2011

George Mawuli

AKPANDJAR

Econ 605 Chalmers

Homework
Econ 605 Chalmers Homework (Q. 7-10) 04-25-2011 George Mawuli Akpandjar

Q7. Summarize Feyerabend’s “anarchy” view of science, and discuss its contribution.

Feyerabend was a philosopher of science who was not astonished by failures of

characterization of science and made an effort to draw the implications of these failures
by the anarchistic account of science (Chalmers, 1999, pp.149).
In the anarchistic account of science, there exists nothing like a scientific method
that is useful for scientists. Also, science does not possess features that render it
necessarily superior to other forms of knowledge. According to Feyerabend, if there is a
single, unchanging principle of scientific method, it is the principle of anything goes
(Chalmers, 1999, pp. 150).
The main argument of Feyerabend’s anarchistic account attempts to undermine
characterization of method and progress in science offered by philosophers by
challenging them on their own ground. He present reasons carefully and clearly in
opposition to the fact that scientific progress did not conform to theories of science
proposed earlier throughout history. In other words, progress in science has not been the
result from following any type of scientific method. For example, using Galileo’s
advancements, he pointed out that if the method and progress in science cannot even
make sense of Galileo's innovations the method is not applicable.
Feyerabend noted that some scientific programs cannot be compared because they
are based on entirely different perspectives and therefore scientists cannot communicate
with each other. He criticized Kuhn’s proposal about consensus as a criteria since it did
not differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate ways of achieving consensus and
also because it did not differentiate between science and other activities such as theology
and organized crime (Chalmers, 1999, pp. 155).
“Given the failure of attempts to capture the special features of scientific
knowledge that render it superior to other forms, which failure Feyerabend considered
himself to have established, he drew the conclusion that high status attributed to science
in our society, and the superiority it is presumed to have not only over Marxism, say, but
over such things as black magic and voodoo, are not justified” (Chalmers, 1999, pp. 155).
He believed the place given to science in society is a dangerous dogma and playing a
repressive role similar to Christianity in the seventeenth century.

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Econ 605 Chalmers Homework (Q. 7-10) 04-25-2011 George Mawuli Akpandjar

The anarchistic account of science increases the freedom of scientists by

removing them from methodological constraints and more generally, leaves individuals
the freedom to choose between science and other forms of knowledge. It is believed in
this account that the state must be free from science just like the state is free from church.
According to him, we should “free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically
petrifying science” (Feyerabend, 1975 in Chalmers, 1999, pp. 156). In his ideal society,
the state is ideologically neutral between ideologies to ensure that individuals maintain
freedom of choice and do not have an ideology imposed on them against their will.
Feyerabend can be criticized for not counting with the active role of society in
creating individuals because individuals are created into a society that pre-exists them
and which in that same sense, possess characteristics the individuals do not choose and
cannot be in a position to choose.

Reference

Chalmers, A. (1999). What is this thing called science?, 3 rd ed., Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co.

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Econ 605 Chalmers Homework (Q. 7-10) 04-25-2011 George Mawuli Akpandjar

Q8. Compare and contrast the sophisticated falsificationist’s, Kuhn’s, Lakatos’, and
Feyerabend’s views of science.

The sophisticated falsificationist view a theory as acceptable or scientific, only if it has

corroborated excess empirical content over its predecessor i.e. only if it leads to the
discovery of novel facts. Falsified theories, in this type of falsificationism, are to be
replaced by theories that can account for the phenomena that falsified the prior theory.
Sophisticated falsificationists argue that theories are used because of their successes, not
because of the failures of other theories.
This account of falsificationism is as a result of the inherent problems of
falsificationism itself; the main one which was the impossibility to locate the cause of
faulty prediction of a theory. Both Kuhn and Lakatos tried to solve this problem by
focusing attention on the theoretical framework in which scientists work.
However, Kuhn drew attention to the extent to which workers in rival paradigms
live in different worlds to such a degree that he left himself with inadequate resources to
make clear and comprehensible a sense in which a change from one paradigm to another
in the course of a scientific revolution is a step forward.
On the other hand, Lakatos tried to avoid that trap, but, apart from problems
concerning the reality of the methodological decisions he brought into existence, he also
ended up with a criterion for characterizing science that was so lax that it can
accommodate almost anything to the extent that Feyerabend’s construal of methodology
can only be fit into Lakatos’s methodology only because of its laxity quality. This made
Feyerabend to see Lakatos as a fellow anarchist.
The way in which Feyerabend understands the Aristotelian stationary earth
framework backed up by naked-eye data and the Copernican, moving earth theory
supported by telescopic data, as mutually exclusive circles of thought was more like
Kuhn's representation of paradigms as mutually exclusive ways of seeing the world.
It is not surprising therefore that “the two philosophers both independently coined
the word ‘incommensurable’ to describe the relationship between two theories or
paradigms that cannot be logically compared for lack of theory-neutral facts to exploit in

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Econ 605 Chalmers Homework (Q. 7-10) 04-25-2011 George Mawuli Akpandjar

the comparison’ (Chalmers, 1999, pp. 155). Nonetheless, Kuhn stayed clear from
Feyerabend's anarchistic conclusions essentially by appealing to social consensus to
restore law and order.
In contrast, Feyerabend also rejected Kuhn's appeal to the social consensus of the
scientific community, partly because he did not think Kuhn distinguished between
legitimate and illegitimate ways of achieving consensus. Also, Feyerabend rejected
consensus because he did not think the appeal to consensus was capable of distinguishing
between science and other activities.

Reference

Chalmers, A. (1999). What is this thing called science?, 3 rd ed., Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co.

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Econ 605 Chalmers Homework (Q. 7-10) 04-25-2011 George Mawuli Akpandjar

Q9. Describe Chalmer’s argument for a “middle ground” between a universal method and
anarchy in science.

A study of scientific progress would reveal many indications to believe that a universal
and ahistoric method is highly imaginative and unlikely. Science would become locked
into a fixed position and very dogmatic instead of adaptable if there exists both universal
and ahistoric methods.
However, a universal method or no method at all does not exhaust all
possibilities. An intermediate way between universal method and no method at all would hold
that there are methods and standards in science, but that they can vary from science to science and
can, within a science. Thus, science should not have limits and restrictions so that as we learn and
knowledge becomes improved, we refine and adapt to our standards.
Chalmers noted there is a middle way, according to which there are historically
contingent methods and standards implicit in successful sciences. “It would seem that
unless there are some superstandards for judging changes in standards then those changes
cannot be construed in a non-relativist way. But superstandards take us back to the
universal method that is meant to yield such standards” (Chalmers, 1999, pp. 162-3).
This middle way is shown by how Galileo demonstrated that we cannot rely only
on the naked eye-observations since we use tools to observe. Galileo made the first step in
what was to be a common trend in science, the replacement of naked-eye data by data acquired by
way of instruments, and in doing so violated, and brought about a change in the scientific method.
Chalmers proposes that there is a universal method seen from a common-sense
perspective since most scientists agree on a number of basic criteria. Galileo was able to
accomplish his work using data from instrument in place of the naked-eye data because there was
much that was shared between him and his rivals. There was a large overlap in their aim i.e. they
all aimed at giving a description of the motions of the heavenly bodies that was borne out by the
empirical evidence.
At any stage in its development, a science will consist of some specific aims to arrive at
knowledge of some specified kind, methods for arriving at those aims together with standards for
judging the extent to which they have been met, and specific facts and theories that represent the
current state of play as far as the realization of the aim is concerned. Each individual item in the
web of entities will be subject to revision in the light of research.

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Econ 605 Chalmers Homework (Q. 7-10) 04-25-2011 George Mawuli Akpandjar

The general idea, then, is that any part of the web of aims, methods, standards, theories
and observational facts that constitute a science at a particular time can be progressively changed,
and the remaining part of the web will provide the background against which a case for the
change can be made.

Reference

Chalmers, A. (1999). What is this thing called science?, 3 rd ed., Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co.