Escolar Documentos
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FACTS/ISSUE RULING
LOAN
1 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND • Fireman's Fund Insurance vs. Metro Port Services (182 SCRA 455),
MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., we have explained, in holding the carrier and the arrastre operator
liable in solidum, thus:The legal relationship between the consignee
1. This is an action against defendants shipping company (EASTERN and the arrastre operator is akin to that of a depositor and
SHIPPING LINES), arrastre operator (METRO PORT SERVICE) and warehouseman. The relationship between the consignee and the
broker-forwarder (ALLIED BROKERAGE CORP) for damages common carrier is similar to that of the consignee and the arrastre
sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by the operator. Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take good care of
insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition
losses/damages. to the consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the
2. The CA RULED- Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore
severally: The amount of P19,032.95, with the present legal interest of charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in good condition
12% per annum from October 1, 1982, the date of filing of this to the consignee.
complaints, until fully paid. • Reckoning point and rate of legal interest- THE RULES
When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-
ISSUES: contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be
held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages"
of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable
• whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods damages.
can be a solidary, or joint and several, liability of the common carrier,
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual
the arrastre operator and the customs broker;
and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
• whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage thereof, is imposed, as follows:
is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed or from the date
the decision appealed from is rendered; When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
• whether the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is twelve payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
percent (12%) or six percent (6%). money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12%
per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of
Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or
until the demand can be established with reasonable
2 FLORENDO VS. CA Section 1-F of Article VI of the HLA cannot be read as an escalation clause as it
does not make any reference to increases or decreases in the interest rate on
FACTS: Petitioner Gilda Florendo was an employee of Respondent Bank from loans. However, paragraph (f) of the mortgage contract is clearly and
May 17, 1976 until August 16, 1984 when she voluntarily resigned. However, indubitably an escalation provision, and therefore, the parties were and are
before her resignation, she applied for a housing loan of P148,000.00, payable bound by the said stipulation that "(t)he rate of interest charged on the
within 25 years from respondent bank's Provident Fund. Petitioners and obligation secured by this mortgage . . ., shall be subject, during the life of this
respondent bank, through the latter's duly authorized representative, executed contract, to such an increase/decrease in accordance with prevailing rules,
the Housing Loan Agreement. Together with the Housing Loan Agreement, regulations and circulars of the Central Bank of the Philippines as the Provident
petitioners and respondent bank, through the latter's authorized representative, Fund Board of Trustees of the Mortgagee (respondent bank) may prescribe for
also executed a Real Estate Mortgage and Promissory its debtors . . . ." 9 Contrary to petitioners' allegation, there is no vagueness in
Note. The loan was actually given to petitioner Gilda Florendo, in her capacity the aforequoted proviso; even their own arguments (below) indicate that this
as employee of respondent bank. Thereafter, respondent bank increased the provision is quite clear to them.
interest rate on petitioner's loan from 9% per annum to 17%, the said increase
to take effect on March 19, 1985. That petitioners protested the increase. In Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank vs. Navarro, 10 this Court in essence
ruled that in general there is nothing inherently wrong with escalation clauses.
ISSUE: Did the respondent bank have a valid and legal basis to impose an In IBAA vs. Spouses Salazar, 11 the Court reiterated the rule that escalation
increased interest rate on the petitioners' housing loan? clauses are valid stipulations in commercial contracts to maintain fiscal stability
and to retain the value of money in long term contracts.
The loan was perfected on July 20, 1983. PD No. 116 became effective on
January 29, 1973. CB Circular No. 416 was issued on July 29, 1974. CB Circ.
504 was issued February 6, 1976. CB Circ. 706 was issued December 1, 1979.
CB Circ. 905, lifting any interest rate ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the
Usury Law, as amended, was promulgated in 1982. These and other relevant
CB issuances had already come into existence prior to the perfection of the
housing loan agreement and mortgage contract, and thus it may be said that
these regulations had been taken into consideration by the contracting parties
when they first entered into their loan contract. In light of the CB issuances in
force at that time, respondent bank was fully aware that it could have imposed
an interest rate higher than 9% per annum rate for the housing loans of its
employees, but it did not. In the subject loan, the respondent bank knowingly
agreed that the interest rate on petitioners' loan shall remain at 9% p.a. unless
a CB issuance is passed authorizing an increase (or decrease) in the rate on
such employee loans and the Provident Fund Board of Trustees acts
accordingly. Thus, as far as the parties were concerned, all other onerous
factors, such as employee resignations, which could have been used to trigger
an application of the escalation clause were considered barred or waived. If the
intention were otherwise, they — especially respondent bank — should have
included such factors in their loan agreement.
ManCom Resolution No. 85-08, which is neither a rule nor a resolution of the
Monetary Board, cannot be used as basis for the escalation in lieu of CB
issuances, since paragraph (f) of the mortgage contract very categorically
specifies that any interest rate increase be in accordance with "prevailing rules,
regulations and circulars of the Central Bank . . . as the Provident Fund
Board . . . may prescribe." The Banco Filipino and PNB doctrines are applicable
four-square in this case. As a matter of fact, the said escalation clause further
provides that the increased interest rate "shall only take effect on the date of
effectivity of (the) increase/decrease" authorized by the CB rule, regulation or
circular. Without such CB issuance, any proposed increased rate will never
become effective.
On the other hand, it will not be amiss to point out that the unilateral
determination and imposition of increased interest rates by the herein
It is basic that there can be no contract in the true sense in the absence of the
element of agreement, or of mutual assent of the parties. If this assent is
PNB informed private respondents that the interest rate of the loan account with wanting on the part of the one who contracts, his act has no more efficacy than
us is now 25% per annum plus a penalty of 6% per annum on past dues." The if it had been done under duress or by a person of unsound mind.
PNB further increased this interest rate to 30% on October 15, 1984; and to
42% on October 25, 1984.
Similarly, contract changes must be made with the consent of the contracting
parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed modification,
especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In the case of
loan contracts, it cannot be gainsaid that the rate of interest is always a vital
component, for it can make or break a capital venture. Thus, any change must
be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, it is bereft of any binding effect.
DEPOSIT
1 PAULINO GULLAS vs. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK 1. YES. As a general rule, a bank has a right of set off of the deposits in its
PNB applied the account of Gullas to the debt created by the dishonor of the hands for the payment of any indebtedness to it on the part of a depositor. Civil
treasury warrant indorsed by GULLAS Code contains provisions regarding compensation (set off) and deposit.The
portions of Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place when two
ISSUE: persons are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other . In his connection, it
Can Philippine National Bank apply a deposit to the debt of depositor to the has been held that the relation existing between a depositor and a bank is that
bank? of creditor and debtor.
Was the set off properly done by the bank? 2. NO.The action of the bank was prejudicial to Gullas notice should actually
have been given him in order that he might protect his interests. While notice of
the application of his deposit to a debt to the bank is not necessary in case of a
maker, the same cannot be applied to an indorser, such as Gullas.
♥
In order that a person can be convicted under Art. 315, par.I(b) , it
must be proven that he has the obligation to deliver or return the
respondent David invested with the Nation Savings and Loan some money, goods or personal property that he received. Petitioners
Association (NSLA). NSLA was placed under receivership by the had no such obligation to return the same money, i.e., the bills or
Central Bank, so that David filed claims therewith for his investments coins, which they received from private respondents. This is so
but he only recovered a lesser an amount than that he invested. because as clearly as stated in criminal complaints, the related civil
Believing that petitioners misappropriated the balance of the complaints and the supporting sworn statements, the sums of money
investments, at the same time violating Central Bank Circular No. 364 that petitioners received were loans.
and related Central Bank regulations on foreign exchange
transactions, David filed a case for estafa against petitioners.
The nature of simple loan is defined in Articles 1933 and 1953 of the
Civil Code.
Pets filed MTD to the charges against them for lack of jurisdiction
because David's claims allegedly comprised a purely civil "Art. 1933. — By the contract of loan, one of the parties
obligation which was itself novated (civil obligations on the part of delivers to another, either something not consumable so that
NSLA which were novated when Guingona, Jr. and Martin assumed the latter may use the same for a certain time- and return it,
them)
in which case the contract is called a commodatum; or money
W/N the public respondents have no jurisdiction when they or other consumable thing, upon the condition that the same
investigated the charges (estafa and violation of CB Circular amount of the same kind and quality shall he paid in which
No. 364 and related regulations regarding foreign exchange case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum.
transactions)
"Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.
Petitioners filed separate petitions for mandamus and prohibition with the RTC Article 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which
of Manila to compel the bank to return their certificate of title and cancel the substitute the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms,
mortgage. BPI-FSB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each
other.
petitioners in Iloilo City after Transbuilders defaulted in its payments.
Consequently, a sheriff’s notice of sale of petitioners’ property at public auction
was issued. The cancellation of the old obligation by the new one is a necessary
element of novation which may be effected either expressly or impliedly. While
there is really no hard and fast rule to determine what might constitute sufficient
ISSUE: Whether there was a novation of the mortgage loan contract between
change resulting in novation, the touchstone, however, is irreconcilable
petitioners and BPI-FSB that would result in the extinguishment of petitioners’
incompatibility between the old and the new obligations.
liability to the bank.
GUARANTY
1 TRADERS INSURANCE and SURETY COMPANY vs. DY ENG GIOK, Remittances of Giok should first be applied to obligation incurred during the
PEDRO LOPEZ DEE and PEDRO E. DY-LIACCO period covered by the surety agreement.
DLT & Co AGENT DY Eng Giok who has a running account in favor of principal, Reasons:
executed surety bond as principal and Traders as guarantor. Giok’s remittances
were applied first to his outstanding balance. DLT & CO demanded payment for I
remaining balance which was paid by surety. Surety demanded reimbursement The first is that, in the absence of express stipulation, a guaranty or suretyship
from Giok. operates prospectively and not retroactively; that is to say, it secures only the
debts contracted after the guaranty takes effect. This rule is a consequence of
the statutory directive that a guaranty is not presumed, but must be express,
and can not extend to more than what is stipulated. (New Civil Code, Art. 2055).
II
Debts covered by a guaranty are deemed more onerous to the debtor than the
simple obligations because, in their case, the debtor may be subjected to action
not only by the creditor, but also by the guarantor, and this even before the
guaranteed debt is paid by the guarantor.
2SPOUSES TOH vs. SOLID BANK CORPORATION Insofar as petitioners stipulate in the Continuing Guaranty that respondent Bank
"may at any time, or from time to time, in [its] discretion x x x extend or change
Respondent SOLID BANK CORPORATION agreed to extend an "omnibus line" the time payment," this provision even if understood as a waiver is confined per
credit facility worth P10 million in favor of respondent First Business Paper se to the grant of an extension and does not surrender the prerequisites
Corporation (FBPC). A continuing guaranty was submitted and then petitioner therefor as mandated in the "letter-advise." In other words, the authority of the
Sps Toh and Sps Li signed the same. The terms of the instrument defined the Bank to defer collection contemplates only authorized extensions, that is, those
contract arising therefrom as a surety agreement and provided for the solidary that meet the terms of the "letter-advise."
liability of the signatories thereto for and in consideration of "loans or advances"
and "credit in any other manner to, or at the request or for the account" of Certainly, while the Bank may extend the due date at its discretion pursuant to
FBPC. the Continuing Guaranty, it should nonetheless comply with the requirements
that domestic letters of credit be supported by fifteen percent (15%) marginal
Petitioner claim that the surety agreement has been extinguished by the deposit extendible three (3) times for a period of thirty (30) days for each
material alterations thereof and of the letter-advise which were allegedly extension, subject to twenty-five percent (25%) partial payment per extension.
brought by the extentions of the due dates of the letters of credit without the
required partial payment for extension. The extensions of the letters of credit made by respondent Bank without
observing the rigid restrictions for exercising the privilege are not covered by the
waiver stipulated in the Continuing Guaranty. Evidently, they constitute illicit
extensions prohibited under Art. 2079 of the Civil Code, "[a]n extension granted
to the debtor by the creditor without the consent of the guarantor extinguishes
the guaranty." This act of the Bank is not mere failure or delay on its part to
demand payment after the debt has become due, as was the case in unpaid
five (5) letters of credit which the Bank did not extend, defer or put off, but
comprises conscious, separate and binding agreements to extend the due date,
as was admitted by the Bank itself.
2 UY TONG VS. CA The prohibition on pactum commissorium stipulations is provided for by Article
2088 of the Civil Code:
FACTS: Petitioners Uy Tong (also known as Henry Uy) and Kho Po Giok
(SPOUSES) used to be the owners of Apartment No. 307 of the Ligaya Art. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by
Building, together with the leasehold right for ninety- nine (99) years over the way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of the same. Any
land on which the building stands. The land is registered in the name of Ligaya stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
Investments, Inc. It appears that Ligaya Investments, Inc. owned the building
which houses the apartment units but sold Apartment No. 307 and leased a The aforequoted provision furnishes the two elements
portion of the land in which the building stands to the SPOUSES.
4 ROXAS VS CA It is settled doctrine that failure to publish notice of auction sale as required by
the statute constitutes a jurisdiction defects with invalidates the sale. Even slight
Petitioner Blanca Consuelo Roxas is the owner of a parcel of land. She deviations therefrom are not allowed.
executed a special power of attorney appointing her brother, the late Manuel
Roxas, as her attorney-in-fact for the purpose of applying for an agricultural
loan with private respondent Rural Bank of Dumalag, Inc. using said land as Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 5939 the
collateral. The mortgage was later on foreclosed. pertinent portion of which, provides:
Delgado defaulted. Leviste filed collection suit against collection xxx xxx xxx
against Delgado and petitioner as solidary debtors.
(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or
W/N the mere execution by the principal debtor of a chattel
7 NORTHERN MOTORS, INC. vs. HON. JORGE R. COQUIA Doctrine: The execution was not justified and that Northern Motors, Inc., as
mortgagee, was entitled to the possession of the eight taxicabs. Those cabs
should not have been levied upon and sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment credit which was inferior to the chattel mortgage. Since the cabs could
no longer be recovered because apparently they had been transferred to
Respondent Honesto Ong and City Sheriff of Manila filed a motion for the persons whose addresses are unknown, the proceeds of the execution sale
reconsideration of this Court's resolution of August 29, 1975. In that resolution, may be regarded as a partial substitute for the unrecovarable cabs (arts.
it was held that the lien of Northern Motors, Inc., as chattel mortgagee, over 1189[2] and 1269, Civil Code; Urrutia & Co. vs. Baco River Plantation Co., 26
certain taxicabs is superior to the levy made on the said cabs by Honesto Ong, Phil. 632). Northern Motors, Inc. is entitled to the entire proceeds without
the assignee of the unsecured judgment creditor of the chattel mortgagor, deduction of the expenses of execution.
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. Northern Motors, Inc. in its motion for the
partial reconsideration, prayed for the reversal of the TC's orders cancelling the
bond filed by Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation. Northern Motors, Inc.
further prayed that the sheriff should be required to deliver to it the proceeds of
the execution sale of the mortgaged taxicabs without deducting the expenses of
execution.
ISSUE: Whether the levy made by mortgagor's judgment creditor against the
chattel mortgagor should prevail over the chattel mortgage credit.
In an action for judicial foreclosure respondent claim the machine is a real Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as
property thus cannot be subject of the chattel mortgage. personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of
chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the
Issue: house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they
should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which defendants-
WON the machinery in suit is real or personal property appellants merely had a temporary right as lessee, and although this can not in
itself alone determine the status of the property, it does so when combined with
other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the
mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personality. Finally, unlike in the Iya
cases, Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. & Plaza Theatre, Inc. & Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong
Machinery & Williamson, wherein third persons assailed the validity of the
chattel mortgage, it is the defendants-appellants themselves, as debtors-
mortgagors, who are attacking the validity of the chattel mortgage in this case.
The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein defendants-appellants,
having treated the subject house as personality.
9. ASSOCIATED INSURANCE and SURETY COMPANY, INC vs. ISABEL IYA’S ENCUMBRANCE IS PREFERRED. The decisive factor is the
IYA, ADRIANO VALINO and LUCIA VALINO, determination of the NATURE OF THE STRUCTURE LITIGATED UPON, for
where it be considered a personality, the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
1. Spouses Valino (owners a house and Lot) purchased on installment and the subsequent sale thereof at public auction, made in accordance with the
from the Philippine Realty Corporation Chattel Mortgage Law would be valid and the right acquired by the surety
company therefrom would certainly deserve prior recognition; otherwise,
2. November 6, 1951-FIRST MORTGAGE- CHATTEL MORTGAGE of appellant's claim for preference must be granted.
HOUSE in favor of the Associated Insurance duly registered with the
Chattel Mortgage Register of Rizal on December 6, 1951. At the time
said undertaking t, the parcel of land on which the house is erected BUILDING IS A REAL PROPERTY- it is obvious that the inclusion of the
was still registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation. building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may
constitute real properties (Art. 415, new Civil Code) could only mean one thing
3. October 24, 1952, SECOND MORTGAGE- REAL ESTATE
— that a building is by itself an immovable property.
MORTGAGE over the LOT AND THE HOUSE in favor of Isabel Iya,
duly registered.
ISSUE:
There is no question as to IYA’s right over the land covered by the real estate
mortgage; however, as the building constructed thereon has been the subject of
2 mortgages; controversy arise as to which of these encumbrances should
receive preference over the other?
1 REPUBLIC VS. PERALTA Yes. In Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) us. National Mines
and Allied Workers Union, 4 the Solicitor General took a different view and there
FACTS: In the voluntary insolvency proceedings commenced by private urged that the term "wages" under Article 110 of the Labor Code may be
respondent Quality Tobacco Corporation, the following claims of creditors were regarded as embracing within its scope severance pay or termination or
filed: separation pay. In PCIB, this Court agreed with the position advanced by the
Solicitor General. We see no reason for overturning this particular position. We
Credits which are specially preferred because they constitute liens (tax or non-
tax) in turn, take precedence over ordinary preferred credits so far as concerns
If the value of the specific property involved is greater than the sum total of the
tax liens and other specially preferred credits, the residual value will form part of
the "free property" of the insolvent — i.e., property not impressed with liens by
operation of Articles 2241 and 2242. If, on the other hand, the value of the
specific movable or immovable is less than the aggregate of the tax liens and
other specially preferred credits, the unsatisfied balance of the tax liens and
other such credits are to the treated as ordinary credits under Article 2244 and
to be paid in the order of preference there set up.
In contrast with Articles 2241 and 2242, Article 2244 creates no liens on
determinate property which follow such property. What Article 2244 creates are
simply rights in favor of certain creditors to have the cash and other assets of
the insolvent applied in a certain sequence or order of priority.
We come to the question of what impact Article 110 of the Labor Code has had
upon the complete scheme of classification, concurrence and preference of
credits in insolvency set out in the Civil Code. We believe and so hold that
Article 110 of the Labor Code did not sweep away the overriding preference
accorded under the scheme of the Civil Code to tax claims of the government or
any subdivision thereof which constitute a lien upon properties of the Insolvent.
It is frequently said that taxes are the very lifeblood of government. The
effective collection of taxes is a task of highest importance for the sovereign. It
is critical indeed for its own survival. It follows that language of a much higher
degree of specificity than that exhibited in Article 110 of the Labor Code is
necessary to set aside the intent and purpose of the legislator that shines
through the precisely crafted provisions of the Civil Code. It cannot be
assumed simpliciter that the legislative authority, by using in Article 110 the
words "first preference" and "any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding" intended to disrupt the elaborate and symmetrical structure set
up in the Civil Code. Neither can it be assumed casually that Article 110
intended to subsume the sovereign itself within the term "other creditors" in
stating that "unpaid wages shall be paid in full before other creditors may
We, however, do not believe that Article 110 has had no impact at all upon the
provisions of the Civil Code. Bearing in mind the overriding precedence given to
taxes, duties and fees by the Civil Code and the fact that the Labor Code does
not impress any lien on the property of an employer, the use of the phrase "first
preference" in Article 110 indicates that what Article 110 intended to modify
is the order of preference found in Article 2244, which order relates, as we have
seen, to property of the Insolvent that is not burdened with the liens or
encumbrances created or recognized by Articles 2241 and 2242. We have
noted that Article 2244, number 2, establishes second priority for claims for
wages for services rendered by employees or laborers of the Insolvent "for one
year preceding the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency." Article
110 of the Labor Code establishes "first preference" for services rendered
"during the period prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation, " a period not limited to
the year immediately prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation. Thus, very
substantial effect may be given to the provisions of Article 110 without
grievously distorting the framework established in the Civil Code by holding, as
we so hold, that Article 110 of the Labor Code has modified Article 2244 of the
Civil Code in two respects: (a) firstly, by removing the one year limitation found
in Article 2244, number 2; and (b) secondly, by moving up claims for unpaid
wages of laborers or workers of the Insolvent from second priority to first
priority in the order of preference established I by Article 2244.