deposed
1. My name is KOMAL PATEL. I am over 18 years of age, a citizen of
the State of Georgia, suffer from no legal disabilities, and am otherwise competent
to testify to the matters contained herein. I have personal knowledge of the facts
here, and if called as a witness, can testify completely thereto.
2. I am a resident of and registered elector in DeKalb County, Georgia.

3. On November 16, 2020, I was present as an observer credentialed by
the Democratic Party of Georgia to observe the statewide hand recount of ballots
cast in the 2020 Presidential Election in Clayton County, Georgia "*'& -$&%)+(*.#.
4. I arrived at the Clayton County Police Department, where the Recount
was held while I observed it, shortly after 8 a.m.
5. On arrival at the Police Department, I had no problems accessing the
room where the Recount was happening.
6. The space was small. But at no point was I concerned about the ability
to view what was happening in any part of the room. While waiting in the roped
off area (for the public, media, and party volunteers who took turns observing the
floor where people were counting), it was easy to see what was happening all
around the room. Any observer could easily see what was happening in any part of
the room merely by moving around a few steps.
7. While monitoring the counting floor , which involved actually
walking around next to the tables with people who were counting , I had access to
view each of the two-person audit teams at the tables. I could hear the auditors
announce and discuss the votes they counted on each ballot. I could also see the
selections voters had made on the ballots that the audit teams were recounting, and
could see into what designated stack a given audit team placed each ballot. Other
credentialed observers had the same access as I did.
8. While I was present, I observed at least five individuals who I
understand were associated with the Trump Campaign and/or Republican Party. I
observed one of these individuals taking pictures and sending them to somebody
on his phone. I observed a Trump-Pence logo on those messages.
9. Additionally, I observed at least three of these individuals causing
disruptions in the Recount room. For example, one of the individuals began
complaining to an election official that the County was not following the rules by
permitting only one monitor per party even though there were 12 tables in the
room. I understand this is the subject of the Affidavit submitted by Ibrahim Reyes.
The individuals I observed were being highly combative and were disruptive.
This resulted in an election official ultimately asking a couple of the individuals to
4*.102'2,-7 leave the Recount room.
10. While I was observing the Recount, in addition to the 5 Republican
observers, there were approximately 6 other credentialed observers present, with
about 4 representing the Democratic Party, and 2 from the Carter Center
(additional non-credentialed observers remained in the public viewing area).

11. Each party, both Republican and Democratic, as well as the Carter
Center, had monitors present and on the floor of the Recount throughout the time I
was present. The monitors for each party, and the Carter Center, alternated on the
floor. The same rules were applied to all credentialed observers.
12. I also observed a group of individuals I understood to be the members
of a vote review panel. I saw at least two of the individuals affiliated with the
Republican Party serve on this panel.
13. I also saw two or three members of the news media and other
members of the public observing the Recount from a designated area.
14. I observed no inaccuracies, improprieties, inconsistencies, or other
problems during the Recount. The audit teams I observed appeared to be counting
correctly. The process ran smoothly, minus the above-mentioned disruptions.
15. Around noon, after approximately 3 hours of observation, I left the
Recount because the County took a break for lunch.
16. I learned from a notice posted by the County in the room where the
morning Recount took place that the Recount was being moved to the Jackson
Elementary School gymnasium in the afternoon of November 16, 2020 (beginning
at 1:30 p.m.). I did not attend the afternoon session of the Recount on November
16, 2020.
2
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JOINT STATEMENT FROM ELECTIONS

INFRASTRUCTURE GOVERNMENT COORDINATING
COUNCIL & THE ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
SECTOR COORDINATING EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES
Original release date: November 12, 2020
WASHINGTON The members of Election Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council GCC

Executive Committee Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency CISA Assistant Director
Bob Kolasky, U.S. Election Assistance Commission Chair Benjamin Hovland, National Association of
Secretaries of State NASS President Maggie Toulouse Oliver, National Association of State Election
Directors NASED President Lori Augino, and Escambia County Florida Supervisor of Elections
David Sta ord and the members of the Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Council SCC
Chair Brian Hancock Unisyn Voting Solutions , Vice Chair Sam Derheimer Hart InterCivic , Chris
Wlaschin Election Systems & So ware , Ericka Haas Electronic Registration Information Center ,
and Maria Bianchi Democracy Works released the following statement:
“The November 3rd election was the most secure in American history. Right now, across the country,
election o icials are reviewing and double checking the entire election process prior to finalizing the
result.
“When states have close elections, many will recount ballots. All of the states with close results in the
2020 presidential race have paper records of each vote, allowing the ability to go back and count
each ballot if necessary. This is an added benefit for security and resilience. This process allows for
the identification and correction of any mistakes or errors. There is no evidence that any voting
system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.
“Other security measures like pre election testing, state certification of voting equipment, and the
U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s EAC certification of voting equipment help to build
additional confidence in the voting systems used in 2020.
“While we know there are many unfounded claims and opportunities for misinformation about the
process of our elections, we can assure you we have the utmost confidence in the security and
TLP:WHITE
integrity of our elections, and you should too. When you have questions, turn to elections o icials as
trusted voices as they administer elections.” TLP:WHITE
Topics: Election Security
Keywords: CISA, Election security
Last Published Date: November 12, 2020
TLP:WHITE
HOME CORPORATIONS ELECTIONS LICENSING SECURITIES CHARITIES
O E INFO. E L & A CANDIDA E INFO. CO N & AGENC
HI O IC FI A E IDE A DI OF A E BALLO HOLD

E L OF E IDEN IAL ACE
(ATLANTA)-Toda , Secre ar of S a e Brad Raffensperger anno nced he res l s of he Risk Limi ing
A di of Georgia s presiden ial con es , hich pheld and reaf rmed he original o come prod ced b Ke Elec ion Da es and Mili ar and O erseas
Informa ion Vo ing
he machine all of o es cas . D e o he igh margin of he race and he principles of risk-limi ing
a di s, his a di as a f ll man al all of all o es cas . The a di con rmed ha he original machine
co n acc ra el por ra ed he inner of he elec ion. The res l s of he a di can be Regis er o Vo e Where do I o e? (MVP)
ie ed HERE , HERE , and HERE .
Georgia s his oric rs s a e ide a di reaf rmed ha he s a e s ne sec re paper ballo o ing
s s em acc ra el co n ed and repor ed res l s, said Secre ar Raffensperger. This is a credi o he ICK LINK
hard ork of o r co n and local elec ions of cials ho mo ed q ickl o nder ake and comple e s ch
a momen o s ask in a shor period of ime. 2020 General Reco n Risk Limi ing A di P blic
Info b Co n No ice
Georgia s rs s a e ide a di s ccessf ll con rmed he inner of he chosen con es and sho ld gi e
2020 Presiden ial GA Vo er ID Info.
o ers increased con dence in he res l s, said Ben Adida, E ec i e Direc or of Vo ingWorks. We
Elec ors
ere pro d o ork i h Georgia on his his oric a di . The difference be een he repor ed res l s
and he f ll man al all is ell i hin he e pec ed error ra e of hand-co n ing ballo s, and he a di S a e Elec ion Board Sec re The Vo e
as a s ccess.
Elec ions Ad isor 2019 Of cial Direc or
B la , Georgia as req ired o cond c a Risk Limi ing A di of a s a e ide race follo ing he Co ncil
No ember elec ions. Unders anding he impor ance of clear and reliable res l s for s ch an impor an
Vo e Safe SAFE Commission
con es , Secre ar Raffensperger selec ed he presiden ial race in Georgia for he a di . Mee ing he
con dence hreshold req ired b la for he a di mean cond c ing a f ll man al all of e er ballo Vo er Regis ra ion Dri e S op Vo er Fra d
cas in Georgia.
Ree amina ion Cos s Online Complain s
The Risk Limi ing A di reaf rmed he o come of he presiden ial race in Georgia as originall
Informa ion for Vo er Proposed Cons i ional
repor ed, i h Joe Biden leading Presiden Donald Tr mp in he s a e.
Regis ra ions Pending Amendmen s
The a di process also led o co n ies ca ching making mis akes he made in heir original co n b no D e o Ci i enship
ploading all memor cards. Those co n ies ploaded he memor cards and re-cer i ed heir res l s,
In en o Tab la e Earl Grea Seal
leading o increased acc rac in he res l s he s a e ill cer if .
SD 4 Q ali ed iVo e - S den s / Ed ca ors
The differen ial of he a di res l s from he original machine co n ed res l s is ell i hin he Candida es
e pec ed margin of h man error ha occ rs hen hand-co n ing ballo s. A 2012 s d b Rice
Uni ersi and Clemson Uni ersi fo nd ha hand co n ing of o es in pos elec ion a di or reco n Ad ance Vo ing Info. Check Yo r Pro isional
proced res can res l in error ra es of p o 2 percen . In Georgia s reco n , he highes error ra e in Ballo S a s for No ember
an co n reco n as .73%. Mos co n ies fo nd no change in heir nall all . The majori of he 6, 2018 Elec ion
remaining co n ies had changes of fe er han en ballo s. 2019 Lis Main enance FAQs
Beca se he margin is s ill less han 0.5%, he Presiden can req es a reco n af er cer i ca ion of he
res l s. Tha reco n ill be cond c ed b rescanning all paper ballo s. LA E ELEC ION NE
Click here for he Risk Limi ing A di Repor Secre ar Raffensperger La nches In es iga ion of
Florida A orne Looking o Fra d len l Regis er and
###
Vo e in Georgia s R noff Elec ion
Th rsda , December 03rd 2020
Secre ar Raffensperger La nches In es iga ion In o

Gro ps Enco raging Fra d len Regis ra ions
Wednesda , December 02nd 2020
Secre ar Raffensperger and Spalding Legisla i e

Delega ion Call for Resigna ion of Spalding Co n
Elec ions Direc or Follo ing Serio s Managemen Iss es
T esda , December 01s 2020
His oric Firs S a e ide A di of Paper Ballo s Upholds

Res l of Presiden ial Race
Th rsda , No ember 19 h 2020
N mber of Absen ee Ballo s Rejec ed for Signa re

Iss es in he 2020 Elec ion Increased 350% from 2018
Wednesda , No ember 18 h 2020
OFFICE OF BRAD RAFFENSPERGER CON AC
NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS 214 S a e Capi ol
A lan a, Georgia 30334

PRESS & MEDIA KIT 404.656.2881
E-Mail
PRIVACY POLICY
2018 Georgia Secre ar of S a e
Risk-Limiting Audit Report
Audit Outcome
The audit confirmed the original result of the election,
Hand-Count Variations
0.1053% (0.001053) variation 0.0099%

(0.000099) variation
2,462,857
2,475,141
62,587
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EXHIBIT 1
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FROM: Chris Harvey, State Elections Director
RE: Absentee Ballot Signature Review Guidance
County registrars and absentee ballot clerks are required, upon

receipt of each mail-in absentee ballot, to compare the signature or
mark of the elector on the mail-in absentee ballot envelope with the
signatures or marks in eNet and on the application for the mail-in
absentee ballot. If the signature does not appear to be valid, registrars
and clerks are required to follow the procedure set forth in O.C.G.A. §
21-2-386(a)(1)(C).
Page 1 of 3
34-1 Filed 12/05/20
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When reviewing an elector’s signature on the mail-in absentee ballot
envelope, the registrar or clerk must compare the signature on the
mail-in absentee ballot envelope to each signature contained in such
elector’s voter registration record in eNet and the elector’s signature
on the application for the mail-in absentee ballot.1 If the registrar or
absentee ballot clerk determines that the voter’s signature on the mail-
in absentee ballot envelope does not match any of the voter’s
signatures on file in eNet or on the absentee ballot application, the
registrar or absentee ballot clerk must seek review from two other
registrars, deputy registrars, or absentee ballot clerks.
A mail-in absentee ballot shall not be rejected unless a majority of the

registrars, deputy registrars, or absentee ballot clerks reviewing the
signature agree that the signature does not match any of the voter’s
signatures on file in eNet or on the absentee ballot application. If a
determination is made that the elector’s signature on the mail-in
absentee ballot envelope does not match any of the voter’s signatures
on file in eNet or on the absentee ballot application, the registrar or
absentee ballot clerk shall write the names of the three elections
officials who conducted the signature review across the face of the
absentee ballot envelope, which shall be in addition to writing
“Rejected” and the reason for the rejection as required under OCGA
21-2-386(a)(1)(C). Then, the registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall
commence the notification procedure set forth in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-
386(a)(1)(C) and State Election Board Rule 183-1-14-.13.
1
Once the registrar or clerk verifies a matching signature, they do not need to continue to review additional
signatures for the same voter.
Page 2 of 3
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EXHIBIT
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RE: Audit Instructions
1. Start and Completion Times
2. Public Access and Political Party Monitors
Page 1 of 3
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3. Audit Teams
4. Vote Review Panels
5. Re-Certifying if Vote Counts Change
Page 3 of 3
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RE: Allowing More Credentialed Monitors at Risk Limiting Audit

Allowing Libertarian Party Monitors
There has been some concern about the appropriate number of political party monitors eligible
to view the audit process. The rules that the Secretary of State’s office put out require that
Superintendents allow a minimum of two political party monitors from each party, with
additional monitors if there are more than twenty audit teams. For example, if DeKalb has 75
audit teams, they would have to allow a minimum of 8 designated monitors for each party.
Additionally, as the Libertarian Party (technically a political body) has a candidate on the ballot
for President, the same standards should be applied to the designated monitors from the
Libertarian Party.
As an addendum to the rules on political parties monitors and because transparency should be
a guiding principle throughout this process, if Election Superintendents can safely allow more
than the minimum number of designated political party monitors consistent with maintaining
an orderly process, space limitations, social distancing/public health guidelines then you should.
Please allow as much transparency as you can while maintaining a secure, orderly process and
abiding your public health regulations.
Page 1 of 1
Case
C ase 1:20-cv-04809-TCB
1:18-cv-05391-S C J Document
Document 61-5 Filed 12/27/19
188 Filed 12/05/20 PPage
age 12 of
of 32
33

ATLANTA DIVISION
FAIR FIGHT ACTION, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
1:18-CV-5391-SCJ
v.
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction concerning the State of Georgia’s recent voter list maintenance
activities in which the status of a large number of Georgia voters on the State’s
inactive elector list was changed to cancelled status. Doc. No. [159].1
The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs use the words “removed” and “purged”
throughout their arguments. However, Defendants have presented evidence and
assert that the use of these words to describe the present circumstances is not correct,
because no voter is ever removed from the voter rolls. In the process of voter list
maintenance (which is permitted under applicable federal law, specifically the
National Voter Registration Act, “NVRA,” 52 U.S.C. § 20501, et al.), the affected voter’s
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According to a press release from the Secretary of State’s Office, the list
was comprised of 313,243 inactive voters.2 Of these 313,243, there were 108,306,
who had filed a change of address request with the United States Postal Service
showing they have moved to a different county or state and 84,376, who had
election mail returned as undeliverable, totaling 192,682. For purposes of the
pending motion, Plaintiffs are not contesting the cancellation of the
registrations of these 192,682 voters. It is the remaining 120,561 voters (defined
as having had no contact with their county election officials since
January 1, 2012 and did not respond to two notices), which are at issue.
Subsequent to the filing of Plaintiffs’ motion, the Secretary of State returned
22,000 of the 120,561 voters to the voting roll (after review of Plaintiffs’ briefing
status is changed from inactive to cancelled, which means that the voter is no longer
eligible to vote. Doc. No. [172], p. 10, n.6 (citing Harvey Dec. ¶ 5). Notwithstanding
Defendants’ argument, the Court recognizes that the applicable Georgia statute
utilizes the word “removed.” See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-235(b) (“the elector shall be removed
from the inactive list of electors.”) (emphasis added).
https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/georgia_secretary_of_states_office_cleans
_voter_file_by_4_as_required_by_law (last visited Dec. 23, 2019); see also Defs.
Hearing Ex. 1 (Dec. 19, 2019).
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and based upon the definition of a calendar year). Thus, it is now
approximately 98,000 voters that are at issue.3
I. BACKGROUND4
In 2018, Plaintiffs Fair Fight Action, Inc. (“Fair Fight Action”), Care in
Action, Inc. (“Care in Action”), Ebenezer Baptist Church of Atlanta, Georgia,
Inc. (“Ebenezer”), Baconton Missionary Baptist Church, Inc. (“Baconton”),
Virginia-Highland Church, Inc. (“Virginia-Highland”), and The Sixth
Episcopal District, Inc. (“Sixth Episcopal District”) (collectively, the
“Plaintiffs”) sued Defendants Brad Raffensperger (in his official capacity as
Secretary of State of the State of Georgia and as Chair of the State Election Board
of Georgia), Members of the State Election Board in their official capacities
(Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley, and Seth Harp), and the State Election
At the December 16, 2019 hearing, Defense Counsel indicated that there were about
50,000 of these individuals who would have been canceled under Plaintiffs’
interpretation of the law. However, Plaintiffs state that this number is incorrect and
was probably based on the misunderstanding as to the calendar year for purposes of
counting inactivity. Plaintiffs expert also explained that other corrections were also
made by the Secretary of State based on a data transfer issue. See Dec. 19, 2019
Hearing Transcript at 27:7–10.
All citations are to the electronic docket unless otherwise noted, and all page
numbers are those imprinted by the Court’s docketing software.
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Board (collectively, the “Defendants”), alleging that there are “serious and
unconstitutional flaws in Georgia’s elections process” and that Defendants’
actions have “deprived Georgia citizens . . . particularly citizens of color, of
their fundamental right to vote.” Doc. No. [41], ¶ 2. More specifically, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants enforced unconstitutional and otherwise unlawful
legislation, such as O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234, which Plaintiffs refer to as “Use it or
Lose it” and Defendants characterize as voter list maintenance.5
At the time of the filing of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, Georgia’s statutory voter
list maintenance authority was found in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-234 and 235 and
required the Secretary of State to send a postcard to voters with whom there
had been “no contact” for three calendar years. If the voter failed to return the
postcard, the voter’s status was changed to “inactive.” If the voter still did not
vote in the next two general elections, he or she was removed from the
registration rolls (or as Defendants’ assert, the registration status was changed
to cancelled).
Plaintiffs also refer to the statute as “voter list purge,” which as stated above,
Defendants have presented evidence showing that this is an inaccurate description.
See n.1, supra.
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During the 2019 Legislative Session, the Georgia General Assembly
passed House Bill 316 (“HB 316”). HB 316, which was signed into law by the
Governor on April 2, 2019, amends the Georgia Election Code to, among other
things, provide for more notice under Georgia’s voter-list-maintenance
process. HB 316 amended O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234 to mandate that the Secretary of
State cannot remove voters from registrations rolls unless there has been “no
contact” with them for five calendar years—as opposed to the previous three
calendar years. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234(a)(2). HB 316 also amended O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-234 to require notice to the voter not less than thirty days but no more
than sixty days prior to the cancellation of the voter’s registration. Id. § 235(b).
The approximately 98,000 voters presently at issue are the voters who
were placed on the inactive list (for no contact) under the prior statutory
provision of three years “no contact” and prior to the enactment of HB 316’s
five year “no contact” provisions. Defendants do not see HB 316 as retroactive
or “backward” looking and have subjected the voters at issue to voter
registration cancellation, even though they had less than five calendar years of
no contact prior to being placed on the inactive elector list. Doc. No. [159-2],
p. 11.
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In Count IV of their Complaint, as amended, Plaintiffs allege that
Georgia’s voter-list-maintenance process violates Georgia voters’ rights to
procedural Due Process under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. Doc. No. [41], ¶¶ 69–81, 205. The Complaint further
states: “[t]he “use it or lose it” statute, as well as its enforcement by Defendants,
unlawfully disenfranchise voters or severely burden their right to vote by
penalizing voters based on their voting choices, providing voters inadequate
notice, and failing to ameliorate the [registration cancellations] by offering
same-day registration.” Id. ¶ 77.
On December 16, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in which they seek
to enjoin Defendants from canceling the voter registrations of 98,561 “inactive”
voters. Doc. No. [159].6 The Court held a hearing on the same date. During this
hearing, Defense Counsel indicated that the “nuclear silo start process” began
Plaintiffs indicated at the hearing that a supplemental pleading was unnecessary to

address the recent circumstances presented in their motion. However, the Court finds
that because the events at issue happened after the filing of the complaint, the better
practice is to supplement the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (“On motion and
reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental
pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date
of the pleading to be supplemented.”).
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on September 24, 2019 and the system completes the program on
December 16, 2019, without anyone taking an action to “push the button,” to
complete the process. Counsel also indicated that undoing the coding to stop
the process, was challenging because there were other categories of cancellation
in the program (besides the active voter cancellation). Counsel further
indicated that if the already-running automated list maintenance process were
stopped, the process becomes manual, which introduces the possibility for
human error. Counsel also indicated that the State of Georgia was already
within the ninety-day federal statutory timeline in which it could perform list
maintenance and stopping the process would render the State of Georgia not
being able to perform list maintenance again until the year 2021. Counsel
further indicated that it is easier to reinstate the voters rather than stop the
ongoing automated process, because the voter registrations could be restored
in an overnight, twenty-four to forty-eight-hour process.
The Court declined to grant an emergency restraining order, finding the
absence of imminent irreparable injury, based in large part on Defense
Counsel’s representation as to the ease of ability to restore the registrations of
the voters at issue within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Doc. No. [164].
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The parties thereafter briefed the preliminary injunction portion of the
motion (Doc. Nos. [172] and [177]) and the Court held a second hearing on
December 19, 2019. Doc. No. [180]. As stated above, in the interim time period
between the emergency December 16, 2019 hearing and the December 19, 2019
preliminary injunction hearing, Defendants returned approximately 22,000
Georgia voters to the voter roll by changing their status from cancelled to
inactive status. During the December 19, 2019 hearing, the parties presented
testimony (from expert witness, Dr. Michael McDonald and Georgia Elections
Director, Chris Harvey) and exhibits. Doc. Nos. [180], [181].
Post-hearing, the Court posed two additional questions to the parties,
concerning the asserted injury and state interests.7 The parties submitted their
responses on December 23, 2019. Doc. Nos. [184], [185].
The Court’s exact questions are as follows:

The Court notes the parties’ different statutory interpretations
of HB 316.
Pursuant to Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 779 (1983), the

Court must consider “the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendment that the plaintiff[s] seek[] to vindicate.”
Id. at 789. The Court asks Plaintiffs to address the following
question: What is the precise injury that will be suffered by the
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This matter is now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court considers four factors when deciding whether to issue a
preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65:
(1) whether there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the
complaint; 8 (2) whether the preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent
approximately 120,000 people at issue here if this preliminary

injunction is denied?
Additionally, pursuant to Anderson, the State must put forward

“precise interests” as “justifications for the burden imposed by
its rule.” Id. at 789. “[T]he Court must not only determine the
legitimacy and strength of those interests, it must also consider
the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden
the plaintiff’s rights.” Id. The Court asks Defendants to address
the following question: Notwithstanding its Eleventh
Amendment argument, what interest does the State have in
applying its interpretation of H.B. 316 to the approximately
120,000 people at issue here?
It appears to the Court that Plaintiffs are arguing the likelihood of success on the
merits of their motion for preliminary injunction; however, the Court’s review of
applicable authority indicates that the standard involves likelihood of success on the
merits of the complaint See Forsyth Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 633 F.3d
1032, 1042 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[t]he County failed to establish a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of its complaint.”); Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306,
1310 (11th Cir. 2013) (indicating that the petitioner had to establish “a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of his complaint.”); Indigo Room, Inc. v. City of
Fort Myers, 710 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that the district court did not
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irreparable injury; (3) whether the threatened injury outweighs the harm that
the preliminary injunction would cause to the non-movant; and (4) whether the
preliminary injunction would be adverse to the public interest.9 Parker v. State
Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034–35 (11th Cir. 2001). Injunctive
relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy and should not be granted unless
the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to each of these four
factors. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F. 3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000).10 In addition, “[a]t
the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and
hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent
injunction, if the evidence is ‘appropriate given the character and objectives of
abuse its discretion in denying injunction motion because it properly concluded that
movants failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of two counts
of their complaint); and Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2009) (noting that the district court ruled that the organizations and voters had
proved a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their complaint).
Factors three and four also involve consideration of whether the movant has shown
reasonable diligence. See Benisek v. Lamone, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1944, 201 L.
Ed. 2d 398 (2018) (“a party requesting a preliminary injunction must generally show
reasonable diligence.”).
However, if a movant is unable to show a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits, the court need not consider the other preliminary injunction requirements. See
Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011).
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the injunctive proceeding.’” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51
F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995). The decision to grant preliminary injunctive relief
is within the broad discretion of the district court. Majd–Pour v. Georgiana
Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1984).
III. ANALYSIS
The crux of Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion involves the
question of what should happen to the approximately 98,000 voters that were
placed on the State of Georgia’s inactive list (for no contact) prior to the
enactment of HB 316. Plaintiffs assert that a constitutional question is
presented by the circumstances and this Court should apply the Supreme
Court’s Anderson-Burdick balancing test (involving consideration of the
asserted injury and the state’s interest) to evaluate whether the voting
restriction at issue violates Due Process or the First Amendment. Plaintiffs also
assert that the State of Georgia has no interest in removing voters from the rolls
in violation of its own laws. Doc. No. [176], p. 2. In contrast, Defendants assert
the Eleventh Amendment and the Pullman Doctrine inter alia to challenge the
propriety of Plaintiffs’ motion. As the Defendants’ arguments are

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jurisdictionally based, the Court will consider those arguments first. 11 The
Court will thereafter consider Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim.
A. Eleventh Amendment
In opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
motion and legal theory are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because
Plaintiffs are essentially asking this Court to adjudicate state law for the first
time (and otherwise address state-law claims in federal court). Doc. No. [172],
pp. 2, 8, 16. More specifically, Defendants’ argument recognizes that Plaintiffs
and Defendants have different interpretations of the effect of HB 316 on the
approximately 98,000 voters at issue. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
requested injunctive relief requires this Court to endorse Plaintiffs’
interpretation of state law, which is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and
State sovereign immunity. Id. at p. 16. Defendants assert that the reality of
“Because the Eleventh Amendment represents a constitutional limitation on the

federal judicial power established in Article III, federal courts lack jurisdiction to
entertain claims that are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” McClendon v. Ga.
Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (“the Eleventh Amendment defense . . .
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar”) and Duke v. James, 713 F.2d 1506, 1510
(11th Cir. 1983) (discussing the Pullman abstention (from the exercise of federal
jurisdiction) doctrine).
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Plaintiffs’ motion is that “it is a declaratory judgment claim regarding
compliance with HB 316 masquerading as a constitutional argument.” Id. at p.
17. Defendants further argue that “Plaintiffs cannot succeed in suggesting their
relief is based in federal law when it requires this Court to determine a novel
issue of state law.” Id. at p. 18.
In opposition, Plaintiffs state that their claims arise from the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, not state law—and
that their arguments do not require the Court to analyze novel issues of state
law. Doc. No. [177], p. 3.
The Eleventh Amendment states in relevant part: “[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court
has held that “a suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes
the Eleventh Amendment.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 117 (1984). 12 The Court also indicated that when injunctive relief is
“The Supreme Court [in Pennhurst] has explained that the rationale for the
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sought, “an error of law by state officers acting in their official capacities will
not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the State where the relief
effectively is against it.” Id. at 113 (citations omitted). The Court further stated:
“it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a
federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state
law.” Id. at 106.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the Pennhurst
decision on numerous occasions. In their briefing, Plaintiffs primarily rely upon
the Eleventh Circuit’s 1989 decision in Brown v. Georgia Department of
Revenue, 881 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989). In Brown, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennhurst does not apply when a
plaintiff alleges a violation of the federal Constitution. Id. at 1023. The Eleventh
Circuit stated that under Pennhurst, “the determinative question is not the
relief ordered, but whether the relief was ordered pursuant to state or federal
[exception to the Eleventh Amendment that allows state officials to be sued for
prospective relief, i.e., Ex parte Young doctrine] ‘rests on the need to promote the
vindication of federal rights,’ but in a case alleging that a state official has violated
state law, this federal interest ‘disappears.’” Ala. v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278,
1290 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
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law.” Id. In the case sub judice, no relief has been ordered, so the Court cannot
necessarily answer this determinative question.13
Additional Eleventh Circuit authority indicates that when the gravamen
of the complaint appears to be that the State improperly interpreted and failed
to adhere to a state statute, there is a Pennhurst problem—as despite references
to the United States Constitution in the pleadings, the claims necessarily rely
on a determination that a state official has not complied with state law, 14 a
determination that is barred by sovereign immunity. See S&M Brands, Inc. v.
Georgia ex rel. Carr, 925 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019) and DeKalb Cty. Sch.
Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680, 688 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Hand v. Scott, 888
F.3d 1206, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that “the district court cannot
Phrased a different way, in Pennhurst, the Supreme Court indicated that “the
general criterion for determining when a suit is in fact against the sovereign is the
effect of the relief sought.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added). In the case
sub judice, the Court finds that the effect of the relief sought by Plaintiffs is a
determination by this Court that Defendants have not complied with state law.
For example, Plaintiffs use the phrase “violation of state law” at numerous times in
their briefing and hearing exhibit/PowerPoint. See e.g., Doc. Nos. [159-1], p. 23; [176],
pp. 2, 7 n.1.
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enjoin [a state] to follow the district court’s interpretation of [the state’s] own
constitution.”).15
While the Court recognizes Plaintiffs’ arguments and citation of
authority to the contrary, as well as its ability to review state statutes,16 the
gravamen of the Plaintiffs’ pending motion appears to be that the Secretary of
State (and therefore the State of Georgia) has improperly interpreted and failed
to adhere to Georgia’s new voter list maintenance statute (HB 316).17 This is
evidenced by the motion’s numerous references to violation of state law and
the fact that Plaintiffs are not seeking an injunction as to the entirety of the
This Court’s independent research only found one case to the contrary, Duncan v.
Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981); however, the applicability and precedential
weight of that case is doubtful, considering that it was decided pre-Pennhurst and
involved a substantive due process claim, as opposed to the procedural due process
claim at issue here.
As stated by Judge Gerald Tjoflat, the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution “allows federal courts to review state statutes, but federal courts are
limited to refusing to apply the provisions they find unconstitutional.” Democratic
Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1348 (11th Cir. 2019) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
Here, the Court is not being asked to find a statute unconstitutional. Plaintiffs are
asking the Court to find a state official’s interpretation of a statute unconstitutional.
More specifically, the case of Democratic Executive Committee v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312
(11th Cir. 2019) cited by Plaintiffs is distinguishable in that the arguments in that case
did not center upon a violation of state law.
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approximately 300,000 voter registrations that were subject to cancellation.
Accordingly, in light of the above-stated authority, the Eleventh Amendment
bars Plaintiffs’ motion to the extent that it requires a conclusion by this Court
that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of HB 316 is correct.18
B. Pullman Doctrine
While the Court considers the Eleventh Amendment analysis
determinative, in the interest of caution, the Court will consider Defendants’
Pullman abstention doctrine argument. Defendants assert the Pullman
abstention doctrine, on the ground that “Plaintiffs’ Motion is predicated upon
only one discrete subset of list-maintenance activities that has not been
adjudicated by state courts [and further argue that] this Court should refrain
from adopting Plaintiffs’ arguments on an unsettled issue of state law.” Doc.
No. [172], p. 20.
“Under the Pullman abstention doctrine, a federal court will defer to
‘state court resolution of underlying issues of state law,’” before a substantial
The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs also present an alternative argument in the
event that the Court declines to engage in statutory interpretation or otherwise finds
that HB 316 is ambiguous as to the voters at issue. To this regard, the Court will
continue with its analysis and consider the constitutional question, infra.
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federal constitutional question can be decided. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1174; see also
Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In considering
abstention, the court “must take into account the nature of the controversy and
the importance of the right allegedly impaired.” Id. In light of said
consideration, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “voting rights cases are
particularly inappropriate for abstention.” Id. In lieu of abstention, the
Eleventh Circuit has indicated that “the preferable way to obtain state court
resolution of those state law issues is through the certification process
established by” the state supreme court. Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1288
(11th Cir. 2001); cf. Roe v. State of Ala., 43 F.3d 574, 582 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We
agree that federal courts should refrain from holding a state election law
unconstitutional when a reasonable alternative course of action exists. We are,
therefore, reluctant to reach a final decision in this case while the proper
application of the [State] Election Code remains muddled. There are two ways
to show deference to the state decisionmakers in this matter: we can leave the
plaintiffs to their state remedies; or we can certify a question to the Supreme
Court of [the state], retain jurisdiction, and await that court’s answer.”)
(citations omitted). In light of this authority, the Court finds that it would not
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be appropriate to apply the Pullman abstention doctrine to this voting rights
case. Nevertheless, the Court still does not proceed to interpreting the statute,
because from this Court’s brief review, the answer as to how HB 316 applies to
the voters who were already on the State of Georgia’s inactive elector list (prior
to enactment of HB 316) is not clear cut and both Plaintiffs and Defendants have
offered reasonable interpretations for how HB 316 affects the voters at issue.
Cf. Duncan, 657 F.2d at 699 (providing an overview of authority concerning
clear and vague statutes in the context of the Pullman abstention doctrine). In
essence, HB 316 is open to interpretation and could reasonably be interpreted
as either party contends. In addition, an interpretation of HB 316 by this Court
at this stage of the case creates a possibility for conflicting interpretations in the
event that a state court later decides the issue—there would be an interpretation
by the federal court and an interpretation by the state court. Cf. Pennhurst, 465
U.S. at 122 n.32 (“when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court’s construction often is uncertain and ephemeral”).
As stated above, the preferable way to obtain resolution of the state law
issue is through the certification process by the state supreme court. However,
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neither party has asked to certify a question to the Georgia Supreme Court.19
Plaintiffs also have an additional remedy in the form of seeking a mandamus
in the state courts. Nevertheless, as stated above, the Court considers the
Eleventh Amendment analysis, supra, determinative to the extent that the
issues involve proper interpretation (and violation) of state law.20
The Court recognizes that it may sua sponte certify a question the Georgia Supreme
Court; however, as indicated at the December 19, 2019 hearing, the Court is concerned
as to timing in that the date that the Georgia Supreme Court will return an answer is
unknown and Plaintiffs have continuously expressed a desire to resolve this case in
March of 2020.
The interplay between the Pennhurst/Eleventh Amendment ruling and the
Pullman abstention doctrine has been described as follows.
The configuration of the Pennhurst litigation was identical
to the litigation in Pullman. Both cases involved lawsuits
filed in federal court, which raised both state claims and
federal constitutional claims against state officials, but
which could have been resolved on the state law claims
alone. The Supreme Court, however, did not consider
Pullman abstention as a potential resolution of the
Pennhurst litigation. Instead, the Court replaced the
methodology of a discretionary stay envisioned in
Pullman with a rule of mandatory dismissal. As a result,
the role of Pullman abstention in allocating
decisionmaking responsibility in suits against state
officials was transmuted substantially without a word of
explanation by the Court.
Keith Werhan, Pullman Abstention After Pennhurst: A Comment on Judicial
Federalism, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 449, 454 (1986).
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C. Constitutional Claim
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs’ motion does not seek a ruling by the
Court regarding the correct statutory interpretation of HB 316 and whether the
three-year or five-year “no contact” provision applies to the approximately
98,000 voters at issue, the Court proceeds with the following constitutional
analysis of HB 316 and, in particular, the “no contact” scheme therein.
The Supreme Court “has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens
in the jurisdiction.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). This equal right
to vote, however, “is not absolute; the States have the power to impose voter
qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other ways.” Id.;
see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (“It does not follow,
however, that the right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for
political purposes through the ballot are absolute.”).
“The Supreme Court has rejected a litmus-paper test for constitutional
challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election laws and instead has
applied a flexible standard.” Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340,
1351 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, a

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reviewing court must first “consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789
(1983). A court must then “identify and evaluate the interests put forward by
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” Id. “Only after
weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether
the challenged provision is unconstitutional.” Id.; see also Burdick, 504 U.S.
at 434. If a State’s election law imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions” upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, “the
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the
restrictions. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). But if a
State’s election law imposes a “severe” burden, it must be “narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Id. (citing Norman v. Reed,
502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). In other words, “lesser burdens . . . trigger less
exacting review.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358
(1997).
Accordingly, the Court begins by evaluating the burden of this “no
contact” scheme on Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

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33
“Ordinary and widespread burdens, such as those requiring nominal effort of
everyone, are not severe.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,
205 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quotation omitted). However, burdens “are
severe if they go beyond the merely inconvenient.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that the
burden imposed on voters by the “no contact” scheme is “severe” and that,
should their motion for preliminary injunction be denied, the “precise injury”
the approximately 98,000 voters at issue will suffer is “complete
disenfranchisement.” See generally Doc. Nos. [159-1]; [184]. Plaintiffs contend
that removing voters solely due to inactivity—without any other evidence that
said voters have moved—raises a substantial risk that individuals will be
erroneously deprived of their constitutional right to vote. See Doc. No. [169-1],
p. 19. They specifically cite to a 2018 Election Assistance Commission Report,
in which statistics show that the State of Georgia mailed 478,295 voter
confirmation notices in advance of the 2018 election to individuals it suspected
of having moved. See Doc. No. [184-2]. Of those confirmation notices, more
than 75% of the notices were neither responded to nor returned as

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33
undeliverable, suggesting that a substantial number of the notices were never
read. Id.
Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that once a voter is removed from the voter
roll under the “no contact” scheme, the likelihood of complete
disenfranchisement is high for two reasons. See Doc. No. [184], pp. 3–5. First,
the State of Georgia does not notify individuals that their voter registration has
been cancelled. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the first moment that many voters
learn that they have been removed from the voter rolls is when they arrive at
the polls on Election Day. Because the State of Georgia does not offer same-day
registration, said individuals are therefore ineligible to vote. Second, for the
individuals who have learned that they have been removed from the voter
rolls, there is only a narrow window of time for said individuals to re-register
before the next election, as Georgia law requires voters to register weeks before
any election. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-224.
Plaintiffs also point to Mr. Harvey’s testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing,
in which he acknowledged that “[t]here are a lot of people that don’t check their mail”
and that, upon receiving confirmation notices, voters may think it’s a “mailer,” “an
advertisement,” or “marketing things that look like . . . official documents.” See
Dec. 19, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 79:1–79:18.
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33
Defendants, in response, argue that Plaintiffs have provided no evidence
of any burden that the “no contact” scheme imposes on the right to vote, let
alone a “severe” burden. See generally Doc. Nos. [172]; [185]. In support of this
contention, Defendants rely on the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Billups. Therein,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a state law requiring voters
to produce photo identification prior to casting a ballot. See 554 F.3d at 1355.
Employing the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, the Eleventh Circuit found
that the plaintiffs “failed to prove that any individual would bear a significant
burden” because they could not “identify a single individual who would be
unable to vote because of the Georgia statute or would face an undue burden
to obtain a free voter identification card.” Id. at 1354. Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit found that “the burden on Georgia voters is ‘slight’” and, thus, that the
state interest need not be “compelling.” Id. (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439).
Defendants argue that, like the plaintiffs in Billups, Plaintiffs have failed
to prove that any individual would bear a significant or “severe” burden due
to the “no contact” scheme. Namely, in support of their motion, Plaintiffs
include eight declarations from Georgia voters. See Doc. Nos. [159-3]; [159-4];
[159-5]; [159-6]; [159-7]; [159-8]; [159-9]; [159-12]. Plaintiffs initially stated that
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33
all eight of these voters were due to be removed from the voter rolls under the
“no contact” scheme despite that fact that none of these voters had ever moved.
Doc. No. [159-1], p. 15. In response, however, Defendants contend that four of
the voters (Linda Bradshaw, Keme Hawkins, Tommie Jordan, and Deepak
Eidnani) remain on the official list of voters as “active” voters. See Doc. No.
[172], pp. 13–14. Thus, these four voters are eligible and able to vote.
Moreover, Defendants contend that the other four voters (Clifford
Thomas, David Hopkins, Charlesetta Young, and Kilton Smith) were removed
from the voter rolls after failing to respond to the two confirmation notices sent
pursuant to the “no contact’ scheme under HB 316. At this time, there is no
evidence that any of these four voters were burdened or precluded from
returning the two confirmation notices, which are prepaid and preaddressed.
The Court notes that these four voters dispute that they ever actually received
confirmation notices. However, Defendants contend that Secretary of State records
show that confirmation notices were in fact sent to these four voters. See Doc. No.
[172-1]. “The common law has long recognized a rebuttable presumption than an item
properly mailed was received by the addressee.” Chung v. JPMorgan Case Bank, N.A.,
975 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (quoting In re Farris, 365 F. App’x 198, 199
(11th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that these four voters never actually
received confirmation notices “is insufficient to rebut the presumption.” In re Farris,
365 F. App’x at 200 (“The mere denial of receipt, without more, is insufficient to rebut
the presumption.”).
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33
Additionally, there is no evidence at this time that any of the four voters are
precluded or burdened by registering to vote again. In fact, at the preliminary
injunction hearing, Mr. Harvey testified that re-registering to vote after being
removed from the voter rolls for “no contact” is no different from registering
to vote in the first instance. See Dec. 19, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 47:23–48:4.
A voter can re-register to vote by going online to use the Online Voter
Registration system or renewing one’s driver’s license or identification card
with the Department of Driver Services. Id.
Based on the limited factual record before the Court, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success that the burden
imposed by the “no contact” scheme (i.e., returning a prepaid, preaddressed
confirmation notice and/or re-registering to voter) is severe.
The Court now turns to the State’s purported interests in enforcing the
“no contact” provision under its interpretation of HB 316. Because the burden
of said provision is “slight,” the state interest need not be “compelling . . . to tip
the constitutional scales in its direction.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439. Rather, “the
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the
restrictions. Id. at 434.

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33
Defendants have identified three State interests in enforcing the “no
contact” provision under its interpretation of HB 316. First, Defendants state
that State of Georgia has an interest—both generally and as compelled by
federal law—in maintaining reliable lists of electors. See Doc. No. [185], p. 4.
Under the NVRA, states are required to make “a reasonable effort to remove
registrants who are ineligible to vote from the official list of eligible voters.”
52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)(a). Congress mandates this, in part, “to protect the
integrity of the electoral process; and . . . [to] ensure that accurate and current
voter registration rolls are maintained.” 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501(b)(3) and (b)(4).
Second, Defendants state that the State of Georgia and the Secretary of State
have an interest in applying election laws as written specifically. See Doc. No.
[185], p. 5. Finally, Defendants maintain that the “no contact” scheme
eliminates voter confusion and improves election-day operations. Doc. No.
[185], p. 5. For example, Defendants argue that inaccurate voter lists that
The method employed by the State of Georgia—both prior to and after the
enactment of HB 316—is contemplated by the NVRA and has been upheld by the
Supreme Court in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., ---U.S.----, 138 S. Ct. 1833,
1842 (2018). As Plaintiffs correctly note, however, the Supreme Court in Husted only
addressed whether the challenged voter-list-maintenance process complied with the
NVRA and did not address the constitutionality of said process.
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33
incorporate individuals who have moved and are no longer eligible may cause
local election officials to improperly assess where equipment and personnel
should be deployed on election day in 2020. Id. at pp. 5–6.
Plaintiffs, in response, argue that the State has waived or disclaimed any
such interest in applying a three-year “no contact” provision to the
approximately 98,000 individuals at issue since HB 316 amended the “no
contact” provision to require five years of inactivity. In doing so, Plaintiffs
overstate the burden on the State under the Anderson-Burdick test. As
discussed supra, Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood of success that
the burden imposed by the “no contact” scheme is “severe.” Accordingly,
under the Anderson-Burdick, the State is only required to articulate an
important regulatory interest in enforcing their interpretation of said provision.
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439. The Court finds that all three of the above-stated
regulatory interests are sufficient to satisfy that obligation under the Anderson-
Burdick test.
The Court therefore concludes that, at this time, Plaintiffs have not met
their burden of showing a substantial likelihood of success that the “no contact”
scheme set forth in HB 316 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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33
Because Plaintiffs have failed to establish a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits, the Court need not examine whether Plaintiffs have will
irreparable harm, or whether a balance of hardships weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor,
or, finally, whether the public interest would support the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. See Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1242.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. [159]) is DENIED
on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
and the principles of sovereign immunity do not permit a federal court to enjoin
a state (or its officers) to follow a federal court’s interpretation of the State of
Georgia’s laws. Such interpretation is within the province of the state court. As
to the remainder of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, the motion is also DENIED
on the ground that Plaintiffs have failed to show a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of their claim that the “no contact” provision violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. It is important to note that the Court has
not conclusively determined the rights of the parties, but in accordance with
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33
applicable authority, only balanced the equities in the interim as this litigation
proceeds.24
While the denial of this motion is based upon the Eleventh Amendment
and respect for state sovereignty, the Court has not ignored the fundamental
significance of voting under our constitutional structure.25 In recognition of this
important right, the Court would be remiss not to express its serious concern
that there needs to be an immediate and accurate interpretation by the state
court of HB 316 as to its effect on the voters who were already on the State’s
inactive list prior to the effective date of HB 316. To this regard, the Court will
allow Plaintiffs, upon request, to stay the pending litigation to seek emergency
relief at the state court level (or otherwise certify a question the Georgia
Supreme Court). In light of the immediacy of the situation in District 171, it is
within the authority of the Secretary of State to return any cancelled voters to
inactive status to allow Plaintiffs reasonable time to seek a decision from the
state court.
See Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2019)
(noting that “the purpose of the injunction is not to conclusively determine the rights
of parties, but only to balance the equities in the interim as the litigation proceeds.”).
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432.
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33
The Court also, pursuant to its inherent authority to control the conduct
of the parties, ORDERS Defendants to make additional diligent and reasonable
efforts (through notices on the Secretary of State’s website and press releases)
to inform the general public (especially those in House District 171, who face a
December 30, 2019 deadline to re-register) of this Court’s order in regard to the
voter list maintenance process and the need for the canceled voters to re-
register to vote during the applicable registration time period. 26
IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of December, 2019.
s/Steve C. Jones
HONORABLE STEVE C. JONES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
See generally Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1335
(11th Cir. 2002) (discussing inherent authority).

ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JA AN PEARSON, , )
)
Plain iff , )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
. ) 1:20-c -4809-TCB
)
BRIAN KEMP, , )
)
Defendan . )
DEFENDANTS CONSOLIDATED BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR

MOTION TO DISMISS AND RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Chri opher M. Carr Care Miller

A orne General Jo h Belinfan e
Br an K. Webb Melanie John on
Dep A orne General
R ell D. Willard Robbin Ro Allo Belinfan e
Senior A i an A orne General Li lefield LLC
Charlene S. McGo an 500 14 h S ree NW
A i an A orne General A lan a, GA 30318
Office of he Georgia A orne General

40 Capi ol Sq are SW
A lan a, GA 30334
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................................4
I. Ge a E ec cV S e Sec e a d Ha N Bee
C ed. .............................................................................................4
A. Ad a d e ec f Ge a e ec c e . ................5
B. Te a d ce f ca f Ge a e . ...............................7
C. Ge a e ec c e a bee c ed a d
Pa ff a e ec a a ed e b eR -
L A d . .............................................................................................9
II. Ab e ee Ba We e Va d P ce ed Acc d La ..................12
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES .......................................15
I. T e C Lac S b ec Ma e J dc beca e P a ff Ca
E ab A c e III S a d ..................................................................15
A. P a ff a e A e ed a I Fac S ff c e F a Ba
f S a d .................................................................................................17
B. P a ff d a eS a d a P e de a E ec . .......................19
C. P a ff A e ed I e a e T aceab e eS ae
Defe da . ..................................................................................................21
II. P a ff C a a eM ..........................................................................24
III. P a ff C a a e Ba ed b eEe e A e d e . ...................25
IV. Lac e Ba Pa ff C a f P -E ec Re ef. ..........................27
V. T e C d Ab a f G a Re ef. .....................................30
i
VI. P a ff M f I c e Re ef S d be De ed. ......................34
A. P a ff a e e cceed e e f e ca . ..........34
B. T e fPa ff efe ed ca d da e e a ab e a . ....44
C. T e ba a ce f e e a d b c e e e ea a a a
c .....................................................................................................45
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................47
ii
INTRODUCTION
Plain iff , a gro p of di appoin ed Rep blican pre iden ial elec or , filed a
Complain alleging ide pread fra d in he No ember general elec ion in Georgia,
ea ing an n ppor ed ale of ballo ffing, he i ching of o e b an
algori hm ploaded o he a e elec ronic o ing eq ipmen ha i ched o e
from Pre iden Tr mp o Joe Biden, hacking b foreign ac or from Iran and China,
and o her nefario ac b nnamed ac or . Plain iff did no bring hi elec ion
challenge in a e co r a pro ided b Georgia Elec ion Code. In ead, he a k
hi Co r o change he elec ion o come b j dicial fia and order he Go ernor,
he Secre ar , and he S a e Elec ion Board o de-cer if he re l of he elec ion
and replace he pre iden ial elec or for Joe Biden ( ho ere elec ed b a majori
of Georgia o er b pop lar o e a pro ided b a e la ) i h pre iden ial elec or
for Pre iden Tr mp. Their claim o ld be e raordinar if r e, b he are no .
M ch like he m hological kraken mon er1 af er hich Plain iff ha e named
hi la i , heir claim of elec ion fra d and malfea ance belong more o he
kraken realm of m ho han he do o reali .
1
A kraken i a m hical ea mon er appearing in Scandina ian folklore, being
clo el linked o ailor abili o ell all ale .
h p ://en. ikipedia.org/ iki/Kraken.
1
The r h i ha he 2020 general elec ion a , according o he federal agenc
a ked i h o er eeing elec ion ec ri , he mo ec re in hi or . ( E b
B.)2 C ber ec ri e per ha e de ermined ha here i e de ce a a
e de e ed e c a ed e a a a
c ed. ( ) The acc rac of he pre iden ial elec ion re l ha been
confirmed hro gh a lea (1) he a e ide ri k-limi ing a di (2) a hand reco n
and (3) independen e ing, hich ha confirmed ha he ec ri of he ae
elec ronic o ing eq ipmen a no compromi ed.
A a hre hold ma er, he Ele en h Circ i i ed an opinion oda ha
manda e di mi al of hi ac ion for lack of anding and moo ne in he rela ed
ca e of , No. 20-14418, hich rai ed man of he ame claim
a hi ca e and o gh imilar relief. ( lip opinion a ached a E b A). In
affirming he di ric co r deci ion den ing Wood mo ion o enjoin cer ifica ion
of he elec ion re l , he panel held:
We agree i h he di ric co r ha Wood lack anding o e

beca e he fail o allege a par ic lari ed inj r . And beca e Georgia
ha alread cer ified i elec ion re l and i la e of pre iden ial
elec or , Wood req e for emergenc relief are moo o he e en
he concern he 2020 elec ion. The Con i ion make clear ha
2
C ber ec ri & Infra r c re Sec ri Agenc Join S a emen From
Elec ion Infra r c re Go ernmen Coordina ing Co ncil & he Elec ion
Infra r c re Selec or Coordina ing Commi ee , No ember 12, 2020. A r e and
correc cop of hi a emen i a ached a E b B.
2
federal co r are co r of limi ed j ri dic ion, U.S. Con . ar . III e

ma no en er ain po -elec ion con e abo garden- arie i e of
o e co n ing and mi cond c ha ma properl be filed in a e co r .
( lip op. a 1). Thi deci ion q arel con rol , and he Co r ho ld di mi he
ac ion beca e Plain iff lack an inj r in fac fficien o e abli h Ar icle III
anding. Cer ifica ion of he elec ion re l al o moo Plain iff claim , a he
Co r ha no a hori nder federal la o ndo ha ha alread been done.
O her hre hold i e bar he relief Plain iff eek. E en if he ere no
moo , Plain iff claim are barred b lache beca e of heir ine c able dela in
rai ing heir challenge o he S a e elec ronic o ing em and ab en ee ballo
proced re n il af er heir preferred candida e lo . Plain iff claim are al o barred
b he Ele en h Amendmen o he U.S. Con i ion, hich bar i for
re ro pec i e relief again a e official ac ing in heir official capaci ab en a
ai er b he S a e. Similarl , de pi e heir a emp o rai e con i ional claim ,
Plain iff la i i reall an elec ion con e challenging he Pre iden ial elec ion,
hich can and ho ld be bro gh in a Georgia co r a ome of Plain iff allie ha e
recen l done.
B mo impor an l , here i no credible e idence o ppor he dra ic and
npreceden ed remed of b i ing cer ified pre iden ial elec ion re l i h he
Plain iff preferred candida e. Wi ho hi , Plain iff canno clearl e abli h he
3
req ired elemen for inj nc i e relief. Like e er a e, Georgia ha a compelling
in ere in pre er ing he in egri of i elec ion proce . Confidence in he
in egri of o r elec oral proce e i e en ial o he f nc ioning of o r par icipa or
democrac . , 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006). P blic confidence in he
elec oral proce o ld cer ainl be ndermined b a co r in alida ing he cer ified
re l of a pre iden ial elec ion in hich nearl 5 million Georgian ca ballo .
Thi Co r ho ld decline Plain iff n ppor able effor o o er rn he e pre ed
ill of he o er , and ho ld den heir req e for relief and di mi hi ac ion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
C ed.
Plain iff allege ide-ranging con pirac heorie ha Georgia elec ronic
o ing em ha been compromi ed b H go Cha e and he Vene elan
go ernmen (or China and Iran, depending on hich e per i a ked), i infec ed
ih a ag el de cribed eigh ed algori hm ha i che o e be een
candida e , and o her i e prod ce fra d len re l . In ppor of heir arg men ,
Plain iff ci e o he n- igned declara ion of Dr. Shi a A ad rai, 3 o her redac ed
3
Dr. A ad rai claim he i an engineer i h a e perience in engineering
em , pa ern recogni ion, ma hema ical and comp a ional modeling and
anal i . [Doc. 6-1, 2]. El e here, Dr. A ad rai claim o be he in en or of
4
declara ion , hear a in he form of ario ne ar icle , and con e ed e iden iar
filing in he ca e , No. 1:17-c -2989 (N.D. Ga.).4
The Plain iff blinded b ei her illf l ignorance or a lack of ba ic
kno ledge of Georgia elec ion are incorrec . Georgia elec ronic o ing em
a adop ed in compliance ih a e and federal la , i cer ified b he Elec ion
A i ance Commi ion follo ing in pec ion and e ing cond c ed b independen
Vo ing S em Te Labora orie ( VSTL ), and ha no been compromi ed. A
re ie of he , a oppo ed o Plain iff con piracie , confirm he inacc rac
of Plain iff allega ion .
A. Ad a d e ec f Ge a e ec c e .
In 2019, he Georgia General A embl enac ed Ho e Bill 316 ( HB 316 ),
a eeping and comprehen i e reform of Georgia elec ion la , hich al o
moderni ed and f r her ec red Georgia o ing em. Specificall , he General
A embl cho e o req ire a ne nified em of o ing hro gho he S a e
elec ronic mail. Sam Biddle,

, B ine In ider (Mar. 6, 2012),
h p :// .b ine in ider.com/ he-cra - or -of- he-man- ho-pre ended- o-
in en -email-2012-3. S a e Defendan objec o an con idera ion of Dr.
A ad rai repor a he i no q alified o offer he opinion proffered and ili e
nreliable me hodolog .
4
The ma er i no bjec o o appeal pending in he Ele en h Circ i
Co r of Appeal , docke n mber 20-13730 and 20-14067.
5
mo ing he S a e a a from he ec re, b older, direc -recording elec ronic
( DRE ) o ing em o a o ing em ili ing Ballo -Marking De ice
( BMD ) and op ical canner . The General A embl de ermined hi replacemen
of DRE i h BMD ho ld occ r a oon a po ible. O.C.G.A. 21-2-300(a)(2).
The legi la ion placed he re pon ibili of elec ing he eq ipmen for he ne
o ing em on he Secre ar of S a e. O.C.G.A. 21-2-300(a). Ho e er, con rar
o Plain iff a er ion ha Go ernor Kemp and Secre ar Raffen perger r hed
hro gh he p rcha e of Dominion o ing machine and of are, (Doc. 6, p. 15),
he proc remen of Georgia ne o ing em a comple ed hro gh an open
and compe i i e bidding proce a req ired b Georgia S a e P rcha ing Ac ,
O.C.G.A. 50-5-50. Secre ar Raffen perger did no make he p rcha ing deci ion
alone, b e abli hed a Selec ion Commi ee compri ed of e en indi id al ho
ere a ked i h re ie ing bid propo al .5 Selec ion Commi ee member e al a ed
ho e propo al ing cri eria and proce e e for h on a Ma er Technical
E al a ion pread hee .6 Of he hree req e for propo al e al a ed b he
Selec ion Commi ee, Dominion Vo ing S em ( Dominion ) recei ed he highe
o erall core.
5
h p :// o .ga.go /admin/ pload /Selec ion 20Commi ee 20Bio .pdf
6
h p :// o .ga.go /admin/ pload /Ma erTechnicalE al a ion redac ed. l
6
On J l 29, 2019, Secre ar Raffen perger po ed a No ice of In en o A ard
he con rac for he a e ide o ing em o Dominion. No bid pro e ere
recei ed b he S a e, and Secre ar Raffen perger i ed a final No ice of In en o
A ard on A g 9, 2019. The o ing em con i of BMD ha prin ballo
b a of a connec ed prin er and op ical canner connec ed o a locked ballo bo .
The Dominion BMD allo he o er o make elec ion on a creen and hen prin
ho e elec ion on o a paper ballo . The o er ha an oppor ni o re ie he paper
ballo for acc rac before placing i in o he canner. Af er canning, he paper ballo
drop in o a locked ballo bo connec ed o he canner. BMD h crea e an
a di able, erifiable ballo , a req ired b a e. O.C.G.A. 21-2-300(a)(2)
( elec ronic ballo marker hall prod ce paper ballo hich are marked i h he
elec or choice af a eadab e b e e ec ) (empha i added).
B. Te a d ce f ca f Ge a e .
Georgia o ing em i bjec o o differen cer ifica ion req iremen .
Fir , he o ing em m ha e been cer ified b he Uni ed S a e Elec ion
A i ance Commi ion ( EAC ) a he ime of proc remen . O.C.G.A. 21-2-
300(a)(3). Second, he o ing em m al o be cer ified b he Secre ar of S a e
a afe and prac icable for e. Georgia BMD em mee bo h req iremen .
7
The Help America Vo e Ac ( HAVA ) crea ed he EAC, hich e p a rigoro
proce for o ing-eq ipmen cer ifica ion, orking i h commi ee of e per and
coordina ing i h he Na ional In i e of S andard and Technolog . 52 U.S.C.
20962 52 U.S.C. 20962, 20971 ( e lab andard ). The EAC cer ifie
o ing em a in compliance i h he Vol n ar Vo ing S em G ideline
( VVSG ), er ion 1.0, and doe o b ili ing appro ed, independen Vo ing
S em Te Labora orie ( VSTL ). In he ca e of he o ing em ili ed in
Georgia, SLI Compliance er ed a he VSTL a ked i h e ing he em for
EAC p rpo e . The em ili ed b Georgia, Democrac S i e 5.5-A, a
cer ified b he EAC on Jan ar 30, 2019.7
Separa el , he Secre ar of S a e ili ed ano her independen EAC-cer ified
VSTL, Pro V&V, o cond c e ing for cer ifica ion of he o ing em.
Follo ing he VSTL e ing, he Secre ar i ed a Cer ifica ion of he Dominion
Vo ing S em a mee ing all applicable pro i ion of he Georgia Elec ion Code
and R le of he Secre ar of S a e on A g 9, 2019.8 Tha cer ifica ion ha been
7
Uni ed S a e Elec ion A i ance Commi ion, Agenc Deci ion Gran of
Cer ifica ion, h p :// .eac.go / i e /defa l /file / o ing em/
file /Deci ion.A hori .Gran .of.Cer .D-S i e5.5-A.pdf
8
Plain iff erroneo l claim ha bo h he Cer ifica e and a e repor igned b
Michael Walker ere nda ed and ha e a ached al ered doc men ha ha e
been cropped o remo e he da e of he doc men . Compl., 12 and E hibi
5 and 6 here o. A correc cop of he Cer ifica e ho ing he da e of A g 9,
8
pda ed d e o de minimi change in em componen on o differen occa ion
ince, on Febr ar 19, 2020, and again on Oc ober 5, 2020.
P a ff a e ec a a ed e b e R -L
A d .
Plain iff conjec re and pec la ion doe no reb he reali ha Georgia
o ing em ha no been compromi ed. No onl ha e o epara e EAC-Cer ified
independen VSTL confirmed ha he em opera e a in ended, b Georgia
ri k-limi ing a di ( RLA ) f r her confirm ha no eigh ed oe i ching
occ rred.
Shockingl , he ba i for Plain iff o landi h claim of em compromi e
are roo ed in pec a i ical no of are anal e ha he gge
irref abl pro e oe i ching occ rred. For e ample, in Dr. A ad rai
n igned declara ion, he a hor reference ( i ho ci a ion) o e o al in cer ain
precinc for he propo i ion ha a eigh ed race algori hm m be re pon ible.
( Doc. 6-1.) The a hor, ho e er, make no a emp o e al a e an
o her rea on o er ma ha e cho en no o o e for Pre iden Tr mp. Indeed, he
2019 ma be ie ed a
h p :// o .ga.go /admin/ pload /Dominion Cer ifica ion.pdf. A cop of he e
repor ho ing a da e of A g 7, 2019 ma be fo nd a
h p :// o .ga.go /admin/ pload /Dominion Te Cer Repor .pdf.
9
a hor of ha declara ion pec la e ha 48,000 of 373,000 o e ca in Dekalb
Co n ere i ched in hi manner from Tr mp o Biden, (Doc. 6-1, p. 28),
meaning ha ( nder he a hor heor ) he re l in Dekalb Co n o ld be
106,373 for Tr mp o 260,227 for Biden (or appro ima el 28.6 o 70 ). Of
co r e, hi o ld be e raordinaril n al for hea il democra ic Dekalb Co n ,
in hich Pre iden Tr mp recei ed 51,468 o e (16.47 ) in 2016, hen he S a e
a ing an en irel differen o ing em.9
Moreo er, he e i ence of ch a eigh ed algori hm o ld ha e been
de ec ed in he RLA cond c ed hi ear. Follo ing he co n ie ab la ion of he
No ember elec ion re l , b prior o cer ifica ion, Secre ar Raffen perger a
req ired b la o cond c a ri k-limi ing a di in accordance i h O.C.G.A. 21-
2-498. S a e Elec ion Board R le 183-1-15-.04 pro ide ha he Secre ar of S a e
hall choo e he par ic lar elec ion con e o a di . Recogni ing he impor ance of
clear and reliable re l for ch an impor an con e , Secre ar Raffen perger
elec ed he pre iden ial race for he a di .10 E b C.
9
Dekalb Co n Elec ion Re l , 2016,
h p ://re l .enr.clari elec ion .com/GA/DeKalb/64036/183321/en/ mmar .h
ml.
10
S a emen of Secre ar Raffen perger, Hi oric Fir S a e ide A di of
Paper Ballo Uphold Re l of Pre iden ial Race, a ached a E hibi C here o
and a ailable a
10
Co n elec ion official ere hen req ired o co n b hand all ab en ee
ballo and paper ballo prin ed b he Dominion BMD . . The a di
confirmed he ame o come of he pre iden ial race a he original ab la ion ing
he Dominion o ing em eq ipmen . While here a a ligh differen ial
be een he a di re l and he original machine co n , he differen ial a ell
i hin he e pec ed margin of error ha occ r hen hand-co n ing ballo . A
2012 d b Rice Uni er i and Clem on Uni er i fo nd ha hand co n ing
ballo in po -elec ion a di or reco n proced re can re l in error ra e of p o
2 percen . In Georgia a di , he highe error ra e repor ed in an co n reco n
a 0.73 , and mo co n ie fo nd no change in heir final all .
The a di re l ref e Plain iff pec la ion ha Dominion machine or
of are migh ha e omeho flipped, i ched, or ffed ballo in he 2020
pre iden ial elec ion. Beca e Georgia o er can erif ha heir paper ballo
( he her hand-marked ab en ee ballo or ballo marked b BMD ) acc ra el
reflec heir in ended o e , an ac al manip la ion of he ini ial elec ronic o e
co n o ld ha e been re ealed hen he hand co n of paper ballo pre en ed a
differen re l . The fac ha hi did no happen foreclo e he po ibili ha
h p :// o .ga.go /inde .php/elec ion /hi oric fir a e ide a di of paper ball
o phold re l of pre iden ial race
11
Dominion eq ipmen or of are had been manip la ed o omeho record fal e
o e for one candida e or o elimina e o e from ano her.
In m, he componen of Georgia o ing em ha e been e al a ed,
e ed, and cer ified b o differen independen labora orie a complian i h bo h
a e and federal req iremen and afe for e in elec ion . Nei her of ho e o
VSTL iden ified an eigh ed o e co n ing algori hm, nor an o her
improprie . And, in Georgia 2020 general elec ion, he correc opera ion of he
o ing em a again confirmed b he a e ri k-limi ing a di .
II. Ab e ee Ba We e Va d P ce ed Acc d La
Plain iff claim ha he r le nder hich co n elec ion official erified
ab en ee ballo are con rar o Georgia la i al o i ho meri . Ab en ee ballo
for he 2020 general elec ion ere proce ed b co n elec ion official according
o he proced re e abli hed b he Georgia legi la re. The e proced re ere par
of HB 316, bipar i an legi la ion pa ed in 2019 o reform he a e elec ion code
and implemen a ne elec ronic o ing em. The reform kep in place Georgia
polic of no e c e ab en ee o ing, b modified he echnical req iremen for
ab en ee ballo . HB 316 modified he lang age of he oa h on he o er ab en ee
ballo en elope o lea e he igna re req iremen b remo e he elec or addre
and da e of bir h. O.C.G.A. 21-2-384. F r her, HB 316 added a c re
12
pro i ion, hich req ire elec ion official o gi e a o er n il hree da af er he
da e of he elec ion o c re an i e i h he o er igna re before rejec ing an
ab en ee ballo for a mi ing or mi ma ched igna re on he o er en elope.
O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(a)(1)(C). The c re pro i ion a added o he a e
req iremen ha elec ion official promp l no if he o er of a rejec ed ab en ee
ballo d e o a mi ing or mi ma ched igna re.
On No ember 6, 2019, he Democra ic Par of Georgia, DSCC, and DCCC
(collec i el , Poli ical Par Organi a ion ) ed he S a e Defendan , alleging
ha he promp l no if lang age of O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(a)(1)(C) a ag e and
ill-defined and lef co n ie i ho andard for erif ing igna re on ab en ee
ballo . (App Vol. I a 144-49).
While ha ac ion a pending, he S a e Elec ion Board ( SEB ) appro ed a
r le ha e abli hed a niform andard for co n ie o follo o promp l no if
o er hen heir ab en ee ballo i rejec ed a req ired b O.C.G.A. 21-2-
386(a)(1)(C). The r le pro ide ha hen a imel bmi ed ab en ee ballo i
rejec ed, he board of regi rar or ab en ee ballo clerk m end he o er no ice
of he rejec ion and oppor ni o c re i hin hree b ine da , or b he ne
b ine da if i hin en da of Elec ion Da . Ga. Comp. R. & Reg . r. 183-1-14-
.13 ( he Promp No ifica ion R le ).
13
The Promp No ifica ion R le a adop ed p r an o he SEB r le-making
a hori nder O.C.G.A. 21-2-31(2). I pro ide a niform hree-da andard for
promp no ifica ion req ired b O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(a)(1)(C) hen an ab en ee
ballo i rejec ed, o ha all co n ie gi e no ice in a niform manner. The Promp
No ifica ion R le a prom lga ed p r an o he Georgia Admini ra i e
Proced re Ac , p bli hed for p blic commen , and di c ed a m l iple p blic
hearing before i became effec i e on March 22, 2020.
Beca e he Promp No ifica ion R le re ol ed he i e in he pending
la i , he par ie re ol ed he ma er in a e lemen agreemen ha incl ded,
among o her erm , an agreemen ha (1) he S a e Elec ion Board o ld prom lga e
and enforce he Promp No ifica ion R le and (2) he Secre ar of S a e o ld i e
g idance o co n elec ion official regarding he igna re ma ching proce .
On Ma 1, 2020, he Secre ar of S a e di rib ed an Official Elec ion
B lle in ( OEB ), ad i ing co n elec ion official of he Promp No ifica ion R le
and pro iding g idance for re ie ing igna re on ab en ee-ballo en elope .
(Declara ion of Chri Har e 5).11 The OEB in r c ed ha af er an elec ion official
make an ini ial de ermina ion ha he igna re on he ab en ee ballo en elope doe
11
The Har e Declara ion a bmi ed in he rela ed ca e of
, Ci il Ac ion No. 1:20-CV-4651-SDG and i a ached a E b D.
14
no ma ch he igna re on file for he o er p r an o O.C.G.A. 21-2-
386(a)(1)(B) and (C), o addi ional regi rar , dep regi rar , or ab en ee ballo
clerk ho ld al o re ie he igna re, and he ballo ho ld be rejec ed if a lea
o of he hree official agree ha he igna re doe no ma ch. ( ) The OEB
e pre l in r c co n official o compl i h a e la . ( )
Con rar o Plain iff claim ha he Promp No ifica ion R le and he OEB
ha e ignifican l di r p ed he igna re erifica ion proce , he e mea re ha e
had no de ec able effec on he ab en ee ballo rejec ion ra e ince he la general
elec ion in 2018. (Har e Dec. 6, 7). An anal i of he n mber of ab en ee-ballo
rejec ion for igna re i e for 2020 a compared o 2018 fo nd ha he rejec ion
ra e for ab en ee ballo i h mi ing or non-ma ching igna re in he 2020 general
elec ion a 0.15 he ame rejec ion ra e for igna re i e a in 2018 before
he ne mea re ere implemen ed. ( )
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
E ab A c e III S a d .
Plain iff rai e hree con i ional co n in heir Complain : (1) ha he S a e
Defendan iola ed he Elec or and Elec ion Cla e of Ar icle I and II ( Co n
I ) ha he S a e Defendan iola ed he eq al pro ec ion cla e of he U.S.
Con i ion ( Co n II ) ha he S a e Defendan denied Plain iff D e Proce

15
rela ed o alleged di para e rea men of ab en ee/mail-in o er among differen
co n ie ( Co n III ) and ha he S a e Defendan denied Plain iff D e Proce
on he righ o o e ( Co n IV ). Plain iff al o bring a a e la elec ion con e
claim again Defendan p r an o O.C.G.A. 21-5-522, in oking he Co r
pplemen al j ri dic ion nder 28 U.S.C. 1367. Ho e er, beca e Plain iff
canno e abli h anding a o an of he e ca e of ac ion, he Co r lack
j ri dic ion o con ider he meri of Plain iff claim and he ca e ho ld be
di mi ed.
Federal co r ha e an independen obliga ion o en re ha bjec -ma er
j ri dic ion e i before reaching he meri of a di p e.
, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11 h Cir. 2020) ( aca ing and ordering di mi al of
o ing righ ca e d e o lack of anding). For a co r o prono nce pon . . . he
con i ionali of a a e or federal la hen i ha no j ri dic ion o do o i , b
er defini ion, for a co r o ac l ra ire . (ci a ion omi ed). If a an poin
a federal co r di co er a lack of j ri dic ion, i m di mi he ac ion.
Ar icle III of he Con i ion limi he bjec -ma er j ri dic ion of federal
co r o Ca e and Con ro er ie . U.S. Con . ar . III, 2. A par in oking
federal j ri dic ion bear he b rden of e abli hing anding a he commencemen
of he la i. , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). A an
16
irred cible con i ional minim m, Plain iff m ho he ha e (1) ffered an
inj r in fac , (2) ha i fairl raceable o he challenged cond c of he defendan ,
and (3) ha i likel o be redre ed b a fa orable j dicial deci ion. , 504 U.S.
a 561. A he par in oking federal j ri dic ion, Plain iff bear he b rden a he
pleading pha e of clearl alleg[ing] fac demon ra ing each elemen .
, 136 S. C . 1540, 1547 (2016).
f Sa d .
Inj r in fac i he fir and foremo of he anding elemen . , 136
S. C . a 1547. An inj r in fac i an in a ion of a legall pro ec ed in ere ha i
bo h concre e and par ic lari ed and ac al or imminen , no conjec ral or
h po he ical. , 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11 h Cir.
2020) , No. 20-3214, 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 35639 a 16 (3d Cir. No . 13, 2020) ( To bring i, o and o
per onall m be inj red, and o m be inj red in a a ha concre el
impac o r o n pro ec ed legal in ere . ).
The alleged inj r m be di inc from a generall a ailable grie ance
abo go ernmen . , 138 S. C . 1916, 1923 (2018). Thi req ire
more han a mere keen in ere in he i e. , 138 S. C . 2392,
2416 (2018) , 549 U.S. 437, 440 41 (2007) ( O r ref al

17
o er e a a for m for generali ed grie ance ha a leng h pedigree. . . . [A]
generali ed grie ance ha i plainl ndifferen ia ed and common o all member of
he p blic i no fficien for anding).
I i for hi rea on ha he Ele en h Circ i fo nd lack of anding in he
ca e. The plain iff in ha ca e co ld no e plain ho hi in ere in
compliance i h a e elec ion la i differen from ha of an o her per on. Indeed,
he admi ha an Georgia o er co ld bring an iden ical i.B he logic of hi
arg men eep pa e en ha bo ndar . All American , he her he o ed in hi
elec ion or he her he re ide in Georgia, co ld be aid o hare [plain iff ] in ere
in en r[ing] ha [a pre iden ial elec ion] i properl admini ered. ( lip op., E .
A, a 11).
Plain iff ha e fared no be er a ar ic la ing a par ic lari ed grie ance ha i
omeho differen han ha of he general o ing p blic. In fac , hro gho heir
Complain , Plain iff allege ha heir in ere are one and he ame a an Georgia
o er. Compl. a 156 ( Defendan dil ed he la f l ballo of Plain iff
and of o her Georgia o er and elec or ) 163 ( Defendan f r her iola ed
Georgia o er righ ), 199 ( all candida e , poli ical par ie , and o er ,
incl ding i ho limi a ion Plain iff , ha e a e ed in ere in being pre en and
ha ing meaningf l acce o ob er e and moni or he elec oral proce ). Ha ing
18
confirmed ha heir in ere are no differen han he in ere of all Georgia o er ,
Plain iff ha e ar ic la ed onl generali ed grie ance in fficien o confer anding
pon hem o p r e heir claim .
B. P a ff d a eS a d a P e de a E ec .
Plain iff a er ha b ir e of heir a a Rep blican pre iden ial
elec or , he are candida e ha ha e anding o rai e ha e er arie of
elec ion complain ha he ma choo e. For hi propo i ion, he ci e o onl a
ingle ca e: , 978 F.3d 1051 (8 h Cir. 2020). Ho e er, a
predica ed on Minne o a elec ion la ha differ from Georgia and pon fac ha
are di ing i hable from he Plain iff ca e. F r her, he Third Circ i in
recen l rejec ed Plain iff broad reading of . In ha ca e, he co r fo nd
ha a congre ional candida e lacked anding o p r e claim nder he Elec ion
and Elec or cla e ba ed on a generali ed righ o r n. I pecificall no ed i
di agreemen ih , a ing The Car on co r appear o ha e ci ed lang age
from [ , 564 U.S. 211 (2011)] i ho con idering he con e
pecificall , he Ten h Amendmen and he re er ed police po er in hich he
U.S. S preme Co r emplo ed ha lang age. There i no preceden for e panding
Bond be ond hi con e , and he co r ci ed none. 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS
35639 a 24, fn. 6 , No. 4:20-CV-03709, 2020 WL
19
6437668 a 2 (S.D. Te . No . 2, 2020) (holding candida e lacked anding nder
Elec ion Cla e) , 958 F.S pp. 341, 344 (M.D. Tn. 1997)
(candida e lacked anding o claim ha iola ion of a e elec ion la had
di enfranchi ed o er a [h]o o her people o e doe no in an a rela e o
plain iff o n e erci e of he franchi e and f r her doe no con i e concre e and
pecific j diciall cogni able inj r . ) , 1 F.S pp.3d 854 (E.D.
Tn. 2014) (plain iff denied oppor ni o be placed on ballo a candida e for
j dicial office hared he ame generali ed grie ance a a large cla of ci i en and
failed o demon ra e concre e and par ic lari ed inj r ).
In finding ha pre iden ial elec or did ha e anding o challenge p rpor ed
iola ion of a e elec ion la , relie hea il on pecific pro i ion of
Minne o a elec ion la ha rea ed pre iden ial elec or he ame a o her
candida e for office. Ho e er, in Georgia, nlike in Minne o a, all per on
po e ing he q alifica ion for o ing and ho ha e regi ered in accordance i h
he la are con idered Elec or . O.C.G.A. 21-2-2(7). Pre iden ial elec or in
Georgia are no elec ed o p blic office, b perform onl a limi ed mini erial role
in hich he appear a he Capi ol on he de igna ed da e and ime o carr o he
e pre ed ill of Georgia elec or b ca ing heir o e for Pre iden and Vice
Pre iden in he Elec oral College. O.C.G.A. 21-2-11. Pre iden ial elec or need
20
no file no ice of candidac o her i e req ired of poli ical candida e . O.C.G.A.
21-2-132. Their name do no appear on he ballo in ead, he name of he
candida e for Pre iden and Vice Pre iden appear on he ballo . O.C.G.A. 21-2-
325. Georgia elec or do no elec an pre iden ial elec or indi id all in ead,
ha la e of candida e hall be elec ed o ch office hich recei e he highe
n mber of o e ca . O.C.G.A. 21-2-501(f).
The Ele en h Circ i ha held ha o er do no ffer a concre e and
par ic lari ed inj r impl beca e heir preferred candida e lo e an elec ion (
974 F.3d a 1252), and ha ch a harm o ld be ba ed on generali ed
par i an preference hich are in fficien o e abli h anding.
138 S.C . 1916, 1933 (2018) (rejec ing anding ba ed on gro p
poli ical in ere , no indi id al legal righ ). Plain iff ha e failed o ar ic la e
ho he , a pre iden ial elec or , ha e ffered an inj r no common o heir
par i an gro p poli ical in ere , or ha o ld no ha e al o been ffered b all
Georgia elec or generall .
C. P a ff A e ed I e a e T aceab e e S a e Defe da .
No onl ha e Plain iff failed o demon ra e an inj r in fac , he canno
a i f he ca a ion req iremen of anding, hich req ire ha a plain iff inj r
m be fairl raceable o he challenged ac ion of he defendan , and no he re l
21
of he independen ac ion of ome hird par no before he co r . , 974
F.3d a 1253 (ci a ion omi ed)
, 641 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11 h Cir. 2011) (holding ha an inj r fficien
o e abli h anding canno re l [from] he independen ac ion of ome hird par
no before he co r . ).
Plain iff ha e in rod ced declara ion and affida i from i ne e ha rai e
di para e complain abo a arie of e en ha occ rring a ario ime and
place d ring he No ember elec ion and b eq en a di . The e complain foc
on ac ion allegedl aken b local elec ion official and o her hird par ie ha are
no named a defendan in hi ca e.12 Wha e er one migh concl de from he e
aried allega ion , he all ha e one hing in common: none of he ac ion
complained of are a rib able in an a o an of he S a e Defendan . In ead,
he ere aken b local elec ion official no named a par ie o hi ca e, and an
12
E ample of he e complain incl de allega ion ha Dekalb Co n elec ion
orker ere more ho ile o Rep blican ob er er han Democra ic ob er er
(Sil a Aff. 06-9 E . 18, 14), ha a Cobb Co n ol n eer a di moni or i ne ed
alread epara ed paper machine receip ballo i h barcode in he Tr mp ra ,
placing hem in o he Biden ra (John on Aff., Compl., E . 17, 4-5), and ha
an a di ob er er a he Li honia loca ion a oo far a a from ballo o ee ho
he had been o ed and ha ome a di or ere alida ing ballo i ho reading
hem alo d o ano her a di or. (O Neal Aff., 6-10, E hibi J, 5-8).
22
inj rie ha migh ha e re l ed from ho e ac ion are no raceable o and canno
be redre ed b he S a e Defendan .
Wi h regard o Plain iff con pira orial claim rela ed o Dominion
eq ipmen and of are, here ha been no allega ion ha oe er ha an of he
S a e Defendan par icipa ed in an con pirac or coll ion i h Dominion or an
o her hird par malicio ac or o ca e an harm o Plain iff or an Georgia
o er . The onl allega ion made again an of he S a e Defendan i ha
Go ernor Kemp and Secre ar Raffen perger omeho r hed hro gh he
eq ipmen elec ion proce . Ho e er, hi proce a an open, compe i i e
bidding proce , cond c ed p r an o Georgia proc remen la , and d ring
hearing , and no allega ion ha been made a o ho ac ion or inac ion
aken b an of he S a e Defendan d ring ha bidding proce migh ha e ca ed
an of Plain iff alleged inj rie .
Finall , o he e en ha Plain iff claim inj r a a re l of an improprie ie
in he mailing, proce ing, alida ion or ab la ion of ab en ee ballo , he e inj rie
again o ld no be raceable o an of he S a e Defendan . Ab en ee ballo are
mailed, proce ed, alida ed, and ab la ed b local elec ion official . O.C.G.A.
21-2-386. Ha ing failed o e abli h ha an of heir p rpor ed inj rie are
raceable o or redre able b he S a e Defendan , Plain iff lack anding and heir
23
claim ho ld be di mi ed. , 974 F.3d a 1253.
, 1:20-CV-03263, 2020 WL 6048048, a 22 (N.D. Ga. Oc . 13, 2020)
(appl ing o di mi elec ion rela ed claim again S a e Defendan ).
II. Pa ff C a a eM .
The Ele en h Circ i held in he deci ion oda ha federal challenge
o he cer ifica ion of he pre iden ial elec ion re l in Georgia are no moo . We
canno rn back he clock and crea e a orld in hich he 2020 elec ion re l are
no cer ified. , lip op. a 17 (q o ing ,
785 F.3d 442, 445 (10 h Cir. 2015)). Accordingl , he ca e no longer pre en a li e
con ro er i h re pec o hich he co r can gi e meaningf l relief.
., 382 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11 h Cir.
2004). Moo ne i j ri dic ional beca e a federal co r ma onl adj dica e
ca e and con ro er ie , and a r ling ha canno pro ide meaningf l relief i an
impermi ible ad i or opinion. .
The Co r canno pre en ha ha alread occ rred.
, 679 F. App 932, 933 (11 h Cir. 2017) , No.
1:10-CV-02546-RWS, 2010 WL 5316550, a 2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2010) ( The
Co r i po erle o enjoin ha ha alread occ rred. ). While Plain iff
p rpor edl eek decer ifica ion of he cer ifica ion ha Secre ar Raffen perger
24
and Go ernor Kemp ha e alread e ec ed, he ci e no a hori ha oe er o
ppor he no ion ha a co r co ld order ch relief. If he Plain iff belie ed ha
he re l cer ified b Secre ar Raffen perger and Go ernor Kemp ere in alid
for fra d or o her gro nd pecified in O.C.G.A. 21-2-522, Georgia pro ide an
adeq a e remed a la b e ing for h he proced re for a a e la elec ion
con e o be ini ia ed in he S perior Co r of F l on Co n . O.C.G.A. 21-2-
520, . Ho e er, here i impl no preceden for a federal co r o i e an
inj nc ion req iring ei her Go ernor Kemp or Secre ar Raffen perger o
decer if heir alread -i ed cer ifica ion or o cer if re l in direc
con ra en ion of he ac al elec ion re l .
III. Pa ff C a a e Ba ed b eEe e A e d e .
Plain iff federal claim are a er ed again he indi id all named S a e
Defendan in heir official capaci ie . (Doc. 1 a 31-33). The e claim are barred
b he Ele en h Amendmen . The Ele en h Amendmen bar i again a S a e or
one of i agencie , depar men or official , ab en a ai er b he S a e or a alid
congre ional o erride, hen he S a e i he real par in in ere .
, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Beca e claim again p blic official in heir
official capaci ie are merel ano her a of pleading an ac ion again he en i of
hich he officer i an agen , official capaci claim again a a e officer are
25
incl ded in he Ele en h Amendmen bar. , 473 U.S. a 165. While an
e cep ion o Ele en h Amendmen imm ni e i nder , 209 U.S.
123 (1908), i i limi ed o i again a e officer for ec e inj nc i e
relief. , 520 U.S. 43, 69 n. 24 (1997). A
federal co r canno a ard re ro pec i e relief, de igned o remed pa iola ion
of federal la .
Plain iff claim for inj nc i e and declara or relief, premi ed on he
cond c of he No ember 3, 2020 General Elec ion and he cer ifica ion of re l
ha ha e alread aken place, are barred beca e he are re ro pec i e in na re.
Re ro pec i e relief i back ard-looking, and eek o remed harm re l ing from
a pa breach of a legal d on he par of he defendan a e official .
, 750 F.3d 1238, 1249 (11 h Cir. 2014) (q o ing
415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)). Simpl beca e he remed ill
occ r in he f re, doe no ran form i in o pro pec i e relief. The erm,
pro pec i e relief, refer o he ongoing or f re hrea of harm, no relief.
, 194 F. S pp. 2d 1378, 1387 (S.D. Ga. 2002). Plain iff
claim for an relief rela ed o he r le and reg la ion go erning he cond c of he
No ember 3, 2020, elec ion or an alleged pa ec ri lap e , mi co n ing of o e ,
26
or elec ion irreg lari ie are en irel re ro pec i e and barred b he Ele en h
Amendmen .
IV. Lac e Ba Pa ff C a f P -E ec Re ef.
In , 2020 U.S.Di . LEXIS 218058 (No . 20. 2020),
hi Co r fo nd ha claim rai ed b Plain iff co n el Lin Wood ere barred b
he doc rine of lache . While Plain iff claim o erlap ignifican l i h Wood
claim , he fac here are e en more compelling hen i come o a finding of lache .
Plain iff ai ed e en longer han Wood did o file hi ac ion. A in ir all
all of he complain ha Plain iff allege regarding he ec ri of Georgia o ing
em or he proprie of S a e Elec ion Board r le or reg la ion co ld ha e been
rai ed prior o he elec ion.
To e abli h lache , S a e Defendan m ho (1) here a a dela in
a er ing a righ or a claim, (2) he dela a no e c able, and (3) he dela ca ed
[ hem] nd e prej dice. , 396 F.3d 1144, 1150 (11 h Cir.
2005) , 915 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11 h
Cir. 2019) ( To cceed on a lache claim, [defendan ] m demon ra e ha
[p]lain iff ine c abl dela ed bringing heir claim and ha he dela ca ed i
nd e prej dice. ).
27
Where, a here, a challenge o an elec ion proced re i no filed n il an
elec ion ha alread been cond c ed, he prej dice o he a e and o he o er ha
ha e ca heir o e in he elec ion become par ic larl e ere. Once he elec ion
ha been cond c ed, an harm ha migh ari e from a p rpor ed con i ional
iola ion m be eighed again ch co n er ailing eq i able fac or a he
e remel di r p i e effec of elec ion in alida ion and he ha oc i reak pon
local poli ical con in i . , 849
F.2d 1176, 1177 (9 h Cir. 1988). For hi rea on, if aggrie ed par ie , i ho
adeq a e e plana ion, do no come for ard before he elec ion, he ill be barred
from he eq i able relief of o er rning he re l of he elec ion. . a 1180-81
( , 710 F.2d 177, 182-83 (4 h
Cir. 1983) , No. 1:20-c -0546, 2020
U.S. Di . LEXIS 98627, 16-17 (E.D. Va. Ma 29, 2020) (rejec ing a imilar
challenge o a e official g idance a barred b lache d e o plain iff fail re o
rai e he challenge prior o he elec ion). To hold o her i e permi [ ], if no
enco rage[ ], par ie ho co ld rai e a claim o la b and gamble pon recei ing a
fa orable deci ion of he elec ora e and hen, pon lo ing, eek o ndo he ballo
re l in a co r ac ion. , 488 F.2d 310, 314 (5 h Cir. 1973).
28
Plain iff dela ed con iderabl in a er ing heir claim . To he e en ha
he had an concern regarding he lnerabili of Dominion o ing em ,
he co ld ha e rai ed ho e claim long before he elec ion. Each of he ab en ee
ballo reg la ion and proced re ha Plain iff no complain of ere adop ed ell
before he No ember 3, 2020 elec ion, and an claim rela ed o he applica ion of
ho e r le d ring ha elec ion are bjec o di mi al here for he ame rea on
ha he ere di mi ed in . And, i h regard o he p rpor ed irreg lari ie
repor ed b Plain iff o er and ob er er declaran , Plain iff offer no e plana ion
h he did no a emp o addre ho e i e i h he rele an local elec ion
official a he ime, b in ead ai ed n il af er he elec ion official comple ed
he ini ial co n and a di and cer ified ho e re l .
A he co r recogni ed, Defendan and he p blic a large o ld be
ignifican l inj red if Plain iff ere permi ed o rai e he e challenge af er he
elec ion ha alread aken place. 2020 U.S.Di . LEXIS 218058 a 23 ( Wood
req e ed relief co ld di enfranchi e a b an ial por ion of he elec ora e and erode
he p blic confidence in he elec oral proce . )
, No. 5:20-c -5193, 2020 WL 6472651, a 5 (W.D. Ark. No . 3, 2020)
( [T]he eq i ie do no fa or in er en ion here he elec ion i alread in progre
and he req e ed relief o ld change he r le of he game mid-pla . ).
29
V. T eC d Ab a f G a Re ef.
The relief Plain iff eek i no hing hor of o er rning he No ember
elec ion. The ad damn m cla e a k hi Co r o (1) order he Defendan o de-
cer if he elec ion re l (2) enjoin he Go ernor from ran mi ing he cer ified
re l o he Elec oral College and in ead (3) req ire he Go ernor o ran mi a
cer ifica ion ha Pre iden Tr mp recei ed he majori of o e in Georgia. (Doc.
1 211(1-3) Doc. 101 a 100.) There are n mero problem i h hi propo ed
relief. Fir , i iola e he principle of federali m. Second, he doc rine
arran di mi al. Finall , and a he er lea , hi la i ho ld be a ed
pending he o come of a e elec ion challenge p r an o he
doc rine.
On federali m, he Ele en h Circ i recen l held ha i i do b f l ha a
federal co r co ld compel a a e o prom lga e a reg la ion. , 974 F.3d a
1257. Fir , federal co r are onl able o order a e defendan from refrain[ing]
from iola ing federal la . (ci ing ,
563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011)). M ch of Plain iff propo ed relief canno be reconciled
i h hi binding preceden . Specificall , Plain iff do no eek o j refrain he
Go ernor and he Secre ar , he eek o compel hem o cer if a differen candida e
han he elec ion la demand, hich i holl incon i en i h Georgia Elec ion
30
Code and he hrice-a di ed re l . The relief o gh i par ic larl offen i e o
federali m principle in he ligh of he elec ion challenge pending in a e co r
ha ignifican l mirror he claim bro gh in hi la i. A he Plain iff
hem el e no recogni e, Georgia la make clear ha po -elec ion li iga ion
ma proceed in a e Co r . , lip op. a 9. Indeed, Plain iff
Complain repea edl claim ha he are bringing heir la i p r an o Georgia
a e ha pro ide he er ba i o challenge elec ion . (Doc. No. 1 150
(O.C.G.A. 21-2-522), 183-207 (O.C.G.A. 21-2-521, 21-2-522). I i hard o
imagine a more ignifican challenge o federali m han for a par o come o federal
co r a king ha co r o re er e cer ified elec ion re l i ho gi ing he S a e
an oppor ni o ac p r an o i o n a or cheme.
The e concern are recogni ed b he doc rine, hich i appropria e
in ca e pre en ing a federal con i ional i e hich migh be moo ed or
pre en ed in a differen po re b a a e co r de ermina ion of per inen ae
la . , 314 F. S pp. 3d 1320, 1334 (S.D. Fla.
2018) (ci ing , 756 F.S pp.2d 1370, 1372 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (q o ing , 625 F.2d 653, 656 57 (5 h Cir. 1980)). Here, he
con i ional i e pre en ed he her he legi la re delega ion of r lemaking
a hori o he SEB i alid, and he her he SEB e ceeded ha a hori hen
31
prom lga ing ario emergenc r le iola e he federal con i ion. In o her
ord , he Co r canno an er he con i ional q e ion i ho fir deciding
ha he a e agenc e ceeded i a hori . Thi i a cla ic
i a ion, hich e amine and req ire ha (1) here m be an n e led i e of
a e la and (2) here m be a po ibili ha he a e la de ermina ion ill
moo or pre en in a differen po re he federal con i ional q e ion
rai ed. a 1372 73 (ci ing , 625 F.2d a 657). J dge Jone reached he ame
concl ion la December in ano her elec ion-rela ed la i,
.13 Thi Co r ho ld do he ame and di mi he la i.
For a imilar rea on, Plain iff req e ed relief iola e he
There are n mero pending challenge o he No ember elec ion ha
ha e properl been filed in Georgia co r , incl ding, according o pre
a emen b Mr. Wood co n el in he li iga ion, one filed la e on December
4, 2020, b Pre iden Tr mp. A lea one eek nearl iden ical relief a he
Plain iff la i . Under imilar circ m ance , he Ele en h Circ i ha indica ed
ha a a of federal proceeding i arran ed nder he doc rine,
hich a hori e a federal di ric co r o di mi or a an ac ion hen here i
an ongoing parallel ac ion in a e co r .
13
A r e and acc ra e cop of he December Order i a ached a E b E.
32
, 374 F.3d 994, 997 98 (11 h Cir. 2004) (ci ing
879 F.2d 1556, 1558 (7 h Cir.1989)). Fac or con idered in
he anal i incl de: he de ire o a oid piecemeal li iga ion,
he her a e or federal la go ern he i e, and he her he a e co r can pro ec
all par ie righ . a 987 (ci a ion omi ed).
Each of he e fac or arran a ing he li iga ion. The b lk of Plain iff
complain addre e i e of a e la : ho ab en ee ballo req e and ballo are
in pec ed, he a hori of he General A embl o delega e a hori o he SEB
and he Secre ar , and he cri eria for cer if ing elec ion . Moreo er, he a e co r
elec ion challenge are o mo e if l . Th , he po ibili of piecemeal li iga ion
i real and concre e. Finall , he relief ha he par ie in he a e co r challenge
can ob ain o ld pro ec all par ie righ . The remedie a ailable o Georgia co r
hen r ling on elec ion challenge are pelled o in a e la . O.C.G.A. 21-
2-527(d). Under he e circ m ance , fac or are a i fied, and he
elec ion challenge ho ld proceed in a e co r nder he ame a e la ha he
Plain iff rai ed in heir Complain .
33
VI. Pa ff M f I c e Re ef S d be De ed.
E en if Plain iff co ld o ercome he j ri dic ional defec ha are fa al o
heir claim , he ill fail o a i f he req iremen for he e raordinar inj nc i e
relief he eek.
A preliminar inj nc ion i an e raordinar remed ne er a arded a of
righ . , 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To pre ail on
heir mo ion, Plain iff are req ired o ho : (1) a b an ial likelihood of pre ailing
on he meri (2) ha he plain iff ill ffer irreparable inj r nle he inj nc ion
i e (3) ha he hrea ened inj r o he mo an o eigh ha e er damage he
propo ed inj nc ion ma ca e he oppo ing par and (4) he inj nc ion o ld no
be ad er e o he p blic in ere . , 954 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11 h Cir.
1992). The Co r ho ld pa par ic lar regard for he p blic con eq ence in
emplo ing he e raordinar remed of inj nc ion. , 555 U.S. a 24.
A. P a ff a e e cceed e e f e ca .
Plain iff eq al pro ec ion claim fail for he ame rea on heir co n el
eq al pro ec ion claim failed in In he o ing righ con e , eq al pro ec ion
mean ha [h]a ing once gran ed he righ o o e on eq al erm , he a e ma
34
no , b la er arbi rar and di para e rea men , al e one per on o e o er ha of
ano her. 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (ci a ion omi ed). T picall , hen
deciding a con i ional challenge o a e elec ion la , federal co r appl he
frame ork ha balance he b rden on he o er i h he a e
in ere in he o ing reg la ion. , 553 U.S.
181, 190 (2008) 915 F.3d 1312, 1318-19
(11 h Cir. 2019).
B ,a he co r recogni ed, Plain iff claim do no fi i hin hi
frame ork. 2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS 218058 a 25. Plain iff ha e no ar ic la ed a
cogni able harm ha in oke he Eq al Pro ec ion Cla e. An ac ion aken b he
S a e Defendan ere aken in a holl niform manner acro he en ire a e.
a 26. No o er incl ding he Plain iff ere rea ed differen l han an
o her o er. ( , 978 F.3d 93, 100 (4 h Cir. 2020).
Nor ha e Plain iff e for h a o e dil ion claim. None of he Plain iff
ha e alleged ha an ac ion of Defendan ha e b rdened heir abili o ca heir
o n o e . In ead, heir claim , like Wood , appear o be ha beca e ome o e
ere improperl co n ed or illegall ca , he e illegal or improperl co n ed o e
omeho ca ed he eigh of ballo ca la f ll b Georgia o er o be
omeho eigh ed differen l han o her . a 27. Bo h he di ric co r in
35
co r and he Third Circ i Co r of Appeal in q arel rejec ed hi
heor . , 2020 WL 6686120, a 31-2 ( if dil ion of la f ll ca ballo b
he nla f l co n ing of in alidl ca ballo ere a r e eq al-pro ec ion
problem, hen i o ld ran form e er iola ion of a e elec ion la in o a
po en ial federal eq al-pro ec ion claim ) , 974 F.3d a 1247
(rejec ing par i an o e dil ion claim).
The S preme Co r deci ion in doe no ppor Plain iff
ca e ( Doc. 6 a 16-17), a ha ca e fo nd a iola ion of eq al pro ec ion here
cer ain co n ie ere ili ing ar ing andard for ha con i ed a legal o e in
he 2000 Florida reco n . 531 U.S. a 105 ( The q e ion before i he her he
reco n proced re are con i en ih i obliga ion o a oid arbi rar and
di para e rea men of he member of i elec ora e ). Here, an ac ion aken b he
S a e Defendan ere nder aken a e- ide. The i ola ed irreg lari ie
complained of b Plain iff ario declaran , if r e, o ld ha e aken place a
he co n le el nder he per i ion of elec ion official ha are no par ie o
hi ca e. All ac ion of he S a e Defendan ha e been niform and applicable o
all Georgia co n ie and o er , in order o a oid he kind of ad hoc andard ha
aried from co n o co n a fo nd ncon i ional in . The are he e ac
oppo i e of arbi rar and di para e rea men .
36
The elec or cla e of he Uni ed S a e Con i ion pro ide ha [e]ach
S a e hall appoin , in ch Manner a he Legi la re hereof ma direc , a N mber
of Elec or , ho, in rn, ca he S a e o e for pre iden . U.S. Con . ar . II,
1, cl. 2. The General A embl e abli hed he manner for he appoin men of
pre iden ial elec or in O.C.G.A. 21-2-10, hich pro ide ha elec or are
in a general elec ion. Plain iff fail o ho ho an ac of he S a e
Defendan ha al ered hi proce .
Similarl , Plain iff fail o ho ho S a e Defendan ha e iola ed he
elec ion cla e, hich pro ide ha [ ]he Time , Place , and Manner of holding
elec ion for Sena or and Repre en a i e , hall be pre cribed in each S a e b he
Legi la re hereof. U.S. Con . ar . I, 4, cl. 1. Plain iff complain abo a arie
of reg la ion or proced re rela ed o ab en ee ballo proce ing, i ho
ar ic la ing preci el ho ho e reg la ion or proced re r n afo l of he elec ion
cla e. In an e en , he S a e Elec ion Board ha he a hori , delega ed b he
legi la re, [ ]o form la e, adop , and prom lga e ch r le and reg la ion a
ill be cond ci e o he fair, legal, and orderl cond c of primarie and elec ion
o long a ho e r le are con i en i h la . O.C.G.A. 21-2-31(2). Th , hile
no one di agree ha S a e Defendan are no member of he Georgia legi la re,
37
Plain iff claim depend on he a mp ion ha he r le and proced re ed o
proce ab en ee ballo d ring he No ember 3, 2020, elec ion ere omeho
incon i en i h Georgia elec ion code.
B hi impl i no o. The SEB R le i con i en i h S a e la , and a
Georgia co r o ld likel a he ame. Under Georgia preceden , hen an agenc
empo ered i h r lemaking a hori (like he SEB i ), he e applied o reg la ion
challenge i q i e deferen ial. Georgia co r ak he her he reg la ion i
a hori ed b a e and rea onable. ,
257 Ga. App. 636, 637 (2002). The an er o bo h q e ion i an nq alified e.
A ho n, he SEB i empo ered o prom lga e reg la ion . O.C.G.A. 21-
2-31(1). A recogni ed b J dge Grimberg in , i i normal and con i ional
for a e legi la re o delega e heir a hori in ch a manner. 2020 U.S.Di .
LEXIS 218058 a 10. The reg la ion are al o rea onable. There i no conflic
be een he igna re erifica ion reg la ion and a e ci ed b he Plain iff ,
O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(a)(1)(C). (Doc. No. 1 a 23.) The a e req ire an ab en ee
ballo here a igna re doe no appear o be alid o be rejec ed and no ice
pro ided o he o er. . The challenged SEB R le, hich merel req ire an
addi ional afeg ard o en re elec ion ec ri b ha ing more han one indi id al
re ie an ab en ee ballo informa ion and igna re for acc rac before he ballo
38
i rejec ed, i con i en i h hi approach. , 2020 U.S.Di . LEXIS 218058
a 10. No a e ci ed b he Plain iff manda e ha onl one co n official
e amine he ab en ee ballo , and ha he re ie proce in ol e e eral official
doe no make i an le rigoro or incon i en i h he a or la . ( Har e
Decl. 3, 5). A Georgia co r o ld likel hold he ame, beca e a e co r ha e
aid ha a reg la ion m be pheld if he agenc pre en o ppor
he reg la ion. , 257 Ga. App. 636,
640 (2002). Mr. Har e declara ion cer ainl a i fie ha andard, and i ho ld
be ob io ha ha ing a erifica ion proce in place de igned o en re niform
a e ide applica ion of he la for de ermining con idera ion of an ab en ee ballo
doe no lead o in alid o e .
An remaining do b m be re ol ed in he S a e fa or, a he Plain iff
ha e no iden ified an conflic in he lang age. Thi i ha J dge Grimberg righ l
concl ded hen he held ha : The record in hi ca e demon ra e ha , if an hing,
Defendan ac ion in en ering in o he Se lemen Agreemen o gh o achie e
con i enc among co n elec ion official in Georgia, hich f e Wood
a ed goal of cond c ing [f]ree, fair, and ran paren elec ion . a 10
(empha i and bracke in original). Thi end he inq ir and i fa al o Plain iff
claim in Co n I, III, IV, and V.
39
Plain iff mo ion fail o ar ic la e a di cernable claim nder he d e proce
cla e. I i nclear ha proce Plain iff claim ha he ere d e or ho an of
he S a e Defendan failed o pro ide ha proce . Co n II of Plain iff Complain ,
hile cap ioned Denial of D e Proce ag el de cribe an ndefined di para e
rea men i h regard o c re proce e and arg e ha he di para e rea men
iola e Eq al Pro ec ion g aran ee . Compl. a 172. Co n IV of Plain iff
Complain i cap ioned Denial of D e Proce on he Righ o Vo e , and appear
o de cribe a claim of o e dil ion or deba emen ci ing o ario eq al pro ec ion
ca e . Compl. a 176-80. Plain iff Mo ion for Preliminar Inj nc ion doe
no incl de an di c ion of d e proce a all.
Plain iff ha e no ar ic la ed a cogni able proced ral d e proce claim. A
proced ral d e proce claim rai e o inq ire : (1) he her here e i a liber
or proper in ere hich ha been in erfered i h b he S a e and (2) he her he
proced re a endan pon ha depri a ion ere con i ionall fficien .
, 978 F.3d 220, 229 (5 h Cir. 2020) (ci ing
, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). The par
in oking he D e Proce Cla e proced ral pro ec ion bear he b rden . . . of
e abli hing a cogni able liber or proper in ere . , 978 F.3d a 229
40
(ci ing , 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005)). Plain iff ha e no clearl
ar ic la ed ha liber or proper in ere ha been in erfered ih b he S a e
Defendan , or ho an proced re a endan o he p rpor ed depri a ion ere
con i ionall fficien . A he co r no ed:
he Ele en h Circ i doe a me ha he righ o o e i a liber in ere

pro ec ed b he D e Proce Cla e. , 975 F.3d
1016, 1048 (11 h Cir. 2020). B he circ i co r ha e pre l declined o
e end he ric re of proced ral d e proce o a S a e elec ion
proced re . , 976 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11 h
Cir. 2020) ( The generali ed d e proce arg men ha he plain iff arg ed
for and he di ric co r applied o ld re ch concep of d e proce o heir
breaking poin . ).
2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS 218058 a 33.
Nor ha e Plain iff ar ic la ed a cogni able b an i e d e proce claim.
The pe of o ing righ co ered b he b an i e d e proce cla e are
con idered narro . , 802 F.2d 1302, 1314 (11 h Cir. 1986). Thi doe
no e end o e amining he alidi of indi id al ballo or per i ing he
admini ra i e de ail of an elec ion. In onl e raordinar circ m ance ill a
challenge o a a e elec ion ri e o he le el of a con i ional depri a ion. .
A he co r recogni ed:
Al ho gh Wood generall claim f ndamen al nfairne , and he

declara ion and e imon bmi ed in ppor of hi mo ion pec la e
a o ide- pread improprie , he ac al harm alleged b Wood
concern merel a garden arie elec ion di p e.
41
2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS 218058 a 35. F r her, [p]receden mili a e again a
finding of a d e proce iola ion regarding ch an ordinar di p e o er he
co n ing and marking of ballo . ( , 619 F.2d 449, 453
(5 h Cir. 1980) for he propo i ion ha If e er a e elec ion irreg lari ere
con idered a federal con i ional depri a ion, federal co r o ld adj dica e
e er a e elec ion di p e. ).
The ame i r e here. Plain iff ha e in rod ced onl pec la i e, concl or
and con radic or e imon from e per ha o ld do no more han e abli h a
po ibili of irreg lari ie if heir anal i ere correc , along i h a hodge-podge
of di para e claim b hird-par o er and ob er er claiming ha he ob er ed
a arie of differen p rpor ed irreg lari ie in a handf l of differen co n ie (none
of hich are par ie o hi ac ion). Plain iff ha e failed o demon ra e he
e raordinar circ m ance ri ing o he le el of a con i ional depri a ion ha
are nece ar o ppor a b an i e d e proce claim. Plain iff ha e herefore
failed o demon ra e a b an ial likelihood of cce on he meri of an claim
for iola ion of he 14 h Amendmen g aran ee of ei her proced ral or b an i e
D e Proce .
42
A ho n, he Plain iff ha e effec i el filed an elec ion challenge nder
Georgia la . Seeking o op cer ifica ion doe no a e he Plain iff Complain for
a lea o addi ional rea on . Fir , i ha long been he r le ha elec or are a e
and no federal official . , 93 F.2d 383, 388 (8 h Cir.
1937). Con eq en l , i i a e la ha de ermine ho challenge o elec or are
made, and Georgia la e for h ha proce a e plained abo e. Thi al o
demon ra e h ab en ion i appropria e. Second, o he e en ha he Plain iff
arg e ha co n elec ion official did no properl co n mail-in and ab en ee
ballo , here are a e remedie a ailable o challenge he ac of ho e co n
official . Indeed, Georgia la go erning elec ion challenge pro ide for j ha .
Finall , and a addre ed el e here in hi brief, he deci ion make
clear ha challenge o ac of co n official m be bro gh again ho e co n
official . 974 F.3d a 1254. I i in fficien o rel on he Secre ar general po er
o e abli h raceabili . , 2020 WL 6048048 a 23. Similarl , reliance
on he phra e chief elec ion official or a emen abo he niformi in he
admini ra ion of elec ion la ha e been deemed in fficien b he co r
hen i applied .
43
In m, beca e Plain iff are no likel o cceed on he meri of an of
heir claim , inj nc i e relief m be denied.
B. T e fPa ff efe ed ca d da e e a ab e a .
Plain iff fail o ar ic la e an pecific harm ha he face if hi req e ed relief
i no gran ed, o her han he ag e claim ha an infringemen on he righ o o e
con i e irreparable harm. Ho e er, Plain iff do no allege ha heir righ o o e
a denied or infringed in an a onl ha heir preferred candida e lo . I i no
irreparable harm if he are no able o ca heir o e in he Elec oral College for
Pre iden Tr mp, beca e [ ]o er ha e no j diciall enforceable in ere in he
o come of an elec ion. , 974 F.3d a 1246 ( Vo er ha e no j diciall
enforceable in ere in he o come of an elec ion. ).
Irreparable harm goe o he a ailabili of a remed no a par ic lar
o come. Cer if ing he e pre ed ill of he elec ora e i no irreparable harm, b
ra her ine i able and legall req ired i hin o r con i ional frame ork. There i
a remed a ailable o e en ha he lo ing candida e ra her han a di a i fied
o er, ppor er, or pre iden ial elec or eek po -cer ifica ion remedie , and ch
elec ion con e ha e been filed in a e co r and remain pending.
44
c .
The e remaining inj nc ion fac or balancing he eq i ie and p blic
in ere are freq en l con idered in andem b co r , a he real q e ion
po ed in hi con e i ho inj nc i e relief a hi ele en h-ho r o ld impac he
p blic in ere in an orderl and fair elec ion, i h he f lle o er par icipa ion
po ible. , 334 F. S pp. 3d 1303, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2018),
, 761 F. App 927 (11 h Cir. 2019) ,
549 U.S. a 4. The Co r m balance he compe ing claim of inj r and m
con ider he effec on each par of he gran ing or i hholding of he req e ed
relief, pa ing par ic lar regard a ell for he p blic con eq ence in emplo ing
he e raordinar remed of inj nc ion. , 555 U.S. a 24.
Here, he hrea ened inj r o Defendan a a e official and he p blic a
large far o eigh an minimal b rden on [Plain iff ]. , 2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS
218058 a 38. Confidence in he in egri of o r elec oral proce i e en ial o
he f nc ioning of o r par icipa or democrac , and co r order affec ing elec ion
can hem el e re l in o er conf ion and con eq en incen i e o remain a a
from he poll . , 549 U. S. a 4-5. For hi rea on, he S preme Co r ha
repea edl empha i ed ha lo er federal co r ho ld ordinaril no al er he
45
elec ion r le on he e e of an elec ion.
., 140 S.C . 1205, 1207 (April 6, 2020) (per c riam).
The Ele en h Circ i recen l held ha he principle applie i h e en
grea er force hen o ing ha alread occ rred.
, 976 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11 h Cir. 2020) ( [W]e are no on he e e of
he elec ion e are in he middle of i , i h ab en ee ballo alread prin ed and
mailed. An inj nc ion here o ld h iola e ell-kno n ca ion again
federal co r manda ing ne elec ion r le e peciall a he la min e. )
, 344 F.3d 914, 919 (9 h Cir.
2003) ( In erference i h impending elec ion i e raordinar , and in erference
i h an elec ion af er o ing ha beg n i npreceden ed. ).
Here, he elec ion , and he la e of pre iden ial
elec or ha been cer ified. Gran ing Plain iff e raordinar relief o ld onl er e
o di enfranchi e [] o er or ide ep he e pre ed ill of he people.
2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 37346 a 28. A he di ric co r in
correc l recogni ed, To in erfere i h he re l of an elec ion ha ha
alread concl ded o ld be npreceden ed and harm he p blic in co n le a .
2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS 218058 a 37-38. Plain iff eek e en broader relief han
ha o gh in If gran ed, Plain iff req e ed relief o ld di enfranchi e no
46
onl Georgia ab en ee o er b o ld in alida e a o e ca b Georgia
elec or .
CONCLUSION
For he foregoing rea on , Plain iff emergenc mo ion for inj nc i e relief
m be denied and he Co r ho ld di mi he ac ion i h prej dice. F r hermore,
he c rren TRO en ered b he Co r ho ld be immedia el di ol ed o pre en
ongoing harm o he abili of co n elec ion official o begin earl o ing for he
Jan ar r n-off, for he rea on ho n in S a e Defendan mo ion o modif he
TRO.
Re pec f ll bmi ed, hi 5 h da of December, 2020.
Chri opher M. Carr 112505

A orne General
Br an K. Webb 743580
Dep A orne General
R ell D. Willard 760280
Senior A i an A orne General
//
Charlene S. McGo an 697316
A i an A orne General
A lan a, GA 30334
cmcgo an la .ga.go
404-458-3658 ( el)
47
Care Miller
cmiller robbin firm.com
Jo h Belinfan e
jbelinfan e robbin firm.com
Melanie John on
mjohn on robbin firm.com
R bb R A Be fa e L ef e d
LLC
500 14 h S ree NW
A lan a, GA 30318
Telephone: (678) 701-9381
Fac imile: (404) 856-3250
48
I hereb cer if ha he foregoing ha been forma ed ing Time Ne
Roman fon in 14-poin pe in compliance i h Local R le 7.1(D).
//
Charlene S. McGo an
49
I hereb cer if ha I ha e hi da elec ronicall filed he foregoing STATE
MOTION TO DISMISS AND RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF S EMERGENCY
MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF i h he Clerk of Co r ing he
CM/ECF em, hich ill end no ifica ion of ch filing o co n el for all par ie
of record ia elec ronic no ifica ion.
Da ed: December 5, 2020.
//
Charlene S. McGo an
50
Signed at Boston, Massachusetts, on the date below.

Date: December 4, 2020
_________________________________
Stephen Ansolabehere
”
doi:10.1093/pan/mps031
3
Hailey Fuchs, “Some Regions Still Experience Slow Delivery of Mail Ballots,” New York Times, November 3, 2020,
Section A, Page 23. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/us/politics/mail-ballot-usps.html
5
Pew Research Center, “Comparing Survey Sampling Strategies: Random-Digit Dialing vs. Voter Files,” 2018.
https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2018/10/09/comparing-survey-sampling-strategies-random-digit-dial-vs-
voter-files/, See page 25-26.
Signed at Boston, Massachusetts, on the date below.

_________________________________
Stephen Ansolabehere
”
doi:10.1093/pan/mps031
Jonathan Rodden
Stanford University
Department of Political Science Phone: (650) 723-5219
Encina Hall Central Fax: (650) 723-1808
616 Serra Street Email: jrodden@stanford.edu
Stanford, CA 94305
Personal
Born on August 18. 1971, St. Louis, MO.
United States Citizen.
Education
Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, 2000.
Fulbright Scholar, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993–1994.
B.A., Political Science, University of Michigan, 1993.
Academic Positions
Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2012–present.
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2012–present.
Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2020–present.
Director, Spatial Social Science Lab, Stanford University, 2012–present.
W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford Univer-
sity, 2010–2012.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2007–2012.
Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, CA, 2006–2007.
Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT, 2003–2006.
Visiting Scholar, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University, 2004.
Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT, 1999–2003.
Instructor, Department of Political Science and School of Management, Yale University, 1997–1999.
1
Publications
Books
Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Divide. Basic Books, 2019.
Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic Research and the Future of Donor Programming. Co-
edited with Erik Wibbels, Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Hamilton‘s Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Winner,
Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007.
Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, MIT Press, 2003. Co-edited with
Gunnar Eskeland and Jennie Litvack.
Peer Reviewed Journal Articles

Partisan Dislocation: A Precinct-Level Measure of Representation and Gerrymandering, 2020, Political
Analysis forthcoming (with Daryl DeFord Nick Eubank).
Who is my Neighbor? The Spatial Efficiency of Partisanship, 2020, Statistics and Public Policy (with
Nick Eubank).
Handgun Ownership and Suicide in California, 2020, New England Journal of Medicine 382:2220-2229
(with David M. Studdert, Yifan Zhang, Sonja A. Swanson, Lea Prince, Erin E. Holsinger, Matthew J.
Spittal, Garen J. Wintemute, and Matthew Miller).
Viral Voting: Social Networks and Political Participation, 2020, Quarterly Journal of Political Science (with
Nick Eubank, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas).
It Takes a Village: Peer Effects and Externalities in Technology Adoption, 2020, American Journal of
Political Science (with Romain Ferrali, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas). Winner, 2020 Best Conference
Paper Award, American Political Science Association Network Section.
Assembly of the LongSHOT Cohort: Public Record Linkage on a Grand Scale, 2019, Injury Prevention
(with Yifan Zhang, Erin Holsinger, Lea Prince, Sonja Swanson, Matthew Miller, Garen Wintemute, and
David Studdert).
Crowdsourcing Accountability: ICT for Service Delivery, 2018, World Development 112: 74-87 (with Guy
Grossman and Melina Platas).
Geography, Uncertainty, and Polarization, 2018, Political Science Research and Methods doi:10.1017/
psrm.2018.12 (with Nolan McCarty, Boris Shor, Chris Tausanovitch, and Chris Warshaw).
Handgun Acquisitions in California after Two Mass Shootings, 2017, Annals of Internal Medicine 166(10):698-
706. (with David Studdert, Yifan Zhang, Rob Hyndman, and Garen Wintemute).
Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders,
2015, Election Law Journal 14,4:1-15 (with Jowei Chen).
The Achilles Heel of Plurality Systems: Geography and Representation in Multi-Party Democracies,
2015, American Journal of Political Science 59,4: 789-805 (with Ernesto Calvo). Winner, Michael Waller-
stein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association.
Why has U.S. Policy Uncertainty Risen Since 1960?, 2014, American Economic Review: Papers and Pro-
ceedings May 2014 (with Nicholas Bloom, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Scott Baker, and Steven Davis).
2
Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 2013, Quarterly
Journal of Political Science 8: 239-269 (with Jowei Chen).
How Should We Measure District-Level Public Opinion on Individual Issues?, 2012, Journal of Politics
74, 1: 203-219 (with Chris Warshaw).
Representation and Redistribution in Federations, 2011, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
108, 21:8601-8604 (with Tiberiu Dragu).
Dual Accountability and the Nationalization of Party Competition: Evidence from Four Federatons,
2011, Party Politics 17, 5: 629-653 (with Erik Wibbels).
The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences, 2010, Annual Review of Political Science 13: 297–340.
Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 2009, Eco-
nomics and Politics 22,1: 37–67 (with Erik Wibbels).
Getting into the Game: Legislative Bargaining, Distributive Politics, and EU Enlargement, 2009, Public
Finance and Management 9, 4 (with Deniz Aksoy).
The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint,
and Issue Voting, 2008. American Political Science Review 102, 2: 215–232 (with Stephen Ansolabehere
and James Snyder).
Does Religion Distract the Poor? Income and Issue Voting Around the World, 2008, Comparative Political
Studies 41, 4: 437–476 (with Ana Lorena De La O).
Purple America, 2006, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20,2 (Spring): 97–118 (with Stephen Ansolabehere
and James Snyder).
Economic Geography and Economic Voting: Evidence from the U.S. States, 2006, British Journal of
Political Science 36, 3: 527–47 (with Michael Ebeid).
Distributive Politics in a Federation: Electoral Strategies, Legislative Bargaining, and Government
Coalitions, 2004, Dados 47, 3 (with Marta Arretche, in Portuguese).
Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement, 2004, Comparative Poli-
tics 36, 4: 481-500. (Portuguese version, 2005, in Revista de Sociologia e Politica 25).
Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government, 2003, International Organization
57 (Fall), 695–729.
Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multi-tiered Systems, 2003, World
Politics 54, 4 (July): 494–531 (with Erik Wibbels).
The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World, 2002, American
Journal of Political Science 46(3): 670–687.
Strength in Numbers: Representation and Redistribution in the European Union, 2002, European Union
Politics 3, 2: 151–175.
Does Federalism Preserve Markets? Virginia Law Review 83, 7 (with Susan Rose-Ackerman). Spanish
version, 1999, in Quorum 68.
3
Working Papers
Federalism and Inter-regional Redistribution, Working Paper 2009/3, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona.
Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations, Working Paper 2010/16, Institut d’Economia
de Barcelona (with Tiberiu Dragu).
Chapters in Books
Political Geography and Representation: A Case Study of Districting in Pennsylvania (with Thomas
Weighill), forthcoming 2021.
Decentralized Rule and Revenue, 2019, in Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, eds., Decentralized Gov-
ernance and Accountability, Cambridge University Press.
Geography and Gridlock in the United States, 2014, in Nathaniel Persily, ed. Solutions to Political
Polarization in America, Cambridge University Press.
Can Market Discipline Survive in the U.S. Federation?, 2013, in Daniel Nadler and Paul Peterson, eds,
The Global Debt Crisis: Haunting U.S. and European Federalism, Brookings Press.
Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, 2012, in Peter Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel, Jr., eds, When
States Go Broke: The Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal Crisis, Cambridge
University Press.
Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribution, 2010, in Nuria Bosch, Marta Espasa, and Albert Sole
Olle, eds., The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows, Edward Elgar.
Back to the Future: Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics, 2009, in Mark Lichbach and
Alan Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Second Edition), Cam-
bridge University Press.
The Political Economy of Federalism, 2006, in Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., Oxford Hand-
book of Political Economy, Oxford University Press.
Fiscal Discipline in Federations: Germany and the EMU, 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena
Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe, Palgrave MacMillan.
The Political Economy of Pro-cyclical Decentralised Finance (with Erik Wibbels), 2006, in Peter Wierts,
Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe, Palgrave
MacMillan.
Globalization and Fiscal Decentralization, (with Geoffrey Garrett), 2003, in Miles Kahler and David
Lake, eds., Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, Princeton University Press:
87-109. (Updated version, 2007, in David Cameron, Gustav Ranis, and Annalisa Zinn, eds., Globalization
and Self-Determination: Is the Nation-State under Siege? Routledge.)
Introduction and Overview (Chapter 1), 2003, in Rodden et al., Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge
of Hard Budget Constraints (see above).
Soft Budget Constraints and German Federalism (Chapter 5), 2003, in Rodden, et al, Fiscal Decentral-
ization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (see above).
Federalism and Bailouts in Brazil (Chapter 7), 2003, in Rodden, et al., Fiscal Decentralization and the
Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (see above).
Lessons and Conclusions (Chapter 13), 2003, in Rodden, et al., Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge
4
Online Interactive Visualization

Stanford Election Atlas, 2012 (collaboration with Stephen Ansolabehere at Harvard and Jim Herries at
ESRI)
Other Publications
How America’s Urban-Rural Divide has Shaped the Pandemic, 2020, Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2020.
An Evolutionary Path for the European Monetary Fund? A Comparative Perspective, 2017, Briefing
paper for the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.
Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations: A Research Report, 2009, in World Report
on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona.
On the Migration of Fiscal Sovereignty, 2004, PS: Political Science and Politics July, 2004: 427–431.
Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, PREM Note 41, Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management Unit, World Bank, Washington, D.C. (July).
Decentralization and Hard Budget Constraints, APSA-CP (Newsletter of the Organized Section in
Comparative Politics, American Political Science Association) 11:1 (with Jennie Litvack).
Book Review of The Government of Money by Peter Johnson, Comparative Political Studies 32,7: 897-900.
Fellowships and Honors

Fund for a Safer Future, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer (LongSHOT),
GA004696, 2017-2018.
Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, Innovation and Entrepreneurship research
grant, 2015.
Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association,
2016.
Common Cause Gerrymandering Standard Writing Competition, 2015.
General support grant from the Hewlett Foundation for Spatial Social Science Lab, 2014.
Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2012.
Sloan Foundation, grant for assembly of geo-referenced precinct-level electoral data set (with Stephen
Ansolabehere and James Snyder), 2009-2011.
Hoagland Award Fund for Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching, Stanford University, 2009.
sity, beginning Fall 2010.
Research Grant on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d‘Economia de Barcelona, 2009.
United Postal Service Foundation grant for study of the spatial distribution of income in cities, 2008.
5
Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 2006-2007.

National Science Foundation grant for assembly of cross-national provincial-level dataset on elections,
public finance, and government composition, 2003-2004 (with Erik Wibbels).
MIT Dean‘s Fund and School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Research Funds.
Funding from DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), MIT, and Harvard EU Center to organize
the conference, ”European Fiscal Federalism in Comparative Perspective,” held at Harvard University,
November 4, 2000.
Canadian Studies Fellowship (Canadian Federal Government), 1996-1997.
Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale University, 1998-1999.
Fulbright Grant, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993-1994.
Michigan Association of Governing Boards Award, one of two top graduating students at the Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1993.
W. J. Bryan Prize, top graduating senior in political science department at the University of Michigan,
1993.
Other Professional Activities

International Advisory Committee, Center for Metropolitan Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2006–2010.
Selection committee, Mancur Olson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association Po-
litical Economy Section for the best dissertation in the field of political economy.
Selection committee, Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award.
Selection committee, William Anderson Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association
for the best dissertation in the field of federalism and intergovernmental relations.
Courses
Undergraduate
Politics, Economics, and Democracy
Introduction to Comparative Politics
Introduction to Political Science
Political Science Scope and Methods
Institutional Economics
Spatial Approaches to Social Science
Graduate
Political Economy of Institutions
Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization
Politics and Geography
6
Consulting
2017. Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.
2016. Briefing paper for the World Bank on fiscal federalism in Brazil.
2013-2018: Principal Investigator, SMS for Better Governance (a collaborative project involving USAID,
Social Impact, and UNICEF in Arua, Uganda).
2019: Written expert testimony in McLemore, Holmes, Robinson, and Woullard v. Hosemann, United States
District Court, Mississippi.
2019: Expert witness in Nancy Corola Jacobson v. Detzner, United States District Court, Florida.
2018: Written expert testimony in League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner No. 4:18-cv-002510,
United States District Court, Florida.
2018: Written expert testimony in College Democrats of the University of Michigan, et al. v. Johnson, et al.,
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
2017: Expert witness in Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections, No. 3:14-CV-00852, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
2017: Expert witness in Arizona Democratic Party, et al. v. Reagan, et al., No. 2:16-CV-01065, United
States District Court for Arizona.
2016: Expert witness in Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections, 3:15-cv-357, United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.
2016: Expert witness in Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant School District, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.
2014-2015: Written expert testimony in League of Women Voters of Florida et al. v. Detzner, et al., 2012-CA-
002842 in Florida Circuit Court, Leon County (Florida Senate redistricting case).
2013-2014: Expert witness in Romo v Detzner, 2012-CA-000412 in Florida Curcuit Court, Leon County
(Florida Congressional redistricting case).
2011-2014: Consultation with investment groups and hedge funds on European debt crisis.
2011-2014: Lead Outcome Expert, Democracy and Governance, USAID and Social Impact.
2010: USAID, Review of USAID analysis of decentralization in Africa.
2006–2009: World Bank, Independent Evaluations Group. Undertook evaluations of World Bank de-
centralization and safety net programs.
2008–2011: International Monetary Fund Institute. Designed and taught course on fiscal federalism.
1998–2003: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Consultant for World De-
velopment Report, lecturer for training courses, participant in working group for assembly of decentral-
ization data, director of multi-country study of fiscal discipline in decentralized countries, collaborator
on review of subnational adjustment lending.
Last updated: October 19, 2020
7
December 5, 2020
Pearson v. Kemp, Case No. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
United States District Court for Northern District of Georgia
Expert Report of Jonathan Rodden, PhD and William Marble
__________________________
Jonathan Rodden, PhD
__
William Marble
8
https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/Fulton/105430/web.264614/#/summary
Jonathan Rodden
Stanford University
Department of Political Science Phone: (650) 723-5219
Encina Hall Central Fax: (650) 723-1808
616 Serra Street Email: jrodden@stanford.edu
Stanford, CA 94305
Personal
Born on August 18. 1971, St. Louis, MO.
United States Citizen.
Education
Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, 2000.
Fulbright Scholar, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993–1994.
B.A., Political Science, University of Michigan, 1993.
Academic Positions
Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2012–present.
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2012–present.
Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2020–present.
Director, Spatial Social Science Lab, Stanford University, 2012–present.
sity, 2010–2012.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2007–2012.
Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, CA, 2006–2007.
Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT, 2003–2006.
Visiting Scholar, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University, 2004.
Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT, 1999–2003.
Instructor, Department of Political Science and School of Management, Yale University, 1997–1999.
1
Publications
Books
Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Divide. Basic Books, 2019.
Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic Research and the Future of Donor Programming. Co-
edited with Erik Wibbels, Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Hamilton‘s Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Winner,
Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, MIT Press, 2003. Co-edited with
Gunnar Eskeland and Jennie Litvack.
Peer Reviewed Journal Articles

Partisan Dislocation: A Precinct-Level Measure of Representation and Gerrymandering, 2020, Political
Analysis forthcoming (with Daryl DeFord Nick Eubank).
Who is my Neighbor? The Spatial Efficiency of Partisanship, 2020, Statistics and Public Policy (with
Nick Eubank).
Handgun Ownership and Suicide in California, 2020, New England Journal of Medicine 382:2220-2229
(with David M. Studdert, Yifan Zhang, Sonja A. Swanson, Lea Prince, Erin E. Holsinger, Matthew J.
Spittal, Garen J. Wintemute, and Matthew Miller).
Viral Voting: Social Networks and Political Participation, 2020, Quarterly Journal of Political Science (with
Nick Eubank, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas).
It Takes a Village: Peer Effects and Externalities in Technology Adoption, 2020, American Journal of
Political Science (with Romain Ferrali, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas). Winner, 2020 Best Conference
Paper Award, American Political Science Association Network Section.
Assembly of the LongSHOT Cohort: Public Record Linkage on a Grand Scale, 2019, Injury Prevention
(with Yifan Zhang, Erin Holsinger, Lea Prince, Sonja Swanson, Matthew Miller, Garen Wintemute, and
David Studdert).
Crowdsourcing Accountability: ICT for Service Delivery, 2018, World Development 112: 74-87 (with Guy
Grossman and Melina Platas).
Geography, Uncertainty, and Polarization, 2018, Political Science Research and Methods doi:10.1017/
psrm.2018.12 (with Nolan McCarty, Boris Shor, Chris Tausanovitch, and Chris Warshaw).
Handgun Acquisitions in California after Two Mass Shootings, 2017, Annals of Internal Medicine 166(10):698-
706. (with David Studdert, Yifan Zhang, Rob Hyndman, and Garen Wintemute).
Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders,
2015, Election Law Journal 14,4:1-15 (with Jowei Chen).
The Achilles Heel of Plurality Systems: Geography and Representation in Multi-Party Democracies,
2015, American Journal of Political Science 59,4: 789-805 (with Ernesto Calvo). Winner, Michael Waller-
stein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association.
Why has U.S. Policy Uncertainty Risen Since 1960?, 2014, American Economic Review: Papers and Pro-
ceedings May 2014 (with Nicholas Bloom, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Scott Baker, and Steven Davis).
2
Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 2013, Quarterly
Journal of Political Science 8: 239-269 (with Jowei Chen).
How Should We Measure District-Level Public Opinion on Individual Issues?, 2012, Journal of Politics
74, 1: 203-219 (with Chris Warshaw).
Representation and Redistribution in Federations, 2011, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
108, 21:8601-8604 (with Tiberiu Dragu).
Dual Accountability and the Nationalization of Party Competition: Evidence from Four Federatons,
2011, Party Politics 17, 5: 629-653 (with Erik Wibbels).
The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences, 2010, Annual Review of Political Science 13: 297–340.
Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 2009, Eco-
nomics and Politics 22,1: 37–67 (with Erik Wibbels).
Getting into the Game: Legislative Bargaining, Distributive Politics, and EU Enlargement, 2009, Public
Finance and Management 9, 4 (with Deniz Aksoy).
The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint,
and Issue Voting, 2008. American Political Science Review 102, 2: 215–232 (with Stephen Ansolabehere
and James Snyder).
Does Religion Distract the Poor? Income and Issue Voting Around the World, 2008, Comparative Political
Studies 41, 4: 437–476 (with Ana Lorena De La O).
Purple America, 2006, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20,2 (Spring): 97–118 (with Stephen Ansolabehere
and James Snyder).
Economic Geography and Economic Voting: Evidence from the U.S. States, 2006, British Journal of
Political Science 36, 3: 527–47 (with Michael Ebeid).
Distributive Politics in a Federation: Electoral Strategies, Legislative Bargaining, and Government
Coalitions, 2004, Dados 47, 3 (with Marta Arretche, in Portuguese).
Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement, 2004, Comparative Poli-
tics 36, 4: 481-500. (Portuguese version, 2005, in Revista de Sociologia e Politica 25).
Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government, 2003, International Organization
57 (Fall), 695–729.
Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multi-tiered Systems, 2003, World
Politics 54, 4 (July): 494–531 (with Erik Wibbels).
The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World, 2002, American
Journal of Political Science 46(3): 670–687.
Strength in Numbers: Representation and Redistribution in the European Union, 2002, European Union
Politics 3, 2: 151–175.
Does Federalism Preserve Markets? Virginia Law Review 83, 7 (with Susan Rose-Ackerman). Spanish
version, 1999, in Quorum 68.
3
Working Papers
Federalism and Inter-regional Redistribution, Working Paper 2009/3, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona.
Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations, Working Paper 2010/16, Institut d’Economia
de Barcelona (with Tiberiu Dragu).
Chapters in Books
Political Geography and Representation: A Case Study of Districting in Pennsylvania (with Thomas
Weighill), forthcoming 2021.
Decentralized Rule and Revenue, 2019, in Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, eds., Decentralized Gov-
ernance and Accountability, Cambridge University Press.
Geography and Gridlock in the United States, 2014, in Nathaniel Persily, ed. Solutions to Political
Polarization in America, Cambridge University Press.
Can Market Discipline Survive in the U.S. Federation?, 2013, in Daniel Nadler and Paul Peterson, eds,
The Global Debt Crisis: Haunting U.S. and European Federalism, Brookings Press.
Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, 2012, in Peter Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel, Jr., eds, When
States Go Broke: The Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal Crisis, Cambridge
University Press.
Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribution, 2010, in Nuria Bosch, Marta Espasa, and Albert Sole
Olle, eds., The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows, Edward Elgar.
Back to the Future: Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics, 2009, in Mark Lichbach and
Alan Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Second Edition), Cam-
bridge University Press.
The Political Economy of Federalism, 2006, in Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., Oxford Hand-
book of Political Economy, Oxford University Press.
Fiscal Discipline in Federations: Germany and the EMU, 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena
Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe, Palgrave MacMillan.
The Political Economy of Pro-cyclical Decentralised Finance (with Erik Wibbels), 2006, in Peter Wierts,
Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe, Palgrave
MacMillan.
Globalization and Fiscal Decentralization, (with Geoffrey Garrett), 2003, in Miles Kahler and David
Lake, eds., Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, Princeton University Press:
87-109. (Updated version, 2007, in David Cameron, Gustav Ranis, and Annalisa Zinn, eds., Globalization
and Self-Determination: Is the Nation-State under Siege? Routledge.)
Introduction and Overview (Chapter 1), 2003, in Rodden et al., Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge
Soft Budget Constraints and German Federalism (Chapter 5), 2003, in Rodden, et al, Fiscal Decentral-
ization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (see above).
Federalism and Bailouts in Brazil (Chapter 7), 2003, in Rodden, et al., Fiscal Decentralization and the
Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (see above).
Lessons and Conclusions (Chapter 13), 2003, in Rodden, et al., Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge
4
Online Interactive Visualization

Stanford Election Atlas, 2012 (collaboration with Stephen Ansolabehere at Harvard and Jim Herries at
ESRI)
Other Publications
How America’s Urban-Rural Divide has Shaped the Pandemic, 2020, Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2020.
An Evolutionary Path for the European Monetary Fund? A Comparative Perspective, 2017, Briefing
paper for the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.
Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations: A Research Report, 2009, in World Report
on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona.
On the Migration of Fiscal Sovereignty, 2004, PS: Political Science and Politics July, 2004: 427–431.
Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, PREM Note 41, Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management Unit, World Bank, Washington, D.C. (July).
Decentralization and Hard Budget Constraints, APSA-CP (Newsletter of the Organized Section in
Comparative Politics, American Political Science Association) 11:1 (with Jennie Litvack).
Book Review of The Government of Money by Peter Johnson, Comparative Political Studies 32,7: 897-900.
Fellowships and Honors

Fund for a Safer Future, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer (LongSHOT),
GA004696, 2017-2018.
Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, Innovation and Entrepreneurship research
grant, 2015.
Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association,
2016.
Common Cause Gerrymandering Standard Writing Competition, 2015.
General support grant from the Hewlett Foundation for Spatial Social Science Lab, 2014.
Sloan Foundation, grant for assembly of geo-referenced precinct-level electoral data set (with Stephen
Ansolabehere and James Snyder), 2009-2011.
Hoagland Award Fund for Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching, Stanford University, 2009.
sity, beginning Fall 2010.
Research Grant on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d‘Economia de Barcelona, 2009.
United Postal Service Foundation grant for study of the spatial distribution of income in cities, 2008.
5
Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 2006-2007.

National Science Foundation grant for assembly of cross-national provincial-level dataset on elections,
public finance, and government composition, 2003-2004 (with Erik Wibbels).
MIT Dean‘s Fund and School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Research Funds.
Funding from DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), MIT, and Harvard EU Center to organize
the conference, ”European Fiscal Federalism in Comparative Perspective,” held at Harvard University,
November 4, 2000.
Canadian Studies Fellowship (Canadian Federal Government), 1996-1997.
Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale University, 1998-1999.
Fulbright Grant, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993-1994.
Michigan Association of Governing Boards Award, one of two top graduating students at the Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1993.
W. J. Bryan Prize, top graduating senior in political science department at the University of Michigan,
1993.
Other Professional Activities

International Advisory Committee, Center for Metropolitan Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2006–2010.
Selection committee, Mancur Olson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association Po-
litical Economy Section for the best dissertation in the field of political economy.
Selection committee, Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award.
Selection committee, William Anderson Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association
for the best dissertation in the field of federalism and intergovernmental relations.
Courses
Undergraduate
Politics, Economics, and Democracy
Introduction to Comparative Politics
Introduction to Political Science
Political Science Scope and Methods
Institutional Economics
Spatial Approaches to Social Science
Graduate
Political Economy of Institutions
Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization
Politics and Geography
6
Consulting
2017. Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.
2016. Briefing paper for the World Bank on fiscal federalism in Brazil.
2013-2018: Principal Investigator, SMS for Better Governance (a collaborative project involving USAID,
Social Impact, and UNICEF in Arua, Uganda).
2019: Written expert testimony in McLemore, Holmes, Robinson, and Woullard v. Hosemann, United States
District Court, Mississippi.
2019: Expert witness in Nancy Corola Jacobson v. Detzner, United States District Court, Florida.
2018: Written expert testimony in League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner No. 4:18-cv-002510,
United States District Court, Florida.
2018: Written expert testimony in College Democrats of the University of Michigan, et al. v. Johnson, et al.,
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
2017: Expert witness in Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections, No. 3:14-CV-00852, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
2017: Expert witness in Arizona Democratic Party, et al. v. Reagan, et al., No. 2:16-CV-01065, United
States District Court for Arizona.
2016: Expert witness in Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections, 3:15-cv-357, United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.
2016: Expert witness in Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant School District, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.
2014-2015: Written expert testimony in League of Women Voters of Florida et al. v. Detzner, et al., 2012-CA-
002842 in Florida Circuit Court, Leon County (Florida Senate redistricting case).
2013-2014: Expert witness in Romo v Detzner, 2012-CA-000412 in Florida Curcuit Court, Leon County
(Florida Congressional redistricting case).
2011-2014: Consultation with investment groups and hedge funds on European debt crisis.
2011-2014: Lead Outcome Expert, Democracy and Governance, USAID and Social Impact.
2010: USAID, Review of USAID analysis of decentralization in Africa.
2006–2009: World Bank, Independent Evaluations Group. Undertook evaluations of World Bank de-
centralization and safety net programs.
2008–2011: International Monetary Fund Institute. Designed and taught course on fiscal federalism.
1998–2003: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Consultant for World De-
velopment Report, lecturer for training courses, participant in working group for assembly of decentral-
ization data, director of multi-country study of fiscal discipline in decentralized countries, collaborator
on review of subnational adjustment lending.
Last updated: October 19, 2020
7
William Marble
Encina Hall West, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305
wpmarble@stanford.edu ⇧ williammarble.co ⇧ (610) 389-9708
Education Stanford University 2015-Present

Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
Fields: American Politics, Political Methodology, Comparative Politics (minor)
Dissertation: “Political Responses to Economic Decline”
Commi�ee: Kenneth Scheve, Jonathan Rodden, Justin Grimmer, Clayton Nall
University of Pennsylvania 2011-2015
B.A. in Political Science and Economics, minor in Mathematics
Publications William Marble and Clayton Nall. “Where Interests Trump Ideology: Liberal Homeowners and
Local Opposition to Housing Development.” Journal of Politics (Forthcoming). [link]
Amalie Jensen, William Marble, Kenneth Scheve, and Ma�hew J. Slaughter. “City Limits to
Partisan Polarization in the American Public.” Forthcoming, Political Science Research
and Methods. [link]
William Marble and Ma�hew Tyler. “�e Structure of Political Choices: Distinguishing Be-
tween Constraint and Multidimensionality.” Conditionally accepted, Political Analysis.
[link]
Working Ala’ Alrababa’h, William Marble, Salma Mousa, and Alexandra Siegel. “Can Exposure to
Papers Celebrities Reduce Prejudice? �e E�ect of Mohamed Salah on Islamophobic Behav-
iors and A�itudes.” Revised and resubmi�ed, American Political Science Review. [link]
William Marble. “Responsiveness in a Polarized Era: How Local Economic Conditions Struc-
ture Campaign Rhetoric.” (Job Market Paper) [link]
Justin Grimmer and William Marble. “Who Put Trump in the White House? Explaining the
Contribution of Voting Blocs to Trump’s Victory.” [link]
William Marble and Nathan Lee. “Why Not Run? How �e Demands of Fundraising Under-
mine Ambition for Higher O�ce.” [link]
Kaiping Chen, Nathan Lee, and William Marble. “How Policymakers Evaluate Online versus
O�ine Constituent Messages.” [link]
William Marble. “All-Mail Voting Can Decrease Ballot Roll-O�.” [link]
In Progress “Estimating Issue Weights in American Federal Elections, 1980-2018”

“Social Ties, Labor Mobility, and Support for the Welfare State”
“A�itude Activation and the Study of Political Campaigns” (with Cole Tanigawa-Lau and
Justin Grimmer)
“How Much Do Social Connections Ma�er for Political Success?” (with Ari Ray)
“Creating the American Gentry: Political Consequences of Property Tax Reform in California”
(with Clayton Nall)
“Where’s the Party in Foreign Policy?” (with Rachel Myrick and Carl Gustafson)
Grants and Dissertation Fellowship, Stanford Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, 2020-2021 ($5,500)
Awards Collaborative Research Fellowship, Stanford Impact Labs, 2020 ($7,000)
Schultz Graduate Student Fellowship in Economic Policy, Stanford Institute for Economic Pol-
icy Research, 2019 ($9,000)
Computational Social Science Grant, Russell Sage Foundation, 2019 (with Ari Ray, $9,835)
Ric Weiland Graduate Fellowship in the Humanities and Sciences, 2018-2020
Stanford Centennial Teaching Assistant Award, 2018
Small Grants for Survey Experiments in Political Science, Stanford Institute for Research in
the Social Sciences, 2018 (with Ala’ Alrababa’h and Salma Mousa, $1,000)
Conference travel grant, Penn College of Arts and Sciences, 2015
Undergrad research grant, Penn Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism Program, 2014
Research fellow, Penn Program on Opinion Research and Election Studies, 2013 and 2014
Invited 2019: UC Santa Barbara

Presentations
Conferences American Political Science Association (2017, 2019)
Midwest Political Science Association (2015, 2018)
Stanford-Berkeley Political Economy Working Group (2018)
American Association for Public Opinion Research (2016)
Teaching Teaching Assistant

Graduate Political Methodology I, 2016 and 2017 (Stanford)
Graduate Political Methodology II, 2017 and 2018 (Stanford)
Math Camp for incoming Ph.D. students, 2016 and 2017 (Stanford)
Undergraduate Political Methodology, 2015 (Penn)
�inking Strategically: Introduction to Game �eory, 2017 (Stanford)
What’s Wrong with American Politics? An Institutional Approach, 2019 and 2020 (Stanford)
International Negotiation and Decision-Making, 2018 (Stanford, short course)
Instructional Workshops
Introduction to Data Science, workshop for high school students visiting Stanford, 2018
Introduction to Webscraping, Stanford Summer Research College, 2016. Links to materials:
slides, tutorial (pdf), GitHub.
Data Visualization Using ggplot2, presentation to Stanford political science graduate stu-
dents, 2016. Links to materials: slides, GitHub.
Introduction to Stata, workshop for summer fellows at the Penn Program for Opinion Research
and Election Studies, 2015
Service Reviewer for American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal
of Politics
TA Mentor for the Stanford Political Science Department, 2017-2020

Co-Chair, Stanford Political Science Graduate Student Association, 2018
Co-Organizer, Stanford Political Science Very Applied Methods Workshop, 2017-2018
Social Chair, Stanford Political Science Graduate Student Association, 2016
Policy “�e Evidence and Tradeo�s for a Stay-at-Home Pandemic Response: A Multidisciplinary
Writing Review of Stay-at-Home Implementation in America.” Policy brief reviewing early research
on covid-19, April 2020. (with Alexis A. Doyle, Mollie S.H. Friedlander, Grace D. Li, Courtney
J. Smith, et al.) [link]
Non-testifying expert witness research in League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, United
States District Court, Northern District of Florida, 2018. (with Jonathan Rodden)
Co-author of expert report on the 2015 vote-by-mail election in San Mateo County, California.
Commissioned by the San Mateo County Election O�ce. (with Melissa Michelson)
Other Co-founder, CivicPulse

Experience Election analyst, NBC News Decision Desk, New York, 2014 midterm elections
Debate coach, La Salle College High School, Wyndmoor, PA, 2011-2015
References Kenneth Scheve Jonathan Rodden

Professor of Political Science and Global A�airs Professor of Political Science
Yale University Stanford University
Email: kenneth.scheve@yale.edu Email: jrodden@stanford.edu
Clayton Nall Justin Grimmer

Assistant Professor of Political Science Professor of Political Science
UC Santa Barbara Stanford University
Email: nall@ucsb.edu Email: jgrimmer@stanford.edu

ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JA AN PEARSON, , )
)
Plain iff , )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
. ) 1:20-c -4809-TCB
)
BRIAN KEMP, , )
)
Defendan . )

MOTION TO DISMISS AND RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Chri opher M. Carr Care Miller

A orne General Jo h Belinfan e
Br an K. Webb Melanie John on
Dep A orne General
R ell D. Willard Robbin Ro Allo Belinfan e
Senior A i an A orne General Li lefield LLC
Charlene S. McGo an 500 14 h S ree NW
A i an A orne General A lan a, GA 30318

A lan a, GA 30334
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................................4
C ed. .............................................................................................4
A. Ad a d e ec f Ge a e ec c e . ................5
B. Te a d ce f ca f Ge a e . ...............................7
Pa ff a e ec a a ed e b eR -
L A d . .............................................................................................9
II. Ab e ee Ba We e Va d P ce ed Acc d La ..................12
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES .......................................15
E ab A c e III S a d ..................................................................15
f S a d .................................................................................................17
B. P a ff d a eS a d a P e de a E ec . .......................19
C. P a ff A e ed I e a e T aceab e eS ae
Defe da . ..................................................................................................21
II. P a ff C a a eM ..........................................................................24
III. P a ff C a a e Ba ed b eEe e A e d e . ...................25
IV. Lac e Ba Pa ff C a f P -E ec Re ef. ..........................27
V. T e C d Ab a f G a Re ef. .....................................30
i
VI. P a ff M f I c e Re ef S d be De ed. ......................34
A. P a ff a e e cceed e e f e ca . ..........34
B. T e fPa ff efe ed ca d da e e a ab e a . ....44
c .....................................................................................................45
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................47
ii
INTRODUCTION
Plain iff , a gro p of di appoin ed Rep blican pre iden ial elec or , filed a
Complain alleging ide pread fra d in he No ember general elec ion in Georgia,
ea ing an n ppor ed ale of ballo ffing, he i ching of o e b an
algori hm ploaded o he a e elec ronic o ing eq ipmen ha i ched o e
from Pre iden Tr mp o Joe Biden, hacking b foreign ac or from Iran and China,
and o her nefario ac b nnamed ac or . Plain iff did no bring hi elec ion
challenge in a e co r a pro ided b Georgia Elec ion Code. In ead, he a k
hi Co r o change he elec ion o come b j dicial fia and order he Go ernor,
he Secre ar , and he S a e Elec ion Board o de-cer if he re l of he elec ion
and replace he pre iden ial elec or for Joe Biden ( ho ere elec ed b a majori
of Georgia o er b pop lar o e a pro ided b a e la ) i h pre iden ial elec or
for Pre iden Tr mp. Their claim o ld be e raordinar if r e, b he are no .
M ch like he m hological kraken mon er1 af er hich Plain iff ha e named
hi la i , heir claim of elec ion fra d and malfea ance belong more o he
kraken realm of m ho han he do o reali .
1
A kraken i a m hical ea mon er appearing in Scandina ian folklore, being
clo el linked o ailor abili o ell all ale .
h p ://en. ikipedia.org/ iki/Kraken.
1
The r h i ha he 2020 general elec ion a , according o he federal agenc
a ked i h o er eeing elec ion ec ri , he mo ec re in hi or . ( E b
B.)2 C ber ec ri e per ha e de ermined ha here i e de ce a a
e de e ed e c a ed e a a a
c ed. ( ) The acc rac of he pre iden ial elec ion re l ha been
confirmed hro gh a lea (1) he a e ide ri k-limi ing a di (2) a hand reco n
and (3) independen e ing, hich ha confirmed ha he ec ri of he ae
elec ronic o ing eq ipmen a no compromi ed.
A a hre hold ma er, he Ele en h Circ i i ed an opinion oda ha
manda e di mi al of hi ac ion for lack of anding and moo ne in he rela ed
ca e of , No. 20-14418, hich rai ed man of he ame claim
a hi ca e and o gh imilar relief. ( lip opinion a ached a E b A). In
affirming he di ric co r deci ion den ing Wood mo ion o enjoin cer ifica ion
of he elec ion re l , he panel held:
We agree i h he di ric co r ha Wood lack anding o e

beca e he fail o allege a par ic lari ed inj r . And beca e Georgia
ha alread cer ified i elec ion re l and i la e of pre iden ial
elec or , Wood req e for emergenc relief are moo o he e en
he concern he 2020 elec ion. The Con i ion make clear ha
2
C ber ec ri & Infra r c re Sec ri Agenc Join S a emen From
Elec ion Infra r c re Go ernmen Coordina ing Co ncil & he Elec ion
Infra r c re Selec or Coordina ing Commi ee , No ember 12, 2020. A r e and
correc cop of hi a emen i a ached a E b B.
2
federal co r are co r of limi ed j ri dic ion, U.S. Con . ar . III e

ma no en er ain po -elec ion con e abo garden- arie i e of
o e co n ing and mi cond c ha ma properl be filed in a e co r .
( lip op. a 1). Thi deci ion q arel con rol , and he Co r ho ld di mi he
ac ion beca e Plain iff lack an inj r in fac fficien o e abli h Ar icle III
anding. Cer ifica ion of he elec ion re l al o moo Plain iff claim , a he
Co r ha no a hori nder federal la o ndo ha ha alread been done.
O her hre hold i e bar he relief Plain iff eek. E en if he ere no
moo , Plain iff claim are barred b lache beca e of heir ine c able dela in
rai ing heir challenge o he S a e elec ronic o ing em and ab en ee ballo
proced re n il af er heir preferred candida e lo . Plain iff claim are al o barred
b he Ele en h Amendmen o he U.S. Con i ion, hich bar i for
re ro pec i e relief again a e official ac ing in heir official capaci ab en a
ai er b he S a e. Similarl , de pi e heir a emp o rai e con i ional claim ,
Plain iff la i i reall an elec ion con e challenging he Pre iden ial elec ion,
hich can and ho ld be bro gh in a Georgia co r a ome of Plain iff allie ha e
recen l done.
B mo impor an l , here i no credible e idence o ppor he dra ic and
npreceden ed remed of b i ing cer ified pre iden ial elec ion re l i h he
Plain iff preferred candida e. Wi ho hi , Plain iff canno clearl e abli h he
3
req ired elemen for inj nc i e relief. Like e er a e, Georgia ha a compelling
in ere in pre er ing he in egri of i elec ion proce . Confidence in he
in egri of o r elec oral proce e i e en ial o he f nc ioning of o r par icipa or
democrac . , 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006). P blic confidence in he
elec oral proce o ld cer ainl be ndermined b a co r in alida ing he cer ified
re l of a pre iden ial elec ion in hich nearl 5 million Georgian ca ballo .
Thi Co r ho ld decline Plain iff n ppor able effor o o er rn he e pre ed
ill of he o er , and ho ld den heir req e for relief and di mi hi ac ion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
C ed.
Plain iff allege ide-ranging con pirac heorie ha Georgia elec ronic
o ing em ha been compromi ed b H go Cha e and he Vene elan
go ernmen (or China and Iran, depending on hich e per i a ked), i infec ed
ih a ag el de cribed eigh ed algori hm ha i che o e be een
candida e , and o her i e prod ce fra d len re l . In ppor of heir arg men ,
Plain iff ci e o he n- igned declara ion of Dr. Shi a A ad rai, 3 o her redac ed
3
Dr. A ad rai claim he i an engineer i h a e perience in engineering
em , pa ern recogni ion, ma hema ical and comp a ional modeling and
anal i . [Doc. 6-1, 2]. El e here, Dr. A ad rai claim o be he in en or of
4
declara ion , hear a in he form of ario ne ar icle , and con e ed e iden iar
filing in he ca e , No. 1:17-c -2989 (N.D. Ga.).4
The Plain iff blinded b ei her illf l ignorance or a lack of ba ic
kno ledge of Georgia elec ion are incorrec . Georgia elec ronic o ing em
a adop ed in compliance ih a e and federal la , i cer ified b he Elec ion
A i ance Commi ion follo ing in pec ion and e ing cond c ed b independen
Vo ing S em Te Labora orie ( VSTL ), and ha no been compromi ed. A
re ie of he , a oppo ed o Plain iff con piracie , confirm he inacc rac
of Plain iff allega ion .
A. Ad a d e ec f Ge a e ec c e .
In 2019, he Georgia General A embl enac ed Ho e Bill 316 ( HB 316 ),
a eeping and comprehen i e reform of Georgia elec ion la , hich al o
moderni ed and f r her ec red Georgia o ing em. Specificall , he General
A embl cho e o req ire a ne nified em of o ing hro gho he S a e
elec ronic mail. Sam Biddle,

, B ine In ider (Mar. 6, 2012),
h p :// .b ine in ider.com/ he-cra - or -of- he-man- ho-pre ended- o-
in en -email-2012-3. S a e Defendan objec o an con idera ion of Dr.
A ad rai repor a he i no q alified o offer he opinion proffered and ili e
nreliable me hodolog .
4
The ma er i no bjec o o appeal pending in he Ele en h Circ i
Co r of Appeal , docke n mber 20-13730 and 20-14067.
5
mo ing he S a e a a from he ec re, b older, direc -recording elec ronic
( DRE ) o ing em o a o ing em ili ing Ballo -Marking De ice
( BMD ) and op ical canner . The General A embl de ermined hi replacemen
of DRE i h BMD ho ld occ r a oon a po ible. O.C.G.A. 21-2-300(a)(2).
The legi la ion placed he re pon ibili of elec ing he eq ipmen for he ne
o ing em on he Secre ar of S a e. O.C.G.A. 21-2-300(a). Ho e er, con rar
o Plain iff a er ion ha Go ernor Kemp and Secre ar Raffen perger r hed
hro gh he p rcha e of Dominion o ing machine and of are, (Doc. 6, p. 15),
he proc remen of Georgia ne o ing em a comple ed hro gh an open
and compe i i e bidding proce a req ired b Georgia S a e P rcha ing Ac ,
O.C.G.A. 50-5-50. Secre ar Raffen perger did no make he p rcha ing deci ion
alone, b e abli hed a Selec ion Commi ee compri ed of e en indi id al ho
ere a ked i h re ie ing bid propo al .5 Selec ion Commi ee member e al a ed
ho e propo al ing cri eria and proce e e for h on a Ma er Technical
E al a ion pread hee .6 Of he hree req e for propo al e al a ed b he
Selec ion Commi ee, Dominion Vo ing S em ( Dominion ) recei ed he highe
o erall core.
5
h p :// o .ga.go /admin/ pload /Selec ion 20Commi ee 20Bio .pdf
6
h p :// o .ga.go /admin/ pload /Ma erTechnicalE al a ion redac ed. l
6
On J l 29, 2019, Secre ar Raffen perger po ed a No ice of In en o A ard
he con rac for he a e ide o ing em o Dominion. No bid pro e ere
recei ed b he S a e, and Secre ar Raffen perger i ed a final No ice of In en o
A ard on A g 9, 2019. The o ing em con i of BMD ha prin ballo
b a of a connec ed prin er and op ical canner connec ed o a locked ballo bo .
The Dominion BMD allo he o er o make elec ion on a creen and hen prin
ho e elec ion on o a paper ballo . The o er ha an oppor ni o re ie he paper
ballo for acc rac before placing i in o he canner. Af er canning, he paper ballo
drop in o a locked ballo bo connec ed o he canner. BMD h crea e an
a di able, erifiable ballo , a req ired b a e. O.C.G.A. 21-2-300(a)(2)
( elec ronic ballo marker hall prod ce paper ballo hich are marked i h he
elec or choice af a eadab e b e e ec ) (empha i added).
B. Te a d ce f ca f Ge a e .
Georgia o ing em i bjec o o differen cer ifica ion req iremen .
Fir , he o ing em m ha e been cer ified b he Uni ed S a e Elec ion
A i ance Commi ion ( EAC ) a he ime of proc remen . O.C.G.A. 21-2-
300(a)(3). Second, he o ing em m al o be cer ified b he Secre ar of S a e
a afe and prac icable for e. Georgia BMD em mee bo h req iremen .
7
The Help America Vo e Ac ( HAVA ) crea ed he EAC, hich e p a rigoro
proce for o ing-eq ipmen cer ifica ion, orking i h commi ee of e per and
coordina ing i h he Na ional In i e of S andard and Technolog . 52 U.S.C.
20962 52 U.S.C. 20962, 20971 ( e lab andard ). The EAC cer ifie
o ing em a in compliance i h he Vol n ar Vo ing S em G ideline
( VVSG ), er ion 1.0, and doe o b ili ing appro ed, independen Vo ing
S em Te Labora orie ( VSTL ). In he ca e of he o ing em ili ed in
Georgia, SLI Compliance er ed a he VSTL a ked i h e ing he em for
EAC p rpo e . The em ili ed b Georgia, Democrac S i e 5.5-A, a
cer ified b he EAC on Jan ar 30, 2019.7
Separa el , he Secre ar of S a e ili ed ano her independen EAC-cer ified
VSTL, Pro V&V, o cond c e ing for cer ifica ion of he o ing em.
Follo ing he VSTL e ing, he Secre ar i ed a Cer ifica ion of he Dominion
Vo ing S em a mee ing all applicable pro i ion of he Georgia Elec ion Code
and R le of he Secre ar of S a e on A g 9, 2019.8 Tha cer ifica ion ha been
7
Uni ed S a e Elec ion A i ance Commi ion, Agenc Deci ion Gran of
Cer ifica ion, h p :// .eac.go / i e /defa l /file / o ing em/
file /Deci ion.A hori .Gran .of.Cer .D-S i e5.5-A.pdf
8
Plain iff erroneo l claim ha bo h he Cer ifica e and a e repor igned b
Michael Walker ere nda ed and ha e a ached al ered doc men ha ha e
been cropped o remo e he da e of he doc men . Compl., 12 and E hibi
5 and 6 here o. A correc cop of he Cer ifica e ho ing he da e of A g 9,
8
pda ed d e o de minimi change in em componen on o differen occa ion
ince, on Febr ar 19, 2020, and again on Oc ober 5, 2020.
P a ff a e ec a a ed e b e R -L
A d .
Plain iff conjec re and pec la ion doe no reb he reali ha Georgia
o ing em ha no been compromi ed. No onl ha e o epara e EAC-Cer ified
independen VSTL confirmed ha he em opera e a in ended, b Georgia
ri k-limi ing a di ( RLA ) f r her confirm ha no eigh ed oe i ching
occ rred.
Shockingl , he ba i for Plain iff o landi h claim of em compromi e
are roo ed in pec a i ical no of are anal e ha he gge
irref abl pro e oe i ching occ rred. For e ample, in Dr. A ad rai
n igned declara ion, he a hor reference ( i ho ci a ion) o e o al in cer ain
precinc for he propo i ion ha a eigh ed race algori hm m be re pon ible.
( Doc. 6-1.) The a hor, ho e er, make no a emp o e al a e an
o her rea on o er ma ha e cho en no o o e for Pre iden Tr mp. Indeed, he
2019 ma be ie ed a
h p :// o .ga.go /admin/ pload /Dominion Cer ifica ion.pdf. A cop of he e
repor ho ing a da e of A g 7, 2019 ma be fo nd a
h p :// o .ga.go /admin/ pload /Dominion Te Cer Repor .pdf.
9
a hor of ha declara ion pec la e ha 48,000 of 373,000 o e ca in Dekalb
Co n ere i ched in hi manner from Tr mp o Biden, (Doc. 6-1, p. 28),
meaning ha ( nder he a hor heor ) he re l in Dekalb Co n o ld be
106,373 for Tr mp o 260,227 for Biden (or appro ima el 28.6 o 70 ). Of
co r e, hi o ld be e raordinaril n al for hea il democra ic Dekalb Co n ,
in hich Pre iden Tr mp recei ed 51,468 o e (16.47 ) in 2016, hen he S a e
a ing an en irel differen o ing em.9
Moreo er, he e i ence of ch a eigh ed algori hm o ld ha e been
de ec ed in he RLA cond c ed hi ear. Follo ing he co n ie ab la ion of he
No ember elec ion re l , b prior o cer ifica ion, Secre ar Raffen perger a
req ired b la o cond c a ri k-limi ing a di in accordance i h O.C.G.A. 21-
2-498. S a e Elec ion Board R le 183-1-15-.04 pro ide ha he Secre ar of S a e
hall choo e he par ic lar elec ion con e o a di . Recogni ing he impor ance of
clear and reliable re l for ch an impor an con e , Secre ar Raffen perger
elec ed he pre iden ial race for he a di .10 E b C.
9
Dekalb Co n Elec ion Re l , 2016,
h p ://re l .enr.clari elec ion .com/GA/DeKalb/64036/183321/en/ mmar .h
ml.
10
S a emen of Secre ar Raffen perger, Hi oric Fir S a e ide A di of
Paper Ballo Uphold Re l of Pre iden ial Race, a ached a E hibi C here o
and a ailable a
10
Co n elec ion official ere hen req ired o co n b hand all ab en ee
ballo and paper ballo prin ed b he Dominion BMD . . The a di
confirmed he ame o come of he pre iden ial race a he original ab la ion ing
he Dominion o ing em eq ipmen . While here a a ligh differen ial
be een he a di re l and he original machine co n , he differen ial a ell
i hin he e pec ed margin of error ha occ r hen hand-co n ing ballo . A
2012 d b Rice Uni er i and Clem on Uni er i fo nd ha hand co n ing
ballo in po -elec ion a di or reco n proced re can re l in error ra e of p o
2 percen . In Georgia a di , he highe error ra e repor ed in an co n reco n
a 0.73 , and mo co n ie fo nd no change in heir final all .
The a di re l ref e Plain iff pec la ion ha Dominion machine or
of are migh ha e omeho flipped, i ched, or ffed ballo in he 2020
pre iden ial elec ion. Beca e Georgia o er can erif ha heir paper ballo
( he her hand-marked ab en ee ballo or ballo marked b BMD ) acc ra el
reflec heir in ended o e , an ac al manip la ion of he ini ial elec ronic o e
co n o ld ha e been re ealed hen he hand co n of paper ballo pre en ed a
differen re l . The fac ha hi did no happen foreclo e he po ibili ha
h p :// o .ga.go /inde .php/elec ion /hi oric fir a e ide a di of paper ball
o phold re l of pre iden ial race
11
Dominion eq ipmen or of are had been manip la ed o omeho record fal e
o e for one candida e or o elimina e o e from ano her.
In m, he componen of Georgia o ing em ha e been e al a ed,
e ed, and cer ified b o differen independen labora orie a complian i h bo h
a e and federal req iremen and afe for e in elec ion . Nei her of ho e o
VSTL iden ified an eigh ed o e co n ing algori hm, nor an o her
improprie . And, in Georgia 2020 general elec ion, he correc opera ion of he
o ing em a again confirmed b he a e ri k-limi ing a di .
II. Ab e ee Ba We e Va d P ce ed Acc d La
Plain iff claim ha he r le nder hich co n elec ion official erified
ab en ee ballo are con rar o Georgia la i al o i ho meri . Ab en ee ballo
for he 2020 general elec ion ere proce ed b co n elec ion official according
o he proced re e abli hed b he Georgia legi la re. The e proced re ere par
of HB 316, bipar i an legi la ion pa ed in 2019 o reform he a e elec ion code
and implemen a ne elec ronic o ing em. The reform kep in place Georgia
polic of no e c e ab en ee o ing, b modified he echnical req iremen for
ab en ee ballo . HB 316 modified he lang age of he oa h on he o er ab en ee
ballo en elope o lea e he igna re req iremen b remo e he elec or addre
and da e of bir h. O.C.G.A. 21-2-384. F r her, HB 316 added a c re
12
pro i ion, hich req ire elec ion official o gi e a o er n il hree da af er he
da e of he elec ion o c re an i e i h he o er igna re before rejec ing an
ab en ee ballo for a mi ing or mi ma ched igna re on he o er en elope.
O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(a)(1)(C). The c re pro i ion a added o he a e
req iremen ha elec ion official promp l no if he o er of a rejec ed ab en ee
ballo d e o a mi ing or mi ma ched igna re.
On No ember 6, 2019, he Democra ic Par of Georgia, DSCC, and DCCC
(collec i el , Poli ical Par Organi a ion ) ed he S a e Defendan , alleging
ha he promp l no if lang age of O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(a)(1)(C) a ag e and
ill-defined and lef co n ie i ho andard for erif ing igna re on ab en ee
ballo . (App Vol. I a 144-49).
While ha ac ion a pending, he S a e Elec ion Board ( SEB ) appro ed a
r le ha e abli hed a niform andard for co n ie o follo o promp l no if
o er hen heir ab en ee ballo i rejec ed a req ired b O.C.G.A. 21-2-
386(a)(1)(C). The r le pro ide ha hen a imel bmi ed ab en ee ballo i
rejec ed, he board of regi rar or ab en ee ballo clerk m end he o er no ice
of he rejec ion and oppor ni o c re i hin hree b ine da , or b he ne
b ine da if i hin en da of Elec ion Da . Ga. Comp. R. & Reg . r. 183-1-14-
.13 ( he Promp No ifica ion R le ).
13
The Promp No ifica ion R le a adop ed p r an o he SEB r le-making
a hori nder O.C.G.A. 21-2-31(2). I pro ide a niform hree-da andard for
promp no ifica ion req ired b O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(a)(1)(C) hen an ab en ee
ballo i rejec ed, o ha all co n ie gi e no ice in a niform manner. The Promp
No ifica ion R le a prom lga ed p r an o he Georgia Admini ra i e
Proced re Ac , p bli hed for p blic commen , and di c ed a m l iple p blic
hearing before i became effec i e on March 22, 2020.
Beca e he Promp No ifica ion R le re ol ed he i e in he pending
la i , he par ie re ol ed he ma er in a e lemen agreemen ha incl ded,
among o her erm , an agreemen ha (1) he S a e Elec ion Board o ld prom lga e
and enforce he Promp No ifica ion R le and (2) he Secre ar of S a e o ld i e
g idance o co n elec ion official regarding he igna re ma ching proce .
On Ma 1, 2020, he Secre ar of S a e di rib ed an Official Elec ion
B lle in ( OEB ), ad i ing co n elec ion official of he Promp No ifica ion R le
and pro iding g idance for re ie ing igna re on ab en ee-ballo en elope .
(Declara ion of Chri Har e 5).11 The OEB in r c ed ha af er an elec ion official
make an ini ial de ermina ion ha he igna re on he ab en ee ballo en elope doe
11
The Har e Declara ion a bmi ed in he rela ed ca e of
, Ci il Ac ion No. 1:20-CV-4651-SDG and i a ached a E b D.
14
no ma ch he igna re on file for he o er p r an o O.C.G.A. 21-2-
386(a)(1)(B) and (C), o addi ional regi rar , dep regi rar , or ab en ee ballo
clerk ho ld al o re ie he igna re, and he ballo ho ld be rejec ed if a lea
o of he hree official agree ha he igna re doe no ma ch. ( ) The OEB
e pre l in r c co n official o compl i h a e la . ( )
Con rar o Plain iff claim ha he Promp No ifica ion R le and he OEB
ha e ignifican l di r p ed he igna re erifica ion proce , he e mea re ha e
had no de ec able effec on he ab en ee ballo rejec ion ra e ince he la general
elec ion in 2018. (Har e Dec. 6, 7). An anal i of he n mber of ab en ee-ballo
rejec ion for igna re i e for 2020 a compared o 2018 fo nd ha he rejec ion
ra e for ab en ee ballo i h mi ing or non-ma ching igna re in he 2020 general
elec ion a 0.15 he ame rejec ion ra e for igna re i e a in 2018 before
he ne mea re ere implemen ed. ( )
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
E ab A c e III S a d .
Plain iff rai e hree con i ional co n in heir Complain : (1) ha he S a e
Defendan iola ed he Elec or and Elec ion Cla e of Ar icle I and II ( Co n
I ) ha he S a e Defendan iola ed he eq al pro ec ion cla e of he U.S.
Con i ion ( Co n II ) ha he S a e Defendan denied Plain iff D e Proce

15
rela ed o alleged di para e rea men of ab en ee/mail-in o er among differen
co n ie ( Co n III ) and ha he S a e Defendan denied Plain iff D e Proce
on he righ o o e ( Co n IV ). Plain iff al o bring a a e la elec ion con e
claim again Defendan p r an o O.C.G.A. 21-5-522, in oking he Co r
pplemen al j ri dic ion nder 28 U.S.C. 1367. Ho e er, beca e Plain iff
canno e abli h anding a o an of he e ca e of ac ion, he Co r lack
j ri dic ion o con ider he meri of Plain iff claim and he ca e ho ld be
di mi ed.
Federal co r ha e an independen obliga ion o en re ha bjec -ma er
j ri dic ion e i before reaching he meri of a di p e.
, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11 h Cir. 2020) ( aca ing and ordering di mi al of
o ing righ ca e d e o lack of anding). For a co r o prono nce pon . . . he
con i ionali of a a e or federal la hen i ha no j ri dic ion o do o i , b
er defini ion, for a co r o ac l ra ire . (ci a ion omi ed). If a an poin
a federal co r di co er a lack of j ri dic ion, i m di mi he ac ion.
Ar icle III of he Con i ion limi he bjec -ma er j ri dic ion of federal
co r o Ca e and Con ro er ie . U.S. Con . ar . III, 2. A par in oking
federal j ri dic ion bear he b rden of e abli hing anding a he commencemen
of he la i. , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). A an
16
irred cible con i ional minim m, Plain iff m ho he ha e (1) ffered an
inj r in fac , (2) ha i fairl raceable o he challenged cond c of he defendan ,
and (3) ha i likel o be redre ed b a fa orable j dicial deci ion. , 504 U.S.
a 561. A he par in oking federal j ri dic ion, Plain iff bear he b rden a he
pleading pha e of clearl alleg[ing] fac demon ra ing each elemen .
, 136 S. C . 1540, 1547 (2016).
f Sa d .
Inj r in fac i he fir and foremo of he anding elemen . , 136
S. C . a 1547. An inj r in fac i an in a ion of a legall pro ec ed in ere ha i
bo h concre e and par ic lari ed and ac al or imminen , no conjec ral or
h po he ical. , 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11 h Cir.
2020) , No. 20-3214, 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 35639 a 16 (3d Cir. No . 13, 2020) ( To bring i, o and o
per onall m be inj red, and o m be inj red in a a ha concre el
impac o r o n pro ec ed legal in ere . ).
The alleged inj r m be di inc from a generall a ailable grie ance
abo go ernmen . , 138 S. C . 1916, 1923 (2018). Thi req ire
more han a mere keen in ere in he i e. , 138 S. C . 2392,
2416 (2018) , 549 U.S. 437, 440 41 (2007) ( O r ref al

17
o er e a a for m for generali ed grie ance ha a leng h pedigree. . . . [A]
generali ed grie ance ha i plainl ndifferen ia ed and common o all member of
he p blic i no fficien for anding).
I i for hi rea on ha he Ele en h Circ i fo nd lack of anding in he
ca e. The plain iff in ha ca e co ld no e plain ho hi in ere in
compliance i h a e elec ion la i differen from ha of an o her per on. Indeed,
he admi ha an Georgia o er co ld bring an iden ical i.B he logic of hi
arg men eep pa e en ha bo ndar . All American , he her he o ed in hi
elec ion or he her he re ide in Georgia, co ld be aid o hare [plain iff ] in ere
in en r[ing] ha [a pre iden ial elec ion] i properl admini ered. ( lip op., E .
A, a 11).
Plain iff ha e fared no be er a ar ic la ing a par ic lari ed grie ance ha i
omeho differen han ha of he general o ing p blic. In fac , hro gho heir
Complain , Plain iff allege ha heir in ere are one and he ame a an Georgia
o er. Compl. a 156 ( Defendan dil ed he la f l ballo of Plain iff
and of o her Georgia o er and elec or ) 163 ( Defendan f r her iola ed
Georgia o er righ ), 199 ( all candida e , poli ical par ie , and o er ,
incl ding i ho limi a ion Plain iff , ha e a e ed in ere in being pre en and
ha ing meaningf l acce o ob er e and moni or he elec oral proce ). Ha ing
18
confirmed ha heir in ere are no differen han he in ere of all Georgia o er ,
Plain iff ha e ar ic la ed onl generali ed grie ance in fficien o confer anding
pon hem o p r e heir claim .
B. P a ff d a eS a d a P e de a E ec .
Plain iff a er ha b ir e of heir a a Rep blican pre iden ial
elec or , he are candida e ha ha e anding o rai e ha e er arie of
elec ion complain ha he ma choo e. For hi propo i ion, he ci e o onl a
ingle ca e: , 978 F.3d 1051 (8 h Cir. 2020). Ho e er, a
predica ed on Minne o a elec ion la ha differ from Georgia and pon fac ha
are di ing i hable from he Plain iff ca e. F r her, he Third Circ i in
recen l rejec ed Plain iff broad reading of . In ha ca e, he co r fo nd
ha a congre ional candida e lacked anding o p r e claim nder he Elec ion
and Elec or cla e ba ed on a generali ed righ o r n. I pecificall no ed i
di agreemen ih , a ing The Car on co r appear o ha e ci ed lang age
from [ , 564 U.S. 211 (2011)] i ho con idering he con e
pecificall , he Ten h Amendmen and he re er ed police po er in hich he
U.S. S preme Co r emplo ed ha lang age. There i no preceden for e panding
Bond be ond hi con e , and he co r ci ed none. 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS
35639 a 24, fn. 6 , No. 4:20-CV-03709, 2020 WL
19
6437668 a 2 (S.D. Te . No . 2, 2020) (holding candida e lacked anding nder
Elec ion Cla e) , 958 F.S pp. 341, 344 (M.D. Tn. 1997)
(candida e lacked anding o claim ha iola ion of a e elec ion la had
di enfranchi ed o er a [h]o o her people o e doe no in an a rela e o
plain iff o n e erci e of he franchi e and f r her doe no con i e concre e and
pecific j diciall cogni able inj r . ) , 1 F.S pp.3d 854 (E.D.
Tn. 2014) (plain iff denied oppor ni o be placed on ballo a candida e for
j dicial office hared he ame generali ed grie ance a a large cla of ci i en and
failed o demon ra e concre e and par ic lari ed inj r ).
In finding ha pre iden ial elec or did ha e anding o challenge p rpor ed
iola ion of a e elec ion la , relie hea il on pecific pro i ion of
Minne o a elec ion la ha rea ed pre iden ial elec or he ame a o her
candida e for office. Ho e er, in Georgia, nlike in Minne o a, all per on
po e ing he q alifica ion for o ing and ho ha e regi ered in accordance i h
he la are con idered Elec or . O.C.G.A. 21-2-2(7). Pre iden ial elec or in
Georgia are no elec ed o p blic office, b perform onl a limi ed mini erial role
in hich he appear a he Capi ol on he de igna ed da e and ime o carr o he
e pre ed ill of Georgia elec or b ca ing heir o e for Pre iden and Vice
Pre iden in he Elec oral College. O.C.G.A. 21-2-11. Pre iden ial elec or need
20
no file no ice of candidac o her i e req ired of poli ical candida e . O.C.G.A.
21-2-132. Their name do no appear on he ballo in ead, he name of he
candida e for Pre iden and Vice Pre iden appear on he ballo . O.C.G.A. 21-2-
325. Georgia elec or do no elec an pre iden ial elec or indi id all in ead,
ha la e of candida e hall be elec ed o ch office hich recei e he highe
n mber of o e ca . O.C.G.A. 21-2-501(f).
The Ele en h Circ i ha held ha o er do no ffer a concre e and
par ic lari ed inj r impl beca e heir preferred candida e lo e an elec ion (
974 F.3d a 1252), and ha ch a harm o ld be ba ed on generali ed
par i an preference hich are in fficien o e abli h anding.
138 S.C . 1916, 1933 (2018) (rejec ing anding ba ed on gro p
poli ical in ere , no indi id al legal righ ). Plain iff ha e failed o ar ic la e
ho he , a pre iden ial elec or , ha e ffered an inj r no common o heir
par i an gro p poli ical in ere , or ha o ld no ha e al o been ffered b all
Georgia elec or generall .
C. P a ff A e ed I e a e T aceab e e S a e Defe da .
No onl ha e Plain iff failed o demon ra e an inj r in fac , he canno
a i f he ca a ion req iremen of anding, hich req ire ha a plain iff inj r
m be fairl raceable o he challenged ac ion of he defendan , and no he re l
21
of he independen ac ion of ome hird par no before he co r . , 974
F.3d a 1253 (ci a ion omi ed)
, 641 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11 h Cir. 2011) (holding ha an inj r fficien
o e abli h anding canno re l [from] he independen ac ion of ome hird par
no before he co r . ).
Plain iff ha e in rod ced declara ion and affida i from i ne e ha rai e
di para e complain abo a arie of e en ha occ rring a ario ime and
place d ring he No ember elec ion and b eq en a di . The e complain foc
on ac ion allegedl aken b local elec ion official and o her hird par ie ha are
no named a defendan in hi ca e.12 Wha e er one migh concl de from he e
aried allega ion , he all ha e one hing in common: none of he ac ion
complained of are a rib able in an a o an of he S a e Defendan . In ead,
he ere aken b local elec ion official no named a par ie o hi ca e, and an
12
E ample of he e complain incl de allega ion ha Dekalb Co n elec ion
orker ere more ho ile o Rep blican ob er er han Democra ic ob er er
(Sil a Aff. 06-9 E . 18, 14), ha a Cobb Co n ol n eer a di moni or i ne ed
alread epara ed paper machine receip ballo i h barcode in he Tr mp ra ,
placing hem in o he Biden ra (John on Aff., Compl., E . 17, 4-5), and ha
an a di ob er er a he Li honia loca ion a oo far a a from ballo o ee ho
he had been o ed and ha ome a di or ere alida ing ballo i ho reading
hem alo d o ano her a di or. (O Neal Aff., 6-10, E hibi J, 5-8).
22
inj rie ha migh ha e re l ed from ho e ac ion are no raceable o and canno
be redre ed b he S a e Defendan .
Wi h regard o Plain iff con pira orial claim rela ed o Dominion
eq ipmen and of are, here ha been no allega ion ha oe er ha an of he
S a e Defendan par icipa ed in an con pirac or coll ion i h Dominion or an
o her hird par malicio ac or o ca e an harm o Plain iff or an Georgia
o er . The onl allega ion made again an of he S a e Defendan i ha
Go ernor Kemp and Secre ar Raffen perger omeho r hed hro gh he
eq ipmen elec ion proce . Ho e er, hi proce a an open, compe i i e
bidding proce , cond c ed p r an o Georgia proc remen la , and d ring
hearing , and no allega ion ha been made a o ho ac ion or inac ion
aken b an of he S a e Defendan d ring ha bidding proce migh ha e ca ed
an of Plain iff alleged inj rie .
Finall , o he e en ha Plain iff claim inj r a a re l of an improprie ie
in he mailing, proce ing, alida ion or ab la ion of ab en ee ballo , he e inj rie
again o ld no be raceable o an of he S a e Defendan . Ab en ee ballo are
mailed, proce ed, alida ed, and ab la ed b local elec ion official . O.C.G.A.
21-2-386. Ha ing failed o e abli h ha an of heir p rpor ed inj rie are
raceable o or redre able b he S a e Defendan , Plain iff lack anding and heir
23
claim ho ld be di mi ed. , 974 F.3d a 1253.
, 1:20-CV-03263, 2020 WL 6048048, a 22 (N.D. Ga. Oc . 13, 2020)
(appl ing o di mi elec ion rela ed claim again S a e Defendan ).
II. Pa ff C a a eM .
The Ele en h Circ i held in he deci ion oda ha federal challenge
o he cer ifica ion of he pre iden ial elec ion re l in Georgia are no moo . We
canno rn back he clock and crea e a orld in hich he 2020 elec ion re l are
no cer ified. , lip op. a 17 (q o ing ,
785 F.3d 442, 445 (10 h Cir. 2015)). Accordingl , he ca e no longer pre en a li e
con ro er i h re pec o hich he co r can gi e meaningf l relief.
., 382 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11 h Cir.
2004). Moo ne i j ri dic ional beca e a federal co r ma onl adj dica e
ca e and con ro er ie , and a r ling ha canno pro ide meaningf l relief i an
impermi ible ad i or opinion. .
The Co r canno pre en ha ha alread occ rred.
, 679 F. App 932, 933 (11 h Cir. 2017) , No.
1:10-CV-02546-RWS, 2010 WL 5316550, a 2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2010) ( The
Co r i po erle o enjoin ha ha alread occ rred. ). While Plain iff
p rpor edl eek decer ifica ion of he cer ifica ion ha Secre ar Raffen perger
24
and Go ernor Kemp ha e alread e ec ed, he ci e no a hori ha oe er o
ppor he no ion ha a co r co ld order ch relief. If he Plain iff belie ed ha
he re l cer ified b Secre ar Raffen perger and Go ernor Kemp ere in alid
for fra d or o her gro nd pecified in O.C.G.A. 21-2-522, Georgia pro ide an
adeq a e remed a la b e ing for h he proced re for a a e la elec ion
con e o be ini ia ed in he S perior Co r of F l on Co n . O.C.G.A. 21-2-
520, . Ho e er, here i impl no preceden for a federal co r o i e an
inj nc ion req iring ei her Go ernor Kemp or Secre ar Raffen perger o
decer if heir alread -i ed cer ifica ion or o cer if re l in direc
con ra en ion of he ac al elec ion re l .
III. Pa ff C a a e Ba ed b eEe e A e d e .
Plain iff federal claim are a er ed again he indi id all named S a e
Defendan in heir official capaci ie . (Doc. 1 a 31-33). The e claim are barred
b he Ele en h Amendmen . The Ele en h Amendmen bar i again a S a e or
one of i agencie , depar men or official , ab en a ai er b he S a e or a alid
congre ional o erride, hen he S a e i he real par in in ere .
, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Beca e claim again p blic official in heir
official capaci ie are merel ano her a of pleading an ac ion again he en i of
hich he officer i an agen , official capaci claim again a a e officer are
25
incl ded in he Ele en h Amendmen bar. , 473 U.S. a 165. While an
e cep ion o Ele en h Amendmen imm ni e i nder , 209 U.S.
123 (1908), i i limi ed o i again a e officer for ec e inj nc i e
relief. , 520 U.S. 43, 69 n. 24 (1997). A
federal co r canno a ard re ro pec i e relief, de igned o remed pa iola ion
of federal la .
Plain iff claim for inj nc i e and declara or relief, premi ed on he
cond c of he No ember 3, 2020 General Elec ion and he cer ifica ion of re l
ha ha e alread aken place, are barred beca e he are re ro pec i e in na re.
Re ro pec i e relief i back ard-looking, and eek o remed harm re l ing from
a pa breach of a legal d on he par of he defendan a e official .
, 750 F.3d 1238, 1249 (11 h Cir. 2014) (q o ing
415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)). Simpl beca e he remed ill
occ r in he f re, doe no ran form i in o pro pec i e relief. The erm,
pro pec i e relief, refer o he ongoing or f re hrea of harm, no relief.
, 194 F. S pp. 2d 1378, 1387 (S.D. Ga. 2002). Plain iff
claim for an relief rela ed o he r le and reg la ion go erning he cond c of he
No ember 3, 2020, elec ion or an alleged pa ec ri lap e , mi co n ing of o e ,
26
or elec ion irreg lari ie are en irel re ro pec i e and barred b he Ele en h
Amendmen .
IV. Lac e Ba Pa ff C a f P -E ec Re ef.
In , 2020 U.S.Di . LEXIS 218058 (No . 20. 2020),
hi Co r fo nd ha claim rai ed b Plain iff co n el Lin Wood ere barred b
he doc rine of lache . While Plain iff claim o erlap ignifican l i h Wood
claim , he fac here are e en more compelling hen i come o a finding of lache .
Plain iff ai ed e en longer han Wood did o file hi ac ion. A in ir all
all of he complain ha Plain iff allege regarding he ec ri of Georgia o ing
em or he proprie of S a e Elec ion Board r le or reg la ion co ld ha e been
rai ed prior o he elec ion.
To e abli h lache , S a e Defendan m ho (1) here a a dela in
a er ing a righ or a claim, (2) he dela a no e c able, and (3) he dela ca ed
[ hem] nd e prej dice. , 396 F.3d 1144, 1150 (11 h Cir.
2005) , 915 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11 h
Cir. 2019) ( To cceed on a lache claim, [defendan ] m demon ra e ha
[p]lain iff ine c abl dela ed bringing heir claim and ha he dela ca ed i
nd e prej dice. ).
27
Where, a here, a challenge o an elec ion proced re i no filed n il an
elec ion ha alread been cond c ed, he prej dice o he a e and o he o er ha
ha e ca heir o e in he elec ion become par ic larl e ere. Once he elec ion
ha been cond c ed, an harm ha migh ari e from a p rpor ed con i ional
iola ion m be eighed again ch co n er ailing eq i able fac or a he
e remel di r p i e effec of elec ion in alida ion and he ha oc i reak pon
local poli ical con in i . , 849
F.2d 1176, 1177 (9 h Cir. 1988). For hi rea on, if aggrie ed par ie , i ho
adeq a e e plana ion, do no come for ard before he elec ion, he ill be barred
from he eq i able relief of o er rning he re l of he elec ion. . a 1180-81
( , 710 F.2d 177, 182-83 (4 h
Cir. 1983) , No. 1:20-c -0546, 2020
U.S. Di . LEXIS 98627, 16-17 (E.D. Va. Ma 29, 2020) (rejec ing a imilar
challenge o a e official g idance a barred b lache d e o plain iff fail re o
rai e he challenge prior o he elec ion). To hold o her i e permi [ ], if no
enco rage[ ], par ie ho co ld rai e a claim o la b and gamble pon recei ing a
fa orable deci ion of he elec ora e and hen, pon lo ing, eek o ndo he ballo
re l in a co r ac ion. , 488 F.2d 310, 314 (5 h Cir. 1973).
28
Plain iff dela ed con iderabl in a er ing heir claim . To he e en ha
he had an concern regarding he lnerabili of Dominion o ing em ,
he co ld ha e rai ed ho e claim long before he elec ion. Each of he ab en ee
ballo reg la ion and proced re ha Plain iff no complain of ere adop ed ell
before he No ember 3, 2020 elec ion, and an claim rela ed o he applica ion of
ho e r le d ring ha elec ion are bjec o di mi al here for he ame rea on
ha he ere di mi ed in . And, i h regard o he p rpor ed irreg lari ie
repor ed b Plain iff o er and ob er er declaran , Plain iff offer no e plana ion
h he did no a emp o addre ho e i e i h he rele an local elec ion
official a he ime, b in ead ai ed n il af er he elec ion official comple ed
he ini ial co n and a di and cer ified ho e re l .
A he co r recogni ed, Defendan and he p blic a large o ld be
ignifican l inj red if Plain iff ere permi ed o rai e he e challenge af er he
elec ion ha alread aken place. 2020 U.S.Di . LEXIS 218058 a 23 ( Wood
req e ed relief co ld di enfranchi e a b an ial por ion of he elec ora e and erode
he p blic confidence in he elec oral proce . )
, No. 5:20-c -5193, 2020 WL 6472651, a 5 (W.D. Ark. No . 3, 2020)
( [T]he eq i ie do no fa or in er en ion here he elec ion i alread in progre
and he req e ed relief o ld change he r le of he game mid-pla . ).
29
V. T eC d Ab a f G a Re ef.
The relief Plain iff eek i no hing hor of o er rning he No ember
elec ion. The ad damn m cla e a k hi Co r o (1) order he Defendan o de-
cer if he elec ion re l (2) enjoin he Go ernor from ran mi ing he cer ified
re l o he Elec oral College and in ead (3) req ire he Go ernor o ran mi a
cer ifica ion ha Pre iden Tr mp recei ed he majori of o e in Georgia. (Doc.
1 211(1-3) Doc. 101 a 100.) There are n mero problem i h hi propo ed
relief. Fir , i iola e he principle of federali m. Second, he doc rine
arran di mi al. Finall , and a he er lea , hi la i ho ld be a ed
pending he o come of a e elec ion challenge p r an o he
doc rine.
On federali m, he Ele en h Circ i recen l held ha i i do b f l ha a
federal co r co ld compel a a e o prom lga e a reg la ion. , 974 F.3d a
1257. Fir , federal co r are onl able o order a e defendan from refrain[ing]
from iola ing federal la . (ci ing ,
563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011)). M ch of Plain iff propo ed relief canno be reconciled
i h hi binding preceden . Specificall , Plain iff do no eek o j refrain he
Go ernor and he Secre ar , he eek o compel hem o cer if a differen candida e
han he elec ion la demand, hich i holl incon i en i h Georgia Elec ion
30
Code and he hrice-a di ed re l . The relief o gh i par ic larl offen i e o
federali m principle in he ligh of he elec ion challenge pending in a e co r
ha ignifican l mirror he claim bro gh in hi la i. A he Plain iff
hem el e no recogni e, Georgia la make clear ha po -elec ion li iga ion
ma proceed in a e Co r . , lip op. a 9. Indeed, Plain iff
Complain repea edl claim ha he are bringing heir la i p r an o Georgia
a e ha pro ide he er ba i o challenge elec ion . (Doc. No. 1 150
(O.C.G.A. 21-2-522), 183-207 (O.C.G.A. 21-2-521, 21-2-522). I i hard o
imagine a more ignifican challenge o federali m han for a par o come o federal
co r a king ha co r o re er e cer ified elec ion re l i ho gi ing he S a e
an oppor ni o ac p r an o i o n a or cheme.
The e concern are recogni ed b he doc rine, hich i appropria e
in ca e pre en ing a federal con i ional i e hich migh be moo ed or
pre en ed in a differen po re b a a e co r de ermina ion of per inen ae
la . , 314 F. S pp. 3d 1320, 1334 (S.D. Fla.
2018) (ci ing , 756 F.S pp.2d 1370, 1372 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (q o ing , 625 F.2d 653, 656 57 (5 h Cir. 1980)). Here, he
con i ional i e pre en ed he her he legi la re delega ion of r lemaking
a hori o he SEB i alid, and he her he SEB e ceeded ha a hori hen
31
prom lga ing ario emergenc r le iola e he federal con i ion. In o her
ord , he Co r canno an er he con i ional q e ion i ho fir deciding
ha he a e agenc e ceeded i a hori . Thi i a cla ic
i a ion, hich e amine and req ire ha (1) here m be an n e led i e of
a e la and (2) here m be a po ibili ha he a e la de ermina ion ill
moo or pre en in a differen po re he federal con i ional q e ion
rai ed. a 1372 73 (ci ing , 625 F.2d a 657). J dge Jone reached he ame
concl ion la December in ano her elec ion-rela ed la i,
.13 Thi Co r ho ld do he ame and di mi he la i.
For a imilar rea on, Plain iff req e ed relief iola e he
There are n mero pending challenge o he No ember elec ion ha
ha e properl been filed in Georgia co r , incl ding, according o pre
a emen b Mr. Wood co n el in he li iga ion, one filed la e on December
4, 2020, b Pre iden Tr mp. A lea one eek nearl iden ical relief a he
Plain iff la i . Under imilar circ m ance , he Ele en h Circ i ha indica ed
ha a a of federal proceeding i arran ed nder he doc rine,
hich a hori e a federal di ric co r o di mi or a an ac ion hen here i
an ongoing parallel ac ion in a e co r .
13
A r e and acc ra e cop of he December Order i a ached a E b E.
32
, 374 F.3d 994, 997 98 (11 h Cir. 2004) (ci ing
879 F.2d 1556, 1558 (7 h Cir.1989)). Fac or con idered in
he anal i incl de: he de ire o a oid piecemeal li iga ion,
he her a e or federal la go ern he i e, and he her he a e co r can pro ec
all par ie righ . a 987 (ci a ion omi ed).
Each of he e fac or arran a ing he li iga ion. The b lk of Plain iff
complain addre e i e of a e la : ho ab en ee ballo req e and ballo are
in pec ed, he a hori of he General A embl o delega e a hori o he SEB
and he Secre ar , and he cri eria for cer if ing elec ion . Moreo er, he a e co r
elec ion challenge are o mo e if l . Th , he po ibili of piecemeal li iga ion
i real and concre e. Finall , he relief ha he par ie in he a e co r challenge
can ob ain o ld pro ec all par ie righ . The remedie a ailable o Georgia co r
hen r ling on elec ion challenge are pelled o in a e la . O.C.G.A. 21-
2-527(d). Under he e circ m ance , fac or are a i fied, and he
elec ion challenge ho ld proceed in a e co r nder he ame a e la ha he
Plain iff rai ed in heir Complain .
33
VI. Pa ff M f I c e Re ef S d be De ed.
E en if Plain iff co ld o ercome he j ri dic ional defec ha are fa al o
heir claim , he ill fail o a i f he req iremen for he e raordinar inj nc i e
relief he eek.
A preliminar inj nc ion i an e raordinar remed ne er a arded a of
righ . , 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To pre ail on
heir mo ion, Plain iff are req ired o ho : (1) a b an ial likelihood of pre ailing
on he meri (2) ha he plain iff ill ffer irreparable inj r nle he inj nc ion
i e (3) ha he hrea ened inj r o he mo an o eigh ha e er damage he
propo ed inj nc ion ma ca e he oppo ing par and (4) he inj nc ion o ld no
be ad er e o he p blic in ere . , 954 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11 h Cir.
1992). The Co r ho ld pa par ic lar regard for he p blic con eq ence in
emplo ing he e raordinar remed of inj nc ion. , 555 U.S. a 24.
A. P a ff a e e cceed e e f e ca .
Plain iff eq al pro ec ion claim fail for he ame rea on heir co n el
eq al pro ec ion claim failed in In he o ing righ con e , eq al pro ec ion
mean ha [h]a ing once gran ed he righ o o e on eq al erm , he a e ma
34
no , b la er arbi rar and di para e rea men , al e one per on o e o er ha of
ano her. 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (ci a ion omi ed). T picall , hen
deciding a con i ional challenge o a e elec ion la , federal co r appl he
frame ork ha balance he b rden on he o er i h he a e
in ere in he o ing reg la ion. , 553 U.S.
181, 190 (2008) 915 F.3d 1312, 1318-19
(11 h Cir. 2019).
B ,a he co r recogni ed, Plain iff claim do no fi i hin hi
frame ork. 2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS 218058 a 25. Plain iff ha e no ar ic la ed a
cogni able harm ha in oke he Eq al Pro ec ion Cla e. An ac ion aken b he
S a e Defendan ere aken in a holl niform manner acro he en ire a e.
a 26. No o er incl ding he Plain iff ere rea ed differen l han an
o her o er. ( , 978 F.3d 93, 100 (4 h Cir. 2020).
Nor ha e Plain iff e for h a o e dil ion claim. None of he Plain iff
ha e alleged ha an ac ion of Defendan ha e b rdened heir abili o ca heir
o n o e . In ead, heir claim , like Wood , appear o be ha beca e ome o e
ere improperl co n ed or illegall ca , he e illegal or improperl co n ed o e
omeho ca ed he eigh of ballo ca la f ll b Georgia o er o be
omeho eigh ed differen l han o her . a 27. Bo h he di ric co r in
35
co r and he Third Circ i Co r of Appeal in q arel rejec ed hi
heor . , 2020 WL 6686120, a 31-2 ( if dil ion of la f ll ca ballo b
he nla f l co n ing of in alidl ca ballo ere a r e eq al-pro ec ion
problem, hen i o ld ran form e er iola ion of a e elec ion la in o a
po en ial federal eq al-pro ec ion claim ) , 974 F.3d a 1247
(rejec ing par i an o e dil ion claim).
The S preme Co r deci ion in doe no ppor Plain iff
ca e ( Doc. 6 a 16-17), a ha ca e fo nd a iola ion of eq al pro ec ion here
cer ain co n ie ere ili ing ar ing andard for ha con i ed a legal o e in
he 2000 Florida reco n . 531 U.S. a 105 ( The q e ion before i he her he
reco n proced re are con i en ih i obliga ion o a oid arbi rar and
di para e rea men of he member of i elec ora e ). Here, an ac ion aken b he
S a e Defendan ere nder aken a e- ide. The i ola ed irreg lari ie
complained of b Plain iff ario declaran , if r e, o ld ha e aken place a
he co n le el nder he per i ion of elec ion official ha are no par ie o
hi ca e. All ac ion of he S a e Defendan ha e been niform and applicable o
all Georgia co n ie and o er , in order o a oid he kind of ad hoc andard ha
aried from co n o co n a fo nd ncon i ional in . The are he e ac
oppo i e of arbi rar and di para e rea men .
36
The elec or cla e of he Uni ed S a e Con i ion pro ide ha [e]ach
S a e hall appoin , in ch Manner a he Legi la re hereof ma direc , a N mber
of Elec or , ho, in rn, ca he S a e o e for pre iden . U.S. Con . ar . II,
1, cl. 2. The General A embl e abli hed he manner for he appoin men of
pre iden ial elec or in O.C.G.A. 21-2-10, hich pro ide ha elec or are
in a general elec ion. Plain iff fail o ho ho an ac of he S a e
Defendan ha al ered hi proce .
Similarl , Plain iff fail o ho ho S a e Defendan ha e iola ed he
elec ion cla e, hich pro ide ha [ ]he Time , Place , and Manner of holding
elec ion for Sena or and Repre en a i e , hall be pre cribed in each S a e b he
Legi la re hereof. U.S. Con . ar . I, 4, cl. 1. Plain iff complain abo a arie
of reg la ion or proced re rela ed o ab en ee ballo proce ing, i ho
ar ic la ing preci el ho ho e reg la ion or proced re r n afo l of he elec ion
cla e. In an e en , he S a e Elec ion Board ha he a hori , delega ed b he
legi la re, [ ]o form la e, adop , and prom lga e ch r le and reg la ion a
ill be cond ci e o he fair, legal, and orderl cond c of primarie and elec ion
o long a ho e r le are con i en i h la . O.C.G.A. 21-2-31(2). Th , hile
no one di agree ha S a e Defendan are no member of he Georgia legi la re,
37
Plain iff claim depend on he a mp ion ha he r le and proced re ed o
proce ab en ee ballo d ring he No ember 3, 2020, elec ion ere omeho
incon i en i h Georgia elec ion code.
B hi impl i no o. The SEB R le i con i en i h S a e la , and a
Georgia co r o ld likel a he ame. Under Georgia preceden , hen an agenc
empo ered i h r lemaking a hori (like he SEB i ), he e applied o reg la ion
challenge i q i e deferen ial. Georgia co r ak he her he reg la ion i
a hori ed b a e and rea onable. ,
257 Ga. App. 636, 637 (2002). The an er o bo h q e ion i an nq alified e.
A ho n, he SEB i empo ered o prom lga e reg la ion . O.C.G.A. 21-
2-31(1). A recogni ed b J dge Grimberg in , i i normal and con i ional
for a e legi la re o delega e heir a hori in ch a manner. 2020 U.S.Di .
LEXIS 218058 a 10. The reg la ion are al o rea onable. There i no conflic
be een he igna re erifica ion reg la ion and a e ci ed b he Plain iff ,
O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(a)(1)(C). (Doc. No. 1 a 23.) The a e req ire an ab en ee
ballo here a igna re doe no appear o be alid o be rejec ed and no ice
pro ided o he o er. . The challenged SEB R le, hich merel req ire an
addi ional afeg ard o en re elec ion ec ri b ha ing more han one indi id al
re ie an ab en ee ballo informa ion and igna re for acc rac before he ballo
38
i rejec ed, i con i en i h hi approach. , 2020 U.S.Di . LEXIS 218058
a 10. No a e ci ed b he Plain iff manda e ha onl one co n official
e amine he ab en ee ballo , and ha he re ie proce in ol e e eral official
doe no make i an le rigoro or incon i en i h he a or la . ( Har e
Decl. 3, 5). A Georgia co r o ld likel hold he ame, beca e a e co r ha e
aid ha a reg la ion m be pheld if he agenc pre en o ppor
he reg la ion. , 257 Ga. App. 636,
640 (2002). Mr. Har e declara ion cer ainl a i fie ha andard, and i ho ld
be ob io ha ha ing a erifica ion proce in place de igned o en re niform
a e ide applica ion of he la for de ermining con idera ion of an ab en ee ballo
doe no lead o in alid o e .
An remaining do b m be re ol ed in he S a e fa or, a he Plain iff
ha e no iden ified an conflic in he lang age. Thi i ha J dge Grimberg righ l
concl ded hen he held ha : The record in hi ca e demon ra e ha , if an hing,
Defendan ac ion in en ering in o he Se lemen Agreemen o gh o achie e
con i enc among co n elec ion official in Georgia, hich f e Wood
a ed goal of cond c ing [f]ree, fair, and ran paren elec ion . a 10
(empha i and bracke in original). Thi end he inq ir and i fa al o Plain iff
claim in Co n I, III, IV, and V.
39
Plain iff mo ion fail o ar ic la e a di cernable claim nder he d e proce
cla e. I i nclear ha proce Plain iff claim ha he ere d e or ho an of
he S a e Defendan failed o pro ide ha proce . Co n II of Plain iff Complain ,
hile cap ioned Denial of D e Proce ag el de cribe an ndefined di para e
rea men i h regard o c re proce e and arg e ha he di para e rea men
iola e Eq al Pro ec ion g aran ee . Compl. a 172. Co n IV of Plain iff
Complain i cap ioned Denial of D e Proce on he Righ o Vo e , and appear
o de cribe a claim of o e dil ion or deba emen ci ing o ario eq al pro ec ion
ca e . Compl. a 176-80. Plain iff Mo ion for Preliminar Inj nc ion doe
no incl de an di c ion of d e proce a all.
Plain iff ha e no ar ic la ed a cogni able proced ral d e proce claim. A
proced ral d e proce claim rai e o inq ire : (1) he her here e i a liber
or proper in ere hich ha been in erfered i h b he S a e and (2) he her he
proced re a endan pon ha depri a ion ere con i ionall fficien .
, 978 F.3d 220, 229 (5 h Cir. 2020) (ci ing
, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). The par
in oking he D e Proce Cla e proced ral pro ec ion bear he b rden . . . of
e abli hing a cogni able liber or proper in ere . , 978 F.3d a 229
40
(ci ing , 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005)). Plain iff ha e no clearl
ar ic la ed ha liber or proper in ere ha been in erfered ih b he S a e
Defendan , or ho an proced re a endan o he p rpor ed depri a ion ere
con i ionall fficien . A he co r no ed:
he Ele en h Circ i doe a me ha he righ o o e i a liber in ere

pro ec ed b he D e Proce Cla e. , 975 F.3d
1016, 1048 (11 h Cir. 2020). B he circ i co r ha e pre l declined o
e end he ric re of proced ral d e proce o a S a e elec ion
proced re . , 976 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11 h
Cir. 2020) ( The generali ed d e proce arg men ha he plain iff arg ed
for and he di ric co r applied o ld re ch concep of d e proce o heir
breaking poin . ).
2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS 218058 a 33.
Nor ha e Plain iff ar ic la ed a cogni able b an i e d e proce claim.
The pe of o ing righ co ered b he b an i e d e proce cla e are
con idered narro . , 802 F.2d 1302, 1314 (11 h Cir. 1986). Thi doe
no e end o e amining he alidi of indi id al ballo or per i ing he
admini ra i e de ail of an elec ion. In onl e raordinar circ m ance ill a
challenge o a a e elec ion ri e o he le el of a con i ional depri a ion. .
A he co r recogni ed:
Al ho gh Wood generall claim f ndamen al nfairne , and he

declara ion and e imon bmi ed in ppor of hi mo ion pec la e
a o ide- pread improprie , he ac al harm alleged b Wood
concern merel a garden arie elec ion di p e.
41
2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS 218058 a 35. F r her, [p]receden mili a e again a
finding of a d e proce iola ion regarding ch an ordinar di p e o er he
co n ing and marking of ballo . ( , 619 F.2d 449, 453
(5 h Cir. 1980) for he propo i ion ha If e er a e elec ion irreg lari ere
con idered a federal con i ional depri a ion, federal co r o ld adj dica e
e er a e elec ion di p e. ).
The ame i r e here. Plain iff ha e in rod ced onl pec la i e, concl or
and con radic or e imon from e per ha o ld do no more han e abli h a
po ibili of irreg lari ie if heir anal i ere correc , along i h a hodge-podge
of di para e claim b hird-par o er and ob er er claiming ha he ob er ed
a arie of differen p rpor ed irreg lari ie in a handf l of differen co n ie (none
of hich are par ie o hi ac ion). Plain iff ha e failed o demon ra e he
e raordinar circ m ance ri ing o he le el of a con i ional depri a ion ha
are nece ar o ppor a b an i e d e proce claim. Plain iff ha e herefore
failed o demon ra e a b an ial likelihood of cce on he meri of an claim
for iola ion of he 14 h Amendmen g aran ee of ei her proced ral or b an i e
D e Proce .
42
A ho n, he Plain iff ha e effec i el filed an elec ion challenge nder
Georgia la . Seeking o op cer ifica ion doe no a e he Plain iff Complain for
a lea o addi ional rea on . Fir , i ha long been he r le ha elec or are a e
and no federal official . , 93 F.2d 383, 388 (8 h Cir.
1937). Con eq en l , i i a e la ha de ermine ho challenge o elec or are
made, and Georgia la e for h ha proce a e plained abo e. Thi al o
demon ra e h ab en ion i appropria e. Second, o he e en ha he Plain iff
arg e ha co n elec ion official did no properl co n mail-in and ab en ee
ballo , here are a e remedie a ailable o challenge he ac of ho e co n
official . Indeed, Georgia la go erning elec ion challenge pro ide for j ha .
Finall , and a addre ed el e here in hi brief, he deci ion make
clear ha challenge o ac of co n official m be bro gh again ho e co n
official . 974 F.3d a 1254. I i in fficien o rel on he Secre ar general po er
o e abli h raceabili . , 2020 WL 6048048 a 23. Similarl , reliance
on he phra e chief elec ion official or a emen abo he niformi in he
admini ra ion of elec ion la ha e been deemed in fficien b he co r
hen i applied .
43
In m, beca e Plain iff are no likel o cceed on he meri of an of
heir claim , inj nc i e relief m be denied.
B. T e fPa ff efe ed ca d da e e a ab e a .
Plain iff fail o ar ic la e an pecific harm ha he face if hi req e ed relief
i no gran ed, o her han he ag e claim ha an infringemen on he righ o o e
con i e irreparable harm. Ho e er, Plain iff do no allege ha heir righ o o e
a denied or infringed in an a onl ha heir preferred candida e lo . I i no
irreparable harm if he are no able o ca heir o e in he Elec oral College for
Pre iden Tr mp, beca e [ ]o er ha e no j diciall enforceable in ere in he
o come of an elec ion. , 974 F.3d a 1246 ( Vo er ha e no j diciall
enforceable in ere in he o come of an elec ion. ).
Irreparable harm goe o he a ailabili of a remed no a par ic lar
o come. Cer if ing he e pre ed ill of he elec ora e i no irreparable harm, b
ra her ine i able and legall req ired i hin o r con i ional frame ork. There i
a remed a ailable o e en ha he lo ing candida e ra her han a di a i fied
o er, ppor er, or pre iden ial elec or eek po -cer ifica ion remedie , and ch
elec ion con e ha e been filed in a e co r and remain pending.
44
c .
The e remaining inj nc ion fac or balancing he eq i ie and p blic
in ere are freq en l con idered in andem b co r , a he real q e ion
po ed in hi con e i ho inj nc i e relief a hi ele en h-ho r o ld impac he
p blic in ere in an orderl and fair elec ion, i h he f lle o er par icipa ion
po ible. , 334 F. S pp. 3d 1303, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2018),
, 761 F. App 927 (11 h Cir. 2019) ,
549 U.S. a 4. The Co r m balance he compe ing claim of inj r and m
con ider he effec on each par of he gran ing or i hholding of he req e ed
relief, pa ing par ic lar regard a ell for he p blic con eq ence in emplo ing
he e raordinar remed of inj nc ion. , 555 U.S. a 24.
Here, he hrea ened inj r o Defendan a a e official and he p blic a
large far o eigh an minimal b rden on [Plain iff ]. , 2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS
218058 a 38. Confidence in he in egri of o r elec oral proce i e en ial o
he f nc ioning of o r par icipa or democrac , and co r order affec ing elec ion
can hem el e re l in o er conf ion and con eq en incen i e o remain a a
from he poll . , 549 U. S. a 4-5. For hi rea on, he S preme Co r ha
repea edl empha i ed ha lo er federal co r ho ld ordinaril no al er he
45
elec ion r le on he e e of an elec ion.
., 140 S.C . 1205, 1207 (April 6, 2020) (per c riam).
The Ele en h Circ i recen l held ha he principle applie i h e en
grea er force hen o ing ha alread occ rred.
, 976 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11 h Cir. 2020) ( [W]e are no on he e e of
he elec ion e are in he middle of i , i h ab en ee ballo alread prin ed and
mailed. An inj nc ion here o ld h iola e ell-kno n ca ion again
federal co r manda ing ne elec ion r le e peciall a he la min e. )
, 344 F.3d 914, 919 (9 h Cir.
2003) ( In erference i h impending elec ion i e raordinar , and in erference
i h an elec ion af er o ing ha beg n i npreceden ed. ).
Here, he elec ion , and he la e of pre iden ial
elec or ha been cer ified. Gran ing Plain iff e raordinar relief o ld onl er e
o di enfranchi e [] o er or ide ep he e pre ed ill of he people.
2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 37346 a 28. A he di ric co r in
correc l recogni ed, To in erfere i h he re l of an elec ion ha ha
alread concl ded o ld be npreceden ed and harm he p blic in co n le a .
2020 U.S. Di . LEXIS 218058 a 37-38. Plain iff eek e en broader relief han
ha o gh in If gran ed, Plain iff req e ed relief o ld di enfranchi e no
46
onl Georgia ab en ee o er b o ld in alida e a o e ca b Georgia
elec or .
CONCLUSION
For he foregoing rea on , Plain iff emergenc mo ion for inj nc i e relief
m be denied and he Co r ho ld di mi he ac ion i h prej dice. F r hermore,
he c rren TRO en ered b he Co r ho ld be immedia el di ol ed o pre en
ongoing harm o he abili of co n elec ion official o begin earl o ing for he
Jan ar r n-off, for he rea on ho n in S a e Defendan mo ion o modif he
TRO.

A orne General
Dep A orne General
//
A lan a, GA 30334
cmcgo an la .ga.go
404-458-3658 ( el)
47
Care Miller
Jo h Belinfan e
Melanie John on
R bb R A Be fa e L ef e d
LLC
500 14 h S ree NW
A lan a, GA 30318
Telephone: (678) 701-9381
Fac imile: (404) 856-3250
48
//
Charlene S. McGo an
49
MOTION TO DISMISS AND RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF S EMERGENCY
MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF i h he Clerk of Co r ing he
//
Charlene S. McGo an
50

ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JA AN PEARSON, e al., )

)
Plain iff , )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
. ) 1:20-c -4809-TCB
)
)
Defendan . )
STATE DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendan Go ernor Brian Kemp, Secre ar of S a e Brad Raffen perger,
and S a e Elec ion Board member Rebecca N. S lli an, Da id J. Worle , Ma he
Ma hb rn, and Ahn Le (collec i el , S a e Defendan ) hereb mo e o di mi
Plain iff Complain for p r an o FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and (6) for lack of
bjec ma er j ri dic ion and ario o her hre hold defen e a ed in he
accompan ing brief in ppor . The S a e Defendan al o mo e ha he Co r den
an inj nc i e, declara or relief, and o her relief o gh in he Plain iff Complain .
S a e Defendan re pec f ll req e ha he Co r gran heir mo ion and di mi
he ac ion i h prej dice. A brief in ppor of hi mo ion i being filed
im l aneo l .
1

A orne General
Dep A orne General

A lan a, GA 30334
cmcgo an la .ga.go
404-458-3658 ( el)
Care Miller
Jo h Belinfan e
Melanie John on
R R A B L
LLC
500 14 h S ree NW
A lan a, GA 30318
Telephone: (678) 701-9381
Fac imile: (404) 856-3250
A ne f S a e Defendan
2

Charlene S. McGo an
3
CERTIFICATE OF SER ICE
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS i h he Clerk of Co r ing he

Charlene S. McGo an
4

ATLANTA DIVISION

VIKKI TOWNSEND
CONSIGLIO, GLORIA KAY
GODWIN, JAMES KENNETH
CARROLL, CAROLYN HALL
FISHER,
CATHLEEN ALSTON LATHAM
and BRIAN JAY VAN GUNDY
Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
v. 1:20-cv-1677-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, in his official
capacity as Governor of Georgia,
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER,
in his official
capacity as Secretary of State and
Chair of the Georgia State
Election Board, DAVID J.
WORLEY, in his official capacity
as a member of the Georgia State
Election Board, REBECCA N.
SULLIVAN, in her
official capacity as a member of
MATTHEW MASHBURN, in his
official capacity as a member of
and ANH LE, in her official
capacity as a member of the
Georgia State Election Board,
Defendants,
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF
GEORGIA, INC., DSCC, DCCC,
JOHN MANGANO, ALICE
O’LENICK, BEN
SATTERFIELD, WANDY
TAYLOR, and STEPHEN DAY,
Intervenors.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that all attorneys and assistants to the
attorneys be allowed to bring cell phones and laptops and other laptop
accessories into the Richard Russell Building on December 7, 2020 for a
hearing in this case.
SO ORDERED this 6th day of December, 2020.
___________________________________
TIMOTHY C. BATTEN, SR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2

CORECO JA’QAN PEARSON, et al,

CASE NO.
Plaintiffs,
v. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, et al,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF FILING ELECTRONIC MEDIA
Come Now the Plaintiffs and submit this Notice of Filing of Electronic
Media consisting of the following time-stamped video surveillance clips from
State Farm Arena on November 3rd and 4th, 2020 which will be delivered
electronically to opposing parties in this case today and hand delivered on a
USB drive to the Clerk of Court Monday, December 7, 2020:
November 3, 2020
- 05:08:00 AM to 05:08:10 AM
- 07:41:00 AM to 07:41:05 AM
- 08:37:00 AM to 08:37:08 AM
- 03:17:24 PM to 03:17:34 PM
- 10:16:08 PM to 10:16:18 PM
- 10:24:50 PM to 10:25:13 PM
- 10:28:53 PM to 10:29:37 PM
- 10:45:01 PM to 10:45:17 PM
- 11:06:35 PM to 11:13:20 PM
- 11:06:35 PM to 11:13:20 PM (Enlarged)
- 11:06:35 PM to 11:13:20 PM (Enlarged 4x Speed)
November 4, 2020
- 12:01:30 AM to 12:05:40 AM
- 12:26:50 AM to 12:29:34 AM
- 12:55:28 AM to 12:56:00 AM
- 01:10:57 AM to 01:11:18 AM
Respectfully submitted, this 6th day of December 2020.
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC

Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
forthcoming

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
Harry W. MacDougald
Filing Electronic Media with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system
which will cause service to made upon counsel of record therein.
This 6th day of December 2020.
Harry W. MacDougald
Georgia Bar No. 4630s76

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
No. _____
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
CORECO JA’QAN PEARSON, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Petitioners,
v.
BRIAN KEMP, ET AL.,

Defendants-Respondents
On Certified Order from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division,
No. 1:20-cv-04809-TCB
PETITIONERS’ APPENDIX (VOLUME IV)
Sidney Powell
Counsel of Record
SIDNEY POWELL PC
2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 300
Dallas, TX 75219
(214) 717-1775
L. Lin Wood
L. LIN WOOD, P.C.
P.O. Box 52584
(404) 891-1402
lwood@linwoodlaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Petitioners. Additional counsel listed on the next page.
Harry W. MacDougald
Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956
Howard Kleinhendler
HOWARD KLEINDLER ESQUIRE
New York, NY 10017
(917) 793-1188
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Petitioners

INDEX TO APPENDIX
Filing Docket No.
Volume I
Docket sheets
Complaint with attachments ................................................................... D1

Briggs Paper ................................................................................... D1-1
Redacted Affidavit .......................................................................... D1-2
Declaration of Ana Mercedes Diaz Cardozo .................................. D1-3
Declaration of Harri Hursti ........................................................... D1-4
Various Materials ........................................................................... D1-5
Email from Samantha Whitley ..................................... Part of D1-5
Official Election Bulletin ............................................... Part of D1-5
Declaration of J. Alex Halderman ................................. Part of D1-5
Supp. Declaration of Kevin Skoglund ........................... Part of D1-5
Declaration of Harri Hursti ........................................... Part of D1-5
Filing Notice re: Redacted Dominion
Lab Report ...................................................................... Part of D1-5
Redacted Dominion Voting
Lab Report ................................................................. Part of D1-5
Volume II
Attachments to Complaint (continued)

Various Materials (D1-5, continued)
Transcript of Court Proceedings ................................... Part of D1-5
Dominion Certification by Ga. Secretary of State ........................ D1-6
Dominion Voting Systems Test Report ......................................... D1-7
Election Law Journal Article ......................................................... D1-8
Redacted Declaration ..................................................................... D1-9
Affidavit of Russell James Ramsland, Jr. ................................... D1-10
Affidavit of Mayra Romera ........................................................... D1-11
Affidavit of Amanda Coleman ...................................................... D1-12
Affidavit of Maria Diedrich .......................................................... D1-13
Affidavit of Ursula V. Wolf ........................................................... D1-14
Volume II (continued)

Affidavit of Nicholas J. Zeher ...................................................... D1-15
Affidavit of Susan Voyles ............................................................. D1-16
Affidavit of Ibrahim Reyes ........................................................... D1-17
Affidavit of Consetta S. Johnson .................................................. D1-18
Affidavit of Carlos E. Silva ........................................................... D1-19
Affidavit of Andrea O’Neal ........................................................... D1-20
Volume III

Affidavit of Debra J. Fisher .......................................................... D1-21
Affidavit of Kevin P. Peterford ..................................................... D1-22
Exhibit A ....................................................................... Part of D1-22
Exhibit B ....................................................................... Part of D1-22
Texas SOS Report on Dominion ................................................... D1-23
Maloney Letter to Paulson ........................................................... D1-24
Affidavit of Juan Carlos Cobucci ................................................. D1-25
Letter of Sen. Warren, et al. ........................................................ D1-26
Declaration of Eric Quinnell ........................................................ D1-27
Affidavit of Mitchell Harrison ...................................................... D1-28
Affidavit of Michelle Branton ....................................................... D1-29
Emergency Mtn. for Temporary Inj. Relief ............................................ D6

Declaration of Shiva Ayyadural ..................................................... D6-1
Joint Cybersecurity Advisory ......................................................... D6-2
Proposed Order ............................................................................... D6-3
Notice of Filing Redacted Declaration ................................................... D7

Redacted Declaration ..................................................................... D7-1
Order Granting in Part Mtn. for Temp. Inj. Relief............................... D14
Certification Order Under 42 USC §1292(b) ........................................ D15
Entry of Appearance by Counsel for Defendants ................................. D16

Volume III (continued)
Amended Certification Order Under 42 USC §1292(b) ........................ D22
Notice of Filing of Affidavit........................................................................ D
Notice of Emergency Interlocutory Appeal ........................................... D32
Stay Order .............................................................................................. D37
Volume IV
Affiant A…………………………………………………….…… Pages 1-5

Affiant B…………………………………………………….…… Pages 6-7
Affiant C…………………………………………………….……… Page 8
Affiant D…………………………………………………….…… Page 9-12
Affiant E…………………………………………………….… Pages 13-14
Affiant F…………………………………………………….… Pages 15-16
Affiant G………………………………...………………….… Pages 17-19
Affiant H……………………………………………….…….…… Pages 20
Affiant I……………………………………………………….. Pages 21-22
Affiant J……………………………….……………………..…..… Page 23
Affiant K…………………………………………………..……..… Page 24
Affiant L ………………………………..…………………..… Pages 25-26
Affiant M…………………………………………………….… Pages 27-28
Affiant N…………………………………………………….… Pages 29-30
Affiant O…………………………………………………….… Pages 31-53
Affiant Q…………………………….……………………….…..… Page 54
Affiant R…………………………..……………………….…. Pages 55-57
Affiant S…………………………..……………………….……Pages 58-66
Affiant T ……………………………………………..……...… Pages 67-69
Affiant U……………………………………………………….…… Page 70
Affiant V………………………………………………………..…… Page 71
Affiant W……………………………………………………..…Pages 72-74
Affiant X…………………………………………………...……Pages 75-78
Affiant Y………………………………………………..……… Pages 79-81
Affiant Z…………………………………………………….… Pages 82-92
Affiant AA………………………………………………………… Pages 93-98

Affiant AB……………………………………………………….. Pages 99-100
Affiant AC……………………………………………………… Pages 101-104
Affiant AD……………………………………………………… Pages 105-106
Affiant AE ………………….………………………………… Pages 107-113
Affiant AF ………………………………………………………….… Page 114
Affiant AG ………………………………………………..…… Pages 115-116
Affiant AH……………………………………………….…… Pages 117-118
Affiant AI …………………………………………………..…. Pages 119-128
Affiant AJ -……………………………………………………….… Pages 129
Affiant AK …………………………………………………….……. Pages 130
Affiant AL …………………………………….……………………… Page 131
Affiant AM…………………………………………………………… Page 132
Affiant AN ………………………………………..…………… Pages 133-135
Affiant AO……………………………………………………….Pages 136-139
Affiant AP……………………………………………………… Pages 140-142
Affiant AQ……………………………………………………….Pages 143-144
Affiant AR ……………………………………………………… Pages 145-148
Affiant AS ……………………………………………………… Pages 149-156
Affiant AT………………………………………………….…… Pages 156-157
Affiant AU ……………………………………………………… Pages 158-159
Preservation Email from Sidney Powell RE Case No 20-CV-04809-
TCB……………………………………………………………… Pages 160-177
Request for Evidence RE Case No 1:20-CV-04651-
SDG……………………………………………………………… Pages 178-182
Civil Action File No 1:20-CV-4809-TCB
…………………………………………………………………… Pages 183-221
Tweet from Congressman Hice Regarding State Farm
Arena………………………………………………………………..… Page 222
I hereby certify that on December 3, 2020, I electronically filed

the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by using the CM/ECF system.
A true and correct copy of the foregoing will be emailed to the

following counsel:
Charlene S. McGowan
cmcgowan@law.ga.gov
Russell D. Willard
rwillard@law.ga.gov
Counsel for Defendants-Respondents Brian Kemp, Brad
Raffensperger, David J. Worley, Rebecca N. Sullivan, Matthew
Mashburn, and Anh Le.
Adam M. Sparks
sparks@khlawfirm.com
Halsey G. Knapp, Jr.
hknapp@khlawfirm.com
Susan P. Coppedge
coppedge@khlawfirm.com
Adam M. Sparks
sparks@khlawfirm.com
Counsel for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants
Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc., DSCC, and DCCC.
/s/ Sidney Powell

ase 1:20-cv-04809-TCB Document 66-1 Filed 12/06/20 Page 15 of 22
Declaration of
28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, (Name), make the following

declaration.
1. I am over the age of 21 years and I am under no legal disability,

which would prevent me from giving this declaration.
2. Detail background and qualifications: SC resident, mother, wife,

voter, concerned citizen with Masters in Ed, Guidance, BA Psych, BA
Health Car Admin.
3.
4. My affidavit highlights: noticed mail irregularities(5), election day

concerns(6), and GA ballot harvesting as a non GA resident(7).
5. Info: October 2020: I noticed we had not received some bills,

packages and other mail in a timely fashion. October 13 I posted a
message to a local facebook page Johns Island United Discussion
Gro p 52 comments are attached. Word and pdf of screenshots are
attached. Much of the conversation references lost, slow mail,
missing, destroyed and lost ballots, confusing guidance on ballots vs
voting in person, one resident contacted Joe Cunningham and a
congressional inquiry was made, voter concern, contact with
businesses who claim mail is slow everywhere.
6. Info: Election day: We were assigned a new venue, Berkely Electric
on Johns Island. Berkely has very little public parking available for
such an event. We arrived at 6:30 a.m. & a.m. we were told
computers were down. A man ran from the building to a car for an
extension cord, 15-20 minutes later we slowly began to enter.
Between the delay and poor parking availability, I witnessed cars
a ca d ha e e g ach e a d causing
delays for voters.
6. Roughly 1.5 million Georgia voters requested absentee ballots, which
is far above the 200,000 absentee ballots from 2016, and is 30% of
their estimated 5 million voter turnout. 6. As of November 6th at
6pm, Georgia election officials said that more than 14,200 provisional
ballots needed to be counted. Jeff Greenburg, a former Mercer
County elections director, remarked that over his 13 years in the
role, he had only processed 200 provisional ballots in total and it
would take his county 2.5 days to process 650 provision ballots. That
implies nearly 55 days to approve, which suggests that the current
pace they are approving provisional ballots is implausibly fast if they
intend to call the election soon.
It is also curious that the correlation between the number of mail-
in votes for Biden net of Trump and the 2016 share of votes for
Clinton is stronger than the total votes for Biden net of Trump. This
evidence is consistent with the view that manipulation is easier with
mail-in votes and more likely to occur where there is less Republican
competitive oversight (e.g., poll watchers turned away).
7. The counties with the greatest reported software glitches and delays
are also the counties with the biggest swings in votes for Biden. The
list of numbers below tabulates the percent change in Democrat
votes from one election to the other for some of the most Democrat
counties in the state. Importantly, the increase between 2020 and
2016 is systematically larger than the 2008 to 2012 or 2012 to 2016
increases: for example, the median (mean) increase from 2016 to
2020 for these counties was 27% (30.6%), whereas they were only
11.5% (9.8%) and -4% (-2.8%).
These are anomalies that evidence a high likelihood of fraudulent

alterations within the software or the system.
Increase in Democrat Votes from Election-to-Election, in %
County 2008-2012 2012-2016 2016-2020
Fulton -6% 16% 28%
DeKalb -6% 6% 22%
Gwinnett 3% 25% 45%
Cobb -6% 20% 38%
Chatham -4% 3% 26%
Henry 8% 14% 46%
Muscogee -4% -6% 24%
Bibb -1% -5% 18%
Douglas 2% 9% 37%
Clarke -14% 16% 22%
Mean -2.8% 9.8% 30.6%
Median -4% 11.5% 27%
These changes alone are highly suspect. The 2016 to 2020 increase in
Democratic votes is at least over double in these counties. Moreover, all
it takes is one or two counties, like Fulton, to become a hotspot for fraud
for it to sway the overall election outcome, particularly via Atlanta.
Moreover, as a control group, consider the fact that counties that are on
the Northeastern border of Alabama have a much lower increase in
Democrat votes for Biden. These counties are comparable given their
proximity, making the especially large surge in Georgia more suspect.
There are also many precincts within these counties that have highly
suspect numbers. For example, 97% of the votes are for Biden in SC16A
(Fulton County) and 97% in Snapfinger Road (DelKab). Many more
examples abound. The distribution is also highly skewed towards
Biden: whereas 10% of the precincts have an over 95% Biden vote, none
of the precincts have an over 90% Trump vote. Given the historical
distribution of votes from 2016, this fact pattern is suspect.
8. O e d ag cf de ec gf a d e Be f d a .I he ca e
of election fraud, that means looking at the distribution of digits
across votes within a specified geography. Using precinct level data
for Georgia, my research identified 1,017 suspicious precincts out of
2,656 when we look at advance ballots. Even more precincts (1,530)
were flagged as suspicious for election day votes. Wh e Be f d a
is not a silver-bullet for identifying fraud on its own, it suggests
suspicious activity that warrants additional attention.
9. Yet another way of detecting statistical anomalies involves looking at
the distribution of the change in 2020 to 2016 vote shares of Trump
a d B de . Whe ea he d b f T e fec a,
the distribution for Biden is non-normal: it is skewed heavily to the
right. This is not present in other states that do not have similar
concerns about fraudulent activity, but is present in the states with
those concerns (e.g., Pennsylvania too).
10. There were many puzzling incidents across states, including

Georgia, where surges of votes for Biden were observed at odd hours
of the morning of November 4th. In particular, preliminary analysis
on the live Edison Research data reveals that new ballots were
coming in increasingly more slowly, but they were larger for
Democrats than for Republicans. The combination of the pattern and
timing is puzzling, particularly since it is not present in other states,

like Florida, that do not have similar concerns about fraud.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct.
Executed this November 16, 2020.
Prior to my work at the County of San Bernardino I worked as a

consultant for a company called Computer Assistance Inc. and I worked
on two fixed priced projects for the City of Los Angeles;
- Animal Management System
- Application Management system (recruitment application). One of my
responsibilities was to program the scanning machines to capture the
results of employee scantron tests into the system.
3. I reside at ***** Riverside California
4. I performed an analysis of the 4,505,777 absentee ballot records from
the Nov 2020 election I obtained from the Georgia election website
(https://elections.sos.ga.gov/Elections/voterabsenteefile.do) and I found
approximately 589 people who appear to have two or more records that
e e acce ed (ba a =A) ac e d ca ce (ba
a = C ). M c c ded e a e a e( , a ,
middle and suffix) and street name and reporting any duplicates with a
different voter registration number.
5. The records in the spreadsheet appear to me to be people who voted
twice. A a a e e ec d Ge a e d
confirm my findings.
6. I mailed the spreadsheet and SQL logic used to produce the spreadsheet
to Lin Wood on Nov 25, 2020.
7. On Nov 27, 2020 I was contacted by an associate of Lin Wood. We
discussed my findings, and I a a ed I d be de a
signed affidavit.
________Date: __________
Declaration of
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, , make the following

declaration.

2. I am the owner and sole proprietor of an educational publishing
company, State Standards Publishing, serving the needs of schools in
Georgia and the United States.
3. I reside at .
4. My affidavit highlights possible voting irregularities in Columbus,
Muscogee County, Georgia.
5. 10/19/20 I arrived to vote at a Muscogee County early voting
location on Citizens Way in Columbus, GA. Upon arrival, all voters
were instructed to complete an intake form while standing in line
and to FILL OUT ALL HIGHLIGHTED AREAS. It appeared that
the county was re-using forms prepared for the earlier primary, and
as a result, one of the highlighted areas we were instructed to
complete was to circle whether we were voting one of three choices:
Democratic, Nonpartisan, Republican. Obviously, this is private
business during the general election. Yet people all around me were
dutifully filling this out. Anyone looking at the form would know
exactly who I voted for on my official ballot!! I questioned the poll
orker abo t this, ho j st shr gged his sho lder that he didn t
have an answer. At that point, a sheriff announced that a less
crowded polling station had been opened (Columbus Trade Center). I
took my intake form and went there to vote. Upon leaving, I called
the county registrar and spoke to Assistant Director Tamika Geist.
She assured me that she was using the forms that had been prepared
for the earlier primary but that the situation would be fixed
immediately.
LOCATIONS AFFECTED:
All early voting locations in Columbus, Muscogee County, Georgia
beginning Monday, October 12, 2020.
MY CONCERNS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
(A) O e e i a ge e al elec i i i a eb i e a d
SHOULD NOT be shared or required to be reported/exposed
to workers at a polling station either during or after voting,
and that (B) anybody with a stack of those intake forms in
hand would have a nice little road map about who voted this
way or that and could, theoretically, pick out ballots they
did ha e ag ee i h a d make h e ballots
disappear. Any requirement to stipulate voting intention in a
general election is irregular (if not illegal!) and opens up the
potential for voting manipulation and fraud.
6. 10/19/20 I submitted the following Fraud Report to the Georgia
Secretary of State using their online submission form, expressing the
above concerns:
On arrival to vote 10/23 (corrected to 10/19), all voters were
instructed to complete an intake form while standing in line and to
FILL OUT ALL HIGHLIGHTED AREAS. The county re-used forms
prepared for the earlier primary, and as a result, one of the
highlighted areas we were instructed to complete was to circle

whether we were voting one of three choices: Democrat, Nonpartisan,
Republican. Obviously, this is private business during the general
election. Yet people all around me were filling this out. Anyone
looking at the form would know exactly who I voted for on my official
ballot!! I contacted the county registrar (Asst. Dir.), who assured me
this would be fixed immediately. I just want to make sure that it HAS
been fixed. This is very disturbing and opens the potential for anyone
in ol ed o amper i h re l he don par ic larl like. Plea e le
me know the outcome, if at all possible. I can provide you with a photo
of my form if needed. Thank you!
Outcome: No response.
7. 11-04-20 I emailed the following elected officials, including a copy of
the SOS Fraud Report and photo of the Muscogee County intake
form:
Randy Robertson GA State Senate
Richard Smith GA House of Representatives
Drew Ferguson US House of Representatives
David Perdue US Senate
Kelly Loeffler US Senate
Outcome: No response from any of these elected officials.
8. 11-10-20 Upon learning of the appointment of Congressman Doug
Collins to head up a Georgia recount, I contacted his Voter Fraud
Hotline and reported all of the above to a young woman named
Ashley. She instructed me to email her the intake form photo and
background. I submitted this information to her at

gaedo@donaldtrump.com.
Outcome: Unknown.
9. 11-20-20 Almost immediately after my conversation with the Voter
Fraud Hotline, I received a call from Chris Harvey in the GA SOS
office (404-985-6351). He stated that the Muscogee County form
would not have helped support vote tampering in any way and was
perfectly okay and appropriate. He asked me to clarify my concern,
and I did so, reiterating the two-fold point made above; namely, that
one s ote in a general election is pri ate b siness and SHOULD not
be shared, and that anybody with knowledge of how someone voted
co ld theoreticall locate and destro ballots the didn t agree ith.
He countered my concern by saying that this would never happen,
and the forms would not help anyone do that in any way. Perhaps
that s so; as I f rther e plained to him, I ha e no idea ho people are
breaking the la and tampering ith otes, b t somebod s doing
just that . . . and I didn t appreciate him dismissing my concern as
invalid. (He pointed o t that he ne er sed the ord in alid. To
hich I replied, Oh, let s split hairs, shall e? If he s s pposed to be
the community relations outreach, that office is in sad need of a fresh
perspective. Anyway, the conversation was patronizing, to say the
least.)
Outcome: Unknown.
(But I hope the Georgia Secretary of State will get the
comeuppance he so richly deserves.)
Declaration of Garland Favorito
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, , make the following declaration regarding my

observations of the full hand count audit conducted by Fulton County for the November 3rd 2020
Presidential race and the associated recount where a Dominion server malfunction forced the recount
process to stop and be repeated.
I am a career Information Technology professional with over 40 years of experience in a variety of

technical disciplines including programming, analysis, development methodologies, internet system
design, financial transaction processing and multi-factor online systems security.
In 2006, I co-founded Voters Organized for Trusted Election Results in Georgia (VoterGA), a nonpartisan,
non-profit, all-volunteer, dues free organization that has been a leader in the Georgia election integrity
movement for 16 years. During that time, I performed extensive research, made many presentations
around the state and produced several studies such as the one entitled: "Unresolved Security Risks in
Ballot Marking Devices" which I presented at the National Voting Rights Task Force in 2019.
I reside at
My declaration highlights that the conduct of the full hand count audit and recount I observed clearly
warrant an immediate court order to inspect absentee ballots and to preserve certain Dominion system
components for forensic review to ensure the integrity of the election.
Declarations:
1. After the November 3, 2020 election, I monitored the hand count audit and re-count conducted
by Fulton County, for the Presidential race in November at the World Congress Center;
2. On November 14, 2020, I participated as a monitor in the full hand count audit conducted by
Fulton County. During the first day of that audit, four hand count auditors who counted ballots
confided to me and other monitors how they noticed potentially fraudulent absentee ballots.
These were not marked with a writing instrument, not creased from mailing and not on normal
ballot stock. All four of the hand count auditors are highly experienced poll workers and have
submitted notarized affidavits of their findings to attorneys.
3. On November 29, 2020, Fulton County experienced a Dominion server malfunction during the
recount. The malfunction caused the county election staff to be unable to upload previously
scanned ballot images to a central Dominion county server for tabulation AND further caused
the county election staff to be unable to upload previously scanned ballot images to a new
replacement server that was brought on site but not set up with a matching Election ID and
election files.
4. The malfunction was so severe that Fulton County election officials had to call for a Dominion
software technician to be flown in from Colorado in an attempt to correct the problems;
5. The malfunction was ALSO so severe that Fulton County election officials decided to begin
scanning all ballot images a second time in case the technician would be unable to resolve the
problem once on site;
6. The onsite Dominion technician established new election files on the same Dell All-in-One
computers that contained the ballot images previously scanned and the staff began scanning
the ballot images again to the same Dell- All-In-One computers that still contained the
previously ballot images;
7. This highly unusual deviation of standard recount processing for the 2020 Georgia Presidential
election is NOT necessarily nefarious BUT it opens a door for new security risks and potential
errors in terms of duplication of ballot scanning, technical ballot images transfers and eventual
tabulation of already questionable election results,
8. In addition, VoterGA has independently confirmed that the Dominion voting system flipped
votes from President Trump to former Vice President Biden in at least one Georgia County. In
Ware County the electronic vote totals shorted President Trump by 37 votes and allocated those
votes to former Vice President Biden as proven by their hand count audit. This irregularity was
discovered thanks to the extra due diligence Ware County election officials performed in
producing their own system of record source totals for the hand count audit to double check
o al con ained in he Sec e a ARLO em ;
9. In summary, four highly experienced hand count auditors detected potentially fraudulent ballots
during the Fulton County hand count audit, there is a known instance of the Dominion voting
system flipping votes in the Ware County Presidential election results, the reported malfunction
of the Fulton County server has introduced new potential for security risks and errors;
10. The closeness of the Presidential election, the impact of Fulton County results on Georgia
election results and the impact of Georgia election results on the national Presidential election
demands a court to act to protect the integrity of the 2020 Presidential election in Georgia
counties,
11. In light of the evidence above, I believe it is imperative for a court to order an immediate
inspection of Fulton County absentee ballots, preservation of the Ware County Dominion voting
system equipment as well as preservation of the malfunctioning Fulton County server, scanned
ballot images, associated memory devices containing those images and the new server onto
which the scanned ballot images will be transmitted.
12. These specific actions if taken by a Georgia court are essential to ensure that all Georgians can
be confident that Fulton County and Georgia election results are accurate.
13. I am prepared to sign a sworn affidavit for the above statements to ensure any court of their
veracity;

Location: Roswell, GA
Declaration of James Nelson

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, make the following declaration.
I am over the age of 21 years and I am under no legal disability, which would prevent me
from giving this declaration.
I am a retired business owner and military veteran of the Vietnam era.
I reside at
My affidavit highlights anomalies and red flags during monitoring the scanning of re-
counted absentee ballots at the world Congress Center in Atlanta Georgia November 25,
2020.
The most important thing about them is some absentee ballots didn’t look folded or
creased which I only started looking for near the end of my day after someone told me to
look for them. It’s strange that they were not folded because you have to return them in
two envelopes.
I saw one box marked No. 98 that were military absentee ballots but they were on election
day ballot forms, the smaller forms. It is strange to me that they were not regular absentee
ballots and folded or creased since, to my knowledge, all absentee ballots must be in two
envelopes, one with the voter’s signature. Scanner one kept breaking down and I saw it
take more than one ballot at a time. It kept breaking down several times, had error
messages that said it should be restarted. The first operator on scanner one seemed need
several consultations to learn the procedure and the lady at Scanner two was helping him
several times. Most of the operators seemed experienced but several did not appear to be
experienced. I gave a list of which operators I thought were experienced to another
monitor to compare with his lost of who we thought was experienced and who was not. I
witnessed two workers reproducing ballots that would not go through scanners, each on
their own with no one watching. In other words, they could have input any candidate by
mistake or otherwise and how would anyone know. One lady hid her input when I started
watching her. Only two monitors from each party were allowed on the flow to cover
thirteen scanners, two reproduction computers and two men bringing and taking away
boxes of ballots to and from the scanners. Not enough monitors to monitor all that. I got a
very intimidating stare from the Fulton Director of Elections, (Mr Berry or Barrett ) that
lasted 15 to 30 seconds. I assume he was giving body language that said don’t monitor us,
because this is my territory.
The audit prior, on approximately November 14 when I was monitoring for the Republican
Party in Fulton County, I witnessed a stack of Biden ballots of over 5 inches with no Trump
ballots. Also, some counters were working alone. In other words, each person at the table
were counting on their own.
In Cobb and Fulton the pairs of people counting were not decided by political party. They
might both be the same party.
My wife and I voted early in person at the Sandy Planes polling place in Marietta. After we
printed our ballots we carried it across the room and a poll worker took our paper ballots
looked at them and put it into the scanner. I learned it is against the law for them to look at
or touch our ballot.
My name is I witnessed some events at 120 Interstate North Parkway, Suite 210,
Atlanta, Ga. today, November 30, 2020.
I arrived at the location just before 12:00 p.m. I drove to the back of the office complex. Other
Patriots were at the location, which is a temporary office for the Secretary of State. There was a
black Secretary of State van parked behind suite 210.
At 12:57 p.m., a large moving van pulled up to the dock that belonged to suite 210. Myself and
another Patriot, John, tried to video what they were loading/unloading. The truck driver and
another person blocked the visibility with cardboard so we could not video what they were
doing. We kept videoing. I could hear things that were being unloaded that sounded like something
with wheels, and there were several of them. They were clearly concerned about us videoing the
process, as they tried to hide it. Pictures and videos are attached.
At 2:29 p.m., a UPS truck pulled up to the dock at 210 Interstate North Parkway. Absentee ballots
were being loaded into the UPS truck. I will send pictures and videos in another email.
I hope this helps with exposing the fraud in this election. I thank you for all that you, Lin, and
Sidney are doing to protect our democracy and freedoms! God Bless America!
Sent from my iPhone

Declaration of
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, (Name), make the following declaration.
1. I am over the age of 21 years and I am under no legal disability, which would prevent me
from giving this declaration.
2. I'm a self employed Utilities Construction Contractor as well as a concerned citizen.
3. I reside at
4. My affidavit highlights my surveillance of 7000 Highlands PKWY and 120 Interstate North
PKWY STE. 210 on November 30 2020.
5. On 11/29/2020 I answered the call from Lin Wood to get down to the Georgia World
Congress Center because they were currently wiping the voting machines there. When I
arrived all was quiet and there was zero sign of anyone else there that was answering the call.
I remained for several hours watching the drama of the judge that didn't know how to make a
decision unfold while I waited.
6. Eventually I returned home only to see this tweet from Link Wood.
https://twitter.com/LLinWood/status/1333182964650348546?s=19
I decided to go see things for myself and confirm.
I arrived at 7000 Highlands Pkwy SE, Smyrna, GA 30082 at 12:46 a.m. on 11/30/2020.
Here is a link to a location screenshot and video I recorded upon arrival.
https://twitter.com/Quisling_hunter/status/1333286324086956032?s=19
I stayed surveilling that location for approximately 2.5 hours. It was quiet however there was
an AT&T van in the parking lot. I did a wifi scan and the only available was Eatonvisitor.
Compare that to the video Lin Wood posted. There was more than 10 networks available and
2 SOS named ones. I thought that this is definite proof of trying to hide something.
7. I then decided to go to the Secretary of State Elections warehouse at 120 Interstate N Pkwy E
SE, suite 210, Atlanta, GA 30339
I arrived at approximately 4 a.m.
At 4:26 a.m. a Waste Management trash truck pulled into the main entrance of the complex
and made a beeline for the dumpster behind suite 210 emptied it and then left the complex
through the back entrance. There's more than 50 dumpsters here and it only picked 1. This
would indicate a special pickup.
Here is a link to the videos and map.
https://twitter.com/Quisling_hunter/status/1333348935184879617?s=19
8. I remained on site until 5:55 am. I was informed through people I was in contact with
through Twitter that another groupof concerned citizens was minutes away so I left. They did
not stay long so I coordinated with guy named Kyle to cover until I could return. I returned
at approx 9:30 am. Kyle and I agreed to split up. I took over watching the front and he
watched the back. I remained in my car in a parking space that viewed the front entrance to
suite 210 for several hours observing absolutely nothing. At 1:44 pm I observed 2 Cobb
county police cars pass in front of me and go to the back of the building. I pulled around back
to see the police talking to several people. I approached them after the police left to find out
what was going on. Turns out they had shown up for the same reason as Kyle and I and had
been at the back for several hours. They informed that a semi truck with trailer had backed up
to suite 210 loading dock. The workers inside the SOS warehouse then blocked off the sides
of the trailer at the dock so that no one could observe what was being loaded. (They showed
me the video for proof) This caused everyone there to wonder what they were hiding. A
couple by the names of John and Valerie decided to follow the truck. The driver went to
Truest park, stopped and went to the guard shack. A few minutes later Cobb County Police
showed up. John and Valerie explained what was going on and the officer then went and
talked to the driver. When the officer returned to them he informed them that the driver
refused to say what he was transporting and that he had no probable cause to search the
trailer. (This was a situation where the officer was unaware of commercial trucking
regulations. A commercial driver is obligated to disclose what they have on the truck,
whether asked by fire or law officials - the cop might not be CDL Cert but that driver is
always aware of his obligations.) The officer then informed them they could not follow
because it's harassment. He also told them he understands the situation but that he could not
follow either because that would be harassment as well. He then offered to follow back to
suite 210 and at least file a report. That is where I came in. When John and Valerie were
stopped from following Kyle in a Mercedes SUV and another person in a Suburban who's
name i do not know decided to pick up the trail. I stayed at suite 210 listening to Kyle on
speaker phone describing what was happening. The driver was going in circles all over Cobb
county trying to lose them. At 3:30 I had to leave again. I returned at 6:30 pm John and
Valerie were still there along with several others. At around 8:00 pm Kyle and the guy in the
suburban returned. They filled me in on the rest of their adventure. Shortly after I left they
said the truck driver pulled into what they described as a run down roach motel, stopped,
opened the back and acted like he was making a delivery. An orange Dodge Charger then
pulled up and blocked Kyle's SUV in and the truck driver hopped in the truck and blocked
the suburban in. A verbal altercation then ensued. The driver then called into the office at
suite 120 on speaker phone and said that these crazy folks that started following me from
your parking lot won't leave me alone what do you want me to do. The person from the office
asked if he had a lock and the driver said yes. The office person said to take it to the yard and
lock it up then. Everyone got in their vehicles and proceeded to AAA Coopers logistics yard
at 1800 Westgate Pkwy SW, Atlanta, GA 30336. (Side note: the truck and trailer both carried
the AAA Cooper logo but when we ran the trailer license plate it came back registered to
Georgia Dept of Fleet Management) When they arrived Fulton County Sheriffs were waiting
and pulled Kyle over. They did not harass him but told him to move on. I fully understand
that this is a second hand account but they corroborated everything with pictures and videos.
I'm merely providing this for corroboration of a series of very very suspicious events. My
biggest concern is why in the world did the driver refuse to go to his destination? I can
speculate many reasons, none good, but I will refrain. After all that we settled in for a cold,
snowy, uneventful night. I left at 5:45 am. and have not returned.
November, 11 2020
Declaration of
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, Seth Keshel, make the following

declaration.

2. I am a trained data analyst with experience in multiple fields,
including service in the United States Army as a Captain of Military
Intelligence, with a one-year combat tour in Afghanistan. My
experience includes political involvement requiring a knowledge of
election trends and voting behavior.
3. I reside at .
4. My affidavit highlights substantial deviance from statistical norms
and results regarding voting patterns in Georgia.
5. All 2020-related voting totals are taken from the Decision Desk HQ
unofficial tracker, are not certified, and are subject to change from
the time of the creation of this affidavit. Other voting totals are from
the Georgia Secretary of State.
6. Georgia has not been won by a Democratic presidential candidate
since 1992. Then-Senator Barack Obama received a large increase in
Democratic votes in his first campaign (2008), earning 1,844,123
votes; however, his support plunged 3.81% in his reelection
campaign, leaving him with 1,773,827 votes. In 2016, Hillary
Clinton earned 1,877,963 votes, just 1.8% more than where Obama
had been eight years before. Donald Trump had very little
improvement over Mitt Romney in 2016, but has improved 17.7%
from his 2016 performance, an addition of 368,899 votes. This strong

performance casts substantial doubt on a 31.6% improvement for Joe
Biden on top of the Clinton total from just four years ago.
7. Metro Atlanta is full of votes, and the urban and suburban counties
support Democratic candidates, while the exurban counties support
Republican candidates. This shift was made complete when Cobb
and Gwinnett Counties moved away from Donald Trump in 2016.
The Atlanta region has added substantial voter registrations, which
has not always correlated to a drastic increase in amount of votes
cast. This year, Gwinnett and Henry Counties have already cast
more than 40% more Democratic votes than in 2016, with Donald
Trump still gaining votes in the counties. Cobb and Douglas
Counties have now cast over 35% more Democratic votes than 2016,
while all other metro Atlanta counties are up substantially from the
2012 and 2016 elections. Population growth can certainly drive
turnout higher, but with the reported signature verification issues
and transparency violations present in Georgia, these totals are
highly suspect. The bar graph highlighting Democratic vote
increases in the 12 most heavily Democrat-voting counties is
contained in Exhibit A.
8. President Trump improved his margins in just 70 of 159 counties in
the state, mostly in the southeast, but also in minority-heavy
counties that he did not win. The most shocking losses of margin are
in strong Republican counties that are not showing indications of
flipping like Cobb or Gwinnett Counties did. President Trump
backtracked 14% in Forsyth, 13% in Fayette, 12% in Paulding, 11%
in Cherokee, and 8% in Hall, all while compiling substantially more

votes than in 2016, when many nominal Republican voters opted to
support minor party candidates. Many rural counties in Northern
Georgia have President Trump running 4-8%, or even worse, behind
his performance in 2016, despite high voter registration percentages
and overall vote increases. The major Republican counties (Forsyth,
Fayette, Paulding, Cherokee, Hall) and heavily Republican rural
areas showing heavy downward margin shift suggest that vote
tabulation errors or machine troubles are present in Georgia and
should be audited. Exhibit A contains a side-by-side comparison of
the County Classification Map of Georgia and the current analysis of
how margins have shifted in 2020 as President Trump struggles to
hold on to his margins in Northern Georgia.
17 Nov. 2020
Aledo, Texas
Declaration of
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, , make the following declaration regarding my

observations of the full hand count audit conducted by Fulton County for the November 3rd 2020
Presidential race and the associated recount where a Dominion server malfunction forced the recount
process to stop and be repeated.
I am a career Information Technology professional with over 40 years of experience in a variety of

technical disciplines including programming, analysis, development methodologies, internet system
design, financial transaction processing and multi-factor online systems security.
In 2006, I co-founded Voters Organized for Trusted Election Results in Georgia (VoterGA), a nonpartisan,
non-profit, all-volunteer, dues free organization that has been a leader in the Georgia election integrity
movement for 16 years. During that time, I performed extensive research, made many presentations
around the state and produced several studies such as the one entitled: "Unresolved Security Risks in
Ballot Marking Devices" which I presented at the National Voting Rights Task Force in 2019.
I reside at
My declaration highlights that the conduct of the full hand count audit and recount I observed clearly
warrant an immediate court order to inspect absentee ballots and to preserve certain Dominion system
components for forensic review to ensure the integrity of the election.
Declarations:
1. After the November 3, 2020 election, I monitored the hand count audit and re-count conducted
by Fulton County, for the Presidential race in November at the World Congress Center;
2. On November 14, 2020, I participated as a monitor in the full hand count audit conducted by
Fulton County. During the first day of that audit, four hand count auditors who counted ballots
confided to me and other monitors how they noticed potentially fraudulent absentee ballots.
These were not marked with a writing instrument, not creased from mailing and not on normal
ballot stock. All four of the hand count auditors are highly experienced poll workers and have
submitted notarized affidavits of their findings to attorneys.
3. On November 29, 2020, Fulton County experienced a Dominion server malfunction during the
recount. The malfunction caused the county election staff to be unable to upload previously
scanned ballot images to a central Dominion county server for tabulation AND further caused
the county election staff to be unable to upload previously scanned ballot images to a new
replacement server that was brought on site but not set up with a matching Election ID and
election files.
4. The malfunction was so severe that Fulton County election officials had to call for a Dominion
software technician to be flown in from Colorado in an attempt to correct the problems;
5. The malfunction was ALSO so severe that Fulton County election officials decided to begin
scanning all ballot images a second time in case the technician would be unable to resolve the
problem once on site;
6. The onsite Dominion technician established new election files on the same Dell All-in-One
computers that contained the ballot images previously scanned and the staff began scanning
the ballot images again to the same Dell- All-In-One computers that still contained the
previously ballot images;
7. This highly unusual deviation of standard recount processing for the 2020 Georgia Presidential
election is NOT necessarily nefarious BUT it opens a door for new security risks and potential
errors in terms of duplication of ballot scanning, technical ballot images transfers and eventual
tabulation of already questionable election results,
8. In addition, VoterGA has independently confirmed that the Dominion voting system flipped
votes from President Trump to former Vice President Biden in at least one Georgia County. In
Ware County the electronic vote totals shorted President Trump by 37 votes and allocated those
votes to former Vice President Biden as proven by their hand count audit. This irregularity was
discovered thanks to the extra due diligence Ware County election officials performed in
producing their own system of record source totals for the hand count audit to double check
totals contained in the Secretary’s ARLO system ;
9. In summary, four highly experienced hand count auditors detected potentially fraudulent ballots
during the Fulton County hand count audit, there is a known instance of the Dominion voting
system flipping votes in the Ware County Presidential election results, the reported malfunction
of the Fulton County server has introduced new potential for security risks and errors;
10. The closeness of the Presidential election, the impact of Fulton County results on Georgia
election results and the impact of Georgia election results on the national Presidential election
demands a court to act to protect the integrity of the 2020 Presidential election in Georgia
counties,
11. In light of the evidence above, I believe it is imperative for a court to order an immediate
inspection of Fulton County absentee ballots, preservation of the Ware County Dominion voting
system equipment as well as preservation of the malfunctioning Fulton County server, scanned
ballot images, associated memory devices containing those images and the new server onto
which the scanned ballot images will be transmitted.
12. These specific actions if taken by a Georgia court are essential to ensure that all Georgians can
be confident that Fulton County and Georgia election results are accurate.
13. I am prepared to sign a sworn affidavit for the above statements to ensure any court of their
veracity;

Location: Roswell, GA
The Secretary of State is responsible by law for election

results and conducting and overseeing elections across
the state of Georgia.
The Secretary of State's website recites that it will produce
the ballots for review specifically referring to the Dominion
machines.
The Secretary of State for Georgia is the proper party
responsible for all elections state-wide.
The Secretary of State wrongly issued directions to all
counties not to cooperate with
Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State, 974 F.3d. 1236
(11th Cir. 2020) is inapposite. That case was about the
way candidates were printed out on the ballots but had no
power to enforce the layout of the candidates on the
ballot.
Georgia law places the Secretary of State in the position
of responsibility for the conduct, oversight and
enforcement of the proper conduct of statewide
elections. Only the Georgia Secretary of State can
purchase and control the voting machines required to be
used throughout the State and in each county. O.C.G.A.
21-2-70 (5) (excepting voting machines from county
duties).
Plaintiffs do not have to sue more than 600 defendants for
Georgia's 159 counties to stop the destruction of evidence
on machines purchased by the Secretary of State. The
Georgia Secretary of State's own website makes that
clear. https://sos.ga.gov/securevoting/.
The Georgia Secretary of State is responsible for the
conduct alleged in Plaintiff's suit as a matter of law. "They
are also accountable for investigating election fraud and
merits; (2) that the Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) that
the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damages the proposed injunction may
cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.
, 954 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1992). The Court “should pay particular regard for
the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” , 555 U.S.
at 24.
The State Defendants will show in their responsive pleadings that Plaintiffs will not succeed on
the merits and are not entitled to any relief, and State Defendants have a right to be heard on
these issues before the Court rules on Plaintiffs’ motion.
State Defendants respond to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s numbered requests as follows:
1. Ballot images
Counties are the custodians of all ballot images, paper ballots, and other voting documents—not
the Secretary of State. County election superintendents are required by law to maintain ballots
and other voting-related documents under seal. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500(a). Plaintiffs did not name
any county election superintendents as defendants in this case. The Eleventh Circuit has made
clear that federal courts do not have the authority to exercise jurisdiction to order relief against
county officials who have not been named as parties, especially where those county election
officials have already completed their statutory obligations regarding the 2020 general
election. , 974 F.3d at 1253.
2. Impoundment of voting equipment
The State Defendants have a “strong interest in their ability to enforce state election law
requirements.” , 635 F.3d 219, 244 (6th Cir. 2011). For
this reason, the Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should
ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.”
., 140 S.Ct. 1205, 1207 (April 6, 2020) (per curiam) (citing
, 549 U. S. 1 (2006)).
The Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit have not been shy about staying lower court
injunctions that altered election rules once the 2020 general election cycle commenced.
, , No. 20A55, 592 U.S. __, 2020 WL 5887393, at *1 (Oct. 5, 2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“By enjoining South Carolina’s witness requirement shortly before
the election, the District Court defied [the ] principle and this Court’s precedents.”
(citations omitted)); , No. 19A1063, 591 U.S. __, 2020 WL
3604049, at *1 (July 2, 2020); , No. 20-13360, 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 31405, at *11-12 (11th Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (“[W]e are not on the eve of the election—we
are in the middle of it, with absentee ballots already printed and mailed. An injunction here
would thus violate ’s well-known caution against federal courts mandating new election
rules—especially at the last minute.”).
Here, Plaintiffs seek relief that, if granted, would affect not only the currently underway
recount of the November 3, 2020, general election but would also have catastrophic impact on
election officials ability to conduct both the December 1, 2020, non-federal run-off elections
around Georgia as well as the January 5, 2020, special election for two seats in the United States
Senate as well as a seat on the Public Service Commission.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have the same redressability issues that infect the vast majority of
their complaint. The voting equipment that they seek to impound is in the possession
of election officials, and the 11th Circuit has made clear in that the State
Defendants cannot stand in as a proxy for local election officials against whom the relief should
be sought. 974 F.3d at 1256-58.
3. Allow imaging and inspection of voting equipment in 10 named counties
The same arguments about interfering with an ongoing election process identified
in (2) above apply with equal force here. In addition, Plaintiffs have the same fatal defect as
to standing and redressability in light of that their requested relief in (1) and (2) has.
4. Request additional imaging and inspection of voting equipment beyond the 10 named
counties
As noted in (3) above, Plaintiffs’ request in 4 The same arguments about

interfering with an ongoing election process identified in (2) above apply with equal force
here. In addition, Plaintiffs have the same fatal defect as to standing and redressability in light
of that their requested relief in (1), (2), and (3) has.
Plaintiffs’ counsel also incorporates a drive-by attack against Dominion in

their request for relief, unsupported by any evidence before the Court. The State Defendants
point out that Dominion is not a party to this litigation. The State Defendants reserve the right
to address further the unsupported arguments made by Plaintiffs once the State has the
opportunity to fully respond to the unsupported allegations made by Plaintiffs.
5. Produce video recordings of voting locations in the 10 named counties
First, discovery has not commenced, and there is no obligation on the part of the State
Defendants to produce anything at this juncture, especially when, as Plaintiffs’ counsel
acknowledges, all of his service on the State Defendants is either partial or inchoate at this
juncture. However, setting that aside, this request by Plaintiffs suffers the same fatal defect as to
standing and redressability that the requests in (1), (2), (3), and (4) have. Plaintiffs seek
recordings which, while they may be in the possession of officials, are in the
possession of the State Defendants. Accordingly, no relief can be ordered against
the Defendants when the relief can only be effectuated by officials.
6. Produce an executed version of the contract between the State and

“Dominion/Smartmatic”
We strongly disagree with the State Attorney’s request for an adjournment of

the pending emergency motion until December 4, 2020.
Defendants’ response cements what has been purely a stall tactic since
Plaintiffs’ counsel notified them of the complaint on November 26, 2020. Despite
multiple efforts of outreach by Plaintiffs’ local counsel Harry MacDougald, Defendants
did not respond until this email to answer correspondence from this Court. Now
Defendants ask this Court to license by delay the very destruction of evidence Plaintiffs’
emergency motion seeks to prevent. They intend to wipe the machines of all data on
Monday November 30, 2020, in connection with a machine recount, using the same
defective system that has cast a pall of doubt over election results in 29 states and the
entire nation. We have filed and attach hereto a redacted declaration from a Union
County poll worker attesting to these facts.
The Plaintiffs are Republican Electors for the President, a county GOP
chairman, and the assistant secretary of the Georgia GOP.
Fraud has infected this election on an unprecedented level as evidence of its

magnitude increases by the day. By federal statute, the electors must be seated and
allowed to vote no later than December 14, 2020.
Plaintiffs must be able to present their case and provide sufficient time for the
court to rule and for any appellate process to conclude before that date. Plaintiffs have
moved and will continue to move expeditiously.
Moreover, Defendants are required by 52 U.S.C. §20701 and O.C.G.A. § 21-

2-500 and Secretary of State Rule 183-1-12-.13-to maintain all voting records—
including the ballot “image” created by the Dominion system which becomes the actual
“vote” read by the Dominion scanner/tabulator and the “AuditMark” images that show
how the tabulators interpreted and passed the vote on to next stage of the Election
Management System (EMS) before the state ARLO system produces the official
tabulation results. The “adjudication” process is rife with opportunity for election fraud.
The Georgia Secretary of State and his Deputy are aware of this problem.
Indeed, Dominion was rushed into Georgia by virtue of a rare no-bid contract for the
$100 million system in 2019.[1] Updates that rendered the system uncertified were
conducted by Dominion on October 31, 2020—just three days before the election—and
after thirteen days of early voting.
Another equally impermissible and uncertified “update” was performed on the

systems in Morgan and Spalding counties the night before the election. Accordingly,
Dominion machines could not have been lawfully used in Georgia for the election even
under Georgia law—much less under federal law.
The Secretary of State advertises on its website:

“Dominion will be working with the Secretary of State’s office to address

perceived concerns regarding use of marked ballots that feature
barcodes. For example, the state can make scanned images of all ballots cast
in statewide elections available, allowing anyone to do a ballot count to check
the accuracy of the results.”
Defendants have the vast resources of the State of Georgia with which to
defend this case. The claim that counsel is occupied with briefing in an entirely
unrelated case brought by a private party, does not withstand scrutiny. The massive
fraud and ballot-stuffing claims which predominate this case and necessitate access to
and inspection of the machines are not raised in Mr. Wood’s case on appeal in the
11th Circuit. The claims here are significant and distinct.
The State’s claims about service of process are also unavailing. We have
offered numerous ways of delivering the pleadings electronically. And, they are all
available on the court’s ECF system. Now that Defendants have finally responded to
correspondence from this Court, the Secretary of State should be required to:
1. Immediately produce to Plaintiffs on Monday November 30, 2020, all

“scanned images of ballots cast in the statewide election” thereby “allowing
anyone to do a ballot count to check the accuracy of results” as stated on its
website.
2. Impound all machines used in the creation, assessment, tabulation,

submission, and reporting of election results statewide to prevent any additional
destruction of evidence for a period of seven days or until further order of this Court.
While Plaintiffs understand the public interest in proceeding with a recount, there is
much greater public interest in ensuring the integrity of the process to Georgia, to the
nation, and to the world which is watching how the United States of America addresses
these troubling allegations and evidence of fraud.
3. Allow Plaintiffs to proceed immediately on Monday November 30 to have

their experts mirror-image all parts of the Dominion voting process in ten
counties over five days to collect a random sample for analysis.
The counties should include: Fulton, Gwinnett, Cobb, DeKalb, Henry,

Cherokee, Forsyth, Hart, Paulding, and Hancock.
This imaging and the related examinations need to be conducted by Plaintiffs’

experts on the equipment for Dominion at all stages of the process, including
the “poll pad,” the “Image Cast ballot marking device,” the “scanner tabulator
(ICP) which reads the QR code generated on the image which becomes the
ballot, the Central County tabulator (ICC) to include any machines utilized for
adjudication, as well as the Election Management System (EMS) equipment,
storage devices and the state’s ARLO official tabulation results. This includes
the “English Street Warehouse” located at 1365 English St. NW, Atlanta, GA
30318 for Fulton County and especially its “lunchroom.”
4. Plaintiffs propose to report at least their initial results to the Court by

Monday, December 7, 2020, for the Court and parties to evaluate whether
additional examinations of machines are warranted. At this stage, it is
possible that Dominion has already destroyed the evidence of its fraud, as
its own handbook concedes facts establishing that its audit trail amounts to
nothing reliable at all. More races are affected by the fraudulent system that
merely the presidential race.
5. Moreover, Defendants should be required to produce on Monday, November

30, 2020, the video evidence for all voting locations at all voting sites and
ballot boxes for 48 hours surrounding the election in the counties designated
above, and especially for the State Farm Arena in Fulton County, Georgia,
where the election officials lied about the water leak and witnesses saw
three women working on the computers for the voting machines in the wee
morning hours after ordering all others to leave the facility.
6. Defendants should also be required immediately to produce the executed

version of the contract between Georgia and Dominion/Smartmatic.
Accordingly, we urge the Court to consider and grant Plaintiffs’ Emergency

motion—at least to the extent outlined herein. Properly counting the legal vote of
American citizens is sacred to maintaining this Republic. The overwhelming public
interest demands nothing less than the full transparency provided by the relief
requested in Plaintiffs’ Motion for TRO and herein. Time is of the essence.
Respectfully submitted,
------
ach, LLP
From: Russell Willard <rwillard@law.ga.gov>

Date: Saturday, November 28, 2020 at 9:22 PM
To: 'Katie Klimko' <Katie Klimko@gand.uscourts.gov>
Cc: Sidney Powell <sidney@federalappeals.com>, Howard Kleinhendler
<howard@kleinhendler.com>, Charlene McGowan
<CMcGowan@LAW.GA.GOV>, "lwood@linwoodlaw.com"
<lwood@linwoodlaw.com>, Harry MacDougald
<hmacdougald@cpdlawyers.com>
Subject: RE: 20-cv-04809-TCB Pearson et al v. Kemp et al
Dear Ms. Klimko,
In response to your inquiry, no, the State has not begun preparation of a brief
in opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion. While Ms. McGowan and myself are in
receipt of certain of Plaintiffs’ filings that have been made in this case, the
initial filings, including the complaint, were made after hours on the
Wednesday before Thanksgiving, and there were apparently some filings
made slightly before midnight on Friday, which was also a state holiday. We
have not heard directly from nor been able to speak with any of our clients
about that correspondence, which included copies of only select filings along
with a link to a shared file drive, which many IT systems will not permit
download from due to security parameters in place. As Plaintiffs’ counsel
acknowledges in his email, our clients have not been served nor has counsel
sent waiver of service packets to any of the defendants. As Plaintiffs’ counsel
further acknowledges, a portion of his pleadings were sent by express
package delivery after hours last night (with no representation as to whether
those were placed in a drop box with Saturday pickup or Monday pickup nor
as to what type of package delivery was selected) with a promise to drop off
the remaining documents, including the complaint and all of the exhibits relied
upon, at an express package delivery sometime today. Neither of those
representations about inchoate delivery provides meaningful notice to our
clients.
We are currently reviewing the filings that we have been able to retrieve, which
encompass hundreds of pages and over thirty exhibits including over twenty
witness declarations. The State intends to file a brief in opposition to Plaintiffs’
motion as soon as possible, and we will be consulting with state elections
officials on what declarations may be necessary to refute plaintiffs’ allegations.
However, those elections officials are preoccupied with the on-going statewide
recount, and we expect that it will be several business days before we will be
in a position to file a complete response.
Furthermore, several of the claims raised in Plaintiffs’ action are currently

before the Eleventh Circuit on an expedited appeal in the related case of L. Lin
Wood v. Raffensperger, Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-04651-SDG (Appeal No. 20-
14418). Mr. Wood functions as the sole plaintiff in that litigation, but he makes
many of the same or substantially related claims as counsel for the plaintiffs in
the instant action. We expect that case, which is under appeal after Mr.
Wood’s request for emergency relief was denied by Judge Grimberg, will
resolve many of the issues before the Court in this action. Pursuant to two
orders entered by the 11th Circuit on Wednesday, Ms. McGowan and I have
been working through the holiday already (and continue to do so) preparing
two separate briefs that the 11th Circuit has ordered be filed in the expedited
appeal on Tuesday, December 1. We are hopeful that the Eleventh Circuit will
rule expeditiously during the coming week.
Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that the Court refrain from
scheduling a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion prior to December 4, 2020, which
should allow the State, after filing the Wood briefs, to respond meaningfully to
the Plaintiffs’ motion. Although Plaintiffs have styled their motion as an
“emergency,” Plaintiffs waited until the commencement of the Thanksgiving
holiday, and 5 days after the Secretary of State and Governor certified the
slate of presidential electors on November 20th, to bring their claims. Plaintiffs
are making the unprecedented request that the Court “de-certify” and set aside
the results of the presidential election. It would be highly prejudicial to the
State Defendants and to the voters of Georgia to schedule a hearing before
the State Defendants have been afforded at least a reasonable period of time
to respond to Plaintiffs’ belated allegations.
We would be happy to participate in a scheduling conference with the Court to

discuss this matter further at the Court’s convenience.
Respectfully,
Russell D. Willard
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Senior Assistant Attorney General: Section Chief

Office of the Attorney General Chris Carr
Government Services & Employment
Tel: (404) 458-3316
rwillard@law.ga.gov
Georgia Department of Law
Atlanta, Georgia, 30334
From: Katie Klimko <Katie Klimko@gand.uscourts.gov>

Sent: Saturday, November 28, 2020 3:11 PM
To: Harry MacDougald <hmacdougald@cpdlawyers.com>
Cc: Sidney Powell <sidney@federalappeals.com>; Howard Kleinhendler
<howard@kleinhendler.com>; Charlene McGowan
<CMcGowan@LAW.GA.GOV>; Russell D. Willard
<rwillard@law.ga.gov>; lwood@linwoodlaw.com
Subject: RE: 20-cv-04809-TCB Pearson et al v. Kemp et al
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open
attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
Thank you, Mr. MacDougald!

A FedEx to the Defendants of hard copies of yesterday’s filings was dropped

into a FedEx box very late last night.
A FedEx to the Defendants of hard copies of the Complaint and the Exhibits,
which are voluminous, is being assembled now and will be turned over to
FedEx this afternoon.
I have not heard back from any counsel for any Defendant.
Please note that I have also copied Sidney Powell and Howard Kleinhendler
on this email, for whom I am serving as local counsel.
With the Court’s permission, if there are any telephone conferences over the
weekend, Ms. Powell and Mr. Kleinhendler would also like to participate.
If there are any other questions, please do not hesitate to call on me.
With best regards,
------
Harry W. MacDougald
Two Ravinia Drive
Suite 1600
Atlanta, GA 30346
404–843–1956
Direct 404-843-4109
From: Katie Klimko <Katie Klimko@gand.uscourts.gov>

Date: Saturday, November 28, 2020 at 1:26 PM
To: Harry MacDougald <hmacdougald@cpdlawyers.com>,
"lwood@linwoodlaw.com" <lwood@linwoodlaw.com>
Subject: 20-cv-04809-TCB Pearson et al v. Kemp et al
Hi counsel,
Judge Batten is aware of the pending TRO motion. We wanted to touch

base on where things are with service, etc. Have Defendants been
served and if not, do you know when you anticipate service? Also, do
you know who will be representing Defendants?
Thanks so much,
1 of 39

2 Atlanta Division
3
et al., )
5 )
Plaintiff, )
6 ) Civil Action
7 )
) Atlanta, Georgia
8 Brian Kemp, et al., ) Sunday November 29, 2020
) 7:45 p.m.
9 Defendant. )
_________________________)
10
11
14
APPEARANCES:
15
16 L. Lin Wood, Jr.
Howard Kleinhendler
17 Harry MacDougald
Christine Dial Buckler
18 Attorneys at Law
19 FOR THE DEFENDANTS: Russell David Willard

20 Attorneys at Law
21
22
(404) 215-1528
24
25 produced by CAT.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
2 of 39
1 THE COURT: Hi. I'm Judge Batten.
2 THE CLERK: I think we have everybody here. Harry
3 MacDougald.
4 MR. MACDOUGALD: I want to announce that my
5 associate Christine Buckler is in the office with me but off
6 camera.
7 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. MacDougald.
8 THE CLERK: Howard Kleinhendler.
9 THE COURT: Howard. Who are you with?
10 MR. KLEINHENDLER: I am with the Plaintiffs.
11 THE COURT: Keep going.
12 THE CLERK: Sidney Powell.
13 THE COURT: I don't see Ms. Powell.
14 MS. POWELL: I am also here with Lin Wood for the
15 Plaintiffs.
16 THE COURT: I don't see either of y'all.
17 THE CLERK: If you will turn on your video, please,
18 Ms. Powell.
19 MS. POWELL: I am not sure it is working properly,
20 but I have given it my best shot.
21 THE COURT: Who else do we have on the call besides
22 Ms. Powell and Mr. Wood?
23 THE CLERK: Charlene McGowan.
24 THE COURT: Is she on the video?
25 THE CLERK: Everyone's video is on except Ms. Powell
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
3 of 39
1 and Rus Willard.
2 THE COURT: I can't see everybody. I suppose that
3 is okay as long as I can hear everybody. So I think we are
4 ready to proceed. Are the Plaintiffs ready to proceed and are
5 the Defendants ready to proceed? One at a time. Plaintiffs?
6 MS. POWELL: Yes.
7 THE COURT: And the Defendants?
8 MR. WILLARD: Yes, Your Honor.
9 THE COURT: You know, I am not really sure exactly
10 what it is the Plaintiffs are trying to obtain in the case
11 right now regarding these machines. There has been a mention
12 of wiping of a machine at the World Congress Center, and also
13 been a discussion about reference to the fact that Union
14 County is going to wipe their machines. You know, I
15 understand that these county officials are obligated by state
16 law to preserve the data from the election on November 3.
17 What is it exactly that the Plaintiffs want me to order the
18 Secretary of State and/or the other Defendants to do? I am
19 not -- excuse me, I am sorry -- I am not talking about
20 ultimately under the complaint that has been filed, I am
21 talking about this emergency temporary relief right now. I
22 know you want me to throw out the election results and et
23 cetera, but I just mean on the short-term basis, what is it
24 exactly that the Plaintiffs would like? Ms. Powell?
25 MS. POWELL: Right now what you ordered in your
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
4 of 39
1 first order of the day would be perfect. We need access to
2 the machines as soon as possible so we can do mirror images of
3 the data that is on there and the operations that are on
4 there, because it's well-established throughout Dominion
5 software systems and anybody who knows anything about them
6 that they can be easily altered. And we understand, from what
7 is going on at the Center today, that process has already
8 begun. Apparently from 11:00 to 1:30 they began substituting
9 software in the machines that was completely unnecessary to
10 count the ballots.
11 THE COURT: Let me stop you right there and ask
12 Mr. Willard, first of all, I understand the State's
13 argument that -- the Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs
14 lack standing. I also understand that they cite Jacobson for
15 the proposition that they aren't the right people to be sued
16 to provide this relief and that instead it should have been
17 the county elections officers. I understand all of that. But
18 I am wondering, and I am just trying to get factual
19 information here, what is it about access to the voting
20 machines that the Defendants have a problem with? Why can't
21 the Plaintiffs' experts go ahead and do a forensic
22 examination? Are they going to damage anything or in any
23 other way interfere with the performance of the government
24 officials' duties?
25 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, I appreciate the
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
5 of 39
1 opportunity to respond. I apologize about the video. With
2 the weather out there, we've had it bad with issues all
3 weekend in my subdivision. I will say that we've got a
4 concern because what your original proposed order and what the
5 Plaintiffs are seeking is going to basically take certain
6 voting equipment out of the equation for the election
7 scheduled to take place this Tuesday, as well as the election
8 scheduled to take place on January 5th, because Plaintiffs are
9 wanting us to hold and basically mothball and preserve these
10 machines at the county level - not in our possession, not in
11 our custody and control - at the county level. They want to
12 preserve those in the form that they were in after the
13 November 3rd election. Under state law there is an obligation
14 on those county election officials to preserve the data. But
15 the State of Georgia has set up a system where the actual
16 equipment is used at each successive election in the cycle.
17 And there is a certain amount of recalibration in terms of
18 getting them ready. For the individual machines, they are not
19 going to have the November 3rd, 2020 ballot card being
20 inserted in them. They are not going to have that database
21 built in any longer. You're going to have a December 1st,
22 2020 database in the machines and in the tabulation computers.
23 You're going to have a January 5th, 2020 database tabulating
24 the results of the federal and state-wide run-off on January
25 5th. They have cited to Curling. Curling is inapposite
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
6 of 39
1 because it was decided before the 11th Circuit's
2 redressability decision in Jacobson. In addition, they are
3 wanting you to poke the procedure. You've got election
4 officials who, as of Tuesday morning, have to turn on the
5 lights, conduct in-person voting, Tuesday night of this week
6 have to tabulate results on the very equipment that the
7 Plaintiffs are wanting you to take out of circulation. And
8 that gets -- now it is so broad, based on what Ms. Powell has
9 asked in some of her more recent emails, you've now implicated
10 the Purcell line of cases and the progeny as interpreted by
11 this circuit that says Plaintiffs don't get to come in and
12 poke at an election procedure that is currently underway.
13 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you, Mr. Willard.
14 First of all, refresh my recollection. The election in two
15 days, which is December 1, is that the run-off for the Public
16 Service Commissioner? Or is that on January 5, 2021?
17 MR. WILLARD: The Public Service Commission race has
18 been moved to January 5th, 2021.
19 THE COURT: What is December 1?
20 MR. WILLARD: Basically any local race that is still
21 out there that --
22 THE COURT: Okay.
23 MR. WILLARD: For example, the Athens Clarke County,
24 Oconee County and, I forget, I think it's the Northeastern
25 Judicial Circuit, that District Attorney's race is on the
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
7 of 39
1 ballot for this Tuesday.
2 THE COURT: I remember that.
3 MR. WILLARD: Clarke County and Oconee are going to
4 be voting in that.
5 THE COURT: Right.
6 MR. WILLARD: I am not aware here on Sunday evening
7 at 7:59 what other counties may have races on Tuesday and what
8 may not. We've been sort of struggling ever since the
9 Plaintiffs filed their emergency motion right before midnight
10 on Friday that we saw sometime around lunchtime on Saturday.
11 We've sort of been scrambling. I don't think all of my
12 clients have still seen everything, as Plaintiffs acknowledge.
13 There has been a complete absence of notice requisite to grant
14 any relief as to the temporary hearing at this point, because
15 I haven't been able to communicate with all of my clients to
16 see if all of my clients have even been properly served with
17 the emergency motion.
18 Plaintiffs have been sort of trying to do this by
19 the seat of their pants, and they keep asking for this sort of
20 ever-shifting claim of relief that they are saying isn't going
21 to matter all that much in the grand scheme of things, but in
22 terms of a currently underway election, it is going to be
23 throwing sugar in that gas tank and gumming up the works for
24 not only the December 1st election, but also the January 5th
25 election, as well as the recount that is underway.
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1 THE COURT: Well, I am having the impression, from
2 what you've just said, Mr. Willard, that there really is not
3 expected to be much turnout for Tuesday's elections, whatever
4 remains statewide. Obviously we are going to have an enormous
5 turnout January 5th, 2021. I just -- you know, I don't fault
6 the Defendants for complaining about the timing, and the fact
7 that they've been given precious little time to respond to the
8 Plaintiffs' requests. I don't blame them. And my draft
9 proposed orders, the two that we are discussing from today,
10 both reflect a hearing schedule that reflects my understanding
11 of the State's position. In other words, I feel like, you
12 know, you've complained, understandably, about the timing and
13 said you need a little more time, and I feel like I am giving
14 you that by having the hearing on Friday, giving you till
15 Wednesday to file the brief in opposition. Believe me, I am
16 not saying that you are getting an abundance of time, but to
17 me, I divided that baby as fair as I thought I could, and I
18 feel like I am giving you enough time. My point is, if I am
19 going to give you that time, I don't understand why it is
20 asking too much. And forget for just a moment the argument
21 about it's not under the Secretary of State's control. I
22 understand that argument. I am going to deal with that in a
23 minute. Laying that aside for a second, the question is, why
24 isn't there enough already -- let me put it like this. What
25 you are asking for, why should you not correspondingly agree
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1 to allow a quick inspection of these machines? And I guess --
2 you know, I don't know how many counties the Plaintiffs are
3 talking about. I think that Jacobson may be on point. I am
4 not sure yet. I don't know. It seems to me hard to believe
5 that the Plaintiffs should have to sue 159 elections
6 commissioners to get the relief they want. I understand
7 exactly what Jacobson said, but that was a different case.
8 What I am trying to accomplish here is, taking into both
9 sides' consideration, their arguments, their respective
10 positions, but incorporating into them also the law. The
11 Plaintiffs want to seize these and impound these machines for
12 a forensic audit by their experts.
13 Let me go back to Ms. Powell and ask you,
14 Ms. Powell, which machines are we talking about? Are you
15 talking about in every county in Georgia? Where exactly are
16 you talking about?
17 MS. POWELL: No, Your Honor. In our motion we asked
18 specifically for machines in ten counties.
19 THE COURT: Those ten counties that you've
20 highlighted. Okay.
21 MS. POWELL: Yes, sir.
22 THE COURT: And what do you want to do with those
23 machines? How long is it going to take your experts to do
24 their thing on those machines?
25 MS. POWELL: It will take approximately a day of
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1 time per county, but we can dispatch three separate teams and
2 be able to do the bulk of it I would think within three days.
3 THE COURT: Okay. What do you say in response to
4 Mr. Willard's argument -- I wasn't -- let me go back to
5 Mr. Willard and just make sure I am clear on this.
6 Mr. Willard, specifically with respect to the Clarke County
7 and Oconee County DA's I guess it is a run-off. I don't
8 remember if it's a run-off or a special election. But for the
9 record, which is it, Mr. Willard?
10 MR. WILLARD: It is a special election run-off.
11 THE COURT: Yeah.
12 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, if I can clarify for the
13 record, that is just one example of a race that is scheduled
14 to be run on Tuesday. There are a myriad other races that we
15 anticipate are being held throughout Georgia, we just haven't
16 had the opportunity to compile an exhaustive list.
17 THE COURT: I understand.
18 MR. WILLARD: But we are letting you know that there
19 is a race scheduled for Tuesday.
20 THE COURT: Right. I understand. I guess what I am
21 wondering is -- well, I guess -- let me think this through.
22 It seems to me that the question should be, and we might -- I
23 might give y'all a little bit of time to find this out. Other
24 than the -- are there any elections set in these ten counties
25 that are going to take place this Tuesday, December 1? And if
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1 so, are the Plaintiffs going to, to get the relief they want,
2 are they going to have to access these machines and not have a
3 -- which would prevent these ten counties from having the
4 machines to use for those Tuesday elections?
5 MR. WILLARD: I'm sorry, Your Honor, is that
6 addressed to me or Ms. Powell?
7 THE COURT: I am kind of thinking out loud and
8 addressing both of you. Basically we have narrowed it from
9 159 down to 10 counties. And the Defendants right now can't
10 tell me, and I don't fault them for that at all, what
11 elections are taking place, if any, in those ten counties this
12 coming Tuesday in two days. So how am I supposed to -- and so
13 that is one issue, is this may be moot if it turns out that
14 there is not even an election taking place in those ten
15 counties on Tuesday, I don't see what the problem would be of
16 me entering a temporary restraining order allowing the
17 Plaintiffs to have quick access to those machines for a
18 forensic examination. On the other hand, if there is going to
19 be an election in any of those ten counties, that raises the
20 question of can they still have the election without those
21 machines. Do you have to look at every single machine? I
22 mean, I don't understand how it works.
23 So I guess I would ask Ms. Powell, let's suppose
24 that in two or three of the ten counties that you are
25 interested in, there are in fact going to be run-off elections
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1 on Tuesday, December 1. How can your objective be met, your
2 objective being a forensic examination of those machines in
3 those counties if there is going to be an election there on
4 Tuesday?
5 MS. POWELL: We can get experts to them tomorrow,
6 Your Honor. We've got at least three teams of experts that
7 could be dispatched to three separate counties to collect the
8 information from the machines. The important part is, it's
9 not just the data that comes out of the machines that is
10 crucial to the fraud case that is so rampant across the
11 country, it is the fact that an algorithm we believe was
12 uploaded to the Dominion machines that weighted the votes for
13 Mr. Biden over the votes for President Trump at approximately
14 1.22 versus .78, and that is what would change with any
15 alteration of the software that is crucial to making the proof
16 of the fraud absolutely conclusive and irrefutable. We know
17 they have already gone into the machines in Fulton County to
18 change the software with no basis to do so whatsoever. In
19 fact, there is an attorney that contacted me just earlier
20 today, in fact while I was replying to the last message from
21 the Court. I believe her last name is Broyles, a Ms. Broyles,
22 who had been contacted by a witness who was very concerned by
23 what she had seen down at the Center today, and felt like it
24 was an abject pretense that they were going to be redoing all
25 the same ballots and there was no reason to change the
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1 software for any reason whatsoever.
2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Willard, what is your
3 response to that?
4 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, I apologize. I am used to
5 dealing with facts and law, not innuendo and accusation. The
6 bottom line here, the Plaintiffs have sent you a copy of the
7 Curling order which, as I mentioned earlier, is inapposite
8 because it predates Jacobson. But in that case, where the
9 security and reliability of the DRE machines, which have now
10 been retired, even Judge Totenberg recognized that you cannot
11 willy-nilly allow individuals from outside of state and county
12 custody and control procedures to have access to these
13 machines. It poses a security risk for Ms. Powell's minions
14 to go in and image everything, download the software, and
15 figure out for future elections a way to hack in so that their
16 preferred candidates can win. That is in effect what they are
17 seeking here. They want to image, as they just said, not only
18 the data on the machines, but also the entire software package
19 and the security protocols that are set up. That is something
20 that no Federal Court can possibly countenance. Even if they
21 had the appropriate defendants here, which they don't, you
22 cannot allow, during the midst of an election cycle, a third
23 party to come in and get the proverbial keys to the software
24 kingdom. I will say that we are trying to get up to speed on
25 this as much as possible. Our office is not representing the
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1 Secretary in the Curling litigation because our office was
2 forced to declare a conflict several years ago, but we have
3 Conflict Special Attorneys General who have spent months and
4 years dealing with the security of the State's electronic
5 voting system in Federal Court. There was a whole procedure
6 set up where you had a white room established in Virginia
7 where experts were only permitted to go in and inspect a
8 single machine at that white room after security protocols
9 were set in place where they couldn't remove anything from
10 there, where they weren't able to take anything that could
11 later compromise the system with them when they left.
12 MS. POWELL: Well it's a little bit late to be
13 worrying about the compromise of the system. That happened,
14 as we have evidence that both Iran and China were hacking into
15 the system during our election, not to mention any number of
16 other foreign entities and domestic actors as well. The
17 entire system was built to be both hackable from afar and
18 locally to overwrite votes, to overwrite review of signature,
19 to drag and drop ballots into the trash can as wanted. It was
20 conceived and created by Mr. Chavez's regime for the very
21 purpose of ensuring that he won future elections. As corrupt
22 as it could possibly be. And that's the system that the
23 Georgia Secretary of State decided was appropriate to run in
24 Georgia, despite any number of revelations of the myriad
25 problems it has.
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1 THE COURT: The problem I have --
2 MS. POWELL: A two-year-old can hack these machines
3 as they are now, and we are certainly amenable to having an
4 observer and videotaping the process that we use to create the
5 mirror images, and to submitting it and holding it under a
6 protective order.
7 THE COURT: And am I correct in expecting that the
8 Defendants further contend that these are -- there is
9 proprietary information on these machines that should not be
10 publicly disclosed?
11 MR. WILLARD: Yes, Your Honor, as well as from a
12 security protocol standpoint.
13 THE COURT: Right. Okay. Well, here is the
14 problem. It's Sunday, November 29th at 8:12 p.m. This motion
15 did not come in until late Friday night. I was not aware of
16 the motion until Saturday. And the State, including the
17 Secretary of State, the Governor, and the Elections Board
18 members have hardly had any opportunity to respond to these
19 allegations. I don't know if that is anybody's fault. I
20 don't know at this particular point -- I haven't considered
21 the issue of whether the suit should have been brought earlier
22 and the Plaintiffs are guilty of laches. I have no opinion on
23 that issue at this point. But what I do have an opinion on is
24 that the burden is on the Plaintiffs, and the relief that they
25 seek is extraordinary. And although they make allegations of
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1 tremendous worldwide improprieties regarding the Dominion
2 voting machines, those allegations are supported by precious
3 little proof. Now let's just suppose hypothetically that the
4 obligations are true, and there simply has not been time to
5 marshal the evidence in support of those allegations. The
6 problem with that is that that doesn't create an exception for
7 me as to whether I should grant this extraordinary relief of a
8 temporary restraining order, which of course can only be
9 granted in truly extraordinary circumstances, and the
10 Defendant -- and it's not even clear to the Court that the
11 named Defendants are the proper parties to this lawsuit with
12 respect to this particular form of relief that the Plaintiffs
13 are seeking. So I am going to deny the Plaintiffs' request
14 for a temporary restraining order on the grounds that the
15 Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing a
16 substantial likelihood, a real likelihood of prevailing on the
17 merits on this claim, or at least I am going to refrain from
18 granting that relief now. If, in the course of discovery in
19 this case, the Plaintiffs become -- the Plaintiffs acquire
20 additional proof that would support their allegations that
21 might make a difference, I am happy to revisit this order.
22 But for now, that is going to be the order of the Court. I am
23 going to deny the request for temporary injunctive relief.
24 And here is what we are going to do regarding the
25 scheduling. The Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion
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1 will be due on Wednesday December 2 by -- I am going to change
2 that to 5 o'clock p.m. Eastern Standard Time. If the
3 Plaintiffs choose to file a reply, it will be due 24 hours
4 after the Defendants' response is filed. And we will have an
5 in-person hearing in my Atlanta courtroom this coming Friday
6 at 10 o'clock a.m. to consider the balance of the claims that
7 have been raised by the Plaintiffs in their complaint. All
8 right. Anything else, Counsel?
9 MR. WOOD: Judge Batten, this is Lin Wood. How are
10 you, sir?
11 THE COURT: Yes, sir. How are you doing, sir?
12 MR. WOOD: I am doing well. Please let me make one
13 request.
14 THE COURT: Okay.
15 MR. WOOD: I understand Your Honor's ruling. I kind
16 of live under the theory that he who has nothing to hide hides
17 nothing. Would there be any way -- would there be any way to
18 give us a very limited, such for example let us go in
19 tomorrow, pick two or three counties, and then randomly two or
20 three machines and do the forensics on that? Because at least
21 we would have some information in the event all of these
22 machines end up being wiped clean? Something very --
23 THE COURT: At first blush, I don't have -- I would
24 not have too much of a problem with that. It certainly is
25 more reasonable than what we have talked about. But the
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1 problem is, again, the State has represented to me that -- the
2 Defendants have represented to me, through counsel, that there
3 are security concerns that they have, and I am being asked to
4 decide this on a Sunday night, have been received no evidence
5 from the Defendants because they haven't had a chance. So I
6 am going to respectfully deny, Lin, your request. But you
7 know, I am going to leave it with -- it is hard for me to
8 believe -- let me ask this. Let me put it this way. Doesn't
9 sound like 159 counties in Georgia are going to have special
10 run-off elections on Tuesday, special election run-offs, I
11 should say, on Tuesday. Why can't you -- if we can find ways
12 to protect the State's legitimate interest in security and
13 proprietary software, can you not look for the algorithm that
14 you claim is there and any other incriminating evidence from
15 some of the other counties, from one or more of the counties
16 where no election is going to take place Tuesday? Why can't
17 you do that?
18 MR. WOOD: Your Honor, this is Mr. Wood again. We
19 can do that. And in fact, this one solution would be if we
20 identify a very limited number of machines, number of
21 counties, we can have our experts come in and do a mirror
22 image, we can turn it over to the Court so there are no
23 security concerns, and then it can be examined at a different
24 time. But the problem is, once the machines are wiped, the
25 evidence is gone. If there is nothing there, there is nothing
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1 there. But at least we will have an opportunity to check on a
2 limited basis and we can preserve it and secure the security
3 of it by having our experts, with their oversight, mirror
4 image and then turn it over to the possession of the Court for
5 a later review. But we don't get that opportunity, once lost
6 we will never get it again. I don't see any harm to the State
7 to preserve this information on a very limited basis.
8 THE COURT: Okay, I am having a hard time
9 identifying any such harm myself. Mr. Willard, what would be
10 wrong with the Plaintiffs being granted access to three of the
11 counties not among -- not in any county where there is going
12 to be an election this coming Tuesday, but tomorrow be granted
13 access in three of these where all of the evidence that are
14 obtained by Plaintiffs' experts will be accompanied by
15 forensic experts from the Defendants. I know you may not be
16 able to line that up by tomorrow, so it probably wouldn't be
17 tomorrow, but where we can have a forensic expert with the
18 Plaintiffs on behalf of the Defendants accompanying and
19 overseeing the Plaintiffs' expert's inspection of the
20 machines; and then with all of the data and all of the
21 information obtained from that inspection, or those three
22 inspections, to be turned over to the Court in camera and not
23 provided to Plaintiffs or their counsel or anybody else until
24 further order of the Court? That's -- I want to hear your
25 response, Mr. Willard. But I have to say, at first blush that
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1 doesn't sound very unreasonable to me. What is the response?
2 And again, we are laying aside for a moment whether or not
3 they have sued the right parties. We are not going to address
4 that yet. But let's assume that they did, and let's assume
5 that they do have standing, what is wrong with that proposal
6 that I have just suggested?
7 MR. WILLARD: Well Your Honor, I think you've hit
8 the nail on the head, and it is sort of impossible to set
9 aside Jacobson. There is no redressability here as to any of
10 these machines right now. They are not in the custody and
11 control of the State Defendants. You can order us every day
12 this week; we cannot give you access to the Hart County voting
13 machines. I cannot go in and tell the Hart County Elections
14 Superintendent to do squat in regards to discovery in a case
15 that they are not a party to. Second, if you are violating
16 trade secrets and security protocols, it doesn't matter if you
17 are doing it for one machine or the entirety of machines. If
18 Plaintiffs' experts are going to come in with a thumb drive
19 and stick it in and take their screwdrivers out and do
20 everything to these machines, we have no safeguards that we
21 can put in place, in this very compressed time frame that
22 Plaintiffs are wanting to have, where you prevent somebody
23 from sticking that thumb drive in their pocket and walking out
24 the door, or doing something else that is going to impact that
25 machine for future elections.
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Wood, I will give you the last word.
2 MR. WOOD: I don't believe we will be using
3 screwdrivers. I think we can do a simple mirror image, they
4 can see it done, and then it will be turned over to the Court.
5 If we've got the wrong parties, we've got the wrong parties.
6 But if we have the right parties, and the Court determines
7 that the Secretary of State does have the authority as we
8 contend that the Secretary of State does, I don't see any
9 harm. We will turn it over to the Court. The battles can be
10 fought. If we win, then we can have -- we can have the
11 examination completed. But if we don't get something, then we
12 end up with nothing, and we don't know whether or not it was
13 erased. I don't see any downside, Your Honor. We turn it
14 over to you and hold it until further rulings in the case. It
15 is just a matter of preserving some reasonably minimum amount
16 of evidence with respect to some of these machines.
17 MS. POWELL: I believe there are no elections Your
18 Honor in Cobb, Gwinnett, Cherokee, or Forsyth, or Paulding, or
19 Hall, or Houston, or Hart, or Hancock, all of which we have
20 requested, or Gwinnett or Henry. In fact, Defendants haven't
21 said where there are any elections at all.
22 THE COURT: Okay.
23 MR. WILLARD: One last point, if I could.
24 THE COURT: Yes.
25 MR. WILLARD: I would point you -- you know, I know
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1 there has been some question about whether the Jacobson
2 decision applies to voting equipment, and decisions made
3 regarding voting equipment. I would point you to the Anderson
4 case, Anderson versus Raffensperger, decided by Judge Brown
5 last month, the docket number is 1:20-CV-03263. It is a
6 78-page decision, and it is very well-reasoned. And pages 62
7 through 68 go into great detail about how the failure to
8 include county election officials presented a redressability
9 problem. Remember, Your Honor, you didn't choose who the
10 Plaintiffs sued, I didn't choose who the Plaintiffs sued. The
11 Plaintiffs knew or should have been aware of the Jacobson line
12 of cases and its progeny. You --
13 MS. POWELL: Jacobson is Florida law.
14 THE COURT: Let him finish.
15 MR. WILLARD: -- cannot craft relief to county
16 defendants --
17 THE COURT: Go ahead.
18 MR. WILLARD: You cannot craft relief that goes to
19 county defendants and equipment in county custody and control
20 where the Plaintiffs have only chosen to sue State Defendants.
21 THE COURT: Ms. Powell, let me ask you this along
22 those lines of what he is saying. I understand the
23 distinction that the Plaintiffs have argued through their
24 counsel's emails to me today between this case and Jacobson.
25 But you know, it sounds to me that Mr. Willard is probably
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1 correct that as a matter of fact and law, the Secretary of
2 State can't call up to Marietta and tell the Cobb County
3 elections officials what to do with their machine. What you
4 want to do is access the machine. You are not talking about
5 data results from the election. You want to actually access
6 the physical machines for a forensic inspection. And --
7 MS. POWELL: Your Honor.
8 THE COURT: Just a second. And so this is the first
9 time we are really addressing the redressability issue. Tell
10 me what is the Plaintiffs' response to that.
11 MS. POWELL: The machines are owned by the State of
12 Georgia. They were purchased by the State of Georgia for $107
13 million of taxpayer money. They are controlled by the
14 Secretary of State's office which has legal responsibility
15 both for investigating the fraud and making sure the machines
16 are what are supposed to be used and properly used and
17 enforcing the rules and regulations and laws related to
18 elections for the State of Georgia. It is clear from the
19 Curling decision that we do not have to sue 600 people in 159
20 counties to obtain the relief we want. It couldn't be more
21 clear as a matter of law.
22 MR. WOOD: Judge, could I say one last thing?
23 THE COURT: Yes, sir.
24 MR. WOOD: And I appreciate this has all been done
25 with not a lot of time.
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1 THE COURT: Right.
2 MR. WOOD: Again, if we don't have the correct
3 parties, we can add the correct parties before the Court would
4 release for further examination the materials that we would
5 collect in the next day or two.
6 THE COURT: I don't understand why the Plaintiffs
7 don't just move to add Cobb County as a party to the case, or
8 the Cobb -- I don't know who it is, Cobb County elections
9 officers? I don't know. I am not going to give you a legal
10 opinion.
11 MR. WOOD: Let me say this. If the Court gives us
12 until Tuesday to examine, we will add the counties that the
13 Court lets us go examine, we will add them tomorrow; add them
14 tonight. I just don't think -- I think that is a procedural
15 issue, and ultimately one the Court can decide, but there is
16 no harm, Your Honor, in preserving what could be critical
17 evidence with respect to this election. We are not asking to
18 look at it until we've got it all down pat and Your Honor is
19 satisfied we are entitled to it, but let's preserve at least
20 some small amount reasonably so we don't find ourselves with
21 no evidence simply because the evidence was erased or
22 destroyed. If there is nothing there, there is nothing there.
23 But, Your Honor, if there is something there, then this state
24 has a serious problem. And I think it ought to be in the
25 interest of the taxpayers and the voters that this material,
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1 on a reasonable basis, limited basis, be preserved so that
2 down the road, if we meet all the other qualifications to have
3 it fully examined, we've at least got it preserved. That
4 seems to me to be in the best interest of the citizens of the
5 State of Georgia.
6 THE COURT: Well let me go back --
7 MS. POWELL: We have obtained access to machines in
8 another state, with no problem of damage to the machines or
9 exposure of trade secrets or any other concern, and in that
10 instance we found that there were 1,474 votes on two rolls on
11 a machine, 1,474 which were changed across the two rolls,
12 almost the same number of voters that voted had their votes
13 completely changed on Dominion machines.
14 THE COURT: Where was that?
15 MS. POWELL: That is a county in Michigan.
16 THE COURT: That was this year?
17 MS. POWELL: Yes, sir. Just a few days ago.
18 THE COURT: Right, okay. And again, just for my
19 factual understanding, Mr. Willard, are you telling me that if
20 I grant this relief, let's say to -- if I were to add a couple
21 of these counties as defendants, or whatever the right entity
22 or person is that should be the defendant, are you telling me
23 that if I grant this relief for this forensic inspection,
24 there is no way that any election run-off can take place on
25 Tuesday in that county? Or do you know?
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1 MR. WILLARD: That is my understanding right now.
2 Once again, I am working on Sunday night at 8:28 p.m. and
3 something that I've been aware of for a little over 24 hours.
4 But at this point in time, Your Honor has already indicated
5 which way he was going to rule, and now Plaintiffs are trying
6 to shift the ground underneath us. The fact is, as I
7 indicated to your clerk last night, Ms. McGowan and I have now
8 given up the entirety of our Sunday, we have responded in a
9 timely fashion, at the Court's request, first on a
10 three-and-a-half-hour turnaround, and then on an hour
11 turnaround, substantively responding to Plaintiffs' arguments.
12 And their responses have been long on rhetoric and short on
13 any authority. We are at a situation now where if the Court
14 is willing to do what it said it was going to do earlier in
15 this call and earlier this evening via email and deny relief,
16 we go on and we prepare for the Friday hearing. If the Court
17 is inclined to grant the relief, we would ask you to certify
18 it so that we can immediately take it up to the 11th Circuit
19 and the 11th Circuit can reassure the Plaintiff that it meant
20 what it said when it ruled in Jacobson.
21 THE COURT: All right, I am going to have to think
22 about it. I am not sure yet what I am going to do, but I need
23 to do some research and think about it a little bit. I am
24 trying to -- I would like, Mr. Willard -- I am sure we are
25 going to talk again tomorrow. I guess we ought to just --
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1 let's plan on an 11 o'clock Zoom hearing tomorrow to address
2 some of these issues. And I am going to want to know -- let
3 me just say, in terms of what I am thinking out loud is that
4 if I were to allow -- let me first ask this question of
5 Ms. Powell and Mr. Wood. If I were to allow the forensic
6 inspection of either the Cobb or Gwinnett or Cherokee or Hart,
7 whatever -- wouldn't it just be sufficient to add one of those
8 counties? If it is the same machine?
9 MS. POWELL: No, Your Honor. The counties can read
10 differently. We really request Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee
11 counties at the bare minimum.
12 THE COURT: Okay. I hear you.
13 MS. POWELL: And we can add those as Defendants
14 tonight if that is important to the Court. I really don't
15 think it's necessary as a matter of law, but we can certainly
16 add them.
17 THE COURT: Who exactly would you move to add?
18 MS. POWELL: The Board of Elections of each -- all
19 the members of the boards of those four counties. We would
20 have to add 12 people.
21 THE COURT: I heard three counties. Cobb, Gwinnett,
22 and Cherokee.
23 MS. POWELL: Three counties, but four people per
24 county, is my understanding.
25 THE COURT: Okay. Here is what I would like to do.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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1 Mr. Willard, if you could tell me when we resume tomorrow at
2 11:00, if you could tell me, having done a little research,
3 what impact, if any, allowing this forensic examination on
4 these three counties' machines would have on the elections
5 that are supposed to take place Tuesday? It may be that there
6 is no election in any of those counties, there may be an
7 election in all three of them. I have no idea.
8 MS. POWELL: It is my understanding, Your Honor,
9 there is no election in those three counties.
10 THE COURT: Let me have that confirmed. I will give
11 Mr. Willard a chance to confirm that tomorrow. And also --
12 MR. WILLARD: That was Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee.
13 Correct, Your Honor?
15 MS. POWELL: Correct.
16 THE COURT: I want to hear a little more on the
17 issue of how would -- you know, one of the issues in the
18 decision of whether to grant injunctive relief is what harm
19 the party opposing the injunction would suffer if the relief
20 were granted. That is one of the four factors that I am sure
21 all of you know quite well, I certainly would expect that you
22 do. I know you do. I would like to hear, Mr. Willard, from
23 you tomorrow morning if you could please tell me -- if you
24 could answer that question for me. What harm would it do the
25 State or to these Defendants, including any newly added
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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1 Defendants, if I were to grant that relief?
2 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, I will do my best, but it
3 may not be me on the call. As I indicated to your clerk,
4 we've got two brief responses in the Woods case due on
5 Tuesday. We've already had to give up our Sunday responding
6 to this, after I asked your clerk last night not to schedule
7 anything until after those briefs were filed. Now because of
8 Plaintiffs' shifting demands, they want to go forward with a
9 hearing in the morning. Whoever is going to respond to that
10 hearing is going to have to take time away from getting the
11 responses filed in the 11th Circuit on Tuesday, including our
12 client, in the midst of an ongoing state-wide recount for
13 President, in the midst of conducting and supporting county
14 election officials with the December 1st election, as well as
15 getting ready for early and advanced voting for the January
16 5th election. We --
17 THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Willard. Let me ask a
18 question of Ms. Powell. If there are in fact no elections
19 taking place in those three counties, why does this have to be
20 done tomorrow? Why do we have to have the answer to this by
21 tomorrow or Tuesday?
22 MS. POWELL: Time is of the essence, Your Honor, on
23 the entire election proceeding.
24 THE COURT: I got you. In other words, the general
25 time-is-of-the-essence principle. It sounds to me like having
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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1 a response by 11:00 tomorrow is not necessary and would be
2 unreasonable to expect the Secretary of State, the Governor
3 and the Elections Board Defendants to be able to respond so
4 quickly. So here is what I am going to do. I am going to
5 reserve ruling. I am going to keep the schedule regarding
6 briefing and the hearing, and I am going to reserve ruling on
7 the Plaintiffs' request -- I am going to consider it a motion
8 to amend the pleadings, and a motion to add as parties these
9 elections officers in Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee counties.
10 I want the Secretary of State to let me know -- I will give
11 you a deadline in the second, but what I want the Secretary of
12 State and the other Defendants to let me know is what
13 opposition, if any, they have or what conditions they would
14 like to see complied with if these machines are going to be
15 inspected. In other words, if they want their own inspector
16 there, et cetera. I agree with Ms. Powell on the general
17 principle that time is of the essence, but it is not at all
18 reasonable to give the Defendants in this case until 11
19 o'clock tomorrow morning. There is just no way they can do
20 that. I am trying to decide right now how much time to give
21 them. It certainly is going to be this week. I guess,
22 Mr. Willard, what I would like you to do is let me know, as
23 soon as you find out, but in any event you are going to have
24 to let me know by Wednesday. That is what my first blush
25 issue is this issue. I just don't see what the urgency is.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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1 The case will still be pending after this week. So I just --
2 you know, I understand the -- I completely understand the
3 general urgency of the case, but the Defendants have got to
4 have a little bit of time to provide that information I want,
5 which again namely is whether they would oppose these three
6 counties' machines being forensically examined, and why they
7 would -- what the basis for any such opposition would be, and
8 I would want that supported with an affidavit or affidavits
9 from an expert or experts or somebody affiliated with the
10 Defendants who could provide evidence to why that would be
11 harmful. Again, we are focusing on the -- I believe is the
12 third prong -- I may have them in the wrong order -- of the
13 four-part test, which is what the harm would be to the party
14 opposing the injunctive relief. So that is going to be the
15 order of the Court. And I will --
16 MR. KLEINHENDLER: Your Honor.
17 THE COURT: Yes, sir?
18 MR. KLEINHENDLER: I wanted to make one point here.
19 And that is, I understand the State's concern about having us
20 go in and look at their machines. However, what we have
21 alleged with affidavit testimony is that they are erasing
22 their machines. So while they are thinking about what the
23 harm is, and while they are figuring out where their elections
24 are that they can't identify, at a minimum, Your Honor, where
25 there are no elections to be taking place, there should be an
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
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1 order entered now that no machine should be erased. Because
2 that is very troubling, it is spoliation, it's irreparable
3 injury. That is point one. I want to make one other point
4 for you, Your Honor. They mentioned that the county is under
5 an obligation to preserve the evidence of the election. Let
6 me explain to you what they preserve. They have these
7 machines that people vote on, and they produce these memory
8 cards. They make a copy of the memory card, but the machine
9 stays the same. It's sort of like you have an iPhone --
11 MR. KLEINHENDLER: You can take out the sim, right?
12 THE COURT: Right.
13 MR. KLEINHENDLER: So I would ask Your Honor to
14 please order no more erasing machines that are not being --
15 THE COURT: Okay.
16 MR. KLEINHENDLER: -- used for these local
17 elections --
18 THE COURT: That sounds reasonable to me,
19 Mr. Willard, until we resolve this in just a few days. Do
20 your clients have any objection to that? The way I would
21 phrase it, and I am going to give you a chance to respond to
22 this, but my inclination is to order and temporarily restrain
23 the Defendants to the extent it is within their lawful
24 authority, from altering or destroying or erasing or allowing
25 the alteration, destruction, or erasing of any of the computer
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
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1 information on any of the machines in these three counties
2 that we discussed, specifically Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee.
3 What is y'all's response? What is the State's response to
4 that, Mr. Willard?
5 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, I will say that there are
6 no State officials, there is no one within the direction and
7 control of any of the named State Defendants who is going to
8 be doing anything in regards to this voting equipment this
9 week or in the coming months. So you still have the same
10 redressability issue. You can order us to stop all you want,
11 but if we are not the ones behind the wheel, it is not doing
12 anything.
13 THE COURT: Well then I would think that the
14 Defendants wouldn't have any problem being ordered to stop.
15 If they are not doing anything, there is nothing for them to
16 stop. So that is going to be another feature of this order.
17 And we are not going to enter a written order, it will be in
18 the transcript. But again, to the extent that it's within the
19 Defendants' lawful authority, they shall not alter, destroy,
20 or erase any of this information from any of these three
21 computers, nor will they allow anyone within their control and
22 authority, legal authority, from doing any of those things.
23 It sounds to me like you've been put on notice, Plaintiffs'
24 counsel, by Mr. Willard, quite clearly that you need to direct
25 these concerns towards these county officials. The State, in
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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1 this -- obviously the Defendants in this case are disavowing
2 any authority or any responsibility or connection with these
3 county machines in this sense, they are not going to be going
4 down to any -- they are not going down to Lawrenceville or
5 Canton, or Marietta to try to erase any of these machines, the
6 concern that -- is Mr. Kleinhendler?
7 MR. KLEINHENDLER: Kleinhendler, Your Honor.
8 THE COURT: I was close. Closer than you usually
9 get, I'll bet. So let's do that. Why don't we do this, why
10 don't we have a Zoom call tomorrow afternoon at 4 o'clock
11 where we will wait to hear back from someone on behalf of the
12 Defendants, if it is either Mr. Willard or someone else, to
13 respond, and let us know if there is something that the Court
14 is missing regarding the inspection, the forensic examination
15 of these machines. So my --
16 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor?
18 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, we have moved again from
19 Wednesday. To say --
20 THE COURT: All I want tomorrow, Rus, is an update.
21 If they can give us an update. If you want to update. In
22 fact, I will leave it like that. But if you want to update
23 us, just let us know tomorrow, and we'll be ready for a call
24 at 4 o'clock. But if you don't have anything to report
25 tomorrow, that is perfectly fine. I understand the competing
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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1 interests that the Defendants have. They are trying to juggle
2 a lot of balls in the air at one time. I understand that.
3 Let me know if you know something tomorrow. And if not -- I
4 guess, you know, I am -- I have to admit, you know, when I
5 think out loud like this, which is not something judges enjoy
6 doing because it gets pointed out to them that they are
7 changing their mind. And I am inclined to agree with
8 Mr. Willard on this. Let's wait until Wednesday to hear back
9 from Mr. Willard. How about something in writing,
10 Mr. Willard, by the same time that the brief is due on
11 Wednesday, 5:00 p.m., in response to this inquiry that the
12 Court has as to the basis for any opposition by the Defendants
13 to this particular relief regarding the forensic examination
14 of the Dominion equipment in these three counties. That is
15 what the order of the Court is going to be. And contrary to
16 what I said a minute ago, I will put it in writing so everyone
17 can see it and it will be clear and you don't have to read the
18 transcript. That order will be entered either tonight or
19 more -- I would say almost certainly not until tomorrow
20 morning. Okay? Anything else, Counsel? Yes, sir?
21 MR. WILLARD: Just two procedural points. One, do
22 you want as a unified filing on Wednesday, or do you want us
23 to make them as two separate filings?
24 THE COURT: Separate filings.
25 MR. WILLARD: All right. So I won't need, I think
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
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1 at this juncture, to ask for a page limit extension, but I may
2 revisit that issue with the Court.
3 THE COURT: You can have however many pages you
4 need. There is no limit on the pages.
5 MR. MACDOUGALD: The Plaintiffs as well, Your Honor?
6 THE COURT: The Plaintiffs' response as well.
7 MR. MACDOUGALD: Thank you.
8 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, the second point, and now
9 that you have said that you are going to reduce this to
10 writing, I know that there has been a lot of rumor, innuendo,
11 and misinformation spread out there regarding what has taken
12 place in a number of courts around the country, and this Court
13 today, there were a number of social media posts made about
14 this Court's indication of the two earlier rulings.
16 MR. WILLARD: I ask you to make clear in your order
17 that only the State Defendants are being enjoined by anything
18 in your order and it is not enjoining any county officials
19 from doing anything.
20 THE COURT: Not at this time. They are not parties
21 to the case yet.
22 MR. WILLARD: Thank you.
23 MR. WOOD: Judge, for what it's worth, when we add
24 them tonight, we will be sending spoliation litigation hold
25 letters. I think they have already received those a week ago,
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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37 of 39
1 but we will redo it.
2 THE COURT: And Mr. Willard, just to be clear, you
3 are referring to -- you refer to the Governor and the
4 Secretary of State, not the other members of the Elections
5 Board? Is that right?
6 MR. WILLARD: I am actually referring -- I'm sorry?
7 THE COURT: The Governor and the Secretary of State.
8 Let's see, of course I don't -- the Governor is a party and of
9 course the Secretary of State is a party, and then we have
10 the --
11 MR. WILLARD: The Election Board --
12 THE COURT: -- four other Election Board members.
13 And what you just wanted to make clear to me, or clarify with
14 me, was that it was your understanding that the order I am
15 going to enter would only be enjoining the Governor and the
16 Secretary of State and not the four Election Board members who
17 are also named as Defendants. Am I right about that?
18 MR. WILLARD: No, Your Honor. I am requesting that
19 you make clear in your order that only the State Defendants
20 are enjoined, and there is no injunction against any of the
21 unnamed county defendants.
22 MR. KLEINHENDLER: Your Honor, this is Howard again.
23 I think your language earlier was right on. You said you are
24 going to enjoin the State Defendants and anybody in their
25 control. And our argument is that all these counties are
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
38 of 39
1 under the control of the Secretary of State. So now if the
2 State wants to play a game and say, well, we have no ability
3 to control the counties, okay, we will deal with that on a
4 sanctions motion. But I think you were very clear, Your
5 Honor, anybody -- the Defendants and anybody under their
6 control. What the State is asking for now is to wiggle out of
7 that order, and I would urge you not to give to them that
8 language. It is enough for you to say the Defendants in the
9 case and anybody under their control.
10 THE COURT: Okay. I understand the issue. The only
11 point I was trying to make with Mr. Willard was I was trying
12 to see if he was trying to exclude the Governor. I understand
13 that his main point was really that I was not ordering
14 directly any county officials to do or not do anything. I
15 understand that that is what he was saying. I think I
16 understand it. I am actually clear on it. So I think
17 everybody has their marching orders, we know what to do. I am
18 the one that has to move next. I have to enter an order that
19 clarifies all of this, and I think I do that with no problem.
20 It will probably be in the morning, okay?
21 MR. MACDOUGALD: Judge, one housekeeping matter. In
22 terms of serving future papers and filings on the Defendants,
23 can we agree or can the Court order that service on
24 Mr. Willard and Ms. McGowan is sufficient service on the State
25 Defendants?
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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39 of 39
1 THE COURT: I can't order them to waive their right
2 to be served.
3 MR. MACDOUGALD: Okay, but what we would have to do
4 otherwise is send the papers directly to the State Defendants.
5 THE COURT: Right. That is a matter for you and
6 Mr. Willard to discuss when I am not on the line. If the
7 Defendants want to acknowledge and waive service that is fine,
8 and if they don't that is not something that I am going to
9 upset with a ruling.
10 MR. MACDOUGALD: Okay.
11 THE COURT: We are adjourned, and you will hear from
12 me in the morning. Y'all have a good night.
13 (End of hearing at 8:48 p.m.)
14 * * * * *
16
19
20 _________________________________
Lori Burgess
23 Date: November 30, 2020
24
25
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
Below please find a Tweet of Congressman Jody Hice, including

a video proving that the “pipe burst” at the State Farm Arena in
Fulton County, Georgia never happened. Further, this shows
election workers working in the wee hours of the morning,
pulling “votes” out from under the table after they lied to poll
workers and sent them home.
https://twitter.com/CongressmanHice/status/1334609467703521283?s=20
https://youtu.be/nVP 60Hm4P8


CASE NO.
Plaintiffs,
v. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF FILING OF APPELLATE APPENDIX

VOLUME 4
following:
Volume 4 of the Appendix on Appeal of this case, which contains the
following affidavits and declarations:
Affiant A…………………………………………………….…… Pages 1-5
Affiant B…………………………………………………….…… Pages 6-7
Affiant C…………………………………………………….……… Page 8
Affiant D…………………………………………………….…… Page 9-12
Affiant E…………………………………………………….… Pages 13-14
Affiant F…………………………………………………….… Pages 15-16
Affiant G………………………………...………………….… Pages 17-19
Affiant H……………………………………………….…….…… Pages 20
Affiant I……………………………………………………….. Pages 21-22

Affiant J……………………………….……………………..…..… Page 23
Affiant K…………………………………………………..……..… Page 24
Affiant L ………………………………..…………………..… Pages 25-26
Affiant M…………………………………………………….… Pages 27-28
Affiant N…………………………………………………….… Pages 29-30
Affiant O…………………………………………………….… Pages 31-53
Affiant Q…………………………….……………………….…..… Page 54
Affiant R…………………………..……………………….…. Pages 55-57
Affiant S…………………………..……………………….……Pages 58-66
Affiant T ……………………………………………..……...… Pages 67-69
Affiant U……………………………………………………….…… Page 70
Affiant V………………………………………………………..…… Page 71
Affiant W……………………………………………………..…Pages 72-74
Affiant X…………………………………………………...……Pages 75-78
Affiant Y………………………………………………..……… Pages 79-81
Affiant Z…………………………………………………….… Pages 82-92
Affiant AA………………………………………………………… Pages 93-98
Affiant AB……………………………………………………….. Pages 99-100
Affiant AC……………………………………………………… Pages 101-104
Affiant AD……………………………………………………… Pages 105-106
Affiant AE ………………….………………………………… Pages 107-113
Affiant AF ………………………………………………………….… Page 114
Affiant AG ………………………………………………..…… Pages 115-116
2
Affiant AH……………………………………………….…… Pages 117-118
Affiant AI …………………………………………………..…. Pages 119-128
Affiant AJ -……………………………………………………….… Pages 129
Affiant AK …………………………………………………….……. Pages 130
Affiant AL …………………………………….……………………… Page 131
Affiant AM…………………………………………………………… Page 132
Affiant AN ………………………………………..…………… Pages 133-135
Affiant AO……………………………………………………….Pages 136-139
Affiant AP……………………………………………………… Pages 140-142
Affiant AQ……………………………………………………….Pages 143-144
Affiant AR ……………………………………………………… Pages 145-148
Affiant AS ……………………………………………………… Pages 149-156
Affiant AT………………………………………………….…… Pages 156-157
Affiant AU ……………………………………………………… Pages 158-159
Preservation Email from Sidney Powell RE Case No 20-CV-04809-
TCB……………………………………………………………… Pages 160-177
Request for Evidence RE Case No 1:20-CV-04651-
SDG……………………………………………………………… Pages 178-182
Transcript of Zoom Hearing in Civil Action File No 1:20-CV-4809-TCB
…………………………………………………………………… Pages 183-221
Tweet from Congressman Hice Regarding State Farm
Arena………………………………………………………………..… Page 222
3
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC

Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
forthcoming

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
4
Harry W. MacDougald
5
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
6
Declaration of Stephen Joseph Matzura, Jr.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, (Name), make the following

declaration.

2. I spent five years in the U.S. Navy with the rating STG3, where I
held a top secret clearance from 1998 through 2002. I spent my time
at four bases: Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, CA; NSGA, Kunia,
Hawaii; Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas; Anti-
Submarine Warfare Base (Naval Base Point Loma), San Diego, CA.
3. I reside at 1012 N. Ocean Blvd.# 811 Pompano Beach, FL 33062
4. My affidavit highlights two videos and four photos found on the

Internet showing presumably Ruby Freeman and presumably her
daughter (Shaye Freeman Moss) in one of the photos at an election
site in Georgia with potential election irregularities.
5. Two of the images are freeze frame images of presumably Ruby

Freeman prior to moving suitcases of ballots from the four screen
split videos that have gone public on the news.
6. One of the photos shows a photo of presumably Ruby Freeman with a

name identifying Ruby Freeman on her desk. The identifier was a
sign stating 'La Ruby's Unique Treasures'.
7. One of the videos shows what appears as election material being

handed off (video USB handoff) by presumably Shaye Freeman Moss
who I believe is Ruby Freeman's daughter. Presumably Ruby

Freeman appears in that video as well.
8. The other video is presumably Ruby Freeman videoing herself at an

election center filled with ballots and boxes.
Name: Stephen Joseph Matzura, Jr.
Date: 12/06/2020
Location: 1012 N. Ocean Blvd.# 811 Pompano Beach, FL 33062



CASE NO.
Plaintiffs,
v. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF FILING
following:
1. The Supplemental Declaration of Eric Quinnell, Ph.D. and S. Stanley
Young, Ph.D. as Exhibit “A”;
4. The Declaration of Stephen Joseph Matzura, Jr., as Exhibit “B”; and
5. The Declaration of Wilburn J. Winter, Jr., attached as Exhibit “C.”
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC

Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
forthcoming

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
Harry W. MacDougald
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956


CASE NO.
Plaintiffs,
v. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, et al.,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFFS’ CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO THE

MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
L. Lin Wood Sidney Powell

L. LIN WOOD, P.C. Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 52584 SIDNEY POWELL PC
Atlanta, GA 30305-0584 2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite
(404) 891-1402 300
lwood@linwoodlaw.com Dallas, TX 75219
(214) 717-1775
Harry W. MacDougald Howard Kleinhendler

CALDWELL, PROPST & DELOACH, HOWARD KLEINHENDLER ESQUIRE
LLP 369 Lexington Avenue, 12th Floor
Two Ravinia Drive, Suite 1600 New York, NY 10017
Atlanta, GA 30346 (917) 793-1188
(404) 843-1956
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Petitioners

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ..........................................................................................................3
Statement of Facts ...............................................................................................5
Argument and Citation of Authority .................................................................12
I. Plaintiffs as Presidential Electors and a Political Party
Organization have Standing .................................................................12
1. Defendants’ Standing Arguments .........................................................12
2. State Defendants’ Standing Arguments ...............................................18
II. The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Count V. ................20
III. Laches Does Not Bar Claims For De-Certification Based on
Election Fraud and Illegality Asserted Three Business Days after
Certification and Before Post-Recount Certification. ..........................22
IV. Plaintiffs Have Stated Claims For Relief .............................................25
1. The 12(b)(6) Standard............................................................................25
2. Allocation of the Burden of Proof with Respect to Electronic
Election Fraud. ......................................................................................28
3. Plaintiffs’ Claims are Plausible.............................................................32
4. Plaintiffs Have Pleaded a Claim Under the Elections and Electors
Clause. ....................................................................................................34
5. Plaintiffs Have Pleaded an Equal Protection Violation ......................35
6. Plaintiffs Have Pleaded a Due Process Violation ................................37
V. The Plaintiffs’ Claims are Ripe and not Moot. .....................................39
VI. The Eleventh Amendment does not Bar Claims for Injunctive
Relief. ......................................................................................................42
VII. Plaintiffs’ Claims are not subject to Dismissal Under Abstention
Doctrines. ...............................................................................................43
VIII. Reply in Support of Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief..............48
1. Expert Testimony ..................................................................................49
Conclusion...........................................................................................................51
2


CASE NO.
Plaintiffs,
v. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, et al,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFFS’ CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO THE

MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Come now the Plaintiffs and submit this Conslidiated Response to the
Motions to Dismiss and Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Injunctive
Relief.
INTRODUCTION
The motions to dismiss contends that Plaintiffs’ claims are baseless. In
fact, they are based on the Constitution, and are supported by substantial
and voluminous evidence filed with the Complaint showing in multiple
dimensions that the election was conducted in an unconstitutional manner
and was infected with fraud, politically biased counting, and illegality more
than sufficient to put the outcome in doubt. The evidence presented shows a
substantial disregard for the State Legislature’s Election Code for federal
elections, which are clearly within the jurisdiction and power of a federal
court to redress. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 121 S.Ct. 525 (2000). There is no
question that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to conduct an inquiry
into whether the acts of the State’s administrative agents in this regard
constituted a significant departure from the legislative scheme and that this
Court has jurisdiction and authority to redress these grievances.
In response to Plaintiffs’ substantial body of evidence from many
credible fact and expert witnesses substantiating the allegations (further
discussed below), the Defendants put their fingers in their ears. They address
this evidence with self-serving press releases that cover the ugly and
unconstitutional political malfeasance at the heart of this case. Instead, they
offer a series of slogans – standing, subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to
state a claim for relief – the evidence being the last thing they want the
Court to notice. They contend that presidential electors, who legally are
candidates in the election, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-10, have no standing to complain
that the election was stolen from them by fraud, illegality, unconstitutional
political discrimination in the counting of the votes and a wholesale
”departure from the legislative scheme.” They invoke an equitable doctrine,
laches, to shield clearly unconstitutional election fraud and illegality from
judicial scrutiny, as if equity would lend itself to such a purpose.
4
Plaintiffs could not claim the election was stolen until it actually was
stolen and evidence of that theft emerged with sufficient clarity to support
the allegations of this case. As the world now knows, the wrongdoing for
which this case seeks relief was completed on and after November 3, 2020.
This case was filed on the third business day after certification, well within
the most closely analogous state law limitations period, which requires
election contests be filed within five days of certification.1 See O.C.G.A. § 21-
2-524(a). Cf. SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prod., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 960 (2017) (laches does not generally apply within statutory
limitations period). Even more to the point, this lawsuit was filed before the
certification of the recount results.2 Arguments that Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim betray unfamiliarity with the allegations, the evidence and the
relevant law. The motion should be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs have alleged and submitted fact and expert witness
testimony to multiple serious illegalities in the election which may be
summarized in pertinent part as follows:
1 For periods less than seven days, intervening weekends and legal holidays
are not counted. See O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(c)(3)
2 See https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/02/politics/georgia-recount-results-brad-
raffensperger/index.html (Raffensperger on December 2, 2020 “expects to re-
certify President-elect Joe Biden as the winner.”)
5
1. Illegal tabulation of a significant volume of absentee ballots in

Fulton County out of public view in violation of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-
483(b). See Complaint, paras. 10-11, 116-119. Republican
observers were told to leave around 10:30 PM. Doc. 1-28 and 1-29.
This has recently been confirmed by surveillance video obtained
from State Farm Arena which clearly shows this activity, and
further shows that the same ballots were scanned over and over,
another clear election fraud. This video evidence will be filed with
the Court Monday December 7, 2020.
2. Eye-witness testimony from a poll manager with 20 years’

experience that stacks of utterly pristine mail-in ballots were
counted – impossible for any absentee ballot returned in the mail
(as they all are) because they have to be folded twice to fit in the
envelope. To the witness’ observation, 98% of these ballots were
voted for Vice President Biden. Complaint ¶ 75; Doc. 1-16
(Affidavit of Susan Voyles, ¶¶ 14-16, 27). This evidence is
supplemented by a declaration from another experienced observer
that he also observed pristine ballots during the recount which
were voted for Joe Biden. See Declaration of Wilburn J. Winter,
filed December 6, 2020.
3. Expert testimony that 20,311 non-residents voted illegally.

William. M. Briggs, Ph.D., a statistician, estimated based on
survey data rigorously collected by Matt Braynard and the Voting
Integrity Project, that 20,311 absentee or early voters voted in
Georgia despite having moved out of state – sufficient in itself to
put the outcome of the election in doubt. See Complaint ¶ 122(d);
Doc. 1-1 (Briggs Declaration and Report); Doc. 45-1 (Expert Report
of Matthew Braynard).
4. A massive number of unrequested absentee ballots were sent in

violation of the legislative scheme, estimated to a 95% confidence
interval to be between 16,938 and 22,771 ballots – sufficient in
itself to put the outcome of the election in doubt. Complaint ¶
122(b); Doc. 1-1 (Briggs Declaration and Report); Doc. 45-1 (Expert
Report of Matthew Braynard).
5. A massive number of absentee ballots that were returned by the

voters but never counted, estimated to a 95% confidence interval
to be between 31,559 to 38,886. Complaint ¶ 122(a); Doc 1-1,
Briggs Declaration; Doc. 45-1, Braynard Report.
6
6. A statistical analysis of Fulton County precinct voting results by

Eric Quinnell, Ph.D. identifies 32,347 votes in Fulton County alone
as statistically anomalous, and notes that in certain precincts
Biden gained more than 100% of the increase in new registrations
from the 2016 general election. Complaint ¶ 123; Doc. 1-27, ¶¶ 7-8.
A second declaration from Dr. Quinnell and S. Stanley Young,
Ph.D., a member of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science in the area of statistics, further analyzes Fulton County
absentee ballots and finds glaring statistical anomalies that are so
extreme as to be mathematically impossible to co-exist in the
absentee ballot data. See Doc. 45-2.
7. An analysis by Russell Ramsland of absentee ballot statistics

showing that 5,990 absentee ballots had impossibly short intervals
between the dates they were mailed out and the dates they were
returned, and that at least 96,000 absentee ballots were voted but
are not reflected as having been returned. Complaint ¶¶ 16 & 190;
Doc. 1-10, ¶¶ 15 (Ramsland Declaration).
8. The absentee ballot signature rejection rate announced by the

Secretary of State was .15%. Only 30 absentee ballot applications
were rejected statewide for signature mismatch, with nine in tiny
Hancock County, population 8,348, eight in Fulton County and
zero in any other metropolitan county. Under the faulty consent
decree, signatures could be matched (if there was any matching
done at all) with the applications alone – allowing unfettered
injection of bootstrapped signatures into the valid absentee ballot
pool. Plaintiffs allege that these facts represent the de facto
abolition of the statutory signature match requirement of O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-386 in violation of state statute, the Elections and Electors
Clause, and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
9. An analysis by Benjamin Overholt, filed at Doc. 45-3, calculates

that the signature rejection rate in Georgia for absentee ballots in
the 2020 election was .15%, and that the Secretary of State has
used inconsistent methodologies in calculating the 2016, 2018 and
2020 rejection rates to make the 2020 rejection rate seem better by
comparison. Overholt says the Secretary of State’s press release is
“misleading” and uses inconsistent methodologies and faulty
comparisons.
7
10. The Dominion voting system ballots marked by Ballot Marking

Devices are not voter-verifiable or auditable in a software-
independent way. Complaint ¶¶ 13, 110(a) Doc. 1-5, ¶ 7; Doc. 1-8
passim). This issue has been litigated and decided against the
State Defendants in Curling v. Raffensperger, 2020 WL 5994029
(N.D. Ga. 10/11/20), giving rise to issue preclusion against the
Defendants.
11. The electronic security of the Dominion system is so lax as to

present a “extreme security risk” of undetectable hacking, and
does not include properly auditable system logs. Complaint ¶ 8, ;
Doc. 1-4 (Hursti Declaration ¶¶ 37, 39, 45-48; Doc. 1-5, at p. 29, ¶
28). Judge Totenberg’s decision in Curling v. Raffensperger, 2020
WL 5994029 (N.D. Ga. 10/11/20) also gives rise to issue preclusion
on this problem.
12. The process of uploading data from memory cards to the Dominion
servers is fraught with serious bugs, frequently fails and is a
serious security risk. Doc. 1-4 (Hursti Declaration ¶¶ 41-46).
13. There has been no inventory control over USB sticks, which were
regularly taken back and forth from the Dominion server to the
Fulton County managers’ offices, another extreme security risk.
Id. at ¶ 47
14. “The security risks outlined above – operating system risks, the
failure to harden the computers, performing operations directly on
the operating systems, lax control of memory cards, lack of
procedures, and potential remote access, are extreme and destroy
the credibility of the tabulations and output of the reports coming
from a voting system.” Id. at ¶ 49.
15. The Spider Affidavit, Doc. 1-2, reports on cyber security testing
and analysis, penetration testing, and network connection tracing
and analysis with respect to Dominion Voting Systems servers and
networks. The Affiant is formerly of the 305th Military
Intelligence Battalion with substantial expertise and experience in
cyber security. In testing conducted November 8, 2020, he found
shocking vulnerabilities in the Dominion networks, with
unencrypted passwords, network connections to IP addresses in
Belgrade, Serbia, and reliable records of Dominion networks being
accessed from China. Doc. 1-2, ¶¶ 7-10. The Spider affidavit also
8
finds that Edison Research, an election reporting affiliate of

Dominion, has a directly connected Iranian server, which is in
turn tied to a server in the Netherlands which correlates to known
Iranian use of the Netherlands as a remote server. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.
The Spider affidavit identifies a series of other Iranian and
Chinese connections into Dominion’s networks and systems. The
affidavit concludes in ¶ 21:
In my professional opinion, this affidavit presents

unambiguous evidence that Dominion Voter Systems
and Edison Research have been accessible and were
certainly compromised by rogue actors, such as Iran
and China. By using servers and employees connected
with rogue actors and hostile foreign influences
combined with numerous easily discoverable leaked
credentials, these organizations neglectfully allowed
foreign adversaries to access data and intentionally
provided access to their infrastructure in order to
monitor and manipulate elections, including the most
recent one in 2020. This represents a complete failure of
their duty to provide basic cyber security.
16. The Declaration of Russell Ramsland, Doc. 1-10, finds similar

shocking vulnerabilities in the Dominion networks and systems,
and confirms the findings of the Spider affidavit. He further shows
that malware on SCTYL’s servers can capture log in credentials
used in the Dominion networks. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. Ramsland finds that
Dominion’s source code is available on the Dark Web, and that
Dominions election systems use unprotected logs, making
undetectable hacking by sophisticated hackers possible. Id. at 6-7.
This latter point confirms Judge Totenberg findings about the
vulnerabilities in the Dominion system in Curling v.
Raffensperger, 2020 WL 5994029 (N.D. Ga. 10/11/20).
17. In further analysis, Ramsland finds through sophisticated

mathematical techniques that there was a distinct political bias in
favor of Joe Biden and against Donald Trump in the results
reported from Dominion machines vs. those reported on other
systems. Id. at ¶¶ 8-10. Biden averaged 5% higher on Dominion
and Hart systems than on other systems. Id. Looking at counties
where Biden overperformed Ramsland’s predictive model, where
other machines were used Biden overperformed only 46% of the
9
time, indicating machine neutrality. However, in the

Dominion/Hart system counties, Biden overperformed the model
78% of the time, an anomalous or unnatural result to the 99.99%
confidence level. Id. at 10-12. This analysis was confirmed by
checking it by another machine learning method. Id. at ¶ 12. See
also ¶13 (“This indicates the fraud was widespread and
impacted vote counts in a systematic method across many
machines and counties.”) (Emphasis in original).
18. Ramsland reaches the same conclusion as the Spider affidavit, and
adds the following:
Based on the foregoing, we believe this presents

unambiguous evidence that using multiple statistical
tools and techniques to examine if the use of voting
machines manufactured by different companies affected
2020 US election results, we found the use of the
Dominion X/ICE BMD (Ballot Marking Device)
machine, manufactured by Dominion Voting Systems,
and machines from Hart InterCivic, appear to have
abnormally influenced election results and
fraudulently and erroneously attributed from
13,725 to 136,908 votes to Biden in Georgia.
(Emphasis in original).
19. Dominion’s Chief Technical Officer, strategy director, and co-

inventor on several patents assigned to Dominion, and primary
defense expert witness in Curling v. Raffensperger, and holder of
multiple patents on Dominion’s software, is a member of Antifa, a
violent revolutionary communist group, responsible for months of
mayhem in Portland, Oregon, and violent rioting all over the
United States. Dr. Coomer is consumed with an intense loathing
and frothing psychotic rage towards Donald Trump and all of his
supporters. Dr. Coomer said in an Antifa conference call “Don’t
worry. Trump won’t win the election, we fixed that.” Complaint ¶
120. Dr. Coomer thus had motive, means and opportunity to rig
the election through the Dominion software and openly declared
he had done so.
It is claimed by the Defendants that the hand audit precludes the
possibility of electronic election fraud. Not only is this not true, the State
10
Defendants are collaterally estopped from making this argument because it
has been decided against them by Judge Totenberg in Curling v.
Raffensperger, 2020 WL 5994029 (N.D. Ga. 10/11/20). As Judge Totenberg
held:
Georgia’s Election Code mandates the use of the BMD system

as the uniform mode of voting for all in-person voters in federal and
statewide elections. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300(a)(2). The statutory
provisions mandate voting on “electronic ballot markers” that: (1)
use “electronic technology to independently and privately mark a
paper ballot at the direction of an elector, interpret ballot selections,
communicate such interpretation for elector verification, and print
an elector verifiable paper ballot;” and (2) “produce paper ballots
which are marked with the elector’s choices in a format readable by
the elector” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(7.1); O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300(a)(2).
Plaintiffs and other voters who wish to vote in-person are

required to vote on a system that does none of those things.
Rather, the evidence shows that the Dominion BMD system does
not produce a voter-verifiable paper ballot or a paper ballot
marked with the voter’s choices in a format readable by the
voter because the votes are tabulated solely from the
unreadable QR code. Thus, under Georgia’s mandatory voting
system for “voting at the polls” voters must cast a BMD-generated
ballot tabulated using a computer generated barcode that has the
potential to contain information regarding their voter choices that
does not match what they enter on the BMD (as reflected in the
written text summary), or could cause a precinct scanner to
improperly tabulate their votes.
Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added). These properties render the election
unauditable by hand recount. Plaintiffs’ evidence, and the evidence reviewed
at length by Judge Totenberg, shows that BMD ballots are not auditable in
any software-independent way. See e.g. Doc. 1-8, passim. Claims to the
11
contrary rest on a fallacious assumption that the veracity vel non of the BMD
ballots is independent of the BMDs themselves – a classic case of circular
reasoning.
In the face of all this evidence from the Complaint and before the
Court, Defendants travel under the 12(b)(6) standard of review that requires
the Court to assume all of the foregoing is true. They then argue there is
“nothing to see here” and that we should all just move along. That argument
is utterly without merit and should be rejected.
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY
I. PLAINTIFFS AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS AND A

POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION HAVE STANDING
1. DEFENDANTS’ STANDING ARGUMENTS
The Defendants first contend that Plaintiffs do not have standing.
However, Plaintiffs Correco Ja’Quan Pearson, Vikki Townsend Consiglio,
Gloria Kay Godwin, James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn Hall Fisher, and
Cathleen Alston Latham are all nominated Republican Presidential Electors
for the State of Georgia. As such, in legal contemplation they are candidates
in the election under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-10, which provides:
At the November election to be held in the year 1964 and every

fourth year thereafter, there shall be elected by the electors of this
state persons to be known as electors of President and Vice
President of the United States and referred to in this chapter as
presidential electors, equal in number to the whole number of
senators and representatives to which this state may be entitled in
the Congress of the United States.
12
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-11, the duties of presidential electors are
as follows:
The presidential electors chosen pursuant to Code Section 21-2-10

shall assemble at the seat of government of this state at 12:00 Noon
of the day which is, or may be, directed by the Congress of the
United States and shall then and there perform the duties required
of them by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The standing of presidential electors to challenge fraud, illegality and
unconstitutional political discrimination in a presidential election stands, as
it were, on a different footing than that of an ordinary citizen elector. They
are candidates, not voters. Theirs is not a generalized grievance, it is a
particularized grievance. The election was not stolen from their preferred
candidate, it was stolen from them individually and particularly. There are
only 16 Republican Presidential electors in the whole state – six of them are
plaintiffs in this case – versus 7,233,584 registered voters in Georgia.3
The Eighth Circuit case of Carson v. Simon, 978 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir.
2020) is directly on point and highly persuasive, leading the Defendants to
deride it as an outlier. In fact, the reasoning of Carson is directly analogous.
Carson reviewed Minnesota law, including Minn. Stat. § 208.03, which
provides that a vote for a presidential and vice-presidential candidate “shall
be deemed to be a vote for that party’s electors.” Carson then concluded
3 See https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/Elections/voter_registration_statistics, last

visited November 5, 2020.
13
“Because Minnesota law plainly treats presidential electors as candidates, we
do, too.” Id. at 1057. Georgia law similarly treats presidential electors as
candidates, and has a statute nearly identical to Minn. Stat. § 208.03,
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-480(g), which provides that “[a] vote for the candidates for
President and Vice President of a political party or body shall be deemed to
be a vote for each of the candidates for presidential electors of such political
party or body.”
As the court in Carson explained, this drove its conclusion that
presidential electors have standing:
As candidates, the Electors argue that they have a cognizable

interest in ensuring that the final vote tally accurately reflects the
legally valid votes cast. An inaccurate vote tally is a concrete and
particularized injury to candidates such as the Electors. The
Secretary's use of the consent decree makes the Electors' injury
certainly-impending, because the former necessarily departs from
the Legislature's mandates. Thus, the Electors meet the injury-in-
fact requirement.”
Id. at 1058.
The causal-connection test is satisfied because the injury – an
inaccurate vote tally – flows from the fraud, illegality and unconstitutionality
in the conduct of the election as alleged in the Complaint.
The redressability test is satisfied because decertification of the
election results, and/or certification of the Trump Electors, or prohibition of
14
the Biden Electors from voting in the Electoral College would redress the
injury. See id.
Prudential standing is also satisfied because “[a] significant departure
from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents a
federal constitutional question.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112, 121 S.Ct.
525, 533-534 (2000) (Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas concurring).
As the Eighth Circuit concluded, “[f]or these reasons, we conclude the
Electors have Article III standing as candidates.” Id. So should this Court.
The Defendants rely principally on Bognet v Sec’y of Commonwealth,
No. 20-2314, 2020 WL 6686120 (3rd Cir. Nov. 13, 2020), where the court
found that electors lacked standing based on the particularities of a
Pennsylvania law that are not present here. In particular, the Bognet court
did not discuss the significance of State law provisions pursuant to which
Presidential Electors are candidates for office – the linchpin of the Carson
decision. Moreover, none of the plaintiffs in Bognet were Presidential
Electors.
Plaintiff Jason M. Shepherd is the Chairman of the Cobb County
Republican Party and sues in his official capacity on its behalf.4 All of the
4Mr. Shepherd’s status as a plaintiff is alleged in paragraph 29 of the

Complaint. He was not included in the caption due to inadvertence.
15
authorities cited by the Intervenors to support their right to intervene in this
case support this Plaintiff’s standing.
Plaintiffs’ allege, first, and with great particularity, that Defendants
have violated the Georgia Election Code to dilute the votes of Georgia’s
Republican voters (or voters for Republican candidates) with illegal,
ineligible, duplicate or fictitious ballots that Defendants, in collaboration
with public employees, Dominion and Democratic poll watchers and activists,
have caused to be counted as votes for Democratic candidates. The fact and
expert witness testimony describes and quantifies the myriad means by
which Defendants and their collaborators illegally inflated the vote tally for
Biden, including: double counting of the same vote, non-resident voters,
impossible sent and received dates on absentee ballots, failure to match
signatures, etc., etc. Thus, the vote dilution resulting from this systemic and
illegal conduct did not affect all Georgia presidential electors or political
parties equally; it had the intent and effect of inflating the number of votes
for Biden and reducing the number of votes for Trump.
Further, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Defendants
disenfranchised Republican and Trump voters to reduce their voting power,
in clear violation of “one person, one vote.” See generally Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Defendants engaged
in several schemes to devalue Republican votes as detailed in the Complaint,
16
including absentee ballots being returned but not counted, or “1 person, 0
votes,” and Dominion algorithmic manipulation, or for Republicans, “1
person, 1/2 votes,” and for Democrats, “1 person, 1.5 votes.” See e.g., Doc.
1-1 (Dr. Briggs Testimony regarding ballots not requested but sent, ballots
returned but not counted), Doc. 1-10 (Ramsland testimony regarding additive
algorithm), ¶¶ 116-119 (allegations of illegal tabulation at State Farm Arena,
validated by video surveillance obtained December 2, 2020).
Plaintiffs’ injury is that the relative values of their particular votes,
and those of similarly situated voters for Republican candidates were
devalued or disregarded, rather than a “generalized grievance” “no different
than the interests of all Georgia voters as Defendants claim. Doc. 63-1 at 19.
,”Federal courts in Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit have long recognized
that “plaintiffs have standing to bring Due Process and Equal Protection
claims where they allege that their votes would likely be improperly
counted,” as they were here. Curling v. Kemp, 334 F.Supp.3d 1303, 1316
(N.D. Ga. 2018) (citing Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding voter plaintiffs had standing and substantial likelihood of success on
equal protection and due process claims challenging use of voting machines
likely to debase or devalue their votes).
17
2. STATE DEFENDANTS’ STANDING ARGUMENTS
What has already been said covers much of the State Defendants’
standing arguments, except for one, after which we address their traceability
and redressability arguments here.
The State Defendants rely on Wood v. Raffensperger, 2020 WL 7094866
(11th Cir. Case No. 201-14418 Dec. 5, 2020) for their argument that Plaintiffs
here present only non-justiciable generalized grievances. While Wood applies
this rule to Wood as a citizen elector, it expressly notes that if he had been a
candidate – like the presidential elector plaintiffs in this case – he would
have had standing:
Wood asserts only a generalized grievance. A particularized injury

is one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (internal quotation marks
omitted). For example, if Wood were a political candidate harmed
by the recount, he would satisfy this requirement because he could
assert a personal, distinct injury. Cf. Roe v. Alabama ex rel. Evans,
43 F.3d 574, 579 (11th Cir. 1995)
Id.
As for traceability and redressability, according to the State
Defendants, they are mere bystanders to the election just conducted, having
virtually nothing to do with any of the fraud and irregularity alleged by the
Plaintiffs. The State Defendants’ role is not so limited. Plaintiffs seek the
remedy of de-certification (unlike Wood who sought only to delay certification
in the district court proceedings) and an injunction against the State
18
Defendants’ empowering and empaneling the Biden Electors to vote in the
Electoral College on December 14, 2020. These remedies go directly to the
statutory role of the Governor and Secretary of State in a presidential
election under Georgia law.
With respect to certification, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(i) provides that
election superintendents are not permitted to certify election results they
know or have reason to know include fraudulent, illegal or erroneous results:
“If any error or fraud is discovered, the superintendent shall
compute and certify the votes justly, regardless of any fraudulent or
erroneous returns presented to him or her, and shall report the facts to
the appropriate district attorney for action.” (Emphasis added).
Similarly, as particularly applicable to the Secretary of State as the
chief elections officer in Georgia, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-499 provides that
[i]n the event an error is found in the certified returns

presented to the Secretary of State or in the tabulation,
computation, or canvassing of votes as described in this Code
section, the Secretary of State shall notify the county
submitting the incorrect returns and direct the county to
correct and recertify such returns.” (Emphasis added).
The pretense that the officials made responsible by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31
for ensuring the legality and purity of Georgia elections are powerless to do
the very job they are authorized and commanded to do is preposterous.
19
The State Defendants, after this lawsuit was filed, have re-certified the
election following a machine recount despite the evidence presented in this
case and in the public square. The injury caused by certification of results
marred by fraud, illegality and error in an amount sufficient to put the
outcome of the election in doubt is directly traceable to the actions of the
State Defendants under controlling provisions of the Georgia Election Code.
It is also redressable by the remedies prayed against the State Defendants.
They cannot pretend they are blameless for the problems or helpless to
correct them. They picked the Dominion system. Their polices lead to the de
facto abolition of the signature match requirement. Their regulation to
permit early processing of absentee ballots is unlawful and unconstitutional.
Their Settlement Agreement breached the citadel for absentee ballots and is
unlawful and unconstitutional. The claims against the State Defendants
satisfy all elements of standing and justiciability.
II. THE COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

OVER COUNT V.
The Intervenor Defendants devote two sentences in a single paragraph
to the top-level heading argument that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the state law election contest claim in Count V, relying on
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-523(a) which states that an election contest under the
relevant article of the Election Code shall be tried and determined in the
20
superior court of the county where the defendant resides. That is the extent
of their argument.
But, as noted elsewhere in this brief, we are dealing here with a
departure from the legislative scheme for appointing presidential electors.
20,188 non-residents were allowed to vote, in violation of the Georgia
Election Code. The signature match requirement for absentee ballot
applications was de facto abolished and applied in a highly unequal fashion
between counties, in violation of the Equal Protection clause. The signature
rejection rate for absentee ballots themselves was only .15%. Either nearly all
Georgia voters have perfect penmanship, or the statutory requirement was
effectively abolished. Ballots were tabulated after hours and out of public
view, in violation of the Georgia Election Code. Ballots were scanned over
and over again in violation of the Georgia Election Code. “A significant
presents a federal constitutional question.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112
(2000). Therefore, Count V of the Complaint presents not just a state law
question, but a federal constitutional question as well, over which the Court
has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28
U.S.C. § 1343 (Presidential election) and 28 U.S.C. §1367 (supplemental
jurisdiction for state law and constitutional claims).
21
III. LACHES DOES NOT BAR CLAIMS FOR DE-

CERTIFICATION BASED ON ELECTION FRAUD AND
ILLEGALITY ASSERTED THREE BUSINESS DAYS AFTER
CERTIFICATION AND BEFORE POST-RECOUNT
CERTIFICATION.
Defendant Intervenors assert that Plaintiffs claims are barred by
laches.
Laches is “a defense developed by courts of equity” to protect

defendants against “unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing
suit.” Petrella, supra, at ___, ___ (slip op., at 1, 12). See also 1 D.
Dobbs, Law of Remedies §2.3(5), p. 89 (2d ed. 1993) (Dobbs) (“The
equitable doctrine of laches bars the plaintiff whose unreasonable
delay in prosecuting a claim or protecting a right has worked a
prejudice to the defendant”).
SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prod., LLC, 137 S. Ct.
954, 960 (2017).
Here there is no unreasonable delay in asserting Plaintiffs’ rights and
no resulting prejudice to the defending parties. Plaintiffs could not file a
lawsuit claiming the election was stolen by fraud and illegality, fraudulent
ballots, non-resident voting, unrequested absentee ballots, absentee ballots
returned but not counted, politically discriminatory counting, illegal
tabulation, scanning the same ballots multiple times, and apparent
fraudulent electronic manipulation of votes until the election actually was
stolen through those means.
The de facto abolition of the signature match requirement, and the
State Defendants’ failure to enforce the requirement and the other massive
22
irregularities surrounding absentee ballots did not happen until the election
occurred. The appalling failure to protect this election against massive fraud
through absentee ballots did not happen until Defendants caused or let it
happen.
The claims of prejudice to the Defendants and to lawful voters who cast
their legal votes in the election presume the point in controversy – whether
the election was lawful or fraudulent. No Defendant, no candidate, no
intervenor, no political party and no citizen can claim a legally protectible
interest in a fraudulent election result. In legal contemplation, there can be
no prejudice to anyone from invaliding such an election. Defendants would
have us believe there is no cognizable legal, equitable or constitutional
remedy for an election that has been won through fraudulent means. This
notion is obnoxious to history, law, equity, the Constitution and common
sense. Elections are regularly invalidated for fraud and illegality. There is no
reason this one cannot also be invalidated if the evidence is sufficient to
support that remedy.
The election was certified on November 20, 2020. Plaintiffs filed their
Complaint on November 25, three business days later, and well within the
state law limitations period for election contests of five days. See O.C.G.A. §
21-2-524(a). Plaintiffs seek de-certification. De-certification presumes prior
certification. The claim was not ripe until then. Moreover, much of the
23
misconduct identified in the Complaint was not apparent on Election Day, as
the evidence of voting irregularities was not discovered until weeks after the
election and through very careful expert analysis. Finally, as noted, the
election was re-certified after this lawsuit was filed.
Finally, the election was re-certified after the recount after this case
was filed.5 Laches cannot reach backward in time to bar a case filed before
one of the events complained of
Under the heading of laches, the Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs
claims must be barred because the requested relief would “erode the public’s
confidence in the electoral process” citing Wood v. Raffensperger, No. 1:20-cv-
04561, ECF No. 54 at 22 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 20, 2020). That ship has sailed.
Millions of people have seen the surveillance video from State Farm Arena
showing two hours of illegal tabulation not in public view – after the press
and partisan observers were unlawfully told to leave. Millions of people have
seen election workers on this video scanning the same ballots over and over
again. Millions of people who have seen this flagrant, large-scale, systematic,
intentional and knowing election fraud by workers in the Fulton County
Board of Registrations and Elections are utterly shocked and disgusted.
There is no confidence left to preserve. Instead, it must be restored by
5 See n. 2 above.
24
invalidating a fraudulent result and allowing the electors to be chosen by the
Legislature under the plenary power granted them for this purpose by the
Elections and Electors Clause. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Ramming a
fraudulent election result down the throats of the American people in the
name of preserving confidence in the electoral process would be one of the
most ridiculous and provocative acts of betrayal in our long and tumultuous
history.
IV. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STATED CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. T H E 12(b)(6) S T A N D A R D .
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order
to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must
articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d
929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While it is true that a pleading
that merely offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action” may subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6),
25
the “facial plausibility” standard does not give rise to a “probability
requirement” at the pleading stage. Twombly at 556. The standard merely
“calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence” of the claim. Id. In doing so, the Court must accept all of the
plaintiff's allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.2008).
Twombly suggests that the Court adopt a “two-pronged approach” in
applying these principles: 1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint that
are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, “assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Under Twombly and Iqbal,
courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint “obvious
alternative explanation[s],” which suggest lawful conduct rather than the
unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.
Defendant Intervenors argue the Court should apply Rule 9(b) to this
election case and require that the alleged fraud be plead with particularity.
This rule has no application to the context of election fraud or illegality
because of the problems of proof in such cases arising from a constitutional
guarantee of a private ballot. In election contests, it is only necessary to show
enough fraud or illegality or irregularity to put the outcome in doubt – one
does not have to be prove conclusively what the outcome would have been but
26
for the fraud. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-522. Therefore, pleading standards applicable
to common law fraud claims, which always involve a claim of but for
causation of actual damages, should not be applied to election disputes. In an
election contest it is not necessary to show how the illegal ballots were voted
because once ballots have been introduced into the pool that will be counted,
it is normally not possible to identify which were illegally cast or counted.
Recognizing this reality, the Georgia Supreme Court has held,
The fallacy in the trial court's analysis is demonstrated by the

impossibility of determining how the 481 electors would have voted
had they been supplied with proper ballots. … It is precisely for this
reason that we have held that the focus in an election contest
involving illegal ballots is on whether they “exceeded ... the margin
of victory.” Howell v. Fears, supra at 628, 571 S.E.2d 392. Thus,
[i]t was not incumbent upon [Plaintiff] to show how the []

voters would have voted if their [absentee] ballots had been
regular. [Plaintiff] only had to show that there were enough
irregular ballots to place in doubt the result.
Mead v. Sheffield, 278 Ga. 268, 272, 601 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2004) (citing Howell
v. Fears, 275 Ga. 627, 571 S.E.2d 392 (2002). See also Miller v. Picacho
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 33, 179 Ariz. 178, 180, 877 P.2d 277, 279, (S.
Ct.1994) (“We therefore hold that a showing of fraud is not a necessary
condition to invalidate absentee balloting. It is sufficient that an express non-
technical statute was violated, and ballots cast in violation of the statute
affected the election.”)
27
Moreover, even if Rule 9(b) were applicable, the Complaint as
summarized above particularizes the precise fraudulent conduct alleged here.
2. ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF WITH

RESPECT TO ELECTRONIC ELECTION FRAUD.
The difficulties of proof just discussed warrant further consideration.
Forensic examination of the black boxes inside which the election
software operates is necessary to even approximately obtain direct evidence
of electronic fraud in elections. Even that may be impractical or impossible
due to the lack of protected audit and system logs inside the in Curling v.
Raffensperger, 2020 WL 5994029 (N.D. Ga. 10/11/20) and due to the
compressed time frame for resolving the controversy. A practical and
appropriate method of allocating the burden and order of proof of electronic
election fraud should be developed and applied.
The Supreme Court has laid down the mechanics for allocating the
burden of proof in analyzing discriminatory-treatment cases where the
evidence will depend on circumstantial or statistical evidence, as is the case
here. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme
Court laid out a three-step analysis. First, plaintiffs must make out a prima
facie case of the discrimination, see id. at 802, just as the Plaintiffs here have
demonstrated harm by the statistical analysis of the results. Second, the
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate reason for the
28
challenged action – there is none here. See id. at 802-03. Finally, the plaintiff
must establish that the reason articulated is mere pretext and that
discrimination occurred. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803.6 Plaintiffs
have already provided evidence of that discrimination – it is now time to look
at the software and how it was used.
Plaintiffs have discharged the burden of the first step by pleading and
proving a prima facie case showing in their Complaint that (1) Dominion
vote-collection-aggregation-tabulation software was employed on November 3
in Georgia; and (2) the specific software so employed included at relevant
times a capability of collecting, aggregating, and/or tabulating votes in
discriminatory fashion. See Doc. 1-10 (Ramsland Affidavit). Competent
evidence establishes unmistakably that this software was both fraud-enabled
and audit-disabled. The prima facie showing in this case could hardly be
more persuasive.
6 Courts have readily adapted the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas
in other cases where discrimination claims are “based principally on
circumstantial evidence.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141. Although originally decided
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courts have deployed
McDonnell Douglas adaptations when analyzing other constitutional and
statutory claims based on Sperino, BEYOND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS, U. Cinn.
(2013) (McDonnell Douglas structure used in cases under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (‘ADA’"),” “Age Discrimination in Employment Act (‘ADEA’),”
and “discrimination cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and
1981,” and “various state antidiscrimination statutes.”). It makes sense to
consider this as a useful paradigm to determine whether there is
discrimination against one group of voters over another.
29
Further, there has been no adequate rejoinder to this compelling prima
facie showing. Given the foundational constitutional importance of the right
to vote, Defendants bear the burden of presenting, in response to a prima
facie demonstration of electronic electoral discrimination, conclusive evidence
that negates the risk that the software was used in a discriminatory fashion.
Algorithms that discriminate based on political preference or affiliation
are never permissible. Vote collection-aggregation-tabulation software,
especially when applied in multiple locations in a multi-precinct election,
poses a new challenge in analyzing discrimination, but the same judicial
analysis should apply. Further, just as discrimination in other contexts,
software engineered to produce disparate treatment of different voters will
also be engineered to cover its own tracks and will be deployed by politicians
only where the software’s role will be difficult to show after the fact,
particularly in the short window for mounting electoral challenges.7
Although conclusive evidence of actual discrimination perpetrated
through voting software may well be available in some instances, just as
7 A further consideration concerns synchronization of electoral decisions. The

timing of determinations of electoral outcomes, unlike outcomes in making
multiple employment decisions, is an issue of great practical moment and
independent constitutional significance. See, e.g., U.S. Const Amend XX. One
cannot un-ring bells, unscramble omelets, get second chances at first
impressions, or re-run the same election after an extended adjudication
contesting the vote-counting algorithms employed in the first instance.
30
direct statements of discriminatory intentions are sometimes available, in the
more usual case direct, timely, and comprehensible evidence of the precise
operation and effects of fraud-enabled election software may be hard to come
by, especially where time is short and political tempers run hot.
There can be no legitimate reason—none whatever—for vote-collection-
aggregation-tabulation software to include the capability or potential for
discriminating on a basis of political preference or affiliation, or for covering
up the potential for such disparate treatment. Accordingly, in adapting
McDonnell Douglas to electronic electoral frauds, the second and third steps
of this paradigm should be combined, thus streamlining its application to
these cases of alleged political discrimination. While one can argue that
software algorithms may be appropriate in employment decisions, or even in
cases involving political drawing of voting districts, employing fraud-enabled
software that opens the door to invidious political discrimination is quite a
different matter.
As with any fraud, there was ample motive, opportunity, and capability
to use the software as it was designed to change the outcome of the
tabulation, and scant evidence has been presented to show that it was not
used in that way. Defendants have made no arguments as to why the
software employed the features it contained, and no evidence that its
capabilities were not used in this election. Given the foundational
31
constitutional importance of the right to vote, the standard for upholding the
use of fraud-enabled or audit-disabled software must be demanding, and
Defendants have not satisfied their burden in rebutting the allegations and
the evidence presented. Mere certification of the software and Logic and
Accuracy testing are inadequate, as Judge Totenberg found in Curling v.
Raffensperger.
Judge Posner remarks that “one of the most persistent fallacies” in
commentary on Bush v. Gore and the 2000 election is “the notion that the
winner of an election can be determined without reference to election rules.”
Posner, Breaking the Deadlock, at 2. Once use of fraud-enabling and/or audit-
disabling software has been established, Defendants should bear the burden
of showing that such software did not affect the outcome that would be
generated by the election rules but for the presence of the software.
Otherwise, the only resort is invalidation of the compromised election.
3. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE PLAUSIBLE.
Turning to the plausibility inquiry, the Defendants contend that the
Plaintiffs’ claims are “simply not plausible.”
All Defendants contend that the hand audit necessarily precludes there
having been anything amiss in the Dominion software. The premise of this
argument is that the paper ballots printed by the Dominion Ballot Marking
Devices are auditable in a software-independent independent manner. Not
32
only is this not true, the State Defendants are collaterally estopped from
making this argument, for it has been decided against them by Judge
Totenberg in Curling v. Raffensperger, 2020 WL 5994029 (N.D. Ga. 10/11/20).
Reviewing the evidence, Judge Totenberg explained why the Dominion BMD
ballots are not auditable in a software independent way:
A voting system is strongly software independent “if an

undetected change or error in its software cannot cause an
undetectable change or error in an election outcome, and moreover,
a detected change or error in an election outcome (due to change or
error in the software) can be corrected without re-running the
election.” (Stark Suppl. Decl., Doc. 640-1 at 42 ¶ 10.) “Systems
based on optically scanning hand-marked paper ballots (with
reliable chain of custody of the ballots) are strongly software
independent, because inspecting the hand-marked ballots allows an
auditor to determine whether malfunctions altered the outcome,
and a full manual tabulation from the paper ballots can determine
who really won, without having to re-run the election.” (Id.)
Therefore, a risk-limiting audit of an election conducted using hand-
marked paper ballots “can guarantee a large chance of correcting
the outcome if the outcome is wrong.” (Id.)
Dr. Stark’s affidavits and hearing testimony address

the impossibility of conducting a reliable audit of ballots
and voting totals derived from QR codes for purposes of
verifying the accuracy or integrity of election results or
processes. In Dr. Stark’s view, the risk-limiting audit methodology
cannot be properly utilized to assess the accuracy of
election results in the context of a BMD system where
ballots are tabulated based on a humanly non-readable QR
code that is not voter verifiable and where the computer
voting system is vulnerable to data hacking or manipulation
that can alter votes cast in untraceable ways – including in
the votes actually shown on the ballots that are audited.
Id. at 28 (emphasis added). See also Doc. 1-8, (academic article presenting
33
behavioral research that Dominion’s BMD ballots are not actually verified by
voters and showing they are not auditable independent of the software). This
finding is crucially significant because the evidence is overwhelming that
Dominion’s systems, including BMDs, are easily hacked and can rig the votes
printed in the QR codes, which are not human-readable and which contain
the actual vote read by the scanners. Summing up, Judge Totenberg ruled
that “Absent such an injunction [prohibiting the use of BMDs], there is no
audit remedy that can confirm the reliability and accuracy of the
BMD system, as Dr. Stark has stressed.” Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs easily meet the pleading stage plausibility analysis because
their claims are copiously supported with eye-witness and expert testimony.
This is more than enough to surpass the 12(b)(6) standard under Twombly
and Iqbal.
4. PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLEADED A CLAIM UNDER THE

ELECTIONS AND ELECTORS CLAUSE.
Plaintiffs have alleged the following violations of the Elections and
Electors Clause:
1. Secretary of State Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15, permitting absentee ballots to

be opened up to three weeks before election day, is directly and
irreconcilably contrary to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(2).
2. The Settlement Agreement is facially unconstitutional because it varies

from the specified statutory procedures for handling and adjudicating
absentee ballots.
34
3. The de facto abolition of the signature match requirement in violation

of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386.
Defendants contend none of this matters and cannot be remedied in any
event so the Complaint should be dismissed. To the contrary, “A significant
presents a federal constitutional question.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112,
(2000). The Elections and Electors clause effectively federalizes and
constitutionalizes state election codes for the selection of presidential
electors. When those procedures are substantially altered by means other
than a duly enacted statute as they have been in Georgia, the Constitution is
violated. This is the teaching of McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) and
Bush v. Gore.
In Georgia, changes to the absentee balloting procedures have opened
an 8-lane superhighway for fraudulent ballots, which the supporters of Biden
have fully exploited. Plaintiffs have stated a claim for violation of the
Elections and Electors Clause.
5. PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLEADED AN EQUAL PROTECTION

VIOLATION
Defendants also absurdly contend that plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim that the Equal Protection clause was violated. There is an Equal
Protection violation in the dilution of votes for Trump by the injection of tens
of thousands of illegal ballots for Biden. There is an Equal Protection
35
violation in the use of Dominion equipment that confers a politically
discriminatory 5% advantage to Biden as compared to other election systems.
There is an Equal Protection violation in the de facto abolition of the
signature match requirement for absentee ballots as compared to in person
voting in which voters have to provide proof of their identity. The receipt and
counting of more than one million absentee ballots for which there was no
effective signature match violates the Georgia Election Code and the Electors
and Elections Clause and subjects absentee voters and in person voters to
disparate treatment. Counting 20,188 votes from non-residents
unconstitutionally dilutes the votes of legal residents. The Equal Protection
violations in this case are plain and obvious under a large body of “one person
one vote” case law from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) and Bush v. Gore.
In Equal Protection cases, it has been made clear that
[o]ur treatment of anecdotal evidence in Cone Corp. and Ensley

Branch is consistent with the formulation in Justice
O'Connor's Croson plurality opinion that ‘evidence of a pattern of
individual discriminatory acts can, if supported by appropriate
statistical proof, lend support to a local government's determination
that broader remedial relief is justified,’ 488 U.S. at 509, (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). In light of Croson 's guidance on the
point, and our decisions in Cone Corp. and Ensley Branch, we
believe that anecdotal evidence can play an important role in
bolstering statistical evidence, but that only in the rare case will
anecdotal evidence suffice standing alone.
Engineering Contrs. Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 925
36
(11th Cir. 1997) (citing Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509,
(1989). “Moreover, evidence of a pattern of individual discriminatory acts can,
if supported by appropriate statistical proof, lend support to a local
government's determination that broader remedial relief is justified.” Id.
Plaintiffs have offered such statitistical evidence.
6. PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLEADED A DUE PROCESS

VIOLATION
Similarly, the Complaint states a claim for violation of the Due Process
clause. The Settlement Agreement and Rule 183-1-14-0.9-.15 were adopted in
violation of the Georgia Election Code and the Elections and Electors clause,
depriving Plaintiffs of their rights thereunder without Due Process. The
fundamental right to vote protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is
cherished in our nation because it “is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562. Voters have a “right to cast a
ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud,” Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992), and “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our
electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory
democracy.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam).
“Obviously included within the right to [vote], secured by the
Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots
and have them counted” if they are validly cast. United States v. Classic, 313
37
U.S. 299, 315 (1941). “[T]he right to have the vote counted” means counted
“at full value without dilution or discount.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555, n.29
(quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
“Every voter in a federal . . . election, whether he votes for a candidate
with little chance of winning or for one with little chance of losing, has a right
under the Constitution to have his vote fairly counted, without its being
distorted by fraudulently cast votes.” Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S.
211, 227 (1974); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962). Invalid or
fraudulent votes “debase[]” and “dilute” the weight of each validly cast vote.
See Anderson, 417 U.S. at 227.
The right to an honest [count] is a right possessed by each voting
elector, and to the extent that the importance of his vote is nullified, wholly
or in part, he has been injured in the free exercise of a right or privilege
secured to him by the laws and Constitution of the United States.” Anderson,
417 U.S. at 226 (quoting Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326, 331 (6th
Cir.), aff'd due to absence of quorum, 339 U.S. 974 (1950)).
Practices that promote the casting of illegal or unreliable ballots or that
fail to contain basic minimum guarantees against such conduct can violate
the Fourteenth Amendment by leading to the dilution of validly cast ballots.
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a
38
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”).
The argument that Plaintiffs have not stated a Due Process claim is
without merit and should be rejected.
V. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE RIPE AND NOT MOOT.
The State Defendants’ mootness argument is based on the false
premise that this Court cannot order any of the relief requested in the
Complaint or the TRO Motion. As this Court held in a recent decision
granting a TRO enjoining Defendant Secretary Kemp, “Defendant’s claim
that the Secretary cannot redress Plaintiff’s injury fails because the
Secretary of State is the state official in charge of enforcing Georgia’s election
laws.” Common Cause Ga. v. Kemp, 347 F.Supp.3d 1270, 1291 (N.D. Ga.
2018) (citing Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314, 131 (11th Cir. 2011)).
Accordingly, “Defendant’s role as the chief election official of the state, a
ruling by the Court directed at Defendant can redress Plaintiff’s injuries.” Id.
Without an immediate temporary injunction, electoral votes will be
cast, electors will be appointed and this Court will lose any authority to
provide relief to Plaintiffs. There is no harm to Respondents by the potential
relief fashioned by this Court. As recently held by a court considering claims
similar to those asserted here.
39
3 U.S.C. §5 makes clear that the Safe Harbor does not expire until
December 8, 2020, and the Electoral College does not vote for
president and vice president until December 14, 2020. According to
an October 22, 2020 white paper from the Congressional Research
Service titled “The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election
Timeline,” the electors will meet and vote on December 14, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/ IF11641. December
8, 2020—six days prior to the date the College of Electors is
scheduled to meet—is the “safe harbor” deadline under 3 U.S.C. §5.
That statute provides that if a state has provided, “by laws enacted
prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its
final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the
appointment of all or any of the electors of such State,” and that
final determination has been made “at least six days before the time
fixed for the meeting of the electors,” that determination—if it is
made under the state’s law at least six days prior to the day the
electors meet— “shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution . . . .”
It appears, therefore, that December 8 is a critical date for
resolution of any state court litigation involving an aggrieved
candidate who is contesting the outcome of an election.
Feehan v. Wisconsin Board of Elections, Case No. 20-cv-1771(E.D. Wis.
12/4/20) (Attached as Exh. A).
This Court can grant the primary relief requested by Plaintiffs, i.e., de-
certification of Georgia’s election results and an injunction prohibiting State
Defendants from transmitting the results. There is also no question that this
Court can order other types of declaratory and injunctive relief requested by
Plaintiffs, in particular, impounding Dominion voting machines and software
for inspection, nor have State Defendants claimed otherwise.
40
In Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000), a case arising from
the 2000 General Election, the Eleventh Circuit held that certification did not
moot the claim:
This Court has held that “[a] claim for injunctive relief may become
moot if: (1) it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable
expectation that the alleged violation will recur and (2) interim
relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the
effects of the alleged violation.” Reich v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 102 F.3d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir.1997).
We conclude that neither of these elements is satisfied in this case.

The Democratic candidate, Vice President Gore, and others are
currently contesting the election results in various lawsuits in
numerous Florida state courts. There are still manual recount votes
from at least Volusia and Broward Counties in the November 26th
official election results of the Florida Secretary of State. In view of
the complex and ever-shifting circumstances of the case, we
cannot say with any confidence that no live controversy is
before us.
Id. at 1172-73 (emphasis added). ). See also Common Cause, 347 F.Supp.3d
at 1291 (holding that certification of election results did not moot post-
election claim for emergency injunctive relief). The State Defendants cannot
be allowed to certify the results after this case has been filed and then claim
the lawsuit is moot because they have certified.
The case of Wood v. Raffensberger, No. 20-14418, 2020 WL 7094866
(11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2020) also does not support Defendants’ mootness or
standing arguments. The key difference between this case and Wood is that
the plaintiff in Wood requested delay of certification, rather than de-
41
certification, so in the Court’s view certification rendered his request moot.
Plaintiffs here also request several additional types of injunctive relief (as
well as declarative relief) to preserve evidence and maintain the status quo
that are not moot, e.g., access to voting machines and records as well as
declaratory relief.
VI. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR CLAIMS

FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
State Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. While the contours of the Eleventh Amendment’s
jurisdictional bar are ambiguous in many cases, this is not one of them. As
the Court held in Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger, 413 F. Supp. 3d
1251 (N.D. Ga. 2019):
Under the doctrine enunciated in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28

S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), ... a suit alleging a violation of the
federal constitution against a state official in his official capacity for
injunctive relief on a prospective basis is not a suit against the
state, and, accordingly, does not violate the Eleventh Amendment.”
Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756–57, 119 S.Ct.
2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (“The rule [of sovereign immunity],
however, does not bar certain actions against state officers for
injunctive or declaratory relief.”) and Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (“Of course a state
official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief,
would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for
prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’”).
Id. at 1278. The Court further held:
42
In addition, the remedy of prospective injunctive relief is “not the

‘functional equivalent’ of a form of relief barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.” Id. The proposed remedy also will not resolve “for all
time,” Georgia's election system.
Id. at 1280.
This is precisely what the Plaintiffs request in the Complaint, namely,
equitable and injunctive relief to prospectively enjoin the Defendants from
taking actions that are within the scope of their statutory authority, in
particular, the Secretary of State as the State’s chief election officer,
including but not limited to seeking a permanent injunction to de-certify the
election results and against transmitting the currently certified election
results to the Electoral College.” The Eleventh Amendment is no bar to this
Court granting the requested relief.
VII. P L A I N T I F F S ’ C L A I M S A R E N O T S U B J E C T T O D I S M I S S A L
UNDER ABSTENTION DOCTRINES.
The State Defendants next argue that the Court should dismiss the
Complaint to permit State court resolution under the abstention doctrines
announced in Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) and
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800(1976); State Defendants’ Brief at pp. 30–33. As to Pullman abstention, a
federal court may stay or dismiss proceedings for “a state court resolution of
underlying issues of state law” when (1) the case presents an unsettled
question of state law, and (2) the question of state law is dispositive of the
43
case or would materially alter the constitutional question presented. Harman
v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 85 S.Ct. 1177 (1965). As a preliminary
matter, Defendants have not identified any “unsettled question of state law”
that must be resolved to address Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, nor have
they identified any specific state proceeding in which such an unsettled
question is before a state court. See Doc. 63-1 at 30-33. The state law
“questions” raised in the Complaint are relatively straightforward – and
involve bright-line factual determinations – e.g., did Georgia election officials
de facto eliminate the absentee ballot signature matching requirement, were
absentee ballots sent to voters who did not request them, were Republican
ballots destroyed, lost or disqualified at a higher rate than comparable ballots
for Democratic candidates, etc.
While it is true that “abstention is discretionary” Siegel v. LePore, 234
F.3d 1163, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000), the Supreme Court has made clear that
“the power to dismiss under the Burford doctrine, as with other abstention
doctrines, ... derives from the discretion historically enjoyed by courts of
equity.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727–28, 116 S.Ct.
1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) (emphases added). In exercising its discretion, a
federal court must consider whether “certain classes of cases, and certain
federal rights” are more appropriately “adjudicated in federal court.” Id. at
728, 116 S.Ct. 1712; Edwards v. Sammons, 437 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.
44
1971) (federal courts “must also take into consideration the nature of the
controversy and the particular right sought to be enforced.”).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held abstention is inappropriate
when First Amendment rights, rights related to school desegregation, and
voting rights are alleged at issue. Id., citing Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.
528, 537 (1965) (abstention improper when voting rights violation being
alleged), Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375–80 (1964) (abstention improper
when First Amendment violation being alleged), and Griffin v. County Sch.
Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, (1964) (abstention improper when
school desegregation violations being alleged)); see also Siegel, 234 F.3d at
1174 (collecting cases holding abstention improper).
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the argument that a federal court
should abstain under Pullman in voting rights cases in no uncertain terms.
Drawing from decades of precedent, the Eleventh Circuit in Siegel concluded
that “[o]ur cases have held that voting rights cases are particularly
inappropriate for abstention.” Id. This conclusion was “strengthened by the
fact that Plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation of their voting rights.” Id.
The law is crystal clear in the Eleventh Circuit. Federal courts do not
abstain when voting rights are alleged to be violated. The unambiguous
holdings from binding precedent, mentioned nowhere in the State’s
Defendants’ Brief, sharply confine the Court’s discretion to abstain from
45
exercise of its Article III jurisdiction over this case. See e.g. Harman, 380 U.S.
at 537 (“Given the importance and immediacy of the problem [of voting
rights], and the delay inherent in referring questions of state law to state
tribunals, [ ] it is evident that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to abstain.”) (citations omitted).
The very nature of this controversy and the inapplicability of
discretionary abstention is dispositive on this issue. Abstention would result
in substantial delay as the various state court challenges work their way
through the state court system. Abstention, were it applied, would by its
nature last well beyond the current certification and electoral college process
and moot the Plaintiffs’ claims. “The delay which follows from abstention is
not to be countenanced in cases involving such a strong national interest as
the right to vote.” Edwards, supra, 437 F.2d at 1244.
The State Defendants also argue that the Court should decline to reach
the merits of this dispute under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance—a
doctrine that is part and parcel of the Pullman analysis — because it “might
be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination
of pertinent state law.” State Defendants’’ Brief, pg. 31 (citing cases); See
Duke v. James, 713 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining how
Pullman applies when there is an unsettled question of state law and “that
the question be dispositive of the case and would avoid, or substantially
46
modify, the constitutional question.”). However, constitutional avoidance does
not permit federal courts to avoid federal questions under the federal
constitution. See Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1285–87 (11th Cir. 2001);
(“federal courts should not abstain in order to avoid the task of deciding the
federal constitutional issues in a case.”); Duke, 713 F.2d at 1510 (“It is
improper ... to view abstention as a tool merely to extract from the state
courts an alternative state law ground for the judgment.
Abstention is not intended to serve in this manner when state law is
clear. Similarly, if the state court will merely apply federal constitutional
law, then the state construction will not moot or modify the constitutional
question.”).
It is not for the courts to withdraw that jurisdiction which Congress

has expressly granted under section 1983 where such a withdrawal
is contrary to the purpose of Congress in extending that alternative
forum. In this regard, the Pullman doctrine is narrow and is tightly
circumscribed. A federal court must grapple with difficult
constitutional questions that confront it squarely. The abstention
doctrine is an exception to this rule, to be exercised only in special
or “exceptional ” circumstances.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
As to Colorado River abstention, the State Defendants fail to provide
any basis for its application in this case. The Colorado River analysis is
applicable when federal and state proceedings involve substantially the same
parties and substantially the same issues. Ambrosia Coal and Const. Co. v.
47
Pages Morales, 368 F.3rd. 1320, 1329-1330 (11th Cir. 2004). While the State
Defendants generally allege that the existence of “numerous pending
challenges to the November election that have properly been filed in
Georgia’s courts,” other than a vague reference to supposed “statements by
Mr. Wood’s counsel in the no-longer-pending Wood litigation,” there is no
sufficient showing that any ongoing parallel state court action involves
“substantially the same parties and substantially the same issues” that
would properly invoke application of the Colorado River abstention doctrine
to permit this Court to avoid its “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise
its jurisdiction over these claims. Moses v. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (primary purpose of Colorado River
abstention is avoidance of piecemeal litigation between same parties).
There is no reason for this Court to abstain from deciding this case.
VIII. R E P L Y I N S U P P O R T O F M O T I O N F O R E M E R G E N C Y
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
The Intervenor Defendants’ response to the motion for emergency
injunctive relief is largely a rehash of the arguments made in their motion to
dismiss – standing, mootness, laches, failure to state a claim dressed up as
not likely to succeed on the merits, no irreparable harm and balancing of the
equities. All of these contentions are addressed in the earlier arguments in
48
this brief in response to the motions to dismiss. Two bites at the dismissal
apple ought to be enough for the vast swarms of lawyers defending this case.
Plaintiffs reiterate that they have demonstrated that they have
satisfied the requirements for the grant of a TRO, in particular, substantial
likelihood of success, and highlight this Court’s decision to grant a TRO
where plaintiffs brought a post-election challenge regarding Defendant
Secretary Kemp’s implementation of Georgia election laws supported by
substantial statistical evidence and witness declarations showing that the
“infringement of the rights of the voters to cast their votes and have their
votes counted.” Common Cause, 347 F.Supp.3d at 1295.
1. EXPERT TESTIMONY
Intervenor Defendants move to exclude all of Plaintiffs’ expert
testimony and offer reports of their own experts.
The objections to Plaintiffs’ experts all go to weight, not admissibility.
Defendants’ own experts are subject to many of the same criticisms, with the
additional criticism that several of them are paid mouthpieces, while all of
Plaintiffs’ experts are working for free and with great courage, as they have
undertaken a great career risk due to the incredibly toxic nature of our
current political environment.
The most important point to make is that this is not a jury trial. The
Court is well-able to discern the wheat from the chaff and determine what
49
weight and credibility should be afforded to competing experts. Because there
is no jury, this not a case in which the cause of justice needs to be protected
from unsophisticated jurors’ having excess credulity for expert testimony –
the whole animating purpose of D’aubert and its progeny. Each side has its
experts. The Court should exercise its discretion over evidentiary questions
and weigh them all for what they are worth.
Responses from Plaintiffs’ experts are submitted contemporaneously
herewith.
Russell Ramsland has also offered a reply to the reports critiquing his
work.
Eric Quinnell, Ph.D. and S. Stanley Young offer a very brief rebuttal
which demonstrates that the Rodden-Marble report, which purports to
critique their analysis, actually confirms it. Quinnell and Young find that the
statistical properties of the data set of Fulton County absentee ballots are
mathematically and statistically impossible absent some external
intervention. This is compelling prima facie evidence to support Plaintiffs’
allegations of wrongdoing and complements the State Farm Arena video tape.
The after-hours counting out of public view, in which batches of ballots were
scanned over and over again, concluded just before 1:00 AM on November 4,
2020. The first upload of Fulton County’s absentee ballot results, consisting
of 73,523 ballots, is time-stamped at 12:59 AM, December 4, 2020.
50
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss should be denied, and
the motion for emergency injunctive relief should be granted.
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
forthcoming

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
51
Harry W. MacDougald
52
This is to certify that I have on this day e-filed the foregoing document
with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will cause
electronic service to be made upon all counsel of record.
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
53

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
WILLIAM FEEHAN,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 20-cv-1771-pp
v.
WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DEFERRING RULING IN PART ON

AMENDED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO BE HEARD IN AN EXPEDITED MANNER
(DKT. NO. 10)
At 10:30 a.m. on December 3, 2020, the plaintiff filed an “Amended
Motion For Temporary Restraining Order And Preliminary Injunction To Be
Considered In An Expedited Manner.” Dkt. No. 10. The amended motion seeks
a temporary restraining order or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction,
“to be considered in an expedited manner.” Id. at 1. It states that the motion is
being submitted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 “and Civil L.R. 7.” Id.
The motion asserts that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the
court does not grant a temporary restraining order. Id. at 2. The plaintiff states
that he will suffer irreparable harm if various actions he describes “are not
immediately enjoined across the state of Wisconsin pursuant to 52 U.S.C.
§ 20701 (preservation of voting records)” to prevent destruction or alteration of
evidence. Id. at ¶5. He asserts that the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 9, filed
C ase 2:20-cv-01771-P P Filed 12/04/20 P age 1 of 10 Document 29

the same day as this motion) and the motion present “material dispositive
issues which are questions of law that may be resolved without factual
investigation or determination.” Id. at ¶6.
The plaintiff attached to the motion a proposed briefing schedule. Dkt.
No. 10-1. The schedule indicates that the plaintiff s counsel had conferred with
defense counsel (and planned to speak with them again later that day) and
anticipated proposing that the defendants file their response to the motion for
injunctive relief by 8:00 p.m. on Friday, December 4, 2020, that the plaintiff file
his reply by 8:00 p.m. on Saturday, December 5, 2020 and that the schedule
conclude with a “[h]earing as directed by the Court. Plaintiff proposes to submit
the matter on briefs without argument.” Id. at 1. Neither the amended motion
nor the briefing schedule indicated whether the plaintiff needed a decision from
the court by a date certain.
At 5:13 p.m. on December 3, the plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to
defendant Tony Evers s motion to reassign Trump v. Wisconsin Elections
Commission, et al., Case No. 20-cv-1785, from U.S. District Court Judge Brett
H. Ludwig to this court. Dkt. No. 18. The brief stated that “[w]ith the College of
Electors scheduled to meet December 8, there could never be a clearer case of
‘justice delayed is justice denied. ” Id. at 1. The plaintiff stated that the court
should deny the motion to reassign and “immediately order briefing and issue
its decision no later than 5 p.m. Sunday evening, December 6 so that Plaintiff
may have even a few hours to prepare for and seek whatever further relief may

be then available in the one day left before the December 8 meeting of electors.”
Id. at 2.
The plaintiff reported that the parties had met and conferred regarding a
briefing schedule for the motion for injunctive relief, but that the defendants
had “refused to agree to the schedule proposed by Plaintiffs, and in fact,
refused to offer a proposed schedule of their own,” indicating that they would
be seeking reassignment of Case No. 20-cv-1785. Id. at 3. The plaintiff said the
defendants also indicated that they could not stipulate to a TRO “to preserve
electronic and physical data, materials, and equipment (voting machines in
particular) for inspection by Plaintiff s experts” because the defendants said
they had “no control or influence whatsoever over preservation of evidence by
local jurisdictions and elections clerks.” Id. The plaintiff concluded the brief by
reiterating his request that the court immediately order briefing and that the
court issue its decision no later than 5:00 p.m. Sunday evening, December 6.
First thing on December 4, 2020, defendant Tony Evers responded to the
request for an expedited briefing schedule. Dkt. No. 25. The defendant noted
that although the plaintiff had asserted that the court needed to decide the
motion before the electors meet, that meeting was not scheduled until
December 14. Id. at 2 n.2. The defendant proposed an alternative schedule by
which the defendants would file their briefs in opposition to the motion for
injunctive relief by 5:00 p.m. on Monday, December 7; the plaintiff would file
his reply brief by 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December 8; and the court could

exercise its discretion regarding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing or hear
argument. Id. at 1-2.
Minutes later, defendants the Wisconsin Elections Commission and its
members filed their brief in opposition to the request for an expedited briefing
schedule. Dkt. No. 26. They, too, stated that the meeting of electors will not
take place until December 14, 2020. Id. at 26. They propose a schedule
whereby the defendants will file their opposition briefs to the motion for
injunctive relief by 11:59 p.m. on Tuesday, December 8, 2020 and the plaintiff
will file his reply brief by 11:59 p.m. on Wednesday, December 9, 2020. Id. at
2,
In seeking an expedited briefing schedule, the plaintiff s December 3,
2020 amended motion for injunctive relief cites Civil Local Rule 7 (E.D. Wis.),
but identifies no subsection of that rule. Rule 7(b) gives a non-moving party
twenty-one days to respond to a motion and Rule 7(c) gives the moving party
fourteen days to reply. Given the plaintiff s repeated use of the word “expedited”
and the briefing schedule he proposes, the court concludes that he is asking
the court for shorter turnaround time than that provided in Rules 7(b) and (c).
There is a provision of Civil L.R. 7 that allows a party to seek expedited
briefing. Civil L.R. 7(h), which allows a party to seek non-dispositive relief by
expedited motion if the party designates the motion as a “Civil L.R. 7(h)
Expedited Non-Dispositive Motion.” When the court receives a motion with that
designation, it may schedule the motion for a hearing or decide the motion on
the papers and may order an expedited motion schedule. Civil L.R. 7(h)(1). The

rule limits such motions to three pages in length, requires the respondent to
file its three-page opposition memorandum within seven days unless the court
orders otherwise and allows the respondent to attach an affidavit or declaration
of no more than two pages. Civil L.R. 7(h)(2).
Although the plaintiff did not designate it as such, the court construes
the plaintiff s request for the motion for injunctive relief to be heard in an
“expedited manner”—Dkt. No. 10—as a Civil L.R. 7(h) Expedited Non-
Dispositive Motion for an Expedited Briefing Schedule. The court will grant that
motion (although it will not order the briefing schedule the plaintiff suggests).
The other part of the plaintiff s motion seeks immediate temporary
injunctive relief—a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. The
motion states that the amended complaint and the motion “present material
dispositive issues which are questions of law that may be resolved without
factual investigation or determination.” Dkt. No. 10 at 3. The plaintiff never has
requested a hearing, either in writing or by contacting chambers by phone with
the adverse parties on the line. The anticipated briefing schedule the plaintiff
attached to the amended motion for injunctive relief, while mentioning a
hearing “as directed by the Court,” states that the plaintiff proposes to “submit
the matter on briefs without argument.” Dkt. No. 10-1 at 1. In his brief in
opposition to a motion to reassign another case, the plaintiff proposes briefing
through the weekend and a ruling from this court on Sunday evening; because
court generally is not in session on weekends, the court deduces that the
plaintiff does not anticipate a hearing on the motion.

The United States Supreme Court has held that injunctive relief is “an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Counsel, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).
Because it is an extraordinary remedy, injunctive relief never is awarded as of
right. Id. (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008)). Courts
considering requests for such extraordinary relief must, in every case, “balance
the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of
the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Id. (quoting Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)).
In this court s experience it is unusual for a party seeking the
extraordinary remedy of preliminary injunctive relief to ask the court to issue a
decision on the pleadings, without presentation of evidence or argument. But
because that is what the plaintiff—the movant—has asked, the court will rule
on the pleadings.
As for the expedited briefing schedule, the schedule the plaintiff has
proposed severely limits the time available to the defendants to respond to his
pleadings and to the court to rule. The plaintiff created this limitation by
waiting two days to confer with defense counsel and by waiting until late
yesterday afternoon to mention a date by which it appears he seeks a ruling
from the court. The court disagrees that the plaintiff will be denied his right to
redress if the court does not rule by Sunday evening, December 6.

The plaintiff stated in his opposition brief to the motion to reassign that
time was of the essence because the College of Electors was scheduled to meet
December 8. Dkt. No. 18 at 1. That is not correct. According to an October 22,
2020 white paper from the Congressional Research Service titled “The Electoral
College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline,” the electors will meet and vote
on December 14, 2020. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/
IF11641.
December 8, 2020—six days prior to the date the College of Electors is
scheduled to meet—is the “safe harbor” deadline under 3 U.S.C. §5. That
statute provides that if a state has provided, “by laws enacted prior to the day
fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any
controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors
of such State,” and that final determination has been made “at least six days
before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors,” that determination—if it is
made under the state s law at least six days prior to the day the electors meet—
“shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as
provided in the Constitution . . . .” Wisconsin has enacted such a law. It is Wis.
Stat. §9.01. That statute provides for an aggrieved candidate to petition for a
recount. It provides specific procedures for the recount, as well as appeal to the
circuit court and the court of appeals. Wis. Stat. §9.01(11) states that it is “the
exclusive judicial remedy for testing the right to hold an elective office as the
result of an alleged irregularity, defect or mistake committed during the voting
or canvassing process.”

It appears, therefore, that December 8 is a critical date for resolution of
any state court litigation involving an aggrieved candidate who is contesting the
outcome of an election. The state courts1 either will or will not resolve
allegations of violations of Wis. Stat. §9.01 by the December 8, 2020 “safe
harbor” deadline. The plaintiff has not explained why it is necessary for this
federal court to grant or deny the injunctive relief he seeks—orders requiring
the defendants to de-certify the election results; enjoining defendant Evers
from transmitting certified election results to the Electoral College; requiring
defendant Evers to transmit certified election results stating that President
Donald Trump is the winner of the election; seizing and impounding voting
machines, ballots and other election materials; requiring production of security
camera recordings for voting facilities—before the safe harbor deadline for state
courts to resolve alleged violations of Wis. Stat. §9.01.
Because the electors do not meet and vote until December 14, 2020, the
court will impose a less truncated briefing schedule than the one the plaintiff
proposes, to give the defendants slightly more time to respond. The court will
require the defendants to file their opposition brief to the Plaintiff s Amended
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to be
Considered in an Expedited Manner (Dkt. No. 10) by 5:00 p.m. on Monday,
December 7, 2020. The court will require the plaintiff to file his reply brief in
support of the Plaintiff s Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
1The plaintiff has alleged in this federal suit that the defendants violated the
“Wisconsin Election Code.” Dkt. No. 9 at 11. This court has made no
determination regarding whether it has jurisdiction to resolve that claim.

Preliminary Injunction to be Considered in an Expedited Manner (Dkt. No. 10)
by 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December 8, 2020.
The court directs the parties attention to Civil L.R. 7(f), which provides
that memoranda in opposition to motions are limited to thirty pages and reply
briefs in support of motions are limited to fifteen pages.
Finally, an administrative note: On December 2, 2020 a document was
docketed as a notice of appearance for lead counsel Sidney Powell. Dkt. No. 8.
The document is blank (except for the designation of the court); the court does
not have a completed notice of appearance on file for Attorney Powell.
The court GRANTS the plaintiff s amended motion to the extent that it is
a Civil L.R. 7(h) Expedited Non-Dispositive Motion for an Expedited Briefing
Schedule. Dkt. No. 10.
The court ORDERS that the defendants opposition brief to the Plaintiff s
Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
to be Considered in an Expedited Manner (Dkt. No. 10) by must be filed by
5:00 p.m. on Monday, December 7, 2020.
The court ORDERS that the plaintiff s reply brief in support of the
Plaintiff s Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction to be Considered in an Expedited Manner (Dkt. No. 10) must be filed
by 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December 8, 2020.
The court DEFERS RULING on the amended motion to the extent that it

asks the court to issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 4th day of December, 2020.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________________
HON. PAMELA PEPPER
Chief United States District Judge



CASE NO.
Plaintiffs,
v. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, et al,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF FILING
following:
1. The Supplemental Declaration of Garland Favorito as Exhibit “A”;
2. The Supplemental Declaration of Scott Hall, as Exhibit “B”; and
3. The Supplemental Declaration of Affiant A, as Exhibit “C.”
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC

Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
forthcoming

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
Harry W. MacDougald
Filing Electronic Media with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system
which will cause service to made upon counsel of record therein.
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956


CASE NO.
Plaintiffs,
v. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF FILING
following:
1. The Supplemental Report of Russell Ramsland, as Exhibit “A.”
/s Sidney Powell*
Sidney Powell PC

Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
forthcoming

LLP

Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
Harry W. MacDougald
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956

December 6, 2020

Pearson v. Kemp, Case No. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
United States District Court for Northern District of

Georgia

Expert Report of Russell J. Ramsland, Jr.

________________________________________
Russell J. Ramsland, Jr.

RESPONSES TO DR. REDDON:

1) I have read the Dr. Reddon’s rebuttal to my affidavit dated December 5, 2020 and
find it unconvincing in a real world scenario for several reasons. The first of these
reasons is the broadly recognized importance of contextual factors in inferring
various analytical results from research data whether the considerations involve
ecological fallacies, corporate fallacies or individualistic fallacies. Simply put, an
over-reliance on inferred results without taking into consideration the events and
their time- sequencing, the parties of input and influence (corporate or individual)
and the historical and contemporary backdrop in which they exist (“spiraling
contextuality” in political science jargon) yields false assurances in the outcomes.
Dr. Reddon makes this very mistake in his arguments for his counter analysis that
essentially boils down to the notion that Dominion machines cannot be held
responsible for what our team found as highly anomalous reporting in favor of
Biden using 3 different metrics because they are placed in historically democratic
heavy areas to begin with. Therefore we should expect this self-fulfilling outcome.
There are several problems with Dr. Reddon’s argument.

2) The first example of failing to recognize contextual matters is Dr. Reddon’s
apparent assumption that any such selection of Dominion Systems by a heavily
democratic area is divorced from Dominion’s history and alliances. It is absurd to
make such an assumption as the previous 4 affidavits of Spider and my own affidavit
make clear. Further, the new affidavit of Spider adds to the enormity of the
importance of viewing any anomaly in the context of Dominion’s history and
relationships. 1 Clearly Dominion’s history and alliances are of tremendous
importance to the decision makers who select these systems, and part of that
history includes its vulnerability to being tampered with by inside or outside actors.
For instance, in the real world of power politics it cannot be easily dismissed as a
potentially attractive feature in certain cases, and in this sense the relationship
between Dominion’s selection and the heavy bias of Dominion outcomes may
certainly be related. Hence no amount of correlation between Dominion selection
by more heavily democrat counties has anything useful to add to the question of
whether Dominion systems are innocent of fraud or tampering. That question is still
wide open and our three perspectives on anomalous behavior in our analysis of this
question is at least as valid as Dr. Reddons.
3) The second example of failing to recognize contextual matters is illustrated by

one of the very sources Dr. Reddon uses in his analysis, Verified Voting. This
organization has historically been a champion of actual paper ballots and scanners
(as opposed to ballot marking devices, etc. as used by Dominion) for the very reason
they are so vulnerable to manipulation within the system and audit trails can be
erased, changed or even bypassed since many aspects of them are now voluntary as
selected by the user. However, as of late Verified Voting has come under intense
criticism by some of it’s own experts. Important excerpts from Fast Company’s
article about it in 2019 include:

1 andy_huang_affidavit, Spider, 12.5.2020
“Amid heightened concerns about the integrity of the voting process in the
run-up to the 2020 presidential election, two election security experts
recently quit Verified Voting, a respected election accountability group, in
protest. They claim that it has been downplaying security risks in popular
voting machines.
Richard DeMillo, a Georgia Tech professor who sat on Verified Voter’s

advisory board, just left the group, soon after the departure of UC Berkeley
statistics professor Philip Stark, a board member who sent a fiery letter of
resignation on November 21st. Stark and DeMillo believe that Verified Voting
has been giving election officials false confidence in their voting machines
and providing cover for the companies that make and sell the machines.” It
further says “Amid heightened concerns about the integrity of the voting
process in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election, two election security
experts recently quit Verified Voting, a respected election accountability
group, in protest. They claim that it has been downplaying security risks in
popular voting machines.
Richard DeMillo, a Georgia Tech professor who sat on Verified Voter’s

advisory board, just left the group, soon after the departure of UC Berkeley
statistics professor Philip Stark, a board member who sent a fiery letter of
resignation on November 21st. Stark and DeMillo believe that Verified Voting
has been giving election officials false confidence in their voting machines
and providing cover for the companies that make and sell the machines.
In his resignation letter, Stark accused the group of being on the “wrong side”
by approving pricey new voting systems that replace hand-marked ballots
with computer-printed ballot summary cards [BMD], the accuracy of which
he questions since they depend on potentially insecure software. . .
Since the election interference in 2016, many states and localities have been
moving to voting machines called ballot marking devices that record the
voter’s choices digitally and also print them on a paper ballot as a backup.
And there’s the disconnect. The findings of the RLA depend totally on the
assumption that the paper ballots accurately reflect the choices of the voter.
Stark and DeMillo warn against making that assumption.
“Because there is software between the voter and the paper, what the paper
shows might not be what the voter did or saw . . . on the device,” Stark told
me. That’s because the software could be hacked and caused to create a false
paper ballot. In close elections, it might take only a small number of these to
change the result.”
And then finally, lest anyone think the so-called audit in Georgia of it’s
Dominion machines (the same machines as in Maricopa, Co.) answered any
questions about Dominion, Stark says “In Georgia and particular, the kind of
audit that was done is called a ballot polling audit, and a ballot polling and it
doesn’t even check the tabulation at all,” Stark told me. “It just checks whether
there is a sufficiently large majority to report a winner and a sufficiently
large sample that it’s implausible that somebody else won.” (italics and
underline is added)2.
4) These are but two examples of why no one should rely on merely a standalone
analysis without taking into account the real world background and facts. Yet this is
precisely the argument Dr. Reddon posits. Without context, it becomes merely an
analytical argument of whose facts, which data, what approach is the superior one.
While we are comfortable with our approach, which I will more thoroughly outline
later, we would not argue it alone is sufficient to eliminate all other context and
would say the same for Dr. Reddon’s thesis.
5) This leads me to the second problem which is that there are the many
documented vulnerabilities in Dominion’s voting system wherein the votes are
demonstrably switched, and many experts have testified and written about the
many ways this can be accomplished. These proven problems go more directly to
the real question at hand and have been extensively examined by experts include
Harri Hursti, Matt Blaze of Georgetown University and John Halderman of Michigan,
and there are many others.3 The State of Texas has refused to certify Dominion for
use in Texas due to it’s deficiencies, saying “Specifically, the examiner reports raise
concerns about whether the Democracy Suite 5.5-A system is suitable for its
intended purpose; operates efficiently and accurately; and it safe from fraudulent or
unauthorized manipulation”.4 .

6) Further, spot field testing of results in Antrim Co., MI. that uses the same
Dominion equipment as most of Georgia., have now shown in Antrim Co. that as a
result of a hand recount, 6,000 votes were switched by the machines. Additionally, a
re-tabulation on November 6th of the November 3rd tabulated results in Central
Lake Township yielded dramatically different results as well (see attached Antrim
Report V1.7). Then on December 3rd, from Ware Co., Georgia (that also uses the
same Dominion equipment as Maricopa Co.) comes the report and sworn affidavit of
Garland Favorito that a hand recount, as reported in Voter/GA “confirmed the
Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5 system used throughout Georgia flipped dozens of
votes cast in at least one county for President Donald Trump to former Vice
President Joe Biden during the November 3, 2020 election. Dominion vote flipping
from Trump to Biden was previously believed to have occurred only in Antrim
County, Michigan where the system swapped 6,000 votes from Trump to Biden.

2 https://www.fastcompany.com/90441559/two-experts-quit-election-accountability-group-over-
claims-it-has-been-endorsing-untrustworthy-machines

3 2006 Hacking Democracy video
2020 Kill Chain video

Everest Report
C-Span Panel: ICIT - Cybersecurity and U.S. Voting Systems (2016)
Matt Blaze Testimony before before US Hse. Comm. On Administration (1/9/20)
Red Team Testing Report Dominion Democracy Suite 4.14-A and Dominion Democracy Suite 4.14.A.1
w/ Adjudication 2.4 - 11 -18 -14 - Freeman, Craft, McGregor Group

4 https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/forms/sysexam/dominion-d-suite-5.5-a.pdf

In Georgia, Ware County Elections Director confirmed that the recently completed
hand count audit totals showed the total electronic vote count shorted Donald
Trump 37 votes and added those 37 votes to totals for Joe Biden. The 74 affected
votes represents .52% of the 14,192 county votes cast, exactly double Biden’s total
statewide margin of .26%”. 5
And from Maricopa Co. AZ where Dominion is also the vote counting system comes
further proof that the same sort of machine vote switching behavior is happening
there. The sworn affidavit of GOP chairwoman Linda Brickman as reported in the
Epoch Times saying “Maricopa County GOP chairwoman Linda Brickman on Nov. 30
testified before members of the Arizona State Legislature that she personally
observed votes for President Donald Trump being tallied as votes for Democratic
presidential nominee Joe Biden when input into Dominion machines.
Brickman, the GOP head of one of the country’s largest counties and a veteran county
elections worker, submitted her testimony in a sworn affidavit under penalty of
perjury. She testified that she and her Democratic partner witnessed “more than
once” Trump votes default and shift to Biden when they were entering votes into
Dominion machines from ballots that couldn’t be read by machines.
7) This brings me to Dr. Reddon’s totally incorrect assertions about the use of
algorithms being used in the Dominion voting machines. The use of an algorithm
being used in the vote counting is evident from a number of perspectives. First,
there are decimal places being incorporated into the supposed vote totals instead of
whole number votes. This can be viewed from the NYT times Edison data. In the
time series shown below, note the percentages in Time Series 2020-11-
04T01:10:54Z that shows 3 decimal places (.471) displayed in the percentage
distribution for Biden of the 579,645 votes. But note Trump percentage is only 2
decimal places (.52). One might wish to argue that the issue of decimal places
appearing in the vote number is simply due to the fact only 3 decimal places are
displayed, and that if 20 or 30 decimal places were displayed, multiplying the
percentage decimal by the total votes would yield whole numbers appearing as
votes, instead of points with decimal places. And therefore there is no evidence in
this illustration that an allocative algorithm was utilized. The problem with this is
two-fold. The first is the percentages do not come close to 100% regardless of
rounding. But the much bigger problem is that by displaying only 2 decimal places
for Trump when 3 could clearly be displayed, makes it clear that Trump’s share of
the 579,645 votes is EXACTLY .52 at that time. Therefore, multiplying .52 X the
579,645 vote total yields 301415.4 votes for Trump, a vote that clearly displays
decimals. This is totally contrary to Dr. Rodden assertion that Dominion RCV voting
is incapable of producing non-integer vote totals, and if he were to read Dominion’s
own manual he would find it too doesn’t agree with him. See “Fixed Precision
Decimals” in the manual page below:

5 https://voterga.files.wordpress.com/2020/12/press-release-dominion-flips-trump-votes-to-biden-
in-ga-county.pdf

Source: https://static01.nyt.com/elections-assets/2020/data/api/2020-11-
03/race-page/georgia/president.json
state timestamp eevp trump % biden % TV BV

georgia 2020-11-04T01:04:54Z 10 0.495 0.495 257210.415 257210.415
georgia 2020-11-04T01:05:56Z 10 0.502 0.488 268269.302 260787.688
georgia 2020-11-04T01:06:57Z 11 0.516 0.474 293312.46 269438.19
georgia 2020-11-04T01:10:54Z 11 0.52 0.471 301415.4 273012.795
georgia 2020-11-04T01:11:58Z 12 0.512 0.478 332111.36 310057.09
georgia 2020-11-04T01:12:16Z 12 0.517 0.474 339754.822 311496.684
Illustration calculating the “points” for each candidate from the NYT Edison time series by
multiplying the votes by the percentage to show the calculated votes/ (TV = Trump Votes) (BV =
Biden Votes)
Source: Democracy Suite EMS Results Tally & Reporting User Guide
Version: 5.11-CO::7 May 28, 2019

8) The second piece of evidence that an algorithm is being utilized comes from our
observation that the percentage of the votes submitted in each batch that went
towards a candidate remain unchanged for a long series of time and for a number of
consecutive batches is extremely concerning. Further, the percentage for Trump
decreases in a mathematically extremely consistent pattern. The red arrows
indicate the impossible consistencies. The statistical impossibility of the consistent
percentage reported to Biden approaches zero. This makes clear an algorithm in the
election system is allocating votes based on a percentage.

9) These sorts of problems, ranging from clear cyber vulnerabilities from inside or
outside actors to an algorithm actually “awarding” or “distributing” points instead of
whole votes, simply should never occur in a secure voting system and all of these
are proof Dominion EMS system is not secure.

10) This leads me to the third problem in Dr. Reddon’s analysis that concerns actual
proof of illegal activities with respect to the actions of individuals operating the
election, be they Dominion personnel or county personnel. The ease and possibility
of this type of activity is most graphically laid out in video footage first presented at
the Subcommittee of Georgia Oversight Committee on December 3, 2020 wherein it
was made clear that observers of the Georgia count were mis-led into thinking that
counting had stopped and immediately after clearing the room boxes of ballots were
pulled from under tables and a mad dash for counting them ensued, including
excerpts where stacks of ballots were scanned multiple times.6 Unfortunately,
Dominion equipment doesn’t preclude multiple scans and repetitive counting of the
same ballots.

11) With regards to most of the questions raised by Dr. Reddon as to ASOG’s
analysis of Voting irregularities in Georgia, and it’s sources, I list the following full
report:

6 https://twitter.com/KanekoaTheGreat/status/1335027487357616128





• In counties using Dominion BMD voting machines, candidate Biden appears

to have consistently received 5% more votes than he should have received
• Biden over-performed predicted/expected values in 78 % of the counties
that used Dominion or Hart machines. In counties with other machines,
Biden over-performed only 46% of the time (anything close to 50% is
normal/expected)










RESPONSES TO DR. MAYER:

SOURCE: https://elections.sos.ga.gov/Elections/voterabsenteefile.do

In reading Dr. Mayer’s response, it appears he doesn’t know or failed to isolate or
otherwise identify ballot records with no return date that were mailed and not
cancelled. These ballots are, at the very least, “live” ballots and within the Dominion
system are available for misappropriation and assignment to people who otherwise
didn’t vote. That is exactly why ballots need to be tracked and affirmatively marked
cancelled. This misappropriation is technically possible, in fact it’s technically easy
as one can see if they read the Dominion manual.

Our source data was from https://elections.sos.ga.gov/Elections/voterabsenteefile.do. and was
downloaded November 16th.

Apparently Dr. Mayer chose a different source of data that had already excluded
those ballots with no return date.

Our dataset has about total is 4.3M lines of absentee and early ballots. Those lines
include roughly 230,000 lines with no return date. Parsing those lines to eliminate
the C (cancelled), R (rejected) and S (spoiled) ballots still leaves approximately
134,588 ballots that have no received back date and the ballot was not marked
cancelled. Therefore, these ballots are available for electronic assignment and
manipulation and should be considered as likely candidates for malfeasance. We
can probably agree that there were roughly 100,000 ballots cancelled, but I was
highlighting the number of ballots not cancelled that were mailed out. We do not
take issue with the number of cancelled ballots, it just wasn’t my point.

Finally, these ballots are spread across a number of counties, and in the huge
number they represent constitute either gross and widespread negligence, or
something worse.
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82 of
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84 of
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(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

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(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

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(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

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(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

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(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

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(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

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90 of
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(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

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151

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(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

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(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

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Case
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12/06/20 Page
Page 122
122 of
of 151
151
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Case
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123 of
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Page 124
124 of
of 151
151

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Page 125
125 of
of 151
151
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12/06/20 Page
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126 of
of 151
151

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127 of
of 151
151
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Case
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12/06/20 Page
Page 128
128 of
of 151
151
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Case
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12/06/20 Page
Page 129
129 of
of 151
151

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1. Rua M. Williams June 2, 2020 MMCMN;HN,LI@?MMIL,OL>O?
1HCP?LMCNS

2. Brianna Posadas April 9, 2020 )?>C; ?GI=L;=S"OH>,IFC=S
"?FFIQ

3. Tiffanie Smith October 28, 2019 MMCMN;HN,LI@?MMIL(CH=IFH
1HCP?LMCNS

4. Elizabeth A. Matthews June 25, 2019 MMCMN;HN,LI@?MMIL3;MBCHANIH
(??1HCP?LMCNS

5. Sanethia V. Thomas March 13, 2019 (?=NOL?L1HCP?LMCNSI@"FILC>;

6. Jerone Dunbar August 3, 2018 $IH>;.?M?;L=B ?P?FIJG?HN

7. Jessica N. Jones March 16, 2018 $OG;H/SMN?GM.?M?;L=B
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8. Julian Brinkley March 16, 2018 MMCMN;HN,LI@?MMILF?GMIH
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9. France Jackson March 15, 2018 %HN?F

10. Marvin Andujar July 24, 2017 MMCMN;HN,LI@?MMIL1HCP?LMCNS
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11. Chris Crawford July 17, 2017 MMCMN;HN,LI@?MMIL1HCP?LMCNS
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12. Andrea Johnson June 30, 2015 MMCMN;HN,LI@?MMIL/J?FG;H
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13. Hanan Alnizami December 17, 2014 &;AO;L(;H>.IP?L.?M?;L=B

14. Tamirat Abegaz November 17, 2014 MMCMN;HN,LI@?MMIL1HCP?LMCNS
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15. July 18, 2014 MMCMN;HN,LI@?MMIL%1,1%
Aqueasha Martin-
Hammond

16. Joshua Ekandem July 18, 2014 %HN?F
17. April 3, 2013 $ILN?HCOM% B?H;OFN!H>IQ?>
Kinnis Gosha
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18.
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Ignacio Javier Álvarez
Martínez

19. Christin D. Shelton );S IHMOFN;HN

20. Shanee Dawkins OAOMN .?M?;L=B/=C?HNCMN;N*%/0
(;MN1J>;N?>&OH?

Case
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130 of
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151
21. );L=B .?M?;L=B/=C?HNCMN;N1HCP?LMCNS

Wanda Eugene
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22. &OFS %HNOCN
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Yolanda McMillian
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24. );S 1 / ?J;LNG?HNI@ ?@?HM?
Philicity K. Williams
25. Kenneth Rouse &OFS MMI=C;N?,LI@?MMILIGJON?L
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1. Jeremy A. Waisome (U. of Florida)

2. Edward Dillon (U. of Alabama)

3. Wanda Eugene (Auburn University)

4. Jamie Macbeth (UCLA)
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Consensus Study Report

SEPTEMBER 2018 HIGHLIGHTS FOR FEDERAL POLICY MAKERS
HIGHLIGHTS
SECURING THE VOTE

Protecting American Democracy
The 2016 presidential election made clear the vulnerability of America’s election
infrastructure to foreign cyberattacks. Such attacks represent a new threat to the
nation’s system of representative democracy. A new report from the National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine recommends concerted action by Congress,
federal agencies, and state and local governments to protect the security and integrity
of U.S. elections.
Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy recommends that focused attention
be directed at strengthening cybersecurity for election systems. In addition, the report
recommends that all U.S. elections be conducted with human-readable paper ballots
by the 2020 presidential election. Risk-limiting audits should be implemented for all
federal and state elections within a decade. And election systems should continue to
be considered as U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-designated critical
infrastructure. In addition, the report states that Internet voting should not be used for
the return of marked ballots at the present time, as no known technology guarantees
the secrecy, security, and verifiability of a marked ballot transmitted over the Internet.
STEPS FEDERAL POLICYMAKERS SHOULD TAKE TO SECURE U.S. ELECTIONS

The report recommends that Congress:
• provide funding for state and local governments to improve their cybersecurity
capabilities on an ongoing basis;
• create incentive programs for public-private partnerships to develop modern
election technology; and
• authorize and fund immediately a major initiative on voting that supports
research relevant to the administration, conduct, and performance of elections.
This initiative should include academic centers to foster collaboration both across
disciplines and with state and local election officials and industry.
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has a vital role to play in improving
election administration, the report says. It urges the president to nominate and
Congress to confirm a full commission and to ensure that the commission has sufficient
members to sustain a quorum.
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The report also recommends steps Congress should take to support the EAC’s work, including:
• appropriating funds for distribution by the EAC for the ongoing modernization of election systems;
• authorizing and funding the EAC to develop voluntary certification standards for voter registration databases,
electronic pollbooks, chain-of-custody procedures, and auditing;
• providing the funding necessary to sustain the EAC’s Voluntary Funding System Guidelines standard-setting
process and certification program;
• requiring state and local election officials to provide the EAC with data on voting system failures and information
on other difficulties arising during elections (for example, long lines, fraudulent voting, intrusions into voter
registration databases); this information should be made publicly available; and
• fully funding the EAC to carry out its existing functions, as well as additional ones articulated in the report.
For example, the report recommends that the EAC and DHS continue to develop and maintain a detailed set
of cybersecurity best practices for state and local election officials. And it urges the EAC to closely monitor the
expenditure of federal funds made available to states for the purposes of enhancing election security.
The report also recommends that Congress take steps to support work by the National Institutes of Standards and
Technology (NIST) around election systems, including:
• authorizing and appropriating funds to NIST to establish Common Data Formats for auditing, voter registration,
and other election systems;
• authorizing and providing appropriate funding to NIST to carry out its current elections-related functions and to
perform the additional functions articulated in the report; and
• authorizing and funding NIST, in consultation with the EAC, to develop security standards and verification and
validation protocols for electronic pollbooks, in addition to those standards and protocols developed for voting
systems.
COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF VOTING: ACCESSIBLE, RELIABLE, VERIFIABLE TECHNOLOGY

LEE C. BOLLINGER (Co-Chair), Columbia University; MICHAEL A. McROBBIE (Co-Chair), Indiana University; ANDREW
W. APPEL, Princeton University; JOSH BENALOH, Microsoft Research; KAREN COOK (NAS), Stanford University; DANA
DeBEAUVOIR, County of Travis, TX; MOON DUCHIN, Tufts University; JUAN E. GILBERT, University of Florida; SUSAN
L. GRAHAM (NAE), University of California, Berkeley; NEAL KELLEY, County of Orange, CA; KEVIN J. KENNEDY,
Wisconsin Government Accountability Board; NATHANIEL PERSILY, Stanford Law School; RONALD RIVEST (NAS/
NAE), Massachusetts Institute of Technology; CHARLES STEWART III, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Staff:
ANNE-MARIE MAZZA, Study Director and Senior Director, Committee on Science, Technology, and Law (CSTL); JON
EISENBERG, Senior Director, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board; STEVEN KENDALL, Program Officer,
CSTL; KAROLINA KONARZEWSKA, Program Coordinator, CSTL; WILLIAM J. SKANE, Consultant Writer; CLARA
SAVAGE, Financial Officer, CSTL.
For More Information . . . This Consensus Study Report Highlights was prepared by the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine based on the Report Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy (2018). The study
was sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. Any opinions,
findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of any
organization or agency that provided support for the project. Copies of the Report are available from the National
Academies Press, (800) 624-6242; http://www.nap.edu or at www.nationalacademies.org/futureofvoting.
Committee on Science Technology and Law

Policy and Global Affairs
Copyright 2018 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

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ATLANTA DIVISION
CORECO JA AN PEARSON, e al., )

)
Plain iff , )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
. ) 1:20-c -4809-TCB
)
)
Defendan . )
NOTICE OF FILING
Defendan Go ernor Brian Kemp, Secre ar of S a e Brad Raffen perger,
and S a e Elec ion Board Member Rebecca S lli an, Da id Worle , Ma he
Ma hb rn, and Anh Le bmi hi no ice of filing of (1) he Declara ion of France
Wa on and (2) he Declara ion of J an E. Gilber , Ph.D., a ached here o.


A lan a, GA 30334
cmcgo an la .ga.go
Telephone: (404) 656-3389
Fac imile: (404) 651-9325
1
Care Miller
Jo h Belinfan e
Melanie John on
R R A B L
LLC
500 14 h S ree NW
A lan a, GA 30318
Telephone: (678) 701-9381
Fac imile: (404) 856-3250
C n el f S a e Defendan
2
/ /Cha lene S. McG an

Charlene S. McGo an
3
I hereb cer if ha I ha e hi da elec ronicall filed he foregoing NOTICE
OF FILING i h he Clerk of Co r ing he CM/ECF em, hich ill end
no ifica ion of ch filing o co n el for he par ie of record ia elec ronic
no ifica ion.

Charlene S. McGo an
4
20-14480 Pearson, et al. v. Governor of Georgia, et al.
ERRATA:
Corrected spelling of “Presidential” on p. 2.



CASE NO.
Plaintiffs,
v. 1:20-cv-4809-TCB
BRIAN KEMP, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF EMERGENCY APPEAL
Plaintiffs Coreco Ja’Qan Pearson, et al., pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291 and
Fed. R. App. P. 4, hereby file an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit from this Court’s Order of December 7, 2020, granting
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and dissolving the Temporary Restraining
Order that prohibited destruction of evidence on Dominion Voting Systems
equipment in Georgia (Minute Order Doc. 74; Judgment Doc. 75).
Plaintiffs request this Court immediately transmit this notice of appeal
to the Eleventh Circuit so that that court may docket the matter, thus enabling
Plaintiffs to proceed as quickly as possible to have these urgent issues of
national importance addressed.
Respectfully submitted,
/s Sidney Powell
1
Sidney Powell PC
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 707-1775
Office (917) 793-1188
Mobile (347) 840-2188
CALDWELL, PROPST &

DELOACH, LLP

Harry W. MacDougald
CALDWELL, PROPST &

DELOACH, LLP
Atlanta, GA 30346
(404) 843-1956 – Telephone
(404) 843-2737 – Facsimile
2
Harry W. MacDougald
3
OF APPEAL with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will
cause service to made upon counsel of record therein.
Harry W. MacDougald

Atlanta, GA 30346
404-843-1956
4

AND CLERK OF COURT
U.S.D.C. No.: 1:20-cv-4809-TCB

U.S.C.A. No.: 00-00000-00
X
enclosed.
X This is not the first notice of appeal. Other notices were filed on: 12/2/20 and
12/3/20; USCA Case No. 20-14480-RR.
in forma pauperis
DEATH PENALTY
Case
Document78
77 Filed
Filed12/08/20
12/08/20 Page
Page11of
of27
1

AND CLERK OF COURT
U.S.D.C. No.: 1:20-cv-4809-TCB

U.S.C.A. No.: 00-00000-00
X
enclosed.
X This is not the first notice of appeal. Other notices were filed on: 12/2/20 and
12/3/20; USCA Case No. 20-14480-RR.
in forma pauperis
DEATH PENALTY
27
4months,APPEAL,CLOSED
U.S. District Court

Assigned to: Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. Date Terminated: 12/07/2020
Case in other court: USCA− 11th Circuit, 20−14480−RR Jury Demand: None
USCA− 11th Circuit, 20−14480−RR Nature of Suit: 441 Civil Rights: Voting
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Suite 1600
Two Ravina Dr.
Atlanta, GA 30346
404−843−1956
Fax: 404−843−2737
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
12th Floor
New York, NY 10017
917−793−1188
Fax: 732−901−0832
Email: howard@kleinhendler.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
South Building
Ste 900
561−888−3166
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

L. Lin Wood, P.C.
P.O. Box 52584
1
404−891−1402
Fax: 404−506−9111
LEAD ATTORNEY
Sidney Powell
Sidney Powell, PC
2911 Turtle Creek Blvd
Suite 300
Dallas, TX 75219
214−707−1775
LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Sidney Powell
LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
2
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Sidney Powell
LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
James Kenneth Carroll represented by Harry W. MacDougald
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Sidney Powell
LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
3
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Sidney Powell
LEAD ATTORNEY
Plaintiff
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Sidney Powell
LEAD ATTORNEY
4
Plaintiff
LEAD ATTORNEY
Howard Kleinhendler
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Julia Z. Haller
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
L. Lin Wood , Jr.

LEAD ATTORNEY
Sidney Powell
LEAD ATTORNEY
V.
Defendant
Brian Kemp represented by Carey Allen Miller
in his official capacity as Governor of Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield,
Georgia LLC −Atl
500 Fourteenth St., N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30318
678−701−9381
Fax: 404−856−3250
Email: cmiller@robbinsfirm.com
Charlene S McGowan
Office of the Georgia Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General
Atlanta, GA 30334
404−458−3658
5
Joshua Barrett Belinfante

Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield
LLC
Atlanta, GA 30318
678−701−9381
Fax: 404−856−3250
Email: jbelinfante@robbinsfirm.com
Melanie Leigh Johnson

Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield
LLC
Atlanta, GA 30318
678−701−9381
Fax: 404−856−3250
Email: mjohnson@robbinsfirm.com
Russell D. Willard
Department of Law
Atlanta, GA 30334
404−656−3300
Defendant
Brad Raffensperger represented by Carey Allen Miller
Election Board
Charlene S McGowan


Russell D. Willard
Defendant
6
David J. Worley represented by Carey Allen Miller

Charlene S McGowan


Russell D. Willard
Defendant
Rebecca N. Sullivan represented by Carey Allen Miller
Charlene S McGowan


Russell D. Willard
Defendant
Matthew Mashburn represented by Carey Allen Miller
Charlene S McGowan
7


Russell D. Willard
Defendant
Anh Le represented by Carey Allen Miller
Charlene S McGowan

Russell D. Willard
V.
Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. represented by Amanda J. Beane
Perkins Coie−WA
1201 Third Avenue
48th Floor
206−359−3965
Email: abeane@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Amanda R. Callais
Perkins Coie−DC
Suite 600
700 Thirteenth St., N.W.
Washington, DC 20005−2011
202−654−6396
Email: acallais@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
8
Atlanta, GA 30309
404−888−9700
Fax: 404−888−9577
Email: hknapp@khlawfirm.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
Joyce Gist Lewis

1201 W. Peachtree Street, NW
Suite 3250
Atlanta, GA 30309
404−888−9700
Email: jlewis@khlawfirm.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
Kevin J. Hamilton
Perkins Coie LLP
1201 Third Avenue
Suite 4900
206−359−8741
Email: khamilton@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Marc E. Elias
Perkins Coie LLP
700 13th St NW
Ste 800
202−654−6200
Email: melias@perkinscoie.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE

Perkins Coie
1120 N.W. Couch, 10th Floor
Portland, OR 97209
503−727−2199
Fax: 503−346−2199
Email: mmertens@perkinscoie.com
9
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Susan Coppedge
Office of the United States
Attorney−ATL600
600 United States Courthouse
75 Ted Turner Dr., S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303
404−581−6250
Email: susan.coppedge@usdoj.gov
(Inactive)
LEAD ATTORNEY
Adam Martin Sparks

Atlanta, GA 30309
404−888−9700
DSCC represented by Amanda J. Beane
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Amanda R. Callais
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
LEAD ATTORNEY
Joyce Gist Lewis

LEAD ATTORNEY
Kevin J. Hamilton
LEAD ATTORNEY
10
PRO HAC VICE

Marc E. Elias
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE

LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Susan Coppedge
LEAD ATTORNEY
Adam Martin Sparks

DCCC represented by Amanda J. Beane
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Amanda R. Callais
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
LEAD ATTORNEY
Joyce Gist Lewis

LEAD ATTORNEY
Kevin J. Hamilton
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
11
Marc E. Elias
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE

LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
Susan Coppedge
LEAD ATTORNEY
Adam Martin Sparks

Intervenor
John Mangano represented by Bryan P. Tyson
Taylor English Duma LLP
Suite 200
1600 Parkwood Circle
Atlanta, GA 30339
770−434−6868
Fax: 770−434−7376
Email: btyson@taylorenglish.com
Intervenor
Alice O'Lenick represented by Bryan P. Tyson
Intervenor
Ben Satterfield represented by Bryan P. Tyson
Intervenor
Wandy Taylor represented by Bryan P. Tyson
Intervenor
Stephen Day represented by
12
Bryan P. Tyson

(rvb). (Entered: 11/27/2020)
(Entered: 11/27/2020)
13

11/27/2020)
11/29/2020)
11/29/2020)
11/29/2020)
11/30/2020 16
14
NOTICE of Appearance by Charlene S McGowan on behalf of Brian Kemp,

11/30/2020 17 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 6 MOTION for Temporary Restraining
(Entered: 11/30/2020)
11/30/2020)
15

11/30/2020)
(Entered: 11/30/2020)
16

(MacDougald, Harry) Modified on 12/2/2020 to correct filing fee amount (pjm).
(Entered: 12/01/2020)
(Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 34 Transmission of Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal, USCA Appeal Fees, Order
and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 32 Notice of Appeal. (pjm)
(Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 35 AMENDED ANSWER to Complaint (Proposed) of Proposed
Intervenor−Defendants by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc..
(Sparks, Adam) (Entered: 12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 36 USCA Acknowledgment of 32 Notice of Appeal, filed by Cathleen Alston
Latham, James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Coreco Jaqan Pearson,
Brian Jay Van Gundy, Gloria Kay Godwin and Vikki Townsend Consiglio. Case
Appealed to USCA− 11th Circuit. Case Number 20−14480−RR. (pjm) (Entered:
12/01/2020)
12/01/2020 37 ORDER STAYING 17 Order Setting Hearing on Motion. Signed by Judge
12/02/2020 MINUTE ORDER granting Julia Z. Haller's 24 Application for Admission Pro
12/02/2020)
J. Beane Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10432164).. Attorney Amanda J. Beane added appearing on behalf
12/02/2020)
R. Callais Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10432211).. Attorney Amanda R. Callais added appearing on behalf
12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 28 APPLICATION for Admission of Kevin J.
Hamilton Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10432219).. Attorney Kevin J. Hamilton added appearing on behalf
12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 29 APPLICATION for Admission of Marc E.
Elias Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
17
AGANDC−10432230).. Attorney Marc E. Elias added appearing on behalf of

DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. (nmb) (Entered: 12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 30 APPLICATION for Admission of
Matthew Mertens Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10432239).. Attorney Matthew Joseph Mertens added appearing on
behalf of DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. (nmb) (Entered:
12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 38 RESPONSE in Opposition re 20 MOTION to Intervene filed by James Kenneth
Carroll, Vikki Townsend Consiglio, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Gloria Kay Godwin,
Cathleen Alston Latham, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy.
12/02/2020 39 USCA Order: Appellants' "Emergency Motion for expedited briefing schedule
and Review" filed by Appellants Coreco Ja'Qan Pearson, Vikki Townsend
Consiglio, Gloria Kay Godwin, James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn Hall Fisher,
Cathleen Alston Latham and Brian Jay Van Gundy is GRANTED re: 32 Notice
of Appeal, filed by Cathleen Alston Latham, James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn
Hall Fisher, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy, Gloria Kay Godwin
and Vikki Townsend Consiglio. Case Appealed to USCA− 11th Circuit. Case
Number 20−14480−RR. (pjm) (Entered: 12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 40 ORDER POSTPONING this Court's December 4th hearing, until further order
of the Court. Signed by Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. on 12/02/2020. (usw)
(Entered: 12/02/2020)
12/02/2020 41 Emergency MOTION to Intervene by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of
Georgia, Inc.. (Callais, Amanda) (Entered: 12/02/2020)
12/03/2020 42 ORDER granting 20 Motion to Intervene; 41 Emergency Motion to Intervene by
The Democratic Party of Georgia, the DSCC and the DCCC. The Clerk is
directed to add these entities as parties and to docket their proposed motion to
dismiss [20−1], brief in support of motion to dismiss [20−2], and answer [20−3].
Signed by Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. on 12/3/20. (rsh) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 43 MOTION to Dismiss by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc.
(Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support)(rsh) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 44 ANSWER to COMPLAINT by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia,
Inc. Discovery ends on 5/3/2021.(rsh) Please visit our website at
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions. (Entered:
12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 45 NOTICE Of Filing Evidence by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend
Coreco Jaqan Pearson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Expert Report of Matthew
Braynard, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Eric Quinnell, Ph.D. and S. Stanley
Young, Ph.D., # 3 Affidavit Affidavit of Benjamin O. Overholt,
Ph.D.)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 MINUTE ORDER granting Amanda J. Beane {26], Amanda R. Callais 27 ,
Kevin J. Hamilton 28 , Mark E. Elias 29 , and Matthew Mertens's 30
Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice. Entered by CRD at the direction of
Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. If the applicant does not have CM/ECF access in
18
the Northern District of Georgia already, they must request access at

http://pacer.gov. If they have electronically filed in this district in a previous
case, please omit this step.(usw) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 46 NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL as to 14 Order by Brian Kemp, Anh Le,
Matthew Mashburn, Brad Raffensperger, Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley.
Filing fee $ 505, receipt number AGANDC−10445305. Transcript Order Form
due on 12/14/2020 (McGowan, Charlene) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 47 NOTICE Of Filing NOA Transmittal Letter re: 46 Notice of Cross Appeal.
(pjm) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 48 Transmission of Certified Copy of Notice of Cross Appeal, USCA Appeal Fees,
Order and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 46 Notice of Cross Appeal.
(pjm) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 49 NOTICE of Appearance by Carey Allen Miller on behalf of Brian Kemp, Anh
Worley (Miller, Carey) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 50 NOTICE of Appearance by Joshua Barrett Belinfante on behalf of Brian Kemp,
Matthew Mashburn, Brad Raffensperger, Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley
(Belinfante, Joshua) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 51 NOTICE of Appearance by Melanie Leigh Johnson on behalf of Brian Kemp,
Worley (Johnson, Melanie) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 52 Emergency MOTION Defendants' Emergency Motion for Relief from TRO 14
Order with Brief In Support by Brian Kemp, Anh Le, Matthew Mashburn, Brad
Raffensperger, Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit
Barnes Declaration, # 2 Exhibit Royston Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Eveler
Declaration)(Miller, Carey) (Entered: 12/03/2020)
12/03/2020 53 USCA Acknowledgment of 46 Notice of Cross Appeal, filed by Rebecca N.
Sullivan, David J. Worley, Brian Kemp, Anh Le, Matthew Mashburn and Brad
Raffensperger. Case Appealed to USCA− 11th Circuit. Case Number
20−14480−RR. (pjm) (Entered: 12/04/2020)
12/04/2020 54 USCA Order: Appellees Emergency Motion to Expedite Cross−Appeal and
Consolidate Briefing is GRANTED re: 46 Notice of Cross Appeal, filed by
Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley, Brian Kemp, Anh Le, Matthew
Mashburn and Brad Raffensperger and 32 Notice of Appeal, filed by Cathleen
Alston Latham, James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Coreco Jaqan
Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy, Gloria Kay Godwin and Vikki Townsend
Consiglio. Case Appealed to USCA− 11th Circuit. Case Number 20−14480−RR.
(pjm) (Entered: 12/04/2020)
12/04/2020 55 Emergency MOTION to Intervene with Brief In Support by John Mangano,
Alice O'Lenick, Ben Satterfield, Wandy Taylor, Stephen Day. (Tyson, Bryan)
(Entered: 12/04/2020)
12/04/2020 56 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Plaintiffs' complaint shall come before
the Court for hearing on Monday, December 7, at 10:00 a.m., EST, in the
ceremonial courtroom on the 23rd floor. Defendants' brief in opposition to the
claims in Plaintiffs' complaint will be due on Saturday, December 5, by 9:00
19
p.m. EST. Any reply brief will be due on Sunday, December 6, by 6:00 p.m.
EST. Plaintiffs are also directed to file their response brief to the pending motion
43 to dismiss by Sunday, December 6, at 6:00 p.m. EST. In light of the
upcoming hearing, Defendants' emergency motion 52 to dissolve or alter the
November 29 temporary restraining order is denied. This renders moot the
Gwinnett County Board of Registrations and Electors members' pending
emergency motion 55 to intervene. Therefore, that motion is denied. Signed by
Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. on 12/4/20. (rsh) (Entered: 12/04/2020)
12/04/2020 57 ORDER granting 5 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Matters Under Seal.
Affidavits are to be filed under seal until further order of the Court, and
Plaintiffs are permitted to file these affidavits with the identifying information
redacted in the public docket. Signed by Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. on
12/4/20. (rsh) (Entered: 12/04/2020)
12/04/2020 73 USCA Opinion received DISMISSING re: 46 Notice of Cross Appeal, filed by
Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley, Brian Kemp, Anh Le, Matthew
Mashburn, and Brad Raffensperger and 32 Notice of Appeal, filed by Cathleen
Alston Latham, James Kenneth Carroll, Carolyn Hall Fisher, Coreco Jaqan
Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy, Gloria Kay Godwin and Vikki Townsend
Consiglio. In accordance with FRAP 41(b), the USCA mandate will issue at a
later date. Case Appealed to USCA− 11th Circuit. Case Number 20−14480−RR.
(pjm) (Entered: 12/07/2020)
12/05/2020 58 RESPONSE in Opposition re 6 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order
IMMEDIATE HEARING REQUESTED MOTION for Preliminary Injunction
Intervenor−Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Emergency
Motion filed by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc.. (Sparks,
Adam) (Entered: 12/05/2020)
12/05/2020 59 NOTICE Of Filing by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. re 58
Response in Opposition to Motion, Affidavits in Support of
Intervenor−Defendants' Resp. in Opp. to Pls.' Emergency Mot. (Attachments: #
1 Ex. 1. − Aff. of S. Valies, # 2 Ex. 2 − Aff. of A. Thomas, # 3 Ex. 3 − Aff. of
K. Brandon, # 4 Ex. 4 − Aff. of D. Sumner, # 5 Ex. 5 − Aff. of R. Laurie, # 6
Ex. 6 − Aff. of O. Alston, # 7 Ex. 7 − Aff. of R. Cason, # 8 Ex. 8 − Aff. of S.
Young, # 9 Ex. 9 − Aff. of B. Graham, # 10 Ex. 10 − Aff. of R. Short, # 11 Ex.
11 − Aff. of S. Ghazal, # 12 Ex. 12 − Aff. of S. Zydney, # 13 Ex. 13 − Aff. of K.
Patel)(Sparks, Adam) (Entered: 12/05/2020)
12/05/2020 60 MOTION to Exclude TESTIMONY OF SHIVA AYYADURAI, RUSSELL
JAMES RAMSLAND, JR., MATTHEW BRAYNARD, WILLIAM M.
BRIGGS, RONALD WATKINS, BENJAMIN A. OVERHOLT, ERIC
QUINNELL, S. STANLEY YOUNG, AND SPYDER with Brief In Support by
DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc.. (Sparks, Adam) (Entered:
12/05/2020)
12/05/2020 61 RESPONSE in Opposition re 6 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order
IMMEDIATE HEARING REQUESTED MOTION for Preliminary Injunction
and Consolidated Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed by Brian Kemp,
Worley. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Affidavit, # 5
Exhibit)(McGowan, Charlene) (Entered: 12/05/2020)
20
12/05/2020 62 AFFIDAVIT re 60 MOTION to Exclude TESTIMONY OF SHIVA

AYYADURAI, RUSSELL JAMES RAMSLAND, JR., MATTHEW
BRAYNARD, WILLIAM M. BRIGGS, RONALD WATKINS, BENJAMIN A.
OVERHOLT, ERIC QUINNELL, S. STANLEY YOUNG, AND SPYDER, 58
Response in Opposition to Motion, Attorney Declaration of Amanda R. Callais
by DCCC, DSCC, Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Ex. 1 −
Ansolabehere Report (Braynard), # 2 Ex. 2 − Ansolabehere Report (Briggs), # 3
Ex. 3 − Rodden Report, # 4 Ex. 4 − Mayer Report, # 5 Ex. 5 − Rodden and
Marble Report)(Sparks, Adam) (Entered: 12/05/2020)
12/05/2020 63 MOTION to Dismiss with Brief In Support by Brian Kemp, Anh Le, Matthew
Mashburn, Brad Raffensperger, Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley.
(Attachments: # 1 Brief)(McGowan, Charlene) (Entered: 12/05/2020)
12/06/2020 64 ORDER ALLOWING ATTORNEY CELLPHONES and LAPTOPS IN THE
COURTROOM on 12/07/2020 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by Judge Timothy C.
Batten, Sr. on 12/06/2020. (usw) (Main Document 64 replaced on 12/7/2020)
(rvb). (Entered: 12/06/2020)
Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy of Electronic Media (MacDougald, Harry)
Modified on 12/7/2020, One (1) flash drive received by clerk and placed in civil
action file(tcc). (Entered: 12/06/2020)
Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Appendix
Vol. 4 from Appeal)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 12/06/2020)
Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Supplemental
Declaration of Quinnell and Young, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of S. Maturza, # 3
Affidavit Declaration of Wilburn J. Winter)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered:
12/06/2020)
12/06/2020 68 RESPONSE in Opposition re 63 MOTION to Dismiss , 43 MOTION to
Dismiss, 6 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order IMMEDIATE
HEARING REQUESTED MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs
Consolidated Response to the Motions to Dismiss and Reply in Support of
Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief filed by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki
Latham, Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy. (Attachments: # 1
Exhibit Wisconsin Order from Election Case)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered:
12/06/2020)
Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affidavit of
Garland Favorito, # 2 Affidavit ffidavit of Scott Hall, # 3 Affidavit Affidavit of
Affiant A)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 12/06/2020)
21
Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Supplemental

Report of Russell Ramsland)(MacDougald, Harry) (Entered: 12/06/2020)
12/06/2020 71 APPLICATION for Admission of Sidney Powell Pro Hac Vice (Application fee
(Entered: 12/06/2020)
12/06/2020 72 NOTICE Of Filing by Brian Kemp, Anh Le, Matthew Mashburn, Brad
Raffensperger, Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley (Attachments: # 1
Affidavit of Frances Watson, # 2 Affidavit of Juan Gilbert)(McGowan,
Charlene) (Entered: 12/06/2020)
12/07/2020 APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 71 APPLICATION for Admission of Sidney
Powell Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number
AGANDC−10452641).. Attorney Sidney Powell added appearing on behalf of
12/07/2020 MINUTE ORDER granting Sidney Powell's 71 Application for Admission Pro
12/07/2020)
12/07/2020 74 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr.: Motion
Hearing held on 12/7/2020 granting 43 Motion to Dismiss and 63 Motion to
Dismiss. TRO is DISSOLVED. Case is DISMISSED. Clerk shall close the case.
(Court Reporter Lori Burgess)(dmb) (Entered: 12/07/2020)
12/07/2020 75 CLERK'S JUDGMENT (dmb)−−Please refer to http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov
to obtain an appeals jurisdiction checklist−− (Entered: 12/07/2020)
12/07/2020 Civil Case Terminated. (dmb) (Entered: 12/07/2020)
12/07/2020 76 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 75 Clerk's Judgment, 74 Order on Motion to
Dismiss,,,, Motion Hearing, by James Kenneth Carroll, Vikki Townsend
Coreco Jaqan Pearson, Brian Jay Van Gundy. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number
AGANDC−10458354. Transcript Order Form due on 12/21/2020 (MacDougald,
Harry) (Entered: 12/07/2020)
(Entered: 12/08/2020)
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JUDGMENT
Ordered and Adjudged
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1 of 39

2 Atlanta Division
3
et al., )
5 )
Plaintiff, )
6 ) Civil Action
7 )
) Atlanta, Georgia
8 Brian Kemp, et al., ) Sunday November 29, 2020
) 7:45 p.m.
9 Defendant. )
_________________________)
10
11
14
APPEARANCES:
15
16 L. Lin Wood, Jr.
Howard Kleinhendler
17 Harry MacDougald
Christine Dial Buckler
18 Attorneys at Law
19 FOR THE DEFENDANTS: Russell David Willard

20 Attorneys at Law
21
22
(404) 215-1528
24
25 produced by CAT.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
2 of 39
1 THE COURT: Hi. I'm Judge Batten.
2 THE CLERK: I think we have everybody here. Harry
3 MacDougald.
4 MR. MACDOUGALD: I want to announce that my
5 associate Christine Buckler is in the office with me but off
6 camera.
7 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. MacDougald.
8 THE CLERK: Howard Kleinhendler.
9 THE COURT: Howard. Who are you with?
10 MR. KLEINHENDLER: I am with the Plaintiffs.
11 THE COURT: Keep going.
12 THE CLERK: Sidney Powell.
13 THE COURT: I don't see Ms. Powell.
14 MS. POWELL: I am also here with Lin Wood for the
15 Plaintiffs.
16 THE COURT: I don't see either of y'all.
17 THE CLERK: If you will turn on your video, please,
18 Ms. Powell.
19 MS. POWELL: I am not sure it is working properly,
20 but I have given it my best shot.
21 THE COURT: Who else do we have on the call besides
22 Ms. Powell and Mr. Wood?
23 THE CLERK: Charlene McGowan.
24 THE COURT: Is she on the video?
25 THE CLERK: Everyone's video is on except Ms. Powell
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
3 of 39
1 and Rus Willard.
2 THE COURT: I can't see everybody. I suppose that
3 is okay as long as I can hear everybody. So I think we are
4 ready to proceed. Are the Plaintiffs ready to proceed and are
5 the Defendants ready to proceed? One at a time. Plaintiffs?
6 MS. POWELL: Yes.
7 THE COURT: And the Defendants?
8 MR. WILLARD: Yes, Your Honor.
9 THE COURT: You know, I am not really sure exactly
10 what it is the Plaintiffs are trying to obtain in the case
11 right now regarding these machines. There has been a mention
12 of wiping of a machine at the World Congress Center, and also
13 been a discussion about reference to the fact that Union
14 County is going to wipe their machines. You know, I
15 understand that these county officials are obligated by state
16 law to preserve the data from the election on November 3.
17 What is it exactly that the Plaintiffs want me to order the
18 Secretary of State and/or the other Defendants to do? I am
19 not -- excuse me, I am sorry -- I am not talking about
20 ultimately under the complaint that has been filed, I am
21 talking about this emergency temporary relief right now. I
22 know you want me to throw out the election results and et
23 cetera, but I just mean on the short-term basis, what is it
24 exactly that the Plaintiffs would like? Ms. Powell?
25 MS. POWELL: Right now what you ordered in your
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
4 of 39
1 first order of the day would be perfect. We need access to
2 the machines as soon as possible so we can do mirror images of
3 the data that is on there and the operations that are on
4 there, because it's well-established throughout Dominion
5 software systems and anybody who knows anything about them
6 that they can be easily altered. And we understand, from what
7 is going on at the Center today, that process has already
8 begun. Apparently from 11:00 to 1:30 they began substituting
9 software in the machines that was completely unnecessary to
10 count the ballots.
11 THE COURT: Let me stop you right there and ask
12 Mr. Willard, first of all, I understand the State's
13 argument that -- the Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs
14 lack standing. I also understand that they cite Jacobson for
15 the proposition that they aren't the right people to be sued
16 to provide this relief and that instead it should have been
17 the county elections officers. I understand all of that. But
18 I am wondering, and I am just trying to get factual
19 information here, what is it about access to the voting
20 machines that the Defendants have a problem with? Why can't
21 the Plaintiffs' experts go ahead and do a forensic
22 examination? Are they going to damage anything or in any
23 other way interfere with the performance of the government
24 officials' duties?
25 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, I appreciate the
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
5 of 39
1 opportunity to respond. I apologize about the video. With
2 the weather out there, we've had it bad with issues all
3 weekend in my subdivision. I will say that we've got a
4 concern because what your original proposed order and what the
5 Plaintiffs are seeking is going to basically take certain
6 voting equipment out of the equation for the election
7 scheduled to take place this Tuesday, as well as the election
8 scheduled to take place on January 5th, because Plaintiffs are
9 wanting us to hold and basically mothball and preserve these
10 machines at the county level - not in our possession, not in
11 our custody and control - at the county level. They want to
12 preserve those in the form that they were in after the
13 November 3rd election. Under state law there is an obligation
14 on those county election officials to preserve the data. But
15 the State of Georgia has set up a system where the actual
16 equipment is used at each successive election in the cycle.
17 And there is a certain amount of recalibration in terms of
18 getting them ready. For the individual machines, they are not
19 going to have the November 3rd, 2020 ballot card being
20 inserted in them. They are not going to have that database
21 built in any longer. You're going to have a December 1st,
22 2020 database in the machines and in the tabulation computers.
23 You're going to have a January 5th, 2020 database tabulating
24 the results of the federal and state-wide run-off on January
25 5th. They have cited to Curling. Curling is inapposite
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
6 of 39
1 because it was decided before the 11th Circuit's
2 redressability decision in Jacobson. In addition, they are
3 wanting you to poke the procedure. You've got election
4 officials who, as of Tuesday morning, have to turn on the
5 lights, conduct in-person voting, Tuesday night of this week
6 have to tabulate results on the very equipment that the
7 Plaintiffs are wanting you to take out of circulation. And
8 that gets -- now it is so broad, based on what Ms. Powell has
9 asked in some of her more recent emails, you've now implicated
10 the Purcell line of cases and the progeny as interpreted by
11 this circuit that says Plaintiffs don't get to come in and
12 poke at an election procedure that is currently underway.
13 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you, Mr. Willard.
14 First of all, refresh my recollection. The election in two
15 days, which is December 1, is that the run-off for the Public
16 Service Commissioner? Or is that on January 5, 2021?
17 MR. WILLARD: The Public Service Commission race has
18 been moved to January 5th, 2021.
19 THE COURT: What is December 1?
20 MR. WILLARD: Basically any local race that is still
21 out there that --
22 THE COURT: Okay.
23 MR. WILLARD: For example, the Athens Clarke County,
24 Oconee County and, I forget, I think it's the Northeastern
25 Judicial Circuit, that District Attorney's race is on the
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
7 of 39
1 ballot for this Tuesday.
2 THE COURT: I remember that.
3 MR. WILLARD: Clarke County and Oconee are going to
4 be voting in that.
5 THE COURT: Right.
6 MR. WILLARD: I am not aware here on Sunday evening
7 at 7:59 what other counties may have races on Tuesday and what
8 may not. We've been sort of struggling ever since the
9 Plaintiffs filed their emergency motion right before midnight
10 on Friday that we saw sometime around lunchtime on Saturday.
11 We've sort of been scrambling. I don't think all of my
12 clients have still seen everything, as Plaintiffs acknowledge.
13 There has been a complete absence of notice requisite to grant
14 any relief as to the temporary hearing at this point, because
15 I haven't been able to communicate with all of my clients to
16 see if all of my clients have even been properly served with
17 the emergency motion.
18 Plaintiffs have been sort of trying to do this by
19 the seat of their pants, and they keep asking for this sort of
20 ever-shifting claim of relief that they are saying isn't going
21 to matter all that much in the grand scheme of things, but in
22 terms of a currently underway election, it is going to be
23 throwing sugar in that gas tank and gumming up the works for
24 not only the December 1st election, but also the January 5th
25 election, as well as the recount that is underway.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
8 of 39
1 THE COURT: Well, I am having the impression, from
2 what you've just said, Mr. Willard, that there really is not
3 expected to be much turnout for Tuesday's elections, whatever
4 remains statewide. Obviously we are going to have an enormous
5 turnout January 5th, 2021. I just -- you know, I don't fault
6 the Defendants for complaining about the timing, and the fact
7 that they've been given precious little time to respond to the
8 Plaintiffs' requests. I don't blame them. And my draft
9 proposed orders, the two that we are discussing from today,
10 both reflect a hearing schedule that reflects my understanding
11 of the State's position. In other words, I feel like, you
12 know, you've complained, understandably, about the timing and
13 said you need a little more time, and I feel like I am giving
14 you that by having the hearing on Friday, giving you till
15 Wednesday to file the brief in opposition. Believe me, I am
16 not saying that you are getting an abundance of time, but to
17 me, I divided that baby as fair as I thought I could, and I
18 feel like I am giving you enough time. My point is, if I am
19 going to give you that time, I don't understand why it is
20 asking too much. And forget for just a moment the argument
21 about it's not under the Secretary of State's control. I
22 understand that argument. I am going to deal with that in a
23 minute. Laying that aside for a second, the question is, why
24 isn't there enough already -- let me put it like this. What
25 you are asking for, why should you not correspondingly agree
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
9 of 39
1 to allow a quick inspection of these machines? And I guess --
2 you know, I don't know how many counties the Plaintiffs are
3 talking about. I think that Jacobson may be on point. I am
4 not sure yet. I don't know. It seems to me hard to believe
5 that the Plaintiffs should have to sue 159 elections
6 commissioners to get the relief they want. I understand
7 exactly what Jacobson said, but that was a different case.
8 What I am trying to accomplish here is, taking into both
9 sides' consideration, their arguments, their respective
10 positions, but incorporating into them also the law. The
11 Plaintiffs want to seize these and impound these machines for
12 a forensic audit by their experts.
13 Let me go back to Ms. Powell and ask you,
14 Ms. Powell, which machines are we talking about? Are you
15 talking about in every county in Georgia? Where exactly are
16 you talking about?
17 MS. POWELL: No, Your Honor. In our motion we asked
18 specifically for machines in ten counties.
19 THE COURT: Those ten counties that you've
20 highlighted. Okay.
21 MS. POWELL: Yes, sir.
22 THE COURT: And what do you want to do with those
23 machines? How long is it going to take your experts to do
24 their thing on those machines?
25 MS. POWELL: It will take approximately a day of
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
10 of 39
1 time per county, but we can dispatch three separate teams and
2 be able to do the bulk of it I would think within three days.
3 THE COURT: Okay. What do you say in response to
4 Mr. Willard's argument -- I wasn't -- let me go back to
5 Mr. Willard and just make sure I am clear on this.
6 Mr. Willard, specifically with respect to the Clarke County
7 and Oconee County DA's I guess it is a run-off. I don't
8 remember if it's a run-off or a special election. But for the
9 record, which is it, Mr. Willard?
10 MR. WILLARD: It is a special election run-off.
11 THE COURT: Yeah.
12 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, if I can clarify for the
13 record, that is just one example of a race that is scheduled
14 to be run on Tuesday. There are a myriad other races that we
15 anticipate are being held throughout Georgia, we just haven't
16 had the opportunity to compile an exhaustive list.
18 MR. WILLARD: But we are letting you know that there
19 is a race scheduled for Tuesday.
20 THE COURT: Right. I understand. I guess what I am
21 wondering is -- well, I guess -- let me think this through.
22 It seems to me that the question should be, and we might -- I
23 might give y'all a little bit of time to find this out. Other
24 than the -- are there any elections set in these ten counties
25 that are going to take place this Tuesday, December 1? And if
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR
11 of 39
1 so, are the Plaintiffs going to, to get the relief they want,
2 are they going to have to access these machines and not have a
3 -- which would prevent these ten counties from having the
4 machines to use for those Tuesday elections?
5 MR. WILLARD: I'm sorry, Your Honor, is that
6 addressed to me or Ms. Powell?
7 THE COURT: I am kind of thinking out loud and
8 addressing both of you. Basically we have narrowed it from
9 159 down to 10 counties. And the Defendants right now can't
10 tell me, and I don't fault them for that at all, what
11 elections are taking place, if any, in those ten counties this
12 coming Tuesday in two days. So how am I supposed to -- and so
13 that is one issue, is this may be moot if it turns out that
14 there is not even an election taking place in those ten
15 counties on Tuesday, I don't see what the problem would be of
16 me entering a temporary restraining order allowing the
17 Plaintiffs to have quick access to those machines for a
18 forensic examination. On the other hand, if there is going to
19 be an election in any of those ten counties, that raises the
20 question of can they still have the election without those
21 machines. Do you have to look at every single machine? I
22 mean, I don't understand how it works.
23 So I guess I would ask Ms. Powell, let's suppose
24 that in two or three of the ten counties that you are
25 interested in, there are in fact going to be run-off elections
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1 on Tuesday, December 1. How can your objective be met, your
2 objective being a forensic examination of those machines in
3 those counties if there is going to be an election there on
4 Tuesday?
5 MS. POWELL: We can get experts to them tomorrow,
6 Your Honor. We've got at least three teams of experts that
7 could be dispatched to three separate counties to collect the
8 information from the machines. The important part is, it's
9 not just the data that comes out of the machines that is
10 crucial to the fraud case that is so rampant across the
11 country, it is the fact that an algorithm we believe was
12 uploaded to the Dominion machines that weighted the votes for
13 Mr. Biden over the votes for President Trump at approximately
14 1.22 versus .78, and that is what would change with any
15 alteration of the software that is crucial to making the proof
16 of the fraud absolutely conclusive and irrefutable. We know
17 they have already gone into the machines in Fulton County to
18 change the software with no basis to do so whatsoever. In
19 fact, there is an attorney that contacted me just earlier
20 today, in fact while I was replying to the last message from
21 the Court. I believe her last name is Broyles, a Ms. Broyles,
22 who had been contacted by a witness who was very concerned by
23 what she had seen down at the Center today, and felt like it
24 was an abject pretense that they were going to be redoing all
25 the same ballots and there was no reason to change the
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1 software for any reason whatsoever.
2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Willard, what is your
3 response to that?
4 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, I apologize. I am used to
5 dealing with facts and law, not innuendo and accusation. The
6 bottom line here, the Plaintiffs have sent you a copy of the
7 Curling order which, as I mentioned earlier, is inapposite
8 because it predates Jacobson. But in that case, where the
9 security and reliability of the DRE machines, which have now
10 been retired, even Judge Totenberg recognized that you cannot
11 willy-nilly allow individuals from outside of state and county
12 custody and control procedures to have access to these
13 machines. It poses a security risk for Ms. Powell's minions
14 to go in and image everything, download the software, and
15 figure out for future elections a way to hack in so that their
16 preferred candidates can win. That is in effect what they are
17 seeking here. They want to image, as they just said, not only
18 the data on the machines, but also the entire software package
19 and the security protocols that are set up. That is something
20 that no Federal Court can possibly countenance. Even if they
21 had the appropriate defendants here, which they don't, you
22 cannot allow, during the midst of an election cycle, a third
23 party to come in and get the proverbial keys to the software
24 kingdom. I will say that we are trying to get up to speed on
25 this as much as possible. Our office is not representing the
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1 Secretary in the Curling litigation because our office was
2 forced to declare a conflict several years ago, but we have
3 Conflict Special Attorneys General who have spent months and
4 years dealing with the security of the State's electronic
5 voting system in Federal Court. There was a whole procedure
6 set up where you had a white room established in Virginia
7 where experts were only permitted to go in and inspect a
8 single machine at that white room after security protocols
9 were set in place where they couldn't remove anything from
10 there, where they weren't able to take anything that could
11 later compromise the system with them when they left.
12 MS. POWELL: Well it's a little bit late to be
13 worrying about the compromise of the system. That happened,
14 as we have evidence that both Iran and China were hacking into
15 the system during our election, not to mention any number of
16 other foreign entities and domestic actors as well. The
17 entire system was built to be both hackable from afar and
18 locally to overwrite votes, to overwrite review of signature,
19 to drag and drop ballots into the trash can as wanted. It was
20 conceived and created by Mr. Chavez's regime for the very
21 purpose of ensuring that he won future elections. As corrupt
22 as it could possibly be. And that's the system that the
23 Georgia Secretary of State decided was appropriate to run in
24 Georgia, despite any number of revelations of the myriad
25 problems it has.
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1 THE COURT: The problem I have --
2 MS. POWELL: A two-year-old can hack these machines
3 as they are now, and we are certainly amenable to having an
4 observer and videotaping the process that we use to create the
5 mirror images, and to submitting it and holding it under a
6 protective order.
7 THE COURT: And am I correct in expecting that the
8 Defendants further contend that these are -- there is
9 proprietary information on these machines that should not be
10 publicly disclosed?
11 MR. WILLARD: Yes, Your Honor, as well as from a
12 security protocol standpoint.
13 THE COURT: Right. Okay. Well, here is the
14 problem. It's Sunday, November 29th at 8:12 p.m. This motion
15 did not come in until late Friday night. I was not aware of
16 the motion until Saturday. And the State, including the
17 Secretary of State, the Governor, and the Elections Board
18 members have hardly had any opportunity to respond to these
19 allegations. I don't know if that is anybody's fault. I
20 don't know at this particular point -- I haven't considered
21 the issue of whether the suit should have been brought earlier
22 and the Plaintiffs are guilty of laches. I have no opinion on
23 that issue at this point. But what I do have an opinion on is
24 that the burden is on the Plaintiffs, and the relief that they
25 seek is extraordinary. And although they make allegations of
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1 tremendous worldwide improprieties regarding the Dominion
2 voting machines, those allegations are supported by precious
3 little proof. Now let's just suppose hypothetically that the
4 obligations are true, and there simply has not been time to
5 marshal the evidence in support of those allegations. The
6 problem with that is that that doesn't create an exception for
7 me as to whether I should grant this extraordinary relief of a
8 temporary restraining order, which of course can only be
9 granted in truly extraordinary circumstances, and the
10 Defendant -- and it's not even clear to the Court that the
11 named Defendants are the proper parties to this lawsuit with
12 respect to this particular form of relief that the Plaintiffs
13 are seeking. So I am going to deny the Plaintiffs' request
14 for a temporary restraining order on the grounds that the
15 Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing a
16 substantial likelihood, a real likelihood of prevailing on the
17 merits on this claim, or at least I am going to refrain from
18 granting that relief now. If, in the course of discovery in
19 this case, the Plaintiffs become -- the Plaintiffs acquire
20 additional proof that would support their allegations that
21 might make a difference, I am happy to revisit this order.
22 But for now, that is going to be the order of the Court. I am
23 going to deny the request for temporary injunctive relief.
24 And here is what we are going to do regarding the
25 scheduling. The Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion
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1 will be due on Wednesday December 2 by -- I am going to change
2 that to 5 o'clock p.m. Eastern Standard Time. If the
3 Plaintiffs choose to file a reply, it will be due 24 hours
4 after the Defendants' response is filed. And we will have an
5 in-person hearing in my Atlanta courtroom this coming Friday
6 at 10 o'clock a.m. to consider the balance of the claims that
7 have been raised by the Plaintiffs in their complaint. All
8 right. Anything else, Counsel?
9 MR. WOOD: Judge Batten, this is Lin Wood. How are
10 you, sir?
11 THE COURT: Yes, sir. How are you doing, sir?
12 MR. WOOD: I am doing well. Please let me make one
13 request.
14 THE COURT: Okay.
15 MR. WOOD: I understand Your Honor's ruling. I kind
16 of live under the theory that he who has nothing to hide hides
17 nothing. Would there be any way -- would there be any way to
18 give us a very limited, such for example let us go in
19 tomorrow, pick two or three counties, and then randomly two or
20 three machines and do the forensics on that? Because at least
21 we would have some information in the event all of these
22 machines end up being wiped clean? Something very --
23 THE COURT: At first blush, I don't have -- I would
24 not have too much of a problem with that. It certainly is
25 more reasonable than what we have talked about. But the
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1 problem is, again, the State has represented to me that -- the
2 Defendants have represented to me, through counsel, that there
3 are security concerns that they have, and I am being asked to
4 decide this on a Sunday night, have been received no evidence
5 from the Defendants because they haven't had a chance. So I
6 am going to respectfully deny, Lin, your request. But you
7 know, I am going to leave it with -- it is hard for me to
8 believe -- let me ask this. Let me put it this way. Doesn't
9 sound like 159 counties in Georgia are going to have special
10 run-off elections on Tuesday, special election run-offs, I
11 should say, on Tuesday. Why can't you -- if we can find ways
12 to protect the State's legitimate interest in security and
13 proprietary software, can you not look for the algorithm that
14 you claim is there and any other incriminating evidence from
15 some of the other counties, from one or more of the counties
16 where no election is going to take place Tuesday? Why can't
17 you do that?
18 MR. WOOD: Your Honor, this is Mr. Wood again. We
19 can do that. And in fact, this one solution would be if we
20 identify a very limited number of machines, number of
21 counties, we can have our experts come in and do a mirror
22 image, we can turn it over to the Court so there are no
23 security concerns, and then it can be examined at a different
24 time. But the problem is, once the machines are wiped, the
25 evidence is gone. If there is nothing there, there is nothing
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1 there. But at least we will have an opportunity to check on a
2 limited basis and we can preserve it and secure the security
3 of it by having our experts, with their oversight, mirror
4 image and then turn it over to the possession of the Court for
5 a later review. But we don't get that opportunity, once lost
6 we will never get it again. I don't see any harm to the State
7 to preserve this information on a very limited basis.
8 THE COURT: Okay, I am having a hard time
9 identifying any such harm myself. Mr. Willard, what would be
10 wrong with the Plaintiffs being granted access to three of the
11 counties not among -- not in any county where there is going
12 to be an election this coming Tuesday, but tomorrow be granted
13 access in three of these where all of the evidence that are
14 obtained by Plaintiffs' experts will be accompanied by
15 forensic experts from the Defendants. I know you may not be
16 able to line that up by tomorrow, so it probably wouldn't be
17 tomorrow, but where we can have a forensic expert with the
18 Plaintiffs on behalf of the Defendants accompanying and
19 overseeing the Plaintiffs' expert's inspection of the
20 machines; and then with all of the data and all of the
21 information obtained from that inspection, or those three
22 inspections, to be turned over to the Court in camera and not
23 provided to Plaintiffs or their counsel or anybody else until
24 further order of the Court? That's -- I want to hear your
25 response, Mr. Willard. But I have to say, at first blush that
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1 doesn't sound very unreasonable to me. What is the response?
2 And again, we are laying aside for a moment whether or not
3 they have sued the right parties. We are not going to address
4 that yet. But let's assume that they did, and let's assume
5 that they do have standing, what is wrong with that proposal
6 that I have just suggested?
7 MR. WILLARD: Well Your Honor, I think you've hit
8 the nail on the head, and it is sort of impossible to set
9 aside Jacobson. There is no redressability here as to any of
10 these machines right now. They are not in the custody and
11 control of the State Defendants. You can order us every day
12 this week; we cannot give you access to the Hart County voting
13 machines. I cannot go in and tell the Hart County Elections
14 Superintendent to do squat in regards to discovery in a case
15 that they are not a party to. Second, if you are violating
16 trade secrets and security protocols, it doesn't matter if you
17 are doing it for one machine or the entirety of machines. If
18 Plaintiffs' experts are going to come in with a thumb drive
19 and stick it in and take their screwdrivers out and do
20 everything to these machines, we have no safeguards that we
21 can put in place, in this very compressed time frame that
22 Plaintiffs are wanting to have, where you prevent somebody
23 from sticking that thumb drive in their pocket and walking out
24 the door, or doing something else that is going to impact that
25 machine for future elections.
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Wood, I will give you the last word.
2 MR. WOOD: I don't believe we will be using
3 screwdrivers. I think we can do a simple mirror image, they
4 can see it done, and then it will be turned over to the Court.
5 If we've got the wrong parties, we've got the wrong parties.
6 But if we have the right parties, and the Court determines
7 that the Secretary of State does have the authority as we
8 contend that the Secretary of State does, I don't see any
9 harm. We will turn it over to the Court. The battles can be
10 fought. If we win, then we can have -- we can have the
11 examination completed. But if we don't get something, then we
12 end up with nothing, and we don't know whether or not it was
13 erased. I don't see any downside, Your Honor. We turn it
14 over to you and hold it until further rulings in the case. It
15 is just a matter of preserving some reasonably minimum amount
16 of evidence with respect to some of these machines.
17 MS. POWELL: I believe there are no elections Your
18 Honor in Cobb, Gwinnett, Cherokee, or Forsyth, or Paulding, or
19 Hall, or Houston, or Hart, or Hancock, all of which we have
20 requested, or Gwinnett or Henry. In fact, Defendants haven't
21 said where there are any elections at all.
22 THE COURT: Okay.
23 MR. WILLARD: One last point, if I could.
24 THE COURT: Yes.
25 MR. WILLARD: I would point you -- you know, I know
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1 there has been some question about whether the Jacobson
2 decision applies to voting equipment, and decisions made
3 regarding voting equipment. I would point you to the Anderson
4 case, Anderson versus Raffensperger, decided by Judge Brown
5 last month, the docket number is 1:20-CV-03263. It is a
6 78-page decision, and it is very well-reasoned. And pages 62
7 through 68 go into great detail about how the failure to
8 include county election officials presented a redressability
9 problem. Remember, Your Honor, you didn't choose who the
10 Plaintiffs sued, I didn't choose who the Plaintiffs sued. The
11 Plaintiffs knew or should have been aware of the Jacobson line
12 of cases and its progeny. You --
13 MS. POWELL: Jacobson is Florida law.
14 THE COURT: Let him finish.
15 MR. WILLARD: -- cannot craft relief to county
16 defendants --
17 THE COURT: Go ahead.
18 MR. WILLARD: You cannot craft relief that goes to
19 county defendants and equipment in county custody and control
20 where the Plaintiffs have only chosen to sue State Defendants.
21 THE COURT: Ms. Powell, let me ask you this along
22 those lines of what he is saying. I understand the
23 distinction that the Plaintiffs have argued through their
24 counsel's emails to me today between this case and Jacobson.
25 But you know, it sounds to me that Mr. Willard is probably
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1 correct that as a matter of fact and law, the Secretary of
2 State can't call up to Marietta and tell the Cobb County
3 elections officials what to do with their machine. What you
4 want to do is access the machine. You are not talking about
5 data results from the election. You want to actually access
6 the physical machines for a forensic inspection. And --
7 MS. POWELL: Your Honor.
8 THE COURT: Just a second. And so this is the first
9 time we are really addressing the redressability issue. Tell
10 me what is the Plaintiffs' response to that.
11 MS. POWELL: The machines are owned by the State of
12 Georgia. They were purchased by the State of Georgia for $107
13 million of taxpayer money. They are controlled by the
14 Secretary of State's office which has legal responsibility
15 both for investigating the fraud and making sure the machines
16 are what are supposed to be used and properly used and
17 enforcing the rules and regulations and laws related to
18 elections for the State of Georgia. It is clear from the
19 Curling decision that we do not have to sue 600 people in 159
20 counties to obtain the relief we want. It couldn't be more
21 clear as a matter of law.
22 MR. WOOD: Judge, could I say one last thing?
24 MR. WOOD: And I appreciate this has all been done
25 with not a lot of time.
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1 THE COURT: Right.
2 MR. WOOD: Again, if we don't have the correct
3 parties, we can add the correct parties before the Court would
4 release for further examination the materials that we would
5 collect in the next day or two.
6 THE COURT: I don't understand why the Plaintiffs
7 don't just move to add Cobb County as a party to the case, or
8 the Cobb -- I don't know who it is, Cobb County elections
9 officers? I don't know. I am not going to give you a legal
10 opinion.
11 MR. WOOD: Let me say this. If the Court gives us
12 until Tuesday to examine, we will add the counties that the
13 Court lets us go examine, we will add them tomorrow; add them
14 tonight. I just don't think -- I think that is a procedural
15 issue, and ultimately one the Court can decide, but there is
16 no harm, Your Honor, in preserving what could be critical
17 evidence with respect to this election. We are not asking to
18 look at it until we've got it all down pat and Your Honor is
19 satisfied we are entitled to it, but let's preserve at least
20 some small amount reasonably so we don't find ourselves with
21 no evidence simply because the evidence was erased or
22 destroyed. If there is nothing there, there is nothing there.
23 But, Your Honor, if there is something there, then this state
24 has a serious problem. And I think it ought to be in the
25 interest of the taxpayers and the voters that this material,
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1 on a reasonable basis, limited basis, be preserved so that
2 down the road, if we meet all the other qualifications to have
3 it fully examined, we've at least got it preserved. That
4 seems to me to be in the best interest of the citizens of the
5 State of Georgia.
6 THE COURT: Well let me go back --
7 MS. POWELL: We have obtained access to machines in
8 another state, with no problem of damage to the machines or
9 exposure of trade secrets or any other concern, and in that
10 instance we found that there were 1,474 votes on two rolls on
11 a machine, 1,474 which were changed across the two rolls,
12 almost the same number of voters that voted had their votes
13 completely changed on Dominion machines.
14 THE COURT: Where was that?
15 MS. POWELL: That is a county in Michigan.
16 THE COURT: That was this year?
17 MS. POWELL: Yes, sir. Just a few days ago.
18 THE COURT: Right, okay. And again, just for my
19 factual understanding, Mr. Willard, are you telling me that if
20 I grant this relief, let's say to -- if I were to add a couple
21 of these counties as defendants, or whatever the right entity
22 or person is that should be the defendant, are you telling me
23 that if I grant this relief for this forensic inspection,
24 there is no way that any election run-off can take place on
25 Tuesday in that county? Or do you know?
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1 MR. WILLARD: That is my understanding right now.
2 Once again, I am working on Sunday night at 8:28 p.m. and
3 something that I've been aware of for a little over 24 hours.
4 But at this point in time, Your Honor has already indicated
5 which way he was going to rule, and now Plaintiffs are trying
6 to shift the ground underneath us. The fact is, as I
7 indicated to your clerk last night, Ms. McGowan and I have now
8 given up the entirety of our Sunday, we have responded in a
9 timely fashion, at the Court's request, first on a
10 three-and-a-half-hour turnaround, and then on an hour
11 turnaround, substantively responding to Plaintiffs' arguments.
12 And their responses have been long on rhetoric and short on
13 any authority. We are at a situation now where if the Court
14 is willing to do what it said it was going to do earlier in
15 this call and earlier this evening via email and deny relief,
16 we go on and we prepare for the Friday hearing. If the Court
17 is inclined to grant the relief, we would ask you to certify
18 it so that we can immediately take it up to the 11th Circuit
19 and the 11th Circuit can reassure the Plaintiff that it meant
20 what it said when it ruled in Jacobson.
21 THE COURT: All right, I am going to have to think
22 about it. I am not sure yet what I am going to do, but I need
23 to do some research and think about it a little bit. I am
24 trying to -- I would like, Mr. Willard -- I am sure we are
25 going to talk again tomorrow. I guess we ought to just --
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1 let's plan on an 11 o'clock Zoom hearing tomorrow to address
2 some of these issues. And I am going to want to know -- let
3 me just say, in terms of what I am thinking out loud is that
4 if I were to allow -- let me first ask this question of
5 Ms. Powell and Mr. Wood. If I were to allow the forensic
6 inspection of either the Cobb or Gwinnett or Cherokee or Hart,
7 whatever -- wouldn't it just be sufficient to add one of those
8 counties? If it is the same machine?
9 MS. POWELL: No, Your Honor. The counties can read
10 differently. We really request Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee
11 counties at the bare minimum.
12 THE COURT: Okay. I hear you.
13 MS. POWELL: And we can add those as Defendants
14 tonight if that is important to the Court. I really don't
15 think it's necessary as a matter of law, but we can certainly
16 add them.
17 THE COURT: Who exactly would you move to add?
18 MS. POWELL: The Board of Elections of each -- all
19 the members of the boards of those four counties. We would
20 have to add 12 people.
21 THE COURT: I heard three counties. Cobb, Gwinnett,
22 and Cherokee.
23 MS. POWELL: Three counties, but four people per
24 county, is my understanding.
25 THE COURT: Okay. Here is what I would like to do.
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1 Mr. Willard, if you could tell me when we resume tomorrow at
2 11:00, if you could tell me, having done a little research,
3 what impact, if any, allowing this forensic examination on
4 these three counties' machines would have on the elections
5 that are supposed to take place Tuesday? It may be that there
6 is no election in any of those counties, there may be an
7 election in all three of them. I have no idea.
8 MS. POWELL: It is my understanding, Your Honor,
9 there is no election in those three counties.
10 THE COURT: Let me have that confirmed. I will give
11 Mr. Willard a chance to confirm that tomorrow. And also --
12 MR. WILLARD: That was Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee.
13 Correct, Your Honor?
15 MS. POWELL: Correct.
16 THE COURT: I want to hear a little more on the
17 issue of how would -- you know, one of the issues in the
18 decision of whether to grant injunctive relief is what harm
19 the party opposing the injunction would suffer if the relief
20 were granted. That is one of the four factors that I am sure
21 all of you know quite well, I certainly would expect that you
22 do. I know you do. I would like to hear, Mr. Willard, from
23 you tomorrow morning if you could please tell me -- if you
24 could answer that question for me. What harm would it do the
25 State or to these Defendants, including any newly added
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1 Defendants, if I were to grant that relief?
2 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, I will do my best, but it
3 may not be me on the call. As I indicated to your clerk,
4 we've got two brief responses in the Woods case due on
5 Tuesday. We've already had to give up our Sunday responding
6 to this, after I asked your clerk last night not to schedule
7 anything until after those briefs were filed. Now because of
8 Plaintiffs' shifting demands, they want to go forward with a
9 hearing in the morning. Whoever is going to respond to that
10 hearing is going to have to take time away from getting the
11 responses filed in the 11th Circuit on Tuesday, including our
12 client, in the midst of an ongoing state-wide recount for
13 President, in the midst of conducting and supporting county
14 election officials with the December 1st election, as well as
15 getting ready for early and advanced voting for the January
16 5th election. We --
17 THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Willard. Let me ask a
18 question of Ms. Powell. If there are in fact no elections
19 taking place in those three counties, why does this have to be
20 done tomorrow? Why do we have to have the answer to this by
21 tomorrow or Tuesday?
22 MS. POWELL: Time is of the essence, Your Honor, on
23 the entire election proceeding.
24 THE COURT: I got you. In other words, the general
25 time-is-of-the-essence principle. It sounds to me like having
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1 a response by 11:00 tomorrow is not necessary and would be
2 unreasonable to expect the Secretary of State, the Governor
3 and the Elections Board Defendants to be able to respond so
4 quickly. So here is what I am going to do. I am going to
5 reserve ruling. I am going to keep the schedule regarding
6 briefing and the hearing, and I am going to reserve ruling on
7 the Plaintiffs' request -- I am going to consider it a motion
8 to amend the pleadings, and a motion to add as parties these
9 elections officers in Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee counties.
10 I want the Secretary of State to let me know -- I will give
11 you a deadline in the second, but what I want the Secretary of
12 State and the other Defendants to let me know is what
13 opposition, if any, they have or what conditions they would
14 like to see complied with if these machines are going to be
15 inspected. In other words, if they want their own inspector
16 there, et cetera. I agree with Ms. Powell on the general
17 principle that time is of the essence, but it is not at all
18 reasonable to give the Defendants in this case until 11
19 o'clock tomorrow morning. There is just no way they can do
20 that. I am trying to decide right now how much time to give
21 them. It certainly is going to be this week. I guess,
22 Mr. Willard, what I would like you to do is let me know, as
23 soon as you find out, but in any event you are going to have
24 to let me know by Wednesday. That is what my first blush
25 issue is this issue. I just don't see what the urgency is.
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1 The case will still be pending after this week. So I just --
2 you know, I understand the -- I completely understand the
3 general urgency of the case, but the Defendants have got to
4 have a little bit of time to provide that information I want,
5 which again namely is whether they would oppose these three
6 counties' machines being forensically examined, and why they
7 would -- what the basis for any such opposition would be, and
8 I would want that supported with an affidavit or affidavits
9 from an expert or experts or somebody affiliated with the
10 Defendants who could provide evidence to why that would be
11 harmful. Again, we are focusing on the -- I believe is the
12 third prong -- I may have them in the wrong order -- of the
13 four-part test, which is what the harm would be to the party
14 opposing the injunctive relief. So that is going to be the
15 order of the Court. And I will --
16 MR. KLEINHENDLER: Your Honor.
17 THE COURT: Yes, sir?
18 MR. KLEINHENDLER: I wanted to make one point here.
19 And that is, I understand the State's concern about having us
20 go in and look at their machines. However, what we have
21 alleged with affidavit testimony is that they are erasing
22 their machines. So while they are thinking about what the
23 harm is, and while they are figuring out where their elections
24 are that they can't identify, at a minimum, Your Honor, where
25 there are no elections to be taking place, there should be an
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1 order entered now that no machine should be erased. Because
2 that is very troubling, it is spoliation, it's irreparable
3 injury. That is point one. I want to make one other point
4 for you, Your Honor. They mentioned that the county is under
5 an obligation to preserve the evidence of the election. Let
6 me explain to you what they preserve. They have these
7 machines that people vote on, and they produce these memory
8 cards. They make a copy of the memory card, but the machine
9 stays the same. It's sort of like you have an iPhone --
11 MR. KLEINHENDLER: You can take out the sim, right?
13 MR. KLEINHENDLER: So I would ask Your Honor to
14 please order no more erasing machines that are not being --
15 THE COURT: Okay.
16 MR. KLEINHENDLER: -- used for these local
17 elections --
18 THE COURT: That sounds reasonable to me,
19 Mr. Willard, until we resolve this in just a few days. Do
20 your clients have any objection to that? The way I would
21 phrase it, and I am going to give you a chance to respond to
22 this, but my inclination is to order and temporarily restrain
23 the Defendants to the extent it is within their lawful
24 authority, from altering or destroying or erasing or allowing
25 the alteration, destruction, or erasing of any of the computer
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1 information on any of the machines in these three counties
2 that we discussed, specifically Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee.
3 What is y'all's response? What is the State's response to
4 that, Mr. Willard?
5 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, I will say that there are
6 no State officials, there is no one within the direction and
7 control of any of the named State Defendants who is going to
8 be doing anything in regards to this voting equipment this
9 week or in the coming months. So you still have the same
10 redressability issue. You can order us to stop all you want,
11 but if we are not the ones behind the wheel, it is not doing
12 anything.
13 THE COURT: Well then I would think that the
14 Defendants wouldn't have any problem being ordered to stop.
15 If they are not doing anything, there is nothing for them to
16 stop. So that is going to be another feature of this order.
17 And we are not going to enter a written order, it will be in
18 the transcript. But again, to the extent that it's within the
19 Defendants' lawful authority, they shall not alter, destroy,
20 or erase any of this information from any of these three
21 computers, nor will they allow anyone within their control and
22 authority, legal authority, from doing any of those things.
23 It sounds to me like you've been put on notice, Plaintiffs'
24 counsel, by Mr. Willard, quite clearly that you need to direct
25 these concerns towards these county officials. The State, in
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1 this -- obviously the Defendants in this case are disavowing
2 any authority or any responsibility or connection with these
3 county machines in this sense, they are not going to be going
4 down to any -- they are not going down to Lawrenceville or
5 Canton, or Marietta to try to erase any of these machines, the
6 concern that -- is Mr. Kleinhendler?
7 MR. KLEINHENDLER: Kleinhendler, Your Honor.
8 THE COURT: I was close. Closer than you usually
9 get, I'll bet. So let's do that. Why don't we do this, why
10 don't we have a Zoom call tomorrow afternoon at 4 o'clock
11 where we will wait to hear back from someone on behalf of the
12 Defendants, if it is either Mr. Willard or someone else, to
13 respond, and let us know if there is something that the Court
14 is missing regarding the inspection, the forensic examination
15 of these machines. So my --
16 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor?
18 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, we have moved again from
19 Wednesday. To say --
20 THE COURT: All I want tomorrow, Rus, is an update.
21 If they can give us an update. If you want to update. In
22 fact, I will leave it like that. But if you want to update
23 us, just let us know tomorrow, and we'll be ready for a call
24 at 4 o'clock. But if you don't have anything to report
25 tomorrow, that is perfectly fine. I understand the competing
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1 interests that the Defendants have. They are trying to juggle
2 a lot of balls in the air at one time. I understand that.
3 Let me know if you know something tomorrow. And if not -- I
4 guess, you know, I am -- I have to admit, you know, when I
5 think out loud like this, which is not something judges enjoy
6 doing because it gets pointed out to them that they are
7 changing their mind. And I am inclined to agree with
8 Mr. Willard on this. Let's wait until Wednesday to hear back
9 from Mr. Willard. How about something in writing,
10 Mr. Willard, by the same time that the brief is due on
11 Wednesday, 5:00 p.m., in response to this inquiry that the
12 Court has as to the basis for any opposition by the Defendants
13 to this particular relief regarding the forensic examination
14 of the Dominion equipment in these three counties. That is
15 what the order of the Court is going to be. And contrary to
16 what I said a minute ago, I will put it in writing so everyone
17 can see it and it will be clear and you don't have to read the
18 transcript. That order will be entered either tonight or
19 more -- I would say almost certainly not until tomorrow
20 morning. Okay? Anything else, Counsel? Yes, sir?
21 MR. WILLARD: Just two procedural points. One, do
22 you want as a unified filing on Wednesday, or do you want us
23 to make them as two separate filings?
24 THE COURT: Separate filings.
25 MR. WILLARD: All right. So I won't need, I think
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1 at this juncture, to ask for a page limit extension, but I may
2 revisit that issue with the Court.
3 THE COURT: You can have however many pages you
4 need. There is no limit on the pages.
5 MR. MACDOUGALD: The Plaintiffs as well, Your Honor?
6 THE COURT: The Plaintiffs' response as well.
7 MR. MACDOUGALD: Thank you.
8 MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, the second point, and now
9 that you have said that you are going to reduce this to
10 writing, I know that there has been a lot of rumor, innuendo,
11 and misinformation spread out there regarding what has taken
12 place in a number of courts around the country, and this Court
13 today, there were a number of social media posts made about
14 this Court's indication of the two earlier rulings.
16 MR. WILLARD: I ask you to make clear in your order
17 that only the State Defendants are being enjoined by anything
18 in your order and it is not enjoining any county officials
19 from doing anything.
20 THE COURT: Not at this time. They are not parties
21 to the case yet.
22 MR. WILLARD: Thank you.
23 MR. WOOD: Judge, for what it's worth, when we add
24 them tonight, we will be sending spoliation litigation hold
25 letters. I think they have already received those a week ago,
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1 but we will redo it.
2 THE COURT: And Mr. Willard, just to be clear, you
3 are referring to -- you refer to the Governor and the
4 Secretary of State, not the other members of the Elections
5 Board? Is that right?
6 MR. WILLARD: I am actually referring -- I'm sorry?
7 THE COURT: The Governor and the Secretary of State.
8 Let's see, of course I don't -- the Governor is a party and of
9 course the Secretary of State is a party, and then we have
10 the --
11 MR. WILLARD: The Election Board --
12 THE COURT: -- four other Election Board members.
13 And what you just wanted to make clear to me, or clarify with
14 me, was that it was your understanding that the order I am
15 going to enter would only be enjoining the Governor and the
16 Secretary of State and not the four Election Board members who
17 are also named as Defendants. Am I right about that?
18 MR. WILLARD: No, Your Honor. I am requesting that
19 you make clear in your order that only the State Defendants
20 are enjoined, and there is no injunction against any of the
21 unnamed county defendants.
22 MR. KLEINHENDLER: Your Honor, this is Howard again.
23 I think your language earlier was right on. You said you are
24 going to enjoin the State Defendants and anybody in their
25 control. And our argument is that all these counties are
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1 under the control of the Secretary of State. So now if the
2 State wants to play a game and say, well, we have no ability
3 to control the counties, okay, we will deal with that on a
4 sanctions motion. But I think you were very clear, Your
5 Honor, anybody -- the Defendants and anybody under their
6 control. What the State is asking for now is to wiggle out of
7 that order, and I would urge you not to give to them that
8 language. It is enough for you to say the Defendants in the
9 case and anybody under their control.
10 THE COURT: Okay. I understand the issue. The only
11 point I was trying to make with Mr. Willard was I was trying
12 to see if he was trying to exclude the Governor. I understand
13 that his main point was really that I was not ordering
14 directly any county officials to do or not do anything. I
15 understand that that is what he was saying. I think I
16 understand it. I am actually clear on it. So I think
17 everybody has their marching orders, we know what to do. I am
18 the one that has to move next. I have to enter an order that
19 clarifies all of this, and I think I do that with no problem.
20 It will probably be in the morning, okay?
21 MR. MACDOUGALD: Judge, one housekeeping matter. In
22 terms of serving future papers and filings on the Defendants,
23 can we agree or can the Court order that service on
24 Mr. Willard and Ms. McGowan is sufficient service on the State
25 Defendants?
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1 THE COURT: I can't order them to waive their right
2 to be served.
3 MR. MACDOUGALD: Okay, but what we would have to do
4 otherwise is send the papers directly to the State Defendants.
5 THE COURT: Right. That is a matter for you and
6 Mr. Willard to discuss when I am not on the line. If the
7 Defendants want to acknowledge and waive service that is fine,
8 and if they don't that is not something that I am going to
9 upset with a ruling.
10 MR. MACDOUGALD: Okay.
11 THE COURT: We are adjourned, and you will hear from
12 me in the morning. Y'all have a good night.
13 (End of hearing at 8:48 p.m.)
14 * * * * *
16
19
20 _________________________________
Lori Burgess
23 Date: November 30, 2020
24
25
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR

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CASE NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CORECO JA’QAN PEARSON, VIKKI TOWNSEND CONSIGLIO, GLORIA KAY

STATE OF GEORGIA, BRIAN KEMP, in his official capacity as Governor of

/s/ Howard Kleinhendler

Transcript of 12/7/20 Motions Hearing 3

1-1 Aﬀ. of Briggs.pdf 151

1-2 Aﬀ. of Redacted.pdf 184

1-3 Aﬀ. of Cardozo.pdf 193

1-4 Aﬀ. of Hursti.pdf 199

1-5 Aﬀ. of Hursti (Embedded).pdf 248

1-7 Pro V&V Report.pdf 370

1-8 Study of BMDs.pdf 398

1-9 Aﬀ. of Spider.pdf 432

1-10 Aﬀ. of Ramsland.pdf 450

1-11 Aﬀ. of Romera.pdf 462

1-12 Aﬀ. of Coleman.pdf 467

1-13 Aﬀ of Diedrich.pdf 472

1-14 Aﬀ of Wolf.pdf 478

1-15 Aﬀ. of Zeher.pdf 480

1-16 Aﬀ. of Voyles.pdf 502

1-17 Aﬀ. of Reyes.pdf 513

1-18 Aﬀ. of Johnson.pdf 521

1-19 Aﬀ. of Silva.pdf 525

1-20 Aﬀ. of O'Neal.pdf 532

1-21 Aﬀ. of Fisher.pdf 539

1-22 Aﬀ. of Peterford.pdf 544

1-23 TX SOS Report.pdf 566

1-24 Ltr. Maloney to Smartmatic.pdf 570

1-25 Aﬀ. of Cobucci.pdf 573

1-26 Ltr. from Senator Warren.pdf 579

1-27 Aﬀ. of Quinnell.pdf 595

1-28 Aﬀ. of Harrison.pdf 615

1-29 Aﬀ. of Branton.pdf 619

3 Request for Issuance of Summons.pdf 637

3-1 Le Proposed Summons.pdf 625

3-2 Mashburn Proposed Summons.pdf 627

3-3 Raﬀensperger Proposed Summons.pdf 629

3-4 Sullivan Proposed Summons.pdf 631

3-5 Worley Proposed Summons.pdf 633

3-6 Kemp Proposed Summons.pdf 635

4 Cert. of Intereseted Persons.pdf 641

5 Motion to File Aﬀ. Under Seal.pdf 688

5-1 Aﬀ. of Redacted.pdf 648

5-2 Redacted Joint Cybersecurity Report.pdf 657

5-3 Redacted Joint Cybersecurity Report.pdf 675

5-4 Proposed Order Granting Motion.pdf 686

6 Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief.pdf 764

6-1 Aﬀ. of Ayyadurai.pdf 699

6-2 Joint Cybersecurity Advisory.pdf 745

6-3 Proposed Order.pdf 756

7 NOF Recacted Declaration.pdf 800

7-1 Redacted Declaration.pdf 794

8 Sullivan Summons.pdf 804

9 Summons to Mashburn.pdf 806

10 David Worley Summons.pdf 808

11 Kemp Summons.pdf 810

13 Summons to Anh Le.pdf 814

14 Order on Request for ...ency Injuctive Relief.pdf 816

15 Order Certifying for Immediate Review.pdf 820

16 Charlene McGowan Entry.pdf 822

17 Order setting hearing and briefing schedule.pdf 826

18 Minute Entry re- 11-29-20 Proceedings.pdf 828