North Korea Nuclear Programe

North Korea claims to possess nuclear weapons, and it is widely believed to

have a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons (deliverable by artillery). North
Korea was a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but withdrew in 2003,
citing the failure of the United States to fulfill its end of the Agreed Framework, a
1994 agreement between the states to limit North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement

that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both the United
States Geologic Survey and Japanese seismological authorities detected an
earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.2 on the Richter scale in
North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims.

1. Nuclear weapons
1.1:Background
Korea has been a divided country since 1947. The Korean War was fought
from June 25, 1950 until a cease. However, since North Korea and South Korea
have still not officially made peace, strictly speaking, the war has yet to be ended
officially.

Tensions between North and South have run high on numerous occasions
since 1953. The deployment of the U.S. Army's Second Infantry Division on the
Korean peninsula and the American military presence at the Korean Demilitarized
Zone are publicly regarded by North Korea as an occupying army. In several areas,
North Korean and American/South Korean forces operate in extreme proximity to
the border, adding to tension. This tension led to the border clash in 1976, which
has become known as the Axe Murder Incident.

The U.S. has rejected recent North Korean calls for bilateral talks
concerning a non-aggression pact, stating that only six-party talks that also include
the People's Republic of China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are acceptable.
The American stance is that North Korea has violated prior bilateral agreements,
thus such forums lack accountability. Conversely, North Korea refuses to speak in

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the context of six-party talks, stating that it will only accept bilateral talks with the
United States. This has led to a diplomatic stalemate.

On November 19, 2006 North Korea’s Minju Joson newspaper accused

South Korea of building up arms in order to attack the country: The South Korean
military is openly clamoring that the development and introduction of new
weapons are to target the North. Pyongyang accused South Korea of conspiring
with the United States to attack the isolated and impoverished state, an accusation
made frequently by the North and routinely denied by the U.S.

1.2:Plutonium
Concern focuses around two reactors at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific
Research Center, both of them small power stations using Magnox techniques. The
smaller (5MWe) was completed in 1986 and has since produced possibly 8,000
spent fuel elements. Construction of the larger plant (50MWe) commenced in 1984
but in 2003 was still incomplete. This larger plant is based on the declassified
blueprints of the Calder Hall power reactors used to produce plutonium for the UK
nuclear weapons program. The smaller plant produces enough material to build
one new bomb per year; if completed, the larger plant could produce enough for 10
each year. It has also been suggested that small amounts of plutonium could have
been produced in a Russian-supplied IRT-2000 heavy-water moderated research
reactor completed in 1967, but there are no recorded safeguards violations with
respect to this plant.

On March 12, 1993, North Korea said that it planned to withdraw from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and refused to allow inspectors access to its
nuclear sites. By 1994, the United States believed that North Korea had enough
reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs with the amount of plutonium
increasing. Faced with diplomatic pressure and the threat of American military air
strikes against the reactor, North Korea agreed to dismantle its plutonium program
as part of the Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the United States
would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those
reactors could be completed. Because the light water reactors would require
enriched uranium to be imported from outside North Korea, the amount of reactor
fuel and waste could be more easily tracked, making it more difficult to divert
nuclear waste to be reprocessed into plutonium. However, with bureaucratic red-
tapes and political obstacles from the North Korea, KEDO,established to advance
the implementation of "Agreed Framework", had failed to build the promised light
water reactors and in late 2002, North Korea returned to using their old reactors.

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 1.3:Enriched uranium
With the abandonment of its plutonium program, North Korea began an
enriched uranium program. Pakistan, through Abdul Qadeer Khan, supplied key
technology and information to North Korea in exchange for missile technology
around 1997, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

This program was publicized in October 2002 when the United States asked
North Korean officials about the program,. Although the Agreed Framework
specifically prohibited then-existing plutonium programs, not uranium, the U.S.
argued North Korea violated the "spirit" of the agreement. In December 2002, the
United States terminated the 1994 Agreed Framework, suspending fuel oil
shipments.

North Korea responded by announcing plans to reactivate a dormant nuclear

fuel processing program and power plant north of Pyongyang. North Korea soon
thereafter expelled U.N. inspectors and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.

1.4:North Korean-American relations

Even though U.S. President George W. Bush had named North Korea as part
of an "Axis of Evil" following the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. officials stated
that the United States was not planning any immediate military action.

According to John Feffer, co-director of ’Foreign Policy in Focus’, "The

primary problem is that the current U.S. administration fundamentally doesn’t
want an agreement with North Korea. The Bush administration considers the 1994
Agreed Framework to have been a flawed agreement. It doesn’t want to be saddled
with a similar agreement, for if it did sign one, it would then be open to charges of
"appeasing" Pyongyang. American ire at North Korea is further inflammed by
allegations of state sponsored drug smuggling, money laundering, and wide scale
counterfeiting. The Vice President has summed up the approach as: "We don’t
negotiate with evil, we defeat evil."

Diplomatic efforts at resolving the North Korean situation are complicated

by the different goals and interests of the nations of the region. While none of the
parties desire a North Korea with nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea are
very concerned about North Korean counter strikes in case of military action
against North Korea. The People's Republic of China and South Korea are also

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very worried about the economic and social consequences should this situation
cause Korean government to collapse.

1.5:Chronology of events
1.5.1: 1989-2001

• 1989: Soviet control of communist governments throughout Europe

begins to weaken and the Cold War comes to a close. As the USSR's
power declines, North Korea loses the security guarantees and
economic support that had sustained it for 45 years.
• Through satellite photos, the U.S. learns of new construction at a
nuclear complex near the North Korean town of Yongbyon. U.S.
intelligence analysts suspect that North Korea, which had signed the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 but had not yet
allowed inspections of its nuclear facilities, is in the early stages of
building an atomic bomb.
• In response, U.S. pursues a strategy in which North Korea's full
compliance with the NPT would lead to progress on other diplomatic
issues, such as the normalization of relations.
• 1992: In May, for the first time, North Korea allows a team from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), then headed by Hans
Blix, to visit the facility at Yongbyon. Blix and the U.S. suspect that
North Korea is secretly using its five-megawatt reactor and
reprocessing facility at Yongbyon to turn spent fuel into weapons-
grade plutonium. Before leaving, Blix arranges for fully equipped
inspection teams to follow.
• The inspections do not go well. Over the next several months, the
North Koreans repeatedly block inspectors from visiting two of
Yongbyon's suspected nuclear waste sites and IAEA inspectors find
evidence that the country is not revealing the full extent of its
plutonium production.
• In an interview on the Daily Show with Jon Stewart, former Secretary
of State James Baker let it slip that North Korea “... had a rudimentary
nuclear weapon way back in the days when I was secretary of state,
but now this is a more advanced one evidently.” He was Secretary of
State between 1989 and 1992.
• 1993: In March, North Korea threatens to withdraw from the NPT.
Facing heavy domestic pressure from Republicans who oppose
negotiations with North Korea, President Bill Clinton appoints Robert

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 Gallucci to start a new round of negotiations. After 89 days, North
Korea announces it has suspended its withdrawal. (The NPT requires
three months notice before a country can withdraw.)
• In December, IAEA Director-General Blix announces that the agency
can no longer provide "any meaningful assurances" that North Korea
is not producing nuclear weapons.
• 12 October, 1994: the United States and North Korea signed the
"Agreed Framework": North Korea agreed to freeze its plutonium
production program in exchange for fuel oil, economic cooperation,
and the construction of two modern light-water nuclear power plants.
Eventually, North Korea's existing nuclear facilities were to be
dismantled, and the spent reactor fuel taken out of the country.
• 26 October, 1994: IAEA Chairman Hans Blix tells the British House
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee the IAEA is "not very
happy" with the Agreed Framework because it gives North Korea too
much time to begin complying with the inspections regime.
• 18 March, 1996: Hans Blix tells the IAEA's Board of Governors
North Korea has still not made its initial declaration of the amount of
plutonium they possess, as required under the Agreed Framework, and
warned that without the declaration IAEA would lose the ability to
verify North Korea was not using its plutonium to develop weapons.
• October 1997: spent nuclear fuel rods were encased in steel
containers, under IAEA inspection.
• 31 August, 1998: North Korea launched a modified Taepodong-1
missile in a launch attempt of its Kwangmyŏngsŏng satellite. US
Military analysts suspect satellite launch is a ruse for the testing of an
ICBM. This missile flew over Japan causing the Japanese government
to retract 1 billion in aid for two civilian light-water reactors.

1.5.2: 2002

• 7 August: "First Concrete" pouring at the construction site of the

light-water nuclear power plants being built by the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization under the 1994 Agreed
Framework. Construction of both reactors was many years behind the
agreement's target completion date of 2003.

• 3-5 October: On a visit to the North Korean capital Pyongyang, US

Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly presses the North on
suspicions that it is continuing to pursue a nuclear energy and missiles

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 programme. Mr Kelly says he has evidence of a secret uranium-
enriching programme carried out in defiance of the 1994 Agreed
Framework. Under this deal, North Korea agreed to forsake nuclear
ambitions in return for the construction of two safer light water
nuclear power reactors and oil shipments from the US.

• 16 October: The US announces that North Korea admitted in their

talks to a secret nuclear arms programme.

• 17 October: Initially the North appears conciliatory. Leader Kim

Jong-il says he will allow international weapons inspectors to check
that nuclear facilities are out of use.

• 20 October: North-South Korea talks in Pyongyang are undermined

by the North's nuclear programme "admission". US Secretary of State
Colin Powell says further US aid to North Korea is now in doubt. The
North adopts a mercurial stance, at one moment defiantly defending
its "right" to weapons development and at the next offering to halt
nuclear programmes in return for aid and the signing of a "non-
aggression" pact with the US. It argues that the US has not kept to its
side of the Agreed Framework, as the construction of the light water
reactors - due to be completed in 2003 - is now years behind schedule.

• 14 November: US President George W Bush declares November oil

shipments to the North will be the last if the North does not agree to
put a halt to its weapons ambitions.

• 18 November: Confusion clouds a statement by North Korea in which

it initially appears to acknowledge having nuclear weapons. A key
Korean phrase understood to mean the North does have nuclear
weapons could have been mistaken for the phrase "entitled to have",
Seoul says.

• 27 November: The North accuses the US of deliberately

misinterpreting its contested statement, twisting an assertion of its
"right" to possess weapons into an "admission" of possession.

• 4 December: The North rejects a call to open its nuclear facilities to

inspection.

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 • 11 December: North Korean-made Scud missiles are found aboard a
ship bound for Yemen. The US illegally detains the ship, but is later
forced to allow the ship to go, conceding that neither country has
broken any law.

• 12 December: The North pledges to reactivate nuclear facilities for

energy generation, saying the Americans' decision to halt oil
shipments leaves it with no choice. It exposes the US for wrecking the
1994 pact.

• 13 December: North Korea asks the UN's International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) to remove seals and surveillance equipment -
the IAEA's "eyes and ears" on the North's nuclear status - from its
Yongbyon power plant.

• 22 December: The North begins removing monitoring devices from

the Yongbyon plant.

• 24 December: North Korea begins repairs at the Yongbyon plant.

North-South Korea talks over reopening road and rail border links,
which have been struggling on despite the increased tension, finally
stall.

• 25 December: It emerges that North Korea had begun shipping fuel

rods to the Yongbyon plant which could be used to produce
plutonium.

• 26 December: The IAEA expresses concern in the light of UN

confirmation that 1,000 fuel rods have been moved to the Yongbyon
reactor.

• 27 December: North Korea says it is expelling the two IAEA nuclear

inspectors from the country. It also says it is planning to reopen a
reprocessing plant, which could start producing weapons grade
plutonium within months.

1.5.3: 2003

• 2 January: South Korea asks China to use its influence with North
Korea to try to reduce tension over the nuclear issue, and two days

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 later Russia offers to press Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear
programme.

• 6 January: The IAEA passes a resolution demanding that North

Korea readmit UN inspectors and abandon its secret nuclear weapons
programme "within weeks", or face possible action by the UN
Security Council.

• 7 January: The US says it is "willing to talk to North Korea about

how it meets its obligations to the international community". But it
"will not provide quid pro quos to North Korea to live up to its
existing obligations".

• 9 January: North Korea agrees to hold cabinet-level talks with South

Korea on 21 January.

• 10 January: North Korea announces it will withdraw from the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

• 24 January: Cabinet-level talks between North and South Korea end

without making progress. South Korean President-elect Roh Moo-
hyun proposes face-to-face meeting with Kim Jong-il.

• 28 January: In his annual State of the Union address, President Bush

alleges North Korea is "an oppressive regime [whose] people live in
fear and starvation". He accuses North Korea of deception over its
nuclear ambitions and says "America and the world will not be
blackmailed".

• 29 January: North Korea says Mr Bush's speech is an "undisguised

declaration of aggression to topple the DPRK system" and dubs him a
"shameless charlatan". At the same time, however, it reiterates its
demand for bilateral talks on a non-aggression pact.

• 31 January: Unnamed American officials are quoted as saying that

spy satellites have tracked movement at the Yongbyon plant
throughout January, prompting fears that North Korea is trying to
reprocess plutonium for nuclear bombs.
• White House spokesman Ari Fleischer delivers a stern warning that
North Korea must not take "yet another provocative action... intended
to intimidate and blackmail the international community".

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• 4 February: The United States says it is considering new military
deployments in the Pacific Ocean to back up its forces in South
Korea, as a deterrent against any North Korean aggression, in the
event that the US unleashes aggression on Iraq.

• 5 February: North Korea says it has reactivated its nuclear facilities

and their operations are now going ahead "on a normal footing".

• 6 February: North Korea warns the United States that any decision to
build up its troops in the region could lead the North to make a pre-
emptive attack on American forces.

• 12 February: The IAEA finds North Korea in breach of nuclear

safeguards and refers the matter to the UN security council.

• 16 February: Kim Jong-il celebrates his 61st birthday, but state

media warns North Korean citizens to be on "high alert".

• 17 February: The US and South Korea announce that they will hold
joint military exercises in March.

• 24 February: North Korea fires a missile into the sea between South
Korea and Japan.

• 25 February: Roh Moo-hyun sworn in as South Korean president.

• 2 March: Four North Korean fighter jets intercept a US

reconnaissance plane in international air space and shadow it for 22
minutes.

• 10 March: North Korea fires a second missile into the sea between
South Korea and Japan in as many weeks.

• 22 March: As a blistering bombing campaign pounds the Iraqi

capital, and South Korean and US forces perform military exercises
on its doorstep, a jumpy North denounces their "confrontational
posture" and calls off talks with the South.

• 1 April: The US announces that "stealth" fighters sent to South Korea

for a training exercise are to stay on once the exercises end.

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• 7 April: Ministerial talks between North and South Korea are
cancelled after Pyongyang fails to confirm they would take place.

• 9 April: The United Nations Security Council expresses concern

about North Korea's nuclear programme, but fails to condemn
Pyongyang for pulling out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

• 12 April: In a surprise move, North Korea signals it may be ready to

end its insistence on direct talks with the US, announcing that "if the
US is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a
settlement of the nuclear issue, [North Korea] will not stick to any
particular dialogue format".

• 18 April: North Korea announces that it has started reprocessing its

spent fuel rods. The statement is later amended to read that
Pyongyang has been "successfully going forward to reprocess" the
rods.

• 23 April: Talks begin in Beijing between the US and North Korea,

hosted by China. The talks are led by the US Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian affairs, James Kelly, and the deputy director
general of North Korea's American Affairs Bureau, Li Gun.

• 24 April: American officials say Pyongyang has told them that it now
has nuclear weapons, after the first direct talks for months between the
US and North Korea in Beijing end a day early.

• 25 April: Talks end amid mutual recrimination, after the US says

North Korea had made its first admission that it possessed nuclear
weapons.

• 28 April: US Secretary of State Colin Powell says North Korea made

an offer to US officials, during the talks in Beijing, to scrap its nuclear
programme in exchange for major concessions from the United States.
He does not specify what those concessions are, but reports say that
Pyongyang wants normalised relations with the US and economic
assistance. Mr Powell says Washington is studying the offer.

• 5 May: North Korea demands the US respond to what it terms the

"bold proposal" it made during the Beijing talks.

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• 12 May: North Korea says it is scrapping a 1992 agreement with the
South to keep the peninsula free from nuclear weapons - Pyongyang's
last remaining international agreement on non-proliferation.

• 15 May: South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun meets US President

George W Bush in Washington for talks on how to handle North
Korea's nuclear ambitions.

• 2 June: A visiting delegation of US congressmen led by Curt Weldon

says North Korean officials admitted the country had nuclear weapons
had "just about completed" reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods which
would allow it to build more.

• 9 June: North Korea says publicly that it will build a nuclear

deterrent, "unless the US gives up its hostile policy".

• 13 June: South Korea's Yonhap news agency says North Korean

officials told the US on 30 June that it had completed reprocessing the
fuel rods.

• 18 June: North Korea says it will "put further spurs to increasing its
nuclear deterrent force for self-defence".

• 9 July: South Korea's spy agency says North Korea has started
reprocessing a "small number" of the 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods at
Yongbyon.

• 1 August: North Korea agrees to six-way talks on its nuclear

programme, South Korea confirms. The US, Japan, China and Russia
will also be involved.

• 27-29 August: Six-nation talks in Beijing on North Korea's nuclear

programme. The meeting fails to bridge the gap between Washington
and Pyongyang. Delegates agree to meet again.

• 2 October: North Korea announces publicly it has reprocessed the

spent fuel rods.

• 16 October: North Korea says it will "physically display" its nuclear

deterrent.

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 • 30 October: North Korea agrees to resume talks on the nuclear crisis,
after saying it is prepared to consider the US offer of a security
guarantee in return for ending its nuclear programme.

• 21 November: Kedo, the international consortium formed to build

'tamper-proof' nuclear power plants in North Korea, decides to
suspend the project.

• 9 December: North Korea offers to "freeze" its nuclear programme in

return for a list of concessions from the US. It says that unless
Washington agrees, it will not take part in further talks. The US
rejects North Korea's offer. President George W Bush says
Pyongyang must dismantle the programme altogether.

27 December: North Korea says it will take part in a new round of

six-party talks on its nuclear programme in early 2004.

1.5.4: 2004

• 2 January: South Korea confirms that the North has agreed to allow a
group of US experts, including a top nuclear scientist, visit Yongbyon
nuclear facility.

• 10 January: The unofficial US team visits what the North calls its
"nuclear deterrent" facility at Yongbyon.

• 22 January: US nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker tells Congress that

the delegates visiting Yongbyon were shown what appeared to be
weapons-grade plutonium, but he did not see any evidence of a
nuclear bomb.

• 3 February: North Korea reports that the next round of six-party talks
on the nuclear crisis will be held on 25 February.

• 25 February: Second round of six nation talks end without

breakthrough in Beijing.

• 23 May: The UN atomic agency is reported to be investigating

allegations that North Korea secretly sent uranium to Libya when
Tripoli was trying to develop nuclear weapons.

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 • 23 June: Third round of six nation talks held in Beijing, with the US
making a new offer to allow North Korea fuel aid if it freezes then
dismantles its nuclear programmes.

• 2 July: US Secretary of State Colin Powell meets the North Korean

Foreign Minister, Paek Nam-sun, in the highest-level talks between
the two countries since the crisis erupted.

• 24 July: North Korea rejects US suggestions that it follow Libya's

lead and give up its nuclear ambitions, calling the US proposal a
"daydream".

• 3 August: North Korea is in the process of developing a new missile

system for ships or submarines, according to a report in Jane's
Defence Weekly.

• 16 August: North Korea says it will not attend a working mujligiljhn

• 23 August: North Korea describes US President George W Bush as

an "imbecile" and a "tyrant that puts Hitler in the shade", in response
to comments President Bush made describing the North's Kim Jong-il
as a "tyrant".

• 28 September: North Korea says it has turned plutonium from 8,000

spent fuel rods into nuclear weapons. Speaking at the UN General
Assembly, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon said the weapons were
needed for "self-defence" against "US nuclear threat".

1.5.5: 2005

• 14 January: North Korea says it is willing to restart stalled talks on

its nuclear programme, according to the official KCNA news agency.
The statement says North Korea "would not stand against the US but
respect and treat it as a friend unless the latter slanders the former's
system and interferes in its internal affairs".

• 19 January: Condoleezza Rice, President George W Bush's nominee

as secretary of state, identifies North Korea as one of six "outposts of
tyranny" where the US must help bring freedom.

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• 10 February: North Korea says it is suspending its participation in
the talks over its nuclear programme for an "indefinite period",
blaming the Bush administration's intention to "antagonise, isolate and
stifle it at any cost". The statement also repeats North Korea's
assertion to have built nuclear weapons for self-defence.

• 18 April: South Korea says North Korea has shut down its Yongbyon
reactor, a move which could allow it to extract more fuel for nuclear
weapons.

• 1 May: North Korea fires a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan,
on the eve of a meeting of members of the international Non-
Proliferation Treaty.

• 11 May: North Korea says it has completed extraction of spent fuel

rods from Yongbyon, as part of plans to "increase its nuclear arsenal".

• 16 May: North and South Korea hold their first talks in 10 months,
with the North seeking fertiliser for its troubled agriculture sector.

• 25 May: The US suspends efforts to recover the remains of missing

US servicemen in North Korea, saying restrictions placed on its work
were too great.

• 7 June: China's envoy to the UN says he expects North Korea to

rejoin the six-nation talks "in the next few weeks".

• 22 June: North Korea requests more food aid from the South during
ministerial talks in Seoul, the first for a year.

• 9 July: North Korea says it will rejoin nuclear talks, as US Secretary

of State Condoleezza Rice begins a tour of the region.

• 12 July: South Korea offers the North huge amounts of electricity as

an incentive to end its nuclear weapons programme.

• 25 July: Fourth round of six-nation talks begins in Beijing.

• 7 August: The talks reach deadlock and a recess is called.

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 • 13 September: Talks resume, but a new North Korean request to be
built a light water reactor prompts warnings of a "standoff" between
the parties.

• 19 September: In what is initially hailed as an historic joint

statement, North Korea agrees to give up all its nuclear activities and
rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while the US says it had
no intention of attacking.

• 20 September: North Korea says it will not scrap its nuclear

programme until it is given a civilian nuclear reactor, undermining the
joint statement and throwing further talks into doubt.

• 7 December: A senior US diplomat brands North Korea a "criminal

regime" involved in arms sales, drug trafficking and currency forgery.

• 20 December: North Korea says it intends to resume building nuclear

reactors, because the US had pulled out of a key deal to build it two
new reactors.

1.5.6: 2006

• 12 April: A two-day meeting aimed at persuading North Korea to

return to talks on its nuclear programme fails to resolve the deadlock.

• 26 June: A report by the Institute for Science and International

Security estimates that current North Korea plutonium stockplies is
sufficient for four to thirteen nuclear weapons.

• 3 July: Washington dismisses a threat by North Korea that it will

launch a nuclear strike against the US in the event of an American
attack, as a White House spokesman described the threat as "deeply
hypothetical".

• 4 July: North Korea test-fires at least six missiles, including a long-

range Taepodong-2, despite repeated warnings from the international
community.

• 5 July: North Korea test-fires a seventh missile, despite international

condemnation of its earlier launches.

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• 6 July: North Korea announces it would continue to launch missiles,
as well as "stronger steps", if international countries were to apply
additional pressure as a result of the latest missile launches, claiming
it to be their sovereign right to carry out these tests. A US television
network also reports that they have quoted intelligence sources in
saying that North Korea is readying another Taepodong-2 long-range
missile for launch.

• 3 October: North Korea announces plans to test a nuclear weapon in

the future, blaming "hostile US policy." Their full text can be read
here
• 5 October: A US envoy directly threatens North Korea as to the
upcoming test, stating "It (North Korea) can have a future or it can
have these (nuclear) weapons, it cannot have them both." The envoy
also mentions that any attempt to test a nuclear device would be seen
as a "highly provocative act."

• 6 October: The United Nations Security Council issues a statement

declaring, "The Security Council urges the DPRK not to undertake
such a test and to refrain from any action that might aggravate
tension, to work on the resolution of non-proliferation concerns and
to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through political
and diplomatic efforts. Later in the day, there are unconfirmed reports
of the North Korean government successfully testing a nuclear bomb."

• 9 October: North Korea announces that it has performed its first-ever

nuclear weapon test. The country's official Korean Central News
Agency said the test was performed successfully and there was no
radioactive leakage from the site. South Korea's Yonhap news agency
said the test was conducted at 10:36 a.m. (1:36 a.m. GMT) in Hwaderi
near Kilju city, citing defense officials. The USGS detected an
earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.2 at
41.311°N, 129.114°E. The USGS coordinate indicates that the
location in much north of Hwaderi, near the upper stream of Oran-
chon, 17km NNW of Punggye-Yok, according to analysts reports.

• 10 October: Some western scientists had doubts as to whether the

nuclear weapon test that took place on 9 October 2006 was in fact
successful. The scientists cite that the measurements recorded only
showed an explosion equivalent to 500 metric tons of TNT, as

16
 compared to the 1998 nuclear tests that India and Pakistan conducted
which were from between 24 - 50 times more powerful. This could
indicate that the test resulted in a fizzle.

• 14 October: The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution

imposing sanctions on North Korea for its announced nuclear test on 9
October 2006 that include steps to hit the North Korea's nuclear and
missile programs as well as keeping luxury goods away from its
leaders, for example French wines and spirits or jet skis. However, the
sanctions do not have the full support of China and Russia.

North Korea is widely believed to possess a substantial arsenal of chemical

weapons. It reportedly acquired the technology necessary to produce tabun and
mustard gas as early as the 1950s, and now possesses a full arsenal of nerve agents
and other advanced varieties, and has developed the means to launch them in
artillery shells.[citation needed] North Korea has a large artillery arsenal within range of
Seoul, South Korea's capital, and a chemical attack could cause a very large
number of casualties. North Korea has stated that this arsenal is required as
deterrent from invasion.

North Korea has expended considerable resources on equipping its army

with chemical-protection equipment.

North Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, the

Geneva Protocol on January 4, 1989, but has not signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention.

2.Delivery systems
North Korea's ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction to a
hypothetical target is somewhat limited by its missile technology. As of 2005,
North Korea's total range with its No Dong missiles is only 1,300 km, enough to
reach South Korea, Japan, and parts of Russia and China, but not to the United
States or Europe. It is not known if this missile is actually capable of carrying the
nuclear weapons North Korea has so far developed. BM-25 is a North Korean
designed long-range ballistic missile with range capabilities of up to 1,550 miles
(2493km), and potential of carrying a nuclear warhead. They have also developed
the Taepodong-1 missile, which has a range of 2,000 km, but it is not yet in full
deployment. With the development of the Taepodong-2 missile, with an expected
range of 5,000-6,000 km, North Korea could hypothetically deliver a warhead to

17
almost all countries in Southeast Asia, and parts of Alaska or the continental
United States. Such targets may include Los Angeles, Seattle, San Fransisco, and
other cities on the west coast. Former CIA director George Tenet has claimed that,
with a light payload, Taepodong-2 could reach western parts of Continental United
States, though with low accuracy.

To combat this potential threat to the region, various talks were held,
including the Three-party talks, Four-Party talks, the Six-party talks in 2003 and
now the Ten-party talks in 2006.

On June 19 2006 there were news reports of an approaching test of a missile

with the potential to target much of East Asia and across the Pacific to the
continental United States. Some reports suggested that a satellite launch is being
prepared rather than a missile test. The rocket launch site was reported as the No-
Dong facility on the Musu-dan promontory in the Sea of Japan. Satellite navigation
tools such as Google Earth reveal an approximately 50m-long assembly building at
40.65918056° N 129.6591806° E (40°39'33.05" N, 129°39'33.05" E), with nearby
launch, control and engine test facilities. On 5 July 2006 (local time), North Korea
conducted multiple missile launch tests. Several short range missiles and a long-
range Taepodong-2 ICBM were fired despite international pressure to cancel the
launch. The long range missile failed and fell into the Sea of Japan just 45 seconds
after launch. The Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun reported that the long range
missile may have been aimed at Hawaii. Washington denies this claim. They
believe it was for international attention and propaganda purposes due to the
launch date (American Independence Day). While improving the missile defense
system, President George W. Bush insists that diplomacy is key but a military
strike (or any thing else) cannot be ruled out. Days later, North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il threatened a nuclear war if a preemptive strike is launched and warned that
any sanctions against North Korea will be taken as a "declaration of war."

The Six-party talks

The Six-party talks are a series of meetings with six participating states -
the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the United States of
America, the Russian Federation and Japan. These talks were a result of
North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
in 2003. The aim of these talks is to find a peaceful resolution to the security

18
concerns raised by the North Korean nuclear weapons program. After five
rounds of talks, little progress has been made.

1. Content of the six-party talks

The main points of contention are:

1. Security guarantee - this issue has been raised by North Korea

since the Bush administration (2001 - Present) took office. North Korea
perceives the Bush Administration as being hostile and planning to
overthrow the North Korean government by force. This concern was
elevated following the 2002 overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
2. The construction of light water reactors - the 1994 Agreed
Framework (including KEDO) stated that the members of KEDO would
agree to build several light-water reactors in return for North Korea's
cessation of its nuclear program. This agreement broke down after both
sides defaulted, especially since 2000.
3. 'Peaceful' use of nuclear energy - whilst the NPT allows states
the right to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes, this is thought to have
been used by North Korea as a cover for their nuclear weapons program.
4. Diplomatic relations - North Korea wants normalization of
diplomatic relations as part of the bargain for giving up its nuclear
weapons program. The US has at times disagreed and at times agreed to
this condition, providing North Korea irreversibly and verifiably disarms
its nuclear weapons program.
5. Financial restrictions / Trade normalization - The US has
placed heavy financial sanctions on North Korea for what they see as an
uncooperative attitude and unwillingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons
program.
6. 'Verifiable' and 'Irreversible' disarmament - Members of the
six-party talks have disagreed on this. Japan and the US have demanded
that North Korea completely dismantle its nuclear program so that it may
never be restarted, and that it can be verified by the six members of the
talks before aid is given. South Korea, China and Russia have agreed on a
milder, step-by-step solution which involves the members of the six-party
talks giving a certain reward (e.g. aid) in return for each step of nuclear
disarmament. North Korea has wanted the US to concede some of the
conditions first before it will take any action in disarming their weapons
program, which they see as the only guarantee to prevent a US attack on
their soil.

19
2.Timeline
1st round (27 Aug—29 Aug 2003) Objectives achieved
• A Chairman's Summary agreed upon for a further round of talks.
• No agreement between parties made.

2nd round (25 Feb—28 Feb 2004) Objectives achieved

• A Chairman's Statement announced with seven articles, including:
o Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
o Peaceful Coexistence of Participating States, stressing the use of mutually
coordinated measures to resolve crises.
• Agreement to hold the third round of talks with full participation during the
second quarter of 2004.

3rd round (23 Jun—25 Jun 2004) Objectives achieved

• A Chairman's Statement announced with eight articles, including:
o Reconfirming the commitment to denuclearising the Korean
Peninsula, stressing specification of the scope and time,
interval (between steps of) and method of verification
• Agreement to hold fourth round of talks in Beijing before September
2005

4th round, 1st phase (26 Jul—7 Aug 2005) Objectives achieved
• US and North Korea cannot agree on 'peaceful' use of nuclear energy
• Three-week recess of talks due to ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
meeting

4th round, 2nd phase (13 Sep—19 Sep 2005) Objectives

achieved
• Agreement on a Joint Declaration of six articles, including:
1. Verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Observe and realize the 1992 Korean Peninsula
Denuclearization Declaration
3. North Korea to agree to abandon all nuclear weapons and
nuclear programs and return to the NPT as soon as possible

20
 4. However, the states still respect North Korea's right to peaceful
use of nuclear energy as stated under the NPT
5. The issue of the light-water reactors will be discussed at a
suitable time later
6. US and the South Korea to formally declare that they have no
nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula
7. US will practice non-aggression towards North Korea
8. US will work to normalize ties with North Korea and by
respecting each other's sovereignty, right to co-exist peacefully.
9. Japan will normalize relations with North Korea through the
Pyongyang Statement by settling historical disputes.
10. Promising North Korea it will receive economic cooperation
and aid with energy through strengthening bilateral/multilateral
economic cooperation in energy, trade and investment. The five
other members will serve as guarantors to this condition
11. South Korea will channel two million kiloWatts of power to
North Korea.
12. The Korean Peninsula peace treaty to be negotiated separately.
13. 'Words for words'; 'actions for actions' principle to be observed,
stressing 'mutually coordinated measures'.
• Agreement to hold fifth round of talks in early November, 2005.

5th round, 1st phase (9 Nov—11 Nov 2005) Objectives

achieved
• Joint Statement issued with six points. This is essentially the same as the previous
round's statements, except for:

• Modifying the 'words for words' and 'actions for actions' principle to
'commitment for commitment, action for action' principle.

• No agreement on when the next talks will be held, though March 2006 looked
likely at the time.

5th round, 2nd phase (likely 18 Dec 2006 —) Objectives

achieved
• In April 2006, North Korea offered to resume talks if the US
releases recently frozen North Korean financial assets held in a bank
in Macau.

21
 1. The US treats the nuclear and financial issues as separate;
North Korea does not.

• North Korea then announced on October 3, 2006, that it was

going to test its first nuclear weapon regardless of the world situation,
blaming 'hostile US policy' as the reason for the need for such a
deterrent. However, it pledged a no-first-strike policy and to nuclear
disarmament only when there is worldwide elimination of such
nuclear weapons. For North Korea's full text, read this.
• On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced a successful
nuclear test, verified by the US on October 11.
• In response, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1718 unanimously condemning North Korea, as well as
passing Chapter VII, Article 41. Sanctions ranged from the economic
to the trade of military units, WMD-related parts and technology
transfer, and a ban on certain luxury goods. Both the People's
Republic of China and the Russian Federation were quick to stress
that these were not military-enforceable sanctions. The Resolution
also gave the right to other nations to inspect any North Korean
vessel's cargo, although the People's Republic of China has held
reservations about this move, saying it wanted to avoid any military
confrontation with North Korea's navy.
• On 31 October 2006, the Chinese government announced
that six-party talks would resume. U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill
later stated that the resumption could happen in the next month and
that North Korea had not set preconditions for the talks. The deadlock
was broken by what BBC News called "frantic behind-the-scenes
negotiations" by Beijing. However, Japan's Foreign Minister Taro Aso
stated that his country was not willing to return to the six-party talks
until North Korea had renounced nuclear weapons.
• On 5 December 2006, the Russian envoy Alexander
Alexeyev said that the talks were unlikely to resume before 2007
owing to the slow progress towards the talks and the fact that
Christmas was coming up soon.
• On 10 December, it became apparent that talks would
resume on 18 December 2006.

22
 Iran and Nuclear Weapons
As of 2006, Iran is not known to possess weapons of mass destruction and
has signed treaties repudiating possession of them, including the Biological
Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A number of countries, including the U.S.,
France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom, have accused Iran of a
clandestine intention to develop nuclear weapons. On 31 July 2006, the
United Nations Security Council passed a resolution demanding Iran
suspend its nuclear activities.

1.Biological weapons
Iran ratified the Biological Weapons Convention on August 22, 1973. Iran has
advanced biology and genetic engineering research programmes supporting an industry
that produces world class vaccines for both domestic use and export. The dual use nature
of these facilities mean that Iran, like any country with advanced biological research
programmes, could easily produce biological warfare agents.

A 2005 report from the United States Department of State claimed that Iran began
work on offensive biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, and that their large
legitimate biotechnological and biomedical industry "could easily hide pilot to industrial-
scale production capabilities for a potential BW programme, and could mask
procurement of BW-related process equipment". The report further said that "available
information about Iranian activities indicates a maturing offensive programme with a
rapidly evolving capability that may soon include the ability to deliver these weapons by
a variety of means".

According to The Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iran is known to possess cultures of

the many biological agents for legitimate scientific purposes which have been
weaponised by other nations in the past, or could theoretically be weaponised, though
they do not allege that Iran has attempted to weaponise them, Iran possesses sufficient
biological facilities to potentially do so.

2. Chemical weapons
Iran is one of the few countries in the world that has experienced chemical warfare
(CW) on the battlefield, suffering tens of thousands of casualties, both civilian and
military, in chemical attacks during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. As a result Iran has

23
promulgated a very public stance against the use of chemical weapons, making numerous
vitriolic comments against Iraq's use of such weapons in international forums. Following
from its experiences, Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993
and ratified it on November 3, 1997.

A US Central Intelligence Agency report dated January 2001 alleges Iran has
manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons - including blister, blood, choking, and
probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. It further
claims that during the first half of 2001 Iran continued to seek production technology,
training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could
be used to help Iran reach its goal of having an indigenous nerve agent production
capability.

3.Nuclear weapons
Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on July 1, 1968 and ratified the
treaty on February 2, 1970.

A number of countries, including the U.S., France, Germany, Russia and the
United Kingdom, have accused Iran of a clandestine intention to develop nuclear
weapons.

A 2005 assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded "if
Iran threw caution to the wind, and sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as
possible without regard for international reaction, it might be able to produce enough
HEU for a single nuclear weapon by the end of this decade, assuming no technical
problems. More plausible development programmes Iran could choose to follow would
take over a decade".

3.1: IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an autonomous body,

established by the United Nations, that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear
energy and to inhibit its use for military purposes.

According to the IAEA, Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, or even weapons-
grade uranium. On March 6, 2006, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA,
reported that "the Agency has not seen indications of diversion of nuclear material to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

24
 On December 18, 2003, Iran signed an additional protocol that allows IAEA
inspectors access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use
equipment, certain military-owned workshops, and research and development locations.

On May 12, 2006, claims that highly enriched uranium (well over the 3.5%
enriched level) was reported to have been found "at a site where Iran has denied such
sensitive atomic work", appeared. "They have found particles of highly enriched uranium
[HEU], but it is not clear if this is contamination from centrifuges that had been
previously found [from imported material] or something new," said one diplomat close to
the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These reports have not yet been
officially confirmed by the IAEA (as of June 1, 2006).. [Note: reader discretion is
advised since the above claims come from unverifiable sources and as such should be
taken with the appropriate amount of scepticism.]

On 31 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution

demanding that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities.

In late 2006, "New traces of plutonium and enriched uranium — potential material
for atomic warheads — have been found [by the IAEA] in a nuclear waste facility in
Iran." However, "A senior U.N. official who was familiar with the report cautioned
against reading too much into the findings of traces of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium, saying Iran had explained both and they could plausibly be classified as
byproducts of peaceful nuclear activities. The official, who spoke on condition of
anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the report publicly, said that while
the uranium traces were enriched to a higher level than needed to generate power, they
were below weapons-grade."

3.2: The Iranian stance

Iran states the purpose of its nuclear programme is the generation of power and
that any other use would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which
it is a signatory (but has threatened to withdraw from), as well as being against Iranian
religious principles. Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population
and rapidly industrialising nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than
doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that
burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran's environment drastically. Additionally,
Iran questions why it shouldn't be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially
when there are fears of its oil fields eventually being depleted. It continues to argue that
its valuable oil should be used for high value products and export, not simple electricity
generation. Furthermore, Iran argues that nuclear power makes fairly good economic

25
sense. Building reactors is expensive, but subsequent operating costs are low and stable,
and increasingly competitive as fossil-fuel prices rise. Iran also raises funding questions,
claiming that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it $40 billion,
let alone pay for the power plants. Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this,
considering Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium ore .

Iran has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT. Iran,
and many other developing nations who are signatories to the NPT, believe the Western
position to be hypocritical, claiming that the NPT's original purpose was universal
nuclear disarmament. Iran also compares its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with
three nations that have not ratified the NPT. Each of these nations developed an
indigenous nuclear weapons capability: Israel by 1968, India by 1974, and Pakistan by
1998.

On December 14, 2001, Iran's former president and an Islamic cleric, Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani alluded to Iran's position toward Israel and the Western world. He
said (according to a translation by the BBC):

If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that
Israel possesses now, then the imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill
because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy
everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational
to contemplate such an eventuality.

However, years later on December 3, 2004, he backtracked:

Allah willing, we expect to soon join the club of the countries that have a
nuclear industry, with all its branches, except the military one, in which we
are not interested. We want to get what we're entitled to. I say unequivocally
that for no price will we be willing to relinquish our legal and international
right. I also say unequivocally to those who make false claims: Iran is not
pursuing nuclear weapons, but it will not give up its rights. Your
provocation will not make us pursue nuclear weapons. We hope that you
come to your senses soon and do not get the world involved in disputes and
crises.

On November 14, 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator said that his country agreed
to voluntarily and temporarily suspend the uranium enrichment programme after pressure
from the European Union on behalf of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as a
confidence-building measure for a reasonable period of time, with six months mentioned
as a reference.

26
 Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has publicly stated Iran is not
developing nuclear weapons. On August 9, 2005 Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, issued a fatwa that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are
forbidden under Islam and that Iran shall never acquire these weapons.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and
use of nuclear weapons on August 9, 2005. The text of the fatwa has not been released
although it was referenced in an official statement at a meeting of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a 2005 speech to the U.N. General

Assembly said "We are concerned that once certain powerful states completely control
nuclear energy resources and technology, they will deny access to other states and thus
deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international community
... peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession of a nuclear fuel cycle is an empty
proposition".

On 6 August, 2005, Iran rejected a 34 page European Union proposal intended to

help Iran build "a safe, economically viable and proliferation-proof civil nuclear power
generation and research programme.” The Europeans, with US agreement, intended to
entice Iran into a binding commitment not to build atomic arms by offering to provide
fuel and other long-term support that would facilitate electricity generation with nuclear
energy. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi rejected the proposal
saying, "We had already announced that any plan has to recognize Iran’s right to enrich
uranium".

Iran resumed its uranium enrichment programme in January 2006, prompting the
IAEA to refer the issue to the UN Security Council.

On February 21, 2006, the reformist Internet daily Rooz reported that Hojatoleslam
Mohsen Gharavian, a student of Qom’s fundamentalist cleric Mesbah Yazdi, spoke about
the necessity of using nuclear weapons as a means to retaliate and announced that "based
on religious law, everything depends on our purpose".

In an exclusive interview with IRNA on February 21, 2006, Gharavian rejected

reports quoting him as saying that the use of nuclear weapons is allowed according to the
Islamic tenets. He claimed to have been misquoted, that his remarks had been distorted,
and that enemies of Iran had attempted to create pretexts and misuse the issue through
hue and cry.

27
 On April 11, 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced Iranian
scientists working at the pilot facility at Natanz had successfully enriched uranium to the
3.5 percent level, using a small cascade of 164 gas centrifuges. In the televised address
from the city of Mashhad he said, "I am officially announcing that Iran has joined the
group of those countries which have nuclear technology".

In May 2006 some members of the Iranian legislature ("Majlis" or Parliament) sent
a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan threatening to withdraw from the NPT if
Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technology under the treaty was not protected.

3.3: The United States' stance

• A potential reason behind US resistance lies in Middle Eastern

geopolitics. In essence, the US feels that it must guard against even
the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Some
nuclear technology is dual-use; i.e. it can be used for peaceful energy
generation, and to develop nuclear weapons, a situation that resulted
in India's nuclear weapons programme in the 1960s. A nuclear-armed
Iran would dramatically change the balance of power in the middle
east, weakening US influence. It could also encourage other middle
eastern nations to develop nuclear weapons of their own further
reducing US influence in a critical region.

• The U.S.'s primary concern with Iran obtaining nuclear weapons is

that it believes Iran sponsors international terrorism.

• Iran's support of Hamas and Islamic Jihad [8] leads to US fear that
Iranian nuclear weapons could find their way into the hands of Islamic
militants

• The U.S. maintains that Iran does not need nuclear power due to its
abundant oil reserves since nuclear power is more expensive for the
Iranians to generate than oil-fired power. However, it should be noted
that this argument has taken a back seat as developing nations have re-
invested in their civilian nuclear industries and as magazines such as
The Economist have taken an economic stance similar to that of
Iran's.
• The US government is concerned that Iran does not formally
recognise Israel's right to exist, and some Iranian politicians have
openly called for the destruction of Israel.

28
 • In 2003 the US insisted that Tehran be "held accountable" for seeking
to build nuclear arms in violation of its agreements.

In June 2005, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice required IAEA

head Mohamed ElBaradei to either toughen his stance on Iran or fail to be chosen
for a third term as IAEA head.

The IAEA has on some occasions criticized the stance of the U.S. on Iran's
program. The USA denounced Iran's successful enrichment of uranium to fuel
grade in April 2006, with spokesman Scott McClellan saying, they "continue to
show that Iran is moving in the wrong direction".

In November 2006, Seymour Hersh described a classified draft assessment

by the Central Intelligence Agency "challenging the White House's assumptions
about how close Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb. He continued, "The
CIA found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-weapons
program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has declared to the
International Atomic Energy Agency," adding that a current senior intelligence
official confirmed the assessment.

3.4: Other international responses

The claims and counter claims have put an immense amount of pressure on
Iran to reveal all aspects of its nuclear programme to date. A great deal of this
pressure has come from Iran's trade partners: Europe, Japan, and Russia. Iran has
been slow to respond, claiming the pressure is solely an attempt by the US
government to prevent it from obtaining nuclear technology.

3.5: France
On February 16, 2006 French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said
"No civilian nuclear programme can explain the Iranian nuclear programme. It is a
clandestine military nuclear programme."

3.6: United Kingdom

On 8th May 2006, Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of British Land

Forces, General Sir Hugh Beach, former Cabinet Minsters, scientists and
campaigners joined a delegation to Downing Street opposing military intervention
in Iran. The delegation delivered two letters to Prime Minister Tony Blair from
1,800 physicists warning that the military intervention and the use of nuclear
weapons would have disastrous consequences for the security of Britain and the

29
rest of world. The letters carried the signatures of academics, politicians and
scientists including some of 5 physicists who are Nobel Laureates.

CASMII delegation

On 17th July 2006, a meeting in the House of Commons challenged Tony

Blair’s statement that Iran and Syria are to blame for the latest crisis in the Middle
East and condemned a decision by the Foreign Ministers of the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany to refer Iran to the
UN Security Council. Commons Meeting

3.7: Israel

Israel, a non declared nuclear power, claims that Iran is actively pursuing a
nuclear weapons programme and would use nuclear weapons against Israel.

Israel is concerned that Iran has developed missiles that are capable of
carrying nuclear warheads between the two countries. This concern was intensified
when Iran publicly paraded some of the missiles under anti-Israeli banners, such as
"Death to Israel" and "Israel should be wiped off the map". See Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Israel.

Reasons for Israeli concern can be summed up in 5 points:

1. Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and other Iranian leaders

deny Israel's right to exist. Iran develops its nuclear energy technology in
clandestine facilities.
2. The distance from Iran to Israel is within the range of missile systems
possessed by both countries.
3. Iran maintains a close relationship with the Hezbollah organisation,
which has been involved in violent conflicts with Israel.
4. Iran has pledged to attack Israel if it is attacked, even if it was
attacked by the United States (and not Israel).

On December 11, 2005 then Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon put the
Israeli Defense Forces on high alert for the possibility of ordering airstrikes against
Iran's nuclear installations. However, airstrikes are seen as a last resort due to the
dispersal, hardening and defense by Surface-to-air missiles of Iranian sites.

30
 3.8: Opinions in the Arab and Islamic world

The San Francisco Chronicle reported on October 31, 2003, that Grand
Ayatollahs, like Ayatollah Yousef Sanei, and Iranian clerics led by Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei have repeatedly declared that Islam forbids the development and use of
all weapons of mass destruction. SFGate.com quoted Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as
saying: "The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its fundamental religious and legal
beliefs, would never resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction. In contrast to
the propaganda of our enemies, fundamentally we are against any production of
weapons of mass destruction in any form."

On April 21, 2006, at a Hamas rally in Damascus, Anwar Raja, the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine representative from Lebanon declared:

"The Muslim, Iranian, fighting people now possess nuclear capabilities. My

brother, the Iranian representative sitting here, let me tell you that we, the
Palestinian people, are in favor of Iran having a nuclear bomb, not just energy for
peaceful purposes."

On May 3, 2006 Iraqi Ayatollah Ahmad Husseini Al Baghdadi was

interviewed on Syrian TV. On his interview he declared his support for the Islamic
world to obtain nuclear weapons:

Why shouldn't an Islamic or Arab country have a nuclear bomb? I am not

referring to the Iranian program, which the Iranians say is for peaceful purposes.
I am talking about a nuclear bomb. This Arab Islamic nation must obtain a nuclear
bomb. Without a nuclear bomb, we will continue to be oppressed, and the
American destruction... The American donkiness... The American donkey itself
will always continue to attack us, because the Americans are very conceited.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan already possesses nuclear weapons, see

Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction for further details.

On May 12, 2006 AP published an interview with Pakistan's former chief of

staff Mirza Aslam Beg In the AP interview, Beg detailed nearly 20 years of Iranian
approaches to obtain conventional arms and then technology for nuclear weapons.
He described an Iranian visit in 1990, when he was army chief of staff.

"They didn't want the technology. They asked: 'Can we have a bomb?' My
answer was: By all means you can have it but you must make it yourself. Nobody
gave it to us." Beg said he is sure Iran has had enough time to develop them. But

31
he insists the Pakistani government didn't help, even though he says former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto once told him the Iranians offered more than $4 billion for
the technology.

3.9: The Baku Declaration

A declaration signed on June 20, 2006 by the foreign ministers of 56 nations

of the 57-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference stated that "the only way
to resolve Iran's nuclear issue is to resume negotiations without any preconditions
and to enhance co-operation with the involvement of all relevant parties".

3.10: Qatar & Arab vote against the U.N. Security Council Resolution

July 31, 2006: The UN Security Council gives until August 31, 2006 for Iran
to suspend all uranium enrichment and related activities or face the prospect of
sanctions . The draft passed by a vote of 14-1 (Qatar, which represents Arab states
on the council, opposing). The same day, Iran's U.N. Ambassador Javad Zarif
qualified the resolution as "arbitrary" and illegal because the NTP protocol
explicitly guarantees under international law Iran’s right to pursue nuclear
activities for peaceful purposes. In response to today’s vote at the UN, Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that his country will revise his position vis-
à-vis the economic/incentive package offered previously by the G-6 (5 permanent
Security council members plus Germany.)

3.11: The Non-Aligned Movement

On September 16, 2006 in Havana, Cuba, all of the 118 Non-Aligned

Movement member countries declared supporting Iran's nuclear program for
civilian purposes in their final written statement .That is a clear majority of the 192
countries comprising the entire United Nations.

4.Delivery Systems
Missiles

Iran is believed to have a current inventory of 25 to 100 Shahab-3 missiles

which have a range of 2100km and are capable of being armed with conventional
high explosive, submunition, chemical, biological, radiological dispersion and
potentially nuclear warheads. A Shahab-4 with a range of 2000km and a payload
of 1000kg is believed to be under development. Iran has stated the Shahab-3 is the
last of its war missiles and the Shahab-4 is being developed to give the country the

32
capability of launching communications and surveillance satellites. A Shahab-5, an
intercontinental ballistic missile with a 10,000km range, is also believed to be
under development.

Iran has 12 X-55 long range cruise missiles purchased without nuclear
warheads from Ukraine in 2001. The X-55 has a range of 2500 to 3000 kilometers.

Iran's latest and most advanced missile, the Fajr-3, has an estimated range of
2500km and MIRV capability.

On November 2, 2006, Iran fired unarmed missiles to begin 10 days of

military war games. Iranian state television reported "dozens of missiles were fired
including Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 missiles. The missiles had ranges from 300 km
to up to 2,000 km...Iranian experts have made some changes to Shahab-3 missiles
installing cluster warheads in them with the capacity to carry 1,400 bombs." These
launches come after some United States-led military exercises in the Persian Gulf
on October 30, 2006, meant to train for blocking the transport of weapons of mass
destruction.

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