*SPROPOSED/ TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM” TECHNICAL RESULTS OF/ THE) FIRST/ MANNED | ORBITAL, FLIGHT /PROM. THE UNITED STATES/ PART J =) MISSION RESULTS Prepared by lexrcury Project Orfice ited! by J. H\ Boynton WORD ONE/KEYSEARCH MANNED) SPACECRAPT) CENTER REVIEW COPY MPO Rio & NER Peibsen,, Restos, Rovio Roelzh Dicer» MAG ‘CLassirseation Spavare Ta ; Lathassitord Br AutHomrr or EO /2 iilACKNONLEDGEMENTS. : General acknowledgement |s made of the extensive effort on the” part of the entire Mercury teap. This notably Includes the Departmant of Defense for its recovery support, HeDonnel! Aircraft and its sub- contractors for the spocccraft, Ganeral Dynamlcs/Astronautics for the launch vel , the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center for its Mercury Network support, the NASA Hanned Spacecraft Center, and in general the many Industrial organizations and NASA agencies which directly or indirectly made possible the success of this historical flight. Individual acknowledgement is given the following adi tors for thair direct contribution in publishing the preliminary document upon which thif report [= based: R, G. Arble Data Coordination P, G. Bonne! ly Capsule Systems E.H. Ficlds Nereury Project Offico J, DB. Hodge Flight Operations Div N, F. Smith Flight Systems Diviston Or. R. B. Voas Office of Director = Astro. Training Dr. §. 6. White Life Systems Division Acknowledgement is presented at the conclusion of this report to the many systems=speclalists who authored and assisted in updating ' specific portions of the text.- SUONFTSENTIALetal TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST oF TABLES LIST OF FIGURES SUMMARY, INTRODUCTION SYHAOLS MISSION DESCRIPTION Hission Objectives Mission Evaluation - SPACE VEHICLE DESCRIFTION Spacecraft Launch Vehicle EVENTS, TRAJECTORY, AND GUIDANCE Sequence of Events Trajectory Guidance SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE Reaction Contre! Systen Environmental Control Systen Communication Systens Mechanical and Aockat Systens Electrical and Sequential Systems Telemetry end Recording Systems. eee inatCOTTER Vibration : Postflight Inspection LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE Abort Sensing and Implenentattan Systen Staging Events Orbital Lifetime Aerodynantc Loads AGROMEDICAL ANALYSIS AMD FLIGHT ACTIVITIES Introduct Ton Agromedical Invest! gations Astronaut Activities Astronaut!s Report FLIGHT CONTROL AND NETWORK PERFORMANCE Mercury Network Performance Flight Control Summary OPERATIONS Spacecraft History Launch Operat tans Launch Proceduce Weather Condi tiens Filght Safety Reviews Photographic Coverage Recovery Operations Recovery PlansRecovery Procedure Recovery Aids SUMMARY OF RESULTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: REFERENCES | | | | | qTSE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADHINISTRATION ‘TECHNICAL HEHORANDUM x = MERCURY-ATLAS HISSION 6 (WA-G SPACECRAFT 13) RESULTS, DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYS!S Edited by John H. Boynton SUMMARY ‘The Hercury-Atlas Hission 6 was the first United States manned erbital flight, and all prescribed mission objectives were succassfully accomp. hed. A complete description of the mission, Ineluding a listing of its preflight objectives and @ postlaunch evaluation, is presented, A comparison of all plonned and actual sequence deta indicates that mission parameters eofneide with expected values. The space- craft, launch vehicle, and Hercury Network functioned satisfactorily during the mission. Early in the flight, however, the onboard telemetry transmitted on ominous nal to the ground that the heat shield was not firmly attached to the spacccraft. A subsequent enalysis resulted in @ recemendation to Astronaut Glenn that the retropackage be retained Into reentry In order to ensure correct placement of the heat shield. A postflight Investigetion revealed a faulty, ch as the sourca of an incerract CONPTEETTPrNeeee telemetry signal, and the heat shield, in fect, was not improperly deployed during the orbital flight. During the second orbital pass, fallure of the oné-pound yew thrushars, caused repeated loss of automatic orbitel stabilization, requiring the astronaut to manually control the Spacecraft for the remainder of the mission. Despite these and other minor malfunctions, tha mission was completed successfully, and recovary was effected in the prescribed arca by the destroyer Nos within twenty minutes fram landing. The astronaut's performance during al] mission phases was Ighly satisfactory, and no deleterious effects of weightlessness Were noted. Astronaut Glenn was foundt» be in excellent phystolagical and psychological health during the postflight examination,Orta INTRODUCTI ON The first manned orbital flight in conjunction with Project Marcury was successfully performed en February 20, 1962, from the Cape Canaveral Missile Test Center. Astronaut John H. Glenn, Jr., shown in Figures 1 through 4, was the assigned pilot for this Horcury-Atlas (HA-6) Mission. ‘This wes the third orbital flight of a Hereury specification spacecraft, and it marked the sixth of a serles utilizing Atlas launch vehicles. ‘The HA-6 mission was planned for three orbital passes and was the culmination of a program to develop the Mercury spacecraft for manned orbital flight. The objectives of the flight were to evaluate. the parformance of the manned spacecraft system In a three-pess Sion, to evaluate the effects of space flight on the astronaut, and to obtaln the astronaut's evaluation of the operational sultability of the spacecraft end supporting systems for manned orbital missions. All data telemetered end recorded during the flight has been thoroughly analyzed by specialists in their fields, and this report Presents these results ond their analyses. Brief descriptions of the mission, the spacecraft, and the launch vehicle precade tha performance analysis end supporting data. All significant events of the MA-G. © mission, beginning with delivery of the spaceeraft to the launch slte through recovery and pase flight examinations, sre documented.ODOR Although the graphical information presented herein sufficiently Supports the text, tha reader is referred to THX__-___(reference 1) for 2 completa presentation, without analysis, of all MA-6 tine history date.cont MISSION DESCRIPTION Hission Objectives The mission cbJectIves and systems priorities, as specified "in the Project Mercury Mission Directive for MA-6/13, are listed below for reference. Test Objectives 1, Evaluate the performance of 'a men-spacecraft system In a three-pass mission. 2. Evaluate the effects of spaceflight on the astronaut. 3. Obeain the astronaut's opinions of the operational suitability of the spacecraft and supporting systens for manned spaceflights. Systens Priorities (2) Communications systen Priority (1) Gommand receiver no. | Primary (2) Command receiver no. 2 Primary gj (3) Low frequency telemetry (225.7 me) Primary (4) High frequency telemetry (259.7 mc) Primary (5) UNF and HF veice Primary (6). C-band beacon Primary 5 pagar riero ® @ Cio) Scone S re ‘S-band beacon. SARAH beacon SUPERSARAH beacon SEASAVE beacon — (b) Automatic Stabilization and Control System (c) Rate Stabilization Contre] System (@) Reaction Control System (ce) Environmental Control System (f) Electrical Power System (g) Explosive devices (p) Cabin equipment a) (2) @) (4) G) (6) Navigation instruments ECS indicators Electrical system indicators Sequential and warning lights ASCS indicators Satellite clock (i) Rocket system (i) Landing and recovery systen ' (k). Instrumentation system Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primory Primary Primary Sai\ Forres HISSION EVALUATION The MA-6 mission, with Astronaut John Glenn es the pilot, experienced unscheduled prelaunch helds totaling 2 hours and 17 minutes. This wes the result of difficulties with the General Electrie guidance Fate beacon and a spacecraft-hatch belt, In addition to allonences for topping fuel, loxing the launch vehicle, and verifying the Bermuda computer after a ground power failure. The vehicle lifted off ot approxtmately OS47 e.s.t. on February 20, 196% 3 2 hours ond 42 minutes after the astronaut entered the spacecraft. All Atlas fltght parameters were normal during launch. Virbration amplitudes and frequencies were acceptable end comparable to those experienced during the MA-5 launch. Spacecraft or! al section conditions ware excellent. Deviations froa neminal values of inartial flightpath angle and velocity were -,05 dagrees and -7 ft/sec, respectively, with a resultant capability of nearly 100 orbital passes. General Electric-Burroughs and AZUSA guidance data beth indicated a "GO" condition after sustainer engine cut off. Thé perigee and apogee of the orbit differad from the noainal values of 87.0 and Wh. nautical miles by 0.1 neuticel miles and 3.5 nautical respectively. 2 Spacecraft separation, rate damping, ond turnaround were accomplished satisfactorily. With the exception of steadily rising teaperatures on both inverters, all spacecraft systens performed satisfactorily during the first pass. ET aieCODEN The astronaut observed the launch vehicle tenkage tn [zs sllghtly lower orbit for somo tima, checked out the spacecrafe control systems, performed planned tasks and mada scientific observations, Including a report of small luminous-appearing partTeles around the spacecraft at sunrise. At approximately the beginning of the second orbital period, the astronaut reported that the spacecraft was nat maintaining ecceptable attitudes in the orbit mede of control in right and later in left yaw. This was because of a thrust loss from the low thrusters. The astro- haut elected to control the spacecraft manually to conserve fuel; and mast of the remainder of the mission was flown in a manual control mode. Hecassary attention to control of the spacecraft precluded accomplishment of sone flight-plan items. However, the astronaut accomplished the major planned tasks ond confirmed the major weather phenonena were visible on the moonlite dark side of the arth. Ho controlled the spacecraft attltudes by visual reference to the horizon and stars cn the dark sido of the earth, and spacecraft maneuvers were performed manually, including 1892 yew maneuvers. Ouring the second and third passes, sn indication from telemetry that the spaceeraft heat shicld might be unlocked caused sone concern.” A recemmendation was made that the enpty retrepack be retained on the spacecraft during reentry at the end of tho third orbital pass, The intent was to hold the heat shield In place until sufficient POLEws COHEIPEINGL, aerodynanic pressure was built up, in case it wes unlatched, The retropack had no detactable effect on the reentry, ‘It was later disclosed that the heat chicld had not been prematurely released. Spacecraft attitudes during the retrof by both the automatic control system and the astronaut using manual control, Spscecraft oscillations diverged during reentry and were not satisfactor! ly controlled unt!1 the drogue parachute stabilized the spacecraft. The dregus parachute deployad at about 27,000 feet, rather then the planned 21,000 feet. Landing (at 04:55:16) occurred approximately 40 nautical mi las upranga of the planned land!ng polnt. ‘The spacecraft, with the astronaut Inside, was recovered sone 17 wwtes after landing by the destroyer Noa. The astronaut was found to be in excellent physiological condition. Natwork operations, including telemetry reception, radar tracking, communications, command control and computing were excellent, which permitted effective Flight control during the mission.~ COMTVENTTAT ‘SPACE VEHICLE DESCRIPTION A photograph of the space vehicle lift-off configuration, consisting of the spacceraft and the launch vehicle, is shown in figure 5. Spacecraft - Spacecraft No. 13, shown In figure 6 was utilized for the HA-6 manned orbital mission. The spacecraft axis system is shown Figure 7. ‘The prinary differences between spacceraft no. 13 ond spacecraft no. 9 (HA-5 mission) are listed below: J. An astronaut's couch was installed, 2. A personal -equipment container was installed. 3. Filters were provided for the astrenaut's window. 4, An indicator was added to the instrument pene! which displayed the temperature of the suit circuit steam vent. 5. The suit cirevit incorporeted a constant-bleed orifice (750 ce/min). 6. The sult shutoff valve spring force decreased to approximately 25 \bs., conpared to about 40 Tbs. for spacecraft no. 9. 7. The cabln-fan inlet duct incorperated improved screens. 8. The latehing rélay to lock in the number 2 suit fan was omitted. 3 9. The sult-Inlet snorkel door was located on the conteal after" body. 10. Cooling plates of the new design wore installad under the. 150 VA and 250 YA main inverters, and tha stalnless steel! check a —COMELDENT Ite) ible valves were installed in the coolant line In lieu of aluninun valves. 11. ‘The Manual Proportions! contro! system linkage had shear pins added. 12, ‘proved heat-cendition paths and heat sinks were installed near the thrusters for temperature control of the roll thruster fuel lines. 13. Indicating lights were added te the Instrument panal to show | which Inverters were operative. 14, Direct canual suitehing without fusos to the was incorperated.eer 15. The maximum altitude sensor was provided a separate battery. 16. Qne-ohm fuses were Installed im al] squib cireuits. 17. Aa integrating accelerometer was installed. 18. A Super SARAH beacon was incorporated in View of on Ultra SARAH. 19, A reserve chute was installed. 20. A switch wes Installed to allow manuel override of heat shield deployment. 21. The escape tower legs were of heavier construction. 22, A manually actuated blood pressure measuring system was Incorporated. Tha weight and balance parameters for spacecraft no. 13 are shown in the following table: Parameter entry Con- figuration eight, pounds 3. 2421.79 119.74 Istation, inches X . ‘ : #133 16 258.1 353.5 359-5Launch Vehicle. = The N4-6 launch vehicle, Arias No. 109-0, was modi- fled for the mission as on previous Harcury-Atias flights. A sketch showing the general configuration Is shown in figure 8. It differed from the MA-5 Mercury-Atlas booster (93-4) in one mbjor respect. The inguletien and its retaining bulkhoed betwoer the lox and fuel tank dome was renoved prior to launch when it wes discovered that fuel sulation. The original requirement for this had leaked into this Insulation and retainer had been deleted earlier in the Atlas develop- ment program es being non-essential, and this insulation 13 not re- tained in the éperational ICBM version. The following minor modifications were incerporated on Ni=6 and are “planned fer future Hercury-Atlas flights: 1, The gyro canister was modified to Include specially selected transistors ef the eriginal design type that had good thermal characteristics. Thi change decreases the possibl lity of thermal runeaway In the gyro torquer and signal amplifier. 2. The booster lox-tank pressure parameter for the Abort Sensing and Implementation System (A815) was changed from 21.5 + 1,0 psi te 19-5 4 1.0 psi to protect against an inadvertent abort « dua to lox - tank-ullage pressure transicnts which oceur ot lift-off.| ) 5 : cor J ORY, AND GUIDANCE Sequence of Events ven in tale I, imac at whieh tho major ever ads ‘he groua track of fligi nin figure 9, oud the altitude-leneitude profile 42 shown tn fi, ‘Tho lauack trajectory date, shoun in real tine eutpat tho Rengo Safcty Impact Tredieter Conputer ¢ used AZUSA IY and Capo FPS-16 redere) ond the Genered Blectric= Bu $ Guidance computer. The data from thoso tracking fectiitios ) wero need during tha timo poricds listed below, culity Cape Canaveral FE-10 0 ta 00:45 AZUSA IK TT 00285 to 01:08 OLz08 te 05:02 om for the "planned" Jautch trajectory Ja teble the 1933 ARE nedel atmosphere to maintain eon= sistoney eith other publi: donsity of the Capo Cenaveral at guar (than ¢hat|ot 2050 AEC aemoottase - ihite blocd colic /sn’--. Differential white-blood ect ‘Iymphocytes, percent-- Weutrophites, percent. Monosytes, percent. Eosinophilec, percent. Basophiles, percent--- TDeterminntions by sam technician.Glucese (whole ‘ilood) mga/100 | Boatun (serum), 39/in= Bi Potesciua (serum), mEq/L 48 Coleiun (corum), xBa/L-- 5.2 si BEES Ephinephrine, plasma jig/T=-. Norepinephrine, plasiia be/I-=—<= sotpes GaBs eee PRE ERnGu a 18.) eolbemeneyas 2 PEGS 2 Ge te oy Cperational priorities preciuded miking a biochemical requirement for fasting specimens.‘ABLE XI.— PLASMA ENEYHES SUNQUNY, ‘Transaninases SOFT. Esterase: Acetylcholins-- Poptidace: Toweylonino=- Tecueylosino) heats steble Aldolase= Mudelave, heat treated Tsorerso: Phospliohexase ic, heat. stable-|-—— Uh to 15 Aiphs-ketogiutaric- Beta-glutanic-—- Fhosphatae AMKoline Tactic Acid. Cholesterol- Cholesterol esters, percentex== DPI Oxidation (non, specific ensym: netivity)=. Ma-6 2light—Urine Summary Prema] BALG sight Porttight 24] tor] tan! ai 418 Volume, €. Specific gravity. Microscope ‘exetalnation « ceplthe- ‘eelh ia a] a0 | 20 7 1.029 [1.024 fh. oan p1.ons % Lal Re, og. | Sen. tO: New. sg. | Nem. | New Neg. New | Nees | Nek a0 ear | ese | Be & 35) a 65 | 3 30} 20] 77 1 nae ass] a) et! sn|_ mo) i | se | bail er [No feraned elerarnts.ee Astronout Activitios ‘This section presents a brief review of the astronaut's ectivities in vreparation for and during the MA-6 mission. Preflight training sumory.- Spacecraft checkeut activities: Astronaut Glenn's involvemnt: in the preflight checkouts urorided him with the opportunity to ‘vocom thoroughly fonilier with the MA-6 spacecvaft end leuach vehicle systema. Table XIII summarizes his checkoxt activities. He spent 25 hours and 55 mimrtes in the spacecraft itself, and many ore hours were consumed before and after each pad checkout operation in preparation, trouble-shooting, observation, and discussica. Training activities: Toble XIV is a brief sumary of tha training activities using the vrocedures trainer from Decerber 13, 1961, to February 17, 1962. During this peried, the astronsut spent 59. hours end h5 minutes accomplishing 70 simulated missions end ex ‘Periencing 189 similatea systers failures. The rain crphaoio during this period wan on procedure] training, particularly leunch and early nisaion failures usually calling for en eborted mission. Glenn also eceerplished geveral three-vass missions ou the trainer, as vell as soveral similstions involving the M00, the blockhouee, ond the entire Mercury Tetwork. The astronaut alco spent a meat deol of tine in briefings on the various subsystens ond {Ment planning and in individual study. edPlight preparedness: Astyoucit Glem achieved a igh Aovel of skill en knoviedge several weoks prior te the actual lgmch date. There was a gradual reduction in the intensity of the ureflight training vregraz, particularly en the procedures trainer. everthe- jess, thers vas no decline in iis level of preparedness, as demonstrated in part by figure 36, which shows his sustained effectiveness in retrofire practice. Astronaut Glenn's comments during postflight 4ebriefing cesions recognizes the value of hie preflight training. His major comsonts ware (1) that his partieipation in the spacecraft checkouts ves very useful, (2) that personel briefings froa syotema experts were-belpful, and (3) that the ALFA trainer vas less valuable thon the proredures trainer as en gttitute control trainer. | Chronology of pilot's activities during flight.- Figure 37 is a sixplified chronology of the pilot's activities during the HAS fliget from Mft-off to loniling. Tdentification of continental limits, certain celestial observations, photography, ond comamications nodes are not included in tht table, since the ecemmications tapes do not provide sufficient tima correlation. Spaceoraft systems problexs during the flight prevented the pilot from completing all. the tesks in the MA-6 flight plen. These mreblems also interfered vith his providing = complete running comentery on those be 41a complete.aie o Abtibwie control. Tho pilot's attitude control activities exe simmarized in table XV. The pilot wns sble to control the vehicle wdequately ‘throughout the flight with the exception of the last portion of reentry. The general ability of the pilot to coutrel the vehicle 45 illustrated by the brief review of the major merual maneuvers discussed belov. Control systems check: The control systems check is designed to cheek ell of the primary control modes in a minitum anount of time end vith miniial fuel usage. This series of monewvers was ac- complished meothly and efficiently, end vas alzost identical to the verformence on the procedures trainer price to the flight. The ebtitudes achieved varied less than 10 degrees and the rates 41d not vary over 1/2 degrea por cocond fren the procedures trainer simalation at any tim. 60° right-yaw caneuver: The astronaut performed this sxoothly, ‘overshooting only three or four degrees, which is within the accuracy of his visual ebilitses to determine the exact 60°. position on his infiicator (see figure 38). ‘Tree 160° right-yaw nanouvers: The first 180° meneuver, using ¢ window ao tho prinary abtitwle reference, was intended eg a precise 280° ransuver, Keeping the pitch end roll exrore minimized. Theae second and third yew mencuvers were done only far the purpese of chserving end toking pictures of the sunrise awl the particles sux rounding his spacecraft. Theta maneuvers were accomplished satis- fectorily es cen te seen in figure 39. Holding on conetellntion: Th astronat held on the constellation Orion ou two different occasions during the flight. Figure 4o illustrates the attitude variations during the second period on Orion- se variations are within the limits normally held on instruments on the ALPA and Procedures Treinexs. Gyre caging: Tho astroncut caged and unonged tha gyros immediately after completion of each ef the three 180° yow maneuvers because of incgreenent between indieated ond true attitude. The third while #t122 on the caging occurred shortly before the second sunri: dork side of the earth; the other tvo casings were perform:’ during the daylight poriods. Tho records indicate thet he uneoged at opprexi- mately vero yay and roll and a minus 1) degrees in pitch for both dey operations, but thet he caged and uncaged ati zero yaw, minus Us degrees pitch, ond 2 minus 20 degrees in roll during the night- side operation. Tt is unlikely that the pilot vould have teen able +e aline the spaceeraf’ co well in ya and yet make on orror in roll vhich should te easier to determine using the window. It therefore seems Lkely that the astronaut's attention vas diverted by other duties. Tho pilot caged end uncaged the eyros at « -24° in pitch,+ oar even though he reported to the ground that be was going to zero, zero, zero attitade during the firet caging operation. Oaging at a -1k" in pitch, ufing the window reforeneo, if necestary to coo the howizen. The astronaut'd report te the ground was a commnmiention error. Retrofire control: ‘the sctrongub backed up the A803 Guring ‘the retrosequence and retrofire events using the maminl proportional contwol mode. It 4s impossible to assees individually the operstions of the ASC3 or of the astronaut at this tine. ‘The attitudes aid not doviate more then #5 degrees during this event. Reentry piteh mannaver: Astronsat Glenn used the maminl pro- portional control systen and the rate and attitude indicators to pitch to the reentry attitute, As can be seen from figure 4)] bo performed thie canswver with precision and was well within hie capability denmstrated on ground trainers. Reentry demping: The carly part of the reentry through peck de- celeration (max. g) was controlled by employing My-by-wire ond manuel proportional eystens. The esefllations ware gual] during the early port of reentry price to max. g-(ace figure #2). after 100, the pitch end yav oscillations built up repidly and the pilot's stick drpute d#4 not result in satisfactory control. Fron enalysis of tha fuel usage, bis mamal fuel was deplated at 4:47:04. J CorThe fly-by-wive control node apparently still had fuel avatlable, os imiicated by the effectiveness of the Mectliary Damping Syrten of OhaTs2. The lack of antisfactory control ves due to the change in control effectiveness because of depletion of Kamal fuel. Pilgb'o woe of external reférence: The pilot xeported that, in general, he a2 able te orient the vehicle, using external reference Without aifficulty, partienlarly in the roll ond witch axes. The pilet stated that there uns a period of Jeerning to use the pariaccpe and the vindoy af a yeit references hovever, he felt that by the end of the flight he wae able, on the Asylignt side, to e@just yaw within a fev degrees. During’ the flight he devoloped the procedure of pitehing dow to -60" im piten in order to be better able to pick “upterrein drift due to the orbital velocity. At a piten attituae of 0°, suparent velocity of-terrain xovement 15 .60° por second, vnorens at -60° pitch ottitude tho apearent velocity due to orbital movenent is 1.41° per second. . The greater apparent drift as the vehicle pitches toverd the nadir voint aids yav determination by increasing the ratio of the terrein movement due to orbital rate in comperison to opporent terrain xovemcnt due to spacecraft attitwde rate. The pilot aia not Like the periecope as voll aa the window Zor yow alinenent. He €1d ob Like the pericope high- magnification view because of the unclear area at the border between ‘the bigh- ond low-megnification views. The eetrongut reported thathe felt that going forvard wa the “best vay to travel’, "juct like sitting up in front of a Greyhound bus watching the world com: at Qa tho nightelde, the pilet reported that the horizon was olveys visible through the window. With full moon iDimination he felt that he could eline the spacecraft in yaw almost as well at on the daylight side. Glenn was not able to use the eye pateh to *Gork-sisnt; therefore, be wat able to sce little, if enything, of the ground or clouds before moonmiee. With good dark-sdaptation and lower: eavin idimmination, it well may be possible to sce clouds evan without the moon, since a fair anount of 11iminetion will be ‘rovided fron otter night light phenomena. In general, the pilot reported that the periscope ves not very useful for determining Grizt on the nightside. Even with a fill mon, the clowis vere teo dim in the periscope to pick up a specific point and follow it for yaw heading information. The pilot reported that he could use ster drift as a reference at yey angle close to 90°, but thet within ten degrees of zero yaw, it was quite difficult. The pilot ves also able to uco constolIations TENCE as a heeding ref reported that the mmber of stars that he cow see vere approximately the eame as normally can be seen from the ground on a dark night. He had no trouble recognizing ccustelations and therefore cowl uce tho store to determine heading ‘by referring to his Star Navigation Deviee.Comminication Activities.= Table XVI summarizes the flight commnicatiens. The pilot reported that he felt nore tims was, devoted to formal cperetionnl reports during the MA-6 mission than would be desirable for future flignts. duction of the high ppreporticn of communications involved in miking radio contact, roporting switch positions, end relaying instrument readings woul permit more detailed reports by the pilot of his activities end observations.Ee Sotentitie Gheervations.= Celestial Observations: Fumrous mall particles of 1/16" to 3/8" an size were cbserveé during each sunrise period as moving renrvard past the spacecraft at a relative velocity estimated at 1.3 to 2.2 matere per second. Sime sem: of the yarticles vere seen to drift into the spacecraft's shadow, the estimated sizes and the velocities con be relied upon. he small éifference in the relative velocity between the spacccraft aml the particles indicates nearly the same orbit, which makes it certain that the particles com from the epaceeraft, They undevbtedly drifted due to com aerodynamic drag. The most plausible material for the particles is frozen water, since other substenccs ere either not present in maffictont quantities, or are Lintte’ in source, which ought to be exhausted by the third orbitel pass. Water from the spaereraft omrironmentel control systen is more slightly probable then fron the thrusters, because of the low observed velocities. This supply is ouffieient ond frozen water is consistent vith the cdbecrved colors and zovements. A Juminous bend observed esoumd the horizon may be ths result of internal reflections of the mocallt earth between twe inclined windows in the spacecraft. This explasctien has been abrenghensd “wy observation of the band in earth phetes fren the spacecraft, by+ a ericulntion from the blueprints, and by direct observation in the ‘raincr ond in spacecraft 28, The ten to buff color is foun in ons: ef ten cbserved reflections. If not e reflection, the pilot may have «acon th 6300 ond G4GL AP red layer which is mow te exist at chou the altitude reported. ‘The gun vas observed to be highly flattened on samt sunset photographa, although the phenomenon vac net reported vicually. Spectra of half a dozen stars in Oricn vere cbtained with a hani- hela, objective-prism spectrogrenn. Vetecrological observations: U. 8. i ther Bureau Scientists aesigned to provide information for the develomment of improved suggested a prosran of observations for tht aotroneut which veo optical sensing equinment for satellite weather-cbservation systems. ‘Three of the requested observations reported vy Glam ere listed below. 1. Determine whether eloud hedehte con be evaluated fren orbital altitude. Regort: The astronaut reported he could identity cloud types and determine cloud heights. 2. Determine whether clouds can be seen on the dark olde ef the earth. Report: ‘The pilot rerorted that with the full moon up he was able to see clomis on the dark side and sens vertical develoment.B. Determine uhether lightning can be seen on the dark side ofthe earth. Report: Astronaut Glen reported that he could clearly see Mghtning in tvo storms in the Tndten Occan, which were fom over in the night tina. ‘Tht Woather Bureen elso suggested thet pictures, using infre- red film ond a special set of filters, be token of cloud cover in order to evaluate the relotive effectivences of various vavo length intervals for clond observation. The required filter and Siin was sboard the MA-G flight spacecraft. However, this was scheduled for the third pass end because of the RCS malfunction the pilot vas not ble te eamy cut this exercise. Terrestrial Observations: It is important to leern what the effective visunl horizon for the pilot in ovbital space may be and et hat distance he cen recognize londzarks fer uec in navigation ani attitude control. The pilot's observations for the Mi-6 flight ore swarizea in the following paragraphs. Astronaut Olena confimmed whet earlier earth-cky pictures end Tyros photographs have indicated, nemely that a large pereentege of the earth's curfece dc covered by clos. Oaly four land areas, tha western Africen desert, western Australia, the vestern United States, and the eastern coast of the Unites States, were relatively free of clouds during the four ani a half hours of the MA-6 flight. TS— Glenn reported that he could coe the following lendmorke during the Goylight perieds across the United States: the cities of El Paso, New Orleans, Charleston, and Savanah; the Salton Sea in California, the Mesissippi Dolta, and Cepe Censverel. le also reported e V-shaped figure in the vater dn the Atlentic, which he interpreted to bea a weke froue ship. hie is probably the smallest object reported by the pilot. IZ it ues the woke of a destroyer, the voke would be eprroximately 120 feet in width end yerheps 300 yerds Jong. he only non-dliicinated feature coon at night, other then clouds, was a faint indication of the western coastline of Australia. Two types of #2luminated features were reported, Jghtning profuced ‘by tvo storms in the Indian Ocean and the lights of the City of Forth. The Indien Oceon Ship flare vas not seen, undoubtedly ‘becouse of cloud cover. Color Fhotogrerhs: The pilot vas able to take a total of seventy Photographs, thirty-eight of which were on one rel and the ‘valance on a second. Toble XVII contains a complete listing of the subjects and the approximate times of exposure. The pilet attempted to take pictures of tia particles seen during sunrise using tha color film. While there are several photogravhs containing specke, Lt camot be definitely determined that these specks ere actua2ly the porticles observed. ReamesCO eel Orientation ‘a: ona During Wolektlecones: Generel Sensations: The pilot reported that weightlessness vas not unpleasant, no problen et oll, ond that in several respects it was easier or more enjoysble than the 1g condition. For exermla, there wore no presoure points from the seat, and cortain tacks vere easier such es using the cemera and other personal equinment. ‘This eq™ipment could be left henging in midair while enother tesk was performed. Of eperational sigificence was his xeport that, under weight= Jesoness, the head ascums a nev position due to the helust tie- dom straps. This suggests that the visual engles through the window end the periscope would be slightly different. ‘The pilot reported no recblen in reaching fo ond activating controls. There was no tendency to overrench. This was not unexpected, since experience hae ghomn that the eyes vill quickly correct or muscular reaction inaccuracies. A more popitive demonstration of Raychenoter qAjustnent to weightless conditions would be by demonstrating capability to locate ereas in the spacecraft with the eyes closed. Rusion Astroneut. Pitov reported’ vertige end nausea by the sixth orbital pass under thee conditions, when the heat was rotated, when he tracked repidly meving objects, anf when he =sam tapering very slowly vovard ths horizon. I could not pick up any approcisble Zodiacsl. Mgat. I locked for it closely; I think ‘perhaps I was not enoagh might e@epted to see it. Sunrise, I picked up in the periscope. At every sunrise, I sav Little epecke, ‘brilliant specks, floating around owtoide the copawle, I bad no idea, vet they were. Oa the third orbit, T turned around at sunrice ao that I eculd face into the sun qn see if they were still heading in the sume direction end they wore. But I noticed then every sun- rice md tried to get pictures of then. Gust as I came over Mexico at the end of the first exbit, T nea my first indication of the ASUS problem that vas to stick with m for the rest of the flight. It started out with the yay rate going off at chout ona and one-half degrees por second to the right. ‘The capsule vould not stay in orbit mode, tut would go out of imits. When 4¢ reached about 20° instead of tha 30° I expocted, 4% vould inick back into orientation mode and swing beck with the rate going over into the left yew to correct back to {ts normal orbit cttitude. Somvtimes, it vould eross-couple inte pitch and roll end veld go though a general diervetion or orbit mode until s+ settled down into orbit’ attitude. Tho yoy vould again stort a slew drift to tha right and the A5CS vould kick ont again into orientation mode. 1 teak over mamally at thet point en fron then cn, through the resta attempted to rench ovitehes vhich zoquired hoa and body rovements. Glenn reported that he repented these sexe octivities at epproxinately half-how intervals throughout the flight, beginning cautiously with very slow heed movements end preceeding te mare rapid end vigorous motions es tine progressed. He reported there was no difference in sensation between zero g end 1g. The difference between Glenn's and Titov's experiences can be logically explained by either or both of two factors. First, Pitor's cymptons apposred after epproximately tirice the veightless period that Glenn experienced, and, secondly, tov may be physiologically more sensitive to certain effects of yeightlessness than Glenn. Orientation: Jchn Glenn reported that he experienced two A2imsions of motion, but both of these vere actocinted vith changing acceleration fields end not with zero g per ce. The first occurred at S800, when he felt as if ke were slightly pitching forverd head over heals. Tae second illusion of motion cecurred during retro- rocket firing, at which tine he reported that he felt Like he vas going back tovarda Hovaif. He stated that following retrofire, vhen he vat cble to look owt the window end see the terrsin roving evay from him, this {Musion diserpecred. Ascme results of physiological reactions to space flight conditions, by 0. G. Gazenko, USSR, Academy of Sefonres, Moscow.sd benny Fo iliusiong of position cecurred during zero g. Glenn did not feel et any time that he was stemiing still end the earth was moving, i ; or thet he was in any position other then the true spacberaft position during the flight. The pilot reported that he could fee? accclerations which produced rates above 5 degrees per second. hie te cuproximately in agreement with the teste on the pilot condueted at Fonsacola on the Human Disorientation Device (a two dimensional rotational eyperatus). There iz no indication of greater sensitivity to Totatione) forces under zero g than ig, hovever, the observations are teo Hmited to varrant firm conclusion. A final erea of interest vas his judgement of veritical snd horizontal during weightlessness. Worneliy, this perception is strongly effected by the atclith organs of the inner eer. Variations 4a the ability to determine the horizontal bnve been demonstrated when the individual: ts azked to adjust a vicible line in a complotely dork room While lying on his side. Errors in this adjustment ueally occur after approcizstely tvo minutes vith the lights out. Provisions for conducting this test heve been bullt dute the miniaturized photomster carried cboard the spacecraft. ‘The pilot's odjustmant to the horizontal wes oceurate. Hevever, interpretation of the results de dlecieult since, because of the control problem, the pilot wes xusnea snd made the line edjustment very shortly after looking date. the device. —Borgonal Equivsent The equipment that the pilot used ond his Telsvent coments are presented in this section. ‘The daylight color ommra: (See figure 45). A 35mm Ansco intonet vith a photoelectric cel) to mtomatically eljust tho F stop wos provided. It hae a 50m, ¥2.8 lens ond hap been ywovided with controls permitting repid one-hand operation. Tae only eoxmnt. regarding camera operation concerned changing fim. le relesscd tht easette, and, iu reaching for it, it got avay ond floated ‘Yehind the instrumnt ponol. The results of the efforts with this camira are in the section labeled Puotographic Efforts. Uxtresriolet spectrograph: (See figure lk), A Leica 35m corera vith n special Jena system adapted for ultra-violet spectral ‘photography was ineluied. The rerults of this experiment ere contained in tha section on Astronomical Observations. Fhotometer: (See figure 45). This ia a miniature device used ‘by the pilot to view the own at sunset end to eveluste his capability to orient to the horizontal. Air glow filter: (See figure k6). This device filtered all. Light except the 5977 line. ‘he only attexpt to use this filter produced mo results. Thie ie primarily because of a low level night edaptation at the tims.Wight eaptation eye patch: (Sco figure h7). Tho forn-titted nold vhich ie attached with tape prior to cuncet, worked vell rior, to lift-off but foiled to renain positioned during the flight. Tho combined effects or minute dust in the syacceratt, lew nimiatuy, end perspiration of the astronaut wnieubtedly reduced the effectiveness ofthe adhesive. Map booklet ema ster navigation devica: ‘he location of thess @evices was reported as having been ewvieverd. Flight plan cerds: Those aro siniler in style to figure 37 end three cards vere provided to aid sn maintaining schedules and to serve an a reninder of upcoming events. Food Tube: (Sea figure 48). Two tubes vere provided, one containing beef and veactebles.and the other applesauce, He consumed the quplecauee without diffioulty, but did not have on opportunity to open the other tube. Food Tablets: (Sce figure 49). A food tablet dispenser was Provided containing one xylose tablet ond several ualt tablets.‘TABLE XOTT.— TIME EXPENDED Dl ASTRONAVE PRELAUNGH AGEIVITIES Flight Acceptance Comporite Test! Zounch simiaticn Tounch eimuletion Simlated flight Simulated tight Countdown ‘Simlated flight Tine dees uot inclule allovance for preperation, monitoring, cbriefing, trouble shooting, conferences, and the like.‘BRIEF SUMMARY OF MA-6 ORBITAL FLIGHT BY ASTRONAUT: quem Tove are tony things thet are so impressive, it's almost ixpossible to try and deseribe the sensations that I hed during the flight. J think the thing that stands cut nore particularly than anything else right at the monent is the reentry during the fireball. T2eft the stutters open specifically 50 I could waten it. Tt got a brilliant orange color; it va never too bliniing. ‘The retropack wes stil ghoerd ond shortly efter reentry hegmn, it aterted to break up dn big chunks. One of the strays cams off an’ eae around across the vindow. There vere large floming pieces of the retropack = I asgume that's what they were - that broke off end came tunbling around the sides of the cepaule. I could eve then going on beck behind me then and miking 1ittla mcke trails. 2 eould also cee a long trafl of vhat probably vas cblation material ending in o small bright spot similar to that in the pictures out of the window teken during the Ming flight. I sew the same spot belt there end I eoald cee 4t move bach and Zorth as the eapewle oscillated alightiy- Yes, I tnink the reentry wes probably the cost impressive pert of the flight. Amis extexporaneous report by Astronmt John H. Glenn, Jr., wae recorded onboard’ the Destroyor Noa shortly after the MA-6 mission on February 20, 1962 and ig presented with cuperficial editing only.Comeaaaiaie Starting back with highlights of the flight: Insertion vas nornal this morning execpt for the delays that vere occasioned by hatch-bolt trouble ond by the microphone fitting breaking off in ay helmet. The vonther cloared up nicely and after only moerate delays, ve got off. Ldtt-off vas just stout as T hed expected. There was some vibration. Coming up off the pal, the roll progvaming vas very noticesble es the spacecraft svang around to the preper aximith. There ‘also wos no doubt sbout when the pitch programing ctarted. There was come Vibration at 1ift-off from the pai. Tt snoothed out just moderately; never did get to very smooth flight until wo were through the high q orca, At this tine - I would guess a minute ond fifteen to twenty seconds - it wes very noticeable. ‘After this, it really sucothed cut and by a minute and a helt, Gr sbout the tine cobin pressure sealed off, it was smooth os could be. The staging vas normal, though I had expected a more sherp cutoff. Th felt as though the g ramped down for maybe bel a second. For some reason, it was not as abrupt a5 I had anticipated i might be. The acceleromstere read ont and a quarter g'a when I received a confirnatioa on staging fro the Capsule Comunieater.T hed been waiting for thie message at that point because I was net to go to tower Jetticon a we hed planned, in case the booster had not ctoged. At this time, I alse sov a wisp of smoke and I thought perhepa the tower had jettisoned early. ‘The tower really hed not jetticoncd gt that time end did dJettigon on schedule at 2+34. As the booster and capsule pitched over end the tower jotticoned, I hed a firot glimpse of the horizon; it vas a beautiful sight, locking eastward across the Atlantic. ‘ Toward the lest vert ef the imertion, the vibration began budding up egain. This T hadn't quite expected; it wasn't too rough but it vas noticeeble. Cutoff vas very good; the enpmule acted just 28 it wes supposed to. The sSCS domped ond turned the epace- craft around. As we vere completing the turneround, I glanced out, of the window and the booster wes right there in trout of me. It Iocked as though {t wasn't more thon a hundred yarda evay. The sis] ena of tho booster was pointing toward the northeast and I saw it a muiber of tines from‘ then on for about the next caven or eight mimites as it slowly went below ry altitude aml moved farther avay. That was very impressive. I think I vas realty surprised at the ease with which the controls cheek went. It vas almost just ike making the controls check on the Procedures Trainor that wo've done co many tines. The control check aeda went off ike clockvorii; there vas no problen at all. Everything damped vhen 1t should derp@A control vat easy. Zero-g was notice= eble at S800. I hei a vary slight sensation of tumbling forward heal-oversheels, Tt vas veny slight; wot e9 pronomeed an ertect e5 ve experience on the centrifuge. Turing turnaround, T hed no sensation of augular acccleration. I acclimated to weightlessnces in just a matter of ceconis; it was vary curpricing. I wes reaching for switches end doing things end having no problen. I didn't at any time netice any tendency to crershcot a oviteh, Tt seemed it's Just natural to acclimate to this mew condition. Tt vas very confort= ebls. Under the weightless condition, the head scened to be a Little farther out of the couch which mele it a little eneier to see the window, though I could not get up quite as mear to the window as I thought I might. {he rest of the first orbit went protty such gs planned, with reports +o the stations cazing up on schedule. I wan a little behind at a couple of points but most of the things vere going right accord- ing to schedule, incluting remaining on the eutoretic control systen for optimum reder and ecmmnications tracking. Sunset from this altitude 4o tremendous. I hod never ceen anything Mike thio ond it wad a truly beautiful, beautiful sight. The speed at which the sum goes down 4s very renarkeble, of course. The brilifent orange and Dine layers opread cut probebly 45° to G0 each side of the suarot the flight, this was my main concern. I tried to pick up the flight plan again at a few points and T neeemplished a fev mira things on it, tut I'm afraid most of the flight tine beyond that point wan teken up with checking the various modes of the ASCS. I Qid have full control in fly-by-wire and Jater on during the flight, ‘the yay problen switched from left to right. Zt acted exactly the seme, except it would drift off to the left instead of the right- Tt appeared algo that any time I vas on manual control and would be: @rifting ewey from regular obit attitude Zor any appreciable period of tims that the attitule dniications would then be off when 2 come back to orbit attitude. I called out come of thosa and I remenber that at one tine, roll was off 30°, yaw ves off 35°, end pitch was off 76°. These were considerable erras ani I have no explonation for then at this tims. I eowld control on fly-by-wire amd rome) very edequately. It was not diffiewlt at all. Fly-by- wine wes by far the most accurate means of control, even though I didn't bave accurate control in yow at all tines. Retroroskets were fired right on schedule Just off California and it wes surprising coming out of the zero-g field that the retro- rockets firing as though I were accelerating in the other direction — back toverd Hawaii. However, efter retrofire vas completed when I could @lonee out of the vinfow again, it was easy to tell, of course, which way I was going, even though ny sensations during EEretrofire hed been that I was going in the other Gizection. T made retrofire om automatic control. Apparently, the solid-on fol for slaving just. price to reteofire breueht the gyros back up to orbit attituie, Fees they corrected very nicely uring that pericd. The epaceernft waa juct about in orbit attitude as I could see it from the window end through the periscope just: prior to retrofire. #0, I feel thot ve were right in attitude. I Jeft it on #8CB end backed up nemally end vorked right slong with tha FSCS during retrofixe. I think the retronttitule held alzoct exactly on end I would gness that we vere never more then 3° off in any erie et eny tim during retrofire. Following retrofire, a decision ves made to have mm reenter — with the retropackage otill on because of the uncertainty aa to vhether the Janding bag hod been extended. I don't mow oll. the regsons yet for thet perticalar decision, but I assume thet it hed been pretty well thought cut oni it.cbvdously vas. I punched up .05g mamally at a little after the tine dt was given tone. I vas actually in a smell g-field at the tima I pushed up .05g ond it went green and I began to grt noice, or vhat sounded like small things rushing against the capmule. I begon to get this very a shortly efter .05¢ end this noise kept increasing, Well before we got into the renly heavy fireball area, one strap swung around ap! bung dow over tha window. There was soma emoke. I don't imow whether— the bolt fdred at the center of the pack or what haypeced. Tae capmale kept en dte coures. I aian't get too far off of reentry attitude. I went to namel control for reentry after the xetros fired end hd no trouble controling reentry attitude through the bigheg area. Cocmnicatious blackout stertcd gq little bit before tho firoball. The fireball was very intense. I left the shutters open the vhole time and observed it and it aot to be a very, very bright orange color. There were Jerge fleming pieess of vhat I nseuit was the retropackage breaking off ani going back behind the cqpeule. This ves of som ecncern, beceuse I vasa't cure of what it was. I had visions of then posotbly being ehunko of heat shield breaking off, but £t turnel out it ves not that. The oscillations that built up efter penk-g vere nose thea I could control with the mamal systen. I vas demping okey ond it Just plain overpowered me end I could not do anymore about Jt. I evitehtd to sm. Temp as soon aa T could reite ny erm up after the g-pulse to help damp and this aid help scce. However, even on Aux. Demp, tha oppoule ven svinging bask end forth very rapidly ond tha oscillations were divergent as we descended to about 35,000 feet. Au thie point, I elected to try. to put the drome out memlly, even though it-vas high, because I was afraid we vere going to get ever to such an attitude that the enpoule might actually be goingeos enail. end down during pert of the flight if the oscillations key going the way thoy were. And just es I ves reaching up to pull out the droge on mamal, it came out by itselt. The drogie aia straighten the capsule cut dn good shape. I believe ths altitude was somewhere between 30,000 axl 35,000 ab thet point. I came on down; the euerkels, I believe, came out at about 16,000 or 17,000. The pariscops come out. ‘There was so mich axoke and Girt on the windshield that 4% vao comviat difficult te eee. Every tine T cane eround to the mm - for T hed estabMehed uy roll rate on mamel = it was virtually impossible to ses anything out through the window. The copsuls wos yery steble When the antenne section jettaconed. T could cco the whole recovery systen just lined vp in one big linc oe 4% care out. Tt unreeded and blossomed normally; alt’ the panels end visors lesked good. I was going through my landing ehackore List vhen the Capsule Gcemmicator celled to remind me to deploy the landing bag. I flipped the switch to auto immediately ani the green light com: on and I felt the bag release. I vee able to watch ‘the water coming towards ze in the;periscope.. I-vas fable (to; entinat| il very closely when I would nit the vater. The impact bag wos a heavier shock than I had expected, but it did uot bother me.RELL Cocmmications with the recovery ship Noa were wary gook. The Nea had ms in sight before impact and estimated 20 minutes to recovery which turned out to te about right. When the destroyer eae along- side, thoy hooked on vith the chepherd’s hock ond cut the HP antema, During copsule pickep, I received one good solid bump on the side of the chip as it rolled. Once on deck I tock the Jeft hand psne2 loose end started to discomoct the ouit hese im ordex to heck wp the hose extension prior to egressing through the upper batch. By this time I vas really hot - pouring oveat. Tae enpsvle was very hot after reentry end I really noticed the increase in humidity after the morkels opened. I decided thet the best thing at that point, wes to com out the side rathor then through the tp. I on swe T could have ects cut the top if J hel hed to, but I 44a not see any reason 0 keep working to com out the top. So I called chip ad asked thea to clear the srea outside the beteh. When I received word thet the area wes clear, I renoved the copmule pin and hit the plunger vith the back of my bond! It sprig back and cut my knincklas slightly through tha glove. The noiea of the bateh zepart was good end loud but not uncomfortable. Tn omeery, ny condition ds excelent. Ian in good shape; no problems st all. The SCS problens were the biggest I encountered ‘on the flight. Weightlessness ves no problem. I think the factCre that I could teke over and shov that a pilot can control the caprule ramally, using the different coutrol moles, satisfied m nost. pe greatest Gissatiofaction I think I feel vas the fact that I id not get to accomplish oll the other things that I vented to eo. The A5C8 problem overrode everything else.ood ‘FLIGHD CONTROL AND NETWORK PERFOR!ANCE The Mercury Netvork consists of the Nereury Control center (ucc) at Cape Canaveral (HV); stations ab the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR), Bor- muda (BDA), and at fourteen other locations along the orbital ground track; and commnientions and commting centers at the Goddanl Space Flight Center. The Network affords a data acquisition capability ror real-tins monitoring, mission control, ond postflight analysis. This section describes the flight moaltoring end control and presents infor- ration on the performance of the communications, teleretry, tracking, computing, and comand systems. sRlignt Ooatrol Sumayy, he orbitel leunch'end insertion parameters very closely approximated nominal conditions, The pilot's porformmce throughout the flight vas excellent, and he was able to cove with the wucuel situations which arose. Several probleng developed in the spacecraft autenatic centrol. systen. Tho ASOS cysten vas unable to miintain the spaceeraft within the preset attitude limite sbout the yaw axis after aporoximately one ovbital pass becouse af the lack of thrust from the L-~pound yow thrusters. This sane ualgvaction was reflected in the system's operation when the astronaut: selected the fly-by-wire moe hovever, be vas able to maintain satisfactory attitude coutrel about the yaw axis ty using the lavger thrusters. ‘he horizon ccamer and gyro reference system appeared to be in error mainly in the roll axis while the spacecraft was on the dark side of the earth. COCR} a, ‘The memal-proportional control systen worked well throughout the fitgnt. ‘The cooling system for both rain inverters appeared to be inoperative Yhyoughout the entire Light ond the inverter temperntures reeched valuas as high as 210 te 220°F however, no inverter mlfunctions occurred. a the first eso over Canaveral, segment 5 of the commtator ghoved a signal indication which, if correct, indigated that the space craft heat shield had beon deployed. Considerable analysis and disous- sion followed, and contlusion vas first made that the siguel, althouga el correct telenctry output, was the result of a faulty avitch end thet the normal cequence of events should be followed. Further discussion, however, indicated that the eafest approach would be to allow the retro- package to remain attached. ‘he zetropackese straps would then hold the heat shield in place until sufficient dynamic force was exerted to main- tain ite poottion throughout reentry heating. The opinion wes that the heat effects of the retropackage on the capmilo heat shield and afterboly would not ve damaging. ‘Therefore, the pilot vas dizected ducing the xetrofixe maneuver over GAL to keep the retrojettieon switch in tk disarm position, The zemaindor of the flight wao normal, end no other najor system malfunctions occurred. It mist be strongly emphasized that with Q pilot dn the spacecrart to make decisions and texe corrective action, the mifunctions vaich cecurred would heve nef om unmanned ftghh - extrencly difficult, ani those quite possibly could have reowlted in failure to reenter the spacecraft anf effect successful recovory- a,Peet Mercury Tatwork Performance Mercuzy Network performance vas excellent, all systens were fully operational st lift-off, and the few minor malfunctions which occurred did not affect the flight monitoring and control of the mission. Acqui- “sition oP data trom tracking, telemetry, ond air-growl voice cystens vas satisfactory in bath quantity and quality for mealtime monitoring and Postflight analysig, The relaying of air-ground voice back to the Mereury Control Center (NCC) from all sites with « point-to-point voice capability contributed substantially to the real-tind conttoring ef the mission. Tracking.- Radar tracking on this flight was satisfactory and guperior to that of MA-4 or MA-5 Missions. Al] stations provided date for ell passes waenever the spacecraft yas above their horizon, The: quantity and quality of these deta were more than adequate. Minor problems oxisted in S-bani phasing end handover, bub this caused a negligible lees of data. ‘The commmications used fer this were satisfactory. Interference of en unknown source caused some concern om C-band st Cope Conaveral and Zermudn, but this did not cause any extensive loss of data. It ie apparent that the ‘extensive caintenanee, training, and refine- rent of tracking procedures for the network has yielded dividends. Setistectory C-band tracking was accomplished during mest of the "blackout" period. ‘Two Cape Cannvere! raders hed satisfactory S-band tracing Tor: the first tuo minutes of blackout, and they were thon turned off because «the end of their range interval had been reached.rn rice} S- and C-band Radox~tracking coverngs da shown in figures 50 and 51 respec- tively. ‘he performance of acquisition-ald was satisfactory, ond, in oll eases ccquisition,was eccomplished without dirriculty. Date trancufssion.- The trensmission ef both high-speed and low-speed pactery throughout the mission, .- At lift-off, tho solected source for display data vas sat Grajectory Computaté: st the MCC wae the output of the IP 7090. FPS-16 tracking at Cape Canaveral was utilized unti? approximately 00:00:50, at vhich time the TP 7090 suitehed te AZISA tracking was Clsplayed for approximately the next 20 seeonds, at vhich time Generel Hlectric—Eurroughs date. through Goddard Space Flight Center was selected and was displayod throughout powered flight. ‘The Genaral Electric radar acquired both rate and track at 00:02:08 and never lost lock throughout the reneinder of the boost Phaze. The quality of the General Electric dota was excellent up to SECO and during the CO-NO-CO computation. ‘The programed yhaso of the flight showed niner deviations of +0.75° in flight-path angle and +1.0n.m, in altitude at BECO, After leunch vehicle staging guidance corzected these deviations. A mxdmum deviation of $2.8 nen. in crossrangs end a residual of 50+ Spa in yaw velocity oxtsted at eutcdd. The yaw velocity looked very good up to approximntely 35 seconds before cutof, but it then opyeared to lack response to steering with the final results as stated above. There appears to be conflicting evidence on this rarticular point, since the calculated impact point at tho Conary Islands Station was right on the expected ground track, which COI Tovio difficult to recolve with 2 residual velocity of 50fya in yaw. It vas Jeter Aisclosed, however, thet an error in the scale of the plotboard at the HCC existed, uhich accounts for this mioveprecentation in your velocity. The cutoff conditions displayed in MCC are listed in table XVIII. low-speed tracking data from the remote sites ware excellent, that the orbit was vell-defined by the end of the first orbital pass, subse- quant tracking during the steond and third passes choved negligible improvenent in the orbit parameters. ‘ho mmbor of radar observations received from cach site is chem in tole IX. The "A" computer was lost during the second yass betveen Havali and, California, A restart was made in lese than 5 minutes using the FAH vootor, thus, the coxputer was ready to accept the White Sands date. A malfunction of the "B" computer caunnd the Texas ond Zglin data for the second pass Eglin data on reentuy to be igiored. During the reentry, tracking date appeared to pinpoint the landing loeation vith @ high degree of confidence, and the final valuss trom the Goldard computers indiented only 2 nm. difference between the landing location as cbteined from the California Station data and the Cape Consveral FPS-26 data (sce table XX), However, the landing point as reported by the recovery ship, as voll as that computed by the Cape IP 7090 computer using Cape Canavere] and Con Salvador FPS-16 date, docs not agtec with the Goddard computations. ' The actus] Janding point was 39 n.m. short of the planned location. ‘The weight loss of RCS fuel, attributable to the requirement for manual, SSTGia control during two orbitel perieds, ves much greater then anticiaptea. This weight Girrerence contributed the major error of 31 nti. from that predicted, since the lover weight for a given quantity of retrograde impulse will result in a ligher negative velocity inerexnnt at retrofire. A variation 4n spacecraft attitude during retrofire vested in an additional error of 4 numi., anda slightly greater impulse than the hore value provided another 2 n.mi. deviation, These factors account for 3] nmi. of the actual landing point discrepancy. The Low-frequency cyclic noise vattern vas epperent in both Generel Blectric-Barroughs and AZUSA énte, but this var slightly lover in ompli- ‘ude than that for the MA-5 Mission and mich lower than MA-l, # insertion, General Electric gave an inertial velosity of 25,727.6 fout/sacond and an inereiel Tlight-path angle of -0,0674 degrees, while AZUSA Pigures were 25,733.5 and -0.0907, respectively. Telesetry.- The data provided by the telenetry systen wes adequate and of good quality, Coverage wes satisfactory, with date acquisition et 11 stations throughout each pass whenever the spacecraft was above the radio herizon. Coversge 1s shown graphically in figure 52 (2, b, and ¢) and in tebwlay form with decccmtator Meures, range and elevation in table 2. Signal strengths vere satisfactory, ranging up to 400 micro- volts. Several sites reported low signal levels when compared with previous missions, . Teniration blackout of telexotry begen at approxinately 04:12:52, &5 seen at Canaveral, and ented at ovbroximately Ob:i7:1h, as seen at CeePm th Grond Turk. Thus, the blackout period insted 4 minutos end 22 seconds. Tata flew charts vere drawn up bacod on the telemtry ommezy necsageo frou the sites. The majority of the date points fall within + 3 porcent of e faired curve. A few excertions were evident, however, in that figures from several sites vere consistently aff the feired curves of fuel quantity by as mush as 10 percent es show dn figure 53. Mz-prownd voice. The performance ef the primary air-ground voico system (UHF) was good throughout the mission. Signal strengths vere adequate enough to provide excellent signal-to-noise retios whenever the spacccrart was above the local viswol horizon. In most instances, HF zefraction increased the coverage over vil line-of-sight by one to tuo nimtes of arc. UF in-renge tines averaged almost seven minutes per orbital yess. The UP volee system provided some al@itional coverage, but, ns expected; it was not an satisfactory as the UNF was of pextiewlar value during the firet and third passes whore the Canary, California, Ouaymns, Zanzibar, Indian Ocean Ship, Muchea, and Canton Stations were able to converse with the astronaut beyond the capability of tha UHF system. It is interesting to note that in some instances where the IF vas being used as the spaceeraft approached tho station, the auality of cemmuii- eutions improved considerably as the clovmtion angle became positive, particularly as the miltch wes mde to UIE. Figure 5k shows approxinate coverage compared vith times abeve the | visual horizon. Through the afr-ground voice aysten, UCC was able to azaman ‘to foley the recovery procedure and monitor ell conversations until after . the spacecreft vas eboarl tha recovery ship, Command Systen.- The commnd systen for MA-6 operated in a satis- fectory navher during the mission. The Zew aixborme-ayeten anomalies are Giecussed below. The 600-watt stations appeered to have hed caveraga ‘beginning at a slant range of 400-150 1.M., and the 10 KW stations bad coverage beginning at a slant range ef 650-700 H.M. A summry of the comand handover exercises is shown in Teble X00E and a sumary of the command transmissions is shown in Twble CII. Ground Systen: ‘here were several problems involving the comand equipment and the codex relay panels during the mouth prior to launch, hovever, no delays in the launch countdown resulted. A total of eleven: (12) functions were successfully transmitted from the sites: Jusildary Sustainor Cutoff (ASCO) was tronesitted from San Salvador, three sets eneh of R and Z calibrations vere tranauitted frea Mucha, and to ssts each of R ani Z calibrations were transuitted trom Cope Canaveral. Conrand coverage fron all sites ws satisfactory vith the exception of Inches on the third pass. A combination of slant ranges in excess of 450 nautical miles, airborne antenna patterns, end 600 watts of RF power resulted in only one minute and 50 seconds of coverage ebove receiver threshold. Aixborme System: Command Receiver "A", operating fron the 16-volt fsolated bus, appeared to be mich more sensitive te signal strongths shove 30 mlcrovolts then Receiver "B", vaich operates from the 18-volt ieeestandby lus. Below 30 mierovolts both receivers! operatipn coincided. The owbonatl reconied oignel obreagtho although acceptable, were about © a, or less, beley those of the MA-) and MA-5 migeiong, he reason for the Girrerence in récondad sigual strengths is not kava at this time, hovever, this ragaitude of decrease 1s of no great concern. ‘The air bore enterna pattern problem, which wes expertenced on MAb and MA-5, oO again evident from the MA-6 onboard records, Spacecraft attitude changes are definitely reflected on the ‘signal strengths records. Tonization blackowt occurred on the Comma Frequency betueen Ob:h5:05:5 GET ond Obtk7:22 cat. Griggering of the "All-Fuction Events Chansel" occurred five $ihes during donization blackout. he tone channels triggered ara unimown, Dut are coincident with a burst of sional into the receivers. Tt 15 known that the tones keyed vere not clock chenges, R and Z celi- brations, nor Mayday, Later teats of the commmication revtaled thet interference between the telemtry ond UHF voice trmnmitters produecd a signal with & frequancy on the edge of the commnd receiver bandwidth. fn dncrease of 0.5 MG in the low iif trequancy has ayparontly corrected. this. he characteristies of the inputs to the ecumand recelvers are shovn as oscillograph record reproductions in figure 55. Whet ic assumed to be random noice with a signel strength from ona’ to } merovalts was recorded befween (1:14:00 GBP to 01:15:07 CET. Command carrier vas not present during this period.ol Ground cotmuni¢ations.- All the grownd communications networks provided good aurrort for the mission. Exeept for a few short preleunch outages, nl the voice, teletyre, and datalines vere available ct all tines, ond the quality of tmnanission was satiafactory. Single-sidebond voice commmication with the tyd shits vas very satisfactory, as provided by AMR, Part of the Jink trom the Indien Ocean Ship had to be relayed. through Ascension Island,