Hypatia, Inc.

Monogamy, Nonmonogamy, and Identity

Author(s): Christine Overall
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 1-17
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810500 .
Accessed: 20/01/2011 00:05

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=hypatiainc. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Hypatia, Inc. and Blackwell Publishing are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Hypatia.

http://www.jstor.org
Monogamy,Nonmonogamy,
andIdentity
CHRISTINEOVERALL

After a brief discussionof the terms "monogamy"and "nonmonogamy,"I

evaluateexplanationsofferedby differenttheoristsfor thepain thatnonmonogamy
can causeto thepartner(especiallya femalepartner)of a nonmonogamous person
(of eithersex). My suggestionis thattheself, especiallythefemaleself, is convention-
allydefinedin termsof sexualpartners.I presentandreplyto a possibleobjectionto
thisexplanation,and thendiscussmy theory'snormativeimplications.

There are some persons for whom monogamouspractices, and others for
whom nonmonogamouspractices,are in no way problematic.I, however, am
interested in attempting to understand why both monogamy and non-
monogamy continue to be, and be seen as, problematicfor many of their
participants,especially for women. My aim here is to try to account for the
persistenceof the issues-even, or especially,for feminists-and their associ-
ated ideologies, structures,and feelings, in particularthe phenomena of jeal-
ousy and possessiveness.
While nonmonogamyhas sometimesappearedto be more "liberated"and
liberatingthan monogamy,for some, perhapsmany,of those affectedby non-
monogamouspractices,it can also occasion tremendousdistress(e.g., Eskapa
1984, 34). The personwho is "cheatedon" can feel profoundjealousy,desper-
ation, and hopelessness,and even women cast in the role of "otherwoman"
may suffergrief and pain over sharingtheir lover (Richardson 1985, 95-97,
117-21). Here, I want to considerpossibleexplanationsand interpretationsof
the situation where a person, especially a woman, who may well have no
objections to nonmonogamousbehavioron an intellectual level, nevertheless
feels deeply hurt when she lears that her partnerhas not been monogamous.
The existence of a powerfulheterosexist ideologypromotingmonogamyis
insufficient to account for these feelings. It is not enough to claim that
vol. 13,no. 4 (Fall1998)? byChristineOverall
Hypatia
2 Hypatia

monogamy,with its accompanyingjealousyand possessiveness,"stem[s]from

patriarchalnotions of men's propertyrights over women" (Betsy Kassoffin
"Non? Monogamy?"1985, 102). Many women who are self-identifiedfemi-
nists have told me that although they understand,in theory, the patriarchal
origins of the practice of monogamy, they are nonetheless unable to free
themselves of their socializationto the extent of being able to countenance
nonmonogamousrelationshipsfor their lovers or even for themselves, even
aftera deliberateagreementto such an arrangement(Hamilton 1990, 85). Yet
such women have successfullydisencumberedthemselves from many other
aspects of patriarchalideology, including those that govern women's work,
reproduction, and motherhood. For heterosexual feminists as for lesbians,
merely being told that one should not be concerned about monogamyis not
enough to prevent its being a live issuein their lives. Why does nonmonogamy
continue to pose such problems for.these women? How can the profound
possessiveness and jealousy often associated with sexual relationships be
understoodin feminist terms?
I attempt to answer the aforementionedquestions within the following
structure: First, I provide brief discussions and definitions of the terms
"monogamy"and "nonmonogamy."I presentand evaluatesome explanations
offeredby differenttheoristsfor the pain that nonmonogamycan cause to the
partnerof the nonmonogamousperson. Because these explanationsprove to
be inadequate,I proposemy own interpretation,which involves a claim about
the cultural construction of women's identity. I then present and reply to a
possibleobjection to this proposal,and I conclude by discussingthe proposal's
normative implications.

I. DEFINITIONS

It is difficult even to define "monogamy"and "nonmonogamy,"partly

because of the political baggage that the words already carry.Monogamy
derived its originalsignificancewithin the practice of marriage.Forexample,
in dictionariesof Englishusage,"monogamy"is usuallydefinedas "thepractice
or state of being marriedto one person at a time," and is contrasted with
"polygamy,"defined as "having more than one wife or husband at the same
time"(ShorterOxfordEnglishDictionary,new ed.). Most standardphilosophical
evaluationsof monogamydiscussit as a featureof contemporarymarriage,and
sociological studies focus on the "extramaritalaffair."Although now a non-
maritalheterosexualrelationshipmay meaningfullybe describedas monoga-
mous or nonmonogamous, in philosophical discussions the benefits and
liabilities attributedto monogamyare seldom separatedfromthose attributed
to the institution of marriage(Palmer1984; Bayles 1984).1The resultis often
a persistent heterosexism within the analyses, best representedby Herbert
Strean'scategoricalclaim that "[m]ostindividualswho rebel againstmarriage
 Christine Overall 3

and monogamyare angryand unhappypeople who understandablyrationalize

their objections.... They need therapeutichelp so that they can matureand
derive genuine pleasurefromliving" (1980, 205).
Moreover,given their patriarchalorigins, the concepts of monogamyand
nonmonogamymay seem particularlyinappropriateto the discussionof femi-
nist and lesbian relationships.As JuliaPenelope insists,
Lesbiansand feminists continue to use words like monogamy
and nonmonogamyas if they made sense within a "feminist"
conceptualframework,when, in fact, they makeno sense,espe-
cially when they're being used to describe Lesbian relation-
ships! Monogamymeans, literally,"marriageto one [woman],"
and its contrastiveterm is polygamy,which means "marriageto
more than one [woman]."I've added the word woman, in
brackets,here because onlymen ever have the option of being
marriedto more than one [woman].These terms assumethat
women are the propertyof the men who marrythem. Both
monogamyand nonmonogamyname heteropatriarchalinstitu-
tions within which the only important information is: how
manywomencan a man legitimately own?Since the question of
is
"ownership" supposed to be a non-question in feminist and
Lesbian-feministrelationships,I want to know why so many
wimmin who claim to have a "raisedconsciousness"persistin
using such words when they're supposed to know better?
(Penelope 1985, 35-36, italics in original)
Yet feminists and lesbians2do find the concepts of monogamy and non-
monogamy of absorbinginterest, for good or ill, and there is no dearth of
discussion of these issues within the context of lesbian and heterosexual
relationships.
Here, discussionof monogamywill not presupposethat it must be defined
in termsof formalmarriage(an institution that raisesa numberof interesting
additional issues of its own [McMurtry1984]) or in terms of heterosexual
relationships.I shall to some extent set aside the differencesbetween hetero-
sexual and lesbian relationships. Part of the difficulty of researchingand
writingabout issuesof monogamyand nonmonogamyis that most contempo-
rary literatureon the subject focuses either on heterosexualmonogamyand
nonmonogamy,3especiallywithin the institutionof marriage,or upon monog-
amy and nonmonogamywithin lesbian relationships.4I shall attempt to work
acrossthat division. Of course,I am not unawareof the significantdissimilarit-
ies, particularlythe powerdifferences,between heterosexualand lesbianrela-
tionships, even when heterosexual relationships are not given the social
blessingof legal marriage.Nevertheless,I believe that with respectto this issue,
where intimacy,self-identity,possessiveness,competition, and jealousyfind a
4 Hypatia

readyexpression,there may be fewer differencesthan usual between women

involved in a heterosexual relationship and women involved in a lesbian
relationship.
Certain other ways of defining "monogamy"and "nonmonogamy"also
introduce,in a partisanfashion, ethical and ontological issuesthat should not
be prejudged.Thus, if monogamy is said to be commitment to an exclusive
sexual/romanticrelationshipwith one person, the words"commitment"and
"exclusive" may suggest, falsely, both that nonmonogamy cannot involve
commitment and that monogamyshuts others out by excluding them. Alter-
natively, if monogamy is defined in terms of faithfulnessto one person, the
implicationmayseem to be that fidelity is not involved in nonsexualrelation-
ships, or that becomingsexuallyintimate with more than one personinvolves
a breakingof faith, or that it is only possible to be faithful to one person at a
time. (In rejectingthis assumption,some feministsuse the word"poly-fidelity"
instead of nonmonogamy.) "Fidelity,""commitment,"and "exclusivity"are
obviouslyloaded terms.
In what follows, therefore,"monogamy"will minimallymean a patter by
an individualof sexual interactionswith only one other personduringa given
periodwithin that individual'slife, while "nonmonogamy"will mean a pattern
by an individual of sexual interactionswith more than one person during a
given periodwithin the individual'slife.
Monogamousbehaviormayhave manyprecursors.It might, forexample,be
a consequence of a lack of available desirable other partners;it might be
imposedby one'spartneras a condition of the continuationof the relationship;
it might be a responseto a requestfromone'spartner,or negotiationswith her
or him. Or,it might be an independentchoice, foundedupon moralor religious
principlesindependentof the personwith whom one is in a relationship.What
I am primarilyinterested in, however, is not so much the differentways by
which monogamousbehavior originates, but rather,the significance of the
situation in which a monogamouspersonwants and believes her partnerto be
monogamous and, subsequently,discovers that the partner is not monoga-
mous.

AND PAIN:EXPLANATIONS
II. NONMONOGAMY

What accountsfor the powerfuland painfulfeelingsof anger,abandonment,

jealousy,andgriefthat areoften occasionedwhen a monogamouspersonlearns
that her partneris nonmonogamous?I shall considerand assessthree standard
explanations:the role of the promiseof exclusivity;culturalconventions about
scarcity;and psychoanalyticexplanations.
One possible explanation, then, is the fact that in many forms of non-
monogamy, a promise, explicit or implicit, has been violated. Because the
keeping of promisesis still held in high regard,the breakingof this promiseis
 Christine Overall 5

an indication of general unreliability.Richard Wasserstrom,for example,

attempts to construct argumentsfor the wrongfulnessof adulteryby pointing
to the deceptive and promise-breakingbehavior that it ordinarilyentails.
Adulterousbehavior,he says, may be perceived as a manifestationof "akind
of indifference,"as "anadditionalrejection,"and as "the intentional infliction
of substantialpain" (Wasserstrom1984, 95).
But the question remains why promisingsexual exclusivity is considered
importantin the firstplace. What is interestingis not only that the breaking
of the promiseis usuallypainfulfor the personwho expected commitment,but
also that this sort of promiseis generallyregardedas necessary,inevitable, and
desirable.Why does a commitment to monogamyoften appearto be essential
to makingthe sexual relationshipsecure?
Wasserstrom's answeris that "sexualintimacy is one of the chief currencies
through which gifts [of oneself] are exchanged" (1984, 96-97). He describes
the "correlation"of love and sexual intimacies as "natural"for women,
although not for men, but offersno evidence or explanationfor this claim; in
the end, Wasserstromprofessesto be unableto saywhetherthere is "something
about love in general that links it naturallyand appropriatelywith feelings of
exclusivity and possession"(1984, 101).
Other writers, however, have insisted that the pain experienced by the
"betrayed"partneris a consequence of culturalbeliefs and conventions about
love and sexually intimate relationships.The possessivenessoften associated
with monogamousrelationships, they suggest, appearsto be founded upon
questionable assumptionsof finitude: that love and intimacy are scarce and
limited resources,and if another person gets love and intimacy from one's
loved one, there won't be enough-or any-left for oneself. "[M]onogamous
sexual relationships[are]privatizedand 'coupley':they set up barrierswhich
[keep]other people out, as well as imprisoningthe couple. They elevate[ ] one
kind of relationship above all others, and this narrow[s]the scope of other
kinds of friendships"(Cartledge1983, 174). The very notion of "cheating"in
the context of sexual behavior suggests depriving someone of something
throughfraudor deceit, or the dishonestviolation of rules.The nonmonogam-
ous person owes something to her lover, something that is defined by the
socially-sanctionedrulesof the relationship,and she then takes it and gives it
to someone else. There appearsto be a limited amountof love, sexualactivity,
intimacy, commitment, and attention to go around.The implicit economic
metaphor, consistent with capitalist culture, suggests that spending in one
location means less for another. One person's gain is another's loss, and
relationshipsare zero-sumgames.
According to this explanation, monogamous,exclusive relationshipsare
simultaneouslya way of coping with fearsof isolation, loss, and rejection, and
a means of generatingsuch fears.By creatingthe opportunityfor "infidelity,"
they also createthe opportunityto be hurtfurther.Thus, McMurtryarguesthat
6 Hypatia

the pain of the "cheated"partner springs from the depth of the cultural
prohibition of infidelity: "[O]ne is led to speculate that the intensity and
extent of jealousy at a partner'sextramaritalsexual involvement is in direct
proportion to the severity of the accepted cultural regulationsagainst such
involvements. In short such regulationsdo not prevent jealousy so much as
effectivelyengenderit" (1984, 116-117, endnote 10). Similarly,LynnAtwater
claimsthat reactionsto nonmonogamyaredeterminedby ourculture's"feeling
rules,"which are perceivedas "the only correctemotions to feel when discov-
ering our spouses'infidelity"(1982, 19).
McMurtryand Atwater are correct at least in so far as, in contemporary
culture, the anxiety about finite human resourcesoften has a practicalbasis.
An explicit or implicit promiseof monogamyseems like insuranceabout the
future availability of an apparentlyor potentially scarce commodity:sexual
intimacy.Realistically,from the point of view of a monogamousperson, the
commencementof a nonmonogamousrelationshipby her partneror lover may
seem to have a high probabilityof leading at least to the loss of some of the
lover's time and attention, and at worst to the total loss of the lover. The
experience of women such as Simone de Beauvoir,who cherisheda life-long
commitment to Jean Paul Sartreeven while each of them conductedongoing
"contingent"sexual affairswith others (which nonetheless often affordedher
considerablepain) (Francisand Gontier 1987), suggeststhat it is possibleand
useful to distinguish between sexual exclusivity and possession, on the one
hand, and on the other,the creationof a long-term,even life-long projectwith
another person.When one is sureof the permanenceof the life-long project,
perhapssexual exclusivity mattersless. Present culturalconditions, however,
encouragewomen to fear imminent loss of the loved one when s/he begins a
sexual relationshipwith anotherperson.When simultaneousrelationshipsare
not recognizedand validated,and when materialconditions makeunavailable
the time and energy necessary to cultivate them, the only alternative to
lifelong monogamy may appearto be serial monogamy.So when a partner
begins a new sexual relationship,it is likely the beginning of the end for the
old. When, in addition, there is a relationshipof economic/materialdepen-
dence of the monogamouspartner on the person who has begun another
relationship,the fear of loss takes on an even more terrifyingdimension.
However, this explanation, in terms of cultural conventions about and
consequencesarisingfromscarcity,maynot be powerfulenough to account for
the pain that is often caused by nonmonogamousbehavior even when the
originalrelationshipis sustained.Nor does it account forthe specificallysexual
nature of romantic possessiveness.As a result, some theorists have offered
psychoanalyticspeculationsthat the depths of these feelings may come from
very earlyexperiencesand sexualhurtsrelatedto one'srelationshipswith one's
parents,especiallythe mother."Wherethe site of control and abandonis the
body,the demandsof the infant self are most visible.. ." (Benjamin1988, 51).
 Christine Overall 7

Formost human beings, the mother was the firstgreatlove, the first"one and
only," who cared most intensively for their bodily and emotional needs and
wants. For a limited time, at least, mother seemed to be all one's own, one's
possession,a loved entity scarcelyseparatefrom oneself, who existed only to
fulfill one's own needs. The pain of the ultimate realizationthat motherhad a
separateexistence, had other needs, wants, and interests,could not be exclu-
sively one's own, it is claimed, may remain buried within people's sense of
themselves, laying a foundationfor futurecompetitionsand vulnerabilitiesin
human relationships,and a longing for the restorationof that old apparently-
exclusive relationship. People want to return to the original oneness, the
absence of boundaries,the community and communing that constituted the
relationship with the woman who created them (Joyce Trebilcot in "Non?
Monogamy?"1985, 85-87; Ryan 1983, 201-202). Nancy Chodorow refersto
the theory that
the returnto the experienceof primarylove-the possibilityof
regressingto the infantile stage of a sense of oneness, no reality
testing, and a tranquilsense of well-beingin which all needs are
satisfied-is a main goal of adult sexual relationships:'This
primarytendency,I shall be loved always,everywhere,in every
way, my whole body, my whole being-without any criticism,
without the slightest effort on my part-is the final aim of all
erotic striving.'(Chodorow 1978, 194)
On the basis of this explanation, the sufferingoccasioned by sexual non-
exclusivity may not be inevitable or unavoidable. To the extent that the
adult/infantrelationship,particularlythe mother/infantrelationship,is a prod-
uct of existing normsgoverningchild-rearingand genderrole socializationin
the contemporaryNorth American family (Rossiter 1988), there is nothing
inevitable and naturalabout the relationship;it-and its outcomes-may be
subjectto change.
However,attractiveas this explanationmay seem, it also assumesan idyllic
view of infancythat maynot accordwith the realitiesof infant experience.Not
enough is understoodabout infancy and the perspectiveof the little child, as
well as about the extent to which earlyperceptionsand distresspersist,to be
able to know whether or not or to what extent these experiencesplay a role in
adult perceptionsof and reactionsto monogamyand nonmonogamy.

III. NONMONOGAMY
AND IDENTITY

I suggest it is possible to account for the possessivenessassociated with

monogamyand the pain occasionedby nonmonogamyby lookingmoreclosely
at the determinants,structures,and conventions of adultsexual relationships
as they are lived and experienced in patriarchalsociety. "[I]tseems that in
8 Hypatia

contemporaryculture,sexualityis nearly always,but not invariably,linked to

identity" (Person 1980, 49). Sex is, or at least is made to seem, part of
individuality,and the startof sexual experience is commonly thought to mark
the development of a more mature identity (Atwater 1982, 143). A sexual
relationshipcultivated for its own sake (ratherthan, let's say, for the sake of
income or personal survival) representsin part a choice about the kind of
personone is going to be, either for the short-termor the long-term.5
According to patriarchalconventions and norms, while both women and
men define themselves partlyin termsof their sexuality,they are expected to
differin how those selves are constructed.Masculinecultureencouragesmen
to see sexual activity as definitive of maleness. There is a phallic focus on
performance.6"Insofaras sexuality is a majorcomponent in the maintenance
of gender, it is crucial to identity. There is a wealth of clinical evidence to
suggest that, in this culture, genital sexual activity is a prominent feature in
the maintenanceof masculinegenderwhile it is a variablefeaturein feminine
gender.Thus an impotent man alwaysfeels that his masculinity,and not just
his sexuality,is threatened"(Person 1980, 50). A man'sself-concept may be
shatteredif he is "impotent"(a strikinglyrevealingtermin itself) or if a woman
in his life has sex with someone else, becausethen he is no longer performing
as a man should. (This is not to deny the pain that men may feel over sexual
relationshipsgone wrong,but only to suggestthat its culturalconstructionmay
often be differentfrom that of women.)
Women are encouraged,more than men, to define themselvesnot so much
through sexual activity per se, but by referenceto the person(s) with whom
they aresexual.The convention of sexual relating,outsideof paid sex work, is
that in that context the woman expressesherself, becomes and is most truly
and genuinely herself.In a sexual relationship,the sexual partneris the focus
of attention in a special way.According to MarilynFrye,"Attention is a kind
of passion.When one'sattention is on something,one is presentin a particular
way with respect to that thing. This presence is, among other things, an
element of erotic presence"(Frye 1983, 172).
In many sexual experiences,not only are one's physical/bodilyboundaries
crossed, but also one's emotional/identificational boundaries.There is an
opening up of the personto receive and encompassthe other. The individual
becomes a personwho is in partdefined by the sexual connections she makes.
Because, in Westernculture,sexual relating is defined as the ultimate formof
intimacy, the result in women's romantic/sexual relationships is often an
expansion of the sense of self to include those with whom they have sexual
relationships.
A sexual relationship then becomes a form of chosen vulnerability.As
enforcedaccess is the heart of dominance,so chosen and willing opennessand
vulnerabilityare the heart of erotic unity. Hence, in a sexual/romanticrela-
tionship, a woman may become stronger,but also more vulnerable,becauseof
 Christine Overall 9

her sexual partner.That openness is the precursorof the feeling (illusory

though it may often be) of oneness and mutuality of interaction, which
develops fromthe balance of separationand fusion (Benjamin 1988, 29).
Women, I suggest,are generallyexpected to incorporatethe sexual partner
into their own identity.The social constructionof women to encompassthose
with whom they are sexual is reinforced, for heterosexual women, by the
definition of the heterosexual couple as the building block of the culture, a
definition that contributesto the isolation of the couple as a social unit and
the privatizationof the relationship.Forlesbians,mergingor fusingwith one's
lover may be especially problematicin relationshipsthat are highly closeted
(Rotenberg 1989).
That this self-definitionby referenceto sexualpartnersis the functioningof
conventions of sexual relating is suggestedby the contrastto the conventions
of sex work,in which women define themselvesby referenceto the paid labor
they performratherthan by reference to the men with whom they interact,
and usually choose not to be vulnerable, self-expressive,or genuinely open.
Sex workers'perspective on their labor is not a distortion of the way sexual
relating "really"is, but rather another way of structuringsexual relating, in
particular, a way of dealing with an unequal and sometimes oppressive
relationship. By contrast, noncommercial sex is supposedto be nonoppress-
ive (though it often is not), and hence the conventions of sexual openness
apply to it.
To the extent that this ontological convention is adheredto, the incorpora-
tion within the female self of the person(s) with whom she is sexual helps to
account for the pain that a partner'snonmonogamousbehavior can produce.
"Parentsof four, five, six, or even ten children can certainly claim, and
sometimes claim correctly,that they love all of their children, that they love
them all equally,and that it is simplyuntrueto their feelings to insist that the
numbers involved diminish either the quantity or the quality of their love"
(Wasserstrom1984, 100). Why are similarrelationshipsfar more difficult in
the case of multiple sexual interactions?I suggestthat the significant differ-
ence turs on whetheror not the relationshipsarechosen. Even when they are
originallyunsoughtand unplanned,beloved children are in an importantway
a chosen and willed project of their parents,who undertaketo admit them to
their lives. Similarly,a womanwho freelytakeson a second sexualrelationship
in addition to one she alreadyhas is likely to feel a comparableexpansion of
her identity, or even a claiming or reclaimingof self. She has chosen to take
into her self another person;she has chosen to expand the boundariesof her
person:"The benefitsof nonmonogamythat women describedwere an intense
sexuality,the sense of emotional growth,discoveryof differentsidesof yourself
through different people, and a feeling of independence"(Kassoffin "Non?
Monogamy?"1985, 101).7
10 Hypatia

From the point of view of a monogamouswoman whose partneris non-

monogamous,however, the partner'snew sexual relationshipmay affect her
own identity in waysover which she has no control; it is likely to appearas an
invasion and violation of her person, a threat to her dignity,wholeness, and
integrity.When the monogamouspersonsays,of her lover, "I'mselfish;I don't
want to share,"she may not necessarilybe thinking of her lover as a child
thinks of a toy or a bag of candy.She may ratherbe saying that she does not
choose to share herself, to extend herself to include this new person,who is
not a chosen part of her self-assumedidentity.
According to SarahLuciaHoagland,"Iam presentor I am not at any given
moment, and that I am later presentelsewheredoes not change the natureof
my earlier presence" (1988, 171). However, the person with whom one is
sexuallypresentoften changes who one is, and the refocusingand redirection
of attention almost inevitably affectshow one is sexually present with other
people. When a monogamouswoman'spartner is, without her assent, non-
monogamous,then not only is the monogamouswoman'sself invaded; it is
invaded independently of her own will. Someone else has been introduced
into the originaldyadwhom the monogamouspartnerdid not choose and does
not want. Moreover,the new personwho has been introduceddid not choose
her either, and presumablydoes not want her. Thus, the new relationship
undertakenby the nonmonogamouspartneracquiresenforced access to the
monogamousperson'slife. This fact helps to account for the correctnessof
RichardTaylor'sobservationthat the role of this new person may loom even
largerthan "the role of the personto whom one jealouslytriesto cling" (Taylor
1982, 143;also see Eskapa1984). What is importantin feelingsof jealousyand
possessivenessin responseto a partner'snonmonogamousbehavior is not, or
not only, the loved one, the loved one's "betrayal,"and one's feelings about
both of these, but also the perceivedintruder,the sexualpartnerof one'ssexual
partner,and one'sfeelings abouther or him.
In responseto this explanation, it might be objected that relationshipsare
not transitive:A friendof my friendneed not be my friend;a lover of my lover
need not be my lover. Why then would my sexual partner'snew lover affect
my identity?And why would my sexual partner'snew lover affect my identity
any more than it would be affected if my sexual partnertakes up the cello,
becomes a vegetarian,or changes careers?All of these actions on the part of
my sexual partnerare likely to have an effect on me beyond my control, yet
they would not likely arousemy jealousy,and people would be unlikely to be
sympatheticif I did not want my partnerto change in these ways.8
My suggestionis that the self, especially the female self, is conventionally
defined in terms of sexual partners.But if cello-playing,vegetarianism,or a
new careerrequiredfromone's sexual partnerthe intimacythat sexual behav-
ior usually does (and sometimes activities such as these can make this
demand),then I submitthat it could be almostequallythreateningand painful
 Christine Overall 11

to the lover of the personengagedin these things, and the lover might become
jealous.The reasonis that in such cases, these activities could become partsof
the sexual partner'sself. However,there are fewer social conventions, expec-
tations, and pressuresthat make it likely that cello-playing,vegetarianism,or
even one's career will be incorporatedinto the female self in the way that
sexual partnersmore standardlyare. Moreover,engagementwith music, with
a specialdiet, or with professionalpursuitsis not the same as engagementwith
a person.Hence, my sexual partner'scello-playingdoes not make me vulnera-
ble to enforced intimacy with a cello in the way that I may be vulnerableto
enforced intimacy with another person through my sexual partner'snon-
monogamousbehavior.At least underpresentconventions, a woman is more
likely to incorporatesexual partnerswithin her identity;her self includes, or
even is defined by,not the sexual activities themselvesbut the self or selves of
sexual partners.
The monogamouspersonwith a nonmonogamouspartnerthus findsherself
in a kind of forcedrelating,9which seems inevitablyto change the meaningof
the originalrelationship.While the nonmonogamouspersonhas gainedby the
freely-chosenexpansion of his or her personalboundaries,the monogamous
personhas lost throughthe violation of her self-definition.It is sexualconven-
tions that make possible the pain occasioned by nonmonogamy,but these
conventions operateat the deepest level of our creation and understandingof
ourselves.

IV. MONOGAMY,NONMONOGAMY,
AND SOCIALTRANSFORMATION

The perspective sketched so far suggeststhat although there is nothing

inherently morally superior about monogamy, the development of sexual
relationshipsunderpatriarchyis such that one's partner'snonmonogamymay
cause considerablepain, especially for women. The ideologies of monogamy
and nonmonogamy reflect cultural notions of who women and men are
supposedto be. To the extent that persons,especially women, define them-
selves in terms of their lovers, nonmonogamousbehaviorby their partnersis
likely to cause harm. The conventional ontology for female selfhood thus
creates the occasion for moral problems. These problems arise when one
personis or wants to be nonmonogamousand the other personin the relation-
ship is not or does not: "Whathappenswhen one partneris keen to have other
relationshipsand the other prefersto be monogamous?Whose wishes should
be given greaterweight?Is all the onus on the would-bemonogamouspartner
to swallowher feelings or even try to change them?What responsibilitydoes
the otherhave to take accountof those feelings?Is there indeedany negotiable
groundupon which compromisescould be workedout between monogamyand
nonmonogamy?"(Cartledge1983, 174).
12 Hypatia

In an attempt to deal with these moral problems,Tayloroffersa series of

"rules"for the governanceof nonmonogamousrelationships(Taylor1982, 13).
But some of them seem maximally designed to promote men's interests in
sexualaccessto manywomen-for example,rulesforthe monogamouspartner
such as "Do not spy or pry,""Do not confrontor entrap,"and "Stayout of it."
Others, such as "Stop being jealous"and "Stopfeeling guilty,"presupposean
extraordinaryability to terminateone's feelings. And others still, such as "Be
awareof the needs of the other"and "Behonest,"areso obviousas to be banal.
Yet some feminist alternatives for the governance of nonmonogamous
relationships are equally problematic. For example, one writer describes a
possible model for lesbian nonmonogamyby distinguishingbetween primary
and secondary rankingsof partners.In so doing, she appearsto enshrine a
patriarchalstandardfor sexual relationships:
If you were primary,you could expect certainrights,i.e., Satur-
day nights, vacations, making plans with your partnerfirst. If
you were secondary, you knew to expect Friday instead of
Saturdaynight dates, not to ask for vacations, to wait to make
plans with your lover aftershe'd checked it out with girlfriend
number 1, etc. In many ways, this arrangementresemblesthe
age-oldpatternof wifeandmistress,with severalimportantexcep-
tions: everyone knows what's going on (at least the general
picture), everyone technically consents (at least by puttingup
withit), and each wife can have a mistress,or mistressa wife (at
least in theory). (Kassoffin "Non? Monogamy?"1985, 102,
italics added)
Somewhat similar recommendations are made by MargaretNichols, who
advocatesthe emulationofnonmonogamousgaymale relationships,which are
assumedto be casual and brief, and the separationof romantic love from the
love appropriateto a "committedprimaryrelationship."Nichols proposesthat
women-lesbians, anyway-follow the model supposedlyset by gay men of
"extramaritalsexuality[that]is almostalwayscasual (even anonymous),brief,
and recreationalratherthan emotionally intense" (Nichols 1987, 118-119).
But it is unclear that this proposedpartitioningof feelings is either desirable
or achievable, because it ignoreswhat I take to be the underlyingontological
basisfor the pain that nonmonogamycauses.
In general,because problemsabout monogamyand nonmonogamyappear
to arise from the gendered constitution of sexual relations and personal
identity,it mayseemthat their solution is for women to become stronger,more
autonomousindividuals,with a better-definedsense of who they are, indepen-
dent of those to whom they relate. Sexual/romanticrelationshipsare founded
upon a cultural commitment to the primacy of the (heterosexual) couple.
Within this context of isolation, women are encouragedand expected to lose
 Christine Overall 13

themselves in their sexual/romanticrelationships,to fuse their identities with

other persons.The solution to conflict aboutnonmonogamy,it may therefore
seem, is for women to opt for the culturallymasculineavenue of developing a
strong, self-sufficient,independent identity, which does not incorporatethe
selves of sexual partners.
Such a solution is problematic. As Person remarks,"any discrepancy
between female and male sexuality is viewed as problematicfor females. The
male model of sexuality, with its emphasis on orgasm and on sexuality as
performanceand achievement, is used as the sexual standardfor both sexes"
(Person 1980, 55; see also Lawson1988, 217-221). Similarly,Rossitersaysthat
proposedsolutions to conflicts within patriarchy"sufferfromthe very individ-
ualism that helps to construct the problemin the first place. For instance, if
one attributesthe problems... to the characteristicsof a particularrelation-
ship between two people, then the solutionhas to be seen in termsof changing
the nature of the relationship. What is avoided in this formulation is an
examination of the waysin which poweroperatesto producea Womanwho is
herself-in any relationship-coherent with capitalist patriarchy"(Rossiter
1988, 271). Discussionof the seemingly individualmoral questionsraisedby
nonmonogamouspracticesmustbear in mind this political context. Although
women are often socialized to be "selfless,"to ignore their own needs and
desires,feminist critiquesof the masculinistideal of the independentself (e.g.,
Ferguson, 1989; Lugones 1989; Whitbeck 1983) counsel caution about its
adoption by women and raise questions about whether or not it is truly
undesirableto define oneself in termsof otherpeople. Forexample,discussions
of lesbian relationships (MacDonald 1988; Rotenberg 1989) suggest that
growingcriticisms(Lindenbaum1985) of what are regardedas the unhealthy
element of mergeror fusion in these relationshipsrest too uncriticallyupon an
acceptance of masculinistversionsof what human interactionsshould be like
and a discountingof the role of oppressionin formingwomen'srelationships.
And Benjaminsays,

The original sense of oneness [with another person]was seen

[by traditionalmale thinkers]as absolute, as 'limitlessnarcis-
sism,' and, therefore,regressionto it would impede develop-
ment and prevent separation.In its most extreme version, this
view of differentiation pathologized the sensation of love:
relaxing the boundariesof the self in communion with others
threatenedthe identity of the isolate self. Yet this oneness was
also seen as the ultimate pleasure, eclipsing the pleasure of
difference.Oneness was not seen as a state that could coexist
with (enhance and be enhanced by) the sense of separateness.
(Benjamin 1988, 47)
14 Hypatia

Perhaps the real problem is not so much the construction of the self,
especially the genderedfemale self, in terms of other people, but rather,the
constructionof the self almostexclusively in termsof sexualrelationshipswith
other people. The conventional productionof female identityprimarilyin and
throughsexual relationshipsmeans that both monogamyand nonmonogamy
will continue to be problematicfor women under patriarchalconditions and
assumptions.
On the one hand, the ideology of monogamyovertly limits the opportunity
to love morethan one personat a time:"Thelogic of the preferenceourculture
gives the principleof exclusivity is that it is better to abandona person with
whom one has built up an intimate relationshipthan it is to have and express
feelingsof love and erotic attachmentto two persons"(Gregory1984, 267-68).
But on the other hand, so also does the ideology of nonmonogamy,for it
defines potential love and closeness in terms of sexual relatedness,and thus,
ignoresthe other deep and profoundformsof humanconnection that maywell
be physicaland close but arenot necessarilysexual.The idea of nonmonogamy
holds out the deceptive promise that the way to love others, to be close to
others, is througha sexual relationshipwith them. It creates the illusion that
sexual freedom is the path to sexual liberation,10or that it providesthe route
to social transformation.11 It endorsesthe masculinistidea that sexual feelings
are overwhelming and uncontrollable, and that one must act upon them.12
Critics of monogamyoften found their argumentson the assumptionof the
power of underlyingsexual drives, which people repressonly to their detri-
ment, or even which they areunableto repressat all (McMurtry1984, 112 and
115). Thus personswho aremonogamousareassumedeither to have a low "sex
drive"or else to be exertingsuperhumancontrol over their sexualdesires.The
ideology of nonmonogamy also assumes, without much justification, that
sexual desires themselves are entirely unbidden and unchosen, that people
cannot help how they feel sexually for other people, and that they have no
libertyto direct and redirectthe sexual focus of their attention.13
My aim is not to legislateaboutthe rightnessor wrongnessof nonmonogam-
ous behavior itself. Rather, I have sought to understand the nature and
meaningof the sufferingthat nonmonogamycan cause.Given my ontological
claim that the conventional structureof the self for women incorporates
intimate partners, I suggest we need to rethink the partitioning of sexual
activities and relationshipsas self-constitutivefromother activities and rela-
tionshipsthat are not conventionally taken to define the self. The concepts of
monogamyand nonmonogamyare problematicbecausethey derive fromand
implicitlysubscribeto certainviews aboutsexualrelations,love, and intimacy,
that underliehuman connections underpatriarchy,and cryout for reexamina-
tion: that sexual coupling defines and is the hallmarkof closeness between
human beings;that being sexual is being intimate;and that sex is almost the
only route to warmphysicalcontact between adults.They endorsethe notion
 Christine Overall 15

that sexuality is necessarilycentral to human culture, central to who we are,

and definitive of our selves; that personalfulfillment can alwaysbe achieved
throughsex; that sexual enjoyment in itself is a hallmarkof health (Steinbock
1986, 12); and that sexual relationshipshave and should have a moral and
emotional primacyover other relationships.
All of these assumptionsare not only open to question, but also may be
unnecessarilylimiting to human identity and development.Forit appearsthat
if women and their bodies were not constituted as a sexual resourceto which
access must be controlled and limited;if there were not the presentscarcityof
love, intimacy, warmth, and closeness in human relationships; if human
socializationdid not foster dependence upon one human being-in short, if
the constructionof genderwere not the linchpin of patriarchy-then perhaps
sexual exclusivity and inclusivity would not raise problemsfor women's (and
men's) sexual relationships. But to the extent that women continue to be
encouragedto define themselvesprimarilyor even exclusivelyin termsof their
sexualpartners,they will continue to be vulnerableto partnerswho choose not
to be monogamous.

NOTES

I amgratefulto the womenandmenwhohavediscussed theseissuesinformallywith

me,andto the editorialstaffat Hypatiaandtwoanonymous Hypatiareviewersfortheir
stimulating commentsandsuggestions.
1. As a resultof thecentralityof marriage to discussionsof monogamy, theconcept
of adulteryanditsassociated behaviorpatternsandimplications arethefocusof a large
amountof sociologicalinvestigation (e.g.,Strean1980;Wollison1982;Atwater1982;
Richardson 1985;Lawson1988).
2. See,forexample,"Non?Monogamy? A Readers' Forum" (1985).Mydiscussion
drawsuponthe ideasexpressed there.See alsoAtheyandOsterman(1984,48-50).
3. See, forexample,Taylor(1982),whichdeliberately excludesall consideration
of same-sexrelationships.
4. It is remarkable thatwhilelesbianandbisexualfeministshavewrittenexten-
sively about issues
pertainingto theirsexualpractice,heterosexual feministsaresome-
what morereticent,preferring, apparently, to stick to issuessuch as sexualassault,
pornography, andprostitution.
5. A sexualrelationshipundertaken for the sakeof incomerepresents a choice
aboutthe kindof workerone is goingto be.
6. Margaret Carterfirstmadethispointto me.
7. Thesefeelingsareamplyconfirmedin the researchdonebyAtwater(1982)on
heterosexual women.
8. I amgratefulto the anonymous Hypatiareviewerwhopresentedthisobjection.
9. I owethisobservation to TedWorth.
10. "Byaffirmingone'sfreedomfromsexualrestraintone obtainsa feelingof
personalfreedom;this, in turn,sustainsone in the routinizedactivitiesof day-to-day
living"(Walshok1974,164).
16 Hypatia

11. "Theconquestof sexualjealousy,if achieved,couldbe the greatestadvancein

humanrelationssince the adventof commonlaw or the initiationof democratic
processes" (SmithandSmith1974,38).
12. "Anyonewho has sufferedthe disproportionate, inordinateand incalculable
powerof romantic/sexual loveknowsthatit isaforcewhichoverwhelms boththemind
andthecharacter. religion,reason,respectandrationality"
It annihilates (Eskapa1984,
183).
13.Taylor's bookexemplifies theseassumptions mostclearly.He writes,"Thereare,
in fact,menandwomenwho havea strongandimmediatesexualattractionto each
other,often inexplicable,but sometimesinstantlyknownto both of them .... I am
convincedthatthe presenceof suchfeelings,orthe lackof them,is totallybeyondthe
controlof people,andequallybeyondtheirunderstanding-something whichshould,
by itself,be enoughto exhibitthefoolishnessof thosewhowantto condemnthem....
Thereis no comprehending whya givenmanor womanis sweptup in a tideof sexual
for
passion just one person,and quiteunableto mustersuch feelingsfor
particular
anotherwithwhomhe orshemightbe genuinelyanddeeplyin love,whois recognized
asa betterpersonin all ways"(Taylor1982,25, italicsin original).

REFERENCES

Athey,PhyllisJeankinheartandMaryJokinheartOsterman.1984.Thelesbian relation-
shiphandbook. Evanston:KinheartProgram on SexualityandHomophobia.
Atwater,Lynn.1982.Theextramarital connection:Sex,intimacy,andidentity. New York:
Irvington.
Bayles,MichaelD. 1984.Marriage, love, andprocreation. In Philosophy andsex,ed.
RobertBakerandFrederick Elliston.Buffalo:Prometheus Books.
Benjamin,Jessica.1988.Thebondsof love:Psychoanalysis, feminism,andtheproblem of
domination.New York:PantheonBooks.
Cartledge,Sue. 1983.Dutyanddesire:Creatinga feministmorality.In Sexandlove:
New thoughts ed. Sue CartledgeandJoannaRyan.London:
on oldcontradictions,
Women'sPress.
Chodorow, Nancy.1978.Thereproduction of mothering:Psychoanalysisandthesociology
ofgender.Berkeley:Universityof California Press.
Eskapa,Shirley.1984.Woman versuswoman.London:Heinemann.
Ferguson,Ann. 1989.A feministaspecttheoryof the self.In Women,knowledge, and
in
reality:Explorationsfeministphilosophy, ed. Ann and
Garry Marilyn Pearsall.
Boston:UnwinHyman.
Claude,andFemandeGontier.1987.Simone
Francis, deBeauvoir:A life... a lovestory.
Trans.LisaNesselson.New York:St. Martin's.
Frye,Marilyn.1983.Thepoliticsof reality:Essaysin feministtheory.Trumansburg, NY:
CrossingPress.
Gregory,Paul.1984.AgainstCouples.Journal ofApplied Philosophy1 (2): 263-68.
Hamilton, Roberta. 1990.A politicsof intimate life:A funnythinghappenedon the
waythroughthe eighties.Atlantis: A Women's StudiesJournal15 (Spring):82-89.
Hoagland,SarahLucia. 1988. Lesbianethics:Towardnew values.Palo Alto, CA:
Instituteof LesbianStudies.
 Christine Overall 17

Lawson, Annette. 1988. Adultery:An analysisof love and betrayal.New York:Basic

Books.
Lindenbaum,Joyce P. 1985. The shatteringof an illusion:The problemof competition
in lesbianrelationships.FeministStudies11 (Spring):85-103.
Lugones,Maria.1989. Playfulness,'world'-traveling,and loving perception.In Women,
knowledge,andreality:Explorations in feministphilosophy,
ed. Ann Garryand Mari-
lyn Pearsall.Boston:Unwin Hyman.
MacDonald, Ingrid. 1988. Crying over spilt milk: Thoughts on lesbian relationships.
Rites5 (May): 12-13.
McMurtry,John. 1984. Monogamy:A critique.In Philosophy andsex, ed. RobertBaker
and FrederickElliston. Buffalo:PrometheusBooks.
Nichols, Margaret.1987. Lesbian sexuality:Issues and developing theory. In Lesbian
psychologies: and challenges,ed. the Boston LesbianPsychologiesCol-
Explorations
lective. Urbana:University of Illinois Press.
Non? Monogamy?A reader'sforum.1985. LesbianEthics1 (2): 79-105.
Palmer,David. 1984. The consolation of marriage.In Philosophyand sex, ed. Robert
Bakerand FrederickElliston. Buffalo:PrometheusBooks.
Penelope, Julia. 1985. The mysteryof lesbians:II. LesbianEthics1 (2): 29-67.
Person, Ethel Spector. 1980. Sexuality as the mainstay of identity: Psychoanalytic
perspectives.In Women:Sex and sexuality,ed. CatharineR. Stimpson and Ethel
Spector Person.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
Richardson,Laurel. 1985. The new otherwoman:Contemporary singlewomenin affairs
withmarriedmen.New York:FreePress.
Rossiter,Amy. 1988. Fromprivateto public:A feministexplorationof earlymothering.
Toronto:Women'sPress.
Rotenberg, Lorie. 1989. Impact of homophobia, heterosexism and closetedness on
intimacy dynamicsin lesbian relationships.Resourcesfor FeministResearch/Docu-
mentationsur la recherche
feministe18 (June):3-9.
Ryan, Joanna. 1983. Psychoanalysisand women loving women. In Sex and love:New
thoughtson old contradictions,ed. Sue Cartledge and Joanna Ryan. London:
Women'sPress.
Smith, JamesR., and LynnG. Smith. 1974. Introductionto Beyondmonogamy:Recent
studiesof sexualalternativesin marriage,ed. JamesR. Smith and Lynn G. Smith.
Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press.
Steinbock, Bonnie. 1986. Adultery.ReportfromtheCenterforPhilosophy andPublicPolicy
6 (Winter): 12-14.
Strean, HerbertS. 1980. The extramarital affair.New York:Free Press.
Taylor,Richard. 1982. Havingloveaffairs.Buffalo:PrometheusBooks.
Walshok,MaryLindenstein. 1974. The emergenceof middle-classdeviant subcultures:
The case of swingers.In Beyondmonogamy:Recentstudiesof sexualalternativesin
marriage,ed. James R. Smith and Lynn G. Smith. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Wasserstrom,Richard. 1984. Is adultery immoral?In Philosophyand sex, ed. Robert
Bakerand FrederickElliston. Buffalo:PrometheusBooks.
Whitbeck, Caroline. 1983. A differentreality:Feministontology.In Beyonddomination:
New perspectiveson women and philosophy,ed. Carol C. Gould. Totowa, NJ:
Rowman & Allanheld.
Wollison, MaryAnne. 1982. Affairs:The secretlivesof women.Toronto:Musson.