AMERICAN DICTATORS: COMMITTEES FOR PUBLIC SAFETY DURING THE

AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1784

BY

JOSHUA P. CANALE

BA, Le Moyne College, 2007

MA, Binghamton University, 2009

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
in the Graduate School of
Binghamton University
State University of New York
2014
 UMI Number: 3641969

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 Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
in the Graduate School of
Binghamton University
State University of New York
2014

May 16, 2014

Douglas Bradburn, Chair and Faculty Advisor

Department of History, Binghamton University

Diane Miller Sommerville, Member

Department of History, Binghamton University

Stephen R. Ortiz, Member

Department of History, Binghamton University

J. David Hacker, Outside Examiner

Department of History and Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota

  iii  
 Abstract

After the collapse of British colonial rule, the fledgling American governments

soon discovered the need to legitimize both sovereignty and social order. While

legislatures undoubtedly democratized the Revolution, the difficulty of achieving quorum

hampered their efficiency. Recognizing that, amidst a civil war, ordinances and laws

meant little if unenforced, legislatures empowered committees for public safety to

effectively enforce the patriots’ wartime agenda from 1775-1782. How did committees

for public safety establish legitimacy and order? This study examines committees for

public safety in New York, Virginia, and New Jersey both before and after July 1776.

Since legislatures have received a disproportionately large share of historians’ attention,

this study seeks to contextualize these executive bodies’ origins, their accumulation of

power both through legislation and practice, their activities, their influence on the

Revolution, controversies surrounding their measures, and finally their eventual demise.

By investigating committees for public safety, this dissertation illuminates their forgotten

legacy. These distinctly undemocratic committees seized the reins of the Revolution with

coercive tactics and instilled community conformity. While each emerging state faced

unique concerns, their respective committees for public safety shared common

responsibilities. To some degree, each body acted as a civil bulwark against military

usurpation of power, assisted the war effort, regulated the economy, and policed internal

dissent. Consolidating the local committees’ power, these provincial and later statewide

institutions provided critical stability for the revolutionary governments. At times,

  iv  
because of their efficiency, these small executive bodies controlled the fate of the

Revolution in their states. Arguably, the committees’ coercive police powers provided

their most controversial measures. Given the nature of the conflict, committees for

public safety immediately sought, and initially struggled, to define their enemies.

Accused subversives ranged from inhabitants charged with aiding the enemy, engaging in

illicit trade or seditious speech, refusing to recognize the oath of allegiance, and even

exhibiting an equivocal or dangerous behavior. By monitoring inhabitants’ movement,

confiscating mail, stifling free speech, extending oaths, interrogating the accused,

summoning the suspicious, apprehending potential subversives, deporting residents,

paroling neighbors, and even jailing those deemed enemies, these institutions secured the

Revolution’s success. Ironically, committees for public safety and their coercive actions

were necessary for the fledgling democracy to succeed. Although their regulatory and

executive powers might be viewed as coercive, these institutions claimed their actions

necessary in the name of the common good. With a foundation in common law and

English history, these boards justified their controversial measures, which at times

prioritized public rights over individual liberties. However, committees for public safety

relied upon Americans’ active involvement in societal surveillance and citizens helped

perpetrate the committees’ security state. Witnessing disorder around them, Americans

desired security and willingly participated in the committees’ agenda by condoning the

boards’ coercive tactics and circumvention of individual liberties. Citizens collaborated

with the committees by providing information, ostracizing inhabitants, delivering

accusations, and policing their neighbors. Without widespread support by the people the

  v  
committees for public safety would not have been as successful instilling conformity.

Ultimately, committees for public safety were instrumental to the patriots’ success.

  vi  
 Acknowledgements

By no means would this dissertation be possible without the guidance, direction,

assistance, and encouragement of my advisors, friends, and family. First and foremost, I

am eternally indebted to my advisor Dr. Douglas Bradburn for his constant support,

critical assessment, and enthusiasm. From the moment I arrived at Binghamton

University to my dissertation defense and beyond, I am proud to say that Doug’s support

was instrumental every step of the way. After this long journey I can say there is no one I

would have rather have called my advisor.

I would also like to give special thanks to Dr. Diane Miller Somerville whose

encouragement over the past several years has inspired my work and me as a historian.

Her guidance throughout my graduate student career has been immeasurable. She is truly

devoted to her students’ success. Dr. J. David Hacker provided much appreciated critical

analysis and his encouragement significantly strengthened the project. Dr. Stephen Ortiz

provided exceptional support and words of wisdom that assisted in the final stages of the

dissertation. Finally, I would also like to thank Dr. Gerald Kadish and Dr. Herbert Bix,

both of whom took an interest in my project, read chapter drafts, and provided insightful

analysis. Although I was neither one of their students, they were kind enough to meet

with me regularly and assist with the conceptualization of the project.

This project would not have been possible without the generosity of many

institutions and their wonderful staffs. The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, the

Virginia Historical Society, the Robert H. Smith International Center for Jefferson

  vii  
Studies, the New Jersey Historical Commission, and Binghamton University all provided

much appreciated financial aid and support to conduct research necessary to complete

this dissertation. During the course of my several research trips I have encountered many

archivists, librarians and staff members whose enthusiasm and expertise provided

exceptional support. At the John D. Rockefeller Jr. Library at Colonial Williamsburg,

George Yetter and Doug Mayo’s assistance finding sources significantly strengthened my

project. At the Virginia Historical Society, discussions with Frances Pollard helped me

in the early stages of my research by highlighting obscure sources that added texture to

my chapters.

My friends and colleagues at Binghamton University and beyond deserve special

thanks for reading chapters and discussing the project with me every step of the way.

Brett Palfreyman, Christopher Pearl, Elliot Bowen, Kevin Murphy, Matthew Williams,

Andrew Fagel, Daniel Pearson, William Dolan, Candy Johnson, Mary Lou Weinberger,

and Shenglan Li contributed unique insights, encouragement and assistance. To my

graduate school colleagues, I am grateful for all your help and hope to continue what we

started at Binghamton.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. Throughout the course of researching

and writing this dissertation their support truly has made this entire project possible.

 
 
 
 

  viii  
  
 

Table of Contents
 
List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... xi
Introduction: “take effectual measures to discover and bring the perpetrators…to condign
punishment”: Establishing Legitimacy and Order during the Revolution...........................1
Chapter 1: “disaffected and dangerous persons…endanger” inhabitants’ safety: The New
York Committee of Safety, 1775-1776 .............................................................................51
New York’s Committee of Safety Commences.............................................................53
“…this Continent [is] in all the horrors of a civil war” .................................................57
Establishing Civil Authority and Protecting Society.....................................................64
The September 1775 Resolutions: Transition from Propaganda to Monitoring
Inhabitants......................................................................................................................73
Transition to a Security State.........................................................................................92
Chapter 2: “make strict enquiry into the…former conduct of the Inhabitants”: The
Virginia Committee of Safety, 1774-1776 ......................................................................104
County Committees: The Committee of Safety’s Predecessors ..................................111
The Committee of Safety and the Military ..................................................................122
The Committee of Safety and Surveillance .................................................................132
Norfolk: The Culmination of the Security State..........................................................140
Chapter 3: “the safety of every individual… depends entirely upon the Security of the
whole:” The Committee of Safety of New Jersey, 1775-1776........................................154
Local Committee Actions: Slow but Steady................................................................160
Divisions within New Jersey: William Franklin and Disaffection..............................171
The New Jersey Committee of Safety .........................................................................183
The Rise of William Livingston ..................................................................................193
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................197
Chapter 4: “In these times, every one is watching his next neighbor:” New York’s
Security State, 1776-1782................................................................................................202
New York’s Security State ..........................................................................................206
No Constitution, No Problem ......................................................................................213
Economic and Social Regulation.................................................................................218
Security State Realized ................................................................................................224
Liberties Trampled: Life in the Security State ............................................................243
Culmination of the Security State: Albany County .....................................................253
Final Days of the Security State?.................................................................................266
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................270
Chapter 5: “to provide for the safety…[of Virginia, we must] vest the executive with
extraordinary powers for a limited time:” The Council of the State of Virginia, 1776-1783
.........................................................................................................................................273

  ix  
 Executive Power and the Transition to the State of Virginia ......................................275
Carving its Place in the New State: the Council and Defense.....................................280
Surveillance in the State of Virginia............................................................................292
The Council of the State and Oaths of Allegiance ......................................................301
The Council of the State as a Functioning Government..............................................307
End of War...................................................................................................................314
Chapter 6: “strike a Terror into the disaffected:” The Rise of William Livingston and the
Council of Safety of New Jersey .....................................................................................319
Violence in the Early State Years – Monmouth County and Beyond .........................326
Governor Livingston, I Presume? Livingston and the Council of Safety....................336
The Council of Safety takes the Reins of the Revolution............................................348
Providing for the Public...............................................................................................372
Reaction and Backlash.................................................................................................380
The End of the Council of Safety and Beyond ............................................................391
Conclusion: “Every whig would have thought it a duty he owed his country to deliver up
the fugitive to the vengeance of her violated laws:” Committees of Safety and their
Legacy..............................................................................................................................401
Legacy..........................................................................................................................409
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................413

  x  
 List of Abbreviations

AA American Archives

BAHMC Department of Education, New Jersey State Library, Bureau of Archives

& History Manuscript Collection, 1680s-1970s: Revolutionary War
Documents

CENJ Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from
1776-1786

CHMNY Calendar of Historical Manuscripts Related to the War of the Revolution,

New York

CWFL John D. Rockefeller Jr. Library, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation

Library

EC Evans Collection of Early American Imprints

JCC Journals of the Continental Congress

JCSV Journals of the Council of the State of Virginia

JPCCS Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of

Safety, Council of Safety of the State of New York, 1775-1777

MBCSTC Minute Book of the Committee of Safety of Tryon County the Old New
York Frontier

MCDDC Minutes of the Committee and First Commission for Detecting and
Defeating Conspiracies in the State of New York

MCSNJ Minutes of the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey

MPCCS Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety

NJA New Jersey State Archives, Trenton, New Jersey

NJAS New Jersey Archives Series

NJH New Jersey History

  xi  
NJHS New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, New Jersey

NYPCCSP New York State Provincial Congress and Committee of Safety Petitions,
1776-1777

NJRE New Jersey’s Revolutionary Experience

NYSA New York State Archives, Albany, New York

NYSL New York State Library – Manuscripts and Special Collections, Albany,
New York

PFP Preston Family Papers, “f” series, Virginia Historical Society

PGC Public Papers of George Clinton

PGRC George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781

PGW The Papers of George Washington, Digital Edition

PNJHS Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society

PTJ The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Digital Edition

PWL The Papers of William Livingston, Carl Prince Edition

RVA Revolutionary Virginia: The Road to Independence

SVA The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia,
from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619

VHS Virginia Historical Society

WMQ The William and Mary Quarterly

  xii  
 Introduction: “take effectual measures to discover and bring the perpetrators…to
condign punishment”: Establishing Legitimacy and Order during the Revolution

“Everywhere distrust, fear, hatred and abominable selfishness were met with.

Parents and children, brothers and sisters, wife and husband, were enemies to one

another,” uttered Swedish Reverend Nicholas Collin as he surveyed revolutionary

America in 1777.1 As in any civil war, dissension, suspicion, and, as we shall see, even

coercion ruled the day.2 Although laws existed to curtail subversives who threatened the

struggle for liberty and undermined the common good, without an adequate means to

execute law, mandates against dissent were nothing but dead letters. For patriots, dissent

undermined their ability to rule because, like a disease, it could spread quickly. With

such divided loyalties, patriots searched for a method to detect, control and eradicate

political dissent. If they could find an adequate solution to that problem, the new states

could administer the Revolution, consolidate local patriot committees’ power, establish

governmental legitimacy, enforce law, and create a new American community.

                                                                                                               
1
Nicholas Collin, The Journal and Biography of Nicholas Collin, 1746-1831, translated by Amandus
Johnson (Philadelphia: The New Jersey Society of Pennsylvania, 1936), 244-245.
2
I am in dialogue with a number of historians who argued the American Revolution was a civil war fought
predominately at the local level. Unlike these historians, I am not interested in quantifying damages but
rather I examine the effects of civil strife on government and society. Russell F. Weigley, The Partisan
War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970);
John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), Revised Edition, 183 and 191; Jacob Judd,
“Westchester County,” in The Other New York: The American Revolution beyond New York City, 1763-
1787 eds. Joseph S. Tiedemann and Eugene R. Fingerhut (Albany: State University of New York Press,
2005), 107; Rebecca Nathan Brannon, “Reconciling the Revolution: Resolving Conflict and Rebuilding
Community in the Wake of Civil War in South Carolina, 1775-1860,” (PhD Dissertation: The University of
Michigan, 2007), x; and Michael S. Adelberg, “An Evenly Balanced County: The Scope and Severity of
Civil Warfare in Revolutionary Monmouth County, New Jersey,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 73,
no. 1, (January, 2009), 9-47. For works that attempt to quantify the damages see: Dennis Ryan, “Six
Towns: Continuity and Change in Revolutionary New Jersey, 1770-1792” (PhD Dissertation: New York
University, 1974); Robert Gross, The Minutemen and their World (New York: Hill & Wang, 1976), 9; and
David J. Fowler, “Egregious Villains, Wood Rangers, and London Traders: The Pine Robber Phenomenon
in Revolutionary New Jersey,” (PhD Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1987) ii.

  1  
 Given the tense political climate, patriots, such as New Jersey Governor William

Livingston, championed creating an executive that could intimidate residents, instill

conformity, and protect the common good. Rising before the New Jersey General

Assembly in March 1777, Livingston desperately urged legislators to earn their mantel as

“Guardians and Protectors,” whose “indispensible Duty” was to demonstrate to the

people “the brightest Examples of a disinterested Love for the common Weal; and be

inflexible in our Resolution, to know neither Friend nor Favourite, whenever his

Solicitations appear incompatible with the general Good.”3 Heeding the peoples’ demand

for security and the governments’ need for order, Livingston argued that without laws

“faithfully executed” during such tumultuous times, “the Happiness of Society” suffered

and legislation itself meant nothing. Since no institution now existed that could compel

people’s conformity to ensure “publick Safety,” the Assembly needed to create an

emergency and exceptionally authoritarian board to execute law.4 Soon after the

legislature created the Council of Safety, a coercive board, that could effectively

administer government and curtail dissent. These new executive bodies, according to

patriot newspapers, proved that “the gentlemen in authority are determined to take

effectual measures to discover and bring the perpetrators… to consign punishment.”5

Across America, patriots demanded similar boards, designed to instill security and

order. In fact, the Continental Congress previously suggested all colonies adopt

executive bodies in July 1775 to “superintend and direct all matters necessary for the
                                                                                                               
3
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey. At a Session begun at
Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776..., (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 10-12. EC, Series I, No.
15466. The previous executive body, the New Jersey Committee of Safety began in 1775 but was, as we
shall see in chapter three, largely ineffective.
4
William Livingston to the Assembly, March 11, 1777, PWL, 1:273.
5
“Burlington,” The New-Jersey Gazette, December 17, 1777.

  2  
security and defence of their respective colonies.”6 Some committees for public safety

had already commenced but more would follow. These bodies stood at the helm of

patriots’ agenda of nation breaking and eventual process of nation building. Operating

both before and after July 1776, executive committees assisted in the un-making of the

old colonial order by performing a vital role coercively defining the American

community.7 By monitoring allegiance and punishing the suspicious, committees for

public safety placed those they deemed unpatriotic outside a newly defined public.

Ironically, the fledgling democracy required that committees for public safety wield

unbridled coercive powers that trampled individual liberties to win the war and secure the

Revolution’s success. Despite the power and authority these bodies wielded and their

central place in the Revolution’s success, both the committees for public safety and their

undemocratic methods have been purposively omitted by scholars who preferred to

highlight a traditional narrative of this era rather than its darker moments. By eschewing

the traditional interpretation of the democratic origins of the country’s founding, this

dissertation both uncovers the forgotten legacy of committees for public safety and

unearths these institutions’ controversial measures in the formation of the American

community during the Revolution.

Although historians have highlighted local committees’ role in the Revolution, the

controversial colony and state committees for public safety have been written out of

                                                                                                               
6
JCC, 2:188-189.
7
By coercively enforcing conformity, committees of safety defined who belonged in the American
community. As we shall see, the committees sought strict obedience to what they deemed as acceptable
behavior. This included for example, accepting oaths of allegiance and willingly delivering legitimacy to
the committees by sacrificing their individual liberties and monitoring their suspicious neighbors. Those
who did not conform were placed outside the American community.

  3  
history because of their role during the Revolution’s darkest days.8 State committees for

public safety stood charged with both executing the legislators’ orders and consolidating

local committees’ power across their territory. These boards sat at the apex of the

revolutionary government during a critical period when the Revolution seemed in

jeopardy.9

This dissertation employs the term committees for public safety to universally

discuss the Committees and Councils of Safety as well as Commissions for Detecting and

Defeating Conspiracies in New York, Virginia, and New Jersey. Since these boards

predominately executed laws, they were considered executive bodies. Yet they were not

strictly confined to that executive status. Created by conventions, congresses, or

legislatures, committees for public safety operated initially when assemblies and

conventions adjourned, thus giving them a share of legislative power. Committees for

public safety, then, occupied a muddled position in the revolutionary political hierarchy.10

Historians have in part disregarded these executive bodies because they have not

properly understood their position within the revolutionary government. At first,

committees for public safety sat only when legislators adjourned, but over the course of

                                                                                                               
8
T.H. Breen, American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People (New York: Hill and
Wang, 2010), 161. When I discuss executive committees broadly I use the term ‘committees of public
safety’ or ‘committees.’ When necessary, I will distinguish between local committees and colony or
statewide committees. In later chapters, I employ each committee’s full name. For example in New York, I
distinguish between the Committee of Safety, the Council of Safety, and the Commission for Detecting and
Defeating Conspiracies (CDDC).
9
Edward Countryman argued committees in general possessed both legislative and executive powers to
which they applied towards “dissolving the authority of an old order” and then creating “a bulwark against
the revolution becoming chaos.” However, he stated that true consolidation of power only came when the
state constitution took hold in 1779. Like other scholars, Countryman disregarded this interim period when
these boards ensured the Revolution’s success. Edward Countryman, “Consolidating Power in
Revolutionary America: The Case of New York, 1775-1783,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 6
no. 4, (Spring, 1976), 664-665.
10
The legislators that established these short-term emergency executive bodies generally approved their
minutes and actions with little debate.

  4  
the war assumed a greater purpose. Committee members were generally elected amongst

legislators, but at times the governor appointed men directly. Smaller and more efficient

than legislatures, committees for public safety ranged and fluctuated in size from as low

as six members to as many as twenty committeemen. Generally, only four to six

members were actually present for meetings and most committeemen only sat when the

executive body met close to their homes.11 Quorum was difficult to achieve and even

disregarded out of necessity. While local committees commenced early in the

revolutionary era, legislatures did not create colony wide executive bodies until summer

1775. In theory, the colony, and later statewide committees for public safety sat atop

these local boards, consolidating power and instilling the state’s authority.12

Acting as executive and sometimes even legislative authority, these efficient

boards administered the early years of the Revolution. Even though their minutes were

subject to legislative review, the committees for public safety acted quickly and

decisively when interpreting and executing law. Operating essentially as miniature

versions of the legislatures, committees for public safety voted on executive decisions

and even issued resolutions. Mandated to execute law and protect the common good,

members met regularly to raise supplies, react to British aggressions, meet the demands

of war, regularize prices and, most importantly, police society.

Committees for public safety held ultimate power to shape the American

community by excluding those residents deemed dangerous, disaffected, suspicious, or

even merely equivocal. Social control and police powers allowed these boards to

                                                                                                               
11
The war disrupted meetings as many members needed to either flee their homes or protect their families.
12
As this dissertation will demonstrate, the committees for public safety struggled at times to rein in local
boards.

  5  
establish a security state capable of monitoring inhabitants’ allegiance and illicit

activities.13 By summoning or apprehending the suspicious, extending the oath of

allegiance, paroling the accused, conducting surveillance and jailing the disaffected,

committees for public safety demonstrated the new governments’ ability to coercively

enforce law and monitor loyalty.14

For the nascent state governments, coercive tactics appeared necessary to win the

war as well as establish the legitimacy and order required for sovereignty.15 Employing

coercive and controversial powers that curbed or even eliminated individual liberties,

committees for public safety justified their actions in the name of preserving a common

good. Governmental legitimacy and sovereignty thus depended upon the committees for

public safety and their intimidating tactics to enforce law and conformity, especially

against those disaffected Americans who potentially threatened the Revolution.

                                                                                                               
13
I define a security state based in part on Howard Brown’s description of an apparatus that “emphasizes
the importance of surveillance and regulatory control to maintain public order rather than simply using
coercive force to restore it.” I argue that monitoring allegiance was indeed coercive. Brown’s revolutionary
boards in France later mirrored the American committees’ methods. His security state is in part derived
from Michel Foucault’s lectures on “governmentality.” Howard G. Brown, Ending the Revolution:
Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 2006), 343 and Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. The Foucaultian Effect:
Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 102.
14
Michael Kammen argued New Yorkers in particular experienced a crisis of conscience. In this crisis,
brought on by civil war, previous fidelity to Great Britain was questioned and possibly betrayed. Although
Kammen delved into colonists’ consciences, arguing oaths tied the religious and political worlds, this is not
a debate I address. For more on conscience and oaths in English history see Michael Kammen, “The
American Revolution as a Crise de Conscience: The Case of New York,” in Society, Freedom, and
Conscience: The American Revolution in Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York ed. Richard M. Jellison
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976), 131-143.
15
Similar to Howard Pashman’s study on New York’s Commission of Sequestration, my work examines
how the state built legitimacy. Through property confiscation and redistribution, Pashman argued the
Commission responded to New Yorkers’ pressing need to build its legitimacy. While Pashman contended
that the Commission attained legitimacy by providing New Yorkers with subsistence (in the form of real
and removable property), executive bodies in this dissertation claimed legitimacy by providing people with
security. In both instances, Americans actively took part in the Revolution because they received benefits.
Howard Pashman, “The People’s Property Law: A Step Toward Building a New Legal Order in
Revolutionary New York,” Law and History Review, Vol. 31, no. 3 (August, 2013), 588-599.

  6  
 Referred to as committees or councils of safety as well as commissions to detect

and defeat conspiracies, these institutions’ names alone struck an ominous tone and

symbolized their nature and methods. Targeting enemies of the Revolution and political

dissidents as threats to security, committees for public safety casted a wide net when

ostracizing, coercing, and punishing anyone they deemed suspicious, disaffected, or

equivocal. However, disaffection is a vague term, subject to change as the Revolution

intensified. As we shall see, aiding the enemy, illicit trade, sedition, refusing an oath,

counterfeiting and a variety of other actions were deemed dangerous.16 For residents,

regular policing of society was nothing strange as slave patrols existed in most colonies

and later in the states. In fact, committees for public safety replicated slave patrols’

system of passes, interrogations, coercion, and fear. Both committees and patrols also

stressed the community over the individual by emphasizing a common good and a sense

that the public needed to share responsibility to curb disorder. Like slave patrols, the

committees asserted their own law upon the population.

To instill their rule, committees for public safety delivered their commands to

militia leaders and relied upon neighbors’ accusations at the local level to effectively

monitor society. Through the use of accusations and interrogations, committeemen ruled
                                                                                                               
16
In general, I employ Alexander Flick’s definition of disaffection, as “a refusal to accept as true the
opinions of the party in power and to support its policy, and the slightest suspicion of this was quite
sufficient to cause arrest.” Despite Flick’s definition, he and others paint too strict a dichotomy, claiming,
“[t]here was no middle ground and no possible compromise” between loyalists and patriots. This
dissertation contends loyalty was much more fluid. People switched allegiances for a variety of reasons
including proximity of enemy armies. In fact, many Americans chose neutrality, pacifism, or equivocal
stances. Depending on the period, these labels eventually became unacceptable. Building off Sally
Hadden’s work on slave patrols, this dissertation moves beyond the laws and state constitutions to examine
how committees functioned. Like slave patrols, the committees for public safety examined inhabitants’
behavior. Alexander C. Flick, Loyalism in New York during the American Revolution (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1901), 73; Alexander C. Flick, The American Revolution in New York: Its
Political, Social and Economic Significance (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1926), 207;
Ray Raphael, A People’s History of the American Revolution: How Common People Shaped the Fight for
Independence (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 183-233; and Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and
Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 2-3 and 219.

  7  
against accused persons, delving out punishment they deemed fit given the nature of the

offense and present logistics. These proceedings were neither trials nor was any evidence

or a jury necessary. Generally, only hearsay or perhaps intercepted mail was enough to

condemn. After a short hearing, punishments ranged from social ostracizing, continued

monitoring, a recognizance for good behavior, jail time, or deportation. Needless to say,

committees for public safety later freely admitted their expedited and zealot obsession to

establish security caused them to frequently punish the innocent.

Through consolidating power of the local committee system and providing stable

civil government, the committees for public safety ensured the Revolution’s success.17

As historian Edward Countryman suggested, nascent state governments needed to prove

themselves by aiding the war effort and ending civil strife to make any claims of

legitimacy. At times, acting as the only civil government in the colonies, and later states,

committees for public safety represented the apex, not only of the vast local committee

system, but also of the fledgling governments. When legislatures lacked quorums or

became too cumbersomely large or inefficient, patriots created these boards to administer

the government, manage the war, and regulate society. At times when American military

leaders encroached upon weak legislatures, the committees for public safety rose to

defend against a potential military usurpation of civil authority and ensured law would be

                                                                                                               
17
Historians generally downplay statewide committees for public safety’s role consolidating power and
reining in local committees. See: Bernard Mason, The Road to Independence: The Revolutionary Movement
in New York, 1773-1777 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press-Lexington, 1966), 132; Edward
Countryman, A People in Revolution: The American Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760-
1790 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981), 136-143; and Thomas S. Wermuth, “The Central
Hudson Valley: Dutchess, Orange, and Ulster County,” in The Other New York, 135-137. Although better
known, the French committees for public safety mimicked their American predecessors by consolidating
power. Both the American and French committees appointed civil officials beholden to them, such as
justices of the peace and sheriffs. Through commissions, committees ensured some degree of local support
to uncover enemies of state.

  8  
enforced through a civil apparatus.18 Committees for public safety represented an

obvious American strength during the Revolution, as the British lacked any semblance of

a civil government, relying predominately upon military figures as leaders. Ultimately

executive bodies’ most vital role was creating an American community by instituting a

security state that monitored inhabitants’ loyalties and inculcated social control through

coercion.

Along with their role policing society, committees for public safety aided the

Revolution’s success by administering the war, procuring men and supplies, and acting as

a bulwark of civil authority. As John Shy suggested, the Revolution and war should not

be viewed separately but as complimentary developments, since both dealt with the

similar themes of the nature of civil war and violence in society.19 By

compartmentalizing each event and treating each separately and distinctly, historians

have obscured the Revolution’s narrative and misunderstood the extent to which politics

and the war were intertwined in the period.20 Specifically designed not to be military

tribunals, committees for public safety still commanded the militia, procured supplies,

protected the community, and constructed enemies’ lists to monitor and apprehend

                                                                                                               
18
Committees for public safety bridged the gap between the civil and military worlds. For example, rather
than allow the military to police allegiance, executive bodies conducted interrogations.
19
Committees for public safety have been minimized in the historiography on the war despite their
predominate place supplying the military, delivering militia commissions, commanding armed men and
dealing with officials. Leonard Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution: The War of Independence in New Jersey
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), 269 and Hamilton Fish, New York State: The Battleground of
the Revolutionary War (New York: Vantage Press, 1976). John Selby and Michael McDonnell correctly
noted the committees’ military function, but shied from drawing conclusions. McDonnell argued county
committees executed ordinances in “a more orderly fashion” than the Virginia Committee of Safety.
Warren M. Billings et al. Colonial Virginia: A History (White Plains: KTO Press, 1986), 339-346; John E.
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783 (Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation,
1988), 52-53 and 90-93; and Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class, & Conflict in
Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 97.
20
Shy, 3-4.

  9  
potential subversives.21 Leading civil and military figures such as George Washington,

John Adams, Patrick Henry, Charles Lee, William Livingston, and George Clinton

advocated for these institutions. Patriot leaders implored committees for public safety to

extend oaths and encouraged internal policing so as to gauge residents’ allegiance.

By examining committees for public safety and their role policing society, this

dissertation seeks to correct the historical record of the American Revolution. While

historians have examined this era extensively, it is still a period understudied in terms of

executive bodies’ role, especially in regards to their very undemocratic measures.22

Contrary to the scholarship, committees for public safety were neither weak nor benign.

Rather they engaged in exceptionally coercive behavior to instill social conformity.

After colonial government collapsed and before state governments commenced,

executive bodies policed society in the name of the common good.23 Based in common

                                                                                                               
21
Shy suggested the militia acted more as a police force than engaged the British and its “chief purpose
was to engineer consent, by force if necessary.” Shy, 176.
22
Even when historians focus on the transition from resistance to revolution they downplay committees for
public safety’s significance. Devoting little analysis to the particular committees of safety, Pauline Maier
recognized, in general, their role as governments. Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution Colonial
Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: Vintage Book,
1972), 78-80 and 224 and Larry Gerlach, Prologue to Independence: New Jersey in the Coming of the
American Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976), 235 and 274.
23
Recently, historians have noted that after royal colonial governments collapsed, formidable state
governments commenced to protect and govern the people. Building off the work of political theorists and
social scientists such as Max Weber and Theda Skocpol, Douglas Bradburn and others argued that the state
was not abstract but an actual physical entity controlled by real actors. Douglas Bradburn, “Rise of the
States: The Problem of Order and the Making of American Independence,” Paper given at the American
Historical Association, Spring 2008, in author’s possession; Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship
Revolution: Politics & the Creation of the American Union, 1774-1804 (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 2009), 47; Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 8; David Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Last World of
the American Founding (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), ix; Max M. Edling, A Revolution in
Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003), 4; and Christopher Ryan Pearl, “For the Good Order of Government”: The
American Revolution and the Creation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1740-1790,” (PhD
Dissertation: Binghamton University, 2013), 1-3.

  10  
law, these coercive police powers assisted American patriots’ efforts during the war.24 In

The People’s Welfare, William J. Novak argued that states employed police powers to

regulate and protect public welfare. Such a justification authorized states to curb or even

suppress civil liberties if leaders believed communal rights or safety at risk.25 Novak

argued, while controversial, police powers were a central component of sovereignty.

Novak and other theorists, such as Ernst Freund and Lewis Hockeimer, argued

that police powers, which regulated both society and the economy, were in fact based in

common law.26 Considered in this light, executive bodies’ willingness to curb individual

liberties to achieve security provides historians with a nuanced understanding of the

Revolution that at times placed public rights over those of the individual.27 Social

regulation at the hands of the government pre-dated the Revolution. Patriotic state

leaders thus based their authority in both history and tradition.

Despite the irony that revolutionary executive bodies placed the common good

above the rights of the individual, public rights are present in common law.28 In

Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone described “police powers” as

                                                                                                               
24
Max Weber’s idiom that “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” accurately reflects the Hobbesian security state I
describe during the American Revolution. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology edited and translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Abingdon, Oxon: OX:
Routledge, 1946), 78.
25
William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 13.
26
Both Freund and Hockheimer had similar definitions of police powers that Novak expanded upon. None
of the three scholars studied the revolutionary era. Ernst Freund, Police Power: Public Policy and
Constitutional Rights (Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1904), iii and Lewis Hockheimer, “Police Power,”
Central Law Journal, 44 (1897), 158.
27
Frequently citing the common good, executive bodies had no qualms about monitoring inhabitants’
movements, confiscating the goods of men who broke price regulations, curbing free speech, and limiting
individual liberties.
28
Novak argued the “polizei” even aided in the transfer of power from the Early Modern Church to civil
government.

  11  
“the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the

state… are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good

neighborhood, and good manners.”29 Novak cautioned historians studying the

Revolution from focusing solely upon individual rights, reminding them that

governmental regulation of the community was integral to leaders’ conceptualization

when forming a polity. He rejected as absurd any notion that civil liberties were

somehow absolute since such rights “always had to conform to the superior power of

self-governing communities to legislate and regulate public interest.”30 Scholars of the

American Revolution have begun to illuminate Novak’s argument of societal regulation.

No longer serving the crown, state institutions served the people. Building on Douglas

Bradburn’s work, this dissertation argues that, despite the immense power and

intimidating influence that committees for public safety possessed, they were generally

composed of men democratically elected many of whom also served on legislatures. For

Bradburn, the American states were Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathans, “loaded with latent

power.”31

Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, written during the English Civil Wars period,

examined a coercive sovereign and its role within government and society. Given the

dangers inherent in the state of nature, Hobbes contended, a strong sovereign needed to

execute law and preserve communal security. Charged with protecting “the Peace and

Defence of them all,” Hobbes contended the sovereign must remain vigilant while
                                                                                                               
29
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England Book the Fourth (London: A. Strahan, 1825)
The Sixteenth Edition, Book IV, Chapter XIII, 161. Other legal theorists also recognized police powers. In
Law of Nations, Emmerich de Vattel described a similar use of police powers as a governmental initiative
to fend off disorder.
30
Novak, 11.
31
Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution, 47.

  12  
monitoring “Discord at home” and “Hostility from abroad.”32 Hobbes, like the

conventions and legislatures that endowed American committees for public safety with

their power, argued that the sovereign was to judge the commonwealth’s safety and, if

threatened, must proceed, as it deemed necessary.33 Similar to the committees for public

safety, Hobbes encouraged the sovereign to act when “there is no visible Power to keep

them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of the Covenants.”

In Leviathan, Hobbes focused upon the sovereign’s responsibility to end civil war and

instill order to establish governmental legitimacy in the people’s eyes. Any coercive

powers employed, he stated, could not be as harsh as people’s experience within the state

of nature or during civil strife. Terminating such threats to stability could only be

accomplished with a strong sovereign state. He contended that the state’s authority was

intrinsically related to “the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience.”34

Hobbes outlined a blueprint for committees for public safety to both exert

sovereignty and limit dissent. Mandated to protect the common good, the sovereign

needed to elicit the people’s obedience and trample any rumblings that might cause

others to question authority. Seditious words undermined its ability to rule by attempting

to normalize dissent.35 Hobbes vehemently supported restricting both free speech and the

                                                                                                               
32
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II, Chapter XVIII, in Hobbes’s Leviathan: Reprinted from the Edition
of 1651 ed. W.G. Pogson Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), 136. For Hobbes and police powers see:
Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political
Symbol translated by George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 59.
33
Hobbes’ sovereign, like the committees, possessed executive, legislative and judicial powers as well as
the power to appoint.
34
Hobbes, Leviathan, A Review and Conclusion, 556. Committees of Safety during the English Civil War
possessed the “power to call delinquents to trial, to suppress rebellions, [and] to treat with foreign states.”
Sir William Molesworth, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malemesbury Volume VI, (London: C.
Richards, 1840), 411.
35
Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XXX: Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative, 258-264.

  13  
press in an effort to preserve order. Liberties in general, Hobbes believed, to some

degree, must be surrendered to the sovereign to successfully secure safety.36 Committees

for public safety later adopted a Hobbesian view of communal rights and security.37

Stressing that a sovereign should use any means of instilling fear, Hobbes recognized the

necessity of coercion to bring about its desired ends.38 Since many people condoned

sacrificing liberties for protection, committees received legitimacy and accepted the

people’s mandate for safety.

Hobbes’ argument for social control even encouraged the sovereign to punish

overt signs of dissent. All crime, Hobbes argued, threatened the state. As long as one

behaved as a proper citizen and refrained from negatively influencing their neighbors, he

would be left alone.39 When committees for public safety adopted Hobbes’s theory,

freedom of speech, the press, and education met harsh regulation. Committees took this

theory one step further by issuing oaths and criminalizing thought. By forcing Americans

to publicly admit their inner thoughts, committees for public safety made Hobbes’ crimes

of conscience into public political dissent against the state.40 Anyone guilty of crimes

against the state discovered themselves outside the legal system and could be dealt with

as the state deemed appropriate. Modeled after Hobbes’s conception of a strong

sovereign to instill social conformity, the committees for public safety threatened to

                                                                                                               
36
Ibid, Chapter XXI: Of the Liberty of Subjects, 166.
37
Ibid, Chapter XVII: Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Common-Wealth, 131.
38
Ibid, Chapter XVIII: Of the Rights of Soveraignes by Institution, 136.
39
Dieter Hüning, “Hobbes on the Right to Punish,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan
ed. Patricia Springborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 217-218.
40
See Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, 20-22 in Hüning, “Hobbes on the Right to Punish,” 221. For Hobbes,
punishment could only be administered by the state. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XXVIII: Of Punishment,
and Rewards, 238-239.

  14  
induce terror so others conformed.41 Typically refraining from executing transgressors,

the committees for public safety apprehended, confined, and bound to a recognizance

large numbers of men and women. These measures serve as a testament to the terror

Hobbes advocated for and “the correction” he sought for those who opposed the state.42

However, when creating committees for public safety, Americans had a long history to

draw from that predated common law and Hobbes.

Not only did committees for public safety have a basis in common law, but they

also possessed a place in both Roman and English history. American leaders understood

and valued the Roman Republic so it should come as no surprise that committees for

public safety mirrored Roman dictators. In ancient times, endowed by the consul with

short-term emergency powers to serve the state, dictators held considerable authority, yet

were expected to willingly return their power after a crisis passed.43 Similar to the

committees for public safety, dictators were mandated to protect the people, could

summon the legislative body and held command over both civil and military affairs. To

accomplish their goals, dictators arguably received powers even greater than those

possessed by the consuls.44 As Livy suggested, dictators held both auspicia (power of

                                                                                                               
41
Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XXVIII: Of Punishment, and Rewards, 240.
42
Ibid, Chapter XV: Of Other Lawes of Natture, 117.
43
T. Corey Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, Volume I (New York: Oxford, 2000), 38 and
Francisco Pina Polo, The Consul at Rome: The Civil Functions of the Consuls in the Roman Republic (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 39.
44
Livy, Rome and Italy: Book VI-X of The History of Rome from its Foundation, translated by Betty Radice
(New York: Penguin Books, 1982), Book VIII, Chapter 32, 201-202 and Livy, Hannibal’s War: Books
Twenty-One to Thirty, translated by J.C. Yardley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), Book XXX,
Chapter 24, 589-590.

  15  
war) and imperium (sovereignty of state affairs) authority.45 Appointed by the consuls

during an emergency period the dictator reigned supreme over other magistrates and

officials.46 Much like committees for public safety, Livy acknowledged that despite their

critical role in military victories, consuls overshadowed dictators’ measures. 47 Part of the

reason for this omission is that, again similar to committees for public safety, writers

have neither fully understood emergency leaders’ vague powers nor their place within the

regular government.48 Since both dictators and committees acted as emergency

institutions, neither outlined in the constitution nor laws per-se, this led to considerable

interpretation of their jurisdiction. Both the committees for public safety and dictators

were appointed to handle alleged conspiracies abroad and within Rome among its

magistracies.49 Similar to the Roman Dictator Cincinnatus, committees for public safety

                                                                                                               
45
Brennan, 39. This statement is contested. More likely the dictator did not possess powers beyond the
consul. Even in the second century, it seems writers neither fully understood the dictator’s powers nor its
position within the political system. My claim is not that committees for public safety were the same as
dictators but that they were modeled after the Roman office.
46
The people directly elected neither dictators nor the committees. Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the
Roman Republic (New York: Oxford Press, 1999), 110. Dictators were usually nominated but the
committees for public safety members were either elected amongst legislators or appointed by the
governor. Vetoing the dictator’s actions was impossible early in the positions’ existence but this changed
over time. Committees for public safety also could act unchecked while sitting, but ultimately the
legislature reviewed their minutes and actions.
47
Even though some dictators delivered critical orders that precipitated success, they received little credit.
Brennan, 39-40.
48
These men presided over the military, elections, civic and religious ceremonies, and even public works
projects. Emergency situations also included guiding society during periods of disease. Dictators held
powers that committees for public safety did not, such as dealing with enemy emissaries. Brennan, 40 and
Polo, 39, 46-47, and 58. For more on dictators and the misunderstanding of their position see: Lintott, 109-
113 and Geoffrey S. Sumi, Ceremony and Power: Performing Politics in Rome between Republic and
Empire (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008). 47-73.
49
Polo, 129. Dictator C. Maenius investigated conspiracies in Campania and then Rome. After examining
magistrates, the aristocracy complained and he was removed. When it came to law enforcement, the
dictators intimidated plebeians to instill conformity. Dictators also arrested plebeians, published lists of
enemies, and some coercive measures even turned into violent purges. Dictator Sulla even passed laws
declaring immunity for his past actions and empowered himself to confiscate property. While dictator,
Julius Caesar created laws free from potential vetoes and pushed the assemblies towards legislation.

  16  
responded to threats and led the fledging governments to preserve the people’s safety. As

influential as Roman history was upon revolutionary leaders, patriots did not need to look

solely to antiquity for an example of emergency executive powers.50

Although prone to coercion, legislatures designed committees for public safety to

protect the happiness and welfare of all people during a civil war.51 Therefore, when

historians search for a model for American committees for public safety, the closest

influence is the English Civil Wars.52 During a similar period of civil strife and social

upheaval, Parliament appointed a committee of safety to operate when Charles I

dissolved the elected representative body for a year and later made war on his own

people.53 In response, Parliament established a joint committee, the Committee for the

Safety of the Kingdom, composed of members from both the House of Lords and

Commons dedicated to “the Safety of the Kingdom, the Defence of the Parliament… [and
                                                                                                               
American committees for public safety replicated some of these men’s measures. Lintott, 32; Livy, The
History of Rome: The First Eight Books translated by D. Spillan (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853), Book II,
Chapter 29-30, 112-115; Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic, translated by Rex Warner (New York:
Penguin Books, 2005), Revised Edition, 97-99; and Sumi, 49-57.
50
Patriots discussed establishing a wartime dictator and committeemen conversed about Roman history.
51
Mentioning of the police or polizei can be found in the works of Adam Smith, Johann Justi, and Nicholas
Delemare.
52
For more on English Committees of Safety see: Agnes Hunt, Committees of Safety of the American
Revolution (Cleveland: Press of Winn & Judson, 1904), 158-171; Godfrey Davies, The Restoration of
Charles II, 1658-1660 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 96, 106-107, 157, and 184-187; C.V.
Wedgwood, The King’s War, 1641-1647 (London: St. James’s Place, 1958), 61, 117, 143, and 238; Ann
Hughes, Politics, Society, and Civil War in Warwickshire, 1620-1660 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), 225; Ronald Hutton, The British Republic, 1649-1660 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000)
Second Edition, 124-125; and D.E. Kennedy, The English Revolution, 1642-1649 (New York: MacMillan
Press, 2000), 33 and 37-38. Most works merely noted the committees of safety’s military role, issuing
commissions, and calling Parliament. Even though committees received the legislature’s power, historians
have overlooked them or characterized them as too slow. Both Alexander Flick and later Edward
Countryman recognized the use of committees of safety in 1689 in the Dominion of New England where
these bodies opened letters and recruited armed men. Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 27 and
Countryman, A People in Revolution, 136-137.
53
Charles I dissolved the Short Parliament in 1629 and did not summon representatives again until 1640.
When the Long Parliament met in January 1642, the King ordered leading members of the House of
Commons seized.

  17  
to preserve] peace.”54 Far less dominant or active than its American successors, these

bodies were relegated to advising, delivering defensive directions, and procuring

supplies.55 Despite lacking significant control over other boards, the legislature trusted

the Committee of Safety when danger levels reached their zenith. Similar to committees

during the American Revolution, the English board members were mostly elected

officials and at times had a contentious relationship with the military as well.56 Vaguely

defined like their American successors, the English committees of safety, at times,

broadly interpreted the legislature’s mandate as a call to apprehend and interrogate

potential subversives and conspirators to uncover plots.57 Aside from interviewing

alleged conspirators, the English Committee also possessed the power “to secure and

disarm all such persons as shall discover their Disaffection to the present Safety.”58

                                                                                                               
54
House of Lords Journal, 4 July 1642, Journal of the House of Lords, Volume V: 1642-1643, British
History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=34840. Accessed 5/2/2014; and
House of Commons Journal, 4 July 1642, Journal of the House of Commons, Volume II, 1640-1643,
British History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=8790. Accessed 5/2/2014.
55
Hunt, 160-161.
56
The English Committee suffered because the military viewed it as lacking legitimacy. A similar struggle
between civil and military authority would resurface during the American Revolution.
57
For example, the English Committee was responsible for examining members of the Waller Plot, which
advocated loyalty to the King. During an interrogation Lady Daubigney stated, “I do not mean to give an
account to such fellows as you [the Committee] are.” D’Ewes’s Diary, Harl. MSS. 165, fol. 100-102 in
Samuel R. Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War, 1642-1649, Volume I (London: Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1886), 185. For examples of compiling intelligence, undermining plots, and ordering apprehensions,
see: Gardiner, Volume I, 160, and 265 and History of the Great Civil War, 1642-1649, Volume III
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1891), 113, 115, and 127.
58
The Committee of the Militia also held this power. House of Commons Journal, 1 August 1647, Journal
of the House of Commons, Volume V: 1646-1648 British History Online, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=25146&strquery=committee+of+safety. Accessed 5/2/2014 and House
of Lords Journal, 3 August 1647, Journal of the House of Lords, Volume IX, 1646, British History Online,
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=37099. Accessed 5/2/2014. Deeming the Committee
too dependent, Parliament created the Committee of Both Kingdoms in 1644. Even in 1659, well after
Charles I and Oliver Cromwell died, the Committee of Both Kingdoms policed internal enemies and
ordered hostile persons to leave London and Westminster. Other proclamations included calling
Parliament, prohibiting raising troops unless the Committee delivered permission, and creating duties.
House of Commons Journal, 22 May 1644, Journal of the House of Commons, Volume III: 1643-1644,

  18  
 While some men and women rejected the English Committee’s authority, it acted

as a model for future American executive boards. Committees of safety reappeared in the

English world in 1689 on the other side of the Atlantic in both Boston and New York to

oppose loathsome colonial governors, Edmund Andros and Francis Nicholson.59 Similar

to its successors during the Revolution, this Committee of Safety initially possessed little

claim to legitimacy. Even though people opposed it, Jacob Leisler called the board to aid

him during his conflict against Andros.60 For his part, Leisler even exaggerated his

support.61 Historian Charles Andrews later referred to Leisler’s authority as arbitrary

power that was a “violation of our Laws and Liberties.” Others simply remarked the

Committee of Safety “rule[d] at so strange a rate…denying all power but their own and

                                                                                                               
British History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=1938. Accessed 5/2/2014; and
England and Wales Committees of Safety, “By the Committee of Safety the Common-wealth of England,
Scotland, and Ireland Proclamation: Departure of the Persons herein mentioned, out of the Cities of London
and Westminster,” December 16, 1659 (London: Henry Hills and John Field, Printers to the Committee of
Safety, 1659). Early English Books Online,
http://gateway.proquest.com.tjportal.idm.oclc.org/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99870116. Accessed 5/2/2014. Most historians only
recognize the Committee of Both Kingdoms. See: Lawrence Kaplan, Politics and Religion during the
English Revolution: The Scots and the Long Parliament (New York: New York University Press, 1976) 18
and 35.
59
J.A. Doyle, English Colonies in America: The Middle Colonies, Volume IV (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1907), 196 and 202 and Charles M. Andrews ed., Original Narratives of the Insurrections,
1675-1690 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915), 328. See also: Captain Leisler to King William and
Queen Mary, August 20, 1689, Colonial Documents of New York…, Volume III (Albany: Parsons and
Company, 1853), 614-616; Randall Balmer, “Traitors and Papists: The Religious Dimensions of Leisler’s
Rebellion,” New York History, Vol. 70, no. 4 (October, 1989), 341; and Evan Haefeli, “A Scandalous
Minister in a Divided Community: Ulster County in Leisler’s Rebellion, 1689-1691,” New York History,
Vol. 88, No. 4 (Fall 2007), 357-361 and 380. For more on Leisler’s Rebellion see: J. Thomas Scharf,
History of Westchester County… (Philadelphia: L. E. Preston, 1886), 27 and Patricia U. Bonomi, A
Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971),
75-78.
60
William Smith, The History of the Province of New-York from the First Discovery to the Year 1732
(London: 1757), 73 and 86 and J.W. Fortescue ed., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and
West Indies, 1689-1692 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1901), xvi-xvii, 81, 115-116.
61
Schuyler Van Rensselaer, History of the City of New York in the Seventeenth Century, Volume II (New
York: MacMillan Company, 1909), 404.

  19  
turning out militia...at their pleasure.”62 Faced with growing animosity, Leisler’s

Committee of Safety organized the militia, raised taxes, and formed a functioning

government.63 For Leisler, might made right and his committeemen apprehended and

interrogated anyone he deemed suspicious.64 Residents who spoke against Leisler’s

Committee faced apprehensions and interrogations.65 Such a mentality and measures

would epitomize the committees for public safety during the Revolution as well.

Discovering resistance to arbitrary arrests and proclamations, Leisler’s Committee sought

to ensure loyalty to their cause by issuing a declaration that aggressively encouraged

residents to sign their names, accept the oath (both to the king and the committee itself)

or face being labeled an enemy.66 Despite their critical role in the American Revolution

and the long-legacy of emergency and coercive executive power, scholars have largely

written committees for public safety out of the historical narrative.

In a period characterized by historians as democratic, legislative bodies have

received a disproportionate share of scholars’ attention in accounting for the

                                                                                                               
62
Stephen Van Cortlandt to Francis Nicholson, August 5, 1689 and John Tudor to Francis Nicholson,
August 20, 1689, in Fortescue, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1689-
1692,117 and 131. It seems the Committee also raised taxes. Andrews, 329 and 366. See for critiques of the
Committee as arbitrary and disorderly: Colonel Bayard to Captain Nicholson, July 23, 1689, Abstract of
Colonel Bayard’s Journal, June 23 and 28, 1689, and Fredrych Phillips and S.V. Van Cortland to Secretary
Blathwayt, August 5, 1689 and Colonel Baynard’s Narrative of Occurrences in New-York, from April to
December, 1689, in Documents relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York…, ed., John
Romeyn Brodhead, Volume III (Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Company, Printing, 1853), 598, 602-604, 608
and 643.
63
Van Rensselaer, 407-409.
64
Abstract of the proceedings of the Committee of Safety of New York, 27th June to 15 August 1689 in
Fortescue, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1689-1692, 126-127.
These proceedings include members and their titles, commissions, military activities, and funding issues.
65
Brandt Schuyler, brother of the Albany mayor, repudiated its authority and refused to take orders.
Schuyler Van Rensselaer claimed they were not ill-treated. Van Rensselaer, 410.
66
Leisler supported William of Orange, Protestantism, and English liberties. Andrews, 385 and 391. As
was the case with later revolutionary era executive bodies, there were few deaths. See also Van Rensselaer,
412 and 420.

  20  
Revolution.67 However, when the Revolution faltered, legislatures delivered

undemocratic executive bodies immense authority to provide security. Unsurprisingly,

executive bodies and their unrestrained powers of force and coercion do not fit nicely into

the traditional narrative about rights and liberties. This is a forgotten period of the

American Revolution. Committees for public safety have been purposely omitted from

the historical narrative because of their very nature, despite their years of operation.

During what can only be described as the dark days of the Revolution, executive

committees performed a critical, if not controversial, role in the Revolution’s success.

Without these boards, the revolutionary government would have been unable to

effectively execute law, win the war, or rely on local patriot committees to police internal

disaffection. As this dissertation illuminates, this was a period when victory was

anything but inevitable.68 Leaders reacted to the grim times and inhabitants’ uncertain

loyalty with dominant and intimidating institutions. After successfully winning

independence, these institutions’ efforts then continued to attain legitimacy by enforcing

and executing law. Ironically, to win a war fought against tyranny, the fledgling

democracy needed institutions that wielded excessive undemocratic powers that at times

crushed individual liberties.

                                                                                                               
67
Similar to George Curtis’ dissertation my work highlights a revolutionary institution other than the
legislature. Curtis argued Virginia’s colonial court system was recreated due to leaders’ desire to curb the
local committees’ powers. County committees resembled courts but experienced little oversight, leading to
many summons without evidence and the accused having to prove their innocence. He contended the
transition from colony to state was relatively smooth. George M. Curtis III, “The Virginia Courts during the
Revolution,” (PhD Dissertation: University of Wisconsin, 1970), iii-v.
68
Contingency certainly performed a vital role, as committees for public safety seized the reins of
revolution when the legislature lacked the ability to lead. Historians, such as Gordon Wood, have too easily
brushed the years before independence aside and prioritized legislatures, thus obscuring the executive
bodies’ role. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 162-164.

  21  
 By finally studying executive bodies, such as the committees for public safety,

historians can more accurately answer Carl Becker’s famous question “who should rule at

home?”69 Examining committees for public safety not only provides insight into this

question, but also illustrates how these institutions assisted in the Revolution’s success.

Powerful and coercive committees for public safety responded directly to Americans’

demands for security. Yet, the committees’ efforts came with a price and challenged

individual rights. Many Americans resisted these boards’ efforts, both through their

words and actions. This dissertation argues that studying committees for public safety

not only highlights the vital role previously neglected coercive executives bodies

performed in the Revolution’s success, but it also sheds light on an untold tragic narrative

of the darker side of this period.70

Avoiding the darker nature of committees for public safety, scholars of the

American Revolution have continuously noted the critical role legislatures performed

                                                                                                               
69
Carl L. Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin, 1909), 22. Rather than focus on ideological or socio-economic arguments for the
origins of the Revolution, by focusing on the committees for public safety new themes can be addressed.
For ideological origins argument see: Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 24-25 and Bernard
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992),
xii-xiii. For class conflict see: Jesse Lemisch, “Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seaman in the Politics of
Revolutionary America,” WMQ, Vol. 25, no. 3. (July, 1968), 407; Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible:
Social Change, Political Consciousness and the Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1979), 33; and Marcus Rediker, “A Motley Crew of Rebels: Sailors, Slaves and
the Coming of the American Revolution,” in The Transforming Hand of Revolution: Reconsidering the
American Revolution as a Social Movement, ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1995), 155-198.
70
For the Revolution’s tragic nature see: Kammen, 131 and Gary Nash, The Unknown American
Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (New York: Viking,
2005), xvi. Brett Palfreyman has also illuminated the Revolution’s darker side in his study of Bills of
Attainder. Although patriots considered both Bills of Attainder and the committees for public safety
necessary during the war, the United States Constitution only forbade the former. Brett Palfreyman, “Peace
Process: The Reintegration of Loyalists in Post-Revolutionary America” (PhD Dissertation: Binghamton
University, 2014), 240-246

  22  
democratizing and propelling politics of the era.71 However, this interpretation represents

only half of the narrative. America’s first governors and executive bodies under early

state constitutions are generally derided as weak due to colonists’ disregard of British

governors. With newspapers and broadsides filled with anti-executive rhetoric and state

constitutions limiting the executive’s influence, it is not difficult to see why historians

surmised executive bodies’ weaknesses.72 Lacking constitutionally ordained powers, in

reality committees for public safety, both before and after July 1776, received and seized

additional authority despite Americans’ distrust of strong executives. Such additional

powers and aggressive mindset permitted committees for public safety to coercively

monitor their neighbors’ allegiance and behavior.

Despite committees’ coercive power, few historians recognize their critical role in

the Revolution’s success. Regardless of which executive body is examined, scholars

have seldom provided adequate analysis. Surprisingly, some historians simply omitted

executive bodies from their studies altogether, employed these bodies’ minutes

anecdotally, or portrayed the committees as weak and timid. Although recent scholars

have largely dismissed or diminished the committees for public safety, earlier historians

did not.

Beginning in 1904, Agnes Hunt shed scholarly light on executive bodies in

Committees of Safety of the American Revolution. Although, for the most part, Hunt

described the resolutions creating the committees and their powers accurately, she offered

                                                                                                               
71
Jackson Turner Main, “Government by the People: The American Revolution and the Democratization of
the Legislatures,” WMQ, Vol. 23, no. 3 (Jul., 1966), 394; Gerlach, 274; and Countryman, A People in
Revolution, xiv.
72
Some historians noted the import roles committees for public safety performed, but disregarded their
activities after July 1776. Claiming that state constitutions now reigned, these historians neglected to
examine the bodies’ continued significance. Wermuth, 136.

  23  
little analysis and incorrectly characterized these boards as judicial bodies not based in

common law.73 More importantly, Hunt downplayed the committees’ coercive nature,

forced oaths, police powers and effects on society.74 Her work’s shortcomings

notwithstanding, Hunt recognized the committees for public safety’s English

predecessors and the executive bodies’ importance behind the scenes, especially their

military role.75

Few early twentieth-century scholars built upon Hunt’s work, yet those historians

who did further illuminated the committees’ role leading the revolutionary government

during this transitional period between colony and state. Carl Becker, John C.

Fitzpatrick, Alexander Flick and Leonard Lundin each highlighted the committees’ role

policing society or assisting the military.76 These historians commended the committees’

critical role in the Revolution, responding to the need for governmental efficiency and

admirably combating enemies. Pronouncing the boards as “most important of all”

revolutionary committees because they consolidated power, Fitzpatrick noted their

                                                                                                               
73
Hunt neglected executive bodies’ role consolidating power and presented these boards as subservient to
the legislature. Hunt, 64-66, 71, and 97.
74
Despite Hunt’s overwhelming praise of committeemen, she briefly recognized the potential of abuse.
When discussing the New Jersey Council of Safety she stated, in its desperation, the government employed
measures that “struck down as well what opponents might claim as the safeguards of constitutional liberty.”
She also noted that the people must have supported committees because local boards worked with statewide
executives. Hunt, 80.
75
Hunt vaguely addressed that the committees dealt with “poverty, inertia, discouragement, and fear.”
Correctly asserting committees’ vital role pursuing enemies, she failed to examine the effects of
surveillance. Hunt, 7 and 80.
76
For the most part, Becker discussed committees broadly and did not devote attention to the committees
for public safety. He hinted at the New York Committee of Safety’s undemocratic nature. Later works
followed Becker’s path of studying committees in general. Becker, 211, 224 and 235; John C. Fitzpatrick,
“The Committees of Correspondence and Safety of the Revolutionary War,” Daughters of the American
Revolution Magazine, Vol. LV, No. 11 (November, 1921), 611-620; Lundin, 269 and Wermuth, 136-137.
Robert Hilldrup referred to Edmund Pendleton’s position as President of the Virginia Committee of Safety
as the most critical role in the revolutionary government, but failed to provide details. Robert Leroy
Hilldrup, The Life and Times of Edmund Pendleton (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1939), 132.

  24  
“almost dictatorial” authority.77 New York historian Alexander Flick urged scholars to

study these powerful boards that policed society during a period when legislatures were

weak. Expressing some apprehensions about these committees’ powers and even their

“ominous” name, overwhelmingly these historians believed their leaders employed

authority “wisely… and quietly wielded in cooperation” with local leaders. Although

these scholars highlighted the committees’ vital role and even, at times, labeled the

boards as “radical,” they seldom considered executive bodies as coercive, believing the

committeemen’s “intelligence, heroism, sound judgment, foresight, and patriotism”

guided them “to keep the peace, protect property, safeguard the rights of the people and

carry on an orderly organized society.”78 For the most part, these historians shed some

light on the committees’ importance but ultimately they inaccurately lumped committees

for public safety with all revolutionary era committees. Incorrectly claiming these bodies

democratized the period, in fact executive bodies operated quite differently from other

revolutionary institutions.79 Their misconception largely came from presenting executive

                                                                                                               
77
Fitzpatrick, 616 and 619. While some scholars recognized committees of safety’s role after royal
government collapsed, few understood these institutions aided in consolidating local committees’ power.
78
Becker, 211 and Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 28-29. Becker neglected to examine the
same committees this dissertation investigates; rather he focused on local boards. Flick’s Loyalism in New
York also outlined the New York Committee of Safety’s functions and transition but at times only credited
the Provincial Congress, calling the executive a “provincial inquisition.” My dissertation is in debt to
Flick’s under-appreciated works that detailed the committee system. Flick, Loyalism, 66. See for a similar
interpretation in Virginia: Larry Bowman, “The Virginia County Committees of Safety, 1774-1776,” The
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Jul., 1971), 325.
79
Believing the committees democratized the Revolution, Flick devoted little analysis to coercion. By
ignoring executive bodies’ trampling of individual liberties, Flick merely referred to the treatment of
loyalists in the pre- July 1776 period as “firm but moderate.” Flick, The American Revolution in New York,
46 and Alexander C. Flick, “The Loyalists,” in History of the State of New York, ed. Alexander C. Flick,
Volume III (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), 343-344. Other works also bordered on
hagiography when examining these committees. A. Van Doren Honeyman, “Concerning the New Jersey
Loyalists in the Revolution,” PNJHS, Vol. LI (April, 1933), 120-121.

  25  
bodies as static and unchanging during the war. Their error caused future historians to

continue this misconceived interpretation of these boards.80

Following these early works, subsequent historians merely employed the

committee for public safety anecdotally, if at all.81 Anecdotal evidence obscured any

sense of change over time and these scholars misunderstood the committees’ nature, their

role in the Revolution’s success, and their effects on society. Ultimately, historians such

as H.J. Eckenrode, Bernard Mason, and Larry Gerlach presented colonial and state

committees for public safety as timid, weak, lethargic or even conservative.82 These

                                                                                                               
80
Both Leonard Lundin and Richard McCormick confused the New Jersey Committee of Safety with its
successor the Council of Safety. McCormick barely addressed either the Committee or Council of Safety,
focusing predominately upon the legislature and arguing most loyalists did not receive poor treatment.
Richard P. McCormick, New Jersey from Colony to State (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.,
1964), 137 and Richard P. McCormick, Experiment in Independence: New Jersey in the Critical Period,
1781-1789 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1950), 28-29.
81
James Miller Leake, “The Virginia Committee System and the American Revolution,” John Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1917), vii.
Leake intended to give a sense of totality to Virginia’s committee system, yet neglected the Committee of
Safety. Despite recognizing committees’ role in the transition from colony to commonwealth, he only
considered their legislative functions. A number of other works discuss briefly or omit the committees for
public safety entirely. Thomas Nelson Page, The Old Dominion: Her Making and Her Manners (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1910), 167; Cornelius C. Vermeule’s “The Active Loyalists of New
Jersey,” PNJHS, Vol. LII (April, 1934), 87-95; Adrian C. Leiby, The Revolutionary War in the Hackensack
Valley: The Jersey Dutch and the Neutral Ground, 1775-1783 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University
Press, 1962), 124 and 133; Carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution (Clifton: Augustus
M. Kelley Publishers, 1973); Nash, The Urban Crucible, 44; Donald Wallace White, A Village at War:
Chatham, New Jersey, and the American Revolution (Madison, N.J.: Farleigh Dickinson, 1979), 52, 96, and
148; Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina, 1982), 276; Albert Tillson Jr., “The Local Roots of Backcountry Loyalism: An Examination of
Popular Culture in Virginia’s New River Valley,” The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 54, No. 3, (Aug.,
1988), 387-404; Shelia L. Skemp, William Franklin, Son of a Patriot, Servant of a King (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), 192; Richard M. Ketchum, Divided Loyalties: How the American
Revolution Came to New York (New York: A John Macrae Book, 2002), 342; David Hackett Fischer,
Washington’s Crossing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 81; Ronald L. Heinemann, et al., Old
Dominion, New Commonwealth: A History of Virginia, 1607-2007 (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 2007), 118-120; and Benjamin L. Carp, Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 163. Some of these works study committees in general but failed to
distinguish the committees for public safety.
82
Mason hinted that the New York Committee of Safety needed the army’s prodding to take action. He
described the Provincial Congress as slow, despite the overwhelming numbers of whigs in New York. John
Alden focused more on Lee’s criticism of a slow legislature. Eckenrode’s study suffered from focusing
solely on how the Virginia Committee and Convention dealt with leading loyalists, neglecting much of

  26  
scholars downplayed the committees’ coercive nature and authority.83 At times they even

presented executive bodies as weak puppets of the legislature or lenient when it came to

punishing dissent. Other scholars argued the military acted more forcefully against

disaffection.84 Predominately focusing on the resolutions creating the committees or a

selection of their activities, these historians disregarded executive institutions as

ineffective and unimportant.85 More recently, historians such as Howard Pashman and

Michael Levine echoed these sentiments, contending that in New York and New Jersey

the law went largely unenforced because of weak executives.86

                                                                                                               
their activities. Mason, 2, 108 and 181-183; H.J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), 33; John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot?
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 95-97; and Gerlach, 279-280. Other works merely
offered anecdotes: Alice Kenney, Stubborn for Liberty: The Dutch in New York (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1975) 179-180; Adele Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia: The Norfolk Area and
the Eastern Shore (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1982), 30; Thomas J. Humphrey, Land and Liberty:
Hudson Valley Riots in the Age of Revolution (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 84-85
and 95; Kevin R.C. Gutzman, Virginia’s American Revolution: From Dominion to Republic, 1776-1840
(New York: Lexington Books, 2007), 10 and 27; and Thomas B. Allen, Tories: Fighting for the King in
America’s First Civil War (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 161. Adele Hast incorrectly stated that laws
against Norfolk and Eastern shore loyalists were relaxed. While I do not engage in a quantitative argument,
Hast’s conclusion hinged on the fact many loyalists went unpunished. Since many inhabitants fled the
region, her claim is hard to accept. Hast also neglected the Committee of Safety’s resolutions regarding
those regions.
83
While Hugh Blair Grigsby did not focus on the Virginia Committee of Safety, he realized its critical role
as the executive. Due to the Virginia Convention’s vague ordinances creating the Committee, it assumed
exceptional powers as well as “discretionary” ones. Despite such incredible authority, Grigsby refused to
acknowledge the Committee of Safety capable of coercion. Hugh Blair Grigsby, The Virginia Convention
of 1776…(Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1855), 48-50 and 161.
84
Isaac Samuel Harrell, Loyalism in Virginia: Chapters in the Economic History of the Revolution (New
York: Ams Press Inc., 1965), 46-47.
85
Scholars such as Edward Countryman only discussed the New York Committee of Safety’s role briefly
and not in regards to disaffection. Countryman, A People in Revolution, 141.
86
Pashman, 590 and Michael Lewis Levine, “The Transformation of a Radical Whig Under Republican
Government: William Livingston, Governor of New Jersey, 1776-1790,” (PhD Dissertation: Rutgers
University, 1975), 87-93. Pashman indicated that the people had little interaction with the state government
aside from Commissioners of Sequestration. Despite his claim, the people had a direct relationship with
executive bodies. Likewise, Michael Levine viewed New Jersey Governor William Livingston and his
Council of Safety as weak, lacking constitutional power and incapacitated by the legislature.

  27  
 Scholars generally point to state constitutions, which limited executive authority,

to defend their position. Focusing predominately upon constitutional powers, these

historians neglected committees’ minutes, actions, and even the emergency laws that

temporarily increased their authority.87 This reasoning has led some scholars, such as

Robert Hilldrup, to simply regard the Virginia Council of the State as insignificant.88

Alexander Flick also reduced New York’s executive bodies to mere creatures of the

legislature.89

                                                                                                               
87
For example, Hunt attested, but provided little detail, that the New York Council of Safety was “the
highest power in the State with no authority to check or control it” until elected officials assumed their
positions. In fact, the Council of Safety encompassed all branches of government. Even after Governor
George Clinton took office, he charged the Council with executive functions while he assumed war duties.
The Council essentially preserved its legislative and executive powers, but not judiciary functions. Its
members refused such a role other than examining court-martial proceedings, leaving the legislature to
create courts. Despite her praise, Hunt believed the Council of Safety lacked influence at the local level.
Claiming its actions “conservative and cautious,” Hunt refused to acknowledge their coercive potential,
devoting much of her study to praising patriot leaders. Hunt, 73-75.
88
Perhaps since the Virginia Council of the State was composed of former colonial era leaders, scholars
chose to discuss more democratic aspects of the Revolution. Possessing limited pardon powers, no veto,
(nor any legislative or judicial powers) Hilldrup considered the Council of the State weaker than its
colonial predecessor. Hilldrup, 181. Some historians believed Virginia’s leaders were too afraid of dictators
to devote any more power. James Anderson argued Virginia intentionally implemented some continuity
between the colonial Council and the new Council of the State. Some men held positions on both. James
LaVerne Anderson, “The Virginia Councilors and the American Revolution: The Demise of an Aristocratic
Clique,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 82, no. 1 (Jan., 1974), 67. Most works on
Virginia briefly outline the Council of the State’s constitutional powers or anecdotally discuss its role
administering the military and monitoring loyalists. Other scholars completely dismiss the boards. William
Buckner McGroarty, “Loyalism in Alexandria, Virginia,” The Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography, Vol. 52, no 1 (Jan., 1944), 35 and 41; and George M. Curtis, III, “The Goodrich Family and the
Revolution in Virginia, 1774-1776,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 84, No. 1
(Jan., 1976), 65-68 and 71-74.
89
Flick referred to the New York Council of Safety’s continuation as an example of the patriot’s
“resourcefulness.” Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 97. A number of other works omit post
July 1776 executive bodies or dismiss them as a mere a stop gap until the state government commenced.
Mason, 212. See also for local committees: Willis Tracy Hanson, A History of Schenectady during the
Revolution…, (Privately Printed, 1916), 19-23 and Philip Ranlet, The New York Loyalists (New York:
University Press of America, 1986), 158. Some works omit committees for public safety. Leopold S.
Launitz-Schürer. Jr., Loyal Whigs and Revolutionaries: The Making of the Revolution in New York, 1765-
1776 (New York: New York University Press, 1980); and Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians,
Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 2006).

  28  
 Historians who devoted any attention to the post July 1776 committees for public

safety generally perpetuated the idea of their weak and ineffective nature.90 Noting

committees’ vast powers, Margaret MacMillan still considered both these boards’ lacking

a definitive status and operating only when the legislature required them, as a sign of

their weakness.91 Considered overwhelmed, moderate, and lenient, some historians even

argued committees’ perceived hesitancy harmed the war effort.92 Overall, most scholars

disregarded the boards as tentative revolutionary bodies bound by strict legal parameters

of the legislature and willingly delivering their powers to governors. Even when

historians acknowledged committees for public safety’s power or influence, they failed to

provide an accurate depiction of their coercive nature.

Recent treatments of both provincial and statewide committees for public safety

continue to misrepresent their coercive nature. In American Insurgents, American

Patriots, T.H. Breen challenged historians to focus on the years before July 1776,

specifically the Continental Association and local committees, arguing that patriot boards

                                                                                                               
90
Referring to the Virginia Council of the State as heir to Committee of Safety’s “most important labors,”
Eckenrode presented the Council as supreme. However, his work was muddled with contradictions. At
times he called the board ineffective, conservative and “thoroughly disjointed and conflicting” but also
stated its powers grew over time. While Eckenrode correctly noted the governor presided over the board
and never ruled separately, he, like others, presented a mundane board and gave little consideration to
change over time. Eckenrode, 174.
91
Margaret Burnham MacMillian, The War Governors in the American Revolution (Gloucester, M.A.:
Peter Smith, 1965), 32-36 and 87-88. MacMillian, like many historians, relied upon the negative comments
of military leaders who experienced a tense relationship with the committees in regards to military and civil
jurisdiction. For example, American General Charles Lee berated both the New York and Virginia
Committees of Safety.
92
Eckenrode believed the Virginia Council of the State too lenient because of its decision to re-try men due
to insufficient evidence. He cited exiling accused disaffected persons, accepting pledges not to aid the
enemy, and holding local trials as signs of its weakness. Failing to examine the Council’s role in social
control efforts or overseeing other bodies, Eckenrode and others offered the Goodrich family as an example
of both the executive’s leniency backfiring and, eventually, its harsh treatment of enemies. Eckenrode, 176-
178.

  29  
prevented excessive violence witnessed in other revolutions.93 Despite noting their

potentially coercive powers, Breen contended committees’ “bark was generally worse

than the bite.”94 Highlighting violent scenes of committee induced punishment and

monitoring, Breen still soft-pedaled terror techniques and intrusive policing.95 Even if

neighbors did not respond violently, victims of committee propaganda branded as traitors

lacked the means to provide for themselves, ply their trade, or protect their families. In

fact, Breen made little mention of committees’ trampling of civil liberties or the

predominate rhetoric justifying their actions in the name of the common good. Prone to

over generalize, Breen referred to these institutions as “laboratories for republican rule,”

yet he failed to properly address all boards of this nature.96 Some institutions, such as the

                                                                                                               
93
Breen, American Insurgents, American Patriots, 18. Although the Revolution did not witness the same
mass executions as the French Revolution, violence and terror existed. Some recent works, such as Joseph
Tiedemann and Eugene Fingerhut’s edited volume The Other New York, briefly address the New York
Committee of Safety’s activities. Philip Papas, “Richmond County, Staten Island,” in The Other New York,
87.
94
Breen, American Insurgents, American Patriots, 164. Even when historians, such as Richard Upton,
highlighted the era as defined by suspicion and hysteria, he refused to acknowledge committees’ coercive
practices. Although not his focus, he argued committees possessed nearly unchecked dictatorial powers.
Upton cited a New Hampshire loyalist who stated there “had never a more energetic government, nor a
more honest executive.” Brushing aside the committees’ darker side, Upton failed to disclose that the
quoted loyalists also highlighted that the Committee of Safety often punished men whose only crime was
supporting their king. Richard Francis Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire: An Account of the Social and
Political Forces Underlying the Transition from Royal Province to American Commonwealth (Port
Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1936), 120 and William Plumer, “The Constitution of New Hampshire:
A Discourse Delivered Before the New Hampshire Historical Society” in The Historical Magazine and
Notes and Queries concerning the Antiquities, History, and Biography of America, Volume IV, Second
Series (Morrisania, N.Y.: Henry B. Dawson, 1868), 174.
95
Other works have more accurately described local committees’ violence. Brendan McConville, The
King’s Three Face: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2006), 298. For example, the New York Committee of Safety successfully executed
summons by appointing men such as Sampson Dyckman to conduct its affairs. At the Committee appointed
to execute Resolutions of the Provincial Congress…, June 19, 1776 in Abbott Collection, Box 3 481a-483,
NYSL.
96
Breen broached some major topics such as monitoring inhabitants and the ensuing fear it caused. While
he noted infringements on individual liberties, he neither drew the connection to public liberties nor
considered the committees as executive bodies. He also argued committees established a sense of shared
pseudo-nationalism that this dissertation does not address. Breen, American Insurgents, American Patriots,
170 and 231-232.

  30  
New Jersey Council of Safety and New York’s various conspiracy boards were not even

comprised of elected officials. He also argued the Association itself allowed these bodies

to effectively navigate around accusations of arbitrary power.97 Citing the Association

might have aided legitimacy, but the committees for public safety garnered their authority

by employing police powers, in the name of the common good, that at times trampled

private rights.98 Ultimately, Breen offered a sanguine depiction of the insurgents by

comparing the American Revolution to more violent eras.99 Americans who suffered the

most at the committees’ hands might disagree with these scholars regarding the

supposedly fair treatment they received. Breen’s broad survey, based largely upon New-

England sources, forced him to over generalize. Rather than American insurgents,

committees for public safety were well organized, based in common law and English

political tradition, and incredibly coercive.

Not all historians have relegated committees for public safety to anecdotal

references or accused these boards of being timid and ineffective. During the Revolution,

                                                                                                               
97
Pauline Maier also claimed the Association hearings were not about punishing the guilty but converting
residents to the cause. I argue ostracizing was certainly coercive punishment. Committees for public safety
were just as satisfied when alleged enemies recanted their opinions as they were to oust the suspicious from
the patriot community. Maier also referred to the revolutionary movement as orderly. While the
committees’ goal was order, their methods induced terror. Maier, 281-282.
98
Breen claimed “ordinary people experienced such a heady sense of social empowerment, they found it
hard to turn back the clock to the days when aristocratic pretenders demanded deference.” Breen, American
Insurgents, American Patriots, 18.
99
Years earlier, Robert Calhoon presented a similar approach to Breen, focusing predominately upon New
England based sources as well. Calhoon argued the committees were lenient because they sought only to
bring Americans back within the community. He briefly noted some of the committees’ initiatives such as
responding to petitions against neighbors and deporting suspects. Accurately describing the creation of
New York’s conspiracy commissions, Calhoon largely neglected the New Jersey Council of Safety. He
dismissed violence and loyalism in New Jersey, claiming dissent was more about disrespecting the
government than outward displays. Calhoon briefly mentioned that local committees recognized they
possessed little hard evidence against accused enemies, yet the boards did not desire to appear weak.
However, such a broad statement does not reflect all committees. Robert McCluer Calhoon, The Loyalists
in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), 290-303, 404,
and 408-410.

  31  
loyalist Thomas Jones lambasted coercive committees for their treatment of loyalists and

equivocal persons. Jones’ assessment, while biased and politically charged, highlighted

the committees’ actions and vital role.100 At the time, patriots too recognized the

committees for public safety and their importance. In 1775, Virginia Convention

member and future governor, Edmund Randolph immediately realized the Virginia

Committee of Safety’s significance aiding the transition “from monarchy into self-

government, without convulsion or a single clogg to its wheels from its novelty or from

disaffection.”101

Modern historians have begun to note committees for public safety’s essential

role in the Revolution and their coercive nature. Emory Evans contended that executive

power during the Revolution was more significant than previously realized. Evans

highlighted that executive bodies possessed abilities not defined in the state Constitution

that permitted them prerogative powers.102 However, he attributed this authority to the

governors. Other scholars such as Jeffrey Richards and David Fowler described the
                                                                                                               
100
Jones referred to the period after July 1776 as “a medley of military law, convention ordinances,
congress recommendations and committee resolutions.” During the Revolution, an Act of Attainder was
issued against Jones. Thomas Jones, History of New York during the Revolutionary War, and of the
Leading Events in the Other Colonies at that Period, Volume II (New York: New York Historical Society,
1879), 115. Eckenrode and Claude Halstead Van Tyne mentioned some of the coercive acts against the
disaffected, likening the Virginia Council of the State’s removal of residents to “reconcentration camps.”
Isaac Harrell also mentioned the Virginia Council’s coercive methods but focused on the governor
primarily. Eckenrode, 174 and Claude Halstead Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution
(Honolulu: The University Press of the Pacific, 1902), 213.
101
“Edmund Randolph’s Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia, 1774-1782,” The Virginia
Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 43, no. 4 (Oct., 1935), 299.
102
For Evans, the executive branch was merely the governor and in his study he dismissed the Virginia
Council of the State. Although he recognized that the Assembly revived the executive’s powers, he
neglected to examine the Council’s endeavors. Evans refrained from using the word ‘prerogative,’ yet
contended that its authority went “far beyond its delegates’ powers.” He attributed the Council’s success
both to strong governors and the Committee of Safety’s past measures. Evans argued though the Council
carried out the legislature’s will, especially in regards to procuring military goods, deploying troops, and
appointing officers, it did so effectively. Emory G. Evans, “Executive Leadership in Virginia, 1776-1781,”
in Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty eds. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1981), 186-187.

  32  
Revolution as an intensely violent civil war.103 Richards, a literary scholar, argued that

Michel Guillaume Jean de Crèvecoeur’s revolutionary era fictional stories depicted

committee violence and social upheaval.104 According to Richards, in the play

“Landscapes,” Crèvecoeur lamented a horrifying world in which New York’s Committee

of Safety assaulted “Privacy, domestic tranquility, individual religious liberty, [and]

freedom of political opinion.”105 Highlighting similar controversial measures, David

Fowler’s study of crime in New Jersey referred to the Council of Safety as “a de facto

directorate.”106 Presenting the committees for public safety as an essential governmental

apparatus, Fowler argued that Americans recognized its strength.

Scholars David Bernstein and Michael Kammen also shed light upon the vital

roles the committees for public safety performed in New Jersey and New York.

Bernstein noted that despite the constitutional limitations placed upon the executive, the

Council of Safety provided essential leadership when the legislature proved

                                                                                                               
103
Dennis Ryan, “Six Towns: Continuity and Change in Revolutionary New Jersey, 1770-1792,” (PhD
Dissertation: New York University, 1974), 106 and 173 and David J. Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 102.
104
Although it is unclear, it seems Crèvecoeur’s committee of safety could have been a local body. Richard
primarily focused on Crèvecoeur’s works and the author’s perspective on the colonial past in relation to a
bleak American future in regards to individual rights, hard work, and traditions. Crèvecoeur (or his
Americanized name, J. Hector St. John), a Frenchman, had his loyalty questioned by both sides. Jeffrey H.
Richards, “Revolution, Domestic Life, and the End of ‘Common Mercy’ in Crèvecoeur’s ‘Landscapes,’”
WMQ, Vol. 55, no. 2 (Apr., 1998), 281-282.
105
In the play, all of Committee Chair Deacon Beatus’ targets experienced a loss of property,
demonstrating Crèvecoeur’s disdain for the lack of protection of non-conformists’ rights. Historian Kevin
Kelly highlighted similar themes such as the committees’ response to chaotic time and the hypocritical
treatment of the accused. From 1775-1776, several loyalists fled Williamsburg rather than be harassed.
Kevin P. Kelly, “The White Loyalists of Williamsburg,” The Interpreter, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1996).
http://research.history.org/Historical_Research/Research_Themes/ThemeRevolution/Loyalist.cfm.
Accessed 5/16/14.
106
David J. Fowler, “’Loyalty Is Now Bleeding in New Jersey’: Motivations and Mentalities of the
Disaffected,” in The Other Loyalists: Ordinary People, Royalism, and the Revolution in the Middle
Colonies, 1763-1787 ed. Joseph S. Tiedemann, et al. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009),
55.

  33  
ineffective.107 His accurate portrayal of the New Jersey Council of Safety is, however,

overshadowed by his denial of its coercive nature.108 On the other hand, Michael

Kammen correctly highlighted that in New York, the committees for public safety

performed a vital role establishing governmental legitimacy by coercively extending

oaths. To pursue enemies, Kammen insisted, executive boards cared little if they

restricted citizens’ rights under the new state constitution or if a suspect possessed proof

he had previously accepted an American oath.109 Ultimately, Kammen reiterated

previous historians’ misinterpretations, considering the committees’ efforts as lenient

while “rehabilitating” former loyalists.110 Incorrectly viewing the use of recognizances

for good behavior as a sign of committees’ leniency, Kammen portrayed the boards as

confused over their jurisdiction.111 Rather than lenient, the recognizance system allowed

committees for public safety to increase communal surveillance of allegedly suspicious

residents, even those who accepted the oath.

Despite committees for public safety prominent role in punishing political dissent,

the loyalist historiography has also all but ignored these institutions, focusing too intently
                                                                                                               
107
Bernstein also called the Council a directory. David Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American
Revolution: The Establishment of a Government amid Civil and Military Disorder, 1770-1781,” (PhD
Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1969), ii-iv and 282.
108
Bernstein contended that the New Jersey Council of Safety never became “an inquisition” and acted
within strict legal procedures. Bernstein, 296.
109
Suspicious inhabitants’ fate within the community was in the committees’ hands. Kammen highlighted
the violation of Article XIII of the New York constitution, “That no member of this state shall be
disenfranchised, or deprived of any rights or privileges secured to the subjects of this state by this
Constitution, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.” He noted victims’ lack of rights
and that, at times, even innocent men were placed outside the community and punished. Charles Z. Lincoln,
The Constitutional History of New York… Volume I (Rochester: The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing
Company, 1906), 173 and Kammen 145-146.
110
Kammen, 144. Kammen only studied New York’s conspiracy boards. He correctly noted these
institutions allowed former British soldiers to enter paroles and remain in the state. However, such actions
were not the boards’ main function.
111
Kammen considered recognizance lenient because it monitored residents and delivered them court dates.

  34  
upon rigid lines of allegiance. Some scholars have even lamented executive bodies’

records as useless because they often fail to provide specific charges.112 In the early

twentieth century, scholars such as Claude Halstead Van Tyne, illuminated the harsh

treatment high-ranking loyalists faced, the laws limiting acceptable political behavior,

and coercive oath taking, yet he and others neglected to accurately portray the civil

institutions that policed allegiance.113 One reason the loyalist historiography has

overlooked committees for public safety is because these boards did not focus solely on

active loyalists. Rather, their target was disaffection in all its forms, including neutrals

and equivocal persons. Anyone who did not actively support the patriot cause remained

under governmental scrutiny and suspicion. Predominately examining only leading

loyalists, these scholars overlooked the committees for public safety’s role in social

control. Even later historians who studied ordinary loyalists, such as Ray Raphael, failed

to examine committees for public safety. These scholars provided a nuanced

interpretation of patriots’ definition of the enemy, demonstrating that revolutionary

governments targeted and oppressed neutrals, pacifists and equivocal persons, as

passionately as they pursued active loyalists.114 Therefore, this dissertation builds off

                                                                                                               
112
Ranlet, 158. Phillip Ranlet recognized the minute’s shortcomings, yet neglected to ask appropriate
questions. Therefore he saw few abuses of power.
113
Van Tyne, 65; William H. Nelson, The American Tory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961),
103-104; Robert M. Calhoon, et al eds. Loyalists and Community in North American (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1994); and N.E.H. Hull, Peter C. Hoffer, and Steven L. Allen, “A Quantitative Study of
the Personality Determinants of Loyalists and Revolutionary Political Affiliation in New York,” The
Journal of American History, Vol. 65, No. 2, (Sep., 1978), 344-366. Although some scholars depicted some
of the committees’ harsh tactics, they neglected to position these bodies in their proper place within the
system.
114
Raphael suggested quantifying loyalists was nearly impossible, especially with traditional definitions of
active loyalists. By examining committees for public safety, historians can better understand how enemies
and loyalty were defined, changed over time, and how the patriot community dealt with such persons.

  35  
Raphael, Ronald Hoffman and others’ works that employ the term ‘disaffected.’115

Contrary to most historians’ beliefs, committees for public safety were not benign, weak,

ineffective, or hesitant of their jurisdiction. Why then, have scholars neglected these

institutions in the Revolution’s narrative? Scholars have purposively dismissed the

effects of coercive executive bodies’ surveillance tactics because they found it difficult to

acknowledge that Americans could embrace or sanction these measures.

Rather than weak, committees monitored, interrogated, and confined men

frequently on the basis of hearsay or examinations alone. Disregarding individual rights,

these boards broadly interpreted the ordinances, and later laws, granting them power so

as to preserve security. In fact, committeemen even demanded or seized additional

authority. After independence, when state constitutions limited the executive’s power,

historians continued to mistakenly consider such bodies feeble. Without examining these

boards over the course of the war, it is impossible to fully understand how they amassed

power, both legally and through precedent.116 While some scholars broached important

questions regarding the committees’ role defining the community of conformers and

dissenters, they failed to provide detail.

Previous historians mistakenly argued that committees for public safety sought to

sway potential enemies or disaffected persons to reclaim their position in the community.

                                                                                                               
115
Focusing predominately on the South Carolina Council of Safety, Raphael examined the civil war nature
of the conflict there. Like Kammen, Raphael noted the oppressive nature of oaths and the trampling of civil
liberties. Kammen implied committees never felt oaths definitively disregarded previous suspicion.
Raphael, 183-184, 193-195, 212-215; Ronald Hoffman, “The ‘Disaffected’ in the Revolutionary South” in
The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism, ed. Alfred F. Young
(DelKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976), 284-285; Kammen, 156-157 and Kenneth Shefsiek,
“A Suspected Loyalist in the Rural Hudson Valley: The Revolutionary War Experience of Roeloff Josiah
Eltinge,” The Hudson Valley Review Vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 2003), 38.
116
Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 300-301. This dissertation builds on both Calhoon
and Breen’s studies of local committees’ intrusive efforts.

  36  
At times, such a motivation could be accurate as committees sought alleged enemies to

recant their loyalty publicly, but this impulse was hardly the boards’ sole purpose.117

Rather, by publishing names of enemies and having public issuing of oaths, committees

of safety essentially placed their enemies outside the realm of acceptable behavior and

knowingly left them susceptible to suspicion, violence, and ostracism. In an effort to

normalize conformity, the committees employed social control tactics, sometimes to the

extreme. No greater evidence is required than committees’ eventual dismissal of

neutrality as a viable political position. This dissertation argues, during this dark period

of the Revolution, committees for public safety created American communities by

defining and labeling potential enemies and then placing them outside the patriotic

fold.118 Seeking to understand where committees for public safety fit in the revolutionary

government, this project contends that these emergency boards performed a vital role in

the Revolution’s success. Examining the committees for public safety highlights a

nuanced understanding of the Revolution’s narrative by shedding light on how

undemocratic measures played a key role defining and punishing the country’s first

enemies.119

                                                                                                               
117
Calhoon cited examples when committees employed rhetorical devices to trick accused disaffected
persons to support American sovereignty, even if they did not endorse armed conflict. The committees
placed people under oath, trying to convince them to recant past allegiances. Such interrogation methods
were not the committees’ normal behavior.
118
Calhoon, to his credit, mentioned this tactic as well. He also hinted that the New York conspiracy boards
consolidated various committees’ power into a bureaucracy. Although he briefly addressed the possibility
that committees acted as servants to instill public virtue, he neither expanded nor explained this point.
Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 302-304 and 410.
119
To accomplish this goal, this dissertation avoids traditional themes regarding loyalists such as why they
choose their path, the number of active loyalists, confiscation of loyalist property, loyalist communities, or
their experiences after the war. The loyalist historiography has also neglected or only anecdotally
referenced these committees. Wallace Brown, The King’s Friends: The Composition and Motives of the
American Loyalist Claimants (Providence: Brown University Press, 1965), 11; Paul H. Smith, “The
American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical Strength,” WMQ, Vol. 25, no. 2. (April

  37  
 By examining American committees for public safety through a lens of social

control, historians can comprehend how these institutions disciplined society and

provided security during a period of upheaval. Employing Michel Foucault’s three

modes of power as an analytical reference, this dissertation explores how committees for

public safety operated over the course of the Revolution and deployed their authority.120

Demonstrating these institutions’ significance, each of the three states studied in this

dissertation possessed an executive body both before and after July 1776.

During the period before declaring independence, committees for public safety

demonstrated Foucault’s first mode, disciplinary power, to instill conformity by singling

out inhabitants who acted, spoke out against or rejected strict obedience to the

government. The evolution of each board, while unique to its own state’s experience in

the war, generally began as a propaganda initiative at the local level that disciplined

residents by economically and socially ostracizing anyone it considered suspicious or

unpatriotic.121 Working in conjunction with local leaders in the period before July 1776,

                                                                                                               
1968), 259-261; Wallace Brown, The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution (New
York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1969); and Calhoon, Loyalists and Community in North
American, 19.
120
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (New
York: Vintage Books, 1995), 69 and Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended:” Lectures at the
Collège De France, 1975-1976, edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, translated by David
Macy (New York: Picador, 2003), 36-40 and 242-247. By no means are the three modes of power the
primary agents as committeemen made decisions and displayed agency. As Timothy Mitchell noted, “One
should not overstate the coherence of these technologies, as Foucault sometimes does. Disciplines can
break down, counteract one another, or overreach. They offer spaces for maneuver and resistance, and
indeed can be turned to counter hegemonic purposes.” Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond
Statist Approaches and their Critics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, no. 1 (March, 1991), 93.
121
I employ Leonard Doob’s definition of propaganda as a “systematic attempt by interested individual (or
individuals) to control the attitudes of groups of individuals through the use of suggestion and
consequently, to control their actions.” Leonard Doob, Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique (New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935), 89. Philips Davidson asserted that historians needed to eschew a
twentieth century interpretation that propaganda is synonymous with “evil” and move towards discussing
public opinion. Phillips Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1941), xiii.

  38  
committees sought to exclude residents who questioned either the Association or the

government’s authority. Non-conformity could easily pollute their neighbors’ minds;

therefore, potentially negative influences could not be tolerated. While historians have

examined propaganda in newspapers and tavern culture and its effect on politics and

society, executive institutions also shaped public opinion by disciplining community

members deemed treacherous to public safety.122 Due to their subversive behavior and

opinions, committees demanded the community stigmatize and cast out dissenting men

and women. By removing these people from the community, committees regulated and

normalized behavior to ensure conformity. Furthermore, by enforcing obedience, it is

evident that executive bodies’ coercive methods sought inhabitants’ compliance, not their

consent, with the boards’ drastic measures.

Ironically, to sway equivocal persons to support an American democracy,

committees imposed social conformity and punished individualism if it did not meet

patriotic standards. Social conformity efforts began in 1775, when local committees

extended the Association, which established unity by agreeing to abstain from British

imports and adhering to the Continental Congress’ resolutions.123 Even publicly signing

ones name did not forego suspicion. For those men and women suspected of disaffection,

their patriotism and loyalty were continuously questioned, especially as neutrality

                                                                                                               
122
David Ramsay, The History of the American Revolution, Volume I (Trenton: James J. Wilson, 1811),
84; Arthur M. Schlesinger, “The Colonial Newspapers and the Stamp Act,” The New England Quarterly,
Vol. 8, no. 1 (Mar., 1935), 63; Robert Glenn Parkinson, “Enemies of the People: The Revolutionary War
and Race in the New American Nation,” (PhD Dissertation: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 6; and
Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution, 57.
123
T.H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 26 and Breen, American Insurgents, American Patriots, 160-
170.

  39  
became less viable.124 Loyalty needed to be proved, not assumed. Despite committees

for public safety’s heavy-handed tactics, residents felt conflicted when choosing sides.125

Social stigma and ostracism proved to be effective and harmful to those residents targeted

but these tactics represented only executive bodies’ first measures.

The executive bodies’ other two modes of power were even more communally

based. The second mode, public services, included enforcing price regulations, aiding

injured or poor inhabitants, erecting defense mechanisms, delivering military exemptions,

and monitoring infectious disease, among other enterprises. In essence, these actions

sought wide-scale enforcement so as to regularize behavior on a community basis.126 The

committees’ third power was sovereign authority, or police efforts, to enforce

governmental rule. This power included executing legislation and also, at times, creating

law and even performing judiciary functions. Blurring governmental branches allowed

these institutions the ability to suspend individual rights in the name of public safety.

Following the Declaration of Independence, policing and surveillance became

increasingly efficient and extensive with the advent of treason laws. In both New Jersey

                                                                                                               
124
Men like James Allen of Pennsylvania signed the Association specifically to avoid suspicion and
continued his business without harassment. Others, such as Roeloff Josiah and the Van Schaack brothers,
signed but because they refused to recognize American sovereignty, committees monitored and scrutinized
their conscience. “Diary of James Allen, Esq., of Pennsylvania,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography, Vol. IX (1885), 186. Neutrality was long distrusted in Western philosophy and politics by
thinkers such as Solon and Aristotle. John Jay even quoted Solon in his disagreements with neutral Peter
Van Schaack. Plutarch, “Solon” in The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, translated by John
Dryden (New York: Modern Library, 1955), 108-109; Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, VIII, 5, translated
by Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950), 76; and Edmund Burke,
Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (London: 1770), 115. See also Henry C. Van Schaack,
The Life of Peter Van Schaack Embracing Selections from His Correspondence and Other Writings, during
the American Revolution, and His Exile in England (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842), 122.
125
In “The Pausing American Loyalist,” the narrator describes the painful struggle many Americans
experienced when faced with the Association. “The Pausing American Loyalists,” in Diary of the American
Revolution… ed. Frank Moore (Hartford: The J.B. Burr Publishing Company, 1876), 169.
126
Foucault referred to this function as ‘bio-powers.’ Foucault, “Society Must be Defended,” 246-247.

  40  
and New York, the security state instituted a comprehensive recognizance system to

monitor alleged enemies and ensure they remained on “good behavior.” If the board

desired, it could also have subversives deported or confined. Under this system of

issuing recognizances, policing society relied heavily upon instilling fear to institute

consensus.127 Even if at times coercively induced, widespread support existed as citizens

condoned the committees’ actions.128 Although many Americans rejected the coercive

boards’ legitimacy, other residents complied out of principle or fear. Thus Americans

aided in the creation of the security state by making accusations and acting as informants,

both formally as spies or informally. Committees for public safety could not have

produced the same degree of success without popular acceptance by men and women

who willingly sacrificed liberties, as well as their potentially dangerous neighbors, for

security. Given the chaotic times and threats to safety, many Americans condoned or

even solicited the creation of these dictatorial boards.129 Some residents even suggested,

“Would it not conduce to the immediate safety… if a Dictator were appointed for three or

six months, with full powers to exert the strength of the state in any way he should think
                                                                                                               
127
Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983),
Second Edition, 209 and 220.
128
Studying twentieth century Nazi Germany, Robert Gellately argued the regime’s success came not from
an advanced spy network but society policing itself. Such self-policing stemmed directly from a widespread
consensus in support of governmental efforts. By no means am I comparing the two regimes, but merely
demonstrating the importance of consensus even within a coercive society. This dissertation argues both
monitoring and consensus produced results. I also view informants and spies as occupying a muddled
position of both consensus and coercion because spies came from the civilian, not military, population.
While some executive bodies paid informants, these people were not always militarily trained. They
infiltrated communities under assumed names and accused their neighbors of crimes. Robert Gellately, The
Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Radical Policy, 1933-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 8-13
and Claire M. Hall, “An Army of Spies? The Gestapo Spy Network 1933-45,” Journal of Contemporary
History, Vol. 44, no. 2 (Apr., 2009), 247.
129
After the British invaded New York and New Jersey in late 1776, an anonymous “Citizen” of
Pennsylvania suggested the assembly appoint a dictator. “To the Assembly of Pennsylvania,” The
Pennsylvania Evening Post, December 7, 1776.

  41  
proper against our enemies?” Most likely knowing that the use of emergency powers

existed since antiquity, the anonymous writer stated, legislators displayed too much

“languor” and must dispense “absolute power” to a man or group so as to coerce the

population into obeying laws and thus save the republic.130

Many residents recognized that aiding law enforcement helped end civil disorder

and so in order to achieve security, they willingly sacrificed their rights to facilitate the

committees’ efforts to normalize behavior.131 By providing security, committees for

public safety successfully mobilized increasing numbers of people to join their efforts

and ensured the state’s strength by limiting dissenting opinions. Non-conformists,

neutrals, pacifists, and equivocal people were slowly displaced from society. As

sociologist Barrington Moore Jr. suggested, people, although not versed in social contract

theory, understood the eternal negotiation between those in power and themselves. Thus,

Americans effectively created a bargain, willingly delivering legitimacy to leaders so

long as they felt protected.132

At the heart of this bargain, the committees for public safety had to gauge loyalty.

To ascertain Americans’ loyalty, committees for public safety issued oaths and

affirmations that, although they changed over time, helped define the American

                                                                                                               
130
The Continental Congress endowed George Washington with similar dictatorial powers from late 1776
to mid 1777. Revolutionary leaders even debated a dictator during the 1780s, mentioning both Washington
and Nathaniel Greene.
131
Gellately, 10.
132
As long as order was maintained, Moore argued, people seldom rejected authority. Barrington Moore,
Jr. Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1978), 46-47, 79-80,
and 482. Before executive bodies commenced instituting order, nascent states lacked authority. Legal
historian Stephen Holmes suggested, in such an environment “rights can be imagined...[they were not]
experienced.” Stephen Holmes, Passions & Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 19.

  42  
community.133 No longer did the ancien regime’s ideals of monarchy, deference,

property ownership, or patronage solely define Americans’ political community.134 Now

sovereignty lay with the people. As the Revolution and war progressed, signing one’s

name was not enough to insure loyalty as military service and other blatant public

displays were necessary to stave off accusations of disaffection. Despite previous

historians’ assertions that executions were not widespread, violence and coercion defined

the committees’ surveillance tactics. Through ostracizing, monitoring, harassing,

confining, deporting, and paroling residents, committees for public safety created an

American community based on conformity and social control. Those residents who

remained within the community implicitly agreed to behave as good citizens and to

actively display their patriotism by taking oaths, serving the military, obeying laws, and

most importantly by monitoring and delivering information against their neighbors.135

Positive displays of patriotism were vital as the revolutionary governments’ only claim to

legitimacy was what they could enforce or obtain from the people.

                                                                                                               
133
Revolutionary leaders, such as John Adams, long recognized the importance of oaths to establish new
governments, instill respect for laws, and preserve peace. He also asserted the importance of military oaths
and the need to punish anyone who refused. It is absurd “to Reason and … Conscience, for the People of
these Colonies to take oaths and affirmations, necessary for the support of any Government under the
Crown of Great Britain and it is necessary that the Exercise of every Kind of Authority under the Said
Crown should be totally Suppressed, and all Powers of Government under the Authority of People of the
Colonies, exerted for the Preservation of internal Peace, … good order, as well as to defend our Lives,
Liberties, and Properties, from the hostile Invasions and cruel Depredations of our Enemies.” John Adams
to James Warren, May 15, 1776, in Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789 eds. Paul H. Smith, et al.,
Volume III (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1978), 678-679; Adams to Nathanael Greene, July 2,
1777, and Adams to Abigail Adams, July 16, 1777, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, Volume
VII, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1981), 163 and 348.
134
Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution, 57-58. Oaths and affirmations began with non-importation
agreements and later included military service.
135
David Ramsay, A Dissertation on the Manner of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a Citizen of
the United States (1789), 5 and Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution, 58.

  43  
 Committees’ near dictatorial powers would not go unchallenged; inhabitants at

times demonstrated their disdain and distrust towards the committees through a variety of

means. Contending that the committees possessed no legitimacy, some Americans

overtly voiced their displeasure with the boards. Citing the institutions’ tendencies to

infringe on individual rights, such as free speech or conscience, they articulated their

anger in the newspapers or public forums. Not all residents limited their distaste to words

and some defied committees by taking up arms, over-charging for goods, or engaging in

illicit behavior. Others recognized the committees’ political power and sought redress

through petitions or even fled the government’s authority. Stretching across America,

cries rose against committees’ tyranny, their insatiable appetite for power, and ability to

“pronounce… enemies to the general good.” Opponents lamented,

I am heartily disgusted with the times. The universal cry is Liberty! to support
which, an infinite number of petty tyrannies are established, under the appellation
of committees; in every one of which a few despots lord it over the calm and
moderate; inflame the passions of the mob, and pronounce those to be enemies to
the general good, who may presume any way to different from the creed they
have thought proper to impose.136

Facing a community that challenged their right to rule, committeemen confronted a

difficult battle.137

                                                                                                               
136
The author, William Eddis, expressed his displeasure while in Maryland. He came to America in 1769
and believed, as a native of Great Britain, he could not side with the patriots. William Eddis, Letters from
America, Historical and Descriptive; comprising Occurrences from 1769, to 1777…(London: 1792), 210.
137
As many historians suggested, the Revolution unlocked a strand of anti-deferential attitudes.
Committees combated British officials and the general disaffected population. For the deference
historiography: Charles S. Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in
Washington’s Virginia (New York: The Free Press, 1952), 44; J.R. Pole, “Historians and the Problem of
Early American Democracy,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 67, no. 3 (April, 1962), 639; William
F. Willingham, “Deference Democracy and Town Government in Windham, Connecticut, 1755-1786,”
WMQ, Vol. 30, no. 3 (July, 1973), 402; J.G.A. Pocock, “The Classical Theory of Deference,” American
Historical Review, Vol. 81, no. 3 (June, 1976), 516-523; Harry S. Stout, “Religion, Communications, and
the Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,” WMQ, Vol. 34, no. 4 (Oct., 1977), 519-541; Nash,
The Urban Crucible, 382-384; Isaac, 247; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution
(New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 5; Michael, Zuckerman, “Tocqueville, Turner, and Turds: Four Stories

  44  
 Defending their controversial actions as vital means to protect the common good

and provide security, committees for public safety sought to curb political dissent. Citing

internal subversion and the need for societal regulation, committees argued a lapse in the

American people’s public virtue as justification for trampling inhabitants’ rights.

Convinced internal enemies conspired throughout America, committees monitored,

apprehended, interrogated, intimidated, and jailed inhabitants to secure public safety, thus

establishing a security state. Through intimidation techniques, constructing lists of the

accused, deporting non-conformists and the suspicious, confining men without a trial, and

monitoring movements and allegiances, these institutions claimed legitimacy by rooting

out dissent and providing loyal inhabitants with two vital necessities, security and

stability. Due to the incredible political, economic, and social upheaval brought about by

civil war, many residents only desired stability, thus they willingly condoned

committees’ actions. Lofty ideals of individual rights might have guided the Revolution,

but coercive measures accomplished many of its goals.138

Examining in detail how committees for public safety established a security state

as well as the resistance they met enforcing their agenda, this dissertation also

demonstrates that large numbers of inhabitants willingly cooperated with these

                                                                                                               
of Manners in Early America,” Journal of American History, Vol. 85, no. 1 (June, 1998), 13-42; Alfred F.
Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press,
1999), 44-45; Peter Thompson, Rum, Punch, & Revolution: Taverngoing & Public Life in Eighteenth
Century Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 19; Richard R. Beeman, The
Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth Century America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2005), 5; and Billy G. Smith and Simon Middleton eds. “Deference in Early America: The Life
and/or Death of an Historiographical Concept,” Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol.
3, no. 2, (Fall, 2005), 227-401.
138
Most notably Joyce Appleby has emphasized the affects of liberalism on the origins of the American
Revolution, highlighting the importance of individual rights. Joyce Appleby, “Liberalism and the American
Revolution,” The New England Quarterly, Vol. 49, no. 1 (Mar., 1976), 6. See also: Isaac Kramnick,
“Republican Revisionism Revisited,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 87, no. 3, (Jun., 1982), 629
and John Patrick Diggins, “Comrades and Citizens: New Mythologies in American Historiography,” The
American Historical Review, Vol. 90, no. 3 (Jun., 1985), 614.

  45  
institutions and their strenuous exercise of authority, which at times, required Americans

to sacrifice their rights. Historians of the American Revolution must recognize that

during a time of upheaval, as Howard Brown noted in Ending the French Revolution,

people “accept undemocratic and illiberal – and sometimes quite draconian – methods of

repression in order to defeat” disorder.139 Fearful residents, eager to avert additional

violence, desired a strong government to assert power. Americans willingly delivered

names of their suspicious neighbors, signed petitions, gave affidavits and depositions, and

helped monitor or apprehend alleged un-patriotic citizens. Their efforts aided the

intrusive committees for public safety and though they sacrificed their liberties, they

willingly delivered their allegiance in exchange for security, a common theme in

wartime.

Although the demand for effective executive power does not commonly come to

mind when considering the American Revolution, contemporaries certainly understood

its importance. The disorder brought on by the Revolution could not be effectively

addressed without powerful and controversial executive bodies. Historians, though, have

failed to consider that although Americans rejected strong colonial governors, they

recognized legislators’ “languor” and pondered if “the present alarming exigency of our

affairs, fully demonstrate that placing so little power in the hands of the executive branch

of government, is a most essential and fundamental fault in all our new constitutions?”140

                                                                                                               
139
The chaos in America was similar to, yet not to the same degree as, the violence, counterfeiting, and
theft Howard Brown uncovered in France. Unlike later executive bodies in France that lacked legal status,
newly elected legislatures mandated American committees for public safety to protect the common good.
Brown, Ending the French Revolution, 327 and 341.
140
“To the Assembly of Pennsylvania,” The Pennsylvania Evening Post, December 7, 1776.

  46  
 This dissertation examines three states and is divided into six chapters to

illuminate committees for public safety in each colony and state both before and after

July 1776 to understand their origins, actions, influence, termination, and how they

transformed over the war years. In chapter 1, New York’s Provincial Congress

authorized the Committee of Safety to administer the colony before it adjourned. Over

time, New York’s Congress delivered its executive body additional power to guide the

Revolution. Acting as the civil bulwark against military aggressions, the Committee of

Safety also began policing allegiance. Despite its powers, after General William Howe

seized New York City, patriots realized a more systematic security state was required. In

chapter 2, we find the origins of Virginia’s Committee of Safety and discover how it

consolidated county committees’ authority, successfully establishing civil government in

the face of British invasion, American military antagonism, and epidemic disaffection.

We also discover how the Committee of Safety’s success influenced Virginia’s

Constitution and the creation of the Council of the State. Despite the limited number of

active loyalists in Virginia, the Committee of Safety established executive authority

necessary to win the war, institute governmental sovereignty, and set a precedent for

employing coercive intimidation techniques against political dissent. In chapter 3, we see

the antithesis of the New York and Virginia executives in the New Jersey Committee of

Safety. This board lacked many of the qualities necessary for success, sitting only

briefly, never broadly interpreting its mandate and guided by moderate and more hesitant

patriots. With a savvy royal governor in William Franklin, a sizable disaffected, as well

as neutral, population, and a hesitant patriot leadership, New Jersey discovered the effects

of a dearth in executive power. Unable to either consolidate local boards’ power or curb

  47  
the growing amount of dissent, the Committee of Safety’s experience highlighted for

New Jersey patriots the need for effective and daunting police power.

The second half of the dissertation examines committees for public safety after

July 1776 during the early state years. In Chapter 4, we find that internal subversives and

the imminent threat of invasion postponed New York’s constitution, allowing committees

for public safety to continue to lead the Revolution. Facing incredible odds, the

Committee, and later Council, of Safety required additional help policing society. To

alleviate the executive’s time constraints so it could efficiently provide the necessary

functions of government, the legislature continuously created Commissions to Detect and

Defeat Conspiracies (CDDCs). Designed specifically to systematically inspire fear and

conformity, the various incarnations of the CDDCs created a security state in New York.

By administering the oath of allegiance and issuing a large-scale system of recognizances

for future good behavior, the CDDCs instituted a self-policing society.

Next we turn our attention back to Virginia in chapter 5, unlike in New York, its

state constitution immediately created the governor’s office and instituted the Council of

the State to help administer executive authority. While the Council of the State employed

similar methods as both the New York and New Jersey Council of Safety, it was not the

same. Much less concerned with summoning and interrogating Virginians, the Council

administered the entire state by enforcing laws, establishing defenses, raising troops, and

impressing materials. When it came to internal dissent, despite historians’ claims that

Virginia contained an insignificant loyalist population, the Council of the State attacked

disaffection more broadly, by restraining residents from trading or providing the enemy

with intelligence, curbing seditious Virginians’ liberties, as well as policing deserters,

  48  
Quakers and anyone who refused the oath. Less concerned with administering the oath

and policing Virginia itself, the Council of the State executed law and delivered harsh

orders against subversives, including deportations and limiting mobility. Similar to the

two Councils of Safety, Virginia’s Council of the State attempted to indoctrinate fear and

normalize conformity. While historians have rightly recognized the state constitution

limited the executive’s authority, during the war the Council of the State assumed extra-

constitutional powers that allowed it to enforce laws against disorder and reign supreme.

In the final chapter, we return to New Jersey to find the state’s answer to its

divisions and weak executive body. Led by Governor William Livingston, the short-term

emergency Council of Safety, like the CDDCs, focused predominately upon disaffection.

As in New York, the New Jersey Council of Safety aggressively extended recognizances

for good behavior to allegedly suspicious inhabitants, replicating New York’s self-

policing society. Based on his radical republican beliefs, Livingston’s Council of Safety

trampled individual liberties in the name of the common good while eliminating

neutrality as a viable political position. Devoting most of their efforts to eradicating

opposition, Councilors also protected loyal patriots by: erecting defenses, enforcing price

regulations, and providing for injured or deceased soldiers and their families. Even

though Livingston and the Council of Safety refrained from most military preparations,

they met New Jerseyans’ demands for stability and security.

Provincial and state committees for public safety both before and after July 1776

acted more as a functioning government than local committees by handling military,

economic, and political issues. As the only acting civil body at times, these revolutionary

institutions not only policed society but also responded to inhabitants’ demand for stable

  49  
government and security during a period of upheaval. Executive bodies provided the

stability that the British army lacked during the Revolution and thus not only contributed

to the war effort but also ensured America’s success. Despite historians’ bias towards

legislative bodies and a narrative that foregrounds America’s democratic origins, these

coercive and at times undemocratic institutions were responsible for leading the fledgling

country through its darkest days. Their names’ alone, “Committees of Safety,” illuminate

a daunting question that would be answered by the end of the war. Who decided who

posed a threat to safety and what was the cost of security?

  50  
 Chapter 1: “disaffected and dangerous persons…endanger” inhabitants’ safety:
The New York Committee of Safety, 1775-1776

“…hypocrisy, slyness, cupidity, inhumanity and abuse of power in these petty

country despots are evident,” Michel Guillaume Jean de Crèvecoeur declared while

surveying New York’s revolutionary leaders in the introduction of his play

“Landscapes.”1 Opening with the self-righteous Deacon Beatus and his family discussing

the absence of his son Anthony at breakfast, the audience soon discovers Anthony “was

all night a-Tory-hunting.” Upon hearing such news, the family applauded his efforts:

assaulting the deaf old Stubb, killing the man’s horse, and ransacking Adam Mills’ home

searching for personal papers before ripping the alleged enemy from his bed to anoint

him with a suit of tar. Deacon Beatus’ hypocrisy becomes abruptly evident as he leads a

family prayer calling for the punishment of traitors. After concluding the prayer, former

friend, Philip Rearman, recently released from the revolutionary committee’s “putrid

gaols,” visited the Beatus family.2 Although Rearman never asserted any allegiance to

the British or Americans, he disapproved of the committee’s terror and interrogation

                                                                                                               
1
Originally published in 1782, Crèvecoeur likely wrote the piece in the early 1770s under the pseudonym
J. Hector St. John. Initially claiming neutrality, Crèvecoeur eventually became a loyalist. In “American
Belisarius” he wrote, “The horror, the chocking details of the following tragedy, ‘tis true, show mankind in
the worst light possible. But what can you expect when law, government, morality are become silent and
inefficacious?” Some historians disagree that Crèvecoeur was an active loyalist as the British questioned
his loyalty and confined him when he arrived in New York City. St. John de Crèvecoeur, Letters from an
American Farmer and Sketches of Eighteenth-Century America: More Letters from an American Farmer,
eds. Henri L. Bourdin, Ralph H. Gabriel, and Stanley T. Williams (New York: Benjamin Blom, Inc., 1972),
229 and 254; Julia Post Mitchell, St. Jean de Crèvecoeur (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916),
15; and Michael Kammen, “The American Revolution as a Crise de Conscience” in Society, Freedom, and
Conscience: The American Revolution in Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York, ed. Richard M. Jellison
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976), 142.
2
Although Beatus possessed no prior knowledge of the harsh treatment, he believed it was unavoidable
during such times, a common theme uttered by the real committees. Following his released, Rearman
discovered his neighbor dared not help him for fear of mob repercussions. Believing the law no longer
served justice, he suspected it obeyed a new master.

  51  
methods. As the local committee chairman, Beatus implored his erstwhile neighbor to

“follow my counsel” and receive protection. Unsatisfied, Rearman condemned

committeemen led by “blind passions” and possessing little “humanity or even reason.”3

When the deacon’s wife, a true Lady Macbeth, urged Rearman to beg for the committee’s

mercy, he recalled being informed that signing the Association would protect him. Such

assurance failed to provide the promised security as Rearman soon discovered

community suspicion and confinement without any evidence would be his fate.4

Throughout the play, the audience ascertains that Beatus, as the committee’s

chair, possessed great power and influence. Everywhere the deacon travelled, he

confronted men, whose allegiance he suspected and whom he accused of lacking

patriotism if they differed with his principles.5 Beatus, empowered by self-righteousness,

threaten a landlord to refrain from renting to men he deemed disaffected. All of

Crèvecoeur’s characters he depicted as fearful for their lives lest the “inquisitor” have

reason to suspect they undermined the patriots’ authority.6 In many of his works, the

author portrayed an idyllic world shattered by committees’ heavy-handed and

                                                                                                               
3
Crèvecoeur, 260-261. Rearman informed the deacon, “Thousands obey or… dread your laws,” rather than
be placed on the committee’s lists.
4
Crèvecoeur, 262. The deacon’s wife, Eltha, hated loyalists and concerned herself only with her husband’s,
and consequently her own, rise in society. Convincing the deacon to view loyalist women’s confiscated
goods on a Sabbath, Eltha hoped to obtain items before others had an opportunity.
5
Beatus harshly questioned a landlord who rented to loyalists stating, “Why, have you lived so long and do
not know yet what a Whig is? ‘Tis a lover of Congress and committees, a lover of his country.” Beatus
claimed, “I am their [the people] organ, but I am led by their desires.” He warned inhabitants not to give
him reason to question their allegiance.
6
By no means was Beatus the only villain as committeeman and militia officer Aaron Blue-Skin also
terrorized inhabitants. Blue-Skin threatened the same landlord to follow the Association less “the
committee…take you in hand.” Both he and Beatus employed psychological games with their prey, hoping
to cause them to divulge more information than they wished. Blue-Skin threatened to make an “orderly
set… of all of you. Look at the Jersey: thanks to their laws and their worthy governor, the very primrose of
the continent, they have brought the people to fear and reverence the laws.” Crèvecoeur, 287-293.

  52  
hypocritical tactics. When the New York Provincial Congress went into recess in August

1775, it appointed a Committee of Safety to act in its place and endowed with some of

the powers that Crèvecoeur lamented in his story. From that point on forced conformity,

monitoring, suspicion, and arbitrary rule increasingly replaced tolerance, freedom, and

private rights.7 How did New York arrive at this point when it needed to create and

continuously empower the Committee of Safety to monitor its own citizens?

New York’s Committee of Safety Commences

When the colonial New York Assembly refused to send delegates to the

Continental Congress, the colony’s Provincial Congress commenced in April 1775 to

lead the early stages of resistance.8 Bitterly divided between conservatives and radicals,

New York’s Provincial Congress initially acted slowly.9 Hampered by divisions, only

nine counties agreed to send representatives while five refused. That body adjourned

                                                                                                               
7
Mrs. Marston, the wife of a loyalist who fled, chastised Beatus as “A bad man… who tears up the bowels
of his native country; subverts its best laws; who makes tyranny, informing, injustice, oppression of every
kind the cause of God; who arrests people without cause; imprisons them for whole months and seasons
without hearings or inquires; and leaves them to languish under the accumulated weight of want, despair,
and disease.” She lambasted propaganda efforts and harsh lines of allegiance. Despite Crèvecoeur’s
politics, he noted violence existed on both sides as his stories “The Wyoming Massacre” and “The Frontier
Woman” illustrated loyalist and Native American violent frontier attacks.
8
Almost immediately, hundreds of New Yorkers voiced their displeasure with the illegal Convention and
committees. Denying the election’s validity, they claimed few New Yorkers elected or even supported such
a combination. As early as late 1774, much of New York, aside from Albany, Suffolk, and Ulster, rejected
the Association. Protest of Inhabitants and Freeholders of Westchester County, New-York, April 13, 1775
in AA, Series IV, 2:321-323. Nineteen members of the first Provincial Congress later became loyalists. For
information on the April 1775 Provincial Convention and its members see: Bernard Mason, The Road to
Independence: The Revolutionary Movement in New York, 1773-1777 (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press-Lexington, 1966), 42-46 and 183 and Franklin B. Hough, The New-York Civil List… (Albany: Weed,
Parsons & Co., Publishers, 1858), 47.
9
Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution (Cleveland: Press of Winn
& Judson, 1904), 63-64. Regions such as Kings County, dominated by loyalists, sent like-minded men. As
more loyalists fled New York City, Kings County slipped deeper into disaffection. Some notable men who
arrived in fall 1775 included: Mayor David Mathews, Governor William Tryon, and Chief Justice Daniel
Horsmanden. Richmond County followed suit, electing moderate and conservative men who generally
opposed the Revolution. Edwin Burrows, “Kings County,” and Phillip Papas, “Richmond County, Staten
Island,” in The Other New York: The American Revolution beyond New York City, 1763-1787, eds. Joseph
S. Tiedemann and Eugene R. Fingerhut (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 23 and 86-87.

  53  
after only three months, but not before creating the New York Committee of Safety to sit

in its place during arguably the most tumultuous period of the Revolution. Instead of the

cumbersomely large Congress, the Committee of Safety operated as an efficient short-

term emergency replacement. Originally only authorized to receive and send letters and

vaguely mandated to “carry into execution all orders” of the Continental and Provincial

Congress of New York, this executive body became increasingly vital after Royal

Governor William Tryon fled the colony aboard the Halifax in October 1775.10 Even

though the resolution creating the Committee of Safety mentioned nothing about

disaffection, its jurisdiction over alleged enemies expanded over the course of the war.11

Slowly amassing powers until spring 1776, the Committee of Safety led New York

during the chaotic and transitional period before July 1776.12

Both by providing stability and civil government as well as policing society, the

Committee of Safety navigated New York in the pre-independence period. As a bulwark

of civil government’s authority, the Committee of Safety staved off military threats by

not only the British but also the American forces. Considering itself the defender of civil

authority, when American General Charles Lee claimed military jurisdiction over New

                                                                                                               
10
The Provincial Congress also ordered the Committee of Safety to met with military leaders and
“authorized” the executive “to give directions to General Wooster” or other commanders. Despite fleeing,
Tryon and the royal government continued issuing land grants to maintain allies and curtail the
Association. JPCCS, 1:69-70 and Mason, 45-49.
11
In regions, such as Dutchess County, tenants leaned “lukewarm” towards the patriot cause and some
seemed hesitant to join landlords against the British. However, British supporters overestimated resistance.
Thomas S. Wermuth, “The Central Hudson Valley: Dutchess, Orange, and Ulster Counties,” in The Other
New York, 130.
12
When the Provincial Congress commenced, it faced an uncertain future. From 1774-1775, New York’s
royal government attempted to slow the Whigs’ progress. Revolutionaries moved hesitantly since New
York City was the headquarters for His Majesty’s Forces in North America. Due to New York’s hesitant
behavior, other colonies viewed New York with caution, stating, “we are not ignorant of that crowd of
placemen, of contractors, or officers, and needy dependents upon the Crown, who are constantly employed
to frustrate your measures.” Letter from the General Committee of Charlestown, S.C. to the New-York
Committee…, May 3, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 2:1-3 and Mason, 45 and 60.

  54  
York residents, the Committee of Safety rose to the challenge.13 Committeemen and Lee

vehemently disputed authority over standing armies in New York City, apprehending

suspicious inhabitants, and issuing oaths. Claiming responsibility to preserve the

common good, the Committee of Safety rejected Lee.

Aside from acting as the civil bulwark, the Committee of Safety was concerned

with internal dissent and resistance. Initially both New York’s Congress and Committee

of Safety operated reluctantly towards internal opposition, at times choosing stern words

over actions.14 Lacking a precise definition of treason or enemy behavior, punishing

dissent proved difficult for much of 1775.15 Soon recognizing the need to strengthen the

Committee of Safety, in September 1775, the Provincial Congress created new resolves

to punish those found guilty of aiding the enemy. From that point on, the Provincial

Congress slowly bestowed upon its executive greater powers to label and combat

America’s first enemies. Culminating with the September 1 Resolutions, the legislature

enabled the Committee of Safety to effectively monitor the population.16 Receiving the

September 1 Resolutions as a mandate, the New York Committee of Safety significantly

increased monitoring efforts: creating lists of enemies, mounting apprehensions of

residents, and even blurring the lines between governmental powers by issuing and

                                                                                                               
13
I disagree with Kammen who argued that the conflict was not about civil vs. military jurisdiction but
rather New Yorkers’ desire to control their own region rather than an outsider. Kammen, 178-179.
14
Both contemporaries and historians described the Provincial Congress as hesitant in 1775. American
General David Wooster wrote Connecticut Governor Jonathan Trumbull noting, “the suspicious light in
which the New York Congress are viewed.” Mason, 60-61 and General Wooster to Governor Trumbull,
August 24, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3: 262.
15
Alexander C. Flick, Loyalism in New York during the American Revolution (New York, Columbia
University dissertation, 1901), 58. Flick highlighted that before August 1775 there was no definition of
treason and he seemed to hint at the September 1 Resolutions’ importance. This dissertation builds off his
study of New York’s efforts against the disaffected and restrictions on acceptable behavior.
16
September 1 Resolutions is a term I created.

  55  
executing resolutions.17 Eventually realizing the Committee of Safety’s potential, in

early 1776 the Provincial Congress considered it necessary that the executive body

possess both emergency powers and the ability to operate under a veil of secrecy.

Additionally, the Committee of Safety received the authority to grant commissions, seize

command during an insurrection or invasion, examine the suspicious, remove the poor

from distressed areas, administer military stores, and restore accused inhabitants to their

previous community standing.18 Wielding emergency powers over civil and military

affairs, the Committee of Safety assumed near dictatorial powers as both the guilty and

the innocent found themselves before the emergency board.19 Upon its creation the

Committee of Safety displayed coercive tendencies, but not until the eve of independence

did it commence systematizing a security state.20 These early surveillance techniques

proved essential to institute the new state’s sovereignty. By curbing disaffection and

ensuring civil government, the Committee of Safety filled the vacuum of executive power

                                                                                                               
17
Building on Becker’s minor note, this dissertation asserts the Committee of Safety, in many ways, acted
as a condensed version of the Provincial Congress by voting on decisions and issuing resolutions.
However, the Committee of Safety was not representative of the entire colony. Patriots in both New York
and Virginia received criticism for the lack of representation on their respective executive bodies. Both
committees dealt with quorum issues, meeting technically illegally out of necessity. Hugh Flick also noted
the Committee of Safety’s goal to reduce the number of men needed to execute law and its lack of
quorums. However, he did not credit the Committee of Safety with preventing disorder. Rather, he cited
other committees policing the population and consolidating power into a central body. Hugh Flick, “The
Committee System,” in History of the State of New York ed. Alexander C. Flick, Volume III (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1933), 248-249.
18
From January to March 1776, the Provincial Congress delivered the Committee of Safety additional
powers to order Continental forces, apply and administer money, call the legislature, open letters, comply
or reject Continental army orders, purchase pitch, tar, and turpentine, and secure government documents.
Some of these powers began earlier.
19
Once independence was a foregone conclusion, the Provincial Congress assumed an active role against
disaffection and created a committee to eradicate dissent. While this committee possessed no name, its
successor’s title speaks volumes, the Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies.
20
New York’s security state, the subject of chapter 4, was arguably the most extensive, powerful and
necessary. Continuing previous tactics, the security state also created a sub-executive committee designed
to systematically eradicate disaffection and actively engaged the entire community by using informants,
self-policing, and recognizances for future good behavior.

  56  
after the royal government fell and until the fledgling state government began operating

sufficiently.21 Viewing individual liberties as a threat to public security, the Committee

of Safety curbed behavior seen as a liability to their ultimate goal of instilling order.

These institutions actively labeled community members as enemies to eliminate dissent

yet, despite the Committee of Safety’s efforts, New Yorkers resisted the coercive

institution by petitioning, fleeing, and opposing its initiatives. Americans’ resistance in

turn influenced the Committee of Safety to alter and enhance its methods, eventually

leading to the creation of a security state in July 1776.

“…this Continent [is] in all the horrors of a civil war”

After the Battle of Lexington and Concord and the collapse of royal government

in April 1775, New York’s revolutionary leaders believed it necessary to have a strong

and efficient central governing body to preserve order and public security, a broad and

amorphous concept especially when mobs opened letters and armed patriots marched

through the streets beating drums and flying banners ahead of boisterous crowds.22 With

                                                                                                               
21
Thomas Wermuth briefly mentioned committees in general (not the Committee of Safety) filling this
void and gaining more power. However, he incorrectly stated that the creation of a formal government
curtailed their powers. In fact, the Provincial Congress bestowed upon New York’s early committees
incredible powers to tax inhabitants that even colonial bodies did not possess. Wermuth also discussed the
early committees and traditional crowd actions. He placed heavy emphasis on committees’ economic
regulation. Wermuth, 136-138 and Committee of Kingston, in Ulster County, New-York…, April 7, 1775
in AA, Series IV, 2:298.
22
Before Lexington and Concord, the patriots arrested few loyalists. Isaac Sears and John Lamb led the
march. The mob opened letters and seized provisions in a “scene of riot, tumult, and confusion.” Sears, a
member of the Sons of Liberty, stood against men like Low in previous years, trying to agitate New
Yorkers against the Tea Act. Sears also took part in the less publicized New York Tea Party and previously
held positions on patriot committees. Edward Countryman, A People in Revolution: The American
Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760-1790 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981),
140. See also: Address of the New-York Committee…, April 26, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 2:400; Thomas
Jones, History of New York during the Revolutionary War…, Volume I (New York: New York Historical
Society, 1879), 39-40; William Smith, Historical Memoirs of William Smith…, ed. W.H.W. Sabine,
Volume I (New York: Colburn & Tegg, 1956), 222-223; Mason, 13-15, 21 and 26; and Alexander Flick,
“The Loyalists,” in History of the State of New York 3:333.

  57  
the onset of armed conflict, New Yorkers were increasingly forced to take sides.23

Divisions ripped the colony apart as even before the war the colonial New York

Assembly abruptly ended and the Council, the colonial executive body, met sporadically

and possessed little power.24 Many New Yorkers feared the lack of moderate men atop

the political world to guide the colony through the consuming chaos.25 Isaac Low,

chairman of the New York Committee, plainly stated, “this Continent [is] in all the

horrors of a civil war” and suggested a Provincial Congress be formed to preserve “our

common safety.”26 Searching to foster unity, New York’s patriot leaders extended the

Association, believing American liberties and safety depended upon the formation of a

new government to prevent anarchy.27 Immediately, the Association set an ominous tone

                                                                                                               
23
Before the battle, divisions within New York largely followed the old factional lines, pitting the De
Lanceys and Livingstons. The De Lanceys left the patriot fold by 1775, joining the loyalists. After the
battle, many in New York City supported forming a patriot government. Mason, 69-71.
24
Lord Dartmouth notified Governor Tryon that the King still intended to enforce law and would send
vessels to New York. Earl of Dartmouth to Governor William Tryon, July 1 and 5, 1775, Transcript in
Andrew Elliot Papers, Box 5, folder 1, NYSL.
25
John Thurman to Amos Hayton, N.D. 166, John Thurman Letterbook 1770-1821 in John Thurman
Papers, 1741-1835, NYSL. Thurman was a loyalist merchant.
26
Low later refused to take arms against the British. JPCCS, 1:5 and Mason, 13-17. Disgusted with the
patriots, residents like Reverend Myles Cooper referred to their meetings as a “Cabal” whose members’
“guilty Souls, Nor Laws of God, or Man, controls.” Cooper’s word did not go unnoticed as the Sons of
Liberty burnt his pamphlets. Reverend Myles Cooper, The Patriots of North-America: A Sketch with
Explanatory Notes (New York, 1775), 5. EC Series I, 14359. Lewis Leary, “Literature in New York,
1775,” Early American Literature, Vol. XI, no. 1 (Spring, 1976), 10. James Rivington’s loyalist New York
Gazetteer included many stories, possibly exaggerated, of violence against the disaffected. In the satirical
tale (allegedly based upon a true story) “The Case Stated in a Late Tavern Adventure; or the Humours of a
Noted Sedition Shop” a patriot owner extorted “Sedition and Toddy” while forcing others to concur with
his ideology and refusing to trade with anyone who disagreed. Both Cooper and Rivington, received
payments from the British. Mason, 53-60 and 63 and “To the Printer of the New-York Gazetter and The
Case Stated,” New York Gazetteer January 12 and 19, 1775. Aside from divisions, the patriot government
faced currency issues and the Provincial Congress seized the colonial treasury. By 1776, the legislature
issued paper money. Alexander C. Flick, The American Revolution in New York: Its Political, Social and
Economic Significance (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1926), 105-127.
27
JPCCS, 1:4. The Association read, “Persuaded that the salvation of the rights and liberties of America
depends… on firm union of its inhabitants, in a vigorous prosecution of the measures necessary for its
safety; and convinced of the necessity of preventing the anarchy and confusion on which attend a
dissolution of the powers of government.” According to Bruce Bliven, some New Yorkers rejected the

  58  
in contested regions. In Tryon County, the local patriot committee purposefully indicated

that residents voluntarily signed the Association and not due to “Motives of Force or

Fear.”28 Whether the men actually signed willingly is debatable, but clearly New

Yorkers recognized that without governing authority and unity, chaos and lawlessness

would ensue. Stark divisions already separated colonists as both sides adamantly referred

to the other as full of “Malice, Rage...[and] Ignorance.”29

To combat the growing divisions and violence within the colony and reassert

order, New Yorkers suggested monitoring the community. The Provincial Congress

needed “internal police” to regulate law and society, Low argued.30 He contended, “this

Congress is competent to and ought freely to deliberate and determine on, all matters

relative to the internal police of the Colony.”31 Initially no resolution went into effect,

yet New York’s leaders endorsed policing policies. Local county committees in Albany,

                                                                                                               
Association because they had accepted similar earlier versions while some loyalists accepted it merely to
confuse patriots. Bruce Bliven Jr., Under the Guns: New York, 1775-1776 (New York: Harper & Row,
1972), 50 and Kammen, 138.
28
MBCSTC, 31-32. Arguably, the Association was the first American oath issued in Tryon on June 17,
1775. Located amidst the Iroquois Confederacy, Tryon patriots sought to displace the powerful Johnson
family. Bitterly divided, the community was set to implode. Robert W. Venables, “Tryon County,” in The
Other New York, 179-180 and 183-187.
29
Cooper, 7.
30
The Continental Congress suggested how to administer the Association yet allowed local leaders to
enforce it.
31
JPCCS, 1:8. Overwhelmingly delegates on May 23, 1775 agreed with Low.

  59  
Schoharie, Schenectady, and Tryon formed to support the initiative.32 Arguably, these

local committees enjoyed more extensive powers than previous colonial officials.33

Considering that the Continental Congress expected the British to take a decisive

stance within New York and the fact the colony contained several loyalist leaders, such

as British Superintendent of Indian Affairs Guy Johnson, New York’s patriots recognized

a growing threat.34 By late spring 1775, though the term was not widely used,

disaffection had already reared its ugly face. For example, in Tryon County, Guy

Johnson and his Native Americans allies stirred fears and sought to slow patriots’

progress. At a meeting in the Mohawk District, Johnson’s armed men arrived to disrupt

residents from discussing their grievances with the British and “struck Terror into most of

them.”35 The atmosphere only worsened as rumors circled that Johnson recruited Indians

                                                                                                               
32
Early boards prepared defenses, established communications, formed companies, and endorsed the
Association. William E. Roscoe, History of Schoharie County, New York (Syracuse: D. Mason & Co.,
1882), 37 and James Sullivan ed., Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence, 1775-1778, Vol. 1
(Albany: University of the State of New York: 1923), 3.
33
Wermuth, 136-137. Their powers included, the right to tax, deliver appointments, raise forces, instill
judicial and police authority and regulate the economy. Claiming that local committees lost power once the
state government commenced, Wermuth failed to recognize the later local conspiracies boards and New
York Council of Safety.
34
Possibly influenced by the recent bloodshed in New England, the New York Convention adhered to the
Continental Congress’ suggestion and removed canons from Fort Ticonderoga. The Convention also
maintained communication with the New Jersey Provincial Congress. Some residents rejected the
Association, referring to it as “subversive of, inconsistent with, the… laws of our happy Constitution; it
abrogates or suspends many of them essential to the peace and order of Government; it takes Government
out of the hands of the Governor, Council, and General Assembly; and the execution of laws of out the
hands of the Civil Magistrates and Juries.” Even before the Committee of Safety existed, charges of local
committees infringing “on the liberties of their fellow-subjects, and without the shadow of a trial, take from
them their property…hold them up to contempt, and expose them to the vilest injuries.” Loyalist writers
cited Montesquieu when critiquing committees’ lack of a balance of powers. “To the Americans, and To
the People of New-Jersey,” New York Gazetteer, February 16, 1775 and December 1, 1774 and Phillips
Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1941), 277.
35
MBCSTC, 7. By May 1775, the Provincial Congress called for committees of correspondence in all
counties and by July asked them to extend the Association. The Tryon County committee minutes are the
only county committee records still in existence. Flick, American Revolution in New York, 34.

  60  
for protection and ordered travelers he deemed suspicious seized.36 Committees for

public safety would replicate these same methods of intimidation, apprehension, and

force, previously bemoaned by patriots.

Confronted by uncertainty, divisions, courts still under English jurisdiction, and

British ships off the coast, the Provincial Congress and Committee of Safety operated

apprehensively at first.37 Rather than a blood-soaked moment, these revolutionary bodies

initially chose strong words, economic sanctions, and moral arguments over dramatic

actions.38 Many New Yorkers held the British civil government in low regard,

contributing to the tension.39 In New York City, patriots raided the Crown’s military

stores and argued with residents who rejected the Association.40 For its part, the

Continental Congress previously forbade aggressions against the British but New York’s

legislature only condemned the illegal exploits as a “violation of Continental order” that

“tends to destroy their and our authority” and places the city “in the utmost confusion and

distress.”41 Left with little other recourse, the Provincial Congress met its bombastic

                                                                                                               
36
JPCCS, 1:23-24. By June, Johnson felt threatened and believed he might be kidnapped.
37
JPCCS, 1:77 and 139.
38
Despite the lack of executions, the Revolution still contained moments of induced terror and boycotting
individuals. While both Alexander and Hugh Flick noted patriot institutions’ weakness, they also
highlighted that soon after Lexington and Concord, the Provincial Congress ordered mail confiscated and
read at the customs house. Hugh Flick, “The Committee System,” 233 and Flick, The American Revolution
in New York, 38-39.
39
Tryon to Dartmouth, July 4 and 7, 1775 in Documents relative to the Colonial History of the State of
New York…, ed. E.B. O’Callaghan, Volume VIII (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company Printers, 1857),
589 and 593.
40
British supporters and the patriot Committee of Sixty rejected the vessel the James from entering the
harbor in February 1775. However, it allowed the ship to receive supplies. Mason, 65.
41
JPCCS, 1:35.

  61  
rhetoric with only the promise to send eight delegates to investigate.42 The Provincial

Congress responded to breaches of the Association by sentencing Robert and John

Murray to be economically ostracized.43 Soon both men admitted fault, agreed to behave

properly in the future, submitted to the Association, and recognized the revolutionary

government’s legitimacy.44 Economic ostracism and mandated public contrition, while

harsh, paled in comparison to later executive authority’s actions.45 However, early

warning signs of surveillance were noticeable as the patriots sought collaborators to

deliver names of non-associators and local boards, such as the Schenectady Committee,

employed intimidating propaganda tools and suggested employers dismiss any non-

associators, which facilitated the discovery of dissent.46

                                                                                                               
42
Two days later, Low supported a resolution calling on inhabitants who possessed stolen firearms to
return them to the New York City mayor.
43
The signer agreed to, “in all things follow the advice of our [New York Congress] respecting the
purposes aforesaid, the preservation of peace, and good order.” JPCCS, 1:15. Similar examples exist in
Tryon County as leaders called upon neighbors to refuse business with non-associators. MBCSTC, 16. Flick
referred to committees as means of disseminating propaganda and called lists of non-associators “black
lists” saved for future punishments. However, he inaccurately contended these lists were not coercive. By
his count, at least 6,000 people refused the Association. The true number is probably much larger, as some
loyalist strongholds did not report any numbers. In Dutchess, Tryon, and Westchester, residents opposed
the Association and were divided over electing representatives to the Provincial Convention. Mason, 85-87;
Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 45-46; Flick, Loyalism, 47; and Flick, “The Loyalists,” 332.
44
JPCCS, 1:38. The Murrarys ‘voluntarily’ chose to pay the expenses of transporting and storing illicit
materials in New Jersey. After their contrition, they were restored to conduct business. As a Quaker, Robert
only took an affirmation. The Committee of Safety officially received the power to restore individuals in
March 1776, but assumed this authority earlier.
45
At times, the revolutionary government foreshadowed its future methods to combat disaffection. For
example, discovering Angus McDonald recruited some forty men to take arms against the colonies, the
Provincial Congress summoned him. After confessing and providing information against British recruiter
Captain Alexander McDonald, the Congress ordered more apprehensions. The Provincial Congress, with
no mention of a trial, still found Angus McDonald guilty and sent him to General David Wooster’s camp.
The next day, a committee ransacked Alexander McDonald’s home on Staten Island, yet found no
evidence. Such foreshadowing typified the security state’s behavior in years to come. JPCCS, 1:42-43. In
Tryon County, the local committee monitored slaves and servants and threatened, “to take up and secure
every Servant or Slave not having such Certificate.” MBCSTC, 16-17.
46
Punishments varied from economic ostracizing, fines or jail time. Hugh Flick, “The Committee System,”
3:233.

  62  
 Facing such daunting issues, on July 8 the Provincial Congress temporarily

adjourned, relinquishing the reins of government and public security to the Committee of

Safety. The legislature possessed upwards of at least forty-nine members, the Committee

of Safety a mere fourteen.47 Given the pressing needs of war, the smaller executive body

proved vital until the legislature reconvened. As the executive governing body, the

Committee of Safety possessed broad powers that, in theory, delivered it near dictatorial

control over civil and military affairs. With this mandate, these men executed

congressional resolutions at their own discretion. Like the legislature, initially the

Committee of Safety mostly offered advice and, at times, the Provincial Congress even

retained the final word.48 Frequently, local committees petitioned the colony wide

Committee of Safety for instructions. For example, when the Newburgh and New

Windsor local patriot committee sought advice on how to protect their community from

three men apprehended for upsetting “the public tranquility and destroy[ing] that

unanimity so necessary for the preservation of our liberties,” the Committee of Safety

recommended them both confined.49 The Committee of Safety ruled against the local

leaders, who felt the men should be released, however, by the end of the month New

York’s Congress released the accused and ordered the local committee to ensure their

                                                                                                               
47
Each county was designated a representative, except New York City and County was permitted three.
48
William Duer lamented crowds shutting down courts and others who “formed a resolution… abolishing
the law.” Duer supported “the absolute necessity… of keeping up, at least, the shadow of order and
justice.” He bemoaned the enemy would inflict less damage than “intestine anarchy and confusion.” The
Committee of Safety knew to establish the government’s legitimacy it needed “good order…as internal
divisions prove injurious to the common cause.” The Committee of Safety took no immediate action,
perhaps because it did not fully understand its jurisdiction. JPCCS, 1:71-72.
49
Local committees frequently looked to provincial bodies for guidance. The Newburgh and New Windsor
committees accused John Morrell, Adam Patrick, and Isiah Purdy of inimical behavior and suggested the
Committee decide between liberating them or extending securities. The local leaders felt some measure was
needed to set people’s minds at ease. Although it recommended liberation, the local committee possessed
no moral scruples restricting rights to preserve safety. JPCCS, 1:81-82.

  63  
wellbeing. Despite confessions, the Provincial Congress believed amnesty to be the

correct course of action and released them with only a warning for better conduct in the

future.50 This episode serves to illustrate that though the Congress demonstrated

leniency, the Committee of Safety’s resolve for swift action was evident. As the

revolutionary government continued to struggle with how it would handle dissent,

problems with the British military consumed the Committee of Safety’s attention.

Establishing Civil Authority and Protecting Society

Facing numerous military threats, the Committee of Safety successfully operated

as a civil institution against British threats and American abuses of power. Hoping to

quell tension and curb violence between British forces and New Yorkers, the Committee

of Safety sought to preserve order. During summer 1775, British man-of-war, the Asia,

became a contentious symbol of imperial authority and when rowdy New Yorkers burned

one of the vessel’s smaller boats, New York City slid into disorder. Angered over the

disrespectful act of violence, New York City Mayor Whitehead Hicks appeared before

the Committee of Safety demanding its members instill order, since no other legitimate

government presently operated. Recognizing that the Committee of Safety represented

the only chance to save his city, Hicks informed its members that a fearful craftsman

refused to rebuild the boats unless the executive body ensured his safety.51 In response,

the Committee of Safety recommended civil magistrates investigate the matter and

implored inhabitants “to aid and assist” identifying the parties responsible for the wanton

                                                                                                               
50
The legislature also recognized the need to extract securities and to disarm the men to keep the peace.
JPCCS, 1:93.
51
JPCCS, 1:81. Hicks asked the Committee of Safety to issue a statement that it approved the carpenter’s
project. In spring 1775, to avoid violence, around 100 troops were evacuated from the garrison in New
York City to the Asia. Mayor of the City…, July 18, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 2:1792 and Mason, 77.

  64  
acts of destruction.52 Calling for the construction of new boats, the Committee of Safety

attempted to instill order but ultimately its actions failed to produce the desired effects as

angry inhabitants destroyed more vessels and continued to threaten carpenters who might

accept the position. Understandably frustrated, the Provincial Congress condemned

anyone who weakened the government’s authority as dangerous.53 The boat itself had

become a symbol, an affront to the revolutionary government’s ability to instill order.

New Yorkers quickly discovered that the Committee of Safety lacked the coercive power

to effectively police society. Its sheer determination to pursue the aggressors and

reconstruct the boat demonstrates the Committee of Safety’s struggle to obtain

legitimacy.54

When the New York Provincial Congress and Continental Congress received

intelligence detailing potential British invasions or attempts to restrict communication

and trade between New England and the south, effective measures needed to be

                                                                                                               
52
In early August 1775, the Provincial Congress ordered all men involved punished. Calling the aggressors,
violators of the Association, “disturbers of the public peace and enemies of their country,” it intended to
send a message regarding disorder. JPCCS, 1:98.
53
JPCCS, 1:108-109. On August 16, the city’s carpenters refused to construct a new boat due to death
threats. The Provincial Congress resolved that any person who threatened construction “ought to be
considered as factious, disorderly members of the community, and are guilty of a dangerous attempt to
destroy the authority of this Congress.” It then commissioned Henry Sheaf to build the barge while Colonel
Lasher protected it to prove “a few rash and restless individuals” could not threaten “our public safety.”
54
In late August, the Asia unleashed a three-hour assault on New York City. Causing minimal damages to
property and life, the attack was a warning to patriots following the removal of a cannon. British Captain
Vandeput ordered the firing after citizens and British soldiers exchanged shots. Denying any orders to fire
on the city, Vandeput accused the entire community of committing the offense. News of the attack spread
quickly, causing families to flee in terror. Given the ensuing panic, the Provincial Congress ordered to
“preserve peace” no one from the Asia be permitted to come ashore for provisions and it appointed
Abraham Lott and the Committee of Safety to aid the British. Letters from Captain Vendeput, of the Asia,
to the Mayor of New-York…, August 28, 1775 and Another Letter from New-York…, August 24, 1775,
AA, Series IV, 3:259-261; JPCCS, 1:126 and 346; and Mason 142.

  65  
adopted.55 Within New York, the Provincial Congress commissioned a committee to

recommend measures for defense, yet despite the legislature’s attempts to reassure the

population that their representatives remained in control, the colony faced a precipice.56

As the threat in New York increased, Washington notified the Committee of Safety he

sent General Charles Lee to aid the patriot leadership. However, the executive body was

not enthusiastic about the general’s arrival.

Fearing a loss of civil authority due to the impending arrival of American troops,

New York City’s inhabitants shared the Committee of Safety’s apprehension and worried

Lee might instigate aggressions.57 Recognizing New York’s apprehension about Lee’s

arrival, Washington stressed the imperative need to fortify Long Island.58 Unconvinced,

New York residents nervously collected their families and effects to flee the city.59

Empowered by the Provincial Congress to deal directly with Continental army officers,

the Committee of Safety warned Lee against aggressive tactics for fear of a British
                                                                                                               
55
JPCCS, 1:172. On November 1, 1775 rumors of a potential invasion on the eastern seashore included
burning towns down the coast and Governor Tryon leading a combined force of colonists and Indians
against any rebels who refused to bear arms for the King.
56
Suggestions included to gather supplies, ready troops, erect distress beacons, build a battery on the
Hudson River, and preserve inter-colonial communication. In response to potential invasions, the
Provincial Congress formed a committee to protect “the women and children in this city.” The Provincial
Congress also was involved in military preparations, raising troops, gathering supplies, and issuing
commissions and warrants for purchasers and suppliers. JPCCS, 1:185 and Mason, 184-190.
57
John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot? (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1951), 88-89 and 94. Sent to New York in January 1776, Lee considered local leaders as weak. Lee
to Washington, January 5, 1776, The Lee Papers Volume I, New-York Historical Society, Collections, Vol.
4 (New York: Printed for the Society, 1872), 234-236.
58
Brooklyn and Long Island were both strategic positions and fertile land. Due to Kings County residents’
inertia, the Provincial Congress demanded they provide wood and manpower for fortifications. Burrows,
24-25 and Henry R. Stiles, A History of the City of Brooklyn…, Volume I (Brooklyn, 1867), 246-247.
59
William Smith, Historical Memoirs, From 16 March 1763 to 9 July 1776 of William Smith: Historian of
the Province of New York Member of the Governor’s Council, and Last Chief Justice of that Province
under the Crown… ed. William H.W. Sabine, Volume I (New York: Colburn & Tegg, 1956), 259-260 and
Garish Harsin to William Radclift, February 13, 1776 in New York City during the American Revolution:
being a collection of original papers…, eds. Abraham Tomlinson et al. (New York: The Mercantile Library
Association, 1861), 85-87.

  66  
response.60 Thoroughly embracing that their charge to preserve inhabitants’ safety meant

avoiding aggressive military tactics, Committeemen recommended Lee’s troops remain

outside the city until he appeared before them.61 Lee, in turn, assured the Committee of

Safety that he intended only to prevent the British from seizing New York City and Long

Island. Attempting to assuage the executive body members, the general promised he

possessed no intentions of instigating violence, so long as the British refrained as well.62

Hesitantly agreeing, the Committee of Safety permitted Lee to bring three regiments into

the city, but, as we shall see, their presence would soon be a point of contention.63

Arriving outside New York City, Lee and the Committee of Safety once again

quarreled over who held jurisdiction over the military forces. Claiming supremacy, the

Committee of Safety previously enjoyed unchecked authority yet Lee’s presence

challenged this assumption.64 Arguing that it represented civil authority within New

York, the Committee of Safety vehemently attested that it accepted orders only from the

                                                                                                               
60
JPCCS, 1:258-259. Loyalists such as Jonathan Odell (Camillo Querno) hated Lee. Odell expressed
negative attitudes towards John Jay and other patriots referring to their ignorance, tyranny and traitorous
behavior. “See in committees Ignorance preside; Conventions met, and Folly was their guide.” Jonathan
Odell, “American Times,” in The Loyalist Poetry of the Revolution ed. Winthrop Sargent (Philadelphia,
1857), 3-4 and 29. The Committee desired Lee to demonstrate restraint as the city lacked enough powder
and no works were erected. Its attempts to procure powder had been unsuccessful.
61
The incident with Lee was not the only time the Committee of Safety aided the people’s welfare. In
December 1775, the Provincial Congress permitted the Committee of Safety “to apply £1000 to the relief of
New York City’s poor.” By March 1776, the Committee of Safety possessed the power “to remove the
poor” at the New York City alms-house to a safe place. JPCCS, 1:231; Petition of the Vestry of New York,
May 30, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 1, folder 10, petition 32:83, NYSA.
62
JPCCS, 1:266. Lee warned if the British provoked him, he “shall be the funeral pile of some of the best
friends.” He promised to enter the city with only a few men and to meet with patriot leaders.
63
Lee to the President of Congress, February 9, 1776 in The Lee Papers, 1:279. By the beginning of
February, Sir Henry Clinton also arrived in New York raising fears. Anxious of a potential outbreak of
violence, thousands of New Yorkers fled. Some New Yorkers would return, but not all of them. Mason and
Flick seem to agree that over half of New York City’s residents opposed the British, yet it is difficult to say
they supported independence. Mason, 78-79.
64
The Committee of Safety received two letters on February 1 stating that it did not posses unmitigated
powers over Continental forces.

  67  
Continental Congress, therefore Lee’s presence did not supersede it. Committee

members argued their “duty to their constituents to preserve their liberties, and prevent

any maneuver or accident that may endanger the safety of the city, or cause the removal

of inhabitants at this inclement season of the year” prevented them from allowing troops

in the city.65 Although it opposed Lee, the Committee of Safety found itself on weak

ground as the Continental Congress and others leaders disagreed with its demands.66

Unable to gain control over the army, the Committee of Safety refused to allow civil

authority to be trampled.

Lee’s presence convinced the Committee of Safety it must be mindful to protect

civil authority from the military, especially in regards to civilian arrests.67 When the

American military seized residents, such as Cumberland County clerk Samuel Gale, and

confined him in Connecticut barracks, New York’s leaders were horrified. Disgusted that

the military would arrest a resident without a trial or notifying the civil government, the

Provincial Congress chastised the “wanton act of military power, inconsistent with that

liberty for which the Colonists are contending.” As a citizen, Gale fell under the civil

government’s jurisdiction and the military’s actions severely undermined the Provincial

Congress and Committee of Safety’s power to enforce resolutions. More importantly,

New York’s Congress and Committee of Safety viewed themselves “essential to the

security of our constituents.”68 In response, Lee recognized he lacked the power to arrest

                                                                                                               
65
JPCCS, 1:279.
66
Mason, 207-208.
67
For an example of a Committee arrest warrant: In the Committee of Safety for Dutchess County, July 23,
1776 in Abbott Collection, Box 3, 387-391, NYSL.
68
The Provincial Congress of New York to Lee, March 6, 1776 in The Lee Papers, 1:349-350. Mincing no
words, the Provincial Congress conceded it would cooperate to ensure security, but not at the expense of its

  68  
and imprison citizens yet defended his methods. Arguing that Gale appeared dangerous

to the common cause, Lee broached a critical topic and questioned how he could defend

New York without apprehending disaffected persons. Unapologetically, he would accept

public complaint if it meant preserving security. Lee’s words, while controversial, would

later be accepted and become the basis for the Committee of Safety’s security state. The

Committee’s protest was centered not on whether alleged disaffected inhabitants should

be arrested on suspicion, but rather at whose command. Both New York’s Congress and

Committee of Safety saw themselves as responsible for policing civilians and believed

the military to be subservient to civil authority.69 After American General William

Alexander, known as Lord Stirling, detailed Gale’s case, the Provincial Congress ordered

him released because American forces arrested him without a hearing or trial.70 For his

                                                                                                               
authority “to protect the liberty and property of our constituents.” It also lambasted Lee for firing upon
inhabitants going to and from the city that he suspected of supplying the enemy. His actions ensued panic
and caused residents to question the cause. For his part, Lee ridiculed the notion of supplying the British,
making defending the city difficult. Alden, 99. While on the Asia, exiled loyalist John Tabor Kempe, New
York attorney general, wrote, “Skinner’s Welcome” in which he threatened the Asia would respond to
American aggressions, “Should vile whigs come here to plunder.” “Skinner’s Welcome” in Sargent, 62.
Other issues in March 1776 included a dearth of salt and rumors the British planned to send 60,000 troops.
JPCCS, 1:343 and 362.
69
Lee inquired about a similar case involving John Greg, accused of attempting to murder a sentinel. Lee’s
opinions on the disaffected were well documented. In a letter to the Provincial Congress, he argued, “When
the enemy is at our door, forms must be dispensed with…If I have done wrong, and I confess the
irregularity, I must submit myself to the shame…but I shall have the consciousness in my own breast that
the most pure motives of serving the public cause…have urged me.” JPCCS , 1:346-347 and Lee to the
Provincial Congress of New York, March 6, 1776 in The Lee Papers, 1:353.
70
New York’s civil government continued its complicated relationship with military figures when
American forces overstepped their jurisdiction. Daniel Whitehead Kissam, of the Great Neck and Cow
Neck Committee, informed the Provincial Congress that Colonel Isaac Sears arrived in Queens County
with armed men and harassed inhabitants, even Associators. Sears received his orders regarding extending
the test oath directly from Charles Lee. Despite the civil authority’s frustration, Sears reported to his
superiors his success claiming, “tories… swallowed the oath.” JPCCS, 1:354-355; and In the Provincial
Congress, March 7, 1776, Charles Lee to Congress, March 5, 1776, and Sears to Lee, March 7, 1776 in
Documents and Letters intended to illustrate the Revolutionary Incidents of Queens County… ed. Henry
Onderdonk Jr. (Leavitt, Trow and Company, 1846), 51-53. Notably, Sears served on the Committee of
Safety in 1775 as a representative from Tryon. Such treatment of equivocal persons was not isolated, as in
Westchester neutrality eventually was no longer an option. Sung Bok Kim, “The Limits of Politicization in

  69  
part, Gale did not sit idly by, but rather challenged the revolutionary government by

sending petitions and letters demanding habeas corpus. Astonished, he received neither

relief nor response. Like so many others he pondered, “I am strangely mistaken if it has

not, even heretofore, been looked upon as an essential right of a free people” to speak

your conscience.71

The Committee of Safety also became embroiled with Lee when he angered New

York’s leaders by issuing test oaths to ascertain inhabitants’ allegiance. Neither the New

York delegates who broached the topic nor the Committee of Safety itself possessed

moral scruples against forcing residents to publicly announce their loyalty, yet Lee’s

involvement troubled them. The delegates argued only the Provincial Congress or

Committee of Safety, as elected representatives, possessed such authority to extend oaths.

Patriot civil leaders declared, “There can be no liberty where the military is not

subordinate to the civil power in every thing not immediately connected with their

operations.”72 Stressing that public safety was inherently at risk if military figures

obtained too much power, the delegates knew oaths needed to be conducted by a civil

body. The disagreement over the issuing of oaths represented only one point of

contention between civil and military leaders. From that time on, all of New York’s

committees for public safety would engage in extensive initiatives to extend the oath to

citizens. However, the Committee of Safety did not only combat the American military,

but worked alongside it as well.

                                                                                                               
the American Revolution: The Experience of Westchester County, New York,” The Journal of American
History, Vol. 80, no. 3 (Dec., 1993), 872-873.
71
Gale even challenged authorities that if he was guilty of a crime, the punishment should at least be
prescribed by law and not arbitrary. He pondered if “some of my persecutors want to dip their hands in the
blood of a martyr?” Gale eventually took the oath and was discharged. JPCCS, 2:183-184.
72
JPCCS, 1:379.

  70  
 Unlike Lee, George Washington recognized the importance of working with the

Committee of Safety to curb the American military’s potential to harass residents and

provide stability during the war. Both Washington and the Committee of Safety

understood the problems arising from an undisciplined American military. Washington

even asked the Committee of Safety to regulate the “taverns and tipping houses” in New

York City, hoping to circumvent disaster by limiting the men’s chances to drink.

Similarly, when White Plains’ residents accused troops of debauchery and pillaging, the

Committee of Safety heard depositions. After investigating, it demanded Washington

punish the transgressors. Informing the general of its position the Committee of Safety

reiterated, “the presence of the army does not supersede the laws of the country.”73

No doubt sensing a growing tension between the Continental army and New

York’s civil leaders, Washington communicated frequently with the Committee of Safety

regarding the necessity of cooperating to prevent inhabitants’ illicit intercourse.74

Agreeing with Lee, Washington recognized the glaring problems stemming from

inhabitants communicating and supplying the enemy. Calling upon the Committee of

Safety to aid in eradicating this detrimental behavior, Washington understood the

Committee of Safety’s vital role. Mincing no words Washington stated,

                                                                                                               
73
This discussion took place in April 1776. JPCCS, 1:729 and 731-732.
74
In August 1775, Washington wrote New York’s leaders citing illicit trade and a potential attack. Illegal
trade and avarice not only undermined the cause but also harmed the community. While the New York
Committee of Safety lambasted New Jersey for poorly monitoring goods leaving the region, Washington
noted boats also left New York. With New York City a potential target, the Provincial Congress ordered
local committees to examine alleged illicit trading. However, at times New York’s government permitted
merchants and captains to export goods if they promised to return with necessities. For example, John
Foster propositioned the legislature to obtain military supplies. JPCCS, 1:101.

  71  
 It will certainly add great weight to the measures adopted, when the civil authority
cooperates with the military to carry them into execution. It will also redound
much to the honour of the government of your Committee in particular.75

The following day, the Committee of Safety responded, applauding Washington’s

consideration to civil authority and promised to cooperate with the military in the

future.76 The board also promised that any residents who engaged in illicit behavior

would find themselves labeled as enemies.

Even before both Washington’s letter and a notification from John Hancock

discussing the recent British act allowing the seizure of ships, the Committee of Safety

continued to increase its role executing resolutions and attempting to establish order.77

Tightening its control over the colony, the board issued its own resolution stating that no

inhabitant shall have any intercourse with British ships or officials. The Committee of

Safety also forbade inhabitants conducting commercial intercourse with Continental army

non-commissioned officers or troops unless the military figure produced a certificate by a

superior approving the transaction.78 Washington’s arrival in New York and strong

words helped stir the Committee members to respond.79 More importantly, these

resolutions, while specifically tailored to prevent provisions and intelligence from

                                                                                                               
75
JPCCS, 1:411-412.
76
When trouble arose again between the Committee of Safety and Washington over the command of
troops, the Committee quickly backed down, deferring to the general. However, the board also made
requests of him, such as asking him to remove provisions from threatened areas. The New York Committee
of Safety to George Washington, April 29, 1776, PGW; Hunt, 70; and JPCCS, 1:603.
77
JCC, 4:251. In response, that spring, the Continental Congress commissioned private ships, allowing
them to seize provisions intended for the enemy.
78
The Committee of Safety solicited recommendations and petitions regarding forming companies. By
reviewing and approving military organizing, the Committee of Safety consolidated power and gained
legitimacy at the local level. JPCCS, 1:382.
79
Around this same time Washington and the Committee of Safety discussed issues of jurisdiction during
which the executive body expressed deference. However, its poor recruiting came to light. Mason, 142-143
and JPCCS, 1:397 and 419-420.

  72  
entering enemy hands, demonstrated that New York’s executive not only held the power

to both issue and execute resolutions against dissent but also began taking preliminary

efforts to monitor the community.80

The September 1775 Resolutions: Transition from Propaganda to Monitoring

Inhabitants
In early 1775, an anonymous loyalist poem mourned the current situation in

Queens County. “No Yankee” watched in horror as suspected enemies found themselves

“advertise[d]” and their “doom” sealed.81 Likening committees’ lists to the

“proscriptions…[of] ancient Rome,” the narrator demanded justice but most likely did

not foresee what was to come. In July 1775, the patriot government’s official policy

stated that no inhabitants should harm loyalists or their property, as long as the alleged

enemies gave their word to take no action against the American cause, yet this leniency

would not last.82 As the war progressed, internal divisions became more pronounced by

fall 1775. Washington continuously reminded the Committee of Safety of the potentially

damning prospect of a divided colony.83 Representatives too believed it necessary to

establish clear parameters regarding “what is proper to be done with persons whose

                                                                                                               
80
For example, Joseph Blanchard and Peter Pullion were apprehended in May 1776, accused of
corresponding and supplying the British respectively. Both men claimed to support the American cause, yet
suspicion surrounded them. Witnesses stated Blanchard spoke ill of the American army’s chances,
possessed military papers, and reportedly spoke against the Committee and its resolutions. Pullion claimed
to be unaware of the resolutions forbidding intercourse with the British due to his remote housing. The
Committee of Safety discharged him with a warning, ordering him to help prevent illicit trade. JPCCS,
1:431-433. Other issues the Committee encountered included shortages and counterfeiting. The Committee
of Safety received information from Elisha Phelps that the army threatened mutiny if soldiers did not
receive flour. Phelps eventually procured flour, yet shortages persisted. After hearing of a counterfeiting
operation, the Committee of Safety dispatched Colonel Drake to interrogate and punish any one involved.
81
‘No Yankee,’ “O Tempora, O Mores,” in Documents and Letters Intended to Illustrate the Revolutionary
Incidents of Queens County, 21-22.
82
Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 53.
83
JPCCS, 2:107-108 and New York Committee of Safety to Washington, September 9, 1775, PGW.

  73  
conduct is inimical to this country.”84 The September 1 Resolutions commenced

immediately following the Asia’s assault on New York City and sought to punish with

jail time and disarmament anyone who might “assist and aid the ministerial army and

navy in their endeavours to carry into execution the cruel and oppressive acts of

parliament against the rights and liberties of the inhabitants.”85 Believing the situation

had turned dire, the Provincial Congress did not stop there. Realizing its next resolution

was necessary yet possibly disturbing, it broached the topic carefully. Assuring

inhabitants of its respect for “freedom of speech, the rights of conscience, and personal

liberty,” the Provincial Congress claimed these liberties depended upon the “general

security.” In the name of public safety therefore the Provincial Congress resolved,

                                                                                                               
84
JPCCS, 1:131. This meeting took place on September 1, 1775. The November 1775 elections were
muddled, as only 9/14 counties elected officials due to poor communication, factionalism, and other issues.
New Yorkers vehemently disagreed on tactics, legality, and reasons for the Revolution. Mason 114-116.
Arguably the most disaffected counties were Kings, Queens, and Richmond followed by Dutchess, Tryon,
and Westchester. Orange, Suffolk, and Ulster were patriot strongholds. For example in Suffolk, New
England Presbyterian ministers propelled their neighbors to join the cause. Although some still opposed the
Revolution, especially in Brookhaven. Letter from the Committee of Brookhaven to the Provincial
Congress of New-York…, August 3, 1775 and Committee on a Letter from the Committee of
Brookhaven…, August 8, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:16 and 527; Countryman, A People in Revolution, 103-
104; Meeting of the Inhabitants of South Haven, June 13, 1774 in Revolutionary Incidents of Suffolk and
Kings Counties… ed. Henry Onderdonk (New York: Leavitt & Company, 1849) 13-16; and John G. Staudt,
“Suffolk County,” in The Other New York, 65-66.
85
September marked the beginning of the Committee of Safety’s second sitting, continuing until October
1775. It received the same powers plus the authority to commission officers appointed by county
committees, direct the militia, and issue paper currency. The September 1 Resolutions called for disarming
and fining any inhabitant guilty of aiding the enemy. The accused could be imprisoned for up to three
months, while the second offence was a possible seven-year banishment. After the incident with the Asia,
the Provincial Congress adopted stricter policies towards disaffection. First, it resolved that no boats could
leave the colony without it or the Committee of Safety’s permission. Second, a committee of six would
investigate internal divisions and designated those accused of disaffection as dangerous. The September 1
Resolutions were the product of this committee’s endeavors. The vessel permit included an oath, for both
the owner and master, to ship to an accepted destination. Flick recognized the September 1 Resolutions
represented a transition in how the government treated disaffection. Flick, The American Revolution in New
York, 208-211. Days after the Asia episode, the Provincial Congress ordered Colonel Lasher to seize a
sloop and apprehend the crew accused of trading with the enemy. At the end of August, the legislature
began issuing passes to inhabitants to ship goods from the colony. Bernard Mason recognized the gravity of
the September Resolutions, but disregarded the Committee’s role as it allowed local committee to handle
some cases and only volunteered to step in if needed. Mason omitted Alexander McDougall’s anxiety when
the Congress did not call a Committee of Safety later that year. JPCCS, 1:135-136. For more on the Asia’s
attack and Mason’s interpretation of the September 1 Resolutions see: Mason, 105-106 and 111-112.

  74  
 if any person or persons shall oppose or deny the authority of the Continental or
of this Congress, or the Committee of Safety, or [local committees]… or dissuade
any person or persons from obeying the recommendations of the Continental or
this Congress, or the Committee of Safety…[he or she] shall [be] disarmed.86

Citing public security as imperative, revolutionary leaders believed individual rights must

be sacrificed to ensure unity and safety. During a revolution, even one based on liberties,

opposition could not be tolerated. Recognizing potential threats, the Provincial Congress

ordered local militias to police communities and apprehend residents who aided the

enemy or uttered dissent.87 Just before adjourning, it also passed coercive and

intimidating resolutions, thus leaving the Committee of Safety with immense and vague

powers.88 On its first day operating under the September 1 Resolutions, some

Committeemen embraced their new mandate but not all members seemed as enthusiastic

of such unprecedented authority. A few patriots recognized that disarming suspicious or

neutral citizens risked alienating and transforming them into active loyalists.89 Most

reservations were brushed aside as the Committee of Safety seized the colony’s future.

                                                                                                               
86
JPCCS, 1:132. A second offense resulted in confinement at the offenders’ expense. The Provincial
Congress hoped policing would be left to the local institutions, yet acknowledged if these officials could
not handle the situation, it or Committee of Safety would step in.
87
Those caught enlisting for the enemy risked losing their real and personal property. Yet, the Provincial
Congress claimed any suspicious individuals would be treated with justice and notified of charges. Accused
persons, such as Peter Van Schaack, argued this was not the case.
88
Clearly measures were needed. For example, in Tryon County, sheriff and Johnson associate Alexander
White’s inimical behavior caused the local committee to confine him. Letter from General Schuyler to
Albany Committee, August 11, 1775 and Extract of a Letter dated Crown Point, August 14, 1775, August
14, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:86, and 136. For a soldier’s perspective on Tryon County see: Mark E. Lender
and James Kirby Martin eds., Citizen Soldier: The Revolutionary War Journal of Joseph Bloomfield
(Newark: New Jersey Historical Society, 1982), 47-56.
89
Joseph Tiedemann, “Queens County,” in The Other New York, 48. In Hempstead, residents complained
of abuses suffered at the hands Charles Lee. Letter from General Lee to the President of Congress, March
5, 1776 and Letter from General Lee to Colonel Sears, March 5, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 5:74-75. For more
on loyalists and their numbers see: Mason, 64-65 and 92-95.

  75  
Despite previous struggles, some New Yorkers understood the Committee of Safety’s

apparently limitless powers, referring to its members as “Demagogues.”90

Almost immediately, the Committee of Safety called for non-associators, those

who refrained or refused to sign the Association, to be disarmed by force if necessary. If

a resident refused, the Committee urged to “repel force by force, and take into custody

such persons or persons, so resisting, and cause him or them to be brought before” it or

the Provincial Congress.91 In Queens County, local patriot leaders soon met resistance

from boisterous residents. One man in particular refuted the Committee of Safety’s

orders on the grounds it was “an unconstitutional body” though expressed his willingness

to comply if the Continental Congress called for such a mandate.92 Similarly, the

Committee of Safety ordered some residents, such as Mordecai Lester of Dutchess

County, to be apprehended for “misdemeanors against the liberties of America.”93 While

it is not clear why, three Committee members disagreed with this order. Perhaps these

men questioned the board’s legitimacy. Or, perhaps the dissenters believed they

themselves lacked sufficient evidence to apprehend Lester or feared the frightening

repercussions of creating such a heavily monitored society in which a powerful

                                                                                                               
90
Smith, Volume I, 254.
91
This order came on September 16. Arms would be turned over to troops who did not posses ones. For
example, General Phillip Schuyler disarmed Tryon County inhabitants. Although New York’s Congress
later disapproved of the Committee of Safety’s disarming of non-associators, the Continental Congress
endorsed such measures in March 1776. Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 211. Arms Fit for
the Use of the Troops, September 9, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:898 and Resolutions of the Committee of
Safety, October 24, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:1303. Many counties refused to comply and threatened to
retaliate. For examples of the Committee of Safety’s earlier efforts such as confiscating letters, observing
inhabitants on parole, and communicating with the other colonies see: Letter to the Committee of Safety for
New-Jersey, September 27, 1775, AA, Series IV, 3:912-913.
92
District of Great Neck, Cow Neck, March 9, 1776 in Documents and Letters Intended to Illustrate the
Revolutionary Incidents of Queens County, 49.
93
JPCCS, 1:133. The Hudson Valley included some of the best farmlands in America. Wermuth, 128.

  76  
governmental institution lacking oversight openly questioned loyalties.94 Any hesitancy

or reluctance soon disappeared under the immense strains caused by the war and the

Committee of Safety commenced monitoring the population and apprehending suspects.

By December 1775, the Provincial Congress held power over New York City’s night

watch, strengthening its surveillance efforts.95 As news of the disarming and

apprehension of enemies spread, loyalists did not remain passive.96 Therefore to meet the

demands for order, the Committee of Safety required additional powers to combat

internal enemies.

In examining the Committee of Safety’s actions and measures from September 4

to October 2, there is a noticeable enhancement in the board’s operation. This alteration

is especially evident as the increasingly powerful board accepted the September 1

Resolutions as a mandate to enforce a coercive and intrusive policy against subversives.97

One of the Committee of Safety’s first actions involved extensive questioning of

inhabitants’ loyalties, something that had previously not occurred. The executive body

decided to actively pursue Quakers in the city and county of New York and compiled

lists of residents who signed or refused the Association. Officials were also to identify

                                                                                                               
94
Lester appeared before the Provincial Congress at his own request, yet it viewed him as “inimical to the
liberties of this country.” After he promised to obey the laws, the Provincial Congress permitted Lester to
remain in Dutchess County and demanded inhabitants treat him fairly. JPCCS, 1:185.
95
Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 44. By the end of 1775, the Committee appointed George
Clinton Brigadier General. Clinton and the executive body worked together throughout the war. E. Wilder
Spaulding, His Excellency George Clinton: Critic of the Constitution (New York: MacMillian Company,
1938), 52-55 and 66 and John P. Kaminski, George Clinton: Yeoman Politician of the New Republic
(Madison: Madison House, 1993), 23-27.
96
Jones, 1:307-308. By May 1776 places such as Kings County ceased holding elections. Burrows, 24.
97
The Committee of Safety also aggressively pursued supplies in September searching New York City for
spare arms, examining the colony’s lead mines, and initiating an arms manufactory. JPCCS, 1:138, 142,
and 148.

  77  
the Quakers in each county.98 Already versed in creating lists, this act was different as

now the Committee of Safety solicited a record of all Quaker males between ages sixteen

and sixty-five, believing it necessary to assess the number of religious dissenters who

refused to bear arms or recognize the revolutionary government’s legitimacy. The

Quaker community, citing their religious principles, refused to comply.99 Refraining

from immediate action against the Quakers’ brash denial of executive authority, New

York’s leaders likely remembered their insolent behavior as the pacifists received poor

treatment after New York declared independence when later committees for public safety

targeted Quakers as possessing equivocal loyalties.100

As the Committee of Safety transformed into a more effective police force,

members understood that the board evolved into a powerful institution capable of leading

the Revolution. In a letter to Washington, the executive body agreed with the general’s

assertion that the colony faced dangerous times, but assured him of its readiness to

lead.101 From mid-to-late September 1775, the Committee of Safety actively sought to

procure firearms for an army nearly void of weapons. When buying weapons proved

                                                                                                               
98
Association in Suffolk County, May 1775 in CHMNY, 1:50-53.
99
JPCCS, 1:148. Queens County also contained many Quakers who refused to join the patriot cause,
proving at times, patriot propaganda was unsuccessful. Joseph S. Tiedemann, “Communities in the Midst
of the American Revolution, Queens County, New York, 1774-1775,” Journal of Social History, Vol. 18,
no. 1 (Autumn, 1984), 65 and Tiedemann, “Queens County,” 47-48.
100
Charles Lee held a special malice for Quakers, bemoaning they “enjoy all the blessings of liberty
without contributing a single mite towards the acquiring or preservation of that blessing.” Lee to John
Adams, October 5, 1775, The Lee Papers, 1:210. Crèvecoeur’s “Landscapes” also examined Quakers’
treatment. Crèvecoeur, 298-302 and Richards, 283.
101
The Committee declared, “[There are] instances of avarice…[that] call for severe scrutiny and
exemplary punishment. Be assured, sir, that we are vigilant for the discovery of such deliquents; and that
those who may fall in our way will not escape their just deserts.” JPCCS, 1:143. Similarly, the Committee
of Safety endorsed the Cambridge, Hosac, and Bennington local committee’s resolve to assert civil law
after violence erupted over a private disagreement leaving one man wounded and another dead.

  78  
insufficient, it contended, “the only method remaining is to impress arms.”102 Displaying

another power, the Committee of Safety ordered that anyone who did not sign the

Association must turn over their firearms. The controversial act did not mean the

Committee of Safety simply confiscated guns, but rather appraised each weapon and

delivered the owner a receipt. If any non-associators refused to comply, the impressers

could respond with force, arresting anyone who opposed the government’s designs for

security.103 The Committee of Safety agreed to disarm potentially disaffected residents,

yet much to the chagrin of the American military, it wanted to delay confiscation until it

received more information on the situation.104 Meeting resistance often, American Major

William Williams reported that Jamaica and Hempstead inhabitants had hidden their best

weapons. Other residents blatantly denied the validity of Provincial Congress’

measures.105 Neatly divided between patriots in the north and loyalists in the south,

                                                                                                               
102
The Committee devised a system designating a place for impressments and appraisals in each county.
See JPCCS, 1:149-150. In September, poor New York inhabitants petitioned the legislature to be permitted
not to take up arms. Petition of Sundry Persons of New-York, September 9, 1775 in CHMNY, 1:139.
103
JPCSC, Volume I, 156. On September 25, while collecting arms in Jamaica, Abraham Skinner notified
the executive body that he believed opposition would rear itself. In response, the Committee of Safety sent
Egbert Benson to investigate.
104
Mason argued that the Committee of Safety displayed hesitancy while disarming Queens County by
suggesting that McDougall wait for more information from Major William Williams. While Mason
correctly noted military officials’ anger at New York’s inertia, he disregarded later measures. Mason also
selected a few examples to display the Committee of Safety as ineffective in military endeavors such as
when it did not respond to letters detailing Tryon’s movements or militia enlistments. Again, while true,
these examples do not characterize its entire existence. Of course it is fair to note, New Yorkers complained
at times about their leaders’ tentative behavior. Mason, 108-109 and 111-113.
105
The Provincial Congress already realized Queens County residents armed themselves for a struggle and
after Colonel Heard deployed excessive force to arrest residents, the Continental Congress ordered him to
leave. JCC, IV:150. Heard’s exploits forever demonized him in poetry. “Col. Heard has come to town/In all
his pride and glory/And when he dies he’ll go to Hell/For robbing of the Tory.” Onderonk Jr., Documents
and Letters Intended to Illustrate the Revolutionary Incidents of Queens County, 48. Some 27 Queens
County residents were jailed, while Heard disarmed around 600 residents and brought 19 ringleaders before
the Continental Congress in February 1776. Later on, several confined people petitioned the Provincial
Congress for release or parole. Petition of Sundry Tories of Queens County, February 12, 1776 in
NYPCCSP, Box 1, folder 10, petition 32:89a, NYSA.

  79  
Hempstead’s inimical residents displayed their brashness publicly marching through the

streets and firing their weapons in a sign of opposition.106 Still facing issues of

legitimacy, New York’s government refused to accept such gross insubordination. Well

into March 1776, the Provincial Congress condoned more arrests and “Tory Hunting

Parties” in areas such as Queens County, regions ripe with disaffection.107 From 1774 to

1776, many Queens’s residents chose no side in the struggle.108 Hard-handed tactics such

as apprehensions demonstrated that winning the residents’ hearts and minds might not be

possible. Arbitrary and necessary arrests soon led to filled jails in New York City. By

this point, New York’s patriots only hoped to repress subversion.109

During this period, the Committee of Safety also increased monitoring

inhabitants, their movements, and political leanings. All aspects of life were affected.

Inhabitants, such as William Tillou, had to petition the Committee of Safety to travel to

Dutchess County in attempt to find work.110 As the Revolution progressed, the executive

body began apprehending, summoning, and interrogating increased numbers of

inhabitants. Some alleged enemies, such as Captain Isaac L. Winn, found themselves
                                                                                                               
106
Tiedemann, “Queens County,” 45.
107
In 1775 alone, Queens County loyalists refuted their local committee’s resolutions. Loyalist poetry also
lambasted patriot coercion. In “O Tempora! O Mores!” the narrator bemoaned “In blood of villains, who, to
show their hate/ Of kingly rule, try to unhinge the state.” ‘No Yankee,’ “O Tempora! O Mores!,” in
Documents and Letters intended to illustrate the Revolutionary Incidents of Queens County, 20-21.
108
In 1775, only 12% of the population declared themselves loyal to the Americans and 26.8% to the
British. In Queens, historian Joseph Tiedemann referred to the struggle as a small civil war, where local
issues, not imperial ones, dominated. Tiedemann, “Queens County,” 44.
109
Tiedemann suggested Howe ordered loyalists to lay low to deceive patriots. Therefore, repressive patriot
efforts are hard to gauge. Such an argument is difficult to prove, yet either way, Queens County loyalists
employed propaganda to sway neutrals. Joseph S. Tiedemann, “A Revolution Foiled: Queens County, New
York 1775-1776,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 75, no. 2 (September, 1988), 430-43.
110
William Tillou, June 8, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 1, folder 3, petition 32:19 NYSA. These petitions along
with many of the original manuscripts of New York’s Provincial Congress, Committee and Council of
Safety are badly burned and at times illegible.

  80  
before the Committee of Safety’s watchful eye due to suspicions that he supplied the

British military. Winn, sensing his precarious position, solicited an audience before the

executive. Unlike the incident regarding the Asia when inhabitants directly disobeyed

and undermined the government’s legitimacy, Winn recognized the Committee of

Safety’s authority. After the executive cleared him of any wrongdoing, Winn wisely

requested a certificate proving to the community the Committee of Safety affirmed his

affection to the American Cause.111 Although it provided Winn with documentation of

his innocence, its members continued to open and examine his letters, reflecting lingering

suspicion and intimidation. Once suspected, it seemed the stigma of disloyalty

remained.112 Some residents desperately pleaded with the government to clear their

names, knowing that their businesses and lives would suffer immensely.113

By the end of 1775, New York faced daunting internal disturbances and external

threats and the Provincial Congress responded by extending the Committee of Safety’s

powers.114 On December 15, a legislative subcommittee recommended that the

Committee of Safety receive increased authority, including transforming it into a

                                                                                                               
111
JPCCS, 1:141. Winn mentioned that newspapers lied about his loyalty.
112
Men like Mangle Minthorne, when praying to be allowed back into the community, even cited the
“stigma” they received when listed as an enemy. Petition of Mangle Minthorne, June 13, 1776 in
NYPCCSP, Box 1, folder 4, petition 32:27, NYSA and JPCCS, 1:492.
113
Petition of John Fowler January 28, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 3, folder 4, petition 32:234, NYSA. John
Fowler kept a public house and it seems he implied the government might have either shut it down or asked
residents not attend because it feared he would pollute minds.
114
In November 1775, as the Provincial Congress adjourned, news of a plot in Westchester to assault and
kidnap revolutionary leaders sparked anxiety. Westchester’s local committee feared it could not handle
such numbers of armed disaffected inhabitants. Terrified residents reported men stalking in the night. The
Provincial Congress suggested the local committee investigate, protect inhabitants and, only if
overwhelmed, would the legislature aid. Additional reports of disorder included enemy recruiting and
communication in Dutchess County as well as sedition. Upon receiving such information, the Committee of
Safety generally acted quickly, seizing private property rather than allow the enemy to possess it. JPCCS,
1:188-189, 193-194, 215-216, and 219-220.

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permanent body endowed with greater jurisdiction.115 Imbuing its executive with the

authority to curb illicit trade and communication, the Provincial Congress hoped to

circumvent enemy recruiting, weed out sedition, and eradicate all threats to security. To

accomplish this imposing list of orders, the legislature realized the Committee of Safety

needed to administer effectively and thus permitted it to operate secretly and to seize

control of New York in an emergency.116 The legislative body even insisted the

Committee of Safety “purchase, and secure… as much pitch, tar, and turpentine as the

said committee may think necessary for the public use and public safety.”117 Although

these supplies are necessary for naval stores, the Committee of Safety’s critics had a hard

time believing the executive body did not have a hand in mob violence. Unfazed by such

accusations, the executive recognized, based on petitions, disaffection continued to

corrupt the minds of potentially loyal inhabitants.118 Therefore, its members knew they

required greater means to combat such detrimental influence.

Officially possessing the executive power to “take up and examine persons

suspected to have broken the resolutions” of either congresses, the Committee of Safety
                                                                                                               
115
The Provincial Congress reaffirmed many of the Committee’s powers such as delivering militia
commissions, administering funds (even for “secret services”), directing Continental forces, procuring
military supplies, summoning the legislature, and settling accounts with the Continental Congress. Days
later, the legislature ordered the Committee to print all of Parliament’s acts that harmed America and
provide “remarks…they may think useful to inform the people” to construct a consensus for its authority.
New York’s Congress also bestowed upon the Committee the power to handle military stores and purchase
arms, draft and apply Treasury notes under £5,000 (the board could spend money legislators did not
previously approve), keep a journal, settle accounts, dispense money on credit, and oversee elections.
JPCCS, 1:222-225.
116
One of the Committee of Safety’s more dramatic cases operating under secrecy involved an extensive
investigation of spiked canons in Westchester. Beginning in January 1776, the Committee examined at
least 15 men, the most inimical were placed in irons and jailed. JPCCS, 1:261, 264, and 272. “Petition
Isaac Young” June 1, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 5, folder 9, petition 33:188 NYSA.
117
JPCCS, 1:232. Although Flick noted this probable connection to violence, he insisted the Committee of
Safety acted fairly. Flick, “The Loyalists,” 345-346.
118
Petition of Thomas Place January 3, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 3, folder 10, petition 32:294a, NYSA.

  82  
also was permitted to operate in secrecy “for the public safety.”119 Not only was the

public unaware of operations and methods, but the legislature knowingly allowed itself to

be kept the dark as well. If New York faced impending danger and the Committee of

Safety believed secrecy vital to prevent disaster, then public security trumped all.

Extreme military command, emergency powers, the ability to execute resolutions, the

authority to apprehend and interrogate inhabitants, and the lack of any real transparency,

created the foundations for a security state in early America. With the Committee of

Safety’s powers ever growing, the Provincial Congress confidently adjourned, leaving the

Revolution’s fate in the hands of a small institution with exceptionally undemocratic

powers and little to no oversight or transparency.

Facing mounting problems throughout the colony, the Provincial Congress not

only willingly placed the Committee of Safety in charge of the government but also

needed the executive body to efficiently intimidate the population. New York’s leaders,

such as Continental Congress member John Jay, agreed. With the legislature adjourned,

Jay reiterated the Committee of Safety was imperative to New York’s success. Across

the colony, patriots faced significant challenges to their authority. For example, in

Queens County the Asia supplied disaffected residents with weapons.120 Weapons

shipments most likely happened multiple times, thus empowering British

sympathizers.121 Alarmed, the Provincial Congress decreed that disloyal behavior could

                                                                                                               
119
JPCSC, Volume I, 222. Similarly, in 1775 the Schenectady Committee refused Daniel Campbell’s
removal of powder and instead forced him to sell it for the good of his neighbor’s protection. James
Sullivan ed., Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence, 1775-1778 and Minutes of the
Schenectady Committee, 1775-1779, Volume II (University of the State of New York, 1925), 1010.
120
John Jay to Colonel McDougall, December 23, 1775, The Correspondence and Public Papers of John
Jay, ed. Henry P. Johnston, Volume I, 1763-1781 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890), 40.
121
Two counties ripe with disaffection, Queens and Richmond, also lacked representatives on the
Provincial Congress. Over 734 residents were published as non-associators. In 1776, Queens County

  83  
no longer be tolerated and, since the county openly disrespected governmental authority,

it deemed the region delinquent and placed them outside “the protection of this

Congress.”122 Being placed outside the Provincial Congress’ protection meant these

regions were economically shunned and the legislature permitted the Committee of

Safety to confront disaffection with armed men, if necessary.123 Essentially, the

legislature and Committee of Safety dictated and regulated the American community.

Those who did not immediately conform to the Committee’s strict sense of acceptable

behavior, found themselves increasingly monitored and coerced. To ensure that the

Committee of Safety could operate effectively to meet mounting pressures, the legislature

resolved to further curb inhabitants’ movements and required any persons entering the

colony to receive a certificate from a revolutionary committee, proving their loyalty.124

                                                                                                               
comprised Newtown, Flushing, Jamaica, Hempstead, and Oyster Bay, approximately 11,000 people.
Although more people supported the British than the American Cause, many inhabitants sought neutrality.
Unlike in Kings County, Queens’ residents were divided along religious line, pitting Anglicans against
Presbyterians. The issue of representation on the Provincial Congress plagued Queens throughout 1775.
Many residents were apolitical until 1776 when Jamaica and Flushing did not support the American cause.
Richmond County occupied the area presently known as Staten Island and was comprised of mostly middle
class prosperous farmers who traded domestically, largely with New York City, Perth Amboy and
Elizabethtown. With many Anglicans, connections to New York City, and a defenseless state, Richmond
leaned towards the British yet inhabitants’ religion determined allegiance. New Jersey committees
distrusted the area and threaten to cut off trade. Tiedemann, “Queens County” and Papas, 43-46, 49 and 83-
86; and List of the Voters in Queen’s County…, November 7, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:1389.
122
The inhabitants refused to appear. JPCCS, 1:229-230. By January 1776, the entire county was nearly
disarmed. Flick, Loyalism, 90. Richmond County, also guilty of not electing representatives, received 15
days to send to Congress a list of offenders or the entire county would be considered delinquent. The names
would be published so the community would know whom to ostracize. However, the Provincial Congress
questioned if any potential representatives could be trusted.
123
Several regions were disarmed. The Continental Congress ordered Long Island residents disarmed. In
April 1776, the Committee of Safety ordered the local board in Albany to disarm residents and it was
completed by May. Flick, “The Loyalists,” 339.
124
JPCCS, 1:232. The Provincial Congress believed many disaffected people entered the colony and such
certificates would limit their influence. Some local committees refused entry into their towns without a
credible pass. The Great Cow and Great Neck District Committee feared that too many suspected persons
entered their “good and virtuous” community and threatened the “public good.” Committee for the District
of Great Neck, Cow Neck, etc, March 18, 1776 in Documents and Letters Intended to Illustrate the
Revolutionary Incidents of Queens County, 53-54. At this time, the Committee of Safety also received

  84  
Both measures sought to prevent illicit communication and assuage residents’ anxiety.

Claiming to restrict inhabitants’ rights for their own good, the legislature stymied

liberties to ensure conformity.

After the Provincial Congress enhanced the Committee of Safety, the executive

body received petitions both calling for mercy and admonishing tyranny. Led by

chairman Pierre Van Cortlandt, the Committee busily prepared defensive measures,

secured powder, enlisted men, and obtained supplies. Yet internal enemies caught the

Committee’s steady eye.125 No sooner had the Committee commenced than it received

the fruits of its labor in the insurgent Queens County.126 Recognizing the Committee of

Safety’s growing power, two residents, Thomas Place and Gabriel Van Cott, appealed for

mercy. Place admitted fault in opposing the election of representatives, and thus

damaging governmental legitimacy, claiming licentious men swayed him. Satisfied with

the petitions, the Committee took pleasure convincing inhabitants “of their demerits, and

bring them to a just sense of their duty to the public.”127 Concerned family members also

petitioned for the release of loved ones. Claiming their willingness to provide securities

                                                                                                               
£50,000 for “defence and security.” New York City leaders petitioned the Committee of Safety to
reprimand unruly inhabitants who threatened order by firing at British vessels. Petition of Town Major
Leary, January 16, 1776 in CHMNY, 1:214. For an example of a certificate proving an inhabitant accepted
an oath see: James Grant, November 30, 1776 in Abbott Collection, Box 3, 346 NYSL.
125
Americans recently learned King George, who previously declared the colonies in a state of rebellion,
issued orders for the suppression of all insurgents. Mason, 100. Mason noted while weak in 1775, by the
time new policies against the disaffected began achieving success in early 1776, the revolutionary
government consolidated power. However, he did not credit the Committee of Safety.
126
The Provincial Congress eventually allowed Queens and Richmond County back into the patriotic fold
after they admitted fault for not electing representatives and proved enough residents signed the
Association. JPCCS, 1:294, 300-301, and 311.
127
JPCCS, 1:237. Place promised to behave if the Committee restored him. There is no record of Van
Cott’s petition, but is said to be similar. In January 1776, 462 Queens County residents signed a declaration
to follow congressional resolutions and to refrain aiding the enemy. Declaration Signed by Sundry
Inhabitants of Queens County, New York, January 19, 1776 in CHMNY, 1:215-217.

  85  
and even monitor their own families’ loyalties and future actions, residents took notice of

the Committee’s power. Others, such as Timothy Doughty and Christian Bergh, begged

for mercy after spending weeks confined despite the lack of evidence. Starving and

suffering residents plead, the Committee “to hear our Cry” or else surely they would die.

By restoring men, the Committee assured New Yorkers it possessed the power to inflict

punishment and to forgive.128 Although the Committee of Safety displayed leniency, this

demonstration was a sign of power, not weakness. Of course, not all inhabitants sought

redemption, as many disaffected persons maintained their staunch opinions against the

Revolution. Reverend Samuel Seabury, for one, claimed the congress and committees

had “introduced a system of the most oppressive tyranny that can possibly be imagined; -

a tyranny, not only over the actions, but over the words, thoughts, and wills, of the good

people of this province.”129 Committees viewed his opinions and other like-minded men,

as toxic. Seeking to instill conformity as well as meet demands for security, the

Committee of Safety embraced its undemocratic and intrusive measures.

                                                                                                               
128
While sick in jail, Doughty and Bergh’s families suffered greatly as the government seized their
property. Petition of Timothy Doughty, Christian Bergh and other Prisoners, September 22 and 25, 1775 in
CHMNY, 1:153-154 and 156. Others too petitioned starving and ill. They claimed due to the lack of space
“but one part of us Can Lay down at a time.” Petition of Elnathan Foster and others, Kingston Goal in C.M.
Woolsey, History of the Town of Marlborough Ulster County, New York: From its Earliest Discovery
(Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, Printers, 1908), 142; and John Graham to the Committee of Safety, January
26, 1776 and Petition of Margaret Graham, February 7, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 2, folder 4, 32:139,
NYSA.
129
Samuel Seabury, “An Alarm to the Legislature…” January 17, 1775 in Letters of a Westchester Farmer
(White Plains: Westchester County Historical Society, 1930), 155. In November 1775, armed men from
Connecticut seized Seabury at his Westchester home, dragged him out of state and imprisoned him. While
imprisoned he could not speak with his friends, pray, perform his sacred office, and patriots read his letters.
Denying most accusations against him, he bemoaned his liberties trampled and how his family suffered.
The armed men latter destroyed Rivington’s press. E. Edwards Beardsley, Life and Correspondence of
Samuel Seabury, D.D…(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1881), 36-42; Judd, “Westchester
County,” in The Other New York, 112-113; and Mason, 56-59.

  86  
 The Committee of Safety not only forced coercive measures on the population,

but also responded to inhabitants’ demands for security and intense policing of residents.

When reports from Cumberland County, a region thought devoutly patriotic, suffered

from internal divisions causing militia delays and shortages, the executive body

commenced a month long investigation into alleged inimical persons.130 In January 1776,

the Committee of Safety issued apprehension orders for suspected enemies and

responded to the inhabitants’ demands for order. New York had become the scene of

immense civil strife, evidenced by cases such as Thomas Merrit. New York residents

apprehended Merrit, whom they deemed dangerous, and charged him with withholding

knowledge of who supplied bullets to the disaffected.131 Although the Committee of

Safety did not cave into mob rule, it strictly disciplined then discharged Merrit with a

warning for his future behavior.132 Throughout early 1776, the Committee issued more

apprehension orders and continued monitoring behavior more regularly than before.

Many of those who appeared before it found themselves discharged, but some like

William Weyman were confined. Upon Weyman’s release back into society, the

Committee of Safety again solicited the local communities’ aid by recommending to “all

                                                                                                               
130
JPCCS, 1:242. The Committee of Safety sent Cumberland County a letter on January 9, to terminate
dissent for “your own welfare and happiness.”
131
JPCCS, 1:241-242 and 247. On January 9, the Committee of Safety called for the arrest of Lawrence
Hartwick, accused of aiding the British capture a Continental officer. It also received affidavits against
Samuel Devine, claiming he condemned Congress, declared the whigs would be hung by spring, allegedly
threatened to pay for the capture of committeemen and refused to muster.
132
In The Patriots of North-America, loyalist poet Reverend Myles Cooper stated, whigs were “men
deprav’d…without Remorse, or Shame, or Fear…Seduc’d, alas! by fond Applause; of gaping Mobs.” He
specifically cited the foolish and abusive committeemen as well as violence that ensued. Cooper, 3.

  87  
friends to liberty and their country to keep a watchful eye on his future conduct.”133

Surveillance had limited results because, despite the Committee’s power, no efficient

enforcement system was yet in place. Discharging many residents with a strict warning,

some men, like Azor Betts, were deemed too dangerous to be permitted their freedom.

Unlike those who supplied or supported the British, Betts’ crime was less

pronounced but equally as offensive to security. Claiming that some revolutionary

leaders sought their own aggrandizement over their country’s betterment, Betts’ words

damned him. Such claims directly harmed the Committee’s goal of public security.

Even though Betts had not taken up arms against the colony, the Committee of Safety

confined him. By no means a loyalist, it still considered Betts disaffected to the cause.134

His point of contention was not the Revolution but the fact that the Provincial Congress

forbade smallpox inoculations, his livelihood. Considering him as a security threat since

he undermined governmental legitimacy, the Committee of Safety cared little that his

complaint stemmed from economic hardship. Inoculation potentially limited able-bodied

men from military service, thus the board deemed his activity as a threat to public safety.

Further damaging his case, Betts bombastically damned the Congress and its resolutions.

Viewing his behavior dangerous to the cause and opinions a public nuisance, the

Committee of Safety curbed his influence.

Even supporters of the rebel cause could find themselves at odds with the

increasingly powerful Committee of Safety for voicing their opinions or questioning

                                                                                                               
133
JPCCS, 1:248. Weyman, of Westchester County, admitted fault and was confined for providing
necessities to the Asia. He apologized and agreed to behave accordingly in the future. In Westchester,
loyalists armed themselves by 1775. Kim, 874.
134
JPCCS, 1:248-249. Betts believed not all members were corrupt. Eventually, he was released after
signing the Association and was forced to accept £200 recognizance for his future good behavior. See also
Petition of Azor Betts, June 14, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 1, folder 4, petition 32:29, NYSA.

  88  
governmental initiatives. After problems arose between James Livingston and

shipwrights contracted by the Continental Congress, the Committee of Safety stepped in

to resolve the issue. Workers had used a plot of Livingston’s land to construct vessels

and though he permitted public use of his private property, Livingston requested an order

from the Provincial Congress or Committee of Safety condoning the work. Obliging

Livingston, the Committee wrote, “Though neither the Continental or Provincial

Congress would choose to possess themselves of any man’s property against his

will…your refusal to comply with the request above mentioned will render you

obnoxious to all the friends of liberty.”135 Mincing no words, not even with patriots, the

Committee of safety’s tone was definitive and aggressive. If Livingston or others refused

to comply with, or even questioned, its orders, they too could find themselves labeled as

potential enemies. Neither weak nor hesitant, the Committee of Safety targeted men like

Betts and Livingston for questioning its actions. Neither man raised arms against the

Revolution, yet both represented a threat to the now incredibly powerful Committee of

Safety. As the Committee grew stronger it also sought to rein in local boards.

At times, the New York Committee of Safety attempted to establish order by

consolidating and disciplining local committees. These boards frequently acted too

independently and zealously against potential illicit behavior, thus undermining the

Committee of Safety’s authority. For example, leaning toward the side of caution, the

Committee of Safety agreed with John Booth in his claim against the local board in

Bedford when it sought to restrain him from bringing cattle to New York City.136

                                                                                                               
135
JPCCS, 1:255.
136
JPCCS, 1:267-268. Agnes Hunt mistakenly claimed this occurrence as evidence of the Committee’s
weakness. The Committee also tried to discipline the New York Convention members for not sitting when

  89  
Resolving that such restrictions could immediately harm locals’ chances of procuring

food in such desperate times, the Committee of Safety overruled the local leaders. Well

aware of the impact of local boards’ actions to cut off provisions to New York City, the

Committee of Safety sensed its own legitimacy at risk as well.137 As long as Booth and

anyone else seeking to travel with provisions did not seem to be supplying the enemy,

they should be permitted passage. Further cementing its supremacy, the Committee of

Safety declared only it could issue such restrictions in the future.138 In an effort to further

centralize power, New York’s provincial government demanded local committees deliver

more accurate accounts of their measures against disaffection.139

At arguably the apex of the Revolution the Provincial Congress adjourned again,

leaving the Committee of Safety to sit from March 18 through May 8. Determined to

expand enemy disarmament, the Committee of Safety embraced the Continental

Congress’ order on March 14, even though New York’s executive body had already

commenced this process as early as fall 1775.140 Even though the Committee of Safety

                                                                                                               
called, threatening to expel them. While the Convention rejected such punishment, it agreed to fine
delinquent members. When the Convention refused to meet when summoned by the Committee, the
executive at times simply took matters into its own hands. Hunt, 70-72.
137
Westchester included the region from Dutchess County in the north to the Bronx in the south as well as
access to several navigable bodies of water including the Hudson and Long Island Sound. Connected to the
Atlantic world through trade, Westchester included several wealthy manor lords and a diverse ethnic
community. J. Thomas Scharf, History of Westchester County… (Philadelphia: L. E. Preston, 1886), 2 and
Judd, 108-109.
138
Some evidence would be required for locals to stop supplies from going to New York City.
139
For example, in March 1776, the Provincial Congress lambasted the Queens County Committee for
failing to provide enough details of their activities against accused prisoners. Local leaders soon acquiesced
and provided evidence, mostly hearsay, against one of the prisoners. District of Great Neck and Cow Neck,
March 9, 1776 in Documents and Letters Intended to Illustrate the Revolutionary Incidents of Queens
County, 48-49.
140
The Continental Congress called to disarm the disaffected and non-associators. The confiscated arms
would to be sent to Continental troops raised by the colony. In April, disarmed Queens County residents
begged the Committee for exemption from militia service. Although the Committee bemoaned local

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endorsed disarming alleged disaffected inhabitants, it still stressed that the military must

be mindful how it treated residents for fear of losing popular support.141 Unwilling to

allow a military coup or dictatorship, the Committee of Safety continued to preserve civil

authority. The same day the Committee received the congressional order for

disarmament, New York’s executive instructed local committees to expand measures to

include not only non-associators but also anyone who refused to accept an oath.142 Soon

the executive body sent forces to disarm entire areas and when residents refrained from

swearing that all arms had been turned over, they were fined 5 shillings a day.143

According to historian Alexander Flick, in some cases, whole neighborhoods had their

weapons removed, thus leaving entire areas defenseless.144 Instructing all inhabitants to

carry passes denoting their allegiance, the Committee of Safety’s surveillance methods

reached a new height. By the eve of independence, the executive body had become an

increasingly powerful and coercive institution.145

                                                                                                               
boards’ inertia, Mason argued most complied when the news eventually reached each board. JCC, 4:205
and Mason, 144-145.
141
JPCCS, 1:417.
142
The Committee grew angry at local boards’ improper inventorying of seized items. Mason, 144.
143
Inhabitants also had to carry certificates to identify where they came from to ensure no additional
loyalists entered the colony. Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 211.
144
Colonel McDougall directed to have brought to the City the Arms taken from disaffected persons…,
March 26, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 5:1469. See Flick, Loyalism, 63.
145
Arrests only increased at this juncture. Flick, “The Loyalists,” 338.

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Transition to a Security State
In mid 1776, New York witnessed increased accounts of both internal and

external enemies.146 With the British nearby, threatening both livestock and polluting

minds, the Committee of Safety tightened its control on the colony by limiting

movement. Men like John Atherton found himself targeted by the Committee of Safety

for boarding a British vessel in search of work. When informed by the apologetic and no

doubt frightened man that starvation caused him to board the ship, the Committee of

Safety was unsympathetic.147 Additional reports that Long Island and Connecticut

inhabitants conspired with the British to massacre American supporters forced New

York’s government to respond.148 John Alsop, chairman of a sub-committee to devise a

method to handle the “intestine enemies,” notified the Provincial Congress of the

presence of a highly organized internal enemy. The need for a more efficient method for

handling disaffection became apparent.149 By spring, the Continental Congress dissolved

all colonial governments in recognition of the severing of imperial ties. Such a

                                                                                                               
146
By May 1776, the Revolution had vastly changed and the Provincial Congress became more aggressive
from May 8 to June 30, summoning or apprehending inhabitants. Upon receiving reports of counterfeiting
on Nassau Island, the legislature sent armed guards to apprehend five men. JPCCS, 1:443-445.
147
Deciding he willingly associated with the enemy and threatened public safety, the board had him
confined. To the Committee, livelihood and personal wellbeing were not acceptable reasons for
disobedience. Some loyalists, such as Cadwallader Colden and Whitehead Hicks were permitted to board
the governor’s ship. General Lee and the Committee of War pressured New York’s Congress to issue
stricter policies for ordinary residents boarding and supplying British vessels. However, the legislature
feared any antagonism could cause violence. When the Provincial Congress met from February to March
1776, it was clear that the Committee of Safety predominately would handle cases of disaffection. For its
part, after hearing petitions admitting fault for opposing elections, the Congress restored Queens County’s
status. Likewise, Richmond County previously decided to send delegates to the Provincial Convention, but
needed to prove enough inhabitants signed the Association. JPCCS, 1:294, 300-301, and 311.
148
JPCCS, 1:453.
149
The committee reported “the general welfare” depended on efficient preparations to prevent illicit
communication. It also noted the high percentage of disaffection in Kings, New York, and Queens counties
and believed residents would take up arms if weapons arrived from Europe. This committee also sent a list
of names to apprehend, extend the oath to, or be paroled. Those who were especially suspicious should be
sent directly to the Congress. JPCCS, 1:459 and Mason, 199-200.

  92  
declaration left the provincial congresses in charge of internal policing until new

governments could be formed. Embracing this official mandate, New York’s Congress

continued monitoring inhabitants, investigating cases of price gouging and merchants

refusing to accept paper money. Arrests and hearings by the hundreds commenced across

New York at all levels of the government. Some men, like Roelof Eltinge, refused to

accept continental currency on the basis that, if the British won, the paper would be

useless. Such vocal opposition led to his summons and eventual deportation to New

Hampshire.150 Disaffected persons filled county jails in Albany, Ulster, and Queens,

leaving historians to refer to such scenes as “detention camps.”151

To more effectively meet the Continental Congress’ resolutions calling for the

arrest of suspicious and dangerous persons, the Provincial Congress created a committee

specifically empowered to execute such orders. Coincidentally, by the end of the month,

the British commenced their invasion of Staten Island.152 Given the situation facing New

York, a ways and means committee suggested a month earlier, due to significant

                                                                                                               
150
The Commission to Detect and Defeat Conspiracies sent both Roelof and his brother to Exeter. After
petitioning, they were permitted to return after the war. Roelof Eltinge 1776, in The Price of Loyalty: Tory
Writings from the Revolutionary Era ed. Catherine S. Crary (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 146-147.
Eltinge’s arrest might have arisen from a family land feud against their rivals the Hasbroucks. Such
community animosity surely manifested itself in charges of disaffection. Even when allowed to leave the
community, some men received harsh treatment and molestation. Ralph LeFevre, History of New Paltz and
its Old Families (Albany: Fort Orange Press, 1903), 485; John Weatherhead Memorial, October 3, 1783 in
Crary, 44-47; and Papas, 87.
151
As early as March 1776, Lee advocated Colonel Sears to remove Queens County residents to
Connecticut. JPCCS, 2:148.
152
Burrows, 25. Another point of contention between the Committee of Safety and Charles Lee centered on
Staten Island’s defense. Imploring the general to send vessels, the Committee hoped to protect the island
yet Lee refused, citing a lack of resources. Washington later asked New Jersey to protect the islands’
provisions and halt military intelligence. After Colonel Heard arrested some loyalists, inhabitants grew
angry. When Staten Island fell to the British, it remained an important post. Beginning in July 1776 patriots
fled the island and loyalists hastened there, using it to pillage New Jersey. Similar to other British held
regions, raiders harassed loyalists and neutrals living amongst them. Citizens regularly complained of
British price regulations and martial law. Papas, 88- 89 and 92-95.

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disaffection in Queens County that residents should be disarmed and extended an oath to

the American cause.153 Ironically, on the same day the Congress ratified the Declaration

of Independence, New York’s leaders summoned and apprehended over 100 residents

from Kings, New York, Queens, Richmond, and Westchester counties to be brought

before this new committee to handle the suspicious.154 Over half the names listed were

crown officials. Obviously the committee initially targeted residents overtly attached to

Great Britain rather than search out secret disaffected New Yorkers.155 This unnamed

committee existed only briefly yet it was the first of its kind in New York, specifically

designed to exterminate disaffection.156 Empowered to investigate all cases of dissent,

this new committee operated efficiently and discreetly to root out subversives. If no

evidence surfaced but the “suspicious light” still surrounded an individual, the committee

                                                                                                               
153
It further recommended arresting all British officials and only releasing those men who supported
American liberties. All others deemed dangerous, it recommended should be paroled to Connecticut, New
Jersey, or Pennsylvania. If any refused parole, they would be jailed. Discovering trials too lengthy, the new
committee called its own witnesses and delivered its own form of justice.
154
For nearly complete minutes of this first committee to detect conspiracies see: AA, Series IV, 6:1153-
1183 and Minutes of the Committee to Detect Conspiracies in CHMNY, 1:340-372. The committee created
official summons and arrest warrants. Committee met in the Assembly..., June 15, 1776 in AA, Series IV,
6:1152. Kings County contained a small number of Whigs due to its lucrative benefits from British trade.
No countywide demonstrations against the crown took place well into 1775. Burrows, 22-23. For some of
the debate, confusion, and protest surrounding independence in New York and the legislature’s hesitancy
see: Mason, 155-177 and Ezra Stiles, The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, D.D., LL.D. ed. Franklin Bowditch
Dexter, Volume II (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 29.
155
Holding several offices, the outspoken Whitehead Hicks was one of the first men summoned. Refusing
the Association, he was paroled. Those who signed the Association were released, but those who rejected it
were confined. By summer 1776 in Kings County, Mayor David Mathews was arrested and sent to
Connecticut for his role in the Hickey Plot. Flick, Loyalism, 69 and Burrows, 26 and 38.
156
MCDDC, 1:xii. The first committee was composed of Gouverneur Morris, Henry Remsen, John Ten
Broeck, John Haring, Thomas Tredwell, Lewis Graham, and Joseph Hallett. Five men were necessary for a
quorum. Later Philip Livingston, John Jay, Leonard Gansevoort, John Sloss Hobart, and Thomas Randall
were added in place of Remsen, Ten Broeck, and Haring. The first committee sat from June 15-29 and
summoned 150 residents. Most disaffected found themselves paroled or forced to enter a bond. Although
busy, the committee dissolved on August 7, 1776. Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 213 and
Flick, “The Loyalists,” 340-341.

  94  
was still sanctioned to continue monitoring.157 Anyone who threatened security by aiding

the enemy or corrupting inhabitants’ minds was deemed a serious threat. With the

creation of this new committee dedicated to eliminate dissent, New York’s security state

commenced as the Committee of Safety called upon all residents and local boards to

recognize and detain suspicious persons. The new committee even ordered Washington

to arrest and deliver accused loyalists to it, a civil body.158 To some degree these

measures might have served to regulate local committee violence, but critics disagreed.159

The Provincial Congress’ rhetoric establishing this first committee helped

formulate the security state but also created a community of exclusion. Many of the

names the patriots deemed dangerous were high-ranking colonists who had connections

to the royal government. These men, as well as any others under suspicion, were

responsible to prove “why they should be considered as friends to the American

cause.”160 Essentially the men were guilty until proven innocent. Any person who failed

to sign the Association would be given a chance to accept a newly revised one. If they

accepted it, their weapons would be returned or, at least, compensated.161 The creation of

                                                                                                               
157
JPCCS, 1:476-477. This first committee possessed many security state powers including the power to
arrest, jail, parole, or summon residents. The board also could require monetary securities and use physical
force if necessary. The Provincial Congress recommended it act in secrecy to avoid alarming suspects.
Ultimately, the committee was to report to the legislature. At times, sub-committees examined the accused.
158
Letter from the Committee to General Washington, June 21, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1158. On June 21,
1776 the committee ordered Washington to arrest David Matthews.
159
The Newburgh and New-Windsor local committee broke into Cadwallader Colden Jr.’s home one night
in June 1776. Threatening him to appear before the committee, Colden eventually found himself confined
before his trial. Colden continued to receive threats and feared mob reprisals. Letter from Cadwallader
Colden, Jr. to the Committee for Ulster County..., June 27, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1112.
160
JPCCS, 1:477.
161
JPCCS, 1:501. If the person refused, they had to sign an oath swearing they turned over all weapons.
The Provincial Congress permitted county committees to jail anyone who refused its authority. By the end
of June, the legislature permitted Washington to arrest any loyalists in New York City. Problems with the

  95  
the American community was in part accomplished by executive bodies’ efforts to label

not only who belonged but also who was an enemy.162 Those who dissented or were

deemed suspicious found themselves increasingly monitored. By July 1776, if a person

did not outright reject the new government’s authority, such as Captain Archibald

Hamilton, there remained a chance to stay neutral. Hamilton was able to remain neutral

by accepting a parole on honor, a symbol he recognized the patriot’s authority. His

parole limited his mobility and, by oath, he could not communicate or support the enemy.

Others, such as William Axtell, who hoped to maintain neutrality but denied the

Provincial Congress’ offer of a parole, were sent to higher authorities.163

New York patriots’ efforts to stymie disaffection could not come to fruition soon

enough as by July, British General William Howe arrived.164 With the British located in

their stronghold of New York City, the region became a mecca for the disaffected over

the next six years. In Richmond County, hundreds of residents signed oaths to the King

                                                                                                               
disaffected continued to mount as places such as Dutchess and Westchester counties possessed significant
inimical populations, leading to more arrests. JPCCS, 1:500-504.
162
As June began, the revolutionary government faced reports of foreign troops and disaffection in Queens
County. Until a new government formed, the Provincial Congress led the colony. This mandate included:
eliminating disaffection, ensuring the safety of livestock from threatened areas, and selling necessities such
as flour. Washington notified New York that a number of inhabitants refused continental bills. He implored
the legislature to prevent lapses in commerce. The legislators agreed that public rights superseded those of
the individual. Two days later the Provincial Congress allowed the army to seize pork from men who
previously refused paper money. The army paid the just price in paper money. JPCCS, 1:492-493.
163
Mr. Axtell objects to the parole…, June 27, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1179. Axtell argued, “signing the
parole might be construed on the other side of the war an over act.” Axtell was not hostile and agreed to
return when summoned. He even consented to be moved to another region of the colony but not another
state.
164
By June, loyalist Joseph Stansbury wrote a poem “A Welcome to Howe” to commemorate Howe’s
arrival. Joseph Stansbury, “A Welcome to Howe” in The Loyal Verses of Joseph Stansburg and Doctor
Jonathan Odell: Relating to the American Revolution ed. Winthrop Sargent (Albany, 1860), 10-11.

  96  
only days after the Declaration of Independence.165 Those residents who supported the

American cause quickly petitioned the Provincial Congress for aid.166 While

Washington, Lee, Adams and Hancock all desired the New York government to either

take more active measures or hoped the Continental Congress would permit the army to

seize additional power over civilians, the Provincial Congress continued to assume

authority.167 Jealously protecting civil authority, legislators continued, as always, to

resist military intervention. Yet another example of civil government refuting military

authority was when generals Israel Putnam and Thomas Mifflin objected to a crowd’s

vicious behavior towards the “disaffected.” Despite the military men’s complaint, the

civil government condoned such harsh measures, deeming it as patriotic.

Crowds frequently took matters into their own hands when it came to disaffection.

As Peter Elting described, “We Had some Grand Toory Rides…Several of [t]hem ware

handled verry Roughly Being Carried trugh the Streets on Rails, there cloaths Tore from

there becks and ther Bodies pretty well Mingled with the dust.”168 Throughout New

York, tory-hunting became all too common and, while the patriot government claimed

not to approve of such actions, the legislature stated, mobs “proceeded from a real regard

to liberty, and a detestation of those persons who, by their language and conduct, have
                                                                                                               
165
In Suffolk County, loyalists conducted a census to discover how much grain each home needed to
subsist and noted all rebel houses abandoned. Suffolk County composed almost 2/3 of Long Island.
Richmond County July 9, 1776 and Suffolk County Census 1778 in Andrew Elliot Papers, Box 4, folder 11
and 12, NYSL and Staudt, 64.
166
Petition of the Inhabitants of Cortland Manor, July 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 4, folder 10, petition
33:94a, NYSA.
167
Flick, “The Loyalists,” 344.
168
These men stood accused of trying to bring sheep to the enemy. Peter Elting to Capt. Richard Varick,
June 13, 1776 in New York City during the American Revolution: Being a Collection of Original Papers,
97; Frank Moore, Diary of the American Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner, 1860), 288-289 and
George Rapelje, A Narrative or Excursions, Voyages, and Travels (New York: West & Trow, 1834), 12-14.

  97  
discovered themselves to be inimical to the cause of America.”169 Although reiterating

that the people should desist and allow elected officials to handle enemies, the

representatives’ tone spoke volumes. New York’s patriot leaders understood that the

creation of Association, the Committee of Safety, and the committee to detect

conspiracies instituted a culture of fear, suspicion, and violence, a climate that ultimately

paid little heed to liberties that obstructed their goals.170 With New York City under

Crown control, eliminating dissenting voices became more imperative than ever.

If infringing on individual liberties of those men labeled disaffected was not

controversial enough, the Committee of Safety also stifled the free press, even of fellow

patriots. After reading a notification that Samuel Loudon planned to print a tract refuting

Common Sense, a crowd of armed men from the Committee of Mechanics, a patriot

organization in New York City, visited him, demanding he refrain from printing the

controversial tract.171 Led by Christopher Duyckinck, the boisterous crowd prevented

Loudon from working, destroyed some impressions, stole materials, and interrogated

him. Loudon challenged their right to threaten, question, or prevent a free press.
                                                                                                               
169
Committee to report how the people called Quakers…, June 12, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1397-1398. In
the middle of the day a mob led by searched the town for loyalists. When they discovered alleged enemies,
they “dragged several from their lurking holes, where they had taken refuge… When they had taken several
of these unhappy victims…they placed them upon sharp rails with one leg on each side.” If we believe
Thomas Jones, the precession went past City Hall where the Congress met and Committee of Safety sat
“preserving good order.” When Putnam tried to stop the inhumane treatment, Washington scolded him
pronouncing “to discourage such proceedings was to injure the cause of liberty in which they were then
engaged, and that nobody would attempt it but an enemy to his country.” Whether or not Washington
uttered such an inflammatory statement is debatable, however the mob’s violent parade seems to have
happened. Jones, 1:101-103; and Pastor Schaukirk’s Diary in James Grant Wilson, ed. The Memorial
History of the City of New-York, Volume II, (New York: New York History Company, 1892), 495.
170
As Elting and others realized, “Our Congress published a Resolve on the Ocacion, Expressing there
disaprobation, tho it might have procedid from a Proper Zeal for the liberties of American freedom &
desire that it may Cease, & that a mode for punishing such Offenders will soon be adopted.” Peter Elting to
Captain Richard Varick, June 13, 1776 in New York City during the American Revolution: Being a
Collection of Original Papers, 97.
171
Petition Samuel Loudon Printer, March 28, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 2, folder 2, petition 32:110, NYSA.

  98  
Notifying the angry mob he intended to appear before the Committee of Safety the

following night after being accosted, Loudon found himself summoned before a local

patriot committee that reiterated he was not permitted to print such a pamphlet “as my

personal safety might be endangered.”172 Forced to comply, Loudon relented, but when

he returned home, a mob of 40 men once again led by Duyckinck awaited him.

Eventually, Loudon reported the ordeal to the Committee of Safety, detailing how the

men “rushed into my house; some of them ran up stairs to the printing office, while

others guarded the door, and took away the whole impression of said pamphlets.”

Begging the Committee of Safety to “secure the liberty of the press, protect private

property, [and] prevent such insults for the future,” Loudon assumed the board would

secure public safety and dispense justice. Insisting that “if any set of unauthorized men

shall be permitted to assume the power of legislating for their fellow-citizens, and

punishing them as they please,” Loudon concluded “our legal conventions and

committees with all the precious liberties for which we are contending will be in effect

annihilated.”173 It appears Loudon never received his justice, as nowhere in the

Committee of Safety’s minutes appears any reference to a resolution. Such silence

speaks volumes and reasserts the executive’s agenda. To ensure internal security, the

government would suppress dissent even at the cost of individual liberties or property.174

                                                                                                               
172
Loudon was employed by the New York Convention to print acts and proceedings. He first reported this
incident on March 20, 1776 and was not re-summoned by the Committee of Safety until April 13. Loudon
deliberated over printing the tract, but believed it did not hold the Continental Congress in a poor light.
JPCCS, 1:377, 405-406.
173
Loudon contended that, “freedom of the press is now insulted and infringed by some zealous advocates
for liberty. A few more nocturnal assaults upon printers may totally destroy it, and America in consequence
may fall a sacrifice to a more fatal despotism than that which we are threatened.”
174
Loudon was also reprimanded in 1777 for disobeying the Committee of Safety. The Committee scolded
Loudon for publishing extracts from Hugh Gaines’ paper based in British held New York City. Previously

  99  
 There can be no doubt the Committee of Safety and the new sub-committee

became more terrifying to the accused, yet the executive also achieved some legitimacy

in inhabitants’ eyes.175 Tellingly, a petition in the Constitutional Gazette decried the

potential of “anarchy and confusion” due to the lack of real government since the royal

one collapsed.176 While the author worried what would become of those men imprisoned

in military jails, he feared mob rule even more. Ultimately, the petitioner begged the

Committee of Safety to take proper measures to establish a new government.

The Committee of Safety’s coercive and dictatorial powers did not fail to go

unnoticed or without criticism.177 Almost a year after the aforementioned resolutions on

dissension and disaffection, an anonymous author under the Roman Republic pseudonym

“APPIUS” wrote to the London Chronicle claiming he once supported the colonists’

argument regarding the unjust taxations, but based on the recent events realized, “their

opposition is not dictated by true patriotism but by a spirit of tyranny and despotism.”178

Focusing on New York, “APPIUS” cited restrictions on the press when it disagreed with
                                                                                                               
forbidden from printing seditious words, Loudon, the state commissioned printer, apologized. The
Committee reminded Loudon “you have been guilty of a great insult to their [the Committee’s] authority.
That so long as you receive a pension… you are their servant, and therefore guilty of great ingratitude, in
presuming to disobey their commands. The House do not mean to lay any restrictions upon the liberties of
the press, but they are determined not to employ any person who shall do things inimical to the cause of
American freedom.” The Committee later pardoned him. JPCCS, 1:781.
175
In conjunction with the Provincial Congress, the Committee purchased flour and bread to be sold.
176
“A Petition to the Honorable Committee of Safety of the Colony of New York,” Constitutional Gazette,
April 24, 1776.
177
In chapter 2, we will see Samuel Seabury’s pamphlets noted New York committees’ hypocrisies,
comparing them to the Spanish Inquisition and their leaders to tyrants. Fearful of their excessive power to
summon residents, he questioned their very existence. Seabury also recognized the coercive nature of,
“Cast[ing] out from civil society! Nobody to have any dealings with thee! None to sell thee a loaf of
bread.” Seabury, “The Congress Canvassed: or An Examination into The Conduct of the Delegates at their
Grand Convention,” November 28, 177 in Letters of a Westchester Farmer, 85. Others also spoke against
the patriots such as reverends Charles Inglis and Jonathan Boucher. Davidson, 251-256.
178
‘Appius’ to the Printer of the London Chronicle..., September 19, 1776 in AA, Series V, 2:391.

  100  
Congress as well as citizens forced to submit to the Association. Not stopping there,

“APPIUS” argued New York’s leaders were,

depriving their fellow-citizens of the common privilege of investigation and

speech, precluding them of the benefit of trial by jury, subjecting them to
punishments by ex post facto laws; and exposing to the mercy of an
unconstitutional and inquisitorial judiciary, the fortunes and lives of those whom
they may determine have spoken disrespectful of their proceedings, or
controverted their authority.179

“APPIUS” then turned his attention to the Provincial Congress’s resolves of September 1,

1775. Appalled by the resolutions bestowing upon New York’s government the ability to

terminate sedition, disarm the suspicious, apprehend the accused, and confine inhabitants,

the anonymous writer concluded American liberty was nothing but a farce. In reality,

“APPIUS’s” criticism of the Committee of Safety was accurate; the Revolution had

turned to a coercive and dictatorial board and delivered it undemocratic powers to root

out opposition.

Despite the Committee of Safety’s efforts, New York still faced steep opposition.

In areas such as Queens County, neutral residents remained unconvinced by patriot

propaganda.180 Additional reports came from Dutchess and Westchester counties as well

as Nassau indicating the number of disaffected overwhelmed American leaning residents.

Realizing the British might potentially invade, New York leaders increased the number of

militiamen to preserve peace and aid policing efforts. With many inhabitants refusing to

sign the Association or bear arms, the Continental Congress’s resolution declaring it

treasonable to live within a colony, benefit from the protection of its laws but still remain
                                                                                                               
179
Ibid. “APPIUS” saw New York’s government as rampant with corruption, claiming those who executed
laws and decided the fate of the accused worked with accusers for their own benefit. “Is the happiness of
thousands to be sacrificed, to aggrandize riches like these? Shall the sacred name of Liberty be made the
instrument to glut the avarice, the tyranny, of such enemies to civil society?”
180
This question lay at the heart of America’s struggles during the war. Such high numbers of neutrals
made it difficult to establish patriot institutions. Tiedemann, “Queens County,” 47-48.

  101  
loyal to the British, weighed heavily on its decision to remove the threat of dissent and

create a community of conformity. As New York began its journey as a sovereign state,

it fell upon its executive bodies to create the legitimacy and order needed to establish

internal security. After the Revolution concluded, Peter Van Schaack’s son Henry wrote

a biography of his well-known allegedly disaffected father. Van Schaack the elder

refused to take a side during the conflict and though his opinions are biased, he explained

what life in the security state had become after independence. “It will scarcely now be

credited” Van Shaack recalled, “that powers so undefined and extraordinary, should have

been entrusted to a few individuals, by a people so jealous of encroachments” and such

“powers and duties should have led to many abuses and irregularities.”181

Echoing Van Schaack’s sentiments, towards the end of Crèvecoeur’s

“Landscapes” the audience witnesses a conversation between a certain Dr. Ecclestone

and the foreign alien Iwan regarding the state of affairs in New York. Finding it ironic

that the patriots and committeemen spoke so often of liberties, Ecclestone noted “They

have consigned” their liberties “over to Congress without the acknowledgement even of a

pepper-corn.”182 The good doctor reiterated the absurd levels of harsh treatment, lack of

mobility, and fines facing nearly all inhabitants, let alone the property confiscation

loyalists endured. Forced to take orders from these dictators, Ecclestone arrived at his

wits end. His companion, Iwan, eventually concluded “some sort of order, if it is the fruit

of fear and coercion, will be better than committee rule, the most detestable of any.” By
                                                                                                               
181
Henry C. Van Schaack, The Life of Peter Van Schaack, LL.D… (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842),
65-66. Although not necessarily ran out of New York by the Committee of Safety, in January 1776
Reverend Myles Cooper, then in Great Britain, retold his harrowing tale. The fear and haste Cooper
described fleeing violent mobs could easily be the same for any accused person. Myles Cooper, “Stanzas
written on the Evening of the 20th of May, 1776 written by an Exile from America,” in The Gentleman’s
Magazine and Historical Chronicle ed. Sylvanus Urban, Volume XLVI, (July, 1776), 326-327.
182
Crèvecoeur, 278.

  102  
early summer 1776, New York’s Committee of Safety commenced its fledgling security

state. For the remainder of the Revolution in New York a committee to detect and defeat

conspiracies instilled order and public security by curbing or destroying individual rights

and policing the population’s movements and allegiance to the state.

  103  
 Chapter 2: “make strict enquiry into the…former conduct of the Inhabitants”: The
Virginia Committee of Safety, 1774-1776

“Mr. Trueman, I am happy to see you. In times like these, of war and danger,

almost every man is suspicious even of his friend.”1 These words, uttered by the

protagonist Meanwell, open Robert Munford’s largely neglected satirical play The

Patriots. Munford’s satire highlighted the political and social conflicts Virginia faced as

rebellion transitioned to revolution. During the play, the protagonists Meanwell and

Trueman find themselves under the revolutionary committee’s watchful and suspicious

eye.2 Both members of the gentry, they stood accused of supporting the British, by a Mr.

Tackabout, whom the reader soon discovers is a tory in disguise. But Tackabout is

neither the only villain in the play nor is he even Munford’s most devious and dangerous

character. The patriot author reserved this role for the committeemen.

Trueman explained to his friend Meanwell that Brazen, a committeeman, was one

of the “violent patriot[s]” who seized the reins of the Revolution. Motivated by their own

material gain, committeemen allowed emotions to overrule reason.3 While Meanwell and

his noble friend served their country faithfully aided by rational thought, the committee

zealously and recklessly persecuted innocent men, upsetting social and political order,

                                                                                                               
1
Courlandt Canby, “Robert Munford’s The Patriots,” WMQ, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1949), 437. Known for his
1770 political satire The Candidates, Munford penned The Patriots around 1777, although it was not
publish it until 1798. From here on, citations of the play will be referred to as The Patriots.
2
Canby referred to Munford’s committee as the Committee of Safety while Michael McDonnell considered
it a county committee. It is not clear who is correct. Michael A. McDonnell, “A World Turned ‘Topsy
Turvy’: Robert Munford, “The Patriots”, and the Crisis of the Political Revolution in Virginia,” WMQ, Vol.
61, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), 235-270.
3
Trueman described Brazen’s political philosophy as being “perfect anarchy” and that Brazen preferred
“that nobody shall tyrannize over him, but [is] very content to tyrannize over others.” The Patriots, 437.

  104  
and wreaking havoc. Portraying his antagonists as opportunistic men who quickly rose to

power by stirring the emotions of the mob, Munford certainly held patriot committees in

low regard. Munford himself experienced harassment from overtly zealot patriots,

despite his support of the Americans. 4 Displaying his own distrust of patriot committees,

Munford’s protagonists lamented the rise of these “little democracies” which they likened

to the Spanish Inquisition.5 Lacking the evidence necessary to prove guilt, the committee

summoned Meanwell, Trueman and Scottish residents before a kangaroo court to

determine their true allegiance and fate. The latter’s Scottish heritage, it seemed, was

enough evidence to raise doubt about their loyalty.6 Although fictional, Munford’s story

reveals that even patriots considered the committees’ fear inducing tactics as extreme.

Clearly, his words echo Crèvecoeur and other disaffected persons who lamented how

committees’ undemocratic measures instituted a society of accusations and suspicion.

Even patriots recognized the committees for public safety’s power and their role during

the American Revolution’s darkest days.

                                                                                                               
4
Munford experienced persecutions similar to those of his heroes. As a conservative member of the gentry,
he garnered the animosity of new men for his hesitant patriotism. Munford’s fears of political and social
unrest are evident in both his fiction and his own experience.
5
Committeemen Colonel Strut and Mr. Summons argued the protagonists threatened the community by
“starting doubts and creating divisions; divisions are dangerous.” In reality, committees also targeted
inhabitants for supposedly seditious language. The Patriots, 459.
6
Upon discovering one Scotsman was born in America, Brazen retracted his accusation yet preceded to
disarm the other man. When the heroes appeared, they charged the board with hypocrisy, demanding the
members define a “tory.” Failing to deliver a satisfying answer, the committee vaguely stated a tory is a
man “who disapproves of men and measures” or anyone “suspected.” In reality, committees also found it
difficult to define enemies. The Patriots, 461 and 484. Despite the heroes’ efforts, they did not exonerate
themselves nor is the conclusion of the play a happy one, as the committee never received its comeuppance.
Even when the protagonists are restored as patriots, the committeemen remained in control of the
Revolution. When the committee eventually devolved into mob violence against loyalist Mr. Tackabout,
the reader finds Trueman calling for him to be hung. In his final soliloquy, Trueman realized the cost of his
restoration. “I have kick’d a tory, it seems: there is a merit in this, which, like charity, hides a multitude of
sins.” McDonnell, “A World Turned ‘Topsy Turvy,’” 262-263.

  105  
 This chapter focuses on the Virginia Committee of Safety’s origins, methods, and

impact on the Revolution. Specifically it seeks to answer the following questions: how

did the Committee of Safety rise to power? How did this short-term emergency

executive body operate and influence the Revolution before July 1776? What role did the

Committee of Safety perform to preserve civil authority in the face of military power?

How did it manage disaffection? Finally, as an executive, how did it influence its

successor, the Council of the State of Virginia?

Rather than being timid or unimportant, as historians have suggested, the

Committee of Safety exerted assertive executive authority in Virginia during a period of

upheaval. In the absence of the Royal Governor Lord Dunmore, executive authority

completely collapsed. Beginning in 1774, county committees could only summon,

reprimand, and publish the names of those deemed disaffected. While publishing a

resident’s name certainly had negative repercussions, the punishments became more

severe. By fall 1775, Virginia’s leaders realized the lack of a central executive with

colony-wide jurisdiction placed the Revolution at risk. The dearth in executive power led

the Virginia Convention to create the vaguely defined Committee of Safety in August

1775 to defend inhabitants’ security and execute ordinances.7 Over time, due to

necessity, the Committee of Safety amassed powers both by ordinance and precedent.

Ultimately, in the name of the common good, the Committee of Safety employed

coercive methods to execute law, establish order, and most importantly eradicate

disaffection. In time, fear of internal enemies led to increasingly stricter and harsher

                                                                                                               
7
As the acting legislative body, the Virginia Convention chose Robert Carter Nicholas, Patrick Henry,
Richard Henry Lee, and Thomas Jefferson to frame the Committee of Safety’s powers. Lee and Jefferson,
who were exceptionally vocal against the former colonial governor, proceeded to create an arguably more
powerful executive. George M. Curtis III, “The Virginia Courts during the Revolution,” (PhD Dissertation:
University of Wisconsin, 1970), 201.

  106  
policies. On the eve of independence, the Committee of Safety was anything but timid,

creating propaganda, repulsing Dunmore, successfully preserving civil authority in the

face of American General Charles Lee’s aggressive policies, and crippling disaffection by

monitoring both inhabitants’ movements and their allegiances. By examining the

Committee of Safety’s origins and actions from 1775-1776, historians can better

understand how Virginia consolidated executive power.8 Although historians have

overlooked it, patriot leaders believed such institutions vital enough to bestow nearly

unchecked authority at such a critical juncture during the transition from colony to state.9

Similar to other committees for public safety, Virginia’s civil executive body

administered the military, communicated with other colonies, procured supplies, drew

upon treasury money, and, most importantly, executed “the ordinances and resolutions”

of the Virginia Convention “according to the true intent and meaning.”10 Without the

Committee of Safety, resolutions went unenforced and meaningless. Given the

tumultuous political environment, Virginia’s revolutionary leaders feared potential

invasions and uprisings. As patriot George Gilmer stated,

The situation of this continent is sufficiently alarming to rouze the indignation of

every man that is capable of feeling for the publick welfare. Our particular

                                                                                                               
8
In 1962, Thad Tate urged historians to examine county committees and their relation to patriot leadership
to discover, as he posited, that the county boards followed an agenda. Thad W. Tate, “The Coming of the
Revolution in Virginia: Britain’s Challenge to Virginia’s Ruling Class, 1763-1776,” WMQ, Vol. 19, no. 3
(Jul., 1962), 342.
9
While legislative bodies created committees to execute ordinances, short-term emergency bodies blurred
the lines of government by creating and executing resolutions. In 1775, when the Prince Edward County
committee realized how boundless its powers had become, members unanimously resolved that their
“unlimited powers” might be a danger and therefore they sought to operate only within the resolutions of
the Continental Congress and Virginia Convention. Not all committees had such willpower. Prince Edward
County Committee, November 20, 1775 in RVA 4:441.
10
SVA, 9:49-53.

  107  
 situation will justify suspicion of the most dreadfull nature, and when our safety is
at stake, those suspicions will be sufficient to Justify any preparation.11

Even though historians have disregarded Virginian’s divisions, claiming loyalists’ efforts

insignificant, patriot leaders continuously feared themselves under threat.12

To instill legitimacy and order, as well as eradicate disaffection, the Committee of

Safety proceeded to identify, apprehend, and detain suspicious individuals. This

extraordinarily powerful board possessed nearly limitless power over civil and military

affairs. Despite being designated by the Convention as an executive body, the

Committee of Safety operated similar to the legislature, except possessing fewer

members to enhance its efficiency. Asserting that the key to establishing legitimacy in a

contested region lay with controlling public opinion, the Committee of Safety sought to

maintain its tentative hold on society. During the transition from royal to state

governments, this authoritarian revolutionary body proved indispensable.

Virginia’s Committee of Safety provided stable executive authority in a crucial

period when royal authority collapsed. With the House of Burgess ceasing to have any

influence or even to meet by summer 1774, combined with Dunmore’s flight from the

colony, Virginia faced uncertainty and little government presence.13 Exerting coercive

measures, the Committee of Safety established governmental legitimacy and order on the

eve of declaring independence. First, by enforcing both the economic and political
                                                                                                               
11
Virginians, such as Dr. George Gilmer, supported raising independent volunteer companies. Dr. George
Gilmer’s Commonplace Book, 1775-1820, VHS.
12
Tate, 343.
13
Dunmore dissolved the House of Burgesses in June 1774 after members passed a bill calling for a day of
fasting. Attempts were made to hold a session in 1776 to no avail as the body failed to meet quorum. John
Pendleton Kennedy, ed. Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1773-1776… (Richmond, 1905)
and Douglas R. Egerton, Gabriel’s Rebellion: The Slave Conspiracies of 1800 & 1802 (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 5.

  108  
program known as the Association, the Committee of Safety, as well as county

committees, not only punished violators but also regulated the marketplace. By

intimidating Virginians, the executive body identified the fledgling nation’s first enemies.

Encountering difficulties early on identifying such persons, the Committee of Safety

became increasingly effective policing such individuals. Second, the board’s pursuit of

disaffection culminated with its controversial decision to punish and destroy the loyalist

strongholds at Norfolk and Portsmouth. Wielding unprecedented powers, the Committee

of Safety claimed to act for the common good, despite criticism that it met illegally.

Citing the public welfare as justification for its controversial actions, Committee of

Safety President Edmund Pendleton argued whatever measures, “public safety seems to

require, should be immediately done, even tho’ some injury may arise to innocent

individuals.”14

This chapter begins by examining how local county committee operations

influenced the Virginia Committee of Safety’s transition from an institution engaged

primarily in propaganda to a security state. Consolidating power, especially executive

authority, the Committee of Safety filled a necessary void during the transition from royal

to state government. Though not a direct objective but more of a consequence, the

Committee of Safety also inculcated a culture of fear and suspicion amongst neighbors.

Next, this chapter highlights how the Committee of Safety established its security state by

initially acting as a propaganda institution that not only regulated the economy and

politics but also did so with a distinct moral argument. Labeling hoarders and war

profiteers not as merely unpatriotic but detrimental to the community; the Committee of

                                                                                                               
14
Edmund Pendleton to Lee, May 5, 1776, The Lee Papers, Volume I, New-York Historical Society,
Collections, Vol. 4 (New York: Printed for the Society, 1872), 470-471.

  109  
Safety argued such behavior threatened the common good and investigated these people

as criminals under its definition of disaffection. By confiscating mail, interrogating

residents, apprehending inhabitants, and exiling Virginians, the Committee of Safety

ruled Virginia. Next, we discover how the Committee of Safety assumed the mantle of

protecting civil authority from military dictatorship, while still aiding the war effort. The

mere fact that no Committeeman could hold a military position demonstrates the

importance the legislators placed on civil authority so as to prevent any semblance of a

military dictatorship.15 Finally, this chapter concludes in the Norfolk County region.

After the culmination of over a year of hostility in the area, the Committee of Safety

demonstrated the extent of its coercive and undemocratic police powers by calling for

residents to be punished and Norfolk itself destroyed. The Committee’s decisive

demolition of the town and blatant trampling of liberties served to not only nearly

eradicate disaffection but also, by implicating the British in the ruination, galvanized the

population to support the Revolution.

Although the Virginia Convention deemed a coercive executive body necessary

during the emergency presented by civil war, other patriots, such as George Mason,

disagreed. The venerable leader supported county committees’ measures boycotting

British goods but feared a colony-wide executive body with excessive and expansive

authority over both the military and civil life.16 Apprehensions not withstanding, the

                                                                                                               
15
Alonzo Dill mentioned in his biography of Committee of Safety member Carter Braxton that the
executive body held control over the militia. He also highlighted the tension between Patrick Henry and the
Committee. Alonzo Thomas Dill, Carter Braxton, Virginia Signer: A Conservative in Revolt (New York:
University Press of America, 1983), 51-53.
16
George Mason to Martin Cockburn, July 24, 1775 in The Papers of George Mason ed. Robert A.
Rutland, Volume I, 1749-1778 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 241-242.
Although he disagreed with the Committee of Safety’s creation, Mason was not timid when it came to

  110  
Committee of Safety performed a vital role after the collapse of royal government by

instituting order and the nascent government’s legitimacy that were necessary to ensure

the Revolution’s success. By the time it ceased to exist, the Committee of Safety sought

residents’ conformity, not their consent. From its creation in August 1775 until the

Declaration of Independence, the Committee of Safety slowly amassed incredible and

unprecedented powers both through resolutions and precedent.17 By intrusively

monitoring and policing society the Committee of Safety curbed individual liberties to

establish security, even if this meant punishing the guilty and innocent.

County Committees: The Committee of Safety’s Predecessors

Dissolving the House of Burgesses in May 1774, British Royal Governor Lord

Dunmore hoped to undercut the rising rebellion within the colony. After many royal

courts closed, law and order were left in disarray. Observing Virginia, Patrick Henry

noted, “all government is dissolved.”18 Virginians’ anxiety reached their zenith after

Dunmore ordered public gunpowder seized in April 1775 and news of the battles at

Lexington and Concord reached the colony. Understandably alarmed, residents feared

                                                                                                               
policing the disaffected. To the Maryland Council of Safety, November 29, 1775 in The Papers of George
Mason, 1:258-259.
17
From late 1775 to July 1776, the Virginia Convention and the Committee of Safety slowly amassed
extensive powers. For example, after seizing Norfolk in January 1776 the Convention strengthened the
executive body, discussed a general test oath, and considered a new enemies act. From January to March
1776, a crucial three-month period, the Committee of Safety sat for sixty-six days. During this period the
executive body acted almost unilaterally and even without a quorum. By May, Vice President of the
Committee John Page pressured President Edmund Pendleton for a stricter enemies ordinance. By
successfully persuading Pendleton, Page convinced him to call for a harsher ordinance.
18
Extract of a letter from the Earl of Dunmore to the Earl Dartmouth, December 24, 1774 in AA, Series IV,
1:1062 and John Adams, Notes of Debates, September 6, 1774 in Letters of Members of the Continental
Congress ed. Edmund C. Burnett, Volume I (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921),
14.

  111  
being left defenseless in the face of British aggression or slave rebellion.19 Colonial

leaders tried to pacify crowds, yet anxiety did not subside. In some counties, residents

roamed menacingly with their weapons in hand, leaving Virginians to wonder if violence

loomed.20 Tensions continued to mount between Virginians and the British, prompting

raids on powder magazines, rumors of invasion, and mustering of militias. Adding to the

confusion, Dunmore fled the colony in June leaving a dearth of executive authority.21

Causing even more havoc, after The Virginia Gazette printed correspondence between

Dunmore and Lord Dartmouth, Virginians soon discovered their governor conspired

against them. Detailing how patriot committees coercively monitored inhabitants to

institute order, Dunmore’s letters depicted the chaotic society. Like other critics, he

believed committees’ public censor of allegedly disaffected residents placed them in

harms way, as angry patriots mobs knew which inhabitants to target.22 Soon rumors

                                                                                                               
19
Dunmore forbade the election of congressional representatives a month earlier. The response from the
Municipal Common Hall condemned Dunmore’s theft. The Capital: Municipal Common Hall to Governor
Dunmore A Humble Address, April 21, 1775 in RVA, 3:54-55. Local committees also refuted Dunmore’s
actions. Richard Barksdale Harwell, ed., The Committees of Safety of Westmoreland and Fincastle:
Proceedings of the County Committees, 1774-1776 (Richmond: The Virginia State Library, 1956), 40 and
66 and Henrico County Committee: Detestation and Abhorrence, April 27, 1775 in RVA, 3:62-63.
20
Patrick Henry stirred tensions by lambasting Dunmore’s actions and rousing others to follow. More
conservatively minded Virginians such as Peyton Randolph hoped to assuage fears, but realized the danger
facing the colony. The Capital: Peyton Randolph to Mann Page, Jr., Lewis Willis, and Benjamin Grymes,
Jr., April 27, 1775 in RVA, 3:63-64.
21
Caroline County Committee: D. Cross, Glasgow, Scotland to James Dunlop, Merchant, Port Royal,
Virginia, June 8, 1775 in RVA, 4:19. Feeling compelled to act the Virginia Convention desperately searched
for powder and raised militias. The legislators turned to John Goodrich Sr. to acquire powder from the
West Indies. Goodrich resided in a predominantly loyalist area of Portsmouth and the Convention knew his
interests were more financially driven than ideologically. Entrusted with £5,000, Goodrich instructed his
son William to sail and purchase war goods. After acquiring powder he also sought to import dry goods,
which violated the Association. The Goodrichs played a dangerous game, as both the Convention and
Dunmore construed their actions as inimical. When Dunmore’s forces captured William in October 1775,
Goodrich Sr. agreed to secretly work for the British. By December, the Convention questioned Goodrichs’
loyalty. George M. Curtis III, “The Goodrich Family and the Revolution in Virginia, 1774-1776,” The
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Jan., 1976), 53.
22
Royal government commanded little respect in many areas, as justices of the peace largely served on
committees and courts were closed. Dunmore tried to maintain allies, but discovered this task difficult.

  112  
spread that the governor planned to “pay us a visit in this city [Williamsburg]” and

Virginians’ trepidation seemed justified. Patriot leaders across the colonies needed to

respond to the confusion caused by civil war, decentralized local patriot committees, and

collapse of executive power. Such an inefficient decentralized system failed to meet the

demands of war because it was inadequate to deal with disaffection.

In response to continued British aggression and popular grievances against

neighbors who refused to sacrifice for American liberties, Virginia endorsed the

Continental Congress’ call for an economic boycott known as the Association, a

propaganda tool that questioned inhabitants’ loyalty and patriotism. In Virginia, county

leaders endorsed the notion that “public safety” deemed it necessary to end exportation

and demanded merchants obtain official papers proving their goods met regulations.23

The Association allowed Virginia’s local committees to enhance their jurisdiction to

police the populace, thus legitimizing and organizing their efforts to question

allegiance.24 Revolutionary leaders published Virginians’ names that violated the

Association in an effort to publicly condemn them as threats to their neighbors’ safety.

Local committees’ efforts to defame non-associators were so pronounced that nearly all

residents took note of such efforts to induce conformity.25 If public pressure was not

enough a reason to accept the Association, coercion certainly forced hands to sign away
                                                                                                               
However, the intrepid governor remained optimistic, hoping the non-importation agreements would soon
cause scarcities leaving many inhabitants hungry and angry. Extract of a letter from the Earl of Dunmore to
the Earl of Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter) April 29, 1775,
supplement and Royal Chief Magistracy, May 3, 1775 in RVA, 3:80-82.
23
Westmoreland County leaders pressured inhabitants to seize the initiative “to prevent such Exportation
by all means in their power.” Harwell, 47.
24
Many county committee members were judges. Caroline County Order Book 1772-1776, Virginia State
Library, Part 2, 458-565 in Curtis, “The Virginia Court during the Revolution,” 163.
25
February 5, 1776, Robert Wormeley Carter Diary, CWFL.

  113  
their allegiance and pledge their unwavering loyalty.26 Despite local committees’ efforts,

the battle to achieve community allegiance was far from over.27 Even when local

committees formed, their powers and jurisdictions were neither fully understood nor

accepted. For example, after Edmund Pendleton read the oath publicly, merchant

Andrew Leckie foolishly decided to mock Associators. Leckie’s ill-timed joke that a

slave boy should sign the oath as well quickly drew the sober patriots’ ire.28 Soon Leckie

found himself forced to publicly confess his wronging. Leckie continued to irk the local

Caroline County committee by refusing to reveal his account ledgers. As pressure grew,

Leckie eventually conceded after a month-long campaign of being labeled an enemy to

the community and economically ostracized. Was Leckie an enemy? In the end, after he

surrendered his books, the committee deemed he had broken no resolutions. Yet the local

leaders successfully mobilized communal conformity to force Leckie and others to

recognize their authority, thus a growing culture of obedience and suspicion began based

on the need for public security. The incident involving Leckie also demonstrated that

patriot committees possessed a broad definition of enemy behavior.

Possessing a broad definition of inimical behavior was only the beginning of the

committees’ labors as central to the administration of the rebellion was identifying these

                                                                                                               
26
Coercion could just as easily sway inhabitants away from the patriot cause. Keith Mason, “A Loyalist’s
Journey: James Parker’s Response to the Revolutionary Crisis,” The Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography, Vol. 102, No. 2 (Apr., 1994), 158.
27
In Virginia both Dunmore and the committees struggled for residents’ allegiance. Historian George
Curtis argued the Goodrich family’s experience demonstrated the fluidity of loyalties during the chaotic
period. While the revolutionary government navigated through this confusing time trying to understand its
powers, the Goodrichs became victims of the necessity to punish disaffection. Curtis mentioned the
Committee of Safety’s role instilling order, yet dismissed it as timid. Curtis, “The Goodrich Family and the
Revolution in Virginia, 1774-1776,” 49-74.
28
Leckie admitted to calling out, “Piss Jack, turn about my Boy and Sign.” Leckie previously signed the
Association but had also damned the Congress and its taxes. “To the Corresponding Committee of Caroline
County,” Virginia Gazette (Purdie) November 3, 1774.

  114  
men.29 While local committees across the colonies have long been credited with

mobilizing the Revolution, less well known is the coercive methods employed by these

boards to monitor inhabitants.30 Perhaps ironically, Dunmore delivered the most accurate

description of committees’ efforts watching,

the conduct of every inhabitants, without distinction, and to send for all such as
come under their suspicion into their presence; to interrogate them respecting all
matters which, at their pleasure, they think fit objects of their inquiry; and to
stigmatize… such as they find transgressing what they are now hardy enough to
call the Laws of Congress, which stigmatizing is no other than their inviting the
vengeance of an outrageous and lawless mob… upon the happy victims. Every
County… is now arming a company, for the avowed purpose of protecting their
Committees, and to be employed against the Government.31

Dunmore’s description accurately reflects how committees treated inhabitants

they believed to have violated the Association or merely voiced opposition. Extending

the Association was essentially a means to distinguish between those who supported and

those who opposed the American Cause as well as regulate the marketplace. Rational

dissent or discussion was even punished when some residents tried to organize a party of

dissenters.32 Patriots recognized the need for conformity and a monitored society. In

fact, spirited men, such as Gilmer, who raised volunteers, and Robert Wormeley Carter,

                                                                                                               
29
Historians have called these county committees of safety yet it seems they were not all labeled as such
during the 1770s. Those identified as inimical ranged from violators of the Association to anyone who
undermined order.
30
R.A. Ryerson, “Political Mobilization and the American Revolution: The Resistance Movement in
Philadelphia, 1765 to 1776,” WMQ, Third Series, Vol. 31, no. 4 (Oct., 1974), 565-588.
31
Extract of a letter from the Earl of Dunmore to the Earl Dartmouth, December 24, 1774 in AA, Series IV,
1:1062. County committees refuted Dunmore’s claims, stating they possessed no authority to force
merchants to deliver their books and denied coercion. Such a defense does not seem true. Norfolk County
Committee, May 4, 1775 and Caroline County Committee: Ill Treatment and Diabolical Disposition, May
19, 1775 in RVA, 3:89 and 149-150; and Nicholas Cresswell, The Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-
1777 (New York: The Dial Press, 1924), 57.
32
Virginia Gazette (Pinkney), December 15, 1774.

  115  
spoke highly of the Association and its necessity.33 Gilmer even suggested dissenting

voices needed to be quieted, as “There cannot be an individual capable of a murmur at

the plan proposed.” The Association brought unity to Virginia, one way or another.

For those who disagreed with Gilmer’s patriotism, the Virginia Convention

denounced these equivocal and disaffected men’s avarice, especially given the

community’s need for conformity.34 Those who broke the Association either by speaking

ill of it or hoarding materials and price gouging were labeled as immoral for their disdain

towards neighbors. Local committees, whose claim to authority was highly contested,

knew they needed to impose their beliefs on the community by controlling public space.

The preferred method of enforcing social and economic stigma was to publish the

individual’s name. After summoning an inhabitant, the county committee deemed the

person a threat to social order and published his or her name as an enemy. Schoolteacher

David Wardrobe of Westmoreland County, for example, stood accused of writing a letter

spreading malicious rumors against the American cause.35 Wardrobe voiced displeasure

with his neighbors’ outlandish patriot behavior and effigy hangings, causing county

leaders to view his dissent as venomous. To punish Wardrobe, the committee advised

                                                                                                               
33
George Gilmer, Address of Lieut. George Gilmer to the First Independent Company of Albemarle
County, “Papers Military and Political, 1775-1778 of George Gilmer, M.D., of ‘Pen Park,’ Albemarle
County, VA,” in Collections of the Virginia Historical Society, New Series, Volume VI (Richmond:
Virginia Historical Society, 1887), 78-79 and June 29, 1774, Robert Wormeley Carter Dairy 1774, TR 8,
Transcript, 21-22, CWFL. Original in American Antiquarian Society. It was assumed the virtue of
preserving a common good meant shared sacrifice, but not all Virginians believed such a quality existed.
Carter Braxton, Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Commonwealth of Virginia, on the
Subject of Government in general… (Philadelphia: John Dunlap, 1776), 15, EC Series I, 14669.
34
Second Virginia Convention: Proceedings of the Seventh Day, March 27, 1775 in RVA, 2:383.
35
In an intercepted letter, Wardrobe detailed the happenings in Richmond County since the Boston Port
Act. Wardrobe lamented the burning of a Lord North effigy, yet took solace knowing few gentlemen
agreed with the violence. Westmoreland County Committee: David Wardrobe to Archibald Provan of
Glasgow, Scotland – An Extract, November 8, 1775 in RVA, 2:135-136.

  116  
inhabitants to forbid him use of public buildings and refrain from sending their children

to his classes. By late November, the embattled teacher, like many other ostracized

residents, acquiesced and begged for forgiveness to alleviate his suffering. Other

residents lamented that their non-conformity caused them to “soon became a marked

man…daily met with insults, indignities, and injuries. At length Information respecting

my supposed inimicality to America were regularly sworn to.”36

Local committees sought not only to enforce the Association but to assure

compliance with behavioral standards as well. Many residents eventually complied with

the committees’ regulation, yet how willingly they did so is debatable. Men, such as

John Schaw, whom the Norfolk Borough Committee identified as inimical, knew well the

crowd’s potential violence towards those who refuse to conform, after residents captured

and paraded him around town.37 Publishing an inhabitant’s name could certainly do more

than economically and socially ostracize. Sedition and refusing to turn over account

books were just two of the numerous crimes the patriots defined as dangerous. Other

infractions included gaming or stirring slaves. Such coerced conformity became the
                                                                                                               
36
There were numerous cases of American committees punishing Association violators. See Jonathan
Bouchier, ed. Reminiscences of an American Loyalist, 1738-1789: Being the Autobiography of the Rev.
Jonathan Boucher,… (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925), 105-130, Small Special Collections,
University of Virginia Library and James Parker to Charles Steuart, August 2, 1770, Steuart Papers, MSS,
5040, f. 101 in Mason, “A Loyalist’s Journey,” 159. H.R. McIlwaine suggested county committees sought
to harness public opinion against enemies. “Proceedings of the Committee of Safety of Cumberland and
Isle of Wight Counties, 1775-1776,” ed. H.R. McIlwaine Virginia State Library Report 1918 (Richmond,
1919), 3. Some violators voluntarily appeared, and admitted breaking the 8th Article of the Association
forbidding gambling. They pledged to obey the articles in the future and the committee allowed them to
return to their status, hoping “the public will join with them in not consider[in]g them as enemies to
American liberty.” Southampton County Committee: Chearful Payment and Future Strict Compliance,
April 13, 1775 in RVA, 3:42.
37
Schaw admitted notifying Dunmore of residents who supported the Revolution. Norfolk Borough
Committee, August 8-12, 1775 in RVA, 3:406-433. For other examples of mob action against men cited by
the committee see: Accomack County Committee, June 28, 1775 in RVA, Volume III, 237. When John
Sherlock refused to recognize the committees, a mob seized him at his home and marched him to the
Liberty Pole for a “solemn trial.” He eventually fled to his house, locking himself upstairs armed for
protection. Afterwards, he issued an apology but still received the committee’s censure.

  117  
standard and, evidenced by the number of residents who begged to be restored to their

previous standing, effective.38 Virginians frequently appeared before local committees to

admit fault and attested their loyalty. Economically ostracized was no enviable position

as those deemed suspicious received ill treatment and violence from their neighbors.

With the community mobilized against them, men like Nicholas Cresswell lacked a

means to survive.39 Stigmatized, Cresswell possessed little opportunity to make a living

“for fear of [being considered]…an inhabitant” and forced to take arms against the

British. Rather than fight, Cresswell stated he preferred to “turn parricide,” “starve” or

join the Indians. The sadness, humiliation, desperation, and suffering in his words

illuminate the dehumanizing effects of surveillance. In colonial society, as Cresswell’s

experience demonstrated, economic ostracism was a near death sentence.

While public condemnation remained the major method of punishment, local

committees at times combined publishing names with strong-arm tactics. In an effort to

discern whether merchants were abiding by the Association, in late 1774 the Caroline

County committee initiated a full-scale investigation of seven Port Royal merchants to

discover if they broke the Association.40 Ten days later, two of the seven merchants

willingly cooperated and opened their books. The five merchants who did not were

                                                                                                               
38
Publishing names had an effect, as men like Paul Thilman announced, in a perhaps committee dictated
statement, he would adhere to any measures “for the publick Good.” Hanover County Committee: Candid
Confession and Declaration of Paul Thilman, November 11, 1774 in RVA, 2:170.
39
In a 1779 letter to Thomas Jefferson, amongst other issues, loyalist John Randolph lamented the poor
treatment he received by neighbors and authorities as well as his own family. John Randolph to Jefferson,
October 25, 1779 in A Letter from the Virginia Loyalist John Randolph to Thomas Jefferson Written in
London 1779 ed. Leonard L. Mackall (Worchester, MA: The American Antiquarian Society, 1921), 12,
Small Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
40
Caroline County Committee: To the Printers, December 16, 1774 in RVA, 2:201. Other committees
conducted similar surveillance tactics. In Charles City County, the committee stated that if any member
“shall be informed, or have reason to suspect, that any thing has been done… contrary to the association he
shall” summon the members.

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labeled as unpatriotic public enemies. Edmund Pendleton, Caroline County Committee

chair and future president of the Committee of Safety, lambasted the merchants for

flaunting the revolutionary committee’s authority by appealing directly to the people with

their complaints against the board’s intrusion. When the merchants finally appeared

before the local patriot committee, their disobedient nature had abated, acquiescing to the

board’s intrusive demands. A review of the accounting books showed that the merchants

had not violated the Association. The merchants resented the committee’s reasoning and

tactics. Even though the investigation exonerated them, the merchants disdained and

feared the culture of suspicion, false accusations, and intrusive undemocratic executive

power that was only beginning.

The heavy-handed tactics by the local committees, that sometimes violated

liberties and rights of Americans were resisted and criticized. As a pastor, Reverend John

Agnew held considerable sway over his flock and when he chastised legislators as “great

men... [out to] ruin the poor” and accused committees of invading homes and stealing

goods, revolutionary leaders felt compelled to censor his complaints.41 Denying their

tactics were coercive, committees often reiterated they possessed little recourse in the

struggle against disaffection. In reality, local committees frequently violated private

property on mere suspicion and hearsay. Agnew, like others Virginians, expressed

anxiety over the newly created revolutionary bodies and their ability to execute

resolutions by any means necessary.42

                                                                                                               
41
Nansemond County Committee: Industrious Propagation of False and Erroneous Principles by the Rev.
John Agnew, March 6, 1775 in RVA, 2:315. See also Brendan McConville, The King’s Three Face: The
Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 297.
42
William Clarke expressed similar discontent as others stating, “I shall pay no obedience to the summons
of an Illegal Assembly.” Like others, Clarke later voluntarily declared he would have no further dealings or

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 Other critics publicly lambasted executive bodies as illicit, unjust coercive

institutions that illegally monitored inhabitants and trampled their rights. Written under

the pseudonym A.W. Farmer, Samuel Seabury’s Letters of a Westchester Farmer were

publicly condemned and burned by committees for their critique of the boards’ tactics

and authority. Calling committees biased, ignorant, and excessively coercive, Seabury

harangued hypocritical “papish Inquistion[s]” that intrusively monitored inhabitants and

threatened life and liberty.43 Like other critics of committees, Seabury feared entrusting

any man with such extensive powers. Seabury well understood that publicly denouncing

a man as a traitor inherently created a target, leaving the individual susceptible to

community scorn.44 “Cast out from civil society,” Seabury noted the accused could turn

to no one for assistance or even food.45 In Orange County, patriots seized and

                                                                                                               
correspondence with anyone who opposed the patriot movement. Notably, Clarke also announced he
intended to leave town immediately, vowing not to return within one year.
43
Samuel Seabury, “Free Thoughts on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia,”
November 16, 1774 in Letters of a Westchester Farmer ed. Clarence H. Vance (White Plains: Westchester
Historical Society, 1930), 60-62. For Seabury, the inherent problem was that while committees claimed
they only recommended inhabitants abide the Association, in reality the boards enforced conformity if it
were law. Questioning by what authority they met and executed resolutions, Seabury asked why did
farmers submit to such gross violations of law and individual rights? Requiring no proof, trial or evidence
when condemning a man, Seabury stated no government on earth deserved such unquestioned power.
Seabury, “The Congress Canvassed: or An Examination into The Conduct of the Delegates at their Grand
Convention,” November 28, 1774, in Letters of a Westchester Farmer, 84-85. Others too noted civil
liberties infringed upon. “Is there no Danger to Liberty when every Merchant is liable to have his House,
Property, and even Life, invaded or threatened by a mob.” “To Mr. Purdie,” Virginia Gazette (Purdie)
January 20, 1774. Virginia’s political environment became so tense that when accused of breaking the
Association, Anthony Warwick of Nansemond County refused to appear before a local committee unless
granted protection. Rather than protection, he found himself confronted and seized by an angry crowd
ready to dispense justice. Since the committee lacked a quorum, Warwick received no formal examination
but instead acquired a suit of tar to remind him to observe the patriots’ rule. Isle of Wight County: A Suit of
Tar and Feathers and a Shower of Eggs, August 24, 1775 in RVA, 3:485.
44
Adele Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia: The Norfolk Area and the Eastern Shore (Ann Arbor:
UMI Research Press, 1982), 25. Adele Hast argued once the economic portion of the Association was
effectively enforced, the Norfolk Committee turned to other illicit behavior, such as sedition.
45
Seabury, “The Congress Canvassed: or An Examination into The Conduct of the Delegates at their Grand
Convention,” November 28, 1774, 85. Seabury argued that those who are published are, “considered as
Out-laws, unworthy of the protection of civil society, and delivered over to the vengeance of a lawless,

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condemned his letters as “falsehoods and malicious artifices” that sought to divide

Americans.46 During a civil war, seditious words demoralized the rebellion and

corrupted inhabitants’ minds. Therefore committees censored free speech.47

Recognizing the limits of local committees’ authority, the Virginia Convention

desired stricter policing and more effective centralized leadership. Imploring “the People

to observe a peaceable & orderly behavior,” legislators declared the need for a “proper

Plan” to both protect inhabitants and secure potentially dangerous men “who are

Nu[i]sances to every Society.”48 Casting aside apprehensions about a strong executive,

Convention members recognized the inherent problems of a vast local committee system

in the face of mounting disorder.49 Virginia suffered from an inefficient system of

procuring supplies that relied on local committees requesting inhabitants’ involvement.50

                                                                                                               
outrageous mob,… O rare American Freedom.” Seabury, “Free Thoughts on the Proceedings of the
Continental Congress at Philadelphia,” November 16, 1774, 61.
46
Orange County Committee: Surprising Conduct of the Reverend John Wingate, March 25, 1775, and
Orange County Committee: A Noble Indignation, March 27, 1775 in RVA, 2:377-378 and 386.
47
George Gilmer contended that, “Should we be distressed with the horrors of a civil war… but should it
be unavoidable, I say let us not behold it in such a fatal view as to be terrified at the event.” He called upon
people to give up “private Interest.” George Gilmer, Address of Lieut. Geo. Gilmer at the Muster of
Albemarle County, June 17, 1775, “Papers Military and Political, 1775-1778 of George Gilmer, M.D., of
‘Pen Park,’ Albemarle County, VA,” 87-88.
48
Second Virginia Convention: Proceedings of the Sixth Day, and Second Virginia Convention:
Proceedings of the Seventh Day, March 25 and 27, 1775 in RVA, 2:373 and 381. Additionally, the
Convention hoped creditors and debtors could set aside their differences without causing disunity.
49
As news of Bunker Hill came, some members of the ruling elite wondered how government would be
affected. William Byrd to Ralph Wormeley, October 4, 1775, Papers of Ralph Wormeley, 1773-1802,
Small Special Collections, University of Virginia Library. On June 24, violence reached Dunmore as a
group plundered his home. In Williamsburg, armed patriots paraded with their guns, defying Dunmore’s
ever weakening hold on Virginia. Given such violence, patriots realized an executive was needed but
seemed hesitant of a dictatorship. RVA Volume 3:226.
50
At the end of June, the Cumberland County Committee issued a passionate open letter thanking residents,
but also assuring them the struggle against subversion was far from over. Calling inhabitants to action, the
patriot committee argued that the war placed their liberties at stake. McIlwaine, “Proceedings of the
Committee of Safety of Cumberland and Isle of Wight Counties, 1775-1776,” 15-16.

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Even though Virginia was not yet a state, George Mason vehemently asserted that its

future ordinances represent “the Face of Law” as previous ones had not.51 Mason

understood that any semblance of law and order would provide stability. However, the

undisciplined and disconnected committee system could not be trusted with such a

complex and imperative problem.

The Committee of Safety and the Military

On August 16, 1775 the Third Virginia Convention recognized the dire times and

called for an effective executive “for the Protection and Defence of this Colony.”52

Although deeming the Committee of Safety a necessity to meet this demand, legislators

only vaguely mandated it to carry “into Execution the several Rules and Regulations

established by this Convention.”53 Meeting only when the Convention recessed, no

Committeeman could hold military office. The importance and confidence Virginia’s

patriots placed in the Committee of Safety is evident by the amount of power they

bestowed upon it at this critical juncture in the Revolution. Conscious of the divide

between civil and military jurisdiction, the Virginia Convention mandated that the colony

                                                                                                               
51
George Mason to Martin Cockburn, August 22, 1775, The Papers of George Mason, 1:252. The
Convention hoped to regularize elections, raise military forces, and print paper money. See also: Gordon
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1969), 317.
52
Passed on August 24, the Convention stressed the need to suppress criminal activity to establish “peace
and good Behavior.” Third Virginia Convention, August 22, 1775 in RVA, 3:451.
53
The Convention already began some monitoring of vessels that would become emblematic of the
Committee of Safety’s reign. Yet complaints ensued. Third Virginia Convention, July 27, 1775 and August
16, 1775 in RVA, 3:350-351 and 451 and Third Virginia Convention: Norfolk Borough Committee to
Thomas Nelson Jr., James Holt, and Joseph Hutchings, Esquires, July 28, 1775 and Third Virginia
Convention, August 4, 1775, RVA in 3:364 and 397.

  122  
possess a civil bulwark, like the Committee of Safety, to effectively counterbalance the

American military and guide the Revolution.54

The Committee of Safety possessed a wide array of executive powers including:

commissioning officers, procuring supplies, corresponding with committees within and

outside the colony, subsidizing sulfur and saltpeter production, establishing lead mine

initiatives, and the ability to capture and confine disaffected persons.55 Committee of

Safety member John Page would prove to be exceptionally influential on both that board

and later the Council of the State. As a former member of the Governor’s Council, Page

brought sorely needed experience and leadership to the Committee of Safety.56 As a civil

body, the Committee of Safety administered to the colony’s defense and worked

alongside military forces and personnel. Vitally important to the Committee of Safety’s

mission is that it maintained civil authority in the face of potential military usurpation of

its power. Consciously aware that civil authority must be preserved for the Revolution to

                                                                                                               
54
Recognizing immense and undefined powers could easily be abused; legislators even excluded militia
officers. After a short debate, members rejected dividing the colony into 16 military districts. On August
17, 1775 the Convention voted Edmund Pendleton, George Mason, John Page, Richard Bland, Thomas
Ludwell Lee, Paul Carrington, Dudley Digges, William Cabell, Carter Braxton, James Mercer, and John
Tabb as a Committee of Safety. Some of the men previously sat on the Governor’s Council and possessed
executive experience. Although Mason wished not to serve, perhaps his belief that both society and
government must be “calculated for the general good and safety of the community” stirred him. Remarks
on Annual Elections for the Fairfax Independent Company, April 17-26, 1775, The Papers of George
Mason, 1:229-232. Mason compared the colonies to the transition from the Roman Commonwealth to
Empire and took particularly issue with the concept of a dictator or rulers who served for life. Such power
was the downfall of Rome, and would be in America as well. Such sentiments might have influenced the
Committee of Safety’s short-term status.
55
John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia: 1775-1783 (Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg
Foundation, 1988), 52-53; SVA, 9:49-53 and 71-73. Gilmer lamented salt deficiencies and implored
conservation. Gilmer, Address of George Gilmer to the Inhabitants of Albemarle County, “Papers Military
and Political, 1775-1778 of George Gilmer, M.D., of ‘Pen Park,’ Albemarle County, VA,” 120. Notably,
the Convention established both the powerful Committee of Safety and the general test at the same time.
Issues of loyalty would continue to be uniquely linked to its agenda.
56
Influential as Page was on the Committee of Safety, historians have seldom devoted scholarship to him.
Labeled a conservative, Page has been neglected much like the committee he served.

  123  
succeed, the Committeemen still aided military leaders with defensive measures.57

Ordering the Committee of Safety to erect and guard a magazine, the Virginia

Convention hoped to prevent a repeat of the April fiasco. Given the chaos caused by the

potential invasions and insurrections, legislators understood the necessity of defensive

measures and allowed the Committee of Safety to summon and command both the

regular forces and the minutemen to prevent “immediate danger” and assure “internal

security.”58 Embracing the Convention’s mandate, the Committee of Safety contacted

local committees to acquire any public arms, erect powder mills, issue military contracts,

and ration provisions. Examining the Committee of Safety’s ledger demonstrates the

sheer volume of military preparations. On September 28th alone the Committee of Safety

paid Edward Snickers and Dr. James Innes £1000 each for weapons collected.59 During

that month alone, the Committee of Safety paid over £2,000 to recruiters.60 Aside from

war preparations and consolidating local committees’ power, the Convention concluded

that the Committee of Safety was necessary to meet the increasing violence.

Tensions continued to rise, making effective executive leadership essential. In

areas with a strong British presence such as Norfolk, patriots faced immediate challenges

                                                                                                               
57
County committees delivered commission recommendations to the Committee of Safety. February 2,
1776, Robert Honyman Diary, 1776-1782, Microfilm, CWFL.
58
Third Virginia Convention, August 25, 1775 in RVA, 3:487-492. The Convention also received a petition
from British born merchants and agreed if these men caused no problems their liberties would be preserved.
The very next day the Committee of Safety commissioned Patrick Henry as the colonel of the first
regiment. While this was a controversial move, Henry was charged with protecting the colony and keeping
the peace. The Convention also ordered the executive body to encourage the manufacturing of saltpeter,
sulfur, and to collect arms and ammunition. SVA, 9:50. George Mason feared this extra-ordinary power that
even Dunmore did not possess. For more on Virginia’s recruiting problems see: Michael A. McDonnell,
The Politics of War: Race, Class, & Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 2007), 281.
59
Virginia Committee of Safety, September 28 and October 2, 1775 in RVA, 4:150 and 158.
60
The Committee of Safety issued resolutions for providing soldiers with supplies. See for example:
Virginia Committee of Safety, November 13, 1775 in RVA, 4:392-393.

  124  
to their authority. Commander of HMS Mercury British Captain John Macartney notified

Norfolk mayor Paul Loyall that due to local committees’ intrusive policies investigating

inhabitants’ allegiance and condemning men without trials, he intended to employ “the

utmost coercive measures” to prevent “unlawful combinations and persecutions.”61

Lawlessness encompassed the region as Dunmore continued to raid the coastline, seizing

or destroying weapons.62 These minor victories combined with rumors of the possible

arrival of additional reinforcements kept loyalists in good spirits.63

In response to British aggressions, the Committee of Safety sought to protect

Virginians. Instructing Colonel William Woodford to enter the Norfolk region, the

executive body reiterated he was to protect friends of the American Cause, capture

anyone who took arms against the Revolution, eliminate attempts to communicate or

supply the enemy, examine the suspicious, prevent slave uprisings, preserve loyalists’

land, and allow any neutral inhabitants to remain unmolested.64 Neutrality would fast

become a classification the revolutionaries would not accept. Hoping to preserve

                                                                                                               
61
Macartney bemoaned the accusation-based culture that placed resident John Schaw in jeopardy. He also
hinted at Andrew Sprowle’s experience. Accused of supplying British troops, Sprowle received harsh
treatment by a mob. Later Sprowle revealed, Dunmore forced his way into Sprowle’s home and zealot
committee members, lacking evidence, unjustly persecuted him. Hast, 28-29. Norfolk Borough leaders
continued to exchange words with Macartney, accusing the captain of intimidating residents and usurping
powers. Finding his accusations groundless, the local committee condemned Macartney’s attempts to
threaten civil authority by instituting military rule. Norfolk Borough, August 12 and 15, 1775, Norfolk
County Committee, August 12, 1775, and Norfolk Borough: Proceedings of Common Hall respecting
Conduct of Captain John Macartney, August 21, 1775 in RVA, 3:431-433, 448 and 473.
62
Patriots received reports of troops arriving from St. Augustine, a violent loyalist mob led by Josiah
Phillips in Princess Anne County, and British ships plundering the coastline seizing slaves. Third Virginia
Convention: Norfolk Borough Committee to Peyton Randolph, July 31 and August 1, 1775 and Third
Virginia Convention: Officers to President and Gentlemen of Convention, August 1, 1775 in RVA 3:378
and 385.
63
Ivor Noel Hume, 1775: Another Part of the Field (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 355. Residents
such as Edward Johnson lamented the continued deteriorating imperial conflict and the high prices that
distressed families. Edward Johnson to William Preston, October 14, 1775 in PFP, VHS.
64
Virginia Committee of Safety: Orders for Colonel William Woodford, October 24, 1775 in RVA, 4:270-
271.

  125  
inhabitants loyalties, the Committee of Safety struggled to provide security. After

Dunmore’s Proclamation declared martial law and he called upon inhabitants to bear

arms and rally to his standard, many Virginians flocked to the embattled governor out of

loyalty as well as fear.65 Even though loyalist William Eddis knew the inherent problem

of martial law and freeing the slaves, he claimed the proclamation indeed mobilized

supporters.66

British aggression and victories quickly increased their supporters yet the

Committee of Safety refused to remain idle. Based on the voluminous number of

intercepted letters, the executive body understood momentum had shifted and residents

feared for Norfolk’s safety.67 Other intercepted letters delivered military intelligence,

such as residents begging Dunmore to intercede and protect them. As Dunmore’s forces

won decisive victories at Kemp’s Landing and issued his infamous proclamation

emancipating rebels’ slaves, Virginians experienced a significant psychological loss.68

                                                                                                               
65
Dunmore commenced issuing oaths calling upon residents to attest that patriots “violently under various
false pretences usurped the legislative and executive powers.” Norfolk loyalists released their own
Association, arguing they had been mislead by committeemen. Royal Chief Magistracy, November 7,
1775, Royal Chief Magistracy, November 14, 1775, and Royal Chief Magistracy: Association of Loyal
Virginians, November 15, 1775 in RVA, 4:334, 395, and 403-404.
66
William Eddis, Letters from America, Historical and Descriptive; comprising Occurrences from 1769, to
1777…(London: 1792), 250-252. With many collaborators in the Norfolk area, Dunmore possessed
intelligence. Even former patriots communicated with Dunmore and when discovered, were exiled to the
interior. Hugh Blair Grigsby, The Virginia Convention of 1776…(Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1855), 51. In
general, many locals feared the town was to be leveled. Committee of Safety: Andrew Sprowle, Gosport,
Virginia, to George Brown Merchant in Glasgow, Scotland: An Intercepted Letter, November 1, 1775 in
RVA, 4:313.
67
Katherine Hunter’s letter demonstrated her devotion to the King, recent military maneuvers, and
hardships. Committee of Safety: Katherine Leslie Hunter, Gosport, Virginia, to Miss Logan, Milliner, Na
Street, Glasgow...: An Intercepted Letter, November 5, 1775 in RVA, 4:323-325.
68
County committees protested Dunmore’s proclamation, feared his influence over the “lower Class of
People” and knew Norfolk aided the enemy. Committee of Northampton County, Virginia, to the honorable
The President of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, November 25, 1775 in RVA, 4:468. Dunmore’s
Proclamation caused moderates to join the patriot camp, fearing slave uprisings. Others, such as Robert

  126  
Helen Calvert Maxwell recalled inhabitants nervously flocked to the governor’s standard.

Trepidation stirred residents to buy red cloth, demonstrating their allegiance to the

King.69 As Dunmore retook more areas, his followers increased by the thousands.

Virginians realized that as momentum shifted, at any minute, “we must take up Arms

either in one side or the other.”70 To combat British aggressions, the Convention

responded with stricter measures against the disaffected, removing military restrictions

for neutral merchants.71 The patriot government sent a clear message, conform and bear

arms or leave the colony. As the war continued, the revolutionary government assumed

more powers to fill the vacuum left by royal government’s collapse.72 Along with these

                                                                                                               
Carter Nicholas, viewed Dunmore as a direct threat to property. Jack Greene ed., Diary of Colonel Landon
Carter of Sabine Hall, 1752-1778, Volume II, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1965), 989.
69
Commenting on the chaos, Maxwell recounted to Dunmore tales of armed blacks interrogating her and
searching her home for militiamen and goods. Her husband, patriot William Maxwell, went into hiding
when Dunmore arrived but eventually accepted a British oath. Helen Calvert Maxwell, Memoirs of Helen
Calvert Maxwell Read ed. Charles B. Cross Jr. (Chesapeake, Norfolk Historical Society, 1970), 57-58.
Robert Nicholas Carter also described British plunders and the fluidity of loyalties. Anxious over
Dunmore’s martial law decree, Carter wished the Committee of Safety would soon sit. Robert Nicholas
Carter to Jefferson, November 25, 1775, PTJ. Former patriots now swore they were forced them to take up
arms. In an intercepted letter, Neil Jamieson recounted the utter confusion, and rush to accept the oath.
With marital law declared, the British arrested those deemed responsible for swaying the poors’ allegiance.
The community imploded, accusing each other of betraying the British in order to save themselves.
Committee of Safety: Neil Jamieson, Norfolk, Virginia, to Messrs. Glassford, Gordon, Monteath, & Co.,
Glasgow: An Intercepted Letter, November 17, 1775 in RVA, 4:423-425.
70
Committee of Safety: Alexander Wylie, Portsmouth, Virginia, to Mr. William Wylie…: An Intercepted
Letter, November 16, 1775 in RVA, 4:434-435.
71
On December 19, 1775 the Convention requested any merchants who had not aided Dunmore to swear
allegiance to Virginia or depart. The test oath required them to meet the Association, not conspire with the
enemy, and obey all ordinances. An Ordinance for Establishing a General Test Oath, August 19, 1775, The
Papers of George Mason, 1:246-249. If any resident refused the oath twice, they faced disarming, limited
mobility, and had their names published. Fourth Virginia Convention, December 20, 1775 in RVA, 5:198-
200. The test oath also required Quakers to affirm as well. Anyone who refused faced a £200 fine. They
had six months to take the oath and receive a certificate in order to be restored to their previous standing.
72
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 79. Due to Dunmore’s blockade and raids, the Virginia Convention
ordered ports open to all countries. Selby argued this was a move towards independence. The Convention
also called for county committees to appoint sheriffs. SVA, 9:92-93.

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new resolutions, the Virginia Convention extended the Committee of Safety, the arm of

the Revolution.73

Once patriot forces reasserted themselves, the Committee of Safety could root out

dissenting opinions. After the American victory at Great Bridge, the Committee of

Safety boasted control of Norfolk.74 Inhabitants, who previously wore red strips,

discarded the controversial fabric. Beleaguered residents who remained approached

American Colonel Woodford, pleading for exoneration while others absconded in terror.

Woodford informed the Committee of Safety that he had immediately notified inhabitants

if they acquiesced to his orders, past infractions would be forgotten.75 However, the

more suspicious and notorious residents found themselves confined until the Convention

or Committee of Safety ordered otherwise. James Imrie, whose letters the executive

body intercepted, recalled that once the Americans seized momentum, inhabitants lacked

a luxury of choices, either bear arms or face confinement.76 Knowing that Parliament had

passed the Restraining Bill, encouraging loyal British subjects to terminate the rebellion,

the Committee of Safety and American military leaders felt compelled to strictly police

                                                                                                               
73
The Committee of Safety was extended for another year. SVA, 9:95-96.
74
Rumors circled of Dunmore pressing men into service and conducting germ warfare. “Williamsburg,”
Virginia Gazette (Pinkney), December 30, 1775 and Extract of a letter from Philadelphia July 18,
Connecticut Gazette, July 26, 1776.
75
Fourth Virginia Convention: Petition of the Inhabitants of Norfolk to the Right Honourable Army …, and
Petition of Neutral Highlanders, December 10, 1775 in RVA, 5:97. Both Norfolk residents and recently
emigrated neutral Highlanders petitioned Woodford for protection. Woodford demanded they aid him in
return. He also ordered the capture of anyone deemed inimical. The Convention instructed Woodford to
examine inhabitants and send those who bore arms to Williamsburg. Some accused residents applied
directly to the Committee of Safety, requesting information regarding their fate. During this period, the
Convention discharged some, paroled others, and confined the rest.
76
Committee of Safety: James Imrie…to John Hay…: An Intercepted Letter, December 16, 1775 in RVA,
5:162. Colonel Robert Howe later informed the Convention that while American forces held Norfolk, the
town possessed a high number of “wretches” who opposed American liberties.

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allegiance, leaving neutrality as dangerously outdated. Combating the British only

represented one military threat to civil order the Committee of Safety faced.

When American General Charles Lee brought his military prowess and zealous

hate of loyalists to Virginia, the Committee of Safety rejoiced yet soon discovered, like

the British, he threatened civil authority. Initially, Committee President Edmund

Pendleton happily awaited Lee’s arrival.77 Yet as in New York, Lee proved to be a

powder keg, immediately stirring trouble in the southern theater by capturing the

Maryland colonial governor and complaining of the Virginia Committee of Safety’s

perceived lethargy. Similar to the situation between Lee and the New York Committee

of Safety the dispute centered on the conflict between civil authority and military

leadership. Considering the Committee of Safety too apprehensive, Lee made unilateral

decisions without notifying elected representatives. Angering civil authorities, Lee

confiscated the governor’s home as his headquarters and attempted to usurp the College

of William and Mary into a field hospital. Vehemently opposing Lee’s actions, the

Committee of Safety charged him with disregarding executive jurisdiction. Attempting

to be diplomatic, Pendleton wrote the general, that even if his actions did not intend to be

“destructive,” the people would assume they are “being subjected to an absolute military

Government whilst we are straining every nerve in defence of liberty.”78 Pendleton’s

initial excitement disappeared, as by no means did the Committee of Safety wish for

                                                                                                               
77
Pendleton possibly hoped Lee would alleviate some of the Committee of Safety’s responsibilities and
target disaffection. Pendleton to James Mercer, March 19, 1776, The Letters and Papers of Edmund
Pendleton ed. David John Mays, Volume I (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1967), 159-
160. John Alden briefly mentioned Lee’s relations with executive bodies, but mostly focused on his hate
for disaffection. John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot? (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1951), 112-115.
78
Pendleton to Lee, April 25, 1776, The Lee Papers, 1:451-452.

  129  
zealot military men to infringe on civil authority. Even after Lee apologized, Pendleton

again wrote the general clarifying his position. Expressing that the Committee of Safety

did not wish to accuse Lee of instituting military rule, Pendleton reiterated the general

needed to be aware of the executive body’s apprehensions with his methods.79 Far from

timid, Pendleton warned Lee to think twice before he disregarded civil government.

Ultimately both Lee and the Committee of Safety sought the same goal, and it

aided the military’s effort. Believing Dunmore still planned to invade, Lee continued his

efforts to secure the South and the Committee of Safety offered assistance.80 Delivering

Lee the colony’s military forces, the Committee of Safety provided two regiments and

seven battalions. Placing early tension behind them, the executive body members praised

Lee’s leadership skills and asked colonists not to question his methods, even though the

general’s plans possibly left some areas defenseless and angry. Unlike the New York

Committee of Safety, Virginia’s Committee relinquished some military responsibilities,

but never backed down completely.81

Lambasting Lee on occasion, the Committee of Safety still approved some of his

more controversial pursuits of disaffection. In a letter to Pendleton, the general argued

even women and children possessed inimical natures and should be removed since they

“had learnt the art and practic’d” of spying. Therefore, Lee suggested leveling

                                                                                                               
79
Virginia Committee of Safety, May 2, 1776 in RVA, 6:509. According to John Selby, the original order to
arrest loyalists in April 1776 was recommended by the council of war and approved by the Committee of
Safety. The Committee, under Pendleton’s guidance, later acquitted some loyalists at the end of April 1776.
80
Lee to the President of Congress, April 19, 1776, The Lee Papers, 1:433. Rumors swirled in Virginia that
since British General Henry Clinton arrived, more violence might ensue. Historians have accepted Lee’s
critique of the Committee of Safety and subsequently incorrectly refer to the body as timidly handing
power over to military leaders.
81
The Committee of Safety to Lee, April 10, 1776, The Lee Papers, 1:403-405.

  130  
Portsmouth.82 In Portsmouth, Lee once again disrespected civil authority by ordering the

homes of three disaffected persons burnt to the ground. Desiring to destroy the whole

town, he accepted leveling a few homes to intimidate others to obey ordinances. Arguing

public examples needed to be made of anyone who aided the enemy, Lee pressured the

Committee of Safety to act.83 Aside from burning homes, Lee turned his attention to

apprehending suspicious inhabitants. Lee conceded, while not protocol, apprehensions

still had “occasions when the necessity will excuse deviations, and this I hope will appear

to the Committee to be one of these occasions.” Realizing the controversial nature of his

methods, he hoped the Committee of Safety would recognize such measures as necessary.

Pendleton did not disappoint. Far from being timid, Pendleton condoned Lee’s behavior.

After consulting the rest of board, the Committee President boldly declared,

It being one of the inevitable consequences of this kind of war, that legal modes
of enquiry must yield to necessity, and what the public safety seems to require,
should be immediately done, even tho’ some injury may arise to innocent
individuals.84

In this case, public security trumped both legal procedures and the potential of harming

innocent persons. While Pendleton agreed that only the homes of “the most notorious

offenders” should be destroyed, he certainly did not dismiss the idea. Instead, Pendleton

noted that the people’s representatives should be consulted before military figures’

unilateral decision. By thanking Lee for his handling of the disaffected in Portsmouth,

                                                                                                               
82
Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776, The Lee Papers, 1:467-469.
83
Lee openly admitted to Pendleton that even men, such as a certain Mr. Hopkins who admitted his guilt,
was forced to watch his goods seized and “his house [set] on fire in his Presence.” Three enemies Lee
targeted were John Goodrich, Andrew Sprowle, and Robert Shedden. Adding injury to insult, Lee’s troops
stole salt and molasses from the region.
84
Edmund Pendleton to Lee, May 5, 1776, The Lee Papers, 1:470-471. Pendleton stipulated that if sugar
and molasses were taken from innocent people, inventories needed to be taken for returns, if possible.

  131  
the Committee of Safety endorsed the idea of intimidating the population to institute

conformity, obedience and, most importantly, security.

The Committee of Safety and Surveillance

Intercepted letters not only assisted the war effort but also delivered the

Committee of Safety information regarding residents’ allegiance. Its members argued

such surveillance measures provided necessary details to protect inhabitants. Early in the

war, those in England already realized, “Letters are liable to be inspected by the people

calling themselves Committees.”85 The Committee of Safety swiftly targeted community

members it deemed suspicious, such as Charles Burg, who previously defended

Dunmore’s seizure of powder. Knowing Burg’s political opinions made him an easy

target to monitor. Although intrusive and controversial, such tactics provided the

Committee of Safety with the means to police society. Such undemocratic measures did

not anger all inhabitants, as open letters to local patriot committees revealed Virginians’

frustration with the government’s ineffective enforcement of the Association and price

regulation. Perceiving complaints as a mandate, the Committee of Safety crafted its

modus operandi to police society.86 Anonymous resident, “Galba” questioned why

during such tumultuous times that demanded sacrifices and taxes for “internal police,”

was it acceptable for inimical persons to over-charge for goods, disrespecting

                                                                                                               
85
On December 6, 1775, the Virginia Convention officially ordered all “intercepted letters” that “concern
the publick” be delivered to the Committee of Safety. Surveillance became tied to the war effort as
gathering intelligence depended upon knowing inhabitants’ allegiance. Proceedings of the Convention of
Delegates held at the Town of Richmond, in the Colony of Virginia on Friday the 1st of December, 1775
(Alexander Purdie: Williamsburg, 1776), 4. EC, Series I, 15197. Virginia Committee of Safety: Archibald
Ingram…, to James Ingram ...: An Intercepted Letter, August 30, 1775 in RVA, 4:58. Archibald Ingram
wrote to James Ingram in Norfolk whom the Committee of Safety assumed held loyalist leanings.
86
Another writer, “Cassius,” demanded that the Association be enforced lest provisions went to the British
in Boston. The writer also criticized the “class of men” who spread false rumors, undermining the cause.
“Galba” even named merchant John Greenhow as a violator and proposed the committee to take action.

  132  
governmental legitimacy and harming their neighbors’ well being.87 For many people the

Committee of Safety’s measures were not arbitrary, as inhabitants demanded more

action.

Intercepted letters provided a surplus of information as well as unfounded rumors.

Correspondence mentioned the raising of troops and names of residents who possibly

broke the Association.88 For example, a letter from Alexander Watson Jr. did not

immediately lead to labeling him as inimical. However within two months of continued

surveillance, the Committee of Safety designated Watson an enemy based on his

correspondence.89 In part due to information from intercepted letters describing a

possible enemy attack, the Committee of Safety instructed militia leaders to be prepared.

Scribbled in the margins of its letters, Committee of Safety secretary John Pendleton

demanded the militia “Keep up a regular Patrol.”90 With invasion almost certain,

monitoring the colony and its inhabitants remained vital. However, after acquiring

intercepted letters, what could committees do with such knowledge?

Empowered by the Continental Congress to “arrest and secure every person…

whose going at large may… endanger the safety of the colony or the liberties of

America,” the Committee of Safety broadly interpreted such a vaguely defined

                                                                                                               
87
Williamsburg City Committee, September 14, 1775 in RVA, 4:111.
88
See: Virginia Committee of Safety: John Ander Jr., Glasgow, Scotland, to William Shedden…: An
Intercepted Letter, August 31, 1775 and Virginia Committee of Safety: George Brown, Glasgow, Scotland,
to Andrew Sprowle…: An Intercepted Letter, September 1, 1775 in RVA, 4:61-62 and 65-67. The
Committee of Safety also discovered recruiting missions in Augusta County.
89
Virginia Committee of Safety: Alexander Watson Jr., Norfolk, Virginia to Thomas Smyth…: An
Intercepted Letter, September 18, 1775, RVA, 4:124-125. See also: Watson to William Lloyd, October 18,
1775 and Watson to Alexander Watson, Sr., November 10, 1775 in RVA 4: 236-237, and 373.
90
Edmund Pendleton, Sir, The Committee of Safety request you will immediately…(Williamsburg:
October [14], 1775), Small Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.

  133  
mandate.91 Conscious of the situation in Virginia, its delegates in Philadelphia warned

the executive body to be mindful of Dunmore. Providing intelligence only, the delegates

did not seek to control the Committee of Safety. Rather, they suggested only that the

executive body to strengthen the military presence and to employ stealth so as to not

alarm the enemy. Writing from Alexandria, resident Nicholas Cresswell anxiously

described the scene in Virginia as,

the utmost confusion. Committees are appointed to inspect into the Characters
and Conduct of every tradesman, to prevent them selling Tea or buying British
Manufactures. Some of them have been tarred and feathers, others had their
property burnt and destroyed by the populace.92

Witnessing upheaval upset Cresswell. He travelled to America to make his fortune and

despite recent hardships caused by the Revolution, had no intention of allowing such

threats to discourage him. His opinion, however, would change as the Committee of

Safety’s power grew.93

Other intercepted letters revealed just how difficult the Committee of Safety made

traveling within Virginia. Men like Robert Shedden lamented how communication

                                                                                                               
91
Treasurers directed to collect…, October 6, 1775, AA, Series IV, 3:1891.
92
Cresswell, 43-44. Believing the “rebellious scoundrels” usurpers of power, Cresswell’s opinions are
echoed by others. Cresswell noted that anyone who opposed the committee on paper currency issues might
find, “prisons and persecution…convince them of their mistaken notions.” While Cresswell had not fled the
country, George Mason noted that many Norfolk residents escaped Dunmore’s aggressions. Mason to
Washington, October 14, 1775, The Papers of George Mason, 1:256. George Rae and Samuel Edwards
believed the rise of the revolutionary governments was steeped in violence. After Dunmore’s departure,
both men surmised that good government ceased to exist. Committee of Safety: George Rae… to Mr. John
Rae,…: An Intercepted Letter, November 1, 1775 in RVA, 4:336-338. Edwards, a British shipmate on the
Otter located on the Elizabeth River, related the chaos facing the colony. “Law, Justice, and Trade are
Entirely stop’d.” Committee of Safety: Samuel Edwards… to Unidentified Addressee: An Intercepted
Letter, November 8, 1775 in RVA, 4:313.
93
By the end of October, Cresswell believed many in Alexandria endorsed independence and the “people
here are ripe for revolt, nothing but curses and imprecations against England. Accused of spying in
Maryland, Cresswell stated, “The Committees act as Justices. If any person is found to be inimical” they
hand them to the mob. He lamented, “It is as much as a person’s life is worth to speak disrespectfully of the
Congress. The people are arming... They are all liberty mad.” Cresswell, 56-57 and 113-114.

  134  
between Portsmouth and Williamsburg was difficult and only made possible if one

possessed an official pass permitting safe travel.94 Even those possessing a passport

discovered widespread surveillance. Attempting to reach Colonel Woodford to obtain

permission to enter Norfolk, Edward Johnson was apprehended. By the time he reached

Norfolk, the Committee of Safety summoned him for failing to comply with his pass.95

Once interrogated Johnson realized the Committee intended to charge him with sedition

based solely upon hearsay.96 The Committee confined the frightened Johnson for weeks

while it summoned his accuser. Contending the man a liar, Johnson claimed the charade

blatant anti-Scottish sentiments.97 When the day came for his accuser to deliver his

statement, the man rescinded his allegations. Even though the Committee’s coercive

tactics failed, it refused to allow Johnson to depart and forced him to stand trial.98 Even

without a conviction, the Committee scared Johnson and others into recognizing its

                                                                                                               
94
Committee of Safety: Robert Shedden… to Andrew Sym..: An Intercepted letter, November 9, 1775 in
RVA, 4:354. Anthony Warrick expressed similar sentiments and feared Norfolk would be destroyed.
95
Edward Johnson to William Preston, December 16, 1775 in PFP, VHS. A local committee similarly
captured John Johnson traveling without a pass. John Johnson and his compatriots discovered the board
possessed little interest in justice. It confined the men as spies without a trial or any chance for parole. On
the Committee of Safety’s orders, the local body interrogated them. No doubt disaffected, Johnson referred
to his treatment as “the Spirit of the times.” Committee of Safety: John Johnson …to Unidentified
Addressee: An Intercepted Letter, November 16, 1775 in RVA, 4:414-417.
96
His accuser claimed that a drunk Johnson refused to take arms for the Americans and insisted if forced,
he would secretly retreat to Dunmore. Although Johnson never affirmed his patriotism to his cousin, whig
leader William Preston, he argued he would never abandon his family. It seems Edward Johnson appeared
before the provincial Committee of Safety, but it is not definitive. Edward Johnson to William Preston,
December 16, 1775 in PFP, VHS.
97
To his astonishment, Johnson witnessed, “Civilized people” persecute and view him as a criminal based
on his ethnicity. Edward Johnson to William Preston, August 24, 1775 in PFP, VHS.
98
Edward Johnson to William Preston, December 23, 1775 in PFP, VHS. Johnson wrote pathetically to
Preston of his utter unhappiness “and wish[ed] myself …any where Else.” There is no record of the
outcome of Johnson’s trial but he never appeared censored again and remained in Virginia even though
many Scots fled. Richard Osborn, “William Preston and the Revolutionary Settlement,” Journal of
Backcountry Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, (2010), 16,
http://www.partnershipsjournal.org/index.php/jbc/issue/view/10. Accessed on 5/15/2014.

  135  
ability to police the population. The culture of suspicion and violence only intensified

over time. Manhunts for a resident who wrote a negative song about the Committee,

former friends turning on one another, investigations of loyalty, and permits to travel

created a terrifying new world.99

Women as well as men experienced the frightening world committees for public

safety created. For example, Mary Easson found herself before a board in Isle of Wight

County due to an accusation from an unidentified person claiming Easson was “privy to

certain intelligence.” Defiant and unwilling to recognize its authority, Easson “refused to

be sworn, or answer such questions…and after behaving in a very insolent, scandalous,

and indecent manner, departed without leave.”100 Displaying no evidence against Easson,

the committee’s suspicion and her own insubordination was enough to publish her as an

enemy.

Even though inhabitants rejected the Committee of Safety’s agenda, the

Convention realized the executive body’s efforts were effective; thus the legislature

extended its authority over people deemed dangerous.101 To strengthen the Committee of

Safety’s efforts, the Convention also passed “An Ordinance for establishing a mode of

                                                                                                               
99
Cresswell described a manhunt in Loudon County. Despondent, Cresswell eventually realized the fate of
dissenters, “I am a prisoner at large.” After hearing of Norfolk’s destruction, Cresswell desired only to flee
but knew he must do so secretly. Cresswell, 134-136. Suggesting sending troops to Warwick County, the
legislature hoped to uncover disaffection. Those found suspicious were to immediately appear before the
Committee and obtain a permit to leave the colony. The Fourth Convention, December 19, 1775 in RVA,
5:189. Courts still functioned poorly in 1775, if at all, leading the Convention to institute a new appellate
court system. Curtis, “The Virginia Courts during the Revolution,” 64.
100
Isle of Wight County Committee, October 26, 1775 in RVA, 4:285-286.
101
Not all patriots endorsed the executive body. The Fairfax County Committee of Correspondence wrote
to Committeeman George Mason regarding its distressed situation and the need for assistance. Frustrated
over the lack of geographic representation on the Committee of Safety, Fairfax did not oppose the
executive’s methods, but hoped to strengthen American unity rather than merely cater to the southeast
Tidewater region. Instructions of Fairfax County Committee to Their Convention Delegates, December 9,
1775, The Papers of George Mason, 1:261.

  136  
punishment for the enemies to America in this colony,” defining treasonable action as

anyone who “shall hereafter aid or assist the enemy, by enlisting soldiers, giving

intelligence, or furnishing them with arms, provision, or naval stores, or shall bear arms

against this colony.”102 Virginians like Robert Honyman attested that the ordinance was

indeed enforced, and transgressors punished.103 Along with police powers, legislators

also endowed the Committee of Safety with the responsibility to deal with persons who

turned themselves in as well as pardoned former offenders “upon being satisfied of his or

their repentance.” Although an executive, the Committee of Safety possessed judicial

functions and held jurisdiction over slaves captured who took arms against the colony.

Slaves deemed to have voluntarily joined the enemies would be sold to the West Indies to

buy war materials. If the inimical slave could not be exported, the Committee of Safety

could decide a worthy punishment, sending some to work in lead mines.

Operating from January to March 31, 1776 under this new and stronger ordinance

the Committee of Safety achieved nearly unilateral control of the Revolution on the eve

of independence. During this span, it sat an extraordinary sixty-six times.104 Without the

Convention meeting during this period, the Committee of Safety continued to defend the

                                                                                                               
102
SVA, 9:102. The new ordinance also clarified the Association and its punishments. Judges were named
to hear cases and the Committee of Safety handled appeals. Those who failed to turn themselves in and
those who the Committee of Safety captured could have their estate seized or find themselves imprisoned.
Under the new ordinance, the executive body also commissioned five men in each county to thoroughly
examine inhabitants and cargos to ensure compliance. Such judicial powers now possessed by the executive
were unprecedented in the colonial era. Unlike the General Court, the Committee of Safety could hear any
case it chose.
103
February 2, 1776, Robert Honyman Diary, 1776-1782, Microfilm, CWFL. Honyman believed anyone
who broke the Association would be forbidden from trading in Virginia.
104
RVA, Volume VI, 3.

  137  
colony, build a military presence, procure supplies, and battle disaffection.105 At times,

the Committee of Safety operated with only a few members or even without a quorum

due to what they deemed emergency situations. By authorizing such extreme powers in a

critical time, the legislature implicitly recognized the Committee of Safety performed a

necessary role in the patriots’ previous, and future, success. Even after the Committee of

Safety’s unopposed reign ended, the effects of this inflated power became evident in its

agenda against disaffection and desire for harsher laws.

Even with its increased powers, members of the Committee of Safety realized

their limitations and sought means to circumvent any roadblocks. When forced to release

known disaffected Ralph Wormeley Jr. due to a lack of evidence in April 1776, the

Committeemen recognized a weakness in their ability to police the population. Having

seized a letter from Wormeley to John Symes, the Committee of Safety regrettably noted,

“nothing appears to us in his conduct or in the said Letter, to be within the offences

defined by a later Ordinance” punishing enemies.106 Left to its only recourse, the

executive body issued a heavy security of £10,000 but still suspected Wormeley and

                                                                                                               
105
On February 18, the overworked Committee realized it lacked “Sufficient number of Members” yet it
needed to address critical issues. Therefore, Pendleton, Page, Joseph Jones, and Thomas Walker acted
alone to contact North Carolina about preparing for a possible invasion. Operating without quorum violated
the ordinance creating the Committee, however members argued the common good dictated such a need.
Virginia Committee of Safety, February 18, 1776 in RVA, 6:109.
106
Wormeley Jr. also agreed not to join, correspond, or aid the enemy. Restricted to his father’s estate in
Frederick County and ordered to remain on “good behavior,” he could not leave the colony without the
Convention or Committee’s approval. In May 1778, Wormeley continued to protest his “very long,
inconvenient, and expensive confinement.” Pleading for justice, he argued he broke no ordinance.
Wormeley to Mann Page Jr., May 11, 1778, in Ralph Wormeley, Jr. Papers, 1776-1778. Accession 29882.
Personal papers collection, The Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. Wormeley hoped Mann Page Jr.
(Wormeley’s brother-in-law and John Page’s brother) could plead his case to be included under a potential
new law to pardon enemies. On June 1, 1778, Mann Page wrote Wormeley informing him of his release
and encouraged Wormeley to take an oath of abjuration. Like Page, Wormeley Jr. previously sat on
Dunmore’s Council. Mann Page Jr. to Ralph Wormeley, June 1, 1778 in Papers of Ralph Wormeley 1773-
1802, Small Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.

  138  
ordered him to appear when summoned. The decision incensed both General Lee and

John Page. Convinced Wormeley and others held inimical beliefs and frustrated that it

could not legally confine suspicious persons without breaking the enemies act, the

Committee of Safety required greater jurisdiction. Contending that the Committee of

Safety was too weak, Page demanded, “the Convention should make some new and

stricter regulations” against the disaffected or else “we must labour under infinite

disadvantages.”107 Unlike how previous historians have characterized Committeemen,

Page actively solicited measures to combat disaffection and sought remedies. Requiring

at least the guise of legality for their actions, Page argued that the enemies act needed to

be restructured so inimical or even equivocal residents could be pursued. While

historians traditionally have argued Virginia lacked a significant disaffected population,

Lee and the Committee of Safety perceived themselves constantly under threat both from

potential invasions and internal enemies.108 Thus strengthening the Committee of Safety

by enhancing the enemies act was vital to the Revolution’s success.109

                                                                                                               
107
John Page to Lee, April 28, 1776, The Lee Papers, 1:455-457. In his memoirs, Page discussed his
critical role on the Committee of Safety and Council of State, referring to his duties as “interesting and
hazardous services.” “Memoire” in Thomas Nelson Page, The Old South: Essays Social and Political (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911), 223-231.
108
Lee constantly asked Congress to send more troops south. Lee to the President of Congress, April 24,
1776, The Lee Papers, 1:449.
109
In May 1776, the Virginia Convention also created the Committee of Privileges and Elections to
conduct trials, allowing the legislature to be the judicial power in treason cases. With a new system and
eyewitness evidence, the Convention convicted John Goodrich who had previously slipped through the
Committee of Safety’s fingers. George Curtis argued Lee unfairly treated Goodrich before he was even
convicted. To make some amends, the Committee of Safety released his sons. Curtis, “The Goodrich
Family and the Revolution in Virginia, 1774-1776,” 72-73. With the Convention defining and trying
treason, the Committee of Safety captured estates after conviction. By the end of spring 1776, Pendleton
confidently stated to the Continental Congress that, “We [the Committee of Safety] Shall not fail to strain
every Nerve for defeating their cruel attempts, and as far as may be in our power to carry into Execution the
several resolutions of Congress.” Continental Congress, May 4, 1776 in RVA, 6:517.

  139  
Norfolk: The Culmination of the Security State
The Committee of Safety’s meticulously constructed surveillance system

instituted to define America’s first enemies, police the population, and establish order

coalesced in the Norfolk region. From mid 1775 on, tensions over residents’ allegiances

continued to mount. Adding to the hostility, the presence of British man of war the

Mercury heightened inhabitants’ anxiety. The anonymous writer “THOUSANDS” wrote

in disbelief that residents did not burn the Mercury to ashes for being a beacon to slaves

and a symbol of the colony’s impending doom.110 Surmising that many people secretly

opposed American liberty, “THOUSANDS,” like many patriots, distrusted Norfolk’s

allegiance. Flames of animosity continued to rise as the ongoing war of words escalated

between British Captain Squire and John Hunter Holt regarding claims about the printer’s

inflammatory words.111 Days later when the captain seized Holt’s printing press as

retribution for disseminating alleged falsehoods, residents did nothing to prevent this

heinous attack on American liberties.112 Thomas Jefferson and other patriots deeply

distrusted Norfolk, demanding in a letter to John Page, “Delenda est Norfolk.”113 No

doubt, Page well understood the historical reference that Carthage, like Norfolk,

threatened the republic and needed to be devastated.

                                                                                                               
110
“Mr. Pinkney,” Virginia Gazette (Pinkney), September 21, 1775.
111
Throughout September 1775, the Williamsburg City Committee feared Squire’s presence off the coast.
Norfolk Borough: Captain Matthew Squire to the Printer of Norfolk Papers: An Open Letter, September 9,
1775, Williamsburg City Committee, September 11, 1775, and Norfolk Borough, September 13, 1775 in
RVA, 4:86, 96, and 107.
112
Outraged, revolutionary leaders wrote Dunmore claiming Squire violated, “peace and good order” by
seizing the press and two workers. Dunmore defended the seizure claiming Holt polluted minds. As for
peace and order, Dunmore noted that local committees disregarded Virginia’s laws, so they had no right to
complain. Royal Chief Magistracy, September 30, 1775 in RVA, 4:161-162.
113
Thomas Jefferson to John Page, October 31, 1775, PTJ.

  140  
 As it did elsewhere throughout the colony, to combat the British and disaffection,

the Committee of Safety sought to eliminate travel to Norfolk and Portsmouth.114 Even

though the Committee of Safety and patriot forces policed the region, Norfolk remained

problematic and residents lamented, “We have… now no Government.” Hoping

Dunmore would return to the area, loyalist residents feared that chaos would consume

society and the economy.115 Ascertaining that disaffection remained problematic in the

Norfolk region, the Committee of Safety ordered inhabitants to examine suspicious

persons traveling within Virginia. Given the nature of the times, it stressed the need to

interrogate and detain anyone who refused to “give a proper account of their journey and

employment.”116 Coercive interrogations and presumed guilt dominated the era. By

releasing the genie from the bottle, the Committee of Safety unleashed a culture of

suspicion and distrust upon the colony.

As the war continued, Norfolk residents’ allegiance became increasingly

distrusted. Once again demonstrating the Committee of Safety anything but timid, Page

stated Norfolk inhabitants “are under dreadful Apprehensions of having the Town

burnt...They know they deserve it…many of them deserve to be ruined and hanged.”117

Zealots like Page even considered Norfolk patriots as part of the problem since they did

nothing to defend the cause. In his mind, patriotism needed to be active. Surmising that

                                                                                                               
114
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 63.
115
Virginia Committee of Safety: Alexander Watson Jr., to Mr. William Lloyd..: An Intercepted Letter,
October 18, 1775 in RVA, 4:237.
116
While the Committee of Safety stated all inhabitants were responsible to interrogate suspicious persons,
this responsibility likely fell upon officials. Vigilant Examination of Strangers, October 19, 1775 in RVA,
4:240.
117
John Page to Thomas Jefferson, November 11, 1775, PTJ.

  141  
patriots needed to be taught a lesson, Page proposed leveling the town rather than allow it

to become a beacon for the enemy.118 In response, the Committee of Safety ordered

Colonel Woodford to march on Norfolk, not to fight but to monitor and seize the

suspicious, capture slaves, prevent communications and create a culture of

intimidation.119 Some inhabitants openly did not trust the Committee of Safety’s

integrity.120 However, the Committee of Safety’s most controversial actions in the name

of the common good came in January 1776 after British Captain Bedlam ordered the

bombardment of Norfolk and pillaged its shores.

Virginia patriots not only made little effort to stop the spread of flames, but also

contributed to the city’s destruction. Allowing loyalists’ building to be consumed by the

fires, Virginia forces even looted suspected enemies.121 As the flames consumed much of

the town, the legislature and Committee of Safety debated the unthinkable, destroying the

rest of Norfolk. Expressing some reservations in a letter to Woodford, Pendleton still

understood the tactical advantage of such a controversial order.122 Virginia’s leaders

                                                                                                               
118
Others such as Major Alexander Spotwood agreed with Page as Norfolk’s population represented a
threat. Committee of Safety: Major Alexander Spotswood to Edmund Pendleton…, November 16, 1775 in
RVA, 4:412-413.
119
The Committee of Safety to William Woodford, October 24, 1775, The Letters and Papers of Edmund
Pendleton, 1:122-123. As previously mentioned, the Committee ordered Woodford “to attack, kill, or
captivate” anyone who threatened American supporters. While the Convention elected Patrick Henry
colonel of the First Regiment, the Committee of Safety delivered Woodford its demands. Historian Hugh
Grigsby praise the Committee of Safety’s genius selecting Woodford, despite the controversy surrounding
the nomination of the inexperienced Henry. Grigsby concluded that the Committeemen possessed too much
honor to harbor ill will towards Henry. Grigsby, 51-52.
120
Committee of Safety: John Johnson…to Unidentified Addressee: An Intercepted Letter, November 16,
1775 in RVA, 4:414-417.
121
While the civilian death total is debated, the fact that thousands fled is a testament to the damage caused.
122
Colonel Robert Howe to the Honble the President of the Convention…, January 6, 1776 in RVA, 5:355.
Howe wrote to Pendleton on the state of Norfolk. While he lamented the suffering, he believed residents
were disaffected.

  142  
recognized drastic measures were needed, especially after the Convention received a

petition from Norfolk and Princess Anne county residents bemoaning their desperate

state.

Begging for action, the petitioners requested their neighbors’ loyalties be

examined and if found inimical they should “be removed… to some distant Part of the

Colony, or otherwise according to you superior Wisdom, so disposed of.”123 Attesting

their security in jeopardy, residents argued that only by removing their distrustful

neighbors and curbing their rights, could they themselves be safe. Therefore, they turned

to the government. Realizing such a petition better suited for the executive, the

Convention forwarded the plea to the Committee of Safety. Lamenting that it lacked the

power not the desire to engage in such an initiative, the Committee of Safety

recommended American supporters to leave the region.124 This episode demonstrates a

critical moment in the Committee of Safety’s development. The Convention recognized

the necessity of such coercive and undemocratic measures and fully endorsed the

Committee’s role in the endeavor. Even though the Committee of Safety regretted its

limited jurisdiction at the moment, the controversial notion would be revisited.

Even after a Convention resolution calling for the destruction of Norfolk was

defeated, John Page continued to push for radical action. Afterwards, in a secret meeting

the patriots decided to destroy nearly the entire town. Even with the presence of

American supporters, the burning would be completed in early February.125 Realizing

                                                                                                               
123
Fourth Virginia Convention, January 8, 1776 in RVA, 5:362-363.
124
The Committee promised to aid those residents who could not afford such a costly move.
125
The Convention ordered an inventory estimating homes lost. Americans long believed the British
responsible for Norfolk’s destruction. However, a 1777 commission concluded the Americans destroyed
863 homes, while the British leveled only 51. Later the government suppressed the findings until 1823,

  143  
innocent residents would suffer immensely the legislature asked that the military notify

inhabitants in advance so they might take their belongings and flee. Days later under the

guise of the “General good,” the Convention requested the Committee of Safety

investigate if Portsmouth was worth guarding or it too should be destroyed. Within a

month, the Committee of Safety ordered the remainder of Norfolk leveled to prevent the

British utilizing it as a headquarters. At the time, colonists believed the British decimated

the town. In reality, Norfolk’s destruction swayed many Virginians to support

independence, proving that the coercive and undemocratic measures were a decisive

moment for the patriots and the Committee of Safety.126 In the end, the Committee of

Safety succeeded. For the time being, the executive body secured the colony from

possible disaffection and stirred the rest of the population to support the cause.

By April, the Committee once again feared a potential attack on the Norfolk

region. Intercepted letters, such as the correspondence between Ralph Wormeley Jr. and

John Randolph Grymes, revealed many Norfolk residents still supported the King despite

hardships.127 General Lee had previously expressed serious concern that the Committee

of Safety needed to act before it became too late. After assessing the colony’s strengths,

weaknesses, military preparations, and slave situation, the general concluded Norfolk and

                                                                                                               
fearing a loss in morale. Norfolk Commission Report: Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts: Records of
Commissioners to Examine Claims in Norfolk, 1777-1836, Library of Virginia archives, ref. APA 235 in
Michael Kranish, Flight from Monticello: Thomas Jefferson at War (New York: Oxford University Press,
2010), 82-83.
126
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 84-85. After the British, with the Americans’ help, destroyed the
town, Dunmore received brief aid from the British military. Dunmore was encouraged that he could still
rally loyalists. In the meantime, the Committee of Safety tightened its grasp by issuing pass permits,
curbing disaffection, preparing defenses, and sending slaves to lead mines. Virginia Committee of Safety,
February 16, 1776 in RVA, 6:87.
127
Virginia Committee of Safety: Ralph Wormeley Jr….to John Randolph Grymes: An Intercepted Letter,
April 4, 1776 in RVA, 6:325.

  144  
Princess Ann county residents represented Virginia’s foremost threat. Arguing, “these

Inhabitants thus dangerously dispos’d, … [should be] removed,” Lee wished they be

disposed to a location where they could not harm the cause. Whatever difficulties might

arise, he attested that the Committee of Safety could not allow such hindrances to prevent

its duty. Inhabitants must be removed and even the “Wives and Children shou’d be

carried into a place of security as hostages for the good behavior of the Husbands and

Fathers.”128 If the Committee of Safety could not devise a more humane plan, Lee

concluded that even more coercive means would be the only logical choice to remove

inhabitants from their homes. The Committee agreed, exile was the answer and

deportation would soon begin.

On April 10, 1776 the Committee of Safety issued its terrifying resolution to

residents of Norfolk and Princess Anne counties. After hearing Lee’s report and

uncovering several letters implicating residents communicating with Dunmore’s vessels,

the executive body declared, “All the Inhabitants of Norfolk and Princess Anne

Counties…[must] be immediately removed to some Interior parts of the Colony.”129

Convinced the British intended to subvert American efforts by undermining from within

the population, the Committee of Safety viewed disaffection as a noxious and contagious

disease. Even though the executive body surmised the vast majority of inhabitants in the

two counties were disloyal, it admitted some innocent residents would suffer. The

                                                                                                               
128
Lee to the President of the Committee of Safety of Virginia, April 8, 1776, The Lee Papers, 1:393.
129
The evacuation plan was essentially limited to inhabitants within the area between the British and
American forces. Unanimous Resolution for the Evacuation of Parts of Norfolk and Princess Anne
Counties, April 10, 1776 in RVA, 6:369. The Committee of Safety also called for the removal of all
livestock and male slaves over the age of thirteen whose owners were deemed suspicious. The slaves were
to be held in custody until their owners were removed. Willis Riddick, James Murdaugh and Andrew
Meade were given £1,000 to help convey poor inhabitants’ removal.

  145  
Committee of Safety willingly accepted this risk, deeming that protecting the common

good superseded individual rights and justified punishing the innocent with the guilty.

Despite the Committee’s claim that the evacuation would be administered “in the most

humane” manner, appalled residents vehemently rejected the notion that “the most likely

means of securing this Colony from such Attempts [of undermining the government and

common cause] will be to remove all suspicious persons beyond the Influence of the

Enemy.”130 Both the Committee of Safety and General Lee agreed, anyone considered

highly suspicious should be apprehended and brought before the increasingly coercive

and powerful executive body.131

The evacuation resolution frightened Prince Anne County’s local committee

members enough to plead “the great dejection… Miseries and Distresses, which we

humbly apprehend will attend and await on such a Measure.”132 Agreeing with the

Committee of Safety that some residents aided the enemy, a most despicable act, the local

leaders were horrified that the patriot leadership so willingly would punish the innocent

because of a few wicked minded people. Only a few residents possessed such injurious

designs, the local leaders declared, while the majority of their community favored the

American cause. Lamenting their neighbors’ shameful behavior, the local committeemen

                                                                                                               
130
Unanimous Resolution for the Evacuation of Parts of Norfolk and Princess Anne Counties, April 10,
1776 in RVA, 6:370.
131
Proceedings respecting the Hon. Ralph Wormeley Jr., April 16, 1776 and Major General Charles Lee to
John Page, April 16, 1775 in RVA, 6:398-399. The Continental Congress recently increased all committees
of safety’s power, stating that “much inconvenience” arose from various county committees seizing letter
carriers. Therefore, only the committees and councils of safety should possess such power in the future.
132
Petition of Princess Anne County Committee, April 22, 1775 in RVA 6:437.

  146  
expressed their loyalty.133 Begging for mercy, the Princess Anne County Committee

cited the executive’s “good Intentions to protect all the Inhabitants of this Colony as far

as consistent with the safety of the whole.”134 If the colonial executive body truly wished

to preserve the common good, how could it condone such an inhumane measure?

Less than a month later, the Committee of Safety altered its evacuation plans,

deciding, “many inconveniences” would arise from their original agenda. Oddly, the

Committee of Safety never disclosed what these inconveniences would be, but it seems

likely the reason was not the gross abuse of individual rights as the board’s alternative

plan was dangerously similar. Amending its initial order, the Committee of Safety

created a commission and mandated its members to,

make strict enquiry into the temper and former conduct of [Princess Anne County
inhabitants] & Certifie …[who had] … remained quiet at home, without taking an
active part on either side, & who have appeared Inimical to America, on which...
the General or Commanding officer is desired to suffer all such as have been
friends or neutrals, to remain at their habitations, with their familys, but to remove
all their stock, except such as the Commrs. above named shall judge necessary for
their immediate Subsistence: And that all the Enemies of America… be
compelled to remove with their familys & effects, according to the Former
Resolutions.135
                                                                                                               
133
Local leaders argued the real threat was their defenseless state. Realizing the seriousness of the situation,
they suggested removing some of the livestock to prevent British plundering. The local committee
downplayed how many slaves they possessed. Since some slaves already fled, they preferred to retain their
slaves. Historians disagree, stating slaves were still escaping to Dunmore.
134
Petition of Princess Anne County Committee, April 1775 in RVA, 6:439.
135
JCSV, 2:495 and Colonel William Woodford to Lee, May 2, 1776, The Lee Papers, 1:463. Agnes Hunt
referred to the evacuation as the “despotic character of revolutionary governments.” Yet, she incorrectly
called the plan evidence of the Committee’s inexperience. After the Committee altered the original idea, the
next month the Convention still wanted suspicious residents evacuated. Eventually, the government
allowed loyal farmers to remain, since their removal would all but destroy the food supply. However, the
Committee ordered farmers’ families, slaves, and some of their livestock removed. Hunt believed this
resolution was not enforced as the manpower and livestock was too necessary for farming. She insisted that
leaders preferred not to provide for all the displaced women and children. Agnes Hunt, Committees of
Safety of the American Revolution (Cleveland: Press of Winn & Judson, 1904), 115-177. William
McGroarty argued the Committee of Safety pursued loyalists despite the fact the colony contained few
openly disaffected persons. McGroarty even used words like “watchful eye” and “witch-hunt.” William
Buckner McGroarty, “Loyalism in Alexandria, Virginia,” The Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography, Vol. 52, no 1 (Jan., 1944), 35.

  147  
Rather than force all Virginians to evacuate the county, the Committee of Safety decided

to investigate residents’ loyalty by sending commissioners to interrogate all inhabitants

and if any seemed suspicious, the commissioners reserved the right to forcefully remove

them. Even those residents who passed the commissioners’ loyalty standards or were

considered neutral still could find their goods, beyond what was seen as “necessary,”

confiscated. The definition of loyalty had changed, neutrality ceased to be an option.

The Committee of Safety’s resolution struck fear into inhabitants’ hearts, not just in these

counties, but also across Virginia. By the eve of independence, the Committee of Safety

had become a coercive and undemocratic institution capable of monitoring residents,

punishing perceived disloyalty, and establishing governmental legitimacy.

Norfolk residents refused to relent and continued to lament hardships ensuing

from the forced deportation. Fearful inhabitants pointed out, “the greatest Distress” for

those inhabitants with “Large Familys and have no Places to retreat to,” no means to

transport “their Provisions Necessary to support them, nor have they Money to buy it else

where.”136 Even though the Committee of Safety agreed to aid inhabitants, local officials

could hardly rely upon the same executive body that forced them from their homes.

Aside from the merciless deportation order, petitioners also illuminated an unsettling

claim that since the Norfolk courthouse was destroyed, they could not elect

representatives to the Virginia Convention. Without Norfolk representatives, the

Convention and Committee of Safety passed the controversial evacuation order.

Residents’ cries of injustice fell upon deaf ears, as more reports arrived regarding Norfolk

                                                                                                               
136
Fifth Virginia Convention, May 22, 1776 in RVA, 7 Part I:227.

  148  
and Princess Anne residents’ plight.137 In the end, the revolutionary government only

evacuated Portsmouth residents, yet it is critical to recognize the expansion of executive

power. With the Committee of Safety’s endorsement, Lee removed inhabitants, captured

leading loyalists, and burned some residents’ homes. Similar to his time in New York,

Lee ordered suspected leading loyalists seized and their cattle taken.138 In the name of

the common good, the executive body had few qualms trampling individual rights.139

As support for independence grew, the Committee of Safety’s time drew to an

end. But its influence did not die. Virginia’s leaders, such as Jefferson and Page,

remarked that inhabitants steadily believed independence was the answer.140 As the

flames of independence grew, Page’s experience on the Committee of Safety influenced

                                                                                                               
137
Fifth Virginia Convention, May 25, 1776 in RVA, 7 Part I:266.
138
Lee to Lieut. Colonel Eppes, Williamsburg April 11, 1776, The Lee Papers, 1:411.
139
While some historians credit Lee for the evacuation, the Committee of Safety approved the resolution
and tried to implement it. However, John Selby argued that Pendleton steered the Committee in a more
moderate direction, as those deemed friendly to the cause would not be punished. Yet evidenced by the
Committee’s words, its members accepted that the innocent would be harmed as well. Selby ignored the
Committee’s coercive tactics. Rather than being Lee’s puppet, the Committee of Safety’s role was vital.
Page desired the power to punish inhabitants whom he knew, from intercepted letters, did not support the
American cause. While Curtis claimed the Committee of Safety sought to demonstrate restraint to win
friends, it would appear from its actions in Portsmouth, that this was not the case. Curtis also argued the
Committee of Safety disagreed with Page’s opinion, yet offered no evidence. However, Curtis seemed to
contradict himself, stating the Committee extended its police powers during the forced evacuation and
became “less ambivalent” as independence approached. Curtis, “The Goodrich Family and the Revolution
in Virginia, 1774-1776,” 69.
140
Selby argued intercepted letters to Maryland Governor Eden was one of the final straws, pushing
Virginia towards independence. John Page to Richard Henry Lee, April 12, 1776 in Southern Literary
Messenger, Vol. 27, Issue 4 (Oct., 1858), 255 and Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson, May 16, 1776,
PTJ. Pro-independence candidates dominated the spring 1776 elections. While this chapter demonstrates
the chaotic nature of the Revolution in Virginia, I do not endorse Woody Holton’s argument that patriots
were “forced founders.” I argue that the disorder the colony faced caused them to establish a functioning
executive body. Former leaders who did not support independence found themselves voted out of office.
Robert Wormeley Carter bemoaned how faithfully he served constituents yet was “most shamefully turned
out.” April 1, 1776, Robert Wormeley Carter Diary, CWFL; Louis Morton, “Robert Wormeley Carter of
Sabine Hall: Notes on the Life of a Virginia Planter,” Journal of Southern History, Vol. 12, no. 3 (Aug.,
1946), 348-352; and Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, & the Making of the
American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), xviii.

  149  
his conception of statehood. When the Fifth Virginia Convention met in May, Page’s

opinions towards internal enemies affected Edmund Pendleton’s opening speech. As the

newly elected Convention president, Pendleton outlined the problems Virginia faced and

proposed solutions. Since “almost all Powers of Government have been suspended for

near two Years,” Pendleton implored delegates to strengthen the military and revise the

“Ordinance prescribing a Mode of punishment for the Enemies of America.”141 Heeding

Page’s earlier argument that the enemies act was too rigid and lenient, thus hampering

efforts to eradicate disaffection as it did not encompass all behaviors the Committee of

Safety deemed dangerous, Pendleton pushed the legislature to act. However, little could

be accomplished before the colonies declared independence.142 After the Convention

authorized its delegates at the Continental Congress to vote for independence on May 15,

Virginia’s leaders issued an ordinance calling for test oaths for all suspected inhabitants.

The oath called upon citizens to aid the new government, refrain from helping the British,

and assist uncovering their disaffected neighbors. If residents refused, they faced

disarming. The Committee of Safety and its network apprehended many legitimately

dangerous persons, yet several of those who experienced the executive’s power firsthand,

                                                                                                               
141
Fifth Virginia Convention, May 6, 1776 in RVA, 7 Part I:27. At this time the Committee of Safety also
tried to strengthen commerce, which was especially important after the Goodrich fiasco. In May the
Committee sent men to New Orleans to procure gunpowder. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 170.
142
As independence approached, county committees focused more on military endeavors than loyalty
issues. Curtis also briefly mentioned the county committees’ role in economic regulation as courts had
previously accomplished this goal. Curtis, “The Virginia Courts during the Revolution,” 171-172. “At a
Meeting of the Committee for Caroline County,” Virginia Gazette (Dixon & Hunter), January 14, 1775 and
H.R. McIlwaine, “Proceedings of the Committee of Safety of Caroline and Southampton Counties Virginia,
1774-1776,” Bulletin of the Virginia State Library, Vol. XVII, no. 3 (Richmond: Division of Purchase and
Printing, 1929), 128.

  150  
received punishment without evidence or reason.143 Such repercussions were the nature

of life in the security state.

From May to July, the Committee of Safety continued to operate as a dictatorship,

coercing the population to conform. During this period the Committee of Safety, and

local county boards, summoned and apprehended suspicious inhabitants. Men such as

Robert Shedden, imprisoned in Williamsburg, petitioned the Committee of Safety after

three weeks of confinement. Shedden’s horrendous ordeal was compounded by the fact

he had already been acquitted a month earlier.144 Although the Committee of Safety

possessed no evidence that Shedden had taken action against America, why then did it

seize him at his home? After intercepting several of Shedden’s letters, the Committee

members needed no further evidence to declare his sentiments hostile. While there is no

doubt there is a degree of validity, Shedden and others suffered in jail for expressing their

opinions. After the Virginia Convention issued an ordinance that non-consenters had to

petition the Committee of Safety to depart the colony, and subsequently be advertised in

the newspaper, it became even more evident that the government sought conformity not

consent. Individuals’ rights, such as free speech, had its boundaries. With the new

ordinances, the definition of an enemy became clearer and broader.145 Those who held

                                                                                                               
143
JCSV, Volume II, 491. George Farrar was “taken at his house” on February 28. When Farrar finally
appeared before the Committee of Safety it became apparent there was no evidence against him and he was
discharged on May 1, 1776.
144
Fifth Virginia Convention: Robert Shedden to the Honorable John Page…, May 14, 1776 in RVA, 7 Part
I:129-130. Shedden and others requested a court date. See for examples, Fifth Virginia Convention:
Petition of Three Prisoners to Mr. Chair Man of the Committee of Safety, and Fifth Virginia Convention:
Charles Henly to the Honorable the Gentlemen of the Committee of Safety and George Oldner to the
Honorable the Gentlemen of the Committee of Safety, June 3 and 6, 1776 in RVA, 7 Part I:343 and 378-9.
145
By the end of June, the Continental Congress further defined what actions fell under disaffection or
treason. “Resolved, That all persons abiding within any of the united colonies and deriving from the laws of
the same owe allegiance to the said laws and are members of such colony.” Taking arms for the King was
treason. Furthermore, it recommended each colony pass laws to eradicate internal enemies, something the

  151  
loyalist sympathies, such as Nicholas Creswell, noticed the harsh “persecution” and

realized life in Virginia had changed.146

Arrests and interrogations of both the guilty and innocent demonstrated an

important reality, now that royal administration concluded, Virginia’s patriot leaders

wielded incredible powers. By summer 1776, through the Committee of Safety’s

leadership, Virginia suppressed the disaffected population for the time being. These

actions provided patriots with a society ready to conform and a precedent for coercive

and undemocratic executive authority. The Committee of Safety officially concluded

under the new constitution, leaving the recently elected governor Patrick Henry and the

Council of the State to assume the executive body’s legacy. Before Henry could accept

his oath and assume his office he became ill. Anxious, John Page wrote Jefferson

informing him that the governor and four Council members were unable to take the oath,

leaving Virginia devoid of executive power. Fearing the worse, Page worried if Henry

perished without the Council electing its own president, “the Country will be without any

head – ever Thing must be in confusion.”147 While Page’s fear never materialized, he

recognized the Committee of Safety’s significance and knew effective executive power

would be even more critical during the state’s early years. The new executive body, the

Council of the State, would have its powers in part defined by the state constitution.

                                                                                                               
Convention and Committee already had begun. Finally, with the increasing need for paper money, the
Continental Congress also suggested passing laws against counterfeiting or even passing forged money.
While the Committee of Safety previously dealt little with this issue, its successor the Council of the State
would address it to a greater degree. JCC, 1:385.
146
Despite such treatment, a loyalist presence continued in Leesburg where disaffected inhabitants rioted.
Cresswell took particular notice of the 100lbs iron weights forced upon disaffected John Goodrich while
confined. Cresswell, 143.
147
John Page to Thomas Jefferson, July 6, 1776, PTJ.

  152  
Limited by the state’s constitution, the Council benefited from the Committee of Safety’s

leadership and seamlessly followed its predecessor, employing coercive tactics to execute

laws, eliminate disaffection, and further institute the security state. Yet long before July

1776, both patriot Robert Munford and loyalist Samuel Seabury foreshadowed events to

come. Seabury warned that no inhabitants would, “risk … opposing the committee in the

execution of the office lately established by their High Mightinesses the Delegates.” In

that same vein, if Munford’s play proves anything it is that even patriots feared the new

regime’s excessive executive power.148

                                                                                                               
148
Seabury, “The Congress Canvassed: or An Examination into The Conduct of the Delegates at their
Grand Convention,” November 28, 177 in Letters of a Westchester Farmer, 90.

  153  
 Chapter 3: “the safety of every individual… depends entirely upon the Security of
the whole:” The Committee of Safety of New Jersey, 1775-1776

In spring 1776, Nicholas Collin, a Swedish Lutheran pastor from Penn’s Neck,

New Jersey, nervously observed the events going on around him. Writing in his journal,

he detailed how “After the English army had defeated the American, captured N[ew]

York and spread itself over [New] Jersey, there was constant alarm” and “much

dissension among the people.”1 Fearful, the pastor described a world ripped apart as

terrified inhabitants sought sanctuary in their homes or even in the woods to avoid the

consuming violence and disorder. As trying times grew worse, many residents began to

arm themselves. Even the Swedish pastor’s church lacked the ability to offer spiritual

sustenance, as his flock could not easily attend. American militia surrounded the House

of God and cleverly used the service schedules to seize horses and men. For Collin, life

in New Jersey had become unbearable and lawless. By late spring 1776, the fledgling

state desperately needed order despite the revolutionary government’s best efforts.

On the eve of the Revolution, ingrained diversity and both the geographic as well

as metaphorical divisions between the East and West prevented New Jersey from strongly

uniting. Late eighteenth-century New Jersey was an ethnically diverse colony, home to a

mix of Dutch, British, French, German, Swedish, Native American, African, and African

                                                                                                               
1
Nicholas Collin, The Journal and Biography of Nicholas Collin, 1746-1831, translated by Amandus
Johnson (Camden: Sinnickson Chew & Sons Co., 1936), 236. Many religious denominations resided in
New Jersey including: Anglicans, Baptists, Dutch Reformed, Presbyterians, Quakers, Africans, and
African-Americans. To a lesser degree German Lutherans, Methodists, Moravians, and Swedish Lutherans
resided as well. Overall residents accepted the pluralistic society, but did not intermingle. Larry R. Gerlach,
Prologue to Independence: New Jersey in the Coming of the American Revolution (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1976), 12-13. For more on the violence in this era see: “A Mechanic to Bernardus
La Grange,” June 1776 in NJARDH, 239-241. Bernardus La Grange administered British oaths and later
received threats.

  154  
American inhabitants.2 Adding to the heterogeneity, the colony possessed a sizable slave

population for such a small region; by 1775, around 1/12 of the total population of

120,000 was in bondage.3 The colony’s population, neatly divided between East and

West Jersey, predominately resided in the powerful northern counties of Burlington,

Essex, Hunterdon, Monmouth, Morris, and Sussex. The small colony’s greatest city,

Elizabethtown, contained only 1,200 residents and lacked the influence of urban centers

in other colonies.4 Located close to New York City, only Perth Amboy developed a

significant commercial class.5 Largely, though, New Jersey’s trade was mostly local.

Farming dominated the colony and it never witnessed a sizable home manufacturing

economy.6 Neither poor nor affluent, New Jersey lacked many defining characteristics

present in other more rebellious colonies. Despite its relatively small stature, the colony

                                                                                                               
2
Richard P. McCormick, New Jersey from Colony to State (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.,
1964), 80.
3
Accounts vary, but historians estimate there were about 10,000 slaves, mostly located in the northern and
middle counties. Leonard Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution: The War of Independence in New Jersey
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), 44 and Gerlach, Prologue, 11. Other estimates have New
Jersey’s population at 122,000. Slavery would remain a major point of contention for Quakers, especially
men such as Samuel Allinson. Samuel Allinson to Patrick Henry, October 17, 1774, Allinson Family
Papers, 1710-1939, Ms. Coll. 968, Haverford College Special Collections, Tri-College Digital Library,
http://triptych.brynmawr.edu/cdm/ref/collection/HC_QuakSlav/id/9852. Accessed on 5/12/14. The Native
American population in New Jersey was much smaller. Lorraine E. Williams, “Caught in the Middle: New
Jersey’s Indians and the American Revolution,” in NJAR, 107-109.
4
Larry Gerlach, “The Road to Revolution,” NJRE, 7:7. Although a social and economic center within the
colony, Elizabethtown did not provide an urban crucible.
5
Lundin, 12-13. These men dominated both the Council of Proprietors of East Jersey and society.
6
Gerlach, Prologue, 9.

  155  
lacked any organizations that encompassed all regions.7 Ultimately, homogenous local

ethnic and religious communities trumped heterogeneity.8

Unlike the previous two colonies examined, scholars have largely ignored New

Jersey in the historiography aside from the major battles and Washington’s emblematic

crossing of the Delaware. When addressed, most historians either subsume New Jersey’s

experience with Pennsylvania and New York or merely examine the small colony but fail

to incorporate it into the Revolution’s main narrative. The few scholars who have

recognized New Jersey’s unique experience in the Revolution generally characterize it as

slowly embracing the American cause.9 Lacking a major newspaper, meaningful

merchant class, urban center, or artisan and mechanic committees, New Jersey offers a

unique perspective.10 Rather than containing a significant number of unruly and

democratic sailors, many Quakers called the colony home.11 With both pacifist Quakers

and a well-respected governor in William Franklin, scholars have portrayed New Jersey

                                                                                                               
7
Larry Gerlach believed the economic, social, and political divisions and competing influences from New
York and Philadelphia prevented New Jersey from offering a unified force in the imperial struggle. The
colony also lacked direct connections with British merchants and politicians. Gerlach, Prologue, 25-26.
8
While the Dutch dominated Bergen and Somerset, the English held sway over Cape May, and the Scottish
populated central Jersey. Middlesex and Monmouth were more mixed. Slavery was most prominent in the
East, as Quakers dominated West Jersey. Despite wealthy and connected families like the Franklins and
Livingstons, many New Jerseyans were landless and in debt. David Fowler, “’These were Troublesome
Times Indeed’: Social and Economic Conditions in Revolutionary New Jersey,” in NJAR, 17-20.
9
Lundin, vii.
10
Richard F. Hixson, “The Press in Revolutionary New Jersey,” NJRE, 1:7. For more on print culture in the
Revolution: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), vii.
11
Jesse Lemisch, “Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America,”
WMQ, Third Series, Vol. 25, no. 3 (July, 1968), 371-407 and Marcus Rediker, “A Motley Crew of Rebels:
Sailors, Slaves and the Coming of the American Revolution” in eds. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Alberts
The Transforming Hand of Revolution: Reconsidering the American Revolution as a Social Movement
(Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1996), 155-198.

  156  
as hesitant and moderate at best or conservative at worst.12 Distinct from other colonial

leaders, Franklin retained much of his influence well into 1775. New Jerseyans’ respect

combined with his own political connections and savvy, allowed Franklin to stave off the

flames of independence as long as possible.13 Ultimately, historians argue New Jersey

only reluctantly accepted the Revolution, but the question is why?14

A reluctant Whig leadership only compounded an entrenched royal governor and

a divided population.15 In fact, as late as November 1775, New Jersey’s Assembly

rejected independence and, as historian Larry Gerlach argued, its neighbors swept the

colony into resistance. Willing to support resistance to a degree, New Jersey trailed other

colonies when it came to promoting independence. Lacking the imperial problems

present elsewhere, zealot ideologues, and the same social and economic tensions, Gerlach

contended New Jersey did not witness a revolution so much as it seceded from the

empire.16 A sizable disaffected population also contributed to New Jersey’s trajectory.

                                                                                                               
12
Gerlach, Prologue, 358; Donald L. Kemmerer, Path to Freedom: The Struggle for Self-Government in
Colonial New Jersey, 1703-1776 (Cos Cob: Connecticut, 1968), 346; John E. Pomfret, Colonial New
Jersey: A History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 268-269; and David Bernstein, “New Jersey
in the American Revolution: The Establishment of a Government amid Civil and Military Disorder, 1770-
1781,” (PhD Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1969), ii and 233. Historians argued that the years before
declaring independence, New Jersey moved slowly despite relative consensus. Such an imposing
consensus, I argue was not the case, nor did patriots perceive it. Historians who have noted New Jersey’s
hesitancy and Franklin’s role slowing resistance have not considered the Committee of Safety’s role.
13
Thomas Fleming, “Crossroads of the American Revolution” in NJAR, 3.
14
According to Gerlach, the new state reflected the colonial era, with many of the same leaders in power
and a replicated political, social, and economic world, one of moderation and order. When the new state
commenced, the obvious difference was that power resided in popular sovereignty and republicanism.
15
David Bernstein cited the lack of a coherent patriot leadership as a reason for New Jersey’s lethargy. The
disagreements between William Livingston, Elias Boudinot, Stephen Crane, John Witherspoon, Hendrick
Fisher, and Samuel Tucker resulted in disjointed governmental leadership.
16
Gerlach, Prologue, xvi. Tensions within the colony in the 1760s and 1770s slipped into the background,
especially as independence became its own issue. Gerlach believed despite a broad based franchise, an
increasingly smaller number of loyalists and Quakers in the early state years, there was never a radical
democratic push nor was there much overturn of political power.

  157  
 In fact, New Jersey contained a strong loyalist contingency, arguably more

tenacious than in any New England colony.17 Past figures have placed their number at

least 5,000 active loyalists, highlighted by Cortlandt Skinner’s Loyalist Regiment, the

largest in America.18 Most historians have anecdotally noted that the Revolution in New

Jersey was a civil war, but some have sacrificed studying it in detail in order to stress a

general consensus in the resistance movement.19 Discord and strife in the period from

1774 to July 1776 preoccupied New Jersey patriots. How did New Jersey patriots deal

with the issues facing their colony? How did the New Jersey Committee of Safety

operate in comparison to similar pre-July 1776 committees for public safety elsewhere?

To answer these questions, this chapter will first examine the rise of the patriot

committee system and its efforts to unify and police society. With both the Provincial

Congress and Committee of Safety more reluctant to meet disaffection head on, these

local patriot committees filled the void by policing society. Lacking an aggressive

                                                                                                               
17
Wallace Brown, The Good Americans: The Loyalists of the American Revolution (New York: William
Morrow and Company, Inc., 1969), 232-233. Most loyalists were native born and located on the coast in
the north or east, centered in Raritan Bay and Perth Amboy. Economically, they were middling farmers but
some loyalists had relative wealth. Dennis P. Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” NJRE, 20:6-12. For New
Jersey whigs see: Dennis P. Ryan, “New Jersey’s Whigs,” NJRE, 19, 5-6.
18
A. Van Doren Honeyman, “Concerning the New Jersey Loyalists in the Revolution,” PNJHS, Vol. LI no.
2 (April 1933), 126.
19
Gerlach correctly depicted the many reasons why New Jersey slowly embraced the Revolution. Yet, he
contended disaffection to be a small minority by December 1775, as the patriot government largely
eradicated it. Ending his study just after July 1776, he presented the period as a time of consensus when in
reality disaffection remained. While he noted the civil war nature of the Revolution in New Jersey, other
scholars have suggested he downplayed divisions within the colony to promote an image of consensus. My
dissertation builds off Gerlach’s work to highlight that the lack of a strong executive body also contributed
to New Jersey’s struggles early in the Revolution. He only discussed the Committee of Safety and local
boards in regards to their military role. Similarly, John Pomfret painted New Jersey ripe with divisions, but
ultimately ambivalent. He believed only small pockets of the colony wanted independence or war, even in
1776. By that point they needed to make a decision regarding their loyalty. T.H. Breen agreed with others
that New Jersey experienced a general consensus. Neglecting the colony’s unique experience, he devoted
little analysis. Gerlach, Prologue, xvi and 276; Pomfret, 268-270; and T.H. Breen, American Insurgents,
American Patriots: The Revolution of the People (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 198-199.

  158  
centralized institution, there was no consolidation of power. Next, this chapter highlights

the overwhelming disaffection and divisions patriot committees struggled against.

Finally, the chapter concludes by examining the New Jersey Committee of Safety, the

executive institution that in other states provided stability and governmental legitimacy,

but failed to do so in New Jersey. Since the Committee of Safety could not effectively

execute law, intimidate dissent and coercively induce conformity, both the Revolution

and unity lay in peril.

Unlike its counterparts in New York and Virginia, New Jersey’s Committee of

Safety lacked effective power. Franklin’s presence, some degree of Whigs’ hesitancy,

and the sizable equivocal and neutral population derailed the resistance movement and

affected the Committee of Safety’s behavior and measures. More importantly, despite

receiving a similar mandate as other emergency executive bodies, the New Jersey

Committee of Safety did not interpret its powers broadly. Reflecting its colony’s

apprehensiveness and daunting divisions, the Committee of Safety behaved accordingly.

Unlike the other two committees, New Jersey’s Provincial Congress, the colony’s

revolutionary legislature, never bestowed the government’s reins to its executive for long

periods. When in session, the Committee of Safety possessed only weak powers and,

with the presence of a respected governor and divided population, New Jersey did not

immediately embark on the same surveillance trajectory. The Committee of Safety’s

measures fell ineffective and its influence nearly non-existent outside a select few

instances. This chapter argues that on the eve of statehood, such a dearth of executive

authority, caused by the weak Committee of Safety, left New Jersey in a precarious

position when more demonstrative and wide scale disaffection reared its ugly head.

  159  
Unable to replicate its counterparts’ efforts to consolidate local committees’ power, the

New Jersey Committee of Safety failed to organize a systematic policing of dissent. Due

to the Committee of Safety’s frustratingly weak ability to enforce law, New Jersey

patriots discovered the increased need and demanded more extensive governmental

surveillance and executive power. Given New Jersey’s critical position separating north

and south, located between Philadelphia and New York City, and continuous proximity to

the British army for the majority of the war, leaders such as William Livingston and

George Washington knew the Committee of Safety lacked the executive authority

necessary during this era. This chapter examines the period of hesitancy and divisions

before July 1776 and how New Jersey’s executive body, the Committee of Safety,

formed and attempted to deal with such problems. Largely unsuccessful in its efforts to

consolidate power and curb dissent, its reign influenced the creation of the much stronger

and coercive New Jersey Council of Safety in 1777.

Local Committee Actions: Slow but Steady

Facing a host of problems, New Jersey’s patriot community attempted to unify the

colony. Forming local committees in an attempt to steer New Jersey towards the

American cause, patriots surveyed the state of affairs early on and realized their colony

needed stability. By June 1774, local committees sprouted up across the colony

beginning in Freehold and then in Newark, as the Essex County Committee commenced

led by Isaac Ogden and John DeHart.20 Local boards enforced the economic boycott

                                                                                                               
20
New Jersey witnessed protests before spring 1774. While College of New Jersey students protested New
York merchants’ abandoning the non-importation agreements, Woodbury residents harassed anyone who
broke the same agreements. Accusations increased of avarice individuals hoping to raise their fortunes “on
the Ruins of the Public.” Extract of a Letter from Princeton, Extract from a Letter from New-Brunswick,
and Advertisement, New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy, July 16, 30 and August 6, 1770.

  160  
known as the Association to spur unity and heeded the Continental Congress call to

uncover neighbors who required censor.21 Calling upon the Association as the source of

their authority, some county committees admitted their intentions to monitor behavior

and loyalty.22 The Sussex committee dictated it would seize any resident who,

Shall hereafter Asperse any of the friends of Liberty in this County on Account of
their Political Sentiments, or Shall Speak Contemptuously or Disrespectfully of
the Continental or Provincial Congress or any of the Committees of and in this
County or in any Measures Adopted, or Appointed to be pursued by the Congress
or Committees for the Public good & Safety.23

In Woodbridge and Gloucester, committees extended the Association, while the

Middlesex Committee was bestowed carte blanche “to transact all such publick business”

necessary for “the general interest of the County.”24 These committees, elected locally

amongst inhabitants, sought to preserve American rights from British aggression and

intimidate their neighbors to conform. For the most part, according to Gerlach, the

Association seemed to be well enforced in New Jersey. Of course, lacking a significant

mercantile class, there was less need to break the economic boycott and regulations.25

Even without a substantial mercantile class, committees still policed the shores.

Local committees ordered men to board vessels and investigate merchants to ascertain if

they had violated the Association. Monitoring shipping abroad, local committeemen
                                                                                                               
21
For example of the Essex County meeting: “New Jersey,” New-York Gazette; and the Weekly Mercury,
December 19, 1774.
22
A Meeting of the Freeholders of Somerset County, New Jersey, July 28, 1775, MPCCS, 162-163. See
also: Somerset County, “Enforcement of the Association in Sussex County,” August 10-11, 1775 in
NJARDH, 158-159.
23
Sussex County Committee Minutes, August 11, 1775, Revolutionary Era Mss in Gerlach, Prologue, 275.
24
Woodbridge Committee, January 10, 1775 and Middlesex County Resolutions, January 16, 1775,
MPCCS, 43 and 46. Other places received specific orders to curb gaming, horseracing, cock fighting, and
the use of East India Tea.
25
Since New Jersey’s economy did not rely on shipping, farmers did not feel they sacrificed too much.
Gerlach, Prologue, 250.

  161  
extended permits to anyone who both solicited permission and willingly accepted their

authority.26 Patriot committees did not solely enforce strict rules upon the population.

On some occasions, New Jerseyans requested committees to approve cargos so as to

avoid accusations. Other residents complained that neighbors over-charged or hoarded

provisions, leading to committees’ investigations.27 In response, local committees

engaged in intrusive practices such as price regulations on items like Jamaica spirits,

coffee, salt, chocolate, pepper, country rum, and molasses.28 With the British encamped

nearby, local boards feared illicit trade and labeled violators as community enemies.29

Even though New Jersey’s local committees operated less actively compared to those in

New York and Virginia, people endorsed their power because they believed that

committees preserved security. Those who violated the committees faced sanctions.

To enforce their will, New Jersey’s patriot boards, as in other colonies, at times

employed armed militiamen and ostracism to enforce conformity. Patriot committees

                                                                                                               
26
Monmouth County Committee, November 8, 1775, Transcript, Cherry Hall Papers, 1682-1941,
Collection 22, Misc Mott Papers, Box 15, Folder 3, Misc Mott Papers, 1725-1785, Monmouth County
Historical Association.
27
Shrewsbury Committee, “Minutes of the Shrewsbury Township Committee,” October 16, December 11
and 26, 1775 and January 15 1776 in NJARDH, 148-149. Committees seized cargos suspected of heading
to the enemy.
28
For New York prices see: “Price-Current in New-York,” New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury, April
22, 1776. Newark County issued a resolution on March 15 and another on April 15. Newark also enforced
restrictions on killing lamb or sheep. Violators were named enemies of the community.
29
Many feared the British might apprehend New Jerseyans and patriot General William Alexander (known
as Lord Stirling) monitored the coast and colony. Alexander became a brigadier-general responsible for
military operations in New York. He frequently called upon New Jersey and the Committee of Safety to
provide troops to aid New York. Colonel the Earl of Stirling to his Excellency John Hancock, December
19, 1775, Colonel the Earl of Stirling to Robert Ogden, February 9, 1776, and Brigadier-General the Earl of
Stirling to Samuel Tucker, March 23, 1776 in The Life of William Alexander, Earl of Stirling… ed. William
Alexander Duer (Wiley & Putnam, New York, 1847), 116, 128-129, and 157.

  162  
routinely summoned men such as Richard Cayford.30 However, as patriot Ebenezer

Elmer noted, the committees did not merely summon Cayford, but sent a militia to seize

him and others as his home.31 Similar to local patriot committees discussed in previous

chapters, New Jersey’s boards relied heavily upon social and economic ostracism.32

After being seized and confined, Cayford and others “made their confessions.” Yet,

afterwards, the men threatened repercussions and many residents within the community

feared the committees’ coercive measures did more harm than good. As proprietor of an

inn in Bridgeton, Cayford discovered the Cumberland County Committee needed little

reason to condemn him for his alleged inimical words. Accused of undermining the

cause, the county committee wished to silence Cayford’s seditious opinions, which

included discrediting military efforts, referring to Americans as rebels, and corrupting

residents. The local board displaced him from the community “as an enemy to the rights

of America.”33 Hoping to avoid the same fate as Cayford, Ezekiel Beach of Mendham

publicly admitted fault and begged for forgiveness. Not only did he recant that he hoped

                                                                                                               
30
“Cumberland County,” Pennsylvania Gazette, July 22, 1775. This incident was the first time the
committee summoned Cayford. He did not seem to deny the charges. Ebenezer Elmer’s Journal in Thomas
Cushing and Charles E. Sheppard, History of the Counties of Gloucester, Salem, and Cumberland, New
Jersey (Philadelphia: Everts & Peck, 1883), 539.
31
Ebenezer Elmer recalled the other man seized, J. Wheaton, “flashed a gun at us” but was soon taken and
confined. Cushing and Sheppard, 539.
32
Historians have largely overlooked how often economic ostracism was employed to curb free speech. See
for example: Sussex County (New Jersey) Committee, October 5, 1775, AA, Series IV, 3:951; “In
Committee, Sussex County, New Jersey,” New-York Journal, December 28, 1775; and Committee for
Barnard’s Township, New Jersey, declare Nathaniel Haten and enemy, December 11, 1775, AA, Series IV,
4:235.
33
“Cumberland County,” Pennsylvania Gazette, August 9, 1775.

  163  
the British army would overrun the country and reinstitute taxation, Beach also

recognized the New Jersey Provincial Congress’ authority and regulations.34

However, economic and social ostracizing was only the beginning of the intrusive

and violent measures. No doubt men in Cayford or Beach’s situation worried they would

be targeted in recent “quest[s] of Tories,” or violent hunts, that existed across the

American colonies. Colonel Ephraim Martin and Mark Thompson claimed that they led

armed militias “in good order and regularity” to pursue internal enemies. But residents

likely feared 400 armed men roaming the county throughout fall and winter searching for

alleged threats. In December alone, armed militias seized 40 men.35 Martin and

Thompson represented no random ruffian leaders, as both sat on the Provincial Congress

from 1775-1776, an ominous early indication of the Revolution’s authority figures. The

fact that Congressional members joined in the monitoring of society signified a

dangerous sign of what could come.36 Daniel Coxe, an ardent British supporter, watched

in horror as “licentious” men “exercised every malevolent Inclination” upon their

countryman. As local patriot committees increased their activities, he rightly feared that

even neutrality might soon no longer be permissible if the patriots engaged in “Lex

Talionis.”37

                                                                                                               
34
“Newtown, Sussex County, New Jersey,” New-York Journal; or General Advertiser, December 28, 1775.
35
Ibid. This incident likely occurred in Newtown of Sussex County.
36
Punishment of Thomas Randolph of Quibbletown, December 28, 1775, AA, Series IV, 4:203. For an
example of the Provincial Congress seizing a boat and its cargo suspected of heading to the enemy, see:
MPCCS, 396, 399, 400-401 and A List of militia of Elizabethtown who volunteered to capture the ship
‘Blue Mountain Valley,’ January 22, 1776 in Department of Defense, Adjutant General’s Office
(Revolutionary War) Series: Copies of Miscellaneous Records, 1774-1837, Box 1, 1774-1784, NJA.
37
Daniel Coxe to Cortland Skinner, July 4, 1775 in NJAS, Series I, 10:654-655.

  164  
 As crisis worsened the demands of war placed new pressures upon New Jersey

and local patriot leaders sought to address the colony’s needs for centralized government.

In response, the Freehold Committee of Correspondence mustered its militia to defend

Perth Amboy while the New Brunswick Committee called for the first New Jersey

Provincial Congress to meet in May 1775 at Trenton.38 Somewhat unsure of its authority

and abilities, the Provincial Congress moved more apprehensively than the local boards.39

Rhetoric and action were distinctively different things. However, the Provincial

Congress accepted the non-importation agreement and five days later instituted a

Provincial Association to begin delineating America’s enemies.40 Local patriot

committees continued to operate, begging heads of households and masters to encourage

their dependents to enlist.41 New Jerseyans recognized a turning point, as Jemima

Condict noted in her diary, “we Can hear the Quarels are not like to be made up Without

bloodshed.”42 Residents feared increasing disorder loomed on the horizon. New Jersey

patriots knew more measures were needed to combat disaffection.

                                                                                                               
38
New Jersey Committee of Correspondence, May 2, 1775, MPCCS, 108-109. Although composed of 85
members, each county had only one vote. Notable members included Elias Boudinot, Caleb Camp, James
Parker, Jonathan D. Sergeant, Stephen Skinner, Silas Condict, William Winds, Hendrick Fisher (President),
Frederick Frelinghuysen, William Paterson, John Hart, Samuel Tucker (Vice President), and Jonathan
Elmer. Whigs dominated the meeting. Some members previously served on the Assembly and would later
sit on the Committee and Council of Safety. No Quakers attended. The Provincial Congress affirmed
allegiance to the King, ordered companies raised, levied taxes, and agreed to maintain inter-colonial
communication. Without guidelines, the Congress acted hesitantly. See Gerlach, Prologue, 370-379.
39
Gerlach, Prologue, 268. Even after the Provincial Congress seized the reins of government (creating a
militia ordinance, printing money, ordering local boards to collect taxes, establishing elections, and creating
the Committee of Safety) it still met resistance. McCormick, New Jersey from Colony to State, 116 and
Gerlach, “The Road to Revolution,” 31-32.
40
Adopt the Non-Exportation Resolution of the Continental Congress, May 26, 1775, AA, Series IV, 2:689.
41
Newark Committee, April 24, 1775, MPCCS, 101.
42
April 23 and May 1, 1775, Jemima Condict Diary, 1772-1779, MG 123, NJHS. Condict also noted
British troops arrived in May, days of mourning, and the election of representatives.

  165  
 Even with a new centralized authority, local bodies remained imperative to

establish order. The New Jersey Provincial Congress, assembled in response to British

aggressions, and local committees monitored not only loyalists but also a range of

allegedly disaffected activities, such as desertion and runaway servants.43 In the

Shrewsbury Township, the local committee ordered increased patrols to prevent servants

and blacks from meeting at “Unli[c]enced Taverns and other Bad Houses” which could

cause problems not only for their masters but the entire community. The colony

contained a considerable servant population, igniting fears over the prospect of servants

fleeing their masters.44 Therefore, local leaders insisted anyone breaking the law be

apprehended and severally punished. Related to public welfare, the committees also

forbade smallpox inoculation believing it might debilitate men from mustering. Local

patriot committees considered inhabitants’ health and safety as intricately related to the

preservation of the common good.45 In an effort to quell dissent and secure safety, a local

patriots board even harassed printers for disseminating inaccurate statements and thereby

“forfeit[ed] its support.”46

                                                                                                               
43
Pennsylvania Packet, January 1, 1776. Colonel William Maxwell of Sussex County listed 10 men who
deserted from his battalion in December 1775 alone. He encouraged all inhabitants to help apprehend them.
“Burlington,” Pennsylvania Packet, January 1, 1776 and “Forty Shillings Reward,” The Pennsylvania
Gazette, January 3, 1776 in NJAS, Series II, 2:5-9.
44
Lundin, 44.
45
New York and Virginia committees engaged in public health issues.
46
On January 5, 1775, the Newark Committee promised its delegates in the Continental Congress it would
find “those Sons of Belial” who attached their own country. The board specifically targeted James
Rivington. The Monmouth County Committee also restricted Rivington’s paper for printing A.W. Farmer’s
Free Thoughts on the Resolves of the Congress. Newark Committee, December 7, 1774, Elizabeth
Resolutions, December 19, 1774 and Freehold, Monmouth County, Committee March 6, 1775, MPCCS,
37-41 and 95-97. For more on Monmouth see: Michael S. Adelberg, “The Transformation of Local
Governance in Monmouth County, New Jersey, during the War of the American Revolution,” Journal of
the Early Republic, Vol. 31, no. 3 (Fall 2011), 470 and 474.

  166  
 Residents such as James Moody recognized the shift in committees’ actions as

patriots transitioned from merely social ostracizing to intimidating inhabitants.47 Writing

after the war, Moody recounted a series of experiences with committees that drove him to

become arguably the most notorious loyalist in New Jersey. Previously satisfied with his

idyllic existence as a farmer, “the present ill-fated Rebellion” shattered Moody’s world.

Unconcerned with politics, he worked alongside his neighbors and cared for his

community.48 But, after committees and the congresses formed, he feared his way of life

and the constitution he cherished hung in the balance. For Moody, “Choice and plan…

have seldom much influence in determining either men’s characters, or their

conditions.”49 Sensing his eventual odds with the popular front, Moody recognized

danger lay ahead for himself and his family. His beloved neighbors could not

comprehend why such a respected man of the community denied their right to challenge

grievances.50 Moody regarded patriot leaders as treacherous men who seized control of

committees, “the preliminary apparatus necessary to a Revolt.” Forcing their neighbors

to “Join or die!,” the committees incited the population to a fervor. Moody’s attempt to

remain silent was shattered when local leaders harass him into submission. The local

committee demonstrated little restraint upon recognizing his stubbornness and responded
                                                                                                               
47
Bernardus La Grange, A Loyalist Testimonial, November 1783, in NJARDH, 272-274. Men like
Bernardus La Grange discussed the horrors of having his name published after a patriot committee
ransacked his home and exposed him to “the Rage of an inflamed Populace.”
48
Moody had no debt and possessed, “every possible reason to be grateful for, and attached to, that
glorious Constitution.” James Moody, Lieut. James Moody’s Narrative of his Exertions and Sufferings in
the Cause of Government… (New York: The New York Times & Arno Press, 1968) Second Edition, 2.
49
Moody refused to address the imperial crisis, stating he was no “politician.” He believed the American
people never asked for such a rebellion and had no grievances. Those men who clamored for change were
but few and, according to Moody, probably possessed little property. Led by “demogogues,” the people
found themselves tricked to take arms. Moody, 1 and 4-5.
50
It would seem Moody drew the line at rebellion. Moody, 3.

  167  
by brandishing their tomahawks. Assaults by associators became more frequent over

time. Pushed to his limit, Moody sensed the time had arrived for him to combat what he

considered to be extra-legal bodies with his own brand of justice by taking arms against

the patriots.

On the local level predominately, monitoring inhabitants only increased. In Essex

County, the local patriot committee demanded that any persons who wished to remain in

the county produce a certificate from the local committee where they came from that

proved they indeed signed the Association. Ultimately, ordinary New Jerseyans were

forced to take the initiative to prove they were “friendly to American liberty.” Failure to

provide the necessary documentation would result in immediate deportation.51 Since the

Committee of Safety could not police allegiance effectively, local committees took

measures into their own hands. Like other local boards, the Essex Committee even

policed American troops under Washington, ensuring that they did not allow dangerous

residents to travel to Staten Island.52 Although nowhere near the New York or Virginia

committees’ effectiveness, these actions slowly started to monitor society.

Aside from minor monitoring efforts and coercion, New Jersey’s revolutionary

bodies dealt with pardons and military issues. The Provincial Congress and committees

received letters from accused enemies desiring to be reinstituted to their previous

community standing, petitioned the British, raised money, and organized the militia. The

Provincial Congress also attempted to administer local committees with rules and
                                                                                                               
51
Committee, for Essex County, New-Jersey…, June 14, 1776, AA, Series IV, 6:890. For examples of
monitoring and informants elsewhere see: Information given by David Baldwin, of Bergen County, New-
Jersey, June 29, 1776 and Letter to the Provincial Congress of New-Jersey, with Affidavits respecting a
defection in Bergen County, June 8, 1776, AA, Series IV, 6:1182 and 1384.
52
Letter from General Washington to the Committee of Essex County…, June 23, 1776, AA, Series IV,
6:1039.

  168  
regulations. Even from the colony’s largest disaffected population, the Quakers, the

Provincial Congress only demanded that they find other means to serve the community.53

Displaying its fledgling nature, by August 1775 the Provincial Congress failed to institute

the same agenda against dissent witnessed in New York or Virginia. Without aggressive

leadership, the provincial legislature accomplished little more than what the Continental

Congress dictated and was left to largely focus on military preparations.54

Aside from a handful of dramatic and coercive measures taken by the local

committees, on a whole the patriots’ agenda to instill conformity evolved slowly due to

hesitant and moderate leadership. For example, in Essex County, committeeman Elias

Boudinot’s moderate voice was one of many who guided the colony over the next several

years on the Provincial and Continental Congresses as well as the Committee of Safety.

An Elizabethtown lawyer, his profession connected him to New Jersey’s leading families,

including the Stocktons, Clarkes, and Oldens.55 Yet Boudinot, like other New Jersey

leaders, has fallen into relative historical obscurity.56 Even early on, Boudinot

demonstrated a conservative approach as he attempted to persuade his fellow

                                                                                                               
53
MPCCS, 192-193. The Congress issued this resolution in August 1775.
54
Gerlach, Prologue, 271.
55
George Adams Boyd, Elias Boudinot: Patriot and Statesman, 1740-1821 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1952), 11-15 and Edwin F. Hatfield, History of Elizabeth, New Jersey… (New York:
Careton & Lanahan, 1868), 588-590. Boudinot was a successful lawyer whose clients included William
Alexander. He served with William Livingston on the Essex County Committee of Correspondence.
56
Essex in part led the way and Boudinot’s influence cannot be understated. Amongst his endeavors are:
corresponding with distressed areas and forwarding powder. J.J. Boudinot ed., The Life, Public Services,
Addresses, and Letters of Elias Boudinot, LL.D. Volume I (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company,
1896), 5.

  169  
representatives in the recently elected Provincial Congress to refrain from both raising

troops and molesting residents who refused to join them in “Opposition.”57

Even after the Provincial Congress commenced, the Revolution suffered due to

the lack of a strong executive body. Similar to other colonies’ situations, local

committees required reining in and guidance. At times, without a strong executive,

committees fought over jurisdiction and methods. For example, the Essex County

Committee lambasted the Newark Committee for usurping powers and denying the

Provincial Congress’ authority. Essex claimed the legislature bestowed upon it the right

to name a county collector, yet Newark circumvented this ruling and refused to pay the

appointed man. Citing “harmony interrupted” in a critical time, Essex committeemen felt

threatened as Newark disrupted the chain of command and “denied them [Essex] the right

of exercising the Powers given them.”58 Essex’s leaders did not stop there, claiming that,

if Newark could seize the county’s power, what would stop them from disobeying the

Provincial Congress? Without a strong centralized executive to discipline the divided

colony and disobedient committees, the Revolution in New Jersey stood on the edge of

collapse. Any fissures threatened public welfare and the American cause. Essex

concluded sarcastically that they hoped “the Congress will support their own dignity of

the proper authority of each Committee.” The county leaders openly admitted that they

attempted to come to a solution, yet they lacked the power. Clearly the colony felt the

                                                                                                               
57
Boudinot’s hesitancy included rejecting raising arms in 1775 and opposing independence as late as April
1776. Elias Boudinot, Journal or Historical Recollections of American Events during the Revolutionary
War (Philadelphia: Frederick Bourquin, 1894), 4-6 and Elias Boudinot, The Life, Public Services,
Addresses, and Letters, 1:13-21. Even moderates like Boudinot, while on the Newark Committee in 1775,
interrogated men who refused to assuage the committee’s fears about their dealings.
58
Memorial of the Essex County Committee to the Provincial Congress…, February 26, 1776, New Jersey
Provincial Congress, 1775-1800, MG 6, Document 36, NJHS.

  170  
lack of effective executive leadership to consolidate power and police the growing

epidemic of disaffection.

Divisions within New Jersey: William Franklin and Disaffection

Early on, New Jersey’s divisions, disaffection, and governor’s influence were on

display. Lacking energetic mechanics and fraternal societies, New Jersey was left with a

large Quaker and neutral population as well as Franklin’s moderate voice.59 In fact, the

colony did not appoint a committee of correspondence until February 1774, the last

colony to do so.60 An active colonial governor and a sizable disaffected and neutral

population hampered New Jersey’s already slow path towards independence. Appointed

royal governor in 1763, William Franklin’s leadership during the period before July 1776

helped stabilize New Jersey and keep its colonists from joining the Revolution.61 Due to

his famous father’s connections, Franklin understood the English political world yet

sympathized with angry colonists over taxation issues. In fact, he remained a supporter

of American assemblies’ rights without supporting independence. During his time in

office, New Jersey only tepidly endorsed colonial protests.62 Calmly guiding his colony,

                                                                                                               
59
Not all Quakers abhorred violence nor remained neutral, some supported the British. Ryan, “New
Jersey’s Loyalists,” 11. British leaders such as Lord Shelburne recognized Franklin’s temperament,
remarking how the governor’s “Ease and Honour” averted catastrophe. Lord Shelburne to Governor
Franklin, September 13, 1766, Shelburne Papers, 53: 161-162, WLC in Gerlach, Prologue, 140.
60
MPCCS, 2. The Assembly appointed James Kinsey, Stephen Crane, Hendrick Fisher, Samuel Tucker,
John Wetherill, Robert Friend Price, John Hinchman, John Mehelm, and Edward Taylor to the Committee.
61
In comparison to his predecessors, Franklin was fairly successful. Gerlach, Prologue, 37-41.
62
Protests against the Stamp Act and Tea Act were limited. Rather than combat opposition, Franklin
permitted the demonstrations and allowed the Assembly to meet so as to not risk upsetting matters further.
William Coxe To His Excellency Governor Franklin, September 3, 1765, and Governor Franklin’s Answer,
September 4, 1765 in NJAS, Series I, 9:497; Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Leonidas Dodson eds., Philip
Vickers Fithian: Journal, 1775-1776 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1934), 247; “‘Caesariensis’ on
Stamp Collectors and the Stamp Act Congress,” New-York Gazette; or the Weekly Post-Boy, September 12,
1765; Essex County Stamp Act Resolves, October 31, 1765, and The Effigy of a Wretch Hanged in New
Brunswick, October 31, 1765 in NJARDH, 10-12 and 18-20; William Franklin to Benjamin Franklin,
November 13, 1765, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin ed. Leonard Labaree, Volume XII (New Haven:

  171  
Franklin desired legislatures to petition and work with Parliament. In the years before

declaring independence, Franklin steered New Jersey towards a more moderate stance

than other colonies. The determined governor used to his advantage the fact that local

issues dominated New Jersey and not imperial affairs.63 He also retained support by

asserting that the lack of American representatives in Parliament stood at the root of the

problem, not taxes, and no amount of force could change colonists’ opinion.64 Standing

with his father, Franklin the younger desired Anglo-American unity but pled for

constitutional reform.65 Able to remain in office well into 1776, Franklin served as a

constant champion for royalists and a symbol for those residents who opposed the

committees. Whether threatening the New Jersey Assembly that the King might

“reduce…subjects to obedience” if they continued their rebellious ways or persuading the

legislators to break rank with the Continental Congress and petition the crown directly to

address their grievances, Franklin stirred divisions within New Jersey.66

                                                                                                               
Yale University Press, 1968), 366-370; Cushing and Sheppard, 536-537; and Votes and Proceedings of the
General Assembly of the Province of New-Jersey …, begun at Burlington, November 26, 1765 and
continued till the 30th day following, (Burlington: James Parker, 1765), 3. EC, Series I, 10089.
63
Maxine N. Lurie, “New Jersey Radical or Conservative in the Crisis Summer of 1776?” in NJAR, 35. For
opposition to the Stamp Act see: Edgar Jacob Fisher, New Jersey as a Royal Province, 1738-1776, Studies
in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XLI, 107 (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., Agents,
1911), 409-424.
64
Compromise, he argued, was ultimately the answer. Sending brute force to Boston might prevent
“scandalous Riots” but it would never end the “sullen Discontent.” Governor Franklin to the Earl of
Hillsborough, November 23, 1768 in NJAS, Series I, 10:70-71.
65
Shelia L. Skemp, William Franklin, Son of a Patriot, Servant of a King (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990), 100.
66
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Province of New-Jersey … at Perth-Amboy,
Wednesday, January 11th 1775, and continued until the 13th day of February, 58-61. EC, Series I, 14288;
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Province of New-Jersey… at Burlington,
Wednesday, November 15, 1775, and Continued until the 6th Day of December (Burlington: Isaac Collins,
1775), 4-6. EC, Series I, 14290; and Gerlach, Prologue, 243-244. Franklin’s words did not fall solely on
deaf ears as several radical motions failed to pass the conservatively leaning Congress. Pomfret, 257.

  172  
 Franklin’s efforts no doubt encouraged the inherent disaffection amongst the

people. His defiance helped undercut the patriot institutions and, in some regions,

election of delegates was met with violence.67 Across New Jersey, emboldened residents

resisted local committees’ efforts. In Burlington County, 133 residents petitioned to

“Discourage an Independence.”68 Vocal opposition to the Revolution hampered the

Provincial Congress ability to label enemies. In November 1775, the New Jersey

Assembly even rejected independence, demonstrating how the tide shifted.69 Even more

telling, Continental Congressmen John De Hart and James Kinsey resigned.70

Presumably, De Hart feared the resistance movement had gone too far.71 Charles Pettit,

Franklin’s former secretary, recognized that support for independence seemed weak even

in spring 1776.72 Such developments continued to give Franklin hope, especially when

the Assembly drafted a petition for the King to intervene and restore proper constitutional

order. However, despite his endeavors, the tide shifted once again. Franklin’s

                                                                                                               
67
Some Sussex men rioted over the decision to send delegates. Report of the Knowlton Committee to the
County Committee, May 11, 1775, Revolutionary Era MSS, NJHS in Gerlach, Prologue, 262.
68
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Province of New-Jersey… at Burlington,
Wednesday, November 15, 1775, and Continued until the 6th Day of December, 16-19. EC, Series I, 14290.
Franklin was excited to see the barracks would be repaired and the bill to support royal colonial
government moved through the legislature. The Assembly also reassured his safety.
69
Ibid, 19-20. See also: Burlington County Freeholders, “A Burlington County Petition to the Legislature
on Reconciliation,” November 1775 in NJARDH, 160-161.
70
Kinsey, a Quaker and Burlington lawyer, supported a legislature led resistance but refused to take part in
a war. He served on his county committee and in the Assembly where he acted as a moderate voice. After
the war he became a chief justice on the state supreme court. James Kinsey to Elias Boudinot, June 14 and
July 2, 1774 in NJARDH, 73-75.
71
Governor Franklin to the Earl of Dartmouth, January 5, 1776, NJAS, Series I, 10:680-681 and DeHart to
the New Jersey Assembly, November 13, 1775, Lloyd W. Smith Collection, 291, Morristown National
Historical Park in Gerlach Prologue, 296. See also Mr. De Hart’s Letter of Resignation, November 13,
1775, AA, Series IV, 3:1876.
72
Gerlach, “The Road to Revolution,” 36.

  173  
momentary victory collapsed when a contingency from Philadelphia swayed the New

Jersey Assembly to desist. The governor could not even look to his Council for aid as

four members favored the American cause against two for the British, with another two

remaining undecided.73

On the ground level, Franklin’s efforts yielded some results as not all areas

adhered to the non-importation agreements found in the Association. Bergen, Cape May,

and Sussex refrained from creating committees or signing the Association, while loyalist

stronghold Perth Amboy refused to be represented at the Middlesex County Committee.

In fact, only Essex followed by Gloucester, Middlesex, Morris and Somerset counties

elected new county level committees of correspondence.74 In Hackensack, residents of

Bergen County resoundingly protested such measures stating, “to show our loyalty to our

King, and love to our Country” they refused to engage in “unconstitutional measures.”75

Similar cases took place in Ridgefield, Monmouth County and among Quakers all over

the colony.76

Disaffection was a broad term and not all inhabitants labeled so were loyalists.

Due to their pacifism, Quakers rejected the Association and oaths in general. Such

resolution drew negative attention from the patriots and Quakers felt compelled to issue a
                                                                                                               
73
Pomfret, 257-258. Franklin was exceptionally upset at William Alexander’s treachery. Letter from
Charles Petit, Secretary to the Council of New-Jersey…, September 7, 1775, Lord Stirling to Governor
Franklin, September 14, 1775, and Governor Franklin to Lord Stirling, September 15, 1775 in AA, Series
IV, 3:656-658. As independence approached, even though he was left with few choices, Franklin still
refused a parole. William Franklin to his Council, June 23, 1776 in Revolutionary Era Manuscript
Collection, 1765-1790, MG 4, Box 1, Folder 2, NJHS. Franklin’s ordeal took a toll on his wife who soon
died. Delight W. Dodyk, “’Troublesome Times A-Coming’: The American Revolution and New Jersey
Women” in NJAR, 141-142.
74
Gerlach, Prologue, 235.
75
Meeting of the Inhabitants of Hackensack, New Jersey, March 14, 1775, MPCCS, 98.
76
“Mr. Holt,” New-York Journal, February 9, 1775.

  174  
statement or risk increased accusations of suspicious behavior. For patriots, Quaker

loyalty was imperative as they dominated South Jersey politics and held influence

elsewhere.77 Patriots’ hopes to sway Quakers’ allegiance were largely unsuccessful. In

Shrewsbury, when freeholders met to choose a committee of inspection, the people

rejected the call, as it would “prove a means of disturbing that peace.”78 Quaker leaders

even persuaded their followers to reject “public resolutions” which now “produced great

discord and confusion.”79 Openly attesting in the Pennsylvania Gazette that they

believed the King would alleviate all grievances, Quakers had faith that legal

mechanisms would eventually prevail, instead of the violent measures presently

employed. Bemoaning the usurpation of law, Quakers refused to challenge British rule.

Specifically citing the “illegal assemblies,” the pacifists rejected committees’ authority

and perhaps immediately labeled themselves as suspicious in the eyes of many New

Jersey patriots. Quakers continued to remain outside the patriot committees’ favor when

some sects stripped membership in the Society of Friends from anyone who took arms for

the Americans.80

According to scholar Wallace Brown, New Jersey housed at least 5,000 active

loyalists by the wars’ conclusion, a number that neglected to consider general

                                                                                                               
77
Gerlach, Prologue, 237. While active in the 1765 protests, Quakers balked at the violence the popular
movement embraced. Some Quakers even avoided sending aid to Boston lest they be accused of endorsing
rebellion. Some Quakers even served on the Continental Congress.
78
Extract of a letter from Shrewsbury, Rivington’s New-York Gazetteer, January 26, 1775. Angered over
their brethren’s lack of commitment, the Freehold Committee begged them to join to no avail. Committee
of Freehold, Monmouth County, March 14, 1775, MPCCS, 99.
79
“Testimony of the People called Quakers,” Pennsylvania Gazette, February 22, 1775.
80
This began occurring in February 1776. Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 14. On the patriot side both
Presbyterian and Baptist churches leaned towards the American cause and implemented their own loyalty
standards. In Middletown, men were denied communion in a Baptist Church for supporting the British.

  175  
disaffection or neutrality, yet still by no means demonstrated a large-scale consensus.81

Other scholars have suggested even larger numbers of disaffected persons, perhaps over

50,000 residents (36-37% of the population).82 Such a sizable disaffected population

went largely unchallenged because, unlike the previous two colonies examined, New

Jersey lacked a coercive and effective centralized executive body.

In addition to Franklin, many of the colony’s leaders, such as the influential East

Jersey Board of Proprietors, remained loyalists.83 Elsewhere, the high sheriffs of

Burlington, Gloucester, Huntington, Middlesex, and Monmouth all supported the British,

which hampered local patriot committees’ policing efforts.84 When considering the

sizable loyalist population and the lack of efficient coercive enforcement of laws against

dissent, disaffection was positioned to significantly influence New Jersey.85 Even

neutrality, a difficult term to both identify and quantify as it ranged depending on the
                                                                                                               
81
Both Wallace Brown and Charles Stedman highlighted the strong presence of British support early in the
struggle. Loyalists’ enthusiasm faded after British soldiers destroyed property and harassed families.
Despite such hardships inflicted upon the population, Brown noted that the Loyalists’ claims demonstrated
many arrant royalists remained. Charles Stedman, The History of the Origin, Progress and Termination of
the American War Volume I (London: 1794), 242 and Daniel Isaac Brown and William Taylor in Loyalist
Transcripts, Volume XV, 157, XXXIX, 73-74 in Brown, The King’s Friends: The Composition and
Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants (Providence: Brown university Press, 1965), 112-113.
82
Paul H. Smith, “New Jersey Loyalists and the British ‘Provincial Corps’ in the War of Independence,”
NJH (1969), 76. According to Paul Smith the average percent in other colonies hovered around 16%. New
Jersey also produced the largest number provincial regiments.
83
Pomfret, 272. Most Anglican and Dutch Reformed Churches leaned loyalist. The East Jersey Board of
Proprietors had been long hated by the people because it tried to seize land in Elizabethtown and Newark as
early as the 1740s. Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 8-9.
84
Bernstein, 264. Many justices of the peace leaned loyalist as well. Middlesex, because of its proximity,
engaged in illicit trade with Staten Island. The same was the case in Bergen County near New York City.
Adrian Leiby claimed about a third of Bergen’s residents held loyalist leanings and half of Essex’s
inhabitants supported the crown. Bernstein, 265; Lundin, 116-117; and Adrian C. Leiby, The Jersey Dutch
and the Neutral Ground, 1775-1783 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962), 83n.
85
David J. Fowler, “’Loyalty Is Now Bleeding in New Jersey’: Motivations and Mentalities of the
Disaffected,” in The Other Loyalists: Ordinary People, Royalism, and the Revolution in the Middle
Colonies, 1763-1787 ed. Joseph S. Tiedemann, et al. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009),
49.

  176  
region, remained rampant. In places such as Shrewsbury, the number could have been as

high as 40% while elsewhere much lower or even negligible.86 Finally, as high as a third

of the total population between 1776-1778 did not overtly support independence and

might not have ultimately cared which side won. These numbers demonstrate that in

New Jersey disaffection was widespread and influential. Without an effective and

powerful executive body to enforce conformity, New Jersey failed to curb disaffection.

Those New Jerseyans who remained loyal to the crown did so for a variety of

reasons including their socio-economic position, conservative worldview, ties to the

British Isles, religion, or even political heritage.87 Others, such as James Moody,

endorsed the British after experiencing patriots’ harsh treatment.88 Based on postwar

petitions to the Loyalist Claims Commission, most New Jersey claimants resided in

Middlesex County where the capital, Perth Amboy, was located.89 Other loyalist

strongholds included Bergen, Essex, and Monmouth counties, while West Jersey,

specifically Burlington and Gloucester, contained high numbers of Quakers. Therefore, it

is easy to see how New Jersey would be difficult to sway towards the patriot cause,

                                                                                                               
86
Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 6-7. In Morristown the neutrals could be less than 1% of the population.
However, Dennis Ryan’s definition is confusing because he asserted neutrals refused to pay taxes or trade.
Although he admitted the patriots would have labeled these men as disaffected or enemies.
87
Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 7-13 and Brown, The King’s Friends, 111-126. By no means did a
certain “class” side with the patriots or loyalists.
88
Moody, 2-7.
89
Two-thirds of the claimants came from the four counties closest to New York. Eugene R. Fingerhut,
“Uses and Abuses of the American Loyalists’ Claims: A Critique of Quantitative Analyses,” WMQ, Vol.
25, no. 2 (Apr., 1968), 249 and Brown, The King’s Friends, 117, 289, and 315.

  177  
especially without coercive executive authority.90 With a sizeable disaffected population,

some New Jerseyans questioned the local committees’ actions.

Both overt loyalists and some ordinary New Jerseyans considered patriot

committees’ very existence as a threat to public safety. Chief Justice Frederick Smyth

questioned whether the tyranny that Americans bemoaned was located in Parliament or in

American committees.91 Other anxious inhabitants pondered the committees’

unprecedented rise, their unwarranted assumption of “dangerous power” and seemingly

lack of “public virtue.” If one wished to contain corruption, suggested an anonymous

Essex County “Freeholder” and self-proclaimed “real Lover of Liberty,” residents need

only turn their attention to arbitrary patriot boards that investigated without prudence or

reason.92 Despite local patriot committees’ referencing and calling upon God to endorse

the Association and terminate disorder, they did little to alleviate suffering in reality. For

many of the local patriot institutions’ detractors, the boards represented the potentially

dangerous times that awaited the colony.93

                                                                                                               
90
Fowler, “’Loyalty Is Now Bleeding in New Jersey,” 51. For more on Freehold and Shrewsbury, two
towns within Monmouth County that divided sharply, see David J. Fowler, “Egregious Villains, Wood
Rangers, and London Traders: The Pine Robber Phenomenon in Revolutionary New Jersey,” (PhD
Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1987), 30-33.
91
“To the Hon. Frederick Smyth Esq. Chief Justice, of the Province of New Jersey,” New-York Journal,
November 17, 1774.
92
“‘A Freeholder’ to the Essex County Committee,” Rivington’s New-York Gazetteer, January 5, 1775. The
“Freeholder” noted that many people did not vote for the committeemen and the body operated in “an open
violation of our constitution…with unlimited, not to be defined” powers. For more complaints see:
Nottingham Township, “The Nottingham Petition to the Legislature,” January 30, 1775 in NJARDH, 115-
116.
93
Writing in horror the “Freeholder’ uttered “the constitution of my country is thus wantonly to be altered,
and by which men are to be cloathed with power to revenge themselves upon their neighbors without
controul, and the poor victim of their mad zeal,…, is to be exposed to infamy and disgrace, unheard,
without the form of a trial, and against the laws of this country.” Other loyalists voiced their displeasure in
letters to England. ‘A Freeholder’ to the Essex County Committee, January 5, 1775 in NJARDH, 104.

  178  
 Perhaps recognizing a divided colony, those New Jerseyans who supported the

royal government hoped to persuade residents about the threats posed by patriot

committees. The anonymous writer “Z” warned his countryman that anyone who resisted

British colonial officials “have formed no system” to alleviate the problems at hand nor

any that might arise in the future. Rather, the writer contended, patriots’ only

accomplishment had been to exacerbate matters.94 With the British colonial government

in jeopardy, “Z” cited the dearth of authority and police measures so as to highlight an

obvious shortcoming in the weak committee system, the absence of a chief executive to

instill order. Others, such as loyalist Reverend Thomas Bradbury Chandler, encouraged

residents to openly defy the illegal government.95 Chandler’s opposition in The

American Querist demonized ordinary residents and vigilantes who formed committees

and usurped Parliament’s sovereignty. He warned that such designs meant rebellion and

despair loomed.96 For his overt sedition, patriot committees labeled Chandler an enemy,

burned his pamphlets, and forbade them from being distributed in their towns.97 Free

speech had its limits in New Jersey as elsewhere. Aside from such dramatic instances,

many New Jerseyans only tentatively supported the Continental Congress.98

Other inhabitants put the “Freeholder” and “Z’s” words into action by refusing to

appoint local revolutionary bodies. “A Jersey Farmer” and his neighbors disagreed with
                                                                                                               
94
“To the People of New Jersey,” Rivington’s New York Gazetteer, December 1, 1774.
95
Thomas Bradbury Chandler, What Think Ye of the Congress Now?…, (New York: J. Rivington, 1775), 5.
96
Thomas Bradbury Chandler, The American Querist… (London: T. Caddel, 1775). For more on Chandler:
Albert Harrison Hoyt, Sketch of the Life of the Reverend Thomas Bradbury Chandler, D.D…,. (Boston:
New-England Historical and Genealogical Register, 1873), 12.
97
Samuel Seabury and James Rivington received similar treatment. Large-scale demonstrations and
resolutions to forbid Rivington’s paper were held in Newark, Morris, and Middlesex County. Hixson, 8.
98
Gerlach, “The Road to Revolution,” 26.

  179  
the Congress’ very nature and proceedings. Wishing to counteract the illegal bodies, they

devised a “declarative of their sentiments” for others to sign in response to the

Association. This counter-Association rejected extra-legal claims of sovereignty, calling

upon the need for “good order and government.”99 Anti-associators asserted that

committees’ proceedings lacked legality because not all residents voted for these so-

called representatives. Such sentiments demonstrated to local patriot committees that the

struggle for loyalty would be difficult. For moderates like Elias Boudinot, ingrained

societal divisions meant committees needed to proceed slowly so as not to “deter every

good Man from joining with us.” Boudinot specifically warned his brethren on the

Morris County Committee to refrain from intimidating equivocal residents.100 His voice

of moderation would soon serve as an influence on the New Jersey Committee of

Safety.101 Like others, Boudinot hoped to restore order, persuade New Jersey to accept

the Continental Congress’ resolutions, and reject zealots’ demands to raise troops in

1775.102 Without a strong executive to coerce people, New Jersey lacked unity in the

                                                                                                               
99
“Mr. Rivington,” Rivington’s New York Gazetteer, January 26, 1775.
100
“Elias Boudinot to the Morris County Committee,” April 25, 1775 in NJARDH, 132-133. Writing on
behalf of the Essex Committee, Boudinot highlighted an example when residents attempted to intimidate
Reverend Chandler, the rector at St. John’s Anglican Church. At the last minute the Essex Committee
prevented further harassment. Chandler upset inhabitants by promoting an Anglican Bishop in America and
championing the British cause in pamphlets until his departure in 1775. Thomas Bradbury Chandler, D.D.,
Appeal to the Public in Behalf of the Church of England in American (New York: James Parker New
Printing Office, 1767), i; William Livingston, A Letter to the Right Reverend Father in God, John, Lord
Bishop of Landaff (New York: Garrat Noel, 1768), 3. EC Series 10949; and Patricia U. Bonomi, Under the
Cope of Heaven: Religion, Society, and Politics in Colonial America (New York: Oxford, 1986), 205. For
Chandler’s other works see: Thomas Bradbury Chandler, A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans,
on the Subject of Our Political Confusions (America, 1774). For more on the religious debates see: Edward
J. Cody, “The Religious Issue in Revolutionary New Jersey,” NJRE, 10:5-7.
101
Boudinot also served as the Commissary General for Prisoners from 1776-1778, in the House of
Representatives and as the Director of the United States Mint. His thoughts on government influenced his
political beliefs as he adhered to the Whig notion that if government threatened property it acted illegally.
Donald W. Whisenhunt, “Elias Boudinot,” NJRE, 18:6-10.
102
Boudinot, Journal, 3-4.

  180  
years before declaring independence. In fact, New Jerseyans expressed lukewarm

enthusiasm for independence into 1776. The Assembly received petitions begging it to

reject independence.103 Citing “the real Welfare of New-Jersey,” petitioners dreaded

“Separation” and hoped representatives possessed “the Honour, the Interest, Safety and

Welfare” of their colony. Reconciliation, they argued, would help promote order and

happiness. Many disaffected persons lamented the rise of coercive patriot committees by

discrediting them in newspapers or rejecting their authority. However, some New

Jerseyans took their disaffection in a more violent direction.

Unsatisfied with bombastic words, disaffected residents took up arms to resist.

Reports circled of “Tories in every part [of the colony] have of late assumed fresh

Courage, and talk very daringly” and Richard Beatty noted New Brunswick residents

“have on their Regimentals, are pretended Whigs; but as soon as they put them off are

detestable Tories; and are Hypocrites.”104 Other men simply refused militia duty and

asserted they intended to join the King’s standard.105 In Upper Freehold, inhabitants

notoriously displayed little patriotism since the 1760s Stamp Act Crisis and they

continued to display disaffection throughout the decade.106 Perhaps most notoriously, in

                                                                                                               
103
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Province of New-Jersey… Burlington, Monday,
November 15th 1775, and continued until the 6th day of December, 16. EC, Series I, 14290. The Assembly
also voted to replace Benjamin Franklin as the colonial agent, agreed to send a separate petition to the
King, and instructed their delegates not to vote for independence.
104
Letter from Lord Stirling to the President of Congress, December 17, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 4:295 and
Reading Beatty to Mr. Green, “Letters of the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-1794,”
1775 in The Pennsylvania Magazine on History and Biography, Vol. XLIV (Philadelphia: The Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, 1920), 196-197.
105
William A. Whitehead, Contributions to the Early History of Perth Amboy… (New York: D. Appleton
& Company, 1856), 327.
106
Fowler, “’Loyalty Is Now Bleeding in New Jersey,’” 52.

  181  
spring 1776 the “Loyalist Club” formed. Led by the dynamic “Little Anthony”

Woodward, Jr. he and his supporters mustered at Quaker loyalist and merchant Richard

Waln’s mill. The “Loyalist Club” questioned the patriots’ motives, believing they

intended to raise the price of goods intentionally to harm the common man.107 Stirring

class tensions, “Little Anthony” rallied angry neighbors to reject the Association at all

costs. The group soon appointed Richard Robins and Moses Ivins as captains to oppose

rebel leaders. Aware of such rumblings in Monmouth County, the Provincial Congress

summoned Robins and Ivins.108 After refusing to appear on June 26, the legislature

ordered Colonel Charles Read to apprehend the men as well as others and confine them

in Gloucester.109 While “Little Anthony” escaped to the British lines, three days later

Richards and Ivins petitioned to be heard and desired to admit their fault.110 After

hearing the men’s pleas, the Provincial Congress still required they remain confined. The

next day, it extended the men a £500 bond “conditioned at all times… faithfully to

observe, obey, keep, and perform all resolves, …and be of good behavior.”111 Released

again into the world Richards and Ivins, as well as “Little Anthony” and the rest of his

“Loyalist Club” would not be silenced so easily. Until a strong executive formed, such

men went unchecked.

                                                                                                               
107
Confession of Thomas Fowler against Anthony Woodward and others, April 11, 1777 and Confession of
Thomas Fowler before the Governor and Council of Safety, April 11, 1777 in New Jersey Council of
Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 36 and 37, NJA.
108
MPCCS, 465. Others summoned on this day refused to appear. The Loyalists Club’s activities and
relation to the Council of Safety will be studied in Chapter 6.
109
MPCCS, 477.
110
Fowler, “’Loyalty Is Now Bleeding in New Jersey,’” 53 and MPCCS, 483.
111
MPCCS, 486-487.

  182  
The New Jersey Committee of Safety
In August 1775, with no end of the struggle in sight, the Provincial Congress

created an eleven member Committee of Safety to act as the colony’s executive.112 As

Gerlach noted, the Committee of Safety’s creation demonstrated the patriots understood

war would be arduous and an “ad hoc emergency committee system [was] obsolete.”113

In other colonies, committees for public safety acted as a bulwark for civil authority

against both British aggression and even American usurpations of power. They also

consolidated power amongst the revolutionary local committees, policed inhabitants,

instilled conformity, regulated the economy, and provided for the common good by

establishing security. Led by moderate men, like Elias Boudinot, the New Jersey

Committee of Safety lacked the same initiative found in other colonies. Adding to the

Committee of Safety’s inefficiency was the fact that it sat for much briefer periods than

other similar bodies and never received the same unprecedented powers. Replacing the

committee of correspondence, the Committee of Safety met only when the legislature

adjourned and performed many of the same functions, including the raising and

disciplining of the militia.114 Presented with a similarly vague mandate from the

Provincial Congress as other committees for public safety received to “act for the public

welfare,” the New Jersey executive body displayed a lack of initiative when the colony

struggled in the face of disaffection.115 With several of New Jersey’s most notable

                                                                                                               
112
A committee examined the executive’s minutes. Committee to Inspect the minutes of the Congress and
Committee of Safety, October 10, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:1220.
113
Gerlach, Prologue, 280.
114
MPCCS, 187-192.
115
The Committee included: Samuel Tucker (president) Hendrick Fisher (vice president) John Hart,
Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, Peter Schenck, Enos Kelsey, Frederick Frelinghuysen, Isaac Pearson, Joseph
Borden, John Schureman, and Azariah Dunham. The Committee of Safety’s bias composition became an

  183  
leaders sitting on the executive body, Gerlach suggested its potential power, but it did not

materialize. This lack of extensive power is not to say the New Jersey Committee of

Safety did not engage in similar activities as executive bodies in New York and Virginia,

but rather its monitoring efforts were by no means to same scale. While committees for

public safety in other colonies summoned, apprehended and monitored large numbers of

inhabitants, the New Jersey Committee of Safety’s efforts paled in comparison.

Even though not as effective or systematic, New Jersey patriots monitored society

by formulating lists of residents who refused the Association and called for inspection of

suspicious travelers.116 Acting when the Provincial Congress adjourned, the Committee

of Safety called for the securing and patrolling of public roads. Citing the treacherous

nature of travel since “strollers,” “vagabonds,” “horse stealing and other robberies” had

become more frequent, the executive body ordered examinations.117 In an attempt to

curb servants from fleeing their masters, the Committee of Safety solicited “the good

people” to “examine all suspicious persons” on the road. If unsavory characters proved

unable to “give a satisfactory account,” then he or she should be seized.

To combat internal threats and disorder, the Provincial Congress attempted to

increase the Committee of Safety’s intelligence network. If an American deserter was

discovered, the government could contact local militias to capture and confine the

                                                                                                               
issue. Five members hailed from Somerset but only four other counties were represented. There would be
overturn on the next Committee of Safety, as Somerset would not be as highly represented. New Jersey’s
leaders experienced a great deal of overturn. For religious and occupation breakdown see: Gerlach,
Prologue, 280 and 286-287. MPCCS, 254.
116
The Provincial Congress called for lists of non-Associators. Committees of the several Counties
required to furnish a list of the names, August 5, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:41. In August 1775, counties
such as Bergen ordered anyone who refused to comply with militia duty, to leave. Bergen County (New-
Jersey) Committee appoint a County Committee of Safety…, August 29, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:450.
117
MPCCS, 195.

  184  
offender. To enhance its efforts, the Committee of Safety enlisted the entire population

to be watchful and report deserters.118 Calling upon inhabitants to aid monitoring the

suspicious was common in other colonies and Committee of Safety Chairman Samuel

Tucker ordered each town board to forward intelligence.119 The Committee of Safety

also strengthened its intelligence network by ordering each county to appoint riders and

erect distress beacons.120 Policing the shores was also critical. When patriots discovered

that the sloop, Polly and Anne, ran ashore, the Monmouth County Committee ordered its

cargo seized and sold.121 The crew, meanwhile, were apprehended and sent back to their

home colony of New York. The Committee of Safety placed other captured residents on

parole or pressured them to sign the Association. By increasing its network and

attempting to rein in local leaders, the executive sought to gain influence and slowly

attempted to consolidate power. The revolutionary era intelligence network, which was

successful elsewhere, began to form, albeit at a slow pace. However, the Provincial

Congress, at times, assumed a relaxed attitude towards those residents who refused to

sign the Association, only filing away names for a later day.122 In comparison to other

                                                                                                               
118
MPCCS, 217.
119
Letter from Samuel Tucker, Chairman of the Committee of Trenton…, November 10, 1775 in AA,
Series IV, 3:1757. Although scholars have overlooked him, Fisher of Somerset was a member of several
revolutionary bodies such as the New Jersey’s Committee of Correspondence, the Provincial Congress
(President), and the Committee of Safety. Fisher advocated a moderate stance and hoped for reconciliation.
After Lexington and Concord, his opinions changed. T.E. Davis, “Hendrick Fisher,” PNJHS Third Series,
Vol. IV, no. 3, (May-October, 1907), 129-146.
120
Journal of the Votes and Proceedings, as well of the Committee of Safety, as the Provincial Congress of
New-Jersey, at a Sitting at New-Brunswick, began January 31, and continued to the second Day of March
following (New York: John Anderson, at the Continental Printing-Office, 1776), 5, EC Series I, 14913 and
Gerlach, Prologue, 305. While Gerlach noted the creation of the intelligence network and even used the
term surveillance at times, he never questioned the Committee’s coercive tactics.
121
After selling the goods, the colony received the profits. Journal of the Votes and Proceedings, as well of
the Committee of Safety, as the Provincial Congress of New-Jersey, 11-12.
122
MPCCS, 211.

  185  
colonies, New Jersey’s monitoring was weaker and its scale less dramatic. Recognizing

the growing disorder consuming the colony, Philip Vickers Fithian explained, “We leave

New Jersey in a melancholy State! Battalions of Militia…Drums & Fifes rattling –

Military language in every Mouth.”123 The civil government had to assert itself.

Not nearly as extensive as in other colonies, on a few occasions New Jersey’s

Committee of Safety apprehended and summoned crown officials to demonstrate its

authority and establish legitimacy. When royal official Robert Ellison of Sussex refused

to pay taxes or muster, his local committee cited him and he soon found himself before

the Committee of Safety. Regretting his ill decision, Ellison admitted fault but

immediately contended that Justice Nathaniel Pettit had deceived him. Ellison begged

forgiveness and pleaded for mercy citing that he previously signed the Association. The

Committee of Safety then apprehended Pettit, who soon admitted fault. Since Ellison had

already been cited as disaffected once, the Committee of Safety ordered both he and

Pettit be disarmed and removed from their offices. The symbolism inherent in the

Committee of Safety’s actions should not be overlooked. Two high-ranking officials

found themselves completely humiliated by the patriot institution and stripped of their

power. Each man owed the new government dues and had to enter a recognizance with

their local patriot committee.124 If they proved themselves worthy, they might regain

                                                                                                               
123
Albion and Dodson, 131. Born in 1747, Fithian attended Princeton College with Henry Lee, Aaron Burr,
and James Madison. After teaching in Virginia, he conducted missionary trips to Western Virginia and
Pennsylvania. Later, he served as a chaplain for the New Jersey militia. John Rogers Williams ed., Philip
Vickers Fithian: Journal and Letters, 1767-1774: Student at Princeton College 1770-72, Tutor at Nomini
Hall in Virginia 1773-74 (Princeton: The University Library, 1900), xiii.
124
Journal of the Votes and Proceedings, as well of the Committee of Safety, as the Provincial Congress of
New-Jersey, 13-15. In January 1776, each man paid £8 for the expense of their own apprehension and
another £50 security for their future good behavior.

  186  
their posts, but such an outcome could only come with the blessing of the patriot

government. Arrests of loyalists stirred fear of large-scale disarming and unfounded

rumors of executions for non-conformity.125

To a lesser degree than other executive bodies, the Committee of Safety also

hoped to instill unity by regulating the economy. Rumors spread of residents openly

rejecting the Association, forming mobs, and harming the public “welfare.” Therefore,

the Committee of Safety decided executive action was needed. To ease tensions between

“all ranks of people,” it called for price regulations on salt, wool and course linens.126

Committeemen openly admitted that fixed prices fell below the cost to manufacture or

import, but with necessity too great, such measures seemed vital to calm socio-economic

divisions. Without readily available goods, people would become unpredictable.

Begging residents with goods to “consider the poor people,” the Committee of Safety

hoped sellers would not seek maximum profits. Justifying forced price regulations as

vital to preserve inhabitants’ property from theft, the Committee of Safety asserted that

such measures ensured general security. All people within the colony were to abide by

these rules and local committees were called upon frequently to subdue riots. However,

lacking a coercive executive to administer such regulations was still the main problem.

                                                                                                               
125
Franklin heard tales of disarming in Sussex. He knew the patriots had the ability to procure arms and
powder from abroad and therefore his concern was justified. He also insisted a Continental Congressman
had suggested that any New Jerseyan who refused to surrender his arms should be executed. Governor
Franklin to the Earl of Dartmouth, January 5, 1776 in NJAS, Series I, 10:680 and R. Smith Journal, 32 in
Kemmerer, 339.
126
Resolution of the Committee of Safety of New-Jersey, May 15, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:467. It also
sought to force people with gold and silver not to charge more than its worth in paper currency. Some
county committees also disallowed the killing of lambs before a certain date. Committee of Newark…,
May 20, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:523.

  187  
 Dramatic stories of policing the population and setting prices aside, New Jersey’s

Committee of Safety dealt primarily with military preparations. First and foremost, the

Committee attempted to operate as a central administrator. Devoting most of its time to

the war, the Committee of Safety delivered commissions, procured military supplies, and

ordered companies to fill vacancies.127 Committees for public safety across America

frequently communicated with each other to deal with imperative military issues. For

example, New Jersey’s board received letters from the New York Committee of Safety

requesting deserters be captured and returned. Several New Jerseyans joined New

York’s ranks and then fled back to their home colony. Understandably, New York’s

executive felt that diplomacy was the best course of action and requested New Jersey’s

Committee of Safety to investigate.128 New Jersey continued to contribute to the inter-

colonial alliance by notifying New York that three of its residents allegedly enlisted for

the king.129 Aside from communicating with the other colonies, New Jersey’s executive

also worked with the Continental Congress.

As the civil executive in charge of military matters, the Committee of Safety

served as a conduit between New Jersey and the Continental Congress, especially in

regards to defense issues. The Continental Congress heard complaints about military

readiness from local militias, such as when Cumberland County bemoaned its depleted
                                                                                                               
127
Generally the legislature dealt more with disaffection than the Committee of Safety. The Committee
instructed minutemen to adopt hunting-frocks to distinguish themselves. Jacob Ford received a bond to
deliver powder to the Provincial Congress or Committee of Safety. Colonel Jacob Ford Bond 1776, New
Jersey Provincial Congress, 1775-1800, MG 6, Document 6, NJHS and Committee of Safety of New-
Jersey, August 30, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:457.
128
Letter to the Committee of Safety for New-Jersey, September 27, 1775 and Resolutions for
apprehending Deserters from the Continental Troops, October 17, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:913 and 1226.
129
New Jersey’s Committee sent the men to New York. Letter from the Committee of Safety of New-
Jersey…, April 20, 1776 and Letter from the Committee of New-Brunswick, in New–Jersey, with the
examination of Henry Smith, April 27, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 5:1464-1465 and 1473-1474.

  188  
state without the necessary provisions to stave off General Gage.130 New Jersey’s

Provincial Congress heeded the advice and ordered a bill drafted. When the Continental

Congress required battalions for an excursion into Canada, it charged the Committee of

Safety with raising the men.131 To arm men, the Provincial Congress occasionally

ordered local officials to fine anyone who refused paper money and even seized goods.

The Committee also dealt with prisoners. For example, the executive agreed to send two

British officers, General Prescott and Captain Chase, under guard to the Continental

Congress.132 When Prescott refused parole, the Committee of Safety confined the general

and delivered him in chains. Other prisoners, pleading poverty, refused to pay for their

confinement or else their families’ might suffer for want of food.133 Ultimately, the

legislature ordered the Committee of Safety to remove and parole the prisoners from

Trenton to anyplace else within the colony far enough away from travel routes.134

Anyone who refused would be imprisoned. Charged to be the arm of the civil

government, its lack of initiative, in comparison to other committees for public safety,

caused the New Jersey executive to have a less tumultuous relationship with the military.

                                                                                                               
130
Memorial from Committee for the County of Cumberland, September 30, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 3:849-
850.
131
Letter from the President of Congress to the New-Jersey Committee of Safety, January 20, 1776 in AA,
Series IV, 4:783-784.
132
Letter from New-Jersey Committee of Safety to the President of the Congress, January 23, 1776 in AA,
Series IV, 4:814.
133
The Committee of Safety rejected the plea and refused from hearing the cases. It also extended paroles
to others who accepted, such as Dr. William Bryant, allowing him to remain in Princeton. Letter from New-
Jersey Committee of Safety to the President of Congress, January 22, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 4:815.
134
Resolutions of Congress, March 20, 1776 and Letter from Samuel Tucker to the President of Congress,
March 23, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 5:473 and 474. The prisoners were moved to Mount Holly.

  189  
 Since the New Jersey Committee of Safety often both lacked power and failed to

realize its potential, it enjoyed a relatively stable relationship with the American military.

New Jersey endorsed the Continental Congress’ belief, that America’s strength was

“Civil power” working alongside the military.135 American General William Alexander

and the Committee of Safety cooperated together. The executive body complied with his

orders and sent several county militias to defend Perth Amboy, Elizabethtown, Bergen-

Neck, and Paulus Hook.136 Alexander argued that these extra forces were imperative and

begged the Committee to work speedily. The Committee of Safety also was responsible

for sending three battalions to New York. General Washington too solicited the

Committee of Safety’s aid rallying and organizing the militia when the British threat

seemed imminent.137 Ultimately, New Jersey’s Committee of Safety lacked the same

jealous and cautious protection of civil authority as displayed in New York and Virginia.

When New Jersey faced potential invasion and occupation, the Committee of Safety took

some active measures to preserve civil authority. For example, Lord Stirling

recommended the committees “suspend the operations of the civil law” until they

understood the British’s motives, yet the Committee of Safety was unwilling to allow the

American military to besiege the colony.138 Samuel Tucker and the Provincial Congress

responded to the inter-colonial legislature’s petition to raise more militiamen and

                                                                                                               
135
President of the Continental Congress to the Convention of New Jersey, June 18, 1776 in CENJ, 6-7.
136
New York counties, such as Richmond, removed provisions and stock to Staten Island and New Jersey
to protect them from potential raids.
137
Letter from General Washington to the Committee of Safety…, April 24, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 5:1052.
138
Lord Stirling solicited both the Committee of Safety and William Livingston’s aid, arguing extensive
defense measures were needed. Other military leaders also strategized with Livingston on defense
positions. Letter from Lord Stirling to Committees of New-Jersey…, March 17, 1776 and Letter from Lord
Stirling to Essex County Committee…, March 18, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 5:397 and 402; and Lord Stirling
to Livingston, March 24, 1776 and William Heath to Livingston, April 1, 1776, PWL, 1:44-47.

  190  
implored New Jerseyans to remember that their proximity to the action would surely

open them “to the cruel depredations of the enemy.”139 Similar to other committees for

public safety, New Jersey’s executive body restricted inhabitants’ commerce with

Continental troops to prevent abuses. Such behavior could be potentially risky, and the

Committee of Safety forbade such trade unless the officer or soldier produced a

certificate permitting such transactions.140 As aforementioned, aside from a few

instances, the Committee of Safety seldom asserted itself during the period before 1776.

It created no effective security state and given the rampant disaffection, the Committee of

Safety accomplished very little.

Perhaps the Committee of Safety’s lack of an identity contributed to its less

aggressive nature. Evident of its lack of ability to centralize and consolidate power, local

committees were still actively policing society to fill the vacuum of effective executive

power.141 Some local boards even solicited the provincial government to assume greater

power and regulate the colony more effectively. Unsatisfied with how the Provincial

Congress and Committee of Safety operated, these boards continued to take matters into

their own hands.142

                                                                                                               
139
“New-Jersey, in the Provincial Congress,” New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury, June 24, 1776.
William Livingston withdrew from his seat on the Continental Congress to aid his colony as New York and
New Jersey fell into chaos after British troops landed on Staten Island in July 1776. See for examples of
Livingston’s role in defense as well as the confusion caused by reports of the British landing: Washington
to Livingston, June 28, 1776, PGW; and Livingston to Samuel Tucker, June 29 1776, Livingston to Joseph
Reed, July 3, 1776, and Livingston to Samuel Tucker, July 3, 1776, PWL, 1:58 and 60.
140
If someone broke this resolution, they would be treated as an enemy. Resolutions of the Committee of
Safety…, April 23, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 5:1042.
141
The Somerset County Committee paid men to apprehend slaves who escaped and roamed New Jersey.
Minutes of the Meetings of the Justices and Chosen Freeholders for the County of Somerset: May 13, 1772
to September 2, 1822 (Somerville: Somerset County, 1977), 4-5.
142
The Elizabethtown Committee wrote the Provincial Congress soliciting stricter regulations as many
people entered the colony, some of whom presumably intended to harm the cause. Unwilling to wait for

  191  
 In comparison to other executive bodies, the New Jersey Committee of Safety

was weaker. Facing internal dissent, the Committee of Safety struggled to instill

conformity or consolidate power effectively. Meeting only when the Provincial Congress

adjourned, the Committee of Safety lacked the ability to prosecute suspected disaffected

characters outside their home counties. William Livingston, one of many patriots who

recognized the Committee of Safety’s flaws, distrusted its ability to actually curb

disaffection with these restrictions. Inimical residents, deserters from areas under threat,

and suspicious persons entering the colony contributed to the toxic situation for liberty

and security.143 In the end, the Committee of Safety’s shortcoming manifested itself in

the extensive chaos that consumed the colony on the eve of declaring independence and

immediately afterwards. Handling military commissions, procuring supplies, and

summoning some disaffected persons, the Committee of Safety failed to establish

conformity or consolidate local boards’ power. With the British nearby in New York,

Livingston felt uninspired by the board’s track record thus far.

                                                                                                               
action, the Shrewsbury Township Committee ordered all arms in the hands of “Negroes Either free or
Slaves” be seized. Soon after, the committee forbade slaves from traveling off their master’s property and
empowered any inhabitant to secure a wayward bondsman not possessing a pass. If the master or mistress
could not pay the 10 shilling fine, the slave remained confined and whipped 15 times. At which time, the
master was still required to pay a 4 shilling fine. Non-Associators would be disarmed and the committee
prohibited entertainment, dancing, and gambling. Any residents whom the committee were advertised as
enemies and even had their homes searched. During its February-March 1776 session, the Provincial
Congress passed a resolution stating that anyone who refused the Association would be disarmed and
required to provide a security for their good behavior. Although they could appeal to a local board for
redress, those residents who refused to pay would be confined. Even Quakers had to pay 10 shillings if they
refused their patriotic duty by bearing arms. Residents old enough to bear arms were required to fulfill
their duty as a “good citizen” and defend New Jersey’s security. Despite such resolutions, the Committee of
Safety was too weak to enforce law. Journal of the Votes and Proceedings, as well of the Committee of
Safety, as the Provincial Congress of New-Jersey, 47 and 125-127; Minutes of the Shrewsbury Township
Committee, February 12, 1776 in NJARDH, 149; and MPCCS, 407. For more on blacks’ experience during
the war: Giles R. Wright, “Moving Toward Breaking the Chains: Black New Jerseyans and the American
Revolution,” in NJAR, 113-137.
143
Ordinance To Prevent persons deserting places in danger of being attacked, and for restraining such as
are dangerous to the common cause, from taking refuge in this Colony, February 19, 1776, MPCCS, 428-
429.

  192  
The Rise of William Livingston
Born in Albany, William Livingston studied at Yale University and became a

lawyer. Aside from his practice he also edited the Independent Reflector and held several

political and community positions.144 Championed as a defender of American liberties

and freedom, historians also depicted Livingston as skeptical about abusive executives.145

Livingston certainly did not endorse pure democracy, believing that only an aristocracy

could rule effectively. Considered a radical Whig, Livingston supported a balanced

constitution at the heart of a republic. For him, government operated as a necessary evil

to protect the weak from the strong.146 Rather than eschewing an executive, he argued its

role remained necessary to “restrain licentious anarchy.”147 Livingston’s attitudes toward

an executive shifted over the course of the Revolution and his lengthy governorship.

Over time, he slowly endorsed additional executive powers, such as impressments of

private property, and even suggested a dictatorship. Livingston went as far as to question

any state that later adopted too democratic state governments.148 Endorsing executive

prerogative powers even before being named governor, due to his radical Whig beliefs,

                                                                                                               
144
The short-lived Independent Reflector served as Livingston’s tool to attack his political adversaries.
145
Michael Lewis Levine, “The Transformation of a Radical Whig Under Republican Government:
William Livingston, Governor of New Jersey, 1776-1790,” (PhD Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1975),
ii.
146
According to Bernstein, Livingston believed government served the people, especially the property
class. Livingston disliked party politics, as he believed this sacrificed the common good. Serving on the
Continental Congress, Livingston was a moderate when it came to imperial politics in the early 1770s.
147
Levine, ii. Both my dissertation and Levine’s work recognize that Livingston understood the weakness
of his position as governor and expanded his power. My work also builds of David Bernstein’s argument
that William Livingston led the government when the legislature was unable.
148
Livingston blamed his financial woes on depreciation, turning his attention to this issue. Levine, iii-iv.

  193  
Livingston vehemently argued that individual rights had limits. In order to preserve the

public good, Livingston contended, some individual liberties needed to be sacrificed.149

Abandoning his law practice, Livingston moved to Elizabethtown in 1772 and

built a new home Liberty Hall.150 As for politics, he previously held a seat on the New

York Assembly for only two years, yet most of his public experience came as a factional

leader.151 During the imperial crisis, Livingston was no fire-eater; like many others, he

chose a middle stance. Opposed to the Stamp Act, he also detested violent extra-legal

proceedings and feared potential social upheaval. Such opinions placed him at odds with

both extremes and he eventually lost his influence.152 Much to patriots James Kinsey and

Elias Boudinot’s dismay, Livingston remained outside the imperial crisis. The two men

questioned how long a man of Livingston’s talents could remain passive after being a

champion of colonial rights.153 By June 1774, Elizabethtown elected the former New

York lawyer as its representative on county committees and as a member of both

Continental Congresses.154 As a junior committee member, Livingston participated in the

                                                                                                               
149
I build upon Levine’s argument. For more on Livingston see chapter 6.
150
PWL, 1:3. Once in New Jersey, he was well connected through his wife Susanna French, the daughter of
a wealthy landowner and his clients included the Parkers, Skinners, and Rutherfords. Bernstein, 230.
151
Livingston led a group comprised of John Morrin Scott and William Smith. PWL, 1:4.
152
Seldom practicing law in New Jersey, he became involved with the struggles between the people and the
East New Jersey Proprietors. See: Benjamin Bond, An Answer to a Bill in the Chancery of New-Jersey at
the Suit of John Earl of Stair…, (New York: James Parker, 1752), 4. EC, Series I, 6808 and William A.
Whitehead, East Jersey under the Proprietary Governments…, New Jersey Historical Society, Collections,
Volume I (New York: New-Jersey Historical Society, 1846), 85-87.
153
James Kinsey to Elias Boudinot, June 14, 1774 in Boudinot Papers, Library of Congress, in PWL, 1:9.
154
In the Continental Congress he served on committees that wrote, “Address to the People of Ireland” and
“Declaration on Taking Arms.”

  194  
investigation of disaffected counterfeiters and drafted early county resolutions.155

Through his involvement, he developed the necessary political and military relationships

to lead the colony, especially as a war governor later on.156

Livingston’s leadership in the period before independence and during his

governorship foreshadowed his behavior in the formative state years. He spurred inter-

colonial dialogue and called upon freeholders in Essex County to choose committees to

construct a “more extensive observation of the conduct of individuals.”157 Livingston

desired some means to police the population to protect public security. Through his

committee work in the Continental Congress, Livingston organized civil and military

forces in New York to work together. Hoping to foster cooperation and unity, the

committee Livingston served on also instructed New York’s Committee of Safety to take

necessary measures to aid General Charles Lee to protect the colony.158 Livingston also

wrote local patriot committees, encouraging them to effectively enforce the Association.

His experiences on the Continental Congress combined with his belief in the common

good aptly prepared Livingston to lead New Jersey.

                                                                                                               
155
Edwin F. Hatfield, History of Elizabeth, New Jersey; including the Early History of Union County (New
York: Careton & Lanahan, 1868), 410.
156
Livingston served as a brigadier general and led the militia. He also took an active role in 1775 issuing
commissions and supplying troops. Livingston to Lord Stirling, December 19, 1775 and To Unknown
Person, December 22, 1775, PWL, 1:31-32.
157
“New-Jersey,” New-York Gazette; and the Weekly Mercury, December 5, 1774.
158
JCC, 4:81. Livingston and the committee also suggested the Committee of Safety remove prisoners
from the neighborhoods they were held in. See also: Resolutions of Congress, directing the Prisoners at
Trenton to be removed…, March 20, 1776 and Letter from Samuel Tucker to the President of Congress,
March 23, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 5:473-474.

  195  
 Livingston witnessed first hand the New Jersey Committee of Safety’s weakness

when it solicited the Continental Congress’ advice for dealing with counterfeiters.159

When husband and wife counterfeiters Henry and Elizabeth Vandyne allegedly admitted

their guilt while confined in Morris County, the Committee of Safety pressed for the

Continental Congress’s aid, apparently unsure how to react.160 The local board then

spirited the accused away to the New Jersey Committee of Safety along with evidence

and affidavits.161 Hoping the Committee of Safety would provide swift guidance and

decisive punishment, Morris County leaders might have been disappointed.

Left to decide in the wake of the Committee of Safety’s deferral, the Continental

Congress seized the opportunity to punish the transgressors and suggested that the two

culprits repay residents whom they had wronged and then be placed on a recognizance to

attend a trial. The Continental Congress’s sub-committee, on which Livingston sat, also

recommended a resolution that punished future counterfeiters to further deter internal

subversion. No doubt Livingston learned from these experiences and realized the

necessity of punishing disaffection in all its forms. Previously, counterfeiting continental

currency was not a formal criminal offense. After June 1776, however, the Continental

Congress recommended all colonies amend their laws. In some places, counterfeiting

                                                                                                               
159
A Continental Congress committee of Livingston, Thomas McKean, Roger Sherman, John Adams,
Carter Braxton, and James Duane handled the request. JCC, 4:321 and JCC, 5:426. Resolution of the
Committee of Safety of New-Jersey respecting the counterfeiting of Continental Bills…, April 23, 1776 in
AA, Series IV, 5:1038.
160
Letter from the Committee for Morris County to the New-Jersey Committee of Safety, April 6, 1776 in
AA, Series IV, 5:1038.
161
Affidavits and Testimony relating she eventually admitted to her role to the counterfeiting, April 4-6,
1776 in AA, Series IV, 5:1038-1042.

  196  
would mean death.162 By July 1776, Livingston recognized the increasing threat New

Jersey faced with the British located nearby. Arguably even more important, he

witnessed the people’s fear first hand.163 Inhabitants’ anxiety materialized as British

regulars headed towards Elizabethtown on July 3, a moment when most of New Jersey’s

armed forces happened to be elsewhere.164 Once again, New Jersey’s lack of effective

executive power was evident.

Conclusion
After the Provincial Congress allowed their new delegates to the Continental

Congress, John Hart, Richard Stockton, and John Witherspoon to vote for independence,

New Jersey joined the rest of the colonies.165 By July 1776, New Jersey also possessed a

new state constitution.166 Written under an impending time constraint due to rumors of an

invasion and the uncertainty presented by independence, leaders framed a constitution

within weeks.167 Curiously referring to New Jersey as a “colony” and not a “state,” the

                                                                                                               
162
JCC, 5:475-476 and Ordinance for punishing Treason and Counterfeiting [in New Jersey] July 18, 1776
inAA, Series IV, 6:1648-1649.
163
Letter from General Livingston to General Mercer…, July 3, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1233-1234 and
John Covenhoven to the President of Congress, July 3, 1776 in AA, Series V, 1:1.
164
See: Extract of a Letter from Trenton…, July 2, 1776 and Letter from General Livingston to General
Washington, July 4, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1262. In New Jersey independence was hardly a foregone
conclusion. Fleming, “Crossroads of the American Revolution,” 4 and Governor Franklin to the Earl of
Dartmouth, January 5, 1776 in NJAS, Series I, 10:677.
165
Lurie, “New Jersey: Radical or Conservative in the Crisis Summer of 1776?,” 34.
166
MPCCS, 473. Led by Reverend Jacob Green and John Dickinson Sergeant a ten-member committee
framed the state’s first constitution. Influenced by John Adams’ Thoughts on Government, Sergeant
promoted republicanism. It was only the third new constitution created in the colonies. The document
ended the formal need for local committees and the Committee of Safety by reinstituting the governor,
Assembly and Provincial Council (now called the Legislative Council). It also created more elected
positions. Richard J. Connors, “The Constitution of 1776,” NJRE, 15:6-9.
167
Gerlach, Prologue, 329. Washington recently lost several battles in New York.

  197  
constitution stripped the executive of the colonial governor’s power.168 Possessing

jurisdiction over the militia, the governor with his Council, could also act as a court of

appeals.169 However, in an attempt to limit patronage powers, he lost the authority to

veto legislation and much of his appointment responsibilities. Elected annually by the

legislature, the constitution clearly placed the Assembly as supreme. Finally, as Gerlach

suggested, the constitution delivered the executive little direction on how to actually

execute law.170 Gerlach believed that the constitution was a decisive win for legislative

authority that denoted sovereignty lay with the people.171 Arguing the constitution’s

most significant impact was psychological effects of replacing one government with

another, he noted this moment as the transition from a monarchy to a republic. Asserting

“the catalyst that transformed New Jersey” into a state was the constitution, Gerlach was

partially correct. While realizing it would take an effective personality like Livingston to

overcome the obstacles the constitution placed on the executive, by ending his narrative

with the state constitution, Gerlach omitted the rise of the powerful Council of Safety

whose power existed outside the constitution. Only by understanding how the

Revolution and war influenced the creation of the Council of Safety can historians

understand how the patriots succeeded.

                                                                                                               
168
The document actually allowed for reconciliation with Great Britain, which would nullify the
constitution.
169
The governor and Council also could grant pardons. Peter Wilson ed., Acts of the General Assembly of
the State of New-Jersey from the establishment of the present Government, and Declaration of
Independence, to the End of the first Sitting of the eight Session, on the 24th Day of December, 1783
(Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1784), 6-7.
170
For the other branches and voting see: Gerlach, Prologue, 342-344 and Judith Apter Klinghoffer and
Lois Elkins “’The Petticoat Electors’: Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807,” Journal of the Early
Republic, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1992), 159-193.
171
Gerlach built off of Gordon Wood’s argument. Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998) Second Edition, 345.

  198  
 Although New Jersey contained a large number of active loyalists and numerous

equivocal persons, some historians have downplayed the organized resistance in 1774

and 1775. Wallace Brown contended that local committees met little animosity and the

Assembly accepted the Provincial Congress in 1775. However, resistance did exist.172 In

fact, George Washington frequently remarked of the daunting number and strength of

disaffection in places such as Perth Amboy.173 Washington complained to Livingston

that New Jersey had become overrun with dissent. Correspondence between internal

enemies and the British was rampant and needed to be curbed. The general wanted the

militia to end illicit communication and protect American supporters, since some

residents in Perth Amboy appeared to be “notoriously disaffected.” Since the instigators

felt protected by the British’s proximity, the only option left was to remove them all.

Washington further recommended removing livestock and ferries to limit their

provisions, influence, and movement. How could New Jersey accomplish these goals?

He left that daunting task for Livingston to decide. Quickly responding, Livingston

notified Washington of his intention to do all he could “for the public good.”174

By July 1776, the Provincial Congress ordered two important changes to combat

dissent. First, it approved disarming anyone who refused to join the American military

forces, including religious dissenters.175 Days later, the legislature responded to New

York’s plea and allowed its neighbor to “be empowered to apprehend and secure” its

residents who have fled into the Jerseys in the name of “the publick good.” Willing to
                                                                                                               
172
Brown, The King’s Friends, 113-114 and House of the Assembly, January 25, 1775 in NJAS, Series I,
10:546.
173
Washington to Brigadier General William Livingston, July 5, 1776, PGW.
174
Brigadier General William Livingston to Washington, July 5, 1776, PGW.
175
July 1, All persons who refuse to bear arms to be disarmed, July 1, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1634.

  199  
increase coercive monitoring measures, New Jersey’s legislature called upon its own

inhabitants, “to aid and assist…as they may think proper.” Recognizing the need to

monitor their own society and fugitives, Samuel Tucker ordered Stephen Crane, Lewis

Ogden, and Caleb Camp to serve as a committee that would work in tandem with New

York’s own Secret Committee.176 The two covert bodies would remain in

correspondence and cooperate with each other to “apprehend and confine” any person

who might threaten the public welfare. The New Jersey Provincial Congress also ordered

judges, justices of peace, sheriffs, and any other civil officials to remain in their position

until the new government operated appropriately.177 According to Gerlach, by replacing

royal officials with men of its own choosing, the legislature obtained legitimacy.

Frustratingly weak, the Committee of Safety demonstrated the necessity for

greater surveillance to meet disorder.178 The Committee of Safety failed to provide New

Jersey with one of the greatest strengths found in other colonies, civil government.

Influenced by radical Whig theory, Livingston firmly adhered to the notion that the

executive possessed prerogative powers that allowed it to curb individual liberties. He

was not alone endorsing these thoughts, which would ultimately make New Jersey’s

security state successful in the coming years. Even as early as 1772, men like Philip

Vickers Fithian argued our leaders “should keep a watchful eye upon the whole conduct
                                                                                                               
176
Letter from Samuel Tucker to the New-York Congress…, July 3, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1233. Local
committees continued to police society. Memorial of the Committee of Hunterdon County, respecting
certain disaffected persons, June 18, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1624.
177
In Provincial Congress, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, July 10, 1776 in
NJAS, Series II, 1:140.
178
Leaving Newark, A. Duchau noted how people were “moving the Household goods & affects… [from]
the frontier…people minds are much agitated.” He also described the enemy’s presence on Staten Island,
the proximity of the artillery, and Elizabethtown militiamen’s reluctance to head to New York and leave
their family. When New Jersey’s militia was summoned to New York, Livingston knew inhabitants feared
their state’s defenseless. July 4, 1776, New Jersey Provincial Congress, 1775-1800, MG 6, Document 4,
NJHS and Livingston to Hugh Mercer, July 3, 1776, PWL, 1:62-63.

  200  
of those in whose power it is to disturb & injure them.”179 However, for Fithian this was

not merely about maintaining power but preserving “the safety of every individual in a

state depends entirely upon the Security of the whole.” Everyone needed to be mindful

and ready to prevent attacks on the state, whether the government was prepared to defend

itself or not. When the state was ready to protect inhabitants from intruders and, more

importantly, internal subversion, the people needed to be ready to monitor their neighbors

as well. Many Americans who willingly monitored their neighbors would echo both

Fithian’s endorsement for unity and coercion.

                                                                                                               
179
Williams, Fithian: Journal and Letters, 24-26. This quote came years earlier. Fithian was interested in
public virtue as necessary to successfully rule or live in society. Although he did not discuss the Committee
of Safety’s treatment of the disaffected in New Jersey, he spoke briefly of reports of similar tactics in
Pennsylvania. Arrests and imprisonment of alleged enemies did not trouble him.

  201  
 Chapter 4: “In these times, every one is watching his next neighbor:” New York’s
Security State, 1776-1782

Years after serving New York’s Commission for Detecting and Defeating

Conspiracies as a spy, Enoch Crosby dictated a memoir to H.L. Barnum about life within

New York’s security state. One inauspicious warm September day, Crosby recalled

walking along a ravine through war torn Westchester County, where he met a gentlemen

who identified himself only as Mr. Bunker. Upon striking up a conversation, Bunker

inquired if Crosby, a twenty-seven year old who had recently decided to re-join

Washington’s Continental forces, intended to head “down below,” colloquial terminology

for joining the British downstate.1 Immediately realizing he held an advantage over his

new acquaintance, Crosby pressed Bunker to divulge how inhabitants safely reached

British recruiters.2 Continuing his ruse, Crosby deceitfully obtained entry into the man’s

home, where the young patriot soon discovered many disaffected persons who had eluded

the Committee of Safety’s watchful eye.3 Though the inimical band treated him kindly,

Crosby nevertheless recognized his gracious hosts as a threat to public security, and as

such, he spent the next three days secretly gathering information to foil their treacherous
                                                                                                               
1
New Yorkers understood how devastating the lost at Long Island was for the American Cause. Israel
Keith to Cyrus Keith, September 16, 1776 and Israel Keith to John P. Palmer, September 18, 1776, Israel
Keith Papers, 1767-1803, Box 1, Folder 7 and 8, NYSL and Ezra Stiles, The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles,
D.D., LL.D. ed. Franklin Bowditch Dexter, Volume II (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 51.
2
Born in 1750, Crosby arguably inspired James Fennimore Cooper’s The Spy: A Tale of the Neutral
Ground. Although Cooper never met Crosby, he probably heard tales from John Jay. Portions of The Spy
mirrored Crosby’s life. After much persuasion, Barnum penned Crosby’s memoirs late in the former spy’s
life. The above story, albeit less dramatized, is contained in Crosby’s 1832 pension deposition. James
Pickering “Enoch Crosby, Secret Agent of the Neutral Ground: His Own Story,” New York History, Vol.
47, no 1 (January, 1966), 61-73.
3
Pleased that many of his neighbors were loyalists, Bunker believed they would succeed despite “the
vigilance of Jay, Duer, Platt, and Sackett, and their instruments.” H. L. Barnum, The Spy Unmasked; or,
Memoirs of Enoch Crosby… (Cincinnati: A.B. Roff, 1831) Second Edition, 43-45 and 85.

  202  
plans. After discovering that the dissidents had not only planned to abscond, but also

held illicit correspondence, Crosby informed his ‘compatriots’ he would depart alone to

join the British ranks faster. Instead, under the cover of night, Crosby traveled to Joseph

Young’s home, a known patriot.4 Expressing that he did not know whom to trust, Young

brought Crosby before the Committee of Safety in White Plains. Upon meeting John Jay

and his cohort, Crosby praised the men as “watchful guardians of the public safety.”5

Following Jay and board’s orders, Crosby and the Committee of Safety’s contingent of

rangers soon secured the surrender of Bunker’s frightened men, after which the patriot

committee began to consider using the recently re-enlisted Continental soldier as a spy in

the contested White Plains region.6

Perceiving that the “greatest danger…is from internal foes; those secret enemies

who, in their midnight cabals” plot destruction, the Committee of Safety implored Crosby

to accept this unenviable position. Such a mission, the eager young patriot knew, would

garner no praise: the more successful his deceit, the less Crosby’s compatriots would

know of his sacrifices.7 Assuring the Committee that he accepted his fate, Crosby

received a pass of protection (only to be used in the utmost emergency), a false identity

                                                                                                               
4
Young sat on the Westchester Committee and lived in Mount Pleasant.
5
By mid 1776, Jay moved further from his moderate leanings likely due to the intensity of the war.
Michael Kammen, “The American Revolution as a Crise de Conscience” in Society, Freedom, and
Conscience: The American Revolution in Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York ed. Richard M. Jellison
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976), 153.
6
More likely Crosby met Jay and the Committee to Detect and Defeat Conspiracies (CDDC) as records
indicate they employed him. Crosby’s efforts led to the arrest of Jonathan Fowler, James Kipp and Beverly
Robinson’s companies. At times, the records refer to the CDDCs as a “Committee” or a “Commission.”
Catherine S. Crary ed., The Price of Loyalty: Tory Writings from the Revolutionary Era (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), 184. The CDDC was called both the “Committee” and the
“Commission,” to avoid confusion I refer to it as the CDDC or the Commission.
7
Obliged to tell Crosby everyone he knew would believe he betrayed his beloved country, the CDDC
assured him that God would know the truth.

  203  
as an itinerant shoemaker seeking employment, and instructions to “discriminate between

their real friends and their secret foes.”8 During his time as a spy, Crosby helped

cultivate New York’s culture of suspicion and distrust, traveling from town to town

befriending communities, earning their confidence, toasting the King, and distributing

General William Howe’s Proclamations, all while working for the notorious CDDC.9

Perhaps sensationalized, Crosby’s The Spy Unmasked still recounts some of the

ways in which committees for public safety attempted to monitor and police a divided

and suspicious population.10 No longer predominately interested in mere propaganda or

economic ostracizing, in the period following the Declaration of Independence, these

institutions employed men in “secret services” to unscrupulously deceive their neighbors

and systematically create a culture of fear and forced conformity.11 Straddling both the

disaffected and Committee of Safety’s worlds, Crosby’s account offers a unique

perspective on this co-constructed culture. While there can be no doubt that the activities

                                                                                                               
8
Both the CDDC and Crosby knew residents accepted oaths, yet still switched allegiances. Crosby went by
false names such as John Smith and Jacob Brown. He claimed responsibility for apprehending hundreds of
men. Barnum, 57 and Pickering, 65-66.
9
The culture became so toxic John Becker recalled when a local man named was confined for disaffection,
his whole family was deemed suspicious and treated poorly. John Becker, The Sexagenary or,
Reminiscences of the American Revolution (Albany: J. Munsell, 1866), 127-128. Loyalist militia officers
extended oaths too. Colonel William Axtell Copy of Officers oath for Kings County Loyalist Militia, June
3, 1777 in Andrew Elliot Papers, Box 4, Folder 3, NYSL.
10
The Spy Unmasked demonstrates the physical and mental hardships men like Crosby faced when they
encountered friends who thought he joined the enemy. Believing Crosby a loyalist, patriot forces also
hunted him, yet he always seemed to escape their clutches. Crosby’s duplicity caused him to at times
identify with the disaffected since he deceptively gained their friendship. He even admitted to feeling he
did not belong to either world.
11
The CDDCs’ minutes contain references to nine other men employed (Maurice Please, Joseph Bennet,
William Denny, Benjamin Pitcher, George Smith, Henry Wooden, Samuel Hopkins, Benjamin Pitcher, and
John Haines). These men, labeled as informers by scholar Tremaine McDowell, were probably not all
spies. However, John Hains, received payments for his “secret services” and resembled a spy. McDowell
claimed the more dramatized stories in Barnum’s work were fabricated, as they were not included in
Crosby’s pension deposition. Tremaine McDowell, “The Identity of Harvey Birch,” American Literature,
Vol. 2, no. 2 (May, 1930), 114-117.

  204  
of the disaffected caused alarm, The Spy Unmasked makes clear that the committees for

public safety employed their own terror techniques in the hopes of creating a security

state.12

The themes addressed in The Spy Unmasked illustrate New York’s security state,

which systematically policed allegiance and defined the state’s first enemies. In this

period, much of New York was a ‘neutral ground,’ with extremists on both sides raiding

and plundering.13 Such a chaotic world turned neighbors against each another and

encouraged them to label fellow community members as “enemies.”14 Like his superiors,

Crosby recognized the fluidity of loyalty but thoroughly believed that men of equivocal

nature constituted a threat to public security. Even though revolutionary leaders

acknowledged the difficulties inherent in measuring one’s allegiance, they realized that in

order to preserve the common good, they needed to apply pressure to anyone who

                                                                                                               
12
Armed rangers surrounded the home. When noise outside alerted the conspirators “they all sat in
breathless silence; every heart palpitating with fearful anticipation.” The captured conspirators were then
bound and marched to the Committee. As a secret spy Crosby experienced “punishment, without the
ceremony of a trial,” when captured by the Committee’s forces. He noted the danger when “civil law was
but little regarded by the soldiery.” Barnum, 64-65 and 105.
13
The ‘neutral ground’ “extended from the Sound to the Hudson and from Harlem to Peekskill.” By 1771,
Westchester had over 21,000 people. Most scholars who have examined Crosby only focus on his
biography. J.C. Pumpelly recognized the spy’s role in an area nearly devoid of trustworthy militiamen and
infested with over 10,000 disaffected inhabitants. J.C. Pumpelly, “Enoch Crosby, the Continental Soldier,
the Original of Cooper’s Harvey Birch, the Patriot Spy,” Americana, Vol. IX (October, 1914), 830; E.B.
O’Callaghan, The Documentary History of the State of New York, Volume I, (Albany: Weed, Parsons &
Co. Public Printers, 1819), 697 and Jacob Judd, “Westchester County,” The Other New York: The
American Revolution beyond New York City, 1763-1787 eds. Joseph S. Tiedemann and Eugene R.
Fingerhut (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 118-119. For more on Crosby: Harry
Edward Miller, “The Spy of the Neutral Ground,” The New England Magazine, Vol. XVIII, no. 3 (May,
1898), 307-319; and MCDDC, 1:27, 47-48, 80, 93-94, 163-165, 266, 406, 420, 422. Crosby even became
the topic for children’s literature in which the anonymous author described the Committee of Safety as
“men of distinction friendly to the liberties of their country” appointed to “watch over the interests of the
country.” Whig Against Tory: or the Military Adventures of a Shoemaker, A Tale of the Revolution for
Children (New Haven: A.H. Maltby, 1831), 48.
14
Barnum, 103.
 

  205  
wavered.15 More importantly, committees for public safety normalized their coercive

behavior by constructing a society that policed itself as much as the boards policed it. As

Governor George Clinton emphatically declared, “essential to the Internal Peace and

safety in the Country [was to] apprehend or destroy” the disaffected.16

New York’s Security State

Despite the Committee of Safety’s efforts, in June 1776 George Washington

expressed displeasure with New York’s handling of disaffection.17 With about half the

state’s population aligned with the King, stricter measures needed to be taken. Writing to

the New York Provincial Convention, he sternly asserted the need for more “effectual

provision for detecting, restraining, and punishing disaffected and dangerous persons”

and called for the elimination of all correspondence with the enemy.18 Therefore, after

independence was declared, state leaders increasingly forced inhabitants to make a

decision. How did New York’s committees for public safety operate after July 1776?

                                                                                                               
15
“It is not always easy to determine who were genuine whigs, as hundreds assumed that mask…But there
is little difficulty or danger in denouncing the cautious and the wavering as tories. In a cause where the
liberties of a whole nation, and the lives and property of thousands, are all at stake, ‘he who doubts is
damn’d.’ He that is not for his country is virtually operating against it.” When Crosby finally revealed his
secret commission rather than incur additional wrath from the rangers, he lamented how intrusive and error
prone the security state operated. Barnum, 106 and 125.
16
Clinton to the Convention of the State of New York, May 4, 1777, PGC, 1:796. Clinton demanded the
state police loyalists and condemned vigilante justice. He initially opposed property confiscation,
eventually accepting it due to the state’s financial situation. To the Committee of the City and County of
Albany, February 26, 1778, Albany Committee Chamber Minutes, March 4, 1778, List of Cambridge
‘White Caps,’ February 23, 1778, Albany Committee to Committee of Saratoga District, March 4, 1778,
and Samuel Parsons to Clinton, March 5 1778, PGC, 2:854-859; and John P. Kaminski, George Clinton:
Yeoman Politician of the New Republic (Madison: Madison House, 1993), 78-79.
17
It is important to remember the Committee of Safety was still beholden to the Provincial Congress. For
example, Henry Chase notified the Provincial Congress that the Committee of Safety refused to send him to
trial without the legislature’s permission. Petition of Henry Chase, September 13, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box
4, folder 10, petition 33:90, NYSA and Petition of Henry Chase, September 13, 1776 in CHMNY, 1:475.
18
June 14, Convention of New-York requested to make effectual provisions for detecting, restraining, and
punishing…, June 14, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1705-1707.

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How did these executive boards manage allegiance and police disaffection while

besieged by a constant British presence?

After declaring independence, New York’s Committee of Safety continued to

direct the war, regulate the economy, and monitor inhabitants. As historian Agnes Hunt

first noted, after July 1776, the Committee of Safety embraced its role as more than just

the state’s executive body. In fact, until spring 1777, the Committee of Safety operated

as New York’s functioning government.19 Even after ratifying the state constitution, the

Committee and later Council of Safety continued to carry New York through a dangerous

period, providing stability until June 1778.20 Even men who opposed these bodies

recognized their efficiency and speedy resolutions.21 However, the treatment of

                                                                                                               
19
The Committee of Safety frequently met because the legislature lacked quorum. By October 1776, the
Committee of Safety held all the Provincial Convention’s powers. Eventually the Council of Safety, the
next executive body, was selected to oversee the state’s first election. It reigned until Clinton returned from
his position as General (July 1777) and the legislature was reinstated. The Council of Safety led “so long as
necessities of the State require[d].” Agnes Hunt, Committees of Safety of the American Revolution
(Cleveland: Press of Winn & Judson, 1904), 71 and JPCCS, 1:647, 677, and 1062.
20
The Council of Safety’s powers were nearly identical to its predecessor, sitting from May 1777 to
January 1778. On October 7, 1777 the legislature adjourned due to the threat posed by British General John
Burgoyne’s march from the north and Sir Henry Clinton’s capture of forts in the Highlands. With members
fleeing or taking arms, the legislature had little choice but to form a Convention and appoint the Council of
Safety. Unlike the old Committee of Safety, this executive body would be even more efficient with only
seven members. Clinton sat on this Council of Safety, making it similar to Virginia’s Council of the State.
While the governor referred to the Council as “the Legislature,” it wielded executive powers. Some of the
Councilors also sat on the legislature, preserving some sense of representative government. In June 1778,
the legislature approved the Convention and Council’s actions, ending the near three-year reign. Alexander
Flick merely noted the Council handled the war and disaffection. Alexander C. Flick, The American
Revolution in New York: Its Political, Social and Economic Significance (Albany: University of the State of
New York, 1926), 96-97. Some historians cite the British invasion as the reason why New York’s leaders
delayed a constitution, others posited patriots hesitated. See: Charles Z. Lincoln, Constitutional History of
New York… (Rochester: The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company, 1906), 491-492; John Jay, The
Life of John Jay… Volume I (New York: J&J Harper, 1833) 68; Becker, 230; and Jared Sparks, The Life of
Gouverneur Morris Volume I (Boston: Gray & Bowen, 1832), 120.
21
William Smith, Historical Memoirs of William Smith… ed. W.H.W. Sabine, Volume II (New York:
Colburn & Tegg, 1958), 139 and 294. Loyalist William Smith suggested the Council influenced the Senate
and Assembly. His memoirs detailed his arduous path with the committees for public safety. See William
Smith, Historical Memoirs of William Smith… ed. W.H.W. Sabine, Volume III (New York: Arno Press
Inc., 1971), 1, 32, and 599.

  207  
disaffection shifted significantly from the pre-July 1776 period, when boards possessed

few guidelines on how to handle dissent.22 In July, the Provincial Congress had

emphatically declared that any inhabitant residing within New York and receiving the

law’s protection owed allegiance to the new government.23 Thus, citizens who aided the

enemy in any fashion now found themselves open to charges of treason, the penalty for

which could mean execution. Sanctioning the arrest of suspicious persons, the New York

Provincial Convention ordered many distrustful residents banished from the nascent state.

In essence, New York had declared numerous residents enemies of the state, a new group

whose capture and punishment now lay within the purview of the committees to detect

and defeat conspiracies.24

With the creation of the various CDDCs, aspects of New York’s security state that

had hitherto existed in only a nebulous state now coalesced into a well-defined

institution. The CDDCs effectively instilled legitimacy and order in two key ways: 1) by

systematically deporting and monitoring inhabitants 2) by coercively enforcing

community compliance. The public good demanded that the entire society become

                                                                                                               
22
Flick noted this difference. Before July 1776, county committees dispensed justice, sending the most
dangerous cases to the Committee or Council of Safety. Lacking a formal government or laws outlining
citizenship and treason, such a void hampered police efforts.
23
JPCCS, 1:506 and 527. On June 24, 1776, John Hancock stated, any who resided in, or passed through,
the state owe allegiance to its laws. The resolutions also cited the need for laws against harboring criminals
and counterfeiting. JCC, 5:475-476.
24
Discussed in chapter 1, the first short-lived committee of this nature began in June 1776 yet had no
formal name. On September 21, 1776 subsequent bodies were known as the Commission for Detecting and
Defeating Conspiracies (CDDC). This body could apprehend anyone it deemed “dangerous to the safety of
the State” and “do every act and thing whatsoever, which may be necessary.” Under Captain Melancton
Smith the CDDC could raise troops to instill “public safety.” The Convention also ordered Captain Samuel
Delivan to raise 30 men in Westchester under the CDDC’s disposal. The original CDDCs members were:
William Duer, Charles De Witt, Leonard Gansevoort, John Jay, Zephaniah Platt, and Nathaniel Sackett
from the Convention and Pierre Van Cortlandt was added on October 15, 1776. In January 1777, four more
members were added.
 

  208  
involved in surveillance, as disaffection was not solely a political threat but also

represented “crimes against society, which even a state of war would not justify.”25 The

CDDCs’ first methods involved systematically monitoring, apprehending, interrogating,

disarming, confining, and exiling, without a trial, any alleged enemies. To a much larger

degree, the CDDCs policed the state and effectively eliminated neutrality as a viable

option. Recognizing the security state in full force, British soldier Thomas Anburey

recalled traveling through New York in 1778. “The Americans” he stated, “are so

oppressive, they will not let any one remain neuter; and they compel every inhabitant to

take the oath, or quit the country.”26 With suspicion enough to damn, labeling enemies

became essential to the processes of community construction.

However, the security state was more than merely a larger scale replication of the

Committee of Safety’s surveillance tactics. New York’s security state also solicited and

relied on Americans’ involvement. Employing recognizances for good behavior and

accusations, the CDDC ushered in a self-policing society based on both consensus and

fear.27 While it is easy to immediately assume that New Yorkers rejected the CDDCs’

intrusive methods, in reality, many willingly adopted them by providing information

against their neighbors. Without some degree of popular support, the CDDC could not

have successfully combated dissent. Simply put: inhabitants collaborated because they

                                                                                                               
25
John Becker recalled disaffect men barricading themselves in their cells with gunpowder and threatening
to ignite it. Eventually able to penetrate the cell, the sheriff and townspeople led them to the gallows. “No
one appeared to pity them” as the community sensed the necessity. Becker, 132-135.
26
Neutrals filled jails. Thomas Anburey, Travels through the Interior Parts of America in a Series of
Letters… Volume II (London: William Lane, 1789), 263-264.
27
Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics
eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), Second Edition,
209 and 220.

  209  
desired both security and accepted new state laws normalizing such behavior.28 Whether

due to consensus, fear, or indifference, the CDDC successfully mobilized Americans to

construct the security state, thus creating an American community.29 While returning

residents to the patriotic fold was a bonus, it was not necessary, as the CDDCs also

sought to exclude people deemed potential threats to the process of nation breaking and

nation building. As tensions increased after independence, a friend noted to John Jay, “A

pure democracy may possibly do when patriotism is the ruling passion; but when a State

abounds in rascals…you must suppress a little of that Popular Spirit.”30

In fall 1776, New York’s CDDC began deporting any alleged threats to other

states. Based on how dangerous it considered them, the CDDC demanded that these

exiled subversives be either confined or placed on parole.31 To accomplish this goal,

Commissioner John Jay solicited military leaders’ aid to discover and apprehend

                                                                                                               
28
Some CDDCs’ actions, such as deploying spies and extending oaths of allegiance, engaged Americans.
29
The more consensus a regime achieved, the less room dissent could operate. Barrington Moore Jr.,
Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1978), 482.
30
Jay received this letter from Edward Rutledge and it no doubt influenced Jay’s CDDC. In the letter
Rutledge advocated New York “establish a good Government, with a strong Executive,” albeit a singular
person not a body. Letter from Edward Rutledge to John Jay, November 24, 1776 in AA, Series V, 3:825.
31
Flick noted this precedent of early deportations. Alexander C. Flick, Loyalism in New York during the
American Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1901), 123 and Bernard Mason, The Road to
Independence: The Revolutionary Movement in New York, 1773-1777 (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press-Lexington, 1966), 202-203. That November in New York City, loyalists signed a declaration to King
George. Yet they soon discovered British troops presented threats to order. His Majesty’s forces discussed
the importance of executive power. Collector of the port, Andrew Elliot detailed governmental policing in
New York City after Howe’s arrival including: monitoring inhabitants’ behavior and confining them.
Disputes between British authorities and civilians mirrored the problems the CDDC faced such as: destitute
aid, confiscations, oaths, and illicit trade. If the British possessed a civil government, Elliot felt it might
have eased the problems. However, General Henry Clinton considered such a government would hamper
military efforts. R.W.G. Vail, “The Loyalist Declaration of Dependence of November 28, 1776,” in
Narrative of the Revolution in New York (New York: New York Historical Society, 1975), 32; Chief Justice
Frederick Smyth to Sir Guy Charleton, May 31, 1782 in Andrew Elliot Papers, Box 6, Folder 4 and
Andrew Elliot Letterbook, 19-57, Box 7, Folder 1, NYSL; Mason, 68-69; Joseph E. Tiedemann, “Queens
County,” in The Other New York, 50 and Thomas Jones, History of New York during the Revolutionary
War…(New York: New York Historical Society, 1879), 1:114 and 2:27.

  210  
inhabitants who secretly supported the British.32 As the conflict continued, New York

intensified its campaign for conformity. Interested in neither mere propaganda nor

economic shunning, by November the Convention had passed stricter laws against

loyalists traveling without passes. In February 1777, the Convention created another

smaller CDDC of non-legislators and ordered the new body to distinguish between men

confined as enemies of state and those accused of general disaffection.33 Those in the

latter category would be summoned to immediately appear before the CDDC. If the

commissioners deemed the accused not guilty of treason, they would be extended an oath

requiring them to help uncover potential plots against the state.34 Anyone who refused

received a pass and the board ordered him or her to immediately depart with their

families. Many alleged enemies protested this forced evacuation, leaving the CDDC to

declare them “open enemies of this State.”35 In July 1778 the New York Convention

adopted the oath of allegiance as a supreme test, in effect rendering neutrality as

“treason.”36 Expressing the committee’s sentiments, Governor Clinton declared that

                                                                                                               
32
John Jay to Major General William Heath, December 31, 1776 NYSL.
33
The three initial members from Dutchess County included Egbert Benson (county committee chairman),
Colonel Jacobus Swartmout (militia officer), and Melancton Smith (committeeman). In February, the
Committee of Safety also approved confiscating Westchester loyalists’ property. Mason, 203-204.
34
The oaths had a religious tone and could not be issued to someone under 16 years old. The Convention
received petitions, which caused it to restore men “who have not by their crimes rendered themselves
unworthy of being partakers in the exalted privileges of freemen.” It appears this resolution included those
in jail or paroled. JPCCS, 1:827.
35
JPCCS, 1:827. Those who failed to appear were deemed enemies and their property would be seized.
After summer 1777 battles at Ticonderoga and Oriskany, fear abounded. Sung Bok Kim, “The Limits of
Politicization in the American Revolution: The Experience of Westchester County, New York,” The
Journal of American History, Vol. 80, no. 3 (Dec., 1993), 868-889; William W. Campbell, Annals of Tryon
County…(Cherry Valley: The Cherry Valley Gazette Print, 1880), 87 and 237; and Robert Venables,
“Tryon County,” in The Other New York, 188 and 190.
36
Flick referred to the July 1778 oath as the “supreme test.” Flick, Loyalism, 130 and 170 and Laws of the
State of New-York, commencing with the first session of the Senate and Assembly, after the Declaration of
Independence…anno 1777, (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, 1782), 43. EC, Series I, 17630. Quakers’ pacifism

  211  
during a civil war a “Neutral Character” is “Dangerous & cannot expect the Confidence

or Friendship of either Side.”37 To no one’s surprise, Clinton held great malice toward

loyalists and the disaffected.38 Those who could not serve certainly could aid in other

capacities, such as helping to uncover plots. Unsurprisingly, around that time the

Convention created the final CDDC, which remained in existence until 1782. This board

dealt primarily with extending the oath to anyone deemed remotely suspicious, though it

also employed recognizances much more extensive.39 New York’s committees for public

safety created a community where alleged dissent stigmatized an individual for the

duration of the war. By reviewing the cases of those it deported, the CDDCs allowed

some residents the opportunity to accept an oath and return. However, even accepting an

oath did not always lift the veil of suspicion, as monitoring continued.

                                                                                                               
and rumors they sold provisions to the enemy and encouraged slaves to join the British, caused them to be
suspected of disloyalty. Their refusal to accept the oath and unlicensed travel into contested areas also drew
suspicion. In January 1777, after receiving notification Quakers must accept an oath or affirmation, four
men begged the Committee of Safety to reconsider; yet the executive did not budge. In June 1777, the
CDDC confined over 20 Quakers for traveling to Long Island. The CDDC stated, “we are not possessed of
any evidence either that they have or have not” involved themselves politically. Some Quakers were sent to
the Fleet Prison. After petitioning, the government released many Quakers when they accepted the
affirmation, yet their release did not come quickly. Stefan Bielinski, “Albany County,” in The Other New
York, 165; MCDDC, 2:320 and 441-442 and JPCCS 1:779 and 972; Flick, The American Revolution in
New York, 92; Arthur J. Mekeel, “New York Quakers in the American Revolution,” Bulletin of Friends
Historical Association, Vol. 29, Number 1, (Spring, 1940), 55 and A. Day Bradley, “New York Friends and
the Loyalty Oath of 1778,” Quaker History, Vol. 57, Number 2 (Autumn, 1968), 112-114. For a Quaker
petition from Fleet Prison see: Petition of Paul Upton and other Quakers, July 10, 1777 in NYPCCSP, Box
8, folder 2, petition 33:418, NYSA.
37
William Smith Pass, October 31[?], 1777, PGC, 2:492 and Kaminski, 2. Cadwallader Colden, son of the
former Lieutenant Governor, became an early target of the committees for public safety. As early as August
1777, he professed a desire to remain neutral but only by accepting an oath would he achieve liberty.
Cadwallader Colden Jr., Journal, August 7, 1777 in Crary, The Price of Loyalty, 205-206. For more on
Colden, see Kammen, 165-167 and 173.
38
Loyalists held strongholds in New York City, Long Island and much of the southern counties. DeAlva
Stanwood Alexander, A Political History of the State of New York, Volume I (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1906), 23; and Kaminski, 77.
39
In 1779, an Act of Attainder listed 59 former residents, who if caught within the state, would be
sentenced to death. Residents who accepted the oath likely received proof to deter future hardships. For
example, see: Major General James Grant, December 10, 1776 in Jacob Abbott Collection, Box 3, folder
346, NYSL.

  212  
No Constitution, No Problem
As previously mentioned, in June 1776 the Continental Congress recognized New

York’s hardships and recommended it “make effectual provision for detecting,

restraining and punishing disaffected and dangerous persons.”40 With disaffection an

increasingly dangerous threat, the New York Convention created a committee to examine

such persons. As Continental troops flooded New York City and British war ships

occupied the harbor, residents feared the worst.41 Assembling in White Plains in early

July, the Convention asserted that internal turmoil had prevented the framing of a state

constitution and ordered all magistrates and officers to continue their duties.42

Subversives needed to be stymied to commence a formal government. With news of

armed loyalists residing in southern New York, the nascent government had cause for

anxiety.43 That same month, New York’s Convention declared that any person residing

within the state and receiving the protection of its laws owed allegiance to the new

government, unpatriotic inhabitants faced treason charges.44 Both the Convention and

                                                                                                               
40
Letter from President Hancock, enclosing Resolutions of the Continental Congress…, June 17, 1776 in
AA, Series IV, 6:1412-1413. Rumors of plots to kidnap George Washington and Israel Putnam put leaders
on notice. By June 22, warrants and arrests began.
41
Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 44. As those residents most under threat fled their homes,
the Committee of Safety built barracks for the flux of troops.
42
JPCCS, 1:518. By May 1776, New York’s leaders realized the state needed a formal government. Flick,
The American Revolution in New York, 79 and JPCCS, 1:527. After the British invaded New York in fall
1776, over 11,000 people fled New York City as refugees. They soon became a stress on the patriot
population elsewhere. Howard Pashman, “The People’s Property Law: A Step Toward Building a New
Legal Order in Revolutionary New York,” Law and History Review, Vol. 31, no. 3 (August, 2013), 596-
597. Other issues facing the government included Litchfield prison problems, removing cattle from
distressed areas, scarcity of necessities, Native American raids, requests for additional armed guards in
distressed areas, and mounting disaffection. The Albany local committee also feared slaves joining the
disaffected. Letter from the Committee of Albany, October 23, 1776 in AA, Series V, 3:266.
43
Rumors swirled that former Royal Governor William Tryon raised troops in New York and New Jersey.
Letter to the Continental Congress, July 11, 1776 in AA, Series V, 1:1396.
 
44
Any person on parole who fled risked property confiscation. Those convicted of treason, faced death.
JPCCS, 1:527.

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Washington recommended apprehending any person “whose going at large” might

endanger “the safety of the State.”45 Even though Washington apprehended suspicious

people, clearly New York faced overwhelming problems.46 Similarly problematic, places

such as Kings County refused to oppose the British threat.47 Confronted by such

pressure, on August 17 the Provincial Convention decided to extend the committee

system’s operation well into 1777. The legislature also stressed the need to revive the

Committee of Safety, a testament to its success. After the British victory at the Battle of

Long Island on August 27 and their subsequent seizure of New York City, the

Committee’s endeavors became even more urgent.48 Throughout New England and New

York, British momentum was undeniable.49 Valiant efforts by both the Suffolk militia

and the Continental Army notwithstanding, the American forces stood little chance.50

                                                                                                               
45
Letter from General Washington to the Committee of the City of New-York, July 19, 1776 in AA, Series
V, 1:448. Washington called for the apprehension of “all equivocal and suspicious characters.” Others
argued for more dramatic punishments. During trials, loyalist received no consul or witnesses on their own
behalf. Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 215.
46
George Washington to the New York Convention, August 12, 1776, PGW and JPCCS, 1:570. Local
committees also issue arrest warrants. Committee of Safety Dutchess County, July 23, 1776 in Jacob
Abbott Collection, Box 3, folder 387-391, NYSL.
47
Edwin Burrows, “Kings County,” in The Other New York, 26 and John J. Gallagher, The Battle of
Brooklyn 1776 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), 135 and 147.
48
In fall, the Committee wrote Washington to stop a revolt in Fishkill where the disaffected tried to meet
the British. Uprisings took place elsewhere as well. General Washington to Colonel Tash, October 13, 1776
in AA, Series V, 2:1026. For a loyalist interpretation of the American flight see: Peter DuBois to
Cadwallader Colden,” September 16, in Crary, The Price of Loyalty, 298-299 and The Battle of Brooklyn:
A Farce of Two Acts (New York: J. Rivington, 1776), 2.
49
Ezra Stiles noted Howe’s success recruiting. Stiles, The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles Volume II (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901), 51-52.
50
John G. Staudt, “Suffolk County,” in The Other New York, 67. As soon as the British seized Suffolk, its
military ordered the suspension of Congressional resolutions. Elsewhere martial law commenced. Oliver
Delancey to Phineas Fanning, September 2, 1776 in Revolutionary Incidents of Suffolk and Kings
Counties… ed. Henry Onderdonk (New York: Leavitt & Company, 1849) 45-46; Joseph S. Tiedemann,
“Patriots by Default: Queens County, New York, and the British Army, 1776-1783,” WMQ, Vol. 43, no. 1
(Jan., 1986), 49-59; Stephen Conway, “To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the

  214  
Secured in their stronghold, the British commenced a similar process of delineating

between friends and enemies of government, offering protection to the loyal and

punishment to anyone with an “R” on their door.51 Eventually, the British became

suspicious when overwhelming numbers of residents wore red badges and accepted

oaths.52 Surrounding regions, such as Queens, remained under British control until

1783.53 However, in patriot-dominated areas such as Suffolk, the invading army did not

enjoy complete hegemony as American supporters continued holding meetings.54

Following the loss of New York City, the Committee of Safety, and not the

Convention, administered defensive measures and instructed Colonel Samuel Drake in

Westchester County to monitor enemy ships as well as to terminate illicit

communication.55 With efforts to frame a constitution on hiatus, the Committee of Safety

sought to combat rising internal and external disorder.56 Despite arguments of necessity,

                                                                                                               
Revolutionary War,” WMQ, Vol. 43, no. 3 (Jul., 1986), 387, 390-391, 394, and 403; and Stephen Conway,
“‘The Great Mischief Complain’d of’: Reflections on the Misconduct of British Soldiers in the
Revolutionary War,” WMQ, Vol. 47, no. 3 (Jul., 1990), 382-384.
51
Extract of a letter received in London from New-York, October 20, 1776 in AA, Series V, 2:1136.
52
The British enacted harsh travel policies. Prices of goods increased, as did the level of harassment and
crime. Henry R. Stiles, A History of the City of Brooklyn…, Volume I (Brooklyn, 1867), 297-299 and 301-
302; Frederic Gregory Mather, The Refugees of 1776 from Long Island to Connecticut (Albany: J. Lyon
Company, Printers, 1913), 1050; and Captain John Bowater to Basil Fielding, June 5 and 11, 1777, The
Lost War: Letters from British Officers During the American Revolution eds. Marion Balderston and David
Syrett (New York: Horizon Press, 1975), 131; and Tiedemann, “Queens County,” 50.
53
In October 1776, 1,293 Queens County residents petitioned the King and expressed their support. Queens
County Petition October 21, 1776 in Documents and Letters intended to illustrate the Revolutionary
Incidents of Queens County… ed. Henry Onderdonk Jr. (Leavitt, Trow and Company, 1846), 117-129.
54
Staudt, 68-70.
 
55
JPCCS, 1:593. By September 1776 the British reopened courts in New York City. In response, the
executive bodies recognized the need for a formal government. By July 1777, Pierre Van Cortlandt wrote
to Clinton that the Council of Safety wished to relieve itself of “the Reins of Government” as soon as “the
safety and advantage of this State and of the public Service” allowed. In the Council of Safety for the State
of New York, July 21, 1777, PGC, 2:128.
56
JPCCS, 1:605-606. After receiving reports on September 3 citing armed regiments roaming Westchester,

  215  
the suspension of a former constitution elicited cries of political abuse. Leaving the reins

of government in the non-elected Committee of Safety’s hands (which by fall 1776

formally received all of the Convention’s powers) certainly had its detractors. Shocked,

loyalist William Smith could not imagine bestowing upon on a non-elected body such

near limitless powers.57 Still distrusting the population’s allegiance, the Committee of

Safety instructed county leaders to create lists of affected inhabitants in Dutchess,

Orange, Ulster, and Westchester to combat rumors of Howe’s recruiting and threats to

“the public safety.”58 The state even solicited specific information from supposedly well-

affected neighbors, hoping to gain knowledge of potential subversives.59 Unsurprisingly,

with the creation of such lists, the Committee intensified apprehensions. For example, in

one week alone, the Committee of Safety ordered nine inhabitants accused of sedition

captured.60 Its actions appeared necessary, as in September, General Howe’s quisling

                                                                                                               
the Committee of Safety ordered Clinton to apprehend threats. It also instructed preventative measures in
New York City, calling on the local committee to remove church bells and brass from doors. The
Committee of Safety also assisted Washington removing the sick from Orange Town.
57
William Smith lambasted leaving “a Council of Safety composed of some of the present Convention.
This is singular! The expiring Power revives in a few not elected for any such Purpose – Thus the
Confusion will multiply.” According to Smith, others too questioned the initial Council of Safety,
especially since the public knew few of the men because no notifications were published. During Smith’s
lengthy interrogation before the Council of Safety he recalled being treated fairly. No doubt such treatment
arose from his prominent status. Smith, Memoirs, 2:100, 135, 141 and 152-158 and JPCCS, 1:677.
58
Dutchess, Orange and Ulster Counties saw a rise of new men who, despite entrenched landlords in the
region, acquired power. The most notable was George Clinton. Eventually he became known as one of the
more radical Whigs on the legislature. By the mid 1770s, Clinton supported the Continental Congress and
non-importation. Thomas S. Wermuth, “The Central Hudson Valley: Dutchess, Orange, and Ulster
County,” in The Other New York, 131-133. For more on Ulster County and Clinton’s early years: E. Wilder
Spaulding, His Excellency George Clinton: Critic of the Constitution (New York: MacMillian Company,
1938), 1-21, 27-29 and 35-38; Jones, 2:326-327; and Kaminski, 14-15.
 
59
New York Assembly, November 13, 1779 in Jacob Abbott Collection Box 3, NYSL.
60
The Committee of Safety also ordered Reverend Samuel Seabury removed from his home and placed far
from the enemy to limit his influence. The executive body also ordered Clinton to apprehend Samuel Gale
and Isaac Ludlum for communicating with the disaffected on Nassau Island. At this time the Committee of
Safety ordered local boards to investigate the homes of four men accused of delivering speeches against
American liberties. JPCCS, 1:623. Committee of Safety to Clinton, September 15, 1776 PGC, 1:348-349.

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Abraham Gardiner (despite accepting the Association in 1775) coercively administered

British oaths to 117 residents in Easthampton and Southampton.61

However, the Committee of Safety’s tactics failed to produce the desired effects,

and after receiving a letter from Thaddeus Crane regarding disaffection, the state

concluded that the best method to effectively police the population was to revive the

CDDC.62 Given the enemy’s immense influence, the Convention reinstated the CDDC’s

previously held surveillance powers, as well as the ability to call out a militia, suppress

insurrections, and “apprehend, secure, or remove such persons who they shall judge

dangerous to the safety of the State.”63 It was from decisions such as these that New

York’s security state was born, enabled to draw up to £500 and raise armed men for

“public safety.” Six days later, the Committee of Safety also endowed the new

conspiracy board to “place guards,” to apprehend deserters, and to assist in the “detecting

and defeating [of] all conspiracies.”64 Viewing it as a necessary means of protecting “the

liberties of America,” the Convention empowered the CDDC to monitor its own people

with armed guards, setting an ominous precedent for the state’s executive authority to

police a free people’s allegiance. With the CDDCs prepared to punish dissent without

prejudice, the Committee of Safety (and later Council) could focus primarily upon

maintaining the necessary functions of government.

                                                                                                               
61
James Truslow, Memorials of Old Bridgehampton (Bridgehampton, Long Island, 1916), 129-130 and
Crary, The Price of Loyalty, 84.
62
JPCCS, 1:606. Furthermore, the Convention ordered all local committees to regularly report rumors to
the CDDC, making it the epicenter of counter-intelligence. After the loss of New York City, British
loyalists in the Hudson Highlands found renewed spirits and flocked down river.
63
JPCCS, 1:638-639.
 
64
JPCCS, 1:648.

  217  
Economic and Social Regulation
The internal agents of chaos included far more than merely the British army and

its most loyal supporters. Any threat that undermined public safety fell under executive

bodies’ watchful gaze. This broad definition of security included examining price

regulations as well as assisting unemployed laborers and the poor. Although disciplinary

measures epitomized the security state, the Committee and Council of Safety realized that

they also needed to provide stability for residents’ well being.

In fall 1776, after the Provincial Congress examined allegations of high tea prices,

the Committee of Safety responded to a letter from Kingston committeeman Johannis

Sleight.65 Sleight had recently notified New York’s patriot government of a frightening

experience in his town. Petrified, he described the nascent state’s tenuous authority, as

townswomen refused to accept the committee’s leadership due to tea shortages.

According to Sleight, “women surround the committee chamber, and say if they cannot

have tea, their husbands and sons shall fight no more.”66 Others in nearby Dutchess

County also feared shortages, and Colonel Henry Ludinton, Joseph Crane Jr., Jonathan

                                                                                                               
65
JPCCS, 1:465, 590, 654 and 669. Henry Van Schaack noted the new state could not prevent the “state of
nature.” Henry C. Van Schaack, Memoirs of the Life of Henry Van Schaack Embracing Selections from His
Correspondence during the American Revolution (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Company, 1892), 71. The
Provincial Congress promised to investigate prices in May 1776 but no resolution came. For more price
regulation in the Central Hudson Valley see: Wermuth, “The Central Hudson Valley: Dutchess, Orange,
and Ulster County,” 137-141 and Letter from the Committee for New-Windsor to the New-York Congress,
May 31, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:637.
66
Historians have noted the social acceptability of crowd actions and the moral economy. George Rude,
Ideology and Popular Protest (New York: 1980), 131 and E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common (New
York, 1993), 185-189. Women demanding goods for husbands or sons’ military service was common.
Drew Gilpin Faust, “Altars of Sacrifice: Confederate Women and the Narrative of the War,” The Journal of
American History, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Mar., 1990), 1224. See also Barbara Clark Smith, “Food Rioters and the
American Revolution,” WMQ, Vol. 51, no. 1 (January, 1994), 3. There is no debate that women had
political roles in eighteenth century America. See Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and
Ideology in Revolutionary America (New York: Norton, 1986), 8; Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex
and Class in New York, 1789-1860 (New York: Knopf, 1986), xii; and Mary Beth Norton, Liberty’s
Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1996), 299.

  218  
Paddack, and Elijah Townshend wrote the Council of Safety outlining “the wicked,

mercenary intrigues of a number of engrossing jockies” whose hoarding of bread

threatened many residents with starvation.67 The men believed a certain Mr. Helmes had

purchased great quantities of food and that as a result the “well affected people are

universally dissuited.” Helmes had then apparently planned to leave the area with over

100 barrels of flour, yet “the people, concluded to stop the flour and Helmes…until this

express may return.”68 In Europe popular uprisings were common, as communities

attempted to set a just price during hard times. In the past, New York’s local government

at times even encouraged community efforts to curb such unwarranted price-gouging or

artificial scarcities.69

During the revolutionary era, the dearth of food and other material necessities

prompted a major question: how could the government claim legitimacy while its people

suffered and women rioted? On August 10, Johannis Sleight again fearfully begged the

Committee of Safety to issue regulations on tea, as he felt his power, and consequently
                                                                                                               
67
This event took place in December 1776.
68
JPCCS, 2:355. For similar examples of crowds demanding just prices and claiming their authority
bestowed upon them by committees see: Edward Countryman, A People in Revolution: The American
Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760-1790 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981),
182-183 and Edward M. Ruttenber, History of the Town of New Windsor: Orange County, N.Y. (Newburgh,
N.Y.: The Historical Society of Newburgh Bay and the Highlands, 1911), 67-68.
69
Thomas S. Wermuth, “‘The women! In this place have risen in a mob’: Women Rioters and the
American Revolution in the Hudson River Valley,” The Hudson River Valley Review, Vol. 20, no. 1
(Summer 2003), 67 and Countryman, A People in Revolution, 56-59 and 67. At times, military figures
aided female rioters. Female crowds justified their actions based on local traditions and committees’ price
maximums. Similarly, in May 1777 women demanding tea be sold at a just price appeared several times at
Peter Messier’s home. When he informed the 22 women and 2 soldiers of the price, the women agreed.
Upon producing the tea, the women then refused the previously agreed upon price and “brought Hammer &
Scales” to weigh out tea and left paying what they deemed fair. When Messier’s wife asked them to leave
their names, the women rebuked her stating the transaction was complete. Messier was later accosted twice
more by a crowd of women. By the last time, the women even claimed to be a committee and broke into
Messier’s home. They drank his liquor and refused to provide him with proper documentation. These
women understood the world the CDDC created. Unfortunately, the CDDCs’ actions against these women
are nonexistent, if there were any. MCDDC, 1:301-303.

  219  
the state’s legitimacy, waning. Both he and the Committee of Safety realized the

dangerous potential of riots and the breakdown of government. Immediately, he notified

the Convention of such dangers.70 As historian Thomas Wermuth noted, such crowds

believed that their actions, taken on behalf of the community, were indeed

demonstrations of patriotism.71 Policing public security, these crowds championed the

same public rights the Committee of Safety supposedly endorsed, putting the executive

body into an uncomfortable position.

For the Committee of Safety, instituting public security not only meant policing

allegiance but also providing for the population’s well being. Believing tea sellers’

avarice to be the true problem, the Committee of Safety ordered local boards to seize

“from every tea merchant, shop keeper, or other person or persons…all the bohea tea…

over and above the quantity of 25lbs.”72 Noting that sellers had already doubled the

price, a development that aroused “the resentment of the people” and led to “many

riotous proceedings…to the great disturbance of the quiet and breach of the peace and

good order of the community,” the Committee of Safety bemoaned the state

government’s oscillating legitimacy. All confiscated tea would then be sold at the

                                                                                                               
70
Sleight later bemoaned, “we are daily alarmed, and our streets filled with mobs from different parts of the
country” and disturbing “the peace of the good people” because tea was still stored. There were other
letters about tea riots. JPCCS, 1:714 and 741 and 2:229-230. This letter was written in November, after the
Committee already took action, but it implies Sleight and the Kingston Committee desired advice on how
to handle the “disturbances.” Sleight proposed price regulations and a resolution ordering proprietors to sell
provisions for “the peace of the good people.” For more tea riots and local committees’ actions see: JPCCS,
1:708 and 2:231.
71
Smith, “Food Rioters and the American Revolution,” 5-6. Patriot leaders noted war-profiteers’ avarice.
 
72
JPCCS, 1:682-683. When the Continental Congress placed a hold on tea sales, proprietors were stuck
with loads of perishable goods. According to the Committee of Safety, tea-sellers were not happy with the
fixed price “and forgetting the patriotic principles” sought to delay sales so as to create a scarcity.

  220  
enforced price of 6 shillings/lb. Said proceeds would be delivered to the proprietor.73

Despite statehood, the executive body continued to operate as before and viewed

individual rights as secondary to public safety, especially if those rights threatened

stability.74 Due to a lack of supplies and money, the Committee of Safety also ordered

provisions impressed from presumably loyal inhabitants, promising it would later

reimburse them.75 Not appropriated by the Committee of Safety directly, John Becker

recalled how his father’s provisions had been appraised and taken by General Horatio

Gates. Spurred by patriotism, Becker’s father became upset by the large quantity and

lack of a certificate to ensure reimbursement. Becker later lamented, “This is one of the

thousand instances of the petty tyranny and injustice of public agents.”76 Becker’s

                                                                                                               
73
The Committee of Safety appointed a man to sell tea (no more than 12lbs to any persons) and restrict
shipping tea out of state; those guilty forfeited double the price. Tea revolts continued when the Council of
Safety sat. In July 1777, James Caldwell and other patriots purchased tea in Philadelphia but a crowd of
men and women seized their goods at Orange County. Writing Caldwell on July 22, the Council stated theft
would not be tolerated but the courts would have to decide. JPCCS, 1:682, 1008 and 1010 and 2:506 and
508. Aside from tea, inhabitants found other commodities hard to acquire such as cattle, leather and salt.
For near riots see: Petition of Messers. McCalmy and Finch, September 26, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 4,
folder 9, petition 33:88, NYSA and Petition of Messers. McCamly and Finch, September 26, 1776 in
CHMNY, 1:484. For the dearth of salt and iron as well as the distribution of the mineral see Smith,
Memoirs, 2:252 and 264.
74
Similarly related, the Committee and Council of Safety faced currency issues. Condemning those people
who refused continental currency, Robert G. Livingston argued every patriotic inhabitant must refrain from
actions that “weaken our present struggles, [especially] depreciation of the Continental currency.” On
December 3, 1776 the Committee of Safety ordered all residents altering or passing counterfeit bills
confined. JPCCS, 2:296 and 734. The CDDC apprehended and interrogated those accused of counterfeiting
or passing false bills to uncover if any inhabitant had dealings with the enemy. MCDDC, 1:309-313. For
inhabitants’ anxiety over counterfeiting see: Sidney Barclay ed., Personal Recollections of the American
Revolution: A Private Journal…(New York: Rudd & Carleton, 1859), 132-133 and Kenneth Scott,
“Counterfeiting in New York during the Revolution,” in Narratives of the Revolution in New York (New
York: New York Historical Society, 1975), 141, 143, 156-158.
75
For an example of a reimbursement certificate: Certificate, October 28, 1778 in C.M. Woolsey, History
of the Town of Marlborough Ulster County, New York: From its Earliest Discovery (Albany: J.B. Lyon
Company, Printers, 1908), 143. It is unlikely this was the Committee of Safety as the certificate was signed
merely “Nath’L Kelsey Right Carpenter Two of the Committee.” The Committee of Safety also helped
establish a State Clothier in February 1777 under the direction of John Henry. Hardships and delays made
the commissary’s job difficult and other means to obtain supplies were taken. New York also imported
military supplies at increased prices. JPCCS, 1:695, 698, and 807 and Mason, 189-191.
76
Becker, 101-103. Neither his father nor he ever received payment.

  221  
disappointment aside, the state enforced price and wage regulations frequently

throughout the war.77

Closely related to economics, executive bodies also alleviated inhabitants’

suffering, especially the poor and laborers. As early as December 1775, the Provincial

Congress provided the Committee of Safety with £1000 for New York City poor relief.78

After receiving word that ship carpenters employed by the Continental Army had had

their tools commandeered by the military, the Council of Safety tried to help the laborers

obtain work. Upon receiving the ship carpenters’ petition, the executive body decided

that however “improper it may in general be for public bodies to take notice of private

contracts,” the men needed their tools to provide for their families.79 Dismissing private

enterprise, the Council of Safety recognized that unemployment could lead to both

suffering and violence. As the civil authority, the executive body pressured General

Philip Schuyler to find answers and produce results.80

                                                                                                               
77
Wermuth, “The Central Hudson Valley,” 138. At times New Yorkers solicited the Council to intervene.
JPCCS, 2:355 and 457.
78
The Committee of Safety gave the £1,000 to John Ramsey and Isaac Stoutenburgh to employ the poor as
spinners. In February 1776, the executive body ordered £200 spent on food for the poor. The Congress
approved the Committee of Safety’s actions regarding the destitute. In the fall, New York City’s poor were
removed to New Windsor and the Convention ordered Colonel Lott to provide “a means to take care of
them.” Executive bodies continued to provide funds to local committees to defray expenses for New York
City’s indigent. JPCCS, 1:231, 264, 290, 348, 657, 805 and 817. Most the government’s aid focused on
employing the poor, including children. Such aid continued well through 1777.
 
79
JPCCS, 1:1016. See: Petition of Ship Carpenters, July 22, 1777 in NYPCCSP, Box 7, folder 10, petition
33:398, NYSA.
80
When a Massachusetts embargo meant procuring supplies had become difficult, the Council of Safety
endorsed the legislature’s stance and lambasted their New England brothers’ ignorance and avarice.
Writing to James Bodewine, President of the Council of Massachusetts, the New York Council of Safety
harangued the illogical embargo and noted the irony that New England refused to aid despite the charity
they received during the Boston Port Act. However, New York also ordered embargos and seized goods not
permitted to leave. JPCCS, 1:973.

  222  
 Ultimately, executive bodies’ altruism reflected their emphasis on public rights.

Upon receiving a letter from the Albany Committee detailing how disaffected

inhabitants’ had purchased wheat for the enemy and overcharged for goods, the Council

of Safety lamented that “Public virtue has too much given place to private interest,”

recognizing that its failure to act meant public suffering.81 Tellingly, the Council of

Safety did not table Albany’s letter; instead, it agreed that the “safety of the State” hung

in the balance. Disaffection, war-profiteering, aiding the enemy, and the contempt for

public rights all inhibited order, severally damaging security efforts and thus undermining

governmental legitimacy. After adjourning, the Council of Safety began to contemplate

solutions.82 No doubt even though the legislature examined regulation, the Council of

Safety believed that only by reviving the CDDCs could such internal chaos be

successfully combated. Even when the executive body could not effectively aid an

inhabitant petitioning for redress after the military abused property, it could order local

committees to assist.83

Though the state’s executive bodies continued to actively combat dissent,

disloyalty would primarily be handled by the CDDCs.84 As previously mentioned, the

                                                                                                               
81
Salt remained scarce, but by May 1777, the Council ordered Abraham Lott to purchase 6,000 bushels for
disbursal. The Council of Safety continued to purchase, regulate and disburse salt until late 1777. JPCCS,
1:933-934, 1050, and 1107-1108 and Volume II, 351. The Committee also received petitions from refugees
seeking aide as well. Petition of Refugees from Long Island, June 12, 1777 in NYPCCSP, Box 8, folder 10,
petition 33:49B, NYSA and Petition of Refugees from Long Island, June 12, 1777 in CHMNY, 2:194-195.
 
82
Eventually the Council recommended that the state accept the Continental Congress’ November
resolution that New York and New Hampshire’s appoint commissioners to regulate prices, labor, and
internal produce. JPCCS, 1:1109.
83
Petition of William McNeal, October 17, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 4, folder 3, petition 33:28, NYSA and
JPCCS, 1:696. Women also petitioned for redress when the army stole their property. “Petition of Phoebe
Oakley,” December 2, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 4, folder 5, petition 33:48, NYSA.
84
The Committee of Safety still summoned and apprehended residents as well as issued oaths. However it
acted on a smaller scale than the CDDCs. JPCCS, 1:617-621 and 672.

  223  
Council of Safety endured as a vital component of the state government well after

ratifying the new constitution.85 Even with a sitting governor, Washington commended

and asserted the Council of Safety’s invaluable role aiding the smooth transition to state

government.86 Once able to send alleged disaffected persons to the CDDC to determine

their fate, the state’s executive bodies focused on administering the government and

war.87 The CDDCs did not replace the Council of Safety, but rather operated within the

state’s growing bureaucracy answering to the legislature and executive. Thus the security

state continued to amass power.

Security State Realized

A Most daring deed was perpetrated last night about [a] quarter of a mile from us.
Mr. Robert Lester is a Tory, and has been somewhat active. He was awakened at
midnight by a loud crash; it was occasioned by an immense stone
thrown…against the front door…[upon entering the house] the robbers…ordered
Mr. Lester to dress himself; he dared not disobey, being completely in their
power; he was blindfolded… and rowed over to the main shore…The villains will
sell him to the Whig Committee of Safety.88
                                                                                                               
85
According to Flick, the state’s first constitution resembled the colonial government. The legislature was
composed of a popular elected representative body, governor, and lieutenant governor. The governor could
not unilaterally veto, but could do so along with the judiciary. He also commanded the military, could call
the legislature, and held some of his colonial predecessor’s powers, including pardoning offenders (except
in cases of treason or murder). The Council of Appointments restricted the governor’s power of
appointment. On April 20, 1777 the constitution was ratified. Due to British occupation in the south, the
Council appointed nine senators and assemblymen. The constitution limited many of the colonial
governor’s prerogative powers. Despite restrictions, the war made the governor’s position increasingly
significant and Clinton employed his military knowledge. Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 87-
89, 94 and 96.
86
JPCCS, 2:503. Since the new government would not commence immediately, Washington feared without
the Council of Safety there would be a power vacuum. To the New York Council of Safety, July 22 1777,
PGW and Kaminski, 18.
 
87
As Flick noted, the state executive bodies handled high treason, counterfeiting, and enemy recruiting.
The CDDC sought approval and guidance. By July 1777, the Council of Safety called for increased
recruiting. All residents under 60 who had previously been exempted from the draft needed to enroll with
their local captains. JPCCS, 1:1023.
88
It appears the narrator’s name was Mary and that her father was a minister in the Church of England who
hoped to remain neutral. In her journal, she described her anxiety during the occupation of Long Island.
Barclay, 17-21, 26-28, and 78.

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 This frightening scene, described by the Long Island wife of a Revolutionary war

officer, no doubt was replicated across the fledgling states throughout the war years.

Like many other non-combatants, the woman who reported this incident attempted to

remain outside the violence that consumed New York, yet faced immense suffering both

at the hands of the British and other agents of chaos. With accounts of disorder, robbery,

violence and mayhem swirling all about the region, such stories only served to stir more

New Yorkers to desire governmental security, by any means necessary.89

Despite not sitting atop the nascent state government, the CDDCs ushered in a

terrifying era of systematic policing. Beginning with the mass deporting of alleged

enemies, CDDCs also demonstrated their public power by extending new oaths of

allegiance, engaging the community to police one another, and deploying informants to

deceitfully infiltrate suspicious areas. In September 1776, the CDDC ordered over 230

alleged disaffected persons (currently confined, on parole, or ordered to be apprehended)

deported to neighboring states.90 Residing all across the state, the accused faced charges

ranging from general disaffection to conspiracy.91 For prisoners such as Roeloff Eltinge,

deportation meant confinement in the homes of two separate American lieutenants, and

eventually a transfer to a prison in Exeter.92 While confined he, like others, faced the

                                                                                                               
89
Barclay, 104-108.
 
90
Washington actually suggested removing potentially dangerous parolees from New York as early as May
1776. JPCCS, Volume I, 436 and 531.
91
Not all were necessarily formally removed.
92
When the CDDC forcibly removed William Smith, the man represented a near negligible threat yet the
CDDC still only allowed him two wagons. Smith, Memoirs, 2:424-429.

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added burden of having to pay for his own expenses.93 Although he and others suffered

abroad, their despondent families struggled at home.

Sending letters to Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, CDDC members William

Duer and John Jay explained that their state’s volatile situation made the mass exile

imperative to the security of the republic.94 Citing the demands of both time and

necessity, New York’s CDDC refused to grant hearings to the accused, arguing that

interrogations, parole bonds or confinement were simply faster.95 Paroled individuals

found themselves sent to areas of minimal threat.96 Many of those summoned had their

papers confiscated and were disarmed before removal. Despite their age, some men wept

when they appeared before the CDDC. George Rapelje recalled that his family suffered

immensely after his father’s exile to New Jersey.97 Others confined, such as Christian

Kroat, notified the Council of Safety of similar problems facing his family. After Kroat

was confined, his son joined the Continental Army, hoping to dispel the suspicion

brought on by his father’s arrest. Rather than wait to be labeled an enemy like his father,
                                                                                                               
93
See MCDDC, 2:414 and Receipt of February 15, 1777 from Roeloff Eltinge to Joseph Stacy of the Exeter
Goal, Roeloff and Ezekiel Eltinge Papers, Huguenot Historical Society, New Paltz, N.Y. in Kenneth
Shefsiek, “A Suspected Loyalist in the Rural Hudson Valley: The Revolutionary War Experience of
Roeloff Josiah Eltinge,” The Hudson Valley Review, 20, no. 1 (Summer 2003), 35. Roelof Elting and
Cadwallader Colden petitioned the Council of Safety to be paroled to their own homes. Objections of
Cadwallader Colden and Roelof Elting, November 1, 1777 in NYPCCSP, Box 7, folder 3, petition 33:326
NYSA.
94
MCDDC, 2:413-415.
95
Alleged crimes included: insurrecting, aiding the enemy, enlisting for the British, disarming patriots,
refusing continental currency, and conspiracy.
 
96
Smith, Memoirs, 2:379.
97
Only a child in 1776, George recalled his outspoken father Rem was a loyalist who remained in New
Jersey on parole. George’s brothers voiced their displeasure, leaving their mother forced to save them from
a “committee” home invasion by dressing them as women. George Rapelje, A Narrative or Excursions,
Voyages, and Travels (New York: West & Trow, 1834), 14. Other petitions even cited the accused person’s
desire to be present to educate his children, attempting to appeal to the Committee’s heart. Petition of
Frederick Philips, November 29, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 4, folder 4, petition 33:32 NYSA.

  226  
the boy intentionally offered his life for the country’s security, no doubt a pleasing result

for the Council of Safety and CDDC. Kroat’s other son, a boy of only 16 years, was

forcibly apprehended when he refused to follow in his brother’s footsteps. Expressing

sincere remorse over his wife’s abandonment, Kroat knew her suffering would increase

now without husband and children. Hoping the Council of Safety would alleviate her

suffering, Kroat desired his youngest son returned.98

Although details regarding the exiles’ experiences are scarce, the CDDC paid

armed men to conduct manhunts for accused disaffected persons and anyone who

escaped jail.99 Whether innocent or guilty, such an extensive initiative in the CDDC’s

opening days sent a forceful and frightening message: the slightest suspicion could lead

not only to stigmatizing, but also now to banishment and suffering.100 With incessant

civil and guerilla warfare raging across the state, removing any potential threats was

deemed vital.101

Those residents who managed to evade the CDDC’s security apparatus found

themselves living within an increasingly monitored society. Believing that its policy of

issuing passes had been subjected to rampant abuses, in November 1776, the Committee

                                                                                                               
98
Petition of Christian Kroat, August 11, 1777 in NYPCCSP, Box 7, folder 4, petition 33:334, NYS. His
youngest son was apprehended while buying bread, bound and dragged to Fort Montgomery.
99
American Lieutenant Adiel Sherwood captured and brought before the CDDC John Savage and John
Claas. Sherwood recognized Savage, an escaped prisoner, and believed Claas was involved. The two men
admitted the enemy seized them against their will. After examining the men, the CDDC still confined them.
Sherwood apprehended 11 others who claimed only to be “going to New York to live in Peace.” MCDDC,
1:81-82. Becker also recounted a tory hunt one night, “Every suspected spot was carefully approached in
hopes to observe the objects of their search.” Becker, 195.
100
Michael Kammen noted the difficultly discerning why some accused dissents were exiled or exchanged
while others confined. Both punishments, as well as confiscation varied. Kammen, 163.
101
Israel Keith to Colonel John P. Palmer, November 13, 1776, Israel Keith Papers, Box 1, Folder 15.
NYSL.

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of Safety demanded greater attention to examinations.102 To curb such exploitation, the

executive body demanded stricter policing of dispersal and ordered that henceforth no

person would be permitted to travel out of his or her district without a pass. Suspected

inhabitants discovered that the executive and other committees also engaged in long-term

monitoring. Individuals like Levi Quimby found themselves repeatedly brought before

the CDDC, despite being discharged shortly after their initial arrests. For Quimby these

subsequent summons entailed additional interrogations and even the questioning of

neighbors and family members. Only after he accepted an oath, provided proof of

compliance, and entered a bond did the Committee of Safety loosen its hold on him.103

Men on parole faced even more dramatic surveillance.104 Yet, for many residents the

state’s coercive security apparatus served a necessary purpose, as disorder and violence

ran rampant through New York.105 For New Yorkers, the need for collective security

outweighed the need for liberty and freedom.

                                                                                                               
102
JPCCS, 1:706. The Committee of Safety designated only two persons per county to issue travel passes.
Furthermore, it ordered only 4,000 passes printed. The state did not know whom to trust since the British
issued their own oaths of allegiance. Letter from Colonel Livingston to Governor Trumbull, September 10,
1776 in AA, Series V, 2:281.
103
Petition of Levi Quimby to the Honorable Council of Safety, Major Lewis DuBois to the Council of
Safety, May 19, 1777; Petition of Levi and Nathaniel Quimby to Honorable Brigadier General John Scott,
and Recognizance of Levi Quimby, January 1777 in Woolsey, 132-135. Men such as Jacob Lansing
received passes stating they should be “protected from any Molestation, whatever, either in person or
property” from the army. Previously a committee deemed there was “nothing farther” against Lansing.
Secretary Matthew Visscher Albany County Chamber, October 31, 1776 and Major James Hughes in
Headquarters, September 1, 1777 in Jacob A. Lansing Papers, Box 1, folder 7 Committee for Safety 1776-
1782, NYSL.
104
Smith, Memoirs, 2:379. Friends informed William Smith that the CDDC monitored him and that
confinement might follow.
105
Both Joseph Brant and the lesser-known Claudius Smith led notorious raids on Americans. Smith struck
terror in residents’ hearts, despite having the reputation as Robin Hoods. Samuel W. Eager, An Outline
History of Orange County… (Newburgh: S.T. Callahan, 1846-1847), 56, 263, 539, 552-562; JPCCS,
1:1002; and Barclay, 84-86.

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 One of the main differences between the provincial and post-July 1776

committees for public safety had to do with the question of allegiance to the nascent state.

After General Howe’s November 1776 proclamation of pardon, the battle for inhabitants’

loyalty intensified. As an example of this struggle, consider the committee’s actions in

Dutchess County, where the Rhinebeck militia had refused to defend the Highlands. To

the Committee of Safety, such “disobedience” had to be “punished,” both to “awe the

guilty” and to “deter others from engaging in such pernicious designs.106 Hoping to

instill a sense of fear in the region’s inhabitants, the Committee of Safety appointed

commissioners (some members of the CDDC), to travel to Rhinebeck with a militia and

enforce the government’s will. The Committee of Safety even permitted the board to

employ violence, if necessary, against enemies of the state. A similar situation arose the

next month in Claverack, and here the CDDC forced all inhabitants to sign an oath of

allegiance.107 In early 1777, the Committee of Safety had required the CDDC to issue an

oath to the formerly disobedient militiamen. The oath specifically called for them to

rescind their loyalty to the Crown and instead pledge themselves to the state. After the

fall of forts Washington and Lee, New Yorkers recognized the symbolic as well as real

threat to stability.108

Following the Rhinebeck incident, the CDDC argued that the state would no

longer tolerate neutrality claims, as it believed that such assertions only provided the

disaffected a means of furthering their support of the enemy. Such “ill-timed lenity”

                                                                                                               
106
JPCCS, 1:757.
 
107
MCDDC, 1:26. With high frequency of men absconding, oaths were necessary.
108
Israel Keith to John P. Palmer, December 1, 1776, Israel Keith Papers, 1767-1803, Box 1, Folder 19,
NYSL.

  229  
jeopardized American liberties, and all equivocal persons needed to be removed before

formulating plots to divide inhabitants or aid the enemy.109 Convinced that conspiracies

engulfed the region, the CDDC argued for the need to proactively eliminate possible

threats. By early January 1777, the CDDC notified the Committee of Safety that it had

already begun removing dubious inhabitants en masse so as to preserve “good

government and order.” Openly admitting that it possessed no means of distinguishing

between the guilty and the innocent, the CDDC called upon “persons of known probity

and attachment to the American cause” to provide information against their neighbors, a

chilling statement given the fact that no trials would be convened.110 By engaging in

such methods, the CDDC’s interrogations demonstrated how “Equivocal neutrality” was

quickly becoming extinct. Stressing that the “Rubicon” had been crossed, the CDDC

wanted definitive answers on residents’ allegiances. Such an extensive program yielded

some unexpected results; as many of those hoping to maintain neutrality recognized, the

CDDC’s strong-arm tactics “made a Great many Tories, for it is natural when a man is

hurt to kick.”111

                                                                                                               
109
The CDDC’s statement referenced Cadwallader Colden whom many believed too dangerous to remain
within the state, however the board was convinced others fainted a neutral stance as well. In spring 1776,
Washington suggested displacing prisoners to Connecticut due to its attachment to the cause. JPCCS, 1:531
and 762.
 
110
On October 17, 1776 the CDDC determined inimical Dutchess County residents seduced others away
from the cause and should be exiled until their trial to ensure “internal peace and security.” Once in Exeter,
the prisoners were to support themselves. MCDDC, 1:2-3. In response to the confinements and
imprisonments, concerned neighbors swore their brethren, if released, possessed no threat. Citing a
suffering family, Newburgh and New Marlborough residents hoped Samuel Devine would be released and
personally swore he would abide by any Council stipulations. Expressing their concern for men like
Devine, citizens agreed to continue self-policing their own society. Petition from Newburgh and New
Marlborough, November 29, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 7, folder 6, petition 33:356 NYSA.
111
Such interrogations were personal, committees questioned men like Beverly Robinson’s family and their
allegiance. Beverly Robinson before the Committee to Detect and Defeat Conspiracies, February 22, 1777
in Crary, The Price of Loyalty, 148-149.

  230  
 Aside from large-scale demonstrations of the CDDC’s police powers, the boards

also engaged the community directly by covertly employing spies and informants against

its own people. Under Nathaniel Sackett’s leadership, this program helped the CDDC

infiltrate the community at a local level.112 After receiving a commission from

Washington to gather intelligence in New York, Sackett established a series of covert spy

networks, the existence of which was known only to a few, secrecy-sworn men.113

Sackett immediately sent informants into enemy-held New York City, various British

encampments, and a number of contested areas. Many of Sackett’s tactics, which

included the use of fraudulent names and networks to obtain military intelligence, also

found a home in civil society, as the CDDC employed Crosby and others for “secret

services.”114 While their stories are not as numerous or dramatic as Crosby’s tales,

Samuel Hopkins, John Maxfield, George Smith and Henry Wooden each received

monetary compensation for their “secret services.”115 Such deceptive acts proved

exceptionally helpful in procuring the names of alleged conspirators and dissenters. Like

Crosby, Hopkins deceived his acquaintances so as to gain entry into their inner circle.

Once learning of these men’s devious plans to take the state’s oath only to later enlist

with the British and recruit for the enemy, Hopkins promptly notified the authorities, who

                                                                                                               
112
Orders to Nathaniel Sackett, February 4, 1777, PGW.
113
Sackett to Washington, April 7, 1777, PGW. Sackett did not divulge the names of his spies. Typically,
historians only study spies’ military nature and not their role with the CDDC. Morton Pennypacker,
General Washington’s Spies: On Long Island and in New York (Brooklyn: Long Island Historical Society,
1939); Corey Ford, A Peculiar Service (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965); and Alexander Rose,
Washington’s Spies: The Story of America’s First Spy Ring (New York: Bantam Books, 2006).
 
114
Similar to Commissioners for Sequestration, the CDDCs also relied on paid informants, allies, coercive
militias, and intimidation to obtain the people’s compliance. Pashman, 599 and 603.
115
MCDDC, 2:455. Like Crosby, Smith was apprehended as an enemy until Sackett vouched for him.

  231  
then secured their arrest and confinement aboard the Fleet Prison.116 Once aboard the

horrific vessels, former residents, now supposedly devious enemies to liberty, lamented

their destitute situation both onboard and at home.117

The CDDC, demonstrating it was no mere insurgency itself, precisely planned

Crosby’s missions. Upon examining John Hanes, the CDDC discovered that he and his

fellow conspirators had planned to meet at Captain Chapman’s home near Mount

Ephraim. Before sending troops to this rendezvous point, Sackett provided Crosby with a

fake name, a travel pass, and money to “use the utmost Art to discover the [men’s]

designs.”118 At times, the CDDC even allowed Sackett to administer his spy network

without its consent. For a body that sought to eliminate dissent, the CDDC thrived on

names and stories. Hopkins and Crosby named at least 34 persons in their depositions.

Some of those named had recently returned from New Hampshire and no doubt failed to

appear before the CDDC as instructed. Crosby and Sackett’s success helped the CDDC

                                                                                                               
116
Hopkins accused the men of stealing horses, swords, guns and recruiting for the enemy. MCDDC,
2:377-378. The Council of Safety created the Fleet Prison (2-3 ships anchored in Rondout Creek at Esopus)
on May 2, 1777 and 17 days later it housed 175 accused loyalists. Originally designed to imprison those
suspected of uprising in Dutchess, Westchester, and Ulster County, it later included men from Albany and
Orange counties as well as those who returned from New England paroles. By June, it appointed a
committee of three to regulate the floating prison and design rules such as: food would be provided (but
according to prisoners’ letters this was not the case), no friends could send necessities or visit without
permission, no letters sent without proper authorization, the Council of Safety must receive reports, and
discharges could only be executed if accounts were settled. In October 1777, when the British attacked
Kingston both the American and British set fire to the vessels. Some prisoners were sent to Hartford, others
escaped. According to Thomas Jones, the patriots failed to release the prisoners and many died due to
“rebel humanity.” JPCCS, 1:908, 937, 967, 973-974, and 1063. For more on Fleet Prison: James Roberts et
al., eds. New York in the Revolution as Colony and State Volume II (Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, Printers,
1904), 235-237; Jones, 1:220; and Shefsiek, 35. Of course, American prisoners also cited harsh conditions.
Jonathan M. Scott, Blue Lights or the Convention: A Poem in four Cantos (New York: Charles N. Baldwin,
1817), 29 and 98-99 and “Incidents of the Prisoners and Prison-Ships at New York,” in Revolutionary
Incidents of Suffolk and Kings Counties, 207-250.
 
117
Petition of Hendrick Clumb, July 29, 1777, and Petitions of John Clint, August 11, 1777 in NYPCCSP,
Box 7, folder 8 and 9, petition 33:376, NYSA and Petition of Hendrick Clumb, July 29, 1777 and Petitions
of John Clint, August 11, 1777 in CHMNY, 2:257 and 271-272.
118
Crosby was given the name Levi Foster. MCDDC, 1:47.

  232  
to pursue those residents accused of aiding the enemy or threatening legislators.119 The

work of spies also demonstrated the fluidity of citizens’ loyalty. In most cases, Sackett

and the CDDC searched for “well affected persons” in the area, whose services would be

enlisted to aid in the apprehension of alleged enemies. The accuracy of spies’ reports

mattered little. As evidenced by Crosby’s memoirs, inhabitants understood that spies

were present in the community, watching their every move. Such a culture of fear and

accusations no doubt aided the board’s work and was even encouraged.120 By cultivating

such communal behavior, the CDDC normalized its activities and furthered a policy of

“governmentality.”121

While it is not clear if the conspiracy board ever paid female spies, women

certainly performed a vital role in the CDDC’s efforts to construct a new American

community. Obviously, women petitioned for travel passes to be with their husbands and

delivered testimonies, thus proving that they were recognized political actors.122 When

Mrs. Melanshaw, the wife of a “Tory” in New York City, and another woman desired to

leave the area, the CDDC ordered their belongings searched thoroughly. Such

interrogation and seizure of goods was common, but although armed men would be

present, the CDDC demanded that, “two discreet Women, of known attachment to the
                                                                                                               
119
On January 10, Sackett received word from Crosby that a group of men planned to join the enemy.
Sackett informed the CDDC and sent Peter Van Gaasbeek to “arrest” Crosby (now going by the name John
Brown) but allowed him to escape. Crosby recounted to the CDDC that the men recently returned from
New Hampshire. Presumably, the men escaped confinement or had not appeared before the board upon
their release. MCDDC, 1:93-94, 163-165 and 2:430.
 
120
Washington stressed to Sackett that he must convey information quickly or else it was wasted.
Washington to Sackett, April 8, 1777, PGW.
121
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., The Foucaultian Effect: Studies in
Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 102.
122
At times New York’s committees for public safety summoned wives and children to be deported. Smith,
Memoirs, 2:262.

  233  
American Cause” conduct the search. Not only did the board distrust the potentially

disaffected female travelers, but also it readily handed over such responsibility to

politically savvy women. Judging by the CDDC’s rhetoric, this was not a matter of

merely rifling through belongings, but an actual examination.123 The Council of Safety’s

respect for female patriots no doubt stemmed from the petitions they received from

women who claimed that, despite their husbands’ disaffection, they remained steadfastly

loyal. Some women even admitted to warning their husbands against such devious

behavior.124

Of course, it was not only through the use of paid informants that the CDDC

obtained names, so too were these provided by the accused. For example, when Charles

Haight Jr. found himself before the CDDC, he claimed that Caleb Fowler Jr. had “enticed

him” to go to Long Island.125 Admitting his fault in the matter, Haight played his only

card, delivering the board names and details. Detailing how slaves had transported him

and his fellow travelers, Haight described meeting the enemy in Memaroneck and

receiving accommodations from the disaffected. Once with the enemy, Haight

recognized other men, presumably from his community, enrolled in the infamous Roger’s

Rangers. Although he refrained from admitting that he had planned to join the British,

Haight knew it behooved him to cooperate. Given his illicit travel and communication,

the fact that he had enlisted with the enemy, and his association with insurrectionary
                                                                                                               
123
Such a case was not unique. When Lieutenant Martin Cornell arrested Abraham Brower on suspicion of
disaffection, his sister Mary Thomas fled. After interrogating Brower and finding nothing, Cornell
eventually re-encountered Mary, who later turned over documents. Upon appearing before the board, the
CDDC ordered Mrs. Goodwin and Mrs. Conner to examine her. MCDDC, 1:87 and 102-103.
 
124
Petition of Catherine Kittle, December 2, 1777 in NYPCCSP, Box 8, folder 4, petition 33:439, NYSA
and Petition of Catherine Kittle, December 2, 1777 in CHMNY, 2:311.
125
Haight recalled Fowler warning if he remained “he would be taken.” MCDDC, 1:22-23.

  234  
slaves, Haight stood accused of serious charges. Perhaps engaging his captors in some

sort of plea deal, he agreed to aid Captain Townsend in apprehending five of the men he

named.126 Almost a month later, at least four of these men were seized and placed on

parole. In the meantime, Haight himself had an epiphany, took the oath and was finally

discharged. Such incidents demonstrated that the security state still faced serious loyalty

issues. This question became increasingly important throughout the months of January

and February 1777, as the CDDC extended the oath to more inhabitants.

Allegiance was difficult to gauge, and the CDDC received a great deal of petitions

from the accused pleading for mercy and a second chance. Some who accepted an oath

were discharged, yet many times a cloud of suspicion persisted. At times accused men

perhaps felt pressured and joined the military only to dispel lingering doubts regarding

their loyalties.127 Petitions reveal not only that inhabitants recognized the state’s

increased powers, but also their own desperation. After being confined, they begged the

Council of Safety for mercy, claiming a variety of reasons (even inebriation) for their

indiscretion.128 Families and neighbors also petitioned for the return of loved ones.

Occasionally, the CDDC displayed mercy, especially if the accused agreed to behave as

                                                                                                               
126
Along with William Underhill Jr. and Samuel Kip who had both enlisted, Haight named Stephen Lyon
whose slaves transported the men, as well as two other men who entertained the men for a night.
 
127
Some men hoping to procure the Council of Safety’s favor, petitioned to serve while others noted their
past service as reason for release. Petition in favor of Abraham Middagh, July 18, 1777 in NYPCCSP, Box
8, folder 1, petition 33:402, NYSA and Petition in Favor of Abraham Middagh, July 18, 1777 in CHMNY,
2:251.
128
Samuel Townsend’s crime was essentially a joke that a group of tories could beat a group of whigs
easily. Eventually he accepted an oath. Petition of Samuel Townsend May 15, 1777 in Woolsey, 119-120.
Prisoners frequently petitioned for release from their terrible conditions. Their crimes varied and at times
concerned minor misdeeds based on suspicion or hearsay. Petitions of Prisoner, October 1, 1776 in
NYPCCSP, Box 4, folder 7, petition 33:64a, NYSA.

  235  
“good & faithful Subjects of this State.”129 Some residents hoped to persuade the

powerful state that their misguided actions constituted only a one-time transgression, and

pointed out that they had obeyed the committees for public safety in all other instances.

Defenses aside, one cannot read these petitions without sensing the fear and awe the

CDDC inspired. Such trepidation stemmed directly from knowing that their fate lay in

the hands of an exceptionally powerful board.130 While the CDDC granted some

inhabitants additional time to consider the oath, commissioners desired swift decisions.131

Those unfortunates brought before the committees for public safety had to swear they

would deliver any information regarding so-called inimical persons directly to the

CDDCs, a policy that perpetuated the self-policing society.132

In early March 1777, the CDDC received additional letters from residents

deported to New England.133 Begging for a trial, the men bemoaned the lack of bread

and “the Horrors of a cold winter Goal.” Many affirmed not only their support for

independence and their desire to serve in the Continental military, but also their

willingness to submit to “some Committee of Inspection.” In conforming to its desire for

                                                                                                               
129
MCDDC, 1:98. Others, such as Samuel Barns, were apprehended visiting family at Christmas and only
released upon signing the Association.
 
130
Petition 2 unidentified in NYPCCSP, Box 4, folder 1, petition 33, NYSA.
131
Designating Beverley Robinson equivocal and informing him he reached the “Rubicon,” the CDDC
refused to allow him to remain unless he accepted an oath. He refused and became an active loyalist.
132
William Thorn to Jacob Lansing, January 6, 1777, and In Committee, April 20, 1777 in Jacob A.
Lansing Papers Box 1, folder 7 Committee for Safety 1776-1782, NYSL.
133
William Smith noted the CDDC’s demanded that anyone paroled to a neighboring state appear before it,
whether they were permitted to return or did so on their own. Smith, a historian and last chief justice,
attempted to remain neutral but eventually incurred both sides’ anger. Due to his influence, the CDDC
summoned him to take the oath. After refusing, it paroled and later removed him. He vehemently disagreed
with the CDDC’s general announcement that all parolees had one week to appear before it stating, “The
Laws of England with a due Attention to Liberty and Property will not admit News Paper Notification.”
Recognizing the CDDC’s reign differed from the Committee of Safety’s individual summons, Smith hoped
for an end to the CDDC’s “Indolence and Wantoness.” Smith, Memoirs, 2:xxii, 92 and 411-414.

  236  
surveillance, such actions only enhanced the board’s legitimacy.134 Considering

themselves “prisoners at large but not confined,” these men desperately wrote to their

families and the government, yet upon receiving few responses, some believed their

letters were intercepted.135 On account of the many exiled residents who returned

without permission, on March 7, 1777, the New York Convention decided to reconstruct

the community by issuing oaths to persons formally labeled as disaffected.136 Swayed in

part by the humble petitions, in addition to the specter of disorder raised by its own

actions, which resulted in large numbers of residents confined or paroled, the New York

Convention ordered a general pardon.137 Recalling anyone whose “crimes [have not]

rendered themselves unworthy of being partakers in the exalted privileges of freemen,”

the CDCC then ordered the former exiles to take an oath pledging that they would

henceforth “bear true faith and allegiance to the State of New-York.”138 While such a

proposition excluded those who aided the enemy by taking up arms, it called upon

inhabitants to aid in uncovering disloyalty. This measure represented a chance for neutral

and equivocal persons sent abroad to return and accept the oath.139 Anyone who refused

                                                                                                               
134
Petition of Elnathan Foster and others, 1777 in NYPCCSP, Box 8, folder 7, petition 33:460 and
“Petitions of William Forbes,” October 26, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 4, folder 7, petition 33:68a, NYSA.
 
135
Evert Byvanck to John Byvanck, January 29, 1777, NYSL. Evert Byvanck was not deported from New
York but fled. His letters from New England expressed similar themes as others’ petitions such as: fearing
letters were not receive, longing for his family and inquiring about his property. See also letters on
February 21 and 22, and August 18, 1777.
136
MCDDC, 1:173.
137
JPCCS, 1:827. Actually, the CDDC began ordering those men released from parole or confinement in
New England to appear with their permits as early as January 1777. MCDDC, 1:72-73 and 107.
138
Those men who did not fall under this broad umbrella were residents who took up arms, accepted a
commission, provided intelligence, supplied the enemy, or enlisted.
 
139
Michael Kammen asserted that by May 1777, Jay finally recognized neutrality was “unacceptable.”
Neutrality now meant potential banishment. Kammen, 154.

  237  
would be exiled within six days or confined. Of course, if such persons never appeared,

the CDDC assumed guilt and labeled the man an enemy, which could lead to estate

forfeiture. To the CDDC, the Convention had gone soft, and as such, they demanded that

oath-refusing residents be permitted only to take common necessities like clothing and

bedding into exile.140 Acquiescing, the New York Convention permitted the CDDC “to

use a discretionary power in granting the indulgences,” as those men who chose to leave

the state had lost the right to such protection. These enemies’ fates lay in the CDDCs’

hands.

Immediately afterwards, men such as Henry Crosby and William Wyatt flocked to

the CDDC so as to recant their past sins. Others like Captain Peter Corne, who continued

to refuse, faced exile. Some did not openly refuse, but solicited more time to consider the

oath.141 Mindful of the men’s suspicious nature, the CDDC monitored anyone who

returned to the state. Roeloff Eltinge returned on March 25, but because he refused to the

take the oath, on May 13 the CDDC sent him to the dreaded Fleet Prison.142 On the

surface the aforementioned pardon may seem to constitute a stroke of benevolence; in

reality it was in keeping with the CDDC’s conception of an American community. For

example, in mid-March, 28 inhabitants requested additional time to consider the oath and

received 6 days to make a decision. If inhabitants chose to accept the oath, it increased

                                                                                                               
 
140
JPCCS, 1:844.
141
The CDDC permitted some who refused the oath to return home for a time. Presumably this meant until
arrangements could be made for them to leave permanently. Others went to jail.
142
His brother-in-law, Jacobus Hardenburgh petitioned for his release and he was paroled on June 18.
Shefsiek, 35. William Smith believed the CDDC empowered to use force against anyone confined and he
even hinted at its potential to execute. This claim is not substantiated. Smith, Memoirs, 2:127.

  238  
the patriot population and if they did not, they would be forcibly removed.143 Either way,

surveillance increased and all Americans received a definitive message.

New York’s desire to issue oaths, at times was met with too great of a resistance.

In early April, Tryon County representatives petitioned the Convention soliciting a

general oath for the entire state.144 Recognizing the local patriots’ pleas, the legislature

still abruptly dismissed the idea, as without a “regular government” too many residents

might refuse such an ultimatum. Since previous efforts had not garnered the desired

results elsewhere, Tryon seemed unlikely to be fruitful either. Clearly, the state believed

that even if inhabitants accepted the oath, its position was too precarious to “probe a

wound [so] deep.” Rather, the legislature preferred that representatives simply “keep a

watchful eye over such as you may suspect, and to retain those in custody whom you may

deem dangerous.”145 At this point, the board preferred extending the oath only to the

suspicious.

However, by no means did the CDDC passively wait for those men exiled to New

England to appear; instead, it ordered their apprehension or summons. Such a measure

included employing men as secret agents in Peekskill, where they would disguise

themselves and infiltrate groups of allegedly disaffected persons planning to join the

enemy.146 As had Crosby, two secret agents tricked Ezekiel Bugsby by telling him they

intended to join the British. Once gaining his trust, they became privy to not only his

                                                                                                               
143
In April 1777, the Convention allowed the CDDC to pardon certain offenders. MCDDC, 1:256.
 
144
In March 1778, Governor Clinton appointed six men to administer oaths in Tryon. George Clinton,
March 1778 in Jacob Abbott Collection, Box 1, folder George Clinton 1778. NYSL.
145
JPCCS, 1:883-884.
146
Elijah Oakley and Albert Cary were sent to Peekskill.

  239  
plans but also the names of co-conspirators.147 Committees also established regular

armed patrols and night watches, similar to slave patrols, throughout the state. In

Schoharie, local leaders stationed groups of four “watchers” in various homes across the

region.148 While night watches served a critical role in monitoring for potential

invasions, these armed men also threatened inhabitants’ safety. As a young man, John

Becker recalled traveling near military barracks. Although he frequently passed

sentinels, on one occasion he failed to provide proper salutations. Suspicious, the

sentinel nearly fired upon him.149 Charged with the task of providing security at all costs,

CDDCs’ armed associates frequently harassed citizens to accomplish their goals.

On May 10, 1777 New York’s Convention again extended a free pardon oath,

which allowed anyone “seduced [away] from their allegiance” to return to their families

and country.150 Unlike earlier resolutions, this one even allowed those who took up arms

to renounce their past allegiances and swear loyalty to the state, as long as they appeared

before a magistrate within two months.151 Offered as a chance to join the State of New

York, this proved to be the CDDC’s final act of wartime clemency before the June 1778

                                                                                                               
147
MCDDC, 1:221-222. To accomplish these goals, Martin Ray appeared with credentials to raise a
company of men at the CDDC’s command. William E. Roscoe, History of Schoharie County, New York
(Syracuse: D. Mason & Co., 1882), 39.
 
148
Roscoe, 39.
149
Becker, 211-212.
150
JPCCS, 1:920-921. Apparently many “deceived by the enemy, and instead of being protected, have
either been totally neglected, or compelled to take up arms for the express purpose of enslaving and
destroying their fellow citizens” wished to return.
151
Of course, the state’s leniency had limits, as Clinton desired to make a “sudden & severe Example…to
deter others.” If nothing was done to prevent residents from joining the enemy, he feared, citizens “will
soon take the Law in their own Hands ag’t them.” Clinton noted that oaths had limited affects. That same
day the Convention passed a resolution to send prisoners to boats on the Hudson and allowed the CDDC to
place captured men in jail. Clinton to the President of the Convention, May 2, 1777 and Resolution of the
Convention, May 2, 1777, PGC, 1:783-786.

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test oath, which officially eliminated neutrality.152 Related to the pardon, the Council of

Safety wrote the CDDC inquiring into prisoners’ status.153 Desiring the Kingston jail to

“discriminate between such as have ignorantly been led into crimes, and such as are more

hardened in guilt,” the Council of Safety understood the difficulties inherent in

attempting to confine a large number of men, paroled or confined, without a hearing.154

In June, it ordered the CDDC to send all those currently confined in New England jails to

the Fleet Prison.155 Because it aimed to completely control the movement of the state’s

residents, the Council of Safety furiously lambasted Pennsylvania for having released,

without permission, New York’s disaffected exiles. By the end of the summer, once

again the Council of Safety ordered CDDC member Egbert Benson and others to

examine the Fleet Prison’s inmates, and to discharge those deemed least dangerous.156

Controlling the state’s population was one of the security state’s most critical functions.

Finally, after issuing the aforementioned pardons, New York took its most

decisive stance against neutrality. Since late 1776, the CDDC had come to believe that

those inhabitants who formally claimed neutrality did so deceptively so they could later

join the enemy. Such duplicity could not be tolerated, especially given the current
                                                                                                               
152
The CDDC continued to pay men for secret services after the May 10 pardon. The Supreme Test Oath
was issued in June 1778.
 
153
As previously mentioned the Council of Safety remained involved pursuing disaffection. Clinton also
contacted the Council regarding military preparations and apprehending enemy recruiters. He also worked
with the Council of Safety sending information on appointments and enemy plans. Clinton to the Council
of Safety, June 5, 1777, PGC 2:5.
154
The letter was addressed to Colonel Van Rensselaer, Harmanus, and Major Ten Broeck. By June, the
Council of Safety also deployed a similar process for the prisoners on the boats at Esopus Landing. JPCCS,
1:941 and 959.
155
JPCCS, 1:968. June 1777 witnessed the lost of Fort Ticonderoga and the northern frontier exposed.
Soon the Highlands also fell. Kaminski, 28-33.
156
JPCCS, 1:1054.

  241  
invasion of the Hudson River and Westchester.157 Accepting its grave task to protect

American liberties, the CDDC believed that the policy of “Illtimed lenity to individuals

who have either artful & wicked designs or from interested motives shrunk from their

duties,” needed to be terminated.158 Although other means were taken against neutrals at

first, the CDDC resolved that all citizens needed to defend the cause and that “persons of

influence & of equivocal characters” should not be permitted to remain. Therefore, the

CDDC suggested removing them. In the words of state historian Victor Hugo Paltsits,

“patriotism was to be made manifest.”159 The continued recalling of prisoners sent

abroad (and the subsequent releasing of those not deemed dangerous) culminated with the

June 1778 test oath, which eliminated neutrality as a viable option. With the frontier still

under immense threat, New York needed stability.160 Summoning accused equivocal and

neutral persons to take an oath declaring New York State sovereignty, those who refused

or did not appear when called faced two possible outcomes: (1) confinement (if deemed

dangerous); (2) deportation (if considered less of a threat). Rather than have their

property confiscated, many (though not all) New Yorkers finally accepted. In July 1779

                                                                                                               
157
For much of the summer, the Hudson was the center of military endeavors. Both Orange and
Westchester residents feared pillaging. Others thought their disaffected neighbors might aid the British. The
potential of both insurrection and invasion caused increased monitoring and measures. Richard J. Koke,
“The Struggle for the Hudson,” and “The Struggle for the Hudson: The British Naval Expedition under
Captain Hyde Parker and Captain James Wallace, July 12 – August 18, 1776,” in Narratives of the
Revolution in New York (New York: New York Historical Society, 1975), 36-74.
158
MCDDC, 1:12-13. The CDDC suggested neutrals be removed in December 1776.
159
Anyone who was removed under this act, if found within New York State afterwards would be jailed for
treason. Victor Hugo Paltsits ed., Minutes of the Commissioners for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies
in the State of New York: Albany County Sessions, 1778-1781 Volume I (Albany: The State of New York,
1909), 18.
160
Early in 1778 there was also reports of mutinies and desertions. Kaminski, 39-43; Committee of
Congress to Clinton, February 17, 1778, PGC, 2:766-767 and James Duane to Clinton, September 22,
1778, PGC, 4:66-69.

  242  
alone, forty people refused the oath.161 Unsurprisingly, the same month the Convention

passed the test oath, the CDDCs underwent their final transformation, and after this they

systematically issued oaths of allegiance to nearly every person appearing before them.

This tactic not only sought to eliminate both dissent and neutrality, but also to bind

citizens to the CDDC’s recognizance system. Those who refused would simply be

removed, as “dangerous and equivocal neutrality” was now equated with a lack of loyalty

and patriotism.162 Non-conformity was subversive. While men like former Deputy

Secretary Goldbrow Banyar tried to remain neutral in action yet loyalist at heart, all New

Yorkers now had to make a choice.163

Liberties Trampled: Life in the Security State

Besieged on all sides, commissioners believed they needed to rigidly police the

community. Soon after declaring independence, CDDC member William Duer notified

American General James Clinton that companies of men planned to enlist with the enemy

in the Highlands that very night. Although the CDDC had already deployed armed men

to intercept these purported enemies, Duer desired additional security and asked Clinton

for more men. Fearing that the disaffected possessed forged passes, he contended that “it

will be necessary to Seize every Man passing along the Road, and to detain them till

                                                                                                               
161
It is unclear where Flick obtained this number; likely it came from sources destroyed in the Albany
Capital Fire of 1911. Flick, Loyalism, 130. Clinton made clear such an act was no pardon for those who
took arms. Clinton to Ebenezer Russell, August 24, 1778, PGC, 3:689.
162
Robert Benson to Aaron Burr, August 2, 1778, Memoirs of Aaron Burr ed. Matthew L. Davis (New
York: DA Capo, 1971), 131-132.
163
Friends with James Duane, Baynar conveniently found reasons not to appear before the CDDC and
eventually the board allowed others to vouch he was not dangerous. Crary, The Price of Loyalty, 158 and
Gorham A. Worth, Random of Albany: From 1800-1808 (Albany: J. Munsell, 1866), 112-119.

  243  
further orders [arrive].”164 In the name of “public Safety,” each man seized on the open

road was to be thoroughly searched. In this case, it seemed better to assume travelers’

guilt than allow their unfettered passage along the road. As John Becker recalled, when a

local teacher attempted to meet Burgoyne’s approaching army, “an American patrol”

quickly apprehended and questioned him.165

Such heightened suspicion led to obvious abuses of power, as CDDCs meted out

rulings quickly and confinement was sometimes based solely on hearsay. First and

foremost, these bodies were not courts; there was neither a jury nor a lawyer present. As

had previously been the case, the CDDC received a multitude of petitions from prisoners

and their families, all of which begged for justice. Even innocent families of the accused

knew they would suffer in the security state.166 While most petitions highlighted poor

treatment during confinement, others applauded the state for arresting potentially

dangerous residents who threatened security. Curbing individuals’ rights did not concern

those who fashioned themselves patriots. New Yorkers who supported the committees

for public safety contended that since they themselves did not threaten the state, they had

nothing to fear from coercive tactics meant only to preserve security.167 Sacrificing their

liberties for safety was a price they were willing to pay.

While speaking to the dank and putrid conditions of committees for public safety

sanctioned confinement, most petitioners vociferously vouched for the accused persons’
                                                                                                               
164
MCDDC, 2:415-416.
165
Becker, 78-79.
166
Becker noted that after patriots captured a group of British spies, their sisters wept not only for their
brother but their own fate as well. Becker, 198-199.
167
Petition of Joshua Purdy and other Prisoners, August 18, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 5, folder 1, petition
33:108, NYSA and Petition of Joshua Purdy and other Prisoners, August 18, 1776 in CHMNY, 1:455.
 

  244  
innocence.168 While these men might have been guilty of directly or indirectly

supporting the British, petitions nevertheless illuminated numerous committees for public

safety’s injustices. Individuals like William Barker Jr. were accused and sentenced

without even being made aware of the charges against them, and never received the

luxury of defending themselves. Barker’s personal trials and tribulations are echoed in

others’ petitions. Confined for five months without knowing exactly what he had been

accused of doing, Barker expressed sorrow and grief that he could ever be viewed as an

enemy to his homeland. Believing that his accuser was using the era’s political climate to

enact a personal vendetta, Barker seemed genuinely confused by what he could have

possibly done to justify such punishment.169 Daily hoping to appear before the state

executive body to prove his innocence, Barker never seemed to receive a summons.

Willing to comply with any requests that the executive body “should think proper for

your safety if I cannot satisfy you that I am no foe to the cause,” Barker pled only to be

heard. “If you knew my heart as well as I know it,” Barker lamented, “you gentlemen,

would not think me to be a foe…I hope you won’t punish the innocent for the guilty’s

sake.”170

                                                                                                               
168
Philander Forbes petitioned the Council of Safety on behalf of her son Gilbert accused of disaffection
and arrested in June 1776. His mother pled to alleviated him of his “unhealthy room.” It is unclear if his
conditions faired any better, yet he was transported to a Kingston jail and then removed from the state. One
year later, he returned from confinement in Connecticut, took the oath and was released. Forbes probably
fell under the umbrella of general disaffection and in summer 1777 was permitted to return upon taking an
oath. JPCCS, 1:583, 941-2, and 978. Others such as Jonathan Cumming were simply terrified of being sent
to the Fleet Prison indefinitely. JPCCS, 2:440.
169
Barker refused to take up arms but stated all along he would aid the effort in any other way.
170
JPCCS, 2:388. Barker wrote his plea on January 17, 1777. Like many others, he begged for release
based on injury to himself and his family.
 

  245  
 Even revolutionary leaders such as New Hampshire governor Meshech Weare

expressed misgivings regarding the CDDC’s actions. Writing to CDDC member William

Duer regarding prisoners exiled to his state, Weare expressed concern regarding the

“Great uneasiness [that] prevails among them, and their clamours of being sent here

without examination…and consciousness of their innocence which they assert has had

considerable influence among the people in these parts.” Obviously anyone imprisoned

would argue his or her treatment unjust, but Weare was no one’s fool and sat on his

state’s Committee of Safety. He pressed Duer, and presumably the CDDC, to investigate

and make sure no innocent persons were confined “in the confusion and unavoidable

hurry.”171 Believing such injustices had no place in a republic, Weare’s words of caution

fell upon deaf ears, most likely because of New Hampshire’s less subversive population.

Petitions and accusation aside, one need look no further than the CDDC’s minutes to see

cases of men captured and held despite members’ admissions that they possessed no

evidence.172 Committees for public safety discharged many of those summoned due to a

lack of evidence.173 Without any courts operating, the CDDC sought to afford “no

                                                                                                               
171
In his December 1776 letter, Weare discussed the issues arising from holding so many prisoners,
constantly monitoring those confined or paroled, and the expense.
172
In February 1777, the CDDC examined Benjamin Searles concerning the murder of John White. Major
Graham apprehended Searles but after the interrogation, the CDDC found no reason to charge him yet
ordered Searles remain confined until further notice. MCDDC, 1:152.
173
Williams Besley and Cornelius Besley appeared on December 31, 1776. Although it is not clear if they
were summoned from confinement, parole, or their homes, both men were discharged as “nothing appears,
& whom there is Reason to believe entirely innocent.” Through its coercive measures, the CDDC
successfully undermined real plots. Upon receiving a letter in December 1776 that David Aitkins recently
returned from enemy territory possessing protection orders for his neighbors, the CDDC ordered 20 armed
men to apprehend, disarm, and seize his documents. When the investigations ended, the CDDC discovered
Aitkens was tricked into carrying papers and discharged him upon taking the oath. The real criminals who
received the protections were confined. MCDDC, 1:30-31 and 34-38.

  246  
greater Liberty... than what humanity may require.”174 Despite the lack of trials, alleged

enemies whom the board trusted found themselves put to hard labor on the Hudson River

rather than rotting in a cell.175 Of course, in some petitions the accused pled for mercy by

willingly admitting wrongdoings or naming others as the true culprits, thus contributing

to the security state’s goal of creating a self-policing society based on fear. For example,

the Council of Safety agreed to discharge John L. Van Allen and John J. Van Alstyne

from the dreaded Fleet Prison if they entered a bond and provided names of Kinderhook

community members.176

More eloquently, Kinderhook brothers Henry and Peter Van Schaack lambasted

the treatment of alleged enemies of state and questioned the government’s strict

definitions of loyalty.177 Although patriots viewed Kinderhook as a loyalist stronghold,

was it accurate to label both men disaffected due to their neutrality? Both men opposed

harsh treatment based merely upon “appearance of guilt” and their status during the war

changed.178 Accused of corresponding with the enemy, Henry Van Schaack was

                                                                                                               
174
MCDDC, 1:114. This order was in response to a January 21, 1777 petition from six men confined who
desired a trial.
 
175
MCDDC, 1:133. Captain Michin was instructed “to Keep a Watchful Eye over them and use his utmost
Endeavers that none of them Escape.”
176
The two petitioned for release from their nightmare after being held for withholding evidence.
177
Both brother’s memoirs as well as the MCDDC and JPCCS shed light on neutrals’ treatment. Some
historians have mistakenly labeled the Van Schaacks as loyalists despite their claims of neutrality. Alice
Kenney, Stubborn for Liberty: The Dutch in New York (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1975), 181.
178
JPCCS, 1:583. Although he served on early committees, in March 1776, neighbors demanded Henry (a
justice of the peace) stop collecting debt. In June, the local committee arrested and sent him along with 16
others to Albany. Forbidden to write their families or even accept bail, they were released after seventeen
days when the patriots deemed there “was NOT OF SUFFICIENT WEIGHT to require defense.” Despite
the lack of evidence and no charge against them, the men still had to pay expenses for their imprisonment.
Van Schaack later assumed that either someone with ill intentions gave false evidence or the committee
permitted “alarm and suspicion.” Van Schaack, Memoirs of the Life of Henry Van Schaack, 55-58.

  247  
apprehended in July 1776 and was sent first to Albany and later Connecticut.179 In

August, he penned a scathing letter to the Convention denouncing its hypocritical claims

of protecting inhabitants’ “safety and welfare” while he and his fellow inmates found

themselves “unheard, unquestioned, and contrary to the principles of the Bill of Rights,

published by the Honourable Continental Congress” just a month earlier in September

1776.180 Van Schaack claimed he never broke any resolutions, yet the state still deprived

him of his “sacred rights” and neglected notifying him of the charges.181 Mockingly

referring to New York’s Convention as “guardians of those rights which are held

valuable in society,” he demanded to be heard or paroled. Instead, New York shipped

Van Schaack to New London. While in Connecticut, he received a parole to visit

Kinderhook, where he remained under suspicion. In his papers, he went to great lengths

describing how a mere difference of political opinions could lead to suspicion and

condemnation.182 Van Schaack illuminated a world where the rules of conduct and

loyalty quickly changed, leaving many confused over what behavior was patriotic and

                                                                                                               
179
Two rivals groups in Kinderhook elected committees; one led by the Van Schaacks the other by militia
officers. Kenney, 176-177.
 
180
JPCCS, 2:215.
181
Van Schaack hinted at the harshness of his confinement and numerous transportations. Accusing the
patriots of hypocrisy and jealously guarding their own rights while depriving others of theirs, he discredited
much of their accomplishments as often violent. Rather than decreeing “liberty” as their reasoning, they
should have been calling for “license.” Lamenting the destruction of loyalist property and rights, he also
highlighted the punishment for “the mere expression of opinions honestly entertained by those who
doubted the expediency or propriety of many of the public measures.” Van Schaack, Memoirs of the Life of
Henry Van Schaack, 65-66.
182
“Mere differences of political sentiment, particularly in an individual of influence or distinction, though
wholly unaccompanied by overt acts of a dangerous character, was termed ‘disaffected;’ and this undefined
offence was often adjudged to be a sufficient ground for imprisonment and banishment to another state.”
Van Schaack considered it ridiculous to be jailed or exiled for celebrating the King’s birthday, a time
honored tradition. Van Schaack, Memoirs of the Life of Henry Van Schaack, 68-69.

  248  
what constituted disaffection.183 The CDDC had summoned him, as well as numerous

others, under the March 1777 resolution that all residents accused of general disaffection

(not treason) be allowed to return home and take the oath of allegiance. When he did not

appear by March 10, the CDDC ordered him apprehended and brought before them.184

Refuting the CDDC’s authority and the oath outright, he was allowed 20 days to leave the

state.185 Although Van Schaak neither took up arms nor aided the enemy, his crimes

constituted a breach against the state’s legitimacy.

Unlike his brother, Peter Van Schaack had expressed reservations over the present

civil war. Obliged to adhere to the royal government, Peter also believed he must defend

the principles of liberty.186 Conflicted as he was, he took part in the 1776 Albany County

Committee, but refused to sign the Association because it mandated the taking up of

arms. Professing pacifism, he withdrew from the patriot community.187 In response, his

                                                                                                               
183
Van Schaack did not understand how the legislature could pray for the King but he could not toast him
nor pray for enemies as the Bible commanded. Rather than a fluid transition, Van Schaack believed the
change from royal to state government was wrought by “irregularities.”
 
184
MCDDC, 1:275 and 279.
185
MCDDC, 1:280-1 and 315. Van Schaack was first paroled and then left for Massachusetts. After the
war, he returned to Kinderhook. He cited the American oath as the reason he did not join the patriots, as he
previously took a British oath to perform his office. The CDDC notified George Clinton of Van Schaack’s
removal in September 1780. Van Schaack and others later appealed to Clinton to return so they could
administer their affairs. Mathew Goes Jr., Henry Van Schaick, and Daniel Van Schaick to Clinton,
September 17, 1780, and Van Schaaks and Mr. Goes to Clinton, December 23, 1780, PGC, 6:233-234 and
517-518.
186
Peter’s conflicting emotions regarding the Revolution seemed genuine in his 1776 writings debating the
state of the empire and the colonies’ place in government. Van Schaack was elected a member to the
“Committee of safety, correspondence, and protection” for Albany County as the Kinderhook
representative in May 1776. Henry C. Van Schaack, The Life of Peter Van Schaack, LL.D.,: Embracing
Selections from His Correspondence and Other Writings, during the American Revolution, and His Exile in
England (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842), 54-59.
187
He became disheartened with the Revolution over the “irregularities committed by the whigs ‘in the
name of liberty.’” Furthermore, he decreed that, “amidst all the calamities which are incident to mankind,
those attendant upon a civil war are the most grievous, complicated, and extensive.” Van Schaack, The Life
of Peter Van Schaack, 59-62.

  249  
neighbors began suspecting and plotting against him, despite the fact that he did not

actively support the British. As a professed neutral, he earned no friends and lost some of

those closest to him, including CDDC members Egbert Benson and John Jay.

First summoned in June 1776 by his local committee for not signing the General

Association, Van Schaack was labeled a neutral and an enemy. Doing himself no favors,

Peter referred to the New York Provincial Congress and Committee of Safety’s actions a

“violation of all rule under well regulated free governments,” since all branches of

government were embodied in one board.188 Speaking equally unfavorable of the

CDDC’s “arbitrary powers,” Peter confessed his disbelief at how a body “so undefined

and extraordinary, should have been entrusted to a few individuals so jealous of

encroachments.”189 When summoned in December 1776, Peter Van Schaack outright

rejected the oath, declaring that allegiance to a rebel government could be disastrous and

lead to additional hardships if the cause collapsed. Unfortunately for Van Schaack, such

logic held little sway amongst those who already accepted that very risk. In a letter to the

New York Convention, he proposed a number of philosophical and logical questions:

without a state constitution, what institution was he taking an oath to? Who would rule

and how would the government operate? Blurring the issue of loyalty, Van Schaack

concluded, he had the right to align himself with neither side of the conflict. Logical or

                                                                                                               
 
188
Van Schaack, The Life of Peter Van Schaack, 65.
189
MCDDC, 1:39. Peter appeared on a list of four men to be summoned for having “long maintained an
equivocal Neutrality” and needed to answer if they believed themselves subjects of the State or of the King.
If they accepted the oath they would be discharged, if not they would be sent to Boston. Although Van
Schaack petitioned not to appear, he was denied. Writing New York’s Convention, he expressed his
preference for Boston. Lambasting his exile without a trial, he noted despite his appearance before a board
in Albany, he still did not understand how the government viewed him, was he a subject of theirs or not?
Like others, Van Schaack delved into the CDDC’s abuses, malicious suspicions and irregularities brought
on by civil war. Van Schaack, The Life of Peter Van Schaack, 66-71.

  250  
not, the Convention summoned him again, this time paroling him to Kinderhook.190 Still

under surveillance in 1778, he continued to criticize the CDDC’s policy of forced oath-

taking, which to him represented a fear tactic. Believing neutrality a legitimate stance,

Van Schaack attacked the assumption that any man who refused an oath was an enemy.

When not lambasting oaths, Van Schaack reserved his most poignant criticism for the

CDDC’s arbitrary abuse of individual rights.191

The mere extension of oaths to people who refrained from actively taking a stance

was “repugnant,” Van Schaack protested, adding that those in power were delusional if

they believed that “the pretence of public good, however specious, is always a sufficient

reason for severity.” “There are rights of individuals,” he continued, “the infringement of

which even this cannot justify.”192 Van Schaack argued that extending the oath to

“suspicious” men who had done nothing was ironic. If he accepted the oath but

continued to maintain his lifestyle, what did it prove? Although never recognized as a

conspirator, New York deported Van Schaack just before George Clinton realized the

man posed no threat. However, the governor’s letter to the CDDC did not arrive in time.

Even though he possessed former friends in positions of power, in 1778 the CDDC

designated Van Schaack and other so called equivocal persons dangerous.193 Van

Schaack’s neutrality was now obsolete in the CDDC’s world.194

                                                                                                               
190
JPCCS, 2:432.
 
191
“We are called before a board for punishing conspirators, when we are acknowledged to be no
conspirators; before a board unknown to the constitution of this State, to be condemned without a trial, and
to be punished without a crime.” Van Schaack, The Life of Peter Van Schaack, 111-112.
192
Quoting Italian philosopher Marquis Beccaria, Van Schaack wrote “Though punishments be productive
good, they are not on that account more just; to be just they must be necessary.”
193
The author of both Van Schaack brothers’ memoirs, Henry C. Van Schaack (Peter’s son), wrote with a
noticeable anger and highlighted the Revolution’s hypocrisies. Van Schaack the younger never questioned

  251  
 While the Van Schaack brothers articulated arguments of natural rights and railed

against their unjust treatment, others less articulate also petitioned the Convention and

Council of Safety. One group of thirteen imprisoned men petitioned not for their release,

but simply to obtain better treatment. The men inquired as to how the Council of Safety

could decline provisions to impoverished men, which to them seemed “so horrid an

order.”195 Already limited to the confinements of a cell, the befuddled men noted how

even “savages” gave their prisoners food. Promising not to provoke violence, the letter

also expressed an ominous message regarding how both sides perceived their enemy’s

inhumanity. The stigma behind a CDDC apprehension or accusation proved

exceptionally detrimental to the community as well. Even after the CDDC released men

like Silas Gardiner, only 12 hours later his neighbors seized him at his home and dragged

him to a nearby military fort. Once confining him there, the mob sentenced him to

death.196 Men such as Gardiner and the Van Schaacks, although bias, witnessed first

                                                                                                               
the American cause, only the conspiracy boards. The two brothers eventually returned to America, Henry
to Massachusetts and Peter to Kinderhook. While Peter was eventually accepted into the community, Henry
continued voicing controversial messages. Kenney, 183.
194
Both Van Schaacks are well-known, dramatic cases, yet Thomas Menzies’s experience might be more
emblematic of a systematic exclusion. His story spans over three years when in May 1776 his county
committee summoned him. Upon discovering “nothing was Objected to my Conduct,” he wrote Clinton
three years later. The only issue the committee uncovered against him was that he admitted to being paid by
the crown. Menzies was then paroled not to travel to British lines without the local authorities’ consent. In
October, on the CDDC’s orders, his papers were seized and he was dragged to Fishkill. When the CDDC
asked him if he was loyal to the Crown, “it was judged inconsistent with the political Measures of the
State” to allow him to remain and sent him to Massachusetts. Soon returning to New York, he again was
placed on parole. After three years on parole, he desired to leave due to harsh treatment he received from
neighbors and the military. Menzies held a position in the British army and after confined he could not
support his family. Although Clinton sent apprehension orders to the CDDCs, he allowed them to handle
their matters for the most part. Clinton received several petitions from men, like Menzies, sent by the
CDDC to enemy lines. In once instance, residents of the Albany region petitioned for the return of Dr.
Henry Van Dyck because the community suffered. Thomas Menzies to Clinton, August 9, 1779 and
Inhabitants and Freeholders of Albany County to Clinton, September 13, 1779, PGC, 5:184-187 and 274.
195
Petition from Kingston gaol, August 23, 1777 in Woolsey, 129-130.
196
It is unclear what happened to Gardiner. MCDDC, 1:263; Petition of Silas Gardiner: Kingston Gaol,

  252  
hand how the security state treated the accused. However, even the Provincial

Convention agreed that conditions in the jail were unbearable. How did legislators come

to such an epiphany? One of the jails was located directly under the Convention

chamber, and members gasped at how the “unwholesome, and very nauseous and

disagreeable effuvia arises.” On the surface it would appear the politicians were

concerned for inmates’ health, yet in reality they called for the legislative chamber to be

smoked so as to prevent any danger to “the health of the members of this Convention.”197

Curiously, nothing was mentioned about the alleged enemies’ living conditions.

Culmination of the Security State: Albany County

With a population over 42,000, Albany was New York’s largest county and sat at

the crossroads of the Mohawk and Hudson corridor.198 In January 1775, the Albany

Committee of Correspondence (and other various boards) began governing locally,

despite internal threats.199 Targeting first the non-associators and then disaffection more

                                                                                                               
May 9, 1777 and May 16, 1777 in CHMNY, 2:134, 161-162; and Woolsey, 130-131. Stigma also
surrounded Roeloff Eltinge who the CDDC summoned in October 1777 for breaking his parole. Although
this accusation proved untrue, when the British approached Kingston, armed men seized him at his brother-
in-law’s home (despite not breaking the limits of his parole) and arrested him. Perhaps this arrest was due
to his dinner with Cadwallader Colden Jr. For some reason, the CDDC chose not to deport either man, and
both remained on parole. Later in November 1777, he found himself deported, this time to Nine Partners in
Dutchess County. There he and a few loyalists remained so as to limit their influence. He eventually
refused the oath and the CDDC removed him and his family to enemy lines in July 1778. Shefsiek, 36-41.
 
197
The Convention later ordered the men removed. JPCCS, 1:842. The former clerk of the Inferior Court in
Tryon County wrote to Captain Richard Varick (General Philip Schulyer’s secretary) shocked when he
found himself confined with murders. Complaining about the conditions, he wrote in horror of cramped
rooms, only straw to sleep on, and no provisions for days. “The Disagreeable Smell… in this Horrid Place”
will cause illness. Bleeding from his fingers as he wrote his plea, he lamented seeing his own wife
limitedly. Bryan Lefferty to Richard Varick, April 14, 1776, in Crary, The Price of Loyalty, 202-203.
198
Bielinski, 155 and 159. Since 1765, Albany organized against the imperial crisis leading to the
formation of the Albany Committee of Correspondence. Albany contained British supporters and fluid
loyalty. George Rogers Howell and Jonathan Tenney et al., History of the County of Albany, N.Y. from
1609 to 1886 (New York, W.W. Munsell & Co. Publishers, 1886), 393. Howell and Tenney do not mention
the CDDCs.
199
Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence, 1775-1778, Volume I (Albany: The University of

  253  
broadly, by 1776 Albany’s leaders had begun deporting and confining enemies of the

Revolution.200 Perhaps such zeal arose from the large number of New York City patriots

who fled to Albany after the British seized their city. With fighting surrounding the

county throughout the war, Albany’s leaders remained alert. Those outside the city lived

in near constant fear of loyalist raids, and in late 1775, a series of devastating fires in

nearby Schenectady sent refugees into Albany.201 Both the Johnson family’s weakness in

the late 1770s and Burgoyne’s miscalculation regarding the number of active loyalists in

the region notwithstanding, Albany’s leaders believed that threats remained imminent.202

As early as 1776, Albany patriots understood that the future would be difficult, as they

faced scarcities, hoarders, and disorder brought on by Britain’s seizing of New York

City.203 With the enemy so close, throughout 1777 the region confronted the prospect of

invasion and pillaging.

It was in the grip of such fear that on April 4, 1777, the Provincial Convention

received an alarming letter from the Albany Committee. Attesting that banishment

accomplished very little and that “keeping them [disaffected] among us… will prove our

ruin,” county leaders suggested that any thoughts of leniency be abandoned. Assuming

that America’s enemies “insinuate [that] we are afraid to pursue more spirited measures,
                                                                                                               
the State of New York, 1923 and 1925), 1 and 2:1009. The second volume contains the Schenectady
Committee minutes from 1775-1779.
200
While this is a larger point of my dissertation, Bielinski briefly addressed the transition. Bielinski, 160.
 
201
Bielinski, 163. Clinton and others desired production to resume. While Bielinski noted a level of
normalcy in the early state years, this would not last.
202
Bielinski, 164-165. Bielinski incorrectly believed loyalists had been largely neutralized by 1776 or fled.
Despite such a claim, he recognized Albany Commission was instrumental in the region.
203
Bielinski, 160-161. Despite the influx of patriots, places such as Kinderhook remained divided and
unreliable. Edward C. Collier, A History of Old Kinderhook… (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1914),
165-170.

  254  
and assure their hearers the affair will soon be settled,” the Albany Committee suggested

more aggressive tactics.204 With jails filled and banishment no longer deemed an

adequate response, the committee suggested that the Convention “strike [a] terror” in the

hearts of the disaffected by sending loyalist prisoners to French vessels.205 Albany had

long been a hotbed of coercion, among both patriots and the disaffected.206 It is unclear if

the Congress agreed with this motion, yet the government had already begun sending

suspicious and accused persons aboard the Fleet Prison. The New York Convention’s

continued support of committees for public safety demonstrated the legislature’s

adherence to such terror-based tactics. With Burgoyne supposedly targeting Albany, the

New York Convention understood that action was needed.207 By October 1777, the

British even possessed a strong foothold in the Hudson Valley, which allowed them to

raid towns along the river.208 Westchester, Tarrytown, and Peekskill frequently

experienced British attacks.209

On behalf of Albany, Council of Safety member Pierre Van Cortlandt pled to

Governor Clinton that although patriotic Albany residents had attempted to suppress “the

                                                                                                               
204
JPCCS, 1:875-876.
 
205
The Albany Committee presumed if disaffected “neighbors were exchanged for…their sailors” the state
would gain loyal men and remove threats. Such a tactic would “strike a terror in others.”
206
Colonel John Williams notified George Clinton the CDDC believed the enemy planned to rally the
disaffected near Ticonderoga in April 1778. Patriots like Williams and Clinton both thought the CDDC
operated efficiently and would guide the state during the chaotic period. John Williams to Clinton, April
25, 1778 and John Williams to Clinton, May 4, 1778 PGC, 3:213-214 and 264.
207
Philip Ranlet, The New York Loyalists (New York: University Press of America, 1986), 94. Burgoyne
hoped to rally British supporters.
208
Guerilla war continued in Westchester throughout the war and after Cornwallis’ surrender. Judd, 120-
122.
209
Judd, 120.

  255  
Insurrections of the disaffected…little can be expected from them unless the Tories are

overawed by the appearance of immediate Force.”210 Despite the pressing need for

another CDDC, the final installment was delayed. Even though Egbert Benson

introduced a bill in fall 1777, a British attack on Fort Montgomery in October forced

many legislators and their families to flee Albany.211 That same month, Clinton spoke

from Kingston, reiterating the dire straits the fledgling state faced. Invasions “on the

northern and western frontiers, and the prospect of an attack by General Howe, on the

fortress in the highlands” had forced him to suspend the legislature. Praising the militias

and military leaders’ efforts, the governor also applauded the Council of Safety’s

“abilities and integrity” administrating the government.212 The entire legislature did not

meet again until late January, when it immediately took up a bill to create a new

CDDC.213

On February 5, 1778, the New York Senate and Assembly passed a law spawning

a commission for “enquiring into, detecting and defeating all Conspiracies… against the

Liberties of America.”214 No doubt these efforts were somewhat connected to the state

                                                                                                               
210
In a second letter, Van Cortlandt sounded even more fearful. Pierre Van Cortlandt to Clinton, August
13, 1777 PGC, 2:218; Spaulding, 127; and Kaminski, 110.
 
211
See: Votes and Proceedings of the Senate of the State of New-York, at their first session…, (Fish-Kill:
Samuel Loundon, 1777-1779), 18, 24-25, 44, and 54. EC, Series I, 15480.
212
Without naming the Council of Safety, Clinton clearly meant the executive body. Speech before the
Legislature, September 10, 1777, The Speeches of the Different Governors to the Legislature of the State of
New-York: Commencing with those of George Clinton, and Continued Down to the Present Time (Albany:
J.B. Van Steenbergh, 1825), 2.
213
Kammen correctly noted that in January 1778 Albany County relaxed some of its harsh measures (once
again allowing residents to take an oath and remain), this was only the beginning, not the end, of
surveillance. Kammen suggested that after the victory at Saratoga the patriots demonstrated a “swagger,”
which allowed them to openly recruit people to rejoin the community. Kammen, 159-160 and Minutes of
the Albany Committee, 1775-1778, 876 and 902.
214
Those residents who withheld information faced similar stern punishments. The Albany CDDC

  256  
government’s desire for Albany to revive long-dormant agricultural production.215 Citing

the current invasion as well as past boards’ success, the legislature empowered the

governor to appoint up to ten commissioners, though he himself would not serve on the

new CDDC.216 Given his previous record, it should come as little surprise that Clinton

was involved in this last incarnation of the CDDC.217 Desiring first and foremost the

protection of New York, Clinton willingly endorsed another controversial CDDC.218 It is

likely Clinton saw the CDDCs as a means for creating an ever more powerful state.

Depicted as “absolute and despotic” in Ulster, loyalists had feared Clinton since the

conflict’s outset.219 The decision to grant CDDC members extra-legislative authority

                                                                                                               
(ACDDC) searched homes, secured money and goods, and returned supposedly stolen property. For
example, the Commissioners ordered Lenah Cronkheydt apprehended after rumors she possessed silver
shoe buckles not her own. After robberies on the eastern Hudson became “intolerable,” Commissioners
ordered ranger Captain Jacob DeForest to apprehend and search “in every suspected House for Papers &
stolen Goods.” Furthermore, all suspected strangers also were to be apprehended. See: Paltsits, Volume I,
128 and 181. For laws against robberies see: Laws of the State of New-York, commencing with the first
session of the Senate and Assembly, after the Declaration of Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie:
John Holt, Printer to the State, 1782), 81-82, 125-126, 144, 149, and 215. EC, Series I, 17630. Robbery
laws became stricter and by November 1781 accessories to robbery were subjected to death.
215
Bielinski, 163. Much work was needed to get Albany back on its feet, including, fixing mills and
tanneries as well as building workhouses and hiring weavers.
216
Laws of the State of New-York, commencing with the first session of the Senate and Assembly, after the
Declaration of Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, Printer to the State, 1782), 6-7. EC,
Series I, 17630. The governor appointed members with the advice of the Council of Appointments. The
new board only needed three members to meet quorum. It also had the power to draw up to £5,000. CDDC
members were paid 20 shillings a day for their services.
217
Clinton endorsed punishing loyalists with land confiscation so as to aid yeomen who served in the war.
Clinton later employed excessive force to establish order during Shays Rebellion. Kaminski, 4 and 7.
218
Kaminski, 62-63. Robert Venables claimed in Tryon County the local committee distrusted the 1778
CDDC, since the governor appointed it. Tryon leaders felt the new board would be filled with wealthy and
moderate men. Venables, 189.
219
Loyalist Thomas Jones compared Clinton to the King of France and as “cruel and arbitrary as the Grand
Turk.” Jones contended, the governor “tried, condemned, imprisoned and punished Loyalists most
unmercifully” to instill conformity. Clinton was strict in regards to pardons and travel permits to alleged
enemies’ wives. However, some loyalists, such as Colden, appreciated Clinton’s just treatment. Some
historians argued Clinton’s draconian methods eased over the years, but early on were fairly harsh. Jones,
2:327-328; Spaulding, 109-110; and Kaminski, 19.
 

  257  
likely only intensified their misgivings. Since the governor now directly appointed

commissioners, its extreme powers were even more controversial and Albany County

would soon gain firsthand knowledge of how a culture of suspicion and surveillance

operated.220

For the most part, the Albany County Commission for Detecting and Defeating

Conspiracies (ACDDC) operated much as earlier CDDCs, but on a more local level.221

Similar to other executives, the ACDDC received its incredible powers for short intervals

as the times dictated.222 Clinton soon wrote to Albany’s local patriot committee stressing

the ACDDC’s significance and promised to appoint men for “this Important Trust.”223

                                                                                                               
220
Most ACDDC members sat on other committees dealing with disaffection and held positions (such as
judges, county clerks, coroners, etc). For example, Egbert Benson was a member of the Assembly, an
attorney, a solicitor, and advocate of the State. Members came from seven counties and while each
Commissioner had jurisdiction over the whole state, they generally sat only in their home county. Finally,
each county had a main board (for example in Albany County, the main board sat in Albany) as well as
minor boards (in Stillwater and Saratoga). Members frequently changed in Albany: John M. Beeckman,
Egbert Benson, Peter Cantine, Jr., Stewart Dean, Isaac D. Fonda, Cornelius Humfrey, John McClung,
James McMaster, Hugh Mitchell, Reyneir Mynderse, Samuel Stringer, Jeremiah Stringer, Jeremiah Van
Rensselaer, Mathew Visscher, William Wills, and Petrus Wynkoop, Jr. The most active members were
Beeckman, Fonda, Van Rensselaer, and Visscher. Paltsits, 1:35.
221
Robberies, murder, and “speaking words…in the Opinion of the Board might have a dangerous
Tendency & prove detrimental to the Liberties of America” all remained prevalent crimes. The Assembly
created a new law against counterfeiting in March 1778, just before creating the ACDDC, making it a
felony without the benefit of clergy. By November 1781, it was also illegal to counterfeit French currency.
The next year the law extended to passing fraudulent bills of the Bank of North America. Some such as
Henry Dawkins, arrested and imprisoned for counterfeiting, even hoped the state would terminate his
distress by putting him to death. Laws of the State of New-York, commencing with the first session of the
Senate and Assembly, after the Declaration of Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt,
Printer to the State, 1782), 60, 210, and 236-237. EC, Series I, 17630; and Petition of Henry Dawkins,
October 19, 1776 in NYPCCSP, Box 4, folder 8, petition 33:74, NYSA. In regards to sedition in July 1778,
Daniel Campbell and James Ellice stood accused of verbally threatening the cause. Both refused the oath,
but a year later accepted it. Paltsits, 1:101-103. Historian Alice Kenney believed 400 of the 1,200 persons
captured in Albany County had Dutch surnames. Although many who appeared were merchants, only one
Dutch merchant, Mayor Abraham Cuyler, was arrested. She suggested, Albany Dutch closed ranks “and
used it as a weapon to expel unwanted intruders upon their civic privileges.” Kenney, 181.
222
In April, the last revision to the law enlarged the Commission to 20 members. Laws of the State of New-
York, commencing with the first session of the Senate and Assembly, after the Declaration of
Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, Printer to the State, 1782), 29-30. EC, Series I,
17630.
223
Clinton expressed his desire to forbid potentially dangerous persons to go at large and promised to be

  258  
Just days after the legislature passed a law once again calling for the removal of

“disaffected and dangerous Persons and Families” who threatened “public Safety,” the

ACDDC commenced its work.224 Immediately, it notified local boards to not only

provide alleged enemies’ names and crimes, but also to stop enforcing laws against the

disaffected, as this was now the ACDDC’s jurisdiction.225 Utterly convinced that

Albany had been thoroughly infested with dangerous people, ACDDC member Matthew

Visscher informed Albany representatives that the state’s efforts would be exceptionally

difficult. Based on information provided to him by a group of rangers who had

interrogated local inhabitants, Visscher solemnly reported that calling on the militia to

prevent such machinations would only alarm their enemies. Only “the greatest Secrecy

and Dispatch” would save the state.226

After the legislature’s 1778 passage of an anti-neutrality act designed to “more

effectually prevent the Mischiefs, arising from the Influence and Example of Persons of

equivocal and suspected Characters,” the ACDDC sprang into action, extending the oath

to equivocal and neutral men.227 Though many refused the oath, the ACDDC claimed

that neutrality represented nothing more than “Poverty of Spirit,” and the legislature

                                                                                                               
stricter. Clinton to Chairman of Albany Committee, March 8, 1778, PGC, 2:876-879.
 
224
These people threatened security due to their character or current location. Laws of the State of New-
York, commencing with the first session of the Senate and Assembly, after the Declaration of
Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, Printer to the State, 1782), 25. EC, Series I, 17630.
225
Paltsits, 1:43. The ACDDC frequently advised other boards, instructed frugality, and ordered them to
demonstrate humanity when removing families. Historian Victor Paltsits argued this tactic was aimed at
wrestling power from zealot patriots and placing authority in legal institutions.
226
Matthew Visscher to Albany County members of the Legislature, June 20, 1778, NYSL.
227
Some people might have returned and took the oath later on. For men like John Van Alen, the ACDDC
gave additional time to consider the oath. While he later refused, others eventually accepted. Paltsits,
1:171-172 and 188-190.
 

  259  
believed that such inhabitants plotted to betray their neighbors and break any paroles or

agreements. Not only did these people threaten stability, but also they could easily

manipulate those “weak minded Persons” around them into joining the enemy’s ranks.228

Demanding that justice be served to those who garnered the state’s benefits yet refused to

serve, lawmakers handed neutrals’ fate to the newly created ACDDC.

To accomplish its legislative mandate to extend the oath to “all such Persons, of

neutral and equivocal Characters,” the ACDDC employed armed rangers.229 Anyone

who refused would be exiled to enemy lines, and if caught attempting to return would be

“judged guilty of Misprison of Treason.”230 Commencing its work immediately, after

                                                                                                               
228
Laws of the State of New-York, commencing with the first session of the Senate and Assembly, after the
Declaration of Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, Printer to the State, 1782), 43-44. EC,
Series I, 17630. Before removing a person, the ACDDC notified the governor to possibly procure an
exchange.
229
For the ACDDC, dangerous and equivocal behavior extended to Quakers, Shakers, and women. New
laws placed Quakers under scrutiny to affirm their allegiance. Clinton refused to accept Quakers’ excuses
as they “have already given us so much trouble & have it in their Power to do us much Mischief under the a
specious Cloak of Religion.” Laws of the State of New-York, commencing with the first session of the
Senate and Assembly, after the Declaration of Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt,
Printer to the State, 1782), 25. EC, Series I, 17630; and Governor Clinton Suspicious of Quakers and So
Informs General Heath, November 10, 1781, PGC, 7:495-496. After Shakers three Shakers were captured
by an angry mob while conveying their sheep from New Lebanon to Niskayuna they were brought before a
local justice of the peace charged with treason. Their sheep were seized and the men were sent to the
ACDDC. Ann Standerren, known as Mother Ann, the pacifist leader of the Shakers sent men to act as their
brothers’ witness. Though denying the charges of treason and aiding the enemy, the board jailed the men
and issued additional warrants. Responding to neighbors’ complaints, the ACDDC called for the arrest of
John Patherton, William Lees, and Standerren in July 1780. ACDDC Door Keeper John Kidney also
arrested three others. Upon Kidney’s arrival, Mother Ann bemoaned to her followers, “The wicked are
plotting against us; they mean to drive us away from this place; and it is unknown to me whether I shall
ever see you again in this world.” The ACDDC suspected the Shakers of polluting minds. While the
ACDDC initially released several Shakers on bail, Mother Ann remained confined. Clinton eventually
released her after four months. He stated, “the said Persuasion have been reformed and that no further Evil
is to be apprehended from her Influence or Example.” Richard Francis, Ann the Word: The Story of Ann
Lee, Female Messiah, Mother of the Shakers, the Woman Clothed with the Sun (New York: Arcade
Publishing, 2000), 143-151; Paltsits, 2:591-592; Stephen J. Stein, The Shaker Experience in America: A
History of the United Society of Believers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 13-14; and George
Clinton to James Clinton, November 19, 1780, PGC, 6:420-421.
230
Under the June 30, 1778 test oath law, if anyone refused the oath, the ACDDC published their names
and summoned them. If they did not deliver themselves, it was assumed they rejected it. Any land held by
the state, “in Fee Simple or Fee Tail, or which may hereafter be acquired by, or devised, granted, or
descend to any of the Persons who shall refuse to take the aforesaid Oath or Affirmation, when called upon

  260  
only six months the legislature chose to continue the ACDDC.231 To aid Commissioners,

in November 1778 the legislature created a Night Watch in Albany, Charlotte, Dutchess,

Tryon, and Ulster counties.232 Any militia officer could summon a Night Watch, which

was typically composed of eight men.233 The ACDDC was not directly in charge of these

men, but Night Watches monitored and apprehended allegedly suspicious persons. Later

on, the Commission lobbied to obtain a group of rangers, which constituted the physical

embodiment of its power. In a letter to Governor Clinton, Abraham Yates Jr. argued for

the need for “a parcel of light militia (Rangers) in this [Albany] and Tryon County.”234

Use of rangers began in May 1778, when the ACDDC commissioned Captain John Ryley

“for the Purpose of ranging about the Woods and doing Services as should be

requested.”235 Such an ominously vague mandate certainly conjured up images of slave

patrols. However frightening the rangers appeared to residents, the ACDDC commended

                                                                                                               
by the said Commissioners, shall forever thereafter, be charged with double Taxes.” Some like Israh
Sanford from Massachusetts were exiled under this order as a person “who pretend that they are restrained
by their religious principles to take up Arms.” Others such as James Patherton of Nestageune were
confined. Paltsits, 1:167-168.
231
Laws of the State of New-York, commencing with the first session of the Senate and Assembly, after the
Declaration of Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, Printer to the State, 1782), 44-45. EC,
Series I, 17630.
232
By October 1779, the Night Watch was extended to Orange and Westchester counties. Laws of the State
of New-York, commencing with the first session of the Senate and Assembly, after the Declaration of
Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, Printer to the State, 1782), 46-47 and 80-81. EC,
Series I, 17630. Due to imperative situation, New York’s leaders knew legislation had to go into effect.
Leonard Gansevoort to John Ten Broeck, October 15, 1778 in Leonard Gansevoort Papers, 1778-1799 Box
1, folder 1, NYSL.
233
All able-bodied men between the ages of 16-60 were eligible, with few exceptions.
234
Abraham Yates to Clinton, April 16, 1778, PGC, 3:184. General James Clinton, after discussing with
the ACDDC, also supported hiring rangers to remove the disaffected to the enemies’ lines or the frontier.
James Clinton to George Clinton, April 15, 1779, PGC, 4:735.
235
After taking an oath, each man was paid 6 shillings a day and one ration of provisions. Paltsits, 1:111-
112.
 

  261  
the “Valor & Patriotism” with which they hunted their neighbors. Within a month,

Ryley’s rangers had produced results, apprehending alleged Hessian deserters, robbers,

inhabitants traveling without a pass, and men accused of general disaffection.236 It

appears that rangers operated both on orders and their own initiative. While Ryley’s

reign ended a short time later, the ACDDC employed several ranger contingents. Despite

the similarities, two aspects above all others separated the ACDDC from previous boards.

The two main differences between the ACDDC and previous bodies was the use

of monetary recognizances for alleged enemies’ future good behavior and regular

appearance before the ACDDC.237 Even inhabitants who lived in areas previously held

by the enemy remained under suspicion and were forced to enter a recognizance

agreement. Generally, an inhabitant of good standing would vouch for their neighbor.

For example, John Becker’s father provided a “security” for a dissenting teacher and

thereby saved him from the “horrors of confinement.”238 Even when the only evidence

against an individual was suspicion of their having been in contact with the enemy, as

was true for William Reside and William McAuley, the ACCDC forced residents into

recognizance for future good behavior and ordered their monthly appearances before the

                                                                                                               
236
Paltsits, 1:159, 168-169, 251. The ACDDC encouraged other local boards to raise armed men as well.
The Commissioners even applied to have additional continental troops placed under Ryley’s command.
237
Recognizances ranged from £20-£5,000. Most recognizances were £100 yet it does not seem that the
crime reflected the amount. Instead possibly the number was reflective of the person’s wealth or standing.
Early in the ACDDC’s existence it requested those men placed on recognizance make monthly
appearances. Later on, most suspects had to appear when summoned. Some like Dr. George Smith, accused
of aiding alleged spy Peter Cohoon travel, was bound to a recognizance, confined to his house, and forced
to enter a recognizance to remain in the city. Smith also could not hold “Correspondence upon Political
Matters” that might harm the state. He appeared several times and had been previously limited solely to his
home and yard. Strict paroles were meant to enhance monitoring. Paltsits, 2:550 and 561.
238
Becker, 79. Becker’s family fled several dangerous areas. Only a child during the Revolution, Becker
highlighted the civil war nature of the conflict, the fear that defined the period, hospitality showed amongst
strangers and his mother’s impressive leadership role.
 

  262  
board. Not only were these men and others each held to a £200 recognizance, but they

also required someone to vouch for them and provide a £100 bail.239 Few were those

who eluded the ACDDC’s recognizance dragnet. As proof of the weight it placed on

recognizances, consider the fact that in the summer of 1780, the ACDDC demanded that

all accused and previously summoned New Yorkers enter into new recognizance

agreements.240

On the surface, the use of recognizance appears to have been more lenient and

less coercive than previous measures, yet in reality this was not the case. Rather than

imprison these people in overcrowded jails or send them out of state, those men accused

of general disaffection remained always under the veil of suspicion. As an example of

this tendency, consider the experience of Henry Van Hining, who had been accused of

enlisting with the British. After “several Principle Inhabitants” convinced the

Commissioners that Van Hining had actually aided American scouts during the previous

campaign, he was offered and accepted a loyalty oath.241 However, while neither exiled

nor confined, Van Hining remained under suspicion, as the ACDDC forced him to enter

                                                                                                               
239
It is unclear what this recognizance actually meant. Edward Countryman suggested an individual could
not have paid such exorbitant bails or recognizances and more likely the community helped defray
expenses. He offered little evidence and suggested neighbors might have turned to patriots. I argue based
on other examples, a recognizance was not paid at the moment but more likely was a surety that an
individual forfeited if they broke the terms of discharge. Such forfeiture would mean the loss of real or
personal property. The legislature stipulated that a person who appeared before the ACDDC could not be
released or allowed bail by any judge or magistrate. Bail was another method to incorporate the entire
community. By providing bail, you accepted responsibility for an alleged enemy. While at times paid by
family, bail bondsman also became involved. When Archibald McNeal violated his recognizance, the
ACDDC ordered his bailsman, Thomas Shipboy, to bring him for questioning. By employing
recognizances, sureties, and bail, the CDDCs engaged the entire community to police itself. Countryman, A
People in Revolution, 121-122 and Paltsits, 1:82 and 2:769-771.
240
Of course, like other executives, many people were released after long confinements when “nothing
special having as yet appeared against him.” After a 40-day confinement, William Leonard of Claverack
was discharged. Paltsits, 1:221 and 261.
241
Paltsits, 1:83.
 

  263  
into a recognizance agreement and to appear before the board on a monthly basis. As this

example suggests, despite his professed and demonstrated loyalty to the state, Van Hining

was still not part of the community. Without proof, the ACDDC seemed less likely to

hold alleged disaffected persons, but was nevertheless unwilling to allow them to return

to the community unblemished. Since the ACDDC operated on local level, such a stigma

was even more damning. Hearsay, accusations, and suspicion were even more

dangerous, as is evident in the dramatic tale of Samuel McFarlan.242

McFarlan found himself labeled “a Person of a Suspicious Character,” and as

such was brought before the Commissioners. Under interrogation, McFarlan stated that

he had formerly held a position in the Continental Army and asserted that others could

vouch for his discharge. Informing the inquisitorial civil servants that he had recently

been a prisoner of the enemy in New York City, McFarlan claimed he escaped.243 Prone

to trust their instincts and not the pleas from the suspicious, the Commissioners ordered

him confined. After searching him, $150 dollars and his silver watch were lifted from his

person “by way of a security” that he remain in custody until a final decision could be

determined. About a month later, word came that McFarlan escaped jail with the aid of a

man named Stephen Van Dyck, whom the ACDDC immediately labeled disaffected and

ordered apprehended as well.

                                                                                                               
242
Petitions and accusations were common. For example, when the people of German Flats desired justice
against Rudolph Shoemaker, George Clinton suggested they speak with the ACDDC “whose Duty it is to
have apprehended & confined” dangerous persons. Clinton stated he would not doubt “that on a proper
representation made to them they will do what is proper.” Apparently Shoemaker and others stood accused
of “being infected with that poison, he never has done any good to our Cause” and consorted with the
enemy. Discouraging men from marching, Shoemaker allegedly told them to lay down their arms and seek
British protection. In response residents raided his goods. A Delegate from German Flats to Clinton, April
22, 1779 and Clinton to John Bellinger, April 26, 1779, PGC, 4:746-749 and 760.
243
McFarlan also claimed he delivered communications between William Livingston and General
McDugall. The Commissioners sent a letter of inquiry requesting information. Paltsits, 1:355-356, 359-360,
394, 397-398, 402, 404, 413, and 426.

  264  
 Days later, McFarlan remained on the Commissioners’ obsessed minds. Soon they

came across a certain Walter Norris, who possessed “Intelligence with Respect to the

[details]” of McFarlan’s miraculous escape. As Norris had it, a man named Jeremiah

Johnson had provided crucial aid to McFarlan. At this point the web of hearsay became

even more cloudy, as Johnson denied abetting McFarlan and instead named John McDole

and Alexander McElhany as the true culprits “harbouring and Secreting” the fugitive.

Exonerating McElhany and a certain Jonathan Pettit after examining them, the ACDDC

still had no answer. Two months later, the ACDDC was back where it began, as

Commissioner Jeremiah Van Renselaer once again suggested that McFarlan’s accomplice

had been Stephen Van Dyck.

Such charades did not end with Van Renselaer’s retreading of old accusations.

Miraculously (or rather, ironically), the examinations of Morris, Johnson, and McElhany

finally aligned, as all three men testified that McFarlan’s accomplice had been John

McDole. At this point, the ACDDC also began referring to McFarlan as a spy.

Appearing before the ACDDC, McDole denied the charges, but was forced into a

recognizance and told to appear at court. While the result of McDole’s trial is uncertain,

McFarlan’s fate is clear. Almost five months after his original apprehension, the

ACDDC’s minutes unceremoniously note that McFarlan reappeared before the board and

delivered his proper credentials for an official discharge. No doubt this must have been a

triumphal moment for McFarlan, as he had returned to the very same inquisitorial board

that had nearly condemned him as a spy. Finally able to prove his loyalty, McFarlan

must have taken pride in refuting the Commissioners’ wild and unsupported accusations

of disloyalty. While the ACDDC desperately desired to catch McFarlan, its methods and

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willingness to indulge in hysteria and hearsay to label him an enemy demonstrates the

fact that the Commissioners had little intentions of allowing the accused to simply re-

reintegrate into society.

Final Days of the Security State?

After almost eight months operating under the June 30, 1778 law against neutrals

and equivocal persons, on February 17, 1779 the legislature called for “common

Charity.” Realizing a devastating message had been sent, it resolved that anyone who

refused the oath but chose to recant their stubborn disloyalty could appear before the

Commissioners and swear allegiance.244 Even after this latest display of supposed

leniency, the ACDDC continued effectively issuing recognizances, both to residents

accused of disaffection and to men deemed innocent. This is not to say that every person

who appeared before the Commission was forced into a recognizance, as many still found

themselves confined, even for a short period. However, it is clear the Commissioners

preferred recognizances in most cases, especially in instances of alleged robberies and of

aiding the enemy.245

                                                                                                               
244
Laws of the State of New-York, commencing with the first session of the Senate and Assembly, after the
Declaration of Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, Printer to the State, 1782), 49. EC,
Series I, 17630. See also Votes and Proceedings of the Senate of the State of New-York, at their first session
held at Kingston…, (Fish-Kill: Samuel Loudon, 1777), 165-166, 168, 172, 175-176 and 178. EC, Series I,
15480. Although there was some debate from Senators Richard Morris and Ebenezer Russell regarding
delivering the Commission additional funds, the Senate allowed it an additional £3,000. The dissenting
senators contended that no additional money should be given until an accurate account of prior funds was
presented. The legislature also once again extended the Commission.
245
The minutes are not always detailed, but at times those men most vocally denying the ACDDC’s
legitimacy and those accused of taking arms were confined. However, some were released on good
behavior. In many cases, part of the recognizance was to appear if summoned or to appear at a later court
date. See for example the case of Lowrance Deal, John Garret and John Coenly (all farmers from
Cooksakie District) who had to agree to a £100 recognizance and have someone provide a £100 bail. Both
parties also had to concede to the recognizance’s stipulations and a court date. Paltsits, 2:578-579.
 

  266  
 Fear continued to grip the area, and by 1780, the ACDDC had subjected a

majority of people to such recognizances.246 No doubt the continued British and Native

American raids after Saratoga contributed to patriots’ anxiety.247 It is logical to conclude

that the Commission and state government issued recognizances because of their tangible

benefits, alleged disaffected persons either obeyed the laws or left the new state,

forfeiting their property in the process.248 Either way, this tactic was less about

reintegrating inhabitants and more about inculcating a culture of fear and labeling

dissenters as outsiders. Tellingly, as the ACDDC’s existence neared its end, its use of the

oath drastically decreased. Considering that the CDDC’s previous modus operandi had

been to issue oaths, such a decrease suggests as the war neared conclusion, the

Commissioners no longer sought reintegration.249 However, this was not an end to

                                                                                                               
246
The Commission expired in October 1779 but the Assembly’s records do not divulge any reason for
allowing it to lapse only to then be revived soon after. The Votes and Proceedings of the Assembly (Fish-
Kill: Samuel Loudon, 1780), 117. EC, Series 1, 43853. Like the other revival laws, this one continued the
Commission until twenty days after the next legislative session met and delivered it the power to draw up
to £4,000 from the treasury. The act also justified the “Acts, Matters and Things” the Commission had done
when it continued to operate past the law’s expiration. Finally, the law empowered the Council of
Appointment to remove and appoint Commissioners. For a first hand account of the fear in Saratoga during
this period see: Becker, 179-195. There are variations between editions and the pagination is off.
247
Bielinski, 166. Sir John Johnson personally led assaults into Schoharie. Leading patriots, such as Philip
Schuyler, feared they or their families might be kidnapped. Certainly influenced by not only the political
atmosphere in New York but also perhaps the rise of the CDDCs, Schuyler wrote Alexander Hamilton that,
“A Spirit favorable to the common cause has pervaded almost both houses, they begin to talk of a dictator
and vice dictators, as if it was a thing that was already determined on. To the Convention to be held at
Hartford I believe I shall be sent with Instructions to propose that a Dictator should be appointed.” Philip
Schuyler to Hamilton, September 16, 1780, ed. Harold C. Syrett The Papers of Alexander Hamilton Digital
Edition (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2011).
248
The ACDDC also issued passes to travel, especially to enemy lines. Passes were no forgone conclusion,
as many women were refused. Politicians such as Connecticut Governor Jonathan Trumbull argued that
removing women and children to the enemy aided the “Ease and Safety of the State.” On July 28, 1779, the
Commissioners ordered no passes would be given unless voted on by three members. Well into 1780,
Clinton still consulted the ACDDC regarding defense of the northern and western parts of the state. Clinton
to the Albany Commission for Conspiracies, July 24, 1780, PGC, 6:45.
249
The decrease in oaths of allegiance also included a decrease in oaths to deliver information or to
withhold intelligence from the enemy. When extended the oath, some like Benjamin Baker proclaimed, “he
would perjure himself and that none but Rogues and Fools would or could take it.” Paltsits, 1:177-179.

  267  
coercive executive power against dissent. In March 1781, the legislature passed a law to

“more effectively… punish Adherence to the King of Great-Britain,” which made those

remaining residents who supported the British guilty of high treason. Any language that

promoted the Crown’s authority was thoroughly suppressed, and those who convinced

neighbors not to deliver their allegiance to the state found themselves subjected to

punishment without the benefit of clergy.250 Even amidst its growing influence, the

ACDDC’s controversial reign would not last forever.

By February 1781, complaints about the Commissioners had begun to reach the

legislature.251 In response to the state’s already long history of coercive and powerful

executive bodies, a Dutchess County committee of 23 men filed a list of grievances, one

specifically relating to the CDDCs. Seven days later, Albany County residents declared

that the “Star Chamber Court of commissioners for detecting & defeating conspiracies

ought to be abolished” and replaced by local civil magistrates and field officers.252 Other

common petitions similarly argued that matters of dissent and disunity were best left in

                                                                                                               
250
Laws of the State of New-York, commencing with the first session of the Senate and Assembly, after the
Declaration of Independence…anno 1777 (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, Printer to the State, 1782), 189. EC,
Series I, 17630.
251
As early as October 1778, Clinton grew angry with the ACDDC for disobeying orders. Horrified to
discover the mistreatment of prisoners, the governor wrote, “State Prisoners are not now treated with the
same Degree of rigor which they formerly experienced, and it is not my Desire to increase the Distress of
Individuals by Close & rigorous Confinement.” Confinement should be reserved only as a last resort, as
parole was preferred. The governor also disciplined the ACDDC for deporting people without notifying
him first, as he hoped to procure exchanges. After Clinton lambasted the board, it contacted him regularly.
For example of Clinton and the ACDDC discussing exchanges see: Clinton to Albany Commission for
Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies, August 12, 1778 and Albany Commission for Detecting and
Defeating Conspiracies to Clinton, August 15, 1778, PGC, 3:627 and 640; and Clinton to Albany
Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies, September 20, 1778, and Clinton: Leniency to be
shown prisoners…, October 26, 1778, PGC, 4:58 and 206-207.
252
Assembly Papers – Miscellaneous, Volume 2, 18 and 38 in Paltsits, 1:27. For other complaints see:
Votes and Proceedings of the Senate, & c. At the second meeting of the fourth session (Poughkeepsie: John
Holt, 1783), 43. EC, Series I, 44424.

  268  
the hands of communities and their elected officials. Recognizing that grievances were

piling up, a joint committee of the Senate and Assembly investigated existing complaints

against the CDDCs. The first line of the committee’s report declared that “Government

is without Corruption,” and demonstrated the legislature’s unwillingness to succumb to

democratic impulses. Preaching patience with the new regime on issues such as taxation

and debt, the Senate eventually discussed the controversial inquisitorial board.

The extraordinary Powers given to Commissioners for defeating Conspiracies,

may undoubtedly be justified by our peculiar Situation, and by the Practice of all
Nations under similar Circumstances. On this Occasion… [we ask] whether it is
not absolutely necessary, to be attentive to their [enemies of state] Motions, to
compare Intelligence received from different Quarters, to counteract the various
Machinations…to subjugate us to British Tyranny…[although] you conceived
their Proceedings may, in some Instances, have been improper…that on a more
serious Consideration, you, as Friends to your Country, will be impressed with the
Necessity of such Powers, and that they will be obnoxious to none but the
Disaffected.253

The Senate’s message was clear: while patriotic residents had nothing to fear from

coercive and extraordinarily threatening boards, anyone who questioned the board might

be exiled from the community. The legislature’s strong words had limited effects.

Petitions contended that the CDDCs’ very nature violated the purpose of the constitution,

which “declares the civil and military authority sufficient to govern the People, where

each Subject may have a fair and impartial Trial by Jury; That grand Bulwark is here

taken away by that Board of Commissioners or otherwise may be deem’d a Tribunal with

absolute and despotic Power.”254 After receiving such damning petitions, in March 1782,

                                                                                                               
253
Votes and Proceedings of the Senate, & c. At the second meeting of the fourth session (Poughkeepsie:
John Holt, 1783), 72-76. EC, Series I, 44424. The Senate promised to review the Commissions’ minutes,
but was not terminating it. On the other hand, a petition from the militia at Rensselaerwyck Manor, in light
of alleged disaffected persons, called for the Commissioners to be given additional power to exile their
neighbors to serve on a fleet. Rensselaerwyck Manor inhabitants held no scruples limiting their neighbors’
rights to provide security. Assembly Journal, 1781 (Albany, 1820) 50 in Paltsits, 1:29.
 
254
By early 1782, a Westchester petition signed by 215 people contained similar complaints calling the

  269  
an Assembly subcommittee recommended repealing the Commissioners. However, the

bill did not progress quickly.255 On March 27, 1783 an act to repeal the CDDCs finally

passed.256 Commissioners relinquished recognizances to the clerk of the Court of

General Sessions of the Peace of the County.257 A list of all men confined with their

alleged crimes would also be turned over to local justices of the peace. Essentially,

justices of the peace now possessed the right to apprehend and send to court any person

coming from enemy territory, thus ending the period of New York’s revolutionary era

committees for public safety.

Conclusion
By 1782, even the hated printer James Rivington realized that British victory

seemed unlikely. At some point, the man once burned in effigy now placed his

allegiance, albeit secretively, with the Americans. Reconciled to living in New York’s

security state, Rivington delivered a public apology. Hoping his neighbors would “look

over past errors and depend on future correctness,” Rivington echoed the same rhetoric

                                                                                                               
Commissioners “a dead Cost to the Public and entirely unnecessary” at this point in the war. While the
CDDCs served their purpose early on, the community itself along with civil and military figures could
prevent disaffection. Around that same time, Commissioners in Westchester stated “some persons…
Clamourous as to their powers” complained about the “Continuing in the Exercise of the office of
Commissioner, it being a very disagreeable task and Subject to Aspersions.” The Commissioners desired
the legislature know the situation and recognized the boards’ significance. Assembly Papers –
Miscellaneous, Vol. 2, 294-312 in Paltsits, 1:30.
255
The subcommittee also recommended permitting two justices of the peace to release men who deserted
from the enemy. At first the bill was tabled and did not pass. In January 1783, a joint committee
investigated the state of prisoners, expenditures, receipts, and the Commissioners’ activities. The joint
committee asked for a list of recognizances including those forfeited. Throughout February and into March,
the bill moved through the legislative process until March 25, 1783. Votes and Proceedings of the
Assembly, &c. At the second meeting of the Sixth Session (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, 1783), 102, 107, 109,
124, 159, 173, 176, and 178. EC, Series I, 44420. Votes and Proceedings of the Senate, &c. At the second
meeting of the Sixth Session (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, 1783) 156, 160, 163. EC, Series I, 44425.
256
Laws of the State of New-York, passed at Kingston, in the second meeting of the Sixth Session of the
Legislature (Poughkeepsie: John Holt, 1783), 298-299. EC, Series I, 18060.
257
Forfeited recognizances would then be prosecuted. The CDDCs would also be audited.

  270  
found in the committees for public safety hearings, promising his allegiance and future

good behavior.258 Although permitted to remain, New Yorkers despised Rivington and

others who cast their lot with the British. Reports exploded with cases of maltreatment

by new committees and assemblies that refused to treat loyalists justly.259 Some former

loyalists, such as John Cook, distrusted both the committees and the state government,

fearing continued coercion. Cook’s sentiments are echoed throughout petitions and

letters bemoaning the harsh treatment of loyalists, many of who continued to castigate

intrusive local committees. One anonymous writer’s poem in the New York Morning

Post, deliberated on the question of whether to remain or not. Amongst the many factors

pushing former loyalists away from their homes was the “Committee’s rage.”260 Even

after the war, the CDDC’s extreme powers continued to influence the community. In

September 1782, John Jay sadly recounted to the infamous neutral Peter Van Schaack,

I felt very sensibly for you and for others, but as society can regard only the
political propriety of men’s conduct, and not the moral propriety of their motives
to it, I could only lament your unavoidably becoming classed with many whose
morality was convenience, and whose politics changed with the aspect of public
affairs.261
                                                                                                               
258
“To the Public,” Royal Gazette, July 10, 1782; Catherine Snell Crary, “The Tory and the Spy: The
Double Life of James Rivington,” WMQ, Vol. 16, no. 1 (Jan., 1959), 65; and Crary, The Price of Loyalty,
327-328.
259
John Cook Deposition, September 16, 1783 in Crary, The Price of Loyalty, 364-365. Guy Carleton’s
papers contain petitions and letters accusing patriot assemblies, committees, mobs and legislatures of
violence and maltreatment after the war.
260
The New York Morning Post, November 7, 1783 in Crary, The Price of Loyalty, 391-392. Citing the
state’s constitution, others too called for the removal of potential dangerous people for “Public peace &
Safety.” Lewis Morris tract, May 3, 1784, photocopy in U.S. Declaration of Independence Signers
Collection, Box 1, Groups 1-8, folder Lewis Morris, NYSL. Not all people shared such sentiments after the
war. Jelles Fonda wrote to Colonel John Butler in March 1784, wondering “w[h]at laws there will be maid
Concerning Persons who have Been Disafected.” Fonda realized the communal strains civil war caused and
hoped “we ought not to Luck [sic] on E[a]ch other as Being Enemys any more.” Jelles Fonda to John
Butler, March 22, 1784 in Jacob Abbot Collection, Box 1, folder 265-269, NYSL.
 
261
John Jay to Peter Van Schaack, September 17, 1782, The Correspondence and Public Papers of John
Jay, 1781-1782 ed. Henry P. Johnston (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1891), 343. Even in 1784, Robert
Livingston continued to lament the shameful persecution of the disaffected. Stating, “the violent spirit of

  271  
                                                                                                                
persecution which prevails here and dread its consequences upon the wealth and commerce & future
tranquility of the state…In some few it is a blind spirit of revenge & resentment but in more it is the most
sordid interest. One wishes to possess the house of some wretched Tory another fears him as a rivale in his
trade or commerce & a fourth wishes to get rid of his debts by shaking of his creditor or to reduce the price
of Living by depopulating the town.” Although written in 1783, one must wonder if such mentality
contributed to the security state. Robert R. Livingston to Hamilton, August 30, 1783, The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton Digital Edition.

  272  
 Chapter 5: “to provide for the safety…[of Virginia, we must] vest the executive with
extraordinary powers for a limited time:” The Council of the State of Virginia,
1776-1783
 
As he considered the tyrannical new regime in Virginia that monitored and

punished inhabitants in March 1777, Nicholas Cresswell wrote, “This is the happy fruits

of Independence.” By this point in the rebellion, as Cresswell deemed it, his experience

with committees for public safety had become unbearable. Suffering greatly from want

of work and subjected to harsh treatment by both his neighbors and patriot committees,

Cresswell wrote despondently about his miserable existence. Even though he never bore

arms against the American Cause, Virginia deemed him suspicious and publicly

denounced him an enemy of state. Like many other residents, the state placed Cresswell

under surveillance and paroled him based on his future good behavior.1

While on parole earlier that month, Cresswell encountered a vindictive committee

member in Leesburg, Virginia. Meeting the man in a public space, Cresswell offended

the zealot patriot by not kissing the man’s daughter when introduced. The old patriarch,

infused with indignation and his own self-righteous power, notified Cresswell’s

compatriots that he intended to enact revenge. Citing his full network of spies, the old

man promised to discover “anything treasonable” and to then “prosecute to the utmost of

                                                                                                               
1
Born in England, Cresswell came to America in 1774. After royal governor Lord Dunmore fled,
Cresswell decided to abscond to New York for fear of an impending imprisonment. Considered a spy, the
committee forbade him to depart and forced him to enter a security or be confined. Valuing his convictions,
Cresswell was unable to obtain work and was forced to survive on others. Because of the insults, slurs, and
accusatory glances he received, Cresswell hoped to flee. Although never confined, his lack of liberty felt
“worse than Egyptian bondage.” Nicholas Cresswell, The Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777 (New
York: The Dial Press, 1924), 150, 166-167. For a Loyalist memorial detailing harsh treatment see:
Evidence on the foregoing Memorial of Richard Corbin, February 12, 1787 in Virginia Colonial Abstracts:
King and Queen County Records Concerning 18th Century Persons ed. Beverly Fleet, Volume XV, Sixth
Collection (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1961), 40-41.

  273  
the Laws.”2 Afterwards, Cresswell regretted not kissing “the ugly Jade,” realizing any

perceived disrespect could lead to greater misfortune. Both before and after parole,

Cresswell and his compatriots received physical harassment and verbal berating.

Americans, he recognized have “grown insolent, if you do not tacitly submit to every

insult…they think proper, they immediately call you a Tory and think that if you have

that stigma upon your character they have the right…to knock your brains out.” A month

later, friends informed Cresswell that the state monitored him and secretly planned to

search his belongings. Bemoaning the tyrannical treatment he incurred from “usurping

rascals, accountable to none,” Cresswell felt dejected.3 Soon after, two men associated

with the committee called upon him to search his room “for treasonable papers…[on]

order of the Committee.”4 Although Cresswell feared the committee’s ruling, the men

found nothing illicit. Avoiding further censor, Cresswell later recalled his anxiety of

being labeled as a traitor, as their lot “make[s] me tremble with fear.”

Creswell’s experience illuminates three realities of Virginia’s nascent security

state: first, committees certainly took paroles seriously, monitoring inhabitants at all

times. Second, coercion and instilling fear became woven into committees’ operations

                                                                                                               
2
Cresswell, 186.
3
Cresswell, 194. Like others, Cresswell sarcastically referred to the committee as “the Court of
Inquisition.” Desperately poor, Cresswell feared returning to England as a beggar. Many relatives tried to
sway him from journeying to America. While he accepted some responsibility, he blamed the “cursed
rebellion” for his failure.
4
Cresswell accused the committee’s men of stealing a shot pouch and powder. In late November, the
committee interrogated him, informing him they would examine his papers. The board then forced
Cresswell to remain in Virginia for three months; if he tried to leave he would be confined. Rather than
further incur the committee’s wrath, he reluctantly accepted. Labeled an enemy and ostracized, he found
the community harsh. When a woman stole his jacket, she refused to pay because “[she] tells me that I am a
Tory.” Left with no recourse as, “Neither law or justice in this country” aided him, Cresswell drank
heavily. “These bitter reflections” and “a lowness of spirit which too often is the cause of me drinking more
than is of service. I must and will call my resolution and fortitude to my aid, or I shall insensibly sink into
the Sot or the Drunkard.” Cresswell, 172-173, 187, and 200.

  274  
and treatment of allegedly disaffected men. Finally, Virginia’s security state encouraged

the entire community to distrust and abuse inhabitants suspected of inimical behavior.

Such scorn, suspicion, and violence towards men like Cresswell who committed

no treasonous acts characterized the Council of the State of Virginia’s early reign.5 The

Council of the State and Virginia’s Committee of Safety operated similarly, as the former

expanded the security state by employing extensive executive powers capable of

establishing the new state’s sovereignty through surveillance and coercion. Unlike other

committees for public safety, the Council of the State was constitutionally ordained and

did not replicate New York and New Jersey’s method of large-scale summons. Rather,

by acting outside its constitutional authority, the Council of the State continued to

monitor society and performed an array of governmental functions necessary for internal

security, such as preparing defenses, administering scarcities, protecting property, and

removing enemies. By providing stability and security when the legislature could not

meet external and internal threats, the Council of the State assisted Virginia’s transition to

statehood.

Executive Power and the Transition to the State of Virginia

It should come as no surprise that given turmoil during the War of Independence,

some of Virginia’s leaders implicitly or explicitly discussed a dictatorship. Despite

suggesting names such as George Washington and Patrick Henry, patriots never instituted

an official dictatorship. Historian Hugh Blair Grigsby argued that though Virginia never

named a dictator, the legislative journals “contain resolutions conferring large powers

                                                                                                               
5
Adele Hast illustrated the chaos, suspicion, and monitoring during this period. However, she focused upon
courts and not the Council. Adele Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia: The Norfolk Area and the
Eastern Shore (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1982), 91.

  275  
upon the Governor and Council.”6 Grigsby justified patriots’ controversial actions as

meeting “the crisis that was impending.” Leaders understood the threat they faced and

believed a new executive body needed to wield significant authority. Based on the

Committee of Safety and its success, Virginia created the Council of the State.

Meeting during spring and summer 1776, the Virginia Convention faced difficult

decisions framing a new constitution. With few models to follow, representatives

undertook this immense task while also fighting the British and quelling internal

insurrections.7 During this trying hour, the Virginia Convention demanded the Council

of the State resemble the Committee of Safety. Consisting of the governor and his

councilors, the legislature mandated the Council of the State to, “exercise the executive

powers of government” and possess the power to pardon.8 Just as they viewed its

predecessor, the Committee of Safety, some contemporaries and historians considered the

Council of the State as weak. Despite both contemporaries, like Patrick Henry, and

historians’ perception that the governor’s powers were inadequate (he lacked even the

power to veto), the Council remained a force during the war. Yet despite this perceived

                                                                                                               
6
Virginia pressed the Continental Congress to bestow significant power upon Washington, which it
conceded. Hugh Blair Grigsby, The Virginia Convention of 1776… (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1855), 93.
7
John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia: 1775-1783 (Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg
Foundation, 1988), 101 and 112. Thomas Jefferson and others wanted as little power as possible vested in
the people and argued senators should be elected by the lower house and serve for life. John Augustine
Washington contended, “we can no longer do without some fixed form of government.” He marveled over
the fact the previous revolutionary government performed as well as it had. John Augustine Washington to
Richard Henry Lee April 22, 1776 in SLM, 328-329 in Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 112.
8
Executive pardons could not exist “where the prosecution shall have been carried on by the House of
Delegates, or the law shall otherwise particularly direct: in which cases, no reprieve or pardon shall be
granted, but by resolve of the House of Delegates.” In a General Convention. Begun and holden at the
Capital….The Constitution, or form of government…of Virginia… (Williamsburg: Alexander Purdie,
1776). EC, Series I, 43207. Other historians also noted the governor could not act without the consent of
the Council of the State. Alonzo Thomas Dill, Carter Braxton, Virginia Signer: A Conservative in Revolt
(New York: University Press of America, 1983), 76, 82, and 169-170.

  276  
limitation, leaders dreaded anarchy far more than they feared an executive dictatorship,

thus the legislature empowered the Council of the State with emergency authority.

Purposely curbing the governor and Council of the State’s power in the

constitution, the Virginia Convention outlined executive authority in the new state. Even

though the framers prioritized their state legislature, the General Assembly, they

recognized the need for an efficient executive. Unlike previous colonial governors, the

newly elected Patrick Henry could neither dissolve nor adjourn the legislature. With the

advice of the Council of the State, Henry could summon the representatives. Rather than

placing the responsibility and power in the hands of only one man, framers bestowed

executive authority upon the entire Council of the State.9 After the Virginia Convention

intentionally reduced the executive’s constitutional power, men such as John Adams,

Richard Henry Lee, and Patrick Henry protested the decision.10 Historians have correctly

noted the Virginia Convention’s intentions to limit executive authority, but scholars have

too easily allowed the framers’ constitutional check on executive power as reason to

dismiss the Council of the State’s significance. How did the Committee of Safety

                                                                                                               
9
The Virginia Convention stipulated the Council of the State would be composed of eight men (either
representatives or residents of the state) chosen by the General Assembly “to assist in the administration of
government.” Amongst its own members, the Council elected a President to act as a Lieutenant Governor
and appointed its own clerk. Councilors received pay for their services based on attendance and only four
members constituted a quorum. To ensure a mix of Councilors, the legislature voted to remove members
every three years and no member could be eligible again until three years had passed. Although the Council
was not the Supreme Court, its five senior members acted as a court of oyer and terminer to clear out jails.
Even though the Committee of Safety created a commission to oversee the navy, the Council remained in
control of procuring supplies. It also continued to make appointments as well. Even when various sub-
committees were formed, the Council lost little power as it approved nearly all decisions. For example, the
Board of War made few decisions without the Council’s approval. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 148,
and 239-240. See also: SVA, 10:291-292. While the new constitution provided the governor with some
powers over the militia, the Convention stipulated appointments and removals; calling the militia would be
conducted “with the advice of the…Council.” With the Council’s consent, the governor appointed justices
of the peace and approved appointments of sheriffs, coroners, and other positions. SVA, 9:310.
10
Ronald L. Heinemann, et al., Old Dominion, New Commonwealth: A History of Virginia, 1607-2007
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2007), 125.

  277  
influence the Council? If the Convention weakened the Council’s constitutional powers,

what of its emergency short-term abilities? Finally, how did the Council of the State aid

the war effort and ensure the Revolution’s success?

Some politicians, such as James Madison, referred to the executive as “the grave

of all useful talents,” but do such sentiments mean the Council of the State served no

significant role in the Revolution?11 At its commencement, Virginia’s leaders debated

over the Council of the State’s necessity. St. George Tucker and others vehemently

contended that the Councilors possessed powers equal to those of the governor. Some

supporters noted the Council’s potential as a check on the governor, who could only act

with its consent.12 On the other hand, others, such as Thomas Jefferson, did not share

such sentiments.13 Due to early Americans’ rhetoric against a tyrannical colonial

executive and historians’ preference to promote the democratic origins of the Revolution,

the Council of the State’s narrative has gone untold. Although historians have

purposively neglected the Council of the State’s vital role in the Revolution, during the

summer of 1776, the Convention understood its importance and extended executive

authority. After receiving additional legislative mandates and increased powers, the

Council of the State implemented similar policies as its predecessor, the Committee of

                                                                                                               
11
Irving Brant, James Madison: The Virginia Revolutionist (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941),
316. Edmund Randolph also noted Virginia’s leaders intention to weaken the executive. Edmund
Randolph, History of Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), 255.
12
Many at the time were shocked the aristocratic Virginia installed any democratic aspects. The governor
and Councilors were elected by a joint session of the legislature. However, the Assembly controlled which
Councilors stepped down and did not always do so fairly. Some members were never removed. A few
former Colonial Councilors served on the new board, including John Page, John Tayloes, and Dudley
Digges. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 118.
13
Dill, 170-173 and Brant, Volume I, 316. Dill noted that if the Council was as weak as some
contemporaries and historians have concluded, then why was there so much debate over its powers? If
nothing else, Dill contended, the Council enjoyed the influential power of appointing officials. For Carter
Braxton, a seat on the Council retained his privileged position despite the changing political world.

  278  
Safety.14 In fact, in framing the constitution, the Convention did not believed it truly

destroyed executive authority, as in times of crisis, the Council became the civil bulwark

against disorder.

Unlike executive bodies in other states, the Council sat continuously. Designed to

be the Committee of Safety’s heir, the legislature stipulated that the Council of the State’s

most controversial powers were limited to a short-term emergency basis.15 Never weak,

the Council of the State seized the reins of government, even acting without the governor

or a quorum if necessary.16 Lacking many constitutionally defined executive powers, the

Council operated on an emergency basis. Providing stable civil authority, the Council

seized a leadership role pursuing disaffection after the colonies declared independence.17

Even when threats seemed low, the Council of the State took proactive measures,

preparing defenses, monitoring inhabitants, opening trade, and procuring materials to

combat scarcity. To gauge the Council of the State’s importance, one need look no

further than the multiple times the General Assembly extended the executive’s coercive

powers.

                                                                                                               
14
Most powers dealt with deploying or supplying troops and exporting goods. For the executive’s increased
powers see: SVA, 9:49-53, 178-179, 309, 429, 462, and 477-478.
15
John Selby referred to the legislature’s bestowing of emergency authority on the executive as
“unconstitutional” powers. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 119.
16
Lacking quorum, the Council decreed, the “Public service” demanded they strengthen defenses and raise
troops. The Council even operated without the governor and sometimes with only one member. Lieutenant
Governor John Page and Dudley Digges assumed control of the Council on occasions, an unconstitutional
action, but a measure deemed necessary. At times, the Council recommended it operate on its own when
the governor could not administer. After three years, the idea of a plural executive was slightly abandoned
and the governor could operate on his own in ordinary measures. JCSV, 1:72, 77, 188, and 217-233; Selby,
The Revolution in Virginia, 122; and Executive Council to Jefferson, November 13, 1779, PTJ.
17
Even after the fall of 1776, when momentum shifted towards the Americans, the Assembly deemed the
Council necessary to police loyalty and provide the functions of government. Even though loyalists might
not have materialized as significantly as patriots feared, many residents still opposed the Revolution,
causing increased anxiety.

  279  
Carving its Place in the New State: the Council and Defense
Even after Virginia declared independence, Lord Dunmore, the former royal

governor, remained off the coast antagonizing patriots and rallying Eastern Shore

loyalists.18 American troops eventually forced Dunmore from nearby Gwynn’s Island on

July 9, yet the former governor continued to plunder and burn plantations. Not all

Virginians rejoiced. Cresswell lamented, “This cursed Independence has given me great

uneasiness” and he continued defying the fledgling state by consuming illicit materials.19

Still clinging to the hope of a British victory and General Howe’s success in New York

that July, Cresswell knew life would become increasingly difficult under the burgeoning

surveillance measures. Following Dunmore’s swift retreat, loyalists had little chance to

escape.20 With Dunmore neutralized, Councilors recognized additional threats

approached, as John Page solemnly noted in his almanac, “Washington has evacuated N.

York.”21 Reports of enemy movements abounded, including a potential 100-vessel

                                                                                                               
18
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 106. Dunmore remained in contact with Eastern Shore and
Chesapeake Bay island loyalists. Deposition of John Emmes, June 21, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1008. The
governor hoped independence would inadvertently raise support for the king. His prayers were diminished
by his lack manpower caused by a smallpox epidemic. June 22, 1776, Robert Honyman Diary, 1776-1782,
Microfilm, CWFL.
19
Cresswell, 149. Cresswell realized his dangerous predicament on August 1, after hearing of Dunmore’s
loss on Gwinn Island. He lamented, “I am now at a loss again.” The Council’s interrogations slowed
slightly due to the decrease in open loyalists, yet it continued to focus on disaffection. After losses in the
north in 1776, the Assembly believed residents needed to choose sides. H.J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in
Virginia (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), 178.
20
Kevin P. Kelly, “The White Loyalists of Williamsburg,” The Interpreter, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1996).
http://research.history.org/Historical_Research/Research_Themes/ThemeRevolution/Loyalist.cfm.
Accessed 5/16/14.
21
John Page Diary in The Virginia Almanack for the Year of Our Lord God 1776, (Williamsburg: J. Dixon
& W. Hunter, 1776), CWFL.

  280  
enemy fleet sailing from New York southward and tales of a forty-man Dutch mob

roaming Virginia.22

Throughout the war, internal insurrections or external invasions presented

immediate dangers. From 1777 to the end of the war, the British frequently threatened

the Chesapeake region, attacking cities and plundering goods.23 Their incursions gave

loyalists reasons to rejoice and rally around the British standard.24 Consistent threats

from the British forced Virginia patriots to respond. In the region surrounding Norfolk,

loyalist aggressions continued, especially when the British were nearby.25 At times, the

Council of the State needed to take matters into its own hands to ensure efficiency.

To meet the immediate demands presented by the war, the Virginia legislature

debated a bold decision and entrusted Governor Patrick Henry with dictatorial powers.

Despite his self-absorption, others also endorsed bestowing emergency powers upon him.

George Mason himself argued that much of the legislature’s authority should be

transferred to the executive.26 The fact that a man who once feared the Committee of

                                                                                                               
22
Mobs stalked Virginia searching for salt and at times violence ensued. Living in Alexandria, Cresswell
related the terror, “All of them armed with swords or large clubs” searching for salt, “if none comes in the
people will revolt.” Not all mobs resorted to violence, but the sight of armed roving men stirred fears. As
spirits waned, it negatively affected militia turnout. Cresswell, 173-174.
23
For example, in August 1777 British General William Howe sailed up the Chesapeake. The British again
made an incursion in December.
24
Inhabitants most mistreated by the Council and Committee of Safety (the Goodriches, James Parker,
Josiah Phillips, and George Blair) delivered information to the British and then actively aided the invaders.
25
For example, in May 1779 the H.M.S Raisonable appeared off the coast. The British also blockaded
Hampton and attacked Fort Nelson. Adele Hast correctly noted the high number of active loyalists in the
region, including members of Norfolk and Princess Anne County courts. Finding few convictions resulting
in jail time, Hast disregarded the Council’s intensity and the laws empowering it. Hast, 91-96 and 105 and
JCSV, 1:165 and Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 204-205. For later examples of British aggressions and
the Council’s recognition see: JCSV, 2:264 and 269-272
26
Resolutions Urging Recruitment and Conferring Emergency Powers on the Governor and Council,
December 21, 1776 in The Papers of George Mason ed. Robert A. Rutland, Volume I, 1749-1778 (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 326-327.

  281  
Safety’s controversial powers now openly endorsed bestowing extraordinary jurisdiction

upon the Council of the State proves how vital patriot leaders viewed effective executive

authority.27 Delivering emergency, extra-constitutional supremacy to the governor and

the Council of the State called to mind Roman dictators. Wisely choosing their words

carefully, to avoid outright suspending the constitution, the Virginia Senate

diplomatically called for “additional powers be given to the Governor and Council.” Due

to sheer desperation, the legislature enhanced Virginia’s security state.28

Besides Mason, other patriots, such as former Convention member and colonel

John Banister, supported a strong emergency executive to administer the war effort and

preserve rights. Writing Theodorick Bland Jr., Banister acknowledged that war changed

the nature of self-government; a “popular assembly” could not provide security in such

times. He argued,

for though the liberty and rights of a people are safely entrusted to men of their
own electing, and the danger of having their constitution infringed is sufficiently
by that institution guarded against, yet that form government which in peace is
their best security, in war exposes them to the utmost danger. Nay so clear is it
from daily experience, that the operations of war should be confined to a few.29

To win the war, Banister contended, individual rights and self-government needed to be

suspended. However, neither he nor the Council of the State desired for executive

authority to subvert the war effort. Rather, patriots hoped the Council would aid the

                                                                                                               
27
The legislature extended the Council’s power in spring 1777. This act placed battalions at the Council’s
disposal and empowered it to pardon prisoners sentenced to death. SVA, 9:309. Also during this session, the
legislature passed laws regarding desertions, invasions, and insurrections.
28
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 129-130. Selby argued Henry gained dictatorial powers yet
overlooked the Council of the State’s role.
29
John Bannister to Theodorick Bland Jr., June 10, 1777 in The Bland Papers: Being a Selection from
the Manuscripts of Colonel Theodorick Bland Jr. of Prince George County, Virginia ed. Charles Campbell,
Volume I (Petersburg: Edmund & Julian C. Ruffin, 1840), 58. Bannister argued that raising troops
efficiently not only aided the war, but also would reaffirm to residents the Council’s authority.

  282  
military.30 For example, the Council of the State advised Henry to tactfully inform

American General Edward Hand that he and the Council reserved the right to command

the militia, as this responsibility was an executive and not congressional power. To

preserve civil authority, the Council of the State needed to maintain control.

With potential dictatorship even more realistic, the Senate carefully blunted the

governor and Council of the State by placing time limits on its emergency powers. Due

to threats of invasion and insurrections, Henry still could command and dispense troops.31

While leaders deemed emergency powers necessary to preserve the republic and the state

government, Thomas Jefferson and others pondered what type of precedent was set if the

constitution could so easily be circumvented.32 Because of the necessities brought on by

war, such a question was not often discussed.

In the face of British aggressions, the Council of the State assumed its mandate

and quickly rose to meet the challenges of war by increasing monitoring efforts. Acting

swiftly when potential threats arose, the Councilors instructed military leaders such as

Captain James Cocke and Captain Calvert to protect the eastern shore and James River.33

After ordering Cocke to stealthily remove public powder from the threatened region, the

Council of the State charged Calvert with distracting and disturbing the enemy on the
                                                                                                               
30
For example, in July 1777, the Council aided the military by sending militia to the American frontier.
JCSV, 1:446-447.
31
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 130. Due to how the constitution was designed, only the Assembly
could recruit new troops. If not convened, no military preparations could be made.
32
Jefferson pondered this question as the Council’s reign began. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 130.
33
Aside from the eastern shore, in summer 1776, Cherokees attacked frontier communities from Georgia to
Virginia. The Council sent minutemen to meet the threat. Notifying the Council of the frontier’s
defenselessness, George Rogers Clark received powder to protect inhabitants so they would not flee.
Violence ensued through 1777, in part caused by American forces. Powder Granted for the Defense of
Kentucky, August 23, 1776 and Petition by John Gabriel Jones and George Rogers Clark, October, 1776,
PGRC, 18-19; Heinemann, 128-129 and Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 127 and 186-187.

  283  
James River.34 However, Councilors also understood the importance of protecting

friendly residents and their vessels, commanding Calvert to take necessary measures. To

strengthen its intelligence, the Council decreed that “public Safety” required swift and

accurate military intelligence as well as congressional instructions to ensure the executive

was prepared to meet all challenges.35 The Council sought to position itself to administer

the state effectively.

The executive body hoped intelligence networks and monitoring would help

prevent reports of servants and slaves roaming the nascent state and enemies

masquerading as military officials. When a group of inimical characters impersonated

officers to depreciate currency and curb enlistments, the Council decreed, “all such

Persons may be vigilantly inspected and brought to Condign punishment according to the

Laws of this State.”36 For the duration of the war, Councilors promoted regular patrols to

capture disorderly people and called upon guards to prevent servants and slaves from

traveling.37 Forbidding the sale of goods at a reduced price to any officer or solider who

did not possess the proper documentation, the Council sought to prevent illicit travel and

trade. The Council’s measures were warranted, as patriots knew that some army officials

                                                                                                               
34
JCSV, 1:67 and 70. During the summer 1776, the Council also ordered 19 slaves to lead mines and sent
two more into the interior to shore up defense, procure supplies, and remove threats.
35
JCSV, 1:315. The Council appointed Jonathan Walker of Albemarle County as its informer at
Washington’s headquarters. The Council cited a past embarrassment in its January 1777 minutes as the
reason for a better intelligence network.
36
In July 1777, the Council discovered people, under the “Guize of Officers,” charged exorbitantly high
prices for necessities and discouraged enlistments with false reports of Washington’s record. In response,
the Council authorized investigations. JCSV, 1:450.
37
Servants and slaves needed to provide a reason for traveling. The Council also worried its own letters
were intercepted just as the Committee of Safety had once done to its own residents. JCSV, 1:494.

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abused the commissary by taking advantage of reduced prices.38 Abuses undermined the

state’s legitimacy. Contrary to historians’ belief that Virginia’s active loyalist population

decreased in 1777, disaffection still existed.

The Council’s efforts to defend residents from potential invasions did not go

unappreciated. The Virginia Gazette praised the Council of the State’s decisive initiative

preserving the city and state in August 1777.39 Acknowledging that the Assembly

empowered the Council of the State, the newspaper credited the executive for actually

securing Virginia. However, the city still succumbed to some “alarm and bustle.”40 Led

by Page in the governor’s absence, the Council seized the moment to lead Virginia during

the turmoil. Unfazed by the governor’s absence, the Council reassured that it would

inform Henry of its actions, after it met any potential threat. Page and his Council

quickly trained and armed the state’s militia, yet a battle did not take place.41 In its

                                                                                                               
38
The law allowed some officials to purchase goods at a reduced price but this privilege was only for men
“whose Salaries are not Limited or ascertained by Law, it being presumed that such persons have provided
an adequate reward for their Services in their respective Contracts and consequently do not come within the
intention of the law.” The Council again noted soldiers abusing the law by obtaining more goods than
necessary and then selling the excess. It advised the governor in order to prevent abuses, the commissary
must refuse requests without specific orders. JCSV, 2:159, 203-204.
39
“Williamsburg,” Virginia Gazette (Purdie), August 22, 1777. The Council named Thomas Nelson Jr.
brigadier general to meet the defensive needs.
40
Also in August 1777, Howe planned to attack Philadelphia by sailing up the Chesapeake. In December,
the legislature empowered the Council to send the militia west to arrest enemies. George Mason assisted
drafting the resolution permitting the Council’s additional power to eradicate subversion. That same month,
the Council held a secret meeting with George Rogers Clark and commanded him to enter Illinois where he
combated and defeated Natives Americans at Kaskaskia and Vincennes. Not until November 1778 did
Henry and the Council divulge the secret plan. Henry explained to the Continental Congress and Virginia
Assembly “the Executive power of this State” sensed a danger on the frontier and sent forces. By that point,
Henry’s good news overshadowed the Council’s controversial actions. Clark’s costly exploits caused the
Council to rescind supplies necessary to move on Detroit. Governor Henry to the Virginia Delegates in
Congress, November 16, 1778, PGRC, 72 and Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 188-196.
41
JCSV, 1:463-465. The Council also recommended establishing networks to convey intelligence and
gather war materials. This incident was not the first time Page lead the Council during a potential invasion.
Claiming if successful in New York, the British would attack Virginia, Page issued a broadside on the
Council’s behalf to raise militias. Williamsburg, August 20, 1776, (Williamsburg: Printed by Alexander
Purdie, 1776), Broadsides 1776:9, VHS.

  285  
urgency, the Council even demonstrated its willingness to contradict military leaders if it

believed Virginia’s security at risk.42

To further ensure security, the Council of the State also replicated the Committee

of Safety’s policies of forcibly removing suspicious persons during potential invasions.

Thomas Jefferson and others recognized the legislature could not act effectively enough

in such an emergency. Communication and intelligence easily transpired between the

British Navy and Virginia’s coast, leaving Jefferson to argue that the executive required

coercive powers to combat internal dissent and limit inhabitants’ mobility. He argued,

it became necessary for the Governor and Council, for the public safety, to
remove and restrain, during the Imminence of the Danger, at a Distance from the
Ports and Encampments of the said Militia, and from other places near the Ports
and Harbours …certain persons whose affections to the American Cause were
suspected and more especially such as had refused to give assurance of Fidility.43

If an order to forcibly remove supposedly suspicious inhabitants was not controversial

enough, Jefferson contended that no member of the Council could be charged with

“Actions, Suits, and Damages” for infringing on an individual’s liberties. The

Councilors’ controversial powers were now being cloaked with a degree of immunity.

The Council also responded to frontier inhabitants’ petitions bemoaning security

and safety threats. After receiving a memorial from Green Brier inhabitants fearing

Native American aggression, the Council hoped to both protect people and send a

message of its authority. Dispatching both lead and weapons and calling for the capture
                                                                                                               
42
The Council raised men to aid Washington, but refused to allow any additional troops. Afterwards the
men were sent home. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 134.
43
Bill Indemnifying the Executive for Removing and Confining Suspected Persons, December 16-26,
1777, PTJ. The later law was named “An act for indemnifying the Governour and Council, and others, for
removing and confining Suspected Persons during the late publick danger.” SVA, 9:373-374. In July 1780,
when the Council sent General Thomas Nelson Jr. to endangered areas it permitted him to take any
necessary steps to ensure “public safety.” For the “good of ye state,” the Council shielded the general from
any repercussions, stating that the executive’s influence would absolve any legal troubles. JCSV, 2:264.

  286  
of whites that murdered several Shawnee, the Council sought to alleviate the root of the

conflict.44 Convinced the community knew the aggressors, the Council required

neighbors to prove their loyalty by aiding the security state and delivering the accused.45

Not only did the Council combat violence on the frontier, but also reinforced defenses.46

Empowering Colonel William Preston to protect the exposed frontier, the Council hoped

by providing security, Virginians would cease fleeing the region.47 Maintaining a frontier

presence was vital and the Council of the State aimed to assure inhabitants to remain

there. To further secure its position on the frontier, the Council instructed military

proxies to preserve friendships with French and Indian allies, maintain control of Illinois,

and prevent hostile Native American incursions.48 Stressing the “Value of Liberty” on

the frontier, the Council notified the people that they were assured “A free & equal

Representation… there in a little Time together with all the Improvements in

Jurisprudence & police which the other parts of the State enjoy.”49 Given the Council’s

                                                                                                               
44
JCSV, 2:86-87.
45
Wondering if a message should be sent to both the innocent and guilty regarding the consequences of
disobedience, the Council wanted the murders and anyone who harbored them. Though it was unclear how
the Council obtained the names, in March 1778 Henry announced James Hall, William Roane, Hugh
Gallbreath, Malcom McCoun, and Adam Barnes were implicated. The Council then notified inhabitants
that as citizens, they were responsible to “bring these desperate offenders to the punishment due to their
Guilt and as an encouragement thereto as well as a proof of the public abhorrence of such detestable
Crimes.” If a sense of neither duty nor coercion was enough to stir patriotism, the Council offered monetary
rewards (Hall -$200, McCown - $150 and the rest of the men $100). The Council also demanded punitive
measures when Loudoun County rioted during a militia draft. Angered by such insolence towards its
sovereignty, the Council demanded the names of all involved. JCSV, 2:93-94 and 111.
46
Such measures included informing militias to rally and designating weak areas. The Council also called
for an asylum, possibly at Yorktown, to protect inhabitants from the enemy. JCSV, 2:121-132.
47
The Council allowed him to retain armed men as well. JCSV, 2:131.
48
JCSV, 2:233-240. In December 1778, the Council wrote to Lieutenant John Todd, and others regarding
frontier defense. As the militia leader, the Council placed Todd in charge of protecting civil authority from
being overrun by the army.
49
JCSV, 2:235.

  287  
“Jurisprudence & police” in the rest of Virginia, no doubt it aspired to institute frontier

security and surveillance.50 Despite the Council’s efforts, the region remained

problematic as April saw struggles with natives and militia grumblings in Albemarle,

Goochland, Louisa, Henrico, Fluvanna, and Orange counties.51 Worried militias might

join the enemy, the Council immediately called officers to discipline their unruly men.52

Throughout the war, the legislature continuously empowered the Council of the

State to meet the growing demands of war and it assumed a leadership role when

necessity mandated. The General Assembly’s renewal of the Council of the State’s

emergency powers during potential invasions and insurrections for “the safety and

defence of this state” demonstrates its vital role in the Revolution’s success.53 In 1780,

such a mandate allowed the executive to summon up to 20,000 militiamen from any

county to aid another southern state in distress or meet any internal insurrections and

                                                                                                               
50
The Council vaguely ordered Lieutenant John Todd to relay any “Grievances which obstruct these
[liberty, jurisprudence, and policing the population] be known in order to their Removal.” It encouraged
inhabitants to report soldiers’ abuses, not to violate Native American or French property since a treaty was
desired, and erect posts. JCSV, 2:235-237.
51
JCSV, 2:250-268. George Rogers Clark, who led much of the success, proved a poor frontier
administrator, resulting in abuses. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 200-201. By summer 1781, the
Americans abandoned Fort Jefferson and by 1782, British progress led to the western campaign’s failure.
52
JCSV, 2:254. In May 1779, the Assembly passed a law allowing men who refused the oath on religious
terms to accept a similar affirmation. SVA, 10:28.
53
In part, this May 1780 law was meant to prevent an attack on another southern state. Therefore the
Assembly “vest[ed] the executive with extraordinary powers for a limited time.” The Council had
previously received this power as well to protect “internal security.” The Council assisted when local
insurrections arose by issuing apprehension orders. Between 1778-1780, to help the Council pursue
disaffection, the legislature regularly passed laws against insurrections, forgery, and lay embargos. It also
allowed the Council to superintend the jails, supply the army, and continue its other vaguely defined
powers. Due to inconvenience the Council eventually no longer superintended jails. JCSV, 2:127 and 180;
SVA, 9:428-429 and 458; and 10:93-97, 105-107, 140-142, 156-157, 306, 309-310, and 378.

  288  
invasions.54 In a similar vein, the legislature cited the need “for the publick security that

disaffected persons should be confined” and removed. The governor and Council then

could incarcerate anyone suspected “of disaffection to the Independence of the United

States.”55 After the government moved to Richmond in 1780, the Council of the State

consolidated power by phasing out both the Board of War and Board of Trade. Already

assuming their responsibilities, the Council no doubt sought more power and efficiency.56

Yet, the Council’s reign was not always a success.

Not all of the Council of the State’s measures were successful and it had to adapt

to challenges to prove its legitimacy. For example, former American hero turned traitor

Benedict Arnold arrived in the Chesapeake on December 30, 1780, catching the Council

off-guard. Despite summoning the militias and preparing supplies to meet enemy

vessels, the Council did not act fast enough.57 Moving swiftly, Arnold reached

Richmond in January and immediately commenced burning and pillaging. Fearing for

their lives, Richmond and Petersburg residents fled.58 As a result, Virginians blamed

                                                                                                               
54
For example, there were insurrections in Princess Anne and Norfolk counties in 1778. Governor Henry to
the Speaker of the House of Delegates, Benjamin Harrison, May 27, 1778 in Official Letters of the
Governors of the State of Virginia ed. H.R. McIlwaine, Volume I (Richmond: Davis Bottom,
Superintendent of Publish Printing, 1926), 282-283.
55
SVA, 10:310-311. Sentence did not go into effect without the Council’s approval. The law reiterated the
Council’s jurisdiction to supply and call troops and allowed it to prosecute anyone who obstructed this
endeavor.
56
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 246. Page and other Councilors resigned soon after. The state also
faced economic problems such as depreciated currency and poor harvests.
57
JCSV, 2:269-272. In late 1780, the British also attacked Richmond and Petersburg. With disease
outbreaks, British invasion, and shortages of both supplies and troops, the state faced major challenges. By
1780, many Virginians expressed war weariness. Robert Carter Wormeley lamented the loss of a young
soldier he knew. “Cursed Effects of war; O most Gracious God of thy mercy, put a stop to the Effusion of
human blood. I most sincerely sympathize with his dear Parents.” May 20, 1780, Robert Wormeley Carter
Diary, TR 8, Transcript, 10, CWFL. Original at College of William and Mary.
58
Jefferson ordered as many supplies moved from the enemy’s path as possible.

  289  
Governor Thomas Jefferson and the Council of the State “for their neglect &

supineness.”59 Richmond lay in ruins and Arnold encamped at Portsmouth. In response,

the Council of the State issued a proclamation regarding the harsh treatment Virginians

who retained American loyalties received at the hands of the conquering army.60 Citing

the Law of Nations, Jefferson denounced the British for removing inhabitants from their

homes and forcing them to accept a parole promising to not aid the American cause.

Understanding that, for the state to claim the legitimacy it needed to protect its people,

Jefferson argued these good, or perhaps ignorant, citizens would be forgiven if they

accepted a British oath under duress.61 Tension did not abate and the Council sent the

British commanding officer at Portsmouth a letter enclosing the Assembly’s resolution

that the state would retaliate if inhabitants on ‘forced paroles’ were threatened.62 While

the Assembly issued the resolution, the Council of the State declared the ultimatum.

                                                                                                               
59
September 8, 1780, Robert Honyman Diary, 1776-1782, Microfilm, CWFL. John Page and Edmund
Pendleton criticized Jefferson, claiming he embarrassed the state. Pendleton to Washington, February 16,
1781 in The Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1734-1803 ed. David John Mays Vol. I
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1967), 338-340 and Reverend James Madison to James
Madison, March 9, 1781 in The Papers of James Madison Digital Edition. When it came to employing the
militia to build fortifications, Jefferson was a strict constitutionalist, believing as governor that he lacked
the power to force militiamen to do manual labor or conscript laborers. Impatient with the governor’s
inactivity, Baron von Steuben eventually convinced Jefferson the executive needed more power during
invasions. When Steuben demanded Jefferson and the Council procure slaves for manual labor, the
governor hesitated and only slowly met the request with little success. Thomas Jefferson to Friedrich
Wilhelm von Steuben, February 12, 1781 and Thomas Jefferson to Major General Baron von Steuben,
March 10, 1781, PTJ and Michael Kranish, Flight from Monticello: Thomas Jefferson at War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 205.
60
Inhabitants fearfully met the British and accepted paroles to avoid harsh treatment or military service.
January 29, 1781, Robert Honyman Diary, 1776-1782, Microfilm, CWFL.
61
As early as October 1779, the Assembly ordered nonjurors who accepted the oath be redeemed their
(double or even triple) taxes owed. SVA, 10:194. Jefferson and the Council believed no citizen could legally
accept a British oath and remain in the state. Any man who accepted a British oath must obtain a passport
and depart. In early February 1781, the Council also forbade proprietors from interacting with the British
even under a flag of truce to obtain confiscated property (i.e. slaves). JCSV, 2:274 and 285.
62
JCSV, 2:317.

  290  
 In summer 1781, when Lord Charles Cornwallis planned to destroy supplies at

Point Fork and capture Jefferson and the Assembly in Charlottesville, the legislature

quickly fled, but not before again increasing the Council of the State’s powers. To

respond to Cornwallis’ threat, the Assembly permitted the Council to dispense the militia,

impress slaves and supplies, imprison men without a trial, banish suspicious persons

under pain of death, extend recruiting, and create criminal courts.63 Similar to previous

acts delivering incredible power, the Assembly cited the necessity of preserving “safety

and welfare of the commonwealth” as well as the steadfast execution of laws. As for

disaffection, the law permitted the Council to apprehend and confine any suspicious

residents. The executive neither had to offer bail nor provide habeas corpus.

With Cornwallis nearby, the Council of the State tightened security by forbidding

militia officers from issuing travel passes under flags of truce and called for additional

defenses on the James River.64 Virginians soon rejoiced after news arrived that French

Admiral Comte De Grasse pushed British Admiral Thomas Graves back to New York,

leaving Cornwallis in an inopportune position.65 By the end of the month, Washington

and French forces headed to Yorktown. Not to allow civil authority to be outdone, the

Council of the State just days earlier pardoned several confined, apologetic, inimical

                                                                                                               
63
“An act for giving certain powers to the governor and council, and for punishing those who shall oppose
the execution of laws.” Virginians banished had 20 days to sell property and if they refused to leave, could
be executed. The Council could banish any man if it had “good cause” to suspect their loyalty or if the man
had previously been convicted. Additionally, it could also call for a special court comprised of three men
(similar to a criminal court) to hear cases. Finally, the legislature also declared martial law 20 miles from
either army and instituted harsher punishments against its own soldiers for theft. SVA, 10:411-416.
64
JCSV, 2:375. Only the Council or a commanding officer could do so from now on.
65
John E. Selby, A Chronology of Virginia and the War of Independence, 1763-1783 (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1973), 45. For the most part, in September the Council focused on obtaining
supplies, hurrying farmers to produce wheat, sending flour to distressed areas, and appointing county
administrators who had thus far been delinquent. JCSV, 2:382-391.

  291  
persons, releasing them on their promise of their future good behavior and to appear if

summoned.66 Despite this perceived leniency, the Council also summoned inhabitants

closer to the invasion, as it questioned their loyalty now that the enemy retreated.67

Undoubtedly, the Council performed a vital role preserving Virginia during the war

through its military preparations and leadership, however its strength lay in how it

policed the disaffected.

Surveillance in the State of Virginia

From the time of its creation, the Council of the State employed the Committee of

Safety’s surveillance policies.68 Since the same threats remained, the Councilors

believed the Committee of Safety’s coercive actions were justified and successful.69

Apprehensions, passports, paroles, and imprisonment remained the executive body’s

modus operandi to establish social control.70 For example, in mid July 1776, the Council

                                                                                                               
66
The Council informed pardoned residents they must serve as soldiers. The journals do not indicate the
charges against them. Some men, such as John Lyon, received a reprieve from his five years in prison, but
were forced to remove himself twenty miles north of Richmond and remain on good behavior. JCSV, 2:394
and 397. Governor Thomas Nelson acted without the Council under “peculiar circumstances,” yet the
Assembly approved his actions during the siege at York. Citing the “general good,” the Assembly argued
his actions should be considered as if “all the formalities prescribed by law” had been followed. Legalizing
and applauding Nelson’s tactics, the legislature deemed he would not be subjected to punishment. Nelson
differed from Jefferson as he aggressively seized opportunities to exert authority. Jefferson endorsed
Nelson, believing the latter’s skills in both the civil and military arena would aid the war. Diary of Arnold’s
Invasion and Notes on Subsequent Events in 1781…, 1796, PTJ.
67
By December, jails were so crowded that the Council began issuing bail and ordered the accused to
return to answer charges. JCSV, 2:402-404.
68
Since the Committee’s records are incomplete, comparing it to the Council is difficult.
69
Fear plagued the state and courts attempted to curb violence. John Harvie Creecy ed., Virginia
Antiquary: Princess Anne County Loose Papers, 1700-1789 Volume I, (Richmond: The Dietz Press, Inc.,
1954), 85 and 92.
70
Passports remained necessary to travel within and outside the state. State enemies like John Goodrich and
Andrew McCann, who aided the British or bore arms against Virginia, were captured. When both
eventually escaped, the Council offered rewards. The two men were spotted with four “negroes,” perhaps
slaves. More routine cases of accusations and paroles continued as well. Even when the Council showed
leniency, it had limits. If the crime was committed inadvertently or the person found innocent, he needed to
provide security for his future good behavior. Social and political stigma still surrounded accused residents.

  292  
ordered the apprehension of two counterfeiters, Benjamin Woodward and Joseph Bray.

Only listed as “suspicious,” the Council still placed a bounty for their capture. Months

after his arrest, Woodward escaped from confinement, prompting the Council to issue a

reward.71 Monitoring inhabitants’ behavior and loyalty remained critically important

whether the person in question was suspected of aiding the enemy or merely engaged in

the “baneful practice” of gaming. Such surveillance was uniquely tied to the Council’s

conceptions of moral behavior and whom it deemed a good citizen. If, for example, the

Council possessed reason to suspect a person or region, it could quickly order armed men

to apprehend the accused.72 Soon after Virginia declared independence, many open

loyalists realized the time had arrived to abscond. On one day alone, fifteen natives of

Great Britain applied to the Council for permission to return home.73 No doubt desiring

to remove dissenting and corrupting minds, the Council allowed them to leave, provided

                                                                                                               
At times, the innocent pled for the Council to issue a statement exonerating him so he “may not unjustly
suffer by a proceeding which publick Justice has rendered necessary.” JCSV, 1:165 and 471-472.
71
It is not definitively that this is the same Benjamin Woodward. JCSV, 1:141-142 and JCSV, 2:229-230.
Some counterfeit bills were so accurate that authorities had difficulty recognizing false ones. See also:
Ebenezer Hazard and Fred Shelley, The Journal of Ebenezer Hazard in Virginia, 1777 in The Virginia
Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 62, No., 4 (Oct., 1954), 409.
72
The Council believed Tangier Island inhabitants aided to the enemy. The Council also handled
disobedient American captains in Princess Anne County. Some captains were court martialed for delaying
their orders, discouraging recruitment, and burning commissions. JCSV, 1:346-347 and 349. Former British
Lieutenant Governor of Detroit Henry Hamilton fared no better. In June 1779, the Council indicted
Hamilton for “inciting” Native Americans to commit atrocities. Claiming Hamilton was directly linked to
civilian murders, the Council ordered he and others be confined in irons and restricted from all
communication. Writing from prison, Hamilton decried the putrid conditions and claimed his innocence.
Referring to the “inhumanity of the executive power” Hamilton believed paroles merely a façade. After
months confined, gout and scurvy worsened amongst prisoners. Transferred a few times, Hamilton noted
others blamed Virginia’s executive for their horrendous plight. In October 1780, he realized parole was his
only hope and agreed to the Council’s demands. Henry Hamilton to the Honorable the Lieut Governor and
Council of Virginia, August 1779-August 1780, PGRC, 200-203.
73
Another six natives of Great Britain petitioned on August 19. The Council released the suspicious
Andrew Stephenson from confinement on condition he become a sailor on any vessel leaving the country.
Rather than confine Stephenson in already crowded jails or risk paroling him, it sent him away. JCSV,
1:111 and 166.

  293  
they met the Convention’s stipulations to depart.74 Some Virginians who were forced to

leave petitioned the Council for pardons or even extensions.75 Yet, the Council of the

State could not demonstrate mercy at all times. For example, after receiving “Authentick

Information” that Edward Hughes delivered “aid and Comfort” to the enemy, it ordered

him apprehended and brought to the city for interrogation.76 The legislature desired the

Council to rid the state of disaffection on a larger scale.77

Soon after declaring independence, the legislature defined treason as aiding the

enemy, maintaining British authority, or taking arms against the state. It also outlined the

punishment for these crimes.78 The legislature stated that any person encouraging others

to resist governmental sovereignty or laws or who stirred “tumults and disorders” faced

punishment as well.79 Openly naming the Council as the Committee of Safety’s heir, it

bestowed upon the executive body all its predecessor’s powers for the “safety and

                                                                                                               
74
The Convention’s stipulations to depart the state were issued on June 28, 1776.
75
Death penalty pardons and paroles were the most common, and the Council stipulated the individual
refrain from delivering intelligence to the enemy. The Council also dealt with slave pardons. JCSV, 1:307,
311 and 331-332.
76
Whatever aid Hughes provided, his own words damned him. Admitting during an interrogation to aiding
the enemy, he was sent to trial for treason. JCSV, 1:336 and 342.
77
Virginia’s patriot leadership had to deal with not only loyalists, but also rebellious slaves and
disenchanted poor and middle class whites. Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class, &
Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 6-13.
78
Those guilty of treason faced execution or property confiscation. Either confession or two witnesses were
needed to convict of treason. The legislature also passed a law to conduct trials for prisoners. To curb some
of the governor and Council’s power, it eliminated their right to pardon. The executive could deliver a
reprieve until the Assembly examined the case. The Assembly also passed an ordinance allowing sheriffs to
remain in their positions until the governor made appointments. SVA, 9:168-169.
79
The punishment was up to £20,000 or 5 years in jail. Other crimes included discouraging enlistments and
importing British goods. The act was for the remainder of the war. A separate statute outlawed horse
stealing and set the reward at £10. SVA, 9:170-175.

  294  
security of the commonwealth” during the immediate danger “to the community.”80

Citing public safety, the Assembly continued the Committee’s extreme authority without

actually listing any specifics, thus making the Council the new bulwark of civil authority.

The state effectively endowed its successor with the same authority even though some

leaders previously feared the Committee of Safety’s incredible power.81

In early 1777, attempting to rid the state of dissension, the Council sought to

enforce the legislature’s proclamation mandating that inhabitants leave the state within

forty days if they “were Partners with, Agents, Factors, Store keepers or assistant

Storekeepers here for any Merchant…in Great Britain” when Parliament attempted to

prevent commerce and seize American property.82 However, if residents proved they

supported the cause or possessed American families, they could file an exemption.

Loyalty remained the key but grey issue. Allegiance during war was still difficult to

gauge. For the Council, identifying, containing, and eradicating disaffection was

necessary to preserve public safety and establish community conformity. No doubt

                                                                                                               
80
SVA, 9:178.
81
Nearly every time the legislature designated a power to the governor, it added the Council must be
consulted. “An act for raising six additional battalions of infantry on the continental establishment” further
delivered the Council military authority in 1776. It could make commissions, deliver trader permits, and
punish those falsifying records. Furthermore, “An Act for making a farther provision for the internal
security and defence of this country” allowed the governor and Council to erect fortifications in areas the
Assembly designated. In a separate act, the Council could assign people to work at the Fincastle lead
mines. Both slaves and suspicious persons were sent during the war. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia,
167-168. This power would soon become controversial, but it allowed the executive the power to sell lead.
All sales had to be first offered to the United States or any state before being offered to a private citizen.
SVA, 9:179-191 and 237.
82
JCSV, 1:303. By May 1777, the Assembly ordered all men 16 and older to take an oath of Allegiance.
Those who refused found themselves disarmed and lost the right to vote or hold offices. Many who
supposedly did not know the law failed to take the oath. Historian H.J. Eckenrode claimed few refused due
to outright disaffection, but offered little evidence. For example, Joshua Tinsley, an elderly man who did
not know where to take the oath, had his taxes doubled. Elsewhere, justices were not available to extend
oaths. After many residents were fined, the Assembly granted relief in 1779. Some deemed loyal were
supposedly reimbursed. Legislative Petitions. Essex (A5349) in Eckenrode, 182-183.

  295  
fearful for their lives, families, and livelihoods, Virginians pled for mercy and filed

exemptions. At times, the Council granted exemptions, delaying responses to some

people to “avoid a hasty determination of this matter.”83 The Council hoped to avoid

allowing any suspicious persons to remain. The proclamation offered the executive a

chance to coercively instill conformity. Mustering whatever empathy it could, the

Council of the State agreed not to deport them while it deliberated.84 For all appeals,

though, the burden of proof fell upon the individual to demonstrate that “they have

manifested a uniform attachment to American Interest.”85 It was not the Council’s goal

to prove innocence or increase the patriot population. It sought security and conformity.

By late spring 1777, the Council advised Henry to issue a proclamation to county

lieutenants to remove all natives of Great Britain who fell under the deportation

resolution. For many of these unfortunates, their time had lapsed and the Council seemed

eager to commence the forced exodus. Judging by its rhetoric, the Council desired swift

results by any means necessary. It ordered local officers to,

take all such persons… [in their counties] into custody as prisoners of war and all
such of the said prisoners as reside on the south side of James River to be
removed to the Court House of Cumberland county, and those on the north side of
the said river to Caroline Court House.86
                                                                                                               
83
The Dinwiddie County court’s word and evidence that David Ross had previously been “of great
utility…to the State” did not sway the Council to immediately exempt him. JCSV, 1:332-333.
84
The Council suggested David Ross find people to speak to his character. In June 1777, the Council
discussed Ross’ memorial, but since no one offered evidence, Ross’ nightmare concluded. Other natives of
Great Britain successfully petitioned, but much of the time, petitions merely prolonged their stay in
America to settle affairs and acquire a means to travel. See JCSV, 1:333.
85
JCSV, 1:360. Natives of Great Britain continued to appear well into 1778. Patrick Ronaldson, who was
suppose to leave the country, returned. Captured in Isle of Wight County, the Council ruled he was now a
prisoner of war and paroled him to his home. JCSV, 2:180.
86
JCSV, 1:377. Recognizing civilian and military tension, at times the Council sought to eliminate
unnecessary abuses. Angry Williamsburg citizens complained of “great Inconvenience from the
Instructions at present given to the Soldiers upon Guard” who “often Interrupt innocent people from
pursuing their Business.” Residents feared random interrogations at the hands of city sentinels. The Council

  296  
Calling upon local military officials to initiate a manhunt for outstanding ‘enemies,’ the

Council of the State desired a swift capture of all suspicious persons and ordered them

confined in detention camps. By incarcerating their former neighbors without a trial,

Councilors sought to secure the state. Surveying Virginia’s tense political and social

climate, Edward Johnson argued that, when “Justice & Charity is uncertain and when any

set of men in a Community is subjected to deprivation of property on Suspicion without a

trial or being informed of these censors,” such governmental surveillance is worse than

living among your enemies.87 Wishing the Americans well, Johnson still could not

endorse such methods.88 Though a British native, Nicholas Cresswell did not write

specifically about this resolution, but mentioned the increasing unhappiness within the

state directed at “the effects of an Independent Government,” especially large-scale

disarming.89

                                                                                                               
instructed soldiers to avoid “useless Severity” and “great Infringement[s] of the Rights of the People,” and
ordered them to exercise prudence. City sentinels, the Council ordered, should refrain from assailing all
Virginians, especially residents who quietly maintained their business. Cresswell also visited Williamsburg
and noted soldiers’ “disorderly” nature. He contended that they were not “the guardians of the people and
the defenders of their rights.” The distraught Cresswell recalled, “Houses burnt down, others pulled to
pieces for fuel, most of the Gardens thrown to the street, everything in disorder and confusion and no
appearance of trade. This melancholy scene fills the mind of the itinerant traveler with gloomy and horrid
ideas.” JCSV, 1:490 and Cresswell, 206-207.
87
Edward Johnson to William Preston, July 31, 1776 in PFP, VHS.
88
Similarly, Cresswell noted that when patriots regained control, they punished disaffection. For example,
when a local committee discovered John Gee recruited for the British, a mob captured and paraded him
around town on “a sharp rail…cut [him] with knives” and “bruised [him] with clubs.” Gee was later sent to
New Jersey, where he escaped to the British only to be recaptured. Imprisoned again in Virginia, Cresswell
saw Gee naked, dirty, and lacking food. Cresswell, also lacking goods, provided Gee with clothes and
blankets. After hearing of Washington’s victories in the north and Howe’s retreat, Cresswell lamented his
situation and hoped to abscond. Cresswell, 183.
89
Cresswell, 190.

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 Even with powers not outlined in the constitution, the Council recognized, to be

effective, it had to bend or even break the law to secure the common good.90 For

example, when a Halifax County court deemed James Stevens, Walter Robinson, Thomas

Hope, and James Calland (all natives of Great Britain) enemies of the state to be

forcefully deported, the Council lamented the four men did not fall under the recent act.91

Hesitant to punish the men but wary of releasing them, the Council reluctantly liberated

them on the stipulation they be tendered the oath. If refused, they would be disarmed and

interrogated under “the particular Acts of Enmity of which they have been guilty.” To

any cognizant resident, the Council demonstrated the true extent of its power when it

came to exterminating disaffection. If the Council deemed an inhabitant an enemy, it

would construct a means to enact punishment whether a law existed or not. After July

1776, refusing the oath damned many residents, forcing them to flee the country.92 Even

patriots such as Ebenezer Hazard lamented the unfortunate suffering of the destitute

forced into exile and caught between two worlds. At times, even residents who later tried

to accept the oath found themselves personas non grata.93

                                                                                                               
90
The Council faced similar threats as the Committee, such as reports of salt deficiencies and British
targeting of Portsmouth. JCSV, 1:382 and 386. In April 1777, after hearing Cumberland needed salt, the
Council ordered Carter Braxton to distribute the mineral to distressed inhabitants. The lack of salt
continued. Soon after, the Council received word that British ships from New York might target Virginia.
Since Portsmouth appeared defenseless, Councilors sent troops.
91
None of the men were “agents, Tailors, Clerks, or storekeepers for any merchants in Britain on the first
day of January 1776.” JCSV, 1:385.
92
Hazard heard loyalist merchants, after refusing the oath, purchased a ship to leave the country. Caught
between two worlds, the British seized the boat and returned the merchants to Virginia. Later on another
boat came for the men to convey them to New York. Hazard and Shelley, 418.
93
In July, Hazard noted the Scots, “having once already refused, & chosen rather to put themselves under
the Protection of our Enemies. These unhappy Men are now reduced to a most disagreeable Situation,
through the Perfidy & Inhumanity of the King’s Officers, upon whom they had every Claim to Protection
& Kindness.” He believed these “Friends of Government,” suffered due to “a foolish Attachment to the
Tyranny, or a ridiculous Fear of the Power of G. Britain.” Hazard and Shelley, 418-419.

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 Similar to the proclamation against natives of Great Britain, the Council openly

targeted other groups, such as deserters. In April 1777, the governor called upon

residents, “to make diligent search for all deserters… lurking within the state” and help

bring them under guard to Williamsburg.94 Calling upon military officials to conduct the

manhunt, the Council seemingly suggested Virginians provide information, hunt, or

capture deserters.95 Patriotism meant aiding security. Much like the Committee of

Safety’s publishing of names, these proclamations stirred fear and while not directly

calling for violence, ignited danger. These orders incited others to conform as well.

Such fear helped the Council further establish both the security state and conformity.96

Another group of suspicious Virginians drawing the security state’s watchful eye

was the pacifist Quakers. Perceived to lack loyalty, the Council targeted the pacifists

after receiving intelligence from the Continental Congress that Pennsylvanian Quakers

held illicit correspondence with the British when in Virginia. Producing little evidence or

reason, the Council assumed Virginia’s Quakers must be inimical as well. Such a

tenuously tied theory did not prevent the executive from ordering letters sent to patriots in

Henrico, Nansemond, Hanover, Loudoin, and any other counties where the Society held

meetings. Furthermore, the Council of the State ordered local leaders to “use their best

Endeavours to gain Information in whose Custody the Records of the remains, to issue

Warrants for the Seizing… & if any such Treasonable practices” exist, apprehend all
                                                                                                               
94
JCSV, 1:397.
95
In its May session, the Assembly passed “An Act for regulating and disciplining the Militia,” to call for
additional troops. The Assembly listed the regulations and placed the Council in a position to “degrade”
officers. SVA, 9:271.
96
Similarly, the Council frequently dealt with individuals who refused to recognize their commission or
behaved improperly. For example, the Council heard accusations of disaffection from William Montague’s
neighbors. Montague was the nominated justice of the peace at the time. JCSV, 1:415. By spring 1777,
Virginia witnessed angry protests against enlistments. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 130-133.

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criminals.97 Given the times, the Council justified and ordered the search and seizure of

openly professed pacifists to root out potential threats. During war, across all three

states, pacifism was deemed unpatriotic.

Coercively employing surveillance techniques to reach its goals, the Council

cannot be accused of baseless paranoia. For example, in spring 1777 the Virginia Gazette

reported a plan by “Tories and traitors” to burn Alexandria. The authorities captured

Thomas Davis and his six compatriots before they could complete their heinous crime.98

Similarly, shoreline towns such as Jamestown still lay in ruins due to attacks.99 Mounting

disorder led the Assembly to pass a law empowering the governor and Council with

emergency military powers to prevent invasions and insurrections.100 Within months,

Lieutenant John Wilson of Norfolk wrote the Council informing them of “evil disposed

persons” who conspired “to foment a Dangerous Insurrection.”101 Norfolk remained a

                                                                                                               
97
JCSV, 1:499-500. Earlier in 1777, Pennsylvania sent alleged inimical Quakers to Frederick County,
Virginia for safety purposes. Residents soon disagreed with this measure and threatened violence. Wishing
to rid Virginia of this problem, the Council wrote Pennsylvania’s executive calling for the Quakers’
removal. Sensing disaster, the Council ordered the prisoners paroled but demanded county lieutenants
ensure their safety. Considering any violence against these people as “highly Derogatory & Dishonorable to
this Government,” the Council warned inhabitants. Around the same time, Winchester inhabitants also
complained about housing some 750 prisoners of war. Therefore, the Council ordered the prisoners
disbursed between Berkeley and Dunmore counties. JCSV, 2:9 & 15.
98
“Williamsburg,” Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), May 30, 1777. Hazard recalled prisoners paraded
down the street in irons. Hazard and Shelley, 402. Two men, Wales and Hepburn, held significant property,
and none of the accused were Americans. Counterfeiting remained a problem and in the May 1777 session,
the Assembly passed a law giving the Council the authority to take some money from the offender’s estate
to provide for his family. SVA, 9:287 and 303.
99
Hazard and Shelley, 411.
100
The Assembly also passed, “An act to discourage Desertion, and to punish persons harbouring or
entertaining Deserters.” Since desertion undermined authority and endangered the community, the
Assembly called upon militia officers to appoint men to hunt deserters. Many accused men appeared before
the Council, which reprimanded them and sent them to the proper authorities. Anyone who harbored or
traded with a deserter could be fined £5 over the actual worth of the item. Even those not appointed to
capture deserters could receive a £3 reward. SVA, 9:289-297.
101
JCSV, 1:435.

  300  
breeding ground for disaffection, as dissidents secretly collaborated against “the

peaceable and well affected Inhabitants.” After Wilson named three ringleaders

responsible for the terror, Levy Sykes, Josiah Phillips, and Jon Ashely, the Council

advised the governor to offer a $150 reward for the capture of each man.102 The

Assembly passed additional laws against disaffection throughout the war against

deserters and seditious residents.103 A bond for good behavior and the publishing of

one’s name might also be imposed if authorities felt the suspicious individual warranted

such a punishment, leaving the accused branded in society, much like how Cresswell

described.

The Council of the State and Oaths of Allegiance

Oaths of allegiance became arguably the most significant method to measure

society’s allegiance. No excuses would be permitted and those who refused an oath

found themselves displaced from the new state government’s favor. In mid August 1777,

anyone who refused the oath or was deemed suspicious found his travel severely

                                                                                                               
102
In May 1778, the Assembly passed a bill of attainder against Phillips and his men to turn themselves in
or face the full force of law. Citing the fear the band instigated in Princess Anne and Norfolk, the Assembly
deemed “it shall be lawful for any person” to kill Phillips and his men. SVA, 9:463-464 and Brett
Palfreyman, “Peace Process: The Reintegration of Loyalists in Post-Revolutionary America” (PhD
Dissertation: Binghamton University, 2014), 266-267. Virginia still faced disorder on the Eastern Shore
and in Princess Anne County slaves fled to the British. The Council ordered any suspicious or inimical
whites in these areas forcefully removed to the interior for “Peace and security.” In Princess Anne County,
local residents claimed internal subversives delivered intelligence and disarmed patriots. Thus the Council
ordered officers to detain the suspicious and remove them from the county. Councilors added that the
suspicious should be separated from the treasonous and removed. In September 1777, the Council noted
Princess Anne County residents leaving the area with their “valuable Effects.” This note could be the
forced exile the Council dictated. JCSV, 1:483 and 497-498.
103
During the May 1780 session, the legislature passed a law targeting American deserters, making it easier
to apprehend and punish the accused. Commanding officers were cited as responsible for capture, but the
Council could release or remove deserters. The punishment for sedition was up to five years in prison or a
£100,000 fine. SVA, 10:263 and 268-270.

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limited.104 In the name of “preserv[ing] the internal Peace,” the Council interrogated

inhabitants and seized their private property, namely any boats or vessels.

Despite such measures, in a letter congratulating Washington for his “success in

the Jerseys,” John Parke Custis disclosed unsettling news regarding disaffection in

Virginia, Williamsburg specifically. An allegedly disaffected man named Davis and his

compatriots were acquitted of charges.105 Custis bemoaned both the judges’ illogical

reasoning and also the possible negative repercussions. Without strict and intimidating

penalties for aiding the enemy, no one would fear the government. In response, the

Council proclaimed Virginia “may be greatly injured by Persons residing here, who are

unfriendly to the true Interest of the same, unless” swift action was taken to intimidate

them into conformity.106 In Williamsburg, at least on the surface, Custis explained, “the

test is generally taken…few or none hesitating.” But this was not the case everywhere.

Therefore, the Council of the State ordered military officers to seize all who refused the

oath and anyone else whom patriots possessed “good cause to suspect have a Design to

do any thing unfriendly to the State.”107 Any person apprehended would then be

                                                                                                               
104
JCSV, 1:468-469. The army and navy were empowered to execute these orders. All free males had until
October 1777 to swear allegiance. Some residents fled while others were jailed or were disarmed and had
their names published. Lists of names filled the Virginia Gazette in the first half of 1777. Those men
disarmed still had to attend militia drills but could not hold office, sue, serve on a jury, or buy land. Selby,
The Revolution in Virginia, 149.
105
Even if juries found men guilty, Custis argued, prosecutors did not provide clear definitions of “the
enemies of America,” allowing lawyers to persuade courts to overturn verdicts. Apparently, Washington’s
previous kindness to a former convict named Davis helped bring about these events. John Parke Custis to
George Washington, August 8, 1777, PGW.
106
JCSV, 1:468.
107
JCSV, 1:469. The 1777 act extended the oath to all free male Virginians. In January 1778, upon
receiving information regarding the British at Kaskasky on the western frontier, the Council advised an
immediate and secret expedition. Stressing to George Rogers Clark the necessity of speed and “Humanity”
the Council desired him to extend the oath. Thereby, inhabitants recognized the state’s sovereignty and
knew they would be treated “as fellow Citizens & their Persons and property duly secured.” If the residents
denied, “these reasonable Demands, they must feel the Miseries of War.” JCSV, 2:56-57. If inhabitants

  302  
removed at least 10 miles from the British forces or threatened areas. If subsequently

discovered within these areas, the accused would be sent to the local justices of the peace.

No doubt such efforts eventually resorted to witch-hunts when the Council issued such

broad definitions of enemies of the state and extended the right to deprive the alleged

inimical persons of their rights.108 Less than two weeks later, with the British in

Maryland, the Council of the State believed the threat had abated and it allowed allegedly

suspicious inhabitants to return home. While their boats and other vessels would be

returned, the Council reserved its right to order such a seizure again.109

From 1777-1778 the Council of the State focused on curbing contact between the

British and Virginians, yet disaffection continued. Lieutenant Governor John Page and

the Council notified county lieutenants to stop and seize any boats that might “facilitate

the escape of our internal Enemies or Slaves.”110 Such an extensive project would be

difficult, but the Council suggested focusing on the most suspicious residents, profiling

                                                                                                               
recognized Virginia’s sovereignty, their trade would be protected. By July, Clark succeeded in taking the
region. Realizing disaffection remained a threat; the Assembly passed a law calling for the investigation
and apprehension of disaffected persons in Ohio, Monongalia, and Yohogania counties. SVA, 9:374-375.
During the May 1779 session, the legislature passed “An act declaring who shall be deemed citizens of this
commonwealth” which stipulated that white men born or living in the state for two years were eligible to
take an oath, but not British aliens. The executive could expel all fugitives and anyone guilty of treason in
another state. Anyone who violated the state’s laws faced forfeiture of lands. SVA, 10:129-130.
108
The Council placed bounties on specific people. In August 1777, John Goodrich Sr., Levin Townshend,
Andrew McCann, and Malcom Shilcot escaped from jail in Albemarle County and sailed down the James
with four black men. The Council offered a $100 reward for Goodrich Sr., a $50 reward for the other white
men, and $25 for each black accomplice. The three were captured seven days later. JCSV, 1:472.
109
JCSV, 1:479. When threats passed, the Council relaxed some of its rules, such as curbing its August 18,
1777 resolution that ordered residents removed from threatened areas and terminated apprehensions in
those regions. Invasions from the Chesapeake Bay seemed unlikely; therefore evacuations were suspended.
Nine residents were apprehended in Accomack and Northampton counties on the Council’s order.
However, receiving no charge against them, and since they had accepted the oath, the Council discharged
the men to be “good Citizens.” JCSV, 2:5-7. The Council continued monitoring inhabitants it previously
deemed suspicious and forced them to accept a parole to remain on good behavior.
110
JCSV, 1:466.

  303  
for anyone who refused the oath of allegiance. Also, inhabitants using non-government

sanctioned flags of truce reportedly boarded British men of war and conducted illicit

trade.111 Again leading the Council, Page advised Henry to issue a proclamation

forbidding such behavior in the future. Demanding that only persons holding a new

special license be permitted to board enemy ships, Page suggested only Councilors

possess the power to distribute passes.112 No doubt under Page’s leadership, the Council

ordered “all the Good people of this State,” especially civil and military officers, “to exert

their utmost Vigilance to detect & bring to condign Punishment all such offenders.”

Loyalty was continuously in question and American Colonel Martin Pickett

notified the Councilors that the enemy potentially planned to divide the population with

deceit and trickery. He stressed that even residents who appeared to support the cause

should still be forced to prove their fidelity by accepting the oath. Anyone who refused

the oath faced property confiscation. Such a strategy of distinguishing “between the

Innocent Ignorant, & the designing Betrayer of his country,” while perhaps not

completely successful, was their only option.113 Considering oaths a necessary evil

Pickett feared, “it will have its bad as well as its good effect unless carefully handled.”

Too often men accepted the oath publicly but privately remained “unfriendly.” With that

in mind, Pickett knew internal enemies remained, even if subversively. Like Pickett, the

                                                                                                               
111
Henry and the patriots knew disaffected men illicitly traveled under flags. Patrick Henry to the Speaker
of the House of Delegates, May 25, 1779 in Patrick Henry, Life Correspondence and Speeches ed. William
Writ Henry, Volume III (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891), 242.
112
JCSV, 2:84-85.
113
Martin Pickett, Williamsburg, October 28, 1778 to [?] Brooke, John Churchill, [?] Diggs, [?] Whiting,
[?] Woodford and an unidentified addressee, VHS. Born in Fauquier County Virginia, Pickett represented
his county on the Virginia Convention in 1776 and 1788. Elroy M. Avery ed., “Colonel Martin Pickett,”
Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine Volume XXXVI, (January – June 1910), 414.

  304  
Council recognized allegiance was still contested.114 Despite contrary assertions, dissent

had not been eradicated.115

The Council also demonstrated leniency, at times issuing pardons and providing

loyal Americans with security.116 As the executive relinquished some of its emergency

powers, it commenced delivering power to courts. In summer 1781, the Council received

word of an insurrection in Hampshire County and ordered a court of oyer and terminer to

convene and punish any man who took part or might engage in an insurrection or

treasonous activity.117 Two days later, the Council issued another statement: deliver the

                                                                                                               
114
James McGavock notified patriot William Preston that though some men sat in chains, disaffection
remained a problem. Patriots feared enemy recruiters, such as John Griffith, and the potential threat that
nonjurors plotted with men in the Walkers and Reed Creek region. McGavock suggested if they were not
captured, violence would commence. William Campbell also explained to Preston that men such as
Michael Hennigar, who provided information against the disaffected, feared for his life. McGavock
recounted similar stories of residents berated by inimical men if they accepted oaths to the state. Both
Campbell and McGavock described interrogating, obtaining names, and ordering apprehensions. James
McGavock to William Preston, April 15, 1779 and William Campbell to William Preston, April 19, 1779,
and James McGavock to William Preston, April 25, 1779 in PFP, VHS. Jefferson agreed with Preston’s
methods endorsing apprehensions and removing dangerous persons from the county for trials. He advised
Preston, if there was a lack of evidence to convict of a capital crime, he should try for lesser charges.
Jefferson and Virginia’s leaders remained aware of internal subversion throughout 1781. Jefferson to
Colonel Preston, March 21, 1780, Jefferson to Colonel William Preston, July 3, 1780, and Jefferson to
George Rogers Clark, February 19, 1781, PGRC, 402, 434, and 507.
115
Edward Johnson erroneously claimed in May 1779 that disaffection had disappeared. Edward Johnson
to William Preston, May 29, 1779, in PFP, VHS. In Fincastle County, Preston pled with his neighbors to
meet so he could assuage potentially disaffected persons who threatened his home. Some inhabitants met
secretly and even took British oaths leading to arrests and bonds. In the name of community, Preston asked
for peace, noting that, much to the state government’s ire, he refrained from taking harsher measures
against nonjurors. Preston continued to report disaffected persons stirring disorder. William Preston to his
neighbors, June 1779, James Montgomery to William Preston, June 11, 1779, and William Preston to
William Campbell, July 19, 1779, in PFP, VHS and Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 219-220.
116
The Assembly offered pardons to anyone who ignorantly took a British oath before November 1, 1780.
SVA, 10:324. Revived consistently, the legislature desired the executive to battle “the arts of the enemy
joined by the disaffected persons, riots have taken place in some counties injurious to the peace and dignity
of government; to prevent such pernicious practices in the future, and in order to aid the civil power in the
due and effectual execution of law.” The act enabled the Council to call troops if it suspected a riot or
recruitment mutiny was possible. If treason was discovered, the Council could call for a general court.
117
JCSV, 2:350. The Council assigned John Magill, Alexander White, Dolphin Drew, and Phillip Pendleton
to serve on the commission. Specific attention was to be given to the “present invasion.” A separate law
stipulated the punishments for lesser crimes.

  305  
ringleaders. Ordering officers to pardon inhabitants who delivered names of instigators

in Rockingham, Augusta, and Hampshire, the Council of the State hoped to capture

deserters and men responsible for stirring the flames of disaffection. While the Council’s

ultimate goal hinged on law and order, its members announced they desired residents to

“return to their duty as citizens.”118 If inhabitants “refused to comply with this mild

condition,” the Council warned it would display the “whole strength” of the militia to

instill justice.119

The Council’s desire to regularize its policing efforts brought some stability. For

example, in 1781, Attorney General George Nicholas suggested all prisoners taken with

the enemy at the surrender of York be “proceeded against under the act for giving powers

to the Governor and Council, and for punishing those who shall oppose the Execution of

the Laws” since at that time “there can [be] no commitment but under that law by which

they can be legally detained in custody.” In the end, Councilors sent 36 men to jail based

on “just cause to suspect that all the [a]forementioned persons are disaffected to the

Independence of the American States and attached to their Enemies.”120 Capturing and

imprisoning accused disaffected persons proved fruitful as the board obtained

information from men like Bassil Jackson, who divulged details on Carolina refugee

                                                                                                               
118
JCSV, 2:351.
119
Only a few weeks later, the legislature informed the Council it would examine the executive’s conduct
over the past twelve months. Councilors seemed surprised, as they believed any suspension of executive
power would be harmful to the state. JCSV, 2:356. On December 15, Peter Hog of Rockingham and
Colonel Vanmeter of Hampshire asked the Council for mercy for those inhabitants involved in the
insurrection. By mid December 1781, the British lost at Yorktown and the state demonstrated some
clemency. While still displaying its power, the Council stated it would consider pardoning “all those
deluded people” except the ringleaders. JCSV, 3:13.
120
JCSV, 2:404 and 3:4-5. Councilors met five days after releasing men on bail and changed their mind.
Claiming the men obstructed the law, the Council sent them to prison and ordered the jailer to receive the
seven original men plus an additional twenty-nine others to be held until “due course of law.”

  306  
loyalists disguised as British prisoners. With such details, the Council sent Jackson to

Winchester to identify conspirators.121 Later on, the Council appointed Josiah Parker,

William Robinson, and William Nimmo Jr. as a commission of oyer and terminer at

Portsmouth to conduct trials for the disaffected in Norfolk County. No doubt the timing

was in part related to the British’s defeat at Yorktown.122 With disaffection waning, it

was time for the Council of the State to transition to more formal government.123

The Council of the State as a Functioning Government

Aside from preparing defenses and pursuing disaffection, the Council of the State

also provided inhabitants with the necessary functions of government. From its

inception, the Council appointed justices of the peace, permitted trading vessels to

resume business, and tried to spur domestic production.124 The executive also responded

to petitions. For example, the Council acknowledged Alexandria residents’ grievances

regarding their defenseless situation and permitted their purchase of cannons to guard the

shores. Such measures ensured both a secure coastline and inhabitants’ confidence in the

                                                                                                               
121
JCSV, 3:19.
122
On the same day, the Council called for an investigation of an American assaulted and robbed. Curbing
such violence was necessary to maintain legitimacy. JCSV, 3:7.
123
Even with the British gone, the Council of State faced challenges. It continued detaining and sending to
trial those captured at Yorktown and issued proclamations to apprehend deserters and British prisoners of
war who did not possess proper licenses for their parole. JCSV, 3:14 and 16. The Council also
recommended magistrates to examine men in jail after discharge.
124
The executive ordered trade with the West Indies to procure supplies and created a merchant network in
the Caribbean. These men treated the state as a client, which at times led to corruption and confusing
bookkeeping. In 1777, the Council sent vessels to Europe for supplies yet only one eventually returned due
to the British blockade. Even with the Council’s efforts, continental trade remained negligible. Located far
away, western salt reserves were hard to reach. Most salt before the Revolution was imported until 1778.
Dunmore previously destroyed salt in 1776, which led to high prices and pillaging. While the Convention
called for salt works constructed by 1778, it became cheaper to trade on the open market. JCSV, 1:324 and
454; 2:43; and Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 165-166 and 172-176.

  307  
government.125 For the Council, protecting citizens was necessary to achieve legitimacy.

Providing for citizens also included addressing scarcity and war profiteering. Aside from

championing the embargo and seeking to boost trade and manufacturing, the executive

body felt inclined to prevent violence caused by scarcity.126

Aside from disaffection and an invading army, another significant issue Virginia

and the Council faced was scarcity. “If no Salt comes in” Cresswell wrote, “there will be

an insurrection in the Colony.”127 With other necessities expensive or completely

unavailable, the Council of the State undoubtedly worried allegiances might shift.

Cresswell lambasted the Council’s supposed attention to the common good as the poor

suffered the most. Rejecting the security state’s methods, Cresswell bemoaned that,

“Poor people are almost naked. Congress or Committee of Safety or some of those

infernal bodies have issued an Order that every one that is fortunate enough to be

possessed of two coats is to give one to their naked soldiers.”128 Like others who

suffered at the hands of the security state, Cresswell knew the cost of the Council’s

pursuit of the common good. To combat scarcities, Cresswell noted, committees for

public safety sold salt in small quantities. Such rationing had limited effects. Although

Cresswell found these small portions inexcusable, the people seemed pleased with the

                                                                                                               
125
JCSV, 1:149.
126
In attempts to salvage the economy, the Council issued numerous trade permits to captains willing to
abide by governmental regulations, which included oaths of allegiance. During fall 1776, the Council
continued the Committee of Safety’s practice of conducting trade by seeking commerce in the West Indies.
Inhabitants applied for permits. JCSV, 1:324.
127
Others too noted high prices in early 1777. January 16, 1777, Robert Honyman Diary, 1776-1782,
Microfilm, CWFL.
128
It is unclear which committee Cresswell referenced. Cresswell, 180-182.

  308  
dole. During the Council’s reign, it enacted similar measures.129 For example, after

rampant abuses in army impressments, the General Assembly permitted the Council to

set prices.130

Leaders across Virginia understood measures were needed as both patriots and the

disaffected misused resources. According to Custis, patriot leaders also abused prices to

aggrandize themselves. These hypocritical men punished others for crimes they

themselves committed. Highlighting the widespread price gouging by deceitful men,

Custis lamented that they “buy up every article, and retail them out again at the most

intolerable prices, distressing the poor at a cruel degree.”131 Considering inflation and

speculation as threats to stability, John Page championed decisive measures.132 Writing

to Richard Henry Lee, he contended, “The Spirit of Traffic prevails so much amongst us,

and the Demon of Avarice is…let loose upon us.”133 Underhanded economic dealings

devastated the war effort and the Council even offered slaves to miserly speculators

rather than the depreciated currency.134 Although the Council’s measures were not

                                                                                                               
129
The Council permitted former Committee of Safety and current Council member Carter Braxton to
import salt under specific regulations. Despite these efforts, violence and disorder still ensued. Dill, 94-95.
130
SVA, 10:437. In 1781, the legislature lambasted Virginia Governor Thomas Nelson for overstretching
his powers ordering impressments. Nelson argued, “the trust my country has repos’d in me demands that I
should stretch my powers to their utmost extent, regardless of the censures of the inconsiderate or any other
evil that may result to myself from such a step.” Nelson to Major Hubbard, September 20, 1781, Hubbard-
Bolling Family Papers. U.V. in Emory G. Evans, Thomas Nelson: Revolutionary Virginian (Williamsburg:
The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1975), 115.
131
Since the Assembly did little to nothing to protect the public, Custis argued the people would take
matters into their own hands. Such activities plagued the new state’s ability to rule. John Parke Custis to
George Washington, August 8, 1777, PGW.
132
Honyman noted that high prices caused the poor to suffer. February 3, 1779, Robert Honyman Diary,
1776-1782, Microfilm, CWFL.
133
John Page to Richard Henry Lee, February 17, 1778, Revolutionary Papers, (Letters to Richard Henry,
Arthur, and William Lee) 1750-1824, in Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 180.
134
JCSV, 2:143.

  309  
always successful, trade was somewhat revived after the blockade was lifted. By winter

1778-1779, Virginia and the Council finally were able to conduct some degree of

commerce with Europe.135

Advocating for the “General Welfare” and endorsing the Congress’ embargo, the

Council faced nearly insurmountable odds when it came to alleviating economic issues.

The General Assembly recognized during a time of “lust of grain,” inhabitants might be

tempted to export items contrary to the embargo. Such behavior would be detrimental as

there was a “present alarming scarcity and publick distress.”136 Placing the governor and

Council in charge to lay the embargo, the law stated that if caught, the accused would be

forbidden from future trade within the commonwealth except what was necessary for his

family’s subsistence.137 Ships and wagons suspected of carrying illicit cargo could be

seized and the goods forfeited. Believing that exporting goods would only serve to aid

the enemy, Councilors knew without decisive measures, war profiteers would continue to

abuse their neighbors.138 The Council also endorsed an act forbidding the removal of salt

for four months. Hoping these measures would alleviate some of the problems, the

Council of the State advised Henry to issue a proclamation warning treacherous residents

                                                                                                               
135
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 182. The governor and Council also ordered a letter sent to Rawleigh
Colston to negotiate a line of credit with Spain.
136
In its October 1778 session, the Assembly passed additional laws allowing the governor and Council to
lay embargos and punish transgressors. Due to “divers persons” the state lost valuable wheat, Indian corn,
and other provisions. The executive reserved the right to give special permission if the goods were going to
another state in great need. SVA, 9:474, 530-535.
137
If violated, the accused risked forfeiture of goods. Furthermore, ship captains were to give bonds that
their cargos did not contain outlawed goods. The Council also advocated, in light of the John Goodrich’s
treachery on the high seas, for a stronger navy to capture and intimidate such criminals. George M. Curtis,
III, “The Goodrich Family and the Revolution in Virginia, 1774-1776,” The Virginia Magazine of History
and Biography, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Jan., 1976), 49-74.
138
JCSV, 2:209.

  310  
that their goods could be forfeited if caught. In 1779, the Council instructed the

Commissioner of Trade to distribute 300 passports in attempts to bring additional loads

of salt to Virginia.139 To assist the dearth of necessities towards the end of the war, the

Council also attempted to enforce price regulations on meats, grains, spirits, and salt.

Forced to repeal these restrictions for a short time, eventually the regulations returned

with a few exceptions.140 Counterfeiters also felt the Council’s long reach when the

executive issued bounties for twenty-three men accused of falsifying bills.141 While not

all men were captured, a statement was certainly sent. Despite the Council’s efforts, its

measures to curb food shortages did not alleviate the problem. Virginia still experienced

currency scarcity and food shortages throughout the state, which continued to divide the

population.142 Although the Council recognized the problem, it failed to make significant

progress.

Seeking to ease inflation and scarcity, the Council still understood in order to

establish legitimacy it could not always trample inhabitants’ rights. As the state

executive, preserving order also meant protecting loyal Americans from lawless mobs.

For example, when Richard Savage found his recently imported salt, as well as himself,

threatened, he petitioned the Council for aid. Savage explained to the executive that a

riotous crowd warned him not to remove his salt from their neighborhood before they
                                                                                                               
139
The Assembly called to continue the embargo on salt and encouraged importation by allowing the owner
to export one hogshead of tobacco duty free. SVA, 9:149-151.
140
JCSV, 2:365-366, 368, 373 and 375. Days later, the Council desired more time to consider. On August
10, with inhabitants suffering, it ordered the Commercial Agent to procure as many supplies as possible by
trading flour. However, it instructed him to hold out for the best deal.
141
JCSV, 2:229-230. Rewards ranged from £350 to £1,000.
142
By 1777, there were many military insurrections over the lack of necessities and military drafts.
Angered by their treatment throughout the war, poor whites gained little by supporting the Revolution.
McDonnell, 281-315.

  311  
could acquire the life-sustaining minerals. Informed that Savage’s neighbors lacked the

money to purchase the salt, the Council of the State did not side with the unfortunate

inhabitants. Although seemingly contrary to the Council’s adherence to the common

good, it does not seem Savage overcharged for salt and the Council believed it needed to

preserve order by protecting his property. According to the Councilors, the crowd

behaved with a “riotous Disposition …so disgraced to Government.”143 Insulted by the

lack of respect displayed for the law, the Council wrote to the county leaders to repress

the situation and protect Savage and his goods at all costs. In a similar effort to curb riots

and disorder, the Council also defended Major Dick against York residents who quarreled

over his decision to cut down the palisades for firewood. Arguing the palisades were

public property and their destruction sanctioned, the Council contended executive

authority had few limitations. Decreeing that the “Government is bound to protect” Dick

“and to defray any damages which he may sustain in consequences” if a court did not

side with him, the Council once again demonstrated its belief in the supremacy of

executive power.144 Seemingly, the Council implicitly stated that it could circumvent the

law. For the Council of the State, both episodes were not a turning point in logic, but

another opportunity to curb disorder, provide security, and institute governmental

legitimacy. In Savage’s case, riotous inhabitants undermined its authority and in Dick’s

situation, the Council refused to allow inhabitants to interfere with the military.

Providing for inhabitants’ security also meant protecting loyal Americans’ goods

and safety. In King and Queens’s counties, two areas under immense stress from a

                                                                                                               
143
JCSV, 1:180. In fact Council stated, “it wou’d be improper… to bestow ye public money in the purchase
of advantages for a small part of the Community though equally necessary to the whole.”
144
JCSV, 3:182. No first name was given.

  312  
previous law allowing cattle seizures, the Council recommended residents in each region

should be exempt from continuing to bear as heavy a load moving forward.145 When

Virginia patriots retook Portsmouth after British General Cornwallis disrupted the region,

the Council discovered that stolen cattle and horses were scattered across the countryside.

Councilors instructed that the livestock be gathered and deliver to their owners.146

Councilors also ordered the restoration of any private citizens’ horses that were seized by

the state and sold. They continued this practice by offering Elizabeth City, Gloster,

James City, Warwick, and York county residents compensation for property damage.147

Aside from protecting inhabitants’ livestock, the Council was also mindful of its own

constituents’ security. The executive body rejected Baron von Steuben’s plan to send

some 2,000 militiamen into North Carolina to aid General Nathaniel Greene against

Cornwallis. Believing such a maneuver placed Virginia in danger, the Council stood

resolute.148 By providing for inhabitants, even in these isolated instances, the Council

hoped to instill order and government stability.149

As the war neared conclusion, the Council sought to address other non-military or

disaffection issues such as preventing abuses of public property and encouraging

                                                                                                               
145
JCSV, 2:306.
146
The Council ordered the Commissioner of the War Office to handle this matter. JCSV, 2:359. For much
of July, some Councilors took ill, leaving a lack of quorum but operations continued. However, not until
the war ended did the Council work regularly. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 298-300.
147
JCSV, 3:21. The Council ordered a public notice printed for anyone who sustained damages from
American or French forces. The Council appointed former Committee of Safety member Dudley Digges to
lead this endeavor. JCSV, 3:91.
148
Such a plan left less than half of Virginia’s troops in the state. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 270.
149
To assist stability, the Council encouraged home manufacturing by employing residents. To meet
demands, the Council ordered the Commissioner of War to hire additional Virginians at the gun factory
located at Point of Fork. In an effort no doubt to save money and materials, Councilors demanded that the
factory repair old weapons and stop making new ones. JCSV, 3:178.

  313  
manufacturing. Hoping to retain public property, the Councilors disciplined American

Captain Charles Thomas for seizing publicly owned slaves and ignoring executive orders

to deliver them back to their masters. According to Captain Henry Young, Thomas

employed the slaves for his own personal use. Referring to such an act as “highly

reprehensible” and a threat to governmental legitimacy, the Council summoned him to

deliver the usurped human property.150 After a month passed, Thomas’ still had not

returned all the bondsmen he employed as ropewalkers and tanners, leaving the Council

to threaten a lawsuit.151 Aside from Thomas, others who preserved iron for the state

during the war never returned its surplus. With iron a vital necessity, the Council could

not allow such a loss without an investigation.152 Ordering the Commissioner of War to

inquire and recover the missing items, the Council demanded all involved in the

deception prosecuted.153

End of War
After defeating Cornwallis, the Council remained active, despite the lack of

British aggression, by issuing reprieves, policing travel, and sending residents to court
                                                                                                               
150
JCSV, 3:102. The Council demanded the number of slaves and their names. Towards the end of the war,
the Council turned its attention to bookkeeping, obtaining supplies, and issuing appointments (based on
recommendations) to courts of oyer and terminer, boundary line boards, and warehouse inspectors. Such
efforts assisted the Assembly’s plan to stabilize society and formalize the government.
151
Presumably the Council succeeded, as there is no other mention of issues with Thomas. JCSV, 3:121-
122, 318 and 508.
152
JCSV, 3:119.
153
There were other incidents when the Council felt inclined to protect state supplies. For example, after a
number of African Americans destroyed gunpowder at Point of Fork, the Council sent men to protect
supplies. Likewise, when the Council discovered flour would be worthless unless quickly sold, the
executive body decided “to rescue from injury the public property in such cases while they keep within the
Spirit tho’ perhaps not in the immediate forms of Law.” In September 1782, some flour was sold on credit
as no available buyers came forward. The Council also appointed a commission to examine the public
money records because there were irregularities and abuses. Accepting the commission’s advice, the
Council summoned civil or military officers with unclosed accounts and instructed the Commissioner of
War to file a lawsuit if they refused. JCSV, 3:138, 170 and 234-245.

  314  
dates.154 The Council continued to pardon inhabitants, even men accused of treason.155

Despite reprieves, the Council did not alleviate the security state. Flags of truce remained

a problem; the Council demanded new officers be appointed to handle any incoming

flags and instructed pilots to only bring someone bearing a flag from designated ports.156

Later on, perhaps to give weight to the Council’s orders, the Assembly passed an act to

prevent interaction between subjects of Great Britain and Virginians. The penalty was a

£200 fine and any British subjects would be considered prisoners of war. Those who did

not willingly turn themselves over to the Council would be jailed without bail until they

could be exchanged.157 By the end of 1782, with the Council’s advice, Virginia

Governor Benjamin Harrison condemned any British subjects remaining in the state as a

potentially “seditious and malignant party.”158 Previous laws and Council’s statements

strictly forbade natives of Great Britain within the state, unless they possessed its
                                                                                                               
154
The Council still called for prosecutions against anyone who refused to return public cattle. JCSV, 3:39-
110. In 1782, the Council spent much of its time on ordering reprieves for death row slaves and issuing
passports for both men and women to travel to British lines. Allowing women to leave with their children
and a slave or servant, the Council forbid them from returning. Councilors also continued to raise men and
supplies and permitted (or forced) people to leave the state. Those individuals ranged from British prisoners
to natives of Great Britain hoping to gain citizenship to women fleeing the country.
155
JCSV, 3:74. Accused of treason but not convicted, the Council cited the General Assembly’s June 21,
1781 resolution as reason to suggest a pardon.
156
The approved ports were York or Hampton Road unless designated otherwise. On May 13, the Council
also ordered men to meet any possible Native American assaults. To increase internal security, the Council
sent pardoned men to work in lead mines. This practice began with criminals such as horse thieves and
mobs. The Council also inquired about opening tobacco trade with France. In mid June, it summoned 4,000
militiamen to protect the eastern shore. JCSV, 3:85, 88-89, 94, 109, and 132.
157
SVA, 11:136-138. In November 1782, the Council continued to embrace its administrative role, dictating
defenses on the frontier and making appointments. The Council also continued issuing apprehension orders
for horse thieves and illicit traders, intercepting letters, interrogating residents, apprehending thieves,
punishing its own military for abusing citizens, and reprimanding officers for disobeying executive orders.
JCSV, 3:186-187,189-191, 193, 197, and 198. The Council ordered all British merchants who remained in
York to depart immediately. When the time expired for them to settle accounts, the Council deemed it
“highly improper” they be permitted to remain. Although the Council previously issued a hard-line stance,
it later permitted two men to remain a little longer. JCSV, 3:41, 93, 134, 155-156.
158
JCSV, 3:196.

  315  
permission. Believing its own power in jeopardy, the Council argued that such people

could “retard the Execution of the best Laws” thereby diluting and negating state

sovereignty.159

With the patriots seemingly in control of the state, the Council continued to

monitor enemies on parole.160 The Council still limited the travel of known criminals,

such as John Goodrich Jr.161 Even Virginia natives who never took an oath to the state

but served in the British army were now viewed as criminals. Arguing even though “not

literally a traytor,” men such as John Wormeley who were employed by the British

Army, possessed “a higher degree of Criminality than the Subjects of England.”162

Before a finalized peace treaty existed, no definitive parameters existed for these persons

and the Council did not believe such men should be permitted to interact with citizens. In

the end, the Council ordered such men forced out of the country so as to minimize their

influence.163

                                                                                                               
159
The Council highlighted its new initiative to “root out” the problem and “do justice to the faithful and
deserving members of the society.” Thus the Council called upon all civil magistrates, county lieutenants,
and militia officers to conduct a “diligent search within the several Counties” and apprehend anyone who
met this description. The proclamation cited British deserters with official papers as exempt.
160
The Council also sought to reduce war preparations and ordered naval vessel construction discontinued
as Chesapeake trade no longer required monitoring. The Council ordered troops dismissed, public arms
delivered back to the county lieutenants, and all receipts sent to the clerk of war. All items in public stores
were to be sold, except what was needed to defray clothing costs. These efforts included ordering
commissaries to close their accounts. The Council continued to offer reprieves; deeming some crimes did
“not merit the utmost rigour of the Law,” a group of accused men were released most likely to demonstrate
to inhabitants where power resided. The men’s crimes included robbery, treason, horse stealing, and grand
larceny. JCSV, 3:239, 241 and 247-248. Trouble remained on the frontier and the Council continued to
send war materials to combat natives.
161
Despite the word of American Colonel Edward Harwood, the Council only allowed Goodrich’s family
to return. JCSV, 3:256.
162
JCSV, 3:256. Wormeley continued to stay in Virginia until early July when the Council issued a new
proclamation.
163
The Council did not leave loyal Americans unprotected. When American Colonel Baylors’ regiment
marched on Richmond to demand their pay, the Council recognized their plight, as long as the men did not

  316  
 For the rest of 1782, the General Assembly showed no signs of reducing the

Council’s powers and continued to deliver it jurisdiction over defense and dissent.164 The

fledgling state still faced some internal subversion. For example, in July 1783, the

Council forbade natives of Great Britain to trade or collect old debts. Until the Assembly

decided what categories such people fell into and how to move forward, the Councilors

proclaimed that any person who 1) left Virginia 2) was forced to leave by the legislature

or executive order, or 3) bore arms against the state and since returned without

authorization, could remain in the state only until the legislature issued an official

statement. Anyone who returned before a resolution was issued would be forcefully

deported.165 There seemed to be some confusion when new laws against British natives

were enacted and, at first, the Council erred on the side of caution. For example, when

British subjects David Blair and Joseph Williamson landed in Virginia in late September

1783, the Council allowed them to remain for a month “unmolested.”166 Shortly after

arriving, Williamson wrote to the Council detailing that, while selling goods, a crowd

attacked him and delivered him a suit of tar. Knowing it could not allow such disorder,

                                                                                                               
resort to mob actions. Even though the regiment threatened “public Interest,” they had “performed great &
meritorious Services.” The Council preferred to “treat it as a weakness rather than a vice and entitled rather
to the pity & pardon than the severity of Government as long as” they did not proceed further. The Council
thus ordered them to move on, promising the Assembly would examine their complaints. During its May
1783 session, the Assembly also allowed religiously minded nonjurors and anyone who previously had not
taken the oath to join the community as “peaceable and industrious people.” This statement specifically
referred to Quakers and Mennonites. JCSV, 3:261 and 263; and SVA, 11:252-253.
164
For example in June 1783, the Assembly bestowed upon the Council additional powers including the
right to draw on funds for eastern defense and the ability to enlist fifteen to fifty guards for public
buildings. JCSV, 3:268 and 274.
165
Some like John Wormeley who had previously been given personal dispensation to stay in Virginia,
now fell under this new proclamation and had to wait for the Assembly’s decision. British merchants also
seemed confused by the new rules and hoped to continue business. Much to their dismay, the Council gave
them twenty-one days to load their goods and leave. JCSV, 3:276-277 and 279.
166
JCSV, 3:288.

  317  
the Councilors called for depositions and swift justice.167 Its police role had not

completely ended.

The Council’s active and essential role during the war years came to an end when

the General Assembly did not revive many of the Council’s coercive emergency powers.

After the war ended, much of the wartime bureaucracy disappeared, leaving many of its

former functions to the governor and his Council.168 However, in October 1784, the

Assembly recognized the Council’s former role in “An act punishing certain offences

injurious to the tranquility of this commonwealth.” The legislature once again called

upon the executive to apprehend threats to “the good people of this commonwealth” who

committed crimes in foreign nations.169 Perhaps in recognition of its wartime role, the

Council could still order apprehensions if public security was threatened. While the

governor and Council could still call out the militia in case of invasion or insurrection,

the threat of war that instigated the extreme extra-constitutional measures had abated,

ending the Council’s dominating reign over Revolutionary Virginia.

                                                                                                               
167
JCSV, 3:294-295. Violence against British subjects continued. In July 1786, the Council and governor
issued a proclamation forbidding “threats & other unlawful means to expel from this State Sundry
Subjects” of Britain. The executive then called upon “all Magistrates & other civil officers of the State to
protect all persons in the rights which they may be entitled to under the Laws of the Commonwealth or the
said Treaty of peace.” JCSV, 3:369.
168
Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 317. The Council continued to examine boats arriving in the state to
prevent disease. SVA, 11:329.
169
SVA, 11:471.

  318  
 Chapter 6: “strike a Terror into the disaffected:” The Rise of William Livingston
and the Council of Safety of New Jersey

Recognizing disorder consuming his state, Governor William Livingston stood to

address the state’s lower legislative house, the General Assembly. Only eight months

earlier, that same body elected him as the first governor of the state of New Jersey. But

now that jubilation seemed only a fading memory, internal disaffection along with the

presence of British forces threatened stability as well as the American Cause. Confronted

by enemies from all sides, John Hancock and others begged the radical Whig governor

for “the immediate interposition of government to suppress” domestic adversaries.1 Ever

since American losses at Forts Washington and Lee, residents’ faith in the fledgling

government had been devastated.2 That previous winter, fearful and desperate New

Jerseyans fled to British forces hoping to accept oaths of allegiance to the Crown in an

attempt to avoid the invaders’ wrath. Even after Washington’s emblematic victory at

Trenton, the state still faced enemy occupation and violence.3 Appealing to the

Assembly for stricter laws, Washington requested that the militia and justices of the

                                                                                                               
1
President of the Continental Congress to the Governor, November 12, 1776 in CENJ, 18. Livingston’s
republican beliefs have been attributed to his years at Yale. Milton Martin Klein, “The American Whig:
William Livingston of New York,” (PhD Dissertation: Columbia University, 1954), 49.
2
Leonard Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution: The War of Independence in New Jersey (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1940), 159.
3
For more on the battles of Princeton see: George Washington Parke Custis et al., Recollections and
Private Memoirs of Washington… (Philadelphia: J.W. Bradley, 1861), 191-192; Varnum Lansing Collins
ed., A Brief Narrative of the Ravages of the British and Hessians at Princeton in 1776-1777; A
Contemporary Account of the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, in Princeton Historical Association, no. 1
(Princeton: the University Library, 1906), 16; and David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004). Andrew Elliot, loyalist Collector of Customs of New York, believed
if not for the surprise victory at Trenton, New Jersey would have abandoned Washington. Andrew Elliot to
Sir Gilbert Elliot, February 13, 1777, in Catherine S. Crary, The Price of Loyalty: Tory Writings from the
Revolutionary Era ed. Catherine S. Crary (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 302-303.

  319  
peace “keep a watchful eye over and apprehend all such [disaffected] persons.”4

Surveying his state, Livingston lambasted magistrates for enforcing laws against dissent

inadequately.5 Weary and frustrated with his lack of constitutionally ordained power,

Livingston devised a plan in March 1777 to meet pressing issues, which consequentially

increased his own powers. As a proponent of radical Whig political theory, Livingston

advocated for a strong executive although many Americans retained a strong hatred for

governors dating from the colonial era. No longer willing to tolerate ineffectiveness or

subversion, Livingston rose to speak on March 11.

AS the best Laws are of little Avail to the Happiness of Society unless faithfully
executed; and the most salutary Measures in Danger of losing their intended
Utility, unless duly expedited in their Execution; and there is at present, …during
the Invasion of this State… a greater Necessity than in Times of Peace and
Tranquility for an executive Body, vested with such Powers and Authorities as
may appear requisite for the publick Safety, and which cannot at present be
legally exercised by any… Persons in the State.6

                                                                                                               
4
Other problems included desertion and harboring enemies of state. In January 1777, Washington wrote to
the Assembly imploring all states to pass stricter laws against deserting. George Washington to the
Legislature of New Jersey, January 31, 1776 in CENJ, 23-24. The general previously remarked to Samuel
Washington that defection in New Jersey took its toll. George Washington to Samuel Washington,
December 18, 1776, PGW. The American military also harmed the cause by confiscating and stealing food
from civilians despite shortages. Hamilton to Major General Adam Stephen, May 1777, The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton Digital Edition, ed. Harold C. Syrett (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
Rotunda, 2011); Jacob Van Dyke, Middlesex County, to General Assembly, September 24, 1776 in
BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 24, NJA; and N.J. Damages by the British in
New Jersey, 1776-82 and Damages by the Americans in New Jersey, 1776-82 (Archives and History
Bureau, New Jersey State Library, Trenton) in Donald Wallace White, A Village at War: Chatham, New
Jersey, and the American Revolution (Madison, N.J.: Farleigh Dickinson, 1979), 86-88.
5
“By his Excellency William Livingston,” The Pennsylvania Packet, February 11, 1777. In his
proclamation, Livingston stressed the need for justices of the peace to pursue enemies. He also condemned
the militia for seizing goods and harassing alleged enemies without going through the proper judicial
channels. With law unenforced and the “public weal” threatened, the governor knew immediate action was
necessary.
6
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at
Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776… (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 99-100. EC, Series I, 15466.
A proponent of civil and religious liberties, Livingston’s articles in the Independent Reflector emphasized
“publick Vice” and “Public Abuses.” “Introduction,” Independent Reflector I, November 30, 1752.

  320  
The Revolution that he and his compatriots had already sacrificed so much for was now

held in the balance and Livingston knew strong words did not effectively enforce laws,

especially those outlawing dissent. Fortunately for Livingston, the General Assembly

required little convincing, sensing the dramatic need for executive power, and acquiesced

to his demand.7 Almost immediately, the powerful Council of Safety commenced with

Livingston at the helm of New Jersey’s security state.

With vicious retaliatory violence, illicit trade and travel, pillaging, occupying

armies, and counter-insurgency consuming a state without a properly functioning court

system, the Council of Safety was Livingston’s only hope.8 Even zealous patriots, like

David Forman, further complicated the state’s attempts to establish order by violently

terrorizing supposed suspicious persons, thus “Leading to Annarchy and Confusion.”9

                                                                                                               
7
Both Michael Levine and David Bernstein noted that at the time, the legislature admitted its powers had
been obstructed. On March 15, 1777, the Council commenced to preserve the state and prevent “external,
and secret Machinations of internal foes.” Since the legislature elected Livingston less than a year earlier,
perhaps he had its support for such unprecedented power. David Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American
Revolution: The Establishment of a Government amid Civil and Military Disorder, 1770-1781,” (PhD
Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1969), 233. The same day, to further internal policing the legislature
issued laws regulating constables. See also: Michael Lewis Levine, “The Transformation of a Radical Whig
Under Republican Government: William Livingston, Governor of New Jersey, 1776-1790,” (PhD
Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1975), 80-83.
8
Unlike the emergency Council of Safety, the constitution outlined the state’s Privy Council in Article VIII
as a body of at least three men to “consult” with the governor. Similar to the Council of Safety, historians
have overlooked the Privy Council, only noting that it served as a check on Livingston, met the challenges
of the day and closely resembled its colonial predecessor, the Governor’s Council. Most Privy Councilors
held positions on the Provincial Congress before the war. Although many states possessed privy councils,
few had specifically ordained powers. Both councils possessed vague ordinances and gained power through
legislation or practice. With the Council of Safety handling internal divisions the Privy Council assumed,
with the legislature’s blessing, governmental functions such as administering courts and supplying and
controlling the militia. David A. Bernstein ed., Minutes of the Governor’s Privy Council, 1777-1789 New
Jersey Archives, Third Series, Volume I (Trenton: New Jersey State Library Archives and History Bureau,
1974), 1-4.
9
Dennis P. Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” NJRE, 20:15. See also: Charles Forman, Three Revolutionary
Soldiers: David Forman, Jonathan Forman, Thomas Marsh Forman (Cleveland: The Forman-Bassett-
Hatch Co., 1902), 7-18. Inhabitants accused Forman, the leader of the Committee of Retaliation, of abusing
power and meting out his own justice. Since treason fell under both civil and military jurisdiction, many
complained of his atrocities. Robert Lawrence to the Legislature on Martial Law, October 7, 1777 in
NJARDH, 252. A 1781 petition from residents who supported the American Cause but hated the Committee

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Obviously, the General Assembly preferred the Council of Safety’s state-administered

coercive security measures.10 Since neither the Committee of Safety nor the legislature

could stabilize New Jersey, the responsibility fell upon Livingston and his new Council to

consolidate power, punish dissent, and instill conformity during the interim period.

Focusing solely on disaffection, the Council of Safety sought to eliminate dissent by

coercively curbing freedom and strictly monitoring residents so the official state

governmental apparatus could function. Less than a year later, in a credit to Livingston’s

efforts, the loyalist Royal Gazette targeted the hated governor’s cruel and hypocritical

reign. The editor noted newspapers were “filled with the names of those persons, whom

you and your agents are daily plundering for the atrocious crime of adhering to their

loyalty, and flying from your unsupportable tyranny.”11 How then did New Jersey arrive

at this point as a security state? How did the Council of Safety differ from its weak

predecessor, the Committee of Safety? What role did Livingston perform? Finally, how

did the emergency Council of Safety aid the Revolution’s success?

                                                                                                               
of Retaliation argued that the body stirred disorder; it cited the lack of governmental intervention as the
cause of such abuses. Residents wanted the government, not vigilantes, to uphold the law and administer
justice against alleged enemies. Petitions claimed the “arbitrary and Tyrannical” Committee threatened
everyone and intimidated voters. See: Inhabitants of Monmouth County to the Council and General
Assembly, December 1781, and Inhabitants of Monmouth County to the Legislative Council and General
Assembly, September 1782 in BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 114 and 121,
NJA.
10
Nineteenth century historians, while quick to note British troops’ deprivations, focused solely on praising
the patriots and ignored the Council of Safety’s actions. Because the Council dealt less frequently with elite
loyalists, scholars such as William Shaw ignored the executive body. William H. Shaw, History of Essex
and Hudson Counties, New Jersey, Volume I (Philadelphia: Everts & Peck, 1884), 49. See also: Edwin F.
Hatfield, History of Elizabeth, New Jersey… (New York: Carlton & Lanhan, 1868), 408; William Nelson,
History of Bergen and Passaic Counties, New Jersey… (Philadelphia: Everts & Peck, 1882), 38 and 50; and
William A. Whitehead, Contributions to the Early History of Perth Amboy… (New York: D. Appleton &
Company, 1856).
11
Plain Truth, “To William Livingston,” Royal Gazette, September 9, 1778.

  322  
 Although recent scholars have acknowledged the violent civil war in New Jersey,

historians who addressed the Council of Safety have at times misunderstood Livingston’s

vital role.12 Dennis Ryan nearly omitted the governor’s leadership while David Bernstein

claimed Livingston only bought the state time when the legislature failed to operate

properly.13 Even though the legislature and constitution limited Livingston’s power,

Bernstein noted the governor and the Council served an important, albeit brief, role.14

Considering Livingston as a symbol of hope and perseverance, Bernstein ultimately

neglected much of his actual influence.15 Similarly, Michael Levine highlighted

Livingston’s radical Whig political philosophy and his support of public virtue, yet he did

not make the connection between these principles and the Council of Safety.

                                                                                                               
12
Some earlier accounts claimed that New Jersey’s disaffected faced “a bloodless revolution.” Scholars
like David Fowler have corrected the narrative. Dennis Ryan and Fowler have also illuminated the
economic hardships New Jersey faced. Joseph H. Jones, The Life of Ashbel Green… (New York: Robert
Carter and Brothers, 1849), 32-33 and 58; Dennis Ryan, “Six Towns: Continuity and Change in
Revolutionary New Jersey, 1770-1792,” (PhD Dissertation: New York University, 1974), 105 and 173;
David J. Fowler, “Egregious Villains, Wood Rangers, and London Traders: The Pine Robber Phenomenon
in Revolutionary New Jersey,” (PhD Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1987), 54 and 102; and David J.
Fowler, “’Loyalty Is Now Bleeding in New Jersey’: Motivations and Mentalities of the Disaffected,” in The
Other Loyalists: Ordinary People, Royalism, and the Revolution in the Middle Colonies, 1763-1787 ed.
Joseph S. Tiedemann, et al. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), 55.
13
Bernstein credited Livingston, his “wartime cabinet,” and ability to work with the legislature for saving
New Jersey during its early state years. Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 14 and Bernstein, “New Jersey in
the American Revolution,” ii-vii. My work is indebted to Bernstein, Fowler, and Levine.
14
Robert Calhoon incorrectly highlighted William Paterson and not Livingston’s importance. While
Paterson was instrumental in the judicial system, the Council was Livingston’s brainchild. Richard Haskett
also highlighted Paterson’s role. Although Haskett correctly noted that the Council’s conclusion came
when Paterson’s loyalist prosecutions hit their zenith. Robert McCluer Calhoon, The Loyalists in
Revolutionary America, 1760-1781 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), 403 and Richard
C. Haskett, “Prosecuting the Revolution,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 59, no. 3 (Apr., 1954),
580-584.
15
Bernstein noted that the legislature gave the Council power when it could not meet pressing issues,
although the state’s problems were more dramatic than he suggested. Duane Lockard recognized
Livingston’s ability to steer agenda but ultimately reduced the governor to an independence cheerleader
and satirical writer. Lockard intended to examine New Jersey governors’ power (both constitutional and
extra-legal), yet he omitted the Council. He did note the governor’s tumultuous relationship with the
legislator when it did not enact his laws. Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” vi-vii and
Duane Lockard, The New Jersey Governor: A Study in Political Power, The New Jersey Historical Series,
Volume 14 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), 36-41.

  323  
 As for the Council of Safety, historians have generally downplayed its role.

Although Bernstein noted the Council’s incredible powers and its role in the transition to

statehood, he disregarded its coercive nature and trampling of individual rights in the

name of the common good.16 Instead he contended that the Council of Safety never

became an “inquisition” because Livingston adhered to “legal formalities.”17 Correctly

noting that the Council did not formally convict people it summoned, Bernstein

misunderstood that its accusations could damn a person. Bernstein also overestimated

Livingston’s mercy towards the accused, disregarding the governor’s harsh rhetoric and

treatment of the disaffected.18 Similarly, Levine considered the Council of Safety a weak

proto-grand jury and disregarded it coercive nature. He also incorrectly considered the

Council as a constitutional apparatus, when in fact it was an emergency wartime

executive body not outlined in the state constitution.19 In reality the Council combined

                                                                                                               
16
This dissertation builds on Bernstein’s idea that the Council assisted during this transition by adapting the
constitution and combining branches of powers. Fowler also recognized the Council performed a vital role
as part of the state apparatus and even the people realized its authority. He also referred to the Council as “a
de facto directorate” with a “terrifying” nature in his study of counter-insurgency. Bernstein, “New Jersey
in the American Revolution,” 282 and Fowler, “’Loyalty Is Now Bleeding in New Jersey,’ 55.
17
While he referred to the Council as a “directory,” Bernstein argued Livingston attempted to “neutralize”
loyalists rather than expel them. The existence of an appeal process does not diminish the security state’s
inquisitorial nature. Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 296-297. See Acts of the
General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey, at a session begun at Princeton on the 27th day of August
1776…, (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 40-42, 63-65, 84-92. EC, Series I, 15459. Acts of the General
Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun Trenton on the 28th day of October 1777
(Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1778), 13-16. EC, Series I, 15926. See also Votes and Proceedings, at a session
begun at Princeton on the 27th day of August, 133-134. EC, Series I, 15466.
18
Bernstein noted that in May 1777, Livingston argued that an “Act of Indemnity” should be used to
pardon anyone who wished to return home. However, this act is not indicative of his treatment of all the
accused. Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at
Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776, 120. EC, Series I, 15466; MCSNJ, 8; Acts of the General
Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a Session begun at Trenton on the 28th day of October 1777
(Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1778), 55-56. EC, Series I, 15927 and Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American
Revolution,” 296-297.
19
Levine described Livingston and the Council’s actions, but focused on the governor’s loss of royal
prerogative powers. According to Levine, an example of Livingston’s prerogative powers in 1776 was
when he employed force to gain militia service, demanding men bear arms or “the Consequence will be

  324  
all three branches of power and some of its members held no political offices. Correctly

recognizing Livingston’s desire to step outside the constitution’s boundaries, Levine still

disregarded the Council. Ultimately, Levine argued that the legislature tempered

Livingston’s powers. Since the legislature elected him annually, Levine argued,

Livingston owed the Assembly his allegiance. Considering Livingston weak, Levine

depicted him as afraid to upset the state’s representatives despite evidence that he

actually exerted influence.20

Ultimately, Livingston and the Council of Safety did not try to dominate the

legislature nor was the governor simply the Assembly’s puppet. Although some

historians have attempted to portray Livingston frustrated or confused by a political

system that lacked extensive and coercive executive powers, in reality, he held

considerable influence.21 Therefore, this chapter argues that Livingston as the leader of

                                                                                                               
dreadful beyond Expression.” Later the legislature refused to allow such action. Levine outlined other
failed attempts of executive prerogative such as proclaiming an embargo, but the legislature eventually
seized this initiative. Levine, 87-93 and Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of
New-Jersey. At a session begun at Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776, 94. EC, Series I, 15466.
20
Rather than examples of Livingston’s weakness, the episodes Levine presented are perhaps signs of the
governor attempting to address other issues. Levine cited Livingston’s reluctance to appoint military
officers and his desire for the legislature to be more active demonstrates that from 1777-1778 he prioritized
disaffection. Even though Livingston stated that he did not want to upset people by filling commissions,
this is not indicative of his lack of influence. Rather, Livingston argued he did not have the power in some
cases. Levine also considered that the legislature’s complaint that Livingston stop writing for the New-
Jersey Gazette as evidence that he was subservient. Levine stated that Livingston’s notification to the
Assembly that guarding and supplying the disaffected came under its jurisdiction as evidence of his
supposed deference. William Livingston to Joseph Bloomfield, July 8, 1777, in Levine, 99. Levine, 97-101.
21
The governor, Levine contended, believed an executive necessary for “restraining the people” and the
legislature needed to check that power. Claiming Livingston lacked such authority; Levine depicted the
governor as confused. Certainly Livingston might have desired more prerogative powers, but to not
acknowledge the powers he possessed is inaccurate. Livingston suggested the short tenure of office was
meant to stop abuses of power, but felt this might have given into “democratic Extravagance.” William
Livingston to Henry Laurens, February 5, 1778, PWL, 2: 209.

  325  
the Council of Safety, the only institution capable of saving the state and preserving the

common good, played a vital role in the Revolution’s success.22

Violence in the Early State Years – Monmouth County and Beyond

In July 1776, after Washington effectively displaced them from Boston, British

forces under General William Howe arrived off the New York coast. However,

Washington’s fear that the British presence would empower the disaffected soon

materialized.23 Perhaps due to such proximity, inimical inhabitants began voicing their

displeasure with the Declaration of Independence.24 For the patriots, the positive side of

such bold statements was that it provided them with lists of enemies to both society and

militia stability.25 However, after the British victory at the Battle of Long Island and

subsequent occupation of New York City in late August 1776, New Jersey faced grave

uncertainty. No longer would the regions’ disaffected remain quite as they now

possessed a beacon to draw strength from during the ongoing civil strife. Losses

continued to mount along the Hudson River as Forts Washington and Lee both fell by

November, leaving New Jersey even more vulnerable.26 Referred to as the “Cockpit of

                                                                                                               
22
Levine correctly acknowledged Livingston’s desire to work with executive bodies. Levine, 100-103.
23
George Washington to William Livingston, July 5, 1776, PGW. Livingston and Washington discussed
Bergen and Essex counties, yet knew problems existed elsewhere. Before the Council of Safety
commenced, Livingston sent accused loyalists to Samuel Tucker in July 1776. William Livingston to
Samuel Tucker, July 8, 1776, PWL, 1:84-85.
24
Larry Gerlach, Prologue to Independence: New Jersey in the Coming of the American Revolution (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976), 335.
25
Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 118.
26
Fort Lee sat near the New Jersey Palisades. Washington named General Hugh Mercer as commander in
New Jersey. Beginning in June 1776, Mercer struggled procuring men and defending the region between
Perth Amboy and Bergen County. Richard P. McCormick, New Jersey from Colony to State (Princeton: D.
Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), 134; and Israel Keith to Cyrus Keith, September 16, 1776, and Israel
Keith to John P. Palmer, December 1, 1776, Israel Keith Papers, 1767-1803, Box 1, Folder 19, NYSL.

  326  
Revolution,” New Jersey witnessed lengthy army encampments, decisive battles, and

incessant civil conflict.27 In total, the state endured seven straight years of warfare.

Adding to the mayhem, from as early as November 1776, Howe issued a general pardon

to fearful residents. Convinced of his military superiority, Howe extended oaths and

claimed over 3,000 residents who willingly relinquished their American loyalty.28

Approaching the people as a Roman hero, Howe dispensed free “Continental Pork, to the

Poor & protected Inhabitants” in exchange for their unwavering allegiance.29 He even

offered money to any farmer who delivered provisions to Bordentown.30

As evidenced by an anonymous poem from the period, New Jerseyans distrusted

their neighbors’ loyalty. The author, like other New Jerseyans, feared the disaffected

who lurked in the shadows of the war were always “very free in ‘giving it out.’”31

Concerned that the enemies from within sought to deceptively convert and pollute the

common cause, patriot leaders realized their plight. As the author hinted, and the rest of

the state recognized, force would be necessary to stymie disaffection.

While disaffection plagued the entire state, it strangled areas such as Monmouth

and Bergen counties. As one historian noted, Monmouth was nearly divided in half

equally between those men who supported the Revolution and those who vehemently
                                                                                                               
27
McCormick, From Colony to State, 132. For an updated version of Lundin’s study, see Mark Edward
Lender, “The ‘Cockpit’ Reconsidered: Revolutionary New Jersey as a Military Theater,” in NJAR, 45-60.
For brief remarks on New Jersey’s experience see J.J. Boudinot ed., The Life Public Services, Addresses
and Letters of Elias Boudinot, LL. D. President of the Continental Congress Volume I (New York:
Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1896), 1-2.
28
Lundin, 159.
29
Brigadier General Philemon Dickinson to Washington, December 24, 1776, PGW.
30
Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 361. Howe occupied Bordentown, Burlington,
Princeton, and Trenton. Similar reports existed for Sussex County. Lundin, 163-164.
31
Charles Davis Platt, Ballads of New Jersey in the Revolution (Morristown: The Jerseyman Print, 1896),
31.

  327  
opposed it.32 Outlaws had long sought havens in the Pine Barrens region, a rich forest

partially cut off from the rest of New Jersey. Although mostly fabricated myths during

the colonial era, the region witnessed guerilla attacks, robberies, and retaliatory violence

during the Revolution.33 Stories of atrocities weighed heavily on patriots’ minds as they

contemplated their government’s legitimacy and its ability to secure public welfare,

contributing to their creation of the Council of Safety. As the war years progressed, the

Pine Barrens became a center of violence and criminal activity that affected the entire

society.34 In fact, as John Shy suggested, civilian violence and warfare harmed common

                                                                                                               
32
Michael Adelberg divided Monmouth residents into categories based on their support and actions during
the war (revolutionaries, whigs, loyalists, disaffected, trimmers, and neutrals/unknowns). While he
considered the disaffected as people who opposed the Revolution in minor way, my dissertation follows a
more traditional definition employed by the committees of public safety as anyone who undermined the
patriot cause. Adelberg argued that the disaffected opposed the patriots but were not willing to sacrifice or
risk a great deal to do so. This part of his argument I do not endorse because I believe even Adelberg’s so-
called minor disaffected behavior (traveling without a pass, sedition, trading with the enemy, signing
Loyalist Associations, etc) angered the committees and were the basis of the security state. Michael S.
Adelberg, “An Evenly Balanced County: The Scope and Severity of Civil Warfare in Revolutionary
Monmouth County, New Jersey,” The Journal of Military History Vol. 73, no. 1 (Jan, 2009), 9-18.
33
Myths of uncivilized mountain men contributed to stereotypes. The forests spread across the southeastern
counties of Burlington, Cumberland, and Gloucester and housed debtors. Fithian to Enoch Green, February
1775, in NJP in Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” vi and 2-5; and Thomas Thompson, An Account of Two
Missionary Voyages… (London: 1758), 19-20. According to David Fowler, accusations that Pine Barrens
residents were uncivilized stirred social anxiety. Most stereotypes lacked validity. Robert Greenhalgh
Albion and Leonidas Dodson eds., Philip Vickers Fithian: Journal, 1775-1776 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1934), 250-255. Although characterized as a violent area, before the war the region was
relatively quiet until the 1770s. Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 10-11 and 18-19. For examples of the
violence see: Journal of the Proceedings of Council for the Colony of New Jersey, June 1, 1756 and
October 10, 1757 in NJAS, Series I, 17:25-26, 143-144. For a more recent study of Monmouth during the
revolution see: Michael S. Adelberg, “The Transformation of Local Governance in Monmouth County,
New Jersey, during the War of the American Revolution,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 31, no. 3
(Fall, 2011), 470 and 474.
34
The Council of Safety’s early activity involved investigating this region but unfortunately, the Pine
Barrens criminals left little historical evidence on why they opposed patriots. Contemporaries referred to
these men as “egregious villains,” “banditti,” “friends,” etc. Nineteenth century antiquarians as well as
historians’ biases and inaccuracies obscured the criminals’ narrative and twentieth century scholars
accepted the myths as truth. Fowler highlighted these men were not fake loyalists who attacked both sides.
Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 21-26. See for example of myths perpetuated: Franklin Ellis, History of
Monmouth County, New Jersey (Philadelphia: R.T. Peck & Co., 1885), 195.

  328  
people far more than either army.35 It should come as no surprise that a majority of the

robbers hailed from Monmouth County due to its economic depression and proximity to

New York.36 With Freehold a patriot stronghold and Shrewsbury a haven for

disaffection, Monmouth seethed with animosity.37 Shrewsbury’s disobedient behavior

continued into New Jersey’s early years of statehood as patriots bemoaned the

“disaffected majority” that aided and corresponded with enemies of the state.38 Close to

New York City and home to many Quakers, Shrewsbury immediately leaned heavily

toward the British.39 Even though the law mandated militia service, few penalties were

issued in Monmouth. Such divisions came to a head in August 1776, as the county

committee helplessly related how the dissidents harbored “refugee Tories” from New

York. American military leaders urged New Jersey to follow other states’ lead and take

                                                                                                               
35
John Shy, “The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War,” in A People Numerous and
Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press, 1993), Revised Edition, 198. See also: Joseph S. Tiedemann, “Patriots by Default: Queens
County, New York, and the British Army, 1776-1783,” WMQ, Vol. 43, no. 1 (Jan., 1986), 35-63; and Sung
Bok Kim, “The Limits of Politicization in the American Revolution: The Experience of Westchester
County, New York,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 80, no. 3 (Dec., 1993), 868-889.
36
Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 28.
37
See chapter 3 for more on Freehold and Shrewsbury. See also Committees of Freehold and Shrewsbury,
“Proceedings of the Committees of Freehold and Shrewsbury, on the opening of the Revolution,” January
2, 1775 and March 6, 1775 in PNJHS, Series I, Vol. 1, no. 1 (1845), 189-190 and Extract of a Letter to a
Gentlemen in New-York, January 18, 1775 in AA, Series IV, 1:1165.
38
Letter from the Committee at Monmouth, in New-Jersey…, August 17, 1776 in AA, Series V, 1:1534-
1535. In Monmouth, many residents joined the New Jersey Volunteers and later returned to the county in
1777 where they continued to be disaffected. Adelberg, “An Evenly Balanced County,” 25-28.
39
Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 269 and Lois J. Given, “Burlington County Friends
in the American Revolution,” PNJHS, Vol. LXIX, (July, 1951), 199-200. Quakers represented the second
largest religion to Presbyterianism. Due to their size, leadership, and pacifist principles, patriots distrusted
them. However, before the war, Livingston actually supported Quakerism. McCormick, New Jersey from
Colony to State, 93; Levine, 202-203; and Adelberg, “An Evenly Balanced County,” 15.

  329  
decisive measures against the inimical, especially in Monmouth County.40 Efforts to

monitor the shores and capture the suspicious proved insufficient, as areas such as Sandy

Hook became loyalist refugee towns for servants, slaves, and the disaffected.41 Although

patriots disarmed, seized, and sent suspicious persons (as well as Quakers and non-

associators) before the Provincial Congress and Committee of Safety, such efforts made

little progress.42 Lacking the ability to curb dissent, even the more infamous Monmouth

County residents, accused of recruiting for the enemy, were only bound to £500

recognizances for their future good behavior.43

                                                                                                               
40
From the General commanding at New York to the President of the Provincial Congress of New Jersey,
August 8, 1776 in CENJ, 7-8. Suspicious people in the region surrounding Long Island were monitored by
both the state and the military.
41
The Monmouth Committee summoned resident New Yorkers to prove why they should be allowed to
remain. Inhabitants of New York City even begged Washington to remove the disaffected from Long
Island and Shrewsbury. Certain Inhabitants of New York to Washington, July 9-14, 1776, and Nathaniel
Woodhull to Washington, July 26, 1776, PGW; and Extract of a Letter from Elizabeth-Town, December 1,
1781 in NJAS, Series II, 5:344.
42
During this time, authorities also seized William Franklin. Other regions also still bemoaned disaffection.
Memorial of the Committee of Hunterdon County, respecting certain disaffected persons in that county,
June 18, 1776, Petition of sundry Inhabitants of Shrewsbury, in Monmouth County, praying that no new
mode of Government may be established…, June 19, 1776, and Colonel Charles Read with two companies
of the Militia of Burlington County…, June 26, 1776, AA, Series IV, 6:1624-1625 and 1630; and Fowler,
“Egregious Villains” 43.
43
Names included: John Leonard, Richard Robins, Moses Ivins, Thomas Lewis Woodward, and Ezekiel
Forman. July 1, All persons who refuse to bear arms to be disarmed, July 1, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1634.
According to accused criminal Thomas Fowler, the Loyalist “Club Men” that met in spring 1776 under the
direction of “Little Anthony” Woodward elected Robins and Ivins as militia captains. Confession of
Thomas Fowler against Anthony Woodward and others, April 11, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety
Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 36, NJA. David Fowler argued the Pine Barrens
experienced a transition to more extreme violence. Woodward’s Quaker gang held property, yet as the war
progressed, the region witnessed an increase in landless criminals. Despite their Quaker faith, the
Woodward’s church previously disciplined them for slave owning and marrying outside religious
restrictions. Eventually, the church expelled gang members for bearing arms. For more on Woodward’s
success: Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 60. Quaker Churches also expelled members on the patriot side.
Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 267-268. “Little Anthony” escaped capture although
his brother George begged the government to permit his return. After he fled, patriots raided his home.
Fowler surmised that since the Woodwards possessed wealth, they feared losing their position if the
Revolution succeeded. Letter to the Ladies of Amboy: Their petition in favour of Dr. Lawrence cannot be
granted, Resolution of the Congress…, July 17, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:1647.

  330  
 Despite Provincial Congress President Samuel Tucker’s proclamation “the Tories

of Monmouth” had been “crushed,” the area remained a hotbed of disorder.44 While

some residents recanted their treacherous behavior by claiming they had been “seduced

and misled by the false and malicious reports,” disaffection had by no means been

eradicated. Believing lenity still possible for all but the leaders, the Provincial Congress

opted for mercy early on.45 Despite the Provincial Congress’ clemency, additional

reports of disaffected-led attacks and correspondence with the enemy continued. If

suspicious inhabitants returned from enemy lines, officials assumed they held nefarious

purposes and labeled them spies.46 While such actions on the surface might seem

paranoid, Shrewsbury residents did in fact plot recruitment efforts for their secret

counter-Association after the Battle of Long Island. With the region bitterly divided,

neither side seemed to gain the upper hand in 1776 as both sides engaged in disarming

initiatives. Rallying his supporters in November, the notorious “Little Anthony” returned

to Freehold spouting bombastic promises of the British’s impending arrival and claiming

he had received orders to seize the salt works.47 Patriots’ early momentum diminished,

                                                                                                               
44
By July 1776, over sixty-armed Shrewsbury men joined the British and reports indicated more planned to
enlist as well. Leaders ordered increased efforts to disarm potential internal enemies. Letter from Samuel
Tucker to the President of Congress, July 11, 1776 in AA, Series V, 1:139. As the executive of the
Provincial Congress, Tucker remained in power as an administrator until July 1776. See John Smith to
Samuel Tucker, February 21, 22, and 26, 1776 in CENJ, 1-4.
45
July 4, Pardon offered to such of the Monmouth Insurgents…, July 4, 1776 in AA, Series IV, 6:139.
46
Colonel Frederick Frelinghuysen to William Livingston, August 25, 1777 in CENJ, 95-96.
47
Confession Thomas Fowler, April 11, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety, Records 1776-1778, Box 2
Loose Records, folder 37, NJA.

  331  
soon even Freehold fell to the loyalists, thus leaving Howe to believe the “general

submission of the country to the southward” would be as effortless.48

Emboldened by their potential success, seizing weapons and stirring fear marked

the Woodwards’ triumphal return to the region. Arriving unannounced at residents’

homes, Jesse and Anthony “Black Nat” Woodward berated inhabitants, seized muskets,

and apprehended patriots such as Thomas Forman as “a Rebel and …very active against

the King.” Forman, like many others, received incredible abuses including being dragged

to his home while his aggressors searched for weapons.49 The hostile counter-insurgents

absconded with horses, wagons, guns, and swords. Although the men stole provisions,

they also attempted to “persuade” residents to accept British protections.50 Not only had

the robbers induced terror but they also prevented provisions and military goods from

reaching the Americans.51 In Trenton, their bravado reached its zenith when they

threatened to kill anyone who took arms against their brethren. Such a public display of

                                                                                                               
48
Extract of a letter from General Sir William Howe to Lord George Germaine, December 20, 1776 in
NJAS, Series II, 1:425.
49
After threatening Forman, the men hauled him to Lawrence Taylor’s tavern before joining Thomas
Woodward to disarm more enemies. State of New Jersey against Jesse Woodward, William Grover,
Anthony Woodward, and others: Deposition of Thomas Forman, April 23, 1777, New Jersey Council of
Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 60, NJA. Additional disarming ensued as Lewis
Bestedo, Joseph Holmes Jr. and Michael Mount found themselves tracked like animals and robbed. In April
1777, Bestedo accused Thomas Fowler and Nicholas Williams of assault the previous December. Although
the robbers killed Williams, Bestedo captured Fowler. Appearing before the Council of Safety, Fowler
blamed the deceased Williams but the executive body charged him with murder and confined him. The two
robbers lived in the woods and were part of Woodward’s gang. Deposition of Lewis Bestedo, April 15,
1777, and Examination of Thomas Fowler concerning an assault on Lewis Bastedo, April 9, 1777 in New
Jersey Council of Safety, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 29, NJA.
50
When Abraham Hendricks presumably denied such an offer, they abused and robbed him. Loyalist Mss.,
box 20, no. 6, NJ Supreme Ct. Case File 37836, NJ in Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 70 note 36 and
Examination of Abraham Hendricks, April 10, 1777, PWL, 1:310.
51
Jesse Woodward bragged he disarmed 16 patriots while “Black Nat” claimed he seized twenty-six
weapons and approximately seventy horses. Examination of Jesse Woodward, April 10, 1777 in CENJ, 51-
52.

  332  
power and rage no doubt induced many neutral and equivocal New Jerseyans to accept

the hostile ultimatums.52 Rumors of foreign troops’ arrival and British deprivations in

Trenton haunted inhabitants.53

Such overt disaffection caused equivocal men like John Bray, a middling farmer

from Middlesex, to question if patriots could ever emerge victorious. Brary and others

feared attaching themselves to a treasonous cause as the state seemed incapable of

providing security thus far. Writing his uncle in December 1776, Brary begged him to

accept a British protection even if only to avoid “molestation.”54 With the war

consuming more communities, many neutrals such as Margaret Morris feared either

army’s approach. Residing in Burlington, Morris and other residents discovered all three

armies descended upon their homes. Lamenting, “surely the Lord will not punish the

innocent with the guilty,” Morris feared the worse.55 Despite her prayers, when the

American forces arrived they intrusively interrogated the townspeople and searched

homes for alleged enemies.56

                                                                                                               
52
Many residents harbored anger towards Presbyterians due to local grievances. Fowler, “Egregious
Villains,” 73-74 and 77.
53
Israel Keith to Cyrus Keith, January 1, 1777, Israel Keith Papers, 1767-1803, Box 1, Folder 20, NYSL.
54
John Bray to Andrew Bray, December 17, 1776 in NJARDH, 364-365. The British’s proximity caused
many, including Quakers, to support its cause. William S. Stryker, The Battles of Trenton and Princeton
(New York: Houghton and Mifflin and Company, 1898) 13. Washington lambasted New Jerseyans’ lack of
commitment. Washington to Samuel Washington, December 18, 1776, PGW. See also Margaret Morris,
Private Journal… (Philadelphia: 1836), 5-6.
55
Many residents fled when they heard the British might burn or seize the city. Morris, a widow and
mother, has been described as either a neutral or loyalist. Either way, she feared both sides that December.
56
By December 11, the Americans opened fire on Burlington but could not forestall the Hessians. Speaking
through their interpreter, the notorious Reverend Dr. Jonathan Odell, the Hessians threatened repercussions
for those who withheld weapons. When American forces arrived in Burlington to search for enemies, many
fled for cover but Morris remained, pleading they not burn her home. After the Hessians left, “Parties of
armed men rudely” searched throughout the town for disaffected persons and some of Morris’ neighbors
found themselves seized by “Tory-hunters.” Eventually, six armed men arrived at her home to search “for a
d—d Tory” spy. While the “spy” they sought was actually her young son amusing himself with an

  333  
 Other areas faired no better. In Newark, patriot Reverend Alex McWhorter

described the town as consumed by vicious individuals attacking private property,

women, the elderly, and even loyalists.57 McWhorter and Elisha Boudinot wrote to

Livingston informing the governor of the treacherous plight the city faced and the

desperate need for policing.58 Even loyalist Thomas Anburey reiterated this point

recalling “desolation of the Jersies, which included friends, and moderate persons, as well

as enemies, had done great injury to our cause.”59 When the Council of Safety

commenced in April 1777, it faced an uncertain world and began apprehending and

interrogating anyone previously captured as well as those who interacted with the

criminals.60 Livingston understood his state witnessed ravages, disarming of patriots,

British protections and oaths, robberies and violence, yet he believed strong executive

                                                                                                               
eyeglass, Morris also secretly harbored Odell. Witnessing the American interrogations, Morris aided
others’ escape. Despite news on December 17, the British arrived at Mount Holly, the Americans continued
“patrolling the streets” and searching for weapons and enemies. When General Israel Putnam arrived in late
December with 1,000 men at Mount Holly, the “Tory-hunting” died down. Morris, Private Journal, 6-22.
57
Accusing British soldiers of “murder, robbery, ravishments, and insults,” McWhorter depicted a
horrendous scene of women of all ages ravished and homes broken into, not only for theft, but to induce
fear. “Appendix to the Report of the Committee,” Pennsylvania Evening Post, April 26, 1777. For more on
the patriot minister McWhorter and the chaos see: Shaw, 1:465-467; Washington to Livingston, March 3,
1777, PGW; and Nicholas Collin, The Journal and Biography of Nicholas Collin, 1746-1831, translated by
Amandus Johnson (Camden: Sinnickson Chew & Sons Co., 1936), 243-249. See also Fred Shelley,
“Ebenezer Hazard’s Diary: New Jersey During the Revolution,” NJH, Vol. 90, no. 3 (Autumn, 1972), 171-
179. Patriots, including Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, frequently fled distressed areas. Samuel Miller, The
Life of Samuel Miller, D.D., LL.D… New Jersey, Volume I (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen and
Haffelfinger, 1869), 147.
58
Reverend Alex McWhorter and Elisha Boudinot to William Livingston, April 26, 1777 in CENJ, 58-59.
59
Thomas Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, 1776-1781, Volume II (Boston, 1923),
160.
60
After Bestedo captured Jesse Woodward, the prisoner admitted disarming whigs and stealing wagons, but
claimed he would return the items and refuted allegations of British employment. Examination of Jesse
Woodward, April 10, 1777 and Francis Wade to Governor Livingston, April 10, 1777 in CENJ, 51-54.
Fowler argued this event marked the beginning of increased violence in the Pine Barrens akin to what
Bertram Wyatt-Brown referred to as honor-related violence steeped in retribution. Bertram Wyatt-Brown,
Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: 1982), 370.

  334  
power could terminate such threats.61 With the Council of Safety’s inauguration, some

disaffected persons such as Thomas Fowler, a former Woodward associate, recognized

the executive’s strength and, upon his capture, confessed damning information about his

former brethren, including “Little Anthony’s” land promises.62 However, in New Jersey

as elsewhere, courts stood in shambles and were unable to punish transgressors or bring

stability to the ravished new state.63 Without the state’s support, court officials and

constables possessed little courage and feared rousing further hostility. Additionally,

many of these local officials lacked the experience to conduct their posts responsibly.

With the judicial system in shambles, the state’s fate lay with the Council of Safety. The

Council brought massive results by hauling in numerous people to make accusations, sign

oaths, enter into forced paroles, be confined, await court dates, or be removed from the

state.64 Jails overflowed with the accused during the Council of Safety’s tenure. In

                                                                                                               
61
See: State of New Jersey vs. Benjamin Helme: Examination of John Jones, April 10, 1777 in New Jersey
Council of Safety, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 33, NJA.
62
Thomas Fowler named some nineteen men including Black Nat and Jesse Woodward, his own relative
William Fowler, and John McGinniss, who accidently stumbled upon Fowler hiding in the woods but
promised not to notify the authorities. Charged with high treason and intent to murder Bestedo, Thomas
Fowler was then jailed. Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 86-87 and Confession of Thomas Fowler before the
Governor and Council of Safety, April 11, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose
Records, folder 37, NJA. For more accounts of criminal activity in the region see: State of New Jersey
against Samuel Wright, Henry Weatherby, William Smith, Thomas Shearman and others: Deposition of
William Sands, April 23, 1777, New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers,
folder 61, NJA and MCSNJ, 38. See also: Deposition of Samuel Knott concerning recruitment of residents
for King’s troops, April 24, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose
Papers, folder 63, NJA. In June 1777, Charles Pettit suggested Livingston send militiamen to watch the
enemy’s movements at Egg Harbor. Charles Pettit, Burlington County, to Governor William Livingston,
June 19, 1777 in BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 40, NJA.
63
Calhoon, Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 402-403. Laws creating courts existed but operation was
sparse.
64
With jails filled, the Council of Safety used paroles. Elias Boudinot noted the conundrum of releasing
“any Prisoners to labour, that you can possibly find Places to Confine, as they greatly taint the Minds of the
People, get a Knowledge of the Country and have an Opportunity of deserting.” Elias Boudinot to Joshua
Mersereau, November 14, 1777 in“Their Distress is almost intolerable”: The Elias Boudinot Letterbook,
1777-1778 ed. Joseph Lee Boyle (Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, Inc., 2002), 47-49.

  335  
Morristown, the jail held at least twenty-two men in August 1777 alone. Their crimes

ranged from taking arms against the American cause to the mere suspicion of disaffection

or the holding of inimical beliefs.65 Soon after its creation, the Council of Safety meted

out its own justice and also heard petitions for mercy from the souls brought before it.

Unchallenged, the Council of Safety reigned until October 1778.66

Governor Livingston, I Presume? Livingston and the Council of Safety

Ever since he was a young man, William Livingston supported the notion that the

government should enact legislation to instill and protect public virtue.67 A sarcastic,

confident, and opinionated man, Livingston made a career of upsetting elites as a talented

writer. The well-read Livingston possessed little fear voicing his distaste regarding

politics or society.68 Writing in the New-Jersey Gazette in 1778 under the pseudonym

‘Cato,’ he extolled the importance of public virtue and sacrifice to stave off

“degenerating into anarchy and confusion.”69 Realizing public virtue was not innate in

people, he firmly believed political leaders needed to inspire them. Hoping that

                                                                                                               
65
Others were confined for passing counterfeit money and refusing to muster. Men petitioned the Council
for release, hoping to accept the oath under the free pardon and end their captivity. Conway Oldham to the
Governor and Council, “List of State Prisoners in the Morristown Goal, 1777,” August 18, 1777 in PNJHS,
Third Series, Vol. III, no. 1 (Oct., 1898), 87-88.
66
Not until January 1778 did Livingston finally create any semblance of a court system. This court was a
“special session” in Monmouth County. As with the Council’s proceedings, guilt was assumed and
innocence needed to be proven. Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 93-94. The men were held in Freehold cells
at this point. Burlington, December 17, 1777, NJAS, Series II, 1:514 and MCSNJ, 195.
67
For example, Livingston desired legislation that curbed over-indulgence and also supported removing
children from their parents to educate them and induce patriotism. Overall, he stressed sacrifice and service
in his first two years in office. Livingston both encouraged legislation to punish men who refused militia
service and also called for high taxes to support the war effort. Levine, 73-77.
68
Lockard, 38.
69
“To the Printer of the New-Jersey Gazette,” New-Jersey Gazette, January 7, 1778. ‘Cato’ discussed
sacrifice and “observations on our internal police, as I think may be salutary to the cause of liberty and
virtue.” The people needed to elect virtuous representatives who stressed the common good.

  336  
republicanism meant the legislature would avoid partisan interests and compel public

virtue, Livingston discovered that his desire to force people to maintain a common good

would be circumvented by the very men he presumed to be his allies.70 Amongst others,

the writings of Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard heavily influenced Livingston while

editing the Independent Reflector years earlier.71 Supporting the concept of a mixed

government, he believed government must protect life, liberty, and property against

threats of corruption.

Vital to Livingston’s conceptions of public virtue and curbing political corruption

was preserving community rights.72 Although a firm defender of freedom of religion, the

press, and thought as central tenants to state development, he recognized even these

rights had limits.73 For the governor, public virtue meant that restraint was needed for

society to function. This tenant was not solely a responsibility of government, but the

people as a whole also needed to conform for the sake of security.74 In his mind, such a

theory justified curbing individual liberties for societal good during the war years. Of

course, those men he targeted as alleged enemies despised Livingston, referring to him as
                                                                                                               
70
Shocked that the legislature disregarded his advice to enact strict laws compelling militia service with
heavy penalties, Livingston remarked that lawmakers were influenced, “by the Fear of disabling their
Constituents, that they dare not exert themselves with the requisite Spirit for the Exigencies of War.”
William Livingston to George Washington, March 3, 1777 in PGW. Livingston encountered similar
reluctance passing heavy taxes as well. William Livingston to Nathaniel Scudder, December 9, 1778,
microfilm in Levine, 78. See also Levine, 79-80.
71
Klein, 311.
72
“A Discant on the Origin, Nature, Use and Abuse of Civil Government,” “The Absurdity of the Civil
Magistrate’s interfering in Matters of Religion, Part I and II,” and “Of Passive-Obedience and Non-
Resistance,” Independent Reflector XXXII, XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII, July 12, August 2, August 9,
August 16, 1753; “Watch Tower” X, New-York Mercury, January 27, 1755 in Klein, 331.
73
He rejected tyranny in all its forms, both civil and religious. For more on Livingston and religion see:
Klein, 327-433.
74
Levine, 178. See also: Phillip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), 11-13 and 348-349.

  337  
“Don Quixote of the Jersies,” the “Itinerant Dey of New Jersey,” the “Spurious

Governor,” the “Despot-in-Chief in and over the rising State of New Jersey,” and

“Knight of the most honorable Order of Starvation.”75 His detractors who suffered most

considered him as “Daemon of the first magnitude” or the “child of darkness.”76 Forced

to flee the American forces, loyalist Reverend Jonathan Odell extolled disaffected

residents’ plight in “The American Times.” Detailing the absence of justice at the hands

of Congress, committees, and mobs as well as highlighting the seeds of anarchy, Odell

lambasted several leading patriots, including Livingston’s perceived “Gall in thy heart,

and malice on thy brow.”77

Despite criticism, Livingston articulated the government needed to prevent lapses

into the state of nature. If residents refused to sacrifice, then the state must employ

coercion to steer people towards communal interests.78 Therefore, despite his earlier

critiques of executive prerogative powers, Livingston did not wish to see such rights

abolished.79 Neither tyranny nor anarchy was desired. How could Livingston limit

                                                                                                               
75
While loyalists defamed Livingston in poetry and newspapers, the British attempted to assassinate him.
Livingston employed his own bodyguards for protection. Joseph Doty served the governor for six months
in 1778. Lewis Condict, “The Condict Revolutionary Record Abstracts: Record of Joseph Doty” in PNJHS,
Vol. VI, no. 3 (Jul., 1921), 166.
76
Klein, 711-712. Even worse Livingston was called “black soul…fit for treason, sacrilege, and spoil, and
polluted with every species of murder and iniquity” or even a wolf in man’s clothing. Winthrop Sargent,
The Life of Major John André, Adjutant-General of the British Army in American (New York: D. Appleton
and Company, 1871), 215. For more negative opinions of Livingston see: Jonathan Odell, “American
Times…,” in The Loyalist Poetry of the Revolution ed. Winthrop Sargent (Philadelphia, 1857) 4.
77
He wrote under the name Camillo Querno. Odell, “American Times,” in The Loyalist Poetry of the
Revolution, 1-4. Odell’s poem addressed patriots’ violence, hypocrisy and persecution.
78
Independent Reflector, no. XXXIX, August 23, 1753, 332 in Levine, 26. To resist an unjust government
however, property rights were imperative and the people needed to monitor government. Independent
Reflector, no. XIII, February 22, 1753, 147-148 in Levine, 28.
79
The Sentinel, no. III, The New-York Gazette, March 14, 1765 in Levine, 29. He hoped such power would
prevent the Council or governor from merely executing the law but would deliver real authority to prevent
anarchy. “The American Whig,” no. XXV, New-York Gazette, August 29, 1768 in Levine, 29.

  338  
suspicious persons’ rights but still preserve the government’s legitimacy?80

Unsurprisingly, Livingston did not feel these two goals to be at odds, as he understood

freedom of speech and the press as community rights against unjust governmental

powers. When loyalists rejected the new state’s initiative against tyranny, they lost such

public rights placing themselves outside the community by attempting to harm it.81 If

anything, by quelling disaffected residents’ rights and their seditious behavior, it aided

the common good and public virtue. For him, if free speech or the press threatened “the

public Weal, it is abused; and that the Prohibition of printing any Thing, not repugnant to

the Prosperity of the State, is an unjustifiable and tyrannical Usurpation.”82 Furthermore

he stated, “Civil Liberty is built upon a Surrender of so much of our natural Liberty of the

Press, is always to be restricted from becoming a Prejudice to the public Weal.”83 During

the war years, for Livingston, political dissension was not defensible because sedition

divided the people thus justifying governmental suppression.84 In the end, there was little

difference between taking up arms and voicing dissension.85

                                                                                                               
80
Throughout his career, Livingston defended freedom of religion and opposed an established church.
Furthermore, he asserted the press had a right to produce the truth. Levine, 5-7 and 20.
81
Klein, 3-5 and 179. English radicals believed for anarchy to be controlled, a leader needed to possess
both power and public virtue. Public virtue was necessary to refrain from selfish interests.
82
Independent Reflector, no. XL, August 30, 1753, 339-340 in Levine, 34. Livingston defended freedom of
the press at times, especially when questioning British tyranny. “The American Whig,” no. XVI, The New-
York Gazette, June 27, 1768 in Levine, 35.
83
“The Sentinel,” no XII, The New-York Gazette, May 23, 1765 in Klein 35.
84
Specifically, he cited loyalism as “self-interested licentiousness rather than simply as an alternative
system of ideas entitled to consideration upon intellectual merits.” Levine, 181.
85
Even before the Council, or his governorship, Livingston directed the Provincial Congress to apprehend
men who voiced dissent. William Livingston to Samuel Tucker, July 29, 1776, The PWL, 1:110-111.

  339  
 Upon his election as governor in 1776, Livingston remained true to his political

philosophy, recognizing the government’s success fell upon him by default since the

legislature failed to meet any of the challenges facing the nascent state. 86 As the

champion of self-sacrifice, Livingston aimed to instill virtue even if coercively.87 In a

September 1776 speech to the legislature, Livingston stressed the need for self-sacrifice if

the state hoped to defeat the tyrannical power besieging it.88 He proposed measures such

as severally punishing anyone who refused mandatory militia service and also called for

strict price regulations to aid the military in procuring supplies. However, both the

legislature and community met him with resistance.89 After almost a year of

representatives’ inactivity, Livingston realized he could not rely on them. Thus he

                                                                                                               
86
Livingston rejected overarching monarchy, yet he knew it and aristocracy stood as necessary checks on
liberty. Levine, 72-73 and Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 229.
87
“To the Printer of the New-Jersey Gazette,” New-Jersey Gazette, January 7, 1778. Writing under “Cato,”
Livingston argued that elected representatives needed to place themselves above accusations of private
interests to serve the people. “WE have, by the blessing of Providence, established a glorious fabric of
freedom and independence; but unless that fabric is supported by the same spirit of patriotism…I am afraid
that it will not be of long duration. Whenever our public virtue decays, our government, which owes its
origins to, and was founded upon, public virtue, will languish.”
88
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at
Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776, 10-12. EC, Series I, 15466. Livingston stressed representatives
needed, “to rise superior to all private Attachment or Resentment.”
89
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at
Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776, 94. EC, Series I, 15466. In 1778, he argued for higher taxes to
pay for the war. Livingston to Washington, November 5, 1777, PWL, 2:102-103. In December, the
Continental Congress highlighted the necessity of virtue and sacrifice for the common good. Curbing
individual rights was necessary for safety. If laws were instituted and transgressors punished, then citizens
would understand. President of the Continental Congress John Hancock to William Livingston, December
23, 1777 in CENJ, 111-113. Despite his beliefs in limiting rights, Livingston opposed impressments, a
common tactic of committees for public safety. However, he knew the military needed a method to obtain
critical supplies. In 1777, the legislature allowed for seizures but under strict guidelines: payment of goods
immediately under fixed price. Livingston and the Council executed the law but did not seize goods
themselves. He blamed waste and corruption for shortages. Levine, 108-109. By February 1778, Livingston
agreed the Council required the power to impress wagons “for a limited time.” However, he vehemently
asserted people should willingly sacrifice and reiterated all impressments must follow the law. William
Livingston to George Washington, February 16, 1778, PGW and Votes and Proceedings of the General
Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a Session begun at Trenton on the 28th day of October 1777, 94-95.
EC, Series I, 16399.

  340  
acknowledged stronger executive powers were vital.90 Even before the Council of

Safety’s reign, the state issued bonds and paroles of honor to monitor society and remove

suspicious persons from threatened areas.91 Although accused residents placed on parole

complained and petitioned the government, Livingston demonstrated early on that he

possessed little remorse for “Gentlemen of your Principles” who claimed inconveniences

while they actively undermined their neighbors’ wellbeing.92 With many patriots

displaced from their homes, “those who openly disavow her Cause, cannot expect better

Quarter.”93 Even before the Council of Safety’s reign, Livingston displayed his disdain

for non-conformity.

In February 1777, Livingston’s State of the State speech further highlighted his

fears of an “unrelenting Enemy…[and] Devastation unknown to civilized Nations.” To

combat internal subversion, the state needed to “distinguish our Friends from our

Enemies.” Too often inhabitants sought to secure their own “Idol, Property at the Hazard

                                                                                                               
90
Levine, 80-81.
91
As the Commissary of Prisoners, Boudinot arranged British prisoners for an exchange. Elias Boudinot
to Hannah Boudinot, March 11, 1778 in The Life, Public Services, Addresses, and Letters of Elias
Boudinot, LL.D. ed. J.J. Boudinot Volume I (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1896), 106-107.
On September 8, Cavelair Joulet asked for his parole extended. Others petitioned to travel beyond their
abode. Petitions demonstrated that the state commanded respect. Cavelair Joulet, Essex County, to
Provincial Congress of New Jersey, Parole of Honor, July 31, 1776, Cavelair Jouet, Essex County, to
Samuel Tucker, September 8, 1776, and Jonathan Fairholme to John Stevens in BAHMC, Revolutionary
War Documents, Box 4-1, documents 13, 16 and 19, NJA.
92
Any complaints, Livingston stated, should have been expressed before agreeing to the parole. William
Livingston to Edward Dongan, July 14, 1776 in PNJHS, Series III, Vol. III, no. 2, (1899), 118.
93
Petitions ranged from humbly asking to be excused from punishments, permission to leave the country,
regretting paroles, and grave inconveniences from their limited mobility. For example, possessing a
significant fortune, David White refused to spend his last years fighting and desired to return to England.
Initially Edward Dongan agreed to be paroled but regretted his decision and wanted to stay in Raway to
work, support his own family, and not be a dependent. Although he promised to take no measures against
America, Livingston expressed little compassion and forbid Dongan to change his parole. David White,
Somerset County to the Continental Congress, August 25, 1776, and Edward V Dongan to Governor
William Livingston, July 13, 1776 in BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 15 and
10, NJA.

  341  
of the general Weal” and thus allowed the British to commit unspeakable atrocities only

found in literature and religious history.94 However, another related issue caused the

governor even more anxiety - the fact many Americans considered the British as an

insurmountable enemy and thus already relinquished the fight. In response, he knew the

government needed to make a statement for the people to rally behind. The “Time [to]

avenge an injured People” had arrived. Calling for the creation of a ten-member body led

by none other than himself, Livingston urged the legislature to bestow upon each

Councilor justice of the peace powers to enforce order. Furthermore, the body should

have the authority to fill vacancies and call the legislature into session. Most importantly,

the Council of Safety must be allowed to seize anyone deemed to have “dangerous

Designs against the State.” Without courts, no immediate trial was possible, but the

alleged enemy would be held to a restrictive bond or placed in jail until a trial could be

held. With the militia at its disposal by fall 1777, the Council of Safety possessed nearly

unchecked power in its grand design for social control.95 Other patriots such as William

Paterson vehemently agreed with Livingston; a weak legislature and almost negligent

judiciary left a critical need for a strong executive.96

                                                                                                               
94
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at
Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776, 85-89. EC, Series I, 15466.
95
Livingston’s fights with the legislature over service requirements are detailed elsewhere in this chapter.
Once the Privy Council controlled the militia, it aided the Council of Safety. Several men sat on both
councils: Livingston, Elmer, Crane, Paterson, Symmes, and Condict. Minutes of the Privy Council, 8-9. Of
course, Livingston had to be mindful not to send the militia too far from their homes. Petition of sundry
inhabitants of Cape May County to William Livingston, to exempt the militia of Cape May from service
‘abroad,’ March 10, 1778 in Legislature: Petitions, Resolutions, Transactions…, 1700c-1845, folder 8,
NJA.
96
“In vain may Legislators be convened; in vain may Laws be enacted; in vain may the powers of
Legislation be exercised; if there be no Bodies to carry their measures into execution.” Therefore, he
concluded a council was needed “composed of the most spirited persons invested with large and extensive
Powers to act with Vigor.” Paterson also expressed his thoughts in October 1777 around when the Council
of Safety was revived. “Unpublished Address of William Paterson” in Somerset County Historical

  342  
 After delivering a March 11 speech calling for an executive body, the legislature

created the now twelve-member Council of Safety and acquiesced to most of

Livingston’s demands, leaving him to begin creating a bureaucracy.97 Livingston’s

wartime Council also received the critical power to remove confined alleged criminals to

more secured locations. Months after its creation, the Council also received the power to

authorize travel passes within or outside the state.98 To expedite this process, it permitted

the legislature, courts, justices of the peace, and militia officers to administer this duty,

but mandated that ferrymen and innkeepers must view such papers from any person

                                                                                                               
Quarterly Vol. II, no. 1 (Jan., 1913), 4 and William Paterson to William Livingston, October 25, 1777,
Livingston Papers, MHS in Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 242.
97
Five members would be from the Legislative Council and seven from the Assembly. The Council of
Safety did not receive the ability to fill all vacant positions. A list of members included: John Cleves
Symmes, William Paterson (sitting attorney general), Nathaniel Scudder, Theophilus Elmer, Silas Condict,
John Hart, John Mehelm, Samuel Dick, John Combs, Caleb Camp, Edmund Wetherby, and Benjamin
Manning. Later it added Jacob Drake, Jonathan Bowen, John Buck, Peter Tallman, William P. Smith,
Frederick Frelinghuysen, and Edward Fleming. For other members, only last names were given: Mr.
Cooper, Mr. Imlay, Mr. Crane, Mr. Fennemore, Mr. Linn, Mr. Cook, and Mr. Keasby. The first Council
reflected equal representation from East and West Jersey. The second incarnation saw the membership
raised to sixteen, nine of whom sat on the Assembly. Three of the new members did not have seats in the
legislature (William P. Smith, Edward Fleming and Frederick Frelinghuysen). Bernstein surmised the first
two were appointed because they came from Essex, Livingston’s county. With the new additions, the east
outnumbered the west. The fourth Council saw more realignment between east and west as well as the
Legislative Council and the Assembly. Paterson, Smith, John Mehelm, and Jonathan Bowen still occupied
no seat in the legislature. Finally, the last Council had twenty-three members to combat quorum issues.
Salaries were also increased from 12 to 20 shillings a day. The Council could also spend up to £2,000. To
battle quorum issues, the Council could add justices of the peace. Livingston, Paterson, Elmer, Condict,
Hart, Mehelm, Manning and Camp sat on all Councils. It seems that Livingston possessed a contingency of
allies in Smith, Mehelm, Condict, Elmer, and Camp. For more on the Council’s composition, see Bernstein,
“New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 283-295. The Council’s commissions proved dangerous for men
such as Joseph Hedden, appointed Commissioner for Essex County, who inventoried the Estates and
Effects of people who joined the enemy. One night British soldiers dragged Hedden from his home in and
abused him and his wife. He later died. Shaw, 1:38-39.
98
Even Boudinot needed to solicit a pass from Livingston to send provisions. Elias Boudinot to William
Livingston, July 26, 1777 in “Their Distress is almost intolerable,” 24-25. The Council found its
authorities increased in June 1777. Acts of the General Assembly of New-Jersey at a session begun at
Princeton on the 27th day of August 1776… Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777) EC, Series, Series I, 15459 and
Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at Princeton on the 27th day of
August 1776…, (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 63-65. EC, Series I, 15460.

  343  
wishing to travel.99 With enhanced powers to monitor and police the population, the

Council of Safety became the face of law and order. However, even more importantly,

the General Assembly increased the Council’s terror and surveillance power under the

guise of protecting the common good. It could now lead retaliation upon any inhabitants

who stood accused of molesting its citizens.

Using the power to issue travel passes, the Council constructed society as it

desired by removing non-conformists and anyone it deemed dangerous to the new state’s

interests. For example, it sent women and children to enemy lines and used the military

to seize disaffected persons in response to British apprehensions.100 Distrustful of

internal subversives, the Council even exiled to New York wives who claimed they had

no contact with their allegedly inimical husbands.101 By late June, the legislature ordered

several women and children, whose family members joined the enemy, removed from the

region and sent beyond enemy lines in Bergen County.102 While some women desired

                                                                                                               
99
MCSNJ, 61-62 and Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 293.
100
Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at Princeton on the 27th day
of August 1776…, (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 62-65. EC, Series I, 15460. Livingston possessed a list
of suspected Newark women that he perhaps used to identify people to send beyond enemy lines or to
monitor. Joseph Hedden to William Livingston regarding Tory women, Newark; list of Tory women, June
21, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 90, NJA. New Jersey
actually witnessed several politically charged women. Adelberg, “An Evenly Balanced County,” 20.
101
Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 15. Not all of the Council’s removals were nefarious. With the British
approaching New York, the Council allowed Mary Allen to return to New York to be with her dying son.
Memorial of Mary Allen, New Brunswick to William Livingston and the Council of Safety requesting a
passport back to New York to join her dying son, May 16, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety, Records,
1776-1778 Box 2, folder 77, NJA and MCSNJ, 52.
102
In June 1777, the legislature empowered the Council to exile families. Order to remove Tory Women
and children from Essex to Bergen, behind enemy lines, June 24 1777 and Samuel Hayes to William
Livingston regarding removal of certain women from the County of Essex, Newark, June 30, 1777 in New
Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 92 and 95, NJA. Bergen County
was a loyalist stronghold connected by trade to New York City. Ruth Keesey, “Loyalism in Bergen County,
New Jersey,” WMQ, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct., 1961), 560. For more information on Bergen and Essex counties
see: Shaw, 1:28-53. Petition of inhabitants of Raritan Landing and Township of Piscataway to William

  344  
removal, the Council’s minutes must be taken with a grain of salt as they provide limited

details. For example, Rachel Wells had “leave to go” outside the state; yet in reality, she

desired to remain.103 Earlier that month, Livingston and the Council received a petition

from her Raritan Landing neighbors lamenting that, ever since her husband James fled to

the enemy in June, Wells, “a lame woman,” and her family had become an inconvenient

expense for the town. Even though Wells presented no immediate threat, with the winter

approaching, her neighbors desired her deported.

In line with Livingston’s mandate for the public good, the Council also received

administrative powers less directly related to disaffection but still connected to

community rights. By September 1777, the Council could reschedule elections that had

been threatened by the enemy. It could also enforce, albeit to a small degree, price

regulations and militia exemptions.104 Other functions included preventing the spread of

diseases, erecting distress beacons, and providing for injured or deceased soldiers and

their families.105 While executing its design, the Council of Safety demonstrated little

resolve for private property when public welfare was in jeopardy. This mindset was

especially evident when residents violated community rights by over-charging for goods

or were deemed suspicious enough to be disarmed.106

                                                                                                               
Livingston and Council of Safety to expel Rachel Wells, September 7, 1778 in Legislature: Petitions,
Resolutions, Transactions…, 1700c-1845, folder 9, NJA.
103
MCSNJ, 285.
104
John D. Cushing, The First Laws of the State of New Jersey (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier,
Inc., 1981), 33-34.
105
See for example: Resolution of the Assembly Empowering the Council of Safety to give relief to
Wounded Soldiers, October 11, 1777 in BAHMC, Legislative Records, 1770-1781, Box 1-14, NJA.
106
Perhaps due to his radical Whig principles rejecting governmental usurpation of private property,
Livingston lamented, “Necessity, say these Gentlemen, hath no Law. but that can hardly be predicated of a
necessity, which there was no necessity for introducing; and which did every particular Department

  345  
 With the courts system in shambles and magistrates unable or unwilling to

perform their duty, Livingston justified the Council’s incredible powers to ardent patriot

Reverend John Witherspoon. Livingston argued that when disaffection consumed the

state, if the government did nothing to protect inhabitants’ security, it failed.107 He

assured the reverend the Council of Safety would swiftly employ “the most salutatory

Effects in the Suppression of our internal enemies.” For 308 days, less than one year,

Livingston stood at the helm of his brainchild board, which was based on the supremacy

of public rights, and endowed with powers to “strike a terror into the disaffected.”108

Despite the other Councilors’ presence and influence, Livingston led the board

and military officials solicited his advice regarding suspicious people or those who

refused to relinquish protections.109 Livingston’s influence created the board, his passion

for the common good and to pursue disaffection led its actions, and since the Council

traveled, its attendance changed remarkably. Yet, Livingston was always a constant.110

                                                                                                               
faithfully discharge its Duty, would never be introduced,” when goods were seized in Monmouth County.
William Livingston to George Washington, January 12, 1778 in PGW. See also Levine, 107-109. Some
towns, like Newark, approached the Council soliciting commissions. Bernstein argued such actions allowed
the Council to gain legitimacy. However, it was much more than just legitimacy as the Council also
consolidated power at the local level. Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 291 and
MCSNJ, 39.
107
Livingston to Witherspoon, May 7, 1777, PWL, 1:324. See also Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary
America, 403.
108
Livingston to Witherspoon, May 7, 1777, PWL, 1:324.
109
In April 1777, Nathaniel Heard wrote Livingston to inquire the fate of men who refused to relinquish
their British protection since no militia law regulated such matters. Heard captured a man with British
recruitment papers upon him who claimed Sussex residents engaged in such activity. Washington also
discussed disaffection with Livingston, hoping the governor would not simply release men who threatened
the public. General Nathaniel Heard to Governor Livingston, April 3, 1777 in CENJ, 45-46 and
Washington to Livingston, April 16, 1777 in PGW.
110
Only five Councilors constituted a quorum and several members limited their involvement to sessions in
their region. Most Councilors sat less than half of the meetings while Livingston missing only four. Levine,
85. Silas Condict lamented that Councilors’ poor attendance and volunteered to sit even though ill. Silas
Condict to Governor Livingston, April 7, 1777 in CENJ, 49-50. Livingston, along with other Councilors,

  346  
He attended nearly every meeting, dictated agenda, made little effort to include his

Councilors, and eschewed soliciting more members to attend meetings.111 However, his

critical role is not to say the Council was a façade, as even Livingston knew a singular

executive would cause a firestorm of controversy. He neither envisioned himself, nor

attempted to become, a demagogue.112 After only four months, Livingston proclaimed

the Council’s success. Writing the commander-in-chief in July regarding the posting of

guards in Elizabethtown and Newark, the governor questioned whether it would be

possible to remove some of the militia in Newark. Remarking how the Council had

“pretty well suppress[ed] the Spirit of Disaffection in” Sussex County, he hoped such an

initiative would bring Bergen County “to the obedience of the States.”113 Such an

ominous statement suggests the governor’s confidence to handle dissidence. Sitting from

March 1777 to October 1778, Livingston’s Council, while short-lived compared to other

executive bodies, possessed extreme powers. When the Council achieved stability to

some degree, it turned its attention to aiding society.114 Ultimately, the state was at the

                                                                                                               
possessed both political and military credentials necessary to navigate the state. Bernstein, “New Jersey in
the American Revolution,” 238. For example, William Churchill Houston served militarily and as the
Council’s treasurer in 1778. Thomas Allen Glenn, William Churchill Houston, 1746-1788 (Norristown,
PA: Thomas Allen Glenn, 1903), 17 and 74.
111
Silas Condict to Livingston, April 7, 1777, Dreer Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania and
Livingston to John Stevens, December 30, 1777, Stevens Family Papers, NJSH in Levine, 85-86. See also
Levine, 84-87. For more on John Stevens and Livingston’s relationship see: Bernstein, “New Jersey in the
American Revolution,” 242-244.
112
He cooperated with the Assembly and intentionally created an executive council, not a dictatorship.
Despite some complaints, he easily won reelection numerous times. Votes and Proceedings of the General
Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776…
(Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1779), 158-160. EC, Series I, 16398 and Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American
Revolution,” 244 and 255.
113
Livingston to Washington, July 11, 1777, PGW.
114
Similar to other committees for public safety, New Jersey’s board did not sit indefinitely (originally only
until June 1777), but was continued until October 1778. In total, the legislature revived the Council five
times. While the Council did not receive the power to appoint justices of the peace and eventually lost the

  347  
mercy of the Council. Over the next roughly 400 meetings in ten counties, it decided the

fate of the Revolution in the “Cockpit.”115 On the eve of the Council’s commencement,

James Allen noted that Washington and Livingston warned the militia and army not to

mistreat loyalists. Such orders seemed necessary because nowhere else were suspected

“Tories” plundered & imprisoned without mercy.”116 While coercive, the Council of

Safety not only monitored society but also instituted order. Soon the Council of Safety

instituted a security state by engaging in extensive interrogations, but also employing the

militia to enforce property confiscations and price regulations.117

The Council of Safety takes the Reins of the Revolution

Given the Committee of Safety’s unsuccessful reign, in early July 1776, the

Provincial Congress sensed a need for excessive measures and, on the local level, created

a Secret Committee in Essex County “to issue warrants and apprehend and confine”

anyone deemed suspicious.118 According to historian David Bernstein, such measures

were necessary to consolidate power yet more was required.119 Disorder wrought the

                                                                                                               
power to exile alleged loyalists’ families, there is little evidence the legislature controlled it. Despite
Bernstein’s perceived shortcomings in the Council, he recognized a potential abuse existed from such
power in the hands of the very few. Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-
Jersey. At a Session begun… on the 27th day of August, 1776, 138. EC, Series I, 15466.
115
The Council convened twenty-four times in Burlington, Essex, Gloucester, Hunterdon, Morris, and
Somerset. It met in Princeton and Morristown most often, safe within whig strongholds protected by the
army. The Council refrained from meeting in Bergen or Monmouth. Bernstein, “New Jersey in the
American Revolution,” 288.
116
James Allen, “Diary of James Allen, Esq. of Philadelphia,” February 17, 1777 in The Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. IX, no. III, (1885), 290.
117
See Levine, 85 and Livingston to George Washington, July 8 and 11, 1777, PGW.
118
MPCCS, 409.
119
Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 276-277. He argued the Assembly wasted time
“hearing petitions and witnesses in divorce and war relief cases.” Also the Assembly could not meet when
under attack.

  348  
colony, as local institutions in Bergen, Burlington, Cumberland, Essex and Sussex

counties could not even hold elections.120 More political turmoil ensued at the state level

when men resigned due to old age, religious tenants, moving into other positions, or in

scandal. With internal division and political turnover, the Council represented a constant

presence to rid New Jersey of dissent. But how did the legislature define dissent and

enemies of state?

Disaffection was a vague and dangerous term that changed over time. Starting on

July 18, 1776, the legislature mandated that anyone within the state (either a citizen or

traveler) owed allegiance to its laws. Any person who supported the king or expressed

sedition would be guilty of treason and punished.121 To prevent internal enemies, the

state designated oaths of allegiance to be vitally important. Only a month before the

Council commenced, Washington highlighted both the necessity and successful history of

oaths as a “national policy... to engage its Members to the discharge of their public duty

by the obligation of some Oath.”122 Starting in September 1776, civil and military

                                                                                                               
120
Minutes of the Justices and Freeholders of Bergen County, 1715-1797 (Hackensack, 1924), 106-141; E.
M. Woodward and John F. Hageman, History of Burlington and Mercer Counties, New
Jersey…(Philadelphia: Everts & Peck, 1883), 254-255; and Thomas Cushing and Charles E. Sheppard,
History of the Counties of Gloucester, Salem, and Cumberland, New Jersey (Philadelphia: Everts & Peck,
1883), 665 and 718. Both armies camped in Bergen County and the British presence strengthened loyalists
in Paulus Hook and Staten Island. They also frequently traded with the troops. Keesey, 560.
121
If a jury convicted a man for counterfeiting, the maximum penalty was death. MPCCS, 561-563. This
ruling represented a new delineation of degrees of treason. Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American
Revolution,” 274. The legislature passed other counterfeiting laws starting in September 1776. Acts of the
General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey, at a session begun at Princeton, from the 27th day of
August… (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 3. EC, Series I, 15459.
122
“From the first institution of civil Government” it has been necessary for a state “to engage its Members
to the discharge of their public duty by the obligation of some Oath; its force and happy influence has been
felt in too many instances to need any Arguments to support the Policy… I have often thought the States
have been too negligent … and am more fully convinced of it” given General William Howe’s experience
in New Jersey.” Washington also cited Elizabethtown men who refused the oath and tried to convince
others not to serve in the militia. Washington to John Hancock, February 5, 1777, and Washington to
Brigadier General William Maxwell, February 12, 1777, PGW.

  349  
leaders needed to accept an oath to prevent deception and establish their fidelity.123

Many civil leaders, due to their influential positions, had to prove their loyalty. This

included jurors, sheriffs, judges and teachers.124 By October 1776, the legislature passed

“An Act to punish Traitors and disaffected Persons” and declared any such persons

aiding the enemy guilty of high treason.125 However, residents vocally supporting British

sovereignty or disparaging the state faced stiff fines and confinement. By June 1777, the

state ordered that not only officials would be extended the oath, but also anyone deemed

suspicious. Those residents suspected would be interrogated and confronted to publicly

affirm their loyalty; anyone who refused faced recognizances for good behavior, court

appearances, and confinement.

After the British failed to unseat New Jersey’s civil leadership and eventually

retreated in early 1777, patriots realized that with proper leadership the state could seize

momentum against internal enemies. Thus Livingston delivered his stirring

aforementioned speech demanding increased executive powers.126 In an effort to not

                                                                                                               
123
Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey, at a session begun at Princeton, from the 27th
day of August… (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 2-3. EC, Series I, 15459.
124
Cushing, The First Laws of the State of New Jersey, 27-29. The law passed October 6, 1777.
125
Those found guilty faced fine or imprisonment. Cushing, The First Laws of the State of New Jersey, 4-5.
While this law passed October 4, 1776, confiscation did not begin until December 1777.
126
Although internal strife eventually escalated, Mark Lender argued the British missed an opportunity and
loyalists suffered. Lender, “The ‘Cockpit’ Reconsidered,” 50-51. The Assembly defined disaffection as
anyone who aided the British by bearing arms, adhered to its sovereignty, spread sedition, etc. Acts of the
General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey, at a session begun at Princeton, from the 27th day of
August… (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 4-6. EC, Series I, 15459. Affidavit of Thomas Carter and
William Hunt, Allentown Monmouth County, March 19, 1777 in BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents,
Box 4-1, document 27, NJA. Stories mounted of the Woodward’s clan activities. As even justices of the
peace treated citizens and their property poorly, Livingston discovered much work was needed to stabilize
the state. Benjamin Vareller claimed when “any other officer of this State shall deviate from that line of
prudence or equity which out to dignify their respective offices, I have the confidence, that this honorable
house will rectify those unfortunate mistakes.” Residents frequently highlighted neighbors as suspicious
and solicited the governor to examine them. Benjamin Varleer, Newtown, to the Representatives of the
State of New Jersey, May 21, 1777, and James Talman, Woolwich, Gloucester County, to Governor and

  350  
only punish the Woodwards and other subversives, but also prove to inhabitants that the

government could secure the state, the Council of Safety set its sights first on Monmouth

County.127 Without the luxury of time to learn its powers and jurisdiction, the Council of

Safety immediately targeted the alleged criminals who propagated terror, stole from

neighbors, damned the Congress, belittled paper currency, and spread false rumors

against the cause. In the first month alone, over fifty alleged disaffected persons

appeared, of which fifteen refused the oath.128

Subversive behavior ranged from physical and overt displays of aggression

(aiding the enemy or taking up arms against the American Cause) to verbal political

dissent (refusing the oath of allegiance or sedition) and even included un-patriotic

behavior (over-charging for goods). To most effectively combat dissent and evaluate

loyalty, the Council embarked on an extensive campaign issuing oaths of allegiance.

Without functioning courts, the Council engaged in massive interrogations to collect

information against alleged enemies. Accepting hearsay as damning evidence, it listened

to charges, accusations and defamations.129 As Reverend Nicholas Collin noted,

                                                                                                               
General Assembly, May 27, 1777 in BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 30 and
39, NJA.
127
Depositions detailed threats such as Lieutenant Colonel John Morris intimidating “to strip him [Isaac
Potter] of everything” and confine him if he did not take arms for the King. Deposition of Isaac Potter,
April 7, 1777, PWL, 1:299-300. When the Assembly created the Council, it reiterated Livingston’s plea
that, “the executive Powers of Government should be strengthened and increased at a time when, by the
Invasion of the Enemy, and other concurrent causes, the natural Strength of Government is greatly
obstructed in its usual Operation and Energy.” Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey, at
a session begun at Princeton, from the 27th day of August… (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 40-42. EC,
Series I, 15459.
128
MCNJS, 7-27 and Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 289.
129
When listing “evidence” against Bergen County loyalists, at times this designation was merely
accusations by other alleged enemies. Notes of evidence against Bergen County Loyalists, August 1777 in
New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 110, NJA.

  351  
“Everywhere distrust, fear, hatred, and abominable selfishness were met with. Parents

and children, brothers and sisters, wife and husband, were enemies to one another.”130

Men such as John Taylor, a Council collaborator, recognized that other than neighbors’

testimony and “what we ourselves do observe,” evidence was scarce.131 Since the

Council possessed reasonable evidence that political dissidents worked in secret, it too

needed to react to such measures.132 Captured by armed men and eventually finding

themselves before the powerful tribunal, it should come as little surprise many of the

accused delivered depositions (whether accurate or not mattered little) and accepted oaths

or paroles. When interrogations and depositions took place, the Council sought as much

information as possible and its bounty was a host of names. For example, when an

American colonel captured Jeremiah Bennett and numerous others, Bennett alone

delivered over 20 names as potentially disaffected.133 The validity of interrogations can

be disputed, yet the Council realized three truths: 1) people willingly gave information

and accused their neighbors of inimical behavior, perhaps to save themselves; 2) judging

from the evidence, disaffection not only existed, but was organized; and 3) claims of

                                                                                                               
130
Collin, 244-245.
131
Taylor captured the men possibly attempting to reach the enemy and heard negative reports about
Woodward. He claimed to know nothing of the other accused men. John Taylor to William Livingston
regarding Thomas Woodward, Thomas Williams and John Brown alias John Lee, Cranberry, [oversized]
May 15, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 4 Oversized, folder 74, NJA.
132
William Smith confessed, before the Council’s creation, that Henry Weatherby and his associates
solicited names to fight the Americans. Examination of Henry Weatherby; depositions of William Smith
and Samuel Knott against Weatherby, November 17, 1776, and Examination of Sundry Persons who have
been take by Colonel Hendrickson’s orders and brought before two Justices, November 19, 1776, New
Jersey Council of Safety, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 1 and folder 2, NJA.
133
Some of the men captured along with Bennett were released. Examination of Sundry Persons who have
been take by Colonel Hendrickson’s orders and brought before two Justices, November 19, 1776 in New
Jersey Council of Safety, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 2, NJA. This evidence was taken before
the Council’s existence but was likely used when the prisoners appeared in April 1777.

  352  
neutrality were unacceptable. To combat subversives, the Council embarked upon a

coercive and intrusive program of interrogations, apprehensions, and forced oath-taking

to establish legitimacy and terrorize potential enemies into submission.134

During interrogations, any man’s words, whether truthful or not, could be used as

evidence of wrongdoing. As John Lawrence discovered in April 1777, the nascent

Council worked swiftly, interviewing at least three men claiming that while at a tavern he

pontificated against the “rebels” and supported the true royal government.135 Although

Lawrence certainly held inimical beliefs, the Council accepted such hearsay delivered

over alcohol as an excuse to strengthen its police efforts. To convey alleged enemies

such as Lawrence before the inquisitorial board, Livingston ordered men like Asher

Holmes, high sheriff of Monmouth County, to enforce warrants. Generally the ominous

warrants cited an accused enemy “to answer…such things as shall be objected against

him.”136 Since the Council was no court, men like Lawrence or Moses Mount could be

held indefinitely for “spreading such false Rumours” that “alienate the Affections of the

People from the Government, and to terrify and discourage the good Subjects of this

                                                                                                               
134
The costs associated with summoning and apprehending disaffected persons were great. In the month of
October, the Council spent over £300 in services. No. 3 Council of Safety expenditures [and receipts] from
12 October to 16 December 1777 by Theophilus Elmer, Treasurer, December 16, 1777 in New Jersey
Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 3 Loose Papers, folder 140, NJA. Many residents petitioned
the government to remove their suspicious neighbors. Boudinot to Robert Lettis Hooper and Boudinot to
John Duyckinck, November 13, 1777 in “Their Distress is almost intolerable,” 42-43.
135
Notes on evidence given against various individuals including John Laurence, Thomas Watson, Francis
Jones, Moses Mount, April 3-10, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose
Papers, Folder 20.2, NJA. See also MCSNJ, 15.
136
State of New Jersey to Asher Holmes, April 5, 1777 in Collection 22, Cherry Hall Papers, 1682-1941,
Asher Holmes (1740-1808), Box 6, Folder 4, Sheriff’s Papers, 1777, Monmouth County Historical Society.
This is probably the same John Lawrence.

  353  
State.”137 Curbing free speech and instituting surveillance might seem paranoid, yet the

Council knew Howe’s success spreading oaths and felt mandated to prove its own

legitimacy. This goal could be accomplished by demonstrating that the government

functioned properly and provided security by inducing fear to obey the law. Fortunately,

oaths accomplished both goals. In areas such as loyalist stronghold Bergen County, oaths

could be a powerful device not only to gain active allies, but also to demonstrate that

breaking an oath carried stiff penalties.138

Only three months after creating the Council, the legislature offered an

unconditional pardon to loyalists who accepted the oath of allegiance; however, the

caveat was anyone who refused the ultimatum faced property confiscation.139 From its

inception to eventual conclusion, excluding Quakers who took affirmations, there were

many incidents when inhabitants accepted the oath.140 More tellingly, even when the

Council signified neither an infraction nor any evidence against an individual existed, the

unfortunate souls who appeared would still be extended an oath. With loyalty so fluid

and questioned, the Council demanded that anyone deemed suspicious should have his or

                                                                                                               
137
Mount apologized for his past misconduct and begged the governor for mercy. Blaming not himself, but
others, he subsequently served in the militia. State of New Jersey vs. Moses Mount: Mittimus ordering
confinement of Moses Mount, April 10, 1777, and Petition of Moses Mount, Burlington Goal to Governor
William Livingston and the Council of Safety, Bordentown, acknowledging his past conduct and wishing
them well in the ‘American Cause,’ April 16, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778,
Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 30 and 51, NJA. See also: MCSNJ, 19.
138
Bergen County, “A Bergen County Oath of Allegiance,” January 28, 1777 in NJARDH, 365-366. In
total, 26 names signed the Bergen County oath.
139
Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 18. On June 3, 1777 the legislature issued the pardon. Votes and
Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at Princeton on the
27th day of August, 1776, 135-136. EC, Series I, 15466.
140
In England, Quakers had long accepted affirmations rather than oaths. However, this behavior was not
an easy transition in America. Levine, 208-209.

  354  
her allegiance and conscience tested.141 Councilors also demonstrated little regard or

sympathy for men claiming to have been forced to travel behind enemy lines.142 Oaths

also provided exceptionally successful means of combating rising enlistment issues. In

May 1777, Lieutenant Gilbert Imlay wrote to Livingston and the Council to suggest that

fifteen prisoners deemed “innocent, or stand accused of petty offences” were fit for

military service.143 With the abundance of suspicious men who lacked sufficient

evidence against them, the Council acquiesced. Several men accept the offer to serve

rather than face the uncertainty of indefinite imprisonment or a life under surveillance.

Of course, not all men agreed; William Newman risked jail time and eventually

succumbed to smallpox in prison.144 Even when men accepted the offer, some later

deserted, thus contributing to the Council of Safety’s fears.

                                                                                                               
141
As David Vanbuskirk discovered, even when the Council produced no evidence, it still demanded he
publically accept an oath to bind him to the state. MCSNJ, 112.
142
When James Wells and Richard Churchward admitted absconding to New York under duress,
Livingston forced the men to enter an oath before discharging them. Those residents who returned from
enemy lines faced felony charges. “State of New-Jersey: An Act for rendering more effectual two certain
Acts therein mentioned,” Pennsylvania Packet, June 17, 1777.
143
Memorial of Lieutenant Gilbert Imlay concerning Monmouth County prisoners, May 19, 1777 in New
Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 80, NJA and MCSNJ, 50.
Despite accusations, American prisoner’ treatment concerned the Council. Therefore it tried to be
conscious of how it treated the British in jails. Robert Morris to William Livingston regarding possible
prisoner exchange and a list of suspected traitors, Pompton, July 5, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety
Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 98, NJA. Despite the Council’s efforts, Jonathan Odell
lamented its odious method of recruiting men in dirty jails and giving them an option to betray their King.
Odell, “The American Times” in The Loyalist Poetry, 18. Alleged enemies who agreed to serve understood
the great risk. Some like Benjamin Hatfield left his family instructions. Note to Jonathan Hampton from
Benjamin Hetfield detailing his last wishes, August 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-
1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 109, NJA and MCSNJ, 123. Accused of illicit trading, Hetfield named
James and Jacob Hetfield as engaging him to go to Staten Island for Bohea Tea. State of New Jersey
against James Hetfield and Jacob Hetfield: Deposition of Benjamin Hetfield, August 22, 1777, Benjamin
Hetfield: Enlistment in the Navy, August 22, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778,
Box 2 Loose Records, folder 115 and 116 NJA and Silvannus Seely to William Livingston, August 21,
1777 in CENJ, 91-92.
144
It is not always clear if all offers were accepted. Facing an impending trial and perhaps a death sentence,
prisoners might have sensed this was their best option. The Council demonstrated little restraint in its
accusations and the courts might have felt political pressures to condemn. One Morristown court sentenced

  355  
 While overt disaffection raged, equivocal or professed neutrality eventually

needed to be addressed. As previously mentioned, since no formal oath for every adult

male existed in New Jersey, as was the case in Pennsylvania, in September 1776, a state

law ordered that all civil and military leaders and anyone accused of disaffection had to

prove their allegiance by accepting an oath.145 By October 1777, schoolmasters too had

to accept an oath or forfeit £6 a week if they wished to continue teaching. Some residents

protested this blatant propaganda.146 According to the law, young citizens “should be

early instructed in the Principles of publick Virtue, duly impressed with the amiable Ideas

of Liberty and Patriotism, and at the same Time inspired with the keenest Abhorrence of

despotick and arbitrary power.”147 Believing a republic’s success intrinsically linked to

the cultivation of public virtue, Livingston demanded children be educated to appreciate

and protect their country.148 Immediately, Quaker leader Samuel Allison voiced

                                                                                                               
35 alleged loyalists to die. After two executions, the rest agreed to join the American ranks. Others
empathically stated death was “preferable to fighting against the King.” Mark E. Lender, “The New Jersey
Soldier,” NJRE, 5:23. The same William Newman who appeared before the Council of Safety as
disaffected was charged with high treason and refused to enlist. MCSNJ, 53, 58, 64, 105, and 153.
145
Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey, at a session begun at Princeton on the 27th day
on the day of August 1776…, (Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 2. EC, Series I, 15459. By September 1776,
the legislature created the New Jersey State Loyalty Oath for any public official. Livingston requested a
general test oath in May 1778.
146
Samuel Allison to William Livingston, July 13, 1778, PWL, 2:383-384.
147
Cushing, The First Laws of the State of New Jersey, 28.
148
Citing Lycurgus, lawmaker of ancient Sparta, Livingston wrote in 1753, “the unalienable Right of the
Commonwealth [was education]. It was dangerous…to suffer the incautious Minds of those who were born
Members of Society, to imbide any Principles but those of universal Benevolence, and an unextinguishable
Love for the Community of which they were Subjects. For this Reason, children were withdrawn from the
Authority of their Parents, who might otherwise warp their immature Judgments in Favor of Prejudices and
Errors obtruded on them by the Dint of Authority…this was considered as a prudent Step to guard the
Liberty and Happiness of that Republic.” The Independent Reflector, no. XX April 12, 1753, 191-192.

  356  
displeasure when a fellow Friend and teacher opposed the oath on religious terms.149

According to Allison, the man “harmless & inoffensive as perhaps any in the province”

had a class full of pupils whose parents supported America. However, rather than allow

the man to express himself and instruct his students, a magistrate barged into his

classroom and terminated his livelihood. Allison questioned the executive: did

preventing a pacifist from teaching strengthen the cause? Challenging the very essence

of oaths, Allison rejected the notion of oath-takers’ righteousness. If forcing allegiance

was “a sprout of true liberty,” what did that say about the republic? Although Allison

broached this topic, like his call for slave manumission, it fell upon deaf ears.150 Of

course, the more significant issue was not teachers accepting the oath but neutrality.

Allison already stood on weak ground with Livingston, who detested professed

neutrality as a farce. Unable to even comprehend such behavior, Livingston lambasted

his former friend, Walter Rutherford, for his unwillingness to take a stance. Rejecting

Rutherford’s appeal, the governor refused to extend his parole due to his friend’s inability

to take arms against his native country, Great Britain. Believing tyranny always

                                                                                                               
149
Schools were as diverse as the population and served to teach English to immigrants as well as “preserve
or guard the distinct national, religious, and social traditions of the community.” Quakers were particularly
hesitant of education outside their community for fear their children would learn worldly temptations.
However, the sect stressed “humanitarian social values.” Even without loyalty oaths, war disrupted
education. In 1778, the Assembly exempted one teacher from militia service in each region that had 15
pupils, as long as he took the oath. Furthermore, authorities had the right to test “his knowledge and his
skill in teaching” to prove he was legitimate. Douglas Sloan, “Education in New Jersey in the
Revolutionary Era,” NJRE, 24:22. For arguments to excuse men in school from service see: “’Cato’ on the
‘Importance of a Liberal Education to Civil Society,’” New-Jersey Gazette, January 14, 1778 in NJARDH,
427-429.
150
Citing that English Quakers in fact accepted oaths and did not complain (and penalties were stricter),
Livingston was not swayed. As for teachers, Livingston remarked it would be easy to find patriots to
replace them, a frightening statement regarding the state of both free speech and education.

  357  
outweighed birthplace he refused to aid Rutherford.151 The pragmatic governor

dismissed pacifism, attesting that neutrals only continued their equivocal stance to assure

their safety no matter which side emerged victorious. Such dearth of self-sacrifice was

unacceptable and Livingston vehemently articulated in his Proclamation to the Assembly

that “Such political Hypocrites ought, by a General Test, to be dragged from their lurking

Holes.”152 To Livingston, these men did not deserve pardons despite the legislature’s

generosity and forgiveness.

Aside from neutrals, the Council of Safety also targeted residents who most

threatened the government’s stability, such as British colonial leaders and former patriots

who lacked honor. Within the first thirty days sitting, the Council summoned former

Legislative Council member John Lawrence, an active agent of the King accused of high

treason for offering pardons to men who took up arms.153 Other depositions attested that

                                                                                                               
151
“Tyranny ought forever to be detested by whomsoever & against whomsoever it may be attempted,”
Livingston demanded. If Rutherford refused to join his countrymen, the governor could not help him. By
choosing to defend his native country over his adopted one, Livingston mocked Rutherford’s regrettable
behavior and accused him of harming Americans. Rutherford and James Parker both were released later in
1778. William Livingston to Walter Rutherford, January 15, 1778, PWL, 2:185-186.
152
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a Session begun at
Trenton on the 28th day of October…until the 8th of October 1778, (Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1779), 119. EC,
Series I, 16399. For other negative comments on Quakers see: Israel Putnam to Livingston, February 10
and 18, 1777, PWL, 1:220-221 and 241-242.
153
There are many John Lawrences (spelled differently, sometimes with a Jr., or a middle name of Brown)
and it is unclear whom each deposition references. MCSNJ, 25. A John Lawrence had already entered a
parole in July 1776 with the Provincial Congress. MPCCS, 495 and John Lawrence to Provincial Congress
of New Jersey, Parole of Honor, July 13, 1776 in BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1,
document 4, NJA. Others accused enemies entered bonds with Samuel Tucker to remain on their good
behavior during the period after the Committee of Safety concluded and before the Council began. Most
paroles agreed to remain in a certain area and refrain from political activities. See: Bond of William Hick
and Phillip Kearney of Perth Amboy, Middlesex County to Samuel Tucker and Parole of William Hick,
July 13, 1776 in BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 5, NJA and Deposition of
James Cox Jr., April 1, 1777, PWL, 1:288-289. Rumors existed that neither British protection nor professed
loyalism prevented his Majesty’s troops’ from harassing inhabitants. For more on the Council versus
enemy recruiting see: Examination of Peter Young and Henry Mowerson regarding ‘Enlistment of
Loyalists in Morris County,’ May 2, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2
Loose Papers, folder 70, NJA; MCSNJ, 46; and Affidavit of Jonathan Palmer against Nicholas Pickle,

  358  
Lawrence plotted to supply the enemy with provisions.154 Lawrence was not the only

prominent loyalist who appeared before the Council as James Parker, a wealthy merchant

and Governor’s Council member, also entered a forced recognizance for good behavior

and found his movement restricted to Morristown.155 Unlike Lawrence, Parker elected

for neutrality to no avail. After his refusal to neither serve on the Provincial Congress

nor to aid Governor Franklin, Parker represented no realistic threat. However,

Councilors considered Parker a symbol of the old regime. Although claiming neutrality,

Parker found himself confined after refusing the oath and later exchanged. Along with

Rutherford, the two men sat in a Morristown jail while their wives pled for an

exchange.156 Despite the men’s professed impartiality and eventual successful return to

American politics, the security state assumed suspicious behavior of anyone who

refrained from openly boasting their patriotism.

                                                                                                               
William Craig, Andrew Pickins and others, September 17, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records,
1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 118, NJA.
154
Deposition of Thomas Farr, April 5, 1777 in PWL, 1:294. Farr was a member of the Monmouth militia.
Several men gave depositions against Lawrence. State of New Jersey against John Lawrence, Esq. of Upper
Freehold: Affidavit of Gilbert Barton, April 5, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778,
Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 21, NJA and MCSNJ, 15. Eventually, Lewis Fenton murdered Farr and his wife
in 1779. Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 163-165.
155
MCSNJ, 98 and 154 and William Nelson, New Jersey Biographical and Genealogical Notes…(Newark:
1916), 173. Parker served on the colonial Council from 1765-1775 and sat on the East Jersey Board of
Proprietors. He was also Cortland Skinner’s brother-in-law. For more on Cortlandt Skinner’s loyalists
troops see: William S. Stryker, “The New Jersey Volunteers” (Loyalists) in the Revolutionary War
(Trenton: Naar, Day & Naar, Book and Job Printers, 1887), 4-5 and Calhoon The Loyalists in
Revolutionary America, 362. For an example of a recognize see: Joseph Pegg’s experience. Previously
confined in Easton, the Council ordered him moved to the Sussex County jail. The Council’s minutes on
October 19, 1777 state that Parker and ninety-three other men accused of various unspecified crimes of
disaffection would be charged in Morris County if they committed another offense. Pegg’s recognizance
stated he must appear at court. Supreme Court Recognizance, 1777 in Supreme Court Recognizances,
1706-1838 and n.d., NJA.
156
Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 24. It seems Parker was neutral. He eventually returned to New Jersey
and was elected mayor of Perth Amboy in 1791.

  359  
 Even former American leaders found themselves treated with similar disdain.

Upon discovering Samuel Tucker and Richard Stockton accepted British protection in

1776, the Council summoned the two disgraced patriots. Tucker, the former Provincial

Congress President, and Stockton, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, had to

publicly accept an oath to the state.157 Tucker reiterated he only sought British protection

for fear of his property while Stockton cited extreme physical abuse.158 Even upon

hearing their claims, the government showed little sympathy since many residents

experienced hardships and did not abandon their loyalty. For two high-ranking men to

have accepted British security the Council of Safety had to set an example and both fell

from grace.159

When a suspicious person refused to appear when summoned, the Council

responded with force. However, as Robert Morris noted in a correspondence to

Livingston early during the Council’s reign, disaffection must be dealt with carefully.

Certain areas were more at risk than others due to British proximity.160 Morris reiterated

                                                                                                               
157
MCSNJ, 213.
158
MCSNJ, 178. Stockton appeared on December 22, 1777. The Pine Barrens men apprehended Tucker in
December while traveling to Trenton. After threatening his life, Tucker accepted a British parole to save his
life. He was able to hid public money and his own. “Mr. Collins,” New-Jersey Gazette, July 5, 1784.
159
Men like James Grover, who sat on the committee of correspondence, the Council ordered apprehended.
John Taylor to William Livingston, Bordentown, in support of James Grover, Middletown, April 19, 1777,
and Warrant to apprehend James Grover, Henry Waddell, Joseph Leonard, [and others] in Monmouth
County July 19, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 55
and Box 4, folder 103, NJA; Henry Waddell to Livingston, April 11, 1777, PWL, 1:302; and MCSNJ, 128.
The Council received accusations that local committeemen held inimical beliefs and only retained their
deceptive position to avoid militia service or negatively steer the Revolution. William Sands’ oath in
reference to Tories [Deposition against Daniel Van Mater and his brothers], April 14, 1777 and Tunis
Vanerveer against John Van Mater [Deposition against Daniel Van Mater and John Van Mater], April 15,
1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 46 and folder 50,
NJA.
160
Joseph Hedden Jr. to William Livingston, July 1, 1777 in CENJ, 78. Hedden wrote Livingston with a list
of names as well as alleged crimes (many appeared before the Council) that sat in jail. He solicited the
governor’s guidance due to Newark’s exposed situation. Paterson called for all prisoners in Newark’s jail

  360  
that allegations of disaffection too often ended with American militias or soldiers’ carpe

diem behavior.161 Inhabitants worried about unrestrained zealot pursuit of the enemy and

the Council needed to recognize this fear. Morris reminded Livingston that accusations

of disloyalty came from “several friends who reside in different parts of the County” and

not necessarily from evidence. Morris’ warnings seemed to fall on deaf ears as the

Council felt it had little choice, believing it must pursue nearly all accusations of internal

subversion.162 Therefore, it captured and placed the accused on recognizances, securities,

bonds, or sureties to appear at court or remain on good behavior.163 Hundreds of people

received such a sentencing. To understand the Council’s presence and surveillance over

society, one need only examine an accused man’s letter to his family attesting he would

abide by the law and begging his brother to provide his surety.164

The most common offense the Council policed was aiding the enemy. This

allegation could mean taking up arms, recruiting, accepting protection, confirming

loyalty, trading with the enemy, spreading false or seditious rumors, harboring alleged
                                                                                                               
listed in Hedden’s letter (no matter their crime or duration imprisoned) moved to Morristown jail. Drafted
by William Paterson on the foregoing sheet, 1777 in CENJ, 79-80.
161
Robert Morris to William Livingston, July 5, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records 1776-1778,
Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 98, NJA. Morris admitted in some counties, where disaffection was unchecked,
residents who supported the patriots’ cause felt overburdened with militia duty and angered that their
neighbors received exemptions.
162
Washington expressed concern regarding disaffection in New Jersey. Washington to Captain Francis
Wade, March 28, 1777 in PGW. See also: Washington to John Hancock, April 12-13, 1777, Washington to
Brigadier General Alexander McDougall, April 23, 1777, Washington to Livingston, April 29, 1777, and
Washington to Livingston, May 11, 1777, PGW.
163
Men like Francis Hopkinson, former member of the Legislative Council, the Provincial Congress, and
the Continental Congress, trusted Livingston to apprehend and interrogate suspicious persons. If guilty, he
was to send them to Philadelphia. Others such as General Israel Putnam sent prisoners (whom little
evidence existed against) to Livingston. Francis Hopkinson to William Livingston, April 1777, and General
Israel Putnam to William Livingston, April 25, 1777 in CENJ, 57.
164
Forman, Morris Jail, Morris County, to brother, November 10, 1777, BAHMC, Revolutionary War
Documents, Box 4-1, document 56, NJA.

  361  
loyalists, disarming or harming patriots, kidnapping, or spying.165 In February 1778,

Livingston, with advice from his Privy Council, noted the continued “illicit

Correspondence” between the British in Pennsylvania and the Delaware coastline of New

Jersey. Due to such a risk to “Publick Safety,” Livingston ordered commanding officers

in the militia to seize and secure all such vessels so “no Person what ever” could continue

such detrimental practices.166

As previously mentioned, sedition was as serious a crime as actively aiding the

enemy. In April 1777, the Council issued a warrant against Obadiah King for

“expressions, which tend to encourage Disaffection, and to raise Tumults and Disorders

in the State.”167 King and others like him threatened governmental sovereignty but also

in Livingston’s opinion, the community. Therefore, free speech could not be tolerated

during a civil war. Even men accused months before the Council’s existence of toasting

the king and damning Washington as well as Congress, were not forgiven when the

                                                                                                               
165
For men such as the captured Jacob Cummins, the Council charged him “on suspicion of aiding &
abetting the Enemy and conspiring against the Government.” He was later discharged on his future good
behavior and was required to appear at court. MCSNJ, 18 and 23.
166
Minutes of the Privy Council, 61-62. The Privy Council ordered Colonel Joseph Ellis to have boats
“removed to places of Safety in the Country,” “disabled,” or “destroyed” with few exceptions.
Similarly, enemy recruiting also polluted the population. After receiving word of Joseph Salter’s
disaffection in Dover, Monmouth County, the Council interviewed both Isaac Potter and Daniel Griggle.
Potter, perhaps to save himself, related that Monmouth residents threateningly ordered men to sign papers
that “put us on the same footing we formerly were under the King.” Potter claimed to have initially rejected
the oath, but outnumbered and afraid, ultimately signed. Griggle described a similar story but asserted that
Salter and the others openly refuted local committees, claiming such bodies lacked authority. Recognizing
local boards’ dearth of resources, the Council arrested and imprisoned Salter in April 1777. Deposition of
Isaac Potter against Joseph Salter, and State of New Jersey against Joseph Salter: Deposition of Daniel
Griggs, April 7, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 7
and folder 27, NJA and MCSNJ, 12. It appears he was eventually released and lived in New Jersey. To be
Sold, 1779 and To be Sold, May 5, 1779 in NJAS, Series II, 3:71 and 361.
167
MCSNJ, 33-34. King admitted fault and accepted the oath.

  362  
Council sat in March.168 Of course there were far less obvious cases as well. While

intoxicated, John Drummond, who never stood accused of aiding the enemy, claimed to

be tricked by a “Seducer” to utter false statements.169 Even without evidence other than

hearsay, the Council still forced him to accept an oath. Women also appeared before the

Council for sedition: both Margaret McClean and Joanna Wood accused Hannah Wright

of speaking out against the cause. The Council later had her confined. With women as

both the accusers and the alleged enemy, it is obvious the Council recognized women’s

political involvement on both sides during the war.170

From the Council’s point of view, harsh treatment and coercion were necessary to

succeed; if the British employed such tactics, then the Council would too. Upon

discovering that internal subversives captured and abused patriot and Legislative Council

member John Fell, Livingston demanded the Council of Safety have retaliation powers

that allowed it to kidnap as many British supporters as necessary to procure Fell.171 To

capture alleged subversives, the Council operated similarly to New York’s CDDCs,

soliciting patriots to deliver lists and employing armed men to apprehend them. On July

                                                                                                               
168
Accused in February 1777, the Council summoned Richard Barns on March 19 for toasting the King.
Barns remained jailed until the Council summoned him. He accepted the oath and was discharged a month
later. Evidence against Anwell Tories [Francis Shivers and Peter Head against Richard Barnes], February 5,
1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 6, NJA and
MCSNJ, 8. Others such as Thomas Woodward spread false rumors against the Congress. Deposition of
Thomas Forman, April 23, 1777, PWL, 1:310-311 and MCSNJ, 50-51 and 60.
169
Petition of Jacob VanWagoner and Matthew Everse on behalf of John Drummond arrested for
portraying the King while drunk, June 10, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box
2 Loose Papers, folder 89, NJA and MCSNJ, 63.
170
MCSNJ, 113. Hannah, the wife of William Wright, was sentenced on August 7, 1777. Both Henry
Desbrow and his wife stood accused of condemning Continental money. MCSNJ, 264.
171
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at
Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776, 117 EC, Series I, 15466. The Assembly later reconfirmed on
April 4, 1778. Cushing, The First Laws of the State of New Jersey, 42. James Parker was later exchanged
for Fell. Lundin, 79.

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7, 1777, Livingston wrote to Samuel Meeker, Samuel Kirkendall, Isaac Martin, Jacob

McCollom, and George Allen and asked them to appear in Sussex County (where the

board temporarily met) before the Council with a list “disaffected or dangerous”

residents. By calling upon locals to deliver names, the Council strived for efficiency but

also risked punishing innocent people.172 The Council’s investigations, while under time

constraints, were not completely rushed; Livingston solicited information on confined

individuals, even writing to other states inquiring about the character of men in jail.173 Of

course, delivering evidence against a neighbor, whether friend, foe, or stranger, could

prove to be dangerous. The disaffected certainly understood the security state sought

names and information. James Cornelius claimed that the allegedly disaffected Walter

Curtis threatened him with harm if any of Custis’ friends happened to be captured.

Cornelius claimed when Curtis was finally captured, he offered him £1,000 to refrain

from testifying against him.174 Not stopping at mere peace offerings, Curtis warned

Cornelius that if he did testify to the Council, he would certainly be hanged.175

While lists notified the Council of suspicious persons, it needed to hire men to

apprehend alleged enemies. In July, the Council delivered a list of names to General

William Winds and permitted him to dispense 200 Morris County militiamen, a daunting

                                                                                                               
172
The Council acquired lists that provided details and accusations against several residents in a county,
including confessions of aiding the enemy, supporting the King, and threats of apprehensions or thefts.
Evidence against Bergen County Tories, July 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778,
Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 96, NJA.
173
William Smith and Benjamin Ramsey to William Livingston vouching for the character of a Mr.
Campbell, April 8, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records,
folder 28, NJA.
174
Affidavit of James Cornelius against Walter Curtis, May 28, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety
Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 86, NJA.
175
Curtis was forced to take an oath and meet a court date. MCSNJ, 55.

  364  
physical presence of the Council of Safety’s power.176 Ordering Winds’ men not to

destroy private property, Livingston’s black list was still ominous. The governor notified

Washington that it was “necessary for the public interest” to confine and seize the estates

of those who went to the enemy.177 Colonel Morgan and Major Hayes immediately sent

nine prisoners to the Council for examination.178 Although not necessarily harassed by

the Council, James Moody described “Committees” employing armed men to intimidate

residents by brandishing guns and tomahawks.179 In late March 1777, after the Council

already commenced, hired ruffians even shot at Moody for expressing his disenchantment

with the American Cause.180

The Council possessed a complicated relationship with the military, at times

employing armed men to capture the disaffected but also disciplining abuses. In August

1777, the Council hired Lieutenant Jost Zebrisci to organize a party of thirty men to

apprehend anyone whom they deemed suspicious, especially those inhabitants traveling

illegally.181 Not long before Zebrisci’s appointment, the legislature empowered the

Council to issue travel passports. Instructing Zebrisci to target residents who had not

                                                                                                               
176
William Livingston to General William Winds, July 3, 1777, PWL, 2:8-9.
177
William Livingston to General George Washington, July 7, 1777 in CENJ, 81-82.
178
Joseph Hedden Jr. to William Livingston, July 21, 1777 in CENJ, 83-84.
179
James Moody, Narrative of the Exertions and Suffering of Lieut. James Moody, in the Cause of
Government since the Year 1776 (London, 1783), 1-7. Moody did not escape Livingston’s eye. In July
1780, the Privy Council ordered him apprehended. Minutes of the Privy Council, 160-161.
180
Such treatment led him to later join the British. For an account of Moody’s harsh treatment being placed
in irons in jail, see fellow prison mate William Buirtis’ account. William Buirtis describes the Ordeal:
William Buirtis to the Judge Advocate Office, May 11, 1782 in Crary, 209-210.
181
For an example of a Council sanction apprehension (not issued to Zebrisci) see: New Jersey against
John Blackwell: Warrant to arrest and hold John Blackwell for the Council of Safety, April 15, 1777 in
New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 47, NJA and MCSNJ, 24,
39-42. Blackwell was captured and jailed before witnesses were heard.

  365  
accepted the Act of Pardon, the Council of Safety also recommended monitoring those

men who returned from beyond enemy lines or seemed suspicious of plundering.182

Aside from Zebrisci, others also gladly policed the shores and enemy lines to capture

suspicious inhabitants traveling.183 With accusations of major abuses in issuing passes,

Livingston accused lesser officers of neglecting their duty.184 Even men close to

Washington employed as spies supposedly abused their position by illicitly trading with

the enemy on Staten Island.185 Such behavior was especially rampant in West Jersey

when the British stayed in Philadelphia.186 Some historians insist that most illicit trade

                                                                                                               
182
MCSNJ, 109.
183
Minutes of the Council of Safety concerning the examination and discharge of prisoners, March 18-19,
1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2, folder 12, NJA. After examining a
number of prisoners captured moving from Philadelphia to New York, Livingston and the Council sent
them to Pennsylvania’s Council of Safety. Committees for public safety frequently communicated with
other state governments. Correspondence from unknown sender [Pennsylvania Council of Safety?] to
unknown recipient [William Livingston?] informing them that Colonel Humpton would be crossing into
‘your county,’ January 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers,
folder 4, NJA.
184
See for example the case of Mr. Macomb and Mr. Voorhes for illicit travel under flags. William
Paterson to William Livingston, August 12, 1777 in CENJ, 86-87.
185
Essex County Grand Jury to William Livingston, August 23 1777, PWL, 2:27. Washington delivered
travel passes to Joseph Morse Jr., Baker Hendricks, and John Hendricks. The men allegedly delivered beef
to the enemy. Livingston was aware spies traveled New Jersey. Abraham Clark to Livingston, November
13, 1777, Livingston Papers, MHS, microfilm reel 2 in Levine, 57. Orders of John Taylor concerning 3
prisoners, Peter Overt, Francis Letts, and William Lake, May 6, 1777, and John Taylor, Cranberry to
William Livingston, Haddonfield regarding three prisoners, Peter Overt, Francis Letts, & William Lake,
May 7, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2, folder 71 and folder 72, NJA.
Illicit trade in Bergen County led to violence. These conflicts might have stemmed from “personal
indignities.” Although there had been wealthy loyalists, most disaffected owned less than 100 acres or were
tenant farmers. Ruth Keesey, “Loyalism in Bergen County, New Jersey,” WMQ, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct.,
1961), 560-569.
186
David Fowler, “’These were Troublesome Times Indeed’: Social and Economic Conditions in
Revolutionary New Jersey,” NJAR, 29. The Council continued to receive reports of disaffected men and
women in Bergen, Cumberland, Essex, Middlesex, and Monmouth throughout spring and summer 1777.
After the British seized Philadelphia in September 1777, loyalist regiments increased attacks in West
Jersey. Thomas Fleming, “Crossroads of the American Revolution” in NJAR, 8.

  366  
was “Imperatives of survival,” but patriots refused such arguments.187 Either way, as

Reverend Collin suggested, army occupation left the region in a “wretched state” and he

believed the laws in fact harmed people.188

Illegal trade became so problematic the New-Jersey Gazette openly disparaged

those residents who harmed the community.189 The patriot periodical printed in

Burlington declared, “it is to be hoped that government will make terrible examples of

some of those miscreants, to prevent the like criminal and felonious intercourse for the

future.”190 With New Jerseyans growing increasingly disenchanted about the nascent

state’s ability to govern, Livingston issued additional warrants.191 Anyone who traveled

behind enemy lines, intentionally or not, faced stiff punishments. Claiming poverty as

well as ignorance, some accused men attested they traveled only to procure salt for their

                                                                                                               
187
Kim, “The Limits of Politicization in the Revolution,” 882. The Privy Council also dealt with illegal
trading by issuing proclamations limiting travel. If the guilty party joined the military, he could be
pardoned. Minutes of the Privy Council, 32-34.
188
Many people traded with the English for hard currency, sugar, tea, and other items. Collin, 244.
189
The New-Jersey Gazette began in December 1777 and immediately became embroiled in political
debates. For example, in 1779 after “Cincinnatus” lambasted Livingston, the government pressured printer
Isaac Collins to identify the author, claiming, “the Freedom of the Press ought to be tolerated as far as it is
consistent with the Good of the People, and the Security of the Government established under their
Authority.” Collins refused and the Assembly relented. Other papers such as the New-Jersey Journal
(printed by the patriot Shepard Kollock) began in 1779. Richard F. Hixson, “The Press in Revolutionary
New Jersey,” NJRE, 1:9 and 11-16. Livingston was instrumental creating the New-Jersey Gazette to stir
patriotism and combat Rivington’s Royal Gazette. He wrote for the paper under the name “Hortentius.”
Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 235. Livingston argued the state funded newspaper
was necessary after the British seized Philadelphia. See also Votes and Proceedings of the General
Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776, 202.
EC, Series I, 16398. With the New-Jersey Gazette in his corner, Livingston not only influenced public
opinion but also manipulated it towards independence and pro-government thinking. He sent letters from
various pseudonyms to trick the public. Levine, 184-188.
190
“Burlington,” New-Jersey Gazette, December 17, 1777. The paper bemoaned the “several acts of petty
larceny… committed in this city.” The author reiterated the desire that, “the gentlemen in authority are
determined to take effectual measures to discover and bring the perpetrators …to punishment.”
191
Livingston to Washington, November 22, 1777, PGW.

  367  
families.192 While difficult to judge the validity of their defenses, it is not unthinkable.

Many residents, including those men involved in government, did not know all the laws

and given shortages caused by war, the lack of necessities induced starvation. Believing

he faced incredible odds, Livingston lamented to Washington his limited options since

“A Tory is an incorrigible Animal: And nothing but the Extinction of Life, will

extinguish his Malevolence against Liberty.”193 Livingston’s desire for strong policing

aside, he still understood the shortcomings of relying on the military to apprehend alleged

enemies, as they often did so based mostly on accusations and with little evidence.194 At

times, supposed enemies of the state were nothing more than fisherman catching clams

and oysters who refused to bear arms.195 Committees for public safety generally

preferred to handle civil apprehensions and interrogations rather than allow the military

to seize too much control. However, in the end, securing the state from threats largely

meant extensive policing, including monitoring theft and slaves.

For example, Jonathan Palmer of Hunterdon, while employed by the Council as a

light horse rider “collecting the effects of the Tories,” accused four men of stealing

                                                                                                               
192
The Council ordered John McGinnis and John Havens returned to jail and pay their own expenses.
Petition of John McGinnis and John Havens to William Livingston, for a pardon of their Nine-Month
Sentences, July 16, 1777 in Legislature: Petitions, Resolutions, Transactions…, 1700c-1845, folder 5 and
MCSNJ, 92.
193
Livingston to Washington, October 5, 1777, PGW.
194
For example, on Putnam’s orders, Major Taylor sent Peter Overt, Mr. Lake, and Francis Letts to
Livingston. The men stood accused of trading with the enemy. Although locals complained the men were
“very dangerous to the state,” Taylor divulged “it is very difficult to obtain any evidence.” Taylor was not
the only military man to send prisoners in this manner. Major John Taylor to William Livingston, May 7
and 15, 1777 in CENJ, 59-60.
195
Captain John Webster to Colonel Frelinghuysen, August 17, 1777 in CENJ, 88-89.

  368  
turkeys and stirring slaves to secretly seize their masters’ weapons.196 Even more

troubling, the Council previously released these men upon accepting the oath, proving

loyalty could never truly be trusted.197 If the Council could not protect loyal Americans

and provide security, its legitimacy was nonexistent.

Possessing a significant slave population, no allegation against bondsmen could

be taken lightly, especially those involving weapons. On rare occasion, slaves also

appeared before the Council charged with aiding the enemy.198 Upon hearing Captain

John Dennis’ claims that he captured two slaves bearing arms and aiding the enemy, their

owners appealed to the Council in recognition of its authority.199 According to Abraham

                                                                                                               
196
Affidavit of Jonathan Palmer, October 1, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778,
Box 3 Loose Records, folder 121, NJA. Palmer accused William Craig, Nicholas Pickel, Emlay Drake and
Peter Snider of stealing from Anthony White and working with the British. After robbing others, they
hoped to flee to Staten Island. See for examples of the military sending the Council alleged tea thieves:
General Nathaniel Heard to the Council of Safety, June 17, 1777 in CENJ, 69 and PWL, 2:81-82.
197
MCSNJ, 134-136 and 152. While Elisha Bird and Andrew Pickens successfully fled, George Myers,
William Craig, Lewis Kinney had to meet a court date where the men beat the charges. Imlay Drake and
Peter Hillier took the oath to later be tried and were subsequently dismissed. Some men enlisted after their
pardon from execution. Finally, Nicholas Pickle managed to escape jail. MCSNJ, 152-4, 160 and Robert
Morris et al. to William Livingston, November 12, 1777 in PWL, 2:111-116. Councilors also heard
accusations of enemy impressments and thefts of patriot or neutrals’ belongings. The State of New Jersey
vs. Jesse Woodward: Affidavit of Alexander Montgomery, April 11, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety
Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 35 NJA. Many of the allegations against the Woodwards
were from late 1776. State of New Jersey vs. Richard Robins: Deposition of William Imlay, April 12, 1777,
and State of New Jersey against Jesse Woodward: Deposition of William Imlay, April 12, 1777, New
Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 39 and folder 40, NJA and
MCSNJ, 26. The courts eventually jailed Richard Robins, Jesse Woodward, and “Black Nat” Woodward
until they paid a fine. This ruling might have been due to their respected community standing and fact that
they killed no one. Robins and Jesse Woodward seem to have learned a lesson and do not appear cited
again. Minutes of the Monmouth County Oyer and Terminer Court, January 20 – February 7, 1778, Nj in
Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 94. The community never fully forgave the men. Richard Robins Loyalist
claim, PRO: AO 12/15 (mc at PWacD) in Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 94-95.
198
Although not substantiated, the Council heard reports of slaves accusing their masters of disloyalty.
Most likely these accusations were in hopes of obtaining their freedom. Evidence of John Pope against
John Lawrence Jr., April 1, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose
Papers, folder 16, NJA.
199
Memorial of Captain John Dennis, Shrewsbury, to the Governor and Council, Haddonfield respecting
two negros belonging to Peter Parker (Seipo] and John Hocum [Joseph], May 15, 1777 in New Jersey
Council of Safety, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 73, NJA.

  369  
Lane, an armed slave Scipio (sometimes referred to Sip or Siepio) uttered the “damned

rebels” would be after him soon and he would take care of them.200 Given the state’s

enslaved population, such words stirred terror, yet it appears the Council found little to no

evidence of their guilt. Despite their apparent innocence, when their master appeared, the

Council forced the men to accept an oath, promising their slaves would remain on good

behavior.201 State surveillance relied upon public displays so that the community

understood that the Council intended to investigate potential threats. Such displays also

notified citizens which of their neighbors they should monitor as well.

Scipio and Joe’s potential innocence uncovers the nature of the accusation-based

security state. Like other committees for public safety, such an institution relied heavily

upon inhabitants’ fears and accusations. Personal animosities and local disputes must

have also weighed in when residents brought charges against one another. Alexander

Hamilton, possibly realizing the potential for vendettas in New Jersey, pondered to the

governor that “it appeared that private pique and resentment had their influence in

causing some innocent persons to be apprehended.”202 The Council itself witnessed

baseless accusations first hand. For example, Jonathan Palmer delivered several

depositions that the Councilors felt compelled to dismiss. For whatever reason, Palmer’s

accusations that George Myers and John Hillmer traveled to enemy lines or that Imlay

Drake roused slaves to steal weapons were eventually disregarded due to lack of
                                                                                                               
200
Scipio and Joe were accused of stealing arms and attempting to join the British. Affidavit of Abraham
Lane against Negro Sip [Siepo], Slave of Peter Parker, May 20, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety
Records, 1776-1778, Box 2, folder 82, NJA. MCSNJ, 43 and 52.
201
William Livingston to Richard Bache, May 22, 1777, PWL, 1:338.
202
Hamilton wished that the state would make “examples of some of the most atrocious offenders.”
Alexander Hamilton to William Livingston, April 29, 1777, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton Digital
Edition ed. Harold C. Syrett (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2011).

  370  
evidence.203 Perhaps fearing the repercussions of arresting and then having to release a

number of innocent people (such as New York’s CDDCs faced) Livingston refused to

accept Palmer’s tales.

Despite his dismissal, deception became intertwined in daily life. The Council

possessed few means to recognize or distinguish an enemy, neutral, or patriot; therefore,

both the Americans and British used oaths and interrogations but, as evidence proved,

these measures could be circumvented.204 Therefore, the predominance of recognizance

and forced oath-taking remained significant. The Council and its methods acted as a

constant reminder that the state indeed monitored inhabitants and would continue to do

so. New Jerseyans under suspicion would be extended an oath and given a recognizance

that, if broken, could be used against them at a later trial. Such social control and

surveillance was the Council of Safety’s only means to police the population while the

constitutionally ordained government functioned improperly.

For example, Morgan John and others pretended to be loyalists and later related

information to the American authorities. Whether their sudden patriotism was true or

not, the Council issued the men an oath of allegiance and later discharged John and his

compatriots. Similar experience happened on both sides of the political line. Benjamin

Lawrence claimed Jonathan Forman discussed the fluidity of allegiance and openly

admitted declaring allegiance to the Whigs while, in his heart, remaining a “tory.” He

chided his Whig neighbor for rigidly adhering to his allegiance when he could “have been

                                                                                                               
203
MCSNJ, 152 and PWL, 2:82n10.
204
Examination of Thomas Groom and others [Joseph Groom, Morgan John, and John Ashton] taken
before General Putnam, March 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose
Papers, folder 7, NJA. These men later appeared on March 29, 1777. MCSNJ, 10, 29, and 269.

  371  
nothing.”205 Ironically, his duplicity did not prevent Forman from delivering information

against Joseph Horner for enlisting loyalists in Monmouth County.206 Ultimately, loyalty

was difficult to gauge. Historians’ belief that oaths bound people, while at times true,

was not always the case. Residents openly vouched for previously devious men, such as

Moses Ivins, swearing their neighbor had neither spoken nor acted against the country

since he gave his “obligations to the Provincial Congress.”207 The Council’s best option

was to bond the suspicious to a recognizance and continue to monitor them throughout

the war.208 Left with few alternatives, the Council of Safety found itself unable to fully

trust the people they protected and thus distrusted the population to the point that

extensive surveillance was vital. However, preserving the common good meant more

than just state surveillance.

Providing for the Public

Confirming Livingston’s goal to protect the community, the Council also engaged

in endeavors for public safety not directly linked to policing the disaffected. While the

Council eschewed most administrative functions that other executive bodies performed,

at times it assumed a leadership role protecting the money supply, enforcing price

regulations, removing or protecting livestock, erecting distress beacons, and providing for
                                                                                                               
205
Deposition of Benjamin Lawrence against ‘Freehold Tories’ [Jonathan Forman], March 7, 1777 in New
Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 10, NJA and MCSNJ, 8. Forman,
arrested earlier that month, remained in jail until the Council of Society summoned him.
206
Deposition of John Forman against Joseph Horner for forming Companys of Loyalists in Monmouth
Company, March 7, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers,
folder 9, NJA.
207
Recommendations on Behalf of Moses Ivins, March 12, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records,
1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 11, NJA. Ivins later admitted Anthony Woodward disarmed men
for the British. Ivins detailed Woodward’s activities. Examination of Prisoners at Haddonfield, March 19,
1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 13, NJA.
208
MCSNJ, 8.

  372  
inhabitants. Acting as the state’s intelligence agency, the Council assumed a leadership

position beyond political dissent. As a testament to its knowledge of state security, when

the legislature charged Charles Pettit to remove public documents in light of threats, he

solicited Livingston and his Councilors for the best manner in which to ensure the

records’ safety.209 Pettit recognized the Council possessed the utmost intelligence on safe

routes to ensure the critical documents remained secure. Considering the endeavor “a

business of executive nature,” Pettit posited that the Council would be interested

especially since “coercive power may be necessary.”

With its “coercive power,” one of Livingston’s main objectives was to stabilize

the money supply especially from depreciation and counterfeiting since the state received

petitions to alleviate currency issues.210 To ensure confidence in the nascent

government’s money supply, Councilors sought to restrain those men who dared to cheat

their neighbors. On July 2, 1777, the board imprisoned Morris Hetfield and Baker

Hendricks for “uttering & passing Bills of Credit, Knowing them to be counterfeited, and

altered.”211 Such behavior, along with illicit trade, harmed both the government and their

neighbors. When the people apprehended counterfeiters, crowds handled them roughly

                                                                                                               
209
Charles Pettit to William Livingston respecting the removal of [state] records, Burlington, April 5, 1777
in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 24, NJA.
210
Petition of Inhabitants of Middlesex County to the Council and General Assembly concerning
depreciation of currency, September 30, 1777 in BAHMC, Legislative Records, 1770-1781, Box 1-14,
NJA. Many people could tell the difference between real and counterfeit money. January 18, 1779, James
Parker Diary, MG 287, NJHS.
211
MCSNJ, 74. See Livingston’s account of John and Baker Hendricks as spies whom “popular clamour”
called for the Council to apprehend. Livingston to Washington, January 26, 1778, PGW. Similarly, the
Council protected committeemen threatened by the disaffected in an effort to secure governmental
legitimacy. State of New Jersey against William Grover, Thomas Woodward, David Heslip, and others:
Deposition of John Andrews, April 23, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2
Loose Papers, folder 59, NJA.

  373  
and at times beat them to death.212 By policing such matters, no doubt the Council hoped

to curb crowd violence and demonstrate its legitimacy as well as its ability to secure

safety. As Livingston remarked to Washington, “The Confidence of the People in the

Integrity of our Officers diminished and a universal Murmuring excited among the

Friends of the common Cause.”213 Since the British as well as the disaffected altered

money and deceptively inserted false bills back into the community, Councilors could not

take such claims lightly.214 With the British perpetually close by, the temptation for illicit

trade and plunder continued, thus destabilizing the state.

In an effort to provide stability, the Council responded to inhabitants’ desire to

protect their goods and provide them with food.215 With price inflation rampant, the

fledging states stood crippled.216 In the second half of its existence, after January 1778,

the Council began to strictly enforce price regulation laws.217 Angered by “the boundless

                                                                                                               
212
Collin, 246.
213
William Livingston to Washington, August 15-16, 1777 in PGW.
214
Extract of a letter from Morris-Town, February 21, 1777 in NJAS, Series II, 1:295-296.
215
Inhabitants petitioned the Council when the army impressed goods or animals, yet even upon providing
the quartermaster with reimbursement certificates, were refused. It is unclear what measures Livingston
took, but he did not dismiss the claims. Petition of Mathias Sharp, Peter Demund Jr., John Berry, and John
Beckman concerning compensation for horses taken by the Continental Army, July 25, 1777 in New Jersey
Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 105, NJA and MCSNJ, 103.
216
Thomas Powell wrote in the Pennsylvania Evening Post regarding the high prices in August 1777.
“Burlington,” Pennsylvania Evening Post, August 16, 1777. For more on inflation and counterfeiting see:
Cushing, The First Laws of the State of New Jersey, 245-248; E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse:
A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961),
29; and Richard Buel, In Irons: Britain’s Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 45, 122-123.
217
One act in particular that established price regulation was, The Prices of Produce, Manufacture and
Trade. Price fixation laws in New Jersey began in December 1777 and by June 1778 the Assembly forbade
sending provisions out of state. The act was suspended in October 1778. New Jersey petitioned the
Continental Congress to enforce price fixations in 1779. Laws were eventually abandoned because New
York and Pennsylvania did not accept the fixations in 1780. E. Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at
Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 108-111 in David J. Fowler, “’These were Troublesome Times

  374  
Avarice” of some farmers “who would rather see us ingulphed in eternal Bondage, than

sell their produce at a reasonable price,” Livingston commenced summoning

transgressors to publicly shame and punish such nefarious people.218 For men such as

Marmaduke Abbot, accused of overcharging for the precious commodity salt, Councilors

retained little sympathy. Elsewhere, residents rioted over the dearth of the mineral;

therefore, the executive understood the dangers of Abbot and others’ war profiteering.

Upon discovering Abbot also charged more to customers paying in continental paper

currency than in gold, the Council issued a £6 fine and bound him to a recognizance to

appear at court.219 Others such as Joseph Smyth not only had to enter a recognizance and

appear at court for price inflation, but the livid Council forced him to reimburse Mrs.

Pearson because of fraudulent wheat sales. When Thomas Van Camp and William Pace

stood accused of price inflation, they paid fines and yet the Councilors also stipulated

they must forfeit their products. Given their crimes against the community, the Council

of Safety deemed it necessary to protect public rights.

Occupied by both armies, New Jersey suffered greatly from want of provisions.

Counterfeiting and illicit trade proved detrimental; however, so too did pillaging.

                                                                                                               
Indeed’: Social and Economic Conditions in Revolutionary New Jersey,” 26; William Livingston to Henry
Laurens, June 8, 1778, PWL, 2:363-364; and Cushing, The First Laws of the State of New Jersey, 104-105.
Bernstein also noted the change in the Council’s actions. Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American
Revolution,” 289 and 292-294.
218
William Livingston to George Washington, January 12, 1778, PGW. Not all inhabitants supported the
law. Petitioners argued that while intended to help the people, the law actually encouraged traders to take
their goods out of state. Petition of Sundry Persons to the General Assembly Requesting that Price Limits
be Suspended, January 16, 1778 in BAHMC, Legislative Records, 1770-1781, Box 1-14, NJA.
219
MCSNJ, 146-147. The Council witnessed instances of price gouging and voicing displeasure of such
laws. The Privy Council also protected inhabitants from abuses. Livingston noted in March 1778, military
leaders “in the Departments of Commissary & Quarter-Master… have been guilty of Oppressions, in
seizing by Violence what they might have peacefully procured either by voluntary Consent… or in the
Mode prescribed by Law.” Minutes of the Privy Council, 69. By His Excellency William Livingston…
Proclamation, March 9, 1778, NJAS, Series II, 2:110-112.

  375  
Responding to complaints that British army representatives such as John Blackwell

seized inhabitants’ cattle if they refused to deliver them willingly, the Council executed

plans to prevent further abuses.220 Due to such threats, the Council ordered Colonel

Seely to remove the animals near Raway-Neck and any other place near the British or the

disaffected.221 Frustrated, the emergency body then called for the removal of all sheep

and swine, leaving only milk-bearing cows for residents’ use. Such actions, while

inconvenient or even harsh on inhabitants, circumvented the enemy’s plans. Cognizant

of the severe situation, the Council of Safety implored Seely to employ reason and avoid

disturbing the locals any more than necessary. Since residents likely viewed such

measures as intolerable, Livingston drafted a letter to farmers assuring them that, if they

brought their provisions to Trenton, they need not fear their wagons, horses, or cattle

would be impressed.222 Likewise, Livingston assured Hugh James that the Council

believed it was its duty to “check every abuse of military Power by the Interposition of

civil authority which is the Grand Security of our Freedom & happiness.”223 To

                                                                                                               
220
Blackwell was subsequently ordered apprehended upon the testimony of Quaker Joseph Campion.
Affidavit of Joseph Campion against John Blackwell, April 30, 1777, and State of New Jersey against John
Blackwell: Deposition of John Wright, May 1, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778,
Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 66, NJA and MCSNJ, 24, 39-42. Similarly, Stephen Flood aided British
pillaging and was subsequently jailed in Burlington. Deposition of William Ball against Stephen Flood,
May 2, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 68, NJA
and MCSNJ, 40.
221
MCSNJ, 171 and 174. Levine correctly noted that in November 1776 and April 1777, Livingston refuted
his ability to employ force to move private goods away from endangered areas because he felt the military
(a non-elected office) could more easily accomplish such a measure. However, he would instruct the
military to do so. Levine, 104-106. See also: William Livingston to George Washington, November 9,
1776, William Livingston to Henry Laurens, January 8, 1778, PWL, 1:174-176 and 2:171-172.
222
MCSNJ, 213.
223
Draft letter of William Livingston to Hugh James, Lewis Nicholas and Alexander Chambers regarding
damages to citizens’ property, October 8, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box
3 Loose Records, folder 125, NJA. The Council also investigated and removed Gifford Dally from his
position in the Department of Quartermaster. MNJCS, 233-235.

  376  
Livingston, the Council was neither unjust nor coercive as it targeted inhabitants who

already threatened stability and society. As the civil body in charge of the state and

dissent, it sought to assert conformity to preserve security.

Unlike other committees for public safety, New Jersey’s board dealt little with

actual military efforts.224 Despite its lack of engagement supplying the army and

administering the war, it still took its inhabitants’ safety serious.225 Citizens entrusted the

Council with their wellbeing, and the board solicited advice when towns or residents’

safety were endangered.226 The Council’s conscience attempt to protect its constituents

even included cleaning towns after military encampments so as to prevent infectious

diseases from spreading. Patriots even solicited the Council’s advice when the enemy

approached on Newark in June 1777. With great anxiety, Joseph Hedden Jr. asked the

Council for recommendations on removing men from a local jail.227 Elsewhere in

Newtown, Justice John Cleves Symmes pressured Livingston and the Council to reopen

the court of oyer and terminer to conduct trials for escaped prisoners. According to

Symmes, “this sort will work wonders.”228 Understanding the Council’s power and

                                                                                                               
224
William Paterson alleged that at times the Council negatively influenced military matters. William
Paterson to William Livingston, October 18, 1777 in CENJ, 107-109.
225
The Council appointed men to procure horses and gear. Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly
of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at Trenton on the 28th day of October, 1777 (Trenton: Isaac
Collins, 1779), 95. EC, Series I, 16399.
226
John Cox and Elijah Clark to the President of the Council of Safety, June 12, 1777 in CENJ, 61-63.
227
Joseph Hedden Jr., to William Livingston, June 30, 1777 in CENJ, 76.
228
According to the Chief Justice, residents despised James Morris and Mr. Atwoods and wished to see
them hang. Chief Justice John Cleves Symmes to William Livingston, June 14, 1777 in CENJ, 77.
Livingston agreed with Hamilton and others on the need to curb crime and promised to initiate courts.
William Livingston to George Washington, May 2, 1777 in PWL, 1:320-321. This authority was one of the
prerogative powers Levine highlighted, but he dismissed the Council’s role in this process and only focused
on the calling of courts. However, as William Paterson noted, in fact the Governor and Council held this
authority.

  377  
influence, Symmes suggested that an appearance and display was “necessary at this time,

as the rays of the sun are to vegetation.” The Council’s imposing presence exuded order

and could intimidate residents into submission. Later in October, William Paterson wrote

Livingston as well, begging the governor and Council of Safety to summon a court for

men caught going to the enemy. Paterson stressed both the need as well as the Chief

Justice’s inability to act without the Council’s orders.229 To further meet residents’

immediate demands for protection, the Council of Safety ordered distress beacons erected

in critical areas. Such beacons aided “alarming the County in case of Invasion.”230 Led

by Reverend James Caldwell, construction began in January 1778 in critical areas such as

Longhill, Morristown, and Newark. To further ensure inhabitants’ safety, the Council

protested Congress’s actions allowing high-ranking disaffected persons to remain on

parole since the enemy still surrounded the state. Internal subversives could not be

permitted, as the British military found friends wherever it traveled and Hunterdon was

especially vulnerable. Viewing disaffection as an infectious disease, the executive feared

such dissent could easily spread its inimical nature.231 Although the governor insisted he

would comply with the Congress’ best wishes, his words stung with resentment that the

                                                                                                               
229
Six detained men confessed to high treason. Four additional men confessed to crimes, including
travelling to enemy lines. Such behavior was a felony and confession might suffice, but Paterson reiterated
the need of witnesses to successfully convict the men. He also suggested a Councilor come and vouch for
hearing the confession. See MCSNJ, 64 and William Paterson to William Livingston, October 18, 1777 in
CENJ, 107-109.
230
MCSNJ, 185.
231
Hunterdon was by no means secured, and the Council suggested removing them to a safer region. Draft
letter of the Council of Safety to Congress protesting release by parole of Governor Penn and Chief Justice
Benjamin Chew of Pennsylvania, October 4, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778,
Box 3 Loose Records, folder 124, NJA and MCSNJ, 141, 165-166.

  378  
legislature would so easily bypass the Council’s jurisdiction regarding the administering

of public safety.232

Related to military issues, the Council also issued exemptions from service to

residents who served the community in other capacities and even aided injured or

deceased militiamen and their families. For example, millers who provided flour for the

military received an exemption due to their critical role.233 Without flour, the military

and society suffered, thus the Council needed millers to continue working more than it

required their militia service. When the need for firewood in a hospital arose to keep

patients warm, the Council permitted eight men a thirty-days leave to perform this service

to the community.234 While exemptions were necessary in extenuating circumstance, for

those who served in the military, the Council provided aid to them and their families.

Aid to militiamen only came in the second half of the Council of Safety’s

existence, after a year of it almost solely pursuing subversives.235 John Clawson, an

ensign in the Sussex County militia who could no longer work because of a self-inflicted

hand wound caused by his musket exploding, received relief, as did some other men

injured while defending the American cause.236 In March, the Council appointed Major

                                                                                                               
232
In October 1777, Livingston and the Council sent a list to Chief Justice Robert Morris of 94 men
charged on suspicion of treason as well as other lesser crimes. Order of Council of Safety to Chief Justice
Robert Morris, Moorestown, charging ninety-four persons with suspicion of treason or other crimes,
October 19, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 3 Loose Records, folder 129,
NJA.
233
MCSNJ, 185-186, and 190.
234
MCSNJ, 183.
235
Bernstein claimed that the Council’s decrease in loyalists’ cases was related to the legislature assuming
its power. This reasoning seems correct, however while the Council diversified its activities, disaffection
did not end. Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 294.
236
Memorial of John Clawson, wounded soldier of Sussex County, requesting relief, June 30, 1777 in New
Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778 Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 94, NJA and MCSNJ, 75.

  379  
Asher Holmes to aid wives, widows, and children of the Monmouth County militia. To

aid these families, the Council delivered Holmes £120 to help families of captured or

deceased men.237 Soldiers received varying funds and payments, possibly related to the

nature of their injuries.238 Compensation was apparently deemed necessary for loss of

rations and pay while unable to work or fight. If the soldier died, at times, the Council

also provided the family with funds.239 Widows, like Hannah Griffin, received payments.

However, not all widows shared Griffin’s luck. Some women were instructed they could

not obtain funds until the Council formally recognized their husbands’ service. Sadly,

some women could not even receive the payment directly, as the funds had to be given to

a male overseer.240

Reaction and Backlash

Unsurprisingly, many inhabitants rejected New Jersey’s security state and their

resistance altered the Council’s efforts. Petitions to the emergency body were the most

common form of protest, yet to some degree also denoted that the petitioner recognized

the Council’s legitimacy. For example, when former British officer Archibald Kennedy

                                                                                                               
237
MCSNJ, 214.
238
MCSNJ, 166. Such government measures of paying pensions during the Civil War was to ensure men’s
loyalty in the future by providing for their families in the event of injury or death. Megan J. McClintock,
“Civil War Pensions and the Reconstruction of Union Families,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 83,
No. 2 (Sep., 1996), 459.
239
Even if the soldier did not die, such as John Lindley, his father received £7.10.6. MCSNJ, 234.
240
A Mr. Manning received $60 from the Council on behalf of Mary M’Myers when her husband died.
MCSNJ, 280. Money to widows was not extensive, as few women received funds and the amounts varied.
The Council’s actions were somewhat ahead of its time, as nearly two years later in 1780, due to what
appears to be heavy costs in Pennsylvania, some leaders suggested that widows (or women in soldiers’
families more broadly) only receive funds if they worked for the army. All others should return to their
homes and apply to their local governments for relief. Edward Hand to Joseph Reed, March 19, 1780, “A
Suggestion for the Support of Soldiers’ Wives” in PNJHS, Series II, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Jan., 1894), 23-24.

  380  
lambasted Livingston in September 1776 for never receiving the charges against him, he

sensed the Council’s jurisdiction to release him on parole was an inconvenient

situation.241 However, the Council received petitions from Kennedy’s neighbors citing

their distrust of the half-pay British officer. Questioning his motives, inhabitants claimed

he supplied British troops with 70-80 cattle from his farm.242 By January 1778, the

Council paroled Kennedy after receiving affidavits regarding his behavior. Since

Washington viewed Kennedy as a state prisoner, he left the man’s fate to the Council,

who removed the suspect to Sussex County and severally limited his ability to travel.

Months later, the Council decided to permit him to return home on parole of his good

behavior.243

Aside from Kennedy’s letters, petitions flooded the board and, depending on the

nature of the case, Livingston forwarded complaints to Washington or in some cases, the

army.244 Willing to listen to appeals, Livingston and the Council heard petitions for

                                                                                                               
241
Originally charged by the Provincial Congress, Kennedy wished to be released on parole like other
lesser officers. Archibald Kennedy to Governor Livingston, September 30, 1776 in BAHMC,
Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 22, NJA.
242
William Paterson to William Livingston, October 18, 1777 in CENJ, 107-109.
243
Initially Kennedy could travel no further than one mile from the local courthouse. MCSNJ, 186-188,
194, 204, and 235. Livingston informed Washington he intended to seize more control over civilian
prisoners as the military handled this duty improperly. Livingston to Washington, January 13, 1778, PGW.
244
Benjamin Morgan’s petition was forwarded to the army because it apprehended him. Benjamin Morgan
to the Honorable the Council of Safety for the State of New Jersey, July 2-3, 1777 in PNJHS, Series II, Vol.
XIII, no. 2 (May, 1894), 86-87. Anxious about his status as a prisoner, Edward Taylor also petitioned the
Council and the legislature. Taylor was initially summoned by the Council, in 1777 and held as “a prisoner
to the Governor, under bail” and “free from insult” of “military authority.” Much to his surprise, Taylor did
not find himself under bail at a court of oyer and terminer, but sent to General Forman. Not only did Taylor
refute the charges, but he also faced a much harsher and uncertain future. Since his bail was not recognized,
his mill and servants went unattended, leaving himself and his neighbors to suffer. Taylor desired
Livingston remove him from military confinement and protect his property. His experience demonstrates
the confusion residents faced while trying to navigate the new state’s laws and governing apparatus.
However, despite Taylor’s confusion he willingly recognized Livingston and the Council’s authority.
Edward Taylor to William Livingston and the Legislature, August 25, 1777 in CENJ, 96-97. The name
Edward Taylor appeared several times in the Council’s records beginning in April 1777, when he defended

  381  
redress. Many men charged with disaffection and promised a trial, such as Ebenezer

Ellis, remained in jail out of state and his case was never heard. Begging for mercy and

claiming to have accepted the oath, Ellis and his family still suffered.245 Many who

petitioned the Council recognized its strength even if they did not admit fault. John Jolly

pled for a release knowing the Council represented his only chance and willingly agreed

to any measures it required if he could return to his family.246 Such complete

acknowledgement of the executive’s authority and willingness to conform by a man not

even imprisoned in New Jersey demonstrated to the Council that inhabitants recognized

its power. In Jolly’s case, the Council exerted the state’s sovereignty and recalled him

home to accept an oath.247 However, not all petitions led to success. When Hackensack

residents petitioned the Council for Isaac and Cornelius Van Saan’s release, the executive

body maintained its stance and refused to acquiesce due to allegations of their deceitful

behavior when British regulars arrived.248

                                                                                                               
himself. He refused the oath and was given a court date as well as a recognizance. Later in August, Taylor
appeared as surety for other men. Finally, the Council summoned Taylor and three other men charged with
disaffection. This man was also held to a bond to appear at court. There are also references to an Edward
Taylor released from a bond in 1778, but it seems he was still on a parole. MCSNJ, 29, 37, 164,168, 190,
242, and 253.
245
Ebenezer Ellis, Sussex County, to Governor William Livingston and Council of Safety, July 9, 1777 in
BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 43, NJA.
246
Petition to the ‘Honorable Council’ [of Safety?] from John Jolly requesting his release from a
Philadelphia Prison, March 27, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose
Papers, folder 14, NJA.
247
MCSNJ, 41.
248
The petition claimed the men were harassed to confess falsehoods. Petition of the inhabitants of
Hackensack on behalf of Isaac and Cornelius Van Saan, June 24, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety
Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 93, NJA. According to the petition, the men always
followed both their militia leaders as well as the congress and committees’ orders. When the British
arrived, they did not collaborate, yet somehow a rumor surfaced by deceitful men to tarnish their names.
The petition ultimately fell upon deaf ears and they were exchanged. MCSNJ, 67 and 70.

  382  
 As in New York, prisoners also rejected their harsh treatment as well as putrid

conditions; at times the Council even responded.249 Peter Dubois, James Nuttman,

Thomas Cadmus, John Robinson, and Eliphalet Johnson, arrested and confined first in

the Essex County jail and then moved to Morris County, complained of poor conditions

and displacement from their families whom they relied upon while confined.250 With no

supplies and putrid conditions, life was a nightmare.251 Allegedly, American soldiers

even abused and stole the little provisions the men possessed. They desired to either be

pardoned or, at least, returned to Essex. Begging for mercy, the prisoners challenged the

Council to find any evidence or a person who attested they harmed civil government.

Admitting their only offense was accepting a British oath, the men claimed they

possessed no choice at the time as the area lacked adequate protection. Given the nature

of the war in New Jersey, such a statement is plausible. Pleading with the emergency

board to extend them an American oath, the executive sympathetically heard their pleas

of disgustingly overcrowded and disease-ridden conditions. However, it refrained from

releasing the men and eventually allowed them to return to jail in Essex at their own
                                                                                                               
249
One must temper such petitions from the disaffected with Elias Boudinot’s efforts to obtain provisions
for British prisoners. Loyalists grew angry that patriot governments treated them as state prisoners, not
prisoners of war, which was how the British handled Americans and was considered less harsh. North
Callahan, Royal Raiders: The Tories of the American Revolution (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrrill
Company, Inc., 1963), 192 and 222; and Royal Gazette June 5, 1779 in Wallace Brown, The Good
Americans: The Loyalists of the American Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.,
1969), 105. For Boudinot’s efforts paroling prisoners see: Elias Boudinot to Joshua Loring, April 30, 1777,
and Elias Boudinot to Jonathan Trumbull, June 19, 1777 in “Their Distress is almost intolerable,” 2-3 and
9-10. See also Elias Boudinot to Richard Peters, June 20, 1777 in The Life, Public Services, Addresses, and
Letters of Elias Boudinot, 1:46-49. Bernstein also noted that Boudinot solicited the Council’s advice, more
so than the legislature, on prisoners. He argued such actions demonstrated its legitimacy.
250
Petition of Peter Dubois, James Nuttman, Thomas Cadmus, John Robinson, and Eliphalet Johnson
protesting conditions at the Morris County Goal and requesting a pardon, July 17, 1777, New Jersey
Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 101, NJA.
251
Although both sides committed atrocities, reports from Boudinot that Americans’ “Distress is almost
intolerable” made state governments less likely to treat the disaffected with mercy. Elias Boudinot to
Richard Peters, June 30, 1777 in “Their Distress is almost intolerable,” 11-12.

  383  
expense.252 No doubt the stigma of disaffection still remained. Inhabitants also hoped

the Council, as the acting civil government, would check American military abuses.

In October 1777, Robert Lawrence cited Brigadier General David Forman for

abusing his power by banishing women from the state to enemy lines.253 Writing to

several governmental bodies including the Council of Safety, Lawrence hoped for redress

but received little help. Believing any abuses in power harmed the new constitution and

governmental legitimacy, he approached the Council on behalf of his daughter, Mary

Leonard. Assuming the Council sought to protect all inhabitants’ safety, the executive

did nothing to protect either the women or the constitution, much to Lawrence’s

surprise.254 Sometime after Forman removed Mary, she somehow returned to New

Jersey, no doubt because of family ties. Upon her return, the Council reported her

captured.255 With his daughter now a prisoner, Lawrence appeared before the Council,

yet found no asylum. Confused and upset, he retorted, “I never suspected” to hear such

words “come from the Mouths of Freemen much less from those who are chosen

Guardians to our Freedom.” The Council upheld Forman’s conduct under the codes of

martial law, leaving Mary with the choice between either confinement or forced exile.

Astonished that Forman could banish without a court martial or common law trial,
                                                                                                               
252
MCSNJ, 74, 80, 92. Even the most hardened and perhaps obvious criminals, the Woodward gang, sent
petitions. Professing their willingness to accept the oath to return to their families, eventually the Council
acquiesced. While some of the Woodward gang saw jail time, in the end many went into exile. Numbered
Records, RD 44, Nj; William Livingston to whom it may concern, April 27, October 1, 1777, Jesse
Woodward Loyalist Claim, PRO: AO 13/21 (mc at PWacD) in Fowler “Egregious Villains,” 89-90.
253
Robert Lawrence to the Legislature on Martial Law, October 7, 1777 in NJARDH, 252-253. Adelberg
noted in counties such as Monmouth, massive amounts of people experienced significant suffering
throughout the war, especially loyalists. Adelberg, “An Evenly Balanced County,” 30-35.
254
Mary’s husband Thomas was a wealthy Freehold farmer and former sheriff who enlisted in the New
Jersey Volunteers. His estate was confiscated in 1779 and he later fled to Nova Scotia.
255
MCSNJ, 141.

  384  
Lawrence seemed genuinely surprised with the Council’s inactivity and reasoning.256

Most telling of Lawrence’s complaints was that, while his son-in-law was certainly

disaffected, Lawrence supported the American cause. Supporting the Revolution and

trusting the Council to aid his daughter, Lawrence misunderstood the board’s goals and

conception of both safety and liberties. Angered by its treatment and confused by its

modus operandi, he did not turn to violence but rather indicated he would vote against

any representatives that turned him away. With liberty seemingly trampled in

Lawrence’s eyes, he knew the first general election under the constitution approached

and he refused to let citizens’ sacrifices be in vain. Lawrence promised that any cunning

men who made such “dareing Attempt upon our Libertys” would not remain in office.

Concluding his angry tract, Lawrence questioned the Council of Safety’s authority and

posited under what law did the people live? What power did civil government possess?

Where could the people look for security if the Council of Safety turned them away?257

Aside from Lawrence, Robert Morris and his cousin, Gouverneur Morris, also

questioned the government’s treatment of alleged enemies. The two men discussed the

necessity of showing humanity to political dissidents, especially for reconciliation to be

                                                                                                               
256
Lawrence minced no words claiming Forman acted unlike a Christian. Joseph Hedden wrote Livingston
specifically citing the need to rein in “tory women” within the state who “secret the goods, and conceal
every thing they possibly can.” Some of the identified women claimed they wished to depart and live
“among christians.” In response, Hedden sarcastically suggested they go live with “our enemies.” Joseph
Hedden Jr. to William Livingston, July 9, 1777 in CENJ, 82-83. The list included eighteen disaffected
women. Additional reports from Cumberland detailed how residents supposedly supplied the British and
openly spouted their disdain for the state. While apprehensions were conducted and a few people accepted
oaths, others refused. The Council understood the issue demanded attention as the state’s authority to
govern held in the balance. Account of Cumberland Tories in Downs Township, July 30, 1777 in New
Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Records, folder 107, NJA.
257
In the end the legislature must have agreed with the Council’s logic as it ultimately tabled and dismissed
Lawrence’s grievances. Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a
session begun at Princeton on the 27th day of August, 1776 (Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1779), 193 and 197.
EC, Series I, 16398 and Votes and Proceedings of the State of New-Jersey. At a Session begun at Trenton
on the 28th of October 1777 (Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1779), 11 and 13. EC, Series I, 16399.

  385  
successful after a civil war.258 Hardened men might not be swayed, but neutrals and

reluctant loyalists should be shown the state’s mercy and not solely its coercive side.

Citing other violent civil wars, Robert Morris wondered how it was possible for members

of society to support a government that once persecuted them. Vengeance and retaliation

could not be the answer and both men agreed reason needed to win out. If mercy instead

of coercion was shown, perhaps people would come to accept the government. Of

course, not everyone shared such an opinion.

Despite Morris’s thoughts on reconciliation and petitions bemoaning poor

treatment, many New Jerseyans actually endorsed coercive tactics. The Council travelled

across the state, sitting in Burlington, Gloucester, Hunterdon, Morris, Somerset, and

Sussex, but also arrived when summoned by inhabitants desiring it to restore order.

Perhaps sensing a need for justice, Silas Condict solicited the governor’s presence in a

display of power.259 Similarly, Charles Pettit asked Livingston if perhaps “a Rub or two

might be spared for Burlington, which is rather growing Rusty.”260 The Council

responded when perceived threats reared themselves. Appearing before the executive,

Johanes Westbrook detailed secret meetings in Sussex County involving upward of eight

men plotting against America and potentially aiding the enemy if “they advanced Near

Enough.”261 Soon after Westbrook delivered his deposition, Colonel Heard notified

                                                                                                               
258
Robert Morris to Gouverneur Morris, December 11, 1777 and Gouverneur Morris to Robert Morris,
December 3, 1777 in NJARDH, 255-256.
259
Silas Condict to William Livingston, April 7, 1777, Dreer Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania
in Levine, 84.
260
Charles Pettit to Livingston, July 25, 1777, Livingston Papers, MHS, microfilm reel 1 in Levine, 84.
261
Depositions of Johanes Westbrook and Thomas Clark concerning Loyalist activity in Sussex County,
April 3, 1777 in New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 20.1, NJA.

  386  
Livingston of a plot in the county and promised to “apprehend any Villain.”262

Appearing before the Council of Safety, the captured men were immediately confined for

“aiding and abetting the Enemy, and conspiring against the Government.”263

With individuals consistently petitioning and evaluating the Council’s behavior,

arguably the single most problematic group Livingston faced was the pacifist Quakers

even though not all of the Friends supported the British or even opposed the

Americans.264 Despite supporting freedom of religion, the Presbyterian Livingston had a

tumultuous relationship with Quakers during the war.265 From 1777-1782, the

government penalized Middlesex pacifists for non-service and Woodbridge Friends

found their goods and property seized for refusing taxes. Some responded to the pressure

by joining the American cause; others did not.266 For example, the Council extended the

“Affirmations to the Effects of the Oaths” to a number of Quakers during its short reign.

Such an affirmation delivered the Quakers’ loyalty, but did not obligate them to bear

arms. Quakers who refused faced either expulsion beyond enemy lines or a court date.267

                                                                                                               
262
Nathaniel Head to William Livingston regarding a plot in Sussex, Millston, April 7, 1777 in New Jersey
Council of Safety Records, 1776-1778, Box 2 Loose Papers, folder 25, NJA.
263
MCSNJ, 18.
264
Despite Quakers supporting both sides, the military and Continental Congress still felt their presence a
threat. Francis Wade to the Committee of Congress, March 4, 1777, Papers of the Continental Congress,
V104 423, page 383 in Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 78.
265
Due to their religious pacifism, patriots often suspected Quakers of disaffection. Livingston’s animosity
during the war years is evident. In 1778, he cited Gloucester and Burlington as “abound with Tories” when
both counties contained large Quaker populations. In October 1777, he even indicated his desire to employ
the Council in Quaker Town. However, he did not let Allison and the Quakers know his apprehensions.
William Livingston to George Washington, October 12, 1777 and May 2, 1778, PGW.
266
Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 15.
267
Most Quakers who appeared accepted the affirmation. MCSNJ, 241.

  387  
 Yet, despite harsh restrictions facing Quakers, Livingston did not want people to

perceive that the Council persecuted religion. In May 1778, Quakers Abel and James

Thomas found themselves apprehended and brought before the Councilors. After

identifying themselves as Quakers on their way to a religious meeting, the Council

deliberated and eventually pardoned the men.268 After releasing the two men, Livingston

received a letter of praise from Quaker leader Samuel Allison congratulating the governor

for his fair treatment. Citing the Council and Livingston’s justice, he promised to spread

the word to all Quakers denoting the government’s treatment of his brethren.269 A

mutually beneficial relationship with Allison was a major victory. Other Quaker leaders

had long hoped to gain the patriots’ favor by disciplining the Woodwards even after the

state conducted trials against them.270 However, despite Livingston’s actions, Quakers

like Allison were not totally swayed by the Council’s measures and logic.

In fact, Livingston’s strong words against pardoning residents accused of

disaffection troubled the religious leader who challenged him to follow Matthew 18:21

and forgive those who offend you.271 Allison disagreed with what he considered the

Council’s terror tactics and implored the governor to employ kindness instead to enhance

                                                                                                               
268
David Bernstein misjudged Livingston’s relationship with Quakers claiming he treated them with a
“special concern” and leniency. While Livingston tried to eliminate kissing the Bible during oaths (which
Quakers disliked) his leniency went only so far. Despite Livingston’s pre-war praise of Quaker pacifism,
these feelings ended during the war. Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 298.
269
Samuel Allison to William Livingston, July 13, 1778, PWL, 2:381.
270
Chesterfield Monthly Meeting Min., mc, PSC-Hi in Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” 90. Such discipline
was not strange during this period. Arthur J. Mekeel, “The Relation of the Quakers to the American
Revolution,” Quaker History, Volume 65, No. 1 (Spring, 1976), 8.
271
Specifically, Allison disagreed with Livingston’s May 29, 1778 proclamation rejecting Continental
Congress’ pardons. Livingston believed pardoning the disaffected “unequal and impolitick.” Some states,
he contended could allow such measures but New Jersey should not. Votes and Proceedings of the General
Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at Trenton on the 28th day of October, 1777, 120-
122. EC, Series I, 16399.

  388  
the patriot’s allies. Conformity did not need to come hand in hand with intimidation.

Leniency and forgiveness could prove fruitful, he argued, especially at a time ripe with

division. Allison highlighted that, logically, not everyone exiled was an enemy. Many

New Jerseyans forced to leave their wives and children would accept a pardon to return

home ready to assume roles as good citizens. Too many deported men faced exclusion

from their government and were banished from their homes due to “an error in

Judgment” or an “injudicious & unjust severity, & not malignity to this Government.”

Past disagreements should not permanently displace or stigmatize people.

Since many Quakers in fact did choose sides, drawing patriots’ resentment,

Allison felt implored to justify the true pacifist position. Quakers like himself supported

neither war nor would topple any government; this was God’s role. However, such a

stance did not exclude the Society of Friends from acting as good citizens to the

victorious side.272 Patriots feared Quakers as conservative because they rejected violent

overthrows, yet in reality, they only sought religious freedom. Such a tenant forced

Allison to oppose a general test oath, a measure rejected for the most part even by

governments in England since 1689. The very thought of forcing an oath upon all men

18 years and older was abhorrent,

as in Penna of Witnesses, Jurymen, & even of persons traveling to their homes;

refusing a passage across a ferry for want of a certificate of having taken them,
tho a pass was produced from a Justice…[is] a new & unpresidented & will, if I
am not mistaken, be found injudicious, hurtful, & therefore extremely
impolitick.273

                                                                                                               
272
Allison rejected the oath as it “must injure & oppress thousands or make them change or desert their
avowed religious tenets.” Samuel Allison to William Livingston, July 13, 1778, PWL, 2:383. See also:
Maxine N. Lurie, “New Jersey: Radical or Conservative in the Crisis Summer of 1776?” in NJAR, 38.
273
Samuel Allison to William Livingston, July 13, 1778, PWL, 2:386. If a general oath came into affect, he
feared the power it would have over the people. Allison also pressured Livingston to consider abolition.

  389  
What could possibly be gained he posited? The worst and most treacherous among us,

Allison contended, would accept oaths only to later break them. Therefore, the only

tangible result of such an initiative would be to deliver full rights to an enemy. While

empowering dangerous persons, industrious citizens like the Quakers would be punished

simply for possessing religious principles and moral scruples.

Such a political and religious tract deserved a response. Livingston replied twelve

days later, sympathizing with the Quaker leader, but argued that he must execute all laws,

whether he agreed with them or not, and reiterated that citizens must obey such mandates

or petition representatives for an appeal.274 Angered by Allison’s accusation of religious

persecution, Livingston took the opportunity to question the bombastic pacifist’s positing.

He openly challenged Allison to consider how others citizens would feel when they

sacrificed their lives, families, and taxes to protect men who refused to offer anything.

Receiving protection of both rights and property, the Quakers only gained from their

relationship with the state. The governor defended himself asserting that this measure

was not persecution, but rather calling upon all citizens to share the burden. If they

wished not to serve, then they should at least pay their militia dues or face the Council.275

Livingston justified his leniency towards the Thomas men because he would not question

their beliefs or claims that they did not know the laws. However, this episode was an

                                                                                                               
274
William Livingston to Samuel Allison, July 25 1778, PWL, 2:399. While discussing restriction on
education, Livingston justified the oath because of the high number of loyalist teachers. Lamenting “the
interruption of education” Livingston argued, “I cannot but think that the total want of letters is preferable
to the instruction of youth in principles subversive of liberty and patriotism.” Teachers and free speech
threatened the instilling of public virtue and the republic. Therefore, their rights could legally be curbed.
Livingston did not view his actions as persecuting Quakers, but rather curbing their behavior that harmed
society’s interests, i.e. not bearing arms.
275
See for fines for not serving in the militia: Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a
Session begun at Trento on the 28th day of October 1777…, (Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1778), 44-46. EC,
Series I, 15927.

  390  
exception and he still rejected pardoning all men who traveled to enemy lines.

Livingston concluded that he and Allison drastically differed on how to protect the

community and gain the people’s acceptance of the new government. Leniency,

Livingston argued, would “absolutely ruin us” and should never be permitted to anyone

who opposed government. Daring the Quaker leader to provide an example of a

government that allowed all offenders of law to be pardoned, Livingston argued such a

notion threw logic aside. All citizens, both “offenders against, & observers of, the law”,

needed to be judged the same. Just as Allison used the Bible and Judeo-Christian tenets

to prove his arguments for mercy, Livingston contended a man indeed possessed the right

to judge another. Government officials retained the right and duty to bring “a terror to

evil doers & a praise to them that do well.”276

The End of the Council of Safety and Beyond

Despite the Council’s effectiveness and continued violence within the state, it

ceased to operate in October 1778. That same month, the legislature empowered the

governor and his Privy Council to issue apprehension warrants to sheriffs, justices of the

peace, and other civil servants.277 However, this change in jurisdiction did not mean

Livingston terminated his pursuits. More likely, Livingston never intended the Council

of Safety to endure forever; an active judicial system was necessary. Even as early as the

first months after the Council commenced, the governor called for a hastily constructed

                                                                                                               
276
Paraphrase of Peter 2:14. For more on the Quaker-patriot tensions see: Given, 201-203. By 1780,
Livingston’s confidence swelled and he openly refused to recognize Quakers’ sincerity in their
proclamation of neutrality. Despite publically supporting religious freedom, he believed if religion impeded
civic obligations there was limits to liberty. William Livingston to Samuel Allison, June 2, 1780, Samuel
Allison Letterbook, RUL in Levine, 219-221.
277
Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at Trenton on the 28th Day
of October, 1777…, (Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1778), 98-99. EC, Series I, 15929.

  391  
court in Sussex County (led by some of the leading justices in the state: Robert Morris,

Isaac Smith, and John Cleves Symmes) to hear cases of high treason and other crimes

against the “Peace and good Order of the State.”278 The commission for the court

highlighted those officials who failed in their positions as sheriffs, justices of the peace,

jailers, or constables. Sussex had proven itself a hotbed of disaffection and therefore a

dramatic and quick message needed to be sent to quell dissent. All prisoners in the

county jail would be put on trial. Criticizing the hastiness of the court, Morris still

deemed it successful. Beginning in January 1778, the Monmouth County court of oyer

and terminer also handled cases against the Woodward clan, serving indictments against

riots, assaults, and false imprisonments with fines and jail time.279 On April 18, 1778, the

legislature called for trials against loyalists that included estate seizures and stiff penalties

for those men who returned to New Jersey.280

Well into the 1780s, violence did not end in New Jersey. Both sides continued to

engage in a destructive war of retaliation. In Essex County, 115 residents pressured the

Assembly with petitions calling upon the government to end the loyalist-inspired

                                                                                                               
278
Once a year, the Supreme Court sat in various counties as a circuit court. See: Commission to Robert
Morris, February 4, 1777, and Commission for Court in Sussex County, May 24, 1777, PWL, 2:211-212
and 339-341.
279
Woodward, Robins, and others remained in the community, but neighbors economically ostracized
them. Minutes of the Monmouth County Court of Oyer and Terminer, January 20 – February 7, 1778 and
Supreme Court case files 37836 and 39543, New Jersey State Archives; Jesse Woodward Loyalist Claims,
AO 13/21, PRO in Fowler, “Loyalty is Now Bleeding in New Jersey,” 54.
280
Juries formed of twenty-four freeholders (requiring a net worth of £50 or more). If twelve jurors agreed
with the guilty verdict, the accused faced publishing of his name and sale of property. Ryan, “New Jersey’s
Loyalists,” 18-19. Such legislation became stricter in December to include loyalist citizens’ of other states
and their property. Many neutrals and disaffected persons feared for their families and some accepted oaths
and affirmations.

  392  
violence or risk losing the people’s confidence and allegiance.281 Equally as problematic

was extensive vigilantism that supposedly targeted loyalists in Monmouth County but, in

reality, attacked residents regardless of political allegiance. Ultimately the people wanted

all men responsible for violence captured and put to justice. When word reached

inhabitants that the legislature planned to create a five member board “to sit during the

recess of the assembly…invested with power, merely on the suspicion of disaffection to

government, to banish any” and “every freeman of the state to the enemy” and “not return

without legal permission on pain of death,” the anonymous writer “A Freeman” hoped he

had acquired misinformation. Shocked that the creation of such “guardians of our

liberty” could exist, perhaps he recalled the Council of Safety. Anxiously considering the

legislature’s ill-conceived mandate, “A Freeman” assumed such a lapse in judgment

arose from “inattention [rather] than evil design.” Arguing,

The plea of NECESSITY has in it an equality extremely pleasing to TYRANTS,

and when uttered by the tongue of apparent patriotism, a sound which charms the
ear of many men of integrity.

But no cry of necessity can justify an act of treason or guilt; no fear of danger can
excuse the commission of evil; no exigency of a state can acquit a subversion of
its LIBERTIES by those who have sworn to maintain them. Should the plea of
necessity be admitted, there would be an end to freedom, and no potentate,
however tyrannical or unconstitutional his acts, could be deposed, or arraigned at
the bar of justice.282

                                                                                                               
281
Essex County, “Essex County Residents to the General Assembly on Tory Raiders,” 1781[?] and
Monmouth County, “Residents of Monmouth County to the General Assembly on Vigilantism,” May 12,
1782 in NJARDH, 393- 398. The Council, with Attorney General and Councilor William Paterson’s aid,
sought to curb disaffection by strengthening local courts. Richard Haskett failed to understand that any
crimes during the fledgling state’s early years were in fact crimes against the state. However, he
highlighted the Council of Safety began because of a weak judicial system. Haskett, 583-584. Fowler also
noted the transition to courts (and executions) after 1778. He argued that later criminals, unlike Moody and
the Woodwards, came from lower socio-economic backgrounds and engaged violent terrorism. Fowler,
“Egregious Villains,” 167. For more on vigilante activities and local responses see: Adelberg, “The
Transformation of Local Governance in Monmouth County, New Jersey,” 485-486.
282
“For the New-Jersey Gazette,” New-Jersey Gazette, October 4, 1780.

  393  
To preserve freedom and liberty, he believed, one needed to protect, not limit, these

principles by voting into office representatives who served the people. Despite never

formally citing the Council of Safety, “A Freeman’s” critiques addressed the coercive

patriot institution’s methods and arguments. Livingston championed the Council, citing

that same argument of its necessity to instill fear and patriotism that “A Freeman”

genuinely feared. To protect liberty, Livingston believed that some residents’ liberties

needed to be sacrificed; “A Freeman” could not condone such an argument.

After the war concluded, patriotic inhabitants’ responses to their treacherous

neighbors’ return ranged greatly. Some hunted the disloyal while other New Jerseyans

accepted their former friends back into the fold.283 However, the Council and other

patriotic institutions had a recognizable effect as few inimical and equivocal persons

returned to the state. Despite the drastic decrease in disaffection, Livingston’s animosity

remained; he rejected both his wife and brother Robert’s pleas that New Jerseyans be

permitted to return.284 But there was more behind Livingston’s tone; if inhabitants chose

to leave the state and join the enemy, then “we do not want them back again.” Hunterdon

County residents agreed and petitioned the legislature in 1783 to banish their disaffected

neighbors for not sacrificing years earlier. “No true friend to his Country Could but with

Horror,” the petitioners argued; “See those Miscreants Injoying those Privileges which by

Shedding the Blood Of their Countrymen, they strove to Obstruct, which therefore they

                                                                                                               
283
Ryan, “New Jersey’s Loyalists,” 26.
284
Robert petitioned William on behalf of Philip Schuyler, who took refugee in New York City, but the
governor had no remorse and desired to deter leniency to avoid an en masse return of treacherous persons.
William Livingston to Robert Livingston, April 22, 1782 in NJARDH, 263-264.

  394  
Cannot have the Least Right too, founded Either in Reason or Equity.”285 Similar

petitions came from the war-torn Monmouth County as well. Hoping their former

neighbors would not be allowed to return, petitioners endorsed continuing the Council of

Safety’s surveillance tactics because citizens must “always have a jealous and watchful

eye over their [internal enemies’] conduct.”286 The war on the battlefield was over, but

not the war in hearts and minds.

Arguably, the Council of Safety’s efforts also affected the population’s morale as

well. In 1776, Washington lamented Jersey militiamen’s pathetic patriotism and their

complete lack of discipline and commitment to the American Cause. With Howe’s

success, civilians of all stripes feared repercussions and turned to the British for

protection. Even staunch patriots like Tucker and Stockton betrayed their countrymen.

However, all this changed by June 1778 at the Battle of Monmouth when the New Jersey

militia aided Washington’s decisive victory.287 While historians argue the state

                                                                                                               
285
Hunterdon County, “Hunterdon County Residents Petition the Legislature to Banish Loyalists,” 1783 in
NJARDH, 268-269. Other petitions feared if the government allowed alleged enemies to return, they would
undermine the state from within it. Voting restrictions existed since 1776 for those who did not sign the
Association and in 1777 anyone who served the British also found themselves restricted from politics. By
December 1783, the legislature passed a permanent law against residents who took arms against the
Americans, had their land confiscated, or committed treason. All who fell under this law could not vote and
even faced jail time for not signing a loyalty oath. See also: “The New Jersey Provincial Association,”
MPCCS, 176-177, and Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey, at a session begun at
Princeton on the 27th day of August 1776..,, (Burlington, Isaac Collins, 1777), 2. EC, Series I, 15459.
286
Residents even promised to outright reject any governmental pardons and sought to have their neighbors
banished. Monmouth County, “The Monmouth County Association to Oppose the Return of Loyalists,”
1783 in NJARDH, 270-271.
287
Lender, “The ‘Cockpit’ Reconsidered,” 50-1 and 55-56. My dissertation builds on Lender’s argument
that after Washington’s victories at Trenton and Princeton, the patriots could reassert authority. He briefly
noted the importance of both the British’s lack of civil government and the Council’s role reasserting
authority. Lender focused more on property confiscation but also stated that loyalists’ rights were trampled
due to necessity of a civil war. For the most part, Lender asserted the loyalists (whom he considered
psychologically broken) had to wage a guerilla war from that point on. Lender believed that the momentum
shift from 1776 to 1778 contributed to civilians’ increased morale to aid the army. My point here is that the
Council provided a vital role in this moment as well.

  395  
government’s ability to stabilize the region led to increased morale, they barely credit the

Council of Safety’s endeavors to pacify violence and root out subversives. Despite

historians’ neglect, even the legislature deemed the Council of Safety successful when it

renewed and labeled the board as “very beneficial.”288

Even though the Council ended, the legislature and judicial system did not

immediately assume its powers.289 With internal violence, dissent, and British threats

still present, Livingston and his Privy Council filled some of the void left by the Council

of Safety. This constitutionally ordained body handled many of the issues plaguing the

state, such as disaffection. Before the Council of Safety’s demise, the Privy Council

operated concurrently and supplied the militia but, by 1778, it assumed more

responsibility for apprehending the accused, confining state prisoners, deporting the

suspicious, granting pardons, issuing warrants, commissioning courts of oyer and

terminer, ascertaining rates of exchange, and delivering proclamations. Privy Councilors,

all members of the upper house, mimicked its executive body partner. Even before the

Council of Safety concluded, the Privy Council issued oaths of allegiance to alleged

enemies, pardoned men who displayed willingness to serve in the military, and created

courts.290 Thus the constitutionally ordained executive aided the final transition to an

                                                                                                               
288
Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey. At a session begun at Trenton on the 28th day
of October 1777…, (Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1778), 13 and 37. EC, Series I, 15926 and 15927.
289
The British’s departure from Philadelphia might have contributed to the Council of Safety’s termination.
290
Minutes of the Privy Council, 57-60. Some pardons required men to leave the state within a short
timeframe. It also called for fifty courts of oyer and terminer from 1777-1789 to punish disaffection. The
Privy Council sat 227 times from 1777-1789 and possessed the power to move courts when in session and
could grant charters and corporations. For example, the debate over granting Quakers a charter see: Minutes
of the Privy Council, 43-44 and John William Cadman, The Corporation in New Jersey, 1791-1875
(Cambridge: Harvard University Pres, 1949), 3-5.

  396  
effective state government.291 Spending more time hearing appeals and issuing pardons

than the Council of Safety, the Privy Council still policed society to some degree.292

Privy Councilors even received requests in 1780 soliciting patrols between Perth Amboy

and Newark to notify residents of danger.293 Ultimately, after October 1778,

apprehension orders and interrogations were not as common since the security state

largely weaned with the Council of Safety’s conclusion.294

Sedition continued to sprout throughout the state and Livingston pursued targeting

anyone who openly disrupted the patriot government by daring to publically question it

or demerit its leaders.295 The General Assembly responded to newspaper articles that

questioned Livingston’s powers or hinted that he persecuted Quakers by issuing a

frightening resolution in October 1779 that finally delivered legal justification to the

Council of Safety’s most controversial tactics. Considering direct verbal or written

attacks on the government as attempts to “disturb the Peace of the Inhabitants, …

promote Discord” and “encourage those who are disaffected to the present Government,”

the Assembly argued freedom of the press was designed to promote “the Good of the

People, and the Security of the Government established under their Authority.”

However, if any person committed an action that directly or indirectly aided the enemy,

                                                                                                               
291
Bernstein also credited the legislature’s property confiscation for this transition.
292
For example of pardon powers see: Minutes of the Privy Council, 31. The Privy Council frequently
reduced sentences. Bernstein, “New Jersey in the American Revolution,” 299.
293
Inhabitants of Essex County and Middlesex County to the Privy Council, February 2, 1780 in BAHMC,
Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 84, NJA.
294
Minutes of the Privy Council, 91-92. The Privy Council ordered Monmouth County criminals
apprehended and issued rewards for capturing the seven men ranging from $100-$500. These men were not
from the Woodward clan. Fowler, “Egregious Villains,” Chapter 5.
295
For criticism of Livingston see “Cincinnatus,” New-Jersey Gazette, October 27, 1779 and Levine, 188-
190.

  397  
he “ought to be detected and brought to such Punishment…agreeable to Law and

Justice.”296 The Council of Safety’s voice echoed in the law; dissent in any form, even

questioning leadership, was treacherous and would be punished.

Livingston’s almost draconian efforts would not go unnoticed. Chevalier de

Fleury argued, after the Council of Safety concluded, that although the state admirably

staved off disaster it owed much to the governor. Fearing if someone defeated the current

governor in the following election, de Fleury believed the state would be lost.297 Even

though the Assembly allowed the Council to lapse, by summer 1780, Livingston

surveyed New Jersey once again. Noticing, “The tories are grown so impudent” the

governor coolly concluded, “nothing but another Council of Safety will reduce them to

order.” Unsurprisingly, others agreed. That very same summer, a committee suggested

the legislature reconvene the Council of Safety due to certain “exigencies of the war and

the good of the State may require.” Not stopping there, the committee delineated a new

executive body should be empowered with the same magistrate powers as well as the

ability to suspend habeas corpus.298 Such a direct renouncing of individual liberties was

seldom witnessed in the state. The advocates, Jesse Hand and Peter Wilson, suggested

the Council have free reign to act however it “shall judge it necessary for the publick

good.” Proposing the Council be permitted to impress goods, remove livestock (away

from the enemy or for the army), apprehend or move any suspicious person and confine
                                                                                                               
296
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey, at a session begun at
Trenton the 26th day of October, 1779 (Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1780), 8. EC, Series I, 16891.
297
“Lewingston is Roman. The republicans call him Brutus, and the royalists, the American Nero. There
are many Tories, but he prosecuted them as State criminals.” Chevalier de Fleury, “Summary of the
Political and Military Conditions of America,” November 16, 1779 in PNJHS, Series II, Vol. XIII, no. 2
(May, 1894), 87.
298
Report of Committee, June 5, 1780, BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 93,
NJA.

  398  
them, call out the militia, and enforce the state’s laws, the controversial emergency

executive was almost reborn. The two men essentially advocated delivering the Council

all its previous powers despite the supposed waning numbers of internal disaffection.

Despite the men’s desire, the Council would not be continued. However, its

influence could be seen in the adjustments and recommendations the state and country

assumed after the war. In 1782, the United States Congress suggested offering rewards

for the capture of escaped prisoners of war and other disaffected enemies.299 Similarly,

New Jersey citizens called for governmental intervention to prevent alleged disaffected

persons from easily rejoining the community as voters unless they provided “sufficient

proof… of attachment to the Cause.”300 Such people, the petitions argued, “can never

become full Members of Society” because of past suspicions and crimes.301 The

petitioners feared such men’s past could always rear itself and influence their children to

hold animosities against the state. Other petitions hoped accused loyalists would not

return at all.302 Truly old scars healed slowly or, in some cases, not at all.

Writing his memoirs years later, Livingston recalled his time on the Council of

Safety and reiterated that the legislature desired a more efficient method “against the

common enemy.” Regarding his Council, Livingston merely stated the board “was

                                                                                                               
299
U.S. Congress Resolution recommending the States pass laws giving a reward to persons who capture
escaped prisoners of war, March 30, 1782 in BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document
116, NJA.
300
Bergen County Joint Committee of Townships and Precincts to the Legislature Council and General
Assembly, August 31, 1782 in BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 120, NJA.
301
Inhabitants of Essex County to the Legislative Council and General Assembly, October 1, 1782 in
BAHMC, Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 125, NJA.
302
Inhabitants of Essex County to the Legislative Council and General Assembly, 1782 in BAHMC,
Revolutionary War Documents, Box 4-1, document 127, NJA.

  399  
highly approved by the zealous whigs.”303 However, Livingston recalled, “the summary

powers it [the legislature] bestowed…soon proved unacceptable to the people at large.”

                                                                                                               
303
Theodore Sedgwick, Jr. A Memoir of the Life of William Livingston… (New York: J. & J. Harper, 1833),
231.

  400  
 Conclusion: “Every whig would have thought it a duty he owed his country to
deliver up the fugitive to the vengeance of her violated laws:” Committees of Safety
and their Legacy

In February 1798, old friends Thomas Jefferson and John Adams dined together

one evening. Over the course of their evening no doubt they discussed Adams’ waning

administration and current politics around the nation. Beginning with comments on the

labor situation and the men’s joint distaste for current banking practices, the venerable

leaders inevitably turned their attention to government. When pausing later that evening

to reflect on their conversation, Jefferson focused only briefly on the former topics. Such

matters provided him little to consider as by far the most interesting part of his dialogue

with the Duke of Braintree was the sitting president’s thoughts on the republic and the

Revolution’s legacy.

Jefferson recalled Adams vehemently stating, “no republic could ever last which

had not… a Senate strongly rooted, strong enough to bear up against all popular storms &

passion.”1 Although he approved of the Senate body, especially its elective process,

Adams still feared democratic impulses that could undermine it. “[T]rusting a popular

assembly” to preserve “our liberties… was the merest chimaera imaginable.” Adams’

opinions on democracy are well known, but it was his next statement that might have

shocked the Sage of Monticello. Distrusting the people to ever make a decision that did

not merely satisfy their “own will,” the President longed for the days to be “again in the

hands of our committees of safety who made the law & executed it at the same time.”

                                                                                                               
1
Notes on a Conversation with John Adams, February 15, 1798, PTJ.
Not stopping there, Adams reiterated to his old friend, “anarchy did more mischief in one

night than tyranny in an age.”

This dinner took place long after American committees for public safety had

dissolved, so the choice as Adams’ dinner conversation topic might have seemed odd.

However, two more contemporary events might have contributed to their conversation.

That very same spring Federalists in the legislature marshaled the Alien and Sedition

Acts, raising the specter of abuse of power.2 As Douglas Bradburn noted, the Alien and

Sedition Acts represented more than the Federalists’ attack on political rivals, but also an

opportunity for “America to be a true national community” with “a common national

interest.” To achieve this goal, the Federalists needed laws to “control, regulate, and

constrain foreign and seditious elements.”3 Like the Alien and Sedition Acts, the

committees for public safety sought conformity to establish security and restrain

subversives through coercive and controversial means including deportations and curbing

anti-government discourse. Predictably, the Acts, like the committees, faced steep

opposition in the wake of questionable and undemocratic actions. Even before the

controversial Acts were passed, local committees organized and mobilized resistance.4

Petitioners and protestors resisted the Alien and Sedition Acts by calling on “the rhetoric

of revolution,” but also on the grounds that the hated laws violated the universal rights of

man.5 Newspapers, especially in the south, echoed these sentiments, condemning the

                                                                                                               
2
Douglas Bradburn, “A Clamor in the Public Mind: Opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts,” The
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Volume 65, no. 3 (Jul., 2008), 565-600.
3
Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics & the Creation of the American Union, 1774-
1804 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 140.
4
Ibid, 172.
5
Ibid, 187-188.

  402  
Federalists’ Acts. The rights of free speech and the press might be protected by

constitutions, but petitioners argued these right were natural and not created by law or

statues. Perhaps the vehement rejection of the Alien and Sedition Acts was in part based

on people’s memories of the American committees for public safety.

The second event likely weighing on Adams was the Reign of Terror in France a

few years before. Such a point of comparison, Jefferson noted, was not lost on Adams.

The President reflected that the distress generated by France’s violent political and social

upheaval, overseen by the Committee of Public Safety, far exceeded anything a king

could possible have accomplished during his entire reign. Seeking to establish security

and punish transgressors, the National Convention continually bestowed upon the French

Committee of Public Safety emergency and coercive surveillance powers.6 Similar to its

American predecessors, it also operated during wartime to meet internal and external

threats. While the French Committee for Public Safety eventually resulted in the bloody

Reign of Terror, the American boards still employed terror tactics to coercively monitor

and intimidate residents to instill conformity and American unity. Despite the similarities

between the American and French revolutionary era institutions, for Adams at least,

American committees for public safety would forever live on as the appropriate check on

democratic abuses of power.

Despite Adams’ fond recollection for the revolutionary committees for public

safety and his awareness that they had served an important role executing law,

                                                                                                               
6
Other French Revolution era committees also engaged in coercive and violent practices. R.R. Palmer,
“Fifty Years of the Committee of Public Safety,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 13, no. 3 (Sep.,
1941), 589; Ben Kafka, “The Demon of Writing: Paperwork, Public Safety, and the Reign of Terror,”
Representations, Vol. 98, no. 1 (Spring 2007), 2-3; and Howard G. Brown, Ending the Revolution:
Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 2006), 78-79.

  403  
establishing order, and instilling conformity, historians have long relegated them to

historical footnotes or simply omitted them from the Revolution’s narrative. Historians

can embrace legislative bodies, the embodiment of democratic principles, but coercive

executive bodies are omitted because they do not fit the liberty-loving paradigm. But, by

examining committees for public safety and the role they played in the creation of

American unity, historians can more accurately understand the process of the Revolution

and how it was achieved. Introduced amidst military and political chaos brought on

when royal government collapsed, executive bodies filled a much-needed power void that

helped stabilize colonial governance. As executive bodies, committees for public safety

occupied at least as important a place in the Revolution’s success as their legislative

counterparts, which had received a disproportional share of scholars’ attention. Given the

fact that these committees not only executed the law, providing critical governmental

stability and asserting sovereignty, but also at times assumed legislative jurisdiction, they

performed a vital role during the Revolution’s most dire times.

Although legislatures originally conceived American committees for public safety

as short-term emergency institutions, patriot leaders continued to invest them with

increasing powers as the Revolution required. Initial provincial committees for public

safety operated slowly as members at first struggled to comprehend the vague mandates

delivered to them by legislative bodies. Charged by legislatures to “carry into execution

all orders,” the committees lacked a clear sense of their jurisdiction and scope of

authority. Misinterpretations, confusion, and disagreements were muddled further given

the nature of the conflict. Committees for public safety had to learn their place within the

  404  
revolutionary government, develop a functioning relationship with the American military,

and interpret law all while policing the population during a civil war.

Historians such as John Shy and Sun Bok Kim have eloquently and accurately

referred to the American Revolution as a civil war.7 The war immensely influenced

every aspect of life throughout America, including its politics and institutions. Fledgling

governments in-the-making quickly faced a divided population, which created a

challenge to establishing governmental legitimacy. Executive bodies’ first real challenge

was to end civil strife and provide security. In the three states examined here,

disaffection (including both active loyalists and residents who failed to openly embraced

the cause) posed a prominent, real, threat to the Revolution’s success and unity. A

second threat to the American cause, the British army remained in close proximity for

long durations in each of these states. The presence of British troops nearby emboldened

loyalists, fueled hope and provided opportunity to thwart patriot efforts of unifying and

establishing order. The British’s proximity presented an even more troubling danger to

the committees for public safety as the enemies’ presence could also serve to sway

neutral, equivocal, or anxious residents away from supporting the patriots. To a large

degree, the struggle that committees faced did not end on the battlefield but also took

place in the hearts and minds of Americans.

By consolidating local boards’ powers, providing citizens with the necessary

functions of government, instituting order, enforcing sovereignty, and establishing

security, committees for public safety ensured the Revolution’s success and instilled

                                                                                                               
7
John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American
Independence, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), Revised Edition, 183 and 191; and
Sung Bok Kim, “The Limits of Politicization in the American Revolution: The Experience of Westchester
County, New York,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 80, no. 3 (Dec., 1993), 868-889.

  405  
conformity. Although the committees for public safety performed many governmental

duties during their emergency reign, arguably no responsibility was more significant than

the committees’ police powers. Backed by a rich history of strong executives from

Roman Antiquity to the English Civil Wars, committees for public safety modeled

themselves after Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. Like Hobbes’ sovereign, the committees

for public safety also possessed considerable power and influence. Designed to be awe

inspiring, his sovereign protected citizens’ safety and prevented the state of nature.

Citing the importance of “the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience,” the

English political philosopher could have easily been speaking about the committees for

public safety and their agenda to establish a common good.8

The common good and public liberties defined the committees for public safety

and their reign during the revolutionary era. Individual rights such as free speech,

freedom of the press, and rights of conscience came under intense scrutiny. Even

educators and religious tenets fell victim to the committees’ intense social control

methods. Seeking to make any violation against the state a crime against the entire

community, committees for public safety labeled alleged enemies as disaffected and

threats to all Americans. By publicly announcing the suspicious, entire communities

stood as witnesses to their neighbors’ alleged transgressions. Therefore, social control

did not always have to be coercive in a traditional sense. While there can be no doubt

that punishing alleged subversives swayed some Americans to adhere to the committees’

standards for acceptable behavior, such intimidation measures were not always necessary.

Some Americans supported the committees because they believed the institutions served

                                                                                                               
8
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, A Review and Conclusion, in Hobbes’s Leviathan: Reprinted from the
Edition of 1651 ed. W.G. Pogson Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), 556.

  406  
a greater purpose, namely establishing order and providing security. If their neighbors’

rights needed to be curbed to protect the community, so be it. As William Novak

highlighted in the nineteenth century, and Early American historians are beginning to

now illuminate, public rights could supersede those of the individual.

During the Revolution, the most pressing public need was establishing security.

Therefore, committees for public safety sought to define and confront America’s first

enemies. By engaging in the critical role of both nation breaking and nation building,

these institutions sought to instill social conformity.9 Initially deploying propaganda and

social and economic ostracism while enforcing the Continental Association, committees

for public safety eventually enhanced their surveillance methods, culminating in a

security state. Although each state varied in its endeavor to police residents, these

institutions all confiscated mail, monitored society, interrogated, summoned, and

apprehended suspicious persons. Extending coercive oaths of allegiance in a public

setting, committees for public safety did not solely wish to frighten citizens to join the

cause. Rather, the committees understood such aggressive tactics could root out enemies.

As deportation, confinement, forced paroles and recognizances for future good behavior

became more frequent, committees increasingly engaged the population in the security

state. Delivering accusations and monitoring neighbors became essential components of

both patriotism and state security.10 As the war continued, the definition of disaffection

                                                                                                               
9
Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended:” Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-1976 (New
York: Picador, 2003), 36-40 and 242-247.
10
As the title of the chapter suggests, Enoch Crosby quickly recognized the effects of the security state on
relationships between inhabitants and the definition of patriotism. “Every whig would have thought it a
duty he owed his country to deliver up the fugitive to the vengeance of her violated laws.” H. L. Barnum,
The Spy Unmasked; or, Memoirs of Enoch Crosby… (Cincinnati: A.B. Roff, 1831) Second Edition, 103.

  407  
became broader and eventually included loyalists but also seditious individuals, neutrals,

pacifists, and equivocal persons.

The committees for public safety and their drastic measures obviously left

causalities. Learning from his experience helping to create the security state and enhance

governmental surveillance, committee spy Enoch Crosby recalled the boards’ effects

years later in his memoirs. A devout patriot for the rest of his life, Crosby expressed

concern over his duplicity. Befriending men he knew he would eventually condemn,

Crosby possessed strong reservations with the committees’ approach to establishing

security. Witnessing the security state from a unique position, Crosby could not help but

notice, “how easy a thing it is to mistake a man’s real character; and how prone we are to

suspect the innocent.”11 Crosby’s reservations aside, like Edmund Pendleton and other

committee leaders, ultimately, the ends justified the means. However, that did not

preclude Crosby and others involved in the security state from expressing remorse and

concern.

Despite many citizens’ acceptance of coercive measures to provide security, the

committees for public safety did not go unchallenged. People petitioned and protested,

wrote tracts condemning the boards’ actions, engaged in illicit behavior, fled, and took up

arms against the revolutionary governments. Even by professing neutrality or pacifism,

inhabitants took a definitive stance against the committees’ obsession with conformity. It

is critical to remember that the committees for public safety responded to these perceived

threats against unity. In fact, the legislatures and executive bodies’ initiatives stemmed

                                                                                                               
11
Barnum, 106 and 125. For a fictional account of the affects of false accusations see: Samuel Woodworth,
A Widow’s Son, or Which is the Traitor, a Melo-Drama (New York: C.N. Baldwin, 1825). Woodworth’s
play illustrated how false accusations and harassment by patriots turned William Darby to support the
British and betray his country.

  408  
largely from subversives’ activities. At times, the people’s illicit or controversial

behavior dictated how committees for public safety adapted and enhanced their authority.

Legacy
Why were committees for public safety so successful? First and foremost they

provided Americans with a sense of stability and security. In worn torn areas, devastated

by both the American and British armies, the committees for public safety sought to curb

crime and disorder. Acting as civil bulwarks, the executive bodies openly combated

military figures when they felt the American army overreached its jurisdiction. As

General Charles Lee discovered, neither the New York nor the Virginia committees of

safety were as passive as he originally conceived. While these boards frequently

corresponded and assisted the military, they did so on their own terms. Desiring neither

to allow American civil authority to be circumvented by military leaders nor permit

citizens’ rights trampled (at least not by the military), the committees preserved

governmental jurisdiction when it came to policing citizens. Second, while endowed

with incredible powers, the committees for public safety also received guidance from

exceptional leaders. Perhaps not the most famous founding fathers, the committees still

boasted a membership of brilliant strategists and influential political minds such as

George Clinton, John Page, and William Livingston. By examining committees for

public safety historians can better understand these men’s role in the Revolution. Finally,

committees also succeed because, in part, Americans endorsed their coercive and

controversial actions. Desiring security amidst a tumultuous, violent and long revolution,

many citizens wished for an end to civil strife. If instituting security meant sacrificing

some of their rights, or more importantly their neighbors’ liberties as well, Americans

  409  
endorsed the committees’ measures. For this reason alone, studying committees for

public safety and their community policing efforts provides historians with a nuanced

interpretation of the Revolution that cannot be denied nor can its legacy be overlooked.

However, aside from the Council of the State of Virginia, all other executive

bodies discussed in this dissertation concluded by 1782. For the most part, obscurity was

their fate. How and why did this happen? Perhaps the committees for public safety

represented a moment early historians of the Revolution wished to overlook or minimize.

Unlike other dark moments of the Revolution, such as Bills of Attainder, the committees

for public safety were not strictly forbidden in the U.S. Constitution.12 Instead rather,

these undemocratic executive bodies were simply written out of history. Both

hagiographical and teleological interpretations certainly have found it difficult to properly

address these boards. With the advent of the French Committees for Public Safety, no

doubt many Americans wished to distance their revolution from the bloodshed in Europe.

Agnes Hunt and Alexander Flick amongst others also struggled to accurately depict a

revolution that they believed prioritized individual liberties yet also allowed coercive

boards that trampled these very same rights. For many historians, such a perceived

contradiction was far too problematic to address. Most likely not wanting to discredit

revolutionary leaders, scholars merely described committees’ actions, only hinting at

their coercive nature. However, by neglecting the committees’ undemocratic measures,

historians have misunderstood the boards’ critical role in both the Revolution and

instilling community conformity.

                                                                                                               
12
Brett Palfreyman, “Peace Process: The Reintegration of Loyalists in Post-Revolutionary America” (PhD
Dissertation: Binghamton University, 2014), 240-246.

  410  
 Scholars of the revolutionary era have understandably and rightly focused on

legislatures. These institutions democratized America, bringing more people within the

political world. Electing representatives, serving on conventions, and creating law

became an intricately important essence of the American narrative. While executive

bodies are in fact the other half of this narrative, these institutions do not fit nicely into

that typical story. By examining committees for public safety as executive bodies,

historians can more fully comprehend the complete narrative.

Most importantly, as the physical embodiment of the revolutionary era

governments, committees for public safety consistently interacted with the people.

Committees obviously affected citizens simply by executing laws, but as the security

state expanded there can be no doubt Americans understood the state governments’

growing powers. As more people heard tales of the committees’ practices and

punishments, it enhanced the states’ sovereignty and legitimacy in many citizens’ eyes.

When the committees’ reign concluded they undoubtedly left their mark on the

Revolution and America. While the committees for public safety served an essential role

in the Revolution’s success and met the people’s demands for security during a civil war,

after the struggle concluded both the boards and coercive executive authority were

ultimately rejected and largely removed from the annals of history. It is possible even the

patriots wished to distant themselves from the undemocratic and coercive measures

deemed necessary during a war but repugnant during peace.

Despite these institutions’ powers and authority they never actually were named

dictators. In fact, as we saw, committee members hoped the legislatures would relieve

them of their incredibly powerful positions as soon as possible. As we saw, the New

  411  
York Council of Safety only continued operations since the state lacked a constitution

until 1777. With the war consuming the state, the executive body had to continue

leading. However, when the war concluded, the committees for public safety did not

become tyrants. The smooth transition to constitutional authority should neither go

overlooked nor diminished. The seamless transition from the committees for public

safety to state constitutions is a credit to both the executive bodies’ efforts and its

members’ political philosophy. In large part, the former committeemen never became

tyrants because they understood the emergency nature of their authority and their powers’

origins in English political theory and history. They also well understood in common law

the relationship between public rights and security. Finally, the committeemen never

truly lost power as many of the former executives, such as John Page and William

Paterson, later served as governors and other elected representatives.

To conclude, after the New Jersey Council of Safety ended, its legacy remained.

Even though never citing the coercive body, in 1782, Essex County residents petitioned

that all laws allowing for government to search homes, based on suspicion alone of

trading with the enemy, not be repealed.13 Such abrasive actions while intrusive, the

petitioners argued, would not harm “any honest” citizen if properly executed. Fully

willing to continue to lay down their own rights for a perceived public good and security,

they begged the legislature to neither give into their rivals nor repeal these sections of the

laws. Ultimately their point was simple, such a sacrifice was necessary and was “as mild

and guarded as our Circumstances can possibly bear.”

                                                                                                               
13
Petition of Inhabitants of Essex County to the General Assembly, concerning house searches, November
28, 1781 in BAHMC, Legislative Records, 1770-1781, Box 1-14, NJA. For years after the war New Jersey
citizens still hated their former loyalist neighbors and wrote petitions to restrict them from returning home.
Richard P. McCormick, Experiment in Independence: New Jersey in the Critical Period, 1781-1789 (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1950), 26-27.

  412  
 Bibliography

Primary Sources

I. Manuscripts and Special Collections

Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, John D. Rockefeller Jr. Library

John Page Diary, The Virginia Almanack for the Year of Our Lord God, 1776
Robert Honyman Diary, 1776-1781
Robert Wormeley Carter Dairy, 1774, Transcript
Robert Wormeley Carter Diary, 1776
Robert Wormeley Carter Diary, 1780, Transcript

Haverford College Special Collections

Allinson Family Papers, 1710-1939

Monmouth County Historical Society

Cherry Hall Papers, 1682-1941

New Jersey History Society

James Parker Diary
Jemima Condict Diary, 1772-1779
New Jersey Provincial Congress, 1775-1800
Revolutionary Era Manuscript Collection, 1765-1790

New Jersey State Archives

Bureau of Archives & History Manuscript Collection, 1680s-1970s:
Revolutionary War Documents
Legislative Records, 1770-1781
Department of Defense, Adjutant General’s Office (Revolutionary War) Series: Copies of
Miscellaneous Records, 1774-1837
Legislature: Petitions, Resolutions, Transactions…, 1700c-1845
New Jersey Council of Safety Records, 1776-1781
Supreme Court Recognizances, 1706-1838 and n.d

New York State Archives

New York State Provincial Congress and Committee of Safety Petitions, 1776-1777

New York State Library

Abbott Collection

  413  
Andrew Elliot Papers
Evert Byvanck to John Byvanck, January 29, 1777
Israel Keith Papers, 1767-1803
Jacob A. Lansing Papers
John Jay to Major General William Heath, December 31, 1776
John Thurman Papers, 1741-1835
Leonard Gansevoort Papers, 1778-1799
Matthew Visscher to Albany County members of the Legislature, June 20, 1778
U.S. Declaration of Independence Signers Collection

University of Virginia Small Special Collections Library

Boucher, Jonathan ed. Reminiscences of an American Loyalist, 1738-1789: Being the
Autobiography of the Rev. Jonathan Boucher,… New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1925.
Papers of Ralph Wormeley, 1773-1802
Mackall, Leonard L. ed. A Letter from the Virginia Loyalist John Randolph to Thomas
Jefferson Written in London 1779. Worchester, MA: The American Antiquarian
Society, 1921.
Pendleton, Edmund. Sir, The Committee of Safety request you will immediately…
Williamsburg: October [14], 1775.

Virginia Historical Society

Dr. George Gilmer’s Commonplace Book 1775-1820
Martin Pickett, Williamsburg, October 28, 1778 to Brooke, John Churchill, Diggs,
Whiting, Woodford and an unidentified addressee
Preston Family Papers, 1727-1896, “f” series
Williamsburg, August 20, 1776…Williamsburg: Printed by Alexander Purdie, 1776.

Virginia State Library Archives and Manuscripts

Ralph Wormeley, Jr. Papers, 1776-1778

II. Digital Collections

American History and Culture Online: Sabin Americana, 1500-1926.

<http://galenet.galegroup.com.tjportal.idm.oclc.org/servlet/Sabin?locID=thomjeff
&finalAuth=true>

British History Online. Journal of the House of Commons, (1547-1699 & 1830).
<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commonsjournal>

British History Online. Journal of the House of Lords (1509-1793, 1830-1832).

<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lordsjournal>

Colonial Williamsburg John D. Rockefeller Jr. Digital Library, Virginia Gazette.

  414  
 <http://research.history.org/DigitalLibrary/BrowseVG.cfm>

Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans (1639-1800).

<http://infoweb.newsbank.com.tjportal.idm.oclc.org/iw-
search/we/Evans?p_product=EVAN&p_action=keyword&p_theme=eai&p_nbid=
P62N4EKGMTQwNjQ3MTQxNS41MzgwNjE6MToxNToxMzIuMTc0LjI1NS4
xMTk&p_clear_search=yes&d_refprod=EVAN&>

Early American Newspapers, Series I (1690-1876).

<http://infoweb.newsbank.com.tjportal.idm.oclc.org/iw-search/we/HistArchive>

Early English Books Online.

< http://eebo.chadwyck.com.tjportal.idm.oclc.org/home>

The Papers of Alexander Hamilton Digital Edition. ed. Harold C. Syrett.

Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2011.
<  http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu.tjportal.idm.oclc.org/founders/ARHN.html>

The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital Edition. ed. Barbara B. Oberg and J.
Jefferson Looney. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008.
<  http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu.tjportal.idm.oclc.org/founders/TSJN.html>

The Papers of James Madison Digital Edition. ed. J.C.A. Stagg, Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2010.
<  http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu.tjportal.idm.oclc.org/founders/JSMN.html>

The Papers of George Washington Digital Edition. ed. Theodore J. Crackel.

Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008.
<  http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu.tjportal.idm.oclc.org/founders/GEWN.html>

III. Newspapers and Magazines

Connecticut Gazette
Constitutional Gazette
Independent Reflector
New-Jersey Gazette
New-York Gazette, and Weekly Mercury
New York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy
New York Gazetteer
New-York Journal
New-York Journal; or General Advertiser
Pennsylvania Evening Post
Pennsylvania Gazette
Pennsylvania Packet

  415  
Royal Gazette
Virginia Gazette (Dixon & Hunter)
Virginia Gazette (Pinkney)
Virginia Gazette (Purdie)

IV. Printed

Albion, Robert Greenhalgh and Leonidas Dodson, eds. Philip Vickers Fithian: Journal,
1775-1776. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1934.

Alexander, William. “Lord Stirling to his Excellency John Hancock.” In The Life of
William Alexander, Earl of Stirling…with Selections from his Correspondence.
Edited by William Alexander Duer LL.D. New York: Wiley & Putnam, 1847:
116-118.

Alexander, William. “Lord Stirling to Robert Ogden.” In The Life of William Alexander,
Earl of Stirling…with Selections from his Correspondence. Edited by William
Alexander Duer LL.D. New York: Wiley & Putnam, 1847: 128-129.

Alexander, William. “Lord Stirling to Samuel Tucker.” In The Life of William Alexander,
Earl of Stirling…with Selections from his Correspondence. Edited by William
Alexander Duer LL.D. New York: Wiley & Putnam, 1847: 157-158.

Allen, James. “Diary of James Allen, Esq., of Pennsylvania.” Pennsylvania Magazine of

History and Biography. IX, no. 3 (1885): 278-296.

Anburey, Thomas. Travels through the Interior Parts of America in a Series of Letters…
2 Volumes. London: William Lane, 1789.

Andrews, Charles M., ed. Original Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-1690. New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915.

Anonymous. The Battle of Brooklyn: A Farce of Two Acts. New York: J. Rivington,
1776.

Aristotle, Constitution of Athens. VIII, 5. Translated by Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp.
New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950.

Balderston, Marion and David Syrett, eds. The Lost War: Letters from British Officers
During the American Revolution. New York: Horizon Press, 1975.

Barclay, Sidney, ed. Personal Recollections of the American Revolution: A Private

Journal…New York: Rudd & Carleton, 1859.

  416  
Barnum, H. L. The Spy Unmasked; or, Memoirs of Enoch Crosby… Second Edition.
Cincinnati: A.B. Roff, 1831.

Beatty, Reading, et al. “Letters of the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army,
1774-1794” The Pennsylvania Magazine on History and Biography 44 no. 3
(1920): 193-263.

Becker, John P. The Sexagenary or, Reminiscences of the American Revolution.

Albany: J. Munsell, 1866.

Bergen County. “A Bergen County Oath of Allegiance.” In New Jersey in the American
Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach.
Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 365-366.

Bergen County. Minutes of the Justices and Freeholders of Bergen County, 1715-1797.
Hackensack, 1924.

Bernstein, David, ed. Minutes of the Governor’s Privy Council, 1777-1789. New Jersey
Archives. Third Series, Volume I. Trenton: New Jersey State Library Archives
and History Bureau, 1974.

Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England Book the Fourth. The
Sixteenth Edition. London: A. Strahan, 1825.

Bland Jr., Theodorick. The Bland Papers: Being a Selection from the Manuscripts of
Colonel Theodorick Bland Jr. of Prince George County, Virginia. Edited by
Charles Campbell. Volume I. Petersburg: Edmund & Julian C. Ruffin, 1840.

Bloomfield, Joseph. Citizen Soldier: The Revolutionary War Journal of Joseph

Bloomfield. Edited by Mark E. Lender and James Kirby Martin. Newark: New
Jersey Historical Society, 1982.

Bond, Benjamin. An Answer to a Bill in the Chancery of New-Jersey at the Suit of John
Earl of Stair… New York: James Parker, 1752.

Boudinot, Elias. “Elias Boudinot to the Morris County Committee. In New Jersey in the
American Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry R.
Gerlach. Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 132-134.

Boudinot, Elias. Journal or Historical Recollections of American Events during the

Revolutionary War. Philadelphia: Frederick Bourquin, 1894.

Boudinot, Elias. The Life, Public Services, Addresses, and Letters of Elias Boudinot
LL.D. Edited by J.J. Boudinot. Volume I. New York: Houghton, Mifflin and
Company, 1896.

  417  
Boudinot, Elias. “Their Distress is almost intolerable”: The Elias Boudinot
Letterbook, 1777-1778. Edited by Joseph Lee Boyle. Bowie, MD: Heritage
Books, Inc., 2002.

Braxton, Carter. Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Commonwealth of
Virginia, on the Subject of Government in General… Philadelphia: John Dunlop,
1776.

Brodhead, John Romeyn, ed. Documents relative to the Colonial History of the State of
New-York…, Volume 3. Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Company, Printing, 1853.

Burke, Edmund. Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (London: 1770).

Burlington County Freeholders. “A Burlington County Petition to the Legislature on

Reconciliation.” In New Jersey in the American Revolution, 1763-1783: A
Documentary History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach. Trenton: New Jersey
Historical Commission, 1975: 160-161.

Burnett, Edmund C. Letters of Members of the Continental Congress. Volume I.

Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921.

Canby, Courlandt. “Robert Munford’s The Patriots.” The William and Mary Quarterly
Third Series, 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1949): 347-503.

Carter, Landon. Diary of Colonel Landon Carter of Sabine Hall, 1752-1778. 2 Volumes.
Edited by Jack Greene. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1965.

Chandler, Thomas Bradbury. The American Querist… London: T. Caddel, 1774.

Chandler, Thomas Bradbury. Appeal to the Public in Behalf of the Church of England
in American. New York: James Parker New Printing Office, 1767.

Chandler, Thomas Bradbury. A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans, on the

Subject of Our Political Confusions. America, 1774.

Chandler, Thomas Bradbury. What Think Ye of the Congress Now?… New York: J.
Rivington, 1775.

Clark, George Rogers. George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781. Edited by James Alton
James. Illinois State Historical Library, Collections, 8. Springfield: Illinois State
Historical Library, 1912.

Clinton, George. Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York. Edited
by J.A. Holden. 10 Volumes. Albany: The J.B. Lyon Company, State Printers,
1899-1914.

  418  
Collin, Nicholas. The Journal and Biography of Nicholas Collin, 1746-1831. Translated
by Amandus Johnson. Philadelphia: The New Jersey Society of Pennsylvania,
1936.

Collins, Varnum Lansing, ed. A Brief Narrative of the Ravages of the British and
Hessians at Princeton in 1776-1777; A Contemporary Account of the Battles of
Trenton and Princeton. In Princeton Historical Association no. 1 Princeton:
the University Library, 1906.

Committees Freehold and Shrewsbury. “Proceedings of the Committees of Freehold and

Shrewsbury, on the opening of the Revolution.” Proceedings of the New Jersey
Historical Society. Series I, 1, no. 1 (1845): 184-200.

Commonwealth of Virginia. The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of
Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619. Edited by
William Waller Hening. 9-11. Richmond: J. & G. Cochran, Printers, 1821-1823.

Cooper, Myles. The Patriots of North-America: A Sketch with Explanatory Notes. New
York, 1775.

Cooper, Myles. “Stanzas written on the Evening of the 20th of May, 1776 written by an
Exile from America.” The Gentleman’s Magazine and Historical Chronicle
Edited by Sylvanus Urban. 46 (Jul. 1776): 326-327.

Crary, Catherine S., ed. The Price of Loyalty: Tory Writings from the Revolutionary
Era. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973.

Creecy, John Harvie, ed. Virginia Antiquary: Princess Anne County Loose Papers, 1700-
1789. Volume 1. Richmond: The Dietz Press, Inc., 1954.

Cresswell, Nicholas. The Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777. New York: The
Dial Press, 1924.

Crèvecoeur, St. John de. Letters from an American Farmer and Sketches of
Eighteenth-Century America: More Letters from an American Farmer. Edited by
Henri L. Bourdin, Ralph H. Gabriel, and Stanley T. Williams. New York
Benjamin Blom, Inc., 1972.

Cushing, John D. The First Laws of the State of New Jersey. Wilmington, Delaware:
Michael Glazier, Inc., 1981.

Custis, George Washington Parke, et al., Recollections and Private Memoirs of

Washington… Philadelphia: J.W. Bradley, 1861: 191-192.

Davis, Matthew L., ed. Memoirs of Aaron Burr. New York: DA Capo, 1971.

  419  
De Fleury, Chevalier. “Summary of the Political and Military Conditions of America.”
Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society Series II, 13, no. 2 (May 1894):
87.

Eddis, William. Letters from America, Historical and Descriptive; comprising

Occurrences from 1769, to 1777…(London: 1792).

Elting, Peter. “Peter Elting to Capt. Richard Varick.” In New York City during the
American Revolution: Being a Collection of Original Papers. Edited by Abraham
Tomlinson et al. Amercantile Library Association of New York City, 1861: 97

England and Wales Committees of Safety. “By the Committee of Safety the Common-
wealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland Proclamation: Departure of the Persons
herein mentioned, out of the Cities of London and Westminster.” London: Henry
Hills and John Fields, Printers to the Committee of Safety, 1659.

Essex County Residents. “Essex County Residents to the General Assembly on Tory
Raiders.” In New Jersey in the American Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary
History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach. Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission,
1975: 393-394.

Fithian, Philip Vickers. Philip Vickers Fithian: Journal and Letters, 1767-1774: Student
at Princeton College 1770-72, Tutor at Nomini Hall in Virginia 1773-74. Edited
by John Rogers Williams. Princeton: The University Library, 1900.

Fleet, Beverly, ed. Virginia Colonial Abstracts: King and Queen County Records
Concerning 18th Century Persons. Volume 15. Sixth Collection. Baltimore:
Genealogical Publishing Co., 1961.

Force, Peter, ed. American Archives. Washington D.C., 1837.

Ford, Worthington C. et al., eds. Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789. 34

Vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-1937.

Fortescue, J.W., ed., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West
Indies, 1689-1692. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1901.

Franklin, Benjamin. The Papers of Benjamin Franklin. Volume XII. Edited by Leonard
Labaree New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Frey, Samuel Ludlow, ed. Minute Book of the Committee of Safety of Tryon County the
Old New York Frontier. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1905.

  420  
Gilmer, George “Papers Military and Political, 1775-1778 of George Gilmer, M.D., of
‘Pen Park,’ Albemarle County, VA.” Collections of the Virginia Historical
Society, New Series. Volume VI. Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1887:
69-140.

Hand, Edward. “Edward Hand to Joseph Reed: A Suggestion for the Support of Soldiers’
Wives.” Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society Series II, 13, no. 1
(Jan., 1894): 23-24.

Harsin, Garish. “Garish Harsin to William Radclift.” In New York City during the
American Revolution: being a collection of original papers…, eds. Abraham
Tomlinson et al. New York: The Mercantile Library Association, 1861: 85-87.

Harwell, Richard Barksdale, ed. The Committees of Safety of Westmoreland and

Fincastle: Proceedings of the County Committees, 1774-1776. Richmond: The
Virginia State Library, 1956.

Hazard, Ebenezer and Fred Shelley. “The Journal of Ebenezer Hazard in Virginia,
1777,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. 62, No., 4 (Oct.,
1954).
Henry, Patrick. Patrick Henry, Life Correspondence and Speeches. Edited by William
Writ Henry. Volume 3. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan… Hobbes’s Leviathan: Reprinted from the Edition of 1651.
Edited by W.G. Pogson Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929.

Hunterdon County. “Hunterdon County Residents Petition the Legislature to Banish

Loyalists.” In New Jersey in the American Revolution, 1763-1783: A
Documentary History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach. Trenton: New Jersey
Historical Commission, 1975: 268-270.

Jay, John. The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay. Volume I, 1763-1781.
Edited by Henry P. Johnston. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890.

Jay, John. The Life of John Jay… Volume I. New York: J&J Harper, 1833.

Kempe, John Tabor. “Skinner’s Welcome,” in The Loyalist Poetry of the Revolution.
Edited by Winthrop Sargent. Philadelphia, 1857: 61-62.

Kennedy, John Pendleton, ed. Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1773-
1776… Richmond, 1905.

Kinsey, James. “James Kinsey to Elias Boudinot.” In New Jersey in the American
Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach.
Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 73-74

  421  
Kinsey, James. “James Kinsey to Elias Boudinot.” In New Jersey in the American
Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach.
Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 74-75.

La Grange, Bernardus. “A Loyalist Testimonial.” In New Jersey in the American

Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach.
Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 272-274.

Lawrence, Robert. “Robert Lawrence to the Legislature on Martial Law.” In New Jersey
in the American Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry
R. Gerlach. Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 252-254.

Lee, Charles. The Lee Papers Volume I, 1754-1776. Collections of the New-York
Historical Society. Volume 4. New York: Printed for the Society, 1872.

Leisler, Jacob. “Jacob Leisler to King William and Queen Mary.” In Colonial Documents
of New York… Volume III. Albany: Parsons and Company, 1853.

Livingston, William. A Letter to the Right Reverend Father in God, John, Lord Bishop of
Landaff. New York: Garrat Noel, 1768.

Livingston, William. The Papers of William Livingston. Edited by Carl E. Prince. 5

Volumes. Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1979.

Livingston, William. “William Livingston to Edward Dongan.” Proceedings of the New

Jersey Historical Society Series III. 3, No. 2, (1899): 118.

Livingston, William. “William Livingston to Robert Livingston.” In New Jersey in the

American Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry R.
Gerlach. Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 263-265.

Livy. Hannibal’s War: Books Twenty-One to Thirty. Translated by J.C. Yardley. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Livy. The History of Rome: The First Eight Books. Translated by D. Spillan. London:
Henry G. Bohn, 1853.

Livy. Rome and Italy: Book VI-X of The History of Rome from its Foundation. Translated
by Betty Radice. New York: Penguin Books, 1982.

Mechanic. “A Mechanic to Bernardus La Grange.” In New Jersey in the American

Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach.
Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 239-242.

Mason, George. The Papers of George Mason. 3 Volumes. Edited by Robert A. Rutland
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970.

  422  
Mason, Keith. “A Loyalist’s Journey: James Parker’s Response to the Revolutionary
Crisis.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 102, No. 2 (Apr.
1994): 139-166.
Maxwell, Helen Calvert. Memoirs of Helen Calvert Maxwell Read. Edited by Charles B.
Cross Jr., Chesapeake: Norfolk Historical Society, 1970.

McIlwaine, H.R., ed. “Journals of the Committee of Safety of Virginia.” In Journals of

the Council of the State of Virginia. Vol. 1. Richmond: Division of Purchase
and Printing, 1931: 1-66.

McIlwaine, H.R., ed. Journals of the Council of the State of Virginia. 5 Volumes.
Richmond: Division of Purchase and Printing, 1931-1952.

McIlwaine, H.R., ed. “Minutes of the Committee of Safety of Virginia.” In Journals of

the Council of the State of Virginia. Volume 2. Richmond: Division of Purchase
and Printing, 1932: 405-516.

McIlwaine, H.R., ed. Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia. Volume 1.
Richmond: Davis Bottom, Superintendent of Publish Printing, 1926.

McIlwaine, H.R., ed. “Proceedings of the Committee of Safety of Caroline and

Southampton Counties Virginia, 1774-1776.” Bulletin of the Virginia State
Library 17, no. 3. Richmond: Division of Purchase and Printing, 1929.

McIlwaine, H.R., ed., “Proceedings of the Committee of Safety of Cumberland and Isle
of Wight Counties, 1775-1776.” Virginia State Library Report 1918. Richmond,
1919.

Miller, Samuel. The Life of Samuel Miller, D.D., LL.D… New Jersey. Volume 1.
Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen and Haffelfinger, 1869.

Monmouth County. “The Monmouth County Association to Oppose the Return of

Loyalists.” In New Jersey in the American Revolution, 1763-1783: A
Documentary History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach. Trenton: New Jersey
Historical Commission, 1975: 270-272.

Monmouth County. “Residents of Monmouth County to the General Assembly on

Vigilantism.” In New Jersey in the American Revolution, 1763-1783: A
Documentary History. Edited by Larry R. Gerlach. Trenton: New Jersey
Historical Commission, 1975: 397-399.

Moody, James. Lieut. James Moody’s Narrative of his Exertions and Sufferings in the
Cause of Government… Second Edition. New York: The New York Times &
Arno Press, 1968.

  423  
Moore, Frank, ed. Diary of the American Revolution… Hartford: The J.B. Burr
Publishing Company, 1876.

Morgan, Benjamin. “Benjamin Morgan to the Honorable the Council of Safety for the
State of New Jersey.” Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society Series II,
13, no. 2 (May, 1894): 86-87.

Morris, Margaret. Private Journal… Philadelphia: 1836.

Morris, Robert. “Robert Morris to Gouverneur Morris.” In New Jersey in the American
Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry Gerlach.
Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 254-256.

New Jersey. Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, 1776–1781.
Burlington and Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1777-1782.

New Jersey. Provincial Congress. Journal of the Votes and Proceedings, as well of the
Committee of Safety, as the Provincial Congress of New-Jersey, at a Sitting at
New-Brunswick, began January 31, and continued to the second Day of March
following. New York: John Anderson, at the Continental Printing-Office, 1776.

New Jersey. Provincial Congress. Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of
Safety of the State of New Jersey. Trenton: Naar, Day, & Naar, 1879.

New Jersey. Selections from the Correspondence of Executive New Jersey, from 1776 to
1786. Newark: Newark Daily Advertiser Office, 1848.

New Jersey. Council of Safety. Minutes of the Council of Safety of the State of New
Jersey. Jersey City: John H. Lyon, 1872.

New Jersey. Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Province of New
Jersey… 1763-1776. Woodbridge: James Parker, 1763-1776.

New Jersey. Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey,
1776-1779. Burlington and Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1777-1779.

New York. Calendar of Historical Manuscripts Related to the War of the Revolution… 2
Volumes. Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1868.

New York. Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of

Safety, Council of Safety of the State of New York, 1775-1777. 2 Volumes.
Albany: T. Weed, 1842.

New York. Laws of the State of New-York…. Poughkeepsie: John Holt, 1782-1783.

  424  
New York. Minutes of the Committee and First Commission for Detecting and Defeating
Conspiracies in the State of New York. 2 Volumes. New York: John Watts De
Peyster, 1924.

New York. The Speeches of the Different Governors to the Legislature of the State of
New-York: Commencing with those of George Clinton, and Continued Down to
the Present Time. Albany: J.B. Van Steenbergh, 1825.

New York. Votes and Proceedings of the Assembly of the State of New York… 1780-
1783. Fish-Kill: Samuel Loudon, 1780-1783.

New York. Votes and Proceedings of the Senate of the State of New-York, 1777-1783.
Fish-kill: Samuel Loudon, 1777-1783.

Nottingham Township. “The Nottingham Petition to the Legislature.” In New Jersey in

the American Revolution, 1763-1783: A Documentary History. Edited by Larry R.
Gerlach. Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975: 115-116.

O’Callaghan, E.B. The Documentary History of the State of New York. Volume I.
Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co. Public Printers, 1819.

Odell, Jonathan. “American Times…” In The Loyalist Poetry of the Revolution. Edited
by Winthrop Sargent. Philadelphia, 1857: 1-36.

Oldham, Conway. “Conway Oldham to the Governor and Council: List of State Prisoners
in the Morristown Goal, 1777” Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society
Series III, 3, no. 1 (Oct. 1898): 87-88.

Onderonk Jr., Henry, ed. Documents and Letters Intended to Illustrate the Revolutionary
Incidents of Queens County… New York: Leavitt, Trow and Company, 1846.

Onderdonk, Henry. ed. Revolutionary Incidents of Suffolk and Kings Counties… New
York: Leavitt & Company, 1849.

Page, John. “John Page to Richard Henry Lee.” Southern Literary Messenger 27, Issue 4.
(October, 1858): 255.

Paltsits, Victor Hugo, ed. Minutes of the Commissioners for Detecting and Defeating
Conspiracies in the State of New York: Albany County Sessions, 1778-1781. 3
Volumes. Albany, NY: The State of New York, 1909.

Paterson, William. “Unpublished Address of William Paterson.” Somerset County

Historical Quarterly. 2 (Jan., 1913): 1-8.

Pendleton, Edmund. The Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1734-1803.

2 Volumes. Edited by David John Mays. Charlottesville: The University Press of

  425  
 Virginia, 1967.

Platt, Charles Davis, ed. Ballads of New Jersey in the Revolution. Morristown: The
Jerseyman Print, 1896.

Plutarch, “Solon.” In The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Translated by John
Dryden. New York: Modern Library, 1955.

Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic. Translated by Rex Warner. Revised Edition. New
York: Penguin Books, 2005.

Randolph, Edmund. “Edmund Randolph’s Essay on the Revolutionary History of

Virginia, 1774-1782.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. 43, no. 4
(Oct. 1935): 294-315.

Randolph, Edmund. History of Virginia. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,

1970.

Rapelje, George. A Narrative or Excursions, Voyages, and Travels. New York: West &
Trow, 1834.

Ricord, Frederick and William Nelson, eds. “Documents Relating to the Colonial History
of the State of New Jersey,” in New Jersey Archives. Series I, Volume 9-10 and
17. Newark: Daily Advertiser Printing House, 1885-1892.

Sargent, Winthrop. The Life of Major John André, Adjutant-General of the British Army
in American. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1871.

Scott, Jonathan M. Blue Lights or the Convention: A Poem in four Cantos. New York:
Charles N. Baldwin, 1817.

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