Amir Mualem – Protagoras Paper – PHI205

2. "The pleasant is the good." Discuss this idea, and the role it plays in Socrates' discussion with
Protagoras.

This paper will address a problem of interpretation in the Socratic dialogue Protagoras. It has been
argued by commentators on Plato’s Protagoras that Socrates advances as his own what appears to be
an argument for hedonism. Troubled by this, some scholars have either tried to deny that Socrates
actually assumes this position as his own, implying that it is part of his dialectical conceit or strategy, or,
like Michael Frede, have also tried to show that the overall thesis of the dialogue can be reconstructed
without any necessary hedonist principles. (Frede, xvii, xxviii-xxix, xxxi) Both claims, I will argue, project
much into the text that is unwarranted by a close analysis of its unified structure, which shows that
Socrates, unless he himself is absolutely in an ‘absurd’ position (355a-e), must, in this dialogue at least,
accept the thesis in its final form as motivating his action. (358c) A closer reading of the dramatic action
will allow us to better understand the real significance of his stance, without having in any way to qualify
it, as Protagoras inadequately does when Socrates first proposed it (351c, ‘I mean,…’). The philosopher,
represented by Socrates, avoids absurdity by affirming in his decisions the art of hedonism; this is
because the greatest possible pleasure of being a philosopher is precisely measuring one’s actions in
such a way that will ensure that the pleasure of his being a philo-sopher will never end—that is, of
always questioning, and thus not to be wise (‘sophist’), but rather to be a lover of wisdom
(‘philosopher’).

The dialogue as a whole represents two important arguments concerning the nature of virtue: that of
the unity of virtue and that of the relation between virtue and a theory of motivation, in so far as virtue
is to consist in part or principally, as Protagoras proposed, of courage. (349d) Pleased with Protagoras’
answer with regard to the unity of virtue, Socrates proceeds to question the possibility that courage can
be the virtue that is primary and independent from the rest, including wisdom. (349e) The remaining
dialogue proceeds to the point where courage must depend on a kind of wisdom (‘art of measurement’
355a-e, 356c-357a, 357b-358b), but in three distinct dialectical forms or stages: first, following
Protagoras’ definition, Socrates interrogates the similarity of confidence to courage. (349e-350c)
Protagoras defends himself easily at this point (350c-351b), forcing Socrates to initiate a different line of
inquiry in which he introduces the hedonist thesis. (351b) A second dialectical inquiry explicitly begins
here, but this time Socrates’ interlocutor is not Protagoras as himself, but an imaginary ‘crowd’ whose
responses Socrates projects and Protagoras confirms. (351a-358a) Once the crowd is shown to hold the
absurd position of believing that one can be overcome by pleasure to do in a particular circumstance
what is contrary to their better knowledge of what is good, the dialectic with the crowd ends and two
other sophists are briefly included in direct dialogue. (358a-358e) The third stage of this dialogue
returns to Socrates’ interest in what, in light of what has been determined, Protagoras alone and for
himself holds to be true (359d). This develops until they both reach the reverse position of what they
thought they believed in the beginning of the dialogue. But at this point Protagoras mistrusts Socrates’
motivation in arguing with him and refuses Socrates’ desire to continue the inquiry into ‘what virtue is in
itself.’ (361d-362a)

Socrates’ motivation to question Protagoras (and not others) is not only explicitly in question, but it also
appears that our evaluation of it is at the very least essential to our understanding both the nature of his
Amir Mualem – Protagoras Paper – PHI205

dialectic and the sincerity of the positions (such as the hedonist thesis) he affirms therein. Michael
Frede’s conclusion, although generous, is nevertheless dependent on an analysis and speculation of
what he claims is the nature of dialectic in general. (xv-xvii) This, however, is inconsistent with this
dialogue in particular, since ‘dialectic’ as such is not only a point of contention, but also appears to take
a variety of forms (as shown above).1 Although Frede admits this variety, it still does not follow from a
general definition of dialectic, without consideration of the particular form it takes at different points in
the dialogue, that we have adequate grounds to speculate on Socrates’ true motivation: whether he is
aiming to ‘win’ the argument, as Protagoras assumes, or whether in order to win the argument he
assumes convenient positions, such as hedonism, which he would otherwise disavow. (Frede, xvi) But
without the specificity of these distinctions, how are we going to distinguish between a sophist and a
philosopher, so similar as they appear to be in this dialogue (without assuming such a distinction a priori
—as Plato would never have hoped to expect of his reader! Given such political circumstances…)?

Ultimately, if Socrates had merely wanted to win an argument against the Sophists in general, or
Protagoras in particular, why is it that, after having already clearly shown both the Sophists and
Protagoras to be in an irreconcilably confused position (and thus clearly ‘defeated’), he would decide to
want to continue questioning not anyone else but Protagoras, over and against the appointment he is
supposed to keep with his friend?2 (361d-e, 362a) If at this point we must admit that he has in fact
‘won’ the argument, what motivation could we attribute to his desire to continue questioning, if in fact
the primary one is, as is assumed, to win? The only sufficient reason that explains the unity of his action
is that winning is not his motivation, but instead that at this moment he is performing the hedonistic art
of measurement in deciding that he will gain that much more pleasure, as philosopher, in questioning
the wisdom of Protagoras, than in running off to his friend in victory to proclaim his own.

1
What reason can we find within the dialogue for Socrates’ preference for dialectic? More than one, particularly
one which involves Socrates’ inability to follow Protagoras’ speeches, but a second, more accepted and generally
typical definition of dialectic, offered by Socrates after his analysis of the poem and in relation to poetry as a topic
of discussion. (347d-e) This is significant, because if we stick to the definitions of dialectic as they are explicitly
represented by Plato in the text, we would have to decide between these two. The first clearly does not conform
to Frede’s, or anyone’s, general definition of dialectic; only the second is possible, and in fact more likely if we are
going to analyze the discussion that follows from the agreement on this definition and motivation. But even this
definition is strictly inconsistent with the fact that like the absent poet, the crowd, too, is absent, and non-existent
as such. Thus the second form that the dialectic takes forces us to seek other motives for Socrates’ desire for
dialectic with Protagoras in particular. In any case, neither Socrates’ definition, nor Frede’s definition, allows us to
abstract Socrates’ true motive. Perhaps Plato’s inclusion of masterful poetic interpretation by Socrates should give
us a clue of how to proceed—after all, both Plato and Socrates are, like poets, absent and cannot be questioned
directly.
2
Plato seems to have gone out of his way to suggest that Socrates had every opportunity to leave the venue or to
question someone else entirely (348b), and that his motives were ambiguous enough that Socrates would feel
compelled to explain them. (348c-349a)