Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III:

Caught in Kirchberg am Aspekt-Wechsel

Kristijan Krkač, Zagreb

“Rabbit Fire”, 1951, dialogue: Mike Maltese, Looney Tunes, production NO

1166
“(Philosophers are often like little children, who first scribble random lines on a
piece of paper with their pencils, and now //Then// ask an adult “What is that?”
– Here’s how this happened: now and then the adult had drawn something for a
child and said: “That’s a man”, “That’s a house”, etc. And then the child draws
lines too, and asks: now, what’s that?”) (PO 193) “I believe that my sentences are
mostly descriptions of visual images that occur to me” (PPO 123) “One might
also say “I do not merely interpret the figure, but I clothe it with the interpre-
tation”.” (RPP I 33)
Abstract
In the paper the author examines Wittgenstein’s examples of aspect-seeing and
aspect-change (Aspektwechsel, PI p. 195), particularly the duck-rabbit head, or
abbreviated as “the Dubbit”. The main proposal of the paper is that seeing an
aspect is an issue of the philosophical morphology, and eventually of the philo-
sophical grammar, namely the grammar of sight (following J. Good). An argu-
ment for the proposal consists of an explication of Wittgenstein’s standpoint re-
garding the Dubbit. His explication consists of balanced and partial acceptance
and rejection of several parts of two opposite “theories”, namely an empiricist
one, and the Gestalt one. The balanced solution itself, which says that seeing
an aspect is “half perception and half interpretation” (following G. Baker), is in-
troduced in order to apply morphological method in order to achieve clear de-
scriptions regarding perception, and finally the grammar of sight. Grammatical,
or perhaps hinge propositions of the grammar of sight are suggested in the paper,
but only regarding the example of the Dubbit, such as for instance “The Dubbit
consists of the following aspects…”.
122 Kristijan Krkač

Figure 1: The dawning of the dubbit (duck–rabbit head)

1. The dawning of the dubbit (LW I 147, 492)

Say that one is presented with a series of drawings from (a) to (f ) as
shown in the Figure 1. What kind of descriptions would one give regard-
ing this series of drawings (Wittgenstein mentions this possibility, see PI
p. 199, LW I 517)?
Drawing (a) in Figure 1 could be a scribble, similar to one a child
often makes while drawing something and at one moment starts to scrib-
ble over it claiming that it performed “a horrible” mistake. Furthermore,
for drawing (a) it could be said that it consists of unorganised lines (on
the other hand and in a child’s mind they are completely “organised”
since they cover the alleged “mistake” perfectly). Now, drawing (b) is
less unorganised. There is some minimal, almost geometrical organisation
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 123

Figure 2: The Dubbit (the duck–rabbit head)

of lines present in (b), namely some parallel lines, curves, etc. Now, draw-
ing (c) is somehow different. It does not only consist of simply, geometri-
cally organised lines. There is more to it. They seem to represent some-
thing, perhaps an angry face on the right side and a vase on the left side.
Now, in drawing (d) the face and vase disappeared and something else
seems to dawn. Drawing (e) uncovers what it is, namely some kind of an-
imal. Finally, drawing (f ) uncovers that it is a puzzle picture. It could be
seen as a duck and as a rabbit. The change from (a) to (b) could be called
the dawning of an organisation, the change from (b) to (c) could be called
the dawning of a representation, the changes from (c) to (d), and (d) to
(e) called the dawning of a change of a representation, and finally, the
change from (e) to (f ) could be called the dawning of a puzzle picture,
namely, the duck-rabbit head. In other words, it is a drawing that has
two aspects: the duck aspect and the rabbit aspect. The whole series
could be dubed as “the dawning of the duck-rabbit”.
The topic of “seeing–as”, “seeing–aspects”, and “an aspect-change” is
discussed among Wittgenstein scholars under the heading “philosophy of
psychology” (see for instance, Baker and Hacker 1985; Budd 1991, 77 –
98; Hacker 1990; Rhees 2003, 16 – 27; Schulte 1992; an aspect-change
in German is der Aspektwechsel, PI p. 195 regarding the title since Inter-
national Wittgenstein Symposium in Austria takes place at Kirchberg am
Wechsel). However, and especially since the aspect–relativity seems to be
at the heart of Wittgenstein’s morphology, it will be suggested that the
appropriate heading would rather be “philosophical morphology” and
“philosophical grammar” as the core of his later philosophy (the choice
of word is close to J. Good’s phrase “a grammar of sight”, Good 2006,
7 – 40). The following illustration is the topic of this paper (as shown
in Figure 2). We can call it “the dubbit” (as shorten of “a duck-rabbit
head” as Wittgenstein calls it in PI pp. 193 – 229, RPP I, II, and LW I).
124 Kristijan Krkač

Now, what one sees, if one sees anything at all, are not “organised
lines” (no more then “a strange creature”, or “an odd drawing”), if one
sees anything at all, then it must be an aspect, since this is the precise
point regarding such multi–aspectual drawings. It has been suggested
that here the distinction between continuous and representative seeing–as
applies in a way that when one perceives “an odd drawing” this should be
understood as continuous seeing-as, while seeing-it as a rabbit or a duck
should be understood as representative seeing–as (Voltolini 1993, 567 –
72, grounded on PI p. 194). However, it will be suggested that there is
no “representation” here, since there is nothing that “can” represent any-
thing else. The drawing itself isn’t something that represents aspects, since
the drawing itself is an aspect of the dubbit. Besides this particular dis-
tinction, it seems that the dubbit is important at least for two reasons:
(1) It is important because seeing aspects is significant part of Wittgen-
stein’s morphological method (PI 66) and grammatical goal in terms
of perspicuous (re)presentation (PI 122). This point is nicely expli-
cated by J. Good in the following passage. “To use one of Wittgen-
stein’s metaphors, the concept of seeing is like a delicious artichoke
with many leaves. When we construct a theory or a definition to cap-
ture its essential nature, we divest the artichoke of its leaves, trying to
find the real artichoke hidden within. Nevertheless, the artichoke is
its leaves. Wittgenstein offers us a technique for exploring the
whole artichoke, for getting to the heart without losing the whole.”
(Good 2006, 2)
(2) In addition, it is a significant because it reveals the notion of “seeing”
especially in phrase “seeing aspects” as something between perception
and interpretation (this point is explicated by G. Baker 2004. For the
difference between interpretation and imagination regarding this par-
ticular case, and for “an interpretation” as action of “interpreting” see
Budd 1989, 90 – 1), and while being at half way it also differs from
seeing Mller-Lyer lines, Necker’s cube, or double cross, for instance,
as seeing with a significant influence of will. This means that one can
“[c]hange the imaginative focus of the aspect at will” no matter how
the imaginative focus itself is constrained by the visually grasped
properties of the object one perceives. (Voltolini 1993, 567) It is ap-
proximately half way between the case of double cross and any case of
pure interpretation (as shown in Figure 3).
(2.1) Regarding (1) and (2) it seems that Wittgenstein uses the dubbit
as an example of his morphological method and grammatical inquiry, the
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 125

goal of which is “clarity”, and as an quite obvious objection to the modern

differentiation between perception and reasoning (thinking), between em-
piricism and rationalism, or between perception and volition (which he
found perhaps in James’s The Principles of Psychology or in The Varieties
of religious Experience, or in Russell’s works (for instance Russell [first pub-
lished 1927] 1995, 48), or regarding the perception between behaviourism
and Gestalt theory, or regarding the ontology between “desert landscapes”
and “overpopulated universes” (Quine 1980, 4). If such objections are ac-
cepted, then another issue is raised, namely – is all our perception so to
speak “aspectualised”? In order to answer affirmatively to this and similar
questions, one needs to understand that there is no strict border between
“seeing”, “seeing–as” and “imagining–as”.
(2.2) On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s treatment of the issue, espe-
cially some indications of his solution in terms of grammatical proposi-
tions, show that it is connected to his conception of human consciousness
which is further connected to his conception of the human being. In ad-
dition, it represents the first example of a morphological and grammatical
inquiry which goes beyond investigating morphology of “expressions”,
namely the morphology of “visual experience”. Regarding the last
point, the grammatical inquiry stays the same, namely the one containing
hints of grammatical propositions, while the morphological one changes,
and one could see some strengths and weaknesses of such method precise-
ly in cases such as that of the dubbit. Some of these explications will be
investigated in further sections in more detail.
These reasons (1, 2) constitute the vital point (described in Figure 3),
as well as explication (2.1 – 2) that will be made in the present paper.
Now, a lot of it was implied in (1 – 2.2). In the following section it
will be suggested that the dubbit is no issue of a theory of perception,
rather that it is an issue of morphology (the third section) and an issue
of philosophical grammar (fourth section).

2. Aspects of the dubbit – is it because the drawing is poor?

When one sees the dubbit for the first time, one could say something like
“I don’t see anything at all”, or ask “What is this?”, or “I see a pile of
lines”, or “I see lines that seem to be organised in a particular yet to
me unknown way”, or “OK, now I can see a rabbit, … but I see a
duck as well”, or “How outlandish, I see a duck at one moment, and a
rabbit at the other!” or, “I see a one-eyed monster with both ears on
126 Kristijan Krkač

Figure 3: Seeing Dubbit–aspects as half–perception and half–interpretation with si-

gnificant influence of will

the left side of its head”, or something similar. Now, how it is possible
that one “sees” the duck and the rabbit? Maybe the drawing itself is some-
how “poor”, or quite the contrary; perhaps it is perfectly “aspectualised”.
Namely, small changes in the drawing can be made in order to minimize
some ambiguities. For instance, if one stretches it horizontally, one will
see the rabbit first and then perhaps the duck later on, and if one stretches
it vertically, one will see the duck first and perhaps the rabbit afterwards.
these versions of Figure 1 are shown in Figure 4.
Therefore, even slight changes in the proportion of the drawing ob-
viously influence our seeing of aspects. Regarding both changes it is easier
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 127

Figure 4: Some changes in proportions of the drawing of Dubbit

to recognize one of the two aspects, namely in the first one the rabbit as-
pect, and in the second one the duck aspect, because in the first one the
beak is unnaturally long for a duck, and in the second one the ears are
unnaturally short for a rabbit. Leaving aside proportions of the drawing,
some other changes can be made. In particular, the position of the eye is
also important since if the eye is moved more to the left or more to the
right this would surely influence seeing one aspect before the other (as
shown in Figure 5).
However, it is also possible that the aspect one notices will remain the
same, because the whole dubbit looks as it is positioned diagonally in re-
lation to the observer. Perhaps there is another distinction, namely the
one between “a pile of lines” and “a number of specifically organised
lines”, but then – what does “an organisation” mean? Does “an organisa-
tion” mean that “aspects” are possible? Let us test the drawing by making
128 Kristijan Krkač

Figure 5: Some changes regarding the position of Dubbit’s eye

few minor changes in “the organisation” of lines in order to investigate

this particular possibility (as shown in Figure 6).
In the Figure 6, namely in its upper part, a small hollow on the left
side of it is emphasised and the eye is moved slightly to the left, while in
the lower part of it the eye is slightly moved to the right and the hollow
on the left side is completely removed. In both illustrations shadows are
removed as well. If these changes are sufficient for one in order to see
only a rabbit in the upper part, and a duck in the lower one, then we
clarified what it means that lines are “organised” in certain ways in
order for one to see a rabbit and a duck.
However, one could make the drawing even more distinct as shown
in Figure 7 in which the “rabbit’s” ears are a little bit lowered (looking
perhaps like a turkey, or an alien creature aspect besides the rabbit aspect)
and it seems almost impossible to see a duck on the upper part of the
Figure 7. Now, one can go back to the original drawing and remove
changes one by one and stop at the one that seems to be sufficient for
noticing both aspects.
On the other hand, these distinctions are distinctions between so to
say “real aspects”, no matter how odd “an aspect–absent” drawing should
sound. All of the descriptions of aspects belong to certain perspicuous
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 129

Figure 6: Some minor changes in the organisation of (Dubbit) lines

presentation of the dubbit; they belong to “the grammar of sight” not to

“the grammar of the dubbit”. The dubbit itself has no grammar, only or-
ganisation of lines. Therefore, the basic question is still unanswered:
What is the difference between perception of “the dubbit” and visual ex-
perience of the “duck aspect” or “rabbit aspect”?
There are many such possibilities each one making the drawing more
or less ambiguous. However, the drawing is always the same; there are no
changes even in its proportions. Instead, what is changed is our seeing of
it, namely
(3) “[t]hat experience is what I call perceiving an aspect” (PI 398 – 401).
As we already mentioned, Wittgenstein discusses seeing aspects in PI (PI
398 – 401, II: xi) and in some other works. Now, one should not be mis-
guided by the use of the word “seeing” in the expression “seeing–as”, no
more then with the word “odd” in the expression “an odd drawing”, since
this could be a metaphorical use. Namely, many of our words for knowl-
edge are oculocentric (the phenomenon itself is even sometimes referred
to as “oculocentrism”). Those are for example:
130 Kristijan Krkač

Figure 7: Some major changes in the organisation of (Dubbit) lines

• definition, observation, phenomenon, introspection, contemplation,

speculation, and many other phrases containing words like “eye” or
“see” which are obviously used metaphorically, like
• “I see it in my mind”, “I see what you mean”, and similar.
This raises many questions.
• Is Wittgenstein’s use also metaphorical like in the mentioned cases?
• Namely, when one sees an aspect, is this a good example of perceiving,
or a good example of interpreting?
• What is visual perception in this particular case of “seeing aspect”?
o Is “seeing–as” looking at with an assignment an extraordinary atten-
tion or a bizarre caution?
The main point concerning seeing–as is that one sees as one interprets.
(4) “So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.” (PI p. 193, Z 212)
(4.1) “… [A]n interpretation becomes an expression of experience.”
(RPP I 20 see also 99)
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 131

(4.2) “My inclination was indeed to say that “It is as if I saw an in-
terpretation”” (LW I 179)
(4.3) “One might also say “I do not merely interpret the figure, but I
clothe it with the interpretation”.” (RPP I 33)
Therefore, the last question arises to the following questions
• is the possibility of seeing the dubbit as a duck, a rabbit or as a one
eyed monster
o somewhere “in our minds”,
o or in some specific influence of such drawing on us, or vice versa,
o or perhaps in the drawing, namely, in the particular already exam-
ined organisation of lines, composing the dubbit as being necessary
for seeing duck and rabbit aspects?
Surely, the drawing can be slightly changed (in proportions for instance)
in order to see only one aspect, but then there is a change in the drawing
as demonstrated in the previous illustrations (see Figures 3 – 4).
Can we see ordinary daily objects as being somewhat similar to the mys-
terious drawing of the dubbit? Is it OK, if one sees his bicycle as a bull’s
head, or the front of his automobile as a face of a dangerous monster (like
in the famous S. Spielberg’s movie “Duel”), etc.? Is the world full of hid-
den and at the same time essentially manifested aspects? Nevertheless,
what seems to be correct is:
(5) that one sees the “mysterious” drawing (perception),
(6) that the drawing itself has the characteristic of being perceived (ob-
served, visually experienced) under (at least) two aspects,
(7) and that we are those who see what we see as this or that aspect (will-
ingness).
(8) However, regarding (7), Wittgenstein differs between
(7.01) the drawing of the dubbit and
(7.02) the drawing of the dubbit as “a picture” of a duck or of a rab-
bit (PI p. 195), (a picture “representing” / “manifesting” its aspects).
It seems that he claims that the experience is a visual perception of a
duck-rabbit head, but not seeing the duck-rabbit head as a duck, or as
a rabbit (precisely this distinction will be useful later on). Nevertheless,
this seems to be against the common sense, namely, to claim that what
one sees is a duck, because what one can see is only the drawing, i. e.
lines on paper. Therefore, it seems that what we have here are two con-
cepts of seeing (7),
(7.1) one that is a visual perception of a drawing,
132 Kristijan Krkač

(7.2) and the other is seeing the aspects with mind’s eye, or interpret-
ing what one perceives (of course, the point is precisely in connection
with proposition (4), namely, that one must interpret in order to see).
The particular difference between (7.1) and (7.2) can be described as a)
what there is (lines on a paper) and b) how it “appears” or “looks” to us
(visual experience of a duck, rabbit, and change of aspects). This point
goes along with the distinction made by J. Good, namely the following:
“Correlated grammatically with the distinction between seeing and inter-
pretation is a distinction between direct and indirect descriptions of what
is experienced. The expression of an interpretation is an indirect descrip-
tion.” (Good 2006, 26)
(7.3) 7.2, besides being consistent with (4), i. e. with PI p. 193, also
goes along with Wittgenstein’s remark that the aspect–change we in fact
describe as the change in perception, almost as the object itself changes in
front our very eyes (PI p. 195).
Nevertheless, how is this possible if the drawing remains the same? Per-
haps something changes regarding our visual experience, or with our in-
terpretation of the drawing? On the other hand, perhaps it is just a spe-
cial kind of drawing. The last point should not be of our pivotal interest
since the question is not empirical or technical (for instance – how to
draw such a multi–aspectual drawing), no matter if this is of some impor-
tance regarding art theory (interpreting Escher’s or Arcimboldo’s works
for instance) or visual literacy education.

3. Morphologies of the dubbit

Proposition (7.3) as a correct interpretation of (7.2) and being consistent

with (3) and (4) implies that there is one drawing, (at least) two aspects
and that these aspects are different; but how do we know this, especially
the last one? Of course, one could say, this point can be illustrated with
two drawings of the dubbit and with pointing to the differences between
them, but how to point to the differences if both drawings are the same?
Namely, there will be no differences between the drawings.
• However, if they were different and made by two people who claim to
see only one aspect, say that Smith claims to see only the duck aspect,
while Jones claims to see only the rabbit aspect, then if there are differ-
ences in “their drawings” of the dubbit, the differences should be at-
tributed to the ability to draw what one sees (a similar proposal was
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 133

made by Fogelin 1987, 202). However, we would then have two differ-
ent drawings of the dubbit, one more duck–like, and the other one
more rabbit–like. Now, say that Smith and Jones are skilled cartoonists,
and consequently draw exactly the same drawing, namely the dubbit,
and claim to see only one aspect, this proves nothing. Perhaps some-
thing is wrong with their eyes, or brain, or imagination; perhaps
they are aspect–blind?
o Regarding “cartoonist”, it should be noted that Wittgenstein bor-
rowed the dubbit from Jastrow 1900. However, Jastrow published
the drawing a year later as well (1899), and borrowed it from
“Harpers Weekly” magazine (1892, 1114). Finally, “Harpers Week-
ly” reprinted the drawing from the German magazine “Fliegende
Bltter” of the same year (1892, 312). Wittgenstein was obviously
acquainted with the magazine, and particularly with the cartoonist
Adolf Oberlnder (PPO 97). However, I did not succeed in finding
the name of the author of the original drawing (the reprint of the
page from the magazine is accessible on the Internet).
The point is that the drawing itself “can be seen” in two ways not that
“there are two drawings in one”. Does this mean that there are no differ-
ences between these two aspects? Surely, there is some kind of difference
and even a kind of change, while one sees one aspect after another, but on
the other hand, it is not the change in perception, and consequently it
cannot be shown by two different drawings, rather the change goes on
in our “seeing”, since the eye filters, but the mind interprets. In other
words, we do not want to introduce neither “a mind’s eye”, nor “a private
language”.
The drawing is organised in such a particular way that one can see
only the lines, but also the aspects. The organisation of lines is an essen-
tial part of the drawing. On the other hand, it seems like
• in the first case (previously 7.1) one is just “looking at” the drawing
and observing lines only, and
• in the second case (previously 7.2) one is also “seeing them as” a duck
and as a rabbit.
Does this mean that the duck and the rabbit are already “in” the drawing?
But if they are, where are they? – “But, don’t you see” is the only possible
comment regarding this question and we are at the beginning again.
(8) The point and the problem is that “seeing–as” does not belong to the
perception, and this is so because “seeing–as” is like visual perception
and at the same time it is not (PI p. 197).
134 Kristijan Krkač

We have here at least two distinctions (following Wittgenstein

7.01 – 7.02):
(9) A state of affairs in which one sees the drawing, which should be
described as a particular organisation of black lines on a white
piece of paper,
(10) Then we have another situation in which one sees the drawing “as”
an aspect, say that of a duck (this is the first distinction),
(11) One also has a situation in which one sees not just one aspect, say a
duck aspect, but also a rabbit aspect (this is the second distinction),
and the change from one to the another.
These two distinctions (namely 9 – 10 and 10 – 11) should not be con-
fused for reasons that will be explicated further on.
• Wittgenstein makes a note about a rabbit, which suddenly runs in
front of us. We see it and exclaim, “Rabbit!”. He introduced the differ-
ence between perception (seeing the drawing of the dubbit) and visual
experience (seeing the drawing of the dubbit as). Let us compare these
two cases. If the distinction is correct, we have one perception and one
visual experience.
o In the first situation, one sees a rabbit suddenly running in front of
him/her and exclaims “Rabbit!”.
o In the second situation, one looks at the drawing of the dubbit on
the paper, sees nothing at first, but moments later one exclaim “I see
a rabbit!”.
• In both cases, there is a particular visual perception. In the first case a
living, running rabbit, and in the second case thedrawing of the dub-
bit. In addition, in both cases there is visual experience and exclama-
tion as a reaction to what one sees. There is no relevant difference be-
tween these two phenomena, since they can not be distinguished, apart
from the fact that in the second case one could have exclaimed
“Duck!”, however in the first case one could also have exclaimed “Bea-
ver!” The supposed difference is in an interpretation, namely in the
second case one could say that it was a case of mistaken identification
of the animal, while in the first one, one could say that it was a case of
seeing one of two aspects first.
Regarding the mentioned option, the question is: How can one, without
noticing it consciously, secretly slide from perception to interpretation,
since we see as we interpret (4, PI p. 193)?
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 135

(12) This is so because immediate seeing of an aspect appears to be half

visual perception and half thinking. “Thinking” here means “over-
view” or “presentation” of what one sees (PI p. 198), since present-
ing all of the aspects surely must be a part of an overview of the
dubbit.
(13) Wittgenstein’s solution seems to be unacceptable, since he claims
that there is a significant difference between perception of a drawing
and visual experience (half-thinking so to speak, although “seeing an
aspect” isn’t something like seeing + thinking, or a mixture of these,
PI p. 211; it is not cognitive at all, but the matter of will PI p. 213).
He also claims that the perception is “described” and that experi-
ence is “presented”; that, in a case of quick recognition of aspects,
the decisive role is connected with habit and upbringing (here
one should allow some kind of relevance of “visual literacy”); and
finally that there is no special justification in the language–game
of representing visual experiences.
His solution seems to be unacceptable since he claims that there is a dif-
ference between (9) and (10 – 11). It seems that one cannot see an aspect
without noticing the drawing, therefore there cannot be (10, 11) without
(9), as it were that (9) is “phenomenologically” prior to (10, 11), or the
condition of (10, 11). On the other hand, an aspect must be, so to speak,
“epistemologically” prior to the drawing itself, since the “particular organ-
isation of lines” is also an aspect of the drawing as well as the duck aspect,
or the rabbit aspect. To give an example.
• If one sees this , one could say that he or she sees “a small black circle”,
*

or “a black dot”, or “a hole on a white piece of paper”. Now, there is no

special reason to regard “a small black circle” as the precise description
of what one sees. The “small black round circle” as a superior descrip-
tion would then have two aspects, namely, a dot aspect and a hole as-
pect.
Therefore, we have one more distinction regarding the dubbit:
The first distinction:
(14) Seeing nothing (white piece of paper with nothing on it), and
(15) Seeing something (white piece of paper with some lines on it)
The second distinction:
(15) Seeing something (white piece of paper with some lines on it), and
(16) Seeing something as a duck (some lines as a duck, LW I 165 – 72)
The third distinction:
136 Kristijan Krkač

Figure 8: Seeing something and seeing nothing

(16) Seeing something as a duck (some lines as a duck), and

(17) Seeing something as a rabbit (some lines as a rabbit)
The first distinction (14 – 15) is the issue of perception (see Føllesdal
2005:127 – 42); the second (15 – 16) and the third one (16 – 17) are is-
sues of “an aspect seeing”, and in some more complicated cases also
the issues of so to speak “aspect talent”, opposite of which could be “as-
pect blindness”. However, levels of these phenomena are topics under the
heading “visual literacy”. In order to clarify the first distinction, namely
seeing something – seeing nothing (i. e. 14 – 15) one should compare two
situations as shown in figure 8 where concerning a) one could react with
an utterance such as “I see something”, while concerning b) with an ut-
terance such as“I don’t see anything” or “I see nothing”.
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 137

In both cases, a) and b), the words “something” and “nothing” are
used figuratively, not literally. Namely, in a) one is using “something”
in a way that if one is asked to explicate what one sees in more detail,
one would probably say something regarding an unorganised pile of
mostly straight lines, etc. By giving such an answer one is in fact saying
“I am seeing something, but it doesn’t resemble anything I know” or “I
cannot recognise what I am seeing”. Now, in b), by saying “I see nothing”
one is not claiming that he/she is blind, rather that one cannot recognise
what one sees. Namely, as being simply “white, say, piece of paper” it
could be almost anything white, and by that one claims that he/she
does not recognise anything else besides the colour. Therefore, seeing
without recognising would be similar to “pure perception”, while seeing
with recognition would be perception + thinking (here “thinking” means
“seeing–as” which includes a use of some concepts, as well as interpreta-
tive activity).
(18) Wittgenstein’s point here is not just that we interpret in the same
way as we actually perceive the dubbit, rather that we see the dubbit
as we interpret it. Wittgenstein seems to make two “hypotheses”,
one that says that there is a change of aspect, and secondly that
there is a change of interpretation.
(18.1) The first hypothesis leads to the somewhat odd consequence
that aspects are in one’s mind (but there is no private language, at least in
this case, and the aspects can be described simplyas “duck” or “rabbit”), or
that aspects are in the very organisation of lines (but senses do not expe-
rience, we do, and we experience aspects).
(18.2) The second hypothesis leads to the consequence that aspects
are just language–games of specific interpretations (but then the qualifi-
cation of “visual experience” is dropped out), or that aspects are not just
language–games but something more (which leads back to the issue of
private language, or to the issue of grammar and of forms of life).
(18.3) At first sight, it seems that Wittgenstein chooses the second
hypothesis, and that he struggles with the possibility to save the stand-
point from the problems of private language on one hand, and from
the problems with attributing “mystical powers” to the drawing, or to
the senses on the other hand (PI, Z, Denneson 2002).
However, investigating the second possibility (18.2) and (18.3) leads one
directly to the issue of the grammar of sight, because a number of distinc-
tions regarding the dubbit enable certain morphological investigations
which leads to an explication of the grammar. Say that, unorganised
138 Kristijan Krkač

lines are = a, the dubbit = b, the duck aspect = c, the rabbit aspect = d,
the monster = e, and SA = seeing–as. Now, there are many possibilities,
namely the following.

MORPHOLOGICAL RELATIONS
(18.4) “Seeing unorganised lines SaAb AN IDENTIFICATION
as the dubbit.”
(18.5) “Seeing the dubbit SbAc NOTICING OF AN
as a duck.” ASPECT
(18.6) “Seeing a duck ScAd A CHANGE OF AN
as a rabbit.” ASPECT
(18.7) “Seeing the dubbit SbAe AN IMAGINATION
as a monster.”

SaAb is the issue of perception of an odd drawing, a drawing which “re-

sembles” something, but one is not sure what it is. In order for a to “re-
semble” to “something” one needs concepts of “duck” and “rabbit”, oth-
erwise it would not “resemble” at all. This could be compared to seeing a
3D picture which has only two aspects, namely “a strange pattern” and
“an organised picture” representing something particular. Now, SbAc is
the “dawning of an aspect”, say the duck aspect. We could imagine one
exclaiming “Oh, now I see, it is the duck!”. However, ScAd is the most
important possibility, namely, a change of aspects. Again, one could ex-
claim “What is this, I see a duck now!”. Now, what is the difference be-
tween (18.5) and (18.6)? The difference is similar to the one between “in-
complete” and “complete” identification, say of flightless birds, namely
penguins, or of flying animals which are not birds, namely bats, and in
that light (18.6) could be regarded by one noticing a change of aspects
as a genuine discovery accompanied with surprise and admiration. As
Wittgenstein points out, (18.6) could be regarded as a new discovery be-
cause it is not a result of separate noticings of aspects. One could notice
one aspect separately from another; more to that, (18.6) means to “no-
tice” the change of one aspect into another aspect, and learning to control
this change (therefore it is an issue of will). Consequently, (18.5) is not
“noticing an aspect” at all, it is simply “identification” of an organisation
of lines as a duck for instance. In such a situation something unidentified
should not be regarded as “an aspect”. So far it was explicated that
• “seeing” is needed (regarding 18.4),
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 139

• that “concepts” are needed, and therefore a change of aspects is related

to thinking (18.5);
• and that “a control of the change” is needed, and therefore it is related
to willingness as well (18.6).
In other words, one could say that it is a perceiving-thinking-willingness
issue. Now imagine that one seeing aspects is changing seeing one aspect
into another at will and does that for a few minutes, almost automatically.
At one such a change one does not see any of two aspects but sees a
one–eyed monster with both ears on the left side of its head. This is a
new relation, namely not “seeing–as” but “imagining–as”. Surely, one
does not need “a lot of imagination” but some seems to be necessary.
• Therefore imagination is also needed (18.7).
Imagining the dubbit as a one–eyed monster with both ears on the left
side of its head, and imagining for instance a kitchen table with a vase
on it in which there are two tulips as a giraffe (as shown in figure 9)
are to be differed regarding the level of imagination. On the other
hand, in the case of the dubbit and of a kitchen table imagination is lim-
ited, since one imagines something as something else. One could imagine
the dubbit as a monster consisting of an eye and two legs walking around
(as shown in figure 10). Therefore, to the previous conclusion we could
add imagination, and claim that the dubbit is a perceiving-thinking-will-
ingness-imagining issue. Now, in order to clear this conceptual mess one
should try to separate different kinds of propositions regarding these
morphological relations (18.4 – 7).

4. A grammar of the dubbit

The last point leads us to the conceptual or grammatical investigation of
aspects (not to the causal or perceptual issues). At various places (RPP I,
II for instance) Wittgenstein claims that the issue of “conceptual mess” is
caused by the mess inherent in the common use of words like “see” and
“interpret”. The issue is not causal, but conceptual, since eyes are not
tools of the brain, for the reason that eyes do not see, “we” do. However,
this seems to be circular because one needs to see in order to interpret,
and one needs to interpret in order to see.
(19) Here Wittgenstein tries to preserve some kind of reality of aspects
without private language, and at the same time the reality of percep-
tion as well as avoiding many issues regarding visual experience.
140 Kristijan Krkač

Figure 9: A kitchen table with a vase and two tulips

Figure 10: The dubbit as a monster

This is so because what is important in the interpretation is habit

and upbringing (PI p. 201) but also that “the substratum of this ex-
perience is mastering a technique” (PI p. 208). Aspect talent and as-
pect blindness are not issues of visual perception but of visual liter-
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 141

Table 1: All of the distinctions regarding the dubbit

acy, visual arts (McFee 1999), culture, perhaps also of social psy-
chology, consumer behaviour, epistemology of eyewitness testimo-
ny, etc. to point out only a few applications.
To repeat all of the distinctions (with the distinction between “a pile of
lines” (scribble) and “organised lines” included as shown in table 1).
Table 1 shows that only “a perception of the dubbit”, “a duck aspect”
and “a rabbit aspect” are significant for the seeing-as issue. In the table
6.1 circularity is not suggested, but it could be, since in one way or an-
other basic circularity (namely, interpreted as seen, and seen as interpret-
ed) repeats itself (the curved dashed arrow on the right side of table 6.1
could be represented as a circular one). Regarding this issue of circularity,
which is introduced due to the somewhat unclear function of “interpre-
tation”, a solution could be suggested. Namely, one could try to interprete
with some less “interpretative” actions then “interpretation”; for instance
142 Kristijan Krkač

“noticing” (as Wittgenstein does). The dubbit is perceived, but the duck
and the rabbit aspects are noticed or recognised. On the other hand,
what is noticing if not perceiving with special care or concern. Therefore,
circularity remains. It could be possible to find the way in explicating
Wittgenstein’s solution positively no matter if such an attempt is some-
what risky. However, let us start with the negative or critical elements
of his standpoint.
(20.1) In opposition to behaviourism and some empiricist “explana-
tions”, Wittgenstein seems to suggest, that what “we” perceive are not just
lines but organised lines (therefore the alleged distinction between “a pile
of lines” and “organised lines” is of no relevance, see previously 6.2.1.).
(20.2) On the other hand, against Gestalt theory, he claims that what
we perceive are not “visual objects” (mental entities, RPP I 1035), or at
least that there is no need to postulate such entities. Wittgenstein goes
instantly against empiricist thesis of “the myth of the given” according
to which there are pure stimuli (pure perception) which will be interpret-
ed later on, RPP I 101 – 2, Z 223 – 5.
(20.3) If there is no change, neither “in” the drawing (pure stimulus
+ interpretation) ! (against behaviourism), nor “in” the organisation
(visual objects) ! (against Gestalt psychology), but there is a change
like the one in “seeing” and in “thinking” ! (Wittgenstein’s solution),
then the question still remains – is this thinking (interpreting) or seeing?
The notion of “seeing” seems to be natural; no matter if the actual use of
the word is metaphorical. However, the idea of “thinking” seems to be
quite strange regarding this particular case.
(20.4) The argument for (20.3) “seeing” is by no means perception.
On the other hand “seeing–as” is a little bit like a thinking or willingness;
and this is so, because “seeing” for example a double cross or a Necker’s
cube, does not involve only the seeing of the phenomenon, namely going
along the borders of the white or black cross in order for one to “see” the
cross, but also some concepts are needed, such as “the white background”
or “the picture in front” (see the Figure 3 at the beginning of the chapter).
(20.5) In other words, if one needs concepts to see the aspects, then
the process is not purely perceptual but also conceptual as well and if one
needs to “use certain concepts appropriately” in order to “see” the aspect,
then it can be called “interpretation”. Finally if one needs aspect talent
and training in order to see all of aspects, then it includes a considerable
level of visual literacy, creativity and imagination.
Now, these seem to be reasons for his standpoint. Here we can repeat it
more clearly. Wittgenstein’s final position seems to be the following.
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 143

(21) “Seeing–as” can be located between seeing (pure perception) and

thinking (pure interpretation), but it is in some cases (like in the
case of the dubbit) closer to the interpretation. This explication is
quite close to Baker’s interpretation, which says that it is “half per-
ception–half imagination”, Baker 2004, 282. It can be formulated
as “mono–aspectual seeing” and as “multi–aspectual seeing”.
(21.1) Wittgenstein’s reason for (21) can be explicated as well. There
is no sharp borderline between perception and interpretation. This is so
because of two further reasons.
(21.1.1.) “Seeing–as” is similar to an interpretation (imagination,
thinking, willingness) because optical and visual pictures stay the same,
because seeing an aspect is a matter of will (it is possible to strive to
see an aspect and to succeed) and finally because by noticing aspects
one does not notice simply the organisation of the drawing, but also in-
ternal relations, perhaps even some hints of its pattern (its grammar, this
is similar to Good’s position mentioned at the beginning).
(21.1.2.) On the other hand, “seeing–as” is also similar to seeing, be-
cause it is not possible to be mistaken regarding noticing an aspect. To see
an aspect is a state, and there is no simpler expression of experience of
“seeing–as” then expressions such as “I see this as a rabbit now” in a
case when one sees a drawing of the dubbit. Namely, “seeing an odd
drawing” is not simply an expression of an experience of “seeing this
odd drawing as a rabbit”. However, aspects are not given, one needs train-
ing in order to notice them, especially more complicated ones like the
dubbit.
Here the main thesis which says that the dubbit is a good example of
morphological inquiry and philosophical grammar can be explicated.
Namely, if one is trained to see aspects, then what we have are experiential
propositions, hinge proposition, and grammatical propositions such as
the following:
GRAMMATICAL PROPOSITIONS
(22) A grammar of sight is possible. (Good 2006)
(23) “Seeing is a state, while seeing–as (interpreting) is an action.” (RPP
I 1, LW I 89)
(24) “Seeing–as is half perception and half interpretation.” (Baker 2004)
(25) “Everything observed is at least one-aspectual.”
144 Kristijan Krkač

(26) “The aspect-seeing (and aspect-change) is subject to the will: this by

itself relates it to the thinking” (RPP II 544 – 5, PI p. 212), perhaps
even a perceiving-thinking-willing-imagining issue.

HINGE PROPOSITIONS
(27) “The dubbit has many aspects.”
(28) “Aspects can change from one into another.”
(29) “The dubbit has many aspects, namely, the following (a) A pile of
lines (or “lines organised in certain manner”), (b) a duck, (c) a rab-
bit, (d) a one-eyed monster with both ears on the left side of its
head.” (an extension of proposition 23)

EXPERIENTIAL PROPOSITIONS
(30) “ is the dubbit.” (an experience of identification)
(31) “I see the dubbit as a rabbit now.” (an experience of “aspect-dawn-
ing”)
(32) “A rabbit changed into a duck.” (an experience of “aspect-change”)
Now, the descriptions of aspects (a–d) in (29) are not different regarding
clarity. Namely, the description (a) is not “more clear” then, say the de-
scription (d). However, (a) can be regarded as clearer then (d) for partic-
ular purpose. All of them are on the same level, but surely (a) is a more
“perceptual” description while (d) is a description that is more “imagina-
tive” (or creative). Descriptions (b) and (c) are in this context “aspectual”
descriptions. Finally, one could find herself in situations where she sees
nothing, especially after imagining strange aspects like the one–eyed
monster, and afterwards starting from scratch (seeing only “unorganised
lines on paper”). Furthermore, a grammar of the dubbit would have to
be presented. Here, I am only suggesting one possible way of such a pre-
sentation (as shown in table 2).
Therefore, the final table would have to include at least some prop-
ositions regarding the grammar of sight (as shown in table 3).
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 145

Table 2: The grammar of the dubbit

Table 3: All distinctions regarding the dubbit accompanied with a few propositions
146 Kristijan Krkač

5. Some objections instead of conclusion

Wittgenstein often hesitates while stating and accepting the abovemen-
tioned solution (21 – 21.1.2.) Once again, one could ask – what is think-
ing in this case? Is thinking not something like reasoning, while in this
case it seems to be more like intuitive knowledge? Wittgenstein explicitly
claims that a report such as “Now I see this as a duck” is a spontaneous
response to what is seen. He also implicitly claims that the organisation
of a drawing of the dubbit, or organisation of our seeing, is not changed
(against behaviourism and Gestalt psychology), rather our attitude is
changed (Glock 1997, 39), our way of reacting, and if one reacts correctly
and quickly it also means that one has some kind of ability for “aspect–-
seeing”, talent and training. Thinking, on the other hand, simply means
that particular concepts are needed in order to see an aspect, in order to
describe what one sees (RPP I 1029, 36). However, the keynote that he
makes regarding “seeing–as” is that it is integral to complete perception,
not just concerning few exceptions to the “standard perception” like the
dubbit, the double cross and similar. These are examples of a particular
“grammar of sight” which shows that our perception is mostly “half in-
terpreting – half seeing”. Of course, some visible things do not have
“the second aspect” (they are mono-aspectual), but at the end, it is the
issue of our willingness, imagination, and training, since perhaps an or-
dinary table with a vase and two tulips do not have “the second aspect”,
but a bicycle can be “seen–as” a bull’s head and the rest of it. Claiming
that all of visual perception is in fact “aspect seeing” leads to the some-
what strange possibility, namely that many observed phenomena are as
it were “at least-one-aspect phenomena” or perhaps not (LW I 172). In
addition, it changes our understanding of perception in front of our
eyes. Finally, a little bit of “two aspect–art” instead of a substantial con-
clusion, or needed criticism (as shown in Figure 7).

Acknowledgements and a note

I would like to thank Boran Berčić, Josip Lukin, Davor Pećnjak, and
Nenad Smokrović for their criticism and suggestions regarding some fun-
damental points of my viewpoint. This paper is in fact a continuation of
my treatment of the dubbit topic, namely the title is “Wittgenstein’s dub-
bit – III” since I published Krkač K. 2005 “Wittgensteinov patkozec”,
(“Wittgenstein’s dubbit”) in: Filozofska istraživanja (98, 2/2005), 2005,
 Wittgenstein’s Dubbit III 147

Figure 11: Marcel Duchamp, “Fountain” (1917)

647 – 663, and Krkač K. 2007 “Wittgensteinov patkozec II, predavanje o

patkozecu” (“Wittgenstein’s Dubbit II, Lecture on Dubbit”, the second
part), in: Godišnjak za filozofiju, 2007, 67 – 95. However, this part is
substantively rewritten and shortened in terms that only in the first sec-
tion there are some similarities with previous papers (I, and II), while sec-
tions two to five are completely new except for a few sentences of lesser
significance for newly developed thesis.
148 Kristijan Krkač

Bibliography
Wittgenstein’s works
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology I, Oxford
1982. [= LW I]
–: Philosophical Grammar, Oxford 1974. [= PG]
–: Philosophical Investigations, Oxford 1953, revised edn 2001. [= PI]
–: Philosophical Occasions 1912 – 1951, eds. James Klagge and Alfred Nord-
mann, Indianapolis 1993. [= PO]
–: Public and Private Occasions, eds. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, Lan-
ham 2003. [= PPO]
–: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, I, II, 1980, Oxford. [= RPP I, II]
–: Zettel, Oxford 1967, 2nd edn. 1981. [= Z]

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