JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, G.R. NO.

DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES

142509 ESTATE
JR., Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
cralawPetitioner,Present: No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan,
PANGANIBAN, C.J. PasigCity,
(Chairperson) Metro Manila
YNARES-SANTIAGO, August 18, 1995
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
- versus -CALLEJO, SR., and Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. #8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario , PasigCity, Metro Manila
THE PEOPLE OF THE Subject:Anent your letter dated August 18,
PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE 1995
J. PIERAZ,Promulgated:cralaw addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Respondents.March 24, 2006 Atty. Pieraz:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This has reference to your lousy but inutile
---x threatening letter dated August 18, 1995,
addressed to our client; using carabao
English.
DECISION
May we remind you that any attempt on
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: your part to continue harassing the person
of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo
St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity, Metro
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Manila---undersigned much to his regrets
Alemania Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the shall be constrained/compelled to file the
Decision dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in necessary complaint for disbarment against
CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which affirmed the decision of the you.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting
him of the crime of libel.Also assailed is the appellate court's You may proceed then with your stupidity
Resolution dated March 13, 2000 denying petitioner's Motion for and suffer the full consequence of the law.
Reconsideration. Needless for you to cite specific provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is
The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are irrelevant to the present case. As a matter
as follows: of fact, the same shall be used by no other
cralawOn August 18, 1995, the wife of private- than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing
complainant Atty. JoseJ. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), administrative charge against you and all
retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to persons behind these nefarious activities.
her husband. The letter was open, not contained in
an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the
husband's desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz undersigned to face you squarely in any
came upon the letter and made out its content. It courts of justice, so as we can prove 'who is
reads: who once and for all.
 Trusting that you are properly inform (sic)
regarding these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name;
(Signed)
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
Atty-in- Fact of the present
Court Administrator of the entire
Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty.
Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a
communication by registered mail to said Buatis,
Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr.
dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995
to Atty. Pieraz.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr.,
particularly: 'Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish
carabao, Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel
against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its
contents came to the knowledge not only of his
wife but of his children as well and they all chided
him telling him: 'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.
Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as
aresult of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz
frail health was likewise affected and aggravated
by the letter of accused-appellant.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant
Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it was at
the behest of the president of the organization
'Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan
or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco,
that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a
comment to the letter of private-complainant in
the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not
recall whether he had signed that letter-comment
or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither
could he remember if he had made and sent
another letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to
Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-
affidavit which he filed before the Pasig City
Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not
deny its contents, among which was his admission
that indeed, he had sent subject letter of August
18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty.
Pieraz.
cralawAfter trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision
dated April 30, 1997 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
libel, the dispositive portion of which reads:
cralawWHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr.
GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353
and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and
One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as
maximum; to indemnify the offended party in
theamount of P20,000.00, by way of
compensatory damages; the amount of
P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and
another amount of P10,000.00, for exemplary
damages; to suffer all accessory penalties
provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer 'inutil', stupid and
capable of using only carabao English, is intended not
only for the consumption of respondent but similarly for
others as a copy of the libelous letter was furnished all
concerned; the letter was prejudicial to the good name
of respondent and an affront to his standing as a
lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed to
him, was representing a client in whose favor he sent a
demand letter to the person represented by petitioner;
the letter is libelous per se since a defect or vice
imputed is plainly understood as set against the entire
message sought to be conveyed; petitioner failed to
reverse the presumption of malice from the defamatory
imputation contained in the letter; the letter could have
been couched in a civil and respectful manner, as the
intention of petitioner was only to advice respondent
that demand was not proper and legal but instead
petitioner was seething with hate and contempt and
even influenced by satanic intention.
The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or
brought to the attention and notice ofother persons other than
the offended party, there was publication; and that the element
of identity was also established since the letter was intended for
respondent. It rejected petitioner's stance that the libelous
letter resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner
boldly admitted that he had to reply to respondent's letter to
Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of
petitioner's association.
The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory
damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory
imputation was to impair respondent's reputation although no
actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also awarded moral
damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of
the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a
reckless disregard for the rights of respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA
which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its
entirety the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for
and defamatory in character as they impeached the good
reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It
rejected petitioner's claim that the letter is a privileged
communication which would exculpate him from liability since
he failed to come up with a valid explanation as to why he had
to resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer to the
extent of ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so
called 'duty in a more toned down fashion. It found also that
there was publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified
as privileged.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated March 13, 2000.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner, raising the following issues:
A. CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS
ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO
A RESPONDING URBAN POOR LEADER ACTING AS
COUNSEL, DEFENDING A MEMBER OF AN
ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF EJECTMENT
FROM HER DWELLING PLACE?
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE
COURT ERREDIN NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED
LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE OF THOSE FALLING
UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE (sic)
COMMUNICATION?
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT:THE
PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE TO ACCEPT FULL
RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID IS A CRIME?
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of
the People and respondent filed his own Comment praying for
the affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us, the parties
submitted their respective memoranda.
The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is
guilty of the crime of libel.
In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to
apply the ruling in People v. Velasco that 'if the act/matter
charged as libelous is only an incident in [an] act which has
another objective, the crime is not libel; when he made his reply
to respondent's letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her
to vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent
that Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the
Rodriguez estate which is claiming ownership over the area of
Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-
fact of the administrator of the Rodriquez estate;
communication in whatever language, either verbal or written
ofa lawyer under obligation to defend a client's cause is but a
privileged communication; the instant case is a qualified
privileged communication which is lost only by proof of malice,
however, respondent failed to present actual proof of malice;
the existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic
evidence that petitioner bore a grudge against the offended
party, or there was ill will or ill feeling between them which
existed at the time of the publication of the defamatory
imputation which were not at all indicated by respondent in his
complaint; contrary to the findings of the CA, there was
justifiablemotive in sending such a letter which was to defend
the vested interest of the estate and to abate any move of
respondent to eject Mrs. Quingco.
Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous
letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is justification for
the use of those words, to wit: 'lousy but inutile threatening
letterusing carabao English was due to the fact that the demand
letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not serve its
purpose as respondent's client has no legal right over the
property and respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that
respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus
he is stupid; that the words 'Yours in Satan name is only a
complementary greeting used in an ordinary communication
letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person
being communicatedand which is just the reverse of saying
'Yours in Christ.
We deny the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a
public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must
concur:(a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it
must be given publicity;and (d) the victim must be identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by the
prosecution.There is publication in this case.In libel, publication
means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known
to someone other than the person against whom it has been
written.Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that the
same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had
dictated the letter to his secretary.It is enough that the author
of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third
person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was
open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject
letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.
We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to
whether the imputation is defamatory and malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be construed in their entirety and should
be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as
they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood
in another sense.
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication
alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes,
to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co.
(109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to
say on this point:In determining whether the
specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of
construction are conspicuously applicable:(1)That
construction must be adopted which will give to
the matter such a meaning as is natural and
obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which
the public would naturally understand what was
uttered.(2)The published matter alleged to be
libelous must be construed as a whole.
In applying these rules to the language of an
alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or
 ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on
being called to account.The whole question being
the effect the publication had upon the minds of
the readers, and they not having been assisted by
the offered explanation in reading the article, it
comes too late to have the effect of removing the
sting, if any there be, from the words used in the
publication.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the
letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is
defamatory. In using words such as 'lousy', 'inutile', 'carabao
English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', the letter, as it was written,
casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of
respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it.As the CA said,
these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public
ridicule as even his own family have told him: 'Ginagawa ka
lang gago dito.
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory;
and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner
(malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner's
imputation is malicious (malice in law). A reading of petitioner's
subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated
respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco.
There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner's
good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in
order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private
communication made in the performance of his moral and social
duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the
Rodriguez estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and
to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate,
thus in the nature of a privileged communication and not
libelous.
We are not persuaded.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354.cralawRequirement for publicity.─ Every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1.cralawA private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral, or social duty; and
2.cralawA fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or
of any other act performedby public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the
defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a
qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as
claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or
social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of
the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed
to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or
duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the
protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication
are made in good faith and without malice.
While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner
out of his social duty to a member of the association which he
heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter's
demand letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the
subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any
explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she
is entitled to the premises as against the claim of respondent's
client. The letter merely contained insulting words, i.e, 'lousy
and 'inutile letter using carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan',
which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingco's right
over the premises. The words as written had only the effect of
maligning respondent's integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had
served as legal officer in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources for so many years until his retirement and
afterwards as consultant of the same agency and also a notary
public. The letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is
necessary in answering a demand letter which exposed
respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and
showing malicious intent on petitioner's part.
Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation
made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such
statement must be communicated only to the person or persons
who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who
have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of
the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot
be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated
among the public. In this case, petitioner admitted that he
dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same
and made a print out of the computer. While petitioner
addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter
showed that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of
selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of
privileged communication. Such publication had already created
upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought
discredit and shame to respondent's reputation.
Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is
presumed under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The
presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as
discussed above.
Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming
the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime
of libel.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review
and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found
in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or
not.We find that the award of P20,000.00 as compensatory
damages should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To be
entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be
competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount
thereof. Respondent had not presented evidence in support
thereof.
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means
of writings or similar means with prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to
6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose
a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to
impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a
penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, where petitioners therein
were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for alternative
penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and
imprisonment, we deleted the prison sentence imposed upon
petitioners and instead ordered them only to pay a fine
equivalent to double the amount of the check. We held:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino
entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the
national economy. Apparently, they brought this
appeal, believing in all good faith, although
mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have
accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied
for probation to evade prison term.It would best
serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the
penalty within the range of discretion allowed by '1,
par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely,
that of redeeming valuable human material and
preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to
the protection of the social
order.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the subsequent case of Lim v. People, we did the same and
deleted the penalty of imprisonment and merely imposed a fine
for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve
the ends of criminal justice.
Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000. On February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular
13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by
stressing that the clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty,
but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties provided for in B.P. 22.
While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons
behind the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment applicable
to petitioner's case of libel. We note that this is petitioner's first
offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the OGIE DIAZ, G.R. No. 159787
demand letter sentby the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then Petitioner,
sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of Present:
the RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising a
civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
term but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a - versus- *CORONA,
crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is AZCUNA, and
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the
GARCIA, JJ.
social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic
usefulness and other social ends. Consequently, we delete the
prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a
fine of six thousand pesos. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent.
This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of May 25, 2007
imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of libel. In x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Sazon v. Court of Appeals,petitioner was convicted of libel and
was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and upon a DECISION
petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but
changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby cralaw

AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary (Eleventh Division) dated March 15, 2002, in CA-G.R. CR No.
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory 22545.
damages is DELETED. cralaw
SO ORDERED. cralawOn October 16, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Manila
an Information for libel against Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz
(Ogie Frias in real life), petitioner.The Information, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 92-1113377, reads:
cralawThat on or about December 28, 1991, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
being then the Managing Editor and writer,
respectively of Bandera, a newspaper of
general circulation, conspiring and
Republic of the Philippines confederating together and mutually helping
SUPREME COURT each other, with the malicious purpose of
Manila impeaching the integrity, honor and reputation
FIRST DIVISION of one FLORINDA BAGAY, and with the evident
intent of exposing her to public interest,
hatred, contempt, and ridicule, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously write
and publish, or cause to be written and
published in the movie section of said
newspaper an article which reads in part as
follows:
cralawIlang beses na nakaladkad
ang pangalan ng isang Miss S sa
buhay ni Philip Henson ang lalaking
mahilig makipagsex sa asawa.
Nasulat na sa ibang tabloid na
limang beses diumanong ginalaw ni
Philip ang babaing kine-claim na
nabuntis ako ni Philip.
cralawDahil sa pahayag na yon ay
nagpaliwanang at nagbigay pa ng
detalye si Philip. Nagpa-interbyu
siya sa ilang piling reporters.
cralawAt muli, babanggitin lang
namin ang kanyang mga pahayag
tungkol sa pagkakasangkot niya sa
buhay ni Miss S.
cralawInamin ni Philip na limang
beses niyang ginalaw si Miss S.Pero
hindi ko pinasok ang akin sa ano
niya dahil siya rin ang may ayaw.
cralawAng sabi niya kasi sa akin,
isa siyang malinis na babae at hindi
siya basta-basta nagpapaganuon.
So ang ginawa namin, ipit method.
cralawYung ipitin niya iyong akin sa
dalawa niyang hita kunwari sa ano
niya nakapasok habang nagpa-
pump ako.
cralawSiya pa nga ang nagturo sa
akin ng ibat ibang posisyon, e yung
helicopter at saka ang galing
niyang bumlow job. Sanay na
sanay siya.
cralawKahit itanong nyo pa kay Ray
Ravelo. Nagalaw din siya ni Rey,
pahayag ni Philip at kami mismo
ang nakarining ng mga linyang iyon
sa isa naming pag-uusap sa Jaloux
Disco.
cralawIn which words and phrases, which were
used by many people, the said accused meant
and intended to convey as in fact, they meant
and conveyed false and malicious imputations
that the said Florinda Bagay is a sexual pervert
and possesses lascivious and immoral habits,
the accused well knowing that said imputations
are devoid of truth and without foundation in
fact whatsoever, highly libelous and offensive
to the good name, character, and reputation of
the said Florinda Bagay.
cralawContrary to law.
cralawUpon being arraigned on June 8, 1993, petitioner Ogie
Diaz and his co-accused Pichel, assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty.After the pre-trial, the case was heard on the
merits.
cralaw
cralawFlorinda Bagay, complaining witness, testified that she
is a graduate of medical secretarial course.She tried her luck
in the movies under the guidance of her godmother, Mila
Parawan, a writer covering the entertainment
industry.Florinda adopted and used Patricia Santillan as her
screen name.
cralaw
cralawDuring her brief stint in the movies, she met Philip
Henson, an aspiring bit player.A whirlwind romance between
them followed and on June 16, 1988, they started living
together.On March 9, 1991, she gave birth to a girl she
named Maria Briana Bagay.By that time, her relationship with
Philip Henson ended.
cralawFlorinda claimed she was the Miss S alluded to in
petitioners column Pakurot considering that her screen name
is Patricia Santillan.
cralaw
cralawOne Nonette Lim called her attention to the article and
she felt embarrassed.Mila Parawan showed her the item.Her
family and neighbors also read it.As a result, she was forced
to stop her studies as a medical technology student at the
United Doctors MedicalCenter.
Florinda further testified that at the time the article came
out, she and Philip were no longer living together.
cralaw
cralawMila Parawan also took the witness stand and
corroborated Florindas testimony.She further testified that
after Philip and Florinda parted ways, her former press
relations officer, who used the nom de plume Isko Peta,
wrote an item entitled Ibinulgar namin ang babaeng
inanakan ni Philip Henson which appeared in the December
2, 1991 issue of Artista Magazine. Philip believed that
Florinda released their story to the press.He then caused the
publication of the libelous article against her.
Mila Parawan added that Florinda came from a well
respected family in their community. Thus, she could not
have done the acts being imputed to her.
On cross-examination, Mila Parawan stated she was
certain the Miss S referred to in the article is Florinda
because petitioner and Pichel, her good friends, told her that
Miss S is her alaga (ward).
Pichel testified that he had been a journalist covering
show business for the past 21 years. He denied having met
or known the complaining witness.He also denied being the
editor of Bandera.He was only its lay-out artist, a part time
job.
Petitioner Ogie Diaz admitted that while he wrote the
column Pakurot where the alleged libelous statements
appeared, however, he did not know the complaining witness
or Miss S.The source of his article was Philip Henson.
The defense also presented as witness two movie
journalists Ernie Pecho and Mario Bautista.Both had more
than 50 years covering the entertainment industry.
Pecho testified that he has never heard the screen
name Patricia Santillan; that reading the article in question
would not give the reader any idea that Miss S is Patricia
Santillan; and that in the movie world, the letter S refers to
shabu, not to a person.
Bautista, for his part, stated that he has never heard
of any actress or starlet named Patricia Santillan.After
reading the article, it never came to his mind that Miss S is
one Patricia Santillan.
Douglas Quijano, a long-time line producer and talent
manager, testified that in his many years of managing movie
and TV stars, he could not recall an actress named Miss S.He
has never heard of Patricia Santillan.
On May 12, 1998, the trial court rendered its
judgment convicting petitioner and Pichel of the crime
charged.The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above
discussion and findings, the Court finds both
accused Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel,
defined in Article 353 and penalized under
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences each of them
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY as minimum to
FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of
prision correcional in its Minimum and Medium
Periods, as maximum and to pay a fine of
P3,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision,
sustained the conviction of petitioner but acquitted Pichel.
Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration,
but it was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution
dated August 29, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the
subject article is libelous.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides:
ART. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a
public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice, or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.
This provision should be read in relation with Article
355 of the same Code which states:
ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or
similar means. A libel committed by means of
writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000
pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party.
Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it
must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the
victim must be identifiable.Absent one of these elements, a
case for libel will not prosper.
We find the first element present. In determining
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to
be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their
plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by the persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another
sense.In the instant case, the article in question details the
sexual activities of a certain Miss S and one Philip Henson
who had a romantic liaison.In their ordinary sense, the words
used cast aspersion upon the character, integrity, and
reputation of Miss S.The words convey that Miss S is a sexual
libertine with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom.In
a society such as ours, where modesty is still highly prized
among young ladies, the behavior attributed to Miss S by the
article in question had besmirched both her character and
reputation.
As to the element of malice, we find that since on its
face the article is defamatory, there is a presumption that
the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same
Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown.There is malice
when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal
ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely
to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have
been defamed.We agree with the Court of Appeals that there
was neither good reason nor motive why the subject article
was written except to embarrass Miss S and injure her
reputation.
On the element of publication, there can be no
question that the article appeared in the December 28, 1991
issue of Bandera, a local tabloid.
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified
or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article.In
order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be
named.It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is
apparent or if the publication contains matters of description
or reference to facts and circumstances from which others
reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the
latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that
those knowing such person could and did understand that he
was the person referred to.Kunkle v. Cablenews-American
and Lyons laid the rule that this requirement is complied
with where a third person recognized or could identify the
party vilified in the article.
The libelous article, while referring to Miss S, does not
give a sufficient description or other indications which
identify Miss S.In short, the article fails to show that Miss S cralawIn 1997, respondent Vicente C. Ponce filed a string of
and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person. criminal complaints against petitioner Nicasio I. Alcantara and
his family, hereafter the Alcantaras, including one for estafa
Although the article is libelous, we find that Florinda against petitioner in the Makati Prosecutors Office docketed as
Bagay could not have been the person defamed therein.In I.S. No. 97-39547. In essence, respondent Ponce alleged that
Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen, we held that where the petitioner had swindled him out of 3,000,000 shares of Floro
requirement for an identified or identifiable victim has not Cement Corporation.
been complied with, the case for libel must be dismissed.
It was in the course of the preliminary investigation of the
complaint for estafa that respondent Ponce, shortly after giving
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged
his sur-rejoinder affidavit, submitted to the investigating
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22545 is
prosecutor a newsletter purporting to be a belated annex to the
REVERSED.Petitioner Ogie Diaz is ACQUITTED of the crime of
affidavit.It was prefaced with the quotation For every
libel.The bail on appeal posted for his temporary liberty is extraordinary fortune there is a great crime and the text:
ordered CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED. An example is Marcos. We need not discuss this.
Second example is the Alcantaras.
cralawa)Overshipment of log;b) Land grabbing;
FIRST DIVISION cralawc)Corruption of public office;cralawd)
Corporate grabbing.
NICASIO I. ALCANTARA,G.R. No. 156183
cralawPetitioner,
Present: The newsletter then went on to discuss SEC Case No. 2507
PUNO, C.J., which, in the sur-rejoinder affidavit, respondent Ponce described
Chairperson, as being the forefather of all the cases he had filed against the
cralawSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Alcantaras.In SEC Case No. 2507 which the Securities and
- v e r s u s -CORONA, Exchange Commission en banc decided against him, Ponce
AZCUNA* and accused the Alcantaras of defrauding him of his shares in Iligan
GARCIA, JJ. Cement Corporation.
VICENTE C. PONCE and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, On December 3, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for libel
cralawcralawRespondents.Promulgated: against respondent Ponce with the Makati Prosecutors Office in
connection with the aforesaid newsletter. He claimed that: (1)
February 28, 2007 the statements therein were defamatory; (2) respondent had
x----------------------------------------- circulated it in the Makati Prosecutors Office and (3) the
---------x newsletter could not be considered an annex to the sur-
DECISION rejoinder because respondent had not attached it to the said
affidavit but had given it thereafter.
CORONA, J.:
The preliminary investigation was conducted by City Prosecutor
cralawThis is a petition for review on certiorari from a decision Imelda P. Saulog. On March 17, 1998, Prosecutor Saulog issued
and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). a resolution finding probable cause for libel and recommending
the filing of an information in court. Thereafter, the case was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled to Judge
Tranquil Salvador of Branch 63.
However, respondent Ponce filed a petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice, who reversed the City Prosecutor in a
resolution dated February 28, 2000. This reversal was based on
the finding that the newsletter was a privileged communication,
having been submitted to the investigating prosecutor Benjamin
R. Bautista as an intended annex to respondents sur-rejoinder.
The Secretary of Justice thus directed the withdrawal of the
information.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the
CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61543. In a
decision dated August 29, 2002, the CA found that the Secretary
of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, set aside the
latters resolution and directed the reinstatement of the criminal
case. After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration in the
Department of Justice, respondent Ponce attempted to elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 157105.
However, we denied respondent Ponces motion for extension for
time to file his petition as well as his subsequent motions for
reconsideration.
In the meantime, however, before CA-G.R. SP No. 61543 was
decided, the Office of the Makati City Prosecutor, in deference
to the resolution of the Justice Secretary, filed a motion to
withdraw information, which the trial court granted on
September 28, 2001. The trial court ruled that the absence of
the essential element of publicity precluded the commission of
the crime of libel. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
withdrawal but the trial court denied the motion in an order
dated March 21, 2002.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On June 17, 2002, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari
in the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71189. In this case, the
CA rendered the assailed decision.
The principal question for our consideration is whether or not
the CA, in its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189, gravely erred in
finding that Judge Salvador had not committed grave abuse of
discretion for granting the withdrawal of the information for libel
against respondent Ponce.
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code, has the following elements:
(1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance;
(2) publicity or publication;
(3) malice;
(4) direction of such imputation at a natural or
juridical person, or even a dead person and
(5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of the person defamed.
The factual antecedents are undisputed. The only issue is
whether or not the controversial newsletter constituted
privileged communication, which would exempt it from libel.
cralawAccording to the Special Fifth Division of the CA:
cralaw
cralawIt is a settled principle in this jurisdiction
that statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged. This
absolute privilege remains regardless of the
defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the
same are relevant, pertinent or material to the
cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. The lone
requirement imposed to maintain the cloak of
absolute privilege is the test of relevancy.
cralawIn this case, a reading of the Sur-Rejoinder
Affidavit, contrary to petitioners submission,
instantly shows that there was sufficient reference
to the newsletter which justified the Justice
Secretary and respondent Judge in holding that
private respondent actually intended the said
article to be included as an annex attached to said
pleading and that the same was merely omitted
and belatedly submitted to Prosecutor Bautista
during the preliminary investigation. Such
sufficient reference is shown by the fact that the
newsletter is about SEC Case No. 2507 the very
same case being discussed by private respondent
in pages 8 to 12 of his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit and
hence, petitioners claim that Annex F mentioned
together with Annex E, both articles showing the
devious maneuvering of petitioner in the said
case, refers to another article. And even if the
supposed Exhibit F could refer also to that article
So The Public May Know, such circumstance will
not exclude the subject newsletter as an intended
annex to the said pleading as in fact private
respondent explicitly mentioned articles without
stating that there were only two (2) particular
articles being referred or which of those articles
caused to be published by his counsel.
cralawAs the Justice Secretary opined and which
position the respondent Judge adopted, the
newsletter containing the defamatory statement is
relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint
for estafa then under preliminary investigation.
The crime of estafa involves deceit, dishonesty
and other fraudulent acts. The inclusion in the Sur-
Rejoinder Affidavit of the newsletter discussing the
alleged corporate grabbing by petitioner will tend
to support private respondents case of estafa
against petitioner insofar as such alleged
corporate grabbing will highlight or manifest
petitioners propensity for dishonest dealing or
fraudulent machinations. There is therefore no
doubt that the subject newsletter is relevant and
pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa, and
hence the same comes within the protective cloak
of absolutely privileged communications as to
exempt private respondent from liability for libel
or damages.
cralawIn determining the issue of relevancy of
statements made in judicial proceedings, courts
have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all
doubts in favor of relevancy. Thus, in People vs.
Aquino, our Supreme Court has emphasized that it
is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should
be liberally construed to favor the writer, and the
words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic
intensity. The doctrine of privileged
communication has a practical purpose.
xxxcralawxxxcralawxxx
cralawPublication in libel means making the
defamatory matter, after it has been written,
known to someone other than the person to whom
it has been written. There is publication if the
material is communicated to a third person. What
is material is that a third person has read or heard
the libelous statement, for a mans reputation is
the estimate in which others hold him, not the
good opinion which he has of himself. Our
Supreme Court has established the rule that when
a public officer, in the discharge of his or her
official duties, sends a communication to another
officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to
perform with respect to the subject matter of the
communication, such communication does not
amount to publication. Applying this rule by
analogy to the present case, private respondents
submission of the newsletter intended as an annex
to his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit in I.S. No. 97-39547
to Prosecutor Bautista who was then conducting
the preliminary investigation in said case, does not
amount to publication for the reason that the
sending of such material was made specifically for
the purpose of including the same as evidence in
the preliminary investigation. That such
submission was belatedly made does not take out
the material from the absolutely privileged
communication rule. Prosecutor Bautista had a
legal duty to perform with respect to the subject
communication, which is to consider the same
along with the other evidence submitted by
private respondent as complainant in I.S. no. 97-
39547, in determining the existence of probable
cause for the commission of the crime of estafa
and that petitioner as accused-defendant therein
should be tried for such offense. Under the
circumstances and in the lawful exercise of private
respondents right to present evidence in support
of his accusations against petitioner in the criminal
 complaint for estafa, We fail to see how such
submission of documentary evidence omitted from
the annexes to the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, could
amount to publication that would give rise to
private respondents liability for a libel charge
especially when there is no proof of the alleged
circulation of copies of the subject newsletter
except to the City Prosecutors Office of Makati
wherein I.S. No. 97-39547 was then in the
preliminary investigation stage. Petitioners feeble
argument that Prosecutor Bautista remains a third
person because the subject newsletter was never
included or formally offered as evidence, hardly
convinces Us to hold that there was actual
publication for purpose of finding a prima facie
case for libel against the private respondent. He
must be reminded that the case for estafa was still
at the preliminary investigation stage and there is
no requirement of a formal offer of such
documentary evidence or supporting documents
to establish probable cause (citations omitted).
cralawSince the newsletter was presented during the
preliminary investigation, it was vested with a privileged
character. While Philippine law is silent on the question of
whether the doctrine of absolute privilege extends to
statements made in preliminary investigations or other
proceedings preparatory to the actual trial, the U.S. case of
Borg v. Boas makes a categorical declaration of the existence of
such protection:
cralawIt is hornbook learning that the actions and
utterances in judicial proceedings so far as the
actual participants therein are concerned and
preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an
official nature have been given absolute privilege.
Of particular interest are proceedings leading up
to prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for
crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed
with the prosecutor or the court is not libelous
although proved to be false and unfounded.
Furthermore, the information given to a prosecutor
by a private person for the purpose of initiating a
prosecution is protected by the same cloak of
immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an
action for defamation. (Emphasis ours)
The ruling in Borg is persuasive in this jurisdiction. We see no
reason why we should not adopt it.
Furthermore, the newsletter qualified as a communication made
bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest . . . made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
[in]criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While the doctrine of privileged communication can be abused,
and its abuse can lead to great hardships, to allow libel suits to
prosper strictly on this account will give rise to even greater
hardships. The doctrine itself rests on public policy which looks
to the free and unfettered administration of justice. It is as a
rule applied liberally.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The one obstacle that those pleading the defense of privileged
communication must hurdle is the test of relevancy. Under this
test, a matter alleged in the course of the proceedings need not
be in every case material to the issues presented but should be
legitimately related to the issues or be so pertinent to the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the
course of trial.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralawHere, the controversial statements were made in the
context of a criminal complaint against petitioner, albeit for
other, separate acts involving greed and deceit, and were
disclosed only to the official investigating the complaint.
Liberally applying the privileged communication doctrine, these
statements were still relevant to the complaint under
investigation because, like the averments therein, they also
involved petitioners alleged rapacity and deceitfulness.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the
September 13, 2002 decision and November 21, 2002 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
FIRST DIVISION
ANNIE FERMIN, a.k.a. G.R. No. 147977 Lachica, Naty Lachica, Manuel Lagartera, Juliano Landisen,
ANITA SAGACO, and Maximino Lapid, Silvestre Lorenzo, Timoteo Lubusan
AURELIO LEO KIGIS, Present: (Dapnisan), Helen Matale, Soledad Nabunat, Damian Peera,
Petitioners, Eliseo Pidazo, Pablito Sacpa, Ananao Santos, Esteban Santos,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,cralaw Juanito Santos, and Samson Santos (Arizo, et al.). The case
CARPIO, was docketed as Civil Case No. 925-R.
CORONA,
- versus - AZCUNA, and cralawIn a Decision[4] dated 28 June 1991, the Regional Trial
cralaw LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court) ruled:

HON. ANTONIO M. ESTEVES, cralawWHEREFORE, judgment is hereby

in his capacity as Presiding Judge rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
of Branch 5, Regional Trial Court, defendants as follows:
Baguio City, and Promulgated:
MARIANO TANENGLIAN, cralaw(a) Ordering the defendants to respect
Respondents. March 26, 2008 and recognize plaintiffs ownership of the two (2)
parcels of land in question;
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
------x cralaw(b) Ordering the defendants to remove
their
houses/structures/constructions/improvements
from the subject parcels of land and surrender
DECISION the possession of the premises they are
respectively occupying to the plaintiff; and

CARPIO, J.: cralaw(c) Ordering the defendants to pay, jointly

The Case
cralawBefore the Court is a petition for review[1] with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, assailing the 28 April 2000
Decision[2] and 24 April 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48373.
The Antecedent Facts
cralawOn 15 October 1986, Mariano Tanenglian (respondent)
filed an action for quieting of title and damages against
Anselmo Arizo, Fred Balusdan, Gregorio Carreon, Teodita
Ceril, Corazon Dapnisan, Mario Dapnisan, Rogel Estrada, Aida
Fermin, Marilou Fernandez, Michael Fernandez, Teofilo
Fulmana, Andrew Herrero, Simeon Jastan, Rogelio (Rodolfo)
and severally, the plaintiff the amount of
P10,000.00 for and as attorneys fees plus the
costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
cralawOn appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts ruling in its Decision dated 18 February 1994. Arizo, et
al. filed a petition for review before this Court, but it was
denied in a Resolution dated 2 August 1995. This Court
denied Arizo, et al.s first and second motions for
reconsideration in its Resolutions dated 15 January 1996 and
4 March 1996, respectively. An Entry of Judgment was issued
on 8 April 1996.
cralawOn 16 December 1996, the trial court granted
respondents motion for execution. In a Special Order of
Demolition[6] dated 30 April 1998, the trial court ordered:
cralawWHEREFORE, Defendants, their agents,
assigns, representatives and/or successors-in-
interest are hereby given a period of fifteen (15)
days from notice within which to remove their
improvements from the premises subject of this
case.
cralawThe Deputy Sheriff assigned to this Court
is likewise hereby ordered to cause the
demolition of all improvements which he may
find within the premises immediately after the
expiration of the abovesaid period with the
survey report of the committee to be made as a
parameter in compliance with this Order; and to
simultaneously place Plaintiff in possession
thereof.
cralawExpenses of the demolition shall be borne
by the Plaintiff.
cralawSO ORDERED.[7]
cralawThe trial court issued an Alias Writ of Execution[8] on
even date.
cralawAnnie Fermin, a.k.a. Anita Sagaco, and Aurelio Leo
Kigis (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals. They alleged that the deputy sheriff was poised to
implement the Special Order of Demolition not only against
Arizo, et al. but also against them. Petitioners alleged that
they were deprived of their right to due process because
they were never made defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R.
Petitioners alleged that they entered into the possession and
occupancy of the lands as members of an indigenous cultural
community in the honest perception and belief that the lands
formed part of their ancestral lands. Petitioners further
alleged that their occupancy of the lands was not pursuant to
any agreement entered into with anyone of the defendants in
Civil Case No. 925-R or any of the defendants predecessors-
in-interest. Further, they alleged that it was not even
established that their residential structures were within the
area subject of Civil Case No. 925-R.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
cralawIn its 28 April 2000 Decision, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition and affirmed the Special Order of
Demolition.
cralawThe Court of Appeals ruled that respondents right to
the subject parcels of land had already been settled with
finality. The Court of Appeals ruled that had petitioners been
in good faith regarding their possession of the land, they
could have intervened in Civil Case No. 925-R under Rule 19
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals
further ruled that had petitioners been really unaware of the
proceedings or aggrieved because of the damage posed by
the Special Order of Demolition, they could just have
apprised the trial court of their adverse claim and move for
the issuance of the necessary terceria under Section 43, Rule
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals
ruled that since petitioners failed to avail of these remedies
or any other possible remedies in law, they could no longer
prevent respondents exercise of his rights of ownership by
belatedly complaining about their supposed property rights.
cralawPetitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
cralawIn its 24 April 2001 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.
cralawHence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
cralawThe issue in this case is whether the Special Order of
Demolition may be enforced against petitioners who were not
party-defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R.
The Ruling of this Court
cralawThe petition has merit.
cralawThe generally accepted principle is that no man shall
be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by
the court.[9] Execution of a judgment can only be issued
against one who is a party to the action, and not against one
who, not being a party in the case, did not have his day in
court.[10] Due process requires that a court decision can
only bind a party to the litigation and not against one who did
not have his day in court.[11]
cralawIn this case, petitioners were not parties in Civil Case
No. 925-R. Petitioners allegation that their possession did not
arise from an agreement with the defendants or the
predecessors-in-interest of the defendants in Civil Case No.
925-R remains unrebutted by respondent. The Special Order
of Demolition only binds the defendants in Civil Case No.
925-R as well as their agents, assigns, representatives, or
successors-in-interest. In the absence of proof that
petitioners are agents, assigns, representatives, or
successors-in-interest of the defendants in Civil Case No.
925-R, the Special Order of Demolition may not be enforced
against them.
cralawThe Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners could have
intervened in Civil Case No. 925-R. Yet, there was no
evidence that petitioners were aware of the pendency of Civil
Case No. 925-R. We cannot accept respondents assertion
that the pendency of Civil Case No. 925-R could not have
escaped petitioners notice because it was frequently talked
about in the community.
cralawThe Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioners could
have availed themselves of the remedy under Section 43,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:
cralawSec. 43. Proceedings when indebtedness
denied or another person claims the property. -
If it appears that a person or corporation,
alleged to have property of the judgment obligor
or to be indebted to him, claims an interest in
the property adverse to him or denies the debt,
the court may authorize, by an order made to
that effect, the judgment obligee to institute an
action against such person or corporation for the
recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a
transfer or other disposition of such interest or
debt within one hundred twenty (120) days from
notice of the order, and may punish
disobedience of such order as for contempt.
Such order may be modified or vacated at any
time by the court which issued it, or by the court
in which the action is brought, upon such terms
as may be just.
cralawIn this case, Arizo, et al. are not judgment obligors as
contemplated in Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Neither are petitioners indebted to Arizo, et
al. It was not even established that petitioners are in
possession of the property of Arizo, et al. In fact, petitioners
alleged that it was not established that their residential
structures are within the area subject of Civil Case No. 925-R.
In other words, Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which would allow the judgment obligee to
recover indebtedness due to the judgment obligor, does not
apply in this case.
cralawWhen the Court of Appeals referred to the remedy of
terceria, it must be referring to Section 16, Rule 39, not
Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[12]
which provides:
cralawSec. 16. Proceedings where property
claimed by third person. - If the property levied
on is claimed by any person other than the
judgment obligor or his agent, and such person
makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to
 the possession thereof, stating the grounds of
such right or title, and serves the same upon the
officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon
the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property, unless such
judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files
a bond approved by the court to indemnify the
third-party claimant in a sum not less than the
value of the property levied on. In case of
disagreement as to such value, the same shall
be determined by the court issuing the writ of
execution. No claim for damages for the taking
or keeping of the property may be enforced
against the bond unless the action therefor is
filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from
the date of the filing of the bond.
cralawThe Court recognizes the finality of the trial courts
Decision in Civil Case No. 925-R. However, petitioners are
contesting whether their residential structures are within the
area subject of Civil Case No. 925-R. Since petitioners are not
parties to Civil Case No. 925-R, respondent has to file the
proper action against petitioners to enforce his property
rights within the bounds of the law and our rules.[13]
Petitioners right to possession, if any, should be threshed out
in a proper court proceeding.
cralawWHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 28 April 2000
Decision and 24 April 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 48373. We make permanent the temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on 25 June 2001
enjoining the enforcement of the Special Order of Demolition
dated 30 April 1998 against petitioners.

cralawThe officer shall not be liable for damages cralawSO ORDERED.

for the taking or keeping of the property, to any
third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing
herein contained shall prevent such claimant or
any third person from vindicating his claim to
the property in a separate action, or prevent the
judgment obligee from claiming damages in the
same or separate action against a third-party
claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious
claim.

cralawThe remedy of terceria is available to a third person

other than the judgment obligor or his agent who claims a
property levied on. In this case, the property was not levied
on and put on auction. The implementation of the Special
Order of Demolition would result in the destruction of
petitioners property. Further, terceria is not a speedy and
adequate remedy insofar as petitioners are concerned
considering that the Special Order of Demolition ordered the
Deputy Sheriff to cause the demolition of all the
improvements immediately after the expiration of the 15-day
period granted upon the defendants, their agents,
assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest to
remove their improvements on the premises.