Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
No.
137873
April
20,
2001
WHEREFORE,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
ordering
defendant
to
pay
plaintiff,
D.
M.
CONSUNJI,
INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
MARIA
J.
JUEGO,
as
follows:
respondents.
KAPUNAN,
J.:
1.
P50,000.00
for
the
death
of
Jose
A.
Juego.
At
around
1:30
p.m.,
November
2,
1990,
Jose
Juego,
a
construction
worker
of
D.
2.
P10,000.00
as
actual
and
compensatory
damages.
M.
Consunji,
Inc.,
fell
14
floors
from
the
Renaissance
Tower,
Pasig
City
to
his
3.
P464,000.00
for
the
loss
of
Jose
A.
Juego’s
earning
capacity.
death.
4.
P100,000.00
as
moral
damages.
5.
P20,000.00
as
attorney’s
fees,
plus
the
costs
of
suit.
2
PO3
Rogelio
Villanueva
of
the
Eastern
Police
District
investigated
the
tragedy
and
SO
ORDERED.
filed
a
report
dated
November
25,
1990,
stating
that:
On
appeal
by
D.
M.
Consunji,
the
Court
of
Appeals
(CA)
affirmed
the
decision
of
x
x
x.
[The]
[v]ictim
was
rushed
to
[the]
Rizal
Medical
Center
in
Pasig,
Metro
the
RTC
in
toto.
Manila
where
he
was
pronounced
dead
on
arrival
(DOA)
by
the
attending
physician,
Dr.
Errol
de
Yzo[,]
at
around
2:15
p.m.
of
the
same
date.
D.
M.
Consunji
now
seeks
the
reversal
of
the
CA
decision
on
the
following
grounds:
Investigation
disclosed
that
at
the
given
time,
date
and
place,
while
victim
Jose
A.
Juego
together
with
Jessie
Jaluag
and
Delso
Destajo
[were]
performing
their
work
• THE
APPELLATE
COURT
ERRED
IN
HOLDING
THAT
THE
POLICE
REPORT
th
as
carpenter[s]
at
the
elevator
core
of
the
14
floor
of
the
Tower
D,
Renaissance
WAS
ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE
OF
THE
ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE
OF
Tower
Building
on
board
a
[p]latform
made
of
channel
beam
(steel)
measuring
PETITIONER.
4.8
meters
by
2
meters
wide
with
pinulid
plywood
flooring
and
cable
wires
attached
to
its
four
corners
and
hooked
at
the
5
ton
chain
block,
when
suddenly,
• THE
APPELLATE
COURT
ERRED
IN
HOLDING
THAT
THE
DOCTRINE
OF
RES
the
bolt
or
pin
which
was
merely
inserted
to
connect
the
chain
block
with
the
IPSA
LOQUITOR
[sic]
IS
APPLICABLE
TO
PROVE
NEGLIGENCE
ON
THE
[p]latform,
got
loose
xxx
causing
the
whole
[p]latform
assembly
and
the
victim
to
PART
OF
PETITIONER.
fall
down
to
the
basement
of
the
elevator
core,
Tower
D
of
the
building
under
construction
thereby
crushing
the
victim
of
death,
save
his
two
(2)
companions
• THE
APPELLATE
COURT
ERRED
IN
HOLDING
THAT
PETITIONER
IS
who
luckily
jumped
out
for
safety.
PRESUMED
NEGLIGENT
UNDER
ARTICLE
2180
OF
THE
CIVIL
CODE,
AND
It
is
thus
manifest
that
Jose
A.
Juego
was
crushed
to
death
when
the
[p]latform
• THE
APPELLATE
COURT
ERRED
IN
HOLDING
THAT
RESPONDENT
IS
NOT
3
he
was
then
on
board
and
performing
work,
fell.
And
the
falling
of
the
[p]latform
PRECLUDED
FROM
RECOVERING
DAMAGES
UNDER
THE
CIVIL
CODE.
was
due
to
the
removal
or
getting
loose
of
the
pin
which
was
merely
inserted
to
the
connecting
points
of
the
chain
block
and
[p]latform
but
without
a
safety
Petitioner
maintains
that
the
police
report
reproduced
above
is
hearsay
and,
1
lock.
therefore,
inadmissible.
The
CA
ruled
otherwise.
It
held
that
said
report,
being
an
entry
in
official
records,
is
an
exception
to
the
hearsay
rule.
On
May
9,
1991,
Jose
Juego’s
widow,
Maria,
filed
in
the
Regional
Trial
Court
(RTC)
of
Pasig
a
complaint
for
damages
against
the
deceased’s
employer,
D.M.
The
Rules
of
Court
provide
that
a
witness
can
testify
only
to
those
facts
which
he
4
Consunji,
Inc.
The
employer
raised,
among
other
defenses,
the
widow’s
prior
knows
of
his
personal
knowledge,
that
is,
which
are
derived
from
his
perception.
availment
of
the
benefits
from
the
State
Insurance
Fund.
A
witness,
therefore,
may
not
testify
as
what
he
merely
learned
from
others
either
because
he
was
told
or
read
or
heard
the
same.
Such
testimony
is
After
trial,
the
RTC
rendered
a
decision
in
favor
of
the
widow
Maria
Juego.
The
considered
hearsay
and
may
not
be
received
as
proof
of
the
truth
of
what
he
has
5
dispositive
portion
of
the
RTC
decision
reads:
learned.
This
is
known
as
the
hearsay
rule.
Hearsay
is
not
limited
to
oral
testimony
or
statements;
the
general
rule
that
hearsay.
The
rest
of
the
report,
such
as
the
summary
of
the
statements
of
the
6
excludes
hearsay
as
evidence
applies
to
written,
as
well
as
oral
statements.
parties
based
on
their
sworn
statements
(which
were
annexed
to
the
Report)
as
well
as
the
latter,
having
been
included
in
the
first
purpose
of
the
offer
[as
part
The
theory
of
the
hearsay
rule
is
that
the
many
possible
deficiencies,
of
the
testimony
of
Major
Enriquez],
may
then
be
considered
as
independently
suppressions,
sources
of
error
and
untrustworthiness,
which
lie
underneath
the
relevant
statements
which
were
gathered
in
the
course
of
the
investigation
and
bare
untested
assertion
of
a
witness,
may
be
best
brought
to
light
and
exposed
may
thus
be
admitted
as
such,
but
not
necessarily
to
prove
the
truth
thereof.
It
7
by
the
test
of
cross-‐examiantion.
The
hearsay
rule,
therefore,
excludes
evidence
has
been
said
that:
8
that
cannot
be
tested
by
cross-‐examination.
"Where
regardless
of
the
truth
or
falsity
of
a
statement,
the
fact
that
it
has
been
9
The
Rules
of
Court
allow
several
exceptions
to
the
rule,
among
which
are
entries
made
is
relevant,
the
hearsay
rule
does
not
apply,
but
the
statement
may
be
in
official
records.
Section
44,
Rule
130
provides:
shown.
Evidence
as
to
the
making
of
such
statement
is
not
secondary
but
primary,
for
the
statement
itself
may
constitute
a
fact
in
issue,
or
be
Entries
in
official
records
made
in
the
performance
of
his
duty
made
in
the
circumstantially
relevant
as
to
the
existence
of
such
a
fact."
performance
of
his
duty
by
a
public
officer
of
the
Philippines,
or
by
a
person
in
the
performance
of
a
duty
specially
enjoined
by
law
are
prima
facie
evidence
of
When
Major
Enriquez
took
the
witness
stand,
testified
for
petitioners
on
his
the
facts
therein
stated.
Report
and
made
himself
available
for
cross-‐examination
by
the
adverse
party,
the
Report,
insofar
as
it
proved
that
certain
utterances
were
made
(but
not
their
10
In
Africa,
et
al.
vs.
Caltex
(Phil.),
Inc.,
et
al.,
this
Court,
citing
the
work
of
Chief
truth),
was
effectively
removed
from
the
ambit
of
the
aforementioned
Section
44
Justice
Moran,
enumerated
the
requisites
for
admissibility
under
the
above
rule:
of
Rule
130.
Properly
understood,
this
section
does
away
with
the
testimony
in
open
court
of
the
officer
who
made
the
official
record,
considers
the
matter
as
(a)
that
the
entry
was
made
by
a
public
officer
or
by
another
person
specially
an
exception
to
the
hearsay
rule
and
makes
the
entries
in
said
official
record
enjoined
by
law
to
do
so;
admissible
in
evidence
as
prima
facie
evidence
of
the
facts
therein
stated.
The
(b)
that
it
was
made
by
the
public
officer
in
the
performance
of
his
duties,
or
by
underlying
reasons
for
this
exceptionary
rule
are
necessity
and
trustworthiness,
such
other
person
in
the
performance
of
a
duty
specially
enjoined
by
law;
and
as
explained
in
Antillon
v.
Barcelon.
(c)
that
the
public
officer
or
other
person
had
sufficient
knowledge
of
the
facts
by
him
stated,
which
must
have
been
acquired
by
him
personally
or
through
official
The
litigation
is
unlimited
in
which
testimony
by
officials
is
daily
needed;
the
information.
occasions
in
which
the
officials
would
be
summoned
from
his
ordinary
duties
to
The
CA
held
that
the
police
report
meets
all
these
requisites.
Petitioner
contends
declare
as
a
witness
are
numberless.
The
public
officers
are
few
in
whose
daily
that
the
last
requisite
is
not
present.
work
something
is
not
done
in
which
testimony
is
not
needed
from
official
sources.
Were
there
no
exception
for
official
statements,
hosts
of
officials
would
The
Court
notes
that
PO3
Villanueva,
who
signed
the
report
in
question,
also
be
found
devoting
the
greater
part
of
their
time
to
attending
as
witnesses
in
11
testified
before
the
trial
court.
In
Rodriguez
vs.
Court
of
Appeals,
which
involved
court
or
delivering
deposition
before
an
officer.
The
work
of
administration
of
a
Fire
Investigation
Report,
the
officer
who
signed
the
fire
report
also
testified
government
and
the
interest
of
the
public
having
business
with
officials
would
before
the
trial
court.
This
Court
held
that
the
report
was
inadmissible
for
the
alike
suffer
in
consequence.
For
these
reasons,
and
for
many
others,
a
certain
purpose
of
proving
the
truth
of
the
statements
contained
in
the
report
but
verity
is
accorded
such
documents,
which
is
not
extended
to
private
documents.
admissible
insofar
as
it
constitutes
part
of
the
testimony
of
the
officer
who
(3
Wigmore
on
Evidence,
Sec.
1631).
executed
the
report.
The
law
reposes
a
particular
confidence
in
public
officers
that
it
presumes
they
x
x
x.
Since
Major
Enriquez
himself
took
the
witness
stand
and
was
available
for
will
discharge
their
several
trusts
with
accuracy
and
fidelity;
and,
therefore,
cross-‐examination,
the
portions
of
the
report
which
were
of
his
personal
whatever
acts
they
do
in
discharge
of
their
duty
may
be
given
in
evidence
and
knowledge
or
which
consisted
of
his
perceptions
and
conclusions
were
not
shall
be
taken
to
be
true
under
such
a
degree
of
caution
as
to
the
nature
and
circumstances
of
each
case
may
appear
to
require.
While
negligence
is
not
ordinarily
inferred
or
presumed,
and
while
the
mere
happening
of
an
accident
or
injury
will
not
generally
give
rise
to
an
inference
or
It
would
have
been
an
entirely
different
matter
if
Major
Enriquez
was
not
presumption
that
it
was
due
to
negligence
on
defendant’s
part,
under
the
presented
to
testify
on
his
report.
In
that
case
the
applicability
of
Section
44
of
doctrine
of
res
ipsa
loquitur,
which
means,
literally,
the
thing
or
transaction
Rule
143
would
have
been
ripe
for
determination,
and
this
Court
would
have
speaks
for
itself,
or
in
one
jurisdiction,
that
the
thing
or
instrumentality
speaks
agreed
with
the
Court
of
Appeals
that
said
report
was
inadmissible
since
the
for
itself,
the
facts
or
circumstances
accompanying
an
injury
may
be
such
as
to
aforementioned
third
requisite
was
not
satisfied.
The
statements
given
by
the
raise
a
presumption,
or
at
least
permit
an
inference
of
negligence
on
the
part
of
sources
of
information
of
Major
Enriquez
failed
to
qualify
as
"official
the
defendant,
or
some
other
person
who
is
charged
with
negligence.
information,"
there
being
no
showing
that,
at
the
very
least,
they
were
under
a
duty
to
give
the
statements
for
record.
x
x
x
where
it
is
shown
that
the
thing
or
instrumentality
which
caused
the
injury
complained
of
was
under
the
control
or
management
of
the
defendant,
and
that
Similarly,
the
police
report
in
this
case
is
inadmissible
for
the
purpose
of
proving
the
occurrence
resulting
in
the
injury
was
such
as
in
the
ordinary
course
of
things
the
truth
of
the
statements
contained
therein
but
is
admissible
insofar
as
it
would
not
happen
if
those
who
had
its
control
or
management
used
proper
care,
constitutes
part
of
the
testimony
of
PO3
Villanueva.
there
is
sufficient
evidence,
or,
as
sometimes
stated,
reasonable
evidence,
in
the
absence
of
explanation
by
the
defendant,
that
the
injury
arose
from
or
was
21
In
any
case,
the
Court
holds
that
portions
of
PO3
Villanueva’s
testimony
which
caused
by
the
defendant’s
want
of
care.
were
of
his
personal
knowledge
suffice
to
prove
that
Jose
Juego
indeed
died
as
a
result
of
the
elevator
crash.
PO3
Villanueva
had
seen
Juego’s
remains
at
the
One
of
the
theoretical
based
for
the
doctrine
is
its
necessity,
i.e.,
that
necessary
12 22
morgue,
making
the
latter’s
death
beyond
dispute.
PO3
Villanueva
also
evidence
is
absent
or
not
available.
conducted
an
ocular
inspection
of
the
premises
of
the
building
the
day
after
the
13 14
incident
and
saw
the
platform
for
himself.
He
observed
that
the
platform
was
The
res
ipsa
loquitur
doctrine
is
based
in
part
upon
the
theory
that
the
defendant
15 16
crushed
and
that
it
was
totally
damaged.
PO3
Villanueva
also
required
Garcia
in
charge
of
the
instrumentality
which
causes
the
injury
either
knows
the
cause
and
Fabro
to
bring
the
chain
block
to
the
police
headquarters.
Upon
inspection,
of
the
accident
or
has
the
best
opportunity
of
ascertaining
it
and
that
the
plaintiff
he
noticed
that
the
chain
was
detached
from
the
lifting
machine,
without
any
pin
has
no
such
knowledge,
and
therefore
is
compelled
to
allege
negligence
in
17
or
bolt.
general
terms
and
to
rely
upon
the
proof
of
the
happening
of
the
accident
in
order
to
establish
negligence.
The
inference
which
the
doctrine
permits
is
What
petitioner
takes
particular
exception
to
is
PO3
Villanueva’s
testimony
that
grounded
upon
the
fact
that
the
chief
evidence
of
the
true
cause,
whether
the
cause
of
the
fall
of
the
platform
was
the
loosening
of
the
bolt
from
the
chain
culpable
or
innocent,
is
practically
accessible
to
the
defendant
but
inaccessible
to
block.
It
is
claimed
that
such
portion
of
the
testimony
is
mere
opinion.
Subject
to
the
injured
person.
18 19
certain
exceptions,
the
opinion
of
a
witness
is
generally
not
admissible.
It
has
been
said
that
the
doctrine
of
res
ipsa
loquitur
furnishes
a
bridge
by
which
Petitioner’s
contention,
however,
loses
relevance
in
the
face
of
the
application
of
a
plaintiff,
without
knowledge
of
the
cause,
reaches
over
to
defendant
who
res
ipsa
loquitur
by
the
CA.
The
effect
of
the
doctrine
is
to
warrant
a
presumption
knows
or
should
know
the
cause,
for
any
explanation
of
care
exercised
by
the
or
inference
that
the
mere
fall
of
the
elevator
was
a
result
of
the
person
having
defendant
in
respect
of
the
matter
of
which
the
plaintiff
complains.
The
res
ipsa
charge
of
the
instrumentality
was
negligent.
As
a
rule
of
evidence,
the
doctrine
of
loquitur
doctrine,
another
court
has
said,
is
a
rule
of
necessity,
in
that
it
proceeds
res
ipsa
loquitur
is
peculiar
to
the
law
of
negligence
which
recognizes
that
prima
on
the
theory
that
under
the
peculiar
circumstances
in
which
the
doctrine
is
facie
negligence
may
be
established
without
direct
proof
and
furnishes
a
applicable,
it
is
within
the
power
of
the
defendant
to
show
that
there
was
no
20
substitute
for
specific
proof
of
negligence.
negligence
on
his
part,
and
direct
proof
of
defendant’s
negligence
is
beyond
plaintiff’s
power.
Accordingly,
some
court
add
to
the
three
prerequisites
for
the
The
concept
of
res
ipsa
loquitur
has
been
explained
in
this
wise:
application
of
the
res
ipsa
loquitur
doctrine
the
further
requirement
that
for
the
res
ipsa
loquitur
doctrine
to
apply,
it
must
appear
that
the
injured
party
had
no
Petitioner
apparently
misapprehends
the
procedural
effect
of
the
doctrine.
As
25
knowledge
or
means
of
knowledge
as
to
the
cause
of
the
accident,
or
that
the
stated
earlier,
the
defendant’s
negligence
is
presumed
or
inferred
when
the
party
to
be
charged
with
negligence
has
superior
knowledge
or
opportunity
for
plaintiff
establishes
the
requisites
for
the
application
of
res
ipsa
loquitur.
Once
23
explanation
of
the
accident.
the
plaintiff
makes
out
a
prima
facie
case
of
all
the
elements,
the
burden
then
26
shifts
to
defendant
to
explain.
The
presumption
or
inference
may
be
rebutted
The
CA
held
that
all
the
requisites
of
res
ipsa
loquitur
are
present
in
the
case
at
or
overcome
by
other
evidence
and,
under
appropriate
circumstances
disputable
bar:
presumption,
such
as
that
of
due
care
or
innocence,
may
outweigh
the
27
inference.
It
is
not
for
the
defendant
to
explain
or
prove
its
defense
to
prevent
th
There
is
no
dispute
that
appellee’s
husband
fell
down
from
the
14
floor
of
a
the
presumption
or
inference
from
arising.
Evidence
by
the
defendant
of
say,
due
building
to
the
basement
while
he
was
working
with
appellant’s
construction
care,
comes
into
play
only
after
the
circumstances
for
the
application
of
the
project,
resulting
to
his
death.
The
construction
site
is
within
the
exclusive
doctrine
has
been
established.1âwphi1.nêt
control
and
management
of
appellant.
It
has
a
safety
engineer,
a
project
superintendent,
a
carpenter
leadman
and
others
who
are
in
complete
control
of
In
any
case,
petitioner
cites
the
sworn
statement
of
its
leadman
Ferdinand
Fabro
the
situation
therein.
The
circumstances
of
any
accident
that
would
occur
therein
executed
before
the
police
investigator
as
evidence
of
its
due
care.
According
to
are
peculiarly
within
the
knowledge
of
the
appellant
or
its
employees.
On
the
Fabro’s
sworn
statement,
the
company
enacted
rules
and
regulations
for
the
other
hand,
the
appellee
is
not
in
a
position
to
know
what
caused
the
accident.
safety
and
security
of
its
workers.
Moreover,
the
leadman
and
the
bodegero
Res
ipsa
loquitur
is
a
rule
of
necessity
and
it
applies
where
evidence
is
absent
or
inspect
the
chain
block
before
allowing
its
use.
not
readily
available,
provided
the
following
requisites
are
present:
(1)
the
accident
was
of
a
kind
which
does
not
ordinarily
occur
unless
someone
is
It
is
ironic
that
petitioner
relies
on
Fabro’s
sworn
statement
as
proof
of
its
due
negligent;
(2)
the
instrumentality
or
agency
which
caused
the
injury
was
under
care
but,
in
arguing
that
private
respondent
failed
to
prove
negligence
on
the
the
exclusive
control
of
the
person
charged
with
negligence;
and
(3)
the
injury
part
of
petitioner’s
employees,
also
assails
the
same
statement
for
being
suffered
must
not
have
been
due
to
any
voluntary
action
or
contribution
on
the
hearsay.
part
of
the
person
injured.
x
x
x.
Petitioner
is
correct.
Fabro’s
sworn
statement
is
hearsay
and
inadmissible.
th
No
worker
is
going
to
fall
from
the
14
floor
of
a
building
to
the
basement
while
Affidavits
are
inadmissible
as
evidence
under
the
hearsay
rule,
unless
the
affiant
28
performing
work
in
a
construction
site
unless
someone
is
negligent[;]
thus,
the
is
placed
on
the
witness
stand
to
testify
thereon.
The
inadmissibility
of
this
sort
first
requisite
for
the
application
of
the
rule
of
res
ipsa
loquitur
is
present.
As
of
evidence
is
based
not
only
on
the
lack
of
opportunity
on
the
part
of
the
explained
earlier,
the
construction
site
with
all
its
paraphernalia
and
human
adverse
party
to
cross-‐examine
the
affiant,
but
also
on
the
commonly
known
fact
resources
that
likely
caused
the
injury
is
under
the
exclusive
control
and
that,
generally,
an
affidavit
is
not
prepared
by
the
affiant
himself
but
by
another
management
of
appellant[;]
thus[,]
the
second
requisite
is
also
present.
No
who
uses
his
own
language
in
writing
the
affiant’s
statements
which
may
either
29
contributory
negligence
was
attributed
to
the
appellee’s
deceased
husband[;]
be
omitted
or
misunderstood
by
the
one
writing
them.
Petitioner,
therefore,
thus[,]
the
last
requisite
is
also
present.
All
the
requisites
for
the
application
of
cannot
use
said
statement
as
proof
of
its
due
care
any
more
than
private
the
rule
of
res
ipsa
loquitur
are
present,
thus
a
reasonable
presumption
or
respondent
can
use
it
to
prove
the
cause
of
her
husband’s
death.
Regrettably,
24
inference
of
appellant’s
negligence
arises.
x
x
x.
petitioner
does
not
cite
any
other
evidence
to
rebut
the
inference
or
presumption
of
negligence
arising
from
the
application
of
res
ipsa
loquitur,
or
to
Petitioner
does
not
dispute
the
existence
of
the
requisites
for
the
application
of
establish
any
defense
relating
to
the
incident.
res
ipsa
loquitur,
but
argues
that
the
presumption
or
inference
that
it
was
negligent
did
not
arise
since
it
"proved
that
it
exercised
due
care
to
avoid
the
Next,
petitioner
argues
that
private
respondent
had
previously
availed
of
the
accident
which
befell
respondent’s
husband."
death
benefits
provided
under
the
Labor
Code
and
is,
therefore,
precluded
from
claiming
from
the
deceased’s
employer
damages
under
the
Civil
Code.
Article
173
of
the
Labor
Code
states:
fault
of
the
employers
or
whether
they
may
avail
themselves
cumulatively
of
both
actions,
i.e.,
collect
the
limited
compensation
under
the
Workmen’s
Article
173.
Extent
of
liability.
–
Unless
otherwise
provided,
the
liability
of
the
Compensation
Act
and
sue
in
addition
for
damages
in
the
regular
courts.
State
Insurance
Fund
under
this
Title
shall
be
exclusive
and
in
place
of
all
other
liabilities
of
the
employer
to
the
employee,
his
dependents
or
anyone
otherwise
In
disposing
of
a
similar
issue,
this
Court
in
Pacaña
vs.
Cebu
Autobus
Company,
entitled
to
receive
damages
on
behalf
of
the
employee
or
his
dependents.
The
32
SCRA
442,
ruled
that
an
injured
worker
has
a
choice
of
either
to
recover
from
payment
of
compensation
under
this
Title
shall
not
bar
the
recovery
of
benefits
the
employer
the
fixed
amounts
set
by
the
Workmen’s
Compensation
Act
or
to
as
provided
for
in
Section
699
of
the
Revised
Administrative
Code,
Republic
Act
prosecute
an
ordinary
civil
action
against
the
tortfeasor
for
higher
damages
but
Numbered
Eleven
hundred
sixty-‐one,
as
amended,
Republic
Act
Numbered
Six
he
cannot
pursue
both
courses
of
action
simultaneously.
[Underscoring
hundred
ten,
as
amended,
Republic
Act
Numbered
Forty-‐eight
hundred
sixty-‐four
supplied.]
as
amended,
and
other
laws
whose
benefits
are
administered
by
the
System
or
by
other
agencies
of
the
government.
Nevertheless,
the
Court
allowed
some
of
the
petitioners
in
said
case
to
proceed
with
their
suit
under
the
Civil
Code
despite
having
availed
of
the
benefits
The
precursor
of
Article
173
of
the
Labor
Code,
Section
5
of
the
Workmen’s
provided
under
the
Workmen’s
Compensation
Act.
The
Court
reasoned:
Compensation
Act,
provided
that:
With
regard
to
the
other
petitioners,
it
was
alleged
by
Philex
in
its
motion
to
Section
5.
Exclusive
right
to
compensation.
–
The
rights
and
remedies
granted
by
dismiss
dated
May
14,
1968
before
the
court
a
quo,
that
the
heirs
of
the
this
Act
to
an
employee
by
reason
of
a
personal
injury
entitling
him
to
deceased
employees,
namely
Emerito
Obra,
Larry
Villar,
Jr.,
Aurelio
Lanuza,
compensation
shall
exclude
all
other
rights
and
remedies
accruing
to
the
Lorenzo
Isla
and
Saturnino
submitted
notices
and
claims
for
compensation
to
the
employee,
his
personal
representatives,
dependents
or
nearest
of
kin
against
the
Regional
Office
No.
1
of
the
then
Department
of
Labor
and
all
of
them
have
been
employer
under
the
Civil
Code
and
other
laws
because
of
said
injury
x
x
x.
paid
in
full
as
of
August
25,
1967,
except
Saturnino
Martinez
whose
heirs
decided
that
they
be
paid
in
installments
x
x
x.
Such
allegation
was
admitted
by
herein
Whether
Section
5
of
the
Workmen’s
Compensation
Act
allowed
recovery
under
petitioners
in
their
opposition
to
the
motion
to
dismiss
dated
may
27,
1968
x
x
x
said
Act
as
well
as
under
the
Civil
Code
used
to
be
the
subject
of
conflicting
in
the
lower
court,
but
they
set
up
the
defense
that
the
claims
were
filed
under
decisions.
The
Court
finally
settled
the
matter
in
Floresca
vs.Philex
Mining
the
Workmen’s
Compensation
Act
before
they
learned
of
the
official
report
of
30
Corporation,
which
involved
a
cave-‐in
resulting
in
the
death
of
the
employees
the
committee
created
to
investigate
the
accident
which
established
the
criminal
of
the
Philex
Mining
Corporation.
Alleging
that
the
mining
corporation,
in
negligence
and
violation
of
law
by
Philex,
and
which
report
was
forwarded
by
the
violation
of
government
rules
and
regulations,
failed
to
take
the
required
Director
of
Mines
to
then
Executive
Secretary
Rafael
Salas
in
a
letter
dated
precautions
for
the
protection
of
the
employees,
the
heirs
of
the
deceased
October
19,
1967
only
x
x
x.
employees
filed
a
complaint
against
Philex
Mining
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
(CFI).
Upon
motion
of
Philex
Mining,
the
CFI
dismissed
the
complaint
for
lack
of
WE
hold
that
although
the
other
petitioners
had
received
the
benefits
under
the
jurisdiction.
The
heirs
sought
relief
from
this
Court.
Workmen’s
Compensation
Act,
such
my
not
preclude
them
from
bringing
an
action
before
the
regular
court
because
they
became
cognizant
of
the
fact
that
Addressing
the
issue
of
whether
the
heirs
had
a
choice
of
remedies,
majority
of
Philex
has
been
remiss
in
its
contractual
obligations
with
the
deceased
miners
31
the
Court
En
Banc,
following
the
rule
in
Pacaña
vs.
Cebu
Autobus
Company,
only
after
receiving
compensation
under
the
Act.
Had
petitioners
been
aware
of
held
in
the
affirmative.
said
violation
of
government
rules
and
regulations
by
Philex,
and
of
its
WE
now
come
to
the
query
as
to
whether
or
not
the
injured
employee
or
his
negligence,
they
would
not
have
sought
redress
under
the
Workmen’s
heirs
in
case
of
death
have
a
right
of
selection
or
choice
of
action
between
Compensation
Commission
which
awarded
a
lesser
amount
for
compensation.
availing
themselves
of
the
worker’s
right
under
the
Workmen’s
Compensation
The
choice
of
the
first
remedy
was
based
on
ignorance
or
a
mistake
of
fact,
which
Act
and
suing
in
the
regular
courts
under
the
Civil
Code
for
higher
damages
nullifies
the
choice
as
it
was
not
an
intelligent
choice.
The
case
should
therefore
(actual,
moral
and
exemplary)
from
the
employers
by
virtue
of
the
negligence
or
be
remanded
to
the
lower
court
for
further
proceedings.
However,
should
the
petitioners
be
successful
in
their
bid
before
the
lower
court,
the
payments
made
police
investigators
which
appellee
may
not
have
even
known.
This
may
explain
under
the
Workmen’s
Compensation
Act
should
be
deducted
from
the
damages
why
no
complainant
is
mentioned
in
the
preliminary
statement
of
the
public
that
may
be
decreed
in
their
favor.
[Underscoring
supplied.]
prosecutor
in
her
memorandum
dated
February
6,
1991,
to
wit:
"Respondent
Ferdinand
Fabro
x
x
x
are
being
charged
by
complainant
of
"Simple
Negligence
The
ruling
in
Floresca
providing
the
claimant
a
choice
of
remedies
was
reiterated
Resulting
to
Homicide."
It
is
also
possible
that
the
appellee
did
not
have
a
chance
32 33
in
Ysmael
Maritime
Corporation
vs.
Avelino,
Vda.
De
Severo
vs.
Feliciano-‐Go,
to
appear
before
the
public
prosecutor
as
can
be
inferred
from
the
following
34
and
Marcopper
Mining
Corp.
vs.
Abeleda.
In
the
last
case,
the
Court
again
statement
in
said
memorandum:
"Respondents
who
were
notified
pursuant
to
recognized
that
a
claimant
who
had
been
paid
under
the
Act
could
still
sue
under
Law
waived
their
rights
to
present
controverting
evidence,"
thus
there
was
no
the
Civil
Code.
The
Court
said:
reason
for
the
public
prosecutor
to
summon
the
appellee.
Hence,
notice
of
appellant’s
negligence
cannot
be
imputed
on
appellee
before
she
applied
for
In
the
Robles
case,
it
was
held
that
claims
for
damages
sustained
by
workers
in
death
benefits
under
ECC
or
before
she
received
the
first
payment
therefrom.
the
course
of
their
employment
could
be
filed
only
under
the
Workmen’s
Her
using
the
police
investigation
report
to
support
her
complaint
filed
on
May
9,
Compensation
Law,
to
the
exclusion
of
all
further
claims
under
other
laws.
In
1991
may
just
be
an
afterthought
after
receiving
a
copy
of
the
February
6,
1991
Floresca,
this
doctrine
was
abrogated
in
favor
of
the
new
rule
that
the
claimants
Memorandum
of
the
Prosecutor’s
Office
dismissing
the
criminal
complaint
for
may
invoke
either
the
Workmen’s
Compensation
Act
or
the
provisions
of
the
Civil
insufficiency
of
evidence,
stating
therein
that:
"The
death
of
the
victim
is
not
Code,
subject
to
the
consequence
that
the
choice
of
one
remedy
will
exclude
the
attributable
to
any
negligence
on
the
part
of
the
respondents.
If
at
all
and
as
other
and
that
the
acceptance
of
compensation
under
the
remedy
chosen
will
shown
by
the
records
this
case
is
civil
in
nature."
(Underscoring
supplied.)
preclude
a
claim
for
additional
benefits
under
the
other
remedy.
The
exception
is
Considering
the
foregoing,
We
are
more
inclined
to
believe
appellee’s
allegation
where
a
claimant
who
has
already
been
paid
under
the
Workmen’s
that
she
learned
about
appellant’s
negligence
only
after
she
applied
for
and
Compensation
Act
may
still
sue
for
damages
under
the
Civil
Code
on
the
basis
of
received
the
benefits
under
ECC.
This
is
a
mistake
of
fact
that
will
make
this
case
35
supervening
facts
or
developments
occurring
after
he
opted
for
the
first
remedy.
fall
under
the
exception
held
in
the
Floresca
ruling.
(Underscoring
supplied.)
The
CA
further
held
that
not
only
was
private
respondent
ignorant
of
the
facts,
Here,
the
CA
held
that
private
respondent’s
case
came
under
the
exception
but
of
her
rights
as
well:
because
private
respondent
was
unaware
of
petitioner’s
negligence
when
she
filed
her
claim
for
death
benefits
from
the
State
Insurance
Fund.
Private
x
x
x.
Appellee
[Maria
Juego]
testified
that
she
has
reached
only
elementary
respondent
filed
the
civil
complaint
for
damages
after
she
received
a
copy
of
the
school
for
her
educational
attainment;
that
she
did
not
know
what
damages
police
investigation
report
and
the
Prosecutor’s
Memorandum
dismissing
the
could
be
recovered
from
the
death
of
her
husband;
and
that
she
did
not
know
36
criminal
complaint
against
petitioner’s
personnel.
While
stating
that
there
was
that
she
may
also
recover
more
from
the
Civil
Code
than
from
the
ECC.
x
x
x.
no
negligence
attributable
to
the
respondents
in
the
complaint,
the
prosecutor
nevertheless
noted
in
the
Memorandum
that,
"if
at
all,"
the
"case
is
civil
in
Petitioner
impugns
the
foregoing
rulings.
It
contends
that
private
respondent
nature."
The
CA
thus
applied
the
exception
in
Floresca:
"failed
to
allege
in
her
complaint
that
her
application
and
receipt
of
benefits
from
the
ECC
were
attended
by
ignorance
or
mistake
of
fact.
Not
being
an
issue
x
x
x
We
do
not
agree
that
appellee
has
knowledge
of
the
alleged
negligence
of
submitted
during
the
trial,
the
trial
court
had
no
authority
to
hear
or
adjudicate
appellant
as
early
as
November
25,
1990,
the
date
of
the
police
investigator’s
that
issue."
report.
The
appellee
merely
executed
her
sworn
statement
before
the
police
investigator
concerning
her
personal
circumstances,
her
relation
to
the
victim,
Petitioner
also
claims
that
private
respondent
could
not
have
been
ignorant
of
and
her
knowledge
of
the
accident.
She
did
not
file
the
complaint
for
"Simple
the
facts
because
as
early
as
November
28,
1990,
private
respondent
was
the
Negligence
Resulting
to
Homicide"
against
appellant’s
employees.
It
was
the
complainant
in
a
criminal
complaint
for
"Simple
Negligence
Resulting
to
investigator
who
recommended
the
filing
of
said
case
and
his
supervisor
referred
Homicide"
against
petitioner’s
employees.
On
February
6,
1991,
two
months
the
same
to
the
prosecutor’s
office.
This
is
a
standard
operating
procedure
for
before
the
filing
of
the
action
in
the
lower
court,
Prosecutor
Lorna
Lee
issued
a
resolution
finding
that,
although
there
was
insufficient
evidence
against
That
lack
of
knowledge
of
a
fact
that
nullifies
the
election
of
a
remedy
is
the
basis
petitioner’s
employees,
the
case
was
"civil
in
nature."
These
purportedly
show
for
the
exception
in
Floresca.
that
prior
to
her
receipt
of
death
benefits
from
the
ECC
on
January
2,
1991
and
every
month
thereafter,
private
respondent
also
knew
of
the
two
choices
of
It
is
in
light
of
the
foregoing
principles
that
we
address
petitioner’s
contentions.
remedies
available
to
her
and
yet
she
chose
to
claim
and
receive
the
benefits
from
the
ECC.
Waiver
is
a
defense,
and
it
was
not
incumbent
upon
private
respondent,
as
plaintiff,
to
allege
in
her
complaint
that
she
had
availed
of
benefits
from
the
ECC.
When
a
party
having
knowledge
of
the
facts
makes
an
election
between
It
is,
thus,
erroneous
for
petitioner
to
burden
private
respondent
with
raising
inconsistent
remedies,
the
election
is
final
and
bars
any
action,
suit,
or
waiver
as
an
issue.
On
the
contrary,
it
is
the
defendant
who
ought
to
plead
41
proceeding
inconsistent
with
the
elected
remedy,
in
the
absence
of
fraud
by
the
waiver,
as
petitioner
did
in
pages
2-‐3
of
its
Answer;
otherwise,
the
defense
is
37
other
party.
The
first
act
of
election
acts
as
a
bar.
Equitable
in
nature,
the
waived.
It
is,
therefore,
perplexing
for
petitioner
to
now
contend
that
the
trial
doctrine
of
election
of
remedies
is
designed
to
mitigate
possible
unfairness
to
court
had
no
jurisdiction
over
the
issue
when
petitioner
itself
pleaded
waiver
in
both
parties.
It
rests
on
the
moral
premise
that
it
is
fair
to
hold
people
the
proceedings
before
the
trial
court.
responsible
for
their
choices.
The
purpose
of
the
doctrine
is
not
to
prevent
any
38
recourse
to
any
remedy,
but
to
prevent
a
double
redress
for
a
single
wrong.
Does
the
evidence
show
that
private
respondent
knew
of
the
facts
that
led
to
her
husband’s
death
and
the
rights
pertaining
to
a
choice
of
remedies?
The
choice
of
a
party
between
inconsistent
remedies
results
in
a
waiver
by
election.
Hence,
the
rule
in
Floresca
that
a
claimant
cannot
simultaneously
It
bears
stressing
that
what
negates
waiver
is
lack
of
knowledge
or
a
mistake
of
pursue
recovery
under
the
Labor
Code
and
prosecute
an
ordinary
course
of
fact.
In
this
case,
the
"fact"
that
served
as
a
basis
for
nullifying
the
waiver
is
the
action
under
the
Civil
Code.
The
claimant,
by
his
choice
of
one
remedy,
is
negligence
of
petitioner’s
employees,
of
which
private
respondent
purportedly
deemed
to
have
waived
the
other.
learned
only
after
the
prosecutor
issued
a
resolution
stating
that
there
may
be
civil
liability.
In
Floresca,
it
was
the
negligence
of
the
mining
corporation
and
its
39
Waiver
is
the
intentional
relinquishment
of
a
known
right.
violation
of
government
rules
and
regulations.
Negligence,
or
violation
of
government
rules
and
regulations,
for
that
matter,
however,
is
not
a
fact,
but
a
[It]
is
an
act
of
understanding
that
presupposes
that
a
party
has
knowledge
of
its
conclusion
of
law,
over
which
only
the
courts
have
the
final
say.
Such
a
rights,
but
chooses
not
to
assert
them.
It
must
be
generally
shown
by
the
party
conclusion
binds
no
one
until
the
courts
have
decreed
so.
It
appears,
therefore,
claiming
a
waiver
that
the
person
against
whom
the
waiver
is
asserted
had
at
the
that
the
principle
that
ignorance
or
mistake
of
fact
nullifies
a
waiver
has
been
time
knowledge,
actual
or
constructive,
of
the
existence
of
the
party’s
rights
or
of
misapplied
in
Floresca
and
in
the
case
at
bar.
all
material
facts
upon
which
they
depended.
Where
one
lacks
knowledge
of
a
right,
there
is
no
basis
upon
which
waiver
of
it
can
rest.
Ignorance
of
a
material
In
any
event,
there
is
no
proof
that
private
respondent
knew
that
her
husband
fact
negates
waiver,
and
waiver
cannot
be
established
by
a
consent
given
under
a
died
in
the
elevator
crash
when
on
November
15,
1990
she
accomplished
her
mistake
or
misapprehension
of
fact.
application
for
benefits
from
the
ECC.
The
police
investigation
report
is
dated
November
25,
1990,
10
days
after
the
accomplishment
of
the
form.
Petitioner
A
person
makes
a
knowing
and
intelligent
waiver
when
that
person
knows
that
a
filed
the
application
in
her
behalf
on
November
27,
1990.
right
exists
and
has
adequate
knowledge
upon
which
to
make
an
intelligent
decision.
There
is
also
no
showing
that
private
respondent
knew
of
the
remedies
available
to
her
when
the
claim
before
the
ECC
was
filed.
On
the
contrary,
private
Waiver
requires
a
knowledge
of
the
facts
basic
to
the
exercise
of
the
right
respondent
testified
that
she
was
not
aware
of
her
rights.
waived,
with
an
awareness
of
its
consequences.
That
a
waiver
is
made
knowingly
40
and
intelligently
must
be
illustrated
on
the
record
or
by
the
evidence.
Petitioner,
though,
argues
that
under
Article
3
of
the
Civil
Code,
ignorance
of
the
law
excuses
no
one
from
compliance
therewith.
As
judicial
decisions
applying
or
interpreting
the
laws
or
the
Constitution
form
part
of
the
Philippine
legal
system
MAGNO,
and
the
COURT
OF
APPEALS
(Second
Division),
Respondents.
(Article
8,
Civil
Code),
private
respondent
cannot
claim
ignorance
of
this
Court’s
ruling
in
Floresca
allowing
a
choice
of
remedies.
D
E
C
I
S
I
O
N
The
argument
has
no
merit.
The
application
of
Article
3
is
limited
to
mandatory
42
and
prohibitory
laws.
This
may
be
deduced
from
the
language
of
the
provision,
MONTEMAYOR,
J.:
which,
notwithstanding
a
person’s
ignorance,
does
not
excuse
his
or
her
compliance
with
the
laws.
The
rule
in
Floresca
allowing
private
respondent
a
On
August
22,
1950,
Efren
Magno
went
to
the
3-‐story
house
of
Antonio
Peñaloza,
choice
of
remedies
is
neither
mandatory
nor
prohibitory.
Accordingly,
her
his
stepbrother,
located
on
Rodriguez
Lanuza
Street,
Manila,
to
repair
a
“media
ignorance
thereof
cannot
be
held
against
her.
agua”
said
to
be
in
a
leaking
condition.
The
“media
agua”
was
just
below
the
window
of
the
third
story.
Standing
on
said
“media
agua”,
Magno
received
from
Finally,
the
Court
modifies
the
affirmance
of
the
award
of
damages.
The
records
his
son
thru
that
window
a
3’
X
6’
galvanized
iron
sheet
to
cover
the
leaking
do
not
indicate
the
total
amount
private
respondent
ought
to
receive
from
the
portion,
turned
around
and
in
doing
so
the
lower
end
of
the
iron
sheet
came
into
43
ECC,
although
it
appears
from
Exhibit
"K"
that
she
received
P3,581.85
as
initial
contact
with
the
electric
wire
of
the
Manila
Electric
Company
(later
referred
to
as
payment
representing
the
accrued
pension
from
November
1990
to
March
1991.
the
Company)
strung
parallel
to
the
edge
of
the
“media
agua”
and
2
1/2
feet
Her
initial
monthly
pension,
according
to
the
same
Exhibit
"K,"
was
P596.97
and
from
it,
causing
his
death
by
electrocution.
His
widow
and
children
fled
suit
to
present
total
monthly
pension
was
P716.40.
Whether
the
total
amount
she
will
recover
damages
from
the
company.
After
hearing,
the
trial
court
rendered
eventually
receive
from
the
ECC
is
less
than
the
sum
of
P644,000.00
in
total
judgment
in
their
favor
—
P10,000
as
compensatory
damages;
chan
damages
awarded
by
the
trial
court
is
subject
to
speculation,
and
the
case
is
roblesvirtualawlibraryP784
as
actual
damages;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000
remanded
to
the
trial
court
for
such
determination.
Should
the
trial
court
find
as
moral
and
exemplary
damages;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand
P3,000
as
that
its
award
is
greater
than
that
of
the
ECC,
payments
already
received
by
attorney’s
fees,
with
costs.
On
appeal
to
the
Court
of
Appeals,
the
latter
affirmed
private
respondent
under
the
Labor
Code
shall
be
deducted
from
the
trial
court'’
the
judgment
with
slight
modification
by
reducing
the
attorney’s
fees
from
award
of
damages.
Consistent
with
our
ruling
in
Floresca,
this
adjudication
aims
P3,000
to
P1,000
with
costs.
The
electric
company
has
appealed
said
decision
to
to
prevent
double
compensation.
us.
The
findings
of
fact
made
by
the
Court
of
Appeals
which
are
conclusive
are
stated
WHEREFORE,
the
case
is
REMANDED
to
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Pasig
City
to
in
the
following
portions
of
its
decision
which
we
reproduce
determine
whether
the
award
decreed
in
its
decision
is
more
than
that
of
the
below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ECC.
Should
the
award
decreed
by
the
trial
court
be
greater
than
that
awarded
by
the
ECC,
payments
already
made
to
private
respondent
pursuant
to
the
Labor
“The
electric
wire
in
question
was
an
exposed,
uninsulated
primary
wire
Code
shall
be
deducted
therefrom.
In
all
other
respects,
the
Decision
of
the
Court
stretched
between
poles
on
the
street
and
carrying
a
charge
of
3,600
volts.
It
was
of
Appeals
is
AFFIRMED.
installed
there
some
two
years
before
Peñaloza’s
house
was
constructed.
The
record
shows
that
during
the
construction
of
said
house
a
similar
incident
took
SO
ORDERED.
place,
although
fortunate]y
with
much
less
tragic
consequences.
A
piece
of
wood
which
a
carpenter
was
holding
happened
to
come
in
contact
with
the
same
wire,
Davide,
Jr.,
Puno,
Pardo,
and
Ynares-‐Santiago,
JJ.,
concur.
producing
some
sparks.
The
owner
of
the
house
forthwith
complained
to
Defendant
about
the
danger
which
the
wire
presented,
and
as
a
result
Defendant
[G.R.
No.
L-‐8328.
May
18,
1956.]
moved
one
end
of
the
wire
farther
from
the
house
by
means
of
a
brace,
but
left
the
other
end
where
it
was.
MANILA
ELECTRIC
COMPANY,
Petitioner,
vs.
SOTERO
REMOQUILLO,
in
his
own
behalf
and
as
guardian
of
the
minors
MANUEL,
BENJAMIN,
NESTOR,
“At
any
rate,
as
revealed
by
the
ocular
inspection
of
the
premises
ordered
by
the
MILAGROS,
CORAZON,
CLEMENTE
and
AURORA,
all
surnamed
MAGNO,
SALUD
trial
court,
the
distance
from
the
electric
wire
to
the
edge
of
the
‘media
agua’
on
which
the
deceased
was
making
repairs
was
only
30
inches
or
2
1/2
feet.
chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
negligence
cannot
be
determined
by
a
simple
Regulations
of
the
City
of
Manila
required
that
‘all
wires
be
kept
three
feet
from
matter
of
inches;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
all
that
the
city
did
was
to
the
building.’
Appellant
contends
that
in
applying
said
regulations
to
the
case
at
prescribe
certain
minimum
conditions
and
that
just
because
the
ordinance
bar
the
reckoning
should
not
be
from
the
edge
of
the
‘media
agua’
but
from
the
required
that
primary
electric
wires
should
be
not
less
than
3
feet
from
any
side
of
the
house
and
that,
thus
measured,
the
distance
was
almost
7
feet,
or
house,
the
obligation
of
due
diligence
is
not
fulfilled
by
placing
such
wires
at
a
more
then
the
minimum
prescribed.
This
contention
is
manifestly
groundless,
for
distance
of
3
feet
and
one
inch,
regardless
of
other
factors.
The
appellate
court,
not
only
is
a
‘media
agua’
an
integral
part
of
the
building
to
which
it
is
attached
however,
refrained
from
stating
or
suggesting
what
other
precautionary
but
to
exclude
it
in
measuring
the
distance
would
defeat
the
purpose
of
the
measures
could
and
should
have
been
adopted.
regulation.
Appellant
points
out,
nevertheless,
that
even
assuming
that
the
distance,
within
the
meaning
of
the
city
regulations,
should
be
measured
from
After
a
careful
study
and
discussion
of
the
case
and
the
circumstances
the
edge
of
the
‘media
agua’,
the
fact
that
in
the
case
of
the
house
involved
surrounding
the
same,
we
are
inclined
to
agree
to
the
contention
of
Petitioner
herein
such
distance
was
actually
less
than
3
feet
was
due
to
the
fault
of
the
Company
that
the
death
of
Magno
was
primarily
caused
by
his
own
negligence
owner
of
said
house,
because
the
city
authorities
gave
him
a
permit
to
construct
and
in
some
measure
by
the
too
close
proximity
of
the
“media
agua”
or
rather
its
a
‘media
agua’
only
one
meter
or
39
1/2
inches
wide,
but
instead
he
built
one
edge
to
the
electric
wire
of
the
company
by
reason
of
the
violation
of
the
original
having
a
width
of
65
3/4
inches,
17
3/8
inches
more
than
the
width
permitted
by
permit
given
by
the
city
and
the
subsequent
approval
of
said
illegal
construction
the
authorities,
thereby
reducing
the
distance
to
the
electric
wire
to
less
than
the
of
the
“media
agua”.
We
fail
to
see
how
the
Company
could
be
held
guilty
of
prescribed
minimum
of
3
feet.
negligence
or
as
lacking
in
due
diligence.
Although
the
city
ordinance
called
for
a
distance
of
3
feet
of
its
wires
from
any
building,
there
was
actually
a
distance
of
7
“It
is
a
fact
that
the
owner
of
the
house
exceeded
the
limit
fixed
in
the
permit
feet
and
2
3/4
inches
of
the
wires
from
the
side
of
the
house
of
Peñaloza.
Even
given
to
him
by
the
city
authorities
for
the
construction
of
the
‘media
agua’,
and
considering
said
regulation
distance
of
3
feet
as
referring
not
to
the
side
of
a
that
if
he
had
not
done
so
Appellants
wire
would
have
been
11
3/8
(inches)
more
building,
but
to
any
projecting
part
thereof,
such
as
a
“media
agua”,
had
the
than
the
required
distance
of
three
feet
from
the
edge
of
the
‘media
agua’.
It
is
house
owner
followed
the
terms
of
the
permit
given
him
by
the
city
for
the
also
a
fact,
however,
that
after
the
‘media
agua’
was
constructed
the
owner
was
construction
of
his
“media
agua”,
namely,
one
meter
or
39
3/8
inches
wide,
the
given
a
final
permit
of
occupancy
of
the
house
cralaw
.
distance
from
the
wires
to
the
edge
of
said
“media
agua”
would
have
been
3
feet
and
11
3/8
inches.
In
fixing
said
one
meter
width
for
the
“media
agua”
the
city
“
cralaw
The
wire
was
an
exposed,
high
tension
wire
carrying
a
load
of
3,600
authorities
must
have
wanted
to
preserve
the
distance
of
at
least
3
feet
between
volts.
There
was,
according
to
Appellant,
no
insulation
that
could
have
rendered
the
wires
and
any
portion
of
a
building.
Unfortunately,
however,
the
house
it
safe,
first,
because
there
is
no
insulation
material
in
commercial
use
for
such
owner
disregarding
the
permit,
exceeded
the
one
meter
fixed
by
the
same
by
17
kind
of
wire;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand
secondly,
because
the
only
3/8
inches
and
leaving
only
a
distance
of
2
1/2
feet
between
the
“Media
agua”
as
insulation
material
that
may
be
effective
is
still
in
the
experimental
stage
of
illegally
constructed
and
the
electric
wires.
And
added
to
this
violation
of
the
development
and,
anyway,
its
costs
would
be
prohibitive…
”
permit
by
the
house
owner,
was
its
approval
by
the
city
through
its
agent,
The
theory
followed
by
the
appellate
court
in
finding
for
the
Plaintiff
is
that
possibly
an
inspector.
Surely
we
cannot
lay
these
serious
violations
of
a
city
although
the
owner
of
the
house
in
constructing
the
“media
agua”
in
question
ordinance
and
permit
at
the
door
of
the
Company,
guiltless
of
breach
of
any
exceeded
the
limits
fixed
in
the
permit,
still,
after
making
that
“media
agua”,
its
ordinance
or
regulation.
The
Company
cannot
be
expected
to
be
always
on
the
construction
though
illegal,
was
finally
approved
because
he
was
given
a
final
lookout
for
any
illegal
construction
which
reduces
the
distance
between
its
wires
permit
to
occupy
the
house;
chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
it
was
the
company
and
said
construction,
and
after
finding
that
said
distance
of
3
feet
had
been
that
was
at
fault
and
was
guilty
of
negligence
because
although
the
electric
wire
reduced,
to
change
the
stringing
or
installation
of
its
wires
so
as
to
preserve
said
in
question
had
been
installed
long
before
the
construction
of
the
house
and
in
distance.
It
would
be
much
easier
for
the
City,
or
rather
it
is
its
duty,
to
be
ever
accordance
with
the
ordinance
fixing
a
minimum
of
3
feet,
mere
compliance
with
on
the
alert
and
to
see
to
it
that
its
ordinances
are
strictly
followed
by
house
the
regulations
does
not
satisfy
the
requirement
of
due
diligence
nor
avoid
the
owners
and
to
condemn
or
disapprove
all
illegal
constructions.
Of
course,
in
the
need
for
adopting
such
other
precautionary
measures
as
may
be
warranted;
present
case,
the
violation
of
the
permit
for
the
construction
of
the
“media
agua”
was
not
the
direct
cause
of
the
accident.
It
merely
contributed
to
it.
Had
said
grasped
the
electric
wire
and
was
electrocuted.
The
person
electrocuted
in
said
“media
agua”
been
only
one
meter
wide
as
allowed
by
the
permit,
Magno
case
was
a
boy
who
was
in
no
position
to
realize
the
danger.
In
the
present
case,
standing
on
it,
would
instinctively
have
stayed
closer
to
or
hugged
the
side
of
the
however,
the
wires
were
well
high
over
the
street
where
there
was
no
possible
house
in
order
to
keep
a
safe
margin
between
the
edge
of
the
“media
agua”
and
danger
to
pedestrians.
The
only
possible
danger
was
to
persons
standing
on
the
the
yawning
2-‐story
distance
or
height
from
the
ground,
and
possibly
if
not
“media
agua”,
but
a
“media
agua”
can
hardly
be
considered
a
public
place
where
probably
avoided
the
fatal
contact
between
the
lower
end
of
the
iron
sheet
and
persons
usually
gather.
Moreover,
a
person
standing
on
the
“media
agua”
could
the
wires.
not
have
reached
the
wires
with
his
hands
alone.
It
was
necessary
as
was
done
by
Magno
to
hold
something
long
enough
to
reach
the
wire.
Furthermore,
We
realize
that
the
presence
of
the
wires
in
question
quite
close
to
the
house
or
Magno
was
not
a
boy
or
a
person
immature
but
the
father
of
a
family,
its
“media
agua”
was
always
a
source
of
danger
considering
their
high
voltage
supposedly
a
tinsmith
trained
and
experienced
in
the
repair
of
galvanized
iron
and
uninsulated
as
they
were,
but
the
claim
of
the
company
and
the
reasons
roofs
and
“media
agua”.
Moreover,
in
that
very
case
of
Astudillo
vs.
Manila
given
by
it
for
not
insulating
said
wires
were
unrefuted
as
we
gather
from
the
Electric
Co.,
supra,
the
court
said
that
although
it
is
a
well-‐
established
rule
that
findings
of
the
Court
of
Appeals,
and
so
we
have
to
accept
them
as
satisfactory.
the
liability
of
electric
companies
for
damages
or
personal
injuries
is
governed
by
Consequently,
we
may
not
hold
said
company
as
guilty
of
negligence
or
wanting
the
rules
of
negligence,
nevertheless
such
companies
are
not
insurers
of
the
in
due
diligence
in
failing
to
insulate
said
wires.
As
to
their
proximity
to
the
house
safety
of
the
public.
it
is
to
be
supposed
that
distance
of
3
feet
was
considered
sufficiently
safe
by
the
technical
men
of
the
city
such
as
its
electrician
or
engineer.
Of
course,
a
greater
But
even
assuming
for
a
moment
that
under
the
facts
of
the
present
case
the
distance
of
say
6
feet
or
12
feet
would
have
increased
the
margin
of
safety
but
Defendant
electric
company
could
be
considered
negligent
in
installing
its
electric
other
factors
had
to
be
considered
such
as
that
the
wires
could
not
be
strung
or
wires
so
close
to
the
house
and
“media
agua”
in
question,
and
in
failing
to
the
posts
supporting
them
could
not
be
located
too
far
toward
the
middle
of
the
properly
insulate
those
wires
(although
according
to
the
unrefuted
claim
of
said
street.
Thus,
the
real
cause
of
the
accident
or
death
was
the
reckless
or
negligent
company
it
was
impossible
to
make
the
insulation
of
that
kind
of
wire),
act
of
Magno
himself.
When
he
was
called
by
his
stepbrother
to
repair
the
nevertheless
to
hold
the
Defendant
liable
in
damages
for
the
death
of
Magno,
“media
agua”
just
below
the
third
story
window,
it
is
to
be
presumed
that
due
to
such
supposed
negligence
of
the
company
must
have
been
the
proximate
and
his
age
and
experience
he
was
qualified
to
do
so.
Perhaps
he
was
a
tinsmith
or
principal
cause
of
the
accident,
because
if
the
act
of
Magno
in
turning
around
carpenter
and
had
training
and
experience
for
the
job.
So,
he
could
not
have
and
swinging
the
galvanized
iron
sheet
with
his
hands
was
the
proximate
and
been
entirely
a
stranger
to
electric
wires
and
the
danger
lurking
in
them.
But
principal
cause
of
the
electrocution,
then
his
heirs
may
not
recover.
Such
was
the
unfortunately,
in
the
instant
care,
his
training
and
experience
failed
him,
and
holding
of
this
Court
in
the
case
of
Taylor
vs.
Manila
Electric
Railroad
and
Light
forgetting
where
he
was
standing,
holding
the
6-‐feet
iron
sheet
with
both
hands
Company,
16
Phil.,
8.
In
that
case,
the
electric
company
was
found
negligent
in
and
at
arms
length,
evidently
without
looking,
and
throwing
all
prudence
and
leaving
scattered
on
its
premises
fulminating
caps
which
Taylor,
a
15-‐
year
old
discretion
to
the
winds,
he
turned
around
swinging
his
arms
with
the
motion
of
boy
found
and
carried
home.
In
the
course
of
experimenting
with
said
his
body,
thereby
causing
his
own
electrocution.
fulminating
caps,
he
opened
one
of
them,
held
it
out
with
his
hands
while
another
boy
applied
a
lighted
match
to
it,
causing
it
to
explode
and
injure
one
of
In
support
of
its
theory
and
holding
that
Defendant-‐Appellant
was
liable
for
his
eyes
eventually
causing
blindness
in
said
eye.
Said
this
Tribunal
in
denying
damages
the
Court
of
Appeals
cites
the
case
of
Astudillo
vs.
Manila
Electric
Co.,
recovery
for
the
injury:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
55
Phil.,
427.
We
do
not
think
the
case
is
exactly
applicable.
There,
the
premises
involved
was
that
elevated
portion
or
top
of
the
walls
of
Intramuros,
Manila,
just
“
cralaw,
so
that
while
it
may
be
true
that
these
injuries
would
not
have
been
above
the
Sta.
Lucia
Gate.
In
the
words
of
the
Court,
it
was
“a
public
place
where
incurred
but
for
the
negligent
act
of
the
Defendant
in
leaving
the
caps
exposed
persons
come
to
stroll,
to
rest
and
to
enjoy
themselves”.
The
electric
company
on
its
premises,
nevertheless
Plaintiff’s
own
act
was
the
proximate
and
principal
was
clearly
negligent
in
placing
its
wires
so
near
the
place
that
without
much
cause
of
the
accident
which
inflicted
the
injury.”
difficulty
or
exertion,
a
person
by
stretching
his
hand
out
could
touch
them.
A
boy
named
Astudillo,
placing
one
foot
on
a
projection,
reached
out
and
actually
To
us
it
is
clear
that
the
principal
and
proximate
cause
of
the
electrocution
was
not
the
electric
wire,
evidently
a
remote
cause,
but
rather
the
reckless
and
negligent
act
of
Magno
in
turning
around
and
swinging
the
galvanized
iron
sheet
without
taking
any
precaution,
such
as
looking
back
toward
the
street
and
at
the
wire
to
avoid
its
contacting
said
iron
sheet,
considering
the
latter’s
length
of
6
feet.
For
a
better
understanding
of
the
rule
on
remote
and
proximate
cause
with
respect
to
injuries,
we
find
the
following
citation
helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“A
prior
and
remote
cause
cannot
be
made
the
basis
of
an
action
if
such
remote
cause
did
nothing
more
than
furnish
the
condition
or
give
rise
to
the
occasion
by
which
the
injury
was
made
possible,
if
there
intervened
between
such
prior
or
remote
cause
and
the
injury
a
distinct,
successive,
unrelated,
and
efficient
cause
of
the
injury,
even
though
such
injury
would
not
have
happened
but
for
such
condition
or
occasion.
If
no
danger
existed
in
the
condition
except
because
of
the
independent
cause,
such
condition
was
not
the
proximate
cause.
And
if
an
independent
negligent
act
or
defective
condition
sets
into
operation
the
circumstances
which
result
in
injury
because
of
the
prior
defective
condition,
such
subsequent
act
or
condition
is
the
proximate
cause.”
(45
C.J.
pp.
931-‐332.).
We
realize
that
the
stringing
of
wires
of
such
high
voltage
(3,600
volts),
uninsulated
and
so
close
to
houses
is
a
constant
source
of
danger,
even
death,
especially
to
persons
who
having
occasion
to
be
near
said
wires,
do
not
adopt
the
necessary
precautions.
But
may
be,
the
City
of
Manila
authorities
and
the
electric
company
could
get
together
and
devise
means
of
minimizing
this
danger
to
the
public.
Just
as
the
establishment
of
pedestrian
lanes
in
city
thoroughfares
may
greatly
minimize
danger
to
pedestrians
because
drivers
of
motor
vehicles
may
expect
danger
and
slow
down
or
even
stop
and
take
other
necessary
precaution
upon
approaching
said
lanes,
so,
a
similar
way
may
possibly
be
found.
Since
these
high
voltage
wires
cannot
be
properly
insulated
and
at
reasonable
cost,
they
might
perhaps
be
strung
only
up
to
the
outskirts
of
the
city
where
there
are
few
houses
and
few
pedestrians
and
there
step-‐down
to
a
voltage
where
the
wires
carrying
the
same
to
the
city
could
be
properly
insulated
for
the
better
protection
of
the
public.
In
view
of
all
the
foregoing,
the
appealed
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
is
hereby
reversed
and
the
complaint
filed
against
the
Company
is
hereby
dismissed.
No
costs.
Paras,
C.J.,
Bengzon,
Padilla,
Reyes,
A.,
Jugo,
Bautista
Angelo,
Labrador,
Concepcion,
Reyes,
J.B.L.,
and
Endencia,
JJ.,
concur.