Front. Philos.

China 2009, 4(3): 417–436

DOI 10.1007/s11466-009-0027-0

RESEARCH ARTICLE

PAN Derong

Reader and text in the horizon of understanding

methodology: Gadamer and methodological
hermeneutics

© Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2009

Abstract Judging Gadamer’s theoretical stance is a complicated matter, and his

ontological hermeneutics is usually regarded as a text-centered theory of
understanding. Through an analysis of the phenomenological premises from
which his theories take off, however, we can clearly see his reader-centric stance.
On the basis of this stance some cease to seek for the original intention of the
author or the original meaning of the text, which ineluctably leads to the
ignorance of an understanding methodology. As far as people’s intentional
understanding is concerned, however, the important as well as essential task is
still that of striving for a certain kind of understanding that is relatively correct,
with universally effective methodology as its necessary prerequisite. What is
more, herein lies the significance of the epistemology of hermeneutics. This
article aims to re-insert a sense of methodology after hermeneutics went through
a period of ontological reflection, and hence clarify that it is of necessity that
hermeneutics resumes its text-centric methodological stance.

Keywords Gadamer, Methodology Hermeneutics, understanding, text

摘要 判定加达默尔的理论立场是一个复杂的问题。他的本体论诠释学一般被视为
一种文本中心论的理解理论，然而通过对他所从出发的现象学前提之分析，可以清
楚地看出他的读者中心论的立场。正是基于这一立场，放弃了对作者原意或文本原
义之诉求，必然导致对理解方法论的漠视。但是，就人们有意识的理解活动而言，
首要的以及根本的任务仍然是努力获得某种相对正确的理解，而普遍有效的方法论
就是其必要的前提，诠释学的认识论意义便在于此。在诠释学经历了本体论的反思
后，应重新注入一种方法论的意识，回到以文本为中心的方法论立场。
Translated by Zhang Lin from Zhongguo shehui kexue 中国社会科学 (Social Sciences in
China), 2008, (2): 42–53
PAN Derong ( )
Department of Philosophy, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200241, China
E-mail: drpan@philo.ecnu.edu.cn
418 PAN Derong

关键词 加达默尔，方法论诠释学，理解，文本

1 Introduction

With its novel ontological and interpretative ideas, ontological hermeneutics

fiercely attacked the traditional conception of every discipline of the human
sciences, promoting the transformation from mono-rationality to multi-rationality,
from traditional ontology to existential ontology, and from modernity to
post-modernity; it thus drowned out the voice of methodological hermeneutics.
The condition of Chinese hermeneutic studies can be said to be the echo of this
trend. This condition manifests itself in the obvious fact that while we have
hitherto translated, not inadequately, the works of Heidegger and Gadamer, little
interest has ever been shown towards such classic works of methodological
hermeneutics as Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutik und Kritik (Hermeneutics and
Critique), Dilthey’s Der Auf bau der geschichtlichen Welt in den
Geisteswissenschaf ten (The Construction of the Historical World in Human
science), and Betti’s Allegemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der
Geisteswissenschaften (General Interpretative Theory as the Methodology of
Human science), and their Chinese versions have yet to be seen. 1 As for
hermeneutics itself, however, methodology is still an integral part of it. This
means that hermeneutics was originally created and developed as a methodology
for human sciences; even Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics has
methodological significance. This article intends to analyze Gadamer’s
hermeneutics from the perspective of methodology, aiming to elucidate the
necessity for hermeneutics to resume its methodological stance with text as its
center.

2 The “misunderstood” Gadamer

It must be pointed out first that it is Gadamer who “misunderstood” himself: “I

use this terminology of Hermeneutics, which has an ancient tradition, and some
misunderstandings have thus arisen. A ‘technology’ of understanding akin to
ancient hermeneutics is not at all my purpose. Nor have I ever thought of
concocting a set of systematic rules to describe or guide the methodological
procedures of human science” (Gadamer 1986g, bd. 2, s. 438). As he writes in

1
As a matter of fact, in Western countries, notably Germany, ontological Hermeneutics by no
means enjoys overwhelming superiority. On the contrary, Hermeneutics in the methodological
tradition is still assigned considerable importance.
Reader and text in the horizon of understanding methodology 419

another article, “Obviously it will be a kind of misunderstanding when some

criticize slogans like Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method), conceiving that
the methodological rigor of modern science has been ignored here” (Gadamer
1986a, s. 449). Gadamer responds to criticisms from Betti, F. Wieacker etc. by
means of self-justification.2 Nonetheless, people refused to accept Gadamer’s
explanation: Ricoeur and Turk have targeted Truth and Method for criticism,
contending that Gadamer stands for the opposition between truth and method and
that he abandoned method in favor of truth (Turk 1982). On account of this,
Ricoeur contended that it would be more suitable to change Truth and Method
into Truth or Method (Ricoeur 1986), while Bubner preferred “truth and
non-method” (Wahrheit und nicht Methode) (Nassen 1982, s. 302). Hirsch wrote
an article entitled Gadamer’s Theories of Interpretation to criticize Gadamer,
believing that in the philosopher’s view, “no methodology used to interpret text
exists in that interpretation is, in essence, fundamentally a course of study with
objective as well as stable cognitive aims.” According to Hirsch, nevertheless,
“When we raise this innocent question; namely, where the correct interpretation
lies, the persuasive proof of the difficult points and ambivalences Gadamer’s
theories concern are abandoned” (Hirsch 1991, pp. 283, 292).
The reason why Gadamer’s theories are so generally “misunderstood” might
not be as simple as what Gadamer himself said, namely, that he was
misunderstood due to his use of the terminology of “Hermeneutics”, or his
decision to title his book Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method). The deepest
reason is related to the characteristics of Gadamer’s hermeneutics itself.
Gadamer repeatedly declares that his hermeneutics is a species of ontological
theory, and that he does not intend to construct a set of methodological
understanding procedures to guide the investigations of human science; he
converts understanding theories about objects into those about the reader’s
self-understanding so as to demonstrate the productive and existential
characteristics of human spiritual phenomena. Detailed textual research indicates
that for Gadamer, the process of understanding has two constructive perspectives,
the first of which is the construction of the subject of understanding. As Gadamer
points out, “Heidegger deepened the concept of understanding to the level of
ontology, making it a basic formulation of a category of human Dasein which, to
me, is of particular importance” (Gadamer 1986e, s. 331). This means that in lieu
of being considered as a subjective way of acting directed towards the object of
understanding, “understanding” should be the “existential way of Dasein itself.”3

2
See Gadamer’s “Vorwort zur 2. Auflage” (1965) (preface to the second edition). In: Wahrheit
und Methode. This point was reiterated later in the postscript of the book’s third edition (1972).
3
Gadamer, “Vorwort zur 2. Auflage” (1965). In: Wahrheit und Methode, Bd.2. Tübingen:
J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
420 PAN Derong

In other words, Dasein is constructed in understanding, and with understanding

Dasein further expands. In this sense, human being as the subject takes
understanding as his essence, viz. the subject is what is presented in the
subjective action of understanding, and the construction of the object of
understanding is only secondary. In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, the text as the
object of understanding should by no means be regarded as the syntactical or
linguistic product. This is to say that text is not an end-product (Endprodukt);
rather, it is merely an intermediate-product (Zwischenprodukt), a phase in the
event of understanding (Gadamer 1986e, s. 341). It is by virtue of understanding
and interpretation that text becomes real, whereas its meaning is formed in its
correlation with understanding.
These double constructions are combined into one during the process of
understanding. Essentially, understanding not only is the being of the
Being-in-the-world of Dasein itself, but also transforms text from the object of
cognition into that of understanding, becoming the medium of the
self-construction and self-validation of Dasein. Hence the narration of the text is
regarded as being addressed to “me”, and its meaning as being intended for “me”,
i.e. meaning understood by reader, or else the meaning of the authenticity of
being of Dasein. It is in this sense that Gadamer claims that his hermeneutics has
moved beyond the dualism of the subject vs. the object. It is here we can see the
starting point from which Gadamer sets out to ultimately surpass Husserl’s
phenomenological principle: “…each originally given intuition is a legitimate
source of cognition. What is originally (i.e., can be said to really be within its
organism) given to us in intuition should be understood only as it is given and,
what is more, understood only within the limitations of its being given here. It
should be noted that each theory can only adduce the truth from what is
originally given” (Husserl 1995, p. 84). It is called by Husserl “the principle of
all principles”. The “originally given” is the consciousness of the object obtained
via eidetic intuition. The purpose of reflection is to grasp what is experienced and
what is “sensed” (Husserl 1994, p. 168). Rather than the object itself, as opposed
to the subject, what is “sensed” when people encounter objects — what appears
in our consciousness — is what lays the foundation for Gadamer’s hermeneutics.
Needless to say, phenomenology, called by Husserl the real and correct “first
philosophy”, is still a kind of epistemology in its spirit. Husserl endows what is
directly given (i.e. what is constructed in consciousness) with the status of
absolute “pure evidence”, contending that things essentially manifest themselves
in the way they are constructed. The fundamental goal of what he tries to set up,
namely “metaphysical science”, is to disclose the essence of cognition and the
cognition of essence. What is disclosed is “truth that can demonstrably stand any
test whatsoever” (Husserl 2006, pp. 32–33). Husserl and Gadamer also differ
from one another in that Husserl refuses to accept any axiom belonging to natural
Reader and text in the horizon of understanding methodology 421

science, however “completely evident” it is, yet sticks to the faith of positivism,
attesting to the scientific-ness of his theory with the “repeatability” and
“demonstrability” (Husserl 1994, pp. 183–184) of psychological experience
(Husserl 1994, p. 134, pp. 198–205). Nevertheless, in Gadamer’s theory of
understanding, what is constructed in consciousness is not a cognitive object any
more, but rather signifies the existential state of the man who understands
himself. On account of this, the following claim by Gadamer sounds logical:
“When we understand something generally, we are always doing so in different
ways. That is enough” (Gadamer 1990, Bd. 1, s. 302).We may as well regard this
demonstration as the demarcation line between the objective of ontological
hermeneutics and the objective of traditional epistemology. Taking “objective
truth” as its goal, epistemology holds that correct cognition is the authentic
reflection and “copy” of the object; it reflects the object of cognition as it is.
While it cannot be said for sure that some thought has grasped the object
correctly, people are able to make a judgment as to the superiority and inferiority
of different knowledge claims in terms of “verisimilitude”. Gadamer advocates
the constructiveness of understanding, holding that what understanding illustrates
is the existential state of Dasein; hence any understanding, as far as it is an
expansion of Dasein, possesses existential rationality and legitimacy without
drawing any distinction between completeness and incompleteness, correctness
and incorrectness.
If we follow Gadamer’s thought, there is indeed no need to probe into the
methodology of understanding. In fact, once methodological conceptions are
introduced, hermeneutic investigations will surely return to where they started
from, that is, how to comprehend text correctly. On this account, Gadamer
demonstrates his viewpoint clearly: “People will really be short-sighted when
they confine the task of interpreting text to the bias of modern scientific theories
and scientific standards. The task of the interpreter is in effect always more than
simply making a thorough investigation as to the logical-technical meaning of
any discourse because in so doing, the truth of the discourse would go totally
ignored” (Gadamer 1986b, s. 285). He also points out that “Method (Methodos)
is the ‘road to follow.’ As what will always be followed by people when they are
walking, method indicates the operating procedure of science. Nonetheless, what
will appear as being demanded by truth will surely be confined herein” (Gadamer
1986c, s. 49).
Admittedly, with regard to the “self-appearing” “truth” to which Gadamer
adheres, methodology hinders its realization rather than helps it, playing an
almost negative role. This is also why so many scholars contest that Gadamer is
against methodology. Why, then, does Gadamer nevertheless claim that he has
been misunderstood? Further taking into consideration his claim, we will sense
the deep-seated implications so conveyed, once again bringing all the
422 PAN Derong

hermeneutic problems originally thought to have been solved by Gadamer to the

fore, where the issue of understanding Gadamer’s theory itself is included.
Gadamer clearly observes that since its publication, his Truth and Method has
encountered fierce criticisms in philosophical circles. The excellent system of
methodological hermeneutics advocated by Betti, in particular, forced him to
again confront the challenge of hermeneutic methodology, and even to a certain
extent forced him to yield. For this reason, in his preface to the second edition of
Truth and Method in 1965, Gadamer stated that he did not “aim” to set up a
“technology” of understanding, implying that he did not deny hermeneutics as a
methodology. Nonetheless, if we read in detail the “Introduction” to Truth and
Method before looking back upon what is mentioned above, we would get the
same impression as Turk — that method is the most valueless thing (Turk 1982).
As far as theoretical investigation is concerned, it is far from enough to simply
point out the inconsistency in the aforementioned explanation by Gadamer. In my
view, this inconsistent expression happens to reflect the profound conflict
inherent in Gadamer’s theory; namely, the ambivalence between his alleged idea
(that of discarding understanding methodology) and the idea rooted deeply in his
thought (that of pursuing the “objective meaning” in understanding). As to the
understanding of what Gadamer himself contends, there is no material
disagreement between his supporters and opponents. The question is: To what
degree can we conclude that Gadamer has deviated from his argument in favor of
“the pursuit of objective meaning”? A conclusion is implied in Gadamer’s
argument when he says that his theory has been “misunderstood;” namely, he
admits that there is something that can be called the author’s “original intention,”
and that there is “correct understanding” as well as “misunderstanding” as to the
objects understood. To argue for his being misunderstood indicates that Gadamer
shares with other thinkers a common aspiration: that his theory can be
“correctly” understood and accepted. From the point of view of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics, however, the original intention of the author as such is of little
consequence in the milieu of understanding the works. As Gadamer once said,
“Obviously, the self-justifications of artists are nothing but problematic”
(Gadamer 1986e, s. 104). This observation, of course, suits him as a philosopher.
According to him, the meaning of a work is fundamentally the expansion of what
“is narrated” by the work in the reader’s horizon as well as in the direction of
meaning anticipated by him, i.e. the result from the fusion of horizons. It is in
this point that our interpretation of Gadamer’s works, while different from his
theme as has been claimed, is still reasonable, and that we can find the kind of
internal contradiction unnoticed, in all probability, by Gadamer himself.
We have noticed that while Gadamer intends to discard (or, in his argument,
does not try to construct) methodology in theories of understanding, his
hermeneutical system itself has methodological significance. Specifically, his
Reader and text in the horizon of understanding methodology 423

important elucidations as to concepts like “spacetime” and “effective-history” are

in effect those about his methodological ideas. As he writes, “Spacetime can
usually settle the truly critical issues of hermeneutics; that is, distinguish in
understanding between true predictions (die wahre Vorurteile) and false ones (die
falsche Vorturteile) that mislead us” (Gadamer 1990, Bd. 1, s. 304). He contends
that people are unable to make judgments before spacetime gives a determinant
yardstick, and that it is only when the relationships between the events narrated
in the work and the time wherein readers live totally cease can people reach
generally efficacious understanding of the events, with the “real” meaning of the
work therefore being understood. For that matter, spacetime has the
methodological function of filtering out “false predictions” as well as that of
realizing the work’s real meaning.
In Gadamer’s view, rather than referring to the absolute space between the text
and reader, spacetime directs into what is produced in the process of time, i.e. a
new “source of understanding” that includes various views on the events
understood. Due to the appearance of these views, the reader can gain the ability
to differentiate true and false predictions via comparison. For this reason,
spacetime itself happens to demonstrate the consistency, that is, historicity, of the
events understood, and hence Gadamer derives the famous “principle of
effective-historical consciousness.” History therefore is not considered as the
aggregation of isolated historical events but as the collection of relics that are
handed down by dint of narration and re-narration, and all the new factors
produced in spacetime influence and change these historical relics. Relics
themselves represent a past horizon in which the relics were formed, whereas
what the reader possesses is the horizon of time in which he lives. Understanding
is the fusion of the two horizons through which the reader obtains a broader one,
or in other words is elevated to a horizon with greater generality. Gadamer’s
concept of the “fusion of horizons” is often used to demonstrate the rationality of
understanding ontology, and is applied to demonstrate the being-constructiveness
of history in understanding and in the generation of Dasein. It nevertheless has
methodological significance. As Gadamer says, “Having obtained a horizon, we
learn to observe beyond what is close at hand. Nonetheless, by so doing, we are
not inclined to evade meeting with such things, but to make a better observation
of them according to a more correct criterion, in a bigger whole” (Ibid., bd. 1, s.
310).
Any argument for a certain kind of methodology is based on the idea that the
methodology can grasp objects “better” and “more correctly” than alternatives;
any argument for a certain kind of ontology must include proof of its rationality
and superiority. The demonstration process is one in which the reader applies
some method to the demonstration, intentionally or unintentionally. In the
aforementioned analysis, where Gadamer’s theory was understood from a
424 PAN Derong

methodological perspective, we did not purposefully select cases. As is known to

all, in the “hermeneutic cycle” to which great importance is attached by Gadamer
and Heidegger, methodological significance in fact outweighs its ontological
counterpart. Hence it is self-evident that methodological significance also exists
in ontological hermeneutics which, in the praxis of interpretation, and notably
when it is applied to literal criticism, is really regarded as a new methodology
(Palmer 1988). When Gadamer’s theory is summarized from the perspective of
methodology, it is a reader-centric frame of reference.
Because people understand Gadamer’s hermeneutics methodologically as well
as ontologically, they reproach him, believing that his theory has led to a
relativism of understanding. Have we misunderstood Gadamer, or has he
misunderstood himself? At this point, this is not an important question. By means
of the above analysis, we intend to show that methodology is still an
indispensable element, even in the theory where Gadamer advocates discarding
understanding methodology. Hence I would rather take the inconsistency in the
enunciation of Gadamer as an expression of the conflict between ontology and
methodology within the hermeneutic sphere in his own thought, and to illuminate,
by virtue of disclosing this conflict, the necessity for hermeneutics to return
again to the methodological level after the ontological transformation advocated
by Heidegger and Gadamer. It is a misunderstanding of hermeneutics to hold that
methodological hermeneutics is an outdated tradition without vitality; that it has
been surpassed and renounced by its ontological counterpart, and is thus only
valuable in the field of history of thought.

3 Reader-centrism: Another kind of understanding of

Gadamer

It has been a complicated issue to make a proper judgment as to Gadamer’s

theoretical stance. As he says, “What we have really experienced and expect to
obtain in an artistic work is in effect the actuality of it, to wit, in what way we
can better understand and re-understand things and ourselves” (Gadamer 1990,
Bd. 1, s. 119). Jauss hereby considers Gadamer’s idea of understanding to be “the
conception of ‘imitation’ of ‘understanding’” (Jauss and Houlb 1987, p. 39).
When mentioning Gadamer’s argument as it concerns “historical relics,” Jauss
says that “It is the rejuvenation of materialism in his [Gadamer’s] elucidation of
history” (Jauss 1987, p. 81). According to Jauss, Gadamer’s viewpoint — namely
that “relics” (i.e. text, artistic works, etc.) themselves present questions on the
basis of which we can put understanding and interpretation into action — is still
Reader and text in the horizon of understanding methodology 425

characterized by “materialism” (Ibid., p. 82).4 On the other hand, Gadamer has

also once pointed out that “only starting from the concept of interpretation can
the concept of text be established as the core of linguistic structure; this
demonstrates that the concept of text will not manifest itself as the given
(Gegebene) and the to-be-understood (zu Verstehende) unless it correlates with
interpretation and thereby starts off” (Gadamer 1986e, s. 359). He stresses that
“Only starting from the ontology of artistic words — rather than from the
aesthetic experiences appearing in the process of comprehension — can the
artistic quality of literature be grasped” (Gadamer 1990, bd. 1, s. 166).
The above quotations indicate that Gadamer takes text (i.e. historical relics) as
“noumenon” on the basis of which the questions presented by the text become
the starting point of understanding. On this account, people further understand
the text via these questions before finally grasp its meaning. The following
conclusion can thus be reached: Gadamer conceives that text is “noumenon,” as
well as the starting point, and the object of understanding; hence his
hermeneutics is “text-centric”. While text — rather than aesthetic experience —
is regarded as the noumenon and the core of the act of interpretation, his
philosophy has the quality of “materialism”. On this point, some objective
demand regarding cognition is implied in Gadamer’s hermeneutics: That is, to
understand the text accurately, so as to better understand the text and ourselves.
Is such a corollary problematic? It surely is. Whether it is Jauss’ refutation of
Gadamer from the stance of reader-centrism, or the conclusion drawn in
accordance with Gadamer’s argument, a critical issue goes ignored: Namely, the
phenomenological premise of Gadamer’s theory. For Gadamer, the object of
understanding is not something existing in some objective sense, but is what has
been constructed and hence thought by us in consciousness. In this sense, the
“text” as the object of understanding is nothing different than the phenomenon of
consciousness as presented in the consciousness of the reader. Only starting from
this premise can the particular qualities of Gadamer’s theory be understood.
What will first be explained is Gadamer’s conception of “text”. If, as usual, we
consider “text” as the object of understanding that corresponds to the subject, and
that text exists before the subjective act of understanding, the conclusions of
“text-centrism” and “epistemology” can actually be deduced from Gadamer’s
aforementioned remarks. In Gadamer’s theory, however, the conception of “text”
happens to be presented in a sense different from the general one: in the first
instance, “Text is a stage during the process of understanding events rather than
an object that is given” (Gadamer 1986e, s. 345). This is to say that text does not

4
According to Jauss, the dialectic movement of question and answer is motivated, more often
than not, by people’s actual interests rather than by questions raised by tradition. Jauss
apparently criticizes the “materialism” stance of Gadamer from a subjective point of view.
426 PAN Derong

exist independently of the reader’s reading. In other words, it is constructed

during the act of being comprehended and is comprehended by being constructed.
Hence, in the second instance, the meaning of text is not pre-given but instead
created during interpretation. The meaning of the text exists in the consciousness
of the reader. Gadamer follows the path initiated by Heidegger in his early
Heidelberg period: He agrees with Derrida’s viewpoints, holding that the later
Heidegger did not abandon metaphysical logos-centrism (Logozentrismus). That
is, when pursuing the essence or the significance of the existence of truth,
Heidegger still spoke in a kind of metaphysical language, holding that meaning is
at-hand and detectable (Ibid., s. 333). In the third instance, he writes that “all
understandings are self-understandings (Sichverstehen)… whoever understands,
he projects himself according to his own possibilities” (Gadamer 1990, bd. 1, s.
265). Thus, “The understanding that Dasein carries on in its existence and in the
world is by no means the dealing with some cognitive object, but the dealing
with its Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) itself” (Gadamer 1986e, s. 331).
By way of this, we can clearly see the basis from which Gadamer starts his
theory, as well as its end result: that is, we can understand the text from the
stance of reader-centrism, regarding the understanding of text as the
self-understanding of Dasein and its real Being-in-the-world.
Gadamer’s theories of “dialogue” and the “fusion of horizons” are often
considered as proof that he transcended the theory of subject-object dualism.
“Dialogue” is a common phenomenon in daily life; it happens between subjects
engaged in dialogues. In a dialogue, “my” expression is by no means a
monologue but rather the understanding and reply to “your” words, and vice
versa. Hence Gadamer especially stresses “listening”, in that the possibility of an
active dialogue results from listening to one another. Since the two parties of a
dialogue are guided by the other’s words, and find expression in a kind of
dialogue-logic that develops by way of question-and-answer, a dialogue is thus
considered “objective” because the progression and end of it has gone beyond the
subjective inclination of any one party (Gadamer 1990, bd. 1, ss. 373–374). It is
also considered true in that what is demonstrated here are the real events in the
consciousness of the interlocutors. A “fusion of horizons” follows. Each party
has his own particular horizon and understanding via the other, and mutual
understanding is obtained by dint of mutual listening, hence the “fusion” of
different horizons.
If this is the end of our analysis, Gadamer would by no means be categorized
as a “reader-centrist”. Once we probe into the progression of understanding
following Gadamer’s description, once we consider his theory from the
perspective of the “applicability” (practicality) of understanding he creates, an
unexpected conclusion will be reached. Gadamer states that “What is implied in
hermeneutic phenomena is itself the primal trait of dialogues and the structure of
Reader and text in the horizon of understanding methodology 427

questions and answers” (Gadamer 1990, bd. 1. s. 375). In so saying, he shifts

smoothly from “dialogue” to an analysis of the comprehension of “text”. The
question here is whether “you”, who are engaged in a dialogue with “me”, can be
equal to the “text” that the reader intends to comprehend. After all, the “text” that
has been widely expanded upon in Gadamer’s theory includes all objects, be they
linguistic or non-linguistic, including drawings, historical relics, and literary
works, to name just a few. In the course of real dialogues between “you” and
“me”, we are open to each other, and make adjustments on account of the other
party’s questions or answers so as to give answers or present further questions.
Nevertheless, some text in comprehension is itself, as a rule, established as well
as finished. Even when we comprehend some fragmentary text that is structurally
unfinished, we always treat it as a given whole that is to be understood. In this
sense, the narration of the text is “monologue” and will narrate or question
closely nothing beyond what has been given. If a reader repeatedly reads a text,
the text will become stubborn and continue to reiterate itself.
Seen in this light, it looks like that it is impossible to engage in a dialogue with
text. Gadamer nevertheless managed to construct such a theory of dialogue with
the following premises: understanding is made ontological, the comprehension of
text is converted to the meaning it shows to the reader, and “your” (the text’s)
narration is transformed into that which is comprehended by “me” (the reader),
and then into that which constitutes the reading subject himself. Gadamer points
out, correctly, that the text is the author’s answer to some question, thus what
should be understood first is the question with which the author is concerned and
which he intends to answer. The text will not be comprehended until that
question, with the text as its answer, is determined (Gadamer 1990, ss. 374–375).
In part of Gadamer’s thinking, the question is therefore prior to narration
(Gadamer 1986c, s. 55). The difficulty lies in that the text, more often than not,
fails to reveal the question to which it will offer an answer. Such a question is
usually re-constructed by the reader through reading the text and consulting other
literatures and historical background. It is by way of analyzing the
“re-construction” of the question that the text-centrism implied in Gadamer’s
hermeneutic system is demonstrated. Since the reader cannot but reconstruct in
his own horizon the “question” to which the author will offer an answer when
writing the text, the reconstructed question “becomes the one presented by us”
(Gadamer 1990, bd. 1, s. 380). What is confronted by the author is, as a matter of
fact, sensed by us when we reflect upon the practical context in which we place
ourselves. The text in this way becomes the answer to the question that we
presented; or, more exactly, we try to find out in the text the answer to the
question presented by us. Only on this account can the ambivalence and the
productivity of textual meaning be reasonably demonstrated. Let us put in order
Gadamer’s line of reasoning: The starting point of understanding is the reader’s
428 PAN Derong

“preconceptions” based upon which the question of the text is reconstructed. By

virtue of this reconstruction, the direction (anticipation of meaning) of textual
meaning is stipulated before people’s comprehension of the text is, eventually,
defined as “self-understanding” — it is also the definition of the existence of
Dasein itself, in that what is constructed in understanding is as real as the
constructor himself (Gadamer 1986c, s. 55). All this starts with the stance of the
“reader”. For Gadamer, the process of understanding begins from the
preconceptions of the reader (the understanding subject) and ends up with the
reader’s self-understanding. Gadamer’s famous theory of the “fusion of
horizons” is in the same vein. While the fusion of horizons is demonstrated to be
the fusion between the horizon of the author (history, tradition) and the horizon
of the reader (presence), Gadamer in effect refuses to acknowledge the
“historical horizon” and the “present horizon”, which exist independently from
each other. According to him, the historical horizon is nothing but what is
constructed in the understanding progress of the reader, being treated by the
reader as different from his own horizon. When the historical horizon is
constructed, it is infused into the reader’s present horizon. What really exists,
therefore, is only this one horizon that “is always in motion” (Gadamer 1990, bd.
1, ss. 309–311).
In our view, this is enough to indicate that the basic idea implied in Gadamer’s
theory is essentially a reader-centric idea. As he says, the stance of hermeneutics
“is the stance of every reader” (Gadamer 1986e, s. 341). We now turn to Jauss’
criticism of Gadamer. He argues that Gadamer has a materialist tendency when
he talks about historical interpretation, that “the artistic conception of classicism
to which Gadamer rigidly adheres” is just an “imitation” in the epistemological
sense, and hence unable to “lay a general foundation for reception aesthetics.”
Moreover, he argues that Gadamer’s acceptance of Plato’s schemata means that
he still believes in some eternal truth. Jauss himself stresses that the reader
“actively participate in the construction of consciousness,” that is, he stresses the
“creative function” of understanding (Jauss 1987, pp. 39, 81). Nonetheless, in our
view, all these criticisms stem from a misunderstanding of Gadamer’s theory,5
since Jauss ignored the theoretical basis from which Gadamer’s ontological
hermeneutics originates, to wit, phenomenology. As stated above, the “tradition”,
“text”, etc. mentioned by Gadamer are by no means those objects of cognition
that exist prior to the activity of understanding. On the contrary, they appear and
are sensed in the consciousness of the reader. In addition, they are constructed in
the process of understanding and are reconstructed continuously, along with the
deepening of understanding. Reconstruction is not a method of understanding

5
Gadamer has also once pointed out some of Jauss’ misunderstandings of him. See Gadamer
1986f, s. 223 (footnote 3).
Reader and text in the horizon of understanding methodology 429

through which the reader exposes the meaning of a text; it is an activity of

creation. Essentially “All comprehensive readings are a kind of recreation and
interpretation” (Gadamer 1990, Bd. 1, s. 165); it signifies the existential state of
Dasein. It is in this sense that Gadamer claims: “Fantasy (Phantasie) is the
decisive task for scholars” (Gadamer 1986f, s. 227).
Although Jauss criticizes Gadamer vehemently, he shares with Gadamer
certain fundamental views. As Jauss said, “I try to set up a possible history of
literature on the basis of reception aesthetics while Gadamer’s principle of
influence history [another translation of “efficacy history”] aims to sublimate the
conception of classicism to the plane of archetype as to the historical adjustment
between present and past, so we are in substantial agreement” (Jauss 1987, p. 38).
Had Jauss not ignored that Gadamer’s concept of “efficacy history”, which is
praised by Ricoeur as the highest achievement that Gadamer attained in
reflecting on the foundation of human science, shares the phenomenological
foundation with his concepts of “text”, the “fusion of horizons”, etc., he would
have realized that there is no substantial difference between his reception
aesthetics and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. It is by dint of criticisms of Gadamer
that Jauss elucidates his more thoroughgoing argument for a “reception
aesthetics” based on reader-centrism, whence to a certain extent their distinction
appears: Jauss bases his theory on aesthetic experience, a species of pure
subjective enjoyment, whereas Gadamer concerns himself with the effect that the
“text” exerts on the reader. While the “text” is considered as a reconstruction in
the reader’s consciousness, this reconstruction is affected by factors from the text
itself, and the effect can be sensed by us in reading powerful works. People begin
to notice the gleaming “epistemology” implied in Gadamer’s expression due to
Jauss’ criticisms. Nonetheless, Gadamer’s epistemology does not find expression
in the place Jauss alleges. As a matter of fact, an epistemological tendency is
really manifested when Gadamer argues about why he fails to take a “relativist”
stance on his theory of understanding. Up to then he has converted “efficacy
history”, the “hermeneutic cycle”, “spacetime”, etc. into hermeneutic
methodology so as to demonstrate why what is constructed in understanding, i.e.
what is manifested in the reader’s consciousness, has exceeded the personal
intentions of the reader and manifests as a kind of objectivity.
It is for this reason that in the melody of Gadamer’s theory, there appear some
discordant notes: if people, in accordance with Gadamer’s reader-centrism
argument, assigned all understandings to “self-understanding”, they might
abandon methodology because “self-understanding” refers to the respective
understandings of different readers in lieu of the correct understanding obtained
by virtue of appropriate methods. On the other hand, he cannot but construct
methodology so as not to be enmeshed with much-vilified relativism. Here his
argument obviously shows an appeal to the objectivity of understanding, and his
430 PAN Derong

stance turns correspondingly to text-centrism — from the reader’s

“self-understanding” to the “better” understanding of the text. Seen in this light,
dual conflicts are implied in Gadamer’s theory: the conflict between
reader-centrism and text-centrism, and the conflict between discarding traditional
methodology and constructing a new one. As has been pointed out above,
Gadamer mainly inclines towards reader-centrism, which is also a logical
conclusion that can be drawn from his ontological basis — that is, treating
understanding as the construction and manifestation of Dasein (and also as a
reader in the reading progress). The argument for discarding methodology is the
by-product of this ontology. With this in mind, the aforementioned dual conflicts
can essentially be summarized as the conflict between the ontology of
understanding (self-understanding and self-generation) upheld by Gadamer and
the traditional cognitive methodology (correct understanding of text). What
Gadamer tries to renounce, i.e. methodology, reenters his thought as the opposite
side of his new ontology.

4 Methodological hermeneutics: The return to text-centrism

In its original phase modern hermeneutics was a methodology of understanding

directed towards the author’s original intentions. It made use of such methods as
syntactics and semantics and reached its summit after introducing psychological
approaches. Nevertheless, since the human mentality is effectively more difficult
to affirm than the meaning of language, the interpreting method that drew
support from psychology came to an end. Since Schleiermacher and Dilthey, the
methodological hermeneutics that seeks for the author’s original intentions has
been on the decline. While Hirsch has once gone all out to advocate such a view
and published his book Validity in Interpretation, he offered few new arguments.
As he said, “My whole demonstration is in essence to try to base some
hermeneutic principles of Dilthey on the epistemology of Husserl and linguistics
of Saussure” (Hirsch 1991, p. 280, footnote 1); as a result, few people followed
suit.
Meanwhile, a chorus of criticisms of hermeneutics derived from
Schleiermacher came to the fore, and rapidly intensified. It is this kind of
criticism that hastened the emergence of two results with positive significance,
representing the two orientations of the progression of modern hermeneutics.
One of the orientations concerns ontological hermeneutics as upheld by
Heidegger and Gadamer. The concept of “noumenon” upheld here is by no
means the “noumenon” based on some epistemological stance that is presented
as the object of cognition and then as the basis of this epistemology. Rather, it is
what is generated and expanded in the understanding process. Heidegger and
Reader and text in the horizon of understanding methodology 431

Gadamer’s criticism of the traditional theory of understanding is a case of their

criticizing traditional epistemology. Tentatively, this was taken by them as a
means of transcending the whole epistemology. In this sense, ontological
hermeneutics is the medium through which modern philosophy with cognitive
qualities transforms into the post-modern philosophy, thus it has the traits of both
modernity and post-modernity. On the part of the new idea of ontology it
advocates, it laid the foundation for the anti-essentialism as well as the
anti-Logos-centrism of postmodern non-cognitive philosophy, denying that
philosophy is a form of knowledge — which indicates that there have been some
traits of postmodern philosophy in ontological hermeneutics.6 As for the fact
that it replaces traditional ontology, there are still traces of traditional
metaphysics in it. Thus, in the view of postmodern philosophers, the fact that
Heidegger used the concept of “Being” and tried to make “ontological
distinctions” between “Being” and “beings” indicates that he has yet to
drastically free his mind from the fetters of traditional metaphysics (Rorty 1992,
pp. 100–101). Some other philosophers meanwhile criticized the relativist trend
in hermeneutics from different epistemological perspectives. For instance, basing
his theory on the analysis of language, experience, and intersubjectivity formed
in common daily communication, Habermas points out the possibility of
reaching some universally efficacious and correct understanding, and assumes
that the “consensus” upheld by Gadamer is the result of ineffictive
communication (Habermas 1973, ss. 319–320). Habermas agrees with Apel’s in
that “Truth has a unique coercive power tending towards non-compelling
common acknowledgement” (Habermas 1986, p. 32).
The other orientation concerns the methodological hermeneutics promoted by
Betti, which takes the epistemological stance that the interpreting process
(Auslegungsproze) is in essence “solving the cognitive problems in
understanding” (Betti 1962, s. 11). For Betti, the epistemological conviction to
which the author adheres should by no means be abandoned. The objective
meanings of objects outside the subject of understanding are available to us via
appropriate methods. Betti however does not futilely seek to revive the theory
about the original intention of the author. Rather, he tries to grasp some objective

6
Rorty’s neo-pragmatism is the consequence of hermeneutics. He confesses that “Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature is expected to be a hermeneutical movement.” He also states in the
introduction to this book that he applies Gadamer’s thoughts to comparing “systematic”
philosophy with “didactic” philosophy (Rorty 2003, p. 9, p. 388). Rorty fails to hold an overall
view as to hermeneutics in that he “demonstrates the opposition between two ideas by means
of two words, i.e. epistemology and hermeneutics (Ibid., p. 300),” indicating that he lacks an
in-depth understanding of cognitive hermeneutics, namely the cognitive hermeneutics
inherited from Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Hence, he ignores the fact that hermeneutics seeks
for objective knowledge pertaining to spiritual phenomena.
432 PAN Derong

meaning. In discussing hermeneutics in an epistemological frame of reference, if

people cannot but discard the author’s original intention and, in the same fashion,
discard the meaning understood by the reader, the only choice left for them is the
textual meaning. Here we see the necessity for hermeneutics to shift from the
theory of the author’s original intention to that of the original textual meaning.
Distinct from the intangible original intentions of the author, the text as the
objectified object of thought — the linguistic expression of the thoughts fixed by
means of writing — has, after all, offered some “objective” support for human
understanding. In addition, no matter how people persist in the theory of the
author’s original intention, their objects of interpretation are, by and large, still
linguistic texts, and when they seek the author’s original intention the relatively
reliable and feasible part of their methodology is about language. Therefore, it is
virtually inevitable that epistemological hermeneutics will shift from
author-centrism to text-centrism. When emphasis is put on understanding
ontology, however, it will shift to reader-centrism, as demonstrated by Gadamer’s
hermeneutics. Against this background, we can express their relationship in two
ways.
As far as the difference between methodological hermeneutics and its
ontological counterpart is concerned, both the theory of the author’s original
intention and that of textual meaning belong to methodological hermeneutics,
and hence possess cognitive traits. In this sense, the latter is the extension of the
former along the same line. Nevertheless, ontological hermeneutics is the denial
of methodological hermeneutics (in accordance with the claims of many
hermeneutic philosophers), or at least it is something irrelevant to methodology
(according to Gadamer’s self-justification).
Meanwhile, the three factors in hermeneutics — namely the theory of the
author’s original intention, the theory of textual meaning, and the theory of
meaning understood by the reader — are by no means mutually exclusive,
though they are somewhat opposed to one another. It is my contention that what
modern hermeneutics really concerns is the relationship between the three
hermeneutic factors, which are unavoidable in any hermeneutic theory; different
schools of hermeneutics differ from one another only in their emphasis. To take
an example from Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, which seeks for the author’s
original intentions, the first part of his methodology is syntactic interpretation
pertinent to textual meaning, whereas the second part consists of psychological
rules or canons concerning the author’s original intentions. While
Schleiermacher later sublimated, gradually, psychological norms into important
methods, he never abandoned syntactic methods. He also confesses that the
reader may understand the text in a better way than the author does
(Schleiermacher 1977, s. 94). Stressing on the original textual meaning, Ricoeur
also alleges that what we obtain from the text is an exaggerated self (Ricoeur
Reader and text in the horizon of understanding methodology 433

1987, p. 188). Gadamer’s analysis of the fusion of horizons and dialogues

between the text and reader also demonstrates the part that the author and text
play in understanding. Betti, who sticks to text-centrism, puts forward four
famous hermeneutic canons, the most primordial as well as the most basic one of
which is the first canon, “the canon of the hermeneutical autonomy of the object”
(Kanon der hermeneutischen Autonomie des Objekts), which holds that textual
meaning as compared with the author and reader is autonomous (objective) as
well as independent, and that the reader should thus set aside any external
intentions so as to grasp the original meaning of the text. His text-centrism is
predicated on this. Nonetheless, whether or not an understanding is correct one
must consult the author’s intentions and the production process of the work:
understanding will not be acceptable unless the two consulted elements achieve
some continuity. Betti presents this requirement in his third canon, namely “the
canon of the actuality of understanding” (Kanon der Aktualität des Verstehens),
wherein “actuality” refers to converting what the author describes, via shifting
and synthesizing, into the reader’s own spiritual horizon and hence
reconstructing the creative process of the author. The assessment pertaining to
the original intention of the author is apparently involved here. Meanwhile, the
forth cannon, i.e. “the canon of the hermeneutical correspondence of meaning”
(Kanon der hermenertischen Sinnentsprechung [Sinnadäquanz des Verstehens]),
is concerned with the subject of interpreting activity, holding that the interpreter
should try to make his own vitality and the feelings activated by the
interpretation reach a certain kind of harmony — which means that the two
parties have reached some consensus and consonance. This requires that the
interpreter keep his own mind open, take a justified stance, and sincerely
overcome his bias so as not to hinder himself from achieving correct
understanding (Betti 1962, ss. 53–54). From this, it follows that Betti’s
postulation is the harmonious state of meaning between the author, text, and
reader with the text as the core, and so on.
When reflecting holistically on the three internal factors of hermeneutic
phenomenon, we may regard the following two descriptions as pertinent to their
relationship:
In accordance with the chronological order of the appearance of the three
factors, we might order them author→ text→ reader, whereas in understanding
progression, the sequence would be as follows:
→author’s original intention
Reader→ text−−−−−→text meaning
→meaning understood by reader
It is easy to see that whatever perspective we may take, the text is all the while
located in the center of the interpreting process. Text is the form of meaning into
which the author’s mind is objectified, and the interpreter enters this form of
434 PAN Derong

meaning via reading to encounter the author. Hence, the meaning implied in this
form is transformed into another object strange to its creator, that is, the
interpreter. Seen in this light, text is actually the bridge between the author and
reader, and the starting point of any understanding as well. Due to this fact, while
ontological hermeneutics stressing reader-centrism is presently in its heyday, the
interpretation of text is still a prerequisite, and is the core issue of hermeneutics
itself. Constant discussion of the author’s original intentions or the reader’s
comprehension would to a certain extent be based on a poor foundation if a
correct understanding of the text is not available.
Against the above-mentioned considerations, we propose that people should
go back to textual hermeneutics as an understanding methodology and reestablish
the cognitive significance and function of hermeneutics. In so doing, they may
modify the prevailing over-correction in the ontological hermeneutics. This
seems to be particularly important if we look at the condition of hermeneutic
investigations in our academic circles today. The reasons for returning to
cognitive textual hermeneutics can thus be summarized as follows:
(1) Why understanding becomes a problem? 1) The first and foremost is to
believe that text has objective meaning, without which the labor we spend on
comprehending the text would in essence be futile. 2) While we understand the
text to a certain extent, we may of course misunderstand. Understanding would
not pose as a problem if there is full understanding or no understanding at all.
Gadamer argues that the realm of hermeneutics lies in “the area between
strangeness and familiarity with which historical relics impressed us” (Gadamer
1990, bd. 1, s. 300). We can add that the “understanding problem” appears in the
process wherein we transform strange things into familiar ones, and that this
transformation will be realized only when various hermeneutic methods are
comprehensively applied. A methodological hermeneutics with the purpose of
grasping textual meaning thus becomes necessary.
(2) Our reading experiences indicate that people can to a certain degree
correctly understand a text by reading it, and thus arrive at some consensus based
on the transmission of meaning by language itself. The areas where
“misunderstanding” may be engendered or multiple comprehensions produced
can be regarded as “special cases” which, though they may appear frequently,
cannot lead to a denial of our ability to reach some correct or common
“understanding”. Even Gadamer would not refute this, for otherwise there would
be no need for him to write Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method), much
less to justify himself after being criticized. Therefore, while we are unable to
infallibly verify textual meaning, we may nonetheless take it as a goal that we
pursue, hoping that “better” understanding can be obtained.
(3) By “understanding” we mean, first of all, the understanding of some text
(generally referring to any object of understanding in Gadamer’s sense). Even if
Reader and text in the horizon of understanding methodology 435

we want to know the author’s original intention, or the meaning apprehended by

the reader, we have nothing to rely on except the text. The so-called centering on
“text” does not mean that we should regard the “text” as the only valid factor in
interpretation. Rather, it refers to harmonizing the author and the reader through
reading the text. Only on the grounds of correct understanding of the text can the
reader’s apprehension and argumentation gain basic legitimacy and justification.
We have to differentiate between textual meaning and the meaning we expand
upon, using the inspiration presented by the text. Textual understanding is a
demand for us readers to stick to the objective principle of meaning (that is,
Betti’s text-autonomous canon), trying to evade totally subjective claims. We
should not rely on our subjectivity and misinterpret the text just on the excuse
that we cannot completely eliminate subjectivity or achieve absolute
understanding of the text.
I conclude this article with a famous quote from Betti: “As the defenders of
human science, we take as our responsibility to defend such objectivity [i.e. the
objectivity of the interpretation of human science] and to explore its
epistemological pre-conditions” (Betti 1962, s. 35).

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