District Court, Gunnison County, State of Colorado

Gunnison County Courthouse

200 East Virginia
Gunnison, CO, 81230

David Justice
Plaintiff,
v.

Gunnison County Sheriff Richard Murdie,

Defendant. Case Number : _________

David Justice, sui Juris Div.:

c/o Detention Center
200 Iowa
Gunnison, Colorado

VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Plaintiff, David Justice, for a writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to the procedures outlined in C.R.S. §13-45-
101 et seq., and/or Colorado R. Civ. Proc.106 (a)(4), states as follows:

1. Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-45-101 states in part:

If any person is committed or detained for any criminal or supposed criminal matter,
it is lawful for him to apply to the supreme or district courts for a writ of habeas
corpus, which application shall be in writing and signed by the prisoner or some
person on his behalf setting forth the facts concerning his imprisonment and in whose
custody he is detained, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the warrant of
commitment, or an affidavit that the said copy has been demanded of the person in
whose custody the prisoner is detained, and by him refused or neglected to be given.
The court to which the application is made shall forthwith award the writ of habeas
corpus, unless it appears from the petition itself, or from the documents annexed, that
the party can neither be discharged nor admitted to bail nor in any other manner
relieved. Said writ, if issued by the court, shall be under the seal of the court, and
directed to the person in whose custody the prisoner is detained, and made returnable
forthwith.

2. Colorado R. Civ. Proc.106 states in the pertinent part:

(a) Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Certiorari, Prohibition, Scire

Facias and Other Remedial Writs in the District Court. Special forms of pleadings
and writs in habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, scire facias,
and proceedings for the issuance of other remedial writs, as heretofore known, are hereby
abolished in the district court. Any relief provided hereunder shall not be available in the
superior or county courts. In the following cases relief may be obtained in the district
court by appropriate action under the practice prescribed in the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure: (4) Where any governmental body or officer or any lower judicial body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its

David Justice v. Richard Murdie

GUNNISON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
PAGE 1 OF 4
 discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy otherwise provided by
law[.]

3. Habeas Corpus has been designated the "greatest of all writs," and the precious safeguard
of personal liberty, concerning which courts are admonished that there is no higher duty
than to maintain it unimpaired. Its ascendancy among the writs should be ever sustained.
Geer v. Alaniz, 138 Colo. 177, 331 P.2d 260 (1958). The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall never be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it, Colo. Const. Art II sec. 21. The purpose of an action in habeas
corpus is to determine whether the person instituting the proceeding is being unlawfully
detained by the respondent who is holding him in custody. Ryan v. Cronin, 191 Colo.
487, 489, 553 P.2d 754, 755 (1976). Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy where a
conviction is void. Hart v. Best, 119 Colo. 569, 580, 205 P.2d 787, 793 (1949).
Conditions to application, other than by statute, may not be imposed. To impose any
other or additional conditions than are in § 13-45-101 on one seeking the writ would be
doing exactly what the constitution and the general assembly have said shall not be done.
Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677 (1963).

4. Plaintiff has exhausted all avenues available to him for a remedy, and there is no other
plain, adequate, or speedy remedy available. Regardless, to impose conditions on
issuance of the writ, such as exhausting other available remedies in certain situations, is
pro tanto a suspension of the writ which may not be done. Stilley v. Tinsley, supra.

5. On or about May 22, in the year of our Lord two thousand two, Plaintiff was convicted
by a jury of six in the Gunnison County Court case of People v. Justice, 01T300, (“trial
court”), for alleged traffic violations C.R.S. 42-4-1409(1); 42-2-138(1)(a) and 42-3-
133(1)(b), and was thereafter sentenced to serve 180 days in the Gunnison county jail.
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated with a scheduled release date of June 13, 2003, A.D.
(Mittimus is attached as Plaintiff's exhibit one).

6. The subject matter of the said complaint is an automobile, a 1976 Toyota Corolla,
(“Corolla”), the property of which is exclusively held by the Embassy of Heaven Church
(“Church”) and vested in the Plaintiff as ministerial agent.

7. The Corolla was donated to the Church. The certificate of title issued to the owner for the
Corolla was cancelled by the Church upon acceptance of the property, and returned to the
Colorado Department of Revenue.

8. The Church procured no subsequent certificate of title from any state for the Corolla.

9. It is the position of the Church that absent a certificate of title for the Corolla from the
state, or its dedication to public use, the state lacks public interest in the Corolla.

10. It is the position of the Church that absent a public interest, the Corolla is not a vehicle
subject to classification or required to be registered by the state— i.e. is not a “motor
vehicle” as contemplated by Colo. Const. Art. X sec. 6, the Certificate of Title Act,
C.R.S. 42 sec. 6, or the revenue provisions of licensing and registration under C.R.S. 42
secs. 2 and 3.

11. It is the position of the Church that the privilege of use of a motor vehicle on the public
highway is a derivitive of motor vehicle classification, licensing and registration under
C.R.S. title 42 secs. 2, 3 and 6.
David Justice v. Richard Murdie
GUNNISON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
PAGE 2 OF 4
12. Plaintiff has fundamental, inalienable rights to the private use of the Corolla and the
public highways for the purpose of travel in the enjoyment of his Freedom and Personal
Liberty.

13. On the date, and at the time and place of the incident giving rise to the complaint
underlying the trial court proceedings of concern herein, Plaintiff was not exercising the
public privilege of use of a motor vehicle on the public highways, but was rather
exercising his aforementioned inalienable rights.

14. It is the position of the Plaintiff that the state has no authority to unreasonably burden the
exercise of inalienable rights such that the burden compels the relinquishment of such
rights in exchange for privileges. e.g. Frost v. Railroad Comm. 271 U.S. 583 (1926)

15. It is the position of the Plaintiff that in the absence of a public interest in the Corolla,
were the C.R.S. title 42 revenue provisions of licensing and registration construed as
compelling the Plaintiff to relinquish his inalienable rights to use the Corolla and the
public highway while exercising his Liberty, in exchange for the public privilege of use
of the public highways, such would be an unreasonable burden on the exercise of his
fundamental rights, and therefore unconstitutional. A fundamental principle of statutory
construction provides that statutes shall not be construed in such manner as to reach an
unconstitutional result.

16. It is the position of the Plaintiff that absent a public interest in the property of the Corolla,
and absent the exercise of a public privilege of use of the Corolla or the public highways,
the State lacked the capacity and standing to charge the Plaintiff with the complaint in the
trial court. The claim and exercise of a fundamental right cannot be converted into a
crime. e.g. Miller v. United States, 230 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1956)

17. It is the position of the Plaintiff that absent standing and capacity to bring the complaint,
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges, thereby making the
subsequent proceedings, conviction and sentence of the trial court based thereon void,
and the Petitioner’s present incarceration constitutionally infirm and a grievious
deprivation of his personal liberty.

18. The Plaintiff is entitled to immediate relief on grounds that he is not validly confined and
because in the absence of jurisdiction both the People and the trial court have performed
serious constitutional infringements resulting in a significant loss of liberty to the
Plaintiff.

WHEREFORE the Plaintiff respectfully requests this court to grant this petition for a writ of
Habeas Corpus.

Dated this April _____, in the year of our Lord, two thousand and three

_________________________________
David Justice
c/o Guinnison Detention Center
200 Iowa Street
Gunnison, Colorado 81230

David Justice v. Richard Murdie

GUNNISON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
PAGE 3 OF 4
I declare under oath that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing facts are true, correct and
complete.

Subscribed and sworn to before me by David Justice this April ______ , A.D. 2003

________________________ ________________________
Person authorized to administer oath My commission expires

David Justice v. Richard Murdie

GUNNISON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
PAGE 4 OF 4