Escolar Documentos
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Cultura Documentos
By Claude Lefort
Let us hold out our hands to each other and rally around our Party's committees.
We must not forget even for a minute that only the Party committees can
worthily lead us, only they will light our way to the Promised Land.
not with the aid of personal qualities, but with the aid of an impersonal machine.
And it was not he who created the machine, but the machine that created him.
That machine, with its force and its authority, was the product of the prolonged
and heroic struggle of the Bolshevik Party, which itself grew out of ideas. The
machine was the bearer of the idea before it became an end in itself ... Lenin
created the machine through constant association with the masses, if not by oral
word, then by printed word, if not directly, then through the medium of his
disciples. Stalin did not create the machine but took possession of it.(5)
And the fact that today he is playing first is not so much a summing-up of the
man as it is of this transitional period of political backsliding in the country.
Helvetius said it long ago: 'Every period has its great men, and if these are
lacking, it invents them.' Stalinism is above all else the automatic work of the
impersonal apparatus of the decline of the revolution.(6)
This usurpation [of power by the bureaucracy] was made possible and can
maintain itself only because the social content of the dictatorship of the
bureaucracy is determined by those productive relations that were created by the
proletarian revolution. In this sense we may say with complete justification that
the dictatorship of the proletariat found its distorted but indubitable expression
in the dictatorship of the bureaucracy. (10)
Right up to the last minute, I avoided the struggle, for, in the first stage, it had
the character of an unprincipled conspiracy directed towards me, personally. It
was clear to me that a struggle of this nature, once begun, would inevitably
assume an exceptional vigour and, in the conditions of the revolutionary
dictatorship, might lead to dangerous consequences. This is not the place to try
to find out whether it was correct at the cost of the greatest personal concessions
to tend to preserve the foundations of a common work, or whether it was
necessary for me to throw myself into an offensive all along the line, despite the
absence, for such an offensive, of adequate political bases The fact is that I
chose the first solution and that in spite of everything I do not regret it. (12)
Would Lenin have been able to carry out the regrouping in the party direction
that he planned? At that moment, he undoubtedly would ... Our joint action
against the Central Committee at the beginning of 1923 would without a shadow
of a doubt have brought us victory. And what is more, I have no doubt that if I
had come forward on the eve of the twelfth congress in the spirit of a 'bloc of
Lenin and Trotsky' against the Stalin bureaucracy, I should have been victorious
even if Lenin had taken no direct part in the struggle. (14)
Now, from that point on and 'to the very last minute', the
Left Opposition practised a policy of' conciliation' and
'appeasement'. Even this policy could not remain
coherent, for even if the Left Opposition did not want a
fight, the bureaucracy did. Its triumph involved the
annihilation of the former revolutionary leader, at the very
time that this leader was seeking an understanding. So
Trotsky was led to attack on several occasions; but his
attacks bore the sign of his weakness. As Souvarine
rightly remarks, Trotsky wore himself out in a vain
polemic within the politbureau. In his articles (those that
he published on the New Course in 1923, and the Lessons
of 0ctober in 1924) he piled allusion on allusion and
wrote in such a way that he could be understood only by
the leadership of the party. None of his writing was
intended to instruct the ordinary militants. Far more
seriously, while the bureaucratic repression pitilessly
tracked down the members or sympathizers of the Left
Opposition, Trotsky did nothing to defend them; by his
constantly shifting line he disarmed them politically; he
gave them no platform for struggle, no theoretical element
that might enable them to recognize themselves and to
regroup.
None of us desires or is able to dispute the will of the Party. Clearly, the Party is
always right ... We can only be right with and by the Party, for history has
provided no other way of being in the right. The English have a saying 'My
country, right or wrong,' whether it is in the right or in the wrong, it is my
country. We have much better historical justification in saying whether it is right
or wrong in certain individual concrete cases, it is my party ... And if the Party
adopts a decision which one or other of us thinks unjust, he will say, just or
unjust, it is my Party, and I shall support the consequences of the decision to the
end. (15)
Sterile and absurd are the Sisyphean labours of those who try to reduce all
subsequent developments to a few allegedly basic original attributes of the
Bolshevik Parry ... The Bolshevik Party set for itself the goal of the conquest of
power by the working class. In so far as that party accomplished this task for the
first time in history and enriched human experience with this conquest, it
fulfilled a tremendous historical role. Only the bewildered with a liking for
abstruse discussion can demand of a political party that it should subjugate and
eliminate far weightier factors of mass and class hostile to it. (25)
One cannot but agree as to the prodigious historical role of the Bolsheviks. But the
question is badly put. It is obviously not a matter of requiring the party to win some sort
of triumph over the course of history, but to understand how the course of history is
expressed through the structure and life of the party itself. The fact that the Bolshevik
Party carried out the October Revolution must not lead one to deify it and to see its
subsequent failure as a mere accident. The failure of the Bolshevik Party in 1923 must
be understood in terms of the internal dynamics of that party. In no sense am I trying to
minimize the role of objective factors, but rather to discern, on the basis of the
Bolshevik experience, the enduring power which they may have.
All the facts concur: the party which, from its origin and
by reason of the objective situation, tended to develop
towards a military structure and functioned as a body
loosely linked to the masses began to accentuate these
traits considerably during the post-revolutionary period.
One cannot but follow Souvarine when he takes up
Bukharin's definition of the party as 'entirely apart from
and above everything'.(29) On the other hand, it seems to
me that Souvarine oscillates between a (subjective)
criticism of the leaders' attitude and an objective
interpretation that links this development of Bolshevism
to the given economic, social, national and world
situation. I repeat, the first criticism has no significance
for me; let us put aside that kind of value judgement. The
political strategy of the Bolshevik Party between 1917
and 1923 was that of a revolutionary organization
struggling desperately to preserve, until the outbreak of
world revolution, a proletarian victory unprecedented in
history. This strategy was essentially contradictory, since
it led to the adoption of an anti-proletarian content in the
name of the higher interests of the proletariat. But its
contradictions were themselves objective, for they
expressed the contradictions of the victorious Russian
proletariat, stifled in its victory by negative factors on a
national and international scale. The post-revolutionary
period in Russia is the tragic moment of Bolshevism, torn
apart between its ends and the nature of the forces that it
tried to animate. This tragedy culminated in the repression
of the workers of Kronstadt by Trotsky, who was led to
crush them and to forge false evidence in order to
persuade the whole world of their guilt. But this moment
of contradiction was essentially transitory. Bolshevism
could not remain split between its real behaviour and its
principles; whatever the supreme ends at which it aimed,
it could not survive if it were cut off from its real content
-the proletarian masses that it represented. It could not
remain without a social basis, as a pure will determined to
force the course of history.
NOTES
2 Ibid., p. 18.
3 Ibid., p. 187.
14 Ibid., p. 410.
26 Ibid., p. 61.
27 Ibid., p. 64.
31 Ibid., p. 179.
32 One may also compare this statement with the final
lines of Trotsky's Stalin which completely contradict it:
34 Ibid., p. 406.