Breaking - California Does Not Verify Citizenship of Voter Applicants

Pamela Barnett, Pro se Plaintiff
1215 22" St., Apt. B

Sacramento, CA, 95816 CLERK. U.S. DISTRICTCOURT
EASTERN DISTRICTOF CALIFORNIA
Telephone: (415)846-7 170 BY DEPU'Y CLEiiK
Pb-realestate@yahoo.com
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
X
PAMELA BARNETT,
Plaintiff, Civil CASE: 10-cv-02216-FCD-DAD
v. (KJM)
DAMON JERRELL DUNN, et al.,
Defendants.
JUDICIAL NOTICE PENDING THE COURT'S DECISION IN RE:
THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST THAT

THEY DO NOT VERIFY CITIZENSHIP OF CALIFORNIA VOTER AFFIANTS, EAC's
VOTER REGISTRATION FORM WHICH BREAKS CALIFORNIA ELECTION, HAVA
AND NVRA LAWS, MEMORANDUM FROM SOS TO ALL CA COUNTY REGISTRARS
WHICH SANCTIONS CA ELECTION LAW BREAKING, FBI FINDINGS OF PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE OF VOTERIELECTION FRAUD DURING THE 2002 ELECTION
FOR THE 3om ASSEMBLY DISTRICT WHICH INCLUDES NON-CITIZEN AND
MULTIPLE VOTERS
I, Pamela Bamett, declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s1746:
1. Declarant 1 Plaintiff in esse is pro se herein without being an attorney. Based on
information and belief the Plaintiff asserts the following for judicial notice.
SOS ADMITS AGAINST INTEREST THAT THEY AND THE COUNTY

REGISTRARS DO NOT VERIFY THAT VOTER AFFIANTS (APPLICANTS)
ARE LEGAL CITIZENS
2. After researching the California Secretary of State's procedures for verifying
voter affiant data, plaintiff confirmed that neither the Secretary of State's office
Judicial Notice: SOS Failure to Check Voter Citizenship, EAC Voter Application, SOS Memo
and FBI Investigation, Page 1 of 9
1 nor any of the country registrars verify that the voter affiant is a legal U.S. citizen.
2 Plaintiff used the Brennan Center for Justice, Making the List: Database Matching
3 and Verification Processes for Voter Registration, (California) report published in
4 2006 for a basis of her determination. ( see Exhibit 1) The Brennan Institute for
5 justice conducted a study of voter registration database implementation under the
6 new requirements of Help America Vote Act. Brennan also sent a questionnaire
7 to each state’s head election official. On May 4, 2011, plaintiff verified her
8 conclusion with a Secretary of State Office employee Cathy Ingraham Kelley.
9 She confirmed that neither the county registrars nor the secretary of state’s office
10 verifies citizenship of voter affiants (applicants). She stated that the SOS relied
11 on the sworn statement of the affiant and treated the issue of citizenship like a
12 “rebuttable presumption.” After spending hundreds of millions of federal (USDOJ
13 Source) and California state tax dollars to build voter databases to safeguard the
14 integrity of voter registrations under Help America Vote Act, California under the
15 guidance of Debra Bowen failed to ensure that the citizenship information on the
16 California Drivers/Identification and/or Social Security records databases was
17 cross-checked with the state voter databases. According to the California section
18 of the report page CA-2, the state of California only verifies Identifying Number,
19 first name, last name, and date of birth. California does NOT verify citizenship
20 information or place of birth.
21 Directly from report - “What fields from the voter registration form will the state
22 seek to match to motor vehicle or Social Security records? Indentifying number,
23 first name, last name, and date of birth.”
24
1 Bowen ignores valuable citizen verifying information data fields on the
2 California Department of Motor Vehicles. California DMV does not pointedly ask
3 whether or not they are a citizen (see Exhibit 2), but they ask in Block 3 in the
4 Driver License Or Identification Card Application “to complete this section only if
5 you ARE NOT eligible for a Social Security Number. An applicant attesting that
6 they ARE NOT ELIGIBLE would be ruled out as non-citizens (because all U.S.
7 citizens are entitled to a Social Security Number). However, some non-citizens
8 like Permanent Resident aliens, receive Social Security Numbers and Social
9 Security benefits without ever being a U.S. citizen. Block 2 asks for “State or
10 Country for the ID number.“ This field would also highlight non-citizens. Finally,
11 in the upper right corner of the form in the “For DMV Use Only” box, the DMV
12 employee writes in an “BD/LP Code”, LP stands for “legal proof”. In this box is
13 also asks for the State/Country of identification Primary Document.
14 The CA DMV states on its website “The issue of identification reliability,
15 integrity, and confidentiality is of prim concern to all citizens. Eligibility for
16 government services, issuance of various licenses, assessment of taxes, the right
17 to vote , etc., are all determined through evaluations based on identification
18 documents. It is critical that identification documents be authenticated and
19 accurate in identifying each individual.” (see Exhibit 3) Plaintiff continues to look
20 for what information fields are available on the other state and federal databases
21 the SOS and registrars could use for cross-checks.
22 Bowen could have checked these fields with her database cross-check but
23 failed to do so.
24 Bowen’s voter registration process and database cross check fails to eliminate
25 non-citizens from the voter rolls by not validating citizenship of applicant. Non-
26 citizens obtain drivers licenses and social security numbers.
27
28 Further, this is another example of the Election Assistance Commission’s
29 failure to oversee and safeguard the California state voter registration databases
30 from fraudulent non-citizen voter registrations. Both the State of California and
1 the EAC fail to protect citizen suffrage rights by allowing access to voter
2 registration by non-citizens.
3
4 CA and EAC USE VOTER REGISTRATION FORM THAT BREAKS NVRA AND HAVA
5 LAWS BY NOT ASKING VOTER AFFIANT FOR PLACE OF BIRTH OR IF AFFIANT IS
6 CURRENTLY REGISTERED TO VOTE
7
8 Another example of gross negligence or even worse, the intentional undermining of
9 one citizen, one vote, is the state of California and the EAC use of a voter registration
10 form that breaks the law and encourages non-citizen and multiple voting. According to
11 the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) 42 USC 1973gg(3) and HAVA the measure
12 of compliance by registration is the compelling state interest as if an applicant were also
13 obtaining a driver’s license in the domiciliary state, and to which the National Mail Voter
14 Registration Form (NMVRF) fails to require an applicant’s place of birth (which helps
15 election officials to ascertain information validity including citizenship status in keeping
16 with the preemptory nature of Federal law) and whether the voter registrant has
17 registered before and if so – where? (which helps election officials to eliminate election
18 fraud through duplicate registrations). California Secretary of State Debra Bowen makes
19 available on her CA SOS website the NMVRF to be used by legal residents of California
20 for actual voter registrations in all counties. (see Exhibit 4) Affiant’s state or country of
21 birth information is required information under California Election Code 2150,
22 Subsection 6 and prior voter registration information is required under CEC 2150,
23 Subsection 10 which states - A prior registration portion indicating whether the affiant
24 has been registered at another address, under another name, or as preferring another
25 party. If the affiant has been so registered, he or she shall give an additional statement
26 giving that address, name, or party.

1 Leading up to the 2010 CA general election, the San Diego County Registrar sent
2 correspondence asking for place of birth information to affiants that submitted the
3 NMVRF for processing. (see Exhibit 5 County Registrar Letter) This has cost San
4 Diego County an untold amount of money to correct a problem that the EAC and
5 Secretary of State Debra Bowen have caused. This has also caused
6 disenfranchisement of at least San Diego county voters, has even worse opened up the
7 door to non-citizen voters, and weakened the vote for all legal citizen voters of
8 California. Plaintiff does not know if any of the other county registrars attempted to
9 correct the problem that the EAC and Bowen have caused.
10
11 SOS BOWEN ADMITS IN MEMORANDUM #09173 THAT THE NATIONAL MAIL
12 VOTER REGISTRATION FORM BREAKS CALIFORNIA LAW, BUT FAILS TO
13 ADDRESS THAT IT ALSO BREAKS FEDERAL LAW UNDER THE NVRA
14
15 In SOS Memorandum #09173, SOS Bowen admits that the National Mail Voter
16 Registration Form breaks California Election Code 2150, Subsection 6, which requires
17 applicant to include state or country of birth, but fails to address that it also breaks
18 federal NVRA and HAVA laws. (see Exhibit 6) Even so, Bowen sanctions its use.
19 According to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) 42 USC 1973gg(3) and HAVA
20 the measure of compliance by registration is the compelling state interest as if an
21 applicant were also obtaining a driver’s license in the domiciliary state, and to which the
22 National Mail Voter Registration Form (NMVRF) fails to require an applicant’s place of
23 birth (which helps election officials to ascertain information validity including citizenship
24 status in keeping with the preemptory nature of Federal law). Bowen also fails to
25 acknowledge that the National Form also breaks CEC, Subsection 10 that requires that
1 there be a prior registration portion indicating whether the affiant has been registered at
2 another address, under another name, or as preferring another party. If the affiant has
3 been so registered, he or she shall give an additional statement giving that address,
4 name, or party.
5 SOS office states the following:

6
7 Accepting the National Form: Election Officials Do Not Need to Determine Registrant’s
8 Country or state of birth (if born in the U.S.) or country of birth (if born outside of the
9 U.S.)
10 This requirement can be found in two places:
11 Elections Code section 2150 (a)(6), which states in part:
12 (a) The affidavit of registration shall show:
13 (6) The state or country of the affiant’s birth.
14 Elections Code section 2157 which states in part:
15 (a) Subject to this chapter, the affidavit of registration shall be in a
16 form prescribed by regulations adopted by Secretary of State.
17 The affidavit shall:
18 (Contain the information prescribed in Section 2150.
19 However, the requirement that a person provide this information to register
20 to vote only applies to someone registering to vote using the state voter
21 registration form that is developed pursuant to state law and regulation.
22 State law does not require a person using the National Form to provide
23 any additional information beyond what is contained on the national Form
24 in order to register.
25
26 The requirement that state and local elections officials accept the National
27 Form from any person applying to register to vote can be found in the
28 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-4 (a)
29 which reads in part:
1 (1) Each State shall accept and use the mail voter registration
2 application form prescribed by the Federal Election Commission
3 [now the Election Assistance Commission] pursuant to section
4 1973gg-7(a)(2) of this title for the registration of voters in
5 elections for Federal Office.
6 (2) In addition to accepting and using the form described in
7 paragraph (1), a State may develop and use a mail voter
8 registration form that meets all of the criteria stated in section
9 1973gg-7(b) of this title for the registration of voters in elections
10 for Federal Office.
11 So, while (2) permits states to develop their own voter registration forms, (1) requires
12 states to (unless they have been exempted under the NVRA) accept as complete a
13 voter registration application submitted by a person using the National Form.
14
15 FBI INVESTIGATION DETERMINED PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF VOTER
16 REGISTRATION FRAUD BY NON-CITIZEN VOTERS
17 The harm caused by Democrat Debra Bowen’s grossly lax voter registration
18 standards enforcement (intentional or not) has real consequences. Dean Gardner of
19 Bakersfield, CA lost the election by 197 votes for the 30th Assembly District in 2002
20 because of voter registration fraud of non-citizen voters and multiple voters. (Information
21 previously submitted in First Amended Complaint, the article from the Porterville Post,
22 Voter Fraud Simple, Easy and Undeniable, Aug. 10, 2010. Dean Gardner and his wife
23 Ruth Gardner researched why Dean lost when Dean was ahead in the polls by 18%.
24 They mailed out 14,000 questionnaires to Democrat voters in the district. In that simple
25 questionnaire, a monetary award was to be given if it was accurately returned.
26 Completed questionnaires totaling 2,650 were returned. Here are the three questions
27 that they had to honestly answer and return.
1
2 1.) Do you live at such-a-such address, and fill in the blank.
3 2.) Are you a citizen of the U.S.?
4 3.) Are you working on getting your citizenship?
5
6 According to Ruth, "A few more than 700 of these questionnaires, according to the
7 U.S. Postal Service - were undeliverable, no such person, no such address, no such
8 house - and 54 of those people voted."
9 Continuing with the results, Mrs. Gardner stated, "1,691 questionnaires were returned
10 by electors. 93 admitted 'in writing' they were not citizens. 273 stated that they were not
11 registered to vote and did not live in the 30th Assembly district. One woman who lives in
12 Porterville, CA. voted twice, while 69 more admitted they voted more than once."
13 Summarizing from the article, Mrs. Gardner said, "The bottom line of all these 2,650
14 returned questionnaires, 1,318 had voting irregularities. 37% of the democrat votes were
15 fraudulent and of the 2,650 votes we can prove that 905 were illegal." These results
16 and completed questionnaires were given to the Bakersfield FBI office in 2003. Dean
17 Gardner confirmed with me that the FBI told him there was “evidence of prima facie
18 voter fraud”. However, the FBI did nothing to try to overturn the election. The FBI never
19 gave back the research materials or written investigation results to Dean Gardner.
20 Plaintiff called the Bakersfield, FBI on April 1, 2011 and requested that they send to
21 Plaintiff a copy of their findings and a copy of the original research materials. They did
22 not call back and Plaintiff called them again May 20, 2011. The person who answered
23 the phone told plaintiff she was transferring me to an agent that knew of Dean Gardner’s
24 file. The person who answered confirmed that there was a report and said that I could
25 NOT have a copy of the research or the investigation findings, but she would check with
her supervisor to make sure. Plaintiff told her there was a lawsuit against the state for
voter fraud and she needed a file copy.
Plaintiff asks the court to order the FBI to turn over all materials to the court as it
proves that voter and election fraud in California is a huge problem and that Plaintiff's
case demands an immediate hearing on the merits as a statewide election is
approaching in November and Plaintiff would be asking for a massive audit of California
voter registration databases as the state of California is not protecting the civil rights of
any of its citizens when it comes to their right to vote and to fair elections..
3. 1 do solemnly declare under penalty of perjury with 28 USC $1746 and the laws of the
State of California this date May 23, 2011 in the County of Sacramento, that the facts
and circumstances described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
., sacramento, CA, 95816 i
i
i
I Judicial Notice: SOS Failure to Check Voter Citizenship, EAC Voter Application, SOS Memo 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BARNETT V. DUNN ei aL Civil CASE: 10-cv-02216-FCD-DAD
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
a
o n ~ a y 201 1, I, p u T c ) . - ~ ~ z ,under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 USC
1746,
1. That Declarant is over 18 years of age and not a party herein;
Declarant caused the service of four (4) copies of the PLAINTIFF PAMELA BARNETT'S
JUDICIAL NOTICE PENDING THE COURT'S DECISION IN RE:
THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST THAT

THEY DO NOT VERIFY CITIZENSHIP OF CALIFORNIA VOTER AFFIANTS, EAC's
VOTER REGISTRATION FORM WHICH BREAKS CALIFORNIA ELECTION, HAVA
AND NVRA LAWS, MEMORANDUM FROM SOS TO ALL CA COUNW REGISTRARS
WHICH SANCTIONS CA ELECTION LAW BREAKING, FBI FINDINGS OF PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE OF VOTER/ELECTION FRAUD DURING THE 2002 ELECTION
FOR THE 3oMASSEMBLY DISTRICT WHICH INCLUDES NON-CITIZEN AND
MULTIPLE VOTERS
2. May '7 4 , 201 1 with Exhibits annexed, and did place each complete set in a sealed folder
properly addressed with proper postage to be served by USPS mail upon:
Yoshinori H. T. Himel Anthony Paul O'Brien

United States Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office for the State
501 I Street, Suite 10-100 California Department of Justice
Sacramento, CA 958 14 1300 I Street P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
Brian T. Hildreth
Bell, McAndrews & HILTACHK, LLP
455 Capitol Mall, Suite 801 Nicholas S. Chrisos, NCAED
Sacramento, CA 958 14 Orange County Counsel
333 West Santa Ana Boulevard
Suite 407
Santa Ana, CA 92702- 1379
I do declare and certify under penalty of perjury:
Dated: May ,201 1

Sacramento California - -0
Address: (+l,y~ 3 ~ .
5\ o q h k,(-'&~ .?5G3
~ ~ ~

EXHIBIT 1
California
Registration Deadline
M T W Th F Sa Su
1
Forms must be received or postmarked 15 days before an election.T
Database Implementation Status
California currently maintains a bottom-up registration system: forms processed at the

county level are periodically uploaded to the statewide database.2 Anticipating that it
would not be able to meet the January 1, 2006, deadline for the creation of a HAVA-
compliant system, California entered into a memorandum of understanding with the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ MOU”) concerning the implementation of the state’s
statewide voter registration system (“CalVoter”).3
Entering Voter Registration Information
Who inputs voter registration information? County boards of registrars generally review
and enter information from voter registration forms in their jurisdictions into the county
systems.
What happens to voter registration forms submitted at state registration agencies?

Forms received by the Secretary of State, the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”),
or another voter registration agency are sent to the appropriate county registrar for review
and entry.4 If an application is mistakenly delivered to an inappropriate county registrar,
it will be forwarded to the correct county registrar, but the application will only be valid
for elections occurring at least 29 days after the application is received.5
How are most forms submitted? California reported that in 2004, 59% of forms were
submitted by mail, 23% were submitted in person to election officials, 8% were
submitted at the DMV, 6% were submitted at another voter registration agency, and 5%
were submitted by other means.6
Voter Registration Form
The relevant portions of the voter registration form are included at the end of this
section.7
Processing of Forms Without Identifying Numbers
How will the state treat an application with an affirmative indication that the applicant
has no valid identifying number? The state will attempt to match the applicant’s
information (see below); if an appropriate identifying number can be found through the
match process, that number will be applied to the applicant’s record. Otherwise, the
applicant will be assigned a unique voter registration number. If the applicant is
otherwise eligible, she will be considered registered, but will have to show identification
at the polls.8
Making the List CA - 1

How will the state treat an application without an identifying number and without an
affirmative indication that the applicant has no such number? The state will attempt to
match the applicant’s information (see below); if an appropriate identifying number can
be found through the match process, that number will be applied to the applicant’s record.
Otherwise, the applicant will be assigned a unique voter registration number; if the
applicant is otherwise eligible, she will be considered registered, but will have to show
identification at the polls.9
How will the state treat an application listing an identifying number that is either
incomplete or illegible? Under regulations adopted pursuant to the DOJ MOU, it appears
that if uncorrected (see below), the application will be rejected for voters who register
other than by mail; for an applicant registering by mail, if the applicant is otherwise
eligible, she will be considered registered, but will have to show identification at the
polls.10
Matching Against Motor Vehicle and Social Security Records
What fields from the voter registration form will the state seek to match to motor vehicle
or Social Security records? Identifying number, first name, last name, and date of birth.
How precise is the match standard? California intends to use an exact match standard,
but has not yet finalized the criteria by which a match will be sought.
How much human intervention is involved in determining whether information is

matched? California intends to use a fully automated system, but has not yet completed
system design and has not yet fully determined the extent of human discretion that will be
involved.
Description of matching process: California has not yet determined the process by which
a match will be sought for information on forms listing a driver’s license number.
Information on forms listing SSN digits will be automatically checked against the SSA
database through the standard AAMVA process: the county elections official will submit
an entered record to the DMV database, which will automatically submit the appropriate
fields to the SSA and return a code indicating whether the record was successfully
matched or not.
What are the consequences if the state cannot find a match? Under regulations adopted
pursuant to the DOJ MOU, it appears that if uncorrected (see below), the application will
be rejected for voters who register other than by mail; for an applicant registering by
mail, if the applicant is otherwise eligible, she will be considered registered, but will have
to show identification at the polls.11
Notice and Opportunity to Resolve Errors
Brennan Center for Justice CA - 2

Does the applicant have the opportunity to correct a missing or incomplete identifying
number, without submitting a new form? Yes. The applicant may correct missing or
incomplete information at any point before the voter registration deadline.
Does the applicant have the opportunity to resolve a failed match, without submitting a
new form? Yes. The applicant may submit information to resolve a failed match at any
point before the voter registration deadline.
If information on an otherwise timely application is corrected after the voter registration

deadline, is the correction timely? No.
Description of notice and correction process: The county registrar will contact – by
telephone if possible, and otherwise by mail – an applicant whose identifying number is
missing, incomplete, or unverified.12 The applicant may correct any errors until the voter
registration deadline, by submitting verifiable identifying numbers or a copy of valid
identification by mail or in person. Under regulations adopted pursuant to the DOJ
MOU, it appears that an applicant without identifying numbers that have been verified by
the voter registration deadline may still vote if she applied by mail and provides
identification at the polls, but that she may not vote any ballot that will count if she did
not apply by mail.13
Identification Requirements at the Polls
Who must provide identification at the Forms of ID:

polls? A first-time voter registering 1st-time voters current and valid photo ID
by mail whose identifying numbers registering by mail current utility bill w/ name, address
without verified bank statement w/ name, address
have not been verified must show ID identifying number: government check w/ name, address
at the polls. government paycheck w/ name, address
other gov’t document w/ name, address
What forms of identification are

accepted? A current and valid photo ID provided by a third party in the ordinary course
of business (including a state driver’s license or ID card, passport, employee photo ID
card, commercial establishment’s photo ID card, credit or debit card with photo, military
photo ID card, student photo ID card, health club photo ID card, insurance plan photo ID
card, or public housing photo ID card), or a current utility bill, bank statement,
government check, government paycheck, or other government document that shows the
voter’s name and address.14
What are the consequences of failing to show identification? The voter may cast a
provisional ballot.15 The ballot will be counted if the signature on the provisional ballot
matches the signature on the appropriate voter registration form.16
Statutes and Regulations
CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2000 et seq. generally concern registration of voters. CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 2168 directs the Secretary of State to establish and maintain a statewide voter

registration system. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 19001 et seq. comprise the applicable
regulations.
End Notes
Note: Pursuant to the recommendation of state officials, county officials were also
interviewed for this summary.
1
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2102. New California residents may register up to seven days
before a general election, in the county elections office; these new residents must also
vote in the county elections office. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3400.
2
electionline.org, Assorted Rolls: Statewide Voter Registration Databases Under HAVA,
June 2005, available at http://www.electionline.org/Portals/1/EB11.FINAL1.pdf, at 15;
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2168.
3
Memorandum of Agreement (Nov. 2, 2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/ca_moa.htm; Help America Vote Act: The
Endgame, electionline Weekly (Dec. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.electionline.org/Newsletters/tabid/87/ctl/Detail/mid/643/xmid/166/xmfid/3/D
efault.aspx.
4
The Secretary of State is required to forward application forms to the appropriate county
within one working day of receipt. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 19050.8(b).
5
6
Election Assistance Commission, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office 2003-2004, June 30, 2005,
tbl. 2, available at http://www.eac.gov/NVR_Spreadsheets/NVRA_table_2.html. Due to
rounding, the percentages listed may exceed 100%.
7
The voter registration form that California has made available online is the federal form.
8
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 20108.65, 20108.70.
9
Id. §§ 20108.65, 20108.70; see also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2150(7) (“No person shall be
denied the right to register because of her or her failure to furnish one of these numbers,
and shall be so advised on the voter registration card.”). Before the DOJ MOU, some
California counties indicated that they followed a different procedure. One county
explained that the voter would be notified of the need to supply the appropriate
information before the close of registration; if the voter did not correct the omission, she
would only be able to vote a provisional ballot, to count only if the signature on the ballot
matched the signature on the registration application form.
10
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 20108.37(b), 20108.38. Section 20108.37(b) appears to
state that an applicant with an unverified identifying number is to be designated
“pending,” and may not be entered into the statewide voter registration system to vote a
regular ballot; section 20108.38 appears to state that an applicant submitting her form by
mail with an unverified identifying number must be entered into the statewide voter
registration system with a notation that she may only vote a regular ballot if she shows
identification before Election Day or at the polls. Neither section acknowledges any
potential conflict with the other.
11
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 20108.37(b), 20108.38. Section 20108.37(b) appears to
state that an applicant with an unverified identifying number is to be designated
“pending,” and may not be entered into the statewide voter registration system to vote a
regular ballot; section 20108.38 appears to state that an applicant submitting her form by
Brennan Center for Justice CA - 4
mail with an unverified identifying number must be entered into the statewide voter
registration system with a notation that she may only vote a regular ballot if she shows
identification before Election Day or at the polls. Neither section acknowledges any
potential conflict with the other.
12
13
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 20108.37(b), 20108.38 determine who may be entered into
the statewide voter registration system; section 20108.18(b) of the same title requires that
the statewide system be used to determine whether a provisional ballot will be counted.
Therefore, a voter who is not entered into the statewide system will not be able to cast a
regular ballot, and also will not be able to cast a provisional ballot that will be counted.
14
Id. § 20107 lists particular forms of identification that qualify, but while HAVA
permits the use of a paycheck with the individual’s name and address, the California
regulation specifies that the paycheck must be issued by the government. However, the
same regulation also states that “[t]her section shall be liberally construed to permit
voters and new registrants to cast a regular ballot. Any doubt as to the sufficiency of
proof or a document presented shall be resolved in favor of permitting the voter or new
registrant to cast a regular ballot.” Id.
15
Id. § 20107(c).
16
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14310(c)(1).

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reportcoverPMS377 3/24/06 12:59 PM Page 4
Making the List:

Database Matching and
Verification Processes
for Voter Registration
by
Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser,

and Ana Muñoz
VOTING RIGHTS &

ELECTIONS SERIES
March 24, 2006
About the Brennan Center

The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law unites thinkers and
advocates in pursuit of a vision of inclusive and effective democracy. The organization’s
mission is to develop and implement an innovative, nonpartisan agenda of scholarship,
public education, and legal action in the areas of Democracy, Poverty, Criminal Justice,
and Liberty and National Security, promoting equality and human dignity while safe-
guarding fundamental freedoms. The Center’s Democracy Program supports practical and
administrable election reforms that foster full and equal political participation. For more
information, please see www.brennancenter.org or call 212-998-6730.
161 Avenue of the Americas

12th Floor
New York NY 10013
212 998-6730 tel
212 995-4550 fax
www.brennancenter.org
Making the List:
Database Matching and
Verification Processes
by
Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser,

and Ana Muñoz
VOTING RIGHTS &

ELECTIONS SERIES
March 24, 2006
Acknowledgments
The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law sincerely appreciates
the time of the election officials in 46 states and the District of Columbia who responded
to this survey. The Brennan Center acknowledges the assistance and cooperation received
from these offices, and gratefully extends its thanks.
The Brennan Center also extends special thanks to Sam Munger, who provided substantial
research vital to the production of this report, to Renée Paradis, who provided substantial
statutory analysis, and to Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, which con-
tributed further significant research assistance.
This report was prepared under the auspices of the Brennan Center’s Democracy Program.
The Center is grateful for the generous support provided for the Democracy Program by
an anonymous donor, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Knight Foundation, the
Open Society Institute, and the Rockefeller Family Fund. The statements made and views
expressed in this report are the responsibility solely of the Brennan Center.
About the Authors

Justin Levitt is an Associate Counsel with the Brennan Center, working on election
administration and voting rights concerns. Before joining the Brennan Center, he was
in-house counsel to a national voter registration and mobilization organization and the
Director of Strategic Targeting for a national presidential campaign. A graduate of
Harvard Law School and the Kennedy School of Government, he clerked for Judge
Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He may be
contacted at justin.levitt@nyu.edu.
Wendy R. Weiser is a Deputy Director of the Democracy Program at the Brennan Center
and coordinates the Center’s work on voting rights and election reform and its fair courts
project. Prior to joining the Brennan Center, she was a senior staff attorney at NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund and a litigation associate at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison. After receiving her J.D. from Yale Law School and her B.A. from Yale
College, she clerked for Judge Eugene H. Nickerson of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York. She can be reached at wendy.weiser@nyu.edu.
Ana Muñoz is a Research Associate with the Brennan Center, working primarily on
election administration and voting rights concerns. Prior to joining the Brennan Center,
she worked on voter registration and turnout campaigns in Arizona and Oregon, and
served as a coordinator of 2004ward, a group which trained and organized college students
to work on voter registration initiatives across the country. She received a B.A. in History
from Yale College in 2004.
© 2006. This paper is covered by the Creative Commons “Attribution-No Derivs-NonCommercial” license
(see http://creativecommons.org). It may be reproduced in its entirety as long as the Brennan Center for
Justice at NYU School of Law is credited, a link to the Center’s web page is provided, and no charge is
imposed. The paper may not be reproduced in part or in altered form, or if a fee is charged, without the
Center’s permission. Please let the Center know if you reprint.
Table of Contents
Introduction i
Executive Summary ii
Background 1
The new databases 1

Duplicate entries and unique identifiers 1
Verifying identity of selected voters 2
The new process from the voter’s perspective 2
The limits of databases 4
Findings 7
Four key categories of state policy 7

Criteria for matching 8
Consequences of a failed match 16
Incomplete information 18
Opportunity to correct errors 19
Recommendations 23
Recommendations for match criteria 23

Recommendations for addressing failed matches 24
Recommendations for addressing forms with incomplete information 24
Recommendations for correcting errors 25
Other recommendations for databases and the registration process 26
Recommendations for databases and continuing list maintenance 28
Methodology 31
Scope of State Summaries in Appendix 33
Report Glossary 34
Making the List:
Database Matching and Verification Processes
This report is the first comprehensive summary of critically important new voter registration
procedures effective in most states at the beginning of 2006.
Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide
databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability
to get on the rolls—and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted—will now
depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter
registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could
result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to
register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration
process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.
This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first
comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and
in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls. The
report covers each state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through
Election Day—including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which informa-
tion from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the
match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the
process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and
beyond.
Making the List is the result of an extensive national survey of state election officials,
supplemented by a review and analysis of the relevant state statutes and regulations. It is
the best available summary of current and anticipated state practices employed to place
new registrants on the rolls, using the new voter registration databases. In addition to
state-by-state summaries, this report includes detailed policy recommendations regarding
the registration process, based on the best practices in the states and comparative research
from other fields. These recommendations are intended to ensure that computerized voter
registration lists are compiled and maintained as accurately as possible, in a manner that
minimizes the risk that eligible voters will be unintentionally or unfairly disenfranchised.
This report is intended to serve as a resource for election officials, legislators, citizens, and
advocates interested in safeguarding access to the franchise and making effective use of the
new statewide databases. We hope that the information in this report will contribute to
greater understanding of the policies states are currently contemplating to govern the voter
registration process, as well as the best policy options available.
i Making the List

Executive Summary
In 2006, virtually every state will experience serious changes in its voter registration
process. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (known as “HAVA”) now requires that states
create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration
information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls—and thus their ability to vote and have
their votes counted—now depend on the policies governing the use of these databases in
the voter registration process. While good policy choices could help the voter registration
process run more smoothly than ever, poor policy choices could result in the unwarranted
disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote.
After an extensive national survey, the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law
presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices that
will now govern how individuals get onto the voter rolls. Our survey found that:
• A few states—Nebraska and Oregon, for example—plan to implement voter registra-

tion databases for their intended purposes: to help clean the registration rolls, to provide
those new voters who are subject to identification requirements with a convenient
alternative means to confirm their identity, and to promote the smooth administra-
tion of a process that enables every eligible citizen to vote. States like Minnesota and
Wisconsin go further, offering Election Day registration as an additional safeguard for
citizens who have encountered unforeseen problems in the registration process.
• In contrast, a few states have adopted database policies that create unwarranted
barriers to the franchise. Iowa, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, for example,
report that they will reject the application of citizens whose information cannot be
matched to the state’s motor vehicles database or the database of the Social Security
Administration, barring the applicant entirely from the polls. And Maryland will
reject such applicants unless they provide certain identification documents by the
registration deadline. A 2004 trial run in New York City showed that up to 20% of
eligible new applicants could have been rejected under such a rule solely because of
data entry errors by election officials, and the Social Security Administration is now
showing a 28.5% failed “match” rate nationwide.
• In the rest of the country, implementation of HAVA’s database provisions seems to

be mixed: some state policies are good, fulfilling the intent of the law while mini-
mizing the burdens on eligible citizens, and others create unnecessary hurdles for
eligible voters.
Fortunately, most state policies are not yet either codified or hard-wired. Indeed, some may
have changed since this report was issued. This report is intended not only to shed light on
states’ plans, but also to encourage them to bring their policies in line with best practice.
To that end, the Brennan Center offers recommendations for the proper implementation
of HAVA’s database provisions. These include recommendations that states enact:
Brennan Center for Justice ii
• Policies to account for the wide variety of common database matching errors by
ensuring that the match process will not bar registration of an eligible voter.
• Reasonable guidelines for matching voter information to other government

databases, with built-in flexibility and ample opportunity to correct the mistakes that
arise.
• Standards for clarifying registration forms, for ensuring accurate data entry from the
forms into registration databases, and for keeping database information updated.
• Clear, transparent, and voter-protective procedures for database maintenance and

purging, to ensure that eligible voters are able to get on—and stay on—the voter
rolls.
Brennan Center staff are available to discuss these recommendations in more detail, and
to assist officials, advocates, and interested citizens more generally in implementing the
new statewide voter registration databases in a voter-protective manner. For additional
materials, including the state-by-state analyses of the policies and procedures summarized
here, please see www.brennancenter.org.
iii Making the List

Background
In the 2000 elections, the states’ varying systems of election administration were tested
under a national spotlight. Many longstanding problems in the administration of federal
and state elections suddenly became salient. In the aftermath of the elections, policymakers
turned their attention to some of these problems. The Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA) was the federal government’s first attempt to devise some solutions.
The new databases
One of HAVA’s centerpieces is its requirement that each state create and use a single com-
puterized statewide voter registration database by January 1, 2006. Previously, in most
states, each county was responsible for its own list. This resulted in spotty and inconsistent
standards for keeping the lists up to date, and little practical ability to keep track of voters
who moved across county lines. As of January 1, however, each state is now required to
maintain a single official database of registered voters, subject to uniform state standards.
This requirement is intended to ensure that voter registration lists are as complete and accu-
rate as possible.
Duplicate entries and unique identifiers
The HAVA drafters also recognized that existing state voter lists were plagued by duplicate
entries, representing individuals who had moved within the state or who for other reasons
had registered multiple times. These duplicates—part of the registration list’s “dead-
wood”—clutter the rolls, create confusion, and artificially depress turnout estimates by
inflating the apparent number of registered voters. In mandating statewide databases,
Congress sought to mitigate the duplicate problem. Michigan, one of the models for
HAVA’s database provisions, had managed to cut its deadwood by 600,000 to 1 million
after implementing a statewide voter registration database in which each voter’s entry was
associated with a unique identifying number. Consequently, to help resolve duplicate
entries, HAVA requires that each voter’s statewide database entry contain a numerical key
used to uniquely identify each voter.
To supply this numerical key, HAVA requires that most applicants provide, on the voter
registration form, a current and valid driver’s license number to be used as a unique identi-
fying number. If the applicant does not have a current and valid driver’s license, HAVA
requires that she provide the last four digits of her Social Security number. (The full number
is not required in most states, for privacy reasons.) Although these four digits alone will
not be unique within a state (there are only 10,000 possible combinations of four digits), in
combination with an individual’s name and birth date, they should uniquely identify any
given voter. Finally, if the applicant has neither a current and valid driver’s license nor a Social
Security number, the state must create and assign her a unique identifying number.
HAVA also created an additional step to ensure that the unique identifying numbers are
correct, so that individuals are not mismatched in the databases. HAVA requires election
Brennan Center for Justice 1

officials to try to “match” information from the registration form with information in the
state’s motor vehicles database (for forms with driver’s license numbers) or the Social
Security Administration database (for forms with Social Security digits), to verify that the
identifying number is correct. Without this step, a mistake or typographical error might
cause states to wrongly presume two individuals to be the same because they appear to
share the same unique identifying number—and mistakenly overwrite the valid informa-
tion of an eligible voter.
Verifying identity of selected voters
This match process also serves another purpose in HAVA’s statutory scheme. HAVA
represents a compromise between legislators who wished to subject many voters to iden-
tification requirements and those who believed that ID requirements exclude legitimate
voters. For one class of registrations in which fraud was seen as more likely to be an issue—
those submitted by voters registering for the first time in a given jurisdiction, and doing
so by mail—HAVA requires that states attempt to verify the registrants’ identities before
voting.
The statute recognizes, however, that there are several ways in which the identity of
a first-time voter registering by mail can be verified. First, the voter may present—either at
registration, at the polls, or in between—a form of documentary identification, including
a current photo ID, utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or another
government document listing the voter’s name and address.
Second, and in the alternative, if the registrant’s information matches information in the
state’s motor vehicles database or the Social Security administration’s database, HAVA
also recognizes this match as a verification of the applicant’s identity. HAVA therefore
exempts individuals whose information is matched in this way from its ID requirements
for first-time voters who register by mail. This is the only consequence of the match
process that is specifically mentioned in HAVA.
Third, HAVA leaves states the discretion to use alternate means to verify a voter’s identity. If
a first-time voter who registered by mail neither “matches” nor provides ID, HAVA entitles
her to cast a provisional ballot that will be counted if the state determines that she is eligible
under state law to vote. States use a variety of means to verify a provisional voter’s eligibility,
including signature matches, verification mailings, and sworn affirmations.
The new process from the voter’s perspective
From the voter’s point of view, a state’s implementation of HAVA’s database provisions
changes the registration process in a few significant ways. Before HAVA, in most states, a
voter would submit a voter registration form—directly or indirectly—to a county or
municipal official, and information on that form would be entered directly into a local list,
for transfer to the pollbook. Now, when a voter submits her form to the local official, a
number of steps intervene on the way from form to pollbook:
2 Making the List

• First, the official reviews the form for a driver’s license number or Social Security dig-
its. If no number appears on the form (or if the entry is illegible), the state may pre-
sume that the applicant lacks such a number,1 and a unique identifier will be
assigned. Or the state or local entity may presume that the applicant has made an
error, decide whether the error is material or immaterial, and decide how it may be
resolved.
• Second, for forms with a complete driver’s license number or Social Security digits,
the state will attempt to match the information on the application form with infor-
mation in the motor vehicle or Social Security databases. Different states will have
different criteria for determining when information is deemed to “match,” and dif-
ferent abilities to account for typos and similar errors.
• Third, in the event that the state cannot find a match, the state will notify the voter
and may provide an opportunity to resolve the problem. States vary, of course, in the
processes used to resolve mismatches.
• Fourth, in some states, the result of the match process will affect whether the voter
is put on the pollbooks, and if so, under what conditions she may vote. In a few
states, the voter will be kept off of the rolls entirely if no match is found; in most oth-
ers, the match process will not be an absolute barrier to registration. Most states will
flag entries in the pollbooks if no match is found, at least for first-time voters regis-
tering by mail, to indicate that the voter must show ID in order to vote a
regular ballot. Conversely, if a match is found, some states will note that the voter (at
least, a first-time voter registering by mail) need not show ID.
DANGER ZONES: Stages at which eligible voters’ attempts to register may be rejected
INTAKE
Is a form accepted and entered? NO VOTE!
OPPORTUNITY
TO CORRECT
Is there a deadline
for voters to resolve
MATCHING & VERIFICATION
any errors?
Is matching used to help or
hinder registration?
Can an applicant correct her
information?
1 Some, but not all, states’ AT THE POLLS

forms include some space for Is a voter without identification VOTE!
the voter to indicate that she prevented from voting?
has neither a driver’s license
number nor a Social Security
number.

These additional intervening steps can be used—as HAVA intended—to foster more
efficient election administration, or—contrary to HAVA’s intent—to impose additional
hurdles on voter registration. As noted above, most states plan to use the verification and
matching process to try to ensure that the most accurate unique identifying numbers are
associated with each registrant’s record, so that the record can be identified should the
registrant move or re-register. And many states also plan to use the verification and match-
ing process to provide an alternate means of confirming the identity of first-time voters
who register by mail. In contrast, a handful of states plan to use the matching process as
a barrier or screen: only those for whom a successful match can be found may proceed
through registration. This is a dramatic change from established registration practice, is
not warranted by—indeed, is contrary to—HAVA, and creates significant problems for
the eligible voter.
The limits of databases
Using the match process as a barrier to registration creates problems for eligible voters
because of the inherent limitations of databases. All large databases have errors—glitches
like typos, transposed names, and omitted information. Such errors could prevent a
legitimate match for two records that in fact reflect the same individual. Also, databases
compiled at different times and for different purposes record information differently,
which makes it even more difficult to find proper matches: “William” may not match
“Will” or “Billy”; a maiden name may not match a married name. A sample of these
problems are outlined in the following table:
The Problem(s) with Matching: Examples of Potential Database Errors

Name of Registrant
Source of Error On Voter Registration Form In Database
Typos Pierce Peirce or Pearce or Perce or Pierrce
Transliteration Mohammad Muhammed
Marriage Mary Pierce (née Owens) Mary Owens or Mrs. Martin Pierce
Nickname Sam Pierce Samuel Pierce
Transposed field Bao Lu Lu Bao
Double names “Mary Ann” (first) “Pierce” (last) “Mary” (first”) “Ann” (middle) “Pierce” (last)
Hyphenated name “Mary” (first) “Owens-Pierce (last) “Mary” (first”) “Owens” (middle) “Pierce” (last)
Punctuation al-Amin al Amin
Date of Birth
Source of Error On Voter Registration Form In Database (Voter, DMV and/or SSA)
Typos 01/03/05 02/03/05 or 1/00/05 or 1/03/05 or 11/03/05
Transposed field 01/03/05 03/01/05 or 05/01/03
Invented default 01/03/05 01/01/05 (submitted only as January 2005)
Such errors occur quite frequently in large databases, and could create enormous problems
for new registrants if additional hurdles—or absolute bars—are imposed in the event the
state cannot successfully find a match. A sample run in New York City in late 2004, for
example, foreshadowed the scope of the problem: an audit conducted after attempting to
4 Making the List
match 15,000 records in the voter registration database against those in the state motor
vehicle database revealed that almost 20% of those records did not match because of typos
by election officials. If the right to vote were conditioned on a proper match, up to 20%
of new voter registrations would have been rejected solely because of data entry errors
completely unrelated to eligibility. There are protocols and programs available to reduce
this error rate, but even the most sophisticated matching technologies—which are not
being used in most states—will leave many eligible voters unmatched. Depending on the
state’s policies and procedures, these eligible voters may end up disenfranchised, through
no fault of their own.
Despite these limitations, databases can and should be used as tools to improve the voter
registration and record-keeping process for both voters and election officials. But states
must account for, and avoid compounding, the unavoidable limitations of databases and
record matching procedures. Many states have recognized these limitations and adopted
policies accordingly, as this report shows below. Unfortunately, in a few outlier cases, a
tool meant to smooth the road to accurate registration has instead been used to create a
significant pothole.

6 Making the List
Findings
Four key categories of state policy
This report catalogs states’ policies and procedures with respect to the new voter registra-
tion process under HAVA, paying particular attention to the policy choices that may affect
an eligible citizen’s voting rights.
As a result of HAVA, when a citizen now attempts to register to vote, she must (in most
states) submit her driver’s license number or state identification card number, if she has
one; if not, she must submit the last four digits of her Social Security number. (If she has
neither number, the state must assign her a unique identifying number.) Most states then
attempt to match information on the voter registration form—including this “identifying
number”—to information in other government databases, including the driver’s license
database of the state motor vehicles department or the database maintained by the
Commissioner of Social Security.
State practices regarding this matching process—and its effect on a citizen’s voter registra-
tion—vary widely. The survey reveals that there are four primary ways in which these state
practices differ:
1. Match criteria: First, states vary in the criteria they use to determine whether the
information on a voter registration form matches information in another govern-
ment database. Some states use a fairly flexible standard, to account for typos and
other mistakes; other states use a very exacting standard that does not compensate for
these kinds of errors. The more exacting the standard, the more likely that a minor
error prevents an eligible match—decreasing the chance that the state’s
database stays clean.
2. Failed match: Second, states vary in the consequences they impose when they are
unable to find a match between information on a citizen’s application for voter reg-
istration and information in another government database. Some states implement
the limited identification procedure required by HAVA for first-time voters who reg-
ister by mail; other states place additional burdens on the voter or reject the applica-
tion outright. The more burdensome the consequences, the more likely that eligible
citizens will be barred from the polls because of errors in the process.
3. Incomplete information: Third, states vary in the way in which they treat applica-
tions submitted with a missing, illegible, or incomplete identifying number. Some
states check whether the right number can be located in another database, or assign
a new unique identifier and then register the applicant; other states immediately
reject the application. The more rigid the response, the more likely that an eligible
citizen will not be registered due to a minor and immaterial mistake.

4. Correcting errors: Finally, states vary in the opportunities they provide to resolve
errors in the matching process. All states notify the voter when a problem occurs, but
they differ in the form such notice takes and the process by which errors can be
resolved. The greater the opportunity for correction, the less likely it is that errors will
remain unresolved and create problems at the polls for eligible voters.
Each of these categories reflects a different opportunity for states to address the errors that
inevitably arise in the registration process, including common errors that have no bearing on
a citizen’s eligibility to vote. There are many ways in which errors arise: the applicant may
make an honest mistake on the form, transposing a number or omitting a digit; an elections
clerk may make an honest mistake in data entry, such as a typo or a mistake in reading hand-
writing; there may be a mistake in other government databases, such as in those maintained
by a state department of motor vehicles or the Social Security Administration; or there might
simply be a mismatch between two correct sources of information, such as a woman listed
with a maiden name in one database and a married name in another.
None of these mistakes mean that the applicant is ineligible to vote, but any of them may
keep eligible citizens from the polls, depending on a state’s practices. In general, the more
accommodating the state’s approach in each area, the more likely it is that eligible voters
will retain the opportunity to vote; conversely, the less accommodating the approach, the
more likely it is that eligible voters will be barred from the polls.
We now discuss the states’ intended practices in relation to each category. This following
discussion represents a snapshot of state intentions in early 2006; state policies are, in
many cases, still developing as election officials develop experience with the statewide
voter registration databases.2
1. Criteria for matching: state practices

States employ different criteria to determine whether information on a voter registration
application matches information in another government database. Some states use a
flexible match standard, requiring that fields match substantially, but not exactly: for
example, under such a “substantial match” standard, “Michael” would match “Michael,”
but might also match “Mike,” “Micheal,” “M.,” or even “Michaela.” Some states require
each character of each field to be the same: under such an “exact match” standard,
“Michael” would match only “Michael,” and would not match any of the other variants
above. Some states’ criteria fall in between.
2 Neither Hawaii nor North
The more exacting the match criteria, the greater the likelihood of a “false negative,” in Dakota is reflected in the
tallies of individual state prac-
which a match between two records will not be found when the records in fact belong to tices below. Hawaii did not
the same person. The possibility for error is exacerbated as the number of compared fields respond to this survey, and no
relevant policies were reflected
(name, date of birth, etc.) increases, because of the increased opportunity for typos or in its state statutes or regula-
similar mistakes. Conversely, the more flexible the match criteria, the greater the likelihood tions. North Dakota has no
system of voter registration at
of a “false positive,” in which two records are deemed to match when they do not belong to all, and does not collect any of
the same person. This effect, however, is mitigated as the number of compared fields (name, the information described in
this report.
8 Making the List

date of birth, etc.) increases, because each field acts as a double-check on the others.
Other industries—including the security, insurance, and health care industries—compare

information from multiple sources all the time. Standard practice in these industries
accounts for the balance between “false negatives” and “false positives” by comparing
multiple fields using sophisticated and flexible matching protocols. The flexibility of the
protocol is tuned to the application: more flexible when it is more important to err on
the side of catching every true match (e.g., when comparing an airline manifest to a
watch list for terrorists, it is more important to make sure that no name that should be
matched slips off of the list—that is, it is more important to minimize “false negatives”);
less flexible when it is more important to err on the side of catching every true mismatch
(e.g., when comparing a class list to a list of kids who are exempt from an immunization
shot, it is more important to make sure that no name gets on the exemption list that
shouldn’t be—that is, it is more important to minimize “false positives”).
In the voter registration context, most states appear to have built some flexibility into their
match criteria, at least when comparing records based on driver’s license numbers.
Unfortunately, our survey found that when comparing records submitted with Social
Security digits, contrary to standard industry practice, many states may not be using the
most appropriate matching criteria for the job.
Records with driver’s license numbers
Consider first the attempt to match records of applicants submitting a driver’s license or state
identification card number. Eleven states3 use or plan to use some form of a “substantial
match” standard to seek matching records. In these states, motor vehicle records are culled—
either by an automated process or by manual review—to produce a list of possible matches.
An election official reviews this list of possible matches, to determine whether any of these
records represents the applicant.
An example will help demonstrate the “substantial match” systems used by these 11 states.
Consider a voter registration record application submitted by Jane Elizabeth Smith, born
February 5, 1975, ID #123456789. The motor vehicle records might include any of the
following potential matches:
1. #123456789 Jane Elizabeth Smith 02/05/1975 (all fields identical)

2. #123456889 Jane Elizabeth Smith 02/05/1975 (typo in ID)
3. #123456789 Jane Elizabeth Smith 05/02/1975 (swapped month/date of birth)
4. #123456789 Joan Elizabeth Smith 02/05/1975 (mistake in first name)
5. #123456789 Jane S. Martin 02/05/1975 (married name)
6. #123456789 Martin Brown 11/08/1955 (ID typo for different person)
The culling algorithm used in the particular state will determine which “possible match”
records are returned; each algorithm has a different capacity to accommodate typos or
other common errors. Some algorithms, for example, will find example #6 (where the ID
3 AK, AR, CO, FL, IL, IN, numbers appear to match) but not #2 (where they do not). Others will find #2 (where the
NC, NH, OR, VT, and WY.

names are the same) but not #6 (where they are not). An official will then review the
possible matches to determine whether any represent the same individual.
At the time of this survey, 8 of the 11 states using a “substantial match” standard had not
determined precisely how they would select a list of “possible match” records, but intended
to employ flexible criteria to do so.4
Florida’s “substantial match” system is based on the way in which it generates driver’s
license numbers. Florida generates a test number for a would-be voter in the same way that
it would generate a driver's license number for a driver: it derives a basic set of characters
from the applicant’s name, date of birth, and gender such that individuals with similar
names and birthdates (like “Tim Johnson” and “Tom Jensen”) end up with the same basic
character set.5 It then produces its “possible match” list by returning all motor vehicle
records which match either this generated test number or the license number listed on the
voter registration form.
Vermont’s “substantial match” system is even more dependent on human intervention.

Vermont election officials regularly receive a duplicate copy of the full state driver’s license
database. The officials search this copy of the driver’s license database for the individual on
the voter registration form, looking first for an exact match of the driver’s license number,
name, address, and date of birth. If no exact match is found, the officials will keep check-
ing for variants and typos, searching manually through the database for partial matches if
need be. Alaska’s system is similar, but officials directly access the driver’s license database,
looking for a match based on either the identifying number or the name.
Fifteen states plan to use a sort of hybrid system, requiring an “exact match” of every 4 AR, CO, IL, IN, NC, NH,
character in one field, but permitting “substantial matches” of one or more other fields.6 OR, and WY. Oregon will not
These systems are designed to be somewhat flexible, but are still susceptible to failure in the only use a “substantial match”
protocol, but if the state can
event of typos. Montana’s system is among the most flexible of the hybrids. To generate its find a match despite a “scriven-
“possible match” list, the system returns records that exactly match either identifying num- er’s error” in the identifying
number, it will correct the
ber, first name, or date of birth; the returned records are then ranked by the number of identifying number on the
fields that match exactly. applicant’s behalf. Colorado
has indicated that it will con-
sider nicknames and common
Seven of the 15 states7 with this sort of hybrid system will generate “possible match” records name variants a match, and
for election official review by returning records for which the identifying number matches will account for minor errors
(e.g., omission, transposition)
exactly. Pennsylvania similarly returns for official review records matching the identifying in the identifying number, but
number and the first two letters of the last name. Because each of these 8 states make the has not determined precisely
how the match will be carried
identifying number the keystone of a match, if there is an error in the identifying number, out.
as in example #2 above—on the application form, as entered by election officials, or in the 5 When Florida produces a real
motor vehicles database—a match will not be found. If the identifying number is correct, driver’s license number, it adds
unique digits to this basic set
however, other errors in the record, such as typos in the spelling of the name, will be subject to distinguish a “Tim Johnson”
to human judgment. Minnesota uses a slight variation of the above scheme, returning from a “Tom Jensen.”
records matching either the identifying number or the last name, first initial, and date of 6 AZ, DE, IA, ID, MI, MN,
MT, NE, NJ, NY, PA, RI, UT,
birth. This gives some flexibility in the event of an error in the identifying number; WA, and WI.
Minnesota would find example #2 above, where the other hybrids would not. 7 DE, ID, NE, NJ, RI, UT,
and WI.
10 Making the List

In contrast, 5 of the 15 states use or plan to use hybrid systems that are dangerously close
8 In Arizona’s system, the variants of an overall “exact match” standard. These systems leave a little flexibility to
last name must have five account for a limited range of data errors, but only in certain circumstances. Iowa and
letters in common, and the
first name must have three Washington will seek an exact match of the identifying number, last name, and date of
letters in common. birth, but will accept variations of the applicant’s first name—they would find example
9 CA, LA, MA, MD, ME, #4 above, but not #2, #3, or #5. Arizona will seek exact matches of the number and date
MO, MS, SD, and TX.
of birth, and find substantial matches of the name8—it would find example #4, and
10 AK, AZ, DE, IL, IN,
LA, MA, ME, MN, MS,
might find example #5, but would not find examples #2 or #3 above. Michigan will seek
and WI. exact matches of the number, last name, and first initial of the first name, but will find
11 AK, IL, and IN. all other substantial matches —it would find examples #1, #3, and #4 above, but not
12 AZ, DE, MN, and WI. examples #2 or #5. New York will seek an exact match of the identifying number; for all
13 LA, MA, ME, and MS. such records, the system will return a code stating whether the name, date of birth, or
14 7 states (GA, HI, KY, address match exactly (in examples #4 and #5 above, the official would see only a code
NM, SC, TN, and VA)
collect the registrant’s full
stating that date of birth matches but name does not). The official then has the discre-
Social Security number and tion to determine whether enough fields match to constitute a matching record.
do not ask for a driver’s
license number or state
identification card number.
Finally, 9 states9 use or plan to use an “exact match” standard likely to lead to many “false
15 CA, CO, FL, IA, ID, negatives.” In these states, certain fields are selected (usually the identifying number, first
MD, MI, MO, MT, NC, name, last name, and date of birth; some states include the applicant’s middle initial or
NE, NH, NJ, NY, OR, PA,
RI, SD, TX, UT, VT, WA,
current address), and records are deemed to match only if each and every character of each
WV and WY. selected field matches exactly. Using this method, only example #1 above would be returned
16 Iowa’s contract with the as a match; all other examples would be rejected.
Social Security Administra-
tion indicates that the SSA
may only be willing to Records with Social Security digits
match information for voter
registration through AAMVA,
which would render the There is a similar division in how states approach the records of an applicant submitting
AAMVA standard the de the last four digits of her Social Security number—except that even more states plan to use
facto national standard.
a rigid “exact match” standard. Eleven states10 use or plan to use the same system noted
17 Indeed, as of January
2006, the Social Security above that they will use for driver’s license or identification card numbers (3 “substantial
Administration reported that matches,”11 4 hybrid,12 4 “exact matches”13).14 Twenty-four states15 instead use or plan to
28.5% of the first 143,000
attempted matches—over use a common “exact match” procedure developed by the Social Security Admininstration
40,000 voters—had been and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, which is likely to lead to
rejected. This rate—more
than 1 in 4 voters—most
many “false negatives.”16 Under this procedure, an automated system will seek an exact
likely reflects an enormous match of the applicant’s last four SSN digits, first name, last name, month of birth, and
number of “false negatives.”
year of birth. A code will then be returned indicating only whether or not an exact match
Curiously, AAMVA has
devised a different matching
was found. Using the examples above, only example #1 would be returned as a match; all
protocol to compare infor- others would be rejected.17
mation for the purposes of
issuing driver’s licenses than
the protocol described in
Tennessee and Virginia—both of which collect a full SSN (all nine digits), and do not
this report, which is used request either a driver’s license or state identification card number—use hybrid systems
only in voter registration.
The AAMVA protocol for
that are variants of the “exact match” standard. Tennessee seeks an exact match of the
issuing driver’s licenses is SSN, last name, and date of birth, and a substantial match of the first name. Virginia
more flexible—and less
prone to error—than the
seeks an exact match of the SSN and date of birth and a substantial match of name.
protocol for voter Tennessee would find examples #1 and #4 above; Virginia would find examples #1, #4,
registration described
above.
and #5. Neither state would find the others.

Matching Driver's License Numbers
Match Standard Match Fields Match Process Likelihood of error
AK substantial ID #, name, DOB official searches database directly moderate
AL did not respond ID #, name, DOB did not respond ?
AR substantial ID #, last name, DOB official checks a list of possible matches moderate
AZ hybrid exact ID #, DOB system finds matches automatically high

substantial name
CA undecided ID #, name, DOB undecided (likely: system finds very high

(will likely use exact) matches automatically)
CO substantial ID #, name, DOB undecided ?
CT undetermined* ID #, name, DOB undetermined* ?
DC undecided ID #, name, DOB undecided ?
DE hybrid exact ID # official searches database directly moderate

substantial name, DOB, address
FL substantial name, DOB, gender official checks a list of possible matches moderate
GA no match system no match system no match system n/a
HI did not respond did not respond did not respond ?
IA hybrid exact ID #, last name, DOB official checks a list of possible matches very high
substantial first name
ID hybrid exact ID # official checks a list of possible matches significant

substantial name, DOB
IL substantial undecided undecided ?
IN undecided ID #, name, DOB undecided moderate

(likely: substantial) (likely: checks list of possible matches)
KS undecided ID #, name, DOB undecided ?
KY no match system no match system no match system n/a
LA exact ID #, name (accounting for system finds matches automatically very high
maiden name), address
MA undecided ID #, last name, undecided (likely: system finds very high

(likely: exact) first initial, DOB matches automatically)
MD exact ID #, name, DOB system finds matches automatically very high
ME undecided ID #, name, DOB undecided ?

(likely: exact)
MI hybrid exact ID #, last name, system finds matches automatically very high
first initial, DOB
MN hybrid ID # or last name, official checks a list of possible matches significant

first initial, DOB
MO undecided ID #, last name, DOB undecided (likely: system finds very high
(likely: exact) matches automatically)
MS undecided ID # undecided (likely: system finds very high

* Because of litigation in Connecticut pending at the time the survey was conducted, Connecticut materials in this report reflect
only the practices codified in state statues and regulations, and do not reflect the phone survey.
12 Making the List

Matching Driver's License Numbers
MT substantial number ID #, name, DOB official checks a list of possible matches significant
of fields must
match exactly
NC substantial ID #, name (including official checks a list of possible matches moderate

maiden name), DOB, address
ND no registration no registration no registration n/a
NE hybrid exact ID # official checks a list of possible matches significant

substantial first name, DOB
address
NH substantial ID #, name, DOB official checks a list of possible matches moderate
NJ hybrid exact ID # official checks a list of possible matches significant

NM undecided ID #, DOB undecided ?
NV did not respond ID #, name, DOB did not respond ?
NY substantial number ID #, name, DOB, address official checks a list of possible matches high
of fields must
match exactly
OH did not respond ID #, name, DOB or address did not respond ?
OK no match system no match system no match system n/a
OR undecided undecided undecided ?

(likely: substantial)
PA hybrid exact ID #, last initial official checks a list of possible matches significant
RI hybrid exact ID # official checks a list of possible matches significant

SC no match system no match system no match system n/a
SD exact ID #, last name, 1st: database finds maches automatically high

first name (variant), DOB 2nd: officals search database directly for
unmatched records
TN SSN match only SSN match only SSN match only n/a
TX exact ID #, last name, database finds matches automatically very high

former last name, DOB
UT hybrid exact ID # official checks a list of possible matches significant

substantial last name, DOB,
and, in some counties, address
VA SSN match only SSN match only SSN match only n/a
VT substantial ID #, name, DOB, and address official searches database directly moderate
WA hybrid exact ID #, last name, DOB database finds matches automatically very high
WI hybrid exact ID # official checks a list of possible matches significant

WV undecided ID #, name, DOB, address undecided ?

(likely: exact)
WY substantial ID #, name, DOB official checks a list of possible matches moderate

Matching Social Security Digits
AK substantial ID #, name, DOB official searches database directly low
AL did not respond ID #, name, DOB did not respond ?
AR undecided undecided undecided (likely: official checks a list low

(likely: substantial) (likely: ID #, name, DOB) of possible matches)
AZ hybrid exact ID #, DOB system finds matches automatically high

substantial name
CA AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
CO AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
CT undetermined* ID #, name, DOB undetermined* ?
DC undecided ID #, name, DOB undecided ?
DE hybrid exact ID # official searches database directly moderate

FL AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
GA no match system no match system no match system n/a
HI did not respond did not respond did not respond ?
IA AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
ID AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
IL substantial undecided undecided ?
IN undecided ID #, name, DOB undecided moderate

(likely: substantial) (likely: checks list of possible matches)
KS undecided ID #, name, DOB undecided ?
KY no match system no match system no match system n/a
LA exact ID #, name (including system finds matches automatically very high

maiden name), address
MA undecided ID #, last name, first initial, DOB undecided (likely: system finds very high
MD AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
ME undecided ID #, name, DOB undecided ?

(likely: exact)
MI AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
MN hybrid ID # or last name, official checks a list of possible matches significant

first initial, DOB
MO AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
MS undecided ID # undecided (likely: system finds very high

(will likely use exact) matches automatically)
MT AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
NC AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
ND no registration no registration no registration n/a
NE AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
* Because of litigation in Connecticut pending at the time the survey was conducted, Connecticut materials in this report reflect
only the practices codified in state statues and regulations, and do not reflect the phone survey.
14 Making the List

Matching Social Security Digits
NH AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
NJ AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
NM undecided ID #, DOB undecided ?
NV did not respond ID #, name, DOB did not respond ?
NY AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
OH did not respond ID, name, DOB, or address did not respond ?
OK no match system no match system no match system n/a
OR AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
PA AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
RI AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
SC no match system no match system no match system n/a
SD AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
TN hybrid exact ID#, last name, DOB official checks a list of possible matches very high
TX AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
UT AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
VA hybrid exact ID #, DOB official checks a list of possible matches high

substantial name
VT AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
WA AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
WI hybrid exact ID # official checks a list of possible matches significant

WV AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
WY AAMVA AAMVA AAMVA very high
No matching
Four states—Georgia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and South Carolina—do not match or plan
to match information from new voter registration forms to the motor vehicles or Social
Security databases before placing the registrant on the rolls.
18 AL, AR, CT, DC, KS, NM,

NV, and OH. Because of liti- Undetermined
gation in Connecticut pending
at the time the survey was con- Finally, the match criteria for 8 states18—for matching records with either driver’s license
ducted, Connecticut materials
in this report reflect only the number or SSN digits—could not be determined for this survey. The determination could
practices codified in state not be made either because the state in question had not yet decided on its match criteria
statutes and regulations, and
do not reflect a survey or because it did not respond to the survey and had no policy reflected in state law.
response.

2. Consequences of a failed match: state practices
Even using the most flexible criteria for finding a “substantial match,” for a significant
number of eligible citizens, the state will simply not be able to match the information in
their applications to information in another government database. States differ in how
they treat applications for which they cannot find a match.
In some states, if a match cannot be found, the only consequence for the voter is the alter-
native verification scheme required by HAVA: voters registering for the first time and by
mail must show some form of identification at the polls. Other states place additional
burdens on the voter—or in the most extreme cases, reject the application outright, even
if the citizen is eligible to vote. The more burdensome the consequences, the more likely
it is that eligible citizens will be barred from the polls because of errors in the process.
Only 4 states—Iowa, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington—take the most extreme
position, rejecting a citizen’s application outright if the state cannot find a match. (Most
of these states have also decided to use error-laden “exact match” criteria, as explained
above, for most fields to be matched.) Pursuant to a new agreement with the Department
of Justice, California may also reject unmatched applications.19 Maryland (which also uses
an “exact match” standard) and Pennsylvania (which uses a “hybrid” standard) intend to
reject the application if the state cannot find a match, unless the applicant submits docu-
mentary proof of identity before the close of registration.20
19 Pursuant to a new agreement
In 4 states, Election Day registration compensates somewhat for the consequences that the with the Department of Justice,
state assigns to a failed match. Idaho, Maine, and New Hampshire will reject an application California has changed its poli-
cy since the research for this
for which the state cannot find a match; however, because these states provide for Election report was conducted. The new
Day registration, the applicant is not barred from voting, but may re-register at the polls. policy, as with all new policy
changes documented and sub-
Wyoming gives each county the discretion to determine how to treat an application when mitted to the Brennan Center,
a match cannot be found; because Wyoming also features Election Day registration, in will be reflected in the summary
of each state’s practices in the
counties that reject the application, the applicant may re-register at the polls. Appendix to this report, avail-
able online.
Twenty-four states21 will place the voter on the pollbooks despite the failure to find a 20 Pennsylvania has also
match. Some states describe such voters as “registered,” while others describe their regis- changed its policy since the
research for this survey was
tration status as “provisional” or “pending.” In either case, the voter will appear on the conducted. See note 19, above.
pollbook, often with an annotation stating that identification or an affidavit is required 21 AK, AR, AZ, CO, CT, DC,
to complete the registration process or vote a regular ballot. Sixteen of these 24 states22 DE, IL, IN, KS, LA, MA, MI,
MN, MO, MS, MT, NE, NJ,
ask all unmatched voters to show ID or sign an affidavit before voting a regular ballot; NY, RI, TN, VA, and WI.
eight states23—following HAVA—ask such voters to do so only if they are registering for Pursuant to a new agreement
with the Department of
the first time in the jurisdiction and doing so by mail. Seven of the states requiring iden- Justice, California has changed
tification24 require the same identification whether or not a match is found: in these its policy.
states, the match process does not independently serve as an adequate means of verifying 22 AK, AR, AZ, CO, DC, DE,
the voter’s identity. IL, IN, KS, LA, MO, MS,

MT, RI, TN, and WI.
23 CT, MA, MI, MN, NE,
Oregon will also place the voter on the pollbooks despite the failure to find a match. The NJ, NY, and VA.
voter will be fully registered for all state elections. She may also vote a provisional ballot 24 AZ, CO, IL, IN, LA, MO,
and MT.
16 Making the List

in federal races,25 which will be counted if she supplies an identifying number that can
be matched, a statement that she has no such number, or documentary identification.
Five states provide that a voter for whom a matching record cannot be found may vote only
a provisional ballot. In Florida, the provisional ballot will be counted if the identifying num-
ber is later verified or if the voter submits evidence to the county that the identifying number
submitted on her voter registration form was accurate. Utah and West Virginia will count the
provisional ballot if an election official is able to verify the voter’s identity and residence. In
Vermont, the provisional ballot (for federal races only) will count if administrative error pre-
vented a match and the voter is otherwise eligible. North Carolina believes that the voter will
be able to vote a provisional ballot, but has not yet determined when that ballot will count.
Four states—Georgia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and South Carolina—do not match or plan
to match information from new voter registration forms to the motor vehicles or Social
Security databases before placing the registrant on the rolls.
Finally, the consequences of a match for 5 states26 could not be determined for this
survey. The determination could not be made either because the state in question had not
yet decided on the relevant consequences or because it did not respond to the survey and
had no policy reflected in state law.
Failure to Match Information to Motor Vehicle or Social Security Databases

Not Registered Registered / No Matching Provisional Election Day Undetermined
On the Rolls Pre-Registration Ballot Voting Registration
Iowa Alaska Georgia Florida Idaho Alabama

Maryland* Arizona Kentucky North Carolina Maine Hawaii
Pennsylvania* Arkansas North Dakota†† Oregon† New Hampshire Nevada
South Dakota California° Oklahoma Utah Wyoming New Mexico
Texas Colorado South Carolina Vermont Ohio
Washington Connecticut West Virginia
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
New York
Oregon†
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Virginia
Wisconsin
25 Because Oregon conducts
elections by mail, it intends to
maintain a dual system distin- * Maryland and Pennsylvania voters whose information does not match will be registered if they submit
identification before the close of registration. Pennsylvania has changed this policy; see note 20, above.
guishing valid registration
entries and valid ballots for ° Pursuant to a new agreement with the Department of Justice, California has changed this policy; see
state elections and for federal note 19, above.
elections. † Oregon voters whose information does not match will be fully registered to vote in state races.
26 AL, HI, NM, NV, and OH. †† North Dakota does not register its voters.

3. Incomplete information: state practices
If a citizen submits an application with an incomplete, illegible, or missing “identifying
number,” states also vary in how that application is treated. At least one state may affirma-
tively attempt to find the right number in another database.27 Most states assign a new
unique identifier for database maintenance purposes, and proceed to register the appli-
cant. A substantial minority of states immediately reject the application, creating the risk
that an eligible citizen will not be registered because of a minor and immaterial mistake.
Twenty states28 will treat the application as if the applicant had no driver’s license number,
state identification card, or Social Security number, and proceed to place the applicant on
the pollbooks. However, as with the “provisional” or “pending” registration status described
above, such voters may be asked to show identification or sign an affidavit at the polls before
casting a regular ballot. Fifteen states29 ask all such voters to do so, and 5 states30 ask such
voters to do so only if they are registering for the first time in the jurisdiction and doing so
by mail.
Oregon will also place the voter on the pollbooks despite an incomplete, illegible, or 27 A new agreement with the
Department of Justice seems to
missing identifying number. The voter will be fully registered for all state elections; she require California—at least for
may also vote a provisional ballot in federal races,31 which will be counted if she supplies applications with no listed
number—to seek a matching
an identifying number that can be matched, a statement that she has no such number, or record in other state databases,
documentary identification. In Tennessee and Utah, such a voter may vote only a provi- and if a match is found, to
apply the identifying number
sional ballot for all races; the ballot will count if a county election official is later able to contained in those other data-
verify the voter’s identity and residence. bases to the voter registration
application.
In contrast, 14 states32 will reject the application if the missing information is not supplied. 28 AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC,
DE, GA, KS, KY, LA, MI,
In 10 of these states,33 the application will be rejected for lack of an identifying number MS, MT, NE, NJ, NY, RI, VT,
even though the state also requires identification of all voters at the polls. Maryland and and WI. Georgia has adopted
this position pending the out-
Pennsylvania will accept documentary identification in lieu of an identifying number, but come of litigation; if litigation
will reject the application if neither is supplied by the close of voter registration.34 is resolved in favor of the state,
it intends to reject applications
in which the Social Security
Five states—Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wyoming—will reject an number is missing.
application with incomplete information as an initial matter, but because these states pro- 29 AR, AZ, CT, DC, DE, GA,
vide for Election Day registration, the applicant will not be barred from voting; rather, she KS, KY, LA, MS, MT, NY, RI,
VT, and WI.
may attempt to register again at the polls on Election Day. Illinois gives each local jurisdic-
30 CA, CO, MI, NE, and NJ.
tion discretion to determine how to treat an application with an incomplete, illegible, or Pursuant to a new agreement
missing “identifying number.” with the Department of Justice,
California will apparently
accept applications with an
The policy of 4 states—Alabama, North Carolina, Nevada, and Ohio—could not be illegible or incomplete number
determined, either because the state in question had not decided how to treat such only if submitted by mail.
applications, or because it did not respond to the survey and had no policy reflected in 31 See note 25, above.
state law. 32 AK, FL, IA, IN, MA, MO,

NM, OK, SC, SD, TX, VA,
WA, and WV.
33 AK, FL, IN, MO, NM, SC,
SD, TX, VA, and WA.
34 See note 20, above.
18 Making the List

4. Opportunity to correct errors: state practices
If a citizen submits an application with an incomplete, illegible, or missing “identifying
number,” or if the state cannot find a matching record in its other databases, each state
will notify the applicant that there has been an error. But states have different means of
delivering this notice. For example, some states send a letter; some follow-up with a phone
call; and some send a new application form with any notification. Moreover, states also
differ in the processes by which eligible citizens may resolve an error. Some require the
applicant to resubmit another voter registration form, affirming all information anew;
others allow the applicant to resolve errors over the phone or by mailing additional infor-
mation. Finally, states differ in whether errors may be corrected after the voter registration
deadline. Some permit corrections after the deadline as long as the original application was
timely; others do not.
The less robust the notice, and the less practical opportunity for an applicant to resolve an
error, the greater the likelihood that any of the mistakes discussed above will remain unre-
solved through Election Day. And many of these minor errors can have serious
consequences, including the potential to bar eligible citizens from the polls.
A state’s decision as to whether to allow errors to be resolved after the voter registration
deadline is likely to have severe ramifications in practice. Many voter registration applica-
tions will inevitably be submitted close to the voter registration deadline, as campaign
intensity, media attention, and voter interest all heat up. These timely applications,
however, may be derailed by immaterial errors. Depending on a state’s policy, an immate-
rial error in the process for an application submitted at the registration deadline may pre-
clude any practical opportunity to resolve the error, resulting in extra burdens on the voter
or outright disenfranchisement.
Twenty-two states35 allow an applicant to resolve errors in the registration process even if
the voter registration deadline has passed. (Vermont permits corrections to the identifying
number after the deadline.) This correction period ranges from several days after notice of
an error is sent, up through Election Day. Three states—Idaho, Minnesota, and
Wyoming—will reject corrections submitted after the voter registration deadline, but will
give the applicant the opportunity to re-register at the polls on Election Day.
In contrast, in 10 states,36 any correction submitted after the voter registration deadline
will not be considered timely for an upcoming election. Iowa and South Dakota will reject
any correction after the voter registration deadline if the mistake is on the part of the appli-
cant, but if the new information corrects an error on the part of someone other than the
applicant, it will be accepted after the deadline.
35 AR, AZ, CO, DE, IN, MA,
ME, MI, MT, NE, NH, NJ,
NV, NY, OR, RI, TN, TX,
Illinois, Mississippi, and Utah leave the decision to the local jurisdiction to determine
VT, WA, WI, and WV. whether corrections will be accepted after the voter registration deadline. Louisiana will gen-
36 AK, CA, DC, FL, KS, MD, erally accept corrections within 21 days after the notice of an error is sent to the applicant, but
MO, NC, NM, and VA.
Pennsylvania has changed this
has not decided whether corrections within 21 days will be accepted if the voter registration
policy; see note 20, above.

Opportunity to Correct Errors in the Matching Process After the Voter Registration Deadline
Reject Corrections Voter May Correct Reject Corrections, but No Matching Undetermined
After Deadline Errors After Deadline Election Day Registration Pre-Registration
Alaska Arkansas Idaho Georgia Alabama

California Arizona* Minnesota Kentucky Connecticut
District of Columbia Colorado* Wyoming Oklahoma Louisiana
Florida Delaware* South Carolina Ohio
Kansas Iowa†
Maryland Illinois†
Missouri Indiana
New Mexico Maine
North Carolina Massachusetts
Pennsylvania° Michigan
Virginia Mississippi†
Montana*
Nebraska*
New Hampshire*
New Jersey
Nevada
New York*
Oregon*
Rhode Island*
South Dakota†
Tennessee
Texas
Utah†
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin*
West Virginia
° Pennsylvania has changed this policy; see note 20, above.

* These states allow voters to correct errors up through the day before Election Day. MT, NH and WI allow
corrections after the voter registration deadline, and also permit Election Day registration.
† These states only allow voters to correct errors under certain circumstances. IL, MS, and UT grant discretion
to local election officials to accept or reject errors after the voter registration deadline. SD and IA only
allow voters to correct errors if the inaccuracy was not the result of an applicant’s error.
NB: Hawaii did not respond to the survey. North Dakota does not register its voters.
deadline has already passed. Because Georgia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and South Carolina
do not match or plan to match information from new voter registration forms to the motor
vehicles or Social Security database before placing the registrant on the rolls, no correction
process is necessary. Finally, neither Alabama, Connecticut, nor Ohio responded to the survey
or reflected their correction policy in state law.37
37 Because of litigation in
Summary of findings Connecticut pending at the
time the survey was conducted,
Connecticut materials in this
As the survey results reveal, a few states will implement HAVA’s verification and matching report reflect only the practices
provisions precisely as they were intended: to help clean the registration rolls, to provide codified in state statutes and
regulations, and do not reflect
first-time voters registering by mail with a convenient alternative means to confirm their the phone survey.
identity, and to otherwise promote the smooth administration of a registration process 38 While these states
enabling every eligible citizen to vote. Nebraska and Oregon, for example, report that they intend to use flexible criteria
for matching information on
intend to use at least moderately flexible match criteria38 with ample opportunity to cor- applications with driver’s
rect errors, and will impose only the consequences anticipated in federal law: the oppor- license numbers, they also
intend to implement AAMVA’s
tunity for first-time voters registering by mail to confirm their identity by other means if exacting match criteria for
no match can be found. States like Minnesota and Wisconsin go further, by offering Election applications with Social
Security digits, which creates
Day registration as an additional safeguard for their citizens. a substantial risk of error.
20 Making the List

In contrast, the survey also shows that a few states intend to implement HAVA’s veri-
fication and matching provisions in a manner that twists the intent of the law to create a
new barrier. Iowa, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, for example, all report that they
will reject the application of citizens whose information cannot be matched, barring the
applicant entirely from the polls. And most of these states compound the burden by using
a character-by-character exact match that is particularly likely to result in widespread dis-
enfranchisement.
In the rest of the country, HAVA implementation seems to be mixed: some state policies
fulfill the intent of the law, others create unnecessary hurdles for eligible voters.
Fortunately, most state policies are not yet either codified or hard-wired. This report is
intended not only to shed light on states’ current intentions, but also to encourage them to
bring their policies in line with best practice. To that end, we offer below specific recommen-
dations for the proper implementation of HAVA’s verification and matching procedures.

22 Making the List
Recommendations
The Brennan Center’s recommendations regarding state implementation of HAVA’s
verification and matching provisions are designed to facilitate the opportunity of every
eligible citizen to register to vote, smoothly and without undue burden, and to ensure
that states maintain complete and accurate voter registration lists. The new verification
and matching processes described in this report, like many other tools, have the poten-
tial to improve the voter registration process—or render it a hopeless mess.
New York City’s recent experience suggests the scope of the disaster that could ensue if states
make flawed verification and matching choices. In September 2004, New York City’s board
of elections sent 15,000 registration records to the state department of motor vehicles for
verification. The DMV attempted to match the driver’s license number on the voter registra-
tion form to a license number in its own database. 2,951 of those forms—19.6% of the
total—could not be matched solely because of typos by city officials. (An additional 4% of
the forms did not produce a match because of a nonmaterial error by the registrant, such as
the transposition of a character in the driver’s license number.) Moreover, the city attempted
to match only driver’s license number to driver’s license number; had the city attempted to
match additional fields such as name or date of birth, the potential for error would have
increased.
It is essential to learn from such trials. If New York had chosen to reject voter registration
applications that could not be exactly matched, up to 20% of eligible registrants could
have been disenfranchised due solely to minor mistakes of election officials. Furthermore,
New York’s experience is not an anomaly. Peer-reviewed studies from other disciplines
indicate that error rates of 20-32% are common in similar contexts.39
When voting rights are at stake, such error rates are unacceptable—but they are not
unavoidable. By adopting good practices with respect to the verification and matching
process, and forgoing bad practices, states may fulfill HAVA’s mandate without jeopardizing
the voting rights of eligible citizens. Our recommendations for how to accomplish this—
whether through clear and transparent policy, regulation, or legislation—are laid out in
39 See, e.g., Neil A. Maizlish
detail below.
& Linda Herrera, A Record
Linkage Protocol for a Diabetes
Registry at Ethnically Diverse
Community Health Centers, 12
Recommendations for match criteria
J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS
ASS’N 331, 335 (2005); Minor errors—things like typos, transpositions, and inconsistencies—occur frequently
Shaun J. Grannis et al.,
Analysis of Identifier even in relatively “clean” databases. For example, one study found as many as 40 different
Performance Using a spelling variations of “Fort Lauderdale” in a Florida social service database—and Fort
Deterministic Linkage
Algorithm, 2002 PROC. AMIA Lauderdale, as Florida’s seventh largest city, is presumably familiar to the Florida officials
ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM 305, entering the social service data. For unfamiliar entries like surnames and random digits,
307-08; Carol Friedman &
Robert Sideli, Tolerating
error rates are likely much higher. Such errors could prevent a system from recognizing
Spelling Errors During Patient that two records reflecting the same individual should actually be matched.
Validation, 25 COMPUTERS
& BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
486, 503-04 (1992).

The Brennan Center therefore recommends that in the verification process, states employ
“substantial match” criteria capable of compensating for typos and other common database-
related errors in every field compared.40 AAMVA and the SSA should do the same. Whether
the process of matching voter registration information to information in other databases is
automated or manual, that process must account for inevitable mistakes and minimize the risk
that these “false negatives” create hurdles for eligible voters. There are many technologies and
procedures available to help account for mistakes, from the most sophisticated software to
manual double-checks involving common sense. Whatever the particular matching proce-
dure that a state chooses for verification purposes, the Brennan Center strongly recommends
that it reflect the following standard: an individual’s voter registration information will be
deemed “matched” if a reasonable person would find it substantially likely that a record in
an existing government database refers to the same individual on the registration form.
Recommendations for addressing failed matches

Even with a “substantial match” protocol, states will inevitably fail to find matches for a
significant number of eligible citizens who provided accurate information on their regis-
tration forms. There are many reasons for this: a match protocol that remains imperfect,
a name change more recent than the last DMV entry, mistakes in Social Security records,
and so on. Driver’s license and Social Security databases are immense government systems 40 In contrast, a more exacting
that are not compiled for national identity or elections purposes. These databases will yield standard should be used when
seeking to remove names from
errors when used for these ends. Indeed, the Social Security Administration’s Director of the list because “false positive”
Information Exchange and Computer Matching has admitted that at least 10% of the matches could disenfranchise
eligible voters in that context.
information obtained when attempting to match identifying information in the SSA’s Further recommendations for
database with other identifying data may be inaccurate.41 purge practices are described
below.
41 Remarks of Pete
Given the potential for error even under favorable circumstances, the Brennan Center
Monaghan, Director of
strongly recommends that an applicant be registered despite the failure of the state to find Information Exchange and
a match. Indeed, such a policy is required to make sense of HAVA.42 A failed match should Computer Matching of the
Social Security Administration,
produce only the single consequence expressly identified in the statute: a citizen registering at the February 2004 meeting
by mail and for the first time in a given jurisdiction is subject to an identification require- of the National Association of
Secretaries of State.
ment, unless the state is able to match the information in her registration form. The match
42 For an explanation as to
thus serves as one means by which the state may identify a voter; if the match fails, the state why this policy is required by
must use some other means of identifying the voter.43 There are several readily available HAVA, see http://www.bren-
nancenter.org/programs/dem_
alternative means to confirm a voter’s identity—including matching her signature to the vr_hava.html.
signature on her registration card, requesting documentary ID for first-time voters who reg- 43 This is what HAVA’s spon-
ister by mail, or requiring the voter to swear to her identity under penalty of perjury. sors expected: in the
Congressional record, Senator
Kit Bond described the verifi-
Recommendations for addressing forms with cation provision by stating that
“[i]n lieu of the individual pro-
incomplete information viding proof of identity, States
may also electronically verify an
individual’s identity against
HAVA states that a voter registration application may not be processed unless it includes an
existing State databases.” 148
identifying number—primarily, the number of the applicant’s current and valid driver’s CONG. REC. S10488-02,
license, or if the applicant has none, the last four digits of her SSN. If the applicant has *S10489 (daily ed. Oct. 16,
2002) (statement of Sen.
neither, the state must assign the applicant a unique voter registration number. HAVA then Bond) (emphasis added).
24 Making the List

expressly reserves to each state the discretion to determine whether the information provided
by an applicant on a form is sufficient to meet the HAVA requirement that this number be
provided.
The Brennan Center recommends that states exercise this discretion to protect eligible
citizens from disenfranchisement because of immaterial error. Some voter registration
applications will inevitably be submitted by eligible citizens without an identifying
number: because the form is unclear, because the citizen has lost her driver’s license or
does not know the number when she completes the form, or for some other reason. As
one of HAVA’s chief sponsors explained, a missing or incomplete number need not
become an insurmountable hurdle:
[N]othing in [the verification section of HAVA] prohibits a State from accepting

or processing an application with incomplete or inaccurate information. [This section]
specifically reserves to the States the determination as to whether the information sup-
plied by the voter is sufficient to meet the disclosure requirements of this provision. So,
for example, if a voter transposes his or her Social Security number, or provides less than
a full driver’s license number, the State can nonetheless determine that such information
is sufficient to meet the verification requirements, in accordance with State law. . . .
Moreover, nothing in this section prohibits a State from registering an applicant once the
verification process takes place, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant provided
inaccurate or incomplete information at the time of registration . . . or that the match-
ing process did not verify the information.44
The Brennan Center recommends that states construe applications with missing or
incomplete information, consistent with the law, so that eligible citizens may still become
registered. If an application has a missing or illegible identifying number, but the appro-
priate number is discovered during the match process, states should process the form as if
the number had been legibly provided in the first instance: there is no need to penalize the
voter if the information can be found by other means.45
Furthermore, if no identifying number is found during the match process, the state should
presume that the applicant has no such number, assign a unique voter registration number,
and proceed with registration.46 If there is any lingering doubt about an applicant’s
identity, especially for first-time voters registering by mail, the state may still ask her to
44 148 CONG. REC. S10488- provide some sort of identification before voting—but at least she will be registered, and
02 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002)
able to resolve any doubt at the polls.
(statement of Sen. Dodd).
45 This practice is consistent
with HAVA because states Recommendations for correcting errors
would not “process” applica-
tions until a number was
assigned to and included with The attempt to match information on a registration form to information housed in a large
the application. See 42 U.S.C. government database compiled for a different purpose is inherently error-laden. And
§ 15483(a)(5)(A)(iii).
because errors introduced into large databases tend to persist and create unanticipated
46 This practice similarly com-
ports with HAVA’s reservation problems, it is best to ensure ample opportunities to correct any errors, with minimal
of discretion to the states. See burden on the voter.
id.

The Brennan Center recommends that whenever there is any error on a voter registration
application or in the verification and matching process, state officials notify the appli-
cants—not only by mail to all valid addresses on file, but also by phone if a valid phone
number is available. The Brennan Center also recommends that states allow applicants to
resolve errors by phone, by mail, or in person, without submitting a new form (which may
present new opportunities for error). The state should make the correction process as
straightforward as possible, to increase the chance that errors are caught and corrected
quickly.
Furthermore, in order to ensure that voter registration applications near the end of an
election cycle are not unduly prejudiced, the Brennan Center recommends that states
process corrections to timely applications up through Election Day, even if the correction
itself is submitted after the voter registration deadline. If a correction arrives too late to be
represented on the poll books, it should be accepted and processed, so that any provisional
ballots cast can be evaluated against the most recent, most accurate registration information.
Other recommendations for voter registration

databases and the registration process
In addition to the four most salient categories of findings addressed in detail above, this
survey revealed several additional important ways in which state policies and practices
differ with respect to voter registration and the interaction with the statewide voter
registration databases. Based on our research, the Brennan Center makes the following
additional recommendations:
Inputting and Storing Voter Registration Information
• Data entry audits. One of the primary sources of error in the registration process
is data entry. States should conduct regular audits of information entered into the
voter registration database, including procedures for checking the electronic records
against original paper applications.
• Online voter registration. One means of reducing errors in data entry is to allow
applicants to enter their own registration information. Arizona provides, and
Washington has just proposed, an online gateway through which eligible citizens
may register to vote. With appropriate security protocols, such online systems offer
not only greater convenience, but also greater accuracy as well. Even if applicants are
not able to register online, they should be able to view and confirm their registra-
tion information in the system through a secure public portal.47
• Real-time synchronization. Although the Election Assistance Commission has

47 For model legislation on
confirmed that a single central voter registration database accessed by local terminals
such public access portals, see
is “most closely akin to the requirements of HAVA,” the survey reveals that a small http://www.brennancenter.org/
minority of states continue to maintain local databases that are regularly synchronized programs/downloads/HAVA/P
ublic_access_portal_mode_%2
at the state level. To the greatest extent possible, the official state records should be 0bill_09_21_05.pdf.
26 Making the List

updated immediately upon any local change, so that there is no confusion regarding
a citizen’s official voter registration status.
• Security log. The state should keep an electronic log of all database transactions,
to ensure database security and to correct processing errors. These records should
indicate the date and time of each transaction, the identities of the persons who
accessed the system, the identities of the persons who authorized the transaction, and
the reason for any modification to existing information.
• Information privacy. States should adopt strict protocols for access to voter records
stored in the database, including different layers of security to restrict access to infor-
mation to authorized individuals for discrete authorized purposes. Sensitive personal
information, such as a voter’s social security or driver’s license number, or the infor-
mation provided by domestic violence victims, should be subject to greater protection.
Information Collected on the Voter Registration Application
• Registration forms. As is apparent from the forms reproduced in the Appendix

to the report, many states’ voter registration forms are cluttered and confusing.
A reasonable voter looking at these forms will often be uncertain about the
information requested or required. For example, some forms may lead voters to
believe that they may submit a recent out-of-state driver’s license when such a
license will not in fact be accepted; other forms do not clearly state how the voter
should indicate that she has no driver’s license or Social Security number. Voter
registration forms should clearly label all mandatory and optional information, and
explain the consequences of errors or omissions.
• Non-driver’s identification card number. Only 14 states48 specify on the form that
voters may provide a non-driver’s state ID card number rather than a driver’s license
number. Allowing other government-issued identification suits both the history and
the purpose of HAVA’s verification provisions.49 An individual’s authorization to
drive a car does not reflect upon her eligibility to vote; HAVA selected the driver’s
license number because—like a non-driver’s ID number issued by a state licensing
authority—it is a commonly available personal number verified by the government
as belonging uniquely to a particular individual.
48 AK, AZ, CA, CO, FL, IL,
IA, MD, MI, MN, TX, UT,
WA, and WI. The Match Process
49 It is true that HAVA
specifically designates a “dri- • Transparent standards. This survey was made necessary by the fact that the process
ver’s license number” as the
principal identifier, 42 U.S.C. and criteria by which most states will implement HAVA’s matching provisions is not
§§ 15483(a)(5)(A)(i)(I), expressly provided in statute or regulation or publicly available policy guidance.
15483(b)(3)(B)(i)(I), but
this term naturally embraces
States should develop uniform, non-discriminatory, and specific procedures that
ID numbers issued by state maximize election officials’ ability to find matching records—and they should do so
licensing agencies that serve
as official identification for
in a fashion transparent to the public.
non-driving residents.

• Searching additional databases. Congress designed HAVA’s matching procedures
to help establish a unique identifying number for each individual in the voter regis-
tration database, and to serve as one means of verifying the identity of a first-time
voter who registers by mail. HAVA specifies the motor vehicle and Social Security
databases as targets of the matching process, but other government databases may
suit these purposes just as effectively. If information on a voter registration form
cannot be matched with the motor vehicle or Social Security databases, states should
attempt a match with other reliable government records that uniquely
identify citizens, including records of agencies registering voters under the NVRA.
Procedures at the Polls
• Identification acceptable at the polls. The matching process represents just one way
to confirm the identity of a voter. When the state cannot find a match, it should look
to non-burdensome alternative methods, including signature matching, sworn affi-
davits, or, as a last resort, documentary proof of identity. Any of these methods should
be sufficient to serve as proper identification.
• Meaningful provisional ballots. Some states will apparently still issue voters a
provisional ballot which is certain—at the time it is issued—to be void. For example,
Texas will issue a provisional ballot to voters who arrive at the polls without identifica-
tion, but that ballot will only be counted if identification was provided at the polls.
These ballots are deceptive placebos: the voter believes that she has cast a valid ballot,
but the ballot is actually meaningless. States should reconcile their election law so that
a provisional ballot will be counted if the information submitted with the ballot
comports with information timely submitted on the voter’s registration form.
• Database access at the polls. By statute, the statewide voter registration database
represents the only official list of registered voters. Election officials should therefore be
able to access the database at polling places on Election Day. Polling place access to a
searchable database will reduce the number of registered voters whose names cannot be
found on a printed page, reduce the number of provisional ballots, enable poll workers
to determine quickly and easily if a voter is in the correct polling place, and generally
facilitate a smoother election process with shorter lines. Jurisdictions like Forsyth
County, Georgia, have already reported tremendous success with such programs.50
Recommendations for voter registration databases and 50 See Gary J. Smith, Director
of Elections, Forsyth County,
continuing list maintenance Ga., Forsyth County Electronic
Poll Book Program, in THE
Although the body of this report addresses only verification and matching for purposes of ELECTION CENTER, 2005
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES
“making the list,” states may attempt to match voter registration records with records in PAPERS 53 (Janis K. Womack
other databases for other list maintenance purposes as well. For example, states will ed., 2005), available at
http://electionupdates.caltech.
attempt to match voter registration records with records of other databases to account for edu/2005%20Election%20Ce
voters who become ineligible because of death, criminal convictions, or relocation. These nter%20Prof.%20Pract.%20P
apers.pdf.
28 Making the List

databases, too, are imperfect. And just as record matching may be beneficial or detrimen-
tal in placing voters on the list, matching may be beneficial or detrimental in taking them
off of the list of active voters (or, better, labeling them as inactive). We therefore make the
following recommendations for using databases for other list maintenance purposes:
Ensuring accuracy of records
• Using other databases to correct records. We recommend that states attempt to

match registration records with records of other government databases in order to
flag voter registration information that may need to be corrected, supplemented, or
updated. Voters must be notified, of course, before any such change is made, but the
process should help keep the registration database as accurate as possible. All avail-
able reliable databases should be consulted for this purpose, including those of social
service and disability agencies.
Database purges
• Uniform procedures. Most controversial purges or attempts to purge the voter rolls
occur outside of a regular process that citizens can monitor and evaluate. States
should establish uniform, transparent, non-discriminatory, and regular procedures
for purging the voter rolls. The procedures should specify how, and under what con-
ditions, databases will be used in the purge process.
• Accurate match criteria. Most states will attempt to match database information in
order to find, in the database of registered voters, records of citizens who have become
ineligible. Removing a voter from the rolls is in many ways the inverse of placing a
citizen on the rolls, and requires inverse matching criteria. As shown above, in verifi-
cation, a “false negative” (an improper failure to match) could keep an eligible citizen
from voting—and so a flexible protocol should be used to minimize the chance of an
improper failure. In purging, the opposite is true: a “false positive” (an improper
match) could keep her from voting—and so an exacting protocol should be used to
minimize the chance of an improper match. When matching for purposes of purging,
51 Notification should be
states should conclude that a voter may be ineligible only if there is no reasonable
made by a certified, forward-
able letter to her last known doubt that she is the person listed in a record in a database of ineligible persons.
address, along with a postage
pre-paid response card.
52 This recommendation is
• Notice and opportunity for correction. While the match criteria appropriate for
similar to that made by the verification and purging are very different, the appropriate opportunity to correct
Midwestern Legislative errors is identical. In either case, the voter must be notified of any problem that arises
Conference of the Council
of State Governments in its in the matching process,51 and afforded a practical and reasonable opportunity to
August 2002 report, which respond, before the results of an attempted match may be used to impose an addi-
recommended that “[p]roce-
dures governing the purging tional burden or to block access to the polls entirely.52 To ensure that such problems
of duplicate registrations are resolved well in advance of any election, states should not purge voters from the
should include sufficient
notice to affected voters and database within 90 days of an election, unless the voter has become ineligible during
an opportunity to correct that period.
errors in a timely fashion.”

• Use of all relevant sources of information. HAVA directs states to look to agency
records on felony “status” when seeking to determine the eligibility of voters who
have been convicted. This must include not only records of conviction, but also
records pertaining to the restoration of voting rights. States should ensure that any
search for voters rendered ineligible by conviction includes clemency records as well
as, where applicable, records indicating whether citizens have completed their terms
of incarceration, parole, or probation.
• Authorization to remove names. States should develop clear rules to ensure that only
authorized state officials have the ability to remove names from the database and that
these “purges” can be audited and monitored. The database should prevent any one
person, acting alone, from removing names from the list. The purging of any voter
record must be authorized by at least two officials (preferably with different political
affiliations and at different levels of government).
30 Making the List

Methodology
During the summer and fall of 2005, the Brennan Center conducted an extensive phone
survey, successfully contacting elections officials in 46 states and the District of
Columbia. The survey was conducted by research associates, legal interns, paralegals,
and attorneys, closely supervised by staff attorneys. In each case, the surveyors attempt-
ed to contact the individual designated by the state as responsible for determining how
new voter registration applications are or will be processed once the voter registration
database is in use. The title and position of this official varied from state to state; the
appropriate individual was often an election official in the office of the Secretary of State
charged specifically with HAVA implementation. Where it was necessary to speak with
multiple officials in order to determine state practice—for example, when several
statewide officials shared responsibility, or when the state deferred substantial portions
of the registration process to county officials—the surveyors attempted to contact these
individuals as well. In some states, surveyors spoke first with an election official with
general knowledge of registration policy, and then with a second official versed in the
technical aspects of the database and matching process.
Because the status quo was changing so rapidly throughout 2005, the survey questions
reflected anticipated practices for the registration and/or matching process in 2006 in each
state. More specifically, the survey addressed: the process by which information from voter
registration forms is collected and entered into the state’s database; the procedure for address-
ing forms with missing or illegible information; the procedure for matching information
against data in other state records, if matching occurs; the procedure for correcting any
errors in the process; and the consequences, if any, of an attempted match.
The verification and matching process is sufficiently new that practitioners and advocates
have not yet established common, agreed-upon jargon; that is, different officials describe
the same practices using different language. For example, consider a voter for whom the
state cannot find a match, but who may vote a valid provisional ballot upon presentation
of ID at the polls. In one state, an official will describe such a voter as “not registered”; in
another, the voter is “provisionally registered”; in a third, the voter is “registered, but
flagged.” Due to this lack of common language, the Brennan Center employed a flexible
survey instrument. Surveyors used a written guide, but did not follow this guide mechan-
ically; rather, they were instructed to ask appropriate follow-up questions, in order to best
understand the actual practice—and the effect on the voter—in each state. The survey was
designed to be completed in approximately 30 minutes. The surveyors took detailed notes
of each call to memorialize the state’s response.
After reviewing the survey responses and each state’s relevant statutes and regulations,
Brennan Center attorneys then prepared summaries of the pertinent state practices. In most
states, existing statutes and regulations address few of the relevant questions. Survey notes
were therefore used to fill in the interstices; thus, information in this report that does not
reflect existing statute or regulation was derived from the interviews. Occasionally, infor-
mation from the interviews seemed to conflict with existing state law; these inconsistencies

—which may reflect misunderstanding on the part of the interviewer, the interviewee, or
both—were noted in the summaries, but state policy as reflected in statute and regulation
was deemed controlling.
Each relevant summary was then distributed by email to the appropriate respondent, with
a two-week opportunity for the relevant election officials to correct misunderstandings
and to add information on policy decisions made since the surveys were conducted.
Twenty-one of the officials who received these draft descriptions of state policies returned
those descriptions with minor revisions or affirmations of their accuracy. Relevant
modifications were included in the attached summaries, except in the few instances in
which the suggested revision was contradicted by existing state law. Where a state’s stated
practices remained unclear, the Brennan Center attempted in early 2006 to follow up with
particular election officials. Such clarifications were also incorporated in this report.
Since this research was conducted, states may also have substantively changed their policies;
to the extent that such changes are communicated to the Brennan Center, they will not be
reflected in this summary of findings, but will be reflected on an ongoing basis in the indi-
vidual state descriptions collected in the Appendix, available online.
In addition to surveyed facts and legal provisions for each state, the attached summaries
contain the most recent available copy of the relevant pages of each state’s voter registration
form and instructions. The applicable sections have been highlighted. In California,
Delaware, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, and Ohio, a state-based form
was not available online; summaries for those states include the federal voter registration
form and the relevant state instructions. In Wyoming, each county uses a different form;
the form included in the Wyoming summary is only a sample.
32 Making the List

Scope of State Summaries in Appendix
The state-by-state summaries attached to the electronic version of this report and available
at www.brennancenter.org describe states’ standard voter registration practices, from the
time a voter fills out an application form up through the time that she casts a vote in a
general election. The summaries reflect the information obtained by surveying election
officials and the relevant laws and regulations in each state. At times, the information
from these sources appears inconsistent or contradictory. This may reflect the fact that
election officials may have been articulating some of the policies discussed in this report
for the first time. This confusion underscores the need for concerted attention to imple-
menting the voter registration database process and the importance of adopting clear
policies that protect the rights of eligible citizens to vote.
These summaries reflect usual state practice, and may not account for certain special
circumstances. The summaries of states’ identification requirements, in particular, are
tailored to individuals who vote in person in a regular election on Election Day. States
may provide different requirements and procedures for voters who vote by mail, vote
absentee, or vote early. These different procedures are not reflected here. Similarly, this
report does not capture different procedures that may govern special elections or municipal
elections.
This report also does not reflect many of the different means by which a state may
confirm an individual’s voter registration information other than by matching to motor
vehicle or Social Security records. For example, several states compare a voter’s signature
at the polls to the signature submitted on a registration card. Some states also mail a non-
forwardable confirmation card to the address on the voter’s application; if the card is
returned as undeliverable, the application may be rejected. Other states authorize a phys-
ical canvass of applicants’ homes. Such practices are beyond the scope of this report.
Finally, this report does not reflect the means by which a state may remove voters from the
voter registration rolls, or the means by which a state will flag certain voters as “question-
able” or “inactive.” For example, the report does not describe ongoing state database main-
tenance practices, such as purging of voters who have become ineligible or inactive. Nor
does the report address challenge procedures or their aftermath.

Report Glossary
The verification and matching process is sufficiently new that practitioners and advocates
have not yet established common, agreed-upon jargon; that is, different officials describe
the same practices using different language.
To compare apples to apples, this report defines terms consistently across states—even if
a different descriptive word is used by a particular official or within a particular state. This
glossary explains how terms are used within this report:
DMV: the agency in each state responsible for maintaining motor vehicle license records,
which is usually the same agency responsible for issuing state non-driver’s identification
cards.
Identifying number: the driver’s license number, state non-driver’s identification card
number, full Social Security number, or last four digits of the Social Security number, as
appropriate within each state.
SSA: Social Security Administration.
SSN: Social Security number.
SSN-4: last four digits of the Social Security number.
States: includes the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
34 Making the List

Board of Directors & Officers

James E. Johnson, Chair Richard Revesz
Partner Dean
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP NYU School of Law
Nancy Brennan Daniel A. Rezneck
Executive Director Senior Assistant Attorney General
Rose Kennedy Greenway Conservancy Office of the Attorney General
of the Distict of Columbia
Zachary W. Carter
Partner Christina Rodríguez
Dorsey & Whitney LLP Assistant Professor
NYU School of Law
John Ferejohn
Professor Stephen Schulhofer
NYU School of Law & Stanford University Professor
NYU School of Law
Peter M. Fishbein
Special Counsel John Sexton
Kaye Scholer LLP President
New York University
Susan Sachs Goldman
Robert Shrum
Helen Hershkoff
Senior Fellow
Professor
New York University
NYU School of Law
Rev. Walter J. Smith, S.J.
Thomas M. Jorde
President & C.E.O.
Professor Emeritus
The HealthCare Chaplaincy
Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley
Sung-Hee Suh
Jeffrey B. Kindler
Partner
Vice Chairman & General Counsel
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP
Pfizer Inc.
Clyde A. Szuch
Ruth Lazarus
Michael Waldman
Burt Neuborne
Executive Director
Legal Director, Brennan Center
Brennan Center
Professor, NYU School of Law
Adam Winkler
Lawrence B. Pedowitz
Professor
Partner
UCLA School of Law
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
Steven A. Reiss, General Counsel
Partner
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
161 Avenue of the Americas

12th Floor
New York NY 10013
212 998-6730 tel

212 995-4550 fax
www.brennancenter.org
EXHIBIT 2
EXHIBIT 3
From www.dmv.ca.gov
Birth date verification and legal presence requirements
The issue of identification reliability, integrity, and confidentiality is of prime concern to all
citizens. Eligibility for government services, issuance of various licenses, assessment of taxes,
the right to vote, etc., are all determined through evaluations based on identification documents.
It is critical that identification documents be authenticated and accurate in identifying each
individual. The California driver license and ID card have been declared as primary identification
documents in this state by the California legislature.
State law requires every applicant for an original California identification (ID) card and driver
license to show verification of birth date and proof of legal presence within the United States to
help safeguard the accuracy and integrity of departmental documents.
If your current name no longer matches the name on your birth date/legal presence document,
see "True Full Name" and "How to Change Your Name" for more information.
Only the original or a certified copy of one of the following documents is acceptable:
• US Birth Certificate (certified copy from state or local vital statistics office)
• US Certificate of Birth Abroad or Report of Birth Abroad
• Federal Proof of Indian Blood Degree
• USCIS American Indian Card
• Birth Certificate or passport issued from a US Territory
• US Passport or US Passport Card
• US Military Identification Cards (Active or reserve duty, dependent of a military member,
retired member, discharged from service, medical/religious personnel)
• Common Access Card (only if designated as Active military or Active Reserve or Active
Selected Reserve)
• Certificate of Naturalization or Citizenship
• Northern Mariana Card
• USCIS US Citizen ID Card
• Permanent Resident Card
• Temporary Resident Identification Card
• Canadian Passport/Birth Certificate
• Non-resident Alien Canadian Border Crossing Card
• Valid foreign passport with a valid Record of Arrival/Departure (form I-94)
• "Processed for I-551" stamped in a valid foreign passport
• Permanent Resident Re-entry Permit
• Refugee travel document
• Certified court order or judgment issued from a court of competent jurisdiction. Must
contain name, birth date, place of birth, legal presence status, and judge’s signature.
• Certification from California Department of Corrections or California Youth Authority
• Employment Authorization Card
• Valid I-94 stamped "Refugee," "Parole or Parolee," "Asylee," or Section 207, Section
208, Section 209, Section 212d(2), HP or PIP
• Valid I-94 with attached photo stamped "Processed for I-551 temporary evidence of
lawful admission for permanent residence"
• Notice of Action (I-797 Approved Petition) – must indicate approved extension of stay or
change in status that grants temporary or permanent residency, or indicates that an original,
duplicate or renewal Resident Alien card is forthcoming.
• Immigration judge’s order granting asylum
• Mexican Border Crossing Card with valid I-94
• U.S. Border Crossing Identification card with valid I-94

How to apply for a driver license if you are over 18
If you are a visitor in California over 18 and have a valid driver license from your home state or country, you
may drive in this state without getting a California driver license as long as your home state license remains
valid.
If you become a California resident, you must get a California driver license within 10 days. Residency is
established by voting in a California election, paying resident tuition, filing for a homeowner’s property tax
exemption, or any other privilege or benefit not ordinarily extended to nonresidents.
To apply for an original driver license if you are over 18, you will need to do the following:
• Visit a DMV office (make an Appointment(s) for faster service)

• Complete application form DL 44 (An original DL 44 form must be submitted. Copies will not be
accepted.)
• Give a thumb print
• Have your picture taken
• Provide your social security number. It will be verified with the Social Security Administration while you
are in the office.
• Verify your birth date and legal presence If your current name no longer matches the name on your birth
data/legal presence document, see “True Full Name” and “How to Change Your Name” for more information.
• Provide your true full name
• Pay the application fee
• Pass a vision exam
• Pass a traffic laws and sign test. There are 36 questions on the test. You have three chances to
pass.(Sample Test)

EXHIBIT 4
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EXHIBIT 5

EXHIBIT 6
DEBRA BOWEN I SECRETARY OF STATE
STATE OF CALIFORN IA I ELECTIONS
1500 nth Street, sth Floor I Sacramento, CA 9s814 ITel (916) 657~2166 1 Fax (916) 653-32141 vvww.sos.ca.gov
November 3, 2009
County Clerk/Registrar of Voters (CC/ROV) Memorandum #09173
TO: All County Clerks/Registrars of Voters
FROM: ~
Cathy Mitchell
Chief of Elections
RE: Voter Registration: Use of National Mail Voter Registration Form
After posting a program on the Secretary of State's website that allows voters to
more easily fill out the National Mail Voter Registration Form (National Form), two
questions have arisen .
The first is why the National Form, not the state voter registration form, is posted
on the Secretary of State's website.
The second is whether county elections officials need to obtain a registrant's U.S.
state or foreign country of birth before officially registering to vote anyone who
used the National Form to register.
Using The National Form, Not The State Voter Registration Form
Current state law and regulations specify how a state voter registration form must
be constructed , Specifically, Elections Code section 2157 requires the state
voter registration form to :
a Be included on one part of a multipart card that is perforated

o Contain a serial number
o Use multiple type sizes and colors of ink
o Have its return postage pre-paid by the Secretary of State
Furthermore, Title 2, California Code of Regulations, section 19056, requ ires the
state voter registration form to be 5" x 8" x ,007, "
These requi rements effectively preclude a state or local elections official from
accepting a state voter registration form printed from a website, This is why the
Secretary of State does not make the state form available on the Internet and
discourages others from making it available on the Internet.
Prior to 2009, the Secretary of State's website did allow a person to fill out a state
voter registration form online and have it mailed to them so the person could sign
and return it. That program was discontinued for three reasons :
1. It cost approximately $1.64 per form .

2. Many people did not return the form because they mistakenly believed
they had registered to vote online and therefore did not need to sign and
return the voter registration form .
3. Many people requested the forms too close to the E-15 registration
deadline and could not return them by the deadline.
Accepting the National Form: Elections Officials Do Not Need to Determine

Registrant's Country or State of Birth
Under California law, when a person submits a state voter registration form , he or
she is required to provide either their state of birth (if born in the U.S.) or country
of birth (if born outside of the U.S.).
This requirement can be found in two places:
Elections Code section 2150 (a)(6) , which states in part:
(a) The affidavit of registration shall show:
(6) The state or country of the affiant's birth .
Elections Code section 2157 , which states in part:
(a) Subject to this chapter, the affidavit of registration shall be in a form

prescribed by regulations adopted by the Secretary of State. The affidavit
shall:
(1) Contain the information prescribed in Section 2150.
However, the requirement that a person provide this information to register to

vote only applies to someone registering to vote using the state voter registration
form that is developed pursuant to state law and regulation. State law does not
require a person using the National Form to provide any additional information
beyond what is contained on the National Form in order to register.
This is clarified in Elections Code 2162, which reads in part:
(a) No affidavits of registration other than those provided by the Secretary

of State to the county elections officials or the national voter registration
forms authorized pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act (42
U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg) shall be used for the registration of voters.
The requirement that state and local elections officials accept the National Form
from any person applying to register to vote can be found in the National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA) , 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-4 (a), which reads in part:
(1) Each State shall accept and use the mail voter registration application
form prescribed by the Federal Election Commission pursuant to section
1973gg-7(a)(2) of this title for the registration of voters in elections for
Federal office.
(2) In addition to accepting and using the fonm described in paragraph (1),
a State may develop and use a mail voter registration form that meets all
of the criteria stated in section 1973gg-7(b) of th is title for the registration
of voters in elections for Federal office.
So, while (2) permits states to develop their own voter registration forms , (1)
requires states to (unless they have been exempted under the NVRA) accept as
comp lete a voter registration application submitted by a person using the
National Form.
If you have any questions, please contact me at Cathy.Mitchell@sos.ca.gov or

Robbie Anderson at Robbie.Anderson@sos.ca.gov or via telephone at
(916) 653-7635.

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Breaking - California Does Not Verify Citizenship of Voter Applicants

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Pamela Barnett, Pro se Plaintiff

1215 22" St., Apt. B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DAMON JERRELL DUNN, et al.,

JUDICIAL NOTICE PENDING THE COURT'S DECISION IN RE:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST THAT

I, Pamela Bamett, declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s1746:

1. Declarant 1 Plaintiff in esse is pro se herein without being an attorney. Based on

SOS ADMITS AGAINST INTEREST THAT THEY AND THE COUNTY

2. After researching the California Secretary of State's procedures for verifying

3 and Verification Processes for Voter Registration, (California) report published in

5 justice conducted a study of voter registration database implementation under the

8 conclusion with a Secretary of State Office employee Cathy Ingraham Kelley.

12 “rebuttable presumption.” After spending hundreds of millions of federal (USDOJ

16 California Drivers/Identification and/or Social Security records databases was

20 information or place of birth.

26 giving that address, name, or party.

20 the measure of compliance by registration is the compelling state interest as if an

5 SOS office states the following:

25 questionnaire, a monetary award was to be given if it was accurately returned.

27 that they had to honestly answer and return.

8 house - and 54 of those people voted."

voter fraud and she needed a file copy.

case demands an immediate hearing on the merits as a statewide election is

., sacramento, CA, 95816 i

BARNETT V. DUNN ei aL Civil CASE: 10-cv-02216-FCD-DAD

THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST THAT

Yoshinori H. T. Himel Anthony Paul O'Brien

I do declare and certify under penalty of perjury:

Dated: May ,201 1

Database Implementation Status

California currently maintains a bottom-up registration system: forms processed at the

Entering Voter Registration Information

What happens to voter registration forms submitted at state registration agencies?

Voter Registration Form

Processing of Forms Without Identifying Numbers

Making the List CA - 1

Matching Against Motor Vehicle and Social Security Records

How much human intervention is involved in determining whether information is

Notice and Opportunity to Resolve Errors

Brennan Center for Justice CA - 2

If information on an otherwise timely application is corrected after the voter registration

Identification Requirements at the Polls

Who must provide identification at the Forms of ID:

What forms of identification are

Statutes and Regulations

Making the List CA - 3

Making the List CA - 5

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Making the List:

Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser,

VOTING RIGHTS &

About the Brennan Center

161 Avenue of the Americas

Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser,

VOTING RIGHTS &

About the Authors

The new databases 1

Four key categories of state policy 7

Recommendations for match criteria 23

Scope of State Summaries in Appendix 33

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