Palko v.

Connecticut

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Palko is tried and convicted of murder for a second
time after state appeals previous murder conviction on same events.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The double jeopardy prohibition provision included in the
Fifth Amendment is not applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Facts. Defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree. The jury returned a
conviction of murder in the second degree, for which he received a life sentence.
Pursuant to state law, the State of Connecticut appealed and the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. This court
found harmful error to the state as a result of the exclusion of testimony as to a
confession by the defendant, the exclusion of cross-examination testimony to
impeach the defendant, and faulty jury instructions as to the difference between
first and second degree murder. They ordered a second trial at which the jury
sentenced the defendant to death. The defendant was granted certiorari to have the
second conviction overturned.

Issue. Does the entire Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibition apply to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held. No. The Supreme Court of the United States affirms the first degree murder
conviction and the accompanying death sentence.
Two requirements need to be met for a state to appropriately choose to not include
the prohibition on double jeopardy, or any other piece of the 5th Amendment, in its
law. They do not have to incorporate such a right if it is not of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty, and if its abolishment would not violate a principal of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the American people as to be
ranked fundamental. Here, the Supreme Court saw the state’s allowing a second trial
on the same facts as not violating fundamental principles of liberty and justice
because it was only done to make sure that there was a trial without legal error.

Discussion. The Supreme Court’s decision here embracing selective incorporation in

stating that the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibition was not entirely
applicable to state law through the Fourteenth Amendment was overruled in Benton
v. Maryland in 1969. That later case held that the double jeopardy prohibition was a
fundamental concept in our constitutional heritage, and thus definitely applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
 Adamson v California

Brief Fact Summary. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in California

state court after his refusal to take the stand and testify was commented on by
opposing trial counsel.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is

not a part of the right to a fair trial protected by the Due Process clause of
Fourteenth Amendment.

Facts. At murder trial, appellant chose the strategy of not taking the stand and
subjecting himself to cross-examination regarding former crimes of burglary,
larceny and robbery that he had committed. Under a California statute, his attempt
to protect himself from impeachment of his veracity nonetheless allowed
prosecution to make reference to his refusal to testify, and he was convicted.
Appellant argues that the California statute’s allowing opposing counsel to comment
on his refusal to testify ran counter to the Fifth Amendment’s ban on a defendant’s
compulsion to testify, and that the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue. Is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination incorporated into

the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applicable to the states?

Held. No. The court affirms the appellant’s conviction.

The due process clause does not include all of the federal Bill of Rights. Here, it did
not protect a defendant’s freedom from giving testimony by compulsion in state
trials.

The court rejected the argument that the Fifth Amendment’s protection versus self-
incrimination was made effective by freedom from testimonial compulsion that is a
right of national citizenship within the Fourteenth Amendment.They also rejected
the idea that protection versus self-incrimination was a personal privilege or
immunity secured by the Federal Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment
prevents a state from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, but a state may abridge the privileges and immunities flowing from
state citizenship as long as due process is not violated.The decision to not testify did
not serve as an admission of any element of the crime. Proof of the commission of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt still remained with the prosecution, thus the
federal constitutional due process standard was met.

Dissents. J. Black. Deciding what parts of the Bill of Rights are to be incorporated to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment should not be a selective process, as
that leaves too much discretion in the hands of the court. All of them should be
incorporated.
J. Murphy. All the specific guarantees laid out in the Bill of Rights should be
incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment, but states can also violate due process by
abridging other rights not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights.
Concurrence. J. Frankfurter. Do not force the states to include the specific provisions
of the Bills of Rights into their lawmaking. The Fourteenth Amendment’s definition
of due process is enough of a guiding hand to this court on whether a state has
violated constitutional rights.

Discussion. Although this case embraced selective incorporation in stating that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to the states
through the Fourteenth, subsequent cases held that comment upon a defendant’s
failure to take the stand was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Skinner v Oklahoma

Brief Fact Summary. Under Oklahoma law, a person convicted a third time of certain
specified crimes involving “moral turpitude” received the punishment of
sterilization. Persons convicted a third time of other similar crimes were not. The
constitutionality of this distinction was brought into question.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. When the law concerning those who have committed
intrinsically the same type of offense punishes one, but not the other by depriving
the one of a fundamental right, an invidious discrimination has been made.

Facts. Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act (the Act) defined a “habitual
criminal” as a person who has been convicted three of more times for crimes
involving moral turpitude. Such persons under Oklahoma law were to be rendered
sexually sterile. Multiple violations for offenses involving “prohibitory laws” such as
revenue acts, embezzlement or political offenses were exempted from punishment
under the Act. Petitioner, convicted of stealing chickens for a third offense, was
convicted under the Act. The alleged purpose of the law was to prevent the passing
on to future generations of criminal traits.

Issue. Was the Act, calling for the sterilization of certain multiple offenders but not
others, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution (Constitution)?

Held. Yes. The judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma that the
vasectomy be performed is reversed.
Justice William Douglas stated sterilization of repeat offenders of grand larceny,
with immunity for repeat offenders of embezzlement, is an unmistakable
discrimination. Oklahoma has put forward no proof, nor do we have any basis to
conclude, that traits for crimes resulting in sterilization are any more inheritable
than are traits for crimes exempt from sterilization. The right to procreate is one of
the most basic civil rights.
Concurrence. Chief Justice Harlan Stone (J. Stone) concurred in the result. J. Stone I
thought the real question, however, is whether the wholesale condemnation of a
class to an invasion of personal liberty without the opportunity to prove he is not of
the type the law presumes him to be, is a violation of due process.

Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) declares that
the right implicated by the distinction here is a fundamental one, thereby subjecting
the law to the strict scrutiny standard of review. Arguably, the Supreme Court could
have invalidated the Oklahoma law, providing starkly differing treatment as
between embezzlers and larceners, on the grounds of the rational basis standard of
review.

Lochner v New York

Brief Fact Summary. A law that sought to protect the health of bakers by limiting
their employment to ten hours a day (sixty hours a week) was held by the Supreme
Court of the United States to be a violation of the Due Process Clause because it was
“an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference” with the right of the
individual to enter into contracts in relation to labor.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An act which interferes with the general right of an
individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own
labor must have a direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must by
appropriate and legitimate before such an act can be upheld to be valid.

Facts. A New York law prohibited the employment of bakery employees for more
than ten hours a day (sixty hours a week). Appellant, Mr. Lochner, was convicted
and fined for permitting an employee to work in his bakery for more than sixty
hours a week. Appellant successfully appealed claiming that the law is invalid
because it is not a fair, reasonable nor appropriate exercise of the police power, but
rather an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the
individual to enter into contracts in relation to labor.

Issue. Whether the New York act which limits the amount of hours per week a
bakery employee may work is an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to enter into contracts in relation to
labor.

Held. Yes. Judgment reversed. There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the
liberty of a person or the right of free contract by determining the hours of labor in
the occupation of a baker. A law such as the one presented in this case involves
neither the safety, nor the morals nor the welfare of the public. The interest of the
public is not in the slightest degree affected by this act. Thus, this is not a health law
but an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and
employees, to make contracts regarding labor.

Dissent. The liberty to contract is subject to reasonable police regulations. This act
must be taken as expressing the belief of the people of New York that a sixty hour
work week was a necessary health requirement. Thus, the protection of the physical
well-being of those working in the bakery industry is grounds as a valid police
power.
This case is decided upon an economic theory. The Constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory, whether paternalism or laissez faire.

Discussion. The Court applies strict scrutiny to hold that a law that interferes with
liberty to contract will be found to violate the Due Process Clause.

Kelo v City of New London

Facts of the Case: New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain
authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said
developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Kelo Susette and
others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property
owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which
guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without
just compensation. Specifically the property owners argued taking private property
to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court
ruled for New London.

Question: Does a city violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause if the city takes
private property and sells it for private development, with the hopes the
development will help the city's bad economy?

Conclusion: No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the majority
held that the city's taking of private property to sell for private development
qualified as a "public use" within the meaning of the takings clause. The city was not
taking the land simply to benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was
following an economic development plan. Such justifications for land takings, the
majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as "public
use" despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. The Fifth
Amendment did not require "literal" public use, the majority said, but the "broader
and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.'"

Penn Central Trans. V City of New York

Brief Fact Summary. Penn Central (Appellant) owned the Grand Central Terminal,
which was designated by application of New York’s Landmarks Preservation Law to
be a landmark. Thereafter, the Appellant entered into a renewable 50-year lease
with UGP Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom company, under which the UGP agreed
to construct a multistory office building on top of the terminal. The plans for the
new office building were submitted to the Commission for approval, which was
denied.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In deciding whether a particular government action has

effected a taking, this Court focuses both on the character of the action and the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
Facts. Appellant owned the Grand Central Terminal, which was designated by
application of New York’s Landmarks Preservation Law to be a landmark.
Thereafter, the Appellant entered into a renewable 50-year lease with UGP
Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom company, under which the UGP agreed to
construct a multistory office building on top of the terminal. The plans for the new
office building were submitted to the Commission for approval, which was denied.
The plans were in conformity with existing zoning regulation, but the Commission of
Landmarks Preservation nonetheless denied the applications for certificates of “no
external effect” and for “appropriateness.” The Appellants did not pursue any
administrative remedies because none were available. The Appellants did not
decide to submit other plans to the Commission, either. Instead, the Appellants filed
suit in state court seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief barring the City
from using the Landmarks Law to impede the construction of any structure that
might otherwise be lawfully constructed, and damaged for the temporary “taking”
that occurred between the designation date (August 2, 1967) and the date when the
restrictions arising under the Landmarks Law would be lifted. The trial court
granted injunctive and declaratory relief, but severed the question of damages for a
“temporary taking.” The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, and summarily
rejected any claim that the Landmarks Commission had taken any property without
just compensation because the law had not transferred control of the property to
the city, but only limited the Appellants’ use. The Appellants appealed.

Issue. Has a taking occurred?

Held. No. Affirmed.

Several factors must be weighed to determine whether a taking occurred: (1) the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations, and (2) the
character of the government action, a taking is more readily found when the
government has physically invaded the property than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.
In deciding whether a particular government action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses both on the character of the action and the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole- here, the city tax block designated
as the “landmark site.”
The Appellants contended that a taking had resulted by the diminished value of the
terminal as the result of the Landmarks Law. The Court pointed out that other
precedent cases held that diminished value as the result of rezoning did not amount
to a taking.
The Court concluded that the interference with Appellants’ property was not such
that the interference amounted to a taking requiring just compensation. The Court
also held that the impact of the regulation on Appellants’ parcel was insufficient to
require the government to institute eminent domain proceedings.

Dissent. The dissent would not equate the Landmarks Law with a zoning regulation.
The dissent points out that the effect of the Landmarks Law is to place an affirmative
duty on the owner of a designated property to maintain the property as a landmark
at his own expense.

Discussion. This case should be read closely as it contains an excellent discussion of

the permissible scope of zoning regulations and the requirements for finding that a
taking has occurred. The Court did stretch a bit to uphold the Landmarks Law based
on its analogy to zoning.

Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council

Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner purchased two residential lots in South Carolina
with the intention of building single family homes on them. Two years later, the
South Carolina legislature enacted a law barring Petitioner from building on the
land. Petitioner sued.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if

regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking requiring just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Facts. In 1986, Petitioner, David Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of
Palms, Charleston County, South Carolina. He intended to build single-family homes
on the lots. At the time Petitioner purchased the lots they were zoned for single-
family residential construction and with no restrictions imposed upon this use. In
1988, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act (the
“Act”), which barred Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his
two parcels of land. Petitioner filed suit against the South Carolina Coastal Council
who had deemed, with legislative authority, Petitioner’s land as protected under the
Act, claiming that his land had been taken without just compensation, but Petitioner
did not challenge the facial validity of the Act. Petitioner claimed that the Act’s
complete extinguishment of his property’s value entitled him to compensation
regardless of whether the legislature had acted in furtherance of legitimate police
power objectives. The trial court found for Petitioner, and determined that, at the
time of Petitioner’s purchase of the land, the lots were both zoned for single-family
residential construction and there were no use restrictions placed on the property
by the State of South Carolina, the County of Charleston, or the Town of Isle of
Palms. The trial court also found that the Beachfront Management Act decreed a
permanent ban on construction on Petitioner’s lots and that the prohibition
deprived Petitioner of any reasonable economic use of the lots, eliminated the
unrestricted right of use, and rendered them valueless. The trial court found that the
property had been “taken” by operation of the Act and that Respondent was ordered
to pay “just compensation” in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina reversed the trial court and found that, because Petitioner did not
challenge the facial validity of the Act as a reasonable use of the police power, no
compensation could be owed. Petitioner Lucas petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for review.

Issue. Did the construction ban depriving Petitioner of all economically viable use of
his property amount to a “taking” requiring “just compensation” under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments?

Held. Yes. Judgment reversed and remanded.

There are two categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-specific
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint: (1) Where the
property owner has suffered a physical invasion of his property, and (2) Where
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.
The Court finds that there are good reasons for the belief that when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.
The South Carolina Supreme Court based its opinion denying that there was a taking
on the line of cases which state that the government can proscribe “harmful or
noxious uses” without paying compensation. The Court here states that the more
contemporary standard is that land use regulation does not affect a taking if it
“substantially advances legitimate state interests.”
However, where the state seeks to sustain regulation that deprives a land owner
from all economic use, the state may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed
use interests were not part of his title to begin with.
Thus, the burden is on the State of South Carolina on remand to identify background
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses intended by
Petitioner in the circumstances the property is now found.

Dissent.
Justice Blackmun: The Supreme Court of the United States has created a rationale
for disregarding a component of basic Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
jurisprudence: that a case specific inquiry be launched into the public interest
advanced by the State to justify its regulation. At issue here was a nuisance. The
State has not ‘taken’ anything when it asserts its power to enjoin a nuisance.
Justice Stevens: The Supreme Court’s new rule is wholly arbitrary: A landowner
whose property is diminished by 95% would recover nothing, but one whose
property is diminished 100% recovers everything. Moreover, the Supreme Court is
denying the State legislatures much of their traditional powers to revise the law
governing the rights and uses of property.
Concurrence. Justice Kennedy: The Takings Clause protects private expectations to
ensure private investment. The means as well as the ends of regulation must jibe
with a landowner’s reasonable expectations.

Discussion.This case provides an example of a government “taking” resulting from a

regulation of property. As such, this case is distinguishable from Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) in which the Supreme
Court of the United States found that the regulation of certain property did not
amount to a taking.
The Supreme Court also considered it significant that the property was not being
regulated when the property owner bought it. Therefore, the property owner could
not be said to have expected the loss from regulation before he bought the prope.