P R O C E E D I N G S OF T H E

BRITISH ACADEMY
VOLUME LXV

1979

LONDON
PUBLISHED FOR THE BRITISH ACADEMY
τ

DAWES H I C K S LECTURE

CONFLICTING APPEARANCES'
BY M . F . B U R N Y E A T

Read 1 February 1979

M y i n c a p a c i t y t o e x t e n d t h e b o u n d a r y o f m y 'this', m y inability t o g a i n
a n i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e of t h a t i n w h i c h it is s u b o r d i n a t e d a n d
reduced—is m y m e r e imperfection. Because I c a n n o t spread o u t m y
w i n d o w until all is t r a n s p a r e n t , a n d all w i n d o w s d i s a p p e a r , t h i s does
n o t j u s t i f y m e i n insisting o n m y w i n d o w - f r a m e ' s r i g i d i t y . F o r t h a t
f r a m e has, as s u c h , n o existence in r e a l i t y , b u t o n l y i n o u r i m p o t e n c e .
F. H. Bradley.

F ^ R O M t h e fact t h a t h o n e y a p p e a r s b i t t e r to some a n d
sweet to o t h e r s D e m o c r i t u s c o n c l u d e d t h a t it is n e i t h e r
sweet nor b i t t e r , H e r a c l i t u s t h a t it is b o t h . ' T h i s r e p o r t
f r o m Sextus E m p i r i c u s [PH ii. 63) testifies t h a t a r g u m e n t s
f r o m conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s c a m e early to t h e r e p e r t o i r e of
philosophy. D e m o c r i t u s ' p u r p o s e w a s to establish t h e v i e w
s u m m e d u p i n a f a m o u s f r a g m e n t : 'Sweet exists b y c o n v e n t i o n ,
b i t t e r by c o n v e n t i o n , c o l o u r b y c o n v e n t i o n ; i n reality a t o m s
a n d t h e void exist' (frag. 125). I f w e speak of h o n e y as sweet,
it is because this is the r e s p o n s e s a n c t i o n e d b y c u s t o m a n d
c o n v e n t i o n , especially linguistic c o n v e n t i o n , t o t h e w a y c e r t a i n
a t o m s i m p i n g e o n o u r o r g a n s of taste, b u t t h e r e is n o m o r e
to it t h a n t h a t : n o m o r e t h a n a response t o a t o m i c stimuli.
T e r m s like ' s w e e t ' a n d ' b i t t e r ' , ' w h i t e ' a n d ' b l a c k ' , c o r r e s p o n d
to n o t h i n g i n t h e collections of a t o m s w h i c h constitute t h e
t h i n g s in t h e w o r l d a r o u n d us. O u r a t t r i b u t i o n s of w h a t w e r e
l a t e r to be c a l l e d s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s are a p r o j e c t i o n o n to
t h a t world of o u r o w n , m e r e l y subjective affections.
H e r a c l i t u s ' message w a s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t : n o t t h e e m p t y s u b -
j e c t i v i t y of sensible a p p e a r a n c e s b u t their o n e - s i d e d p a r t i a l i t y .
I t m a y be q u e s t i o n e d w h e t h e r h e actually u s e d t h e h o n e y
e x a m p l e , b u t t h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t his s t r a n g e g n o m i c
u t t e r a n c e s i n c l u d e others t o t h e s a m e or similar effect.
 104 PROCEEDINGS O F THE BRITISH ACADEMY
S e a is t h e m o s t p u r e a n d t h e m o s t p o l l u t e d w a t e r : d r i n k a b l e a n d
s a l u t a r y f o r fishes, b u t u n d r i n k a b l e a n d d e s t r u c t i v e f o r m e n .
(frag. 6i)
A g a i n , ' D o n k e y s w o u l d c h o o s e c h a f f r a t h e r t h a n gold' ( f r a g . 9 ) ,
'Pigs e n j o y m u d r a t h e r t h a n clean w a t e r ' f o r w a s h i n g i n ( f r a g .
13 w i t h Sext. E m p . PHi. 5 6 ) . A r e t h e y r i g h t or w e ? T h e i m p l i e d
a n s w e r is t h a t e a c h is r i g h t — f r o m h i s o w n p o i n t of v i e w . I t
follows t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t b u t e q u a l l y v a l i d p o i n t s of v i e w a r e
o n e - s i d e d , p a r t i a l reflections of r e a l i t y . A t s o m e d e e p e r level,
f r o m a s i t ^vere a n a b s o l u t e g o d ' s - e y e v a n t a g e - p o i n t , t h e o p p o -
sition a n d c o n t r a s t is o v e r c o m e . T h e sea is b o t h p u r e a n d i m -
p u r e ; m u d is b o t h clean a n d d i r t y ; r u b b i s h is w e a l t h . I t s o u n d s
like a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , a n d so it i s — w i t h i n o u r h u m a n l a n g u a g e .
O u r l a n g u a g e is so s t r u c t u r e d t h a t t o call s o m e t h i n g p u r e is
to i m p l y t h a t i t is n o t i m p u r e a n d v i c e versa. B u t t h a t o n l y
raises t h e q u e s t i o n , a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of t h e q u e s t i o n w e m e t
with in Democritus, w h e t h e r the oppositions and contrasts
e n c o d e d in o u r l a n g u a g e c o r r e s p o n d t o a n y t h i n g in r e a l i t y .
M a y b e t h e l a n g u a g e w h i c h m a k e s u s t r e a t t h e conflict o f a p -
p e a r a n c e s as a conflict, w h i c h m a k e s u s s a y t h a t w h e r e a p p e a r -
a n c e s c o n f l i c t b o t h c a n n o t b e r i g h t , is itself a n aspect o f o u r
anthropocentric partiality.
B u t w e b e g a n with S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s , a n d Sextus, as a g o o d
P y r r h o n i a n sceptic, h a s h i s o w n m o r a l t o d r a w f r o m t h e f a c t
t h a t h o n e y a p p e a r s b i t t e r t o s o m e a n d s w e e t t o others. T h e
s c e p t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n is t h a t t h e r e is n o s a y i n g w h i c h it i s ; o n e
m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t o n w h e t h e r it is r e a l l y sweet o r r e a l l y
b i t t e r ( P / / i . l o i , 2 1 3 - 1 4 ) . A n d P y r r h o n i a n scepticism e x t e n d s
this p a t t e r n of r e a s o n i n g b e y o n d t h e field of sensible a p p e a r a n c e s
t o e v e r y s u b j e c t of i n q u i r y . I n m o r a l s , f o r e x a m p l e , b e c a u s e t o
s o m e societies o r i n d i v i d u a l s it a p p e a r s r i g h t , t o others w r o n g ,
f o r a m a n t o m a r r y h i s sister or h a v e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e i n
p u b l i c , t h e s c e p t i c s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t o n w h e t h e r it is r i g h t
o r w r o n g ( F N i. 1 4 5 - 6 3 ) . S i m i l a r l y w i t h a n y q u e s t i o n a b o u t
h o w t h i n g s r e a l l y a r e — t h e r e is a l w a y s a c o n f l i c t of a p p e a r a n c e s
a n d a l w a y s t h e sceptic f i n d s himself u n a b l e t o d e c i d e b e t w e e n
them.
W e n o w h a v e three different, actually three incompatible
c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m a single p r e m i s s . W h i c h m i g h t seem m o r e t h a n
enough. But w e have yet to reckon with Protagoras. I t was
p r o b a b l y P r o t a g o r a s , w i t h s o m e p r e c e d e n t in H e r a c l i t u s , w h o
g a v e c u r r e n c y t o the e x t e n d e d n o t i o n of a p p e a r a n c e w h e r e b y
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 71
s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n b u t w h e r e v e r t h e r e is d i s a g r e e m e n t a n d o n e
v i e w is o p p o s e d t o a n o t h e r . A n d t h e m o r a l P r o t a g o r a s d r e w
w a s t h a t e a c h of t h e c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s is t r u e for t h e
p e r s o n whose a p p e a r a n c e it is. H i s d o c t r i n e t h a t m a n is t h e
m e a s u r e of all t h i n g s r e c o m m e n d s a relativistic a c c o u n t of
t r u t h w h i c h a l l o w s t h e h o n e y t o b e b o t h sweet a n d bitter, s u b -
j e c t t o the q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t it is s w e e t for (in r e l a t i o n to) s o m e
p a l a t e s a n d b i t t e r for o t h e r s . By r e l a t i v i z i n g t h e a t t r i b u t i o n s
of s w e e t a n d b i t t e r P r o t a g o r a s a v o i d s the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s e m -
b r a c e d by H e r a c l i t u s . S i m i l a r l y i n m o r a l s , t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t
m a n is the m e a s u r e of all t h i n g s asserts t h a t m a r r y i n g o n e ' s
sister is right f o r o n e i n d i v i d u a l o r society, w r o n g for a n o t h e r .
S o f a r we h a v e f o u r a n c i e n t c h a r a c t e r s on t h e s t a g e . W e s h o u l d
b r i n g on s o m e of their m o d e r n - d r e s s c o u n t e r p a r t s . A n d first
Berkeley. Y o u d o n o t h a v e t o r e a d f a r i n t o t h e f i r s t of Berkeley's
Three Dialogues b e f o r e y o u f i n d t h e f o l l o w i n g :
T h a t which a t o t h e r times s e e m s sweet, shall to a d i s t e m p e r e d p a l a t e
a p p e a r bitter. A n d n o t h i n g c a n b e p l a i n e r , t h a n t h a t divers p e r s o n s
p e r c e i v e d i f f e r e n t tastes in t h e s a m e f o o d , since t h a t w h i c h o n e m a n
d e l i g h t s in, a n o t h e r a b h o r s . A n d h o w c o u l d this b e , i f the t a s t e w a s
s o m e t h i n g r e a l l y i n h e r e n t i n t h e f o o d ? ( p . 180)'
Berkeley agrees with D e m o c r i t u s in concluding from the con-
flict of a p p e a r a n c e s t h a t t h e f o o d is n o t i n h e r e n t l y sweet or
b i t t e r . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e sides w i t h H e r a c l i t u s a n d P r o t a -
g o r a s against D e m o c r i t u s i n w a n t i n g t o c o u n t b o t h a p p e a r a n c e s
v e r i d i c a l . T h e r e r e a l l y is s o m e t h i n g sweet a n d s o m e t h i n g b i t t e r .
B u t since ( c o n t r a r y to H e r a c l i t u s ) n o t h i n g c a n b e b o t h s w e e t
a n d bitter, t h e sweet t h i n g a n d t h e b i t t e r t h i n g are s e p a r a t e
a n d distinct. T h e sweetness b e l o n g s t o a n i d e a p e r c e i v e d b y or
i n t h e m i n d of o n e p e r s o n , t h e b i t t e r n e s s to a n i d e a p e r c e i v e d b y
or i n t h e m i n d of a n o t h e r ( o r t h e s a m e person a t a n o t h e r t i m e ) .
T h i s looks like P r o t a g o r a s , since s w e e t a n d b i t t e r alike exist
o n l y f o r o n e w h o tastes it, a n d w e s h a l l see t h a t it does h a v e a
lot i n c o m m o n w i t h a t h e o r y of p e r c e p t u a l r e l a t i v i s m w h i c h
P l a t o d e v e l o p e d o u t of P r o t a g o r e a n m a t e r i a l s i n t h e Theaetetus,
w h i c h t h e o r y B e r k e l e y h i m s e l f t h o u g h t was e x a c t l y like his o w n
(Siris, § 311). B u t t h e r e is i n f a c t a d i f f e r e n c e . W h e n P r o t a g o r a s
says t h a t s o m e t h i n g exists f o r t h e p e r s o n to w h o m it a p p e a r s ,
h e does not i n t e n d Berkeley's idealist conclusion that sensible
I References to the Three Dialogues a r e b y page n u m b e r in The Works
of George Berkeley, ed. A. A. L u c e a n d T . E. Jessop, vol. ii ( L o n d o n ,
104
PROCEEDINGS O F T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
q u a l i t i e s exist i n t h e m i n d w h i c h p e r c e i v e s theni.^ I n this lec-
ture I shall be m o r e concerned with the resemblances than w i t h
t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n B e r k e l e y a n d P r o t a g o r a s , b u t in v i e w of
t h e d i f f e r e n c e j u s t n o t e d w e s h o u l d in p r i n c i p l e c o u n t Berkeley's
a fifth c o n c l u s i o n f r o m t h e p r e m i s s of c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s .
T h e c o n c l u s i o n , n a m e l y , t h a t e a c h a p p e a r a n c e reveals a dis-
t i n c t b u t m e n t a l existence.
T h e issue b e t w e e n B e r k e l e y a n d P r o t a g o r a s b r e a k s o u t a g a i n
in twentieth-century disputes about whether sense-data are
m e n t a l o r m e r e l y d e p e n d e n t for t h e i r e x i s t e n c e on a m i n d
perceiving them. For in t h e twentieth century arguments f r o m
c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s h a v e f r e q u e n t l y b e e n u s e d to e s t a b l i s h
t h a t w h a t w e p e r c e i v e is s e n s e - d a t a r a t h e r t h a n p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s .
Russell, f o r e x a m p l e , in The Problems of Philosophy^ c h a p , i, a r g u e s
t h a t b e c a u s e a t a b l e a p p e a r s t o b e of d i f f e r e n t c o l o u r s a n d o f dif-
f e r e n t s h a p e s f r o m d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of v i e w , as t h e result of v a r i a -
tions i n l i g h t i n g a n d p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e r e f o r e we d o n o t see t h e r e a l
c o l o u r o r t h e r e a l s h a p e of t h e t a b l e . W e m a y say, f o r the p u r p o s e s
of o r d i n a r y p r a c t i c a l life, t h a t t h e r e a l c o l o u r of t h e t a b l e is b r o w n
a n d its r e a l s h a p e r e c t a n g u l a r , b u t all w e a c t u a l l y see is a series
of a p p e a r a n c e s (sense-data) n o o n e o f w h i c h h a s m o r e r i g h t
t h a n its c o m p e t i t o r s to s t a n d a s t h e t a b l e ' s r e a l c o l o u r or s h a p e .
O t h e r t h e o r i s t s i n t r o d u c e s e n s e - d a t a b y w a y of ' t h e a r g u m e n t
f r o m i l l u s i o n ' , b u t o f t e n , i n A y e r f o r e x a m p l e {The Foundations
of Empirical Knowledge, p . 3 ) , this is j u s t t h e s a m e a r g u m e n t
u n d e r a n o t h e r n a m e . T h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e is t h a t it is p r e s u p -
p o s e d — o u r m o r e sceptical c h a r a c t e r s m i g h t s a y g r a t u i t o u s l y
p r e s u p p o s e d — t h a t we k n o w w h i c h a p p e a r a n c e is c o r r e c t a n d
w h i c h t h e illusion.
C o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s c o n t i n u e t o b e p o p u l a r in m o r a l
p h i l o s o p h y also. M o s t r e c e n t l y , J . L . M a c k i e (Ethics'. Inventing
Right and Wrong, chaps. 8 a n d 10) h a s a p p e a l e d t o the r a d i c a l
d i v e r g e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e m o r a l codes o f d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s a n d
societies as s u p p o r t for t h e thesis t h a t v a l u e s a r e n o t p a r t o f t h e
o b j e c t i v e f a b r i c o f the w o r l d . If t h e y w e r e o b j e c t i v e , h e t h i n k s ,
it w o u l d be h a r d to e x p l a i n t h e d i v e r g e n c e s a n d d i s a g r e e m e n t s .
W h e r e a s if t h e y a r e i n f a c t s u b j e c t i v e , w e c a n e x p l a i n t h e e r r o -
neous c l a i m to objectivity which seems to be built into m o r a l
l a n g u a g e . I t is a p r o j e c t i o n of s u b j e c t i v e p r e f e r e n c e s a n d l o c a l
p r a c t i c e s w h i c h a r e felt t o b e in n e e d of e x t e r n a l v a l i d a t i o n .
I See m y ' I d e a l i s m a n d G r e e k Philosophy; W h a t Descartes S a w a n d
Berkeley Missed', i n G. N. A . Vesey ed.. Idealism Past and Present (Royal
Institute of PhilosoDhv Lectures i q riQ78/ql, forthcoming:).
72
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES
W e a r e b a c k , it seems, w i t h D e m o c r i t u s , e x c e p t t h a t t h e s c e n e
h a s s h i f t e d to t h e m o r a l s p h e r e . A n d t h a t is n o n o v e l t y e i t h e r .
For Democritus probably modelled his reasoning on a p a t t e r n
of a r g u m e n t w h i c h o r i g i n a t e d i n f i f t h - c e n t u r y d e b a t e s a b o u t
w h e t h e r justice a n d other values are natural or conventional.
I n o n e f o r m o r a n o t h e r , a n c i e n t d r a m a is still b e i n g r e p e a t e d .
T h a t m o r e o r less c o m p l e t e s m y c a s t of p e r f o r m e r s . T h e m i n o r
roles c a n b e filled as t h e y a r e n e e d e d . I t r e m a i n s to s p o t l i g h t
t h e c r i t i c i n t h e a u d i e n c e . I n Sense and Sensibilia, well a w a r e
t h a t h e is a t t a c k i n g a t r a d i t i o n of t h o u g h t w h i c h goes b a c k t o
Heraclitus (pp. 1-2), Austin writes:
W h a t is wrong, what is even faintly surprising, in the idea of a stick's
being straight b u t looking bent sometimes? Does anyone suppose that
if something is straight, then it jolly well has to look straight at all times
a n d in all circumstances,^ Obviously n o one seriously supposes this.
(P· 29)
T h e fact is, as w e h a v e s e e n , m a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e s u p p o s e d
e x a c t l y this. T h e y h a v e a p p e a l e d t o cases of c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r -
a n c e s in o r d e r t o call i n q u e s t i o n t h e u n q u a l i f i e d l a n g u a g e
i n w h i c h w e o r d i n a r i l y a t t r i b u t e sensible q u a l i t i e s , m o r a l
p r o p e r t i e s , a n d so o n , a n d t h e y h a v e d o n e s o in a m a n n e r
p l a i n l y p r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t it w o u l d o n l y be c o r r e c t to say w i t h o u t
f u r t h e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t h o n e y is sweet a n d t h e stick s t r a i g h t ,
o r t h a t m a r r y i n g o n e ' s sister is w r o n g , if it a p p e a r e d so t o ail
alike.
II
W h a t e m e r g e s f r o m t h i s b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l r e v i e w is a t y p i c a l
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m . I d o n o t m e a n the p r o b l e m of d e c i d i n g
w h a t does f o l l o w f r o m t h e p r e m i s s t h a t a p p e a r a n c e s c o n f l i c t .
F o r t h e a n s w e r t o t h a t q u e s t i o n , I believe, is t h a t n o t h i n g fol-
l o w s : n o t h i n g of a n y e p i s t e m o l o g i e al s i g n i f i c a n c e a t all. T h e
p r o b l e m r a t h e r is to d i s c o v e r w h y so m a n y c o n f l i c t i n g c o n -
clusions h a v e b e e n t h o u g h t to follow. W h y h a v e some philo-
s o p h e r s b e e n so i m p r e s s e d , w h i l e o t h e r s like A u s t i n r e m a i n
unimpressed, b y the familiar fact that appearances conflict?
W h a t assumptions, spoken or unspoken, are at work to m a k e
t h e f a m i l i a r f a c t seem p r o b l e m a t i c ?
T h a t t h e a n s w e r is t o b e s o u g h t , a t least s o m e t i m e s , a t t h e
level of u n s p o k e n a s s u m p t i o n s m a y begin t o l o o k likely if w e
r e t u r n to A u s t i n ' s r e m a r k t h a t n o o n e seriously s u p p o s e s t h a t
if somethingr is s t r a i g h t , t h e n it j o l l y well h a s t o look s t r a i g h t
 74 PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
a t a l l t i m e s a n d in all c i r c u m s t a n c e s . W e h a v e a l r e a d y seen
t h a t , t a k e n as a claim a b o u t t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d , this is w r o n g .
I t h a s to be w r o n g b e c a u s e t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e
equivalent b y the rule of contraposition :
(1) I f s o m e t h i n g a p p e a r s F to s o m e o b s e r v e r s a n d not-i^
t o o t h e r s , t h e n i t is n o t i n h e r e n t l y / r e a l l y / i n itself F.
(2) I f s o m e t h i n g is i n h e r e n t l y / r e a l i y / i n itself F, then it a p p e a r s
F t o all observers o r it a p p e a r s not-F t o all.
A n d f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e p r e s e n t discussion we m a y s i m p l y
b r a c k e t off a s i r r e l e v a n t t h e s e c o n d d i s j u n c t i n (2). F o r n o o n e ,
o r n o o n e e x c e p t possibly B e r k e l e y ' s H y l a s i n a m o m e n t of
d i a l e c t i c a l d e s p e r a t i o n {Three Dialogues^ p p . 181-3, 1 8 7 ) , is
g o i n g t o p r o p o s e t h a t f o r a t h i n g t o b e r e a l l y F it m u s t a p p e a r
o t h e r w i s e to e v e r y o b s e r v e r . T o b e s u r e , D e m o c r i t u s c l a i m s
t h a t t h e real properties of things a r e h i d d e n , i.e. do n o t a p p e a r
t o a n y of u s : ' M a n m u s t k n o w b y t h i s r u l e , t h a t he is c u t o f f
f r o m t h e r e a l ' (frag. 6 ) , ' I n r e a l i t y w e k n o w n o t h i n g ; f o r t h e
t r u t h is in t h e d e p t h s ' ( f r a g . 117). B u t D e m o c r i t u s c l a i m s this,
I t a k e it, n o t f r o m H y l a s ' m o t i v e b u t b e c a u s e h e a c c e p t s ( i ) ,
h e n c e also ( 2 ) , a n d h e c a n n o t find a n y i n s t a n c e w i t h i n h u m a n
e x p e r i e n c e w h e r e s o m e t h i n g a p p e a r s F to everyone.^ H o n e y
a n d t h e stick h a v e n o p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h a p p e a r t h e s a m e t o all
o b s e r v e r s , so t h e y themselves a r e m e r e l y p h e n o m e n a l , t h e e f f e c t
o n h u m a n sensibility o f t h e m o t i o n s o f a t o m s : ' I n r e a l i t y w e
k n o w n o t h i n g o f a n y t h i n g , b u t belief is a f l o w i n g in u p o n e a c h
of u s ' ( f r a g . 7 ; cf. frag. 9).^ T h u s w i t h i n t h e m a c r o s c o p i c w o r l d
of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e t h e s e c o n d d i s j u n c t of (2) is not o p e r a t i v e
f o r D e m o c r i t u s either. A n d (2) w i t h o u t its s e c o n d d i s j u n c t is
t h e v e r y t h i n g t h a t A u s t i n said n o o n e seriously supposes t o b e
t h e case.
W h a t is t r u e is t h a t a t o t a l l y explicit t e x t for (2) is r e m a r k a b l y
h a r d t o find. I n o n e v e r s i o n o r a n o t h e r f o r m u l a t i o n ( i ) a b o u n d s .
T h e a r g u m e n t s cited f r o m D e m o c r i t u s a n d P r o t a g o r a s , B e r k e l e y
a n d R u s s e l l , all rest on ( i ) , w h i l e S e x t u s q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y a p p l i e s
its e p i s t e m i c c o u n t e r p a r t
( i ' ) I f s o m e t h i n g a p p e a r s F to s o m e o b s e r v e r s a n d n o t - F
to others, then w e do not k n o w (cannot determine)
w h e t h e r i t is i n h e r e n t l y / r e a l l y / i n itself Κ
( i ' ) in t u r n transposes t o
' See D i e l s - K r a n z , Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker^ 68 A i ï 2 , A 135 §§ 63-4,
69-70.
^ See f u r t h e r D i e l s - K r a n z , 67 A 32, 68 A 37, A 57.
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 75
(2') If w e k n o w w h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g is i n h e r e n t l y / r e a l l y / i n
itself F , t h e n it a p p e a r s F t o all observers o r it a p p e a r s n o t -
Fto all.
B u t I c a n find n o clear i n s t a n c e o f (2') in t h e l e n g t h y e p i s t e m o -
l o g i c a l d i s q u i s i t i o n s of S e x t u s ' Outlines of Pyrrhonism a n d Ad-
versus Mathematicos. O n c e or t w i c e we c a t c h a g l i m p s e o f (2)
{PH\. 177, iii. 179, ? M vili. 3 7 ) , b u t it is t h e e x c e p t i o n r a t h e r
t h a n the r u l e . S i m i l a r l y w i t h Berkeley, I c o u n t s o m e e i g h t
i n s t a n c e s of ( i ) in t h e first Dialogue,^ as a g a i n s t a m e r e c o u p l e
o f instances of (2), a n d t h e s e last a r e in a n y c a s e c o n f u s e d w i t h
s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t (see V b e l o w ) . As for R u s s e l l ' s t r e a t m e n t
o f these issues in The Problems of Philosophy^ i t is all b a s e d o n
( i ) with n o t so m u c h as a h i n t of (2).
W^e m a y w o n d e r w h y p e o p l e s h o u l d b e s h y of t a k i n g t h e i r
s t a n d on f o r m u l a t i o n (2). A n d w h y , for t h a t m a t t e r , A u s t i n
s h o u l d s e e m i n g l y h a v e f a i l e d to n o t i c e t h a t w h a t he says n o o n e
w o u l d seriously s u p p o s e is j u s t a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e sort of
v i e w he h a s b e e n s h o o t i n g a t all along. P e r h a p s t h e r e a s o n is
t h a t (2) is manifestly i m p l a u s i b l e i n some w a y t h a t ( i ) is n o t .
T h a t would i m p l y that ( i ) has b e e n persuasive because it w r a p s
t h i n g s u p a b i t , keeps h i d d e n a n i n f l u e n c e w h i c h c o m e s closer
t o t h e s u r f a c e in (2). I a m g o i n g to p r o p o s e t h a t t h e h i d d e n
i n f l u e n c e is a c e r t a i n u n d e c l a r e d p i c t u r e or m o d e l of w h a t p e r -
c e p t i o n is o r o u g h t to b e like. I t is a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e p i c t u r e ,
even more inappropriate w h e n carried over into the moral
s p h e r e , a n d f o r t h a t r e a s o n it is n o t s o m e t h i n g a p h i l o s o p h e r
will r e a d i l y a c k n o w l e d g e , e v e n t o himself
T h e r e a r e , I fear, o b v i o u s p i t f a l l s in t h e w a y of a d i a g n o s i s
s u c h as this. T h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y m u s t respect its texts
a n d the a r g u m e n t s in t h o s e texts, a n d if o n e is going to suggest
t h a t t h e r e is m o r e to a n a r g u m e n t t h a n a p p e a r s in the t e x t o n e
n e e d s to h a v e g o o d g r o u n d s i n t h e t e x t itself. W e h a v e all k n o w n
occasions w h e n it was r e a s o n a b l e t o say of s o m e o n e , ' H e o n l y
m a i n t a i n s t h a t b e c a u s e a t s o m e level he t h i n k s t h a t q, a l t h o u g h
h e m i g h t n o t a c c e p t q if h e w a s explicitly a s k e d a b o u t it.' But
w e also k n o w t h a t this t y p e of diagnosis c a n b e a b u s e d , a n d in
t h e history o f p h i l o s o p h y it h a s s o m e t i m e s b e e n a b u s e d . Being
m i n d f u l , t h e r e f o r e , of t h e d a n g e r s a h e a d , I p r o p o s e to set o u t
f r o m a . d e t a i l e d t e x t u a l e x a m i n a t i o n of o n e of t h e a r g u m e n t s
f r o m c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s w h e r e , if I a m r i g h t , the i n f l u e n c e
of a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e m o d e l of p e r c e p t i o n c a n b e d i s c e r n e d .
' pp. i80j 181, 185,? 186, 189 (3 times), 191.
 104
PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
B u t a t o n c e w e f a c e a h i s t o r i c a l p r o b l e m . W e c a n n o t go d i -
rectly to P r o t a g o r a s or D e m o c r i t u s , since t h e i r a r g u m e n t s s u r -
vive o n l y i n s e c o n d - h a n d r e p o r t s ; a n d H e r a c l i t u s p r e f e r r e d
g n o m i c p a r a d o x t o the m u n d a n e p r o c e s s of g e t t i n g f r o m
p r e m i s e s t o conclusions. T h e earliest r e a s o n e d a r g u m e n t o n
o u r s u b j e c t w h i c h w e c a n s t u d y in t h e o r i g i n a l w o r d s is a n
a r g u m e n t i n P l a t o ' s Theaetetiis o n b e h a l f of P r o t a g o r e a n rela^
tivism, o c c u r r i n g i n a p a s s a g e (153 D - 1 5 4 B) w h i c h has n e v e r ,
I t h i n k , b e e n g i v e n the e x t e n d e d discussion it deserves. P r o t a -
g o r a s is t h e b e n e f i c i a r y of t h e a r g u m e n t , n o t its a u t h o r : t h e r e
is e v e r y r e a s o n t o think t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t is a dialectical
c o n s t r u c t i o n b y P l a t o himself, r a t h e r t h a n s o m e t h i n g e x t r a c t e d
f r o m P r o t a g o r a s ' o w n w r i t i n g s . C o n s e q u e n t l y w e must b e a r
in m i n d t h a t w e shall be v i e w i n g t h e a r g u m e n t i n a d o u b l e
p e r s p e c t i v e , o u r o w n a n d P l a t o ' s . T h i s is P l a t o ' s a t t e m p t t o
b r i n g o u t t h e k i n d of t h i n k i n g w h i c h l e a d s to a relativistic
a c c o u n t o f sensible qualities, so it a l r e a d y c o n t a i n s a n e l e m e n t
of d i a g n o s i s . I b e l i e v e , h o w e v e r , t h a t P l a t o ' s d i a g n o s i s is o n t h e
r i g h t lines, a n d t h a t all w e n e e d d o is c o m p l e t e t h e j o b he b e g a n .
Ill
153D SOCRATES. W e l l t h e n , y o u m u s t t h i n k like this. I n t h e case o f t h e
eyes, first, y o u m u s t n ' t think o f w h a t you c a l l w h i t e c o l o u r as b e i n g
s o m e d i s t i n c t t h i n g outside y o u r eyes, or i n y o u r eyes e i t h e r — i n f a c t
E y o u m u s t n ' t assign a n y place t o i t ; b e c a u s e i n t h a t case i t w o u l d , s u r e l y ,
b e a t its a s s i g n e d p l a c e a n d i n a s t a t e of rest, r a t h e r t h a n c o m i n g t o b e .
THE AE TETUS. W e l l , h o w c a n I think of i t ?
SOCRATES. L e t ' s follow w h a t w e said j u s t n o w , a n d l a y it d o w n t h a t
n o t h i n g is o n e t h i n g j u s t b y itself. O n those lines, w e ' l l find t h a t b l a c k ,
w h i t e , o r a n y o t h e r colour will t u r n o u t to h a v e c o m e i n t o being, f r o m
154A t h e collision o f t h e eyes w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e m o t i o n . W h a t w e s a y
a g i v e n c o l o u r is w i l l b e n e i t h e r t h e t h i n g w h i c h collides, n o r t h e t h i n g
it collides w i t h , b u t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h h a s c o m e i n t o b e i n g b e t w e e n
t h e m ; something private to e a c h one. O r w o u l d y o u b e p r e p a r e d to
insist t l i a t e v e r y c o l o u r a p p e a r s t o a d o g , o r a n y o t h e r l i v i n g thing, j u s t
the w a y it a p p e a r s to you?
THEAETETus. Certainly not.
SOCRATES. A n d w h a t a b o u t a n o t h e r m a n ? Is t h e w a y a n y t h i n g
a p p e a r s t o h i m like t h e w a y i t a p p e a r s to y o u ? C a n y o u insist o n t h a t ?
O r w o u l d n ' t y o u m u c h r a t h e r s a y t h a t it d o e s n ' t a p p e a r t h e s a m e e v e n
t o yourself, b e c a u s e y o u ' r e n e v e r i n a s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n t o y o u r s e l f ?
T H E A E T E T U S . Yes, I t h i n k t h a t ' s n e a r e r t h e t r u t h t h a n tlie first
alternative.
Β SOCRATES. S u r e l y then, if w h a t we m e a s u r e ourseh^es a g a i n s t o r
77
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES
touch h a d been large, white, or hot, it would never have b e c o m e
d i f f e r e n t by b u m p i n g i n t o a d i f f e r e n t p e r c e i v e r , a t a n y r a t e n o t if i t
d i d n ' t u n d e r g o a n y c h a n g e itself A n d o n t h e other h a n d , if w h a t d o e s
t h e m e a s u r i n g o r t o u c h i n g h a d b e e n a n y o f those t h i n g s , t h e n a g a i n , i t
w o u l d n ' t have b e c o m e different w h e n a n o t h e r thing c a m e u p against
it, or t h e thing w h i c h c a m e u p a g a i n s t it h a d s o m e t h i n g h a p p e n t o i t :
n o t if i t h a d n ' t , itself, h a d a n y t h i n g h a p p e n to it.^
S o c r a t e s ' a i m i n this p a s s a g e is t o establish o n b e h a l f of
P r o t a g o r a s t h a t sensible q u a l i t i e s like h o t a n d c o l d , w h i t e a n d
b l a c k , are essentially r e l a t i v e t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e i v i n g s u b -
j e c t . T h i s thesis is e x p r e s s e d i n t w o c o n n e c t e d w a y s , (a) T h e
c o l o u r white, f o r e x a m p l e , is n o t t o b e l o c a t e d i n (153 D 9 - E I)
or i d e n t i f i e d w i t h (154 A 1 - 2 ) e i t h e r t h e object p e r c e i v e d o r t h e
e y e o f the p e r c e i v e r . I t is n o t a d i s t i n c t t h i n g e x i s t i n g a n y w h e r e
a t all, b u t w h e n a n eye l i g h t s on^ w h a t we w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y
d e s c r i b e as a w h i t e stick o r a w h i t e stone,^ s o m e t h i n g o c c u r s
b e t w e e n t h e m a n d it is i n t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t t h e colour w h i t e
arises o r c o m e s t o be. I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e c o l o u r is a r e l a t i o n a l
h a p p e n i n g o r o c c u r r e n c e , essentially i n v o l v i n g b o t h p a r t i e s t o
the perceptual encounter (153 D-154 W N e i t h e r the object
seen n o r t h e p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t is i n itself w h i t e ( 1 5 4 B). I n d e e d ,
n o t h i n g is in itself a n y o n e t h i n g a t all ( 153 e 4 - 5 , r e f e r r i n g b a c k
t o 152 D).
T h e s e two formulations a d d u p to a proposal to treat t e r m s
like ' h o t ' a n d ' c o l d ' , ' w h i t e ' a n d ' b l a c k ' , a s i n c o m p l e t e o r
r e l a t i o n a l p r e d i c a t e s . F r o m f o r m u l a t i o n [b) i n its P r o t a g o r e a n
c o n t e x t we m a y g a t h e r t h a t n o s e n t e n c e of t h e f o r m 'x is w h i t e '
is t r u e as it s t a n d s , w i t h o u t a q u a l i f y i n g c l a u s e s p e c i f y i n g a
p e r c e i v e r for w h o m it is t r u e . T h i s gives us t h e result t h a t t h e
c o l o u r w h i t e is essentially r e l a t i o n a l a n d its o c c u r r e n c e s s h o u l d
' Q u o t e d in t h e transladon of J o h n McDowell, Plato— Theaeteius ( O x f o r d ,
1973), with the following modifications : [a) Socrates' last speech a t 154 Β
1 ff. should begin w i t h an inferential 'Surely then', not McDowell's 'Well
n o w ' (the Greek is ούκοΰν), a n d should n o t b e spaced off from 154 A as a
s e p a r a t e p a r a g r a p h designed to set a puzzle (McDowell, pp. 19, 131).
{b) A t 154 Β 2 McDowell has ' b u m p i n g i n t o a different person', w h e r e the
G r e e k is not so specific and w h e r e we should allow for t h e animal perceivers
cited in 154 A. (C) For ίδιον at 154 A 2 McDowell has 'peculiar', b u t it is
not misleading t o use the epistemologically loaded t e r m 'private' (cf 161 D,
166 c).
2 I choose this English expression to counterbalance t h e exaggeratedly
somatic overtones of McDowell's translation in terms of colliding a n d
b u m p i n g , προσβάλλειν is used of the sun's rays striking the earth a n d in
similar cases.
^ For the examples, cf. 156 E.
104 PROCEEDINGS O F T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
c a n o n i c a l l y b e r e p r e s e n t e d i n s e n t e n c e s o f t h e f o r m 'x i s / b e -
c o m e s w h i t e f o r s o - a n d - s o ' . B u t n o w , if t h a t is so, there is n o
u n q u a l i f i e d p r e d i c a t e ' w h i t e ' to be a b s t r a c t e d f r o m its p r e d i -
cative position a n d made t h e subject of t h e definitional question
' W h a t is w h i t e ? ' . T h e r e is n o such t h i n g a s ( b e i n g ) white sim-
pUciter, o n l y w h i t e for y o u a n d w h i t e f o r me.^ H e n c e , finally,
f o r m u l a t i o n (a) : w h i t e is n o t a d i s t i n c t t h i n g existing i n t h e
s u b j e c t o r i n t h e o b j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n .
W e n o w h a v e a thesis: sensible q u a l i t i e s like h o t a n d c o l d ,
w h i t e a n d b l a c k , a r e essentially r e l a t i v e t o p e r c e i v e r s . W h a t
are the g r o u n d s for accepting it? T h e y are not, as c o m m e n -
t a t o r s s o m e t i m e s suggest,^ g r o u n d s p e r t a i n i n g to a t h e o r y of t h e
m e c h a n i s m of p e r c e p t i o n . T h e thesis is m e a n t to b e e s t a b l i s h e d
i n d e p e n d e n t l y of a n y d e t a i l e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c o m m e r c e
b e t w e e n p e r c e i v e r a n d p e r c e i v e d ; ^ i n d e e d , t h e t h e s i s will s h a p e
t h e t h e o r y of p e r c e p t i o n to b e e l a b o r a t e d i n t h e d i a l o g u e ( 1 5 6 A
ff.) r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g s h a p e d b y it. T h e a r g u m e n t f o r the r e l a -
tivity o f s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s is e n t i r e l y g e n e r a l , a n d its l e a d i n g
p r e m i s s is t h e c o n f l i c t of s e n s i b l e a p p e a r a n c e s .
S o c r a t e s i n 154 A m e n t i o n s t h r e e t y p e s of v a r i a t i o n or c o n f l i c t
b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e s , i n a classification t h a t w a s t o b e c o m e
traditional. Colour appearances vary between m a n and other
a n i m a l s , b e t w e e n o n e m a n a n d a n o t h e r , a n d b e t w e e n one t i m e
a n d a n o t h e r w i t h i n t h e e x p e r i e n c e of a s i n g l e man.'^ S o c r a t e s
a c t u a l l y i m p l i e s t h e strongest possible c l a i m , t h a t n o two c o l o u r
a p p e a r a n c e s a r e alike, b u t I w a n t to l e a v e t h a t aside for t h e
m o m e n t . I t will b e sufficient f o r t h e a r g u m e n t S o c r a t e s h a s i n
view t o s t a r t f r o m t h e m o r e m o d e s t c l a i m t h a t v a r i a t i o n s d o
o c c u r . F o r h e asserts a t 154 Β t h a t this is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h
a t t r i b u t i n g sensible qualities c i t h e r to t h e o b j e c t o r t o t h e s u b -
j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n .
W e m a y e l u c i d a t e his c l a i m as follows. T a k e , a s before, a n
^ T h e abstraction-move underlying δ δή εκαστον είναί φαμεν χρώμα (153 ^ 7"
154 Α ι) is standard in Plato: sec G. E. L. Owen, 'Dialectic and Eristic in
the Treatment of the Forms', in G. E. L. Owen ed., Aristotle on Dialectic
(Oxford, 1968), pp. 114-15.
2 e.g. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), p. 40,
McDowell, op. cit., p. 131.
3 Witness the difficulty (adverted to by McDowell, pp. 130-1) of fitting
the language used to describe perception here into the more detailed story
that comes later.
^ T h e first two types of variation correspond to the first two of the T e n
A'lodes of Pyrrhonian scepticism, the third is expanded in a number of the
remaining Modes (Sext. Emp. PH1. QÖff.l.
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 79
e v e n t of t h e k i n d w e w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y d e s c r i b e as t h e s e e i n g
of a w h i t e s t o n e ( ' m e a s u r i n g o u r s e l v e s a g a i n s t ' is P r o t a g o r e a n
f o r p e r c e i v i n g o f a n y k i n d ) . T h e n , first, t h e s t o n e c a n n o t b e
w h i t e in itself o r else, so l o n g as it s u f f e r e d n o c h a n g e , it w o u l d
a p p e a r w h i t e t o a n y o t h e r p e r c e i v e r . S e c o n d , t h e s u b j e c t of
p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t itself b e w h i t e e i t h e r , or else, so long a s it
s u f f e r e d n o c h a n g e , it w o u l d see e v e r y t h i n g w h i t e : i n c l u d i n g
t h e s t o n e we s t a r t e d w i t h , s u p p o s i n g t h a t to h a v e b e e n p a i n t e d
red.^ M o r e g e n e r a l l y , if s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s i n h e r e i n t h e o b j e c t s
of p e r c e p t i o n , t h e y o u g h t t o m a k e themselves a p p a r e n t to e v e r y
p e r c e i v e r alike, r e g a r d l e s s of d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n p e r c e i v e r s
o r c h a n g e s i n t h e c o n d i t i o n of a s i n g l e p e r c e i v e r ; if, a l t e r n a -
t i v e l y , they i n h e r e in t h e p e r c e i v i n g subject, t h e n c o n v e r s e l y
their a p p e a r a n c e should n o t be affected by differences a n d
c h a n g e s in t h e o b j e c t s p e r c e i v e d . B u t it is a f a c t of e x p e r i e n c e
f a m i l i a r to us all t h a t s e n s i b l e a p p e a r a n c e s v a r y w i t h d i f f e r -
e n c e s a n d c h a n g e s o n e i t h e r side of t h e p e r c e p t u a l e n c o u n t e r .
S o w e are i n v i t e d t o d r a w t h e d e s i r e d c o n c l u s i o n : s e n s i b l e
q u a l i t i e s are essentially r e l a t i v e to t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e i v e r .
T h a t is t h e a r g u m e n t , a n d a t first r e a d i n g it m a y n o t s e e m
a significant a d v a n c e . T h e w o r d s O r would y o u be p r e p a r e d
to insist . . . ' a t 1 5 4 A 2 - 3 i n d i c a t e t h a t it is t h e conflict of
a p p e a r a n c e s w h i c h is to s h o w t h a t colours a r e n o t i n h e r e n t
in t h e object o r t h e s u b j e c t , b u t r e l a t i o n a l . T h a t is, in 153 E -
4 A t h e a r g u m e n t rests o n ( i ) . B u t t h e n S o c r a t e s p r o c e e d s i n
154 Β to spell o u t his a r g u m e n t in t e r m s of (2). A n d w e h a v e
a l r e a d y seen t h a t (2) is j u s t a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of ( i ) ; it p r o v i d e s
n o a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t for t h e c o n c l u s i o n he w i s h e s to d r a w .
B u t this dismissive j u d g e m e n t is p r e m a t u r e . I n t h e first
p l a c e , we s h o u l d b e g r a t e f u l to P l a t o for p u t t i n g t h e e m p h a s i s
o n f o r m u l a t i o n (2), t h e t h i n g A u s t i n said n o o n e w o u l d seri-
o u s l y suppose. G i v e n t h e r a r i t y of (2) in l a t e r p h i l o s o p h e r s ,
it is n o t to b e a s s u m e d t h a t it w a s p r o m i n e n t i n e a r l i e r p r e s e n -
t a t i o n s of t h e l i n e of t h o u g h t w h i c h P l a t o is r e c o n s t r u c t i n g .
W e c a n also t h a n k P l a t o f o r m a k i n g a b s o l u t e l y explicit t h e
i m p o r t a n t point that with either formulation the a r g u m e n t
o n l y applies o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e t h i n g w e are t a l k i n g
a b o u t remains u n c h a n g e d (cf Ayer. pp. 14-15). Second, (i)
a n d (2) as f o r m u l a t e d c o n c e r n o n l y t h e o b j e c t o f p e r c e p t i o n ,
w h i l e S o c r a t e s ' a r g u m e n t f o r a r e l a t i v i s t i c a c c o u n t of s e n s i b l e
' It was, I think, R. Hackforth, 'Notes on Plato's Theaetetus\ Mnemosyne
series 4, 10 (1957), p. 130, who first made sense of ή τι ttoÔôvtos (154 β 5)5

qualities comes i n two halves. O n e half a t t e n d s t o the o b j e c t
of p e r c e p t i o n , t h e other tackles t h e c u r i o u s - s o u n d i n g suggestion
t h a t t h e t h i n g w h i c h is w h i t e in itself, o r the t h i n g where t h e
whiteness is to b e found, is t h e perceiving subject. W h y s h o u l d
a n y o n e suppose t h a t ? A n d , if he did, w h a t on e a r t h w o u l d
h e m e a n b y it?
I n his a d m i r a b l e c o m m e n t a r y on t h e Theaetetus J o h n M c -
Dowell suggests^ t h a t the issue is not w h e t h e r t h e perceiver is
c o l o u r e d w h i t e b u t w h e t h e r h e is seeing white. A perceiver
c a n n o t b e said, i n the o r d i n a r y u n q u a l i f i e d way, t o be seeing
w h i t e unless, so l o n g as h e u n d e r g o e s n o c h a n g e , h e sees e v e r y -
t h i n g w h i t e ; i.e. it is a c o n d i t i o n of his seeing w h i t e at all t h a t
h e sees o n l y w h i t e , not also o t h e r colours. I d o n o t think this
c a n be t h e r i g h t r e a d i n g of t h e text. F o r o n e t h i n g , it involves
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' a n y of t h o s e things' (154 Β 4) a s taking u p
' m e a s u r i n g or t o u c h i n g ' , i.e. perceiving, r a t h e r t h a n ' l a r g e ,
white, o r h o t ' , w h i c h is t h e obvious r e f e r e n c e f o r the p h r a s e .
M c D o w e l l only makes t h e suggestion b e c a u s e h e finds it o b -
scure ' w h y a n y o n e might b e t h o u g h t t o w a n t t o say (except
for obviously i r r e l e v a n t reasons) t h a t a n eye is w h i t e ' ; w h y ,
in o t h e r words, t h e r e s h o u l d b e a n issue as to w h e t h e r t h e
subject of p e r c e p t i o n , as o p p o s e d to its o b j e c t , is i n itself col-
o u r e d . W h y i n d e e d ? T h i s is exactly t h e sort of h e r m e n e u t i c
puzzle in t h e f a c e of w h i c h it b e c o m e s r e a s o n a b l e to p r o b e
for u n s p o k e n assumptions u n d e r l y i n g t h e surface text.
W i t h this in m i n d I w a n t to b r i n g to b e a r o n o u r text t w o
passages f r o m l a t e r writers, o n e a n c i e n t a n d o n e m o d e r n . I n
t h e first c h a p t e r of Appearance and Reality B r a d l e y presents t h e
following a r g u m e n t against t h e reality of s e c o n d a r y qualities :
W e assume t h a t a t h i n g m u s t b e self-consistent a n d self-dependent. I t
either h a s a q u a l i t y or has n o t g o t it. A n d , if it has it, it c a n n o t h a v e it
only sometimes, a n d merely i n this or t h a t r e l a t i o n . B u t s u c h a p r i n c i p l e
is the c o n d e m n a t i o n of s e c o n d a r y qualities.
I t m a t t e r s very little h o w i n detail w e w o r k w i t h it. A t h i n g is
coloured, b u t n o t coloured in t h e s a m e w a y to every e y e ; and, e x c e p t
to some eye, it seems n o t coloured a t all. Is it t h e n c o l o u r e d or not? A n d
t h e e y e — r e l a t i o n t o which a p p e a r s s o m e h o w to m a k e t h e q u a l i t y —
does t h a t itself possess colour? Clearly not so, unless t h e r e is a n o t h e r eye
which sees it. N o t h i n g therefore is really c o l o u r e d ; c o l o u r seems only to
belong to w h a t itself is colourless. A n d the s a m e result holds, again, w i t h
cold a n d h e a t . A t h i n g may b e cold or hot a c c o r d i n g t o different p a r t s
of m y skin; a n d , w i t h o u t some relation to a skin, it seems w i t h o u t a n y
' op. cit., pp. 131-3.
such q u a l i t y . A n d , b y "a like a r g u m e n t , t h e skin is p r o v e d UOL luseu liïf
o w n t h e quality, w h i c h is h e n c e possessed b y nothing, ( p p . 9 - 1 0 )
T h e resemblances a r e striking. W h e t h e r Bradley h a d the Theae-
tetus passage i n m i n d I d o n o t k n o w . I f h e did, h e p r e f e r r e d t o
c h a n g e the a r g u m e n t , for B r a d l e y ' s reason for d e n y i n g c o l o u r
t o t h e eye is t h a t it is only c o l o u r e d w h e n seen b y a second eye,
w h i c h seems t o a s s u m e t h e conclusion t o be p r o v e d . But a t least
h e r e is one serious p h i l o s o p h e r witnessing to t h e r e l e v a n c e in
this sort of c o n t e x t of t h e t h o u g h t t h a t the c o l o u r of t h e eye
m i g h t be the s o u r c e of t h e c o l o u r w e see. A n d t h e r e is a n o t h e r
resemblance. A l t h o u g h B r a d l e y e n d o r s e s the a r g u m e n t , a n d will
l a t e r (pp. 12 f.) s a y t h a t it a p p l i e s e q u a l l y to p r i m a r y qualities,
his a t t i t u d e to it h a s n o n e t h e less a certain d e t a c h m e n t his
p r e s e n t a t i o n , like Plato's, is m i x e d w i t h diagnosis. So it is n o t
w i t h o u t interest t h a t h e s t a r t s off w i t h t h a t r a r e thing, a c l e a r
a n d explicit v e r s i o n of (2) ; Ά t h i n g . . . either h a s a q u a l i t y o r
h a s n o t got it. A n d , if it h a s , it c a n n o t h a v e it o n l y s o m e t i m e s
a n d merely i n this o r t h a t r e l a t i o n . '
T h e second passage for c o m p a r i s o n is Sextus on t h e s u b j e c t
of p e r c e p t i o n :
S u f f e r e r s f r o m j a u n d i c e say t h a t things w h i c h a p p e a r white to us a r e
yellow, and t h o s e whose eyes a r e b l o o d s h o t say t h e y are b l o o d - r e d .
Since, then, s o m e animals also h a v e yellow eyes, o t h e r s bloodshot eyes,
o t h e r s albino, a n d others eyes of yet a n o t h e r colour, i t is likely, I t h i n k ,
t h a t they h a v e a d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n o f colours. ( Ρ Ι ί i . 44)
W h y is it likely? D o t h i n g s r e a l l y look b l o o d - r e d w h e n y o u
w a k e u p f r o m a h e a v y d r i n k i n g - b o u t with bloodshot eyes?
I w a n t to suggest t h a t a n y o n e w h o t h i n k s it likely is in t h e g r i p
of a certain p i c t u r e or m o d e l of p e r c e p t i o n . I f one t h i n k s of
visual p e r c e p t i o n as a m a t t e r of looking o u t t h r o u g h t h e eyes
as t h r o u g h a w i n d o w , t h e n c o l o u r e d eyes will b e like t h e t i n t e d
spectacles f a v o u r e d b y m o d e r n philosophers of p e r c e p t i o n ,
o n l y f u r t h e r i n ; j u s t so, o n Sextus' e x p l a n a t i o n of the p h e n o m -
e n o n (PH Ì. 126) yellow o r r e d in t h e eye is a n a d m i x t u r e of
c o l o u r within t h e field of vision. S o m e animals look out t h r o u g h
a yellow o r a b l o o d - r e d w i n d o w - p a n e , a n d so will you t o o if
y o u r eyes go yellow w i t h j a u n d i c e o r b l o o d - r e d f r o m d r i n k i n g
t o o m u c h . I f o r b e a r f r o m q u o t i n g Sextus' f u r t h e r r e m a r k s
' Because h e thinks that at the common-sense level it is perfectly correct to
say that secondary qualities, no less than primary, are ' a n actual p a r t of the
physical world' (p. 247). W h a t h e is most opposed to is the metaphysical
bifurcation of p r i m a r y and secondary qualities.
104
PROCEEDINGS O F THE BRITISH ACADEMY
{PH i. 4 7 ) a b o u t the s h a p e t h i n g s m u s t look t o a n i m a l s w h o s e
eyes h a v e s l a n t i n g or e l o n g a t e d p u p i l s .
I t s h o u l d n o t be t h o u g h t t h a t this is j u s t a p i e c e of a n t i q u e
p h y s i o l o g y . D e s c a r t e s , n o s t r a n g e r t o o p t i c s , c i t e s the e x a m p l e
of a m a n w i t h j a u n d i c e t o w h o m t h i n g s look yellow b e c a u s e
his eye is t i n g e d w i t h y e l l o w (Regulae, X I I ) , a n d s o does B e r k e l e y
{Three Dialogues, p. 185), w h o c o u p l e s it w i t h the e x a m p l e
of a n i m a l s w i t h eyes of a d i f f e r e n t t e x t u r e f r o m ours. R u s s e l l
b r o a d c a s t t h e j a u n d i c e e x a m p l e f r o m t h e B B C i n 1948.^ I t w a s
still g o i n g s t r o n g i n 1 9 6 3 w h e n P r o f e s s o r R o d e r i c k C h i s h o l m
u s e d it i n a p a p e r on ' T h e T h e o r y of A p p e a r i n g ' , ^ a n d i t g a v e
e v i d e n c e for b o t h sides o f a n A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y s y m p o s i u m
i n 1968.3 Y e t i t is q u i t e false t h a t p e o p l e w i t h j a u n d i c e see
( w h i t e ) t h i n g s yellow. O f t h i s I a m a s s u r e d b o t h by m e d i c a l
a u t h o r i t y a n d b y those w h o h a v e h a d t h e c o n d i t i o n . A s a
m a t t e r of f a c t , w e all h a v e yellow i n s i d e o u r eyes. I n h u m a n s
a n d a r a n g e o f other a n i m a l s t h e l e n s of t h e eye is y e l l o w .
B u t so f a r f r o m m a k i n g t h i n g s look y e l l o w , t h i s e n h a n c e s c o l o u r
contrast a n d eliminates b l u r from t h e differential refractive
p r o p e r t i e s of d i f f e r e n t w a v e l e n g t h s of l i g h t . R e d c a n h e l p t o o :
t u r t l e s h a v e r e d oil d r o p l e t s in t h e i r eyes t o i m p r o v e t h e i r
vision o v e r t h e g l a r y s u r f a c e of t h e w a t e r . B u t these a r e r e l a -
tively r e c e n t discoveries.'^ W h a t w e h a v e t o ask is w h y f o r
centuries the myth about jaundice should continue to be
b e l i e v e d , as it e v i d e n t l y still is b e l i e v e d . ( S o m e o n e a c t u a l l y
s a i d t o m e , ' B u t surely, t h e y h a v e y e l l o w eyes', a n d a p p e a l e d
t o t h e p h r a s e ' a j a u n d i c e d v i e w of t h i n g s ' . ) F o r t h a t m a t t e r ,
a c c o r d i n g to A u s t i n (p. 4 9 ) , it is e q u a l l y false t o say, w i t h A y e r
(p. 6),5 ' W h e n , a s the r e s u l t of m y p u t t i n g o n g r e e n spectacles,
t h e w h i t e walls o f m y r o o m a p p e a r t o b e g r e e n , m y e x p e r i e n c e
is q u a l i t a t i v e l y t h e s a m e as if I w e r e p e r c e i v i n g walls t h a t
r e a l l y w e r e g r e e n . ' A u s t i n d o e s n o t say w h y it is false, b u t I t h i n k
1 See Bertrand Russell, Why I am not a Christian and other essays on religion
and related topics (London, 1957), pp. 161-2.
^ Cited fi'om Robert J . Swartz ed., Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing (New
York, 1965), p. 183.
3 F . N. Sibley a n d Michael Tanner, Objectivity a n d Aesthetics', Arisi.
Soc. Suppl. Vol. 42 (1968), pp. 39 and 60.
* Gleaned from the fascinating store of empirical detail in Gordon Lynn
Walls, The Vertebrate Eye and Its Adaptive Radiation, Cranbrook Institute of
Science Bulletin No. 19 (Michigan, 1942), p p . 191 ff. M o r e recent still is
knowledge of picrotoxin. Picrotoxin intoxication, I am informed, yellows the
skin (but not the eye) and does make things seen assume a yellowish look.
s But Ayer is actuallv retailing examoles from other πρπηίρ
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 83
it w o u l d b e c o r r e c t t o insist t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e of l o o k i n g
through g r e e n a n d t h e e x p e r i e n c e of looking at g r e e n a r e i m p o r -
t a n t l y distinct. So those w h o cite t h e j a u n d i c e e x a m p l e a r e c o m -
m i t t i n g a d o u b l e e r r o r o f f a c t if t h e y say w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n
t h a t the c o n d i t i o n m a k e s t h i n g s l o o k yellow. F i r s t , t h e r e is n o
s u c h y e l l o w i n g e f f e c t ; s e c o n d , if seeing t h r o u g h y e l l o w eyes
r e a l l y were like seeing t h r o u g h y e l l o w - t i n t e d glass, it w o u l d
still b e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f seeing a y e l l o w
o b j e c t . But t h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t is t h a t t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h
p h i l o s o p h e r s t h r o u g h t h e c e n t u r i e s h a v e r e p e a t e d this t y p e
o f e x a m p l e , i n d e f i a n c e o f a s c e r t a i n a b l e f a c t , is e v i d e n c e t h a t
a t s o m e level p e o p l e a r e p o w e r f u l l y d r a w n t o t h e t h o u g h t t h a t
w e look t h r o u g h o u r eyes as t h r o u g h a w i n d o w .
T h a t w e a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a n i m p l i c i t p i c t u r e or m o d e l of
p e r c e p t i o n , n o t a n explicit i n f e r e n c e f r o m o u t m o d e d p h y s i o l o g y ,
is c l e a r e v e n i n a n t i q u i t y . O n e e a r l y c i t i n g o f t h e j a u n d i c e
e x a m p l e is b y L u c r e t i u s (iv. 3 3 2 - 6 ) , a n d o n t h e a t o m i s t as-
sumptions of Lucretius' official physiology o f perception o n e
m i g h t well t h i n k t h a t t h e e x a m p l e should b e n o n s e n s e . F o r
r e m e m b e r t h a t for a n a t o m i s t y e l l o w is n o t h i n g b u t t h e e f f e c t
of c e r t a i n a t o m s i m p i n g i n g o n t h e eye, n o t a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of
t h e eye or o f a n y t h i n g else. L u c r e t i u s , h o w e v e r , h a s a n a n s w e r .
T h e eyes a n d b o d y of t h e j a u n d i c e d p e r s o n e m i t n u m e r o u s
a t o m i c effluences of t h e t y p e r e q u i s i t e for h i m t o a p p e a r y e l l o w
to o t h e r p e o p l e a n d s o m e o f these 'seeds o f y e l l o w ' r e t u r n t o his
o w n eye m i x e d u p w i t h t h e e f f l u e n c e s f r o m o u t s i d e o b j e c t s ,
w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h o s e o b j e c t s l o o k yellow t o h i m . I t is a n
o b v i o u s d i f f i c u l t y for t h i s e x p l a n a t i o η t h a t i t s h o u l d i m p l y
t h a t if s o m e o n e w h o s e eyes a p p e a r a n o r m a l h e a l t h y w h i t e
p u t s o n a c l e a n w h i t e t o g a , h e will see e v e r y t h i n g w h i t e . L u -
c r e t i u s offers n o t h i n g to e a s e this difficulty, a n d seems n o t to
h a v e n o t i c e d i t . C l e a r l y , h i s b e l i e f t h a t y e l l o w eyes p r o d u c e
y e l l o w a p p e a r a n c e s is n o t a d e d u c t i o n f r o m p h y s i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y
b u t a n o t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y a c q u i r e d , w h i c h p h y s i o l o g y is t h e n
m a d e to a c c o m m o d a t e . A n d t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l
s h o w s itself w h e n h e a d d s a r e f e r e n c e to 'seeds o f yellow' i n t h e
e y e itself ( 3 3 5 ) — a s if t h e e y e w e r e w i t h i n t h e field of v i s i o n
a n d the m a n w e r e looking t h r o u g h it.
T h i s e v i d e n c e f r o m L u c r e t i u s is t h e m o r e r e m a r k a b l e b e -
c a u s e a t iii. 3 5 9 - 6 9 h e a t t a c k s a v i e w w h i c h e x p l i c i t l y c o m p a r e d
t h e eyes to w i n d o w s t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e m i n d l o o k s o u t a t things.^
^ Lucretius actually says 'doors' {fores), not 'windows', but the parallels
T h e p o i n t a t issue is w h e t h e r it is t h e eyes themselves o r t h e
m i n d w i t h i n w h i c h is t h e p r o p e r s u b j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n . T h e
w i n d o w c o m p a r i s o n comes f r o m s o m e o n e a d v o c a t i n g a version
of P l a t o ' s view (see V I I I b e l o w ) t h a t it is a u n i t a r y m i n d , n o t
t h e s e p a r a t e sense-organs, w h i c h does o u r p e r c e i v i n g . ' L u c r e t i u s
disagrees, for it is E p i c u r e a n d o c t r i n e t h a t the b o d y is e n d o w e d
b y t h e soul w i t h a p e r c e p t u a l sensitivity of its own. T h a t is,
h e disavows t h e w i n d o w m o d e l w h e n it is p u t t o him. B u t , I
claim, h e w o u l d not h a v e said w h a t h e later says a b o u t t h e
j a u n d i c e e x a m p l e unless a t a less concious level he w a s still
susceptible to its influence.
I t is n o t unlikely that s i m i l a r e x a m p l e s w e r e a l r e a d y c u r r e n t by
t h e t i m e P l a t o w r o t e the Theaetetus. P e r h a p s t h e earliest a t t e s t e d
a p p e a l t o t h e j a u n d i c e e x a m p l e — t h e earliest, a t a n y rate, t h a t
I h a v e f o u n d , a n d it has a blood-red e x a m p l e to go with it—is
d u e to t h e C y r e n a i c school, w h o d e v e l o p e d a h a r d - l i n e sceptical
epistemology i n the second half of t h e f o u r t h c e n t u r y B.C.
By S e x t u s ' a c c o u n t ( M vii. 192, 1 9 7 - 8 ) , t h e y used these a n d
o t h e r e x a m p l e s to a r g u e t h a t we h a v e n o k n o w l e d g e of or
access t o a n y t h i n g b e y o n d o u r o w n e x p e r i e n c e s . For in s u c h
cases it is t r u e t h a t we a r e 'yellowed' o r ' r e d d e n e d ' (the c u r i o u s
t e r m i n o l o g y for the e x p e r i e n c e of s o m e t h i n g ' s a p p e a r i n g yel-
low/red is revealingly suited to the e x a m p l e s ) , b u t false—as a n y -
o n e will a g r e e — t h a t the objects seen a r e yellow o r r e d . So h o w o n
a n y o t h e r occasion can w e b e sure of m o r e t h a n t h a t we a r e t h u s
' y e l l o w e d ' o r ' r e d d e n e d ' ? I t w o u l d b e i n t e r e s t i n g to be b e t t e r
i n f o r m e d t h a n w e are a b o u t t h e C y r e n a i c epistemology,^ b u t
for p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s t h e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g is t h a t the e x a m p l e s
(quoted b y Cyril Bailey, Lucreti De Rerum Natura [Oxford, 1947], ä p. 1052)
make it likely that fores renders θυρίδες, 'windows'.
' W h o was this someone? Bailey, loc. cit., says, ' T h e theory which
Lucretius here refutes is quite definitely that of the Stoics', and cites the
Cicero passage—but Cicero does not name his source. Sextus traces the
comparison to Strato of Lampsacus and to Aenesidemus' work on Heraclitus.
Sextus wishes to think (Mvii. 364) that the point of the comparison is to make
a claim t h a t the mind can get a direct, unmediated perception of things,
in contrast to a view of the senses as obstructively 'in front o f the m i n d ( M
vii. 352-3). Lucretius and Cicero, however, m a k e it clear t h a t the issue is the
one discussed at Theaet. i 8 4 B f f . , about the subject of perception a n d its
unity; Tertullian, De Anima 14 confirms that this was Strato's and Aeneside-
mus' concern also. T o get back from this evidence to Stoic doctrine (whether
Posidonius or earlier) is a m a t t e r of unravelling the tangled knots of Aenesi-
demus' work on Heraclitus: see Ulrich Burkhard, Die angebliche Heraklit-
Nachfolge des Skeptikers Aenesidem (Bonn, 1973).
2 For a few suggestions, see 'Idealism a n d Greek Philosophy', op. cit.
w o u l d only s e r v e to illustrate a n d r e c o m m e n d so e x t r e m e a
t h e o r y if t h e y w e r e of a t y p e w h i c h the a u d i e n c e was a n t e -
c e d e n t l y disposed to a c c e p t as f a m i l i a r and uncontroversial.^
I h o p e this is e n o u g h j u s t i f i c a t i o n — I do n o t t h i n k it is m o r e
t h a n e n o u g h — f o r a diagnosis of w h a t is going o n in the s e c o n d
h a l f o f the a r g u m e n t before us. I n t e r m s of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l ,
Socrates' p o i n t is t h a t if t h e w h i t e w e r e in t h e eye of t h e p e r -
c e i v i n g subject, t h e n h e w o u l d b e looking o u t , as it w e r e ,
t h r o u g h a w h i t e - t i n t e d p a n e a n d so should see e v e r y t h i n g w h i t e .
N o w apply t h e w i n d o w m o d e l to t h e first half of t h e a r g u m e n t .
I f t h e white w e r e o u t t h e r e in the stone, n o t in t h e eye o f t h e
b e h o l d e r , a n d o n e looks t h r o u g h t h e eye as t h r o u g h a w i n d o w ,
t h e n one's view of t h e w h i t e m u s t be u n o b s t r u c t e d . T h e w i n d o w -
p a n e should b e t r a n s p a r e n t , w i t h o u t spot or b l e m i s h . O r b e t t e r ,
since classical G r e e k w i n d o w s w e r e unglazed, t h e eye s h o u l d
be a n open a p e r t u r e w i t h n o p a n e a t all. T h e r e is as it w e r e
n o t h i n g b e t w e e n t h e p e r c e i v e r a n d t h e t h i n g h e perceives. I n
tliat case t h e s t o n e should a p p e a r w h i t e to e v e r y perceiver.
M y suggestion, then, is t h a t t h e w i n d o w m o d e l makes sense
of a n a r g u m e n t w h i c h o t h e r w i s e is no a r g u m e n t at all. T h e
n e x t step is t o look for c o n f i r m a t i o n of this diagnosis in t h e
w i d e r context of the d i a l o g u e as a whole.
IV
T h e passage u n d e r discussion is p a r t of an e l a b o r a t e dialectical
c o n s t r u c t i o n designed to u n r a v e l t h e implications a n d c o m m i t -
m e n t s of T h e a e t e t u s ' d e f i n i t i o n of k n o w l e d g e as p e r c e p t i o n
(151 e).^ T h e question a t issue is t h i s : if we a c c e p t t h a t k n o w -
l e d g e is p e r c e p t i o n , w h a t m u s t w e suppose a b o u t p e r c e p t i o n
a n d the w o r l d for the d e f i n i t i o n t o hold g o o d ? T h e a n s w e r ,
i n b r o a d o u t l i n e , is t h a t w e m u s t a c c e p t a P r o t a g o r e a n e p i s t e m o -
l o g y a n d a H e r a c l i t e a n a c c o u n t of the w o r l d . P r o t a g o r a s
said, ' M a n is t h e m e a s u r e of all things, of t h o s e t h a t a r e , t h a t
t h e y are, a n d of those t h a t a r e n o t , t h a t they a r e not', m e a n i n g
b y this t h a t w h a t e v e r a p p e a r a n c e s a person h a s , they a r e t r u e
for h i m — t h i n g s really a r e , for h i m , as t h e y a p p e a r t o h i m
to b e — a n d , conversely, t h e only t h i n g s t h a t a r e r e a l for h i m a r e
t h o s e t h a t a p p e a r to h i m . F o r t h e present w e c a n confine o u r -
selves to sensible a p p e a r a n c e s a n d t o the first h a l f of the d o u b l e
1 νενόμιστσι at M vii. 193 reports precisely that the examples are common
currency.
^ For a more textual justification of this reading t h a n I can offer here see
'Idealism and Greek Philosophy', op. cit.
86 PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
thesis c o n t a i n e d i n the m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e : w h a t e v e r sensible
a p p e a r a n c e s a p e r s o n h a s , t h e y a r e t r u e for h i m . I f w e a d o p t
this principle, w e will postulate a state of affairs m a t c h i n g e v e r y
sensible a p p e a r a n c e , to r e n d e r t h a t a p p e a r a n c e t r u e , and t h e n ,
if p e r c e p t i o n is c o n s t r u e d i n P r o t a g o r e a n t e r m s as t h e h a v i n g
of sensible a p p e a r a n c e s (cf. 152 Β I I - C I ) , e v e r y p e r c e p t i o n
will be t h e u n e r r i n g a p p r e h e n s i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of a f f a i r s :
t h e s t a t e of a f f a i r s w h i c h consists in s o m e t h i n g ' s really b e i n g ,
f o r t h e p e r c e i v e r , a s it a p p e a r s to h i m t o be. B y this l i n e of
a r g u m e n t e v e r y c a s e of p e r c e p t i o n is a c a s e of k n o w l e d g e a n d
T h e a e t e t u s ' d e f i n i t i o n is so f a r v i n d i c a t e d .
I t is a t this p o i n t t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t w^e h a v e b e e n p u z z l i n g
o v e r b e c o m e s r e l e v a n t , a n d w e c a n n o w see w h y S o c r a t e s m a k e s
t h e v e r y s t r o n g suggestion t h a t n o t w o c o l o u r a p p e a r a n c e s a r e
alike. T h e t h e o r y h e is e l a b o r a t i n g is c o m m i t t e d t o the v i e w
t h a t , if t h i s w e r e so, e a c h a p p e a r a n c e s h o u l d still yield k n o w -
l e d g e of a r e a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s . If t h e t h e o r y is t o h o l d g o o d , it
m u s t b e a b l e to t a k e in its s t r i d e t h e m o s t e x t r e m e v a r i a t i o n
i m a g i n a b l e in t h e course o f a p p e a r a n c e s . So w e h a d b e t t e r
s u p p o s e , f o r t h e sake of t h e a r g u m e n t , t h a t e x t r e m e v a r i a t i o n
a c t u a l l y o b t a i n s . E a c h a p p e a r a n c e is i n d e p e n d e n t of e v e r y
o t h e r a p p e a r a n c e , yet e a c h is k n o w l e d g e .
B u t n o w , if e a c h a p p e a r a n c e is i n d e p e n d e n t o f every o t h e r ,
yet e a c h is k n o w l e d g e , t h e r e m u s t b e a matching v a r i a t i o n in
t h e states of a f f a i r s w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d . E v e r y t h i n g I k n o w a n d
p e r c e i v e m u s t b e c h a r a c t e r i z a b l e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f w h a t is t h e
case f o r a n y o t h e r p e r c e i v e r , i n c l u d i n g myself a t a n o t h e r t i m e ,
a n d i n d e e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of w h a t is t h e case for m y o t h e r
senses a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e . S o w e a r e l e f t w i t h such i t e m s as
a t h i n g ' s b e i n g w h i t e f o r m y eye n o w . N o t h i n g c a n be w h i t e in
itself a n d w h i t e is not a d i s t i n c t t h i n g i n itself, o n l y w h i t e f o r
m e / m y eye now.
T h u s t h e a r g u m e n t is p l a i n sailing if w e p u t i t back i n t o its
c o n t e x t i n t h e d i a l o g u e a n d a d d t o t h e p r e m i s s of c o n f l i c t i n g
appearances t h e Protagorean principle that each and every
p e r c e p t u a l a p p e a r a n c e is t h e m e a s u r e o r c r i t e r i o n of w h a t is
t h e case f o r t h e p e r c e i v e r ; o r , m o r e b r i e f l y , t h a t e v e r y p e r c e p t i o n
is k n o w l e d g e . F r o m this c o m b i n a t i o n o f p r e m i s s e s it does f o l l o w
t h a t sensible q u a l i t i e s c a n n o t i n h e r e e i t h e r in t h e o b j e c t o r i n t h e
s u b j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n . B u t n o w : w h a t is t h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n c i p l e
b u t a c o o l t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l ( t r a n s -
p a r e n t v e r s i o n ) ? As P l a t o p u t s it e l s e w h e r e i n t h e d i a l o g u e , w h a t
t h e p r i n c i p l e c l a i m s is t h a t every p e r c e p t i o n is ' c l e a r ' (179 c ) .
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES
I t h i n k this d i a g n o s i s is c o r r e c t . T h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n c i p l e
does n o t challenge the assumptions of the w i n d o w model b u t
c o n f i r m s t h e m . I t e m b o d i e s a thesis t h a t p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e
is t r a n s p a r e n t a n d saves i t f r o m t h e o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d a g a i n s t
t r a n s p a r e n c y a t 154 Β b y m a k i n g t h e w h i t e p r i v a t e to t h e e y e
w h i c h sees it ( 1 5 4 A 2) a n d b y d e n y i n g t h e d i s t a n c e w h i c h
s e p a r a t e s the e y e f r o m its o b j e c t . T h e colour w h i t e is n o t i n m e
n o r o u t there b u t i n b e t w e e n , s o m e t h i n g p r i v a t e to m e a n d
t h e o b j e c t I see ( 1 5 3 DE, 154 A ) — t h e s p a t i a l l a n g u a g e m a y b e
m e t a p h o r i c a l b u t c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s are o f t e n effects of
t h e i n t e r v e n i n g m e d i u m . T h e c h o i c e o f m e t a p h o r reveals t h a t
t h e w i n d o w m o d e l is still d o m i n a n t . P r o t a g o r e a n w i n d o w s p r o -
v i d e a flawless c l o s e - u p v i e w of t h e c o n t e n t s of a p r i v a t e w o r l d .
S o m e o n e m a y o b j e c t t h a t this e v i d e n c e f r o m t h e w i d e r
c o n t e x t of t h e d i a l o g u e a c t u a l l y c u t s t h e o t h e r w a y . T o s a y
t h a t a p h i l o s o p h e r is in t h e g r i p of a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e p i c t u r e
of p e r c e p t i o n m a k e s it s o u n d as if s o m e t h i n g r a t h e r d i s r e p u t a b l e
is g o i n g on. B u t it h a s n o w t u r n e d o u t t h a t , o n t h e c o n t r a r y ,
P l a t o ' s a r g u m e n t is g u i d e d b y a n e n t i r e l y e x p l i c i t , coolly t h e o -
r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e w h i c h is q u i t e sufficient to g e t us f r o m t h e
c o n f l i c t of a p p e a r a n c e s t o t h e r e l a t i v i t y of s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s .
I f so, i t seems n o t o n l y r u d e b u t u n n e c e s s a r y t o b r i n g i n t h i s
t a l k o f the w i n d o w m o d e l . N e v e r m i n d t h a t t h e P r o t a g o r e a n
p r i n c i p l e c a n b e seen as itself a n e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n o f t h e w i n d o w
m o d e l . T h e q u e s t i o n is, w h y s h o u l d i t b e ?
B u t h e r e w e m u s t r e c a l l t h e d o u b l e p e r s p e c t i v e I s p o k e of
e a r l i e r . I t is P l a t o w h o h a s c o n t r i v e d t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m
c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s c o m e s a f t e r t h e d e f i n i t i o n of k n o w -
l e d g e as p e r c e p t i o n a n d a f t e r t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e P r o t a g o -
r e a n p r i n c i p l e w h i c h s u p p o r t s it. T h e w h o l e p a s s a g e , a s I
n o t e d earlier, is p a r t of a n e l a b o r a t e w o r k i n g o u t of t h e i m p l i -
cations and c o m m i t m e n t s of the initial definition. T h e t r o u b l e
is t h a t n o t h i n g h a s b e e n s a i d so f a r as to w h y a n y o n e w o u l d
b e t e m p t e d t o t h i n k t h a t k n o w l e d g e is p e r c e p t i o n , a n d n o
motivation has been given for adopting the Protagorean prin-
c i p l e except t h a t it is n e c e s s a r y t o d o so if t h e d e f i n i t i o n is t o
h o l d good. A n d e v e n this c o n s i d e r a t i o n is n o t r i g h t o u t i n t o t h e
o p e n yet. T h e discussion s t a r t s f r o m t h e d e f i n i t i o n , as S o c r a t i c
discussions t y p i c a l l y d o , a n d S o c r a t e s t u r n s a t o n c e to a r g u e ,
in t h e m a n n e r described, t h a t t h e definition requires to be
s u p p o r t e d b y a P r o t a g o r e a n e p i s t e m o l o g y a n d so is e f f e c t i v e l y
e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t m a n is t h e m e a s u r e of all t h i n g s ;
' P r o t a g o r a s s a i d t h e s a m e t h i n g a s T h e a e t e t u s b u t p u t it a
104 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY
d i f f e r e n t w a y ' {152 A). O n l y l a t e r , a s t h e discussion d e v e l o p s , is
there a n opportunity to go into the philosophical motivations
f o r h o l d i n g a relativistic v i e w . A n d ' l a t e r ' m e a n s , i n t h e first
i n s t a n c e , t h e passage w e a r e l o o k i n g at. T h a t passage p l a y s
a d o u b l e r o l e . C o n s i d e r e d as a d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e p o s i t i o n
a l r e a d y p r e m i s s e d for e x a m i n a t i o n , i t m a y b e allowed t o p r e -
suppose the Protagorean principle t h a t every perceptual a p p e a r -
a n c e is t h e m e a s u r e o r c r i t e r i o n of w h a t is t h e case f o r t h e
p e r c e i v e r ; i n w h i c h c a s e t h e a r g u m e n t goes t h r o u g h . B u t c o n -
s i d e r e d as P l a t o ' s a t t e m p t to b r i n g o u t t h e k i n d of t h i n k i n g
w h i c h m o t i v a t e s p e r c e p t u a l r e l a t i v i s m , i t m u s t s t a n d o n its o w n
feet.^ If, t h e n , we raise t h e q u e s t i o n h o w P r o t a g o r a s h i m s e l f
c a m e t o t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t m a n is t h e m e a s u r e of all t h i n g s ,
if w e ask w h y he m a i n t a i n e d t h a t e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e is t h e
m e a s u r e o r c r i t e r i o n o f w h a t is t h e case f o r t h e person w h o s e
a p p e a r a n c e it is, P l a t o ' s a n s w e r is t h a t it w a s h i s solution t o t h e
p r o b l e m of c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s . I n t h e Theaetetus, i n d e e d ,
t h e m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e is initially i n t r o d u c e d a n d e x p l a i n e d i n
t e r m s of w h a t P r o t a g o r a s w o u l d s a y a b o u t a n e x a m p l e of
c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s , t h e e x a m p l e o f t h e w i n d w h i c h feels
cold t o o n e p e r s o n a n d does n o t feel c o l d t o a n o t h e r (152 B).
A n d t h e r e c a n h a r d l y b e a n y serious d i s p u t e t h a t P l a t o ' s answer
is r i g h t . N o p h i l o s o p h e r w h o w a s n o t a n t e c e d e n t l y w o r r i e d
a b o u t conflicting appearances would propose a thoroughgoing
r e l a t i v i s m of t h e P r o t a g o r e a n k i n d .
B u t t h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e w i n d o w m o d e l is n o t otiose. I f w e
d o ask t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s t o s t a n d
o n its o w n f e e t , it s t u m b l e s . H e n c e it is l e g i t i m a t e t o s u g g e s t
t h a t a n y o n e w h o finds i t p e r s u a s i v e is l e a n i n g on s o m e e x t r a
s u p p o r t , w h e t h e r or n o t h e is a w a r e o f t h e f a c t .
V
I n t e r e s t i n g l y — a n d this m a y help m y diagnosis—we e n c o u n t e r
a r a t h e r s i m i l a r p r o b l e m of d o u b l e p e r s p e c t i v e in B e r k e l e y ' s
first Dialogue. H e r e w e find a w h o l e series o f a r g u m e n t s f r o m
c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s : t h e case of sweet a n d b i t t e r q u o t e d
e a r l i e r , t h e f a m o u s e x a m p l e of t h e w a t e r w h i c h feels w a r m t o
I T h a t the passage has this additional role is confirmed by comparing it with
the immediately preceding 153 AD, which performs a parallel function for
the Heraclitean component of Plato's dialectical construction. This is a light-
hearted collection of Heraclitean considerations, capped by a joking inter-
pretation of Homer, the whole making no contribution to the serious business
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 89
o n e h a n d a n d cold t o t h e o t h e r , a n d m a n y m o r e . B u t b e f o r e
e m b a r k i n g o n these a n d o t h e r a r g u m e n t s Berkeley h a s l a i d
d o w n a n o t i o n of i m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n w h i c h t u r n s o u t t o
e m b o d y a version of t h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n c i p l e we h a v e b e e n
discussing. I m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n is k n o w l e d g e (cf. T h e a e t e t u s '
d e f i n i t i o n ) , w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y p e r c e i v e d m u s t r e a l l y be as
i t a p p e a r s t o b e , h e n c e t h e states of affairs (ideas) a p p r e h e n d e d
i n p e r c e p t i o n m u s t v a r y t o m a t c h each a n d every c h a n g e i n
sensible a p p e a r a n c e s . O r b e t t e r , w h e r e t h e P r o t a g o r e a n t h e o r y
h a s reality c h a n g e to k e e p p a c e w i t h the c h a n g i n g a p p e a r a n c e s ,
f o r Berkeley t h e states of a f f a i r s a p p r e h e n d e d in i m m e d i a t e
perception simply are t h e appearances. This notion of i m m e d i -
a t e p e r c e p t i o n defines a B e r k e l e y a n p e r s p e c t i v e g r a n t e d w h i c h
t h e e n s u i n g a r g u m e n t s a r e i m p e c c a b l e . T h e t r o u b l e is t h a t
a t the s t a r t of t h e first Dialogue the full i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e
n o t i o n of i m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n a r e not b r o u g h t i n t o t h e o p e n ,
a n d if w e a s k w h y w e s h o u l d a c c e p t the n o t i o n , w h y w e s h o u l d
a d o p t t h e B e r k e l e y a n p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e a n s w e r is t h a t it is B e r k e -
l e y ' s s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s . As i n
t h e Theaetetus, so in t h e Three Dialogues, t h e n o t i o n w h i c h c o m e s
first in t h e o r d e r of e x p o s i t i o n s h o u l d , in t h e o r d e r of a r g u m e n t ,
c o m e last.
T h i s is c l e a r if we c o m p a r e t h e Three Dialogues w i t h B e r k e l e y ' s
earlier w o r k , The Principles of Human Knowledge. I n t h a t t r e a t i s e
a r g u m e n t s f r o m c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s a r e m u c h less p r o m i -
n e n t , t h e r e a s o n b e i n g t h a t t h e y a r e n o w n o t Berkeley's o w n
w e a p o n b u t p a r t of t h e a r m o u r y of t h e s c e p t i c w h o m h e t a k e s
a s his o p p o n e n t . T h e c o n c l u s i o n f r o m t h e p r e m i s s of c o n f l i c t i n g
a p p e a r a n c e s is n o t t h e Three Dialogues c o n c l u s i o n b u t t h e scepti-
cal conclusion urged b y Sextus Empiricus: ' I t must be confessed
t h a t this m e t h o d of a r g u i n g d o t h n o t so m u c h p r o v e t h a t t h e r e
is n o e x t e n s i o n or c o l o u r in a n o u t w a r d o b j e c t , as t h a t w e d o
n o t k n o w b y sense w h i c h is t h e t r u e e x t e n s i o n or c o l o u r of t h e
o b j e c t ' (Princ. § 15). ( T h e e c h o o f Sextus is n o a c c i d e n t : t h e r e
is e v i d e n c e t h a t B e r k e l e y ' s p r o j e c t for r e f u t i n g scepticism w a s
c o n n e c t e d w i t h his r e a d i n g o f t h e P y r r h o n i a n a r g u m e n t s
t r a n s m i t t e d b y Bayle's Dictionary.Y In Berkeley's view, then,
t h e ( P y r r h o n i a n ) sceptic h a s a g o o d a r g u m e n t to s h o w t h a t
' T h i n g s r e m a i n i n g t h e s a m e , o u r ideas v a r y , a n d w h i c h o f
t h e m , o r e v e n w h e t h e r a n y of t h e m a t all r e p r e s e n t t h e t r u e
q u a l i t y r e a l l y existing i n t h e t h i n g , it is o u t of o u r r e a c h t o
' Richard Popkin, 'Berkeley and Pyrrhonism', Review of Metaphysics 5
 d e t e r m i n e ' [Princ. § 87). T h e o n l y answer is to d e n y t h e contrast
between h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r a n d how t h e y really a r e : 'Coiour,
figure, m o t i o n , extension a n d t h e like, c o n s i d e r e d only as so
m a n y sensations in t h e m i n d , a r e perfectly k n o w n , there b e i n g
n o t h i n g i n t h e m w h i c h is n o t perceived' (ibid.) B u t n o w : to say
t h e r e is n o t h i n g in t h e idea w h i c h is n o t p e r c e i v e d a n d t h e r e b y
perfectly k n o w n is t o m a k e explicit, in a cool theoretical f o r m u -
lation, t h e p r i m e d e s i d e r a t u m of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l — t r a n s -
p a r e n t , close-up version (Berkeley is f a m o u s for his denial t h a t
sensible qualities a r e at t h e d i s t a n c e w e t a k e t h e m to be). T h e
thesis is t h a t , w h a t e v e r else m a y go on in w h a t w e w o u l d o r d i n -
arily describe as t h e seeing of a w h i t e stone, at t h e core of t h e
process is a t r a n s p a r e n t l y c l e a r ' i m m e d i a t e ' a w a r e n e s s of w h i t e ,
a w h i t e w h i c h is n o t at a d i s t a n c e f r o m t h e eye.^ Instead of
looking t h r o u g h t h e eye, w e enjoy a m o r e satisfactorily t r a n s -
p a r e n t v i e w of t h e contents of o u r o w n minds. T o t h e m w e
look t h r o u g h — n o t h i n g a t all. T h i s is Berkeley's solution to t h e
c h a l l e n g e of t h e sceptical use of conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s .
B u t t h e Three Dialogues tries to r e c o m m e n d t h a t solution
f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e o r d i n a r y m a n . I t is a p o p u l a r ex-
position, w r i t t e n t o take r e a d e r s into t h e p r i n c i p l e s of Berkeley's
p h i l o s o p h y ' i n t h e most easy a n d f a m i l i a r m a n n e r ' (Preface,
p. 168). T o t h a t e n d Berkeley a p p r o p r i a t e s t h e sceptic's a r g u -
m e n t s from conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s a n d tries to m a k e them p r o v e
directly t h a t sensible qualities d o n o t i n h e r e in o u t w a r d objects.
T h e y w o u l d p r o v e this if t h e y could call o n t h e n o t i o n of i m m e -
d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n a n d the P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n c i p l e it embodies. B u t
these, of course, a r e no p a r t of the o r d i n a r y m a n ' s perspective.
A n d w i t h o u t t h a t assistance t h e a r g u m e n t s d o n o more t h a n
assert p r o p o s i t i o n ( i ) for a succession of d i f f e r e n t values of F.
O n c e o r twice Berkeley transposes ( i ) i n t o (2). T h u s after c i t i n g
t h e j a u n d i c e e x a m p l e a n d a n i m a l s w i t h d i f f e r e n t l y textured eyes
to s h o w t h a t colours a r e n o t i n h e r e n t i n a n y o u t w a r d o b j e c t ,
i.e. a f t e r a n a r g u m e n t w h i c h rests on ( i ) , h e c o n t i n u e s :
T h e p o i n t will b e p a s t all d o u b t , if you consider, t h a t i n case colours
w e r e r e a l p r o p e r t i e s or affections i n h e r e n t in e x t e r n a l bodies, t h e y
could a d m i t of n o alteration, w i t h o u t some c h a n g e w r o u g h t in t h e v e r y
bodies themselves, (p. 185)
B u t t h a t transposition, as w e h a v e seen, is n o h e l p to the cause.
A n d p e r h a p s it o n l y looks as if it m i g h t h e l p b e c a u s e Berkeley's
f o r m u l a t i o n is a m b i g u o u s as b e t w e e n (2) a n d t h e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t
' At Siris § 317 Berkeley endorses the Theaeteius account of white.
•p*'·****"^!—^·—^nr-· ' • -η- ----- .
of it, the c o l o u r could n o t actually c h a n g e (as o p p o s e a ^ T o r i r
c o u l d not a p p e a r to c h a n g e ) w i t h o u t a c h a n g e in the t h i n g
itself. This p r i n c i p l e could well s e e m plausible, b u t it is irrele-
v a n t here, since t h e e x a m p l e s Berkeley is t a l k i n g a b o u t a r e
e x a m p l e s of a p p a r e n t c h a n g e s in t h e colour of a t h i n g . T h e
1
s a m e goes for a l a t e r passage on p r i m a r y qualities :
N o r e a l i n h e r e n t p r o p e r t y of a n y object c a n be c h a n g e d , without some
c h a n g e in the t h i n g itself. . . . B u t as w e a p p r o a c h t o o r recede f r o m a n
o b j e c t , the visible extension varies, b e i n g at one d i s t a n c e ten o r a n
h u n d r e d times g r e a t e r t h a n a t a n o t h e r . D o t h it n o t therefore follow
f r o m hence likewise, t h a t it is n o t really i n h e r e n t in t h e object? (p. 189)
T h e principle of t h e a r g u m e n t talks a b o u t r e a l c h a n g e , t h e
illustration a b o u t a p p a r e n t c h a n g e in size, so w h a t is c l a i m e d
to follow does n o t follow a t all.
T h e r e is n o getting a w a y f r o m this distinction. I t is o n e
t h i n g to say t h a t t h e real o r i n h e r e n t features of a n object c a n -
n o t b e a.mong those t h a t a r e a f f e c t e d by c h a n g e s e x t e r n a l to
t h e object, e.g. in the s u r r o u n d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t or in t h e p e r -
ceiver. T h i s m e a n s , r o u g h l y , t h a t t h e real i n h e r e n t f e a t u r e s of
a n object m u s t n o t be r e l a t i o n a l (cf. Sext. E m p . Λ ί viii. 4 5 3 - 7 ) .
I t is quite a n o t h e r to suggest t h a t the real i n h e r e n t f e a t u r e s
c a n n o t be a m o n g those t h a t appear to vary w i t h changes o u t -
side the o b j e c t . T h e l a t t e r p r i n c i p l e is the o n e whose p e r s u a -
siveness we a r e trying t o d i a g n o s e ; confusion w i t h t h e f o r m e r
o c c u r s too s e l d o m to e x p l a i n its pervasive i n f l u e n c e in t h e first
Dialogue. I n t h e end, I t h i n k , if Berkeley o r his r e a d e r is led
b y the a r g u m e n t f r o m c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s to a c c e p t t h e
conclusion t h a t sensible qualities d o n o t i n h e r e in o u t w a r d
things, it is in good m e a s u r e d u e to the s u p p o r t i n g i n f l u e n c e
of t h e h a l f - f o r m u l a t e d t h o u g h t — h a l f - f o r m u l a t e d because it is
suggested b u t n o t fully spelt o u t w h e n the n o t i o n of i m m e d i a t e
p e r c e p t i o n is first i n t r o d u c e d — t h a t every p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e
contains w i t h i n it a direct a w a r e n e s s of s o m e t h i n g . W h i c h is to
say t h a t Berkeley's r e b u t t a l of scepticism in t h e first Dialogue
o n l y works to t h e e x t e n t t h a t a n i n t e r n a l i z e d version of t h e
w i n d o w m o d e l is implicitly p r e s e n t all along.
VI
Is it just c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t t h e ambiguities o f the Theaetetus
a r g u m e n t a n d of Berkeley's first Dialogue r u n p a r a l l e l ? I h a v e
a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d t h a t Berkeley himself t h o u g h t the Theaetetus
104 PROCEEDINGS O F T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
theory exactly like his own. Perhaps, then, the common features
can tell us something about why relativistic views have exercised
such a strong hold on the philosophy of perception.
O u r inheritance from Protagoras and Berkeley is modern
sense-datum theory, which has reworked the old materials in
a manner which may tend to disguise their essentially rela-
tivistic character. But it is quite profitable, I think, to read the
seemingly sterile disputes about whether sense-data can exist
unsensed, or whether they can be identified with parts of the
surfaces of things, as disputes about the possibility of restoring
some independence and externality to one term of the Prota-
gorean relation. Better still, we can recognize a rather explicit
expression of the window model in the notion, central to sense-
datum theory, of sensing or acquaintance or direct awareness—
the terminology varies but most theorists are agreed that the
relation we have to the object or sense-datum which is pre-
sented to us in perceptual experience is a relation of unmediated
non-inferential knowing (cf. Theaetetus' definition).^
Predictably, it is G. E. Moore who gives the most 'window-
like' account of the matter :
When we refer to introspection and try to discover what the sensation
of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only a single
term. The term 'blue' is easy enough to distinguish, but the other
element which I have called 'consciousness'—that which sensation of
blue has in common with sensation of green—is extremely difficult to
fix. That many people fail to distinguish it at all is sufficiently shown by
the fact that there are materialists. And, in general, that which makes
the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us: it seems, if I may
use a metaphor, to be transparent—we look through it and see nothing
but the blue. ('The Refutation of Idealism', Philosophical Studies,
p. 20.)
So nearly explicit a picture of an internal window may help
to make plausible what I said about an internalized version
of the window model in Berkeley. Moore comes back to it later:
When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the
blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous, (p. 25)
This 'other element', the sensation or consiousness, Moore
says is in fact a 'knowing' or 'being aware o f or 'experiencing'
something, viz. blue (p. 24). Admittedly, Moore does not here
' See, for example, H. H. Price, Perception (London, 1932), pp. 3, 31;
C. D. Broad, 'Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Preception' (1952),
cited from Swartz, op. cit., p. 44.
C O N F L I C T I N G APPEARANCES 93
talk his usual sense-datum language about blue, but his dia-
phanous awareness of blue is a good preparation for it.
If other sense-datum theorists are less candidly revealing
about the pictures which guide their thinking, they tell us
more about the philosophical motivation for bringing in the
notion of sensing or acquaintance. Russell sums up the results
of the first chapter of The Problems of Philosophy in these
terms :
What the senses immediately tell us is not the truth about the object as
it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sense-data which,
so far as we can see, depend upon the relations between us and the
object. Thus what we directly see and feel is merely 'appearance',
which we believe to be a sign of some 'reality' behind, (p. 16)
This direct seeing and feeling of appearances or sense-data
is what he later calls acquaintance or direct awareness, where
this is one kind of knowledge of things (p. 46). But remember
that chapter i of The Problems of Philosophy begins with the
arguments from conflicting appearances which I cited at the
outset of this lecture. So in Russell's case also it is reflection
on conflicting appearances which is supposed to lead us to
adopt the notion of acquaintance.
T h e examples of conflicting appearances bring to our atten-
tion the fact that, as Russell puts it in the passage just quoted,
'sense-data . . . depend upon the relations between us a n d the
object'. And it is clear from the discussion which precedes that
w h a t Russell means by this is that the way things appear to us at
a given moment from a given point of view is causally dependent
on the state of our sensory apparatus, the condition of the inter-
vening medium, on perspectival effects and so on. ΑΠ of which
is undeniably correct. But unless (i) is true, for which Russell
offers no independent argument, none of this shows that the
colour or the shape which the table appears to have is not its
real colour or shape. It shows only that if and when the table
does appear the colour or the shape it really is, it does so thanks
to the causal interaction of our sensory apparatus with a variety
of environmental factors. And this, I think, is what at bottom
Russell is getting at when he invokes the notion of what we
directly or immediately see and feel. His idea is that if, per
impossibile, the senses could tell us about 'the object as it is apart
from us', they would have to do so directly or immediately, where
'directly' and 'immediately' can only mean: not by way of a
causal interaction between us and the environment.
 PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
104
N o d o u b t R u s s e l l w o u l d n o t like t h i s w a y of p u t t i n g i t .
T h e i d e a o n l y w o r k s b e c a u s e it r e m a i n s h a l f - f o r m u l a t e d . B u t
t h a t i t is t h e i d e a w h i c h g u i d e s h i s t h o u g h t is c o n f i r m e d w h e n
h e says t h a t w e d o directly a n d i m m e d i a t e l y see a n d feel t h e
sense-data or appearances which themselves d e p e n d upon t h e
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n u s a n d t h e o b j e c t . All t h e c a u s a l aspects o f
t h e p e r c e p t u a l p r o c e s s h a v i n g b e e n assigned t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n
of s e n s e - d a t a , to t h e b r i n g i n g a b o u t of t h e r e l a t i o n o f a c q u a i n -
t a n c e , t h a t r e l a t i o n itself is l e f t f r e e of c a u s a l i t y .
W e a r e b a c k a t Tkeaetetus 154 AB. C a u s a l i t y m a k e s the a p -
p e a r a n c e s r e l a t i v e t o the c o n d i t i o n s of p e r c e p t i o n , and t h a t
w r e c k s t h e h o p e o f a t r a n s p a r e n t view of t h e e x t e r n a l o b j e c t
w i t h its r e a l ( i n h e r e n t ) p r o p e r t i e s . B u t w e c a n save t r a n s p a r e n c y
b y m a k i n g t h e ' i m m e d i a t e ' o b j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n p r i v a t e to t h e
perceiver a n d by abolishing t h e distance between subject a n d
o b j e c t ; t h u s R u s s e l l locates s e n s e - d a t a in t h e p r i v a t e ( a p p a r e n t )
s p a c e of t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e i v e r , a g a i n o n g r o u n d s h a v i n g
to d o w i t h c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s (pp. 2 9 - 3 0 ) .
N o t i c e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t if t h e r e w e r e s u c h a t h i n g a s p e r c e p t i o n
w i t h o u t c a u s a l i t y , p r o p o s i t i o n (2) w o u l d v e r y l i k e l y be t r u e .
A g r e a t m a n y , a t least, of t h e cases w h e r e a t h i n g w h i c h is r e a l l y
F a p p e a r s to s o m e o n e not to b e F a r e cases of interference or-
b r e a k d o w n i n t h e causal p r o c e s s b y w h i c h w e o b t a i n i n f o r m a -
t i o n t h r o u g h t h e senses. M o r e o v e r , (2) d o e s h o l d f o r s e n s e - d a t a .
A s e n s e - d a t u m of necessity r e a l l y is as it a p p e a r s t o be to t h e
o n e o b s e r v e r w h o h a s access t o i t ; (2) h o l d s h e r e j u s t b e c a u s e
c a u s a l i t y d o e s n o t get i n t h e w a y . B u t R u s s e l l ' s a r g u m e n t
rests o n ( i ) , w h i c h we s a w t o b e e q u i v a l e n t t o (2). So t h e
a r g u m e n t h a s t h e s a m e a m b i g u i t y as w e f o u n d i n Berkeley
a n d t h e Tkeaetetus. W h a t is s u p p o s e d t o c o m e o u t of it is a
cool t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l : the thesis
t h a t w e h a v e k n o w l e d g e b y a c q u a i n t a n c e or d i r e c t a w a r e n e s s
of s e n s e - d a t a . B u t t h e a r g u m e n t o n l y w o r k s t o t h e extent t h a t
a h a l f - f o r m u l a t e d version of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l is p r e s e n t f r o m
t h e s t a r t . I t is p r e s e n t b e c a u s e ( i ) , w h i c h is f o r m u l a t e d , r e d u c e s
t o (2), w h i c h c o n t a i n s (in its first d i s j u n c t ) t h e u n f o r m u l a t e d
d e m a n d for transparency.
I will n o t v e n t u r e to assert t h a t w h a t I s a y t h r e e t i m e s is t r u e .
B u t a t least, if it is t r u e , it c a n h a r d l y b e c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t it is
t r u e . T h a t is o n e g a i n f r o m f o l l o w i n g t h e fortuna o f t h e w i n d o w
m o d e l i n m o d e r n t i m e s . A n o t h e r g a i n is t h a t w e h a v e c o m e t o
see t h a t t h e a p p e a l of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l is c o n n e c t e d w i t h
worries a b o u t c a u s a l i t y . P e r c e p t i o n , it is felt, o u g h t n o t t o b e
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 95
m e d i a t e d by a c a u s a l process.^ B u t a l a s , t h a t c a n n o t be. T h e
t r u t h is t h a t t h e w i n d o w m o d e l is u t t e r l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e
r e a l f a c t s of p e r c e p t i o n . B u t i n s t e a d o f c o m i n g t o t e r m s w i t h
r e a U t y , o u r t h e o r i s t s find a p l a c e f o r t h e w i n d o w m o d e l w i t h i n
p e r c e p t i o n . L e t c a u s a l i t y d o its w o r s t : a t the c o r e of the p e r -
c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e t h e r e will still b e a n u n m e d i a t e d k n o w i n g ,
like M o o r e ' s d i a p h a n o u s a w a r e n e s s of b l u e , a n d w h e n a s u i t a b l e
story h a s b e e n t o l d a b o u t t h e o b j e c t s of this k n o w i n g , t h e
p r o b l e m of c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s is solved. I t is a p h a n t a s y
s o l u t i o n , in a q u i t e p r o p e r sense. F o r i f m y e f f o r t s a t d i a g n o s i s
h a v e h i t the m a r k , the conflict of appearances o n l y ever b e c a m e
t h e p r o b l e m t h e s e theorists t o o k i t t o b e b e c a u s e t h i s was g o i n g
to b e t h e s o l u t i o n .
VII
A t t h i s point, n o w t h a t w e h a v e c o n n e c t e d t h e w i n d o w m o d e l
w i t h a desire t o c u t f r e e f r o m t h e t r a m m e l s o f c a u s a l i t y , w e
s h o u l d t u r n a s i d e b r i e f l y t o t h e field o f m o r a l s . O n t h e face of i t ,
if c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s a r e a p r o b l e m h e r e , it s h o u l d b e a
d i i ï e r e n t p r o b l e m . W e d o n o t a s c r i b e m o r a l p r o p e r t i e s to t h i n g s ,
as w e ascribe sensible q u a l i t i e s , o n t h e basis of a c a u s a l t r a n s -
a c t i o n b e t w e e n u s a n d t h e m . T h a t m a y h o l d s o m e t i m e s of
p r e d i c a t e s like ' n i c e ' a n d ' n a s t y ' , p r e d i c a t e s w h i c h m e r e l y e x p r e s s
a r e a c t i o n to t h i n g s . B u t i t c e r t a i n l y d o e s n o t h o l d of t e r m s l i k e
' r i g h t ' a n d ' w r o n g ' or ' l o y a l ' , ' h o n e s t ' , ' c h a r i t a b l e ' , a n d ' b r a v e ' .
T r u e , t h e c r u d e r f o r m o f e m o t i v i s t t h e o r y assimilates m o r a l
p r e d i c a t e s to p r e d i c a t e s o f r e a c t i o n , b u t t h e v e r y i m p l a u s i b i l i t y
o f t h a t a s s i m i l a t i o n is s t r o n g e v i d e n c e t h a t m o r a l conflict o u g h t
' T h e day after this lecture was delivered, there arrived on my desk a copy
of Mind 88 (Jan. 1979), containing Maurice Charlesworth's paper, 'Sense-
impressions : A N e w Model'. T h e 'new model' is none other than the window
model, recommended as a means of picturing a role for sensations in percep-
tion which does not make them representative of external things. Roughly, if
we can perceive the world through sensations as through a transparent
window-pane, we will not be stuck with the traditionally problematic notion
that we perceive sensations instead of the world outside (which they merely
represent), and by this means we can avoid the dilemmatic choice between
representative realism and phenomenalism. I t is most instructive to see how,
to make the model work, Charlesworth eventually finds it necessary to
a b a n d o n simple transparency a n d imagine a physics for the glass we look
through, a physics which makes its own contribution to the way things
appear to us. In other words, he has to make the window a properly causal
medium. Just this is what Berkeley and Russell are unwilling to d o for
immediate awareness.
96 P R O C E E D I N G S OF T H E B R I T I S H ACADEMY
to be a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t type of issue, with difficulties o f its o w n
a n d peculiar t o itself.
All too o f t e n , h o w e v e r , w h a t o n e finds in t h e philosophical
l i t e r a t u r e is a r e p e t i t i o n of t h e d e b a t e a b o u t sensible qualities.
T h e s a m e f o r m of a r g u m e n t is used (in Sextus, a s we s a w
earlier, t h e p a r a l l e l is deliberate a n d explicit, a n d it w a s almost
certainly t h a t w a y i n P r o t a g o r a s also) ; o f t e n t h e r e is the s a m e
reliance o n a m y t h i c a l e x a m p l e w h i c h for some r e a s o n people
w a n t to believe ( t h o s e distant tribes w h o h a v e sexual intercourse
in p u b l i c a r e a r e c u r r i n g p r e s e n c e in G r e e k l i t e r a t u r e f r o m
H e r o d o t u s o n w a r d s , a n d t h e y a r e still a t it in M o n t a i g n e ) . ^
But over a n d a b o v e these parallels w i t h t h e d e b a t e a b o u t
p e r c e p t i o n , t h e r e is also in t h e m o r a l d e b a t e a p r e o c c u p a t i o n
with p e r c e p t i o n itself, and it is this t h a t w e need to scrutinize.
W h e n M a c k i e presents ' t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m relativity' for
t h e thesis t h a t m o r a l values a r e n o t objective, n o t p a r t of t h e
f a b r i c of t h e w o r l d (note t h e initial choice of m e t a p h o r [p. 15]),
he starts o f f b y a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t t h e d i v e r g e n c e in m o r a l
beliefs b e t w e e n o n e g r o u p a n d a n o t h e r is i n itself m e r e l y ' a f a c t
of a n t h r o p o l o g y w h i c h entails n e i t h e r first o r d e r n o r second
o r d e r ethical views' (p. 3 6 ) . Nevertheless, s u c h divergence
requires e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e n e x t step is t o a r g u e t h a t the d i v e r -
gences in belief w o u l d be difficult to e x p l a i n on t h e a s s u m p t i o n
t h a t m o r a l v a l u e s are objective, w h e r e a s o n t h e opposite as-
s u m p t i o n t h a t v a l u e s are n o t objective t h e divergences c a n
q u i t e r e a s o n a b l y b e explained as d u e ( a n d M a c k i e must m e a n
t h e y are all entirely due) to local or p e r s o n a l differences in t h e
ways of life w h i c h give rise ( b y a process of p r o j e c t i o n or o b j e c -
tification) to t h e conflicting value-systems. H o w , t h e n , is it t o b e
shown t h a t t h e objectivist will find it difficult to explain m o r a l
conflict a n d d i s a g r e e m e n t ?
For this key step in t h e a r g u m e n t M a c k i e offers just t w o
models for u n d e r s t a n d i n g d i s a g r e e m e n t . O n e is d i s a g r e e m e n t
b e t w e e n scientific investigators in cases w h e r e t h e issue is
objective b u t t h e evidence is insufficient to d e c i d e between t h e
speculative hypotheses f a v o u r e d by d i f f e r e n t investigators
(p. 36). T h i s , w e m a y agree, is n o t a p l a u s i b l e parallel for t h e
m o r a l case. T h e other m o d e l is d i v e r g e n c e i n perception:^
1 Apologie de Raimond Sebond, Essais ed. Pierre Villey (Paris, 1922), ii. p . 341.
M o n t a i g n e also retails, as we would expect, b o t h t h e honey a n d the j a u n d i c e
exaraples (pp. 348, 362).
2 Cf. Gilbert K a r m a n , The Nature of Morality (New York, 1977), c h a p , i,
who asks w h e t h e r m o r a l principles can be tested a n d confirmed and proceeds
T h e a r g u m e n t f r o m relativity h a s s o m e f o r c c simply b e c a u s e the a c t u a l
v a r i a t i o n s in t h e m o r a l codes a r c m o r e readily e x p l a i n e d by t h e
h y p o t h e s i s that t h e y reflect w a y s of life t h a n by the h y p o t h e s i s t h a t
t h e y e x p r e s s p e r c e p t i o n s , m o s t of t h e m seriously i n a d e q u a t e a n d b a d l y
d i s t o r t e d , of o b j e c t i v e values, (p. 37)
But w h y would t h e objectivist h a v e n o choice b u t this? W h y
m u s t b e treat m o r a l divergence, like p e r c e p t u a l divergence,
as a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d i n d i c a t i o n of e r r o r on s o m e b o d y ' s p a r t ,
a n d t h e n explain m o r a l e r r o r o n t h e analogy of p e r c e p t u a l
e r r o r ? Mackie says, a n d this is his second a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t
t h e objectivity of values, ' t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m q u c e r n e s s ' —
If t h e r e were o b j e c t i v e values, t h e n t h e y w o u l d be entities o r qualities o r
r e l a t i o n s of a v e r y s t r a n g e sort, u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m a n y t h i n g else i n
t h e u n i v e r s e . C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , if w e w e r e a w a r e of t h e m , i t w o u l d h a v e
t o b e b y some s p e c i a l faculty of m o r a l p e r c e p t i o n or i n t u i t i o n , u t t e r l y
d i f f e r e n t from o u r o r d i n a r y w a y s of k n o w i n g e v e r y t h i n g else. (p. 38)
I t is Mackie w h o i n t r o d u c e s t h e p e r c e p t u a l m o d e l , n o t his
objectivist o p p o n e n t , M a c k i e w h o claims t h a t objectivism
m u s t sooner o r l a t e r t u r n i n t o i n t u i t i o n i s m : ' I n t u i t i o n i s m
m e r e l y makes u n p a l a t a b l y p l a i n w h a t other f o r m s of o b j e c -
tivism w r a p u p ' (ibid.). N o t only s h o u l d the objectivist d i s p u t e
this assertion, b u t he should n o t i c e t h a t t h e o n l y substantive
a r g u m e n t M a c k i e offers for it is t h e following: w h e n p e o p l e
j u d g e that s o m e things a r e g o o d o r right, a n d o t h e r s b a d o r
w r o n g , for t h e m o s t p a r t t h e y do so 'not b e c a u s e — o r a t a n y
r a t e n o t only b e c a u s e — t h e y e x e m p l i f y some g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e
for w h i c h w i d e s p r e a d i m p l i c i t a c c e p t a n c e c o u l d be c l a i m e d ,
b u t because s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h o s e things arouses c e r t a i n
responses i m m e d i a t e l y in t h e m , t h o u g h t h e y w o u l d a r o u s e
radically a n d irresolvably d i f f e r e n t responses in others. ' M o r a l
sense' or ' i n t u i t i o n ' is a n initially m o r e plausible description of
w h a t supplies m a n y of o u r basic m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s t h a n ' r e a s o n ' .
W i t h regard to all these s t a r t i n g p o i n t s of m o r a l t h i n k i n g t h e
a r g u m e n t f r o m relativity r e m a i n s i n full force' (p. 378) I t is
t h e emotivist assimilation to p r e d i c a t e s of r e a c t i o n / o v e r l a i d
b y a p e r c e p t u a l gloss. T h a t is w h y t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m relativity
to i n q u i r e w h e t h e r they can b e tested a n d confirmed by observation, only to
find t h a t 'there does not seem to b e any w a y in which t h e actual Tightness
or wrongness of a given situation can h a v e any effect o n your p e r c e p t u a l
a p p a r a t u s ' (p. 8).
^ Cf. p. 42 w h e r e , to illustrate o u r projection or objectification of moral
attitudes, M a c k i e uses the a n a l o g y of someone who calls a fungus foul
because it fills h i m with disgust.
gS PROCEJiUlINCjS u r ιπΕ. orviiioii i
r e m a i n s in full force. M o r a l p r e d i c a t e s express a n i m m e d i a t e
response o r r e a c t i o n to things, so if t h e objectivist is to m a k e
intelligible the n o t i o n of a mistaken a p p l i c a t i o n of such p r e -
dicates, h e m u s t say t h a t s o m e t h i n g goes w r o n g in the t r a n s -
action b e t w e e n u s a n d t h e m . A n d for this it is no d o u b t
t r u e t h a t t h e o n l y d e c e n t m o d e l w e h a v e is t h e m o d e l of
misperceiving.
T h u s M a c k i e ' s whole case rests on t h e premiss that, for t h e
most p a r t a t least, we a p p l y m o r a l p r e d i c a t e s to things, as w e
a p p l y sensory predicates, o n t h e basis of a t r a n s a c t i o n b e t w e e n
us a n d t h e m . A t this p o i n t M a c k i e ' s a c c o u n t of morals r e a l l y
is p a r a l l e l to D e m o c r i t u s ' a c c o u n t of s e c o n d a r y qualities.'
A n y sensible objectivist w h o denies t h e premiss gets off scot free.
B u t w h a t is of interest h e r e is the w a y M a c k i e argues t h a t a
p e r c e p t u a l m o d e l for t h e s u p p o s e d t r a n s a c t i o n breaks d o w n ,
a n d c a n b e seen to be a b s u r d , as soon as one t r i e s to fill in a
c e r t a i n a m o u n t of as it w e r e 'causal' detail to explain w h a t
h a p p e n s w h e n things go w r o n g . I n effect, M a c k i e first p r o j e c t s
u p o n t h e objectivist his own a t t a c h m e n t to t h e w i n d o w m o d e l ,
t r a n s p a r e n t d i s t a n c e version ( a n i n t u i t i o n of n o n - n a t u r a l q u a l i -
ties o u t t h e r e in t h e fabric of t h e w o r l d ) , a n d t h e n he c o m p l a i n s
t h a t t h e m o d e l is unrealistic because it c a n n o t c o p e w i t h t h e
conflict of a p p e a r a n c e s . H e n c e values a r e subjective. A n d this
does seem r e m a r k a b l y like D e m o c r i t u s c o n c l u d i n g that h o n e y
is n e i t h e r sweet n o r bitter o n t h e g r o u n d s that, w h i l e it a p p e a r s
sweet to y o u a n d me, it also a p p e a r s b i t t e r — s o S e x t u s assures us
(PH i. 101), a n d Sextus w a s a doctor·—to p e o p l e w i t h j a u n d i c e .
VIII
N o n e of this shows, of course, t h a t m o r a l values a r e objective or
t h a t t h e objectivist can in f a c t give a p l a u s i b l e a c c o u n t of m o r a l
d i s a g r e e m e n t . Likewise, m y earlier discussion d i d n o t a t t e m p t to
p r o v e t h a t sensible qualities a r e i n h e r e n t in t h e t h i n g s we ascribe
t h e m to. I h a v e n o t a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e is n o t r u t h in relativism
or in subjectivism, w h e t h e r these a r e t a k e n as theories a b o u t
values, a b o u t s e c o n d a r y qualities or a b o u t p r i m a r y qualities as
well. I h a v e criticized w h a t m a y in full p r o p r i e t y be called
t h e classical a r g u m e n t s for relativism a n d subjectivism, b u t I
h a v e criticized t h e m chiefly w i t h a view to u n d e r s t a n d i n g their
a p p e a l . A n y o n e w h o t e a c h e s outside t h e walls of a c o n v e n t i o n a l
' Cf. also Mackie's remarks on the extent to which m o r a l values exist by
convention, pp. 36, 42 ff.
C O N F L I C T I N G APPEAKANUKS
university p h i l o s o p h y d e p a r t m e n t soon finds t h a t these a r g u -
m e n t s are a p o t e n t force in t h e w i d e r c u l t u r e of our society:
99
1
as p o t e n t as t h e y were in a n c i e n t Greece. T h e y seem to c o m e
n a t u r a l l y , of t h e i r own a c c o r d , to m a n y p e o p l e u n t u t o r e d in
philosophy, as soon as t h e y e n g a g e with H e r a c l i t u s ' q u e s t i o n ,
h o w far our l a n g u a g e a n d t h e w a y s w e o r d i n a r i l y speak a b o u t
t h i n g s can c l a i m absolute validity. A r g u m e n t s which h a v e
t h a t kind of a p p e a l call f o r diagnosis as m u c h as for s t r a i g h t -
f o r w a r d logical appraisal.
I shall r e t u r n to this m a t t e r of diagnosis, b u t first, to p r e v e n t
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e r e a r e several f u r t h e r p o i n t s I s h o u l d
m e n t i o n , if o n l y to m a k e it clear w h e r e they fit in a n d w h a t I do
a n d d o not w a n t to say a b o u t t h e m .
( i ) I have n o t said, n o r d o I believe, t h a t t h e w i n d o w m o d e l
is a n a b e r r a t i o n of philosophers w h o s e worries a b o u t conflicting
a p p e a r a n c e s t a k e a relativist or subjectivist t u r n . A n o t h e r
a d h e r e n t of t h e p i c t u r e is P l a t o himself.
P l a t o sets u p relativism i n t h e Theaetetus in o r d e r to a r g u e
t h a t when its implications a n d c o m m i t m e n t s are followed
t h r o u g h it will b e seen to l e a d to m u l t i p l e absurdities, n o t t h e
least of w h i c h is t h a t in t h e e n d t h o s e private, relative o c c u r -
r e n c e s of w h i t e a n d other sensible qualities c a n n o t be i d e n t i f i e d
o r described as, e.g., w h i t e r a t h e r t h a n a n y t h i n g else; p e r c e p t u a l
relativism m a k e s l a n g u a g e impossible. W h a t P l a t o most objects
to i n the k i n d of e m p i r i c i s m r e p r e s e n t e d b y T h e a e t e t u s ' defi-
n i t i o n a n d P r o t a g o r a s ' e p i s t e m o l o g y is t h a t it covertly assigns
to p e r c e p t u a l experience as such those f u n c t i o n s of t h o u g h t
w h i c h are r e q u i r e d for t h e p e r c e i v e r to i d e n t i f y w h a t his ex-
p e r i e n c e is of. H i s target i n this p o l e m i c is t h e Berkeleyan view
t h a t one h a s o n l y to sense w h i t e t o know it for w h a t it is.
Accordingly, w h e n t h e Theaetetus goes on ( 1 8 4 B - 7 A ) to give
P l a t o ' s own a c c o u n t of t h e m a t t e r , a very s h a r p distinction is
d r a w n b e t w e e n p e r c e p t i o n a n d j u d g e m e n t . I t is one t h i n g to
perceive a c o l o u r , q u i t e a n o t h e r to j u d g e or b e a w a r e t h a t it is
t h e colour w h i t e . H o w e v e r , i n t h u s a r g u i n g t h a t p e r c e p t i o n as
s u c h c a n n o t b e knowledge, b e c a u s e p e r c e p t i o n o n its own h a s n o
p o w e r of j u d g e m e n t or c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , P l a t o himself m a k e s
h e a v y use of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l in t h e interests of a n i m p o r t a n t
thesis a b o u t t h e u n i t y of t h e p e r c e i v i n g consciousness.'
» See my 'Plato on the G r a m m a r of Perceiving', Classical Quarterly NS 26
(1976), PP· 29-51, to which I must refer for a detailed defence of the inter-
pretation sketched out here.
ΙΟΟ PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
P l a t o ' s c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t w e c a n n o t m a k e sense o f p e r c e p t i o n
( w h e t h e r as p h i l o s o p h e r s o r as perceivers) e x c e p t in t e r m s
of a u n i t a r y m i n d or soul w h i c h c a n t h i n k a n d r e a s o n a b o u t
t h e o b j e c t s of d i f f e r e n t senses a n d m a k e c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n
t h i n g s p e r c e i v e d a t d i f f e r e n t times. I t m u s t b e o n e a n d t h e
s a m e e n d u r i n g s o u l which p e r c e i v e s all t h e o b j e c t s o f the s e v e r a l
senses a n d it m u s t b e t h a t s a m e p a r t of ourselves w h i c h a p p l i e s
t h o u g h t t o w h a t w e p e r c e i v e . F o r this thesis P l a t o offers c o o l
t h e o r e t i c a l a r g u m e n t , r a t h e r g o o d a r g u m e n t , b u t in a d d i t i o n
h e helps the a r g u m e n t along with models a n d metaphors.
If t h e r e w e r e n o u n i t a r y consciousness, t h e several senses w o u l d
b e like t h e b a n d of w a r r i o r s i n t h e w o o d e n horse a t T r o y , e a c h
c a r r y i n g o n his p e r c e p t u a l a c t i v i t y i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the o t h e r s
a n d of t h e w h o l e w h i c h c o n t a i n s t h e m . I n p l a c e o f this p i c t u r e
P l a t o p u t s a n o t h e r , b e t t e r o n e . C o l o u r s a n d o t h e r sensible
q u a l i t i e s a r e o u t t h e r e , w i t h a ( n o n - r e l a t i v e ) n a t u r e or essence
o f t h e i r o w n ; t h e soul g a i n s access t o t h e m t h r o u g h the senses
o r s e n s e - o r g a n s ; a n d we a r e e n c o u r a g e d t o t a k e t h e p r e p o s i t i o n
' t h r o u g h ' , o n w h i c h m u c h e m p h a s i s is l a i d , as a spatial m e t a -
p h o r . ^ T h e m e t a p h o r of o r g a n s or senses as a p e r t u r e s f o r t h e
soul t o p e r c e i v e t h r o u g h c o n j u r e s u p a p i c t u r e of a u n i t a r y soul
w h i c h , b e c a u s e i t stands b a c k as it w e r e f r o m t h e i n d i v i d u a l
senses, is a b l e b o t h to p e r c e i v e t h e o b j e c t s of m o r e t h a n o n e
sense a n d t o t h i n k a b o u t w h a t it p e r c e i v e s i n g e n e r a l t e r m s .
I n a w o r d , a u n i t a r y soul, a n d o n l y a u n i t a r y soul, c a n b e
conscious.
All t h i s s t a n d s i n p o w e r f u l c o n t r a s t t o t h e e m p i r i c i s m i n i t i a t e d
b y T h e a e t e t u s ' d e f i n i t i o n . I f t h e e m p i r i c i s t w e r e to r e p l y b y
p r e s s i n g P l a t o w i t h his o w n a r g u m e n t a t 1 5 4 AB, the a n s w e r
w o u l d b e t h a t it does n o t w o r k b e c a u s e t h e n o t i o n of a p p e a r i n g
already incorporates the perceiver's t h o u g h t or j u d g e m e n t
(cf Sophist 2 6 4 B), a n d it is t h o u g h t w h i c h a p p l i e s t h e p r e d i c a t e s
' F ' or ' n o t - F ' t o t h i n g s ; t h e p e r c e p t u a l e l e m e n t i n a p p e a r a n c e
c a n b e d e s c r i b e d in c a u s a l t e r m s b u t t h a t is all t h e r e is t o s a y
a b o u t it.
I g i v e this v e r y s u m m a r y sketch o f P l a t o ' s o w n p o s i t i o n ,
n o t b e c a u s e I t h i n k his final a n s w e r s a t i s f a c t o r y , b u t b e c a u s e
I t h i n k t h a t h i s use of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l b r i n g s out a n i m -
p o r t a n t p o i n t . S o far f r o m b e i n g a n a b e r r a t i o n of c e r t a i n
empiricist philosophers, t h e picture associated w i t h the m o d e l
is o n e c o m p e l l i n g l y n a t u r a l expression o f t h e d i f f i c u l t y of c o m i n g
' It was this, presumably, t h a t inspired the explicit window comparison
attacked by Lucretius (III p. 84 above).
COl^rXf G i'ixVò 'jÌÌ-«^
t o t e r m s with w h a t it is t o b e b o t h i n the w o r l d a n d c o g n i z a n t
of t h e world. T h e eyes a n d t h e r e m a i n i n g senr.ory a p p a r a t u s
of t h e b o d y a r e e n t a n g l e d i n t h e c a u s a l m e c h a n i s m s w h i c h a r e
n e c e s s a r y to p e r c e p t i o n . I n c e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l m o o d s it m a y
strike us t h a t t h e y are t o o m u c h in t h e w o r l d t o b e c o g n i z a n t
of i t . T o e x p l a i n p e r c e p t u a l consciousness it is t h e n t e m p t i n g
t o i m a g i n e o n e s e l f s t a n d i n g o f f , as it w e r e , f r o m o n e ' s o w n b o d y
a n d its causal i n v o l v e m e n t s , l o o k i n g t h r o u g h i t ( t o use P l a t o ' s
a m b i g u o u s p r e p o s i t i o n ) a t t h e w o r l d b e y o n d . A n d h e r e too,
as i n t h e empiricists, t h e m e t a p h o r i c a l looking is f r e e of c a u s a l i t y ,
b e c a u s e the c a u s a l i t y gets u s e d u p , so to s p e a k , i n the b o d y ' s
interaction with the enviroment.
(2) I h a v e n o t s a i d a n y t h i n g a b o u t the i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of
t h e w i n d o w m o d e l to senses o t h e r t h a n sight. I h a v e n o t d o n e
this b e c a u s e w h a t is i n t e r e s t i n g a n d r e v e a l i n g a b o u t t h e m o d e l
is t h e w a y i n w h i c h it is i n a d e q u a t e to t h e specific m o d e of
p e r c e p t i o n , n a m e l y sight, b y w h i c h i t is i n s p i r e d . I t h a s o f t e n
b e e n r e m a r k e d t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h y of p e r c e p t i o n has t e n d e d
t o g i v e the p r i m a c y to sight, a l l o w i n g t h e o t h e r senses to p r o v i d e
u s e f u l e x a m p l e s of illusion or c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s b u t
otherwise leaving them t o tag along. Perhaps the w i n d o w
m o d e l has s o m e t h i n g to d o w i t h t h i s t e n d e n c y .
I n this c o n n e c t i o n t h e Theaetetus passage w e s t a r t e d f r o m
is q u i t e r e v e a l i n g . I t sets f o r t h its thesis i n t e r m s of c o l o u r
p r e d i c a t e s , a n d w h e n i t d o e s c o m e to m e n t i o n o t h e r s , t h e
e x a m p l e s g i v e n a r e ' l a r g e ' a n d ' h o t ' . N o w ' l a r g e ' is c l e a r l y
s u g g e s t e d b y t h e P r o t a g o r e a n i m a g e of p e r c e i v i n g as m e a s u r i n g .
W e a r e to t h i n k of a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h w e literally m e a s u r e
ourselves a g a i n s t a n o b j e c t i n o r d e r to e s t i m a t e its size b y
c o m p a r i s o n w i t h o u r o w n . T h a t is, t h e e x a m p l e invites a v i s u a l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a g a i n . W h a t is m o r e , it i n v i t e s us to p i c t u r e
o u r o w n b o d y as w i t h i n t h e v i s u a l field.
I t w o u l d , h o w e v e r , b e p e r f e c t l y possible t o t a k e o n e ' s i n s p i -
r a t i o n from a sense o t h e r t h a n sight. C. D . B r o a d o n c e p r e s e n t e d
t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s in i m a g e s of j u m p i n g
a n d grasping :
I n its purely phenomenologicai aspect seeing is ostensibly saltatory. I t
seems to leap the spatial g a p between the percipient's body and a
remote region of space. T h e n , again, it is ostensibly prehensive of the
surfaces of distant bodies as coloured and extended, and of external
events as colour-occurrences localized in remote regions of space. ('Some
Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Perception', op. cit., p. 32.)
 Given this i m a g e r y to w o r k with, B r o a d ' s conclusion f r o m t h e
usual survey of conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s is t h a t t h e p h e n o m e n o -
logy is m i s l e a d i n g , the d i s t a n c e to t h o s e r e m o t e regions c a n -
n o t be j u m p e d , so we h a v e to say t h a t p e r c e p t u a l experiences
a r e ' p r e h e n s i o n s ' of non-physical p a r t i c u l a r s w h i c h do r e a l l y
h a v e t h e q u a l i t i e s of redness, squeakiness, hotness, etc., w h i c h
t h e y a p p e a r to h a v e (p. 4 2 ) . I t is the Theaetetus a r g u m e n t a g a i n ,
c o n d u c t e d in t e r m s of m o v e m e n t a n d t h e m o d a l i t y of t o u c h .
N o w B r o a d ' s ^prehensions' h a v e a m o r e e m b o d i e d p r e c e d e n t
in t h e h a n d - g e s t u r e s w i t h w h i c h Z e n o of C i t i u m illustrated t h e
Stoic t h e o r y of t h e c a t a l e p t i c or ' g r a s p i n g ' impression (Cicero,
Academica i. 41, ii. 145), a t r u t h - g u a r a n t e e i n g experience w h i c h
t h e Stoics also i m a g e d as a perfect p i c t u r e of its object (Sext.
E m p . M vii. 248) a n d as a clear a n d distinct impression of it
(Diogenes L a e r t i u s vii. 46). T h e d i f f e r e n c e is that, w h e r e
B r o a d h a s to c o n t e n t h i m s e l f with a n o n - p h y s i c a l grasp of a
n o n - p h y s i c a l p a r t i c u l a r , t h e Stoics h a v e e n o u g h faith i n t h e
n a t u r a l a d a p t e d n e s s of o u r faculties t o t h e u n i v e r s e we live in
to be w h o l e - h e a r t e d physicalists. T h e i r g r a s p i n g , p i c t u r i n g o r
clear a n d distinct impression is a c a u s a l l y d e t e r m i n e d , w h o l l y
physical process in w h i c h o n e b o d y , t h e perceiver, achieves
c e r t a i n t r u t h a b o u t a n o t h e r body. W h a t links t h e bodily g r a s p
of t h e Stoics to Broad's e t h e r i a l p r e h e n s i o n s is o u r w o r d ' p e r -
ception'. It comes from t h e Latin 'perceptio', meaning 'a taking
h o l d ο f ' , w h i c h was o n e o f Cicero's t r a n s l a t i o n s of t h e Stoic
t e r m 'catalepsis', grasp (cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 17). I t looks v e r y
m u c h as t h o u g h the i d e a of p e r c e p t i o n as a firm grasp of a n
o b j e c t is some sort of antithesis to t h e w i n d o w model, a n d
p e r h a p s a d i f f e r e n t , if r a t h e r less c o m m o n , w a y of c o p i n g w i t h
the same ultimate problem.
(3) I h a v e n o t so far said a n y t h i n g a b o u t a r g u m e n t s i n w h i c h
t h e p r e m i s e of conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s is o v e r t l y and d e l i b e r -
ately c o m b i n e d with f u r t h e r premisses. M o s t of the sceptical
a r g u m e n t s in Sextus a r e of this k i n d . I n his b e t t e r m o m e n t s
Sextus k n o w s t h a t Berkeley was w r o n g to s a y it follows j u s t
f r o m t h e conflict of a p p e a r a n c e s t h a t 'we d o not k n o w b y
sense w h i c h is t h e t r u e extension or c o l o u r of t h e o b j e c t ' . O f
course, if w e a r e told t h a t s o m e t h i n g a p p e a r s F to one p e r s o n
a n d n o t - F to a n o t h e r , w e c a n n o t d e c i d e o n t h a t basis a l o n e
w h e t h e r t h e t h i n g is F o r n o t - f . B u t this does n o t p r o v e t h a t
it c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n e d a t all, n o r t h a t it c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n e d
by sense.
At. ί» 1»»»
' I s i t F or n o t - F ? ' ( a n s w e r ; ' I t a p p e a r s to b e F') with t h e o u t -
sider's q u e s t i o n 'Is it r e a l l y F as it a p p e a r s to h i m t o b e ? '
I t is easy to confuse t h e t w o b e c a u s e of c o u r s e the p e r c e i v e r
himself c a n s t e p back a n d ask a b o u t himself the o u t s i d e r ' s
question in t h e f o r m ' I s it really F as it a p p e a r s to m e to b e ? '
N o w , in a conflict case t h e o u t s i d e r needs a reason to p r e f e r
o n e person's a p p e a r a n c e s to a n o t h e r ' s . N o t h i n g h a s been said so
f a r t o show h e c a n n o t h a v e it. S u p p o s e he does. Tlien c e r t a i n l y ,
his knowledge t h a t the t h i n g is r e a l l y F is n o t based o n sense
a l o n e . But for all t h a t h a s b e e n s h o w n so far t o t h e c o n t r a r y , h e
is n o w entitled to say of t h e p e r s o n to w h o m it a p p e a r s F t h a t
he knows it is F because a n d simply because h e perceives it to b e
so. T h a t is, t h e outsider m a y v e r y well r e a c h the conclusion
t h a t the c o n d i t i o n s a r e right for t h e insider t o gain k n o w l e d g e
f r o m his p e r c e p t i o n . H u m e ' s assessment of t h e sceptical a r g u -
m e n t f r o m conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s has it e x a c t l y right :
These sceptical topics, indeed, are only sufficient to prove, that the
senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on; but that we must
correct their evidence by reason, and by considerations derived from
the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposi-
rion of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere, the
proper crìterìa of truth and falsehood. {Enquiry concerning Human Under-
standing Xll. 117.)
W h a t is t r u e is t h a t if as outsiders we b e c o m e c o n v i n c e d t h a t
t h e r e is n e v e r reason t o p r e f e r o n e person's a p p e a r a n c e s to
a n o t h e r ' s , w e shall c o n c l u d e t h a t u n d e r n o c i r c u m s t a n c e s does
k n o w l e d g e result w h e n t h e insider judges t h a t s o m e t h i n g is F
because it a p p e a r s so t o h i m . B u t , c o n t r a r y to Berkeley, this
c a n n o t be p r o v e d by t h e conflict of a p p e a r a n c e s alone. A c c o r d -
ingly, m u c h of Sextus' eflfort goes into a r g u i n g , explicitly a n d
i n detail, t h a t there is n e v e r r e a s o n to p r e f e r o n e a p p e a r a n c e
t o another ; o r as he p u t s it, t h a t t h e r e is n o criterion of t r u t h —
n e i t h e r t h e senses n o r a n y t h i n g else are ' t h e p r o p e r criteria
of t r u t h a n d falsehood'. A d d t h a t to the p r e m i s s of conflicting
a p p e a r a n c e s a n d the sceptical a r g u m e n t goes t h r o u g h . F o r if
t h e r e is n o criterion of t r u t h , all a p p e a r a n c e s are of e q u a l
strength, e q u a l l y w o r t h y a n d e q u a l l y u n w o r t h y of belief, a n d
w e are f o r c e d to suspend j u d g e m e n t .
So put, t h e sceptical c h a l l e n g e seems to m e to deserve some-
t h i n g b e t t e r t h a n the p h a n t a s y solutions it h a s so often received.
I t calls for a detailed e x a m i n a t i o n a n d a p p r a i s a l of t h e g r o u n d s
o n which w e o r d i n a r i l y p r e f e r some a p p e a r a n c e s to others.
H
104 PROCEEDINGS O F T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
I t is n o t e n o u g h , for e x a m p l e , to talk i n a g e n e r a l p r o m i s s o r y
w a y a b o u t h e a l t h y m i n d s in h e a l t h y b o d i e s u n d e r n o r m a l
c o n d i t i o n s of p e r c e p t i o n . T h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t a k i n g these as
t h e m e a s u r e or c r i t e r i o n of w h a t sensible q u a l i t i e s things h a v e
m u s t lie i n a d e t a i l e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n
p e r c e i v e r a n d p e r c e i v e d . T h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e reliability of t h e
processes b y w h i c h we o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the w o r l d
m u s t b e s q u a r e l y faced in c a u s a l t e r m s , n o t a v o i d e d by t a k i n g
r e f u g e i n t h e w i n d o w m o d e l a n d its i l l u s o r y a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e
c a u s a l m e d i u m i n which p e r c e p t i o n is i m m e r s e d .
(4) I h a v e n o t so far c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n t o d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g t h e
t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s o f v a r i a t i o n o r conflict b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e s
w h i c h S o c r a t e s sets out a t Theaetetus 154 A. B u t clearly, t h e r e
a r e i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b o t h b e t w e e n a n d w i t h i n these
c a t e g o r i e s . I n m o r a l s , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e y a r e d i f f e r e n t sorts of
d i f f e r e n c e of o u t l o o k a n d j u d g e m e n t w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h a m a n in
his m a t u r i t y f r o m t h a t s a m e m a n in a d o l e s c e n c e , a m a n h u n g r y
a n d oppressed f r o m that same m a n w h e n he has become the
l e a d e r of his p e o p l e , a n d a m a n i n f l a m e d w i t h passion f r o m
t h a t s a m e m a n reflecting n e x t d a y . A n d t h e s e differences
s h o u l d t h e m s e l v e s be c o n t r a s t e d , n o t e q u a t e d , w i t h t h e dif-
f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n one m a n a n d his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , w h i c h
are different again from the differences b e t w e e n him a n d
p e o p l e o f o t h e r times a n d places. S i m i l a r p o i n t s c o u l d b e
m a d e a b o u t d i f f e r e n c e s in t h e i m p o r t o f c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s
f o r t h e d i f f e r e n t sense m o d a l i t i e s . B u t w h e r e p e r c e p t i o n is
c o n c e r n e d , it s e e m s to m e t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t i n g c a t e g o r y is t h e
o n e least a t t e n d e d to i n m o d e r n discussions, t h e v a r i a t i o n
b e t w e e n m a n a n d other a n i m a l s . T h e i n t e r e s t i n g p r o b l e m is
not relativity or subjectivity in general, b u t Heraclitus' p r o b l e m
of a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c i t y . ^
S u p p o s e w e h a v e been a b l e t o j u s t i f y o u r p r a c t i c e of p r e f e r r i n g
the appearances enjoyed b y healthy h u m a n s in normal con-
ditions o f p e r c e p t i o n o v e r t h o s e of h u m a n s u b j e c t s a f f e c t e d
b y j a u n d i c e a n d other d i s a d v a n t a g e s . S e x t u s w i l l argue, a n d
he has both Heraclitus a n d Protagoras behind h i m , that even
so it is a r b i t r a r y to p r e f e r h u m a n a p p e a r a n c e s , h o w e v e r c a r e -
fully selected, t o the c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s w h i c h o t h e r
a n i m a l s g e t f r o m t h e s a m e t h i n g s . T h e r e is n o n e e d to r e s o r t t o
^ Compare David Wiggins, ' T r u t h , Invention, and the Meaning of Life',
Proc. Bnt. Acad. Ixii (1976), pp. 331-78, at pp. 348-9; Thomas Nagel, ' W h a t
is it like to be a Bat?', Philosophical Review 83 (1974), pp. 435-50.
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 105
q u a i n t e x a m p l e s like H e r a c l i t u s ' pigs e n j o y i n g the m i r e . '
W e know, o r h a v e g o o d r e a s o n t o believe, t h a t a t a b l e w h i c h
n o r m a l l y looks b r o w n t o us looks v e r y d i f f e r e n t to a n o r m a l
h e a l t h y c a t , w h o has o n l y b l a c k a n d w h i t e vision a n d sees
e v e r y t h i n g i n g r a d a t i o n s of grey. I s it n o t a k i n d of e p i s t e m o -
l o g i c a l 'speciesism' (cf. PHì. 59) t o prefer o u r o w n p e r c e p t i o n s
to t h e cat's
A s it s t a n d s , this is n o t a g o o d a r g u m e n t . W e d o n o t i n f a c t
p r e f e r in a c o m p l e t e l y g e n e r a l w a y our o w n p e r c e p t i o n s to
t h o s e of o t h e r a n i m a l s . W e r e a d i l y accept, a n d so does S e x t u s
(PH i. 62 ff), t h a t a n i m a l s a r e o f t e n m o r e sensitive t o smells
t h a n we a r e , a n d in s o m e w a y s m o r e sensitive t o s o u n d . E v e n
i n t h e case o f colour, w e c o u l d believe, a n d it m a y a c t u a l l y
b e t h e case, t h a t s o m e a n i m a l s h a v e a s p e c t r u m w i d e r t h a n o u r s .
I n s u m , w e h a v e a n o t i o n of b e t t e r or worse p e r c e p t u a l e q u i p -
m e n t a n d t h a t n o t i o n is n o t species-specific. I t is a n e m p i r i c a l
q u e s t i o n , w h o is best a t p e r c e i v i n g w h a t , a n d t h e c i t i n g of
v a r i a t i o n s i n p e r c e p t i o n b e t w e e n us a n d o t h e r species does
n o t h i n g t o s h o w t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n c a n n o t e v e r h a v e a well-
grounded answer.
T h u s S e x t u s ' a r g u m e n t fails. B u t H e r a c l i t u s will c o m e b a c k
to m a k e t h e c h a r g e of a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c p a r t i a l i t y at a h i g h e r
level. I t is o u r h u m a n l a n g u a g e i n w h i c h all t h i s has b e e n said,
o u r l a n g u a g e i n w h i c h t h e scientist's e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n is
c a r r i e d o u t . T h e i n t e r e s t i n g case w o u l d be o n e w h e r e it is n o t
j u s t t h a t t h e o t h e r a n i m a l is m i s s i n g s o m e t h i n g w e c a n p i c k u p
o r vice versa, b u t r a t h e r t h a t h e h a s a n e x p e r i e n c e of c o l o u r ,
s a y , w h i c h is t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f a n y
h u m a n . 3 T h e n s o m e of H e r a c l i t u s ' p a r a d o x e s c o u l d b e g i n to
bite.
^ Though Berkeley did : Three Dialoguesy "p. 181.
2 Another way of getting to the problem is by changing human beings.
For ways of doing this, see J o n a t h a n Bennett, 'Substance, Reality and
Primary Qualities', Amer. Phil. (^art. 2 (1965), pp. 1-17, who is concerned to
draw a moral about the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Bennett shows that the objectivity of primary qualities is more fundamental,
in a certain clear sense, than the objectivity of secondary qualities, but it
would be wrong to conclude that this makes my problem disappear. We
still have to explain what type of objectivity the secondary qualities can
enjoy. And here the variety of animal perceptions (the first Mode of Pyrrho-
nian scepticism) offers a more radical challenge than, for example, limited
colour blindness in human beings.
^ If I mention here Gerald H . Jacobs and Robert L. Yolton, 'Visual
Sensitivity and Colour Vision in Ground Squirrels', Vision Research 11 (1971),
pp. 511-37, it is without confidence that they intend to describe such a case.
ïo6 P R O C E E D I N G S O F T H E B R I T I S H ACADEMY
Suppose we h a d elaborated a scheme of colour predicates
to describe the other animars experience from his point of
view. Let one of these predicates be 'huey'. Would it be a
contradiction for one and the same thing to be both blue and
huey all over at the same time? Must we oppose the colour-
qualities things have for us (the Protagorean idiom seeming
inescapable as the only alternative to paradox) to those they
have for the other creature, insisting that 'blue* and 'huey'
be regarded as contraries in the same way as 'blue' and 'red'
within our own colour vocabulary? M a n y will prefer the Demo-
critean solution that the object in itself, absolutely considered,
is neither blue nor huey, all colour being equally subjective.
But Heraclitus himself was not so despairing.
Heraclitus' version of the absolute god's-eye vantage-point
is not designed to show us the world 'as it is apart from us'.
O n the contrary, when he talks of the god's-eye view, he pro-
jects into it all our opposing, relativity-conditioned predicates :
To god all things are fair and just: but men suppose some things just and
others unjust, (frag. 102)^
I interpret this to mean that our h u m a n contrast between
justice and injustice has no absolute validity, even though it is
necessary to the very meaning of the terms in our language:
For [men] would not know the name of Dike [ = Justice] if these
things [sc. injustices] did not exist, (frag. 23)
From an absolute vantage point everything is just—but not in a
way that contrasts with injustice. For at that level it is equally
true that justice is strife, i.e. what men think of as injustice:
What one ought to understand is that war [sc. that which separates]
is common [sc. that which connects] and justice is strife, and that all
things which come to pass do so in accordance with strife and what
ought to be. (frag. 80)
And what holds for moral predicates holds for the rest of our
language:
God is day night, winter summer, war peace, hunger satiety: he
changes [sc. becomes many opposite things] in the way that fire [sc.
the fire at a sacrifice], when it is mixed with spices, is named according
to the scent of each. (frag. 67)
No matter. We can still try to imagine a case and consider what we could
say about it.
I Text as in M . Marcovich, Heraclitus, Editio Maior (Mérida, 1967),
pp. 480-a.
CONtLIClIINti
I n sum, the absolute viewpoint, far from being different from
every partial viewpoint, would be one which saw that every
partial viewpoint is correct.
All this may seem indulgent mystification, even if I am
pardoned for thinking that we might apply what Heraclitus
says about opposed predicates within language as it is to the
imagined case of 'blue' and 'huey'. What possible alternative
to Democritus can Heraclitus offer unless he explains what the
overcoming of opposition and contradiction within the god's-
eye vantage-point amounts to? But reasonable as it m a y seem
to ask for such an explanation, to expect Heraclitus to say that
the predicates are not really opposed, the strife image tells us
that of course they are opposed (so too frags. 102 and 23, quoted
above) ; and many other fragments convey the same message
with unmistakeable force. Heraclitus' solution to the problem
of conflicting appearances is not an explanation but a certain
kind of awareness :
To those who are awake the world-order is one, common to all; but
the sleeping turn aside each into a private world, (frag. 8g)'
T h e world as we ordinarily understand it is from a god's-eye
view relative to us and the categories of our language, as a
dreamer's world is to him. T h e trouble is that people are not
aware of this. Most men 'fail to notice what they do after they
wake up, just as they forget what they do when asleep' (frag. i).
A true awakening would remember the dream world and be
aware that it was a private world.
For those who have heard not me but the Logos wisdom is agreeing
that all things are one. (frag. 50)
Wisdom is becoming aware of the relativity of one's categories
and experience, not thereby denying its (partial) validity but
putting it into perspective along with other viewpoints. T h e
Logos which connects things that our language separates and
opposes is itself still language, our own language. The god's-eye
view for Heraclitus is simply this : seeing that the h u m a n view
is the human view and no more. One carries on as before—one
speaks and can only speak from within one's own language.
But the wise man is awake to what he is doing. T h a t is how
Heraclitus could sum u p his whole philosophy in the words
Ί searched out myself (frag. l o r ) .
' For a defence of the authenticity of this fragment see Marcovich, op. cit.,
pp. 99-100.
104
PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY
W h a t t h i s a c c o u n t of H e r a c l i t u s suggests as h i s answer t o
o u r e a r l i e r p r o b l e m is t h e f o l l o w i n g . T h e i n c l i n a t i o n to r e g a r d
' b l u e ' a n d ' h u e y ' as i n c o m p a t i b l y o p p o s e d is n o t to b e s u p -
pressed b u t r a t h e r r e c o g n i z e d for w h a t it is, n a m e l y , a m a n i -
festation of the fact that w e c a n n o t a b s o r b the o t h e r creature's
c o l o u r s c h e m e i n t o our o w n . T o r e c o g n i z e this is t o r e c o g n i z e
t h a t it lies i n t h e n a t u r e o f a v i e w p o i n t — a n y v i e w p o i n t — t o
c l a i m t h e a b s o l u t e allegiance of t h e o n e w h o s e v i e w p o i n t it is.
H e r a c l i t e a n w i s d o m is t h u s c o m p a r a b l e t o t h e s t a n c e of a m a n
w h o r e c o g n i z e s t h a t his m o r a l i t y is o n e a m o n g o t h e r s , yet d o e s
n o t o n t h a t a c c o u n t feel, n o r t h i n k t h a t h e o u g h t to feel, its
values t o b e a n y t h e less a b s o l u t e or b i n d i n g . T h e r e m a y b e
difficulties i n expressing a n d m a i n t a i n i n g this s t a n c e , b u t i t is
r e a l l y n o less d i f f i c u l t to c o n c e i v e a P r o t a g o r e a n o r D e m o c r i t e a n
life w h i c h seriously a t t e m p t e d to t r e a t first-order e x p e r i e n c e
a n d c o n c e r n s as relative o r subjective.^ A n d t h i s brings m e t o
t h e q u e s t i o n of diagnosis.
IX
W h e n I w a s discussing t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e Theaetetus a r g u m e n t
t o t h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n c i p l e l a i d d o w n a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e
dialogue, I considered t h e objection t h a t m y window-model
diagnosis was b o t h rude a n d unnecessary. I have, I hope, dealt
sufficiently w i t h t h e c l a i m t h a t it is n o t n e c e s s a r y . But I h a v e
n o t a d d r e s s e d t h e c o m p l a i n t t h a t I m a k e it s o u n d a s if s o m e t h i n g
r a t h e r d i s r e p u t a b l e is g o i n g o n i n t h e Theaetetus a r g u m e n t a n d
t h e o t h e r s w e h a v e b e e n l o o k i n g at. I a m v e r y f a r f r o m t h i n k i n g
this to b e so. I h a v e i n d e e d e m p h a s i z e d t h e p i c t u r e s a n d t h e
m e t a p h o r s , b u t so t h a t w e m a y see t h e m for w h a t t h e y a r e .
W h e t h e r it is t h e flawless close-up vision or t h e p r e h e n s i v e
g r a s p , w h e t h e r i t secures a w h o l e o b j e c t or o n l y some p a r t of
t h e s u r f a c e of o n e or j u s t a n o n - p h y s i c a l s u b s t i t u t e for t h e s e ,
s u c h p i c t u r e s h a v e t h e i r o r i g i n in o u r e a r l i e s t a n d d e e p e s t
e x p e r i e n c e . I f t h e y h a v e elicited a smile, it s h o u l d h a v e b e e n
a s m i l e of r e c o g n i t i o n , n o t c o n t e m p t . F o r if, as H e r a c l i t u s
a d v i s e d , w e r e m e m b e r o u r d r e a m s , w e will r e c o g n i z e t h a t
t h e r e w a s a t i m e in o u r o w n lives w h e n t h e p r o b l e m o f c o n -
flicting a p p e a r a n c e s e n g a g e d o u r s t r o n g e s t feelings; a t i m e ,
m o r e o v e r , w h e n p e r c e p t i o n a n d v a l u a t i o n w e r e n o t yet d i s t i n -
g u i s h e d . W e k n o w too little a b o u t t h e p s y c h i c r o o t s of c r e a t i v e
p h i l o s o p h y to t u r n o u r b a c k s o n t h e s e sources of i n s p i r a t i o n .
If t h e y a r e f o u n d d i s r e p u t a b l e , t h e f a u l t r e a l l y is, for o n c e , i n
I For valuable discussion of this and related issues, see Wiggins, op. cit.
CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 109
t h e eye of t h e b e h o l d e r . O f c o u r s e the a r g u m e n t s m u s t b e
criticized. B u t t h e p o i n t is t h a t t h e criticism m u s t be j o i n e d by
respect and understanding.
I t is t h a t e l e m e n t of r e s p e c t , s o necessary f o r real u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g , w h i c h I miss i n A u s t i n ' s work a s a critic o f the
t r a d i t i o n w h i c h h e r i g h t l y s a w as s t e m m i n g f r o m H e r a c l i t u s .
A u s t i n is a t h i r d case of d o u b l e p e r s p e c t i v e . I n his first c h a p t e r
h e explains t h a t h e c a n n o t g o b a c k to t h e v e r y earliest texts
f r o m before P l a t o , since t h e y a r e n o l o n g e r e x t a n t . S o h e
chooses A y e r a s his ' c h i e f s t a l k i n g horse', w i t h s u b s i d i a r y re-
f e r e n c e s to P r i c e a n d t o W a r n o c k ' s book o n Berkeley. T h e s e
w o r k s seem t o h i m 'to p r o v i d e t h e best a v a i l a b l e expositions of
t h e a p p r o v e d r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g theories w h i c h are a t l e a s t as
o l d as H e r a c l i t u s — m o r e full, c o h e r e n t , a n d t e r m i n o l o g i c a l l y
e x a c t t h a n y o u find, f o r e x a m p l e , in D e s c a r t e s or B e r k e l e y '
(p. i ) . But u n f o r t u n a t e l y , this w a s a serious h i s t o r i c a l m i s t a k e
o n Austin's p a r t .
I t was a m i s t a k e b e c a u s e t h e r e a s o n s A y e r p r o v i d e s f o r t h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n of s e n s e - d a t a a r e not t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l y a p p r o v e d
reasons, t h o u g h A y e r h i m s e l f c l a i m s t h a t t h e y a r e :
W h a t the advocates of the s e n s e - d a t u m theory h a v e done is to decide
to apply the w o r d 'see' or a n y other words t h a t designate m o d e s of
perception to delusive as well as to veridical experiences, a n d a t the
s a m e time to use these words i n such a w a y t h a t w h a t is seen o r other-
wise sensibly experienced m u s t really exist and m u s t really h a v e the
properties t h a t it appears to h a v e . N o d o u b t they also use these words
in other, m o r e familiar, senses. But it is this usage t h a t leads t h e m to
t h e introduction of sense-data. (p. 2 4 ) '
T h i s was w r o n g as h i s t o r y — n e i t h e r P r o t a g o r a s n o r B e r k e l e y
n o r Russell r e l i e d o n a n o v e l sense of 'see' o r ' p e r c e i v e ' — b u t
c o r r e c t as a n a c c o u n t of w h a t A y e r himself w i s h e d to d o , w h i c h
w a s to m a k e t h e w h o l e issue a q u e s t i o n of w h i c h l a n g u a g e o n e
chooses for t h e p u r p o s e s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y . O n t h e r e a d i n g
I h a v e o f f e r e d in this l e c t u r e , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a r g u m e n t f r o m
c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s sets u p a p r i v a t e s u b s t i t u t e o b j e c t to
b e p e r c e i v e d i n t h e v e r y s a m e sense of the v e r b as t h a t i n w h i c h
w e originally w a n t e d to p e r c e i v e w h o l e o b j e c t s o u t t h e r e i n t h e
w o r l d . W h a t is c h a n g e d b y a d d i n g the relativistic q u a l i f i e r s
I A footnote on the next page refers to G. A. Paul, 'Is there a Problem
about Sense-Data?' (1936), in Swartz, op. cit., pp. 271-87, as clearly bring-
ing out the point that the sense-datum theorist is simply recommending a
new verbal usage. But Paul denies that the sense-datum theorists themselves
would represent their procedure in such terms (pp. 227—9).
110 PROCEEDINGS O F T H E B R I T I S H ACADEMY
'for m e ' , ' i m m e d i a t e l y ' , ' d i r e c t l y ' , a n d t h e like, is n o t the sense
of t h e v e r b ' p e r c e i v e ' b u t its o b j e c t . W h a t g u a r a n t e e s t h a t
s o m e t h i n g r e a l l y is as it a p p e a r s to b e is n o t a special sense of
t h e v e r b b u t its t a k i n g as o b j e c t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is itself ( a n )
a p p e a r a n c e . ' A n d this is c o m p l e t e l y a t v a r i a n c e vsrith A u s t i n ' s
d i a g n o s i s i n t e r m s of linguistic sleight o f h a n d (cf. p p . 3-5) o r t h e
u n j u s t i f i e d i n v e n t i o n of a s p e c i a l sense of ' p e r c e i v e ' (chap. I X ) ,
I t is t r u e t h a t A u s t i n t e m p e r s his d i a g n o s i s f r o m time t o t i m e
w i t h a n a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t t h a t it w a s A y e r w h o g a v e t h e s u b -
j e c t a l i n g u i s t i c t u r n {cf. p . 102). B u t t h a t a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t
is itself m o d i f i e d b y A u s t i n ' s v i e w t h a t t h e n e w linguistic c l o t h i n g
is r e a l l y j u s t a disguise f o r t h e o l d t r a d i t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s f o r a n
ontological dichotomy between sense-data a n d material objects
( p p . 5 9 - 6 1 , 84, 105-7). A n d despite these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , h e
c o n t i n u e s t o discuss t h e a r g u m e n t s a n d d i a g n o s e their m i s t a k e s
in p r e d o m i n a n t l y linguistic t e r m s , t a k i n g it t h a t A y e r does give
' t h e a p p r o v e d reasons' f o r t h e old t h e o r y . ^ T h e effect, a s m a n y
r e a d e r s o f Sense and Sensibilia h a v e felt, is t h a t A u s t i n ' s o b j e c t i o n s
fall u n h a p p i l y b e t w e e n t w o stools. T h e y n e i t h e r get t o t h e
b o t t o m of the traditional arguments, w h i c h r e q u i r e a diagnosis
d e e p e r t h a n linguistic m e t h o d s c a n a c h i e v e , n o r a r e they a p p r o -
p r i a t e t o t h e essentially s t i p u l a t i v e , c o n s t r u c t i v e c h a r a c t e r of
Ayer's o w n enterprise.
I t s e e m s to m e , then, t h a t as a critic A u s t i n falls short b e c a u s e
h e d i d n o t p r o p e r l y sort o u t t h e d o u b l e p e r s p e c t i v e he a d o p t e d
w h e n h e d e c i d e d to l o o k a t t h e h i s t o r y t h r o u g h Ayer's spec-
tacles. H e w o u l d h a v e d o n e b e t t e r t o go b a c k t o the o r i g i n a l
sources, w h i c h h e was of c o u r s e well e q u i p p e d t o h a n d l e . E v e n
t h e e a r l i e s t sources, p r i o r t o P l a t o , a r e n o t c o m p l e t e l y b e y o n d
t h e r e a c h of historical u n d e r s t a n d i n g — a s I h o p e t o h a v e s h o w n .
I n t r y i n g t o s h o w this, m y essential c l a i m h a s been t h a t a
' Let me add that I have nothing to say in this lecture about phenomena-
lism. Considered as a theory about the analysis of material object statements
in terms of statements about perceptual experience, phenomenalism is a
separate issue from the introduction of sense-data (just one approach to
perceptual experience) with which it has historically been associated.
^ T o mention just one of the historical distortions that result, Price, who
really belongs to the prelinguistic phase, gets landed with Ayer's account
(as quoted above) of hoAv sense-data are introduced (Ausün, p. 103). A
footnote seeks to make amends, but it does not m a k e clear that Price
only raised the matter of the senses of 'perceive' in chapter 2 of Perception
(pp. 22 £f.), after introducing sense-data in chapter 1 on the basis of an
entirely epistemologica! argument from what we can and cannot doubt
(though cf. p. 5 η.).
^WiNTL·!«^ 1 1J1VJ i»»
r e s p e c t f u l h i s t o r i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the o r i g i n a l sources is a
first step t o w a r d s realism i n o u r o w n p h i l o s o p h y .
X
I t is only fitting t h a t t h e e p i l o g u e be given t o the f o u n d e r of
t h e series o f lectures i n w h i c h I h a v e t h e h o n o u r t o s p e a k .
I n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y j u d i c i o u s a n d historically i n f o r m e d p a p e r
o n ' A p p e a r a n c e and R e a l Existence''—a p a p e r which treats
a n c i e n t a n d m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y a s a single c o n t i n u i n g story,
w i t h equal h o n o u r s for Plato, K a n t , and H e g e l — D a w e s Hicks
h a s this t o s a y a b o u t R u s s e l l ' s version of t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m
conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s i n The Problems of Philosophy:
I t is obvious, I think, t h a t this a r g u m e n t is fallacious, a n d t h a t the
conclusion does not follow f r o m the premises. F o r , in order to test it,
suppose t h a t colour of some kind is i n h e r e n t in t h e table, t h a t t h e table
has a specific colour. T h e n , surely, t h e r e would b e nothing to conflict
w i t h this supposition in t h e circumstances t h a t s u c h real colour will
present a d i f f e r e n t aspect if a n o t h e r colour be reflected u p o n it, or if
a blue pair of spectacles intervene between it and t h e eyes of the observer,
o r if it be enveloped in darkness r a t h e r than in daylight. T h e reasoning
would only b e valid on t h e assumption t h a t if the table is really
coloured, t h e real colour must a p p e a r the same i n darkness a n d in d a y -
light, through a pair of b l u e spectacles and w i t h o u t them, i n artificial
light and in the sun's l i g h t — a n assumption which, on the view I a m
taking, is a t o n c e to be dismissed as untenable. I f t h e colour d i d a p p e a r
to be the s a m e in these v a r y i n g circumstances, then certainly there
would be reason, and sufficient reason, for d o u b t i n g the reliability of
visual apprehension.- F o r obviously the conditions m e n t i o n e d — r e a l ,
objective conditions, as I t a k e t h e m to b e — c a n n o t be without influence
u p o n any real colour the table m a y be said to possess, (p. 42)
T h i s is w h e r e w e c a m e i n , R u s s e l l ' s a r g u m e n t rests o n p r o p o s i -
t i o n ( i ) , ( i ) is e q u i v a l e n t to (2), a n d (2) is m a n i f e s t l y false.
T h e r e it i s — t h e logical r e f u t a t i o n n e a t l y l a i d out, c l e a r a n d
conclusive, j u s t o n e y e a r a f t e r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of The Problems
of Philosophy. W h y d i d it m a k e n o d i f f e r e n c e ? W h y , if s t r a i g h t -
f o r w a r d l o g i c a l r e f u t a t i o n is e n o u g h , d o t h e a r g u m e n t s f r o m
conflicting a p p e a r a n c e s live o n ?
' Proc. Arisi. Soc. 14. (1913/14), pp. 1-48.
- Compare Augustine, Contra Academicos iii, 26: ' I f an oar dipped in water
looked straight, I would rather accuse my eyes of false testimony'—so far as
I can discover, the point is original with Augustine, one of several that make
the Contra Academicos a pioneering work.