4th Kyiv Security Forum Digest

a platform for European
security architecture
DIGEST
Changing the Security Paradigm

in a Fragmented World.
European Dimension
Kyiv, November 11-12, 2010

The opinions expressed in the Summary report do not
necessarily reflect the positions of Open Ukraine Foundation
or its partners and donors organizations. Speakers’
interventions have been edited for clarity and may differ
slightly from delivery.
Kyiv, 2010
© All rights reserved.
2 4th KYIV SECURITY FORUM

CONTENT
Acknowledgments 4
Introduction 5
Forum Agenda 7
Summary Report 12
Expert Focus 20
Plenary Session I. 20
New Threats and New Rivalries
Plenary Session II. 30
Evolving Security Dynamics
Morning Parallel Session I. 38
NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Rethinking
Partnerships
Morning Parallel Session II. 43
Two Terms, One Meaning: National
resilience or Homeland Security?
Afternoon Parallel Session I. 52
Black Sea Geopolitics: Dilemmas and
Prospects
Afternoon Parallel Session II. 58
Ukraine: Choices and Constrains
Plenary Session III. 64
The Crossroads of European Collective
Security
Media Focus 72
4th KYIV SECURITY FORUM 3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Arseniy Yatsenyuk Open Ukraine Foundation wishes to sincerely

thank all the institutions and individuals who contributed to the
success of the 4th Kyiv Security Forum. We would like to express our
appreciation to our partner – Chatham House (United Kingdom) –
for its support and cooperation; to our donors – the Victor Pinchuk
Foundation (Ukraine) – for the key financial support, Black Sea Trust
for Regional Cooperation, a Project of German Marshall Fund of the
United States of America and the NATO Information and Documentation
Centre in Ukraine – for their financial support.
We would also like to gratefully acknowledge the valuable

deliberations and comments of the distinguished moderators, speakers
and participants of the event.
We are extending our gratitude to the Ukrainian weekly “Day” and

news agency “UNIAN” for information and media support.
Finally, we are grateful to Stephan De Spiegeleire, James Sherr,

James Nixey, Alex Nice, Dimitrious Triantaphyllou, Yuliya Kovalenko
and Orysia Lutsevych for their engagement and contributions.

INTRODUCTION
The 4th Kiev Security Forum converged against the backdrop of a world community
grappling with the repercussions of the global economic crisis. Convened in parallel to the
G-20 summit in Seoul, the KSF was dominated by economy-, ecology-, and demography-
related topics which define the contemporary approach to security matters.
The participants stated that, despite the abiding first crisis wave and the growing GDP-
rates registered in 2010 in most parts of the world, the ailment of the global financial
system is far from being eradicated. As they ascend out of the crisis, the leading nations of
the world, in many ways, act as egoistically as they did while descending into it: trying to
avoid the bitter medicine of streamlining their national economies, abusing the monetary
mechanisms, etc.
This is even more concomitant for global political security, as mankind is caught right
in the middle of a transformation from a US-dominated one-polar world to a new multi-
polar order on the international scene. The new world is characterized by a deepened
anxiety and apprehension of the multiple challenges heading towards it – both known
ones as well as those still to be accounted for.
In Europe’s particular case, these anxieties are strongly aggravated by the existence
of dividing lines and imbalances between the NATO-covered area and the rest of the
continent. NATO’s new strategic concept of 2010 represents a political and ideological
opportunity to overcome this chasm and create a new, more beneficial background for
political cooperation in this new multi-polar reality.
Aside from the new forms and levels of cooperation envisaged between NATO-members
and other nations on the continent, the Strategic Concept can be seen as evidence that
the security of the modern world can, and should be, shaped by soft power elements. And
despite the fact that the very term “soft power” is being questioned or reformulated by a
number of researchers (including during the KSF-4 sessions), the fundamental idea seems
to be firmly taking root in the new multi-polar environment: the military-political terms
cannot and will not solely dominate the security-political discourse in the first decades
of the 21st century.
Whereas there seems to be a consensus regarding the necessity to expand the

understanding of security in the modern world and to fill the existing loopholes between
the East and West of the continent, a unified approach on the part of the NATO-countries
– on how to proceed with this agenda – is still amiss. As the new East European members
suggest putting ideology first, and using the Western ideals of democracy and freedom of
speech as the strongest soft power tool for spreading stability throughout the continent,
the “old members” appear to be more pragmatic-minded and accommodating to other
“democracy models”.

Although Russia a priori stands at the core of these discussions, its political elite often
appears to be more preoccupied with mounting problems on the domestic agenda rather
than with the desire to integrate their country into the new political order on the global
and European scene. Russia’s newly-developed sense of national self-consciousness and
desire to flex its muscles as a global player is often out of sync with the post-crisis sense
of political humility in the West, and with the enlargement fatigue imbuing the NATO-
dominated realm of the continent. This creates an additional political and ideological
imbalance for countries such as Ukraine, which are on the lookout for their own answers
to the pressing needs of their own and regional security between the NATO- and Russia-
dominated portion of the continent.
As most of the KSF-speakers stated, the first steps of Ukraine’s new administration
in the foreign and security policy field appear to be ambiguous in terms of reaching
the objectives of the nation’s security. While Ukraine’s newly proclaimed target of a
strategically balanced foreign policy is laudable and reality-bound, it remains to be
seen whether anchoring a non-bloc clause in the national Law of Principles on Domestic
Foreign Policy was the correct long-term answer to the security challenges facing this East
European nation.
In the complicated security environment of today’s Europe Ukraine seems to be one of

the most striking illustrations of existing political ambivalence and blurred ideological
lines between East and West on the one hand, and the old and new NATO-members on the
other. As the 4th KSF most vividly demonstrated, whereas East European members of the
Alliance continue urging Ukraine to clearly side up with NATO as a “community of ideals”,
the West European members give Ukraine more leeway to define its own security strategy
and ideology between East and West.
That aside, the participants seemed to be in consensus that Kyiv’s main security
challenges are derived from mounting domestic problems of the last few years, rather
than from a lack of ideological unity on the national level. As the second decade of
Ukraine’s independence comes to a close, the nation still finds itself in the initial stage
of formulating the essential foundations of the nation’s economy and political system. In
view of this, the new administration’s pragmatic approaches constitute both a chance and
a challenge. A chance – because non-ideological political managers seem to be better
suited to act as “uniters” in Ukraine’s ambivalent ideological environment; a challenge
– because non-ideological approaches cannot and should not constitute a rift between
Ukraine and Western ideals.

FORUM AGENDA
Kyiv, 11 November 2010
Venue: Hotel “InterContinental”, 2A Velyka Zhytomyrska St., floor «-2»
15:00 – 16:00 PARTICIPANTS’ REGISTRATION (Foyer, Intercontinental Hotel, Floor “-2”)

16:00 – 18:00 Plenary Session I – Grand Ballroom
NEW THREATS, NEW RIVALRIES
· What is Replacing US Hegemony: Collective Security? Multipolarity?
· What are the Implications of the ‘Rise of the Rest’?
· Are we Entering a Period of Climate Politics and /or Resource Wars?
Moderator: Andriy KULYKOV, journalist, TV presenter, ICTV
channel, Ukraine
Opening remarks: Arseniy YATSENYUK, Member of the Parliament
of Ukraine, Leader of the Party “Front of Change”, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2007)
Presentations:
Oleksandr HORIN, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ukraine
Giorgi BARAMIDZE, Vice Prime-Minister, State Minister on
European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Georgia
Robert SIMMONS, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Security
Cooperation and Partnership, NATO HQ, Brussels (prerecorded
address)
Dr. Theodore MELESCANU, Vice-President of Senate, Minister of
National Defence (2007-2008), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1992-
1996), Romania
Andrei POPOV, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and European
Integration, Republic of Moldova
Robert NURICK, Member, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic
Studies and the Central Eurasia Studies Society, USA
Petro POROSHENKO, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2009-
2010), Secretary of National Security and Defence Council (2005),
Ukraine
18:30 RECEPTON – HOTEL FOYER (-2 FLOOR)

Kyiv, 12 November 2010
Venue: Hotel “InterContinental”, 2A Velyka Zhytomyrska St., floor «-2»
8:30 – 9:00 PARTICIPANTS’ REGISTRATION (Foyer, Intercontinental Hotel, Floor
“-2”)
9:00 – 10:45 Plenary Session II – Grand Ballroom
EVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS
· Is the West Losing its Monopoly on Soft Power?
· Transatlantic Relationship: Collective Security or Coalitions of the Willing?
· Will Today’s Ministries of Defense be Tomorrow’s Ministries of Security?
Moderator: James GREENE, President, Effective Engagement
Strategies LLC, USA
Presentations:
Dr. Bogdan AURESCU, Secretary of State for European Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania
Pavlo KLIMKIN, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ukraine
Borys TARASYUK, Member of the Parliament of Ukraine, Chairman,
Parliamentary Committee on European Integration, Ukraine
Chris DONNELLY, Director, Oxford Institute for Statecraft and
Governance, United Kingdom
Dr. Yevgeniy KOZHOKIN, Rector, Academy of Labour and Social
Relations; Director, Russia Institute for Strategic Studies (1994-
2009), Russian Federation
Michael COX, Professor, London School of Economics, United
Kingdom
Discussants:
Dr. James SHERR, Head, Russia and Eurasia Program, Chatham House,
United Kingdom
Dr. Bartosz STANISLAWSKI, Director, Mapping Global Insecurity Program,
Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Maxwell School, Syracuse University,
USA
10:45 – 11:15 COFFEE BREAK

FORUM AGENDA
11:15 – 13:00 MORNING PARALLEL SESSIONS
NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT: TWO TERMS, ONE MEANING: NATIONAL

RETHINKING PARTNERSHIPS RESILIENCE OR HOMELAND SECURITY?
GRAND BALLROOM CONFERENCE HALL 1
· Will Relations with Georgia and · How do we Define Threats? What Tools
Ukraine be Given New Stimulus? and Strategies are Required to Strengthen
· What is the Ideal Role for Russia? National Resilience in a Multicultural and
· Will NATO Policies Towards Post-Soviet Institutionally Diverse Europe?
States Continue to Cause Internal · What are the Resources Required to
Divisions? Build Resilience? At what Level Should our
Capabilities be?
Moderator: Dr. Thanos DOKOS,
· How Effective are Private-Public
Director General, Hellenic Foundation
Partnerships in Protecting Critical
for European and Foreign Policy
Infrastructure?
(ELIAMEP), Greece
Moderator: Stephan DE SPIEGELEIRE,
Presentations:
Senior Scientist, Director Defense
Amb. Marie GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE, Transformation, the Hague Centre for
Member of NATO’s New Strategic Strategic Studies, the Netherlands
Concept Group of Experts, Canada
Presentations:
Dr. Andrei ZAGORSKI, Professor and Dr. Hans-Georg WIECK, Ambassador,
Leading Researcher, Moscow State President of Federal German Foreign
Institute of International Relations Intelligence Agency (BND) (1985-1990),
(MGIMO), Russian Federation Germany
Dr. Klaus WITTMANN, Brigadier Daniel J. KANIEWSKI, Assistant Vice
General of Bundeswehr (ret), Former President for Homeland Security and
Director Academic Planning and Policy Deputy Director, Homeland Security
at the NATO Defence College in Rome, Policy Institute, the George Washington
Germany University, USA
Bryden SPURLING, Deputy Director,
Amb. Valeri RATCHEV, Head of the
Strategic Policy Guidance, Department of
Political Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign
Defence, Australia
Affairs, Republic of Bulgaria
Bjorn RUTTEN, Senior Research Associate,
The Conference Board of Canada, Canada
Dr. Todor TAGAREV, Associate Professor,
Centre for Security and Defence
Management, Bulgarian Academy of
Sciences, Republic of Bulgaria

13:00 – 14:00 LUNCH
14:00 – 15:45 AFTERNOON PARALLEL SESSIONS
BLACK SEA GEOPOLITICS: UKRAINE:

DILEMMAS AND PROSPECTS CHOICES AND CONSTRAINTS
GRAND BALLROOM CONFERENCE HALL 1
· Will the Russia-Turkey Tandem Strengthen · Are Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Choices
or Endanger Regional Stability? Defined by External Threats or Domestic
· Can the Region’s Militarization be re- Politics?
versed? · Does Ukraine’s Stability come at the
· Will Conflict Return to the Region? What Expense of its Integration into European
Lessons have we Learned from August and Euro-Atlantic Community?
2008? · Can Ukraine Strengthen its Partnership
with Russia without Compromising its
Moderator: Dr. Dimitris Independence?
TRIANTAPHYLLOU, Director, European
Studies Centre, Kadir Has University, Turkey Moderator: Valeriy CHALY, Deputy
Director General, Razumkov Center,
Presentations: Ukraine
Dr. Mustafa AYDIN, Rector, Kadir Has
Presentations:
University, Turkey
Dr. James SHERR, Head, Russia and
Georgian POP, MP, Member of the Eurasia Program, Chatham House, United
Parliamentary Committee on National Kingdom
Defence and Security, House of Deputies,
Matthew ROJANSKI, Deputy Director,
Romania
Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie
Tengiz PKHALADZE, Chairman, Endowment for International Peace, USA
International Center for Geopolitical Pawel KOWAL, MEP, Chairman, Delegation
Studies, Georgia to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary
Dr. Danila BOCHKAREV, Research Fellow, Cooperation Committee, Brussels
Global Security Program, East West Vitaliy PORTNIKOV, Editor-in-Chief, TVi
Institute, Brussels Channel, Ukraine
Carina STACHETTI, Head of the Russia, Dr. Frank EVERS, Deputy Head, Centre for
Ukraine and Eurasia Desk, Directorate OSCE Research (CORE), Institute for Peace
for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Research and Security Policy, University of
France Hamburg, Germany
Mark OPGENORTH, Staff Officer, Russia
and Ukraine Section, Political and Security
Policy Division, NATO International Staff,
Belgium

FORUM AGENDA
15:45 – 16:15 COFFEE BREAK

16:15 – 18:00 PLENARY SESSION III - Grand Ballroom
THE CROSSROADS OF EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY
CONFERENCE HALL 1
· Is the Corfu Process at a Dead End?
· How do we Engage Russia in a Constructive European Security
Dialogue?
· How will Competencies be Divided Among NATO, the EU and the
OSCE? Will a New System Emerge?
Moderator: Konstantin von EGGERT, Political Analyst and
Journalist, Centre for Political Research, Russian Federation
Presentations:
Oleksandr PAVLYUK, Head of External Cooperation, OSCE Secretariat,
Austria
Dr. Artiem MALGIN, Adviser to Rector of Moscow State Institute of
International Relations, Russian Federation
Pierre HASSNER, Associate Research Fellow, Center for International
Studies and Research (CERI, SceincesPo), France
David DARCHIASHVILI, Chairman, Committee on European
Integration, Parliament of Georgia, Georgia
Dr. Kamer KASIM, Vice President of USAK (ISRO); Director, Center
for EU Studies, USAK , Turkey
Dr. Graeme HERD, Head of the International Security Programme,
Geneva Center for Security Policy, Switzerland
18:00 – 18:10 CONCLUSIONS FROM ORGANIZERS

Closing remarks:
Dr. James SHERR, Head, Russia and Eurasia Program, Chatham
House, United Kingdom
Ivanna KLYMPUSH-TSINTSADZE, Director, Open Ukraine Foundation,
Ukraine
18:30 BUSES DEPART TO DINNER VENUE
19:00 DINNER (O’Panas Restaurant, 10 Tereshchenka Str.)

SUMMARY REPORT
Changing the Security Paradigm in a Fragmented World:
European Dimension
The European continent is hostage to a security paradox. It is both a place where new
security paradigms are being tested by the postmodern European Union, and one where
old quarrels are still being solved by old-fashioned military means.
Seeing security in interdependence, the EU has spent much of the last 50 years building
a system in which norms and institutions generate common values. These values being
the prosperity and well-being of their people, the countries of the EU have gradually
shifted their attention away from military muscle-flexing. Since battles against
pandemics or environmental catastrophes cannot be won with large armies, Europeans
no longer think of their security and defense in Westphalian terms. Instead, they have
preferred to adopt a vision of human security that can be defended by building resilient
societies rather than by accumulating military arsenals. Shrinking European defense
budgets present a clear indicator of the predominance of this type of thinking. At the
same time, recent fiscal austerity measures have further strained the Union’s ability
to develop its defense capabilities. This may give an impetus to the idea of common
defense and reinforce the EU’s postmodern world vision, but it hardly reflects a realistic
assessment of its security environment.
The globalized world is a more interconnected but also a more perilous place. The
recognition of new asymmetric and transnational threats could have laid the foundation
for greater cooperation between countries, but the global redistribution of power has
created new hyper-competition. The EU’s own backyard is a Pandora’s Box that has
been opened by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Russia and Turkey have become strong
and independent-minded players that the EU can no longer disregard if it wants to
preserve peace on the European continent. If strong neighbors are a security challenge,
the Union’s weak and badly governed neighbors prove that the contrary is also true.
Corruption-ridden newly independent states, entrenched in post-Cold War disputes, are
equally a source of instability.
Global security dynamics
The global security environment is a completely new unexplored land that European
countries have yet to discover. The simultaneous rise of China and India, defying the
rest of the world with fast-growing economies and booming populations, has already
set the global power shift in motion. With the global centre of gravity moving steadily
from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the European continent will – for the first time in 500
years – cede its central role in global affairs.
In a world where European countries haven’t yet found their place nor defined their role,
the new rules of the game may be expediently set by other players. Despite their familiar

appearance, evoking memories of the old days of the Concert of Europe, these new rules
are, in the end, Europe’s nightmare. European countries are neither psychologically nor
practically prepared to play a game in which winners win and losers lose.
Zero-sum thinking has already kicked off the competition, and the resource-hungry
rising powers are driving it. To satisfy their billions of hungry mouths, they are ready to
use any means necessary. If it means learning from the West how to use such tools as
soft power, they will be exemplary students who may quickly outmatch their teachers.
What used to be the Western monopoly on the power of attraction and persuasion has
now given way to a fierce competition for soft power.
In this hyper-competition for hard and, increasingly, soft power, European countries
are unlikely to keep pace with the rising Rest. The EU’s reliance on American hard power
may no longer be sustainable. Shifting its attention to the Pacific, the United States is
reluctant to maintain the same level of engagement in Europe. Furthermore, soft power
is no longer Europe’s exclusive advantage.
On the other hand, the emergence of a new set of threats may undermine the relevance
of both hard and soft power. Pandemics, natural disasters, terrorist and cyber attacks
are immune to traditional power projection. This is the same reasoning we all use in our
daily lives: if you want mushrooms, you can go to pick them up in a forest where you
will need to carry a gun to protect yourself from wild beasts or other dangers. You can
also go to a grocery store where you may run the risk of buying rotten mushrooms. But
carrying a gun to protect yourself from poor quality would be grotesque.
European countries are right to emphasize human security. This contributes to a better
awareness of these new dangers, but also presses for action. Building resilient societies
that are able to bounce back after an attack is a challenge in terms of both thinking and
resources. Government stovepipes do not allow the overlap of functions necessitated by
new threats. Making resilience work requires a new way of thinking that must translate
into greater inter-agency cooperation and whole-of-government approach.
On the other hand, governments are often simply not in charge of the critical
infrastructures that are most vulnerable in the face of new dangers – despite their
ultimate responsibility for providing security. For example, as much as 75 per cent of
critical infrastructures in the United States are owned by private companies. In most
countries, electricity grids and communication networks are run by private companies
and not governments. Thus, protecting vital national infrastructures will make public-
private partnerships indispensable. However, while security is a raison d’etre for states,
private companies are driven by profits. The convergence of interests may ensue only
if governments manage to build a strong business case for private companies to invest

SUMMARY REPORT
in infrastructure protection. Its foundation is a simple cost-benefit calculation. For

instance, the disruption of transport and communication may halt the delivery of
supplies, against which companies may not be insured. Just think of huge losses caused
by an eruption of the Icelandic volcano earlier this year.
The ash cloud paralyzed Europe but also demonstrated how unforeseeable our future
could be. It may also have contributed to a better understanding of resilience.
Resilience is not the ability to prevent any attack or disaster: preventing the unthinkable
is simply impossible. Being resilient means withstanding a crisis by maintaining the
minimum level of operation and by quickly restoring it to normal. In the United States,
the change of attitude has apparently already taken place. In the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks, President Bush promised not to let it happen again. In contrast, the Obama
administration maintains that if a terrorist attack were to occur, American people must
be able to absorb it. Such an assertion may be unpopular, but it nonetheless deserves
the credit of breaking unrealistic expectations.
In modern societies, individuals used to rely on the state for their security. New security
challenges are likely to shake up the status quo. The Australian government, for
example, has already moved in that direction by encouraging people to stock up on food
for emergency situations. Surprisingly, bad governance may better prepare people for
emergencies because they are less prone to count on the government for their safety.
The concept of human security draws attention to individual security. Bouncing back
requires individuals to accept a greater share of responsibility. Traditional state power
is toothless when it comes to new dangers. Nevertheless, if the world falls into hyper-
competition, Europe’s novel security thinking may become futile.
Regional security dilemmas
The European continent is not trouble-free. New threats haven’t simply replaced the
old ones. Further ignoring the acrimonious feelings of the EU’s neighbors is not only
impossible, but dangerous. Russia is determined to assert its regional role, and Turkey
no longer sees its alignment with the West as an essential characteristic of its foreign
policy. The European security system has reached a tipping point beyond which none of
the existing organizations – NATO, OSCE, CSTO – will remain relevant.
In recognition of the growing need to rethink the European security architecture,

NATO worked towards the November summit in Lisbon by developing a new strategic
concept. The OSCE, in an attempt to overhaul its regional standing, hosted discussions
on Medvedev’s proposal under the so-called Corfu Process. Its first summit in 11 years
also took place in Astana in December this year.

CAMERA FOCUS

SUMMARY REPORT
Despite all the diplomatic back-and-forth on the continent, European security couldn’t
look more fragmented. Since war between members of the Euro-Atlantic community
is unlikely, Russia is deeply suspicious of NATO’s future role. Moscow is wary of NATO’s
evoking Article 5 to counter energy, cyber security or any other new threats. It also
fears that NATO will act unilaterally in out-of-area operations when the United Nations
Security Council is paralyzed.
Conversely, the West is tempted to use the window of opportunity opened by Medvedev’s
proposal to launch discussions on the European security architecture. But reservations
persist. The war in August 2008 demonstrated that Russia has not yet renounced the
use of force. And many are worried that Russia wants to maintain a sphere of privileged
interests by seeking a veto power that would be conferred by its proposed European
Security Treaty.
Thus, rebuilding trust must be a priority. NATO could benefit from formal cooperation
with the CSTO in conducting its operations in Afghanistan. For Russia, this would signal
recognition of its regional role. Moving forward on missile defense cooperation could
also help repair relations. If the idea of common missile defense succeeds, it may lay a
solid foundation for genuine cooperation.
Turkey is another disenchanted regional player. As it is queuing up for European

membership with no clear prospects, it feels no remorse for developing a tous azimuts
foreign policy. The current rapprochement between Russia and Turkey reflects tactical
convergence toward divergent long-term goals. Despite growing bilateral ties in the
form of trade, a visa-free regime and energy deals, the two countries are mistrustful
partners. They are partners in keeping the West out of their common backyard, rather
than long-term allies. When the United States started showing interest in the Black Sea
region soon after the 9/11 attacks, many opposed the emergence of what they called a
Russia-Turkey condominium. However, as soon as Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of
State, announced in January 2007 that the United States would not seek a larger role in
the Black Sea region, fear of this condominium vanished. Hence, the current tandem of
Russia and Turkey may be bad news for the European Union. The two countries may be
teaming up in an attempt to seize the momentum of the European Union’s disarray to
develop their own regional policies in the common neighborhood.
The multiplication of regional policies in the common neighborhood of Europe’s major

powers – Russia, Turkey and the European Union – risks perpetuating the grey zones of
instability. It will allow regional countries to gravitate indefinitely between different
power poles without ever embracing a policy.
Ukraine is a country that swings from instability to disarray because its leadership

unscrupulously chooses a la carte from competing offers. The country’s geopolitical
situation – bordering two major powers – makes balancing intuitive. However, when
the balancing act is not underpinned by an overarching strategic vision of the national
interest, the country becomes vulnerable to manipulation.
Ukraine’s democratic showing is disappointing. Its October elections were like a card
game in which the dealer got twice as many cards as his opponent. The game itself was
fairly played, but it is not difficult to guess who had the wining hand. This situation
illustrates how normal it still is in Ukraine to play with the rules rather than by the rules.
Ukraine’s mimicking of democratic practices gives its people a misleading impression of
democracy, causing political disorder and economic collapse. The example of neighboring
Russia, with its relative economic prosperity and stability, is a trap that Moscow is
always ready to exploit. Hence, Ukraine’s failure to deliver on democratic reforms will
inevitably draw it back into the Russian orbit. Moreover, democratic disillusionment
may draw a real dividing line on the European continent, separating those who equate
democracy with good governance from those who blame it for disorder.
Reforms have stalled, and corruption is flourishing in Ukraine. This does not make the
country attractive to foreign investors, but it does not deter those who just have not
seen better. Russian businessmen take advantage of Ukraine’s bribery-ridden system to
get hold of the country’s economic assets. Letting them do so will mean letting Ukraine
fall further into Russia’s embrace.
With respect to security, Ukraine does not enjoy a multitude of options. It is surrounded
by Russian military forces on all sides: the Russian border is to the east, Russian troops
are still stationed in Transnistria, and Sevastopol is still home to the Russian Black
Sea fleet. By taking NATO accession off the table, the current Ukrainian leadership has
deprived itself of its last bargaining chip in the eyes of Russia. A bizarre maneuver,
considering how little practical effect this decision had on the actual scope of Ukraine-
NATO cooperation. Particularly so, as Ukrainian budgetary constraints make cooperation
with NATO critical for maintaining the country’s current level of capabilities.
Ukraine has not been granted easy solutions. Making its national project work requires
juggling complex geopolitical realities while keeping an eye on internal divides. To
succeed, the Ukrainian leadership must put forward a strategy that translates a long-
term vision of their country’s cultural, political and security identities.
Ukraine’s success or failure will determine the future of the whole region. Countries
like Georgia and Moldova look to Ukraine to predict their own fates. The two countries
have been making progress in building democratic societies and in advancing reforms.
Both have Russian troops stationed in their breakaway regions. Tbilisi and Chisinau are

SUMMARY REPORT
right to discard hard power options when it comes to restoring their territorial integrity.
Instead, democracy, good governance and economic prosperity are the right ingredients
for building soft power that their countries’ lost sons will not be able to resist. Georgia
and Moldova may well be leaders in democratic reform in the region, but they will not
succeed if Ukraine is lagging behind. They need Ukraine to balance against Russia. Both
countries need a strong, independent and democratic Ukraine to make sure that trade
flows, that borders are secure, and that spoilers are kept at bay.
For centuries, the European continent was plagued with rivalries and devastated by
wars. The EU has learned a history lesson that has allowed it to enjoy a fairly long
and practically undisturbed moment of peace. However, if it wants to prevent history
from repeating itself, it must ensure that its neighbors do not repeat its own historical
mistakes. If the European continent emerges as a single and unanimous power pole,
then others in the world may also be compelled to listen.

CAMERA FOCUS

EXPERT FOCUS
PLENARY SESSION I: NEW THREATS, NEW RIVALRIES
• What is Replacing US Hegemony: Collective Security? Multipolarity?
• What are the Implications of the ‘Rise of the Rest’?
• Are we Entering a Period of Climate Politics and /or Resource Wars?
“…The world today is focusing on solving global

problems: from economic, demographic, social and
medical crises to climate change. Can security be
measured solely in terms of nuclear stockpiles,
implementation of international agreements, arms
control and managing terrorist threats? I believe
security should be defined differently. The world is
facing immense challenges that cannot be overcome
by any country in the world, including Ukraine.”
“Today, we have to integrate with the globalized

world, because there is no unique formula for solving
security issues. Ukraine is not a member of the G-8 Arseniy YATSENYUK,
or the G-20, but we would like the world to solve its Member of Parliament,
problems from the perspective of the G-191 – all Leader of Party Front
the countries in the world. We would like Ukraine to
Zmin, Founder of Open
have an active domestic and foreign policy. We would
like Ukraine to become a key element of European Ukraine Foundation
stability and key contributor to world stability.”
“I don’t understand how a country [Ukraine] that has no international security guarantees,
except of course the UN Charter (the Budapest Declaration is an interesting and good
declaration, but these are non-binding obligations, in other words, it has no legal effect)
can independently narrow its own security and manoeuvres?! I believe the so-called
Ukrainian Law “On the fundamentals of domestic and foreign policy” is a foreign policy
victory for our Russian partners. They have finally legally blocked NATO expansion. This is
the first and most important real victory for our Russian partners.”

“…The border between the two worlds, existing
in the past, was geographically clear-cut – the
Berlin Wall. Then the wall crashed down, and along
with it the old political reality. Instead of one
historical choice, now we face dozens, hundreds,
even thousands of everyday and not so everyday
choices. Instead of two worlds, there were a dozen.
Most concepts and statuses in the international
world became accessible – even the status of a
“global player”. In 1990 there were two global
players: the Soviet Union and the United States.
In 2010 there are at least five: the U.S., Russia,
China, EU and Japan – and few doubts that soon Oleksandr HORIN,
they will be joined by India, Brazil and Turkey, with Deputy Minister for
Mexico, South Africa and Australia banging at the Foreign Affairs, Ukraine
global door. …In today’s world, countries become
neighbours with whomever they want, not with
whomever they can. There are geographic, economic, spiritual, cultural, linguistic and
religious neighbours, and the more powerful and open a country, the more open the
modern world is to it and the more neighbours – real and virtual – it has. I deeply
believe that the more open a country and the more it is integrated into the global
economic, cultural and scientific network – the more closed it is to threats.”
“There must be a reaction to events that occur in relation with each challenge. The
reaction to what happened in Afghanistan was grossly overblown, and as a result
there was a new wave of opposition that strengthened anti-NATO sentiment after NATO
entered Afghanistan. Islamic extremism can be defeated only by Islamic nations.
Muslims must find a solution to combat this radicalism and the world must create
conditions to enable this.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“There are debates among intellectuals and

politicians, regarding which security policy or
economy policy is more effective, more productive
– a moral policy or a pragmatic one. I think there is
no real contradiction. There cannot be a pragmatic
policy without results, without considering what
we are striving for, and what we want to achieve by
making deals with other countries… by becoming
members of this or that organization. No policy
can be sustainable and productive for security
purposes, for economic development, at least in the
medium and long term, if it forgets the principles,
Giorgi BARAMIDZE, if it strays away from these values and principles
Vice Prime-Minister, State and morals.”
Minister on European and “…It is very important to cooperate within the
Euro-Atlantic Integration, framework of the Eastern Partnership with our EU
Georgia friends as well as directly with the countries of the
Eastern Partnership. This enables us to cooperate in
all the realms that are important for us, beginning
with the issue of security and defence, and dealing with issues no less important such
as education, science, cultural issues, not to mention energy security, transportation,
trade etc. This is a very important opportunity for our countries to become closer to
European standards.”
“...We welcome the European Union’s and NATO’s dialogue with Russia, because we
believe that stronger ties between NATO and the European Union and Russia will
encourage Russia to be a more willing player with international roles...”

“…The U.S. has always been a leader of the Alli-
ance but it has to be a collective Alliance as all
of its members have the right to vote in order to
reach a required consensus and, in fact, NATO has
been based on such a consensus. ...We will very
much maintain it. But the essence of U.S. strength
and the strength of our Alliance is that it’s well-
prepared to defend all the members of the Alliance.
And we will reaffirm at the NATO Summit in Lisbon
the importance of Article 5, our commitment to de-
fend the members of the Alliance.”
“…We are faced with many new threats. As a secu- Robert SIMMONS,
rity Alliance we will focus on those threats, those Deputy Assistant
concerns that come from our security basics. En-
ergy security is one of the new discussions; deal-
Secretary General for
ing with terrorism – is another; cyber-security, Security Cooperation and
e.g. making sure that people cannot act in global Partnership, NATO HQ,
networks, and so on. All these demonstrate that we Brussels
have to focus on new, broader security challenges,
other than the traditional ones. Because we don’t
see that any individual country is an enemy ...these new challenges must be faced
together with the Alliance and its partners.”
“...About relations with Ukraine. We understand the Government’s decision of choosing

not to actively pursue membership in the Alliance at this moment and we respect
this. At the same time, following our meeting in Bucharest, we do see Ukraine being a
partner of the Alliance. In relation to this, however, both Ukraine and our neighbours
want to continue the active cooperation which we have between the Alliance and your
country. That cooperation is important for what you have done in Afghanistan and
other missions.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“Russia still represents one of the most important

roles in our region. And this is based on spheres
of influence. Nobody speaks today about spheres
of interest, but there are very clear spheres of
interest or degrees of interest on behalf of the
Russian Federation in its relations. The first sphere
involves the neighbouring countries of Kazakhstan,
Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia. We have a next
stage, which includes members of the European
Union and NATO, as well as former members of the
Communist camp – in other words the Baltic States
and Eastern Europe, which also are represented in
Dr. Theodore MELESCANU, the Russian Federation’s zones of interest. And
Vice-President of Senate, lastly, of course – friendly countries and partners
from Western Europe, Western and Eastern Europe,
Minister of National such as Turkey, France, Italy, Germany, which are
Defence (2007-2008), important European partners for Russia.”
Minister for Foreign
Affairs (1992-1996), “...We are living in a world in which we have
Romania three different kinds of conflicts, which are linked
together. We have the first generation of conflicts
– rooted in the Cold War: conflicts in the Middle East, which date back about 60 years,
including the tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and other areas. Then
we have the second generation of conflicts which are related to the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and Former Yugoslavia: all the frozen conflicts ranging from Abkhazia
and Ossetia to Transnistria and the Western Balkans. We have a third series of conflicts,
which includes global wars, the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons
trafficking, etc. Can the European Union be an important player and actor? Yes, but
under the condition that we can offer the necessary means to build its military and
political presence abroad.”
“…We have to concentrate on 3 issues: stabilizing the rules of international law,

ensuring institutional stability and the capability of meeting new challenges, and
involving not only governments but also citizens, civil society, national and sub-
national players in all of the processes of decision-making regarding EU security.”

“…The position of Moldova’s national interest is
to develop a strong partnership with its two neigh-
bours -Romania and Ukraine, and to become a key
point of stability.”
“I’ll focus on some elements related to the way

in which the Republic of Moldova can contribute
towards the promotion of security and stability in
the region. There are two key directions to this: the
first step is to transform Moldova into a successful,
democratic, predictable European state, and the
second step is to promote the viable settlement of
the Transnistrian conflict ensuring the integrity of Andrei POPOV,
the Republic of Moldova. These two goals are inter- Deputy Minister for
related and mutually pre-cursory and solving the
Transnistrian conflict is the key factor to making
Foreign Affairs and
Moldova an attractive country. These efforts European Integration,
are on three levels: the first level is internal: Republic of Moldova
reorganization, modernization, and transformation
of Moldova’s inter-level protection of Transnistria.
The second level relates to ensuring – through
political and diplomatic efforts – the security and support of Moldova’s partners,
primarily in their vital support of finding a viable solution to this conflict. The key,
third level of efforts relates to the reversing of the trends of separation, segmentation
and drifting apart, which have been taking place during the previous two decades.”
“We see Transnistria, first of all, not as a territory
which has to be taken back, but, primarily as a
community of people who have their interests and
concerns. They have to be listened to and under-
stood, and their hearts and minds have to be un-
derstood…”
“I would propose to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Ukraine to facilitate the revision of the
European Security Treaty and to ensure that solid
proposals will be introduced which set up the
legal frameworks of non-bloc status of Ukraine. It
Volodymyr HORBULIN, would give a legal basis for discussions about how
Head of National Centre to ensure our security. Only after that we can talk
about wider security format.”
for Euro-Integration

EXPERT FOCUS
“…This is certainly the case whether the US is

absolutely declining or not. I think it is not! The
sense is that this will proceed in the future and the
US will likely remain the most powerful economic
and political force in global affairs. It welcomes
power, in part, because of constraints on US
actions, and in part also because of the increasing
power of other players.”
“…The main factor that has been poignant and

relevant to this question, of course, is the effect
of the global economic crisis on the U.S. and this
Robert NURICK, effect is real and powerful. Yet there is another one
Member, International that may or may not be asked. First, this is politics.
After all, the economy tells us what condition the
Institute for Strategic country is in and whether it has the resources to
Studies, the American engage in foreign policy. Politics always decide
Association for the what course of action to take, and politics in
Advancement of Slavic the U.S. have changed. …The results of recent
Studies and the Central elections really have been quite dramatic. It’s
not simply that the Republican Party has regained
Eurasia Studies Society, control of the House of Representatives and
USA nearly has regained control of the Senate. Those
types of changes are not, in and of themselves,
extraordinary, but the shift is what usually
empowers an election. And more importantly, the electoral results were driven by a
popular movement campaign, which manifested enormous distrust of the Obama’s
Administration, enormous unhappiness in the economic policy, and I think distrust
of political institutions in general. And the question that arises in Washington, and is
being raised for this purpose, is as follows: “What should be the foreign policy initiatives
of these people?”…The new people coming into the House or the Senate have been
driven primarily by domestic concerns. ...What is quite clear is that this group of people
holds a considerable distrust against multi-level institutions and constraints, and this
is the general sentiment which has been expressed in these elections. These multi-level
national institutions are too limiting on the U.S. freedom of action. The other element
is the very strong focus on the economy. I think this already reinforces a very powerful
trend in the United States, which resists further choice and, therefore, I don’t think we
are going to have more interventions of the sort we have recently had in Afghanistan
and in Iraq without enormous political struggles in the U.S.”

“Unfortunately, we have to admit that we are not
moving towards a well-organized and institution-
alized collective security, but towards a multi-polar
world that is less stable, less predictable and lacks
proper institutional frameworks. …Given the eco-
nomic recession and sharp increase in problems,
including in developed countries, less often can
we say that collaboration by the world’s most de-
veloped countries produces effective global solu-
tions. …The world continues to fight over natural
resources and those global threats, including cli-
mate change, remain unanswered. …Soft power is
becoming increasingly less effective. Furthermore, Petro POROSHENKO,
its ineffectiveness is increasing the temptation to Minister for Foreign
use military force. Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran are
proof of this.”
Affairs of Ukraine (2009-
2010), Secretary of
“The major changes we see today in the world are National Security and
transforming the entire system of international re- Defence Council (2005),
lations. A striking example of this is the shift in Ukraine
global influence: the growing role of China and In-
dia; the ineffectiveness of international institutions to ensure security and stability,
including the UN, NATO and OSCE; the escalation of global conflicts; departure from
norms of international law that has been the foundation for our system of international
security and international relations – which characterizes the conflicts in Kosovo, Ab-
khazia and South Ossetia. All this leads us to admit that the world is becoming increas-
ingly less safe.”

CAMERA FOCUS

PLENARY SESSION II: EVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS
• Is the West Losing its Monopoly on Soft Power?
• Transatlantic Relationship: Collective Security or Coalitions of the
Willing?
• Will Today’s Ministries of Defence be Tomorrow’s Ministries of Security?
“…We have NATO and the EU, which, for us as full-

fledged members, are crucial in terms of ensuring
security through their policy of partnerships, such
as those with Russia, with Ukraine, with Georgia,
the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Security Council) and so on,
which have created a cooperative security beyond
their borders. These organizations play an important
security role for all countries in the European area.
There exist simultaneous processes of expansion
regarding the countries of Eastern and Central Europe:
they have proven to be an effective instrument for the
stabilization of the region, encouraging political and
economic reforms and the consolidation of the whole Dr. Bogdan AURESCU,
of Europe. They share the same values and principles, Secretary of State for
such as individual freedom, rule of law, market European Affairs, Ministry
economy, therefore they both have an intrinsic soft
of Foreign Affairs,
power dimension.”
Romania
“…The important thing is that we are not only in
support of developing our fundamental values, but in favour of actually being satisfied
by these values. NATO or the EU is not in the process of giving up these values, whether
they are soft or not. These powers are not a drive towards imposing our will on others. It is
rather about leading by the example of others. We should replicate our style while taking
our fundamental values and internalizing them.”
“The presence of the United States in the Euro-Atlantic cooperation format in the field of
security remains crucial for the security and stability of our continent. There’s also a salient
interest on the part of the European and Euro-Atlantic partners to develop cooperation
and areas of coordination with Russia. Romania is very much open to finding new ways to
cooperate with Russia and is willing to contribute towards the construction of an effective
partnership based on common values and shared principles.”

“In the past the world was bipolar. Now many say
that it has become multi-polar. I propose the notion
that the world is non-polar. In terms of polarity, we
had essentially two camps that were different, but
nevertheless sought to achieve a balance: strategic
balance, military balance, economic balance, and
to certain extent humanitarian balance.”
“Today everyone agrees that new poles, new

centres, are developing around existing ones. What
I believe is important is that they’re different –
different in terms of mentality, economic potential,
their vision for economic development, their vision Pavlo KLIMKIN,
of global security. Thus, the world we live in has Deputy Minister for
different poles…” Foreign Affairs, Ukraine
“…Soft security today is dominant. And for me the
idea that we have different poles and multilateral regimes is a prototype of the future
architecture, including in the security sphere. … Any structure, whether bipolar or
multi-polar, is by definition a structure that does not produce security for itself, but
seeks to create security around itself, a structure that will simultaneously have many
poles and multilateral regimes. The multilateral regimes set the rules of the game,
and these rules of the game established for the poles, in my opinion, are a unique
opportunity to create in the future a system that will produce security for itself.”
“…Soft power plays a much greater role then all others. Today, the term “soft power” is
understood by many as something that they put themselves in that concept. It lives its
life and is very good. There are key European values that Ukraine must adhere to. The
idea of introducing European values is the basis for the further development of the idea
of “soft power”, which the European Union can produce rather effectively not only in
its own environment, but worldwide. And the European Union needs to learn to produce
this soft power because European policy with Russia or the Eastern Partnership so far
isn’t working that way we would like it to.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“…We are witnessing a revival and modification

of security processes. We are on the eve of a new
Strategic Concept for NATO, new global players
are emerging that impact security… At the same
time we are witnessing the emergence of new non-
traditional security threats and responses to them,
including greater use of so-called “soft power”. But
the search for security remains just as it was fifty,
thirty, ten years ago – the main goal is to ensure
the security of a country, community, citizens and
protect the free market and a country’s energy
supply. The main theme of present day global
Borys TARASYUK, security processes is the reduced share of the
Member of the Parliament military factor and the relevant increase in non-
military factors, or so-called “soft security.”
of Ukraine, Chairman,
Parliamentary Committee “The security element of the EU’s foreign policy
on European Integration, remains weak and the European Union should
Ukraine focus more attention on its common foreign
security policy.”

“We are now experiencing a period of change in
the world, as fast and as rapid as what happened
during 1940–1945. We are experiencing war with
changes and the horrible truth is that our national
and international solutions, our ministries and
organizations such as the EU and NATO have not
been able to adapt in order to keep pace with
this change. There are no blocs any more. The
world, in general, with a few small exceptions, is
not characterized by military confrontation or
ideological competition. So the idea of balancing
is no longer a sensitive issue because there’s
nothing to balance. Today’s world is characterized Chris DONNELLY,
by new powers ascending all over the world.” Director, Oxford Institute
“The next ten years are crucial because they will
for Statecraft and
probably decide what the world will be like around Governance, United
us. This is the new concept we will shape and in Kingdom
which we are already living in. New models of
relationships are replacing the military ideological
blocs. The EU has also made an effort over the last
half century to create a new model which would take away the unnatural competition
between states, and how they perceive aggression, and it has been successful.”
“But the EU itself is a player within a larger world and the relationships in that wild
world between states are based on a model for which I would like to suggest a title,
namely hyper-competition – extreme competition is what characterizes this model.
Previously, we’ve called it soft power. This is power, but it is not soft, because its states
compete and they develop new ways of influencing one another...”

EXPERT FOCUS
“There are two components to soft power: the

ideological product and the method for delivering
this product. The delivery technique, without a
doubt, is constantly being improved. The world has
a brilliant laboratory that is constantly developing
new formulas for delivering information and
ideological products to people – the United States
of America. … From the point of view of delivery,
there is constant progress.”
“Today the world is being presented with … a

one dimensional ideological product. The West’s
Dr. Yevgeniy KOZHOKIN, ideological product is now primarily the open
Rector, Academy of Labour market, democracy and liberal vales. There is a
part of the world that accepts this product. That
and Social Relations; is above all Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Georgia,
Director, Russia Institute Armenia – this product is accepted even with those
for Strategic Studies features that are characteristic for the current
(1994-2009), Russian stage of development of ideology, when ideology
Federation becomes a PR ideology.”
“We look at problems from the context of the Western world, of which Russia, Ukraine,
and even Belarus are a part. But in this large western World, we are its periphery,
including intellectual and ideological periphery, and this is sad for us.”

“A more significant form of power shifting, as many
believe, is taking place between the great powers
of the world. But the debate about the American
decline, whether or not it exists, is connected, of
course, to the rise of another great power. In some
sense it’s a debate about whether America would
be less important if there wasn’t another great
power emerging. And another great power is of
course China. Since the argument for another type
of power shift exists as well, namely an economic
power shift, it will be political and diplomatic over
the long term, from the United States to China,
which has already affected the region of Asia.” Michael COX,
Professor, London School
“The United States has a long way to go before it
goes down. …China at the moment is rising within
of Economics, United
the system. And China recognizes these constraints Kingdom
but at the same time we should not underestimate
it. Western values remain strong. And what we call
“the East”, and the many countries in the East still
look to the West: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan –
to the United States both in terms of their ideas and in terms of their basic security.”
“If the economic crisis continues and shows no signs of going away, and if the rever-
berations of the economic crisis also continue, as indeed they are, around the world
and particularly in Europe for the last two or three years, then we could be in a situa-
tion where, on the one hand, we have a standard Western economic order in the United
States and Europe, and a dynamic East. …If we continue to see this for the next five-
ten years, in other words – completely uneven economic growth rates, – then in ten
years’ time the good news will be less good news.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“There has never been, since the collapse of the

Holy Roman Empire, a system of general security
in Europe that has been inclusive, comprehensive
and effective. The systems of collective security
that have been successful and effective have not
been inclusive. They have been systems, such as
NATO, that were founded on a basis of common
interests, common values, common practices and
common working cultures… The last inclusive
comprehensive general system of collective
security in Europe was the League of Nations. It
was not only a failure, but its operations and the
Dr. James SHERR, illusions that sustained it, made it more rather than
Head, Russia and Eurasia less difficult to identify, contain and counter real
threats as they were emerging. The one exception
Program, Chatham House, to this picture was the Concert of Europe in the
United Kingdom 19th century, and if you look at Russia’s current
proposals for a new European Security Treaty you
can sense this as an understanding of the Great Concert which the Russian leadership
has in mind. But let us be very honest about why that system worked. It was not a
democratic system: three of its five great powers were autocracies, absolute monarchies.
It was a hierarchical system that formally limited the rights of smaller powers and it was
a system which legitimized war between the players and was characterized by frequent
wars among them.”
“…If Ukraine wishes to strengthen its own security, the starting point should not be
new architectures of security which have no historical bases and have not amounted
to anything concrete. The starting point must be the use of internal as well as external
measures, in order to collaborate more effectively in Ukraine’s interests with those
security structures that exist, such as NATO. By the way, the CSTO also conforms to
the definition of a non-exclusive but effective system. The challenge for Ukraine is to
collaborate more effectively with those systems that work.”
“Russia’s civilizational significance in this part of the world is considerable. But the
civilizational factor and linguistic factor has now been politicized and accentuated in
a very effective way. These factors even extend to the project of shaping and reshaping
the historical narrative under which we understand ourselves. The power of Russian
business culture in this part of the world is a culture that is fundamentally based on
networks rather than markets. That is a producer-oriented rather than a consumer
oriented business market. It is collusive rather than competitive.”

“…Very often during the discussions about the
security we hear terms which begin with the word
“new”, such as new world order, new terrorism, and
new security environment. …We hear about ter-
rorism being one of the new challenges that never
existed before. …But most of us here have read
about or actually remember the 1970s. We hear
about the monopoly of violence or the monopoly
of military force or force in general being lost by
the States. …Think of the end of 19th century and
the beginning of the 20th century: the expansion
of anarchism and related terrorist activities. Was
that the end of the monopoly for the States? The Dr. Bartosz STANISLAWSKI,
United States has not lost the monopoly of pow- Director, Mapping Global
er. If the United States so wished, it could have
made Afghanistan look like a parking lot on 9/11
Insecurity Program,
and probably the international community would Moynihan Institute of
not have had any objections on September 12th, Global Affairs, Maxwell
2001. But it chose nuanced warfare – much more School, Syracuse
complicated, much more prolonged and much more University, USA
costly.”
“When we look at the issue of invention and innovation, the centres of invention and
innovation are still in the so-called West. Yes, there are some important inventions and
innovations happening in the so-called East, but the East is mostly known for improv-
ing the inventions which were created in the so-called West. The main brain power is
still attracted to the West and that is why the East is coming to study and work in the
US and in Europe.”

MORNING PARALLEL SESSION I: NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC
CONCEPT: RETHINKING PARTNERSHIPS
• Will Relations with Georgia and Ukraine be Given New Stimulus?
• What is the Ideal Role for Russia?
• Will NATO Policies Towards Post-Soviet States Continue to Cause Internal
Divisions?
“We already have the NATO-Russia Council which

can help us build mutual trust and cooperation, but
this will obviously take time. We have to identify
the issues of common interest; where we can work
together, whether it is missile defence, the war
against drugs, terrorism or other issues, and we have
to see how far we can go.”
“…The experts group decided to retrieve the “Open

Door” policy adopted by NATO which is based on
Article 10 of the Treaty. The report also recommends
that our allies make regular use of the NATO-Ukraine,
NATO-Georgia Commissions to discuss mutual Amb. Marie
security concerns and to foster practical cooperation, GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE,
including on defence reform. It also adds: “… a Member of NATO’s New
clearer need to articulate its position to partners and
Strategic Concept Group
the more accurately it can assess their perceptions,
the more adept the allies will be at defusing crises of Experts, Canada
and building trust.”
“…Despite the fact that there is a framework agreement between NATO and the UN,
cooperation remains a challenge. Both organizations have own culture and priorities, but
as the Afghanistan experience has demonstrated again, NATO has to improve its cooperation
with the UN and with civil society. This will require a number of transformations and I am
pleased to know that our report recommended that a NATO Liaison Office be created at the
UN in New York. We also recommended that a Small Civilian Planning Unit be established
within NATO to maintain points of contact, share information, and engage in joint planning
with partner countries and international organizations.”

“The first and most important issue is whether or
not the coverage of threats by Article 5 is going to
be extended or not, which means will the Article
5 continue covering only military action or is it
going to be extended to cover other threats, such
as cyber attacks, or eventually energy security.”
“There is an entire debate on this issue of

resuming contingency planning, which could make
future relations between NATO and Russia much
more difficult if NATO resumes defence planning,
particularly with some of its new member states.
The reason for this is that, contingency planning Dr. Andrei ZAGORSKI,
in Europe means developing a war plan against Professor and Leading
Russia. It doesn’t matter, whether it’s for defence Researcher, Moscow State
purposes or for any other reason, but contingency Institute of International
planning means war planning against Russia. And
Relations (MGIMO),
this is going to wake every negative instinct in
Moscow concerning NATO and NATO policies.” Russian Federation
“We are still quite far from having a common understanding of what a joint ballistic
defence entails, what is its purpose and how it should be defined, on the practical side.
Because in the West, the underlying idea for ballistic defence involves putting assets
together into one system, integrating assets which already exist or which might appear
in the future. While in Moscow the basic task would be: A) to agree, and we have not
yet agreed on whether or not we need a ballistic defence; B) to agree on what we need
a ballistic defence against; C) exclude the points on which we disagree regarding this
endeavour, and then have a common design and build a joint system which would be
jointly managed by all participating states.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“Regarding the contentious issues, the Strategic

Concept, in my view, should state the following.
…The Alliance remains a regional organization
but with a global horizon, and without necessarily
implying military action, much more intense
consultation will take place on all security-
relevant issues. NATO-EU cooperation needs a new
impetus, which also means overcoming blockages
resulting from national interests, in order to make
it function in a complimentary synergetic way…
It must be made clear that NATO does not want to
lead everybody, it doesn’t want to coordinate all
Dr. Klaus WITTMANN, others, but rather, to coordinate with them.”
Brigadier General of
“NATO must make it clear that it respects the
Bundeswehr (ret), prerogative of the UN Security Council but does
Former Director Academic not totally exclude a Kosovo-like situation. NATO
Planning and Policy at the should also explain its limited role on all the new
NATO Defence College in unconventional security challenges… Over all,
Rome, Germany Article 4 – Consultation of the Washington Treaty
– will be rigorously activated in order to establish
powerful analysis and debate on all security related
issues worldwide…”
“NATO’s partnerships must be further developed and they must be put to use in what
I could call preventive stabilization. Although out-of-area missions are not common
in NATO’s spectrum of tasks at the moment, ensured protection of all member-states
remains of the essence...”
“I think we have greatly misunderstood the Russian political psychology – the “Imperial
Fatum Pain” and we have mismanaged at least the third round of NATO enlargement,
while the first round was cushioned by the creation of the NATO-Russia Council …
which must be developed qualitatively.”
“The Strategic Concept on Ukraine will place emphasis on the partnership, the use of the
NATO-Ukraine Commission. It will not make any advances to Ukraine, such as, “please
come into NATO”, since NATO was never pulling. As far as the signal from Bucharest is
concerned, I am not sure whether we agree on what that signal was. For me, it was a
signal of disunity on a controversy that was totally unnecessary. This has antagonized
Russia in an unnecessary way and I’m one of those who think there should be a middle
ground between “no veto for Russia” and “bending over to Russian indignation”; there
needs to be a middle way of taking into account some Russian interests.”

“NATO will take responsible actions together
with every partner willing to cooperate with us
on security and defence matters. If we put this
pillar together and look at the question of how
our conference is changing the security paradigm,
and the security paradigm of the nation could look
like the following. It is in our interest to meet the
security threats head-on as early, in the stage of
escalation, as possible in order to: A) diminish
and limit the potential damages as far away as
possible from the national borders, because the
new threats can very easily infiltrate society
through different channels that are provided as a Amb. Valeri RATCHEV,
result of globalization, and B) eliminate them as Head of the Political
soon as possible in order to downsize and limit the
possibilities of the manoeuvring of the threatening
Cabinet, Ministry of
source. This new security paradigm requires a total Foreign Affairs, Republic
change of the national security policy of every of Bulgaria
country.”
“Europe needs to talk with Russia and probably

with Turkey. The recent meeting of the German Chancellor and French President with the
Russian President Medvedev demonstrates a remarkable development in this direction.
If you add to this fact the proposal of Chancellor Merkel to establish an EU-Russia
Security Council and if you add to this the ambition of President Sarkozy to establish
a common economic space with Russia, along with a specific security concept, then
the picture is much clearer. The tendency towards establishing a cooperative security
system in Europe is much more realistic than ever before. In my opinion, this does not
at all mean the disengagement of the United States in Europe…”

EXPERT FOCUS
Russia-NATO relations are critical for Ukraine’s

security because Ukraine will always be an irritant
in these relations. The partnership between
Ukraine and NATO will largely depend on the extent
to which Ukraine finds its place in this triangle.
As for Russia’s participation in the Ballistic Missile
Defence system, I believe it is hardly impossible
because it is unlikely to expect the level of trust
that will allow NATO to delegate some of the
responsibility to such a partner.
Oleksiy MELNYK,
Military Programs Leading
Expert, Razumkov Center
“Most analysts, especially in the West, would

consider NATO as the most successful Alliance
in the history. Nevertheless, its continuing
influence has been questioned quite often
both by experts and by politicians and – most
importantly – by public opinion, what we call
the “tax payers”. So NATO has been challenged…
and it has to adapt to a new global security
environment, to the new political challenges.”
“The new Strategic Concept will try to square

the circle and to reassure the NATO members
in the former Eastern Europe that it will firmly Dr. Thanos DOKOS,
guarantee their security. At the same time it Director General, Hellenic
will try to revitalize its relations with Russia,
but there are two issues that it has with Russia:
Foundation for European
one is enlargement and Ukraine; and the issue of and Foreign Policy
missile defense.” (ELIAMEP), Greece

MORNING PARALLEL SESSION II: TWO TERMS, ONE MEANING:
NATIONAL RESILIENCE OR HOMELAND SECURITY?
• How do we Define Threats? What Tools and Strategies are Required to
Strengthen National Resilience in a Multicultural and Institutionally
Diverse Europe?
• What are the Resources Required to Build Resilience? At what Level
Should our Capabilities be?
• How Effective are Private-Public Partnerships in Protecting Critical
Infrastructure?
“…The idea of resilience is actually something that
comes from Physics. If you take an object, let’s think
about an object for a second, if you drop this object,
you know it might break. It’s very much focused on
the braking of this particular entity, the braking of
the state, the failing of the state and then that leads
to security consequences. Resilience urges you to
look at the object itself.”
“An equivalent, in a more traditional security field,

would be what we are doing in terms of the security
sector reform. There we try to build resilience in
states, so that they can start taking care of their own Stephan DE SPIEGELEIRE,
security problems.” Senior Scientist, Director
Defence Transformation,
“Resilience is something that has really caught-on
the Hague Centre for
in the homeland security crowd. The first responders
are not the fire brigade and are not necessarily the Strategic Studies, the
police who run it – it’s the people at home. When a Netherlands
crisis breaks out, if they have the resilience to deal
with these issues, the crisis will never aggrandize in the larger issues where we have to
make much more effort afterwards. So the homeland security community has really taken
resilience almost as the heart of their efforts now.”
“Security is not just about international organizations such as NATO or the EU. It’s not even
just about our governments – it’s also about every individual, it’s about your children, your
parents.
We are on the eve of rather quite major changes and we are not doing well in the security
arena.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“We do not consider the terrorism to be a war. It

is a battle, a fight for which Germany uses the
system of the criminal law and the penal code. In
other words it is the activity of law enforcement
agencies, supported by external and internal
intelligence structures.”
“…We alone cannot be certain that we will be

secure. So, that’s why we are nation-states, then
we are not an inter-link, but are tied to each other
in this field by the assessment centres of the NATO
and the European Union and second, the we are tied
to each other by the police structures which are Dr. Hans-Georg WIECK,
also linked within Europe, for example EUROPOL.” Ambassador, President of
Federal German Foreign
“The Cold War era, over time, actually evolved into Intelligence Agency
a capacity whereby countries were transformed to
(BND) (1985-1990),
cope with any emergency, so that now emergency
readiness capabilities can and must be repeatedly Germany
checked every four, five, or six years. However, it
would be in vain if the application of the law can
be manipulated.”
“…The open societies, who usually have control through the process of elections
and through investigation committees of the parliamentary institutions, so that
the abuse and “by-passing” can be reduced to a minimum. However, open societies
– such as those where we had hurricane Katrina – demonstrate to us that they also
have deficiencies. And therefore, open societies have to review the way in which, for
instance, private enterprise runs infrastructure, and then in the case where government
controls are needed to make private enterprise function, these “controls” must comply
with a number of rules. Again, it all comes back to the rule of “good governance”. And
now my conclusion is that everyone who lives in Europe, but outside the EU, thinks that
it would be a good idea to live in the EU.”

“Some people feel they are very different and
distinct, i.e. homeland security on one side, –
internal, national security on the other side –
external. I happen to believe in the middle-ground
approach, which suggests that homeland security
and national security really are inter-twined, and
homeland security is a part of national security.
The reason that distinction is important, it isn’t
just for philosophical reasons; it actually was
translated into bureaucratic reasons in the United
States. What I mean by that is: at 9/11 we realized
that our government was not effectively organized
to manage the threat of terrorism.” Daniel J. KANIEWSKI,
Assistant Vice President
“With respect to resilience… the way that our
homeland security enterprise is organized, we
for Homeland Security
have four major thrust areas: preparedness, and Deputy Director,
protection, response, and recovery. Preparedness Homeland Security Policy
means getting ready for something, - whether Institute, the George
it is a disaster or natural disaster, or terrorist Washington University,
attack – and the way we primarily prepare as a
nation of the United States is, we at the Federal
USA
level provide funding in the form of grants to sub-
national governments, in our case, to state and local governments. Protection and
critical infrastructure protection are important, and as a result you could end up having
public-private partnerships. There is some funding available to the private sector and
to organizations, to help secure these areas.”
“In the United States more than three-quarters, over 75 percent of our critical
infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, so the Government does
not control it, but at the same time when it comes to electrical power, lights, hospitals,
roads and bridges – these areas are absolutely necessary following a terrorist attack.
Response is fairly straight forward – responding; that is what FEMA (Federal Emergency
Management Agency) traditionally does. Recovery – this is generally when the Federal
government pays state and local entities to recover from that disaster.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“National resilience requires actions – not just

from the government, but from business and
from individuals. A public-private partnership
in national resilience is essential, because so
many critical services are now delivered by the
private sector. But it is not too difficult to see
how business encourages the making of money, a
profit, and seeing the system as perhaps something
you might need, or might take, to preserve the
resilience of the system. It is also a challenge to
motivate individuals to play their part in national
resilience.”
Bryden SPURLING,
Deputy Director, “In some ways, developing countries can be more
resilient, because, perhaps, the citizens are more
Strategic Policy Guidance, used to making do on their own as they face
Department of Defence, development. Citizens can’t often go placement
Australia because governments tend to provide more, their
expectation to the government can be higher.”

“…75 to 80 percent of Canada’s trade is with the
US. So if the trade stops, if it’s interrupted, that’s
significant. We have an integrated electricity grid.
As a result, the electricity lines crisscross the bor-
der and we supply each other, so it’s not the one-
way supply, it goes in both directions. We realized
that we have dependences and inter-dependences
across the border. We need to increase capability
of preventing incidents, and protection is a part of
this resilience concept. Protection is a part of it,
but resilience is much broader. We want to miti-
gate the effect that incidents have on our critical
infrastructures, because it is important for quick Bjorn RUTTEN,
economic recovery and for operational resilience Senior Research
as well.”
Associate, the Conference
“Certainly, the private sector does not have a re- Board of Canada, Canada
sponsibility for national security ... it’s the gov-
ernment that has the responsibility, but not the
capability, if we are talking about, for example,
electricity sector in North America because most
of the generators, operators, and owners are from the private sector. Certainly, it helps
if it is a regulated industry.”
“…You need the appropriate leadership in the region to make this work. Somebody has
to lead this and maybe this has to be a co-chair, because we have a private sector and
the public sector in the room, and obviously our viewpoints, our perspectives and our
mandates are quite different from each other. From our experiences the information
sharing element of building this public-private partnership is hard nut to crack.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“Many of the threats and challenges are of the

cross-border nature. So when we talk about the
organization of the security sector, first and
foremost, we need to be sure that each individual
organization provides robust capabilities to deal
with primary challenges and responsibilities,
as well as capabilities that might be useful for
other types of threats and challenges. There
are also needs for an increased cooperation and
coordination of cross-border activity, and of all
this requires information exchange, knowledge
and something that we rarely talk about – trust.”
Dr. Todor TAGAREV,
Associate Professor, “We have to recognize that governments cannot in
principal be fully prepared to deal with the spectrum
Centre for Security and of threats and challenges. And the citizens cannot
Defence Management, be seen only as recipients of services provided
Bulgarian Academy of by the state and other public organizations. We
Sciences, Republic of cannot provide resilience unless the citizens – and
Bulgaria the society as a whole – are involved in making
themselves more resilient. To achieve resilience, in
that regard, is not only the matter of legislation, bureaucratic procedures and provision
of equipment, it is a matter of perceptions and attitudes of the people.”
“Resilience means that vital services are available or quickly recovered after the
calamity. In Europe, in the US and elsewhere, that subject is often discussed under
the rubric of critical infrastructure. Implementing the concept of resilience, in many
cases, means that we need to create some sort of redundancies. …This means we
need to invest in those redundancies. We need to think about investments that would
not necessarily be made according to conventional business logic, i.e., looking for
competitive business.”

“I think this topic may be of the utmost impor-
tance to us Ukrainians, because we experienced
the Chernobyl catastrophe. …After Chernobyl, we
had a number of catastrophes and many chemical
accidents, and we have a bureaucratic mess. In
other words, we have many institutions, but, first of
all, we don’t have good coordination among those
institutions. Furthermore, it is very important for
me to mention the problem of informing citizens
about what happened, because, many of our citi-
zens do not believe in official statements and in
government propaganda.”
Amb. Yuriy SHCHERBAK,
Ambassador, Director,
Center of Global and
Regional Researches of
Kiev-Mohyla Academy

CAMERA FOCUS

AFTERNOON PARALLEL SESSION I:
BLACK SEA GEOPOLITICS: DILEMMAS AND PROSPECTS
• Will the Russia-Turkey Tandem Strengthen or Endanger Regional Stability?
• Can the Region’s Militarization be reversed?
• Will Conflict Return to the Region? What Lessons have we Learned from
August 2008?
“There are a number of problems, dilemmas and
paradoxes which exist in the region, but one recurring
notion, is that all the problems which emerged in
early 1990s, continue to remain as problems. None
of the problems that emerged at the end of the Cold
War have been solved in the region. And this is the
only constant in the region – everything is changing,
but the problems are remaining as they are. We
realized that the so-called “frozen conflicts” are not
so frozen. There are other paradoxes and dilemmas,
including uneven economic development in the
region, environmental degradation, inconclusive
results of democratization, an unsatisfactory level of Dr. Mustafa AYDIN,
regionalization, etc.” Rector, Kadir Has
University, Turkey
“Black Sea politics emerging within the region have
not been able to create Black Sea regionalization by
itself. In other words, the politics alone did not generate enough power to create integrity,
good governance and interdependencies. Therefore, outside interested parties should
support and should encourage this. You need push from outside, pressures from outside.
The Black Sea is the only place in the world where Russia, the European Union and the
United States have developed distinct policies and different interests. And also of course,
you have regional polices, difference etc. Thus, this is an area where many problems may
occur if we don’t deal with them soon.”
“Aside from Turkey, none of the regional countries had placed a priority on Black Sea issues.
Even Turkey didn’t place a priority on Black Sea issues, but it did develop a number of
initiatives on the Black Sea. For Russia, the Black Sea is part of the Caucasus. Ukraine doesn’t
consider itself a Black Sea country. Romania briefly became a Black Sea country between
2005 and 2007, and I think it was not an internal idea; this happened from the outside. As
to the other countries, Georgia is just not doing enough to become a Black Sea country and
their interests are just not focused on this area. Thus, there are no prioritized interests on
the Black Sea from the regional countries, and as a result there are no initiatives from within
the region to make it a subject instead of an object, or vice versa, of anyone’s discussion.”
“Economic development and security: the statistics
shows us the following – the GDP per capita and
the quality of life in the countries of the Black
Sea region are much lower than in the European
Union on the average… Therefore, the migration is
oriented from our region towards Western Europe.”
“We have faced asymmetric risks such as drugs-,

weapons- and human- trafficking, cyber attacks
so on, and we have important reasons to combat
drugs-trafficking. Therefore, genuine cooperation
focused on fighting against some risks, is possible,
and it can be effective.” Georgian POP,
MP, Member of the
Parliamentary Committee
on National Defence
and Security, House of
Deputies, Romania
“Russia and Turkey are stakeholders in the Black
Sea region and they play significant role, they have
common interests, and both try to develop their
cooperation. The fact that seventeen agreements
were signed during the Russian president’s visit
to Turkey in May of 2010 is a clear and open
indicator of an increased level of partnership. This
partnership in on its way to becoming a strategic
one, however, it is too early to define Turkish-
Russians relations as a tandem.”
“Russia is a huge, strong and important player, but

Tengiz PKHALADZE, it has lost its advantage in the post-Soviet area.
Chairman, International It is a member of CSTO which assesses the NATO as
a threat, and unfortunately, it is an unpredictable
Centre for Geopolitical partner which is capable of breaking off established
Studies, Georgia relations with its partners, but without any
substantial reason. As a result, instead of a “zero
problems policy” with its neighbour, Russia has a policy of “privileged interests”, as
well as problems with all post-Soviet neighbouring countries which do not agree to be
in the sphere of Russia’s “privileged interests.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“Turkey realizes that EU membership is not a very

plausible prospect for Ankara in the nearest future.
In other words Turkey has to develop parallel policy
and take into account the influences of the Islamic
world a “zero problems” policy with its neighbours.
Regarding the growing cooperation in the military
area, apparently this is linked to Turkish ambitions
of becoming independent producer of military
equipments.”
“Turkey has ambition to build an energy corridor,

however not only from East to West, but also
Dr. Danila BOCHKAREV, from North to South. This makes perfect sense,
Research Fellow, Global especially when you consider the number of
political problems related to transporting oil
Security Program, East via Bulgaria and Greece. Therefore, by applying
West Institute, Brussels Samsun and Ceyhan energy pipeline, Turkey would
help to aggregate Kazakh and Russian oil to the
Mediterranean by by-passing the Bosporus Strait.
Afterwards, there is also a question of transferring
gas through the South Stream pipeline. Turkey has always been lobbing to connect
the South Stream and Nabucco pipeline, in order to become an energy hub – and not
simply a transit country – so that the energy
would flow North, South, East and West. …As a
result, what you see basically is – in summing
up – a competitive engagement. In other worlds,
there is cooperation, but this cooperation is
purely pragmatic. Ankara creates the impression
that it knows what it really wants. It’s ready to
play dawn its pantocratic ambition in Central Asia,
and to cooperate more with Russia. In general,
we cannot call it a strategic partnership; accept
regarding the economy and energy.”
“One of the major trends involves the Russian push Carina STACHETTI,
towards the post-Soviet space with the so-called
Head of the Russia,
“privileged interests”. Thus, the security issues
in the area raised cautions for the EU member- Ukraine and Eurasia Desk,
states which are now facing difficulties to engage Directorate for Strategic
dynamically and to fully carry out those policies Affairs, Ministry of
which we have in common.” Defence, France
“…One the most important developments in the Caucasus region, is the deterioration of
the situation not only in the South, but also in the Northern part of the Caucasus. This
point is very important and we have to take it into account, because I think this entire
process is a result of two wars: Chechnya – this process of change, and the deterioration
of the situation is caused mainly by Russia, and, at the same time, by its neighbours;
and, of course, Georgia. In other words, there are attacks, killings, casualties of the civil
population and so on. Thus, this process is now accelerating, in fact, it’s a civil war.
Therefore, it is very important for European countries – and not only on the regional
level, but also on the local level – to assess this situation, to analyze the implications
for the European security. Russia’s North Caucuses is in the grip of a civil war with a
mixed flavour of those who support independence and those who are Islamists.”
“Very interesting issue is the EU role and presence

in the region. First of all, there is an actual debate
as to whether the EU is a regional stakeholder. I for
one, say that it is, because Romania, Bulgaria, and
Greece as well, are all three considered to be part of
the wider Black Sea, and as Black Sea powers, and
they are doubled-headed as EU member-states.
But others might not necessarily agree with this.
And while the EU is set up to formulate the Black
Sea policy, it has also been formulating recently,
within the last few years, many different polices in
this part of the world. As a result, sometimes this
Dr. Dimitris causes big risks and conflicts, which sort of lead to
TRIANTAPHYLLOU, the debate about the EU’s role – or about the role
it should seek for itself – in the region.”
Director, European
Studies Centre, Kadir Has
University, Turkey

EXPERT FOCUS
“None of the problems we saw in the Black Sea

region in 1991 was solved by 2010. Why? The
number of Black Sea organizations far exceeds the
number of Black Sea countries. Summits, meetings,
conferences, forums are held maybe once a month,
but there are no results. One of the explanations is
that each country has a varying degree of interest
in this region. For Russia, for example, the Black
Sea region is not a primary interest. Geopolitical
competition with the US is first, relations with the
EU second, etc. But for Georgia, it is perhaps first
or second. So the level of interest differs, as does
Amb. Andriy VESELOVSKYY, the amount of attention given. Only by finding a
Ambassador-at-Large, common denominator can we begin to influence
the situation in the region. An International
Ministry for Foreign Commission on the Black Sea may perhaps have
Affairs of Ukraine an effect on the situation to some extent, but
let’s look for something stronger. If we compare
this with the situation in the Balkans, the mutual
interest for all the regional actors was their relationships with one another and their
common future, and the problem was resolved in the Balkans. In our case, there is no
common future, and many things aren’t decided here. We need a push from outside, and
this shows that we are weak. But who will make this push from outside? I think you’ll
find many people who say that the best option is the European Union. The ambiguity
of the EU’s actions related to the Black Sea regions, despite the synergies that were
declared and approved the next day, largely preserves the problems we have today.”

CAMERA FOCUS

AFTERNOON PARALLEL SESSION II:
UKRAINE: CHOICES AND CONSTRAINTS
• Are Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Choices Defined by External Threats or
Domestic Politics?
• Does Ukraine’s Stability come at the Expense of its Integration into
European and Euro-Atlantic Community?
• Can Ukraine Strengthen its Partnership with Russia without
Compromising its Independence?
“There are number of reasons why the West itself
was responsible for this very disappointing Western
perception about what has happened here. Suffice
it to say that, if the West had the same policy and
attitude about visa and emigration towards this
country that the Russian Federation has, the situation
in Ukraine could be very different from what it is
today, and there would be a genuine level playing
field of influence between the EU and Russia which
today the Schengen system, and I ashamed to say still
the British system, impair and inhibit. But it would be
grossly damaging to ignore the fact that Ukrainians,
and particularly the Ukrainian political elites across Dr. James SHERR,
the political spectrum are profoundly responsible for Head, Russia and Eurasia
this state of affairs.” Program, Chatham House,
United Kingdom
“In the past five years we saw a truly democratic
Ukraine but the democratic system was not effective.
The real dividing line in Europe today is not between
one part of Europe where there’s a democracy and another part of Europe in which there
is no democracy. The dividing line is between one part of Europe where ordinary people
instinctually equate democracy with effective government and another part of Europe
where people equate democracy with ineffective government.”
“Ukraine of the 1990s was about to prove of a very, very different point. But disillusionment
of post-Orange years has greatly strengthened the number of people in this country who
now equate democracy with disorder, “bardak”, the loss of security, political and economic.
…There was a brief period of 2005 when Ukraine possessed real “soft power” in this region,
because of the expectations even in Russia.”
“…The mechanisms which were described for cooperation between NATO and Ukraine are

in place and they are working. Nevertheless, the fact is that the “heart and soul” have been
taken out of that relationship, and this fact serves the interest of those people who are in
power in Kyiv, as well as the interest of many of the powers-at-be at NATO Headquarters. The
most curious aspect to me – of the law on non-bloc status – is that it seems that Ukraine’s
Government has deliberately chosen to deprive itself of a strategic option which Leonid
Kuchma always understood. Before 2002, Ukraine’s policy was never to say – “we will go into
NATO or we will not”, but rather, its policy was to keep the option open. This constrained
and disciplined Russia’s behaviour, so much so, that in 1997 when the interstate treaty
was concluded, the Russians who supported it said, “we better make concessions otherwise
Ukraine might go into NATO, i.e., we must be more reasonable to Ukraine.” Today that option
has been taken off the table.”
“…Ukraine faces significant challenges in terms

of its border security and its territorial integrity.
There might be a subtle degrading of Ukraine’s own
ability to control its physical space. Obviously its
land border with Russia is relatively secure. The sea
boarder is still an open question. When it comes
to Transnistria on Ukraine’s western border, Russia
still has effective veto power to end negotiations
and to prevent a resolution. And what that means
is that Russian troops can remain in Transnistria
Russian troops are in Russia and Russian sailors
are in Sevastopol. In other words, Ukraine is
surrounded from three sides by Russian military Matthew ROJANSKI,
forces.” Deputy Director, Russia
and Eurasia Program,
“Ukraine’s economic security is recovering but
it still is not stable, it is not a re-bust... The Carnegie Endowment for
independence of the Ukrainian energy sector is International Peace, USA
still in question. Regarding whether it may benefit
those who control the energy sector to be in closer coordination with Russia, one thing
is clear – it certainly would not benefit them to be controlled by Russia. And we should
remember that this is a two-way street: Ukraine’s de-facto veto power over Russia’s
ability to export gas to Europe is reality. And whatever the pipelines plans might be –
politically possible or not – the reality is not going to change any time soon.”
“If Ukraine can work to develop an Eastern Neighbourhood Concept of its own in
which it works closely with Poland, with Hungary, with other Eastern European states
to approach the European Union jointly as a region then I think Ukraine has a chance
to have leverage with the European Union. However, to simply sit back and demand
association – Ukraine does not have a negotiated position to do that.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“It’s not Ukraine that needs to be convinced that the “reset” does not come at the
expense of Ukraine… It’s Russia that needs to be convinced, because it’s Russia that is
making the argument and it is Russia that is engaging in the behaviour which causes
Ukrainians to doubt whether the United States has, in fact, sold-out Ukraine.”
“What we need is help from Ukraine – we need Ukrainians to show us that you have
sufficient commitment to the things that America cares about. We are willing to devote
very limited political resources, but we need help from Ukraine to be reminded about
what matters and why we should pay attention to Ukraine.”
“The monopolization of the political scene just by

one party and marginalization of the opposition
could lead to a situation where politicians could
become so satisfied with themselves that they
would forget to rule the state. However, a stable
Government can clearly state the goals, as it has
recently done in Ukraine. The opposition should
choose to work and do everything for the sake
of Ukraine. The political elite in Ukraine, in the
form of a special board or committee, could bring
together Ukrainian politicians of all political
persuasions and coordinate the activities of
Pawel KOWAL, a generally formulated minimum plan. Under
MEP, Chairman, Delegation the auspices of this committee, a group should
be established which could work jointly on the
to the EU-Ukraine issue of visas, negotiations of an association
Parliamentary Cooperation agreement, or on the agreement of a free trade
Committee, Brussels zone. The establishment of such an entity would
demonstrate to Brussels that between the parties
in Kyiv there exists some understanding. ...The
Polish experience reminds me, however, – before we entered the Union in 2004 – of
the phrase that “in European affairs, Polish politicians should speak with one voice”;
this was received as a daily prayer, but often it was deemed to be strict because in some
sense it violated the freedom of expression. ...Ukraine needs to continue, but with
strong authority and strong opposition too. Without these two conditions it will be
hard to fulfil the Ukrainian dream of Europe.”

“Can we say that Ukraine is moving closer to Russia
when current Russian-Ukrainian relations, based on
reality not declarations, are perhaps not the worst
in the past decade, the most fundamental issues
in this relationship aren’t being addressed and
the Russian political leadership sees its Ukrainian
colleagues not as partners but as traitors? Can we
say that Ukraine is moving closer to the European
Union if the goal is to monopolize power in this
country, destroy not only the opposition but also
those clans that threaten the monopolizing of
power by the President and his inner circle and
when decisions on constitutional or legislative Vitaliy PORTNIKOV,
amendments are made not in order to adhere to Editor-in-Chief, TVi
the laws and procedures accepted in the civilized
world, but to strengthening this group’s position?”
Channel, Ukraine
“In this situation everything has to take place in sequence. First, there needs to be
a normal and civilized society that is aware of its duties. Then, we need responsible
politicians who are working not for their own self-enrichment, to amass capital in
the short period they’re in power and steal everything from the country, but to build
a normal country as is the case in the world surrounding Ukraine, at least the West,
because our Eastern partners offer a different lesson. Next, we need to set priorities
and they must be shared. Once there are shared priorities, we’ll know there is true
political elite because a political elite that acts responsibly towards the state can’t
have different foreign policy priorities.”
“… A lot has changed since the last Forum.
There are major changes in the approaches to the
Ukrainian foreign policy strategy and its security
model. And a fairly sufficient period has passed to
be able to draw conclusions on how the changes of
the fundamentals of foreign policy (now enshrined
in legislation), in the foreign policy practice and
balance among Ukraine’s traditional partners
(Russia, the European Union, and the United
States), as well as the new trend of developing
closer cooperation with the East influenced the
shift in this balance.”
Valeriy CHALY,
Deputy Director General,
Razumkov Centre
EXPERT FOCUS
“Crimea is subject to the same inter-ethnic

tensions that predominated ten years ago. It could
be said that the conflict situation has become
entrenched – strategic goals, perceptions, political
slogans and even the range of day-to-day topics
of disagreements between the major ethnic and
political clans have shifted only marginally.”
“...There is a clear impact of the Georgian events

of 2008. To the ethnic communities, the signal was
that it is possible to change ethnic issues, even in
bilateral relations and not only inside a country, by
Dr. Frank EVERS, the means of force.”
Deputy Head, Centre for
“…Lack of ethnic identity, antagonistic ethnic
OSCE Research (CORE), identities, diminishing ethnic dialogue, conflicting
Institute for Peace strategic goals and interests, make Ukraine
Research and Security vulnerable to internal conflict. This makes Ukraine
Policy, University of vulnerable to manipulation from outside. …These
Hamburg, Germany problems are aggravated by bad governance,
social downgrade, demographic problems and
disappointing developments following the Orange Revolution.”
“…Ukraine is already involved in all of the NATO
programs that it needs, in fact, in all the NATO pro-
grams that exist, whether for NATO member-states
or non-NATO member-states and partners which ex-
ist to help Ukraine do what it really needs to do at
this time and this is, to develop capacity to deliver
security to its people. And if you consider the state
of the Ukrainian armed forces and not only the
armed forces but also the security agencies, and
if considered that their budgets are at such a low
level that really, the only thing they are doing is
just maintaining what they have (they spend very
little money on development and training), then Mark OPGENORTH,
the assistance provided by NATO is quite substan- Staff Officer, Russia and
tial in that respect.”
Ukraine Section, Political
“...Currently Ukraine is in the process of making a and Security Policy Division,
strategic defence review and this exercise, in the- NATO International Staff,
ory, should define the threats that Ukraine faces, Belgium

and assign resources to the areas that need to be developed. This time around NATO
has not been part of the process of developing the strategic defence review, so we have
some doubts in a back of our minds about what is going to result from this; therefore
we come back again to the question of, “what choices does Ukraine have?” I don’t think
Ukraine needs to make a choice between NATO and any other bloc, but it does need to be
focused in its approach to reforming its security sector.”
“…Russia’s ruling elite continues to see Ukraine

as part of Russia, as part of its territory, and they
haven’t come to terms with the fact that Ukraine is
independent. They are doing everything possible
to bring Ukraine back into Russia’s fold and restore
their delusions of a great and united Russia.
Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the European
Union is seen as an irreversible loss of Ukraine.
It is not considered a threat to Ukraine’s national
interests, but a threat to the realization of these
unfounded fantasies. The imposed non-bloc status
creates a major threat not only for Ukraine, but all
Amb. Volodymyr of Europe. The threat of Ukraine’s self-isolation
VASYLENKO, is accompanied by a humanitarian attack being
waged by Russia against Ukraine on three fronts:
Ambassador-at-Large, an informational and propaganda war, a linguistic
Ministry for Foreign and cultural war, and a historiosophic war aimed
Affairs of Ukraine at destroying the identity of the Ukrainian nation
as the foundation of independent Ukrainian
statehood.”

PLENARY SESSION III: THE CROSSROADS OF EUROPEAN
COLLECTIVE SECURITY
• Is the Corfu Process at a Dead End?
• How do we Engage Russia in a Constructive European Security Dialogue?
• How will Competencies be Divided Among NATO, the EU and the OSCE?
Will a New System Emerge?
“It is recognized that there are rather serious problems

with European security and this was apparent in
2008 when the majority of OSCE member-states did
not agree that the legally binding treaty, or at least
the draft that was circulated, is a way of solving the
existing problems, that different mechanisms and
instruments are needed. …Many OSCE member-
states have stressed the importance of preserving
the key structures and fundamental principles of
the modern European security system. This doesn’t
mean that they shouldn’t be improved, but that these
countries aren’t willing to give them up. If you look
at the European continent, the current structures are Oleksandr PAVLYUK,
rather developed and other parts of the world, such as Head of External
Northeast and Southeast Asia, often look to Europe Cooperation, OSCE
as a model for building a regional security system,
Secretariat, Austria
not to mention the political commitments voluntarily
assumed by all the OSCE member-states, ranging from
the Helsinki Final Act, Riga Charter, and so on. If
many of these commitments were the subject of talks today, it’s not a fact that agreements
would be reached. Those agreements were reached at a certain stage of development of the
security system in our region; they are basically respected by the member states and few
would want to change them, recognizing the advantage of the existing system.”

“If you look at the history of European architecture,
you will see that nearly every decade since 1973
when Helsinki process began, we witnessed a
rethinking and then eventually we saw reshuffling
of European security architecture institutions.
Thus, we had the Helsinki Final Act, then cross-
measures, then Paris Charter (the Charter of Paris
for a New Europe), then Istanbul Charter (Charter
for European Security), and then nine years later,
we had the ideas proposed by President Medvedev,
I would say that these suggestions were put forward
due to the existence of a number of provocative
issues, and just because of the general logic to Dr. Artiem MALGIN,
draw the balance every ten years.” Adviser to Rector of
Moscow State Institute of
“…Almost immediately after this initiative, International Relations,
somehow within OSCE, the “Corfu Process” started.
Russian Federation
And it would be impossible to start “Corfu Process”
simply and entirely from Moscow. It was really “un
grand temps”. Besides, if you look at other security institutions in Europe, for example
NATO, you will see that NATO stopped this so-called “narrow thinking”. This is probably
due to general logic and because of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, as a result of
which NATO has started thinking in a slightly different way. And thanks to this slightly
“different thinking” the initial dialogue between NATO and the Collective Security
Treaty Organization was launched. And now we are simply searching for a better way
to bring these organizations together, so they can work together on Afghanistan,
and eventually on all other threats from Afghanistan to Central Asia, including drugs,
terrorism and so forth.”

EXPERT FOCUS
“Collective identities – and states first and

foremost – are in crisis, and all of this is combined
with the rights of minorities, of ethnic groups, of
transnational groups, and the notion of networks,
etc. All of these issues have created an extremely
complex situation… There will always be a constant
combination of both aspects, and there will always
be competition. As a result, the question is – how
do we regulate it and how do we set up a processes
for balance and dialogue, in order to reach an
understanding? In relation to this, I would like
to offer a few of my own concrete conclusions:
Pierre HASSNER, one – which is mentioned very often – is that I
Associate Research Fellow, am always surprised that the discussion regarding
NATO’s Strategic Concept does not really seem to
Centre for International be a priority of discourse, at least not in public.
Studies and Research Secondly, the difficulties of military intervention:
(CERI, SceincesPo), France in today’s world, the threats come from everywhere.
In other words, threats don’t necessarily come from
the border of our country; they come from the
other end of the world, they come from within – for example the Twin Towers and Times
Square – or, in the case of Cyber attacks, we don’t always know where threats originate
from. Therefore, this creates the necessity to look everywhere, and to not separate
inter-state security from domestic security or from global security.”
“In terms of security, we have many problems in Europe, ranging from energy, migration,
and human security, but there is one very traditional problem – the status and the
security of Russia’s neighbours. How today to convince Russia that its neighbours,
including Ukraine, including Georgia cannot be its vassals and do not want to be its
enemies? That is really a problem for all three - for Russia, for us in the West and for
those countries themselves.”

“…What is very revolutionary is the change in
information and communication technologies.
This has serious implications for every field,
including security and policy.
Despite this interdependence - which sometimes

results in divergence of views within NATO
member-countries and within European Union
countries – I think these institutions rely very
heavily on the economy and… there is the
importance and strength of the economy, despite
fluctuating tendencies in the global financial and
economic markets. Thus, these institutions, which David DARCHIASHVILI,
we are now discussing, do indeed rely on a solid Chairman, Committee on
economic base, because this obviously determines
their military capabilities. In addition, there are
European Integration,
also fundamental legal and cultural principles: Parliament of Georgia,
human rights, rule of law, democracy, etc., all of Georgia
which have a global outreach, despite the uneven
distribution of these values, it’s only rational to
maintain these institutions and there is no deadly
challenge to those institutions, despite certain problems which these institutions failed
to solve. For example, one of the problems is Russia-Georgian war – a war between two
members of the Council of Europe and a war which the existing architecture failed to
prevent. Furthermore, this existing architecture now is challenging the aftermath of
the war, which goes against international law. Nevertheless, in order to deal with this
problem, we have to strengthen these institutions and to give additional courage to
the representatives of these institutions, and not to demolish them”.

EXPERT FOCUS
“…As a result of new security threats, discussions

were initiated about the EU European security
structure, to include of course, strong Trans-
Atlantic ties. However, one basic problem during
the process was that we haven’t been able to
clearly define a common threat, as was the case
during the Cold War, when there was a common
threat. It is difficult to establish a new European
security structure with strong transatlantic ties.
Another problem, in some ways related to this one,
is the disagreement between the European Union
countries on how to conduct discussions with
Dr. Kamer KASIM, Russia regarding security matters. In fact, many
Vice President of European Union countries conduct negotiations
with Russia bi-laterally, and this gives Russia the
USAK (ISRO); Director, opportunity to play one country against another.
Centre for EU Studies, With this strategy, Russia manages to realize its
International Strategic foreign policy objectives, and at the end we realize
Research Organization, that Russia’s proposals are now demanding a new
Turkey security treaty.”
“...It might be argued that a productive strategy towards Russia requires an “open
door” policy to Russia for cooperation, but always acting with caution regarding
security matters. The West should at least try to act as a bloc in dealing with Russia.
In other words, it should not be forgotten that the indivisibility of security is a fact,
and NATO’s role providing security in the bloc is still valid. The Russian desire to have
a path to power within the framework of NATO security-related discussions must not be
accepted at the moment.”

“The US is the prime actor and has prime actor
status in international system and I think we can
conclude that the US wants to keep that. We also
have power shifts and we have interdependence.
So, primacy, interdependence, power-shifts, and
they don’t appear to be compatible. It’s difficult
to see how this puzzle fits together. What are the
strategic effects of power-shifts – basically it is a
question of multi-polarity, where you have power-
shifting from Europe, from the US to East Asia, to
South Asia. As a result, this suggests that, accord-
ing to realist international relations theory, there
Dr. Graeme HERD,
is a net loss of power from Euro-Atlantic space and
a gaining of power in India and in China. This, inHead of the International
turn, suggests a return to “balance-of-power” poli-
tics, as well as negative and zero-sum thinking.”
Security Programme,
Geneva Centre for Security
“…Strong European partnership is critical for the Policy, Switzerland
U.S., which now faces protectionism, isolationism,
and grid-lock paralysis in political decision mak-
ing. So, having a strong Europeanist partner is a
vital, and the key to having a strong Europe is getting over the strategic mistrust with
Russia. How do we get over the strategic mistrust with Russia? The answer is — by
addressing Ukraine, and having a “Ukraine policy” which understands its role and func-
tion in the international system.’

EXPERT FOCUS
“The Paris Charter already contains many of the

principles which Russia itself keeps violating –
and yes, they want to split the US from Europe and
then to regain the “spheres of interest”. But why
are we not capable of engaging in this debate in an
offensive way, confident in our positions and in the
agreed principles? It reminds me of the Helsinki
Charter – and the very positive effect it had on
recent European history – which also referred to
Soviet proposals which in the beginning we were
really afraid of. Russia is a strategic partner, let us
be realistic. For a long time there will be tension
Dr. Klaus WITTMANN, between cooperation on the one side and the regime
Brigadier General of on the other side. And the closer the cooperation
and the back of the confidence becomes, the less
Bundeswehr (ret), important the assurance measures will be.”
Former Director Academic
Planning and Policy at the
NATO Defence College in
Rome, Germany

CAMERA FOCUS

MEDIA FOCUS
Partnership. The Alliance is also ready to
deepen cooperation with Ukraine, not only
November 11, 2010 in terms of the military sector, but also sci-
Yatsenyuk calls Ukraine’s neutral ence and research,” said Ambassador Marie
status a victory for Russia, Gervais-Vidricaire, a member of NATO’s New
Poroshenko calls it a trap Strategic Concept Experts Group.”
“For the moment, Ukraine made an informed

decision regarding non-alignment, which leads, if November 12, 2010
there are no security guarantees, to a trap in the Participants of the 4th Kyiv
context of its security,” said Petro Poroshenko, Security Forum discuss
former Ukrainian Foreign Minister. “Geographical approaches to maintaining
location can also be viewed as a risk factor. security for Ukraine and the
Ukraine is located between the European Union world
and NATO countries on one side, and the rather
powerful Customs Union and CSTO on the other.” “… Pavlo Klimkin, Deputy Foreign Minister
of Ukraine noted that a future security sys-
tem can produce security for itself. “How-
ever, the system of European values remains
November 11, 2010 the key. Ukraine needs to introduce Euro-
Yatsenyuk noticed as Russia beat pean values, ideas of soft power. But the EU
NATO must also learn to produce and properly use
the soft power,” he said.”
“Arseniy Yatsenyuk, leader of “Front of Change”,
expressed his conviction that Ukraine has no
security guarantees and that the country has
become part of another state’s foreign policy.”
November 11, 2010
Ukraine is preparing proposals
for a European security system
November 12, 2010 “According to Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Min-
New strategy calls for closer ister Oleksandr Horin, the world, which once
cooperation with partners, says had “two political and ideological poles: the
NATO representative USA and the USSR,” has become a multi-
polar world, in which a collective security
“Ukraine remains an important partner for system goes far beyond defence and military
NATO and we will continue to implement the doctrines.”
provisions of the Charter on a Distinctive

and the emergence of the East. However,
the expert noted that the Atlantic region is
still central and that “the Unites States has
November 12, 2010 a long way to go before it goes down.”
Borys Tarasyuk: Ukraine is
“stuck” in the security field
“The absence of reliable international se-

curity guarantees for Ukraine and a weak November 6, 2010
national defence system indicates that Kyiv Security Forum: Changing
Ukraine is in a very dangerous period, said the Security Paradigm in a
Borys Tarasyuk, Chairman of the Verkhovna Fragmented World – European
Rada Committee on European Integration.” Dimension
“Security processes in the world are being “Opening the forum, its initiator, former
revived and modified. “We are on the eve of Foreign Minister of Ukraine and leader of
the adoption of a new Strategic Concept for “Front of Change” Arseniy Yatsenyuk, noted
NATO. New global players are emerging that that the world is facing immense challenges,
influence security issues. The role of China, which cannot be overcome by any country
India and the BRIC group is growing,” he in the world including Ukraine. Therefore,
said.” Ukrainian problems should be considered
only through the prism of global concerns.”
November 12, 2010 November 12, 2010

New security for a new world: «Strengthening collective
challenges, dilemmas and pros- wisdom»... Will the government
pects listen to the conclusions of
the Kyiv Security Forum?
“…According to Professor Michael Cox,
London School of Economics, we are “Dr. Klaus Wittmann: “…Ukraine’s further
witnessing a global power shift on three integration with the West is likelier through the
levels: power is moving from the Atlantic European Union than NATO. But the partnership
region to the Pacific; power is shifting with the Alliance and the NATO-Ukraine
between the Great Powers of the world; Commission will remain important…”
and civilizational shift – the decline of the
West, which was dominating international
politics since the late fifteenth century,

MEDIA FOCUS
economic problems. This was made clear by
experts from the U.S. who said the new Re-
November 12, 2010 publican majority in the House will mean a
A new security paradigm for a move in Washington towards protectionist
new world: challenges, dilemmas policies.”
and prospects
Nadia Kaydanovych
“Dr. Bogdan Aurescu, Secretary of State for

European Affairs, Romanian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, said a system of collective security November 20-26, 2010
requires pragmatic instruments, and so there Flying past Lisbon
should always be discussion especially regarding Tatiana Silina
issues that cause disagreement. Moreover, …
global and regional threats that we all face “Many participants of the Forum agreed with Mat-
require cooperation with international partners thew Rojanski’s statement that Ukraine has no
and a cooperative approach.” strategic vision of what it wants to be or where it
should be, not only in terms of foreign policy but
also domestic policy.”
November 12, 2010

Threats have changed November 11, 2010
Pavlo Syvokhin A secure Ukraine is healthy,
prosperous and responsible…
“Another important issue raised at the Natalia Bukvych, Vasyl Korotky
Forum was the transformation of NATO
Doctrine to meet new threats that emerged “Arseniy Yatsenyuk, MP, stressed the need to
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In their look at security from the context of modern
discussions, analysts stressed that now global challenges: “…in today’s realities,
military power is not crucial for genuine important decisions concerning international
leadership in the world. The military problems should be made not in a G-20 format,
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were but from a G-192 perspective”. Moreover,
called failures.” the politician underlined: “Ukraine can and
should make a significant contribution in
“…During the economic crisis, countries addressing global challenges.”
moved their attention away from imple-
menting common policies aimed at achiev-
ing global security to solving their own

November 11, 2010
Ukraine’s non-bloc status – a
November 12, 2010 victory for the Russians, who
Europeans don’t want to remain succeeded in stopping NATO
the “younger brothers” of the expansion.
United States and don’t believe Channel 5: Program “News Time”
them, says an expert. Ihor Tatarchuk
Sergey Sibiryakov
“Ukraine’s non-bloc status is a victory for
“Dr. Klaus Wittman, Brigadier General (Ret.) the Russians, who succeeded in stopping
of the Bundeswehr, assured the participants NATO expansion, Arseniy Yatsenyuk said at
of the Forum that NATO won’t be getting the 4th Kyiv Security Forum.”
involved in problems of territorial integrity “The Forum brought together experts on
of countries that aren’t part of the Alliance law, economics and politics. Today they
(Georgia, Moldova). They should solve focused on “new threats and new rivalries”
their own problems themselves, without in the world.”
use of force, through consultations with
stakeholders interested in resolving the
problem.”
November 18, 2010

In Kyiv, talks about security
November 11, 2010
NATO wants to continue military “The organizers admit that the topic of
cooperation with Ukraine security is not new, but at the Forum it
will be discussed not only in terms of arms
“Robert Simmons, NATO Deputy Assistant and military capabilities, but also quality
Secretary General for Security Cooperation of life, health and language policy. In his
and Partnership, said the Alliance hopes opening remarks, the Forum’s initiator,
to continue military cooperation with Arseniy Yatsenyuk, cited several figures:
Ukraine. He said that despite Ukraine’s 3 billion people live on $2 a day, 210
non-bloc status, “we will continue mutual million are unemployed, 270 million are
cooperation…We hope that the Annual going hungry. Ukraine faces the same
Partnership program between Ukraine and problems – unemployment, external debt
NATO will continue next year.” and emigration. In recent years, 6 million
people left Ukraine and today Ukrainians
live 2 years less than in the 1990s.”

FORUM
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The Black Sea Trust

for Regional Cooperation
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a platform for European

Changing the Security Paradigm

Kyiv, November 11-12, 2010

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Arseniy Yatsenyuk Open Ukraine Foundation wishes to sincerely

We would also like to gratefully acknowledge the valuable

We are extending our gratitude to the Ukrainian weekly “Day” and

Finally, we are grateful to Stephan De Spiegeleire, James Sherr,

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Whereas there seems to be a consensus regarding the necessity to expand the

4th KYIV SECURITY FORUM 5

In the complicated security environment of today’s Europe Ukraine seems to be one of

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15:00 – 16:00 PARTICIPANTS’ REGISTRATION (Foyer, Intercontinental Hotel, Floor “-2”)

18:30 RECEPTON – HOTEL FOYER (-2 FLOOR)

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11:15 – 13:00 MORNING PARALLEL SESSIONS

NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT: TWO TERMS, ONE MEANING: NATIONAL

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BLACK SEA GEOPOLITICS: UKRAINE:

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15:45 – 16:15 COFFEE BREAK

18:00 – 18:10 CONCLUSIONS FROM ORGANIZERS

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in infrastructure protection. Its foundation is a simple cost-benefit calculation. For

In recognition of the growing need to rethink the European security architecture,

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Turkey is another disenchanted regional player. As it is queuing up for European

The multiplication of regional policies in the common neighborhood of Europe’s major

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“…The world today is focusing on solving global

“Today, we have to integrate with the globalized

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“There are debates among intellectuals and

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“...About relations with Ukraine. We understand the Government’s decision of choosing

4th KYIV SECURITY FORUM 23

“Russia still represents one of the most important

“…We have to concentrate on 3 issues: stabilizing the rules of international law,

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“I’ll focus on some elements related to the way

“I would propose to the Ministry of Foreign

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“…This is certainly the case whether the US is

“…The main factor that has been poignant and

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“…We have NATO and the EU, which, for us as full-

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“Today everyone agrees that new poles, new

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“…We are witnessing a revival and modification

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