PUPPETMASTERS

ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF MILITARY RULE

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF LLP

THAILAND 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1

One year ago, the Royal Thai Government massacred
ninety-one people to avoid an early election it feared it
might lose. Finally, the general elections for which dozens
of Red Shirts gave their lives are on track to take place
in June or July 2011. While it is hoped that the elections
will be free of outright fraud and ballot stuffing, the com-
petitiveness and fairness of the process are being under-
mined in many other ways.

The upcoming elections will take place in a context of in-

timidation and repression, coupled with the continuing
efforts by most of the institutions of the Thai state to
secure a victory for the Democrat Party. Aside from com-
peting against a hobbled opposition under rules designed
to artificially boost its seat share, the Democrat Party will
once again avail itself of the assistance of the military, the
bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the rest of the establish-
ment. These institutions stand ready to commit whatever
money, administrative resources, and television airtime
might be necessary to haul the otherwise unelectable
Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva over the hump.

In this series of reports, Amsterdam & Peroff details the

attempts by Thailand’s Establishment to fix the results of
the upcoming general elections. This report — the first
in the series — focuses on the Royal Thai Army’s effort
to protect its dominant position in Thailand’s political
life by manufacturing a victory at the ballot box for the
Democrat Party. As usual, fraud and intimidation are the
generals’ stock-in-trade.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Prayuth Chan-
ocha, promised the Thai public that the military will observe a policy of strict
neutrality in the 2011 general elections. Given the resources that Thailand’s
armed forces have expended since 2006 to steer voters into returning the
desired election results, overthrow elected governments it did not consider
worthy of its support, and impose its own proxies on a recalcitrant electorate,
there is no chance that the generals will stay on the sidelines. Indeed, just as
in the 2007 elections, the Royal Thai Army has its own candidate for Prime
Minister — Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva. Whereas their efforts failed to save the
Democrat Party from defeat in 2007, this time Thailand’s armed forces are
determined to stop at nothing to manufacture a legislative majority on behalf
of Mark Abhisit. Not only is the dominant role that the military has managed to
assert over Thailand’s political system at stake in these elections; the prospect
that an opposition victory might result in the investigation and prosecution of
senior generals for their role in the massacre of Red Shirt protesters in April
and May 2010 has raised the stakes even further. For Thailand’s armed forces,
defeat is not an option in the 2011 general elections.

A few months ago, Mark Abhisit made the imaginative claim that the Thai
military remains under civilian control.1 Considering that he owes his job to
the generals, the Prime Minister knows better. In fact, with the choice of Mark
Abhisit as its frontman, the Royal Thai Army has shown that it has learned the
lessons of 1992, when General Suchinda Kraprayoon’s insistence on personally
serving as Prime Minister triggered massive protests in Bangkok, complete
with a massacre of unarmed protesters. To avoid a repeat of that debacle,
Mark Abhisit’s urbane demeanor and patrician pedigree are the ideal cover
for the military’s continued dominance of Thailand’s political life. Beyond
the window-dressing, however, the reality is that the Thai military has almost
never been under civilian control. What is worse, the generals have more power
today than they have had in decades.

Having staged more coups than any modern army, the Thai military’s views
still figure into every political calculus. And while its budget has more than
doubled since the 2006 coup, the events of April and May have shown that

1. Shawn W. Crispin, “Tentative Democrat, Reluctant Autocrat,” AsiaTimes Online,

December 15, 2010.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LL15Ae01.html
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  1
its competence and commitment to democratic values are beyond the pale of
analysis. Unlike his predecessor, General Prayuth Chan-ocha finds it impossible
to resist the temptation of reminding the public that he is in charge. Almost
every day, the public is treated to his windbaggery on a range of topics lying
well beyond his narrow constitutional authority and still more limited intellect.2
The military’s handling of the border dispute with Cambodia, moreover, has
offered ample evidence for the proposition that the generals take no orders
from civilians. Embarrassingly, General Prayuth and Defense Minister Prawit
Wongsuwon recently rejected Indonesian mediation of the dispute, to which
the government had already agreed, leaving dumbfounded Cambodian officials
to wonder aloud whether it is the generals or the civilians who have the right
to negotiate.3 Free to disregard, in the most conspicuous ways, whatever
instructions are issued by a feeble civilian government, General Prayuth and
his associates are determined to return Mark Abhisit’s servile administration
to power — if at all possible, through means that may allow the government to
claim some “democratic” legitimacy.

This report examines the state of civil-military relations in Thailand,

highlighting the dominance of the Royal Thai Army over the country’s civilian
government on each of the five dimensions that experts generally consider to
measure civilian control — elite recruitment, public policy, internal security,
external defense, and military organization. The report goes on to illustrate
the crucial role that Thailand’s armed forces will play in the upcoming general
elections in support of the Democrat Party. The generals appear to have taken
a two-pronged approach to the elections. On the one hand, the rumors of a
military coup, the thinly veiled threats of violence and chaos, and the constant
accusations disloyalty to the monarchy hurled against the opponents of the
regime serve to intimidate the electorate into voting for the Democrat Party,
out of fear of what the military might do should the opposition win yet again.
On the other hand, the Royal Thai Army has committed massive financial,
organizational, and logistical resources to fixing the outcome of the elections.
In constituencies around the country, the military is actively engaged in the
effort to mobilize Democrat Party voters, buy the support of influential local
2. See Pravit Rojanaphruk, “The Army Chief Who Dons Too Many Hats,” The Nation,
April 20, 2011.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/04/20/national/An-army-chief-who-dons-
too-many-hats-30153484.html
3. “Govt United on Border Observers, Says Abhisit,” Bangkok Post, April 11, 2011.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/231345/govt-united-on-border-observers-
says-abhisit
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  2
figures, bully opposition candidates, and suppress the opposition’s vote.
While the junta’s recourse to these practices in lead-up the 2007 elections
was extensive (and well documented), the military’s aggressiveness has since
intensified with the skyrocketing costs of a potential electoral defeat.

2. MILITARY RULE BY CIVILIAN PROXY

The past several years have witnessed the re-assertion of the power of the Royal
Thai Army to levels not seen since the tragic events of “Black May” 1992. While
the coup d’état of September 19, 2006 was, from the military’s perspective,
above all a defensive act designed to prevent its political marginalization, the
generals quickly determined that the armed forces had to stay on offense if
they were to continue to stave off the threat to their power posed by popular
elected politicians. Still, recent history has taught the Royal Thai Army that
direct military rule is untenable and possibly counterproductive in modern
times. Instead of attempting to extend the life of the junta that seized power
in 2006, the generals have sought to consolidate their political power while at
the same time retreating behind a façade of constitutional democracy.

Messy and ugly though its actions have been, the military has thus far succeeded
in the attempt to reassert its dominance over Thailand’s political system. The
relentless campaign to destroy Thai Rak Thai, for one, managed to bring back
the weak civilian governments that Thailand used to elect before Thaksin’s rise.
Moreover, while the Royal Thai Army failed to secure an election victory for
the Democrat Party in the 2007 elections, the junta had written enough safety
mechanisms in the new constitution to prevent an electoral defeat from having
effects too adverse or long-lasting. Above all, the generals could now rely on
Thailand’s politicized judicial branch — empowered by the 2007 Constitution
to overturn the results of freely conducted elections — to confer upon the
removal of elected governments a semblance of legality. That happened in late
2008, with the court-ordered dissolution of the People Power Party and two
junior members of its governing coalitions. After the Court’s verdict, the Royal
Thai Army successfully used its influence to install Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva in
the Prime Minister’s office, propped up by a coalition that joined the Democrat
Party with the most unprincipled among the politicians who had supported
the previous government.

By making Mark Abhisit the Prime Minister, the Royal Thai Army entered into

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  3

a mutually beneficial arrangement with the Democrat Party. The Democrats
received positions of prestige and influence they could never have attained
on the basis of their electoral strength alone. In return, Democrat politicians
offered the military the veneer of a civilian administration behind which the
generals have been able to run the country without seizing power directly.
Because of the Democrats’ conservative, anti-democratic ideology — and the
weakness of their coalition — Mark Abhisit’s administration has never posed
any threat to the generals’ autonomy and clout.

As new elections approach, Thailand’s armed forces exercise a degree of power

inconsistent with the minimum standards of civilian control a democracy must
meet.4 On each of the dimensions upon which specialists generally base their
assessment of civil-military relations, the Thai military dominates over the
country’s formal, civilian leadership. In a recent article, Croissant et al. identify
five dimensions based on which civilian control can be conceptualized and
assessed systematically: 1) Elite recruitment, which speaks to the processes
leading to the selection and legitimation of political office holders; 2) Public
policy, encompassing agenda-setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption;
3) Internal security; 4) National defense; and 5) Military organization, intended
as the degree to which civilians control the size/structure of the armed
forces, their doctrine/education, as well as the amount and type of equipment
procured.5 A brief survey of each dimension reveals just how far Thailand is
from approximating the ideal of “civilian control.”

The most visible aspect in the re-establishment of the military’s predominance

over Thailand’s political system is the role that it has played in the area of
elite recruitment. Starting with the removal of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006,
the Royal Thai Army has continually inserted itself in the process by which
civilian leaders are selected and replaced. It is well known that the military
played a key role in the rise of Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva by inducing former
Thaksin allies to switch their support to the Democrats. This entailed not only
holding a meeting with the leaders of these smaller parties at the home of
former Army Chief Anupong Paojinda, complete with a call from “a man whose
message could not be refuted.”6 By that time, the military had done much

4. See Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is... and Is Not,” Jour-
nal of Democracy 2(1991): 75-88, 81.
5. Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers, and Siegfried O. Wolf, “Beyond the
Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging De-
mocracies,” Democratization 17(2010): 950-975.
6. “Democrat Govt a Shotgun Wedding?,” The Nation, December 10, 2008.
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  4
to demonstrate that it would not have accepted any alternative government
by crippling the administration of Somchai Wongsawat. Having called on the
former Prime Minister to resign after the clashes between the police and the
People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) on October 7, 2008, General Anupong
refused to execute the government’s order to disperse the PAD’s occupation of
Suvarnabhumi and Don Muang airports. For politicians interested above all in
holding on to their offices, the promise of stability that the military’s backing
of Mark Abhisit’s administration provided was likely decisive to the decision
to switch. Since then, the military has made good on that promise by propping
up the government, holding the fragile coalition together through a series of
crises, scandals, and massacres that would have brought down almost any
civilian administration, in Thailand or elsewhere.

The key role that the military plays in the recruitment of elites has also
taken somewhat less visible forms, related to the increased fusion between
Thailand’s armed forces and the Privy Council. Because the Privy Council has
long dominated appointments to various senior positions in the bureaucracy
and the judiciary, the fact that some of the Privy Council’s most prominent
figures are former generals has given these institutions an unprecedented
degree of integration and unity of purpose. The Privy Council itself has been
highly instrumental in protecting Mark Abhisit’s administration and very
active in making sure that various high-profile offices are held by the “right”
people. Pasit Sakdanarong, the former secretary to the Constitutional Court
president who leaked videos showing Democrat politicians lobbying the
Court in the party’s recent dissolution case, revealed that the dismissal of the
charges against the Democrat Party took place at the behest of Privy Council
President General Prem Tinsulanonda.7 Similarly, coalition politician Chumpol
Silapaarcha recently complained that the selection of appointed Senators
(totaling half of the upper house) is monopolized by an unnamed “mysterious
figure” thought to be General Prem himself.8

While the Thai armed forces continue to wield enormous power in Thailand,

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/read.php?newsid=30090626
7. “Pasit alleges Constitution Court lobbied to spare Democrat,” The Nation, April 10,
2011.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Pasit-alleges-Constitution-Court-lobbied-
to-spare--30152964.html
8. “Mysterious Figure ‘Dominating’ Senator Selection: Chumpol,” The Nation, April 1,
2011.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Mysterious-figure-dominating-senator-
selection-Chu-30152296.html
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  5
the generals are typically happy to leave most aspects of domestic policy
formulation to other wings of the Thai Establishment, including civil servants
and coalition politicians. In fact, Democrat Party officials have been quoted as
saying that the generals are “scared shitless” of the prospect of running the
country directly, without the cover of a civilian government.9 Still, on matters
of importance including amendments to the constitution, the armed forces
can at any stage impose the desired policies or veto the adoption of policies
they oppose. In the areas of internal security, external defense, and military
organization, moreover, the military is unmistakably in charge.

With regard to internal security, the Thai armed forces control most activities
related to counterinsurgency in the South and the preservation of the regime’s
stability against threats posed by pro-democracy forces. The traditional
authority of the military to manage internal security was recently strengthened
with the introduction of legislation such as a new Emergency Decree in 2005
and a new Internal Security Act in 2008. Both laws contain inordinately
broad specifications of the circumstances that might warrant the recourse of
emergency powers and reserve sweeping, unaccountable powers for the armed
forces. Even at the time they were introduced, international human rights
organizations condemned the provisions for posing a threat to democratic
governance in Thailand. Upon the junta’s completion of the draft Internal
Security Act in late 2007, for instance, Human Rights Watch condemned it for
being “aimed at perpetuating military rule” and for leaving Thailand “in an
environment prone to abuses and the arbitrary use of power.”10

Over the past two years, the systematic abuse of those provisions, in manners
inconsistent with international law, has repeatedly given the military the power
to essentially take over the country’s administration, suspend constitutional
rights, and commit a plathora of human rights violations for which security
forces have enjoyed complete impunity.11 The Emergency Decree, which was
invoked in 2009 and again for almost nine months during 2010, not only

9. Shawn W. Crispin, “Do or Die for Thai Democracy,” AsiaTimes Online, April 13,
2011.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MD13Ae01.html
10. Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and
Human Rights,” November 5, 2007.
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act- threatens-
democracy-and-human-rights
11. Asian Legal Resource Centre, “Thailand: Arbitrary Detention and Harassment un-
der the Emergency Decree,” August 31, 2010. http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/
mainfile.php/2010statements/2791/
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  6
gave the generals a prominent role in the country’s administration — the
Center for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) supplanting the
Cabinet as the principal executive body — but also placed few restrictions
on the military’s authority to re-establish “order.” Partly as a result, none of
the officials involved in the 2010 massacres have been subjected to criminal
prosecutions. In fact, senior officers who orchestrated the crackdowns were
rewarded with promotions.

With regard to external defense, similarly, ever since Mark Abhisit became
Prime Minister the military has repeatedly demonstrated its autonomy from
the civilian administration and its power to override decisions taken by the
government. Throughout the past two years, for instance, the military has
continued to enforce its policy of towing Rohingya refugees out to sea on
barges with no navigational equipment; whereas the policy has resulted in
the death of hundreds of refugees, no members of the security forces have
ever faced any criminal investigations or disciplinary action. It is, however, the
border dispute with Cambodia that has offered the most disturbing evidence
of the military’s dominance of foreign policy. Reportedly, in February 2011
the generals authorized the heavy artillery fire into Cambodian territory,
featuring the use of devastating cluster bombs,12 without even consulting the
civilian government.13 When the government agreed to Indonesian mediation,
in the wake of the bloody clashes, top generals stepped in and overruled the
administration; the following day, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban
was trotted out to bring the government back in line with the generals’
position.14 In the end, Thailand agreed to send its representatives to a Joint
Boundary Commission meeting in Indonesia only after obtaining that the host
country would be barred from participating in the negotiations.15 Aside from
demonstrating the powerlessness of the civilian government, the military’s
interference continues to undermine the prospects of putting an end to the
dispute.

12. “Thailand ‘Admits Cluster Bombs Used against Cambodia’,” BBC, April 6, 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12983127
13. See Shawn W. Crispin, “Bombshells and Rally Cries,” AsiaTimes Online, February
8, 2011.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MB08Ae01.html
14. “Suthep Opposes Presence of Foreign Troops in Disputed Zone,” National News
Bureau of Thailand, March 24, 2011.
http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255403240011
15. “JBC Meeting Off to a ‘Smooth Start’,” The Nation, April 8, 2011.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/04/08/national/JBC-meetIng-off-to-a-
&039;smooth-start&039;-30152770.html
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  7
With regard to military organization, finally, since the coup the Thai armed
forces have exercised complete autonomy over both policy and procurement.
Not only has the military’s budget more than doubled since 200616 — the
generals have been permitted to buy any equipment, however fraudulent,
obsolete, or overpriced, that offers opportunities for the kinds of kickbacks
that make them wealthy in spite of meager government salaries.17 When the
government finally acknowledged that the GT-200 bomb detectors were a
fraud, in February 2010, all branches of the Thai armed forces participated in
a joint press conference where they rebuked Mark Abhisit and insisted that
the devices were effective no matter how convincing the scientific evidence
attesting to the contrary.18 Earlier this year, the government rolled over and
approved a new, US$2.3 billion cavalry unit based in Northeast Thailand, which
has long been described by General Prem as his “last wish.”19 This comes on
the heels of the authorization of another wasteful infantry division in Chiang
Mai.20

3. VOTE ARMY?
As things stand, Thailand is in essence a military regime except in name and
outward appearance. What separates the country from full-blown military
rule is simply the military’ preference for hiding behind a weak civilian
administration and its lack of interest in policy areas that do not affect the
generals’ power, prestige, and proceeds. But this state of affairs is hardly stable,

16. See Paul Chambers, “Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democ-
racy,” Asian Survey 50(2010): 835–858, 850.
17. “GT-200 a Costly Dowsing Rod,” Bangkok Post, February 19, 2010.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/33124/gt200-a-costly-dowsing-rod
See also Saksith Saiyasombut, “Undelivered Ukrainian APCs and German weapon ex-
ports to Thailand,” Siam Voices, September 13, 2010.
http://asiancorrespondent.com/40239/undelivered-ukrainian-apcs-and-german-
weapon-exports-to-thailand/
18. Andrew MacGregor Marshall, “Coups in Thailand: Never Say Never,” Reuters, April
6, 2011.
http://blogs.reuters.com/andrew-marshall/2011/04/06/coups-in-thailand-never-
say-never/
19. Saksith Saiyasombut, “A New Cavalry Unit in Thailand’s North-East: Old Wish, New
Threat?,” Siam Voices, March 3, 2011.
http://asiancorrespondent.com/49429/a-new-cavalry-unit-in-thailands-north-east-
an-old-wish-to-a-new-threat/
20. Wassana Nanuam, “Red Presence Forces Military to Establish New Division,” Bang-
kok Post, July 29, 2010.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/188371/red-presence-forces-mili-
tary-to-establish-new-division
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  8
considering that it has come into being only through the denial of majority
rule and has remained in existence only thanks to the worst in a series of
massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators. For this reason, the upcoming
elections present the army with both opportunities and risks. On the one
hand, an acceptably “clean” Democrat victory would give the current regime
the claim to electoral legitimacy it currently lacks. The voters’ endorsement,
in other words, would give the arrangement described above a chance to
consolidate by muffling the opposition’s cries for the return to democracy.
On the other hand, an opposition victory would force the military to choose
between three undesirable options — accept a diminished role, rely on the
judiciary to invalidate the results, or once again stage a coup. Consequently,
the Royal Thai Army is deeply involved in the campaign to earn Mark Abhisit
at least the fig-leaf of an electoral mandate. What is more, while observers
generally do not expect that there will be much in the way of outright fraud,
intended as ballot stuffing, destruction of opposition ballots, or physical voter
suppression, it would be naive to rule out the possibility — particularly as the
generals might come to view the costs of undoing an unfavorable result to
exceed the potential downsides of manufacturing a favorable one.

In view of that, the military can be expected to try everything short of rigging
the elections outright and then engage in whatever amount of fraud it perceives
might help the Democrat Party without attracting international condemnation
and, most importantly, without leading to a massive voter uprising. Its most
powerful weapons are intimidation and organizational resources funded by
taxpayer money.

The work of intimidating voters is led by none other than the Commander-
in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Prayuth Chan-ocha. Having often
signaled that he would not hesitate to intervene if things were not to go his way,
General Prayuth has recently urged Thai voters to turn out in force against the
opposition. The Army Chief also echoed the Prime Minister’s warning that the
elections are a choice between the Democrat Party’s policies and a new cycle
of violence and instability. The implication is that if Thai voters reject Mark
Abhisit, yet again, the military has no qualms about giving the next elected
government the same treatment it offered the last three. In weighing their
options, the electorate is reminded that voting against the Democrat Party
might lead to more coups, more anarchy, and more massacres.

Aside from intimidating voters with thinly veiled threats of violence and chaos,

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  9

both the military and civilian leadership are actively engaged in a campaign
to bully the opposition into moderating their criticism of Thailand’s status
quo. Whereas the government’s recourse to legislation that criminalizes the
expression of dissenting opinions — the 2007 Computer Crimes Act and
Article 112 of the criminal code, defining the crime of lese majeste — has been
both systematic in nature and unprecedented in scope over the past two years,
the abuse of these repressive measures appears to be intensifying further as
elections approach.

In February, a web designer for an opposition website, Tanthawut

Taweewarodomkul, received a thirteen-year prison sentence for the publication
of online content he had no involvement in either drafting or posting. Others
have been arrested at recent Red Shirt demonstrations for passing out literature
calling for the abolishment of Article 112, or for distributing a documentary
produced by the Australian television network ABC. On April 11, 2011, General
Prayuth himself sent a group of military officers to file lese majeste complaints
against three Red Shirt leaders (including two sitting members of parliament)
for speeches given during the commemoration of the first of massacres the
army committed in 2010. The speeches in question contained no criticism of
either the King or the royal family, but rather condemned the abuse of the
lese majeste law and called on the military and the government to stop hiding
behind the monarchy to protect their own power. In explaining his actions to
the press, General Prayuth doubled down by calling on voters to cast ballots
meant to “protect the monarchy.”21 Three days later, the Department of Special
Investigations (DSI) announced that eighteen Red Shirt leaders are currently
under investigations for lese majeste in connection with the demonstrations on
April 10, 2011.22 After revealing that most such leaders are being investigated
because they were caught on video using “body language that indicated joint
action or support, such as yelling, cheering and clapping” during the offending
speeches,23 the DSI charged all of them for both lese majeste and sedition.

21. “Vote to Protect Monarchy: Army Chief,” The Nation, April 13, 2011.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/04/13/national/Vote-to-protect-monar-
chy-Army-chief-30153123.html
22. “DSI Says at Least 18 UDD Core Leaders of UDD May Face Insulting Monarchy
Charges,” MCOT News, April 15, 2011.
http://www.mcot.net/cfcustom/cache_page/195944.html
23. “DSI ruam laktan len ngan 18 daeng lom Jatuporn,” Matichon, April 16, 2011.
http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1302949087 An English trans-
lation is available at: http://thaipoliticalprisoners.wordpress.com/2011/04/17/an-
unspoken-lese-majeste/
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  10
Having repeatedly warned that those who “offend the institution” will be
hunted down like dogs, both the military and the simulacrum of a civilian
government behind which the generals operate continue to associate those
who oppose their rule with enemies of the monarchy.24 The agenda is obvious
— accusations of disloyalty, the frequency with which opposition activists
are targeted, and the harshness of their legal treatment are designed to
both discredit the opposition in the eyes of the public as well as discourage
opponents from making too incisive a case against Thailand’s real structure
of power. At the same time, by portraying the opposition as enemies of the
nation and the monarchy, the military is laying the groundwork for another
coup in the event that the opposition should manage to win the next election.
The reason for doing so publicly is to tell voters, in no uncertain terms, that
they should vote for the Democrat Party if they wish to avoid the chaos that
another military coup might bring.

Beyond this, the military is expanding on the range of underhanded measures

it is known to have implemented in the run-up to the 2007 elections. Days
before the last general elections took place, Human Rights Watch issued a
scathing report in which it condemned the Election Commission for failing to
counter the military’s attempt to undermine the fairness and freedom of the
electoral process. Citing the contents of a leaked internal memo issued by the
then-junta, the Council for National Security, three months before the polls,
Human Rights Watch highlighted a number of tactics used by the military
to damage the People Power Party and deliver a victory for the Democrats,
including “various operations to harass, block, and discredit the People Power
Party and its supporters” as well as “the mobilization of army-run television
channels, radio stations, intelligence, and security agencies to present reports
and circulate rumors discrediting the People Power Party and Thaksin.”25
Election monitoring organization ANFREL also found that the military’s actions
“undoubtedly created a climate of fear where freedom of expression and
assembly was curtailed.”26 Even though the Election Commission subsequently

24. See Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thailand’s Military on the Offensive: The Thai
Army Politicizes the Monarchy,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2011.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703922504576272432046756072.
html
25. Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Military Interference Undermines Upcoming
Elections,” December 20, 2007.
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/12/19/thailand-military-interference-under-
mines-upcoming-elections
26. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) , “Thailand: Restoring Democracy,
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  11
ruled, in a 4-1 vote, that the junta had failed to remain neutral during the
campaign, the commissioners also determined that the generals enjoyed
“constitutional immunity” for actions undertaken in an effort to safeguard
national security. Evidently, under the new rules of the game introduced after
the 2006 coup, rigging an election has become something of a constitutional
priority in Thailand, perhaps insofar as it saves the military the trouble of
staging another coup.

Considering the eventual failure of the military’s campaign in 2007, as well

as the costs that the military incurred (in terms of public image, internal
cohesion, and human lives) in its subsequent effort to undo the results of the
elections, the generals have taken an even more aggressive approach to the
2011 campaign. After all, the Thai military is no more prepared to accept the
“wrong” election result than it was four years ago; as noted, the stakes were
raised even further by the 2010 massacres, for which senior officers need
continuing guarantees of impunity.27

The opposition recently disclosed details of just such a plan. The plan
reportedly envisions the establishment of an election taskforce and the
deployment of security forces to influence voting decisions by intimidating
voters, buying the support of local notables, and spreading fear with regard
to the opposition’s support of a secret conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy.
The plan also calls for staging incidents of electoral irregularities that might
help frame opposition candidates, laying the “legal” foundations for their
disqualification by the Election Commission or the dissolution of the party
itself.28 It bears noting that while the Democrat Party was the beneficiary of
most irregularities in 2007, back then the Election Commission intervened
almost exclusively to invalidate the results of races that had been won by the
People Power Party and its allies. The People Power Party was subsequently
dissolved by the Constitutional Court based on one such episodes.

Given the stakes involved as well as the scale of the attempts made by the

Elections to the House of Representatives,” Report of the International Election Obser-

vation Mission, March 2008.
27. Shawn W. Crispin, “Do or Die for Thai Democracy,” AsiaTimes Online, April 13,
2011.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MD13Ae01.html
28. “Tu chae pen chak paen bong kan yub sapha yong yok yai tahan-- lom puea thai,”
Khao Sod, April 9, 2011.
http://www.khaosod.co.th/view_newsonline.php?newsid=TVRNd01qTTFNakV5TlE9P
Q%3D%3D&sectionid

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  12
government and the security forces to fix the results of the elections, it is no
surprise that Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban would angrily reject
the possibility of inviting foreign election observers. That is not because he
does not “respect Westerners” or is concerned about Thailand’s sovereignty,
as he claims,29 but rather because foreign observers threaten to expose the
lengths to which the government and the army are willing to go to trample on
the Thai people’s sovereignty. While foreign election observers will likely not
be allowed to monitor the process, one can be sure that the government will
call upon the military to guarantee “security” at polling stations throughout
the country. Given the military’s tendency to associate “security” with the
continuing existence of its puppet regime, the physical intimidation of voters
may also soon be described as a matter of “national security.”

Perhaps most worrisome on this count is the Royal Thai Army’s history of
pre-election violence (most notably in the 1970s) as well as its involvement in
bombings and other violent incidents throughout 2010, as part of a “strategy of
tension” designed to justify the government’s continued recourse to emergency
powers and draconian restrictions on the rights of the opposition.30 As Philip
Willan wrote with reference to the “strategy of tension” masterminded by
right-wing groups and parts of the Italian state beginning in the late 1960s,
“terror increases people’s desire for security at the expense of their desire
for change.”31 Whenever Thailand has appeared on the verge of democratic
change, the Royal Thai Army has never hesitated to use violence and terror, to
strike fear in the hearts of those who may have otherwise wanted the generals
to go back to the barracks.

4. DEFYING MILITARY CONTROL

It is frequently pointed out that the Thai military does not function as
instrument of external defense, but rather as a private guard that protects
Thailand’s Establishment (which includes prominent generals) from the
people’s democratic aspirations. This position confers upon the military the
ultimate veto role in Thailand’s network of political power. Much like Latin

29. “Thailand Rejects Foreign Election Monitors,” AFP, March 24, 2011.
http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_648749.html
30. See Robert Amsterdam, “No Respite from Fear,” August 16, 2010
http://robertamsterdam.com/thailand/?p=296
31. Philip Willan, Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy (Lon-
don: Constable & Company Ltd., 1992), 14.
AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  13
American caudillos a few decades ago, the Thai military has never shied
away from human rights violations, massacres, and military takeovers when
democracy threatened the Establishment and the conservative interests it
embodies. Thanks to American support and the existence of limited external
threats, over the past several decades the Thai military has wholly dedicated
itself to maximizing its own power and budget at the expense of the rule of law,
civilian institutions, and the Thai people’s freedom. Today, Thailand’s military
remains as strong, meddlesome, and brutal as ever. Thailand’s political conflict
cannot be fully resolved unless an institution that is so doggedly committed to
the cause of preventing Thailand from ever becoming a democratic country is
either scrapped or reformed.

There is no doubt, as the country’s Prime Minister is reported as stating, that

the upcoming elections offer the Thai people a clear choice. The decision before
the Thai electorate, however, goes well beyond the endorsement of alternative
policies or candidates. The choice before them is whether to accept military rule
and legitimize its implausible civilian façade, however begrudgingly, or to once
again defy Thailand’s Establishment with a vote that demonstrates an enduring
commitment to democracy and self-determination. Choosing democracy over
dictatorship is guaranteed to have its costs, as the Thai military has never
taken kindly to the public’s effrontery. But it would be worse still for Thai
voters to succumb to intimidation and fear, and wait for future generations
to deliver the country from military rule. To give the generals the opportunity
to further consolidate their grip is to allow the costs of eventually taking on
the military to multiply several times over. As the tragic events of 2010 have
reminded us all, those costs are measured in human lives.

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1  14
THAILAND 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1