THE EXPLOITS

OF GILGIT
SCOUTS

We will now briefly deal with the Gilgit Rebellion which led to the liberation or
capture of Northern Areas of Kashmir State by anti-Maharaja Muslim forces. The
Northern areas comprised the areas of Baltistan, Gilgit Wazarat and Ladakh. Gilgit
was leased to the British in 1901. The British had raised an all Muslim para military
force known as Gilgit Scouts under British officers to garrison the area and to act as
a scout and early warning force against an invasion from Czarist Central Asia. In
1947 once the Britishers were withdrawing from India they returned the area to the
Kashmir State. The area was all Muslim and Dogra rule was unpopular. The
Maharaja sent a new Governor and some Kashmir State troops to take over the
area. Once the Gilgit Scouts realised that the Dogras (Kashmir State) were planning
to disband them46, they planned a rebellion against the Dogra rule in which their
two British officers i.e. Major Brown and Captain Mathieson who were dedicated
enough to identify themselves with their Muslim rank and file also joined. The total
strength of the Gilgit Scouts was 582 men47. There were no Kashmir State Force
troops at Gilgit the capital of the Gilgit Agency where the Dogra Governor Brigadier
Ghansara Singh was housed. The nearest Kashmir State Force Unit i.e. 6th Jammu
and Kashmir Infantry Battalion was at Bunji 36 miles south of Gilgit. This unit had
two companies of Punjabi (Kashmiri Muslims from Poonch area) Muslims and two of
non- Muslims. (one Hindu Dogra and one Sikh)48. When the Scouts received news
of accession of Kashmir State on 28th October, they planned a revolt and executed
their plans on 4th November capturing Gilgit and placing the Dogra Governor
Ghansara Singh under arrest. The scouts also seized Bunji without much effort since
the non-Muslim troops, who were overwhelmingly outnumbered, were too
demoralised to put up a fight. Some of them took the great risk of attempting to
escape towards Skardu in Kashmir State territory or Astor on the Gilgit-Bunji-
Srinagar route, however few of these reached Skardu. The Gilgit Scouts initially
proclaimed an independent Republic, but later, probably keeping in view the more
dangerous regular Indian Army intervention threat; decided to join Pakistan in mid
November.
In order to understand accurately the nature of Northern Areas terrain, the reader
may note that within 65 miles radius of Gilgit there are eight mountain peaks above
24,000 feet including Rakaposhi (26,050 feet), and Nanga Parbat (26,650 feet) and
a large number of glaciers etc. Gilgit was about 231 miles from Srinagar the
Kashmir State capital and a mountain track connected Srinagar-Gilgit, with the
13,780 high Burzil Pass, which was snowbound from November to March in the
middle. The other route to Kashmir territory was the Gilgit-Skardu track in the Indus
valley which was little more than a mule track and was about 118 miles long. All the
rivers in the area were extremely swift, unfordable and unnavigable except by ferry
rafts made of inflated buffalo skin and these also required great expertise and skill
in order to be employed successfully part of the non-Muslim garrison at Bunji
surrendered while some elements tried to withdraw to Skardu in the Kashmir State
territory or towards Astor on the Gilgit-Srinagar route, but most were killed or
captured.
AIR COMMODORE SHAH KHAN WHO LED THE ESKIMO FORCE ACROSS
DEOSAI IN OLD AGE
CAPTAIN MIRZA HASSAN

The Pakistani Government sent Lieutenant Colonel Aslam Khan (the same Major
Aslam of the Srinagar operation) as overall commander of military operations in
Northern Areas. Aslam Khan reached Gilgit in December 1947. It may be noted that
in most Pakistani accounts written by either non-Northern Area/Punjabi etc officers
all credit for the success of operations in the Northern Area is heaped on Aslam
Khan. From 1979 onwards when my father was commanding a brigade group in
Northern Areas and on various other occasions when I visited Northern Areas during
the period 1979-97 I met various veterans of 1948 war and questioned them about
Aslam’s role. The general consensus of opinion was that Aslam had limited role in
planning or executing these operations and that the most active part in the
planning and execution was played by Major Ehsan (Kashmir State Forces) and
Lieutenant Shah Khan (Gilgit Scouts) but Aslam being a regular army officer, having
excellent contacts, and because he was the overall commander robbed both of all
the credit.

Aslam had lobbied for the appointment and got it on the basis that his father had
served the Dogras before 1947 and that he knew the area. Aslam was by
caste/origin a Pathan; but Punjabi speaking and was closer in ethnic terms to the
men who were associated with compilation of the official history and Shaukat Riza;
who in his books was subconsciously trying to project the Punjabi Muslims as the
only fighting race as far as Pakistan Army was concerned. Foreign readers are
advised to treat Aslam’s projection in the official history and in Shaukat Riza’s
account with a pinch of salt!

The Gilgit Scouts and the Muslim companies of 6th Jammu and Kashmir conducted
their operations after the capture of Gilgit/Bunji on three axis. It may be noted that
following the fall of Gilgit, a large number of locals of Gilgit and Hunza had
volunteered for military service and the total strength of the Scouts reached the
figure of approximately 2,000 men49. The Ibex Force (approx. 400 men) was given
the objective of advancing on axis Gilgit-Skardu under the indomitable Major Ehsan
Khan; with a view to capturing Skardu which was held by a Dogra battalion.

The Tiger Force under Captain Hassan Khan (400 men) was tasked to advance on
axis Bunji-Kamri-Gurais-Bandipura; the axis which the Indians were likely to adopt;
after the snow melted in early 1948 to capture the Northern Areas. The Eskimo
Force (400 men) under Lieutenant Shah Khan was to move from Astor through the
snow bound and uninhabited Deosai Plain above 10,000 feet and attack Dras-Kargil
and Zojila Pass area from the rear severing the communications of the Dogra
garrisons holding Dras-Skardu and Leh with the Kashmir valley/Srinagar area. The
operations of the Gilgit Scouts in the Northern Areas are the most fascinating and
inspiring part of the entire 1947-48 War, however, for lack of space we will discuss
them in a very brief manner. The Ibex Force commenced its advance along northern
bank of Indus river in end January 1948 and besieged the Dogras at Skardu from 12
February.

The Dogras were vastly outnumbered and their defeat; keeping in view numerical
disparity, limited supplies and distance from Srinagar; was a foregone conclusion.
Despite all their tangible inferiority the Dogras led by Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jang
Thapa; an extremely resolute commander and a very chivalrous human being as far
as treatment of non-combatants was concerned50 held on till 14th August 1948;
when 200 of his garrison broke out towards Kargil, while Sher Jang with the
remainder 250 of his troops surrendered51.
Flight Lieutenant Khyber Khan’s who flew a T 6 Harvard aircraft transporting a mortar gun in the rear seat of
the aircraft to Gilgit.This mortar proved to be instrumental in capture of Skardu fort.

The Indians had made many attempts to relieve Skardu, but these were foiled by
the Scouts/Volunteers who defeated the various Indian relieving columns by laying
some very unconventional and brilliant ambushes on the Skardu-Kargil Road. Dras
on the Kargil-Skardu road was captured by the Gilgit Scouts on 6th June 1947.
Major Jarral who led the combined Gilgit Scouts and J and K Infantry attack
on the Zoji La Pass

In June the Scouts finally advanced towards Zojila Pass the gateway to Srinagar
Valley from the east. Zojila Pass (11,578 ft) was captured by the Gilgit Scouts under
the leadership of Lieutenant Shah Khan on 7th July 1948. The Gilgit Scouts also
advanced towards Leh about 160 miles east of Skardu in the Indus valley, but could
not capture it since, their relative numerical inferiority, lack of adequate logistic
support and a majority of non-Muslim population in the area, made the success of
their operation doubtful. By mid-July the Scouts, without any regular army troops
had liberated the entire Northern Areas and had reached the administrative
boundary of Srinagar district holding an area stretching in the west from outskirts of
Bandipura 40 miles north of Srinagar, holding Zojila Pass 62 miles east of Srinagar
and at Nimu few miles west of Leh.

MAJOR JARRAL IN OLD AGE

The Scouts had achieved more than their actual potential warranted and could only
be praised for doing what they did. It was not possible for the Scouts any further,
since an advance west south or east of the line they were holding would have
brought them into open territory, where high mountains and steep cliffs and high
altitude were no longer present to act as force multipliers and where the Indians
could effectively employ their regular army supported by modern artillery, aircraft,
armoured cars and tanks.

The other important Indian strategic success of the 1948 War was the capture of
Zojila Pass and the relief of Leh.We have earlier seen that Zojila Pass commanding
the land link to Kargil-Leh etc in Ladakh region had been captured by the Gilgit
Scouts under Lieutenant Shah Khan on 7th July 1948. The Scouts crossed Zojila and
exploited till Sonamarg and till the outskirts of Leh but could not either capture Leh
or seriously threaten Srinagar as they were numerically too few and could not fight
against regular army troops aided by artillery and airpower.The Indians continued to
air supply their garrison at Leh,while the Scouts remained too weak to attack Leh
and no regular Pakistan Army unit was sent to Leh or Zojila area.Thimaya the GOC
Srinagar Division was a determined and able military commander and had firmly
resolved to capture Zojila and relieve the Leh Garrison.To improve command and
co-ordination he

brought Headquarters 77 Para Brigade from Uri area to Baltal area and placed the
three infantry battalions (including one Gurkha battalion) under command of this
briagde104 .The Zojila Pass ( 11,578 ft) was held by approximately a company plus
of Gilgit Scouts and had withstood various determined Indian assaults supported by
artillery, Tempest aircrafts and launched by regular Indian Army units of Brigade
size105. The strength of the Pakistani position at Zojila lay in immense natural
defensive strength,unusually high altitude and extreme toughness and
determination of the indomitable Gilgit Scouts to defend their fatherland against the
Indians. Thimaya appreciated that tanks alone could achieve a breakthrough and
took the brilliant decision of employing tanks at the highest altitude in the history of
warfare till that time. This record was broken by the Indians again during the Sino-
Indian Conflict of 1962 once the Indians broke the record and again by 7th Light
Cavalry when Stuart Tanks were employed at 14,000 feet only106. A squadron of
Stuart Light Tanks of 7th Light Cavalry was brought all the way from Akhnur a
distance of 445 Kilometres,in about a fortnight, in conditions of absolute secrecy107
.

ZOJI LA PASS

The tanks reached Baltal 60 miles east of Srinagar on 15th October where there
turrets which had been taken separately were refixed108. The Indians were lucky in
having Thimaya (a South Indian) who believed in leading from the front.Thimaya
personally flew an air recce mission over the Pass on 15th October109. Meanwhile
snow fall had started and this resulted in postponing date of attack from 25 October
to 1st November. Finally on 01 November the tanks, Thimaya in the leading
tank110 attacked the Pass leading two infantry battalions in the attack on the
Zojila.
No army in the world could have stopped these juggernauts without anti tank guns
and the Gilgit Scouts were forced to abandon the Pass which they had successfully
held since July 1948. Following this great technological success nothing could stop
the 77 Para Brigade. Thus Dras was captured on 15th November and Kargil on 23rd
November111. The small Gilgit Scouts force blocking Leh was forced to withdraw
and Leh was relieved.There is no doubt that employment of tanks at Zojila was the
wars greatest strategic surprise, and a non armour officer was its architect.The
Indian Army owes its possession of Ladakh through which it later infiltrated into
Siachen Glacier to Thimaya’s genius and to 7th Light Cavalry. There were tanks and
armoured cars on the other side also,but were not used because the extremely
naive and miserly political leadership trusted a Britisher who had no interest in the
war.
By 23rd November the Indians were firmly in possession of Ladakh,had secured
Poonch for eternity and were no longer in a state of imbalance which had plagued
them since October 1947. The Pakistani political leadership at last realised that an
effort must be made to at least assume a more threatening posture,failing which
the Indians emboldened by their success at Poonch and Zojila may attempt an
offensive operation which may bring them yet closer to the Kashmir-Pakistan
international border112. It may be noted that area south of Poonch is mostly below
5,000 ft and operations in this area are not severely restricted unlike the higher
area in the north because of heavy snowfall.Keeping this fact in view the Pakistani
GHQ felt that an Indian advance towards Mirpur and Bhimbhar was likely unless the
Pakistan Army now at last assumed a more responsible and offensive posture. We
will now deal with the famous ‘Operation Venus’ which was given the shape of a
political controversy by two gentlemen,one an army officer and the other a civil
servant! By mid November the Pakistani political leadership at last realised that a
more active military policy must be adopted in Kashmir. Finally the civilian political
leadership was moved from its state of supreme lethargy and indecision and gave
the army its first responsible political directive ; ‘The Pakistan Government
therefore, directed the C-in-C that, subject only to the defence of West Pakistan
frontiers with India,the Pakistan Army was to prevent at all costs, the Indians from
extending the area of their occupation in the Jammu and Kashmir State’113. This
directive was issued in mid November 1948 and following this the GHQ decided to
move sizeable forces for offensive action in Bhimbhar Sector in Kashmir. In addition
the Pakistani Cabinet asked the C-in-C to ‘examine in detail the military implications
of the proposed counterstroke’114. Gracey proposed a counterstroke involving an
armoured brigade and infantry brigade originating from Bhimbhar area and directed
at Beri Pattan on the main Indian supply route from Akhnur to Nowshera-Rajauri and
Poonch115.

The aim of the projected Operation Venus as the counterstroke was code named
was not to recapture Kashmir or even to recapture Poonch but in words of the
official history of the Kashmir War to:— ‘FORCE THE INDIANS TO SUE FOR AN
IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUS QUO AS THEIR RECENT
OPERATIONS HAD INVOLVED THE MAXIMUM EFFORT THEY WERE CAPABLE OF
PUTTING FORTH AT THAT TIME.THE MANOEUVRES NOW CONTEMPLATED WOULD
INSTEAD OF PROLONGING THE FIGHT IN KASHMIR,FORCE THE INDIANS TO
TERMINATE THE CONFLICT’116.

The preliminary plan of Operation Venus involved launching a subsidiary offensive

manoeuvre nicknamed ‘Operation Little Venus’117, involving capturing two
insignificant hill features called Reech and Maindak hills few miles west of Beri
Pattan; and this was scheduled to be launched on 8th December 118. Sometime
before 8th December the cabinet decided not to launch ‘Little Venus’ but wait and
see if Indians did not undertake any offensive action in Kashmir,in case of which
‘the planned counteroffensive was to be launched’119 On 14th December when the
Indians resorted to some offensive moves in Bhimbhar area a ‘Modified Little Venus’
involving heavy artillery shelling on Beri Pattan area without any physical infantry
attack was executed120. The shelling continued for two days and temporarily
disrupted movement of Indian supply convoys on road Akhnur-Nowshera121. The
Indians stopped offensive raids after this cannonade122. On 30th December the
Pakistani GHQ received a signal from the Indian GHQ requesting for ceasefire123
and finally on the midnight of 31 December 1948/01 January 1949 ceasefire came
into formal effect.

Thus ended the 1948 War as it is now remembered. The Official Pakistani history did
not give any figure of Pakistan Army casualties. The approximate Indian casualties
according to an author thus were124:-

a. KILLED —1,500
b. WOUNDED —3,500
c. MISSING —1,000
(INCLUDING PRISONERS)

Very few participants of the Kashmir War have left any written accounts of their war
experiences. General Iqbal who participated in the war and later on rose to the rank
of full general and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, long after the Kashmir
War made one very thought provoking remark about the Kashmir War in an article
in the Pakistan Army Green Book 1992. This particular publication was sub titled
‘Year of the Senior Field Commanders’. Iqbal wrote; ‘During 1948 Kashmir
Operations I saw one senior officer sitting miles behind the frontline and counting
availability of mules and rations. He had relegated the fighting to a senior battalion
commander 125’.

In 1963 once Major General Fazal I Muqueem Khan (Punjabi speaking although by
caste a Pathan from East Punjab) wrote ‘THE STORY OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY’ as a
serving officer and with blessings of Ayub Khan (being dedicated to Ayub,with a
foreword written by Musa the Army C-in-C) Fazal I Muqueem made a veiled remark
criticising the political government and particularly the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali
Khan (a Hindustani Muslim who was not forgiven for having been chosen by Mr
Jinnah as Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, by Punjabi Muslim leaders of that period in
particular) without naming Liaquat.Fazal thus wrote; ‘To the Army’s horror, Pakistan
during her greatest hour of triumph in Kashmir agreed to accept the ceasefire...it
was difficult to understand why Pakistan let that opportunity pass. Was it assumed
weakness; or as a result of pressing advice; or from misplaced chivalry towards an
unfriendly neighbour in distress? Whatever the reason,Pakistan’s reluctance to
accept the risks of continuing the war,cost her Kashmir at that time. It was a risk
worth taking126

In other words Fazal I Muqueem was saying that Pakistan lost Kashmir because that
accursed Hindustani was Pakistan’s Prime Minister!It may be noted that Liaquat
bashing has been a favourite pastime of Punjabi Muslim historians in Pakistan,and is
a favourite conversation topics in many Punjabi and Sindhi Muslim households.The
Hindustani Muslims on the other hand have been projecting Liaquat as Pakistan’s
greatest politician.As a matter of fact both these extreme positions are ridiculous
and a great distortion of history! Using Fazal’s criticism as an authority and a factual
basis; another historian mildly criticised Liaquat’s handling of Kashmir issue once he
said,’The decision of Liaqat’s government to accept the cease-fire in Kashmir at the
time it did ‘to the army’s horror’ (QUOTING FAZAL I MUQUEEM) also has been
criticised127. It is worth examining Fazal’s ridiculous allegations levelled like an old
pre 1947 one anna witness in a little more detail!Less than five lines will suffice to
prove the absence of any foundation of Fazal’s allegation.The Pakistani attack force
collected for Operation Venus consisted of about six infantry battalions and two
armoured regiments128.

To oppose this the Indians had two infantry brigades (50 Para Brigade and 80
Infantry Brigade) .In addition there were two armoured regiments in the same area
i.e. Central India Horse and the Deccan Horse129 . In addition the Indians also
possessed 14 other armoured regiments which were not in Kashmir but in Punjab or
Western UP and could move to Kashmir. We shall see in 1965 how Pakistani armour
functioned and the reader can keep that as a yardstick in order to appreciate how
Pakistani armour and infantry would have behaved in Operation Venus; had it been
ever launched!Fazal does not explain how capture Of Beri Pattan bridge would have
led to complete collapse of Indian hold over Kashmir,apart from temporary severing
of the line of communication to Poonch.Greater part of the Central India Horse was
at Nowshera close to Beri Pattan while Deccan Horse in Chamb-Akhnur area was
also within striking range and the battle would have been a hotly contested affair!
Shaukat Riza did not take the extreme viewpoint similar to Fazal’s when he wrote
his book on Pakistan Army.He merely said that ‘On December 30 both sides saw the
wisdom of cease-fire’.130 There is another aspect in Shaukat Riza’s case i.e. the
fact that once his book was being finalised and published in 1989 a Hindustani
Muslim i.e. General Aslam Beg was the Army Chief and the book’s final draft was
vetted and approved by the GHQ. An officer who worked with Shaukat Riza while
serving as a staff officer in GHQ confided to the author in 1993 that Shaukat Riza
despised Beg,due to some incident in East Pakistan in 1971, and felt that the GHQ
was not giving him a free hand in writing the book. There is no doubt that Shaukat’s
triology was heavily doctored and modified by too many cooks!In any case history
writing in Pakistan has remained an extremely dicey affair in which ulterior motives
of authors, based largely on ethnic biases play an instrumental role. Lately in an
article General K.M Arif adopted a more rational viewpoint, when he stated that the
Kashmir War of 1948 was mismanaged simply because Pakistan was not in a
position to fight it successfully summing it up by stating ; ‘It is too hazardous a risk
to fight a war on ad hoc basis’131
There is no doubt that Pakistan was in a favourable position to win the Kashmir War
at least till the first week of November. Mr Jinnah exhibited great Coup de Oeil when
he ordered Gracey to employ two brigades and advance with one brigade each
towards Jammu and Srinagar. But Mr Jinnah was unlucky in possessing no one like
Patel and his Prime Minister and his entire Cabinet proved to be an undoubted
failure at least as a war cabinet! Mr Jinnah’s decision not to have a Pakistani C in C
although taken in the best interest of the country and the Army as Mr Jinnah saw it
ensured that the British acting C in C procedurally blocked the execution of Mr
Jinnah’s orders in October to attack Kashmir. Pakistan was unlucky in having a man
like Iskandar Mirza at the Ministry of Defence.Mirza did not advise Mr Jinnah
correctly and the fact that he had hardly served in the Army and did not understand
military affairs further ensured that Mr Jinnah and the Prime Minister remained as
ignorant as they were about military affairs as they were when they were in high
school. It is incorrect to criticise Liaqat for Operation Venus since in December 1948
the Indian position was much more secure than in 1947.Liaqat can be criticised for
not ever visiting Kashmir while the war was on and for not standing by Mr Jinnah in
pressurising Gracey in October 1947 to order the Army to attack Kashmir.Had a
Pakistani C in C been appointed even in December or in March 1948 the Indians
may not have held on to Poonch-Nowshera area at least. Had Major Masud been
allowed with his armoured cars on Domel-Baramula Road despite Ghazanfar Ali and
Sher Khan’s objections;Srinagar may have been captured by the Tribesmen by first
week of November 1947. The Indians were lucky in having comparatively more
regular army officers who led from the front and is evident from higher officer
casualties among Indian Army officers above the rank of captain vis a vis the
Pakistan Army.The subsequent Pindi Conspiracy of 1950 was a logical result of
disgust of the army officers with the irresolute civilian political leadership as
exhibited during the 1948 war. We can say with the benefit of hindsight that if the
army did have to rule Pakistan as it later did from 1958;it would have been far
better had real soldiers and patriots taken over in 1950! These men after all were
men of crisis ; highly patriotic and outlook;and possessed an independent mind!
Ironically paper tiger soldiers with poor war record and naive intellect ; more
interested in improving their personal fortunes took over.A seal of essential
mediocrity despite an outwardly impressive form , was thus firmly stamped ; as far
as higher military leadership,doctrine and organisation was concerned; on the
Pakistan Army. But this was proved only fourteen years later in 1965!

LETTER FROM ASSISTANT POLITICAL AGENT NORTHERN AREAS 1947 TO ME

IN 2000