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The fire caused three firefighter fatalities (LODD) and injuries to 24 firefighters.
The USFA published a technical report (USFA-TR-049) on the One Meridian Plaza fire
that is still available for download from the USFA web site, HERE. The report clearly
defined the need in 1991, for built-in fire protection systems and reiterated the fact that
fire departments alone cannot expect or be expected to provide the level of fire protection
that modem high-rises demand. That fire protection must be built-in to the structures.
This was clearly illustrated in this event when the One Meridian Plaza fire was finally
stopped when it reached a floor where automatic sprinklers had been installed.One
Meridian Plaza was a 38-story high-rise office building, located in the heart of downtown
Philadelphia, in an area of high-rise and mid-rise structures. The building had three
underground levels, 36 above ground occupiable floors, two mechanical floors (12 and
38), and two rooftop helipads. The building was rectangular in shape, approximately 243
feet in length by 92 feet in width (approximately 22,400 gross square feet), with roughly
17,000 net usable square feet per floor. Site work for construction began in 1968, and the
building was completed and approved for occupancy in 1973.
• Origin and Cause: The fire started in a vacant 22nd floor office in a pile of
linseed oil-soaked rags left by a contractor. Fire Alarm System The activation of a
smoke detector on the 22nd floor was the first notice of a possible fire. Due to
incomplete detector coverage, the fire was already well advanced before the
detector was activated.
• Building Staff Response: Building employees did not call the fire department
when the alarm was activated. An employee investigating the alarm was trapped
when the elevator opened on the fire floor and was rescued when personnel on the
ground level activated the manual recall. The Fire Department was not called until
the employee had been rescued.
• Alarm Monitoring Service: The private service which monitors the fire alarm
system did not call the Fire Department when the alarm was first activated. A call
was made to the building to verify that they were aware of the alarm. The building
personnel were already checking the alarm at that time.
• Electrical Systems: Installation of the primary and secondary electrical power
risers in a common unprotected enclosure resulted in a complete power failure
when the fire-damaged conductors shorted to ground. The natural gas powered
emergency generator also failed.
• Fire Barriers: Unprotected penetrations in fire-resistance rated assemblies and
the absence of fire dampers in ventilation shafts permitted fire and smoke to
spread vertically and horizontally.
• Ventilation openings in the stairway enclosures permitted smoke to migrate into
the stairways, complicating firefighting.
• Unprotected openings in the enclosure walls of 22nd floor electrical closet
permitted the fire to impinge on the primary and secondary electrical power risers.
• Standpipe System and Pressure Reducing Valves (PRVs): Improperly installed
standpipe valves provided inadequate pressure for fire department hose streams
using 1 3/ 4-inch hose and automatic fog nozzles. Pressure reducing valves were
installed to limit standpipe outlet discharge pressures to safe levels. The PRVs
were set too low to produce effective hose streams; tools and expertise to adjust
the valve settings did not become available until too late.
• Locked Stairway Doors: For security reasons, stairway doors were locked to
prevent reentry except on designated floors. (A building code variance had been
granted to approve this arrangement.) This compelled firefighters to use forcible
entry tactics to gain access from stairways to floor areas.
• Fire Department Pre-Fire Planning: Only limited pre-fire plan information was
available to the Incident Commander. Building owners provided detailed plans as
the fire progressed.
• Firefighter Fatalities: Three firefighters from Engine Company 11 died on the
28th floor when they became disoriented and ran out of air in their SCBAs.
• Exterior Fire Spread: “Autoexposure” Exterior vertical fire spread resulted
when exterior windows failed. This was a primary means of fire spread.
• Structural Failures: Fire-resistance rated construction features, particularly
floor-ceiling assemblies and shaft enclosures (including stair shafts), failed when
exposed to continuous fire of unusual intensity and duration.
• Interior Fire Suppression Abandoned: After more than 11 hours of
uncontrolled fire growth and spread, interior firefighting efforts were abandoned
due to the risk of structural collapse.
• Automatic Sprinklers: The fire was eventually stopped when it reached the fully
sprinklered 30th floor. Ten sprinkler heads activated at different points of fire
penetration.
• The three firefighters who died were attempting to ventilate the center stair
tower: They radioed a request for help stating that they were on the 30th floor.
After extensive search and rescue efforts, their bodies were later found on the
28th floor. They had exhausted all of their air supply and could not escape to
reach fresh air. At the time of their deaths, the 28th floor was not burning but had
an extremely heavy smoke condition.
• After the loss of three personnel, hours of unsuccessful attack on the fire, with
several floors simultaneously involved in fire, and a risk of structural collapse, the
Incident Commander withdrew all personnel from the building due to the
uncontrollable risk factors. The fire ultimately spread up to the 30th floor where it
was stopped by ten automatic sprinklers.
Take the time to review this report and examine some of similar issues affecting the fire
service today in the areas of staffing and resources, construction and materials, building
codes, built-in fire suppression systems, training, pre-fire planning, fire load, fire
dynamics and the current methodologies on wind-drive fire theory.
• USFA TR-049 Highrise Office Building Fire, One Meridian Plaza Fire Report
HERE
• Also take a look at the issues that affected operations at the 1988 Interstate Bank
Fire in downtown Los Angeles, California.
Here’s a story posted today at the Phildalphia Daily News with insights on this
anniversary
One Meridian Plaza: 20 years ago, the fire that changed the nation By NATALIE
POMPILIO Philadelphia Daily News
When Jack Bloomer and the other firefighters arrived at One Meridian Plaza that cold
February night in 1991, flames were encompassing the building more than 20 stories
above, leaping from floor to floor. Smoke poured into the air, and broken glass rained
down.
“It was obvious when we pulled up it was an ugly-looking job,” Bloomer, 61,
remembered yesterday.
By the time the 12-alarm fire was declared under control 19 hours later, three firefighters
were dead, 12 others were injured and a Center City high-rise was lost. The blaze, 20
years ago today, changed the city’s skyline and the way the nation fights fires.
“When that fire happened, it was on the news all over the world,” said Chris Jelenewicz,
engineering program manager at the Maryland-based Society of Fire Protection
Engineers. “The One Meridian fire was one of the most significant fires in the history of
high-rise buildings.”
The fire changed Bloomer, who was driving Engine 11 that night. With him were Capt.
David Holcombe and Firefighters Phyllis McAllister and James Chappell.
Bloomer’s the only one who made it home. Read the entire article HERE
Jack Bloomer was the only survivor from his platoon. David Holcombe, Phyllis
McAllister and James Chappell perished in the Feb. 23 high-rise inferno
Excerpts: At about 8 p.m. on Saturday, 23 February 1991, linseed oil-soaked rags left
behind by a cleaning crew burst into flames on the 22nd floor of the 38-story One
Meridian Plaza in downtown Philadelphia. The fire quickly spread, unimpeded by fire
sprinklers, throughout the 22nd floor and then upward. Sprinklers were not required by
the City’s building code at the time of construction and were being added to the building
only as opportunity presented itself.
The twelve-alarm fire burned for 18 hours. The extreme heat caused window glass and
frames to melt and concrete floor slabs and steel beams to buckle and sag dramatically.
Large shards of window glass fell from the facade, cutting through fire hoses on the
ground around the building. Three firefighters were trapped on a fully engulfed floor, and
efforts to rescue them failed.
The fire would not yield and there were increasing concerns about the stability of the
structure. Fire officials called off the attack and allowed the fire to “free burn,”
concentrating their efforts on containing the fire to this building. When the fire reached
the 30th floor, a tenant-installed fire-sprinkler system was activated, and the worst high-
rise fire in U.S. history was finally brought under control.
On May 4, 1998, the 62-story First Interstate Bank Building in Los Angeles, California
experienced a devastating fire that damaged five of the building’s floors before it was
brought under control. It is thought that the fire was the result of an electrical
malfunction, but the cause was actually never determined. The building was in the
process of being retrofit with an automatic sprinkler system, which had been installed in
about 90 percent of the building, but was not operational at the time of the fire. Security
personnel dismissed initial fire and smoke alarms, which delayed the response of the fire
department by almost 15 minutes. Also contributing to the spread of the fire was the large
quantity of combustible materials on each floor, equipment penetrations and other
openings, and a standpipe system that had been shut down due to the sprinkler
installation. Firefighters were also forced to battle dangerous conditions that were created
by the failure of the glass façade and its subsequent fall to the ground below. The fire was
eventually extinguished with the internal standpipe system, but not before one death and
over 50 million dollars worth of damage (Routley 1988).
The fire at Schomburg Plaza was unusual in the fact that it originated in the upper
sections of a trash chute that serviced the 35-story apartment building. The March 22,
1987 fire started somewhere between the 27th and 29th floors, and then traveled up the
trash chute and through the walls into surrounding apartments. Investigations following
the fire found that sprinklers in the chute either failed to work because they were clogged,
or were not actually connected to the piping system. It was also determined that the
building was not built according to its plans, and therefore certain areas did not meet the
two hour fire rating required by code. A final issue was the initial response to the fire and
the misconception that it was a common compactor fire, as had been seen several times
before. Neither firefighters, nor dispatchers realized the severity of the fire, and initially
believed that it was under control, which created an even more dangerous situation. As a
result of this fire, seven people lost their lives (Schaenman 1987).
A more recent high-rise fire occurred on June 28, 2002, in an 11-story condominium
building in Clearwater, Florida. The fire originated in the kitchen of a fifth floor
apartment, and instead of pulling the fire alarm and alerting the fire department, the
tenant tried unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire. This delay allowed the blaze to grow for
17 minutes before the fire department was even notified. As firefighters arrived on the
scene they encountered several problems, including radio communication issues, closed
standpipe riser valves, and a damaged fire hydrant. Another issue was that some building
residents ignored fire alarms and failed to evacuate, believing that it was false alarm. The
building was not equipped with an automatic sprinkler system, and therefore several units
and the central hallway were heavily damaged by fire, smoke, and water before the blaze
was declared under control. In the end two people were killed and many more were
injured. The tragedy resulted in one million dollars worth of damage and the installation
of an automatic sprinkler system.
Feb. 24, 1991: A Medevac helicopter takes off from 15th Street about 1:30 a.m. Sunday
to take urgently needed fresh air bottles to the roof. The bottles were not in time for three
of the firefighters. (Mike Levin / Inquirer files)
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