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Contention 1: Inherency
Denver post (New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/world/asia/08gates.html)
3/8/11
2011 deadline has been thrown out. The United States Federal Government was ready to withdraw in
July but now we have to stay until 2014.
KABUL — Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Monday that the United States was "well positioned" to begin
withdrawing some U.S. troops from Afghanistan in July, but he said a substantial force would remain
and that the United States was starting talks with the Afghans about keeping a security presence in the
country beyond 2014. At a joint news conference in the Afghan capital with President Hamid Karzai, Gates said
no decisions had been made about the number of troops to go home. His remarks were tempered with enough
caveats, however, to suggest that the July drawdown promised by U.S. President Barack Obama could be
minor. "As I have said time and again, we are not leaving Afghanistan this summer," Gates said. About
100,000 U.S. troops are in the country. Gates also used the news conference to offer an extended apology to
Karzai for the killings last week of nine Afghan boys. Karzai accepted it. On Sunday, Karzai rejected an apology
for the error from Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan. "This breaks our heart," Gates
said as he stood beside Karzai in the Afghan presidential palace. "Not only is their loss a tragedy for their
families, it is a setback for our relationship with the Afghan people." One boy who was wounded but survived
described a helicopter gunship that hunted down the children as they gathered wood outside their village. The
gunners apparently mistook the children for insurgents who hours earlier had fired on a U.S. base. The boys were
9 to 15 years old. Meanwhile, the Afghan government has asked the United Nations to remove the names of five
former senior Taliban members from its terrorist blacklist, including the man who ran the extremist regime's
feared religious police, McClatchy Newspapers reported. Karzai's government views the U.N. blacklist as the
primary obstacle to starting peace talks with the Taliban because anyone on the blacklist risks arrest if he's seen
in public. All five of the former Taliban leaders have been named to the 70-member High Peace Council, which
the Afghan government set up last year to try to forge a political settlement, increasingly convinced that the war
effort is going nowhere. U.N. approval of the request, made formally by the Afghan government in a letter dated
Feb. 27, is by no means certain. While most of the international community, including the U.S., agrees in
principle to delisting those who've given up the armed struggle, in practice, the process is slow. Russia, whose
troops lost a bloody war against the Taliban, has been particularly reluctant to remove any names from the
blacklist, even those Taliban members who have died.

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Thus, the plan:

The United States Federal Government Specifically the Executive Branch should phase-out
(to the point of elimination) the United States federal government’s Combat forces from
Afghanistan starting July 2011.

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Advantage 1 is Pakistan:
US troops in Afghanistan increase extremism amongst the Pashtun people – this de-
stabilizes Pakistan.
Graham E. Fuller is a former CIA station chief in Kabul and a former vice-chair of the CIA's National Intelligence Council.
He is author of numerous books on the Middle East, including "The Future of Political Islam." The Christian Science Monitor,
December 2, 2009 – available via Lexis-Nexis Academic

Many decades ago, as a fledgling CIA officer in the field, I was naively convinced that if the facts were reported back to Washington correctly, everything
else would take care of itself in policymaking. The first loss of innocence comes with the harsh recognition that "all politics are local" and that overseas
realities bear only a partial relationship to foreign-policy formulation back home. So in President Obama's new policy directions for Afghanistan, what goes
down in Washington politics far outweighs analyses of local conditions. I had hoped that Obama would level with the American people that the war in
Afghanistan is not being won, indeed is not winnable within any practicable framework. Obama possesses the intelligence and
insight to grasp these realities. But such an admission - however accurate - would sign the political death warrant of a president to be portrayed as having
snatched defeat out of the jaws of "victory." The "objective" situation in Afghanistan remains a mess. The details are well known. Senior commanders
acknowledge that we are not now winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan; indeed, we never can, and certainly not at
gunpoint. Most Pashtuns will never accept a US plan for Afghanistan's future. The non-Pashtuns - Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, etc. -
naturally welcome any outside support in what is a virtual civil war. America has inadvertently ended up choosing sides. US
forces are perceived by large numbers of Afghans as an occupying army inflicting large civilian casualties. The struggle has now
leaked into Pakistan - with even higher stakes. Obama's policies would seem an unsatisfying compromise among contending arguments. Thirty
thousand more troops will not turn the tide; arguably they present more American targets for attack. They will heighten
traditional xenophobia against foreigners traipsing through Pashtun villages and homes. It is a fool's errand to persuade the
locals in Pashtun territory that the Taliban are the enemy and the US is their friend. Whatever mixed feelings Pashtuns have toward the
Taliban, they know the Taliban remain the single most important element of Pashtun political life; the Taliban will be among them long after Washington
tires of this mission. The strategy of the Bush era envisioned Afghanistan as a vital imperial outpost in a post-Soviet dream world where hundreds of
overseas US bases would cement US global hegemony, keeping Russia and China in check and the US on top. That world vision is gone - except to a few
Washington diehards who haven't grasped the new emerging global architectures of power, economics, prestige, and influence. The Taliban will inevitably
figure significantly in the governance of almost any future Afghanistan, like it or not. Future Taliban leaders, once rid of foreign occupation,
will have little incentive to support global jihadi schemes - they never really have by choice. The Taliban inherited bin Laden as a poison
pill from the past when they came to power in 1996 and have learned a bitter lesson about what it means to lend state support to a
prominent terrorist group. The Taliban with a voice in power will have every incentive to welcome foreign money and
expertise into the country, including the Pashtun regions - as long as it is not part of a Western strategic package. An austere Islamic regime is
not the ideal outcome for Afghanistan, but it is by far the most realistic. To reverse ground realities and achieve a markedly different outcome is not in the
cards and will pose the same dilemma to Obama next year. Meanwhile, Pakistan will never be willing or able to solve Washington's Afghanistan dilemma.
Pakistan's own stability has been brought to the very brink by US demands that it solve America's self-created problem in Afghanistan. Pakistan will
eventually be forced to resolve Afghanistan itself - but only after the US has gone, and only by making a pact with Taliban forces both inside Afghanistan
and in Pakistan itself. Washington will not accept that for now, but it will ultimately be forced to fairly soon. Maybe the Pakistanis can root out bin Laden,
but meanwhile, Al Qaeda has extended its autonomous franchises around the world, and terrorists can train and plan almost anywhere in the world; they do
not need Afghanistan. By now, as in so many other elements of the Global War on Terror, the US has become more part of the problem than
part of the solution. We are sending troops to defend troops that themselves constitute an affront to Afghan nationalism.
Only expeditious American withdrawal from Afghanistan will prevent exacerbation of the problem. Afghans must face the
complex mechanics of internal struggle and reconciliation. They have done so over long periods of their history. The ultimate outcome is of greater
strategic consequence to Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran, India, and others in the region than to the US. Europe and Canada have lost all stomach for this
mission that is now promoted primarily in terms of "saving NATO" for future (and obsolescent) "out of area" struggles in a world in which Western
strategic preferences can no longer predominate.

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US presence is the problem – withdrawal from Afghanistan is key to checking collapse of
the Pakistani State.
Nicholas Kristof is a two-time Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist for The New York Times. He is quoting a
group of former intelligence officials – the qualifications of this group are embedded within this piece of evidence
and their qualifications are impressive. A seasoned journalist, Kristoff has traveled to South Asia, offering a
compassionate glimpse into global health, poverty, and gender in the developing world. The New York Times,
“The Afghanistan Abyss”, September 6, 2009 – http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/opinion/06kristof.html

''Our policy makers do not understand that the very presence of our forces in the Pashtun areas is the problem,'' the group said in a
statement to me. ''The more troops we put in, the greater the opposition. We do not mitigate the opposition by increasing troop
levels, but rather we increase the opposition and prove to the Pashtuns that the Taliban are correct. ''The basic ignorance by our
leadership is going to cause the deaths of many fine American troops with no positive outcome,'' the statement said. The group includes Howard Hart, a
former Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Pakistan; David Miller, a former ambassador and National Security Council official; William J. Olson, a
counterinsurgency scholar at the National Defense University; and another C.I.A. veteran who does not want his name published but who spent 12 years in
the region, was station chief in Kabul at the time the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and later headed the C.I.A.'s Counterterrorism Center. ''We share
a concern that the country is driving over a cliff,'' Mr. Miller said. Mr. Hart, who helped organize the anti-Soviet insurgency in the 1980s,
cautions that Americans just don't understand the toughness, determination and fighting skills of the Pashtun tribes. He adds
that if the U.S. escalates the war, the result will be radicalization of Pashtuns in Pakistan and further instability there --
possibly even the collapse of Pakistan. These experts are not people who crave publicity; I had to persuade them to go public with
their concerns. And their views are widely shared among others who also know Afghanistan well. ''We've bitten off more than we can
chew; we're setting ourselves up for failure,'' said Rory Stewart, a former British diplomat who teaches at Harvard when he is not running a large aid
program in Afghanistan. Mr. Stewart describes the American military strategy in Afghanistan as ''nonsense.'' I'm writing about these concerns because I
share them. I'm also troubled because officials in Washington seem to make decisions based on a simplistic caricature of the Taliban that doesn't match
what I've found in my reporting trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Among the Pashtuns, the population is not neatly divisible into ''Taliban'' or ''non-
Taliban.'' Rather, the Pashtuns are torn by complex aspirations and fears. Many Pashtuns I've interviewed are appalled by the Taliban's periodic brutality
and think they are too extreme; they think they're a little nuts. But these Pashtuns also admire the Taliban's personal honesty and religious piety, a contrast
to the corruption of so many officials around President Hamid Karzai. Some Taliban are hard-core ideologues, but many join the fight because friends or
elders suggest it, because they are avenging the deaths of relatives in previous fighting, because it's a way to earn money, or because they want to expel the
infidels from their land -- particularly because the foreigners haven't brought the roads, bridges and irrigation projects that had been anticipated. Frankly, if
a bunch of foreign Muslim troops in turbans showed up in my hometown in rural Oregon, searching our homes without bringing any obvious benefit, then
we might all take to the hills with our deer rifles as well. In fairness, the American military has hugely improved its sensitivity, and some commanders in
the field have been superb in building trust with Afghans. That works. But all commanders can't be superb, and over all, our increased presence
makes Pashtuns more likely to see us as alien occupiers. That may be why the troop increase this year hasn't calmed things. Instead,
2009 is already the bloodiest year for American troops in Afghanistan -- with four months left to go.

State collapse risks take-over by extremist entities in Pakistan

Arianna Huffington is an author and syndicated columnist. She is best known as co-founder of the news
website The Huffington Post. For the relevant portion of the evidence, she internally quotes Robert Baer, a
former CIA field operative – LA Times – October 14th – 2009 – http://www.latimes.com/sns-
200910141852tmsahuffcoltq--m-a20091014oct14,0,6163789,full.story

The number of those on both sides of the political spectrum who share Biden's skepticism is growing. At the beginning of September, George Will
called for the U.S. to pull out of Afghanistan and "do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, air strikes
and small, potent Special Forces units." Former Bush State Department official and current head of the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haas argued
in The New York Times that Afghanistan is not, as Obama insists, a war of necessity. "If Afghanistan were a war of necessity, it would justify any level of
effort," writes Haas. "It is not and does not. It is not certain that doing more will achieve more. And no one should forget that doing more in Afghanistan
lessens our ability to act elsewhere." In "Rethink Afghanistan," Robert Greenwald's powerful look at the war (and a film Joe Biden should see right away),
Robert Baer, a former CIA field operative says, "The notion that we're in Afghanistan to make our country safer is just complete bulls--t. . . . What it's
doing is causing us greater danger, no question about it. Because . . . the more we fight in Afghanistan, the more the conflict is
pushed across the border into Pakistan, the more we destabilize Pakistan, the more likely it is that a fundamentalist
government will take over the army . . . and we'll have al-Qaida-like groups with nuclear weapons."

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The risk of extremists running Pakistan forces India’s hand – causing pre-emptive nuclear
conflict in South Asia
Thomas Ricks is the author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003-05, which was a no. 1 New York
Times bestseller and a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in 2007. He is special military correspondent for The Washington Post,
senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a contributing editor for Foreign Policy magazine. Washington
Post – October 21, 2001 – http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A27875-2001Oct20?language=printer

The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons.
The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani
nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear
stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a
confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam
Gardiner, an expert on strategic games.

India-Pakistan conflict is extremely bad – no restraint, and smoke yields that risk extinction
Dr. Alan Robock is a professor of climatology in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University and the associate director of its
Center for Environmental Prediction. Prof. Robock has been a researcher in the area of climate change for more than 30 years.. His current research focuses
on soil moisture variations, the effects of volcanic eruptions on climate, effects of nuclear war on climate, and regional atmosphere/hydrology modeling.
He has served as Editor of climate journals, including the Journal of Climate and Applied Meteorology and the Journal of Geophysical Research-
Atmospheres. He has published more than 250 articles on his research, including more than 150 peer-reviewed papers and Owen Brian Toon is
professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) at the University of Colorado.
[1] He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University – From the January 2010 Scientific American Magazine –
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=local-nuclear-war

Nuclear bombs dropped on cities and industrial areas in a fight between India and Pakistan would start firestorms that would put
massive amounts of smoke into the upper atmosphere. The particles would remain there for years, blocking the sun, making the
earth’s surface cold, dark and dry. Agricultural collapse and mass starvation could follow. Hence, global cooling could result from a regional war,
not just a conflict between the U.S. and Russia. Cooling scenarios are based on computer models. But observations of volcanic eruptions, forest fire smoke
and other phenomena provide confidence that the models are correct. Twenty-five years ago international teams of scientists showed that a
nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union could produce a “nuclear winter.” The smoke from vast fires started by bombs
dropped on cities and industrial areas would envelop the planet and absorb so much sunlight that the earth’s surface would get cold, dark and dry, killing
plants worldwide and eliminating our food supply. Surface temperatures would reach winter values in the summer. International discussion about this
prediction, fueled largely by astronomer Carl Sagan, forced the leaders of the two superpowers to confront the possibility that their arms race endangered
not just themselves but the entire human race. Countries large and small demanded disarmament. Nuclear winter became an important factor in ending the
nuclear arms race. Looking back later, in 2000, former Soviet Union leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev observed, “Models made by Russian and American
scientists showed that a nuclear war would result in a nuclear winter that would be extremely destructive to all life on earth; the knowledge of that was a
great stimulus to us, to people of honor and morality, to act.” Why discuss this topic now that the cold war has ended? Because as other nations continue to
acquire nuclear weapons, smaller, regional nuclear wars could create a similar global catastrophe. New analyses reveal that a conflict between
India and Pakistan, for example, in which 100 nuclear bombs were dropped on cities and industrial areas—only 0.4 percent of the world’s more than
25,000 warheads—would produce enough smoke to cripple global agriculture. A regional war could cause widespread loss of life even in
countries far away from the conflict. Regional War Threatens the World By deploying modern computers and modern climate models, the
two of us and our colleagues have shown that not only were the ideas of the 1980s correct but the effects would last for at least 10
years, much longer than previously thought. And by doing calculations that assess decades of time, only now possible with fast, current
computers, and by including in our calculations the oceans and the entire atmosphere—also only now possible—we have found that the smoke from even a
regional war would be heated and lofted by the sun and remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years, continuing to block sunlight and to cool the
and Pakistan, which together have more than 100 nuclear weapons, may be the most worrisome adversaries capable of a
earth. India
regional nuclear conflict today. But other countries besides the U.S. and Russia (which have thousands) are well endowed: China, France and the
U.K. have hundreds of nuclear warheads; Israel has more than 80, North Korea has about 10 and Iran may well be trying to make its own. In 2004 this
situation prompted one of us (Toon) and later Rich Turco of the University of California, Los Angeles, both veterans of the 1980s investigations, to begin
evaluating what the global environmental effects of a regional nuclear war would be and to take as our test case an engagement between India and Pakistan.
The latest estimates by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security and by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resources Defense
Council are that India has 50 to 60 assembled weapons (with enough plutonium for 100) and that Pakistan has 60 weapons. Both countries continue to
increase their arsenals. Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests indicate that the yield of the warheads would be similar to the 15-kiloton explosive yield
(equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT) of the bomb the U.S. used on Hiroshima. Toon and Turco, along with Charles Bardeen, now at the National Center for
Atmospheric Research, modeled what would happen if 50 Hiroshima-size bombs were dropped across the highest population-density targets in Pakistan
and if 50 similar bombs were also dropped across India. Some people maintain that nuclear weapons would be used in only a measured
way. But in the wake of chaos, fear and broken communications that would occur once a nuclear war began, we doubt
leaders would limit attacks in any rational manner. This likelihood is particularly true for Pakistan, which is small and could be
quickly overrun in a conventional conflict. Peter R. Lavoy of the Naval Postgraduate School, for example, has analyzed the ways in which a
conflict between India and Pakistan might occur and argues that Pakistan could face a decision to use all its nuclear arsenal quickly
before India swamps its military bases with traditional forces. Obviously, we hope the number of nuclear targets in any future war will be
zero, but policy makers and voters should know what is possible. Toon and Turco found that more than 20 million people in the two countries could die

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from the blasts, fires and radioactivity—a horrible slaughter. But the investigators
were shocked to discover that a tremendous amount of
smoke would be generated, given the megacities in the two countries, assuming each fire would burn the same area that actually did burn
in Hiroshima and assuming an amount of burnable material per person based on various studies. They calculated that the 50 bombs exploded in Pakistan
would produce three teragrams of smoke, and the 50 bombs hitting India would generate four (one teragram equals a million metric tons). Satellite
observations of actual forest fires have shown that smoke can be lofted up through the troposphere (the bottom layer of the atmosphere) and sometimes
then into the lower stratosphere (the layer just above, extending to about 30 miles). Toon and Turco also did some “back of the envelope” calculations of
the possible climate impact of the smoke should it enter the stratosphere. The large magnitude of such effects made them realize they needed help from a
climate modeler. It turned out that one of us (Robock) was already working with Luke Oman, now at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, who was
finishing his Ph.D. at Rutgers University on the climatic effects of volcanic eruptions, and with Georgiy L. Stenchikov, also at Rutgers and an author of the
first Russian work on nuclear winter. They developed a climate model that could be used fairly easily for the nuclear blast calculations. Robock and his
colleagues, being conservative, put five teragrams of smoke into their modeled upper troposphere over India and Pakistan on an imaginary May 15. The
model calculated how winds would blow the smoke around the world and how the smoke particles would settle out from the atmosphere. The smoke
covered all the continents within two weeks. The black, sooty smoke absorbed sunlight, warmed and rose into the stratosphere. Rain never falls there, so
the air is never cleansed by precipitation; particles very slowly settle out by falling, with air resisting them. Soot particles are small, with an average
diameter of only 0.1 micron (µm), and so drift down very slowly. They also rise during the daytime as they are heated by the sun, repeatedly delaying their
elimination. The calculations showed that the smoke would reach far higher into the upper stratosphere than the sulfate particles that are produced by
episodic volcanic eruptions. Sulfate particles are transparent and absorb much less sunlight than soot and are also bigger, typically 0.5 µm. The volcanic
particles remain airborne for about two years, but smoke from nuclear fires would last a decade. Killing Frosts in Summer The climatic response to
the smoke was surprising. Sunlight was immediately reduced, cooling the planet to temperatures lower than any experienced for the past 1,000 years.
The global average cooling, of about 1.25 degrees Celsius (2.3 degrees Fahrenheit), lasted for several years, and even after 10 years the temperature was
still 0.5 degree C colder than normal. The models also showed a 10 percent reduction in precipitation worldwide. Precipitation, river flow and soil moisture
all decreased because blocking sunlight reduces evaporation and weakens the hydrologic cycle. Drought was largely concentrated in the lower latitudes,
however, because global cooling would retard the Hadley air circulation pattern in the tropics, which produces a large fraction of global precipitation. In
critical areas such as the Asian monsoon regions, rainfall dropped by as much as 40 percent. The cooling might not seem like much, but even
a small dip can cause severe consequences. Cooling and diminished sunlight would, for example, shorten growing seasons in the midlatitudes.
More insight into the effects of cooling came from analyses of the aftermaths of massive volcanic eruptions. Every once in a while such eruptions produce
temporary cooling for a year or two. The largest of the past 500 years, the 1815 Tambora eruption in Indonesia, blotted the sun and produced global cooling
of about 0.5 degree C for a year; 1816 became known as “The Year without a Summer” or “Eighteen Hundred and Froze to Death.” In New England,
although the average summer temperature was lowered only a few degrees, crop-killing frosts occurred in every month. After the first frost, farmers
replanted crops, only to see them killed by the next frost. The price of grain skyrocketed, the price of livestock plummeted as farmers sold the animals they
could not feed, and a mass migration began from New England to the Midwest, as people followed reports of fertile land there. In Europe the weather was
so cold and gloomy that the stock market collapsed, widespread famines occurred and 18-year-old Mary Shelley was inspired to write Frankenstein.
Certain strains of crops, such as winter wheat, can withstand lower temperatures, but a lack of sunlight inhibits their ability to grow. In our scenario,
daylight would filter through the high smoky haze, but on the ground every day would seem to be fully overcast. Agronomists and farmers could not
develop the necessary seeds or adjust agricultural practices for the radically different conditions unless they knew ahead of time what to expect. In
addition to the cooling, drying and darkness, extensive ozone depletion would result as the smoke heated the stratosphere;
reactions that create and destroy ozone are temperature-dependent. Michael J. Mills of the University of Colorado at Boulder ran a completely separate
climate model from Robock’s but found similar results for smoke lofting and stratospheric temperature changes. He concluded that although surface
temperatures would cool by a small amount, the stratosphere would be heated by more than 50 degrees C, because the black smoke particles absorb
sunlight. This heating, in turn, would modify winds in the stratosphere, which would carry ozone-destroying nitrogen oxides into its upper reaches.
Together the high temperatures and nitrogen oxides would reduce ozone to the same dangerous levels we now experience below the ozone hole above
Antarctica every spring. Ultraviolet radiation on the ground would increase significantly because of the diminished ozone. Less sunlight and
precipitation, cold spells, shorter growing seasons and more ultraviolet radiation would all reduce or eliminate agricultural
production. Notably, cooling and ozone loss would be most profound in middle and high latitudes in both hemispheres, whereas precipitation declines
would be greatest in the tropics.

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Adv. 2 - Afghan Stability

A. US can’t win – unclear objective, can’t replace opium, safe havens in Pakistan, killing increases terrorist
recruitment.
O’ Connor ’10 – former executive director of the Australian Defense Council (6/23/2010, Michael, “Best We Can Do
is to Pull Out of Afghanistan” http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/best-we-can-do-is-to-pull-out-of-
afghanistan/story-e6frg6zo-1225882965439) HG
This is a war that will not be won on the ground, says Michael O'Connor. The war in Muslim Afghanistan cannot be won by the armed forces
of a Christian country. Even less can it be won by those of a pagan country which is the way the US and Australia are increasingly perceived. For Muslims, we are too easily
portrayed by the Taliban and al-Qa'ida as unbelievers and enemies of Islam. For all our billions of dollars, the theories of counter-insurgency, the brilliant weaponry and the
dogged courage of our soldiers,
this conflict is unwinnable because Western politicians have lost sight of their objective, the
cardinal sin of war-making. Looking back to the immediate aftermath of the al-Qa'ida attack on September 11, 2001, the US demanded of the Taliban government
of Afghanistan that it hand over Osama bin Laden, the mastermind. The Taliban refused and the US went to war. The Taliban was joined with al-Qa'ida as the enemy. The Taliban
was overthrown and a replacement government was manufactured. It was supposed to be a national government of a collection of tribes that demonstrates nationality only when
attacked from outside: by the British, the Russians and now the Americans. In the process ,
the West has developed a mythology that Afghanistan
can be turned into a modern nation, that its women can be educated to take their place in the modern world and that Western-style
democracy will reign supreme. Most futile of all, the West seeks to replace opium as Afghanistan's premier cash
crop with something else that probably won't grow as well, won't pay as well and will have to face competition from other sources. So the Taliban has
recovered. With a combination of fundamentalist Islamic proselytising and terrorism that the North Vietnamese
of another era would envy, plus safe havens in Pakistan, the lightly equipped, very mobile Taliban can keep the
fight alive indefinitely. Certainly they suffer casualties but these are relatively insignificant politically compared with those suffered by the West. And every
time Western technology kills by accident, it recruits even more willing foot soldiers for the Taliban . The religious factor
must not be underestimated. It was not a factor in Vietnam which was lost by American incompetence and a loss of will. Whatever we in the West think, religion is the dominant
factor in Afghanistan, as it was when the US backed the anti-Soviet Afghan forces between 1979 and the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Since that time, militant Islam has become an
even more powerful force. It will continue to be the primary motivating factor of the Taliban and its allies in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is to be modernised, that will be achieved
only by Muslim countries that are frankly reluctant to take on the militants in their own countries, never mind elsewhere. When questioned, the soldiers will assert that the job can
be done but that is loyalty rather than wisdom speaking. They may - probably will - insist that the cost in money and blood will be significant over the long haul but the decision to
stay or go is one which must be made by the political leadership which bleeds no more than votes. The only credible solution to the mess is withdrawal. The clever people who
constructed the case for intervention are equally capable of constructing a credible case for withdrawal. The initiative must come from the US which carries the burden of the
intervention. Its allies who have been more or less willingly shanghaied into the mess need to press the US into committing to a safe but rapid withdrawal. The fundamental
problem for all of the US's allies, including Australia, is that they have committed their own security to the American alliance. None - certainly not Australia - provides adequately
for its own defence so all are handcuffed to US policy. Australians tend to see the American alliance as one of friends anchored in shared experience in past conflicts. They tend
not to see the shackles because it has suited every Australian government since 1944 to severely limit its own commitment to national security. The problem for those governments
is that they are then compelled to do what Washington wants regardless of the merits of the case. Sometimes those merits will be obvious to Australia's core security interests. In
Afghanistan they are not. Terrorism, especially Islamist terrorism, cannot be defeated in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia or elsewhere. Only good intelligence and solid police
work will protect Australia from terrorist attack.

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B. Prolonging military presence in Afghanistan will only allow Islamic extremist takeover of Pakistan
Kristof, ‘9 - a columnist for The Times since 2001, is a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner (Nicholas D., 9/6, “The
Afghanistan Abyss,” New York Times,http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/opinion/06kristof.html?
_r=1&pagewanted=print CT)
President Obama has already dispatched an additional 21,000 American troops to Afghanistan and soon will decide whether to send thousands more. That would be a fateful
decision for his presidency, and a group of former intelligence officials and other experts is now reluctantly going public to warn that more troops would be a historic mistake.
sending more American troops into ethnic Pashtun areas in the Afghan
The group’s concern — dead right, in my view — is that
south may only galvanize local people to back the Taliban in repelling the infidels. “Our policy makers do not
understand that the very presence of our forces in the Pashtun areas is the problem,” the group said in a statement to me.
“The more troops we put in, the greater the opposition. We do not mitigate the opposition by increasing troop
levels, but rather we increase the opposition and prove to the Pashtuns that the Taliban are correct. “The basic
ignorance by our leadership is going to cause the deaths of many fine American troops with no positive outcome,” the statement said. The group includes Howard Hart, a former
Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Pakistan; David Miller, a former ambassador and National Security Council official; William J. Olson, a counterinsurgency scholar at
the National Defense University; and another C.I.A. veteran who does not want his name published but who spent 12 years in the region, was station chief in Kabul at the time the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and later headed the C.I.A.’s Counterterrorism Center. “We share a concern that the country is driving over a cliff,” Mr. Miller said. Mr.
Hart, who helped organize the anti-Soviet insurgency in the 1980s, cautions that Americans just don’t understand the toughness, determination and fighting skills of the Pashtun
if the U.S. escalates the war, the result will be radicalization of Pashtuns in Pakistan and further
tribes. He adds that
instability there — possibly even the collapse of Pakistan. These experts are not people who crave publicity; I had to persuade them to go public
with their concerns. And their views are widely shared among others who also know Afghanistan well. “We’ve bitten off more than we can chew; we’re setting ourselves up for
failure,” said Rory Stewart, a former British diplomat who teaches at Harvard when he is not running a large aid program in Afghanistan. Mr. Stewart describes the American
military strategy in Afghanistan as “nonsense.” I’m writing about these concerns because I share them. I’m also troubled because officials in Washington seem to make decisions
based on a simplistic caricature of the Taliban that doesn’t match what I’ve found in my reporting trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Among the Pashtuns, the population is not
neatly divisible into “Taliban” or “non-Taliban.” Rather, the Pashtuns are torn by complex aspirations and fears. Many Pashtuns I’ve interviewed are appalled by the Taliban’s periodic
brutality and think they are too extreme; they think they’re a little nuts. But these Pashtuns also admire the Taliban’s personal honesty and religious piety, a contrast to the corruption of so many officials
around President Hamid Karzai. Some Taliban are hard-core ideologues, but many join the fight because friends or elders suggest it, because they are avenging the deaths of relatives in previous fighting,
because it’s a way to earn money, or because they want to expel the infidels from their land — particularly because the foreigners haven’t brought the roads, bridges and irrigation
projects that had been anticipated. Frankly, if a bunch of foreign Muslim troops in turbans showed up in my hometown in rural Oregon, searching our homes without bringing any
obvious benefit, then we might all take to the hills with our deer rifles as well. In fairness, the American military has hugely improved its sensitivity, and some commanders in the
field have been superb in building trust with Afghans. That works. But all commanders can’t be superb, and over all, our increased presence makes Pashtuns more likely to see us
as alien occupiers. That may be why the troop increase this year hasn’t calmed things. Instead, 2009 is already the bloodiest year for American troops in Afghanistan — with four
months left to go. The solution is neither to pull out of Afghanistan nor to double down. Rather, we need to continue our presence with a lighter military footprint, limited to
training the Afghan forces and helping them hold major cities, and ensuring that Al Qaeda does not regroup. We must also invest more in education and agriculture development,
for that is a way over time to peel Pashtuns away from the Taliban. This would be a muddled, imperfect strategy with frustratingly modest goals, but it would be sustainable
politically and militarily. And it does not require heavy investments of American and Afghan blood.

C. Islamic extremist takeover of Pakistan leads to nuclear war.

Ricks, 01 – senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and covers Iraq for the Washington Post Staff
Writer (Thomas E., 10/21/01, “Some Fear Regional Destabilization, Retribution Against U.S”
http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/news/articles/warconsequences.htm, IC)
The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear
weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if
it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive
action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has
conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam
Gardiner, an expert on strategic games.

D. Extinction
Fai 7/8/2001 (Ghulam Nabi; Executive director - Kashmiri American Council) Washington Times l/n wbw)
The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement
at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and
sandwiched between nuclear -capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in
1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United
States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view . The director of central intelligence, the Defense
Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and
Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles . Their
defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

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Adv. 3 - NATO Alliance

A. NATO alliance is crumbling now due to U.S. bullying of NATO allies in Afghanistan- Afghanistan is decisive
moment for alliance. Only way to save NATO is to allow it to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Bacevich, ’10 - a professor of history and international relations at Boston University (Andrew J., March/April, “Let Europe be Europe: Why the United States Must
Withdraw from NATO,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/let_europe_be_europe?page=0,1 CT)
Over the course of the disastrous 20th century, inhabitants of the liberal democratic world in ever-increasing numbers reached this conclusion: War doesn't pay
and usually doesn't work. As recounted by historian James J. Sheehan in his excellent book, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?, the countries
possessing the greatest capability to employ force to further their political aims lost their enthusiasm for doing so. Over time, they turned away from war. Of
course, there were lingering exceptions. The United States and Israel have remained adamant in their determination to harness war and demonstrate its utility.
Europe, however, is another matter. By the dawn of this century, Europeans had long since lost their stomach for battle. The change was
not simply political. It was profoundly cultural. The cradle of Western civilization -- and incubator of ambitions that drenched the contemporary age in blood -- had become
thoroughly debellicized. As a consequence, however willing they are to spend money updating military museums or maintaining war memorials, present-day Europeans have
become altogether stingy when it comes to raising and equipping fighting armies. This pacification of Europe is quite likely to prove
irreversible. Yet even if reigniting an affinity for war among the people of, say, Germany and France were possible, why would any sane person even try? Why not allow
Europeans to busy themselves with their never-ending European unification project? It keeps them out of mischief. Washington, however, finds it difficult
to accept this extraordinary gift -- purchased in part through the sacrifices of U.S. soldiers -- of a Europe that has laid down its arms. Instead, successive
U.S. administrations have pushed, prodded, cajoled, and browbeaten European democracies to shoulder a
heavier share of responsibility for maintaining world order and enforcing liberal norms. In concrete terms, this attempt to
reignite Europe's martial spirit has found expression in the attempted conversion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from a defensive alliance
into an instrument of power projection. Washington's aim is this: take a Cold War-inspired organization designed to keep the Germans down, the Russians out, and the
Americans in, and [to] transform it into a post-Cold War arrangement in which Europe will help underwrite American
globalism without, of course, being permitted any notable say regarding U.S. policy. The allies have not proven
accommodating. True, NATO has gotten bigger -- there were 16 member states 20 years ago, 28 today -- but growth has come at the expense of cohesion. Once an
organization that possessed considerable capability, NATO today resembles a club that just about anyone can join, including, most recently, such military powerhouses as Albania
and Croatia. A club with lax entrance requirements is unlikely to inspire respect even from its own members. NATO's agreed-upon target for defense spending, for example, is a
paltry 2 percent of GDP. Last year, aside from the United States, exactly four member states met that goal. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe -- today, as always,
a U.S. general -- still presides in splendor over NATO's military headquarters in Belgium. Yet SACEUR wields about as much clout as the president of a decent-sized university.
He is not a commander. He is a supplicant. SACEUR's impressive title, a relic of World War II, is merely an honorific, akin to calling Elvis the King or Bruce the Boss.
Afghanistan provides the most important leading indicator of where Washington's attempt to nurture a muscle-
flexing new NATO is heading; it is the decisive test of whether the alliance can handle large-scale, out-of-area
missions. And after eight years, the results have been disappointing. Complaints about the courage and
commitment of NATO soldiers have been few. Complaints about their limited numbers and the inadequacy of
their kit have been legion. An immense complicating factor has been the tendency of national governments to impose restrictions on where and how their forces are
permitted to operate. The result has been dysfunction. When Gen. Stanley McChrystal's famous assessment of the
situation in Afghanistan leaked to the media last year, most observers focused on his call for additional U.S.
troops. Yet the report was also a scathing demand for change in NATO's International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF). "ISAF will change its operating culture.... ISAF will change the way it does business," he wrote. "ISAF's subordinate headquarters must stop fighting separate campaigns."
The U.S. general found just about nothing in ISAF's performance to commend. But McChrystal's prospects for fixing ISAF run headlong into
two stubborn facts. First, European governments prioritize social welfare over all other considerations --
including funding their armed forces. Second, European governments have an exceedingly limited appetite for
casualties. So the tepid, condition-laden European response to McChrystal's call for reinforcements -- a couple of battalions here, a few dozen trainers there, some creative
bookkeeping to count units that deployed months ago as fresh arrivals -- is hardly surprising. This doesn't mean that NATO is without value. It
does suggest that relying on the alliance to sustain a protracted counterinsurgency aimed at dragging Afghans
kicking and screaming into modernity makes about as much sense as expecting the "war on drugs" to curb the
world's appetite for various banned substances. It's not going to happen. If NATO has a future, it will find that
future back where the alliance began: in Europe. NATO's founding mission of guaranteeing the security of European democracies has lost none of its
relevance. Although the Soviet threat has vanished, Russia remains. And Russia, even if no longer a military superpower, does not exactly qualify as a status quo country. The
Kremlin nurses grudges and complaints, not least of them stemming from NATO's own steady expansion eastward. So let NATO attend to this new (or residual) Russian problem.
Present-day Europeans -- even Europeans with a pronounced aversion to war -- are fully capable of mounting the defenses necessary to deflect a much reduced Eastern threat. So
why not have the citizens of France and Germany guarantee the territorial integrity of Poland and Lithuania, instead of fruitlessly demanding that Europeans take on
responsibilities on the other side of the world that they can't and won't? Like Nixon setting out for Beijing, like Sadat flying to Jerusalem, like Reagan deciding that Gorbachev
was cut from a different cloth, the United States should dare to do the unthinkable: allow NATO to devolve into a European

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organization, directed by Europeans to serve European needs, upholding the safety and well-being of a Europe
that is whole and free -- and more than able to manage its own affairs.

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B. The Alliance is key to deter Russia
Perkovich 9 (George May 2009 George Perkovich is vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace http://www.icnnd.org/research/Perkovich_Deterrence.pdf TBC 6/23/10)
The former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states now in NATO are more exposed to Russian coercion. Russia has conventional
military superiority over these states which are located near it and Russia probably would be more willing to use hard power against
them than it is against Western European states. NATO collectively has the military resources to deter and stymie
potential Russian aggression against the new NATO states. The question, as discussed below, is under what circumstances NATO would have
the political will to confront Russia on behalf of the new members. And would this resolve be greater or weaker in a world without nuclear weapons?

C. War with Russia would result in use of enhanced radiation and improved nuclear weapon designs
Schneider 06 - analyst for US Nuclear Strategy Forum (2006, Mark, “The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation,”
http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/Russian%20nuclear%20doctrine
%20--%20NSF%20for%20print.pdf) BD
In Russia, today, we see a number of ominous trends. There is a retreat from democracy coupled with a longing for the
superpower status of the Soviet Union which cannot be supported at any time in the foreseeable future. Russia’s approach to maximizing its
political power has been the adoption of a dangerous nuclear escalation strategy that is not aimed at the
deterrence of real enemies but rather at the United States and NATO. Russian strategic forces will numerically decline over the next
decade and beyond, but they will still be several times greater than those we feared could destroy the world during the Cuban missile crisis and will be far more technically The
Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation 27 sophisticated and militarily effective. Russia has a broad based nuclear modernization
effort underway, involving both new delivery systems and new nuclear weapons. Knowledgeable Russians report that the focus of
this program is the introduction of precision low yield nuclear weapons including a number of advanced designs such as
penetrators, enhanced radiation, EMP and “clean” weapons designs. With elections in both the United States and Russia in 2008, the future
of the U.S.Russian relationship is uncertain at best, particularly if Russia continues to turn away from democracy. There are risks associated with the
Russian nuclear doctrine, even if U.S.-Russian relations were to improve. As Alexander Golts wrote in December 2004, “To this day
Russian generals have decisively refused to train the Armed Forces for any other conflict than wars with the USA and NATO.

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Adv. 4 – Terrorism

A. NATO is the only institution that can solve existential threats from terrorism that can come immediately from
anywhere
Robertson 3 (Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the 9th Conference de Montreal May 6 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030506a.htm TBC
6/22/10
The scale of threats has also increased. Today terrorism is more international, more apocalyptic in its vision, and far more lethal. And
despite the best efforts of our diplomats and counter-proliferation experts, the spread of bio-chemical and nuclear weapons is already a
defining security challenge of this new century. If not addressed, it will put more fingers on more triggers. And because not
all of these fingers will belong to rational leaders, traditional deterrents will not always deter. All this adds up to a
guaranteed supply chain of instability. It adds up to a security environment in which threats can strike at anytime, without warning, from
anywhere and using any means, from a box-cutter to a chemical weapon to a missile. In the months leading to Prague,
NATO’s 19 member countries demonstrated that they understood the nature of this challenge and were united in
a common response to it. What this has meant in practice for the Alliance can be summarised under three headings: new roles, new relationships and new
capabilities. NATO is worth retaining only if it is relevant. It evolved successfully in the 1990s to engage former adversaries across the old Soviet bloc and then to deal with
Now NATO is radically changing again to play important new roles in the fight
instability and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.
against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It already provides the common glue of military
interoperability without which multinational operations of any kind would be impossible. Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 and
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry were able to operate effectively against the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan only because of decades of cooperation in NATO.
NATO at Prague became the focal point for
After 9/11, NATO also played a supporting role in actions against Al Qaida. Most importantly, however,
planning the military contribution against terrorism, a major new role and one which no other organisation in
the world could play. In doing so, we have put an end to decades of arid theological debate about whether the Alliance could operate outside Europe. NATO
now has a mandate to deal with threats from wherever they may come.

B. Nuclear terrorism causes nuclear war and extinction.

Guardian, 3-31-2008, Project Syndicate, “The Nuclear Risk,”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/mar/31/newnuclearrisk
Vital pillars of the old arms-control and anti-proliferation regime have either been destroyed - as was the case with the anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) treaty - or substantially weakened, as with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Responsibility for this lies largely with the Bush administration,
which, by terminating the ABM treaty, not only weakened the international control systems for nuclear weapons, but also sat on its hands when confronted with the NPT's
At the beginning of the 21st century, proliferation of military nuclear technology is one of the major threats to humanity, particularly if this
imminent collapse.
technology falls into terrorists' hands. The use of nuclear weapons by terrorists would not only result in a major
humanitarian tragedy, but also would most likely move the world beyond the threshold for actually waging a nuclear
war. The consequences would be horrific.

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Contention 2: Solvency

A. Obama should follow deadline established in December 2009. Four reasons: (1) Karzai government
corrupt, (2) presence increases Taliban’s funding, (3) Pakistan undermining US by funding Taliban, and (4)
NATO is withdrawing in July 2011 and U.S. cannot fight alone.
Sarro ’10 - studied International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto. (6/23/2010,
Doug, “Five Reasons to Withdraw from Afghanistan Sooner Rather Than Later” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-
sarro/five-reasons-to-withdraw_b_621903.html) HG
Gen. Stanley McChrystal's talent[1] for broadcasting his innermost feelings to the world at large is the least of President Obama's problems in Afghanistan. In the face of
Obama needs to decide how quickly to withdraw U.S. troops from the country.
rapidly rising violence throughout the country,
Here are five reasons why Obama should end the Afghan war sooner rather than later: 1. Karzai hasn't changed since he
fudged his re-election last year. Counterinsurgency only succeeds if you're working in support of a
government capable of gaining public trust. Afghan President Hamid Karzai does not lead such a government.
A network of well-connected strongmen, most prominently the president's brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai[2], still run the show in Afghanistan, and remain as unpopular
among Afghans as ever. And Karzai's police force, underfunded and demoralized due to widespread graft among its upper echelons and staffed with officers who
shake down Afghan civilians to supplement their wages, is utterly incapable of securing the country. In sum, the Afghan president has
given NATO no compelling reason to keep writing him blank checks. 2. Early withdrawal means less cash for
the Taliban. A recent report[4] from Congress lends credence to something NATO insiders[5] have been saying for weeks—U.S. tax dollars are
flowing into the Taliban's coffers. Apparently, this is how it works: the Pentagon hires Afghan shipping companies to
transport goods across the country. These companies then subcontract security for these convoys to local
warlords, who in turn provide security by bribing the Taliban not to attack them. They then use whatever cash they have left to
bribe the Taliban to attack convoys they aren't guarding, so as to persuade shippers to hire them next time. Since the Pentagon seems unable to prevent this from happening
while U.S. troops are in Afghanistan, a withdrawal seems to be the only way to block off this Taliban revenue stream. 3.
Washington wouldn't have to defend drug lords at the UN anymore. Over 30,000 Russians die each year because of opiates, 90% of which come from Afghanistan. But when
Russia called on the UN Security Council[6] to launch a crackdown on the Afghan opium trade, the United States, along with other NATO countries on the
Council, quickly poured cold water on the idea. Spraying Afghan farmers' opium crops, they said, would alienate farmers and in doing so undermine McChrystal's
counterinsurgency strategy. 4. Sticking around won't stop Pakistan from slipping aid to the Taliban. Despite the Pakistan
government's protestations to the contrary, evidence[7] is mounting[8] that its intelligence service, in a bid to maximize Islamabad's influence in
Afghanistan and entice militants to halt their attacks in Pakistan, is supplying covert aid to the Taliban and other Afghan militant
groups. Even a massive, open-ended surge won't crush the Taliban as long as its operatives can scurry across the Pakistan border any time they need more ammunition and
recruits. Instead, Washington should slash its military aid to Pakistan and restore it only when its government cuts all of its ties to the
Taliban[9]. 5. The rest of NATO won't be in Afghanistan much longer. Canada, which has been Washington's key ally in Kandahar , will
be out by 2011. Britain will likely withdraw soon after, along with most of NATO's European contingent. If
Obama does not synch his withdrawal with his allies', it won't be long before America finds itself alone in
Afghanistan. We can't pretend that an early American withdrawal won't have consequences for Afghanistan. But it's difficult to see how U.S. forces can avoid these
consequences as long as the Afghan government remains unwilling to clean up its act, and as long as Pakistan's intelligence service remains committed to propping up militant
This is why President Obama should stick to his plan to start withdrawing American troops from
groups.
Afghanistan in 2011, and finish withdrawing soon after.

B. Combat troops unnecessary to stabilize Afghanistan– only need UAV and advisors for training.
Innocent & Carpenter, 09 - *Foreign Policy Analyst at Cato Institute, AND ** Vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato Institute (9/14/09,
Cato Institute, “Escaping the ‘Graveyard of Empires’: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan”, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10533, IC)
Denying a sanctuary to
Given the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, a definitive, conventional "victory" is not a realistic option.
terrorists who seek to attack the United States does not require Washington to pacify the entire country, eradicate
its opium fields, or sustain a long-term military presence in Central Asia. From the sky, U.S. unmanned
aerial vehicles can monitor villages, training camps, and insurgent compounds. On the ground, the
United States can retain a small number of covert operatives for intelligence gathering and discrete operations against specific targets, as well
as an additional small group of advisers to train Afghan police and military forces. The United States
should withdraw most of its forces from Afghanistan within the next 12 to 18 months and treat al Qaeda's
presence in the region as a chronic, but manageable, problem

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C. Withdrawing US troops solves – it lessens the risk of Pakistani instability

Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University. “Winning In Afghanistan” – December
31st – 2008 – http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/30/winning-in-afghanistan.html

One of history's enduring lessons is that Afghans don't appreciate it when outsiders tell them how to govern their
affairs—just ask the British or the Soviets. U.S. success in overthrowing the Taliban seemed to suggest this lesson no longer applied, at least to Americans.
That quickly proved an illusion. In Iraq, toppling the old order was easy. Installing a new one to take its place has turned out to be infinitely harder. Yet the
challenges of pacifying Afghanistan dwarf those posed by Iraq. Afghanistan is a much bigger country—nearly the size of Texas—and has
a larger population that's just as fractious. Moreover, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan possesses almost none of the prerequisites of modernity; its literacy rate, for
example, is 28 percent, barely a third of Iraq's. In terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, the government in Kabul lags well behind Baghdad—not exactly a
lofty standard. Apart from opium, Afghans produce almost nothing the world wants. While liberating Iraq may have seriously reduced the reservoir of U.S.
power, fixing Afghanistan would drain it altogether. Meanwhile, the chief effect of allied military operations there so far has been not
to defeat the radical Islamists but to push them across the Pakistani border. As a result, efforts to stabilize Afghanistan
are contributing to the destabilization of Pakistan, with potentially devastating implications. September's bombing of the
Marriott hotel in Islamabad suggests that the extremists are growing emboldened. Today and for the foreseeable future, no country poses a greater
potential threat to U.S. national security than does Pakistan. To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain
hope of salvaging Afghan-istan would be a terrible mistake. All this means that the proper U.S. priority for Afghanistan
should be not to try harder but to change course. The war in Afghanistan (like the Iraq War) won't be won militarily. It can be settled—
however imperfectly—only through politics. The new U.S. president needs to realize that America's real political objective in Afghanistan is actually quite
modest: to ensure that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda can't use it as a safe haven for launching attacks against the West. Accomplishing that won't require
creating a modern, cohesive nation-state. U.S. officials tend to assume that power in Afghanistan ought to be exercised from Kabul. Yet the real influence in
Afghanistan has traditionally rested with tribal leaders and warlords. Rather than challenge that tradition, Washington should work with it. Offered the right
incentives, warlords can accomplish U.S. objectives more effectively and more cheaply than Western combat battalions. The basis of U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan should therefore become decentralization and outsourcing, offering cash and other emoluments to local leaders who will collaborate with the
United States in excluding terrorists from their territory. This doesn't mean Washington should blindly trust that warlords will become America's loyal
partners. U.S. intelligence agencies should continue to watch Afghanistan closely, and the Pentagon should crush any jihadist activities that local powers fail to
stop themselves. As with the Israelis in Gaza, periodic airstrikes may well be required to pre-empt brewing plots before they mature. Were U.S. resources
unlimited and U.S. interests in Afghanistan more important, upping the ante with additional combat forces might make sense. But U.S. power—especially
military power—is quite limited these days, and U.S. priorities lie elsewhere. Rather than committing more troops, therefore, the new
president should withdraw them while devising a more realistic—and more affordable—strategy for Afghanistan.