Você está na página 1de 27

Between the Model of a New Film Culture and the Reality of

Socialist Economy

Film distribution in Czech lands1 from the point of view of the conflict between
ideological and economic goals (1948-1968)

Abstract:
Distribution was supposed to serve the Czechoslovakian communist regime as a vehicle for
creating a new type of film culture. The failure of this model highlighted the tension between
the ideological requirements put on cultural policy and the economic requirements put on the
film industry. Therefore, distribution in 1948-1968 can be seen not only as a vehicle for the
implementation of the official political ideology, but also as a place of clashes of different
interests implemented by means of particular distribution practices. Besides the research of
the changes of the individual distribution strategies, it is also possible to see a certain stable
feature of the operation of film distribution within a socialist economic system: It is a
shortage. János Kornai’s economic model of an economy of shortage represents a productive
conceptual framework for research of both film distribution and reception under the
conditions of a totalitarian communist system.

“We have nationalized not only film production ... we have also nationalized film renting,
which means that it is impossible for foreign film agencies to nose around here freely and sell
all kinds of rubbish as they did in the past. Film distribution is fully in the hands of the state,
which has to ensure that even the most expensive films are shown everywhere and not only in
those places where the rent fee is paid...“
Kopecký, presentation at the VIII. Czechoslovakian Communist Party (KSČ) congress, March
19462

As this quotation, presented two years before the communist putsch, suggests, film
distribution was perceived not only by the communist machinery, but also by some of the film
industry executives, as a vehicle of creating a new national film culture – the process of
cleaning out the “rubbish“3 was not supposed to be limited by the commercial aspect of profit
or at least returnability. However, the total and immediate subordination of the film
distribution practice to the goals of the KSČ‟s “cultural policy“ was not possible even after
the putsch, mostly due to two interconnected reasons: The first one is the inertia of the fixed
distribution mechanisms maintained mainly by contractual obligations towards foreign
distributors (due to these, a more consistent implementation of the “cleaning” did not happen
until almost two years after the communist putsch); the second one is the financial intensity
of maintaining the nationalized domestic film industry, which was connected with state
budget on one side and with economic results of distribution on the other side. The total
subordination of the distribution practise to ideological goals was conditioned by economic
criteria – the definition of a suitable relationship between the “cultural-political and economic
view” became the central and explicitly reflected criteria for creation and partial changes of
the distribution practices for the whole period of 1948-1968 (and, of course, until 1989). The
emphasis on the cultural-political value, i.e. looking at film not only from the economic, but
also from the artistic and political points of view, is connected to the actual nationalization
concept, which was already formed by left-wing, mainly communist, film industry agents
during WWII.4 Therefore, it also suggests itself as a suitable viewpoint when describing the
practices developed in this sector helping to analyze the important changes or deviations that
occurred. These can be studied in two lines, which react to the more or less reflected tension
between the ideological formation of film culture and the economic requirements of the film
industry. One line is represented by system changes and regulations coordinated by the
Communist Party and government authorities. The second line is represented by the efforts
made by subjects on various levels of the distribution organization – these try to implement
such measures within the system that will enable them to fulfil the tasks assigned. With such a
detailed view it is necessary to correct the assertion of Eva Dzúriková, who, in the only
monograph so far devoted to the history of distribution in Czechoslovakia, says that due to the
maximum centralization of film making management “the import and distribution policy of
„ideology in film, the Communist Party line and up-to-dateness„ was implemented in practice
without any major problems.”5 In fact, in the period of 1948-68 it is possible to see several
stages in which there were not only changes in the system carried out on the basis of the
Communist Party and government organizations, but also different conflicts, clashes of
interests, and applications of practices that were supposed to subordinate the ideological
assignment to the subject‟s own interests.

A diachronic point of view makes it possible to highlight the specific nature of the film
distribution mechanisms, whose changes are not fully synchronized with the wider political
and social processes. Besides that, this approach makes it possible to see the distribution
practices and presentations not only as the gear control lever for the implementation of
cultural policy based on ideological assignment, but also as a place for the conflict of interests
in different institutions, political authorities and the more or less independent economic units
– The Czechoslovakian Film Association, or The Czechoslovakian State Film, The District
Film Enterprise, and the National Committees (the committees comprised a system of local
authorities at the level of village, city, or a district). Their goal is not only the fulfilment of the
ideological assignment but also the performance of their own particular interests and
justification of their positions within the distribution system. Thus, we will not study
distribution and presentation as the mere implementation of ideological frameworks and
economic criteria for the planned fulfilment imposed “from above”, but as a specific
processes that will try to comply with those frameworks but that is at the same time a place of
deviations, a place that puts up resistance against the smooth progress of the ideology.
Whether, to a certain extent, intentional, caused mainly by the economic interests of a certain
institution or unintentional, caused by the particularity of distribution mechanisms and
structure.
The basic conceptual framework in which it is useful to study these mechanisms is the
political-economic analysis of the socialist system performed by the Hungarian economist,
János Kornai.6 This helps us to grasp, on a more general level, the sources and mechanisms of
the tension worked between the economic and ideological tasks, and the motivation of the
practices that try to subdue this tension. We will focus mainly on one typical feature shown
by the film distribution service during the whole period of 1948-1970 – this feature is chronic
shortage economy.
From 1949 there is, in the distribution offer, an inhibition of a certain film product type for
which there was high demands from the viewers and that can be for the given purpose
identified with the production of capitalist countries, which was included in the period‟s
statistics under “other production” (i.e. production that does not come from Czechoslovakia,
the Soviet Union or “people‟s democratic countries“). Such equivalence, which requires
identification of a certain value of goods with national production (especially American,
British, French and Italian), is, of course, only provisional – further research will have the task
of finding out what types of values are offered, among others, by the films of these national
cinema industries which were missed by the viewers (we will look for the values in certain
types of genre structures and in experiences connected to them, for example adventure,
detective and comedy genres). However, the data of attendance and number of presentations
shows us that the bearers of the values that the viewers looked for in the cinema were films
from the capitalist countries. However, their offer was strongly limited to 1960 and it was also
limited during the 1960‟s based on ideological criteria. The viewpoint of national production
for the differentiation of offer is problematic from the point of view of demand and reception,
but from the standpoint of the offer it corresponds with the period‟s criterion for defining
cultural-political values and it facilitates the analysis of distribution and exhibition practices.
Until the beginning of the 60‟s, these values had automatically been attributed mechanically
according to the film‟ place of origin – it was only in 1963 that the requirement for individual
evaluation of individual films began to gain more ground.7
The existence of the shortage economy is, according to Kornai, not an accidental feature,
but a feature principally connected to the classical socialist system – is caused by the interests
and motivations of the individual agents of the system as well as by the most general pre-
requisites of its functioning, i.e. the official ideology of the ruling (communist) party and the
dominant position of state property. Kornai‟s model gives a general picture of the causal
connections that in the case of film distribution worked in relationship with centre of power,
which formed distribution primarily on the basis of ideological criteria, as well as in the
relationship to particular administrative and economic agents (The Czechoslovakian State
Film, the district film enterprises and the National Committees) that fulfilled their tasks and
enforced their interests.8 Kornai‟s model shows that the situation of the absence of goods on
the market is conditioned not only by the previous link of the causal chain, which is in our
case especially the performance plan, but immediately also by other characteristic features of
the system: ideological requirements on suitable compositions of distribution offer as they
were expressed by the Communist Party‟s and government‟s authorities; the state‟s monopoly
on distribution; or central dramaturgy of distribution. It is, of course, necessary to historicize
this model and study its particular implementations and changes – e.g. the bureaucratization
of management was most obviously shown at the end of the 40‟s and at the beginning of the
50‟s in the form of programme series, then programming was decentralized in two stages.
The main line of causality

Block 5
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
Forced growth;
Undivided Dominant Preponderance Plan Chronic
power of the position of of bureaucratic bargaining; shortage
Marxist- state and coordination Quantity drive; economy;
Leninist party; quasi-state Paternalism; Labor shortage
ownership Soft budget and
Dominant constraint; unemployment
influence of Weak on the job;
the official responsiveness the system
ideology to prices; ... specific
situation and
role of foreign
trade; ...
“Shortage economy” also enables us to grasp, as a model, the reaction of consumers –
viewers – within the given economic relationships. In the event of absence of the sought-after
type of goods on the market, consumers have the following options: 1. satisfy their needs by
means of forced substitution with another product; 2. continue looking for the required goods
on the market; 3. postpone the purchase until the product is on the market; 4. give up their
intention of buying the product.

Shopping process starts

0. Good available right away 1. Good available Not available


at the first store at the first store: queuing

2. Forced substitution 3. Search 4. Postponement 5. Purchasing intent


abandoned

0. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 0. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

As we will try to show further herein, the film distribution system tried to solve the
shortage in three different ways. Changing its view of which solution was preferable or
admissible. In the first stage there was a prevailing emphasis on the viewers to satisfy their
demand for “worthless goods“ represented by the “escapist films of capitalist production”
substitutionally - by means of cultural and “ideologically” valuable goods, or to change, in the
future, even the need itself and not to demand the worthless goods at all. Even after the failure
of the assumption that a certain type of need will be totally and immediately successfully
forced out, this forced substitution remained the preferred and asserted solution. Besides that,
it was possible to satisfy the already accepted need of “escapist products“ in two ways. The
first one, asserted by means of power, was satisfying the need by means of domestic
production, or the production of the Soviet Union or of the so called people‟s democratic
countries. The second solution, which was gradually applied by the economic subjects
connected to distribution with increasing success, was a limited offer of films from the
capitalist production.
Let us now have a look, from the standpoint of the functioning of the shortage economy, at
the quantitative data about the number of distributed films, number of exhibitions and
attendance. In the case of the number of screenings (chart no. 1) it is obvious that between
1948 and 1953 the exclusion of the films from capitalist countries was accompanied by a
simultaneous increase in the number of Soviet and Eastern Bloc films, which in connection to
the common practice of organized attendance implies the effort to force the viewers to
substitute one product type with another. However, a look at the attendance statistics (chart
no. 2) shows that this effort was definitely unsuccessful and with regard to the economic
necessity of profit from cinemas for the operation of the film industry, it was necessary to
increase the number of Western movies attractive for the viewers. This increase was
accompanied by great interest from the viewers. In 1957 attendance reached the highest level
in the history of Czechoslovakian cinema. After a shorter deviation in the opposite direction
caused by repeated tightening in the application of the “cultural-political views”, the number
of Western films kept increasing until 1969. That corresponds to the increasing attendance of
these films and decrease in interest in any other production including Czech ones. Although
the total attendance in this decade kept decreasing, the attendance of Western films reached
higher figures than in 1957. Instead of the effort to eradicate a certain type of goods and the
demand itself, the viewers were offered the type of goods they were looking for – and even
the increase in the number of TV sets in households,9 which the film industry alleged as the
reason for the decrease in the total attendance, did not stop the interest in the Western
production. However, in the same period there was a significant decrease in the number of
viewers per screening (chart no. 3) even for movies from western countries, which shows a
change in the distribution approach. The point of view of “economy”, defined as the
maximization of the usage of the cinemas capacity, regulated distribution – with the exception
of a two-year “easing” in 1957-58 – up to the 60‟s. After that the criterion for the number of
cinema visits per inhabitant, which accounted for the increase in the screening of Western
films, started to be preferred. Such a change of approach can imply offer reduction because
films stayed on the programme longer then. However, the problem was that the high rate of
usage of the cinema capacities in the 50‟s had been basically reached by means of coordinated
campaigns of mass organizations and by decreasing the number of screenings. Besides that,
films were often reprised because of limited stock distribution, so, ironically the extension of
offer and horizontal differentiation did not happen. On the other hand, the criterion for the
number of cinema visits per inhabitant led to a higher number of screenings and it justified
keeping successful, though “politically and culturally worthless”, films on the programme
until the demand had been met, and it also increased the availability of the demanded films.

The following text tries to describe some of the particular distribution practices as partial
reasons for the phenomenon of shortage as well as ways of response to its existence. We will
study them as strategies that try to solve the discrepancy between the system‟s ideological and
economic demands. It is important to distinguish between two types of shortage: vertical and
horizontal.10 The first one is connected to the relationships of superiority and subordination
among institutions and it lies in the insufficient supply of goods by the supplier. In our case of
film distribution this concerns insufficient supply of films attractive for the viewers caused by
putting a stop to the purchase of films from Western countries. Horizontal shortage appears in
the supplier-consumer relationship and the aforementioned model shows the consumer‟s
possible reactions to the shortage of the demanded goods (films of the demanded
entertainment value). If there is a great shortage of certain goods – and a great surplus of other
goods that are supposed to work as substitutes – which was a characteristic feature of
Czechoslovakian distribution in 1948-1970, then Kornai‟s economic model provides a good
conceptual tool. It enables us to understand the particular distribution practices on the market
as attempts to cope with the shortage, which appeared both among the individual subjects of
the distribution system (vertical shortage) and in relation to the viewers (horizontal shortage).
We will focus mainly on the period of 1948-1968. This period is defined from one side by
the communist putsch, which enabled a full-scale application of a “classic socialist system”,
and from the other side by a temporary “derailment” of the distribution system in 1968-1969.
A rapid swing in both the distribution offers and attendance was caused especially by two
factors: Partly by the implementation of a new economic management system on 1 January
1969, which led to higher interest of the distribution employees in the economic results and it
represented one of the elements of the reform of the classical socialist system;11 and partly,
with regard to the distribution system, by an outside factor, i.e. the invasion of the
intervention troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This caused temporary suppression
of the distribution of Soviet and “people‟s democratic” films as well as the viewers‟
manifestation of lack of interest in this production.
However, it is necessary to deal briefly with distribution in the early post-war years because
at that time the basic features of the system created after the communist putsch in February
1948 were already being formed. Besides the actual action of film industry nationalization on
August 28, 1945 and its consequences, another important cause of this partial continuity was
also the fact that the film industry came under the Ministry of Information and was therefore
controlled by the communists, so distribution was heavily influenced by the Communist
Party‟s interests.

1945-48: Economic Arguments in the Service of Political Objectives


The main problem during the post-war launch of cinemas operations was, besides the
technical condition of the cinemas, lack of suitable films. There were only unacceptable
German films and Czech films with German subtitles that were “provocative“ and technically
difficult to remove.12 The situation was to be solved by import contracts – mainly with
Hollywood studios and Sojuzintorgkino. The contract with the Soviet film industry made in
July 1945 favoured Soviet production in an extreme way and ensured Sojuzintorgkino 60% of
the screenings in cinemas and the purchase of at least 100 Soviet films during the first year of
the contract with a gradual increase of 5% per year. However, the Soviet film industry was
unable to meet such volumes and the lack of films for distribution was eventually solved by
an agreement with the MPEA, which ensured that in 1946 thirty-four and then a year later
eighty-two American films were accepted for distribution.13 As far as the number of
screenings is concerned, in 1946 films from the USA and Western Europe almost equalled the
Soviet production and in 1947 they dominated the cinemas with an almost 50% share (in
attendance they even reached a 55,6% share). The focus of the communist-controlled
distribution on “Slavic countries” and especially on the Soviet Union was obvious, but its full
implementation was not successful because of the viewers‟ strong demand for American films
and due to criticism by some members of the press.14
However, in that period particular distribution practices were to be formed by favouring of
Soviet movies. In his speech at the meeting of district cinema directors on 12 February 1947,
the General Director of the Czechoslovakian Film Association Lubomír Linhart supported
such a focus with a clumsy argument about the economic benefits of such practices resulting
from the allegedly advantageous contract with Sojuzintorgkino. This contract ensured the
distribution of the rentals in the 50:50 ratio, while with the MPEA the ratio was 35:65.
According to Linhart cinemas represented the most important profit segment of the
nationalized film, and distribution had to abide by the “profitability” criteria: Therefore,
Czechoslovakian films, for which no profit shares were returned abroad, had to receive the
most preferential treatment. After them it was necessary to privilege Soviet and Swiss films
provided under advantageous contracts. These should be preferentially scheduled for Friday-
Monday terms, but according to Linhart it was American films that were most often
improperly scheduled for weekends.
Linhart‟s argument intentionally weakened the issue of popularity and higher attendance at
films from the individual film productions. The viewers‟ behaviour was presented as a “visit
to the cinema” (not a visit to a particular film) that happened mainly at weekends and it was
possible to use it economically in a better way by means of mechanical changes in scheduling.
The possibility of educating the viewers and leading them to the right cultural and political
values – i.e., among other things, by means of the purification of the distribution offer – was
only implied at that time when the economic view was extended and it “economized” even the
sector of artistic value:
“The new film import committee had to eliminate all the rubbish especially when it is also
economically unbearable. [...] Eliminate, within the shortest time possible, the loss-making
foreign films and mercilessly not only all the loss-making films from the economic point of
view, but also those films that are also loss-making from the cultural viewpoint of the
development of cultural education in Czech viewers.“15
Linhart‟s argument was repeated in the correspondence of the Communist Party‟s apparatus
and there was pressure put on distribution to implement the objectives of the proposed
measures.16 From the archive materials it is clear that there was an obvious effort to enforce
the “cultural-political” objectives, i.e. “encourage” the viewers to go see Soviet films –
although they had so far been presented as subordinate to economic objectives: The transfer
of Soviet films to the more advantageous weekend dates was to lead to higher profit.
The degree of control in the distribution sector and the effort to use it for the preference of
Soviet films is also evidenced by the correspondence between Josef Jonáš, a Communist Party
official, and the Film Rental Office director, Josef Hlinomaz. Jonáš referred to the complaint
of the KSČ District Secretariat in Jindřichův Hradec that characterize the opinion that Soviet
films had been pushed aside not as a cause of economic loss, but as a sabotage: “... when a
Russian film arrives, it is played on a weekday when the workmen are in factories so they
have no chance to see Russian films and they are only fed with Western films of a different
quality. ... we have the feeling that a reactionary is doing this on purpose, which is why we
need to exclude him from this activity in a short time.”17
It is, therefore, possible to see, even before the communist putsch, the distribution sector as
a sector of contradicting economic and political interests, or to see efforts to phrase
economically reasoned “cultural-political“ guidelines. Both the contracts made and the choice
of films for distribution were visible and widely discussed and criticized in press – therefore,
they had to be, despite the left-wing orientation and the official foreign affairs‟ political focus
on the Soviet Union, justified mainly by economic interests (necessity of foreign currency
savings, profitability of contracts). However, the less visible pressures in the film presentation
practice served the political interests of the Communist Party and they were preparing the
position for two main objectives of distribution after the putsch: Cleaning the national film
culture from all “rubbish”; and (re)educating viewers and directing them towards active,
preferably repeated, attendance of suitable films, which would harmonize the cultural-
political and economic interests.
The cinema programmes in Brno18 show that these instructions were not consistently put
into practice in 1947-48 – American and British productions prevailed on weekend
programmes. However, at least partially successful pressure was obviously put on the
scheduling of Prague‟s cinemas. There was a strong interest in using the foreign sector for a
less obvious, and therefore less contestable, influence on the so far miscellaneous film offers,
in which American production was superior in number (although this was partly due to the
fact that the Soviet production could not use the space provided by the contract with
Sojuzintorgkino).19 These deformations of the distribution practice for political objectives
were justified especially by economic interests, which in the rhetoric of the Communist
Party‟s officials were already giving way to political interests and they became more of a
supportive – even as still essential – argument. The following three years of film distribution
were the time of the most intensive efforts to suppress the discrepancies between the
economic and cultural-political views. The cultural-political view put emphasis on the priority
of domestic, Soviet and “people‟s democratic” films and of a limited number of “progressive”
films from Western countries, and the objective was to reduce the national film culture to the
sphere of this production. The economic view expected the highest possible attendance
accompanied by maximum economy – i.e. reaching the highest possible number of viewers
per screening. Between 1949 and 1950 particular measures were taken that were supposed to
help to harmonize both criteria, i.e. attract the maximum number of viewers to the preferred
films – a pre-requisite of a long-term, unenforced implementation of this requirement was the
re-education of viewers and change in their habits. The attendance was not to be kept up by
means of mass campaigns, but by the new distribution offer which would be an answer to the
existing demand.

1948-50: Unsuccessful Attempt at Creating a New type of National


Film Culture

After the February putsch there were purges in the film industry, but the change of regime
was not directly apparent in the particular offers of cinemas or in the distribution system.
However, in November 1948 at the national conference of the Czechoslovakian State Film the
Distribution Director, Jaroslav Málek, defined the task of distribution as “systematic
spreading of film work among the people“. During the fulfilment of this task the district
directors and cinema managers “help those films that are valuable from the cultural and
political points of view and politically important“ by promoting and organizing mass
attendance. On the other hand, “escapist” films were labelled as harmful and attendance
should not be organized for “those films that are the inescapable evil that we have here and
that we still need to deal with.”20 A year and a half later this task was confirmed by the
Czechoslovakian Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC - ÚV KSČ), which presented
a binding guideline for the Czechoslovakian State Film. It determined the need of such
distribution that “educates viewers especially by means of our new films as well as by Soviet
films and films from people‟s democratic countries,” and mass organizations, public
education and school administrations were to ensure their mass attendance.21 In order to meet
the objective, i.e. the education of viewers by directing them towards ideologically suitable
works and the cleaning of distribution from the remaining relics of the pre-putsch cultural
policy (which would free the viewers from the possibility of a wrong choice), two crucial
measures were taken. At the beginning of 1949 “circular distribution” began which ensured
fast circulation of “the most significant films from the distributional point of view” in “circuit
cinemas”. The presented films were put into quarterly programme sequences – each sequence
had to include 6 Czechoslovakian and 4 Soviet films, and 3 places were left for presentations
made directly by the Distribution Centre or for “special cases” (such as the presentation of the
Russian film called The Russian Question). This model, which only worked until the second
half of 1953,22 represented the highest degree of centralization and a pursuit of elimination
certain unpredictability and uncontrollability, which was represented by the scheduling
process within the system.
A year after the implementation of the circular distribution, in January 1950, the process
was completed by shredding all films that had been put into circulation between 1945 and the
autumn of 1948 (with the exception of Soviet Union films). All films eliminated in this way
were subject to a new censorship decision before they could possibly be put into circulation
again.23 The discrepancy between ideological and economic tasks, or between the culturally
and politically desirable but currently low attendance at suitable films and the harmful but
high end economically useful attendance of capitalist production films, was to be removed in
this way – the remaining task was to ensure “permanent and mass attendance of progressive
films” in such an ideal situation in which no other films were put on the programmes.
However, because the premiere profile had been radically reduced (74 films presented in 1950
in comparison with the 92 in the previous year and 199 in 1947) as well as attendance
dropped (98.8 million viewers in 1950 in comparison with 122.2 million in the previous year),
distribution had the task of significantly changing viewers‟ motivation, educating the viewers
in a new “attendance tradition”, and teaching them, in the words of Jaroslav Málek, “to attend
not only the new films but to learn from progressive films again and again and to change the
current state in which a viewer always sees a film only once (underlined by P.S.) [...] film will
really become a possession of the working class, who will protect it against the reactionary
danger of embarrassingly low attendance by enjoying these films and learning from them in
the cinema on a large scale.“24 In 1949-50 the most consistent attempt to implement the model
of a new viewer and new viewer‟s culture was introduced whose formation had already begun
within the discourse of (not only) the left-wing film critique before February 1948, especially
in a discussion about film “rubbish” and “kitsch”. The implementation of this radical version
of the model after 1948 was, however, deformed by a (supposedly temporary) lack of suitable
films from the Soviet Union and from the people‟s democratic countries, which resulted in the
necessity of educating viewers who not only learn form the progressive films but who learn
again and again. This model of a new viewer and new viewer‟s culture was to be based on
the activity of visiting cinemas as an act of self-education and also as a political act – seeing
Soviet Union films was supposed to be a “manifestation of inseparable friendship with the
Soviet Union”, so it was not important whether the viewer had already seen the reprised film
or not;25 and on the contrary, avoidance of Soviet films was “a matter of dubious personal
prestige of enemies of the time“.26
Of course, even after the shredding all the “escapist” films and capitalist production films
did not consistently disappear, but the differentiation was to be strongly limited. Therefore,
the distribution sector, also tied by central programming, became more predictable. It was still
suitable to motivate the cinema workers to ensure attendance at “valuable” films. A system of
bonuses was created for cinema managers which was to motivate them to ensure attendance
of progressive films; attendance competitions were announced; the public education
department of the Distribution Centre was supposed to make campaigns for progressive films;
when “important” Soviet films, such as The Fall of Berlin or Secret Mission, were being
shown, it was ordered to screen only stock films concurrently that would not attract viewers‟
attention.27 However, it was more important to create such administrative and institutional
mechanisms that would ensure sufficient attendance – for example, the function of a district
promotion official, whose task was to “educate viewers and increase attendance”; 82% of
promotion costs in 1949 was spent on “progressive films”, i.e. films from the
Czechoslovakian, Soviet and people‟s democratic productions.28 It was these mechanisms that
represented a new point of uncertainty, a potentially imperfect or totally non-functional
element – there were, for example, complaints that even the Communist Party officials did not
go to see the preferred films,29 or the patronage that enterprises assumed over particular
cinemas was not working.30
The significant decrease in attendance from 129 million in 1948 to 98 million in 1950
showed that the efforts to reach the objective had not been successful – the average number of
viewers per one screening of a Soviet film was, despite organized attendance, 148, while in
the case of “other”, i.e. non-socialist, productions it was 228.
In the Report of the Progress and Results of Distribution in 1949, written for a meeting of
the Cultural Committee,31 Málek says that distribution had been “freed from the American
obligation of distributional bondage”, Western films were only used as additions to the
premiere profile, and the “programme need” was reduced to 101 films – that was, using the
phrasing of that time, a transition from extensive to intensive distribution, which was based on
frequent reprises. For comparison it is suitable to say that, for example, in the early 30‟s only
import itself totalled about 300 films. Even the plans for post-war state-controlled distribution
counted on an import of 200-250 films a year.32 Málek admitted that there was “another threat
of attendance decrease; it is necessary to deal with this seriously from the standpoint of the
cultural and political mission of film as a vehicle for mass awareness, exhilaration and
entertainment, as well as from the point of view of economic self-sufficiency of the
enterprise.”33 On the one hand, he admitted the particularity of the economic interests, which
could not be fully identified with the fulfilment of the cultural and political interests, but on
the other hand, he also referred to a binding decision of the presidium of the Czechoslovakian
Communist Party Central Committee which said that it was “a serious task of the Party, as
well as of the mass organizations, the state educational authorities, and school administration,
to continuously ensure mass attendance of Czechoslovakian, Soviet and other types of
progressive films.”34

For the year of 1951 Málek announced programme extension by “colour epic films that,
besides entertainment, will also bring the viewers enlightenment, and dubbed films, which
will help particularly the rural inhabitants to understand the content of the films”.35 Also
promised was a bigger variety of topics, which was supposed to bring the “escapist” films
viewers back to the cinema and persuade them about the importance of the progressive films.
Among those colour epic films on offer in 1951 was certainly the very popular historical
comedy Emperor’s Baker – Baker’s Emperor as well as the Austrian film Spring on the Ice.
Attendance at the latter reached more than 3 million viewers during its whole presentation
time in Czech cinemas and at that time it was the most attended “Western” film shown from
the end of WWII. Presenting a “more varied programme” was obviously the way to deal with
the task set for the second half of the year by the Ministry of Information to the
Czechoslovakian State Film. The task was to “balance financial management”, i.e. stop the
decrease in takings, which were in the first half-year 60 million lower than expected.
Attendance at the preferred films was to be further ensured, for example, by not screening
more attractive films at the same time – however, the individual cinema managers did not
always adhere to this.36
From 1951 some new distribution practises were introduced – these changes resulted from
admitting to the failure of creating a new, “ideal” film culture based on a “new” viewer that
does not look merely for entertainment but mainly for enlightenment. An economic
expression of this failure was a decrease in takings from CZK 389 million in 1948 to 245
million in 1950. In the following period there was a much more significant reflexion of the
discrepancy between the cultural-political and economic requirements put on distribution.
Which in turn was reflected in certain measures and implications of conflicts between the
Czechoslovakian State Film and the government or Communist Party‟s authorities.
1951-56: The First Decentralisation, Implementation of So-Called
Extended Programmes, and Conflicts with State Authorities

In 1951 the Czechoslovakian State Film started to take various measures in the distribution
sector that were supposed to increase takings and use a certain differentiation of offer. The
“colour epic films” promised by Málek, particularly Spring on the Ice and Emperor’s Baker –
Baker’s Emperor, were exhibited for an “increased flat fee” – i.e. the admission fee was not
graded into three categories according to the distance of the seat from the screen, but all
tickets were sold for the highest price set for the given cinema category. In the next two years
there were other foreign films shown in this way: Child of the Danube (Austria), Tiger Akbar
(West Germany), One Summer of Happiness (Sweden) and To the Eyes of Memory (France).
During 1953 the practice of exhibiting films for the “increased flat fee“ was finished and
instead of that a larger number of films were shown within an “extended programme” for so
called “normal fee increased by 1 CZK ”.37 In 1953 sixteen films were shown in this way and
there were three very popular Czech films among them (Africa I, Angel in the Mountains and
Rafter’s Card Game), the others were “Western” produced films, e.g. Fanfan the Tulip,
Where No vultures Fly or The Beauty of the Devil. However, the Czechoslovakian Film was
heavily criticized by the Ministry of Culture, the State Planning Office and the Central
Government Presidium for showing selected films with the one-crown surcharge, which was
seen as a violation of state discipline. It was required that this measure be cancelled and
“thoroughly investigated”. The State Film defended itself by saying that it had been trying to
“add to the ideologically weaker films culturally and politically valuable film supplements
that would normally not be seen by most viewers on other occasions”.38 In the first stage after
the implementation of double-programmes the film supplements shown were Soviet
documentaries, such as Soviet Moldavia or Through the Altai. The State Film was obviously
trying to compensate for the admission fee adjustment. However it got into arguments with
management over the bureaucratic rules and it also caused the government authorities‟ to fear
a negative reaction from the population against such a form of price increase. The already
implemented increased admission fee eventually remained, perhaps also because attendance
had not decreased after its implementation and it had not caused complaints by viewers.
This effort to differentiate the distribution offer and its usage for increase in takings was in
contrast with the programming of travelling cinemas, which ensured film were shown in areas
without cinemas. The country was an object of the effort to use film for educational and
“cultural-political” activities. Which was evidenced, for example, by the organization of an
event called Spring in the Country (1951-56), and for a short time, also by the organization of
the Film Summer and Film Autumn (1951). The usual programme of the travelling cinemas
also unequivocally preferred Soviet and domestic production, which was also caused by the
fact that tours made by the travelling cinemas to small villages were not so profitable for the
Czechoslovakian State Film.39 It was not only the function of film as an ideological and
enlightenment vehicle for the education of the country but also lack of profitability that
influenced the way the travelling cinemas worked and were programmed, their role and
economic profitability did not significantly change until a few years later under the
management of district film enterprises and after wide-screen formats had been spread.
In 1952 the first, though very limited, decentralisation took place when cinema programming
was transferred to district directorates. However, those were part of the Czechoslovakian State
Film. The Ministry of Information and Enlightenment also consolidated its partial control
over programming by preparing a cultural and political distribution plan. Although this did
not concern the “department of normal cinema programming”, it was formed most
significantly by creating a detailed calendar of cultural and political events and important
anniversaries. This calendar determined what films it was necessary to exhibit, for example,
on the anniversary of Lenin‟s death (all Soviet films about Lenin had to be exhibited and
Soviet films had to prevail on cinema programmes for the whole week). During the
International Women‟s Day celebrations ( Soviet films had to be exhibited in which “a
struggling and hard-working woman is an important character”), or on the Soviet Union Air
Force Day (when renewed premiers of Valerij Tchkalov, Test Pilot and Girls’ Squadron had
to be exhibited), etc.40
It was the extensive decentralisation alone41 that in 1957 brought the economic interests of
two new elements of the system into distribution: National Committees became cinema
owners and takings represented an important part of their budgets; and “cost-accounting”
(khozraschet) District Film Enterprises (DFE), which became a central link between the
National Committees s and the Czechoslovakian State Film. Therefore, programming started
to take place on multiple levels and it became the subject of stricter supervision and criticism
by the Czechoslovakian State Film and especially by the government and Communist Party
authorities. However, in 1956, a year before decentralisation, there was a significant increase
in the number of newly exhibited feature films put into the category of “others” from 23 in
1955 to 52 and a corresponding increase in attendance from 129 million to 146 million.
However, the 105 % fulfilment of attendance and of the financial plan led to a significant
increase in the plans for the following year, which put pressure on the newly created district
film enterprises and it motivated them to more frequent showings of attractive, but from the
point of view of “cultural-political goals“ problematic, Western produced films. Another
source for a conflict of interests was the fact that after decentralisation cinemas were owned
by the National Committees, whose budgets absorbed 60% of cinema takings. Besides that,
the District National Committees made plans for the performance of cinemas and therefore
they determined the economic framework for the DFE.42 Immediately after the beginning of
the new distribution system a situation was created that sharpened the disagreement between
the economic interests of the individual subjects that were involved in distribution and takings
and the economic and cultural-political objectives that distribution was supposed to meet. The
priorities of the centrally planned enterprises and Communist Party authorities entered into a
mutual conflict, which required intervention by the Czechoslovakian Communist Party
Central Committee.

1957-1960: Decentralised Distribution and Restored Ideological


Control
As part of the reorganisation, the economic organisations Central Film Rental Office and
Czechoslovak Film Export were set up as of 1 January 1957. On the same day, the existing
regional film directions were replaced with DFE – those were managed by District National
Committees, and cinemas were signed over to them in the first stage by the end of March.
However, cinemas were transferred on to municipal and local national committees on 1
April.43 The momentous importance of the change was also implied in the return to the name
„film hire‟ – the previous term „distribution centre‟ suggested that there were no business
relations within the distribution system.
As mentioned above, the new system soon required a correction of the distribution practices
according to the criteria set by the power hub – the Party. The Fourth Department of the
Czechoslovakian Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) presented a report on the
„current cultural and political problems of film distribution‟ on 17 September 1957. It stated
that the increased number of film premieres and the related variety of programming in 1956
were „welcomed warmly by the public‟, and even the fact that films made in capitalist
countries showed the highest attendance per screening was not viewed as a problem because
„those films include a number of outstanding works that help the cultural and political
education of our people‟. However, such films were neglected in programming already in the
first half of 1957, and the „the greatest number of screenings is given to marginal films of
such provenance […] Regional film corporations are trying to meet their difficult financial
plans by increasing the number of screenings of supplementary Western films,‟ yet the plans
were not met. A rapid increase in the attendance of Western films and a decrease in the case
of Czech and Soviet films were stated – the cause given was weakened supervision of the
cultural and political content of the distributed materials on the part of regional national
committees and regional and district Party structures. A resolution of the CCPCC Secretariat
was drafted based on the report. It obliged (author‟s italics) Minister of Education and Culture
Kahuda to enforce the rule of not presenting more than 35% of foreign films set by the
Ministry.44
It is thus obvious that the decentralisation introduced a considerable conflict of interest in the
distribution system: the ideological requirements of the Party apparatus on the one hand, and
the efforts of the national committees and the regional film corporations to get additional
budget incomes and to meet their plans, respectively. Besides the Party and administration
bodies controlling the work of the regional film corporations, a quantitative limitation on the
number of capitalist films exhibited became the main regulatory instrument. The 35% limit
was the central criterion of the distribution practice for the following years; it stood not only
for the number of films, but also of screenings and of viewers until 1964.45
The brief period of weaker control over distribution in 1957 was also a time of the highest
attendance rates in Czech cinemas. In the following three years, the share of capitalist
productions in the total screenings was decreasing, while the share of Soviet films grew
rapidly (see Chart 1). The decrease in the overall attendance rates followed the trend (Chart
2). The effort to stop the short-term liberalisation and differentiation of distributed supply was
reinforced in a speech by Minister of Education and Culture František Kahuda at the National
Conference on Film Distribution held in October 1958. In his paper, he declared the task to
„cleanse the cinema programming of rubbish and increase the ideological effectiveness and
educational effect of film‟. The presentation form of extended programme was to be phased
out. Extended programmes endured after all, partly maybe because a similar form was
planned in the Soviet Union, known as the Grand Film Programme; the Filmová ekonomika
magazine no. 10 was quick to translate an article about the plan from the Iskusstvo kino.46
Another explicit measure was a reduction in the numbers of screenings, justified by the fact
that the number of unprofitable screenings, which raised wage expenditures, had to be cut
down.47 In reality, the reduction affected the high-attendance Western productions while the
numbers of screenings of Soviet films kept growing.
Another manifestation of the efforts to repress any differentiation in the supply and restore
ideological control over the distribution was the rejection of the attempts to establish film
clubs with the justification that film clubs were meaningless in the country‟s context. Unlike
in the West, where they fulfilled a „progressive role‟ by exhibiting films which would not be
distributed otherwise for „commercial or discriminatory reasons‟, the entire Czechoslovak
cinema network served the cultural and political interests of the state. 48 The Czechoslovak
Film Company Central Administration reiterated the opinion: since the entire distribution was
directed by the interest of cultural-political education of the viewer, there was no need for
film clubs as a special type of establishment.49
The explicit primary reference point of all the measures was the XI. KSČ Congress and its
follow-up task to participate in the „completion of cultural revolution‟. It is therefore
appropriate to see the three years of distribution corseted by increased ideological restrictions
in connection with the preparations for declaring a successful transition to socialism.50 As
shown by the inspection on distribution in the regions, however, the goals were not met,
particularly the task of increasing the attendance of „films of great ideological and artistic
importance‟. One of the main causes stated was that the programming departments of the
regional film corporations favoured capitalist film productions and presented them on
Sundays and public holidays. Even the cinema staff often requested the regional corporations
to send „escapist and ideologically objectionable films‟, including those that had been taken
out of circulation.51
In a situation where the main line formulated at the Conference on Distribution contradicted
the interest in economic performance – and where the task of „balancing or reducing
significantly the difference in average attendance rates for screenings of films of cultural and
political importance and so-called attractive supplementary films‟ failed – the control over the
correct cinema programming composition was assigned to education and culture departments
of regional national committees.52 The following period saw a gradual liberalisation of the
distribution due to pressures of cultural-political criteria, which can be documented
quantitatively by the changing composition of premiere presentations and numbers of
screenings of various national provenances. At the same time, however, this weakening of
ideological restrictions led to an increased tension between the economic interests of the
Central Film Rental Office (total revenues forced by annual plans), regional film corporations
(corporate profit), and national committees (receipts transferred to national committee
budgets).

1961-1967: From the ‘completion of socialism’ to the economic


reforms
Naturally enough, the period saw numerous minor adjustments, and a certain liberalisation
and atmosphere of economic reforms were manifested by the fact that the economic
difficulties of the distribution were discussed in the press openly. No fundamental structural
change occurred, however, in spite of the relatively fierce debate and fights over the
ownership of cinemas, one of the most important characteristics of the economic development
of the distribution in the 1960s. Others include, above all, the gradual and limited
liberalisation of the distribution from the talons of the cultural-political value criterion, and
growing receipts. The trend culminated in 1969, when the receipts even exceeded the 1957
levels, although the overall attendance kept dwindling throughout the period (with the
exception of the year 1969 itself, when it was slightly above the previous year‟s). The growth
in cinema receipts, encouraging the national committees to maintain their operation, were
caused mainly by increasing admissions for extended programmes, double screenings, wide-
screen films, and open-air cinema (“summer cinema”) screenings.
The statistics suggest years of a relatively linear trend in the same direction. Most of all, the
number of screenings of films categorised under „other‟ increased dramatically: from 182,681
in 1960 to 322,323 in 1966 (whereupon the increase stagnated for two years); there was a
corresponding rapid drop in the number of screenings of Soviet films from 240,982 in 1961
(meaning that the decrease began a year later) to 59,546 in 1967 (to keep decreasing for two
more years to 19,536 screenings, which was also partly due to the extraordinary political
situation) (Chart 1). The total number of screenings kept decreasing throughout the period, but
at a markedly lower pace than the numbers of viewers would suggest. In addition, despite the
continuing decrease in the total attendance, the number of viewers seeing the „other‟ category
of films grew from 36,268,000 in 1960 to 49,525,000 in 1966 (Chart 2).
In addition to the growing attendance of films of capitalist provenance, their economic
importance was further underlined by the fact that they were presented at higher admission
prices. In 1962, the average receipts per viewer for Soviet films were 1.94 CSK, while the
number of viewers was 31 million and the total revenues, 69 million CSK. For films coming
from „socialist community countries‟, the average receipts per viewer amounted to 3.04 CSK,
achieving comparable total revenues of 70 million CSK at a much lower attendance rate (23
million viewers). Films from capitalist countries were seen by 51 million viewers, averaging
at 3.75 CSK per viewer and generating total revenues of 191 million CSK.53 The situation
where the capitalist production, largely „culturally and politically unsuitable‟, achieved a great
attendance share and an even greater share in revenues, intensified the conflict of interests
between the Party and Governmental guardians of the cultural-political line of national culture
on the one hand and subjects showing predominantly economic interests (the Central Film
Rental Office and the DFEs) on the other hand. However, there were also discrepancies
among the distributing companies. The DFE‟s interest was to maximise the receipts – which
was not identical to the cinema owners‟ interest in maximising profits, which were dependent
the hire fees, higher for Western films. At the same time, an increased share of Western films
in the distribution was understood as a guarantee of increased receipts, thus leading to their
increased programming, which forced the film companies to show popular films, however
they were not the best from the cinema owner‟s point of view. 54 A 1964 report by the CCPCC
Ideological Department to the CCPCC Secretariat made a critical note that the economic
performance tends to be the primary criterion of cinema work and that „financing and
planning departments of national committees are often more influential on the cinema than
education and culture commissions‟. The problem of using the revenues to finance national
committee budgets, which did not reinvest in further development of the cinemas, was
regarded as so important that the report even suggested that the cinemas be transferred back to
the Czechoslovak Film Company.55 An experimental measure along these lines was even
taken in Pilsen, where the District Film, Concert and Variety Show Enterprise (DFCVSE) was
signed over the cinemas.56 The cinema dispute appeared in the press ever more frequently in
the latter half of the 1960s, where it was mostly the film companies who employed the
„cultural-political value‟ argument, this time in their own favour, saying that the current
situation was forcing them to programme unsuitable, artistically and ideologically pointless
films – the deterrent example of this „rubbish‟ which was on the screen thanks to the current
situation was the West German film Secret of the Chinese Carnation.57
Measures to grant „ideologically valuable‟ films room in the cinemas remained in force. Thus
in 1961, a session of the Brno DFCVSE stated that „attractive films of capitalist origin must
not be screened for over 5-6 weeks. The higher percentage of capitalist films programmed has
to be balanced by mostly Czechoslovak and Soviet productions‟.58 The frequent violations of
this rule were the object of criticism by the education and culture commission of the District
National Committee,59 and the regional KSČ committee was another source of bans.60
Nevertheless, the Brno DFCVSE meeting minutes are a valuable material showing the
concrete practices which the corporation applied to observe the established restrictions
formally, while meeting its planned attendance and receipts. It re-ran Czech films (instead of
showing loss-making Soviet or „popular democratic‟ ones) in order to keep the capitalist share
below the 35-percent limit;61 the capitalist films which were still successful after the permitted
five weeks recurred in the programme several weeks later;62 a cut in number of screenings in
the small cinemas was proposed to provide „extra‟ space for attractive presentation of
successful comedies or Gérard Phillipe films, for example;63 attractive films and extended
programmes were routinely programmed for high-capacity open-air cinemas, or screened in
night shows.64
Wide-screen and 70-mm Western films were also often shown, for which higher admission
prices had been set – the economy-motivated and only weakly Party-restricted wave of
interest in such formats was in stark contrast to the attitude in the late 1950s. Back then in
1958, Minister of Education and Culture František Kahuda said at the National Conference on
Film Distribution that wide-screen films would not be approached from the commercial point
of view as was the practice in the West, where it represented „curry favour to backward taste‟,
which meant that „very few of the Western wide-screen films [were] acceptable‟. His warning
that there would not be „a sufficient supply of wide-screen films available in the nearest
future‟ meant a factual stop to their imports until 1960, when the „transition to socialism‟ was
completed.65
The more common use of wide-screen formats in the first half of the 1960s also had a
changing influence on the role of travelling cinemas. “Cost-accounting” DFEs ran travelling
cinemas after the 1957 decentralisation. Although theirs numbers dwindled constantly, they
might have represented important sources of income – the Brno DFE often programmed wide-
screen films at higher admission prices for its travelling cinemas, which was an important
money supply. The change in the attitude to programming is evidenced, for instance, by the
criticism the Brno DFCVSE received in 1963 for „screening largely escapist films of capitalist
provenance.‟66
A certain acceleration in the trend of liberalising economic points of view from ideological
restrictions appeared in 1964. From then on, the 35-percent restriction on Western
productions only concerned the number of films brought into distribution in a given year (not
the numbers of screenings and viewers); in addition, productions of the so-called developing
countries were excluded from the category.67 In contrast to 1963, which saw the culmination
of a three-year general economic crisis and a definitive collapse of the five-year plan,68 the
imports of films from capitalist countries increased significantly in the following year.
Despite the continuing lack of foreign currency, the CCPCC Secretariat considered it
appropriate to grant special foreign currency allocations in „justified cases‟ for the purchase of
film epics, which admittedly were more expensive, but which would bring „quite outstanding
revenues‟ when distributed.69 In contrast to just four US films distributed in 1963, they were
eight in 1964, including such first-class hits as Big Country, Some Like It Hot, Roman
Holiday, and most importantly, The Magnificent Seven, which attracted over 6 million
viewers by the end of the 1960s.70 The gradually growing emphasis on the role of economic
performance of the distribution followed the reform of the national economy commenced in
the latter half of the 1960s, and the new management system rules were adopted in 1965.
They were only introduced to the film industry on 1 January 1969, but the reform air and
achievements were naturally reflected in the distribution. Already in 1965, the Central Film
Rental Office Deputy Manager Albert Nesveda took the opportunity of the new management
system in preparation, which „placed an increased emphasis on the material interest‟ and
„reinforced the goods-to-money relationships‟, to criticise the 1957 decentralisation. He
proposed the establishment of a „viable economic body in which progressive management
methods could be implemented‟ – which meant, in reality, first and foremost a transfer of
cinemas under DFCVSE management and the restoration of the model which was in
operation very briefly in early 1957. Thus, Nesveda used the reformist rhetoric in the fight
over cinema management to support the efforts to cut cinemas off national committee
budgets.71 However, the efforts were fruitless, with the exception of the above mentioned
DFCVSE „experiment‟ in Pilsen.
The increasing emphasis on the economic performance of the distribution, validated by the
introduction of the new management system in the early 1969, was regarded as negative one
year later, in the era of the so-called „normalisation‟ and repression of the 1960s reformist
effort: „…the economic interest of distribution personnel in the economic performance leads
to a general preference of commercial films, thus shifting the overall composition of films
introduced by the distribution network to an area of entertaining, adventure, and otherwise
escapist films.‟72
Nevertheless, before the normalisation hit the film industry with its personnel cleanses
beginning in September 1969 and before the distribution supply was „cleansed‟ by excluding
32 „Western‟ films in 1971,73 the Czechoslovak Film Company achieved the greatest receipts
in history in 1969; in addition, the number of screenings of films in the „other‟ category was
the greatest for the entire post-war period. Admittedly, the attendance rate for this category
did not beat the year 1947, but it was higher than that of 1957, which was the peak year in
terms of total attendance. The impact of the introduction of the new management system may
be understood as a continuation of the 1960s tendency, but the massive fluctuation in the
attendance and number of screenings of „Western‟ films on the one hand and Soviet and
„popular democratic‟ ones on the other hand was in part caused by a response of both the
spectators and the distribution network to the invasion of the intervention armies in August
1968. The Government did request on 18 December 1968 an inclusion of „artistically valuable
films from the Five Countries‟74 in the programming, but the refusing attitude to their
presentation is obvious from Brno DFCVSE meeting minutes: they say that such films „may
be included, but only upon explicit request and agreement with the cinema manager‟. 75 At a
May 1970 meeting, the DFCVSE made a defence against an allegation of cultural
organisations for lack of will to „normalise‟ by saying that it was willing, but that economic
interests forced it to programme Western films, which yielded higher receipts. Nonetheless,
the programming department had already issued an order to programme one Soviet or
„popular democratic‟ film per month regardless of the cinema managers‟ preferences. 76 The
defensive argument of economic interest was the final example of the open contradiction
between the ideological and economic requirements in the period in question – it was to be
resolved firmly by the normalisers.

Conclusion
Film distribution in the era of the totalitarian communist regime in Czechoslovakia was
defined in its principal contours by ideological requirements set by the Party apparatus. Their
implementation was carried out and controlled by a system of institutions and bodies of the
Communist Party, Government, state administration and specialised corporations. In the first
stage, the distributions mechanisms were set to achieve the primary objective, which was to
create a new type of national film culture, „cleansed‟ of the presence of Western film
productions (of any „escapist‟ productions in its most radical form), and saturated by the self-
reliant production of the Eastern Bloc countries. Both the distribution supply and the concrete
practices had to adapt gradually to the unfeasibility of the model, determined by two
interconnected factors: the failure to build a new model of film spectatorship, and the
economic requirements of the film industry. This paper attempts to present a description of a
certain historic model of distribution, shaped by a fundamental conflict between an
ideological model and economic criteria, from the specific point of view of the interests of the
constituent institutions and subjects which defined the basic distribution structure as well as
practices. In this perspective of economic and ideological interests of the constituent subjects,
the history of the distribution is shown not (only) as one of a smoothly functioning instrument
for the enforcement of power and ideological objectives of party and governmental bodies,
but also as an area of conflict and purpose-driven practice. Certainly, the fundamental changes
in the primary tendencies were dictated above all by the power hub after 1948, but the
ideological formation of the distribution was forced to respond to the economic requirements
and the real performance, which led to an obvious tension between the „cultural-political‟ and
economic requirements, making film distribution an area of covert, sometimes even overt
conflict.
Such a historic rendering of the distribution system and exposure of its internal dynamics and
conflict, however, must not obscure or weaken the usefulness and effectiveness of examining
the film industry in general and the distribution system in particular as a specific case of the
functioning of the socialist economic system. In doing so, my attention focuses on one of its
manifestations, titled „economy of shortage‟ by János Kornai. Despite a certain tendency of
his towards essentialism and historicity, I regard the application of Kornai‟s economic model
as very useful. It may help define the basic difference between a distribution system formed
primarily by market mechanisms on the one hand and a system affected by a qualitatively
different set of ideological, proprietary, bureaucratic and economic relations on the other
hand. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the distribution mechanism in post-war
Czechoslovakia in the period in question was defined markedly by the „shortage‟
phenomenon (be it a shortage due to low productivity of the Eastern Bloc film industry, or the
ideological impediments to importing „Western‟ productions). It manifested itself both in the
vertical relationships among the elements of the distribution system and in the horizontal
relationship to the consumer. It is this horizontal relationship to the viewer which opens up a
productive opportunity to link the research into the socialist distribution model with reception
research. First and foremost, research into the popularity of certain types of production,
defined either in terms of genre or national provenance, will require different conceptual
instruments in a situation of very limited vertical and horizontal differentiation of supply than
it will in the case of a system defined, at least in its basic parameters, by the supply-demand
relation.

Africa I (Miroslav Zikmund – Jiří Hanzelka, Studio uměleckého filmu; Afrika I, CZ, 1952)
Angel in the Mountains (Bořivoj Zeman, Studio uměleckého filmu; Anděl na horách, CZ,
1955)
Beauty and the Beast (René Clair, Universalia/ENIC/Franco Londonfilm; La Beauté du
diable, France/Italy, 1950)
Big Country, The (William Wyler, Anthony Productions/Worldwide Productions; US, 1958)
Child of the Danube (Georg Jacoby, Nowafilm/Wienfilm; Das Kind der Donau, Austria,
1950)
Emperor and the Golem, The (Martin Frič, Studio uměleckého filmu; Císařův pekař –
Pekařův císař, CZ, 1951)
Fall of Berlin, The (Michail Čiaureli, Mosfilm; Padenije Berlina, SU, 1949)
Fan-Fan the Tulip (Christian-Jaque, Amato Produzione/Filmsonor/Les Films Ariane;
Italy/France, 1952)
Girls’ Squadron (Semen Timoschenko, Lenfilm; Nebeskij Tichochod, SU, 1945)
Hunchback of Paris, The (André Hunebelle, P.A.C./Globe Film International; FR/IT, Le
Bossu 1960)
Magnificent Seven, The (John Sturges, The Mirisch Corporation/Alpha Productions; US,
1960)
Moby Dick (John Huston, Moulin Productions Inc; US, 1956)
New Fighters Shall Arise (Jiří Weiss, Studio uměleckého filmu; Vstanou noví bojovníci, CZ,
1950)
One Summer of Happiness (Arne Mattsson, Nordisk Tonefilm; Hon dansade en sommar,
Sweden, 1951)
Rafter’s Card Game (Václav Wasserman, Studio uměleckého filmu; CZ, 1952)
Roman Holiday (William Wyler, Paramount Pictures;US, 1953)
Russian Question, The (Michail Romm, Goskino; Russkiy vopros, SU, 1947)
Secret Mission (Michail Romm, Mosfilm; Sekretnaja Missija, SU, 1950)
Secret of Chinese Carnation (Rudolf Zehetgruber, Rapid Imp.Ex.Ci/Rapid; Das Geheimnis
der chinesischen Nelke, DE/FR, 1964)
Some Like It Hot (Billy Wilder, Ashton Productions/The Mirish Corporation; US, 1959)
Soviet Moldavia (J. Aron, Odesa; Sovetskaja Moldavija, SU, 1951)
Spring on the Ice (Georg Jacoby, Wien-Film, Nova-Film; Frühling auf dem Eis, Austria,
1951)
Test Pilot (Alexandr Stolper, Mosfilm; Nasche serdce, SU, 1947)
Through the Altai (L. Saakov, Mosfilm; Po Altaju, SU, 1950)
Tiger Bay (J. Lee Thompson, Rank; GB, 1959)
Tiger’s Claw, The (Harry Piel, Allianz film; Tiger Akbar, West Germany, 1952),
To the Eyes of Memory (Jean Dellanoy, Gibe; Aux jeux du souvenir, France, 1948)
Valerij Tchkalov (Michail Kalatozov, Lenfilm; SU, 1941)
War and Peace (King Vidor, Paramount; US, 1956)
Where No Vultures Fly (Harry Watt, African Film Associates/Ealing Studios/The Rank
Organisation; GB, 1951)
Chart 1:

Number of screenings

900 000 total


Czechoslovak production
Soviet production
800 000
people´s democratic countries´ production
the others
700 000

600 000

500 000

400 000

300 000

200 000

100 000

0
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
Chart 2:

attendance

160 000 Total

Czechoslovak production
140 000
Soviet production

120 000 People´s democratic


countries´ production
the others
attendance (in thousands)

100 000

80 000

60 000

40 000

20 000

0
45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

year
Chart 3:

Number of viewers per screening


Czechoslovak production
350 Soviet production
People´s democracy countries´ production
The others
300

250
average number of viewers

200

150

100

50

0
45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19
1
Even as the „Czech lands“ – Bohemia and Moravia – were parts of Czechoslovakia, we are not dealing
with Slovakia – the specificities of distribution system were not essential, but the differences in attendance of
national productions, as well as in the number of theatres, were significant.
2
Ideová výchova a kulturní politika strany. Z referátu Václava Kopeckého na VIII. sjezdu KSČ (March
1946). In: Zdeněk Štábla – Pavel Taussig, KSČ a československá kinematografie (výbor dokumentů z let 1945-
1980) (Praha, 1981), p. 28.
3
The process was not limited to the cinema – for the sphere of literature, it is analysed elaborately by
Pavel Janáček in his book Literární brak. Operace vyloučení, operace nahrazení, 1938-1951 (Brno, 2004).
4
See Jindřich Elbl, Jak byl znárodněn československý film. Patnáct let filmové politiky 1933-1948. 2.
část, Film a doba, 8 (1965), p. 399.
5
Eva Dzúriková, Dejiny filmovej distribúcie v organizácii a správe slovenskej kinematografie
(Bratislava, 1996), p. 78.
6
János Kornai, The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, 1992).
7
In January 29, 1963, the secretariat of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party Central Committee
accepted a report of a commission constituted by the employees of Central directorate of Czechoslovak film,
Ministry of Information and State Planning Office. According to the report, the existing monitoring of
attendance based on the criterion of national production is not suitable any more, as it does not allow to evaluate
a cultural-political values of imported movies. Because an import of “progressive” movies is a part of the import
from capitalist countries, it is recommended to differentiate the statistics of attendance.
8
Kornai, p. 361.
9
In 1960, there was one TV set for 13,4 inhabitants, in 1966 it was already one TV set for 5,2
inhabitants – meanwhile, the attendance of western production grown up from 36,3 million to 49,5 million.
10
Kornai, pp. 240-243.
11
See Jiří Havelka, Čs. filmové hospodářství 1966-70 (Praha, 1976), p. 22; see also a report about the
situation in Czechoslovak film industry given by Jan Fojtík to the presidium of ÚV KSČ, 6 January 1970.
Dokumenty z archivu ÚV KSČ, Iluminace, 25 (1997), p. 167.
12
Anon., Proč dosud nehrají česká kina? Problém nových kopií a problém starých titulků. Filmová
práce, 2 (1945), p. 1.
13
See Petr Mareš, Politika a „Pohyblivé obrázky“. Spor o dovoz amerických filmů do Československa po
druhé světové válce, Iluminace, 13 (1994); Petr Mareš, Všemi prostředky hájená kinematografie. Úvodem
k edici dokumentu „Záznam na paměť“, Iluminace, 6 (1991), pp. 75-105.
14
The most active critic of the communists´ politics was the weekly published magazine of the Christian
Party Obzory – the minister of the Information Václav Kopecký attempted to stop its publishing already at the
end of 1945. See Karel Kaplan, Cenzura 1945-1953. In: Kaplan – Dušan Tomášek (eds.), O cenzuře
v Československu v letech 1945-1956 (Praha, 1992), p. 8; and Milan Drápala, Na ztracené vartě Západu.
Poznámky k české politické publicistice nesocialistického zaměření v letech 1945-1948, Soudobé dějiny, 1
(1998), pp. 16-24.
15
Československá filmová společnost II (unprocessed files), National Film Archive, Prague.
16
A letter of Josef Jonáš, the chief of organizational secretariat of Cultural and promotional division ÚV
KSČ, 14 March 1947, addressed to Gustav Bareš (the chief of the Cultural and promotional division ÚV KSČ).
KSČ – ÚV 1945-1989, Cultural and promotional division ÚV KSČ files. Archival unit 660, National Archive,
Prague (hereafter ÚV KSČ, OKP, AU 660, NA).
17
ÚV KSČ, OKP, AU 660, NA.
18
This study is a part of a wider research project that will be focused on the history of a local film culture
in Brno – the second largest city of Czech Republic, which had 285 thousands inhabitants in 1950.
19
Measured by the number of movies accepted for distribution in 1947, the dominant production was
American with 82 movies, followed by 38 Soviet and 32 British films.
20
A quotation from the presentation of Málek at the conference of the Czechoslovakian State Film in
November 1948. In: Zpráva o první celostátní podnikové konferenci Československého státního filmu (Praha,
1948).
21
Za vysokou ideovou a uměleckou úroveň československého filmu. Usnesení předsednictva Ústředního
výboru KSČ o tvůrčích úkolech československého filmu. Rudé právo, 19 April 1950, p. 3.
22
The model of “circular distribution” was finally denied as „evolutionarily permanently unbearable“ and
for the year 1953 only two programme sequences were put together. See Jiří Havelka, Výroční zpráva Čs.
státního filmu za rok 1952 (Praha, 1964), p. 115.
23
Artuš Černík, Výroční zpráva o čs. filmovnictví. Rok 1950 (Praha, 1952), p. 175.
24
ÚV KSČ, OKP, RG 666, NA.
25
Bohuslav Hammer, the Brno district‟s director. Inscription of the theatres‟ heads, 28 January 1949,
Krajský filmový podnik (unprocessed files), G 604, Moravský zemský archiv Brno (hereafter KFP, G604,
MZA).
26
Jaroslav Broţ, Choďme do kina bez předsudků, Svět práce, 20 (1949), p. 10.
27
An inscription of a deliberation at the film subcommittee of the District National Committee‟s school
division, Brno, 12 December 1950 (KFP, G604, MZA).
28
Artuš Černík, Výroční zpráva o čs. filmovnictví. Rok 1949 (Praha, 1952), p. 160.
29
Working conference, Brno, 28 November 1950 (KFP, G604, MZA).
30
To give an example: the Assotiation of Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship assumed a patronage over the
enterprise called “A week of revolutionary movies” and promised to get 100% attendance – however, according
to a complaint lodged at the working conference in November 28, the actual attendance reached the point of
3,6% (KFP, G604, MZA).
31
The Cultural Committee was established by Directoriate of ÚV KSČ in September 1948 and headed by
Václav Kopecký.
32
Jak byl znárodněn československý film. Jindřich Elbl. Film a doba, 8 (1965), p. 399.
33
28 April 1950, ÚV KSČ, OKP, AU 666, NA.
34
Za vysokou ideovou a uměleckou úroveň československého filmu. Usnesení předsednictva Ústředního
výboru KSČ o tvůrčích úkolech československého filmu. Rudé právo, 19 April 1950, p. 3.
35
Dubbing was understood as a form of programme differentiation that gives a higher attractivity to the
Soviet movies above all (from 1946 till 1953, only Soviet and people‟s democratic countries‟ movies were
dubbed) – it is obvious from the complaints on a bad quality and legibility of subtitles or from the complaints
that village people don‟t manage to read them so quickly. Films for children represented a specific problem – it
was recommended to the cinema‟s managers to summarize the story before the screening. See working
conference, Brno, 28 November 1950 (KFP, G604, MZA).
36
See e.g. a memo of Czechoslovakian State Film that pointed out a case of a “fault in programming”:
some premieres took the audience in the time when preferred movie New Fighters Shall Arise was programmed.
An inscription of a deliberation at the film subcommittee of the District National Committee‟s school division,
Brno, 12 March 1951 (KFP, G604, MZA).
37
Ministery of Culture, 1953-1956, AU 867, 196/141, National Archive, Prague (hereafter MK, AU 867,
NA).
38
Ibid.
39
Osvětová beseda, 5 (7 March 1956).
40
Cultural-political plan of movie distribution for 1952, Ministry of information – supplements, 1945-
1953, RG 861/0/1, 134/471, NA.
41
Governmental decree, 16 January 1957, no. 4/1957 about organization of film business: all property of
cinemas including real estates was handed over to National Committees. At the same time district film
enterprises were established.
42
The remaining 40% was “rental”: 89% of the rental was kept by Central Film Rental Office and 11%
was used to cover up expenditures of DFE. See ideological department of ÚV KSČ 1945-1989, 05/3, file 11, AU
69, NA; see also Albert Nesveda, K problematice plánování v kinech, Filmovým objektivem 4 (1963) 4, pp. 61-
62; and A. Nesveda, Ekonomika provozu kin (Praha, 1963), p. 90.
43
Jiří Havelka, Čs. filmové hospodářství 1956-1960 (Praha, 1973), p. 184.
44
A report for CCPCC Secretariat, given by the fourth department of CCPCC Secretariat: report about
contemporary cultural political difficulties of film distribution. Ústřední výbor KSČ 1945-1989, Prague –
secretariat 1954-1962, RG 1261/0/14, file 130, AU 192, item 3, NA (hereafter ÚV KSČ, secretariat 1954-1962, AU
192, NA).
45
O co vlastně jde? O diváka – o peníze – o ...? Divadelní a filmové noviny, 13 (1965-66), p. 1.
46
Zelená novým metodám, Filmová ekonomika, 10, p. 61 (translation from Iskusstvo kino, 8, 1960).
See also A. Nesveda, Ekonomika provozu kin (Praha, 1963), p. XX. Not only that the Extended Programmes
sustained - as the supplements were not used the “cultural-political valuable” documentaries already, but films
about Czech popular film actors.
47
Memo of Central Film Rental Office, KNV Olomouc (1857) 1949-1960, sheaf II, 2068/1491, Country
Archive Opava, subsidiary Olomouc.
48
Zvýšit ideovou účinnost a výchovné působení filmu, všestranně zkvalitnit činnost kin. Presentation of
the Minister of School and Education František Kahuda. Celostátní konference o filmové distribuci (Praha,
1958), p. 11.
49
The Czechoslovak Film Company Central Administration 1958-59, Ministry of School and Education,
34 III, 2000/33, NA.
50
See e.g.: Hlavní úkoly kulturní revoluce. Z usnesení XI. sjezdu KSČ (červen 1958). In: Zdeněk Štábla
– Pavel Taussig, KSČ a československá kinematografie (výbor dokumentů z let 1945-1980) (Praha, 1981), p. 77-
78. See also the report for the ideological commission of ÚV KSČ about the contemporary situation in feature
film production, presented by a member of the commission and employee of ÚV KSČ Secretariat Zdeněk Urban
12. November 1959. Edice materiálů Banská Bystrica 1959. Dokumenty ke kontextům I. festivalu
československého filmu. Iluminace 56 (2004), pp. 200-209.
51
Ministry of School and Education, minister‟s committee meetings, 1956-1966, board no. 32, 13.
August 1959, NA.
52
Report about fulfilling tasks for a minister‟s committee meeting, conference about film distribution, 28
October 1959. Ministry of School and Education, 42/1959, file 23, board no. 42, NA.
53
The Czechoslovakian Film Company‟s politics of export and import in the period 1957-1963. ÚV KSČ,
secretariat 1962-1966, RG 1261/0/15, file 26, AU 48, item 1, NA.
54
O co vlastně jde? O diváka – o peníze – o ...?, Divadelní a filmové noviny, 13 (1965-66), p. 3.
55
The contemporary situation in film distribution and a proposition of rules for the future development.
Secretariat of ÚV KSČ 1962-66, RG 1261/0/15, file 26, archival unit 20, item 3, NA.
56
See Ladislav Ţeníšek, Abychom mohli hledat souřadnice, Kulturní tvorba, 17 (1966), pp. 4-5. The
second exception was Film Enterprise of the Capital Prague that also owned and managed cinemas.
57
See, e.g., Ladislav Ţeníšek, Abychom mohli hledat souřadnice, Kulturní tvorba, 17 (1966), pp. 4-5.;
O co vlastně jde? O diváka – o peníze – o ...?, Divadelní a filmové noviny, 13 (1965-66), p. 3; Albert Nesveda,
Současné ekonomické problémy naší kinematografie, Filmovým objektivem (1965), p. 112; Hovoří ředitel
praţského filmového podniku Jiří Bernard, Film a doba 3 (1967), pp. 152-157.
58
DFE Brno working session, 15 February 1961. KFP, G604, MZA.
59
To give an example, DFE in Brno was criticised for screening of the French movie The Hunchback of
Paris for more ten five weeks. DFE Brno working session, 9 March 1961, ibid.
60
E.g., The District Committee of KSČ banned screening of British crime film Tiger Bay. DFE Brno
working session 22 May 1961, KFP, G604, MZA; and DFE Brno working session 5 June 1961, ibid.
61
DFE Brno working session 22 May 1961 (KFP, G604, MZA).
62
Ibid., 22 May 1961.
63
Ibid., 20 July 1962.
64
Ibid., 28 May 1963.
65
Zvýšit ideovou účinnost a výchovné působení filmu, všestranně zkvalitnit činnost kin. Presentation of
the Minister of School and Education František Kahuda. Celostátní konference o filmové distribuci (Praha,
1958), p. 7.
66
DFCVSE Brno minutes, 19 February 1963 (KFP, G604, MZA).
67
O co vlastně jde? O diváka – o peníze – o ...?, Divadelní a filmové noviny, 13 (1965-66), p. 1;
Ministry of School and Education, minister‟s committee meetings 1956-1966, board no. 32, 13. August 1959,
NA; The contemporary situation in film distribution and a proposition of rules for the future development.
Secretariat of ÚV KSČ 1962-66, RG 1261/0/15, file 26, archival unit 20, item 3, NA.
68
See e.g. Pavel Sirůček a kol., Hospodářské dějiny a ekonomické teorie (vývoj – současnost – výhledy)
(Slaný, 2007), pp. 193-197; and Karel Kaplan, Kořeny československé reformy 1968. II. část: reforma trvale
nemocné ekonomiky (Brno, 2000), pp. 234-306.
69
The Czechoslovakian Film Company‟s politics of export and import in the period 1957-1963. ÚV KSČ,
secretariat 1962-1966, RG 1261/0/15, file 26, AU 48, item 1, NA.
70
What is about 60 per cent of the population. Big Country was screened by the Světozor cinema in
Prague for 19 weeks.
71
Albert Nesveda, Současné ekonomické problémy naší kinematografie, Filmovým objektivem (1965),
p. 112.
72
A report for the presidium of ÚV KSČ about the situation in the Czechoslovak film industry: Zpráva o
situaci v československé kinematografii, kterou podával Jan Fojtík předsednictvu ÚV KSČ 6. ledna 1970.
Dokumenty z archivu ÚV KSČ. Iluminace, 25 (1994), p. 167.
73
Ibid., pp. 191-199.
74
I.e., the states that participated in the intervention to Czechoslovakia.
75
DFCVSE Brno minutes, 18 December 1968. KFP, G604, MZA.
76
DFCVSE Brno minutes, 22 May 1970, ibid.

Você também pode gostar