Você está na página 1de 5

PLEADINGS

I. THAT THE INTERVENTION CARRIED OUT BY JASSBARDS TROOPS IS IN VIOLATION OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. THE DEPLOYMENT OF JASSBARD TROOPS IN GUNARISTAN IS ILLEGAL AND VIOLATES

ITS SOVEREIGNTY.

1. “Operation Humanity” violates the sovereignty of the state of Gunaristan and is thus in

violation of Article 2(4) of UN Charter. The Article strictly prohibits any state “from the

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,

or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 1 The

Minister of External Affairs of Dasint offered government aid to the control the situation

in Gunaristan, the Government of Gunaristan declined the offer and didn’t give any

consent to intervene.2 It is fundamental in international law that a state must take the

consent of the other state before entering its territory.3 The respondents clearly have

breached this duty which they owed to the applicants and the customary law.

2. The principle of non intervention is buttressed by the customary right of states which

allows them to conduct their internal affairs without any external interference. 4 The mere

fact that Jassbards troops entered the Gunaristanian territory without any consent and

conducted raids and bombings is a clear violation of this principle.

3. The Principle 3 of the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law further

supports this, it prohibits any form of intervention, “directly or indirectly, for any reason

1
Article 2(4) Charter of the United Nations [1945] 1 UNTS XVI; Malcolm Shaw, “INTERNATIONAL LAW”, 5th
Ed. Cambridge University Press, 2003. P. 190.
2
Compromise, ¶ 11.
3
UNGA Res 2625 [1970] UN Doc A/8082, p.121.
4
The Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 35; The Nicaragua Case, Nicaragua v. United States of
America [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 [Nicaragua]; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, UN GAOR, 20th
Sess., Supp. No. 14, UN Doc. A/6220 (1965), Art.1. [Res.2131]; Ibid.
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State” 5. The rule in article 2(4) is a

jus cogens norm6 and is a recognised customary law7.

B. THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION OF SELF DEFENCE IN THE ACTION OF RESPONDENTS

4. The UN Charter provides for an exception to the general rule laid down in Art. 2(4) that

prohibits use of force against other states. The exception is the right of self defence 8. But,

the right of self defence is a qualified right. Certain conditions have to be satisfied before

invoking the right of self defence. The state exercising the right must exercise it in

response to an actual or apprehended armed attack 9. The right cannot be exercised

unilaterally by any state if the other state has not launched an armed attack over the state 10.

It was categorically held by this court that there exists no right of collective armed

response by states to acts which do not fall under the purview of armed attacks11.

5. The State of Gunaristan has not launched any sort of armed attack on either of the

respondents. The sovereignty of any of the respondents was not violated by Gunaristan in

any manner whatsoever. It is noteworthy that even after the deployment of Jassbard

Troops and violation of sovereignty of the applicant, it did not launch any sort of armed

attack towards any of the respondents. There is no evidence which suggests that any

citizen of any respondent state has been injured or killed due to the internal conflicts

happening in the State of Gunaristan. The action of the respondent, at maximum, can be

termed as protection of perceived security interests, which does not find any backing from

5
UNGA Res 2131 [1965] UN Doc A/6014; Also, The Nicaragua Case, Nicaragua v. United States of America
[1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 [Nicaragua].
6
The Nicaragua Case, Nicaragua v. United States of America [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 [Nicaragua], ¶ 190; Report
of the International Law Commission, [1966] II ILC Ybk, pp.247-9.
7
Id.
8
Article 51 of the Charter of United Nations.
9
Id; The Nicaragua Case, Nicaragua v. United States of America [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 [Nicaragua], ¶ 51.
10
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. USA), [2003] I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶ 51.
11
Ibid note 9, ¶ 211.
the Article 51 of the Charter of United Nations12. Hence, there is no way, the respondents

can claim the exception of self defence in this case.

C. THE ACT OF THE RESPONDENTS IS IN VIOLATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE

6. The States of Gunaristan, Dautisania, Mekratise, and Dasint entered into the Treaty of

Peace on 21st September, 1949 to mark their first independence day. The Treaty stated that

the member nations would respect the Sovereignty of other treaty member nations as

drawn by the British, that they would not use any weapons or forces against other treaty

member nations save in the case of self defence and that they would not interfere with the

internal affairs of other treaty member nations 13. The act of the respondents clearly

suggests a breach of this Treaty. The Sovereignty of the State of Gunaristan was violated;

the Respondents used force against the State of Gunaristan when there was no justification

to invoke the right to self defence; and the Respondents also interfered in the internal

affairs of the State of Gunaristan by deploying Jassbard Troops.

7. Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that “international

conventions” are a valid source of law and this court takes into consideration

“international conventions” in deciding cases. Now the expression, “international

convention” has a very wide ambit. Not only bilateral and multilateral treaties and the

formally so called conventions come within its scope, but it also encompasses all other

international understandings and agreements provided that they establish rules expressly

recognized by the States parties to the dispute 14. Although the sources given under Article

38(1) are not in hierarchy inter se, but in practice the Court is expected to observe the

order in which they appear, Art. 38(1)(a), (b) are obviously the most important sources and

the priority of (a) is explicable by the fact that this refers to a source of mutual obligation

12
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda) (2006), 45 I.L.M. 271 [Congo], ¶ 148.
13
Compromise, ¶ 1
14
Handbook of the International Court of Justice, 5th Ed., p.92
of parties15. The principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda is indispensable in the interpretation of

treaties16. The obligations of the parties must be performed in good faith. So applying

these provisions and interpretations, it can be concluded that the Respondents violated

International Law by breaching the Treaty of Peace by carrying out “Operation

Humanity”.

D. THERE WAS NO AUTHORISATION FROM THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONDUCT

“OPERATION HUMANITY”

8. The authority to decide whether there has been a breach or threat to peace vests solely

with the United Nations Security Council17, based on that the Security Council first applies

measures which do not involve armed forces18, and if such measures fail, it can direct the

member states to use air, sea or land forces to control the situation 19, but, the charter

explicitly prohibits any enforcement action against a state by regional arrangements or

regional parties20. Here, the States of Dautisania, Mekratise and Dasint formed a regional

arrangement21 and decided to carry out an intervention in the Republic of Gunaristan to

protect the people and put an end to the large scale human rights violation occurring

therein22, this was not authorised by the United Nations Security Council and hence is in

violation of Article 53(1) of the UN Charter.

9. The Resolution (S/RES/1886.A (2010)) passed by the United Nations Security Council on

16th August, 2010 called for a immediate ceasefire in Gunaristan and immediate

withdrawal of Jassbard Troops from the Gunaristanian soil 23, thereby refraining from

15
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed., p. 5.
16
Article 26, Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties [1969] 1 UNTS XXIII.
17
Article 39, Charter of the United Nations.
18
Ibid, Article 41.
19
Ibid, Article 42.
20
Ibid, Article 53(1).
21
Compromise, ¶ 10.
22
Ibid, ¶ 1.
23
Ibid, ¶ 24.
ratifying the intervention carried out by the respondents. The resolution suggested

peaceful means to settle the dispute. This clearly meant that the act of intervention of the

respondents found no backing from the UNSC.

E. EVEN RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE REQUIRES THE AUTHORISATION OF

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

10. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a relatively recent norm developed in international

law which treats Sovereignty as a Responsibility rather than a privilege. It means that the

state owes a responsibility to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against

humanity and ethnic cleansing24. The doctrine gets recognition in international law as a

pre-emptory norm through a resolution passed by the UNSC 25. This resolution is the only

document which supports the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and provides it with a

recognition in international law. The resolution provides for a provision to states to act

collectively against the violations mentioned earlier but after taking prior permission from

the Security Council and with strict adherence to the provisions of the Charter of United

Nations.26 So it is clear that invoking this doctrine requires a vote in favour of military

action by the UNSC27, which is evidently missing in this case. So the doctrine does not

apply in this case.

24
GA Res. 60/1, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp No. 13, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (2005), ¶ 139.
25
Protection of Civilians in Armed conflict, SC Res. 1674, UN SCOR, 5430th Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1674
(2006), ¶ 4.
26
Ibid; World Summit Outcome Resolution, GA Res. 60/1, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp No. 13, UN Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (2005), ¶ 139.
27
World Summit Outcome Resolution, GA Res. 60/1, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp No. 13, UN Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (2005), ¶ 139

Você também pode gostar