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Frank L. Pasquale
Research Associate, ISSSC, Trinity College, Hartford, CT
flpasquale@comcast.net
Paper to be delivered at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
Tampa, Florida
November 4, 2007
Draft: please contact author before citing or quoting
Abstract. Distinctions among types of religiosity and religious identification are many and
detailed. Research that compares and contrasts individuals who consider themselves secular or
nonreligious, or who hold affirmatively or substantially naturalistic worldviews, however, is
largely uncharted territory. These are customarily treated as a homogeneous group with which
to compare the religious. Based on a survey of 911 members of secularist, humanist, atheist,
skeptic, and freethought groups in Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia, varieties of
“secularity,” from “hard” to “soft,” are explored with respect to metaphysical beliefs, attitudes
toward “religion,” self-descriptions, and use and meanings of “spiritual/ity.”
Despite considerable attention devoted to the question of secularization in the past half
century or more, the study of forms of “secularism” or “secularity” as a coherent focus of
inquiry has barely begun (Kosmin and Keysar, 2007). Social scientific study of people’s
existential and metaphysical worldviews, or “meaning systems”1 (Hood, Hill, and Williamson,
2005), has customarily been approached from the vantage of religion and religiosity. This has
resulted in a detailed picture of religious individuals and forms, but comparatively little detail
in our understanding of people at the other end of the metaphysical spectrum, such as those
who may be characterized as substantially or affirmatively nonreligious, irreligious, secular,
non-transcendental,2 or philosophically naturalistic (Pasquale, 2007a, b). They have generally
been treated, as J. Russell Hale once said of the unchurched, “as if. . .they were one
homogeneous category” (1980: 97). Glenn Vernon’s observation, nearly forty years ago that
the image of the “atheist, agnostic, and nonbeliever. . .is blurry and indistinct” (1968: 220)
remains true today.
There are signs of growing interest in secularism, atheism, and related subjects, as
evidenced by Bainbridge 2005, Beit-Hallahmi 2007, Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006, Kosmin
and Keysar 2007, and Zuckerman 2007. But the differences, as well as shared characteristics,
among self-described secularists, (religious) skeptics, and philosophical naturalists have
remained virtually unexplored.
1
Given the lack of coherent attention to the “secular” end the metaphysical spectrum,
we are faced with a swarm of terms and concepts with variable clarity or consistency of
meaning and use. There are many topics in the research literature that bear, directly or
indirectly, on the subject, such as the unchurched, “nones,” and religious “disaffiliation”
(“apostates,” “defection,” “outswitchers,” “dropouts”). Relevant descriptive terms are many:
skeptic, unbeliever, nonbeliever, irreligious, nonreligious, secularist, humanist, agnostic,
rationalist, freethinker, atheist, naturalist, nontheist, non-supernaturalist, non-transcendentalist,
monist, and materialist, among others. Order may come to this array of terms as the nuances of
their use and the characteristics they represent become clearer as research proceeds.
For the sake of clarity here, (philosophical) “naturalism”/“naturalist(ic)” and “this-
worldly” will be used to denote ways of thinking that substantially or affirmatively reject or
avoid “other-worldly” (i.e., supernatural or ontologically transcendental) ideas or phenomena.
“Transcendent” and “transcendental” (and their negation) will, unless otherwise noted, be used
in an ontological sense, and so, correspond to “other-worldly” (or “this-worldly”). “Secular”
refers more broadly to individuals and organizations that distance themselves from established
religious traditions or institutions, or that dismiss or de-emphasize references to theistic or
supernatural ideas (but may be naturalistic to varying degrees). “Secularity” will refer to the
degree to which such a tendency may be said to describe individuals’ meaning systems and
related behavior. Following Kosmin (2007) “secularism” will be reserved for reference to
political ideology concerning the relationship—and institutional separation—between religion
and government.
Since this is largely terra incognita, the approach taken in this study was exploratory
and deliberately a-theoretical. The aim was to cast a net that was wide enough in scope, but
fine enough in weave, to identify both shared and distinctive characteristics in a sample of
individuals who are substantially or affirmatively “secular” (for lack of a better summary
term). Nonetheless, a distinction suggested by Steinfels (2006) and Kosmin (2007) is useful—
between “soft” and “hard” secularity and secularism. As Kosmin writes (2007: 6-7):
The soft secularist. . .is neither a convinced Atheist nor a principled materialist,
and may not be hostile to religious beliefs and institutions. In fact, the majority
are liberal religionists.
Hard secularity, on the other hand,
refers to a worldview, a system of beliefs, or a modality of sense-making
that is determinedly non-religious. A disenchanted universe is a purely
2
physical and material one.
The question posed in the present research is: what do “soft” and “hard” forms look
like among affiliated, self-described “secularists” with respect to several indicators:
> views of metaphysical concepts or phenomena
> self-descriptions
> attitude toward or about “religion”
> attitude about religion-government or church-state relations (and separation)
> use or avoidance of the notion of “spirituality” and meanings assigned to this.
The first four of these are fairly straightforward. With regard to “spiritual” and
“spirituality,” based on in-depth interviews with 50 self-described “nonreligious” individuals
and a small-scale survey of one secular humanist group, Pasquale (2006, 2007a) found that
self-described secularists—both affiliated and unaffiliated—may use these terms. Their
meanings, however, were decidedly this-worldly in character.
Prior work has tended to focus on religious samples and on teasing out the distinction
between “religiousness” and “spirituality,” as well as “spiritual but not religious,” among them
(Zinnbauer, et al., 1999; Zinnbauer and Pargament, 2000). Summarizing findings reported by
Unruh, Versnel, and Kerr (2002), Bregman (2006) gave six categories culled from 92
distinguishable definitions of “spirituality”:
1. “Relationship to God, spiritual being, higher power”
2. “Not of the self”
3. “Transcendence or connectedness, unrelated to belief in a higher being”
4. “Existential”
5. “Meaning and purpose in life”
6. “Life force of the person”
3
Methods and sample
4
conservative estimate, since the actual (net) number of individuals in the distribution sample
was likely closer to 1,500 than 1,600. It is reasonable to conclude that a response rate of
roughly 60 percent was achieved.4
A commitment was made to all participating groups that data would not be reported for
any individual group by name, but rather, for distinguishable group or philosophical types
based on self-descriptions (in group names, in materials or websites, and by group members
and representatives). Assignment of groups to categories was straightforward in most cases,
based on self-descriptive distinctions made by the groups themselves. Groups were assigned to
the Unitarian humanist category on the basis of an indicated relationship with a Unitarian
church or fellowship, substantial numbers of Unitarian church/fellowship members among
respondents, and/or explicit self-description as Unitarian humanists.5 Seven respondents each
who were affiliated with Ethical Culture and “Brights” groups, who described themselves as
“atheist(ic)” and/or indicated dual membership in a regional atheist group, were included in the
Atheist group category. Comparatively low response variability for the Atheist group category
on many items reinforced confidence in the appropriateness of this allocation.
One small group (n=11) that labeled itself “freethought” was excluded from the
analyses presented here. Analysis of responses suggested that its members were markedly and
consistently different from all other groups in the distribution sample. Most indicated
profoundly “religious,” “spiritual,” supernatural, and/or “mystical” views. Aggregation with
affiliates of other freethought groups yielded results with high response variability that did not
fairly represent either of two apparently very different “takes” on “freethought.” This points
up an apparent distinction in popular use and meaning of “freethought” and “freethinker.”
One widely cited dictionary definition of freethought/freethinker refers to “one who
forms opinions on the basis of reason independently of authority; especially one who doubts or
denies religious dogma.” Two of three groups in the distribution sample use these terms in
what may be called the (majority or standard) “rationalist” sense (as in, for example,
Robertson, 1936, or more recently, Jacoby, 2004). Here, emphasis is on reason (or rigorous
application of logic and empirical evidence to the evaluation of truth claims) and denial of
religious doctrine or supernatural ideas. The response patterns of the outlier group, however,
suggested a very different interpretation. Here, thinking may be set free from the perceived
constraints of “traditional” or institutional religious adherence, belief, or doctrine, but also
from those of rationalism, skepticism, naturalism, or non-transcendentalism. (This might best
5
be called an “unfettered” sense of “freethought” and “freethinker.”) Such variation in usage is
not restricted to the groups sampled here. A check of the Worldwide Web indicates that while
the rationalist usage seems most common, there are those (such as one “freethought church,”
not represented in the present sample) for whom these terms mean freedom from either
religious or rationalist/empiricist limitation (with consequent inclusion of pagan, gnostic,
mystical, magical, “neopagan polytheistic,” and “bohemian” references).
Following these adjustments, the final sample for analysis included 911 respondents in
six categories:
6
Table 1. Gender distribution by group type
Gender
male female Total
Group Humanist – Secular Count 210 169 379
type/affiliation % in group type 55.4% 44.6% 100.0%
* Excluding British Columbia groups. ** Among individuals 25 years of age and older (= 191,884,000) U. S.
Census, 2006: http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/cps2006/tab01-01.xls
7
Among the U. S.-based groups (n=782), 17.5 percent indicated Jewish backgrounds.
In all U. S. groups except the Jewish humanists, 7.1 percent of respondents indicated Jewish
backgrounds, an over-representation compared with an estimated 2 to 3 percent of individuals
reporting Jewish descent in the U. S. population at large.
The distribution of ethnic/cultural backgrounds for the entire sample is given in Table
2. Notably, not all Jewish humanist affiliates indicated Jewish cultural/ethnic background, a
reflection of the fact that some member households consist of a Jewish and non-Jewish spouse.
8
Selected findings
Survey components afforded several ways of probing degrees and types of secularity
among respondents:
a) views of specific metaphysical questions or ideas
b) applicability of a range of self-descriptive terms
c) attitudes toward something-called-religion
d) attitude about religion-government, or church-state, relations
e) use and specific meanings of “spiritual” or “spirituality.”
9
> An “impersonal force or energy that courses through and connects all living things or all that exists”
> An “ultimate purpose or direction in human life or all of existence”
Modified Glock and Stark response sets were provided for each of these items.
Modifications were suggested by prior interviews, particularly the addition of a “metaphorical”
approach to metaphysical concepts or phenomena. These were:
> Meaningless/nonexistent: “this makes no sense to me; I don’t think there is any such thing”
> Unknowable: “I don’t know and don’t think this is something human beings can know”
> Maybe/unsure: “this may be; I’m just not sure”
> Sometimes: “sometimes I think this is so and sometimes I do not”
> Metaphorical: “even though I doubt or reject the reality of this, or view this as a human construction,
I like to think as though there is”
> Probably: “there is probably something like this, but I have no idea about its actual nature”
> Definitely: “this is something I definitely think exists or is the case”
Transcendent entity
Non-existent/ Maybe or Metaphorical Probably or Total
unknowable sometimes (as though) definitely respondents
775 50 28 42 895
86.6% 5.6% 3.1% 4.7% 100.0%
Personal essence
Non-existent/ Maybe or Metaphorical Probably or
unknowable sometimes (as though) definitely
749 61 35 47 892
84.0% 6.8% 3.9% 5.3% 100.0%
Ultimate purpose
Non-existent/ Maybe or Metaphorical Probably or
unknowable sometimes (as though) definitely
632 58 107 76 873
72.4% 6.6% 12.3% 8.7% 100.0%
Impersonal force
Non-existent/ Maybe or Metaphorical Probably or
unknowable sometimes (as though) definitely
566 127 57 136 886
63.9% 14.3% 6.4% 15.3% 100.0%
10
With respect to the concept of a transcendent entity, 89.7 percent considered this
meaningless/non-existent or unknowable (86.6 percent) or assented only metaphorically (3.1
percent). Only 1.6 percent felt that this “definitely exists.”
The substantial number of respondents who think of “ultimate purpose” metaphorically
is notable, as are those who indicated that they maybe/sometimes or probably/definitely accept
the existence of an impersonal force. A slightly greater percentage of males (13.3 percent)
than females (10.7) viewed ultimate purpose metaphorically. Females more often accepted the
reality of an “impersonal force” maybe/sometimes (17.5 percent of women; 11.8 percent of
men), or probably/definitely (22.2 percent of women; 11.4 percent of men).
Differences were clearly apparent in responses among group types. While this masks
details, treating responses to all four concepts on a scaled basis (1 = meaningless/
non-existent; 7 = definitely exists or is the case) fairly reflects differences among groups
(Figure 1). Overall, women tended to reject these concepts slightly less than men (except
among the 12 female Freethought affiliates, who rejected a personal essence/soul and
Group type/affiliation
3.5 3.50
Humanist - Secular
Humanist - Judaic
Humanist - Unitarian
Atheist
Skeptic, rationalist
Freethought
Mean response (1-7 scale)
3 3.00
2.5 2.50
2 2.00
1.5 1.50
male female
Gender
Figure 1. Mean responses to four worldview concepts among group affiliates by gender
11
ultimate purpose substantially less than males). Jewish humanists tended to reject the four
concepts least, on average, followed by Unitarian humanists. Atheist and Skeptic affiliates
were most likely to reject them, followed by Secular humanists.
Of the four concepts, an impersonal force was the strongest discriminator among group
types, as indicated in Figure 2. Jewish humanists were least likely to reject the concept (as
nonexistent or unknowable).
Group type/affiliation
4.5 4.5
Humanist - Secular
Humanist - Judaic
Humanist - Unitarian
Atheist
4 4
Mean Impersonal force views
Skeptic, rationalist
Freethought
3.5 3.5
3 3
2.5 2.5
2 2
1.5 1.5
male female
Gender
Figure 2. Mean responses for an “impersonal force” among group affiliates by gender
The most frequent single pattern of responses to all four concepts was “straight-ticket”
rejection (as meaningless or nonexistent). One-third of the full sample responded this way
(Table 5). Atheist affiliates were followed by Skeptic, Secular humanist, and Freethought
affiliates, with Unitarian and Jewish affiliates least likely to reject the concept(s) categorically.
(This, in fact, closely parallels the group pattern concerning an impersonal force.) A separate
analysis indicated that males (42.9 percent) were more likely to be straight-ticket rejecters than
females (27.4 percent; n=2986). Excluding the Jewish and Unitarian humanists, this was true
among the remaining groups, as well (males, 39.4 percent; females, 25.3 percent; n=136).
12
We can also view those who considered all four worldview concepts either
meaningless/nonexistent or unknowable. One-half of the full sample responded this way, but
the pattern of responses among groups remained the same.
Table 5. Group affiliates rejecting a transcendental entity, personal essence, ultimate purpose,
and impersonal force as meaningless or non-existent
13
contributors). Apart from affiliation with Unitarian churches or fellowships, reported
affiliation with religious organizations was negligible (Table 7). Most of the Unitarians were
found in the Unitarian humanist groups (60 percent), with 10.5 percent or less in each of the
other groups.
Table 7. Reported involvement in local religious institutions
14
Respondents were also asked to indicate whether or not they “would. . .or do use any of
[several] terms to describe [their] way of thinking” (Table 9). Predictably (given the large
number of humanist affiliates in the sample), “humanist(ic)” was the most frequently chosen
descriptor. While chosen by large majorities of the humanist group types, substantial numbers
in all other groups applied it to themselves, as well, including 60 percent of Atheist affiliates.
15
“Agnostic” was chosen by little more than a third of all respondents. Nearly half of
Unitarian humanists, but only a quarter of Atheists, applied it to themselves.
“Anti-religious” and “naturalist(ic)” were the least frequently chosen self-descriptions
overall, with less than a third of respondents choosing each. Jewish humanists were least likely
to choose “anti-religious,” followed by Unitarian humanists. (In fact, fewer Jewish humanists
chose “anti-religious,” “atheist(ic),” “naturalist(ic),” “scientific,” “skeptical,” or
“non/unbeliever” than other affiliates.) The limited number of affiliates of any kind who
applied “anti-religious” to themselves is notable in view of fairly critical attitudes about
something-called-religion indicated by many.
Views of “religion.” Attitudes about “religion” were assessed several ways. When
asked to what extent they would say they are “angry about the role, dominance, and/or effects
of religion in the world,” nearly 80 percent indicated anger affirmatively (scaled responses
from 5 to 7; 1 = not at all angry; 7 = very angry). Comments provided by 79 individuals
suggested that responses might have been more affirmative regarding words other than anger,
such as “concerned,” “distressed,” “disappointed,” “distraught,” “frustrated,” “puzzled,” “sad,”
“troubled,” “upset,” “worried,” or “aghast,” among others. While some writers made it clear
that “anger” was apt and warranted, others said that there are more reasonable or productive
sentiments.
Table 10. Reported anger about the role and effects of religion in the world
Respondents were also asked to what extent they considered religion a harmful or
positive force in human affairs (1=harmful; 7=positive). Roughly three-quarters of
respondents considered religion more harmful than positive, but again there were considerable
16
differences among groups (Table 11). Jewish humanists were least likely to consider religion a
harmful force followed by Unitarian humanists; Freethought and Atheist affiliates were most
likely to be of this opinion.
Respondents were offered the opportunity to indicate that “religion is too complex a
phenomenon to generalize about in this way” in addition to, or instead of, a scaled response.
In Table 11, those who chose this option instead of a scaled response are reported. In Table 12,
those who chose this option whether or not they provided a scaled response are reported.
In both cases, Jewish humanists were most likely to feel that “religion” is too complex to
generalize about in such a manner, followed by Unitarian humanists; Freethought and Atheist
affiliates were least likely to do so.
Table12 . Religion too complex to evaluate generally as a harmful or positive force in the world
Overall, more than a third of respondents felt that “religion” was too complex to
Group type/affiliation Total
Humanist - Humanist - Humanist - Skeptic,
Secular Jewish Unitarian Atheist rationalist Freethought
“Religion” Count
126 53 55 30 48 7 319
too complex
% of group N 32.8% 48.6% 43.3% 29.1% 31.6% 23.3% 35.2%
Total N 384 109 127 103 152 30 905
17
Additional items provided further insight into respondents’ attitudes about “religion”
and related issues.7 In general, Jewish humanists were less critical of “religion” and more
critical of “skeptical and nonreligious people” than others, followed by Unitarian humanists.
Close inspection of the data indicated that this was true of both males and females in
comparison with other affiliates. Atheist and Freethought affiliates tended to be most critical
of religion. Skeptic and Secular humanist affiliates generally held the middle ground, with
Skeptics leaning toward leniency and Secular humanists, toward criticism.
Taking another look at (mean responses for) anger about religion (Appendix I, Table
A), Skeptic affiliates registered the least, on average; Freethought and Atheist affiliates, the
most. Only the Skeptics and Unitarian humanists were significantly less angry than Atheist
affiliates (F 5, 875 = 4.34, p<.018).
Looking again at (mean responses concerning) religion as a harmful or positive force in
human affairs, and keeping in mind that 127 individuals did not provide (unequivocal) scaled
responses due to the complexity of “religion,” Jewish humanists were least likely to consider
religion a harmful force, followed closely by Skeptics and Unitarian humanists. These three
groups were significantly less likely to view religion as a harmful force than the Secular
humanist and Atheist affiliates (F 5, 772 = 10.04, p<.01).
The Jewish humanists were most likely to feel, on average, that everyone benefits from
a mix of religious and nonreligious people in the world (F 5, 802 = 11.19, p<.01) and that there
are valuable pieces of religious wisdom in religious texts/traditions (F 5, 795 = 15.31, p<.01).
They were significantly more likely to feel this way than all but the Unitarian humanists, who
in turn felt significantly more than Secular humanists that we benefit from a mix of religious
and nonreligious people, and more than Secular humanist, Freethought, and Atheist affiliates
that there is wisdom in religious texts and traditions. Mean responses among Skeptics, Secular
humanists, Freethought, and Atheist affiliates did not differ significantly.
Although respondents generally tended not to condone ridicule of supernatural or
superstitious beliefs, the Jewish humanists did so significantly less, on average, than other
affiliates, who did not differ significantly among one another (F 5, 791 = 9.46, p<.01). They
were also significantly less likely than others to feel that humans would be better off without
superstition, supernaturalism, or the will to believe without evidence (F 5, 791 = 10.98, p<.01),
and that religion fosters excessive group devotion (except in comparison with Skeptics, which
did not reach significance; F 5, 792 = 9.88, p<.01).
18
The Jewish humanists were also most likely, on average, to feel that it is important in
general to cultivate acceptance of other ways of thinking and behaving (significantly more than
Skeptic and Secular humanist affiliates, F 5, 788 = 3.27, p<.01; with no significant differences
among other affiliates; Appendix I, Table B). They were least likely to feel that skeptical or
nonreligious people were more consistently ethical, considerate, responsible, or reasonable
than religious people (significantly so compared with all other affiliates; F 5, 877 = 8.76,
p<.01). And they were significantly more likely than Secular humanists, Skeptics, and Atheists
to feel that whether one is religious or nonreligious is not as important as being a decent person
(F 5, 795 = 4.48, p<.01).
Skeptics were least likely to indicate that they would be unhappy if a friend or family
member became a religious fundamentalist—significantly less than Judaic and Secular
humanist affiliates (F 5, 796 = 3.95, p<.01).
Atheist and Freethought affiliates were most likely, on average, to feel that their ways
of thinking are discriminated against in society. Judaic humanists were least likely to feel this
way—significantly less than Atheist, Freethought, and Secular humanist affiliates (F 5, 800 =
6.92, p<.01).
With regard to “spiritual” and “spirituality” . . . (check any that apply to you)
__ I use these terms to refer to something that exists beyond physical nature and its properties
(a force, energy, or entity, or multiple forces or entities), with which I/we can make
contact
Among 896 respondents to this item, 58 percent indicated “avoid/do not apply” (Table
13). Thirty-eight percent indicated they may use the terms in a psychological/experiential
19
sense. Only 3.5 percent indicated transcendental usage. While Jewish humanists were least
likely to avoid the terms entirely, the majority of respondents indicated non-transcendent
meanings.
Among the respondents who specified psychological usage (Table 14), most indicated a
feeling or experience of connection with others or with nature. Fewest indicated a process or
experience of higher awareness or consciousness. Fittingly, being at peace, harmony, or
equilibrium was in between.
Non-transcendental usage was not reported among the “softer secularists” alone.
20
Among those who applied the term “atheist(ic)” to themselves (n = 556) 30.8 percent indicated
such usage, as well as 23.8 percent of Atheist group affiliates (n = 104), and 23.5 percent of
those who consider a transcendent entity, personal essence, or impersonal force meaningless/
nonexistent or unknowable (n = 535). Even 15.7 percent of those who flatly rejected notions
of God, soul, force, or ultimate purpose as meaningless or nonexistent (n = 299)—the “straight-
ticket rejecters”—indicated a willingness to use these terms non-transcendentally.
Written texts were provided by 250 respondents (in response to an “Other” prompt
following the scaled item). The great majority of these conveyed naturalistic or non-
transcendental uses and meaning of “spiritual/ity.” Sample texts are provided in Appendix II.
The most frequent meanings were:
> Experience of/in nature
> Awe, wonder, gratitude, or appreciation (about existence, nature, the universe):
> A sense of social connection or generalized connectedness
> Emotion(al) experience
> Reaction to art, literature, music, aesthetic beauty
> Psychological process
> Sense of something greater than oneself (but not ontologically transcendental):
Political secularism. With regard to views on the relationship between religion and
government, respondents were overwhelming agreement. When asked, “What is your attitude
about keeping church and state, or religion and government, separate,” 95.9 percent of
respondents (n=903) indicated that “we can never be too vigilant about this” (scaled responses
from 5 to 7). Only 1.6 percent chose the scale midpoint and 2.6 percent indicated that “strict
separationists take this too far” (scaled responses from 1 to 3). Responses were consistent
across groups, with no significant difference among group means.
21
Discussion
22
The “softness” of the Jewish humanists’ secularity, as a group, is attitudinal as well as
metaphysical, and again, this is generally true of both males and females in comparison with
other affiliates. They are most likely to feel that everyone benefits from a mix of both religious
and nonreligious people in the world, and that there are pieces of wisdom in religious texts or
traditions (due, no doubt in part, to the fact that they themselves draw—sans supernatural
references—from the well of Judaic thought and ritual). They are least likely to feel that
religion is a harmful force in the world or, indeed, that religion can be evaluated in such
general terms. They are least likely to think that religious and supernatural beliefs foster
excessive group devotion or that supernatural and superstitious ideas deserve to be ridiculed.
In general, they are comparatively less judgmental and most likely to feel that it is important to
cultivate acceptance of ways of thinking and behavior other than our own. They are most
likely to feel that skeptical or nonreligious people can be as closed-minded as the religious, and
least likely to think that skeptical or nonreligious people are more consistently ethical,
responsible, or reasonable than the religious.
They are also, however, most likely—shoulder to shoulder with Atheist affiliates—
to indicate that they would be unhappy if close friends or family members were to become
religious fundamentalists. And they are not lowest in reported anger about the roles and effects
of “religion” in the world. This findings, coupled with moderate attitudes about “religion,”
may suggest wariness of perceived “extremism” of any kind.
Unitarian humanists. The Unitarian humanists display a pattern of beliefs and attitudes
similar to, but somewhat less “soft,” overall, than the Jewish humanists. This may be
attributable, at least in part, to the historical meaning and role of “Humanism” within
Unitarianism—as an affirmatively this-worldly, non-theistic, non-supernatural, and (to some)
non-“spiritualistic” meaning system and manner. It may also reflect an important development
(Lee, 1995) within Unitarian Universalism in recent years—a deliberate shift from a
“Humanist” emphasis toward what is called, in Unitarian circles, “God-talk” (increased
reference to “spirits” and “spirituality,” “transcendence,” or “God” and accommodation of
pagan, pantheistic, or “New Age” worldviews). While some “Humanists” have remained
within UU ranks, despite criticism of this shift and of perceived marginalization within the UU
fold, some have shifted affiliation to (secular) humanist groups. It is quite likely that the
Unitarian humanist affiliates sampled here fit this description—some still “in the fold” (as
indicated by the 60 percent who indicated UU membership), some “on the line,” and some “on
23
the outs,” but many having been affected by the shift from a “harder Humanism” in Unitarian
Universalism. In-depth interviews with two current, and two ex-Unitarian humanists (now
Secular humanist affiliates), support this view.
Skeptics/rationalists. Unlike members of The Skeptic Society reported by Shermer
(2000), among whom one fifth to one third (in two surveys) indicated some degree of belief in
a “purposeful higher intelligence that created the universe,” only 4 percent of the current
sample of Skeptic affiliates probably or definitely accept the existence of a transcendent entity,
with 5 percent more who are unsure or waver between belief and disbelief. These tend to be
“thoroughgoing” rather than “selective” skeptics regarding metaphysical, as well as
“paranormal” or “pseudo-scientific” claims, and as such, they are similar to the Secular
humanist, Atheist, and Freethought affiliates. Attitudinally, however, there are signs of more
muted criticism regarding something-called-religion in comparison with those groups. In
addition to registering the least amount of anger about “religion,” on average, they are more
likely than Atheist affiliates to think that there is some wisdom to be found in religious texts or
traditions. And they are least likely to say they would be unhappy if a close friend or family
member were to become a religious fundamentalist.
Secular humanist, atheist, and freethought affiliates. Secular humanists frequently
acknowledge kinship with Atheists concerning rejection of theistic or supernatural thinking,
criticism of established or institutional religion, and support of church-state separation. But
they also tend to distinguish themselves from self-described Atheists with respect to
comparatively greater focus on positive social values and less on religious criticism. Whatever
may transpire in their respective group meetings and public communications, the data here
suggest more substantial kinship than distinctiveness between Secular humanist and Atheist
affiliates with respect to attitudes about metaphysical ideas as well as something-called-
religion. Certainly, the Atheists tend to be more consistently resolute in their rejection of
metaphysical ideas and criticism of “religion,” but this is by degrees.
Atheist and Secular humanist affiliates are both, on average, equally and comparatively
more likely than others to consider “religion” a harmful force in human affairs and to feel least
that we all benefit from a mix of religious and nonreligious people in the world. On other
measures, while differences did not prove statistically significant, the pattern of responses
suggests that Atheist affiliates are somewhat more severe in their views of religion and
supernatural ideas than the Secular humanists. Moreover, the data suggest that the Secular
24
humanists are somewhat more likely to be (self-)critical (about “skeptical or nonreligious
people”). The Atheist affiliates are least likely, on average, to feel that skeptical or
nonreligious people can be as close-minded or dogmatic as religious people, for example.
Little can be said with confidence, based on these data, about Freethought group
affiliates due to small samples and widely divergent meanings of “freethought” and
“freethinker.” While the small sample of (rationalist) Freethought affiliates analyzed here
generally exhibit views resembling Skeptics, Secular humanists, and Atheists, very wide
differences of opinion between male and female affiliates on several measures complicate the
picture further. Public self-descriptions among groups that choose the (rationalist)
“freethought” label suggest that they tend to be generalists—welcoming a wide range of
secularists (including non-theists, atheists, secular humanists, unbelievers, skeptics, agnostics,
rationalists, and freethinkers). The primary focus in some groups, particularly those indicating
affiliation with the Freedom from Religion Foundation, is on separation of church and state.
As such, they may tend to attract strong supporters of that cause whose personal worldviews
vary more than in, for example, Atheist groups. But again, more representative data are
required before anything can be said with confidence.
It becomes clear that “soft”-“hard” characterizations of forms of secularity must be
qualified. With respect to political secularism, or insistence on separation between religion and
government, or church and state, there is broad unanimity:
25
It would be of value in future research to ascertain the conceptions of “religion”
associated with use of the term by various secularists. Long observation among affiliated
secularists, and text responses in the present research on attitudes about “religion,” suggest that
while “religion” is typically used without qualification, when probed it most often refers to
“monotheistic religion(s),” generally Christianity (and now Islam), and particularly the forms
of these phenomena said to be “fundamentalist” or “extremist.” The conception of “religion”
in the minds of many Jewish or Unitarian humanists may well be something different (e.g.,
more “functional”) compared with what many Atheist or Secular humanist affiliates have in
mind.
With regard to naturalistic thinking, or views of metaphysical or other-worldly
concepts, the continuum shifts somewhat:
Consistent with this pattern, more Jewish (followed by Unitarian) humanists indicate a
propensity to make reference to “spiritual/ity,” but what does this mean?
The majority of all respondents indicate that they prefer to avoid these terms since they
do not apply to their experience. Most of those who are willing to use “spiritual/ity” do so in
psychological or experiential terms rather than contact with transcendental entities or forces.
This most often means a sense of connection with others or with nature, or experiences of
peace, beauty, art, awe, or appreciation for sentient existence. With regard to the six categories
of “spiritual/ity” suggested by Unruh, Versnel, and Kerr (2002), virtually none of these
individuals use these terms mean “a relationship with God, a spiritual being, or higher power.”
If used, these terms are most often associated with “transcendence or connectedness, unrelated
to belief in a higher being” or “meaning and purpose in life.”
A greater percentage of Jewish (followed by Unitarian) humanists tend to accept (not
metaphorically) the reality of an impersonal force or energy that connects all living (or
existing) things. With regard to the basis for perceived order in nature, there is a hint of (shall
we call it small-“t”) transcendental (but not “theistic”) thinking among the 17 percent of
26
respondents who view this as a coherent organizing force pervasive in the universe (but do not
see this as an organizing principle that “transcends” the universe). For this minority,
something that knits everything together in some “coherent” fashion, but which we do not fully
comprehend, is brought within nature rather than residing outside it. Comparatively more
Jewish humanists (both male and female) apparently see things this way.
Thematic emphasis on “secular spirituality” can be found in material on secular and
humanistic Judaism. Yakov Malkin (2004) devotes a chapter to “The spirituality of secular
Jews” in Secular Judaism: Faith, Values, and Spirituality (with an approving introduction by
Sherwin Wine, founder of the Society for Humanistic Judaism). He writes that “[o]ne of the
grave dangers facing secularism in general, and Jewish secularism in particular, is the apparent
loss of spirituality or even the perception of its need, as if spirituality somehow needed to be
‘religious’” (p. 37). He proceeds to describe “secular spirituality” in exclusively this-worldly
terms—with reference to social and communal connection, awe and appreciation for existence,
uplifting aesthetic experience, a larger sense of purpose, focus on values and experience
beyond the mundane or everyday, and dedication to matters beyond self and self-interest.
Many of the Jewish humanists’, and most other affiliates’, use of “spiritual/ity” would
seem to conform to such a this-worldly meaning, but not all. Depending on the worldviews
and intended meanings of those who use them, they may reflect (“hard”) naturalistic secularity.
It certainly cannot be assumed, as often seems to be the case, that use of these terms signals
alternate forms of (transcendental) religiosity. To quote one affirmatively naturalistic
individual, the experience of “the paradoxes of existence” or of “the mystery of the human
condition” are not unknown to these people. Use of “spiritual/ity” to describe such experience
by substantially naturalistic individuals would seem to reflect a limitation of language when it
comes to capturing a multi-dimensional, but affirmatively this-worldly, sensation that human
beings experience.
This said, as others have found (e.g., Bishop, 1999; The Baylor Institute for Studies of
Religion, 2006), when more nuanced questions are put to people about their metaphysical
thinking, customary categories erode. It becomes increasingly difficult to decide where lines
may be drawn between “naturalistic,” “transcendental,” “supernatural,” or “theistic” when we
probe beyond conventional notions of a personal transcendent entity (“God”) or personal
essence (“soul”) to those of an impersonal connecting force or energy or an ultimate purpose or
27
directionality in existence—and metaphorical conceptions, as well as acceptance or rejection,
of such concepts.
We have barely begun to map the meanings and varieties of “secularity” or of meaning
systems that may be reasonably characterized as substantially or affirmatively “naturalistic.”
The closer we look, the more we may find that customary categories will dissolve into continua
or complex mosaics of human thought, attitude, and experience that defy simple categorization.
28
APPENDIX I: Table A. Attitudes about religion and supernatural beliefs
> “Religion is generally a 2.56 2.36 2.37 1.82 1.78 1.70 2.06
harmful (1)…positive (7) > SR, SH, A* > SH*,A** > SH*, A*
force in human affairs > FR***
> “We all benefit from… 4.75 4.07 3.52 3.34 3.30 3.54 3.67
and nonreligious people” > all* > SH**
but UH***
> “There are valuable 5.76 5.49 4.89 4.53 4.07 4.29 4.86
pieces of wisdom in > all* > SH*,A* > A***
religious texts/traditions” but UH > SR**
> FR***
Critical views
> “…Angry about the role, 5.38 5.33 5.09 5.62 5.94 5.97 5.51
dominance, or effects of < A*** < A** < A*
religion in the world.” < SH***
> “The human species will be 5.50 6.24 6.16 6.46 6.57 6.59 6.26
better off when it outgrows… < all*
superstition, supernaturalism, but SR***
and the will to believe
without evidence”
> “Religions & supernatural 5.36 6.10 5.86 6.18 6.32 6.25 6.02
beliefs…foster excessive > all*
devotion to particular groups, but SR**
ideologies, or lifestyles”
> “Superstitious and 2.53 3.39 3.92 3.79 4.33 4.00 3.64
supernatural beliefs < all* < A***
deserve to be ridiculed”
29
APPENDIX I: Table B. Measures of acceptance and self-criticism
> “It is important to cultivate 5.88 5.38 5.15 5.30 5.18 5.24 5.38
acceptance of ways of > SR,SH*
thinking and behaving > UH***
different from one’s own.”
> “Whether you are religious 6.58 6.32 6.07 6.07 5.84 6.10 6.16
or nonreligious…is of little > SH,SR,A*
concern. What is important
is [being] ethical, considerate,
responsible, and reasonable”
> “Skeptical or nonreligious 5.92 5.73 5.57 5.40 5.13 5.55 5.54
people can be as close- > SH,A**
minded or dogmatic as
religious people”
> “Skeptical or nonreligious 3.62 4.63 4.52 4.62 5.22 5.26 4.54
…are likely to be ethical, > all*
considerate, responsible and
reasonable more consistently
than religious people.”
> “I would be very unhappy 5.90 5.44 5.14 5.67 5.88 5.66 5.58
if a close friend or family < JH*
member became a < SH**
religious fundamentalist” < A***
> “People with my way of 4.54 4.88 4.76 5.12 5.89 5.83 5.02
thinking are generally < A,FR*
discriminated against < SH**
in society”
30
Appendix II. Written texts on use/meaning of “spiritual/ity”
31
Forty individuals supplied texts that suggest openness to or affirmation of transcendental ideas or
phenomena. Some described themselves as “seekers” or “open” to transcendental possibilities:
32
References
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34
Notes
35
1
“A ‘meaning system’ can be thought of as a group of beliefs or theories about reality that includes both a world theory. . .
and a self theory” (Hood, Hill, and Williamson, 2005: 14) or, borrowing from Wong (1998: 368), “an individually
constructed cognitive system that endows life with personal significance.” Here, “worldview” and “meaning system” will
be used synonymously.
2
Unless specified otherwise, “transcendent” and “transcendental” are used here in an ontological sense, that is, “existence
beyond; independent existence” (Honderich, 2005: 922) or “existing apart from, not subject to the limitations of, the
material universe (The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus: American edition, 1996: 1623).
3
The investigator is grateful for a Shand Award from the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion which helped defray
distribution costs.
4
It should be noted, too, that the nature and quality of mailing lists varied noticeably among the groups. This reflects, in
part, differences in the purposes, activities, and nature of affiliation in these groups. Some exhibit formal organizational
structure with governing boards, committees, regular meetings, and clearly defined levels of membership. Others are less
structured networks of interested individuals and supporters who meet irregularly, distribute newsletters or other bulletins,
maintain continuing contact largely via email, and have less well-defined affiliation levels or requirements, As a result,
some were clearly regularly updated lists of active or dues-paying members, while others were less frequently updated
and/or more inclusive lists covering both active participants (in meetings, email correspondence, or other activities) as well
as people who had inquired about the group or asked to receive electronic or printed newsletters.
5
Nearly 60 percent of Unitarian humanist affiliates indicated affiliation with a Unitarian church or fellowship, while in
other groups 10.5 percent or less did so.
6
Does not total 299 since one respondent did not indicate gender.
7
These were among the appended questions distributed to all but the first two groups, resulting in samples of 353 for the
Secular humanist, and 59 for Atheist, affiliates.
8
Unless otherwise noted, Tamhane post-hoc analyses were performed due to unequal variances between groups.