International Phenomenological Society

Review: Take and Give

Author(s): Thomas W. Pogge
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 189-193
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653468 .
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. LIX, No. 1, March 1999

Take and Give*

THOMAS W. POGGE
Columbia University

Consequentialist moralities ask only that one should act for the best. Accord-
ingly,

(1) choosing an optimal option is never wrong; and

(2) choosing a suboptimal option is always wrong.

These two claims are mutually independent, but each entails the weaker claim
that

(3) there is always at least one optimal option that it is

not wrong to choose.1

Ordinary moral thinking rejects all three claims. These rejections are gener-
ally traced to three distinct rationales, which can be explicated in terms of
highly stylized situations2 in which the sole optimal option of an agent, A,
is an action that renders some, B, better off and some others, C, worse off
than they would have been had A not acted. This does not mean that B/C
become better/worse off than they were before A acted-A's conduct may
merely prevent a deterioration/improvement. But the three rationales emerge
more vividly in cases where A's optimal action would change at least C's
situation (for the worse).
The first rationale, which leads to the rejection of all three claims,
invokes the thought that C has rights that limit what A may or must do to

A review of Peter Unger: Living HighandLettingDie (Oxford University Press 1996).

Parentheticalreferences are to pages of this book.
(1) entails (3) on the trivial assumptionthat there is always at least one optimal option. (2)
entails (3) on the assumption that it cannot be that every available option is wrong to
choose. Since (3) is entailed by (1) as well as by (2), the rejection of (3) entails the
rejection of both (1) and (2).
2 Often characterizedwith the remarkthat other things are boring, or equal. Without pre-
tending to know what this means exactly, I assume throughoutthis review that some such
rideris in play.

BOOK SYMPOSIUM 189

C.3 The second rationale, which leads to the rejection only of (2),
involves a special tie between A and C and invokes the thought that A may
sometimes give more weight to the interestsof herself and her near and dear
than she must give to those of B.4 By seeking to deflate both rationales,
Unger gives supportto consequentialists.But this does not imply that he is a
consequentialisthimself.
If he were, he should want to defend consequentialismagainst the third
rationale, which may lead either to a weak rejection only of (2) or to a
strongrejection of all threeclaims. The firstrationaleinvolves no special ties
between A and either B or C, and the second rationaleinvolves a special tie
between A and C. So what about special ties between A and B; what if A is
B? Consider a travel agent whose sole optimal option involves using a few
unneeded frequentflyer miles from a rich man's account to help a poor and
overworked woman to a much needed vacation. Many who would approve
this theft if committedto benefit a strangerwould be reluctantto endorse it if
the agent herself is the vacation-starvedbeneficiary.Some, contraryto (1)-
(3), consider it wrong for her to take the miles for herself and many, contrary
to (2), at least consider it not wrong for her not to do so. The thirdrationale
thus involves a special tie between A and B and invokes the thoughtthat, in
some cases, A must or at least may give less weight to the interests of her-
self (and her near and dear) than she must give to those of C. That Unger
shows no interest in tackling this third rationale speaks against casting him
as a consequentialist.
As the title of his book makes clear, Unger's chief target is the second
rationale.His principalassertionis that it is seriously wrong not to use one's
nonessentialfunds to preventprematuredeaths.Keepingwhat we need to sus-
tain our life and earningpower, we ought to give the rest to life-saving chari-
ties, especially ones thatcan save lives cheaply.5
The first rationaleconstitutes however an importantsubsidiarytarget for
Unger. He attacksthis rationaleby seeking to show, with the aid of various
argumentsbased on cases, that imposing even very serious losses (death) on

3 Such rights may have thresholds (giving way when the benefits are large enough) and
may also be alienable. And both possibilities are combinable, as when the threshold
benefits requiredfor permissible infringementof C's right can be reduced or eliminated
through waiver or forfeiture.
4 Samuel Scheffler's discussion in The Rejection of Consequentialism(Oxford University
Press 1982) proceeds much along these lines. Preferring normative over evaluative
terms, he distinguishes between agent-centeredrestrictions, motivated by C's rights, and
agent-centeredprerogatives, allowing A to look out for herself and her own. He ends up
arguing that the prerogatives(involving rejection of (2)) are on much firmerground than
the restrictions(involving rejection of (1)-(3)).
5 Unger stresses how surprisinglycheap it is to save children's lives in the poor countries.
But this fact seems to play no role in his argument:Even if the cost per life were very
much higher, so that with present funding Oxfam and UNICEF could save only a few
lives each year, it would still be seriously wrong not to give.

190 THOMASW. POGGE

some others for the sake of significantly lessening serious losses overall is
generally "good behavior"and hence at least not wrong (Chs. 3-4). To show
that this deflationof the firstrationalesupportshis deflationof the second, he
then postulates
The Reasonable Principle of Ethical Integrity. Otherthings being even nearly equal, if it is all
right for you to impose losses on others with the result that there's a significantlessening of the
serious losses suffered by others overall, then, if you're to avoid doing what's seriously wrong,
you can't fail to impose smaller or equal losses on yourself, nor can you fail to accept such
losses, when the result's an equal or greater significantlessening of such serious losses overall
(p. 139f.).'

This principle can easily be misread as follows: "If you impose losses on
others with the result that there is a significantlessening of the serious losses
suffered by others overall (and you consider it all right to do so), then you
must impose and accept smaller or equal losses on yourself for an equivalent
or better result." This principle is indeed quite reasonable, but it is not the
one before us. Nor would it be of any help to Unger, who can assume of his
readers, at best, that we have accepted the permissibility of imposing such
losses on others, not that we have actually imposed such losses. The correct
reading of the principleis then: "If you accept the permissibilityof imposing
losses on others with the result that there is a significant lessening of the
serious losses suffered by others overall, then you must impose and accept
smalleror equal losses on yourself for an equivalentor betterresult."
But this principle is problematic.The antecedentstipulatesmerely that it
is all right to go ahead, not that it is wrong not to do so. It is unclear why
the mere fact that A's action is permissible if A?C should entail that it is
mandatoryin the parallelcase with A=C.7To see this, consider the following
reader'sresponse:"I deem it permissibleto impose such losses on others and
agree that anyone imposing such losses on others ought to impose and accept
like losses on herself. However, I also deem it permissible to decline to
impose such losses on others and hold that anyone who does so decline may
then also decline to impose and accept like losses on herself. Since I myself
have permissibly declined to impose such losses on others, I am permittedto
decline to impose and accept such losses on myself."
In light of this gap in Unger's reasoning, and in the spirit of the name he
has chosen for his principle, let me suggest this weaker rephrasing: A's
declining to act optimally when this involves imposing losses on C for the

6 As I indicated above, a word such as "loss" might suggest merely that someone is worse
off now, after A's act, than she would be now if A had behaved differently or it might
also suggest in addition that she became worse off through A's act than she had been
before A acted. I think Unger here has the second, strongersense in mind.
7 Unger's WeakPrinciple of Ethical Integrity (p. 140) involves the same leap and thus also
seems too strong in this respect.

BOOK SYMPOSIUM 191

sake of significantly lessening serious losses overall should not receive a
bettermoral assessmentwhen A=C than when A?C.8
Now one may well argue that my reformulationis still too strong. One
could, for example, offer this counter-example:If medicine A controls can
save either a life and a foot in group B or C's life only, then A's using it to
save C's life is wrong when A is unrelatedto C, but not wrong when A is,
or is closely related to, C.9But let us grantthe reformulatedethical integrity
principlefor the sake of the argument.
This leads to another problem. Unger's principal assertion is that it is
seriously wrong not to impose various losses on oneself when doing so
would result in a significant lessening of serious losses overall. In order to
support this assertion via the reformulatedprinciple of ethical integrity, we
need a premise to the effect that it is seriously wrong not to impose such
losses on others in like circumstances. However, in all his attacks on the
firstrationale,Unger never uses such stronglanguage.The most he concludes
from his cases is that imposing losses on some so as significantly to lessen
serious losses overall is "good"conduct or behavior.Such argumentsmay be
(and, I think, are) quite effective in underminingthe firstrationale'soffensive
against (1) and (3). But, since they do not undermineits offensive against
(2), they also cannot, via the reformulatedprinciple of ethical integrity, help
underminethe second rationale's offensive against (2). All we get by apply-
ing this principle to those conclusions are blandjudgments of the form that
imposing losses on oneself so as significantlyto lessen serious losses overall
is good behavior.And who would deny that?
If Unger's discussion of the firstrationaleis to supporthis principalasser-
tion, he thus needs to argue for a linking claim such as: It is always seriously
wrong not to impose losses on others so as significantly to lessen serious
losses overall.'0Or, weaker:Whenever it is good behavior to impose losses

8 Endorsingagent-neutralreflection,this readingof the principlefits with consequentialism.

But Unger might also envisage a more agent-relative principle, which invokes the
deontological idea that persons have rights with thresholds:If a goal is so importantthat,
to serve it, A may impose right-infringinglosses on C, then it is also so importantthat, to
serve it, A ought to impose like losses on herself. Though not promising as a reading of
Unger, this principle does suggest a rationale for the leap from "permissible" to
"mandatory."
9 Unger himself may have reason to accept some counter-example of this form. He
explicitly recognizes special obligations toward one's closest family members (pp. 35f.,
149f.-more evidence against casting him as a consequentialist).Such special obligations
suggest that one may give more weight to the survival of one's spouse than to that of a
stranger-and, likewise, that one may give more weight to saving one's spouse from
being widowed than to saving a stranger'sspouse from this fate.
1 Unger has made this claim in conversation.But it would seem to jar with his acceptance
of special ties (C might be the agent's mother). And it has the ratherdubious implication
that, if m is the smallest number such that saving the lives of m innocents counts as a
"significantlessening of serious losses overall,"then, for any n, it is always wrong not to

192 THOMASW. POGGE

on others so as significantly to lessen serious losses overall, it is also seri-
ously wrong not to do so. Through such a link, his discussion of the first
rationalecould supportthe view that, when one can significantlylessen seri-
ous losses overall by criminally redirectingothers' nonessential funds (e.g.
through theft, mugging, blackmail, embezzlement, extortion, kidnapping,
murder?),it is seriously wrong not to do so. And this view could then, via
the reformulated principle of ethical integrity, support Unger's principal
assertion: that it is seriously wrong not to direct one's own nonessential
funds towardsignificantlylessening serious losses overall.
This argumentativepath may offer the best chance to connect Unger's
innovative and suggestive discussion of the first rationale to the principal
assertion of his book. I wonder whether it, or some alternativepath, can be
filled in convincingly.
If so, we would still face two furtherproblems. First, Unger argues that
our conduct is wrong in two respects: We fail to direct toward life-saving
projects our own nonessential funds and those we could expropriate from
others. Now imagine a man who fails only in the first way. He keeps all his
own wealth to himself but never misses an opportunity-most of them ille-
gal-to redirect that of others toward life-saving projects. Is his conduct,
while still seriously wrong, less wrong than that of the rest of us? And if
not, why not?1'
Second, it is highly doubtful that an argumentativestrategy of this sort
has any justificatorypoint, that Unger can convince anyone that she ought to
direct her own nonessential funds to life-saving projects by convincing her
first that she ought so to redirect others' nonessential funds that she can
expropriate.
Unger's book provides highly original discussions of the first and second
rationales. These discussions deserve detailed study. In view of space con-
straints, I have here focused on a more limited question: Is Unger right to
claim that his attack on the first rationale supports his (to him much more
important)attack on the second? My verdict is that furtherclarificationand
justificationare needed to make a convincing case for this claim.

kill n innocents when doing so is the only way of saving n+m innocents from being killed
by others.
This question suggests what above I had called a quite reasonable principle of ethical
integrity. It entails that whoever takes others' property for the purpose of reducing
serious losses overall must be willing to impose equally severe propertylosses on herself
(and her near and dear) for the same purpose. That our imaginary man runs afoul of this
principle could explain why his conduct is, after all, no better than ours and perhaps
worse.

BOOKSYMPOSIUM193