A Struggle for Cityhood by Albert Cong

The Supreme Court en banc, in a 24-page split decision penned by Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio dated November 18, 2008 entitled League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et. al. vs.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et. al., handed down a judgment declaring 16 Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional. Among the 16 newly-named cities affected by the decision are situated in
the Caraga Region, viz., Cabadbaran in Agusan del Norte, Bayugan in Agusan del Sur, and
Tandag in Surigao del Sur. And with that, the 16 cities are in a verge of losing their cityhood.

Apparently, the 16 municipalities began their quest for cityhood during the 11th Congress but
Congress was only able to act on their cityhood bills on the 13th Congress. During that time, the
16 municipalities, through their respective sponsors, filed individual cityhood bills, which all
contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the ₱100M income
requirement, a requirement set upon by Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which was enacted
into law during the 12th Congress. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code
by increasing the annual requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from ₱20M to
₱100M, and contains no exemptions. In the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the amendment
was to restrain the “mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence. But nevertheless, the cityhood bills lapsed into laws during the 13th Congress on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. The LCP later
questioned the conversion of municipalities into cities to protect their share of the IRA and thus
filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.

The high court’s decision was based on 7 key points, all of which centered on the so called
Cityhood Laws’ violation of Section 6, Article X (on the fair and just distribution of national taxes),
Section 10, Article X (on the criteria established in the Local Government Code), and Section 1,
Article III (on the equal protection clause) of the Constitution.

It upheld that RA 9009 is a prospective application of the law and that Congress, in creating a
city, must prescribe all the criteria found in the Local Government Code, without prescribing an
exemption thereagainst, i.e. the exemption from the ₱100M income requirement, because the
code in itself is clear, plain, and unambiguous and therefore requires no extrinsic aids, e.g.
deliberations of Congress. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in the code
(a violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution), they prevent the fair and just distribution
of the IRA (a violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution).

The criteria for exemption, too, is absent of a valid classification which is a violation of Section 1,
Article III. The Court said, “To be valid, the classification must rest on substantial distinctions; it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; it must not be limited to the existing conditions only;
and it must apply equally to all members of the same class.” There is no substantial distinction
between municipalities with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and those who do
not have pending cityhood bills. Limiting the exemption to the existing condition at the time of
the passage of RA 9009 and limiting the exemption only to 16 municipalities violate the
requirements that the classification must not be limited to the existing conditions only and must
apply equally to all members of the same class, respectively.

All these arguments, and more, led the Supreme Court to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional. In a last ditch effort to save their respective cities, all the 16 newly-named
cities consolidated their efforts in making a 53-page Motion for Reconsideration, now
represented by counsel Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, praying that the Court will reconsider its
previous decision. The motion argued that: first, there is no violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, second, there is no violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, and
third, there is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The motion stated that the intent of Congress through the provision entitled “Exemption from RA
9009”, did not come about as a result of whim or caprice but of circumstance which delayed
their enactment—since the 16 cities filed cityhood bills as early as the 11th Congress. Congress
merely followed the criteria set upon by the Local Government Code before it was amended by
RA 9009. It would also be important to note that there are 59 cities out of 117 cities now existing
with income of less than ₱100M as of 2006 and is changing from year to year. RA 9009 does not
provide that cities who do not meet the income requirement will ipso facto lose their status as
cities and revert to being municipalities. There are still cities, about 7 in number, that have an
income of less than ₱20M as of 2006. The “mad rush” reason behind the implementation of RA
9009 is without clear rational foundation, much less a fundamental constitutional purpose which
precludes Congress from providing the criteria in the Local Government Code effective at the
time the cityhood bills were filed and not when they were enacted. It also revealed that the IRAs
of the petitioner cities did not actually decrease, contrary to apprehension of their apprehension,
but actually increased after the implementation of the 16 Cityhood Laws, as data would reveal.
Therefore. they have no extant right of which they have been deprived, or discriminated against.
They also have no right to freeze the number of cities in an exact number. It is Congress that
determines that.

Now whether these arguments will merit the Court’s attention in deciding in favor of the
respondents will really depend upon the Court’s own prerogatives. However, let it be said that
the reversion from a city into a municipality have devastating effects. Right after they were
named cities, they initiated efforts in improving their respective localities, e.g., entering into
contacts to build much needed infrastructures constructed to help make lives better for
everyone, ranging from roads to bridges, from schools to healthcare facilities. When all these are
taken away, it is not the houses of the wealthy that will be at the mercy of the cascading winds
of change but it the shanty of the poor that will be blown away from the raging gale. As
petitioner cities have already harvested the fruits of the revenue apportioned to them; let it be
the time for others to gather the harvest that they have long dreamed of gleaning. I pray that
the highest magistrate of the land will see beyond the issue of monetary gain and traverse the
cries of the people who have felt great suffering and pain from the Courts declaration. But it is in
the immortal cry of Themistocles to Eurybiades: "Strike, but hear me first!" that we find comfort.