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Fissures in the Eastern European Bloc
By NORMAN J. G. POUNDS
40
FISSURES IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN BLOC 41
T HE alliance which has, for more forced by the sanction of Soviet arms,
than twenty years, held together and that the East European countries
the Soviet Union and the countries of were grossly exploited in the process.
eastern Europe differs in an essential By and large, this model fits most of
respect from the associations which have the facts. Yet this "monolithic"quality
formed during the same period between was assumed only slowly and did not
West European, Middle Eastern and last long; there were continuous rum-
Southeast Asian powers. The Soviet blings of discontent, and long before the
Bloc does not constitute an alliance peak of its growth had been reached,
that was entered into voluntarily; it there were gaping cracks in its faqade.
was a consequence of German defeat, of The tendency has probably been to ex-
the westward advance of the Soviet aggerate the unity of control when this
Army, and of the Soviet desire to pro- monolithic quality was in the ascendant,
tect its western flank by a broad zone and, now that the monolith has begun
of allied or subject states. to crumble, to assume that it has feet
There was, it must be admitted, a of clay.
predisposition in some of the countries The purpose of this paper is to show
of eastern Europe to accept a close alli- that there were cracks in the monolith
ance with the Soviet Union. Not only from the start, and, contrariwise, now
were the Soviet armies regarded as a that it has begun to crumble, that the
guarantee against a revival of German reinforcementwithin it is strong enough
nationalism and aggression, but there to make its demolition a very difficult
had long been amongst some of the and prolonged process-and, perhaps,
peoples of eastern Europe a tradition of not a wholly desirable one.
friendship with the Russian peoples, This paper is divisible into three
deriving in part from the Pan-Slavism parts. The first traces in very summary
of the nineteenth century. Polish his- fashion the gradual development of the
tory had been characterized by hostil- Bloc up to the time of Stalin's death;
ity, but the Czechs had a tradition of the second deals with that middle period,
friendship with the Russians, which the from about 1955 to 1960, when political
Munich crisis had done nothing to di- relaxation was acompanied by an in-
minish. If the Romanians cherished no tensive drive toward industrialization
warm feelings towards them, the Serbs in all countries of the Bloc and toward
and the Bulgars could look back upon collectivization of agriculture in all ex-
a history of association with the Rus- cept Poland. The last examines the
sians. trends of the last six years towards
Nevertheless, in spite of such ties as polycentrism. The term Bloc is used
could be forged from these lukewarm to denote the seven East Europeanmem-
friendships of the past, it was an un- bers of the Warsaw Pact and the Coun-
willing empire that the Soviet Union cil for Mutual Economic Assistance
had created in the months and years (COMECON): the German Demo-
immediately following the close of the cratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Second World War. Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and, at
It has become customary to describe least until 1961, Albania. Yugoslavia,
this empire as "monolithic"; to assume which exerted a profound influence on
that it spoke with a single voice and had the ideological development of the Bloc,
but one policy; to believe that essential was never a member of either of its two
decisions were made in Moscow and en- principal organizations.
42 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
the risings, first in Plezeii and then in peace with Austria. The restoration of
Berlin in 1953, were to show; nor did it West German sovereignty revived fears
altogether prevent the countries of the -never really dormant among the mem-
Bloc from continuing to practice, in bers of the Bloc-of a German military
some degree, policies of economic na- revival; the latter deprived the Soviet
tionalism. COMECON was established Union of a legitimate basis for main-
in 1949, but for several years played taining military forces in the Danubian
only a minor, even insignificant, role in countries, the maintenance of its lines
unifying the economies of the East of communication. The Warsaw Treaty
European countries. Plans for indus- attempted to remedy both these situa-
trialization were formulated and imple- tions. It unified the military com-
mented, but the collectivization of agri- mands of the Soviet Union and of all
culture, on which the Soviet Union had the East European countries, with the
set its heart, made only very slow prog- exception of Yugoslavia, and reaffirmed
ress. the right of the Soviet Union to station
troops in the territory of its allies. It
THE DEATH OF STALIN AND ITS called also for frequent consultation be-
AFTERMATH tween them on political and defense
In March 1953, the death of Stalin matters. It appears that, among all the
opened a new era in the history of the motives which contributed to its forma-
Bloc. A change of policy, or at least tion, fear of West Germany-now inde-
some relaxation of control, was ex- pendent and in some small degree re-
pected, but the Stalinist line toward armed-and distrust of the deepening
eastern Europe continued to be pursued unity of western Europe were probably
and was modified only gradually. the most significant. One tends to ex-
Stalinists remained in control of the aggerate the importance of the Warsaw
East European countries, but the dis- Pact. It was a legal underpinning of
play of naked power was less conspicu- the monolith in which the cracks were
ous. Stalin's successors showed either increasingly conspicuous; in the field of
greater finesse or greater restraint, and military command, it probably made
the visible loosening of the alliance must no very great difference, and joint ma-
be dated from the time when its archi- neuvers of the member countries were
tect died. Yet it was a slow process, not, in fact, held for another five years.
punctuated by not infrequent returns to Of the importance of Khrushchev's
something approximating the policy of speech of February 25, 1956, at the
Stalin himself. Three landmarks stand Twentieth Congress of the Communist
out along the road toward relaxation party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), on
during the mid-1950's: the Warsaw the other hand, there can be no question.
Pact, the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev, faced with the urgent need
and the Polish and Hungarian risings. to reverse or at least to modify recent
The first of these, outwardly a move trends of policy in eastern Europe, with-
toward closer Soviet control, was prob- out appearing to reflect on the Soviet
ably the least important, at least in its Union and the integrity of its party,
earlier years. In 1955, ten years after blamed the evils of recent years on
the end of the Second World War, the Stalin himself and the "cult of person-
Western powers recognized the sov- ality" which he had developed. The
ereignty and independence of the Ger- speech was given in camera, but first
man Federal Republic, and at about the rumors and then an allegedly complete
same time the wartime Allies made text were circulating. It appeared to
FISSURES IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN BLOC 45
indicate a complete break with the past. tween the Soviet Union and the Western
Hatred of the terror, discontent with powers.
19w standards of living, resentment at In all the countries of the Pact, there
spoliation by the Soviet Union now ap- were signs of both political and eco-
peared to be not merely condoned but nomic change. The ultraliberalism of
encouraged,by the denunciationof their Poland-at least by the standards of
author. In a sense, the peoples of east- the Warsaw Pact countries-did not
ern Europe might claim to have Khrush- last, but neither did the severity of the
chev's authority for their resistance. neo-Stalinists in Budapest. Even in
The march of events in the remain- countries which had experienced little
ing months of 1956 is well known, and of the ferment of "Spring in October,"
culminated in the successful Polish and there was a new stirring and a new
the unsuccessful Hungarian risings. hope.
These events differed radically in their Relaxation of tensions within each of
nature, as well as in their outcome, and the countries of the Bloc has been ac-
between them they defined the limits companied by some degree of liberaliza-
between the practicable and the impos- tion of the economic system. Progress
sible. Gomulka agreed in that stormy in this latter direction has been greatest
interview in Warsaw to abide by the in Yugoslavia, a member of neither the
rules and to remain in the alliance; Imre economic nor the political-military or-
Nagy broke a fundamental rule by try- ganizations, but is apparent also in
ing to secede from it and declaring the Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere.
neutrality of Hungary. Khrushchev The regimes in all the East European
was faced with the question of determin- countries, except Albania, have become
ing how far a revolution might go. He less intolerant; their monolithic quality
decided that Hungary had gone too far, is slowly, unevenly, yielding.
with consequences that are all too fa- It would be a mistake, however, to
miliar. Poland exemplified the limits regard the post-Stalinist period as char-
of the possible. The relaxation in east- acterized only by the gradual reversal
ern Europe was, in the long run, facili- of all that Stalin had stood for-quite
tated by these events, just because they the contrary. Though, over-all, it was
set guidelines. They permitted a non- a period of liberalization, the monopoly
violent evolution toward the level of of the party was maintained; the proc-
political freedom which Poland had ess of collectivizing agriculture was
achieved in 1956.1 carried to its conclusion in every coun-
Thereafter, the loosening of the ties try, except in Poland and, of course,
which held the alliance together has con- Yugoslavia, which had reversed the
tinued its slow, uneven course, marked process in 1950. The plans for indus-
on the inside by the meetings of the trialization continued to succeed one
Pact countries and the institution of another, with the same emphasis on the
joint military maneuvers, by a tighten- capital-goods industries and only a very
ing up of the operations of COMECON, slight increase in the production of con-
and the winding up of the joint-compa- sumers' goods. Nowhere has the Stalin-
nies, and on the outside by a very slow ist model for economic growth been
and irregular thaw in the relations be- pursued more faithfully than in Roma-
nia, the country which is at present the
1 See Adam Bromke, "Poland's Role in the
most detached member of the Bloc.
Loosening of the Communist Bloc," Eastern
Europe in Transition, ed. Kurt London (Bal- It was suggested earlier that the
timore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 67-92. unity of the Soviet-East European Bloc,
46 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
even in the Stalinist period, was marked on the western borders of the Bloc with-
by serious fissures. Retrospectively, out encouraging it within the Bloc it-
one might, perhaps, have suggested that self. When Romania allows it to be
the unifying forces within the Bloc were, said that Bessarabia is properly hers,
from the start, almost matched by those the chicken has surely come home to
making for disunity and disruption. roost.2
The existence of a common enemy has
Nationalism often produced some unlikely partners.
Hostility to Germany was unquestion-
Foremost among these was national- ably a factor giving some degree of
ism. This emotion is younger and unity to the East European countries in
stronger in eastern Europe than in the years immediately following the
western Europe. National pride is Second World War, but this was not
more easily aroused, and compromise strongly felt by Bulgaria, Romania, and
which touches national interests is less Albania, and it is doubtful whether it
easy to achieve. The whole region long influenced the thinking of the
from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterra- Hungarians. Only among the Poles and
nean is marked by the scars of past Czechoslovaks was it ever a force of
disputes, inspired, for the greater part, great and continuing importance.
by the spirit of nationalism, and it is On the other hand, such good will
doubtful whether the traditional dis- toward the Soviet Union as existed at
putes and feuds have been entirely for- first was quickly sacrificed by the poli-
gotten. When all is said, twenty years cies of the latter. The coldly calcu-
of Communist rule have brought about lating strategy of the Soviet advance
few outward signs of friendship between into western Europe, the tactics before
the East European members of the Warsaw in 1944, the expropriation of
Bloc. There is no reason to suppose goods and the Demontage of industrial
that Hungarian resistance to the Tri- plant, the exploitation of the East Eu-
anon settlement died with Horthy and ropean countries through the opera-
G6mb6s; that Romania has forgotten tion of "joint-partnerships" and the
the southern Dobrogea; that Polish and manipulation of pricing systems, and,
Czech hostility to most things German above all, the imposition of Stalinist
does not also extend to East Germany rather than national governments-all
or, conversely, that the East Germans served to alienate the peoples of eastern
do not view their Slav neighbors with Europe from the Russians.
a mixture of hostility and contempt. Yet the experience of the last twenty
The spoken comment and the occa- years was not only a negative one. In
sional political cartoon demonstrate the a number of ways, it was one of striking
contrary. achievement. Eastern Europe under-
The East Europeans had claims went an industrial and agricultural
against countries lying to the west of revolution. If I might quote the words
them. Poland has regained the West- of Jan Wszelaki:
ern Territories; Yugoslavia has obtained
the Istrian and Julian regions, and This half-enforced and half-spontaneous
industrializationof the mid-Europeanarea
Bulgaria intermittently voices its claims is a majorevent in Europeanhistory. The
to Macedonia. Such claims were Communistsystem may endure or perish,
pressed-in the case of Poland and but what has alreadybeen done can hardly
Yugoslavia, successfully. But it is im-
2 The Guardian (London), May 26, 1966.
possible to give full leash to nationalism
FISSURES IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN BLOC 47
OF
TABLE 1-PROGRESS OF COLLECTIVIZATION in essential crops. Comparisonis often
AGRICULTURE:PERCENTAGEOF FARMLAND made between Yugoslavia and Poland
IN SOCIALIZEDSECTOR
on the one hand and the rest of the
COUNTRY 1955 1960-1965 region on the other, to the great disad-
vantage of the latter. No one doubts
East Germany 93 (1961) that collectivization brought about suf-
Poland 20.2 14.6 (1964)
Czechoslovakia 43.0 89.8 (1964) fering and distress: no agricultural
Hungary 30.5 97 (1965) revolution in history has failed to do
Romania 20.0 95.6 (1965) this. But the crude figures of crop-
Bulgaria 62.7 95
production disguise the facts that the
Albania 15.0 93.3 (1961)
labor input was gradually, but in the
end considerably, reduced and that
Sources: The statistical yearbooks of the
there was a change-locally even a
respectivecountries.
revolution-in the pattern of cropping.
The changes effected during this period
be undone: Middle Europewill not return
to its pastoralera.3 marked a shift to a higher plane of
agricultural production, with diminished
The changes that have been effected are emphasis on subsistence crops and in-
irreversible, and the very success that creased acreage under such specialized,
has been achieved must itself constitute, high-value crops as are suited to the
in a sense, a bond between the countries soil and climate. Bulgaria provides
of the Bloc. perhaps the extreme case.
Here the expansion of production of
Agricultural revolution high-value vegetables and fruit has in-
The collectivization of agriculturewas creased strikingly with, inevitably, a
an initial objective of each of the East decline in acreage under the staple
European governments. After an initial breadcrops. The small improvement in
land reform and distribution among the diet has also brought about changes in
peasants of land taken from the few cropping, with demand for wheat in the
remaining estates, methods of forceful region as a whole increasing at the ex-
persuasion were employed to bring pense of that for rye, and with some
land into the socially controlled sector. increase also in the demand for protein
Yugoslavia interrupted the process of foods.
collectivization in 1950, and Poland to The effect of these changes has been
some degree reversed the process in to increase the volume of agricultural
1956, and thereafter resumed it at a trade within the Bloc and, above all,
very much slower pace. In all other
countries of eastern Europe, over 90 per TABLE 2-PERCENTAGE OF THE LABOR FORCE
cent of all agricultural land is socially IN AGRICULTURE
owned in state, collective, or co-
1930-1944 1960-1963
operative farms. COUNTRY
This process has generally been re- East Germany 23 (1952) 17 (1963)
garded in non-Communist countries as Poland 60 38 (1960)
an undesirable one. It met with strong Czechoslovakia 33 18 (1961)
49 36 (1960)
opposition from the peasantry and al- Hungary
Romania no data
legedly resulted in much smaller yields Bulgaria 73 1 55
3Jan Wszelaki, "The Rise of Industrial
Middle Europe," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30 Source: Production Yearbooks, Food and
(1951-1952), pp. 123-134. Agriculture Organization.
48 THE ANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY
ally tailored to suit a narrow range of placable resources for the development
ores in terms of both grade and quality, of their "dependencies," there is the
would appear to leave little flexibility to question whether the Soviet Union can,
the East European consumers in deter- in fact, afford to do so. The Krivoi
mining the source of their raw mate- Rog ores are becoming depleted, and it
rials. It would also appear to give the is estimated that the Soviet surplus of
Soviet Union, as virtually the monopoly crude oil in the foreseeable future will
supplier, a kind of economic sanction fall considerablyshort of the total needs
on at least six of the East European of its East European customers.
countries.
The Friendship Pipeline, constructed TOWARD POLYCENTRISM
from the Ural region to Poland, East The third period, covering roughly
Germany,Czechoslovakia,and Hungary, the last six years, has been marked by
is coming to play a not dissimilar role. increasing disagreements within the
The purpose of this undertaking is to Bloc on economic and political policies.
supply Soviet crude oil to refineries in The attempts of the Soviet leadership
Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, to fashion a "monolithic" bloc in east-
and Hungary. Romania has its own ern Europe had been defeated even be-
source of crude oil, and imports to Bul- fore they had begun by the defection
garia are by sea to the refineries at of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union's
Burgas. The result is that four of the failure to humble Tito. Though this
East European countries, whose do- rift had, to some degree, been closed in
mestic production is quite small, have 1955 by what has been described as
become largely dependent on the Soviet Khrushchev'sjourney to Canossa, Yugo-
Union for their imports. In this way, slavia has remained consistently out-
the steel pipelines constitute, as it were, side both the Pact and the Council,
a reinforcement to the system of alli- both a focus for disaffection and a
ances. By the same token, the East model to be emulated.
European countries have, in varying Another and similar blow was to fol-
degrees, given economic hostages to the low. Albania, remote and almost inec-
Soviet Union for their political good cessible, had followed the Stalinist line
behavior. all the more readily because this line
On the other side of the coin, we was anti-Yugoslav. Albania's policy
have the Soviet Union, a developed has been consistent only in its hostility
and industrialized country, exporting to Yugoslavia and in its irredentist
primary materials and depleting its own longing for Kosovo-Metohija. Khrush-
reserves in order to build up manu- chev's rapprochement with Tito was
facturing industries in its own "satel- accompanied inevitably by a weakening
lites." This is not a normal role for an of the ties that bound Hoxha to the
"advanced" country to play, and there Kremlin. At the same time the dis-
have been some rumblings of discon- pute-on the surface, one of ideology
tent within the Soviet Union with the and methodology-between the Soviet
colonial status into which it is now Union and China was growing. Soon
beginning to be placed.5 after 1955, the Albanian leaders were
Apart, however, from the fact that turning to China for aid, and China,
some elements in the Soviet Union may for her part, was not unwilling to build
not relish supplying scarce and irre- a bridgehead-however humble-in the
5As reported in the New York Times, Balkans. By 1960, Albania came into
January 16, 1967. the open as an enemy of Khrushchev
FISSURESIN THE EASTERNEUROPEANBLOC 51
ously asserted the latter policy and had industrial development, at the heart of
argued that the more advanced of the which lay an increase of more than 100
Communist countries were obligated to per cent in the iron, steel, and mechani-
help develop the more backward, was cal industries. A new iron and steel
increasingly bitter at the cutting off of combine was built at Galati and is now
Soviet technical assistance. Chinese en- in partial operation, and Romania's
couragementwas not without its effects steel production, 2,126,000 tons in 1964,
on Romania's attitude. is expected to approach that of Poland
That it was Romania which took the and Czechoslovakia by the end of the
lead in opposing Khrushchev's "supra- decade.
state" is not surprising. It was one of When Khrushchev visited Romania
the larger members of the Bloc, but, in and was taken to Galati, the press re-
relation to its size and population, one ported that the construction work, then
of the poorest and least industrialized. under way on the terrace above the
There was a feeling that it had been Danube, was pointed out to him. He
discriminated against by COMECON; looked the other way and, allegedly,
of the nineteen commissions,only one- refused to see it. Ignore it as he might,
that handling the petroleum and petro- the Galati kombinat, symbol of Ro-
chemical industries-was actually lo- mania's revolt against the "suprastate,"
cated in Romania. The allocation of would not go away. Then, as if to
fields of specialization seemed to the heap coals of fire upon the head of
Romanians to favor the northern tier of Khrushchev, Romania in 1963 began
states, and, even before Khrushchev the most ambitious construction project
made his proposal, the Romanians had undertaken hitherto in eastern Europe
already challenged his conclusions in -the Iron Gate dam-in collaboration
their economic plan, published in 1960. with Yugoslavia, a nonmember of
The situation within the Bloc was not COMECON.8 At about the same time,
unlike that within some of its member Romania resumed diplomatic relations
countries. Social considerations called with Albania and continued its fraterni-
for investment and development in the zation with China.
backward areas; production, profit, and In its economic proposals, Romania
technical and resource lease usually had reverted to a kind of Stalinism, but
called for the expansion of production the hard line in other respects was
in areas already well developed. Yugo- abandoned. This intensive program of
slavia was able to put a steel mill in industrialization could not be carried
Skoplje and a rolling plant in Niksi', through alone. Credits, equipment, and
instead of in Slovenia or Croatia, where technical skills had to be imported, and
economieswould have been greater. But for these Romania had no alternative
within the Bloc as a whole, the plums but to turn to the West. And so we have
always seemed, at least to Romania and the most meaningful feature of these
Bulgaria, to go to East Germany, trends of recent years, the tendency for
Czechoslovakia, or Poland. And so the East European countries to intensify,
Romania determined, as it were, to go in greater or lesser degree, their com-
it alone. The Third Economic Plan, mercial relations with Central and West
announced in 1960, followed claims and
8 David Binder, "The Rumanian-Yugoslav
assertions made by Georghiu Dej that
'Special Relationship,'" East Europe (Septem-
Romania would carry through its own ber 1964), pp. 2-7; also "Der Funfjahrplan
rapid industrialization. It called for a Rumaniens," Ost-Probleme, Vol. 18, No. 17,
broadly based and intensive program of August 26, 1966, pp. 52-53.
FISSURESIN THE EASTERNEUROPEANBLOC 53
Europe. The East European countries tance: the Oder-Neisse and Bohemian
have been traditionally sources of food- boundaries,and the division of Germany
stuffs and raw materials for Central Eu- and the related question of recognition
rope. For twenty years, this pattern of of the Deutsche Demokratische Repub-
trade has been interrupted; now it is lik (DDR).
slowly reviving. Trade within the Bloc The political policies of Poland and
has not developed as its planners had Czechoslovakia are largely shaped by
projected, and geographical differences these questions. For Poland, the for-
in specializations among its members malization of the Oder-Neisse boundary
are at present too small for this trade is essential. It is obvious, except to a
to become significant, or the Bloc itself few visionaries, that Germany cannot
autarchic. On the other hand, recipro- regain the territories east of this bound-
cal trade between East and Central- ary without a major war which Ger-
West Europe has greater potentialities. many could not, in any event, win.
In any event, Romania, and those The Oder-Neisse boundary has already
countries that follow the Romanian ex- been given an informal recognition by
ample, will be obligated to service loans, de Gaulle and a characteristically un-
pay technicians, and requite the visible diplomatic one by George Brown. Its
import of technical hardware. recognition by the Bundesrepublik
would pave the way for closer relations
The Germanproblem between Poland and West Germany
Trade without mutual diplomatic from which both countries could only
recognition presents considerable diffi- benefit. The question of Czechoslo-
culties. It had been the common policy vakia's western boundaries is a less
of the COMECON-Pact countries-the serious one, but until the partners to
Soviet Union excepted-not to recog- the Munich Agreement formally abro-
nize West Germany until the latter gate its terms, Czechoslovakia must
recognizes both East Germany and the continue to be concerned about West
new boundaries in eastern Europe. German policy. Neither Kiesinger's
Romania has broken through this pol- recent informal statement that West
icy, though not without protests from Germany does not regard the Munich
the northern tier of the Bloc members. treaty as politically binding nor the
West Germany is currently negotiating text of the Wilson-Kosygin agreement
similar agreements with Bulgaria and are regarded as adequate in this respect
Hungary. by West Germany'sneighbors. Nor do
A final point concerns the northern the activities of the German refugee
tier-East Germany,Poland, and Czech- organizations contribute to a detente.
oslovakia-and their relations with the Some of us may recognize in them a
GermanFederal Republic. In the proc- certain element of elderly adolescence,
ess of political loosening up that has with overtones more of high spirits than
gone on during these recent years, West of high politics. But Poles and Czechs
Germany must play a critical role, not do not see it that way. The matter
only because the aggression and defeat cannot be better phrased than in the
of Germanyled to the present situation, words of the New York Times:
but also because Germany's geographi- Moscow's efforts to reunify the bloc are
cal position almost inevitably makes it, greatly aided by those in Bonn and else-
with the Soviet Union, the twin pole of where who keep alive illusory hopes of
attraction for the East European coun- Germanterritorialenlargementat the ex-
tries. Two issues are of crucial impor- penseof EasternEurope. The fear aroused
54 THE ANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY
in countries like Poland and Czechoslo- long rtin would have to be predicated
vakia... gives Moscow a potent argu- on the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse
ment.9 boundary. The latter course in the
The conclusion of a triangular group of present climate of West German opinion
treaties in March 1967, between the is no less out of the question, though
three countries of the northern tier, it is noteworthy that it would appear
to be not unwelcome to a growing
emphasizing their unity in the face of number of West German
East Germany and their determination political lead-
ers. It may not always be politically
to guarantee each other's integrity, dem-
impossible, and the effective abandon-
onstrates that there is a point beyond
"doctrine" is a
which the disintegration of the Warsaw ment of the Hallstein
very small step in this direction.
Pact countries will not go as long as
The disintegration of the Bloc is ap-
their mutual boundaries with Germany
lack the ultimate sanction of recognition parent, but it would be premature to
in international law. celebrate its demise. Cracks have de-
along the Danubian and Balkan
The question of East Germany is veloped
countries, but the northern tier still acts
more difficult. The German Federal
with some semblance of unity. It is
Republic maintains the ingenious fiction not Russian weapons that
that it alone represents the descent of German,
the German Reich in the direct line, impose
this degree of unity on at
least this subdivision of the Bloc.
and that the Deutsche Demokratische
COMECON, may be, as one writer has
Republik is not merely schismatic but
also illegitimate. The nonrecognitionof recently expressed it, a "dead duck,"
but the Warsaw Pact, diminished only
the government in Berlin has led, under
the defection of Albania, remains a
the so-called Hallstein "doctrine," to by
force of importance. The armed forces
the severance of diplomatic relations
of the six satellites remain under So-
with any country that recognizes it as
viet control. It appears to be a fact
a diplomatic ally. Such a policy had
that they are seeking some voice in the
become increasingly untenable before
military decisions affecting themselves,
the West German-Romanianrapproche-
and to have, as it were, a finger on the
ment, and has, in fact, been abandoned but their commanderis a Rus-
in West Germany's current moves to trigger;
sion; their equipment is Soviet or con-
develop political and economic relations forms to Soviet
with the Bloc countries. specification; and in the
very unlikely event of hostilities break-
East Germany has the highest per
ing out in Europe, the East European
capita national income of any of the countries would
Warsaw Pact countries, one of the inevitably be within the
Soviet camp. Their Communist parties
largest gross national products, and
may have lost their unanimity, and they
probably the fastest growing economy. no longer speak with one voice,
It cannot be ignored. In the long run, may
as in the Stalin era, but they have not
it must either be united with West
lost control of their respective countries.
Germany or accorded some kind of In
varying degrees, a new and more
recognition by the Western Powers. liberal economic
The former appears to be impossible, policy is being intro-
duced, but it is the party which is
at least in the near future, and in the
directing the change, and the party is
9 New York Times, January 23, 1965. showing no signs of withering away.
FISSURES IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN BLOC 55
Q: As far as the Balkans are con- Germany to Bulgaria, in the near fu-
cerned, are the surplus agricultural ture, will be to expand their exports to
products from eastern Europe that you the West in order to acquire the capital
mention really anything new? Surely, for the types of investment which they
the marketing of their agricultural sur- are planning and for the import of raw
pluses was a big problem before World materials which most of them will need.
War II. We remember their barter I think that one of the points which
agreements with Germany, and I have I tried to make is that, although they
met representatives of the area who may have sold their economic souls to
tried to do business with other countries the Soviet Union for the near future,
than prewar Germany in order to get in return for an added supply of iron
rid of their agricultural surpluses. It ore or crude oil or other things, this
is not a matter of communism at all. kind of mortgage will not last indefi-
nitely, as the Soviet Union will not be
A: Yes, I agree. If I had read the able to come through with materials.
full text that I had before me I would The Economist very recently gave fig-
have said that this was a revival of a ures on the Soviet crude oil production
pattern of trade in the 1930's negoti- and on East European needs. It is
ated in the main by Hjalmar Schacht. obvious that in about four, or, at most,
But the trade now is relatively greater five years time, the Soviet Union will
and assumes a somewhat different form. be able to supply only about a fourth of
It is now carried on in more refined their needs. Three-quarters, assuming
agricultural products than it was then. eastern Europe expands its demand,
For example, although I cannot quote must be met from other sources, which
figures from memory, the export of hops must mean that that three-quarterswill
to the West, which had long been a have to be paid for by exports to non-
small Czechoslovak specialty, has gone Bloc countries.
up very considerably indeed. The ex- I assume that it is to the advantage
port of the Bulgarian vegetables and of the West to weaken East Europe's
fruit is relatively new, as only recently dependence on the Soviet Union. The
have the roads been opened up and the best way to do so is to enable and en-
refrigerated semitrailers made available courage these countries to sell their
for the transport. I agree that this is surpluses in the non-Soviet world; to
a revival of an old pattern of trade, grant them credits; and to do whatever
but it is a revival with a difference. is possible to develop a multilateral pat-
tern of trade for these countries instead
of forcing them to continue with their
Q: In line with Dr. Tucker's talk present system of bilateral agreements.
about rapprochement with the Soviet
Union, what should our policy be with
regard to weaning eastern Europe from Q: In the light of this shortage, will
the Soviet bloc? it not move Russia to great efforts to
get the oil supplies they need?
A: It is very difficult to say what
our policy should be in that respect. A: That was a suggestion of the
I assume that the urgent need of the New York Times last January. It is
East European countries, from East most interesting to put on a map the
56 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
think I can say that this is the case. which appeared to make it unnecessary
It does not, obviously, preclude the de- and undesirable. Suppose the mono-
sire and the demand for greater freedom lithic quality should finally disappear,
of expression and for a weakening of and one assumes that in time it must,
the powers of the censorship. Some as no alliance of any kind in the past
have said that this is overwhelmingly has ever lasted long. It is not impos-
the attitude in Hungary. sible that these ideas of federalism
Among church leaders, this is a dif- would be revived.
ferent matter, of course, simply because The experiences of the last two or
the Communist country does not recog- three decades and the aging of people
nize any religious formula at all. And would remove some of the memories of
the church does tend to be the rallying past conflicts. I know that Balkan
point of those who object to the Com- memories are longer than most, but
munist regimen. There is the story of even Balkan memories may fade in
the atheist who was found going to time. If you can suppose that the area
Mass at Warsaw, and, asked why he can be put into a deep freeze, as it
did so, replied: "I am against the were, until, for example, Bulgars
government." forget that they lost some of their
territory to the hated Serbs after
World War I, that certain things hap-
Q: Balkan liberals have talked pened in those countries in World War
about a federation in the past. As a II, and that there was a Macedonian
result of the Communists being there, question, then there is a chance of a
is this ideal closer to realization or has Balkan federation.
it been abandoned? I think that I ought to say that the
longer this present kind of stalemate
A: I am happy to attempt to an- goes on, without any kind of explosion,
swer the question as to whether the the less likely a nationalist explosion
Balkan countries are in any way nearer will be and the more likely will it be-
a federation now than they were when come that the people will come together
the issue was raised very shortly after on some kind of federal basis.
the end of hostilities. After all, the people you are referring
One might almost have said that be- to, if you exclude the Hungarians,
fore the Second World War, this was a Romanians,and Albanians,are all Slavs.
foolish issue even to raise. The coun- If they wish to, they can be mutually
tries in question were so antagonistic intelligible. They do not always wish
to one another and continued to raise to, of course. I would point out that
territorial claims at one another's ex- even within a single country of the
pense so often that the question could area, namely, Yugoslavia, the linguistic-
not have been considered. Yet, they cultural dispute has been revived. I
did raise the question, perhaps not too would not hold out much hope. I
seriously, but nevertheless officially, would only say that when death re-
after the Second World War. Any moves those who took part in past strife
progress in this direction was overtaken and memories wear thin, the chances
by the movement toward Stalinism, will become greater than they are now.