8 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 3, NO.

7, JULY 2008

A Railway Signal Control System by Optical

LAN and Design Simplification
Takashi Kunifuji*, Jun Nishiyama*, Hiroyuki Sugahara**, Tetsuya Okada*, Yamato Fukuta*** and
Masayuki Matsumoto****

*Research and Development Center of JR East Group, East Japan Railway Company, Saitama, JAPAN
**Train Control Systems Signalling and Telecommunications Technology Division, Railway Technical Research
Institute, Kokubunji, JAPAN
***Mito Branch Office, East Japan Railway Company, Mito, JAPAN
****Electrical & Signal Netwo rk System Dep., East Japan Railway Company, Tokyo, JAPAN
Email: {kunifuji, j-nishiyama, tetsu-okada, yama-fukuta, m-matsumoto}@jreast.co.jp, sugah@rtri.or.jp

Abstract— When replace railway interlocking devices,
setting up of large number of signal cables and confirming
of wiring connections are required. So, it is worried that
serious transport disorder caused by human error in wiring
works would occur. We have developed a railway signal
control system utilized optical LAN to reduce the signal
cables and wiring works.
Moreover, all signal devices operate independently,
designers have to handle all devices one by one and pay
great attention to avoid causing harmful influence each
other. We propose the data-driven method to make easy to
replace interlocking device. This logic is rearranged
according to the field device in order to simplify and
decrease design duties of designe rs.
In this paper, we introduce this system, and describe
network transmission, safety-related communication and
software configuration of the system.
Index Terms—railway signal control, optical LAN, design
work
I. INTRODUCTION
We have been improving the railway system
continuously to realize better services which meet user’s
needs, such as increasing of transportation capacity and
the direct operation extend over multiple lines. The
development of this system requires the changing of
control logic and wayside signal devices. In this changing
controls signal devices by digital information exchange
through the optical network. This system can reduce
cable construction work, and increase efficiency of
system test and operation, and also save construction cost.
Furthermore, new control logic can reduce the design
work.
In this paper, we describe problems of the present
signal control system and introduce a configuration of
this system. We consider safety-related communication
that is essential to railway signal devices. Then we
explain software approach of this system and new
function that can be realized by this approach.
II. P ROBLEMS OF THE CURRENT SIGNAL DEVICES
The signal control systems are dramatically developed,
mainly because of the computer technologies.
Nevertheless, they have some problems about signal
control and route control.
A. Problems of the Current Signal Devices
First, as shown in Fig. 1, since the control logic is
usually installed in the computer room of a station yard
and the operational part is at the rail-side area, electric
wires from the central area to the rail-side are still needed.
Control center Train diagram
Traffic control
system
uATOS (for Tokyo

works, we have some problems.

control metropolitan area)

The first problem is that the construction of signal

devices needs enormous amount of wiring. So, it has high
possibility of human error that causes transport disorders. Route
Route
Station
Interlocking
An enormous work load means substantial cost.
control device

The second problem is that control logic must be

Wiring
bay
Many metal cables
rearranged to improve signal devices. This part consists
of the hard-wired logic such as a relay circuit, and then Signal
Along the railway track

we have to make a great effort in the design of this logic. control

East Japan Railway Company has been developing a

Crossing Signal
new signal control system based on the IP-network to
Switch Track circuit Coil

solve those problems [1]. This system composes a Figure 1. A typical control system of railway

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JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 3, NO. 7, JULY 2008 9

For example, an interlocking device directly controls

signal devices by applying electric voltage to copper
wires. Enormous amount of wirings are required because
an interlocking device controls a number of signal
devices.
When the transport capacity increases, or an
interlocking device becomes too old, the interlocking
device will be replaced. It requires much time and is a
manual work because a large number of wirings are
needed. It may causes human errors lead to a serious
transport disorder. Then, reduction of cabling and
conduction check is required.
Second, since the transmission path of the current
system is a simplex structure, it also causes serious
transport disorders when cables have damaged. Therefore,
Figure 2. The purposes and characteristics of the signal control
the duplex structure of the control system for field system using optical LAN
devices is required.
B. Problems in route control
On a signal construction, such as adding of a new
signal device, a logical controller also should be changed.
Since the logical controllers are set up individually and
they have different software and operate independently,
designers have to handle all controllers one by one and
pay great attention to avoid causing bad influence each
other.
When designers change the logic about a signal device,
the influence extends over other logics, because signal
devices interlock directly each other. Eventually, a
designer must evaluate whether there is influence of
change about all signal devices. Design work becomes
hard. Therefore, a new software architecture using Figure 3. Configuration of the system
indirect interlocking is required. from related signal devices, and sends the control data to
signal devices that are connected to this system.
III. S YSTEM CONFIGURATION
In addition, software configuration of the LC solving
To reduce transport disorder from errors in the work, problems about route control is written down in Chapter 5.
we have developed a signal control system using optical
B. E-PON
LAN. This system is changed from control of signal
devices electrically by using signal cables to control of An E-PON (Ethernet-Passive Optical Network) has
signal devices by data transmission using optical cables been adopted in this system, as shown in Fig. 4. It is a
[2]. Fig. 2 shows the purposes and characteristics of this general-purpose optical fiber transmission system, which
system. is composed of an Optical Line Termination (OLT) that is
This system transmits and receives control data and installed in the signal house and an Optical Network Unit
result data between a Logic Controller (LC) installed in a (ONU) that is built into the FC. It is suitable for
signal house at the station and a Field Controller (FC) constructing a network for the railway signal control
embedded in a signal device through the optical network. system for the following reasons.
This system configuration is shown as Fig. 3. 1) A full-duplex transmission is possible with one
optical fiber.
A. Logic Controller (LC) 2) Up to 32 FCs can be connected by splitting an optical
A LC is the safety-related computer and controls signal fiber. An optical coupler splits the optical fiber,
devices on the railway line in place of the interlocking which does not use electric power.
device. It has various control functions such as route 3) The real-time communication can be provided
control, signal indication control, automatic train because fixed transmission bands are allocated to
protection (ATP) control and level crossing control. each channel.
These functions were realized in separate controllers 4) High-speed transmission, up to 100Mbps down-
conventionally. stream and 3Mbps up-stream, is allowed.
The LC generates control data based on control
directions from the traffic control system and result data

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10 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 3, NO. 7, JULY 2008

Color light signal

Green
Yellow “1R ”
Red Direct control
Signal house Common line
by individual
Power supply(+)
Power supply( -) cables
Command (+)
Command ( -) Switching device
Indication (+)
““21””
Indication (-)

Branch “1R ”
Signal house point
Optical cable
“2L”
“2R” Control by data
““21””
Data flow
2L ---
1R 2R 50
21

Figure 4. E-PON
C. Field Controller (FC)
A FC is the safety-related electric device and is
embedded in the signal device, as shown in Fig. 5. It is
composed of standard parts: power supply unit,
transmission unit, fail-safe logic unit and I/O unit. They
are combined and constructed to be suitable for the signal
device package.
The FC decodes the control data from the LC and
electrically controls the signal device’s behavior, such as
lighting signal lights and changing switches, in
accordance with the contents of the control data, as
shown in Fig. 6. After that, the FC sends the result data
back to the LC.
The FC also has a function which monitors the status
of the signal device and sends a monitoring data which
shows the status of the signal device to a Remote Server.
D. Remote Server/Client, Maintenance Terminal
It is not easy to go along the railway line to monitor
signal devices. Therefore, in this system, a Remote Server,
a Remote Client and a Maintenance Terminal are
installed in the signal house and can have functions for a
monitor and for maintenance of the FCs and signal
devices. The Remote Server and the Remote Client has a
function of getting specific information about the status
of signal devices and the network and can operate to the
system configuration.
Figure 6. Direct control by individual cables and the control by using
data-flow
The Maintenance Terminal has several functions such
as reset, install and test to maintain the FC. It is not
connected to the network when not in use.
IV. SAFETY- RELATED COMMUNICATION
Though the LC and FC require safety-related
communication, the E-PON uses the Ethernet that is a
non-trusted transmission system. An international
standard named IEC 62280-1 gives the basic
requirements needed in order to achieve safety-related
communication between safety-related devices connected
the transmission system [3]. We applied this standard to
our system.
A. Network configuration
To improve the system availability, the transmission
line network and all devices have duplex configurations
in this system. The LC and FC transfer data through both
networks of transmission lines, which are shown in Fig. 7.
UDP (User Datagram Protocol) is used for the
transmission between the LC and FC, which is widely
used for fast communications. The LC and FC evaluate
the received data to ensure safety of the signal control.

FC

(a) Front-side of color (b) Back-side

light signal Figure 7. Duplex configurations of the system
Figure 5. A FC embedded in the signal device

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JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 3, NO. 7, JULY 2008
B. Preconditions for applying IEC 62280-1
Table I shows the preconditions to apply IEC 62280-1.
We realized that the transmission system of this system
satisfied these precondition by the following
consideration.
1) The network system related signal control is
functionally independent from the network related
supervision that is not safety-related. The traffic of
this network is fixed and clarified in design.
2) The traffic of remote server/client and maintenance
terminal does not exceed the maximum value which
is defined in design.
3) The access to this network via intranet from
anonymous maintenance terminal is protected by
certification mechanism which is implemented in the
remote server.
4) The maximum number of the FC and the traffic of
the network are defined based on the result of
preliminary test using actual devices.
C. Safety-related communication between the LC and FC
Table II shows the requirements in IEC 62280-1 which
safety-related communication in closed transmission
systems shall satisfy. The LC and FC satisfy these
requirements by the following consideration.
1) Both the LC and FC are safety-related devices (R1,
R13 and R14).
2) If the LC detects some error, it sends control data
which control corresponding signal devices to the
safe-side status. In case of the LC or FC detects some
fault in received data, the LC or FC consider that
safe-side data was received (R2, R3, R10, R12 and
R16).
3) The FC has normal mode (safety-related equipment
such as the LC controls the FC) and maintenance
mode (non-safety-related equipment such as
maintenance terminal controls the FC). The FC
cannot behave as those modes at the same time (R4,
R11).
4) Both the LC and FC are designed as the top level of
safety integrity (i.e. SIL4) (R5, R6).
5) An ID code defining the source address and
destination address is added to the data. The
receiving device identifies the validity of the ID code
(R7).
6) A CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) code is added to
the data in the sending device separate from the FCS
(Frame Check Sequence) of the Ethernet frame and
is checked by the receiving devices (R8, R10 and
R12).
7) A sequence number added to the data is checked
(R9).
8) The LC watches transmission delay between the
control data and the result data. The LC and FC have
a common machine cycle. The LC sends the control
data every machine cycle to the FCs. The FC sends
the result data within further less than machine cycle
back to the LC (R12).
© 2008 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
11
TABLE I. IEC-62280-1 P RECONDITIONS
No. Preconditions
Rr1 The transmission system is closed
The number of pieces of connectable equipment (e ither safety-
Rr2 related or not) to the transmission system has to be known and
fixed.
The physical characteristics of the transmission system are fixed
Rr3 (e.g. transmission media, environment under worst case
conditions, etc.).
TABLE II. IEC-62280-1 REQUIREMENTS
No. Requirements
Safety Integrity Requirements
Safety protection shall be applied to the generation of the data to
R1
be transmitted
R2
Safety reaction shall be applied in case of misoperation. This
shall be consistent with the safety requirements of the receiver.
Error detection mechanism shall be applied at the receiver and
R3
shall be consistent with the safety requirements of the receiver.
R4
The implementation of the safety reaction R2 shall be
functionally independent of the non-trusted transmission system.
The residual data error rate of the safety-related transmission
system for each information interchange between transmitter
R5
and receiver shall be less than a predefined value. This rate shall
be compatible with the safety integrity level of each receiver.
The safety integrity level of the safety-related transmission
R6 system shall be consistent with the highest safety integrity level
of the safety processes.
Safety Procedure Requirements
If the source is not uniquely identified in the transmission
R7 system, authenticity shall be provided by adding a source
identifier to user data.
Integrity shall be provided by adding a safety code to the user
data. The safety process shall not rely on the transmission code
R8
generated and checked by integrated circuits being part of the
non-trusted transmission system.
The timeliness of user data shall be provided by adding the
R9 information to the user data. The time delay which is allowed
depends on the application.
If necessary the sequence of messages shall be checked by the
R10
safety process.
The safety procedures for the safety-related equipment shall be
R11 functionally independent of the procedures used by the non-
trusted transmission system.
All safety-related equipment shall monitor the performance of
the requirements listed in R7, R8, R9 and R10. If the quality of
R12 the transmission falls below a level, which is predefined in the
system requirement specification then an appropriate safety
reaction shall be triggered.
Safety Code Requirements
Safety-related and non-safety-related messages shall have
different structures achieved by applying a safety code to safety-
R13 related messages. This safety code shall be capable of protecting
the system to the required safety integrity level that a non-safety
related message changes to a safety-related one.
The safety procedures of the safety-related equipment shall be
functionally independent from the procedures used by the non-
R14
trusted transmission system and by the non-safety-related
equipment.
To fulfill the required safety integrity level, it is necessary to
R15 detect and act on typical faults of the non-trusted transmission
system.
To fulfill the required safety integrity level, it is necessary to
R16
detect and act on typical errors.
The safety code shall be functionally independent from the
R17
transmission code.
The safety code shall guarantee that the non-trusted transmission
R18 system shall be very unlikely to be able to generate a correct
safety code word.
12 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 3, NO. 7, JULY 2008

9) When a send-receive error has occurred in V. S OFTWARE C ONFIGURATION OF THE LC

transmission systems, the system is controlled by the
Software of the LC revises the following three points
safe-side (R15).
to reduce designer’s work with a system change and to
10) The transmission code does not be used to detect
secure time for maintenance.
error in transmission systems (R17).
11) The transmission system does not have a function A. Review of the Control Logic
which is able to generate a correct safety code word Since current signal devices have to operate
(R18). independently, they sometimes have same logics inside.
D. Example analysis Then, we shift all signal logics hard-wired to software by
unifying of system architecture shown in Fig.9 and
The UDP is used for transmitting between the LC and
applying of autonomous decentralized architecture to the
FC as previously mentioned. However, the UDP does not
software [4]. And then, to eliminate physical interface
ensure the trusted transmission because it does not have
between functions, we integrate various logic controllers
retransmission processing. Then in order to avoid missing
into one logic controller. It is able to estimate easily
of the commands in the data flow process, we have
whether an improvement of a certain signal device
developed a special indicator named “out-of-time flag” to
influences other devices.
detect troubles of the transmission paths immediately as
Logic of the LC consists following two hierarchies.
shown in Fig. 8.
1) Signal device Layer
The error of transmission paths are caused by the
2) Train Tracking Layer
disorder of the sequence numbers, the transmission
Signal device Layer attracts the control logic of the
delays, incorrect deliveries of the commands, or errors of
signal devices. This layer controls FC and receives a
the CRC in the LC/FC. In case the data flows from an LC
control result from it. Each of the signal devices has
to an FC incorrectly, the LC sets the out-of-time flag to
control data, reserves or refers tracks. They give tracks
the next command for the FC. When the FC receives the
reservations in order to control signals. The signal
out-of-time flag, it recognizes the data, which is including
becomes proceed signal when it give all reservations that
the flag may be incorrect. On the other hand, in case an
is necessary.
FC finds an error in the transmissions, the FC sends no
feedback to the LC. Then the LC recognizes that there is Interlocking
Signal Control
some malfunctions in the transmission paths and set the (Hard-Wired) (Software)
out-of-time flag to the next control commands. logic data
Moreover, while the flag is active, the LC and the FC IF
change their states to the irregular states. The train data logic
operations will be kept on the safe-side if they are at the
irregular states. When the transmission path changes in a IF
IF

IF

good state, the LC cancels the flag and the FC recognizes

the recovery of the transmission paths. In spite we use the
UDP for the communication, the assistance of the out-of-
logic
data IF
ATP Level Crossing
time flag enables us to detect the malfunction of the (Software) (Hard-Wired)
transmission paths immediately, and operate the LC/FC Computerization
adequately in case the commands are in bad states. and
Integration
The LC recognizes Logic Controller
the error of the (Software)
#(Number) : sequence numbers
transmissions
: error of the transmission
Inter- Signal- Cross-
ATP
Timer lock Control ing
LC
Out-of- Out-of-

Train tracking
#n-1 #n-1 #n #n time Flag time Flag

#n+1 #n+1 #n+2 #n+2

FC
#n-1 output #n output
The FC notices
Signal device Signal device
control control the error of the
transmissions
FC FC FC FC
Interlock
Figure 8. Schematic illustration of the “Out-of-time flag” Signal Control ATP-Balise Crossing

Figure 9. Schematic illustration of the current system and the LC

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JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 3, NO. 7, JULY 2008 13

Train Tracking Layer is a set of track and accepts a
reservation from signal devices and returns a result to
reference. Each track receives only one reservation as a
general rule. In a conventional interlocking device’s case,
reservations use only for signal control including color
light signals [5].
In case of the LC, these reservations are used not only
for signal control, but also for automatic train protection
(ATP) balises control and level crossing control.
Reservations enrich its contents to meet all signal
devices’ needs (e.g. indication of a signal, a position of a
train, a direction of switch). Train tracking layer has all of
these reservations.
Fig.10 shows an example of relations between signal
device object and tracking object. All interactions
between signal devices are realized through the
information registered on tracking object. Signal devices
decide their own behavior, and sends control data to FCs.
It is not necessary to register interlock of signal devices
directly. Each signal device object doesn’t have
interaction. Influence of software change is localized and
clarified. Much the same is true on a design of ATP and
level crossing. As a result, design duties of a designer
decrease.
B. Coexistence of Systems
There are a variety of exclusive control devices such as
the train detector, the ATS balises and the level crossing
control device. These control devices are independent
functionally. When the LC is installed, the continued use
of these same devices is efficient.
The LC is safety-related device which has functions of
control signal devices and can configure for minimum
functions. When one of the old exclusive control devices
is removed, the function of that device is added to the LC.
The other exclusive control devices and the LC process
C. Coexistence with Train Operation and Maintenance
Work
In current interlocking device, it is impossible to
change the interlocking parameter partially, because that
is very complex work. And then, maintenance work must
be performed during a brief break to operate a train
according to the diagram precisely. As a result, there is
not enough time for maintenance. Much the same is true
on device improvement work.
Therefore, A LC has the function to coexistence of
train operation and maintenance work as shown in Fig.12.
Station yard is divided into two domains in a short time ,
for train operation and for maintenance or signal
construction. Certain signal device concerned with tracks
only in one domain are exclusive and can be controlled
by corresponding LC freely. One domain named “A”
becomes an area for train operation controlled by regular
LC, and the other domain named “B” becomes
maintenance working area controlled by extra LC which
is connected temporarily.
On the other hand, signal devices concerned with
tracks in both domains is shared and would be locked to
safety state by regular LC (e.g. the signal shown in
domain B). Regular LC and extra one take their share of
responsibility for interlocking, so that two domains do not
interfere.
This function needs only a domain division data, and
does not need a new interlocking data for each domain.
When setting of a division domain is inputted, this
function is carried out.
Exchange the
Signal house
data through
Train detector
the interface
LC
Route control ATS-P controller
Track
circuit
Signal
Crossing
Configure function
I/F ATS-P FC Switch FC

a minimum
the control data and exchange the control data through the function
Signal control
function
FC

interface between them. In this way, system introduction Crossing controller

can be managed economically and systematically, as
shown in Fig. 11. Signal house
Add the
function when
Signalling device Object Motor ATS-Balise ATP-Balise LC
needed
11 2RQ 1RQ Route control
Signal Signal Signal ATP-Balise Motor Level-Crossing Train detect FC FC FC

1R 2R 3R 3RQ 12 X1 Signal control FC FC FC

ATS-P control I/F

Crossing controller

Tracking Object Track Signal house

Track Track CT Track Track Develop into
AT BT Track ET FT complete set
LC
DT 2R of equipment
(CT) X1
1R 2RQ Route control Train detect
3R FC FC FC
Crossing control
1RQ
FC FC FC FC
(AT) (BT) (DT) (ET) (FT) Signal control ATS-P control
11 3RQ 12

All interactions between signal equipment are realized

Figure 11. Step-by-step introduction of functions
through the information registered on tracking object

Figure 10. An example of relations between signal equipment

object and tracking object

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Current Interlocking device
Changing of
interlocking
Train Operation
Extra LC
Logic Controller
(Portable/Single)
Domain B
Changing of
interlocking
Track
Regular LC
(Fixed/Dual)
Domain A
Figure 12. Coexistence with train operation and maintenance work
D. Unification of Data Structure
With conventional signal devices, the control data and
monitor data had an original format each. Therefore these
data were checked whether relations did not have an error,
and these formats were converted manually as necessary.
This is one of the causes to complicate design work.
These data format of the LC are defined based on a
common schema. Then, they can convert automatically
and unify management of the data in order to prevent
conversion error. It becomes easy to validate and check
control data of the LC.
E. Design Support Tool
A design support tool helps designers design control
data. A rearrangement of the control logic causes a
reduction in importance of appointing interlocking
directly, and it becomes important to appoint a position of
the device. A design support tool facilitates data input
and validates them. Fig. 13 shows the flow of control data.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described problems of signal
control and introduced the signal control system that uses
optical LAN. To provide safety and reliable railway
transportation servi ces, we have introduced the signal
system based on network technology, and also, design
duties are decreased and design validation are possible by
a review of software of the LC.
In other words, we have made the progress from
electric control via metal cable to data-driven control via
optical cable. In the same way, we make progress from
the conventional method where signal devices interlock
directly to the indirect interlock that uses reservations.
In railway transportation services, needs for the best
safety and reliability have been rising even further. This
system satisfies those needs and can be expected to work
as important infrastructure in the future signal control
system.
© 2008 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 3, NO. 7, JULY 2008
Control Data (for Designer)
Input
Printing Tool LC
Without
Conversion
Unified
Data Structure
Control Data (for LC)
Design Support Tool
Unify Management
Facilitate Data Input
of Control Data
Design Validation
Figure 13. Design support tool and a flow of control data
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Hirano, Takashi. Kato, T. Kunifuji, T. Hattori, Tamotsu
Kato, “Development of Railway Signaling System Based
on Network Technology,” IEEE SMC, Oct.2005.
[2] H. Sugahara, T. Kunifuji, T. Hattori, Y. Hirano, Y. Fukuta,
M. Matsumoto, “Assurance Technologies for Signal
Control System by Optical LAN,” IEEE Assurance
Conference, July.2006.
[3] “IEC 62280-1 Railway applications -Communication,
signalling and processing systems-”, 2002, IEC.
[4] Y. Fukuta, G. Kogure, T. Kunifuji, H. Sugahara, R. Ishima,
M. Matsumoto, “Novel Railway Signal Control System
Based on the Internet Technology and Its Distributed
Control Architecture,” IEEE ISADS, March.2007.
[5] F. Kitahara, "ATOS System for Realization of New
Transport Operation Control,” Rail International, UIC,
No.6, pp.14-22, 1996.
Takashi Kunifuji graduated from Tsukuba University,
Japan, in 1992 with a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering.
He has joined JR East since 1992. And now works as a
Manager of Research and Development Center of JR East group
at East Japan Railway Company. He has engaged in
development of railway signal control systems since 1998. He
had engaged in maintenance, design, and construction of
signaling systems from 1992 to 1998.
Mr. Kunifuji is a member of IPSJ, IEEJ and ACM.
Jun Nishiyama received the M.E. degrees in applied
electronics in 1999 from Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan.
He joined East Japan Railway Company in 1999, and now
works as assistant manager of Research and Development
Center of JR East group at East Japan Railway Company. He
has engaged in development of railway signal control systems
since 2006. He had engaged in maintenance, design, and
construction of signaling systems from 1999 to 2005.
Mr. Nishiyama is a member of IEEJ.
Hiroyuki Sugahara received Master's degree in Computer
Science in 2000 from the Nihon University, Japan.
He is Assistant Senior Researcher of Signaling and
Telecommunications Technology Division at Railway
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 3, NO. 7, JULY 2008
Technical Research Institute (RTRI). He had engaged in
development of railway signal control systems on loan to East
Japan Railway Company from 2005 to 2007. He has joined
RTRI since 2000.
Mr. Sugahara is a member of IEEJ, IEICE, IPSJ and REAJ.
Tetsuya Okada received the M.E. degrees in mechanical
engineering in 1998 from Osaka University, Japan.
He joined Toshiba Corporation in 1998. He has engaged in
development of railway signal control systems on loan to East
Japan Railway Company since 2006. He works in Research and
Development Center of JR East group.
Yamato Fukuta received the M.E. degrees in electronic
engineering in 1996 from Tokyo University, Japan and PhD. in
electronic engineering in 2004 from Tokyo University.
He joined East Japan Railway Company in 1996, and now
works as assistant manager of Mito Branch Office at East Japan
© 2008 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
15
Railway Company. He has engaged in maintenance, design, and
construction of signaling systems since 2007. He had engaged
in development of railway signal control systems from 2001 to
2007. His research interests include train control systems and
wireless sensor networks.
Dr. Fukuta is a member of IEEJ.
Masayuki Matsumoto received the M.E. degrees in physic al
electronics in 1972 from Tokyo Institute of Technology (TIT),
Japan and PhD. in Computer Science in 2003 from TIT.
He joined Japanese National Railway in 1972. From 1987, he
joined East Japan Railway Company, and now works as a
Executive Officer. Electric Railway (Japan: Morikita, 1999). He
is engaged in the research and development of train control
system and assurance system.
Dr. Matsumoto is a member of IEEJ, IEICE and
REAJ. Award from the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology.