OUTLINE

Acknowledgements 1

Illustrations 2

Introduction 3

Chapter I: Theory Development and Methods for Case Study Research 10

Theory Development 19
Case Study Criteria and Selection 28
Methodology for Assessing Case Studies 30

Chapter II: The Spanish Case 33

Spanish Immigration Model: A Lack of Integrative Policy 34
Alienation of Muslim Immigrants 44
Spain’s Increasing Prospects for International Islamic Terrorism 56

Spain: A Post-11-M Train Bombings Examination 67

Chapter III: The Netherlands Case 68

Dutch Immigration Models: A Shift from away from 69
the Multicultural Approach
The Increased Awareness of Immigrant Alienation 78
Investigating the Netherlands: Increasing Prospects
for Islamic Terrorism 94

Chapter IV: Refinements of the Theory and Policy Implications 102

Principal Findings of the Case Study Research 108
Methodological Refinements 110
Policy Implications 111

Bibliography 114
 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Above all, I would like to offer my most genuine appreciation and

gratitude to my advisor, Professor William Rose. His guidance and

assistance throughout the entire thesis process has been tremendous.

The knowledge and understanding of theory development that he has

passed onto me is invaluable. His mentoring has allowed me to delve

deeper into an academic field than I thought possible when I first came

to Connecticut College. Thank you for teaching me to think

methodologically about these topics, it will greatly benefit me in my

future endeavors.

I would also like to thank my second reader, Professor Patton, for

his assistance with this project. During my four years at Connecticut

College, he has provided me with beneficial academic guidance,

supportive words, and an active interest in who I am. My experience as

an international relations major would not be the same without him.

 2

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1.1. Theory Development 21, 103

Figure 2.1. Foreign Population by Autonomous Communities 41

Figure 2.2. Persons linked to Jihadist terrorism imprisoned

in Spain by country of birth 59

Figure 2.3. Percentage of persons linked to Jihadist terrorism imprisoned

in Spain by Country of birth 59

Figure 2.4. Persons linked to Jihadist terrorism imprisoned

in Spain by administrative status 61

Figure 2.5. Percentage of persons linked to Jihadist terrorism imprisoned

in Spain by administrative status 62

Figure 3.1. Development of Migration Motives in the Netherlands 70

Figure 3.2. Unemployment rate in the Netherlands in percent by ethnic descent 86

Figure 3.3. Immigrant population in percent in the largest cities in the

Netherlands by group origin 88

Figure 3.4. Education level of post-school age workers in the Netherlands

by ethnic descent in percent 89

Figure 3.5. Membership in organizations in the Netherlands by country of birth 91

 3

INTRODUCTION

A twenty-five year old Muslim man walks home from his job in Berlin. He is a

second generation immigrant from Iran. His father owns a small jewelry store in the

Muslim neighborhood of Neu-Koln. The son is college educated and works at an

advertising firm. He has German friends, Muslim friends, and Iranian friends. When he

walks down the street, it would be difficult to pinpoint him as a Muslim immigrant. He

wears a black suit, has a short hair cut, and is listening to an IPod. He is a devout Muslim

and attends mosque regularly. This man would never consider becoming an Islamic

terrorist.1

Over in Spain, a Tunisian immigrant named Sarhane Fahket walks down the street

of Madrid. Fahket was a successful real estate agent and was comfortable living in

Western culture. However, in 2000, he met Amer Azizi in Madrid, and over the next

three years Fahket retreated from the West, lost his Spanish friends, and quit his job.2 He

became radicalized, turned from a man seeking a future in the West to a man seeking

revenge on the West. In a small barbershop, 10-minutes away from Atocha Train Station,

Fahket gradually recruited over a dozen fellow North African immigrants to join him in a

Holy War against Spain. By collaborating with Azizi and a Moroccan immigrant named

Jamal Zougam, they built up their own jihadist group. Zougam ran a mobile telephone

shop, and Azizi served as a facilitator between the local Madrid cell and Osama Bin

Laden's network. A Moroccan-born man named Jamal Ahmidan, who became radicalized
1
Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance (New
York: The Penguin Press, 2006).
2
John Larson and Sachar Bar-on, “Lessons from Madrid bombing: What can U.S. learn about terrorist
profiles and planning?” Dateline NBC, June 6, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8074421 (accessed
February 12, 2008).
 4

in his time in a Spanish prison for drug smuggling, was the man who sold Fahket the

weaponry for the attacks in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004. These four men, all

foreign-born immigrants, were responsible for killing 191 people and wounding 1,755.

The radicalization undergone by Fahket has happened elsewhere in Europe as well. For

example in Dewsbury, in the north of England, Mohammed Siddique Khan, a respected

primary school teacher drew three impressionable young Muslims into a jihadist cell.3

To help understand these observations, this paper seeks to answer two questions.

First, what are the causes of Islamic terrorism in Europe? Second, how can variations be

explained? In particular, what conditions account for variations over and time space, and

why are these conditions important? Through an exercise in theory development, this

paper seeks to answer these questions. Case study research is brought in so that the theory

can be constructed in an iterative fashion between, on the one hand, stating and revising

the theory and, on the other hand, research into two contrasting case studies: Spain and

the Netherlands. Finally, if the theory is indeed plausible, what are the policy

implications of these findings?

There are two distinct sets of literature relevant to the topic at hand. The first set,

written in the tradition of international politics, examines general causes of terrorism. The

bulk of this literature focuses on terrorism originating in less-developed countries, “failed

states,” and other non-European environments. Significant attention is given, for

example, to the impact of globalization and the intrusion of western values into Islamic

countries. Not much of this scholarship has been devoted to explaining terrorism in

Europe, and most that does has not been explicitly theoretical. The second set of

3
Mohannad Hage Ali and Paul Cruickshank, “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007): 1–14.
 5

literature, in the comparative politics tradition, examines Muslim immigration into

Europe and factors that affect their inclusion in or alienation from native European

societies. The explanatory focus varies from citizen and immigration laws, to perceptions

of native Europeans towards Muslims and vise versa. Very little of this literature has

studied how different approaches and attitudes may account for an individual Muslim’s

radicalization and move toward terrorist organizations and activities. What has been

published examines only a single case study, however, and has not attempted to explain

—in a theory-informed manner—variations across European states.

Before laying down a roadmap that shows how these questions will be answered,

pertinent terms need to be defined. “Terrorism” is the threat of or act of violence carried

out by a non-state actor that intentionally targets civilians. The overarching purpose of

this act is political and intends to produce a psychological effect on an intended audience,

typically resulting in fear or intimidation. The tactical goals of a terrorist act are to create

a fear of violence in the populace and to increase public awareness of the terrorist’s or

terrorist group’s political goals. On an organizational level, these tactics can be used to

meet any strategic, political goal, from religious to national liberation, and are still

considered terrorism. Guerilla warfare and insurgents need not be linked to terrorism

because of the different targets, civilians versus military actors.4

Acts of “international terrorism” transcend national boundaries in terms of the

means by which they are accomplished, the intended persons they appear to intimidate, or

the locale in which the perpetrators operate.5 This paper will focus on “international
4
Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Maker (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 2005), 17-18. For a history on the changing definition of terrorism, refer also to
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 3-20.
5
International terrorism is also called transnational or global terrorism, because the participants often have
no direct or formal ties to a state. See Charles W. Kegley Jr., “The Characteristics, Causes, and Controls of
the New Global Terrorism: An Introduction,” in The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes,
 6

terrorism” because it seeks to explain the transnational phenomenon that Islamic

terrorism has become. In addition, this paper will only focus on “Islamic terrorism,” or

terrorism that is justified based on Islamic beliefs and laws. This is because the Muslim

immigrant has a unique experience when entering Western Europe, where many states

are largely secular or Christian-faith based. Islamic terrorism has also become a focus

point for media and political discussion since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the

World Trade Center in New York City.

The primary task of this paper is theory development, to build linkages between

these two sets of literature so that variations in Islamic terrorism in Western Europe can

be explained. The independent variable (IV) is the immigration model adopted by a state:

an assimilation-oriented policy, a multicultural-oriented policy, or a lack of integrative

policy. The dependent variable (DV) is the prospects for Islamic terrorism. Connecting

the IV and DV is one intervening variable (IntV) that explains causation between the IV

and DV, the level of alienation felt by Muslim immigrants. The values of these key

variables are also affected by additional factors (condition variables). The result is a

theory that highlights key causal factors that can account for both Islamic terrorism as

well as variations over time and space. The theory explains why these conditions are

important and how causation works.

The theory developed in this paper predicts that the particular immigration model

adopted by a state, via one intervening variable, affects the prospects for Islamic

terrorism in that state. If strict assimilation-oriented policies or a lack of integrative

policies are put in place for Muslim immigrants and there is a high level of immigrant

alienation, then the prospects for Islamic terrorism will be high. If multicultural oriented

Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley Jr. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 4-9.
 7

policies are put in place and there is a low level of immigrant alienation, then there will

be decreased prospects for Islamic terrorism.

The independent variable is the immigration policy put in place by the host state.

This approach can have many variations, but the ones this paper will consider are

assimilationist policies, a lack of integrative policies, and multiculturalist policies. The

condition variables that will affect the value of the independent variable of this theory are

history, the extent of application of the states’ policies, and the political parties’ influence

on the adoption of these policies. The dependent variable in this theory is the prospect for

Islamic terrorism in Europe. This theory will look at the actual attacks and the thwarted

attacks in each of the host states. In addition, the presence of terrorist organizations or

networks and the recruitment by terrorist groups in the host state will be examined.

In this theory, there is one intervening variable that connects the immigration

model adopted by the state to the prospects for Islamic terrorism, the level of alienation

felt by the immigrant population. It can vary from a high level of alienation, where the

immigrant feels completely separate and isolated from mainstream society, to a low level

of alienation, where the immigrant feels that they are a part of mainstream society. The

factors this theory will evaluate to determine an immigrant’s alienation from society are:

the native population’s attitude towards immigrants, immigration, and the Muslim

religion; the socio-economic status of the immigrant population; the extent of the

immigrants’ civil and political rights; and the social and religious institutions present for

immigrants in the host state.

In order to refine my theory, case study research will be done on Spain and the

Netherlands. To do the case study research, this project will utilize both controlled
 8

comparison and congruence procedure type II. Spain was chosen because of the recent

terrorist attacks in Madrid in March of 2004. Spain lacks policies aimed at integrating its

immigrants, so the theory predicts that it will have higher prospects for Islamic terrorism.

The other case chosen is the Netherlands. It is an analytically rich case because

the independent variable shifted drastically in recent history. In the late 1990s, the

Netherlands reversed its multicultural policies and put policies aimed at cultural

assimilation in place. This change sparked controversy and debate in Dutch society. The

recent assassination of Theo Van Gogh and the existence of the Hofstad Network also

make the Netherlands an interesting case to examine.6

The two case studies, Spain and the Netherlands, allowed for the exploration of

the causal connections presented in the theory below. The research illustrates that the

causal connections examined were indeed supported. The following research

demonstrates that the theory is plausible because evidence from the Spanish case and

from the Netherlands case buttress its claims.

This paper has four chapters: the first will include a literature review, theory

development, case study criteria and selection, and methodology for assessing case

studies; the second will be the case of Spain; the third will be the case of the Netherlands;

the fourth will include ideas for future research, the findings of the case study research,

refinement of the theory, the policy implications of the theory, and concluding remarks.

6
Lorenzo Vidino, “The Hofstad Group: The Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 30 (2007): 581. The Hofstad Network is an Islamist terrorist group made up of mostly young
Dutch Muslims of mostly North African ancestry.
 9

CHAPTER I:
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND
METHODS FOR CASE STUDY RESEARCH

Terrorism has become an increasingly more important topic as its characteristics

have altered over time. A study by W. Enders and T. Sandler showed that even though

the number of terrorist incidents had decreased since the 1980’s, the ones that are

occurring are more likely to result in death or injury than the incidents of the past.7 In

addition, more research has been devoted to this subject matter due to the September 11

attacks on the United States and the Madrid bombings on March 11, 2004 (11-M attacks).

Although terrorism has been utilized throughout history, its characteristics and causes

have developed and changed over time. David Rapoport discusses this transformation in

four waves from oldest to newest: the anarchist wave, the anti-colonial wave, the new left

wave, and the religious wave.8 The majority of current terrorism is concurrent with the

characteristics exhibited by the “religious wave.” Terrorist acts of this sort typically use

religion to supply justification and organizing principles. Some of the major attacks that

have occurred or have been thwarted on European soil in the last two and a half decades

have had religious ties. For example, one of the first attacks attributed to a religious

terrorist group was on June 17, 1982 by the Jewish Defense League. One of the major

religions that has been associated with religiously motivated terrorist attacks is Islam.

The first European terrorist attack claimed by an Islamic terrorist group was carried out

by Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad on February 6, 1984 in France.

7
W. Enders and T. Sandler, “Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series
Investigation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 3, (2000): 307-308.
8
David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” in The New Global Terrorism:
Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley Jr. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education,
Inc., 2003), 36-52.
 10

With the growing Muslim population in Europe and the growth of transnational

terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, it is important to determine what causes a minority of

Muslims living in Europe to radicalize and participate in international Islamic terrorism.

The focus of this study is on the development of Islamic terrorist organizations and

thwarted and actual attacks inside of Europe. It seeks to determine if there are variations

over time and space, what circumstances account for those variations, and the importance

of those circumstances. As a result, the bulk of the literature on terrorism that focuses on

less developed states, failed states, and/ or non-European states will not be relevant. Also,

westernization and the intrusion of democracy into Islamic society will not be cited as a

cause for this type of terrorism because of the concentration on developments from

within Western Europe. The individuals and groups being focused on in this study are

those who reside (legally or illegally) in European countries. It is also important to

recognize that a large portion of the literature on terrorism is a descriptive examination

rather than theory-informed analysis, and as a result, noteworthy gaps exist in this field.

When trying to determine the causes of terrorism in Western Europe, it is

important to note that some scholars address factors external to Western Europe, while

others address factors internal to Western Europe. The external factors relevant to this

study are the foreign policies of the states being examined, the global growth of religious

radicalization, and the recruitment being conducted by international terrorist

organizations. The factors internal to Western Europe are the conditions that Muslim

immigrants are subject to. These include the features of the immigrants’ lives, such as

their socio-economic status and civil, political, and human rights. Another internal factor

is the state policies toward immigrants. And a third factor is the views and opinions of
 11

native Europeans and how accepting they are of Muslims and of immigrants. These two

groups of factors, the internal and the external, have been examined by numerous

scholars in a variety of ways.

The first factor external to Western Europe is foreign policy. From a political

perspective, P. Nesser examined the motivations for the 11-M attacks in Madrid and the

assassination of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands and asked how important the

invasion and occupation of Iraq was.9 Nesser determined that there were significant

motivational spillover effects from the Iraq War that led to the two terrorist attacks. With

the 11-M attacks, the presence of troops in Iraq was the main motivational factor. In the

Netherlands, the Hofstad Network was motivated by domestic grievances, Al-Qaeda’s

ideology, and the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Nesser also cites the perceived

injustices to other Muslims, as a result of this involvement, as a large motivating factor.

The war in Afghanistan, and a large number of European states’ involvement in it, may

also prove to be a reason for terrorist activity in Western European states. Nesser’s work

shows that the motivations for terrorism can lie in the foreign policy of the state and in

ties to the universal Muslim community.

Another group of scholars have looked the dimensions and growth of religious

radicalism. Because this growth is not tied to Western Europe, it is considered an external

factor. Mark Juergensmeyer says that religious terrorists have overarching attitudes

toward religion in society.10 Initially, they reject the liberal values and secular institutions

of the state. Secondly, they refuse to observe the boundaries that the secular society has
9
P. Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from
the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,” Studies in Conflicts and Terrorism 29, no. 4,
(2006): 323-42.
10
Mark Juergensmeyer, “The Religious Roots of Contemporary Terrorism,” in The New Global Terrorism:
Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley Jr., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education,
Inc., 2003), 185-194.
 12

made around religion. And finally, they create a new form of religiosity that transforms

the struggles into sacred battles of good versus evil. It will be important to locate the

reason(s) why these individuals initially reject the values and institutions of the state.

Olivier Roy goes a step further and asks if Islamic terror could arise from within

western societies and how it would look if it did.11 He sees the re-islamization of Muslim

immigrants in two forms, diasporic radicalization and transnational radicalization.12 The

first is when the individual’s radicalization is tied to his or her country of origin and tends

to result in nationalist and separatist terrorism. The latter form of radicalization is

characterized by an individual’s identification with the universal umma community, a

rejection of one’s origin culture, a refusal to assimilate into western culture, and the

existence of terrorist recruitment. He also characterizes the individuals as socially

marginalized, urban youth. He analyzed violent Islamic militants since 1990 in order to

provide evidence supporting his theory.

An individual’s radicalization and identification with the universal umma

community provides ample recruiting opportunities for international terrorist

organizations. The Economist asks what turns a man into a terrorist and what can be done

about it?13 This article’s major argument is that people who are bound together by

ethnicity, worship, or criminal activity develop a common interest in the suffering of

Muslims across the globe. Websites and satellite television channels then supply visual

images and incendiary rhetoric from any place where Muslims are fighting non-Muslims.

When these individuals come into contact with recruiters from terrorist organizations,

such as Al-Qaeda, they are introduced to more radical views and given the capabilities
11
Olivier Roy, “EuroIslam: The Jihad within?” The National Interest (Spring 2003): 63-73.
12
Roy defines diasporic radicalization as that which is linked to and focused on the country of origin, not
the European host society. Ibid., 6.
13
“The Enemy Within,” The Economist 376, no. 8435 (July 16, 2005): 24-26.
 13

(training, weapons, etc) to commit terrorist attacks. Nesser, Juergensmeyer, Roy, and The

Economist all discuss external factors that are significant when investigating the causes of

Islamic terrorism in Western Europe.

The following paragraphs discuss the factors internal to Western Europe. A group

of scholars connect the causes of terrorism to the social conditions present. One example

of this is social movement theory, which argues that an individual will be more likely to

join a movement if there is relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and a lack of

political opportunity. The main author that has related this sociological theory to Islamic

activism is Quintan Wiktorowicz.14 His research utilizes Middle Eastern and North

African countries as case studies, but neglects to relate it to western states. Major Jennifer

Chandler has also discussed the explanatory value of social movement theory.15 She

argues that social movements change in different ways based on the social, economic,

cultural, and political dynamics of an environment. Another scholar that focuses on the

social environment as a predictor of terrorism is Llewellyn Howell.16 Howell offers an

explanation for the causes of terrorism that includes four factors in the nature of human

life: increasing population, increasing disparity in wealth and benefits, the expansion of

religious extremism, and increased technology and access to it. He does not test this

hypothesis, however.

Human rights have also been studied as a core cause of terrorism. Rhonda

Callaway & Julie Harrelson-Stephens predict that the denial of subsistence, civil, and

14
Quintan Wiktotowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 2004).
15
Major Jennifer Chandler, “The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory,” Strategic Insights 4, no.
5 (2005): 6.
16
Llewellyn D. Howell, “Is the New Global Terrorism a Clash of Civilizations? Evaluating Terrorism's
Multiple Sources,” in The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ed. Charles W. Jr.
Kegley (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2003), 173-184.
 14

political rights will create an environment that is conducive to the development of

terrorism.17 They test this prediction by examining the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The

IRA is one of the longest-operating terrorist organizations in Western Europe and is a

nationalist/separatist group that seeks an Ireland fully independent of Great Britain. They

determine that threats to human security are directly related to the development and

growth of terrorism. It is only when the government engages in state terror that the appeal

of terror moves into widespread support. This single case study is an initial test of this

theory and the authors acknowledge that it needs to be tested further to determine if this

theory holds true for the genesis and growth of other terrorist organizations. This article

presents the idea of widespread support and its importance when studying the causes of

terrorism.

A recent article in the New York Times by Nieves Perlez, also points to the

internal characteristics of European countries as possible causes of Islamic terrorism.18

Perlez points to the integration of minority populations into mainstream society and to

Islam itself. Other scholars have also addressed this issue. For example, Daniel Fried

provides a description of the causes of terrorism that is similar to the theories presented

above, but also incorporates the growing issues with Muslim immigration in Europe.19 In

addition, Fried presents five criteria that leave Muslim immigrants open to influence by

extremist views. The first criteria is secular alienation from the mainstream, which can

include poverty, lack of employment opportunities, discrimination, lack of political

17
Rhonda Callaway and Julie Harrerson-Stephens, “Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a
Determinant of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflicts and Terrorism 29 (2006): 679-702.
18
Nieves Ortega Pérez, “Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy,” Migration Information Source, February
2003, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=97 (accessed February 20, 2008).
19
Daniel Fried, “Overview of Islamist Extremism in Europe,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on
European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2006, http://www.state.gov/p/
eur/rls/rm/64192.htm (accessed April 20, 2008).
 15

representation, and a lack of education. The existence of overly tolerant or intolerant

policies, spiritual alienation, failed integration models, and extremist recruitment are the

other four criteria that make this population vulnerable to extremist views. Callaway &

Harrelson-Stephens, Perlez, and Fried discuss the dynamics of the environment present in

a state and how the social situation, the civil and political rights, and the economic

standing of an individual all play a role in Islamic radicalization.

When approaching this topic, it is important to note that many authors in different

subject areas have tackled the topic of Muslims in Europe and the troubles that they face.

Extensive research on Muslim citizenship, immigration policies, and different integration

models has been examined in a variety of European states. Modood et al., Jonathan

Laurence and Justin Vaisse, and Yvonne Haddad are prominent examples of this

research.20 Overall, they determine that colonial heritage has played an important role in

the history of immigration in Britain, France, and Spain. The concept of “guest workers”

has also been a large aspect of Islamic immigration in Europe. Though occurring at

different times since World War II, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and

most recently Spain have increased immigration to account for increased economic

opportunities. The arrival of refugees and asylum seekers into Sweden, Norway, and

Denmark has affected the policies and attitudes towards these Muslim immigrants as

well.

Each European state has had a unique experience with Islamic immigration, but

the actual policies adopted are usually identified as either alienating or integrating. This

20
Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, eds., Multiculturalism, Muslims and
Citizenship: A European Approach (New York: Routledge, 2006); Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse,
Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, ed., Muslims in the West: From Sojourners
to Citizens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
 16

observation has been made by numerous scholars studying immigration in Europe,

including Modood et al., Laurence and Vaisse, and Haddad. The majority of the

countries discussed above have adopted policies aimed at integrating the Muslim

population into their society. Haddad defines integration as a measure to facilitate

interaction between the immigrants and the host society.21 Some states created obligations

for the immigrants and refugees to complete in order to be considered integrated into

mainstream society. When integrating, states typically take an assimilation approach or a

multicultural approach. When assimilation policies are adopted, a state expects its

immigrants to absorb into the culture of the mainstream population. On the other hand, a

multicultural approach is intended to accept and publicly recognize the coexistence of

groups that are associated with culturally distinct heritage. For example, Sweden,

Norway, and Denmark have taken multicultural approaches, but their homogenous

societies are not necessarily receptive to these changes. On the other side, France, Britain,

the Netherlands, and Spain have tried to assimilate their Muslim immigrants into their

societies and this has sometimes resulted in discontented immigrants. Germany has been

the most defiant toward integration policies because of its history with “temporary

workers,” and has only recently adopted laws that allow immigrants to become citizens

without having blood ties to a German citizen.

The integration models adopted in these states are diverse, but it is also important

to look at the religious restrictions in place and the overarching attitudes toward Islam.

For example, up until December 2003, Muslims in Britain were not protected from

discrimination by law, and there was no legislation that banned religious, specifically

21
Haddad, Muslims in the West, 125.
 17

Muslim, discrimination. In Britain, there has been a long history of racism and a lack of

tolerance for Islam. On the other hand, in the Netherlands, Spain, and France, the idea of

pluralism has been embraced in their history and these states are currently trying to

continue this tradition with Islam. In Sweden and Germany, individuals are free to

practice any religion of their choice in a private setting that does not disrupt the public

arena.22

Very few authors have studied how these different approaches and attitudes

toward Muslim immigrants may account for the individual’s radicalization and move

toward terrorist organizations and activities. Maria Saux asserts that the connection

between terrorism and immigration is a constructed relationship made by the state.23 In

her study, she utilizes the single case of Spain and its changes in policy after the 11-M

attack in 2003. Instead of adopting stronger counter-terrorism policies, as many other

Western European countries did after the September 11, 2001 and the 11-M attacks,

Spain amended its immigration policies to be more stringent, placing additional

restrictions on its immigrants. Saux argues that these changes were due Spain’s previous

dissatisfaction with its legal and illegal immigrants, and it utilized the 11-M attacks in

order to make these unwanted immigrants the “enemy.” This article provides an

interesting perspective and it may be useful to examine Germany or the United Kingdom

22
The attitudes toward Islam and integration discussed in this paragraph come from a variety of sources.
Haddad, Muslims in the West, discusses Islamophobia in Britain and the Muslim experience in Sweden.
Anne J. Kershen, A Question of Identity (London: Ashgate Publishing, 1998) focuses on British identity.
Modood et. al., Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach, examines the issues
with citizenship that have occurred with Muslim immigrants. Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin A.
Schain, eds., The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe (Portland: Frank Cass, 1994) present the
historical situations that may affect how current Muslim immigrants are perceived.
23
Maria Soledad Saux, “Immigration and Terrorism: A Constructed Connection: The Spanish Case,”
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 13, no. 1/2 (October 2007): 57-72.
 18

in further research because of their similar amendments to immigration policy following

these major terrorist attacks.

The two major questions directing this study are: What are the causes of Islamic

terrorism in Europe and how are variations over time and space explained? After

reviewing the bulk of the literature on this topic, it is evident that two categories emerge.

One category is the literature which addresses the phenomenon and causes of terrorism in

general. Some of this literature is theory-informed; however, the majority of it is not. The

second category of literature focuses on Muslim immigration in Europe. This literature

varies in focus from citizenship and immigration laws to the perceptions by Muslim

immigrants of the native people. A combination of these two sets of literature would be

beneficial to answering the questions laid forth above. The European states’ varying

policies and attitudes toward immigrants’ citizenship, integration, and religious tolerance

in combination with the social, political, and economic environment at hand may explain

the development of international Islamic terrorism in Europe. Because theory-

development is one of the main tasks of this study, a bridge between these two topics will

hopefully aid in answering these questions.

Theory Development

The main undertaking of this paper is theory development. It aims to fill a gap in

the literature on terrorism by bridging two sets of pertinent literature. There is immense

literature on immigration policy and there is emerging theoretical literature on terrorism.

This paper merges these two areas of study in an effort to determine what causes Islamic

terrorism in Western Europe. The theory that this paper develops and refines, through

case study, research argues that the particular immigration model adopted by a state, via
 19

one intervening variable (IntV), affects the prospects for terrorism in that state (See

Figure 1.1). The independent variable (IV) is the immigration model adopted by the state

and the dependent variable (DV) is the prospects for Islamic terrorism.

This paper will utilize vocabulary developed by Steven Van Evera. A prime

hypothesis is the overarching hypothesis that frames the relationship between a theory’s

independent and dependent variables.24 An explanatory hypothesis is the intermediate

hypotheses that constitute a theory’s explanation.25 Also, the numbering of the theory is

done so in a manner that demonstrates the variables’ ability to vary from one value to

another. For example, the value of IV can vary to three extremes, which are IV-1, IV-2,

and IV-3. In order for this theory to operate, antecedent conditions need to be developed.

An antecedent condition is defined as a phenomenon whose presence activates or

magnifies the action of a causal factor.”26 The antecedent conditions for this theory are:

the host states examined must be Western European states, the states must also be

developed democracies, and Muslims constitute a minority of the host state’s population.

As stated in the literature review, states that fall outside of these conditions are out of the

scope of this theory.

The first prime hypothesis in this theory is: if strict assimilation-oriented policies

or a lack of integrative policies are adopted for Muslim immigrants, then the prospects

for Islamic terrorism will increase in that state (IV-1àDV-1 & IV-2àDV-2). The first

24
Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997), 11.
25
Ibid., 12.
26
Ibid., 9.
 Figure 1.1. Theory Development

Independent Variable (IV) Intervening Variable (IntV) Dependent Variable (DV)

Immigration Model Adopted à Level of Alienation à Prospect for Islamic Terrorism in Europe
CV-1: History CV-1: Natives’ Attitudes CV-1: Terrorist Organization
CV-2: Extent of Application CV-2: Socio-economic Status CV-2: Recruitment
CV-3: Political Parties’ Influence CV-3: Civil/Political Rights
CV-4: Presence of Social and Religious Institutions

Strict assimilation policies (IV-1) à High Immigrant Alienation (IntV-1) à High prospects for Islamic Terrorism (DV-1)
Lack of integrative policies (IV-2) à High Immigrant Alienation (IntV-1) à High prospects for Islamic Terrorism (DV-1)
Multicultural policies (IV-3) à Low Immigrant Alienation (IntV-2) à Low prospects for Islamic Terrorism (DV-2)
20
 21

explanatory hypothesis is: if strict assimilation-oriented policies or a lack of integrative

policies are put place, then the Muslim immigrants will feel alienated from mainstream

society (IV-1àIntV-1 & IV-2 à IntV-2). The final explanatory hypothesis is: if there is

a high level alienation, then the prospects for Islamic terrorism in that state are high

(IntV-1à DV-1 & IntV-2 àDV-2). Even though assimilation-oriented policies have

constructive goals, they sometimes result in polarization. The more a state pushes its

immigrants to assimilate into its culture, the more they will feel alienated from and

pressured by mainstream society. Also, when a state fails to integrate its immigrants in

any manner, it also leads to a feeling of alienation by immigrants. Muslim immigrants are

a unique case because their religion and culture tends to be very different than that of

mainstream European society. The theory predicts that alienation from mainstream

society causes immigrants to be drawn into terrorist activity.

The second prime hypothesis in this theory is: if multicultural policies are adopted

in the host country, then the prospects for Islamic terrorism will decrease (IV-3àDV-3).

The first explanatory hypothesis is: if multicultural policies are put in place for Muslim

immigrants, then the immigrants will not feel alienated from mainstream society (IV-3à

IntV-3). The final explanatory hypothesis for this theory is: if Muslim immigrants feel a

low level of alienation from mainstream society, then there will be decreased prospects

for Islamic terrorism. The adoption of multicultural immigration policies that do not

alienate the immigrant population will be the most beneficial way for a state to reduce

Islamic terrorism. By allowing the Muslim immigrant population to maintain its culture

and religion, while still integrating it into mainstream society, the host state will decrease

the likelihood of young, Muslim immigrants from radicalizing.

 22

The independent variable is the immigration model adopted by a state to legally

address its immigrants. This approach can vary to different extremes, but this paper

focuses on the following three: assimilationist policies (IV-1), a lack of integrative

policies (IV-2), and multiculturalist policies (IV-3).

Assimilation-oriented policies (IV-1), commonly referred to as cultural

assimilation, are designed to provide a process of consistent integration where the

members of the minority group are "absorbed" into the established, generally larger,

community. This approach typically presumes the loss of distinguishing characteristics

that make the immigrants different. Examples of these losses are seen in changes in how

people dress and speech particularities or mannerisms. Assimilation can also include the

secularization of religious minorities entering secular states. These policies are related to

the idea of monoculturalism, or cultural homogeneity. The host states seek to protect their

homogeneous societies with assimilationist policies. Examples of these include required

language courses in the national language; required language tests for immigrants;

compulsory courses and/or tests on national history, the constitution and the legal system;

official campaigns to promote national unity; official lists of national values and tests of

acceptance of these values; official declarations specifying that only the national

language may be spoken in certain areas; language prohibitions in schools, universities,

and public buildings; prohibitions on certain ways of dressing; and an introduction of an

loyalty oath for immigrants.27

Secondly, some states do not have policies that attempt to accommodate

immigrants into their state (IV-2). In turn, some states completely lack policies that

27
Klaus F. Zimmermann, “Tackling the European Migration Problem,” The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 9, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 45-62.
 23

address integration. Or, the policies tend to focus only on controlling the entrance of

immigrants into the host state. The policies do not present a plan for helping immigrants

become part of society, typically causing immigrants to feel separated from mainstream

society. Other states have taken a non-accommodating approach and have implemented

anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies. These states generally see immigration as a

temporary phenomenon and do not want this population to be part of the mainstream

population. These policies tend to shorten visa and work permit durations and actively

seek to prevent immigrants from becoming residents or citizens of the host state. The

main goal of this is to alienate the immigrant population from the mainstream population.

A third approach taken by states is to implement multicultural-oriented polices

(IV-3). These policies aim to create a general recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity

within the state. Multicultural policies intend to preserve the different cultures or cultural

identities of immigrants. Typically, they advocate for the extension of equitable status to

these immigrant groups. Government multicultural policies may include: recognition of

multiple citizenship, government support for newspapers, television, and radio in

minority languages; support for minority festivals, holidays, and celebrations; acceptance

of traditional and religious dress in schools, the military, and society; support for music

and arts from minority cultures; and programs to encourage minority representation in

politics, science, engineering, technology, mathematics, education, and the work force.28

The condition variables for the independent variable of this theory are history

(CV-1), the extent of application of the states’ policies (CV-2), and the influence of the

political parties (CV-3). A condition variable is a factor that affects the value of the

28
Tjitske Akkerman and Anniken Hagelund, “Women and Children First! Anti-immigration Parties and
Gender in Norway and the Netherlands,” Patterns of Prejudice 41, no. 2 (May 2007): 197-214.
 24

independent variable, the intervening variable, or the dependent variable.29 A state’s

history with immigration is an important factor because it can affect what policies are put

in place and how severe they are. For example, the colonial history of a state, the

existence of temporary worker programs after World War II, and the acceptance of

asylum-seekers and refugees can all affect the value of the IV. Secondly, the degree to

which the policies are implemented is also pertinent. There are many different scenarios

that occur with immigration policies: a policy can be introduced in the government, but

never make it into the laws; a policy can become part of the law and is not enforced; a

policy can become a law and is strictly enforced; or a policy can become a law and

unequally enforced. These examples show that the implementation of policies can

fluctuate extensively across time and space. Finally, the influence of the political parties

present in the host state may affect the policies implemented. Different parties have

different immigration agendas and may employ different strategies when in power. All

three condition variables affect the value of the immigration policy put in place by the

state.

In this theory there is one intervening variable (IntV) that connects the

immigration model adopted by the state to the prospects for Islamic terrorism. The IntV

is the level of alienation felt by the immigrant population. The IntV varies from a high

level of alienation (IntV-1), where the immigrant feels completely separate and isolated

from mainstream society, to a low level of alienation (IntV-2), where the immigrant feels

a part of mainstream society. When a high level of alienation is felt by Muslim

immigrants, the prospects for Islamic terrorism are high. When a low level of alienation

is felt, the prospects for Islamic terrorism are low.

29
Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 11.
 25

The first condition variable for the intervening variable is the native population’s

attitude about immigrants and immigration (CV-1). This can affect the immigrant’s level

of alienation for many reasons. If the native population is tolerant of the immigrant

population and the Muslim religion than it is likely that the immigrants will not feel

alienated. However, if the native population expresses negative attitudes about Muslim

immigrants, then it is likely they will feel more alienated. The attitudes held by the native

population are dependent on the media, their contact with the immigrant population, their

education level, and the social impact of immigrants in their state.

The second and third condition variables (CV-2 & CV-3) for the IntV are the

immigrant’s socio-economic status and the extent of their civil and political rights. If an

immigrant has low economic status or lacks civil and political rights, they will be more

likely to hold negative attitudes about mainstream society and feel alienated from it. If an

immigrant has a socio-economic status or civil and political rights that are congruent with

the native population, then they are less likely to feel alienated.30

This fourth condition variable (CV-4) is the social and religious institutions

available to assist immigrants in their integration into the greater community. This can be

found through affiliation with a community group or a community mosque. Religious

acceptance in a state can affect the socio-emotional status of an immigrant as well. Some

30
CV-2 & CV-3 and the immigrant’s perception of his or her situation can be further explained by relative
deprivation, or the experience of being deprived of something to which one thinks one is entitled. It is a
term used in social sciences to describe feelings or measures of economic, political, or social deprivation
that are relative rather than absolute. It has important consequences for both behavior and attitudes,
including feelings of stress, political attitudes, and participation in collective action. See Richard T.
Schaefer, Racial and Ethnic Groups, 11th Ed., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2008), 69; Walter
Garrison Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in
Twentieth-Century England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); and Iain Walker and Heather
J. Smith, eds., Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
 26

states are accepting of social displays of religiosity (such as the wearing of a headscarf or

praying in public), while other states are not.

The dependent variable (DV) in this theory is the prospects for Islamic

international terrorism in Europe. Terrorism, in this paper, will be defined as the threat of

or the act of violence carried out by a non-state actor that intentionally targets civilians.

The overarching purpose of this act is political and intends to produce a psychological

effect on an intended audience, typically resulting in fear or intimidation. The tactical

goals of terrorism are to create a fear of violence in the populace and to increase public

awareness of their political goals. On an organizational level, these tactics can be used to

meet any strategic, political goal, from religious to national liberation, and are still

considered terrorism. Guerilla warfare and insurgents need not be linked to terrorism

because of the different targets, civilians versus military actors.31 Acts of international

terrorism transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are

accomplished, the intended persons they appear to intimidate, or the locale in which the

perpetrators operate.

There are two condition variables for the DV. The first is the presence of Islamic

terrorist organizations or networks in the host state (CV-1). If a state has Islamic terrorist

groups present within its boundaries, it has increased chances for Islamic terrorist acts. If

there is a lack of groups or networks in the states, the likelihood of Islamic terrorism

decreases. The second condition variable is the recruitment by terrorist groups in the host

state (CV-2). Recruitment typically includes an indoctrination and radicalization of a

given individual. Once an individual has been successfully recruited and radicalized, the

level of isolation and separation from the host society typically grows exponentially. This
31
Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, 17-18.
 27

seclusion can increase prospects for Islamic terrorism because radicalized individuals will

be even more disconnected from society than they were prior to their recruitment.

Therefore a high presence of recruitment will increase the prospects for Islamic terrorism,

while a low presence of recruitment will decrease the prospects for Islamic terrorism in

the host state.

Case Study Criteria and Selection

This paper will use case study research to refine the theory laid out above in an

iterative manner. It will use an in-depth and systematic analysis of case studies to assess

and repair the theory above. In the next section, the chosen methods of the congruence

procedure research method and the controlled comparison research method will be

discussed.32

The selection of case studies for this research paper is focused on the aims

described above and the following criteria:

1. The cases should be analytically interesting - the independent variable should

vary over time.

2. The value of the independent variable should vary from case to case.

3. The cases should be practical by being congruent with my interests and

knowledge, so that I am able to employ my language skills.

Based on these criteria, the following European states have been chosen: Spain and the

Netherlands.

Spain is an interesting case because of the attacks in Madrid in March of 2004.

The value of the independent variable in the case of Spain is and overall lack of policies

aimed at integrating its immigrants. The policies put in place by Spain have varied from
32
Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 56-63.
 28

1985 to the present. Spain has historically put anti-immigration policies in place, but it

has more recently tried to adopt integrative strategies for its immigrant population.

However, Spain has not successfully formulated or implemented these integrative

policies. In addition, it has had a more complex historical experience with Islam than

other Western European countries. Regardless of its resentment toward immigrants,

Spain has one of the most liberal policies toward the practice of Islam in Europe. Because

of this, one would expect there to be content Muslims in Spain. However, there are

conflicting points of view when it comes to the Muslim immigrant population. Spain is a

practical case because I am able to read and comprehend Spanish, and will therefore be

able to utilize more primary sources when examining this case.

The second case chosen is the Netherlands. It is an analytically interesting case

because the independent variable shifted drastically in recent history and can be analyzed

using the congruence procedure. A major increase in immigration occurred in the 1960’s

and 1970’s, and in the 1970’s multiculturalism became its official immigration policy.

However, over time issues arose with religious differences and the influx of Muslim

immigrants. When multicultural-oriented policies re-entered the political arena in the

mid-1990s, the Netherlands reversed its previous multicultural policies and adopted

policies aimed at cultural assimilation. In the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s, the open

rejection of multiculturalism and immigration caused an increase in public displays of

racism and negative reactions to immigrants. Currently, the Netherlands has a very

stringent assimilation policy and more controls on immigration and asylum.33 The

Netherlands has historically had a homogeneous Dutch population that shared a common

33
Information about the Netherlands experience with immigration policy and Muslim was derived from the
following sources: Haddad, Muslims in the West; Anne J. Kershen, A Question of Identity; and Modood et.
al., Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship.
 29

language and a strong sense of national identity. However, Dutch society was divided

along religious and ideological lines. These divisions instigated the establishment of

Dutch pillarization. Dutch pillarization allowed for peaceful cooperation between the

different religious leaders. The recent assassination of Theo Van Gogh and the existence

of the Hofstad Network also make the Netherlands an interesting case to examine.34

Some other Western European states fit into the criteria outlined above. For

example, Germany provides a good case of alienation and a lack of integrative policies.

However, its value on the independent variable is similar to that of Spain. My academic

experiences in Spain and language abilities make Spain a more sensible choice than

Germany. In addition, Great Britain has had a unique experience with immigration,

religious discrimination, and terrorism. The case of Great Britain does not have a very

strong value on the independent variable.35 Its immigration policies have not been as

distinct as the Netherlands. Although Spain and the Netherlands are the two cases that

will be researched, other Western European states will be utilized for anecdotal evidence.

Methodology for Assessing Case Studies

In order to assess the theory laid out above, two cases will be researched. It will

be helpful to use the method of controlled comparison and the congruence procedure

method to analyze them. The controlled comparison method examines a small number of

cases to see if they share certain similarities but differ in the value of the independent

variable, dependent variable, or both. The theory laid out above, with this method, would

34
Vidino, “The Hofstad Group,” 581.
35
For more on Germany’s and Britain’s immigration policies see Ian R.G. Spencer, British Immigration
Policy Since 1939: The Making of Multi-racial Britain (New York: Routledge, 1997); Christopher
Rudolph, National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western
Europe Since 1945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); and Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher
Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
 30

be supported if in one case the cause of something was correlated with a specific outcome

and in another case a different cause was correlated with an opposite outcome. For

example, assimilationist policies cause higher prospects for Islamic terrorism and

multiculturalist policies cause lower prospects for Islamic terrorism.

With controlled comparison, specific questions that reflect the research objective

are asked of each case in order to guide and standardize the data collected. The following

questions highlight the causal factors in the theory. In order to examine the independent

variable and its condition variables, the following questions will be asked: What kind of

immigration policies are in place? Do they attempt to integrate the immigrants? How do

the political parties in the host state affect these policies? What is the country’s historical

relationship with immigration? Are these policies implemented?

To examine the IntV and its condition variables, these questions will be asked: Do

the Muslim immigrants feel alienated from the mainstream population? What is the

immigrant’s socio-economic situation (wage, type of job, and percentage in poverty)?

Where do the immigrants typically live? What civil and political rights are available to

the immigrant? What is the native population’s perception of immigrants? Is there a high

level of discrimination towards Muslim immigrants? What social and religious

institutions are in place to integrate Muslim immigrants into society? How accepting is

the native population to Islam?

Finally, the subsequent questions will be answered when analyzing the value of

the dependent variable: What are the prospects for terrorism in this state? What terrorist

organizations and/or networks are present in the state? How are Muslim immigrants
 31

recruited to participate in terrorist attacks on the soil of their host state? By using this

method, systematic comparison can take place when analyzing the cases.36

Congruence-procedure type II, as designated by Van Evera, will also be used to

refine the theory above. Congruence-procedure type II makes multiple within case

comparisons. It takes a number of paired observations of values on the independent

variable and dependent variable across a range of circumstances within a case. It then

assesses whether these values co-vary in accordance with the predictions of the test

hypothesis.37 If the independent variable varies and the dependent variable also varies in

accordance with that shift, than it is a strong test. For example, a small amount of A

would result in a small amount of B. If the independent variable changes and there is a lot

of A, then it would result in a lot of B. This method allows for many observations of

values on the IV and the DV, and it also lets the values of the variables vary over time.

In case study research, this method will ask the following questions of the case at

hand: Have the immigration policies in the state varied overtime? If yes, how and how

much have they varied? Has the level of alienation changed overtime? Does the level of

alienation fluctuate in accordance with the changes in immigration policy? Have the

prospects for Islamic terrorism in the state increased or decreased overtime? If yes, do

these changes move in accordance with the changes in immigration policy or with the

level of alienation felt?

In the following two chapters, the congruence procedure type II and the controlled

comparison method will be used to examine the cases of Spain and the Netherlands to

refine the theory at hand.

36
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 67.
37
Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 61-62.
 32

CHAPTER II:
THE CASE OF SPAIN

In Spain, there has been a lack of substantive integrative policies put in place for

its Muslim immigrants. When there was an influx of immigrants at the end of the

twentieth century, this deficiency created ample problems for immigrants in Spain.

Although the need for a more integrative approach was eventually recognized and new

laws were adopted, the failure in implementation left the experience of Spain’s

immigrants the sane. Institutionally and socially, Spain still acts in a manner that fails to

integrate the majority of its Muslim immigrants into mainstream Spanish society. My

theory predicts that this lack of incorporative immigration policy will lead to high

immigrant alienation. This high level of alienation felt by Muslim immigrants will then

lead to higher prospects for Islamic terrorism in Spain.

This chapter plans to describe and explain Spain’s relationship to Muslim

immigration in order to learn if causation unfolded as my theory leads one to expect. This

chapter will use in-depth and systematic case study research to refine the theory laid out

above in an iterative manner. It will pay explicit attention to answering the questions of

the controlled comparison research method laid out in the Methodology for Assessing

Case Studies section in Chapter I.

This chapter will be constructed around the causal chain of the theory, while

simultaneously addressing each of the controlled comparison questions. The following

three sections will highlight the IV, the IntV, and the DV of the theory: the Spanish

immigration model, the alienation of Muslim immigrants, and Spain’s increasing

prospects for Islamic terrorism.

 33

Spanish Immigration Model: A Lack of Integrative Policy

The independent variable in my theory is the immigration policies put in place by

the host state. This section will examine the lack of integrative policy (IV-2) put in place

by Spain. This will be done by asking what kind of immigration policies are in place and

if they attempt to integrate the immigrants. There are three condition variables that will

be investigated in this section: the history (CV-1), the extent of application (CV-2), and

the political party’s influence on immigration policy (CV-3).

The History of Spanish Immigration Laws

By examining the independent variable’s first condition variable, history (CV-1),

this subsection seeks to answer the question: What is the country’s historical relationship

with immigration? In order to evaluate the current policies directed toward immigrants, it

is first necessary to examine the historical creation of these laws and their changing

dynamic.

Historically, Spain was more of an emigrant country than an immigrant one. In

the second half of the twentieth century, many Spaniards left Spain to go to other

European or Latin American countries. In the late 1990’s, however, this trend switched

course, and people began coming into Spain. Immigration into Spain began to increase

dramatically, and from 1992 until 2000, the number of immigrants in Spain increased

214% annually.38 And between 2000 and 2004, the immigrant population increased from

0.9 million to nearly 2.8 million.39 Individuals seeking entry into Spain came from a

variety of different countries, but an overwhelming majority came from Morocco and

Ecuador. Some of the reasons cited for this transition are: the closing of traditional

38
Pérez, “Spain,” 2.
39
A. Triandafyllidou, “The political discourse on immigration in southern Europe: a critical
analysis,”Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 10, no. 5 (2000): 374.
 34

immigrant receiving countries’ borders (i.e., Germany, Switzerland, and France), the

transition away from an authoritarian regime, Spain’s entrance into the European

Union (EU), war and poverty in third-world countries, and the revival of the Spanish

economy. Because of its late experience with immigration and its geopolitical situation as

a border state in the European Union, Spain’s immigration policies have typically

focused on border control rather than integration.

The first Spanish immigration law, commonly known as the “Organic Law (OL),”

was instituted on July 1, 1985.40 The law focused on controlling foreigners’ entrance into

Spain, and it lacked integrative aspects for the immigrants. Because this law was

instituted at the same time Spain was admitted into the EU, a large portion of its political

agenda was dictated by this relationship.41 Being in line with EU policies has caused

Spain to have a practical and normative pre-disposition to be restrictive in its immigration

policy.42

In 1985, Spain viewed its immigrants as temporary workers, and this law reflected

that. The law made a clear distinction between legal immigrants and illegal immigrants

and set forth the distinctive rights of each group. The language utilized in this law was

vague and imprecise, and in turn, subsequent policies were made by administrative

decree and were delegated to regional and provincial authorities.43 This situation led to

diverse interpretations of the law and a disorganized process of controlling and

integrating immigrants.

40
Also known as the “Ley de Extranjería (Foreigner’s Law).” Ley Orgánica 7/1985, sobre Derechos y
Libertades de los Extranjeros en España. http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Derogadas/r0-lo7-
1985.html (accessed October 31, 2007).
41
Spain became a member of the European Union on January 1, 1986.
42
Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe (London: Sage Publications, Ltd.,
2003), 163.
43
Julie R.Watts, Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization: Unions and Employers in an
Unlikely Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 25.
 35

In 1991, the Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants (PISI) was introduced

as the first national immigration plan. PISI reformed the 1985 OL law by

institutionalizing the policy-making process and creating government offices specifically

for immigration.44 By institutionalizing this process, Spanish officials hoped to create a

more unified approach to immigration and integration. This plan also introduced a

framework for the social integration of immigrants, but it was not implemented at this

time.

In 1995, however, PISI took substantial steps when it created institutions that

specifically monitored and assisted with the integration of immigrants. One institution is

the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, which provides an opportunity for

participation and dialogue about the integration of the immigrant population. The forum

is three-tired and is composed of representation from immigrant associations; Spanish

NGO’s, trade unions, and employer’s organizations; and public administrations at both

the national and regional level. Eleven years later, in January 2006, new legislation

increased the Forum’s importance in policymaking. It now draws up studies and

initiatives related to the social integration of immigrants and carries out reports on

proposals, plans and programs. Currently, the Spanish Administration is required to

consult the Forum on state legislative provisions, plans, or programs that may affect the

social integration of immigrants and refugees.45 The Permanent Immigration Observatory

was also created in 2006. Its main purpose was to gather and analyze information on

migration movement in Spain.46

44
Watts, Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization, 26.
45
Mary P. Corcoran, “Local Responses to a New Issue: Integrating Immigrants in Spain,” in From
Immigration to Integration: Local Solutions to a Global Challenge, ed. OECD (Paris: OECD Publishers,
2006), 248.
46
Permanent Immigration Observatory, “Publications, Information, and Proposals,” Secretariat of the State
for Immigration and Emigration, http://extranjeros.mtas.es/en/general/ObservatorioPermanente_index.html
 36

Changes in European Union policy in the early 1990’s affected the nature of

immigration into Spain. In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht led to the formation of the

European Union (from the European Community), under which a policy of common

currency and political union was adopted. This treaty created the basis for European

citizenship and made specialized distinctions for non-EU immigrants. This law requires

workers from non-EU states to have work permits in order to participate in the labor

force in any EU state.47 This law created problems for many immigrants who were

working in the EU without work permits at the time.

In 1994, Spain instituted a quota policy in order to limit the number of foreign

workers who could enter the country. The ministers established annual quotas for foreign

workers in sectors that were lacking local workers. The jobs available were typically

undesirable to native Spaniards for economic, social, and labor reasons. The

implementation of the quota system caused immigrants to be grouped together by country

of origin in different sectors of the labor market. When talking about the regulation of

immigrants and the need of workers in 2000, the Director of the National Program of

Immigrant Integration, Program Greco said, “It is necessary to set the number of

immigrants that Spain needs annually, their qualification and their typology, to fill the

vacancy jobs according to sector, professional profiles, and, if so, according to their

geographic areas of origin.”48 These regulations facilitated the labor market segregation

that still exists today between the native population and the immigrant population.

(accessed February 1, 2008).

47
Pérez, “Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy,” 3.
48
Agrela Belén, “La Política de Inmigración en España: Reflexiones sobre la Emergencia del Discurso
Cultural,” Migraciones Internacionales 1, no. 2 (2002): 8.
 37

The EU’s effort to unify member states’ policies continued with the creation of

the Schengen Area. In 1995, Spain was accepted into the Schengen Area. This agreement

formed part of the European Union Treaty and helped in the harmonization of the

migratory policies of member states by allowing the free movement of European persons.

Another step towards a common migratory policy was the signing of the Treaty of

Amsterdam in 1997, which dismantled control on Europe’s internal borders. This

agreement established that European Union citizens have the right to circulate, reside,

and work freely without limitations within European Union internal borders.49 It also

established that non-European Union citizens could not circulate freely and must fulfill

certain requirements to cross the European Union’s external frontiers. Individuals must

obtain permits to reside and/or work in European Union states. The EU focused its border

control efforts on the Euro-Mediterranean area at this time because of its location as a

southern barrier to Europe from Africa. The European Union recognized that there may

be an influx of immigrants that would happen as a result of accepting the Mediterranean

countries into this treaty. Also, the European Union saw immigration primarily as a

security issue (i.e. drug trafficking, terrorism) and its policies reflected this.

Political Party Influence on Spain’s Immigration Policies

The shifts in political power in Spain affect the value of the independent variable.

The following subsection will observe the influence of political parties on immigration

policy. In 1996, the new right-wing conservative party, the Popular Party (PP), took over

power of the Spanish government after fourteen years of socialist rule by the Socialist

49
María Teresa Gil Bazo, “The Role of Spain as a Gateway to the Schengen Area: Changes in the Asylum
Law and their Implications for Human Rights,” International Journal of Refugee Law 10, no. 1/2 (1998):
216.
 38

Party of Spanish Workers (PSOE).50 This reallocation of power brought about significant

changes in Spanish policy, especially concerning immigration. The Popular Party adopted

a newer, revised version of the original Organic Law. It launched a regularization

program for individuals who once had residence and work permits but were unable to

renew them.51 This decree also created a permanent residence and work permit for those

who could show they had remained in an uninterrupted legal status for at least six years,

that is, successfully renewing their temporary permits with no lapses

Between 1985 and 2000, the problems with immigration and the laws controlling

it became more transparent. The change from an emigration to an immigration country

caused unexpected socio-economic and political issues that Spain was not ready to tackle.

Initially, temporary measures were put in place to alleviate the stresses of immigration.

However, as time went on, more comprehensive and up to date immigration laws were

needed. Over time, it became apparent that the policies for integration were not actually

being implemented, and that the immigrant population was isolated from the native

population.

Finally in 2000, a new policy adopted by the government reflected these needs.

The original 1985 Organic Law was replaced on January 11, 2000 by the 4/2000 Organic

Law.52 This law aimed to recognize the equal rights of immigrants and to regularize a

large number of illegal immigrants residing in Spain.53 In order to be eligible for

regularization under the 4/2000 OL, individuals must have lived in the in the country
50
The socialist party is known as the PSOE or the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Workers
Socialist Party). The right-wing conservative party is known as the Partido Popular or the PP.
51
Kitty Calavita, “Immigration, law, and marginalization in a global economy: Notes from Spain,” Law
and Society Review 32, no. 3 (1998): 544.
52
Ley Orgánica 4/2000, Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España y su Integración Social,
http://noticia.juridicas.com/base_datos/Derogadas/r11-o4-2000.html (accessed October 31, 2007).
53
Bessa, Cristina Fernández and Ortuño Aix, José María, “Spanish Immigration Policies and Legislative
Evolution in that Field as a New Exceptional Framework,” Liberty and Security (May 24, 2006): 3.
 39

since June 1, 1999, received or applied for a working or residence permit in the last three

years, or have a visa from the individual’s country of origin.54 The Government

anticipated that approximately 80,000 people would be regularized under this new policy.

The number of applications greatly exceeded the government’s prediction. A total of

244,000 applications were received, and 183,000 immigrants were accepted.55

Even though the number of accepted applicants was significantly higher than

projected, many Moroccan immigrants were still denied regularization. The first example

of this is presented in the residency of the candidates. In Madrid, only 17.4% of the

applications were denied. However, in Barcelona were 70.9% of the applications were

denied. These percentages show possible discrimination against African immigrants, and

in particular Moroccans, because Barcelona’s foreign population is made up of largely

African immigrants, while Madrid’s foreign population is made up of mostly Latin

American immigrants (See Figure 2.1). Mustafa Mrabet, spokesman of ATIME, or the

Association of Moroccan Immigrant Workers, said,

Only 52% of the applications of his Moroccan compatriots were settled

favorably, while 80% of the Latin American immigrants’ applications
were accepted. This difference is due to discrimination based on religion
or geographical origin.56

The discrimination in the regularization process may affect the level of the IntV in

the theory.

54
Ley Orgánica 4/2000. The last condition was removed in the case of the Equatorian immigrants, who
were allowed to apply for it in Spain without returning to their country.
55
Bessa, “Spanish Immigration Policies and Legislative Evolution,” 4.
56
Ibid., 5.
 40

Figure 2.1. Foreign Population by Autonomous Communities (2001)

Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales (2002): Anuario de Migraciones

Outside of regulation, the 4/2000 OL instituted equal rights for immigrants.

Article 3.1 of this law states, “Foreigners will enjoy the same rights and freedoms

recognized by Title I of the Spanish Constitution for Spaniards.”57 Article 3.2 also says,

“The rules relative to the fundamental rights of foreigners will be interpreted in

conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the International

Treaties and Agreements on this subject currently in force in Spain.”58 This law also

introduced Program Greco, or the Global Program to Regulate and Coordinate Foreign

Residents’ Affairs and Immigration in Spain. One of the main initiatives of Program

Greco was to integrate foreign residents and their families as contributors to the growth

of Spain.59

57
Ley Orgánica 4/2000.
58
Ibid.
59
Pérez, “Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy,” 5.
 41

When this legislation was approved, the Popular Party (Partido Popular-PP)

lacked an absolute majority in Parliament. The introduction of the 4/2000 OL was an

extremely drastic change, and it relied heavily on the support of the Catalan nationalists.

They pushed for the creation of more liberal legislation on immigration than intended by

the Popular Party, or expected by the socialist party.60 In addition, it has been difficult to

manage a multicultural society in Spain, where there are already diverse identities, such

as the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia. These regions have independent parties

that play a significant role in Spanish politics.61

The 4/2000 law was criticized by the PSOE for encouraging illegal immigration,

because it gave undocumented immigrants citizenship and access to heath, education, and

union membership. Because it sought to integrate the immigrants and to legalize illegal

immigrants this legislation was supported by many employers. This support was extended

because it would decrease sanctions against the employers, and it was expected to

alleviate the social conflicts that occurred in the work place due to alack of integration.62

Less than three months after its adoption, the political elections in Spain took

place, and a party with the intention to reform this integrative law was elected into office.

In the March 2000 election, the conservative socialist party, PSOE, gained control of the

government with an absolute majority. Once in power, the PSOE amended the 4/2000

Organic law and the 8/2000 OL was created on December 22, 2000. The 8/2000 OL is

considered a step backward for Spain, because it further reduces its potential to

implement integrative policies. This reform attempted to remove the liberal aspects of the
60
Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, 164.
61
Inmaculada Marrero Rocha, “The Implications of Spanish-Moroccan Governmental Relations for
Morroccan Immigrants in Spain,” European Journal of Migration and Law 7 (2005): 416.
62
Torns, Teresa, “The New Law on Foreign Persons: A Difficult but Necessary Beginning,” Eurofound,
April 28, 2000, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ eiro/2000/04/feature/es0004183f.htm (accessed February
25, 2008).
 42

4/2000 Organic Law. For instance, it made regularization more difficult and threatened

immigrants with expulsion back to their home country.63The President of the Commission

of European Policies of the Forum for Social Integration said, “The new law 8/2000

reduces the rights [of immigrants], and also the possibilities for regularization, and

threatens the immigrants with expulsion.”64

In any case, the new 8/2000 OL made a clear distinction between regular and

irregular immigrants, shrinking the rights of the latter. This was a completely different

approach than the 4/2000 because it sought to remove illegal immigrants rather than

regulate them. In fact, the OL 8/2000 received criticism from different immigrant

associations and from immigrants themselves. There were demonstrations, hunger strikes,

and other protests against the 8/2000 OL and how it tightened the process of

regularization significantly.

On November 20, 2003, Organic Law 11/2003 was introduced. These changes

aimed to reduce household violence, the protect citizens’ security, and to promote the

social integration of immigrants. This gave priority to legal immigrants and to sought to

pursue a more efficient approach with illegal immigration. With this reform, immigrants

were legally allowed into Spain with an employment contract.

Although the migratory policies of the Spanish state have evolved since their

creation in 1985, their main focus has always been on the control of immigration rather

than on the promotion of social integration. With its vulnerable location on the

Mediterranean coast, Spain acts as a “containing barrier” with restrictive regulations on

immigration.65 Spanish legislation has always centered on stopping illegal immigration by

63
Bessa, “Spanish Immigration Policies and Legislative Evolution,” 4.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid., 3.
 43

toughening its border controls and the requirements needed to obtain legal residence in

Spain rather than designing a policy directed toward the integration of its immigrants.66

The immigration policies that were originally adopted in Spain were not intended to

integrate immigrants into Spanish society at all. Once the growing immigration

population in Spain acquired a public presence and became a problem, policies began to

change. Since 2000, legislation has been put in place that has integrative intentions but

the anti-immigration legacy in Spain has hindered the extent of its application. The

change in immigration policy has not resulted in significant changes in the integration of

the immigrant population.

The Alienation of Muslim Immigrants

With minimal integrative policy in place in Spain, my theory predicts that Muslim

immigrants will have a high level of alienation. This section will explore the intervening

variable and its four condition variables to determine whether or not there is a high level

of alienation amongst immigrants. The CV’s are as follows: Natives’ attitudes about

immigration, the socio-economic status of immigrants, the civil and political rights of

immigrants, and the presence of social and religious institutions for immigrants. The

subsequent four subsections will address each of these condition variables.

Negative Native Perception of Immigrants

The opinions held by the native population about Muslim immigrants can have a

significant affect on the level of alienation felt by Muslim immigrants. In Spain, a

predominantly negative view of immigrants and Islam exists. These opinions minimize
66
Rocha, “The Implications of Spanish-Moroccan Governmental Relations Spain,” 425.
 44

the integration of immigrants because the host society’s preconceived notions about a

group of people facilitate their alienation. This subsection will look into the native’s

attitudes (CV-1) about immigration and the immigrant population in order to asses its

impact on the IntV.

From 1996 to 2003, the public opinion surveys done by the Center of Sociological

Investigation (CIS) show changes in the views Spaniards hold about immigration.67 In

1996, 50% of those who participated thought that migration was a positive aspect of

Spanish society. However, by 2003, this percentage decreased to 44% and 58% of those

surveyed thought Spain had enough or too many immigrants.68 The 2003 survey also

revealed why there are significant difficulties integrating immigrants in Spain. 46% of the

people said they treat immigrants with mistrust, 10% treat them with contempt, and 2%

treat them with aggression. In addition, 51% connect crime to immigration.69 These

statistics reveal the degree of animosity that exists toward immigrants in Spain. The

negative opinions held by native Spaniards may impede upon the immigrant population’s

successful integration into or acceptance by Spanish society.

The 2003 CIS Survey reveals that there is a not a consensus among all Spaniards.

There is a difference in opinion between the educated, upper-classes and the less-

educated, lower-classes. In the 2003 CIS Survey, only 19.6% of Spaniards whose

education level surpassed the collegiate level believed that there were too many

immigrants. However, 57% of the individuals with no education or only elementary

67
Center of Sociological Invesitgation, “Actitides ante la Inmigración,” Estudio CIS 32, no. 2511 (May-
August 2003). This CIS survey contains all of the data from the 2003 CIS Survey cited throughout this
section.
68
Rocha, “The Implications of Spanish-Moroccan Governmental Relations,” 417.
69
V. González, “La Inmigración Africana en la España Mediterránea: El Proceso de Integración,” in
Movilidad Interna y Migraciones Intraeuropeas en la Península Ibérica (Santiago de Compostela:
Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 2002), 211-234.
 45

education believe that there are too many immigrants. There is also a divide across socio-

economic lines. Of the upper-class and upper-middle class respondents, only 29.6%

believe there are too many immigrants in Spain. Conversely, over half (54%) of the

working class believes there are too many immigrants. The negative perception of

immigrants held by the lower, less-educated classes could be influenced by Spaniards’

experience with immigrants. Because of immigrants’ placement in lower paying, less

qualified jobs, Spaniards of similar classifications may be more likely to interact with

immigrants in the workplace. Although 80% of Spaniards believe that immigrants from

less-developed countries take the jobs that Spaniards do not want, some of the lower

classes may still feel that their jobs are threatened by the presence of immigrants. In

2000, 44.7% of the population agreed with the statement that immigrants take away at

least some of the jobs of Spaniards.

In terms of the immigration laws in place, there is also a discrepancy between

economic class and level of education. 40.6% of Spaniards with high-levels of education

think the laws that regulate the entrance of foreigners into Spain are strong enough. On

the other hand, less than 20% of those with elementary or no education think they are

strong enough. Approximately 40% of the lower class believes the laws are very tolerant.

Interestingly, 85.1% of all Spaniards questioned believe that entrance into Spain should

only be granted when they have a work permit. Less than 10% of the population holds

radical views on this topic and believes that there should be no regulation of the entrance

of the immigrants, that it should be extremely difficult to enter, or immigrant’s entrance

should be completely prohibited. A large portion of the population would like to see more

rigorous regulations on illegal immigration, but do not seek to eradicate the immigrant
 46

population entirely. Overall, these polls show that Spain holds relatively moderate views

on immigration law.

Spaniards on whether immigrants should integrate or assimilate into Spanish

society have also varied over time. The number of Spaniards who believe immigrants

should maintain their own language and customs while also learning Spanish language

and customs has decreased from 81.2% to 66.7% from 1996 to 2002. Whereas, the

percentage of the population who thinks that immigrants should forget their customs,

learn Spanish, and accept Spanish customs has increased from 12.4% to 28% between

1996 and 2002. Mikel Azurmedia, President of Foro Nacional de Integración Social de

los Inmigrantes said, “We have thought that all the people are the same but this doesn’t

work the same in any tribe…the immigrants’ children have to be like ours, they have

learn the same and eat the same....”70 His words demonstrate Spaniard’s increasing desire

for immigrants to blend into Spanish society, a task that can be very difficult for Muslim

immigrants.

From the 2003 CIS survey, one can also see that different demographic groups of

immigrants elicit varying levels of acceptance by Spaniards. For example, the Latin

American and Eastern European immigrants are more widely accepted because they have

a history, language, and religion in common with native Spaniards. Spaniards are more

likely to accept immigrants who can easily adapt to Spanish customs. North Africans, on

the other hand, whose cultural background is significantly different than of Spaniards,

have received the heavier end of the xenophobic and racist backlash toward immigration.

In the 2003 survey, Moroccans were cited as the least respected immigrant group in

70
Belen, “La Política de Inmigración en España,” 16.
 47

Spain.71 Rocha discusses this backlash and provides two significant examples of it. In

July of 1999, there was a large demonstration and attacks by more than 300 Terrassa

Spaniards against Moroccan immigrants.72 In El Ejido in 2000, three Spaniards were

murdered by a small group of Moroccans. These murders provoked an enormous reaction

by local Spaniards, which included demonstrations and the burning of a number of

Moroccan houses, shops, and mosques. Racist and xenophobic attacks on Moroccan

immigrants continued for months in this town after the murders.

Spanish-Moroccan political relations constitute further factors that create special

difficulties for Moroccan immigrants and their integration into Spanish society.73 Over

the course of history, there has been a dynamic relationship between these two countries.

The Muslims had control of Spain for nine centuries (the 9th century to the 15th century),

but in the late 15th century they were evicted and many of the people went to Morocco. In

the 19th century, two wars were fought between Spain and Morocco. In the “Disaster of

the Annual,” over 9,000 Spaniards were killed. These historical conflicts have created a

centuries old fear of North Africans or “Los moros” in modern day Spain. In addition, the

cultural differences and the competition for jobs and other resources continue to fuel the

historical hatred between them.74 This hatred does not stem from a serious fear that Spain

will be conquered again by “Los Moros.” However, the ethnic, cultural, and religious

differences between the majority, Spanish-Catholic population, and the minority, North

African-Muslim immigrants, have created extensive obstacles to integration.

In addition, there has been increased visibility of illegal immigration in Spain due

to media coverage and problems with regulation. Spaniards believe illegal immigration is
71
Center of Sociological Invesitgation, “Actitides ante la Inmigración, 1.
72
Rocha, “The Implications of Spanish-Moroccan Governmental Relations,” 418.
73
Ibid., 413.
74
Saux, “Immigration and Terrorism,” 60.
 48

one of the most urgent problems facing Spain and the European Union. In 2003, 85% of

the respondents to the CIS Survey believed that the European Union does not provide

enough assistance to Spain in the prevention of illegal immigration. As a border country,

Spain has significant expectations of the EU because many illegal immigrants only use

Spain as an entryway into the EU. They do not intend to remain there, but recognize that

it is poorly guarded and is located close to the African continent. The illegal immigrants

that infiltrate Spain without documentation increase the negative attitudes held by the

native population.

From the CIS Survey and other opinion surveys, it is apparent that the attitudes

held by Spaniards about are not positive. Foreigners, especially those from North Africa,

are seen as the cause of many disgraces in the host-society, such as conflict, alienation,

high criminality, and more recently, terrorism. These perceptions create a schism between

the native population and the increasingly large immigrant population, which reinforces

the alienation of the Muslim immigrant population in Spain.

Socio-economic Status: Labor and Housing

This subsection looks CV-2 of the IntV, the socio-economic status of immigrants

in Spain. The immense increase in immigrants during the twenty-first century has created

significant issues with the legal and social situation faced by those entering the country.

The major social issues are: the inability of immigrants to integrate into mainstream

society and the resistance of the Spanish population to immigration. The effectiveness of

Spanish legal and regulation procedures and the increase the illegal immigrant population

contribute to these difficulties. After the 8/2000 OL was introduced and regulation was

made extremely difficult, illegal immigrants were pushed into an awkward limbo status.
 49

Many were unable to wait through the lengthy and unreliable regulation system in Spain,

while others who lacked proper documentation were left in a vulnerable and

unpredictable state. For example, an Algerian immigrant testified, “Our life is a continual

flight from the police because we don’t have papers. We live with permanent anxiety.”75

The difficulties experienced with the labor and housing market exemplify

immigrants’ separation from mainstream society. For example, Spanish immigration

policies marginalize illegal immigrants, particularly third world immigrants, and confine

them to the underground economy of agriculture, construction, or domestic services

present in Spain.76 The jobs offered to these immigrants are the most lowest-paying, most

physically laborious, and tend to have the greatest turnover of employees in the state.

This economic deprivation can be taxing on an immigrant and his or her family. In 2004,

more than 0.8 million immigrants were illegally residing in Spain and were working in

the underground economy. Beginning in 2005, a normalization process was initiated that

helped to bring approximately 0.7 million people into the labor market legally.77 For legal

immigrants, problems similar to those described above are also widespread. Since its

introduction in 1994, the quota system has been an institutionalized guarantee that

immigrants will be granted the worst jobs in the worst industries. Typically, the jobs

offered have typically been rejected by all native workers.

The difficulties immigrants experience in the housing market are equally

disheartening. Landlords in Spain engage in extensive anti-foreigner discrimination.

Many claim to be concerned about drug and criminal problems, and therefore deny

75
Diamantino Garcia Acosta and Mohamed Dahiri, “La Inmigracion en España,” in Extranjeros en el
Paraíso, ed. Colectivo Virico (Barcelona: Edicions La Lletra SCCL, 1994), 119.
76
Kitty Calavita, “A ‘Reserve Army of Delinquents:’ The Criminalization and Economic Punishment of
Immigrants in Spain,” Punishment & Society: The International Journal of Penology 5, no. 4 (2003): 400.
77
Ibid., 402.
 50

immigrants housing or rent. Because they are denied from many Spanish neighborhoods,

immigrants tend to cluster in poorer, more encapsulated neighborhoods. This causes

severe overcrowding in immigrant communities.78 For example, in Madrid squatter style

settlements, populated by only foreign workers and their families, are growing rapidly.

This housing is typically made from discarded construction materials and sheets of

plastic. Many of these communities lack common urban services, such as running water

and electricity. The discriminatory nature of the housing market reinforces the growing

patterns of ghettoization of immigrants in Spain, particularly Moroccans. These living

arrangements further decrease immigrant contact with, and integration into, mainstream

society.79 For example, the majority of the immigrant population is accumulated in urban

areas such as Madrid and Barcelona (See Figure 2.1).

The immigrant population in Spain has experienced heightened incarceration rates

compared to the mainstream society. This could be a result of immigrants’ increased in

involvement in criminal activities, or it could be due to increased discrimination toward

the immigrant population. Many citizens blame recent Moroccan immigrants for

increased crime rates in the country. When immigration first began to rise in Spain, 18%

of those incarcerated were foreigners.80 In 2001, the figure rose to 20%. These numbers

are staggering because the foreign population in Spain is only 2-3% of the total

population.81 The percentage of incarcerated immigrants in Spain is relatively low when

compared to other western European countries. For example, in the Netherlands 32% of

78
W.A. Cornelius, “Spain: The Uneasy Transition from Labor Exporter to Labor Importer,” in Controlling
Immigration: A Global Perspective, eds. W. A. Cornelius, P. L. Martin and J. F. Hollifield (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1994), 357.
79
Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” The Washington
Quarterly, 27, no. 3 (2004): 29-31.
80
Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin A. Schain, eds., The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe
(Portland: Frank Cass, 1994).
81
Ministerio del Interior, Anuario Estadístico de Extranjeria (Madrid: Ministerio del Interior, 2001).
 51

the prison population is immigrants and 26% of France’s prison population is

immigrants. Spain is considered to have a low incarceration rate, so these increasingly

high percentages of immigrant populations in prison are alarming.

The incarceration rate of immigrants is significant in terms of immigrant

integration because of the implication that comes with a prison sentence. For instance,

once an immigrant has been incarcerated, he or she loses the ability to obtain a residence

permit in Spain. By losing this opportunity, an immigrant may no longer feel compelled

to integrate into society. In addition, the exposure to radical Islamic groups in prison may

facilitate the alienation of an immigrant from mainstream society.

Religious Acceptance with a Façade of Tolerance

This subsection examines CV-3 of the intervening variable, the presence of social

and religious institutions in the state for immigrants. It attempts to answer the following

two controlled comparison research questions: What social and religious institutions are

in place to integrate Muslim immigrants into society? And, how accepting is the native

population to Islam?

A lack of religious acceptance in a state is expected to increase the level of

alienation felt by an immigrant. Legally in Spain, there is a considerable amount of

religious acceptance. People in Spain are allowed to freely practice and express their

religious views. The Federation of Spanish Islamic Entities (FEERI) estimates that there

are close to one million Muslims in Spain. In addition, in January 2005, the Register of

Religious Entities maintained by the Ministry of Justice listed 254 religious institutions

representing Islam. This number may be much larger because some religious groups

choose to register as cultural organizations with the regional governments rather than
 52

with the national registry of religious entities in Madrid. This is because the national

registration process can take up to 6 months and requires a large amount of paperwork.

Religious schools for Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Jewish students are allowed in

Spain. In addition, there are no restrictions placed on parents who want to provide their

children religious home school training or enroll them in private religious schools.

The Government has taken steps to promote interfaith understanding through the

support or sponsorship of programs on interfaith dialogue. Members of all religious faiths

serve as members of a government Committee of Advisors on Religious Freedom. On

March 25, 2005, the government participated in an inter-religious seminar on "Religious

Pluralism and Coexistence" in Madrid. It also sponsors university courses and seminars

with representatives of different religious confessions.

Although the Spanish public has expressed some negative attitudes toward

migration, there has also been a pro-migrant counter-mobilization. Arango (2000) argues

that Spain’s transition to a liberal democracy sparked the development of a civic culture

and a rise in progressive, universalistic values.82 This change had led to the acceptance

and use of The Red Cross, Caritas, S.O.S. Racismo, and other non-governmental agencies

provide social services to immigrants, regardless of legal status and are funded by the

government and the Catholic Church. Services are often dispensed through social service

centers, and they include child care for working mothers, Spanish language instruction,

and legal aid. These organizations have recognized the difficulties faced by native born

children of illegal immigrants and have tried to accommodate them into mainstream

society.83
82
Joaquín Arango, “Becoming a Country of Immigration at the End of the Twentieth Century: The Case of
Spain,” in Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe, eds., R. King, G. Lazaridis, and C.
Tsardanidis (New York: St. Marin’s Press, 2000).
83
Cornelius, “Spain,” 356.
 53

However, this level of religious acceptance and social support only extends so far.

Issues of alienation arise when the minority Muslim immigrant population clashes with

Spain’s majority Catholic population. In 2005, 79% of population considered themselves

catholic.84 In addition to its superiority in numbers, the Catholic population holds a

significant amount of power. For example, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 states,

No religion shall have a state character. The public powers shall take into
account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and maintain the
appropriate relations of cooperation, with the Catholic Church and other
denominations.85

Although the Constitution accepts all religious views, the sheer mention of the Catholic

Church demonstrates its dominant position in Spanish society. The Catholic presence in

Spain further alienates Muslim immigrants.

As for the Islamic community, it has gained autonomy and support in Spain over

the past decade and a half. In 1992, Islam was legally recognized by the Spanish state

with the Agreement of Cooperation with the Islamic Commission of Spain. In order to be

recognized, Muslims had to prove that they were an organized group with a significant

number of members. Because of this requirement, many different associations became

more visible to the public. For example, the Association of Moroccan Workers and

Immigrants in Spain (ATIME) and the Muslim Association of Melilla both came into

public view at this time.86 FEERI, another Spanish Islamic organization, was also created

at this time.

The growth of the country's immigrant population has led to social friction, at

times with a religious foundation. One obstacle that has been faced by Islamic groups in
84
Alfonso Pérez-Agote and José A. Santiago García, La Situación de la Religión en España a Principios
del Sigle XXI (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2005).
85
Spanish Constitution: Article 16.3.
86
ATIME is known as the Asociación de Trabajadores e Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España -Association of
Morroccan Workers and Immigrants in Spain.
 54

Spain is Mosque construction. FEERI reports that the building permit process for new

mosque construction can be difficult and lengthy, especially for building sites in central

urban locations. According to FEERI, new mosque construction sometimes is forced into

less-visible suburban areas, primarily because of resistance from neighborhood groups.

However, in 2003, the construction of a large and prominent mosque was completed in

Granada.

On an individual basis, Muslims in Spain continue to face isolation and

discrimination. For instance, the manner in which many media reports link the terrorist

attacks in Madrid to Islam perpetuates Muslim immigrant’s alienation. In February 2005,

Sigma Dos, a private polling agency, conducted a national survey of 1000 individuals on

attitudes on the Muslim population in the country. The poll revealed that 70 percent of

those who responded had had no contact with Muslims, and 48 percent stated they knew

almost nothing about Islam or Muslims. Also, 43 percent of the respondents felt the

largest threat that came from having Muslims in Spain was the possibility that

fundamentalists would carry out a terrorist attack.87 This poll reveals the lack of contact

between Muslim immigrants and native Spaniards. This lack of contact may be a result of

the poor integration. Although Islam is institutionally accepted, it is apparent that it is not

congruent with the majority Catholic population. Because of its lack of exposure in

Spanish society, the majority non-radical Muslim population has been misrepresented

and misunderstood.

The younger, second-generation immigrants are adapting to modern European

society better than the initial immigrants had. They are able to socialize with and adopt

customs of mainstream society through schooling. However, the continued opinion by

87
Pérez-Agote and García, La Situación de la Religión en España.
 55

natives that their parents’ or grandparents’ immigrant status makes them an outsider has

caused many to feel disconnected from mainstream society. The discriminatory treatment

in the labor and housing market may cause Moroccan immigrants attitudes toward

Spanish society to be skewed and may provoke isolation and marginalization and in turn

avoidance of assimilation into Spanish culture.88

Spain’s Increasing Prospects for International Islamic Terrorism

Spain’s lack of policies to effectively integrate its Muslim immigrants and their

seemingly high level of alienation lead one to predict, based on the theory, that there will

be increased prospects for Islamic terrorism in Spain. This third and final section

examines this prediction about the value of the dependent variable, prospects for Islamic

terrorism in Europe. This section answers the question: What are the prospects for

terrorism in this state?

Spain has had decades of experience with domestic terrorism involving the

Basque terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA).89 The ETA has been active

for approximately 40 years and has taken responsibility for approximately 800 deaths in

Spain. In 2006, it committed to a “permanent ceasefire” with the Spanish government.90

While Spain has been relatively successful in its fight against ethno-nationalist and

social-revolutionary terrorism, this experience may not be transferable to international

Islamic terrorism. 91 Although Europe is not the central focus of the jihad, it has become

88
S. Tarrés Chamorro, “La Islamización de la Vida Cotidiana: El Talig en Sevilla,” in Inmigrantes entre
Nosotros, eds. F. Checa and E. Soriano (Barcelona: Icaria, 1999), 131.
89
ETA stands for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna.
90
Saux, “Immigration and Terrorism,” 58. The ETA broke this “ceasefire on December 30, 2006 when it
detonated a van bomb in a parking building at the Madrid Barajas international airport. The explosion
caused the collapse of the building and killed two Ecuadorian immigrants who were napping inside their
cars in the parking building. At 6:00 P.M., that same evening, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero released a
statement stating that the "peace process" had been discontinued. “ETA Cargó la Bomba de Barajas con al
menos 200 Kilos de Explosivo,” El País, December 30, 2006.
91
Saux, “Immigration and Terrorism,” 60.
 56

an increasingly attractive arena for recruitment and operations. The large population of

immigrants from North Africa, the opportunities that exist for raising funds through illicit

activities, and the ease of travel to other countries in Europe, makes Spain a strategic

location for international terrorist groups.

The intersection between jihadist activities and immigration present a large threat

to Spain.92 In the public opinion surveys done by CIS after the 11-M attacks, it was

apparent that both national and international terrorism were perceived as a problem for

65.5% of the Spanish population.93 When looking only at Islamic terrorism, the survey

found that the top three causes cited for Islamic terrorism are the war in Iraq (26.4%),

religious fundamentalism (20.4%), and the politics of the United States of America

(18.7%). Interestingly, only 5.6% of the participants felt that the inequality between the

rich and the poor was the cause, and only 11.0% saw the politics of the Spanish

government as the cause of Islamic terrorism. The more educated participants were more

likely to see religious fundamentalism as a cause, where as the less educated were more

likely to cite the war in Iraq as a cause.

Profile of Jihadist and Jihadists Networks in Spain

This section researches the Islamic terrorist organizations and networks present in

Spain (CV-1) in order to determine if it affects the value of the DV in the manner

expected.

The main forms of Islamic terrorist activity in Spain prior to the 11-M attacks

were: the distribution of propaganda to increase recruits, sympathizers, and resources;

92
Fidel Sendagorta, “Jihad in Europe: The wider context,” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 66. While Sendagorta
does not explicitly define jihad, it is commonly meant to refer to a soldier fighting in the Muslim holy war
or the act of fighting for Islam and the holy war.
93
Francisco J. Llera and Alfredo Retortillo, Los Españoles y Las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Madrid: Centro
de Investigaciones Sociológicas, December 2004).
 57

fundraising through petty crime, recruitment of volunteers into the network to train

and/or fight in abroad; linking with other jihadist networks abroad; falsification of

documents; and purchase of equipment.94

Fernando Reinares has done significant research on the sociological profile of

jihadists in Spain.95 His study was based on data of 188 detainees in Spanish prisons

between 2001 and 2005. The majority of the detainees were males between the age of 25

and 40 and were immigrants from the Mahgreb region (see Figure 2.2. and Figure 2.3).

The administrative status of jihadists in Spain reveals a connection between

immigration and Islamic terrorism (see Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5). Only 4% of those

arrested were Spanish-born and only 6% were naturalized citizens. Legal residents and

illegal residents account for 81% of those who have been imprisoned for their connection

to jihadist activity in Spain.

94
Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh, “Spain and Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of the Threat and Response
1995-2005,” Mediterranean Politics 11, no. 2 (July 2006): 209-229.
95
Fernando Reinares, “¿Coinciden el Gobierno y los Cuidadanos en qué Medidas Adopter contra el
Terrorismo Internacional? Análisis Real Instituto Elcano 78 (October 7, 2006).
 58

Figure 2.2. Persons linked to Jihadist terrorism imprisoned in Spain by country

of birth (between 2001 and 2005).

80
69 67
70
Number of Persons

60

50

40

30
22
20
12
10 8 8
2
0
Morocco Algeria Syria Pakistan Spain Lebanon Other
Country of Birth

Source: Reinares, “Towards a Social Characterization of Jihadist Terrorism.”

Figure 2.3. Percentage of Persons linked to Jihadist terrorism imprisoned in Spain

by country of birth (between 2001 to 2005).

Lebanon
1.1%
Spain
Other
4.3 % Morocco
4.2%
Algeria
Pakistan
6.4% Syria
Morocco
36.7% Pakistan
Syria Spain
11.7%
Lebanon
Other

Algeria
35.6%

Source: Reinares, “Towards a Social Characterization of Jihadist Terrorism.”

 59

Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh have done extensive research on the history

of Jihad networks in Spain.96 Throughout the 1990’s and leading up to the March 11,

2004 attacks in Madrid, they designated three major jihad networks in Spain: the

Algerian network, Abu Dahdah’s network, and isolated members from other networks.

The Algerian networks started in the early 1990’s and were the first jihad networks in

Spain. These groups originally sprouted to serve as support for the internal struggle in

Algeria but eventually turned into Salafist groups.97 Since 1995, Spanish security forces

have attempted to limit the activities of the Algerian network. However, its transition to

jihad and its relationship with Moroccan jihadist groups has facilitated is continued

existence.98 The specific groups associated with this network are the Armed Islamic

Group (GIA) and The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).99

The second network cited by Jordán and Horsburgh is Abu Dahdah’s network. It

originated from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and came to Spain in the 1980’s after

facing political persecution in their home country. In the 1990’s this group also

transformed and began to support “global jihad.” This group has a tendency to recruit

members in Spain and other Western European countries and then send them to

Afghanistan for training. The 9-11 attacks on the United States revealed this group’s

connection to terrorism, and it was dismantled between November 2001 and September

2003 after several arrests by Spanish authorities. Abu Dahdah received twenty-seven

years for his collaboration with the Hamburg cell and the preparations for the September

96
Jordán and Horsburgh, “Spain and Islamist Terrorism,” 210-211.
97
Salafists follow a Sunni Islamic school of thought.
98
Jordán and Horsburgh, “Spain and Islamist Terrorism,” 210. This relationship has facilitated the creation
of a “Maghrebi network.”
99
The GSPC is a splinter group of Al-Qaeda.
 60

Figure 2.4. Persons linked to Jihadist terrorism imprisoned in Spain by

administrative status (between 2001 to 2005).

94
100
90
Number of Persons

80
70
59
60
50
40
30
11 13
20
3 8
10
0
Legally- Illegally Extradited Naturalized Spanish- No Data
resident Resident foreigners citizens born
foreigners foreigners
Administrative Status

Source: Reinares, “Towards a Social Characterization of Jihadist Terrorism.”

11, 2001 attacks in the United States.100 Barakat Yarkas, a Syrian immigrant to Spain,

was also detained in November 2001 on charges of providing support to Al-Qaeda and

for helping Mohammed Atta organize 9-11. Yarkas and seventeen co-defendants were

convicted in September 2005 for their roles in supporting Al-Qaeda, but three

codefendants were later released on appeal. Among those convicted was al-Jazeera

journalist Taysir Alony, who was sentenced to seven years in prison for transporting

funds from Yarkas to terrorists in Afghanistan under his cover as a journalist. Spanish

authorities released Alony in October for humanitarian reasons stemming from a serious

heart problem, but he remained under surveillance.

100
Jordán and Horsburgh, “Spain and Islamist Terrorism,” 211.
 61

Figure 2.5. Percentage of Persons linked to Jihadist terrorism imprisoned in Spain by

administrative status (2001 to 2005).

Spanish-born Legally-resident foreigners

4% No Data
7% Illegally Resident
Naturalized foreigners
citizens Extradited foreigners
6%
Naturalized citizens
Extradited Spanish-born
foreigners
2% No Data
Legally-resident
foreigners
50%
Illegally Resident
foreigners
31%

Source: Reinares, “Towards a Social Characterization of Jihadist Terrorism.”

The third type of jihadist networks present in Spain is isolated members of other

terrorist networks. Typically this group encompasses individuals who belong to networks

abroad but live in Spain. These individuals tend to group with other radicals and try to

disseminate their point of view to other Muslims in Spain. Two notable terrorists who

belonged to this type of network are Ahmed Brahim, an Algerian arrested in April 2002

for his financial collaborations with Al-Qaeda and Ahmed Ruskar, a Pakistani who was

arrested in March 2003 for contributing funds to Al-Qaeda’s attack on Djerba.101

Recruitment: Details of the 11-M Attacks

This subsection will use the 11-M attack in Madrid to explain how Spain’s

immigrant population can be recruited into the jihadist groups described above and how

they can carry out an attack on Spanish soil. The experience of the individual’s who
101
Ibid.
 62

became radicalized and joined the Madrid cell will help to explicate CV-2’s influence on

the prospects for terrorism. The aim of this subsection is to determine how Muslim

immigrants are recruited to participate in terrorist attacks on Spanish soil.

The simultaneous explosion of ten bombs placed on four trains in the early hours

of March 11, 2004 caused 191 deaths and 1,800 injuries. If the trains were not delayed,

the explosion would have taken place inside Atocha train station, possibly provoking the

collapse of its structure and a much higher number of victims. On March 12, 2004,

Spanish police located the group who planned the Madrid attacks in an apartment in

Leganes, a town near Madrid. After a shoot-out and hours under siege, the terrorists

ignited an explosive charge, taking all of their lives.102

A transnational, Moroccan-based group, known as the Moroccan Islamic

Combatant Group (MICG) was responsible for the Madrid bombings. The terrorists were

salafist jihadists who believed in the idea of a global jihad. The manner in which its

members were recruited indicates that training in Afghanistan is no longer a necessity for

Islamic terrorist cells in Europe. Many of the individuals involved reported being

recruited in mosques, prisons, and refugee centers. The group members met while

worshipping at the M-30 mosque in Madrid, and together became increasingly radical. It

gradually moved its activities to an underground mosque, and in November 2003, it

became an organized terrorist cell.103 The group consisted mainly of second-generation,

North African immigrants to Spain. Many of them dressed and acted like native

102
Home Office Spain, “Operaciones de Lucha Antiterrorista-Operations of the Antiterrorism Fight,”
Office of Information and Social Relations, April 3, 2004, http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Terrorismo_
Internacional/Operaciones_de_Lucha_Antiterrorista/ 2005/ Actividad_Antiterrorista_en_Espana (accessed
October 12, 2007).
103
Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq,” 328.
 63

Spaniards. Nesser argues that the key members of the group suffered from a cultural

identity crisis that precipitated their involvement in radical activities.104

The terrorist cell that committed the 11-M train bombings has also been linked to

Al-Qaeda. For example, Yousef Belhadj, a Moroccan whose relatives identified him as a

member of Al-Qaeda and the GICM helped facilitate the bombings. Belhadj was in Spain

a few days prior to the Madrid attacks and was in contact with members of the network.

Previously in October 2003, Belhadj purchased a telephone card in Belgium using a false

name and date of birth, March 11, 1921. For his other phone the false date of birth date of

May 16, 1985 was given. On that day in 2003, the Casablanca attacks took place. The

card with the March 11 birthday was purchased the day after a video recording of Osama

Bin Laden threatening Spain and its involvement in Iraq, was aired.105 The Spanish police

suspect that Yousef Belhadj is the spokesperson for Al-Qaeda in Europe.106

The three most important members of the MICG were: Allekema Lamari, Serhane

Ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, and Jamal Ahmidan. Allekema Lamari, an Algerian, was the

Operations Chief of the 11-M train bombings. In 1997, Lamari was charged with fourteen

years of imprisonment for belonging to a terrorist organization but was released after two

years due to a judicial error.107 DNA traces link him to the Kangoo van found near to the

railway station in Alcalá de Henares on the day of the train bombings.108 He was among

those killed April 3, 2004, in the suicide blast in a Madrid apartment. Serhane ben

Abdelmajid Fakhet, a Tunisian, was another main commander of the 11-M attacks and

worked for Lamari. He died in the suicide explosion and was approximately 36 years old
104
Ibid., 329.
105
El País, August 5, 2005.
106
Ibid., April 2, 2005.
107
“Madrid bombing suspects,” BBC, March 10, 2005.
108
Pike, John, “Global Security Home Page,” February 15, 2007, globalsecurity.org (accessed January 24,
2008).
 64

at the time. Fakhet preached radical Islam at a mosque across the street from his Madrid

apartment.

Jamal Ahmidan, also known as Mowgli, El Chino, and the Moroccan, was the 11-

M train bombers Second-in-Command. Ahmidan was the chief fundraiser for the 11-M

cell. Zougam owned a mobile phone shop in the Lavapiés neighborhood in Madrid called

“Nuevo Siglo,” or “The New Century.” Authorities believe he is responsible for selling

the telephones used to detonate the bombs. On October 31, 2007 he was convicted of 191

charges of murder and 1,856 charges of attempted murder, and received a sentence of

42,922 years in prison.109

Spain arrested forty-seven individuals with possible links to A-Qaeda and related

extremist organizations in 2003. Authorities held eleven Pakistani nationals arrested in

Barcelona in 2004 for allegedly providing logistical support to A-Qaeda. In April, the

U.K. extradited Tunisian citizen Hedi Ben Youseff Boudhiba to Spain, where he was

awaiting trial for membership in a Spanish terrorist cell that provided false passports and

other identification to the March 11, 2004 bombers. Also,

As the number of Muslim immigrants in Spain increases it is pertinent to examine

their connection to Islamic terrorism. Muslims, mostly Moroccans, are one of the largest

immigrant communities in Spain, and their numbers are increasing daily. The official

figures estimated the number of Muslims at 500,000 people in 2005, but realistically the

figure is probably over 1 million.110 According to projections of the Spanish National

Institute of Statistics, in 2025 the number of foreigners that reside in Spain is expected to

109
“Six Moroccans Suspected of Madrid Attacks,” The Guardian, March 16, 2004.
110
G. De Arístegui, La Yihad en España (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2005), 243.
 65

exceed 12 million (almost 25 per cent of the population).111 This figure does not

distinguish the increase in Muslim immigrants, however, they currently represent one

quarter of all Spanish immigration, and it is likely this trend will continue.

Typically, in Spain radicalization begins when a preacher or recruiter at a radical

mosque target a specific individual because he was paying attention to and reacting to the

radical discourse or because of his disposition. The recruiter will then establish contact

with them by inviting them to special meetings in private places where they are able to

speak openly about radical views and jihad. This method was used to attract many

Maghribi youngsters in Spain who later went to Iraq. One example is an Algerian,

Belgacem Bellil. Bellil was recruited by a network that operated in a village near

Barcelona, and in November 2003 he attacked the Italian base of Nasiriya in Iraq.112 The

radical pockets that exist in Islamist centers are a main contributor to immigrant’s

growing radicalization. An intelligence service report leaked to the press in December

2005 said that of the 600 mosques and places of prayer in Spain, approximately 10%

disseminate radical ideas.113 Also, ten jihadist detainees stated that they have preached in

several different places of prayer in Spain. The use of mosques, prisons, social

institutions, and refugee camps as centers for recruitment is potentially dangerous to

Spanish society.114

Spain: A Post-11-M Train Bombings Examination

As Muslim immigration increases, it is also important to look at the changing

composition of the Islamic terrorist networks in Spain. It is apparent that they are

111
R. Sandell, “Spain’s Population: The Bigger the Better? Ways of Guessing the Future,” Real Instituto
Elcano 58 (2005).
112
Jordán and Horsburgh, “Spain and Islamist Terrorism,” 212.
113
El País, December 19, 2005.
114
Jordán and Horsburgh, “Spain and Islamist Terrorism,” 212.
 66

becoming progressively more heterogeneous in terms of nationality and there is a

growing majority of Moroccans participating in them. Spain is set apart from Morocco by

its considerably higher standard of living. In Morocco, grave socio-economic problems

exist and unemployment of the youth is a major destabilizing factor. This gap in earnings

will encourage increased human transfer from Morocco to Spain.115 The growing number

of Moroccans immigrating to Spain and their increasing participation in jihadist activities

creates a security dilemma for Spanish officials. The lack of integration has lead to

increased alienation of Muslim immigrants in Spain, particularly Moroccan Muslims.

This chapter set out to determine if the causal chain (IV-2 à IntV-1à DV-1)

presented in the theory is plausible. This chapter shows that the theory is supported by

evidence from this case study. In Spain, the value of the independent variable is its lack

of integrative immigration policies (IV-2). When IV-2 is present in a state, the theory

predicts a high level of alienation (IntV-1). In Spain, a high level of immigrant alienation

from mainstream society is evident. Finally, one expects this high level of alienation to

lead to higher prospects for Islamic terrorism. Again, this case follows the predictions

laid out in the theory. The case of Spain corroborates the causal chain of the theory and

satisfies the requirements for a plausibility probe.

115
Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (accessed
February 13, 2008).
 67

CHAPTER III:
THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS

The increasing number of immigrants is not only affecting states on European’s

Mediterranean border, but it is also impacting states in the northern part of the EU. In

2003, the Netherlands’ non-Dutch ethnic population was over three million, and the non-

Western immigrant population had grown to 10.7% of the total Dutch population.116 Over

the last decade, the rising number of immigrants has caused the Netherlands to call its

immigration policies into question. As a result, its confidence in a multicultural system

has faltered, and a more assimilation-oriented approach was adopted.

The Netherlands will serve as the second case study in this paper. This chapter

aims to refine the theory laid out in Chapter I through an in-depth and systematic case

study analysis. Because the IV in the Netherlands varies over time, congruence procedure

type II will be used to analyze this case. The within-case analysis of this chapter aims to

answer the following questions: What changed, in terms of immigration policy, as a

result of this shift? Did this shift in immigration policy affect the level of alienation of

immigrants in the Netherlands? And, if the level of alienation changed, did the prospects

for terrorism also change? These observations will determine if the theory can explain

changes over time.

In addition, in a manner similar to the Spanish case, this chapter will follow the

controlled comparison questions presented in the Methodology for Assessing Case

Studies section of Chapter I. Each section will examine a piece of the causal chain, and

116
Ellie Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: Multiculturalism and the Shift to
Assimilation in the Netherlands,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 5 (2007): 716.
 68

these sections include: Dutch immigration models, immigrants’ increased awareness of

their alienation, and an investigation of the prospects for Islamic terrorism.

Dutch Immigration Models:

A Shift from away from the Multicultural Approach

This section will show how the independent variable, the immigration model

adopted by the Dutch state, shifted over time. The initial changes began in 1994, when

the immigration model transferred from one based on multicultural ideals (IV-3) to one

with assimilationist goals (IV-1). The following subsections will discuss how and why

this occurred by examining the three condition variables of the IV, the history (CV-1), the

influence of the political parties involved (CV-2), and the extent that these policies were

implemented (CV-3). This section will answer the following controlled comparison

questions: What kind of immigration policies are in place? And, do they attempt to

integrate the immigrants?

History: A Society Based on Multicultural Immigration Policy

This subsection examines CV-1 of the independent variable, the history of

immigration into the Netherlands and the policies it has adopted in response to them.

Since 1945, the immigration waves entering the Netherlands have had many different

characteristics (See Figure 3.1). The initial group, which arrived between 1945 and the

1960’s, originated from the former Dutch East Indies as a result of colonization.

In the 1960’s and early 1970’s, the majority of immigrants were guest-workers

recruited from Southern Europe, Surinam, the Antilles, Turkey, and Morocco. Of these,

the men who arrived from Turkey and Morocco were typically employed in low-income

jobs in unfavorable conditions. At this time, these single men lived cooped up in cheap
 69

Figure 3.1. Development of migration motives, 1995, 2000, & 2003

Source: Wal, “Active Civic Participation of Immigrants,” 4.

hostels, prepared to do almost anything to provide for their families back home. One of

these men was Mohammed Bouyeri’s father.”117 Men and women who arrived in the

Netherlands with the guest worker title in the 1960’s were not expected to stay. The

government and the native Dutch population anticipated their return to their home states

once the need for foreign labor disappeared, instead, many chose to stay.
117
Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 20. Mohammed Bouyeri is the man who murdered Theo Van Gogh. The
murder will be discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter.
 70

This situation became problematic in 1973 when Arab oil producers punished the

Netherlands for their support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The punishment, an

embargo, led to crisis in the Dutch economy and the oil shock of 1973. As a result, the

number of jobs available for “guest-workers” from Morocco, Turkey, or the increasing

number of Surinamese immigrants significantly decreased. Ian Buruma argues, “The

result was widespread unemployment, dependence on the welfare state, petty crime, and

a vicious circle of social discrimination and sporadic violence.”118

The wave of immigrants following the guest-workers was made up of refugees

and asylum-seekers. Starting in the late 1970’s, the Netherlands began to accept a large

number of refugees and asylum-seekers, mainly from the former Yugoslavia and Africa.

In combination with the immigrants already present in the Netherlands, this significantly

increased the visibility of the immigrant population. In addition, the diverse origin of the

immigrants caused the Netherlands to move from a very homogeneous state to one with a

remarkable level of diversity.

Beginning in the early 1980’s, the Netherlands instituted a multicultural

immigration policy, known as the Ethnic Minorities Policy to accommodate its growing

immigrant population. This policy allowed designated ethnic groups to freely practice

and participate in their own ethnic culture.119 This was made possible through state-

supported ethnic institutions, such as schools, hospitals, and media. The different ethnic

groups that came to the Netherlands were able to fully function in their own community,

and it was not mandated that there be any contact with or assimilation into mainstream

118
Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 20.
119
The Ethnic Minorities Policy was put in place in 1983 and applied to Turks, Moroccans, Southern
Europeans, Moluccans, Surinamese, Antillians, refugees, Roma and Sintis, and caravan dwellers because
they were seen as segregated social groups. The Chinese were not included because they were not seen as a
minority group.
 71

society. It is speculated that these policies were eventually responsible for the failure of

integrating immigrants in the Netherlands because there was a lack of participation

between these communities and the native Dutch population. This lack of integration was

pinpointed in non-European and Muslim immigrant groups.120

After the negative side-effects of the Ethnic Minorities Policy were realized, other

considerable policy changes were made in the late 1980’s. Dutch politicians chose to

change the following because they believed it would increase the natives’ tolerance for

cultural difference and reduce the refusal of some immigrants to adopt Dutch culture,

language, and values. Anti-discrimination legislation was strengthened, the labor market

was reformed, education programs were put in place, and religious and linguistic

institutions were created.121 For example, in 1985, voting rights for non-citizens at the

local level were instituted; regularization became easier; a consultation structure was

created to give target immigrant groups a voice in society.122 Also, voluntary agreements

and laws were implemented to open up jobs for immigrants.123 These reforms temporarily

decreased the visibility of the integration problems in Dutch society.

By the early 1990’s, it was apparent that the lack of integrative aspects in the

Netherlands’ multicultural policies were causing tensions between the native Dutch

population and the immigrant population. This was especially apparent with the Muslim

population. Frits Bolkestein, the then leader of the Liberal Party and leader of the

opposition in Parliament said, “Islam was a threat to liberal democracy and hindrance for

120
Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 715.
121
The anti-discrimination legislation included the following: a 1985 law that gave voting rights to non-
citizens at the local level, naturalization became easier, and a structure was set up to give minority groups a
voice in Dutch society. In the labor market, special training programs were created for minorities.
122
Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 717.
123
Ibid.
 72

integration of immigrants.”124 These comments sparked serious public debate about the

lack of integration of immigrants in Dutch society.

The refusal of Rita Verdonk’s handshake by a Tilburg iman further illustrates the

public nature of these debates. The orthodox iman refused to shake the hand of Rita

Verdonk, the minister for the integration of minorities, in April of 2006. The Syrian-born

cleric said he could not because she was a woman, and his religion forbade physical

contact with strange women. She replied, as her hand remained outstretched, “But surely

we are equals.”125 The iman’s refusal and the photograph of her untouched, outstretched

hand made the front page of every major newspaper in the Netherlands. Ian Buruma

argues, “This photograph became a prime symbol of the Dutch crisis, the collapse of

multiculturalism, the end of a sweet dream of tolerance and light in the most progressive

little enclave of Europe.”126

In 1994, an integration policy was introduced with the goal of improving the

inclusion of immigrants in mainstream services by moving away from the minority-group

based institutions. Although this policy did not remove the multicultural policies (IV-3)

in the Netherlands, it represents the first toward assimilation policies (IV-1). As defined

in this policy, integration was a process leasing to the full and equal participation of

individuals and groups in society, for which mutual respect for the immigrants’ and

natives’ identity is seen as a necessary condition.127 This policy intended to protect both

124
R. Penninx, B. Garces-Mascarenas, and P. Scholten, Policymaking Related to Immigration and
Integration: A Review of Literature of the Dutch Case (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2005).
125
Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 8.
126
Ibid.
127
H. Entizinger, “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the Netherlands,” in Toward
Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, eds. C. Joppke and E. Morawaska
(Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003).
 73

the native and immigrant population, while also acknowledging each of their

responsibilities in integration.

This approach is also referred to as civic integration. Its main goal is to increase

immigrants’ participation in mainstream institutions through language acquisition

programs and labor market integration. Historically accepting of difference, the

multicultural approach that the Netherlands historically adopted is now being

complemented by a policy of civic integration that urges immigrants to accept Dutch

norms and values.

The introduction of the 1998 Newcomer Integration Law was another major step

toward the Netherland’s transformation.128 WIN pursued the goals of civic integration by

mandating non-EU newcomers to participate in a 12-month integration course, which

consists of 600 hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education, and preparation for

the labor market.129 In terms of compliance, there were minor penalties, but nothing too

severe because Han Entzinger, the architect of this program, said that its mandatory

nature was only a trick to maximize its reach and to make sure the state provided quality

courses.130 After the introduction of this law, it is apparent that the IV in the Netherlands

case shifted to IV-1. Though called civic integration in the Netherlands, this policy is just

a small step away from cultural assimilation policies.

How Far is too Far? Dutch Political Parties’ Influence

This subsection highlights how Dutch political parties influenced the development

of assimilation-oriented laws. Following the controlled comparison method, it examines

128
WIN stands for “Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers” in Dutch.
129
Christian Joppke, “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western
Europe,” Western European Politics 30, no. 1 (2007): 6.
130
Ibid., 7.
 74

CV-2 by asking the how the political parties in the Netherlands affect the immigration

policies.

Four years after WIN was introduced in the Netherlands, there were significant

changes happening in the Dutch political arena. In the years leading up to the 2002

election, Pim Fortuyn became a notable politician in the Netherlands. His candid views

on immigration and Islam placed him in the center of several controversies and provided

him with ample media coverage. He called Islam “a backward culture” and said that if it

were legal to do so he would close the Netherlands’ borders to Muslim immigrants.131

In February of 2002, Fortuyn founded his own party, the LPF.132 This party stirred

up controversy because of its adverse stance on immigration and Islam. The immigration

policies outlined by Fortuyn and his party were extremely restrictive. He argued that all

of the immigrants who already resided in the Netherlands could stay, but he stressed that

it was their responsibility to adopt Dutch culture and customs. Quickly and unexpectedly,

the LPF climbed the ranks of the Dutch political scene prior to the election in 2002.

However, before the election took place, Fortuyn was assassinated on May 6, 2002 by a

militant animal rights activist, Volkert van der Graaf. Van der Graaf claimed in court, “[I]

murdered Fortuyn to stop him from exploiting Muslims as scapegoats and targeting the

weak parts of society to score points in seeking political power.133

The outspoken nature of Fortuyn and the LPF helped it to gain political clout in

the Netherlands. The LPF gained victory in conjuntion with the Christian Democratic

Party CDA, and successfully “stole” the majority away from the Labor Party (PvdA) in

131
John Lloyd, “The Closing of the European Gates? The New Populist Parties of Europe,” The Political
Quarterly 74, no. 1 (2003): 92.
132
LPF stands for Lijst Pim Fortuyn in Dutch.
133
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Joan Clements, “Fortuyn Killed to Protect Muslims,” Telegraph-UK,
March 28, 2003.
 75

the 2002 elections.134 The CDA gained 14 seats (from 29 to 43) and became the largest

party in the Tweede Kamer.135 On the other hand, the PvdA’s parliamentary

representation fell from 45 seats to 23, the lowest in party history. The loss was blamed

on the inability of the PvdA to answer to the new issues related specifically to that

Fortuyn’s party raised.136

Fortuyn’s rise to power and death affected the outcome of the 2002 elections and

the political climate after it. The political authority in the Netherlands shifted from the

liberal Labor Party to a more rightist coalition of the LPF and the CDA. Because Fortuyn

put immigration and the growing Muslim population in the limelight, other political

parties were pushed to deliberate about these issues as well. Since the 2002 election, all

of the major parties have adopted a harsher, more integrative stance on immigration.

After the 2002 elections, the center-right government made up of the CDA and

LPF presented a newer, stricter version of WIN. The changes made it apparent that the

new party wanted to ensure the following, “That newcomers are aware of Dutch values

and to keep to the country’s norms.”137 The 2002 WIN also moved the responsibility of

integration away from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Justice, changing it

from an integration based policy to a compliance based policy. The new system,

introduced in April 2004 by the Cabinet, demonstrates this transformation.

The integration obligation will only have been met as soon as people
have successfully passed their integration examination…. The new-
comers and the settled immigrants will be in charge of their own

134
CDA stands for Christian Democratic Appeal, or Christen Democratisch Appèl in Dutch.
135
The Tweede Kamer is the Dutch House of Commons. It has 150 seats that are filled through elections
using a party-list proportional representation.
136
Hans Keman, “Political Developments in the Netherlands: Volatility & the Rise & Decline of a
Populist Movement,” in Europe and the Crisis of Democracy: Elections in Europe: 1999–2002, ed. Jacques
Delors (Paris: Notre Europe, October 11, 2002), http://www.portedeurope.org/IMG/pdf/cahier_6_2002.pdf
(accessed April 15, 2008).
137
Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 7.
 76

integration…. If a newcomer has failed to integrate after five years an

administrative fine will be imposed.138

In addition, the proposed 2004 law included measures to define and enforce immigrant

obligation. These changes did not necessarily focus on improving the situation of

immigrants in the Netherlands, but instead, they stressed the point that immigrants had

not met their responsibility of the immigrants to integrate.139

Making the integration process the responsibility of the immigrants alone caused

frustration among some politicians. In 2005, Job Cohen, the then mayor of Amsterdam,

argued that learning to live with immigrant cultures is a challenge for both the hosts and

the newcomers. He said, “Both sides must take steps to understand one another, if only

for the purely selfish reasons that society cannot function otherwise.”140 He worried that

integration could not be achieved overnight, and the process may take another

generation.141

Again, in July of 2006, the integration law was made more integrative by the

conservative party. It pushed the responsibility of the immigrants even further than the

2004 law. For example, immigrants are required to pay the full cost for their integration

courses. In addition, the state has decreased its involvement in the process of civic

integration and has hired private companies to run the courses.142 This law also included a

new “integration from abroad” segment.143 This mandates would-be immigrants seeking a

138
Dutch Ministry of Justice, “Dutch Cabinet Agrees to a New Integration System,” (The Hague: Dutch
Ministry of Justice, 2004).
139
Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 718.
140
“The New Dutch Model?” The Economist 375, no. 8420 (April 2, 2005): 3p, 2c.
141
Ibid.
142
Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 7.
143
Ibid., 8.
 77

residency visa to pass a Civic-integration Examination and a Dutch-language Exam at the

Dutch Embassy in their country of origin.144

The Dutch Immigration Minister, Rita Verdonk, says there are over 600,000

people in her country who don't speak proper Dutch and many are unemployed.145 She

argues that the Netherlands can no longer afford to welcome immigrants who will not

integrate into mainstream society, and she was one of the politicians who advocated for

the new restrictive visa system. The changes instituted with the 2006 law make the

Netherlands’ immigration policy one of the strictest and most assimilationist-based in the

EU.

Even after transferring away from multicultural policies, there still exists a

struggle between the political parties in the Netherlands on how to accommodate its

growing immigrant population. The conservative and populist groups (the CDA and LFP)

want cultural integration policies that aim to restoring the Netherlands to a homogenous

nation. The social democrats, however, are interested in the success of immigrants in

education and the labor market, with a prerequisite of cultural integration.146 Since the

murder of Pim Fortuyn and the conservative party’s rise to power, there have been

significant changes to immigration policy. Although the Labor Party made the initial

integrative policies, it was the conservative party who introduced and implemented the

strict assimilation laws that exist today. The political parties had an influence on the IV

and its shift from IV-3 to IV-1.

The Increased Awareness of Immigrant Alienation

144
Jeremy Bransten, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, April 5, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/
featuresarticle/2006/04/2752A95E-E5F6-4886-A65C-75618628A283.html (accessed April 12, 2008).
145
Ibid.
146
Keman, “Political Developments in the Netherlands.”
 78

This section will pay particular attention to the level of alienation felt by

immigrants before and after the shift in Dutch immigration policy. Congruence procedure

type II will be used to examine within case variations. Because of the policy changes, this

method will allow for in-case comparisons of the level of alienation of immigrants in

Dutch society. The first shift away from multicultural policies occurred in 1994, and this

date will be used as a reference point when examining the level of alienation. It is

important to remember the immigration policies in the Netherlands became stricter and

more assimilation-oriented from 1994 to 2006. This section will determine if the level of

alienation increased or decreased in conjunction with the changes in policy. Finally, the

controlled comparison questions, based on the intervening variable and its condition

variables will be used as a framework to guide this section.

A 2004 parliamentary inquiry into government policies toward ethnic minorities

between 1970 and 2000 showed that the migrants who succeeded in the Netherlands did

so “in spite of” rather than “thanks to” government policy.147 Ellie Vasta argues that the

high levels of unemployment, poor educational attainment, and housing segregation,

which are symptomatic of immigrant marginalization, are the result of a specific

discrimination targeted toward specific racial, ethnic, and religious groups. 148 The

following subsections will examine the native perception of immigrants, the socio-

economic status of immigrants, the civil and political rights provided to immigrants, and

the social and religious institutions available to immigrants in the Netherlands.

Native’s Perception of Immigrants

147
Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 1.
148
Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 715.
 79

This subsection examines the native population’s perception of immigrants

(CV-1) prior to and after 1994. This subsection seeks to discover whether or not the IntV

is affected by CV-1. In the Netherlands, the natives’ opinion on Muslim immigrants

stems from public discourse on the topic. The openness of Dutch society and its emphasis

on freedom of speech permits several public figures to speak out about Islam and

immigration. For example, Pim Fortuyn, whose political influence and death are

discussed above, is one of these figures. His opinions on immigration and Islam were

heavily covered by the media prior to his death in 2002. His overwhelmingly negative

opinion of immigrants is demonstrated by his August 2001 quote in the Rotterdams

Dagblad newspaper saying, “I am also in favor of a cold war with Islam. I see Islam as an

extraordinary threat, as a hostile religion.” Fortuyn also said, “If it were legally possible,

I'd say no more Muslims will get in here, because the influx of Muslims would threaten

freedoms in the liberal Dutch society.”149

More specifically, his aversion toward Islam is based on the belief that the

religion failed to undergo a process of modernization, and lacks an acceptance of

democracy and women's, gays’, lesbians’ and minorities’ rights. Fortuyn's position of

political power and openness as a gay man explicates his fears of intolerance in the

Muslim community. In a televised debate in 2002,

Fortuyn baited the Muslim cleric by flaunting his homosexuality. Finally

the imam exploded, denouncing Fortuyn in strongly anti-homosexual
terms. Fortuyn calmly turned to the camera and, addressing viewers
directly, told them that this is the kind of Trojan horse of intolerance the
Dutch are inviting into their society in the name of multiculturalism.150

149
“Pim Fortuyn’s Cold War,”Rotterdams Dagblad, January 2002, http://www.ad.nl/ (April 3, 2008).
150
Rod Dreher, “Murder in Holland,” National Review, May 7, 2002.
 80

By running his 2002 campaign on an anti-immigration and anti-Muslim platform,

Fortuyn was able to disseminate his negative views to general public.

Another well-known critic of Islam is Somalia native, Hirsi Ali. She is a member

of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, or the VVD, and is considered an

expert on Islam in the Netherlands.151 Since arriving in the Netherlands, her political

alliance has moved from the left to right, and her opinion of Islam has become more

conservative. For instance, she has declared that 32 (of 323) forms of Islam are

fundamentally incompatible with liberal democracy. She has also called the prophet

Mohammad ‘a pedophile’ and ‘a perverse tyrant.’152 In Dutch society, her expertise

negatively influences the image that Dutch society has of Islam. For example, she says,

“The treatment of women, the creation of ghettos like Islamic schools, these are all

factors that explain why Muslim communities lag behind others.”153

Paul Scheffer, a prominent journalist and member of the PvdA, also spoke

negatively about minorties in the public arena. In 2000, he argued,

The poor integration of ethnic minorities is the result of a detached and

permissive Dutch policy in respect of minorities that does not confront
ethnic minorities sufficiently with the Dutch language, culture and
history.154

He suggests that the remedy to the problem is to demand that the immigrants adapt to the

principles of liberal democracy.155 People with this opinion tend to believe that the Dutch

151
VVD stands for Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie in Dutch. It is a considered center-right,
conservative liberal, party.
152
Marcel Maussen, “Netherlands,” Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe: Muslims in Western
Europe after 9/11, ed. Jocelyne Cesari, (Paris: European Commission, June 1, 2006), 105.
153
A. Anthony,‘When Theo Van Gogh was Slaughtered in the Street for his Attack on
Islamic Fundamentalism,” Observer Magazine London, December 5, 2004. VVD stands for Volkspartij
voor Vrijheid en Democratie in Dutch. It is a considered center-right, conservative liberal, party.
154
Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 725. On January 29, 2000 Paul Scheffer
wrote in NRC Handelsblad a sensational article titled, The multicultural drama, which is widely interpreted
as an attack on the Netherland’s multicultural society.
155
Ibid.
 81

government has provided sufficient funds and resources to help the immigrants integrate,

and they still chose not to do so. Only 9% of the native population believed that Muslims

were doing enough to integrate themselves into Dutch society.156 Comparatively, 52% of

Muslims think that they are doing enough to integrate themselves.157 There is an

expectation that these individuals will integrate smoothly into a national culture that is

generally assumed to be homogeneous. Paul Scheffer’s opinions perpetuate the idea that

it is the responsibility of the immigrant to integrate themselves into Dutch society.

Finally, the Theo Van Gogh was another individual who made forthright

comments about Islam in the public arena. In May 2004, during a panel discussion about

the Netherlands’ future in Amsterdam’s packed city theatre, Van Gogh called the

chairman of the Arab European League, Abou Jahja, “the prophet’s pimp.”158 In the

immediate aftermath of the murder, there were violent attacks on Islamic targets,

including mosques, schools and other organizations. White Power symbols were painted

on walls, anti-Islamic pamphlets were plastered around the city and there were even some

cases of arson.

There are voices in the Netherlands that support Islam and immigration, but their

opinions have not been plastered on the news as the negative views have. After the

murder of Van Gogh, pro-Islam activists initiated advertising campaigns and debates

designed to promote understanding and dialogue amongst the Dutch population. In

156
Jan Herman Brinks, “Between Mohammed and Mammon: Muslims in the Netherlands,” Immigration &
Refugees (December 18, 2005): 5.
157
Ibid.
158
Brinks, “Between Mohammed and Mammon,” 5.
 82

addition, a number of Moroccan immigrants denounced the violent murder, letting their

voices be heard in the public debate.159

The Public Opinion of the Native Dutch Population

The public opinion surveys completed on this subject illuminate the general

population’s views on Muslim immigrants. In 2005, a polling in the Netherlands, found

pockets of public dissatisfaction with national conditions and concern over immigration

from the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Europe.160 In a different survey, 51% of

non-Muslims agreed with the proposition that they were scared by the growing number of

Muslims in the Netherlands.161

A native Dutch woman who lives in the area of Transvaal, a once Dutch working-

class neighborhood transformed into a mainly immigrant neighborhood, comments on her

opinion of immigrants.

The trouble really began when masses of Moroccan and Turkish families
were dumped in our neighborhood. They had no idea how to behave in our
society. Garbage bags would be tossed into the street from the second
floor. Goats would be slaughtered on the balcony…. The worst, really, is
that we don’t speak the same language. You know when your ceiling leaks
and you can’t tell the neighbors upstairs to turn off their tap. People get
irritated.162

This woman’s experience with the increasing immigrant population is not unique. The

increasingly heterogeneous nature of certain Dutch neighborhoods has led to discord

between the native culture and the incoming cultures. This clash is especially evident

since the murder of Van Gogh. In the Netherlands, the public figureheads’ opinions of

159
Vera Marinelli, “The Netherlands,” in Current Immigration Debates in Europe: A Publication of the
European Migration Dialogue, eds. Jan Niessen, Yongmi Schibel and Cressida Thompson
(Brussels/Utrecht: Migration Policy Group, September 2005), http://www.forum.nl/english /pdf/
netherlands-reportEMD-05.pdf (accessed April 1, 2008), 10.
160
Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, “U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative,” Pew Global
Attitudes Survey, April-May 2005, http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/14.htm (accessed April 10, 2008).
161
Brinks, “Between Mohammed and Mammon,” 5.
162
Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 149.
 83

Islam have portrayed it as a monolithic bloc that is associated with extremism, religious

fanaticism, and the suppression of the rights of women. They go even further to say that

all of these attributes that are incompatible with liberal, Western democracy. The native

Dutch population has been influenced by this public discourse and now holds a negative

view of Islam and of immigrants.

Muslim’s Perception of their Situation

How Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands perceive their personal situation and

relationship with the host society is also important. A 2003 survey done by the Market

and Opinion Research Institute (NIPO) shows that most Muslims do not feel at home in

Dutch society: 85% of the interviewees did not feel welcome, and 69% agreed with the

proposition that regardless of how much a Muslim adapts to Dutch society, he or she will

stay an outsider forever.163

Specific occurrences of discrimination by the native Dutch are also seen as

alienating to the immigrants in the Netherlands. For instance, Najib, a young man of

Moroccan descent, who speaks fluent Dutch, English, and French, was harassed in a

clothing store by a clerk who accused him of stealing. The clerk said, “Fucking

Moroccans are thieves.”164 Another man, Farhane, a Moroccan from a successful family

has an interesting childhood story involving discrimination. The parents of his best

friend, a Dutch child, would not let them play together and would not invite him to his

friend’s birthday party. Farhane says,

That’s something you never forget…. The worst thing is to be put in a

box, to be told you do not belong. So you join others who are in the same
box…. In The Hague…the boys are let loose…no one keeps an eye on
them…. They run wild because there is nobody to tell them what is right

163
Brinks, “Between Mohammed and Mammon,” 6.
164
Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 105.
 84

or wrong. The parents themselves do not know how to cope with practical
things, so their children have to help them with everything, filling out
forms, and the like. That is why children lose trust in their own parents.
You end up feeling angry…with the Dutch state, which let us come here
without explaining how things work. They let our parents clean the streets,
work in factories, fix everything, but it is up to us children, to solve their
problems.165

This quote explains why some second-generation immigrants are indignant about their

position and lives in Dutch society.

Nora, another individual interviewed in Buruma’s book, tells her story as a devout

Muslim whose father left Morocco in the early 1960’s.

Before 9-11, well-educated Moroccans had confidence in their future in

Dutch society. This is where they felt they belonged. It was the
uneducated who felt isolated or indifferent…. But the educated ones have
changed [after 9-11]. They have become frightened to be identified as
Muslims or Moroccans. Yet it is precisely those people who should be
given every chance, those young people who have tried so hard to
succeed. For when they are disappointed when they see the door being
slammed in their faces, they become embittered.166

The negative attitudes displayed by Dutch natives and by prominent Dutch figures

about immigration and Islam affect the level of alienation felt by Muslim

immigrants.

Socio-economic Status: Unemployment and Housing

This subsection looks at the socio-economic status (CV-2) of immigrants in the

Netherlands prior to and after the switch in policy. It does so by examining the

opportunities for employment, housing, and education for Muslim immigrants.

Employment

Involvement and success in the labor market shows the high level of inclusion

that immigrants have in a host state. On the contrary, discriminatory measures and

165
Ibid., 114-115.
166
Ibid., 138-139.
 85

unemployment show the socio-economic alienation of immigrants. In 1983, the

unemployment of foreigners was only twice that of the indigenous Dutch population.167

Although there were efforts to reform the labor market in 1994 when the immigration

policies began to switch, they were more of a symbolic act and actual implementation has

been erratic.168 Five years later in 1999, the non-EU migrant unemployment rate

skyrocketed and was 5.4 times more than that of the natives.169 At this time, only 33.7%

of non-EU foreigners were employed in the Netherlands. The rest of these individuals

were either not participating in the labor market or were dependent on social benefits.

The unemployment rate also varies according to ethnic group (see Figure 3.2).

167
Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 719.
168
Ibid., 724.
169
Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 6.
 86

Moroccans have experienced the highest rates of unemployment in the Netherlands.

Figure 3.2. Unemployment rate in percent by ethnic descent (between 1994 & 2003)

Source: Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 720.

The improvements in the unemployment rates of immigrants in the 1980’s and

early 1990’s can be contributed to the market itself. The flourish of the Dutch economy,

predominantly in the second half of the 1990’s, led to a sharp decrease in native and

immigrant unemployment rates. This is what brought the unemployment rate of

immigrants below 10 % in 2001.170 Because immigration in the 1970’s was typically

through asylum and family reunification, welfare state dependency is rampant among
170
Rinus Penninx, “Dutch Immigrant Policies Before and After the Van Gogh Murder,” Journal of
International Migration and Integration 7, no. 2 (June 2006): 245.
 87

immigrants. In 1998, 47% of all individuals on welfare were immigrants and 20% of non-

Western foreigners depended on welfare.171 This percentage is staggering because it is 10

times greater than the welfare dependency of the native Dutch population.172 This

dependence and the decline of the Dutch economy may help to explain the lower

economic situation of some immigrants.

Pay differential also exists as a significant form of institutional racism in the

Netherlands. One company was found to be paying two Ghanaians a lower amount than

Turks and Moroccans who were also paid less than the Dutch employees who did the

same work.173 In the late 1990’s, Houtzager and Rodrigues determined that ethnic

minorities earned a gross hourly wage of 13.20 Euros compared to the 14.90 Euros

received by the native Dutch.174 It is expected that this gap has increased since the 1990’s.

Housing Segregation

Another issue that hindered integration prior to the shift in policy was residential

segregation. The foreign resident rate in Amsterdam and Rotterdam’s ethnic quarters is

above two-thirds, compared with the one-third present in Germany’s Berlin-Kreuzberg

ethnic quarter (See Figure 3.3).175 This figure shows that the Muslim immigrant

population, like in Spain is clustered in major metropolitan areas.

An Examination of Discrimination in Dutch Education

171
Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 6.
172
Ibid.
173
Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 723.
174
D. Houtzager and P.R. Rodrigues, “Migrants, Minorities, and Employment in the Netherlands:
Exclusion, Discrimination, and Anti-Discrimination,” in RAXEN 3 Report to the European Monitoring
Center on Racism and Zenophobia, ed. European Monitoring Center on Racism and Zenophobia (Vienna:
EUMC, 2002), 43.
175
Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 6.
 88

In the constitution of 1917, the full funding of schools for all faiths on par with

the public schools was guaranteed.176 However, it was not until the late 1980’s that the

first Muslim primary schools opened their doors in Rotterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven,

Figure 3.3. Immigrant population in percent the largest cities in the Netherlands
by group origin, January 2004.

Source: Wal, “Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in the Netherlands,”8.

and Amsterdam. In 2003, there were a total of forty Muslim primary schools and two

Muslim secondary schools in the Netherlands.177

Regardless of the legality of separate Islamic schools, there are still significant

issues with the mixed school in the Netherlands. There is evidence of segregation in the

Dutch school system. In the 1990’s, there was a “white flight” from schools with high

numbers of immigrant children. Some schools were labeled as “black,” while others were

labeled as “white.” After “white flight” began, the demographics of the “black schools”

changed drastically and became made up of mainly ethnic minority children.178 Although

the education system is not as outwardly segregated today, it still has discriminatory

aspects built into it. For example, complaints have been made to the Equal Treatment

Commission because their children have been selectively put on the waiting lists by a
176
Maussen, “Netherlands,” 108.
177
Ibid., 112.
178
R. Koopmans, “Good Intentions Sometimes Make Bad Policy: A Comparison of Dutch and German
Integration Policy,” in The Challenge of Diversity . European Social Democracy Facing Migration,
Integration, and Multiculturalism, eds. R. Cuperus, K. A. Duffek, and J. Kandel (Innsbruck: Studien
Verlag, 2003).
 89

private school because of their ethnicity. The schools involved do this because they

would prefer that the minority parents choose to send their children elsewhere, rather than

wait for a seat at their school.179 This discrimination is detrimental to the second

generation in immigrant families because it diminishes the amount of different social

interactions that the child can have and hampers the child’s educational attainment. The

level of education of the native population is much higher than the minority immigrant

population in the Netherlands (See Figure 3.4).

There is a large discrepancy between the unemployment levels of ethnic minority

youth that have been through the school system and the native Dutch children who have

Figure 3.4. Education Level of Post-School Age Workers (14-65, male & Female)
by ethnic descent in percent (1998 & 2002).

Source: Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 721.

also been through the school system. In 1998, 19% of immigrant children drop out of

high school, while only 8% of native children do.180 Of the immigrant children, the
179
Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 722.
180
Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 6.
 90

Moroccan and the Turkish children have exceptionally high drop out rates of 39% and

25% respectively

The Social and Religious Institutions for Dutch Immigrants

The social and religious institutions present in the Netherlands (CV-4) will be

examined in this subsection. In suit with the controlled comparison method, this chapter

seeks to answer these questions: What social and religious institutions are in place to

integrate Muslim immigrants into society? And, how accepting is the native population to

Islam? In addition, the congruence procedure type II will examine whether or not there

was a change in the presence of these institutions when the immigration polices in the

Netherlands shifted and how their presence affects the IntV.

Pillarism: Religious Institutions and Acceptance

Pillarization was adopted in the Netherlands starting in the late nineteenth

century. It stemmed from the conflicts between the Protestants and the Catholics, and it

for tolerance of individuals with different religious beliefs. Pillarization granted different

religious groups the opportunity to create their own, separate institutions. In modern

Dutch society, pillarization has led to the creation of state-sponsored, semi-autonomous

institutions for minority groups that are separate from the homogeneous native Dutch

population’s institutions. These institutions still exist and range from health care to social

welfare to education. These independent institutions offer immigrants in the Netherlands

the opportunity to maintain their own religious and cultural identities.181 After the

elimination of multiculturalism, immigrants’ participation in social institutions

diminished, while their participation in religious organizations increased. In 2003, the

181
Koopmans and Statham, “How National Citizenship Shapes Transnationalism,” 221.
 91

immigrant population participated in religious organizations more than any other type of

organization (See Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5. Membership of organizations, population 18 years and older, by

country of birth, 2003

Source: Wal, “Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in the

Netherlands,”20.

In general, the Dutch model is based on the principle of equal treatment. Equal

treatment applies both to individual citizens and their religious beliefs, duties and

practices, and to the different collective manifestations of religion or ideology, for

instance in the form of religious and ideological organizations.182 In the late 1970’s, the

Muslim immigrant population that arrived in the Netherlands as “guest-workers,”

asserted its intention to stay. In order to accommodate the Muslim population, with

multicultural-oriented goals in mind, the Dutch government made a number of legal and

institutional provisions to guarantee the equal treatment of Islam as one of the minority

182
Maussen, “Netherlands,” 109.
 92

religions in the Netherlands.183 In the 1980’s, more policies were put in place to allow for

Islamic practice and rituals, including:

An allowance for ritual slaughtering on par with Jewish rituals (in 1977),
an allowance for the call to prayer on par with the ringing of church bells
(in 1988), the recognition of Muslim festivals and dietary rules (notably in
the armed services and prisons), and the adjustment of legislation on
funerary practices to allow for Islamic traditions.184

In the 1980’s, it was difficult to build mosques due to neighborhood protests and

problems with municipal zoning and urban renewal policies.185 In the 1990’s, the number

of newly built mosques increased to a total number of 32 in 1995, and of these 23 had

typical architectural characteristics such as domes or minarets.186 In the late 1980’s and

early 1990’s, mosques represented the multicultural society in the Netherlands. They

were depicted as enrichments to the urban landscape of Dutch towns and as symbols of

emancipation and of recognition.187 However, after the Islamic terrorist attacks on

September 11th, the 11-M train bombings, and the murder of Theo Van Gogh, the

portrayal of these religious buildings has altered. Mosques are now said to be illustrations

of the failure of immigrant integration.188 Marcel Maussen, says,

The mosque building in the Netherlands are now said to be

‘unimaginative,’ ‘ugly,’ and ‘cheap imitations,’ revealing that Muslims in
the Netherlands do not care about their new societal environment and
simply build ‘nostalgia mosques’ which remind them of the ‘countries of
origin.’189

These shifts in the meaning of mosque buildings are illustrative of the changes in the

discourse about the Islamic presence in the Netherlands.

183
Ibid., 110.
184
Ibid., 111.
185
Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy,” 715-718.
186
Maussen, “Netherlands,” 112.
187
Ibid., 112-113.
188
Ibid., 113.
189
Ibid.
 93

In the Netherlands in 2004, approximately 95% and 97% accordingly, of Turks

and Moroccans, consider themselves Muslims.190 Approximately half of Dutch Muslims

supported the view that a Muslim party should be founded, while one in five disagreed.

Of those who wanted a Muslim party, 50% of them said the party should adopt Sharia, or

Islamic law. The basic tenets of Islamic law challenge Western liberal principles. In the

Netherlands there is a delicate balance between freedom of religion and separation of

church and state, freedom of speech and the rejection of discrimination, freedom of

education and the protection of pupils against ideological indoctrination, equal rights for

all citizens and exceptional provisions for religious minorities. Whether or not Muslim

communities can and wish to develop a sense of loyalty towards the Dutch nation-state is

of crucial importance.

Conclusion

This section shows the level of alienation felt by Muslim immigrants in Dutch

society to be high. Prior to the shift in immigration policy, many first generation

immigrants did not feel alienated or disenchanted. However, after a period of economic

downfall, an increasingly large immigrant population, and intense efforts to remove

immigrants from their cultural enclaves created by a multicultural society, the level of

discontent and alienation of immigrants rose. This is especially apparent in second and

third generation Muslim youth. They get lost between the cultures and customs their

parents raised them with and the culture of Dutch society, and struggle to see themselves

as either foreigners or Dutchmen.

190
Brinks, “Between Mohammed and Mammon,” 5.
 94

Investigating the Netherlands:

Increasing Prospects for Islamic Terrorism

This final section of this case study looks into the value of the dependent variable

of the theory being developed. It intends to determine if there are variations over time and

space in the amount of terrorist activity in the Netherlands and to answer the question,

what are the prospects for terrorism in this state? In answering this question, the theory

predicts that the shift in the IV, from IV-3 to IV-1, and the change from relatively low

levels of alienation to higher levels will lead to low prospects for Islamic terrorism prior

to 1994 and higher prospects as time goes on. This section includes two subsections that

examine Islamic terrorist organizations and the murder of Theo Van Gogh.

Islamic terrorist organizations and networks present in the Netherlands

This subsection addresses the first condition variable in the dependent variable of

the causal chain. It answers the controlled comparison question, what terrorist

organizations and/or networks are present in the state? The section also seeks to

determine if the role, the size, or the presence of these organizations have changed

overtime.

The first Islamic terrorist attacks on Europe occurred in 1984 and the first

recognizable Islamic terrorist group in Europe was in **** The Netherlands did not

experience this phenomenon until the early 1990’s, when various North African and

Middle Eastern terrorist organizations manifested themselves in the Netherlands. For

instance, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has amply operated in

the Netherlands since that time.191

191
Vidino, “The Hofstad Group,” 584.
 95

In January of 2002, it became apparent to the Netherlands that the presence of

these groups may be controversial and dangerous. These concerns came about when two

young, Dutch-born Muslims of Moroccan descent died while fighting against the Indian

army in Kashmir. The Dutch domestic agency, AIVD, sought to find answers about why

these two boys chose to involve themselves in jihadist activity.192 AIVD discovered that

regardless of their upbringing in the quiet southern town of Eindhoven, the means of

recruitment and the profiling of potential recruits by terrorist organizations were the main

facilitating factors in the boys’ radicalization.193 The AIVD report also suggests that an

identity crisis is a necessary component of the radicalization these individuals underwent.

Lorenzo Vidino states, “Despite seeming, at least on the surface, to be completely

integrated into Dutch society, they feel rejected by it and complain about racism and job

discrimination.”194

This report further reveals that men recruited in the Netherlands tend to be

between the ages of 18 and 32 and can be categorized into three main groups. The first

group is young men of ethnic Dutch decent who have converted to Islam and adopted

radical views. The second group consists of young Muslim immigrants who have lived in

the Netherlands for a short period of time, know little about Dutch society, and may be

illegally living in the Netherlands.195

The third group is made up of second and third generation immigrants to the

Netherlands, the majority of which originate from Morocco. When Dutch Muslims were

asked about the 9-11 attacks on the United States, the approval of the attacks rose from
192
AIVD stands for “Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidienst.”
193
“Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to Trend.” AIVD Report, December 9,
2002, https://www.aivd.nl/actueel_publicaties/aivd-publicaties/ (March 12, 2008).
194
Vidino, “The Hofstad Group,” 581.
195
“Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to Trend.” AIVD Report, December 9,
2002. p. 10.
 96

11% to 26% when the polling sample was only reduce to those of Moroccan descent.196

Vidino goes even further to say that Hofstad, the Islamic terrorist group described below,

has a parallel structure to the Moroccan youth gangs that are growing in Western

Amsterdam.197 The increasing number of immigrants from Moroccans in Europe, who

become disenchanted with Dutch society and are recruited by radical groups, may

represent a security issue for Western European states.

The Hofstad Group: In the Context of the Murder of Theo Van Gogh

This subsection examines CV-2, the recruitment efforts of terrorist organizations

in the Netherlands, by looking at the Hofstad Group’s involvement in Theo Van Gogh’s

murder. It seeks to examine how this act is carried out by Islamic terrorists residing in the

host state by asking: How are Muslim immigrants recruited to participate in terrorist

attacks on the soil of their host state?

Mohammad Bouyeri, a member of the Hofstad group, carried out the group’s first

successful attack on November 2, 2004 when he shot and ritually butchered Theo Van

Gogh on a busy Amsterdam street. Bouyeri justified this attack in the context of Islam

and saw this act as his religious duty. Because Van Gogh directed a movie about Islam’s

treatment of women in a negative manner, the members of the Hofstad group agreed that

Van Gogh’s punishment for this was death. After killing him, Bouyeri pinned a note on

Van Gogh’s body. It contained Dutch political references which said Hofstad was

fighting those who were fighting Islam in the Netherlands. Ian Buruma interpreted the

note as such:

196
Vermaat Emerson, “Bin Laden’s Terror Networks in Europe,” Report for the Mackenzie Institute, May
26, 2002.
197
Vidino, “The Hofstad Group,” 587.
 97

The content of Bouyeri’s letter…was in fact a long rambling tract, written

in Dutch with a few quotations in Arabic, calling for a holy war against
the unbelievers, and the deaths of a number of people mentioned by name.
The tone was that of a death cult, composed in language dripping with the
imaginary blood of infidels and holy martyrs…. Much of Bouyeri’s
knowledge of radical Islamic rhetoric came from English translations of
Arabic texts downloaded from the internet.198

The letter was not actually addressed to Van Gogh, but to Ayaan Hirsi Ali. He addressed

her as, “A heretic who rebelled against her childhood faith and became a willing tool of

‘Zionists’ and ‘Crusaders.’”199

Mohammed Bouyeri, an Amsterdam West native of Moroccan descent, was a

Muslim immigrant recruited to be part of the Hofstad group. His father was a guest-

worker from the Rif Mountains of Morocco. Bouyeri was known to be a young boy who

excelled at his academics. However, he was greatly influenced by his environment where

crime, gangs, unemployment, and substance abuse were common.200 He attended state

college, but it was here that his religious views became radicalized. He became absorbed

in Islamic readings, grew a beard, and wore traditional Islamic clothing.201 Buruma

describes this transformation as, “Mohammed Bouyeri, a sad loner from an Amsterdam

suburb, whose social horizons had progressively narrowed to a small radicalized circle,

was part of a violent, wider world connected by internet, CD-ROMs, and MSN.”202 In the

spring of 2002, Bouyeri moved into an apartment in Slotermeer with another radical

Muslim, Nouredine El Fatmi, a 21-year old Moroccan living in Holland illegally. It was

at this apartment, that the growing Hofstad group held many meetings, lectures,

198
Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 4.
199
Ibid., 5.
200
Vidino, “The Hofstad Group,” 582.
201
Ibid.
202
Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 17.
 98

educational sessions, and jihad video showings. A little over two years later, he murdered

Theo Van Gogh.

In order to understand Bouyeri’s convictions, it is first necessary to unpack the

organization he was a part of, the Hofstad group. A case of an interesting radical is Jason

Walters. Walters was born in Amersfoort to an American father and a Dutch mother. At

the age of 15, Walters and his brother Jermaine Walters converted from Baptists to a

militant form of Islam. Shortly after his conversion, he came into contact with Samir

Azzouz at the Schiedam phone shop, an establishment owned by a Turkish Islamist.203 He

began to go there regularly with other radical Muslims, and after some time the group

nicknamed themselves, “Hofstad,” or “capital” in English.204 When Western individuals,

like Walters, convert to radical Islam, they bring with them distinct benefits. For

example, “Their deep knowledge of Western cultures and languages, possession of

European passports, and relative lack of ties to lack of ties to large terrorist organizations

make their detection a difficult task for authorities.”205

Prior to Bouyeri’s attack, another attack planned by the Hofstad group was

thwarted. In June 2004, the Dutch authorities suspected terrorist activity and began more

closely investigating Hofstad. Three of the Hofstad group members drove to Portugal

before the beginning of the European Cup soccer tournament. Fearing an attack, the

Portuguese police arrested the members and deported them back to the Netherlands.206

Also in the summer of 2004, the Rotterdam police arrested Samir Azzouz and searched

his apartment. In it, they found bomb-making materials, night vision goggles, a silencer

203
Vidino, “The Hofstad Group,” 582.
204
Dutch Ministry of Justice, “Report by the Dutch Ministry of Justice on the Van Gogh Assassination,”
November 10, 2004.
205
Vidino, “The Hofstad Group,” 579.
206
Ministry of Justice, “Van Gogh Assassination.”
 99

for an automatic gun, ammunition, a bullet proof vest, floor plans of the Schiphol Airport,

floor plans of the Borssele nuclear power plant, and various governmental buildings in

The Hague.207

How does this radicalization happen? There are many academic explanations for

this phenomenon, including brainwashing, psychological problems, alienation, group

think, and the Islamic religion itself. However, it is important to remember, “Anything

can trigger a mood of violent resentment and self-destruction: a job offer withdrawn, a

grant not given, one too many doors shut in one’s face. Such a man was Mohammed

Bouyeri.”208 A large number of Dutch teenagers of Moroccan descent view the members

of the Hofstad group as “heroes.” They exchange their pictures and have their names

written on their backpacks.209 In addition, a Dutch prison guard describes the Muslim

detainees respect for terrorist, Ismail Aknikh, as follows, “He is adored like a prophet,

they literally kiss his feet.”210 The growth of radical Islam in Western European societies

could be detrimental if the proper policies are not put in place to accommodate incoming

Muslim immigrants.

Implications for Muslim Immigrants in the Netherlands

The Dutch government estimates that the number of non-ethnic Dutch individuals

will outnumber ethnic Dutch individuals in the four largest cities (Amsterdam,

Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) by the year 2020.211 The growing immigrant

population has several implications for Dutch society. For instance, the actions taken by

the Hofstad to fight those who criticize Islam may cause intense polarization between

207
Vidino, “The Hofstad Group,” 583.
208
Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 23.
209
Vidino, “The Hofstad Group,” 588.
210
Ibid.
211
Ibid., 590.
 100

different ethnic and religious groups in the future. Although the killing of Van Gogh has

highlighted these tensions, alternative, peaceful solutions are available. Terrorist attacks

only heighten preexisting tensions and increase the distrust toward the Muslim population

among native Europeans, and in a sense further reiterate Muslims’ sense of exclusion

from mainstream society. For example, 40% of the Dutch interviewed in the immediate

aftermath of the Van Gogh murder said that they hoped Muslims “no longer feel at

home” in the Netherlands.212

A number of mosques and Islamic schools were vandalized and firebombed in the

aftermath of his murder, which were countered by attacks on churches. These events

were shocking to the seemingly tolerant Dutch population.

Tolerance, then, has its limits even for Dutch progressives. It is easy to be
tolerant of those who are much like ourselves, whom we feel we can trust
instinctively, whose jokes we understand, who share our sense of irony….
It is much harder to extend the same principle to strangers in our midst,
who find our ways as disturbing as we do theirs, who watch fearfully as
their own children, caught in between, slip from paternal grasp into a new
and bewildering world.213

The tolerant and free nature of Dutch society has had a positive impact in many ways, but

it has also helped to publicly discriminate Muslim immigrants, while at the same time

facilitating the development of terrorist networks through websites, publications, chat

rooms, videos, summer camps, and conferences.

The shift of immigration policy in the Netherlands from multicultural-oriented

(IV-3) to assimilation-oriented (IV-1) in 1994 led to subsequent shifts in the IntV and the

DV. The case study research above shows that from 1994 on, the IntV increased from a

low level of alienation to a high level of alienation, which caused the prospects for

212
Justin Sparks, “Muslim Mole Panics Dutch Secret Service,” Times (London) November 14, 2004.
213
Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 128.
 101

terrorism to also increase. The theory is plausible because evidence from this case study

substantiates my theory, and it can provide at least a partial explanation for the murder of

Theo Van Gogh. Therefore, the Netherlands case, like Spain, satisfies the requirement for

a plausibility probe. Some refinements to the theory, due to deviations from what one

would expect from the theory, transpire in this case study and will be discussed in the

concluding chapter.
 102

CHAPTER IV:
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This paper set out to explore the causes of Islamic terrorism in Europe and how

variations over time and space can be explained. Its main purpose was theory

development, utilizing case study research to assess and refine the theory. The two case

studies, of Spain and the Netherlands, show that this research has significant findings and

implications. To conclude this project, this chapter examines the principal findings of the

research, the policy implications of these findings, possible refinements for the theory,

and suggestions for further research.

Principal Findings and Implications of Case Study Research

This section will examine the principal findings of case study research and the

implications for theory by highlighting analytical points from the two case studies. All or

most parts of the theory’s causal chain that could be examined were supported by the

case studies on Spain and the Netherlands. This situation shows that the theory is

plausible, because evidence from the two case studies supports it.

In the theory, there are three ideal-type values of the IV: assimilation-oriented

policies (IV-1), lack of integrative policies (IV-2), and multicultural-oriented policies

(IV-3). All three values of the IV were covered with the case study research done in this

project. The Spanish case covered IV-2, and the Netherlands case covered both IV-3 and

IV-1, because the value of the IV shifted.

 Figure 1.1. Theory Development

Independent Variable (IV) Intervening Variable (IntV) Dependent Variable (DV)

Immigration Model Adopted à Level of Alienation à Prospect for Islamic Terrorism in Europe
CV-1: History CV-1: Natives’ Attitudes CV-1: Terrorist Organization
CV-2: Extent of Application CV-2: Socio-economic Status CV-2: Recruitment
CV-3: Political Parties’ Influence CV-3: Civil/Political Rights
CV-4: Presence of Social and Religious Institutions

Strict assimilation policies (IV-1) à High Immigrant Alienation (IntV-1) à High prospects for Islamic Terrorism (DV-1)
Lack of integrative policies (IV-2) à High Immigrant Alienation (IntV-1) à High prospects for Islamic Terrorism (DV-1)
Multicultural policies (IV-3) à Low Immigrant Alienation (IntV-2) à Low prospects for Islamic Terrorism (DV-2)
103
 104

The case study research also reinforces other parts of the causal chain. The theory

predicts that a state with a lack of integrative policies in place, like Spain, would also

have a high level of immigrant alienation (IntV-1). The theory expects IntV-1 was to lead

to DV-1, high prospects for terrorism. This holds true with the case of Spain. The theory

is plausible because evidence from the case study supports its predictions.

The theory predicts that when multicultural policies (IV-3) are in place there will

be a low level of immigrant alienation. This low level of alienation (IntV-2) is expected

to lead to low prospects for Islamic terrorism in the host state (DV-2). This almost holds

true as expected in the Netherlands case. The level of alienation is low prior to the shift,

because of how it is perceived by immigrants at this time. The level of alienation is low

because the initial waves of first generation immigrants were not negatively alienated

from the host society. When the immigration policies in the Netherlands shifted from a

multicultural policy to assimilation (i.e., from IV-3 to IV-1), comparable shifts also

occurred in the IntV and the DV. The change to strict assimilation laws was accompanied

by an increase in immigrant alienation (IntV-1). As the theory predicts, the increase in

immigrant alienation led to an increase in prospects for Islamic terrorism in the

Netherlands (DV-1). It is apparent that the level of alienation felt by immigrants is an

integral part of the development of terrorism. This alienation is fueled by the immigration

policies put in place by the state, because they determine how the immigrant population

will or will not be accommodated.

In the case study research, the condition variables met the expectations of the

theory most of the time. When tackling the IV, the history (CV-1) and the influence of

the political parties (CV-3) had influences consistent to those expected of the theory. In
 105

Spain and the Netherlands, historical connections to immigration influenced the

immigration model adopted by the state. In the Netherlands, the asylum-seeker and

refugee wave was an important group of immigrants who helped shape more

accommodating immigration policies. In addition, both Spain’s and the Netherlands’

participation in guest-worker programs influenced their state’s response to immigration.

However, the colonial history of the state did not have as much impact as expected.

Immigrants who migrated back to the country that they were originally colonized by had

similar cultural and ethnic backgrounds to their host state. The theory was less applicable

to this immigrant group. The political party influence was extremely pertinent in the case

of the Netherlands. The conservative agenda held by LPF party influenced the

immigration model adopted, as well as the anti-Islamic and anti-immigration rhetoric that

circled the media at this time. In Spain, CV-3 also demonstrated the expected influence

on its adopted immigration model. The extent of application (CV-2) and its influence on

the immigration model adopted was much more difficult to assess in the Netherlands than

in Spain. In Spain, the lack of policy implementation is a main explanation for its lack of

integrative policies. However, in the Netherlands, such a concrete link was not

discovered between the model adopted and the extent of the policies implementation.

The CV’s associated with the level of alienation of Muslim immigrants also had

the expected influence on the IntV most of the time. The attitudes of the native

population (CV-1) increased the level of alienation when they were negative or were not

tolerant of the immigrant population in both cases. With the two cases researched, there

were no data examined that showed a situation where the native population held positive

attitudes about Muslim immigration. Secondly, the socio-economic status of immigrants

 106

(CV-2) played a role in systematically alienating the Muslim immigrant population.

When the immigrant population began arriving in the host country in the late 1900’s, they

were not met with economic hardship. However, as economic decline hit and the

immigrant population increased, the barriers for entry into the mainstream housing

market and the labor market became more apparent. These impediments impacted the

level of alienation and isolation felt by the later generations and waves of immigrants.

The development of high levels of alienation is evident in both the case of Spain and the

Netherlands. The civil and political rights of immigrants (CV-3) also had the expected

impact on the level of alienation. If there was a lack of opportunity to participate in the

political realm or an increase of discrimination, then the immigrant population is again

alienated from mainstream society. When the Netherlands utilized multicultural policies,

there were ample opportunities for immigrants to participate in these activities within

their own cultural community. Although the immigrant population was not integrated into

mainstream society at this time, there were only minor negative opinions felt by the

immigrants and the native population about this separation.

From the case studies, how the immigrant perceives his or her situation is

revealed. Different immigrants see themselves and their social, political, economic, and

religion position differently. Each immigrant has a different history, experience, social

atmosphere, education, and family life. In 1994 in the Netherlands, when the depraved

economic state of immigrants was shown through high unemployment levels and welfare

dependency, and the isolation of immigrants was brought into the public light, the second

generation immigrant population became wedged in a predicament.

 107

Finally, the presence of social and religious institutions (CV-4) does not always

fit the theory’s expectations. The increased presence of these institutions, including a

general legal acceptance of Islam, should decrease immigrant alienation. In both cases

these institutions were available and there was a general “acceptance” of Islam written

into the laws of the state. However, when further examined, the idea of Dutch

pillarization and religious tolerance are not a complete reality. The legalization of the

practice and education of Islam and the building of mosques in the Netherlands did not

decrease the discrimination or outward hatred expressed towards Muslims. The research

also revealed that Muslim immigrant’s participation in religious institutions may cause

one to become more alienated from society, because it may lead to isolation within one’s

religious group, or even to radicalization. These are ideas that could be addressed with

further research.

The condition variables for the dependent variable act as the theory predicts. Both

Spain and the Netherlands show that the presence of jihadist networks (CV-1) in a state

increases its prospects for terrorism. In order to determine the overall importance of this

CV, it would be helpful to examine a state with a limited presence of jihadist networks

and groups.

Secondly, recruitment efforts by radical groups and leaders (CV-2) also had the

expected outcomes of the theory. Both cases show high recruitment levels to contribute to

high prospects for Islamic terrorism. If an individual is already discontented with his or

her circumstances, then his or her level of alienation is likely to be high and this

individual is more likely to be targeted by radical recruiters. The recruitment process

serves as an important piece of an individual’s radicalization, as shown by the AVID

 108

study done in the Netherlands. The individual’s process of recruitment and radicalization

is another area that could be researched in future projects.

The antecedent conditions laid out in the theory are as follows: the host state must

be Western European, it must be a developed democracy, and Muslims must constitute a

minority population of the state. The requirement to have the Muslim population be a

minority of the host society proved to be an important antecedent condition.

Theoretically, it may be important to include an additional antecedent condition related to

this one: the Muslim immigrant must have a different ethnic background than the

majority population of the host state. In the Netherlands and Spain, Muslim immigrants

coming to the same host country had diverse experiences. These two cases show that the

difficult experiences were especially apparent in second-generation immigrants whose

first generation families were ethnically diverse from the host society. The second-

generation youth struggled to make have a cohesive sense of self because there was

discord between what he was taught in the home and what is expected of him in Western

society. These diverging experiences also present ideas for further research.

Methodological Refinements

This project utilized the controlled comparison method and congruence procedure

type II to refine the theory. The benefits of these methods are discussed in the

introduction of this paper. However, it is also important to address their weaknesses in

order to improve future research. Controlled comparison was used to provide an analysis

across multiple cases. This test is not strong because it can only give correlation between

the variables. This test only provides a correlation because it is difficult to show cause

and effect when comparing different cases. Also, perturbing variables are hard to account
 109

for because the characteristics of paired cases are never identical. Perturbing variables are

factors that might affect the causation forwarded in a theory, and the more a research

design can control for them, the higher the degree of certainty of its conclusions.214

Largely, this is not the weakest method because it is stronger than anecdotal examples.

Additionally, congruence procedure type II was used with the Netherlands to

make within case comparisons. This method makes a test unique because makes certain

predictions. In addition, the extreme values of the IV and DV observed in the case limit

the possibility of perturbing variables and error is unlikely. This proved to be a stronger

method than controlled comparison, because the value of the DV varied in accordance

with the variations of the IV.

In order to enhance the methodology in future research, a stronger research

method, such as process tracing should be used. In this method, a researcher explores the

chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are

translated into case outcomes.215 Decision process-tracing could be used with the

individual immigrants. It focuses on reliable testimonial evidence by the individuals

making key decisions in order to see if the key actors speak and act as the theory

predicts.216 It provides the cause and effect link that connects the independent variable to

the dependent variable through smaller steps. A complete process-trace looks for

evidence of all links in the causal chain in order to show causation. This would be a better

method than controlled comparison or congruence procedure type II because a thorough

process-trace of a single theory can provide a strong test of the theory. However, it can be

difficult to replicate due to the different steps of causation.

214
Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 68.
215
Ibid.
216
Ibid., 64-67.
 110

Policy Implications

Because case study evidence supports the plausibility of the theory, we can

explore the comprehensive policy implications for Western European states with a

growing Muslim population. The immigration policy chosen and the manner in which it

is implemented are integral aspects a host state’s national security. As long as European

states continue to accept a large number of immigrants into their country without

adjusting their policies accordingly, then the prospects for terrorism will remain high.

However, if states recognize the implications of their immigration models and make the

necessary changes in their policy, then the prospects for terrorism will decrease. States

should adopt multicultural oriented policies that do not alienate Muslim immigrants. In

the Netherlands, multicultural policies were existent, and remotely successful, in a

population that ended up having a high level of alienation. The Netherlands should have

maintained their multicultural policies while reducing the immigrant alienation that grew

in the 1990’s, rather than adopting strict assimilationist policies. This theory shows that

the adoption of these policies in the Netherlands increased the level of alienation and

increased the prospects for Islamic terrorism more than the former policy would have.

There are also significant policy implications associated with the intervening

variable. The level of alienation of Muslim immigrants needs to be decreased in Western

European states. The host states need to recognize the increasingly diverse nature of the

EU and embrace the variation that Islam brings to their society. In order to reduce the

level of alienation felt by Muslim immigrants Western European states need to address

the values of the CV’s in their state, to make sure that they are not facilitating high level

of alienation. The three CV’s of the IntV, CV-1, CV-2, and CV-3, that were supported by
 111

the theory should be examined. For example, in order to maintain immigrants’ socio-

economic status (CV-2), better anti-discriminatory laws in the labor and housing market

and in education need to be adopted and successfully implemented. Another suggestion is

the improvement of the portrayal of Islam in native schooling and in the media, which

would facilitate more positive views on immigrants and Islam (CV-1). Finally, equitable

access to political offices (CV-3) should be available for immigrants who have obtained

citizenship status in the host state. The increasing Muslim population in Western Europe

could be detrimental if these issues are not addressed and resolved.

Finally, there are policy implications with the dependent variable and its condition

variables. The theory corroborates the prediction that the presence of Islamic terrorist

groups (CV-1) and recruitment (CV-2) increases a state’s prospects for Islamic terrorism.

When these conditions are coupled with specific immigration models and high levels of

immigrant alienation, policy implications transpire. When dealing with jihadist groups,

states should adopt preventative measures to dismantle these networks before they carry

out a terrorist attacks. In both Spain and the Netherlands, the government speculated

about the possibilities that Islamic groups in the state would carry out such grandiose

attacks. However, little action was taken done prior to the 11-M bombings and the

murder of Van Gogh. If preventative measure were put in place, the possibility of Islamic

terrorist attacks may be reduced.

Prospects for Further Case Study Research

This project is not all encompassing and it presents several possibilities for further

case study research on this theory. Case study research should be continued with further

examinations of the independent variable. It would be extremely beneficial to do this on a

 112

state that has historically had strict assimilationist policies (IV-1). Doing this would

provide a more complete evaluation of the theory.

France is a perfect candidate for this case study because the immigration policies

adopted by France represent a variation from those of Spain, which sets the stage for the

controlled comparison research method. France should also be researched because of the

nature of its strict assimilation-oriented policies. It aims to integrate its immigrants into

the French majority. In addition, the existence of “laïcité,” or the concept of a secular

state, makes for a diverse case. Laïcité necessitates the absence of religious interference

in government affairs, and vice-versa. It also maintains a division between private sphere

(where religion belongs) and the public sphere (where each individual should appear

devoid of ethnic, religious, or others distinctions). The French government does not

legally recognizing any religion, but it does recognize religious organizations.This aspect

of French governance has created controversy for the some parts of the Muslim

population. For example, some Islamist leaders find this problematic because they do not

recognize the superiority of civil law over religious law. In addition, the current French

government is opposed to the wearing of any religions’ symbols because this action

conflicts with laïcité and this has created debates over the head scarves worn by some

Muslim women.217 The case of France is different from that of the Netherlands and Spain

because it has always maintained strict assimilationist policies and has a distinct, secular

stance on the practice of religion.

217
The term laïcité is a core concept in Article 1 of the French constitution, which states, “France shall be
an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic/La France est une République indivisible, laïque,
démocratique et sociale.” Available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp (accessed on
October 27, 2007). In addition, this topic was discussed in Henri Astier, “The Deep Roots of French
Secularism,” BBC News Online, September 1, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3325285.stm
(accessed October 2, 2007).
 113

Other cases that could also be researched are Germany and Great Britain.

Germany has typically lacked integrative policies in a similar manner to Spain. Future

research could determine whether or not the same patterns exhibited in this research on

Spain would hold true in case study research on Germany. Would the lack of policy still

lead to higher levels of alienation and higher prospects for Islamic terrorism? Would

Great Britain’s assimilationist polices cause the same high levels of alienation and high

prospects for Islamic terrorism as the Netherlands did? Also, would other states who

adopt multicultural-oriented policies, such as Sweden, Norway, or Denmark display

characteristics consistent with the theory? These are all questions that can be answered

through additional research.

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