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14, 2012

JUDAISM – JEWISH LAW IN KELSEN

Ari Marcelo Sólon ∗

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1∗Lawassociated Professor at the Law Faculty of the São Paulo University (Brazil) - Professor Associado do Departamento de Filosofia e
Teoria Geral do Direito da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.
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Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Comissão de Pós-Graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP, São Paulo, n. 14, 2012
JUDAISM – JEWISH LAW IN KELSEN

Ari Marcelo Sólon∗


Law associated Professor at the Law Faculty of the São Paulo University (Brazil) - Professor Associado do Departamento de Filosofia e
Teoria Geral do Direito da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.

Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Comissão de Pós-Graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP, São Paulo, n. 14, 2012
SUMÁRIO

JUDAISM – JEWISH LAW IN KELSEN ...................................................................................................................... 5


Ari Marcelo Sólon

CADERNOS DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM DIREITO: ESTUDOS E DOCUMENTOS DE TRABALHO......................................................... 15


Normas para Apresentação

Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Comissão de Pós-Graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP, São Paulo, n. 14, 2012
5

JUDAISM – JEWISH LAW IN KELSEN

Ari Marcelo Sólon∗

“Ich habe gehört, dass manche über den zehn Sephiroth eine Sephira im Unendlichen zufugen,
wonach also angenomen werden musste, dass es am Anfang von Kether `Eljon ein im Undendlichen
verborgenes Ding gibt, welches die Ursache der Ursachen ist...” (Scholem, Gershom. Ursprung und
Anfänge der Kabbala, S. 392)1

(…) Herzlichen Dank auch für die Skizze über "Judaism - Jewish Law in Kelsen". Ich finde den
Gedanken, dass in der Reinen Rechtslehre eine Art säkularisierter "jüdischer Gesetzesglaube" zu
sehen ist, sehr interessant und auch naheliegend. Tatsächlich wurden sich viele "assimilierte" Juden,
konfessionslos oder getaufte Christen, gerade durch die Nazi-Verfolgung wieder ihrer alten Tradition
und Religion bewusst. Was man im 19. Jahrhundert eher ablegen wollte, um nicht Außenseiter zu sein,
wurde nun zum inneren Halt. Man kehrte zu den Vätern zurück! So stelle ich mir das auch bei Kelsen
vor. Die vielen antisemitischen Äußerungen in Deutschland, die sich gegen ihn richteten (Schmitt!),
machten ein "Vergessen" seines Judentums nun plötzlich unmöglich. (An e-mail from Michael Stolleis
to the author of this paper.)

Introduction

In this work, both direct and indirect influence of Judaism (Tora and Halacha; Jewish Law) will be
researched on Hans Kelsen (1881-1973). Direct influence is assumed by Kelsen himself (and by Schmitt in a
polemical way). Otherwise, indirect influence is postulated by us in the assumption that there is a structural
analogy between Jewish Law and Reine Rechtslehre in the later realist phase of Kelsen.

Our hard hypothesis is that the change of Kelsen´s methodology has not indeed mainly to do with
American new environment of Humean epistemology disclaiming Neokantian philosophy, rather being straight
attached to his Jewish consciousness as he himself at one specific point of his life assumes. This thesis
contradicts Kelsen´s own assertion throughout his opus about a militant atheism and an ultra-rationalism in favor
of complete secularization (see secular religion) of science. At the end, we´ll provide an explanation to this
assertion. The other ideological aspects of Kelsen work, as the Lassalian social concept of justice and the
German and Austrian national consciousness,2 will be only tangentially touched.


Law associated Professor at the Law Faculty of the São Paulo University (Brazil).
1“Ich habe gehört” refers to a widely spread quotation from Rabbi Abraham from Köln, the land of my ancestors, against
Nachmanides, that figures as Kelsen spiritual ancestor, as proven in this paper. My grandfather - also from Köln region -
Rudi Strauss was named also Abraham Ben Moshe: he was actually named after both first names of both quoted Rabbis.
Moshe was Moses Strauss, who fought against the occupation of the beautiful Rhein in the Great War, river which was
shown to me by Dr. Henning Kahmann during my stay at Max Planck Institute, where I was researching as Stipendiat
during the last August thanks to the invitation of Professor Thomas Duve. I also want to enjoy this opportunity to thank my
colleague Monica Linhares from FMU for substituting me in my classes there (in São Paulo) and Professor Hans-Peter
Haferhamp for the vibrant reception in his cluster of excellence Institute.
2“Stärker als all dies, stärker als der aller Vernunft und Sittlichkeit hohnsprechende Verlauf der jüngsten Geschichte, deren

Produkt das heutige Österreich ist, stärker als Österreich selbst ist sein Wunsch: aufzugehen im deutschen Vaterland.”
KELSEN, Hans. Österreichisches Staatsrecht. Tuሷbingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1923. S. 238.

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In a memorandum written in 1967 by professor Levontin, Kelsen answers to some speculations about
direct influences of Judaism3 on his works and on his thoughts. Professor Levontin had the chance to pose
Kelsen three questions related to the influence of Judaism on the Pure Theory of Law. The first question was
addressed to clarify the existence (or not) of any kind of Jewish influence (conscious or inconscious) on the
essence of an aimed abstract legal science. Wouldn’t that aspiration of a formal theory of law (or – more
specifically enunciated – legal science) be a product of a universal and cosmopolitan genius instead of a pure
and separated particular national cultural genius? Kelsen didn´t disagree with the direction of the question, but
said that in his opinion the Austrian influence in his theory was more dominant, because of the fact that Austria
was a multinational country. The second question tried to discover if was there any Jewish influence (conscient
or inconscient) in the search of a presumed or basic authority in every legal situation, for instance, on the
insistence that contractual laws of the private law derive from a basic norm of public law? The reason of this
question is that in the tradition of Jewish Law (Moréshet Israel) it is also presupposed that the words of the Tora
(Devarim d’Oraita) have more strength than the words of the Sages. To the words of Prof. Levontin it appeared
that Kelsen endorsed and at this time without stressing another dominant influence. The third question dealt with
the relation between Kelsens theory and Austin’s theory and tries to discover if there would be a sense in that
Kelsens theory is monist and Austin’s theory is dualist. In a dualist perspective, one can identify two sides: at one
side, the ruler comes opposed to the people, at the other side. The first commands the second and the second
must obey the first. On the opposite, Kelsen is a monist who sees only one and continuous legal process
(schematized in the Stufenbaulehre) instead of a duplicity between the ruler and people. Wouldn’t here emerge
an influence of the Jewish monotheism? Kelsen also at this point of the conversation seemed to agree with
Levontin’s considerations without indicating any other influence.

In an homage after Kelsen’s death in 1973 so writes professor Max Knight4:


Kelsen machte kaum Hehl daraus, dass er sich in frühen Jahren im antisemitschen Wien
hatte taufen lassen, um in seiner Laufbahn nitch behindert zu sein, bekannte sich aber seit
Jahrzenten zum Judentum. Die Rückung fand im 1940 im Genf statt, als ein Rabbiner ihn
fragte, ob er sich als Katholiker betrachte. Kelsen erklärte, er sei Jude und betrachte seither
diese Erklärung als seine unoffizielle Rückkehr zum Judentum.

In a polemical way, full of prejudices in 1936 writes Schmitt against Kelsen and his school by naming
her as ”die Wiener Schule des Juden Kelsens”. Schmitt charged Kelsen and his pupils of building an anti-
scientific and ideological Guild on the Legal Science, as long as the Jewish legal thinkers had the strange
academic habit of quoting exclusively one another:
"I merely draw attention to the insolent nonchalance with which the members of the Vienna
School of the Jew Kelsen exclusively quoted themselves mutually, and with what - for us
Germans inconceivable - cruelty and impudence different opinions were disregarded."5

3And I thank professor Izhak Englard, who sent me his paper “Petach Davar” and I specially pay here a tribute to the efforts
of Professor Levontin, who answered trough his wife hands and the mediation of his son an mail regarding his Kelsenian
memorandum.
4KNIGHT, Max. Erinnerungen an Hans Kelsen. Aufbau, 4, March 1973.
5SCHMITT, Carl. Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft im Kampf gegen den jüdischen Geist, DJZ, Bd. 41, S. 1193-1195, okt.,

1936.

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Sinzheimer´s Jüdische Klassiker der deutschen Rechstwissenschaft6 published in 1938 tried rightly to
protest against Schmitts verbal excesses.

One might observe that the twelve leading jurists7 discussed in that book were indeed of Jewish origin
but were not inspired by Jewish Law. Our question here is not of Herkunft. We want to know if Kelsen´s
contribution had specifically to do with the impact of Jewish Law upon his own thoughts.

In a similar sense wrote Schmitt in a letter to his editor:


“Nocheins: Kelsens Normativismus und Identifizierung von Staat und Gesetz ist doch nur
möglich, wenn man eben nicht imStaat, sondern “im Gesetz” lebt. Gesetz, das kann oder
konnte die Thora sein, aber wohl kaum das BGB”.8

“Im Gesetz leben“: Nomos vs Tora

So what´s the influence of Tora in Kelsen thought? We are going to try to render a plausible answer to
this question by interpreting it in the sense of Professor Levontin Memorandum and not in the sense of Herkunft.

Tora is not Law. It means a sum of instruction related to justice against oppression, exactly in the same
way as was the original concept of Nomos conceived in Greece and in Israel during the Axial Age of the V
century b.C. Also the earliest roman Code of Laws, the so called XII Tables, drawn up in the year 450. b.C.,
vehiculated an expression of Nomos as a sum of teachings regarding to justice. So there is a synchronization
between the Tora renewed by the Jews under the leadership of Ezra and the adoption of the fundamental
democratic laws in Greece.9

The identification of Tora with Law steams from its translation in the Greek Septuagint as Nomos.10
Schmitt wants to prove that Nomos is translatable trough the word Law only in the imaginary of Jewish Law after
the fatal translation of Cicero, in which Nomos became Lex, what he sees as a product of the Philonic influence.
For him Nomos (from the source of Nemm) has nothing to do with Law. Besides that Schmitts argues that the
idea of Nomos had already priorly appeared in Homer works, contrarily to the understanding of Pascal and Philo,
who considered the Tora to be prior.

6„Der Titel dieses Buches muss jedem auffalen, der bisher gewohnt war, wissenschaftliche Denker nicht nach ihrer Herkunf,
sondern nach dem Wert ihrer Leistungen zu beurteilen”. SINZHEIMER, Hugo. Jüdische Klassiker der deutschen
Rechstwissenschaft (1938). Amsterdam: Frankfurt am Main, 1953. S. 1.
7Friedrich Julius Stahl, Levin Goldschmitt, Heinrich Dernburg, Josef Unger, Otto Lenel, Wilhelm Eduard Wilda, Julius Glaser,

Paul Laband, Georg Jellinek, Eugen Ehrlich, Philipp Lotmar, Eduard von Simson. See in general the work HEINRICHS,
Helmut; FRANZKI, Ha-rald; SCHMALZ, STOLLEIS, Klaus (Hrsg.). Deutsche Juristen jüdischer Herkunft. Muሷnchen: C.H.
Beck, 1993.
8SCHMITT, Carl. Briefwechsel mit Ludwig Feuchtwanger. 1918-1935. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007. S. 313.
9„Der radikalsten Einschnitt gegenüber dem alten Orient, wo das Königtum der Mittler zwischen der irdischen und der

himmlischen Welt ist, aber auch der tiefste Bruch gegenüber dem Verständnis des Königtums, wie es im alten Testament
etwa in der Königspsalmen hervortritt, stellt das deuteronomische Königsgesetz vor. Hiernach geht die Einrichtungen
eines Königtums also allein auf den Wunsch des Volkes zurück. Gerechtigkeitgefühl, das auch wie in Griechenland auch
in Israel früh zu konstatieren ist“. CRÜSEMANN, Frank. Theokratie als Demokratie zur politischen Konzeption der
Deuteronomium. In: RAAFLAUB, Kurt (Hg.). Anfänge politischen Denkens in der Antike. Griechenland und die
nahöstlichen Kulturen. München, 1993. (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs; Kolloquien 24).
10SCHMITT, Carl. Nomos der Erde. Berlin: Dunckel und Humboldt, 1974. In addition to Schmitt, see COVER, Robert.

Narrative, violence, and the law: the essays of Robert Cover. University of Michigan Press, 1993. (Law, Meaning, and
Violence Series).

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He is right in the sense that the original sense of Nomos is not Law, but division. It relates to the
concrete action of the division of lands.

However, Schmitt´s thesis based on Bogner - Die verwirklichte Demokratie - sees Nomos only in the
Homeric Polis, but not in the post-Solonian Polis, when it was transferred from the religious Areopagos to the
public Agora as written Law based on the ideals of Isonomy. As Deuteronomy, from this same times said: the
Law it´s not in the heaven (Deut. 30.12).11

Amazingly, when Jewish Law is nowadays treated in academic research, a positivist first phase of
Kelsenian model is adopted as applicable to it, as in Elon´s classical book Mishpat Ivry, which mentions the
Kelsenian Grundnorm12. What is disregarded is that the nature of Jewish Law is more easily understood trough a
pluralistic and realistic model of legal science13.

The positivistic and normativistic model of legal science doesn’t apply to the Biblical Law. The Law as
conceived in the Holy Scriptures doesn’t consist of a system of rules logically applied by the courts and the
justice is not perceived as an external criterion. For instance, Proverbs 25-7:9 corroborate this view that
adjudication by courts was not regarded as mandatory. Also the Covenant Code consists of “self-executing
rules”, designed to allow the parties to determine the outcome and execute the juridical remedy without any need
of third party adjudication.

The Mishpatim from the Covenant Code are examples of wisdom-laws, enforcement being a matter of
self-help. As in the theory of David Daube, Biblical Law has an early stage of ancient customary institutions.
Halacha is not compatible with Jewish Law theories that rely on Kelsen´s Grundnorm theory (first phase). For
instance, Elon´s theory based on the fundamental norm, in accordance with which everything that is set forth in
the Torah, i.e., the Written Law, is binding on the Jewish Legal System.

Why Kelsen´s ideals from his first phase don’t fit Jewish Law?

That´s because Jewish Law (i) is not an unified system, and (ii) it is not based on any unique,
authoritative source of law. Following the paths of its biblical origin, the Talmud shows also pluralistic
ideas of law:
R. Jonathan said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because they gave judgements there in
accordance with Torah law. When they then have judged in accordance with untrained
arbitrators? – But says thus: because they based their judgments strictly upon Torah law,
and did not go beyond the requirements of the law (Baba Mezia 30b)

11There is a legend of a jurist in the Talmud who was defeated as he requested heaven for one miracle after the other to
back him in a decision. Finally a heavenly voice pointed out to him the law is “not in heaven”.
12ELON, M. Jewish law: history, sources, principles. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1973. v. 1, p. 230-234.
13This model fits to the Kelsen´s later irrational phase which is in my view more well founded than the first phase as well as

more applicable to Jewish Law and to the Roman Law (die romanistische Jurisprudenz ist fast immer schopferisch
gewesen according to Paul Koschaker, Die Krise des römisches Rechts und die römische Rechtwissenschaft. München,
Berlin: Beck, 1938. p. 28) and also to the Common Law and the Islamic Law, that are both created without direct
legislative logical precedence.

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The possibility of a rabbinic judge deciding a case not according to the Halacha shows that old orthodox
Kelsenian positivistic model doesn’t apply to the practice of Jewish Law. Paradoxically, the second phase of
Kelsen Legal Realism is a better model if we accept the religious language of Halacha.

The halachic process based on its theological explanation, proves what Bernard Jackson concluded in
an old but unbeatable article called “Kelsen between Formalism and Realism.”
The difference between the basis of validity and the justification of validity of a norm reflects
Kelsen´s adoption of a radical differentiation between norms (being the acts of will of legal
organs) and legal propositions (the latter being linguistic propositions, between which alone
inferential relationships are possible). Thus, Kelsen denied the possibility of any syllogistic
relationship between norms themselves, since an act of will could be performed only in
relation to facts which the actor knew to exist: “…only the court, which has established that
Smith has stolen a horse from the farmer, can will that he should be sent to prison as a thief.
And the judge is a different man from the legislator, His act of will cannot be implicit in the act
of will of another man” (Essays 242); the legislator is not aware of Smith, or of the fact that
he has stolen, and cannot therefore will that he be imprisoned. But the truth of the
proposition does not entail the validity of any norm, since the proposition may be true without
any act of will (in relation to Smith) having been made by a legal organ.14

This legal realism as evident as in Kelsen’s later reconsideration of his Grundnorm theory is reflected in
the controversy between Shammaites and Hillelites. The dispute was resolved by the intervention of a heavenly
voice (bat kol) which proclaimed: “both opinions are the words of the living God”.

Divine law is thus conceived to be pluralistic, on the authority of a direct revelation (here, not even
through a prophet) from God himself. This goes against the identification of Jewish Law with the earlier
Kelsenian scheme of the structure of the legal order, where the researcher was supposed to presuppose a basic
norm, what in the field of Jewish Law would imply that there is a original norm that stipulates that everything
stated in the written Torah is biding upon the system of Jewish Law.

A critical realist position doesn’t reduce Halacha to a positivist notion of legal system. Interestingly, this
view comes from the old irrational Kelsen, who undermines his positivism and goes beyond, indicating how
Halacha, like Islamic Law15, implodes the Hohfelian deontic categories.
The halakhah, on the other hand, rejects the sufficiency of these three deontic modalities.
For the rabbinic structure implies that behaviour may be recommended (or, conversely,
discouraged), as well as required, permitted or prohibited. Indeed, Islamic Law explicitly
adopts such a fivefold classification of modalities. Jewish Law does not systematise the
matter in this way; nevertheless, institutions such as Middathasidut clearly imply the
existence of such a wider range of modalities.16

14JACKSON, Bernard. The Liverpool Law Review, v. 7, n. 1, S. 90, 1985.


15"In the opinion of Muslim theologians, not everything that appears in the form of prescriptions and prohibitions is
commanded or forbidden, nor does it carry the same imperative or prohibitive force". GOLDZIHER, Ignaz. The Zahiris:
their doctrine and their history. A contribution to the history of Islamic theology. Translated and edited by Wolfgang Behn.
Leiden; Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2007. p. 63. Ignaz Goldziher was a hungarian Rabbi who also studied the concept
of Ijma, i.e., the concept of the consensus of the competent scholars with regard to legal questions in the universe of the
Islamic Law, a kind of consensus that is also present in Jewish Law.
16JACKSON, Bernard. Constructing a theory of Halakhah. Disponível em:
<http://www.academia.edu/1445715/Constructing_a_Theory_of_Halakhah>.

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It is often said that Judaism rejects the separation between law and morality. Though, a distinction is
recognised between Halacha (binding teaching) and Aggadah (instruction through narrative and other modes).
The moral values of Judaism are integrated within the Halacha.

Halacha is not a system of norms but a nonsystematic delegation to charismatic authorieties, who
decide sometimes not in accordance of Tora. So Halacha endorses not a positivistic model but a legal realistic
one. The Talmud includes many cases that are not decided according to the Law.

Indeed, Jewish Law frequently accepts a distinction between “Halakhah” (the law in theory) and
“Ma’aseh” (the law in practice).

These two manifestations of “legal realism” in the Halakhah focus on different aspects of the judicial
role, as conceived within Judaism. On the one hand, it is a role which entitles the judge to deviate from the Law;
on the other, the judge bears a very personal religious responsibility to make decisions which will not put the
subject of Jewish Law at risk.

While the Institutes of Gaius commences with a list of the sources of Roman Law, no such list is found
in early rabbinic literature: the latter, rather, lists the “Middot”, the non- logical forms of argumentation to be
applied to the text of Scripture.

Free Legal Movement and Kelsen: the bindingness of the Tora

The most important historian of the free legal movement, Lombardi, in my view rightly includes Kelsen in
this intellectual movement. Most of the so called Freirechtler, coming from Neokantianism, tended to overcome
the Sein und Sollen dichotomy. The justice of the concrete case is for the Free Legal Movement a voluntaristic
act of concretization of the Law by the judge, in a process that develops far away from the abstract Sollen.

What unified Kantorowicz, Ernst Fuchs and Kelsen?


Judentum und Sozialismus seie in einem mehr oder weniger bewusst prophetish-
escatologische (daher auch der Gegenwart gegenuber kritische) Einstellung gemeinsam.17

Indeed, in Jewish Law the fact of summum Ius summa Iniura (that according to Del Vecchio comes from
the Talmud, although stated by Cicero, De officis, I, 10, 33) is bend to the principle of equity (lifnim mi shurat ha
din that is within the line of justice, as was explained to me by Professor Rabello) and to the exhortation to
execute Law with justice (Mishpat u- Tsedaka). Many cases in Jewish Law can be described in a form that
emphasizes the individual - of his own accord - acting in harmony with this spirit of equity.

17Behrends doesn’t see any of this components. On the opposite, in his brilliant article BEHRENDS, Okko. Von der
Freirechtsbewegung zum konkreten Ordnungs- und Gestaltungsdenken. In: DREIER, Ralf; SELLERT, Wolfgang. Recht
und Justizim „Dritten Reich“. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989.

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According to Daube, in his Collected Papers, comparing the creativity in Roman and Jewish Law:
It will not surprise that a very great deal of rabbinic exegesis was the type exemplified at
Rome by emancipation, the twisting of a penal provision of the XII tables into an
authorization of a new institution. That is to say it was neither literal not liberal interpretation
of the text, but misinterpretation. Take fighting on a Sabath, proselyte baptism, the washing
of hands before a meal, the reformed modes of capital punishment and monetary damages
in the place of relation.

According to Boaz Cohen in his analysis of justice being furthered by the principle of judicial discretion
as allowed in the Talmud, “durch Interessenjurisprudenz erfüllt die Rechtswissenschaft ihre praktische Aufgabe,
den Inhalt des Rechts zu finden”18. This is also an apt description of the aim of rabbinic jurisprudence.

Using unfortunately the Lingua Tertii Imperii the great jurist Phillip Heck tries to demonstrate the
opposite, but in the end he proves how the Freirechtsbewegung is related to Judaism:
In der Juristischen Wochenschrift findet sich die Behauptung, dass die
Interessenjurisprudenz ein jüdische Richtung sei. Kantorowicz ist ein Hauptvertreter der
Freirechtslehre und nicht der Interessenjurisprudenz. Der letzte Gegner der teleologischen
Methode, ist Kelsen (sic) nicht Arier und gleiches gilt für verschieden Vertreter der freien
Rechtslehre und der soziologischen Schule, nicht nur für Kantorowicz, sonder auch für
Ehrlich, Fuchs un Sinzheimer. Er scheint das der Radikalismus der Freirechtslehre auf
Nichtarier anziehender gewirkt hat, als unsere gemässigte und nüchterne Lehre. 19

Kelsen´s roots: things that are better concealed than revealed (agnon)

Notwithstanding his professed atheism, there is a direct and indirect influence of Judaism on Kelsens
Philosophy of Law. Historically, one of the teachers of Kelsens atheism was Mauthner, who thus comments on
how he formed his own World View in his memories:
„Der Vater meiner Mutter war der steinalte Mann, der wohl einer Lebensbeschreibung wert
wäre, war schon als Jüngling, gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts, der Sekte der Frankisten
beigetreten, die ihre Anhänger aus kabbalistischen oder abtrünnigen Juden rekrutierte und
irgendeinen neuen Messias erwartete oder glaubte, einen Vollender von Jesus Christus.
Mein Großvater soll in dieser militärisch organisierten Sekte (auf dem Schlosse Franks in
Offenbach am Main) Offizier gewesen sein und nach dem Ende der Bewegung die
Dokumente und auch das Bild der ,,Königin“ in Verwahrung gehabt haben.”20

As it’s now well know the Kelsens are descendent from Rabbi Yonathan Eibeschütz, the most important
Rabbi from XVIII century (Margareth Bondi Kelsen were a direct descendent from him)21. What did he learn from
his ancestors?

18COHEN, Boaz. Jewish and Roman Law: comparative study in two volumes. The Jewish Theological Seminary Press,
2012.
19HECK, Philipp. Die Interessenjurisprdenz und ihre neuen Gegner. Tübingen: Mohr, 1936. S.151.
20MAUTHNER, Fritz. Erinnerungen. Muሷnchen: Prager Jugendjahre, 1918. 1 Bd, S. 110-123.
21In a letter Scholem confirms my construction with direct reference to the bondi family: "gibt es noch Familien-Nachrichten

uber die Frankistischen Bondis? Ich habe von in Jerusalem lebenden Angehorigen der familie, die um ihre Frankischen
Verwandschaften gar nicht wussten, mindestens ein hochst merkwurdiges Detail aus sehr guter Tradtion gehort" (Briefe
Beck p. 272).

Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Comissão de Pós-Graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP, São Paulo, n. 14, 2012
12

Yonathan Eibeschütz is till today to the orthodox camp with whom I agree an acknowledged genius in at
least three separate areas of Jewish religious creativity: Talmud and Jewish Law (Halakhah); homiletics and
popular preaching; and Kabbalah.

To the liberal historians, on the contrary,


Jonathan Eibeschütz stammte aus einer polnischen Kabbalisten Familie. Mit einem
außergewöhnlich scharfsinnigen, haarscharfen Verstand und einem glänzenden
Gedächtnisse begabt, fiel der junge Jonathan, früh verwaist, der regellosen Erziehung oder
vielmehr der Verwilderung der Zeit anheim, die ihm nur zwei Stoffe für seine Gehirnarbeit
zuführte, das weitausgedehnte Gebiet des Talmuds mit seinen labyrinthischen Irrgängen und
die berückende Kabbala mit ihren klippenreichen Untiefen. Das eine bot seinem nüchternen
Verstande und das andere seiner ungeregelten Phantasie reiche Nahrung. Mit seiner
haarspaltenden Urteilskraft hätte er einen gewandten rabulistischen Sachwalter abgeben
können, der imstande gewesen wäre, die Rechtfertigung der schlechtesten Sache glänzend
und überwältigend durchzuführen; oder er hätte auch, wenn ihm die höhere Mathematik
Leibniz' und New-tons zugänglich gewesen wäre, auf diesem Felde erfinderisch manches
leisten können. Eibeschütz hatte einige Neigung für Wissensfächer außerhalb des Talmuds
und auch eine gewisse Eitelkeit davon zu kosten.

Darum erscheint sein Leben und Treiben rätselhaft und mit Widersprüchen behaftet. Darum
fand er an der Mystik, wie sie Sabbataïs Nachfolger auslegten, viel Behagen; das Gesetz sei
durch den Eintritt der messianischen Zeit aufgehoben oder könne unter Umständen
aufgehoben werden, oder der in der Kabbala webende Geist brauche sich nicht
Gewissensbisse zu machen, dieses und jenes gering zu achten. Den lästerlichen
Hauptgedanken dieser und anderer Sabbatianer hat Eibeschütz in sich aufgenommen, daß
der höchste Gott, die erste Ursache, mit dem Weltall in keinerlei Verbindung stehe, sondern
eine zweite Person in der Gottheit, der Gott Israels genannt, das Abbild derselben, die Welt
erschaffen, das Gesetz gegeben, Israel erwählt, kurz sich mit dem Endlichen befaßt habe. Er
scheint aber auch den Konsequenzen dieser ketzerischen Theorien gehuldigt zu haben, daß
Sabbataï Zewi der wahre Messias gewesen sei, die zweite Person der Gottheit in sich
verkörpert habe, und daß durch dessen Erscheinen die Bedeutung der Thora.

Scholem seems to agree with this critical assessment of Graetz22. In his article “Redemption through
Sin,” he said he is convinced that Rabbi Jonathan Eibeschütz was a Sabbatean.23
I cannot conceal the fact, however, that after thoroughly examining both Eibeschütz own
Kabbalistic writings and all the polemical works that they engendered I have been forced to
conclude that he was indeed a Sabbatean, as both Jacob Emden and, in a later age,
Heinrich Graetz insisted.

According to Scholem, there is a dialectic between normativism, antinomianism and illuminism. He


proves this by the example of some of the leaders of the French revolution who were crypto sabbathists.

If Scholem is wrong and his assumption of a dialectic of normativism and irrationalism could lead
nowhere regarding to the quest of roots of Kelsen, should we abandon it? Is there anything to suggest that
Kelsen was familiar with the philosophy of Jewish Law enabling us to sustain a further assumption about the
presence of elements of Jewish Law in his work?

22GRAETZ, Heinrich. Geschichte der Juden. 2002. (CD-ROM.) (Digitale Bibliothek 44).
23SCHOLEM, Gershom. The messianic idea in judaism: and other essays on jewish spirituality. New York: Schocken Books,
1971.

Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Comissão de Pós-Graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP, São Paulo, n. 14, 2012
13

In 1913 Kelsen visited Hermann Cohen, who, according to the remaining neokantians have just then
ceased to make any contribution to the epistemological tendency of the Marburg School (followed by the first
Kelsen). Cohen was only interested by then in jewish philosophy (and german patriotism). What Kelsen may
have learned from Cohen from that date on?

That Justice is not to be found as a value. In the Cohen’s "Ethik des reinen Willens" justice appear as an
universal virtue based on Kant and the Bible. We cannot rationally be content until there is complete social
justice in our world. Therefore, striving for the ethical is an infinite process. In addition, every time we use our
minds to learn something, we are rationally aware of what we still do not know. The search for knowledge is
equally infinite.

Is there any testimony that would allow us to asset that this strive for social justice that is completely
evident in any word of Kelsen´s Reine Rechtslehre (only rightly seen by his antagonist Hayek) might be also his
personal own ideology?

Lets see what Norbert Leser says in his autobiography:


Kelsen bezeichnete sich mir gegenüber troz seiner Taufe als nicht gläubig im Sinne der
Christlichen Tradition, erklärte aber, immerhin als in dem Sinne gläubig, dass es etwas gebe,
was der deutsch-amerikanische Teologe Paul Tillich als >>ultimate concerne<< bezeichnete,
also als etwas, >>das uns unbedingt angeht<<, aber nicht bloss aus uns stammt, sondern
die Stimme einer höheren Wirklichkeit ist.24

That’s the face of Kelsen. So although an avowed rationalist, Kelsen avails himself of the kabbalistic
scheme in his device of the basic norm with its Plotinian, Neoplatonic and Gnostic overtones. His Grundnorm is
the Sephira of Keter Elion from the Kabbala. His justice is the biblica

l justice, on the name of what Kelsen criticizes in his whole opus the opressions of the rulers against the
people, sustained by the Greek philosophers Plato, Aristotle, Heraclitus and many others. Kelsen seems to rely
on a hidden justice concept, the same one that was developed in the Axial Age by the democrats in Greece and
the prophets in Jerusalem.

References

BEHRENDS, Okko. Von der Freirechtsbewegung zum konkreten Ordnungs- und Gestaltungsdenken. In: DREIER, Ralf;
SELLERT, Wolfgang. Recht und Justizim „Dritten Reich“. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989.

COHEN, Boaz. Jewish and Roman Law: comparative study in two volumes. The Jewish Theological Seminary Press, 2012.

COVER, Robert. Narrative, violence, and the law: the essays of Robert Cover. University of Michigan Press, 1993. (Law,
Meaning, and Violence Series).

24LESER, Norbert. Skurille Begegnungen. Mosaike zur österreichischen Geistegeschichte. Wien; Köln; Graz: Böhlau, 2011.
S. 118. Paul Tillich was the best representative of the religious social concept of justice.

Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Comissão de Pós-Graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP, São Paulo, n. 14, 2012
14

CRÜSEMANN, Frank. Theokratie als Demokratie zur politischen Konzeption der Deuteronomium. In: RAAFLAUB, Kurt
(Hg.). Anfänge politischen Denkens in der Antike. Griechenland und die nahöstlichen Kulturen. München, 1993. (Schriften
des Historischen Kollegs; Kolloquien 24).

ELON, M. Jewish law: history, sources, principles. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1973. v. 1.

GOLDZIHER, Ignaz. The Zahiris: their doctrine and their history. A contribution to the history of Islamic theology. Translated
and edited by Wolfgang Behn. Leiden; Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2007.

GRAETZ, Heinrich. Geschichte der Juden. 2002. (CD-ROM.) (Digitale Bibliothek 44).

HECK, Philipp. Die Interessenjurisprdenz und ihre neuen Gegner. Tübingen: Mohr, 1936.

HEINRICHS, Helmut; FRANZKI, Ha-rald; SCHMALZ, STOLLEIS, Klaus (Hrsg.). Deutsche Juristen jüdischer Herkunft.
Muሷnchen: C.H. Beck, 1993.

JACKSON, Bernard. Constructing a theory of Halakhah. Disponível em:


<http://www.academia.edu/1445715/Constructing_a_Theory_of_Halakhah>.

______. The Liverpool Law Review, v. 7, n. 1, 1985.

KELSEN, Hans. Österreichisches Staatsrecht. Tuሷbingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1923.

KNIGHT, Max. Erinnerungen an Hans Kelsen. Aufbau, 4, March 1973.

KOSCHAKER, Paul. Die Krise des römisches Rechts und die römische Rechtwissenschaft. München, Berlin: Beck, 1938.

LESER, Norbert. Skurille Begegnungen. Mosaike zur österreichischen Geistegeschichte. Wien; Köln; Graz: Böhlau, 2011.

MAUTHNER, Fritz. Erinnerungen. Muሷnchen: Prager Jugendjahre, 1918. 1 Bd.

SCHMITT, Carl. Briefwechsel mit Ludwig Feuchtwanger. 1918-1935. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007.

______. Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft im Kampf gegen den jüdischen Geist, DJZ, Bd. 41, S. 1193-1199, okt., 1936.

______. Nomos der Erde. Berlin: Dunckel und Humboldt, 1974.

SCHOLEM, Gershom. The messianic idea in judaism: and other essays on jewish spirituality. New York: Schocken Books,
1971.

SINZHEIMER, Hugo. Jüdische Klassiker der deutschen Rechstwissenschaft (1938). Amsterdam: Frankfurt am Main, 1953.

Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Comissão de Pós-Graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP, São Paulo, n. 14, 2012
15

CADERNOS DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM DIREITO

ESTUDOS E DOCUMENTOS DE TRABALHO

Normas para Apresentação

Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Comissão de Pós-Graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP, São Paulo, n. 14, 2012
16

CADERNOS DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM DIREITO

ESTUDOS E DOCUMENTOS DE TRABALHO

Normas para Apresentação

A apresentação do artigo para publicação nos Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito deverá obedecer as
normas da Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas (ABNT)

● Titulo: Centralizado, em caixa alta. Deverá ser elaborado de maneira clara, juntamente com a versão em
inglês. Se tratar de trabalho apresentado em evento, indicar o local e data de realização.

● Identificação dos Autores: Indicar o nome completo do(s) autor(res) alinhado a direita. A titulação
acadêmica, Instituição a que pertence deverá ser colocado no rodapé.

● Resumo e Abstract: Elemento obrigatório, constituído de uma seqüência de frases concisas e objetivas e
não de uma simples enumeração de tópicos, não ultrapassando 250 palavras. Deve ser apresentado em
português e em inglês. Para redação dos resumos devem ser observadas as recomendações da ABNT -
NBR 6028/maio 1990.

● Palavras-chave: Devem ser apresentados logo abaixo do resumo, sendo no máximo 5 (cinco), no idioma
do artigo apresentado e em inglês. As palavras-chave devem ser constituídas de palavras representativas
do conteúdo do trabalho. (ABNT - NBR 6022/maio 2003).

As palavras-chave e key words, enviados pelos autores deverão ser redigidos em linguagem natural,
tendo posteriormente sua terminologia adaptada para a linguagem estruturada de um thesaurus, sem,
contudo, sofrer alterações no conteúdo dos artigos.

● Texto: a estrutura formal deverá obedecer a uma seqüência: Introdução, Desenvolvimento e Conclusão.

● Referências Bibliográficas - ABNT – NBR 6023/ago. 2000.

Todas as obras citadas no texto devem obrigatoriamente figurar nas referências bibliográficas.

São considerados elementos essenciais à identificação de um documento: autor, título, local, editora e
data de publicação. Indicar a paginação inicial e final, quando se tratar de artigo de periódicos, capítulos
de livros ou partes de um documento. Deverão ser apresentadas ao final do texto, em ordem alfabética
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● Citações: devem ser indicadas no texto por sistema numérico, obedecendo a ABNT - NBR 10520/ago.
2002.

As citações diretas, no texto, de até 3 linhas, devem estar contidas entre aspas duplas.

As citações diretas, no texto, com mais de três linhas devem ser destacadas com recuo de 4 cm da
margem esquerda, com letra menor que a do texto utilizado e sem aspas.

Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Comissão de Pós-Graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP, São Paulo, n. 14, 2012

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