NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

FACULTY OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

DEPARTMENT OF QUANTITY SURVEYING

Course: Safety, Health And The Construction Environment

Lecturer: Dr Chigara

Student Name: Shepherd Nhanga

Student Number: N01910621A

MSC CPM Stage 2 Individual Assignment

October 2020
Question: Using accident causation theories, unpack the drivers of poor H&S
performance in the construction industry in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. Suggest ways to
improve the situation.

Health and safety performance is the rate of success or failure of pre-set, known health and
safety standards. Health and safety performance can be measured in a number of ways, usually
through a combination of lagging (output) and leading (input) indicators.

 Lagging indicators measure outcomes after an incident (e.g. incident rate, lost time work
injury), and is effectively a measure of past results. Health and safety lagging indicators are
reactive measures that track only negative outcomes, such as an injury once it has already
occurred.
 Leading indicators measure activities to prevent or reduce the severity of an incident in
the present or future (e.g. safety training, safety audits). Health and safety leading indicators
are proactive measures that measure prevention efforts and can be observed and recorded
prior to an injury.

Usually, organizations are looking for zero. Zero accidents, zero ill health, zero harm. Zero
injuries could be the result of a well-executed plan with an equally rigorous process of
implementation where the work occurs. However, zero could also be due to sheer luck. The
incident rate is a lagging indicator often used to measure, demonstrate, and drive safety
performance. While ‘zero harm’ policies are an admirable aspiration, they often reflect a
misguided interpretation of safety management standards and senior management’s
commitment to the prevention of injury.

Lagging indicators are mostly used because accident data is easy to measure and collect, easy
to present internally and externally to relevant departments and organisations and is cost-
effective in terms of the technology and staff required. However, if used in isolation, the
incident rate might result in an unbalanced approach, but the common leading-indicator
methods (auditing, behaviour/culture assessment and inspection) can all produce time lags
before action is taken and incident prevention is realised. Hence, if focus is skewed towards
leading-performance indicators, the opportunity to prevent an incident may be missed.

In effect, a balanced approach is necessary as shown in Fig 1 below, where both leading and
lagging indicators are used to measure health and safety performance. Injuries, or the lack
thereof, are a very important measurement however, it is also important to understand if work
is being done safely and determine if the safety plans are good or it is simply lucky.

Fig 1

The main cause of accident is due to poor safety performance of the workers from a
combination of contributing causes. In order to improve the safety performance, the root causes
of construction accidents and factors affecting them are needed to be investigated.
The main cause of accident is due to poor safety performance of the workers from a
combination of contributing causes. In order to improve the safety performance, the root causes
of construction accidents and factors affecting them are needed to be investigated.
Although the construction industry undoubtedly plays a significant role in the development of
a country, statistics show that construction industry is one of the most dangerous fields due to
poor health and safety performance noted through the fatalities recorded. Poor health and safety
performance can be caused by many factors including the following:

1. Safety equipment - Dislike to wearing PPE by unskilled labourers, Unavailability of

PPE, Low level of awareness on using PPE
2. Safety management - Poor safety awareness of project managers, Failure to appoint a
safety officer
3. Safety attitude of workers - Lack of awareness about site safety and regulations,
unwillingness to follow safety norms
4. Safety training - Lack of training facilities, Lack of understanding the job
5. Other – Falls, Unsafe behaviour such as Operating without authority, working with
moving machinery, Wearing dangling clothes and unsafe lifting, Workers under the
influence of alcohol and drugs
The drivers of poor health and safety performance can be determined by identifying the root
causes of accidents, which is possible by accident investigation techniques such as theories of
accident causation and human errors. Therefore, the drivers of poor health and safety
performance will be discussed using accident causation theories.

Accident Causation Theories are models used to determine the root causes of accidents in order
to help predict and prevent accidents, hence improving health and safety performance.

The history of accident models to date can be traced from the 1920s through three distinct
phases (Figure 1):

1. Simple linear models

2. Complex linear models ·
3. Complex non-linear models

Each type of model is underpinned by specific assumptions:

1. Simple linear models

These models assume that accidents are the result of a series of events or circumstances which
interact sequentially with each other in a linear fashion and thus accidents are preventable by
eliminating one of the causes in the linear sequence.

2. Complex linear models

These models are based on the presumption that accidents are a result of a combination of
unsafe acts and latent hazard conditions within the system which follow a linear path. The
factors furthest away from the accident are attributed to actions of the organisation or
environment and factors at the sharp end being where humans ultimately interact closest to the
accident; the resultant assumption being that accidents could be prevented by focusing on
strengthening barriers and defences.

4. Complex non - linear models

The new generation of thinking about accident modelling has moved towards recognising that
accident models need to be non-linear; that accidents can be thought of as resulting from
combinations of mutually interacting variables which occur in real world environments and it
is only through understanding the combination and interaction of these multiple factors that
accidents can truly be understood and prevented.

Figure 2 below portrays the temporal development of the three types of model and their
underpinning principle. The types of model together with representative examples will now be
described in detail.

Fig 2

1. Simple sequential linear accident models

Simple sequential accident models represent the notion that accidents are the results of a series
of events which occur in a specific and recognisable order. Examples of such theories are the
domino theory, Weaver updated dominoes, Bird and Loftus Updated domino sequence and
Bird and Germain’s Loss Causation model.

1.1 Heinrich’s Domino Theory

The first sequential accident model was the ‘Domino effect’ or ‘Domino theory’ developed by
Heinrich in 1931. The model is based in the assumption that the occurrence of a preventable
injury is the natural culmination of a series of events or circumstances, which invariably occur
in a fixed or logical order and an accident is merely a link in the chain. This model proposed
that certain accident factors could be thought of as being lined up sequentially like dominos
and that an accident is one of five factors in a sequence that results in an injury. The model also
suggests that an injury is invariably caused by an accident and the accident in turn is always
the result of the factor that immediately precedes it. In accident prevention the bull’s eye of the
target is in the middle of the sequence – an unsafe act of a person or a mechanical or physical
hazard. According to statistics on accident’s reports Heinrich deduced that 88 percent of
accidents are due to unsafe act of workers, 10 percent due to unsafe conditions and 2 percent
of all accidents are associated with act of God such as natural disasters. Heinrich’s five factors
were:

i. Ancestry and social environment- Ancestry and social environment are the process
of acquiring knowledge of customs and skills in the workplace. Lack of skills and
knowledge of performing tasks, inappropriate social and environmental conditions will
lead to fault of person.
ii. Fault of person (carelessness)- Faults of person or carelessness are negative features
of a person personality although these unwanted characteristics might be acquired. The
result of carelessness is unsafe act/conditions.
iii. Unsafe act and/or mechanical or physical condition- Unsafe acts/conditions include
the errors and technical failures which cause the accident.
iv. Accident- Accidents are caused by unsafe acts/conditions and subsequently lead to
injuries
v. Injury- Injuries are the consequences of the accidents.

An accident was considered to occur when one of the dominos or accident factors falls and has
an ongoing knock-down effect ultimately resulting in an accident as shown in figure 3.

Fig 3

Based on the domino model, accidents could be prevented by removing one of the factors and
so interrupting the knockdown effect. Heinrich proposed that unsafe acts and mechanical
hazards constituted the central factor in the accident sequence and that removal of this central
factor made the preceding factors ineffective. He focused on the human factor, which he termed
“Man Failure”, as the cause of most accidents giving rise to Heinrich’s chart of direct and
proximate causes shown in figure 4 below.

Heinrich domino theory became the basis for many other studies on accident causation model
with emphasis on management role in accident prevention; these studies are called
Management Model or Domino’s Updated Model. Management models believe that
management system is responsible for occurrence of accidents.

Fig 4

This theory suggests that accidents are caused by both distal and proximal factors. Factors like
ancestry and fault of person which can cause accidents, occur before project commencement.
However, other factors like a hazard and the actual accident occur during the project execution
or construction phase. Therefore, it is not just the unsafe act that causes the accident, but also
the fault of the person and ancestry, which are already embedded in the person. The accident
is caused by factors before project commencement and factors during execution i.e. distal and
proximal factors.
1.2 Management-based theories

Heinrich’s opinions were criticized for oversimplifying of the control of human behaviour in
accident causation although his research and work were the foundation for many other
researchers. The domino theory of Heinrich has been modified and updated over the years with
greater emphasis on management as an original cause of accidents. The results of this updating
were named as management-based theories or updated domino models. The management-
based theories define management as responsible for causing accidents and the theories attempt
to recognize failures within the management system. Updated domino sequence (Bird 1974),
the Adams updated sequence (Adams 1976) and the Weaver updated dominoes (Weaver 1971)
are some examples of management-based theories. There are other management-based theories
which are not domino-based such as Stair step model (Douglas and Crowe 1976) and the
multiple causation model (Petersen 1971).

1.2.1 Weaver updated dominoes (Weaver, 1971; Domino-based model)

Weaver developed an accident theory based on Heinrich domino theory with emphasis on the
role of management system. Weaver regarded the dominoes three, four and five of Heinrich
dominoes as errors caused by operation. Weaver tried to reveal the role of operational errors
by not only determining the cause of accident, but also identifying the reasons that the unsafe
act was allowed to continue and determining whether the management had the safety
knowledge to avoid the occurrence of accident. Weaver set questions in order to clarify the
underlying causes of accident: if management had the knowledge of safety and relevant
standards of the work, what was the reason that the worker was confused to continue the work
in unsafe condition. The answers to the questions can manifest the underlying operational
errors which caused the accident.

1.2.2 Updated domino sequence (Bird, 1974; Domino-based model)

Bird and Loftus (1974) updated the “Domino theory” in order to reflect the role of management
systems in the sequence of accident causes defined by Heinrich. (See Figure 5).
The updated and modified sequence of events is:
i. Lack of control/management (inadequate program, inadequate program standard,
inadequate compliance to standard)
ii. Basic causes/origins (basic causes: 1-personal factors, 2-job factors)
iii. Immediate causes/Symptoms (sub-standard act and condition)
iv. Incident (contact with energy and substance)
v. Loss (property, people, process)

Fig 5

1.2.3 Bird and Germain’s Loss Causation model

The sequential domino representation was continued by Bird and Germain (1985) who
acknowledged that the Heinrich’s domino sequence had underpinned safety thinking for over
30 years. They recognised the need for management to prevent and control accidents in what
were fast becoming complex situations due to the advances in technology. They developed an
updated domino model which they considered reflected the direct management relationship
with the causes and effects of accident loss and incorporated arrows to show the multi-linear
interactions of the cause and effect sequence. This model became known as the Loss Causation
Model and was again represented by a line of five dominos, linked to each other in a linear
sequence as shown in Figure 6 below.

Fig 6
The updated domino theories, like the Domino theory, suggest that accidents are caused by
both immediate causes and distal causes like inadequate programs. Lack of proper health and
safety plans or poor definition of safety standards can be a cause of accidents as the first domino
which is lack of control. Basic causes which include personal factors and job factors are the
next domino, which are a form of distal factors. Unsafe acts are the immediate cause of the
accident. This model, therefore, suggests that accidents are not caused by unsafe acts alone,
but also by lack of control as well as personal factors and job factors which are distal factors.

1.2.4 Multiple causation model (Petersen, 1971; Non-Domino-based model)

The Heinrich domino theory is structured on theory that an accident is caused by a single cause.
Petersen (1971) developed a model based on management system rather than individual.
Petersen believed that there are two major features of the events which leading to an accident,
namely an unsafe act and an unsafe condition. However, there are more than single cause which
contribute or lead to both unsafe act and unsafe condition and finally occurrence of an accident.
Unlike simplified theory of domino, there are causes and sub-causes when an accident happens
as shown in Figure 7 below. Under the concept of multiple causation, the factors combine in
random fashion, causing accidents. Petersen maintained that these are the factors to be targeted
in accident investigation. Petersen also asserted that trying to find the unsafe act or the
condition is dealing only at the symptomatic level, because the act or condition may be the
‘‘proximate cause,’’ but invariably it is not the ‘‘root cause.’’ As most others did, Petersen
emphasized that root causes must be found to have permanent improvement. He indicated that
root causes often relate to the management system and may be due to management policies,
procedures, supervision, effectiveness, training, etc. Through identification of these multiple
contributing causes of accident, the unsafe acts and unsafe conditions should be prevented from
arising.
 Fig 7

This theory suggests that accidents are caused by unsafe acts and unsafe conditions as the
immediate causes or proximal factors. However, it also suggests that these unsafe acts and
conditions are causes by various sub causes which combine in a random fashion. Unsafe acts
and conditions come about during the execution phase of the project, while the sub causes can
come from the planning phase. For example, poorly planned workstations can be considered a
sub cause which causes an unsafe condition that in turn leads to an accident. Therefore, this
theory also supports the view that accidents are indeed caused by unsafe acts and conditions as
immediate causes, and that accidents are also caused other sub causes which are distal factors.

1.3 Human errors Models

1.3.1 Behaviour models

Behaviour models blame humans for occurrence of accidents. Errors in this approach are likely
to be caused by humans in different environmental conditions. Humans are blamed just for
their unsafe behaviour. Human errors are defined as ‘anyone set of human actions that exceed
some limit of acceptability’. behaviour models are mostly based on the accident proneness
theory indicating that some people have specific characteristics which make them more
susceptible of having accidents. Many behaviours models have been developed by researchers
in order to describe the reasons for accidents repeaters such as the ‘Goals freedom alertness
theory’ (Kerr 1957) and the ‘Motivation reward satisfaction model’.

1.3.1.1 Goals Freedom Alertness Theory (Kerr 1957)

Goals Freedom Alertness theory of accident reflects the idea that the psychologically satisfying
and desirable work environment lead to the safe performance of tasks and activities. The theory
expresses the idea that accidents are low-quality activities due to unpleasant psychological
work environment. Alertness will be lowered as a result; the higher and the richer the climate
is in terms of economic and non-economic opportunities; the more chance of alertness is
created. The result of alertness is a higher quality performance and finally an accident-free
work environment. A psychologically satisfying work environment is a place where the
workers are encouraged to performing their best, taking part, arranging achievable goals and
innovating methods of achieving those goals. Workers are free to participate in identifying and
solving work problems; the management system permit their workers to define goals for
themselves and also lets them innovate methods of achieving their goals. Management can
improve the environment of work for workers by managerial techniques, participative methods,
setting defined goals for workers etc.

1.3.2 Human factors theory

Human factors model is based on the idea that human errors are the major cause of accidents.
However unsafe human behaviour as well as poor design of workplace and environment which
do not consider the human limitation, are considered as contributory factors. Ferrel theory
(Ferrel 1977), the Human-error causation model (Petersen 1982), the McClay model (McClay
1989) and the Dejoy model (Dejoy 1990) are samples of human factor model.

1.3.2.1 Ferrel Theory

One of the most important theories developed in the area of human factor models is that by
Ferrel. Doctor Russel Ferrel (1997) developed his theory of accidents based on a chain of
human factors causes (See Figure 8). He believed that the human errors are the main causes of
accidents occurrence and they are caused by the following factors:
i. Overload - the overload factor reflects the incompatibility between the load and the
capability of the human. The result of this mismatch is anxiety, pressure, fatigue and
emotions that can be intensified by physical environment such as dust, light, noise,
fumes etc. where the person is working.
ii. Incorrect response - the incorrect response by the person is caused by the
incompatible situation where he/she is working in.
iii. Improper activity- the person performing the activity improperly either due to lack of
knowledge of appropriate way of performing the activity, or intentionally take the risk.
 Fig 8

This model suggests that accidents are caused by overload, incorrect response and improper
activity of a person when placed in a certain environment. Overload can be caused by poor
planning during the project planning phase, where a person is allocated a job beyond their
capabilities. As a result, they feel pressure, anxiety etc, which can be worsened by the
environment they are working in. Incorrect response and improper activities occur during the
project construction or execution phase and are the immediate causes of the accident, i.e. the
proximal factors. Thus, this theory also supports other researches that suggest accidents are
caused by unsafe acts, but in this case the distal factors causing the accident are the unsafe
environment the person is exposed to and the overload. The theory agrees that accidents are
caused by both distal and proximal factors.

2. Complex linear models

Sequential models were attractive as they encouraged thinking around causal series. They focus
on the view that accidents happen in a linear way where A leads to B which leads to C and
examine the chain of events between multiple causal factors displayed in a sequence usually
from left to right. Accident prevention methods developed from these sequential models focus
on finding the root causes and eliminating them or putting in place barriers to encapsulate the
causes. Sequential accident models were still being developed in the 1970’s but had begun to
incorporate multiple events in the sequential path. Key models developed in this evolutionary
period include energy damage models, time sequence models, epidemiological models and
systemic models.

2.1 Energy-damage models

The initial statement of the concept of energy damage in the literature is often attributed to
Gibson, Haddon and others. The energy damage model (figure 9) is based on the supposition
that “Damage (injury) is a result of an incident energy whose intensity at the point of contact
with the recipient exceeds the damage threshold of the recipient”.

Fig 9

In the Energy Damage Model, the hazard is a source of potentially damaging energy and an
accident, injury or damage may result from the loss of control of the energy when there is a
failure of the hazard control mechanism. These mechanisms may include physical or structural
containment, barriers, processes and procedures. The space transfer mechanism is the means
by which the energy and the recipient are brought together assuming that they are initially
remote from each other. The recipient boundary is the surface that is exposed and susceptible
to the energy.

This model suggests that an accident occurs when potentially damaging energy is released,
coupled by failure of the hazard control mechanism to control the energy. The energy is then
exerted on a recipient which cannot contain the energy and ends up injured or damaged. This
theory, therefore, varies with other theories in that it does not consider distal factors but only
the immediate cause of the accident, which is the damaging energy and failure of hazard control
mechanism. All this occurs in the execution phase of the project and ignores other distal factors
which may lead to accidents, for example poor planning for the hazard.

2.2 Epidemiological models

Epidemiological accident models can be traced back to the study of disease epidemics and the
search for causal factors around their development. Gordon (1949) recognised that “injuries,
as distinguished from disease, are equally susceptible to this approach”, meaning that our
understanding of accidents would benefit by recognising that accidents are caused by: a
combination of forces from at least three sources, which are the host – and man is the host of
principal interest – the agent itself, and the environment in which host and agent find
themselves. Recognising that doctors had begun to focus on trauma or epidemiological
approaches, engineers on systems, and human factors practitioners on psychology Benner
(1975); considered these as only partial treatments of entire events rather than his proposed
entire sequence of events. Thus, Benner contributed to the development of epidemiological
accident modelling which moved away from identifying a few causal factors to understanding
how multiple factors within a system combined. These models proposed that an accident
combines agents and environmental factors which influence a host environment (like an
epidemic) that have negative effects on the organism (a.k.a. organisation). See for example
Figure 10.

Fig 10

This model suggests that accidents are caused by both environmental factors and human error
split which are caused by predisposition characteristics and situational characteristics.
Situational characteristics and predisposition characteristics are the attributes of human error
which can be peer pressure, poor attitude and risk taking. This model suggests that exposure to
a certain environment causes a reaction based on the situational and predisposition
characteristics, leading to an accident. Therefore, it agrees with other that accidents are caused
by both environmental factors and human error where predisposition characteristics are distal
factors while situational characteristics are proximal factors and once exposed to a certain
environment, will both contribute to an accident.
 2.3 Reason’s Swiss Cheese

Reason’s early work in the field of psychological error mechanisms was important in this
discussion on complexity of accident causation. By analysing everyday slips and lapses he
developed models of human error mechanisms. Reason (1990) went on to address the issue of
two kinds of errors: active errors and latent errors. Active errors were those “where the effect
is felt almost immediately” and latent errors “tended to lie dormant in the system largely
undetected until they combined with other factors to breach system defences”. Reason, unlike
Heinrich (1931) and Bird and Germain (1985) before him, accepted that accidents were not
solely due to individual operator error (active errors) but lay in the wider systemic
organisational factors (latent conditions) in the upper levels of the organisation. Reason’s
model is commonly known as the Swiss Cheese Model (see Figure 11).

Fig 11

Unlike the modelling work of Heinrich (1931) and Bird and Germain (1985), Reason did not
specify what these holes represented or what the various layers of cheese represented. The
model left the OHS professional to their own investigations as to what factors within the
organisation these items might be. Reason had a major impact on OHS thinking and accident
causation in that he moved the focus of investigations from blaming the individual to a no-
blame investigation approach; from a person approach to a systems approach; from active to
latent errors; and he focused on hazards, defences and losses.

The swiss cheese theory agrees with other accident causation theories in that accidents are
caused by latent and active errors, or proximal and distal factors. Active errors are the
immediate causes of the accidents which occur during the execution phase of the project whilst
latent errors are the dormant system errors which can be made in the planning phase of the
project. However, as previously mentioned, Reason did not specify what these latent and active
errors or “holes” are or what the various layers of cheese represented. Nevertheless, the model
shows that both distal and proximal factors contribute to accidents.

3. Complex nonlinear accident models

The new generation of thinking about accident modelling has moved towards recognising that
accident models need to be non-linear; that accidents can be thought of as resulting from
combinations of mutually interacting variables which occur in real world environments and it
is only through understanding the combination and interaction of these multiple factors that
accidents can truly be understood and prevented. Two new major accident models were
introduced in the early 2000s with the intention of addressing problems with linear accident
models (Hovden, et al., 2009): · The Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (Leveson,
2004). · The Functional Resonance Accident Model (Hollnagel, 2004).

These theories suggest that accidents are not caused by a single factor, but my multiple factors
which interact in a random nonlinear way. They agree with other theories in that there ae
various causes to accidents, both distal and proximal, but they differ in that the interaction of
the accident causing factors is complex and not linear.
STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE HEALTH AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE

From the theories discusses above, it can be concluded that poor health and safety performance
is caused by many factors including the following: ancestry and social environment, fault of
person /carelessness, unsafe act and/or mechanical or physical condition, lack of
control/management, poor management policies, procedures and supervision, lack of training,
overload, incorrect response, improper activity etc. These factors can come before the project
starts e.g. ancestry and social environment or come during project planning e.g. poor
management policies or they can come during project execution e.g. unsafe acts.

Controlling exposures to occupational hazards is the fundamental method of protecting workers

by avoiding injuries, illnesses, and incidents; minimizing or eliminating safety and health risks
and helping employers provide workers with safe and healthful working conditions, thereby
improving health and safety performance. Traditionally, a hierarchy of controls has been used
as a means of determining how to implement feasible and effective control solutions and in
turn improve health and safety performance.

One representation of this hierarchy is shown in Figure 12 as follows:

Fig 12
 1. Elimination

Elimination is the process of physically removing the hazard from the workplace. It is the most
effective way to control a risk because the hazard is no longer present. It is the preferred way
to control a hazard and should be used whenever possible. Despite being the most effective at
reducing hazards, elimination also tend to be the most difficult to implement in an existing
process. If the process is still at the design or development stage, elimination and substitution
of hazards may be inexpensive and simple to implement. For an existing process, major
changes in equipment and procedures may be required to eliminate or substitute for a hazard.
An example of elimination is if employees must work high above the ground, the hazard can
be eliminated by moving the piece they are working on to ground level to eliminate the need
to work at heights.

2. Substitution

Substitution, like elimination, is one of the most effective at reducing hazards but also tends to
be the most difficult to implement in an existing process. It involves replacing hazardous
materials or machines with less hazardous ones.

It is sometimes grouped with elimination because, in effect, you are removing the first
substance or hazard from the workplace. The goal, obviously, is to choose a new chemical that
is less hazardous than the original.

The table below provides some examples:

Instead Of: Consider:

organic solvents (causes various effects on body) water-detergent solutions
leaded glazes, paints, pigments (causes various effects versions that do not contain lead
on body)
sandstone grinding wheels (causes severe respiratory synthetic grinding wheels such as
illness due to silica) aluminium oxide

However, care needs to be taken to ensure the substitute chemical or substance is not causing
any harmful effects, and to control and monitor exposures to make sure that the replacement
chemical or substance is below occupational exposure limits.
Another type of substitution includes using the same chemical but to use it in a different form.
For example, a dry, dusty powder may be a significant inhalation hazard but if this material
can be purchased and used as pellets or crystals, there may be less dust in the air and therefore
less exposure.

Fig 13

3. Engineering Controls

Engineering controls are methods that are built into the design of a plant, equipment, ventilation
systems or processes to minimize the hazard. Engineering controls are a reliable way to control
worker exposures as long as the controls are designed, used and maintained properly.

Engineering controls are favoured over administrative and personal protective equipment
(PPE) for controlling existing worker exposures in the workplace because they are designed to
remove the hazard at the source, before it comes in contact with the worker. Well-designed
engineering controls can be highly effective in protecting workers and will typically be
independent of worker interactions to provide this high level of protection. The initial cost of
engineering controls can be higher than the cost of administrative controls or PPE, but over the
longer term, operating costs are frequently lower, and in some instances, can provide a cost
savings in other areas of the process.

. The basic types of engineering controls are:

 Process control.
 Enclosure and/or isolation of emission source.
 Ventilation.
3.1 Process Control

Process control involves changing the way a job activity or process is done to reduce the risk.
Monitoring should be done before and as well as after the change is implemented to make sure
the changes did, in fact, control the hazard.

Examples of process changes include to:

 Use wet methods rather than dry when drilling or grinding. "Wet method" means that
water is sprayed over a dusty surface to keep dust levels down or material is mixed with
water to prevent dust from being created.
 Use an appropriate "wet method" instead of dry sweeping (e.g. with a broom) to control
dust and reduce the inhalation hazard.
 Use electric motors rather than diesel ones to eliminate diesel exhaust emissions.
 Instead of conventional spray painting, try to dip, paint with a brush, or use "airless"
spray paint methods. These methods will reduce the amount of paint that is released
into the air.
 Use automation - the less workers have to handle or use the materials, the less potential
there is for exposure.
 Use mechanical transportation rather than manual methods.

3.2 Enclosure and Isolation

These methods aim to keep the chemical "in" and the worker "out" (or vice versa). An enclosure
keeps a selected hazard "physically" away from the worker. Enclosed equipment, for example,
is tightly sealed and it is typically only opened for cleaning or maintenance. Other examples
include "glove boxes" (where a chemical is in a ventilated and enclosed space and the employee
works with the material by using gloves that are built in), abrasive blasting cabinets, or remote
control devices. Care must be taken when the enclosure is opened for maintenance as exposure
could occur if adequate precautions are not taken. The enclosure itself must be well maintained
to prevent leaks.
Isolation places the hazardous process "geographically" away from the majority of the workers.
Common isolation techniques are to create a contaminant-free or noise-free booth either around
the equipment or around the employee workstations.
3.3 Ventilation

Ventilation is a method of control that strategically "adds" and "removes" air in the work
environment. Ventilation can remove or dilute an air contaminant if designed properly. Local
exhaust ventilation is very adaptable to almost all chemicals and operations. It removes the
contaminant at the source so it cannot disperse into the workspace and it generally uses lower
exhaust rates than general ventilation (general ventilation usually exchanges air in the entire
room).

Local exhaust ventilation is an effective means of controlling hazardous exposures but should
be used when other methods (such as elimination or substitution) are not possible.

The design of a ventilation system is very important and must match the particular process and
chemical or contaminant in use. Expert guidance should be sought. It is a very effective control
measure but only if it is designed, tested, and maintained properly.

Because contaminants are exhausted to the outdoors, you should also check with your local
environment ministry or municipality for any environmental air regulations or bylaws that may
apply in your area.

4. Administrative Controls

Administrative controls limit workers' exposures by scheduling shorter work times in

contaminant areas or by implementing other "rules". These control measures have many
limitations because the hazard itself is not actually removed or reduced. Administrative
controls are not generally favoured because they can be difficult to implement, maintain and
are not a reliable way to reduce exposure. Administrative controls aim to change the way people
work. Administrative controls are frequently used with existing processes where hazards are
not particularly well controlled. Administrative controls may be relatively inexpensive to
establish but, over the long term, can be very costly to sustain. This method for protecting
workers has also proven to be less effective than other measures, requiring significant effort by
the affected workers. Administrative controls alter the way the work is done, including timing
of work, policies and other rules, and work practices such as standards and operating
procedures (including training, housekeeping, and equipment maintenance, and personal
hygiene practices).

When necessary, methods of administrative control include:

  Restricting access to a work area.
 Restricting the task to only those competent or qualified to perform the work.
 Scheduling maintenance and other high exposure operations for times when few
workers are present (such as evenings, weekends).
 Using job-rotation schedules that limit the amount of time an individual worker is
exposed to a substance.
 Using a work-rest schedule that limits the length of time a worker is exposure to a
hazard.

4.1 Work Practices

Work practices are also a form of administrative controls. In most workplaces, even if there
are well designed and well-maintained engineering controls present, safe work practices are
very important. Some elements of safe work practices include:

 Developing and implementing safe work procedures or standard operating procedures.

 Training and education of employees about the operating procedures as well as other
necessary workplace training.
 Establishing and maintaining good housekeeping programs.
 Keeping equipment well maintained.
 Preparing and training for emergency response for incidents such as spills, fire or
employee injury.

4.2 Education and Training

Employee education and training on how to conduct their work safely helps to minimize the
risk of exposure and is a critical element of any complete workplace health and safety program.
Training must cover not only how to do the job safely, but it must also ensure that workers
understand the hazards and risks of their job. It must also provide them with information on
how to protect themselves and co-workers.
4.3 Good Housekeeping

Good housekeeping is essential to prevent the accumulation of hazardous or toxic materials

(e.g., build-up of dust or contaminant on ledges, or beams), or hazardous conditions (e.g., poor
stockpiling), and also prevents trip and fall hazards.

4.4 Emergency Preparedness

Being prepared for emergencies means making sure that the necessary equipment and supplies
are readily available and that employees know what to do when something unplanned happens
such as a release, spill, fire, or injury. These procedures should be written down and employees
should have the opportunity to practice their emergency response skills regularly.

4.5 Personal Hygiene Practices and Facilities

Personal hygiene practices are another effective way to reduce the amount of a hazardous
material absorbed, ingested or inhaled by a worker. They are particularly effective if the
contaminants can accumulate on the skin, clothing or hair.

Examples of personal hygiene practices include:

 Washing hands after handling material and before eating, drinking or smoking.
 Avoiding touching lips, nose and eyes with contaminated hands.
 No smoking, drinking, chewing gum or eating in the work areas - these activities should
be permitted only in a "clean" area.
 Not storing hazardous materials in the same refrigerator as food items.

5. PPE

PPE is equipment worn by individuals to reduce exposure such as contact with chemicals or
exposure to noise. Personal protective equipment (PPE) includes items such as respirators,
protective clothing such as gloves, face shields, eye protection, and footwear that serve to
provide a barrier between the wearer and the chemical or material.

Personal protective equipment should never be the only method used to reduce exposure except
under very specific circumstances because PPE may "fail" (stop protecting the worker) with
little or no warning. For example: "breakthrough" can occur with gloves, clothing, and
respirator cartridges.
Using administrative controls and PPE to reduce risks does not control the hazard at the source.
Administrative controls and PPE rely on human behavior and supervision and, used on their
own, tend to be least effective in minimizing risks. Administrative controls and PPE should
only be used as last resorts when there are no other practical control measures available, as an
interim measure until introducing a more effective way of controlling the risk and to increase
the effectiveness of higher-level control measures. A combination of two or more controls from
the hierarchy is often needed to adequately control the risk, particularly high risks, to a level
that is 'reasonably practicable'.
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