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Evaluation of Divided Attention Theories

Divided attention is the ability of an individual to allocate attentional resources to multiple

tasks, for example, using a mobile phone whilst driving. By studying divided attention knowledge is

gained about the human information-processing system. Eysenck and Keane (2005) explain how there

are three factors that determine how well an individual can undertake multiple tasks; task similarity,

task difficulty and amount of practice. Divided attention is typically investigated using the dual-task

paradigm. Experiments involve participants undertaking one task while simultaneously conducting

another. The fundamental idea behind a dual task experiment is that if participants score worse on tasks

when conducted simultaneously then there is an interference effect. A good example is the Stroop Test

(Stroop 1935) in which participants are asked to indicate the color of a word rather than processing its

meaning. Thus, if an interference effect is observed a dual-task experiment it can be proposed that both

tasks compete for the same attentional resources.

Kahneman’s (1973) model of divided attention proposes that cognitive capacity is moderated by

a central processing unit, much like that of a single core computer. Processing resources are allocated by

degree of importance as well as an individual’s arousal. If comparing to a computer system, one could

draw the analogy of degree of importance being similar to processing priority, and arousal being similar

to overclocking a central processing unit. Overclocking a CPU, although increasing capacity can only be

done for a temporary amount of time as it will overheat. Similarly, human attentional capacity can be

increased temporarily by arousal from natural causes or use of substances. Spelke, Hirst and Neisser

(1976) conducted study suggesting that there are not fixed limitations on central processing capacity.

Further, Kahneman suggested an innate capacity to filter the priority of attentional stimuli, thus as a

task requires more attention, more resources are allocated. One of the major issues with Kahnemans
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model is its inability to satisfactorily explain how individual abilities can be eliminated due to

neurological damage (Eysenck and Keane 2005). A study conducted by Wickens and Gopher (1977) was

able to provide evidence that allocation of resources by central capacity is under strategic control.

Participants on instruction were able to switch the priority of a task and perform accordingly. This

seemingly agrees with Kahneman’s model as it agrees on a central capacity component.

Unlike Kahneman’s model of divided attention, Allport’s module resource theory (1980)

provides an explanation of how resources are allocated to individual tasks. Allport states that attention

is broken down into separate cognitive modules relevant to a specific skill or ability. Rather than, a

shared limited capacity such as in Kahneman’s model, each module has its own capacity and resource

bank. By proposing this idea, Allport shows how there can be similarities in performance in dual-task

paradigms as well as how resources are allocated to each task. Multiple module resource theories i.e.

(Navon and Gopher 1979) suggest that modules although specialized can be traded between different

skills and abilities. That is to say audio module resources could be used for visual attention, however

they would not be as efficient as within their own specialization. However in all module resource

theories there is no agreed number of modules, thus the model cannot be falsified.(Allport 1983,

Wicken 1984). Further, it does not explain how modules are coordinated to perform complex tasks

(Underwood 1974). Baddeley (1986) proposed that divided attention is made up of a hierarchical system

consisting of a combination of central capacity theory and multiple resource theory. Although, this is

refuted as it disagrees with accepted cognitive neuropsychological systems, that there is a general

processing mechanism. Without a general processing mechanism it cannot be shown how the

hierarchical processing system works together (Eysenck and Keane 2005).

Strayer and Johnstons (2001) study on mobile telephone use while driving supports Kahneman’s

concept in an experimental format. The experimenters hypothesized that talking on a mobile phone
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takes away from the attentional resources to be used while driving the car, thus, causing a deficit in the

required capacity to drive a car safely. Initially the experimenters tested the impact of listening to

conversation on driving skill, concluding that listening either does not affect capacity for driving or

requires very little processing power, resulting in driving skill being unchanged. This may be due to

practice, discussed further in the essay. Secondly, participants were tested on driving skill while actively

participating in a mobile phone conversation. Interestingly, shadowing conversation was unaffected,

however when generating words or listening for conversational cues, driving ability declined

significantly. Most importantly this shows that the attentional ability while participating in a dual-task

scenario is dependent on the type of task being undertaken. Using the computer analogy again, some

tasks have greater minimum system requirements and thus cannot be run in parallel with tasks using

the available resources.

The results of this experiment seem to agree with Kahneman’s proposed theory. Processing

ability appears finite due to the interference effect between the two different tasks. However, it is

unclear how resources are allocated. Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) proposed that as one repeats a task

through practice, it creates a greater ability. It is this practiced ability that allows for individuals to

undertake automatic behavior. Logan (1984) describes in the instance theory of automization how

practicing creates multiple instances of a process. This leads to a larger knowledge base of a task

providing a greater store of previously encountered scenarios. It is believed that having an extensive

store of instances allows an individual to react more proficiently to scenarios within the aforementioned

behavior as the probability of previously experiencing said scenario increases. Therefore it could be

argued that listening and shadowing are processes that have acquired an extensive history of practice,

suggesting execution of these processes require relatively little attentional capacity. However, in the

case of verbal communication using a mobile phone, cues come in unexpected format. This puts

cognitive load on the task, increasing priority, ultimately reallocating resources as needed. Further, it
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can be said that mobile phone conversation is a significantly different task than person to person

conversation. In a normal conversation in a vehicle the passenger can regulate conversation as they

experience the same visual cues as the driver, whereas this ability is absent in the other end of a mobile

conversation. This was demonstrated in Parks (1991) experiment as conversation within a vehicle

dropped as a driving-intensity increased.

A study conducted by Segal and Fusella (1970) where participants were tested on visual

imagery, audio imagery and visual detection, found that participants performed worse on tasks engaging

two visual systems than a visual system and an audio system. This supports the module resource theory

as it seems to show the existence of separate resources for each system rather than a single resource

used by a central capacity. Further, an experiment by Dawson and Schell (1982) suggests that separate

hemispheres of the brain act as distinct resources banks (Lund 2001). By pairing audio cues with an

electric shock response, Dawson and Schell (1982) discovered that the right hand side of the brain (for

the left ear) undertook an autonomic response to the audio cues, however the opposite hemisphere did

not upon receiving input from the right ear. If separate hemispheres undertake different abilities, then

resources must be distinct. A central capacity model would predict that both ears (and thus both sides

of the brain) would respond to the audio cue or neither sides would respond to the audio cue (Payne

and Wenger 1998). Thus, with the notion that Kahneman’s central capacity does not support

neuropsychological findings, it appears as if it will be replaced or modified in the near future as brain

imaging techniques improve, along with further neuro-scientific research.

Although central capacity has its flaws, as a model that has significant experimental backup, it

seems to explain attention in a more satisfactory basis to multiple module resource theories. Like

Baddeley (1986) suggests a correct model of attention is more like to be a fusion of both theories with

the support for central capacity coming from experimental research using dual task paradigms and the
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support for multiple resources executed by the central capacity coming from the neuropsychological

research being conducted. To once again use a computer analogy, it seems that evidence for multiple

resources will be in the hardware (as in the components of the brain) and the strategic command of the

central capacity will come from the cellular instructions (or software) that specific neural networks run.

Traditional operating systems such as windows use common driver components to run families of

distinctively different software programs. For example the save box in is a shared component of all

programs in the package. However, the resources needed to run that shared component come from the

hardware in the RAM or central processing unit. If the RAM is full or processing power is being utilized

by a high priority, resource intensive task then other software will either not run or not run at the same

capability. Further, by having additional graphics and audio cards one is able to increase the ability of

the computer to run tasks of the relevant nature. Practice on a neuropsychological basis involves

creating and modifying new neural networks, again this is much like updating software for it to run more

efficiently and thus using less hardware requirements.

In sum, Kahneman’s (1973) model works well in practice. It’s limits lie in its statement that

capacity is limited. Until experimental evidence can be provided that capacity is limited and how

resources are allocated to tasks, it still exists as a flawed model. However, although module resource

theories have a good neuropsychological foundation, they are not correct scientific theory as they are

unfalsifiable. Thus, one can conclude on this basis alone that Kahneman’s (1973) model of divided

attention is a superior scientific model of attention.

References

Allport, D.A (1989) Visual Attention. In Foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge MA: Mit Press.

Allport, D.A. (1980) Attention and performance. In New directions in cognitive psychology. London:

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Baddeley, A.D (1986) Working Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dawson, M.E. and Schell, A.M (1982) Electrodermal responses to attended and non-attended significant

stimuli during dichotic listening. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and

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Eysenck, M.W. and Keane M, (2005) Cognitive Psychology A Student’s Handbook 5th Ed. Psychology

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Kahneman, D (1973) Attention and Effort. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall

Logan, G (1984) Towards an instance theory of automization, Psychological Review 95(4) 492-527

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Strayer, D.L. & Johnston, W.A. (2001). Dual task studies of simulated driving and conversing on a cellular

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