PRIMER

Questions As To Form

Q1: What does matter of form mean with respect to pleadings?

A: The Supreme Court defined form as follows: “form is the methodology

used to express rules of practice and procedure. It is the order or method
of legal proceedings. It relates to technical details. It is ordinarily the
antithesis of substance. It is an established method of expression or
practice. It is a fixed or formal way of proceeding.1”

In this instance, it pertains to the manner and /or formalities by which an

impeachment complaint should be drafted and filed.

Q2: What is the form prescribed by the House Rules on Impeachment as

regards impeachment complaints?

A: The rules require the following: (1) if initiated by a member of Congress,

the complaint must be verified; (2) if initiated by any citizen, the complaint
must not only be verified, it must also be endorsed by any member of
Congress; and (3) if initiated by at least 1/3 of the members of Congress,
the complaint must be verified by the said initiating members. In all cases,
the rules further require that the verified complaint must be filed before the
Office of the Secretary General.

Q3: Does the instant complaint comply with the form prescribed under the
House Rules on Impeachment?

A: Yes. It was verified by the complainants and was endorsed by a member

of Congress and filed before the Office of the Secretary General.

Q4: Section 13, Rule IV on the House Rules on Impeachment provides that
the form of the verification should be as follows:

“We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and

state: That we are the complainants in the above-entitled
complaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have caused the said
complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read the contents
thereof; and that the allegations therein are true of our own
knowledge and belief on the basis of our reading and appreciation
of documents and other records pertinent thereto.”

However, the verification in the instant impeachment complaint reads as

follows:

“I, (name of complainant), of legal age, Filipino and with

address at (address), after having been duly sworn in accordance
with law, do hereby certify and state that I am a complainant in the
foregoing Impeachment Complaint.

1
Munsalud vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 167181, December 23, 2008.

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 I hereby further attest that I have caused the preparation of
the foregoing Impeachment Complaint, that I have read the same,
and that the allegations contained therein are true and correct
based on my own personal knowledge and/or on authentic
documents and other available records.”

Does the verification form of the instant complaint comply with the
verification form prescribed in Section 13, Rule IV?

A: Yes. In fact, the verification in the instant impeachment complaint even

includes those within the personal knowledge of the complainants. This is
unlike the verification in Section 13, Rule IV, which limits it to “knowledge
and belief on the basis of our reading and appreciation of documents and
other records pertinent thereto.”

It may not amiss to stress that the verification in Section 13, Rule IV
applies only to impeachment complaints initiated by 1/3 of the
members of Congress. It does not apply impeachment complaints
initiated by any member of Congress or any other person.

Q5: Should the pertinent and material documents alleged in the impeachment
complaint be attached?

A: The House Rules on Impeachment do not require the attachment of said

documents. In any case, the instant impeachment complaint has, as its
annexes, copies of the documents referred in the complaint.

Questions As To Substance

Q1: When does a complaint for impeachment be deemed sufficient in

substance?

A: Section 4, Rule III of the House Rules on Impeachment expressly provides

that the requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee. Thus, sufficiency in substance is satisfied where the facts
alleged in the impeachment complaint would: (a) constitute the offense
charged; and (b) determine the jurisdiction of the committee.

Q2: What are the offenses charged in the instant impeachment complaint?

A: Betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the constitution.

Q3: Does the Committee have jurisdiction over these offenses?

A: Yes. Under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may

be removed from office on impeachment for culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust.

A. Betrayal of Public Trust

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Q4: What constitutes betrayal of public trust?

A: In his commentaries on the Philippine Constitution, Supreme Court Justice

Isagani Cruz defines the offense betrayal of public trust as covering all
manner of offenses unbecoming of a public functionary but not punishable
by the criminal statutes.

In his commentaries on the Philippine Constitution, Constitutional

Commission Member Joaquin Bernas defines “betrayal of public trust” as
covering any violation of the oath of office. According to him, the intent of
its proponent, Commissioner delos Reyes, was to include all acts, even if
not punishable by statute as penal offenses, which would render the
officer unfit to continue in office. Fr. Bernas, however, stressed that, for
betrayal of public trust to be grounds for impeachment, their concrete
manner of commission must be of the same severity as “treason” and
“bribery”, offenses that strike at the very heart of the life of the nation2.

Q5: What are the charges in the complaint against respondent Ombudsman,
which constitute betrayal of public trust?

A: There are six charges of betrayal of public trust. These are the following:
(1) exonerating all the COMELEC officials involved in the P1.3 Billion
Mega Pacific Election Computerization Contract Bidding Case,
notwithstanding the categorical findings of irregularities and corruption
made by the Supreme Court; (2) failing to act promptly on the reported
graft and corruption perpetrated by bidders and government officials on
the World Bank-Financed Road Projects; (3) filing of a defective
Information against former Justice Secretary Hernani Perez for his
extortion activities against former Congressman Mark Jimenez; (4) failing
to act promptly on the graft and corruption cases on the more than P1
Billion Fertilizer Fund Scam involving former Department of Agriculture
Secretary Jocjoc Bolante; (5) failing to act promptly on the graft and
corruption case involving the “Euro-generals”; and (6) arbitrarily issuing
dismissal and suspension orders against Iloilo Governor Neil Tupas and
Bataan Governor Enrique Garcia.

1. Re: Mega Pacific Case

Q6: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the Mega Pacific
case which constitute betrayal of public trust?

A: The complaint essentially alleged that: (a) the Supreme Court nullified the
contract awarded to Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., because it found “clear
violations of law and jurisprudence” in the award and “reckless disregard
of COMELEC’s bidding rules and procedure”; (b) thus, the Supreme Court
directed the Ombudsman to investigate the criminal liability of the public
officials and private individuals involved in the contract; and (c) respondent
Ombudsman, however, approved the resolution absolving all public
officials concerned in the contract. Hence, to summarize, while the

2
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 2003, p. 1113.

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 Supreme Court found that crimes were committed in awarding the contract
to Mega Pacific, the Ombudsman allegedly did not find any criminal
responsible for the said criminal acts.

Q7: Why would the exoneration of all public officials involved in the Mega
Pacific case constitute betrayal of public trust?

A: When respondent took her oath of office, she committed herself to

prosecute public officials involved in graft and corruption cases. By
absolving all the public officials involved in the Mega Pacific case, even if
found to be imbued with graft and corruption by the Supreme Court, she
not only disregarded the findings of the Supreme Court, but she likewise
abandoned her duty to prosecute erring public officials. This certainly
betrays the trust reposed by the public in her office as the protector of the
people.

Q8: Isn’t it true, however, that the Supreme Court never stated in its Decision
that a crime was committed in the Mega Pacific deal?

A: It is true that the Supreme Court did not categorically state the crimes
committed by the public officials involved in its Decision. The Supreme
Court, however, categorically stated that there were “clear violations of law
and jurisprudence” in the award and “reckless disregard of COMELEC’s
bidding rules and procedure”. It is thus absurd for the Ombudsman to
even claim that there was no crime.

Q9: In the Decision of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman was merely
directed to determine the criminal liability, if any, of the public officials
involved in the Mega Pacific case. It was not directed to file criminal
charges against these officials. Hence, the Ombudsman should not be
faulted if, in its determination, the public officials involved were absolved.
Is this argument valid?

A: No. It is true that the Ombudsman was given the discretion to determine
the criminal liability of the public officials involved. However, this
determination must be made in the light of the findings of the Supreme
Court on the matter. As duly found by the Supreme Court, there were
“clear violations of law and jurisprudence” in the award and “reckless
disregard of COMELEC’s bidding rules and procedure” in awarding the
contract to Mega Pacific. Hence, it is impossible to believe that not one of
the public officials involved committed those violations or reckless
disregarded the bidding rules and procedure.

And even assuming arguendo that no criminal liability can be

imputed to the involved public officials, there is, at the very least,
administrative liability considering that there were clear violations of
law and reckless disregard of COMELEC bidding procedures.
However, the Ombudsman absolved the said public officials even
from any administrative liability.

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Q10: Does the pendency of a petition before the Supreme Court challenging the
Ombudsman’s resolution dismissing the charges against the concerned
COELEC officials in the Mega Pacific case and praying that the
Ombudsman be held in contempt pose a prejudicial question to this issue
in the impeachment complaint, which warrant the suspension on its
resolution pending the Supreme Court’s resolution on the matter?

A: The pendency of such a petition would not necessarily warrant the

suspension of the resolution of this issue, since the jurisdiction on
impeachment lies with Congress. Hence, Congress will have to determine
for itself if the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the corruption charges against the said COMELEC officials.

(On the other hand, there is a possibility that the Ombudsman’s allies in
the Committee on Justice may suggest that the House defers its resolution
until the SC has resolved the said petition.)

2. Re: WB Financed Road Project

Q11: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the WB Financed
Road Project which constitute betrayal of public trust?

A: The complaint essentially alleged that: (a) as early as May 2006, the
Department of Institutional Integrity of the World Bank has provided the
Ombudsman with an oral briefing on the interim findings of its
administrative finding inquiry anent the allegations of fraud and corruption
in the World Bank Financed Road Project; (b) despite its constitutional
mandate to investigate on its own any act or omission of any public official
or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper and inefficient, the Ombudsman did not immediately initiate any
investigation3.

Q12: Why should the Ombudsman’s inaction on the March 2006 oral briefing be
construed as a betrayal of public trust?

A: Because she is explicitly mandated by the Constitution to act promptly on

complaints filed before her office. In failing to act immediately, she is
consequently disregarding her constitutionally mandated function.

Q13: The Ombudsman claims that, after receiving the Referral Report in
November 2007, it immediately conducted a fact finding investigation;
hence, she is not guilty of not acting promptly on the complaints. Is this
valid?

A: No. As disclosed in newspaper reports, WB investigators have already

coordinated with her office as early as March 2006. Hence, she should
have directed a fact finding investigation as early as that time.

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The complaint also alleged that the Ombudsman received the Referral Report of the WorldBank in
November 2007, but still did nothing. Recent news reports, however, indicate that, after receiving the said
report, the Ombudsman directed her deputy to conduct a fact finding investigation in November 2007.

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Q14: The Ombudsman further claims that it could not act on the information
divulged in March 2006, because the information given was limited and
even characterized as restricted and consequently restricted her office
from further looking into the complaint. Does this excuse the Ombudsman
from her inaction?

A: No. The Ombudsman is equipped with all the powers to perform her
mandate. She could have used the information given initially on March
2006 to conduct her own investigation based on the available information.
Yet, she admittedly never conducted an investigation. In fact, WB
representative to the Philippines, Bert Hofman, said that “[m]ost of the
evidence we find in the collusion were from documentary evidence. They
do interview witnesses. They do interview people to corroborate the
evidence found in the documentation,” he said. But: “This is all evidence
on the bid itself; nothing to do with witnesses, nothing to do with
statements, nothing to do with hearsay. This is all in the bid documents
themselves,” he said4.

Q15: Does the subsequent resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable

cause to prosecute public officials involved in the WB Financed Road
Project render this issue moot and academic?

A: No. The Ombudsman’s subsequent resolution finding probable cause

does not change the fact that the Ombudsman failed to immediately act on
the information relayed to her office by the Worldbank in March 2006.

3. Re: Nani Perez case

Q16: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the Nani Perez case
which constitute betrayal of public trust?

A: The complaint essentially alleged that: (a) After several years of

investigation, the Ombudsman eventually filed several criminal cases
against former Justice Secretary Perez arising from his extortion activities
against Congressman Mark Jimenez; (b) However, the Sandiganbayan
dismissed the Ombudsman Information for violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act 3019 for being fatally defective.

In addition, though not alleged in the main body of the complaint, it is

further alleged in footnote number 6 of the impeachment complaint that
the Ombudsman’s inordinate filing of the complaint against Nani Perez
has caused the dismissal of the robbery charge against him by the
Sandiganbayan for violating Perez’s right to speedy trial.

Q17: Why does the dismissal of the said criminal case constitute betrayal of
public trust?

A: The dismissal appears to be deliberate, since it is hard to believe that the

Ombudsman, who served for 21 years at the Department of Justice and
who investigated the matter for several years, would file a defective
4
Inquirer.net, “The 2nd Impeachment”, 16 March 2009.

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 Information against Nani Perez. And even if it were true that the
Ombudsman mistakenly filed a defective Information, the mistake
demonstrates her gross ignorance of the law and manifest incompetence,
which is contrary to her sworn commitment to diligently discharge the
duties of her office.

Q18: Is the Ombudsman legally required to be perfect in its prosecution as to

warrant the extraordinary remedy of impeachment each time it loses a
case?

A: No. The case of Nani Perez, however, is different, because it was

dismissed not after a trial on the merits. It was dismissed because the
Sandiganbayan found that the allegations in the Information drafted by the
Ombudsman, after several years of investigation, would not constitute the
offense of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act 3019. Hence, the high
profile and sensitive case of Nani Perez was dismissed due to the
incompetence of the Ombudsman.

4. Re: Bolante Fertilizer Fund Scam

Q19: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the Nani Perez case
which constitute betrayal of public trust?

A: The complaint essentially alleged that: (a) in 2004, complaints were filed
by Atty. Frank Chavez and Marlene Garcia Esperat regarding the Fertilizer
Fund Scam before the Ombudsman; (b) on 20 February 2006, the Senate
transmitted to the Ombudsman its findings and the evidence it gathered
during its investigation on the said Fertilizer Fund Scam; (c) despite the
foregoing, however, and despite a public commitment to resolve the case
by January 2009, the case remains unresolved and pending before the
Ombudsman.

Q20: How does the foregoing betray the public trust?

A: As Ombudsman, she is constitutionally mandated to promptly act on

complaints filed before her office. In fact, in a number of cases, the
Supreme Court has dismissed cases filed by the Ombudsman due to its
inordinate delay in resolving cases pending before it.

Q21: Is there undue delay in this case considering that Mr. Bolante was
detained in the US from late 2006 to October 2008 and thus could not be
directed to submit his counter-affidavit in accordance with the
requirements of due process?

A: Yes. While Mr. Bolante is the principal respondent in the case, his
absence does not bar the Ombudsman from investigating the matter and
verifying the evidence submitted before it. In fact, when Mr. Bolante was
not able to file his counter-affidavit within the deadline given to him by the
Ombudsman in November 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman even said
that it can still proceed with the case. Unfortunately, apart from the
creation of an alleged task force, which incidentally recommended the

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 filing of graft charges against Mr. Bolante and other public officials, no
other significant developments came out of its investigation.

Q22: Considering the large scope of the investigation, which covered 17 regions
and 181 transactions, not to mention talking to 103 congressmen, 49
governors and 29 municipal mayors all over the country, the Ombudsman
cannot be faulted for the length of time it took to investigate the scam. Is
this valid?

A: No, this is too convenient an argument, considering that, upon Bolante’s

return in October 2008, the Ombudsman, who then began its preliminary
investigation on Mr. Bolante, even claimed that it could already complete
the investigation within 90 days.

5. Re: Euro-generals case

Q23: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the Euro Generals
case which constitute betrayal of public trust?

A: The complaint essentially alleged that: (a) It was publicly known that PNP
Dir. De la Paz was stopped by customs inspectors at Moscow
International Airport from boarding a plane after finding 105,000 euros
(P6.93M) in his carry-on baggage, which exceeded the 3,000-euro limit for
departing passengers; (b) Several investigating bodies in the Philippines
have conducted inquiries on said incident, such as the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG), PNP Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management
(DIDM) and National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), all of which have
found overwhelming evidence and sufficient probable cause to file criminal
and administrative complaints against De la Paz and other police officers;
(d) Dela Paz even admitted having failed to declare the said amount when
he left Manila; (e) despite the foregoing and the turn-over of the findings
by the said bodies to the Office of the Ombudsman, the latter has yet to
resolve the case.

Q24: How does the foregoing betray the public trust?

A: As Ombudsman, it is respondent’s duty to promptly act and/or investigate

on complaints of corruption in government. Her failure to immediately act
on this case, where the evidence already shows the liability of PNP
Director Dela Paz, shows her utter disregard of her constitutional duty to
promptly take action.

Q25: Can there be undue delay in this case considering that the incident
occurred in October 2008?

A: Yes. The Ombudsman supposedly began its investigation into the

incident in November 2008 and supposedly received the PNP report at
that time. At about the same time, the other bodies, such as the PNP, the
Napolcom and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, began their
investigation into the matter. To date, the said bodies have completed

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 their investigation and have come up with their separate finding of liability
against Dela Paz. On the other hand, the Ombudsman is still investigating
the case, even after receiving copies of their findings.

Q26: Can there be undue delay if the Ombudsman wants to first verify the
admissions made by PNP Director Dela Paz with the documents it has in
its possession, because his admissions may turn out to be false?

A: Yes. An admission is admissible as evidence against the declarant. Its

veracity insofar as the declarant is concerned no longer needs to be
established.

Q27: Should you fault the Ombudsman if it is ensuring that it has sufficient
evidence to charge Dela Paz in court?

A: The Ombudsman is merely tasked to determine probable cause, and not

establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. And based on the evidence
gathered by other investigating bodies and the admissions of Dela Paz,
the Ombudsman can already make such determination.

6. Re: Case of Gov . Neil Tupas

Q28: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the case of Gov.
Tupas which constitute betrayal of public trust?

A: The complaint essentially alleged that: (a) the Ombudsman resolved the
case of Gov. Tupas and issued an order dismissing him from office and
perpetually disqualifying him from running for any public office; (b) the
order was served on 12 January 2007, which was a day before the start of
the May 2007 election period, where Gov. Tupas was running for
reelection; (c) the issuance and service of the suspension is to harass and
disqualify Gov. Tupas from running in the May 2007 election.

7. Re: Case of Gov. Enrique Garcia

Q29: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the case of Gov.
Enrique Garcia which constitute betrayal of public trust?

A: The complaint essentially alleged that: (a) the Ombudsman issued a 6

month preventive suspension against Gov. Garcia; (b) the preventive
suspension was issued in connection with the administrative charges
supposedly committed by Gov. Garcia during his previous term, which is
contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Aguinaldo vs. Santos and
Salalima vs. Guingona; (c) the preventive suspension order was issued
in view of the personal grudge the Ombudsman has against Gov. Garcia,
which stem from the political defeat of the Ombudsman’s brother for
mayor in Samal, Bataan and the filing by Gov. Garcia of criminal charges
against her brother, which has led to the issuance of 50 warrants of arrest.

Q30: Why are the foregoing acts be deemed a betrayal of public trust?

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A: The Office of the Ombudsman is the protector of the people. Hence, the
office cannot be used as means for political harassment or persecution.

B. Culpable Violation of the Constitution

Q31: What constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution?

A: It is a willful and intentional violation of the Constitution. It does not

include violations committed unintentionally or involuntarily or in good faith
or through an honest mistake of judgment5.

Q32: What are the charges in the complaint against respondent Ombudsman,
which constitute culpable violation of the Constitution?

A: There three (3) charges, namely: (1) violation of the due process clause
under Section1, Article III; (2) violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases under of Section 16, Article III; and (3) violation of Sections 1, 12
and 13 paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article IX.

1. Re: Violation of Due Process Clause

Q33: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the violation of the
due process clause in the Constitution?

A: The complaint cited two instances. In both instances, the complaint is

essentially premised on the rule that a public office is a protected right to
which the holder cannot be deprived thereof without due process.
Unfortunately, in both instances, the holders of the office were deprived of
their office without due process.

In the first instance concerning the case of Gov. Tupas, the complaint
essentially alleged that: (a) the Ombudsman issued the dismissal order
against Gov. Tupas, thereby depriving him of his office; (b) deprivation,
however, was without due process, in that: (i) the issuance was made
after the Ombudsman took over the investigation of the case from the
Ombudsman for the Visayas, who, by RA 6770, is authorized to
investigate the said case; and (ii) worse, Gov Tupas and his co-
respondents were never given an opportunity to present evidence or
refute the evidence against them or submit position papers.

In the second instance concerning the case of Gov. Enriquez, the

complaint essentially alleged that: (a) the Ombudsman issued a
preventive suspension order against Gov. Enriquez, thereby depriving him
of his office; (b) the deprivation, however, was without due process since)
the case where the preventive suspension was issued pertains to acts
committed by Gov. Enriquez during his previous term and accordingly has
been rendered moot and academic when the latter won in his reelection.

2. Violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases

5
Ibid, 1112.

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Q34: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the violation of the
right to speediy disposition of cases in the Constitution?

A: The complaint essentially alleged that: (a) the right to speedy disposition
of cases inures not only to the persons charged, but also to all parties in
all cases, including civil and administrative cases; (b) despite repeated
pleas and clamor for the speedy disposition of cases pending before her
office, the Ombudsman has yet to resolve them or failed to immediately
resolve them; (c) these cases include the Fertilizer Fund Scam and the
Nani Perez case.

Q35: Was there a deliberate or intentional violation of the right to speedy

disposition of cases in the Nani Perez case?

A: Yes. This is best explained by the Sandiganbayan when it dismissed the

robbery charge filed by the Ombudsman against Nani Perez6. In one of its
concluding paragraphs, the Sandiganbayan categorically held as follows:

“Accordingly, there being a clear violation of

the constitutional right of the accused, the
prosecution is ousted of any authority to file the
information and we hereby order the quashing of the
information and the consequent dismissal of this
case.”

Q36: According to the Ombudsman, the preliminary investigation on the case of

Nani Perez, as opposed to the fact finding investigation, took 15 months,
which is what is subject to the rule on speedy disposition of cases. Does
this excuse the Ombudsman?

A: The findings of the Sandigabayan reveal otherwise. According to the

Sandiganbayan, the factual and substantive issues in the charge will not
merit a seven (7) year investigation.

“With the Ombudsman’s finding that the extortion (intimidation) was

perpetrated on February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of
Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO
133706 on February 23, 2001 in favor of the accused, there is no
reason why within a reasonable period from these dates, the
complaint should not be resolved. The act of intimidation was there,
the asportation was complete as of February 23, 2001 why was the
information filed only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge of
Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and
circumstances upon which to anchor a resolution whether to give
due course to the complaint or to dismiss it are on hand. The case
is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear
transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy
respect for the constitutional prerogative of the accused should
have prodded the Ombudsman to act within a reasonable time.”

6
See Annex “D” of the Impeachment Complaint.

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Q37: Was there a deliberate or intentional violation of the right to speedy trial in
the Fertilizer Fund Scam?

A: Yes. When the incumbent Ombudsman assumed office in December

2005, the Fertilizer Fund Scam was already pending before her office. In
2006, her office received copies of the findings of the Senate investigation
into the matter. Despite the lapse of more than three (3) years, she has
yet to resolve the said case. In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70
(1988), the Supreme Court stressed that, even if the issues are substantial
and factual, the same would not warrant a delay of three (3) years in the
investigation.

3. Re: Violation of Constitutional Mandates on Ombudsman

Q38: What are the acts alleged in the complaint as regards the violation of her
Constitutional duties and mandate?

A: The complaint essentially alleged that: (a) the Ombudsman is mandated to

promptly and swiftly act on all complaints filed before her pursuant to the
constitutional mandates of maintaining honesty and integrity in public
service and to take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption; (b) the Ombudsman failed to comply with this mandate in the
cases enumerated under betrayal of public trust.

Q39: What best exemplifies the Ombudsman’s violation of her constitutional

mandate to promptly act on complaints of corruption?

A: The Ombudsman’s handling of the Mega Pacific Case. For a better

appreciation, the timeline of events after the Supreme Court directed the
Ombudsman in 2004 to determine the criminal liability of the COMELEC
officials involved in the Mega Pacific deal:

January 13, 2004 - the Supreme Court declared as void the Php1 billion contract entered
into by the Comelec with the Mega Pacific for the supply of automatic computing
machines. The SC cited “clear violation of law and jurisprudence" and “reckless disregard
of [Comelec’s] own bidding rules and procedure" as among the reasons.

January 14, 2004 - Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo issued an order directing the then
Fact-Finding and Intelligence Research Office now Field Investigation Office to conduct
an in-depth inquiry on the Comelec-Mega Pacific case.

Feb. 14, 2006 - Acting on the manifestation and supplemental motion of petitioner ITFP,
the SC issued its resolution directing the Ombudsman to show cause why it should not
be held in contempt of court for its failure to comply with the High Court's January 13
decision and to manifest compliance with the directive within 10 days from receipt of the
said resolution.

March 2, 2006 - The Ombudsman invoked its autonomy as an independent body in its
reply to the Supreme Court, saying the Court cannot interfere with the Ombudsman's
investigating powers.

March 28, 2006 - The Supreme Court directed the Office of the Ombudsman, under pain
of contempt to report on a regular basis—once every three months, starting June 30,

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 2006, the steps it has taken and the corresponding results of those actions to determine
the criminal liability if any of the public officials involved in the said contract.

May 3, 2006 - The Supreme Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the
Ombudsman “under pain of contempt", to report by June 30 its final determination on the
liability of public and private individuals involved in the nullified contract.

June 9, 2006 - In a 34-page motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman’s Office of

Legal Affairs said the Supreme Court’s Resolutions “impinge on the constitutional
independence" of the Office enshrined in Sec. 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution." The
Ombudsman said it recognizes that the High Court’s power to punish for contempt is
inherent but there should be a balance between its contempt powers and the
Ombudsman’s constitutional independence.

June 14, 2006 - The Supreme Court rejected the Office of the Ombudsman's motion for
reconsideration “for utter lack of merit." Its directive to the Ombudsman, according to the
Court, did not “in any way impinge upon the [Ombudsman’s] independence as provided
under the Constitution."

June 27, 2006 - In an urgent manifestation, the Ombudsman said it “wasted no time in
conducting its investigation on the possible criminal liability of Comelec officials" involved
in the contract. It added that “the need for further investigation forestall the final
determination by June 30 2006, on the existence or non-existence of probable cause
against all public officials" concerned.

June 30, 2006 - The Ombudsman released a resolution dated June 28, 2006 that cited
Commissioner Borra, but left it to the House of Representatives whether or not to
impeach him because it has no jurisdiction over an impeacheable official like Borra. The
resolution also meted a penalty of dismissal from government service against the
members of the Comelec BAC, and recommended they be charged before the
Ombudsman with with violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in
conspiracy with private respondents Willy U. Yu, Bonnie Yu, Enrique Tansipek, Rosita Y.
Tansipek, Pedro O. Tan, Johnson W. Fong, Bernard L. Fong, and Lauriano Barrios. The
same resolution however dismissed the charges against other Jaime Paz, and Zita
Buena-Castillon, of the Comelec; Jose Tolentino and Rolando Viloria of the Dept. of
Science and Technology (DOST); for lack of sufficient evidence.

September 27, 2006 - The Ombudsman, in a resolution, absolved all respondents

involved in the Mega Pacific controversy of all administrative and criminal liabilities "for
lack of probable cause." It also reversed its June 28 resolution which contained factual
findings that can be used by the House of Representatives to initiate impeachment
proceedings against Comelec Commissioner Resureccion Borra.

Q40: Any other case, which best exemplifies the Ombudsman’s failure to
comply with her constitutional mandate?

A: Yes, the case of Nani Perez. In dismissing the robbery charge, the
Sandiganbayan also noted the Ombudsman’s failure to promptly act on
the complaint against Nani Perez, which also constitutes a violation of the
right to speedy disposition of cases, viz:

“The charge is a simple case for Robbery. Certainly it does not

involve complicated and factual issues that would necessitate
painstaking and grueling scrutiny and perusal on the part of the
Ombudsman. It may have its novel, and to it, valid reason for
departing from the established procedure and rules, but virtually in

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doing so, it has failed to discharge its duty as mandated by the
Constitution to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officers and employees.”

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