“The hypothesis which we embrace is plain.

It maintains that morality is determined by

sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator
the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.” (HUME, Enquiry) Explain
and critically discuss.

What determines morality and motivates us into moral action? Often people
intuitively will tell you that such-and-such is wrong, in the moral sense; but how is it that
they can come to know this? This essay will establish why Hume believes that morality is
not dependent on reason and rationality, but instead it is contingent to sentiment and the
passions, which leads each individual to moral obligation from their feeling of sympathy
for other human beings. I will then examine the two possible implications of morality
being determined by the individual’s sentiments: that either morals are subjective and
mutable with each individual, and as such each individual will experience different
sentiments to the same moral action; or that there are objective moral claims and each
individual’s moral faculty is innately aware of them. I will then go on to discuss the idea
of an “ideal spectator” who serves to provide objectivity when determining morality
through sentiment.

Hume argues that since moral decisions affect actions whereas decisions of reason do not,
morality must therefore not be based on reason. He uses the example of murder, where if
we examine the act of murder we discover no idea of the quality of “immorality” (vice)
but instead only the strong feeling of dislike we have for the idea of murder. Morality is
not a “matter-of-fact” derived from experience, but rather it resides in what Hume calls
the passions (the opposite of Reason). Hume draws this conclusion by pointing out that
although we may not like murder, there is nothing actually illogical or contradictory
about it; and therefore the immorality of actions is not contingent to the irrationality of
them. Instead, Hume suggests, murder should be considered immoral because it cannot
be universally justified as beneficial or good to everyone. That is, not everyone would
give assent to turning murder into a universally approved action, because they would be
condemning themselves to the possibility of being victims. With this example in mind,
Hume concludes that immorality isn’t immoral because it violates reason, but rather

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because it is displeasing to us. He draws upon another example, in which a man would
rather destroy the world than harm his own fingers. Hume suggests that this action would
be immoral not because of the irrationality of global destruction simply to save five
fingers on one human being, but instead, because not even the man in question would
give universal assent and allow anyone else to commit this action.

Hume ascribes morality to the passions because it seems to be the only viable
alternative to reason, which he had already argued does not motivate action (and morality
requires motivating action). He also realized after examining his own ideas on murder
that he could isolate his own feelings about the subject but not the clear and distinct ideas
he had about it. Ideas and impressions, he explains, differ in so much that impressions are
formulated from the senses (sound, sight, taste, touch, smell) and emotions, whereas
ideas are formulated from thoughts and beliefs. Hume believes that we have a moral
sense (a feeling of pleasure or pain accordingly connected to virtue and vice) which tells
us when something is moral or immoral. These feelings of pleasure and pain are
impressions, not ideas, and they give rise to the passions and then motivate action. Moral
impressions are only caused by human actions (as they are formulated through our
perceptive faculties and emotions, and as such are reactionary), and should only be
considered from a social point of view. This is because our actions can only really be
considered moral or immoral with regards to how they affect other people. This idea
leads Hume to argue that sympathy, our feeling of pathos for fellow human beings, is the
foundation for moral obligation. Our actions are then caused by a combination of utility
and sentiment. Hume does point out that moral sentiments must be useful to ourselves
and others, or be pleasing to ourselves and others. He emphasizes that morality is not
strictly voluntary, but rather that it is made up of both voluntary and involuntary virtues.

Is Hume right in suggesting that morality is determined by our sentiments? Does

it seem plausible that simply feeling an unpleasant sentiment towards murder is what tells
us that murder is immoral? If Hume is correct, then there are two possible implications:
either these sentiments are subjective and unique to each individual, meaning that each
individual has a different pleasing or displeasing reaction to whatever action is in

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question; or that we must assume that there are universally objective moral claims that
every human being has a fundamental knowledge of. Let us consider the former first: the
idea that morality is indeed dependent on each individual’s personal sentiments. This
would in fact lead to morality being redundant, as there would be no set morals that all
humans could agree to. That is, if morality is subjective, then Hume’s statement that
“morality is determined by sentiment” thus implies that morality is mutable with each
individual who is faced with the situations which they are making a moral judgment on. I,
for example, could witness a man murdering another man, and think it immoral. The
person standing beside me who is a friend of the murderer and knows the reasons for his
actions might disagree and argue that he is morally justified in his murder because the
other man tried to kill him first. Both of us would have differing sentiments (I
displeasing, and the other bystander pleasing) about the murder, leading us to draw
different conclusions about the morality of the murder. But intuitively this seems wrong.
Hume’s means of determining virtue and vice seems to assume a universality of how
people evaluate a given situation. This is clearly not the case: every individual has their
own reactions based on their upbringing and circumstance. One person may be pro
abortion, another against, and both absolutely convinced of their correctness, and both
experiencing the internal validation Hume refers to (pleasing sentiment). The same can
be said of more general social practices that differ across cultural lines. To define virtue
or vice by the approval or disapproval of a spectator is ludicrous. If morality exists- and
let us assume it does for the sake of this argument- then surely it must have an objective,
certain definition. What makes a rose a rose is what it smells like, and not how sweet the
smeller thinks it is. Similarly, what makes something moral or immoral is not who is
judging it, but the thing itself. This is the difference between morality and judgment, or
justification. An immoral act, such as killing, can have many reasons, and some may be
judged by society as justifiable cause. However, the act of taking a life is still an immoral
one. Hume replies to this objection by pointing out that there are two different types of
virtues: artificial virtues that are dependent on social structure, and as such vary from
society to society (such as justice, fidelity, promises, duties, etc) and natural virtues that
are universal (such as ambition, compassion and generosity). By splitting virtues into
these two categories Hume can then counter argue that whilst some virtues are subjective

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and based around society, others are in fact objective and universal to each rational
human being.

But are there objective moral values? Having considered the possibility of our
moral sense (our “sentiments”) being subjective, now we turn to the possibility of it being
a universal and intrinsic to every rational human being. The mere fact that our society
creates its own moral code relative to our ideals, and that this code differs from society to
society implies that there are no objective moral claims. Some cultures don’t share the
same virtues which Hume calls “natural”. For instance, would a lack of compassion
constitute immorality? It may create a feeling of disapproval from some individuals, but
does that necessarily mean that the action is immoral? Furthermore, are all actions that
create a displeasing sentiment suddenly immoral? If we imagine that there is a patient
that is suffering and in severe pain, who will die in two days time, but a doctor shows
compassion and, at the patient’s request, ends their life early: if I experience a displeasing
sentiment because such is the nature of death that it brings about displeasing impressions,
does that render the doctor’s actions immoral? People seem to disagree about moral
claims because there is no fact of the matter (as opposed to disagreements about non-
moral claims where the correct information, or fact of the matter, can be sought and
verified). Moral claims are reflective of different ways of life rather than expressive
perceptions of objective values; therefore there cannot be any objective moral values. It
seems absurd to rely on our sentiments towards things as a perceptive moral faculty. We
have no way of proving it does indeed exist as an objective and innate moral guide, and
isn’t merely a reactionary faculty that is heavily influenced by our own personal interests
and sympathies.

In response to the objection that our “sentiments” can be misguided or swayed by

different circumstances, Hume relates the sentiments directly to a “spectator” In his
conceptual analysis of “virtue” and “vice”. It is widely believed that Hume was in
agreement with Adam Smith’s idea of the “ideal observer”. Hume refers to a spectator
who must fulfill a set of conditions, making him “ideal” as a judge of morality in
situations. For Hume’s spectator to be able to make moral judgments based on his

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sentiment, “all the circumstances and relations must be previously known”1 (that is, he
must have full knowledge and awareness of anything that is relevant to the case being
evaluated). He must also adopt “steady and general points of view”2, meaning he must
overlook the private interests and relations of the people and remain completely
impartial. In order to adopt a “steady and general” point of view, the spectator must take
into account facts about human nature, overlook his own personal relations to the parties
involved in the case he is evaluating, and finally, overlook his own personal interests.
Essentially, this spectator makes it possible for morality to be determined by sentiment
whilst maintaining that there are objective moral claims. If each individual who is
attempting to determine whether a situation is moral or immoral assumes the role of the
ideal spectator, then he should be able to view the situation impartially and objectively.
This solves the problem of subjectivity that exists because each individual has differing
sentiments towards an action: it forces the individual to imagine himself in a situation of
complete impartiality, helping him to see what the correct moral action in that scenario
would be.

To conclude, if morality is in fact determined by sentiment, then there are two

possible implications. Either morality is completely subjective, as each individual has
different sentiments and feelings towards moral actions based on factors such as social
upbringing, personal history, etc; or morality is completely objective, meaning that
everyone has the same innate ideas about what is right and wrong, and our sentiment is
the metronome which reminds us of them. If the former is true, one of the main
implications that follows is that there are no strict morals, making one person’s moral
action another person’s immoral one (and vice versa). If the latter is true then the
implications that follow is that everyone must have a sort of “6th sense” lodged in our
sentiments that tells us the right and wrongness of actions. The idea of the “ideal
spectator” bridges the gap between moral claims being subjective or objective whilst
being determined by sentiment. It allows each individual to view a situation impartially
and objectively in order to determine the correct course of action, by examining whether

1
Hume (1751) Appx. 1.11
2
Hume (1739-40) 3.3.1.15

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they would experience a pleasing or displeasing sentiment whilst following the
requirements of the spectator. This solves the problems surrounding the possibility of
moral sentiments being completely subjective: all individuals will experience either a
pleasing or displeasing sentiment towards actions, but it is only when they remove their
partiality and examine the situation through the eyes of the “ideal spectator” that they can
experience the sympathy for fellow man that leads to moral judgments.

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 Works Cited
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hackett Pub Co Inc. 1993
Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. 2003