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LL 39
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MAR 25 1964

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r..:20 143, San .E'-T ~' ncisco, Cri lifornia

11 JEreh 1964

sumiCC'i': Less ons Learned Nwnber 39: .<mbush Opera t i ons (TJ)

'1'0: fJ ee j)istribution

1. (U) i:. tta checl es Inclosure 1 are t :.:'8 10 te dt " Les s ons Learned"
from counte ',~' in su rG8ncy ope:,:'a t ions in the j.le:}u~.J lic of Vietn~ .

2. ( U) ".L'he infoI'j'la -Cion cont a ined in " Les':,ons 1 enrned " is p:rir:lOrily
intended fOT l ',se 'oy ;)"8 ":"l.dvi sor s in Vietn"':J . Lessons rila~r be of value fO"£
di:Lect ap-plicctic:;:'l , or the,)' ii1f: y s i .n) ly rcir!f' orce exis '(j-;'ng' tactics, tech-
niq ues , or doc t.J..~ i ne .

3. (Ci-lIli,) This doctL'lll!nt iu c1£; ssifico_ COd" IDl;ITTI AL to pen;!i t free-

dOEl of expre s~J ion and c :n'efu l a nalysis of op0r2 tio112Ll ::'1. 0 th oCl.s and tactics
of the Repu111ic of Vietn:::.n Armed Force s , -Co protect 110 E10.visor-counter-
p1rt relzt).ons ~i i1r:~ to cle ny ~ ny po ssi~l :2 use b~r j . TIsl..lrcc:nt forces . S ~)ecial
bane,lin G j.s r e'luired under the a;)plica ble :xovi sions of DA-DCm U,) when
re1ec:sed to friendly nati ons . Rele2 se to persOlme1 of tho Hepubl ic of
Vie tw.m wH I b o governed by the ':: rovisi ons of : ACV ;,emo 6 , 13 Oc t 62 a nd
; ;A" G ::reDo 380-4, 14 Fov 63 . Sani tized vers i ons of thi s info n:ation omi t-
tin.:; da tes, 118T:18 8 of 1 o c·::; ·:,ions end ~::or tic iv:, ting 2}GZ'sonnel 8nd uni ts may
be pI'8p~Jred fo :c instructi onal Ilurposes 811d/or offici, 1 t "S l'l.rmy publica -
ti C:1S .

4. (U) Conments , quasti ons i:ncl. r oquests fo:-::- cocnges in dis t r ibuti on
sho~.21d b·.:: a dd r essG\i t o this !l€s dquD rte r s , A'J.1TN : 02~T Di vi sion , USAS ~C .

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_·S·po·;io·l- TLossons Len rna(1 )

DO;'¥nJ~:.D:8 lill l 3 Y&~H I i'iTE. ;VALS

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SUBJ ~CT: Lessons Lea rnco_ ITc';') ber 39:

a. General. Ambush opera :;i_ons aloe dependent on current infor-

rna tion of th" va loca tion, l'lOVGl'lent .fE ~tel'n, anc,_ size of his forces. 0ince
the bulk o.~ ve :llovc::1ent is at ni_'~'ht, most of '~he ambush 0pGI'ations are ex.. ·
ecuted at night. Units patrol durin; thu day and set 8'lbusi1es at night.
'rIw size ofoho 8mbush 1)orc9 to be e!'!ployed and method of exocution depend
pri",sri1y on its )urpose; Le., vihethor tho ambush is -GO harass or destroy
tho enQl'ly b;,- use of a doli bera to al'lbush or an aJ"bush of opportuni ty.

b. I,'Tissions lJurfoTIwd by ambush forces.

(1) Cal)tr,.riYlb or destroyine: VC 8\;tack or raid forces in the

vicini tS' of populated areas.

(2) L:.'lbushes utilized as a dofonsj.ve measure in protecting

hamlcd;s and. vil1R'~·Qs.

(3) Capturj.ng 01" destroying gTOi:.pS of VC as they 2t-~e~1pt to

leave or re-enter -c11oir '~lar zones.

(4) Anbushes executo,'l in order -Co cay-turo or ,=ill VC leaders.

(5) Am;'usl1es s"t Cly stay-behind forcGs in conjunc-Gion -;1i th

tactical op'cra tions.

(6) In search ancl cIGar opcrations ambushes arB s t to inter-

C8;,t the: ono;'.1Y being driven into tile ambush position by th,j sGarching GJ,em0nt.
'.chis 8l'l,msh mission can bo used in conjunction wi th Uw "fire flush" and
lI ra bbi t huntll techni;~ues of scarch:Ln.:s an araa.

(7) Ambushes conducted "csaJnst targets of ojJportuni ty.

c. IrY;?0S of 2iJnushcs. 11 :10 tno general typos of ar!lDushes employed


are deli bera to aE~bush"~:'s 0110. ambushes of O;?)Ol"'"b,,;:.w. t:". ".l;hG~" can be employed
Bt,'"Binst 'Joth veh.:- culer 811d. purso:1n81 targets.

(1) b. doli ,,01"3 te cL1h,-,',sh is eno in ;'.':rich th.;.; amJush uni,t is

assi:m(Jd a SPCCL~ 1C ,1.i.ss:i.on. ~_ t is normally basud on d8milwd intcllig6nc8,
to J.l1Clllc.e size, cO!!lposi tion and organization of "Gl1o 0i.1Un.y forcG, and the
time the force '.rill rCclch ccrtGin )oints or areas. ".ill.un this il1i'Ol'mation
is not availa.,lo an arG8 ambUSh may bo Gsta'u11shed Yli th several deliberate
point a;·,11':'1lshus loc8tcd along the Pl~o·.)ablo avenues of appr08.ch • .Also, stay-
behind )8. troIs c[:~n os ta blish an area ambush b~;' l.Jlacing delL~ ora to ambush
posi tions on sev0l"al O'iJ;:c:ct:1,VCS that have boon ,rev:Lousl.'~" cleared. Deliberate
[[;"bu3h0s also arc; o;,,')lo:\"od outside stra te,~.c hEL,lcts for c',ofonse of the; hanlet

and to '::2I'n of an a -c-eock.

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U. ;3. Lit.::f[ Sl~crrIOIT
TTILITA::{Y AS,SIS~!~:j:.. ~rCE i:.DVI SO:~:Y GilOUP? VIgil~TLJI
APO 143, San 1'rancisco, California

MAGAR-OT (S,~A) 11 Much 1964

SU1lJEC'r; Lessons Learned Number 39: Ambush Opera tions (u)

See Distribution

1. (n) Ill'rROmJC'TlOlT: This edition of "Lessons Learned" is concerned

wi th 8Iilbush ope:-8 t~.ons em.ployed in connterinsurg'ency opera tions by t~ie
Army of the Repu:)lic of Vietnam (A,dVn). Previously )r~;Jlished LesGons
Learned cn -Ghis subject (ElL-lllers 10, 15 and 21) are still consiclei"ed
valid; the lessons cove:~ed herein should be cons2.o. e:r'eo. as a~lb'1:1entin6
previ.ol:'..s coverage.

a. Defini tion. An aubush is a sU~'>~Jrise a tu:ck upon a l;'lovil'l[;'

or ten1l)()rarily halted enemy T!i th the mission of destl'>o~;ing 0:::' capturini;;;'
the enemy force.

b. General.

(1) Based_ on the f!_>equency of use by ARV:rJ forces, the

8E!bush can be considered as a basic technique in cOllilterguerrilla Viar-
fElre. ;rhe ambush was also a.Timary technic:,ue used by the Dri tish in
fightincc;uerrHlas in Ihlaya.

(2) 'fhe use of ambushes should not be considered as a

defensi vetac tic. \Then properly planned and agi',r8ssi vely 8m.ployed they
represent an effec ti ve offensive opera "ci ona 1 means of (efea ting> enemy
forces 8nd.limitin · his freedom of ~;1ovenent. In Vietnam, where Viet
Cong (ve) move,"ent is L'equently under the cover of <iarknese" use of
nic;ht anbushes is of gree t importance.

(3) rrhe effect of a successfuJ.. 8P.lbush :;?rog:eai] is not mea-

sured nerely by- num·ers of VC casual ties. Denial or restriction of
freedo::n of :lov8ilcmt, oth d·'."':.l"'ine; the.- day and the night, is a l:lOst im:1oJ.:'"-
tant benefit from an ambush )robrram because the guerrilla must be able to
move in order to live. The continuous harassment, rl.~st:r~ction of ~n.ove­
ment and inabili ty to acquire supplies resul tin(~' irOlil such a pro(,Tam have
2n adverse effect on Guerrilla morale and efficiency.

SUB.n.;CT: lessons Learned Numb er 39: Ambush Operadons (u)

(2) An e:"bus h of opportuni ty is one i n which availa bl e inf or-

mation of enemy activity ~_ oes n ot permit _,)lanning or establishing an ambush
a t a specific time , point or in a :JBrticula r a rea. 'This type ambush is
normally e"'?loyed wh :,n fri endly forces see the enemy first a nd quickly es-
ta :)lish an a",~ush t o surpri se and de stroy him. The cour se of acti on to
follow is determined a t the t ime the opportuni ty for ambush arises. Uni ts
mus t be thor oughly trained in the techniques of rapidly establishing ambus h
pos i tions. Also, IXltrols may be directed to move to an area, es tab lish an
ambush, and a :ilbush the firs t proLi ta e le ta r get -<".9 t appears . jin example
of an ambus h of oppori;uni t o' i s shown at -Inc losure 1.

d. CompOCIi t ion of the ambush force. The ambus h force is normally

com!,osed of on assaul t element, SUP1)ort elei".1€nt a ncl a eecuri ty element.

(1) The assaul t element captures or de stroys the enemy . It

consists of tile ambush cO:Jnander, 2 killin,; group and a s carch IXlrty . 'l'he
mis s ion of t:1e killinG [:;rm-. p i s to leill or c8 : .) ture the VC. The m::"s sion of
the search I:.a,:ty , is to sea re'l the dead and rWl:nded for docunents , and pick
u p weapons and 8 1!lLmni tion a nd equi pnent .

(2) The support element provide s fire support fo:- t he assanl t

element. 'rhis element i s BX'!Jed ".Ii th a l"i1ac hine 3un(S) and/or mortars and
mines. rrhe support elemen t prevent s t he enemy from esca ping tiuooU8h the
front or r ear of the killing z one . If u demoli ti on t ea m is -co be emplo.:'ed
it is a iJBrt of the su!?port el ement.

(3) 'rhe s ecurity el ement protects the as s aul t and au ".port ele -
ments and c overs the avenues of approa ch i nto -ehe ambush site that the VC
may us e t o rei nforce the ~ mbus he d force. This element also covers the 17i th-
dra~:al of ' t he assault and su ;Jport elements and secures -che rally point .

e. Appropria te am:)ush areas and 6i tes.

(1) Areas . NumerouS ni ght ambushes s llo:::ld be l aid E: l ong

railroads , r oa ds, t ra:j.ls and >m te:nvays which the VC mus t use to a pp,coach
hamlets and villa ges. 'I'hese likely approaches can be deduced if required
intelliisence is not kno, m. Sites for a t'! ,_ushes can be f ound in remote areas
oJ' a close study of those loea tions where t he VC contact the po pula tion -
" hile they are working in the fields . These ambushes shot' ld be set before
da'ClTI a nd prior to the arrival of the wOl'kers i n the field. Since the VC
lea ves his safe areas t o en ter l)o pulated areas , ambus hes also s hould be
laid a long roads and trails and a pproxima tely 15-20 kilo[leters out from tile
perin eter of the populated areas .

(2) Sites. Once th::, area f or ~L' bustl operati ons has been
de terr.li ned t he a ctual sites are sel ected. Ambus he s are roost effective
when the site s elected conf~nes the VC to an a rea where he can be des-

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: 'AGAR-O~' (SM)
SU:; JECfr: Lessons IJ8arned l~UJ;:b or 39': il;;)bus h Opcm tions

troyed. Na t ural ohstacl e s nre nU:-,1(:?T OU S in Vie tnaJl1 for 8mbus h positions,
such as cliffs , streams, or.1ba n..\ mc·nts, and norro'.! trails e nd rrr; ds with
canals on e i t he!' side e Ln indi:coct aplJroac b Sh012Jd at? used to enter the
ambus h si te , o t uGl"'lcuse the VC will d etec t the friendl y Movemen t and employ
a n ambush af~ ins t GVN forc Gs . loi.. t t ime s usc of cireui t ous route, ElB.,Y r equire
thro:--, to fou r days to r each the 8nbush s i·ce . it ~trol rnny be forcud to occupy
an or:1Jus h site ')011 ahead of the arl"ivf.ll of '~ bG target . Patience is eSS 0n -
tiel if s oc r e cy is to be rJ2intai ne(~. Jr h8reforu , uni ts must bo prepared to
rOF13 i n in 8r.:l:)ush rn"oClS for a r:rl.nir!1UIn of 0 week r,nd ofte n a s long as 8 mo nth.

f. Ambus h f0112][1 ti ons . Typica l a!n bus h f oroo tions bGi n,~; run,?l oyed
in VIr arG linuar , il1" shope, " V" s r..a~Je , and II Pim"hecl" f or mations . 1' hcse
for!Tlntions Ct.' !1 o e ci" ~)l oycd cffectiv;:;ly os d e li1Jc:;:'D"Ge 81'lbuohos or ar:1bushes
of o ))or t uni 1i,\T . An expl 0l na t :!. on ni th sko tchos of these f O:rrn.::l t i ons is at
InclosnrGs 2 trJ'oEch 5.

g . Ambushes employed in defense of c! ha:~.11et . 3!":t.~ 11 size ambushes

are esta blj. s hccl outs ide ft ha rllJ. ct to ':larn of the direc ~i on of c: VC a "~t.3c:: .
'l' hese ambushes are loea ted 500 to 1000 meters from ooeh corne r or side of
the ru-,ml e t and on li~';:l~ ly VC avenues of 8 IJi;rooch . 1111cs e pos i t i ons are va ri ed
and ~ilQ Vcd one or more tiDe s to preclude s e "Gting a pEt t·i.; e:rn .. In adfi tion
to these ai"!1DUsh positi ons , c.mbushcs arG pJ.snncd. inside "t";..tc b2f,11et wi th E\
plannod and rehearsod cor~rS G of Ection for cc ch ":Jos;:;i:,l c si 1.."118 tionA ~il ­
plo.l'!1 <=nt of an ambush insid e £1 hDE110t is shown ,,10 Inclosure, 6 enCl. 7.

h. Ambushes set :oy smy-bchind forces . In sea rch s nd c l ear opor-

eti ons, s Oc-' rch forc es estDblish n.;":bushos j.n r:.rc[Swi10:.:'0 t he VC '"viII ;nost
likely r eturn. 'l'hes c !lIDY be a mbushes of o,portun.i ty or d 0 1 i b~r[l te nmbusha s.
Inclosure 8 describes ambu ·.hes set .y smy- behind forc Gs .

i. Demolition Ambushes . Foin t or aroa nmbushes may be demol i t ien

amlushbs , d Elli bera te ambushes or ambushes of oppcrtlm;. ty usin;; mines in con-
juncti on wi th assaul t a nd securi ty .::l emcn -ce . DCHi101i t i on T!0rSonnel are a ~ rt
of the, s,,:)~)or t element . An exal'lj}l e of a deliberate point aBJ ush ,li th mines
is sho"?n e t Incl osUre 9. Al s o Dn example 0/ a n ambush of o p:;ortuni ty wi th
th" US" of :.lines is descri bed a t Inclosure s 10 and 11. 1'h ~ followin;: a r G
consin.erc: ti ons in planning for 3 d"",oli tion aMbush:

(1) In sel Gcting torrc1in: Choose term in dong 3 path, troil

or r ond bordo red by Tloods , brush , sriB mp, cuts or VlElt0r . Plac o D.tlbush on n
hill or curve if ) 088i"01c . ,;"h\:1n lle;,";otia t i ne hills or Cl!rvc:s , VC moving ~ l e -
1010n ·cs 2 r<..:: s l Q1:::~d down , thor Gf ol~ 8 ;_Gcoain":.: u ore vulnGrnblc to f i r e .

(2) Hc c Qss£~ ry i nform£"tion of tho VC prior to s e lectinG" th~

si to is ti1":lO, tcrrnin nnd movc.n1"..:n t of torg ct .

(3 )
Cons "t:;:c'u c tj.on of minc-s , f ra fJ'lQnt8t~:...on chn r Cl:: s cnd dcmol -
i tions (F1El ;. n Dnd branch linus) .

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iIAGAR-O'.i' ( S&A)
SUBJECT : Lcnsons Lcc rnc:o. lTUlnber 39 : Anbush
(4) Plnc or18nt of l!i n" s m Id/or ch(' rgos . ( Nur:lber of mines to
coploy is dO :\Jvnd2nt u pon s iz..:; of w. rgc t.)

j. rTi ght ambush . 'l'he Irinci ~)l os of T·.:::u :Jh OIL")r E: tions di s cussed
a bove a pply to n i g ht 2f!lbushcs 2 S ~{ cll as dey DJ:tbush0S . Hm"leve r , D t ni g ht
80;"',0 modifieD tion s may be requir(;d . ConccBlr,,0nt i s ;.l vntiful G t nig'ht , but
obs c rva-ci.on is limited end firo is l"'; l',~s 8CCU T8 tO. ~h or efor,-" Y,'ea p o ns I!1ust
DO j)ro}JI.: :cly s i tod to ensur e compl u tu covorc, gu of tn.~:, k illing zone rd, th fir e ,
~.,rc:c pon fi'J1 0.s of fiT :.; s hould bL fi x e d by s tr:kcs . Pos j. ti ons shou l d D2 cl oser
toget'.cr f or t -. ttor con L-ol. Ambush posi hons nho:.. lo. :)8 occu<Ji ed n t ni ght
hut DftGr D <U! l light r :_cOllik!is sonC8 if fossi "Dle . r.· lnr,~ s sho'.... ld "til: uS l:d
vrh un e v~ i18') l o to GUF) Ort t;;.o ,>·1b1.,: s h force. Infr2r Gcl VlCo. J:)on si.3·hts may be
us~; d by [L71b~.ls h forces t o view p0rsonn:e:l Di1d objects in the dc r!-q ::;~Dk 0 it
possinl ,,:. -co fir ~ on cp) l'Opri2to w r gc ts ~J t ni Ght; Dnd sond anc'l r,.'c e ivc prc-
o.oton-:linod codo sj_ ~n:: ls by uni ng t~i"" li,.:. < ht SOl.ITCC to tr& ns!1i t e nd the
tG1 0s coPQ to r e cei ve . I f ruquir()d ond cvo ilabl c , 1Ul:~j. nous t.ope or iJa int
!!I8. r l-:ings ?,.8~r bo Esad for idontifico. -'cion.

k. 8';'.1£ 11 bos. ts U8 (2Cl" in ~l r:lbus h Qs .

(1 ) I n p3rtia l1y i nundated ar02 S s:-lCh c::s i n the; Delta, s~lc1 1 1

boats c::m b~ used to posi t ion t hc, ambush force emcl c onduct r opid pursui ts
or wi thdrG1Jo.ls from 2:;1bush 8i tr.:s . JO:1t-trr.: ns ~}o rt~:;d fOX-CGS orB n o t Iimi tad
to lcyin!~ til,] tcr'~m.y 2E1bu sh.:..; s ; th0,,,{ c e n opL:rn t o :i_n r.:ny erco rca son[l ~)ly D.ccess -
i bl o by W[l t or.

(2) St u~ l th in ClOVC,"ILmt to POS1 nen c:.: n bu a chi e vod by using

p8dcUo s or poles to prope l b e bOD'os , ins tead of 'w tors . Boc, ts ce n drift
t o posi ti. ,n wi th ;;[,0 c u r run 'G or t ide: l fl ow. HO·,iov ur , ri hilo p8ddling or
drif ting t o posi non , rIOt or s shoul d b0 a ffix tJd t o th0 ~ oats (in t he up
pos j. tiol1 ) so th~t t hey c o n be u s ed u pon cn"!lY contac t . ::",n ll a mbush p8 r t i es
C[\n bu l of t bohind Y/hon p-::1 -'crols stop :::nd d i sr10unt to observe or r '.)connoi tor.
'fh:Ls tuchlli quo is us eful only if bo"t forc cs co;·," wnly opuri.1te wi th frequent
ht :l ts c.n.d d e b.: r!:8tions , [: n~l if -~h '.j stny- bc:hind Dmbllsh 1'(l rty is sl!l:J l1 in
c Of1)x! r ison to t he total for ce .

(3) !11e:thor the DY1 JUsh i s Q::l~) l oy\j d to covor 8 roed, trDil, or
i'T :l t UI"l·)£:Y-, -ell •.) forc,:: nOrIT'l..2 lly d \.;'ucrl,.:s Dnd. tD~;::0 S up c oncon L.JCl positions. Boot
cr0il;:::cn r e~", :~ i n j_n or noc: r tl10ir cr.:: ft , v/hich ,-:ru c8rcful l y conc..::cled . 1:'hc
8 HDU::;h s .:::c urj.'Gy tecn l O:-l der is ::D. dc r Gs ) onsibl... : for svcuri tf of '~ i-h; bonts;
boat Cr tT,-'.:~.h.:n :"'"!r(; und ...:I' his contr ol d u:roing Occuj;o t ion of 3h·.: c.f:1Jush s itu .

WCDUS8 sovore l hours of Hoi tin<-!,' 8 1'U usual ly required nt
the' o::lbush si '~:J , ci1c,ne;cs in l;jvcl ~ nd dire ction of str een fl mi ofte n occur.
'. i.'h0 ambush COni:lD ndc r DUS t n ntici p-_! to thGS C ch.:l n;~:c:s .::! no. p12n hi s c:ntush
[~ rm.lnd th·_:-~ . C ~12i1~::OS i,n t he l ...:vGl of the · \"W . to r d ue: to tides ncy r 2q._-d r c


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; ".GAR- OT (:)M~)
SUBJ.. JCT: Less ons L0~_rnc d !,\~U: l~)Cr 39: An bush O)Ul"'12 'cions (u)

rclDying ~i!\';:Op011S in [t ".?[; tor,'"!,::.,:r OL\·,)llSh. l~t ebb -:~ ido, bonts r.\'~ Y bo strendud,
or sonG "dt hdrc ·.l8 1 r outes :x'. ~t 'v·. eOT.!\..: too she IloH for usc: . T~(.; direction
of 8 Pljr o0.c h ~f 0n c:1Y -bor. t :3 ",' !t! y be J;.-, s ,.:..d on ·~h..; diroction of curren t flo~: •
.~h cs o f [!c to r s nust 2 11 b o cons idercd in choosin:~' the. 10c:J t i on , ti:i:1C: , e nd
' 1c thod of ~' r~:)Ush .

1. F'..r c dct2il Qd di s cussion of c n ~)ush 0.oc trin(; end tc:ctics,

so'c FY: 31-16, "Countori,uorrilla upcrnti ons", ~';,! 21-75 "nO. th~ "1'cctics
end ~~Gchni quC's of Count0rinsur gont Op;:.. r o tl.on.s ll Ll[1l 1l1.~1.

4 . (C!'iHi, ) l£S30RS ill~ R:lC:j) . Tho f oUoliing si ~if icQn t l essons l ec rned
in nubus h opera tions , a 1 t houGh itl? l i0G. in 'ch~ foregoing' discu ssions , :.n:;rrnn t
r ust..'1 t i ng :

.;; . ~eho [;r.1~~)ush is th~.:. b8Sic tc-:cticr: l tochniqu0 in countdrguerri llc

~.70 rfo I'C .

b . As ARVE rc~ i ns control of r:: rt,;C: s t:11d (:st8blishus h.:n:·11 2 t s ,

tho VC l'; il l he ve to r """, in ',lobil e in orcle r t o cont,,~ct th " l oc~ l popul c: tion.
'~ h .;r0for0 t he VC ':Till b wcor.~ ...: ~.: or(; vu !nurn 1.. 10 t o ARvlf 2:::lbush Op0r'u t i ons.
Sinco tho VC is f orc ed to nove in Si:lr: ll grou ps n t ni: ;h t , it i s nl~cessary to
0nploy ni .~ht an~Ju shQs.

c. Hi ,: ·:ht c.!::,.bush-.:.'s unployod outsid0 (:m.)~ plcnncd inside (){'oLj ts

e re offcc t :L vo Tl~2 SUrCS in defuns() of h.~nl ,.... ts •
."" ~.

d. Y!hen th u is r equired t o I ::OVt f rocl his wo r zonvs to c ontc.c t

the 11.,o pl c , ARVE ":,,,us hcs cr;] eff uctl. v 0 \ 'scA nst the, VC Hi t hin [,nd wi thout
th~ lxn'lphcrj' of t:,:, ,oc r zon" . \ '
,/ ,/~/

' ;; {~/ cCcJj~

"/_..) t ':11/i
11 Ine l n. ODEll
as Genem 1, USA

IlernEIIIII"" lUTHOlllEI '
~~~QJJ$IXl @W @~~(Q)r&IJ\l})~Oi1V

:""~~, /~~ I

...... >-:: ;\~ ., "-


~ t t , ''i, '" I
\ (Point ele.ent sets up .-bush) I
upon detecting elllllllT .,.,..ant ,
\ I
\ I
, I

, . ~ ..
.... (1 /

" "
),Pi:toon lIIOVes to eetablish a
RUle Co (-) BIOve: ~ - -<. CP I I blocIdJIg positiOll.. -
establish a blocking posi-
tion. Ckle platoon is left
for eecurit;yo (Friendly forces)

Iacll . ""

... -
. ,. -'.' "-',, ,Ne' .",", C",' Sh. . " ". ,., ;
,_ 1J.<~ .''
, "-


. ,--_ ~V
-- -

~. ~ -
~~ .

..... . . "

"tt'~'" 1.''''111111,••
_ _ _- -- --. _ __ .J

----.-- . loi • . • _ _ - - --

ao,.d, Trail ----------------~----- --~-----~
or epen Area
----------=======J~~_____ ~.
(R:Ules & Aut~t1c Veapops)
(60 _ Mortar, t,aDes, Booby)

1f t
(Assault and Support Elements)
f t (Traps, Cl.a7JIOre Mines,
. (Grenade Launchers.

Securit7- _Security · ,
(Aut_tic Weapons) (Aut_tic Weapons)

Inel 2

- - _ .. --- - --_ .. _-- _ ...... _ ...


Security Road ' or Trail

• fI,

and Enemy

Automatic Weapons

tt i j

• .,,;W

Rifles and
Automat ic Weapons

Incl :3

'tONI 16iftT."

--_.- '- ' ---

~ ...

I s;;; ,
'-. '~

,. ...
i '",,-
..... . "
, ':oJ

..... -- - (,J


, ."



- ?'{~., . . . -.,-
.May be ellPloyed at road or trail junctions. or in j1lDgle areas';
En8ll\r can be &lllbuahed from 8.llY direction.

*2 5itu.tion
/' " r
/' "- "
*1 IDe. Situation
CD "

'" " /'

" " /'


0 Ambush leader
In theee ~ituat1ona #1 and 1/2 assault eleant. switch to preselected
alternate poaiti_ _1;O engage the en-.r.
\ i1"
In order to provide support ~ all directions the support ele..nt is
deJ)lo7ed in center of the /IIIlJiish ,poaition. '


-,-- -- - - -- - - ,-- - ----------'-. ~----





o 0 0 0 o 0 o o o o o ~ Artillery Concentrations
o . ...
o ,
, ( . erve 0

Dunit ot 80
o Control
a _
hine 0
VC Deception ~0 f:. t sun) "
t , .' 0
Four. o
o Force o
o ~ o
o o

o o
o o 0 0 0 o 0 Four to six MIl &lllbueh
(Ambush) L J to warn ot direction

( ____ ; _ --./
/ ot VC attack.
J.o4tp.ted 500 .eters to
11'H frOlll each corner
o1'"t he haIIlet •
.'1 ".

- The concept of the plan is to lfrce thevc.~ntj attempting a hasty witldrawal through
the tront gate. It the VC atta;'i:k1ng torce attempts to withdraw through the gate the
ambush element by the gate with arbille1'7. support Will deetroy thea. It the ene~
chooses to breakout to their lett the /llines vUl stop i;belll and they vUl be in a
cross tire trom the blocking and ambuA torce. I.t'the ' l[C 'H"1es to back-out by return-
ing through the breach in the wall he vUl be sto~ \ "'~illery and the outside
~ush force. This type ambush can be Planne.d tor·aAt· ~on or cornerot the hamlet .
l '~_~"8quad can cOlllbat a VC platoon with tllill ettectivi;"PJ,an.
, i
Incl 6

-._- ~=LASSiF:==



1,- '-'

" h ' . .. . • ,

W ®l!n&l? rn:@ !A\ ~ [3 @~ [!!J $ [E1f U~@ DlID ~0!1 ~ [~][6rn:1I



Ambuah Force
- ~
Aabuh Force

~ ~

If the VC at~~~ to change direction the ambush farces on either side

of the entrance can' block and take them under fire.

.," \
t. ~·i~' ,j ':--/ LAS "'"", -I r- ," "
_ :: 11- t. J

~---- -- - '''' -_ /

~~~lW~ -~r-:Jf ~~ ,_
$tr~1f ®rn:lMln~@I?@~<eIt~

<===:::J1(OF) <: '. I®<

YI - __ -~(... . ' ;::=:=:J
VC 11&1' lIIOVenere Here)
I \
BlocldJlg Force
LD ~,
t:===~ ~_ _ _ _ ' ~?:®
(Set ~UlIh here)

I '.
(Set Ambush here)

Block1ng Force

Area 8earch torce8 leave - U 8ized atq lIehiDd torce to e8tabl.ieh

an ubuBh on variOUll objecti"8 07 on all obJeotlves.

".. ' ,



(2-60 or 81_ Mortar shella aa aiDea electr1cal4 detonated)

* PareciOIl Pua4O• .

Road or Trail

'\ ',
Se':uritlrer /'
AutOlll&tic Weapon

t , t
AII~I&Ulift Element aM Support. 1lA!'"lt
--- ......
--- Security-
AutOll&t-.c. Weapon
.~!'.o-':' -

Detonating net_tine
(Wire) HLne (Wire)

POllitiona of the 811bu8h el_ntll are fle!d.ble .ince th87

can be placecl bel1incl the aiDea or on the flank of the aiDell; '
Tbe paraciOIl deflect. the lII1nea exploaiTEI power in the dell1red
direction, into the k1ll1ng zone.
* l'arad01l. The excavated llpoil or bank behind a trench or fox hole that proteCtll
perllonnel from fire and from beine aeen againet the aqline. Ia CODjllllctiOJt-v1th
JUnell the spoil i8 packed behind the aiDe to control the direction of the ~
llidn all it OCcur8 '
IQ'm:The 11-18, ---
Inol 9


-- ---- -_.. _-- -~------- -.. ------- .---- - - -- ----

&~[;3M~[g] @W @[P[P@~IJM~U1i1f
'" WlllflXl W®rn: ~~~~$ ©w
- - 7 Friendly Forces


6cma Kortar rd.

Hasty Hine Blocking position and
......--r Base of fire placed here.
.. Hasty Jlline 6C. Kortar roUJid

VC lIIIIneuver e18lllllnts

AmbIlsh of opportunity executed ldth use of 6<au. mortar rounds ~s Idnes.

These mines are hastily placed &8 the VC maneuvers to both or either flank upon
being fired on by the friendly base of fire. See Enclosure li. .

The Kola, Cla1llOre mine can be used effectively in ambushes of opportunity_

Incl 10

;... ..
.:.. -' ,., UNCLASSIFIED
~t;; "

/' .... litH


•. "

Batteri" · ~· ~.)

, (Detonat)!g wire 1s'Wrapped arOund

(6Cla1111 mortar rOUDi s ) the b~ orin a r0lot0n lIoldiers
back) ,,' ,

.,~ .

Mines are pre-wired except for , ~l~t~hlaent to the batt'iriell aDd. CaD be
elllpl.o7ed ~iatelT. Mine is set and., as the soldier IIOftIl to the rev the
wire ill _und. and prepared for f i:rirtg' . '
Inel 11



" -- --~- '---- - '

.. .