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Meditations 1 and 2
The argument for universal doubt
4. Objections
a. We think that God is perfectly good and would not deceive us.
b. Some think that there does not exist such a powerful God.
5. Replies
a. If it were repugnant to God's nature to deceive us, he would not allow us to be
deceived at all.
b. If there is no God, we must assume the author of our being to be even less
perfect, so that we have even more reason to doubt all our beliefs.
Therefore, I have reason to doubt the totality of what my senses tell me as well as the
mathematical knowledge that it seems I have.
The argument for our existence (the "Cogito")
1. Even if we assume that there is an evil demon deceiving me, from the very fact that I
am deceived it follows that I exist.
2. In general, it follows from any state of thinking (e.g., imagining, sensing, feeling,
reasoning) that I exist. While I can be deceived about the objective content of any
thought, I cannot be deceived about the fact that I exist and that I seem to perceive
objects with certain characteristics.
3. I can only be certain of the existence of myself insofar as I am thinking.
The argument that the mind is more certainly known than the body
1. It is possible that all knowledge of external objects, including my body, could be false
as the result of the actions of an evil demon. It is not possible, however, that I could
be deceived about my existence or my nature as a thinking thing.
2. Even Corporeal objects, such as my body, are known much more distinctly through the
mind than through the body.
3. Therefore, every act of clear and distinct perception of corporeal matter provides
further evidence for our existence and nature as thinking things.
Therefore, our mind is much more clearly and distinctly known to us than our body.
Meditations 3, 4, and 5
I. Meditation Three: Descartes proves God's existence and that He is not a deceiver, thereby
allowing us to be sure that we are not deceived when we perceive things clearly and distinctly.
A. Summary of things of which I am certain and those which I still must doubt.
1. I am certain that I exist as a thinking thing.
2. I must still doubt both my senses and my intuitions concerning mathematical
knowledge since God may have constituted me so as to be deceived even about those
things which seem to me most certain.
Therefore, in order to become certain of anything else I must inquire into the existence of
God and see whether He can be regarded as a deceiver.
Therefore, the principle upon which I have judged my ideas to be similar to external
objects seems to be mistaken.
C. The argument for the existence of God from the fact that I have an idea of Him
1. There must be as much reality in a cause as in an effect. (In efficient causation. Wilson
calls this the ‘Causal Non-Inferiority Principle’)
a. This is true in formal reality (i.e., causation in the material world) and also in
objective reality (i.e., causation between ideas, or between ideas and the
material world).
b. So, a cause (the entity which gives rise to my idea) must contain at least as
much formal reality as there is objective reality in the idea to which it gives
rise.
c. If the objective reality of any of my ideas is so great that it could not have
originated in me, then I will know I am not alone in the world.
2. I have many ideas, some of people, animals, angels, or finite substances. For these, I
need not assume a cause greater than myself.
Note – Descartes introduces the notion of material falsity (developed by Suarez).
Materially false ideas are those which seem to correspond to some ‘thing’ but
which arise from a non-thing, absence, or privation. So, cold may be simply a
privation of heat, or evil simply a privation of good. In such cases, the ‘thing’
in question simply is absence. It is not merely a fiction (e.g., unicorns are not
materially false).
4. I also have an idea of God, and in my mind this idea has more objective reality than
any idea I have of a finite substance.
5. The idea of God could not have originated in me, since I am a finite substance.
Therefore, God must exist (i.e., possess formal reality), since this is the only way to
account for the great objective reality I perceive in my idea of Him.
5. Objections
a. Why must this more perfect being who is the cause of my idea of God and of
my existence be taken to be God?
Reply – Any finite cause must itself be caused by something else at least
as perfect as itself and the regress must end at some point with an infinite
or perfect cause. It must do so especially because this ultimate cause not
only created (caused) me in the past, but preserves me in existence now.
b. Why cannot there be several partial causes for my existence?
Reply – Unity is one of the main perfections in my idea of God; this
must have been caused by a unified being, which, as unified, necessarily
possesses (insofar as he unifies) all other perfections.
E. God cannot be seen as a deceiver, since He is perfect and deception depends upon some defect.
B. Error is a privation
1. I exist suspended between God (being, perfection) and nothingness (non-being, utter
imperfection).
2. Error is a privation or lack of knowledge which in fact I should have. This lack is a
necessary consequence of my finitude, and not the result of poor design by God (cf.
Augustine, Plotinus).
C. Error is due to the concurrent operation of the will and the intellect
1. No error is found in the intellect. With the intellect I merely perceive ideas, and if I
lack ideas of every thing in the world this lack is not a (negative) deprivation, but
simply a (neutral) lack.
2. No error is found in the will. In fact, our will is essentially equivalent to God’s. Our
understanding, imagination, and memory all pale in comparison to God’s, yet our
will is in essentially no less than his. His will is greater in virtue of his knowledge,
power, and range of action, but no greater in the strict sense. In both cases it is an
utterly free capacity to affirm or negate.
a. Distinction between powerfully affirming one choice (positive freedom) and
‘indifference’ between two things (negative freedom).
3. So intellect and will are in themselves both perfectly crafted.
4. The will, being essentially equivalent to God’s, is greater than the intellect. Error
occurs when we fail to restrain the will, in its judgments, from going beyond what the
intellect clearly and distinctly perceives to be the case.
D. So we can both avoid error and actively pursue truth by refraining from judgment in all
matters of belief until our intellect sees the truth clearly and distinctly.
Note – Descartes is concerned with epistemological matters (intellection and belief), not
moral matters (action), although there is some overlap here. In moral matters he would
allow for appeals to conformity or authority; never in matters of knowledge.
III. Meditation Five: Descartes considers what properties we can know to belong to the essence
of material things and also considers another way of proving God's existence by considering what
properties we can know to belong to God's essence.
A. When I examine those ideas of corporeal objects that are distinct and not confused, I find that
these are properties concerned with extension and duration: length, breadth, depth, size, shape,
position, and movement. (These are primary properties.)
1. When I discover particular things about these properties, it seems as if I am recalling
something I already knew, something already within me.
2. But these ideas are not invented, I am not the source of these ideas. They have their
own immutable natures which would be the same whether or not I existed, or whether
there exists any object that corresponds to these ideas.
3. Neither are they adventitious (i.e., coming through the senses). I can form an idea that
it is impossible to imagine or sense (such as a chiliagram, the thousand sided figure
mentioned in Meditation Six) and demonstrate many necessary truths concerning its
nature.
4. Objections
a. Granted that we cannot think of God except as existing, still our thought does
not make him exist.
Reply - It is not that our thinking makes God’s existence necessary, but
rather that God's existence, understood as inseparable from the very
thought of God, determines my thinking about Him. I am not free to
think of God without existence.
b. We should not suppose that God has all perfections, including existence.
Reply - It is impossible, in conceiving a supreme being, to avoid
attributing all perfections to Him.
c. Extension of the ontological argument. Our idea of God cannot be invented because:
1. There is nothing else whose essence necessarily implies existence
2. I cannot conceive of two Gods
3. I can’t alter or remove any of the attributes I clearly and distinctly perceive in my idea
of God.
III. The evidence for the existence of corporeal things from the senses
A. Summary of old beliefs that I got from the senses: i.e., all my impressions of the secondary
properties of objects.
4. I not only have the power of passive sense, of examining the contents of my mind, but
also of active sense, the power of originating ideas within my mind. This faculty of
active sense cannot be within me for two reasons:
a. No intellection is required for this active sensing.
b. Ideas arising from active sense may do so against my will. Therefore,
5. The active faculty of sensory perception is in a substance other than myself.
6. This substance must have as much reality as the objective reality of the ideas it
produces. (I.e., a cause must have as much reality as its effect; or, Descartes, it must
‘contain within itself either formally or eminently all the reality which exists
objectively in the ideas produced by this [active] faculty’. See above, Med 3)
Therefore,
7. This substance must be either God or a body
a. God will contain all reality eminently; a body will contain all reality formally.
8. God created me with a great inclination to believe that these ideas come from corporeal
things, not from God himself.
9. And God is no deceiver.
10. But, if my ideas do not come from external objects, then God must be a deceiver. But
this is an absurdity. Therefore,
11. QED: Material objects exist.
C. These objects, however, may not be as they seem to us through the senses. Having established
the existence of external objects, Descartes goes on to consider whether our senses tell us the
truth about them.
V. The relation of mind (i.e., me) and (my) body
A. I am intimately joined with my body; I am intermingled with it, and form a unit with it.
I don’t simply ‘regard’ feelings of pain and pleasure, but experience them as
‘confused modes of thinking’ which arise from my union with the body.
B. We have many ideas from sense: some truly taught by nature (e.g., to seek out or to
avoid certain bodies for our well-being), others proceeding from a habit of making
bad judgments (e.g., that color is ‘really’ in objects).
C. Nature (or, the order of Nature) teaches us not to conclude anything from these ideas
until the intellect has examined them.
1. A star and a candle flame may seem the same size, but I judge to star to be
bigger.
2. I link heat with fire, but there is no argument for the belief that there is
‘something’ in the fire which resembles heat.
D. Mind alone, not the composite of mind and body, is capable of knowing truth. (I.e.,
only judgments have epistemological significance, not mere sensations of things in
nature.)
1. We ‘misuse’ the order of nature by trying to draw from it epistemologically
significant conclusions; i.e., Descartes, by ‘treating [sensory perceptions] as
reliable touchstones for immediate judgments about the essential nature of
the bodies located outside us’. Therefore,
E. The senses tell us only what is necessary for the (practical) benefit and welfare of the
composite of mind and body. Our sensation is sufficiently clear and distinct for this
(non-epistemological) purpose.
1. With respect to the essences of things, the senses are confused. But,
G. The poison objection: In some cases our senses do not tell us what is best for the
welfare of our body. For example, some poisons seem attractive to the senses, or an
ill person may desire something injurious to her.
VI. Is God to blame for giving us sensory faculties that sometimes lead us into harm?
A. The body is a machine, like a clock.
B. Mind and body are distinct. The mind is indivisible, while body is divisible.
C. Only the brain affects the mind immediately. All signals from other parts of the body
must travel to the brain.
D. Signals travel from the periphery of our body to the brain. The system is like a cord
(‘cord ABCD’) running to the brain which can be pulled at any point along its length.
Thus sometimes, due to mechanical malfunction or the intrusion of foreign matter,
we get a signal in a brain which we think originated from point D, but which in fact
originated from points B or C. Therefore,
E. Although this is the best possible arrangement to protect our body, it may sometimes
lead us to be deceived. The cause is not due to faulty design, but is a simple if
unfortunate consequence of our nature as a combination of mind and body. Thus God
cannot be blamed.
VII. Being aware of this arrangement, I can use other sensory faculties, memory, and
intellect to avoid error by restraining my judgment to those things I perceive clearly
and distinctly. We can now reassert with confidence all those beliefs which we formerly
took as doubtful, and dismiss those which led us astray. (Also, a final dismissal of the dream
argument).