Art and the Zen Master's Tea Pot: The Role of Aesthetics in the Institutional Theory of Art

Author(s): David C. Graves

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 341-
352
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 DAVID C. GRAVES
Art and the Zen Master's Tea Pot:
The Role of Aesthetics in the Institutional
Theory of Art
The philosophies of ArthurDanto and George
Dickie have been greatly influential,each in its
own way, in establishing a major trend in
post-1960 art theory. That trend had two major
features. The first was to advocate a necessary
connection between art theory and the arthood
status of works of art as such. The second fea-
ture, very much a result of the first, was to re-
move questionsof arthoodfrom questionsof the
aesthetic. It was a radical move, and one of the
utmost historical importance,for the opposites
of those two theses, in reverse order,were com-
monly accepted throughoutthe traditionof the
West's philosophy of art. That is to say, that
arthoodwas always necessarilyconnectedto the
aesthetic (or to beauty, pre-1750), and therefore
quite impervious to definitive, conceptualizing
theory.
In a sense, we were akin to a Zen novice who
always thoughtthattea was tea andthe pot was a
pot, until we became apprenticesof the Chado
mastersDanto and Dickie. Undertheir tutelage,
we came to realize that the tea was not tea and
the pot was not a pot: Art was not an "immedi-
ate" sort of affair, and art theory was not a chi-
mera. Among other concurrenttheories, the de-
velopment of Danto's Artworldand of Dickie's
institutional theory of art seemed to hail the
"endof artas we know it." Many thinkersraised
all manner of objection, but the insights were
too powerful. Moreover, the artworld itself
seemed to concur, what with the onslaught of
conceptualism, readymades, installations, ap-
propriations, and schizophrenic pastiche. The
so-called postmodernartworldraised the "Any-
thing Goes" banner, and some startedprinting
up the obituary.
However, perhapsto the surpriseof many,the
artworldof the past forty years showed us an-
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60:4 Fall 2002
other most intriguing truth: Indeed, anything
goes in art, but not everything works. To be
sure, our conception of art has changed consid-
erably, insofar as we are much more aware of
the contextualizationof works of art, but works
of art themselves, at least in the mainstream,
seem to be just about the same as they always
were. That is to say that, for the majority of
works of art,the aestheticstill seems to be quite
relevant, and that for most artists and theorists
the aesthetic still seems to be a pivotal category
of discourse. The main question of the paper is
thus: Given that the institutional conception
claims to have severed the traditionalbond be-
tween art and the aesthetic, so that the aesthetic
no longerplays an essentialrole in the definition
of art, what role does it play? Moreover, if the
aesthetic is not an essential and definitive fea-
ture of art, as the institutionaltheory contends,
then why is it still so centrallyimportantto art?
I. ART AND THE AESTHETICPART WAYS:
THE CONSTITUTIVENATURE OF ART
Of its very essence, the aesthetic involves that
which is presented to the senses, widely con-
strued.The aestheticdeals with colors andtones,
sounds and timbres, rhythmsand weights, bal-
ances and counterbalances.The aesthetic prop-
erties of any artifact, including works of art,
mustbe propertiesthatthe artifactexhibitsto the
senses. Therefore,any theoryof artthatholds the
aesthetic to be the defining essence of art must
then maintainthatcertainexhibitedpropertiesof
artifactsare responsiblefor the arthoodstatusof
those artifacts. In one way or another, this
includes virtuallyall traditionaltheoriesof artin
the West, since PlatoandAristotleup to Colling-
wood and even Goodman.Danto and Dickie are
342
singled out here because they presentedtheories
of art that explicitly claimed that certain non-
exhibitedpropertiesof worksof artarethose that
areresponsiblefor the works' being art.The pas-
sage from Danto, quotedtime and again, is: "To
see something as art requiressomethingthe eye
cannot decry-an atmosphereof artistictheory,
a knowledge of the history of art:an artworld."'
And from Dickie: "Theinstitutionaltheoryof art
concentratesattentionon the nonexhibitedchar-
acteristics that works of art have in virtue of
being embeddedin an institutionalmatrixwhich
may be called "the artworld"and argues that
these characteristicsareessentialanddefining."2
Even though the tight traditionalcorrelationbe-
tween art and the aesthetic had been subject to
considerable loosening by the post-Wittgen-
steinian thinkers of the analytic tradition,with
Danto and Dickie, art and the aesthetic finally
partedways.
The deep feature common to Danto and
Dickie is the realizationof the constitutivenature
of art.ForDanto, this resides in his key notionof
"the is of artistic identification."Whetherit be
for Leonardo'sMona Lisa or for Warhol'sBrillo
Box, a person's ability to say "Thatis a work of
art"aboutthe object dependsupon thatperson's
masteryof the "is of artisticidentification."Such
masteryinvolves a good workingknowledge of
the relevanttheoriesof artbehindthe objectsand
theirhistory.Withoutsuch knowledge, one sees
paint, canvas, cardboard,shapes, eyes that fol-
low you around the room, and all manner of
things, but one does not see those specific works
of artproperlyidentifiedas MonaLisa andBrillo
Box. As Danto says of Testadura,puzzled by
pure abstractart: "We cannot help him until he
has masteredthe is of artistic identificationand
so constitutesit a work of art."3Dickie concurs,
noting, however, that while Danto's argument
shows that works of artexist within a context or
framework,it does not revealthe natureof the el-
ements makingup the framework.4Dickie offers
up the elements of Danto's artworldin his later
version of the institutionaltheory, TheArt Cir-
cle.5 I will returnto Dickie's descriptionlateron.
The importantpoint for now is thatDickie main-
tains that the institutionsof the artworld,those
established cultural practices such as painting,
theater,andpoetry,arethe practicesthatactually
do constituteartifactsas works of art. One may
say that, as far as Dickie is concerned,the theo-
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
ries andhistoryof which Danto speaksareprop-
erly the theoriesof actualartworldsystems, such
as French impressionist painting and Chinese
theater,and theirhistory.6
For Danto, art theory and history constitute
artifacts as works of art. For Dickie, artworld
systems, subinstitutionsof the artworld,do that.
The question pertinentto both is how they do
that. Dickie offered the answer by focusing
uponthe rule-governednatureof the practicesof
art. In a nutshell, at the core of the artworldat
large, as well as at the core of each of its subsys-
tems, is a constitutivesystem of rules. As Dickie
describesthe institutionof the artworldin terms
of rules and roles,7he finds thatthereare certain
basic, nonconventional rules that institute the
very practiceof art. Two such rules that Dickie
cites are: (1) "If one wishes to make a work of
art, one must do so by creatingan artifact"and
(2) "If one wishes to make a work of art, one
must do so by creatinga thing of a kind which is
presented to an artworld public."8 These two
rules together, states Dickie, are sufficient for
art. Thus, by calling attentionto the rule-gov-
ernednatureof art-making,Dickie proposesthat
the rules establish a "way of doing," which,
when generally recognized by the public, insti-
tute a practice.Any such institution,by way of
its rules, can set out various clusters of require-
ments that must be met by different members
acting in certain capacities. In the case of art,
there are such rule-stipulatedrequirementsone
must fulfill so as to count as an artist,or public
member,or curator,and so on. These areinstitu-
tional roles, which vest the members with the
authority to carry out their respective tasks.9
Summingup the new twist, Dickie suggests that
art can be seen to be a complex of interrelated
roles governed by constitutive (nonconven-
tional) rules.'0
Thus, if one might be hard-pressedto explain
how theoriesor historycan constitutean artifact
as a work of art, one would not be so hard-
pressed to explain how an institutioncan do so.
That is what institutions do. A fortiori, if one
conceives of institutionsas rule-governedprac-
tices, which is the proper way to regardthem.
The logic of the "is of artisticidentification"be-
comes analogous to other cases of culturally
based identifications.A culturalinstitutiongov-
erned by constitutiverules can transforma ball
being kicked into a framednet into the winning
Graves The Role of Aesthetics in the InstitutionalTheoryof Art
goal for the Spanish soccer team. Games simply
are cultural institutions, systems of rules that
constitute the relevant facts of the matter. The
brutefacts concerningthe Spanishsoccer team's
victory are that one person kicked a ball into a
framednet, while otherstriedto stop him. A per-
son who is ignorantof the rules of soccer would
see just that, that is, something analogous to
"nonartisticidentification." The institution of
soccer institutesthe relevantfacts of the matter,
and it does so by way of the participants'acting
in accord with a particular system of rules.
Acting in accord with the rules constitutes cer-
tain institutionalfacts,and they are the pertinent
ones.1I So it is with art:The rule-systems gov-
erning the practices of the artworldinstitute all
relevant art-facts. Artworld systems (usually
called genres or styles, etc.) such as impression-
ist painting and realist cinema are systems of
rules specifying means,ends, products,androles
for theirrespectivepractices.This is sufficientto
explain both Dickie's and Danto's ways of
thinking. Seen this way, Dickie's conception
falls right in line with other respectable con-
ceptions in other realms. Following Wittgen-
stein's conception of language games, this con-
ception of art follows the same kind of logic as
John Searle's theory of speech acts12and Asa
Kasher'stheoryof pragmatics,13to mentiontwo
pertinentanalogues.
As noted earlier, Dickie and Danto are but
two key figures in a major trend of post-1960
philosophy of art. The idea that nonexhibited
properties, hence, nonaesthetic properties, are
responsible for transformingan artifactinto art
is an idea common to their theories. In one way
or another, this contratraditionalkey idea is
common to a host of other contemporarytheo-
ries like proceduralism(e.g., Stephen Davies),
polyfunctionalism(e.g., RobertStecker),the in-
tentional-historicaltheory (e.g., JerroldLevin-
son), not to mention the plethora of post-
modernist theories that reject the aesthetic
essence of art, along with any other essence.
Certainpostmodernisttheories to one side, the
key idea of the institutionaltheory seems to be
variablyimplied by all these kinds of newer the-
ories, namely, that the culturalpractices of the
artworldplay a constitutive role in the defini-
tion, identification,and classificationof art.It is
commonplace nowadays to think that the aes-
thetic propertiesand values of works of art are
343
but one possible type of relevantpropertiesand
values. Art today is considered to be multifac-
eted, including aspects of the cognitive, the
moral, the political, and so on, and not just the
aesthetic. This is not really a matterof theory;
the artworlditself showed us that, startingwith
Dada and Duchamp,throughPop Art and con-
ceptualism, up to installations and appropria-
tions. Thus, the main question of this investiga-
tion becomes clear: If, under such a general
institutionalconception, the aesthetic does not
play the definitive role in art, what role does it
play?
II. THE INSTITUTIONALSTRUCTUREOF THE ARTWORLD
Of all the newer, nonaesthetic philosophies of
art,the institutionaltheoryappearsto be the far-
thest removed from considerationsof the aes-
thetic (with the exception of Davies's proce-
dural theory, which is a proper variant of the
institutionaltheory). For functionalisttheories,
the aesthetic may play a basic role as the
delineatorof one of art's key functions. For the
intentional-historicaltheories,the aestheticmay
delineate a basic notion of properregardfor art,
historically based. For the later Danto, art be-
came "embodiedmeaning,"14and the aesthetic
is basicallyjust presumed.For Dickie, however,
in both his versions of the institutionaltheory,
the aesthetic does not even appearin any of his
proposeddefinitionsof art.For this reason,I am
inquiringas to the possible role of the aesthetic
in artfrom the perspectiveof the theorythat ap-
pears to be most alien to the idea-the institu-
tional theory. If we can answer the query there,
and given thatthe institutionaltheoryappearsto
be pivotal to the antitraditionaltrend spoken of
earlier, then we may possess a sound basis for
follow-up investigationsinto the role of aesthet-
ics in contemporaryphilosophy of art.
Summingup the previouspoint, the mainstay
of the post-1960 antitraditionaltrendin philoso-
phy of art, spearheadedby the institutionalthe-
ory, is that nonexhibited, hence nonaesthetic,
propertiesare the ones responsible for arthood
status.And yet, so many people, artistsand the-
orists alike, still hinge their practices upon the
aesthetic.Why is the aesthetic still so important
to art? The problem restated,then, is this: Can
the apparentlystill-centralrole of the aesthetic
in art be accounted for under an institutional
344
conception? The answer I wish to propose is
yes. Moreover, I wish to show that Dickie and
Danto converge on the same point, all differ-
ences aside. That point of convergence is the
idea of art as essentially being a matterof em-
bodied meaning.To show this, it is necessaryto
take a closer look at the institution of the art-
world.
Simon wishes to be an artist.If he is to fulfill
his wish, Dickie tells him thathe must create an
artifact, a thing of a kind to be presented to a
public. Simon sets out to do that. Two central
questions will arise of their own accord, and
present themselves to Simon. In no order of
preference,those questions are "Whatartifact?"
and "Why?"It is importantto note thatthe insti-
tutionaltheory does not answerthese questions,
and purposely so. The institutionaltheory does
not place any restrictionswhatsoever upon the
kind of artifact,its materialand application,that
can be a work of art. Nor does the theory place
any restrictions upon the reasons for making
such an artifact,that is, the artisticideology be-
hind the act. This is a deep featureof the theory,
for, as Dickie points out, it provides the elastic-
ity whereby creativity of even the most radical
sort can be accommodated by the artworld.15
Thus, Simon must decide for himself what sort
of artifact to make and why, or, conversely,
what is it thathe wants "to say" (i.e., why do it at
all) and what sort of artifact is likely to "say"
that. (This is not the place to expand, but this is
the startof understandingthe truerole of the art-
ist under the institutionalconception, and, per-
haps to the surprise of some, it is not far re-
moved from the traditionalmodern conception
at all.)
So, Simon the would-be artisthas some major
decisions to make. He can paint a painting,if he
has the inclination.But why? Thatwould depend
on whathe was tryingto say. He could say some-
thing aboutthe romanticaspects of personalbe-
littling in face of the vastness of nature. Yes,
Simon could paintthat.He could also danceit, or
rhyme it. WhateverSimon finally decides to do,
the internallogic of the artworldstartsto become
clear. For Simon to fulfill the role of artist, he
must create some sort of artifact with some
meaningful purpose behind it (that meaning is
why he intendsto presentit to a public). So, there
are now two levels of considerationin Simon's
case: the "what?"and the "why?"which are sat-
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
isfied by "painting"and "romanticism,"respec-
tively. Now Dickie always maintainedthat the
artworld consisted of a multitude of subin-
stitutions,called "artworldsystems,"but he gen-
erally regardedthem to be the various media of
art-painting, sculpture,music, theater,and po-
etry. Here, however, we see that a multitudeof
artistic"ideologies"are also involved. Thereare
no "paintings"in the artworld,there are only
"expressionistpaintings"or "romanticistpaint-
ings" or "realistpaintings,"and so on. However,
expressionism,romanticism,and realism, as ar-
tistic ideologies-as sources to answer "why?"
or "whatdoes it mean?"questions-can be man-
ifested in paintingor poetryor many otherartis-
tic "whats."
The institutionallogic, if I may, standingbe-
hind both primarylevels of considerationis one
and the same. There is no brutereason why oil
paintis a mediumof art.If one is to use oil paint
as an artistic medium, then that fact, and other
pertinentfacts of the matter,simply must be in-
stituted.16The same holds truefor artisticideol-
ogies. Art can deal with objective reality (real-
ism), with subjective attitudes(expressionism),
with "naturevs. human spirit"issues (romanti-
cism), or virtually any other sorts of meanings
and significance. However, if one is to use artto
expound upon the subjective attitudes toward
life situations, expressionism as an art form
must be instituted.As Dickie noted, there is no
limit to the numberof such subsystemsthat can
be incorporatedin the overall frameworkof the
artworld.
Scanning the artworld,we can see that there
are artworldsystems thatinstitutepracticescon-
cerning the use of material(broadlyconstrued).
We call them "mediums."Also, we find another
set of artworldsystems thatinstitutevariouside-
ologies for art, such as impressionism,expres-
sionism, and all the other "isms."(I like to call
these subsystems "Big Theory" institutions of
the artworld.Roughly, they are artworld-inter-
nal theories of art, distinguishedfrom artworld-
externaltheories,such as philosophicalor socio-
logical theories.) We note that the first set, the
media, are quite independentof the second set,
the ideologies, since a medium such as painting
can manifest virtuallyany artisticideology, and
a specific ideology such as expressionismcan be
manifested in virtually any medium (in princi-
ple, at least). That means that a third set of
Graves The Role of Aesthetics in the InstitutionalTheoryof Art 345

artworldsystems is needed, one that institutes was wrong, but until now, he had focused only
the very specific practicesof using a certaintype on the framework of the artworld,and not so
of medium to manifest a certain artistic ideol- much on what one finds within that framework.
ogy. French impressionist painting is such an Upon examinationof the inner workings of the
artworldsystem, a way of putting painting and artworld, one finds that the artworld at large
impressionismtogether.We commonly refer to does indeed instituteartas embodiedmeaning.18
these third-levelsubsystemsas genres, styles, or This in itself would be sufficient to reinstatethe
techniques.17 The institutional logic of the aesthetic as being integral to the enterpriseof
artworld,then, can be broken down into three art.If artessentially involves the embodimentof
distinctcomponents:(a) what sortof artifactone meaning, and the very purpose of embodiment
is to produce; (b) what sort of ideology one is presentationto the senses, then the aesthetic is
wishes to make manifest; and (c) how to go indeed essential to art, even under the institu-
aboutdoing that,that is, how to use the material tional conception.However, even thoughthat is
to manifest the meaning. This logic is mirrored the way I wish to go, it will not be that simple.
by the artworlditself, when we distinguish be- The institutionaltheoryis quitedifferentfrom
tween the threedifferenttypes of subinstitutions traditionaltheories of art as embodied meaning
one finds within: in the importantrespect that embodied meaning
is a conclusion of the institutionalconception,
1. The medium-based subinstitutions
such as paint- ratherthan an assumption.The institutionalthe-
ing, music,poetry,and so on. The rule-systems ory might very well be capableof demonstrating
herearespecificas to thematerialrequirements of what the other theories can but presume.
the variousmediaof art,butremainopenwithre- From what has been said thus far, I hope I have
gardto artisticideology. shown thatit is quiteplausibleto suggest thatthe
2. The ideology-basedsubinstitutions such as real- institutionaltheorycan explainwhy the aesthetic
ism, expressionism,conceptualism,and so on. is essential to art, if one accepts its premises (as
They are specific aboutthe ideologicalrequire- outlinedabove). However, for this suggestionto
ments,butremainopenwithregardto materialas- be properlyfollowed through,thereis one more
pects. (In some cases, secondaryideologiesare preliminaryissue that must be fleshed out. That
alsoplacedhere.Forexample,abstract expression- issue is that the institutional theory's derived
ism andfigurativeexpressionism arebothplaced principle of embodied meaning is a schematic
underthe institution of expressionism.) one. Dickie saidthereis no limit to the numberof
3. Thetechnique-based whicharethe
subinstitutions, subsystems that can be incorporatedinto the
frameworks in whichartproduction actuallytakes frameworkof the artworld.This is the heartand
place.Material(type 1) andideology(type2) are soul of art's endlessly creative capacities. If,
joinedtogetherhereto forma systemthatspecifies however, those subsystemsconverge so as to in-
mostpreciselythenatureof its artgame.Forexam- stitute modes of embodying meaning, as shown
ple,LesFauvesandDie Bruckearespecificsubin- above, then the artworldis also open to numer-
stitutionsof paintingandfigurative
expressionism. ous manners of embodying meaning. The art-
world itself does not tell us how to embody
III. ART AS EMBODIEDMEANING meaning,only thatwe should.
In principle, then, if the artworldis open to
The artworld, then, is not just some formless any manner of subsystem, then it is also open
cluster of randomsubsystems. It is a structured to any manner of embodying meaning. "Any-
institution,bearinga distinct sort of logic about thing Goes" is the slogan brandishedupon the
it. Thatlogic, bluntlyput, is a logic of embodied banner of post-1960 art, and the institutional
meaning. It is manifestedby the three constitu- theoryconcurs.It does not tell us which material
tive components:(1) material,(2) idea or mean- to choose as a medium (nor why), which artistic
ing, and (3) a technique in which the materials ideology to employ (nor why), nor how to use
of the chosen medium (1) are used in certain the mediumto embody the meaning.To answer
ways that count as embodying (or trying to em- those questions,we need the specific, third-level
body) the chosen artisticideology (2). So, Danto artworld systems, with specific rules for em-
is right, after all. Dickie never said that Danto bodying meaning in that system. How one em-
346
bodies meaning in impressionist painting is
quite differentfrom how one embodies meaning
in romantic poetry. However, the institutional
theory does yield a general "embodied mean-
ing" rule, a guideline that instructs us to "do
whatever,"as long as the form of our artistic
doing can justifiably count as trying to embody
meaning.Whatwe get here is quite pleasing:we
get a universal principle allowing for, and ap-
plying to, a plurality of artforms.19
"Anythinggoes," we say, but not "everything
works."For an artifactto count as a work of art,
it must meet the constitutiverequirementsof the
artworld,namely, to be an artifactcreatedby an
artistand presentedto a public, within a (set of)
artworld system(s). Then it must meet the re-
quirementsof some properlyinstitutedmedium,
and it must meet the requirementsof some prop-
erly instituted artworld ideology (even if it is
one thatthe artistis inventing).At the bottomof
the institutional structureis a technique-based
subinstitution,which is fully specific with re-
gard to the ends, means, products,and roles of
the system. This top-down proceduredelineates
the classificatory path of artworld systems to
which the work in questionproperlybelongs. In
fact, the procedureconstructs the work as the
kind of artworkthat it is. The classificatorypath
of relevant artworld systems sets out the very
identity conditions of the work of art. The me-
dium-institutionsinstitutethe very fact that cer-
tain materials can be artistic media at all. The
ideology institutionsinstitute the very fact that
their products can mean anything at all as
"worksof art."The techniqueinstitutionsinsti-
tute the very fact thatusing a certainmaterialin
certainways counts as "embodyinga meaning"
at all. And they are all interrelated:for instance,
one cannottrulyunderstand(includingknowing
how to relateto or engage) one of Monet's "hay-
stack"paintingswithout understandingthe spe-
cific system of "Frenchimpressionistpainting."
And one cannotunderstand"Frenchimpression-
ist painting" without understandingsomething
about the more general systems of "impression-
ism" and "painting."This entails an understand-
ing of the history of painting, on the one hand,
and an understandingof the relation of impres-
sionism to other conceptions of art, on the other
hand. (This is a specific example of the kind of
knowledge Danto had in mind, for one to master
the "is of artistic identification.")Monet's cre-
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
ation of an impressionist painting was not, by
any stretch of the imagination, an easy and
mindless task. The institutionaltheory regards
this most difficult of creativeproceduresto hold
truefor all works of art.Thatis the rule, and ex-
ceptions, if any, arejust that.
IV. "ANYTHINGGOES, BUT NOT EVERYTHINGWORKS":
THE RETURN OF AESTHETICS
The institutionaltheory,then, is in complete ac-
cord with the idea of art as embodied meaning.
As suggested, the very structureof the artworld,
involving medium-based institutions, artistic
ideological institutions, and technical institu-
tions for wedding the one to the other,set up the
work of art as being embodied meaning. It fol-
lows that one ought to strive toward a form of
art-making,a style, a technique,in which a clear
relation of appropriatenessbetween the materi-
als used and ideology expressedis createdin the
artifact.Competentartistsknow this as a matter
of course. So do competentcritics. (In the era of
pluralism,however, we sometimes forget.) The
artistic distinction here is in the "body," first and
foremost, as has been well recognized from
Plato and Aristotle on (all differences notwith-
standing).Usually, the idea thatartisticmeaning
is unique (and I agree), comes from the notion
that the meaning of a work of art is such that it
can only be communicatedvia the body of the
work.The gist of it is simply "aesthetics."If cer-
tain material propertiesof an artifact manifest
some meaning,thatcan only be fully understood
when sensed, when felt. What the color red
might mean is quite opaque to someone who
cannotsee it. The possible meaningsof mass are
quite lost on someone raisedin zero gravity,and
who has notpersonally experiencedthe pressure
of weight. It is through the subjective, "in the
first person," sensations of material properties
of works of artthat the meanings manifestedby
the work emerge. Of course, this is all quite de-
pendent upon the competence of the artist and
the willingness of the public. If the artist does
not know how to get the materialpropertiesof
his or her work to appropriatelyrelate to the
work's intended range of meanings, then the
work will (normally)fail to engage. If the public
is unwilling to seek out that appropriaterelation
between the artist's use of materialand the in-
tended range of meanings (as often happens
Graves The Role of Aesthetics in the InstitutionalTheoryof Art
when a new artform is presented)then the work
will fail.
Now, the salient feature is that it is unclear
what constitutessuch an appropriaterelationbe-
tween matter and meaning in a work of art.
Given that art involves a generalrequirementto
embody meaning, and that there are numerous
mannersof embodying meaning that can be in-
stituted by the specific subinstitutions of the
artworld,then it is the propertaskof aestheticsto
investigate and explain what constitutesappro-
priate relationsbetween matterand meaning in
works of art, and why. This can be done at the
various levels of the artworld's institutional
structure,rangingfrom specific accountsof, say,
"theaestheticsof Germanromanticistpainting,"
up to more generalaccountsof "theaestheticsof
tonal keys in painting."Aesthetics has done as
much since its inception. The novelty here is in
the schematicnatureof the essential aestheticre-
quirement.From the institutionalpoint of view,
the artworldat large only demands that an art-
work be an instance of embodied meaning (as a
normative consequence of meeting the art-
world's internaldemands)but it does not specify
anythingat all aboutthe actual manifestationsof
the aesthetic requirement.(This is in complete
accord with the general "institutionallogic" of
the artworld,namely, deploying schematicdefi-
nitions that accommodateunfetteredcreativity.)
The artworld,as it were, "sets up"20art as bear-
ing a generalaestheticessence, and the artworld
subsystems set up the particulars.This needs a
bit of explanation.
The basic tenet of the institutionaltheory is
that an artifact must meet the constitutive re-
quirementsof the institutionof the artworldfor
it to be art. If my rendition of the institutional
theory here is viable, then any work of art must
properlybelong to (i.e., satisfy the requirements
of) at least threesubsystems:a medium,an artis-
tic ideology, and a technique subsystem. The
consequence of this, I have maintained,is that
any work of art is, in effect, an instance of em-
bodied meaning.Thus, in principle,aestheticsis
essential to arthoodstatus.21
However, this turnsout to be a necessarycon-
dition of art, but not sufficient. It is insufficient
precisely because the demandis schematic.For
the aesthetic condition to be sufficiently ful-
filled, an actual practice must be instituted.
Under the institutionalconception, the artworld
347
systems at the bottom of the institutionalstruc-
ture of the artworld-the technique-based
subinstitutions (genres, styles, schools)-are
quite explicitly institutionsthat specifically tell
us what counts as appropriaterelationsbetween
matterand meaning.These institutions,these art
forms, simply are practices of using certain
sorts of materials in certain sorts of ways to
mean certainsorts of things. A specific artworld
system, such as French impressionistpainting,
tells us what counts as appropriaterelationsbe-
tween matterand meaning for that system. It is
imperative to rememberthat instituting an art
form like French impressionistpainting consti-
tutes, creates,sets up the verypossibility of con-
struingMonet's brushstrokeas being appropri-
ate to what he is trying to say.22The institution
of Frenchimpressionistpaintingsets up the aes-
thetics of Monet's brushstroke,for that same
stroke,in a differentsubinstitution-say, French
neoclassical painting-would be deemed aes-
theticallyrepulsive.On the one hand,then, insti-
tutionalanalyses are indeed quite necessary,for
withoutthem the aestheticfloats freely in a frus-
tratingstateof "irreduciblevagueness"and "pe-
rennial debate."23On the other hand, the aes-
thetic investigations into art would provide the
tools and criteriafor determiningwhetheror not
a work of art succeeds in meeting the artworld's
normative requirementof embodied meaning,
how and why. As said, the artworlditself has
shown us that "anythinggoes, but not every-
thing works." Bluntly put, it is the task of aes-
thetics to show us what works (as far as embod-
ied meanings go), and why.
By a peculiartwist of fate, the role of the aes-
thetic here has "reversedits polarity,"if I may,
and not for the first time in its history. Tradi-
tionally, aesthetics served as the definitive as-
pect of art. As such, aesthetics was the anchor
that stabilized the ship of art theory. However,
in the wake of analytical aesthetics from the
1950s, aesthetics seemed to reverse its polarity,
andbecame the destabilizerof the philosophyof
art, what with its concepts being "irreducibly
vague" and "perenniallydebatable."With the
advent of postmodernistcritiques,the aesthetic
gained prominenceelsewhere in our spheres of
life, but seemed to fall out of the artworld's
compass altogether. To be sure, according to
Dickie's earlier versions of the institutional
theory and judging by Danto's early "identical
348
pairs" considerations,it seemed to follow that
artsimply did not have to be aestheticfor it to be
art.And yet, it seemed thatthe majorityof prac-
titioners in the artworldstill thoughtthat it did.
The task, then, is to find a philosophicaltheory
of art that at once accommodatesDickie's and
Danto's originalinsightspertainingto the neces-
sity of theoretical-historical-institutionalcon-
textualizationof art, together with the fact that
the aesthetic still seems to be essential to art,
even under the institutionalconception. This is
what I have tried to provide here.
Now, aesthetics changes it polarityyet again,
and may once more serve as the primarystabi-
lizing agent in the theory of art. This is so be-
cause of the twin featuresof the inherentplural-
ity of artforms, on the one hand,togetherwith a
universalconstraintfor embodied meanings, on
the otherhand.To be sure, Frenchimpressionist
painting institutes the aesthetics of Monet's
brushstroke,and yet there are always reasons
why a specific artworldpracticechooses to em-
ploy certain materials in certain ways so as to
say certain things. One employs music to tell a
kind of story,because a storydevelops over time
and music is a temporalmedium.That is a good
reason to employ music. However, it is quite
possible for one to present an exhibition of
paintings that the public would only listen to.
Simon, our would-be artist, could do that. He
can hang the pictures,andhandout blindfoldsto
all the guests, then have ushers guide them
across the faces of the paintings,pausingbefore
each one to listen to it. Moreover,if Simon were
to do that nowadays, he could probablybe as-
suredof fine press attention,for it is a good gim-
mick, and can be construedas being politically
correct in this age of nonoppressivepluralism.
However, from the perspectiveoffered here, we
at once acknowledgeSimon's legitimaterightto
do that in the name of art,but also point out that
using the medium of painting,a visual medium,
to embody an auditorymanifold of meaning is
simply a wrongheaded idea. The objective,
"brute"propertiesof the variousmedia can rea-
sonably be used in certainways, and not in oth-
ers. Under this proposal, the artworldtells us
what counts as an appropriaterelation between
mediumandmeaningfor a given form of art,but
it is up to aesthetics to inquireinto the reason-
ableness of that artworlddetermination.Some-
what in the spirit of Beardsley's notion of aes-
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
thetics as metacriticism, aesthetics becomes a
normative,hence, stabilizing, aspect of the phi-
losophy of art.
In a dispute with postmodernismwe might
concede that meaning is interpretation,but we
need not concede that the body is interpretation.
One might not know what a paintingmeans, but
one does know thatpaintingsareto be looked at.
One might not know what the brightcolors of a
painting mean, but one does see that they are
bright.Thus, one can reasonablyuse paintingas
a mediumto convey meaningsthatone can only
"see,"and use brightcolors to convey meanings
that are "bright."To be sure, there are many
ways to construethis, we have been throughall
that. Aesthetics will flesh out those problems,
for aesthetics can now be used as a stabilizing
agent, as it sifts throughthe reasonableuses of
materials to convey meanings, distinguishing
them from the unreasonableuses. Thus, in a
quirkytwist of fate, aestheticsin the age of radi-
cal interpretationstabilizes art theory by focus-
ing upon the objective, addressed to the senses
features of works of art, by focusing upon the
body of the work. The bodily featuresof works
of art are much harder to "interpretaway" at
whim and fancy.
It is imperative,however, not to repeat "the
mistake upon which traditional aesthetics
rested,"as we nod in William Kennick's direc-
tion.24If we areclear aboutthe role of aesthetics
suggested here, there will be no dangerof that.
The aestheticis indeed an essential identitycon-
dition of a work of art, but it is not the single
identifyingprinciple.Knowingthata workof art
is, in some sense, aesthetic(i.e., a case of embod-
ied meaning) is necessary for identifying it as a
workof art,but it is not sufficient.Knowledgeof
the work's institutionalcontextualization,the-
ory, and history, is also necessary. That is why
differentpeople are likely to pull differentarti-
facts out of the burningwarehouse.On the other
hand,we will not repeatKennick's own mistake
either. In the "burningwarehouse"story, Ken-
nick claims that "we are able to separatethose
objects which are works of artfrom those which
are not, because we know English."25As even
B. R. Tilghman,who is no fan of the institutional
theory, admits:"Artmay be more like entomol-
ogy than it is like color and it is not always
enough merely to be a native speakerin orderto
identify something as a work of art. Art is a re-
Graves The Role of Aesthetics in the InstitutionalTheoryof Art
markablycomplex cultural phenomenon-that
is the truthbehind the institutionaltheory-and
there are varying degrees of expertise and spe-
cialization in our intercoursewith it."26Placing
Danto's "embodied meanings" thesis in the
frameworkof Dickie' s institutionaltheoryof art
yields the most rewardingresults. On the one
hand, their insights concerning the necessary
theoretical embeddedness of works of art re-
main. Indeed, "anythinggoes" in art, this has
been shown to be quite inherentin the very na-
ture of art. On the other hand, since both their
paths lead directly to the notion of embodied
meaning,then a set of universalconstraintsmay
justifiably be placed upon any instance of art.
These constraintswill also be aesthetic in their
nature,if we bearin mind thatthey seek to estab-
lish appropriatebody/meaningrelationships.
V. THE ZEN MASTER'S TEA POT
So, what has changed? In the spirit of Zen, the
answer is "everythingand nothing." Until the
middle of the twentiethcentury,art in the West
had always been defined in terms of the exhib-
ited properties of works of art. More specifi-
cally, art had always been defined in terms of
the beautifuland then the aestheticpropertiesof
works of art. Even after the watershed of the
1960s, art was still generally identified by its
aesthetic properties, even if not defined (e.g.,
Goodman). Roughly put, the aesthetic deter-
mined the artistic,as a generalrule. For the pro-
ponents of Danto, Dickie, and the others of that
trend,all thatchanged.This was not some minor
alteration.What Danto and Dickie were telling
us is quite simply that what we thought made
somethingartdid not make it art, somethingen-
tirely differentdid. Moreover,they did not argue
that their theories applied to some new form of
art, but that art had always been that way. For
Danto, art always depended upon the appro-
priate atmosphere of theory and history. For
Dickie, art always depended upon established
institutionalpractices. The artistic and the aes-
thetic partedways, linked one to the other only
by a common and contingent history. In this
most importantsense, everythingchanged.
In spite of the strengthof theirinsights, and in
spite of the attempts of certain post-1960 art
forms (e.g., conceptualism)to sever thathistori-
cal link betweenthe artisticandthe aesthetic,art,
349
for the most part, retained its aesthetic flavor.
There were two basic possibilities: either artre-
mainedfaithfulto the aestheticout of mere con-
venience or the institutionaltheory was wrong.
Judgingby the vast quantityof objectionsraised
against the institutionaltheory since its incep-
tion, it is obvious that most people opted for the
second possibility.Thereis, however, a thirdop-
tion. Thatoption is thatthe institutionaltheoryis
right,but thatit does not necessarilysever the es-
sentiallink betweenthe artisticandthe aesthetic.
That is the option presentedherein. The institu-
tional theorysets up artas being a matterof em-
bodying meanings, thus the aesthetic is quite
integral to the enterpriseof art. The difference
between this position and the traditionalone is
still quite pronounced.Whereastraditionmain-
tained that art is by definition aesthetic, for the
institutionaltheoryartis aestheticas a normative
conclusionof the conception.Moreover,the nor-
mative demandis a schematic one, with the fe-
licitous result of having a universal aesthetic
constraint,which is consistentlyapplicableto an
(in principle)unboundedpluralityof artforms.
Having reachedthis point, and inquiringas to
the role of aestheticsundersuch an institutional
conception, we then find that nothing much has
really changed. Aesthetics still does what aes-
thetics has always done. It evaluatesart,it deals
with success andfailure,it works out the reason-
ableness of various modes of embodyingmean-
ing in the forms of art.Aesthetics still deals with
"sensate cognition," it still deals with "sensed
unities of complex manifolds,"it still deals with
intuitions.To be sure,the aestheticno longerde-
fines art, except for in a very cursorymannerin
the form of a schematic normativedemand for
meaningembodiment.Thatmay be very impor-
tant to the philosophy of art, to analyses of the
concept of art,but how important,really, is that
to aesthetics?27Having reachedthis point, I am
not sure that it is all that important.Aside from
the futile attemptto define art solely in terms of
aesthetics (which some people still insist upon
doing) aestheticsstill does whataestheticsdoes.
In "The Artworld,"Danto himself recounts
the tale of Ch'ing Yuan, who saw mountainsas
mountainsand watersas waters,until he studied
Zen. He came to a point where he saw that the
mountains were not mountains and the waters
were not waters.The next point was when he got
to know the very substance,and the mountains
350
were once again mountains, the waters once
again waters. Danto recounts this tale to illumi-
nate the all-important difference between a
philistine who looks at a pure abstractpainting
and says "it's only paint,"and between a tenth
streetabstractionistwho says the same aboutthe
same painting.If I were to expressthe difference
for the sake of brevity, I would say that the
philistine sees the nonartistic physical paint,
whereasthe artistsees the artisticphysicality of
paint.Thereis a world of differencebetween the
two, and thatis precisely what Danto was trying
to show.
I have something similar, but different, in
mind. So I have combined Ch'ing Yuan's Zen
journey with Chado, the Way of Tea, and the
traditionalJapanese Tea Ceremony. In a nut-
shell, the Tea Ceremony is one of pure giving
and receiving; it is a ritualfor cleansing and pu-
rifying the souls of the participantsin the cere-
mony. The principles that govern the Japanese
Tea Ceremonyare harmony,respect,purity,and
tranquility,which combine with what might be
called the Zen aestheticof emptinessto give the
Tea Ceremonyits distinctive feel. In the course
of the ritual,the ceremoniouspreparationof tea
by the one party, and the imbibing of it by the
other party, symbolizes a host of meanings and
significancesfar beyond the naturalpropensities
of drinkingtea. It is of the very natureof consti-
tutive culturalpractices, that certain actions or
things count as something else, under the rules
of the practice.So it is with art.The application
of paint to canvas, the production of sounds
from a taut string,the movementof the body on
a stage, all count as meaning and signify a host
of things in virtueof theirbeing embeddedin the
cultural matrix of the artworld and in accor-
dance with the rules of its establishedpractices.
There are threeimportantpoints to bear in mind
here. The first is that it is by the constitutivena-
ture of these culturalpractices that such mean-
ings and values are attained.The Tea Ceremony
constitutes its special state of peace and recon-
ciliation, and nothing else is quite like it. Sec-
ondly, the meaningsand values institutedby the
Tea Ceremonyare accessible only to those who
participate (or observe) "from within." Only
knowledge of the rules of the game affords un-
derstandingand the possibility of true engage-
ment. The observer"fromwithout,"ignorantof
the rules of the game, sees two people making
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
an awfully big deal out of nothing.He is Danto's
Testadura.The thirdpoint, perhapsthe most im-
portantone, is that the meanings and values in-
stituted by the Tea Ceremony are bona fide
meanings and values. They do count; they be-
come fact. Indeed, they are institutionalfacts,
not bruteones, but that mattersnot. The institu-
tional facts are the ones that count. As a matter
of brute fact, the tea is tea and the pot is a pot,
but that is not what counts.
Thus, in the Tea Ceremony,the tea is not just
tea, and the pot is not just a pot. They are also
something else. The transitionfrom traditional
aesthetic-basedtheoriesof artto the institutional
conception is somewhat like that. Traditionally,
art was consideredto be determinedby the aes-
thetic, and arttheorywas consideredto be a par-
asitical sort of attemptto make sense of art by
trying to define that which defies definition.
FromDanto and Dickie on, artwas not what we
had thoughtit was, nor was art theory. As with
the Tea Ceremony, the institutionalconception
argues that the meanings and values of art are
constitutedby the practicesof the artworld.True
understanding of, and engagement with, art
come only "from within." And, most impor-
tantly,the view "fromwithin"is glorious. A Mi-
chelangelocan be a jaw dropper,a Monet can be
a heartstopper,and a Rothkocan be a glimpse at
God. Only from within. From without, they are
fancy polished marble,erraticslops of paint,and
two rectangles.
Finally, however, tea was chosen for reasons,
(e.g., that it was a first medicine). So were mar-
ble, paint, and rectangles chosen for reasons.
After having learned to see the Tea Ceremony
andthe artworldin the properways, one maypro-
ceed furtherstill. A still deeperunderstandingin-
volves workingout the appropriaterelationsbe-
tween the brute facts and the institutionalones,
betweenthe naturalandthe cultural,betweenthe
objective and the subjective. In terms offered
herein, that deeperunderstandinginvolves rein-
troducingthe aestheticdimension.Imaginea Tea
Ceremony where the tea served was positively
vile and repulsiveto the taste. Well, so much for
that little tea party.28Our conception of the tea
pot may have changed radically, but the tea is,
after all, still tea. It is otherthings, but it is also
tea. A workof artis an artifactcreatedby an artist
and presentedto an artworldpublic, within a set
of artworldsystems. It is, however, also an arti-
Graves The Role of Aesthetics in the Institutional Theory of Art
fact thatis supposedto embody meaning.What-
ever meaning, and whatever mode of embodi-
ment,a workof artshould still be an appropriate
embodimentof its meaning.The practiceof artis
no easy task underthe institutionaltheory,as we
have seen, but the real rewardsareto be found in
the practiceof good art.Forthat,just knowingthe
rules and histories of establishedartworldprac-
tices seems to be insufficient.It is altogethernec-
essary,but not sufficient.Afteryearsof studying
Art-Zen,one can once again sense the beautyof
the tea, withoutlosing sight of the culturallyde-
fined tea pot that made such beauty possible.29
We mightbe able to avoid repeatingthe mistakes
of the past, as we form a theory and practiceof
art, which at once acknowledges the cultural
contextuality of works of art together with the
universal aesthetic constraints that are placed
upon them, by the very nature of the cultural
practicecalled art. No longer apprenticesof the
Zen masters,we may find thatour conceptionof
the tea has changeda bit, butthatit is still tea after
all, only better.It can be the best of both worlds.
DAVID C. GRAVES
Departmentof Philosophy
The Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yaffo
Tel Aviv, Israel 64044
INTERNET:graves@inter.net.il
1. ArthurC. Danto, "The Artworld,"Journal of Philoso-
phy 61 (1964): 580.
2. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic:An Institutional
Analysis (CornellUniversityPress, 1974), p. 12, emphasisin
original.
3. Danto, "The Artworld,"p. 579, emphasis in original.
4. George Dickie, Introductionto Aesthetics:An Analytic
Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.
88.
5. George Dickie, The Art Circle (New York: Haven
Press, 1984).
6. Kendall Walton might provide a good link between
Danto's and Dickie's theories, in his seminal "Categoriesof
Art,"ThePhilosophical Review79 (1970), furtherdiscussed
in his "Review of Art and the Aesthetic,"The Philosophical
Review 86 (1977).
7. While it is nice to still have a few die-hard institu-
tionalists around,they do tend to remain focused upon the
wrong sorts of things. Systems of rules constitutingthe insti-
tutionof the artworldare the truefocus, as Dickie suggested
in 1984. Stephen Davies's "proceduralism,"in his Defini-
tions of Art (Cornell University Press, 1991), stresses the
roles, rather than the rules (in a manner similar to John
Rawls's original distinction between constitutive and regu-
lative systems, in his "Two Concepts of Rules," The Philo-
351
sophical Review 64 [1955]). More recently, Oswald Han-
fling has suggested a reconsiderationof the institutional
theoryof artin its original, "status-conferral" version, in his
"The InstitutionalTheory: A Candidatefor Appreciation?"
The BritishJournal of Aesthetics 39 (1999) pp. 189-194.
8. Dickie, p. 67.
9. Cf. Asa Kasher,"WhatIs a Theoryof Use?" TheJour-
nal of Pragmatics 1 (1977): 105-120.
10. To be sure, all practicesof art involve a host of con-
ventions, but they are not definitive of the practice.
11. For the first distinction between brute and institu-
tional facts, see G. E. M. Anscombe, "On Brute Facts,"
Analysis 18 (1958) pp. 69-73. Furtherelaboratedin John
Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1969), sect. 2.7.
12. Searle, SpeechActs, supra n. 11.
13. Kasher,"WhatIs a Theory of Use?" supra n.9.
14. ArthurC. Danto, "FromAesthetics to Art Criticism
and Back," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism54
(1996): 114.
15. See George Dickie, "What is Art?" in Culture and
Art, ed. Lars Aagaard-Mogensen(Atlantic Highlands,New
Jersey:HumanitiesPress, 1976), p. 23.
16. Cf. Stanley Cavell, who, in spite of his opposition to
the institutionaltheory,recognizedthe necessity of some sort
of systematicframework,which institutesthe practicalfacts
of the matter-namely, thata certainkind of materialcan be
used as a medium,thatthe variousmaterialaspects can bear
such and such a range of meanings, and the like. He says:
"Philosopherswill sometimes say that sound is the medium
of music, paint of paintings, wood and stone of sculpture,
words of literature.... What needs recognitionis that wood
or stone would not be a mediumof sculpturein the absence of
the art of sculpture(his emphasis).... The idea of a medium
is not simply that of a physical material, but of a mate-
rial-in-certain-characteristic-applications." Must We Mean
What We Say? (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,
1976), p. 221.
17. The term "technique,"incidentally, is the most pre-
cise. An artist'stechniqueconsists in her or his ability to use
her or his chosen materialsto manifesther or his chosen ide-
ology.
18. Two remarksin passing: First, Danto did not invent
the idea of art as embodied meaning,of course. That idea is
as old as Aristotle's notion of artas idea materialized.In this
respect, the institutionaltheory does not reinvent art, it de-
scribesit, and,to my mind,betterthanany othertheory.Sec-
ond, this expansion of the institutionaltheory is capable of
providing more insights into the essentials of art than just
embodiedmeaning,but thatis a topic for anothertime. Some
such suggestions are outlined in my dissertation,see David
C. Graves, ConstitutingArt: TheInstitutionalTheoryof Art
(Tel Aviv University, 1994), Asa Kasher and George
Dickie, supervisors.Cf. Robert Stecker's discussion of my
version in his Artworks:Definition, Meaning, Value (Penn-
sylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 259-265.
19. This feature,incidentally,shows that the institutional
theory is a strongcandidatefor the new kind of philosophi-
cal theorythatDantoforesees in his TheDisenfranchisement
of Art (ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1986), p. 210.
20. I am feeding off the intuitionthatthe Latinroot of "in-
stitution"is statuere, which means "to set up."
21. I would like to thankthe anonymousreviewers of the
352
JAAC for for their constructive comments, and to one of
them in particularfor pointing out this conclusion, and con-
vincing me to take that final step toward the aesthetic that
worries any institutionalist.
22. For some elaborationon the role institutionalcontext
plays in determiningappropriatenessrelationsbetweenbody
andmeaningin art,see my "OnPresentingWorksof Art:An
Analysis of Meaning in the Second Intention,"Philosophia,
to appear.
23. Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,"
TheJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 15 (1956) ; 27-
35, of course.
24. William E. Kennick, "Does Traditional Aesthetics
Rest on a Mistake?"Mind 67 (1958): 317-334.
25. Ibid., p. 321.
26. B. R. Tilghman,But is it Art? (Oxford:Basil Black-
well, 1984), p. 50.
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
27. The realizationthatthe aestheticdoes play an integral
partin the definition of art, after all, but in a schematic and
normativefashion, is indeed an intriguingpoint, worthy of
furtherinvestigation.
28. According to the sixteenth-centuryChado Master,
Sen Rikyu, the first of the seven rules for the Tea Ceremony
is: "Makea delicious bowl of tea."
29. In this importantrespect, the analogy between the
way of artand the way of tea should be abandoned.Accord-
ing to the Zen aestheticsof Chadothereis no duality.For art,
however, the duality of mind (meaning) and body is para-
mount(even if certaintheoriesof arthave also triedto eradi-
cate the duality). The dualityoffered up here is between the
cultural and the natural,between the institutionaland the
brute,between the (inter)subjectiveand the objective. That,
I believe, must not be eradicated,for that is what art is all
about.