Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
ALMA T. CUTE
Defendant.
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COMPLAINT
Parties
1. Happy Bee Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines and is engaged in the business of processing and selling process
foods. Its principal office is located at 123 Ayala Ave. Makati City. It may be served
processes, orders, and pleadings through the undersigned counsel at the address indicated
below.
Material Allegations
3. Defendants Alma T. Cute was formerly Happy Bee Inc. Department Head
for processing, which is one of the most critical positions in Happy Bee Inc. food
processing department. As such, she is in possession of confidential Happy Bee Inc.
information regarding confidential meat processing and its ingredients. The disclosure of
such information to a competitor is extremely prejudicial to Happy Bee Inc..
7. Clause 13.2 (a) of the Management Letter Agreement provides that Alma
T. Cute should not, without the written consent of Happy Bee Inc. “directly or indirectly
in any capacity (whether as principal agent, partner, employee, shareholder, unit holder,
joint venturer, director, trustee, beneficiary, manager, consultant or adviser) carry on,
advise, provide services to or be engaged, concerned or interested in or associated with
any business or activity which is competitive with any business carried on by “Happy
Bee Inc.” in the Philippines for a period of six (6) months from the date of termination of
the Management Service Agreement. The Management Service Agreement terminated
on March 8, 2010. Hence, Alma T. Cute undertaking not to compete against Happy Bee
Inc. was binding and effective until September 8, 2010.
11. In a letter dated August 6, 2010, Happy Bee Inc. informed Alma T. Cute
that her employment with Big Mac violated the Management Service Agreement and
reminded her to comply with her obligations thereunder. However, Alma T. Cute did
not reply to this letter.
A copy of this letter is attached as Annex “B”.
12. Employment with Big Mac Foods constitute tortious interference by Alma
T. Cute contractual undertaking not to compete directly or indirectly with Happy Bee
Inc.. This tortious interference makes Alma T. Cute liable for damages under Article
1314 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[a]ny third party who induces another to
violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party”.
Damages
19. Due to the breach by Alma T. Cute of her contractual obligations to Happy
Bee Inc., Alam T. Cute should be held liable for actual damages in the amount of at least
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) , or alternatively, nominal damages.
20. Since defendant acted in bad faith by blatantly breaching their clear
contractual obligations to Happy Bee Inc., She should be held liable for moral damages in
the amount of at least One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
22. Defendants’ action constrained Happy Bee Inc. to engage legal counsel to
protect its rights and incur attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in the amount of at least
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for which defendant should be held liable.
Prayer
WHEREFORE, Happy Bee Inc. respectfully prays that this Honorable Court
render judgment finding:
By:
PAUL REYES
IBP OR No. 793849 1/16/2011 – Makati City
PTR OR No. 120349 1/16/2011 – Makati City
Roll No. 5000
MCLE Compliance No. 19038349
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
I, Moises Adama, Filipino, of legal age, with office address at 527 J.P. Rizal Ave.
Makati City, under oath respectfully state that:
1. I am the Vice President of Happy Bee Inc., the plaintiff in this case, and its
authorized representative, as shown by the attached Secretary’s Certificate.
2. On behalf of Happy Bee Inc., I caused the preparation of and have read the
foregoing Complaint and the factual statements alleged therein are true and correct based
on my personal knowledge and the authentic records of Happy Bee Inc..
3. On behalf of Happy Bee Inc., I certify that it has not commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of my knowledge, no such action or claim is pending therein.
4. If Happy Bee or I should I thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, I shall report such fact within five (5) days
therefrom to this Honorable Court.
IN TRUTH WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 1st day of March 2005
at Makati City.
Moises Adama
Before me, a notary public in and for the city named above, personally appeared:
MOISES ADAMA.,
Complainant,
SMARTY COMMUNICATION,
Alma Uy, Lorna Uy and Fe Uy.
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
POSITION PAPER
PREFATORY STATEMENT
The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor
social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every
Every employer has the inherent right to manage or conduct, according to its
discretion, every aspect of employment. This inherent right includes the prerogative to
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the conduct of the employer’s
business or concern. [Family Planning Organization of the Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, 207
for this reason that the Labor Code allows the termination of employment due to willful
has been found guilty of deliberately disregarding company rules and regulations.
Otherwise, employees would make a mockery of the rules and regulations that they are
required to observe. [Nuez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107574, 28 December 1994; San Miguel
Corporation v. Ubaldo, 218 SCRA 293 (1993); Colgate Palmolive Phils., Inc. v. Ople,
163 SCRA 323 (1988); Lagatic v. NLRC, 285 SCRA 251 (1998)]
PARTIES
Communications Customer Care Representative until he was validly terminated for cause
on 05 November 2010.
existing under the laws of the Philippines with an office at 527 J.P. Rizal, Makati City.
Delivery Center.
prays for the payment of salaries/wages, separation pay, a sum of money for violation of
due process and damages. In his Complaint, complainant is not praying for
reinstatement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Representative, complainant’s basic duties included the following: (a) taking calls from
the client’s customers, and (b) identifying, evaluating, and resolving the issues raised by
inform complainant’s Team Leader/Supervisor Ms. Gina Su that she and complainant
were on the way to the hospital because she was about to give birth. Mrs. Nene Adama
asked Smarty Communications if the latter could process the paternity leave for
complainant that night. Believing that complainant’s wife was due to give birth on the
said date, agreed to help process complainant’s paternity leave application, provided Ms.
for the latter to submit a copy of the birth certificate or any supporting documents
concerning the hospitalization of his wife. However, Gina Su did not receive any
of both complainant and his wife to ask them for a copy of their child’s birth certificate,
as well as their marriage contract. Gina Su also tried to call them. However, Gina Su
did not receive any reply from complainant and his wife and Gina Su’s calls were not
answered.
9. On 26 September 2009, Gina Su received a text message from Ms. Nene
Adama asking about the duration of a paternity leave. Gina Su replied that a paternity
leave is seven days, but noted that complainant had to submit their child’s birth certificate
Smarty Communications’s sick hotline about his continued absences despite knowing
that his paternity leave has not been processed due to his failure to submit the required
documents. Gina Su again called and sent text messages to the mobile phones of both
complainant and his wife, but Gina Su did not receive any reply to his text messages and
12. On 1 October 2009, Gina Su learned from the other agents that
complainant’s wife had not yet given birth. Thus, Gina Su sent a text message to
asked complainant to submit the required documents that will support his absences. Gina
Su also asked complainant for the reason why he did not inform Gina Su that his wife did
not give birth and why he did not report for work even when his wife merely had a “false
alarm.” Complainant did not offer any explanation and simply smiled back at Gina Su.
absences to be processed and authorized. The HCD department informed Gina Su that
complainant should present proof that he and his wife went to the hospital on 23
September 2009 and were sent home because his wife merely had a “false alarm”. Gina
15. Gina Su gave complainant more than one week, or from 7 to 16 October
2009, to present any supporting document, such as a medical certificate, that his wife
October 2009 stating that his wife had a medical check-up on 6 October 2009 and that her
17. After complainant’s wife gave birth on 8 October 2009, complainant again
applied for paternity leave for seven days from 27 October 2009 to 4 November 2009 and
submitted the birth certificate of his child. Complainant also submitted a medical
certificate dated 16 October 2009 stating that he attended to the confinement of his wife
who gave birth on 8 October 2009 and was discharged from the hospital on 10 October
2009.
18. Gina Su approved complainant’s application for paternity leave for the
within five calendar days why no disciplinary action, including termination, should be
his written explanation, complainant stated, among others, that (a) he was unable to go to
work on 23 September 2009 because his wife was experiencing pains on her lower back,
which however turned out to be “false alarm”; and, (b) on 24 September 2009, he advised
his wife to visit the doctor, who told her that she may give birth anytime because his
complainant.
following persons present: complainant, Gina Su , Operations Senior Team Lead Oneil
Employee Relations Tina Sy 4. During the administrative hearing, the panel gave
complainant a chance to present documents that would support his absences on 23 to 25,
19 November 2009 stating that: (a) Ms. Nene Adam was expected to deliver on 1 October
2009; and, (b) she was already having intermittent uterine contractions on 23 September
25. On 27 November 2009, the panel reconvened to discuss and give its
recommendation regarding the case of complainant. The panel noted that Ms. Nene
Adama should have given birth much earlier than 8 October 2009 if her cervix was really
complainant was already given numerous written warnings for his repeated violations of
26.1. On 15 July 2008, complainant was given a file note for violation of
floor.
2008.
December
2008.
Attached as Annex “16” is the final written warning dated 15 May 2009.
Attached as Annex “16-A” is a draft, but clearer copy, of the final written
Attached as Annex “17-A” is a draft, but clearer copy, of the discussion log dated
16 May 2009
26.9. On 1 June 2009, complainant was given another discussion log for
Attached as Annex “18-A” is a draft, but clearer copy, of the discussion log dated
1 June 2009.
26.10. On 17 July 2009, complainant was given a file note for violation of
26.11. On 21 October 2009, an incident report was submitted for his violation of
department head.
2009.
27. After considering the evidence presented against him, including his
terminated complainant’s employment for gross and habitual neglect of duties and willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of his employer, particularly Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the
Smarty Communications Code of Discipline and Articles II-B.2, II-B.2.a., II-B.3.d., and
II-B.3.b (fifth bullet point) of the Accent and Product Training and Production
his employment. Operations Manager Oneil Sy 1, Becca Sy 2 and Gina Su signed the
Notice of Decision and noted Complainant’s refusal to acknowledge receipt of the same.
ISSUES
I.
WHETHER OR NOT COMPLAINANT WAS
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED
II.
WHETHER OR NOT COMPLAINANT IS ENTITLED
TO REINSTATEMENT/SEPARATION PAY AND
BACKWAGES
III.
WHETHER OR NOT COMPLAINANT IS ENTITLED
TO A SUM OF MONEY FOR VIOLATION OF DUE
PROCESS AND DAMAGES
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS
CAN BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE
DISCUSSION
I.
SMARTY COMMUNICATIONS DISMISSED
COMPLAINANT FOR JUST CAUSES AND AFTER
COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS.
Communication dismissed complainant for just causes and after according him
29. The following are the just causes for termination under Article 282 of the
Labor Code.
30. In the case at bar, complainant was validly dismissed for willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer and for gross and habitual neglect by
regard, it is well-settled that company policies, rules, and regulations are binding and
valid and must be complied with, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to
law. [San Miguel Corporation v. Ubaldo, 218 SCRA 293 (1993) reiterating Gold City
Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 189 SCRA 811 (1990)] Thus, employees are
expected “to yield obedience to all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the
[Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 470 (1976)]
31.1. In San Miguel Corporation v. Ubaldo, 218 SCRA 293 (1993), the
dismissal, to wit:
31.2. Likewise, in Nuez v. NLRC, et al., 239 SCRA 518 (1994), the
Supreme Court ruled:
commission of “three (3) unauthorized absences within a six (6) month period
irrespective of excuses or reasons.” On the other hand, Section 5.2 provides that
“absence of three (3) consecutive days without notice or authorization shall be considered
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Discipline are both classified as a “D” offense or one
Guidelines, in particular:
• Article II-B.3.d: Regular employees who would incur two days UPTU2
in six months shall be issued a File Note. Further occurrences within the six
month period will escalate the warnings to a First written warning, Final
written warning and ultimately resulting to a Termination.
Discipline and Attendance Guidelines are: (a) reasonable and lawful; (b) sufficiently
known to complainant; and (c) in connection with the duties that complainant has been
engaged to discharge.
business is primarily driven by maintaining good relations with its clients. Good
provide prompt assistance and excellent service to its clients, which would not be
1
“NCNS” means no call, no show.
2
“UPTU” means unpaid time, unauthorized absence.
35.2. The importance of attendance to Smarty Communication’s
Attendance Guidelines:
against employees, like complainant, whose attendance directly affects his team’s
36. Based on the foregoing, it is also clear that complainant was validly
complainant also violated Section 3.17 of the Code of Discipline which penalizes “gross
38. In Valiao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146621, 30 July 2004, the
Supreme Court held that habitual absenteeism and tardiness constitute gross and habitual
neglect of duties that justified the employee’s termination of employment. Among the
2009, complainant was already given numerous written warnings for his various
39.1. On 15 July 2008, complainant was given a file note for violation of
4
5
6
39.5. On 27 December 2008, complainant was given a second written
39.9. On 1 June 2009, complainant was given another discussion log for
39.10. On 17 July 2009, complainant was given a file note for violation of
2009.
during official working hours without prior permission from his immediate
40. Undoubtedly, complainant was validly dismissed for gross and habitual
8
Smarty Communication’s
accorded complainant procedural
due process.
41. For dismissal based on just cause, procedural due process merely requires
the employer to: (a) serve on the employee a written notice which apprises the employee
of the particular acts or omissions for which the dismissal is sought; (b) provide the
employee an opportunity to be heard and to respond to the charge; and (c) serve on the
employee a subsequent written notice of termination, if the employer decides that there is
just cause for termination after considering the employee’s explanation. [Nitto
Enterprises v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114337, 29 September 1995; Tingson v. NLRC, G.R. No.
84702, 18 May 1990; Ruffy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84193, 15 February 1990]
process before dismissing complainant. The records clearly show that Smarty
Communication (a) duly notified complainant of the acts for which he may be subjected
to disciplinary action, (b) gave him the opportunity to be heard, and (c) notified him of
complainant sufficient opportunity to explain his side before deciding his case and
II.
COMPLAINANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO
REINSTATEMENT, BACKWAGES AND
SEPARATION PAY.
based on the premise that an employee’s dismissal was illegal [Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No.
76721, 21 September 1987]. Moreover, complainant did not pray for reinstatement in his
employee has been illegally dismissed due to the unlawful act of the employer or the
latter’s bad faith [Reyes v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 48705, 9 February 1989]. As
previously discussed, Smarty Communication dismissed complainant for just causes and
after compliance with procedural due process. Clearly, complainant is not entitled to
2010.
III.
45. In his Complaint, complainant is asking for the amount of PhP20,000 for
the alleged violation of due process and PhP450,000 as damages. However, considering
that complainant was not illegally dismissed and Smarty Communications dismissed him
with cause after compliance with procedural process, complainant is not entitled to the
Hence, he is not entitled to the amount of PhP20,000 that he is claiming for the alleged
dismissed, complainant is still not entitled to damages. Under Article 2220 of the Civil
Code, moral damages may be awarded only where the defendant or respondent acted
46.2. Bad faith or fraud, however, is never presumed. This must be proved
clearly and convincingly. [Suario v. Bank of the Philippines Islands, G.R. No. L-
50459, 25 August 1989; Fernando v. Sto. Tomas, 234 SCRA 546(1994)] In this
case, no evidence was presented to establish bad faith or fraud on the part of the
respondents.
47. There being no legal or factual basis for moral damages, complainant is
likewise not entitled to exemplary damages. [Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp.
v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713 (1985); Cocoland Development Corp. v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 51
(1996)] Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. [Article 2233, Civil
Code] In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the
[Article 2232, Civil Code; Garcia v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
110518, 1 August 1994] In this case, there is no proof of such conduct on the part of
respondents.
IV.
48.1. In EPG Construction Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 230
not act with malice or bad faith. Indeed, complainant was validly dismissed for
just cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements. Thus,
RESERVATION
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit.
By:
PAUL REYES
IBP OR No. 793849 1/16/2010 – Pasay City
PTR OR No. 120349 1/16/2010 – Pasay City
Roll No. 70000
MCLE Compliance No. 19038349
Copy Furnished:
Mr Moise Adama.
Complainant
527 J. P. Rizal St., Makati City
EXPLANATION
Due to distance, personal service is not practicable; thus, this Position Paper is
filed by registered mail and courier and is and served on complainant’s counsel by
registered mail.
PAUL REYES
MOISES ADAMA,
Complainant,
SMARTY COMMUNICATION,
Alma Uy 1, Lorna Uy 2, Fe Uy 3.
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
REPLY
[TO COMPLAINANT’S POSITION PAPER]
1. Complainant asserts in his Position Paper dated 26 April 2010 that: (a)
Smart Communication has no valid ground to dismiss him; (b) Smart Communication did
not comply with the requirements of procedural due process before dismissing him; (c)
he is entitled to the following: (i) full backwages from the time of his termination up to
the date of actual reinstatement; (ii) reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and/or
(iii) attorney’s fees; and (iv) moral and exemplary damages.9 Complainant’s assertions
have no merit.
Position Paper. However, in order that this Honorable Office will not be misled,
I. Smart Communication
validly dismissed
complainant for just cause
after being afforded due
process.
Communication dismissed complainant for just causes after according her procedural due
process.
(a) of grave and aggravated character and merely trivial or unimportant;10 and
sarcasm to the customer) are of grave and aggravated character and intimately connected
10
with her work as a Smart Communication Escalations Desk Agent. They amount to
recording clearly shows that complainant kept on interrupting the customer with
a sarcastic statement, “no it’s not”, while the customer was explaining his side.
Complainant also rudely ended the call before the customer hung up when the
customer asked if she can talk to another agent. Complainant also did not respond
complainant) to handle calls in accordance with company policy. All calls are
expected to be handled with utmost promptness, courtesy and competence, with the end
view of satisfactorily addressing the customers’ needs, concerns and queries. However,
clients. Worse, it jeopardizes Smart Communication’s business and damages the good
7.1. The call recording of 8 April 2009 call clearly shows that
complainant kept on interrupting the customer, who was trying to explain his side,
by rudely saying, “no, it’s not!”. Furthermore, because complainant was not
helpful and rude to the customer, customer asked if he can speak to another agent
complainant informed the customer that the latter should dial the same number if
she wants to speak to another agent, complainant “disposed” (i.e., released) the
11
call even when the customer was still talking to the complainant and was trying to
clients, visitors, customers, and other business friends of the company.” Commission of
acts or omissions penalized under Section 2.13 of the Code of Discipline is classified as a
“D” offense or one that is punishable by employment termination even in the first
instance.12
of Discipline and not Section 2.13.13 As explained above, all calls are expected to be
handled with utmost promptness, courtesy and competence, with the end view of
satisfactorily addressing the customers’ needs, concerns and queries. Call avoidance and
damages the good relations between Smart Communication and its clientele. Hence, the
acts of complainant constituted a violation of both Sections 2.12 and 2.13 of Smart
12
13
11. Also, as emphasized in Smart Communication Employees’ Handbook, call
discourtesy towards customers and his commission of call avoidance constituted the
following call violations, which fall under the Zero Tolerance Policy of Smart
Communication:
• Call dropping
13. Aside from the foregoing violations of Hogwarts’ rules, complainant also
violated Section 3.17 of the Code of Discipline which penalizes “”gross or habitual
customer service representative. He claims that the fact that he never received a
14
15
diligent in her duties.16 On the contrary, complainant was already given several
written warnings, including two final written warnings, for various violations of Smart
Communication policies prior to the commission of call avoidance on 8 April 2009 and
• On 9 May 2009, complainant was again given a final written warning for
violating the Critical Working Day Memorandum for being on no call/no
show (i.e., taking unauthorized absence without any notice to her
supervisor) on a critical working day;20 and
never neglected his duties and that he never received a memorandum as to neglecting his
assigned task.
Employees’ Handbook and Memorandum on Call Violation are: (a) reasonable and
lawful; (b) sufficiently known to complainant; and (c) in connection with the duties that
includes the right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
rules and regulations are Smart Communication’s Code of Discipline, Employees’
Handbook and Memorandum on Call Violation. These rules set the benchmark
Communication employees do not only perform their work competently, but also
act professionally towards customers. Also, the penalties imposed under the
Memorandum on Call Violation, which contain the provisions violated, were known to
complainant. Complainant is also aware that call avoidance violates company policy. At
any rate, complainant was furnished a copy of Smart Communication Code of Discipline
16. Hence, it is clear that complainant willfully disobeyed the lawful orders of
Smart Communication’s in connection with his work, which justifies his dismissal from
employment.
17. For dismissal based on just cause, procedural due process merely requires
the employer to: (a) serve on the employee a written notice which apprises the employee
of the particular acts or omissions for which the dismissal is sought; (b) provide the
employee an opportunity to be heard and to respond to the charge; and (c) serve on the
employee a subsequent written notice of termination, if the employer decides that there is
24
18. Contrary to complainant’s claim, Smart Communication’s complied with
the requirements of procedural due process before dismissing her. The records clearly
show that Smart Communication: (a) duly notified complainant of the acts for which he
may be subjected to disciplinary action, (b) gave her the opportunity to be heard, and (c)
Notice to Explain. He was given five (5) days to explain why he should not be
terminated for violating company policy. This constitutes the first notice required
by law, which sets forth the particular acts or omissions for which complainant
may be terminated.25
side.27
25
26
27
28
20. The remedy of reinstatement and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is
based on the premise that an employee’s dismissal was illegal. Likewise, an award for the
payment of backwages presupposes that an employee has been illegally dismissed due to
the unlawful act of the employer or the latter’s bad faith.29 However, as previously
discussed, Smart Communication’s dismissed complainant for just cause and after
21. Moreover, complainant did not pray for reinstatement in her complaint.
2010 that she is no longer interested to be reinstated to her former position. Therefore, he
24. Since complainant is not entitled to moral damages, he should likewise not
be entitled to exemplary damages. The Supreme Court in Cocoland Development Corp.
v. NLRC32 and Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes33 stressed that
exemplary damages may not be recovered where the party involved is not entitled to
moral or compensatory damages.
29
30
31
32
33
25. As to complainant’s claim for attorney’s fees, such claim is equally not
justified. In termination cases, attorney’s fees are not recoverable where there is no
sufficient showing, and there is none here, of bad faith on the part of the employer.34 The
Supreme Court held thus:
As there was no bad faith on the part of Smart Communication, there is no basis
26. All told, the complaint for illegal dismissal should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Reply be noted and the case be
By:
PAUL REYES
IBP OR No. 793849 1/16/2010 – Pasay City
PTR OR No. 120349 1/16/2010 – Pasay City
Roll No. 5000
MCLE Compliance No. 19038349
Copy Furnished:
34
35
Atty. Mano Teres
Counsel for Respondent
Mayo Stock Exchange Centre
Ayala Center, Makati City
Moises Adama
Complainant
527 J.P. Rizal, Makati City
Explanation
Due to distance, personal service is not practicable; thus, this Position Paper is
filed by registered mail and courier and is and served on complainant’s counsel by
registered mail.
PAUL REYES
Moises Adama,
Complainant,
- versus - NLRC RAB Case No. X-01-008-10-D
SMARTY COMMUNICATION.
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
REJOINDER
2”) and Fe Uy 3 (“Fe 3”), by counsel, respectfully ask for leave to submit
claim in his Complaint dated 27 May 2010 that he was a victim of illegal
reveal that he will allege and argue anything just to bolster her frivolous
should be dismissed.
1.1. A graduate of the Arellano University, complainant could not have been
regard, it is also obvious that complainant was seeking legal advice as early as 7
May 2010 (when he sent her written explanation / demand letter and asked to be
compensated “for the serious anxiety, sleepless nights, and embarrassment” that
assume that complainant did not understand the import of alleging in her
1.2. It should also be noted that complainant even reiterated in his Amended
Complaint dated 19 July 2010 that he was a victim of “actual dismissal” on “May
5, 2010”. By the time she filed an Amended Complaint, it cannot be disputed that
that he was merely influenced by the NLRC clerk to allege that he was dismissed
on 5 May 2010.
positions (i.e., “actual dismissal” on 5 May 2010 as stated in her original and
dismissal by virtue of the events that transpired on June 22, 2010” as stated in his
Position Paper) after respondents have demonstrated that he was not dismissed on
5 May 2010 and was even reporting for work and performing his duties as
her own admission that he was merely under preventive suspension on 5 May
allegations and raise arguments that are not consistent with his Complaint dated
27 May 2010 and Amended Complaint dated 19 July 2010. Indeed, Rule V,
b) The position papers of the parties shall cover only those claims
and causes of action raised in the complaint or amended
complaint, excluding those that may have been amicably settled,
and accompanied by all supporting documents, including the
affidavits of witnesses, which shall take the place of their direct
testimony. x x x x
effective 5 May 2010 was simply based on the following: (a) respondents dared to
question his Sick Leave Applications for 19, 29 and 30 April 2010; (b) he was given a
show cause notice asking him to explain why he should not be held liable for dishonesty
and fraud in connection with his Sick Leave applications; and, (c) he was “illegally
of his managers is further shown by him claim that “there is no basis for the assertion of
not call him regarding her sick leave request” on 19 April 2010. Complainant states that
notification for sick leaves may be made “by phone, email, or text.” [Complainant’s
Reply, p. 2] Complainant apparently believes that he can just disregard Lorna 2’s specific
instructions that “an employee who is taking an unscheduled leave should call to properly
explain the reason for the absence and properly turn over any pending work”. While
seemingly trivial, this issue explains why this case came about. Complainant arrogantly
by twisting facts in his favor (e.g., he can notify her manager about her absences in
whatever manner that he wanted, respondents should not have dared question her sick
that medical tests do not qualify as Sick Leaves. In this regard, complainant presents the
Affidavit of former Quality Analyst While Gina Su, who states that “[t]he problem
arising from this situation was clearly the result of an omission on the part of the
company”, since “as far as [Gina Su’s] knows, it has been communicated to us from the
start that sick leaves can be used for medical tests or any other scheduled medical
appointments. If this policy has been changed, the change has not been formally
asked for a copy of the revised company guidelines, Alma 1’s surprised response was
‘Ay, di pa ba kayo nabibigyan?’ (Oh, you haven’t been given a copy yet?).”
that employees were supposed to be given hard copies of the leave policy. Gina
Su simply twisted Buena’s statement, which was not even addressed to Gina Su
employees that “sick leaves can be used for medical tests or any other scheduled
always been the same – it should be unplanned; medical tests do not qualify as
Sick Leaves (since the tests can be scheduled on a non-working day) and should
be filed as Emergency Leaves except when the employee is also ill and cannot
leave policy by simply clicking on the appropriate link on their computer screen.
Sick Leaves.
Attached as Annex “@” is a screenshot of the MyHR site where the employees
applications. Indeed, complainant has not disputed that his Sick Leave applications
followed her pattern of taking Sick Leaves on Mondays or Fridays - complainant’s Sick
Leave on April 19 occurred on a Friday, while her Sick Leaves on April 29 and 30
occurred immediately prior to a long weekend since May 3 (Monday) was a public
holiday. Complainant also has not disputed that he applied for Sick Leaves on the
following dates:
Complainant simply insists that he is “entitled to these sick leaves and he has
that: (a) a Sick Leave application must be supported by “medical or other certificates, as
requested and defined by the Company”; (b) Smarty Communication shall have the right
reserves the right to withhold or impose conditions on the provisions of sick pay, where
Vacation and Sick Leaves in addition to those required by law (i.e., Service Incentive
Leaves of 5 days only), Smarty Communication has the prerogative to impose certain
19 and 20. [Complainant’s Reply, p. 5] However, this does not detract from the fact that
he did not take additional tests or consulted an medical Internist even if his illness was
supposedly serious enough that he had to be absent again on April 29 and 30. It cannot
be overemphasized that his , Dr. Ruel Reyes (“Dr. Ruel”), was holding clinic just beside
Smarty Communication’s office. Even if he was residing in Quezon City, he could have
passed by Dr. Ruel’s clinic when he went to Smarty Communication’s office several
times just to sign and take photos of the security logbook. Instead, he insisted on
compelling Smarty Communication to grant him Sick Leave applications on the basis of
the medical certificates that he previously submitted (even if these medical certificates
did not state that he needed to rest or to take the entire day off). He sought consultation
at Intellicare only when he was required several times by respondents and no longer had
any excuse not to do so. Indeed, complainant’s attempt to prolong his preventive
support his Sick Leave applications is evident from the fact that he did not submit
documents regarding the tests on April 19 and 20, as well as his consultation on May 18
at Mkati Medical Center. Complainant attached these documents only in his Reply.
36
management prerogative to strictly apply its Sick Leave policy cannot amount to illegal
dismissal.
simply issued a show cause notice and asked his to present his side. To be sure, Smarty
and ensure that its policies are complied with. [San Miguel Brewery Sales v. Ople, G.R.
No. 53515, 8 February 1989; San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission (“NLRC”), G.R. No. 87277, 12 May 1989] Indeed, complainant herself
admits that the he was merely asked to “submit her written explanation” and to clear
[Complainant’s Position Paper, p. 6] The issuance of the show cause notice on 5 May
Preventive Suspension
disciplinary investigation. [Book V, Rule XXIII, Section 8 of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code; Soriano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75510, 27 October 1987; Philippine Airlines,
Inc. v. NLRC, et al , G.R. No. 114307, 8 July 1998; Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, et al., v.
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 120030, 17 June 1997] Complainant asserts that: (a) he “had been
unjustly charged” and “punished” [Complainant’s Position Paper, p. 12]; (b) preventive
suspension “does not mean that due process may be disregarded”; and, (c) he was not
precautionary measure, not a penalty. There is also no requirement to comply with the
even decided to pay complainant during the period of her preventive suspension. It was
complainant herself who prolonged his preventive suspension by not submitting the
preventive suspension. In this regard, complainant presents his payslips for May and
June 2010 and notes that his salaries during the period that he was on preventive
complainant who is clearly trying to deceive this Honorable Office. At no time did
respondents claim that complainant actually received his salaries during his preventive
suspension. Respondents have consistently stated that complainant knew that he would
be paid during her preventive suspension, but he herself prevented the actual payment of
her salaries for the said period by not completing Smarty Communication’s MyHR
process before the payroll period cut-off date or filling up Smarty Communication’s Post
cannot claim that his continued employment had become so unbearable, impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as he even reported for work after 5 May 2010, and until his
resignation on 22 June 2010. The payslips provided by complainant also show that aside
from the period when he was on preventive suspension (which was not paid at that time
because complainant failed to process the documents for payment), complainant was
accorded all the rights and benefits of an employee by respondents. This fact alone
should completely negate constructive dismissal. In this regard, the Supreme Court has
ruled that before the burden of proving the validity of dismissal is shifted to the
employer, the employee must first prove by “clear, positive and convincing evidence”
that he or she has been dismissed. [Portuguez v. GSIS Family Bank, G.R. No. 169570, 2
March 2007] In this case, it is obvious that complainant cannot present “clear, positive
14. From the time she was directed to report for work until her resignation on
Editor. Complainant tries to put respondents in a bad light in connection with the denial
of her applications for Vacation Leaves for 21 to 23 June 2010. [Complainant’s Reply, p.
8] To be sure, the employer’s prerogative to regulate leaves, including the “time, place
and manner of work”, has been recognized by the Supreme Court. [San Miguel Brewery
Sales v. Ople, G.R. No. 53515, 8 February 1989] Big Bad Wolf’s exercise of its
Leave for 21 June 2010. On 7 June 2010, complainant also applied for Vacation
connection with her tardiness on 23 April, 4 May and 5 May 2010. Thus, in an e-
mail dated 16 June 2010 (6:12 pm), Bal Celno Inc. Director Alma 1 explained:
“ Miss Joela,
Unfortunately, with the recent corrective action due to your
attendance, we are still unable to approve your VL request.
I am a bit confused as to how you state below that you
don't agree with the corrective action. Given your
attendance is clearly tracked with your own proximity
card, it's a bit of a stretch for you to state you do not agree
with it.
Lorna 1”
allowed to report late to work the next day, and informed respondents for the first
time that he will be attending a hearing on 23 June (at 10 am) of the labor case
respondents did not whimsically deny complainant’s request. At that time, Bal
Celno Inc.’s officers still had not seen the summons for the labor case. Hence,
complainant was informed that she would be considered tardy until she is able to
show (e.g., present a copy of the summons) “that it was the courts that ordered
2010.
resignation is defined as the act of an employee who “finds himself in a situation where
he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the
service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment.”
[Habana v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121486, 16 November 1998; Philippine Wireless, Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 112963, 20 July 1999] Complainant herself drafted his resignation e-
complainant was seeking legal advice as early as 7 May 2010 (when he sent her written
explanation / demand letter and asked to be compensated “for the serious anxiety,
sleepless nights, and embarrassment” that Wolf 2 supposedly caused her), and when he
filed her illegal dismissal complaint on 27 May 2010. It would therefore be absurd to
assume that complainant did not understand the import of his words and the
consequences of her acts. [Dizon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69018, 29 January 1990]
17. Even assuming for the sake of argument that complainant’s tale of
respondents did not threaten to terminate her employment or ask him to resign.
Apparently realizing that her claim of being subjected to “actual dismissal” on 5 May
2010 clearly had no merit because she continued to be employed, complainant baited and
provoked her managers into dismissing him. Unable to do so, complainant herself
September 1989, the Supreme Court noted that the employer’s lack of intention to
dismiss the employee indicates that the employee was not forced to resign:
“While it may be true that his boss Mr. Magtibay appeared to be
hostile towards her, he did not show by his acts any desire to fire
her from employment.”
17.2. In Dizon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69018, 29 January 1990, the Supreme
Court ruled:
claim that complainant voluntarily resigned is belied by the fact that complainant
the Concrete Aggregates, Dizon and Habana cases above clearly show that an
employee’s voluntary resignation may still be given effect even if he or she subsequently
NLRC, G.R. No. 82458, 7 September 1989; Dizon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69018, 29 January
[St. Michael Academy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119512, 13 July 1998] Complainant failed to
complainant presents the Affidavits of former Quality Analyst Benedict Su, Financial
Manager Tina Sy 4. [Complainant’s Reply, Annexes “A”, “H”, “I”, “J”, “K”, “L” and
“N”] These Affidavits only show that complainant was able to convince some persons to
try to help in her illegal dismissal complaint. However. none of the said persons even
said something about the main issue in this case (i.e., whether or not complainant was
dismissed on 5 May 2010) or made any statement within their personal knowledge
GINA SU
issues and actuations regarding work assignments were based on her (Lorna 2’s)
20.2. Gina Su also cannot rebut the statements of Quality Analyst Lorna 2, who
was seated just across complainant and was a close friend of complainant’s.37 Gina
Su was not present during the conversations with complainant that Gina Su 2
MyHR site where the employees can access Smarty Communication’s leave
policy; and, (c) the screenshot of the e-mail regarding Smarty Communication’s
having been given the “opportunity to work at with the United Nations
Development Program.” Respondents cannot help but note Gina Su’s duplicity.
Gina Su made false allegations against Smarty Communication just a few days
after: (a) Smarty Communication graciously acceded to his request for the
shortening of his notice period from the required 30 days to 15 days; (b) he
informed Lorna 2 that “it has been a pleasure working with [Lorna 2] the past year
and with the company for the past three and a half years”; and, (c) wished Lorna 2
and his team “the very best” and looked forward to another opportunity to work at
20.5. In any case, it should be emphasized that Gina Su did not even have
her supposed forced resignation on 22 June 2010. In other words, Gina Su’s
Alma 1
20.6. Alama 1’s statements regarding Lorna 2 holds no water, as he was not
because Team Leader Fe Uy 3 “has been successful in twisting their words and
giving the management whatever reason to fire them”. Contrary to Alam 1’s
allegation, Nida 5 and Mona 6 voluntarily resigned. On the other hand, Olla 7
was validly dismissed in 2009 for abandonment, as she failed to report to work
Attached as Annexes “@” and “@” are copies of the resignation letters of
Gina Uy and Geraldine Uy. Attached as Annexes “@” and “@” are the show
20.8. It also appears that Alma 1 wants to get back at respondent Lau’2 for not
pushing hard enough for his promotion as Financial Data Translation Team
Leader after Fe 3 left the said position some time in March 2010. Fe3 supported
Alama 1’s efforts to get the position, but a more qualified employee was chosen.
Attached as Annex “@” is a copy of Lau’s e-mail dated 3 March 2010, where she
20.9. It should be also be noted that Alma 1 does not say anything about
what transpired on 22 June 2010 does not show that complainant was forced to
resign, and cannot negate the statements of the persons (i.e., complainant’s
witnessed what really happened and have come forward to attest that complainant
dishonest statements. In March 2010, Ryan Sy 3 was given a written warning and
and, (b) for fraudulently making it appear that he performed substantial research
of Internet website logs) showed that the items that he claimed to have performed
Attached as Annexes “@” and “@” are the Corrective Action Forms dated
1 and 5 March 2010. Ryan Sy 3 acknowledged the validity of the findings in the
Corrective Action forms by checking the portion stating “I agree with Employer’s
20.11. In any case, some of Ryan Sy 3’s statements regarding the team
notes that 2, just right after complainant left, said that: (a) Smarty
who bullied management; (b) Lorna 2 and Alma 1 wanted to talk to complainant,
but the latter kept communication lines closed; (c) Bal Celno Inc “did not fire”
over the Affidavits presented by respondents, as the latter were executed by persons (i.e.,
complainant’s managers, teammates, a former professor and a former close friend) who
had personal knowledge of the relevant facts in this case and who have come forward to
rebut complainant’s fabrications. These persons, who were present during the meeting in
Alma 1’s office and/or immediately before complainant walked out of her cubicle and
left the office on 22 June 2010, all belied complainant’s allegations of being “repeatedly
questioned, insulted and berated”, “grabbed [by the] hand” and “dragged...out of the
22. Based on all the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was not illegally
dismissed.
76721, 21 September 1987; Reyes v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 48705, 9 February
24. Even assuming arguendo that complainant did not intend to resign, she is
not entitled to backwages, as she herself has refused to work. It would be unfair and
wage for a fair day’s labor” is a basic rule that governs the relations between employers
and employees and remains so in the matter of paying employees’ wages. If there is no
work performed by the employee, there can be no wage or pay unless the employee was
able, willing and ready to work but was prevented by management or was illegally locked
out, suspended or dismissed. [SSS v. SSS Supervisor’s Union – CUGCO, G.R. No. L-
31832, 23 October 1981; Philippine Airlines v. NLRC, G.R. No. 55159, 22 June 1989]
Respondents could not be expected to continue to pay complainant’s salaries after she
her and Smarty Communication. Considering the baseless and malicious accusations that
38
he has hurled against respondents (e.g., being forced to resign, “repeatedly questioned,
insulted and berated”, “grabbed [by the] hand” and “dragged...out of the company’s
atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated, which may adversely affect
Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 701 (1992); Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.
than willing to pay the same after he completes Smarty Communication’s clearance
the only person preventing the payment of her last salary/final pay (amounting to PhP
28. In any case, complainant is not entitled to moral damages. Under Article
2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded in actions arising from breach of
contract only where the defendant or respondent acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
[Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 435 (1987)] Bad faith or fraud,
however, is never presumed. These must be proved clearly and convincingly. [Suario v.
Bank of the Philippines Islands, 176 SCRA 688 (1989); Fernando v. Sto. Tomas, 234
SCRA 546(1994)] In this case, it is clear that respondents did not commit bad faith or
fraud.
39
Attached as Annex “22” of respondents’ Position Paper are the clearance forms that complainant needs to
submit. Attached as Annex “23” is a computation of complainant’s last salary/final pay.
29. There being no legal or factual basis for moral damages, complainant is
likewise not entitled to exemplary damages. [Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp.
v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713 (1985); Cocoland Development Corp. v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 51
(1996)] Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. [Article 2233, Civil
Code] In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the
[Article 2232, Civil Code] In this case, there is no proof of such conduct on the part of Bal
Celno Inc.
30. Neither are attorney’s fees justified. In termination cases, attorney’s fees
are not recoverable where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of the
employer. [Tumbiga v. NLRC, 274 SCRA 338 (1997); Lopez vs. NLRC, et al. 297 SCRA
508 (1998)] As there was no bad faith on the part of Bal Celno Inc., there is no basis for
awarding attorney’s fees to complainant. In fact, it was complainant who compelled Bal
Celno Inc. to litigate despite her voluntary resignation. It is complainant, and not Bal
Celno Inc., who should be liable to pay the latter attorney’s fees in an amount no less
complainant has failed to establish any basis for making individual respondents Alama 1,
Lorna 2 and Si personally liable for complainant’s claims. Individual respondents did not
act with malice or bad faith. Indeed, the severance of complainant’s employment with
[Construction Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 230 (1992); Businessday
to file other pleadings and to adduce additional evidence, documentary and testimonial,
and/or controvert complainant’s allegations and evidence, insofar as they may be material
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit
and complainant be ordered to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of Three Hundred
By:
PAUL REYES
IBP OR No. 793849 1/16/2010 – Makati City
PTR OR No. 120349 1/16/2010 – Makati City
Roll No. 5000
MCLE Compliance No. 19038349
Copy Furnished:
Moises Adama
Complainant
527 J.P. Rizal, Makati City
VERIFICATION
I, Oneil Sy 1, of legal age and with office address at 786 Pasay Road, Makati City,
after having been sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that:
3. All the allegations therein are true and correct based on my own knowledge
or authentic records.
Oneil Sy 1
NOTARY PUBLIC
DIETHER OCAMPO,
Complainant,
- versus - NLRC SRAB Case No. LAR 7-9022
ABS-CBN SEVEN,
Respondent,
CORINA KANINA,
Respondent.
REPLY
To Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
2. In the recent case of Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson (G.R. No. 156966,
May 7, 2004), the Supreme Court upheld the stipulation providing for an
exclusive venue of any litigation even if it was embodied in a contract of
adhesion. The Court held the agreement on the exclusive venue would be valid
and binding provided that the stipulation is exclusive in nature or in intent, that it
is expressed in writing by the parties thereto, and that it is entered into before the
filing of the suit.
Xxx
6. It has been repeatedly ruled that contracts of adhesion are “as binding as
ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to
reject it entirely.” (South Pachem Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 126260, December 16, 2004; Equitable Banking Corporation v. Jose Calderon,
G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004; Provident Insurance Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118030, January 15, 2004; Philippine Commercial International
Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97785, March 29, 1996; Serra v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 103338, January 4, 1994)
7. Clause No. 5 providing for the exclusive venue of the case is not against public
policy. This case should be differentiated from the case of Sweet Lines. Complainant
had full knowledge of the terms and conditions of the contract of employment. He could
have rejected the contract in its entirety should he have disagreed with Clause No. 5
providing for the exclusive venue in the courts of Metro Manila.
8. Unlike the case of Sweet Lines, Clause No. 5 is clearly written in print and can
be readily seen in the front page of the employment contract. It was not written in fine
print nor was it concealed at the back page of the contract. Since the stipulation is very
apparent in the employment contract, complainant could not have been unaware of this
provision.
9. The Rules of Procedure providing for the venue of cases involving Overseas
Filipino Workers provide that the complainant may file it where he resides or where the
principal office of the employer is situated. Nevertheless, there exists a contractual
agreement providing for the exclusive venue in the courts of Metro Manila and such
agreement is restrictive and mandatory. The latter is the law between the parties and
should be given precedence over the Rules of Procedure, which should be applied only
when there is no contractual agreement providing for an exclusive venue.
10. Time and again, the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of a stipulation
limiting the venue upon a showing that such a stipulation is exclusive in nature. A
written agreement of the parties as to venue before the filing of an action is not only
binding on the parties but also enforceable by the courts. (Gesmundo v. JRB Realty
Corporation, 234 SCRA 153; Bautista v. De Borja, 18 SCRA 474 [1966]; Arquero v.
Flojo, 168 SCRA 540 [1988]).
11. Since the Employment Contract clearly provides that the exclusive and
mandatory venue for cases arising from the employment contract are the courts of Metro
Manila, complainant violated the aforesaid agreement by filing the case in Iloilo. Thus,
venue was improperly laid.
12. It is further submitted that this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of this case.
13. Under Article 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiters have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
15. When complainant filed his complaint for illegal dismissal; payment of wages
for the remaining portion of the contract; separation pay; reimbursement, actual, moral
and exemplary damages; overtime, vacation and sick leave pay; and attorney’s fees, on
February 5,2005, he had already severed the employer-employee relationship a year
before. On May 25, 2004, complainant Gachon requested a discharge at the port of
Isabel, Leyte to attend to some problems. He had resigned from the company. Upon
approval by the respondent Company, the employer-employee relationship was
effectually dissolved.
16. The request for discharge filed by the complainant served as a written notice of
his resignation from the Company. It is a voluntary act, initiated by the employee, which
terminated the employment. This being the case, there is no basis to invoke the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
Plainly, the complainant may not invoke Section 217 (1), (3) and (5) because the
case does not involve unfair labor practice, violations of Article 264 of the Labor
Code nor is it accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.
Complainant cannot claim that the case falls under Section 217 (2) because in a
termination dispute, the employee questions the legality of the dismissal. In this
case, there was no dismissal to question because the resignation of the
complainant was voluntary and was impelled by himself and for his reasons
alone. The company never dismissed the services of the complainant.
Unquestionably, it was the complainant who put a halt to the employment
contract.
Moreover, because of his resignation and the resulting severance of the
employer-employee relationship, complainant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter under Section 217 (4) or (6). These two instances presuppose an
employer-employee relationship and such has been absent, by sole impetus of
the complainant, since May 25, 2004.
PRAYER
PAUL REYES
IBP OR No. 793849 1/16/2010 – MAKATI City
PTR OR No. 120349 1/16/2010 – MAKATI City
Roll No. 50000
MCLE Compliance No. 19038349
Copy Furnished:
GREG SIGUA
Counsel for Respondent
897 Malate St, Makati City
EXPLANATION
Due to distance, the undersigned was constrained to file and serve the foregoing
Reply to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss by registered mail.
PAUL REYES