Understanding Philosophical Counseling

Richard Charlton Sivil

University of KwaZulu-Natal
Howard College Campus
Durban, 4041
South Africa
sivilr@ukzn.ac.za

Abstract
The last two and a half decades has seen the emergence of philosophical
counseling. While it is practiced in many countries comparatively little has
been said on its general character. In this paper I will seek to understand
philosophical counseling by exploring its points of convergence to and devia-
tion from its complimentary parts – philosophy and counseling. The practical
and applied orientation of philosophical counseling seems worlds apart from
what many consider to exemplify philosophy – theoretical, intellectual and
abstract concern with foundational questions. Given this it is worth exploring
how philosophical counseling coincides with what is understood in academic
circles as philosophy. On the other hand, the field of counseling has largely
been the domain of psychology. Given the influence and orientation of the
practice it would seem likely that philosophical counseling would be signifi-
cantly different from the common conception of psychological counseling,
but in what ways? Understanding how the practice lies in relation to the
discipline of philosophy and psychological counseling will go some way to
grasping its nature.
The philosophical counselling movement, established by Gerd Achenbach just over a
quarter of a century ago, is a fledgling field. A review of philosophical counseling
publications (Raabe 2002, Marinoff 1999, Lahav 2001, Walsh 2005) indicates that
there is a plethora of understandings and practices. Since much of the literature fo-
cuses on the methodologies and applications of the particular practitioners (the ‘how
of each practice) while very little is said on the generalized character of philosophical
counseling (the ‘what’ of the practice), it is difficult to arrive at an objective and uni-
fied sense of what constitutes philosophical counseling practice (if indeed there is
one). This makes an exploration into the nature of philosophical counseling challeng-
ing but important: as a scholar and interested practitioner such an understanding would
be informative and enlightening; furthermore, greater clarity on the practice would al-
low for critical engagement, thereby benefiting further development of the practice.
This paper is an attempt to understand philosophical counseling. I will do this by
exploring its points of convergence to and deviation from its complimentary parts –
philosophy and counseling.
Philosophical counselling can be loosely understood as practice aimed at improving
our sense of well being. We face challenges on a daily basis. Our sense of wellbeing is
enhanced or diminished, in part, by our ability to deal with these challenges. Suffering
200 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2)

arises through an inability to understand, attend to or resolve a particular problem or

issue. In this respect suffering is a response to a troubling or problematic predicament.
This response can be emotional and or intellectual. Denial, wishful thinking, anger,
fear, hate and anxiety are some examples. Philosophical counselling, by virtue of its
association with philosophy, focuses on suffering that arises as a result of: fallacious
thinking, conflicting values, disparity between belief and experience, conflicts be-
tween reason and emotion, crises of meaning, problems pertaining to personal identity,
loss, disagreement, or change (Marinoff 1999: p. 12). The underlying assumption
would be that by becoming conscious of what we think, we can attend to problematic
assumptions, beliefs, thought, values and concepts, thereby improving both the mode
and content of our thoughts, and if we can do this then we can change the way we
respond to events and situations, thereby diminishing suffering.
The applied focus of philosophical counselling may seem significantly removed
from what many associate with philosophy – a theoretical discipline concerned with
discovering the ‘truth of the real’. This search has manifested itself in multiple forms
over the course of philosophy’s history. For our philosophical predecessors truth, in-
terconnected with goodness and beauty, was largely an aspiration. Goodness, justice,
righteousness, benevolence, generosity, equanimity, to name a few, were recognized
as ideals to be attained. In contemporary philosophy, cast in the Cartesian fire and
tempered by naturalism, truth seems to have become objectified – something to be
studied and verified. To this end philosophy has become increasingly specialized,
technical, analytical and abstract, confining it to a privileged yet secluded position. In
contrast, the practical orientation of philosophical counseling firmly locates it in the
everyday realm. This is the world of the concrete and the particular. If we assume that
philosophical counseling accords itself with the form of this realm, in order to engage
with the actual and the tangible, then we must assume that the practice would eschew
generalizations and avoid abstractions. This irrevocably alters the practice of philoso-
phy, as it is likely to have significant impact on the understanding and search for truth.
The epicenter of truth would become located in the existential realm. This would have
the effect of melding truth seeker with that which is sought. This is not to suggest that
truth would be relativized to the level of the subject. Instead, truth would become
something which is ongoing and encapsulated within the process of self discovery -
something to be realized. This would appear to be fundamental to the practice, for it is
this process of realization, the active engagement with the development of our being
that facilitates the transformative process. Consciously tending to personal predica-
ments and concerns, combined with actively seeking to improve ourselves, would
bring about an improved state of being in the world.
As distanced as philosophical counseling may appear from the philosophical domain
it is firmly located within the tradition, for the counsel of philosophy is as old as the
history of western philosophy itself. It is rooted in the Socratic ‘care of self’ (Flynn
2005) and is especially evident in the Hellenistic philosophical schools (Epicurean,
Stoic and the Cynics) which saw philosophy to be in service of humanity – aimed at
reducing human suffering, achieving inner freedom and improving flourishing
(Nussbaum 1994: p. 3). For the Hellenistic philosophers suffering occurred as a result
of false belief and judgement. The ‘cure’ to minimize suffering was metered out by
prescribing a particular notion of the good life, and the means to achieve it. These pre-
scriptions were diverse, ranging from the satisfaction of desires (Epicureans) to the re-
straint of desires (Stoics). The view of philosophy as embedded in and concerned with
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2) 201

our way of life is not confined to the Hellenistic period and reappears, in various
forms, in other schools of thought such as phenomenology and existentialism, which
focus on the state of our being in the world; and is notable in the works of thinkers
such as Nietzsche, Foucault and Dewey who saw that the value of philosophy lies in
its application to everyday life.1
Psychology, concerned with the study of the psyche (soul / mind), was originally re-
garded as a branch of philosophy – Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics all pro-
pounded theories of the soul. It was considered an independent scientific discipline in
the mid nineteenth century when experimental research was applied within the field.
As a result emphasis shifted away from metaphysical concerns to the study of mental
functions, including perception, cognition, emotion and personality, as well as behav-
ior. While the practices of philosophy and psychology have become distinct there are
broad ranging overlaps, including a general interest in the processes of mind, concepts,
values and standards, and in particular the inclusion of philosophy into counseling ap-
proaches (Rational Emotive Therapy, Existential Psychology, and Client-Centered
Therapy). The emergence of philosophical counseling is indicative of further
crossover – with counseling practice being adopted by philosophers as a profession.
Counseling can be understood as both a helping relationship that occurs between
practitioner and client as well as a process that the client undergoes as the way they
think and feel is transformed.2 People seek counseling for a range of reasons and to at-
tend to a diversity of needs, including looking for a means to: manage or deal with a
life crisis; heal a past hurt, handle a transition; make a decision; develop a life skill.
Accordingly, counseling aims to: improve the client’s ability to lead a productive satis-
fying life; improve the client’s ability to establish and maintain relationships; enhance
the client’s ability to cope with issues and problems; enhance decision-making proce-
dures; and facilitate potential development of the client (George 1990).
Despite a shared orientation towards improving wellbeing and alleviating suffering
fundamental differences exist between philosophical and psychological counseling do-
mains, resting on a principle shift from psychological to philosophical understandings
and approaches. I will attempt to elucidate this shift by postulating the relationship be-
tween the practices and the medical model; exploring the role of theoretical framework
in the practice; outlining the domains of focus; and surveying a range of possible
approaches.
1 Despite this, philosophy as it is typically produced and transmitted in the contemporary academy is sel-
dom applied (outside of constructing morally challenging situations to test the justifiability of theoretical
outlooks) and is rarely aimed at brining about personal transformation, giving it the appearance of some-
thing that has become sterile and detached – making it suffer “the fate of uselessness” (Raabe 2002: p.
31).
2 The term ‘counseling’ has two distinct meanings. In the United States of America it is used in the sense
of guidance, while in Britain it refers to mental health care. The difference is significant as the former is
sought out by mentally normal members of society in search of counsel, while the latter understanding
applies to individuals with psychological disorders, ranging from neuroses to psychoses (George 1990).
There is a sense that the application of philosophical counseling would be limited in application to the
mentally normal, as it is doubtful whether it would benefit those with pathological conditions and psy-
choses. In this respect it has been dubbed ‘therapy for the sane’ (Peter March, in Marinoff 1999: p. 11).
This is not to say that all problems have a philosophical basis and are resolvable through philosophical
counseling. That would negate the psychological / emotional human element, and would deny the effec-
tiveness and necessity of psychological approaches. Furthermore, it is too early to rule out the possibility
of philosophical counseling benefiting those suffering certain neuroses.
202 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2)

The medical model is a loosely defined ideology.3 It is the dominant approach in the
West which views all physical disease as a deviation from the normal mode of func-
tioning, and accordingly understands the patient as ill and in need of a cure. Influence
of the model is pervasive, and has had significant impact on the development of psy-
chological theories and techniques. A range of medical assumptions, including biolog-
ical / materialistic / causal-deterministic explanations of problems, the belief that men-
tal illnesses are like physical illnesses, the importance of diagnosing the patient on the
basis of established criteria, and that specific mental illnesses are treated with specific
therapies, pervade psychology in general and psychological counseling in particular
(Simon, 1994; Wampold, 2001). Such influence is evident in psychoanalysis, psycho-
therapy, psychopathology, clinical psychology, cognitive-behavioral therapy and
psychiatry. The extent and degree of this influence is beyond the concern of this paper.
Influence of the medical model, as noted by Nussbaum, is evident in the Hellenistic
schools of thought. The purpose of medicine was understood to lie in service of hu-
manity - “finding out how human beings are diseased and what they need is a prelude
to, and is inseparable from, trying to heal them and give them what they need”
(Nussbaum 1994: p. 33). Incorporating this into philosophical thought served as “an
important tool both of discovery and of justification” (Nussbaum 1994: p. 14). The
medical analogy in the Hellenistic period claimed “not only that ethical reality is not
altogether independent of human theories and conceptions but also that ethical truth is
not independent of what human beings deeply wish, need … and desire” (Nussbaum
1994: p. 23). For the Hellenistic philosophers the diseases of the soul that impede hu-
man flourishing were understood to be a result of social beliefs and teachings. Critical
arguments were deemed necessary to dislodge these false beliefs. Reason was seen as
the means to attend to suffering, giving rise to the analogy that ‘logos is to the soul as
medicine is to the body’. In this respect philosophy was promoted as a medical art for
the soul (Cisero 1927: p. 241).
There is the sense that philosophical counselling practitioners eschew the medical
model, and, if this is the case, then it marks a decisive point of departure from their
Greek predecessors and at least some forms of psychological counselling. There are
good reasons for avoiding such influence, which can be deemed problematic on a
number of counts. Firstly, the medical model seeks to make a ‘diagnosis – this presup-
poses that there is a norm, and that the client (patient) deviates from this norm. Such a
diagnosis is reductive in that it labels and compartmentalizes the patient as ill and in
need of a cure. This places the doctor in a position of authority and denies the patient
an active role in their recovery. Since philosophical counselling is concerned with the
examination of one’s thoughts it is unnecessary to subscribe notions of normal or ab-
normal, healthy or sick, which avoids counterproductive labelling. Since there is no
patient who is ill, there is no cure to be metered out. Because no norm is presupposed
a particular view of the good life cannot be prescribed. Instead, the client is encour-
aged to examine their own understanding and (re)formulate a conception through a
3 A model refers to “a collection of beliefs or unifying theory about what is needed to bring about change
with a particular client in a particular treatment context” (Jensen 2006: p. 2). The term ‘medical model’ is
used in a number of ways, and refers to: the framework of assumptions that underpin the doctor / patient
relationship; a mechanistic and technical expertise; an understanding of the nature of illness which fo-
cuses on understanding causes as the means to effect a cure. Aside from multiple meanings of the term,
there are a range of different models (e.g. biomedical, pathological) each operating under specific as-
sumptions. Given this diversity, a false sense of unity is conveyed with the use of the term (Jensen
2006).
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2) 203

process of critical engagement. Not only does this empower the client to take charge
of their own lives, it alters the position of practitioner as expert, further empowering
the client. This could have positive effects on improving the client’s sense of
wellbeing. Secondly, psychological diagnosis, in particular, is made on the basis of in-
formation volunteered by the client during the intake interview. The reliability of this
is questionable, since the client could withhold information for fear of condemnation,
exaggerate the symptoms to gain sympathy, or alternatively could give incorrect infor-
mation due to problems with memory or attention. Disinterest in making a diagnosis
ensures that philosophical counselling avoids this concern. Thirdly, the model reduces
human problems to an assessment of causation followed by remediation. This is prob-
lematic as causation is, for the most part, established symptomatically. A major limita-
tion with this is that not all problems which may manifest physical symptoms have
physical causes, i.e. spiritual / philosophical crises. In this respect treating the
symptom will not attend to the root of the problem.
A direct consequent of subscribing to the medical model is the use of an underpin-
ning theoretical framework. Theoretical frameworks typically comprise four basic ele-
ments: basic assumptions underpinning the theory; an explanation of the acquisition of
helpful and unhelpful behavior; an explanation of the maintenance and perpetuation of
helpful and unhelpful behavior; an explanation on how to help clients change behavior
(Colledge 2002). Theory is deemed to be essential in the counseling process as it pro-
vides the counselor a means to understand and make decisions on how to view the cli-
ent’s behavior and how to treat and respond to them during a counseling session. Psy-
choanalysis, psychodynamic therapy and cognitive-behavior therapy are some exem-
plars.
By virtue of its association to philosophy, it is my contention that philosophical
counseling ought to be free from the constraints of theoretical impositions. Philosophy
is primarily a speculative and introspective activity concerned with objectivity of out-
look and focused on the examination of fundamental perceptions and values. For this
level of inquiry there should be no preconceived notions and no theories to guide, just
an openness to investigate and a willingness to discover and learn. Since philosophical
counseling entails the exercise of philosophical inquiry, it ought to be committed to no
particular school of thought and bound by no particular method. This should not be
taken to imply that practitioners would not make use of philosophical theories - there
may well be instances where such theories could be relevant for purposes of instruc-
tion and explanation as well as useful in facilitating the improvement of concepts or
values.
A concern could be raised that the denial of theoretical framework is problematic to
the counseling process. It should be noted that while theoretical framework is per-
ceived by some to be a crucial element of counseling, its application can be obstruc-
tive. It can lead to a restricted focus by overemphasizing what the theory identifies,
and neglecting what the theory is blind to. This can result in rigidity in the counseling
process that prevents an open-minded exploration of all facets of an issue or problem.
This can be of great disservice to the client as the therapist, in pursuit of what the the-
ory dictates as important, could neglect areas of concern to the client. A further disser-
vice to occur is the ‘unethical selling’ of theories. Approaches that are popular and
marketable tend to be promoted over and above other, potentially more relevant and
applicable theories, but which perhaps are less profitable. An example of this is the
current favoring of short term counseling models by medical insurance schemes,
204 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2)

which deem cheaper to be better. Whether or not philosophical counseling would be

immune to this particular influence remains to be seen. Finally, many theoretical ap-
proaches tend to focus entirely on the individual, thereby failing to take into account
broader cultural and social factors and the ways in which they affect the individual.
Theoretical frameworks can confound the counseling process by obfuscating
understanding of issues as well as discovering solutions. Refusal to operate within the
confines of a theoretical framework avoids these pitfalls.
Recognizing the problematic aspects of applying theoretical frameworks is insuffi-
cient to jettison them, for efficacy should not be compromised. Can counseling be ef-
fective without making use of a theoretical framework? While most psychological
counseling approaches rely upon a single theoretical framework there are modes of
counseling, such as eclectic counseling, which do not, but instead allow the client’s
needs to dictate the methods and techniques to be used. Arguably while multimodal
counseling does not have its own overarching theory, it does borrow theories from
other approaches, and thus it would be incorrect to claim that it does not make use of
theoretical framework(s). Perhaps the question requires rephrasing – is it possible to
conceive of counseling practice sans theoretical framework? I think so. Firstly, evi-
dence within the field of psychological counseling points to the priority of the relation-
ship between counselor and client (Rogers 1957; Clark 2006). A positive relationship
– built on strong rapport, in which the practitioner exhibits empathy – has been shown
to be a necessary and sufficient condition to the healing process. This serves to indi-
cate that a theoretical framework is not essential to the counseling process. Secondly,
social constructivism recognizes that theories are merely constructions of the thera-
pist’s understanding of the world. This means that while theories can be effective their
usefulness is limited, and furthermore, not essential for counseling to occur. Thirdly,
in many instances the source of a client’s worries and concerns rest upon a narrowness
of vision. Immersed in the complexity of the issue, coupled with emotional attach-
ments, personal expectations and demands can blind the client’s ability to view the sit-
uation from an alternative perspective. In such instances an alternative frame of refer-
ence provides clarity to the problem that they were unable to see. Such a frame of ref-
erence does not require a theoretical framework, but a level of disinterested objectivity
coupled with insight and a moderate exercise of wisdom. This could be obtained from
the trained philosophical practitioner.
A further concern could be raised that without an overarching theoretical framework
the boundaries of the profession would be vague. This could present a number of
problems. Firstly, it makes it difficult to talk about something when the parameters are
unclear. This may be the case, but lack of clarity in any newly developing area is par
for the course. It is always easier to understand something which possesses substantive
form. Prior to that point it is natural that its identity would be indistinct. Furthermore,
that it is in this state of becoming doesn’t impede discussion, rather it presents a
unique opportunity to engage in the process of formulation. Secondly, the absence of
theoretical framework makes the referral of clients difficult as it is impossible to know
in advance the basic assumptions any practitioner operates under. This is a valid con-
cern, however the fact that philosophical counselling doesn’t subscribe to a theoretical
framework constitutes part of its current identity, and it is what allows the practitioner
to treat each client and their particular situation as unique. Admittedly this would do
little to quell the concern that it is impossible to know before hand whether or not the
client would benefit from that form of practice. In response, we never can tell if a
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2) 205

mode of counselling is applicable to the client’s issues, but in many instances the
mode of counselling plays less significance than the relationship that develops be-
tween practitioner and client. Furthermore, application of a theoretical framework is
no guarantee that the client will be suitably assisted. It is not the framework that deter-
mines adequacy of client fit but the practitioner who is in the position to determine the
client’s issues and concerns can be addressed by their particular approach. In this re-
spect it is the professional integrity of the practitioner that is important, not the pres-
ence of a theoretical framework. A final concern is that without a theoretical frame-
work there would be no standards to guide training (which may hamper the develop-
ment of a professional status), and by correlation nothing to evaluate the practice of
those in the field, i.e. there is nothing to prevent charlatans entering the practice. These
concerns are not unimportant, but they are premature - it is impossible to have every-
thing worked out in advance. While we ought to bear these concerns in mind we must
be wary of them hampering the development of the practice.
The two counseling domains have distinctive areas of focus. Psychological counsel-
ing approaches focus on the affective, cognitive and or behavioral processes of the cli-
ent. Philosophical counseling, on the other hand, tends to focus on the perceptual
realm of the client, understanding problems as expressions of an individual’s personal
philosophy. Actions, outlooks, attitudes and values can be understood as statements
about ourselves and the world. These statements constitute an individual’s worldview
– the “abstract framework that interprets the structure and philosophical implications
of one’s conception of self and reality; a system that coordinates… that organizes,
makes distinctions, draws implications, compares, confers meaning, and thus makes
sense of one’s attitudes towards oneself and one’s world” (Lahav 1995: p. 7). Reduc-
ing suffering is an intellectual process which the client undergoes as they critically in-
vestigate, evaluate and revise their underlying assumptions, understandings and out-
looks. “Understanding our own philosophy can help prevent, resolve, or manage many
problems” (Marinoff 1999: p. 5). While certain forms of psychological counseling
(RET) incorporate, to at least some degree, interpretations of the client’s worldview
into their practice, this in no way diminishes or negates the relevance of philosophical
counseling, but instead points to the fact that some psychological approaches have
become, in part, philosophical in orientation and application.
A further significant point that could differentiate between the two counseling do-
mains pertains to the scope of application. Psychological counseling is commonly un-
derstood as being useful for dealing with emotional crisis, trauma and other psycho-
logical issues and concerns. As a result its range of application tends to be confined to
those who suffer from emotionally debilitating issues and concerns. While philosophi-
cal counseling could competently deal with a wide range of these issues (excluding
psychoses and possibly some neuroses) it is not limited to them. The practice of philo-
sophical counseling is new, and not marred by public perception. Furthermore, if we
understand philosophical counseling as committed to the improvement of our
wellbeing by helping us engage with our perceptual realm, then we can understand it
to be applicable to everyone. But it is not confined to individual applications alone,
and has potential to be extended to include groups – both private and corporate. This
has the potential to move philosophical counseling into mainstream society.
An exploration of at least some of the methods of application, while pointing to the
‘how’ of the practice, will help us further to understand the ‘what’ of philosophical
counseling. The emphasis in philosophical counseling is on living consciously – being
206 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2)

conscious of one’s worldview, coupled with a willingness to evaluate and improve it.
Practitioners subscribe to a variety of approaches to achieve this, all of which have one
thing in common – the use of philosophical methods, skills and material. These in-
clude, among other things, application of the Socratic dialogue, critical examination of
concepts and values, and critical engagement with philosophical texts.
The Socratic dialogue is central to the practice of philosophical counseling. It is an
open, honest, authentic communication with others and oneself; a practical activity
freed from dogma and doctrine, the point of which is to move the dialoguer toward an
openness of attitude and outlook. An application of the Socratic dialogue would en-
courage the client to engage in critical self examination which seeks to develop mean-
ingful insights and understandings about their personal lives. Concern could be raised
over whether doing so commits one to a Socratic account of knowledge and the pro-
cess of attaining it, for it was often the case that Socrates’ interlocutor ended up by
knowing less than they had originally thought. This would be a great disservice to
someone in search of solace. However, unlike Socrates, who sought to bring about
knowledge that was external to the interlocutor, the practitioner would assist instead
on bringing self awareness and clarity concerning the client’s outlooks – concepts,
values and perceptions.
The concepts, values and perceptions we hold play a primary role in the formation
and application of our worldview. In many instances these are unconsciously adopted,
and as a result could be ill-formed, illogical, and or contradictory. Ill-conceived con-
cepts, values or perceptions lie at the root of many of our problems. Engaging with
concepts and values exposes them through the process of verbalization, and makes it
possible to critically engage with them, thereby allowing us to assess and improve
them where they are misinformed, poorly defined or weak in meaning. General issues
and problems could have an underlying conceptual nature. For example, if the mean-
ings attributed to certain concepts, such as ‘relationship’, ‘love’, ‘marriage’, ‘friend-
ship’ or ‘success’, are ill-formed they could cause us to think about, experience and re-
spond to people, situations and events in inappropriate ways. This in turn could elicit
unexpected and unpredictable responses which we would find disturbing and problem-
atic. This could be remedied through an analysis of these concepts which would high-
light any misconceptions or problematic formulations. Re-conceptualization of con-
cepts could be sufficient to correct misunderstandings that result in problematic issues.
Alternatively, issues and problems could have an ethical nature. In this respect our
sense of what constitutes right and wrong could be ill-formed and or contradictory
leading to us holding a set of confused values, which could place us in a state of seem-
ingly irresolvable tension, indecision as to what to do, or a perpetual state of guilt. A
critical examination and evaluation of our value set could point to the necessity of a
re-conceptualization. An improved value system could remedy the underlying con-
cerns, thereby addressing the problematic issue. Lastly, some problems could have an
existential nature. In this respect failure to have a strong or clear sense of meaning in
life can cause anxiety, while an inability to achieve a state of authenticity can also con-
tribute to suffering. Helping to uncover the meaning of the client’s being, together
with an exploration of the notion of existence (through phenomenological analysis)
could bring about greater self clarity and awareness, thereby allowing them to identify
meaning in their life, the being they wish to be and the root they ought to follow in
order to live authentically.
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2) 207

The Socratic Dialogue has applications that extend beyond facilitating the formula-
tion and evaluation of one’s personal philosophy, and includes providing alternative
understandings to situations or concerns and facilitating the development of frame-
works for managing complex problems. It is important to note that in many instances
the path of the dialogue is more important than the conclusions reached – for it is the
path that reveals the truths of the matter. In this respect solutions are less important
than a persistent and patient application of the method. Ultimately, the goal would be
to establish critical independence within the client, equipping them to self-reflexively
engage with future concerns and issues on their own. It would be the role of the practi-
tioner to impart the necessary critical skills and habits of self examination on to the
client, while at the same time making every effort not to impose their own views onto
the client.
The prescription of philosophical texts has been advocated to address issues by gain-
ing insights (Marinoff 1999). Discovering what others have said could provide a novel
and rationally informed point of reference that can enlighten us by providing a frame-
work for understanding life and our place in it. This could facilitate an assessment and
reorganization of worldview, through the introduction of new ideas and understand-
ings. A skeptical eyebrow could be raised at the thought of Kant providing solace to a
suffering individual - it is more likely to cause confusion than end it. Furthermore, this
particular approach could be seen to be limited to particularly educated individuals. It
is worth noting that the client wouldn’t simply go out and read any text. Instead the
practitioner would introduce the client to the philosophical work, or extracts thereof,
most suited to them and their particular issues or concern. They would then facilitate
an engagement of the text and ideas relating to it so that it can be fully grasped. This
places the practitioner in the role of philosophical matchmaker.
This is not to say that philosophical counseling is a simply matter of skills training
and application. Just as conceiving of philosophy as the application of methods and
skills and the engagement with philosophical texts fails to grasp the true nature of phi-
losophy, similarly such an understanding would provide a diminished conception of
philosophical counseling. More than method, or subject matter, philosophy is a way of
thinking. It is less a discipline of formal study, and more “a continuous act, permanent
and identical with life itself” (Hadot 1995: p. 268). It is less concerned with grasping
the understanding expressed by others, and more a coming to terms with one’s own
understanding of life, underscored by a commitment to continually improve and up-
grade one’s outlook and understanding. This is achieved through an open communica-
tion among those who love and seek the truth; it is a quest to understand the real and
to strive for the good (Hadot 1995). It is a search for one’s own truth – not simply to
know it, but to realize it. In this respect philosophy can be understood as an art of liv-
ing. The implications of this for philosophical counselling is to understand the practice
as a process in which practitioner and client embark on a personal journey directed at
the mutual attainment of truth and wisdom, where the good of the client is primary,
and where there is little pressure of attaining any goals, or following prescribed meth-
ods. The practitioner encourages an exploration of life, issues, and concerns in an on-
going open interactive dialogue. This presents a new dynamic for the counseling pro-
cess, one in which therapy flows from the process rather than being something that is
aimed for. It is human engagement in understanding and discovery that results in the
therapeutic process - counseling is incidental (Walsh 2005).
208 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2)

This inquiry has been fruitful, albeit preliminary. At least some basic foundations
have been exposed. It is clear that philosophical counselling is a practice aimed at im-
proving our sense of flourishing, by reducing human suffering. Suffering in this re-
spect arises as a result of ‘uncontrolled being’ – thought and action that is governed by
the passions, misunderstandings, misconceptions and misinterpretations. This is a state
common to all, but not one that we are doomed to, for we have the power to free our-
selves from this state. We have had a glimpse of how this can be achieved - through an
application of philosophical methods, skills and material, a healthy dose of critical in-
quiry and self-reflectiveness and a desire for self improvement. It was shown that
philosophical counselling falls squarely within the domain of the philosophical – the
orientation to philosophy as a way of life is not new but occurs at different points
throughout the history of the discipline; the practice is directly concerned with access-
ing and assessing the personal worldview of the client; and it makes use of philosophi-
cal methods, skills and materials. Distinct differences between philosophical counsel-
ing and contemporary academic philosophy were noted. The former is practical, ap-
plied, and concerned with the pursuit of an existential notion of truth, while the latter
tends to be abstract, theoretical and concerned, for the most part, with fundamental
questions and trying to establish objective truths. The emergence of philosophical
counselling, which represents an extension to the field of practical philosophy, should
in no way been seen as a negation of the relevance and necessity of academic philoso-
phy. The two can and must co-exist. Theoretical abstract thought is the counterpoint
to the practical and applied form of philosophy. The former provides an invaluable
source of material, methods and skills to the latter; while the latter brings philosophy
out of its ivory tower, and takes it to the market place, reintroducing the philosopher to
the people, highlighting philosophy’s relevance and worth. Philosophical and psycho-
logical counselling were compared. It was shown that while philosophical counselling
shares the broad aim of counselling, it differs fundamentally in its orientations and ap-
proach. Notably, it is philosophical as opposed to psychological. I argued that there is
good reason for the practice to resist the influence of the medical model and the impo-
sition of constraining theoretical frameworks. It was also shown that the practice is
concerned with the perceptual rather than the emotional and cognitive realm of the cli-
ent; and applies philosophical methods, skills and materials. Differences aside, we
must remember that counselling is a relatively recent phenomenon, one that is con-
stantly being reformulated. Each formulation provides a new element of understand-
ing, a new method of approach and an alternative means to conceive of and address
the issues and concerns of the client. In this respect the emergence of philosophical
counseling within the counseling domain should be understood as an addition to the
practice rather than an opposition to it. It adds value not only by introducing philo-
sophical meanings and implications of events into the counselling domain, but because
it incorporates the philosopher into the domain. This brings with it a new dimension to
the field – new understandings, new propositions and new practices. Whether it suc-
ceeds in achieving its goals remains to be seen.4 The search to understand philosophi-
cal counselling has just begun – for while it began in conjecture and speculation it
must proceed through to practice and application. It is here that we will discover more
4 To my knowledge there has been no systematic empirical study pointing to its success or failure. A pre-
liminary study by Ron Lahav indicates positive responses, i.e. that counselees found the process mean-
ingful and helpful (Lahav 2001)
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(2) 209

about what it is.

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