TERM PAPER ON-INDIA –US NUCLEAR DEAL

HOW MUCH ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT

SUBMITTED TO- SUBMITTED BY-

MR.VISHVAS ANAMIKA SINGH
REG. NO-10906890
RS1902B57
 ACKNOWLWDGEMENT

I feel deep sense of gratitude in thinking all those who

helped me to carry out the term paper to its eventual
fruitition.I would like to take this opportunity to extend my
sincere gratitude to LOVELY PROFESSIONAL
UNIVERSITY for providing me with an opportunity to
prepare a term paper on research methodology.I would like
to express my most sincere gratitude to my Faculty guide
MR VISHVAS CHAKRANARAYAN, Lovely Professional
University – Phagwara for the constant guidance,
encouragement and motivation he extended for the term
paper.I also extended my gratitude to my friends,
classmates , well wishers and all those who helped me in
some way or other in the completion of term paper.
INDIA –US NUCLEAR DEAL- HOW MUCH
ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT

TABLE OF CONTENT

1]Introduction

[1]What are the terms of the deal?

[2]What kind of technology would India receive in return?
[3]What do proponents say about the deal?
[4]What are the objections to the agreement?
[5]Who needs to approve the agreement?
[6]What effect will the U.S.-India deal have on the NPT?
[7]What role does China play in the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal?

[8]What effect will the deal have on U.S. and Indian relations
with Pakistan?
[9]What’s the history of India’s nuclear program?

2] Objective of study
3] Literature Review
a) Article 1
b) Article 2
c) Article 3
d) Article 4
e) Article 5
f) Article 6
g) Article 7
h) Article 8
i)article 9

4) HYPOTHESIS

5)DATA BASE AND

METHODOLOGY
6)RESEARCH DESIGN
7)CONCLUSION
8) BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION:-U.S. President George W. Bush and

India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh exchange
handshakes in New Delhi on March 2, 2006.The Indo-U.S.
civilian nuclear agreement, known also as the Indo-U.S.
nuclear deal, refers to a bilateral accord on civil nuclear
cooperation between the United States of America and the
Republic of India. The framework for this agreement was a
July 18, 2005 joint statement by Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush,
under which India agreed to separate its civil and military
nuclear facilities and place all its civil nuclear facilities under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and,
in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full
civil nuclear cooperation with India. This U.S.-India deal took
more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go
through several complex stages, including amendment of
U.S. domestic law, a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in
India, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspections) agreement and
the grant of an exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly
in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974. In its final
shape, the deal places under permanent safeguards those
nuclear facilities that India has identified as "civil" and
permits broad civil

nuclear cooperation, while excluding the transfer of

"sensitive" equipment and technologies, including civil
enrichment and reprocessing items even under IAEA
safeguards. On August 18, 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors
approved and on February 2, 2009, India signed an India-
specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Once India
brings this agreement into force, inspections will begin in a
phased manner on the 35 civilian nuclear installations India
has identified in its Separation Plan.
The nuclear deal was widely seen as a legacy-building effort
by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh But while the
deal had to pass muster with the U.S. Congress twice (once
when the Hyde Act was passed in late 2006 to amend U.S.
domestic law and then when the final deal-related package
was approved in October 2008), Singh blocked the Indian
Parliament from scrutinizing the deal. The deal proved very
contentious in India and threatened at one time to topple
Singh's government, which survived a confidence vote in
Parliament in July 2008 by roping in a regional party as a
coalition partner in place of the leftist bloc that had bolted.
On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards
agreement with India after which the United States
approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant a
waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade. The 45-
nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6,
2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and
fuel from other countries. The implementation of this waiver
makes India the only known country with nuclear weapons
which is not a party to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but
is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of
the world.

The US House of Representatives passed the bill on 28

September 2008.Two days later, India and France inked a
similar nuclear pact making France the first country to have
such an agreement with India. On October 1, 2008 the US
Senate also approved the civilian nuclear agreement
allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from
the United States. U.S. President, George W. Bush, signed
the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal, approved by the
U.S. Congress, into law, now called the United States-India
Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation
Enhancement Act, on October 8, 2008. The agreement was
signed by Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee
and his counterpart Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on
10 October.

Overview:-
July 18, 2005: President Bush and Prime Minister Singh first
announce their intention to enter into a nuclear agreement
in Washington.

March 1, 2006: Bush visits India for the first time.

March 3, 2006: Bush and Singh issue a joint statement on

their growing strategic partnership, emphasising their
agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.
July 26, 2006: The US House of Representatives passes the
'Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act of 2006,' which stipulates that Washington
will cooperate with New Delhi on nuclear issues and exempt
it from signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

July 28, 2006: In India, the Left parties demand threadbare

discussion on the issue in Parliament.

November 16, 2006: The US Senate passes the 'United

States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US
Additional Protocol Implementation Act' to "exempt from
certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
United States exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and
technology to India."

December 18, 2006: President Bush signs into law

congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy.

July 27, 2007: Negotiations on a bilateral agreement

between the United States and India conclude.

Aug 3, 2007: The text of the 'Agreement for Cooperation

between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of
nuclear energy' (123 Agreement) is released by both
governments.

Aug 13, 2007: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh makes a suo

motu statement on the deal in Parliament.

Aug 17, 2007: The CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat

says the 'honeymoon (with government) may be over but
the marriage can go on'.

Sept 4, 2007: In India, the UPA-Left committee to discuss

nuclear deal set up.
Feb 25, 2008: Left parties in India say the ruling party would
have to choose between the deal and its government's
stability.

March 3–6, 2008: Left parties warn of 'serious consequences'

if the nuclear deal is operationalised and set a deadline
asking the government to make it clear by March 15 whether
it intended to proceed with the nuclear deal or drop it.

March 7–14, 2008: The CPI writes to the Prime Minister

Singh, warns of withdrawal of support if government goes
ahead with the deal and puts political pressure on the
Manmohan Singh government not to go with the deal.

April 23, 2008: The Indian Government says it will seek the
sense of the House on the 123 Agreement before it is taken
up for ratification by the American Congress.

June 17, 2008: External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee

meets Prakash Karat, asks the Left to allow the government
to go ahead with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards agreement.

June 30, 2008: The Indian Prime Minister says his

government prepared to face Parliament before
operationalising the deal.

July 8, 2008: Left parties in India withdraw support to

government.

July 9, 2008: The draft India-specific safeguards accord with

the IAEA circulated to IAEA's Board of Governors for
approval.

July 10, 2008: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh calls for a

vote of confidence in Parliament.

July 14, 2008: The IAEA says it will meet on August 1 to

consider the India-specific safeguards agreement.
July 18, 2008: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon briefs
the IAEA Board of Governors and some NSG countries in
Vienna on the safeguards agreement.

July 22, 2008: Government is willing to look at "possible

amendments" to the Atomic Energy Act to ensure that the
country's strategic autonomy will never be compromised,
says Prime Minister Singh.

July 22, 2008: The UPA government lead by Manmohan

Singh wins trust vote in the Lok Sabha in India.

July 24, 2008: India dismisses warning by Pakistan that the

deal will accelerate an atomic arms race in the sub-
continent.

July 24, 2008: India launches full blast lobbying among the
45-nation NSG for an exemption for nuclear commerce.

July 25, 2008: IAEA secretariat briefs member states on

India-specific safeguards agreement.

Aug 1, 2008: IAEA Board of Governors adopts India- specific

safeguards agreement unanimously.

Aug 21-22, 2008: The NSG meet to consider an India waiver

ends inconclusively amid reservations by some countries.

Sep 4-6, 2008: The NSG meets for the second time on the
issue after the US comes up with a revised draft and grants
waiver to India after marathon parleys.

Sept 11, 2008: President Bush sends the text of the 123
Agreement to the US Congress for final approval.

Sept 12, 2008: US remains silent over the controversy in

India triggered by President Bush's assertions that nuclear
fuel supply assurances to New Delhi under the deal were
only political commitments and not legally binding.

Sept 13, 2008: The State Department issues a fact sheet on

the nuclear deal saying the initiative will help meet India's
growing energy requirements and strengthen the non-
proliferation regime by welcoming New Delhi into globally
accepted nonproliferation standards and practices.

Sept 18, 2008: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee

kicks off a crucial hearing on the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Sept 19, 2008: America's nuclear fuel supply assurances to

India are a "political commitment" and the government
cannot "legally compel" US firms to sell a "given product" to
New Delhi, top officials tells Congressional panel.

Sept 21, 2008: US financial crisis diverts attention from N-

deal as both the Bush Administration and the Congress are
bogged down over efforts to rescue bankrupt American
banks. financial crisis in the country.

Sept 26, 2008: PM Singh meets President Bush at the White

House, but were not able to sign the nuclear deal as the
Congress did not approve it.

Sept 27, 2008: House of Representatives approves the Indo-

US nuclear deal. 298 members voted for the Bill while 117
voted against.

Oct 1, 2008: Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal

with 86 votes for and 13 against.

Oct 4, 2008: Secretary of State Rice visits Delhi. India and

the US unable to ink the nuclear agreement with New Delhi
insisting that it would do so only after President Bush signs it
into a law, an occasion when it expects certain misgivings to
be cleared.
Oct 4, 2008: White House announces that President Bush will
sign the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into a law on
October 8.

Oct 8, 2008: President Bush signs legislation to enact the

landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement.

Oct 10, 2008: The 123 Agreement between India and US is

finally operationalized between the two countries after the
deal is signed by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee
and his counterpart Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in
Washington D C.

TERMS OF THE DEAL

THE DETAILS OF THE DEAL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:
INDIA AGREES TO ALLOW INSPECTORS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY ASSOCIATION (IAEA), THE UNITED NATIONS' NUCLEAR
WATCHDOG GROUP, ACCESS TO ITS CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM . BY
MARCH 2006, INDIA PROMISED TO PLACE FOURTEEN OF ITS TWENTY-
TWO POWER REACTORS UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS PERMANENTLY.
TERESITA SCHAFFER, DIRECTOR OF THE SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM AT THE
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, SAYS THESE WILL
INCLUDE DOMESTICALLY BUILT PLANTS, WHICH I NDIA HAS NOT BEEN
WILLING TO SAFEGUARD BEFORE NOW. I NDIA HAS PROMISED THAT ALL
FUTURE CIVILIAN THERMAL AND BREEDER REACTORS SHALL BE PLACED
UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS PERMANENTLY . HOWEVER, THE INDIAN PRIME
MINISTER SAYS NEW DELHI "RETAINS THE SOLE RIGHT TO DETERMINE
SUCH REACTORS AS CIVILIAN." ACCORDING TO HIM : "THIS MEANS THAT
INDIA WILL NOT BE CONSTRAINED IN ANY WAY IN BUILDING FUTURE
NUCLEAR FACILITIES, WHETHER CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, AS PER OUR
NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS." MILITARY FACILITIES -AND STOCKPILES OF
NUCLEAR FUEL THAT INDIA HAS PRODUCED UP TO NOW -WILL BE EXEMPT
FROM INSPECTIONS OR SAFEGUARDS.
INDIA ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL (PDF)-WHICH
COMMITS TO SIGNING AN
ALLOWS MORE INTRUSIVE IAEA INSPECTIONS-OF ITS CIVILIAN FACILITIES.
INDIA AGREES TO CONTINUE ITS MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TESTING.
INDIA COMMITS TO STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF ITS NUCLEAR
ARSENALS.
INDIA WORKS TOWARD NEGOTIATING A FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF
TREATY (FMCT) WITH THE UNITED STATES BANNING THE PRODUCTION
OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES .I NDIA AGREES TO PREVENT
THE SPREAD OF ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES TO
STATES THAT DON 'T POSSESS THEM AND TO SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL
NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS.
U.S. COMPANIES WILL BE ALLOWED TO BUILD NUCLEAR REACTORS IN
INDIA AND PROVIDE NUCLEAR FUEL FOR ITS CIVILIAN ENERGY PROGRAM.
(AN APPROVAL BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP LIFTING THE BAN ON
INDIA HAS ALSO CLEARED THE WAY FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO MAKE
NUCLEAR FUEL AND TECHNOLOGY SALES TO I NDIA .)

KINDS OF TECHNOLOGY WHICH RECEIVE

BY INDIA IN RETURN
INDIA WOULD BE ELIGIBLE TO BUY U.S. DUAL -USE NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY , INCLUDING MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT THAT COULD BE
USED TO ENRICH URANIUM OR REPROCESS PLUTONIUM, POTENTIALLY
CREATING THE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR BOMBS. IT WOULD ALSO RECEIVE
IMPORTED FUEL FOR ITS NUCLEAR REACTORS .
INDIA – US NUCLEAR DEAL – THE BENEFITS

Ultimately the India – US Nuclear deal has to translate into

economics, commerce, trade, development and FDI.

At the moment, Indian Opposition politicians think that the

country’s independence and prestige have been sold out.

Economic benefits to US

If India sets up 10 large size nuclear power plants,

which is its intent in next 15 years, India will import
technology and hardware from US for at least half of these
projects (technology for the remaining may come from
elsewhere). Each of these plants at a green field site will cost
about $4 billion. In short, orders worth $15-20 billion could
be placed with the US companies in next 6 to 8 years.
Remaining orders may go to France, Germany, Canada and
UK. Fund for these installations will come to India either in
form of FDI or soft & commercial loans. Banks and
equipment manufacturers abroad will be delighted to make
this amount available to India. In return India will pay it back
with goods and services export, in the same way China did it
for the past 25 years. It is a win-win situation for the US
lenders and US suppliers. Further expansion of business
dealings on both sides will follow.

Another example of emerging Indo-US co-operation is in

the area of aerospace industry. Order for $8 Billion worth of
commercial airplanes has been placed with Boeing of
Seattle. Another big order for 125 military planes is on the
way. US parliamentarians have to work these big business
deals in their thinking prior their vote.

The high tech manufacturing industry is at a take off

stage in India. In last 3 months, announcements by big US
companies totaling $7 billion dollars investment have been
made. This has gone far beyond India’s expectations. This
sector together with IT services and BPO will power the US
industry and businesses into higher profitability and help
India accelerate its growth.

Co-operation in auto parts, pharmaceuticals, R & D and

defense industry cannot be ruled out. For each of these US is
looking for a low cost supplier, that could be alternative to
China.

Political Benefits to US

With a few strokes of pen, President Bush eliminated a

major Cold War irritant from the scene. India is not politically
and diplomatically aligned with US as Europe is, but India as
a strategic partner in ensuring safety of sea-lanes of the
Indian Ocean is very valuable. At the moment as long as US
stays in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world will perceive US as a
big bully. A major regional power, with a different outlook
than the European and the US is needed to cool the tempers
off. India has to step in to prevent further sliding of the
Middle East into anarchy.

Military Benefits to the US

US benefits immensely with India as a major military

power. Forty percent of worlds’ oil and commerce passes
through the Indian Ocean sea-lanes. These today are
unprotected. Pirates in the Red Sea and at the Malacca
Straits prey on commerce. Indian cooperation will be helpful
in keeping the sea-lanes free.

Another unstated benefit for US appears to be their

assessment that India could be a counter weight to a “rising
China” in the region. This is not the view of Indian policy
makers who believe that a constructive engagement with
China is more beneficial and not linked to any military or
strategic relationship with USA.
 Future military expansion in India to take up its role as
a regional player bids well for the US military hardware
suppliers. They will gain immensely over next 20 years.

What does India get out of the Deal?

Benefits to India are immense with this deal. First and
foremost, is the de-facto recognition of India as a nuclear
power? It is not clearly stated in the deal, but it’s an implicit
understanding. India missed this opportunity in 1970-78. It is
unlikely that this opportunity is to be missed again. Second,
is future recognition of India as a permanent UN Security
Council member? India has tried this in last three years. It
has not succeeded. It is unlikely to succeed in next 10 years.
But with a Trillion and a half dollar economy (8% growth over
ten years), India will make this grade. When UN reforming
movement gains strength in the future, India will be right
there and waiting for this opportunity.

Economic benefits to India

There is an urgent need in India for capital to build its

infrastructure and manufacturing base. And there is only one
source to get it i.e. US & Europe. US and Europe at this
moment are content with sending capital to China to supply
them with consumer goods. The former very cleverly had
avoided exporting manufacturing technology to supply high
priced, high technology capital goods to China. This
component together with auto-parts, pharmaceuticals and
computer hardware could herald India into big leagues in ten
years and beyond. Commercial Aircraft manufacture, ship
building, factories to make giant power plants, steel making
plants, mining & drilling hardware, petroleum &
petrochemical plant building facilities could be ultimately
shared with India. The latter within ten years will have a
workforce sufficiently skilled to undertake all the foregoing.
It will be beneficial to US. Labor costs in India, will always
stay a third of US, and European costs. That will make India
an ideal candidate for this technology transfer.
 Opportunity of the KPO (Knowledge Process Off-shoring)
is knocking at India’s door. Indian graduates of Science and
Engineering will play a major role in this expansion. In about
5 years KPO Off-shoring will grow immensely. India stands to
benefit most from it. Thanks to the edge, Indian science &
technology graduates have established.

Political Benefits to India

After 50 years of isolation, India will have the

opportunity to say something, in world forums like UN, WTO
and World monetary lending institutions, and be heard. This
was not the case previously. Reasons – India had no clout.
With western economies in the future, tied more and more
with India, the latter’s clout will improve. There will be
frequent inter-government exchanges on matters of mutual
interest. India could become a full member of the select
group of G-8 members. Gone will be the days that US
politicians will heap scorn on India, the way they are doing it
today. The Indo – US Nuclear deal is in fact dumping the past
and unlocking the hidden potential of the future. In addition
Pakistan may get the cue and begin a rethink of its policies
towards India.

Military Benefits to India

Indian military is in need to diversify its sourcing of

military hardware. Russia has been a very reliable source for
the past 40 years. This source has to be diversified.
Ultimately all military hardware will have to be produced in
India. But development time in India is too long and success
factor is low. This has to be speeded up. The only way at
India’s disposal is buy its immediate needs and import
technology to develop its own weapon system. It is a bit
expensive up front but pays dividend later as India joins the
select group of countries as a source of military hardware.

Technological Leapfrog
 The immediate benefit would be in getting the latest
technology for nuclear power generation. Current progress in
India on building its own nuclear power plants at best has a
failing grade. Most of nuclear power plants in India are of
other country’s design. The Indian Department of Atomic
Energy falsely clings to the view that Fast Breeder Reactors
will allow India to bridge the nuclear gap in the future. That
future may be difficult to arrive. It may be too distant. This
will hold economic development as hostage. Moreover
developing nuclear technology is one thing, implementing it
is another. For even homegrown technology, India will have
to import critical components.

US Congress and its Support

The support of US Congress is crucial to the deal. This is

a major headache, Bush Administration have to deal with.
Currently, US Nuclear Lobby Group has the ear of the US
Congress. The latter has become hostage to its past
fallacies. They enacted bad laws in the past and are having
difficulty modifying them. Now it is for the US Congress to
redeem itself by changing the bad laws.

What role does China play in the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal?

It is a motivating factor in the deal, some experts say.
China's rise in the region is prompting the United States to
seek a strategic relationship with India. "The United States is
trying to cement its relationship with the world's largest
democracy in order to counterbalance China," CFR's
Ferguson says. The Bush administration is "hoping that
latching onto India as the rising star of Asia could help them
handle China," Sokolski says.
Some experts say the growing economic relationship
between China and India is so critical to New Delhi that its
interests in China cannot be threatened or replaced by any
agreement with the United States. Other experts worry U.S.
nuclear aid to India could foster a dangerous nuclear rivalry
between India and China. Though India has a strong interest
in building economic relations with China, New Delhi is still
wary of China's military rise in the region.

What effect will the deal have on U.S. and Indian relations
with Pakistan?
Pakistan has not received a similar deal on nuclear energy
from Washington. Some experts say this apparent U.S.
favoritism toward India could increase the nuclear rivalry
between the intensely competitive nations, and potentially
raise tensions in the already dangerous region. "My
impression is that [the Pakistanis] are worried this will feed
the Indian nuclear weapons program and therefore weaken
deterrence," Blackwill said. Other experts say the two
countries, both admittedly now nuclear, could be forced to
deal more cautiously with each other. Pakistan is already a
proliferation risk: Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan's illicit
nuclear network, revealed in 2004, shocked the world with
its brazen trade of nuclear technology. Some experts worry
the U.S.-India deal could prompt Pakistan to go elsewhere,
for instance to China, for similar terms.

What’s the history of India’s nuclear program?

In the 1950s, the United States helped India develop nuclear
energy under the Atoms for Peace program. The United
States built a nuclear reactor for India, provided nuclear fuel
for a time, and allowed Indian scientists study at U.S. nuclear
laboratories. In 1968, India refused to sign the NPT, claiming
it was biased. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear bomb,
showing it could develop nuclear weapons with technology
transferred for peaceful purposes. As a result, the United
States isolated India for twenty-five years, refusing nuclear
cooperation and trying to convince other countries to do the
same. But since 2000, the United States has moved to build
a "strategic partnership" with India, increasing cooperation
in fields including spaceflight, satellite technology, and
missile defense.
Objective of the study:-My objective of the
study to find the terms of the deal,benefits to this
deal,objection to this deal.

LITERATURE REVIEW:-

ARTICLE-1]India, US seal nuclear deal: 'Satisfactory

understanding' reached on civilian, military separation

PUBLISHER-Businessline. Chennai: Mar 3, 2006.

India and the US today crossed a major milestone in civil

nuclear cooperation after the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan
Singh, and the visiting US President, Mr George Bush,
reached an understanding on the implementation of the July
18, 2005 agreement on this issue

"I have conveyed to the President that India has finalised the
identification of civilian facilities to which we had committed.
I was also happy to hear from the President that he now
intends to approach the US Congress to amend US laws and
the Nuclear Supplier Group to adjust its guideline. We will
discuss with the International Atomic Energy Agency in
regard to fashioning an appropriate India-specific safeguards
agreement. You will appreciate I cannot say more now, while
our Parliament is in session," the Prime Minister told the
media at a joint conference with Mr Bush after their nearly
an hour-and-half bilateral discussions
India had also made it clear that classification of nuclear
reactors to be built in future would be its sole decision and
there would be no debate on it, official sources said

Apart from the nuclear deal, the two countries also agreed to
cooperate in a number of areas such as trade and economy,
energy security and clean environment, for innovation and
the knowledge economy, for global safety and security and
for deepening democracy and meeting international
challenges

In the field of trade and economy, the two leaders agreed to

consider the recommendations of the Indo-US CEO Forum
and endorse the efforts of the India-US Trade Policy Forum to
reduce barriers to trade and investment with the goal of
doubling bilateral trade in three years

Investment summit Dr Singh and Mr Bush also agreed to

advance mutually beneficial bilateral trade and investment
flows by holding a high-level public-private investment
summit in 2006 and continuing with the efforts to facilitate
and promote foreign direct investment and eliminate
impediments to it

Trade cooperation The two sides will also enhance bilateral

consultations on various issues including tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade in goods and services and preventing the
illicit use of the financial system. The Prime Minister and the
US President also welcomed the US Department of
Commerce's plan to create a licence exception for items that
would otherwise require an export licence to end-users in
India engaged solely in civilian activities. The two countries
have also decided to expand cooperation in agriculture

Mr Bush also indicated that the US might expand the number

of H1B visas for Indian scientists, engineers and physicists.
He also told Dr Singh that "oh, by the way, Mr Prime Minister,
the United States is looking forward to eating Indian
mangoes." So far, the US did not allow import of mangoes
from India.

ARTCLE-2] IT IS GOOD FOR INDIA.

PUBLISHER-BUSINESS LINE, February 14, 2006

 Though the former Prime Minister, Mr V. P. Singh, had earlier
supported India's nuclear agreement with the US, he has
now urged the UPA Government to consult scientists on the
pros and cons before finalising the country's strategy on the
India-US civilian nuclear agreement. The suggestion is to be
welcomed since the US is making fresh demands on India,
such as allowing it (the US) to inspect India's fast breeder
reactors. And India keeps yielding in the hope that one day
US Congress will ratify the nuclear agreement. It has become
a moot point whether this agreement will serve India's
national interests.

ARTICLE-3] India-US nuclear deal : Good intentions, bad

bargain

PUBLISHER-Businessline. Chennai: Aug 1,

Abstract (Summary)
Was the US Congress made aware at the Committee stage
itself that India regarded as particularly pernicious the
provisions to the following effect: (a) binding India to
forswear all future tests even when China or Pakistan, for
example, posed a threat to its security by carrying out
further tests of their own, in collusion or independently; (b)
barring India from enriching and reprocessing the spent fuel
without the prior consent of the US; (c) forbidding it from
participating in any collaborative project on imports of fuel
or reactors or on developing fuel cycle technologies without
the US approval or participation; and (d) prescribing a cap on
fissile material? Has the Government drawn up a medium-
and long-term perspective plan for civil nuclear energy and
secured a guarantee from the US Administration of
unhindered supply, without subjecting it to the stop-go
tactics for political reasons as it did in the case of foodgrains
shipments in earlier times, of requirements of nuclear fuel,
reactors and equipment and associated technology in line
with it? New Delhi, for good reasons, does not want to
commit itself to any India-specific safeguards to be
negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) until after the Congressional enactment and the
modification of the Nuclear Suppliers Group ground rules in
keeping with it become a settled fact.

Is the Prime Minister implying that in case the "end product"

is not to its liking, India may even go back on the [George
Bush]-[Manmohan Singh] agreement? The possibility of
India, Samson-like, tearing down at one stroke the elaborate
diplomatic and legislative edifice that had been erected with
such fanfare and trumpet these last 13 months is simply too
calamitous to contemplate. It will leave India-US relations in
a shambles for as long as one can foresee, with the
additional danger of India being blackballed by the
international community as an irresponsible .

In this background, Dr Singh cannot be faulted if he thought

that India should not face the double jeopardy of banking on
depleting reserves of coal, oil and natural gas and falling
behind in its efforts to develop the full potential of nuclear
energy at a pace rapid enough to take India on a growth
trajectory of 10 per cent or more.

ARTICLE-4] The nuclear fallout

PUBLISHER-Businessline. Chennai: Oct 11, 2006.

Abstract (Summary)
Devastating war Whether he was popular or hated within his
own country when at the pinnacle of his power is of
academic interest here, the main point of concern being that
the US had no business in unleashing a devastating war on
the Iraqi people (solely to get rid of the Iraqi President) for a
reason (the Weapons of Mass Destruction issue) which is
being described today as a figment of someone's
imagination either in the CIA or the Pentagon, or both.
Admittedly, Washington not only attained its objective,
namely, getting rid of Mr [Saddam Hussein], it was also
successful in apprehending the erstwhile dictator alive,
which has today led to the spectacle of the Iraqi President
being tried in a "court of law," something akin to the
Nuremberg trials which saw the victor sitting in judgement
over the vanquished

Impact on India-US deal Who knows, it is also just possible

that the Pakistan-China axis did not introduce a spoke into
the North Korean nuclear-detonation wheel on the premise
that a nuclear test would add to the problems already being
faced by the India-US nuclear deal, which is certainly not in
the best interests of either Islamabad or Beijing.

To some people, the exploding of a nuclear device by North

Korea is probably the best answer any nation could have
given to Washington's recent depredations, the most notable
example of which was the full-scale military assault against
Iraq on a premise which till now has turned out to be false

This is not to suggest that Mr Saddam Hussein has been an

exemplary leader, so to speak, or that he needs to be
emulated in any way by other politicians of the developing
world. Neither has he been a martyr to any cause, least of all
to the cause of the traditional poor-country underdog who
has time and again fallen prey to the rapacity of the rich and
the powerful throughout history. In the eyes of the world at
large, Mr Saddam Hussein has been a dictator, brooking no
opposition to himself or his kin, and trusting no one, perhaps
not even his own shadow.

Devastating war Whether he was popular or hated within his

own country when at the pinnacle of his power is of
academic interest here, the main point of concern being that
the US had no business in unleashing a devastating war on
the Iraqi people (solely to get rid of the Iraqi President) for a
reason (the Weapons of Mass Destruction issue) which is
being described today as a figment of someone's
imagination either in the CIA or the Pentagon, or both.
Admittedly, Washington not only attained its objective,
namely, getting rid of Mr Hussein, it was also successful in
apprehending the erstwhile dictator alive, which has today
led to the spectacle of the Iraqi President being tried in a
"court of law," something akin to the Nuremberg trials which
saw the victor sitting in judgement over the vanquished.

One way of looking at the North Korean nuclear-device

detonation is to see it as a message to Washington that,
despite Iraq, the US does not always have the last word on
international affairs. In fact, Pyongyang went ahead with the
detonation even after Washington held out all sorts of
threats to the north Asian country, including the threat of
economic sanctions - which certainly is something the North
Koreans can do without

Beijing in loop? Since an issue of such wide-ranging global

dimensions is involved, one cannot be blamed if one allows
one's mind to wander in search of possible connexions
between the Korean test and other world capitals,
particularly those which are not too happy with the strategic
position in which the US finds itself in today. Despite the
maverick propensities of Pyongyang under the father-son
rule lasting for nearly 60 years, it is just possible that Beijing
was kept in the loop, so to speak, right from the beginning of
the process which led up to Monday's detonation

This does not seem to be too far-fetched an idea (even with

the new Communists being in charge of the CCP) considering
the proposition that, given China's position in the comity of
nations today, anything that can be seen to affect adversely
the American image can be seen to help Beijing directly or
indirectly
Impact on India-US deal Who knows, it is also just possible
that the Pakistan-China axis did not introduce a spoke into
the North Korean nuclear-detonation wheel on the premise
that a nuclear test would add to the problems already being
faced by the India-US nuclear deal, which is certainly not in
the best interests of either Islamabad or Beijing

The die has now been cast, and it will be interesting to see
how nations which have detonated hundreds of nuclear
devices since the end of the Second World War till the mid-
1990s band together to punish the newest poor-country
entrant to their club.

ARTICLE-5] Future of India-US nuclear deal

PUBLISHER-Businessline. Chennai: Aug 25, 2006.

Abstract (Summary)
The Agreement was carefully crafted to assure India
continued supply of nuclear fuel and guarantee the
continuity of our nuclear weapons programmes, while
expressing India's willingness to participate constructively in
such international initiatives as concluding a Fissile Material
Cut off Treaty

While India pledged to maintain its unilateral moratorium on

nuclear testing, we have always made it clear that the
moratorium permitted us to carry out nuclear tests
necessitated by "extraordinary events". Our unilateral
moratorium was certainly not a signal that India would
accept a de facto Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban in
perpetuity

Given the continuing clandestine transfer of nuclear

weapons materials, designs and know-how between China
and Pakistan and the growing strength of nuclear weapons
and missile capabilities in our neighbourhood, it would be
foolish for India to accede to any Treaty ending fissile
material production, unless all China's nuclear facilities are
subject to the same rigours of international inspection as
those of India.

Despite the Prime Minister's clear enunciation of what

precisely India will and will not accept in any legislation
passed by the US Congress, it is clear that it will be difficult
to conclude a mutually acceptable agreement with the US on
nuclear cooperation in the face of several ground realities. It
would be useful, though, to find the diplomatic space to
conclude such an agreement, says G. PARTHASARATHY

After having wasted huge amounts of public money for two

weeks on puerile controversies generated by the foibles two
former Foreign Ministers, Messrs Jaswant Singh and Natwar
Singh, the Members of the Rajya Sabha showed they are
capable of raising Parliamentary debate to very high levels
that the country can be proud of, on August 17, when the
Indo-US nuclear deal came up for debate and discussion

The Left Parties pointed out the serious implications of long-

term dependence on nuclear fuel from the US for the
independence of our foreign policy

The BJP established the dangerous implications for national

security of provisions in the proposed US legislation,
designed to "cap, roll back and eliminate" our nuclear
weapons capabilities

The Treasury Benches came up with spirited replies. But,

above all, the day belonged to Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, who came out with a high-voltage Parliamentary
performance, combining nostalgia and emotion with a clear
enunciation of what precisely India would and would not
accept in any legislation passed by the US Congress
The July 18, 2005 Agreement between President Bush and Dr
Manmohan Singh was a historic attempt to end three
decades of international sanctions and isolation that India
has faced from the US and the 45-member US-led Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG)

The Agreement was carefully crafted to assure India

continued supply of nuclear fuel and guarantee the
continuity of our nuclear weapons programmes, while
expressing India's willingness to participate constructively in
such international initiatives as concluding a Fissile Material
Cut off Treaty.

While India pledged to maintain its unilateral moratorium on

nuclear testing, we have always made it clear that the
moratorium permitted us to carry out nuclear tests
necessitated by "extraordinary events". Our unilateral
moratorium was certainly not a signal that India would
accept a de facto Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban in
perpetuity.

The Legislation proposed by the Senate International

Relations Committee and the House of Representatives
clearly violates all these understandings. On March 7, 2006
Dr Manmohan Singh announced that "the United States will
support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of
nuclear fuel" for the lifetime of imported reactors and that
both countries will jointly convene a "group of friendly
countries like Russia, France and the UK" to restore fuel
supply to India in the event of a US cut off.

The conditionalities The Legislation now proposed states that

not only does the US Congress require annual certification of
India's compliance with its views on extraneous issues, such
as relations with Iran, but also requires the US to get other
members of the NSG to end nuclear cooperation with India, if
so required by US laws.
Given our past experience when fuel supplies that the US
had guaranteed for the Tarapur Power Plant from 1963 to
1993 were unilaterally terminated and the Clinton
Administration's efforts to coerce countries like France and
Russia to end nuclear cooperation with India, it would be
naive to expect that another President, with views and
priorities like Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton, in the White
House, two years from now, would be as friendly and
forthcoming as President Bush.

Dr Manmohan Singh has also assuaged concerns about our

strategic nuclear weapons programme by making it clear
that provisions mandating an end to nuclear fuel supplies in
the event of another nuclear test were unacceptable.

It should be evident from this that India will not accept

conditions that the Senate International Relations Committee
is seeking to impose, which would prohibit us from carrying
out hydronuclear tests, which are essential to establish the
reliability of our nuclear weapons systems

He has also clarified that India will join a FMCT only if such a
Treaty, which would involve our ending production of
enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons, is
"non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and verifiable"

Given the continuing clandestine transfer of nuclear

weapons materials, designs and know-how between China
and Pakistan and the growing strength of nuclear weapons
and missile capabilities in our neighbourhood, it would be
foolish for India to accede to any Treaty ending fissile
material production, unless all China's nuclear facilities are
subject to the same rigours of international inspection as
those of India

Research and disarmament One hopes that, in future

Parliamentary debates, an assurance will be given by the
Government that that there will be no shortage of funds
provided to our nuclear research establishment, for our
indigenous fast breeder reactor programme

We should be proud of the fact that India is one of the world

leaders in the development of thorium-based power reactor
technologies

Despite the scepticism that has been voiced about this

programme by some well-meaning foreign experts, energy
security can by guaranteed only by the success of this
programme and not by dependence on imports. It should be
evident that even strenuous efforts by President Bush will
not lead to unacceptable conditions currently placed by the
US Congress being withdrawn from the final legislation that
will emerge from both Houses of the US Congress

It is also going to be difficult to conclude a mutually

acceptable bilateral agreement with the US on nuclear
cooperation in the face of these ground realities, though it
would be useful to find diplomatic space for concluding such
an agreement

We also need to see how the NSG ends its sanctions and how
countries like France, Russia and the UK respond to
opposition to the removal of sanctions from Scandinavian
countries and members of the "New Agenda Coalition,"
which still cherish fond illusions that India will "cap, roll back
and eliminate" its nuclear weapons programme

We have for the past few years played a less than active role
in promoting the cause of global and verifiable nuclear
disarmament, losing the moral high ground we had earlier,
primarily out of fears of American opposition. A renewed
push for such global nuclear disarmament should be high on
our diplomatic agenda

Over the past two years there has been a noticeable drift in
our national security policies. We now have no Central
legislation to deal with terrorism
Our missile programme is in the doldrums with inadequate
testing of missiles like the Agni 1 and Agni 2 and the failure
of the much delayed Agni 3 test

Our Air Force is grossly under strength, with programmes for

new acquisitions proceeding at a leisurely pace. One
wonders whether our Nuclear Command Authority ever
meets

While Dr Manmohan Singh has resorted to new and

imaginative ways to carry forward the dialogue with Pakistan
on all issues, including that of Jammu and Kashmir, resort to
"out of the box" thinking on issues like a withdrawal of forces
from Siachen, without demarcating existing positions, could
well prove costly for future generations

One would do well to remember that Gen Musharraf was

emboldened to intrude across the LOC in Kargil in 1999 after
India had lost the qualitative edge it enjoyed earlier,
following drastic reductions in the Defence budget in the
early 1990s.

ARTICLE-6] : Nuclear deal: India, US close to final

agreement

PUBLISHER-Businessline. Chennai: Jul 22, 2007.

Abstract (Summary)
India and the US came closer to a final agreement on a
historic civil nuclear deal after reporting "substantial
progress" in the ongoing official- level talks over the US-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, including the bilateral
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, also known as
the '123 agreement'. This follows four days of intense
discussions in Washington between the Foreign Secretary,
Mr Shivshankar Menon, and the US Under Secretary of State,
Mr Nicholas Burns, to resolve differences on outstanding
issues, including India's rights over fuel reprocessing and the
fate of the deal if India were to conduct a nuclear test in the
future.

India and the US came closer to a final agreement on a

historic civil nuclear deal after reporting "substantial
progress" in the ongoing official- level talks over the US-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, including the bilateral
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, also known as
the '123 agreement'. This follows four days of intense
discussions in Washington between the Foreign Secretary,
Mr Shivshankar Menon, and the US Under Secretary of State,
Mr Nicholas Burns, to resolve differences on outstanding
issues, including India's rights over fuel reprocessing and the
fate of the deal if India were to conduct a nuclear test in the
future. The US State Department spokesperson on Saturday
issued a statement saying: "...The discussions were
constructive and positive, and both Under Secretary Mr
Burns and Foreign Secretary Mr Menon are pleased with the
substantial progress made on the outstanding issues in the
123 agreement. We will now refer the issue to our
Governments for final review." It added that both the US and
India look forward to the completion of these remaining
steps and to the conclusion of this "historic initiative". The
'123 agreement' basically aims to capture all operational
aspects of the deal, which was agreed upon by the US
President, Mr George W. Bush, and the Prime Minister, Dr
Manmohan Singh, on July 18, 2005, and reiterated in a joint
statement on March 2, 2006

Once the Government approvals are in place, the pact

needs to be cleared by the US Congress. India also needs to
sign an additional protocol with the International Atomic
Energy Agency and get the approval of the 45-nation
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The progress on the deal
gives a shot in the arm for the Indian nuclear power
programme by reversing three decades of US sanctions and
opening up access to $100-billion worth of American
business opportunity, besides access to nuclear technology
and fuel from NSG countries. The Centre is also in the
process of finalising coastal sites for imported Light Water
Reactors-based projects and is looking at large capacity
nuclear power plants of 6,000-8,000 MW

The Government's Integrated Energy Policy has set a

target to generate 63,000 MW of power from nuclear
resources by 2032. Work is also on for amending the Atomic
Energy Act to involve the private sector in nuclear
generation. At present, the State-owned Nuclear Power
Corporation and its sister-concern Bhavini are the only
organisations permitted to operate in the nuclear generation
business. Copyright 2007 Business Line

ARTICLE-7] : 'India, US civil nuclear ties will benefit both'

PUBLISHER-Businessline. Chennai: Jul 28, 2007.

Abstract (Summary)
Narayanan said that all of India's concerns have been
adequately addressed in the agreement and that the
strategic programme will remain unaffected, he added. "We
have got a very good deal, which we believe should meet
individual legal requirements of both the countries." He
added that the deal upholds India's rights to reprocess spent
fuel in national safeguarded facilities.
India and the US today formally announced the conclusion
of negotiations on a bilateral accord on civilian nuclear
energy co-operation, which will govern nuclear trade
between the two countries and open the door for American
firms to participate in India's atomic power programme.

In a joint statement issued simultaneously in New Delhi and

Washington, the two Governments said: "Civil nuclear co-
operation between the US and India will offer enormous
strategic and economic benefits to both countries, including
enhanced energy security, a more environmentally-friendly
energy source, greater economic opportunities and more
robust non-proliferation efforts." Speaking to newspersons,
National Security Advisor Mr M.K.

Narayanan said that all of India's concerns have been

adequately addressed in the agreement and that the
strategic programme will remain unaffected, he added. "We
have got a very good deal, which we believe should meet
individual legal requirements of both the countries." He
added that the deal upholds India's rights to reprocess spent
fuel in national safeguarded facilities

India has to reach an agreement with the IAEA on safeguards

The 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) also has to

approve the agreement, after which the US President will
submit the text to the US Congress for approval

Foreign Secretary Mr Shiv Shankar Menon said that once all

clearances are in place, civilian nuclear trade is expected to
take off

Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Dr Anil Kakodkar said

that he was satisfied with the deal and that there was broad
consensus within the scientific community

ARTICLE-8] India-US nuclear deal in last lap

PUBLISHER-Hindustan times.sep29, 2007.

The House of Representatives approved the India-US civilian

nuclear agreement 298-117 with one member voting present
early on Sunday India time.

The Senate majority leader has also promised a vote this

week in his chamber.
President Bush hailed the passage of House Resolution 7081,
on the US-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and
Nonproliferation En- hancement Act, as another step forward
in the transformation of the relationship between the
countries.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh welcomed the US House of

Representatives passing the 123 Agreement and hoped that
the Senate too will approve it soon.

"I am happy that one hurdle has been crossed," said PM

Manmohan Singh.

"It is not the end of the Congressional process and we need

to wait for the final outcome," the Prime Minister said, while
on his way to France from the US. The PM will be in France
for till October 1.

On Sunday, Bush urged the Senate to "quickly take up and

pass this important piece of legislation before their October
adjournment".

While the Bill mustered a two-thirds majority in the House, it

was a step-down from the 359-68 tally for the Hyde Act. In a
house of 435 members, 416 were present. Of the
Democrats, 120 voted for and 107 against. The Republicans
voted 178-10.

Sources in the PM's delegation said President Bush has

assured the inconvenient riders in the accompanying bill of
123 will be "resolved to India's complete satisfaction". The
official said the President did not put up any conditions from
his side.

On his way to France, Manmohan Singh said, he was "looking

forward" to his meeting with President Sarkozy", who as
chairperson of the EU will be presiding over the India-EU
summit.
Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar and
union commerce minister Kamal Nath later joined the PM's
delegation in France.

During his stay in the US, the PM also met Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao, Pakistan President Asif Zardari, UK PM Gordon
Brown and prime minister of Norway and Netherlands.

ARTICLE-9] India-US Nuclear Deal : The politics of

proliferation
Anonymous.
PUBLISHER- Businessline. Chennai: Jan 25, 2007.
Abstract (Summary)
In the meantime, US President Jimmy Carter had moved with
Evangelical zeal to force India to sign the NPT by threatening
to cut off supplies for the Tarapur Plant (which the US was
treaty bound to provide), unless India placed all its nuclear
facilities under international safeguards and became a de
facto member of the NPT. The Janata Party Government
dithered on this issue, but the Americans found in 1980 that
Indira Gandhi would not yield and proposed an "amicable
disengagement" on the Tarapur issue, with India getting
nuclear fuel supplies from France.

The Latest Deal It is in this background that one has to

evaluate the significance of the July 18, 2005 "Nuclear Deal"
with the US. Despite strong domestic opposition by
entrenched lobbies that considered India's nuclear weapons
programme either directly or indirectly a threat to US
security, Mr [George Bush] became the first American
President to challenge this "conventional wisdom," thereby
changing a US policy that had been in vogue for four
decades. More important, the Agreement - whose basic
requirement was that India places its peaceful nuclear
facilities under safeguards in return for an end to global
sanctions - was first proposed by one of India's most
distinguished nuclear scientists, Dr Raja Ramanna.
Not surprisingly, opponents to the deal sought to introduce
provisions that would be "deal breakers," such as a
mandatory cut off of fuel supplies in the event of India being
compelled to conduct further nuclear tests and demanding
that India adopt a foreign policy congruent to that of the US.
Moreover, the legislation seeks to cap India's nuclear
weapons programme by calling for measures to ensure an
early cut off of fissile material production for weapons by
India.
Challenging a 40-year US policy, President George Bush may
have signed a nuclear deal with India, but New Delhi still has
to reckon with the international sanctions for not acceding to
the NPT, and deal with the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Considering these issues, India must proceed cautiously
before signing contracts for the import of large power
reactors, says G. PARTHASARATHY.

Alarm bells rang in Moscow and Washington when China

conducted its first nuclear weapons test on October 16,
1964. India also woke up to the capabilities of a nuclear-
armed China that had less than two years earlier invaded it,
crossing the once impregnable Himalayas.

In 1965, US President Lyndon Johnson appointed a high-

power commission to suggest new directions to American
policy. The Commission that included then CIA Director Allen
Dulles rejected the suggestion that China should be
countered by assisting India and Japan to go nuclear. It
proposed that dialogue with China and the Soviet Union
should be intensified to prevent new entrants to the nuclear
club. It concluded that possession of nuclear weapons by
others would erode American global influence and would
"eventually constitute direct military threats to the USA".

The NPT is born Working hand-in-glove with its principal

adversary, the Soviet Union, the US won widespread
approval for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that
sought to effectively block new entrants to the nuclear club.
China denounced the NPT as a symbol of "hegemony", but
had no hesitation in joining the Treaty in 1992, when it
decided the time was ripe to gain international respectability
as a "responsible power" by doing so.

After initially pressuring India to accede to the NPT, Moscow

soon changed its tune on Indian nuclear imperatives, after
its border conflict with China in 1969. No objection was
voiced to India's nuclear test in 1974. When American
pressure on India mounted on fuel supplies for the Tarapur
Power Plant built with US assistance, Moscow offered to help
India.

In the meantime, US President Jimmy Carter had moved with

Evangelical zeal to force India to sign the NPT by threatening
to cut off supplies for the Tarapur Plant (which the US was
treaty bound to provide), unless India placed all its nuclear
facilities under international safeguards and became a de
facto member of the NPT. The Janata Party Government
dithered on this issue, but the Americans found in 1980 that
Indira Gandhi would not yield and proposed an "amicable
disengagement" on the Tarapur issue, with India getting
nuclear fuel supplies from France.

Requiring Islamabad's assistance to defeating the Soviet

Union in Afghanistan, the Americans looked the other way
for a decade as Pakistan developed nuclear weapons
through a network of clandestine imports and Chinese
assistance.

Free hand for Pakistan The Americans "discovered" that

Pakistan had a nuclear weapons programme only after the
Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. China, however,
continued nuclear assistance to Pakistan even after it
acceded to the NPT in 1992. The Clinton Administration
turned a blind eye to the Chinese proliferation and the US
and China actively colluded and collaborated to "cap, roll
back and eliminate" India's nuclear programme, for the first
six years of the Clinton Presidency.
In the meantime, 188 countries had acceded to the NPT,
which was indefinitely extended by consensus in 1995. India,
however, continued to face sanctions in nuclear and dual use
high-tech cooperation not only from the US but also from the
US-led 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). While
France and Russia showed some understanding in the
immediate aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests, others led by
the US and China spared no effort, albeit with little success,
to isolate and strengthen sanctions against India.

The Latest Deal It is in this background that one has to

evaluate the significance of the July 18, 2005 "Nuclear Deal"
with the US. Despite strong domestic opposition by
entrenched lobbies that considered India's nuclear weapons
programme either directly or indirectly a threat to US
security, Mr George Bush became the first American
President to challenge this "conventional wisdom," thereby
changing a US policy that had been in vogue for four
decades. More important, the Agreement - whose basic
requirement was that India places its peaceful nuclear
facilities under safeguards in return for an end to global
sanctions - was first proposed by one of India's most
distinguished nuclear scientists, Dr Raja Ramanna.

Not surprisingly, opponents to the deal sought to introduce

provisions that would be "deal breakers," such as a
mandatory cut off of fuel supplies in the event of India being
compelled to conduct further nuclear tests and demanding
that India adopt a foreign policy congruent to that of the US.
Moreover, the legislation seeks to cap India's nuclear
weapons programme by calling for measures to ensure an
early cut off of fissile material production for weapons by
India.

On December 18, 2006 Mr Bush made it clear in writing that

as Sections 103 and 104 (d) (2) of the legislation passed by
US Congress sought to restrict his constitutional authority as
President to execute foreign policy, he was not bound by
these provisions, which India could under no circumstances
accept, as they ran counter to US guarantees of continued
fuel supplies during the working life of nuclear reactors
imported by India.

While India now finds no need for further nuclear tests, its
position could change if China decided to resume nuclear
tests following a US decision to test a new generation of
nuclear weapons. The President's action also annuls
objectionable provisions in the legislation seeking to compel
India to adopt US policies on Iran and other proliferation-
related issues.

Long way to go still While these are positive developments,

there is still a long way to go before a full-stop is put to the
international sanctions against India for not acceding to the
NPT. We still have to conclude a bilateral agreement with the
US that has to conform to Section 123 of the US Atomic
Energy Act. India's nuclear envoy, Mr Shyam Saran, who has
shown immense skill in negotiations, will have to craft an
agreement that not only ensures the reliability of fuel
supplies but also deals with the issue of reprocessing of
spent fuel.

While negotiating a safeguards agreement with the

International Atomic Energy Agency should be relatively
straightforward, securing the consent of the NSG, which
includes such countries as Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden
that are members of the "New Agenda Coalition," is not
going to be easy.

These countries have demanded after the 1998 nuclear tests

that India should accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear
facilities under international safeguards. Will a President
from the Democratic Party who could well assume office in
2009 interpret the US legislation ending nuclear sanctions on
India in the same manner as President Bush? What would
India do if he/she chooses to abide by the explicit provisions
of the legislation? It would, therefore, be prudent to proceed
cautiously before signing contracts for the import of large
power reactors.

New Delhi should also consider amending the Atomic Energy

Act to permit foreign and private sector investment in
imported nuclear power plants in India to limit the adverse
impact of any cut off of nuclear fuel supplies, as has
happened in the past.

Further, even if sanctions do end, it is imperative for India to

retain the moral high ground by urging the international
community at every appropriate forum about the fact that a
truly just and secure world order has to be based on a time
bound commitment to universal nuclear disarmament.
Article VI of the NPT, after all, calls for a "move towards
general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control".

Hypothesis
RICE AND MUKHERJEE AFTER SIGNING THE 123 AGREEMENT

My hopothesis is null hypothesis.

My hypothesis is that deal is good for india And usa also.

The most important requirement for India's Economic Growth

in the coming years will be the power & infrastructure. The
argument put forth favouring the 123 Agreement says that
we need Nuclear Power Production to be increased to meet
the demand.

How does US benefit with this Deal?

1. If India sets up 10 large size nuclear power plants, in

next 15 years, India will import technology and
hardware from US for at least half of these
projects,each of these plants at a green field site will
cost about $4 billion. In short, orders worth $15-20
billion could be placed with the US companies in next 6
to 8 years.

2. Fund for these installations will come to India either in

form of FDI or soft & commercial loans. Banks and
equipment manufacturers abroad will be delighted to
make this amount available to India. In return India will
pay it back with goods and services export.
 3. Another unstated benefit for US appears to be their
assessment that India could be a counter weight to a “rising
China” in the region.

4. The growing energy demands of the Indian and Chinese

economies have raised questions on the impact of global
energy availability. The Bush Administration has concluded
that an Indian shift toward nuclear energy is in the best
interest for America to secure its energy needs of coal, crude
oil, and natural gas.

What does India get out of the Deal?

1. India would be eligible to buy U.S. dual-use nuclear

technology, including materials and equipment that
could be used to enrich uranium or reprocess
plutonium, potentially creating the material for
nuclear bombs. It would also receive imported fuel
for its nuclear reactors. In order for India to become a
developed nation, we must have Nuclear energy.

3. U.S. investment that

could spur India's
economic growth and
bring in $150 billion in
the next decade for nuclear power plants and to
modernize the country's transportation system
4. After 50 years of isolation, India will have the opportunity
to say something, in world forums like UN, WTO and World
monetary lending institutions, and be heard. This was not
the case previously.

5. It is India's stated objective to increase the production of

nuclear power generation from its present capacity of 4,000
MWe to 20,000 MWe in the next decade which can not be
acquired without signing this deal.

6. India could become a full member of the select group of

G-8 members.

7.Nuclear energy would save 145 million tonnes of CO2 per

year .

8. More job opportunities to India.

9.Reliable power brings more foreign investments to India.

So,according to me,this deal is very important for both the

country.

• DATA BASE AND METHODOLOGY:-

DATA BASE:-

Data are the fact presented to the researchers’ from the study’s
environment. Data are edited to ensure consistency across respondents and
to locate omission. Data analysis usually involves reducing accumulated
data to manageable size, developing summaries, looking for patterns, and
applying statistical techniques

Two sources of data collection are:-

Primary Data: - Primary sources are original works of research or raw data
without interpretation or pronouncement that represents an official opinion
or position. Primary sources are always the most authoritative because the
information has not filtered or interpreted by a second party.

Secondary Data:- Secondary sources are interpretation of primary data

.Encyclopaedias’, textbooks, handbooks, magazines, and newspaper articles
and most newscasts are considered secondary information sources. Indeed
nearly all references materials fall into this category.

In this research term paper I have used secondary data for

the analysis of the topic i.e. India-us nuclear deal.

The sources I have used is :-

1> Internet

2> Journal

3> Books

4> Newspaper

5> Mazagines

METHODOLOGY:-
The term methodology refers to the process and producers by which
approach problem and seek answer . Methodology differs from another in
this respect and hence conclusion arrived may also vary. It is clear idea of
research procedure and systematic research lines .
Research design:-
Reseech design constitutes the blueprint for the
collection ,measurement 65-and analysis of data.Reserch
design aids the researcher in the allocation of limited
resource by posing crucial choices in methodology.Reserch
design is the plan and structure of investigation so
conceived as to obtain answer to research question.it
express both the structure of the research problem.
Research design are of two types-qualitative and
quantitative.

secondary data
Internet,books

Sample size-20

Awareness of india –us nuclear deal

Respondent
Information about nuclear deal is through?
What do you think people are agree to this deal?

Conclusion:-
Thanks to diplomatic and political
skills of President Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, we have a
deal which could lift India into the
Trillion-dollar club, faster. They both
have worked hard. Ten years from now when electricity
supply situation in India’s households, industry and farms is
significantly better, we have to thank them both. Thank God,
we are not struck with in one sided, Iran - Pakistan – India
pipeline deal. This would have held India permanently
hostage to Pakistan.

Bibliography:-
Website:- http://www.proquest.com
http:// www.google.com
http://www.businessline.com
http://www.timesofindia.com
http://www.hindustantimes.com
http://www.economictimes.com
http://www.financialexpress.com
http://www.business-standard.com
http://www.outlookindia.com
http://www.indianexpress.com.
http://www.capitalline.com
http://www.rediff.com

Thank u