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in his religious beliefs. Rather, his apparently heretical discussions on belief are
actually just set-pieces of the kind of free-wheeling thought that Montaigne is
interested in analysing. It was not a burning need to resolve epistemological issues
that brought Montaigne to adopt Pyrrhonist scepticism. Rather, that brand of
agnostic skepticism usefully grants intellectual legitimacy to the kind of balanced
and open-ended processes of internal deliberation that Montaigne was keen to
investigate.
To‖be‖fair,‖it‖should‖be‖said‖that‖Cave’s‖book‖is‖well‖written and it does offer
the reader a good deal of useful background for reading the Essais. However, I
cannot help but wonder whether he might have fallen victim to a hyper-
sophisticated version of a subterfuge planned long by Montaigne himself.
Somewhat notoriously, Leo Strauss insists that we must always struggle to pierce
through the veil of irony and rhetorical distractions used by philosophical writers
to hide their unorthodox views from the eyes of potential persecutors. Cave claims
that,‖‚Just‖as‖Montaigne is not out to state a philosophical position in the Essais, so
too he avoids asserting religious belief, or indeed talking about divine questions at
all‛‖(p.47).‖What‖better‖way‖for‖a‖heterodox‖thinker‖to‖distance‖himself‖from‖his‖
heretical doctrines than to pretend that he is merely concerned with the process of
thinking itself and not with the content or conclusions of that process?
124 http://www.practical-philosophy.org.uk
Book Reviews
philosophy exists to make us better human beings — but it can make us more
profound‖ ones‛‖ (p.6).‖ He marshals passages from works including The Birth of
Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music, Human All Too Human, The Gay Science, On the
Genealogy of Morals, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra in order to trace Nietzsche's
tortured search for a worthy way to live in a world where God has died and in
which science appears set to explain everything. Appropriately, his discussion of
truth is not framed by issues of epistemological theory (such as: is Nietzsche a
pragmatist?)‖ but‖ rather‖ by‖ the‖ question‖ of‖ how‖ the‖ ‘will‖ to‖ truth’‖ should‖ be‖
incorporated‖ into‖our‖ lives.‖The‖ famous‖ doctrine‖ of‖ the‖ ‘eternal‖ return’‖ is‖ hardly‖
given consideration as a scientific or metaphysical thesis; rather it can serve as a
litmus test of character, separating those capable of embracing it from those
terrified by it. We are told about the proper roles in life of remembering and
forgetting,‖ of‖ cheerfulness‖ and‖ will.‖ Pearson's‖ discussion‖ of‖ ‘the‖ ultimate‖
beauties’―rare and fleeting moments of inspiration―is especially intriguing.
I found Pearson's approach quite appealing; he has certainly focused upon
the most central and gripping aspect of Nietzsche's writings. He also manages to
take Nietzsche very seriously without losing his critical perspective. Although I
read all of the texts he discusses many years ago, his book inspires me to reread
them in a more engaged fashion.
This book does suffer from one flaw, a rather major flaw inasmuch as it is
meant to serve as a first introduction to its subject. Far be it from me to contest the
propriety of Nietzsche's idiosyncratic mode of expression―it would have been a
great loss to our culture if Nietzsche had sacrificed the stylishness of his mind-
bending aphorisms on the altar of philosophical clarity. Pearson is a gifted writer
as well. However, he is not Nietzsche and he is not supposed to be writing in
Nietzsche's genre. Nevertheless, he occasionally seems overly inspired by the
rhetoric of the texts he is explaining and adopts a style that is too long on allusion
and to short on plain explication. It is difficult enough to understand the Master's
leaps of thought. His expositors―especially those writing introductions―would
serve their readers well to walk in careful baby-steps.
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