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Chris George

HIS 224

Professor Fraser

9/30/10

German Perspectives on Peace: A Brief Look at Several Documents

Imperial Germany has often been blamed for World War I. British, French,

Russian, and American propaganda often emphasized German aggression, creating an

utterly inhuman German image. This image, arguably, has obscured German perspectives

on the war, particularly desires to end the war. There were various perspectives on peace,

although all aimed at having some sort of peace. These can be divided between actions

taken by the right-wing elements of the Reichstag and the military, which wanted to at

least portray itself as wanting to get out of the war through victory in order to protect

their own interests—a victor’s peace—and moderate/left-wing politicians and

intelligentsia, who wanted to get out of the war for genuinely pacifist reasons—any

peace.

Right-wing leaders in government and industry, by the beginning of 1915, held

that there would be a definite and ideal end to the war, rather than a continuous costly

war. What this means is that these leaders had particular goals in mind, and they would

like to end the war once these goals had been fulfilled. A group of industrial leaders met

with several state representatives in the Chancellors Palace on the 17th of May, 1915, to

discuss these aims in a more official context (that is, with state approval). Most of these

aims were tied to economic benefit through annexation of resources. The meeting

decided that, “[German] industry demands that Germany acquire the large deposits of
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iron ore in France, [and] that the ore basins of Longwy and Briey, as well as the coal

fields in the Pas de Calais and in the Department du Nord, must in the future belong to

Germany in order to damage the enemy economically and to make us independent.” 1

These leaders believed that only conquest would be the ideal end of war, particularly on

the Western front (France being their primary target). However, they did stress that there

could be a separate peace with Russia on the Eastern front, which these leaders deemed

the most advantageous approach.2 This ultimately means that they definitely wanted

peace, but they wanted a peace in which they were triumphant. Conquest and gain were

the most important factors to these leaders.

This desire for a victor’s peace continued into the end of 1916, when the German

government offered to make peace with the allies. They made this offer, however, in an

ambiguous and arrogant way, one which seemed to posit the idea of a victor’s peace.3 In

a letter from Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg to another state official concerning the

peace offer, the Chancellor remarked that, “[s]hould our enemies refuse to enter peace

negotiations – and we have to assume that this will be the case – the odium of continuing

the war will fall on them.”4 The Chancellor then noted that he believed that the Allied

refusal at peace would boost German morale, to the point that a victory was possible.

Therefore, it seems clear that the leadership was obsessed by the idea of a victor’s peace,

even at this later stage of the war.

1
Gustav Stresemann, “Notes by Industrial League Presidium Member Gustav Stresemann on the Audience
of a Delegation of Large Economic Associations with Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg on
May 17, 1915, on the Question of War Aims,” on German History in Documents and Images.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=981
2
Ibid.
3
“The German ‘Peace Offer’,” Germany History in Documents and Images (introduction)
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=985
4
Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, “Correspondence with Prussian Ambassador in Karlsruhe,
Karl von Eisendecher, on the Purpose of the Peace Offer by the Central Powers,” on German History in
Documents and Images. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=985
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However, there were trends of pacifism among the left-wing and moderates that

grew almost in opposition to this obsession with conquest among the right-wing. These

trends began, arguably, even before the war. This type of pacifism is best encapsulated by

the figure of Ludwig Quidde, a German historian and peace activist. Prior to the war,

Quidde had been the president of the Peace Society in Germany and maintained

international ties. Directly after war broke out, he attempted to stay in contact with

French and British pacifist organizations to broker a peace early on.5

In a 1916 proposal for a German office that would mediate for peace between

nations, Quidde stated that, “the peace that ends this war should of course secure the

freedom of the German people… inviolability of German territory… and the preservation

of the German people’s potential for economic development. However, the peace should

also contain every guarantee of its own durability.” 6 Essentially, Quidde wanted an end to

the war which would be lasting and would not threaten Germany with its own conquest.

His perspective is, consequently, similar yet radically different than what the right-wing

seemed to want. Quidde wanted Germany to have a decent place in the world, as the

right-wing did, but he didn’t want this at the expense of war. Quidde wanted law to

govern nations, rather than purely interest and guns. Consequently, he believed that

World War I must end. His petition to create such an office that would allow for future

peace was signed by 179 people, which is a decent amount of support.7

This kind of compromise oriented pacifism Quidde espoused seemed to grow in

strength by 1917. Several groups in the Reichstag, including the Progressives, Majority

5
“Ludwig Quidde, The Central Office for International Law,” German History in Documents and Images
(introduction). http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=982
6
Ludwig Quidde, German Pacifism during the World War 1914-1918 [excerpt], on German History in
Documents and Images. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=1816
7
Ibid.
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Socialists, and (interestingly) Catholics, proposed a peace resolution.8 They first noted

that Germany did not get into the war officially with conquest in mind (which was true,

and worth noting), and that they wish to maintain this position for the sake of amicable

peace. The resolution furthermore stated that the Reichstag, “rejects all plans that

envisage economic exclusion or continuing enmity among nations after the war… Only

economic peace will lay the groundwork for amicable coexistence among the peoples of

the world.”9 They also desired that there would be increased use of diplomacy between

nations. They posited that Germany would continue fighting until such a peace was

possible, and for the defense of Germany but they wanted this peace to come about as

soon as possible.10 This places them in a direct line with Quidde, and furthermore in

opposition to the rest of the government, who unofficially wanted conquest. The

Chancellor, likely under pressure from the Kaiser and military, promptly ignored their

resolution, continuing to favor a peace that involved conquest.11

Ultimately, Germany received an undesirable peace, by either of these standards.

The Treaty of Versailles left them without any territorial gains, as the Right seemed to

want. Furthermore, the Treaty of Versailles left Germany in an unequal position among

the other nations of Europe, which was not the sort of peace that pacifists argued for.

Why this occurred is not within the scope of this paper. Rather, it is important to note that

German movements towards peace, whether they were amicable towards other nations or

not, were ignored. While there was certainly a strong divide in why and to what end

8
“The Reichstag’s Peace Resolution,” Germany History in Documents and Images (introduction).
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=987
9
“The Peace Resolution of the Reichstag of July 19, 1917,” on German History in Documents and Images.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=987
10
Ibid.
11
“Chancellor Michaelis’ Interpretation of the Peace Resolution (July 19, 1917),” German History in
Documents and Images. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=988
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various Germans proposed an end to the war, there was a desire to end the war.

Ultimately, what matters about this is that, for all of the demonization that Germany

received during and after the war, there was a desire to the end the war. Whether this

peace was beneficial to the rest of Europe depended on who proposed such a peace, and

truly showcases a political and cultural divide between the left and right in Germany.